The post-democratic city? Urban Politics and Governance in Thessaloniki’s port restructuring

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

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<tr>
<td>CPER</td>
<td>Centre for Planning and Economic Research («Κέντρο Προγραμματισμού και Οικονομικών Ερευνών»)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBITDA</td>
<td>Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECoC</td>
<td>European Capital of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EESYM</td>
<td>Hellenic Chambers Transport Association («Ελληνικός Επιμελητηριακός Σύνδεσμος Μεταφορών» ΕΕΣΥΜ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVETH</td>
<td>Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry («Εμπορικό και Βιοτεχνικό Επιμελητήριο Θεσσαλονίκης» ΕΒΕΘ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRADF</td>
<td>Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund («Ταμείο Αξιοποίησης Ιδιωτικής Περιουσίας του Δημοσίου» ΤΑΙΠΕΔ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFCT</td>
<td>International Freight Centre of Thessaloniki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Alert («Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός» ΛΑΟΣ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSG</td>
<td>National Statistical Service of Greece («Εθνική Στατιστική Αρχή» ΕΛ.ΣΤΑΤ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSE</td>
<td>Hellenic Railways Organization («Οργανισμός Σιδηροδρόμων Ελλάδας» ΟΣΕ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PaSoK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement («Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα» ΠΑΣΟΚ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership («Σύμμαχη Ιδιωτικο-Δημόσιου Τομέα» ΣΔΙΤ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEV</td>
<td>Federation of Greek Industries («Σύνδεσμος Ελλήνων Βιομηχανών» ΣΕΒ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEVE</td>
<td>Greek International Business Association («Σύνδεσμος Εξαγωγέων Βορείου Ελλάδας» ΣΕΒΕ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVVE</td>
<td>Federation of Industries of Northern Greece («Σύνδεσμος Βιομηχανιών Βορείου Ελλάδας» ΣΒΒΕ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEE</td>
<td>Technical Chamber of Greece («Τεχνικό Επιμελητήριο Ελλάδας» ΤΕΕ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ThPA</td>
<td>Thessaloniki Port Authority («Οργανισμός Λιμένα Θεσσαλονίκης» ΟΛΘ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThPO</td>
<td>Thessaloniki Planning Organization («Οργανισμός Ρυθμιτικού Θεσσαλονίκης» ΟΡΘΕ)</td>
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Abstract

The University of Manchester

Lazaros Karaliotas

PhD

The post-democratic city? Urban Politics and Governance in Thessaloniki’s port restructuring

15/10/2013

This thesis is about urban politics and polic(y)ing. It seeks to mobilize theories on post-democracy and the post-democratic city as a framework for the analysis of urban politics in Thessaloniki. In doing so, the restructuring of the city’s port over the past twenty years or so serves as a heuristic case study. To this end, the thesis first delineates a theoretical framework to analyze the articulation of urban politics and polic(y)ing with processes of post-democratization. It proposes an understanding of post-democratization as an inherently contingent and incoherent ternary process. Post-democratization, the thesis suggests, articulates three intertwined mechanisms: a. governing mechanisms beyond the people, b. the conceptual legitimization of consensus politics and c. the ordering of the urban with a view towards foreclosing dissent. Insisting on the historically and geographically specific character of these mechanisms, the thesis understands the urban as a pivotal terrain in and through which post-democratization is consolidated and contested. The thesis employs four instances of the restructuring of the port to gear its analysis. These are treated as moments of dis-articulation and re-articulation of the politico-economic and discursive coordinates around the port. Hence, in methodological terms, the thesis seeks to bring into dialogue discourse analysis with the analysis of politico-economic choreographies of power and the reading of the ordering of urban space as these are articulated in Thessaloniki’s port case. Through the four instances of restructuring for the port, the thesis analyzes how post-democratization unfolds through its collision and fusion with previous institutional regimes and practices. It documents how the neoliberalization of urban polic(y)ing around the port, at a multiplicity of scales, has configured a complex web of governance beyond the people. The thesis unearths how the discursive post-politicization of urban politics by local and national politico-economic elites sustains the conceptual legitimization of post-democratization despite the failures of hegemonic politics. In reading such failures, the thesis suggests that performing neoliberalization is a central element in the re-production of politico-economic elites in positions of power. In parallel, it highlights the centrality of spatial practices and of the ordering of the urban spaces of the port in constructing and consolidating a post-democratic horizon for urban politics. Yet, the thesis insists that post-democratization is never a complete and immutable order. To this end, it also provides an analysis of the incoherencies and contradictions of the post-democratization of urban politics in Thessaloniki as well as of the efforts to stage dissent against the hegemonic order.
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not to give up when disheartened, when to stand still and when to be angry, when to interfere and when to be patient. They have always been eager to understand what bothered me or what excited me, and lent their very much needed –critical – support. Nikolia Karaliota, my sister, has grown to be my favourite ally, friend and comrade and I cannot wait to see what awaits us in the paths we will walk together.

Finally, writing this thesis would have been impossible without all those who I do not know in person but whose ideas, writings, music, paintings and political actions have helped me keep the fire of optimism burning. This one goes out to them.
Chapter 1
Introduction

“Going back to the metropolis, my idea is that we are not facing a process of development and growth of the old city, but the institution of a new paradigm whose character needs to be analysed. Undoubtedly one of its main traits is that there is a shift from the model of the polis founded on a centre, that is, a public centre or agora, to a new metropolitan spatialization that is certainly invested in a process of de-politicisation, which results in a strange zone where it is impossible to decide what is private and what is public.” (Agamben, 2006)

“We need free speech and public places not because they help us, as a society, reach a rational consensus but because they disrupt the consensus that we have already reached too easily” (Kohn, 2004: 81)

This thesis is about the politics of urban space. It examines the reorganizations of governance and the ordering of urban spaces that took place around the restructuring of Thessaloniki’s port over the past 20 years. It begins from the premise that the urban political sphere has been one of the prominent terrains through and upon which processes of post-democratization have unfolded. However, it does not take up uncritically the post-political and post-democratic condition thesis. The post-democratic city thesis is explored and its ability to explain urban politics and the ordering urban space in Thessaloniki is critically considered. The historically and geographically specific tropes and modes that processes of post-democratization acquire in particular places is one of the central issues of this thesis. Needless to say, the modes of urban governance and the urban policies, which constitute the focus of this thesis, have emerged in a context of radically shifting national and global politics and have been implemented in a series of cities across the globe.
Over the past 30 years cities have been the platforms of a radical reorganization in the political-economy of space together with spectacular transformations in their built environment. Through a rapid process of urbanization on a planetary scale a deeply uneven urban landscape is produced. Such urban transformations are manifested in a series of well documented policy trends. Three indicative examples are of particular relevance for Thessaloniki’s case. First, what has been described as the renaissance or revitalization of derelict docklands into gentrified housing, mixed-uses cultural quarters or urban heritage and tourism sites, exemplified by London’s Canary Wharf and Baltimore’s Harbor Place (Fainstein, 2004, Goodwin, 1991, Harvey, 2000, Merrifield, 1993, Porter and Shaw, 2008). Second, the proliferation of trans-local bidding processes to host prestigious cultural and sports mega-events (Gold and Gold, 2005). Third, the construction of iconic urban infrastructure mega-projects together with the privatization of infrastructure provision (Graham and Marvin, 2001, Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000, Offner, 2000, Young and Keil, 2010).

In Greece, such strategies have come to the forefront of urban politics since the social-democratic PaSoK’s (Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) election win on 22nd September 1996. Then minister of Environment Planning and Public Works Costas Laliotis has repeatedly placed great emphasis on the importance of “[i]dentity, image, and competition between contemporary cities [as] (…) the givens of the wider geo-political transformation in Europe” (1997: 6). Within this context, hegemonic visions on the construction of the future of Thessaloniki have been articulated around the imaginary of “The Metropolis of Balkans”. Being an ideological construction and a rhetorical vehicle, this imaginary was translated into a series of urban restructuring policies towards the construction of a “multicultural”, “competitive” and “European” city.

Thessaloniki’s port has been doubly inscribed in such processes during the past two decades. On the one hand, the abandoned and underused spaces of the old port have witnessed two waves of revitalization policies: during the preparation for hosting European Capital of Culture 1997 (Gospodini, 2001) and within the context of the ongoing branding of Thessaloniki as a tourist hub, respectively. On the other hand, efforts towards the improvement and expansion of the port’s infrastructure –mainly its container terminal – and the promotion of
its role as a node in maritime transport (Pitsiava, 2008) have unfolded alongside its quasi-privatization in 1999 and through a series of public-private partnerships.

The discursive and material politics around the port not only constitute a prominent terrain through which new modes of political practice unfolded, but also actively reconfigured the ways through which such modes crystallized and evolved. Choreographies of money, power, policies and discourses at a multiplicity of scales are dynamically intertwined in the (re-)ordering of the spaces of Thessaloniki’s port. This introduction situates the discussion around the post-democratic city by first exploring the complexity of urban politics and governance regimes in the early 21st century before then turning to their links with post-democracy.

1.1 Urban Politics and Governance

The afore-mentioned urban projects and events are part and parcel of wider transformations of urban politics and governance since the 1990s. Such transformations have come under close scrutiny in geographical research leading to a voluminous literature evolving around notions like growth coalitions, local boosterism, entrepreneurialism, urban revitalization, place marketing and so on (Boyle and Hughes, 1994, Cochrane, 1999, Cochrane et al., 1996, Cox, 1993, DeFilippis, 1999, Hall and Hubbard, 1996, Harvey, 1989b, Jonas and Wilson, 1999, Leitner, 1990, Logan and Molotch, 1987, Ward, 2000, 2009). During this period, the extent of the geopolitical changes that were often discussed under the name of globalization has led to declarations of the end of history, the end of ideology and even the end of geography (Fukuyama, 1992, Giddens, 1995, O'Brien, 1992). However, geographical research on scale and the politics of scale has sought to document that rather than the death of the local this reorganization of the economy and governance evolved around a politico-economic dialectic between the local and the global (Brenner, 1999, MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999, Swyngedouw, 1992, 1997). Rather than responses to the inevitable globalized neoliberal order such projects are actively constructing a new socio-spatial ordering (Swyngedouw et al., 2005).
Within such a context, local economic elites engaged in drastically redesigning the policy agenda of cities. In this “new urban politics” (Cox, 1993) regulatory and distributive concerns were replaced by a dogmatic belief in interurban competition and the active promotion of growth (Jessop and Sum, 2000, Peck and Ward, 2002). In a highly influential paper, David Harvey has characterized these transformations as a passage from managerialism to “urban entrepreneurialism” (1989b). Urban projects and events have in many cases been orchestrated by state-led coalitions and special-purpose agencies based on the dogma that the spectacular re-imaging of the urban alongside city branding campaigns would boost the local economy by attracting globally mobile investors and revenue-generating tourists (Jonas and Wilson, 1999).

This brings to the forefront the question of urban governance reorganization as this is manifested in and through urban projects and events (Brenner, 2004, Purcell, 2008, Swyngedouw, 1997). Such projects and events fuse together actors, networks and policies beyond the local social milieu (McCann and Ward, 2011, Swyngedouw et al., 2005). The institutional reordering of governance-beyond-the-state (Swyngedouw, 2005) evolves around a multiplicity of scalar and trans-scalar institutions of governance: from sub-national public-private partnerships and urban development forums (Swyngedouw et al., 2005, Tickell and Peck, 2003, Ward, 2000) to supranational forums (like the G20 and the WTO) and partnerships like the European Union (Brenner, 2004, Purcell, 2008, Swyngedouw, 2005). Yet, these polycentric and multinational ensembles of governance, often operate within a geo-institutional void (Hajer, 2003), giving raise to a proliferating and numerous techno-managerial elite (Swyngedouw, 2011c). Coalitions of politico-economic interests hold a prominent role in driving the internal power choreography of such modes of governance (Swyngedouw et al., 2005).

Undeniably, a variety of competing styles of governance have emerged within such a configuration. Yet, geographical research over the past fifteen years has documented the hegemony of common sense and consensual discourses of competitiveness, creativity, flexibility, efficiency, state entrepreneurship, strategic partnerships, and collaborative advantage in urban politics (Albrechts, 2006, Gunder, 2005, Gunder and Hillier, 2009, Healy, 1997, Jessop, 2002, Jessop and Sum, 2006, Purcell, 2008). Here, urban space is
reduced to an object of techno-managerial polic(y)ing in the consensual pursuit for growth within the imperative of the late capitalist order (Gunder, 2005: 184). This tendency is also mirrored in the increasing circulation of urban policies across the globe, lubricated by complex networks of politicians, experts and practitioners (McCann and Ward, 2011, Peck and Theodore, 2010, Peck et al., 2010). An emerging body of geographical research has sought to document how best practice and good governance urban policies have become mobile being at the same time transformed and mutated in their travel through such networks (Cook and Ward, 2012, McCann and Ward, 2011, Peck, 2011b).

Brought together these trends and arrangements pose important questions concerning the nature of urban politics and democracy in general. How can we account for the emergence of a consensus around competitive urban politics? What are the implications of the proliferation of what Ulrich Beck calls “unauthorized actors” (1999) in urban governance? How is the ordering of urban space choreographed in these arrangements? What is the place for polemic and dissent in this configuration? And more importantly what are the implications of this urban politics and governance for democracy as such? In order to engage with such questions research on urban politics and governance might benefit from theories on post-politics and post-democracy (Mouffe, 2005, Rancière, 1999). This thesis seeks to explore some of the broader theoretical and context-specific implications of the mobilization of post-democracy for research in urban politics and space.

1.2 The post-democratic city?

For Jacques Rancière post-democracy is the “political idyll of achieving the common good by an enlightened government of elites buoyed by the confidence of the masses” (1999: 93). It is the paradoxical government practice and discursive hegemonization of a politics that seeks to efface the democratic invention of polemic, while formally celebrating democracy. The thesis – in many cases associated with literature on the post-political condition (Mouffe, 2005, Žižek, 1999a) – has been deployed in the context of European politics towards the end of the 1990s to explain the emergence of a techno-managerial
approach to government that reduces politics to a consensual competition amongst political elites. Within this configuration, the hegemonic order is rarely questioned and there is no attempt to profoundly transform the relations of power.

The geographical dimensions of post-democracy have been highlighted in the literature. Geographical research has analyzed the role of environmental polic(y)ing and discourses in foreclosing the political and consolidating post-democratic governance (Bettini and Karaliotas, 2013, Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010, Raco and Lin, 2012, Swyngedouw, 2007a, 2009a). Besides, the role of the urban in the consolidation of post-democracy has come under close scrutiny. Swyngedouw writes:

“urban governance at the beginning of the 21st century has shifted profoundly (...) It operates through a range of geographical scales, and mobilizes a wide assortment of social actors (...) It is a governance regime concerned with policing, controlling and accentuating the imperatives of a globally connected neoliberalized market economy for which there is ostensibly no alternative, while intensifying bio-political control and surveillance. This new ‘polic(y)ing’ order reflects (...) a postpolitical and post-democratic constitution” (2011a: 3).

Transformations of urban governance, articulated around public-private partnerships and oriented towards consensual policy making (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010, Baeten, 2009, Dikeç, 2007a, MacLeod, 2011, Paddison, 2009, Raco, 2012); the implications of the consensual pursuit for urban sustainability (Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010, Raco and Lin, 2012, Swyngedouw, 2007a, 2009a); and the multiplicity of strategies employed to foreclose dissent (Baeten, 2009, Dikeç, 2007a); have attracted scholarly interest. However, less attention has been paid – at least empirically – on the following questions. How reorganizations of governance and governing practices in and through a multiplicity of scales are tangled in specific urban contexts consolidating post-democratization? What is the role of elite actors and their practices in promoting post-democratization and foreclosing dissent? How are urban spaces shaped by and in turn shaping such processes?
In Greece, post-democracy first entered political and theoretical debates after the outbreak of the so-called Greek crisis in 2010. The radical reorganization of governance, the discursive framing of hegemonic politics as the only viable alternative and the efforts towards the construction of a consensual policy-making framework between the country’s major political parties at the time (social-democratic PaSoK and conservative New Democracy) attracted the interest of scholars working on politics (Douzinas, 2010, 2011b, Katsampekis, 2009, 2011, Katsampekis and Stavrakakis, 2010, Kioupkiolis, 2010). The hegemonic politics over the Greek crisis created conditions that mirrored the post-democratic mode of political practice. Yet, the discussion remains to a large extent abstract evolving around the articulation of hegemonic crisis discourses, focusing almost exclusively at the national and European level and paying – at best – limited attention to the role of the – material and discursive – ordering of urban spaces. Moreover, references to post-democracy fall short in analyzing the historical and geographical specificities that have paved the way for the emergence of a post-political discourse and the elite actors who champion post-democratization. Besides, although urban policies in Thessaloniki have come under close scrutiny by a number of scholars, in history, planning, politics and geography, a perspective that links the ordering of urban space with the efforts to forestry dissent is missing. Mobilizing the restructuring of Thessaloniki’s port as a heuristic case study, this thesis seeks to fill these gaps. It soughts to develop an explanation of urban politics in Thessaloniki in light of the emergence of processes of post-democratization and to examine and map some of the fine-grained details of urban governance within such a context. To do this, the thesis challenges theories of post-democracy to explain contemporary urban politics in Thessaloniki. In parallel, it seeks to move beyond conceptualizations of the urban as a fixed and close entity to unearth the role of actors, policies and politics beyond the local in ordering urban spaces.

To address these and other related themes an array of issues are confronted. If it is accepted that the historical and geographical specificities of Thessaloniki shape the mode of urban politics, how is this played out? How has the form and function of urban politics around Thessaloniki’s port changed over the past twenty years? Through carefully mapping out the trajectory of the restructuring of the city’s port its links with post-democratization are addressed.
Moreover, how has neoliberalization been performed in the restructuring of the port of the city and what were the motives behind the policies implemented? How were hegemonic policies legitimized, and what was the role of mobile policy discourses in this? What is the most fruitful way to interrogate the uneven geographies of post-democratization while balancing the emphasis on local and trans-local actors, networks and power choreographies that are enrolled in the process? These are key themes in this thesis and the text returns to them a number of times. In a nutshell, thus, the aims of the research project can be summarized as follows:

- to critically review and rigorously examine the post-democracy thesis literature and to construct a theoretical framework for the study of post-democratization that is attentive to historico-geographical specificities;
- to outline a methodological approach for reading post-democratization that pays attention to both the discursive and material dimensions of the politics of urban spaces;
- to map how urban governing around the port of the city was reorganized over the past twenty years;
- to offer a reading of how urban polic(y)ing around the port was discursively legitimized;
- to unearth the role of spatial practices and policies in legitimizing consensual politics and foreclosing dissent; and finally
- to choreograph the role of elite actors (both at a local and a trans-local level) in consolidating the post-democratization of Thessaloniki’s urban politics.

1.3 The structure of the thesis

Chapter 2 establishes the basic theoretical tenets of the thesis. The starting point for the analysis is the distinction between politics and the political. It is upon this distinction that the discussion around post-democracy unfolds. The first section of the chapter revisits the theoretical discussion over the nature of the political and analyzes Rancière’s notion of the police as a mode of the foreclosure of the political. Building upon this discussion, the chapter draws
mainly from Rancière’s conceptualization of consensus democracy (1999) to argue that post-democratization is a deeply contingent and contradictory process. It proposes an understanding of post-democratization as a ternary mechanism that articulates: governing practices beyond the people, the construction of a post-political discursive horizon for (urban) politics and the ordering of (urban) space. Implicit in this theorization is that rather than a homogeneous and homogenizing process, post-democratization is a deeply context-specific process that evolves around path-dependencies and geo-institutional transformations. Hence, the chapter insists that the urban is one of the pivotal arenas in and through which this process unfolds and is contested (Swyngedouw, 2009a, 2011c). Thus, in order to offer a nuanced understanding of the post-democratization of urban politics, the chapter draws from geographical research around: 1) urban governance reorganization and the role of elite coalitions; 2) the discursive articulation of urban polic(y)ing around common sense and good governance practices and 3) the discursive and material ordering of urban space. The overall aim of the chapter is to construct a framework for the analysis of urban politics that is attentive to the dimension of antagonism and through this to the contradictory efforts to foreclose the democratic invention of polemic in the name of democracy.

Chapter 3 attempts to translate the theoretical framework, laid out in chapter 2, into a methodological framework for the reading of post-democratization through the restructuring of Thessaloniki’s port. This methodology chapter begins from the premise that discourse analysis can offer valuable insights in the analysis of the ordering of urban spaces and the promotion of post-democratic politics. It details how discourse theory as developed in particular by Laclau (2005), Stavrakakis (1997) and Žižek (1989) can be mobilized to unpack processes of post-democratization of urban politics. However, the chapter moves beyond a mere emphasis on discourse to insist that the ordering of urban spaces is also central in constructing and consolidating post-democratization. In this sense, it develops a synthetic framework through which flows of power and money and the ordering of urban space can also be accounted for. The chapter, then, returns to the methods deployed to collect and analyze the data. The bulk of the empirical material used in this thesis is provided by qualitative data. In particular semi-structured qualitative interviews
with key actors involved in the restructuring of the port throughout the last twenty years are used alongside quantitative and qualitative secondary data derived from a variety of sources from government publications to media articles. The chapter links the methodological approach with the analysis of the data. In parallel, a final section, points towards some limitations of the research methodology and explains how these were addressed.

Before moving into the empirical analysis around the restructuring of the port, chapter 4 offers a focused reading of the historical-geographic trajectory of Thessaloniki’s port since the later years of the Ottoman Empire (1870s). The aim of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to offer an account of the reconfigurations of the city’s politico-economic elites over the past century. In parallel, the social antagonisms of each period are unearthed in an effort to move beyond idyllic portrayals of Thessaloniki’s Ottoman and Greek trajectory. In so doing, it highlights the centrality of the production and ordering of urban spaces as a terrain in and though which these reconfigurations and their contestation unfold. On the other, it seeks to provide an explanation of the crystallizations of path-dependencies and governance structures around Thessaloniki’s port and urban spaces. The chapter constitutes the background upon which the analysis of Thessaloniki’s contemporary urban politics is performed.

The following four chapters constitute the core of the empirical analysis of the thesis. Brought together they aim to offer a detailed account of how and (if so) by whom post-democratization has been consolidated in the city of Thessaloniki in and through the ordering of the spaces of the port. Each chapter focuses in one moment of restructuring of the port’s spaces to trace the reorganizations of the modes of governance as they unfold through these moments, paying further attention to the particularities of the post-democratization of Thessaloniki’s urban politics. Two further elements are pivotal for the analysis in each chapter. First, the historically and geographically specific ways through which the dominant discourse around democracy and urban spaces has been articulated. Second, the discursive and material ordering of the spaces and infrastructure of the port.

Chapter 5 returns to the issue of the revitalization of the old port spaces in preparation for hosting the European Capital of Culture 1997 events. Focusing on the role of cultural policies in re-imag(in)ing urban space the chapter offers a
reading of the signifier of “The Metropolis of the Balkans” around which hegemonic imaginaries around the city were articulated during the period. In so doing, it moves beyond the dominant explanations around the Cultural Capital events that focus on the lack of a strategic vision and the emergence of two opposing narratives around the “Metropolis of the Balkans”: the conservative nationalist discourse of the Greek primacy in the Balkans and the liberal multicultural discourse around the multicultural history of Thessaloniki. Rather, addressing the articulation of these opposing narratives around the “Metropolis of the Balkans” signifier, the chapter traces their convergences on two interlinked elements. First, on the production of urban spaces in line with city-branding and intra-urban competition policies and second on the “imaginary construction of a post-political people” (Sevastakis, 2004: 43). The chapter argues that this logic has been articulated and manifested in and through the revitalization of the old port. The revitalization produced privatized urban public spaces which whilst inviting cultural consumption sought to foreclose the appearance of the people as the subject of antagonism and dissent. The first section provides the theoretical background for the reading of the convergence of opposing discourses around a signifier by returning to discourse theory. In parallel, the section discusses the notion of urban public spaces and the links between their privatization and the erosion of democracy. The second section analyzes through this lense the dominant discourses around the Cultural Capital. The third section explores how this hegemonic approach materialized in the re-production and governance of the old port spaces. The regeneration of the old port spaces is understood as a first instance of silencing “the people” paving the way for the post-democratization of urban politics.

Chapter 6 focuses on a series of failed neoliberal experiments with the port’s spaces and infrastructure during the short first decade (1998 – 2006) after the quasi-privatization of Thessaloniki’s Port Authority. Ranging from a planned second revitalization of the old port spaces to the construction of a submerged cross-city channel that would have its entrance in these very spaces none of the interventions actually materialized. Seeking to explain these failures, the first section argues for an understanding of “neoliberalism as a discourse” (Springer, 2012). Parallel to being circulated through a series of networks and channels neoliberalization discourses perform a vital role in the legitimization and
consolidation of urban elites. After sketching this framework, the second section offers a reading of the hegemonic discourse around the privatization of public infrastructure in Greece whereas the third section focuses explicitly on the country’s major ports. Building on this, the fourth section discusses the planned projects for Thessaloniki’s port. Analyzing the governance structures and the power relations that unfolded around the projects, the chapter argues that performing neoliberalization has been central in the repertoire of the hegemonic politico-economic elites in maintaining local and national state legitimacy in the face of the ‘givens’ of global intra-urban competition. In parallel, the chapter argues that through failing forward neoliberalization discourses introduced and institutionalized forms of governance beyond democratic accountability.

Chapter 7 engages with the ultimately failed efforts towards the concession of the container terminal of the port to Hutchison-Alapis consortium. In so doing, it traces the flows of money involved in the process in dialogue with the analysis of the institutional framework through which the concession was discussed, planned and managed. The aim of the chapter is to engage with the politics around the creation and legitimization of glocal infrastructure funds. The links between glocal infrastructure funds and the post-democratization of urban politics are teased out in the first section. The following section seeks to unearth the articulation of global actors (Hutchison Port Holdings Ltd), local capital (Alapis S.A.) and national and local governance structures and actors in – temporarily – producing glocal spaces of governance and investment. Herein the role of the close interplay between state and market forces in designing, negotiating and attempting to implement the concession framework is of significant importance. The third section analyzes the ways through which the hegemonic elites attempted to silence dissent against the concession of the container terminal. Hence, the armature of tactics mobilized in attempting to consolidate the post-democratization of urban politics is analyzed. A final section mobilizes the failure of consensus politics as a moment of rupture that signals the limits of consensual negotiations and allows unearthing the politico-economic interests involved in the concession. The chapter argues that the discursive post-politicization of the concession has been central in promoting the policy as the only viable alternative and silencing its inherently political character.
Chapter 8 focuses on urban politics in Thessaloniki in the context of the ongoing crisis. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the always contingent and contested nature of post-democratization. In order to do so, the chapter, first, analyzes the hegemonic urban politics in the midst of the crisis as these are articulated around the second revitalization of the port’s spaces and the marketing of Thessaloniki as a tourist destination. Second, it juxtaposes the hegemonic ordering of urban space with the (re-)appropriation of the urban public spaces of Thessaloniki as spaces of dissent. The first section argues that the crisis-driven re-organization of urban governance unfolds within an already neoliberalized trans-local rule regime. In parallel, it insists that, beyond governance structures, the articulation of crisis-ridden urban policy discourses and the ordering of urban space hold a central role in the post-democratization of urban politics. Yet, the section also argues that the acceleration of post-democratization makes its incoherencies more pronounced and render it more susceptible to being challenged. The second section addresses the reorganization of urban governance in the context of the crisis. Loan conditionality agreed between the EU-IMF-ECB troika and the Greek government constitutes the overarching framework for urban politics in the crisis era. In this context, the quasi-public governance organization Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund has been granted the power to privatize the port of Thessaloniki. Brought together these developments grant unprecedented power over urban politics to technocratic elites operating beyond any form of democratic accountability. The third section focuses explicitly on the discursive and material ordering of Thessaloniki’s spaces. On the one hand, it analyzes the strategic mobilization of post-crisis urban policy discourses by city authorities in legitimizing the ordering of urban space. On the other, the centrality of such an aesthetic and material ordering in foreclosing dissent is unearthed. The fourth section focuses on the emergence and disappearance of the movement of «Αγανακτισμένοι» (the Indignants) in Thessaloniki. The centrality of urban space in staging dissent and articulating emancipatory politics is highlighted.

The concluding chapter reviews the key theoretical, methodological and empirical findings of the thesis. In rehearsing and bringing together the major insights of the empirical chapters, it unearths the uneven choreographies of power, money, policies and discourses that constantly push towards the post-
democratization of urban politics in Thessaloniki. Hence, it insists that post-democracy should not be perceived as a complete and immutable condition. However, rather than rejecting theories around post-democracy in understanding urban politics, it argues for a shift of focus towards the uneven geographies of post-democratization as an always contingent and contested process. Post-democratization is identified as a key strategy in the legitimization and consolidation of local and trans-local politico-economic elites. The chapter argues that the discursive and material ordering of urban space and infrastructure constitutes a prominent terrain in and through which such processes unfold, shape form and are consolidated. A final part addresses some of the limitations of the research project and points towards possible future directions for research.
Chapter 2
Theoretical framework: Urban politics and the post-democratic city

2.1 Introduction

Urban governing and polic(y)ing has experienced profound transformations over the past three decades (Dikeç, 2007b, Swyngedouw, 2005, 2009b). In their aftermath, there has been a proliferation of research around urban politics. From the growth machine thesis and research on “new urban politics” through the analysis of urban governance reorganization to recent research on policy mobility, the restructuring of urban politics has come under close scrutiny in geographical scholarship. Yet, politics is qualified. As Mustafa Dikeç contends different understandings of politics significantly influence the theorization of urban governing and polic(y)ing (2005, 2007a). This thesis begins from the theoretical and ontological premise that the notion of politics should be split from within to differentiate between politics and the political (Marchart, 2007). For a number of authors, politics refers to what conventional political science understands as its ‘object’ of inquiry: the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions of a specific constituted political order (Marchart, 2007, Mouffe, 2005). The political, on the other hand, expresses the inherently antagonistic dimension of human relations (Marchart, 2007, Mouffe, 2005, Stavrakakis, 1999, 2007a).

Building on this distinction a number of scholars have engaged with the analysis of – contingent and contested – processes of suturing the political and consolidating consensual techno-managerial governance (see among others Agamben and McCuaig, 2011, Crouch, 2004, Mouffe, 2005, Rancière, 1999, 2006a, Swyngedouw, 2007b, 2011c, Žižek, 1999a). Jacques Rancière has been one of the political theorists to conceptualize the articulation of processes of de-politicization and governance reorganization as post-democracy (or consensus politics) (1995: 177, 1999). During recent years an emerging body of geographical research has sought to document and analyze how processes of post-democratization “unfold in and trough socio-spatial, environmental and scalar transformations” (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 371). Environmental polic(y)ing
(Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010, Raco and Lin, 2012, Swyngedouw, 2007a, 2009a), urban governance reorganizations (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010, Baeten, 2009, Dikeç, 2007a, MacLeod, 2011, Paddison, 2009, Raco, 2012) and the discursive and spatial efforts to foreclose dissent (Baeten, 2009, Dikeç, 2007a) have constituted the focus of this body of literature. This thesis is structured around the theoretical premise that the urban is one of the prominent terrains in and through which post-democracy is consolidated (and contested) (Swyngedouw, 2009a, 2011c).

Yet, the post-democracy thesis and geographical research articulated around it have also been subject to critique. In his recent account of research on the post-democratic city, Gordon Macleod highlights the contested nature of the terms post-political and post-democratic: “post-political? If so, when and where was it the case that cities were (properly) ‘political’? If cities are now post-democratic, again, when and where were they democratic? In this sense then, perhaps the term ‘depoliticised’ offers a more appropriate term with which to interpret the present day consensual ‘police’ and order” (2011: 2653). The concern here is that the post-democratic city thesis runs the risk of underestimating resistance to hegemonic ordering and simplifying the complex dynamics of urban politics (Featherstone, 2009, Paddison, 2009). Furthermore, Raco and Lin couple this concern with “questions over the geographical diversity of political systems and the role of different forms of agency, context, and path dependency in the development of contemporary policy programmes” (2012: 191). In so doing, they draw attention to the “geographies of post-politicism”, the articulation of global and local dynamics and their interactions (2012: 191).

In light of the above debate the chapter revisits Rancière’s conceptualization to highlight three central elements that should inform a geographical understanding of post-democracy (1999, 2006a). Post-democracy is conceptualized as a ternary process that articulates 1) the consolidation of governing practices beyond the people; 2) the conceptual legitimization of consensus politics; and 3) a “partition of the sensible” (Rancière, 2001: 8) that seeks to foreclose the staging of dissent (Rancière, 1999: 101 - 113). Implicit in this understanding is that post-democracy is not a homogeneous and homogenizing condition that settles upon localities (see Rancière, 2006a, Sevastakis, 2004). Nor is it a clear cut break and a paradigm shift. Rather, post-
democratization is conceptualized as a contingent, historically and geographically specific, process towards foreclosing dissent and political antagonism. Hence, the role of urban elites in championing and consolidating post-democracy is of significant importance. This being said, however, urban politics are far from being an exclusively local process. This thesis reads urban politics as the articulation of processes that operate in a variety of scales, from the local to the global. A series of extra-local dynamics become articulated with local politico-economic and cultural specificities in a multiplicity of ways in consolidating (or contesting) post-democratization. This chapter delineates the theoretical framework of the thesis. The task is to construct a lens through which the multiple dynamics that amount to the consolidation of post-democracy can be accounted for.

The argument is laid out in the following manner. A first section engages with the discussion on the distinction between politics and the political within political theory. The aim here is twofold. On the one hand, the section clarifies the use of the terms politics and the political in this project. On the other hand, this discussion serves as a basis to introduce the notion of the police as conceptualized by Rancière (1994, 1999, 2000). The notion of the police, introduced in this section, helps to account for the ordering of urban spaces with a view towards effacing dissent that is discussed later. Building on this, a second section engages directly with the post-democracy thesis particularly focusing on the elements that can inform a reading of urban politics attentive to the dimension of political antagonism. Here, the tenets of the ternary mechanism of post-democracy are highlighted. The following, third, section looks closer to each of these elements in turn. First, the section revisits geographical research on urban governance reorganization and policy mobility to account for the trans-local dynamics of urban governing and polic(y)ing. At the same time, it points towards the role of urban elite reconfigurations in championing post-democratization. Second, to address the conceptual legitimization of consensus politics, the section links literature on post-politics with the promotion of hegemonic visions of best practice and common sense polic(y)ing in urban politics. Third, the section addresses the spatial articulation of practices that foreclose dissent. Here, concerns over the institutional, material and aesthetic ordering of urban space are central. A concluding section summarizes the
theoretical framework that informs the analysis of the geographies of post-democratization performed in the empirical chapters.

2.2 Politics, the Political and the Police

The emergence of the distinction between politics and the political in political theory has been linked with post-Heideggerian and/or Lacanian approaches (see Marchart, 2007, Stavrakakis, 2007b, respectively for comprehensive accounts of these perspectives). Theorists that draw this distinction, however, do not in any sense constitute a homogeneous school of thought. Actually, such an understanding would have been contradictory for a perspective which Marchart (2007) insightfully characterizes as “post-foundational political thought” (see also Stavrakakis, 2007b: 3-5, making the same argument for what he calls the “Lacanian Left”). As a result, the meaning of the terms politics and the political is deeply divergent and still contested. This section, however, does not aim to provide an exhaustive account of the debates over the political in political theory. The aim is rather to clarify the use of the terms politics, the political and police in this project. This discussion in turn serves as a basis for the discussion of the dynamics of post-democratization that follows.

For Claude Lefort, the last decades of the past century have witnessed “the dissolution of the markers of certainty” (1988). The impossibility of a specific ground, like class, nation, the people, gender, locality and so forth, to act as a final positive ground on which to found society (Lefort, 1988). The discussion over the distinction between politics and the political unfolds against this background. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy write:

“with the collapse of certainties, with the deterioration of their foundations and the effacement of their horizons, it became possible – even necessary and urgent – to resume the question of what had been called ‘the essence of the political’” (1997: 144).

It is this question that calls for the split of the notion of politics from within. Hence, the difference between politics and the political, or in French, between la politique and le politique, or in German die Politik and das Politische, is
introduced to act exactly as an indicator for society’s absent ground (Marchart, 2007: 3-10).

Following Chantal Mouffe, while politics refers to the conventional understanding of politics by political theory as “the ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence”, the political refers to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations (2005: 9). Hence, the political “cannot be restricted to a certain type of institution, or envisaged as constituting a specific sphere or level of society. It must be conceived as a dimension that is inherent to every human society and that determines our very ontological condition” (Mouffe, 1993: 3). Thus, the definition of politics by conventional political theory as the formal space of political institutions fails to account for the political per se, the moment in which the definition of politics, the organization of social reality, takes place. As Lefort writes:

“The political is thus revealed, not in what we call political activity, but in the double movement whereby the mode of institution of society appears and is obscured. It appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and unified across its divisions becomes visible. It is obscured in the sense that the locus of politics (the locus in which parties compete and in which a general agency of power takes shape and is reproduced) becomes defined as particular, while the principle which generates the overall configuration is concealed” (1988: 11).

Chantal Mouffe refers to this dialectic as the democratic paradox: on the one hand, the need to produce a social order through specific institutional arrangements and on the other the inherently antagonistic and contingent ontological character of the political and hence of the social (2000). In this sense, politics is the attempt to suture the social field in a particular form by displacing the inherent antagonisms that split the totality, the unity, the One of society or the people (Lefort, 1988, Mouffe, 2005). Yet, this attempt to institutionalize the total unity of the social field, to offer a stable ground as society’s foundation, is inherently contingent, precarious and incomplete. It depends upon and implies “the retreat of the political”(Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997). However, the
moment of the political as the constitutive lack within the social, as the impossibility of a stable ground, will always return to challenge this contingent institutionalization. Hence, the political is not “just the locus of power relations”, but “the place where community as such is brought into play” (Nancy, 1991: xxxvii). The political then, as a moment of openness and undecidability, rather than remaining confined to established practices of government, implies the calling into question of the very structuring principles of the established order (Žižek, 1991). Such an understanding of politics and the political brings forward the question of “the political displacement of politics”: the silencing of the political difference (Marchart, 2007: 159). This is to suggest, that every “displacement of politics is in itself deeply political, that the abolishment of the political is ‘ideological’ in the only precise sense in which the term ‘ideology’ may still be employed: the displacement of politics is an act that tries to conceal its own political nature, and thus its own contingency, historicity, conflictuality and ungroundable status” (Marchart, 2007: 161).

This calls for further attention on the practices and processes through which specific claims and interests – antagonistic to others – become the dominant forms of institutionalized political reality and (always partially and temporarily) stabilize and regulate the social. In other words, it poses the question: what accounts for the contemporary closure of the political and its particular form? In order to respond to this question Rancière introduces the notion of the police (1995, 1999).

Rancière, albeit using different terminology, is one of the authors that adopt this understanding of the political (for an overview of the argument, see Dikeç, 2005). Rancière distinguishes between politics, the political and the police1. In order to account for the specific mode of closure of the political and the ensemble of practices associated with every institutionalization of the social, Rancière mobilizes the notion of the police. For him the police refers to an institutionalized social order of governance – a hierarchical structure – with

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1Rancière, reserves the term politics for the point where the police and the political meet (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 376); the disruptive engagement with the police order, revolving around “the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière, 2006b: 13). For this project the term politics refers to what Chantal Mouffe defines with the term and references to Rancière’s notion of politics are made with the use of the term democratic politics.
everyone in their ‘proper’ place, in the seemingly natural order of things. In such an order every activity and body needs to be given its proper place, name and social function or role in the whole. In other words, saturation is the overarching principle of the police order in the sense of “the absence of a void and of a supplement” (Rancière, 2001: 20). Therefore, the police must be understood in the broadest sense as the plurality of “all the activities which create order by distributing places, names, functions” (Rancière, 1994: 173) and not be misconceived as a shorthand for totalitarianism (Dikeç, 2005).

As Swyngedouw observes the notion of the police in Rancière is close to a Foucauldian understanding of governmental dispositif “that signals a shift in state power from sovereign to bio-power” (2011c: 375). The police refers to a “partition of the sensible” (Rancière, 2001: 8): “to what is acceptable and naturalized as well as to an ‘aesthetic’ register as that what is seen, heard, and spoken, what is registered and recognized” (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 375). It is, hence, not reducible to the activities of state apparatus, for, “the distribution of places and roles that defines a police regime stems as much from the assumed spontaneity of social relations as from the rigidity of state functions” (Rancière, 1999: 29). In a nutshell then:

“The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise” (Rancière, 1999: 29).

However, the police is never a complete and immutable order. The inherently antagonistic nature of the social always results in a part which is excluded or unaccounted for. Therefore, the police order is achieved in a context of antagonism through constant contestation (Mouffe, 2005, Rancière, 1999). As Dikeç observes, the similarities between Rancière’s notion of the police and Laclau’s and Mouffe’s (2001) concept of hegemony are clear (2005). According to them, a totally sutured society is impossible as there will always be a lack or

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2 For a detailed discussion of the notion of the police in Rancière’s thought see Dikeç (2005), May (2008) and Swyngedouw (2011b).
surplus, which the hegemonic practices try to fill in (Dikeç, 2005: 174). Actually, this very lack or surplus in the police, on the one hand makes the order possible as such and on the other constitutes the permanent possibility of the political; of questioning the ‘givens’ of that order through dissensus and polemic (Rancière, 1999, 2001). Thus, the police order is always contingent, precarious and susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions.

Stressing the constitutivity of the political, though, is not diminishing the importance of politics (Stavrakakis, 1999: 75): “the references to the political do not entail a dissolution of the formal sphere of politics. It (...) calls for a distinction between the two registers that do not cease to intertwine with each other, to contaminate one another” (Arditi, 1993: 15, quoted in Stavrakakis, 1999: 75). Yet, following this topology of politics and the political denies an understanding that renders everything political. On the contrary, political activity or democratic politics would not engage merely in a struggle for the control of the governing structures or cannot be reduced to a particular demand like an increase in wages or the reduction of CO$_2$ emissions (see Swyngedouw, 2007a, explicitly focusing on environmental politics). Rather, it involves questioning the fundamental rules and institutions/ing of the police as such, bringing to the front the inherently antagonistic nature of human relations (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, Mouffe, 2005, Rancière, 2001). As Jacques Rancière puts it:

“political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise” (1999: 30).

Building on this approach a number of scholars has characterized the current consensual mode of political practice as post-political (Mouffe, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2007b, Swyngedouw, 2009a, Žižek, 1999a) and post-democratic (Crouch, 2004, Rancière, 1994, 1999, Stavrakakis, 2007b). What is post-democracy then? What are the characteristics of it? That is the theme of the forthcoming sections, which seek to unravel the modi operandi of post-democratization by focusing on the urban context.
2.3 Understanding post-democratization

Before engaging in the discussion around post-democratization it is essential to briefly describe the understanding of democracy upon which this conceptualization is based. For Rancière

“[d]emocracy is not the parliamentary system or the legitimate State. It is not the state of the social either, the reign of individualism or of the masses. Democracy is, in general, [democratic] politics’ mode of subjectification, (...) a singular disruption of this order of distribution of bodies (...) [by] the police” (1999: 99).

As Claude Lefort argues, in democracy “[t]he locus of power is an empty place, it cannot be occupied – it is such that no individual and no group can be co-substantial with it – and cannot be represented” (1988: 17). In this line of argument, the equality of the people as speaking beings is presupposed (May, 2008, Rancière, 2006a). Democracy then is

“the symbolic institution of the political in the form of the power of those who are not entitled to exercise power — a rupture in the order of legitimacy and domination. Democracy is the paradoxical power of those who do not count: the count of the ‘unaccounted for’” (Rancière, 2000: 124).

In this sense, political disputes must not be seen as something that must be reduced or even worse eliminated in democracy, but rather as “the true pillars of democracy” (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 209). This is not to suggest that institutional arrangements of freedom of speech, electoral procedures and state mechanisms are of minor importance. Rather, the point is that democracy should not be identified with them (Rancière, 1999: 101-102).

It is against this backdrop that Rancière mobilizes the term post-democracy (1995: 177). A whole chapter is devoted to post-democracy or consensus democracy in *Dis-agreement* (Rancière, 1999: 95-121). According to Rancière’s schema, this is what post-democracy denotes:
“the paradox that, in the name of democracy, emphasises the consensual practice of effacing the forms of democratic action. Postdemocracy is the government practice and conceptual legitimisation of a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests” (1999: 101-102).

Hence, post-democracy evolves around the disappearance of political dissent and antagonism (Rancière, 1999: 102). It is a mode of identification that presupposes the parties of society as already given and their community as established in order to eliminate the gap of dispute (Rancière, 1999). As conceived by the post-democratic police, society is “a totality comprised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces” (Rancière, 2000: 124). “The utopia of postdemocracy is that of an uninterrupted count that represents the total of ‘public opinion’ as identical to the body of the people” (Rancière, 1999: 103).

A similar line of argument is advanced by Colin Crouch who underlines that “while the formal aspect of democratic institutions remains more or less in place, politics and government are gradually slipping back into the control of privileged groups in a way reminiscent of predemocratic times” (2004: 6). This is a configuration, Crouch argues, wherein “(...) powerful minorities have become far more active than the mass of ordinary; where political élites have learned to manage and manipulate popular demands, where people have to be persuaded to vote by top-down publicity campaigns” (2004: 20). Of course, elections and electoral debate can still change governments but are transformed into a “tightly controlled spectacle” managed by professional experts and restricted to a set of issues selected by them, whereas the majority of the citizens is reduced to a passive, apathetic role (Stavrakakis, 2007b: 264). Behind this façade “the mass of citizens plays a passive, acquiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals given to them (...) [B]ehind the spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by an interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests” (Crouch, 2004: 4, 72-74).
is to say, that while the formal envelope of democracy survives, “its substance is becoming ever more attenuated” (Marquand, 2004: 4).

Often times what characterizes the rise of post-democracy is an identification of democracy with “actually existing liberal democratic capitalism” (Mouffe, 1993: 10). Therein, an “outright identification of democratic form with the necessities of global capital” (Stavrakakis, 2007b: 264) unfolds. As Rancière writes:

“From an allegedly defunct Marxism, the supposedly reigning liberalism borrows the theme of objective necessity, identified with the constraints and caprices of the world market. Marx’s once scandalous thesis that governments are simple business agents for international capital is today an obvious fact on which ‘liberals’ and ‘socialists’ agree. The absolute identification of politics with the management of capital is no longer the shameful secret hidden behind the ‘forms’ of democracy; it is the openly declared truth by which our governments acquire legitimacy” (1999: 113).

In this sense, the saturation of the political in post-democracy is characterized by the “economization of politics” (Morgan, 2003) coupled by the “depoliticization of the economic” (Bourdieu, 2003). As Swyngedouw writes,

“[a] particular fantasy of autopoietic organization of ‘the economy’ has sutured political imaginaries (...) [while] [a]t the same time, much of the concern of governmental policy efforts are geared at assuring the ‘proper’ functioning of this fantasy in the real movement of economic life” (2011c: 372).

This being said, post-democracy is never a complete and immutable order. In a global landscape characterized by all sorts of inequalities, the foreclosure of political antagonism and the hegemony of market management cannot evacuate the dimension of dissent (Mouffe, 2005, Stavrakakis, 2007b). Yet, the post-democratic order is “[u]nable to understand and reluctant to legitimise the centrality of antagonism in democratic politics” (Stavrakakis, 2007b: 264). In the post-democratic imaginary “democratic confrontation [is] replaced by a battle between non-negotiable moral values or essentialist forms of identifications” (Mouffe, 2004: 125). In this sense, post-democracy can be seen as the “fulfilment of a tendency, inscribed at the very core of liberalism, which,
because of its constitutive incapacity to think in truly political terms, must always resort to another type of discourse: economic, moral or juridical” (Mouffe, 2004: 124-125). The case here is not that political frontiers are not drawn but that their character as such is denied (Mouffe, 2005: 76), so that “the post-political [post-democratic] imaginary can remain intact” (Stavrakakis, 2007b: 265). Failing to understand and unwilling to legitimize the dimension of antagonism in democracy “the post-political, post-democratic Zeitgeist forces the expression of this dissent – when it manages to articulate itself – through channels bound to fuel a spiral of increasingly uncontrolled violence” (Stavrakakis, 2007b: 264). The Parisian Riots of 2006 (Dikeç, 2007a) and the London Riots of 2012 can be seen as paradigmatic examples of this process (see also Swyngedouw, 2011c).

Hence, instead of being solely understood as a set of institutional arrangements, post-democratization comprises a series of interrelated dynamics (Rancière, 1999, Swyngedouw, 2011c, cf. Habermas and Cronin, 2012). Thus, post-democratization is conceptualized here as a ternary processes. Schematically, Rancière’s conceptualization comprises at least three interlinked processes: 1) governance reorganizations that reduce democratic control and accountability whilst extending the power of unauthorized actors (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 372); 2) the conceptual legitimization of consensual politics (Rancière, 1999: 95-121); and 3) a certain “partition of the sensible” (Rancière, 2001: 8) that seeks to efface forms of democratic action (Rancière, 1999: 95-121, see also Dikeç, 2005).

Embedded in this understanding is that post-democratization should not be seen as operating over an abstract and homogeneous space. Rather, the above ternary mechanism is played out and contested in quite distinct ways in different places. Post-democracy is not a global project that settles upon localities and homogenizes urban (or national) politics nor is it an epochal shift (Sevastakis, 2004). The post-democratization of (urban) politics occurs as a slow path-dependent “process of collision and fusion” with previous institutional regimes and modes of political practice “rather than as an easily discernible break and discontinuity between distinguishable epochs” (Sevastakis, 2004: 16). In his analysis of the consolidation of “common sense” politics and the emergence of a “post-political people” in Greece, Nicolas Sevastakis delineates how this mode
of political practice has emerged as a result of multiple re-articulations of the pre-existing political discourses, dependencies and practices (2004: 16, 77-116). Yet, post-democratization also articulates a series of dynamics beyond the local (Mouffe, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2009b, 2011c). This conceptualization is close to the understanding of the uneven development of neoliberalization that Brenner, Peck and Theodore advance (2010a). For them “[t]he uneven development of neoliberalization results (…) from the continuous collision between contextually specific, constantly evolving neoliberalization projects and inherited politico-institutional arrangements, whether at global, national, or local scale” (Brenner et al., 2010a: 331). Yet, this is not to suggest that the consolidation (or contestation) of post-democratization unfolds linearly. Rather, it can be conceived as a series of historical continuities interacting with and influenced by certain break points; events that emerge and refashion (urban) politics. It is in other words a process of transformation marked by certain events that punctuate the flow (see also Rancière, 2011, Sevastakis, 2004).

It is in this form of a contingent, historically and geographically specific, ternary process that this project understands post-democratization. The next section engages further with each of the three elements of the process and attempts to further analyze them from a geographical perspective.

2.4 Towards a reading of the post-democratization of urban politics

Following Swyngedouw, the urban is one of the pivotal arenas in and through which post-democratization unfolds; transforming it and being in turn transformed by it (Swyngedouw, 2007b, 2009a). Here the urban should not be understood as a closed, static and fixed entity. As Brenner suggests “political-economic space” should be seen “as a complex, tangled mosaic of superimposed and interpenetrating nodes, levels, scales, and morphologies” (2004: 66). In this sense, urban politics takes place “in the midst of a maelstrom of forces” (Harvey, 1989a: 143) being shaped by and in turn shaping socio-economic relations and political power extending beyond the city. So focusing on how the interrelated dynamics of post-democratization take place in specific urban contexts actually means tracing how governing practices and elite actors beyond the urban are
tangled with urban dynamics, spaces and actors in effacing democratic action. Such processes and transformations are inherently criss-crossed by power relations and antagonisms at a multiplicity of scales (Mouffe, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2007b).

2.4.1 Governing urban restructuring: Governance reorganizations, policymaking and the role of urban elites

Geographical research over the past twenty years has documented a radical reorganization of urban governance (Brenner, 1998, 2004, Jessop, 2002, Purcell, 2008, Swyngedouw, 2000a, 2005). As Swyngedouw notes, writing on large scale urban development projects, this reorganization consolidates “profound transformations of the ‘traditional’ horizons of urban governance, most notably through the formation of new institutional and civic arrangements that centre around the inclusion of private and other non-state actors in the act of governing. (…) They fuse together actors, elites, and institutions not only from the local social milieu, but also from the national or international level” (2009b: 55-57).

Yet, within this reorganization the role of urban elite actors in shaping urban politics remains of significant importance. They seek to forge the local coalitions that sustain the promotion of urban restructuring and through this actively reshape urban politics (Swyngedouw et al., 2005). This section addresses each of these topics in turn.

2.4.1.1 Governance reorganization and the multiple sites and actors of policymaking

The past twenty years have witnessed a move towards – either institutional or quasi-institutional – apparently innovative horizontal and networked modes of governing, that bring together the state, private/market and civil society (mainly NGOs) actors in an active cooperation to formulate policies at a variety of interlinked spatial scales (Mitchell, 2001, Swyngedouw, 2005). It
is exactly the passage to this mode of governing that is described as the passage from government to governance (Brenner, 2004, Tsoukalas, 2010) or governance-beyond-the-state (Swyngedouw, 2005). Such arrangements have been established and empowered by both supranational institutions and the state (Brenner, 2004: 6-10, 82-94) and are proliferating above and below the scale of state power, resulting in a radical reorganization of the “institutional forms of governing as well as their scalar gestalt” (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 372).

Two major trends are of significant importance with regards to post-democratization. First, an externalization of state functions through a series of practices that evolve around privatization, (re-)deregulation and the institutionalization of quasi-governmental arrangements. Herein, the construction of urban development and infrastructure projects is increasingly pursued through the proliferation of public-private partnerships (see among others Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010, Swyngedouw et al., 2005, Ward, 2000), whereas urban public services and infrastructure are becoming increasingly privatized (Graham, 2000, Graham and Marvin, 2001, Tickell and Peck, 2003). In parallel, city branding, large-scale projects and mega-events – urban politics in general – are increasingly planned and materialized through urban development forums or special purpose governing bodies (Moulaert et al., 2003, Swyngedouw, 2000a). Second, the increasing regulatory role of supranational institutions and multinational regulatory arrangements, from the EU, the NAFTA and the like to the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and so on, consolidates the delegation of regulation and decision making at a distance from the people (Larner and Walters, 2002). Simultaneously, it underpins the institutionalization of new forms of multilevel governance, grounded upon dense interdependencies between various tiers of political authority at various scales (Caporaso, 1996, Peck et al., 2010, Scharpf, 1999).

This reorganization of governing and politics does not, however, amount to the diminishment of the role of the state. Rather, it constitutes a “displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g. NGOs), that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a renewed relation between state and civil society actors” (Lemke, 2002: 50).
Here, process of coercive and competitive policy transfer become articulated, remaking not only “local” regulatory formations but the macro-institutional rule regimes within which they are embedded (Peck and Theodore, 2010, Peck et al., 2010). Regulatory trajectories have become increasingly interdependent, as transnational and cross-scalar policy imposition, transfer and learning has intensified and as the rules of the game of regime competition have themselves been neoliberalized (Brenner et al., 2010a, 2010b). As Brenner, Theodore and Peck write: “neoliberalization processes rework inherited forms of regulatory and spatial organization, including those of state institutions themselves, to produce new forms of geo-institutional differentiation” (2010a: 331).

Arguably, this has resulted in the diffusion of decision-making and the proliferation of a complex geography of “multiple overlapping spaces of policymaking” (Cochrane and Ward, 2012: 5). Governance and “policy making processes have promiscuously spilled over jurisdictional boundaries, both ‘horizontally’ (between national and local political entities) and ‘vertically’ (between hierarchically scaled institutions and domains)” (Peck, 2011b: 773). Undeniably, the form of “discursive and material power of national and supranational institutions (...) has changed” (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 171) as policy mobility is lubricated by complex networks of politicians, experts and practitioners (Peck and Theodore, 2010, Peck et al., 2009, 2010). Notwithstanding the transformations and mutations that policies undergo in their travel through such networks (Cook and Ward, 2012, McCann, 2010, Peck, 2011b) what remains of significant importance is that such arrangements overemphasize the role of policy-making, administrative and managerial aspects (Swyngedouw, 2007b, Žižek, 2006). A vast techno-managerial and expert apparatus is proliferating embedded within variably neoliberal regimes of polity (Mouffe, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2011c). As Slavoj Žižek writes, this amounts to “the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension” (2002: 303).

Furthermore, more often than not such networks and expert agents operate in what Maarten Hajer calls an “institutional void” (2003). The inclusion or exclusion of actors and the accountability of these apparently horizontal networked arrangements “often take place in non-transparent, ad hoc, and context-dependent ways and differ greatly from those associated with egalitarian
pluralist democratic rules and codes” (Swyngedouw, 2009b: 57). Policymaking and urban governance are, thus, increasingly operating at a distance from any sovereign people (Purcell, 2008, Swyngedouw, 2000a, 2005). Decision-making is, thus, slipping away from democratic accountability and political control, furthering and consolidating “the political powers of authorities who are not accountable (experts, judges, committees)” (Rancière, 1999: 97).

Yet, urban restructuring is not merely the localized response of urban elites to the “assumed inevitability of neoliberal order” (Swyngedouw, 2009b: 53). As Cochrane and Ward put it: “apparently global phenomena, globalised policies, are only capable of realisation in particular, grounded and localized ways” (2012: 6). Rather than diminishing the importance of urban elites, the afore-described reorganization of governing enhances the role of economic, political and socio-cultural elite configurations in shaping urban political-economic trajectories (Moulaert et al., 2003, Swyngedouw and Baeten, 2001).

2.4.1.2 Urban elite (re)configurations and the consensual pursuit for growth

The role of urban elites in the promotion of urban restructuring has come under close scrutiny in the “new urban politics” literature and particularly in growth machine and urban regime theory. Theories on growth coalitions originated with the groundbreaking work of Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987) and have been further developed by urban regime theory (initially, Stone, 1989). For Logan and Molotch growth operates as the overarching consensus of internally differentiated local elite coalitions. To put it in their words: “the very essence of a locality is its operation as a growth machine” (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 51, Molotch, 1976:309-310). Building on this thesis, growth coalition theory has subsequently been developed both empirically (see, for example, DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993, Lauria, 1997, Lloyd and Newlands, 1988, Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, Valler, 1995) and theoretically (among others Harding, 1991, Jessop et al., 1999, Ward, 2000). The emphasis on the role of urban elites, however, should not slip into voluntaristic or localist accounts (Peck and Tickell, 1995: 61). Actually, this is one of the most common and powerful criticisms that have been addressed towards growth
machine theories (Jessop et al., 1999, Moulaert et al., 2007, Valler, 1995). Hence, as conceptualized in this project, “urban elites emphatically do possess agency. But it is essential to recognize that they also occupy positions within networks, structures, and meaning systems that significantly constrain their range of feasible actions and the longer-term consequences of the choices they make” (Jessop, et al., 1999: 148, emphasis added). Therefore, there is a balance to be achieved between explanations that conceive of elites as operating without any constrain and those that do not take into account individual capacities, tactics, strategies and actions (Ward, 2000: 1097).

The project adopts a broad understanding of local economic elites as “more or less loose groups of ‘self-interested’, profit-maximizing economic agents and institutions that are actively inserted in the local economy” (Swyngedouw and Baeten, 2001: 834). In this sense, it moves beyond the initial narrow focus of the growth machine thesis that ascribed primary role to land-based elites (Lauria, 1999). Growth coalitions effectively bring together business leaders that expect to directly (like developers, financiers and construction companies) or indirectly (the service sector and utility companies) benefit from the process of growth (Harding, 1995). In pursuing growth interdependencies are constructed and consolidated between governmental and non-governmental actors (Lauria, 1997, Stoker, 1995). Evidently, in order to pursue their goals, business interests need to cooperate with local politicians and local media (Quilley, 1999) as well as with leaders of public and quasi-public institutions i.e. local banks, Chambers of Commerce, unions, employers’ federations and the like (Mayer, 1994: 321 - 323). In this sense, urban elites are understood here as actors with considerable economic, political and cultural capital that actively produce and shape urban restructuring (Howe and Langdon, 2002: 216-218). They may include networks of business, political and cultural elites as well as government technocrats, including policy planners, managers and architects (Jessop, 2000).

In formulating networks of coordination in order to enhance their ability to govern (Stone, 1993, Mossberger and Stoker, 2001), these groups actively influence policy formulation, planning documents and regulatory procedures (Harding, 1995).

However, urban elite configurations are far from being homogeneous in each locality. All manners of tension and conflict – both internal and external –
may foreclose the formation of or separate existing growth coalitions (Baeten et al., 1999). Divergent interests, competitive individualism, and other fractures may lead to disintegrated, disjointed, conflicting and heterogeneous strategies (Baeten et al., 1999). Hence, the particular composition of elite alliances, their specific interests, perspectives and strategies as well as their interplay with wider dynamics that partially shape urban trajectories is highly differentiated from place to place, further accentuating an already highly uneven global mosaic of urban spaces (Swyngedouw, 2000b, Swyngedouw and Baeten, 2001). Even further, these intra-elite heterogeneities are not the only factors that limit their power as a variety of counter-hegemonic groups may resist their strategies (Harding, 1995, Swyngedouw and Baeten, 2001). Thus, the promotion of urban restructuring projects ultimately depends on the articulation of coalitions of interest who would promote their construction and consolidate consensus around them (Moulaert et al., 2003). How are these projects legitimized? What are the links between their legitimization and post-democratization? This question constitutes the focus of the next subsection.

2.4.2 The post-politicization of urban politics

One of the key strategies that attempt to legitimize and promote urban restructuring is the drive of urban elites towards the articulation of hegemonic visions and strategies concerning the future city (Gunder, 2005, Zukin, 1995). Urban elites jointly seek to shape and consolidate hegemonic visions as to what the general interest should be (Jessop, 2000: 335). These, inherently political, hegemonic visions are often framed in technical and administrative terms that seek legitimacy by resorting to claims to rationality, value neutrality, expertise and science (Sandercock, 2004: 134, see also Lefebvre, 2003).

Focusing on what McCann calls the supply and demand side of urban policy circulation (2010) can offer valuable insights on the legitimization of hegemonic strategies. In this line of argument, as Peyroux shows in her case study on the transfer of BIDs in Johannesburg, discursive claims to knowledge expertise and best practice are mobilized as a legitimization strategy by urban elites (2012). Urban policies – as sets of knowledges and beliefs – are generally
encapsulated under and geared around generic names or floating signifiers (Stavrakakis, 1999) like the multicultural, competitive, creative, sustainable, liveable or even good city (Gunder and Hillier, 2009). Yet, only a limited range of sensible and best practice alternatives of what constitutes the desirable city are promoted within the context of a variegated neoliberal capitalist environment (Gunder, 2005, Stavrakakis, 2007a). Therefore, an apparatus of expert technocrats and managers is deployed to “facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism” (Gunder, 2005: 184 emphasis added). Hence, as González has convincingly argued – focusing on policy tourism to Barcelona and Bilbao – one of the possibilities for urban policy mobility discourses is to be “reimagined as smoke screens behind which agendas of privatization, modernization of public services or tertiarization of the economy can be implemented” (2011: 17).

As a result, planned and managed through the afore-described governance framework with its emphasis on policymaking and administration, urban restructuring is increasingly framed in an allegedly common sense and consensual language of efficiency, creativity, competitiveness, strategic partnerships and so on (Gunder, 2005, Healy, 1997, Hillier, 2003, Jessop, 2002, Jessop and Sum, 2006, Purcell, 2008). For Chantal Mouffe, every successful – even always temporary – police order needs to “fix [...] the meaning of institutions and social practices and define [...] the ‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is established” (2009: 263). The promotion of such common sense solutions has become for Rancière, the dominant political practice in 21st century liberal democracy (1994, 2004).

Concerning the urban context, two intertwined conditions on which consensus is built unfold. On the one hand, the significance, the urgency of the urban condition is widely accepted. Hence, strategically designed actions by elite techno-managerial apparatuses are called for to avoid ‘disaster’, this being economic decline, social disintegration and environmental catastrophe (Swyngedouw, 2007b, 2009a). As Stavrakakis notes, all actors strive to achieve a vision that provides them with an illusion of security and harmony (1999). Articulating the missing element(s), the parameters that stand as an obstacle in the achievement of the good city can be seen as a first step in the hegemonic
drives to impose a particular desired solution as the only viable way forward for the city (Gunder, 2005: 174, see Gunder and Hillier, 2009: 23-35, for a detailed account of the role of lack in urban planning). On the other hand, this first condition unravels within the consensus that the hegemony of late capitalism is unquestionable and that no alternative is possible (Harvey, 2005, Tickell and Peck, 2003). This second condition is mobilized to fix the meaning of lack, to identify the source of the crisis of the urban. Hegemonic elites build upon this fixing of meaning to construct and impose their specific visions, their fantasy, as universal, as if it was identical to the public interest (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).

Yet, every seeming agreement and consensus is actually an always temporary hegemony of some interests over others (Hillier, 2003: 42). It always entails some form of exclusion (Mouffe, 2000: 104). Hence, the consensual and non-adversarial nature of not just the policies and debates around competitive, creative or entrepreneurial cities and the like but of urban re-(dis)ordering in general, tends to exclude a crucial element of the political: dissensus. For Rancière, dissensus

“is not a quarrel over which solution to apply to a situation but a dispute over the situation itself, a dispute over what is visible as an element of a situation, over which visible elements belong to what is common, over the capacity of subjects to designate this common and argue for it” (2004: 6).

Then, it is consensus formation that becomes the dogma of political practice and common sense techno-scientific solutions the answer to every political problem. The conceptual legitimization of post-democracy proclaims the “end of politics” under the name of consensus and “deliberative democracy” (Mouffe, 1999: 2, Rancière, 1999, for an account of the arguments around deliberative democracy and a critique see Mouffe, 2005, Purcell, 2008). It rests upon a consensual political practice that “(...) mobilizes a view of politics which has evacuated the dimension of antagonism and, postulates the existence of a ‘general interest of the people’ whose implementation overcomes the winners/losers form of resolution of conflicts” (Mouffe, 2005: 14). For Rancière, “to evacuate the demos, post-democracy has to evacuate [democratic] politics” (1999: 110) by “putting any object of dispute that might revive the name of the
people and the appearances of its division in the form of a problem” (Rancière, 1999: 106, see also Rancière, 2006a).

For Chantal Mouffe (2005) and Slavoj Žižek (1999a) this constitutes a post-political view of politics. Specifically, “[p]ost-politics”, Žižek writes, “mobilizes the vast apparatus of experts, social workers, and so on, to reduce the overall demand (complaint) of a particular group to just this demand, with its particular content” (1999b: 204). Dissent and political antagonism are replaced in post-politics “by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus” (Žižek, 1999b: 198). The post-politicization of (urban) politics is, thus, characterized by the transformation of politics into “technological” forms of management or organization, a process which leads to the effective silencing of genuinely political questions” (Marchart, 2007: 66). In post-democracy, then, politics is reduced to institutionalised social management, whereby all problems are supposedly dealt with through administrative-organizational-technical means (Marchart, 2007: 68). Within such a configuration, Chantal Mouffe argues, the political – aspiring to the liberal democratic dogma – is reduced to a competition amongst political elites, a consensual one however, that does not question the dominant hegemony and wherein there is no attempt to profoundly transform the relations of power (2005: 21). It is exactly this possibility of achieving “an order that goes beyond the hegemony” of the police order that is foreclosed through the post-politicization of (urban) politics (Mouffe, 2005: 7). Yet, the foreclosure of dissent is not limited to institutional arrangements and discursive practices. It is also spatially articulated. The police ordering of urban space with a view towards effacing dissent constitutes the focus of the next section.

2.4.3 Fixing Space: The police ordering of urban space

The third central element of this project’s understanding of post-democratization evolves around the ordering of urban spaces. For Rancière, the post-democratic police order seeks to evacuate “the mechanisms of appearance, of the miscount and the dispute opened up by the name ‘people’” (1999: 102) or
in other words to efface “the place where the people appear (...) the place where a dispute is conducted” (1999: 100). Of course, appearance and place here are not solely understood in material terms but also in terms of institutional and discursive practices. Yet, as Dikeç argues Rancière’s notion of the police (and Democracy) is also deeply spatial (2005). Hence, spatial articulations are central in the logic of the police and for consensus democracy as the “reduction of politics to the police” (Rancière, 2001: 31). As it has already been highlighted central in the logic of the police is to ascribe proper places for everyone, to construct a seemingly uninterrupted order. In this sense, the fixing and stabilization of the police order can not but include space, both in its concrete material dimension as well as in its symbolic and cognitive one (Dikeç, 2005, Stavrakakis, 2007a).

This is even more so concerning urban public spaces. Simon Springer mobilizes Lefebvre’s distinction between representation of space and representational space to describe the dual character of public space (2008). The former refers to “public space that is controlled by government or other institutions, or whose use is regulated”, whereas the latter is “public space as it is actually accessed and used by various social groups” (Springer, 2008: 140). In this line of argument “public space is a process, never a complete project, always in a state of flux between those who seek to deprive it and those who seek to expand it” (Springer, 2008: 140). Public space, then, is the product of these two conflicting processes. It is through this dialectic that the relation between post-democratization and urban space can be unravelled.

It is no surprise then that transformations of public spaces have been one of the prominent lenses through which geographical scholarship has engaged with questions of democracy and its erosion during the past years (Featherstone, 2011, Purcell, 2008, Springer, 2010, Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008). Research on this area has highlighted how processes of neoliberalization evolving around the mantra of privatization have transformed the contemporary city (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). In a landscape wherein socio-spatial ordering by and for the market has become the dogma of the day, cities have become, more than ever before, landscapes of (elite) power (Zukin, 1995), where islands of extreme wealth and social power are interspersed with places of deprivation, exclusion and decline (Swyngedouw and Kaika, 2003). Not only has urban space become
an arena where commodification occurs; the city itself has been intensively commodified (Brenner et al., 2009: 178, cf. Gospodini, 2009). Herein, control over public space constitutes a central strategy (Low and Smith, 2006). The subsequent processes of increasing surveillance, commodification, and private usage of urban space have been described in the literature as the “disnefyication” of space; where urban space is constructed as a “sanitized, ersatz architecture devoid of geographic specificity” (Lees, 1994: 446).

This construction of the correct space not only acts as an accumulation strategy but also seeks to promote and sustain a certain police ordering (Dikeç, 2005). Spatial strategies, then, extending from the drawing of boundaries and identifying ‘problematic areas’ within the realms of urban policy that in turn constructs space(s) (Dikeç, 2007b) to the construction of urban spaces by planners, architects and managers (Gunder, 2005), may be effective ideological tools for the institutionalization and consolidation of the order of the police (Dikeç, 2005). Importantly, the ordering of urban spaces is also reproduced through everyday practices; the mundane, quotidian performances that unfold within them (Springer, 2008). The police order “attempts to fix the meaning of space, arranging any number of particularities, disjunctures, and juxtapositions into a seamless unity: the one place, the one identity” (Natter and Jones, 1997: 150). In this sense, the police “relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space, an organization that becomes the basis of and for governance” (Dikeç, 2007a: 19). As constructed by the police “spatial configurations naturalize social relations by transforming contingent forms into a permanent landscape that appears as immutable rather than open to contestation” (Kohn, 2003: 5). The role of the traditional monument, Haussmann’s redesign of Paris and Bentham’s Panopticon are just three well-known examples of such manipulation (Kohn, 2003).

As Dikeç writes: “the space of the police is (...) divisible into discrete and mutually exclusive parts, the sum of which gives the count that is equal to the ‘whole’ to be governed. (...) It spatially articulates identities (logic of identification) and distributes them to their proper places (logic of the proper), and thus displaces, through placement, the disruption of politics through an exhaustive ordering of space” (Dikeç, 2005: 181). This ordering always involves an act of exclusion (Dikeç, 2005, Springer, 2010). “Aesthetically acceptable is”
for the police order “only the (a)political decent i.e. the eviction of any visible protest from public space” (Sevastakis, 2011c: 1). Hence, what is repressed in such a construction of urban space is the political itself, leading to an inability to “assume responsibility for the exclusions – symbolic as well as material – on which its reproduction relies” (Stavrakakis, 2007a: 147). Yet, the police ordering of space is always contingent (Dikeç, 2005). It is not surprising then, that the urban emerges as one of the privileged sites of violent outbursts, that are often times coupled by xenophobic or fundamentalist attitudes (Dikeç, 2007a, Stavrakakis, 2007a). As the ontological status of antagonism suggests the repressed element of the political will always return (Swyngedouw, 2011c).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter addressed some of the implications of the distinction between politics and the political for the analysis of urban politics. This distinction allows moving beyond traditional accounts of urban politics that focus exclusively on formal processes of policymaking, their juridico-institutional crystallizations and their spatialization. It opens a window through which questions over the relationship between contemporary urban politics and democracy can be addressed. In delineating the project’s theoretical framework, the chapter argued for a reading of post-democratization as a ternary process. In this line of argument, post-democratization articulates governing practices beyond the people, the post-politicization of urban politics and a certain ordering of urban spaces. Each of these processes in turn entails complex dynamics that are deeply variegated in historical and geographical terms. The theoretical framework that has been sketched above seeks to construct a lense that is attentive to the articulation of global and local dynamics in consolidating post-democratization. In parallel, it seeks to unearth the role of urban elite actors in shaping its trajectory in particular places.

Each of the analytical chapters of the thesis looks closer to a moment of dislocation and re-articulation of the politico-economic and discursive coordinates around the port of Thessaloniki. Needless to say that, the above framework cannot fully account for urban restructuring in Thessaloniki and the
particularities of each instance of restructuring of the port. Hence, while all of the empirical chapters of the thesis directly engage with the three intertwined dynamics of post-democratization, each chapter also brings this framework into dialogue with literature that is relevant for the particular moment in urban restructuring that it analyzes. In doing so, the thesis attempts to offer a nuanced reading of the consolidation and contestation of post-democratization in the city of Thessaloniki.
Chapter 3
Research Methodology: Reading processes of post-democratization

3.1 Introduction

How can we study the relationship between urban restructuring and processes of post-democratization? This is the methodological challenge that this research project faces. Three analytical elements are of particular importance in constructing its methodological framework.

First, chapter 2 suggested that post-democratization is to be conceived as a ternary processes evolving around 1) governing practices beyond the people, 2) their conceptual legitimization and the 3) ordering of urban spaces. Needless to say, these processes are inherently intertwined and only analytically separated.

Second, post-democratization is not to be understood as a global homogeneous force that settles upon localities. Rather, it is a contingent process that depends highly on the historical and geographical context and unfolds unequally through a multiplicity of scales. In other words, post-democratization relates with the dynamics of urban restructuring in a myriad of intricate manners. It is this articulation of local and trans-local dynamics – mediated through the policies of the national state and multilateral governance arrangements – that shapes and can help explain urban restructuring and the related processes of governance reorganization and the politics of urban space. Third, while the consolidation and contestation of post-democratization is not a clear cut break or discontinuity, it is also not a linear process. Hence, the analysis of the transformations of urban politics should evolve around the analysis of moments of disarticulation and re-articulation of the politico-economic coordinates and how these relate with post-democratization. In this chapter the task is to translate these dialectical processes and dynamics into a framework for empirically grounded research and analysis.

This chapter delineates the research methodology of the project. In doing so, it argues that the politico-economic analysis of the port’s restructuring should be combined with a reading of the discursive practices and the spatial ordering that unfold around it. The structure of the argument is as follows. The first section offers a brief reflection on the ontological and epistemological
implications of the split of the notion of politics from within. This section serves as a ground for the methodological reflections that follow in the second section. The second section also explains the periodization of the events around the port that was followed in the project and the narrative structure of the empirical chapters of the thesis. Building upon this, the third section details the methods of data collection that were mobilized and the perspective adopted in their analysis. A concluding part summarizes the insights of the chapter and addresses some of the limitations of the research project.

3.2 Research Philosophy

The previous chapter has addressed the theoretical and analytical implications of the split of the notion of politics from within. Yet, as Oliver Marchart argues this split bares significant ontological implications and, thus, calls for a shift in research philosophy (2007). For him, what unites the otherwise divergent projects of post-foundational theorists – thinkers as diverse as Schmitt, Ricoeur, Mouffé, Nancy, Badiou, Rancière, Žižek and others – is the effort to weaken the ontological status of metaphysical figures of foundation, such as totality, universality, essence and ground, while not erasing them completely (Marchart, 2007: 2-4). This body of politico-philosophical theory draws, to borrow Heidegger’s vocabulary, a separation between the ontological field of the political, on the one hand, and the ontic field of politics or policy-making on the other. This section traces the implications of this approach for the ontological and epistemological premises of this research project.

As chapter 2 has argued the difference between politics and the political is introduced to act exactly as an indicator for society’s absent ground (Marchart, 2007: 3-10). Specifically, on the one hand, politics remain a specific discursive regime, a particular social system, a mode of organization, a certain form of action i.e. in terms of ontology referring to the ontic level; while, on the other hand, – at the ontological level – the political “assumes the role of something which is of an entirely different nature: the principle of autonomy of politics, the moment of institution of society or the antagonism that is inherent in human relations” (Mouffé, 2005: 101, see also Lefort, 1988, Marchart, 2007). Hence, the political cannot be absorbed by “social differences, repetition, tradition,
sedimentation, or bureaucracy” (Marchart, 2007: 8). On the contrary, the political appears as a supplementary ground to the groundless of society. Yet, this supplementary ground is occulted in the very moment in which it institutes society. Thus, society will always be in search for an ultimate ground, while the maximum that can be achieved will be a fleeting and contingent grounding by way of politics – a plurality of partial grounds. This is the essence of the differentiation between the two concepts. To use Marchart’s words:

“the political (…) will never be able fully to live up to its function as Ground – and yet it has to be actualized in the form of an always concrete politics that necessarily fails to deliver what it has promised. But politics and the political, the moment of ground and the moment of the actualization of this ground, will never meet because of the unbridgeable chasm of the difference between these terms, which in itself is but the signature of our post-foundational condition” (2007: 8).

Hence, the distinction between politics and the political is one of a quasi-transcendental nature (Marchart, 2007). In this line of argument, for Marchart, the internal split of the notion of politics also stands as an indicator of “a problem or deadlock of conventional political and social theory (…) [it] seems to indicate the crisis of the foundationalist paradigm (represented scientifically by such diverse species as economic determinism, behaviourism, positivism, sociologism, and so on)” (2007: 5). The same could be argued to a certain extent for conventional accounts of urban politics within geography (Swyngedouw, 2007b). In this sense, drawing this distinction amounts to a rejection of the essentialist paradigms of positivism, behaviourism, economism and so on.

This understanding of the ontic-ontological difference between politics and the political underlies the methodological and epistemological position of this project. This calls for further elaboration. This project seeks to engage in theoretically informed analysis but what kind of theory? What is the relation between theory and the experience it seeks to analyze? The project departs from determinist positions that claim that “the main reason for believing scientific theories is that they explain the coherence of our experience” (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998: 55). Following this logic, as Bruno Latour argues, science and scientists are given a status as if: “[t]hey can make the mute world speak, tell the
truth without being challenged, put an end to the interminable arguments through an incontestable form of authority that would stem from things themselves” (2004: 14). Yet, “theoretical inquiry and scientific discourse continuously fail to account for, and understand, the totality of our experience, let alone to predict and direct human praxis” (Stavrakakis, 2007b: 5). For science to maintain its status, Stavrakakis argues, an element needs to be repressed and silenced (1999). In this sense, every claim to knowledge is an inherently political claim or as Latour puts it: “epistemology and politics (...) are one and the same thing” (2004: 28). The point here is not that knowledge and theoretical explanation cannot fully account for reality. The point is that this reality is already inscribed within theoretical explanation and symbolization; it is an already theorized (symbolized) reality (Stavrakakis, 2007b). Hence, what is needed is “a knowledge about the limits of knowledge, a profound awareness of the significance of not-knowing” (Nobus and Quinn, 2005: 25).

Yet, this should not be read as a postmodernist relativist stance. The epistemological contribution of post-foundational political thought – and what could be following Stavrakakis called the “Lacanian Left” (2007b) – is that together with the rejection of determinist accounts it also calls for a rejection of a now timeworn “anything goes” postmodernist relativism (Marchart, 2007, Stavrakakis, 2007b). Of course reality is socially constructed but to argue that nothing escapes construction, that every element of the real is included in social construction, entails the danger of essentialism (Stavrakakis, 1999). A paradoxical essentialism where “construction acquires the structural position of the essence of our world, an essence the social constructionist claims to know” (Stavrakakis, 1999: 66). Reformulating Žižek’s discussion of the question of the existence of a meta-language, Stavrakakis summarizes the thesis:

“The position from which the deconstructionist [and the constructionist] can always make sure of the fact that ‘there isn’t any metalanguage’, that no utterance can say precisely what it intended to say [that no utterance can say the truth about reality]; that the process of enunciation always subverts the utterance [that reality is always socially constructed], is the position of metalanguage in its purest, most radical form”. (Žižek, 1987: 33, as reformulated in, Stavrakakis, 1999: 66).
However, this essentialism comes with high costs, constituting a “tautological entrapment into the world of social construction (...) incapable of providing an account of the cause that governs the productions of social constructions of reality” (Stavrakakis, 1999: 67). In order to escape this tautological trap, to account for what stimulates the articulations of (new) social constructions, an element that is external to social construction is needed: “an exteriority impossible to represent, to construct at the level of symbolic meaning, but also impossible to avoid” (Stavrakakis, 1999: 67). For post-foundational theorists the political stands exactly as this element (Marchart, 2007). The political is an element resisting symbolization while at the same time being revealed at the moment of society’s institution (Lefort, 1988). In this sense, the moment of the political is a “moment of dislocation [that also] causes the articulation of new social constructions that attempt to suture the lack created by dislocation” (Stavrakakis, 1999: 69, see also, Laclau, 1990). Against this backdrop post-foundational political thought insists that the weakening of ground does not imply the total dissolution of grounds but rather the “impossibility of a final ground” (Marchart, 2007: 2). Following this line of argument, on the one hand, the contingency of the social is highlighted, while, on the other, the political is posited “as the moment of partial and always, in the last instance, unsuccessful grounding” (Marchart, 2007: 2). In this sense, the ontological position of the project can be labelled as “realist constructionism or a constructionist realism; (...) accepting the priority of a real [the real of the political] which is, however, unrepresentable, but, nevertheless, can be encountered in the failure of every construction” (Stavrakakis, 1999: 86).

It is upon this ontological understanding that this research project builds its analysis of the post-democratization of urban politics. It understands post-democratization as a contingent historically and geographically specific effort towards the displacement of political antagonism and dissent. The next section delineates the project’s methodological approach that, based on the above ontological and epistemological premises, attempts to ground the theoretical analysis of post-democracy in the field of urban politics and Thessaloniki’s port restructuring in particular.

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3 Hence, the moment of the political can also be conceived as an encounter with the Lacanian real (Stavrakakis, 1999, Žižek, 1999b).
3.3 Research Methodology

The project focuses on the restructuring of Thessaloniki’s port over the past 20 years. Such a focus does not intend to build one more local case study. The case study of Thessaloniki’s port functions as a heuristic device for the theoretical analysis of the post-democratization of urban politics. Hence, the project adopts an approach wherein social phenomena are “theorized under the conditions imposed by the situation and the changes in the situation that one observes and tries to anticipate”, not to fall into empiricism, but precisely to offer nuanced theoretical insights (Balibar, 2004: viii for what he calls a "clinical method")\(^4\). The theoretical framework that has been delineated in chapter 2 can also be understood as the first step of the project’s research methodology. It is on the basis of this theoretical framework that the elements of the port’s restructuring that are relevant in the study of post-democratization were identified and the narrative structure of the project was decided. How can then the elements of the ternary mechanism of post-democratization by analyzed on the ground?

To begin with, research on post-democratization, most commonly performed under the notion of post-politics, pays particular attention to discourse and discursive practices. Indeed, the discursive practices that seek to efface the dimension of antagonism from urban politics and the public sphere are of significant importance (Chapter 2: 19-22). However, a clarification on discourse analysis is required here. The so-called cultural or linguistic turn in political economy and geography has established concerns over discourse, meaning, identity and representation at the epicentre of research (Barnett, 1998: 380, Valentine, 2001: 166-167). Yet, this project moves beyond a narrow understanding of discourses as merely argumentative or cognitive entities or processes. Discourses are understood as entities constitutive of social relations and objects (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 96). In political science Ernesto Laclau’s and Chantal Mouffe’s work in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* has laid the

\(^4\) Stavrakakis (1999) from his Lacian perspective calls such a methodology a “symptomatic reading”.

foundations for a discursive reading of politics that is attentive to the constitutive
status of the political (2001). This has been further developed in the work of
Salvoj Žižek (1989) and Yannis Stavrakakis (1997) among others. These
perspectives inform the discursive reading of Thessaloniki’s urban politics
attempted here. In this line of analysis “every object is constituted as an object of
discourse insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of
emergence” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 108). In this view, discourses trespass the
linguistic or argumentative sphere. Such a view of discourse contrasts to other
definitions that reduce discourse to meaning and words, to which they oppose
material objects, institutions and practice (Hajer, 1995). However, this is “not to
reduce everything to discourse (…) [but to argue] that we are always internal to a
world of signifying practices and objects” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 3).
Discourses are construed as “social and political construction[s] which establish
a system of relations between different objects and practices” (Howarth, 2000:
102).

Second, urban governing reorganization and the role of urban elites are
central in consolidating post-democratization (Chapter 2: 14-19). In order to
account for this the project charted the reconfigurations of the map of
governance-beyond-the-state (Swyngedouw, 2005) as these evolved in the case
of Thessaloniki’s port. Evidently, the port’s governance regimes extend beyond
the local scale, let alone Thessaloniki Port Authority as such. In this line of
research three instances were of particular importance for the project: 1) the
quasi-privatization of ThPA in 1999; 2) the reorganization of urban governance
towards public-private partnerships and quasi-governmental organizations during
the previous decade; and 3) the governance reorganization that came as a result
of the EU-IMF-ECB loan conditionality imposed on Greece in the aftermath of
the Greek crisis. It should be noted here that even after the quasi-privatization of
ThPA the Greek state remained the major shareholder in the company effectively
deciding upon the managerial personnel of the organization as well as drawing
the major policy lines. Hence, a large part of the analysis focuses on the
dynamics of state politics and their translation to local politics through privileged
elite actors. Finally, while global dynamics of economic reorganization and
policy mobility have been central throughout the restructuring of the port, their
role has been accentuated since the outbreak of the Greek crisis in 2010. This
also applies to the role of elite actors beyond Greece. Consequently, the project mapped and analyzed the network of elite actors that were directly or indirectly involved in the restructuring of the port over the past two decades. The interplay between these local and trans-local dynamics and actors constituted one of the key focal points of the research. The reconfiguration of governance structures and elite practices are to a certain extent understood as discursive practices in this project. They are both embedded in a world of signifying practices and attempt to hegemonize the meaning and the system of relations between elements. In parallel, however, they are embedded in politico-economic and geographical power choreographies. So, in order to account for them in their entirety insights are drawn from critical political economy and urban geography.

In this sense, third, the emphasis on discourse should not downplay the importance of economic flows in the (re)production of the port’s spaces and infrastructure. A similar concern is advanced by Bob Jessop in developing cultural political economy (2004, Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, Jessop and Sum, 2006). While Laclau’s and Mouffe’s approach to discourse moves beyond reducing everything to language, it is also true that in most cases discourse theory oriented analysis pays less attention to the financial flows and economic mechanisms involved in shaping politics. On the contrary, this research project pays particular attention on how economic mechanisms interact with spatial practices and discursive regimes in shaping urban politics. The financial flows involved in the variety of projects that unfolded in the spaces and infrastructure of the port and in particular the public and private shares in funding them are of significant importance. In parallel, in the aftermath of the Greek crisis any project that attempts to analyze urban politics should be attentive to the loan agreement between Greece and the EU-IMF-ECB troika. The subsequent flows of money and their management as well as loan conditionality imposed on the country – and in particular the privatizations programme – significantly reshape urban politics.

Finally, it is worth noting here that despite its expansive understanding of discourse, discourse theory as developed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) and through its multiple mobilizations in political theory remains far from adequately engaging with space and spatial practices. Even further, as Stavrakakis (2011) notes references to the political are commonly made in the form of temporal
terms as a moment or event (see Lefort 1988, Laclau, 1990). Space, on the other hand, is commonly understood as a container or as complete closure (Stavrakakis, 2011). Yet, “[i]s it conceivable that the exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched? Could space be nothing more than the passive locus of social relations, the milieu in which their takes on body, or the aggregate of the procedures employed in their removal?” (Lefebvre, 1991: 11). For Lefebvre “[t]he answer must be no” (1991: 11). It is in this sense that spatial practices and policies, or in other words the ordering of urban spaces is a central element in reading post-democratization (Chapter 2: 22-25). This ordering of space through the material restructuring of Thessaloniki’s port spaces as well as through institutional practices and discursive articulations constitutes a major source of information for the project.

This being said, one of the important insights of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s discourse theory is their emphasis on moments of disarticulation and re-articulation (2001, Howarth et al., 2000). The theoretical framework has already highlighted that the trajectory of post-democratization is punctuated by events that transform the coordinates around urban politics (Chapter 2: 12-13). In analyzing the restructuring of the port of Thessaloniki the project seeks to uncover these (dis-)continuities and events through the nodal point of the city’s port. Each of the analytical chapters of the thesis looks closer to one moment of dislocation and re-articulation of the politico-economic and discursive coordinates around the port. The project focuses on four such moments, namely: the restructuring of the public spaces of the port in preparation for the European Capital of Culture in 1997; the quasi-privatization of Thessaloniki Port Authority in 1999 and the multiplicity of public-private partnership projects that were planned but never materialized in its aftermath; the ultimately cancelled concession of the port’s container terminal in 2008; and the recent round of urban restructuring in the aftermath of the Greek crisis. While the narrative structure follows a chronological order, this is not to suggest that transformations of urban politics in Thessaloniki unfold linearly. The analytical emphasis is on the dislocations and re-articulations of urban politics as these unfold through the port in light of each of these events. In parallel, whilst all of the moments of the port’s restructuring discussed here evolve around the privatization of the spaces and infrastructure of the port; the discursive, political and economic coordinates
around the policies implemented and contested as well as the fusion with previous discursive and governing regimes are radically different. That is to say, that each of these moments constitutes a distinct transformation of the city’s urban politics and thus offers different insights on the dynamics of the ternary mechanism of post-democratization.

A series of sources such as interviews, policy reports, law acts, newspaper articles, audiovisual archives, political events (like the contestation of the concession of the port’s container terminal), and spatial practices and policies served as data for the analysis. The next section details the research methods that were followed in the collection of primary data as well as how these data were analyzed.

3.4 A Mixed-methods Approach

In order to serve the above research methodology, the project brings into dialogue: semi-structured interviews with elite actors that were involved in the restructuring of port; the analysis of relevant policy and planning documents; the analysis of local and national media reports on the topic; discussions with counter-hegemonic groups in the city of Thessaloniki; and the analysis of the politico-economic dynamics and power relations that unfolded throughout the restructuring of the port.

The fieldwork for the project was conducted between September 2010 and September 2011 in Thessaloniki and was divided in two stages. The first phase took place during September and October 2010 and consisted of five pilot key interviews and an introductory archival research including Thessaloniki’s Port Authority publications and urban planning documents by Thessaloniki’s Planning Organization. More specifically, the key interviewees were three academics working on economic geography, urban planning and urban sociology, an urban developer involved in European Capital of Culture projects and a member of ThPA Board. The purpose of this stage was threefold. First, it aimed to construct a broad understanding around Thessaloniki’s urban politics during the past twenty years, in order to situate the discussion around the restructuring of the port and to identify specificities that require particular
attention. Second, this first set of interviews along with the archival research helped to elaborate the project’s approach to elite interviews. On the one hand, it was mobilized to identify possible interviewees for the rest of the project and to establish links with them. On the other, it served as the basis upon which the interview guide and specific interview questions were prepared. Finally, the archival research during this phase aimed to identify data availability limitations as well as possible further sources of archival data.

Two major themes emerged as of particular importance in both the interviews and the first reading of the archival data and in particular Thessaloniki’s Port Authority master plan (Vanidis, 2008) and Thessaloniki’s strategic development plan (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005). On the one hand, throughout the official documents and the interviews Thessaloniki has been repeatedly described as facing a long period of crisis since the mid-90s. Lagging behind in infrastructure and the absence of a strategic vision for the city were recurring themes of the pilot interviews and the planning documents studied. Hence, one of the major questions that the subsequent interviews tried to address is the perceptions of different actors around this portrayed crisis of the city: the reasons behind it and the role of the port (as both public space and infrastructure site) in responding to it. Indeed, this crisis of Thessaloniki proved to be a central element in the construction of hegemonic discourses despite the great divergences and even conflictual opinions among the city’s elites. On the other hand, the outbreak of the financial crisis and the reorganization of governance and urban politics in its aftermath appeared as of significant importance in analyzing the post-democratization of urban politics. Although not directly involved in the first loan agreement with the EU-IMF-ECB troika the port of Thessaloniki was no exception.

The core of the fieldwork was conducted during November 2010 and September 2011. The project’s approach to each of the research methods that was mobilized, their added value in terms of data and the limitations and problems faced during their implementation are detailed below.

3.4.1 Semi-Structured Interviews
Elite interviews constitute an important source of information for this project. More specifically, throughout the fieldwork approximately 40 semi-structured in-depth elite interviews were undertaken in Thessaloniki. The interviewees were selected with regards to their involvement in the restructuring of the port over the past twenty years but were not in any sense limited to those directly engaged with the management of the port as such. In particular interviewees were: 1) local government – city council and prefecture – senior officials as well as local MPs, 2) senior management staff in ThPA, ThPO and the Organization for ECoC “Thessaloniki ’97”, 3) urban developers 4) academics and planners that either were involved in designing the city’s master plans or their research deals with urban politics, planning and economics, 5) members of the local business elite and in particular privileged clients of the port, and 7) members of the counter-hegemonic urban social movements (like The Underwater Pirates, and the Indignants movement) and the Port Workers Union.

Every interview was conducted mobilizing an interview guide that was crafted according to the positionality of each interviewee. Needless to say that, each of the actors interviewed was not involved in all of the four moments of the restructuring of the port that the project addresses. It is worth noting the major themes covered in the interviews concerning each of these moments. First, concerning the ECoC three were the major topics of discussion: the re-organization of urban governing that unfolded through the institutionalization of the quasi-governmental urban corporation “Thessaloniki ’97”, the discourses over multiculturalism that constituted the epicentre of the popular discussion in the city at the time and the revitalization of the port’s public spaces in preparation for the event. Second, concerning the quasi-privatization of ThPA in 1999 the interviews evolved around: the institutional re-organization that the reform introduced, the discourses that were mobilized to legitimize it, the politico-economic and discursive dynamics around the urban development projects that unfolded in its aftermath and planning and decision-making processes in the city. Third, the concession of the container terminal of the port to Hutchison-Alapis consortium and its conceptual legitimization was a major theme for the interviews in its own right. Fourth, the interviews that covered the ongoing restructuring of the port, in the aftermath of the crisis, sought to address: the inclusion of the privatization of the port in the loan conditionality imposed to
Greece, the second round of regeneration policies that unfolded in the port’s public spaces and the aesthetic ordering of the city and its relations with the staging of dissent.

The researcher sought to avoid approaching the interviews with a predefined and fixed set of questions in order to allow for more room for divergence during the interview and hence for useful information to be obtained (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). Allowing the interviewee to pursue her/his line of argument and construct the narrative of the interview in an – as much as possible – uninterrupted and free manner allowed reconstructing different narratives around the port. Of course, in doing so, the nature of elite interviews and especially the motives and goals of each specific interviewee were taken into account in each case (Ward and Jones, 1999). Actually, to reconstruct the narratives that substantiate such motives and goals was one of the main aims of the interviews. In other words, the purpose of the interviews was not to obtain an objective account of the politics around the port, but rather to gain access to hegemonic discourses around its restructuring. In parallel, the always important role of the temporality of the interviews (Ward and Jones, 1999) was further exacerbated in the midst of the ongoing Greek crisis. It was evident from the early days of the fieldwork that the tone of discourses around urban politics was dictated from mid 2009 onwards by the ongoing crisis. Crisis narratives were unavoidably central in almost all of the interviews. Even when the questions attempted to focus on previous policies around the port, crisis narratives impacted the discourse over urban politics and the port’s restructuring. “The crisis” became the answer to all the questions, able to account for any future policy around the port. More importantly, perceived failures or inadequacies in urban politics were retrospectively narrated through the hegemonic crisis discourses.

The first set (November 2010 - February 2011) consisted of twenty-two (22) interviews with: one (1) member of Thessaloniki’s Port Authority Board; one (1) member of the organization for the ECoC “Thessaloniki ’97” four (4) businessmen/women who are active in the restructured area of the Port or the wider waterfront of the city; four (4) academics whose interests evolve around urban space, politics and economy; three (3) civil servants in organizations closely linked to the Port’s restructuring and spatial planning (Thessaloniki’s
Planning Organization and Greek Parliament); two (2) local politicians members of the Greek Parliament and the regional council, respectively; two (2) members of the Port Workers Union; two (2) members of NGOs explicitly focusing on urban issues (poverty, exclusion, multiculturalism; and three group discussions with (3) counter-hegemonic groups that are active on issues around migration and urban/public space.

The second set (February – July 2011) consisted of 19 further interviews. Parallel to the aforementioned topics this second set of interviews attempted to further address developments that occurred during 2010 around the port. More specifically, the configuration of a strategic coalition between ThPA, the municipality of Thessaloniki and the local Chambers of Commerce and Business to promote the city as a tourist – mostly cruise – destination; the construction of a dock for yachts on the port’s public spaces; and the planned extension of the container terminal of the port (6th pier), were topics of interest. Interviewees in this phase included: the Deputy Mayors for Culture and Urban Development and Planning of Thessaloniki (2); one (1) member of the city council from the Radical Left; the directors of organization and marketing of ThPA (2); the General director and CEO of ThPA and the Advisor of the Board of Directors of ThPA (2); one local journalist who specializes in port issues; two (2) travel agents who are active in the city; three (3) shipping agents from Thessaloniki and two (2) from F.Y.R.O.M. which constitutes the port’s major client in the Balkans; two (2) academics whose interests evolve around urban space and architecture; the director of “Parallaxi” magazine focusing on urban culture and arts (1); and a group discussion with “The Other Thessaloniki” a Non-Governmental-Organisation which organized cultural events at the port’s public spaces. A list of the project’s interviewees as well as details on their role and the date of the interview are provided in the Appendix.

Finally, it should be noted here that, the obligation to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees together with the nature of urban politics in Thessaloniki poses certain limitations to the mobilization of interview quotes in this project. The elite actors involved in the restructuring of the port over the past two decades are a considerably small group of people. Including direct interview quotes with reference to the position of the interviewee would ultimately amount to not maintaining her/his anonymity. In the rare cases where consent was
obtained in doing so direct quotes are used. However, in most of the interviews this was not the case. Yet, this does not pose a significant problem for the research. As already mentioned above, elite interviews are not understood here as a source of objective information but as articulating a discourse. Evidently, local politico-economic elite members have repeatedly expressed their narratives over the restructuring of the port in local and national media. Having obtained significant insights over these narratives through the interviews, the project reconstructs them through media sources. This allows both a better portrayal of the role and the positionality of the actors that champion specific discourses and the preservation of anonymity agreed through the consent form. In parallel, when it comes to institutional reconfigurations and financial flows the fact that ThPA operates as a quasi-private organization makes the publication of relevant data to the press obligatory. In this sense, the interviews served, on the one hand, to direct the other methods of data collection in identifying the major events, flows and actors involved in the restructuring of the port and as a form of data triangulation on the other.

3.4.2 Policy documents and media reports

The analysis of both the official and public/popular discourses is of significant importance for the project. Official discourse refers here to texts that either constitute a legally binding agreement in the form of law acts and contracts or institutionalize the strategic orientation of organizations or governance bodies. The importance of such texts is twofold. On the one hand, they serve to analyze the institutional (re-)configurations around urban politics in Thessaloniki in general and the port in particular. On the other hand, they allow tracing the flows of money and power involved in the different projects that unfolded in the spaces and infrastructure of the port. This project mobilizes three major sources to reconstruct the official discourse.

First, urban policy documents published by the municipality of Thessaloniki, the Region of Central Macedonia, ThPO and the Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works. More specifically, the research sought to analyze among others: the master plans for Thessaloniki (ThPO, 1985, 2008),

Second, a series law acts as voted by the Greek Parliament and their accompanying recommendatory reports were analyzed for two reasons. The Greek government holds a decisive role in the governance of the port of Thessaloniki. Up to 1999 ThPA was a public company owned by the Greek state. Hence, the port’s managerial personnel and in particular its CEOs as well as the Authority’s strategic orientation was decided by the respective Minister of Mercantile Marine. Even after its quasi-privatization (through Law 2688/99) ThPA remains under the close control of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine. Hence, port policymaking as formulated through relevant law acts is decisive in the restructuring of the port. The same goes for the urban development projects that unfolded through the spaces and infrastructure of the port. In Greece, every large-scale urban development project is institutionalized in the form of a law act. Such law acts provide further useful information for the research project. In supporting the case for the law to be voted, recommendatory reports provide an invaluable source of information both for the financial flows involved in the respective projects but also for the construction of the dominant discourse. Hence, parliament minutes of the discussions of relevant law acts also constituted a source of information for the project. It should be noted here that since 2010 the successive memoranda signed between the Greek government and the EU-IMF-ECB troika and their institutionalization in the form of national laws constitutes a further source of information.

Third, official publications by ThPA constitute a further important source of information. In particular the project closely examined among others: the annual reports of ThPA SA, the two master plans designed by the organization over the past years (Impetus SA, 2005, Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2008), the call for the construction of a luxury yacht dock in the first pier of the port (ThPA, 2011a), the updated study for the extension of the container terminal of the port
(ThPA, 2010b) and the call for bids for the concession of the container terminal (ThPA, 2008c).

These official policy documents also construct to a certain extent the public discourse. However, in order to gain further insights on the legitimization of urban politics around the port, the project mobilized a series of further resources. To begin with, a series of publications by the Organization for the ECoC “Thessaloniki ’97” were analyzed. In doing so, the reading of the hegemonic construction of the cultural image of the city through the (re-)interpretation of its past was a central task for the project. Moreover, in early 2011 – and during the fieldwork for the project – a renewed interest in promoting Thessaloniki as a tourist destination became central in urban politics. Hence ThPA’s presentations around Thessaloniki as a cruise destination became central in urban politics. Hence ThPA’s presentations around Thessaloniki as a cruise destination in international events and exhibitions were studied. In parallel, a series of leaflets, brochures and media entries that sought to promote Thessaloniki as a historic, multicultural and youth city were published by Thessaloniki’s Municipality. Together with aiming to attract visitors and investors in the city these documents are also addressed to the local society attempting to construct a certain image for the city and thus came under close scrutiny. Finally, a series of leaflets, brochures and posters by local political formations and MPs elected in the city of Thessaloniki were consulted. Three were the main sources of these data: online publications, the interviews with local politicians and the researcher’s personal archive.

While these sources are important in reconstructing the public discourse the role of local and national media in this respect cannot be overstated. This is more so during the past fifteen years where the role of mass media in the dislocation and re-articulation of the political discourse has been pivotal (Sevastakis, 2004: 16). Hence, the published and online archives of mass media and especially, newspapers and magazines as well as TV and Radio news shows and documentaries hold a prominent role in the analysis of the construction of the public discourse performed here. It is important to note, however, that while newspaper articles provide information around the institutional and economic restructuring around the port this was not the main focus of the project. The aforementioned observations concerning the nature of elite interviews (Ward and Jones, 1999) apply in the case of the media discourse as well. The interplay between the Greek media, politico-economic elite actors and the state has been
widely discussed and documented in the country (Douzinas, 2010, Leandros, 2010, Papanathanassopoulos, 2001). Hence, the importance of the temporality of the publications and the motives and goals behind them are also relevant here. In this sense, the media discourse is not used as a source of ‘objective’ information but as a key element in the construction of the hegemonic public discourse. In order to limit the amount of information and facilitate archival research, a primary search was conducted in each archive with keywords relevant for the topic of each chapter. In parallel, the publications on certain dates that important events around the port unfolded were consulted directly.

In this spirit, the project mobilized the archives of the two major newspapers in Thessaloniki, «Μακεδονία» (Macedonia) and «Αγγελιοφόρος» (Agelioforos), since the early 1990s. Both archives are available in the Central Library of Thessaloniki, while for the years after 1997 both newspapers hold a detailed online archive. In parallel, the archives of the magazine “97” published by “Thessaloniki ’97” and of the urban culture magazine “Parallaxi” were analyzed to gain further insights in the construction of the cultural discourse in the city. Moreover, the magazine PortThess published since 2010 and constituting the megaphone of ThPA provided a valuable source concerning the hegemonic discourse around the port during the last years. Finally, the project also mobilized the online archives of the public television and radio since 1910 and in particular of the public local TV Channel ET3. In light of the celebration of a hundred years of Greek Thessaloniki, ET3 also produced two documentaries around the history of the port and its role in contemporary Thessaloniki. Both documentaries constituted a further important lens in the construction of the hegemonic discourse.

However, the restructuring of the port and Thessaloniki’s urban politics in general attracted the interest of national and international media over the past twenty years. Hence, the project is not limited in the coverage of the topic by local media (Ward, 2009). Thus, the online archives of the five major, in terms of sales, political newspapers in the country «Τα Νέα» (Ta Nea), «Το Βήμα» (To Vima), «Καθημερινή» (Kathimerini), «Ελευθεροτυπία» (Eleftherotipia) and «Εθνος» (Ethnos) came under scrutiny. Together with this, the archives of two national economic newspapers «Ημερίδια» (Imerisia) and «Κέρδος» (Kerdos) were also consulted. Finally, the online archives of Reuters and The Financial
Times provided a first glance on the international coverage of the reorganizations of urban politics.

3.4.3 Data analysis

The discursive reading of the data follows the path traced by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Žižek (1989) and Stavrakakis (1997). A similar perspective has been followed by Gunder and Hillier in their Lacanian approach to planning (2009) and Swyngedouw in the analysis of the politics of Nature (2010a). Laclau and Mouffe define as discursive element any difference (object of meaning) not yet articulated in a discourse, not yet inscribed into a symbolic structure (2001). For them, it is through articulation that a discourse symbolizes and makes sense of the outside and introduces an entity or event into its structure. Here, articulation amounts to any “practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 105). Once this ordering takes place, once an element has been articulated and appropriated into a discourse, it becomes a moment of the discourse of concern (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Hence, the notion of the nodal point (“point de capiton” in Lacan’s terms) is introduced “to account for the structuration of elements into a meaningful system of moments” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 8). Slavoj Žižek, for example, delineates how the meaning of a number of pre-existing elements (like democracy, state, freedom and so) is re-signified through their articulation around the nodal point of communism in communist ideology (1989).

In this sense, discourses are deeply contingent and historical. They are (re-)articulated within certain configurations and are always open to contestation by those excluded in their construction and by the effects of events beyond them (Laclau, 1990: 31-36). Hence, the articulation of discourses is an intrinsically political process as it entails “an act of radical institution, which involves the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 4). Thus, every hegemonic project will always seek to “construct and stabilize the nodal points that form the basis of concrete social orders by articulating as many available elements – floating signifiers – as
possible” (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 15, Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 112). However, no discourse can fully hegemonize the social field and eliminate dislocation and antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). The question then becomes how the discursive horizon is constructed through the stabilization of nodal points and the articulation of elements (Laclau, 2005).

With regards to post-democratization and urban politics, the issue at stake is the political horizon that is constructed and articulated by existing (especially dominant) discourses and how this forecloses political antagonism in order to legitimize consensual politics (Bettini and Karaliotas, 2013). It is through this perspective that the project attempts the discursive reading of Thessaloniki’s urban politics through the case of the city’s port restructuring. It is worth noting again that the institutional and material construction of the port’s spaces and infrastructure is also treated in this project as an object of meaning. The main tasks of this reading, thus, are to unearth how different objects of meaning (elements) are articulated within hegemonic discourses and how the political horizon is constructed through fixing their meaning. This requires an analysis of the hegemonic articulation of nodal points like the “multicultural city”, the “European city”, the “attractive city”, “modernization”, the “Metropolis of the Balkans”, the “port of the Balkans”, the “port of civilizations”, “competitiveness” and “efficiency”. The focus of this reading is the shifting meanings of such nodal points in different political circumstances and the elements that are foreclosed from the discursive horizon through their articulation.

3.4.4 Data organization and translation issues

All of the interview transcripts together with the rest of the textual data that were collected were stored using Nvivo8 software to enhance data organization and retrieving. The data were organized in thematic categories and notes were made in each textual piece with reference to the major elements of its discourse. However, the project avoided the use of further tools of the software like the text search or the tree organization of data for two reasons. In pragmatic terms this would require the translation of all the data in English, a task that
would be time consuming and of little if any added value. In other words, it
would have moved the focus on tasks that are marginal or even irrelevant to the
project (MacMillan, 2005). More importantly, however, the use of such features
would have imposed the software’s structure on the research project (MacMillan,
2005). For translated texts this would also entail the loss of significant
information in the form of inter-textual references.

The bulk of the empirical material mobilized in this project – as well as
some of the theoretical work cited – is in Greek and all of the translations were
made by the author. Two points concerning their translation are worth noting
here. The first issue concerns direct quotations. While the text tried to follow a
word by word translation this was not always possible for reasons of clarity and
comprehensiveness. In such cases, the initial quotes were paraphrased remaining
as faithful to the original text as possible. Still such quotes are indicated as direct
quotations. The second issue has to do with the inter-textual references of the
quotes. Concerning particularly political speeches and interviews, the
connotations and the political charge of the words mobilized in the original text
are difficult to transfer in the English translation. In such cases, I have attempted
to provide the background upon which the statements are made and the terms are
mobilized. When necessary, further details are offered in the form of footnotes.

3.5 Concluding Remarks

To summarize, in order to analyze the consolidation of post-
democratization the research project reconstructed the restructuring of the port of
Thessaloniki in terms of its economic, political and cultural dimensions. In
parallel, identifying the actors that were involved in each moment of
restructuring and analyzing the shifting positions and the interdependences
amongst them were essential for the project. The project moves beyond an
exclusive focus on linguistic practices to bring discursive practices into dialogue
with the analysis of the politico-economic dynamics of urban governing
reorganization and the ordering of urban space. Here, it is worth pointing towards
some of the limitations of the research and the way these were addressed.
As chapter 2 has already highlighted, while post-democratization is a deeply historical and contingent process it is not an exclusively local phenomenon. Rather, what is important is the interplay between global and local dynamics and mechanisms. A more comprehensive understanding of such extra-local dynamics would entail further engagement with wider networks and agents of policymaking or in other words with “the multiple overlapping spaces of policymaking” (Cochrane and Ward, 2012: 5), the formulation of mobile policies as well as the agency of actors beyond the local and the national scale (see for example Larner and Laurie, 2010). Yet, the limitations posed by access to interviewees (and in particular EU-IMF-ECB technocrats and Hutchison Ltd senior management staff) and the time horizon of the project did not allow to further pursue this line of inquiry. The analysis of the role of elite actors beyond Greece in formulating the policies around the port is limited to the reading of the politico-economic dynamics of their involvement and of institutional agreements like the memoranda signed between Greece and the EU-IMF-ECB troika. In parallel, their role in the articulation of the discourse around the port is addressed through a limited number of media interviews. While undeniably this lack forecloses a deeper understanding of policy formulation around the port, this was not the primary aim of the project. The methodological challenge posed by the project was not to construct a framework that would fully account for all the dimensions of the restructuring of the port over the past twenty years. Rather, it was to mobilize the multiple dimensions of the restructuring of the port with an eye towards its major research question: How and to what extend is post-democratization constructed and consolidated through urban restructuring? Hence, the project focused on how global dynamics are expressed and crystallized in the case of Thessaloniki’s port and how mobile policies become embedded in the city’s urban politics. This in turn can inform geographical analysis on what might be called the local politics of policy mobility (Temenos and McCann, 2012).

Moreover, as it has been hinted in this chapter, the outbreak of the Greek crisis constituted a dual challenge for the research. On the one hand, in the aftermath of the crisis the pace of events around the port has been largely accelerated and the depth of the transformations of urban politics has been significantly increased (Kouvelakis, 2010). In parallel, the political landscape
became far more unstable with policy decisions and institutional arrangements changing multiple times over a short period. This uncertainty led to a series of shifts concerning data gathering and analysis during the fieldwork of the project. On the other hand, this unfolding of events significantly limited access to key local and national political elites due to the intensification of political bargaining processes. The same goes, to a lesser extent, for local economic elites that had to deal with the repercussions of the crisis. This problem was deepened by two further local events. More specifically, former Mayor of Thessaloniki Vasilis Papageorgopoulos was during this period prosecuted for the embezzlement of city funds together with other city council members. In parallel, then prefecture leader Panayiotis Psomiadis was convicted for the violation of free competition legislation. These events rendered access to these actors impossible and limited the willingness of interviewees to freely discuss urban politics in the city. However, the information obtained through the rest of the interviews as well as the published interviews of local politicians that were not interviewed covered this gap.
4.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters highlighted that post-democratization is not a homogeneous process. The particularities of the post-democratization of Thessaloniki’s urban politics and the main actors championing it emerge through its collision and fusion with previous institutional configurations and urban practices. Hence, before moving into the analysis of Thessaloniki’s urban politics over the past twenty years, it is important to offer a brief account of the city’s historical and geographical trajectory.

Founded, by Cassander in 316 BC and situated at the south-eastern end of Europe, Thessaloniki has two thousand years of continuous urban life. Built as an amphitheatre between the coasts of Thermaikos Gulf and the slopes of mountain Chortiatis, the city quickly attracted inhabitants and became the centre of Macedonian commerce. Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman and Greek since 1912 Thessaloniki’s landscape bears the marks of years of development and flourish as well as years of catastrophe and decline. Geo-political and socio-economic forces constantly (re-)configure its space. Standing on the verge between the ‘Orient’ and the ‘West’ Thessaloniki flourished and developed as an economic and cultural centre even during the decline of the Byzantine Empire – between the 13th and 15th century. Being a multi-ethnic and multi-religious centre where different cultures, beliefs and social identities co-existed – on the grounds of the hierarchy and rules imposed by the Ottoman administration –, Thessaloniki stood on an analogous verge during the 19th century as the western gate of the Ottoman Empire and one of the epicentres of the renewed European influences in the region (Svoronos, 1996). Since its incorporation in the Greek state in 1912 the city underwent a process of hellenization which significantly reconfigured its politico-economic and cultural elites and transformed the urban landscape. During the city’s turbulent history, its port situated at the southwest end of the historic nucleus never lost its direct linkages with the urban fabric. The historical-geographical relation between the port and the city remains
impressively stable throughout the long history of Thessaloniki (Hastaoglou, 1997).

Thessaloniki’s multi-ethnic history, its politico-economic trajectory and its cultural diversity have attracted scholarly interest over the years (see among others Agelopoulos, 2000, Mazower, 2006, Moskof, 1978). The planning history of the city and the restructuring of its urban landscape since its incorporation in the Greek state have also come under close scrutiny (see among others Hastaoglou, 2008, Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2004, 2008, Yerolympos, 1996). The restructuring of the city’s port throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Hastaoglou, 1997) and its links with the political economy of the city (Downes, 2008, Hekimoglou, 2008, Karadimos-Yerolympo and Hekimoglou, 2002) have been central parameters in the analysis of these processes.

Offering an exhaustive account of Thessaloniki’s history and the many restructurings of its port, moves beyond the scope of this chapter. On the contrary, its aim is to engage in the analysis of the reconfigurations of the city’s elites as they are manifested in and through the production of urban space and the restructuring of the port since the late 19th century. In so doing, the structure of the chapter is as follows. First, it focuses on the period between the years 1870 and 1912. This period was initiated by a series of major reforms by the Ottoman Empire that deeply influenced the city and ended with Thessaloniki’s incorporation into the Greek state. Here, the emergence of a cosmopolitan bourgeois class and its increasing importance against the prevailing rule of religious elites is of particular importance. Second, it covers the interwar and World War II years, to analyze the radical process of hellenization that the city underwent. This process covered every element of the city’s activity and everyday experience, covering from reconstructions of the urban elites through cultural activities to urban planning. Concerning this latter element the restructuring of Thessaloniki in the aftermath of the 1917 fire, that destroyed more than half of the city-centre, is of particular importance. These two sections on the early history of Thessaloniki draw extensively form the groundbreaking work of Mark Mazower on the history of the city – in Salónica, City of Ghosts (2006) – and Aleka Yerolympos on the city’s urban planning history – mainly in Urban Transformations in the Balkans (1820 – 1920) (1996). Third, it addresses the trajectory of Thessaloniki since the end of the civil war of 1946-1949. The
section focuses on the rapid urbanization that the city experienced during the period and the subsequent further reconfiguration of the city’s politico-economic elite. Urban land and housing are among the prominent terrains through which this re-organization unfolded. In parallel, the section analyzes the city’s productive and administrative structure in dialogue with national and international shifts, in order to highlight the close interplay of political and economic elites in the city. A concluding section summarizes the insights of the chapter.

4.2. *Fin de siècle Thessaloniki: Ottoman Reforms, Economic Development and Urban Modernization*

Up until the 1870s Thessaloniki was a traditional provincial Balkan city of the Ottoman Empire cut off from the sea by its encircling Medieval Walls (see Todorov, 1983). The limited maritime commerce needs of the time were served through a small wooden pier flanked by a few shops, warehouses and laboratories, built on the space of the Byzantine port that has been embanked since the 15th century (Hekimoglou, 2008, Figure 1). However, during the last quarter of the 19th century the city experienced profound transformations. Since the 1830s Thessaloniki’s population was increasing steadily “from around 30,000 in 1830 to 54,000 in 1878, 98,000 in 1890 and 157,900 by April 1913” (Mazower, 2006: 208). In parallel, its commercial and trading activities flourished (Mazower, 2006: 228). As a result, an emerging Greek and Jewish bourgeoisie challenged the rule of their religious leaders. The urban landscape was transformed accordingly. A large part of the city’s Ottoman walls was demolished and the first artificial harbour of the city was constructed (Hastaoglou, 1997). New factories, boulevards, retail stores and villas in the suburbs amounted to a new image of the city. At the same time, the city acquired municipal government for the first time in its history. Mazower writes: “it is perhaps only now that the city acquired a consciousness of itself. Under the leadership of its bourgeoisie, Ottoman Salonica embraced Europe” (2006: 224). This section engages with this period focusing on three elements: elite
reconfigurations, the transformation of the urban landscape and the construction of the city’s first artificial port.

Figure 1 «Plan De Salonique» (Thessaloniki’s urban plan) by Antonie Werniesky, 1880-82
(Source: Digital archive e-Ecataeus ΕΚΕΠΠΕ-ΚΕΧΧΑΚ-ΕΘΝΙΚΗΣ ΧΑΡΤΟΘΗΚΗΣ: E4671 and E4672)

Transformations in maritime transports hold a prominent role in this respect. The impacts of the technological innovations that the Industrial Revolution brought forward were multi-faceted: new transportation and commerce horizons were easy to reach after the introduction of steamships in 1830s, maritime transports became industrialized, the city’s hinterland was extended, travel times were radically reduced and communications became easier than ever (Downes, 2008, Driessen, 2005). Moreover, the construction of the Suez Canal radically reconfigured the Mediterranean socio-economic and
political landscape, rendering maritime transports and trade at the epicentre of Thessaloniki’s development and life (Svoronos, 1996). In the years between 1870 and 1912 the city’s imports almost quadrupled (Mazower, 2006: 228).

Yet, the city’s land transportations were lagging behind (Hastaoglou, 2008, Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008). Thessaloniki’s geographical and strategic position, connected with a Balkan hinterland of two million inhabitants, situated the creation of transit-trade infrastructure at the epicentre of its economic growth (Downes, 2008, Driessen, 2005). The city’s isolation by land was lifted through the construction of railway networks. The tremendous increase in maritime trade in the Levant went hand in hand with European economic infiltration, triggering various processes of modernization (Vasiliadis et al., 1997). Thus, ports and railways were developed concurrently, creating a new arena wherein French, German and English interests collided. During the mid-nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire’s transportation infrastructure became a prominent arena of investment for European capital and expertise: “in just over twenty years, therefore, foreign speculators and engineers equipped European Turkey with more then seven hundred miles of track” (Mazower, 2006: 229). In 1871 a railway line linking Thessaloniki and Pristina was constructed and within a decade the line was linked with the Serbian network and central Europe (Mazower, 2006). In the years that followed further links with Monastir and Istanbul were established. These links opened Thessaloniki to Europe and attracted foreign correspondents, visitors and investors.

At the same time, urban governance was reorganized. Thessaloniki acquired a municipal council in 1869, one year after Istanbul. During the previous years, city authority was held by the pashas and kadis who also exercised religious responsibilities. During these days, scarce municipal revenues rendered investment in local infrastructure impossible. However, with the institutionalization of the Muslim-led local government, regulating the urban fabric and constructing urban infrastructure began to gradually be considered as the responsibility of the state. Sabri Pasha was the first governor of Thessaloniki. Having successfully completed the modernization of the port of Izmir he embarked on a similar project in Thessaloniki. His plan foresaw the demolition of the Ottoman walls encircling the city to expand the spaces available for commercial activities and the port (Mazower, 2006: 239). Further
expansion of the port was to be achieved through the use of the rubble of the walls as a landfill. As a result, one mile of the city’s seaside Medieval Walls were demolished and the stones were used as a landfill of 37.5 metres across the city’s waterfront (Yerolympos, 1996). Quays were constructed over a linear pier stretching from the White Tower to the fortress of Vardaris. While the entire pier served ship traffic, its prominent commercial part was situated on the western scaffolding – near today’s first pier of the port – equipped with a customhouse and some warehouses (Downes, 2008, Hekimoglou, 2008).

Yet, the apparent inadequacies of these facilities, which were still based on lighters for unloading and disembarkation, led to the decision to construct the city’s first artificial port in 1888 (Hastaoglou, 1997). The new port’s location had “already been ‘prepared’, from both a historical and functional point of view” (Hastaoglou, 1997: 172). It was situated at the heart of the city’s markets, the French business quarter («Φραγκομαχαλάς») and the burgeoning industrial quarter immediately at the west of the city (Figure 2). As Hastaoglou notes, such topological interconnections were typical of the ports of Levantine cities (1997). Still, the completion of the construction of the port was delayed by financial difficulties. As Downes documents – through a study of the local newspapers of the period – the construction of the port, that was repeatedly described as a decisive step towards Europeanization, was delayed for over two decades due to the efforts by local and foreign elites to acquire economic and political advantages in the flourishing trade economy of the city (2008: 93-94, 130-137). Port expansion schemes were moved from one capitalist investment group to another (Mazower, 2006: 240).

In 1896, the former MP and public work contractor Edmond Bartissol – from Paris – and the Minister of the Civil List signed the contract for the construction of the port (Hastaoglou, 1997: 172). Bartissol, then, founded the Société anonyme ottomane de construction du port de Salonique which was granted permission to operate the port for five years (Hastaoglou, 1997: 172). The estimated cost for the project was 6.5 million francs. The contract had to cover up to 5 millions of the cost whereas the rest of it was to be covered by the Civil List. Following Marseille’s port plan, the project involved: “the construction of a docking area 800m long by 130m wide by reclaiming land from the sea in front of the old quay; two 200m long moles and a breakwater of 560m”
The agreement also included the construction of a railway station and 3,000m of railway lines in the port; provision of water, gas and sewage infrastructure and so on (Hastaoglou, 1997: 173). From the 100,000m² of reclaimed land, 15,000m² were the property of the company intended for the development of commercial activities, whereas the rest of it belonged to the Civil List (Hastaoglou, 1997, Hekimoglou, 2008). In 1904, when the expansion works were completed, a renewed agreement gave to the company, renamed as Société d’exploitation, the right to exploit the port for another 40 years (Downes, 2008, Hastaoglou, 1997). The management of the port and the profits from its operations were divided between the company and the public Port Fund (Hekimoglou, 2008: 27).

A series of connected activities such as the offices of shipping companies (like Messageries Maritimes, Lloyds and others), private warehouses of major commercial houses (like Modiano, Allatini and so on), vibrant banks of the city, the postal services, shops large and small, hotels and cafés, clustered in the surrounding area (Figure 2). The dense and rational plan and the buildings with their imposing concrete bodies constructed a landscape distinct from the
traditional urban fabric; a unique urban landscape that highlighted the economic development and strength of the city.

The opening up of the Ottoman Empire to European capital and engineers, on the one hand, created a climate of speculative frenzy and on the other fuelled prospects of development for Thessaloniki (Mazower, 2006: 230). During the 1880s and 1890s the British and French consuls in Thessaloniki foreasted that the city would become the leading commercial centre in the Levant (Mazower, 2006: 230-231). Eventually, Thessaloniki remained of secondary importance compared to Izmir and Alexandria. Yet, the prospects of the time depicted the confidence in the dynamism of the city’s emerging cosmopolitan bourgeoisie which became the city’s “motor of municipal change, cultural revolution and economic growth” (Mazower, 2006: 231). By 1870s a rich and active cosmopolitan elite made its presence felt in the city of Thessaloniki (Downes, 2008, Mazower, 2006). The Cercle de Salonique was founded in 1873 to provide “a luxurious meeting-place for the city’s new cross-confessional upper class, and for important foreign visitors to the city” (Mazower, 2006: 231-232). In 1887 the club brought together 159 members including Jews, Greeks, Germans, Italians, Turks and others. European elite actors settled in the French quarter («Φραγκομαχαλάς») near the port of the city, reaching and their numbers amounted to nearly ten thousands by the end of the 19th century (Mazower, 2006). The role of the Jewish and Greek industrial and commercial elites was even more prominent. In the words of Mazower: “these were the city’s new masters – professional men, army officers, diplomats, bankers, land-owners and traders – and they insisted (…) that political or other passions [were] not to be allowed to disrupt [their] fundamental spirit of social harmony and comradeship” (2006: 232).

The dynamism of the city’s new elite as well as its multi-ethnic character can also be observed through the city’s professional associations. During the period, Thessaloniki’s Chamber of Commerce was pushing towards the institutionalization of a Commodities Exchange in Thessaloniki. The Exchange was ultimately institutionalized in 1907 and was open to shipping agents, bankers, insurance brokers and land and commodity brokers (Hekimoglou, 2008: 29). The Chamber of Commerce was granted the authority to organize the Exchange (Hekimoglou, 2008). In parallel, Thessaloniki’s Navy Chamber
(Chambre Maritime des Compagnies de Navigation Étrangères) was founded in 1908 (Hekimoglou, 2008: 32). The Chamber brought together 19 foreign (i.e. non-Ottoman) companies active in Thessaloniki. Together they handled 90% of the port’s traffic and their agents in the city were mainly Jewish and Greeks (Hekimoglou, 2008: 32-35).

The role of the bourgeoisie was not limited to commercial and industrial activity. Their role was equally important in the transformation of the urban landscape and the city’s cultural values. Despite delays and inadequacies in the completion of large public works, on a smaller scale the city’s prosperous bourgeoisie and the municipality formed a coalition that actively embarked in the restructuring of the urban landscape (Mazower, 2006: 238-239). Sabri Pasha’s plan for the reconstruction of Thessaloniki foresaw that the created land on the waterfront was to be sold to land developers in order to finance further improvements, the construction of new public buildings, a new tramway as well as the waterfront avenue (Mazower, 2006: 239). While the scheme was approved by the higher Ottoman administration in Istanbul it had to be self-financed. Hence, the success of the whole scheme relied on the participation of the city’s new elite. A series of individual entrepreneurs, state organizations and European investors participated in the scheme. The major area of investment was the city’s waterfront. With the port lying on its western end and the White Tower on the east, the waterfront avenue was promoted as “Salonica’s new face to the world” (Mazower, 2006: 240). Hotels, modern houses and warehouses constructed the image of the avenue. In parallel, Rue Sabri Pasha, the main shopping street of the city, which led from the governor’s konak to the quay, “marked the boundary between two worlds” (Mazower, 2006: 240). On the one side, street vending activities were performed by the multi-ethnic merchant class of the city. On the other, the landmarks of the new capitalist world were erected: the headquarters of Banque de Salonique, the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the Passage Lombardo (Mazower, 2006: 241).

In the years that followed, under the leadership of Galib Pasha, the restructuring of the city was furthered: more boulevards were widened, the quay and the market were paved with stone and a new governor’s konak was built. More importantly, however, infrastructure works were carried out. European (mainly Belgian) investors modernized the water supply network and introduced
gas lighting in the city centre. In 1894 horse drawn trams were introduced as an urban transportation means by Belgian investors. The tramline linked the railway station with the parks, hotels and cafes of the White Tower, constituting a distinctive characteristic of Thessaloniki’s urban life (Mazower, 2006, Yerolympos, 1996). These new transport links together with the new larger boulevards as well as the government buildings and the bastions of economic success defined the new city. They also “pointed to the new coalition of forces – the autocratic central Hamidian state and the wealthy local capitalist class – which ran its affairs” (Mazower, 2006: 242).

The new bourgeoisie’s major battle was against the previously dominant religious elites within their communities. For Mazower, this was the outcome of the contradictory results of the Ottoman reforms (2006: 232). On the one hand, the Gulhané decree of 1839, that attempted to promote religious equality among the Empire’s populations, resulted in the support of the Ottoman State to the Metropolitan and the Chief Rabbi, the respective leaders of the Greek and the Jewish community. On the other, the consolidation of private property rights, the opening up of the Empire’s economy to competition and the city’s growth during the period, increased the power of commercial and business elites (Mazower, 2006). The clash between the conservative religious elites and the new bourgeoisie was fought on multiple grounds: from education to everyday lifestyle. Whereas the religious elites attempted to maintain their power by defending the traditional lifestyle of the communities, the bourgeoisie was gradually becoming accustomed to and promoting European education, fashion and lifestyle (Mazower, 2006: 233-238). Similar experiences were also gradually expanding to the Muslim population of the city.

The role of the local press was significant in this respect. Municipal affairs figured as the prominent focus of the recently established local newspapers and the “Europeanization of space” (Mazower, 2006: 238) was greeted with enthusiasm (Downes, 2008, Mazower, 2006). Ottoman, Greek and Jewish newspapers alike celebrated the consolidation “of a physiognomy of a grand European city” in Thessaloniki (Mazower, 2006: 240). This image was associated with widening boulevards and the cleanliness of the city, with the provision of piped water and gas lighting to houses (Mazower, 2006). Popular cultural activities in the city were discredited in favour of opera performances,
tennis matches and cycling events. The city’s waterfront was a central node in this narrative. As Downes writes: “the *Journal de Salonique* continually focused upon the quay as the most elite, modern, and sophisticated of the city’s spaces. This was emphasized through a constant focus on the elite activities, soirees and clubs that took place in new institutions clustered on or around the waterfront” (2008: 131).

During these years of growth, an influx of diverse populations swarmed in the city, which reached a population of 135,000 inhabitants in 1905 (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008). For the first time in the recent history of Thessaloniki, the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods outside the city walls were differentiated on the basis of economic and social criteria and not on the formerly dominant ethno-religious stratification (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008). The introduction of the tramline allowed many of Thessaloniki’s wealthiest members to build their villas at the eastern side of the waterfront (Figure 3). A lengthy seaside suburb, clearly following European standards, attracted the middle and high income classes irrespective of their religious beliefs (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008, Mazower, 2006).

![Figure 3 Villa Allatini in Eastern Thessaloniki](source: Sotirios Dimitriadis personal archive)
Yet, the majority of the city’s population (70%) lived under, at best, problematic conditions in the historic nucleus (Dimitriadis, 1983). The industrialized west end of the city stood in stark contrast with the eastern suburb. There, the concentration of major transportation infrastructures and industrial activities led to the clustering of immigrant ghettos and slums. Densely populated by workers from all ethnic and religious communities, these neighbourhoods faced increasingly deteriorating living conditions (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008).

These deep socio-economic contradictions fuelled social forces that voiced political claims. The accumulation of capital by the bourgeoisie co-existed with overwhelming poverty for the city’s labouring classes. The hamals and dock-workers of the port had minimum incomes; the cotton mills workers were mainly girls with no labour rights and recognized scale of wages; and children were drawn to work at an early age (Mazower, 2006: 286). At the same time, by 1910 women of all ages and religious groups were working in the city’s “more than hundred brothels in a separate quarter near the railways” (Mazower, 2006: 286). The grievances and anger of these conditions constituted the backdrop for political mobilization. While a variety of organizations were created during the time, one example is worth mentioning further to highlight the multi-ethnic composition of the working population of the city. In 1909, the Jew Avraam Benaroya formulated the Workers Solidarity Federation. Its orientation was clearly internationalist and attracted members from all the ethno-religious groups of the city (Moskof, 1978: 140-146). Anchored in the Jewish working population, which constituted the majority in the city, Federation organized massive demonstrations that attracted six to ten thousand participants (Mazower, 2006: 289). Yet, the workers’ movement was overtaken by the nationalist clashes that unfolded during the early 20th century in the Balkans.
4.3. The Hellenization of Thessaloniki: Thessaloniki as a Greek Border City (1912 – 1944)

4.3.1 The first decade of Greek Thessaloniki and the fire of 1917

At the beginning of the 20th century, Thessaloniki’s space was deeply engraved in the nationalist antagonisms of the period. Being the birthplace of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Thessaloniki was the place where the Neo Turks movement publicly appeared demanding the re-constitution of the 1876 constitution of the Empire. The city’s first public square, near the port, was named Freedom Square to commemorate the celebrations for the proclamation of the new constitutional polity on the 23rd of July 1908 (Megas, 2003: 99). At the same time, as the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating and the new Balkan States were being formulated, Thessaloniki’s geographical and commercial importance attracted belligerent neighboring states which sought to possess it during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. The Greek Consulate in the city was the centre of the Macedonian Struggle and the Greek claims in Macedonia (Megas, 2003)5. Bulgarian nationalists also raised claims over the city. By the end of the Balkan wars of 1912 the Ottoman Empire’s European provinces were lost to Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. The geo-political map of the region was fundamentally altered. On the 26th of October 1912 the Greek army entered the city of Thessaloniki. Thessaloniki became a border city of the Greek State. One of the first tasks that the Greeks engaged with was the 1913 census. The survey was never published and soon got outdated by the population shifts that followed. However, it provides a snapshot of the city’s ethnic composition at the time. In a total population of 157,889 citizens almost 40,000 were listed as Greeks, 45,867 as Ottomans and 61,439 as Jews (Mazower, 2006: 303)6.

The ethnic heterogeneity of the city was a cause of anxiety for the Greek State. Constantine Raktivan was appointed as the governor of Greek Macedonia

5 During the years before the Balkan Wars almost all of the neighbouring Balkan states raised claims over the Ottoman Empire’s territories in Macedonia. Greece, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria were the most active in this struggle. In the nationalist propagandas of the period such claims evolved around the ethnic and religious predominance in the region. The Macedonian Struggle refers to the efforts by the newly formed Greek State to liberate what was narrated as the territories of the Greek Macedonia.

6 The city’s Christian populations were accounted for in the census as Greeks irrespective of their ethnic origins (Mazower, 2006).
and engaged on the task of incorporating Thessaloniki into the Greek state. Raktivan was the minister of Justice in Eleftherios Venizelos’ government, a highly energetic and reformist administration in Greek history (Mazower, 2006: 301). Although Raktivan’s major plans evolved around modernizing infrastructure and administration, this task would take long to be completed. However, some elements of the Ottoman past were easy to target. The fez was to be removed, employees who refused Greek citizenship were fired from public administration posts and Greek became the language of administration (Mazower, 2006: 301-302). At the same time, “Greek policemen, gendarmes, judges and lawyers” were arriving in Thessaloniki to formulate the first Greek ruling class (Mazower, 2006: 302). They came mainly from Peloponnese and Crete. Almost 80 years later Elias Petropoulos noted that “in practice Thessaloniki has been ruled for decades by the Pan-Cretan Brotherhood and the Union of Peloponnesians” (1995: 128-129). In parallel, street names were changed to link the city’s landscape with the history of Hellenism and shops and public spaces were painted blue and white to highlight the Hellenic character of the city (Mazower, 2006: 302-303). Yet, the hellenization of Thessaloniki required further and deeper transformations.

Hence, during the first decade since its incorporation to the Greek State, Thessaloniki maintained to a large extent its multi-ethnic character and heterogeneity. The active involvement of the Jewish community in major reforms and the election of a Muslim Mayor until 1916, together with the overall multi-ethnic composition of the city council (Molho, 2001), were accompanied by the flourishing of multi-lingual newspapers and magazines that constructed the complex mosaic of Thessaloniki’s cultural life (Karadimos-Yerolympos and Hekimoglou, 2002: 167-182). The pace of transformations was significantly accelerated in 1917.

On August 18th 1917 a fire broke out in Thessaloniki. Strengthened by the strong winds that were blowing in the city, fuelled by the wooden constructions, which were still dominant, and facilitated by the dense concentration of buildings in the old city; the fire destroyed almost three quarters of the old city within three days (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008, Mazower, 2006, Figure 4). Yet, for

7 The fez is a flat-topped conical red hat with a black tassel on top worn by men in some Muslim countries. For a long period the fez was the Ottoman (and later Turkish) national headdress.
Venizelos the fire came “almost as a gift of divine providence” (Mazower, 2006: 324). It was perceived as an opportunity to facilitate, previously failed, attempts to introduce “badly-needed aesthetic and hygienic improvements” in Thessaloniki (Mazower, 2006: 234).

The fire, undeniably, accelerated the transformation of the city (Yerolympos, 1996). On the one hand, the extent of the devastation forced a break with Thessaloniki’s historic growth and evolution. On the other, Prime Minister Venizelos and his Liberal government were committed to mobilize the phenomenon to deepen the hellenization of the urban landscape. The reconstruction of Thessaloniki was assigned to an expert committee of Greeks, French and British. Thomas Mawson, the British landscape architect, was initially appointed as the chairman of the committee but soon retired to be
replaced by the French architect Ernest Hébrard who designed the final plan (Yerolympos, 1993). “Introducing modern planning schemes, abolishing the previous land ownership regime and land uses”, the Greek state mobilized the reconstruction of the city to alter its socio-economic and spatial coordinates and consolidate its power (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008: 118). As Thomas Mawson described: “[i]n Thessaloniki, we interpreted the ideals of Mr Venizelos, who conceived of a restored city which would, at the same time, be the port, commercial and manufacturing centre of Macedonia and the regions beyond as well as their intellectual and social centre” (Mawson, 1923: 37 quoted in Yerolympos, 1993). The Ottoman Thessaloniki that the Greek state inherited was treated as “unworthy of the progressive and modern nation” that Venizelos and the liberals wanted to build (Mazower, 2006: 324).

The Hébrard plan constituted a radical intervention in the city’s landscape imposing entirely new spatial patterns on the urban fabric. The plan introduced a functionalist understanding of urban space. At the core of its interventions lied the creation of an administrative and business quarter in the city centre, the expansion and modernization of the city’s port, the construction of a modern hierarchical transportation network, the widening and straightening of the streets, the creation of rectangular plots (Hastaoglou, 1997, Mazower, 2006, Yerolympos, 1993).

Not surprisingly, the plan placed significant importance on the functionality of the port and its incorporation in the urban fabric, despite the fact that both the port and the adjacent wholesale market remained intact by the fire (Vasiliadis et al., 1997). The new plan for the port was designed by Aggelos Ginis. Ginis preserved the existing port and proposed its further expansion westwards in order to construct four new piers. The plan networked the allocation of a series of interconnected urban functions such as the business and industrial zone, the wholesale district, the new workers’ housing quarter and the railway infrastructure, using the port as their nodal connecting point (Hastaoglou, 1997, Figure 5). Hence, the approved city plan of 1919 preserved the old port, while drastically redesigning the surrounding area. The old wholesale market, with its imposing warehouses that stood as symbols of the city’s economic

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8 For a detailed account of the Hebrard Plan see Yerolympos, (1993) and (1996).
vigour, was to be transformed into large building blocks, which were to form the city’s business centre. However, the restructuring of the port was implemented only after World War II.

At the time, the most controversial and contested aspect of the plan was the (re-)settlement of the refugees of the fire-affected areas. Refugees were to be temporarily hosted in shelters and were granted certificates that could be used to bid for building land under the Hébrard plan. Ultimately, however, they were not to return to the city centre. As the majority of these populations were Jewish, the resettlement plan was perceived by the Jewish community as an effort to draw the Jews out of the city centre. Undeniably, this was a central element of the plan as the Jewish settlements were an integral part of the Ottoman Thessaloniki (Molho, 2001, Nehama, 1978). Hetty Goldman reports that Mawson stated to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee “that the fundamental purpose of the plan was to deprive the Jews of complete control of the city [but] there was no desire to oust them completely” (Mazower, 2006: 327). Indeed, Jews were not barred from bidding for and buying land in the city centre. Rather, wealthy Jews heavily invested in the reconstruction of the city centre together with their Greek and other competitors. As Mazower notes, “what happened was as much a socio-economic change as an ethnic one” (2006: 327). The city was divided more in class terms rather than ethnic ones: “workers were to be kept apart from the bourgeoisie, and their places of entertainment were separated too” (Mazower, 2006: 327-328). A local newspaper commented at the time:

“- You see Thessaloniki, how beautifully she has been rebuilt.
 - Where?
 - On paper, for now.
 - Let’s see.
 - Look! A first-class city, with everything. With areas for the rich and separate ones for the workers.
 - And have they really built somewhere specially for us workers?
 - Have they built it? It’s a paradise.
 - And where are our neighbourhoods, then?
 - You can’t see them. They are behind the page.” (quoted in Tomanas, 1995: 270).
The extent, the character and the limits of Thessaloniki’s reconstruction were ultimately decided by the financial constraints that the Greek state was facing during the period. Concurrently, both Venizelos and the socialist leader Papanastasiou soon came under the consensus that private investments were necessary in the materialization of the project (Mazower, 2006: 329). Hence, Thessaloniki’s reconstruction was designed, publicized and carried out as if it was a business enterprise (Yerolympos, 1996). The actual reconstruction was, thus, left to individual land owners and powerful property developers to decide (Mazower, 2006: 329). As a result, large sums of private capital flowed into Thessaloniki from elsewhere in Greece and all over the world (Yerolympos, 1993). Small capital became the principal motor on the production of urban space in collaboration with land owners and the construction sector. The profits were shared by landowners and entrepreneurs, turning land speculation and the building sector into the cornerstones of the city’s economy (Yerolympos, 1996). Being a model of capital accumulation, attracting small investors, land owners and building material industry, and a reproduction model, providing low-cost housing, the application of city planning procedures led to the re-enforcement of
capitalist tendencies around the ownership and production of urban space (Yerolympos, 1993: 162). Thus, all traditional activities were redistributed according to their revenue capacity and were either relocated in the new central district or forced to abandon it. As Yerolympos notes: “[... ] a major alliance between the State and urban landowners was implicitly forged and has never been contested; in order to assure their support the State would not attempt to control land speculation, thus condemning to paralysis all urban planning institutions and local authorities’ efforts” (1993: 162).

The economic profile of the city was once again transformed and Greek capital gained predominance over the, hitherto dominant, Jewish community. The slow consolidation of the primacy of the Greek economic elite in Thessaloniki is also depicted in the trajectories of the city’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry (EVETH) and the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece (SVVE). Established in 1918 Thessaloniki’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry brought together mainly Greek members and has been throughout the years chaired by Greeks (EVETH, 2013). Similarly, the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece, established in 1915, was only for a brief period chaired by the Jew Joseph Misrahi (SVVE, 2013).

4.3.2 Towards the consolidation of Thessaloniki’s hellenization

The transformation of the city was furthered by the influx of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Asia Minor in the years 1922-1923. The years between 1909 and 1924 were one of the most turbulent periods in Greece in political terms. Only between 1920 and 1924 ten changes in government occurred. During the period, both Venizelos’ liberal party and King Constantine embarked in successive expansive wars. Greek foreign policy during these years evolved around the notion of «Μεγάλη Ιδέα» (the Great Idea) that saw Greece expanding in the Balkans and Asia Minor coastline to cover two continents and five seas. The Asia Minor campaign was an integral part of this strategy. The campaign was initially a success leading to the Greek occupation of Izmir with the support of the Entente in 1919. But the success was only temporary. The advance of the Greek army towards Ankara was crushed by the forces of Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk. In September 1922, thousands of Greek and Armenian inhabitants were killed in the city of Izmir and many more were forced to leave the city. One year later, a population exchange was decided between Greece and Turkey.

The effect for Thessaloniki was twofold. First, the Muslim exodus that began in 1912 was brought to an unprecedented phase. Although not facing a large-scale campaign of eviction from the city, enjoying in fact relative safety compared to the rural areas, more than fifteen thousands of Muslims have migrated from Thessaloniki to Izmir and Istanbul (Mazower, 2006: 338). Attacks by Greek nationalists towards Muslim shops and people wearing fezzes were not rare. Yet, between 1920 and 1922 the city’s mayor was again Muslim and the total Muslim population was around thirty thousands (Mazower, 2006). During the following couple of years 111,000 Muslim left Thessaloniki via its port (Mazower, 2006: 348). By June 1925 almost all of the city’s Muslims had left (Mazower, 2006: 349). Second, this outflow of Muslims was accompanied by a parallel inflow of Greeks. During the years prior to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, over a million Orthodox Christians migrated to Greece (Mazower, 2006: 356). The refugees settled all over Greece, but their impact in the city of Thessaloniki was unprecedented. The properties of the Muslims that had left the city, its border status as well as the presence of the port made the refugees’ demographic impact greater. Approximately 92,000 refugees settled in Thessaloniki (Mazower, 2006: 359). In 1928 out of the 244,680 citizens of the city 47.8% were refugees, 16.1 internal migrants and only 36.1% were born in the city (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008: 123). Reflecting on the city’s population composition writer Giorgos Ioannou will later characterize Thessaloniki as the “capital of refugees” (2007).

The resettlement of the refugee population was a slow and problematic process. Military camps, hospitals, hills and pastures were transformed to residential areas. By 1932, more than half of the city’s population lived in the 36 refugee settlements. Thessaloniki now stretched over a sixteen kilometre long arch around the historic centre. Refugee settlements were basically a mosaic of residential units, constructed by a variety of different organizations, based on rough plans. The extended and sparse development of the city, characterized by the presence of slums and the lack of transportation, water and sewage
infrastructure, caused major problems to Thessaloniki’s inhabitants (Kalogirou, 1986: 488). Beyond the lack of housing areas, the refugees also had to face a multiplicity of bureaucratic obstacles and procedures in their search for settlement. Indicative in this respect and important in terms of urban development was the 1923 law that “decreed that land would only be distributed to legally constituted groups rather than individuals” (Mazower, 2006: 362). As a result, refugee organizations were established representing the major refugee groupings: Asia Minor, Thrace, Caucasus and the Black Sea. This was, in turn, depicted in the emergence of new cooperative settlements in the city like «Τούμπα» (Toumpa), «Σαράντα Εκκλησιές» (40 churches) and «Καλαμαριά» (Kalamaria). The impressive increase in the city’s population resulted in a flourishing construction sector. The number of residency buildings that were constructed during the 1920s – around 14,500 new buildings – constituted a temporary source of employment and income for the surplus labour concentrated in the city (Christodoulou, 1936: 312-314, Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008: 125).

Within such a context, the impacts of the 1930s crisis were deeper for Thessaloniki. The drawing of new border lines and the unprecedented turmoil in the Balkans placed significant political, economic and cultural limitations on the commercial activities and population movements in Thessaloniki’s, hitherto unified, Balkan hinterland. Economic activity within Greece clustered in Athens (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008) and only a few of Thessaloniki’s firms were listed on Athens Stock Exchange (Mazower, 2006). Agriculture and predominantly tobacco production and processing were the main economic activity in the city (Labrianidis, 1982). The city’s business elite felt that their claims were ignored by the central state. Indicative in this respect are the concerns that the local commercial and industrial elite expressed in their 3rd conference in 1935. For the city’s economic elite the parameters holding back Thessaloniki’s development after its incorporation into the Greek state were: the delays in the improvement of the land and sea transportation of the city and the creation of new linkages with the “lost” Balkan hinterland; the failure to design and implement a national port and maritime policy that would support the consolidation of Thessaloniki as a major transportation node; and the concentration of economic and administrative power in Athens (Karadimos-
Yerolymos 2008: 127-128, quoting the proceedings of the Chamber of Commerce).

The inadequacies of the city’s infrastructure are manifested in the trajectory of the port during the period. As early as 1913 Venizelos’ Liberal government embarked in the institutionalization of a “Free Zone” of trade for the Balkan countries. The aim was to open new economic and commercial horizons and ensure as wide a market as possible for the city (Hastaoglou, 1997). The “Free Zone” was institutionalized in 1914, but the course of events in Europe, which led to the Great War, signaled the end of the implementation of the “Free Zone” scheme. The initiative, however, authorized the operation of a “Serbian Free Zone”, which constituted a European breakthrough (Hastaoglou, 1997). After the end of the War sound technical and storage facilities and modern loading and transportation infrastructure were required to take full advantage of the institutionalized “Free Zone”. However, the French Company that had the privilege to exploit the port until 1944 was not prepared to perform major construction projects unless the concession contract was extended (Verani, 2008). As a result, the port of Thessaloniki was effectively nationalized (Hastaoglou, 1997). In 1930 the Greek government institutionalized the Port Fund of Thessaloniki which, during the same year, bought the privilege to exploit and manage the port (Hekimoglu, 2008). Thus, it was only in 1937, that the expansion plan of 1914 was activated. Port facilities moved westwards through the construction of new quays with a depth that would allow the anchorage of oceangoing vessels as well as the platform of the coastal avenue and the breakwater. By 1940, when the works were interrupted by World War II, the port area comprised of 900m of platforms, 550m long breakwater, beach sheds of 12,000m², 28,000m² of internal storage spaces, silos for 3,500 tonnes of cereals, the headquarters of the Port Fund, railway lines of 3km, roads, water supply, land area of 270,000m² and modern loading equipment (Hastaoglou, 1997, Vasdravelis, 1958, Verani, 2008).

Yet, the effects of the crisis were far more devastating for the working population of Thessaloniki. By the 1920s Thessaloniki was a “city of workers”: “two-thirds of the labour force of 105,000 recorded in 1928 worked for someone else; another 25,000 were self-employed or assisting relatives” (Mazower, 2006: 372). Besides, the rapid increase in agricultural production, especially tobacco, in
the region of Central Macedonia accelerated the clustering of working class population in the city. In the following years, unemployment in the city became devastating. In 1930 there were 70,000 indigents and 25,000 who depended on the city council’s providence for their survival (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008: 125). The deteriorating working and living conditions of the working class fuelled their organization and politicization. Communist ideas became popular in Thessaloniki and recurring massive strikes marked urban life (Mazower, 2006: 374-376). Heavy-handed police force and the organization of nationalist gangs will be mobilized by the Greek state to repress workers’ militancy (Mazower, 2006). The climax of anti-communist politics in the city was reached during May 1936. On May 9th 1936 the police attacked striking workers with heavy force leading to the death of twelve protesters (Mazower, 2006: 382). In the aftermath of the events, the anti-communist dictatorship of Metaxas took control of the country on August 1936.

The hellenization of the city was even further consolidated during World War II. The German occupation of Thessaloniki since April 1941 had devastating effects for the city’s inhabitants and infrastructure. Thessaloniki had not yet recovered from the 1930s crisis and unemployment levels were still high. The influx of 50,000 more refugees from the Bulgarian zone made matters worse. In short time hunger struck the city at alarming levels. In total, more than 5,000 citizens died between 1941 and 1944 (Mazower, 2006: 432). In terms of housing provision and infrastructure construction, with the eruption of World War II every planning and architectural activity in the city stopped immediately and every contract, concession and agreement that existed was cancelled (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008: 130). From April 1941 until October 1944 the port of the city was occupied by the German forces. During the period, significant parts – up to 80% – of its infrastructure and buildings were either destroyed by the bombarding of the allied forces or sabotaged by the Germans during their retreat (Hastaoglou, 1997).

For the city’s Jews, however, these events were only the beginning. Over the course of German occupation around 50,000 Jews were deported to concentration camps via the city’s railway station (Bowman and Benmayor, 2002, Molho and Nehama, 1974). After the deportation of the city’s Jews their empty houses, looted and destroyed to find the treasures that they allegedly left
behind, became the scene of a further catastrophe (Mazower, 2006). In parallel, thousands of tombs were destroyed in the Jewish cemetery:

“German military authorities requisitioned some of the marble for road-building and to construct a swimming-pool. Greek organizations and individuals carted off more: indeed even a few years ago, tombstones could still be seen stacked in the city's churchyards or set in the walls and roads of the Upper Town” (Mazower, 2006: 428).

By the end of 1944, Thessaloniki had lost almost all of its Jewish inhabitants. One of the most vibrant ethnic communities in the city that actively (re-)shaped and (re-)constructed Thessaloniki’s space for over five hundred years.

The extortion of the Jewish bourgeoisie (together with the previously described Muslim exodus) consolidated the hegemony of the Greek economic and political elite in the city. At the same time, the composition of the city’s working class was also radically reshaped with the internal and Asia Minor refugees constituting a large pool of cheap labour. Even further, the urban landscape and cultural life were now deprived from almost all the symbols and icons of the city’s cosmopolitan past. Thessaloniki became a Greek border city.

4.4. Thessaloniki’s in the Post-War Years: Urbanization, Growth and Crisis

4.4.1 Thessaloniki between 1949 - 1974: Housing boom and the transformation of the urban landscape

In Greece the years immediately after the end of World War II were marked by the Civil War of 1946-1949. After the defeat of the communist party an autocratic right wing state ruled the country for the following two decades. During the period, the para-state network of nationalist groups and army forces, which appeared in the 1930s, acquired further role in shaping urban life, imposing conditions of terror. In Thessaloniki, autocratic state policies were even harsher as the city now lied only 80 kilometres far from Tito's Republic of
Yugoslavia. However, the first two decades after the war were a period of growth, reconstruction and population increase for Thessaloniki. The co-existence of an autocratic right-wing state with urbanization, economic growth and industrialization is a familiar pattern in southern Europe during this period (Gaspar, 1984, Giner, 1985, Hastaoglou et al., 1987).

Since the early 1950s, Thessaloniki entered a period of intensive reconstruction. The Greek state actively engaged in large-scale public works that also enjoyed the military, technical and economic support of the US (Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2000). The tram network, that was an emblematic public transportation means in the city since the end of the 19th century, was removed and a network of streets was formulated. At the same time, a series of large-scale projects were initiated and completed, including the construction of landmark buildings, museums and cultural foundations, like the Central Railway Station, the Macedonian Studies Foundation Theatre, the Courthouse, the central closed stadium, the University campus – over the ruins of the Jewish cemetery – and a number of hospitals and schools. Moreover, the International Exhibition, that had marked a thousand years of economic activity in Thessaloniki, acquired permanent status after the unstable first post-war decade (Kafkalas et al., 2008, Labrianidis, 2008). In parallel, the construction of the city’s new waterfront began to be completed in 1970. The project had a profound military orientation (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008). The expansion of urban space, out to sea through embankment, sought to construct an extended docking area across the gulf of Thessaloniki in the case of a ‘hot’ cold war incident (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008). By the mid-1950s the city’s infrastructure and production reached the pre-war levels (Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2000).

Concerning the port, in particular, in 1953, the Port Fund merged with the “Free Zone” in one organization named “Free Zone and Thessaloniki’s Port”. The organization initiated major construction works at the destroyed port of the city. During the 1950s, the rehabilitation of the port was completed. Expansion and modernization projects were initiated to result in the extension of the platforms, the construction of new storage buildings and the provision of 6km of railway lines connected with the Central Railway Station (Hastaoglou, 1997). Simultaneously, the port’s loading and unloading equipment was renewed (Hastaoglou, 1997, Verani, 2008). Parallel to this, commercial and industrial
growth forced Thessaloniki’s port to develop beyond the urban centre where space was scarce and compressed between sea and mountains (Driessen, 2005, Hekimoglou, 2008: 1).

More importantly, during the 1950s and 1960s Thessaloniki was the second epicentre of the country’s urbanization boom. The city’s population was growing rapidly due to internal migration: from 300,880 in 1951, to 378,000 in 1961 and 557,000 in 1971 (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008: 133). The continuous population and economic growth resulted in an unplanned residential development. The city expanded eastwards and westwards: the eastern areas, became an extensive high-income residential zone, whereas, the western suburbs, already downgraded by their proximity to the port and the wholesale and manufacturing areas, received the working class and low-income citizens and spread rapidly without planning, enclosing army camps and industrial zones (Kostopoulou, 2002). As Triantafyllidis noted in 1959: “Settlement problems become greater every day… 1/3 of the settlements have no access to clean water, 1/4 has no electricity and 4/5 have no bathrooms” (1961: 80-82).

The response to the housing problem had significant implications for Thessaloniki’s urban space as well as for urban politics. Five elements are of particular importance here. First, the cold war conditions, that the city lived in, called for a policy of social provision and stability in order to prevent the hegemonization of communist ideas (Vaiou et al., 2000). The previous section highlighted that, already since the 1917 fire, the Greek state had formulated a coalition with urban land owners. Forty years later, home ownership was once again mobilized to “support the government against its opponents; the communists fighting against private property” (Vaiou et al, 2000: 32). Second, urban land ownership in Thessaloniki, as well as in the rest of the country, was at the time characterized by its fragmentation into a multiplicity of small-size plots (Mantouvalou et al., 1995). Third, the lack of land registry and land use regulations “permitted a profitable mixture of land uses in whatever direction land owners decided” (Hastaoglou et al., 1987: 160). Fourth, the state-decided plot exploitation coefficients were high allowing the construction of high-rise apartments in small plots (Hastaoglou et al., 1987). These coefficients were further raised by the dictatorship and the housing sector reached its climax during these days. Fifth, facing severe lack of funds and with a clear orientation towards
large-scale public works (Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2000), the post-war Greek state resorted to private capital investments to ameliorate the housing problem (Mantouvalou et al., 1995). The combination of these factors “made land speculation a highly profitable sector which reached its peak during the dictatorship” (Hastaoglou et al., 1987: 160). Hence, the building sector became predominant since the 1950s (see Table 1). This predominance led to an accumulation model characterized by the combination of low-productivity and labor-intensive modes of production (Emmanuel, 1980, Tsoulouvis, 1980, 1981). Hence, the building sector acted as the major job market for the internal migrants that were flooding the city (Tsoulouvis, 1980). Labor-intensive work in the construction sites and a flexible labor market “benefitted big and small contractors” (Hastaoglou et al., 1987: 161). In parallel, a large segment of the country’s industry and mainly cement, steel and aluminum production were vertically integrated with the building sector (Hastaoglou et al., 1987).

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**Table 1 Percentage Distribution of Private and Public investments**
Source: Hastaoglou et al., 1987: 162

These characteristics are clearly manifested in the dual, market-dependent, model of access to housing in Thessaloniki (and Greece): 1) “illegally via afthereta” («αυθαίρετα») a process of semi-squatting and 2) “legally via antiparochi” («αντιπαροχή») a process of exchange-in-kind (Hastogioul et al., 103).
Concerning the former, the bulk of the housing needs of the rapidly urbanizing population were covered through semi-squatting practices at the urban fringe. Whereas land was acquired legally it was illegally used for housing purposes. The Greek state not only tolerated these practices but repeatedly legalized large areas of illegal housing, incorporating them into the town plan and hugely increasing their prices (Hastaoglou et al., 1987, Mantouvalou et al., 1995). Providing cheap housing for the labor population afthereta “since the 1960s was the sine qua non of growth and prosperity of the legal urban sector” (Hastaoglou et al., 1987: 163). Living in afthereta in the urban fringes and working in the near-by industries was for many urban dwellers the only solution. Hastaoglou and colleagues estimate that in 1982 afthereta in Thessaloniki covered 905ha or 24.5% of the authorized city area (1987: 164). Hence, these areas were not marginalized but rather contributed to the incorporation of popular strata in urban life substituting for the lack of social policy.

Concerning the latter, antiparochi “is a mechanism through which the owner of the land passes it to a developer in exchange for part of the final built volume” (Mantouvalou et al., 1995: 5). Antiparochi is “a Greek capitalist invention for building which takes advantage of the parcelization of urban land, the high level of private ownership, the lack of capital and the labor intensive forms of work” (Hastaoglou et al., 1987: 165). Benefiting from high exploitation coefficients, antiparochi did not require large-scale investments in land and infrastructure. The low-density old building stock of Thessaloniki was rapidly replaced by thousands of apartment blocks. The private investment-led reconstruction and the feverish expansion of the city imposed one and single type of multi-storey building, leading to a unified and unifying anonymous environment (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008). The raise of exploitation coefficients by the dictatorship facilitated the expansion of the model of antiparochi to areas of illegal settlement, hegemonizing the everyday lifestyle and consumption patterns associated with living in apartments (Mantouvalou et al., 1995).

Brought together, these two mechanisms constituted a mode of accumulation that attracted investments and provided high profits for small capital, land owners and the building sector (Hastaoglou et al., 1987, Leontidou, 1990, Mantouvalou and Balla, 2004). At the same time, the lack of social policy
in welfare, health and education “led popular strata to try to acquire more than one piece of urban property, as a hedge for the future” (Mantouvalou et al., 1995: 5). Thus, a large market for urban property developed and the popular strata were gradually integrated in society as petit bourgeoisie (Mantouvalou et al., 1995). This model of housing provision further strengthened the coalition between the state and property owners. It provided “a model of political stability and political integration, all legal and illegal aspects of this urbanization process were somehow acceptable to successive governments and political parties from the right to the left” (Hastaoglou et al., 1987: 174).

Simultaneously, the city experienced a period of industrialization predominantly around the textile and canning industries that clustered at the widespread industrial area close to the port (Labrianidis, 1982, 2008). This relocation together with the construction boom, heavily influenced the development of the port, which gradually specialized in facilitating the transportation of products and raw materials for industrial as well as construction activities (ThPA, 2006). It is worth noting here, that industrial activity in Thessaloniki during the time took place predominantly through very small firms. Limited industrialization, low percentages of salaried employment and unpaid work of family members characterized the economy of the city (Hastaoglou et al., 1987). As a result, the emergence of the city’s petit bourgeoisie evolved around diffused industrial production. In parallel, the swelling of the state bureaucracy created an extended class of petit bourgeois state employees (Poulantzas, 2006: 13).

On April 21st 1967 general Papadopoulos led a successful coup that took control of the country until 1974. The Junta suspended parliamentary activity and persecuted and banished not only members of the left but of the democratic conservative political elite of the country. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage with an analysis of the processes that led to the coup of April 1967, the political conditions of the time and its repercussions upon urban everyday life (see among many others Mouzelis, 1978, Poulantzas, 2006, Tsoukalas, 1981). What is important for the analysis here is that the modes of production of urban space (Hastaoglou et al., 1987, Mantouvalou et al., 1995), industrialization and economic organization that were dominant in the 1950s and 1960s were further accelerated and deepened by the military dictatorship (Poulantzas, 2006).
4.4.2 Thessaloniki of «Μεταπολίτευση» (Metapoliteusi)\(^9\) (1974 – 1997): Diffused industrialization, state officials and crisis

The consolidation of parliamentary democracy, after the downfall of the military Junta in 1974, opened the way for Greece’s membership in the European Community (EC) in 1981 – the association that was ‘frozen’ during the Junta. Moreover, at a national level, the severe political persecutions against the supporters of the left were put to an end, leading to their full incorporation in the social, political and economic life of the country (Voulgaris, 2001). At the same time, despite the low national growth rates of the period, Greece created a homogenized mass-consumption culture, signified by the acquisition of durable consumer goods like electric appliances, cars and televisions; goods that served as symbols of the same phenomenon in western societies earlier (Voulgaris, 2008).

Industrial investment and employment, in Thessaloniki continued to grow during 1970s and 1980s, induced by expanding domestic and foreign markets, mainly in Europe. Industrial production particularly around food, clothing, footwear, leather products, oil and chemicals, machinery, cars and electrical equipment, subsequently increased (Chronaki et al., 1993). Despite the growth of industrial productivity wages did not follow and remained among the lowest in the EC (Rylmon, 1990). EC protectionist quotas against non-EC countries favoured Thessaloniki, which – due to its productive specialization and good geographical connections – was able to export “just-in-time”, low-cost, quality products to European markets. Industrial investment in the city was financed more by profits of local firms and less by incentives to capital, as was the case in other parts of northern Greece (Kalogirou et al., 1989). Besides, industrial activity at the time was even more important than official figures indicate, since it included the unofficial but significant – in volume, value and employment – part of production that was carried out in small, usually unregistered, workshops.

\(^9\) The term Metapoliteusi, translated as regime or polity change, refers to the period immediately after the downfall of the Junta and the years of consolidation of parliamentary democracy that followed.
and in homes. A pattern of diffused industrialization emerged, grounded in the extensive local incorporation of a variety of atypical, informal and subcontracting activities, quite distant and distinct from the stereotype of the industrial district in Europe and the US (Chronaki et al., 1993, Hadjimichalis and Vaiou, 1990). This ‘hidden’ industrial activity can, to a large extent, account for the dynamism observed not only in Thessaloniki but in northern Greece in general since the mid-1970s (Hadjimichalis and Vaiou, 1990).

Urbanization trends also continued during this period. According to the 1991 census, Thessaloniki’s population increased to 748,000, while the city continued to expand in its greater area, mainly at the southwest where new houses and industries appeared on the side of large provincial roads. The distribution of land use and its general functionality was consolidated. At the west-end of the city industrial and warehouse facilities were located in the extensive industrial zone, with the major, in terms of size and activity, industries clustering in the area between the port and the Central Railway Station. Next to them, above the port area, wholesale enterprises were located; while small clothing and footwear crafts, public services, offices, banks and insurance companies were situated predominantly within the historic nucleus of the city (Tsoulouvis, 1981: 398-416, Kafkalas et al., 2008). The already formulated land allocation and the high building coefficients gradually led to the emergence of neglected areas, which were suffering severe inadequacies in infrastructure and public spaces.

The 1970s and 1980s were a period of restructuring for the port of Thessaloniki too. Transformations of maritime technology since the 1970s, including containerization, new port technologies, changes in the size of ships, new transport systems and the development of new port industries, refashioned the role and functionality of ports in urban political economy. Thessaloniki, like other port cities, faced notable changes in port structures and port-related labour, resulting in the rationalization of work and the decrease of former port functions. There was an enormous reduction of dockworkers and casual labor (Stroux, 2008). During the 1970s and 1980s, Thessaloniki’s port adopted a fundamentally new design of infrastructure and expanded further to facilitate the increased spatial needs of new technologies such as containers, cranes, tanks and roll-on-roll-off facilities. Together with the expansion of storage space and the
construction of the container terminal in its 6th pier in 1980, this resulted in a vast port area (Kostopoulou, 1996). Thus, the port’s activities were relocated from their traditional place in the urban fabric and reorganized further westwards.

Besides, policymaking procedures around the port were also reorganized. In 1970, Thessaloniki’s Port Authority (ThPA) took the place of “Free Zone and Thessaloniki’s Port” as a self-administered public organization under the Ministry of Mercantile Marine. ThPA, incorporating the port workers as its employees, had henceforth the explicit right to exploit the port and manage and administrate every activity within its spaces (ThPA, 2006). The reorganization of the port’s governance, although performed by the military Junta, should be inscribed within a wider massive nationalization scheme that unfolded between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s in Greece. Initiated by the government of conservative New Democracy under Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis and furthered by the social-democratic government of PaSoK under Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou the scheme involved the nationalization of private banks (most notably Commercial Bank in 1976), the gas-network, Olympic Airways and so on (Pagoulatos, 2003, Voulgaris, 2001). The state interventionist policy adopted during the period also involved the establishment of a multiplicity of new government agencies (Pagoulatos, 2003, Voulgaris, 2001). Apart from the increased importance of the state as an employer, this policy also resulted in the proliferation of an extensive class of state-appointed managers. This created a form of political clientelism “at the top”:

“after each government turnover, a large and often fluctuating number of top administrative posts are filled by appointees of the governing elite. These appointees are not necessarily civil servants. But even in the top posts reserved for career civil servants, there is apparent political party intervention” (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 33).

Even further, during the 1980s and 1990s changes in the top managerial posts of Ministries and major public corporations, like Thessaloniki’s port, occurred “even after each reshuffling of the Cabinet of one and the same government” (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 34).

Yet, state-interventionist policies were not limited on these domains. Since 1976 the Greek state was the owner of the country’s two major banking
groups (National Bank and Commercial Bank group) (Pagoulatos, 2003: 139) directing loans through them. Besides, state subsidies played a major role in promoting agricultural and industrial activity. Even further, the state during the 1970s and 1980s continued to heavily invest in public works and infrastructure. This reproduced and consolidated the existence of a state-dependent capitalist class (Sotiropoulos, 2004). This is not to suggest that such strategies and instruments were not used in other ‘developed’ western economies. Rather, in Greece – as in other Southern European countries – these means were mobilized in a highly particularistic manner. Sotiropoulos summarizes the relationship:

“The principal benefactors of this role of the state in society were the extended families of large landowners, industrialists and bankers who constituted the core of (...) [the] capitalist class. They became accustomed to depend on the state for their enrichment and for the reproduction of their power position in society” (2004: 15-16, see also Pagoulatos, 2003).

Meanwhile, developments at an international level brought significant implications for Thessaloniki’s economy. The sweeping socio-economic and geo-political shifts since the late 1980s – i.e. collapse of communist regimes in the Balkans, the war in Yugoslavia and the subsequent redrawing of the borders in the Balkans, EU enlargement and so on – gradually configured a radically new
landscape for Thessaloniki’s economy and urban politics. The impacts of these and related events are analyzed in detail in the chapters that follow but, for the purposes of this chapter it is important to briefly focus on two developments. On the one hand, the partial and gradual restoration of the city’s linkages with its Balkan hinterland created a new landscape for maritime transports, commercial and industrial activity. Since the early 1980s the port of Thessaloniki showed a steady increase in goods traffic (Graph 1). Furthermore, the city’s market became attractive to great numbers of people beyond the northern borders of the country oriented towards its restaurants, shops and beaches (Karadimos-Yerolympos, 2008). Yet, since 1988 the city’s textile and clothing sector were facing a crisis. Due to their dependence on low labour cost, between 1988 and 2002 43% of these firms either relocated in Southern Balkans or closed (Labrianidis, 2008: 316). In parallel, many of the city’s enterprises are bought by Athens based companies (Kalogeresis and Labrianidis, 2008). Unemployment in Thessaloniki increased from 5.6% in 1981 to 7.6% in 1991 and 11.3% in 2001 (NSSG, 1981, 1991, 2001). Overall, during the 1990s, the city’s economy experienced a radical shift from small-scale industrial production to the service sector (hotels, multiplexes, shopping malls and so on) (Labrianidis, 2008). Investments in this sector came mainly from multinational corporations or the country’s big capital located in Athens (Labrianidis, 2008). The other side of the coin of outflow of economic activity and investments was the inflow of immigrants in the city (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2001). Since the late 1980s and up until the mid-90s approximately 100,000 immigrants (one tenth of its population) arrived in Thessaloniki mainly from Albania and the former Soviet Union countries (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2001). Constituting a source of cheap labor and an ‘other’ beyond the predominance of Greek population rendered them as the new urban outcasts. Yet, their everyday practices transformed urban spaces and everyday life bringing a renewed multi-ethnic character to the city.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter attempted to provide a necessarily schematic and brief account of the trajectory of Thessaloniki since the late 19th century. The aim of
the chapter was not to fully account for the history and geography of Thessaloniki. Rather, it traced three interlinked elements: 1) the reconfigurations of the city’s elites, 2) the transformations of urban space and 3) the restructuring of the city’s port and its governance.

The chapter highlighted how in fin de siècle Thessaloniki a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie, consisting mainly of Jews, Greeks and Muslims, formulated a coalition with the city’s Ottoman administration to promote the city as a commercial centre in the Balkans. In the years that followed the incorporation of Thessaloniki within the Greek state the composition of these elites began to slowly change. Greek businessmen and bureaucrats gradually became the dominant actors in urban politics. The city’s economic orientation towards commercial activity did not, however, significantly change. Since the end of World War II, the city’s elites and populations were fully hellenized. During the period, Thessaloniki underwent a phase of industrialization and a construction boom which promoted the associated urban elites at a privileged position. Whereas major investments in industry and public works were made by big capital, the vast volume of housing came from small capital investments. The downfall of the military Junta signalled a further reorganization for the city’s elites, wherein the interplay and clientelism between state officials and a state-dependent capitalist class was further consolidated.

The chapter analyzed how these elite reconfigurations were not only manifested upon urban space and infrastructure but also expressed through them. From the ‘Europeanization’ of Thessaloniki’s space and urban life by its emerging bourgeoisie in the late 19th century, through the reconstruction of the city centre after the fire of 1917 by the liberal government of Venizelos, to the housing boom of the 1950s-1970s, the production of urban space was a key arena in the (re-)production of urban elites and the inclusion or exclusion of popular strata. Throughout the century that the chapter addresses, the lack of funds on the part of the state left the production of urban space to private capital and speculation. Either through the lack of planning and regulation or through the formulation of permissive land use policies, the Greek state effectively sought to develop and sustain a coalition with land owners and the construction sector. It is worth noting, though, that Greece’s (and Thessaloniki’s) peculiar mode of housing provision, through the dual mechanism of afthereta and anti-parochi, led
to high levels of home ownership and thus to the incorporation of large segments of the popular strata in urban life as petit bourgeoisie.

The trajectory of Thessaloniki’s port provides further significant insights on the production of urban spaces. The chapter traced the successive restructurings of the port and the reorganizations of its governance. The first artificial port was constructed under the leadership of French infrastructure capital with the Ottoman administration playing a secondary role. The management of the port was, for the years that followed, also performed by private capital. Since 1930 the port of Thessaloniki was effectively nationalized and its reconstruction materialized through exclusively public investments. The last reform of the period around the port was the institutionalization of Thessaloniki Port Authority by the military Junta. In the years that followed and through highly interventionist state policies the management of the port – as of the majority of the country’s public corporations and infrastructure – was inscribed in practices of political clientelism. The role of state officials and political elites was further consolidated.

The restructuring of the port over the past two decades unfolds against this background. Needless to say that, path dependencies and previous institutional configurations influenced the trajectory of urban politics around the port only to a limited extent. Yet, the trajectory of the post-democratization of urban politics in Thessaloniki, its particularities and contradictions, its continuities and break points can only be understood in relation to this background. That is the task for the empirical chapters that follow.
Chapter 5
The revitalization of the old port in preparation for European Capital of Culture Thessaloniki '97: Privatized public spaces for a post-political people

5.1 Introduction

As the previous chapter described, during the 1980s Thessaloniki’s urban fabric had expanded to such a degree that it was caging the historic port (Hekimoglu, 2008:11). The extension of the port’s zone of interests and activities and the increase in passengers and containers traffic, pushed forward the restructuring and expansion of its spaces (Kostopoulou, 1996). The construction of the port’s container terminal, during the same period, rendered its first and second piers a stock of unused spaces and buildings with decreasing land value, despite their significant historic, cultural and aesthetic value (Vasiliadis et al., 1997). In parallel, in the aftermath of the softening of the national borders in the Balkans, Thessaloniki’s dominant mode of diffused industrialization was entering a period of crisis (Chronaki et al., 1993). Small and medium industrial enterprises (SMEs) – mainly from the clothing sector – followed a local-delocalization strategy (Kalogeresis and Labrianidis, 2008) directed towards the Southern borders of Albania and Bulgaria (Labrianidis, 1996). Increasing levels of unemployment – 11.7% in 2001 (NSSG, 2001) – and derelict industrial sites became a central feature of the urban landscape. Within such a context, Thessaloniki’s first master plan institutionalized planning schemes and initiatives which foresaw the revitalization of the first and second piers of the port to host cultural activities (Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, 1985). The incorporation of the old port’s spaces into the urban fabric became a major theme in policy and popular discourses (Vasiliadis et al., 1997). In 1986, the empty and abandoned warehouses of – what came to be described as – the old port were one of the venues to host the Biennale of New Artists in the European Mediterranean events, attracting spotlight to the revitalization of the site through cultural activities (Hastaoglou-Martinidis and Christodoulou, 2010). Yet, it is through the urban restructuring strategies in
preparation to host the European Capital of Culture (ECoC) 1997 that the revitalization of the old port was designed and implemented (Hastaoglu, 1996).

Waterfront redevelopment in general and the revitalization of old port sites in particular, hold a prominent position in the agenda of the competitive city and constitute a hallmark in city branding policies, implemented in a variety of port cities experiencing de-industrialization (Desfor et al., 2010, Gospodini, 2001, Hoyle et al., 1988, 1992, Marshall, 2001). Together with being configured as prominent sites for capital investment and speculation old port spaces became central arenas for re-imag(in)ing the city (Marshall, 2001, O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007). The role of culture and cultural policies in constructing and hegemonizing such imaginaries is of pivotal importance (Amin and Thrift, 2007, Philo and Kearns, 1993, Tretter, 2009, Zukin, 1995, Zukin, 1996). The ECoC mega-event is paradigmatic in this respect (Boland, 2010, García, 2004a, Richards, 2000). Cities like Glasgow (Garcia, 2005, Tretter, 2009, Tucker, 2008), Rotterdam (Richards and Wilson, 2004), Liverpool (Boland, 2010), Bergen (Sjøholt, 1999), Cork (O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007) and Porto (Balsas, 2004), to name but a few among the over 30 cities that hosted the event, attempted to mobilize the ECoC not only as a city-branding vehicle but also to narrate and construct a different imaginary for their inhabitants.

Thessaloniki is no exception as hegemonic discourses around the ECoC evolved around the promotion of the city as “The Metropolis of the Balkans”. Labrianidis has recently described the ECoC event as one of the city’s “missed opportunities” amounting to what he calls “Thessaloniki’s arrested development” (Labrianidis, 2011). For him, failure to construct a hegemonic strategic vision for the city and the competing micro-political interests that unfolded around the event constituted the major reasons for ECoC’s failure (Deffner and Labrianidis, 2005, Labrianidis, 2011). Similar concerns around competing agendas and at times opposing visions have been raised around many ECoC events (Palmer / RAE Associates, 2004) and in particular for Glasgow (Garcia, 2004b, Mooney, 2004, Garcia, 2005), Cork (O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007), Porto (Balsas, 2004) and Liverpool (O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007).

Against this background, this chapter revisits the revitalization of Thessaloniki’s old port spaces in order to unpack the interplay between the ordering of urban spaces and the articulation of hegemonic discourses. In so
doing, it departs from accounts which pose the deep cultural division of the Greek society and the existence of two opposing discourses of liberal multiculturalism/modernization and conservative nationalism/populism as the decisive factors in explaining Greek (urban) politics and by extent the ordering of urban space (see among many others Diamantouros, 2000, Mouzelis, 2002, Voulgaris, 2001). This is not to deny the existence of two competing elite discourses around the signifier of the “Metropolis of the Balkans” in Thessaloniki. These discourses differ significantly around their understandings of the cultural and historical aspects of the signifier. Actually, urban polic(y)ing in anticipation of hosting the ECoC is a prominent terrain through which these discourses were articulated. Yet, together with Sevastakis, the chapter maintains that these two elite discourses converge on a performative and functionalist understanding of urban politics and “on the imaginary construction of a post-political people” (2004: 43). This logic is articulated and promoted in and through the ordering of urban public spaces. Through a reading of this ordering, the chapter suggests that the revitalization of the old port should be understood as the production of privatized urban public spaces that seek to forbid the appearance of the people as antagonism.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, it briefly sketches the theoretical tenets that underpin the argument around the convergence of opposing discourses. In parallel, it revisits the notion of urban public space and in particular the links between the privatization of urban spaces and democracy. Second, it offers an alternative reading of the two discourses around the “Metropolis of the Balkans” to highlight their convergences and the implications they bare for the ordering of urban public spaces. Third, it focuses explicitly on the re-production of the old port spaces to analyze how such convergences materialized in urban public space, being in turn re-enforced by it. A concluding part summarizes the argument.

5.2 Beyond Dualisms: on the convergences between discourses and the ordering of urban public spaces
The claim that liberal multiculturalism discourses converged with conservative nationalism discourses during the 1990s might seem contradictory at first glance. After all, this dichotomy was mobilized to account for the major political debates that emerged during the period in Greece and Thessaloniki. This section delineates a framework to read this apparent paradox mobilizing discourse theory as a tool for analyzing the convergences of the two discourses. The discursive reading performed in this chapter begins from an understanding of discourse as a “social and political construction which establishes a system of relations between different objects and practices” (Howarth, 2000: 102, see also Chapter 3). Discourses are (re-)produced in the articulation of elements which assume meaning in relation to each other and not because of an intrinsic essence (Laclau, 2005). Discursive elements are, thus, the building blocks of discursive formations and operate as “floating signifiers” whose meaning is fixed through articulation (Žižek, 1989: 95, Stavrakakis, 1999, Laclau, 2005). The distinctiveness of a discourse then resides in the way it (re-)signifies and articulates discursive elements (Stavrakakis, 1997, Laclau and Mouffe, 2001), rather than in the elements per se. Building on this understanding, this chapter reads “The Metropolis of the Balkans” as such an element, a floating signifier, mobilized by various discourses, and among them liberal multiculturalism and conservative nationalism10.

This has implications for our understanding of the dialogues and struggles that unfold among discourses. Elements can assume divergent meanings in conflicting discourses and the fact that the same element is employed by different discourses does not assimilate them (Stavrakakis, 1997, Laclau, 2005). This is not equivalent to the creation of an hegemonic formation – which would imply that the concerned discourses follow logics of equivalence and converge on goals and agendas (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Thus, the claim (developed in the following) that modernization and conservative nationalism discourses converge on at least two elements does not seek to deny their differences, let alone equate them. Yet, the articulation and repetition of such discursive convergences impacts on the discursive horizon of (urban) politics (Bettini and Karaliotis, 116).

10 The use of the terms “conservative nationalism” and “multicultural liberalism” must not be treated as inscribing a fixed boundary between the two camps, but is used to schematically summarize the two conflicting viewpoints and coalitions that emerged.
Thus, what emerges as of significant importance is the discursive horizon within which urban public space is inscribed through such discourses.

It should, thus, be noted that urban public spaces have experienced processes of neoliberal marketization and privatization over the past 30 years or so. Geographical research has sought to analyze the effects of the privatization of public spaces in the erosion of democracy (Purcell, 2008, Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008). Purcell, for instance, comments on how under the hegemony of neoliberalization: “[c]ities cannot afford to preserve democratic public spaces for citizens (plazas, parks, squares) when they can develop privatized, revenue-producing spaces for ‘idiots’” (2008: 26). However, the equation of public space with democracy has been problematized in the literature as public space has also been a site of exploitation and oppression of subordinate groups (Massey, 1994, Springer, 2010, Staeheli and Mitchell, 2008). Besides, dividing lines over what is public and what is private space are not so clear, “insofar as their meaning and usage are embedded within local specificities of time and place” (Springer, 2010: 541). For Rancière, a crucial element of the police “is the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, [the ordering of] bodies (…) assigned by name to a particular place and task” (1999: 29). The police is effectively “an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not” (Rancière, 1999: 29). At the same time, however, democratic politics “revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière, 2006b: 13). Hence, urban public space is to be understood in a “processual and fluidic” manner (Springer, 2010: 543) as both a product of the police ordering and open to democratic contestation (see also Dikeç, 2005). The question, thus, becomes what is discursively and materially produced as urban public space and for whom. In effect, this is a dialectic relationship as the production of urban space involves much more than just planning the material space of the city; it is producing and reproducing all aspects of urban life (Lefebvre 1991: 38-39). It is in this sense, that the claim of this chapter, that hegemonic discourses around the ECoC converge on the production of privatized public spaces for a post-political people, should be understood.
5.3 Reading the “Metropolis of the Balkans”: Conflicts and convergences on the discursive horizon

This section attempts to unpack the convergences of the two discourses around “The Metropolis of the Balkans” during the preparation for the ECoC events. Before doing so, however, it is important to briefly sketch the framework within which the bid for the Cultural Capital occurred, in order to situate the emergence of the signifier.

5.3.1 Biding for ECoC within a context of escalating nationalism

In 1991 Thessaloniki’s City Council unanimously agreed to bid to host the ECoC events for the year 1997. The call issued by the conservative Mayor Constantinos Kosmopoulos after pompously narrating Thessaloniki’s past, concluded by describing the bid as an opportunity for the city as a whole that, required intense efforts and participation by everyone, from local and national politico-economic elites through urban institutions to “every citizen of Thessaloniki, every Macedonian” (1991). In this spirit, ECoC was portrayed as a powerful vehicle to enhance the city’s politico-economic and cultural role within a radically shifting Balkan landscape. As Dimitris Fatouros, the leader of the major opposition in the City Council (supported by social-democratic PaSoK), put it:

“Thessaloniki can and must hold a prominent role in the economic, political, and cultural development of that region of Europe [i.e. the Balkans]. Its nomination as European Capital of Culture is a central component of a perspective that wants Thessaloniki to become a strong European city” (1991).

However, the Mayor’s reference to Macedonians is of particular importance. Since the early 1990s significant tensions emerged between Greece and the newly formed state of Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM) regarding the right to use the name Macedonia. The issue spurred a paroxysmal nationalism in Greece. Nationalist tendencies were even stronger in
Thessaloniki, a city which for centuries was portrayed in the collective imagination as the capital of Macedonia. Indicative in this respect is the title of the first publication around the Cultural Capital by Thessaloniki’s Municipality that read: “Thessaloniki, 23 centuries Metropolis of Macedonia, Cultural Capital of Europe 1997” (1992). Consequently, massive demonstrations were held in Thessaloniki’s waterfront attracting people from literally all points of political compass (Kanellis, 2005, Ta Nea, 1992, Ta Nea, 1994). It is, thus, no exaggeration to argue that “the outbreak of the Macedonian Issue, was the event that sealed the government’s decision to support Thessaloniki’s bid as Cultural Capital against the competing city of Nafplio” (L.P. 2/2011, see also Palmer/RAE Associates, 2004). Hosting the ECoC was repeatedly narrated by local authorities as a means to promote the “rightful claims of the Greeks” on the issue and to safeguard against sovereignty threats not only from FYROM but from Albania and Turkey as well (Kosmopoulos, 1991). Thus, within the heated political climate of the period, the ECoC attracted major funding from the national government – up to €235 million (93.5 billion drachmas) – in an effort to highlight its support for the “Greek Macedonia” (Labrianidis, 2001, Palmer / RAE Associates, 2004). Besides, a series of urban infrastructure networks and institutions were named after Macedonia, under the grotesque nationalism of the period: the city’s International Airport was named “Macedonia” in 1993, the former Industrial School was renamed to “University of Macedonia” in 1990 and the port’s passenger terminal was also named “Macedonia” in 1992.

Within such a context, imaginaries around Thessaloniki’s metropolitan role in the Balkans and – to a lesser extent – Europe, were gaining momentum (Labrianidis, 2001, Hadjimichalis, 2001). During the 1990s, the hegemonic discourses around Thessaloniki – situated at the epicenter of popular, policy and techno-managerial rhetoric – were encapsulated, popularized and articulated around the signifier of “the Metropolis of the Balkans”. To give just an example of the hegemonic character of this imaginary, Labrianidis estimates that in the local newspaper Macedonia 245 articles in 1991 and 300 in 1998 were articulated around this signifier, whereas 52 and 40 articles respectively evolved around this rhetoric in the national newspaper Ta Nea (2008: 344). Actually, this was the stated main objective of the Cultural Capital as such: “[t]o become the ‘metropolis of the Balkans’, by upgrading the cultural infrastructure of the city”
The two major, distinct but inherently articulated, discourses that emerged within such a context evolved around the city’s multicultural past – with differing degrees of emphasis on the Greek character of the city – on the one hand and its European role as the Balkan hub of trade, industry and tourism on the other. The “Metropolis of the Balkans” signifier was geared around the empty signifiers of the “multicultural” and the “European” city (Stroux, 2008, Thoidou, 2008, ThPO, 1995).

5.3.2 Conflicts and convergences over the “Metropolis of the Balkans”

The technical and cultural program of the ECoC constituted the terrain upon which competing understandings of multiculturalism unfolded among the national and local politico-economic and cultural elites. On the one hand, for the conservative nationalists the reference to the city’s multicultural character symbolized the co-presence of isolated and distinct ethnic cultures under the pre-eminence of Greek culture (Agelopoulos, 2008). This rhetoric was mainly promoted by the local political elite of conservative New Democracy and the Christian Orthodox church, but had also considerable links with the nationalist left. The prevalent belief in this camp was that the Balkan identity of Thessaloniki was one of Greek cultural predominance over the other populations of the Peninsula. Now mayor of Thessaloniki and then member of Thessaloniki ’97 organizing board Yannis Boutaris has on a different occasion summarized the prevalent belief amongst the city’s conservative elites – that has also enjoyed massive popular support – as: “(…) a sui generis Christian-orthodox fundamentalism. The city votes conservatively and constitutes a greenhouse for any kind of populism and clientelism (…)” (Boutaris, 2004: 209-10). On the other hand, for liberal multiculturalists the Balkan, Eastern and Jewish elements of the city’s history and culture were to be unearthed (Agelopoulos, 2003, Enteuktirion, 1998). This view was supported mainly by members of PaSoK – being the national government since 1993 – and the Coalition of the Left as well as prominent members of the city’s cultural elite. This view was since 1996 in
accordance with the “modernization campaign” that PaSoK’s government initiated under Prime Minister Costas Simitis. In the words of then Minister of Culture – responsible for the organization of ECoC and PaSoK’s local MP in Thessaloniki –, Evangelos Venizelos: “there were two views on the Cultural [Capital] (...) and whenever one prevailed there were objections from the other” (1998: 64). These two views were summarized in dipoles: “‘National’ vs. ‘Balkan, Mediterranean, Black Sea’ (E. Venizelos), ‘orthodox’ vs. ‘cosmopolitan’ (S. Vougias), ‘modern’ vs. ‘pre-modern’ (T. Ziakas), ‘Greek-centric’ vs. ‘Balkan’ (G. Karampelias)” (Agelopoulos, 2003: 40-41). In effect, this was portrayed as the major dividing line between the city’s political and cultural elites for many years. Extending far beyond the ECoC, this dividing line re-emerged in a series of tensions in Thessaloniki during the last two decades or so; up to Boutaris’ election as Mayor in 2010.

Interestingly enough, there is also a scalar dimension and a politics of scale played out in this conflict. This is not to portray a homogeneous local conservative elite struggling against a homogeneous liberal national elite. Rather, while undeniably the nationalist discourse was more popular in Thessaloniki, crystallizations of political power and micro-political interests and conflicts impacted the articulation of these groups at local and national level. As one of the managers for ECoC’s Cultural Program described:

“severe clashes occurred between local authorities and especially Mayor Kosmopoulos and the national government around the technical and cultural programme. Within such a context – that together with other problems caused severe delays in deciding upon the program –, under the ministry of Venizelos, the final program turned out to be a compromise between the two sides” (P. Th. 2/2011).

The Byzantine era provided the common ground for this compromise. The major event organized for the ECoC was the “Exhibition of the Treasures of Mount Athos” (ECoC Thessaloniki ’97, 1997a). The prevalence of the Orthodox Church during the period together with the multicultural character of the Byzantine Empire seemed to resonate with both discourses. In any case, religious identities played a major role in the organization of urban life in Thessaloniki since the years of the Ottoman Empire (Mazower, 2006) and were
portrayed in the nationalist discourses of the time as the major distinguishing characteristic of the “Greek Macedonia”. In parallel, the European identity of the city and its contemporary multiculturalism were effectively summarized in the organization of the U2 concert in the port of the city. Apart from being a city with a long historical legacy, Thessaloniki was also to be perceived as a contemporary European metropolis following similar cultural consumption patterns with its European counterparts.

Yet, despite prevailing accounts that attempt to construct the dichotomy between liberal multicultural and conservative nationalist discourses as central in explaining the policies of the ECoC events, these two discourses converge on two elements that bare significant implications for urban politics.

On the one hand, both discourses evolve around a functionalist and performative understanding of urban politics within what Minister Laliotis described as “the gives of the wider geo-political transformation within Europe” (1997: 6). Since 1996, a radical shift occurred in state policies and discourses. Under the governance of Costas Simitis, the Greek social-democratic party embarked in a discursive and policy campaign geared around the increasing competitiveness of a strong Greek economy and the promotion of the image of the country to the world (Mantouvalou and Balla, 2004, Sevastakis, 2004). The campaign was summarized under the signifier of state modernization. PASOK’s modernization of the state campaign (in Greek «εκσυγχρονισμός»), evolved mainly around the diminishment of the role of the state that was perceived as inefficient and corrupt and the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects. It is worth noting here, that during his term as a Prime Minister with New Democracy between 2004 and 2009 Costas Karamanlis articulated a similar discourse around the notion of the “re-establishment of the state” («επανίδρυση του κράτους» in Greek). The imaginary of strong Greece, exemplified in the organization of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games, was at the epicentre of the campaign (Voulgaris, 2008). In this sense, the organization of the ECoC 1997 events in Thessaloniki constitutes an integral part of the imaginary of strong Greece (Greek Parliament, 1996, Harisopoulou, 1997).

Consequently, academic discussions of the period around urban restructuring, new forms of production and accumulation through cultural activities, urban competition, city branding and place marketing based upon
distinct local characteristics, were also at the epicentre of planning and political discourses in Thessaloniki. Indeed, from its early pages Thessaloniki’s 1995 Strategic Plan posits urban competition as the decisive factor in designing contemporary urban politics:

“incorporation within urban competition, unfortunately, is not a matter of choice. It is a fact of the new European – and global – reality that, not only cannot be ignored but also has to constitute the central component of developmental planning. Ignoring that fact, in the name of a desirable, socially oriented development, just excludes from the analysis the element of realism and cancels the content of any such visions” (1995: 6).

PaSoK’s modernization campaign, as explicated in ECoC Thessaloniki ‘97, was articulated around this logic. As the then Minister of Environment Planning and Public Works, Costas Laliotis, put it:

“Identity, image, and competition between contemporary cities constitute the gives of the wider geo-political transformation within Europe. International events such as arts festivals and sporting events, including the European Capital of Culture, work effectively as mechanisms to organize and reproduce within urban competition” (1997: 6).

Prime Minister Costas Simitis affirmed this policy orientation during one of his visits in Thessaloniki in 1996. The following excerpt from his interview in Macedonia is indicative in this respect:

“After many difficulties that existed in the past, the project [i.e. the ECoC] has been put forward in a serious and – I believe – efficient manner. We are in the phase of take-off (…). This is very important because, if Thessaloniki is the space that will promote the development of the entire region, we need to promote the presence of culture. Culture plays a very important role. In Thessaloniki we put a bet, a bet to show that we can devise new ways” (Macedonia, 1996d).

Albeit with a distinct nationalist and localist tone, conservative discourses of the period converge with modernization discourses on this functionalist and performative logic. For Mayor and president of the Organization for the ECoC
“Thessaloniki ’97” Costantinos Kosmopoulos the major aim around the ECoC was for Thessaloniki to become the “true European centre of the Balkans restoring its historical and rightful position” (Macedonia, 1996d). In his line of argument, this was to be achieved through the cultural events of the ECoC that had to portray “the uniqueness and singularity of Thessaloniki through artistic events of the utmost importance with global reach” (Macedonia, 1996b). For the vice president of the organization, Dimitris Salpistis: “investments in culture [would] change the physiognomy of a city which during the past thirty years had not seen a single penny invested” (Macedonia, 1996c). Actually, popular and political discourses evolved around the materialization of cultural infrastructure projects. Similar concerns were expressed, for example, by, then MP of conservative New Democracy in Thessaloniki and subsequently Mayor of the city between 1998 and 2010, Vasilis Papageorgopoulos: “Thessaloniki approaches its term as Cultural Capital” with no infrastructure, “promises are not enough for Thessaloniki’s citizens, what they demand is works, not words” (Macedonia, 1996e).

On the other hand, the same period was marked by the return of the signifier Greece as the central point of struggle in national politics (Sevastakis, 2004: 86). For Tsoukalas, the “promotion and fetishization of the new national economic community” was “perhaps the most important ideological development over the past years” (Tsoukalas, 1996). Evolving around the constructed centrality of the afore-mentioned dichotomy, modernization was equated with the techno-managerial streamlining of the country with the ‘modern world’, whilst conservatism was portrayed as anachronistic populism and metaphysical nationalism (Gavriilidis, 2002). In effect, liberal anti-nationalism was confined in providing an alternative vision around a national strategy for a modern and powerful Greece (Sevastakis, 2004). The result of the radiance of the return of the signifier Greece as the nodal point of discursive struggles was the emergence of an undifferentiated “we”, “the Greeks with no further qualification” as the obvious and ultimate truth of politics (Gavriilidis, 2002: 582-3). A similar function was performed in urban political discourses in Thessaloniki through the signifier of the “Metropolis of the Balkans”, further deepened by the nationalist climate of the so-called “Macedonian issue”. Yet, this convergence did not result in the disappearance of differences in the lexicon
of the afore-described camps. Quite the contrary, not least because of conflicting interpretations over culture, the arena of politics was colonized by a multiplicity of discourses evolving around the nation and conflicts over who serves it better.

As the chapter has already described, the conflict over the “Macedonian Issue” was the epicentre of Mayor Kosmopoulos’ call to the citizens of Thessaloniki in view of the bid for hosting the ECoC. The nationalism of the Mayor and the city’s conservative political elite did not wane over the years that followed. As president of the coordinating committee of the plenary of Mayors of Macedonia and Thrace Kosmopoulos repeatedly criticized Simitis’ government over the “Macedonian Issue”: “We do not understand the reasons for haste in resolving the issue under dubious dilemmas (…). Once again we insist on our previous position that the [use of] name of Macedonia [by FYROM] is nonnegotiable” (Macedonia, 1996a). Actually as the hegemonization of modernization discourses progressed in the country, the nationalist discourse posed the “truth of the nation” against the politics of a “distanced state” (Sevastakis, 2004: 54).

The flipside of this coin was the promotion of the truth of civil society against “démodé” politics in modernization discourses (Sevastakis, 2004: 54). The following excerpt from Prime Minister Simitis’ speech during Thessaloniki’s International Fair\(^\text{11}\) is indicative in this respect:

“(a) strong society is not only the society that, protests when it dissent. It is a society that, acts and actively engages in the reforms the country needs; it takes its cue from state initiatives and moves forward, (…) it is in this context that Thessaloniki’s status as “Metropolis of the Balkans” must be understood”

(Dimakas and Zaferis, 1997).

Any form of public protest and dissent was readily equated with reactionary, dangerous and grotesque acts of the ‘losers’ within the new reality in the hegemonic modernization rhetoric of the period and the mainstream media. As Yannis Pretenteris, a prominent commentator in the Greek media and vocal of modernization, wrote at the time: “[y]esterday some farmers, today some dock

\(^\text{11}\) It should be noted here that, the Fair has traditionally been the event during which prime ministers announced the economic policy for the forthcoming year, attracting massive media coverage and popular interest.
workers, tomorrow a few students will personify (or just symbolize) a wider desire to overthrow the new social trajectory” (1996). For him, this was an act of “fixation against the success story that modernization depicts” (Pretenteris, 1996). This constitutes a Manichean logic that brings together social groups and identities that the only thing they share is their dissent against the politics of modernization. As Sevastakis notes: “in narratives on the functionality of “the Modern” anything can be equated with fixations, complexes and danger (…) from teachers and farmers on strike to the terrorist organization 17th of November” (2004: 81).

Ultimately, then, within both discourses, social antagonisms were progressively silenced to substitute ‘the people’ as the subject of politics with the ‘Greek’ or the ‘Greek citizen’ in nationalist and liberal multicultural discourses respectively (Sevastakis, 2004: 90). This transition progressed more through the assimilation and collision with previous discourses rather than as a distinguishable rupture (Sevastakis, 2004: 16). In this sense, these two opposing discourses converge on the construction of a people – it being the nation or civil society or an amalgamation of the two – beyond the dimension of antagonism; to what Sevastakis calls the “imaginary construction of a post-political people” (2004: 43).

This convergence was not only manifested in the ECoC’s program of urban interventions that, attempted to configure cultural activities as a key parameter in urban restructuring (Papadopoulos, 2001), but was also actively constructed through them. The next section focuses on the revitalization of Thessaloniki’s old port to illustrate this point.

5.4 Constructing ‘The Port of Civilizations’: privatized public spaces beyond the people

Thessaloniki’s cultural heritage, the quality of urban space and the city’s geographical location were recurring reference points throughout ECoC’s main publications (ECoC Thessaloniki ’97, 1997b, 1997c, Municipality of Thessaloniki, 1992, Papadopoulos, 2001). Besides, the expansion of urban public space, the preservation of cultural heritage and the promotion of the image of the
city through them were the epicenters of the city’s successive Strategic Plans (ThPO, 1985, 1995: 56). Assembling these inherently interlinked elements was narrated as the central strategy in “strengthening the local cultural and knowledge activities” in order “to reinforce local infrastructure and entrepreneurship” (ThPO, 1995: 9) and “to improve the competitiveness of the city and strengthen its position in the wider Balkan area, by encouraging further development, economic activity and international investment in the city” (EC, 1992). Thus, urban public space and the built environment became the terrains upon which a series of restructuring projects occurred in the course towards the ECoC

“(…) oriented towards: the promotion of the cultural and historical heritage of the city; the restoration and reuse of historic complexes (e.g. historical center); the incorporation of up to now isolated areas and buildings, like the piers of Thessaloniki’s port, in urban life; and the improvement of the quality of the built environment of the city” (Sortikos, 1997: 10).

The derelict spaces of Thessaloniki’s port were, thus, an ideal site of intervention to materialize this city branding strategy. The role of the city’s port – the “Port of Civilizations” (ThPA, 2009a) – was portrayed as of primary importance in shaping and promoting the multicultural character of a city situated at the crossroads between different civilizations. Its historical legacy as a “maritime meeting point, (…) facilitating the interaction of the peoples of the Balkans with economies and cultures throughout the Mediterranean” (ECoC Thessaloniki ’97, 1997b) was mobilized to re-image the port as an emblematic manifestation of the multicultural character of contemporary Thessaloniki. Hence, the revitalization of the old port and the preservation of its 19th and early 20th century buildings and surroundings was an attempt to foreground the unique and glorious past of the city. Simultaneously, the revitalization of the old port was conceived as a project with wider implications for the cultural, social and economic life in Thessaloniki through an expansion of the city centre’s public spaces by 5% of its total land (Vasiliadis et al., 1997, Zeikou, 2001). Up to then, the spaces of the old port were owned by ThPA, as a self-administered quasi-
governmental organization, and through it by the Ministry of Mercantile Marine (ThPA, 2006).

The revitalization of the old port was conceived and prepared as a project before its incorporation within the technical program of the ECoC. The initial plan, prepared for the Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, evolved around the incorporation of the first and second piers of the port (55,000m²) into the urban fabric as a high-quality public space (Vasiliadis et al., 1997, Zeikou, 2001, Figure 6). As described by members of the committee that designed it: “the plan moved beyond immediate production of spaces for cultural activities and aimed towards the revitalization and development of the whole city centre” (V. H. 3/2011). In this respect, while “drawing from the implementation of similar policies in different contexts such as the London Docklands and Barcelona’s waterfront restructuring” (L. P. 2/2011), it attempted to “move beyond the dominant examples of port revitalization strategies (...) in avoiding to transform the area into a gentrified housing and offices space” (V. H. 3/2011). In this spirit, the relocation of the City Hall to the unused and abandoned customhouse, – under the initial agreement of the Ministry of Finance, which has the ownership of the building – was also incorporated in the plan (V. H. 3/2011).

![Figure 6 The initial project's area of intervention (Thessaloniki's port first and second pier)](source: Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2001:111)

Since its incorporation in ECoC’s technical program, however, the trajectory of the old port revitalization was bound with the developments around
the ECoC. Despite the dispersion of ECoC’s funds to a plethora of projects (Deffner and Labrianidis, 2005, A.G. 6/2011, Table 2), the revitalization of Thessaloniki’s old port was one of the major projects implemented and together with the renovation of the Royal Theatre, configured waterfront regeneration as the most prominent, in terms of capital and land, intervention of the program (Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2001). Interestingly enough, the budget for all the projects came almost exclusively from state funds (up to 99%) (Labrianidis, 2001: 75). The main funding body was the Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works which covered the whole technical program of “Thessaloniki ’97”, possibly indirectly channeling funds from European Structural Funds towards ECoC projects as well (Palmer/RAE, 2004: 76).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Project</th>
<th>Drachmas</th>
<th>Euros</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large new Buildings</td>
<td>19.516.118.152</td>
<td>56.096.920</td>
<td>24,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension or restoration of existing urban buildings</td>
<td>20.563.144.399</td>
<td>59.106.480</td>
<td>25,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outdoors and public spaces</td>
<td>18.941.276.360</td>
<td>54.444.600</td>
<td>23,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listed monuments</td>
<td>3.291.906.400</td>
<td>9.462.220</td>
<td>4,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Infrastructure for municipalities</td>
<td>6.425.676.466</td>
<td>18.469.895</td>
<td>7,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (harbour restoration, airport, Mt Athos monuments etc)</td>
<td>12.197.267.444</td>
<td>35.059.694</td>
<td>15,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80.935.389.622</strong></td>
<td><strong>232.639.809</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 ECoC Thessaloniki ’97 budget allocation
Compiled by the author Source: (Euroconsultants, 1998)

The old port revitalization project was organized, designed and implemented through a partnership of local and national authorities and a web of quasi-governmental organizations, namely: the Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, “Thessaloniki ’97”, ThPA, ThPO and Thessaloniki’s Municipality. The involved stakeholders signed a memorandum of cooperation on the revitalization scheme in 1996 (Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2001).
effect, the organizing committee for ECoC “Thessaloniki '97” was, for the period between 1993 and 1997, the key governing body of the city’s restructuring and rebranding campaign. Established in 1993, “Thessaloniki ’97” was the quasi-public governing body of ECoC, aiming “by operating within free market competition, [to] prepare the city of Thessaloniki for the European Capital of Europe, construct the necessary infrastructure works, and organize the cultural activities involved” (Hellenic Republic, 1993: 272). “Thessaloniki ’97” board consisted of six members of the local city councils (five from Thessaloniki’s municipality and one from the wider region), one representative of the Ministries of Environment, Planning and Public Works, Culture, and Macedonia and Thrace, six members of the civil society (three of whom where elected representatives of established groups and three of whom appointed by the government) and the organization’s CEO (Hellenic Republic, 1994: 4775). Since its establishment and until the end of the mega-event mayor Kosmopoulos was the president of the organization (Politis, 1997). In this sense, urban polic(y)ing around the port, in preparation for the ECoC, constituted a “fragmented and uneven (...) shift to governance” (Cook, 2004: 26), wherein policymaking was transferred to a network of public and quasi-public institutions, while the role of the Greek state remained vital in initiating and financing the project (Swyngedouw et al., 2002: 551-557).

In 1996, and under severe delays in the implementation of ECOC’s technical program a part of the revitalization plan began to materialize: the revitalization of the 29,000m² of open land in the first pier and of 5 warehouses of 6,700m² also in the first pier (Hastaoglou, 2006, Figure 7 and 8). With funding of up to €16 million (5.5 billion drachmas) by the Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works the renewal project, focused on what was considered the most important and unique characteristic of the site: the 19th and early 20th century harbor buildings (Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2001, Vasiliadis et al., 1997, Zeikou, 2001). The redesign of space consisted of soft interventions, mainly concerning the conservation of buildings and open spaces and the redesign of interior spaces, to produce a revitalized urban environment (Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2001, Zeikou, 2001). The revitalized warehouses of the port came to host a set of designated activities during the 1997 events (Table 3, Figure 7 and 8).
### Uses of The revitalized Warehouses of the port during ECoC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warehouse A</th>
<th>Museum of Cinema</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(exhibition space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 screening rooms (capacity 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 screening rooms  (capacity 20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warehouse B</th>
<th>Museum of Design</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Museum of Photography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warehouse C</th>
<th>Exhibition hall</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warehouse D</th>
<th>Screening and conference multiplex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Two rooms of 260 and 320 capacity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warehouse 1</th>
<th>Screening and conference multiplex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Two rooms of 238 and 2226 capacity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Uses of The revitalized Warehouses of the port during ECoC
Compiled by the author Sources: (Papadopoulos, 2001)

![Image of revitalized warehouses]

Figure 7 The revitalized Warehouses of the old port
Compiled by the Author, Image Source: GoogleMaps

The management of the sub-projects was outsourced to the appointed project managing company Sortikos-Architech SA (Papamichos and Hastaoglou, 2001). Under a rationale of diminishing the impact of bureaucratic state procedures and hence increasing efficiency (Sortikos, 1996), the projects around the ECoC ’97 were the first set of public projects in Greece whose management was outsourced to private companies (Rizospastis, 1998). In parallel, citing delays in the implementation of the project, the revitalization materialized under
a fast track planning scheme (Hastaoglou, 2006). Together with the lack of systematic control over the construction by the state and the limited role that ThPO played within such a context, the policy led to severe inadequacies and problems in the materialization of the project, extending as far as the demolition and rebuilding of large parts of one of the warehouses that were supposed to be preserved (Hastaoglou, 2006). Moreover, the policy choices amounted to the waiving of formal procedures, allowing the five private construction companies to whom the sub-projects were assigned “to alter the initial plan almost at will” (V. H. 3/2011). Hence, the adoption of fast track planning actually subsumed the logic of the intervention and the key characteristics of the re-production of the port’s spaces to the interests of the construction companies. As a result, the overall cost of the project skyrocketed to the amount of approximately €20 million (7 billion drachmas) (P. Th. 2/2011).

It should be noted that, the trajectory of “Thessaloniki ’97” as a whole was marked by concerns over “sketchiness, deliberate efforts to mask the reality of policy implementation” and the severe delays that occurred (Kounalakis, 1997: 1546)\textsuperscript{12}. In the words of the representative of the Technical Chamber in Thessaloniki ’97 board:

“(d)eviations on the budget of large projects, acted against long-term projects and the quality of life in the city (…) One would have expected from a private company that manages public money to announce the problems encountered, preventing the completion of work. However, the Technical Council for the projects was never active and project managers moved without any guidelines, under the ‘logic’ to advance projects that could absorb funding” (Rizospastis, 1998).

Rendering “the boundary between public and private sector permeable” (Stoker, 1998: 38), the “role of lobbies, family ties, business connections, and forms of ‘clientelism’” (Swyngedouw et al., 2002: 565) left their imprint upon ECoC policies. However, such concerns were skewed in local and national discourses under the functionality and performativity of the revitalization not least at a symbolic level (see also Sevastakis, 2004). At the end of day, albeit with delays,

\textsuperscript{12}Thessaloniki ’97 attracted public interest and critique for many years after ECoC ’97 as it took up until the end of 2010 to be financially cleansed.
dark spots and inadequacies, the existence of the revitalized port promised to offer the terrain to display and promote the cultural heritage of Thessaloniki. It was an urban public space open to its citizens.

Figure 8 Renovated Warehouse A hosting the museum of cinema as in 2000
Source: Author’s Archive

The revitalization of the port has been criticized for confining the whole renewal scheme to a “mono-thematic” re-use of space favoring “high-culture” activities; inherently excluding large parts of the city’s citizens and limiting the incorporation of the revitalized first pier into the urban fabric (Gospodini, 2001, 2009, A.G. 6/2011). However, the question of the incorporation of the old port into the urban fabric as a public space moves beyond the dichotomy of high vs. popular culture. To begin with, the ownership status of the revitalized old port’s spaces and more importantly the political power to formulate decisions around it emerge as an issue of significant importance. The uneven and fragmented governance structure through which policymaking around the ECoC was formulated was the arena through which the ownership status was decided – despite its incorporation in the city’s strategic plan as a public space (ThPO, 1995). Herein, “ThPA’s insistence through its then CEO, Genitsaris, to maintain ownership and management of the land and not support its incorporation into the city’s Master Plan” (F. M. 6/2011) together with the “lack of pressure by the
municipality” (V. H. 3/2011) were decisive factors in eventually maintaining ThPA’s ownership of the land and re-producing power relations over the port’s spaces. The picture becomes even starker if we take into account that Thessaloniki’s Strategic Plan never acquired a legally binding status (Kafkalas et al., 2008). Even further, in May 1999, only two years after the completion of the revitalization scheme, ThPA was quasi-privatized acquiring “the exclusive right to use and exploit the land, buildings and facilities of Thessaloniki’s Port Terrestrial Zone” (Hellenic Republic, 1999a: 611). The old port was, thus, actually re-produced and re-inscribed into the urban fabric as an asset of the company. The revitalization policy was ultimately a large-scale public intervention that increased the port’s land value, but whose added value is directly benefiting a private organization. ThPA’s policy around the old port, aiming to maximize its profits through its land, is in stark contradiction with an understanding of it as a public space open to appropriation by every citizen of the city. This contradiction that becomes even starker when one takes into account the regulatory framework that applies to port areas in Greece offering the exclusive right to design, construct and demolish spaces to port authorities (V. H. 3/2011, L.P. 2/2011). Consequently, it is not surprising that, already since 1998, the initial plans for two warehouses were reformulated to host expensive leisure activities and part of another warehouse was leased to another such company: Kitchen Bar (Gospondini, 2001). Hence, on the one hand, urban public space was, in the case of Thessaloniki’s old port, equated with privatized space; an asset in the portfolio of a quasi-private company.

In parallel, however, together with the restructuring of the adjacent Ladadika area in 1992 the old port revitalization transformed the old city centre into a historic site, an open museum of the city’s history. It constitutes the epicentre of the new symbolic economy of the city, blending educational and cultural activities with commerce and entertainment actively producing urban spaces (see also Zukin, 1995). Since 1997, the revitalized old port constitutes a reference point in the city’s cultural life, hosting museums of cinema, photography, and design as well as expensive leisure activities in the renovated warehouses. Besides, the renovated warehouses became the locus of

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13 The quasi-privatization of ThPA is analyzed in the following chapter.
Thessaloniki’s International Film Festival, a cultural event whose reach extends beyond local confines (Zeikou, 2001). Beyond the Film Festival a series of art exhibitions, conferences and international festivals are also hosted in the revitalized port. Hence, the old port also became an urban public space that, particularly during the days of the International Film Festival, constitutes the heart of the city’s cultural activity. Yet, the continuous presence of ThPA’s security forces and the coast guard at the site do not constitute, to put it mildly, the ideal background to inscribe the old port into the everyday life of the citizens. As a result, most of the time, the redeveloped site remains dark and underused, only attracting certain groups of people when cultural events are hosted (Stroux, 2008). Even worse, as Pavlou suggests for the city branding policies that unfolded around the revitalization: “the state’s perception of the ‘right’ use of urban space promote[d] revitalization projects that, fores[aw] the ‘cleansing’ from immigrants (…). Their presence there [was] considered problematic, as it ‘affect[ed]’ the public image of space that, needs to be restructured according to its social uses (…) around consumption and tourism” (Pavlou, 2001: 140-45). Furthermore, the status of the revitalized port as a privatized public space would be mobilized in multiple occasions to foreclose the possibility of dissent to unfold in these spaces. This would be the case in 2008, for instance, when the presence of demonstrators, against the concession of the port’s container terminal, in the spaces of the old port was forbidden (see Chapter 7). Thus, on the other hand, the urban public space produced through the revitalization is simultaneously inviting and forbidding. An urban public space inviting certain citizens as a space of cultural consumption while forbidding the presence and appearance of the ‘unwanted’ immigrants, unattractive activities or the people as an expression of dissent and antagonism.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter attempted to analyze urban politics around the ECoC, moving beyond prevailing accounts that either overemphasize the conflict between two opposing elite discourses or remain confined within the analysis of policymaking. In so doing, it suggested that, notwithstanding their divergences,
modernization and conservative elite discourses converge on two elements. On the one hand, both discourses share a functionalist and performative understanding of urban politics within intra-urban competition albeit constructed and propagated through different logics. On the other, they foreground the return of “Greece” and mutatis mutandis the “Metropolis of the Balkans” as key signifiers in national and local politics respectively. As a result of this return an undifferentiated “we”, the citizens of Thessaloniki with no further qualifications was discursively constructed as the subject of politics. Understood as either the expression of a nation against a politics that does not express its interests or as a civil society that moves beyond a politics confined to corruption and micropolitics, these discourses amount to the construction of a post-political people. This logic unfolded in and through the revitalization of Thessaloniki’s old port. The privatized urban public space that was the result of ECoC policies over the port, on the one hand, reaffirms the centrality of marketization and consumption in producing and experiencing the urban fabric. On the other hand, the production of such spaces attempts to foreclose the re-appearance of the people as a dissenting democratic subject by ascribing certain uses to certain spaces and by imposing conditions of visibility.
Chapter 6
Performing neoliberalization: The production and governance of Thessaloniki’s port spaces and infrastructure during 2000s

6.1 Introduction

In 1999, two years after hosting the ECoC events, Thessaloniki’s port was quasi-privatized. Specifically, the public port authority was transformed to a private enterprise under the name Thessaloniki Port Authority SA. However, the Greek state remained the major shareholder in ThPA. The port quasi-privatization policy was part of a wider government reform evolving around the privatization of public utility companies and infrastructure networks. In parallel, the reform introduced real estate activities and public-private partnership (PPP) schemes in constructing and managing public infrastructure. In its aftermath, Thessaloniki’s port has been at the forefront of neoliberalization policies or better yet “neoliberal experiments with urban infrastructure” (Haughton and McManus, 2012: 90). Such policies were either designed solely by ThPA SA or involved the spaces and infrastructure of the port as an integral part of them. As summarized in Thessaloniki’s Municipality Strategic Plan, these experiments ranged from the construction of a submerged cross-city channel that would have its entrance on the port’s first pier through real estate investments in the recently revitalized old port to the construction of a logistics centre in its container terminal (sixth pier) together with the latter’s expansion out to sea (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 490-565, see also Figure 9).

This chapter mobilizes the restructuring of the port following its quasi-privatization as an entry point for the analysis of urban politics in Thessaloniki during the 2000s. Rather than treating these experiments as disjoint instances, the chapter reads them as interlinked and integral parts of the hegemonic urban politics. Involving a multiplicity of stakeholders negotiating through a complex institutional web, planned through PPPs and with the active involvement of local and national state and elites; these projects introduced a new mode of governance-beyond-the-state articulated around consensus formation and the implementation of neoliberal urban policies.
Focusing on the hegemonic politics in Greece during the late 1990s and the 2000s, Sevastakis notes that the modernization discourse of the period evolved around a functionalist understanding of the state in general and urban politics in particular (2004). As he writes: “the only assessment criterion that survives is functionalist and performative: every tangible and imposing result (...) effaces from the [political] map questions over its objectives, uses, beneficiaries or the processes followed for its attainment” (Sevastakis, 2004: 100). Variations of this line of reasoning have prevailed in the promotion of the majority of large-scale urban development projects across Europe (Moulaert et al., 2003). Thessaloniki’s port case might, at first glance, seem totally different as none of the planned projects materialized. However, this chapter argues, Thessaloniki’s case unearths the existence of a further variation of this logic. In Thessaloniki, the non-existence of the project as such, its material absence and the failures of neoliberal policing, are continuously re-inscribed in discourses of neoliberalization. Herein, on the one hand, successive rounds of neoliberalization consolidate, through failing forward, forms of governance beyond democratic accountability. On the other, performing neoliberalization emerges as a key strategy in maintaining local and national state legitimacy.

The argument is laid out in the following manner. First, the chapter proposes an understanding of neoliberalization as a performative discourse to...
account for the agency of national and local elites and the specificities of policy formulation. Second, it discusses the quasi-privatization of public utility companies in Greece in the context of the wider “modernization campaign” of the social-democratic government of PaSoK since 1996. In parallel, it highlights the centrality that real estate and PPP projects acquired in urban planning within such a context. Third, it analyzes the quasi-privatization of ThPA, focusing on the approach towards the governance and development of the port that the reform consolidated during the years that followed. A fourth section looks closer to the plethora of neoliberal experiments that involved the port’s spaces as an integral part, as these were crystallized in the city’s strategic plan. Analyzing these projects in dialogue with the insights of the previous sections, this section traces the implications of failing forward neoliberalization for urban politics in Thessaloniki. A concluding part summarizes the argument.

6.2 Neoliberalization as a performative discourse

In a series of recent contributions Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore have called attention to how since the 1980s “‘neoliberalism’ has become something of a rascal concept – promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested” (Brenner et al., 2010b: 184, Brenner et al., 2010a, Peck et al., 2010). In their genealogy of the uses of the concept of neoliberalism they identify two major strands. On the one hand, structuralist interpretations of neoliberalization as a hegemonic ideological project and on the other post-structuralist accounts of neoliberalization that focus on the heterogeneous, context-specific particularities of neoliberal regulatory regimes and forms of subjectification (Brenner et al., 2010a). Following a similar line of analysis, England and Ward distinguish between four different understandings of neoliberalism: 1) neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project; 2) neoliberalism as policy and program; 3) neoliberalism as state form; 4) neoliberalism as governmentality (2007b). Rather than suggesting that such perspectives are mutually exclusive and irreconcilable (cf. Barnett, 2005, Castree, 2006), Brenner, Peck and Theodore suggest
constructing an understanding of neoliberalization that is attentive to both political economy and post-structuralist perspectives (2010a).

Indeed, a number of scholars have attempted to trace possible paths for articulating political economy and post-structuralist accounts of neoliberalization. For England and Ward, for example, the point is “to acknowledge the power of neoliberalism without re-inscribing it as a unitary hegemonic project” (2007a: 251). However, as Springer notes, hegemony understood in the Gramscian sense is neither monolithic nor unitary but “itself rife with contingencies, ruptures, and contradictions” (2012: 138). In this line of argument, the process of neoliberalization can be read “as a variegated form of regulatory restructuring: it produces geo-institutional differentiation across places, territories and scales; but it does this systemically, as a pervasive, endemic feature of its basic operational logic” (Brenner et al., 2010a: 330).

Neoliberalization, thus, “represents an historically specific, unevenly developed, hybrid, patterned tendency of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring” (Brenner et al., 2010a: 330). Hence, neoliberalization is never a complete and immutable project. It is a cumulative process of market-oriented regulatory restructuring dependent upon, while also transforming, previous institutional formations at a multiplicity of scales (Brenner et al., 2010b). Thus, neoliberalization is a process of failing forward: its “manifest inadequacies have – so far anyway – repeatedly animated further rounds of neoliberal invention (...) institutional reinvention spawned as much by the limits of earlier forms of neoliberalization as by some advancing ‘logic’” (Peck, 2011a: 6-7). These new rounds of market-oriented reform occur within already broadly neoliberalized institutional and political contexts (Peck and Tickell, 2002, Offe, 1996).

This conceptualization, in turn, calls for particular attention on the agents who keep pushing towards the “construction of neoliberal reason” (Peck, 2011a). In other words, on how neoliberalization “only ever exists in articulation with actors, institutions and agendas” (Castree, 2006: 2). Returning to the preceding discussion on political economy and post-structuralist accounts of neoliberalization, such a theorization seeks to account for the role of both structure and agency in understanding neoliberalization. Seeking to reconcile these elements Springer has proposed a conceptualization of neoliberalism as discourse: “recognized as a mutable, inconsistent, and variegated process that
circulates through the discourses it constructs, justifies, and defends” (2012: 135). This should not be understood as a mere call for linguistic analysis. Rather, the material practices of regulatory development and polic(y)ing are central in understanding “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Such an understanding of neoliberalization opens up a fruitful path for analysing the interaction between neoliberal urban restructuring projects and previous institutional and political configurations. The analytical emphasis here is on the:

“re-articulations and representations of neoliberal discourse in the form of particular discourses of neoliberalization, where individual actors take a proactive role in reshaping the formal practices of politics, policy, and administration that comprise the dynamics and rhythms of socio-cultural change” (Springer, 2012: 142).

Figure 10 summarizes Springer’s analytical schema.
In this line of argument, the performativity of neoliberalization discourses is of particular importance. Hajer and Uitermark, for example, highlight the role of performing authority in times of crisis. As they note “performing a ‘situation’ is imposing your definition of reality onto others” (Hajer and Uitermark, 2008: 7). Mobilizing a different theoretical perspective, Judith Butler argues that “perforamtivity [is] not (...) the act by which a subject brings into being what she/he names, but, rather, (...) that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (1993: 3). This is an understanding of performativity that moves beyond dramaturgical practices while not denying their importance. Thus, “[d]iscursive performativity appears (...) to enact its own referent, to name and to do, to name and to make. Paradoxically, however, this productive capacity of discourse is derivative, a form of cultural iterability or rearticulation, a practice of resignification, not creation ex nihilo” (Butler, 1993: 107).

In this sense, performing neoliberalization (as discourse) becomes a means and a product at the same time.

While Brenner, Peck and Theodore rightly call for attention on the mutually constitutive elements of “regulatory experimentation, inter-jurisdictional systems of policy transfer and global rule regimes” (Brenner et al., 2010a: 343), a focus on the performativity of neoliberal discourses through a specific urban constellation can offer an additional fruitful way to engage with questions of urban politics. This is not to downplay, let alone deny, the centrality of policy transfer and global rule regimes in formulating urban politics. Rather, it is an effort to focus on how such dynamics are translated and transformed in particular urban contexts in order to unearth the choreographies of power that unfold around these mutations. Hence, the remainder of this chapter focuses on the articulation of neoliberalization discourses in Greece before moving on to analyze how these discourses were played out in producing and governing Thessaloniki’s port spaces.
6.3 “Modernizing Greece”: Privatizations and public-private partnerships in producing and managing urban space and infrastructure

This section briefly discusses the neoliberalization discourse that was introduced and consolidated in Greece through PASOK’s “modernization campaign” in order to contextualize the analysis around Thessaloniki’s port that follows. The introduction of EMU membership as the key political goal since 1996 and the successful bid to organize the Olympic Games of 2004 in Athens constituted the landmarks of a policy orientation (Voulgaris, 2008) that saw “Greece modernizing and playing an active role in contemporary social and political changes” as PM Simitis’ inaugural parliamentary speech declared (1996: 1). In this spirit, economic rationalism – mainly as public debt reduction – and the improvement of existing and the production of new large-scale infrastructure networks were knitted together in hegemonic policies and discourses.

6.3.1 Introducing Efficiency through Privatizations

In 1997 the Greek public deficit was running at 4% and the public debt at 109.5% of the GDP (Eurostat, 2002), both being well-above the maximum limits set by the Maastricht treaty. Therefore, since the late-1990s, both major political parties in Greece (PaSoK and New Democracy) have placed considerable emphasis on identifying mechanisms and methods to reduce public sector debt at local and central state level. This was narrated in the hegemonic discourse as a benchmark of good governance, embedded in discourses of economic rationality and market efficiency. Therefore, a key policy orientation was the shifting of the burden of some aspects of infrastructure provision from the government towards the private sector and the reduction various forms of historically embedded geographical and sectoral cross-subsidies (see also Sevastakis, 2004, Voulgaris, 2008). The privatization and financialization of public infrastructure networks was one of the pivotal terrains through which PaSoK’s government attempted to meet the target. The privatizations of urban infrastructure networks were knitted in the public discourse with the country’s integration in the EMU (see for
As, the now General Director of Ports, Pallis writes “(t)he deregulation of utilities became part of the agenda, in view of the Single European Market” (2006: 157). It is within such a context, that twenty public infrastructure companies including telecommunication networks, power infrastructure, local water services, airports and ports entered a process of quasi-privatization (Georgakis, 1996, Hellenic Republic, 2002, Politis, 1998, Ta Nea, 1998).

The antecedents of this policy can be traced to growing concerns over the government’s (in)ability to efficiently provide and manage infrastructure networks. The major argument through which privatization policies were discursively legitimized evolved around the construction of public sector companies as inefficient, clientelistic and expensive. The public sector, so the argument went, was in these respects in stark contrast with the efficient, rational and ultimately modern private sector (Hellenic Republic, 2002, see also Georgakis, 1996, Politis, 1998, Ta Nea, 1998). Such concerns also resonated with the chronic failures of the Greek national and local state to materialize infrastructure projects that were institutionalized in Master Plans or agreed upon in the parliament (Pitsiava, 2008). Among the vast array of examples cited, the Athens Metro, Thessaloniki’s submerged cross-city channel and the expansion of the sixth pier of Thessaloniki’s port out to sea stand as prominent examples.

6.3.2 Building a ‘Strong Greece’ through Public-Private Partnerships

It is within such a context that the Greek state embarked in a series of large-scale projects to meet perceived or existing inadequacies in infrastructure networks. Particular emphasis was placed on highway transportation networks and large-scale urban projects for the Olympic Games (Mantouvalou and Balla, 2004). This policy orientation was also clearly depicted in the dispersion of European structural adjustment funds. For example, €11.8 billion (4 trillion drachmas) from the 3rd Community Support Framework were directed towards infrastructure network projects (Karanasopoulou, 2002). The epicenter of the modernization campaign was the imaginary that the country’s economy,
infrastructure networks and quality of urban life had to “meet the perceived standards of the developed western European counterparts” (Sevastakis, 2004: 66). Hence, large-scale infrastructure projects and in particular highways (like Rio-Antirio Bridge, Egnatia Highway and Patras-Athens-Thessaloniki Highway) constituted the iconic symbols of the country’s progress. The new phantasmagoric fetishized constructions that, as Kaika and Swyngedouw write on urban networks in early modernity, became “‘compulsively’ admired and marveled at, materially and culturally supporting and enacting an ideology of progress” (2000: 122).

A snapshot (Figure 11) from the inauguration of the Rio-Antirio Bridge provides an indicative example of the extent of the hegemonic status of this logic, whilst simultaneously pointing towards the limits of “modernization” discourses. Rio-Antirio Bridge is an emblematic infrastructure project of the modernization campaign, which was constructed, financed and managed through PPP. After PaSoK’s electoral defeat in 2004, the bridge was inaugurated by the then Minister of Environment Planning and Public works Yiorgos Souflias (New Democracy). The presence of Costas Simitis and two other of PaSoK’s former Ministers (Vaso Papandreou and Costas Laliotis) was to highlight their role in the construction of the project. Hence, the instance can also be read as a symbol of the consensus amongst the major parties over the imaginary of “Strong Greece” built through PPPs as well as of the fetishization of the large-scale project. At the same time, however, the presence of Archbishop Christodoulos to bless the new project attests to the limits of the rhetoric. Even modern infrastructure projects needed the blessings of the Christian Orthodox Church to survive.
The period of “modernization” was marked by a proliferation of planning laws and regulations promoting PPPs in the construction, financing and management of urban land and infrastructure (Hellenic Republic, 1997a, Hellenic Republic, 2002, Mantouvalou and Balla, 2004). The guiding principle of the reforms as summarized in the recommendatory report adopted by the parliament was the consensus around:

“abandoning centralized models of state intervention in planning and managing urban infrastructure in most EU countries and the consequent need for interventions in the urban fabric, through the cooperation of central and local government with the private sector” (Hellenic Republic, 1997b).

Thus, urban space and infrastructure networks became the pivotal terrain through which neoliberalization policies unfolded. Reflecting high levels of rapid policy transfer (see also Larner and Laurie, 2010, Sheppard and Leitner, 2010), there are marked similarities between the Greek policy scheme and those of other Western countries, such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the United Kingdom and various forms of public–private partnership in the EU and the USA. In Greece, the leading edge of neoliberal-oriented urban policies was the promotion of public–private partnerships («Συμπράξεις Ιδιωτικο-Δημόσιου Τομέων/ ΣΔΙΤ») to provide public infrastructure. The term PPPs was preferred over others as part of a “language game” to counteract the pejorative impacts of
phrases such as privatization (Hodge and Greve, 2007: 547). Such policies led to the emergence and consolidation of a variety of PPP models since they allowed major infrastructure projects to be built without the costs appearing in government accounts.

It should be noted here that PPPs in infrastructure projects – but not limited to them – had the active support of the EU, which not only actively promoted them in funding large-scale (infrastructure) projects but also supported the progressive privatization of national infrastructure monopolies (Graham, 2000, Plaskovitis, 2000). Greece’s infrastructure market, thus, emerged as a destination for mainly national – but to a certain extent also international – construction and infrastructure capitals, supported by local experimentation in financial instruments and legal forms that reworked the boundaries of the responsibilities of government and business (Mantouvalou and Balla, 2004, for a discussion of international experiences see Clark, 2005, Graham, 2000, Torrance, 2008). It is no surprise then that the construction sector was at the time the most prominent sector in Greek economy. There are varying estimations on the volume of the sector’s contribution to the GNP during the period. However, an indication is provided by the fact that in September 2003 the European Central Bank expressed concerns over Greece’s over reliance on the construction sector, which it estimated at 8.2% of the GNP compared to a 5.5% European average (Mantouvalou and Balla, 2004).

The following two sections trace the implications of these reforms for urban politics, through the case of Thessaloniki’s port. In so doing, the next section focuses on the quasi-privatization of ThPA to unearth the logic of state entrepreneurialism it introduced. The subsequent section focuses on a series of planned projects around the port to analyze the mode of governance they introduced and consolidated through failing.

6.4 “Winds of Modernization for the port”: On the quasi-privatization of Thessaloniki Port Authority

The reform around Thessaloniki’s – and Piraeus’ – port was introduced in 1999 through Law 2688/99 and is a paradigmatic example of the hegemonic infrastructure politics of the period (Hellenic Republic, 1999a). Through the
reform ThPA was transformed from a public corporation to a private company through the establishment of ThPA SA. As stated in the recommendatory report adopted by the parliament, the policy attempted to “facilitate the adjustment of the sector to contemporary trends and to overcome the deficiencies of the pre-existing port structures, by transferring the management and the responsibility for port services provision to port-level entities” (Hellenic Republic, 1999a). The objectives of the policy were to “increase the participation of Greek ports in global maritime transport, enhance the EU emphasis on the role of its members as port-states” (Pallis, 2006: 158) and promote “the greatest possible private participation in the provision of port services” (Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 2002: 7).

The initiative towards the privatization of the port was discursively promoted through the construction of a dichotomy. On the one hand, the existing organizational and institutional status of ThPA was portrayed as “anachronistic and inadequate”. On the other, the deregulation of public infrastructure provision and the adoption of “market rationality and economic efficiency” were narrated as the only viable, “modern alternative” (Christofilopoulou, 1998: 62). The critique towards the public character of ThPA from national and local media and the port’s privileged users evolved around the “insensitivity towards users demands, absence of port facilities and inland connections, (…) lack of investment (…)” (Pallis, 2006: 156) and for being subject to political management (Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001)14. More specifically, the port’s major clients and shipping agents repeatedly criticized the management of the public monopoly of Thessaloniki’s port for “not [being] able to understand what the market demands from a port within contemporary competition” (V. K. 4/2011) and port workers for being “stack to a bureaucratic ‘civil servant’ mentality that is afraid of competition as a form of evaluation for the staff of the organization” (St. Br. 3/2011). The government-appointed boards of Thessaloniki’s and Piraeus’ ports were denounced for showing little business competitiveness, for “unproductive decisions and the absence of innovative ideas by managers who lacked sector experience but whose appointment facilitated

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14 It is worth noting here that similar concerns were raised concerning the contemporary conditions in the port by its privileged users and mainly by shipping agents and the Exporters Association of Northern Greece that were interviewed during Spring and Summer 2011.
cliente political practices” (International Nautical Union, 1995: 54). In this spirit, the national government insisted that the reform policy aimed to address the shortcomings of the Greek framework with a view towards attracting “new volumes of international trade” and implementing “new technologies and organizational structures” that would “attract high-yield investments” (Pallis, 2006: 158). Thus, the privatization was promoted as a first step towards the integration of Thessaloniki in global transportation networks (Hellenic Republic, 1999a) repeatedly reporting IMF’s strong support for the project and its estimations over the benefits of the reform (Politis, 1998, 1999a).

The initial privatization plan, designed by the Bank of America, foresaw the unbundling of the multiplicity of activities under ThPA’s aegis in – at least – four distinct entities to concession to private capitals: 1) the leisure activities of the revitalized old port, 2) passenger traffic, 3) bulk cargo transportations and 4) the container terminal (Politis, 1999b, see also Graham, 2000). However, the Greek government promoted a corporatization scheme through which a

“public sector undertaking (...) is transformed into a company under private corporate law that conducts the port’s business and holds its assets, although the shares are issued and (...) owned entirely by the government. The main objective is to decrease direct government control over the company and to make it more responsive to market forces” (World Bank, 2000: 46).

Hence, Thessaloniki Port Authority SA was established in 1999 and acquired “the exclusive right to use and exploit the land, buildings and facilities of Thessaloniki’s Port Terrestrial Zone” (Hellenic Republic, 1999a: 611). Further consolidating the quasi-privatization of ThPA, in July 2001 the Greek government decided the listing of ThPA SA on Athens Stock Exchange. As a result, 25.73% of ThPA’s shares entered public negotiation (ThPA, 2004: 33), for a fee of 5.5billion drachmas (around €16 million) (Ta Nea, 2001). Actually, the Greek State actively encouraged “the markets” and the wider public to invest in the so-called blue chips of quasi-privatized infrastructure networks during the years of the Athens Stock Exchange boom between 1997 and 2002 (Stergiou, 2003, Ta Nea, 2001).

Arguably, the reform introduced a radical shift regarding the governance of the port. According to the concession agreement between the Greek State and
ThPA SA: “the organization operates as a private company towards profit-maximization within the market economy” led by “neutral experts” who decide above political motivations (ThPA, 2006: 10). Moreover, as a direct outcome of the listing of ThPA SA on Athens Stock Exchange the port’s land and infrastructure were financialized. Through this, an integral part of Thessaloniki’s urban landscape and infrastructure began to be continuously assessed over financial criteria, with all the pressure and reconfiguration that this brings (Orléan, 1999, Theurillat et al., 2010). Hence, concerns over urban public space, equal access to public services and socio-environmental equality were subjugated to the overarching guiding principles of economic rationality and financialization. In other words, the public provision of urban infrastructure networks gave its place to an entrepreneurial logic.

Yet, the Greek State remained the major shareholder of ThPA SA holding 74.13% of its shares. Hence, the Minister of Mercantile Marine maintained the privilege to appoint the manager of the organization (ThPA, 2004). Together with keeping the company under the control of the state, this privilege will also serve the reproduction of a managerial elite in positions of power through its close interplay with the country’s political elite. Indicative in this respect is not only the appointment of different CEOs for the port after every change in the national government but also the close links between the appointed CEOs and the two dominant parties in Greece. Yannis Genitsaris ThPA’s CEO since 1996, who managed the shift from the public ThPA to ThPA SA and its listing on Athens Stock Exchange, was replaced by Yannis Tsaras right after the election of New Democracy in 2004 to be replaced by Stelios Ageloudis in 2009 after PaSoK’s re-election. Tsaras has for a long time been a member of New Democracy. After his resignation from ThPA, he was responsible for designing Panagiotis Psomiatzis’ programme during the latter’s – successful – candidacy as the first elected regional leader in Thessaloniki in 2010 supported by New Democracy (Agelioforos, 2010a, Agelioforos, 2010c). On the other hand, Ageloudis’ choice was reported in the media to be strongly supported by the then Defence Minister and later president of PaSoK, Thessaloniki’s local MP, Evangelos Venizelos. As the local newspaper Agelioforos reports: “Venizelos being first in the electorate’s choice in the city (...) selected and imposed the CEO of ThPA (...) to be mr Stylianos Ageloudis, Venizelos’ ‘right hand’ in Thessaloniki” (Agelioforos,
2010b). Ageloudis was later appointed as the director of Venizelos’ political office when he became president of PaSoK in 2012 (Real.gr, 2012). Within this configuration, the Greek entrepreneurial state, actively sought to promote financialization and deregulation to construct favourable conditions for global and local infrastructure capitals. The next section traces the choreographies of this politics through a series of fragmented – and ultimately failed – neoliberal experiments with urban infrastructure as these unfolded through ThPA.

6.5 Performing fragmented neoliberal experiments on the “Port of the Balkans”

During the 2000s the spaces and infrastructure of Thessaloniki’s port were the epicentre of a series of neoliberal-inflicted restructuring projects. In effect, however, none of these fragmented and often conflicting projects materialized. Two examples are indicative in this respect and constitute the focus of this section. On the one hand, the conflictual characteristics of the real estate development master plan for the revitalized old port and the construction of a submerged cross-city channel passing through the same spaces. On the other, the construction of a logistics centre in the container terminal in juxtaposition with the expansion of the terminal out to sea. This section offers a reading of the governing structures around these projects and traces the implications of performing neoliberalization for urban politics.

6.5.1 ‘Submerging’ Thessaloniki’s Waterfront Development

Since its listing on the Athens Stock Exchange in July 2001, ThPA embarked on the design of a Master Plan for the development of the spaces of the old port, which were partly integrated in the urban fabric through the interventions of the Cultural Capital. The Master Plan, commissioned to Impetus SA, was oriented towards “the formulation of a development concept and an implementation framework for Thessaloniki Waterfront Development” and was completed in May 2003 (Impetus SA, 2005: 1). The waterfront redevelopment project evolved around the construction of a leisure and entertainment complex
in the old port (Impetus SA, 2005, Y. Ts. 3/2011). The overall aim of the scheme was to maximize land rent extraction (Impetus SA, 2005). To do so, the plan sought to draw from the redevelopment of the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront in Cape Town in which the company had been involved (Impetus SA, 2005). In particular, the Master Plan attempted to benefit from “property management systems and procedures used at the V&A Waterfront that have been developed and improved over the years” (Impetus SA, 2005: 2). Here, the division of services into “various functional activities of expertise” was narrated as of particular “further value for the Thessaloniki project” (Impetus SA, 2005: 2, Figure 12).

Figure 12 Thessaloniki Waterfront Project
(Source: Impetus SA, 2005: 1)

Building on such an approach, a multiplicity of fragmented projects was designed for the old port and was coupled with the re-design and changes in the uses of the revitalized warehouses of the port (V. H. 3/2011, Y. Ts. 3/2011). Concerning the latter the master plan suggested the subletting of the warehouses to cinema multiplexes and other leisure activities companies, trying to benefit from similar activities developed in V&A Waterfront in “leasing, the drawing up of leases relevant to waterfront properties (…) [and] strategic marketing” (Impetus SA, 2005: 2). Concerning the former, the two major projects were the construction of yacht mooring facilities (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 603) and the construction of a luxury hotel in the building of the passenger terminal of the port designed by Eli Modiano in 1909 (V. H. 3/2011, Y. Ts. 3/2011, Figure 13). The incorporation of the projects – apart from the one
referring to the luxury hotel – in the municipality’s Strategic Plan signalled the re-affirmation of the municipality’s and ThPA’s commitment in attempting to attract private capital investments in the development of the port. As a result, ThPA SA, the Municipality of Thessaloniki and ThPO actively engaged in drawing rough planning lines around a multiplicity of projects to be marketed to infrastructure and real estate funds. The study for the construction of yacht mooring facilities, for example, had a budget of €100,000 that was covered at 50% by Thessaloniki’s Municipality, 45% by ThPA and 5% by ThPO (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 603). In turn, Impetus’ experience in V&A Waterfront and the ‘success’ of the Cape Town project were mobilized to discursively legitimize such neoliberal policies. As the then CEO of ThPA highlighted: “our co-operation with a consultancy company with international experience – they have been involved in Cape Town waterfront redevelopment – proves our motive to learn from successful cases and our commitment to modern policies in waterfront redevelopment” (Y. Ts., 3/2011).

However, the projects designed under the aegis of “Thessaloniki’s Waterfront Development” scheme were in stark contradiction with the construction of a submerged cross-city channel incorporated in the city’s Master Plan since 1985 (Hellenic Republic, 1985: Article 14 – Annex 3.1.7). This large-scale infrastructure project had over the years acquired a central position in
public and policy discourses in Thessaloniki, elevated to a legendary level (Kafkalas et al., 2007). As planned and concretized in subsequent Master Plans (ThPO, 1995, Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005), the submerged channel was to have its western entrance next to the revitalized first pier of the port and to pass through its spaces (Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, 2007: 3-6, Figure 14).

Figure 14 The western entrance of the submerged cross-city channel
Source: (Kafkalas et al., 2007)

The first planning schemes around the submerged channel were initiated in 1996 and involved the negotiation of the different dimensions of the project within the “committee on the supervision and guidance of the Submerged Channel”. The committee brought together a host of local institutions and in particular Thessaloniki’s prefecture, Thessaloniki’s Planning Organization, Municipality of Thessaloniki, Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, Ministry of Culture and ThPA (Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, 2007). Within such a context, the planning details were negotiated between the different stakeholders within the overarching consensus over the neoliberal financing, construction and governance of the project. It is during these negotiations that ThPA’s board – still as a public organization – declared that ThPA “accepts the results of the preliminary study and particularly the
sections relating to the area of Thessaloniki’s Port” (ThPA, 1997). At this time, the project enjoyed the support of both local state institutions – approved unanimously by the city council in June 1998 and the prefecture council in October 2000 – and the national government (Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, 2007: 5).

The call for bids for the project was issued in 2002 and attempted to construct a PPP, a method that was needed “for decades in the construction of major highway projects but ideological rigidities, delayed its formulation” (Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, 2007: 2). During the decade that followed and despite the delays in its implementation but, more importantly, the contestation against it by citizens, the project enjoyed the unquestionable support of the city’s political elite and especially of Mayor Vassilis Papageorgopoulos and prefecture leader Panagiotis Psomiadis – both members of the conservative party of New Democracy and in power during the entire decade of the 2000s.

Consequently, in October 2006 an agreement was signed between the Greek State and Thermaikos SA consortium to construct a 6.5 kilometres long highway – 4.5 of which would be under water – at a total cost of €517 million (Kafkalas et al., 2007: 11, Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, 2007). The consortium brought together two of the major construction companies in the country EllAktor SA and Themeliodomi SA and two global infrastructure providers, Archirond Group N.V. and Boskalis International B.V. (Kafkalas et al., 2007, Ministry of Environment Planning and Public Works, 2007). The agreement fuelled a renewed stronger round of opposition against the project articulated around concerns over its socio-environmental and urban planning consequences as well as its economic viability. Besides, Thermaikos SA was granted the privilege to alter traffic and other planning regulations through the whole city centre to facilitate the operation of the submerged channel. Hence, the project was criticized for subjugating any issue to the interests of the construction consortium (Kafkalas et al., 2007). Despite the formal envelope of all inclusive governance-beyond-the-state negotiating the details of the project with a view towards consensus formation, what actually happened in the case of the submerged channel is that “the political system in cooperation with construction companies mystified the benefits of the Submerged Channel and essentially
imposed the project, promoting the relevant resolutions” (Kafkalas et al., 2007: 12). The institutional web of governance-beyond-the-state created “places that do not leave any space for the democratic invention of polemic”, (Rancière, 2006a: 82) operating within an already forged consensus over the inevitability neoliberal urban policies.

Interestingly enough, the contradictory character of the two projects did not prevent the incorporation of both of them in Thessaloniki’s strategic plan (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005). However, ThPA’s “Thessaloniki’s Waterfront Development” master plan stood, from its swathe, in stark contradiction with a large-scale urban project not only institutionalized in the city’s strategic planning but also with the active support of ThPA from the early stages of its design. As the then CEO of ThPA noted:

> “the Master Plan designed could never attract private capital to invest in the first and second piers with the project of the Submerged Channel hanging above them. Heavy construction activities with subsequent increased noise and dust in the piers and more importantly the destruction and re-construction of parts of the first pier for over 3 years, would not allow any ‘reasonable’ investor to invest in the port” (Y. Ts. 3/2011).

In effect, the commitment of the local and national state over both projects created a conundrum, binding the future development of the revitalized port with the developments around the submerged channel.

The conundrum was ultimately resolved in 2009 when the consensual negotiations around the submerged city-channel failed to facilitate the interests of the infrastructure capital involved. The project was ultimately postponed under the decision of the Council of State to request further consideration of its environmental and planning aspects. In light of these developments, the construction consortium, not only withdrew its interest, but also resorted to the Greek justice claiming compensations of €130 million on the cancelation of the project (Agelioforos, 2009, Ta Nea, 2010). The Greek state was ultimately convicted to pay €67 million in compensation for the cancelation of the project to Thermaiki Odos SA (Theodoropoulos, 2011). In parallel, bound with the developments around the submerged channel, none of the projects of “Thessaloniki’s Waterfront Development” materialized.
During the same period, in light of the increasing volumes of cargo transports through the port, Thessaloniki’s transportation infrastructure and its linkages with international networks attracted significant discursive and policy interest. Not surprisingly, the city’s port held a primary role in this strategy. As phrased in Thessaloniki’s Strategic Plan:

“(…) the port will not be simply a terminal in shipping and transshipment of goods but will evolve to an intermediate node in the organization and channeling of flows of freight by land or air to water and vice versa (intermodal hub)” (2005: 125).

The construction of the International Freight Centre of Thessaloniki (IFCT), as incorporated in the city’s strategic plan, was at the forefront of such policies (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 499). The port is doubly inscribed in the project through the expansion of its container terminal out to sea (Figure 15) and the construction of an intermodal freight centre linking its spaces with the industrial era of western Thessaloniki in Sindos (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 502-503).
The role of circulating policy models in legitimizing neoliberal policy schemes is of particular importance here. Thessaloniki’s Strategic Plan attempted to “identify cities that have some common elements with Thessaloniki and can serve as a benchmark for effective interventions applied in various aspects of urban space leading to integrated and sustainable urban development” (2005: 386). After identifying six such European cities: Barcelona, Lyon, Manchester, Birmingham, Munich and Milan; the plan goes on to evaluate them on the basis of a series of quantified criteria (2005: 387-414). Among them, Barcelona is selected as the closest example to which Thessaloniki should aspire (2005: 414). The prominent reasons cited for its selection are the city’s “port of intraregional importance” and Barcelona’s status as “an international example of rapid and successful urban development” (2005: 415). In Thessaloniki’s municipality strategic plan Barcelona is treated as a model of good governance to be transferred in the context of the city. Interestingly enough, in so doing, particular emphasis is paid to Barcelona’s Delta Plan around the construction of a transportation node. This is actually the only ‘successful’ policy example mentioned in detail in the strategic plan (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 422). The locally embedded project, then, is elevated to a policy model which acquires the status of a techno-managerial successful and efficient practice that is to be followed in Thessaloniki.

Following Barcelona’s good governance practice the construction of the IFCT brought together a multiplicity of stakeholders in its planning and implementation (Figure 16). Local and national state institutions, quasi-privatized infrastructure companies and local civil society institutions formulated a complex institutional web of governance-beyond-the-state. Once again the overarching principles were the consensual arrangement of the interests of the involved stakeholders and the formulation of suitable planning and legal regulations necessary in attracting mobile infrastructure capital to invest in the project. The city’s strategic plan summarizes the aims of this framework of governance:

“promote the comparative advantages of the urban system within increasing global competition among cities [through] (...) a wide alliance working for the city’s development [and] achieving the broad consensus of representatives of the private, public and civil
society to create a common development vision” (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 493).

Hence, in negotiating the construction of IFCT local institutions like the Greek International Business Association (SEVE), Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry (EVETH), the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece (SVVE) and the Hellenic Chambers Transport Association (EESYM) were strong supporters of the project. For the city’s economic elite the transformation of Thessaloniki into a logistics hub for South East Europe, was essential in “increasing the competitiveness of businesses in Northern Greece by reducing transportation costs to and from foreign markets and developing and improving the competitiveness of transportation and logistics companies” (Technical Chamber of Greece, 2010: 13).

Within such a governance framework, the efforts towards the construction of the IFCT were initiated in 2003, when ThPA SA and Hellenic Railways (OSE), through the quasi-privatized company GAIAOSE SA – established to initiate real estate projects over OSE’s property –, began negotiations over the construction of the IFCT. The initial investment plan which
amounted to €130 million foresaw the mobilization of two spaces: a land plot of 300 acres – later reduced to 100 acres – in ThPA’s container terminal and a second land plot of 672 acres at former military camp Gonou in Sindos Industrial area (Technical Chamber of Greece, 2010: 14, Figure 17). The spaces within the port were intended to serve maritime transport activities and freights, while the spaces in Sindos were to be used for transshipment, storage and rail transport (Technical Chamber of Greece, 2010). The operation of the IFCT was planned to begin in 2009.

The legal framework for the construction of logistic centres in Greece was formulated in April 2005. Only private companies were allowed to construct and manage logistic centres (Hellenic Republic, 2005). In parallel, the ability to use Free Trade Zones within port areas in the construction of logistic centres was institutionalized (Hellenic Republic, 2005). As a result, Logistic Centers SA was established by OSE to undertake the construction of two logistic centers in Thessaloniki and Athens (Technical Chamber of Greece, 2010). Subsequently, ThPA SA and Logistic Centers SA signed a memorandum of understanding around the IFCT. In 2007, as part of the wider restructuring of OSE, Logistic Centers SA was absorbed by GAIAOSE SA. During the same year, the Ministry of Economics granted to GAIAOSE the right to use the 672 acres of land in the former Gonou camp for an indefinite period of time (Technical Chamber of Greece, 2010). In effect, the public land of Gonou camp was transferred to
GAIAOSE SA, with the sole purpose of constructing the IFCT (Hellenic Republic, 2007: Article 18).

However, already since 2005 the construction of the IFCT was in stark contradiction with the other large-scale project that was planned for the container terminal of the port: its expansion out to sea. In 2005 ThPA’s strategic investment plan expected the project to materialize through the “imminent privatization” of the container terminal (2005: 1). Attracting a global transport operator and infrastructure capital was the epicenter in the materialization of this policy (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005). In 2006, during the announcement of the loan agreement between the Greek State, ThPA and the European Investment Bank to support the expansion of the container terminal, Minister of Mercantile Marine Manolis Kefalogiannis emphatically confirmed the government’s intention to concession the container terminal (Macedonian Press Agency, 2006).

It is no surprise, then, that the development of the IFCT became a conundrum. The priorities of ThPA and the (local and national) government, at the time, were such that the interests of the global operator that would acquire the container terminal were determinant at the expense of the freight centre. In effect, the investor's business plan would determine the approach towards the construction of the freight centre. Hence, the local and national state’s approach towards urban planning, evolving around the fragmentation of urban infrastructure projects to attract mobile capitals, already from its design undermined the construction of the IFCT. The consensus formulated among the involved stakeholders – and especially ThPA’s engagement with the project – was ultimately a consensus over the priority of mobile capitals in choosing between fragmented neoliberal projects to invest. In ThPA’s case the fragmented character of neoliberal experiments with urban infrastructure turned into an unresolved conflict. In 2009, the plan over the construction of the IFCT was cancelled and the Minister of Transport, Costis Hadjidakis, announced the redesign of the spatial planning of the IFCT limited within the confines of the former military Gonou camp (Technical Chamber of Greece, 2010). Until today, however, the IFCT has not begun its operation.
6.5.3 Performing neoliberalization and maintaining local and national state legitimacy

The fragmented neoliberal experiments that unfolded through the spaces of the port are an integral part of the wider neoliberalization of urban politics. Thessaloniki’s 2005 strategic plan comments on the “lack of integrated planning (…) that would lead to coordinated, real-time response to requirements” (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 125). As the previous section highlighted, the articulation of a multiplicity of fragmented neoliberal projects through the spaces of the port turned their future trajectory into a conundrum. The efforts to ex post present these projects as a comprehensive strategic plan did not mitigate such lack. Rather, it crystallized national and local state’s commitment in all of the often conflicting projects. Either by actively prioritizing the interests of a particular infrastructure capital consortium – as in the case of the submerged channel – or by engaging in inherently contradictory policies around infrastructure – as in the case of the IFCT –, the local and national state deepened the inherent fragmentation of neoliberal urban restructuring projects. The city was transformed into a playground; a fair for global and local infrastructure capital to pick which project to implement (or not) from a multiplicity of fragmented – often conflicting – projects on the basis of financial criteria. The objective constrains of urban politics were, thus, assimilated with the logic and choices of the world market.

In *Disagreement* Rancière comments on how “[t]he absolute identification of politics with the management of capital is no longer the shameful secret hidden behind the ‘forms’ of democracy; it is the openly declared truth by which our governments acquire legitimacy” (1999: 113). In the case of Thessaloniki’s port performing neoliberal urban restructuring was the central strategy in maintaining local and national state legitimacy. Proclaiming to manage “the givens of the new European and global reality of intra-urban competition” (Hellenic Republic, 1999b: 3), urban politics were reduced to consensual negotiations between infrastructure capitals and the entrepreneurial state. As Rancière goes on to argue in conceptually legitimizing consensus politics “proof of the right of state power is identical to the evidence that it only
ever does the only thing possible, only ever what is required by strict necessity in the context of the growing intricacy of economies within the global market” (1999: 112-113).

Hand in glove with this strategy, these neoliberalization experiments introduced and consolidated, through failing forward, a reorganization of governance. Urban governance was transferred to a complex, fragmented institutional web beyond-the-state in a multiplicity of scales. Involving a plethora of stakeholders this mode of governance evolved around “achieving the broad consensus of representatives of the private, public and social sector of the city to create a common development vision” (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005: 493). The act of governing the urban was thus reconfigured to a stakeholder based arrangement in which traditional state forms partake together with experts, quasi-private institutions, local institutions and infrastructure capitals; a fragmented arrangement not directly accountable to any people. This failing forward neoliberalization, thus, constituted a fragmented and uneven passage to new forms of urban governance, wherein the ‘outsourcing’ of state activities together with the still prominent role of the state “render the boundary between public and private organizations permeable” (Stoker, 1998: 38). In this sense, it signaled “not a diminishment or reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities, but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government” (Lemke, 2002: 50). However, this allegedly all-inclusive mode of governance effectively effaced the possibility of dissent over what should constitute an urban infrastructure politics and for whom, reducing them to the consensual negotiation of competing stakeholder interests.

6.6 Conclusion

In quasi-privatizing ThPA and actively promoting a series of neoliberal projects around the port of Thessaloniki, the local and national state institutionalized market efficiency and financial assessment as the unquestionable guiding principles in producing and governing urban infrastructure. However, the state maintained close control over the port. Hence,
it adopted an entrepreneurial attitude towards the production of the urban fabric evolving around real estate activities and PPPs in planning and materializing large-scale urban projects.

Understanding neoliberalization as a performative discourse, the chapter argued that neoliberalization should be read as a means and its product at the same time. In Greece and Thessaloniki, in particular, neoliberalization discourses constructed a functionalist and performative understanding of urban politics. The urban large-scale project has been fetishized in the political lexicon of the city and the country. As the previous chapter has suggested, this fetishization can be traced back to the years of the Cultural Capital. The failure to materialize any such project during the 2000s in Thessaloniki, the non-existence of the project as such has been inscribed in this logic. In this sense, the chapter argued that the fragmented neoliberal projects that were planned around the port’s spaces and infrastructure should not be read as isolated and disjointed instances but rather as the hegemonic strategy in producing and governing urban space and infrastructure. Proclaiming to manage the givens of global and European reality, local and national elites attempted to maintain their legitimacy through performing neoliberalization. They attempted to impose their logic and explanation over the situation of the absence of the fetishized project.

In parallel, understanding neoliberalization as a failing forward process, the chapter suggested that through their very failure the planned projects constructed and institutionalized new modes of governance-beyond-the-state. On the one hand, this reorganization did not signal the diminishment of the role of the state but rather introduced informal techniques of techno-administrative governing. On the other, this mode of governance reduced policymaking around urban space to a consensual negotiation between stakeholders. Urban politics and governance were gradually moved beyond democratic accountability.
Chapter 7
Privatizing Thessaloniki’s port container terminal: Glocal infrastructure funds and the post-democratization of urban infrastructure politics

7.1 Introduction

“(...) the creation of transport infrastructures depends upon speculative and political mechanisms rather than upon more usual market mechanisms” (Harvey, 1982: 379)

Taking its cue from the previous chapter, this chapter engages with, yet another, neoliberal urban policy around the port of Thessaloniki which ultimately failed. Specifically, in January 2006, the government of conservative New Democracy announced its decision to concession the container terminals of the two major Greek ports, Piraeus and Thessaloniki. The plan sought to draw international capital and know-how, through the attraction of investments by major global container terminal operators, in order to enhance the country’s role as a transportation hub in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Thessaloniki’s port, in particular, the investments were narrated as an opportunity to become the central node in container traffic in the Balkans (Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 2006). Despite public opposition, the plans for the concession of Thessaloniki’s container terminal continued to constitute the cornerstone of the government’s port policy that crystallized in the public tender for its concession on January 15th 2008 (ThPA, 2008e). As a result ThPA SA signed a temporary concession agreement with the Hutchison-Alapis consortium. The consortium brought together a major global terminal operator and a Greece-based investment fund under the aegis of Alapis pharmaceutical company (ThPA, 2008d). However, the efforts towards the privatization of the container terminal ultimately failed on December 23rd 2008, when Hutchison-Alapis announced its withdrawal from the agreement (ThPA, 2009b).

The de(re-)regulation of urban infrastructure networks and the hegemonization of neoliberal infrastructure politics is hardly a new phenomenon.
During the past decade a prolific body of geographical research has sought to analyze the complex relationships between infrastructure networks, neoliberal urban polic(y)ing and the governance of urban infrastructure in a variety of contexts (Graham and Marvin, 2001, McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008). This entails, for example, research on the shift towards the privatization of urban infrastructure in the ‘Global North’ (Bakker, 2003, Graham and Marvin, 2001, Kaika, 2005); the financialization of urban infrastructure provision and management (Clark, 2005, Haughton and McManus, 2012, Torrance, 2008); and the reorganization of governance of urban infrastructure networks (Graham, 2000, Offner, 2000, Torrance, 2008). As McFarlane and Rutherford suggest, this body of research opened up “the ‘black box’ of urban infrastructure to explore the ways in which infrastructures, cities and nation states are produced and transformed together” (2008: 364). In this line of argument, urban infrastructure networks are understood as a contextualized and conflict-ridden issue. In parallel, this corpus of research is building upon a conceptualization of urban infrastructure networks as trans-local: incorporating “multifaceted and multi-scalar links elsewhere” (Torrance, 2008: 6).

Yet, traditional accounts of privatizations of container terminals have too often focused on global dynamics, techno-managerial aspects of port governance and the corporate geographies of major terminal operators (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2009, 2012, Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2009). Similarly, in Thessaloniki’s container terminal concession case, academic research has been confined to the realms of transport geography and port economics focusing on organizational, managerial and technical aspects (Pallis, 2007b, Psaraftis, 2007, Vaggelas, 2007)15. In other words, what is missing from accounts of the temporary agreement between the Greek state, ThPA and the Hutchison-Alapis consortium is the political. On the other hand, the emerging body of empirical studies around the post-politicization and post-democratization of urban politics within geography (Baeten, 2009, Raco, 2012, Raco and Lin, 2012) has not yet engaged extensively with the politics of urban infrastructure networks (for an exception see Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010).

15 Actually, this academic discourse has a major imprint in the formulation of port policies in Greece as Dr Athanassios Pallis served as the general secretary on Ports and Port policy for the Ministry of Development, Competitiveness and Marine for the years 2011 and 2012; while Dr George Vaggelas as of 2009 is the consultant of ThPA’s CEO.
This chapter argues that the temporary concession of Thessaloniki’s port container terminal is a key site to understand the post-democratization of urban infrastructure politics. In order to do so, it highlights how infrastructure unbundling and financialization created the spaces for the formation of glocal infrastructure investment and operation funds, furthering the dependence of the construction and management of urban infrastructure on speculative and political moves. Hence, through a reading of the politics around the concession of Thessaloniki’s port container terminal, the chapter seeks to analyze how and for what reasons local and national politico-economic elites attempted to discursively post-politicize urban infrastructure politics through a series of tactics. Building on a reading of these tactics, it argues that this discursive post-politicization served to silence the close interplay of local and national political and economic elites.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, it analyzes the theoretical concerns that underpin the argument, tracing the links between the emergence of glocal infrastructure funds and the post-democratization of urban politics. Second, it seeks to unearth the flows of money and power involved in the process of the concession of the container terminal. In doing so, it reads the construction of the Hutchison-Alapis consortium as the emergence of a glocal infrastructure fund, that bounds together global and local actors and dynamics. Third, it delves into the hegemonic politics around the concession of the container terminal to analyze the practices and discourses through which local and national elites attempted to silence dissent against it. Fourth, focusing on Hutchison-Alapis’ withdrawal, it brings the two traits of the argument together to highlight the limits of consensual urban politics. A concluding part summarizes the argument and highlights the centrality of such practices in Greek urban politics.

7.2 Reproducing urban infrastructure spaces: ‘glocal’ infrastructure funds and the post-democratization of urban infrastructure politics

This chapter reads the efforts towards the concession of Thessaloniki’s port container terminal as a process of discursive and material construction of
new infrastructure spaces through which strategies of coalitions of interests unfold, new governance and accumulation regimes are forged and uneven choreographies of power are played out and (re-)produced (Graham, 2000, Graham and Marvin, 2001, Harvey, 1982, Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000). In other words, it understands Thessaloniki’s port container terminal as what McFarlane and Rutherford call “political infrastructures” (2008). It does so, however, through an understanding that builds on the constitutive difference between politics and the political. The contested and changing policies and governance of urban infrastructure, evidenced in recent years, can provide the starting point for such an analysis. This section focuses on the privatization and financialization tendencies around urban infrastructure and the subsequent emergence of glocal infrastructure operation and investment funds to trace their implications for urban infrastructure politics and their links with post-democratization.

The privatization of urban infrastructure is hardly a new phenomenon. The last two decades have witnessed a trend towards the return to private ownership, management and financing of infrastructure in the global North after four decades of mainly public provision (Bakker, 2003, Graham, 2000, Graham and Marvin, 2001, Kaika, 2005, Offner, 2000). In effect, the privatization of urban infrastructure networks remains one of the central elements of “neoliberal orthodoxies” (Raco and Lin, 2012: 155) promoted by a series of multilateral organizations like the World Bank (Kooy and Bakker, 2008) and the European Union (Pallis, 2007a). In a highly differentiated landscape of port policies throughout the EU, the commission sought since 2001 to promote the privatization and liberalization of ports across the union (Psaraftis, 2005). While a multiplicity of institutional configurations were established in member states, involving local and national state at different degrees (Psaraftis, 2005), the assumption that the privatization and liberalization of port infrastructures will increase their competitiveness and efficiency lies at the core of this policy orientation (European Commission, 2001). Port governance is reduced to a techno-managerial problem to be solved following market efficiency and economic rationality. In this sense, the privatization of container terminals is at the heart of “assumption-based, post-political agenda(s)” (Raco and Lin, 2012: 159).
As a consequence of this policy orientation, a profitable market niche was created for powerful transnational infrastructure operators (Graham, 2000, Poole, 1998). Hand in glove with the privatization of urban infrastructures, the last two decades witnessed an unprecedented financialization of urban infrastructure, opening up an accumulation terrain for global infrastructure funds and linking globally, locally unbundled, infrastructure networks (Clark, 2005, Torrance, 2008). Focusing on container terminals, in particular, the two processes are inherently interlinked as the major global terminal operators are also major players in a series of mergers, acquisitions and speculative investments in cooperation with investment banks, hedge funds and private equity groups (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012, Pallis et al., 2008). In parallel, transnational actors, like global operators, seek to embed their activities within urban landscapes. In so doing, they forge “considerable links to the actors present within the respective host localities” (Hess, 2004: 180). This is particularly so, for global terminal operators who need to embed their activities in local economies and logistics chains establishing links “with local partners in order to set up successful operations within the confines of the local commercial, economic and governmental environment” (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012: 9). Hence, glocal infrastructure investment and operation funds are created, assembling global corporations with local economic actors firmly rooted within the politico-economic and institutional urban context. In this sense, the importance of local actors in shaping the trajectories of urban infrastructure is not diminishing, rather the power to do so is even further concentrated in the hands of elite actors.

The tendency towards the neoliberalization of urban infrastructure politics also entails a reorganization of their governance. Research on such de(re-)regulated urban infrastructure spaces has documented that their governance is increasingly regulated through the legal obligations and contractual mechanisms that bind the relationships between state or local actors with investors and operators (Babcock-Lumish and Clark, 2005, Clark, 2005, Clark and Evans, 1998). Hence, the governance of urban infrastructure is gradually shifting towards market mechanisms as private actors, either in the form of global operators or through investment funds, create governance rules and regimes in cooperation and interaction with the (local and national) state. This
reorganization of infrastructure governance, leads to what Torrance calls “glocal infrastructure governance”: “‘glocal’ products, owned by global owners and regulated by local actors are developing (...) based on the rule of law, through which global players own and manage infrastructure assets in various countries in just one portfolio” (2008: 2). These entities are neither public nor private but in-between. Within such a configuration, the governance of urban infrastructure is gradually slipping beyond democratic control and accountability to an apparatus of unauthorized expert managers. In parallel, politics is reduced to the consensual negotiation of contract rules and obligations between the national and local state and business elites.

Jointly marshalled the creation of glocal infrastructure investment and operation funds and the glocal governance of urban infrastructure networks contribute towards the post-democratization of urban politics. On the one hand, infrastructure politics “is really shaped in private by an interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests” (Crouch, 2004: 4). On the other, following Rancière, the spread of the power of law is a central element in the conceptual legitimization of consensual politics:

“in the growing equivalence of the production of relationships of law and management of market forces, in endless cross-reference of law and reality whose final word is pure and simple identification of democratic ‘form’ with the managerial practice of bowing to commercial necessity” (1999: 112).

This being said, as McFarlane and Rutherford argue “global trends are differentially experienced, and take place in different contexts of fragmentation of networked infrastructures in different parts of the world” (2008: 365). The construction of infrastructure spaces is not socially and politically neutral, but to the contrary, manifests and re-configures socio-cultural and politico-economic power relations (Giglioli and Swyngedouw, 2008, Kaika, 2005, 2006, McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008). In effect, infrastructure production and management is a process criss-crossed by contested politics that are played out in quite distinct forms in different urban contexts (Bakker, 2004, Graham and Marvin, 2001, Hall et al., 2003, Laurie and Crespo, 2007, Lobina, 2005). Ultimately, the success or failure of the trajectories of neoliberal infrastructure projects and policies – and what comes to be defined as such – depends on their hegemonization and the
socio-political struggles that unfold in light of their emergence (Kaika, 2005, Swyngedouw, 2007c). A vast armature of context-specific tactics is deployed to serve the legitimization of specific infrastructure projects articulating discursive and material elements and working towards their post-politicization (Baeten, 2009, Raco, 2012, Swyngedouw, 2007b). This post-politicization is understood here as a discursive process that seeks to efface the dimension of dissent and antagonism (Rancière, 1999, Žižek, 1999b) from the inherently contested construction of urban infrastructure projects, “forestall[ing] the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories for future (…) possibilities” (Swyngedouw, 2007c: 26). Understanding this process of post-politicization, thus, requires a close analysis of the actors who champion it and the tactics deployed to do so.

7.3 The temporary concession of Thessaloniki’s container terminal to Hutchison-Alapis: privatization initiatives and the creation of a glocal investment and operation fund

This section analyzes the particularities of the construction of the Hutchison-Alapis glocal infrastructure capital. It reads its emergence through ThPA’s call for bids and the flows of money that were involved in the concession agreement. In light of the steady increase in the port’s container traffic (Graph 2), ThPA’s master plan, designed in 2005, posited the expansion of the container terminal out to sea as the cornerstone of its further development (ThPA, 2005). The project foresaw the expansion of the pier’s scaffoldings by 870m and a total land expansion of 150 acres for an estimated cost of €100 million (Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 2006: 36, Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005, ThPA, 2006). Funding the extension project, however, was postulated as the major obstacle in its materialization by both local and national authorities (Ministry of Mercantile Marine, 2006, Papageorgopoulos, 2006, Kalantzis, 2006). Hence, in September 2006, an agreement was signed between ThPA and European Investment Bank – with the Greek state as guarantor – for a loan of €50 million covering 50% of the total budget of the expansion project (ThPA, 2007: 121). It is no surprise, that the agreement was formally celebrated as a turning point not only for the port but for
Thessaloniki in general. Formally announcing the agreement Minister of Mercantile Marine Manolis Kefalogiannis, Minister of Macedonia and Thrace Yiorgos Kalantzis and the city’s authorities – Mayor Vasilis Papagergopoulos and Prefecture Governor Panayiotis Psomiadis – concurred on this logic (Macedonian Press Agency, 2006).

It is during these celebrations that the Minister of Mercantile Marine, Manolis Kefalogiannis, emphatically reconfirmed the government’s policy-orientation and initial agreements with international terminal operators for “giga-investments in [Thessaloniki’s] port (…) concerning cargo handling and concession of activities” (Macedonian Press Agency, 2006). Hence, “(t)aking into account the entire range of the side constituents for the materialization of this objective, in 2006, the possibility to cede the Container Terminal to third party suppliers of port services was investigated” (ThPA, 2007: 68 emphasis added). This intention was met with severe opposition by the Port Labour Union who went on a two-month strike during the last months of 2006 (Ta Nea, 2006, Vaggelas, 2007, Yioyiokas, 2006a, 2006b). In light of the mobilizations, the government backed from the policy for almost a year to return with similar plans towards the end of
2007, with George Voulgarakis as the Minister of Mercantile Marine (Chiotis, 2007).

The renewed government initiative towards the privatization of ThPA’s container terminal led to the international call for tenders for the concession of the container terminal in January 15th 2008 (ThPA, 2008c). Building on the quasi-privatization of Thessaloniki’s port introduced in 1999 and by virtue of the concession contract signed during the same year, ThPA was entitled “to temporarily cede the use of the Authority’s Container Terminal port facilities to third parties for the purpose of expansion, development, operation and exploitation” (ThPA, 2008e: 8). The container terminal was to be ceded for a period of 30 years – with the compulsory option of an extension to 35 – to the highest bidder (ThPA, 2008e: 9). The concession agreement would effectively transfer the management and governance of the urban infrastructure space to the highest bidder with the details being specified in the concession contract (ThPA, 2008e). Thus, democratic accountability concerning the concession of the container terminal was, already from the call for bids, reduced to consensual negotiations between the involved stakeholders.

Parallel to this, ThPA’s call for bids attempted to guarantee that the terminal would be ceded to a major global terminal operator through mainly two terms included in the call. On the one hand, the bidders should:

“ha(ve) experience in the operation or participation in the operation or management of at least five (5) container terminals globally over the past three years. (...) The average container throughput over the past three years in the above terminals must amount to a cumulative total of over 5,000,000 TEUs” (ThPA, 2008e: 34).

On the other, the solvency of the bidder was to be guaranteed by the fact that the bidding companies should have:

“(a)n average net worth, or consolidated net worth in the case of affiliate companies, greater then €250,000,000 in the past three years. In the case of a joint venture, the weighted average of the net worth of every member of the JV shall be taken into consideration, for the past three fiscal years and based on the
percentile participation of every member of this group” (ThPA, 2008e: 41).

The call attracted three major container terminal operators Hutchison Port Holdings, Cosco Pacific and Dubai Port World (Table 4). With the exception of Cosco, the other global operators submitted their bids in cooperation with Greek investment and infrastructure funds. Hutchison cooperated with Lavrentis Lavrentiadis’ Alapis SA pharmaceutical company, while Dubai Port World with Piraeus Bank and Aktor SA. However, only Alapis SA participated as an equal partner with Hutchison in the joint venture (Alapis SA, 2008c). Actually, Alapis SA was the only company based in Greece that could match the criteria set out for joint ventures by the call for bids. Hutchison-Alapis offered a guaranteed total amount of €419.5 million, 2.5 times the fee offered by Cosco and 7 times the fee offered by Dubai Port World consortium (Table 4). According to ThPA’s CEO the bid exceeded even the most optimistic market forecasts (Y. Ts. 3/2011). As a result, in July 2008, ThPA announced a temporary agreement with Hutchison-Alapis consortium on the concession of the container terminal (ThPA, 2008d).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bids for Thessaloniki Port Container Terminal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concession Period: 30 Years</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nominal Price (Euro in 1000s)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cumulative annual fee (not guaranteed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cumulative annual guaranteed fee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Aktor SA is one of the major construction companies in Greece and has also been involved in the construction of Thessaloniki’s submerged channel (see chapter 6).
17 HPH LTD – HPI SARL – ALAPIS SA – LYD SA also submitted a bid for Piraeus container terminals that were finally ceded to Cosco Pacific SA.
Hutchison Port Holdings is one of the biggest container terminal operators worldwide in terms of TEUs handled (Table 5), number of terminals controlled and real estate land in its portfolio (Graph 3). Port operation activities and particularly container terminal operation underwent a significant restructuring over the past few decades with regional structures, often focused on a single port, being replaced by the development of multinational portfolios by global container terminal operators. Arguably, the increasingly high fixed costs associated with container terminal operation (cranes, IT technologies and deepwater ports) and more importantly policies towards the privatization of port activities through concession agreements amplified the trend towards the consolidation of the container terminal market (Notteboom, 2007, Pallis et al., 2008). Indeed, the ten biggest terminal operators control 60.9% of the global
container handling and 16,000 hectares of land (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012: 5, Table 2, Graph 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Million TEUS</th>
<th>Share</th>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Million TEUS</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hutchison</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>Hutchison</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>APM Terminals</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM Terminals</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P&amp;O Ports</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>DP World</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurogate</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>Cosco</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Throughput of the top five global container terminal operators
Compiled by the author, Source: (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012)

This consolidation trend was furthered between the years 2005 and 2007 – the period exactly before the temporary agreement for Thessaloniki’s port – that were marked by an unprecedented activity of mergers and acquisitions in global terminal operation activities at record prices (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012). Hutchison adopted an expansive strategy during the period increasing the number of ports that the company had interests at from 39 in 19 countries in 2004 to 47 in 24 countries in 2007 (Hutchison Whampoa Limited, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007).
It is through this current that Hutchison expanded its interests in Europe and the Southern Mediterranean creating a network that extended to four major European Ports (ECT in the Netherlands, the UK ports, TERCAT in Spain and Gdynia Container Terminal in Poland), Izmir Port in Turkey and Alexandria and El Dekheila ports in Egypt (Hutchison Whampoa Limited, 2007). During 2008 and before the outbreak of the Euro crisis, Hutchison continued to follow this aggressive strategy in Europe eventually acquiring majority interests in Amsterdam Container Terminals and Taranto Container Terminal (Hutchison Whampoa Limited, 2008) and submitting bids for the acquisition of a series of terminals including the Port of Piraeus and the Port of Thessaloniki in Greece.

Concerning Thessaloniki’s port in particular, its strategic location in the Balkan Peninsula configured it as an ideal entry point to the developing economies of the region and especially Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, FYROM and Albania, which constitute the port’s transit market (Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2008). Notably, transit cargo handling is a major activity for Thessaloniki’s terminal amounting steadily for above 25% of its total activity over the last decade (Graph 4) and covering above 10% of the transit market demand (Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2008). Actually, transit traffic in Thessaloniki’s port reached its peak, at 79,900 TEUs, only one year before the
temporary agreement with Hutchison-Alapis (Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2008: 57). Hence, with Dubai Port World operating the container terminal of Constanta port in Romania since 2004 and the ports of Bulgaria (Varna and Burgas), Croatia (Rijeka) and Albania (Durche) severely lacking in infrastructure and land (Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2008), Thessaloniki’s container terminal emerged as an ideal investment.

Graph 4 ThPA Container Terminal Traffic Analysis
Source: (ThPA, 2012a)

However, this is only one part of the story. Notably, within such a context, the scarcity of land for container terminal operations, particularly in the global North, together with the prospects for container growth attracted a multiplicity of investors like banks, hedge funds, private equity groups (for example Babcock and Brown, Macquarie Infrastructure and American International Group) in the period between 2000 and 2007 (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012, Pallis et al., 2008). As Notteboom and Rodrigue, write: “(n)ever before have so many major deals been closed in such a short space of time. Also, never were terminals and terminal operating companies acquired at such high valuations” (2012: 8). Hutchison has been involved in one of the major deals of this current of mergers and acquisitions through the acquisition of 20% of its shares by PSA (Hutchison Whampoa Limited, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). Hutchison-Alapis’ bid for Thessaloniki’s container terminal should, thus, be seen as an integral part of such moves. The guaranteed fee for the concession was approximately 21 times the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA) for the whole of ThPA’s activities in 2007 amounting to €19.9 million (ThPA, 2008f see also Table 4).

Hence, container terminals both as real estate and infrastructure spaces – often times located at the heart of urban fabrics (like in Thessaloniki’s case) – become doubly inscribed in increasingly globalized flows of money and goods. They are, therefore, evaluated as both infrastructure spaces within expansive transportation networks as well as assets in financial portfolios. Hence, the formation of a joint venture between Hutchison Port Holdings and Alapis SA for the bid for Thessaloniki’s container terminal should be understood as the combined result of the afore-mentioned processes. On the one hand, Hutchison’s strategy to expand its activities in the Balkan Peninsula – beyond the acquisition of the container terminal – would benefit greatly from the co-operation “with [a] local partner(...) in order to set up successful operations within the confines of the local commercial, economic and governmental environment” (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012: 9). On the other, the highly speculative character of the investment in the terminal, encompassing high risks to support and further a global expansion, configured the formation of a joint venture as an effective strategy for the spreading of risk.

As paradoxical as it may sound for a pharmaceutical company, Alapis SA together with its partner company Lyd (ΛΥΔ) SA constituted the ideal partner given the twofold reason for the creation of the joint venture. Alapis Group was founded in May 2007 after the mergers of four major Greek pharmaceutical companies (Elpharma, Lamda Detregents, Veterin and EVIK) with the tycoon Lavrentis Lavrentiadis as the major shareholder and chairman of the group (Alapis SA, 2007a). From its early steps Alapis benefited from the deregulation of financial markets and the devaluation of competing companies in the aftermath of Athens stock exchange downturn. Within only one year Alapis Group tripled its turnover through successive capital share increases and mergers and acquisitions (from €442 millions in 2007 to €1.16 billion in 2008) and profits (from €117 million in 2007 to €412 million in 2008) (Alapis SA, 2008b, Alapis SA, 2009, Graph 5). As Lavrentiadis describes Alapis’ first steps: “up to date we

18 Notteboom and Rodrigue estimate that a series of such deals were made at prices 15 to 25 times the EBITDA of the terminals (2012).
have made 16 acquisitions in Greece and the Balkans, having spent around €180 million” (Lavrentiadis, 2008).

On the one hand, then, Alapis group created a network of activities (factories, distribution and logistics) that spread throughout the Balkan Peninsula (Graph 5 and Figure 18). Control over port and logistics facilities was crucial for the rapid development of the production and marketing of chemical raw materials and products for both Alapis and Neochimiki LV Lavrentiadis SA – also owned by Lavrentiadis up to early 2008 (Kitsiou, 2008). Lavrentiadis, as the major shareholder of Neochimiki, placed particular emphasis in this sector configuring the company as the largest terminal operator in Greece and the Balkans. This was achieved predominantly through the acquisition of the refinery Rafinerija Nafta Beograd in Serbia to exploit its port and logistics services in Danube (Kitsiou, 2008). Hence, for Alapis the involvement in the concession of Thessaloniki’s container terminal constituted a qualitative leap in terms of activities, revenues and strategic advantage against its competitors in Greece. As the group’s chairman, Lavrentiadis put it in an interview in May 2008: “Our core
business is and remains pharmaceuticals. At that moment, it just felt right to work with Hutchison, which we know of old, in a project from which if we qualify – Cosco is a very strong opponent – only benefits will accrue to the shareholders of Alapis. Our food and detergents moving through ports represent 20% of our profits. The different pricing policy that we will surely have if we ‘win’ the piers, will improve our profitability margins” (2008).

Figure 18 Alapis Group Activities in Southern - Eastern Europe
Source: (Alapis SA, 2008a)

On the other hand, however, Alapis’ involvement in the bid for the concession of the container terminal is better understood as a speculative investment. In pursuing the expansion of the group’s activities Lavrentiadis, to a large extent, transformed Alapis to a private equity fund. Benefiting from a €640 millions debenture loan from a group of Greek and international banks and successive capital share increases of up to €440 million in 2007 (Alapis SA, 2008b) Alapis Group handled one of the biggest investment funds in the country19. Notably, only one week before the submission of the consortium’s bid, Lavrentiadis completed a major deal with the global private equity fund, The Carlyle Group, on the concession of Neoichimiki L.V. Lavrentiadis SA for an enterprise value of €749 million (Arnold and Hope, 2009). The deal yielded

19 The group of banks that issued the loan consisted of ABN AMRO BANK N.V, National Bank of Greece, Emporiki Bank, Piraeus Bank SA, BNP PARIBAS IRELAND, Geniki Bank SA, Attica Bank SA, Bank of Cyprus, and ALPHA BANK (Alapis, 2007:73)
Lavrentiadis around €130 million and was followed by his decision to announce a call for placements for up to 14% of his Alapis shares for a price around €210 million (Kitsiou, 2008). In the words of Lavrentiadis again:

“We have a fire-power of €1 billion to continue, but if we need more funds we can find them. We will soon start the second round of acquisitions as the financial crisis has already reset rational valuations on companies that are of interest to us” (2008).

The announcement of the temporary agreement between the consortium and ThPA, fuelled another circle of capital share increase for Alapis and the issuing of another convertible bond loan of up to €300 million (Alapis SA, 2008b). Hence, Alapis’ involvement in the concession of the container terminal was, in effect, a speculative accumulation move which aimed at “the effective short-term financial leverage of our investment funds” (Alapis SA, 2008c).

Thus, participating with equal shares in the creation of the joint venture, Hutchison Port Holdings and Alapis SA consortium should be understood as a glocal investment and operation fund. The unbundling and financialization of urban infrastructure spaces instigated the dynamics for the formulation of such an ensemble which took its particular form through the specificities of the institutional framework set out by local government actors – the state and ThPA. The interests of the involved stakeholders were effectively bound up, bringing into dialogue global dynamics with the local politico-economic landscape and in turn mutually shaping them. At the same time, it is through the local political context that the contested politics of infrastructure construction and management were played out. Within such a context, the discursive post-politicization of neoliberal infrastructure politics became pivotal in maintaining their legitimacy. It is to these processes that this chapter now turns.

7.4 The post-politicization of the Container Terminal concession: Silencing dissent, moralizing neoliberal infrastructure politics

Throughout the process, the decision to concession Thessaloniki’s port container terminal has been an issue of heated political debate at local and
national level (see for example Sichletidis, 2008b, To Vima, 2008). Port labour employees and opposing socio-environmental movements raised concerns over the public character of port services, the monopolistic conditions that the concession would create in Thessaloniki’s container terminal, the institutional framework around Port Authorities that would effectively lease public land and infrastructure to private capital as well as working conditions and labour force dismissal (F. G. 2/2011, Koutsamparis, 2008c, Yioyiokas, 2006b). In what follows, the chapter focuses on the period between 2006 and 2008 to chart the actors and the tactics through whom the post-politicization of the debate was consolidated as a legitimization strategy in performing neoliberal (urban) politics. The aim here is not to reconstruct the debate in its entirety, but to focus on the instances that highlight its post-politicization.

Since the initiation of the concession debate in 2006, Thessaloniki’s container terminal has been repeatedly narrated by local and national politico-economic elites as standing on a verge. In the hegemonic discourse, on the one hand, Thessaloniki’s container terminal had “significant opportunities for rapid development into a major regional gateway port in the Balkans” (Hellenic Republic, 2008: 12). On the other, it faced significant “international changes to which [it] need[ed] to adapt” (Hellenic Republic, 2008: 12). The following excerpt from ThPA’s 2006 annual report effectively summarizes the argument:

“The rapidly developing increase of the competition, especially in the field of containers, from the corresponding port terminals developed in the wider region, with use of private funds and under the management of specialised port services’ suppliers of worldwide range, exercises a significant pressure to the port of Thessaloniki as well. (...) On the other side, the data and forecasts show that the increase, as regards the handling of goods within the area, with the use of containers, shall remain increasing in the decades to follow, therefore, it is possible, under conditions, for the Container Terminal of Thessaloniki to collect significant cargos for handling” (ThPA, 2007: 68 emphasis added).
Hence, the hegemonic discourse over the concession of the container terminal evolved around determining the “thin ground, the ‘almost nothing’ of a possible”, “the minute difference that separates the prosperity to come from the misery hanging over us” (Rancière, 1999: 113). Tackling the inadequacies of existing port infrastructure and increasing the efficiency of the terminal, then deputy Prefect Tsamaslis argued, were exactly the conditions that required urgent attention in order to enhance the port’s competitiveness and “to achieve the development of Thessaloniki which will enhance prospects for new jobs” (Koutsamparis, 2008b). It is worth delving further into these two conditions in order to understand how they were knitted together to construct the concession of the container terminal as the only viable alternative.

Since its initiation as a publicly funded project during the late 1980s (Tanea, 2010), the expansion of Thessaloniki’s port container terminal out to sea has acquired a mythical status in popular and policy discourses in the city (A. G. 6/2011, V. K. 4/2011, Y. Ts., 3/2011). Successive failures to expand the container terminal throughout the past twenty years have been narrated in popular and policy discourses as a major obstacle in the development of the city (Greek Parliament, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2005). In the words of the then Mayor of Thessaloniki: “after 8 years of delays and stagnation, we found a way to finance the most important port project in northern Greece” (Papageorgopoulos, 2006). Despite ThPA’s net profits that run above €2.5 million per year since 2002 and at €13.87 million in 2007 (ThPA, 2007: 55) and the company’s reserves that stood at €61.4 million during the same year (ThPA, 2008a: 80), the issue of financing the extension were narrated as a major obstacle even after the loan agreement with the EIB. As Prefect Panayiotis Psomiadis – heavily exacerbating in the calculation of the cost of the project – put it: “the required investment capital of €280 million can not be covered by ThPA’s operating profits in the near future” (Koutsamparis, 2008b).

This rhetoric is inherently articulated with the discourse over the inefficiency of the public sector. Actually, the hegemonic discourse postulated the inefficiency of the public sector as the prime reason behind the failure of the expansion project. To quote again Panayiotis Psomiadis:

“May I remind you of “Eleftherios Venizelos” Airport, Attiki Odos highway, the Rio-Antirio bridge, projects [materialized by
the private sector] that changed the lives of citizens, but also of other projects constructed directly by the government, such as PATHE highway, which I remember that began under Constantinos Karamanlis and is still not completed, Egnatia highway that should have been completed five years ago (…)” (Koutsamparis, 2008b).

Beyond state inadequacy in materializing the expansion project, the public character of Thessaloniki’s container terminal was also narrated as a major cause of inefficiency in its operation. The report of the major Greek bank Alpha Bank on the competitiveness of the Greek port system, for example, summarizes the rhetoric:

“development opportunities are repeatedly lost in the sector of commercial ports as in other sectors in Greece (…) due to always the same reasons: a) extensive statism (…), b) foreclosure of competition when possible (…), c) pricing policies not related with productivity (…), d) workers industrial action that has resulted in sky-rocketing wages (…)” (2008: 23).


In effect, then, the two issues were intrinsically bound together, in popular and policy discourses, in narrating the concession of the container terminal as “the only way forward” according to the vice president of SVVE Yiannis Stavrou (Koutsamparis, 2008b). Further explicating the rationale behind the privatization the report that accompanied the respective law argued that for the port’s role “to remain significant and increase, Greek port system needs to
adapt to international standards and modern trade and transport needs, which necessitate the introduction of capital and expertise of the private sector. The concession of the Container Terminal is part of this process” (Hellenic Republic, 2008: 12 emphasis added).

Besides, the concession of the container terminal was narrated not only as a necessity but also as an opportunity for the city of Thessaloniki as a whole. In the words of the Minister of Mercantile Marine, Yiorgos Voulgarakis – during the announcement of the temporary agreement with Hutchison-Alapis: “(t)he most important thing is that Thessaloniki turns the page. With the implementation of the investment project and the parallel activities that will be developed, Thessaloniki will no longer be a small port that serves internal needs” (Mathiopoulou, 2008b). Hence, as the Minister of Macedonia and Thrace Margaritis Tzimas put it, through the temporary agreement:

“not only we won’t have to pay the port’s loan but the investor will have to undertake expansion and beautification projects. Consequently, Thessaloniki’s port will attract higher volume ships, transit of larger volume of goods will take place and new jobs will be created. Thessaloniki’s port will become the biggest in North Eastern Europe and one of the biggest in Mediterranean” (2008).

Constructed as a solution that promotes the “general interest of the people’ whose implementation overcomes the winners/losers form of resolution of conflicts” (Mouffe, 2005: 14), the politics around the concession of the container terminal were reduced to a consensual negotiation within an already designed framework. Hence, the government’s intention – at least at the level of announcements – was to proceed “this time [towards the] entrance of private actors in the ports through consensus, as the negotiations between the Ministry of Mercantile Marine and port labour are beginning to bear fruits” (Chiotis, 2007). A similar rhetorical tone can be traced in ThPA’s managerial discourse according to which:

“(t)he basic aim of the Administration for the year 2007 is to continue the materialization of the Container Terminal’s development, with the consent of the employees, by means of the positive dialogue that has already begun. The employees shall
exhibit adjustment to the events taking place in other competitive ports, in order to achieve the planned development and to fulfil [our] objectives” (ThPA, 2007: 68).

However, despite such announcements and the allegedly inclusive character of the institutional framework around the management of the port, certain exclusion borders were drawn again when the already forged consensus around the inevitability of the privatization was questioned. The wide variety of civil society organizations that opposed the government’s and ThPA’s intentions to cede the terminal were radically excluded from the meeting of ThPA’s board that was to decide the issuing of the call for bids for the terminal. This was achieved through a twofold strategy. At a rhetorical level – overlooking the great divergence of opinions within the group – those opposing the agreement were labelled as “romantics and fundamentalists” unable to understand the givens of contemporary infrastructure management (Greek Parliament, 2008a, 2008b). Parallel to this, however, policing urban public spaces proved to be an integral part of silencing dissent in this particular case. For, the workers’ representatives in ThPA’s board, together with a host of parliament members, were excluded with the mobilization of brute force by ThPA’s board meeting in order not to express their opposition (Sichletidis, 2008a, Figure 19).

Figure 19 Police SWAT Forces prevent ThPA workers and members of Parliament to participate in ThPA’s Board Meeting
Source: Eurokinisi
Within such a context, political antagonism was not eradicated but rather slept into the category of moralistic and legalistic discourse (Baeten, 2009, Mouffe, 2005, Rancière, 1999, Stavrakakis, 2007b). This trope of the post-politicization process becomes evident with reference to workers’ industrial action against the concession agreement. Already from the first month of industrial action in the port local and national newspapers began to portray an apocalyptic image concerning the consequences of the strike, with titles like: “Port strike brings the market to its knees” (Koutsamparis, 2008a), “Market facing double myocardial” (Kalli and Liamis, 2008), “The strike in ThPA sinks businesses” (Mathiopoulou, 2008a) and so on. In this spirit, the port workers were repeatedly narrated as a privileged minority stubbornly insisting on their particularistic demands against the general good (Alpha Bank, 2008). Similar positions were adopted by the board of ThPA that accused workers for “adopting a narrow-minded stance ignoring the interests of the organization and society” (St. Br. 3/2011, Y. Ts. 3/2011). As the President of SVVE, Yiorgos Mylonas, put it: “This industrial action has highlighted the inability of the State to come to terms with powerful minorities which do not seem able to appreciate that their extreme demands, with respect to their labour rights, are capable of holding our entire society to ransom. Unfortunately the stance adopted by just 180 workers at the port of Thessaloniki is endangering the whole economy of northern Greece, since the lack of raw materials has forced many of us to suspend our activities and lay off our employees. The attitude of just 180 men is jeopardising the wages of many of their fellow workers and endangering the future of the businesses in which they work” (2008: 3).

Eventually, the conflict around workers’ industrial action would dominate the agenda around the concession of the container terminal with the city’s economic elite, represented by SVVE, EVETH and SEVE and ThPA exchanging a series of extrajudicial notices during March 2008 (SVVE, 2008a). Hence, the debate around the concession was, since ThPA’s call for bids, gradually reduced to an issue of proper and improper political action
overshadowing concerns over the institutional framework introduced through the call for bids, management of public infrastructure spaces and working conditions and labour rights.

![Figure 20 Lavrentiadis' Nomination as Entrepreneur of the Year together with the President of Hellenic Federation of Industries (SEV) Daskalopoulos and EasyJet owner Hadjiioanou](source: Sokou, 2006)

Notably, contrary to port workers who were constructed as the moral evil against the general good, during the same period, Alapis’ CEO and major shareholder attracted the interest of Greek and foreign media as a “success story” and a “big player” (see for example Sokou, 2006, Hope, 2009). Nominated “Greek entrepreneur of the year 2006” by Ernst & Young consultancy group (Kathimerini, 2006, Sokou, 2006, Figure 20), Lavrentiadis managed within a span of ten years to become one of the highest profile and most celebrated actors in the Greek economy. Portrayed as “[a]ctively involved in philanthropic activities and avid collector of works of art”, Lavrentiadis was also described as “a rather shy man whose face, when speaking of the dynamic development of his companies, changes to transmit vigour and pride” (Sokou, 2006). As an entrepreneur who “ha[d] the passion required” to deal with the “everyday adventure” of doing business in the “unstable institutional environment, bureaucracy and corruption that dominates Greek economy” (Sokou, 2006) and whose engagement with the concession of the container terminal will “increase the earnings for all stakeholders and especially (…) ThPA” (Lavrentiadis, 2008). In effect, Lavrentiadis methodically constructed a high social profile through placements in the country’s media groups, one of its biggest football clubs (Olympiacos FC) and through close relations with the Christian Orthodox Church (Sokou, 2006, Nikolaidis, 2012, Pandora’s Box, 2012).
Hence, the discursive post-politicization of the concession of the container terminal was constructed and consolidated through the conscious efforts the city’s (and the country’s) politico-economic elite, the managerial personnel of ThPA and the private media. The next section seeks to unearth the limits of consensual politics and the rationale behind such a strategy by looking at the moment of rupture that the withdrawal of Hutchison-Alapis consortium created.

7.5 Hutchison-Alapis withdraws its interest: The failure of consensual negotiations and the reproduction of the country’s politico-economic elite

In December 2008 and after five months of consensual negotiations between ThPA and Hutchison-Alapis over the drafting of the concession contract the involved stakeholders had not yet reached an agreement. Arguably, the sharp decline in the sector’s throughput during the last quarter of 2008, following the outbreak of the crisis (Psaraftis and Pallis, 2012, Graph 6), had implications upon Hutchison’s speculative on mergers and acquisitions. As the company’s chairman narrated the story in 2008’s annual report:

“[i]n the current global economic environment, the Group is focused on maintaining strict operational and financial discipline to successfully execute its business strategy. (...) Looking ahead, (...) the unprecedented economic environment will have differing adverse effects on the Group’s various businesses around the world” (Hutchison Whampoa Limited, 2008: 9).

Announcing the acquisition of 70% of Amsterdam’s Container Terminal and the joint-ownership of Taranto port Container Terminal during the same month (Hutchison Whampoa Limited, 2008), Hutchison eventually backed from the concession agreement for Thessaloniki’s container terminal. On the 23rd of December 2008 ThPA announced, through a laconic statement, that: “the Consortium of Hutchison Port Holdings Limited, Hutchison Port Investments SARL, Alapis ABEE, Lyd AE has notified ThPA SA that it withdraws its interest from the concession of Thessaloniki’s Port Container Terminal” (ThPA, 2008b). In a further statement ThPA’s chairman
Lazaros Kanavouras attributed the development to the outbreak of the financial crisis (Imerisia, 2008). One year later, ThPA’s annual report also insisted that Hutchison “withdrew from [the] negotiations because of the global economic crisis which had affected shipping to a great degree and especially the carriage of goods by sea, and of course the ThPA container terminal by extension” (ThPA, 2010a: 22). Neither ThPA nor Hutchison made public any further details concerning the negotiations and the, then, members of ThPA’s board declined to provide any further details when interviewed.

![Graph 6 Throughput of major ports in the region (2000-2011)](image)

Compiled by the Author using Eurostat Cronos Data, ThPA data, Port of Taranto data and Port of Constanta data

Evidently, on the one hand, the speculative high fee for the concession (Table 4) that “exceeded even the most optimistic calculations of ThPA” (Y. Ts. 3/2011) constituted a major problem within the deteriorating economic context. Parallel to this, however, a series of Greek media publications at the time – citing ThPA executives who wished to remain anonymous – argued that the ultimately failed negotiations between the stakeholders involved a fundamental renegotiation of the terms of the agreement due to difficulties on behalf of the consortium to secure funding for its investment project for the port and reduced container traffic in light of the economic crisis (see among many others Kalli, 2008, Liamis, 2009, Yiannakidis, 2008, Lampropoulos, 2008). By deciding to
withdraw its interest when its demands where not met, Hutchison made evident the limits of consensual negotiations in producing proper political solutions, reaffirming, at the same time, the irreducible character of political antagonism.

The failure of the concession agreement, simultaneously, brought to the surface the speculative moves of Lavrentiadis’ group and the politics behind it. Only one week after the withdrawal of the consortium’s bid, Lavrentiadis openly turned his interests to private equity fund investments founding Lamda Partners Ltd based in London (RE+D Magazine, 2008). In parallel, he also moved in banking acquiring 31.5% of the small Greek Proton Bank from Piraeus Bank for €70.7 million (Papachristou, 2009). It is beyond the scope of this section to reconstruct the contours of Lavrentiadis’ activities and the legal disputes and economic scandals he has been involved in since then. What remains significant, however, is to highlight the centrality of such practices in Lavrentiadis’ ‘success story’ as well as the political decisions in response to them. This is the focus of the remainder of this section.

One of the first moves by Lamda Partners was to re-buy Neoichimiki SA from The Carlyle Group equity fund after “a dispute over the accuracy of earnings data” (Arnold and Hope, 2009). Despite the buy back of Neoichimiki, however, Lavrentiadis was in 2012 sued by the group of banks which financed the Neoichimiki deal. More specifically, the National Bank of Greece, Emporiki Bank – controlled by Crédit Agricole – Piraeus Bank, Société Générale, HSBC, Portugal’s Millennium Bank, and Hellenic Bank of Cyprus accused Lavrentidis “for felony fraud, manipulation of Neoichimiki’s share, abuse of privileged information, money laundering, formulation and leadership of a criminal organization. According to the complainants, the entrepreneur and his colleagues had ‘tweaked’ the balance sheets of Neoichimiki, achieving to ‘inflate’ the price and get €500 million worth of loans in 2008” (Avgi, 2012).

Things are even worse in the case of Proton Bank chaired by Lavrentiadis. According to the auditors of the Bank of Greece, during the years 2010 and 2011 Proton Bank increasingly mobilized funds from the liquidity financing mechanism, formulated by the European Central Bank and the Bank of Greece in response to the crisis, to offer large loans to companies connected with Lavrentiadis (Reuters, 2012a, Papaioanou, 2011, Papadakou, 2011). On March
21st 2012 the financial prosecutor Grigoris Peponis prosecuted Lavrentiadis for “five felonies on granting bad loans amounting to €701 million in companies directly or indirectly related with him from Proton Bank, during the time he was president of the Board” (Agelioforos, 2012a)20.

Beyond legal disputes, what remains important here is the response of the country’s political elite to the Proton Bank case. In July 2011 and while “the Bank of Greece was investigating irregular transactions and the Authority against Money Laundering noted the embezzlement of €51 million; €100 million were given to strengthen Proton Bank in order to maintain the stability of the domestic financial sector” by the then Minister of Finance Evangelos Venizelos (Greek Parliament, 2011a). The decision was taken despite its conflict with N.2362/9521. It is worth quoting the Minister’s line of argument at length here:

“Think logically and responsibly, just like everyone else in this Chamber. Is it possible for the Greek state to believe, based on current data, that there exists within the Greek banking system a legally operating bank that is insolvent? Can the state conclude, one afternoon, when accounting and cash pictures are formulated, that it won’t deposit to a bank because this bank is insolvent? All our banks are solvent because they are supported by the Greek government, the Bank of Greece and the European Central Bank. This small bank that depositors have entrusted with €1.8 billion, has been enhanced in recent years, from 2008 onwards, and especially in 2008 and 2010, with €300 million by the Greek government in the form of preference shares, special bonds and guarantees available to the European Central Bank” (Greek Parliament, 2011b: 207-208 emphasis added).

However, on October 9th 2011, Proton Bank was liquidated and the assets and liabilities of the bank were transferred to the “bridge-bank” Nea Proton Bank. Effectively, Proton Bank was nationalized and received a state-aid of up to

20 Alapis SA was one of the major beneficiaries of such practices. For a full list of the involved companies see (Papadakou, 2011)
21 Law 2362/95 establishes the framework around how the State manages its assets to interest-bearing placements with commercial banks. Articles 2 and 3 of this ministerial decision define specific solvency criteria that must be met by the banks for the government to support them through placement. Proton Bank did not satisfy these criteria.
€1.7 billion. The decision has the temporary approval of the European Commission (2012a). More specifically:

“The Commission concluded that the €1.122 billion contribution by the Hellenic Deposit Investment Guarantee Fund which is equivalent to a grant as it will not be reimbursed, and the €0.55 billion capital injection by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund on which no profitable return can be expected, are state aid. These measures served to rescue the economic activities of the former Proton Bank, which will continue in a new legal entity, Nea Proton Bank. These activities would otherwise have disappeared” (European Commission, 2012a).

The point here is neither to reduce economic policies to questions of justice and judicial action nor to vilify Lavrentis Lavrentiadis or Evangelos Venizelos at a personal level. This would reproduce the legalistic and moralistic tones of the hegemonic discourse only reversing the roles between good and evil. What remains significant, in any case, is that despite rhetorics of efficiency and technocratic solutions, politico-economic interests and power were heavily entrenched in and reproduced through such decisions. In effect, the post-politicization of inherently political decisions, as those concerning the concession of the container terminal and financing the liquidity of Proton Bank, was mobilized by the hegemonic politico-economic elite in Greece exactly to overshadow these relations and attempt to evacuate the political from the discursive horizon of urban politics.

7.6 Conclusions

This chapter analyzed how the unbundling and financialization of urban infrastructure networks created the spaces for the formation of glocal infrastructure (investment and operation) funds. Within this framework, the construction and management of urban infrastructure spaces, like Thessaloniki’s container terminal, is even further decided upon speculative and political moves and interests. Urban infrastructure spaces, then, not only become entrenched within accumulation strategies and global infrastructure networks, but are also
configured as central terrains through which the trajectory of global dynamics and politico-economic elites are decided. They do so, however, within a framework of consensus politics. Reading the failed efforts towards the concession of Thessaloniki’s container terminal through this lense, the chapter suggested that Hutchison’s withdrawal from the negotiation over the concession should be understood as an inherently political move that attempted to better serve the interests of the global terminal operator. A move that made evident the limits of consensual negotiations between stakeholders and brought the inherently antagonistic nature of urban (infrastructure) politics back to surface. Furthermore, in reading the discursive post-politicization of urban infrastructure politics the chapter choreographed the active involvement of local and national politico-economic elites in discursively silencing the political nature of the concession agreement.

Lavrentiadis’ case is not an exception of corrupt practices, it, rather, is one of the dominant ways through which political and economic elites in Greece were (re-)produced and closely articulated over the past fifteen years or so. Engagement in the construction of urban infrastructure projects, like the concession of the container terminal – as well as the submerged cross-city channel (see Chapter 6) –, and real estate activities were among the prominent terrains through which this process unfolded. Tycoons, who benefitted from the deregulation of the financial and especially banking sector, attempted, in close co-operation with the political elite, to further their profits through speculative investments. The post-politicization of the discursive horizon of urban politics was the central strategy in conceptually legitimizing such infrastructure politics. An armature of tactics was deployed to silence their inherently political character. The point, thus, is to challenge the post-political horizon and unearth the unequal relations of politico-economic power that (re-)produce urban environments. Even beyond that, the challenge is to actively embrace the

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22 Recently a parliamentary inquiry raised serious concerns over “conflicts of interest” for a series of loans that Marfin Popular Bank issued to finance Marfin Investment Group’s activities both owned by the second tycoon that Financial Times identified as a key player in Greek economy, Andreas Vgenopoulos. Parallel to this, Marfin Popular Bank was also a major lender to an order of Greek monks who received swathes of prime state-owned land in sweetheart deals, and who in turn bought shares in Marfin Investment Group. For a short reconstruction of Vgenopoulos’ and Marfin Investment Group story see (Reuters, 2012b).
political; the continuous material and discursive struggle to imagine and produce more equal urban environments and everyday experiences.
8.1 Introduction

It is common sense to argue that urban politics are radically and continuously transformed in the midst of the ongoing global crisis. In Thessaloniki these transformations have been more radically felt since the outbreak of the so-called Greek crisis in 2010. Facing a public debt of 113.4% of its GNP (around €300bn) and a budget deficit of 12.7%, Greece became, since November 2009, the first epicentre of what later was crystallized as a public debt crisis within the EU (Golemis, 2010). The country’s economic outlook created room for speculation on the possibility of downgrading its credit rating by financial houses. Hence, as a response to severe re-financing problems and the country’s inability to repay hugely increased credit interests, the social-democratic government of PaSoK announced the activation of a joint EU-IMF-ECB loan agreement (Douzinas, 2010, Vergopoulos, 2010). The agreement offered a €110 billion loan on the condition of severe austerity and structural adjustment measures signalling a turning point not only for Greece but for the whole EU. The political, economic and governance coordinates were radically reconfigured. For a number of scholars writing on Greek politics, the introduction of the loan conditionality and its subsequent renegotiations between the Greek Government and the technocrats of the troika as well as the depoliticization of the roots of the crisis constitute the quintessence of post-democracy (Douzinas, 2010, 2011a, Katsampekis and Stavrakakis, 2010, Kioupkiolis, 2010). Yet, the outbreak of the crisis also intensified the expression of political discontent against hegemonic politics. Demonstrations, protests and counter-hegemonic practices became part of the everyday agenda attracting at times hundreds of thousands of people.

Geographical scholarship over the past five years has extensively explored the implications of the ongoing crisis for the urban. In a recent account of the critical scholarship on the topic, Oosterlynck and González identify three
major analytical strands through which the role of cities is addressed: “(1) the urban roots of the crisis; (2) the crisis as an opportunity for progressive post-neoliberal urban transformations; and (3) the crisis as another wave of the constant restructuring of urban neoliberalization” (2013: 1075). The urban nature of the crisis and its links with the uneven geographical development of neoliberalization and the financialization of urbanization have already been highlighted (Harvey, 2010, Rutland, 2010). Many accounts have documented the roots of the subprime mortgage crisis within urban neoliberalism and the deregulation of financial and land markets (Aalbers, 2009a, 2009b, García, 2010, Rolnik, 2013). Such processes have often unfolded through innovative financial and speculative schemes under the support of the state. Focusing on the European context, Hadjimichalis has addressed the links between the politico-economic and spatial articulation of the EU and the Greek crisis, to highlight the importance of the uneven geographical development within the Union not only for the analysis of the roots of the crisis but also for the formulation of alternative crisis politics (Hadjimichalis, 2011). Other authors have focused on the crisis as an opportunity to challenge the hegemony of urban neoliberalization (Harvey, 2012, Mayer, 2009, Soureli and Youn, 2009). Here, the crisis is seen as more-than-financial (Marcuse, 2009) incorporating a political and legitimization crisis for the hegemonic order (Marcuse, 2009, Mayer, 2009). This legitimization crisis, so the argument goes, disarticulates the hegemonic order and opens up the room for alternatives. Finally, others have remained more skeptical and consider the crisis as another phase in the variegated neoliberalization of cities (Brenner et al., 2010a, Peck et al., 2010). As Oosterlynck and González observe such perspectives have gained momentum since the transmission of the effects of the crisis from the financial sector to the (national and local) state (2013). The analytical emphasis here is on both the emergent “local regulatory experimentation” and the reorganization of “institutionalized rule regimes” in the wake of the crisis (Brenner et al., 2010b: 216).

Against this background, notwithstanding the importance of the economic implications of the crisis, this chapter focuses on the links between the ongoing crisis and urban politics. In this sense, it attempts to address the latter two of the three above-mentioned research strands. It does so through an understanding of politics that pays particular attention to the dimension of antagonism and the
processes that seek to efface it. In other words, it focuses on the “aporia between la politique/la police [politics] and le politique (the political)” (Swyngedouw, 2011b: 23). Up to date, the relevant literature has analyzed how post-democratization forces the expression of antagonism into sporadic violent urban outbursts (Stavrakakis, 2007b, Swyngedouw, 2011c, see however Swyngedouw, 2011b). The Parisian riots of 2006 (Dikeç, 2007a) and the London 2012 riots are cases in point. Yet, over the past three years urban public spaces, from Tahrir Square through Puerta del Sol and Syntagma Square to Zuccotti Park, have become links in a planetary circulation of revolt (Merrifield, 2013). This is not, however, to argue that the post-democratic order is dead or has lost its hegemonic status. Rather, the chapter argues that beyond homogenizing accounts that either construct an image of the post-democratic order as complete and immutable or solely celebrate the emergence of counter-hegemonic movements in the midst of the crisis; analysis should unpack the contradictory and contested nature of post-democratization.

The relationship between politics and urban public space is the anchoring point for the argument. The chapter mobilizes Thessaloniki’s urban politics as a contemporary living laboratory for the analysis. Thessaloniki’s port, in particular, is doubly inscribed in hegemonic crisis-politics during the period. First, the totality (73.14%) of the state’s shares in ThPA was gradually transferred to the special purpose organization Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) with the purpose of its privatization as part of Greece’s bailout loan conditionality. Second, the promotion of Thessaloniki as a tourist destination constitutes the cornerstone of the hegemonic crisis-politics in the city. Here, ThPA became one of the most active organizations in this city-branding campaign and the ordering of the public spaces of the port a central target of policymaking towards this direction. However, during the same period, popular discontent against the police order was expressed in and through the public spaces of the city. Most notably, during May and June 2011, the movement of Αγανακτισμένοι (Indignants) occupied the White Tower Square, in the city’s waterfront, to stage dissent against the crisis politics. Juxtaposing these two logics and processes, the chapter suggests that whereas processes of post-democratization have been accelerated and deepened during the crisis, the legitimacy of the police order is susceptible to being challenged more than ever
before. The city and in particular urban public spaces are increasingly becoming the terrain where the logic of the police is confronted by the logic of equality and democratic politics (see also Rancière, 1999, Swyngedouw, 2011b, 2011c).

The chapter is organized in four parts. The first part delineates the theoretical concerns that underpin the argument. The first subsection of this part attempts to construct a lens through which the post-2008 re-organization of hegemonic urban politics can be understood. It analyzes how within a neoliberalized rule regime techno-managerial expert polic(y)ing and consensual negotiations define what Swyngedouw calls the “zero-ground of politics” (2009b). The second subsection mobilizes Rancière’s understanding of democratic politics to highlight the centrality of urban (public) spaces in challenging post-democratization. The following two parts offer a reading of Thessaloniki’s port restructuring in the midst of the crisis. The second part focuses on the crisis-driven reorganization of governance of Thessaloniki’s port. Through a close reading of Greece’s loan conditionality and the practices of the recently institutionalized HRADF, this part documents the consolidation of the rule of experts and consensual negotiations in urban politics. The third part looks closer at Thessaloniki’s ‘local politics’ through the second wave of revitalization that unfolded on the public spaces of the port. Urban policy discourses and polic(y)ing around the port serve as an example to analyze the hegemonic urban crisis-politics and their spatialization. The fourth part juxtaposes the hegemonic logic around urban (public) space with the discursive and spatial practices of the movement of the Indignants. This part highlights the centrality of urban public space in staging dissent. The final part summarizes the argument.

8.2 Analyzing urban politics during the crisis

8.2.1 Accelerating post-democratization...

Brenner, Peck and Theodore ground their analysis of the post-2008 capitalism on the notion of neoliberalization to “distinguish its three major dimensions – (i) regulatory experimentation; (ii) inter-jurisdictional policy transfer; and (iii) the formation of transnational rule-regimes” (2010a: 329). For them, the always path dependent and context-specific “waves” of regulatory
experimentation and inter-jurisdictional policy transfer unfold within largely neoliberalized trans-national regulatory regimes. Large-scale pluri-national arrangements and regulatory frameworks impose to a large extent the “rules of the game” wherein local experimentation and re-regulation unfolds. As they write:

“the consolidation of such neoliberalized global and supranational rule-regimes, which are designed to impose marketdisciplinary parameters upon national and subnational institutions and political formations, is arguably one of the most far-reaching consequences of the last three decades of neoliberalizing political-economic reform” (Brenner et al., 2010a: 339).

Recent scholarly work has documented the role of multi-lateral governance arrangements like the WTO, the IMF and the EU “in the construction, imposition, and reproduction of neoliberalized, marketdisciplinary regulatory arrangements within national and subnational arenas” (Brenner et al., 2010a: 336). In this sense, the reorganization of urban governance in the context of the crisis occurs within a landscape wherein neoliberalization “has qualitatively transformed what might be termed the ‘context of context’, that is, the political, institutional, and juridical terrain within which locally, regionally, and nationally specific pathways of regulatory restructuring are forged” (Brenner et al., 2010a: 339). For Harms, multi-lateral governance institutions and agreements have served to promote “institutional lock-in mechanisms to separate the economic and the political under conditions of democracy” (2006: 732). Yet, while the formal envelope of democracy survives this geo-institutional (re-)configuration institutionalizes and consolidates a mode of governance beyond sovereign people (Critchley, 2012, Swyngedouw, 2011b). As Todd May notes concerning the European context:

“[t]he emergence of transnational political entities such as the European Commission and the Council of European Union distance the people from their political ‘representatives’ even further than they are in their national states. Without input from the demos, European legislators seek to determine the economic policies of their constituting states” (2008: 148).
However, whilst neoliberalization “entails a of regulatory arrangements; 
(...) it can only be reproduced and advanced through historically and 
geographically specific politico-institutional formations, strategies and struggles” 
(Peck et al., 2013: 1093). In this sense, Oosterlynck and González convincingly 
argue that the framework developed by Brenner, Peck and Theodore: 

“does not tell us enough about how this geographical 
institutional variation is systematically produced. Their almost 
‘tectonic’ metaphor of waves of regulatory experimentation 
colliding against inherited politico-institutional arrangements is 
somewhat rigid, and it has the danger of being translated 
empirically into a scenario where global forces are imposed into 
a variety of resisting local situations” (2013: 1078).

For them an analytical emphasis on the discursive practices that sustain or 
challenge geo-institutional variation can offer fruitful insights.

Indeed, for Slavoj Žižek, the hegemonic crisis-politics evolve around the 
discursive consolidation of “a state of permanent economic emergency” (2010: 
85). They attempt, he argues, to construct “a de-politicized naturalization of the 
crisis: the regulatory measures are presented not as decisions grounded in 
political choices, but as the imperatives of a neutral financial logic” (Žižek, 2010: 
85). For Swyngedouw, this constitutes a central characteristic of the articulation 
of variegated neoliberalization and post-democratization: “an ‘economization of 
politics’, combined with what Pierre Bourdieu (2002) named as ‘the de-
politicization of the economic’” (2011c: 372). This de-politicization of deeply 
political choices is sustained through the articulation of fear for the consequences 
of the crisis (see Swyngedouw, 2010b) with a constant acceleration of the pace of 
events (Kouvelakis, 2010). It is in this sense that what Giroux calls the “terror of 
neoliberalization” (2004) is further consolidated in the midst of the crisis. 
Politics, and even more so politics in the midst of the crisis, becomes a task that 
is “too decisive and too sustained not to be left to the experts, to those who know 
how” (Rancière, 1999: 113).

Besides the insights that an emphasis on discursive practices can offer, as 
already highlighted throughout this thesis, spatial practices and the ordering 
urban spaces also hold a prominent role in the analysis of the post-
democratization of urban politics. Mustafa Dikeç effectively summarizes this relationship:

“the space of the police is (...) divisible into discrete and mutually exclusive parts, the sum of which gives the count that is equal to the ‘whole’ to be governed. (...) It spatially articulates identities (logic of identification) and distributes them to their proper places (logic of the proper), and thus displaces, through placement, the disruption of politics through an exhaustive ordering of space” (2005: 181).

In this line of argument, the analysis of this chapter seeks to combine the study of geo-institutional re-organizations with a reading of the re-(dis-)articulation of hegemonic (urban) polic(y)ing discourses and the ordering of urban space.

8.2.2 ... and the staging of dissent

Yet, the contingency and the incoherencies of post-democratization is one of the central elements in Rancière’s conceptualization (Dikeç, 2005). Contemporary urban insurrections, Swyngedouw argues, “are indeed telltale symptoms of the contemporary urban order, an order that began to implode, both physically and socially, with the onslaught, in the fall of 2007, of the deepest crisis of capitalism” (Swyngedouw, 2011b: 22). They make evident the limits of the consensual polic(y)ing of the urban and expose “the incoherencies of the contemporary urban ordering, the excess and the gaps that are left in the interstices of the post-political urban order” (Swyngedouw, 2009a: 605). Such incoherencies become even more pronounced in the midst of the crisis. For Jessop and Sum crises are moments during which hegemonic discourses around political economies are called into question (2010, see also Oosterlynck and González, 2013). Margit Mayer advances a similar line of argument when she claims that: “[t]he rapidly unfolding recession is thus intensifying the breaking points around which urban social movements have been rallying, suddenly validating their claims and arguments about the lack of sustainability and the destructiveness of the neoliberal growth model” (Mayer, 2009: 370-71). In this sense, to use Laclau’s and Mouffe’s terms, crises can be understood as moments of dis-articulation and re-articulation of the discursive co-ordinates (2001).
These challenges unfold in and through (urban) space. Margaret Kohn emphasizes the link between the spatial and the political: “space is not just a tool for social control (...) spatial practices can contribute to transformative politics. All political groups – government and opposition, right and left, fascist and democratic – use space, just as they employ language, symbols, ideas and incentives” (2003: 7). There can be no politicization in isolation from the field of spatial representation: antagonism can only surface within space – conflicts between socio-political forces can only be articulated in and through spaces (Lefebvre, 1991: 365). Rancière’s understanding of democratic politics is also articulated in deeply spatial terms. For him, democratic politics is the point where the police and the political meet (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 376); the disruptive engagement with the police order, revolving around “the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière, 2006b: 13). In Rancière’s conceptualization political activity is “whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and (…) makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise” (Rancière, 1999: 30). In this sense, democratic politics entails “produc[ing] the spatiality that permits exercising [the] right [to speak]” (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 376). It, therefore, evolves around the production of “dissensual spaces” (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 376) that can become hosts for “voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding ‘the part for those who have no part’” (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 375). In staging dissent, such spaces become political in the sense that they “modify the map of what can be thought, what can be named and perceived” (Rancière in Levy et al., 2007: 4, quoted in Swyngedouw, 2007b: 72). Before engaging on the analysis of the spatialization of this logic by the Indignants’ occupation of the White Tower Square, this chapter offers a reading of the hegemonic crisis-politics around Thessaloniki’s port.

8.3 Crisis-driven governance reorganization: loan conditionality, quasi-public governance organizations and the rule of technocratic elites
Anchoring its analysis on the governance of Thessaloniki’s port, this section highlights the implications of the crisis-driven reorganization of governance for urban politics. It argues that such shifts constitute the acceleration and deepening of post-democratization as it unfolds in and through a multiplicity of scales, championed by elite actors across them.

8.3.1 Loan Conditionality, consensual negotiations and the privatization of ThPA

Since the introduction of the bailout agreement, the successive negotiations between the EU-IMF-ECB technocrats and PaSoK’s government have become the pivotal arena of policy-making in Greece. Since 2010, urban policing around Thessaloniki’s port is, to a large extent, taking place through the negotiations of the loan conditionality and in particular the reformulations of the privatization plan. It is no surprise then, that the quarterly visits of the EU-IMF-ECB technocrats attract the spotlights of the corporate media and constitute the cornerstone of the public discourse in the country (Tsoukalas, 2010). Yet, at the same time, they are transformed into a tightly controlled spectacle, repeatedly narrated as Doomsday(s) for Greece and foreclosing the information available to the public (Douzinas, 2010, 2011a, Kioupkiolis, 2010).

The privatization plan is one of the aspects of the economic adjustment programme that has been radically reformulated through negotiations between the Greek government and the EU-IMF-ECB technocrats. More specifically, one of the benchmarks for the first evaluation of the adjustment programme was to “[p]repare a privatization plan for the divestment of state assets and enterprises with the aim to raise at least €1 billion a year during the period 2011-2013” by December 2010 (European Commission, 2010a: 57). Following concerns over “the privatization plan remain[ing] vague” (European Commission, 2010b: 56), in August 2010 the Greek government decided to scale up the plan “spanning the state’s holdings in rail, road transport, airports, ports, utilities, the gaming industry and real estate” aiming to raise €7 billion over three years (European Commission, 2010c: 86). However, the programme was brought to an unprecedented phase during the negotiations of February 2011, acquiring a central position within the overall adjustment programme (European
Commission, 2011a). In order to tackle the failure of the overall scheme and serve the increased needs for funds, the government announced its intention “to strengthen and accelerate the privatization programme” (European Commission, 2011a: 2). The new project foresaw the privatization of €50 billion worth of public companies and real estate assets (European Commission, 2011a: 38) (op. cit: 38). ThPA was included in the privatization plan for the first time through this revision. The aim was to partially privatize ThPA through the sale of 23.3% of its shares (European Commission, 2011a: 40, Figure 21).

### Annex II. Greece: Privatization Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>State Share</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Price Action to be Announced to 3BRADF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>GTE</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 OPAP 1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>Concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 OPAP 2</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>Concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 Athens Int Airport</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>Concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 Four Aircraft</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>Sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 Alpha bank</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 National Bank of Greece (NBG)</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 Piraeus Bank</td>
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<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 Mobile Telephony Licenses</td>
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<td>100.0%</td>
<td>sale rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Q1 State Lotteries</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>share sale of SPV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q1 Real Estate Assets 1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>share sale of SPV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Q1 OPAP</td>
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<td>34.0%</td>
<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q1 Alpha bank</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q1 Lambda</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q1 Hellenic Defense Systems (CAS)</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>share/asset sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>40.0%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>at least 21%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>65.0%</td>
<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
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<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Q2 Egnatia Odos Rl</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q2 Pireaus Port (OLP) 1</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>share sale of SPV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>at least 38.8%</td>
<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Q3 Regional airports 1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Q3 Hellenic Post (ELPH)</td>
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<td>at least 40%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Q3 Hellenic Vehicle Industry (ELIB)</td>
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<td>51.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Q4 Public Power Corporations 2</td>
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<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Q5 Ports 1</td>
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<td>share sale of SPV</td>
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<td>share sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Q4 Digital 私营1</td>
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<td>sale rights</td>
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<td>Q4 Thessaloniki Water (EYATH)</td>
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<td>share sale of SPV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q4 Minoes</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Railway Operator (PIANOGE)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Subsidiaries of National and Private Ports will be sold after completing port groups.
2. FPC will be suspended with withdrawal of the productive capacity, and a share of the accounts will be retained.
3. Contractual agreement for OPAP 2 (VLT) includes a payment of Euro 58 million in Q4 of 2013.

Figure 21 Privatization Plan as of February 2011
Source: (European Commission, 2011b: 32)
Five months later, during the July 2011 quarterly meeting, the re-organization of governance through loan conditionality made a qualitative leap forward. In light of the delays in the implementation of the scheme, the meeting evolved around setting up the appropriate governance structure for the privatization plan. The report of the European Commission summarized: “given the length, magnitude and nature of required reforms, political and social consensus remains a prerequisite for success. Weaknesses in institutional capacity will need to be addressed through enhanced technical assistance” (European Commission, 2011b: 4 emphasis added). Hence, the formation of a privatizations fund was incorporated as benchmark loan conditionality, subject to evaluation during the quarterly visits (European Commission, 2011b). The cornerstone of the policy was the institutionalization of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund. Before focusing further on HRADF’s role, however, it is worth explaining how the whole of the Greek state’s shares in ThPA (73.4%) were incorporated in the privatization plan.

In November 2011, under severe social pressure and the failure of the adjustment programme, George Papandreou’s government resigned. A “national unity government” under, former Governor of Bank of Greece and Vice President of the ECB, Lucas Papademos took its place. The new coalition government enjoyed the support of the MPs of the country’s two major political parties up to then (social democratic PaSoK and conservative New Democracy) and of the far right wing Popular Orthodox Alert (LAOS). For Prime Minister Papademos: “an important step in sustaining understanding and consensus for the salvation of the country [was] to establish a coalition government with a clear purpose and specific command” (Papademos, 2011). The purpose of the government was to implement the Greek bonds’ haircut decided by the EU during October 2011 and to formulate a renewed adjustment programme. Despite rhetorics of consensus and specific command, however, Papademos’ technocratic government was not elected by popular vote but supported by parliament members who were elected in the September 2009 elections. Hence, a government with reduced democratic accountability and questionable popular support was to negotiate and formulate one of the most important political projects in Greece for years. The privatization of ThPA was an integral part of
the second economic adjustment programme. The totality of the state’s shares in ThPA was incorporated in the privatization plan by a further transfer of 50.97% of its shares to HRADF (European Commission, 2012b, see also Figure 22). It is worth noting, finally, that both decisions concerning ThPA’s transfer to HRADF were approved only by the Inter-ministerial Committee for Restructuring and Privatization (Hellenic Republic, 2011b, 2012b) and not by the Parliament Plenary. The privatization of the totality of ThPA’s shares was later institutionalized in Greek law by the new coalition government of New Democracy, PaSoK and the Democratic Left (under Prime Minister Antonis Samaras), that was formulated after the double elections of May and June 2012 (Hellenic Republic, 2012a).

Figure 22 Revised Privatization Project as of the Second Memorandum of Understanding between Greece and EU-ECB-IMF
Source: (European Commission, 2012b: 118)

It is, thus, worth noting that the consensual negotiations between the EU-IMF-ECB and the Greek Government not only constructed “a normative consensus that professe[d] expertise about how capitalism should be governed, and by whom” (Sheppard and Leitner, 2010: 186), but also institutionalized it in the form of law (Hellenic Republic, 2011a, 2012a). Thus, “a growing equivalence of the production of relationships of law and management of market
forces” (Rancière, 1999: 112) was consolidated. The “‘expert state’ that follows strict economic necessity bec[a]me thus identified with ‘democratic form’” (Rancière, 1999: 112). However, while the form of democracy seemingly survives, democratic accountability and power control were radically foreclosed through the proliferation of quasi-governmental expert organizations operating at a distance from the people (Swyngedouw, 2000a, Swyngedouw, 2011c). Paradigmatic in this respect is the institutionalization of the HRADF. This section now turns to this theme.

8.3.2 Managing the Privatization of ThPA: HRADF and the rule of technocratic elites

The HRADF was institutionalized through Law 3986/2011 in order to: “restrict governmental intervention in the privatization process, and [guarantee] its further development within a fully professional context” (HRADF, 2011b). According to the relevant law, the HRADF is “not able to transfer assets back to the general government, and if it is determined by the Board that an asset cannot be sold in its current form, it will be sold in pieces or liquidated” (European Commission, 2012b: 109). The EU-IMF-ECB’s July 2011 report suggested on the matter:

“(e)xperience shows that large privatization plans are more effective when a single entity is in the lead of the whole process and takes full ownership of the assets to be privatized. (...) The government is establishing a privatization fund with a credible governance structure. It will comprise an independent and depoliticized board of directors and an advisory board to allow it to benefit from international experience and technical expertise” (European Commission, 2011b: 30-31 emphasis added).

The HRADF is administered by a six-member Board of Directors appointed by the government comprising of “[i]ndividuals of wide acclaim, scientific training and professional proficiency and reliability with a high level of know-how or long standing experience in business administration,
reorganization and restructuring, in financial sector activities or in real estate
development and management” (Hellenic Republic, 2011a: 3227-3228, see also Figure 23). Two members appointed by Eurozone countries and the European Committee also participate in HRDAF’s Board of Directors as observers (Hellenic Republic, 2011a: 3227-3228, see also Figure 23). In parallel, a Council of Experts is nominated following similar criteria in order to provide techno-managerial expertise on the policies of the fund. Three out of seven members of the Council of Experts are nominated by the representatives of the Eurozone countries and the European Committee (Hellenic Republic, 2011a: 3238). It is worth noting here that the Council of Experts holds a central role in the organization as: “a Board decision, requiring previous mandatory opinion by the Council of Experts, shall be null and void, if it is issued without such opinion” (Hellenic Republic, 2011a). Despite the rhetorical emphasis on professional proficiency and reliability, however, the trajectory of HRADF has been marked by resignations. During March 2013, Takis Athanasopoulos resigned from his position as CEO after his prosecution for decisions related with his term in the Public Electricity Company (Ravanos, 2013). He was replaced by Stavros Stavridis former CEO of Hellenic Petroleum and Athens Water and Sewage Company, who in turn resigned during August 2013. The Reuters reported: “Greece dismissed the chairman of its privatisation agency on Sunday after a newspaper exposed how he used the private plane of a businessman who had just bought a state company to go on holiday” (2013). The situation is not better concerning the Council of Experts. Anna Bubenikova was one of the three members of the Fund appointed by the EU. Parallel to her position in Greece she was the head of Slovakia’s National Property Fund until January 2012 before being implicated in graft allegations around the so-called “Gorilla” scandal in Slovakia, her homeland (eKathimerini.com, 2012).

23 In its initial composition HRADF’s BoD included: emeritus professor and European Parliament member John Koukiadis as chairman of the organization. Professor Constantinos Mitropoulos, head of Eurobank Securities and former major shareholder of the consulting firm Cantor SA, as CEO. Andreas Taprantzis as managing director, a former manager at the Hellenic Post office and the Hellenic PostBank that is being sold; the former CEO of Athens Water & Sewerage Company Antonis Varholomaios; and Anna Zoerou, scientific adviser on European and Economic Affairs at the Hellenic Parliament. After June 2012 elections, Takis Athanasopoulos, former Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer of Toyota Europe (2001-2006) and Chairman & CEO of Public Power Corporation (2007-2009) was appointed as president and Yannis Emiris, head of Alpha Banks Investment Banking sector (2004-2012) as CEO.
Within such a context, HRADF’s first step towards the exploitation of ThPA was the appointment of further expert consultancy services in order to explore available privatization options. More specifically, Morgan Stanley and Piraeus Bank were appointed as financial advisors, Alexiou-Kosmopoulos Law firms and Freshfields as legal advisors and HPC Hamburg and Marnet as technical advisors (HRADF, 2011c)24. According to the HRADF “the exploitation of the ports infrastructure via concessions of parts or groups of ports operations or via share sale is being considered” (HRADF, 2012: 33). The HRADF sees consensus formation as the key to privatization strategies and aims to attain this through “communication with the parties involved and presentation of the benefits from the asset development” (HRADF, 2012: 15-16). Yet, this consensus is limited within the suggestions of expert consultants and prominent members of the (local and national) politico-economic elites. The initial suggestions of the expert consultants around ThPA (and a series of other public

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24 For the first two years of the structural adjustment programme HRADF has spent € 17 million to serve the purposes of the privatizations and from that € 7 million were the fees to consultants (Panagopoulos, 2012).
enterprises and real estate assets in Thessaloniki) were discussed during a private meeting between the representatives of the HRADF and members of Thessaloniki’s politico-economic elite during May 2012. As the local newspaper Agelioforos reports:

“The port, (...) and a range of real estate properties that the Greek government holds in the wider Thessaloniki area constituted the epicentre of a meeting held last Tuesday in private, between the heads of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund and a few prominent players in the city. (...) the city was ‘represented’ by mayor Yiannis Boutaris, the presidents of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Dimitris Bakatselos, the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece, Nikos Pentzos, the Association of Exporters, Dimitris Lakasas, and businessman Nikos Efthimiadiis, as representative of the Business Advisory Council for South Eastern Europe (BAC)” (Mitrakis, 2012).

It is within such a framework that policy making around Thessaloniki’s port unfolds in the era of crisis. Politics is reduced to consensual negotiations between government officials and the EU-IMF-ECB technocrats in the first place and between the appointed technocrats of the HRADF (and their expert consultants) and elite actors of Thessaloniki on a second level. On the one hand, achieved through allegedly depoliticized expert elites and techno-administrative means, this consensual politics brings to mind Rancière’s argument around consensus: “there is no contest on what appears, on what is given in a situation and as a situation. Consensus means that the only point of contest lies on what has to be done as a response to a given situation” (2003: 4). On the other, politico-economic power is further concentrated in the hands of a small technocratic elite, who has already been heavily involved in the high-days of the de-regulated financialization race (Jessop, 2009). An uneven geography of power unfolds around Thessaloniki’s port through a multiplicity of scales – from the European Union to the city itself. Herein, elites of technocrats and experts, government and local authorities, and members of the city’s elite are privately negotiating and deciding upon deeply political matters while citizens remain radically excluded even from information around the process.
8.4 Ordering Thessaloniki’s urban public spaces: Performing efficiency through the revitalization of Thessaloniki’s port pier

The transformation of the political coordinates during the crisis is not limited to governance re-organizations. Urban policy discourses and the polic(y)ing of urban space have also been re-(dis-)articulated since the outbreak of the crisis. Occurring only six months after the bailout agreement, the municipal elections of November 2010 introduced a novel element in Greek local politics. Specifically, for the first time since the fall of the military Junta in 1974, the Mayors that were elected in both Thessaloniki (Yiannis Boutaris) and Athens (Yiorgos Kaminis) were not supported by one of the country’s major political parties. Both Boutaris and Kaminis were not ‘professional politicians’ but prominent members of the country’s economic and administrative elite respectively. Arguably, this shift is deeply connected with the legitimization crisis that the Greek state and the major political parties have been facing since the outbreak of the crisis (Bratsis, 2010). Beyond the apparent distrust for the country’s political elite, that the outcome of the elections signals, however, it is worth exploring further the mode of urban politics that this shift introduced in Thessaloniki. This section first analyzes the re-articulation of urban policy discourses in the city during the crisis to then explore the police ordering of urban space as it unfolds through the revitalization of the port’s public spaces.

8.4.1 Urban polic(y)ing discourses during the crisis

The election of Yiannis Boutaris as Mayor constituted a turning point for the city of Thessaloniki. After 20 years of conservative New Democracy supported Mayors, Boutaris was elected as an independent candidate. Transparency in city hall’s economics and “turning the crisis into an opportunity” (Initiative for Thessaloniki, 2010: 3) were the pillars of his electoral campaign. More specifically, Boutaris’ programme evolved around:

“implementing a rapid restructuring programme in Thessaloniki, similar to the Athens Olympics, (...) to address the major development issues of the city and turn into practice the
"Metropolitan Thessaloniki". (...) To turn the crisis into an opportunity using all modern instruments of urban development (...) for the revitalization of the historic centre [and] the development of tourism through innovative actions” (Initiative for Thessaloniki, 2010: 3).

A similar discourse constitutes the cornerstone of urban policy after the election of Boutaris as a Mayor. Urban policy discourses are articulated around the signifier of efficiency. Two elements are knitted together in this discursive performativity. First, it evolves around the selection and gradual implementation of ‘best practice’ and ‘good governance’ policies by resorting to expert knowledge. Second, it entails an entrepreneurial logic of urban politics, a mentality of running the city as a business.

Concerning the first element, Thessaloniki’s authorities and in particular Mayor Boutaris have been the first to engage extensively with the Greek-German Network: “Regions, Municipalities, People”. The network acquired significant support on March 2010 when Chancellor Angela Merkel and Prime Minister George Papandreou agreed to further the co-operation and know-how exchange between the two countries at a local government level (Fuchtel, 2011). Thessaloniki was the host of the second and third conferences organized by the network on November 2011 and 2012 respectively (DGV, 2011, 2012b). Summarizing the outcomes of the second conference Deputy Minister Fuchtel wrote in his press release:

“The main objective (…) is to provide the expertise to develop cooperation at local level. The purpose is the exchange of experiences and ‘best practice’ examples to promote the use of similar European programs and opportunities for cooperation in areas such as (…) attracting investment and tourism” (Fuchtel, 2011).

Addressing a public call in view of the third conference Mayor Boutaris referred to the conference’s benefits for Thessaloniki in particular, writing: “the Greek-German collaboration gives [to us] access to valuable areas of expertise that should be considered cutting-edge for Thessaloniki: garbage collection, training, promotion of tourism and urban regeneration” (Boutaris, 2012). “Best practice” policy mobility and “to draw examples” from German municipalities is
for Boutaris “a praxis of essence and responsibility” (DGV, 2012a: 3). Hence, Boutaris has engaged in a series of policy tourism (see also González, 2011) visits to German cities including Berlin, Hamburg and Stuttgart seeking expert knowledge on garbage collection, governance and tourism (Tzimas, 2012). As he commented in an interview in Kathimerini: “I will run wherever need be and especially to cities that have tradition and culture on the issues of waste disposal and quality of life, but also in other areas in order to provide the groundwork to turn the page for Thessaloniki” (Tzimas, 2012). As Boutaris noted during his February visit to Germany: “We want your expertise, your experiences and that because we do not want to waste time getting started” (Kouparanis, 2012).

This quest for expert knowledge and ‘best practice’ policies is embedded in a functionalist understanding of urban politics. Urban politics is reduced to a business enterprise. This element is closely knitted with the Mayor’s background and personality. For the mainstream media – both locally and abroad – Boutaris’ major strength is “bringing his experience as a businessman to bear on the bloated work force, the tangled regulations and the huge debt that afflicts the city, much as it does the country” (Daley, 2012). Actually, Boutaris, himself, denounces being a politician. As Der Spiegel’s report reads:

“Boutaris is the most unusual politician in Greece, despite his insistence that he is not a politician at all. In fact, he says, he is the opposite of a politician, a businessman who has taken on a new project: running the city of Thessaloniki” (Heyer, 2012).


Knitted together these two elements seek to consolidate a de-politicization of urban polic(y)ing. It is in this sense that Boutaris’ understanding of politics has been repeatedly portrayed as the solution not only for Thessaloniki but for Greece in general. “Thessaloniki tackles Greece’s problems in miniature: Greek Mayor aims to show Athens how it’s done” wrote The New York Times during June 2012 (Daley, 2012). This celebration of the best practice technomanagerial approach towards urban politics resonates with a broader discourse
that is hegemonized in response to the Greek crisis. A discourse that sees “an enlightened oligarchy” as the only ones who know what is to be done and “have the courage and will to implement the much needed but unpopular structural adjustments” (Sevastakis, 2011a). The limits and incoherencies of this approach will be clearly manifested through the second revitalization of Thessaloniki’s port spaces.

8.4.2 The second wave of revitalization for the public spaces of Thessaloniki’s port

This logic of techno-managerial and entrepreneurial efficiency crystallized in promoting Thessaloniki as “an attractive destination for tourists” (Baker, 2012). ThPA’s official magazine summarizes the hegemonic argument:

“Boosting tourism in Thessaloniki and Central Macedonia can be achieved without large investments (…) The long historical legacy of Thessaloniki and the world-renown historic sites that are in relatively short distance, form the best basis to build the tourist profile of the region” (Port.Thess, 2011a: 2).

This focus found its institutional expression in the reactivation of the Organization for the Promotion and Marketing of Tourism in Thessaloniki (OPMTT). The organization brings together the Municipality of Thessaloniki and ThPA as well as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Commerce Association of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki’s Hotel Association and tourist agents among others (Mathiopoulou, 2011). Assuming presidency of the organization, Boutaris highlighted the centrality of the strategy and expressed the elites’ focus towards unearthing and branding the multicultural legacy of Thessaloniki. The major target of this policy is to open the tourist market of the city mainly to Turkey, the Balkans and Israel (Port.Thess, 2011a, Zouka, 2012).

The port of the city holds a central role in this strategy as described in the memorandum of co-operation signed between Thessaloniki’s Municipality, ThPA, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the Commerce Association of the city (Port.Thess, 2011a). Besides, drawing from international best practice and expertise around port revitalization was one of the central elements of the afore-described policy tourism. Specifically, in February 2012, a visit to
Hamburg aimed to draw expertise from the city’s ‘success story’ in revitalizing the old port and attracting large cruise ships (Thumann, 2012). For the same purpose a second visit was organized during June 2012 under Mayor Boutaris himself (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2012a). In parallel, the governance structure and regeneration of Barcelona’s port were narrated as the ‘best practice’ example in promoting cruises and integrating the public spaces of the port in the urban fabric (Port.Thess, 2012b, Y. V. 6/2011).

Hence, a twofold strategy unfolds around the port of the city. First, “mild regeneration” of the public spaces of the port (Port.Thess, 2011b: 2, Figure 24) and plans for the construction of yacht mooring facilities (Ageloudis, 2011) are part of a wider waterfront regeneration policy aiming to produce a new attractive urban aesthetic. Second, ThPA plays a central role in promoting the city as a cruise destination through the publication of city-branding material, participation in relevant exhibitions and shows and by “almost phasing out mooring fees to provide incentive to cruise ships” (Ageloudis, 2010: 9).

For ThPA the revitalization of the first pier evolved around public space. The following editorial of Port.Thess is indicative in this respect:

“The revitalization of the first pier of the port is evidence of our respect for the meaning of public space, which in Greece and Thessaloniki in particular is scorned. In a society that puts the private above all (...), ThPA’s initiative to create – by and on the sea – a promenade for recreation open to all residents and visitors of the city (...) is certainly recorded as something completely positive both in practical and symbolic terms. (...) The success of the initiative signals the need for the multiplication and upgrading of public spaces (...) Humans need (...) to get together (...) the sense of community. The pier leads the way...” (Port.Thess, 2012a: 2).

On June 2011, the civil society organization “The Other Thessaloniki” organized an one-day event in the public spaces of the port to celebrate the completion of the revitalization project. The event was organized in collaboration with ThPA and with the sponsorship of the Municipality of Thessaloniki. Under the title, ‘The … Other Port’ the event aimed to attract a series of artists, civil society organizations and enterprises in the revitalized part of the port to offer: “a
proposal for the best possible use of a vital piece of the city, at a time that its future is in jeopardy” (Parallaxi, 2011). In the words of the organizers: “the Port comes alive in an effort to highlight the many untapped potential of this ‘natural treasure’ of the city. (...) The Port has a long history and great symbolic and economic value for the present and the future of the city, which for years were ignored to a large extent. Even for just a day let’s create some of the pictures we are dreaming of...” (Parallaxi, 2011).

Music concerts, art exhibitions, food taverns and retail activities were drawn to the revitalized piers to create an image of the improvement of the quality of life that the revitalization could bring forward.

Figure 24 The revitalized pier of Thessaloniki's Port
Source: Ethnos.gr

This rhetoric of public space and community, however, is inscribed within an entrepreneurial logic. A large scale privatizations project unfolds through the public spaces, the warehouses and other buildings of the port through multiple concessions. More specifically, since 2012, ThPA engaged in non-binding negotiations over the concession of 7 warehouses and the port’s depots for commercial uses (from logistics services to cultural venues, excluding catering services) (ThPA, 2012c, Figure 25). Similar negotiations included four underused buildings of the port (ThPA, 2012b, Figure 25). Besides, a call for the concession of two of the warehouses of the first pier (Warehouses D and 1) for the operation of a cinema multiplex for a guaranteed minimum fee of €114,000
and a minimum ticket price of €0.80 (ThPA, 2012d, Figure 25) was issued in October 2012. In parallel, ThPA also attempted to lease a two-storey building for the creation of a café-restaurant for €7000 per year (ThPA, 2012e, Figure 25).

More importantly, since July 2011, ThPA has re-activated the plan for the construction of yacht mooring facilities in built land adjacent to the first pier by issuing the first call for proposals (ThPA, 2011d). The dock was planned to host 218 berth positions and its estimated budget stands at €11.3 million (ThPA, 2011d). Together with the construction of the yacht mooring facilities and their exploitation for 30 years, the call also included the concession of 7,193m² of the public spaces of the first pier to the concessioner for the development of facilities that will serve the users of the marina – focusing, on recreation and trade activities (ThPA, 2011d). Further, it also provided 9,370m² of open space in the second pier of the port for the wintering and repairing of yachts (ThPA, 2011d). According to ThPA the above projects – and the marina in particular – would, on the one hand, serve the aesthetic upgrading of the city and on the other increase commercial and tourist traffic (Port.Thess, 2011b). After two extensions of the deadline for the submission of proposals (ThPA, 2011b, 2011c) two participants were selected for the second phase: Aktor, AKTE-VEGA, Cosmos Yachting and Marina Kröslin GMBH consortium and Lamda Development SA (Agelioforos,
Yet, the two participants failed to submit biding proposals and the first international competition was cancelled in April 2013 (Naftemporiki, 2013). The subsequent second call for proposals by ThPA was also declared desolate (Kathimerini, 2013).

The failure of the calls for the construction of yacht mooring facilities should be read alongside the wider urban policy framework in Greece during the crisis. More specifically, in August 2013, the HRADF announced that the report of the council of experts favoured the privatization of the totality of ThPA shares instead of the multiple concessions of parts of ThPA’s activities that was the initial plan (i.e. yacht mooring facilities, container terminal, bulk cargo, leisure activities and so on) (Rousanoglou, 2013). The topic has caused heated debate over the past two years in Thessaloniki with the CEO of ThPA declaring that the wholesale privatization of the city’s port constituted his personal ‘red line’ (Eleftherotipia, 2011) and the City Council adopting a resolution against the privatization of ThPA (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2011). Arguably, the insecurity that the privatization plan created around the ownership of the port, posed significant limitations on the attractiveness of the port’s spaces for capital investments (see also Naftemporiki, 2013). In the face of the announcement, the multiplicity of projects that were designed for the first pier and the subsequent calls for proposals that were issued were rendered irrelevant. Whilst the future of the port and the city’s elite response to decisions around it remain unknown, the limits of the techno-managerial politics adopted by the city’s authorities were made apparent. Within a framework of urban politics dictated by quasi-governmental organizations beyond the state and loan conditionality, the city branding policies adopted by the city council and ThPA were reduced to

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25 Aktor engineering Ltd that leads the consortium is the largest construction company in the country and has also been involved in the (ultimately failed) construction of the submerged cross-city channel (see Chapter 6). Lamda Development SA, on the other hand, is a major real estate company member of the Latsis group of companies. Notably, Lamda Development has acquired the Athens Olympic International Broadcasting Centre from HRADF for a maximum fee of €112.4 million (€80 million guaranteed and up to €32.4 million subject to improving economic conditions in the country) for 90 years (HRADF, 2012c). However, the company was already in a leasing agreement for most parts of IBC for 40 years worth €320 million (Pandora’s Box 2/10/2012).
Performing reform and efficiency (see also Chapter 6 on the importance of performing neoliberalization in sustaining the legitimacy of local and national state).

Performing efficiency, however, also served to constitute tourist attraction as the dogma of urban polic(y)ing and the defining aesthetic in ordering urban (public) spaces. City branding approaches are hardly new in urban politics. But, in the context of the crisis this aesthetic performs a further function. The logic of sustaining the cleanliness and attractiveness of Thessaloniki has been mobilized in several occasions by the city’s authorities to foreclose political activities from its public spaces. Since his election, Mayor Boutaris has twice attempted to ban political events organized in the city’s central Aristotle Square (Agelioforos, 2011). Recently, in view of the national elections on May 2012, the city council approved a vote against the granting of the square for the purposes of public speeches (Municipality of Thessaloniki, 2012b). Defending the logic of the decision Boutaris argued: “Political gatherings in Aristotle Square pose serious problems for the functioning of the market, as the police closes the streets early while we also have complaints from residents” (To Vima, 2012a).

8.5 Staging Dissent: the occupation of the White Tower Square by the Indignants movement

This police ordering of the urban, however, is always contingent and susceptible to being challenged. Urban public spaces can be reclaimed as the stage of dissent In the face of increasing socio-spatial inequalities manifested through everyday life (Kaika, 2012), the Indignants movement emerged, during May and June 2011, as a crack in the mirror of consensus. Whereas the occupation of Syntagma Square in Athens has undeniably been of particular importance for symbolic as well as pragmatic reasons (Douzinas, 2013, Kioupkiolis, 2011a), one of the most interesting characteristics of the movement has been its geographical spread (see also Kioupkiolis, 2011a). Thessaloniki’s White Tower Square offered the stage for the second biggest gathering of the Indignants in the country. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a detailed account of the Indignant Squares movement and its discursive and material
practices (for further analysis see Douzinas, 2013, Kaika and Karaliotas, forthcoming, Kioupkiolis, 2011a). Rather, the aim here is to juxtapose the staging of “dissensual spaces” with the police ordering of the urban in the midst of the crisis. This section draws extensively from the researcher’s participant observation in the Squares movement in Thessaloniki.

The first large gathering in the White Tower Square took place on Wednesday 25th of May 2011 together with the gathering in Syntagma Square, Athens. The Greek movement of the squares emerged ten days after the occupation of Puerta del Sol in Madrid by the Indignados. This was in the aftermath of the proposition for a set of draconian austerity measures. The call for gathering was launched through social media with unknown administrators calling for peaceful demonstrations. Only national Greek flags would be welcome and everyone should participate as an individual without party-banners and political flags and without party-political slogans. The people’s gathering in the White Tower Square was named Αγανάκτησιμένοι (the Indignants) following their Athenian counterpart and paying homage to the Spanish initiative. In the days that followed, the White Tower Indignants, as the occupation came to be known, attracted increasing numbers of protestors (Aganaktismenoi Leukou Pyrgou, 2011a). Up until the end of June 2011, thousands of people re-appropriated the public spaces of the White Tower Square, which up until then were mainly one of the central tourist attractions of the city. The emerging crowds claimed the square as a stage to enunciate their discontent with the hegemonic crisis politics.

This expression of discontent and indignation was the glue that held together a summation of people from different socio-cultural and politico-economic backgrounds. The heterogeneity of the gathering in White Tower Square was becoming more apparent during the days that followed. The existence of two competing imaginaries around the Greek crisis and the way out of it within the Squares movement has already been highlighted (Kaika and Karaliotas, forthcoming, Kioupkiolis, 2011a). More specifically, on the one hand, a large segment of the participants in the Squares movement remained confined within nationalist and a-political claims: blaming the corrupt politicians as a whole for the fate of the country and demanding salvation for the Greek nation. On the other hand, a second imaginary went beyond mere protest against
the socio-economic strangulation of the country, struggling for emancipation from the existing socio-spatial order.

The topographic differentiation between the “upper” and “lower” Syntagma Square (Kaika and Karaliotas, forthcoming, Kioupkiolis, 2011a) could also be observed in the case of the White Tower Indignants. On the one hand, the street in front of the White Tower Square served as the stage for the expression of dissent par excellence. Carrying Greek flags, hurling their anathema to their elected representatives and chanting slogans against the corrupt politicians, people from all socio-economic strata and cultural and political backgrounds occupied the street varying in numbers depending on Parliamentary activity in Athens (see also Gourgouris, 2011 for the case of Athens). The most common slogans amongst the protesters were “Thieves!” or “Burn this brothel of a Parliament”. Yet, the politics of this totalizing ritualistic renunciation were confined at cursing and although it may have accurately expressed the breadth of indignation around the country, it is equally accurate to say that it remained a noise signaling pain for the loss of the promised enjoyment. To a certain extent it was as if the nights of festivity in White Tower Square when Greece won the 2004 European Football Cup while preparing to live the climax of glamour and enjoyment by hosting the Olympic Games; where substituted by the collective moaning and desperation under “the catastrophe that the nation is nowadays facing” (Sevastakis, 2011d). It is important to highlight here, that whereas seeds of extreme right-wing nationalism certainly existed within the protesters in the street in front of the White Tower Square, their discourse remained marginal within the movement.

On the other hand, White Tower Square proper constituted the stage of Popular Assembly gatherings and of collective self-organization against the hegemonic ordering of urban space. Specific action groups were formed and took place in different parts of the Square. Among them, a media group was set up and provided daily content and updates for the movement’s website (http://aganaktismenoi-thess.blogspot.co.uk/) as well as issuing press releases for the mass media. An online broadcasting channel was also set up, live-streaming the gatherings of the Popular Assembly every evening. Besides, an increasing number of people were joining the camp upon the White Tower square spending day and night in it. Hence, practices of collective self-
organization became imperative for sustaining the movement: clothes exchange, toilets and garbage collection groups, were set up. In parallel, a neighborhood organization centre was coordinating actions that would reach different parts of the city beyond the square.

Most importantly, however, participants at the occupation set up an open Popular Assembly, where every evening people took turns in developing their positions. The turns were decided by the drawing of lots and lasted for 3 minutes to serve against the monopolization of speech. This was a conscious attempt to institute proper democratic procedures. Besides, from the outset of the occupation of the square the Assembly placed central emphasis on questions of democracy:

“The movement of the indignant Greeks reclaims its liberation from this deadlock, as well as a type of democracy where the authority will originate from the ordinary people and not from the native or foreign oligarchy that takes decisions against our lives without even asking us” (Aganaktismenoi Leukou Pyrgou, 2011a).

This was also clearly expressed in the central banner of the occupation placed directly in front of the White Tower that read: “We have voice. Real democracy now” (Figure, 26).
Arguably, although fragmented and contradictory, a self-cognizant process of political subjectivization was in the making (Sevastakis, 2011b). In this sense, the discourse emanating from the square’s Popular Assembly can be read as a proper attempt to institute a form of democratic politics, albeit partial and fragmented; as an emancipatory struggle, wherein people took “the right to their own time and their own place” (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 375), “to collectively, think and organize the spatialities of their political practices” (Kaika and Karaliotas, forthcoming). To occupy and re-appropriate the White Tower Square from its allocation within the “late capitalist post-political spatiality” (Swyngedouw, 2011c: 378). This was a public affair, unfolding both materially and symbolically in and through space, redefining the boundaries of the police ordering of public space and re-imagining socio-spatial relations (see May, 2008, Rancière, 1999, Swyngedouw, 2011b, 2011c).

Yet, the White Tower Indignants movement also had certain limitations. First, the engagement of large sections of the middle strata in the Square’s event
increased its heterogeneity and made ideological identifications, and political aims increasingly difficult to articulate (Sevastakis, 2011b). During the early days of the occupation the “skepticism and frustration towards institutionalized polic(y)ing, allowed [a critical mass of post-democratic citizens] to coexist (…) with anarchist ideology (…) and the socially marginalized” (Kioupkiolis, 2011a: 104). But over time and whilst struggling to articulate a proper political imaginary and institute self-organization practices, this coexistence was hard – if possible – to maintain (see Kioupkiolis, 2011b, for the case of Athens). Second, and perhaps more important, the pace and depth of activities on White Tower Square was dictated by Parliamentary activity that took place in Athens. Hence, instead of moving deeper into the imagination and materialization of (urban) spaces beyond the order of the police, the self-organization processes of the square remained confined in providing the stage for the expression of dissent. This is not to suggest that the practices of the White Tower Indignants are to be fully discredited. Rather, it helps explain how the movement of the Indignants has withered in the aftermath of the approval of the austerity measures by the Greek Parliament on June 29th 2011. Indeed, June 28th and 29th constituted the last massive gathering of the Indignants in both Thessaloniki and Athens (Korizi and Vradis, 2012).

In the face of this decline, in August 2011, following the steps of his Athenian counterpart, Mayor Boutaris resorted to the public prosecutor and the police to restore the aesthetics of the White Tower square, ‘spoiled’ by the remaining tents of the Indignants movement (Aganaktismenoi Leukou Pyrgou, 2011b). As the local newspaper Agelioforos described the rationale: “the image of the most touristy part of the city is far from attractive, not only for visitors of the city, but also for its own citizens” (Kyriakoulis and Vatali, 2011). A mobilization of Municipal Police, Police Special Forces and municipal employees evicted the camp of the Indignants on the 7th of August (Aganaktismenoi Leukou Pyrgou, 2011c). While the observations on the declining numbers of participants in the camp and the failure of the Indignants movement to deepen and institutionalize their practices are certainly true, what is also important is the mobilization of the logic of aesthetic attractiveness to foreclose dissent from the city’s public spaces. As Sevastakis wrote on the eviction of the Athens Indignant camp a week earlier: “aesthetically acceptable is
henceforth only the (a)political decent i.e. the eviction of any visible protest from public space. (...) Public space can only be tourist, commercial, consumerist. Even with some intercalary cultural activities and festivals; smart and above all cool festivities for the crowd” (2011c).

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter argued that the post-democratization of urban politics in Thessaloniki has been accelerated and deepened during the crisis. Focusing on governance re-organizations, the chapter analyzed how they extended the power of expert elites operating within already neoliberalized rule regimes (Peck et al., 2010). In this sense, the crisis-driven governance re-organization attempted to suture “the empty locus” (Lefort, 1988) of democratic power with elite expertise. As the preceding analysis highlighted, this process adopts quite distinct discursive and material expressions in different contexts. Focusing on Thessaloniki’s ‘local politics’ the chapter analyzed how a de-politicized logic of efficiency was elevated to the level of an unquestioned truth. Performing efficiency through city branding became a key strategy for the legitimization of local and national elites and for ordering urban public space. The silencing of dissent through aesthetic ordering must not be seen as a side effect of the elite imaginary. “The end of forms of visibility of the collective space” (Rancière, 1999: 118), the end of politics as dissent is the logic that drives a process of effacing the democratic invention of polemic. Yet, in the midst of the crisis the incoherencies and contradictions of the post-democratic urban order become more pronounced than ever before. Urban public spaces become the terrain in and through which the democratic logic of equality confronts the logic of the post-democratic police. The chapter read the occupation of the White Tower Square by the Indignants movement as a spatial manifestation of this process. Yet, as this case suggests, the staging of dissent is only the first step. Moving beyond the order of post-democratization requires the institutionalization of a new mode of democratic politics (Kaika and Karaliotas, forthcoming).
Chapter 9
Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This thesis considered the theoretical and analytical leverage of post-democratization in explaining urban politics in Thessaloniki. In order to do so, it traced the trajectory of the city’s port restructuring over the past twenty years. This conclusion revisits the key arguments of the previous chapters to explore the extent to which, combined, the thesis realised its aims. These can be summarised as follows:

- to construct a theoretical framework for the analysis of post-democratization as a historically and geographically specific process;
- to outline a methodological framework that is attentive to both the discursive and material dimensions of urban politics in reading post-democratization;
- to offer a robust examination of urban governing in Thessaloniki taking into account practices and process beyond the local;
- to offer a reading of the discursive legitimation of urban polic(y)ing;
- to offer a nuanced analysis of the ordering of Thessaloniki’s port spaces over the past 20 years; and finally
- to unearth the role of elite actors in championing post-democratization and the strategies they mobilize in doing so.

The next section summarizes the major insights of the thesis and draws attention to the uneven geographies of post-democratization in Thessaloniki’s port restructuring. The final section addresses some of the limitations of the analysis performed in the thesis and hints towards possible future directions for research.
9.2 Towards an understanding of the uneven geographies of post-democratization in Thessaloniki’s port restructuring

For Gordon MacLeod the term post-democratic city is deeply contested: “If cities are now post-democratic, (…) when and where were they democratic?”, he writes (2011: 2653). Besides, the post-democratic thesis city has often been criticized for constructing a rather homogeneous and immutable state of affairs that downplays the importance of counter-hegemonic movements and the cracks in the order of the police (Featherstone, 2009). It portrays, so the argument goes, an image of urban politics that leaves little, if any, room for human agency (Paddison, 2009).

In light of these criticisms this thesis returned to Rancière’s theorization of post-democracy to construct a framework through which the consolidation of forms of consensual urban governing and polic(y)ing can be analyzed. Concluding his book Hatred of Democracy, Rancière reverses the terms of MacLeod’s question:

“What is meant when it is said that we live in democracies? Strictly speaking, democracy is not a form of State. It is always beneath and beyond these forms. Beneath, insofar as it is the necessarily egalitarian, and necessarily forgotten, foundation of the oligarchic state. Beyond, insofar as it is the public activity that counteracts the tendency of every State to monopolize and depoliticize the public sphere. Every State is oligarchic” (2006a: 71).

Yet, he goes on to argue: “oligarchy can give democracy more or less room; it is encroached upon by democratic activity to a greater or lesser extent. In this precise sense, the constitutional forms and practices of oligarchic governments can be said to be more or less democratic” (Rancière, 2006a: 72). It is in this sense, that, Chapter 2 argued that instead of being understood as a clear cut break or an epochal shift post-democracy should rather be conceptualized as a paradoxical process that in the name of democracy seeks to efface the democratic invention of polemic. To highlight the process-based character of
post-democracy the thesis mobilized the term post-democratization to refer to a ternary process “that articulates three inherently interlinked processes: 1) governance reorganizations that reduce democratic control and accountability while extending the power of unauthorized actors, 2) the conceptual legitimization of consensual politics and 3) a “partition of the sensible” (Rancière, 2001: 8) that seeks to efface forms of democratic action” (Chapter 2: 33-34).

Besides, for Mustafa Dikeç, “the contingency of any established order of governance with its distributions of functions, people, and places is the central premise of Rancière’s politics” (2007a: 17). Swyngedouw further insists on the incoherencies, aporias and contradictions of the post-democratic order (Swyngedouw, 2011b, 2011c). Hence, the thesis argued that post-democratization is neither a linear process nor a homogeneous project that settles upon localities. It highlighted the historically and geographically specific character of post-democratization (Chapter 2). In this spirit, it also sought to unearth the role of urban elite actors in consolidating post-democratization. This is not to suggest that post-democratization processes emanate only from the local or national state and actors. Processes, practices, networks and actors beyond the local, Chapter 2 argued, are tangled with local dynamics in the consolidation or contestation of post-democratization.

This conceptualization bares significant methodological implications. Teasing them out was the task for Chapter 3. As a starting point the chapter has stressed the ontological and epistemological implications of the split of the notion of politics from within. It suggested that the quasi-transcendental ontological status of the political as an element that is occulted at the very moment in which it institutes society calls for the adoption of a realist constructivist stance for research around post-democracy. Moving beyond the realms of positivism, on the one hand, and relativist postmodernism, on the other, such an approach accepts “the priority of a real [the real of the political] which is, however, unrepresentable, but, nevertheless, can be encountered in the failure of every construction” (Stavrakakis, 1999: 86). Translating this ontological and theoretical understanding into research methodology the chapter, first, considered the analytical power of discourse theory and in particular of the approach developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Žižek and
Yannis Stavrakakis among others. Besides, research on post-democracy has commonly followed this research path. Notwithstanding the importance of discursive practices in the articulation of post-democratization, Chapter 3 insisted that in order to offer a nuanced understanding of the process, research should bring into dialogue the reading of discursive practices with the analysis of the politico-economic dynamics of urban restructuring and the ordering of urban space. The articulation of these three dimensions in the analysis of urban politics creates room for a more fine-grained analysis. On the one hand, the analysis of the flows of power and money around urban restructuring allows identifying the actors that were involved in each moment of restructuring. It, thus, paves the way for the analysis of the shifting positions and the interdependences amongst elite actors as well as the reading of the logics and strategic orientations of their discursive and material practices. This, in turn, facilitates a deeper and embodied analysis of post-democratization as a conscious elite strategy and not as an abstract process operating above space. On the other, reading the spatialization of governing and discursive practices unpacks the ordering of the urban as an integral part of post-democratization, whilst highlighting that space is not a container of social relations. Acknowledging in other words that politics (and in the case of this thesis post-democratization and its contestation) unfold in and through space.

Contrary to the dominant research strand within Greece that focuses on the crisis era when analyzing post-democratization, the thesis began its analysis from the early 1990s. It is worth highlighting, again, that this should not be read as an effort to construct a chronological account of a linearly advancing logic of post-democratization. The analytical emphasis, the thesis suggested, should be placed on moments of disarticulation and re-articulation of the political coordinates; events that emerge and punctuate the flow of the process of post-democratization (Chapter 3). This emphasis allows tracing the fusion of previous path dependencies and geo-institutional regimes with processes that re-configure urban politics. Such moments unearth the inherently contingent, incoherent and contradictory character of post-democratization that is always susceptible to being challenged (Chapter 2).

To what extent, then, can this theorization of urban politics account for the trajectory of Thessaloniki, in general and its port in particular? Have
Thessaloniki’s urban politics experienced processes of post-democratization and, if so, what are the specificities of the post-democratization of the city’s urban politics? What are the insights that this line of analysis can add to traditional accounts of urban politics in Thessaloniki? This was the task for the empirical chapters of the thesis. The remainder of this section seeks to recapitulate the major points developed in them with a view towards charting the contours of the uneven geographies of the post-democratization of urban politics around the port of Thessaloniki.

Up until the mid-1990s urban politics in general and the governing of Thessaloniki’s port space and infrastructure, in particular, were exercised through traditional government arrangements of the local and national state. The highly centralized character of the Greek state and the infamously ‘weak’ civil society of the country (Leontidou, 2010), kept the participation of actors beyond state apparatus and elected local governments in urban politics at a minimum level. Besides, the Greek state had direct and complete control over ThPA through the Ministry of Mercantile Marine. This configuration consolidated the power of state administrative elites in urban politics, fuelling, at the same time, a form of political clientelism at the top (Chapter 4). Hosting the ECoC events in 1997 in Thessaloniki proved to be a key moment of reforms in Greek urban politics and governance. The organizing committee for ECoC “Thessaloniki ’97” had been for the period between 1993 and 1997 the key governing body of the city’s restructuring and rebranding campaign. “Thessaloniki ’97” was the first quasi-governmental organization to acquire such political power in urban politics. It brought together a host of actors from the local and national state to civil society members. In parallel, under the aegis of “Thessaloniki ’97”, the urban restructuring projects that were designed and implemented in anticipation of hosting the event and in particular the revitalization of the port’s derelict spaces introduced a further novelty in urban politics. The project was organized, designed and implemented through a partnership of local and national authorities, a web of quasi-governmental organizations and project managers from the private sector (Chapter 5). The quasi-privatization of ThPA in 1999 further consolidated forms of governing beyond the local and national state. Remaining the major shareholder in ThPA, the Greek state adopted a mode of state entrepreneurialism in governing urban space and infrastructure. A key
outcome of the reform was the introduction of real estate and PPPs projects in the construction and management of the port’s spaces and infrastructure. A series of fragmented neoliberal projects around the port were planned throughout the 2000s in pursuit for constantly mobile capital. Rather than disjointed instances, the thesis argued that these projects constituted the dominant mode of producing and ordering urban spaces in Thessaloniki. Governing such projects brought together quasi-privatized public infrastructure organizations, global and local capital, local institutional arrangements and coalitions of stakeholders and the local and national state (Chapter 6).

Yet, three points are of particular importance here. First, this reorganization has also introduced market efficiency and rationality as the logic of governance for Thessaloniki’s port. Profit maximization became institutionalized as the overarching guiding principle in port governance and urban space and infrastructure underwent a process of financialization (Chapter 6 and 7). A round of neoliberalization of urban politics began to unfold. Second, these new forms of governance did not signal the diminishment of the role of the (local and even more so national) state in urban politics. Rather, they introduced informal techniques of techno-administrative governing wherein the borders between public and private became more difficult to discern (Chapters 5 and 6). Even further, inscribed within the previous regime of governance and with no clear rules in the participation of actors in the governing bodies, these innovative networks of governance remained confined within micro-political and clientalistic practices (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). The fusion of neoliberalization with the path-dependencies of Thessaloniki’s urban politics has resulted in the consolidation of the close articulation of the political and economic elite of the country (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Third, within such a framework, urban politics and polic(y)ing were gradually transferred to a complex web of governing that was apparently more inclusive and horizontal (Chapter 5 and 6). Within this framework negotiations between interested stakeholders became the ultimate framework for urban politics (Chapter 6 and 7). The details and trajectories of urban restructuring projects were decided behind closed doors between (local and national) state administrative elites and private capital. However, these negotiations operated within the consensus that attracting private capital was pivotal in producing the urban fabric within the givens of intra-urban
Urban governance, however, cannot in any sense be reduced to local and national practices, actors and configurations. On the one hand, the afore-described re-regulation of the port’s spaces and infrastructure has created the room for the articulation of global and local actors in producing and governing them. Local and global capital constructed consortiums for the materialization of urban projects like the submerged cross-city channel (Chapter 6) and the concession of the container terminal of the port (Chapter 7). Within such a framework and with the commitment of the city’s political elite on neoliberalization policies, the role of such actors became decisive. On the other, the role of governance institutions beyond the urban has since the 1990s been consolidated. Whereas, the institutionalization of the quasi-governmental organization “Thessaloniki '97” can be traced to EU regulations around the organization of the Cultural Capital events (Chapter 5) and the quasi-privatization of the port clearly resonates with policy schemes favoured by the Union (Chapters 6 and 7), the re-organization of urban governance was brought to an unprecedented phase in the midst of the ongoing crisis. In the aftermath of the Greek Crisis, loan conditionality agreed and continuously renegotiated between the Greek state and the EU-IMF-ECB technocrats became the ultimate framework of urban politics. It is important to note that this crisis-driven reorganization of governance unfolds within a geo-institutional regime where the rule regime has itself been neoliberalized. Since 2010, the trajectory of Thessaloniki’s port became embedded in this framework as the privatization of the totality of its shares gradually became part of the loan memoranda. The special purpose organization HRADF became a decisive player in the governance of the port. Urban politics in the midst of the crisis became something too decisive not to be left to expert elites (Chapter 8).

It is important to note here, however, that neither the real estate and PPPs projects nor the concession of the container terminal of the port materialized. The thesis sought to explain this development and explore its implications for urban politics in Thessaloniki (Chapters 6 and 7). It argued that these developments clearly point towards the limits of consensus politics. Whilst the
local and national state openly identified urban politics with the management of capital, it is no coincidence that both the submerged cross-city channel project and the concession of the container terminal of the port were cancelled when the state failed to meet the demands of the local infrastructure capitals (Chapter 6 and 7). Their withdrawal made evident the political character of urban infrastructure politics. These developments bring to the forefront the question of the conceptual legitimization of the post-democratization of urban politics. In other words, how was consensus over this mode of urban politics constructed and consolidated by whom and for what reasons?

The thesis argued that hegemonic discourses around urban politics have attempted to foreclose the political from the discursive horizon of urban politics. It documented the multiplicity of strategies through which this discursive silencing of the political unfolded over the past twenty years. To begin with, market efficiency and economic rationality have repeatedly been narrated as the only viable guiding principles for urban politics within the givens of intra-urban competition. The thesis traced the hegemonization of this discourse since PaSoK’s electoral win in 1996 (Chapter 5 and 6). Building on a critique of the path-dependencies of the Greek development after the downfall of the Junta and in particular of the corrupt and clientele practices of the state, on the one hand, and the repeated failures to cover the perceived or existing inadequacies on the city’s infrastructure, on the other, market rationality and private sector efficiency were constructed as the only way forward (Chapter 6 and 7). This discourse was further consolidated with the election of Yiannis Boutaris as Mayor of Thessaloniki in the midst of the crisis. Boutaris has repeatedly been portrayed as the personification of this logic of market efficiency, building on his background as a successful businessman. In the context of the crisis, Boutaris’ determination to bring business-mentality in urban politics has been narrated as the only solution. This was not only for Thessaloniki that was suffering from the corrupt and inadequate practices of his predecessors but also for the country as a whole that ultimately was led to the crisis due to similar practices on a bigger scale (Chapter 8).

In parallel, and closely articulated with the above logic, on the one hand, the urban large-scale project has been fetishized in the political lexicon of the city and the country. A functionalist and performative understanding of urban
politics has been hegemonized around this fetishization. In Thessaloniki, this fetishization can be traced back in the years of the Cultural Capital (Chapter 5). The failure to materialize any of the planned projects for the port during the 2000s, the non-existence of the project as such was re-articulated within this logic (Chapter 6 and 7). Through failing forward neoliberalization discourses re-inscribed the failure to materialize the fetishized project in calls for further neoliberalization of urban politics, without ever questioning it as the logic of urban polic(y)ing. On the other, urban politics within this framework were reduced to a question of the adoption of the “best practice” and “good governance” policies. Focusing on the local politics of urban policy mobility the thesis highlighted how references to policies from elsewhere (most commonly Barcelona) and policy tourism were mobilized to legitimize the policies designed and implemented (Chapters 6 and 8).

These two discursive strategies were articulated with the construction of an imaginary unity amongst the citizens of Thessaloniki. The thesis traced the emergence of this rhetoric in the convergence of two apparently competing discourses over the Cultural Capital. It suggested that both liberal multiculturalist and conservative nationalist discourses have foregrounded the return and centrality of the signifier of the “Metropolis of the Balkans”. The centrality of the signifier was maintained over the years that followed. As a result of this return an undifferentiated ‘we’, the citizens of Thessaloniki with no further qualification, was discursively constructed as the subject of politics. Understood as either the expression of a nation against a politics that does not express its interests or as a civil society that moves beyond a politics confined to corruption and micro-politics, these discourses amounted to the construction of a “post-political people” (Chapter 5). Yet, certain exclusion borders were drawn again when necessary, though this time in moralist terms. This was the case in the concession of the container terminal of the port. On the one hand, port workers who went on strike against the concession agreement were discursively constructed by the city’s political and economic elite as a fundamentalist minority that was struggling to hold undeserved privileges. On the other, the Greek tycoon Lavrentis Lavrentiadis was portrayed as a ‘success story’ whose success would, at the same time, benefit the city as a whole (Chapter 7).
Politics, thus, were reduced to a techno-administrative act that allegedly went beyond socio-economic and political divisions. This post-politicization of urban politics, however, has also served the reproduction of the local and national politico-economic elite in positions of power through a double movement. First, throughout the 2000s the city’s political elite has maintained its legitimacy through performing neoliberalization. Proclaiming to manage the givens of global and European reality, they engaged in a series of fragmented and ultimately failed projects in order to act as if they were doing everything possible within their power (Chapter 6). The thesis returned to the role of discursive performativity as a legitimization strategy in the context of the ongoing crisis to suggest that performing efficiency has been mobilized not only to maintain local state legitimacy but has also actively ordered urban public spaces (Chapter 8). Second, Chapter 7 choreographed the active involvement of local and national politico-economic elites in discursively silencing the political nature of the concession agreement. Analyzing Alapis’ case, the thesis suggested that Lavrentiadis was not an exception of corrupt practices, rather Lavrentiadis’ case must be seen as one of the dominant ways through which political and economic elites in Greece – closely articulated – have mobilized urban space and infrastructure in order to reproduce in positions of power during the last twenty years or so. Engagement in the construction of urban infrastructure projects like the concession of the container terminal – as well as the submerged cross-city channel (see chapter 6) – and real estate activities have been among the prominent terrains through which, tycoons who have benefitted from the deregulation of the financial and especially banking sector, have attempted in close co-operation with the political elite to further their profits through speculative investments. What was discursively silenced in cases like these, however, was the inherently political character of urban politics.

This brings forward the role of urban space and its ordering not only as an accumulation terrain but in consolidating post-democratization as well. The urban public space of the first pier of Thessaloniki’s port, and in particular the two waves of revitalization that materialized upon it, served to illustrate the centrality of the ordering of the urban in foreclosing dissent. Chapter 5 analyzed how the discursive construction of a “post-political people” unfolded in and through the revitalization of Thessaloniki’s old port. The quasi-privatization of
ThPA only one year after the ECoC events has inscribed the regeneration of the port’s public spaces into a market-oriented logic. The privatized urban public space that was the result of the policy was simultaneously inviting and forbidding. On the one hand, such spaces invite profit making activities and cultural consumption. On the other, they seek to forbid the expression of dissent. This was clearly the case when the quasi-private status of the port’s public spaces paved the way for the mobilization of police SWAT forces in order to prevent the participation of the port workers representatives in ThPA’s board meeting that signed the agreement with the Hutchinson-Alapis consortium (Chapter 7). The second wave of revitalization policies on the port’s public spaces has unfolded during the crisis. Here, the aesthetic ordering of the port’s public spaces served a twofold purpose. On the one hand, it constituted one of the cornerstones of a performativity that attempts to construct an image of proactive and efficient local state. On the other, it attempted to hegemonize a logic around urban public spaces that is ordered, attractive for tourists and investment and above all beyond the banality and fundamentalism of politics. It constructed urban public spaces that sought to efface the re-appearance of the people as a dissenting democratic subject by ascribing certain uses to certain spaces and imposing conditions of visibility (Chapter 8).

From the failure to implement any of the planned projects for the port in the aftermath of the quasi-privatization of ThPA to the withdrawal of Hutchinson-Alapis consortium from the bid for the port’s container terminal, the incoherencies of the post-democratic script are clearly pronounced. These incoherencies, the thesis suggested, became even more pronounced in the midst of the acceleration and deepening of post-democratization during the crisis. The occupation of the city’s White Tower square by the Indignants mobilized urban public space in order to stage dissent and challenge the post-democratic order. These spaces served as a stage through which not only the hegemonic politics were contested but also new ways of being and doing in common were imagined and materialized. This is not to argue that the Indignants movement was without its problems, contradictions and inadequacies. Rather it is to highlight two points. On the one hand, that despite its acceleration and deepening post-democratization is always open to being challenged by (urban) emancipatory movements. On the other, this challenge against the post-democratic horizon of
urban politics and the unequal relations of politico-economic power that (re-)produce urban environments will unfold in and through the occupation and transformation of urban (public) spaces (Chapter 8).

9.3 Limitations of the research and possible future research directions

Chapter 3, together with the methodology of the project, addressed some of its limitations and problems. This section returns to this issue. In analyzing how these limitations were/can be addressed the section also points towards possible future directions for the research project.

To begin with, the thesis insisted that, to further understand the uneven geographies of post-democratization local politics and dynamics should be read alongside trans-local transformations of governance and policy-making. In so doing, the analysis of the networks that lubricate trans-local, and in particular intra-European, urban policy mobility and the mechanisms, power relations and discursive shifts that occur within them can provide significant insights. This research project focused on the crystallization of such processes and dynamics in the case of Thessaloniki. While this focus allowed tracing the practices of local and national politico-economic elites, it cannot fully grasp the transformations of geo-institutional regimes and policy networks through which processes of post-democratization unfold. This being said, trans-local dynamics and processes that reconfigured Thessaloniki’s urban politics were identified – and to a certain extent analyzed – in all of the empirical chapters of the thesis. From the institution of ECoC (Chapter 5), through EU policies on port privatization and management (Chapter 6) and the creation of glocal infrastructure spaces (Chapter 7) to the crisis-driven governance reorganization (Chapter 8), the thesis analyzed how the fusion of previous institutional regimes and practices in Thessaloniki with EU policies and the practices of actors beyond the urban constituted a prominent terrain in the consolidation of post-democratization. However, further analysis of the politics of these networks and the elite strategies that unfold within them could have provided further breadth and depth in the analysis. Research on policy mobility has already formulated a significant body of knowledge around these topics. Yet, the role of such practices in promoting and
consolidating post-democratization has rarely been addressed within this body of literature (for an exception see Ward, 2007). Unearthing and analyzing the practices that work towards the hegemonization of techno-managerial best practice urban policies and construct a limited horizon of possible alternatives; the discursive and material practices that sustain such networks and policies; and the choreographies of power within them allows a better understanding of the ternary mechanism of post-democratization and its uneven geographical development. Hence, bringing research on policy mobility into further dialogue with research on post-democratization emerges as a fruitful analytical strand that can be further pursued.

This brings forward a second related issue that is worth addressing. Whereas the trajectories of urban politics are irreducibly historically and geographically specific, transformations of urban governance across the globe often follow similar patterns and contours. This is particularly so in the case of the EU in the context of the ongoing crisis. Further comparative research on the transformations of urban governance and politics within the EU can provide a fruitful way forward for research. Such a focus can be relevant not only for the analysis of policymaking but can also inform emancipatory movements that seek to go beyond the hegemony of post-democratization.

Finally, this thesis attempted to depart from homogeneous and homogenizing accounts of post-democracy and to highlight its always contingent and contested character. The role of counter-hegemonic movements and the strategies deployed to silence their dissent was addressed, to a degree, in Chapters 7 and 8. However, the major focus of the thesis was the construction and consolidation of post-democratization in Thessaloniki’s urban politics. In this sense, it might be read as a re-affirmation of the hegemony of the dominant discourse, as the flipside of the coin of the post-political discourse. Yet, the focus on hegemonic practices is analytically important and politically relevant for at least two reasons. First, it allows charting the contours of urban polic(y)ing and the choreographies of power that unfold within them. In so doing, it offers significant insights on how geo-institutional differentiation is (re)produced and by whom. In this sense, it can also inform a democratic politics that seeks to challenge and move beyond the post-democratic consensus. Second, it allows mapping the discursive and material practices through which post-
democratization is consolidated and thus informing a political strategy that seeks to disarticulate (or take advantage of the disarticulations of) the hegemonic discourse. Brought together these two trends can offer a nuanced image of post-democratization within specific localities.

This being said, however, further emphasis on the practices of counter-hegemonic movements can shed new light in three ways: 1) through a reading of the counter-hegemonic responses and their drawbacks, 2) through an analysis of the hegemonic strategies that are mobilized against them and 3) through analyzing of the emancipatory practices that are flourishing and sustained within them. Studies of urban social movements are proliferating within political geography especially in the midst of the ongoing crisis. Yet, they often tend to deify the practices of social movements and fail to adequately address the dialectic between the consolidation of post-democratization and its contestation. Bringing into dialogue the analysis of moments of consolidation of post-democracy and moments and events that disarticulate the hegemonic order can provide further insights for emancipatory politics. This is not to suggest that emancipatory movements and practices that seek to challenge the order of the police should follow a predefined script of discursive and material practices and that this can be articulated solely through academic research. Apart from being a top-down construction of a grand narrative this would also be a futile exercise of little relevance. The success or failure of a political agenda is not determined at a theoretical level. Rather, it is a call for both academic research and emancipatory movements to actively embrace the political and its precariousness (Rancière, 2004: 8). To actively embrace in other words the democratic logic of equality; the task of imagining, materializing and institutionalizing spaces of equality in the here and now.
# Appendix

## List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Interviewee</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L. L.</td>
<td>Professor of Economic Geography</td>
<td>10/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr. K.</td>
<td>Professor of Urban Planning</td>
<td>10/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y. A.</td>
<td>Reader in Social Anthropology</td>
<td>10/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. T.</td>
<td>Urban Developer</td>
<td>10/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. G.</td>
<td>ThPA Board and Port Workers’ Union</td>
<td>11/2010, 2/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. P.</td>
<td>Professor of Rural and Surveying Engineering</td>
<td>11/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y. Z.</td>
<td>Local businessman/Exporter</td>
<td>11/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. R.</td>
<td>Local businessman/Exporter</td>
<td>11/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Ts</td>
<td>Local businessman/Transportations</td>
<td>12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Ch.</td>
<td>Local businessman/Transportations</td>
<td>12/2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. K.</td>
<td>Member of Iliosporoi (Environmental NGO)</td>
<td>1/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. P.</td>
<td>Professor of Economics</td>
<td>1/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. P.</td>
<td>Thessaloniki’s Planning Organization</td>
<td>1/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr. N.</td>
<td>Port Worker and Member of the Union</td>
<td>1/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. G.</td>
<td>Member of Thessaloniki’s Passengers (Urban NGO)</td>
<td>1/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thessaloniki's Immigrants Inn-Antracist Initiative Group Discussion</td>
<td>1/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pirates of the Waterfront Group Discussion</td>
<td>1/2011</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eterotopia Group Discussion</td>
<td>1/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. P.</td>
<td>Professor of Architecture</td>
<td>2/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. P.</td>
<td>Professor of Architecture and Planning</td>
<td>2/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Th.</td>
<td>Former Member of “Thessaloniki ‘97” responsible for the Cultural Program</td>
<td>2/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. X.</td>
<td>Regional Council Member</td>
<td>2/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. K.</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>2/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y. Ts.</td>
<td>ThPA CEO</td>
<td>3/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Br.</td>
<td>ThPA Operations Director</td>
<td>3/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. H.</td>
<td>Professor of Urban Planning</td>
<td>3/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. A.</td>
<td>ThPA Marketing Director</td>
<td>4/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. K.</td>
<td>Shipping Agent and former President of the Shipping Agents’ Organization</td>
<td>4/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. D.</td>
<td>Shipping Agent</td>
<td>4/2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. D.</td>
<td>Shipping Agent</td>
<td>4/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tr. M.</td>
<td>City Council Member</td>
<td>5/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z. C.</td>
<td>Shipping Agent (FYROM)</td>
<td>5/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. P.</td>
<td>Shipping Agent (FYROM)</td>
<td>5/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. G.</td>
<td>Professor of Urban Planning</td>
<td>6/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. M.</td>
<td>Travel Agent</td>
<td>6/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. V.</td>
<td>Travel Agent</td>
<td>6/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. V.</td>
<td>Advisor of ThPA’s Board</td>
<td>6/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. M.</td>
<td>Local Journalist specializing in port issues</td>
<td>6/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Other Thessaloniki</td>
<td>NGO (Group Discussion)</td>
<td>7/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y. T.</td>
<td>Director of Parallaxi Magazine</td>
<td>7/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. K.</td>
<td>Vice Mayor of Thessaloniki</td>
<td>9/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. P.</td>
<td>Vice Mayor of Thessaloniki</td>
<td>9/2011</td>
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ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΑ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗ ΚΑΙ ΕΚΜΕΤΑΛΛΕΥΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΤΟΥΡΙΣΤΙΚΟΥ ΛΙΜΕΝΑ (ΜΑΡΙΝΑ) ΣΤΗΝ 1η ΠΡΟΒΛΗΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΛΙΜΕΝΑ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗΣ, ΜΕ ΣΥΜΒΑΣΗ ΠΑΡΑΧΩΡΗΣΗΣ

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