Hybrid state formation in Timor-Leste

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the Faculty of Humanities

2017

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APODETI</td>
<td>Popular Democratic Association of Timor (<em>Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Timorese Social Democratic Association (<em>Associacao Social Democratica Timorense</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVR</td>
<td>Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (<em>Comissao de Acolhimento Verdade e Reconciliacao de Timor-Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celcoms</td>
<td>Community cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRM</td>
<td>National Council of Maubere Resistance (<em>Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Maubere</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT (as resistance movement)</td>
<td>National Council of Timorese Resistance (<em>Conselho Nacional de Resistencia Timorense</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT (as political party)</td>
<td>National Congress of Timorese Reconstruction (<em>Conselho Nacional de Reconstrucao de Timor</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD-RDTL</td>
<td>Committee for the Popular Defence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (<em>Conselho Popular Democratico - Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Language Countries (<em>Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (<em>Concelho Revolucionario da Resistencia Nacional</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falintil</td>
<td>Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (<em>Forcas Armadas da Libertacao Nacional de Timor-Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-FDTL</td>
<td>Falintil-Defence Force of East Timor (<em>Falintil-Forcas de Defensa de Timor-Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fretilin</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (<em>Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-Leste Independente</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBL</td>
<td>Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nureps</td>
<td>Nucleus of Popular Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name and Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Democratic Party (<em>Partido Democratico</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>National Police of East Timor (<em>Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (<em>Partido Social Democrata</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTT</td>
<td>Provisional Government of East Timor (<em>Pemerintah Sementara Timor Timur</em> in Indonesian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENETIL</td>
<td><em>Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste</em> in Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDTL</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of East Timor (<em>Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDT</td>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union (<em>União Democrática Timorese</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### List of Tetun (Lingua franca of Timor-Leste)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Ata</em></td>
<td>Slaves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Barlake</em></td>
<td>Indigenous customary practices that surround marriage and relations between the families or clans of the bride and groom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Datos</em></td>
<td>Aristocrats or nobles, the descendants of royal families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ema reinos</em></td>
<td>Commoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fetosan</em></td>
<td>Wife-taker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Inu</em></td>
<td>Coral bead necklaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Juramentu</em></td>
<td>Blood oaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Karasu</em></td>
<td>Gold earrings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lauhana</em></td>
<td>High-value woven cloths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lia-na'in</em></td>
<td>Lords of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lisan</em></td>
<td>Tradition, custom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Liurai</em></td>
<td>Ruler, king, native chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Loromuno</em></td>
<td>West (where the sun sets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lorosae</em></td>
<td>East (where the sun rises)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lulik</em></td>
<td>Sacred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Malae</em></td>
<td>Foreigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Maromak</em></td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Maubere</em></td>
<td>Timorese commoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Umane</em></td>
<td>Wife-giver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Uma feto</em></td>
<td>Female house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Uma lulik</em></td>
<td>Sacred house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Uma mane</em></td>
<td>Male house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Xefe de suco</em></td>
<td>Chief of suco</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This study is an exploratory inquiry into ‘hybrid state formation’ in Timor-Leste. Due to the escalating number of internal conflicts since the end of the Cold War, the UN and the international community have made efforts to stabilise so-called failed or fragile states, which are mainly in the non-Western and post-colonial context. In spite of their efforts, international peacebuilding and statebuilding have not made successful records in these states. One of the mistaken approaches of international peacebuilding and statebuilding is that these projects were designed based on an ideal form of the state that follows Weberian tradition, and which mainly developed in the process of Western European modernisation. This international top-down approach has disregarded the local norms, values, social structure and tradition, and has therefore encountered the legitimacy problem and dysfunctional state institutions. In order to address the problems of the top-down approach, some critical scholars suggested ‘hybrid institutions’ to increase legitimacy, which involves incorporating local institutions within the international idea of the ideal state. However, this study argues that the institution-focused hybrid approach still retains the Weberian concept of the state and the top-down approach. The study, therefore, calls for the necessity of a new approach to understand the local-centred forms of the state, which reflects its local history: this approach is referred to as ‘hybrid state formation’.

This study draws on the case of Timor-Leste to theorise hybrid state formation. Timor-Leste retains traditional values and institutions that still significantly influence ordinary Timorese people’s daily life, despite the fact that external forces such as Portuguese colonial power, Indonesian invaders and the UN mission have intervened to rule the society by implanting the modern state. By shedding light on this phenomenon, this study suggests a framework named ‘a web of authorities’ to delineate the Timorese hybrid state, in which a rational-legal authority co-exists with traditional and religious authorities. This framework also empirically explains the ways in which Timorese state formation has developed, and investigates the key state formation mechanism in Timor-Leste. Based on literature and via field research, this study identifies Timor-Leste’s traditional, religious and rational-legal authorities and analyses the relation between these multiple authorities, in order to consider the Timorese ‘web of authorities’ as a form of hybrid state.
Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree of qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
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Acknowledgements

This is a bit ambitious work of a non-Westerner to question and challenge to the traditional concept of the west-centred modern state in an academic institute of the country in where the concept was born. As a part of this work, I had to face with all conceptual and philosophical contradictions between the West and the East that I had not been aware of before. The inconsistencies were not only found through reading but also within myself; therefore, I would say that studying other states includes discovering the subject society that I am working on as well as defining what kind of person. This work was merely the first output of this struggle which is still on-going.

Without many people’s encouragement and support, I would not have completed this work. First of all, I should pay my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Oliver P. Richmond. I began this project inspired by his work and came to fruition with his insightful comments and patience in my slow progress of work. I genuinely appreciate his constructive comments, critiques, encouragement and support for my work from beginning to end. I would also send my gratitude to Prof. Roger Mac Ginty, Dr Rubina Jasani and my two examiners, Prof. M. Anne Brown and Dr Sandra Pogodda. Particularly, I genuinely appreciate constructive comments of Prof. Brown who came all the way from Australia to be my examiner. Second, I sincerely appreciate all assistance and friendship of those who I met in Timor-Leste. My particular thanks to Elisea for her excellent support to facilitate interviews in Dili. And also, I would like to thank Pedro, Antonio, Haneul, Jinsun, Mako, Jade and Donghwa Yang and Giyeon Kim from YMCA Korea who generously offered transportation and organised a trip to Manufahi. Moreover, I would like to express my genuine gratitude to all my interviewees who shared their life experience, memories, and family stories with this Malai stranger. Third, I am grateful to all staffs of HCRI and SALC, my colleagues and friends for their generous support. My thanks to Dr Jasmin Ramovic, Dr Yoshito Nakagawa, Annye Meilani, Malgorzata Polanska, Dr Sooyoung Park, Dr Seokjin Yoon, and Ji hye Kim who have offered conversation and critiques.

Last but not least, I sincerely appreciate my family’s endless encouragement, support and dedication. To My parents, Sungsoo Yoo and Soongran Kim, there are no words that I can describe my gratitude to two of you. I will not forget your love, support and dedication forever. Finally, I would like to thank my fiancé, Jin, for his intellectual stimulation, encouragement and patience.
Introduction

The state is neither static nor real; however, it is often defined as a real object. Some might focus on its institutional aspects, such as its legislative, executive and judiciary branches, or its symbolic features, for instance the national anthem and flag. Others, however, might discuss its functional aspects, such as protecting natural rights and social justice, establishing rules and orders, and providing human security and welfare. As such, various descriptions of the state have emerged, based on those practices that make it real (Abrams, 1988; Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Migdal, 2004). Despite these various practices, one definition of the state has been used as a default concept in modern society: ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ (Weber, 1970, p. 78). Although this general definition of the state is dominant throughout the world, in a descriptive sense, none of the 195 existing sovereign states (U.S. Department of State, 2017) fulfils this definition. This thesis considers one of those states unable to be captured by this definition, and hence challenges the normative OECD type of the state.

One such state is Timor-Leste. The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste became an officially (re-)independent state on 20th May 2002 and the 191st UN member state in UN General Assembly on 27th September 2002. This was the official debut of Timor-Leste as an independent sovereign state in the international community after four centuries under Portuguese colonial rule and then 24 years of Indonesian occupation. Becoming an independent sovereign state was a decision made by the Timorese themselves through a referendum in 1999. After the referendum, although the Timorese people were faced with several humanitarian crises - firstly, because of the massive military operation carried out by pro-Indonesian paramilitaries opposing the result and secondly the outbreak of a dispute within the security force - the country has gradually laid the foundation for national stability and development.

The foundation was solidified by unexpected ways from the line of modernity. Different to the trajectory of modern state-formation, the power of Catholicism and the traditional ideas related to ancestors’ spirits that signify irrationality and pre-modernity have been strengthened and revitalised as important strands of Timorese state-formation. Extending their social roles, the two strands of authority involve providing public services including social norms and orders and building a sense of community for a united polity. However, this does not mean that the rational-legal power of the government is absent or has
inversely diminished. With assistance from the international community, the system of Timorese government has been developing and gradually strengthening. All three strands of power have increased their influence in Timorese society and maintain relatively positive relations and even assist in enhancing each other’s authority rather than providing opposition; none of them claim sole legitimacy by defeating other authorities. This seems to be a significantly different feature compared to the Western state-formation (e.g. Tilly, 1985, 1990) which generated the normative concept of the state in IR.

The existence of various authorities in the state has been considered as a cause of national security threats and such states are described as fragile or failed states (Patrick, 2007, 2011; Rotberg, 2004). Research on post-conflict states (often called fragile or failed states) has noted the different process of state-formation (e.g. Krasner, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004) but tends to interpret the phenomena in terms of being ‘out of track’ or a source of internal crisis. The reason is that the non-government authority is considered as an unofficial, rival group which challenges the official authority of the government to usurp its monopolised power in the territory by adopting the concept of the Western state. Therefore, international statebuilding and peacebuilding are designed to build monopolised authority and institutions in fragile or failed states to prevent the society from relapsing into conflict and ensure social stabilisation. If this is right, Timor-Leste must be in political turmoil due to the competition among the three strands of authority. However, as mentioned, the Timorese society has shown a contrasting phenomenon that the society itself is gradually stabilising based on positive relations between these three authorities. Thus, this study focuses on this phenomenon in Timor-Leste as exploratory research.

**Positioning this thesis**

This study aims to develop a new approach to exploring states in conflict-affected and non-Western societies by focusing on the positive relations among various authorities. It starts from the criticism on international peacebuilding and statebuilding which has failed. Although there are various discussions on the cause of failure, it highlights the ideal type of state that peacebuilding and statebuilding assumes – the Weberian state – as a fundamental cause of failure; consequently, it calls for the necessity of a new approach to understand the state in these conflict-affected societies.

Since the end of the cold war, the surging number of intrastate armed conflicts called for the international community to take responsibility for protecting civilians. Peacebuilding
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 1995) emerged in this regard. Peacebuilding is a comprehensive approach to achieve sustainable peace; however, unlike the international community blueprint, active intervention in conflict-affected societies has failed to build peace. According to empirical studies (Collier et al., 2003; Krause and Jüteronke, 2005), nearly half of peace support operations have failed in five years. Timor-Leste has been discussed as one example of this due to the political crisis in 2006 led by 159 F-FDTL soldiers petitioning against alleged factionalism in the national security forces, the F-FDTL (Defence Force of Timor-Leste) and the PNTL (National Police of Timor-Leste).

As a result, scholarly discussion on peacebuilding has bourgeoned. One alternative approach suggested is statebuilding, which particularly concentrates on institution-building (Paris, 2004). Institution-building literature argues that the democratisation of peacebuilding with weak institutions causes an outbreak of political disputes; as post-conflict states are defined as failed or fragile states, an international intervention in these states to solve the problem of fragility is justified. However, this statebuilding approach is also criticised due to its top-down approach and the underlying assumption of the ideal state, which is an OECD-like modern state resting on the concept of Western (neo-)liberal peace (see. Duffield, 2007; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2007; Pugh, 2005; Richmond, 2005).

The counter argument to institution-building emphasises what the local societies have rather than justifying the international intervention. Based on the criticism of the pathological view of post-conflict societies, which requires an external solution to solve the problem, the argument insists that top-down statebuilding fails since the implanted institution is unable to fully function as expected because of the lack of legitimacy. The institution holding the limited level of legitimacy is described by ‘an empty shell’ (Lemay-Hebert, 2011, p. 190). From this argument, the critical scholarly group emphasises legitimacy, the relation between state and society, and the local values, norms and practices involved in statebuilding. Literature on hybridity has emerged in this context.

Hybrid political order as an epochal approach to studying post-conflict states, which have been named ‘failed or fragile states’, sheds light on these states’ remarkable resilience derived from the customary law, traditional authorities and social structure (Boege et al., 2007, 2008). Boege and his colleagues (ibid.) introduced Somaliland, Bougainville and Timor-Leste which have retained customary and traditional characteristics in order to exemplify the hybrid political order; the former two cases were evaluated as successful cases of the hybrid state order, while Timor-Leste was described as a not-so-successful
case (Brown and Gusmao, 2009). They found the reason for the negative evaluation from the top-down institution-building of the government for centralisation based on merely liberal norms without engaging with local cultural values, which are still heavily influential in the everyday lives of Timorese people (Brown, 2013; Chopra, 2000, 2002; Cummins, 2010, 2014; Lemay-Hebert, 2011). In this regard, the political crisis in 2006 was supplied as an example of a misguided hybrid political order (Boege et al., 2007, 2008; Brown and Gusmao, 2009).

However, this study argues that what they called ‘misguided’ has gradually moved to the hybrid statehood by establishing the ways in which various authorities co-exist to represent and enhance the stateness. This study calls this process ‘hybrid state-formation’ and the form of the state consists of various authorities known as ‘a web of authorities’. These two frameworks are the key to this study - theorising a new approach to study the state by drawing on the Timor-Leste case.

As a guiding chapter for this thesis, this chapter will introduce the key concepts which form the foundation for developing these two frameworks.

**Hybrid and hybridity**

In the past decade, the emergence of ‘hybridity’ in Peace and Conflict Studies has brought a considerable change in how conflict-affected societies are viewed. The normative perspective on conflict-affected society represented by the term ‘failed or fragile states’ has been challenged by heavy criticism pointing out the limitations involved in the problem-solving approach of statebuilding by international community (e.g. Boege et al., 2007, 2008; Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011). Although the concept of hybridity emerged through as a critique of statebuilding and orthodox peacebuilding, it gathered momentum to become mainstream in peace and conflict studies and has even been accepted at the level of international policy.

As the concept of hybridity has been popular in PCS, there are various ways of using the concept and various critiques on it. However, the criticism is mainly derived from misunderstanding. As Mac Ginty and Richmond (2015) note that the concept of hybridity can be thought of as a continuum of literature, the concept has been interpreted in various ways by different schools of thought. At one end of the continuum, hybridity is interpreted in a biological sense, grafting two different political systems together to create a third type. On the other end of the continuum, it is considered as a concept which has the potential to
challenge fixed boundaries of the traditional socio-political environment of modernity and further to emancipate the non-West, as insisted by the school of critical PCS. The former end of the continuum stands on binaries such as internationalism, the liberal state, modern vs. local and traditions, while the latter end negates the fixed binaries. All hybridity literature is located in this continuum. The critical school’s hybridity highlights its conceptual potential to go beyond the binaries and essentialism and furthermore challenge structured power relations based on the divisions between the international, modern and liberal vs. the local, traditional and non-liberal and superiority and inferiority by breaking down the homogeneity and essentialism of each aspect. In this vein, the emancipatory potential of hybridity can be highlighted by challenging the structured power relations, thereby stepping towards global social justice.

Although hybrid literature of the critical school criticises and denies traditional dualism, the most common criticism of hybridity relates to its dichotomous approach (or its potential to reproduce dichotomous thought) (Albrecht and Moe, 2015; Heathersaw, 2013; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015; Nadarajah and Rampton, 2015; Peterson, 2012). And this study argues that misunderstanding, especially regarding the hybridity of the critical school, is caused by its limited analytical power. It seems that the concept of hybridity undeniably produces a sense of dualism because hybridity starts from awareness on the imbalance of power between one and another based on comparison. The cognition of difference based on comparison produces identity reflecting one from another, thereby producing dualism based on relativity. Although this dualism is formed based on relativity not essentialism, once the difference between two aspects is defined the feature of difference would easily turn to its characteristics, and indeed, internalise the characteristics as though they were its own attributes. With this reason, hybridity as an analytical tool has limitations in relation to dualism. Therefore, it requires an analytical framework which can be applied in an empirical case to strengthen explainability and hybridity’s emancipatory potential.

Following the discussion above, this study takes hybridity as a meta concept respecting the tradition of critical studies in order to challenge the concept of the Weberian state, which is the foundation of modernisation as well as the fundamental unit in the present international order, and further denaturalise it by drawing upon the case of Timorese state-formation.

State-formation vs. Statebuilding
This study does not take the Weberian state model for granted; rather, it assumes that there are various forms of state exist and defines a state as a historical production reflecting the culture, history, ideology and identity of a polity. This assumption on the state is precisely in contrast to the fragile state thesis justifying statebuilding.

Statebuilding is an intervention in so-called fragile or failed states with a conflict-affected society by the international community. It is justified by the international community, which shares an idea that the intervention in dysfunctional states fulfils its responsibility to protect people in such states and achieve global peace. Its focus is to mould these states into modern states and institutionalise them based on the liberal and democratic values accompanying the historical evolution of the state in Europe (e.g. Chesterman, 2004; Chesterman et al., 2005; Paris, 1997, 2004). This represents a typical ‘problem-solving’ (Cox, 1981, p. 128) approach as a short-term international political project.

The state model premised in the project of statebuilding is the Weberian state, which has been evolved through the history of Western Europe. Taking into account the history of modern state-formation in Western Europe, notions relating the modern state such as the nation, territorial sovereignty, state autonomy, social contract, and liberal-democracy were led by the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, which resulted in the great social transformation into the age of modernity. In this sense, the state model of statebuilding can be considered as a result of the historical evolution of Western Europe. However, the model has been carried out in conflict-affected societies that are generally non-Western as their historicity is deleted. Because of this ahistoricity, the model of the state does not match non-Western nations (Chatterjee, 2004; Migdal et al., 1997; Pouligny, 2005) and thus statebuilding has been evaluated as a failure.

This thesis begins with this criticism and argues that the state has to be analysed by looking at the process of state-formation in society itself rather than focusing on the implementation of international community-led top-down projects. Compared to statebuilding, state-formation is a comprehensive social process relating to the state over the long-term. While statebuilding is designed to intervene in the political domain in the conflict-affected society, state-formation refers to a wide range of changes that are not only political but also economic, cultural and societal. Even though statebuilding targets political transformation through institutionalisation, it unavoidably affects economic and social changes in the conflict-affected society because the state is a part of society as a specific social institution (Migdal, 2004). This is the reason why the state has to be
analysed in a wider social context.

In addition, if the state is considered as a product of the society, it naturally implies the historicity of the society. As mentioned above, the biggest mistake of statebuilding is that it ignored the historicity of the state and depoliticised the state. The changes led by statebuilding do not follow the trajectory of Western modernisation, which means that the state-society relation based on legal-rational legitimacy has not formed and therefore the state has limited sovereignty over the territory. Consequently, projects of statebuilding which institutionalise the ideal-type of Western liberal state have been considered as failures. Yet, this does not mean that all concepts related to the modern state do not exist in the non-Western society, rather the ways in which the society struggles with these internationally given concepts of the state are different (e.g. Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010, 2012; Heathershaw, 2009; Schlichte, 2005) and how the sovereign state practices stateness is also distinct from Western society. Understanding and analysing the process of social struggles to decide whether the society accepts and internalises them in their image and practices of stateness has to consider the long-term, reflecting the historicity of the corresponding society.

To sum-up, state-building is a short-term political project in conflict-affected societies carried out by the international community. On the other hand, state-formation is a long-term comprehensive social process of the state forming and practicing its own stateness.

Hybrid state formation

From above definitions of hybridity and state formation, this study defines that hybrid state-formation is a process of (trans)forming the state in a non-Western society in which the local, traditional or customary norms and values encounter the externally injected Weberian state concept based on liberalism. In this process, the society has to seek for its own mechanisms to deal with the encounter by forming its own stateness with current state-centred international relations; thus, this concept eventually addresses power relations between liberal and non-liberal values and norms.

In order to delineate and analyse the mechanisms, this study emphasises a tool entitled ‘a web of authorities’ in order to explain Timorese hybrid state formation.

A web of authorities
A web of authorities is a framework to theorise the hybrid state-formation of Timor-Leste. As a theoretical framework, it constitutes the central hypothesis of this study. It premises plural authorities and interconnectedness among these authorities. In terms of plural authorities, a web of authorities is different from the Weberian state’s central premise of the monopoly of legitimate authority in a state. In addition, it focuses on the authorities’ relationships, which are based on interconnectedness.

Since this concept is unfamiliar in IR, it is necessary to define its notion and explain why the web is appropriate in this study on hybrid state-formation. In order to clarify this, it would be useful to compare two similar but different concepts: networks and the web.

Networks and structure are more familiar concepts than the web in IR. The term networks emerged in the 1970s, for instance transgovernmental networks pointing out the features of interconnectedness and interdependence between sub-units or individuals within modern governments (Keohane and Nye, 1974). International organisations were described as key players in these transgovernmental networks. Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe networks of activists beyond borders to give significant impact on international organisations and particular states’ policies, for example anti-slavery, suffrage campaigns, human rights, environmental movements and violence against women. Since the attacks of September 11 in 2001, research on networks has focused on global terrorist and criminal organisations and their strategies through social media networks. Networks in IR have typically been interpreted as a mode of organisation that facilitates collective actions, enforces influence or operates as a means of international governance. Thus, it can address the dynamic process of when and how networks are created, strengthened and vanished, particularly focusing on material and social relations (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009).

Compared to the term networks, the term web is newer in IR. Although they to be interchangeable but in this study these two terms are distinguished. The web refers to a type of system built on the presumption of pluralism and a set of relations between multiple agencies connected to each other, whereas networks refer to a mode of organisation. The term web per se presents a system of interconnected agencies and this system can be formed through networks. Since the term refers to a system, it will not be so difficult to identify a linkage between the web and the state - the subject of this study.

The term web has been chosen in order to explain the state - a polity, particularly of Timor-Leste, which may have a different historical experience of state-formation compared to the West in which the notion of the modern state was born to liberate and further protect human-beings from all kinds of oppression. In the case of Timor-Leste, as a post-colonial
state its history of state-formation was more about the process of achieving self-determination from external forces through collective activities of resistance rather than individual freedom; hence, the state is symbolic of the great achievement of Timorese collective activities. Although the direction in which the Timorese state will move in the future is uncertain, the current Timorese state-formation was made through interconnectedness like other Melanesian societies (e.g. Australian social structure of Radcliffe-Brown, 1940). From observing these historical and societal characteristics of Timor-Leste, this study claims that a new approach to study the Timorese state is required and therefore the term web is employed to explain the current Timorese state, which consists of multiple authorities: traditional, religious and rational-legal authorities.

A web of authorities is a concept used to depict the state of Timor comprised by various authorities which practice the stateness together as interconnected authorities. The interconnectedness of various authorities enables the relations to become the focal point; it enables to examine the mode of relations and indeed, if considering the history, it enables to look into when and how each authority emerges, become legitimate, and relation of them changed. In this vein, a web of authorities provides a lens for process-oriented analysis of hybrid state-formation.

**Liberation vs. Emancipation**

This study uses two similar concepts: liberation and emancipation. Because both concepts are related to freedom, they could be considered as interchangeable but in this study they are used in different contexts. First, liberation refers to freedom from oppression and limits on thought and behaviour; it focuses on freedom which is deprived from explicit oppressors, hence in the Timorese context liberation means regaining the freedom and self-determination from the Portuguese colonial power and Indonesian occupation. However, its nuance is different from independence referring to gaining sovereignty over the territory against external forces.

On the other hand, emancipation focuses on the structural issues, for instance the implicit problems of injustice and subjugation prevalent in the society. Emancipation refers to freeing human beings from the structural and circumstantial powers that enslave them (Horkheimer, 2002) and regaining control over their own lives through challenging all forms of domination and forming a justice-oriented society through the connectedness of human agencies (Steinberg and Kincheloe, 2010). This means that emancipation is not
only toward self-autonomy but also looks towards others in solidarity.

In this study, emancipation is deeply linked to the concept of hybridity. As addressed above, hybridity is a concept that was brought in to challenge the established definition of the state and furthermore the international order, knowledge and power build on the definition. Even though the state itself contains historicity, social habitus, culture, identity and so on, all states have been treated as homogeneous in the Weberian ideal. As a result, the Weberian state has accepted as taken-for-granted in positivistic social science. Defying this positivist approach, hybridity sheds light on the potential of heterogenous forms of the state and consequently questions a series of ideas developed on the premise of the Weberian state. Moreover, this turns the focus to each state’s dynamics of state-formation. This means that even a marginalised society becomes agency in hybrid state-formation and therefore reconstructs the established knowledge and dominant power. Hybridity has emancipatory potential to denaturalise and reconstruct establishment and domination in terms of marginalised non-Western nations.

In this study, liberation explains a Timorese liberation history whereas emancipation is a normative goal of hybridisation.

**Methodology**

This study uses a qualitative approach with a case study of Timor-Leste, resting on the critical studies tradition. As briefly noted in the explanation of hybridity, this study is guided by critical theory which concerns domination and alienation and the ways in which various notions of society such as the economy, gender, race, class, religion, ideologies, and other social institutions and their dynamics interact to form a social system of domination and alienation (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005; Morrow and Brown, 1994). Since this study denies the West-centric state theory and international-centred top-down intervention in post-conflict societies and questions the marginalisation of the local, the critical theory provides an appropriate viewpoint to understand unequal power and injustice in the global structure and thereby propose a new theoretical approach.

As a research strategy, a case study approach is adopted because the case study is an appropriate strategy for qualitative research, which has to be conducted in uncontrollable real-life. The uncertainty derived from this uncontrollability can be overcome using in-depth descriptions of a case study (Yin, 2009). In addition, it is useful both to generate theory via theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gersick, 1988; Glaser and Strauss,
1967; Harris and Sutton, 1986) and to complement the shortage of secondary data.

For the data collection, this study uses a literature review, a focus group, and interviews. Since this study is theory-orient, it is heavily reliant on the literature review. This is not only to develop the theory but also to collect secondary data on Timor-Leste to design field research such as the research focus, potential participants and field sites. In order to collect empirical evidence for the developed theory, I designed and then conducted field research in Dili and suco Letefoho of Same in Manufahi District, Timor-Leste, which took place from 28 May to 27 July 2015. However, the research was mainly conducted in Dili, because of limited access to rural areas by public transportation, and self-security reasons.

During the field research, a focus group and interviews were conducted. In total, I organised one focus group session and conducted 32 interviews with international elites (6), local elites (8) and the ordinary Timorese (18), and six interviews with local elites (2) and the ordinary Timorese (4) in suco Letefoho, in the Same sub-district of Manufahi District. Approval was gained from the University of Manchester Research Ethics Committee in April 2015 to undertake fieldwork in Timor-Leste.

**Research questions and scholarly contribution**

The following research questions are explored in this study:

In what ways has Timorese state-formation been developed and what is the key mechanism of forming the state in Timor-Leste? To what extent it is different from the normative Weberian state, which is a presumption of international statebuilding and peacebuilding?

By answering these research questions, this study will make a scholarly contribution to both Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) and IR. First, this study overcomes the inherent dualism of hybridity. As literature on hybridity in PCS has been bourgeoning, there has been significant criticism regarding the concept of hybridity; a vital criticism is the dualism implied in the concept of hybridity. Although the hybridity is suggested as a notion which can overcome the essentialism defining the superiority of Western colonialists and the inferiority of the Eastern colonial subjects by focusing on the relativeness of power, the concept implies the risk of dualism. Hence, this is referred to as the paradox of hybridity. Because of this paradox, this study takes hybridity as a meta concept rather than utilising it as an analytical tool. Therefore, this study suggests a two-layer framework: hybrid state-
formation and a web of authorities. By highlighting power relations, the former uses hybridity in order to reveal the emancipatory potential to challenge the established concept of the state while the latter is suggested as an explanatory and analytical tool relating to the hybridity of the state. Through this two-level approach, this study can evaluate the pluralism implied in the notion of hybridity and as a result underline the conceptual relevance for post-liberal peace.

Second, this study suggests a local-focused and process-orient approach to study the state and to replace the West-centric model of the state. The limitation of international statebuilding and peacebuilding is directly related to the Western liberalism implied in the ideal type of state. Top-down statebuilding and peacebuilding, which marginalise the local norms, values, and social structure, result in a dysfunctional Western state in post-conflict societies. From this empirical evidence, this study fundamentally questions the definition of the state per se.

By adopting historical sociologists’ tradition, it argues that the modern state often used as an ideal model of international statebuilding was born in the Western European history of state-formation; therefore, in the rest of the world where there is a different history of state-formation, a different approach is necessary. By arguing the necessity of shedding light on the different historical trajectory this study puts historicity in the centre of studies on the state, thereby enabling process-orient research. Through this new approach to studies on the state, it challenges the pervasive ahistoricism of the state in IR and furthermore it can shift the international-centred statebuilding and peacebuilding to the local-centred.

Third, the positive relation between the state and peace is elaborated. The Western trajectory of state-formation shows how the state assumed monopoly over the use of legitimate violence as a result of internal and external conflicts. Therefore, the Western history of the state-formation has developed for human liberation from tyranny; the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment are in this historical trajectory. However, a web of authorities suggests an alternative way of state-formation which is ‘liberation with’ by forming the ways in which various authorities co-exist to practice the stateness.

**Contents of the thesis**

In order to answer above research questions, the thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter reviews ideas relating to statebuilding and peacebuilding in order to
develop the conceptual framework of hybrid state-formation. Hence, the first part focuses on a literature review regarding statebuilding and peacebuilding; the literature is categorised into the first and second generations of statebuilding. This section argues that the first generation is top-down statebuilding particularly designed to target institution-building, whereas the second generation is bottom-up statebuilding that has emerged from the criticism of the top-down approach and hence advocates a local-focused approach reflecting local history, customs, and norms and values. However, it asserts that the second generation still retains an external-led building approach premised on liberal values and Western European history inherent to the Weberian model of the state. As a result, a new approach for non-Western contexts is proposed and thus this chapter suggests a conceptual framework - hybrid state-formation - which is a relation-centred and process-orient approach to studying the state, especially in the non-Western world.

The second chapter suggests an analytical tool named a web of authorities. Due to the inherent dualism of hybridity, this study highlights its limited capacity as an analytical tool and thus introduces a web of authorities as an analytical tool which is specifically designed to examine the state of Timor-Leste, which consists of multiple authorities co-existing, constructing and operating the stateness. In order to understand the difference between Western and non-Western states and justify the study’s main claim regarding the necessity of a new approach, the chapter firstly addresses the nature of the stateness in terms of image and practices (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Migdal, 2004) and explains how these two different components of the stateness are developed through a different trajectory compared to the history of state-formation in Western Europe. Based on awareness of the different nature of stateness, it theorises a web of authorities borrowing theory on legitimacy and authority from two different academic traditions: sociology (e.g. Weber, 1978) and political science (e.g. Alagappa, 1995; Barnard, 2001; Raz, 1986; Schneewind, 1998), and agonistic pluralism (Connolly 2002, 2005; Mouffe, 2005, 2013). Indeed, it concludes how a web of authorities can contribute to post-liberal discussion and in what ways its emancipatory potential can be manifested as a form of hybrid state in order to emphasise a linkage between a web of authorities and hybrid state-formation.

The third chapter notes the research method and design of this study. The meaning of hybridity pursued in this study is derived from the tradition of critical studies. Following this tradition, the chapter presents this study’s inquiry paradigm, research design, basic information regarding data collection, issues of trustworthiness, ethics, and finally the methodological limitations of this study.
The fourth chapter is an introductory part to move onto the empirical discussion on a web of authorities in Timor-Leste. With the aim of providing general information regarding Timor-Leste prior to the empirical discussion in earnest, this chapter briefly outlines the history and culture of the Timorese people. In terms of history, it unfolds Timorese resistance history against various external forces and the creation of the sense of resistant nationalism. Indeed, it addresses customary cosmology, practices, and institutions which facilitate and govern the entire Timorese society, not only Timorese societal life but also political and economic life through networks from *uma lulik*.

The fifth and sixth chapters are empirical studies which describe the Timorese state-formation using a web of authorities. The aim of the fifth chapter is to discover Timorese authorities representing the stateness of the country now by tracing the history of Timor-Leste. This chapter starts by introducing post-independent narratives closely related to its past, present and (possibly) future. The post-independent narratives implicitly revealed images, values, and expectations on the state among the ordinary Timorese, and due to the narratives reflects the social values, it supports the justification of three authorities: religious, traditional and legal-rational authorities are legitimate authorities regarding the stateness. The chapter identifies the Catholic church, lulik and government as three co-existing authorities and explains where their authorities are from and how they are legitimate.

A part of mapping a web of authorities, the six chapter examines relations between three authorities. The relations are also traced throughout the Timorese history from early Portuguese Timor to the era of post-independence in order to depict any changed mode of relations and to analyse causes of the changes. As implicitly indicated in Chapter 4, the history of the resistance movement and the achievement of independence is a common but significant historical event which causes relations to change from antagonistic to agonistic. The chapter argues that the experience of the three different authorities that co-operatively resist against Indonesian oppression has increased their cohesiveness, and following independence three different values implied in post-independent narratives became the basis of agonistic respect. Hence, it argues that a web of authorities is able to maintain agonistic pluralism based on an even clearer identity and roles of each authority in the society even after the common goal - Timorese liberation - is accomplished. On top of agonistic pluralism, it focuses on the mutual dependence of these authorities - reinforcing each other’s influence and thereby increasing their legitimacy. It analyses that these mutual benefits are especially evident in the relations between the government and other
authorities due to the government’s policy on culture and religion; considering its relatively low level of legitimacy and weaker network, the government seems to gain the greatest benefits through this compared to the other bodies.

Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings by emphasising the scholarly contribution of this study for IR and PCS, particularly by highlighting the relation-centred concept of the state and the virtue of the commons in the Timorese hybrid state.
Chapter 1. From statebuilding to hybrid state-formation

1.1. Introduction

The first chapter of this study aims to review literature relating to statebuilding and peacebuilding in order to develop a conceptual framework of hybrid state-formation. International statebuilding has a long history, which started with the post-war recovery period after World War II. However, the recent concept of statebuilding, underpinned by the ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ state thesis, emerged during the post-Cold War era, in the wake of neoliberalism. The post-Cold War weakness of the newly independent state has been highlighted as a reason for the increased number of intrastate armed conflicts; in light of this, the international community’s intervention in fragile states was justified. The international approach to these states was comprehensive, from peacekeeping and post-war recovery, to peacebuilding which addressed positive peace (see Agenda for Peace of Boutros-Ghali, 1992). However, unfortunately, the UN’s peacebuilding efforts failed to prevent the society from relapsing into conflict.

In response to the UN’s failed peacebuilding activities, the current concept of statebuilding was implemented, and sheds light on the importance of institution (Caplan, 2004; Chesterman, 2004, Chesterman 2005, et al.; Fearon and Laitin, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Ignatieff, 2003; Krasner, 2004; Paris, 2004). The statebuilding approach rests upon the ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ state thesis to legitimise the active international intervention. The present study postulates that this is the first generation of statebuilding where the concentration is on institution-building.

However, the first generation of statebuilding has also been faced with heavy criticism from various schools. This criticism has focused on international institution-building, which pays no attention to local issues. Institution was only legitimised by the international community and not by the local community, because the institutional approach was designed based on the Euro-centric model of the state-Weberian model, and dismissed local power relations, history, culture, norms and values. In this respect, the critical camp highlights the local community in order to strengthen the relation between state and society. The present study views this local-focused statebuilding as the second generation of statebuilding.

There is no doubt that the second generation has made significant changes to the international programme, embracing the local community; on the other hand, however, it
still maintains its external-led ‘building’ approach based on the liberal values inherent in the Weberian model. Aware of this limitation facing the second generation, the present study claims that a new theoretical approach should be employed, instead of statebuilding. Indeed, the thesis argues that it is vital to question the concept of the state per se in order to escape from the canon of the Weberian model in IR and to avoid reiteration of (neo-)liberal peace in conflict-affected societies. With regard to this, it suggests a framework known as hybrid state-formation to capture the historical social process of (re-)constructing the state in these societies, thereby opening a new state theory and denaturalising the dominant Weberian concept of the state in IR.

This chapter consists of two parts: the first part reviews the first and second generations of statebuilding literature and the limitations facing these generations; the second part concentrates on conceptualising hybrid state-formation based on the literature review on hybridity in the discourse of post-liberal peace.

1.2. From statebuilding to state-formation

This chapter starts by reviewing literature on statebuilding to clarify the international statebuilding approach and to identify the reasons for its failure. The statebuilding approach can be classified into two groups: top-down statebuilding and bottom-up statebuilding. Top-down statebuilding is the first generation of statebuilding, and focuses on the justification of the international community’s intervention in fragile states. Following Weber’s definition of the state as ‘a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1970, p. 78), the state is required to have the physical capacity to protect their populace in the given territory from bellicose intruders and human plights which threaten human security. In this regard, the institutionalists tend to focus on the administrative capability and system of the state to ensure its authority. However, fragile states do not seem to have sufficient institutional capacity and authority to govern their state, and thus the priority of top-down statebuilding is to (re)build security and institutions for fragile states so as they may, in their view, function as a proper state (Lemay-Hébert, 2009). Therefore, this approach focuses on ‘the presence of functionally specific actors, institutions and political orders, such as liberal democracy and consent, universal human rights, the rule of law, and so on’ to justify international intervention (Andersen, 2012b, p. 207).
The second generation statebuilding, known as bottom-up statebuilding, has emerged due to the limitations of first generation statebuilding. In contrast, it focuses on legitimacy from the society. The literature implicitly shows that legitimacy is derived from values of society, and is not automatically delivered by institutions built by the international community (Clark, 2005). It rests upon a critical perspective on the term ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state, and strongly suggests observing the host society itself; for instance, its history, culture and social traditions, which have long been ignored under the term (Andersen, 2012b; Lemay-Hébert, 2009). As such, second generation statebuilding studies how and why specific actors, institutions and processes are accepted in particular contexts, with a primary focus on local processes, perceptions and the thoughts of the local populace. Andersen (2012b, p. 207) refers to the second generation as ‘empirical’ or ‘sociological’.

The following section reviews these two statebuilding approaches and critically analyses them to identify their problems.

1.2.1. The first generation of statebuilding: Top-down statebuilding

The first generation of statebuilding emerged following criticism of the ‘peacebuilding’ invoked by An Agenda for Peace of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992). This Agenda for Peace was the most symbolic and significant document to show a consensus among international actors, the UN, IFIs and NGOs on the necessity of intervening in a fragile state. It identified various UN operations, such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’.

Peacebuilding, newly identified in this document, was defined as ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: II. Definitions, 21.). In 1999, Boutros-Ghali’s successor, Kofi Annan (1999 cited in Paris, 2004, p. 2), also stated that the aim of peacebuilding is ‘to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies’. Approximately four years later, after peacebuilding was first proclaimed by the UN, the Inventory of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Activities (UN, 1996) was published by the UN, which listed the various tasks involved in peacebuilding: relief and humanitarian assistance; mine clearance; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants; repatriation and reintegration of refugees; election monitoring and democratisation support; economic reconstruction and development; and civil society rehabilitation. In addition, and in line with this, the UN Security Council stated in February 2001 that
peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms; the council also concluded that actions following these should foster ‘sustainable institutions in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence’. Jeong (2005) comprehensively presents the UN’s peacebuilding activities in four categories: security and demilitarisation, political transition, development and reconciliation, and social rehabilitation (Lambourne and Herro, 2008).

In the early 2000s, several important articles and books were published, all of which were openly critical of peacebuilding operations and theory (Caplan 2004; Chesterman 2004; Chesterman et al., 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Ignatieff 2003; Krasner 2004; Paris 2004). The main point highlighted by these studies is that practitioners, policy makers, and scholars have tended to overlook the significance of constructing institutional foundations in the transition from war to peace (Paris and Sisk, 2009). In this vein, they argue that institutionalisation is required for sustainable peace. The literature above pertains to the first generation of statebuilding.

First of all, Fukuyama (2004) asserts that a crucial obstacle endangering the economic and social development of weak or failing states, and the security of other states, is weak governance and the absent or inadequate institutions at the nation-state level. He criticises the international peacebuilding record in Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Timor-Leste, and holds these countries accountable for having failed to build self-sustainable states. Fukuyama also insists that the ultimate goal of peacebuilding should be to strengthen the capacity of those states to create functional public administration and be independent from outside assistance. Chesterman (2004), who analyses the history and dynamics of transitional administrations operated by the international community from the League of Nations to the end of the Cold War, also argues that peacebuilding has not paid sufficient attention to constructing institutions and economic stability. He points out the missions of Bosnia and Kosovo when criticising the slow progress in building a functioning law enforcement and judicial system, although the rule of law is the most important element in order for governmental institutions to consolidate peace.

Fearon and Laitin (2004) also point out that weak governmental institutions or low state capacity are the causes of civil war, political disorder and economic deconstruction, and
that this weakness could create global security threats. They claim, however, that the international response has tended to focus on reconciliation and mediation without paying enough attention to strengthening institutional capacity. They place emphasis on institutional capacity, as they view providing public goods through well-functioning government institutions as a prerequisite for political and economic development. Based on the insisted importance of institutions, they argue that the international community is badly organised and poorly resourced when it comes to dealing with state collapse; indeed, they therefore propose a neotrusteeship system to facilitate the coordination of statebuilding activities in the future.

Krasner (2004) reveals a similar viewpoint regarding the importance of governmental institutions in collapsed and failing states. He also argues that effective institutions are a precondition for building sustainable peace, claiming that failed or incompetent national authority structures ‘have sabotaged the economic well-being, violated the basic human rights, and undermined the physical security of their countries’ population’ (ibid., p. 90). In terms of the need for competent and adequate governmental institutions, he feels that ineffective institutions are the cause of their own economic and social destruction. As a recommendation, he concurs that the most positive intervention is a ‘sharing sovereignty’ arrangement which allows fragile states, along with international actors, to take responsibility for some of the ‘domestic authority structures of the target state for an indefinite period of time’ (ibid., p. 108).

Paris (2004)’ criticism of peacebuilding starts with an analysis of the liberal peace which underpins peacebuilding. He states that liberal peace is a legacy of Wilsonianism from the end of World War I, which holds that democratisation and marketisation are the keys to enforcing peace and security not only in international but also domestic politics. Democracy requires competitive elections among many parties, as well as politically vibrant citizenry and civil society to be mobilised as a result of their interests, thus giving rise to conflict among them. This competitive process is generally considered to be healthy in democratic states because peaceful debates, discussions and compromises may facilitate reconciliation of conflicting interests. In terms of the liberal market, it provides a natural harmony of interests while individuals pursue their respective self-interests (Smith and Skinner, 1999). Moreover, the two systems mutually reinforce each other, thereby achieving economic growth and prosperity.

However, this positive side of democracy and the liberal market is appreciated in Western societies’ perceptions of themselves. He agrees that democracies are less likely to
go to war than non-democracies; however, he also argues that only the well-established liberal market democracy is highly likely to lead to peace. Conversely, in the case of states undergoing a transition to market democracy, the efficient functioning of economic and political liberalisation cannot be achieved because of i) ‘bad’ civil society; ii) opportunistic ethnic entrepreneurs; ii) the risk of elections leading to destructive societal competition; iv) local ‘saboteurs’ disguised as democracy seekers; and v) the disruptive effects of economic liberalisation (Paris, 2004, p. 159). In this vein, Paris suggests ‘Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation’ (IBL, ibid., p. 7). IBL justifies international intervention, and states that it must focus on constructing and functioning institutional capacity, which are prerequisites for political autonomy and are essential when it comes to preventing post-conflict states from relapsing into conflict due to incomplete liberalisation (ibid.; Call, 2005).

To sum up, the literature above points out that weak and ineffective state institutions engender national and international security threats. Therefore, it argues that building strong and effective institutions must be the priority for the international community so as to enable economic and social development, as well as sustainable peace in post-conflict countries.

1.2.2. Limitations of top-down statebuilding

Top-down statebuilding has been built on the fallacy of the term ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state. The misdiagnosis of so-called ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states has led to an incorrect solution and has thus been criticised by the critical school of peace and conflict studies. In this respect, the fallacy of the term ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state should first be clarified so as to identify the constraints of top-down statebuilding.

The most salient arguments related to ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states can be summarised as follows: i) simplification of so-called ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states; ii) hidden Western hegemonic power in the concept of ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states; iii) historical and socio-cultural recklessness over ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states; and iv) apolitical and technocratic manner of the concept of ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states.

It must first be noted that numerous scholars critically point out that calling these ‘fragile states’ is problematic, because the sources of their problems are too multifarious to be gathered under one definition. Call (2008b, 2010) asserts that the concept of failed states aggregates diverse kinds of states and their problems. He gives two examples of the definition, namely Rotberg’s failing states (2004) and the Failed States Index by the Fund
for Peace (http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators), to show how diverse social and institutional conditions are agglomerated under the name of ‘failed states’. While it is unnecessary to summarise all of the conditions and criteria suggested by these two examples, some of them are introduced here in order to illustrate their variety.

Table 1-1. **Example of Criteria of ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states**

(Rotberg, 2004; the Fund for Peace, http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotberge’s failing states (2003)</th>
<th>Failed States Index by the Fund for Peace</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• civil wars characterised by enduring violence;</td>
<td>• pressures deriving from high population density;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• disharmony between communities;</td>
<td>• history of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• loss of control over peripheral regions to out-groups;</td>
<td>• ‘brain drain’;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• growth of criminal violence, including gangs, and trafficking of arms and guns;</td>
<td>• institutionalised political exclusion; a drop in GNP;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• cessation of functioning legislatures and judiciaries;</td>
<td>• the appearance of private militias or guerrillas;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• informal privatisation of education, health and other social services;</td>
<td>• increased corruption;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• corruption;</td>
<td>• higher poverty rates for some ethnic groups;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• loss of legitimacy;</td>
<td>• human rights violations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• declining per capita GDP, with associated soaring smuggling and the supplanting of the national currency with external money.</td>
<td>• fragmentation of ruling elites based on group lines, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Patrick (2007) also asserts that scholars tend to put all troublesome developing states into a single ‘failed state’ category. Specifically, he exemplifies the bottom 20 states in the 2006 Failed State Index (including Sudan, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Haiti, Afghanistan, Liberia, Pakistan, North Korea, Nepal, Yemen, and Burma) to highlight the heterogeneity among these states in terms of political stability, government capacity, relative population, regime legitimacy, and current trajectory (ibid., p. 647). In respect of this, highly varied types of states are put into a single category of failed states as a result; the response to failed states
is also simplified by implementing a package of solutions. The normative/institutional approach could also take this ‘one-size-fits-all’ stance as an imposition of ‘Western-like-institutions’ for ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states.

The second point is connected to ideological issues in international politics led by Western powers, which is hubristic self-recognition of the perfection of their own state model. With regard to the concept of state failure or fragile, failed, failing or collapsed states, the definition of the state is derived from Max Weber’s classical definition of modern statehood, namely ‘the monopoly on legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1970, p. 78). It was internationally accepted and standardised in the world order post-World War II. Since then, the state has become the most fundamental entity in the international system, with an autonomous bureaucratic system, a manifestation of popular sovereignty and international recognition as a coherent entity in a given territory (Schlichte 2005, cited in Hagmann and Péclard, 2010).

The universalism of the Weberian state implies the sense of superiority in the First World. According to Hill (2005), who applies a post-colonial perspective when analysing the concept of ‘state failure’, the concept contains a dualism from the colonial legacy. He argues that colonialism changed and recreated the identity not only of the colonial subject, but also of the colonisers themselves. He claims that colonisers’ identity was recreated with ‘priority’, ‘nobility’ and ‘honour’ through images of virtue, while local people’s identity in the colony was regenerated with inferiority and ‘no sense of honour’ in the colonial literature. This dualistic identity (man/master relationship) is retained even in the post-colonial era, albeit thanks to the independence achieved by past colonies. For previous colonisers, the identity of those nascent states after independence remained in that of colonialism as ‘unstable and fragile’. Therefore, it was considered that such states should rely on assistance and care from the First World. In this respect, the dichotomised understanding of ‘we’, where our states are stable, developed and civilised, and ‘non-we’, where your states are unstable, barbarous, bellicose, underdeveloped and uncivilised, is pervasive in the concept of ‘failure states’; as such, it indirectly supports the will of the international community (mainly the North-North donors’ network) to intervene and govern ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states (Duffield, 2001).

Third, the conception of ‘state failure’ dismisses the historical and socio-cultural features of the state (Hobson, 2002; Jung, 2008). Jung (2008), focusing on the current wake of interest in statehood – mainly ‘state failure’ – among academia and practitioners in international politics, analyses state-formation in the Weberian tradition from a historical
sociological perspective. The main argument of his DIIS report is that Eurocentric conceptual tools based on the Weberian tradition are ‘ill-equipped’ for the analysis of post-colonial states in the contemporary world; he also points out that the conception of Weberian states is as ideal types. Jung has encouraged neo-Weberian sociologists such as Elias (1994) and Tilly (1990) to demonstrate the inappropriateness of using Weberian states as analytical tools. These scholars attempt to show the process behind the emergence of the modern state’s monopoly of physical power in the Western European context.

The Weberian sociologist perspective reflects that the universalised concept of state is, in fact, predominantly derived from Western state-formation history in the Age of Enlightenment. Therefore, the underpinning philosophy in this period, and its associated political economic context – for instance, the growing capitalist bourgeoisies and sense of citizenship – must be reconsidered before transplanting such concepts of ‘state’ into post-conflict states which have been formed based on very different philosophical and socio-cultural backgrounds. Although the Western interpretation of the state has also continued to change in response to internal and external circumstances, as when the state was born, the Weberian state has maintained its dominant status in the international order and become the normative objection of the global North in order to make these troubled states transform to Western-like states. Because of this normative approach, the prescription to those ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states tends to be technical and apolitical regardless of the state’s trajectory based on pathological diagnosis.

Lastly, state failure has been discussed in an apolitical and technological manner (Bøås and Jennings, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Egnell and Haldén, 2011; Wesley, 2008), and this is clearly apparent in the statebuilding approach. The notion of ‘building’ states has been discussed on the presumption that failed or potentially failing and fragile states do not have the capacity to function as a state, thus justifying external regulatory intervention where ‘building’ the state is justified for wealthy donors’ own security reasons, and as part of their ethical responsibility. This pathological diagnosis and problem-solving approach is criticised by scholars, who often refer to the views of Cox (1981).

With regard to this point, heavy volumes of ‘lesson learned’ reports have been produced in order to deal with the lack of technical capacity in statebuilding research. The reports are very wide-ranging, from strategies of intervention such as the early warning system, strategic planning, the engagement of military and civic agencies and international coordination, to the contents of intervention, such as the strategy of successful democratic elections, dealing with spoilers and formal militants, building the rule of law, the military,
the police, the judiciary and public finance systems, and providing public services like education, health, HIV/AIDS awareness and so forth (Dobbins, 2003; Dobbins et al., 2007; Milliken, 2003; Rotberg, 2004; Chesterman et al., 2005; Zartman, 1995). One of the most striking exemplary studies explaining statebuilding intervention in the apolitical manner is “Institutionalisation before Liberalisation” by Paris (2004, p. 6).

However, statebuilding is naturally political work. Chandler (2006) refers to Huntington’s study, ‘Political Order in Changing Societies’ (Huntington, 1996), and claims that statebuilding is inherently a highly political process in society, with a critical view of current international regulatory interventions in post-conflict states. Huntington (ibid.) emphasises that the vital point regarding state stability relies on building a domestic consensus, a sense of political community, and a government based on popular legitimacy, all of which are highly political activities. In addition, he insists, somewhat vitally, upon the autonomy of the political sphere in which the public can engage through, for example, party formation and coalition. This political process plays a crucial role in linking social groups and has a social loyalty to state-based projects which not only benefit particular social fragments via patronage, but also grant private rights. He argues that state stability in democratic, participatory and modern societies depends on institutionalisation and the strength of the political sphere, whereas stability in pre-industrialised societies would be produced by bureaucratic rule or a government consisting of isolated cliques.

Call also points out that concentrating on state failure obscures political issues, such as ‘democratisation, representation, horizontal accountability and transparency’ (2008b, p. 1497). He argues that, by focusing on the enhancement of states and state institutions in an apolitical manner, state agencies which provide public services such as the police, the military, judiciary, public financial agencies and other executive agencies of education and health, have been prioritised; as such, he feels that political institutions focused on democratisation, e.g. political parties, civil organisations and legislatures, have been neglected, as has the issue of the rule of governance and regimes. In this regard, he urges scholars to pay specific attention to these questions regarding types of regime, accountability of the state authorities, methods of mediation between different interests among social groups, the problem of social representativeness for the marginalised, and the appropriate judicial system.

Based on the ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state thesis, the top-down statebuilding approach seems to be prevailing as a solution for post-conflict reconstruction and peace. International interventionists attach the stigma of ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state to those states which do not
fulfil the list of criteria based on their own images of the state. In order to deal with the problems they have defined, they emphasise a formula of solutions consisting of institutional building, democratisation and marketisation, regardless of the host countries’ socio-cultural, historical and political context, and based on their belief that the Weberian state, the model for most Western donor states, is an impeccable form of state.

The track record demonstrates the failure of top-down statebuilding. For example, Krause and Jütersonke (2005, p. 447) illustrate that ‘about half of all peace support operations (including both peacekeeping and more expansive peacebuilding operations) failed after around five years’. As they point out, post-conflict states are confronted with relapsed conflicts, and it can therefore be said that statebuilding and peacebuilding have failed. Subsequently, another school of thought with a critical perspective on top-down statebuilding has emerged, thus highlighting the importance of state legitimacy.

1.2.3. Second generation of statebuilding: bottom-up statebuilding

Arising due to criticism of the term ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state and the limitations of institution-building, the second generation of statebuilding strongly suggests observing the host society itself – for instance, its history, culture and social traditions – which have long been ignored under the term. It tends to focus on what the host society has rather than what it should have. By taking into account the host society, it sheds light on the relation between the state and society, which was all but absent in the first generation of statebuilding. This approach has two streams: the first stream focuses on local institutions and practices in order to enhance state legitimacy by meeting people’s needs, while the second pays attention to local knowledge and social dynamics. In this sense, first generation statebuilding focuses on investigating when and how a certain form of legitimacy is adopted, or not, in a specific context. This is due to the fact that the approach tends to concentrate on the dynamic process of state legitimacy generation (which could be called a ‘social contract’ in the Weberian tradition) held by the society.

Institution-centred bottom-up statebuilding

The first feature of the literature when it comes to this approach is that it tends to highlight the embedded systems and practices in the host society. Chesterman, Ignatieff
and Thakur (2005), for example, point out that informal mechanisms are retained to operate even if the state is collapsed, and therefore a power vacuum is not the cause of the state collapse. In this situation, facilitating local processes should be set as a prior goal to redress state collapse and local ownership. Furthermore, Barnett (2006) argues that the state is important but that it is not all about engineering a Western-like state. He suggests that international intervention to establish institutions should be minimised, and that domestic informal systems should instead be allowed to operate in host states.

An OECD-DAC report entitled *Concepts and Dilemmas of State-building in Fragile Situation*, also highlights what the host state has, especially in terms of legitimacy. The report asserts that the fragile states are likely to have multi-legitimacy. They explore different kinds of legitimacy and their effects on the fragility of the state. Among the various legitimacies, the report places particular emphasis on historical legitimacy, ‘intrinsic or embedded legitimacy (Jones and Chandran, 2008, p. 24)’, which could be resistant to external influence and cause the weak state-society relation which results in being a major contributor to state failure.

The second common feature of the literature is that it tends to stress ‘performance legitimacy’ (François and Sud, 2006, p. 147). ‘Performance legitimacy’ is derived from whether the state functions to meet the needs of the people. François and Sud (ibid.) state that ‘performance legitimacy’ is based on the ‘outcome of the game’, while ‘democratic legitimacy’ rests upon the acceptance of the ‘rules of the game’ by society. In their argument, liberalisation and democratisation, which are emphasised by interventionists, may gain social legitimacy, but may not deliver the state’s basic responsibility and functions.

Rothstein (2009)’s article, entitled *Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy Versus Quality of Government*, also makes arguments in this respect. The main argument is that the establishment of electoral democracy is not the most important factor for the creation of political legitimacy but the quality of state’s performance. He argues that the input side of the political system, which he refers to as electoral democracy, does not necessarily establish legitimacy, although the output side, which refers to the quality of government, does play an important role in creating political legitimacy. For instance, the political legitimacy of the former Yugoslavia collapsed not because ethnic groups recognised that they had become permanent minorities in the state, but because the new Croatian government had wielded their power and violated the human rights of their citizens. According to Rothstein, political legitimacy depends on the quality of the
government, rather than on the capacity to hold elections for effective representation.

Call and Wyeth (2008), Sabaratnam (2009) and Ghani and Lockhart (2009) also emphasise the function of state institutions, although their perception of legitimacy is situated between functionalist and subjective concepts (Andersen, 2012b). They agree that the dominant norms and beliefs in a society are not ignorable as a source of legitimacy, but that the state’s function to deliver goods and services is also a significant aspect of generating state legitimacy.

Papagianni (2009) also sets centralised institutions and their function to ensure administrative and legal order as an analytical focus. She insists that legitimacy should be studied as a process which cannot be created as a result of an event such as an election. The process of statebuilding would be more likely to achieve legitimacy if it were inclusive of major political actors, open to the public, and prioritised delivering public goods and services while ensuring administrative and legal order.

Several arguments in the literature on hybrid statehood are analogous to the above. The term ‘hybrid political orders’ was created by a group of scholars from the University of Queensland, Australia as an alternative term for ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state (Boege et al., 2008). Their argument starts with the critical recognition that the terms ‘failed’, ‘failing’, ‘failure’, ‘fragile’ or ‘weak’ state are detrimental to achieving sustainable peace and development, as they mislead the international intervention within the pathological perspective of Western and Weberian states.

This argument has been expanded, with several exemplary states having systemised traditional decision-making practices into the Weberian state model. The literature on hybridity states presupposes that the traditional practices and institutions imply that local norms and values are more legitimate and authorised by the ordinary people than international people, and thus the hybrid model would be more likely to be legitimated than the orthodox top-down institution-building model. Of particular note here are Guurti (Council of Chiefs) of Somaliland (Moe, 2013; Renders, 2012), Malvatu Mauri (National Council of Chiefs) of Vanuatu (Hassall, 2007), the custom-based constitution of the Solomon Islands (Moore, 2007), loya jirga (Grand Council) of Afghanistan (Wardak and Hamidzada, 2012) and Bougainville’s new constitution promoting customary law (Boege, 2013; Larcom, 2015; Wallis, 2012b). In addition, the gacaca is the well-known traditional dispute resolution mechanism of Rwanda in the judicial field (Belloni, 2012).

The formalisation of indigenous institutions and governance structures often involves international actors who purposely attempt to input the liberal democratic state model into
post-conflict states. In the case of Bosnia, the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, and the Commission on Real Property Claims have been appointed to local institutions by international experts to provide more transparent and efficient policy-making (Belloni, 2007). In the hybrid courts of Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and Kosovo, international legal experts are involved. Additionally, at the civil society level, international actors strengthen local NGOs’ capacity for development and liberal democracy.

Roberts (2013a, p.7) points out the limitations of the legitimacy derived from global governance to ensure the social cohesion of state-society; he also argues that more attention should be given to ‘everyday life and social necessity’. Another contribution in this regard comes from Kappler (2013), who suggests that in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, local legitimacy is engineered through the needs and practices of everyday life. She argues that international intervention has failed to build legitimacy as it has marginalised people from the public sphere, but people have transferred the arena of legitimacy to the ‘semi-public’ sphere, which fulfils public needs and interests in everyday life. Her research supports the argument that fulfilling public needs is a profound source of legitimacy (Roberts, 2013a; Luckham and Kirk, 2013). In addition, Kappler (2013)’s article, which depicts the local dynamics within the mobility of the legitimacy arena, shows that legitimacy can be generated at the level of informal and hybrid formal and informal agencies, rather than only at that of formal state institutions.

**Society-centred bottom-up statebuilding**

The literature pertaining to this approach also adopts a critical perspective on conventional statebuilding interventions and, importantly, considers local knowledge and social dynamics. What differentiates it from the former approach is that the analytical focus of this approach is on the people in a society, rather than on state institutions (Autesserre, 2010; Narten, 2009; Pouligny, 2002; Richmond and Frank, 2009; Suhrke, 2009).

Another outstanding feature of this approach is that it focuses on bottom-up legitimacy. Wesley (2008), who argues that dominant conceptions of the state should be reconsidered in order to effectively respond to so-called ‘fragile states’, insists that development agencies in Western states should first acknowledge a variety of state forms which already exist and which will continuously emerge in the following decades; secondly, Wesley advocates state formation from the bottom-up: ‘accepting that stable and effective states
must emerge from within the traditions, compromises, and conflicts particular to the political, economic, and social spheres of each society’ (ibid., p. 381) is required to replace the top-down statebuilding imposed on the basis of the interventionists’ blueprint. He strongly argues that a legitimated and stable state can only be formed on bottom-up dynamics of human activities.

Jones (2002) also claims that statebuilding is not just a technical exercise but involves creating legitimacy from all actors, even from the local level. Lemay-Hébert (2009, 2013b), who has brought a sociological perspective to the state, criticises the institutional approach, claiming instead that social-political cohesion should be given far more consideration in the process of statebuilding to consolidate state institutions.

1.2.4. Limitations of bottom-up statebuilding

It is certain that the second generation of statebuilding is significantly different from its first generation predecessor, since the debate is inclusive of the local society, which was almost completely ignored in the first generation. Nevertheless, the state-centred discourse, even in the discussion on the state and society relation, impedes the society-centred analysis. This cannot be discussed separately from methodological constraints, the latter of which lead to difficulties for empirical studies focusing on society-centre analysis. Furthermore, the state-centred discourse makes it difficult for the critical debate to dismiss the international-led ‘building’ approach; indeed, it will be argued that, rather than the ‘building’ approach, state-formation in the subject society must be set as a research focus in order to bring the local society into the centre of the debate, in concurrence with the claim of Bliesemann de Guevara (2012). Prior to unfolding the argument on state-formation, this section starts with the constraint of bottom-up statebuilding.

The great limitation of bottom-up statebuilding is that its analytical focus is still set on the state. The society has not been discussed to the same extent as the state, even though the people in the society are the source of state sovereignty based on the social contract, which is a foundation of the modern state. It cannot be denied that the second generation has made an attempt to turn the analytical focus to the local society; with this said, however, sufficient analysis concentrating on the local society has not been conducted. The attempts made so far merely serve to move our focus from the institution-centred discussion to the state-centred discussion by bringing state legitimacy into the discussion, but not enough to move it to the society-centred discussion.
Considering the meaning of legitimacy, some might argue that restoring state legitimacy to the discussion of statebuilding implicitly represents the engagement with the society, as the process of legitimisation is the process of forming a strong cohesion of state and society. However, one point missing from this argument is that, according to types of legitimacy, the extent of the society’s engagement differs. For example, the performance of legitimacy would emphasise the function of the state to provide basic public goods and services in response to people’s needs, and as a result, the state legitimacy may become stronger. From this perspective, the roles and functions of the state, such as providing national defence, maintaining social order by law, and meeting people’s basic needs are premised, and legitimacy results from the state’s performance. This performance-based legitimacy tends to minimise the society as a recipient of public services. However, prior to the state functions, people should consent to the regime and roles of the state. Without this consent, the state is unable to extract resources and tax from the society and hence is unable to function and obtain legitimacy as a result of its performance. In this regard, the legitimacy of state existence and operation relies on the society, thus meaning that the extent of engagement in forming legitimacy is greater than the performance legitimacy.

The limitation of bottom-up statebuilding is that it has not sufficiently focused on the process of consent in the society. States should have different processes of consent because their historical, social and cultural backgrounds are different, and because of this, various forms of the state can exist across the world. According to Buzan (1991) and Holsti (1996), the state consists of four elements:

- the physical basis of the state (effective sovereignty, international consensus on territorial limits and state legitimacy);
- the institutional expression of the state (consensus on political ‘rules of the game’, equal access to decisions and allocations, clear distinction between private gain and public service, civilian control of military);
- the idea of the state (implicit social contract and ideological consensus in given territory);
- the vertical and horizontal legitimacy.


‘The expression of the state’ is often the main focus of the entire statebuilding literature – not only the literature pertaining to the top-down approach, but also the bottom-up approach; conversely, ‘the idea of the state’ has gained less attention. Lemay-Hébert (2013) criticises the institutional approach and stresses the importance of ‘the idea of the state’, quoting Buzan
(1991), who notes that ‘the state is more an idea held in common by a group of people, than it is a physical organism’, and ‘without a widespread and quite deeply rooted idea of the state among the population, the state institutions themselves have difficulty functioning and surviving’ (Buzan 1991, pp. 63-64). Considering Buzan’s work, it can conclude that the literature on statebuilding has only addressed the physical territory or institutional capacity of the state, even when discussing state legitimacy on the other hand, it rarely considered the statebuilding in terms of social contract or ideological consensus as Call (2008b) and Chandler (2006) pointed out.

In particular, although the society-centred approach emphasises the social dynamics from the bottom, it does not grasp the picture of social consensus. The reason for this could be that ‘the state’ is mainly interpreted in terms of the IR discipline, which leans predominantly on positivism. In this regard, the critics have claimed that sociological, anthropological and ethnographic methods should be brought into peace and conflict studies in order to open people’s eyes to the local context; however, it cannot be denied that the society-centred approach has not gained sufficient attention compared to its significance.

One particular group of scholars insist on the necessity of linking IR and sociology to study the state, especially in non-Western societies (e.g. Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012; Hobden and Hobson, 2002). Referring to neo-Weberian sociologists’ studies of the state, they argue that state-formation is a more appropriate frame than statebuilding in terms of taking into account the process of social consent in the state. The ‘building’ approach tends to view the state as a sphere which is separate from the society, and thus its analytical focus is prone to concentrate on the state rather than society, even if it emphasises societal aspects in order to strengthen state-society cohesion. Moreover, in terms of the concept of the state in the ‘building’ approach, it is difficult to dismiss the West-born modern state concept. In contrast, the ‘formation’ approach focuses on the process of state-formation in the subject society; i.e. how the state becomes a legitimate entity in the perception and praxis of the society. As such, this approach is more suited to studying the relation between the state and society. Furthermore, it is capable of addressing the historicity, which has been largely ignored in statebuilding, and thereby it has the potential to open a path to trace theories and the non-West states’ process of formation theory.
Local historicity is important when it comes to understanding non-Western states. As pointed out earlier, one of the constraints of ‘top-down statebuilding’ is ahistoricism, derived from the IR tradition; however, Bliesemann de Guevara (2012) claims that the historical context in which international and recipient states stand has not gained much attention even in the critical school. She suggests that scholars who study ‘the state’, and especially non-Western ones, should focus more on ‘state-formation’, which implies ‘historicity’ based on the process-oriented approach, rather than ‘state-building’, the latter of which is a reiterative historical event comprising groups of people who make ‘a conscious effort at creating an apparatus of control’ (Berman and Lonsdale 1992, p. 5).

State-formation, which implies historicity, is a suitable frame through which to understand the subject (non-Western) society itself, particularly in terms of the fact that it makes it possible to trace in what ways the society has responded to external intervention (e.g. Colonialism, international peacebuilding and statebuilding) in a long-term process of
state-formation. Bliesemann de Guevara refers to the concept of social habitus (Bourdieu 1998, cited in ibid.) and repertoire of actions (Tilly, 1985) to explain the relation between the current social actions in the host state and the power of statebuilding. Social habitus illustrates a certain perception and action, both of which are constituted by historical and subjective experiences, and actors’ social positions. Hence, their responsive actions are determined by a ‘historically pre-shaped and therefore limited repertoire of alternative actions and performances at his/her disposal (Bakonyi and Bliesemann de Guevara, 2009, p. 402).’ History also affects formal organisations and institutions, as well as institutionalised practices. The repertoire of actions and institutions historically adopted and shaped would reveal a social logic or mechanism even in interactions with international interventions. Through this historical approach, causes of conflict in post-conflict states and the reasons for intervention failure may be more pragmatically analysed, and, furthermore, local knowledge may be more deeply understood, thus making it possible to overcome Western epistemic power.

To sum up, the statebuilding approach was created due to the negative result of peacebuilding derived from the liberal peace of Wilsonianism (Paris, 2004); however, it gradually shifted its approach from top-down to bottom-up. Top-down statebuilding is the first generation, and focuses on institution-building led by an international community, with the aim of achieving sustainable peace. It is justified by the ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state thesis, which assumes that the absence of functioning governmental institutions in so-called ‘failed’ and ‘failure’ states causes civil war, political disorder and economic deconstruction, and furthermore can weaken global security. According to literature on top-down statebuilding, state legitimacy, which is a reference of successful statebuilding, can be enhanced through international intervention for institution-building in the ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state, and furthermore, can contribute to durable peace (Caplan 2004; Chesterman 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Ignatieff 2003; Krasner 2004; Paris 2004). However, international-led top-down statebuilding has not succeeded in its bid to make history (Collier et al., 2003; Krause and Jütersenke, 2005), and thus criticism of top-down statebuilding has duly followed.

The critical perspective represents the second generation of statebuilding. It contends with the ‘failed’ or ‘failure’ state thesis before placing emphasis on local capacity and the host state’s state-society relation as keys to increase the level of state legitimacy; hence, this approach is known as bottom-up statebuilding. This bottom-up statebuilding is divided into two groups: the first is the institution-centred bottom-up approach, while the second is
the society-centred bottom-up approach. The former approach engages with local institutions, and stands on local values and norms to increase the effectiveness of top-down statebuilding; this, in turn, raises the level of state legitimacy (Chesterman et al., 2005; Barnett, 2006). The latter approach highlights societal aspects, taking into account the state-society relation (Autesserre, 2010; Narten, 2009; Pouligny, 2002; Richmond and Frank, 2009; Suhrke, 2009).

In terms of the fact that the second generation of statebuilding places emphasis on the local society by emphasising the state legitimacy, it has made a giant leap from the first generation. However, the conceptual and methodological limitation of the state ‘building’ approach is that it has not sufficiently reflected the local and societal dynamics (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012). Therefore, rather than statebuilding, many have suggested state-formation in historical sociology as an alternative concept when it comes to studying the state itself in non-West societies, where the most post-conflict intervention has taken place.

1.3. Hybrid state-formation as an agenda for post-liberal peace

Following the former section, which closed by arguing that state-formation is suited to the analysis of the state in non-Western societies, this section will suggest the concept of hybrid state-formation; this is done in order to expand the argument on state-formation articulating with hybridity and post-liberal peace.

Hybrid state-formation denotes the concept of representing non-Western societies’ state-formation. Neo-Weberian historical sociologists have mainly studied state-formation to explain how the modern state developed in Europe and how the Weberian state eliminated its historicity; this is accepted and naturalised as a fundamental unit in International Studies. Accordingly, when we discuss the state, the Weberian state is the default. However, as this thesis studies a state outside of European history, the denaturalisation of the Weberian state is essential in order to understand and analyse the state per se. In order to differentiate states in non-Western societies from states from the West, this study refers to non-Western state-formation derived from hybrid state-formation.

The adjective ‘hybrid’ is an indication that the concept of the Weberian state had an influence on the non-Western society, such as in the post-colonial context. As acknowledged, while the state was born in Western Europe and formed a cultural area, the rest of the area
had to face power interaction between one in the pre-existing social entity, and the other in the concept of the state from the West. This interaction represents a significant difference between the state-formation in the West and that in the rest, especially in the post-colonial society; moreover, in order to indicate the interaction in the non-West society, the adjective ‘hybrid’ is required. Yet, ‘hybrid’ or ‘hybridity’ signifies beyond the interaction.

Hybridity in IR and PCS refers to a challenge to the dominant concept accepted by statebuilding, which is aimed at liberal peace. The aim of statebuilding in PCS is to achieve sustainable peace through restoring the state and stabilising orders of the society which are prone to liberalism. Because of this reason, much of the literature interchangeably uses statebuilding and peacebuilding (e.g. Paris, 2002; Barnett and Zuercher, 2006). However, the liberal peace which underpins statebuilding has been heavily criticised by scholars because of Western orient liberalism (van Leeuwen et al., 2012) and the winner-centred political structure implicit in it. In this regard, it is argued that the research must move its focus to the local, which has been largely marginalised in the praxis of statebuilding and peacebuilding. The second generation of statebuilding is along this line. Indeed, the criticism of liberal peace necessitated discussion on post-liberal peace, with many arguing that hybrid peace guides where post-liberal peace has to go (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond, 2009, 2011a). Following discussion on (post-)liberal peace, it can be said that bringing ‘hybrid’ into PCS refers to a challenge of the Western liberal idea implicit in the state and peace.

By carrying on the above-mentioned ‘hybrid’ discussion, hybrid state-formation is not only the denotation referring to interaction between liberal and local to differentiate the state-formation in the non-Western society from that in the Western society; indeed, it is also an attempt to denaturalise the dominant concept of the liberal state by putting society at the centre of research.

This section consists of three parts. The first part introduces the transition from liberal peace to post-liberal peace in order to review the concept of hybridity. The second part addresses local-liberal hybridity as an agenda for post-liberal peace. Based on the previously-reviewed discourse on post-liberal peace, the last part suggests the concept of hybrid state-formation articulating with post-liberal peace in the process of state-formation in the non-Western society.
1.3.1. Transition to post-liberal peace

Discussion on ‘hybridity’ appeared in the PCS following criticism of liberal peace, upon which statebuilding is premised; there were also calls for a shift to post-liberal peace. This part reviews the discussion on post-liberal peace as the opening of the second session of this chapter introduces ‘hybrid state-formation’.

While two generations of statebuilding reflect criticism of liberal peace, both have failed to escape from the idea of liberal peace. The first generation of statebuilding (e.g. Caplan 2004; Chesterman 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Ignatieff 2003; Krasner 2004; Paris 2004) criticises the liberal peacebuilding model and its practices, all of which are based on the problem-solving approach (Tadjbakhsh, 2011). Rather challenging to the concept of liberal peace per se, it looks for ways to improve the efficiency of the ongoing liberal peacebuilding intervention. Its conditionality-oriented or incentive-based approach reflects the values of efficiency, and hence emphasises institutional efficiency; for example, whether there is enough capacity, resources and political will, whether it is timely and appropriate to implement particular reforms, whether international donors are coordinated and coherent, whether there is any unresolved tension between military and civil participants in intervention operations, and whether there is a space for local participation in the peacebuilding project. This problem-solving camp does have a belief in the underpinning values of liberal peace, such as universalism, egalitarianism, human rights and democracy (van Leeuwen et al., 2012; Tadjbakhsh, 2011). From this perspective, these values are universally valid, in any time and space, and the solutions which they alternatively suggest can fix the failure of the peacebuilding project and make it more efficient. It insists that peacebuilding activities need to be continued via managing, regulating, and understanding problems of institution-building-oriented peacebuilding.

In contrast, critical scholars concentrate on the concept of liberal peace per se (Heathershaw, 2008; Richmond, 2006) and suspect the hidden hegemony and assumption of universal values underlying liberal peace (Tadjbakhsh, 2011). These studies on unpacking liberal peace concur with an argument from van Leeuwen et al. (2012), who point out that liberal peace in fact focuses on Western-centric values and the philosophy of interventionists’ top-down approaches (democracy, free-market economy, the rule of law, human rights, and institutionalisation).

They further argue that liberal peace should not be conceived as a single subject under a sole definition because it is constructed on various conceptions of peace, and reflects
numerous levels of politics and diverse interests. Richmond (2006) notes four strands of thought which construct the liberal peace framework: the ‘victor’s peace’, the ‘constitutional peace’, the ‘institutional peace’ and the ‘civil peace’ (ibid., p. 293). Victor’s peace rests upon a realist argument that peace depends on a military victory, and therefore the dominant position of victor’s peace in the hegemony tends to be retained. Institutional peace is based on idealism, liberal-institutionalism and liberal-internationalism. With regard to institutional peace, which contains the thought of the English School, states’ behaviours can be enforced and regulated by a world order in the normative and legal context. The birth of the UN and the Treaty of Westphalia could be understood in this context. Constitutional peace relates to liberal Kantian thought, namely the belief that democratisation and marketisation lead to peace (Doyle, 1983, 2005). Richmond (2006) notes that this became routinely revived from the European Peace project of the medieval, through the Versailles peace treaty in 1919, to the post-Cold War period. Civil peace rests upon individualism and constructivism, post-structuralism, and post-colonialism, all of which emerged following recognition of ‘the problem of hegemony and domination, self-other relations, identity, particularism and pluralism, as well as the need for human security and justice beyond the states-system’ (ibid., p. 294). The main actors of ‘victor’s peace’, ‘constitutional peace’ and ‘institutional peace’ are states and international and multilateral agencies, whereas those of civil peace include individual agencies. As seen, these four strands of liberal peace have different empirical and intellectual grounds, while the characteristics of each are complementary and contradictory, but consist of the current liberal peace framework together; albeit the hegemony of victor’s peace tragically overwhelms them.

These four strands of liberal peace underpin two generations of statebuilding literature. By recalling ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state discourse, the definition of the state is derived from the Weberian state and sovereign state in IR. Hence, it rests upon ‘victor’s peace’, ‘constitutional peace’ and ‘institutional peace’ born in the Western history of state and inter-state relations. The second generation of statebuilding engages with ‘civil peace’ in addition to the three types of peace mentioned above. In the case of the institution-centred bottom-up approach, it emphasises local institutions but is heavily dominated by ‘victor’s peace’, ‘constitutional peace’ and ‘institutional peace’. Since it has not challenged the concept of sovereignty and the Weberian state, it implicitly rests upon these three types of peace. Above all, because its definition of state legitimacy relies on the normative approach, statebuilding seeks to increase the level of legitimacy to meet a certain standard
already defined by the international community. The involvement of the local perspective is to enhance effectiveness and increase the level of legitimacy to meet the existing standard, which is not to dismantle international order and domination based on the sovereign state. From this perspective, local participation is complementary to supporting established global order. Heathershaw (2008) states that the order-based approach relegates the justice-based and local participatory approaches to a second issue. Society-centred bottom-up statebuilding more widely engages with civil peace. As it focuses on the dynamics of state-society to form state legitimacy, it is more likely to reflect local justice against international and elite centred rules and order. However, because it is still constructed on the premise of a sovereign state, it is difficult to escape from the idea of ‘peace-as-order’ (ibid., p. 609) and ‘peace-as-governance’ (Richmond, 2005, p. 69’.

Prior to the discussion on the hybridity of post-liberal peace, the first part started with a literature review on the idea of liberal peace of statebuilding by retaining a critical perspective on statebuilding. All statebuilding approaches are trapped in peace-as-order of liberal peace through rules and order, despite attempts by the second generation of peacebuilding to shift to peace-as-justice from the bottom. Moreover, the main cause of this phenomenon is that the Weberian state is considered a major premise of discussion on liberal peace. Without denaturalising the default definition of the Weberian state, which has been taken for granted, any peace approaches taking the state as a method may not achieve sustainable peace as they expected.

The criticism of liberal peace calls for a shift to post-liberal peace, with a focus on the liberal-local hybrid (Tadjabakhsh and Richmond, 2011; Richmond, 2011a). The criticism of liberal peace has various strands (Tadjabakhsh and Richmond, 2011) although it can largely be categorised into two (e.g. Chandler and Richmond 2015): one tends to deny or limit international intervention (Chandler, 2010; Lidén, 2011) based on doubt about the linear progress of society and the emancipatory potential of modernisation (Chandler, 2013a, 2013b) and liberal rationality (Paris, 1997); in contrast, the other concedes the emancipatory potential of liberalism based on the Kantian optimism and the autonomous individual human being, and suggests a hybrid approach. This suggestion is based on the assumption that the local society have a self-determination to adopt, resist, subvert and ignore liberal peace, before returning to bottom-up approaches with consideration of engaging with cultures, identity and society (Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011; Richmond, 2011a, 2001b; Tadjbakhsh and Richmond, 2011).
1.3.2. Liberal-local hybridity toward post-liberal peace

Richmond (2010a) suggests that liberal-local hybridity is a fourth generation of PCS. The fourth generation stands on the critiques of the third generation – liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding, which rhetorically pursues both top-down and bottom-up approaches but reveals its limitations in addressing justice, human rights, welfare, culture, identity and so forth. The third generation were criticised because of their Western-centric state conception, universal claims, top-down institution-building, neoliberal or even neo-colonial characteristics, rationalism and secularism.

Criticism of the fourth generation is not only related to rhetoric and praxis of international intervention, but also the ‘romanticisation of the local’. It is clear that much normative criticism is aimed at liberal peacebuilding, which has rarely considered or has even omitted culture, social welfare, human security, local participation and civil society during projects. With this said, however, peacebuilding tends to conflate top-down and bottom-up approaches when considering social and cultural factors. Local participation and civil society involvement are often rhetorically retained in the context. In terms of civil society’s involvement, because the subject of civil society relates to individuals and the subject of international organisations and IFIs relates to the state, co-operation is rarely witnessed; rather, civil society is often co-opted by international organisations and IFIs who exclusively hold major resources so as to secure funds from the resource competition with other NGOs. For this reason, criticism of peacebuilding is mainly focused on the behaviours of the international community, although this does not mean that civil society working with the local community is better than the international community’s peacebuilding. Shedding light on the negative aspects of local practices, Richmond (ibid. 2010b, 2011c, 2014) notes that the fourth generation also cautions against the romanticisation of indigenous practices. As highlighted by Chopra and Hohe (2004), international efforts towards peace in conflict zones cannot be self-sustained without local consensus and participation. In this vein, local participation is important in peacebuilding projects and peacebuilding may actually accommodate civil and local society while increasing local ownership. Indeed, customary and traditional judicial practices and reconciliation, such as *gachacha* in Rwanda, have been highlighted in recent discussions concerning peacebuilding (Clark, 2007). On the other hand, customary and traditional practices can also have negative features, such as corruption, culture of violence and discrimination against women and youth. Therefore, the fourth generation is critical of
anything that undermines everyday peace.

Theoretical and empirical studies on hybridity in PCS have emerged in the wake of post-liberal peace. Many private, regional and international actors have been engaged in improving peacebuilding in practice to open up to cultural and customary local dynamics, with the aim of developing liberal-local hybrid peacebuilding. Empirical research on hybrid peace and hybrid political orders has been conducted in several countries, such as Somaliland, Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands, with more studies set to come (Boege et al., 2008; Moe, 2011, 2013; Richmond, 2011c; Wallis, 2012a, 2012b). Theoretical discussion on hybridity in PCS has also developed (Peterson, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2011; Millar, 2014). Hybridity in PCS has been the subject of exploratory studies seeking a new approach to the failure and fragility of states from rich ethnography (e.g. Boege et al., 2007, 2008). In the early stages, literature on hybridity in PCS is therefore descriptive, so as to illustrate the mixture of international and local elements. While the number of empirical studies focusing on hybridisation has increased, scholarly attempts to theorise hybridity in PCS have also begun, mainly among the critical school. While the adaptation of the concept of hybridity was mainly led by the critical school, it has been gradually accepted at the practical level of interventionist policy to protect liberal peace. The concept of hybridity has already been widely incorporated into various sectors such as law, security, and governance in PCS.

A decade history of hybridity in PCS can possibly be summarised by the continuum between the problem-solving camp and critical studies (e.g. Pieterse, 1994; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015). The problem-solving camp simply understands hybridity as a characteristic of offspring resulting from grafting one to another in a biological sense and interprets the concept of hybridity as a simple mixture of two binary institutions such as, for instance, international, liberal, formal, and top-down versus local, illiberal, customary, informal, and bottom-up. In academia, much of the literature focuses on institutionalising hybridity as sympathising with criticism of liberal peace. Instead of inquiring about knowledge and power of liberal peace, it accepts hybridity as a complement to liberal peace, and hence tends to simply analyse interplay between the international and local actors to theorise hybrid institutions. Belloni (2012), who suggests the concept of hybrid peace governance, notes its potential to create a more stable peace process which reflects the local reality of conflict. Jarstad and Olsson (2012)’s study on Afghanistan addresses a form of hybrid local ownership in peacebuilding operations; they note the international need to support legitimated local actors who could be the owners of a new political order.
and seek to transform illiberal values, norms and behaviour to liberal. In this sense, hybrid local ownership is the local ownership of liberal peace.

At the policy-orient level, international actors such as the UN and multilateral agencies utilise hybrid political order to overcome the limited recognition and legitimacy of their intervention in the eyes of the local people. This tendency is precisely presented in policy documents regarding transitional justice; examples of this include OHCHR’s hybrid courts as a rule-of-law tool for post-conflict states (OHCHR, 2008) and the European Commission’s principle of complementarity to bridge between international and national justice, especially for the effective and efficient functioning of the ICC in war-affected states (European Commission, 2013). Mendez (2009) also observes that hybrid courts can reduce the cost and increase the level of legitimacy of ownership, as is the case for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Kumar and De la Haye (2012) who argue that infrastructures for peace constitute a method of hybrid peacemaking, also note that national infrastructures can cost-effectively resolve conflict in a more inclusive manner. The problem-solving camp takes hybridity based on the self-criticism of top-down intervention and assumes that an international-local peacebuilding hybrid will bring better results for liberal peace projects. Hybridity, in this camp, is a method with which to defend liberal peace.

Even though the hybrid approach of the problem-solving camp represents merely one side of hybridity in the continuum, it is unfortunately seen as a typical hybrid approach, and thus there has emerged great suspicion and criticism of the conceptual value of hybridity in PCS (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015). Criticism of hybridity is based on two main points: the concept of hybrid peace repeats assumptions, values and taxonomies of liberal peace, such as liberal and international versus non-liberal, tradition, and customary (ibid.); secondly, this dichotomic approach, which stands on assumptions of liberal peace, eventually results in the romanticisation of the local. Sabaratnam (2013) notes that the hybrid approach, which embraces society, would make it possible to create inclusive citizenship and a genuine social contract but, in fact, replicates the ambition of liberal social transformation. In this respect, the hybrid approach is a bypass to build a more inclusive state where there once stood an empty shell; this will be achieved through a framework of global and local elites (Nadarajah and Rampton, 2015). Indeed, it tends to romanticise the illiberal or even oppressive local features by depoliticising the local devoid of social and historical aspects like cases of socialism and nationalism in Sri Lanka, and Yugoslav (Höglund and Orjuela, 2012). Acharya (2004) also draws attention to
‘romanticising the local’ by pointing out that local agents can reconstruct foreign norms considered as universally ‘good’ in order to enhance their prior local norms, beliefs and institutions, which are often contrastively considered as ‘bad’. From the perspective of those who perceive foreign norms as good and local norms as bad, the hybrid project for localising international values fails if the local manipulate the foreign norms to justify their prior local norms. In this sense, it can be said that the hybrid model cannot promise to offer more context-based approaches or an alternative to more sustainable development and peace. Therefore, increased hybrid programming such as hybrid courts and governing structures in a policy based on the normative assumption on hybridity can be confronted with unexpected results; as such, the capacity and intention of political actors in the hybrid process should be considered and their belief in the results of hybridity should be questioned. Richmond (2010b, p. 689) also points out that ‘the liberal-local hybrid can represent a combination of very negative political practices (for example, rigorously determined liberal institutionalism and market development solutions with patriarchal, feudal, communal or sexist practices)’. These negative scenes of hybrid programming can be inversely used to justify international interventions (Nadarajah and Rampton, 2015). As a result, critics insist that the hybrid approach is another strategy to save liberal peace in crisis, and not an agenda for post-liberal peace.

The critical camp is aware of criticism of hybridity per se, but denies a sweeping criticism of it. The response of critical scholarship states that the critique of hybridity is mainly derived from misunderstanding hybridity based on a biological definition (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015). Indeed, they criticise the problem-solvers’ hybrid approach by arguing that it is a mere attempt to institutionalise hybridity so as to achieve completion of the liberal order. However, they do not negate the necessity of the concept of hybridity; instead, they emphasise its conceptual potential to challenge the hegemonic power implicit in liberal peace (Mac Ginty, 2010, 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015; Peterson, 2012; Richmond, 2011a, 2011b). Indeed, responding to the critique of binary, they point out that the criticism stands on the fallacy of dualism based on essentialism. They concede the innate dualism of hybridity but emphasise that it rests on power relativism rather than essentialism. Focusing on the asymmetric power between the local and global, customary and tradition do not merely denote subaltern’s knowledge dismissed in the asymmetric global hegemony of liberal order, but also its authenticity. Since the concept of hybridity implies asymmetric power relations, its potential for emancipation through resistance has been discussed in cultural and post-colonial studies (Bhabha 2004; Hall 1993; Gilroy
According to Nederveen Pieterse (1994, p. 172), ‘an assimilationist hybridity’ is at one end of the scale, and ‘adopts the canon and mimics the hegemony that leans over towards the centre’. At the opposite end, ‘a destabilising hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current subverts the centre’. The former refers to acceptance, while the latter refers to resistance blurring (passive) or destabilising (active) the canon. Bhabha (2004, p. 159) also understands hybridity as resistance, explaining that hybridity is ‘the strategic reversal of the process of domination through disavowal’. Richmond (2011b) notes that hybridity is not a mixture of different approaches or ideas for peacebuilding, but rather a strategy to resist dominant (neo-)liberal peacebuilding approaches following Bhabha. If local actors modify the liberal model and express their own different practices, they will challenge liberal values and norms, as well as institutional arrangement. The act of modification shows that local actors have important influential power. In this sense, the forms of hybridity that partly accept and resist liberal peacebuilding could debilitate the intention of liberal co-option.

Much like above, hybridity in the critical camp signifies resistance against and attempts to denaturalise the established and dominant canon of liberal peace; as such, it accompanies the emancipatory potential. In this sense, hybridity’s emancipatory potential tends to be derived from a more conceptual basis of power rather than a physical outcome, and this is the reason why the process of hybridisation must be focused in terms of power relations. However, the hybrid approach has received a great deal of attention, not only in academia but also in policy-oriented and diplomatic sectors; accordingly, general criticism of hybridity is constructed based on a misunderstanding of hybridity. Thereby, the emancipatory potential of hybridity has been under-evaluated. By shedding light on the misreading of hybridity implied by the institutionalisation of hybridity, this study understands hybridity based on power relations and presumes the emancipatory potential of hybridity against the dominant liberal peace, therefore opening discussion on post-liberal peace.

1.3.3. Hybrid state-formation

As the second half of this chapter aims to conceptualise ‘hybrid state-formation’, it reviews discussion on post-liberal peace and hybridity in PCS. Finally, the last part puts forth the definition of ‘hybrid state-formation’ used in the present thesis; this is achieved
by wrapping up discussion on the first and second generation of statebuilding and hybridity.

Underpinning the concept of the state of statebuilding and peacebuilding is the Weberian state. When considering Beetham’s assertion that the ‘problem of Weber is none other than the problem of liberalism itself’ (Beetham, 1989, p. 322), it is clear that statebuilding and peacebuilding cannot be free from the problem of liberal peace if statebuilding and peacebuilding retain the concept of the Weberian state. Hence, in order to overcome the limitations of statebuilding and peacebuilding, it is necessary to question the concept of the state as asserted earlier. Being aware of the necessity of a new definition of the state, there is a need to discuss a new approach to understanding the state in non-liberal or non-Western societies – hybrid state-formation.

To begin with, the question of ‘why hybrid state-formation?’ must be clarified; this can be done by recalling the previously-mentioned implications of ‘state-formation’ and ‘hybridity’. In this study, hybridity is interpreted in two ways: firstly, it is understood as constituting interactions in the relation between dominance and subordinance and, secondly, it is a challenge of dominance. As addressed, the binary implied in hybridity is relative, thus meaning that the identity of dominance is only relevant to that of subordinance through reflective self-cognition of its relative power. In this sense, the notion of hybridity cannot proceed without self-cognition on the imbalance of power engendering injustice; hence, hybridity is interpreted as a form of challenge toward the imbalance of power structure and those who gain benefits from it. Hybridity is interpreted as a sense of power. Applying this interpretation in the context of conflict-affected society, the present study applies hybridity and focuses on its conceptual capability to address power relations in conflict-affected societies, especially where UN peacebuilding missions have been deployed; the purpose of this is to discover groups of people who are relatively less concerned with statist top-down statebuilding and peacebuilding, as well as to delineate the interplays among them.

State-formation refers to a historical process to construct the state in a society. This concept directly contradicts that of statebuilding, the latter of which is an external-led and normative project for social transformation of the conflict-affected society; indeed, state formation concentrates on analysing the internal societal process of forming the state. In the context of conflict-affected society, the project of statebuilding is unavoidable under the ostensible liberalism of the international community. It seems to be a given condition for the recipient society as an external effect in economic terms; as such, its effect on the
society must be reflected in the societal process of state-formation. Since the state-formation embraces the external project of statebuilding being imposed on the conflict-affected society, this is a framework which makes it possible to capture the interaction between the international community and the conflict-affected society. Indeed, with a focus on the interaction between indifferent extents of power between the international/liberal and local, the state-formation framework is very appropriate and suitable when it comes to using hybridity to address the imbalance of power.

The meaning of hybrid state formation may become clearer if it is compared to hybrid statebuilding. In terms of the latter, hybrid refers to grafting A onto B, and is the more appropriate definition to be matched with statebuilding. As noted above, statebuilding is an external-led project, with the tool of institutional-building making it possible to transform the ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state into a liberal democratic society. However, with the international community having witnessed the failure of their project, the second generation of statebuilding, with a focus on local needs and legitimacy, has drawn the attention of researchers. Discussion on hybridity emerged in this phase, following empirical studies. However, the second generation was not devoid of external-led characteristics because its discussion was prone to a focus on legitimisation of the external project via engaging with the local society – localisation. This strategic approach of localisation has become mainstreamed; while it has been named the hybrid approach, it retains its problem-solving approach characteristics. Its problem-solving nature, led by international intervention, distinguishes it from hybrid state-formation and implicitly demonstrates why hybrid state-formation has to be studied.

In terms of defining the concept of hybrid state-formation, the implications of hybrid state-formation can be presented by two points. First, it opens the discussion on non-Western state theory. In IR, when highlighting the historicity inherent in the concept of the state, there is a need to engage with the historical sociology (Hobson, 2002); however, this has methodological limitations, since it failed to connect its limited Western history of state-formation and modernity to the rest of the world (Bhambra, 2007). Although the intellectual history of the state is far longer, as noted by Poggi (1978), Weber’s concept of the state is universally accepted as a start point to study the state not only in IR but also sociology. A few have attempted to expand research subjects in the historical sociology to the non-European state, but simply ended up with variations of modernity (e.g. Arjomand 2014), without challenging the Weberian state and modernity articulating with European history (Bhambra, 2016). In contrast, hybridity makes it possible to turn the focus of the
state-formation from normative modernity to the remaining societies’ history, culture and societal structure, which used to be dismissed. Placing non-Western society at the centre of things makes it possible to consider its state-formation, which obviously has a different historical track; indeed, this could well be the first step in resisting the ideal state. This is a task given to all states in existence.

Second, by examining hybrid state formation in the non-Western context, it may be possible to find a positive relation between the state and peace. The state is considered to be fairly distant from peace. According to the liberal principle, the state can create peace through providing and protecting social orders and rules. However, the implied violence in its historicity from European state formation (see Tilly, 1985) and its legitimacy to use monopolised power (Weber, 1970) have posed threats in the form of inter-state Wars and authoritarian and totalitarian states throughout history. In the context of conflict-affected societies, statebuilding was implemented to build liberal peace but ultimately resulted in the demise of peace. Several academics have pointed out tensions between statebuilding and peacebuilding (Call, 2008; Menocal, 2011; Newman, 2013; Richmond, 2013). Focusing on the history of state-formation, statebuilding is far from peace due to its violent process, which often leads to engagement in wars (Menocal, 2011; Newman, 2013; Richmond, 2013). Indeed, statebuilding can destroy peace due to its political nature, which continuously creates winners and losers. The losers in the process of statebuilding (such as warlords) could eventually engender armed conflicts or resistance, e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In this circumstance, peace achieved by statebuilding pertains to victor’s peace. Tilly (1985, p. 12) notes that ‘the formation of the state through indigenous or internal violence between competing groups and their agendas, which often turn the state into a criminal and predatory, elite racket’. In this respect, Newman insists that international peacebuilders should recognise intrastate conflict: ‘statebuilding conflicts; conflicts related to the control, political vision and constitution of the state; challenges to the territorial control and reach of the state; and conflicts emerging or re-emerging in the context of state breakdown and state reconfiguration (2013, p. 157)’. As such, the Western state-formation could not be separated from the violent conflicts, and liberal peace is a solution to terminate the conflicts. Since the state, conflicts and peace are in linear order, peace in the state does not able to exist without broken-out conflicts therefore, fundamentally incompatible with peace.

Yes, it is difficult to reject the account that statebuilding (and state-formation) inherently accompanies violence and therefore has a potential to engender conflict by defining victors
and losers, especially if we assume the Weberian model. However, it can be questioned whether non-Western state-formation also accompanies conflicts rather than peace. For instance, certain non-Western states which do not have political centralisation in Africa and the Pacific may not follow the track of Weberian state-formation; as such, it cannot be said with certainty that the history of those state-formations accompanies war and conflict. For example, Herbst (2014) argues that the African state-formation is completely different from the European state formation, as it has distinct conditions, such as low density due to the large land and various forms of topography. Compared to the European elites, the African elites have less will to expand territory of power because of the abundance of land they enjoy and the high cost of warfare; thus, warfare with the aim of expanding of territory is not justified. As seen, certain non-Western society states are exceptive cases, demonstrating that the state would not be a by-product of warfare. This gives rise to the possibility that there could be other approaches to achieving peace, not just through rules and orders provided and protected by the centralised power of the Weberian state. Furthermore, finding other approaches which reflect its own history, culture, values and norms, economy and so forth, is the hybrid state-formation’s significant contribution to shaping post-liberal peace.

While hybrid state-formation has been discussed in relation to its conceptual potential for emancipation, it has limitations in terms of its application as an analytical tool. Since the forms of the hybrid state can vary according to each historical, cultural and (internal and external) political context, each process of state-formation must be discussed in its specific context and analytical tools must be developed based on each context. Hence, this study develops its own analytical tool based on a selected case, namely Timor-Leste, throughout the remaining chapters.

1.4. Conclusion

This chapter has aimed to review literature pertaining to international statebuilding and peacebuilding with the aim of justifying the necessity of a new approach to the interpretation of ‘state’, especially in the context of conflict-affected societies, which is the concept of hybrid state-formation.

First, international statebuilding has been reviewed by grouping it into two generations: top-down and bottom-up statebuilding. Top-down statebuilding appeared to criticise
international peacebuilding, as suggested in the Agenda for Peace of Boutros-Ghali (1992). This approach rests upon the failed state thesis and asserts the importance of institution-building for liberal peace. Its focus was on the justification of international intervention. In contrast, the bottom-up statebuilding approach emerged following criticism of the first generation of statebuilding. The bottom-up approach asserts that the failed state thesis is Euro-centric and a hubris account of conflict-affected societies based on the Weberian state model, which is considered to be ahistorical. Institution-building, which stands on the failed state thesis, has also been criticised due to its ignorance about importance of social legitimacy and support from the local society. Thus, its focus was on how to strengthen the relation of state and social. With regard to this, the second generation of statebuilders shed light on the local elements; some argued that engaging with local institutions can increase the level of legitimacy, while others argued that putting the society at the centre of research is more important in terms of strengthening the legitimacy. The former approach focuses on building an effective and resilient state based on the assumption that effective social service provision will increase the level of social legitimacy in the state. In contrast, the latter approach focuses on procedure legitimacy which must reflect social norms and values; therefore, its focus is on the society of the host state.

The second generation of statebuilding suggested more inclusive statebuilding which embraces the local society but still assumes the Weberian state model and aims to build liberal peace through a Weberian state system. This study claims that, if statebuilding is designed according to the Weberian state model, then any attempt to engage with the local society would repeatedly fall into a crisis of liberal peace. Therefore, in order to understand the state, a new concept has been put forward, namely hybrid state-formation; this will also help to overcome the crisis of liberal peace.

The concept of hybrid state-formation has the potential to shape post-liberal peace by turning the focus of research to the local society, and various modes of interaction between the local and global. Hybridity in hybrid state-formation is not interpreted in the biological sense which is intuitively adopted by people in general. Instead, this study follows the tradition of post-colonial and cultural studies, and therefore emphasises its potential to denaturalise established systems; this means the Weberian state model in the short term and the Western centred knowledge and power in the longer term.

As a conceptual tool with which to capture the interplays between the local and global elements, hybrid state-formation is useful but has a clear limitation as an analytical tool, because each state’s circumstance, which determines the formation of the state, differs
from one to another. Therefore, it is necessary to seek a specific analytical tool with which to understand any forms of hybrid state; indeed, this will be developed throughout the thesis.
Chapter 2. Theorising Hybrid state-formation: a web of authorities

2.1. Introduction

Based on criticism of the myth of the modern state in the former chapter, this chapter aims to formulate a state theory which is more appropriate for depicting a post-conflict state, namely the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. As the concept of state was born in Western European history, the situation in the state of Timor-Leste should be explained by referring to the history of the Timor-Leste following the tradition of historical sociology. This is mainly because the present study denies that the default concept of the state from the Weberian perspective is prevalent in a ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ state thesis (Boege et al., 2008); the default concept referred to is: ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1970, p. 78).

The history of state-formation in the Western European countries compared with Timor-Leste is significantly different. One of the outstanding differences is that the former case was a journey to achieving and reinforcing internal and external sovereignty for successful autonomy that claims social control within a territory demarcated through war. In order to claim this successful autonomy, the public and formal spheres were formed and matched with the state; this was done by separating them from the social and informal spheres. On the other hand, the latter case, as a former colony, has been a journey of achieving autonomy from foreign powers. With regard to this aim, their choice was to consolidate all areas of society under the imaged collective identity of Maubere (Timorese subalterns) rather than pitching formal, centre, and state against informal, periphery, and society. The result of this consolidation was, as all we know, the international re-proclaiming of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in 2002. The consolidation has been maintained even in the post-independent period, when international statebuilding and peacebuilding intervened with the default concept of the state. The Western European state was formed by putting itself above the society based on the dichotomy; in contrast, the Timorese state was constructed by knitting together different social powers within the governing territory without creating dichotomy, which is a critical means of modernisation. This is a significant difference between the Timorese state-formation and the Western European one.

The present study focuses on this distinctive feature of Timor-Leste and suggests a
theory known as the web of authorities to explain the form of the post-independent state Timor-Leste. Numerous authorities currently co-exist in Timor-Leste at the national level. This may not be surprising, given that the state is a type of social organisation with various groups, e.g. families, tribes, schools and religious groups. However, in terms of the extent of the territory that each social organisation reaches, more than one authority exercising their own influence over the territory is surely a different feature from the default definition of the state; indeed, the default definition emphasises ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’, especially in a world where the dichotomisation of formal/informal, public/private and state/society has not yet been processed.

This approach to a non-Western state focuses on what the society actually has, rather than arguing about what it must have. The prevalent approach to so-called weak, failed or failure states in IR was retained in the problem-solving based on the default state with modernization; this hindered academic efforts to scrutinise the non-Western state form (Bhambra, 2007). However, as the problem-solving approach in conventional statebuilding has clearly revealed its limitations, this study aims to understand the state-formation of Timor-Leste; it does so by employing process-oriented-analysis as a starting point rather than suggesting an ideal direction for the Timorese state based on assumptions regarding the lineal progress.

In this sense, the ‘web of authorities’ theory will provide a useful lens through which to identify the characteristics of the Timorese state, and Timorese state-formation. The theory first assumes the possibility of more than one authority co-existing in the state territory. This assumption leads to a change of analysis focus on state-formation: from the competition-oriented analysis between multiple authorities in order to be a supreme authority, to the relation-centred analysis. This relation is not only between authorities, but also between the authority and ordinary people, associated with the notion of vertical legitimacy. The competition-focused state theory does not necessarily focus on vertical legitimacy, because the latter is deemed to be a result of competition for centralisation (Tilly, 1985). In this sense, the vertical legitimacy was a corollary phenomenon of monopolising legitimate physical force. In contrast, in a web of authorities, centralisation is not an essential process, and therefore the legitimacy of authorities cannot be taken for granted as a result of centralisation. In this vein, exactly how these authorities are legitimated by the society must be questioned, and hence the focus should move from the state, state institutions, and their means of mobilising power and controlling the society, to people and societies who have decision power over whether or not authorities are
legitimate. Second, it enables process-oriented analysis. Since this study denies the default concept of the state born from Western European history, it must start by unpacking and tracing the historical process of Timorese state-formation in order to understand the source of authority and the process of justifying authority in the society. Third, it may enable us to design a form of the emancipatory state by changing the focus from the institutional state to the society-centred state.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first part examines the nature of the state: image and practices, particularly in non-Western societies that are aware of the domination of the Weberian state via the intervention of imperial power and the international community. The second part introduces the ‘web of authorities’ theory. It begins with an explanation of why a web is an appropriate means by which to explain the Timor-Leste based on the general description of Timorese society. This is followed by the definition of ‘web’, as well as the definition of ‘authorities’; this will make it possible to identify various authorities in Timor-Leste. Indeed, the relation between authorities is also defined in order to establish ways in which they can co-exist. Lastly, the third part explains the implication of the web of authorities as an example of hybrid state-formation.

2.2. The nature of state

In the previous chapter, it was argued that international statebuilding and peacebuilding have been designed on the premised isomorphism of the state, with a great deal of influence from the Weberian concept, in order to emphasise the necessity of a new approach to the non-Western context. Bearing this in mind, the present chapter starts by unfolding the nature of state per se; this is a first step in theorising Timorese state-formation.

Unpacking the nature of the state should be a starting point from which to understand and theorise states like Timor-Leste. The nature of the state presented here is indebted to Migdal (2004)’s work, state-in-society, as well as that of Hansen and Stepputat (2001). Although Migdal’s understanding of the state is based on premises that are monopolised by legitimate authority within a given territory and competitive relations between various social organisations for becoming a supreme authority, his explanation of the nature of the state seems a very useful starting point in terms of understanding the fundamental components (image and practices) of the state and unpacking the state of Timor-Leste.
accordingly. Hansen and Stepputat (2001) also shed light on everyday practices and symbols; indeed, they argue that these two components make the state real. This study agrees that these two are the most fundamental components of the stateness that every state has. Even though these components are the same, the state can manifest itself in different forms through each state’s practices and symbols. It is certain that everyday practices and symbols cannot be independent from the historical trajectory, culture, and tradition of each state, and hence these states cannot be identical to each other. As a result, each state necessarily has different characteristics. In this regard, unpacking the nature of the state is an attempt to establish the nature of the Timorese state-formation by abandoning the dominant state theory and instead focusing on state images and practices that imply historical and cultural background. This attempt supports the present study’s central argument that the Weberian state is one instance among numerous types of the state, which was exclusively derived from European historical trajectory.

This study suggests that the state comprises two interrelated components, namely image and practices. These two elements owe an intellectual debt to Abrams (1988) and Migdal (2004). Migdal (2004) also adopts the idea from Shils (1975), who notes that image ‘amalgamates the numerous institutions of which the performers are members and on behalf of which they exercise authority, into an image of a dominant and single centre of society’ (p.74). This means that the state is viewed as dominant and overarching, and binds numerous institutions in a given territory. The image carries a perception of the state as autonomous, unified and centralised unity within its territorial boundary (Migdal, 2004). It leads people to perceive that the institutions which they belong to or which assert authority on their behalf are generically integrated (ibid.), which can thus result in an imagined community, as stated by Anderson (2006).

Based on Anderson (ibid.)’s symbolic work tracing ‘imagined community’ as a core component of the modern state, this study argues that the image of the state is a vital component, not only when it comes to amalgamating numerous institutions under the image, but also in terms of distinguishing the state from others. The former feature of the image of the state may be homologous in every state due to the dominant perception of the state derived from 15th century Europe, as stated by Migdal (2004). On the other hand, the latter feature of the image should differ from the others because it is formed based on society’s endogenous aspects such as history, tradition, and the culture of a united entity in a given territory.

The two functions of image are like two sides of a coin in the Western history of state-
formation, because one has developed in response to the other, particularly in the era of nationalism in 19th century Europe. With the unification of Germany and Italy in the 19th century, the nation-state became the paradigmatic political unit. European states transformed the nation-state into a solid base by creating a collective identity, educating people on the national language, and introducing an ethnic representation of the national history. The competition between empires to expand territory under imperialism internally strengthened the sense of nationalism.

In non-Western society, where there was a need to adopt the Western concept of the state, the division of the two aspects of image of the state is even clearer. This is because the first feature is exogenous, as it was settled using external intervention, while the second feature is endogenous, and was formed thanks to the internal history, culture and the tradition of the entity. This is particularly significant in the colonial context, because through the interaction with exogenous elements arising from the colonial power, the colonial subjects’ own endogenous heritage appeared to be more distinctive, and was perceived by people as giving them an identity which they could use to resist the colonial power. The image of the state for the amalgamation of numerous institutions in a territory was established by the colonial power, and later by the international community’s intervention for statebuilding. Many people experienced being colonial subjects (or aid recipients), and were directly or indirectly governed by colonial authority and modern institutions through practices including public education, exposing taxation and compulsory labour, drawing a map of the physical domain of its control, controlling the borders and so forth. Indeed, all this induced people to perceive the state as a governing authority within a demarcated territory on a map. These practices of the state contributed to the formation of the image of the state, as the practices are generically similar to each other. The second feature of the state image which represents social cohesion such as nationalism arose in a completely different way to the first feature. In contrast with the mutual creation of two state images in the Western state-formation to strengthen the governance of the nation-state, the second feature of the image seems to enforce only the nation (not the state), which is characterised by resistant nationalism via emphasising national history, culture and tradition from the local perspective of post-colonial societies.

So far, the above-noted image of the state explicitly explains the territorial boundary of entity by referring to the limits of power (exclusive sovereignty) and a sense of unity (nationalism), although there is another image of the state which is bound to the social boundary. Migdal (2004) defines territorial boundary as a line drawn between the state and
the other states, while for him a social boundary is drawn between the state (public) and the private subject to its rules. The point of the social boundary, according to his explanation, is premised on the separation of the state from other non-state, private and social forces, which represents a clear internal binary of public-private and state-society in a territory. Based on this explanation, the state has an image of being separated from any other social organisations because it represents commonality as well as the interests of the general public, and also creates legal norms. In contrast with the image of the state related to a territorial boundary, this image of the state focuses on commonality and the public interests shared by most countries in the normative sense of human rights.

After the image, the second element of the state is practices (Migdal, 2004). As the image of the state is classified into exogenous and endogenous in the post-colonial society, practices can be classified accordingly. The first category of practices includes all activities designed and implemented by formal state institutions, including legislative, administrative and judicial bodies. According to the first image of the state, people’s everyday lives are in a circle of influence of these practices. Numerous policies and activities are observed directly and indirectly through institutionalised political participation, various state services including healthcare, education, justice, security and so forth, as well as the press coverage. Indeed, this is a wide range of practices, from diplomatic negotiation, to individuals’ well-being.

The practices of these formal institutions reinforce the image of the state by penetrating into people’s daily life to form an ideology that makes the image real. For instance, the spatial perception of the territory is formed through ruling geographical space (Radcliffe, 2001; Stepputat, 1999) in ways such as border control, visas, passports, citizenship, taxation and censuses, as well as visualising the boundary of the nation (Anderson 2006) and ‘imaginative geographies’ (Radcliffe, 2001, p. 27) on a map. The perception of a territory as a unitary entity is manifested by national symbols such as a national anthem, a flag, an inauguration speech by the president, a march by the national forces, and so forth. To some extent, the practice of the state could be the core element because, without these practices, the idea of the state is highly likely to cease to exist and lose its ideological power over the people.

Despite its core position, the formal institutions’ practices may have limitations when it comes to manifesting the existence of the state across the country in a given territory; this is particularly likely in the post-colonial world, where the Western governance structure that reaches every single citizen only exists to a limited extent, as in Timor-Leste. For
instance, Timorese state services only reach the capital city, Dili and a specific group of people in rural areas; furthermore, even the state services which reach these areas are of relatively poor quality. In such cases, because the aforementioned image and practices of the state have been (in)voluntarily implanted by imperial powers or international development agencies, a consensus on the image and practices from the ordinary people was hardly reached. Accordingly, the first category of image and practices cannot represent the state polity in a territorial boundary, but only in a partial boundary.

The second category (nation) of image and practices may be able to fill the gap of representation. The second category of practices, which matches the endogenous image of the state is the expressed history, culture, and tradition in the form of narratives, folk music dance, traditional ceremonies such as weddings, funerals and spiritual rites, religious rituals and so forth. These practices function as a glue, not only between people who practice similar faiths, but also from one generation to the next by passing down. If we recall the definition of the nation, it is clear that these practices are a core element of nation-building. In other words, people maintain a sense of unity by remembering or reinterpreting the past through practices. Because these practices are connected to the past, it can be said that both the practices and a sense of unity existed prior to the settlement of the concept of the state; indeed, we have to consider a time order in a community like Timor-Leste, where the spiritual relation with ancestors is still very significant. Therefore, even though the circle of the state by the first category of image and practices is limited both ideologically and institutionally, the second category of practices embedded in the everyday level can complementarily enhance the sense of unity which has been formed based on shared history, culture and tradition in a given territory. Hence, the sense of unity which is crucial in the process of state-formation may be alive in every corner of the state policy – a policy which even has weak formal institutions of the state based on the first image and practices.

The third category of the image of the state rests on the social boundary demarcating the state and society; hence, fundamentally different from the first and second categories which rest on the territorial boundary. The state image is defined by contrasting the society based on the binary of state in public realm and the society in the private realm. However, this study raises the question of the dichotomised concepts of public-private and state-society, particularly in the context of the non-Western world, including post-colonial states. The present thesis argues that dichotomy is not clearly divided and thus cannot be split into a pair (public-state vs. private-society). In actual fact, research does exist on the blurred
division of public and private in post-colonial Melanesian and African societies (Anderson, 1990; Clapham, 1996; Brown, 2007; Emsenstadt, 1973; Englebert, 2000, 2009; Geertz, 1980). These societies have the façade of Weberian modern legal-rational institutions, but conduct state affairs through kinship, nepotism, clientelism and patronage of the social realm; as a result, the state has become privatised. As noticed, previous research pertaining to the unclear division of public-private focuses on the public’s privatisation; in contrast, however, this study’s focus is the sense of commons produced in society. In the binary of public-state vs. private-society, the public-state is in charge of the production of commons; however, in many societies, the commons are also provided by non-state actors in the society. Traditionally speaking, relief work and caring services were provided by the religious institutions and the kinship community. In this sense, society is included in the public area, and hence the social boundaries of state and society cannot be explicit, as mentioned by Migdal (2004). Therefore, without pitching public-state vs. private-society, this study rather highlights commonality as an image of the state, thereby enabling not only the state practices, but also social practices in the sphere of commons enforcing the image of the state.

So far, this chapter has defined the nature of the post-colonial state in an effort to lay the foundation for theorising Timorese state-formation, with a focus on three categories of image and practices of the state that consist of the state polity. However, one missing point here is the relation between these categories, because the methods of co-existence can differ from one state to another according to the process of state-formation. In this supposed condition, the next issue which must be clarified pertains to the methods of co-existence. In the case of Western state-formation, or of almost all so-called strong states, the first two are indifferently recognised. The main reason for this is that, in terms of the power relation, the first category of image and practices has been set and retains its status of supreme authority with formal institutions; in contrast, the other image and practices complementarily exist in order to reinforce its supremacy. While they do co-exist, the second has been embraced by being formally institutionalised under the first category of the state; as such, it has successfully formed the nation-state. On the other hand, states like Timor-Leste, where the first category does not overwhelm the territory, have the second category as a coexistent counterpart with their own institutional set. The second category was introduced as the potential complement to the limited circle of legal-bureaucratic state idea and practices mentioned earlier in this section; however, in what ways the second category can be complementary to the first is yet to be elaborated on. Since being
conceptually seized with the myth of the modern state, a limited intellectual interest in other types of the state has been observed. As such, it is not surprising that research on the relation between the image and practices of the modern state and that of a social and cultural sense of unity has not been sufficient to prove a process of state-formation in the non-Western context. In this sense, the relation between the two categories and the associated institutions must be examined to theorise the state-formation of non-Western states that have different historical accounts when compared to Western state-formation. Indeed, it is vital to answer the following questions: in what ways, and how, do these different image and practices co-exist? These questions will form the core of theorising Timorese state-formation.

As a prelude to the theorisation of state-formation in Timor-Leste, an attempt is made to unveil the nature of the state, with a specific focus on the state which has lived in a non-Western historical trajectory. The state consists of two interlinked elements: image and practices, based on the acknowledgment that the state conceptually exists but becomes real through the practices. The image of the state has two characteristics. The first characteristic is more directly associated with the image of the modern state, symbolised by a supreme authority in a given territory; in contrast, the second is more closely related to the concept of nation derived from the endogenous features of social entity. In cases of post-colonial society, these two characteristics are obviously distinct. The image becomes substantial through practices. Formal institutions’ practices form the physical territory, while the supreme authority is represented by the first image of the state. So-called non-state institutions that exercise customs, traditions and religious practices actualise the second image of the state.

Considering the historically distinct context, the first category of image and practices, which is designed to allow the state to keep its supreme authority, tends to be less dominant in the majority of post-colonial societies compared to the expectations of Western society or the international aid community. These states have been recognised as weak or failed states, because of the myth of the Western modern state; therefore, both policies and research tend to focus on how other types of states transform to fit into their conceptually ideal state. However, the present study consistently argues that this is just one of the unfamiliar types of the state, which means that there could be numerous ways in which to form and structure a polity of the state. The next section pertains to the ‘other ways’, one of which is a ‘web of authorities’.
2.3. A web of authorities

According to the online oxford dictionary, a web is ‘a complex system of interconnected elements’ (English Oxford Living Dictionaries, no date). This definition notes the conditions of web, which are i) it consists of plural elements ii) which are interconnected to each other iii) to form a system. First, the web system can exist when there is more than one element, which means that it is premised on pluralism. The concept of web addresses a mutual connection between elements, and thus the web of authorities makes it possible to investigate the way in which authorities are connected. Furthermore, if we focus on relations of authorities, it will also be possible to depict the dynamics of relations according to historical changes. The web is therefore an appropriate concept when it comes to theoretically delineating Timorese state-formation. Second, the concept of web presents a system which implies an image of functional unit according to certain orders. In this regard, the web of authorities can be defined as an institutional body which has in place rules and routines between multiple authorities. Literally, a web of authorities is an institutional body comprising interconnected authorities.

A web of authorities is one of the ways in which a polity of the state can be structured. This concept is designed to depict a form of Timorese state, and its state-formation. As mentioned above, the current state of Timor-Leste has two types of image and practices of the state. In order to build the modern state according to the modern state theory, the second type of image and practices of informal institutions is supposed to support the first type of image and practices of formal institutions, the latter of which represents the supreme authority in a given territory. This implies a power relation between institutions set in a hierarchical order; indeed, formal institutions related to the first image and practices take on a higher authority compared to informal institutions as a representative of single centres in a society that amalgamates other social organisations in the informal realm. This does not seem to be observed in Timor-Leste.

In contrast with the state model described by the modern state theory, in practice, the legal-bureaucratic state does not seem to be recognised as an elevated authority governing other organisations in the informal sphere. This phenomenon is often captured by the terms ‘failed state’ or ‘fragile’ state. This naming reveals the underlying recognition of power in modern state theory, which is closely linked to the concept of victor’s peace (Richmond, 2008). As reviewed in the former chapter, Weberian historical sociologists like Tilly (1990) and Mann (2012), as well as Migdal (2004), also feel that the concept of victor’s peace is
premised on competition among numerous authorities of social organisations; these authors also hold that the supreme authority is the final winner of the competition. Because they assume the competitive power relation, the moment that numerous organisations co-exist is deemed to constitute a state of competitive process between them to obtain supreme authority; hence, scholars state that the co-existence of more than one authority gives rise to a socially insecure and unstable condition, while the existence of a single supreme authority means that the society has achieved the final equilibrium and stability. Should it therefore be the case that the co-existence of more than one authority in an organisation means that the said organisation is insecure and unstable? This study would argue that the answer is ‘no’, and would further suggest ‘a web of authority’ in order to forward another way of understanding power and peace, which suggests the methods that various authorities and informal institutions can use to stay together.

The web of authorities may be deemed to only cover the relationship between authorities according to the concept presented above in the introduction; however, it must also address the relationship between each authority and the people. This is due to the fact that the concept of authority per se implies a power relation between authority holders and those who are willing to obey them. Accordingly, the web of authorities embraces two relationships: between authorities and between authority and its followers.

![Figure 2-1 Weberian State vs. A Web of Authorities](image-url)
2.3.1. What are authorities?

Vertical social cohesion deals with the issues of the right to rule and rightful rule, and is explained by the notion of legitimate authority. Vertical social cohesion has been studied for a long time, since it is the fundamental element of the study of politics (Holsti, 1996). Considering its significant position in the study of politics, debates surrounding its definition and types are plentiful, with contributions from the likes of Aristotle, Plato, Confucius, and Mencius, as well as modern social scholars and liberal theorists. However, this study focuses on legitimacy or legitimate authority in statebuilding, while peacebuilding tends to be confined to the concept of the modern state, which is a legal-rational authority formed as a result of institutionalised consent, such as the social contract put forth by Locke and Hobbs. However, as this study highlights the so-called social sphere, other types of authority should be addressed to theorise state-formation in such a post-colonial context. In this sense, the present section addresses the nature of authority per se rather than focusing on legitimate authority linked to the modern state-formation.

The exploration of the nature of authority starts with establishing where authority is from, and when the authority becomes legitimate. Indeed, establishing these two things will aid the identification of existing legitimate authority in my case study, Timor-Leste. In order to find answers to these questions, it is fitting to introduce two different explanations of authority, namely the descriptive and normative approaches to authority. In a descriptive sense, the discussion of authority concentrates on where authority is from, whereas in a normative sense, discussion of authority focuses on when political authority is legitimate. Although most theories tend to conclude that each approach separately belongs to two different traditions: descriptive approach in sociology and normative approach in political science, the present study argues that they are, in fact, inseparable from each other.

The most influential explanation of the descriptive concept of authority comes from Max Weber. According to Weber’s theory, authority is interchangeably used with ‘domination’, because the terms are derived from the German word ‘Herrschaft’. In German, *Herrschaft* indicates ‘leadership, political authority and domination at the same time’ (Morrison, 2006, p. 363). In Weber’s writing, *Herrschaft* refers to ‘an entire system of dominance and subordination that was supported by a system of enforcement on the one hand, and a system of social regulation on the other’ (ibid.). The definition of authority or domination can be clearer if it is compared with Weber’s concept of power. According to Weber, power is ‘the ability of an individual to carry out their will in a given situation, despite resistance’
(Morrison, 2006, p. 363). Compared to this, domination is the right of a ruler to command others under ‘established orders’ and to expect that they will follow and obey (Weber, 1970, p. 78). Based on the definition of authority (domination), he attempts to show various types of political authority which have existed throughout history.

He provides three distinct types of authority, which are i) charismatic authority, ii) traditional authority, iii) legal-rational authority. The first type of authority is charismatic authority. He refers to charisma as a ‘gift of grace’, meaning ‘a certain quality of an individual’s personality which is considered extraordinary and treated as capable of having supernatural, superhuman, or exceptional powers and qualities’ of some kind (Weber, 1970, p. 241). Because of their extraordinariness, charismatic leaders hold power and are treated as leaders by others.

In addition, he explains that a leader’s claim to legitimacy comes from two levels of belief. The first is people’s belief in the extraordinary capacity, inspiration and unique moral and ethical vision of the leader. The second is people’s belief that they should follow their leader’s commands, which Weber calls ‘felt duty’ (ibid., p. 244). This represents people’s psychological connection to the leader, which makes people suspend their doubt or critical judgement on their leader’s ability. However, because charismatic authority is grounded on the belief in a leader’s extraordinariness, if a leader exhibits ordinariness or vulnerability, their power can evaporate. According to Weber’s explanation of charismatic authority, the ‘renunciation of the past’ (Weber, 1970, p. 294) is a way to obtain power; indeed, this is the relevant focus of the present research, which addresses the post-colonial context. The renunciation of the past is associated with the emancipatory struggle or revolutionary movement against the legacy of the past, which caused unbearable inequality, long-lasting suffering and historical injustice. This past enables the charismatic leader to obtain the necessary compliance from people by virtue of a call to the special mission or spiritual duty, which might be to fight against the existing oppression. Weber insists that charismatic authority often emerges when a social crisis occurs (Morrison, 2006).

The second type is traditional authority. Weber explains that when authority is based on tradition and custom, it can be said to be traditional. In traditional authority, compliance is derived from the framework of obligations which binds the ruled to the ruler via personal loyalties. The obligations are owed to the traditional status of the ruler, and the ruler’s power to command respect in accordance with tradition. The ruler can obtain this authority in two ways: first, the prestige given by tradition and the belief that the ruled must follow
the ruler’s command because the former believe that the authority is inherent in the traditional right of the ruler; and second, the virtue of the discretionary powers which are given to them by inherited titles (Weber, 1970).

The third type is legal authority. Legal authority is derived from ‘rational grounds’ and the belief in the ‘legality of enacted rules’ (ibid., p. 215). Compliance is not reliant on the personal authority of the ruler, but on the commands issued on the basis of principles of law, and impersonal legal orders. This is a key characteristic of legal authority. In this system of domination, officials in power are also subject to law, and therefore are not allowed to wield the power of personal discretion. The authority is in the legal framework.

As seen, on the one hand, authority is explained by focusing on the source of authority in the descriptive sense, as is the case with Weber. However, on the other hand, it is explained by focusing on the justification of authority. The latter is the normative approach. In a broad sense, legitimacy explains why authority used by a particular body (generally a state or a government) is permissible, and why obligations to obey its commands are accepted. From a narrow perspective, legitimacy is about the moral justification of authority. A political body can claim the right to rule and to command obligations if these claims are met with a certain acquiescence (Peter, 2016). In general, justification of authority can generally be decided by rules which integrative social agents agree to, based on motives that ‘they are freely and rationally able to articulate and justify’ (Thornhill, 2011, p. 135).

Procedure or input legitimacy can certainly be discussed in this vein. According to procedure legitimacy, the state can be legitimate when it is governed through the procedures and mechanisms by those who are accountable to use public power for their people. In Western states, the procedures are in accordance with legally enforceable formal rules which the public have agreed on (OECD, 2010). Another important dimension of procedural legitimacy is democratic representation and participation. Procedural legitimacy pertains, as stated by Dingwerth (2007), to the ‘consent’ of citizens through a participatory channel. The key features of procedure and input legitimacy are whether authority is used in accordance with rules that are democratically consented to by the people.

The procedure or input legitimacy mentioned above comprises three intertwined theories explaining legitimate political authority – instrumentalist theories, consent theories and democracy theory (Peter, 2016). The instrumentalist account is well presented by Raz (1986), who suggests the Normal Justification Thesis. He notes that ‘the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves showing that the alleged
subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly’ (Raz, 1986, pp. 19-20). This approach claims that people feel following authority is better than not following authority, and thus they then decide to follow. Once practical reasoning has been done, the authority institutionalises what and how much people owe, why people should obey commands, what they have to do, and who is in charge of coordinating the people. Another approach reflected in procedure legitimacy is consent theory. Consent theory states that an authority should have the consent of people who are subjected to that authority’s command in order to be legitimate. Locke’s natural right argument is a pre-assumption of this theory. Since every human being has the natural right to freedom, no one can command other human beings without their consent, because this could potentially violate their natural rights. Lastly, democracy theory is also a part of procedure legitimacy. It notes that consent results from democratic representation and participation.

Another type of legitimacy that can be classified as a normative approach is performance legitimacy. This rests on a utilitarian tradition (Schneewind, 1998; Barnard, 2001). It is defined in regard to effectiveness, performance and the quality of the state’s services and goods (OECD, 2010). Alagappa (1995, p. 21) points out that the proper use of power is one element of legitimacy. His concept of ‘the proper use of power’ comprises two aspects: the first is procedural legitimacy, which involves a ‘government operating within the law or other tacitly accepted rules and procedures’; and the second is referred to as performance legitimacy, specifically ‘the effective use of power to promote the collective interest of the community’. He notes that it is a prerequisite criterion that the government operates in accordance with the law or other tacitly accepted rules and procedures in order to maintain its legitimacy. He also adds that such power should be used for public purposes such as justice, security, and welfare, rather than for private gain such as corruption. If the power is used for private gain or violent threats, the government will lose its legitimacy, even if it has obtained the power within well-established rules. In most societies, the consensus on human rights such as political, social and economic rights is that they demonstrate the importance of performance in satisfying the collective will and protecting the cultural and economic welfare of citizens. Furthermore, the effectiveness of performance can be used to generate moral authority (Beetham, 1991) which used to be deployed to justify a communist state’s claim to legitimacy (White, 1986); indeed, most
states’ claims to legitimacy are based on their performance and competence, or promised achievements. As such, the effective use of power for public good (performance) is also an important aspect when it comes to strengthening legitimacy.\(^1\)

An explanation of procedure or input legitimacy has been put forth using the example of formal institutions but with a focus on the key features; indeed, as long as other authorities are met with sufficient acquiescence, it can be said that they are legitimate authorities. Of particular note here is the centrality of formal institutions of the state and legality, both of which are limited in the juristic conceptions in theoretical discussion on legitimacy and authority. Indeed, to borrow Foucault’s contention, this may be because of the domination of state-centric thought in modern political theory. Non-state institutions and organisations have frequently been dismissed from the discussion of moral justification of authority for this reason. However, according to Thornhill (2011), legitimate authority should embrace social norms, meaning that, even though state-centric political theory and juristic conceptions of law have long been mainstream, it may be difficult to state that the domain of non-state should be entirely dismissed. In addition, since the Western history of modern state-formation was delineated as a consensus of state and society, it is even difficult to confirm that political philosophy regarding legitimacy authority exclusively addressed the legitimacy of the state. The exclusive focus on state legitimacy is noticeably influenced by the state-centric political theory in the modern era. If the nature of legitimacy and reasoning of moral justification are highlighted, unofficial authorities’ various types of legitimacy can be analysed using the normative approach.

To sum up, in a descriptive sense, Weber notes three types of authority, which are charismatic, traditional and legal-rational authority. In the normative sense, authority becomes legitimate through institutionalisation, social consent, and democracy; indeed, all theories of the normative approach have a common presumption that individuals are equally free and rational, and thus they assess for themselves whether it is better to obey political authority or not. The descriptive approach tends to focus on the source of authority – why people believe that a particularly body has authority. However, the normative approach tends to focus on circumstance conditions and the mechanism which

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\(^1\) However, scholarship on legitimacy tends to exclude performance from the definitions of legitimacy. Weber (1970), for example, excludes ‘purely material interests and calculations of advantages’ as a basis of authority. The reason is that these are unable to serve as an adequate reliable basis for reparative coordination. Barker (2001) also argues that the nature of authority stems from the character of the institution or persons or procedures, rather than from the substance of what they do or what they say they wish to do.
makes people think that they owe anything to authority.

Table 2-1. Descriptive and Normative approach of Authority theory

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<th>Focus</th>
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<td>Where is authority from?</td>
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<td>Types of authority</td>
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As seen above, legitimacy is presented in two different academic traditions; however, some scholars argue that the sharp distinction does not help to understand legitimate authorities, and therefore the two concepts should be combined (Beetham 1991; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Habermas 1979; Thornhill 2011). They point out that each concept is incomplete in terms of analysing political authority. First, they criticise Weber’s theory, arguing that he dismisses people’s beliefs in authority. Their belief is not only in authority per se, but also in the justifiability of authority; for instance, Beetham says that the ‘power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs’ (Beetham 1991: 11). On the other hand, they also criticise the normative concept because it provides a limited view when it comes to understanding the actual process of legitimisation. According to Habermas (1979), the normative concept tends to generalise the conditions of authority necessary to become legitimate without considering the social process of justification. Habermas argues that consented norms under the rules, which are a prerequisite for legitimate authority in a normative approach, cannot be detached from the factual social situations in which discourse participants engage; this is because the norms result from practical needs and the concerns of participants which reflect pre-occurring socio-evolutionary change. In this sense, the generalised condition of legitimate authority is unable to exist and normative legitimacy is always socially constructed.

In a similar sense, Thornhill argues that political legitimacy requires both political and sociological perspectives. He notes that political legitimacy is primarily understood in a functional dimension, because legitimacy is derived from the ability of a political system to accept its functional purpose, to provide political performance adjusted to a specific social
structure, and to generally and effectively use power in order to stabilise the social environment. Therefore, he understands legitimacy as a ‘functional resource’ (Thornhill 2011:139) which relies on the ability of a political system to wield power in a consistent and relatively simple and self-reproducing manner, and to presuppose social compliance without over-intensified political mobilisation. However, this functional resource can only be consumed and expanded under specific conjunctures, otherwise societal exchanges of power can be easily limited or depleted if the use of power is linked to the question of justification. In addition to this, however, he also argues that political legitimacy requires a reflective dimension based on a sociological perspective. He points out that a political system reflects the norms of the society in which the system is applied; therefore, an analysis of the articulating legitimacy of norms is needed. He notes that the reflective dimension of legitimacy is ‘pre-emptive intelligence within political power’ (ibid.:140). He also suggests that legitimate political authority must be understood as a phenomenon which ‘emerges within a political system when the system adequately and inclusively correlates its practical functions and its normative-reflexive reserves’ (ibid.). In conclusion, political authority has been studied in two distinctive scholarly traditions, although both approaches are deeply inter-related; therefore, in order to examine political authority, both approaches should be considered. The descriptive approach is particularly valuable when it comes to understanding the beliefs, norms and values of the society, which has to underpin formal institutions in a normative sense. In this sense, the normative approach is also fundamentally based on the descriptive approach. Therefore, in order to identify and analyse legitimate authorities, the necessity of the integrative approach is undeniable.

Thus far, this chapter has addressed a debate on the definition of legitimate authority following theoretical arguments based on the distinction between descriptive and normative notions of legitimacy in order to explain a pillar of the web of authorities. Indeed, the necessity of bringing this debate into the present work may be questioned. Legitimate authority in the non-Western context has hitherto tended to be studied within the domain of formal institutions by political scientists; indeed, even conventional statebuilding policy takes the legitimacy of the state for granted once formal institutions and systems have been established via international assistance. The reason for this cannot be separated from the tendency of isomorphism of the state, which brings with it a certain cultural and ethnical history. Therefore, the necessity of unfolding the definitions of authority and legitimate authority has gained less attention. However, because this study holds that the government and its formal institutions are merely a part of the state, it sheds
light on the remaining part of the state, which consists of informal institutions. As such, the exact nature of authority must be clarified, as must the question of exactly when the authority becomes legitimate; this will make it possible to identify and analyse authority and legitimacy in the informal sphere, which has received less academic attention. The integrative notion of legitimate authority is particularly more relevant when it comes to examining the web of authorities, which consists of various authorities that could be underpinned by different norms and values in the socio-evolutionary change.

2.3.2. Relations of authorities in a web of authorities

The next relation implied by the web of authority is relations between authorities. Thus far, this chapter has shown that various vertical relations can be expressed in a given territory. As such, the next question relates to which kinds of interactions can be made in various authorities; indeed, answers to this question will be sought within relations between authorities. Most state theorists who presuppose a single authority in a state therefore feel that a situation where more than one authority exists is an unstable and incomplete situation; this is because they presume that the relation among the authorities should be competitive. The single authority in a given territory is deemed to be the victor resulting from competition. This interpretation dismisses any possibility that more than one authority can co-exist in the territory from the beginning, and this is not separate from the idea that the state and society are divided. However, as this study has already pointed out, the clear division of the state and society cannot be applied as a precondition in the post-colonial context. Hence, this study raises the question of state theorists’ presumption of a monopoly of authority in a given territory, and the competitive relation of co-existence between multiple authorities observed in the post-colonial context, whereby the embedded presumption of the state-society division is in doubt. Analysing relations between authorities starts from this doubt, and in the context that demarcation of the state and society is blurred.

In contrast with conventional state theory, relations between authorities can be introduced as a result of the postulation that plural authorities may co-exist based on agonistic respect (Connolly, 2002) rather than a competitive or antagonistic relation (Mouffe, 2013). With reference to this agonism, the present study assumes that various authorities are able to form a web system in a territory. In order to understand how the agonistic relation can be made and to further contribute to the formation and solidification
of the unity, it is necessary to review agonism theories.

In terms of the relevant agonism theorists, here it is fitting to review the arguments of Arendt, Mouffe, and Connolly, who address the necessity of commonality or consensus as a prerequisite for the agonistic relation in order to understand the way in which social relations are formed and operated in a web of authorities. In brief, Arendt, Mouffe, and Connolly share two points of argument. First, they all emphasise the ineradicable political contestation in contrast with Habermas’ rationalist perspective on consensus in public space. Although some scholars, such as Bernstein (2015) and Benhabib (2003), find similarity between Habermas’ public space and Arendt’s political space for open dialogue and consensus, Villa (1992) argues that Arendt’s theory on public space is different from Habermas’ teleological space; he proves his point by linking it with the agonistic spirit of post-modernists such as Foucault (1990) and Lyotard (1984), who emphasise political action such as resistance and speech to express plurality by raising their voices based on equality. It is unnecessary to say that plurality accompanies antagonistic contestation by revealing a distinct self from others. Mouffe (2013) also emphasises that antagonism is unavoidable when it comes to protecting plurality, as it carries a demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The differences must be acknowledged and expressed in order to ensure political dynamics and openness by challenging any dominant pattern and normalisations. Connolly (2002) also presents the importance of political contestation in a similar sense, stating that the contestation is needed due to its positive effect on participants, who are thus able to recognise the contingent feature of identities in relation with others. As shown, these three agonism theorists welcome conflicts and contestation by acknowledging their contribution to agonistic politics.

Second, despite their emphasis on the inescapability of political contestation, these scholars certainly admit the necessity of shared rules among parties. The political contestation, here, is far distant from Schmitt’s account of enmity. Political contestation and dissent do not mean that parties define each other as an enemy who should be defeated, but rather as an adversary (as stated by Mouffe, 2005) who is able to co-exist by articulating political configuration. In order to have adversarial relations, parties need to have a certain level of consensus on rules in political contestation; Arendt requires moral consensus as a precondition (Arendt 1998; Schaap 2007). In addition, Mouffe (2013) notes the need for a grammar of democratic life, and Connolly (2002) premises agonistic respect. Each of them suggests their own terminology, although a penetrating argument is that to achieve agonistic relations, there is the need for a consensus which admits the existence of
others and their value systems. This common ground is absolutely fundamental to the pursuit of agonistic plurality. Although the agonism theories developed to take democracy into account mainly focus on Western society, these two shared features send relevant messages in terms of drawing relations between authorities in the web.

A web of authorities assumes that the agonistic relation is an idealistic relation between authorities based on pluralism. As briefly reviewed, agonism cannot be achieved without contestation, since the identity of each authority can only be clarified through differentiating itself from other authorities. Hence, contestations are an essential process when it comes to forming the pluralistic condition of a web consisting of multiple authorities that may have counter values, hegemony and praxis; indeed, these counter or dissimilar features are articulated through unavoidable political contestations. If authorities reach a consensus of pluralism based on mutual respect, then the relation can become agonistic.

Idealistic relations between authorities based on agonistic respect implies a process of transformation. In terms of the web of authorities, authorities must first be legitimate in order to be classed as an element of the web; second, the antagonistic relation of contestations must be communicated in order to clarify the identity and difference; and third, if the antagonistic relation successfully transforms to the agonistic relation through the reaching of a consensus of co-existence. Therefore, if we consider this process of transformation as the process of state-formation, then building idealistic relations between authorities is part of the process of state-formation; if this is the case, then it cannot be discreetly interpreted from the historicity of a society. Therefore, exactly how the agonistic relation has been formed or can be formed should be addressed in the historical context.

This study theorises that Timorese state-formation would bring historicity into political contestations; indeed, this reminds us of the importance of historical trajectory in state-formation. The political contestations in agonism theories do not focus a great deal on the historical background, but rather concentrate on the relation between the two parties articulating their difference in the status quo. Considering that the agonism theories were developed based on democratic theory, historicity may not be their major interest. However, when looking at the difference and identification of multiple authorities through the political contestation in the context of state-formation, historicity is critical in terms of understanding the contestation and identity of each authority. Another vital feature of historicity in agonism theories is related to the precondition for the agonistic relation, which is shared order and rule. One of the missing links in the agonism theories is that,
although they note the necessity of shared order in terms of morality, grammar of political life, and agonistic respect, they do not explain ways in which it is possible to reach a fundamental social consensus on the shared order. It is understandable that agonism theories have been developed in the Western political context, and hence authors and leaders may use their common values (i.e. human rights, democracy, rationality and the rule of law) to understand ‘morality’. In this sense, less importance could be assigned to considering the effects of the process of consensus on moral order in the society. On the other hand, with regard to so-called post-colonial societies, mainly in the Third World, the moral standards and language may be dissimilar to the societies where agonism theories were developed; therefore, questions must be asked regarding the exact nature of their socially shared values and moral standards, as well as how these became common ground. These questions have to be reviewed in the historical context.

Regarding the above questions, hints may be interestingly found in work of Trindade (2008), Hohe and Ospina (2002) and Traube (1986). According to them, exogenous authorities gained legitimacy in the eyes of the Timorese with a common strategy which is accepting the local customs and structures. Due to consistent Timorese resistance to the colonial rule, Portuguese authority determined to create relations with the local kings (liurais) via blood oaths and marriage in order to finish wars (Hohe and Ospina, 2002). Traube (1986), who studied the Mambai people’s life in Portuguese periods, also notes that the Portuguese were integrated into the local system as accepting a status of outsider who is considered as a younger brother according to dualistic classification in the Timorese customs. Indeed, Trindade (2008) notes that exogenous authorities like the Church maintain their legitimacy due to their successful integration into the local system. The literature above reveals how exogenous authorities become legitimate, and as a result co-exist in the present Timor-Leste.

The start of agonistic relations in the case of Timor-Leste is first, the understanding of difference, and second, the acceptance of the local order and the creation of traditional agreement which guarantees co-existence. Once the exogenous authority made an agreement with endogenous authority, the former can exist with the latter in the relation of (imagined) kinship. Compared to agonism theory, acceptance of the local system is a similar idea to creating a consensus of agonism theorists and indeed, accompanies relational transformation from enemy to (imagined) kinship. However, the biggest difference between West-born agonism and Timor-born pluralism seems to be obvious in terms of agency and relations. The West-born agonism highlights the agency of each party while the
Timor-born pays less attention to that and rather sheds light on the relation. This is well represented in the West-born agonism’s emphasis on creating shared order and morality among two agents. In contrast, Timor-born pluralism importantly addresses the making of relationship rather than the creating rules; the legitimacy of the newly arrived authority is derived from the relationship (kinship) with the endogenous authority, thereby co-existing.

![Figure 2-2  West-born agonism vs. Timor-born agonism](image)

This does not mean that the relation of co-existence will continue as it was first made. The relation would be relevant if the authorities follow the principle of reciprocity, which is the dominant relational principle in Timorese customary practice (Cummins, 2014). If an authority requires unacceptable commitment in the principle of reciprocity or uses coercive methods to control the relation, the pluralism would not be retained. The Portuguese and Indonesian authorities are examples for this; both authorities made relations through blood oath with liurai in order to be integrated, but their aim in this was to efficiently control the Timorese society, thereby manipulating the relation for their own benefits. In the end, these authorities became no longer relevant in Timor-Leste. In this sense, not only is making a relation (building network) important but also maintaining the relation in accordance with expected rules and order, and then the pluralism can be maintained.

In spite of the significant difference in terms of understanding agency and relation, the
agonistic pluralism offers a good guidance to understand co-existence of various authorities, particularly in terms of prerequisites for plurality – mutual respect and moral consensus (respecting local orders of making relations in the case of Timor-Leste). Indeed, since it encompasses the relational transformation from antagonistic contestation to agonistic relation for co-existence, it could be an appropriate idea to explain the process-oriented state-formation.

In summary, the present section describes the relation between authorities. If social cohesion between authorities is strong, this means that various authorities co-exist based on agonistic respect rather than the antagonistic relation. The consent condition for the agonistic co-existence of various authorities such as morality, grammar of political life, and agonistic respect is rules and order; indeed, this enhances social cohesion in the web of authorities. The social cohesion based on agonistic respect must be addressed in the historical context, because the agonistic relation implies the process of transformation. In this sense, the social cohesion of the web of authorities also supports process-oriented state-formation – a notion which the present study pursues.

In this section, a web of authorities has been introduced. The web of authorities is an effective tool with which to understand the dynamics of state-formation in terms of the relation not only between authorities, but also between legitimate authorities and people who voluntarily grant the legitimacy. Focusing on the latter relation, the section also addressed legitimacy theory in two distinct theoretical traditions, namely descriptive and normative approaches; however, it was also made clear that the integrative approach is appropriate when it comes to understanding the relation between authority and people, as stated by Beetham (1991), Buchanan and Keohane (2006), Habermas (1979), and Thornhill (2011).

Although these scholars’ arguments were expanded based on the example of legal-rational authority because the analysis is mainly conducted in the Western context, they argue that the conditions for normative legitimacy are applicable to other authorities. Hence, this suggests that the integrative approach and the descriptive approach provide a useful lens through which to identify existing authorities, while the normative approach helps to establish which authority is considered legitimate by the people. Indeed, if the authority holds legitimacy based on the norms and values which endogenously developed, its authority would be strongest. Second, this section drew on the agonism theory put forth by Arendt (1998), Mouffe (2005, 2013), and Connolly (2002, 2005) to explain social cohesion between authorities and to account for relations between authorities. It assumed
that agonism theory helps to designate ideal social relations between authorities that must be built on pluralism and agonistic respect between authorities, but argued that the track to reach to pluralism is slightly different from West-born agonist theory. Drawing upon the writings of Hohe and Ospina (2002), Traube (1986), and Trindade (2008), it emphasises that respecting customary orders is a key to making and maintaining a network. In sum, legitimacy and agonism theory introduced certain ways in which to create relations which set out socially acceptable rules and the order of a web of authorities that transforms the polity into a systematic unity, namely the state.

2.4. From a web of authorities to hybrid state-formation

So far, this chapter has focused on theorising a web of authorities; however, it must be reiterated that a web of authorities is an attempt to explain one of the models of hybrid state-formation, particularly by drawing upon post-colonial contexts, such as Timor-Leste. Yet how and why a web of authorities can serve as a model of hybrid state-formation has not been explicitly addressed. This final section will therefore answer these questions so as to highlight the potential of a web of authorities as a form of hybrid state-formation.

In order to explain the relation between a web of authorities and hybrid state-formation, it is necessary to recall the meaning of hybrid state-formation. As reviewed in the former chapter, the recent debates on hybridity in IR and peace and conflict studies have been limited in terms of developing another blueprint of institutionalising hybridity; this dismisses the value of hybridity in nature, which is derived from post-colonial studies (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2015). Thus, the present study has pointed out the limitations of academia and policy circles’ attempts to institutionalise hybrid political orders; it has also argued that hybridity must be interpreted as a power issue, particularly at the meta level. Based on this interpretation of hybridity, hybrid state-formation focuses on the power relation between liberal democracy and rationality delivered with the externally injected Weberian state concept and the local and traditional norms and values in the process of (re-)constructing the state. This could well open the discussion on a new form of state, thereby denaturalising the established Weberian state in IR.

A web of authorities is a tool used to delineate the relations between authorities including the liberal (rational-legal) and non-liberal (spiritual, religious, or customary) authorities, and their rules for co-existence in non-Western societies. Since hybridity
became a popular concept in IR and PCS, overloaded expectation on hybridity as a solution for the failure of the (neo-)liberal approach in international peacebuilding and statebuilding, and critical analysis and concern over its potential have emerged together (e.g. Andersen 2012a; Nadarajah and Rampton 2015; Belloni 2012; Mac Ginty 2010, 2011; Millar 2014; Millar et al. 2013; Roberts 2008, 2013a, 2013b; Richmond and Mitchell 2011; Richmond 2005, 2014; Wallis 2012a, 2012b). The critical concern on the hybridity in the practical level is about its potential for the reiteration of liberal peace implied in a top-down approach of international peacebuilding and statebuilding (Chandler, 2013a, 2013b; Chandler and Richmond, 2015; Richmond, 2014) thereby probably undermining hybridity’s positive impact on ‘bringing the local back’. This criticism is relevant but only when the power is understood in a liberal sense (i.e. the hegemon - subordinator).

A web of authorities extends the power concept into the relational perspective thereby possibly embracing the existence of multiple authorities (respecting local agencies), and focusing on the nature of co-existence in the process of non-Western state-formation of Timor-Leste, which has a dissimilar trajectory from the West.

As a tool, the web of authorities particularly targets explaining the non-Western state. As explained when referring to the nature of a state, the image and practices of the state in non-Western societies cannot be the same as in Western societies. The significant differences are: first, the image of the nation-state was born in order to mutually reinforce each other in the Western history of state-formation – creating a supreme authority while demarcating their territory. Conversely, in most non-Western states, and particularly post-colonial societies, the image of the nation has developed due to non-state actors resisting imperialism and international intervention brought about by the Western state, and its norms, values and institutions. The supreme authority of the state is formed based on imported institutions and a value system led by external actors; in contrast, the concept of the nation is developed based on a form of resistance to nationalism. Indeed, the Western image of the state is emphasised in relation to its publicness, which contradicts society’s private characteristics; however, in many non-Western societies, publicness is not only in the sphere of the state, but also of the society. Therefore, practices related to common and public interests are also carried out by non-state actors. These differences make it clear that the supreme authority is not only an actor, but that non-state authorities also exist to practice the publicness or commonality of stateness, hence requiring a new analysis tool to understand such society’s state-formation, and a web of authorities is useful for this.

Ultimately, a web of authorities is a tool used to describe the possibility of various forms
of the state existing, and therefore it signifies a new state theory. Indeed, by addressing the methods of co-existence used by authorities based on agonistic pluralism, it raises the question of where liberal peace stands in the Weberian state; this has resulted from competition and war-oriented state-formation to create the monopoly of supreme authority. This highlights the agonistic pluralism as a form of post-liberal peace by more widely addressing social and political injustice in liberal and non-liberal perspectives. The web of authorities fundamentally challenges the Weberian state and is considered an ideal type of state in statebuilding and peacebuilding, thereby implicitly revealing the hybrid’s emancipatory potential from the West-centred global order.

Thus far, the web of authorities has been addressed as an ideal form of the state but it should note that the web of authorities does not always manifest positive results. This chapter has attempted to theorise positive hybridity by referring to particular concepts (i.e. legitimate authority and agonism) in order to explain relations linking constituents in a web of authorities. First, the existence of multiple authorities means that, by considering the relation between authority and people, various communication channels and values possibly exist; the existence of various communication channels means that the people’s voice is more likely to be heard, and that the existence of various values implies that the society is more tolerant of difference. In this respect, the characteristics of the ideal web of authorities can be denoted as better communication between authority and people, and tolerance.

However, as addressed earlier, there is the precondition to have social tolerance which is social consensus on morality; the social tolerance can be manifested only if the various values and practices of multiple authorities in the web are in accordance with socially consented moral standards, orders and rules. This means that if new authorities agree to the moral standard, they would be become one of constituents in the web; on the other hand, if the existing authorities in the web broke the consensus, they could be forced out from the web. Thus the ideal web of authorities is capable of transforming itself based on the moral consensus; hence the third characteristic of the ideal web of authorities – flexibility - is added and thereby, characteristics of ideal web of authorities’ are defined: the existence of various communication channels, tolerance to others in the web, and the capacity of self-transformation, and the negative web of authorities would be defined by the web which has the contrary characteristics to the ideal web.

For instance, because the relations naturally imply the power issue, a web of authorities can be overwhelmed by a particular dominant power; as a result, its potential for
emancipation cannot be manifested. If illegitimate authorities consisted of a web, then it is unlikely that the voice of the people would be heard; instead, authorities would be likely to arbitrarily wield their power for their interest (e.g. Portuguese and Indonesian authorities, and the first Fretilin government in Timorese history). Even if authorities are legitimate, if one or a few authorities overwhelm the web, the web also limits the delivery of the people’s voice. Furthermore, if this overwhelming power system became rigid, the state could turn into the authoritarian state. In such cases, a web of authorities results in negative hybridity.

In addition to the opposite characteristics to the ideal web, one essential aspect of the negative web of authorities is whether socially consented moral values can be transformed as change of external conditions. In the case of West-born pluralism, the rules for co-existence have to be made based on consensus; whereas in the case of Timor-born pluralism, the rule for co-existence is the existing customary system; the agonistic respect can be made when authorities accept the existing order rather than consensus between authorities. For instance, in the Timorese context, the standard of morality and orders is in accordance with customary values and orders, and if authorities do not accept the customary values and orders, they would be unable to be a member authority of the web. In a case where only those who accept the existing values and orders can be a part of the web, if the values and orders are unable to be transformed in response to the social requirement for reformation, the web would lose its one of positive characteristics – capacity of self-transformation, hence turning into a negative web. The loss of capacity for self-transformation can result from oligopoly of power or the hegemon; for instance, manipulation of social norms and values for their interest through socialisation of social norms and values (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). Considering that the socialisation is indifference from the top-down internationalisation of liberalism (Ikenberry, 2009), this closed and negative web of authorities is similar to hybridity that has been imposed by the international community.

Thus far, the current section noted characteristics of positive and negative web of authorities: the positive web of authorities represents various channels for communication between authority and people, pluralism of values, and the capacity of self-transformation while the negative web refers to power domination, monopoly of values by the hegemon, and inflexibility. Because the former can address not only liberal values but also non-liberal values, since it guarantees multiple authorities in respect to pluralism in the non-Western state, it can more widely address political and social injustice, embarrassing the liberal and non-liberal perspective, and thus it helps to expand discussion to post-liberal
peace. Indeed, given that it has a capacity of self-transformation, it can even address the structural issue and positive peace in depth. In contrast, the latter web’s ways of dealing with powers, norms, and society is a reiteration of the international top-down approach (Richmond 2014); therefore, it refers to negative hybridity regardless of how many authorities ostensibly co-exist to constitute stateness.

2.5. Conclusion

Based on criticism aimed at the myth of the Western state, this chapter aimed to theorise a web of authorities as a model with which to achieve hybrid state-formation. Prior to explaining the web of authorities, it began with a definition of the state based on two interrelated components of the state, namely image and practices; these were derived from the work of Migdal (2004) and Hansen and Stepputat (2001). These are two fundamental components which are essential for the state; however, they can vary from one state to another because image and practices cannot be independent from each state’s history, culture, and tradition. Thus, each state cannot show congruence with others. This state definition denies IR’s assumption that all states are congruent with others.

In order to explain the variety of states, especially in the non-Western context, this chapter categorised both of these components into three categories: the first category represents exogenous features of the state, while the second represents endogenous characteristics. In the non-Western context, the role of components in the second category is important because of its significant contribution to enhancing the sense of unity based on the endogenous features of the society. The third image of the state is related to its role and expectation of commonality and public interests; however, the image is not only manifested through government practices, but also societal practices which contribute to commonality. These three categories of the state image and practices are observed in most non-Western members of the international community. This is the nature of the hybrid state.

However, because of the limited interest from Western-centred scholarly and policy circles, there is a lack of research when it comes to various states and their different images and practices. The relation between these two categories has, of course, not been clarified. This prevalent indifference, especially in the IR academic and international policy circles, consistently leads to these various other forms of state being marginalised and labelled as weak, failed or failure states.
Based on this critical perspective on conventional studies, the present chapter suggested a web of authorities in order to understand and depict various forms of the state, as well as the conditions for positive hybrid state-formation. One part missing from the first section, which addressed the nature of the hybrid state, was that it did not focus on the ways in which exogenous and endogenous components co-exist. The concept of web is useful when it comes to investigating a complex system consisting of plural components and their relation; thus, it brought about the concept of a web to theorise hybrid state-formation. In order to address the relations, this chapter addressed two different relations: a relation between authorities and people, drawing on two different approaches to authority, and a relation between authorities drawing upon the pluralism of agonism theory. The theory of authority and legitimacy, and of agonism offered ideal relations consisting of an ideal web of authorities.

An ideal form of web of authorities is associated with positive hybridity. Its ideal form should consist of legitimate authorities comprising people, while the legitimate authorities should reach an agonistic relation. However, it is certain that the web of authorities does not always result in the positive result of hybridity. Since the web of authorities is a tool used to examine the power relations not only between authorities but also between authority and the populace (the subjects who assign legitimacy to authority), oppressive and rigid power relations may lead to negative hybridity. This study is fully aware of the potential negative results of hybridity; however, it focuses on the positive effects of the web of authorities in order to bring the local society into the centre of the argument and to establish a post-liberal form of peace in the process of hybrid state-formation. When considering the emancipatory potential of hybridity at the conceptual level, it is clear that concentrating on the ideal web of authorities can give rise to scholarly and political implications which will help to overcome the prevalent distrust in the local and non-liberal norms, values, traditions and institutions portrayed by neopatrimonialism, nepotism, clientelism and patronage.

Based on this theoretical chapter, the following four chapters will focus on mapping the Timorese web of authorities. The next chapter will explain the research design, while the fourth chapter will briefly introduce the general background of Timor-Leste (e.g. its history and culture), before the fifth and sixth chapters explain the Timorese web of authorities by drawing on empirical evidence. The fifth chapter will also focus on identifying relevant authorities in the present Timor-Leste, while the sixth chapter will deal with relations between authorities.
Chapter 3. Research design and methodology

The principal aim of this chapter is to explicate the research methodology used in my PhD research. I employ the case study research methodology to understand interactions between various political authorities and their relations with the public authority of Timor-Leste. I conducted the field research to collect empirical evidence by contacting various political actors – not only those who hold political authority such as the international community, local elites and traditional leaders, but also the ordinary members of society.

This chapter consists of four main sections. First, it briefly discusses the philosophical foundation of this study: critical theory. Second, it introduces the case study strategy. The case selection criteria, the research design and the research process are presented in the second section. Third, it explains the principles of the data collection and analysis, as well as the methods used to collect the data. Lastly, it discusses validity, reliability, ethical issues, and the limitations of the methodology.

3.1. Inquiry paradigm: critical theory

This research design and methodology stands on critical theory. Critical theory usually refers to the so-called Frankfurt school of thought, although it is difficult to find an agreed-upon definition among critical theorists (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005). According to Kincheloe and McLaren, the reason for this is that, first, critical theories are diverse; second, the critical tradition is continuously evolving; third, critical theory tends to avoid specificity, ‘the production of blueprints of sociopolitical and epistemological beliefs (ibid., p. 287)’, and hence there is a space for disagreement. Despite the difficulty of defining critical theory, there are shared features of critical theory which make it possible to justify the critical theory approach in this study.

In contrast with other inquiry paradigms, critical theory is a guide for exploring the world rather than an explanation of how we see the world (ibid.). Its main concerns are domination and alienation, as well as the ways in which various notions of society such as the economy, gender, race, class, religion, ideologies, and other social institutions, and their dynamics interact to form a social system of domination and alienation (ibid.; Morrow and Brown, 1994). In this context, critical theory attempts to expose the winners and losers in a specific social system, identify the processes behind the operation of the
system (Cary, 1996; Fehr, 1993; King, 1996; Wexler, 1996), and reveal the forces that prevent the losers from realising their human agency (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005). In this respect, critical theory is very similar to poststructuralist analysis. It focuses on the forces of hegemony, ideology, language, discursive power, and culture, all of which are complex and diverse powers that shape and dominate consciousness and the vision of reality (Kincheloe, 1995; Lemke, 1995; McLaren, 1997, 2015); moreover, in doing so, critical theory generates the empowered and unempowered. Critical theorists claim that understanding these powers is important when it comes to making people aware of forms of domination and alienation for empowerment and emancipation of the marginalised (Apple, 1996; Giroux, 1997). As noted, critical theory does not separate fact from value as focusing on power and justice in a social system. In this regard, it alerts us to the notion of instrumental rationality, which pursues value-free, efficient and proper methods by claiming that this is an oppressive feature of scientific research which is a legacy of enlightenment and modernisation (Morrow and Brown 1994); the theory also sheds light on the production of ‘facts’, which cannot be absent from the value choice (Giroux, 1997; Kincheloe, 1993; McLaren, 2015; Weinstein, 1998). Thus, critical theory pursues transformation of the status quo so that people become aware of social relations based on unequal power and injustice; they can transform the system by themselves (Guba, 1990).

This study started with a disagreement regarding the generalisation of the state theory, which has developed within European history. This point has been highlighted in the second chapter of the literature review as explaining why the international community failed with the policy of statebuilding. One of the reasons was the Eurocentric perspective on the state, which is the most fundamental mistake when discussing the non-European context. Indeed, this is a representative example of myriad conceptions that are born and developed in the Western perspective but applied to explain the non-Western world. The present study presumes that this frequent mistake is derived from the domination of the West, which implicitly means the alienation of the non-West in the knowledge production industry and world power order. This study began due to an awareness of the domination which may cause (voluntary or involuntary) subjugation of the alienated – the focus of critical theory. In this regard, the main aim of the present research is to suggest a state theory that is more pertinent to delineate a small state in the Pacific, namely Timor-Leste, by challenging the dominant state theory.
3.2. Research design

3.2.1. Case study

The present study employs a case study, which is particularly suitable given that this research requires an in-depth and extensive description of social and political phenomena in Timor-Leste. Yin explains that a case study is used to ‘investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2009, p. 18). Since a case is a unit of human activity of an individual, as well as a group, an institution and a large-scale community in the real world, it can only be studied in the present context (Gillham, 2000). Hence, the case study method is appropriate when researchers wish to investigate meaningful characteristics of a real contemporary set of events by retaining a holistic view on the real world via various research skills (e.g. literature review, interview, focus groups).

There are three characteristics of a case study, and it is these characteristics which make it the perfect research strategy for the present study. First, a case study approach tolerates the unclear boundary between a phenomenon and its context (Yin, 2009). The most important characteristic of qualitative research is that it must deal with uncertainty (Sofaer, 1999) because research has to be conducted within real-life scenarios and events which cannot be controlled by researchers. The case study is an appropriate tool with which to overcome this uncertainty through in-depth descriptions of the phenomenon and context. As this study aims to investigate the relation among various authorities, and between authorities and their followers in the context of the Timorese real world, it provides in-depth description and analysis by employing the case study method.

Second, a case study is the most appropriate research strategy when it comes to studying new topic areas (Eisenhardt, 1989). This approach is particularly useful when developing and generating theory through theoretical sampling (ibid.; Gersick, 1988; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Harris and Sutton, 1986). This doctoral research addresses hybrid state-formation by investigating the relation between different authorities which practice stateness – a new approach to the study of the state in Timor-Leste. In order to investigate existing authorities representing stateness, and their relations, this study employs a case study to provide a comprehensive description of Timor-Leste’s authorities.

The shortage of secondary data is the last reason why this research chooses to rely on the
case study strategy. As a recently independent state where the international community is still active, Timor-Leste has gained a great deal of attention from international scholars who are particularly interested in the effectiveness of international interventions such as statebuilding and peacebuilding; indeed, anthropological and qualitative data on state-formation from Timor-Leste is at a shortage. As the main concern of this study is the interactions between political authorities which are very much underpinned by local norms, values and historical trajectory, the secondary data on Timor-Leste is not sufficient; therefore, employing a qualitative case study method is appropriate for this study, as it facilitates the collection of raw data from Timor-Leste to describe a web of authorities.

3.2.2. Case selection

This study chooses Timor-Leste as a case to develop a theory of hybrid state-formation: a web of authorities. This theoretical assumption was established through the conducting of a literature review on hybridity in conflict-affected societies. I was inspired by research on hybrid political order (Boege et al., 2008) with case studies on Timor-Leste, Somaliland and Bougainville; this, in turn, ignited my interest in the phenomenon of plural political orders and authorities. According to Boege et al. (ibid.), Timor-Leste is exemplified as a misguided approach by international statebuilding; however, as indicated by anthropological studies on the spiritual power of lulik in Timor-Leste (e.g. Bovensiepen, 2009, 2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015, 2016; McWilliam 2005, 2011; McWilliam et al. 2011, 2014; Silva and Simião, 2012; Stead, 2012; Timan, 2012) and the religious institution of the Catholic Church (Carey, 1995, 1999, 2003; Lyon 2011), these two pillars of power (authorities) support Timorese society as common orders and values of Timor-Leste. Although initial statebuilding was led by the international community and tends to dismiss other common orders of the society, state-formation has been gradually moved to the local-led formation, embracing the ignored orders (Hofmann, 2009). This study sheds light on the local-led process which has thus far been undervalued; furthermore, the present study theorises this state-formation as hybrid state-formation delineating the co-existence of various authorities. In this regard, the study selects Timor-Leste as a case study for the purpose of generating an explanatory theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
3.2.3. Research process

The research process consists of three phases: i) the literature review to establish the theoretical framework, ii) case studies of Timor-Leste through desk research and empirical research, iii) data analysis and write-up.

Since this research involves human subjects, prior to conducting the field research, it was necessary to obtain ethics approval. Indeed, approval was secured from the University of Manchester Research Ethics Committee in April 2015 to undertake fieldwork in Timor-Leste (Appendix 2).

3.3. Data collection and analysis

3.3.1. Principle: data triangulation and reflexivity

Considering a study’s validity and reliability in terms of ‘what process data is collected and analysed’ is a crucial issue during the stages of data collection and analysis. Accordingly, it can be useful to note two principles which I followed in two research stages, namely triangulation and reflexivity.

Triangulation is ‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’ (Denzin, 1978, p. 291). The strength of a data collection strategy in a case study is to employ multiple methodologies, thus making it possible to use many different sources of evidence, which can address the potential problems of constructing validity. Patton (2015) discusses four types of triangulation, namely data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological triangulation. Of these four, the current discussion necessitates only data triangulation, which collects data from multiple sources to corroborate the same fact or phenomenon (Yin, 2009). Given the advantage of data triangulation in a case study strategy, I collected data from various sources such as, for instance, archival records, UN documents, focus group, open-ended interviews, and semi-structured interviews; these were consistently compared during the collection and analysis process.

Another important principle is reflexivity. Reflexivity has become an important issue in qualitative social research, with scholars in the field acknowledging that social research is a part of the world they study. Social researchers who emphasise reflexivity in the wake of post-modernism (i.e. interpretivists, feminists, and poststructuralists) reject the notion of universal and value-free knowledge in the positivist tradition, and acknowledge that
research findings and publications are influenced by the personnel and procedure of conducting research (Davies, 2008; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Accordingly, researchers have a significant influence on the construction of meaning during research (Gilbert and Stoneman, 2015b), which is an integral part of the research process.

When considering the significant role of researchers in social research, their awareness of positionality must be a great concern. The subjective experience and personal characteristics of researchers, including age, gender, social background and educational level affect research findings (Bryman, 2004). Hammersley and Atkinson also note that ‘the orientations of researchers will be shaped by their socio-historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon them’ (2007, p. 15). In this sense, it is important for researchers to re-evaluate themselves based on their personal and previous experience in the process of research. In addition, there is another reason why a researcher’s position should be assigned great importance – specifically because research is an interactive process between the researcher and the researched. Positionality should be discussed in power relations between the researcher and the researched because knowledge production is closely interwoven with power relations, as argued by feminist geographers (Haraway, 1991; Harding, 1991). Research can be conducted from a certain standpoint, through selective observations, particular theoretical interpretations, the asking of particular questions and listening to replies, and the writing of a field journal. However, the results of research are not only determined by researchers, but also the reactivity of the researched, e.g. informants. Ethnographic research is usually influenced by the most powerful discourse in the field at the time, and thus researchers are required to keep asking how and why people react to the present research to ensure that the collected data has not been completely misread. Taking reflexivity into account, I consistently returned to questions such as: what do I know and how do I know it? This would be done in order to establish how and where the information is constructed (Hertz, 1997). I considered many layers of my social position (a young, female researcher, East Asian mala) but affiliated with a Western educational institute) when assessing the relation between informants and interviewees; I also carefully tracked my positional change throughout the entire research procedure.

3.3.2. Literature review

Through reviewing a range of literature on Timor-Leste, I have tentatively chosen three
different authorities: traditional, religious and legal-rational. Regardless of the importance of the government of Timor-Leste as a set of formal institutions in the guise of a modern state, the significance of the other two non-state institutions in Timor-Leste, particularly considering their wider influence on the ordinary Timorese in daily life, has been directly or indirectly addressed in the significant number of studies regarding Timor-Leste. In terms of Timorese traditional authority, anthropologists’ studies on Timor-Leste explicitly address the extent to which this authority is significant in the life of ordinary Timorese; for instance, how Timorese (re-)build spiritual connection with traditional spiritual ancestors or power, called lulik (Bovensiepen, 2009, 2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015, 2016; McWilliam, 2001, 2005, 2011); how the Timorese structure their traditional exchange economy (McWilliam, 2011); and how Timorese local governance is practised (Brown, 2009; Chopra, 2002; Cummins, 2010, 2014). In terms of the religious authority (the Catholic Church), its role and influence on Timorese identity formation throughout Timorese history, from the beginning of Portuguese Timor to the post-independence Timor-Leste, has been studied by focusing on the Church’s great dedication to protecting the Timorese from human rights violations (Carey, 1995, 1999, 2003; Lyon, 2011; Smythe, 2004). Of course, other non-state actors, such as clandestine youth (named the Geração Foun) and martial arts groups, have been researched; but these are more regionally and generationally specific than the two authorities above, and are thereby less representative of Timorese common identity. In this sense, I have assumed that these traditional and religious authorities are widely and commonly recognised authorities that can be compared with the government of the state at the same level. It is therefore necessary to conduct research involving fieldwork on all three authorities.

### 3.3.3. Field research

The field research was planned to be conducted in Dili and suco Letefoho of Same in Manufahi District in Timor-Leste, from 28 May to 27 July 2015. However, the research was mainly conducted in Dili because of the poor transportation system, particularly in order to travel to the rural areas of Timor-Leste, and personal security concerns. Hence, I clearly state that this is Dili-based research.

The main purpose of the field research was, first, to cross-check information that I had collected via the literature review, and particularly to determine whether or not my selection of three authorities (legal-rational authority of the formal state institution,
religious and social authority) based on the literature review was relevant. Second, it was also vital to understand the most recent narratives of the three authorities from the ordinary post-independent era. In order to achieve these two aims, I implemented interviews and a focus group.

**Focus group**

I arranged a one-off focus group during my field work, which was organised through a local NGO named Hopeseller. Held once a week, Hopeseller was a student-led, NGO-run capacity building English discussion group; indeed, with their co-operation, I was able to join their session to investigate their image of ‘the state’. I observed the group discussion once before proceeding to the focus group; the purpose of this was to understand gender composition, power dynamics, and particularly the group leader’s role and the power balance in the group. His performance as facilitator was moderately appropriate, hence the group and I agreed to co-operatively proceed to the focus group. On the day of the focus group, I met the leader of the discussion group two hours before commencement in order to remind him of the purpose of the research and the aim of the focus group. With his help, I changed certain questions which we felt may have caused some confusion among the group because of abstract concepts and unfamiliar issues; these were altered to more field-oriented questions. Refreshments were prepared by myself.

A total of six participants took part: two females and four males. All of them were university students at UNTL, although their origins were relatively homogenous from the West. At the beginning of the session, I explained the participant information sheet in English in order to obtain a verbal consent (Appendix 5). The session began in English but soon had to switch to Tetun, as the discussion issues and terminology were too unfamiliar to the participants to continue in English. The facilitator encouraged all participants to join the discussion in any language; moreover, after each speech, he summarised points in English as usual as the leader of the English discussion group. Because of this, although my interpreter was there with me, her intervention was unnecessary. After the focus group, the facilitator, the interpreter and I had a short debriefing session to clarity and cross-check my note taking.

**Interview**

The interviews were conducted at two field sites, namely Dili and Manufahi. In Dili, I
conducted 32 interviews with international elites (6), local elites (8) and the ordinary Timorese (18), while 6 interviews were conducted with local elites (2) and the ordinary Timorese (4) in suco Letefoho, Same sub-district of Manufahi district. The sampling for the interviews I conducted in Dili was mainly carried out using the snowball strategy, except for an interview with a local priest, who was chosen via targeted sampling. In terms of the languages which I used for the interviews, I employed English with the international elites and some of the local elites who worked in the international atmosphere; the remaining interviews were conducted in Tetum with assistance from an experienced interpreter. The sample for the interviews in suco Letefoho was selected via snowball sampling for the first two weeks of field research. Accepting a kind offer from the Korean YMCA, which had been working to build local capacity by growing coffee beans with suco Letefoho, I was able to make a trip to suco Letefoho with this team. They not only provided me with transportation to the rural suco, but also worked as a gate-keeper and interpreter. At both sites, before starting each interview, I explained the participant information sheet in English in order to obtain a verbal consent; my interpreter explained the same in Tetun when participants requested this.

The interviews were designed in two ways. For the elite group, I designed an open-ended but focused interview to elicit their personal perspectives on and experience with three authorities. I supposed that the open-ended style would be the most useful technique to employ with elites who are experienced experts, as this style would make it possible to derive their personal opinions and experiences. I was also of the opinion that a focused interview is another effective approach which allows researchers to focus on interviewees’ opinions and experiences as they pertain to a specific situation (Merton et al., 1990). The interviews did not last for more than two hours. Secondly, for the ordinary Timorese, I designed a semi-structured interview in order to guide interviewees to focus topics as well as to open up opportunities for them to freely bring up their own thoughts during interviews (Willis, 2016). The ordinary interview was structured in the following order: i) asking about the state: symbols and history of the state, roles of the state, to what extent they are satisfied with the state’s policy and activities, and if they can identify state activities; ii) asking questions about the church: roles of the church, to what extent the church is important to their everyday life; iii) asking questions about lülük: to what extent they believe in lülük, encouraging them to describe any stories and events which they have heard relating to lülük. iv) asking questioning regarding the relation between the three authorities (i.e. Have you heard the statement that ‘the church co-operates with the state?’
If so, could you give some examples?; if you imagine that there is an Uma lulik which represents Timor-Leste, who could be the lia’nain of that? Have you seen Catholic elegies at the customary events? If so, could you describe their role in the events?) The interviews did not take more than one hour; indeed, it was thought that in-depth interviews, particularly relating to political issues, would exhaust the interviewees.

After the interviews each day, the interpreter and I returned to my residence in order to conduct an interview debrief. This was a good opportunity for the interpreter and I to form a better rapport, learn each other’s language (in the case of interviews which were conducted by my Timorese interpreter), and more importantly to clarify and cross-check my note-taking during the interviews.

Table 3-1. Code of participants

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<th>Code</th>
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<th>Additional Information</th>
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<td>Catholic Priest</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD-5</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>Dili</td>
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<tr>
<td>OD-6</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td></td>
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<td>OD-7</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
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<td>OD-8</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
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<td>OD-9</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>Dili</td>
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<tr>
<td>OD-10</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>Dili</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD-11</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>Dili</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.3.4. Data analysis strategy

I took notes during all interviews rather than recording the conversations; I also held debriefs with my interpreter after the interviews, following which I analysed all significant pieces of information as well as the trends, themes, similarities and differences that emerged. Debriefing sessions were important for this field work, particularly given that assistance was needed from interpreters due to my incomplete language skills and knowledge of Timorese culture and customs. The sessions not only involved reviewing the verbal communication, but also the atmosphere and participants’ non-verbal feedback during the interviews, which I might have missed or been unable to keep up with.

### 3.4. Trustworthiness, ethics issues, and limitations

#### 3.4.1. Trustworthiness

**Validity**

Recent times have seen validity in qualitative research become an issue of great concern (i.e. Creswell and Miller, 2000; Hammersley, 1998; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Lincoln and Guba, 2002; Reason and Bradbury, 2001; Seale, 1999). Considering the nature of qualitative research, qualitative researchers have discussed different approaches to testing the standard of quantitative research (Creswell and Miller, 2000). This research, as a qualitative exploratory case study, should also employ different approaches from those...
used in traditional quantitative research. Yin (2009) suggests three types of validity that can be applied to all social research as follows:

- **Construct validity**: identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied;
- **Internal validity** (for explanatory or causal studies only and not for descriptive or exploratory studies): seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships;
- **External validity**: defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalised (Yin, 2009, p. 40).

According to Yin’s take on validity, internal validity is irrelevant, but construct and external validity are relevant to this study. Construct validity revolves around identifying whether correct operational measures are used for research. The qualitative case study is often criticised by those who argue that qualitative researchers fails to develop sufficient operational measures and that subjective perspectives are reflected in the data collection (Yin, 2009). However, construct validity assumes that qualitative research can be more credible if certain methods and techniques are employed during the research process. This means that methods and techniques serve as a medium to assure the correct reflection of the world (Cho and Trent, 2006). The first technique used to enhance credibility is triangulation (Creswell and Miller, 2000; Denzin, 2009, 2010; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Yin, 2009). Triangulation refers to the use of multiple sources of evidence and methods to ‘partially overcome the deficiencies that flow from one investigator or one method’ (Denzin, 1989, p. 42). Triangulation is used in this research to attain validity through inference from data collected using different methods: document review, a focus group, and interviews. Another tactic used to increase validity is member checking. Lincoln and Guba note that member checking is ‘the most crucial technique for establishing credibility’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 314). Member checking is a process whereby the collected data is sent back to the informant so that the data’s accuracy can be checked, and their reactions throughout the inquiry can be analysed. Wolcott (1990) shows an endeavour to increase validity; simply put, he allowed informed readers to read his manuscripts so as to gain feedback during the analysis and writing process. In order to gain such feedback, he emphasises just how important it is for the qualitative researcher to record accurately and report fully. In a nutshell, member checking is ‘reassuring the
credibility of constructions of the participants’ (Klenke, 2016, p. 44) so that misunderstandings can be discovered and thus fixed throughout the process.

External validity pertains to whether or not a study’s findings can be generalised (Yin, 2009). There are two types of generalisation, namely statistical generalisation and analytic generalisation. Quantitative survey research relies on statistical generalisation based on a large number of samples, while qualitative case studies rely on analytic generalisation that tries to generalise a particular set of findings to another broader theory (ibid.). Based on the qualitative tradition, this study employs analytic generalisation to increase its external validity. However, it must be stated that this research is an explanatory single-case study, and does not aim to generalise. Rather, the research strives to find a particular set of results which is applicable to further and broader research on IR and PCS.

**Reliability**

Reliability in quantitative research is confirmed by employing standardised research instruments (Robson, 2011), whereas in qualitative research it is assured by guaranteeing the consistency of the research process. Reliability in regard to the latter approach means that if subsequent researchers repeat the same procedures conducted by earlier researchers, they should arrive at the same findings and insights. Silverman (2013, p. 302) defines reliability as ‘the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers of different occasions’. In a more practical manner, he suggests the use of low-inference descriptors. Yin (2009)’s suggestion for achieving reliability is to use case study protocol and develop a case study database. In the same sense, Creswell and Miller (2000) argue that establishing an audit trail can increase credibility. An audit trail refers to the provision of clear documentation which can serve as evidence of the research decisions made and the activities of a researcher. It can be used by external auditors such as supervisors and research progression panellists to systematically review the process of a study. Bearing in mind the importance of research reliability, I took care to write a research field diary and to clearly detail the data collection procedures so as to achieve transparency.

3.4.2. Ethical issues

There were three ethical issues with which I was concerned. The first pertained to exploitation. It is sometimes argued that research can exploit the researched. This is
because the researched provide information that will be used by researchers but are given little, if anything, in return (ibid.). This is typically an issue when researchers deal with participants who are less powerful than themselves. For instance, take the power relation between a researcher from a Western university, located in a more developed country, and the researched in a less developed country, such as Timor-Leste; indeed, it could be said that the researcher has the more powerful and higher social status. Thus, the Timorese might welcome the researcher and participate in the research with some expectation of a significant change in their livelihood or some financial return. However, unfortunately, it is very rare that research results have a political influence on change in a society and, furthermore, ethnographical research is often related solely to knowledge production. Indeed, this situation could unintentionally lead to the researcher exploiting subjects so as to gain an academic degree in the end. This could be a vital issue in Timor-Leste, which has such a sad history of being invaded and betrayed by outsiders. In order to prevent any possibility of exploitation, I clearly informed the participants that I had limited political power as a PhD student, and that the purpose of my research was not to change the situation but to provide descriptions of Timor-Leste’s state-formation for future studies.

The second issue with which I had to concern myself was related to the sensitivity of the country’s post-conflict context and culture. Since my field research did not directly point to any issue regarding peace and conflict, I actually paid little attention to the fact that Timor-Leste is a post-conflict state. However, from the beginning of the interviews, I realised that the concept of the state per se is deeply related to Timorese’s recent traumatic memories and the deaths of their nearest and dearest; indeed, oppression and resistance are part of their history of state-formation. The image of the state is directly related to the sacrificing of someone’s life for Timorese independence. Following this realisation, I emphasised that their participation was entirely violently and thus, if they decided to withdraw, I would respect their decision. Indeed, I presented them with a contact list for local hospitals, police stations, and NGOs where they could receive additional support to address their emotional pain if necessary.

In addition, I paid particular attention to the cultural issue. One of the authorities examined in this study is lulik, which sees cosmology, moral standards, beliefs, culture, and Timorese identity as the most fundamental elements which determine Timorese everyday life. It is sacred potency as well as taboo, and hence a sense of fear of the subject among Timorese was observed. In this sense, it was uncommon for the Timorese to talk about lulik and black magic in open space; as such, I paid extra attention when asking about lulik (e.g. keeping my voice down when discussing lulik if the interview was undertaken in a public space) and
showed my sincere respect and intuitive empathy for their beliefs, culture and history. Lastly, I stressed the anonymity of participants in terms of data protection and confidentiality. In order to achieve this, I coded the names of all the participants in this thesis (see Table 3-1). I also protected the data at all times; for example, while I was travelling, I always carried my field dairy with me in a locked backpack and stored it in a locked drawer at my residence. Once I had returned from the field work, all electronic documents were saved on an encrypted USB and field diaries were stored in the locked drawer at home and in the cabinet at the university.

3.4.3. Limitations

During the first month of the project I learned Tetun, and continued to practice during the field work; indeed, my Tetun was fluent enough to catch nuances and emotions in detail. The language issues in cross-cultural research not only relate to technical issues during the conducting of interviews, but also the conceptual limitation of researchers. A researcher’s linguistic equipment from one culture is not adequate to depict the state of affairs in another culture (Shklarov, 2007). Accordingly, some indigenous features which are extremely crucial to the research question can be ignored, dismissed or misinterpreted (Davis, 2010). Although I made a concerted effort to prevent this during my field work, it was inevitable. Therefore, I needed to work with an interpreter who spoke good English for a short period of time during my research.

However, despite working with the interpreter, I had to face another language problem, which was related to the limited concepts and political vocabulary in Tetun. For this reason, the language used in education and government scenarios in post-independence Timor-Leste is Portuguese. However, this language policy has only been in place for a decade since the independence, and thus fluent Portuguese speakers are very rare among ordinary Timorese. Therefore, the interview language used with the ordinary Timorese had to be Tetun, even though there were linguistic limitations when it came to addressing the political issues. In addition, many words in Tetun have dual meanings, and thus I had to have several sessions with my interpreter to clarify the political concepts to which I referred, and change abstract interview questions to more concrete ones with examples. Although I spent more time with my interpreter than expected to address the language issue, this issue was inherently difficult to overcome.
The third problem was related to the field research site. My main research site was Dili, the capital city of Timor-Leste, where urbanisation has rapidly progressed; indeed, the high level of disparity between urban and rural areas, as well as the regionalism of East-West remained after the internal crisis in 2006-7. In this context, it was predicted that residents of Dili may face the problem of representativeness. While I was aware of this issue, in a realistic sense, it was not easy to travel to the rural areas due to poor infrastructure and limited public transportation services, not to mention limited finances and a tight timeframe. In order to avoid the problem of representativeness during the field research, I paid attention to the participants’ origin to strike a balance between East and West while I conducted the interviews. In spite of my caution on the participants’ origin, because this study was mainly conducted in Dili, the issue of representativeness regarding the region remains a limitation.
Chapter 4. Brief history and culture of Timor-Leste

As stated at the beginning of this study, the idea for this project was born from my curiosity about Timorese society and history. Indeed, Timor-Leste has a number of features which contradict the Weberian state, the latter of which is presumed to be an ideal state in statebuilding. This is simply because Timor-Leste has long had more than one authority co-existing in order to maintain its own exclusive sphere of authority. Based on this observation, the present study raised a question regarding the appropriateness of the conventional statebuilding approach in non-Western societies; the study has also criticised this approach and suggested a new conceptual approach, known as ‘hybrid state-formation’. The conventional approach deletes the historicity implied by the Weberian state, whereas the new approach claims that bringing historicity into state research is necessary in order to understand non-Western societies whose histories differ from Western European societies. In particular, the new approach highlights the history of subjugation by external power in order to analyse the power relation between external and internal power, values, norms and institutions during the process of state-formation. Accordingly, this study suggests a web of authorities as an analytical tool with which to explain the relation between various existing powers and to examine exactly what type of power relation between them would be ideal in terms of making it possible to operate the stateness.

Based on this study’s defiant theoretical work regarding the established state theory, the remainder of study will explain Timorese hybrid state-formation through a web of authorities. Indeed, this explanation begins with the present chapter, which offers a brief introduction to Timorese history and culture.

The greatest contribution of hybrid state-formation, on scholarly and policy grounds, is that it switches the research focus from the international-centred state theory to the local-centred state theory. This accordingly requires knowledge on the local society. Hence, the present chapter addresses Timorese history, with a specific focus on its subjugation by and resistance against external forces: Portugal, Japan, Indonesia, and the UN. Indeed, it reviews Timorese culture by examining the Timorese social fabric-relation-oriented societal characteristics of Timor-Leste in everyday societal, political and economic life.
### 4.1. Brief history of Timor-Leste

#### Table 4-1. Chronology of Timor-Leste

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Additional information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1300s</td>
<td>Direct trade in Sandalwood between China and the island of Timor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500s</td>
<td>1515 Arrival of the first Portuguese traders</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1533 First Portuguese settlements in Oecusse.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>Revolts led by liurai against colonial tax system. (e.g. Manufahi revolt in 1910-1912)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>1942-45 Japanese invasion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>April Carnation revolution in Portugal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May The Governor of Portuguese Timor’s proclamation for establishment of political parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May Foundation of UDT, ASDT, Apodeti, KOTA, Trabalhista ASDT becomes Fretilin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>January The coalition between UDT and Fretilin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May UDT’s withdrawal from coalition with Fretilin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August Internal conflict between UDT and Fretilin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November Fretilin’s unilateral declaration of independence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December Full-scale Indonesian military invasion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>July Integrating Portuguese Timor into Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>October Nicolau Lobato is elected as President</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October Vatican appoints Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes Portuguese bishop José Ribeiro is replaced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>November ✓ Fall of Mount Matebean (end of Fretilin liberation zone) ✓ Forced resettlement to strategic villages set up by the Indonesian military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>March Pacification campaigns by Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>March Xanana is elected commander-in chief of Falintil. CRRN established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>March The Roman Catholic Church affirms to use Tetun as the official language of the liturgy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>December Xanana separates Falintil from Fretilin. CNRM replaces CRRN Xanana becomes president of the CNRM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Additional information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>CNRM organises underground activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Santa Cruz massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Dili’s Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Indonesian President Habibie announced the independent referendum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Referendum is resulted in independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>20th May</td>
<td>Officially becomes an independent nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>F-FDTL soldiers submit petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>591 soldiers were dismissed by PM Alkatiri.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>✓ The petitioner’s demonstration and Catholic Church’s rallies against the government begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓ The petitioner’s demonstration turns violent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>PM Alkatiri resigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNMIT completes its mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Church-State agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: written by author)

### 4.1.1. Early period of Portuguese Timor

The ancient indigenous history of the island of Timor is very limited because of the mainly oral tradition of Timorese. Prior to Dutch and Portuguese colonisers entering Southeast Asia, Timor was a part of commercial networks centred on East Java and the Celebs (Sulawesi), both of which had trading links to China and India (Taylor, 1999). The main trading resource of Timor was sandalwood, which was documented during the Ming Dynasty in a Chinese chronicle of 1436 as ‘the mountains are covered with sandal-trees and the country produces nothing else (Boxer, 1960). Later, the Portuguese also joined the sandalwood trade in addition to the slave trade, although this was 50 years before they began to settle. At that time, the trade basement was on the island of Solor, where a
Dominican friar settled to convert the local population to Catholicism. On the island of Solor there was a mission station and a fort constructed to protect converts from the Muslim raiders. Around the fort, there were an increasing number of populations of mixed races – the offspring of Portuguese soldiers, traders, and sailors from Malacca and Macao who had intermarried with the local women (Boxer 1947, cited in Dunn, 2003). These mixed races are known as the Topasses. The similar community moved to establish itself in Flores and Timor in the face of the Dutch’s pressure and spread the Portuguese culture and influence throughout the colony. They became a dominant power in Timor as supporters of, as well as challengers against the Portuguese rule (Dunn, 2003).

For the first two centuries, Portuguese influence had been constrained by missionary activities and sandalwood trade but gradually expanded to political, economic and military activities; in the end, a colonial government was set up on the island of Timor in the 18th century. In 1701, Antonio Coelho Guerrerier was appointed as the first official Governor of Timor and Solor. Although there were obstructions by da Costas, Coelho Guerrerier established a way to govern the colonial administration by making liurai dependent on Portuguese authority based on Lifau (became Oecussi later). First, he conferred the status of colonel on liurai then granted lower status to other lower level officials of the kingdoms. As a result, he became able to govern Timor indirectly by controlling local elites under the Portuguese authority. However, faced with continuous challenges from some liurai who wanted to turn the whites out, in addition to pressure from the Dutch, the Governor decided to move the capital from Lifau to Dili in order to obtain better protection against enemies and to facilitate easier shipping. In 1859, The Netherlands and Portugal first discussed the delimiting of their territories on the island of Timor in order to end territorial disputes and exclude the third parties (Deeley, 2001; Weatherbee, 1966). The boundary negotiation lasted long enough to be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

In the 19th century, the importance of Timor as a colony diminished with the decline of the sandalwood trade and Portugal’s weakened power in Europe. However, in the mid-19th century, Portugal introduced new crops such as potatoes, wheat sugarcane and coffee to raise revenue and attract Portuguese settlers for plantation development. Most quantities were exported to make profit for Portugal. In particular, coffee plantations became a viable industry to raise revenue for the colonial administration. For instance, Governor José Celestino da Siva (in office, 1894-1908) required every family to plant 600 coffee trees and collected the harvest in each liurai before forwarding it to the colonial administration. The process was facilitated by each liurai. Despite the Governor’s coffee plantation initiative,
the amount of revenue generated did not meet the anticipated amount, and thus the colonial administration eventually introduced head tax for Timorese males between the ages of 18 and 60. The tax collection was a strategy aimed at intensifying military and administrative control over Timor; however, it in fact increased the dissatisfaction of Portugal’s colonial administration and ignited Timorese resentment, which in turn led to a series of Timorese rebellions against the colonial administration. Under such devastated circumstances, Governor Celestino da Silva arrived in Timor to take his appointment in 1894. He became involved in organising campaigns against rebel forces. The revolt of Maubara, which was one of the most important kingdoms in west Dili, was the beginning of the rebellion, and led to a series of uprisings afterwards. One great military success was at a battle against uprisings led by Dom Boaventura of Same (Manufahi) with 28 Europeans and more than 12,000 Timorese warriors supplied by liurai. However, the battle lasted for several months and resulted in massacres committed by both sides. This military success made the Governor independent from the authority of the Portuguese colony of Macao; as such, he became the most trustworthy Governor since the establishment of the Portuguese authority in Timor. He was directly responsible for the central government of Lisbon. However, the Timorese resistance movements and battles continued and, moreover, diseases such as cholera swept over the land. As a result, thousands perished; for instance, according to the Portuguese record, 3424 rebels died and 12,567 were wounded, with 289 killed and 600 wounded on the Portuguese side in a campaign against Boaventura in the Same area (Dunn, 2003).

As a result of this series of resistance movements, the Portuguese colonial administration introduced policies to undermine Timorese traditional political alliances based on kinship and exchanges. The status of liurai was devalued because of the abolition of Timorese kingdoms. The underlying rationale of this policy was derived from a diagnosis, by the Governor of Timor Affonso Castro, that kinship and exchange systems were one of the main obstacles making it impossible to take control of Timorese society. Therefore, the major two objectives of Portuguese policy were, first, to abolish the indigenous system and, second, to establish a basis for the systematic exploitation. Undermining the indigenous system, the Portuguese colonial administration created two

2 The Portuguese used Timorese traditional institutions such as blood oaths and wife exchange as a Wife Taker to pacify liurais and garner their support. Through this approach, some liurais were tied into strong relationships with Portuguese, and therefore helped the Portuguese to fight against others (Hohe, 2002).
new administrative units: the postos, consisting of sucos, and the concelho, controlling postos via a Portuguese administrator. As such, the administrative units were reset generally based on sucos and the role of sucos leaders became more significant. The Portuguese appointed xefe of suco and xefe of povação (hamlet chiefs) to control the local population. In some areas, xefe of suco are now called liurai (Hohe, 2002).

Although the kingdoms had been formally abolished, the indigenous political hierarchy, rituals and exchange practices perpetually existed as the central ideology of Timor-Leste (Taylor, 1999). This, according to Hohe (2002), may be because the Portuguese did not counter the local perception of traditional leadership. Although the Portuguese colonial administration appointed them, most xefe of suco and xefe of povação were descendants of the right house, and therefore acceptable in the eyes of the local people. In some cases, the Portuguese allowed the ritual leadership to choose the right person from the royal family. If the appointees were from the wrong house or a commoner family, they had to be legitimated by rituals to be accepted by the local people. During the Portuguese era, the Timorese customary tradition was therefore strongly maintained (ibid.; Hull, 1999).

When it comes to understanding Timorese society, a great deal of emphasis should be placed on the role of the Catholic Church, as this was vital in the history of Timor-Leste. Prior to Portugal appointing the first official Governor in 1701, the Portuguese population in Timor consisted of Dominican and Jesuit missionaries and Tapasse. These missionaries had the dual roles of priests and military commanders. Carey (1995) states that the Catholic Church is the only sign of Portuguese influence in rural Timor. In addition to the political and military missions, these missionaries also played the role of education providers through establishing seminaries, monasteries and schools (Carey, 1999). According to Ranck (1977, cited in ibid.), 17 schools with a total of 1,035 students were being run by the Catholic Church by 1909. The first diocesan seminary, the Seminario de Nossa Senhora de Fatima, was established in Soibada in 1937, and represented the missionaries’ involvement in education. This is the well-known institution which later fostered Timorese nationalist leaders, as well as key members of Fretilin.

However, the Portuguese system was shattered by the Japanese invasion. As Japan invaded Pearl Harbour, 400 Dutch and Australian commandos landed in Dili to take Timor as a defence base for Australia. Because of this action, the Japanese were convinced that the Allies planned to make Timor a military base, and thus sent 20,000 troops to occupy Timor. A two-year guerrilla war took place; indeed, 400 Allied troops relied on the support of the Timorese population, who acted like a buffer between the Allies and the Japanese.
The Timorese acted as informants, letting the Allies know when Japanese troops were moving, and supplying the Allies with food (Callinan, 1984; Tayler, 1999).

During the war, many towns, villages and hamlets were destroyed by both sides, with the situation becoming even worse after Australian troops left in February 1943. The Japanese started to burn villages where the Australians had been active and executed families who supported the Allied troops. By the end of the war, approximately 40,000 to 60,000 East Timorese had lost their lives (Dunn, 2003), which equated to nearly 14% of the pre-war population; in addition to this, a large number of women had suffered sexual slavery. Compared to the huge number of East Timorese casualties, only 40 Australian men lost their lives, and most of the Australians escaped back to their home country at the end of a guerrilla campaign against Japan (Pilger, 1994).

After Japan left, the Portuguese returned. They rebuilt infrastructure with compulsory labour recruited through liurai networks from their sucos. Due to Portugal’s isolation from the international community following its support of Franco’s policies, the Portuguese had to rely on this forced labour for reconstruction. In certain villages, some male members were absent for the entire year, and they were forced to join the post-war reconstruction. This led to the decline of agricultural output. However, once the basic infrastructure was built and the political system realigned, the Portuguese authority returned to their pre-war aim to increase the yield of cash crops. A few more Timorese were allowed to pursue education through Catholic schools and participate in political activities.

Meanwhile, the Timorese also spent a great deal of energy on reconstructing their rural economy, which had been shattered during the Japanese occupation. The indigenous political system had been retained during the occupation to organise resistance to the Japanese. The system was also reorganised and continued in order to meet the labour demand of the Portuguese authority. Although the Portuguese authority attempted to destroy the Timorese indigenous political system, the Timorese society consistently reproduced and maintained their kinship system, legitimate traditional rule and culture based on reciprocity and exchange, and subsistence economy.

4.1.2. The late Portuguese era: sprouting Timorese nationalism

The Portuguese dictatorship of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was overthrown by the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (AFM) on 25th April, 1974. This is known as the Carnation revolution. Army officers, who were wary of the old feudal system barely
sustained by the overseas colony, transformed a fascist government into a modernised capitalist one committed to decolonisation. They had experienced fighting Africa’s liberation movement, and hence preferred certain types of decolonisation. In this sense, they supported the movement of a new head of the ‘Junta of National Salvation’, Antonio de Spinola; his plan was to give progressive autonomy to colonies under the Portuguese colonialism. The April coup ignited a popular discussion on independence and development among Timorese colonial elites. This not only brought about a huge political change in Timor, but also in the region of Southeast Asia in terms of relations with neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia, as well as Western industrial counties. Indeed, the latter were concerned about regions such as the US, Western Europe and Japan in a security sense during the Cold War (CAVR, 2006; Jolliffe, 1978).

One of the immediate changes led by the coup was a formation of political parties in Timor. During this period, two main parties, namely the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT: Associação Social-Democrata Timorense) and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT: União Democrática Timorense) emerged. The former was later renamed the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin: Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente). The founders of Fretilin were Nicolau Lobato, Mari Alkatiri and José Ramos-Horta, as well as Francisco Xavier do Amaral, who joined after being invited by the founders (Hill, 2002). UDT initially insisted on progressive autonomy with a right to self-determination under the Portuguese colonialism; indeed, this was the case until it became clearer that the majority of the population supported independence.

Although political parties had been springing from dominantly Portuguese speaking elites in the beginning, the Fretilin leadership soon obtained leadership with support from 90% of the common peasantry. Fretilin, influenced by successful liberation movements in other African Portuguese colonies, launched social, economic and political programmes to restructure Timorese society so as it could become self-reliant. The most important work of Fretilin was literacy campaigns. From 1974, Fretilin members travelled with a literacy handbook in Tetum (the most widely spoken language) to tackle the high illiteracy rate of 93%. The handbook mainly contained a description of everyday village life associated with words. This approach was particularly effective when it came to cultivating the basis of Timorese development and the adoption of common ideas and notions in Timorese society. The health programme also adopted a similar strategy which combined modern treatment
with traditional treatment to deal with the most common diseases in East Timor, such as tuberculosis, malaria, and elephantiasis. As an economic programme, they organised cooperatives as a basic unit and implemented agricultural reform to diversify monoculture, which had previously relied on cash crops. The cooperative movement was adopted in other campaigns for further development through working with villagers where Fretilin members had local links (Taylor, 1995). Taylor (ibid.) states that the cooperative movement was accompanied by the establishment of a decentralised administrative system. Fretilin decentralised the decision-making process, particularly in relation to education and health; as such, a considerable degree of autonomy was devolved to regional committees. With social and economic policies accompanying the political system, Fretilin’s popularity rapidly rose, and particularly in rural areas, until the UDT coup.

Another reason for its popularity could be derived from raising the unified national identity of Maubere. The term Maubere was originally used by the Portuguese colonisers to refer to the local Timorese in a derogatory sense. Later, Fretilin adopted Maubere to refer to Timorese commoners who resisted foreign domination. It could certainly be questioned whether or not members of Fretilin were Maubere because Maubere generally represented ema reinos, while Fretilin leaders were from the liurai family. However, as a political party, Fretilin recognised the importance of having a political symbol which was able to absorb a wide range of people and thus Fretilin adopted the Maubere philosophy to reach ema reinos regardless of the ethnic background (Huszka, 2013; Jolliffe 1978). In this respect, Fretilin expanded their influence even to rural areas, working through a local alliance based on kinship and adopting concepts and ideas which were prevalent in indigenous society. As a result, the nationalist movement by Fretilin was able to emerge because of its extensive popularity.

While the popularity of Fretilin increased, the Indonesian intelligence was concerned by this increase in popularity. In order to subdue the increased power of Fretilin over the territory, the Indonesians defined Fretilin as a communist party, and actively supported the establishment of a pro-Indonesian political party known as the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti: Associação Popular Democrática Timorense); this party was supportive of East Timor’s integration with Indonesia. In addition, the Indonesians attempted to persuade UDT that they should not have an alliance with Fretilin. The aim of the Indonesian intelligence community was to create internal disputes between pro-independence forces (mainly between Fretilin and UDT). Their strategy succeeded in providing adequate grounds for Western allies to allow Indonesia’s occupation over East
Timor, with the aim of preventing the Marxist rule (CAVR, 2006; Hill, 2002; Jolliffe 1978; Pinto and Jardine, 1997, Taylor 1999).

The international community connived at Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste. First, the US covertly supported Indonesia’s invasion to guard East Timor from the power of the USSR during the Cold War. After the defeat of Vietnam War, the US sought to strengthen their position in Southeast Asia by forging alliances with Indonesia based on the logic of the Cold War and increasing the geo-strategic importance of East Timor for the US navy; Indonesia, meanwhile, sought to expand their territory. Recognising the mutual interest, Indonesia used media and diplomatic channels to draw attention to the possibility of East Timor becoming the Asian Cuba by exaggerating Marxism–Leninism ideology and the African revolutionary nationalist politics of Fretilin. In response, the US covertly supported Indonesia’s invasion. Suharto’s pro-Western, pro-capitalist, and anti-communist policy attracted financial and military aid, as well as foreign direct investment from the US, Australia and Japan (Philpott, 2006). Second, Australia, another important power and neighbour of East Timor, also connived at Indonesia’s occupation. Australia also acknowledged the importance of foreign policy towards Asia as a combatant of the Vietnam War. Furthermore, Australia became interested in the oil and gas lying beneath Timor Gap. Given these interests, Australia acquiesced in Indonesia’s territory expansion to the East.

With implicit international support, Indonesia’s full-scale invasion of East Timor finally took place on 7th December, 1975. Following this, Indonesia established the Provisional Government of East Timor (Pemerintah Sementara Timor Timur: PSTT) with Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo, the president of Apodeti, as chairman, and Francisco Lopes da Cruz, the president of UDT, as deputy. Of the 20 appointees for the Provisional Government, 16 were from UDT and Apodeti (CAVR, 2006).

It could well be that the late Portuguese era was the most important for the Timorese in terms of the fact that they adopted the modern concept of the state and institutions; for instance, they established political parties, framed the government structure, and formed a national identity – Maubere. While it might be difficult to say that these modern concepts thoroughly settled down in Timorese society, it can be said that it was the naissance of the modern concepts put forth by the Timorese themselves.
4.1.3. Indonesia occupation: rapid growth of Timorese nationalism through organised resistance

The Indonesian government officially reformed the administrative structure of East Timor so that it was identical to the rest of Indonesia as the 27th province of the Republic of Indonesia (Hohe and Ospina, 2002). The biggest change in the Indonesian administration compared to the Portuguese one was that the Indonesians introduced democratic elections. Under the Indonesian structure, the village chief with the most influential local power over the people was no longer appointed by his ritual leaders or elders, but democratically elected by the people. This was the Indonesian administration’s strategy to undermine the traditional Timorese power structure which had been predominant over the society and the resistance network.

While the Indonesian government reformed the Timorese administrative structure, Fretilin cadres organised a national network through already-existing administrative structures mainly based on districts and sucos, as well as the interim administration of Fretilin after the UDT coup (CAVR, 2006). Falintil members returned to their own zona (sub-districts equivalent to the Portuguese posto) and established companies in each zona. Activities in the zona were coordinated through the Falintil command structure controlled by the Ministry of Defence (ibid.).

The Fretilin national administration model was decided at the Fretilin Central Committee conference in Manatuto from May to June 1976. During this conference, the administrative units were defined based on region3. Each unit consisted of districts, and each district consisted of several zona. Each zona consisted of a number of suco comprised of aldeia (hamlets). Each unit was under the control of the political commissar responsible for military and political affairs. The political commissar had assistant commissars who were responsible for education, health, agriculture, political propaganda and women’s affairs. During later years, the resistance movement was structured based on the national administrative units (ibid.). As seen in the Fretilin’s national administrative system, the Fretilin attempted to govern East Timor and organised a systematically clandestine

3 In total there were six administrative units based on region: Ponta Leste (the Eastern end consisting of Lautém região), Centro Leste (the central East, including Baucau and Viqueque districts), Centro Norte (the central North including Aileu, Dili and Manatuto districts), Centro Sul (the central South including Ainaro and Manufahi districts), Fronteira Norte (Northwest areas including the Ermera, and Liquiça districts and sections of Bobonaro district), and Fronteira Sul (the Southwest of the country including Covalima district and sections of Bobonaro district).
resistance.

‘A systematic campaign of terror’ against local people by Indonesian troops began with a full-scale invasion in September, 1978 (Dunn, 2003). Indonesian troops devastated East Timor society. They slaughtered the populations of certain villages, and even entire communities; they also destroyed agricultural systems in the highlands, and forcibly transported civilians and Falintil units from the hills to the ‘strategic villages or camps’ located on the coastal plains and surrounded by the military, local militia and camp administrators (Taylor, 1999). The aim of the forced resettlement was to destroy and tear off traditional units which became the basis of resistance; however, the resettled areas were habitats that the Timorese tended to avoid because of poor water supplies, hotter climates than in the hills, and the fact that malaria was once rampant there. Free movement to outside of the camps was restricted and food in the camps was always in short supply; even the aid supplies from international aid agencies such as ICRC and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) were hoarded and sold by the Indonesian military. As a result, a vast number of the population died due to starvation. According to Paulio Gama, over the first five years (1975-80), approximately 40% of the pre-invasion population perished (Carey, 1995). In particular, the loss of the sanctuary of Mount Matebian in the East resulted in a great number of deaths and the loss of weapons and resources. The destruction of the Fretilin control zone (liberated zones) inevitably increased the degree of reliance on the clandestine movement through student networks in both East Timor and Indonesia.

Since the Fretilin lost their liberate zones, the resistance strategy had to change. Xanana Gusmão was successor to the Fretilin leaders (Nicolau Lobato, Antonio Carvarino, and Vicente dos Reis) and claimed that he would implement significant strategic changes. He was appointed Commander in Chief of Falintil and the president of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Concelho Revolucionário da Resistência Nacional: CRRN) which was established at the ‘First National Conference for the Reorganisation of the Country’. During this meeting, the armed resistance policy was changed, with a new focus on the mobile units of the Falintil guerrillas in order to avoid detection by Indonesian security. The nureps (nucleus of popular resistance) at the village level and the celcoms (community cell) at the hamlet level, were organised to provide intelligence and logistical services (Rei, 2007). According to one Cristalis (2008), 1,700 resistance cells were in operation. The CRRN administration was based on the bush, and very few people were familiar with the administrative structures.

A more significant change through Xanana Gusmão was derived from this attempt to
reconcile the political parties, particularly Fretilin and UDT. Between 1987 and 1988, he depoliticised the resistance movement in order to consolidate national unity. In this regard, he separated Falintil from Fretilin’s control and replaced CRRN with a new multi-party umbrella council called the Concelho Nacional da Resistência Maubere (National Council of Maubere Resistance: CNRM). Approximately a decade later, this council changed its name again to the Concelho Nacional da Resistência Timorense (National Council of Timorese Resistance: CNRT) respecting UDT’s objection to take Maubere which alluded to an image of Fretilin. Under the CNRT leadership, José Ramos-Horta provided diplomatic support after being appointed the CNRM Special Representative Abroad and the Personal Representative of Xanana Gusmão (CAVR, 2006; Shoesmith, 2003).

During the entire period of Indonesian occupation, it seemed that a stronger sense of nationalism was born in order to tackle the Indonesian military strategies. The new national identity of East Timor developed thanks to a re-organisation of the Fretilin leadership and resistance tactics after the Indonesian troops’ conquest of Mt Matebian in 1978; this led to a change in the attitude of the East Timorese toward the Catholic Church, and the birth of the youth leaders received Indonesian education and an urban-based intifada. The clear failure of the Indonesian policies on development also reversely strengthened the national identity of East Timorese, who continued to follow their traditional rule (Carey, 1995).

The Santa Cruz massacre was a critical event for East Timorese, and saw them enter a new phase of struggles. In October 1991, a Portuguese parliamentary delegation was due in Dili in order to see the reality of Timor. Experiencing the Timorese demonstration in front of the international media when the Pope visited in 1989, the Indonesian military threatened and harassed pro-independence advocates, encouraging them not to organise a demonstration and speak to the delegation. Nevertheless, Xanana Gusmao and the Executive Committee of the Resistance (CAVR, 2006) planned a huge demonstration of the clandestine youth in front of the Portuguese delegation. However, on 27th October, 1991, the visit of the delegation was cancelled because of consistent disputes between Portugal and Indonesia. On the next day, Sebastiao Gomes, a pro-independence youth who was seeking safe refuge with other youth in the Motael Church in Dili, was killed by an Indonesian intelligence agent.

After his death, the organisers of the demonstration switched the plan to a march after the memorial mass for Sebastiao; the marchers walked from Motael Church to Santa Cruz Cemetery where Sebastiao was buried. Although the visiting schedule was cancelled, the clandestine youth went to Bali and persuaded journalists to come to East Timor in order to
attend this event; at the same time, they were also mobilising demonstrations on 12th
November. After the peaceful march, the youth unfurled banners featuring phrases such as
‘Indonesia, Why You Shoot Our Church?’ and ‘Independent is What We Inspire’ alongside
pictures of Xanana. However, armed Indonesian troops charged into the cemetery and
opened fire on the crowd without even warning them to disperse. The shooting continued
for approximately 15 minutes. As a result, 271 East Timorese were killed, 382 wounded
and 150 were missing (AFP, 2006). This is now known as the Santa Cruz massacre, and
was filmed and reported by several international journalists. This was the first moment that
the Indonesian military’s brutal treatment of the East Timorese had been publicly
witnessed by people around the world.

The massacre prompted a fresh round of resistance movements, as the Fretilin and
clandestine movements became stronger, with females also participating. The massacre not
only had an influence on East Timorese society, but also on Indonesia and indeed the
Western world. In Indonesia, the educated elites began to realise the reality of East Timor
after reading international newspapers; because of this, the Indonesian democracy and
human rights movements strengthened their ties with East Timor’s clandestine resistance.
For instance, East Timorese student organisations, including the East Timorese Students’
National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste: RENETIL)
participated in Indonesian democracy and human rights movements. In particular, 29
Timorese students in Indonesia jumped over the fence of the American embassy in Jakarta
and demanded to talk with senior US officials; this occurred on 12th November, 1994, the
last day of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the third anniversary of the
Santa Cruz Massacre (CAVR, 2006). After the student protest, similar events were
organised by Indonesian-educated Timorese students, which kept the international spotlight
on East Timor. East Timor continued to rank highly on the international agenda, as
exemplified by the joint award of the Nobel Peace Prize to José Ramos-Horta and Bishop
Belo (ibid.). Indeed, concern over East Timor was expressed by international civil society,
the UN Commission on Human Rights, the UN Congress, the European Parliament, and
Portugal. Not too long after this, internal pro-democracy movements, external pressure on
Indonesia’s military operation in East Timor, and the Asia financial crisis put an end to
Suharto’s regime. The post-Suharto president, B.J. Habibie and Portugal agreed to allow
East Timorese to decide on their future by voting in the independence referendum endorsed
by the UN (ibid.).

However, soon after announcing a referendum, military-backed militias began to attack
independence supporters. They unleashed indiscriminate attacks, terror, and destruction. During the period spanning 1998-1999, 70% of East Timor’s buildings and infrastructure was destroyed; approximately 250,000 people were forcibly deported, while a considerable number of people were killed and women raped. The threats from the Indonesian military and militias were not only against the East Timorese, but also the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET, June – October 1999) which had a mandate to organise and conduct a self-determination ballot, the East Timor Popular Consultation. Despite consistent intimidation, 98.6% of those registered to vote did so; among them, 78.5% voted for independence.

However, the security issue quickly became more problematic. After the announcement of the result of the referendum on 4th September, 1999, the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesia militia embarked on a destructive rampage all over East Timor, with unofficial support from Jakarta. As this indiscriminate rampage led to a huge number of East Timorese and international casualties, the international community put pressure on Indonesia to accept international intervention. To take over the role of security in East Timor from Indonesia, the Australia-led INTERFET was established in Dili on 20th September to restore security; however, it was unable to prevent mass killings and deconstruction by the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesia militias. Despite these adversities in the transitional era, Timor-Leste finally became an internationally recognised state on 20th May, 2002; moreover, with support from the international community (i.e. UN missions: UNTEAT, UNMISET, UNOTIL and UNMIT), the government’s administrative structure was established. The final UN mission: the UNMIT completed its mandate in 2012.

A decade of UN mission’s operation was caused by instability of national security; the 2006-2007 Crisis was an example to show the instability and failure of the state (Scambary, 2009; Silva, 2010; Simonsen, 2006; Wilson, 2008; UN, 2006). The most serious tension emerged with the violent conflict taken place in April and May 2006, which was triggered by the Fretilin government’s decision to dismiss 594 soldiers from F-FDTL. From the dismissal, various latent tensions were ignited to turn up; diverse security groups such as Council for the Popular Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL), Sagrada Familia, Colimau 2000 and Organisasaun Resistencia Social Nacional Cooperativa (ORSNACO) martial arts groups such as Wise Children of the Land (KORK) and Faithful Fraternity of the Lotus (PSHT) were mobilised for the conflict within the national security force (Scambary, 2009). It has often defined as the dispute
between ethnicities from *Lorosae* (east) and *Loromuno* (west) (Leach, 2009) however, in fact, the causes were post-independence complex relating to wide range of political, historical, ethnic, generational and geographical divisions (Babo-Soares, 2003). Due to these various identities derived from the divisions, the conflict was easily expended into diverse levels and in the short-term. In spite of various causes, the general explanation of the cause of the conflict can be the incomplete common identity formation in the post-independence period in the short-term (Lemay-Hebert, 2011); however, the Timorese society has been forming common identity as a political unite which will be addressed in the rest of the thesis.

4.2. Customary practice of Timor-Leste

The customary methods of building relations are fundamental when it comes to maintaining the entire Timorese society. Every single individual in Timor-Leste is interconnected through customary relations; indeed, the underlying cosmology of the customary relations is key to understanding the ways in which Timorese live and the societal structure which has been in operation until now. The ‘unachieved syncretism’ is described by Hicks (1983) as the traditional institutional structure that continuously governs Timorese society despite the operation of external authorities.

These customary practices are particularly important for the present, post-independent Timorese society, because all dimensions of Timorese life are bound by them. In this sense, without being aware of these practices, achieving the aim of this project – which is to theorise Timorese state-formation where the state and society have not been clearly divided, as assumed by the Western interventionists – will be a very difficult task. With the importance of the customary practices having been acknowledged, this section will unfold the Timorese practices and institutions which govern everyday societal, political and economic life.

4.2.1. Societal dimension

The societal dimension of the Timorese customary relationships can be captured from the kin-based and marriage relation. These two ways of building relationships are fundamental to the expansion of the social web of relations. The concept of ‘common
origin’ is important when it comes to elaborating on the societal relationship in Timorese society, which is *uma lulik* (sacred house), to which every Timorese belongs. Facilitating sociality, a sense of community and solidarity based on kinship is one of the most important functions of *uma lulik*. Indeed, it facilitates a bond not only between people, but also between the secular and spiritual world, which is connected to their ancestors. *Uma lulik*, known as the original house of the first ancestor to have settled in a territory, is where the sacred heirlooms were stored. For the ritual occasions, people identified as descendants of the first ancestor reconvene at the house, and reconfirm and strengthen their historical and mythical unity (Traube, 1995). Since it is the first house, under one *uma lulik*, expanded smaller houses consist of the hierarchical structure of houses. Through house alliances, individuals are interlinked to each other. This is the kinship network. The expansion of kinship networks requires perpetual reproduction accompanied by marriage exchange between two houses, namely *uma mane* (male house) and *uma feto* (female house). The marriage exchange is essential for the reproduction and continuity of the kin-based relation in Timor-Leste, where exogamous tradition is common.

Another way in which to create the house relationship is through *Juramentu*, which refers to blood oaths between different *uma lulik*. The purpose of *Juramentu* in Timor-Leste is to make and maintain peace through the sharing of blood, which means to share the image of ancestors and affiliates of *uma lulik*. When different *uma lulik*, tribes, and families are hostile, then they can practice binding them as brothers. The created symbolic brotherhood prevents further violence due to the Timorese norms that family members should not be hostile to other members within the kin-based relationship.

To sum up, the societal relation in Timor-Leste is fundamentally formed through *uma lulik*, which is centred on the kinship network. The house not only facilitates the relationship between family members in this world, but also that between the spirits of ancestors and their descendants, in accordance with the inherited norms and values of the ancestors (Bovensiepen, 2014b, 2015, 2016, McWilliam, 2005; Trindade, 2008, 2011; Trindade and Castro, 2007). The kinship network is first formed by expanding the governing territory of *uma lulik* through reproduction and marriage and, second, by performing *Juramentu*. An important value in the societal dimension, and one derived from the customary practices of making a relational network, is co-existence and (negative) peace, as particularly well revealed in *Juramentu*. Due to the norm that hostility or antagonism toward others in the family network should be avoided, forming and expanding relationships is considered a method of conflict resolution in post-independent Timor-
Leste⁴. As such, the societal relation through the kin-based relationship is a Timorese social fabric that makes it possible to maintain peace, co-existence and pluralism through the relational web.

4.2.2. Political dimension

_Uma lulik_, the house-based social structure, is also at the centre of the political dimension. The political head of the main _uma lulik is liurai⁵_ (king) who was deemed a man of _Maromak Oan_ (God’s son) lineage (Farram, 2004; Gunn, 1999). The traditional political system in Timor-Leste was centred on _uma lulik_, which is a ritual house, and _liurai_, who is responsible for ruling the land and people of the extended family. Although their roles, social respects and relationships have been changed or taken away since the Portuguese administration appointed Portuguese-friendly _liurai_ to replace some of rebellious _liurai_ under their indirect rule over the Timorese territory (Dunn, 2003; Traube, 1986), _liurai_ were traditionally responsible for governance over the territory not only in material terms, but also in spiritual terms connected to _Wehali_. Hence, they were deemed to have immense power to control weather, disease, and even victory or defeat in war (Fox, 1982; Farram, 2004). Their authority was derived from both material and spiritual elements.

As houses were interconnected in a hierarchical order, the political structure also consisted of the same hierarchical order. As noted, an important political figure was _liurai_ of _uma lulik_, a head of family houses who was chosen by _datos⁶_, and under the classes of nobles, _ema-reino⁷_, and _ata⁸_. According to the level of their ritual house, mutual obligation to and tributary relations with other houses from _uma lulik_ to individual household are regulated by _lisan_. Indeed, Renard-Clamagirand’s conclusion in relation to Timorese society is that ‘at the collective level social organisation is based on a hierarchy of houses around the houses of chiefs (1982, p. 293, citied in McWilliam, 2016, p. 32)’. The ruling class, such as _liurai_ and _dato_ possesses symbolical sacred objects (for instance, a cane, a staff, a rattan stick or bastão in Portuguese and metal plates, Bovensiepen, 2016, p. 80) and

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⁴ Trindade and Castro (2007) report that Juramentu took place in Lospalos in 2006 at a communal level. People from five sub-districts of Lautem conducted the ritual in order to prevent inter-communal violence.

⁵ Literally means ‘more than the earth’ (Hicks, 2015, p. 19)

⁶ aristocrats or nobles, the descendants of royal families

⁷ commoners

⁸ slaves
knowledge, both of which are necessary to have governing power (Traube, 1986).

The two ruling classes, namely liurai and dato, have different roles in traditional practices. According to Trindade and Castro (2007), the role of liurai was mainly exercised in a relation between other uma lulik in different kingdoms. For instance, they would make wars or peace with other kingdoms or manage external influences. With regard to the peaceful relation, they would expand their bloodline network through Juramentu or marriage exchange, as mentioned above. While being in charge of the diplomatic roles, they were not necessarily required to become involved in internal disputes but just to confirm that they had accepted agreements made between parties to legitimate the resolution of the disputes. In contrast, datos were in charge of internal governance, and occupied roles such as that of village headman on a day-to-day basis (ibid.; Hicks, 2015). During the Portuguese era, they were less visible in the colonial bureaucracy but had considerable influence, which was conferred on them by lisat (Hicks, 2015). Hicks (ibid.) notes that, in some districts, the dato and the xeфе de suco who were a part of the colonial administrative structure were a pair of leaders who governed the village.

Besides political power via a lineage of nobles, there is another important figure in the Timorese political structure, namely lia-na’i’n9. Their traditional position was dispute mediators or arbitrators, as they had knowledge of traditional resolutions. Lia-na’i’n mediates between victims and perpetrators to reach agreements of balance between the spiritual and secular world that had been broken by perpetrators’ wrong behaviours. Lia-na’i’n is an agent with knowledge of how to link between ancestors’ spiritual world and this secular world. Because of its mediator role, it tends to be interpreted as a judicial agent exercising traditional law; however, due to its arbitrariness, it should not be treated as the equivalent to ‘law’.

Of particular note here are the external interventions, such as the Portuguese colonial administration and Indonesian occupation, both of which attempted to destroy the traditional political authority and structure. Because of this, the traditional political authority of decedents of royal or maromak oan has disappeared in most areas of present-day Timor-Leste or is less respected because of public awareness of its illegitimacy during the colonial era. In some cases, traditional authority was mixed with the authority of modern state administration; for instance, the elected xeфе de suku is a descendent of liurai (Cummins, 2010). In contrast, the role of lia-na’i’n in Timor-Leste still maintains its

9 lords of the world
traditional feature relatively well in tandem with traditional belief, *lulik*; indeed, the latter is still very strongly attached to Timorese everyday life and is one of the most significantly influential authorities when it comes to supporting traditionally embedded norms and values.

### 4.2.3. Economic dimension

Much like the societal and political dimensions, the family-based social structure also regulates economic practices. The main economic practice in traditional Timorese society was reciprocal exchange, which took place in the kinship network through marriage and spiritual practices (McWilliam, 2011) and consistently common practices in post-independent Timor-Leste. One of the common exchange practices is exercised through *barlake* and the marriage relationship. Depending on whether the social system is patrilineal or matrilineal, there is variation when it comes to the ethno-linguistic distinction, the results of negotiations between the two families of the wife-giver (umane) and wife-taker (fetosan) and lisan of houses and clans, as well as the type and quantity of commodities for *barlake*. However, the basic rules of the marriage exchange have similarities, as they are a cornerstone of Timorese traditional practices (Niner, 2012). First, the representatives of each family meet and the groom’s side ask the bride’s side if they consent to the marriage. Following this, each family discusses whether this marriage is acceptable and what kinds of *barlake* the family would like to receive. Based on the family discussion, two representatives from each family conduct the negotiation. After the first exchange is made, the bride and groom can have the ceremony at *uma lulik* (ibid.).

The *barlake* flows from wife-takers to wife-givers. In the case of the Fataluku-language community, goods symbolically present masculinity such as buffalos, horses, animals for feasting, swords, and cash during these days (Renard-Clamagirand, 1982; McWilliam, 2011, p. 751). In contrast, the wife-givers often give famine goods such as ‘pigs, coral bead

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10 *barlake* has been often translated to dowry or brideprice in English, but it should be understood as an agreed regulation which defines the roles of two families (wife-giver and wife-taker) in the life-cycle. In general, a long period of commitment from the family of the wife-taker is required at the counter-family’s important rituals and ceremonies, such as marriage and death; this is based on the initial negotiation before marriage, and helps to fulfill the ‘debt obligation’ (McWilliam, 2011, p. 746). In this sense, *barlake* should be interpreted as marriage gifts which are key to expanding the kinship network and regulating the social relationship between families and their obligation to one another rather than a dowry or bride-price (see Niner, 2012).
necklaces (*inu*), gold earrings (*karasu*), high-value woven cloths (*lauhana*), and sometimes gifts of land’ (ibid.), in addition to the source of life. Moreover, at the final commensal gathering in the sequence of ceremonies, the wife-givers provide rice and pork, while the wife-takers provide the buffalo meat for guests. This provision of contrasting goods of values signifies the continued reciprocal relationship for future life-cycle events. For instance, they also exercise the reciprocal gift exchange when members of a household die. Just as with the marriage exchanges, the wife-givers prepare woven cloth and pork, and the affines of the wife-takers prepare livestock and buffalo meat. The prepared woven cloth goes to the affines of the bereaved who contributed livestock for the gifts and labour. This shows that the gifts continuously move along with the kinship network. This means that every household carries debt and indebt obligations resulting from family expansion via marriage and reproduction; as such, each household practices reciprocal exchanges within kinship and social relationships.

The reciprocal exchanges go beyond the human community. In this reciprocal relation, the indebted obligations are owned by descendants from spiritual ancestors of the house. The underlying rationale of this relationship, which transcends the secular realm, is the belief that ancestors will bring blessings and provide protection to their descendants if there is a relation between the descendants and the spirits of ancestors. This protection from the spiritual realm is owed to descendants, and thus they must give gifts to their ancestral spirits that have lived in their land or sacred objects. The gift-giving to the spirits is always a part of all family ceremonies and rites; it often takes the form of a sacrifice, such as the slaughter of animals. Slaughtered meat is served to guests and the inner organs presented to the spirits with invocations for health, luck and wealth. If they dismiss ancestral signs and their indebted obligation, it is believed that they can be exposed to any forms of calamity through the sanction. This is the same rationale which underlies the restoration of traditional practices and *lulik* in the post-independent era (see Chapter 5).

The two modes of reciprocal exchange presented above are at the heart of the Timorese community’s attempts to form a web of relationships. The marriage exchanges present the prosperity of reproduction by expanding social alliances while the exchanges between spiritual and material realms present prosperity by reinforcing their membership and identity under the umbrella of the house of origin. These two modes of exchanges consequently weave the house community and its alliance community together, which is the Timorese social fabric that makes it possible to perpetuate the Timorese.
4.2.4. A web of relationships as the Timorese social fabric

The first half of this background chapter has reviewed Timorese customary practices in three dimensions: societal, economic, and politics. However, it may be noticed that these three dimensions are intertwined, and thus it is difficult to discuss them individually, especially when focusing on **uma lulik**, the house of origin which is a customary centre of Timorese society. The traditional leadership is also territorially and relationally limited in the kin-based network under the umbrella of **uma lulik**; the societal structure is expanded in the relation between two **uma lulik** and regulated by the **lisan** of each house to maintain peace based on the co-existence. The economic exchange is also practiced between two or within the house alliance as a material medium to create and weave the expanding house alliance. In particular, the latter two dimensions are more closely interrelated to strengthen the social fabric which is fundamental for Timorese to prosper.

In contrast with the political dimension, which has lost its customary characteristics due to the external intervention from the government during the colonial period, customary practices in societal-economic dimensions have been retained and restored in the post-independent period. The house alliance and material exchange articulate how these embedded social institutions functioned as a source of social protection and resilience under Portuguese colonial power and Indonesian occupation. The legitimacy crisis of traditional leadership derived from the political dimension could possibly be overcome due to the strong social relationship between multiple obligations. In the post-independent period, restoration of the relationship with ancestral spirits was a major activity, which manifested as the rebuilding of **uma lulik** which had collapsed, and the practicing of rituals for prosperity in the future based on Timorese hopes and dreams for a bright future. As previously emphasised, with regard to the restoration of the spiritual relationship, **lulik** is becoming a more important part of the post-independent narrative, and crosses over into the political dimension (see Chapter 5).

This chapter briefly addressed Timorese history and culture prior to examining Timorese hybrid state-formation. It focused on East Timor’s history of resistance against external forces such as Portugal, Indonesia and the UN. Timorese society was exposed to the modern political systems such as political parties, democracy and elections by the external forces; in response to these external forces, the society formed a sense of community – resistant nationalism – just like other post-colonial states. The practices of resistance
contributed to the protection and retention of their relation-oriented culture based on *uma lulik*, and have even strengthened the sense of nationalism in the post-independent Timor-Leste.
Chapter 5. Drawing a web of authorities in Timor-Leste I

The aim of this chapter is to understand different authorities in Timorese society. Prior to addressing these authorities, the chapter begins with the recent common narratives in Timor-Leste, which are relevant sources when it comes to proving the significance of these authorities in post-independence Timor-Leste. The narratives implicitly reveal a range of the present Timorese values, and hence provide useful a foundation from which to understand why these authorities are legitimate in the present Timor-Leste.

Based on the range of Timorese values, the second part of the chapter introduces three authorities (traditional, religious and legal-rational authority), focusing on the source of these authorities. The three different authorities have been tentatively chosen based on the literature review (e.g. Braithwaite et al., 2012; Brown, 2013; Brown and Gusmao, 2009; Hohe, 2002; McWilliam and Traube, 2011; Hohe and Ospina, 2002; The Constitution of RDTL, Trindade, 2008, see Chapter 3, p.99); this choice is confirmed in the chapter through identifying the authorities in terms of the descriptive and normative approach (see Chapter 2) based on the narratives.

5.1. Post-independence narratives in Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste became an internationally recognised state following its liberation from the Indonesian occupation. In the new Timor-Leste period, Timorese values, and particularly the priority of these values, have been rapidly changing in response to drastic social, economic and political changes in a new order. During such transition, the system of a web, for instance, a variety of authorities, and relations of authorities in a web can also possibly change following changes in the priority of social values. This means that the Timorese values and the order of those values are critical indicators when it comes to choosing the political significance of constituent authorities in a web. Therefore, it is essential to understand the values in post-independence Timor-Leste to define them and delineate a web of authorities in the country. Following this, it must figure out the Timorese values in post-independence Timor-Leste.

In my fieldwork, I faced a couple of common narratives that I frequently heard. These narratives were closely tied with the Timorese past, present and future, and implicitly revealed the present Timorese value system. My interviewees and acquaintances valorised
their ancestors’ sacrifices for the liberation of the Timorese people, their Timoreseness precisely the fact that they maintained their tradition and identity, and economic development. These values that I found were consistently presented in narratives during the fieldwork and were particularly related to three authorities on which I have chosen to focus. As an introduction to various authorities co-existing in present-day Timor-Leste, it will explore post-independence narratives to identify the present Timorese values.

5.1.1. Value of national liberation and resistance

A UNTL student (OD-1) who I met in the summer of 2011 during my trip to Timor-Leste, but who later became an enthusiastic activist for youth leadership training in Dili, told me that ‘it is the time for compensation’, this was said as he was drinking a bottle of water in a fairtrade coffee shop in Pantai Kelapa. ‘Compensation to whom for what?’ I asked. ‘Those who sacrificed themselves for the Timorese liberation such as veterans and Church’, he said. Some Timorese certainly expressed antipathy towards groups of veterans due to popular suspicion of their capacity to occupy the role of national developers in post-independence Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, a general respect and appreciation of their commitment to the country’s independence during the Indonesian occupation were deeply embedded in their emotions. A Timorese activist from an international NGO sternly stated that this new country’s responsibility for veterans was to show sincere appreciation for their sacrifice while being apprehensive about spreading antipathy against veterans, as is stated in the Timorese constitution.

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11 Dili, 30th May 2015
The Timorese people’s respect for the Church and members of the Church also delivers the value of national liberation. When I asked people about their belief in *Maromak* (God) and Church practices, some of them seemed to be embarrassed to talk about it as lapsed Catholics. Regardless of whether they were lapsed or faithful Catholics, the people highly valued the importance of the Church in the country, since the Church was actively involved in the Timorese liberation movement. A short statement reading ‘Church fought for us. Without Church, we were not able to become an independent state (OD-1)^{12}\) and the pictures of Cross in the former prison, Comarca in Dili (Figure 5-1) implicitly indicates that people recognise and are grateful for the Church’s participation in the liberation movement. The constitution (RDTL, no date, Section 11.2), which clearly acknowledges the dedication of the Catholic Church during the process of Timorese liberation, refers us to the value of liberation in Timor-Leste.

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^12 Dili, 30th May 2015
1. The Democratic Republic of East Timor acknowledges and values the historical resistance of the Maubere People against foreign domination and the contribution of all those who fought for national independence.

2. The State acknowledges and values the participation of the Catholic Church in the process of national liberation of East Timor.

3. The State shall ensure special protection to the war-disabled, orphans and other dependents of those who dedicated their lives to the struggle for independence and national sovereignty, and shall protect all those who participated in the resistance against the foreign occupation, in accordance with the law.

4. The law shall define the mechanisms for rendering tribute to the national heroes.

However, the value of liberation tends to be trapped in the boundary of sovereignty. The Timorese genuinely appreciate their national liberation, which is derived from their independence; however, it seems that such value has not yet been defined at the individual level, e.g. individual liberty. This tendency is evident in people’s grumblings about democracy. Indeed, I conducted an interview with a highly-educated male Timorese who worked with the Australian government (ED-2)\(^\text{13}\). He hastily opened the gate to welcome me and shortly after an informal greeting, he started to talk about the difficulty that he was dealing with regarding his project. The issue was related to the military campaign against a former Falintil guerrilla leader (Mauk Moruk)\(^\text{14}\) and his brother (Cornélio Gama or L7) on his project site and its effect on his work proceedings. Thereafter, our conversation unintendedly unfolded, with a focus on social discord and political stability in general. Regarding this, I asked him to what extent the UN contributed to the establishment of political stability in Timor-Leste. In response to this question, he positively appraised the UN’s contribution, but only in terms of the institution-building; he then pointed out Timor-Leste’s limitation of democracy as a young nation. He placed particular emphasis on the fact that liberal democracy brought by the UN ruined the Timorese moral discipline. For

\(^{13}\) Dili, 19\(^\text{th}\) June 2015.

\(^{14}\) Mauk Moruk was a rebel leader of the Maubere Revolutionary Council to the government of Timor-Leste.
instance, if a youth were to break a window of someone’s house and run away, previously they would have responded to a village adult who would have asked them why they had misbehaved. However, as stated by the participant, ‘we now have democracy’. This may imply that the UN failed to achieve democratisation in Timor-Leste (Hohe, 2002). He also indirectly stated that the 2006 crisis came about because of incomplete democracy from the UN. To me, this seemed to indicate that the Timorese are not ready to adopt liberal democracy.

A similar comment was raised in a tea-time conversation with another interviewee (OD-1)\textsuperscript{15}. We talked about the new Prime Minister, Mr. Rui Araujo, and former PM Xanana’s sudden announcement of his resignation. All political gossip regarding this tended to depict Xanana’s autocrat characteristics and so I said to him that this does not sound like a democratic state. He replied that Timor-Leste is not ready to have liberal democracy. ‘Democracy fostered social disputes and conflict like 2006 crisis. What we Timor-Leste needs now is harmony and stability not a conflict’ he said. Moreover, he stated that the UN’s approach to democratic elections was inappropriate for Timor-Leste. Throughout the conversation, my overall impression was that the autocrat characteristic could be acceptable in his view, as long as they could benefit from (negative) peace, stability and economic development. It seems that he had belief on national leaders who will use power for commons not for their own benefits because they contributed their life for the country’s liberation.

To sum up, in post-independence Timor-Leste, Timorese appreciation and respect for those who participated in liberation movement and dedicated themselves to Timorese independence deliver the value of national liberation and resistance. Indeed, this tendency is revealed by their expressions of gratitude and favour to the freedom fighters and Catholic Church in daily conversations, and the Constitution of RDTL. However, this value tends to be more associated with the notion of territorial sovereignty regarding independence from external influence, rather than with that of individual level of freedom and liberty. The informants’ comments on the incongruity of liberal democracy to the Timorese value and needs for strong leaderships support the argument that the Timorese place less value on liberty at the individual level. From the Timorese perspective, the concept of liberty, which accompanied liberal democracy in Timor-Leste, seems to relate to the license, delinquency, disorder and dispute of the society. In particular, social anxiety

\textsuperscript{15} Dili, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 2015
over potential instability following the 2006 crisis tends to constrain individual liberty and resistance.

5.1.2. Value of Timoreseness

Every state has an ongoing process of identity formation, and Timor-Leste has also been going through this process; granted it is a little tougher for such a transitional state. In transitional terms, national leaders have had to deal with an urgent task, which is to negotiate and articulate shared Timorese identity and national narratives. This so-called nation-building process involves ‘the deliberate interest- and ideology-based formation of a national format which creates collective identity and affiliation of the population with the nation-state’ (Borgerhoff, 2006, p. 103). The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was a founding and official document which enshrined Timorese values, symbols and identity previously suppressed by foreign powers (Leach, 2002; cf. Preamble of The Constitution of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste). The constitution of Timor-Leste defines two features as its core identity. The first feature is a national history of resistance, which was addressed above; the second feature is a cultural affinity with Portugal (Leach, 2002). Here, I will firstly focus on the latter feature.

The Timorese will to maintain their Portuguese heritage is shown in their choice of official language and their policy of international relations. The constitution, Section 13 (1) states that Tetum and Portuguese are the official languages of Timor-Leste. Introducing Portuguese as an official language demonstrates the Fretilin’s inclination towards Portuguese speaking countries. Portuguese was a language of educated political elites, and led to independence in 1975. During the Indonesian occupation, Portuguese was also used in the clandestine network (Simonsen, 2006). At the beginning of the first government’s term, the Fretilin’s majority of political elites consisted of returned diasporas exiled to Portuguese speaking countries; as such, the members of the cabinet were Portuguese speakers. The choice of Portuguese as an official language caused cultural and generational cleavage between the 75-generation and the younger generation who were educated during the Indonesian occupation. However, as the younger generation has gradually taken over the power, the gap does not seem to be as significant as before. Until now, Portuguese has served as a symbol of the legacy and legitimacy of the independent government in 1975,
which had strong ties with Portuguese speaking countries\textsuperscript{16}.

The tight relation with Portuguese speaking countries is also revealed in Timor-Leste’s policy of international relations. The constitution, Section 8 (3) states that ‘The Democratic Republic of East Timor shall maintain privileged ties with the countries whose official language is Portuguese’. Timor-Leste joined the league of Portuguese speaking countries, CPLP (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa: Community of Portuguese Language Countries)\textsuperscript{17} in 2002. Timor-Leste was the host of a biennial Conference of Heads of State and Government held in Dili, 2014; this was part of a rotating presidency of the CPLP. In preparing the conference, the government allocated a considerable state budget to the construction of new infrastructure, such as the CPLP Bridge and the recovery of roads, gardens and other public places, in addition to sanitation infrastructure (Government of Timor-Leste, 2014). Timor-Leste expressed its ambition to strengthen CPLP, promote new sectors of cooperation and support relatively more vulnerable countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea. In 2015, $1.5 million was allocated to the Timorese presidency of the CPLP and $1.9 million was pledged to support the Strategic and Operational Plan 2015-2025 of Guinea-Bissau (Government of Timor-Leste, 2015). Timor-Leste is currently making a strategic effort to set its position in international relations through the South-South and triangular cooperation of CPLP to show its accountability to the international community, and particularly its neighbouring ASEAN communities since Timor-Lester wishes to become an ASEAN member state. In this sense, maintaining a prestigious relation with Portuguese speaking countries was the Timorese diplomatic strategy in order to secure a successful debut in the international community and strengthen its role; moreover, this has also been effective in consolidating the legacy of the 75-generation and nationalism.

\textsuperscript{16} However, considering the relation between language and power, questions must be asked of the social legitimacy of the Portuguese language among Timorese. The fact that only 5.3\% of the population speak Portuguese as their first, second and third language raises doubts about its social legitimacy (Statistics Timor-Leste, 2015). It should be noted that various factors support the argument for the lack of social legitimacy of the language policy. Such factors include the controversy surrounding language policy between the press and the government, the problem of Portuguese proficiency in the government (Taylor-Leech, 2009) and education sector, and the intergeneration and urban-rural division in terms of Portuguese literacy (Statistics of Timor-Leste, 2015; Taylor-Leech, 2009). As a newly (re-)independent state, the language policy is a significant political and social issue which must be taken into consideration.

\textsuperscript{17} Members include 9 countries: Angola, Brasil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste
The second feature of Timoreseness is revealed in the country’s effort to achieve ‘Timorisation’ (Chopra, 2002; Suhrke, 2001, p. 4) of the formal institutional system. Timorisation appeared as a catchphrase alongside capacity building during the post-referendum period (Reis, 2000). At the beginning, it specifically targeted UNTAET, which is exclusively filled with international staff (cf. Gusmao’s New Year’s Message, 2000). In relation to the UN and other bilateral donors, the Timorese government and political leaders had to hold each other in check so as to achieve Timorese self-determination along the lines of Timorisation. While the UN mission was stationary, the country’s senior political figures continued trying to lead Timorisation by gradually taking over its corresponding responsibility for the state from the UN through starting localisation (Engel and Vieira, 2011), bringing features of traditional community into the formal system, and revitalising Timorese cultural heritage. Finally, the last official UN mission, UNMIT, completed its mandate in 2012 and the county office of the UN agencies has steadily localised. Timorisation does represent not only localisation of UN but also restoration of the Timorese customary culture. The traditional problem-solving mechanisms, such as Nahe Biti Bo’ot and Tara Bandu, have been reviewed by the UN, as well as other international and local NGOs in line with the judicial system (Babo-soares, 2004; UNDP, 2013). The foundation of local governance, which is the pakote or package electoral system, requires the inclusion of one lia-na’in as a member of the council, according to Law No. 3/2009. Thanks to the government’s initiative and international assistance, symbolic Timorese cultural houses (uma lulik), many of which were deconstructed by militias following the 1999 ballot, were restored at a remarkable pace (Bovensiepen, 2014a; McWilliam, 2005). In addition, the government has made efforts to revitalise Timorese tradition, symbols and values. For instance, the Secretary of State for Arts and Culture participates in traditional ceremonies such as the Nahe Biti Bo’ot and the Tara Bandu, created by the Academy of Arts, cultural centres, and promoted by cultural creative industries (Secretaria de Estado da Arte e Cultura, 2013).

It is crucial for the newly (re-)independent state to form national identity; Timor-Leste has also concentrated on it, named Timoreseness. Since its history associated with various external force, their identity consists of diverse cultural heritage. Timoreseness seems to have mainly two strands: first, rebuilding a cultural, political and economic relationship with Portugal and Portuguese speaking countries and second, reviving traditional Timorese values and practices.
5.1.3. National goal of economic development

The most recent value which has been raised and importantly considered in present-day Timor-Leste is economic development. As previously mentioned, the antipathy to veterans, particularly in Dili, is also related to the issue of economic development (ED-6, OD-1, OD-5, OD-9, OD-11, OD-15)\textsuperscript{18}. Those people who expressed dissatisfaction with privileged veteran groups argued that veterans should plan their pension spending to contribute to national economic development. A similar narrative was heard when people talked about returnees from Korea\textsuperscript{19}. Some were sarcastic about the spending habits of returnees, feeling that they chose to buy consumer durables rather than saving and investing in the national economy. A recent graduate even described, in a fairly judgmental tone, how many kiosks have been opened by returnees and failed in his home village (OD-5)\textsuperscript{20}. He also stated that the money should be more wisely used for national economic development rather than being wasted. In a similar nuance, discussions on the government’s unsustainable Petroleum Fund management have been a social issue since its establishment (ED-6)\textsuperscript{21}. The Timorese have tended to view the Petroleum Fund as the only financial source for national economic development, but are worried about its unsustainability (Bovensiepen, 2016). The Petroleum Fund became a double-edged sword for the government, with positive feedback from citizens regarding the increased accessibility of public services such as education and medical services; in contrast, the young educated elites criticised the (un- or miss-) planned use of the fund in the long-term. All criticism mentioned here seemed to be based on their desperate desire for national economic development and improvement of their livelihood.

The high expectations of economic development were also revealed when I questioned them about the state, and specifically ‘the role of the state’. The people who I interviewed

\textsuperscript{18} Dili, 17th July 2015; Dili, 30th May 2015; Dili, 14th June 2015; Dili, 8th July 2015; Dili, 10th July 2015; Dili, 15th July 2015

\textsuperscript{19} Through the EPS(Employment Permit System) starting in 2009, 300 or 400 Timorese young workers are being dispatched to Korea every year. According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea (2014), approximately 1,500 Timorese were working in Korea.
http://tls.mofa.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/legengreadboard.jsp?TypeID=16&boardid=5715&seqno=709884

\textsuperscript{20} Dili, 14th June 2015

\textsuperscript{21} Dili, 17th July 2015
in the Korean Language School described the state as an agency of national development\textsuperscript{22}. Some pointed out institutional structures such as administration, legislation and judicature (OD-7, OD-16)\textsuperscript{23}, as well as the state sovereignty; indeed, they mentioned that ‘the state is citizens and nations’ (OD-9)\textsuperscript{24}. However, most interviewees touched upon issues of development – even those who referred to the state institutions and sovereignty. Indeed, they stated that the state should guarantee ‘good life and prosperity’ (OD-8)\textsuperscript{25}, ‘national development’ (OD-6)\textsuperscript{26}, ‘provide job opportunity’, ‘cooperate with other countries so as to ask aid for development’ (OD-11)\textsuperscript{27}, ‘stability and development’ (OD-10, OD-12, OD-16)\textsuperscript{28}. Because of this high expectation of national development, people’s worries about limited natural resources linked to the Petroleum Fund were easily understandable.

To some extent, national development is a reasonable demand from the Timorese, who had to give up the value of freedom during the oppressed years under the Indonesian occupation (see Kammen, 2009; Nygaard-Christensen, 2010). In conflict-affected societies, almost all citizens live with trauma. They are survivors of everyday violence and fear. Indeed, the Timorese had to hear the news of missing people, tortured people, and death day after day. Notwithstanding the fear, they shared food and shelter for clandestine and military activities, even taking risks while under Indonesian surveillance. The reason behind their support of, sacrifice for and even active involvement in the resistance activities was related to the Timorese longing for freedom, peace and safety. As supporters and witnesses of resistance activities in the past, people generously agreed to offer financial support (veterans pension) to veterans with respect and appreciation. However, their tolerance of slow progress, job insecurity, and poor quality social services seemed to be running out, and social tension and grievances seemed to be intensified. It has been more than a decade since the independence, and ordinary people have long wished to benefit from economic development in everyday life.

For economic development and political stability, some Timorese would gladly give up

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} I randomly interviewed people who were learning the Korean language at the Korean Language School in Bakora, Dili from 6\textsuperscript{th} – 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Dili, 7\textsuperscript{th} July 2015; Dili, 15\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
\item \textsuperscript{24} Dili, 8\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
\item \textsuperscript{25} Dili, 7\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
\item \textsuperscript{26} Dili, 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2015
\item \textsuperscript{27} Dili, 10\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
\item \textsuperscript{28} Dili, 10\textsuperscript{th} July 2015; Dili, 13\textsuperscript{th} July 2015; Dili, 15\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
\end{itemize}
their freedom and even stand with autocracy (OD-1, ED-3)\textsuperscript{29}. They have called for a powerful leader who is able to manage the state and create a better future. The Timorese dream of economic development seems to be a superb value and national goal.

Post-independence Timor-Leste stands on three kinds of value: liberation, Timoreseness, and economic development and these different values are related to the three authorities which will be presented here; how these values are related to and underpin the authorities will be followed.

Three different authorities are presented in chronological order of the emergence in Timor-Leste: lulik, Catholic Church and the government. This order is particularly important because it represents the extent of connectedness of descriptive and normative sense of authorities. Recalling the discussion on the descriptive and normative approach on the authority in Chapter 2, it argued that descriptive and normative approaches should not be distinguished since normative justification of authority cannot be separated from the socially consented values and norms; in this sense, the modern state’s rational-legal authority was exemplified in order to explain the interconnectedness. This integrative approach was particularly highlighted in the last chapter to point out the lack of political legitimacy on institutions built by statebuilding but here, is emphasised to measure the strength of each authority in the Timorese society: to what extent socially consent norms and values are adopted in normative. This would be a way to compare the significance of legitimacy between authorities. And to address the level of interconnectedness, this chapter focuses on the chronological order of the emergence of three authorities as a referent to the extent to which the authority is socially consented because the older legitimate authority would mean that it stands on broader and deeper social norms and values (Arendt, 1994). Therefore, it assumes the chronological order represent the order of importance of authorities in the eyes of the ordinary Timorese.

\textbf{5.2. Traditional authority: Lulik}

‘In Timor, we have two different religions. One is the Catholic faith, the other is \textit{lulik}\textsuperscript{30}.’

\textsuperscript{29} Dili, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 2015; Dili, 22\textsuperscript{nd} July 2015

\textsuperscript{30} Lulik has been mainly researched in terms of indigenous culture by anthropologists, but less in terms of authority. Of course, \textit{lulik} has been addressed in line with local politics through \textit{lia-na’in}, who is the medium between \textit{lulik} in the sacred world and people in the profane world; however, research on this is limited and on a small scale, such as a
When I made inquiries about *lulik* during my fieldwork in Dili, this was the common response from my interviewees. Whereas Portuguese missionaries saw it as referring to ‘objects of cult’ (Delgado-Rosa, 2012, p. 8, cited in Bovesiepen, 2014b) which were incompatible with Roman Catholics in the past, Roman Catholics and *lulik* co-exist in present-day Timor. Much like Roman Catholics, *lulik* is also one of the authorities which has the most influence on Timorese life. As a traditional faith, *lulik* has very strong ties with every single Timorese, and works as a source of authority in the web of authorities in post-independence Timor-Leste. *Lulik*, as an authority, will be mainly discussed in the domain of so-called irrationality.

*Lulik* is frequently translated as sacred by anthropologists working on Timor and is often used in a combined form with a noun meaning a building, site, or object (Bovesiepen, 2014a, 2014b). It also translates as holy, dangerous, and taboo (McWilliam and Traube, 2011). A common feature of these words is that they describe a relation (Traube, 1986). Traube’s research on the Mambai people of central Timor points out that *lulik* does not refer to an essence but rather a relational category and distance (ibid.; Bovesiepen, 2014b). Referring to the words sacred and holy, it assumes the division of the world between the sacred and profane (Durkheim, 2001). Human-beings are unable to reach the sacred world of *lulik*, and it is dangerous and taboo for human-beings to approach *lulik* in relation to land and ancestors.

Timorese believe that *lulik* has a transgressive force which brings fortune and misfortune. It was fairly common to hear *lulik* being linked to a sense of taboo and danger in Timorese society, with many warning to maintain a distance from *lulik* sites. While I was traveling to Same, I had a chance to visit the site where Dom Boaventura’s statue and his *lulik* tree were. When I approached the *lulik* tree, a senior Timorese staff member warned

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31 The word *lulik* is from the lingua franca Tetum but *lulik* exists in all the local languages of Timor-Leste and it is applied in a coherent and similar manner; for instance, Makassae render *lulik* as falun, Fataluku as tei, Kemak and Naueti as luli, and Bunak as po (cf. Traube, 1986; McWilliam, 2001, 2005; Hicks, 2004; Palmer and Carvahlo, 2008; Shepherd, 2013).

32 Taking a kind invitation, I was able to travel to Same with a Korean NGO, YMCA Korea. They were assisting coffee farmers to achieve fairtrade from 30th June to 2nd July 2015. Same is a historical district for the Timorese, as Liurai Dom Boaventura led an uprising against the Portuguese power in 1912. In 2012, to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the uprising, festivities (Nahe biti boot, cultural night, concert, bicycle race, history trail, and commemorative mass) were held. As a part of the festivities, a giant statue of Dom Boabentura was built.
me not to jump over the fence around the tree; indeed, he said that that he had seen many people become mad after crossing the fence. A similar warning was also delivered by him after an interview in a house next to uma lulik (or uma adat). In the front yard of the uma lulik, there was a pile of stones demarcated by an approximately 20-centimetre-high grey brick circle (Figure 5-2). ‘Don’t step into the circle, otherwise you will be ill’ he said. The place where I was prohibited anyone from walking closely to lulik sites. Timorese consider people to be at risk of a series of misfortunes, madness, illness and even death if they cross the line between lulik (the sacred) and secularity (profane). On the other hand, if they serve lulik (mostly referring to their ancestors) for instance, through traditional rites, they will be fine and even succeed in whatever they do under the protective blessings of lulik. For this reason, people who are ready to go overseas for educational and vocational purposes visit the uma lulik of their origin to wish for their success and welfare.

Figure 5-2  Lulik stone in suco Letefoho, Letefoho 2015
(Source: Author)

Lulik is more than a transcendental potency in Timorese society. Its transcendentalness defines social value and orders that encompass all areas of social life. According to Trindade, who sees lulik as a core value of Timorese society, it includes ‘the spiritual
cosmos that contains the divine creator, the spirits of the ancestors, and the spiritual root of life including sacred rules and regulations that dictate relationships between people and people and nature’ (2011, p. 16). Moreover, McWilliam et al. note that the concept of *lulik* has a much wider usage ‘as a set of fundamental, philosophical and moral orientations in Timorese social life’ (2014, p. 304).

As a spiritual cosmology, *lulik* defines and regulates relations between people, as well as between people and nature (Trindade, 2011). In this sense, it functions as a moral discipline in a family and community. For instance, it regulates the relationship between older and younger siblings, children and parents, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, and wife givers and takers (*fetosan-umane*). It also defines the relation between people and nature. According to the Timorese belief, *lulik* is connected to nature such as water, trees and stones, much like in other cultures of Southeast Asia (Anderson, 1990; Allerton, 2009; Errington, 1989); therefore, the nature should be respected.

The underlying value of the relational rules above is to assure peace and harmony. Indeed, peace and harmony can be achieved by balancing between the binary world. Trindade (2011) summarises Timorese dualistic concepts based on femininity and masculinity. Table 1 below is an example of Timorese dualism. All social relations in the Timorese community are defined by dualism as below, and are regulated by a rule of balance. The traditional marriage practices also proceed through the exchange between wife givers and takers to create an equilibrium (McWilliam, 2011). In relation to ancestors, the Fataluku-speaking Timorese community practices the ritual work of gift-giving in return for protection and blessings so as to guarantee fertility, stability, wealth and so forth (Schefold 2001, cited in McWilliam, 2011). The sanctions of traditional problem solving practice (*tara bandu*) are also based on material exchange such as money, pigs, and cows between two parties (i.e. perpetrator and victims) (Belun and The Asia Foundation, 2013). Through exchange practices, the community can reach social equilibrium, thus leading to peace and stability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feminine (the inner realm), represents peace, fertility and prosperity</th>
<th>Masculine (the outer realm), represents security and protection</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>People</td>
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Table 5-1. Dualistic conceptual system of Timorese society

(Trindade, 2011, p. 3, modified by the author)
Although it may be named differently, *lulik* is found in every Timorese community as a core value that functions as a moral standard, and regulates social relations between people and people, as well as people and the universe. People should follow the words of *lulik* derived from the land of roots and ancestors. If they do not, they believe that *lulik* casts a curse and brings misfortune. Therefore, people hold gift-giving ceremonies to soothe *lulik* when they meet misfortune. Social relations are based on reciprocity through material and energy exchange to maintain social equilibrium for peace and stability. *Lulik* is a set of fundamental, philosophical and moral orientations that regulate and control Timorese society, which means that it is a form of informal order in parallel with formal legal order.

The influence of *lulik* has been even stronger in post-independence Timorese society as Timorese identity. As noted, the Indonesian administration suppressed *lulik* by considering it as polytheism and superstition which cannot co-exist alongside Islamic theism. In addition, it disregarded the Timorese indigenous order and *lulik* objects; for instance, by dismissing a closer relation between people and the land of origin, the Indonesian administration forcibly relocated Timorese. Because the Timorese consider their land of origin to be a source of prosperity, wealth and well-being, those leading an uprooted life

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33 it may be problematic to say that *lulik* has a unified system of beliefs and practices, since different language groups have different names for *lulik*; moreover, the methods of practice are also different. However, as scholarly groups (Hicks, 2004; McWilliam, 2001, 2005; Palmer and Carvahlo 2008; Shepherd, 2013; Traube, 1986) commonly state, the concept of *lulik* is observed in all local languages in a coherent manner; it can even be said that *lulik* has unified beliefs and practices.
always struggled with worries about furious ancestral spirits of *lulik*. After the independence, forcibly uprooted villagers moved back to their village and restored the relation with the *lulik* land (Bovensiepen, 2014a, 2015). National political leaders also supported the revitalisation of the Timorese tradition (see Chapter 6). The restoration of *uma lulik* in people’s land of origin has proceeded at such a fast pace (Loch, 2007). As one of the pillars of Timorese identity, *lulik* became a more significant source of power in the era of nation-building, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. To some extent, it is deemed to be a contradictive phenomenon because this irrational belief on *lulik* has been stronger, while Timor-Leste has been faced with a great influx of foreigners (*malae*) who are grounded in a legal-rational way of thinking, with priority given to their independence from the Indonesia authority. This, it must be asked: why and in what ways has *lulik* been strengthened by independence, how is it still functioning as social authority in Timorese society and would there be other reasons to explain *lulik* authority in addition to its role of an informal social order and a national identity?

Arendt (1993)’s accounts on authority and tradition offer a useful insight to find answers to above questions. Arendt (ibid.)’s accounts on authority and tradition are based on the Roman trinity. She argues that the trinity of authority, religion and tradition are the fundamental principles of civilised order that Romans have established, and which have been influential throughout European history up to the modern era (ibid.; Klusmeyer, 2014). In the particular political experience of Rome, the Senate has derivative authority in a connection to the past and founders of the city polis. The Senate obtained this by transmitting tradition from ancestors and founders who hold a sign given by the Gods. The Senate was the only person held descent authority from divine founders to lead an argument and advise on political decisions as ‘a central weight, like ballast in a ship, which always keeps things in a just equilibrium’ (Arendt, 1993, p. 123). In her account, the authority is from the divinity through the tradition, which means that authority, divinity and tradition are intertwined, and therefore none can exist without the others; as she said, ‘The past, to the extent that it is passed on as tradition, has authority; authority, to the extent that it presents itself as history, becomes tradition; and ... [a]cceptance of tradition without religiously-based authority is always non-binding’ (Arendt, 2005, p. 73). In this respect, authority without spiritual tradition is inconceivable. If tradition is interrupted, this would mean that authority is violated.

This trinity is applicable to explain *lulik* authority through elaborating the interrelatedness between *lulik*’s authority, divinity, and the past. Timorese *lulik* authority has conspicuously
similar characteristics to Roman authority. *Lulik* is seen as a collection of omniscient spirits transmitted from the first settler of the land. The first settler is the founder of the family whose spirit resides in the *lulik* object. The *lia-na’in*, as a person who possesses all knowledge of history of kinship, family and *lulik* objects, and skills to communicate with the *lulik* spirits, can operate with authorities in order to create a balance in society. In Timorese society, it bridges its past and tradition, and the divinity of the spiritual ancestors. Without the connection, it cannot apply its authority.

In present-day, post-independence Timor-Leste, the interconnectedness of three elements is more obvious in the process of nation-building based on liberation history. This is a different phenomenon from the Western history. She argues that the trinity reached the end because of the decay of tradition due to the Reformation and the Scientific Revolution. The intellectual development subverted confidence in tradition in Western history, whereas the *lulik*, the traditional belief, seems to be contrastingly very strong in present-day post-independence Timorese society where comprehensive Western media, intuitions, knowledge and values are flowing. In a general sense, and much like other developing countries, the traditional way of thinking has gradually faded in the wake of Western influence (Silva and Simião, 2012). Differing from the general sense, however, Timorese society’s ties with the *lulik* authority are deemed to be even stronger in the post-independence era.

The fact that *lulik* cannot function as authority without ‘the past, to the extent that it is passed on as tradition’ (Arendt, 2005, p. 73)’ may explain why there is strengthened authority in post-independence Timor-Leste. In post-independence Timor-Leste, the efforts to revitalise Timorese customary practices and traditional institution which were banished by the Indonesian government. As a result, Timorese society succeeded to rebuild *lulik* authority in terms of restoration of Timorese tradition therefore, it can be said that its strengthened authority is related to Timorese oppressed history during the Indonesian occupation. Particularly, by highlighting the ancestors’ spiritual power of protection under the Indonesian occupation, *lulik* even effectively strengthen its authority, which is exemplified by Bovensiepen’s (2011) research notes that how *lulik* protected Laclubar’s residents in eyes of the Timorese. The residents said that they had protected themselves by opening the land so as to release *lulik* spirits which resided in the land. This action was derived from their belief that the spirits would rise and protect their land from the Indonesian military. This narrative is not only found in the rural area, as revealed by Bovensiepen’s research, but also in the city; indeed, I encountered this in Dili during my
fieldwork. People strongly argued that *lulik* saved the Timorese nation. A story about *kakaruk*, a good example. People told me that during the Indonesian era, particularly freedom fighters carried it, and were given it by a *lia-na’in* of *uma lulik* where they belonged and used it to protect themselves from the Indonesian military. With respect to the freedom fighters’ sacrifice for the nation in the past, people appreciated the protection and blessings from *lulik* and still use *lulik*’s supernatural power today.

Lulik as a set of fundamental, philosophical and moral orientations functions informal order in parallel with formal legal order. Although *lulik* is informal order, in terms of that it is observed in all local languages in a coherent manner and practices (Hicks, 2004; McWilliam, 2001, 2005; Palmer and Carvahlo 2008; Shepherd, 2013; Traube, 1986), its authority possibly explained in the sense of input legitimacy of institutions which stand on socially consent values and norms. Since it has internal mechanism of using force based on social values and norms as well as external mechanism of that through informal but institutionalised patterns and order, its authority would have the strongest legitimacy. This explanation that the connectedness of internal and external mechanisms would be supported by Arendt’s trinity of authority, religion and tradition (Arendt, 1993). Focusing on its religious characteristic, its authority is derived from divinity and profane of religious-binding which is to some text passed on the tradition; *lulik* as a tradition crafts Timorese identity based on its history; as a result, it could hold strongest legitimacy due to the interconnectedness of authority, religion and tradition. In particular, in the post-independence Timor-Leste, the revitalisation of Timorese tradition and appreciation on value of liberation and resistance as a reaction to the oppressed history became a driving force to even strengthen the authority of *lulik*.

5.3. Religious authority: Catholic Church

The Catholic Church is one of three relevant authorities that this study focuses on. It became

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34 A *lulik* object small enough to carry with them every day and which would protect its owner from harm and misfortune.

35 It may seem that this study tends to describe the Church community as a unit, with the aim of modelling ‘a web of authorities’ to suggest a format of the state. With regard to the simplification of modelling, it may be pointed out that the riskiness of defining the Catholic Church as a single authority can be seen in the case of *lulik*. Notwithstanding the fact that Catholicism has a hierarchical and centralised system based in the Vatican, as shown by Timorese history, clergy can have diverse political orientations and show various modes of political participation according to their
a pillar of the web of authorities due to its close ties with ordinary Timorese, particularly during the Indonesian occupation, as briefly reviewed in the former history chapter.

As a later comer than *lulik*, the Church authority is not strong as *lulik* authority due to the missing link in the trinity of religion, authority and tradition. Even though this is a religious authority, the interconnectedness of Catholic religion, authority and tradition is not strongly presented as that of *lulik*. First, the Church is not autochthonic belief like *lulik* therefore the extent to which the Church passed on the tradition can be weaker than *lulik*. Indeed, considering the historical background why the Church gained popular legitimacy during the Indonesian occupation, the connection between divinity and authority of the Church is not strong as that of *lulik* because the Church mainly gained its popular legitimacy as a symbol of resistance and Timorese identity rather than its religious divinity. In this regard, the Church authority can be weaker than *lulik* authority. Due to this weak connection of them, the Church’s authority is analysed mainly based on its traditional role of ministering to as a service provider and community leader for peace in society.

The Church’s authority is generally articulated through its devotion to the Timorese community, particularly during the Indonesian era. The Church became a symbol of Timorese identity, a centre of the liberation movement, and a shelter for Timorese suffering under the Indonesian oppression. After the independence, the national leaders and Timorese community consistently considered Catholicism as a part of Timorese identity and appreciated the Church’s strong devotion and sacrifice for the liberation movement, as noted in the three narratives in the introductory section. As seen, the relation between the Church and the Timorese has been developed mainly based on the resistance movement toward Indonesian oppression. In the post-independence era, the Church authority is still strong, not only due to its past commitment but also its current complementary function in aiding the government’s registration. The Church’s authority in present-day Timorese society is derived from its representativeness of the Timorese nation, its devotion to the liberation movement, and its supply of social services.

Prior to analysing sources of Church authority, it would be useful to review the international Catholic Church’s historical transition from the Vatican Council II in the...
1960s; this is particularly vital because no country’s church can be free from the Catholic Church’s hierarchical and Rome-derived centralised structure. Timor-Leste is no exception, and in this sense, reviewing the transitional moment of the Catholic Church would be important in terms of understanding Timorese church history.

The Vatican Council II, which was formally opened under Pope John XXIII on 11 October 1962 and closed under Pope Paul VI on 8 December 1965, was a significant moment in the history of the Catholic Church; indeed, it defined new roles and a new self-identity as a part of the society of humankind. This was derived from self-reflection of its silence on the cruelty and inhumane regimes in countries such as Germany and Spain; hence, it redefined its active roles in the community, suggesting five models of the Church: church as sacrament, church as servant, church as communion, church as people of God, and church as ecumenical (Himes, 2007). The second model, in particular, guided the Timorese Church to walk into ordinary Timorese society where Timorese were suffering a great deal because of various forms of human rights abuse at the hands of the Indonesian authorities. The ‘church as servant’ (ibid., p.18) model is well presented in *Gaudium et Spes* (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World) which is one of the four constitutions resulting from the Vatican Council II. The main message of this constitution is that the Church should exist within the human community and serve all humanity not only its own members, as Christ came to save all. The document states universal human rights, and the Church disagrees on any types of violation against human beings based on the Church’s interpretation of the modern society: the dark face of capitalism, the growing extent of human interdependence, intense war and conflicts based on political, social economic, racial and ideological disputes. The Church’s role to protect human rights while engaging with ordinary human society by laying down its aloof status, became the core values of Catholic creed. From this perspective, the national Church of Timor was able to gain political and material support from the Vatican under the Indonesian authority, and offer refuge to ordinary Timorese.

Another meaningful result from the Vatican Council II, particularly in line with the Timorese Catholic church, was that the Catholic Church highlighted universality as well as regionalism. It proclaimed the necessity of Church institutions’ change to promote a union between all believers in Christ and to expand its congregation. In this sense, the Church promoted the reformation of the liturgy, respecting deeply rooted local cultures and histories (*Sacrosanctum Concilium*, 1963). Himes calls this tendency of the Church, ‘Church as communion’ (2007, p. 19). The Church has insisted that the Catholic theology should be identical across the country,
but also that the legitimate diversity of regional and local distinctiveness should be achieved. This allows the competent territorial ecclesiastical authority to harmonise with the local tradition, ‘especially in the case of the administration of the sacraments, the sacramentals, processions, liturgical language, sacred music, and the arts, but according to the fundamental norms laid down in this Constitution’ (Sacrosanctum Concilium, 1963, Article 39). In this sense, the vernacular language could be used as a liturgical language.

The two models of the Church mentioned above are meaningful when it comes to understanding Timorese Catholics under Indonesian occupation. I do not mean that every member and clergyman/woman of the Timorese church complied with the five models of the Vatican Council II and hence stood on the front line to protect the Timorese and indeed, some might pursue their own interest at the individual level. However, it is certain that human rights protection and the liturgy reformation into Tetun were supported by the Holy See based on the results of the Vatican Council II. Thus, the international hierarchy of the Catholic church and its influence should not be dismissed when attempting to understand the Timorese national church from a broader perspective.

Returning to the sources of church authority in line with the result of the second Council mentioned above, the first source of authority is the Church’s representative characteristic of Timor-Leste – Timorese identity. It was easily noticeable that Catholicism is part of Timorese identity in this post-independence era. Those who I met frequently told me that Timor-Leste is a Catholic country with over 97% of the population practicing Catholicism. Indeed, these statements came from those I interviewed, as well as daily interaction in a language school, on transport, in cafés, and on the street during my fieldwork in the summer of 2015. Regardless of whether they practiced or followed the Catholic doctrine, they identified themselves as Catholic. The prevalent identity of being Catholic among Timorese does not seem to be separated from the Timorese national identity. Timorese national identity derived from the Catholic church consists of two lines: the first is linked to the 75-generation national elites taught at Catholic educational institutions such as the Seminario de Nossa Senhora de Fatima (Seminary of Our Lady of Fatima) and the second is linked to the Church’s efforts for localisation. During the Portuguese era, the Catholic church was the sole education provider when it came to assimilating and civilising the local Timorese. The Catholic belief represented the civilised high social status and culture connected to the identity of Portugal, as the education opportunities were limited to certain regions and liurai families. In this sense, Catholicism reflects the national leaders’ affinity with Portugal. However, it is not only a reflection of the elites’ identity, but also that of
ordinary people in the Catholic Church. The former case is mainly connected to education enjoyed by the elites in Portuguese Timor, which was a linchpin of the Portuguese civilising mission. With the latter case, the general perception of the church was formed throughout the Indonesian era through its localisation efforts (McWilliam et al., 2014).

Since Portugal left, the Catholic Church has gradually localised. Tetum, which is the lingua franca of Timor, was confirmed as an official language of the liturgy by the Vatican in line with ‘Church as communion’ of the second Council. Although the Indonesian authority declared Bahasa Indonesia the national language and replaced liturgy in Portuguese with Bahasa Indonesian, the Church dissented from that and legitimated Tetum as the liturgical language in 1981. For Timorese, the Church is recognised as a ghetto where they can freely speak their language and maintain their Timorese identity; indeed, the Church is very tolerant of the Timorese traditional belief, lulik (see Chapter 6).

In addition to its localisation efforts, there was also an Indonesian policy which made the Timorese choose Catholic as their religious identity. On behalf of Pancasila, which is a state ideology of Indonesia, the Indonesian authority forced every Timorese to choose one religion among the five religions (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhism, and Hinduism) to prohibit Timorese polytheism and animism and increase the Muslim population. However, differing from its policy expectation, the majority of the Timorese chose Catholic as a mark of resistance to Indonesia has a large Islam population (Archer, 1995; Carey, 1995, 1999; CAVR, 2006; Lyon 2011).

The identity they chose has been inherited by present-day Timor based on Timorese appreciation of and respect for the Catholic Church. An event, namely Cruz Joven provides a good example with which to explain Timorese Catholicism as an identity. During my fieldwork, the nation-wide religious ceremony, Cruz Joven (Youth Cross) was ongoing. Through this annual event, Cruz Joven, the youth have the opportunity to confess their faith and strengthen their community ties. The youth take a leadership role during the preparation of the event, but generally all dwellers of a parish wear a big cross, while the passage of the statue of Our Lady of Fatima also involves preparation for a welcome and farewell ceremony. In general, people decorate the moving route of the statues with coconut leaves and bamboos, while the church choir sings hymns. I asked a xefe of my suco what would happen if someone who was not sarani (Catholics) did not want to participate. He stated that because more than 97% of the Timorese population are Catholics, this would not happen.
During the conversation, he often said ‘imi sarani’, which means we (excluding listeners) Catholics to denote Timorese people. The Tetum word sarani was interchangeably used with ema Timor (Timorese people). As seen, Catholicism consists of ordinary Timorese identity, and hence the Catholic church has default authority (see Figure 5-3).

Figure 5-3  ‘Investments in the Church are equal to investments in our identity’  
(28 May 2015, Timor Post)

Second, the Church authority is derived from the Church’s participation in resistance movements during the Indonesian era. The Catholic Church in East Timor was a centre of resistance under the Indonesian occupation. During the early period of Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church observed political neutrality but gradually changed its political position to support the Timorese self-determination (Carey, 1995, 1999, 2003; 36 Dili, 9th July 2015)
Dunn, 2003; CAVR, 2006; Lyon 2011). As a result, the Catholic Church has represented resistance among ordinary Timorese, based on its strong solidarity with people and its willingness to confront adversity (Hodge, 2013; Singh, 1995). In order to avoid persecution by the Indonesian military, members of the clergy moved to mountains with Timorese nationalists, thus reflecting the ‘church as servant’ model employed by the Council. The churches became refuges for all Timorese with help from humanitarian aid agencies and the international Church. Under the Portuguese authority, the Catholic Church stood above Timorese, while during the Indonesian occupation, the Church walked alongside the Timorese to defend them, and the Timorese also cooperated with the Church (Archer, 1995; Carey, 1995, 1999, 2003; CAVR, 2006; Jolliffe, 1978; Lyon 2011).

The Church supplied various social services such as aid, medical care and education for the oppressed population during the Indonesian era, whereas the education opportunities were limited to certain regions and liurai families in Portuguese Timor (Carey, 1999; CAVR, 2006). Foreign aid from the international Catholic Church came to save those who were suffering from starvation. In some cases, the aid from the international community was controversial in terms of international relations with Indonesia; the national Church built trust and solidarity by living with the ordinary population and providing social protection for the families of resistance fighters. The main institutions involved in this activity were the colégios – Catholic centres composed of ‘a parish church, a convent for priests, ordained and lay brothers, and nuns, a boarding school for boys or girls, and a large tract of agricultural land, usually partly rented out to local farmers and partly cultivated by the students themselves to grow food for their school kitchen’ (ibid., p. 83). In one such colégios, built on the north-Western escarpment of Mt Matebian, wives, widows, children and orphans of guerilla fighters were looked after by nuns. Many of them were suffering from tuberculosis and malaria caused by poor nutrition and their past years spent on the run in the jungle with their parents. Indeed, the nuns had to act as mothers, nurses, teachers and sisters to them (ibid.). For ordinary Timorese, including tens of thousands of orphans, the colégios and Church centres were their refuge and home. The Church’s activities led to the building of trust with ordinary Timorese.

Not only did the Church materially support the resistance movement behind the Indonesian authorities’ back, but also actively condemned the Indonesian authorities for their policy (Lyon, 2011). As addressed above, the Church is opposed to language policy and religious conversion. Indeed, the national Church hierarchy itself strenuously opposed family planning. The Indonesian authority implemented imperative fertility control with
birth control pills, sterilisation programmes, hormonal injections and implants in women, but often without gaining consent from the participants (Pateman, 2007; Lyon, 2011). The Church and Vatican administrators defined all forms of population control policies as human rights violations and criticised them. In addition, The Church monitored a range of violations including torture, killings and arbitrary arrests. Belo made an agreement with the Indonesia military that allowed him to visit them to ensure they were being treated humanely and reported their names to the public to reveal their prison conditions and reduce the risk of death in the prison (Pinto and Jardine, 1997).

The Church’s assistance to Timorese resistance movement was not limited in the Timorese territory. The international assistance of the Catholic Church would not have reached ordinary Timorese if the national Church had not reported Indonesia’s atrocities and human rights abuse to the outside world. For instance, the first East Timor-born bishop, Martinho da Costa Lopes, was able to directly reach Rome unnecessarily via the Apostolic Administrator of Indonesia; indeed, it was thus less difficult to monitor and spread information about Indonesia’s atrocities against Timorese through the Catholic Church network. His breakaway behaviour led to his resignation, yet he continued to travel around the world to disclose the reality of Timor in earnest. The next appointed Bishop of Dili, the most well-known – Timorese Bishop Belo also continued to spread plight of the Timorese under the Indonesia authority’s atrocities. As a co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, he successfully captured international attention by writing letters in order to build overseas contacts such as the President of Portugal, the Pope and the UN Secretary-General. This led to the international community’s action in East Timor. As seen, the Church’s resistance was not limited to the Eastern half of the island of Timor (CAVR, 2006).

The Church’s resistance to the Indonesian authority was in the liberation movement, and the Timorese are respectful of the Catholic Church and thankful for its devotion to Timorese liberation. The respect and gratitude for the Church’s leadership and assistance are the second source of Church authority in post-independence Timorese communities.

Since the independence, the Church provides various social services. First, the Church plays as community leader and mediator to cultivate peace. In the national level, it participated in peace Dialogue between leaders of CNRT and Fretilin. The UNTAET’s limited work on political reconciliation and cooperation was criticised by Timorese society and particularly by Mari Alkatiri, who claimed that ‘the UNTAET leadership primarily chose to relate to Xanana Gusmao, Ramos Horta and CNRT, and not to FRETILIN, the
biggest political party (Ofstad, 2012, p. 18).’ The Church and President Ramos Horta initiated a dialogue called Maubisse Dialogue between leaders of CNRT and Fretilin in 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2013). In addition, the Church was involved in the process of CAVR (The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation). At the district level, it (Commission for Peace and Justice and the Law) also took part in anti-violence community policing in Baucau (Braithwaite et al. 2012). This Church’s role in the Timorese community was also pointed out by several informants (OD-10, OD-11, OD-17)37.

Second, the Church takes a part of public administration role. As a Portuguese military wing, it assisted Portuguese colonial administration in the beginning and then positioned itself in the middle between the colonial administration and ordinary Timorese. This function of the Church was also seen in post-independence Timor-Leste in relation to civil registration, such as birth and marriage certificates (Ministry of Justice, 2011; Unicef, 2011). With more than 90% of the population consisting of Catholics, general citizens’ lives cannot be separated from the Church, from birth to death therefore, Church records, including for baptism and marriage are used as legal documents for the civil registry.

Even though Timor-Leste was once proclaimed as a state in 1976 by the Fretilin government, it was not able to achieve its full statehood due to Indonesia’s invasion. Fleeing from Indonesian oppression, Timorese people needed security, shelter, food, medical services and so forth; the Church provided these necessities (Carey, 1999; CAVR, 2006). Since the independence, the Church has played its social role in restoring post-conflict peace and justice. Indeed, it also partly contributes to the civil registry (RDTL Ministry of Justice, 2011; Unicef, 2011). The Catholic church has been the social service provider in Timorese society. Through providing various social services during the Indonesian occupation and post-independent era, the Church maintains its authority which has been defined as output legitimacy.

To sum up, the authority held by the Catholic church in Timor is derived from its representation of the Timorese nation, its devotion to the liberation movement, and its contributive role as a social service supplier in the Timorese community. The Catholic Church in Eastern Timor observed political neutrality in relation with the Indonesian Catholic church at the beginning of the Indonesian occupation. However, the Church gradually changed its attitude following the inauguration of Timorese bishops to support

37 Dili, 10th July 2015; Dili 17th July 2015; Dili, 20th July 2015
Timorese liberation; moreover, it gained wider support from the international Church in collusion with the result of Vatican Council II. In addition, it provided various social service not only during the period of the Indonesian occupation but also after the independence. The first two accounts of the Church authority are different from the last; the former finds its authority from its past history: its national identity from 75-generation and the resistance movement in the sense of descriptive approach of authority while the latter finds its authority as a result of providing social service for commons (Carey, 2003). However, all three accounts are supported by post-independence narratives which implies popular Timorese values, therefore reveals why the Church is one of popular authority in the present Timor-Leste.

5.4. Formal institutional authority: Government authority

The last authority on which this research focuses is government authority, specifically the authority of formal state institutions. This is the latest authority to arrive in Timor-Leste with liberal norms and values through statebuilding hence, its legitimacy can be defined the weakest among three authorities. Although it has weaker foundation of legitimacy, it has gains legitimacy by making relation their retrospective experience which related to the value of liberation and resistance with authority, and by meeting the ordinary Timorese expectation on the economic development.

Figure 5-4  Organs of Sovereignty
(Source: The Constitution of Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Part III:Section 67)

RDTL is governed by a semi-presidential system. The formal structure of the state consists of four organs of sovereignty: the president of the republic, the national
parliament, the government as the executive body of the state, and courts (Figure 5-4). According to the semi-presidential system, the president of the republic is the head of state, the symbol of national independence and unity, and the supreme commander of the defence force: the president is elected by popular vote for a five-year term. The presidential election and legislative election take place in the same year, but the president is elected first. After the legislative election, the president of the republic appoints the prime minister from the majority party or coalition parties. The president also appoints the rest of the government positions in consultation with the prime minister. Similar to other countries with a presidential system, the president of DRTL also has the right to veto legislation proposed by the government and approved by the national parliament. Because the head of the government, the prime minister, is leader of the ruling party or coalition, the role of the president seems limited to being a representative figure of the republic; therefore, his or her character, political power, and those who offer support seem to be crucial in deciding who the role. The first president was Francisco Xavier do Amaral, followed by Xanana Gusmão; the third was José Ramos-Horta and the fourth was Taur Matan Ruak. The recent presidential election, held in April 2017, was won by Francisco Guterres, a previous revolutionary leader who gained the support of Xanana Gusmão.

The government, as the supreme body of public administration, comprises the prime minister (with one or more deputy prime minister), the ministers (with one or more deputy ministers) and the secretaries of state. The members of the government are appointed by the president, as mentioned above. The first prime minister was Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, the leader of Fretilin, incumbent from 28 November 1975 to 7 December 1975. Since independence, the prime ministers have been Maria Alkatiri, José Ramos-Horta, Estanislau da Silva, and Xanana Gusmão. In February 2015, Xanana Gusmão announced his resignation, aiming to hand power over to the next generation. His successor is the current PM, Rui Maria de Araújo.
Table 5-2  The List of President of RDTL
(Source: Author)

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Term of Office</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Francisco Xavier do Amaral</td>
<td>November 1975 - 7 December 1975</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Xanana Gusmão</td>
<td>20 May 2002 - 20 May 2007</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>José Ramos-Horta</td>
<td>20 May 2007 - 20 May 2012</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Taur Matan Ruak</td>
<td>20 May 2012 - 20 May 2017</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Francisco Guterres</td>
<td>20 May 2017 - Present</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-3  The List of Prime Ministers of RDTL
(Source: Author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term of Office</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nicolau dos Reis Lobato</td>
<td>28 November 1975 - 7 December 1975</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maria Alkatiri</td>
<td>20 May 2002 - 26 June 2006</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>José Ramos-Horta</td>
<td>26 June 2006 - 19 May 2007</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Estanislau da Silva</td>
<td>19 May 2007 - 8 August 2007</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Xanana Gusmão</td>
<td>8 August 2007 - 16 February 2015</td>
<td>CNRT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rui Maria de Araújo</td>
<td>16 February 2015 - Present</td>
<td>FRETILIN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I define the government as an executive organ which carries general-will into effect based on Rousseau’s definition (Rousseau Contract Social, Book III. Chapter 1., Bennett, 2010, p.29). In the Timor-Leste context, this would be the President of Timor-Leste, the National Parliament and the Government. The government can exert its authority merely based on the rule of law, and hence it is easy to conclude that legality is a source of authority. However, legality does not seem to be the most powerful source of government authority due to common problems with the rule of law in countries where the international community is heavily engaged in the activities of statebuilding and peacebuilding. Instead,
the charisma of national leaders in the government, and public service delivery seem to be more influential. Considering the post-independence circumstance after the historical resistance movement and the deep sense of deprivation under the foreign occupation, it is vital to address these two sources of authority.

The first source of authority is the rule of law from which the authority is derived; this is called legal-rational authority. Legal-rational authority is among numerous types of authority proposed by Weber (1970). Legal-rational authority is empowered by law that implies consented norms and values of the society; moreover, the obedience goes to institution-like bureaucracy, which is common in modern states. Differing from other types of authority, such as charismatic authority, legal-rational authority is exercised by bureaucracy not individuals. Based on his theory, an important precondition of legal-rational authority is that established law reflects the shared norms and values of the society. This point is particularly important in understanding post-colonial contexts where there is often the problem of the rule of law being derived from externally imposed law, bureaucracy and the state system.

Post-independence Timorese society also has a problem with other post-colonial societies. The current modern law is not a formalised belief which has hitherto dominant norms and values in the Timorese society (Richmond and Franks, 2008). The present Timorese modern law was mainly designed by UNTAET, which exercised its interim sovereignty including all legislative, administrative and judicial functions. Considering the fact that a limited number of Timorese participated in UNTAET, limited research was conducted on judicial services, and a lack of Timorese legal experts were consulted, the present modern law of Timor-Leste unavoidably implies international legal experts’ perspectives, mainly developed in the Western modern state history (c.f. Schaar, 1981), not Timorese norms and values. The international community, such as the Asian Foundation (2013, 2014a) and UNDP (2011, 2013) also conducted research on the customary law of Timor and the Timorese’s perceptions of that law; however, this seems to be barely influential. This means that the present Timorese modern law has a clear limitation in terms of being enforced within Timorese society as a whole due to the lack of social foundation; as such, the legal-rational authority of the government cannot be dominant. In my fieldwork, of the ordinary people who I met during my daily interaction and interviews, only one lady from Letefoho pointed out the concept of law and social order to explain the
Besides the current modern law, Portuguese, Indonesian and customary law are still influential and, as previously pointed out, customary law is more familiar to and accessible for the ordinary Timorese; as such, legal-rational authority based on the modern law in Timor-Leste is far more limited (Grenfell, 2006; USAID et al.).

Following this, the next question is ‘what others can be the source of government authority?’ This is a vital question given that legal-rational authority has limitations. The second source of government authority is the individual experience of national leaders who participated in country’s resistance history. If we recall the list of all former Presidents and Prime Ministers from the last chapter, we can easily notice that all of them were leading figures in the Timorese resistance during the Indonesian era. The first president and national hero, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato and Xanana Gusmão fought in the armed front; Mari Alkatiri, José Ramos-Horta and Estanislau da Silva were part of the diplomatic front, while Rui Maria de Araújo was in the clandestine front, as a member of RENETIL, Timor-Leste's National Student Resistance in Indonesia. The greatest example here is a freedom fighter of the most significant living figure, Xanana Gusmão, whose power has been overwhelming in the government (Kingsbury, 2013). Most people whom I encountered in Dili praised his personality and great leadership. Expats in Dili described him as an emotional person who evokes public sympathy with crying and appeals to the emotion of the ordinary people to manipulate them (IED-4, IED-5). They said that it was common to see crying crowds when he made a public speech. On the other hand, Timorese in Dili described him as a thoughtful person who touches their mind, pays attention to the vulnerable and has a great sense of humour (OD-1, OD-5, OD-9). Finally, they highly appreciated and admired his leadership as a national hero. They seemed to enjoy talking about his heroic tales when he was a leader of freedom fighters (i.e. his magical art of shortening distances, his clairvoyant power and the power to bring winds and rains, and combative strategy); as such, he was able to survive despite brute force attacks by the Indonesian military. Not only his personality but also his heroic tales during the resistance movement were stressed.

Except for Xanana Gusmão, beloved hero of the Timorese, people tended to focus more

38 Letefoho, 2nd July 2015.
39 Dili, 7th July 2015; Dili, 14th June 2015
40 Dili, 30th May 2015; Dili, 14th June 2015; Dili, 8th July 2015
on the individual’s resistance history rather than his/her personality. When I asked about the politicians listed above, people answered in a certain order; for instance, he is the former president of this country and an ex-freedom fighter. The person’s former resistance position always came next to their (former or present) formal title in the government, and heroic tales were always added if known. In Timor’s post-independence society, the value of resistance for Timorese liberation is a foundation of the country, as clearly stated in the constitution (Preamble and Part I, Section 11). Because of this, the resistance history of politicians is a great narrative to highlight their legitimacy, which constitute the second source of government authority. The resistance history of individuals can be a source of authority in present-day Timor-Leste where there is consented value on resistance for liberation, as noted by the introductory narratives. This would be especially more important for the President, whose position is rather symbolic compared to the PM in the Timorese semi-presidential system, to hold stronger authority in his relation with the ordinary people.

Lastly, the government authority is also derived from the its function of providing public services. This is known as output legitimacy. The majority of my interviewees stated that the most important role of the government is to provide public services such as education, healthcare and infrastructure including roads, water and sewage, electricity and so on (OD-6, OD-8, OD-10, OD-12, OD-16). Since it was an abandoned colony of Portugal, half of the Island of Timor has barely experienced any visible social or economic development. During the Indonesian occupation, Indonesia invested in infrastructure and social services in Eastern Timor for the Indonesian dream. However, the infrastructure was largely destroyed by pro-Indonesian militia after the referendum (CAVR, 2006). The country had to restart from on the ashes. In such a poor and newly independent state, goods and services including infrastructure were the priority, along with national security. The budget for goods and services increased more than 8-fold, from $54.5 million in 2006 to $469 million in 2016 (Ministry of Finance, 2015). After gradually taking back the administrative self-determination from the UN, the government lessened its financial dependency on aid by increasing the budget proportion sourced from the petroleum fund. According to the Ministry of Finance (2014), the amount of ODA given to Timor-Leste was consistent at US$250 between 2011 and 2013; however, the proportion of ODA coming from the Combined Source Budget decreased from 23.5% in 2010 to 11.0% in 2013 as the State

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41 Dili, 14th June 2015; Dili, 7th July 2015; Dili, 10th July 2015; Dili, 13th July 2015; Dili, 15th July 2015
Budget grew rapidly based on the petroleum revenues. Indeed, state expenditure totalled $70-$90 million per annum until 2006, at which point it increased to almost $110 million (La’o Hamutuk, 2009) and $1500 million in 2014 (Ministry of Finance, 2014).

As the budget for public services and infrastructure increased, the level of public satisfaction proportionally rose. According to the Asia Foundation’s Timor Tatoli Survey (2014), 90% of respondents feel that the government performance is ‘somewhat good’ or ‘very good’, while only 10% of respondents are dissatisfied with the government work. I also collected similar responses during my fieldwork. In general, people from Dili stated that they are satisfied with the government performance, particularly in terms of education, road, and healthcare. My interviewees pointed out improved universal primary education and healthcare across the country, which is also shown in the Timor Tatoli Survey (2014). 76% of respondents said that healthcare/clinics/SICSa are ‘good’ and ‘very good’, while more than half said that primary school service is ‘good’ or ‘very good’.

However, during conversations with university students, they also pointed out the problem of quality in public services (OD-4, and focus group). In terms of primary education, since the education service is free, the task of achieving a high level of universal primary education has been all but achieved; however, there is a shortage of school facilities, resources and teachers. A female teacher from my Tetun class told me that she was not satisfied with the quality of education, and thus she planned to send her daughter to Indonesia for educational purposes. In terms of road construction in Dili, the people with whom I spoke generally enjoyed the improvement in paved roads and the expansion of paved areas, although they also complained about the quality of road, saying that they frequently saw unrepaired paved roads. However, toward the end of the conversation, they commented that, in general, they are pleased with improved public service during this initial stage of development, and believed that the government will make better improvements in the near future.

Although there is a quality issue related to the public services, generally speaking people seem pleased with the government’s performance. Indeed, this acceptable level of government performance has successfully established trust and confidence with people. Hence, because of such services, people agree with the state’s dominant status, and grant authority to the government.

42 Dili, 14th June 2015; Dili, 24th June 2015
43 Dili Institute of Technology, Dili, 5th June 2015
5.5. Conclusion

The current chapter has aimed to introduce three different authorities that exist in Timorese society: traditional authority, religious authority, and formal institutional authority; these were tentatively chosen as components of the ‘web of authorities’, based on the literature review (see Chapter 3, p.99). Prior to addressing these authorities, the chapter started by detailing the recent common narratives in Timor-Leste, which are a relevant indicator of the significance of these authorities in post-independence Timor-Leste. The common narratives were summarised by referring to the values of liberation and resistance, Timoreseness, and economic development. Following the narratives, it was clear that the three authorities share these values, and hence the significance was explained.

The second part of the chapter introduced three authorities focusing on their source of authority. The first authority was *lulik*, which refers to traditional authority. Drawing on Arendt (1993)’s trinity of authority, tradition and religion, it elaborates on how *lulik* can be the strongest authority in Timor-Leste. Moreover, in terms of the relation to the resistance history as a spiritual fighter, it also emphasised the revitalisation of *lulik* authority in the wake of the post-independence era modernisation project.

The second authority was the Catholic Church, which refers to religious authority. It was argued that its source of authority was derived firstly from the Church’s co-operative history of supporting the Timorese liberation movement, and secondly from its public service.

The third authority was what the government refers to as formal institutional authority. The government’s source of authority must be mainly derived from legality, but legality based on consent, democracy and institution has clear limitations if being considered for implementation in Timor-Leste, where the modern political philosophy has not settled yet. Hence, it showed that instead of the weak legality of the government, the legitimacy of the government was granted based on the leaders’ retrospective experience in their history as freedom fighters for the Timorese liberation. In addition, it showed that the output legitimacy of the government is salient in post-independence Timor, since the development budget has considerably increased.

Based on the identification of these authorities, the next chapter will focus on the web of
authorities, and particularly on the relation between authorities. Their relational change will be historically tracked in order to elaborate on how these authorities create the rule of co-existence in the present time.
Chapter 6. Drawing a web of authorities in Timor-Leste II

6.1. Introduction

The last chapter identified three different authorities: traditional, religious and rational-legal authority which seemed to represent Timorese stateness of Timor-Leste in the post-independence era; it also explicated their source of legitimacy. Following on from the last chapter, this chapter aims to examine the relations between these authorities by tracing their comparative relational change in the context of Timorese history; the aim of this is to complete the mapping of a web of authorities. By scrutinising these relations in Timorese history, it is possible to understand the ways in which these authorities co-exist and practise the stateness.

The relation between these authorities will be discussed based on the theory of agonistic pluralism noted in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, the two main features of agonism theory were addressed. It was first noted that contestation, which helps to understand a distinct self from others is unavoidable in order to reach to an agonistic relation as a precondition for pluralism. Second, an agonistic relation requires a certain level of consensus to respect the existence of others and their value system. These two features are necessary conditions when it comes to achieving agonistic pluralism, which can be an ideal way that plural authorities co-exist within the given territory. Thus, the present chapter focuses on these two features and how they occur during interaction between the three identified authorities: traditional, religious and legal-rational authority.

Their interactions will be historically chased from Portuguese Timor to the post-independence Timor-Leste. There may be who wonder why the historical trace is needed in order to understand the social cohesion of the present Timorese web of authorities. I would answer this question by saying that the identity of each authority can change in response to historical events and, accordingly, the relation between these authorities and their rules for co-existence can also change. Indeed, with regard to Timorese history, oppressive intervention from external powers has considerably influenced their relational change, as well as the identity of each authority. Therefore, it is vital to engage with historicity in order to map and understand the present web of authorities of Timor-Leste.

Overall, these authorities had conflictive relations in the nascent Portuguese Timor, but transformed to agonistic relations after going through the national ordeal together with the Timorese under the Indonesian suppression. All three authorities co-operated to consolidate
resistance force and regain the status of an independent state of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. However, during the post-independence era, some of the agonistic relations returned to the antagonistic relations; indeed, a series of public demonstration regarding policy on the religious education during the first Fretilin government and 2006 political crisis are examples for this. It would be difficult to say that this is not related to the first Fretilin government represented by Alkatiri attempting to monopolise power much like a Western Weberian state, with disregard for social and religious authorities. However, the opposing political parties, with its legitimate identity as a national leader of the resistance struggle in the home land, successfully gained support from social and religious authorities to strengthen its own power over the territory (Kingsbury, 2007; McGregor, 2012; Siapno, 2006). During this process, the power of the traditional and religious authorities was also strengthened, and hence the co-existence rules of these three authorities were met with consent, which is about the Timorese value presented in the last chapter. These relational dynamics are the main story of this chapter.

6.2. Historical change of authorities’ relation

6.2.1. Religious and traditional authorities

The first section demonstrates the relation change between religious and traditional authorities in order to analyse the ways in which Timorese web of authorities has developed. Catholicism of religious authority was antagonistic to lulik of traditional authority at the beginning of evangelisation by the Europeans. After Catholic missionaries marked their first footsteps, two authorities recognised a series of differences and similarities between each other. In the beginning, the missionaries’ attempted to eradicate traditional belief by expanding their congregation through baptising liurai (Andaya, 2010; Bovensiepen and Delgado Rosa, 2016; Delgado Rosa, 2012; Lyon, 2011). On the other hand, Topasse, who represented the presence of the Portuguese empire by holding a Catholic belief, successfully integrated into Timorese society by emphasising the shared features of Catholicism and traditional belief (Andaya, 2010; Hägerdal, 2007). Their relation swiftly changed following the Indonesian invasion, mainly due to the ordeal of the Timorese population under the Indonesian oppression, which crystallised the co-existence of Catholicism and lulik in order to resist Indonesian authority and to achieve Timorese liberation. This co-existence of the two authorities lasted until the post-independence era
under the shared value of the national identity of resistance. This section will focus on how these two authorities have changed their attitudes toward each other in the historical context, and up until the present day; it will also attempt to establish whether or not the agonistic relation has been achieved and identify the foundational rules for co-existence, as well as how the rules are formed. This analysis begins with Portuguese Timor.

**Portuguese Timor and Timor Timur**

According to the sage of the Catholic Church, Portuguese Dominicans were the first missionaries to arrive on the island with Portuguese traders around 1515. A Father Antonio Taveira was the first missionary of Timor, and had baptised 5,000 Timorese by 1556 (Lyon 2011). The Dominicans came in 1562 and became leaders of evangelisation on the island. The first target of the mission was local leaders, *liurai*, who later became vassals of the Portuguese Empire. By 1577, it is estimated that 50,000 Timorese had been converted (Catholic University of America, 2003). Since the Portuguese Empire was not interested in the Solar archipelagos and Timor, Catholic Church missionaries, mainly Dominicans, exerted considerable influence and effectively ruled the island for over a century until 1702 when the Eastern half of the island officially became the Portuguese colonial territory.

By that time, Portuguese missionaries and *Topasses* (see Chapter 4) represented the Portuguese presence and Catholicism.

The missionaries maintained a distance from the barbaric and savage island at the beginning of their mission. In their eyes, the indigenous were uncivilised heathens who idolised and worshipped ancestors, and performed ‘gentile and devilish ceremonies’ (Silva 1908, p. 194, cited in Delgado Rosa, 2012). The traditional belief of *lulik* was considered a great obstacle hindering the mission’s evangelisation. This tendency was not exceptional even given the important work of the missionaries, which was to enlighten the indigenous population. To achieve this aim, they established schools, seminaries, and monasteries to disseminate Christian teaching and secular knowledge, although access to education was confined to certain classes of the local population, such as baptised *suco xefe* and *liurai* (ibid.). These institutions were in charge of civilising the indigenous population by introducing Portuguese colonial norms and implicitly eliminating the traditional belief instilled by Catholic education (Lyon, 2011). Of particular note here is a narrative from Father Sebastião Maria Aparício da Silva – one of the missionaries who made an effort to increase Catholic congregation. Indeed, his narrative describes well how they pushed
traditional belief out of Timorese life through education; he travelled to Soibada, which would later become a prestigious educational institution responsible for numerous famous national leaders, to transform the abandoned mission into the centre of Catholicism on the South coast of Timor. In approaching the indigenous population, he paid particular attention to the children’s first communions, because missionaries had to contact the children’s parents for this, even if they had not yet been converted. For parents who were curious about Catholicism, he organised classes of catechumens to expand the Catholic doctrine far to the mountainous villages. However, this was not effective enough to remove the traditional belief of *lulik* from Timorese everyday life; as such, a more destructive approach was employed (Bovensiepen and Delgado Rosa, 2016).

Earnestly, missionaries required converts to bring *lulik* objects to the Church in order to destroy them (Andaya, 2010). Father Sebastião, who encountered the significance of *lulik* in Timorese life, changed his attitude and became more aggressive towards *lulik*. He noted that the most heroic action would be to burn *uma luliks* as a show of his faith in God, even though making contact with objects of *lulik* was strongly prohibited. He visited a high land village with help from neophytes and his students to ask the highest ranked *lia-na’in* whether he could demolish *uma luliks* at the traditional welcoming rituals. Surprisingly, the *lia-na’in* permitted this, and so they were able to burn 9 *uma luliks* without considerable resistance (Silva 1908, cited in Delgado Rosa, 2012). This narrative shows that nascent missionaries viewed the traditional belief of *lulik* as an enemy which they had to eliminate.

In contrast, the Catholicism of Topasses penetrated the indigenous tradition and successfully settled on the island thanks to the myth of the strange-king. Topasses were black Portuguese who had descended from Portuguese fathers and indigenous mothers, and who were characterised by a facility for the Portuguese language, Catholic belief, and familiarity with European practices and Asian traditions as they carried Asian blood. This mixed identity of the Topasses was particularly well presented in their approach to the indigenous population, which brings up the tale of the ‘strange-king’ (Andaya, 2010). As presented in Chapter 5 (see Table 5-1), the Timorese had a dualistic conceptual system of Timorese society: feminine and masculine, while Topasses from overseas were perceived as masculine figures. In this dualistic conceptual system, their influx into Timorese community was considered as a threat to the cosmic balance of masculinity and femininity, and hence a solution was to rebalance it through intermarriage between the masculine Topasses and the daughters of local kings who represented femininity. Topasses were able to culturally and socially domesticate as strange-kings through intermarriage and, as a
result, were able to hold the power of legitimate rulers thanks to their Portuguese identity (ibid.). As they successfully integrated into Timorese society, the society also learned to accept their Catholic identity. The indigenous rulers were sufficiently curious about the God of Catholicism which the strange-kings worshipped, as this God was similar in form to *lulik*. From the endogenous perspective, the role of priests was perceived to equate to that of *lia-na’in* in indigenous people’s eyes (Hägerdal, 2007).

The practices of Catholicism in the Timorese community shared similarities with traditional rituals which had resulted from the successful integration of the *Toppasses*. The Easter religious procession noted by Felix Fernandez and Johan Suban Tukan (1997, cited in Andaya, 2010) is a good example of the mixed practices; on Easter, people gathered for the Easter procession to renew the spiritual power of their religious objects. In the special family chapels, people preserved the family regalia of Catholic objects and images such as statuary, which were believed to be protective figures which safeguarded the family. They joined the Easter procession which travelled to every family chapel to let their family religious objects encounter the statues and images of Mary (*Tuan Ma*) and the baby Jesus (*Tuan Ana*). Indeed, this was because they believed that the proximity of Tuan Ma and Tuan Ana led to a renewal of their family objects with spiritual potency which would protect all family members and bring prosperity throughout the whole year. Their expectation of the Easter procession was similar to the Timorese’s expectation of *lulik*. The family chapels were also similar to *uma lulik*; indeed, this was where family *lulik* objects were stored. Similar to traditional ceremonies that people held before a battle to gain a special power from *lulik*, *Toppasses* visited their chapels so as to also gain power.

As detailed above, even though both Catholic priests and *Toppasses* represented the presence of the Portuguese empire and shared Catholicism, they adopted different stances on the traditional belief of *lulik*. Catholic priests treated *lulik* as uncivilised heathens subjected to Catholic conversion and civilisation. Although Father Sebastião encountered the indigenous cult by breaking the rule of prohibition laid down by the mission, this did not equate to an admission that members of the *lulik* cult were adversaries; this is because, principally, his approach to the space of *lulik* was to eradicate it from the indigenous group. His antagonism to *lulik* did not change even though he physically reached *lulik* in high lands. In contrast, the approach of the *Topasses* to *lulik* was more agonistic. Through their approach, it can be said that Catholicism was socially and culturally domesticated in Portuguese Timor. According to a letter from Father Cardoso to the bishop in Macao, he found that Catholic items were preserved like objects of *lulik* (i.e. a mutilated wooden
statue of Our Lady of the Rosary) in west Suai, although the objects of *lulik* functioned as heirlooms of ancestors rather than symbols of the Catholic religion (Cardoso 1923, cited in Delgado Rosa, 2012). In this sense, the Catholicism of *Topasses* in some areas lost its own original characteristics of religion and retained only the characteristics of *Topasses*, which was revitalised in a sense of nationalism later in the Timorese history.

The missionaries’ attitude toward the indigenous population and traditional belief started to change, especially under the direct rule of the Portuguese empire’s inhuman oppression. Some of the missionaries retained their antagonistic stance and stood by the empire, while a few adopted the agonistic stance and criticised the empire’s inhuman oppression. The trigger which led some of the clergy to change their attitudes toward the indigenous population was the policy of forced labour and head tax imposed by the empire. The grievance of the indigenous was increased as exploitation and plunder deepened, which consequently gave rise to a series of rebellions from ordinary Timorese against the Portuguese colonial empire. The most famous of these was the war of *Manufahi*, which was led by the *Manufahi* kingdom. Whereas anti-clericalism was prevalent in Portugal after the Republican revolution, it had not yet reached Timor, and hence the Church played the dual role of missionary and military to fight against the rebellion under the Portuguese rule (Dunn, 2003; McGregor, 2012).

On the other hand, not all missions cooperated with the empire. As the population of the native clergy increased, the influence of the Catholic Church over the local population became stronger than that of the colonial authorities (Carey, 1999; Jannisa, 1997; Mubyarto, 1991). The local population tended to look to the local priests to request protection against the abuse of the colonial authorities and *liurai*; indeed, responding to the request, some of the local priests played a mediating role during Governor Jose Celestino da Silva’s term of office between 1894 and 1908. Furthermore, some of the clergy, such as Father João Lopes, who was the superior of Soibada, provided shelter to rebels and Timorese indigenous, and fled with them to the bush carrying Catholic images as well as objects of *lulik*. Not all missionaries functioned by only obeying the colonial rule and adopting a military role; indeed, they also independently disseminated Catholic values by

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44 For instance, the local priest made particular efforts to lighten the local people’s burden by first forcing labour into the coffee plantations of the state-linked SAPT (Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho) and second by levying everything imposed on all Timorese males between 18 and 16 during his term of office (Jannisa, 1997; Mubyarto, 1991, cited in Carey, 1999).
protecting ordinary Timorese and showing their tolerance of and agonism towards the Timorese belief. This function of shelter was consistent under the Indonesian occupation.

After the Indonesian invasion, the Catholic Church was a shelter not only for oppressed Timorese but also the *lulik* authority. During this period, the Timorese Catholic population soared after some of the *lulik* authority were replaced because of suppression of the traditional belief by the Indonesians. As mentioned in the former two chapters, Indonesia’s government implored the Timorese to choose a religion based on Pancasila and ‘five moral principles’, the first of which relates to monotheism: belief in the one and only God. In the eyes of the Indonesian government, the Timorese traditional belief was an unacceptable religion due to its polytheistic characteristics. For this reason, Timorese traditional rituals were prohibited by the Indonesian government and thus the Timorese chose Catholicism as the alternative. The Catholic Church, as a replacement for traditional belief, became stronger, while the traditional leadership was destroyed as a result of the forced dislocation under the Indonesian oppression (Hohe and Ospina, 2002).

However, this does not mean that the traditional rituals were entirely substituted by Catholicism. Those who did not leave their ancestors’ land were able to continue the traditional rituals, particularly praying for the safety of their freedom fighters. In addition, as a form of Timorese cultural heritage, traditional rituals were ostensibly performed in regard to Indonesian policy (McWilliam, 2005). Overall, during this period of Timor Timur, some features of traditional authority were replaced by Catholic authority. However, considering the fact that traditional authority was revitalised after the independence in the wake of Timorisation (see Chapter 5), it would be more appropriate to define this period as an incubation period of traditional authority within the protection of Catholic authority. Therefore, it can be concluded that Catholicism and *lulik* found a way to co-exist for a common cause, which was resistance aimed at Timorese liberation.

To sum up, it showed the relation between the religious and traditional authorities was competitive but gradually changed to a relation of co-existence. At the beginning of the Portuguese offspring’s settlement in the area of the Solar archipelagos and Timor, the Church viewed the indigenous belief and tradition as the savage’s culture, and one which they had to eliminate through evangelisation. On the other hand, *Topasses* with hybrid characteristics of Europeans and the indigenous successfully localised themselves and their Catholic belief during the period of their power struggle with Portuguese, Dutch, and Dominican missionaries (Hägerdal, 2007). Influenced by the *Topasses*, the Catholicism settled as a *lulik* of *Topasses* in the indigenous perception based on the myth of the strange-
king (Andaya, 2010). Later, when the Portuguese empire increasingly enforced forced labour in the coffee plantations and head tax due to its financial difficulties, some of the Catholic clergy changed their attitudes toward indigenous people, and the indigenous belief and culture (Carey, 1999; Jannisa, 1997; Mubyarto, 1991); indeed, their attitude transitioned from antagonism to agonism. This change resulted from the decision to tackle the empire’s intensive exploitation and increase the number of Timorese clergy. The important contribution of the clergy during this period was to mediate between the rulers and the ruled and, furthermore, to protect the suffering local population. The embracement of the Catholic clergy not only involved the local population, but also their traditional belief, which was, at the beginning, perceived as an enemy. The Portuguese Timor was the period during which the two authorities began to understand the differences and similarities between them; indeed, the swift-moving external political environment led to Catholicism’s positive change of attitude toward the indigenous population. The external persecution by the Portuguese empire meant that the Church had a new role of local leader and could go about establishing a way in which to co-exist. This co-existence continued and was even strengthened further under the Indonesian persecution for the shared purpose of resistance and Timorese liberation; indeed, as a result, lulik was able to maintain its authority under the protection of Catholicism.

**Post-independence Timor-Leste**

The incubation of traditional authority was over and revitalised following the Timorese independence. As such, the presentational division of the two authorities had been clearer, although in terms of the practices of the two authorities, they had similar patterns. Those forcibly uprooted people during the rule of the Indonesian government and returned to their village of origin to reconnect with their ancestors’ land and to reinforce relations with spirits residing in the land (Bovensiepen, 2014a, 2014c, 2015). Hundreds of *uma lulik* were rebuilt following the independence (Loch, 2007 cited in Fox, 2011). In contrast with the period of Timor Timur, the influence of Catholicism in Timor now seems to be weaker every day as a result of the revitalisation of *lulik*. Catholic belief is gradually becoming subject to individual choice based on diversified religions and the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion. While most Timorese still define Timor-Leste as a Catholic nation, the population of other religions has been increasing due to an influx of international people. However, this variety of religions in post-independence Timor-Leste
cannot be solely to blame for the reduced influence of Catholicism. Indeed, another reason could be the reduced performance legitimacy, resulting from the fact that the Church no longer serves as a shelter and centre of clandestine movements\textsuperscript{45}. Much like today’s Western society, the practice of Catholicism is no longer a social obligation, but an individual choice. The fact that most of the ordinary interviewees who I met during my fieldwork did not practice Catholicism implicitly reveals that, in terms of the life of an ordinary Timorese, it could say that the extent of Catholic authority in the post-independence era has been relatively less strong. On the other hand, \textit{lulik} is not the object of choice, since it relates to where they were from: their origin and identity. In this sense, \textit{lulik} always comes first – it is their first tier identity and is related to their roots of life and vitality, followed by Catholicism. All Timorese, whether in rural or urban Dili, still showed strong belief in \textit{lulik} despite the fact that urban Dili has been considerably exposed to international values such as democracy, human rights and rationality (IED-1, IED-5, OD-1)\textsuperscript{46}. This could support the argument that traditional authority has always existed, even during the Indonesian occupation, but could be limitedly practiced due to the Indonesian policy. However, as shown by the post-independence narrative (see Chapter 5), the formation of a national identity of resistance, which was also associated with traditional authority and restoration of the \textit{uma lulik} and practices, even strengthened traditional authority.

Until today, Timorese have tended to interpret Catholicism as parallel with traditional belief from the perspective of the local community. Indeed, according to Hohe and Ospina (2002, p. 67), traditional elders tried to explain their traditional belief in congruence with Catholicism. For instance, a traditional elder of Baucau explained the way he prays to the rising sun seven times and to the setting sun five time by bringing in the Catholic doctrine of seven sacraments and five orders. Another example is that, in some local cases, priests were invited to traditional religious practices. In fact, many local activities were conducted with the Church (ibid.; McWilliam \textit{et al.}, 2014). A Timorese project coordinator in an international NGO stated that many priests invited the rituals of \textit{lulik} into rural areas (ED-1)\textsuperscript{47}. However, their role tended to be limited to that of observer or witness to support

\textsuperscript{45} As mentioned in chapter 5, the current authority of Catholic Church considerably relies on its past resistance history rather than the faith, goods, and moral standards.

\textsuperscript{46} Dili, 5\textsuperscript{th} July 2015; Dili, 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2015; Dili, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 2015

\textsuperscript{47} Dili, 19\textsuperscript{th} June 2015
traditional religious authority.

On the Catholicism side, the Church collaborated with Timorese cultural elements in the practical sense. An outstanding example was the welcoming performance when the International Pilgrim Virgin statue of our Lady of Fatima was sent from Portugal to tour Timor-Leste for the celebration of independence. On the day of its arrival, traditional dances and songs were performed in Comoro Airport and during its tour from suco to suco, traditional farewells and a welcoming ceremony were also performed (Etan, 2002; Sousa, 2009). The sound of a buffalo horn heralded the departure of the statue from one suco to katuas (elders) who were wearing traditional accessories (manufulu, kaibauk, and belak) and cloth made with woven tais; in addition, females wearing tais and playing instruments performed traditional songs and dances. Processions followed the statue with chanting for the rosary until the threshold of the suco. Each katuas from the sending and receiving sucos met each other to hand over the statue and performed bidu before sending their words. Once the procession was completed, the horn was blown to indicate that the statue had been handed over to another suco (Sousa, 2009). As seen, the religious performance was also led by katuas, with symbols of traditional authority.

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48 Syncretism may be misleading when it comes to understanding the commonality of them in the post-independence context where the sphere of two authorities has been the more distinctive division. As da Costa Gomes (2015) points out, inculturation is more appropriate to depict the common features rather than syncretism.
A similar event takes place in an annual pilgrimage known as Cruz Joven (Youth Cross), which I interestingly observed during my fieldwork. During the pilgrimage, a Cross and an icon of Mary travel together from one parish to another across the half island and *sirani* follow in procession. Each parish hosts the Cross and icon for a week and *sirani* gather in prayer. For the welcome and farewell events, *sirani* from each parish must participate in the preparation by, for example, decorating the threshold of *suco* and roads with banana leaves and bamboos, playing musical instruments, dancing and singing (Figure 6-1 and 6-2). All members of *sucos* who live along the path travelled by the Cross and icon are expected to participate in the preparation regardless of whether they are *sirani* or not.

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49 Cruz Joven in Timor-Leste is an annual national event that started at the request of Pope John Paul II who instituted World Youth Day at the end of the Holy Year 1984, with the aim of improving Catholic faith among the youth. According to the Church of Timor-Leste, Pope John Paul II asked to make a pilgrimage of Cruz Joven during his visit to East Timor in 1989. Since his visit was a historically symbolic event for Timorese to announce their strong will for self-determination to the international media, his request was accepted not only by the national Church but also by all nations of Timor-Leste.
8). Despite its religious characteristics, all communities participate under the leadership of xe\text{f}e, the suco council, and the Church community (ED-8). On the day when the two icons are handed over to another village, a similar performance takes place, as described by Sousa (2009). Because I observed the performance in urban Dili, where the lia-na’in remains a symbolic figure, I cannot conclude that the involvement of katuas in this event was significantly identical to the ordinary population as much as to those in rural areas. However, in terms of performances, it can be said that Catholics of Timor-Leste inculturised practices of traditional authority.

Another example of inculturation was shown in the decorative religious symbols. During the procession of Cruz Joven, the Cross was decorated with kaibauk, and belak, which are traditional accessories. A similar outfit of the Cross was found in the Motael Church. In order to celebrate the 500-year history of the Catholic Church, in 2015, a Cross was decorated with tais, while kaibauk were placed on top (Figure 6-2). These decorations on Catholic symbols are commonly witnessed in Timor-Leste. In the post-independence era, the inculturation is an excellent snapshot of established co-existence between the religious and traditional authority.

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50 Dili, 9th June 2015
51 Dili, 9th June 2015
However, to some extent, their relation is more than co-existence. It seems that the inculturation of the Catholic Church with *lulik* helps the Church’s authority to maintain its power. By adopting some culture of traditional authority, the Church seems to have successfully embraced most of the Timorese who have indifferent cognitive processes about *lulik* and *maromak* (Jesus). During the preparation for the farewell event of Cruz Joven in my *suco*, I conducted an interview with *xefe* (ED-8)\(^{52}\). He often used the term ‘*imi sarani*’ (we Catholic), to refer to the general population of Timor. He insisted that participating in the preparation is an obligation of *sarani*, and hence every one of his *suco* joined it. His stern tone of voice made it clear that I could not ask about those who would not join in; as such, I asked my interpreter, who has a very strong Catholic family tradition, about those who were absent from the preparation for Cruz Joven. Instead of answering, she told me a story about her uncle’s illness and misfortune which proceeded his absence from the event of Cruz Joven; this is a type of explanation that I have often heard in the

\(^{52}\) Dili, 9\(^{th}\) June 2015
context of *lulik*. The event started to instil belief and encourage people to confess their faith in God. However, based on the cognitive process of Catholicism and the spiritual power of *lulik*, which are analogous to each other, the influence of the Church could be easily spread and even strengthened. Particularly, a fear of Maromak, who can bring misfortune to them as a form of punishment in this life (not in the next life) is identical to the fear and vengeance that Timorese have toward *lulik*. Despite the clear distinction between the two authorities, the process of cognition applied to said authorities by the local community was still similar. In this respect, the revitalisation of *lulik* in post-independence Timor-Leste may have crowded out the number of Catholic practicing population, but at the same time inversely reinforced the foundation of the Catholic authority in the general population’s perception because of its analogical reasoning process with that of *lulik*. *Sarani* now refers to Catholic Timorese, and became a common noun for Timorese nationals which is interchangeably used, as stated by *xe* (*ED*-8)\(^53\). As such, two authorities exist and are cognised in separate spheres by Timorese; however, the strengthened *lulik* authority positively affects the expansion of the basis of Catholic authority.

During the post-independence era, the traditional authority of *lulik*, which was protected by Catholicism during the Indonesian occupation, was revitalised with the inflow of returnees who used to be forcibly dislocated by the Indonesian authority to their ancestors’ land. Since Catholicism was a substitute for *lulik* during the period of Timor Timur, once the Timorese regained their independent status, the traditional authority of *lulik* was very rapidly revitalised. However, the revitalisation of *lulik* did not expel Catholicism from the Timorese society, but rather the inculturation of Catholicism with *lulik* took place. This inculturation of Catholicism was witnessed not only in the religious practices, but also in a Timorese chain of logic to interpret Catholicism analogous to *lulik*, which shows ways in which different authorities can co-exist: the Church’s and its networks’ protection for human rights of the ordinary Timorese and *lulik* based on the respect for the traditional order and value.

\(^{53}\) Dili, 9\(^{th}\) June 2015
6.2.2. Traditional and modern political authority

The present section explains the development of agonistic relation between traditional and government authority. Traditional authority and government authority consistently maintain a general co-operative relation. Under the Indonesian occupation, *lulik* was perceived as a source of power and protection for freedom fighters, and after the re-independence, the value of *lulik* was revitalised at the state level in the form of national-building (McWillian, 2005). As a result, the traditional authority was strengthened by government authority, even in the post-independence period. All rumours and heroic legends about national leaders were recreated and transmitted, thus giving rise to popular support among the ordinary people for those leaders. The most common legend generally relates to *lulik*. Because people strongly believe in *lulik*, the national leaders' authority meant that *lulik* was even stronger. In this sense, these two authorities are in a relation of co-existence.

The present section focuses on the relation between the two authorities mentioned above, specifically how the two authorities have co-existed and in what ways they have reinforced each other based on the historical perspective. Discussion on the relation between traditional and formal institutional authority starts from the end of Portuguese Timor, when political parties were established and the independence of East Timor was proclaimed by FRETILIN in 1975. This is mainly because the present political leaders and ideology inherited from this period and DRTL find their legal legitimacy in the 1975 government (Constitution of DRTL Preamble). In this sense, the present section begins from the end of Portuguese Timor, differing from that of traditional and religious authority, which have a much longer historical heritage.

**End of Portuguese Timor**

Before analysing the relation between traditional and formal institutional authorities, it is necessary to understand the background of the political parties and elites at the end of the Portuguese Timor period. Indeed, without understanding this, it would not be possible to account for the current political elites and legal legitimacy of DRTL. It is for this reason that analysis starts from the end of Portuguese Timor.

The end of Portuguese Timor was the politically transitional period for Timorese, as this was the moment that the governance system converted from traditional authority centred governance to legal-rational authority centred governance. Following the Carnation
Revolution in 1974, political parties began to be formed. First, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT: União Democrática Timorense) initially stood for self-determination but soon adopted a pro-Portuguese position with a Spinolist manner. UDT was supported by the pro-Portuguese elites and rural liurai, who were appointed by the Portuguese governor (Capizzi et al., 1976). Second, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretelin: Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente) developed out of the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT: Associação Social-Democrata Timorense) which was established by the founders of Fretelin, namely Nicolau Lobato, Mari Alkatiri and José Ramos-Horta; in addition, Francisco Xavier do Amaral later joined at the invitation of the founders (Hill, 2002). Capizzi et al. describe the founders as ‘a small group of urban, educated Timorese, mainly government clerks and high school students who had met regularly but informally prior to the Lisbon coup to discuss the future of their country (1976, p. 387).’ Fretelin stood for self-determination based on the idea of nationalism and social-democratic orientation. Third, the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti: Associação Popular Democrática Timorense) was supportive of East Timor’s integration with Indonesia. The latter was founded as the Timorese People’s Monarchy (APMT: Associação Popular Monarquia Timorense) which placed particular emphasised on the traditional privileges of liurai. It later changed its name to the Association of the Heroic Sons of Timor (KOTA: Klibur Oan Timor Asuwa’in) to fit in with modern parliamentary politics.

During this period, the sense of nationalism was growing, and became the fundamental basis of political parties; however, the significant difference between them was the strategy used to develop the social and economic conditions of the Timorese nation in relation to the external powers, such as Portugal, Indonesia and Australia. UDT sought to retain the tie with Portugal, and hence former privileged groups, such as plantation owners, hoteliers, and xefe de posto, liurai in the old order supported UDT (Jolliffe, 1978). During the incipient stage of party politics, UDT was the most popular party (Hicks, 2015). 230 suco out of the 472 suco supported the UDT, equating to approximately half of the Timorese populace. In a similar sense, in the case of Apodeti, the development partner was Indonesia. On the other hand, Fretelin insisted on anti-colonialism and sought to return to the ordinary Timorese based on their self-consciousness that colonial elites were ‘the best ally of colonialism’ (De Araújo, 1975 cited in Jolliffe, 1978, p. 79). Their policy on education and culture, which sought to eliminate illiteracy and ignorance while fostering Timorese culture through cultural exchange between various ethnic groups, reflected their...
manifesto for an independent RDTL, excluding external intervention. Furthermore, their agricultural policy, such as agrarian reform based on the co-operative system, was also effective in mustering support from the hinterland (CAVR, 2006; Huszka, 2013; Jolliffe, 1978). These actions meant that the popularity of Fretilin soared. In conclusion, the birth of political parties at the end of the Portuguese Timor period was based on the spring of Timorese nationalism in the wake of decolonisation, although the strategy of each party, especially in the diplomatic sense, was different. With regard to the spring of nationalism, *lulik* was not drawn into the political issues, but remained as a Timorese culture.

**Timor Timur**

During the period of Timor Timur, the *lulik*’s cultural characteristic changed to the political authority engaging with narratives of freedom fighters against the Indonesian authority, who have become the national leaders (the president and the prime minister) of the RDTL. While the Provisional Government of Timor-Leste (*Pemerintah Sementara Timor Timur*: PSTT) mostly consisted of UDT and APODETI, FRETILIN, which was unilaterally declared the República Demokrática Timor-Leste (Democratic Republic of Timor Leste), formed the interim administration and operated with its military wing, FALINTIL. However, following the full-scale invasion by Indonesian troops, the Timorese were forcibly transmigrated from the mountain to strategic villages or camps in order to weaken the traditional hierarchy and relations based on blood and marriage ties. The Fretilin control zone was also destroyed (CAVR, 2006; Taylor, 1999).

As a result, Falintil’s armed resistance strategy had to be changed. Xanana Gusmão, who was a new leader of Fretilin, organised a multi-party umbrella council called the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM: *Concelho Nacional da Resistência Maubere*) to reconcile Fretilin and UDT, and separate Falintil from Fretilin. As a result, Falintil became an official military front for Timorese liberation. Meanwhile, the armed resistance strategy was changed by focusing on mobile units of Falintil guerrillas which were placed in the bush, hidden away from the Indonesian security. In addition, the clandestine network was organised at the *suco* and *aldeia* levels for intelligence and logistics in the bush (CAVR, 2006).

Falintil guerrillas were not only physically supported by the clandestine network, but also spiritually by *lulik*. Bovensiepen’s (2011) description of spirit troops in the Laclubar subdistrict of her fieldwork site is an example of how spiritual power was articulated as
potency of protection by the Timorese. In Portuguese Timor, the people of Laclubar were obliged to pay a tribute of cotton and candle wax to Samoro. However, they instead decided to send poor-quality candles to Samoro as a form of protest. Indeed, a liurai of Samoro was so infuriated by this that he mobilised troops, even neighbours, and marched to Laclubar. The elders and ritual leaders gathered and performed a ritual to ask the lulik land for protection after they heard about the march of enemy troops. As the troops were advancing, an enormous army of spirits wearing weapons suddenly rose from the lulik land with round screams echoing and fought the enemy. Afraid for their lives, the enemy fled. This is a narrative that she heard from a small group of people in the Laclubar subdistrict. A similar context was recounted to capture the more recent event of Timor Timur. When the Indonesian military was approaching Laclubar, an army of spirits rose from the lulik land and filled the town and surrounding mountains. The Indonesian military thought they were members of Falintil and fled in panic. However, to the people of Laclubar, the town looked empty, with no human beings. This is what the Timorese called ‘opening the land’ (ibid., p. 56).

A similar narrative about the spiritual potency of protection during the Indonesian occupation seems common across the country. Stories about how the lulik protected freedom fighters, particularly national hero Xanana Gusmão, were often heard in Dili during my fieldwork. It was just a few months later, after Xanana Gusmão announced his resignation from PM, that I arrived in Dili. A transition of national leadership, and consistent attempts from rebel forces to shake his leadership drew attention from not only political elites, but also the ordinary Timorese. In this timely context, the ordinary Timorese seemed to like talking about him. He was mainly described as a national hero and a great leader who fought in the bush against the Indonesian military. In order to explain what a great leader he was, some of my acquaintances told me that his amazing spiritual potency was induced by the lulik objects given by the lia-na’in of various districts. He was protected by lulik, which holds the strongest potency in each district. He was a normal person, but with guidance from lulik, he was able to predict the route of the Indonesian military, when they would arrive, and their weaknesses. As such, he was able to successfully hide from the Indonesian intelligence and military. He was also able to bring darkness, heavy wind and rain to frighten them so as to protect freedom fighters and himself from the enemy’s attack. Some of them believed that he still has the potency of lulik, yet most of the people told me that he had already returned the arms (lulik objects in
this context) to the right place (ED-1)\textsuperscript{54}. It was not only he who was protected by lulik, but also many other freedom fighters (Brown, 2013). Spirits from the land of Timor were awakened during this period to protect the Timorese nation from outsiders and support freedom fighters in an effort to achieve national liberation (ED-1, ED-2, OD-1, OD-4, OD-6, OD-8, OD-10, OD-12, OD-15)\textsuperscript{55}.

According to the current accounts of the resistant movement and the legendary tales of freedom fighters, lulik became a political authority at the level of national politics. Lulik has been consistently political in local governance in a sense that it is a source of authority of local leadership based on the network of lineage and marriage. For this reason, the lulik authority was retained in the domain of local governance (Cummins, 2010, 2013; Brown, 2009; Hohe and Ospina, 2002; Trindade, 2008). On the other hand, at the level of national politics, its political sense has recently manifested in the relation with Falintil leaders who are believed to have the potency of lulik to protect the suppressed Timorese. Given the formation of a collective Timorese identity in response to Indonesia’s oppression, spiritual protection of the Timorese land was highly valued in the national sense. However, it should not be forgotten that the past experience has been interpreted and recreated according to the perspective of the post-independence period, which highlights the resurgence of tradition.

**Post-independence Timor-Leste**

With the Timorese liberation, lulik was revitalised. Since the independent referendum in 1999, a so-called ‘resurgence of custom’ was observed across the country (Barnes, 2011; Brown, 2009; Hicks, 2007; McWilliam, 2005; Trindade, 2008). The most outstanding example of this resurgence was the restoration of uma lulik, which were abandoned and destroyed under the Indonesian occupation. Associated traditional processes and rituals for rebuilding uma lulik were important as methods with which to reconnect the land of origin and the people displaced for a certain period. In addition to the restoration of uma lulik, a traditional method of reconciliation, namely nahe biti boot was implemented. Furthermore, after the 2006 crisis, Xanana Gusmão initiated a project which aimed to return displaced

\textsuperscript{54} Dili, 24\textsuperscript{th} June 2015
\textsuperscript{55} Dili, 24\textsuperscript{th} June 2015; Dili, 19\textsuperscript{th} June 2015; Dili, 30\textsuperscript{th} May 2015; Dili, 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2015; Dili, 14\textsuperscript{th} June 2015; Dili, 7\textsuperscript{th} July 2015; Dili, 10\textsuperscript{th} July 2015; Dili, 13\textsuperscript{th} July 2015; Dili, 15\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
spiritual weapons so as to protect the freedom fighters. In this regard, the ordinary village people thanked the *lulik* of the land for the Timorese liberation. Some of the activities key to the resurgence were carried out by national as well as international actors in line with post-conflict reconstruction; conversely, most of the activities were initiated by the local population themselves. Regardless of who led initiatives, the resurgence of *lulik* has been a prevalent phenomenon in post-independence Timor-Leste as a way of recounting their past experience, particularly by highlighting their social resilience in the face of external force, specifically the Indonesian government (Babo-Soares, 2004; Barnes, 2011; Fitzpatrick and Barnes, 2010; Fitzpatrick *et al.*, 2008; Hohe, 2002; Traube, 2007).

The first noticeable resurgence of *lulik* at national level took the form of a reconstruction of *uma lulik*. The reconstruction consisted of two strands: material reconstruction of the house and spiritual reconstruction of the linkage between the ancestral land and the people. According to Loch (2007), the physical construction demanded between two and five months of work, while some required twice as much; moreover, every process, such as the choice of timbers and other materials, had to follow a ritual order. Besides the physical construction process, the construction of *uma lulik* had to be carried out while re-creating the community entities and re-establishing the social relation with other *uma lulik*, in addition to tracing the history, autochthony and social relation between their houses. In terms of the construction and inauguration of *uma lulik*, all members belonging to the house had to gather and celebrate it. There were no exceptions for urban dwellers. In this sense, the reconstruction of *uma lulik* was not only about the physical reconstruction of the house but also the social reconstruction of traditional values, orders and relationships between the ancestral land and the people, as well as between the people and the people. This is a kind of rebuilding of social capital for Timorese society, and empowering the local society to pursue social resilience (Bovensiepen, 2014a, 2015). The importance of restoring *uma lulik* was accepted by the international aid community; for instance, the U.S. embassy designed a project aimed at recovering the traditional architectural heritage of Timor-Leste, and donated $32,000 to restore four sacred houses in the districts of Lautém, Oecusse, Ambeno, Bobonaro and Ainaro (Government of Timor-Leste, 2010).

The traditional reconciliation was another national initiative which impacted on the resurgence of *lulik*. Before the independence of Timor-Leste, which was proclaimed in 2002, UNTEAT planned to establish The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) to cover crimes between 1974 and 1999. It aimed to reconcile pro-independent and pro-Indonesian leaders; the ordinary people fled into West Timor after
the independence referendum and, as a result, the displaced population in refugee camps at
the border of West Timor were successfully repatriated and reintegrated into their place of
origin. In this vein, a series of high-level reconciliations took place, as well as grassroots
reconciliation known as *Nahe Biti*\(^{56}\), which was carried out at the local level (Babo-Soares,
2004).

*Nahe Biti* had a further effect on the community above reconciliation, specifically the
revitalisation of *lulik*. Timorese traditional rituals take place in accordance with their
traditional values, orders and the cosmology of *lulik*; as such, the first task in organising
traditional rituals should be to rebuild the social institution of *lulik* by restoring a linkage
with the land of their origin which used to be disconnected due to the prolonged
displacement of village people (Babo-Soares, 2004; Bovensiepen, 2014a, 2015; Loch,
2007). In order to organise *Nahe Biti*, this restoration of the traditional linkage with the
land is necessary based on the village consensus; thus, via this process, *lulik* were able to
be revitalised and socially authorised at the grassroots level. *Nahe Biti* not only served to
reconcile the two conflict parties of pro-Indonesia and pro-independence, but also to re-
institutionalise and reinforce the *lulik* in the local context.

The national project to return spiritual weapons was another government effort to restore
*lulik*. As noted in Chapter 5, the objects of *lulik* had been given to freedom fighters based
on the belief that the spiritual potency contained in the objects would protect the freedom
fighters, thus making it possible to achieve independence. After the independence, the
objects of *lulik* should have been returned to their origin place and stored in the right *uma
lulik* house, with rituals held to thank the ancestors who protected the land and the
Timorese (Trindade and Castro, 2007). However, these objects were not returned, and
therefore the Timorese believed that furious ancestors had caused the conflict in 2006 and
spread it throughout the country. Following this assumption, Gusmão suggested that the
weapons be returned to their proper place by holding small ceremonies for peace and
stability. This is the exact same logic as ‘opening and closing the land of *lulik*’, as
explained by Bovensiepen (2011).

The national level of restoration of *lulik* affected to strengthen politicians from the
military and the clandestine fronts, while it did to weaken those from the diplomatic front
in the Fretilin government, particularly in relation to the 2006 crisis.

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\(^{56}\) *Nahe Biti*, which means stretching mat, is a traditional way of problem solving and achieving peace (*dame*) and
stability (*hakmatek*) through finding social balance in the community (Babo-Soares 2004).
The spiritual power of *lulik* has been revalued at the national level as a result of political exploitation led by disputes within the security forces in 2006. It has been generally acknowledged that the 2006 crisis was triggered by alleged discrimination against those of Western Loromon origins, as well as regional factionalism related to the origin of Western Loromonu and Eastern Lorosa’e in the country’s governmental security forces. However, this internal conflict became known to President Xanana Gusmão, who made a speech confirming that it was regional fragmentation and alleged disrespect of Loromonu’s sacrifice in F-FDTL (Silva, 2010). From this point, the tension turned into a war between Loromonu and Lorosa’e (IED-5).

‘On 11 January, I received a petition signed by some military members of the 1st Battalion in Lospalos, presenting the issue of discrimination between ‘loromonu-lorosa’e’ . . . In the petition, they stated that some Veterans [of the Falintil] usually said that ‘Only the people of eastern part of Timor-Leste are the independence fighters and not of the western part’, and ‘if they, the veterans of the eastern part of Timor-Leste had not fought for independence, then people of western part would not be recruited as F-FDTL’. With such discrimination, the promotions were only for soldiers of eastern part’ (Kay Rala 2006a, cited in Silva, 2010, pp. 111-112; original delivered in the Tetum language).

Prior to the outbreak, the F-FDTL cadres of Loromonu origin petitioned; this was followed by a series of negotiations between Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, President Xanana Gusmão, and high ranking cadres of the F-FDTL. The rising number of petitions led to increased tension between Xanana Gusmão, who identified himself as a freedom fighter of Loromonu origin, and Mari Alkatiri. Later, Xanana Gusmão strategically exploited the crisis to weaken the Alkatiri government, which is exemplified by another speech from June 2006, which publicly criticised the Alkatiri group’s leadership of the Fretilin government. He criticised the result of the National Congress of Fretilin, which reinstated Alkatiri’s leadership; indeed, he stated that this highlighted the problems with the party’s voting technique, and the ways in which the Fretilin government dealt with the crisis. His criticism placed particular emphasis on connecting the 2006 political turmoil to the past history of resistance in order to weaken the Fretilin government of Mari Alkatiri.

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57 Dili, 14th June 2015
He recalled the difficulties he experienced during the period of resistance when it came to working with those from the diplomatic front, who only wished to seize seats in the government. He also emphasised his efforts to mobilise different political groups under the one resistance umbrella organisation CNRM in East Timor; moreover, he claimed to value, very highly, those freedom fighters in the land of spirits against the Indonesian military in the bush. Following a couple of events resulting from the protest against religious education in 2005 and petitions, the Fretilin government, led by returned diasporas, gradually lost its legitimacy. However, as critically highlighted by the speech, ex-freedom fighters in national politics spoke of the suffering and sacrifice that they shared with ordinary Timorese during the Indonesian occupation, and successfully gained the ascendancy; indeed, this induced Mari Alkatiri’s resignation (Silva, 2010). This was a victory for the military front over the diplomatic front in the post-independence power struggle.

This victory for the military front accelerated the revitalisation of *lulik* at the national level to account for resistance history focusing on their movement. Stories about spirit warriors and national projects aimed at returning weapons were effective ways in which to emphasise the military front’s efforts for national liberation. Hence, the revitalisation of *lulik* is positively related to the authorisation of politicians who participated in military resistance in the land of spirits during the Indonesian occupation. In addition, because those who perished under the Indonesian occupation are considered as being in underground of the land in where *lulik* spirits reside, the restoration of *lulik* is to pay tribute to the spirits of those who fought for national liberation.

‘Spirits and Ancestors, rise up to look after these people [the ema lisan]! Bones that are scattered everywhere standup. Blood that was spilt everywhere, unite again to see those who want to destroy the people, who want to see the people suffer forever, who always want to see the people dead. Show yourselves, show your power! Your child is here, who implores you to look after the people, to liberate this people from the yoke of the bloodthirsty’ (Kay Rala 2006b, cited in Silva, 2010, pp. 112-113; original delivered in the Tetum language).

The speech of Xanana Gusmão in June 2006 highlighted the sense of unity between the spirits and ancestors of the land, and the freedom fighters who brought liberation to the Timorese. This narrative highlights their legitimacy as national leaders based on their
bloody sacrifice and implicitly excludes the diplomatic front from post-independence nationalism.

If this was his strategy to strengthen the legitimacy of the military front in post-independence Timor, it seems to have been successful. During my fieldwork, I heard so much about Xanana Gusmão and *lulik*, but very little about other politicians and *lulik*. People told me that he was a very spiritual person because he strongly believed in *lulik*. Some described his abnormal power by saying that:

‘He is able to make himself invisible. I heard from my friend that his bodyguard checked him in the living room from the gate of this house then a few seconds later, someone touched bodyguard’s shoulder so looked back. What the bodyguard saw was him who was standing there and said hello to him’ (OD-1)\(^5^8\).

‘A village needed to stand a telegraph pole in the site of a *lulik* tree so there was disputes between lia-na’in and construction workers. While the disputes were escalating, Xanana walked to the site even though no one reported this problem to him. He started to talk to *lulik* tree, and then he said ‘cut the tree’. Although the tree was cut and removed from the *lulik* site, nothing bad things happened’ (ED-2)\(^5^9\).

In these two cases, Xanana is described as a spiritual person with extraordinary power and ability of lia-na’in. Even some of my informants pointed out that Xanana should become lia-na’in if uma *lulik* of Timor-Leste is built (OD-8, OD-10)\(^6^0\). As the highest commander of Falintil, he was perceived as a spiritual power holder. He was not only a former freedom fighter who held spiritual power in independent Timor-Leste; for instance,

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\(^{58}\) Dili, 30\(^{th}\) May 2015  
\(^{59}\) Dili, 19\(^{th}\) June 2015  
\(^{60}\) Dili, 7\(^{th}\) July 2015;  Dili, 10\(^{th}\) July 2015

When interviewing ordinary Timorese, I always closed with this question: if there were a uma *lulik* of Timor-Leste, who would be the lia-na’in of this house? This question did not make sense for most Timorese because, in their eyes, the national level of uma *lulik* has never been imagined. However, all of those who answered pointed out ‘Xanana’. This answer may be interpreted in two ways: first, Xanana is still considered the most powerful or symbolic leader in present-day Timor-Leste. Second, he is the only person able to communicate with the spirits among national leaders. Hence it can be said that he is the only legitimate leader who holds both modern, political authority and spiritual authority.
Sagrada Familia, which was established by a former Falintil commander and former parliamentarian Cornelio Gama known as L-7, also holds the ideology of combining the traditional belief with the Catholic Church (Scambary, 2006). As seen, the frame defining freedom fighters and their connection to *lulik* was established among ordinary Timorese. If it was Xanana’s intention to marginalise the diplomatic front and Fretilin government led by Mari Alkariti, it must be said that his strategy was successful. Indeed, this facilitated governance as a means of control based on the fear of *lulik*, which almost of all Timorese, regardless of level of education or social status, believe in (ED-1, ED-2)61. As a result of this, there is a broader consensus that national leaders such as the PM and the President have to be former freedom fighters from the home land and by combining this with the value of liberation in the post-independence era, this consensus is firmly consolidated. Furthermore, this firm consensus over the country seems to be effective to facilitate a change in the political generation, from the military front of the 75-generation to the clandestine front of the Geração Foun who has rediscovered their links to *lulik* through *uma lulik* (Leach, 2012; McWilliam *et al.*, 2011; Nicholson, 2001; Trindade and Castro, 2007). As such, freedom fighters benefited from their historical link with *lulik* in the post-independence era as a winner of national politics.

61 Dili, 24th June 2015; Dili, 19th June 2015
The Clandestine front, which represents Geração Foun, also respects the value of traditional belief (Leach, 2012; McWilliam et al., 2011; Nicholson, 2001). According to Trindade and Castro (2007), they visited their place of origin to pay tribute to the spirits of the ancestors and show their appreciation for the protection given by the spirits when they returned to East Timor. Although the political era of the 75-generation has been fading out, the importance of lulik will last in the future with Geração Foun, who succeeded to national politics under the guidance of the 75-generation, and especially Xanana.

The resilience of Timor-Leste is derived from lulik, which was revitalised by politicians from the military front during the Indonesian occupation. The underpinning rationale of lulik is that freedom fighters fought for Timorese liberation with invisible spiritual warriors from the land, and thus Timor-Leste was able to re-proclaim its independence in 2002 (Bovensiepen, 2011). In this sense, the restoration of lulik is directly connected to the

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62 How people regard Xanana is revealed in an advertisement of the local newspaper; A local businessman placed an advertisement to celebrate Xanana’s birthday in 2015: in this photo, he is wearing traditional costume which represents traditional leadership.
creation of nationalism and national identity based on the recounting of *lulik* by politicians from the military front. Therefore, it can be said that the revitalisation of *lulik* induces strengthened authority of the military front and will continue with the leadership of Geração Foun.

To sum up, *lulik* appeared in the arena of national politics during the period of Timor Timur. It began to appear when the Indonesian authority attacked Timorese tradition to assimilate it into the Indonesian way. Timorese people who stood to lose their identity and roots at the hands of Indonesian authority identified the importance of *lulik* in the Timorese community in responding to the Indonesian oppression. Since then, *lulik* has become a core identity of the Timorese nation. Indeed, to this very day, many stories have been told of how the potency of *lulik* protected the people and assisted the freedom fighters of the military front. Of particular note are the folk and legendary tales about freedom fighters who became politicians in national politics during the post-independence era. Indeed, these tales transformed to supportive evidence for leaders from the military front during the Fretilin government, led by the diplomatic front. As a result, the military front was able to win in the election and became a major political power based on strong legitimacy derived from its resistance history with *lulik*. Clandestine youth who have gradually succeeded to formal political authority, also have a strong national identity of *lulik*; as such, the agonistic relation has developed based on the belief and the respect from freedom fighters and the clandestine youth on *lulik*, which is connected to the post-independence value: liberation and Timorisation. The agonistic relation between traditional and political authority in post-independence Timor will last for at least the next generation.

6.2.3. Modern political authority and religious authority

This last section addresses the relational change between formal institution authority and religious authority in the same periodical order (the end of Portuguese era, Timor Timur, and post independent Timor-Leste) as that employed in the former section. Compared to other two authorities, the relation between the formal political authority and the religious authority is rather political and strategic. The first part elaborates on their relation at the end of the Portuguese era. Primary focus is on the birth of modern political authority with independent spirits and political ideology among the old generation, articulated in the form of political parties at the end of the Portuguese era. During this period, the Catholic Church
stimulated a political discussion and delivered a new political ideology to the Timorese elite society through Catholic educational institutions. However, since the political parties were established based on different political ideologies and independent strategies that mingled with various external powers (i.e. Portugal, Indonesia, Australia, and the U.S.), the Catholic Church also seemed to find it difficult to present a unified voice in such a complicated international relation. More specifically, the prevalent fear of Communism in the Church community during the Cold War engendered favouritism for Indonesian intervention during the transitional period from the Portuguese era to Timor Timur.

However, as the Indonesian military’s brutality became more severe, the grassroots clergy changed their attitude. With the endorsement of Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo as a Bishop of Dili, the national Church officially had a unified voice to support the Timorese liberation.

During the post-independence era, the first government had disputes with the Fretilin government on the issue of national identity. However, since the Fretilin government lost its leadership in national politics, the following governments and politicians have maintained a good relation with the Church and co-operatively governed Timorese society.

**The end of Portuguese era**

The springing up of political parties at the end of the Portuguese era cannot be separated from the Catholic educational institutions. As is well known, during the Portuguese era, the Church was in charge of the civil education of liurai’s children, who could be the lower ranking civil servants of the Portuguese colonial government (Andaya, 2010; Lyon, 2011). Many politicians from the two main political parties in this period, namely Fretilin and UDT, were also from the privileged class, and had received a colonial education in Dili and Portugal. The most well-known Catholic school is the Seminario de Nossa Senhora de Fatima located a few miles south of Dili (Hicks, 2015). This is the place where the privileged Timorese were educated to become modern Portuguese citizens, and also where they were made aware of their status as colonial subjects who may be discriminated against. For instance, Xavier do Amaral alleged discrimination in relation to promotions of Timorese teachers in the school, and resented the school taking unnecessarily harsh reprisals against Timorese rebels who participated in the uprisings and rebellions of Boaventura (Hill, 2002). Particularly, the liberal priests of Jesuits contributed to criticism of Portuguese dictatorships in the later colonial years. Indeed, Jesuits published a weekly newspaper, Seara, outside the censorship laws; they discussed various contemporary issues
such as ‘traditional marriage law, traditional housing customs and attendant problems, scientific humanism versus Christianity, the morality of violence, the principles of education’ (Jolliffe, 1978, p. 56). In addition to these issues, they regularly allocated a section for Tetum teaching; this directly addressed the criticism of the state education system, which officially instructed pupils to use only Portuguese. Many of Seara’s contributors were educated Timorese elites, including Jose Ramos-Horta, Mari Alkatiri, Xavier do Amaral, Manuel Carrasçalão, Domingos de Oliveria, Francisco Borja da Costa and Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, all of whom achieved prominence as nationalist leaders later in 1974. In March, 1973, Seara was finally closed down by PIDE, although some of the contributors regularly met in Dili to discuss Timor’s political future as a part of the anticolonial group (ibid.). The Church was where Timor’s elite were educated and it certainly enlightened them to discuss injustice under the colonial rule and Timorese liberation (Carey, 2010; Jolliffe, 1978; McGregor et al., 2012).

As a result of the Carnation Revolution, the Church adopted a politically neutral stance alongside the new government in Lisbon, although this was barely applied to the Church in Portuguese Timor. A few Timorese clergy, who had close ties with the Catholic community of Indonesia, supported APODET I – a pro-Indonesian party. In contrast, many of them were on the side of UDT, which had consistently declared an association with Portugal. Unlike the former two parties, ASTD and Fretilin were greatly influenced by African nationalist movements and were subjected to the Church’s criticism by being defined as communists (Jolliffe, 1978).

From the international politics standpoint, the anti-communism of the Church hierarchy of Portuguese Timor brought disastrous results for the Timorese, specifically the Indonesian invasion of 1975. The bishop of Dili, Bishop Don José Joaquim Ribeiro, issued a Pastoral Letter in 1974 which detailed the Church’s willingness to deal with the new situation facing East Timor after the Lisbon Coup. He asserted that the Church was aware of the political and social circumstances affecting the Timorese people and wished the Timorese a progressive, just and peaceful future. In wishing the East Timor Catholics well, the Bishop also warned the communist invaders:

We must guard against materialistic and atheistic Communism and socialistic Marxism which is seeking to extinguish [the] positive values of the Timorese people… People must respect the rights of property… (A letter between the

In addition, he pointed out that the Catholic Church would not support communists or socialists in any election as he wished to prevent his flock from voting for the left. His political position against communism was even clearer in relation with two political parties: UDT and Fretilin. Fretilin stated in its manifesto that it pursued the total abolition of Portuguese colonialism in every corner of Timorese society, from structure to culture. Indeed, it highlighted the separation between the Catholic Church and the state by noting that ‘all citizens will have free choice of religion. Native religious houses, churches, mosques and temples will be protected’ (Fretilin 1975, cited in Jolliffe, 1978, p. 335); indeed, he avoided any privileged position of the Church, instead emphasising pure democracy. Referencing the political ideology of Fretilin which was revealed in the manifesto, it would not be surprising if the Church did not welcome the public support for and popularity of Fretilin. Anti-communism/socialism became his rationale; he neither supported nor even slandered Fretilin. His disclosed concern about the invasion of communism in East Timor was exploited by Indonesia to legitimate its invasion of East Timor. The Suharto government controlled Indonesia’s media press, which attacked Fretilin as a Communist regime and UDT as fascists by warning of the possibility of East Timor becoming an Asian Cuba if it was not checked (Kohen, 1999). The U.S., Japan and Australia tended to take the side of Indonesia in this respect.

As seen, the Church did not have a united voice, as the Timorese Church community consisted of various groups. However, as the representative of the Timorese Church, the bishop stood for anti-communism and supported the Indonesian government, rather than supporting the 75-generation who held the legitimacy of being the current government (Carey, 2010; Jolliffe, 1978; McGregor et al., 2012).

**Timur Timor**

During the early period of Indonesian occupation, the national Catholic Church observed political neutrality, but gradually changed its political position to Timorese self-determination (Carey, 2010; McGregor et al., 2012). Although the Vatican sourced information on the human right abuse of the Indonesian military from the Timorese Church, the Catholic Church did not actively deal with the situation of Timor, because it worried about jeopardising its relation with Indonesia and thus potentially endangering the
Catholic population in Indonesia. However, the first East Timor-born bishop, Martinho da Costa Lopes, who was the successor to Bishop Riberio, changed the status of the Diocese of Dili. This meant it was possible to directly reach Rome unnecessarily via the Indonesian government as an Apostolic Administrator; as such, it became less difficult to monitor and send information about Indonesia’s atrocities against Timorese through the Catholic Church network. His breakaway behaviour was at the root of his resignation, although he did not stop to disclose the miserable reality of East Timor in earnest by travelling around the world. The next appointed Bishop of Dili was the most well-known Timorese bishop, namely Belo. Indeed, he was a co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. He was seen as a Vatican-appointed puppet who was friendly to Indonesia in the beginning since he had been away from the home country for a while, receiving his education in Portugal and Australia during the early period of Indonesia’s invasion. However, he soon changed his position from Vatican neutrality to support Timorese self-determination after witnessing the miserable plight of the Timorese (ibid.).

The diplomatic role of the Church, as briefly addressed above, was especially crucial at the end of the period of the zonas libertadas; as such, the influence of the Church on the political decisions regarding the resistance struggle became significant. As the period of the zonas libertadas ended, the strategies used to tackle the liberation struggle had to change from the armed struggle centred strategy to the diplomatic centred, hence why the importance of the role of the Church and its support for the resistance struggle should not be dismissed. During this period, one of the important political discussions pertained to national unity. Within this agenda, the co-operation between UDT and Fretilin was discussed and, as a result, CNRM was established to embrace all Timorese political parties and groups regardless of political ideology; this was in line with the CRRN, which was his first attempt to consolidate different parties and groups behind the idea of national unity (Braithwaite et al. 2012; CAVR, 2006). In terms of the fight for national unity, another critical party was the Church due to its significant role in the diplomatic struggle. However, as previously mentioned, the discord of the Church with the revolutionary ideology of Fretilin was an issue which Fretilin leaders had to address to gain the support from the Church. Priest Monsignor Martinho Costa Lopes had a secret meeting with Xanana on this matter, and national unity was achieved by abandoning the Lenin-Marxist revolutionary ideology to gain great support from the Western world through the international Catholic network (Braithwaite et al. 2012; CAVR, 2006; Smythe 2004). The participation of the Church in the agenda of national unity was once again reported during
the establishment process of CNRT, which involved not only Fretilin and UDT, but also other political parties such as KOTA and APODETI (ibid.).

Another significant contribution from the Church took the form of resistance activities through the clandestine network representing Geração Foun. With the aim of turning the resistance strategy into a non-violent and diplomatic struggle (Hallett and Summy, 2000), the clandestine activities started as small groups supplying aid such as money, food, medicine, clothes and information on the situation in the towns to Falintil; indeed, this started when the Indonesian invasion became a core strategy for the national independence (CAVR, 2006). The clandestine network was formalised with the reorganisation of CRRN in 1986 and gradually developed thanks to increased youth participation.

The youth mobilisation was successful in organising high school cells which infiltrated official youth organisations such as the Intra-School Students Organisations (Organisasi Siswa Intra-Sekolah, OSIS) and the Catholic Scouts (Escuteiros). The prominent Catholic identity of the clandestine youth was helpful for them to organise demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience through the Church and religious events (Leach, 2012). This was also another safe way for them to gather under the Indonesian surveillance, in addition to the school organisations. In the case of OJETIL and FITUN, when there was tension between the Indonesian authority and the resistance activists caused by the cancellation of the Portuguese parliamentary delegation’s visit in 1991, they spread massages that the Indonesian military planned to attack nuns and convents, in order to maximise disorder (ibid.). This message was effective in mobilising the youth to guard the churches. The great effort made to mobilise them was aimed at gaining maximum international attention through a couple of Catholic events. After the Mass in Tacitolu, held by Pope John Paul II during his visit in Timor in October 1989, a small number of the youth unfurled banners and chanted slogans insisting on independence and denouncing the Indonesian military’s worldwide human rights abuse (CAVR, 2006). Timorese students also led a protest on the 50th anniversary celebration of the diocese of Dili in 1990 (Gomes, 1995). Indeed, in relation to the most tragic but the most well-known event, the commemoration at the Santa Cruz cemetery in 1991 following the memorial service for Gomes at the Motael Church, this was also mainly led by the Timorese students. The Youth Cross, which is a pilgrimage led by Catholic youth marching from village to village across the county, was utilised for a secret meeting for not only the Catholic youth but also Falintil members and clandestine youth leaders as they walked behind the cross (Braithwaite et al., 2012).
Over the period of Timur Timor, the Church maintained a consistent position of anti-communism and revolutionary ideas. In this sense, Fretilin, which had authentic legitimacy of RDTL with representatives of 75-generation, would not gain political support from the Church at ease. On the other hand, the so-called Geração Foun, who had a strong Catholic belief, gained greater support from the Church by utilising the Church network, and hence successfully drove and operated a non-violence strategy for national liberation under the ideology-free umbrella organisation of CNRM/T. The political ideology-free rhetoric of the Catholic priests seemed to effectively organise a national unity and mobilised the youth as well as international assistance.

**Post-independence Timor-Leste**

During the early period of re-independent Timor-Leste, the Catholic Church became an independent political actor (Lyon, 2011). Its role as a political actor was particularly invigorated in the nation-building process by competing with the Fretilin government, which insisted on its authenticity as the revolutionary leading party which proclaimed Timorese independent in 1975. After the Fretilin party lost its majority in the parliament, the Catholic Church stood as an independent authority based on solidarity with freedom fighters and ordinary Timorese who had suffered during the Indonesian occupation with the Church community (Hughes, 2009).

In the Fretilin government, the national Catholic Church of Timor-Leste played like a political authority. Its political stance was demonstrated by its relation with the Fretilin government, led by Mari Alkatiri. There were three major issues that the Catholic Church strongly voiced in the national political discussion against the Fretilin government, namely religious education in public schools, legalisation of abortion and tribunals for war crimes committed in the 1990s (Carey, 2010; McGregor et al., 2012; Lyon, 2011). The Church’s active political engagement weakened the legitimacy of the Fretilin government, put a blemish on the personal profile of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, and hence finally resulted in his resignation (McGregor et al., 2012, Silva, 2010).

The first clash between the Church and the Fretilin government occurred following the government’s effort to secularise education in public schools. The Church’s doubts concerning Fretilin as a socialist party grew based on its suspicions of Fretilin’s Marxist identity since the party’s founding. On the other hand, from the Fretilin viewpoint, the Church was considered as a Portuguese colonial agent (De Araújo, 1975 cited in Jolliffe, 2000).
This antagonism between the two has been consistent in post-independence Timor-Leste and reached its climax in relation to religious education in public schools. The Fretilin government proposed to remove religious education from the compulsory curriculum of public schools in line with its constitution, which talks of a secular state. The Church publicly opposed the education policy, and Alkatiri criticised the Church, saying that it ‘had transformed into a political party’ (Lusa News, 2005). In response to the government, the Church organised a mass demonstration in April 2005, which was attended by up to 10,000 people, including schoolchildren (Cristalis, 2009). On display were Catholic symbols such as the Virgin Mary. The Catholic clergy organised logistics to provide necessities to demonstrators for the one-month long demonstration.

The demonstration was terminated following victory for the Church. The government and the Church signed a joint declaration on 7th May 2005 which highlighted the values of the Church in the national identity, and the socio-economic, cultural, and political level, even though the Constitution defines the secular state of DRTL. More specifically, religious education was retained in the national curriculum; it was also agreed that abortion and prostitution should be outlawed (DRTL, 2005).

The demonstration was initiated by the Church due to religious education, although various issues were underlying motives for mobilisation of the mass population. Clandestine groups, so-called Geração Foun, who were educated by Indonesians, were at the centre of these issues with the Church. The Geração Foun felt that they were being marginalised in national politics by a Fretilin-dominated government consisting of those who came back from exile in Portugal and the lusophone colonies in Africa. In terms of language policy, since Portuguese had been adopted as the lingua franca, government employees from Geração Foun who had limited or no Portuguese language skills were frustrated due to the working language of Portuguese; Arsenio Paixao Bano, Minister for Labor and Solidarity in the first government illustrated his frustration during meetings conducted in Portuguese (Carey, 2003). The comments of Portuguese-language speakers in the government gave salience to the fact that Bahasa Indonesian was dismissed by them. For instance, Carey notes that former Justice Minister, Ana Pessoa, demanded the exclusive use of Portuguese in her department, and José Ramos Horta undervalued Bahasa as ‘a language of donkeys’ (ibid., p.66). In terms of the national economy, Geração Foun had a fear of job insecurity between the Portuguese-speaking 75-generation and the post-

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63 Appendix 2 A Joint Declaration
independence generation who will complete their education in Portuguese. Although over 1,000 people graduated from Indonesian universities, their experts in Bahasa and knowledge were not recognised, hence these highly educated people remained unemployed and had limited future prospects (OD-3). In the eyes of the Geração Foun, a small number of Portuguese speaking elites elevated themselves from the general population and enjoyed their elite privileges without attempting to hear voice of the ordinary Timorese Hughes (2009).

One example of the exclusion of the ordinary voice was religious education. Because of the exclusion, as argued by Hughes (ibid.), exiles failed to read the change in the Church’s role and Timorese Catholic identity in response to the intrusion of Indonesia, which has a Muslim majority. Their absence from home for political exile caused a misunderstanding regarding the Church’s rule and power; this was explicitly revealed in the Fretilin government’s policy, which contested the values of the Catholic Church. Shown in post-independence narratives, the Church represents Timorese suffering, shelters and a channel to the international community, as well as a religious institution that establishes moral standards of society; indeed, it refers to the historical foundation on which the Timorese and the Church have formed a strong sense of solidarity, even after achieving Timorese liberation. Hence, the Church became an inseparable part of Timorese identity. This was the social change that the Fretilin government failed to catch while its leaders were exiled. Moreover, Mari Alkatiri’s ancestry origin – a Timorese mother, a Yemenis father, and a Muslim religious identity – was more remarkable in defining him as an outsider who had not shared the plights of the native people during this leadership. According to a report, Father Benancio Araujo, a spokesman for Dili Diocese, said that ‘We are fighting the dictatorship regime of Alkatiri’ (Garcia, 2005); moreover, according to Lyon (2011), the Catholic radio called on its members to ‘protest against Alkatiri - kick him out’. As shown, he was defined as a dictator and an enemy who intended to destroy the Church. This argument was strengthened even further by Geração Foun in the sense of marginalisation and grievance.

The first government of DRTL had antagonistic relations with the Church during the process of national identity formation of post-independence Timor. This was a power struggle between the 75-generation, who defined the Church as a Portuguese colonial agent based on their political ideology and past experience at the end of the Portuguese era, and

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64 Dili, 3rd June 2015
the Church, which had obtained a new status as a symbol of suffering, sacrifice and anti-
Indonesian nationalism based on wide support from almost 97% of the Catholic
population. The biggest mistake made by the first government was ignorance regarding the
new status of the Catholic Church, which became one of the nation-wide authorities in the
post-independence era (Hughes, 2009). The ignorance of the Catholic Church was enough
to be considered as a denial of Timorese identity and an ignorance toward the ordinary
Timorese, which led to the one-month long demonstration.

In contrast, the following governments have maintained a co-operative relation with the
Church. José Ramos-Horta, who took the seat of Prime Minister following the resignation
of Mari Alkatiri, announced in the parliament that his government was prioritising a ‘good
and fruitful relationship’ with the Church, and that ‘The Timorese Catholic Church is one
of those unique institutions that is the glue that holds the social fabric together’ (Murdoch,
2006). During his presidential campaign, he pledged at least US$ 10 million to the Church
in order to gain its support; indeed, he stated that the Church would ‘assume a bigger role
in the spiritual and moral guidance of our people’ (O’Connor, 2007). He also proclaimed
that ‘The state must collaborate closely with the Catholic Church, because only the church
and state together will maintain peace and national unity in this country (UCANews,
2007)’. His proclamations about the status of the Church showed that he admitted that the
religious authority of the Church was equal to the authority of the government, and that the
Church was a counterpart that the government should co-operate with in order to secure its
own authority.
Figure 6-5  An obituary of Minister of Education, Fernando de Araújo
(5 June 2015, Timor Post)
Not only do political parties appeal to the Church in order to firm up a strong alliance, but also to the ordinary Timorese, by creating the image of a sincere lay Catholic institution. One example is the photographs exposed in the media. Indeed, a foreign priest from Jesuit in Dili commented that it is not difficult to find photographs where politicians and Catholic leaders appear together. He asserted that this public exposure helps to reinforce each other’s authority, and hence it is a reflection of their mutual interests (IED-1)\textsuperscript{65}. The image of politicians with Catholic figures has factually been used in national election campaigns. A Timorese priest commented on the relation between the Church and the political elites, stating that they are inseparable and that ‘Politicians know that the (ordinary) people would like them if they are Christian so attend the mass. (This is the reason why) they invite priest to state events. Everyone knows that Xanana is not Christian but he showed up and instructed in the preparation for a funeral of Alberto Ricardo da Silva, former Bishop of Dili in April 2015’ (ED-3)\textsuperscript{66}. Politicians and their families also participated when the Cross and icon of Mary passed by their parish during the national event of Cruz Joven and showed support for the security forces involved. Their active involvement in the Catholic practices and events is, practically speaking, one of the important conditions required to lead the country (OD-14)\textsuperscript{67}.

Furthermore, in the second government, it would be difficult to deny that the fact that Geração Foun appeared as a strong political group in recent years is related to its collisions with the government and its strong support from the Church. Indeed, it gained the Church’s support following the demonstration against the Fretilin government; as a result, their political alliance was strengthened (Hughes, 2009). During the presidential campaign in 2007, the Church’s political engagement was salient and it supported opposition candidate Fernando de Araújo (Figure 6-5), who was known as ‘La Sama’, and was one of the representative figures of Geração Foun\textsuperscript{68}. Despite Ramos-Horta’s overtures, Father Martinho Gusmao, the Church’s representative on the National Electoral Commission,

\textsuperscript{65} Dili, 15\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
\textsuperscript{66} Dili, 22\textsuperscript{nd} July 2015
\textsuperscript{67} Dili, 19\textsuperscript{th} July 2015
\textsuperscript{68} Fernando de Araújo was a representative figure of Geração Foun; he was the secretary-general of Renetil (Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor-Leste: East Timorese Students National Resistance) and was imprisoned for six years between 1992 and 1998 during the Indonesian occupation. He also organised protests against the Alkatiri government in 2006 and in 2007, ran a Presidential election as a candidate for the Democratic Party in 2007. In the Parliamentary election of the same year, he was elected as President of the National Parliament and worked as an Acting President for almost two months while President Ramos-Horta was absent due to a serious wound.
officially announced that Fernando de Araújo had the proper character to be a leader of the country (O’Connor, 2007). In the first election, he took third place, meaning that he failed to go for the second round; however, he announced that his party would support Ramos-Horta, who was second in the first election. As a result of this, Ramos-Horta became the second president by winning in the second round. Fernando de Araújo became President of the National Parliament in the following parliamentary election in June 2007 as part of a CNRT-led coalition government. Considering the political impact of the Church, it can be said that the Church’s support opened a door which Geração Foun could use to walk onto the major political stage.

The necessity of maintaining a good relation between the Church and the government was widely agreed by the ordinary Timorese, which is certainly confirmed by an affirmative proposition among the Timorese that ‘the state work together with the Church (Estadu cooprasaun ho igresa)’. When I asked people to elaborate on this proposition with examples, most had difficulty explaining it, although some of the interviewees defined the current role of the Church as that of conflict mediator, giving an example of the Church’s mediation work between gang groups during the 2006-2007 crisis and as education provider – a role that is generally expected to the state (OD-11, OD-15, OD-17, ED-8, IED-1)69. To some extent, it seems that the Church’s activities at the grassroots level are complementary to the lack of capacity of the newly independent state. These roles seem to be more highly valued, as indicated by the public acknowledgement of the Church’s sacrifice and contribution to Timorese liberation.

Focusing on the Church’s complementary role, working together with the Church and the government is especially important for this newly independent country, which is currently building its governance system. The Rome-based internationally structured governance system of the Catholic Church would be useful for countries like Timor-Leste, which have not systemised their governance system. In practice, the Church is deeply engaged in the governance of citizens’ lives from the cradle to the grave by proving essential documents for the civil registry (i.e. a birth and marriage certification) and recommendation for job and university applications (OD-10). Indeed, on top of resistant nationalism, the Church provides moral standards to society and function as a channel to communicate with the ordinary Timorese. For political elites at the top level of national politics, the Church is a channel through which they can hear voices from the grassroots,

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69 Dili, 10th July 2015; Dili, 15th July 2015; Dili, 20th July 2015; Dili, 9th July 2015; Dili, 15th July 2015
and control the outrage against the government or any social grievances. As long as the
authority of the Church is protected, it tends to be co-operative with the government and
plays a complementary role to the government in order to reduce the disappointment of the
ordinary Timorese, who expect to see the fulfilment of millenarian promises in post-
independence Timor-Leste.

Since achieving a victory, the Church has raised its voice in relation to various issues
such as the state budget and increasing minimum wage (Ora, 2016). Moreover, its identity
as a Catholic state was stronger following an agreement between the state, represented by
the Prime Minister of East Timor, Rui Maria de Araujo, and the Catholic Church,
represented by Cardinal Pietro Parolin. Via the agreement, the Vatican Secretary of State
agreed to sanction ‘complete harmony between the state and the Catholic Church’ (Vatican
The Church’s engagement with the government, which has an incomplete hierarchy
structure, became more official through the agreement.

The Catholic Church in Timor-Leste has adopted a dual role from the very beginning of
the history of Timor-Leste. In Portuguese Timor, missionaries preformed the role of priest
and were in charge of civilising indigenous Timorese and military commanders who were
responsible for implementing policy from the Portuguese colonial government (Carey,
1999). Its role of civilising the indigenous population changed to the role of teaching the
Timorese in educational institutions, and advocating as well as protecting human rights
by engaging with various social issues (Braithwaite et al., 2012; Carey, 1999, 2003; CAVR,
2006; McGregor et al., 2012). Indeed, its role as civil servant is inherited by registry
services. The Church has retained these roles which were traditionally considered as
functions of the government; as a result, it has been able to maintain its authority.

Its growing political influence on national politics would not be possible without the
Timorese historical crisis. Through the history of Timorese liberation, and especially
during the Indonesian occupation, there has been solidarity between the Church and
freedom fighters from the military and clandestine front. The diplomatic front was unable
to share the sense of solidarity due to their absence from the homeland; indeed, this led to
political disputes in the first government after the re-independence (Hughes, 2009). As
political leadership at the national level was handed over to the Geração Foun who had a
stronger Catholic identity, the Church’s influence on political authority has strengthened.

In present-day Timor-Leste, the Church and the government mutually reinforce each
other’s authority. This, however, does not mean that the Church agrees with the
government all the time; indeed, the clergy freely express opinions which contradict government policy, give advice, intervene in political disputes for social justice as a communication channel between the government and the ordinary as informants indicated. The fact that the Church is able to raise issues which go against the government implies that there is at least a social consensus on the ethos and values between the two authorities through the history of liberation, and hence agonistic co-existence is possible. Similarly to other sides of relation (lulik-the Church and lulik- the government), the Church and the government’s agonistic relation has been developed by sharing the value of liberation and Timorisation; in particular, the government which is newer than the Church adopts the value of the Church and respects its authority.

Differently from the agonistic pluralism of Connolly (2002, 2005) and Mouffe (2005, 2013) who emphasise the necessity of contestation in order to understand the position of myself and others, and then to lay the foundation of co-existence through creating the consent moral ground, the rule of forming agonism in Timor-Leste does not require the stage of contestation for the purpose of forming the consensus. For the agonistic relation, the binary perception in the Timorese tradition, the old and new (Table 5-1, Trindade, 2011) need to make the reciprocal relation following the traditional rule in order to maintain the social balance. In Timorese agonism, the traditional rule is the basic morality hence, if the relation is formed through the traditional rule, co-existence of different agents becomes possible. This is the simple logic of Timorese society to gain popular legitimacy and make a relation between authorities.

On top of the traditional rule, the shared history, values of liberation and Timorisation consolidates three different authorities as a web which practices the stateness.

6.3. Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated in what ways the three different authorities has become the web. In this regard, the relation between the three authorities addressed in this chapter has changed throughout Timorese liberation history. When the Catholic Church arrived on the island of Timor as a representative of the Portuguese empire, its aims were to civilise and govern the Timorese indigenous. For missionaries, lulik was a cult in Timor-Leste which they had to abolish since it was considered incompatible with the Catholic monotheism. However, as the Catholic belief was gradually internalised by topasses who successfully
integrated into the Timorese kinship network via marriage and an increased number of Timorese indigenous clergy, it became an adversary of the Church. Later, the adversarial relation between religious and traditional authorities turned into a co-operative aimed at achieving Timorese liberation under the Indonesian occupation. The Church protected Timorese *lulik* and culture which were persecuted by the Indonesian government according to Pancasila, who emphasised monotheism. Since the re-independence, *lulik*, which used to be hidden under the protection of the Church, was revitalised as one identity of Timor-Leste.

In the case of traditional and rational authorities, they have not hitherto had salient disputes. This is because, first, almost all Timorese believe in the potency of *lulik* and respect it as their cultural roots. Second, based on this belief, it is believed that the former military front, which has become a rational authority in the re-independence era, was protected by spirits from the land under the Indonesian oppression. After the re-independence, the government, led by the military front, revitalised *lulik* by implementing certain policies; as a result, the rational authority of the government has been strengthened even more because of its resistance history, supported by traditional authority. The stronger the traditional authority, the more powerful the rational authority; as such, they are mutually reinforcing their relationship based on shared liberation history and a belief in the potency of ancestral spirits in the land.

In order to communicate the human rights violation to the international community, and protect the Timorese population during the Indonesian occupation, the Church also fought for Timorese liberation with the military and clandestine front in the home land. It continuously played the role of provider of modern education and expanded its role to protect basic human rights by providing the necessities of life. In return, the young Timorese organised self-security groups to protect the Church community and, as a result, a close relationship was forged between the Church and Geração Foun. This co-operative relation was reflected in the national politics of the re-independence era to resist against the diplomatic front of the 75-generation who attempted to create a centralised system based on the government structure, excluding the Church and Geração Foun. As the Church has gained its political position in national politics thanks to the resignation of Alkatiri, it plays a complementary role to weak institutional governance through its traditional hierarchical structure, while at the same time serving as a critical advisor for the government and politicians.

The co-existence of three authorities in the web means that they recognise each other as
adversaries, and share a common consent. The commonness among the three authorities is that they have surmounted historical tragedy together and finally achieved the re-independence of Timor-Leste. This historical narrative has become the foundation of Timorese spirit, while resistant nationalism is now a national identity, which is the common consent of the web.

However, the foremost shared value to form a web is the Timorese traditional rule and order, and via adding common historical plights under the external authority, the web becomes to practise stateness. The adaptation and application of the traditional rule and order to form the web is an important precondition in order to guarantee the agonistic pluralism of the web in Timor-Leste.
Conclusion

Recapping this study

Timor-Leste, a newly re-independent state in 2002, has a long history; indeed, it was governed by external forces as a disregarded Portuguese colony for 273 years, and an occupied Indonesian territory for 24 years. After the people of Timor-Leste voted for independence in a 1999 referendum, UNTAET was established by the UN Security Council to administer the territory of East Timor during a transitional period to independence. It had an integrated role, including security, humanitarian missions, and statebuilding, including organisation of the government and constitution-making for a successful and peaceful transition. However, its ambition for peace, stability and development was not realised; the UN’s statebuilding was unsuccessful concerning the standard model of the Weberian state, and during the process of statebuilding, it had to face the internal crisis of 2006-7. The UN's top-down approach based on the blueprint was criticised (e.g. Chopra, 2000; Hohe, 2002; Ingram, 2012; Lemay-Hebert, 2011).

Among these critics, some argued that the failure derived from the UN’s limited understanding or even apathy toward local political dynamics; however, the critics were less suspicious of the premise model of the state in the UN’s statebuilding (Chopra, 2000; Hohe, 2002; Ingram, 2012). On the other hand, some raised doubts concerning the Weberian state model itself, which was developed in a particular historical and cultural context different from that of Timor-Leste; as such, these scholars argued that focus should be on what the Timorese society has (Lemay-Hebert, 2011), namely hybrid political orders (Boege et al., 2007, 2008). This study concurs with the latter view, and hence is an exploratory study concerned with unpacking state-formation in the Timorese historical and cultural context, and theorising it.

The UN’s intervention in Timor-Leste is in the academic discourse of international statebuilding and peacebuilding in Peace and Conflict studies. The domination of intra-state conflicts in the post-cold war era called for international intervention; international peacebuilding and statebuilding emerged in this context. This international intervention consisted of a wide range of activities, from DDR to social transformation, under the framework of peacebuilding. However, in the wake of 9/11 and following the development and security nexus, institution-centred top-down statebuilding based on the failed state
thesis gained attention but did not record as great an achievement as expected. Various accounts of the failure of the intervention emerged from the side of critical scholars who asserted that the primary reason for the intervention’s failure was derived from the liberal peace thesis. Following this criticism of the liberal peace thesis, discourse on post-liberal peace took centre stage.

The discourse of post-liberal peace, which emphasises the ‘local turn’ through a hybrid local-liberal approach, first attracted attention a decade ago, although research on post-liberal peace is still not sufficient. Studies on hybridity have flourished, but many of them are still focused on the terrain of liberal peace, even claiming to protect liberal peace. Indeed, the theories put forth by critical scholars following hybrid studies have remained slightly obscure because of poor methodology and limited empirical studies. My study started by examining the awareness of the underdevelopment of studies on hybridity and post-liberal peace.

Highlighting the ‘local turn’ in PCS, I argued that a new approach to delineating non-Western states is needed to develop post-liberal peace; if we attempt to develop theories of post-liberal peace without challenging the Weberian state, studies on post-liberal peace will unavoidably encounter the problem of liberal peace. In this respect, I suggested hybrid state-formation as a conceptual tool and a web of authorities to articulate hybrid state-formation, especially in the case of Timor-Leste.

According to Boege et al. (2008), Timor-Leste has been described as a misguided hybrid form. The present study agrees with its main argument that this is a failure of the UN’s statebuilding. However, it also argues that the failure is of the UN rather than Timor-Leste delineating the local-led state-formation. It clearly states that the state or stateness is entirely socially driven in society, not implemented by the external force, and indeed, continuously changes and transforms itself in response to a changing environment; therefore, each state has a different history of formation, ways of operation and source of legitimacy. Hence, I started by questioning ‘what the state is’ rather than adopting the concept of the Weberian state and the embedded Western philosophy of modernisation.

Most studies have focused on the disconnection between the state built by the UN and the society, while fewer questions have been asked of the established concept of the state; as such, the disconnection was considered as evidence of the UN’s liberal statebuilding. Indeed, discussion focused on the ways in which to strengthen the relation between the state and the society, and state legitimacy. With this research focus, although the studies began by criticising the top-down and institution-focused problem solving approach, they
were unable to escape from the recurring issue of problem-solving based on the Weberian state. As can be seen, even the critical school tends to be captured by the problem-solving approach; this is because it has not questioned how we define the state.

With this recognition of the problem, I started by defining the nature of the state. I concluded that the nature of the state is determined by so-called social aspects and hence emphasises the process of state-formation while embracing the society’s historicity, culture and tradition. However, at the same time, I also highlighted the structural issues of International Relations - power between the sovereign states; in light of this, I suggested ‘hybrid state-formation’ and ‘a web of authorities’ to explain the Timorese state-formation. Through these two layers of framework, I showed how the present model of state in Timor-Leste was formed after analysing the relation between authorities and followers who are ordinary Timorese, and between authorities by tracing the Timorese history.

First, in terms of the nature of the state, I assumed that image and practices are theoretically two elements within the state concept. Primary focus was on the image and practices derived from the work of Migdal (2004) and Hansen and Stepputat (2001) to highlight the potential existence of various forms of state. I argued that each state is articulated by these two fundamental components, which are determined by the society’s history, culture and tradition; as such, I posited that the state is ever-changing rather than static. As a result, each state must take different forms, but the difference is more salient in the non-European and post-colonial society; indeed, this society was not part of the European history of the state-formation with Renaissance, the Reformation and Enlightenment. However, this does not mean that a non-European society’s state-formation does not have features in common with the European society; indeed, the former unavoidably accepts the Weberian model of the state because of its colonial history and a wide range of international community interventions in the current international order. Therefore, I divided each element of image and practices into indigenous and exogenous, and defined this as the nature of the hybrid state. Based on this assumption, I focused on the specific characteristic of post-colonial states such as Timor-Leste, which is the co-existence of images and practices relating to modern states’ authority imported by Imperialism and other authorities which represent the stateness.

The web of authorities is a theoretical attempt used to explain how these indigenous and exogenous images and practices co-exist by structuring a polity of the state. Focusing on the method of co-existing as a polity of the state, I highlighted two types of relation: the relation between each authority and the ordinary people, and between authorities.
former relation explains how authority becomes legitimate based on political theories pertaining to legitimacy and authority; in contrast, the latter focuses on defining the conditions of pluralism by drawing upon theories on agonism. These two types of social cohesion were the key to explaining how multiple authorities co-exist as a web of authorities.

Based on the theoretical assumption of the web of authorities, the first half of the thesis attempted to draw a web of authorities using empirical evidence from a case study of Timor-Leste. This study followed the critical studies tradition, adopting a single case study and a qualitative method. I conducted two months of field research in Dili and suco Letefoho of Same in Manufahi District in Timor-Leste from 28th May to 27th July 2015. The main purpose of this field research was, first, to cross-check information that I had collected via the literature review, and verify whether or not my literature-based selection of three authorities – namely rational authority of the formal state institution, religious and social authority – was relevant; second, it was also crucial to understand the most recent narratives of the three authorities during the ordinary post-independence era. To achieve these two aims, I implemented literature review, interviews and a focus group.

The web of authorities in Timor-Leste was described in two parts according to two types of relation: the relation between each authority and the ordinary people, and between authorities reflecting historical trajectory and cultural distinction. The first part of the empirical chapter started with post-independence narratives of Timor-Leste to navigate the prominent values in Timor-Leste, which are important when it comes to delineating the web of authorities. Post-independent narratives found during the fieldwork were summarised by focusing on the values of liberation, Timoreseness, and economic development; indeed, these were the foundation of the web, shared by component authorities of the web. The value of liberation through the resistance movement during the Indonesian occupation was not only a core value of RDTL’s constitution, but also a widely accepted value among Timorese. High recognition of distinctive Timorese culture by the Timorese was another remarkable phenomenon in post-independent Timor-Leste. Through maintaining cultural affinity with Portugal and revitalising traditional authority, the Timorese defined Timoreseness. Lastly, another outstanding value in post-independent Timor-Leste was eagerness for economic development among the Timorese as compensation for their suffering during the Indonesian occupation. These three values revealed in the post-independent narratives supported three authorities: lulik, Catholic Church, and the government which consisted of the web.
First, *lulik* is the most fundamental authority of the Timorese nation and represents Timorese culture, tradition, social order and cosmology (Trindade 2008). All Timorese believe in *lulik*, although it may have a different name depending on region (Hicks, 1976; McWilliam, 2001, 2005; Palmer and Carvalho, 2008; Shepherd, 2013; Traube, 1986). Its authority is derived from the past – a founder of the family – and it maintains its power through tradition. In this sense, in the era of post-independence, restoring the tradition which was ruined during the Indonesian occupation was the foremost priority for Timorese. At the same time, this restoration of *lulik* contributed to the enhancement of the national identity. In addition to its traditional power and identity, *lulik*’s authority in post-independence Timor-Leste has even been strengthened by the general Timorese belief that *lulik* protects the Timorese nation. Timorese believed that *lulik* was a spiritual guardian of Timorese people and, without its protection, Timor-Leste would not be able to be re-independent. The anecdotes of ghost troops and freedom fighters with supernatural powers are good examples to use when evaluating the influence of *lulik*’s authority on post-independence Timor-Leste.

Second, it must be noted that the Catholic Church was another authority in the present Timor-Leste. The Church is the second authority to arrive in Timor-Leste. Historically speaking, the Church used to represent Portuguese colonial power including liurais, who served under the indirect rule of the Portuguese empire, as an educational institution for indigenous civilisation. However, during the Indonesian occupation, the Church’s representativeness changed; indeed, the Church represented Timorese identity as a symbolic sign of resistance to the Islamic state and, indeed, the Vatican Council II’s promise to protect universal human rights (international and national Church’s efforts to protect Timorese from human rights violations perpetrated by Indonesian authorities) and regionalisation (the liturgy reformation in Tetun) based on the Church’s reflexive thinking regarding its passive or even political action during the World War. The Church’s actions influenced the legitimisation of its authority in the eyes of ordinary Timorese. In particular, the clergy’s devotion to and sacrifice for Timorese liberation under the Indonesian oppression made a considerable contribution to the Church authority’s legitimisation. The fact that Dili Bishop Belos was jointly awarded the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize along with Ramos-Horta is a symbolic example of the Church’s great contribution to Timorese independence. In addition to the Church’s traditional role of civil educator under the colonial rule, it also made a considerable contribution not only to Timorese liberation but also social protection. In post-independence Timor-Leste, the Catholic Church is still
influential for ordinary Timorese daily life by representing Timorese identity – Timoreseness and spirit of resistance and playing roles as human rights protector, conflict mediator and an unofficial part of civic service.

Third, the government is another significant authority in the present Timor-Leste. It was defined as a principal agent of economic development and a representative symbol of the Timorese’s significant achievement of independence. In this regard, the most important source of government authority was economic development; this refers to modernisation and rationality, as well as liberation and resistance referent to political leaders who used to be freedom fighters. Since the implementation of the UN’s institution-building, the government has held rational-legal authority – an authority legitimated by the election (input legitimacy). Indeed, since the government invested in national infrastructure and social development by pursuing universal education and social welfare, the output legitimacy has been increased (e.g. Asia Foundation 2014). Another pillar of the government authority is connected to resistant leaders during the Indonesian occupation. As the latest presidential election result showed, Timorese generally agree that the freedom fighters of the military front must lead the country. Since the resignation of the first PM Mari Alkariti, who represented the diplomatic front, the legitimacy of the national leader has been defined by whether or not they were freedom fighters of Falintil; indeed, this means that ordinary Timorese attach a great deal of importance to those who shared the ordinary Timorese’s plight and sacrificed their life in the homeland as a freedom fighter to protect the people and the country (Hughes, 2009). For this reason, Geração Foun, who led the clandestine networks, received widespread support as the next political generation.

As mentioned above, the three authorities of Timor-Leste have different sources of authority based on the history and practice of post-independence values, which are considerably influenced by the past. As such, the question must be asked: how can these different authorities co-exist together? The answer to this question is as follows.

Within the current Timorese society, these three authorities co-exist and underpin post-independence values related to the Timorese past (Timoreseness and the spirit of resistance and liberation) and future (economic development). However, this co-existent relation was not set from the beginning. Their relations have changed throughout history and they have found ways to co-exist and thus maintain their authorities. The change of relation has been shown in this study.

If going on chronological order, lulik is the first authority in the land of East Timor, while the Church is the second. The Church came to East Timor as a representative of
Portuguese colonial power and treated the *lulik* authority as a cult which the Church had to abolish. Even though the Portuguese clergy aimed to abolish it, the Church gradually localised, firstly through Topasses who had the hybrid identity of Asian Portuguese by representing the mixed ethnicity and, secondly through the Church’s great contribution to Timorese liberation. Following the topasses’ successful localisation into the house (*uma lulik*) network, Catholicism was viewed by the indigenous Timorese as a *lulik* of strange kings. As a result of the Church’s great sacrifice to protect the vulnerable Timorese and *lulik* objects, Catholicism successfully gained popular legitimacy. Since the Church accepted the existence of *lulik* and respected its values and practices, the Church authority became a popular authority.

In addition to these two authorities, the government is the latest authority to emerge in the island of Timor. Although the government was established according to the UN’s blueprint, its legal legitimacy, which is the foundation of the modern state and binds the arbitrary use of power, is merely one strand of its source of authority. Due to its relation with other authorities, the government was able to strengthen its authority; for instance, the prevalent heroic stories about national leaders who were once freedom fighters in the military and clandestine fronts and the revitalisation of *lulik* has been supported at the policy level through invoking the tradition of *lulik*. *Lulik* has retained its social power as a traditional belief; moreover, the government has also been able to strengthen its power based on *lulik*, which is the most widely accepted authority in Timor-Leste. It finds its own authority by showing its interrelation with *lulik* authority to co-exist.

In terms of its relation with the Church, the relation has been mostly political. As a communication channel with the international community, the Church’s role during the Indonesian occupation had the greatest impact on the ordinary Timorese by providing the necessities of life, a nationalist spirit, and education for national leaders. Of particular note is the increasing number of Catholics as a form of resistance to Muslim invaders. Because of this, the clandestine youth, who later became a political power group called Geração Foun, developed trust in and protected the Church and Catholic clergy from the Indonesian militants.

However, the relation was broken by a crisis of legitimacy in 2006. It can be said with certainty that the cause of the crisis was not derived from its disrespect of the Church authority, although this, in addition to the political turmoil within the security force, was critical enough to weaken the first Fretilin government’s legitimacy. The first government’s ignorance of the Church’s popular authority in Timorese society highlighted
Alkatiri’s ethnic origin, Muslim identity, and history in exile, which were not congruent with the Timorese values of post-independence. In Timorese eyes, ignorance of the Church was not too different from denial of Timorese identity and its history of resistance and pursuit of independence. The succeeding government has shown a great deal of respect for the Church as a popular authority capable of striking a Church-State agreement according to the Italian model. As evidenced by a photo taken of the pope and a presidential candidate, Ramos-Horta, the Church is an important authority when it comes to increasing the legitimacy of the government authority. This shows that any government which fails to set up co-existence with other existing popular authorities, could face a legitimacy problem. Until today, the Church has co-operated with the government but also plays the role of political advisor and critical observer of national politics and the government.

To sum up, as a result of these relations between the three different authorities, a web of authorities was structured based on mutual respect for co-existence and practices of stateness by fulfilling the values of post-independence Timor-Leste. A particularly noteworthy story concerning the relation between the three authorities is the history of Timorese liberation, which was the key to strengthening interconnectedness of the web. Timorese polity of the state consisted of various authorities were relatively stable in a web of relations, unlike the general anticipation, which was that, if more than one authority exists, the competition between authorities will be intensive and even turn to a conflict to hold the monopolized use of force. Rather than competition, the Timorese state-formation has, thus far, progressed through the consolidation of three main authorities: traditional, religious and formal institutional authorities based on the shared values revealed in post-independent narratives. As such, state-formation can be shown as a structured polity which shares features with Timorese liberation history.

Second, in addition to sharing Timorese liberation history, the web of authorities was structured by customary orders. Considering the chronological order in which these authorities emerged, by building an agonistic respect for the previous popular authority, the late-comer authority can even enhance its legitimacy. This is similar to the ways in which uma lulik created a network with others; indeed, this traditional method of creating a relation between the old and the new leads to a dominant rule over society, and also serves as a key mechanism of Timorese state-formation. By creating an agonistic relation with predominant and popular authorities which existed previously, the late-comer is also able to achieve legitimacy as a popular authority.

In other words, each authority may have different authority in the sense of the
descriptive approach of authority; however, to be legitimate, it should build an agonistic relation with previous authorities. This may be referred to as Timorese procedural legitimacy in the sense of the normative approach. If interpreting this process as building an agonistic relation in a normative sense, then the process represents Timorese traditional norms and rules: maintaining balance through creating relations and exchanging material. Indeed, these are practiced by Timorese in everyday economic and social life, as stated in Chapter 4. In conclusion, by respecting the customary order, Timor-Leste’s web of authorities is tightened and they reinforce each other’s legitimacy thereby co-existing.

The consolidation of authorities in the web of authorities is what differentiates it from the Western history of modern state-formation. This is the significant difference between Timorese state-formation and Western state formation. With regard to the external process of drawing an exclusive territorial border in the history of state-formation, all states were the same in that they experienced wars and conflicts; however, the internal process of each state was different. For instance, the general narration of Western state-formation can be summarised by ‘liberation-from’ bodies such as the Roman Catholic Church and the absolute monarch to achieve individual freedom from all forms of tyranny (i.e. the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment). The liberation here relates to negative liberty, and thereby the narrative of state formation unavoidably accompanies confrontation, separation and dichotomisation between one and another. In contrast, Timorese state-formation proceeds by creating networks and relations with others, thereby expanding and retaining the sphere of commons; indeed, the web of authorities has exemplified the Timorese state-formation. This has formed a consolidated web of authorities underpinned by pluralism. These authorities developed the web during the Indonesian occupation in order to regain their sovereign state and protect Timorese collaborative liberty; indeed, the web is still retained today based on mutual respect that was created through the liberation movement and customary orders. Each authority is more directly linked to ordinary Timorese, which enables their voice to be heard through three different channels of politics. The web is the foundation of communication and solidarity in Timor-Leste as a polity. This distinct narrative of Timorese hybrid state-formation implies that peace-formation may be taking place in the post-liberal era and that successful steps are being taken toward denaturalising the Weberian state and liberal peace.

Focusing on ways in which to form the web of authorities, Timorese hybrid state-formation is significantly different when it comes to the ontological perspective on the state. The web of authorities explains that the state is a result of making relations and
connections between authorities and between authorities and their followers, not that of separating one from another. This relation-led ontology guides us in understanding the local form of peace, since it implicitly offers an interesting insight into interpreting the concept of power in Timorese society. It suggests a different viewpoint in terms of understanding power, namely interconnectedness rather than the relation between dominance-subordinance and power struggle and peace.

With regard to this perspective, agonistic pluralism, which can be reached through the antagonistic relation by forming an order of co-existence between agents, must be understood differently from the Timorese state-formation. Agonistic pluralism is addressed by Mouffe (2005, 2013) and Connolly (2002), who underline the antagonistic relation differently from Habermas (1979). Indeed, the latter places emphasis on consensus and considers ‘agency’, thereby highlighting disputes between two authorities. In contrast, agonistic pluralism in Timorese society focuses on the connectedness and inter-relation between different agents. Timorese customary practice, e.g. creating relationships such as Juramentu, shows that two different parties have recognised otherness once they decide to forge a relationship and can therefore focus on the relation-building. This may allude to the fact that their perception of power is derived from inter-connectedness, unlike agonists, who assume that power belongs to the agent. If this is so, the concept of peace in Timorese state-formation must be different from that hitherto discussed, liberal peace, thereby guiding a distinctive approach to studying the local form of peace.

**Limitation of the current study and the further research agenda**

i. **Danger of ‘romanticising the local?’**

This study gave consideration to the positive side of hybrid state formation; as such, warnings and criticism regarding ‘the romanticisation of the local’ can possibly be raised. In addition, the relation-focused ontology may be criticised for its potential to dismiss human agency due to the less visible value of liberty implied in natural rights, which is one of the core ideas of the modern state.

As I stated in Chapter 2, this study has shown an awareness of the potential of negative hybridity; as such, I have attempted to imagine the potential negative aspects of a web of authorities. Indeed, such a web could bring about the concepts of political structure, such as aristocracy, oligarchy and autocracy, which many post-colonial states had even under the name of democracy (Amin-Khan 2012). In this regard, I tried to create a typology of
the negative web of authorities by suggesting the concept of a closed web of authorities which focuses on the inflexibility of the web. Indeed, if a specific group of authorities dominates the web, this is defined as oligarchy, while if any authority coercively attempts to monopolise the web, it can turn into an authoritarian or totalitarian state. However, while typifying the negative web of authorities, I realised that the great difference between negative and positive webs of authorities is not whether the web is flexible or not, but how ‘power’ is defined and what the social expectations of this power are.

Aristocracy, oligarchy and autocracy imply social valuation of how the power must be used and the nature of power based on the history of Western state formation. Hence, as I consistently argued, because Timorese state formation has a different trajectory based on distinct social norms and values, these political structures were not appropriate for use in the negative web of authorities. In particular, this was due to the Timorese perceptions of power, and expectations regarding the use of power, which seem to be different from those shown in Western state formation. The web of authorities in present-day Timor, which stands on the relational ontology, implicitly reveals that the society has a different understanding of power: it pays attention to the utility of power for commonality rather than focusing on the directing nature of power (A’s ability to make B do something); as such, there is a different moral hierarchy in the society. The fieldwork analysis revealed that all authorities in the web practice stateness, which represents ‘commons (utility)’ and ‘us (identity)’, and thus gain legitimacy. This shows that Timorese focus on ‘in what ways he power has to be used’ rather than ‘how to bind the power to protect individual liberty’. In this sense, I thought that defining a negative or positive web of authorities would not be appropriate in this study, since there is limited evidence based on which to discuss the concept of power in Timor-Leste; this is due to the short period during which the fieldwork was conducted. Therefore, I postpone expanding the discussion on the negative web of authorities and decisions on the ‘romanticisation of the local’; instead, I point out the necessity of further research on the nature of power in Timor-Leste, and the morality of power, which will greatly contribute to the articulation of post-liberal peace, and furthermore overcome the related risk of Eurocentrism.

ii. Absence of fluidity in a web

With the aim of dismantling the domination of the Weberian state, the current study theorised the concept 'a web of authorities' to emphasis the different nature of state
formation in the non-Western world compared to that in the Western world. To achieve this aim, it draws on Timor-Leste state formation as a case study. The main subject of this study, which concerns Timor-Leste, is the co-existence of multiple authorities which are religious, traditional and governmental in nature, and the relational dynamics between three authorities in the process of state formation. However, as will be pointed out, due to the characteristic of modelling, this study does unavoidably face a limitation related to its focus on these three authorities.

Since this study sets out three authorities based on the post-independent narratives, each authority is considered as a homogenous unit. This does not mean that the current study ignores the heterogenous features within the authority. By recalling the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), this study addresses the contestation and heterogeneity; examples in this regard include the civil war in 1974, different political ideology and activities among Catholic clergy during the Indonesian period, and diversity of traditional practices from uma lulik to uma lulik. However, some might argue that the study tends to pay less attention to the power dynamics or contestation within the authorities when analysing the relationship between authorities. According to the argument, the merit of the concept of hybrid state formation, which is a dynamic-focused and process-oriented concept, would likely be weakened.

In regard to the constraint of homogeneity in the current analysis, further research is required to extend the concept of the web into each authority at the international and local levels. This extension would allow us to examine the diversity of groups and interests, as well as the relationship between groups, thereby enabling us to analyse the extent of power, representativeness and the process of gaining or losing legitimacy from the ordinary people's perspective; indeed, these perspectives have, to some extent, been disregarded in the current analysis. To achieve this, more in-depth description of the field will be required through the application of ethnography. In addition, the extension of the web may go beyond the territorial boundary by analysing the relationship with groups of authority such as diasporas, neighbouring state authorities, international organisations, and civil society networks. This would provide a theoretical and practical tool to overcome the current state-centred discussion in IR without devaluing or omitting the importance of the state as a political unity. Therefore, it would also contribute to bridging the gap between the local and the global sphere. Expanding the web of authorities in two directions will be the next research aim for the follow-up study.

Lastly, I would like to point out that this study has limitations in terms of its
generalisability, since it has been developed in order to explain Timorese state-formation with a single case study. In order to achieve generalisation, additional case studies will be needed.

**Scholarly contribution**

This study started by criticising the concept of the state premised on IR. Although this concept of the state is historically specific, it has been taken for granted, even to study the non-Western world. As reviewed in Chapter 1, the limitation of the state concept can be summarised by ahistoricism, which is a pervasive feature of the state in IR (Hobden 1998; Hobson 2002). In comparison, this study understands the state based on the process-orient concept, drawing from the perspective of historical sociology. Although many historical sociologists have developed state theory which is geographically limited to European history in the neo-Weberian tradition (e.g. Mann 2012; Tilly 1985, 1990), their processual approach to explaining state-formation is meaningful when it comes to challenging the dominant political realism in IR. Respecting historicity, historical sociologists support this assumption that every state has a different history of state-formation; therefore, there is not a great deal of similarity between states’ ideologies, structures, social values, norm determining laws, practices, and identities. This assumption directly challenges ahistoricism in IR and mainstream PCS, which set the Weberian state by default.

Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) seems to be at the critical juncture moving from liberal peace to post-liberal peace. The driving force behind discussion regarding the switch from liberal peace to post-liberal peace is an emergence of hybridity in critical PCS (Mac Ginty, 2011; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; Richmond and Mitchell, 2011). Shedding light on the emancipatory potential of the concept of hybridity rooted in post-colonial and cultural studies, the concept of hybridity moves the discussion from the international-centred to the local-centred. Research on peace from the local perspective is a development of this context.

Although hybridity has succeeded, to some extent, in shifting research focus from the international approach of top-down PBSB to the local-driven bottom-up approach, doubts regarding its practical effectiveness have been raised by critics. Based on this criticism, and by drawing upon the case of Timor-Leste, I attempt to expand the discourse on hybridity and post-liberal peace.

The main criticism found in hybrid literature relating to PCS is derived from a
misunderstanding of the concept of hybridity. However, to some extent, this misunderstanding is caused by nascent studies on hybridity, which have overvalued the concept of hybridity. This study attempted to deconstruct the concept of hybridity into two layers: a meta-conceptual level determining ontology of hybridity (hybrid state-formation) and an explanatory level of the phenomenon (a web of authorities). This deconstructing work contributed to clarifying the limitation of hybridity literature and responded to the criticism.

The dualism of global-local is a major criticism put forth by the hybridity literature (Heathersaw, 2013; Hirblinger and Simons, 2015). Critics argue that the inherited dichotomised concepts represented by global, modern, Western, and liberal vs. local, customary, non-Western and post-liberal are unavoidable when discussing the concept of hybridity. These two categories highlight the feature which sets them apart from each other, and therefore dismiss the heterogeneity of each category. Nevertheless, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2015) claim, once more, that a significant contribution of hybridity is the interplay between local and global, although it seems to have limitations in terms of addressing the underlying dichotomous approach of hybridity discourse.

I argued that this paradox of hybridity in critical PCS is derived from the overvaluation of hybridity as a universal tool to explain a site where international and local have re-encountered each other. In other words, hybridity has been reviewed in terms of its usefulness as a meta-concept not as an explanatory or analysis tool. I am alert to applying hybridity per se as an explanatory tool because of its immanent risk of simplification via dichotomisation. As pointed out by Hameiri and Jones (2016), hybridity is unable to capture the different political scales or political groups at the local level. Indeed, I am aware of the risk of using hybridity as an explanatory tool. As a result, I thereby emphasised the use of hybridity as a conceptual tool which has the potential to challenge the established concept of the state; moreover, I suggested ‘a web of authorities’ as an explanatory tool of hybrid state-formation.

The web of authorities moves the focus from difference and confrontation between global and local, to interaction and relation to multiple authorities. This focus shift leads to two implications: first, it makes it possible to address two different political levels in the local context, which are local and local-local. It does this by bringing up the concept of authorities and addressing the relation between authority and ordinary Timorese. Second, it facilitates elaboration of the relation between authorities which make up the web. As an explanatory tool, a web of authorities can overcome the limitation of dichotomisation due
to its premise of pluralism – multiple authorities including traditional, religious and formal institutional authorities in Timor-Leste.

Lastly, it suggested a positive relation between state and peace, especially in terms of how the hybrid state can promote the post-liberal agenda. Most literature on the hybrid state has been hitherto discussed with a view to finding a way to increase the effectiveness of international intervention in the line of liberal peace. This is mainly because the state is considered a source of violence according to the European state-formation (Tilly 1985, 1990) and the realist tradition is predominant in IR, thus meaning that the state accompanies security issues (including human security) rather than peace. From this perspective, state-formation has been considered as an opponent phenomenon to peace-formation (Richmond, 2016), and thus the state has been discussed less alongside post-liberal peace. Indeed, I focused primarily on the state’s image of violence, which is a geographically and chronologically limited concept in modern European history, based on the concept of negative liberty and power. By doing this, I was able to argue that non-European history may have a different trajectory, engendering local-oriented peace. Moreover, with the Timorese case, I proved the potential of the agonistic co-existence of authorities in a given territory as a form of hybrid state. The co-existence is possible mainly because of two elements: first, sharing Timorese liberation history and second, respecting customary orders and indeed, based on these two elements, the authorities maintain stronger cohesion and reinforce each other’s legitimacy. In other words, these two elements consist of the rule or condition of co-existence and in the words of agonistic pluralists, this is the foundation of mutual respect.

However, this rule is overtly different from agonistic pluralists’ lineal interpretation of pluralism which requires disputes and consensus because the co-existence is mainly determined by the past: whether authorities are dedicated to Timorese liberation or adopt customary order rather than the consensus between two agents. This implicitly reveals that the way in which each society makes a relation is distinct; in the West agonistic pluralism highly evaluates agency and individual liberty, in contrast, Timorese pluralism considers that customary orders and rules are most important in order to maintain the society in peace. The latter consideration not only focuses on the relation between two agents but also the influence derived from forming relation to society as a whole. This is holistic and relational in order to maintain social balance (Hohe and Ospina, 2002; Trindade 2008). Since the society more importantly considers ‘relation’ therefore formed a web of authorities, the study guided the possibility of post-liberal peace and power with relational
ontology which was found in the ways in which various authorities create relations to form a web. The traditional Timorese ways of creating a relationship and retaining pluralism can offer useful insights into discussion on post-liberal power and peace.

**The final remark**

The main approach of PCS until today was close to social engineering, which involves international plans to change conflict-affected societies to peaceful societies. Although the social engineering approach has gradually moved to embrace the local perspective, the rigorous step toward ‘the local turn’ has not been taken. Indeed, scholars have called for a more rigorous ‘local turn’ and post-liberal peace, although discussion on post-liberal peace has faced self-contradiction and criticism. This is mainly because our language and concepts are bound in a spirit of modernity; therefore, our way of thinking seems unable to go further. Because of this, I cannot deny that the present study on hybrid state-formation is also trapped in the 19th and 20th centuries’ ideas and knowledge mainly produced by the Western academia as it showed that the web of authorities in Chapter 3 was developed considerably relying on Western philosophy (e.g. political authority and agonistic pluralism); therefore, I had to confront numerous self-contradictions in order to make the 21st century state-formation from the non-Western context fit into the 19th and 20th century concepts. However, as this study has argued, Timorese state-formation was not able to explain congruence in the Western state-formation, and thus I had to accept the philosophical challenge in order to overcome the self-contradiction.

Despite this, it is certain that the 19th and 20th century concepts have accepted in present-day Timor-Leste but differently from the Western ways; the modern state institutions have been built in partnership with the UN, and the concept of procedural legitimacy has been settled through the repertoire of peaceful elections however, its procedural legitimacy is derived from the relation with other authorities, not the legal procedure (legality) per se. In this study, I have taken into account the process behind the legitimisation of the new type of authority (in the case of Timor-Leste, Catholicism and legal-rational government) and how it becomes a popular authority. In light of this, I can conclude that the successfully legitimate authority finds its legitimacy in the past by highlighting its historical relation with already-existing authorities rather than abolishing them. This shows the significance of relation and historicity in Timorese state-formation according to the Timorese customary order and the core value - *hulik*. In addition, the methods of creating relations which result
in co-existence and pluralism implicitly show that the Timorese people’s understanding of power and peace is more likely to be one of power-with rather than power-over or power-to, therefore called for a new approach to study power and agonism via analysing the development of Timorese hybrid state-formation. Hence, this study can contribute to open a new discussion on power and peace in the non-Western context.
Reference


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La’o Hamutuk (2009). How Much Money Have International Donors Spent on and in TimorLeste? A briefing paper from La’o Hamutuk, September [Online]. Available at:


RDTL. Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Dili: RDTL.


Appendix 2. Joint Declaration between the Catholic Church and the Government, 2005

JOINT DECLARATION

Taking into consideration that article 42 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste defines that everyone is guaranteed the freedom to assemble and peacefully demonstrate;

Taking into consideration that the Constitution of the DRET defines that the objectives of the State is to defend and guarantee political democracy and participation of the people in the resolution of national problems;

Having observed the peaceful and orderly manner in which sentiments have been manifested that raise fundamental questions of governance worthy of consideration for the political orientation of the country;

Taking into consideration that the Constitution of the DRTL guarantees freedom of conscience, of religion and cult, and establishes separation between religious denominations and the State;

Taking into account that the Constitution of the DRET attributes to the State the duty to promote cooperation with all different religious denominations;

Recognizing the competences the Constitution of the DRET attributes to the Government;

The Government and Bishops of the Catholic Church of East Timor, based on the due respect for the Constitution of the DRET, affirm jointly and solemnly:

1. Recognize the important contribution that religious values have in the construction of the national identity, in the construction of the nation, and in the socio-economic, cultural, and political level;

2. Recognize the fundamental role that moral and religious values play in the formation of the individual;

3. Recognize that these values should be incorporated in the educational mission entrusted to Schools;

4. Recognize that education should adequately correspond to the aspirations of all citizens, without any form of discrimination;

1/2
5. Recognize that the teaching of Religion must be included as a regular discipline in the curriculum, and consequently, taught during normal hours, and attendance subject to a decision at the time of enrollment and in accordance with the options freely expressed by their Parents – who are the irreplaceable partners in making concrete options that relate to the education of their children.

6. The Draft Penal Code should address the abortion issue in all its dimensions; abortion must be defined as a crime, except in cases where it is absolutely necessary to avoid the mother’s death. The law must equally define the practice of voluntary prostitution as a crime, but should protect victims forced into prostitution. Likewise, as already envisaged in the Draft Penal Code, art. 155 and 156, the exploitation of children is defined as a crime.

7. To guarantee that there will not be threats or retaliation from the authorities against the demonstrators when they return to their place of residence, and to guarantee their physical security and social environment free of intimidation;

8. To establish a Permanent Working Group within a month from the date of signing this Joint Declaration. This Permanent Working Group will be composed of representatives from the Government, the Catholic Church and other religious denominations, and its mission is to accompany the concretization of the principles here established, to make recommendations that are relevant and opportune in all areas of its intervention and to provide better understanding of the existing problems and prevent future problems.

Dili, 7 May 2005

Dr. Mari Alkatiri
Prime Minister

D. Alberto Ricardo da Silva
Bishop of Dili

D. Basilio do Nascimento
Bishop of Baucau

In the presence of:

Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão
President of the Republic
Appendix 3. Participant information sheet for international and national elites

You are being invited to take part in a research study as part of Minji Yoo’s PhD project which aims to explore and theorise Timorese state-formation in order to give an impact on UN policy and academic discourse on state-building of conflict-affected society. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

Who will conduct the research?
Minji Yoo, PhD candidate
Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, University of Manchester
Room C1.48, Ellen Wilkinson Building
Oxford Road
Manchester
M13 9PL

Title of the Research
Hybrid state-formation in Timor-Leste: analysis of Timorese state-formation

What is the aim of the research?
This research aims to analyse the nature of Timor-Leste’s state and develop a theory on how Timorese state is formed.

Why have I been chosen?
You have been chosen because you are relevant authorities in Timorese society. Approximately 13 influential political authorities in international, national and local levels will be interviewed.
What would I be asked to do if I took part?
Interviews are designed as open-ended format. The main questions will be about their role in Timor-Leste as important authorities in Timorese people’s daily life and relations between authorities.

What happens to the data collected?
The data will be used for researcher’s PhD thesis, conference paper and academic articles.

How is confidentiality maintained?
To ensure confidentiality, all personal data will be anonymised through changing participants’ names or removing their names from notes and transcripts. If necessary, changes to their backgrounds will be made to further anonymise them.

Participants’ names will be coded, all work will be carried out on a password protected laptop and will be stored on an encrypted USB. While in Timor-Leste, any research documents will be stored in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s place of residence or in a locked bag whilst travelling.

What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to give verbal consent. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to yourself.

Will I be paid for participating in the research?
No. you will not be paid.

What is the duration of the research?
This interview would take 1-2 hours.

Where will the research be conducted?
Interview will be conducted in participants’ office. Or if necessary, the third place (preferably public place such as restaurants, churches and community centres) can be arranged for the interview with the translator also present.

Will the outcomes of the research be published?
The outcomes of the research will be published on researcher’s PhD thesis, conference papers, academic articles, UN policy brief and etc.

Who has reviewed the research project?
This research project has been reviewed by the University of Manchester Research Ethics Committee.
Contact for further information
Minji Yoo  minji.yoo@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk

What if something goes wrong?
If there are any issues regarding this research that you would prefer not to discuss with members of the research team, please contact the Research Practice and Governance Co-ordinator by either writing to 'The Research Practice and Governance Co-ordinator, Research Office, Christie Building, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL', by emailing: Research-Governance@manchester.ac.uk, or by telephoning 0161 275 7583 or 275 8093.

or

If a participant wants to make a formal complaint about the conduct of the research they should contact the Head of the Research Office, Christie Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL.
Appendix 4. Participant information sheet for community members

Hybrid state-formation in Timor-Leste

Participant Information Sheet

You are being invited to take part in a research study as part of Minji Yoo’s PhD project which aims to explore and theorise Timorese state-formation in order to call for a transformation of UN policy on state-building of conflict-affected society. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

Who will conduct the research?
Minji Yoo, PhD candidate
Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, University of Manchester
Room C1.48, Ellen Wilkinson Building
Oxford Road
Manchester
M13 9PL

Title of the Research
Hybrid state-formation in Timor-Leste: analysis of Timorese state-formation

What is the aim of the research?
This research aims to analyse the nature of Timor-Leste’s state and develop a theory on how Timorese state is formed.

Why have I been chosen?
You have been chosen because they are community members who have actively engaged with community activities.
What would I be asked to do if I took part?

Interviews are designed as semi-structured format. The main question will be about their experience with multiple authorities (i.e. UN, government officials, and politicians, traditional and religious leaders). It will ask in what issues they had to engage with which authority, reasons why they’ve worked with the authority and whether they would like to work with the authority in the future.

What happens to the data collected?

The data will be used for researcher’s PhD thesis, conference paper and academic articles.

How is confidentiality maintained?

To ensure confidentiality, all personal data will be anonymised through changing participants’ names or removing their names from notes and transcripts. If necessary, changes to their backgrounds will be made to further anonymise them.

Participants’ names will be coded, all work will be carried out on a password protected laptop and will be stored on an encrypted USB. While in Timor-Leste, any research documents will be stored in a locked cabinet in the researcher’s place of residence or in a locked bag whilst travelling.

What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to give verbal consent. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to yourself.

Will I be paid for participating in the research?

No. you will not be paid.

What is the duration of the research?

This interview would take 1-2 hours.

Where will the research be conducted?

Interview will be conducted where necessary with the translator also present.

Will the outcomes of the research be published?

The outcomes of the research will be published on researcher’s PhD thesis, conference papers, academic articles, UN policy brief and etc.

Who has reviewed the research project?

This research project has been reviewed by the University of Manchester Research Ethics Committee.
Contact for further information
Minji Yoo  minji.yoo@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk

What if something goes wrong?
If there are any issues regarding this research that you would prefer not to discuss with members of the research team, please contact the Research Practice and Governance Co-ordinator by either writing to 'The Research Practice and Governance Co-ordinator, Research Office, Christie Building, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL', by emailing: Research-Governance@manchester.ac.uk, or by telephoning 0161 275 7583 or 275 8093.

or

If a participant wants to make a formal complaint about the conduct of the research they should contact the Head of the Research Office, Christie Building, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL.
Appendix 5. Consent Form

Hybrid state-formation in Timor-Leste

CONSENT FORM

If you are happy to participate please complete and sign the consent form below.

Please initial box

1. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my participation. I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to any treatment/service.

2. I acknowledge that I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview if I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview.

3. I understand that the researcher will take a note during the interview and hold it in confidence for five years and then destroyed.

4. I understand that the research will not identify me by name in any reports using information obtained from this interview but refer to the group of which I am a member.

5. I understand that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure but if I wish, the researcher may use my name with information obtained from this interview.

6. I agree that any data collected may be passed as anonymous data to other researchers.

7. I have understood the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction.

I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.

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