BALANCING THE BOOKS:

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COLLEGIA IN THE WESTERN
ROMAN EMPIRE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the impact that *collegia* had on the economy of the western Roman Empire. There has been a tendency amongst scholars to dismiss the economic aspects of *collegia* and to think of them instead as primarily social or religious organisations. This thesis demonstrates, however, that some of the earliest work on *collegia* was affected by flawed methodology and that this has in turn affected a good deal of the subsequent scholarship, undermining economic analyses to a certain extent. As a secondary research goal, this thesis is therefore aimed at re-examining the body of scholarship that has gone before it in light of modern research methods and in hopes of drawing a line under many of the debates that continue to be given too much prominence in the literature. In examining the economic impact of the collegia, the thesis draws on modern economic theory and especially on a Neo-Institutional Economic theoretical framework to analyse the epigraphic and, latterly, the papyrological evidence of associations in the Roman Empire. The conclusions demonstrate that many of the *collegia* in the west did have a clear impact on their local economies, despite this not always being immediately discernible in the extant epigraphic evidence. By also examining other types of evidence, namely papyri and the archaeological evidence from Ostia, however, we are able to significantly enhance our understanding of the *collegia*. 
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ABBREVIATIONS

The titles of journals, as well as the titles of conference proceedings and of epigraphic corpora, are abbreviated according to the format of the Oxford Classical Dictionary (4th edition) [Available online at http://classics.oxfordre.com/page/abbreviation-list/#p].

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For Chris Lake
INTRODUCTION

“It is not beneficial to have contempt for a single private citizen or for many or for the entire citizen body, just as it is not good to be held in contempt by them…

…A certain man imagined that, lifting up his clothes in the presence of his companions in a club and phratry, he urinated on each of them. He was removed from the association for being dishonourable.”

Artemidorus, *Oneirocritica*, 4.44.

The evidence for *collegia*, often referred to as clubs or guilds, in the Roman world comes almost entirely from epigraphic and, in the case of Egypt, papyrological sources. With the exception of legal texts and increased elite interest during the 50s BC, there are very few references to the *collegia* in either literary or historiographical sources – a remarkable fact given the enormous number of inscriptions that do refer to them. The examples that exist offer only a vague impression of what the associations actually were. Artemidorus’ reference from the second century, given above, is brief and gives an insight into associative life in only (one imagines) very unusual circumstances.¹ What it does reveal is that associations existed in the second century and were ordinary enough to need no further explanation. It might also indicate that they had a system of rules or at least an understood code of decorum that, if broken, could lead to exclusion. Then again, it is difficult to imagine any companionship that would not turn sour in the event of a member urinating on his or her fellows.

Perhaps the most famous reference to *collegia* in a Latin source comes from Pliny’s Letters to Trajan, in the early second century. After a fire breaks out at

¹ The choice of terminology used to refer to the association, φρατρία and συμβίωσις, offers no further explanation. φρατρία can have a negative implication, especially when used to refer to a political group but can also be used simply to refer to any league or association (cf. *LSJ*, s.v. φρατρα, II.3, ‘league, association) while συμβίωσις (a term used specifically to refer to associations in Asia Minor, cf. Robert, 1978: 540) is also loosely used to refer to companionship or a society. Cf. also *LSJ*, s.v. συμβίωσις, II.1, ‘club, society’.

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Nicomedia, Pliny requests permission from Trajan to form a *collegium* that can act as a fire service:

"tu, domine, dispice an instituendum putes collegium fabrorum dumtaxat hominum CL. ego attendam, ne quis nisi faber recipiatur neve iure concesso in aliud utantur; nec erit difficile custodire tam paucos."

As for you, Master, consider what you think of instituting an association of workers of only 150 men. I myself will ensure that no-one will be accepted unless he is a workman and that they will not use their permitted duty in any other way; it will not be difficult to watch so few.

Pliny (to Trajan), *epistulae*, 10.33

Pliny’s letter implies several things about *collegia*. First, we can infer that the associations could be quite large – indeed, the choice of words would suggest that 150 was a comparatively small number of members. Second, that membership in such an association might be based on one’s profession, although it is not clear exactly what the profession is here, as *faber* is a rather catchall term used to refer to builders, carpenters and other workmen. Third, the tone of the letter would seem to suggest that it was common for *collegia* to be used as fire-fighting bodies in this way. Finally, the act of sending the letter to ask for permission, as well as Pliny’s eagerness to reassure Trajan that he will be able to control the *collegium*, indicates mistrust of such associations, at least amongst the elite, suggesting that they have caused trouble in the past.

The response from Trajan confirms the impression given by Pliny:

"tibi quidem secundum exempla complurium in mentem venit posse collegium fabrorum apud Nicomedenses constitui. sed meminerimus provinciam istam et praecipue eas civitates eius modi factionibus esse vexatas. quodcumque nomen ex quacumque causa dederimus iis, qui in idem contracti fuerint, hetaeriae eaeque brevi fient"
It came into your mind that, following the examples of many others, it might be possible for an association of workers to be instituted amongst the Nicomedians. However, let us remember that this very province and especially those citizens have been troubled by factions of this sort. Whatever name we give to them out of whatever reason, those who are brought together in the same function will quickly be made into those political clubs.

Pliny (from Trajan), *epistulae*, 10.34.

In particular, from Trajan’s response, it appears that *collegia* provoked fear amongst the political class and had a history of forming political movements against the elite. The legal documents from the late republic and throughout the imperial period that refer to *collegia* reveal similar unease about their potential for sedition and, accordingly, are mostly concerned with curtailing their freedom.²

The legislation surrounding *collegia* will be explored in much more detail in the following chapter but it is important to emphasise from the outset that the piecemeal impression handed to us by elite historiographical and literary sources is very different from that afforded by the epigraphic or papyrological evidence. Most of all, despite often being treated as a single homogeneous group by the elite, the *collegia* of the Roman world were actually an enormous number of different associations, formed around various different functions, who were involved in many activities and operated according to their own, as well as to inherited, rules.

Of course, these differences make it very difficult to define precisely what the *collegia* were in the context of the Roman world, as they do not fit neatly into any one box, whatever elite sources might suggest. This has been referred to by Kloppenborg as the “messy taxonomy” of *collegia* and will be the focus of the first chapter. For now, and for the purposes of outlining the scope of this thesis, it is best to define them according to only their most fundamental aspects, which are that they were associations of non-elite men (and occasionally, women), organised in basic hierarchical structures, usually around common involvement in a

² See below, Chapter 1.2.
particular cult or profession. At least some collegia engaged in feasting and in religious activity together, as well as often providing burial.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the collegia in the Roman West during the principate and particularly to argue that at least some did affect their local economies in substantial ways. Historically, there has been a tendency to reject the economic aspects of collegia and emphasise their social function instead. This has begun to change more recently but the debate remains prominent and there is very little agreement on precisely what role the collegia had in an economic context.

Specifically, I will argue that the study of collegia has been dramatically affected by the mistaken assumptions and flawed methodology of some of the earliest scholarship in this area, an issue that caused an obsession in the 20th century with examining the precise purpose and function of collegia. In treating all of the various collegia as one, in this way, and by focusing so narrowly on what they were supposed to do, there is little progress to be made. They were not all the same and therefore attempts to attribute the same purpose or function to them are extremely problematic.

Rather, I argue that we should emphasise the outcomes on individuals of membership within collegia and the overall impact that they had on their local communities. In this context, I will argue that collegia can be thought of primarily as objective-enhancing associations, that is, members with common objectives which are enhanced by their membership, regardless of whether or not this is the stated purpose of the collegium or of their joining it (cf. chapter 1). Therefore, those individuals who formed professional associations absolutely affected the economy in doing so, as well as their own place within it.

There are several methodological problems that have affected the scholarship in this area and continue to do so and it is therefore the secondary purpose of this thesis to reconcile these issues with the latest developments in the scholarship. The following chapters will tackle each issue as it becomes relevant but it is worth outlining them briefly now. The most abiding mistake in the scholarship is the classification of the collegia as burial societies. This is a common misconception
that originates with Mommsen’s reading of a particularly famous inscription, known as the Lanuvian Inscription. Despite Mommsen’s insertions to the text being debunked several times, the idea that many collegia acted specifically as burial societies for poor men remains fairly prominent and the collegia funeraticia (Mommsen’s own term) are still occasionally referred to, as if they were a Roman concept. In reality, it is certainly true that many collegia did provide this function but there is little evidence that it was the primary reason for their existence. Scholars specialising in the topic today are of course aware of the misnomer, but the misconception is pervasive amongst other ancient historians and it is fair to say that this has sometimes led to a general reluctance to accept that there was more to the collegia.

Moreover, I would argue that the suggestion that all collegia acted as burial societies has at times led to a somewhat uncritical approach to the evidence. This brings us to a second methodological issue that this thesis will deal with, the type of evidence that has survived. The vast majority of the evidence for collegia comes from epigraphy, which is a medium that is well suited to recording monumental events, such as deaths. A direct consequence of this is that many of the surviving inscriptions that refer to collegia were made to record a burial, fitting neatly with the narrative that collegia were organised around and for burial. I argue, particularly in the third and fourth chapters below, that this has led to a rather complacent and indeed circular approach to the evidence; it is crucial that, rather than allowing such inscriptions to reinforce the mistaken conclusion that collegia existed specifically to provide burial, we instead probe that evidence more carefully and ask what might be missing from the picture of collegia that it reveals.

Besides these more general problems, there are also issues specific to economic studies of the collegia that continue to confound progress in this area. In 2011, Verboven made an important introduction to a collection of papers on the economic impact of collegia, in which he noted some problems that occur throughout the body of scholarship. To some extent, this thesis is born out of that short paper, as it aims to resolve the problems highlighted by Verboven. In no

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3 See Bendlin (2011: esp. 219, 20); Venticinque (2016: 14) and below, Chapter 1.3.
particular order, these include a debate about whether or not *collegia* were the same as mediaeval guilds in the way that they interacted with the economy; a tendency amongst scholars to cherry-pick the very best evidence in the face of limited, epigraphic evidence; and, similarly, a tendency to plug gaps in the evidence by using papyri from Egypt to speak for the wider empire. As indicated above, the chapters below will tackle these issues, not in hopes of resolving them entirely but rather to highlight their out-dated nature and to draw a line under such stale debates that hold back progress on this topic.

In the first chapter, I will focus on the “messy taxonomy” of *collegia* and particularly on how it has affected much of the scholarship on this topic. I will begin by examining what the *collegia* were in an official sense, through close analysis of the terminology used to refer to them and the body of relevant legislation. Following this, I will review the most important works of scholarship, emphasising that in order for us to make progress in this area and to make use of modern approaches, it is vital that we draw a line under previous debates that have ranged back and forth throughout the last century. Finally, I will provide a reanalysis of some of the most famous and widely used inscriptions that refer to *collegia*, the *leges collegiorum*. By their size alone, these provide the best evidence that we have for *collegia* and are useful both for highlighting certain, key misassumptions and for clearly demonstrating that the different *collegia* were fundamentally not all the same.

In the second chapter, having established that there were several different types of *collegia*, the activities and functions of which could often overlap with one another, I will focus more on the economic impact of those associations that were formed around a common profession or trade. In particular, I will examine the way in which economic historians have treated the *collegia* and will again demonstrate that much of the research in this area has been held back by faulty assumptions. I will analyse new approaches to the evidence, put forward in the last few years, which are based on using modern economic theory – specifically, Neo-Institutional Economics (NIE) – to engage with the evidence of *collegia*. I will argue that, despite its flaws, this approach offers a straightforward, common-
sense way to consider the *collegia* and will show that the so-called barriers to such an approach can be easily dealt with.

In the third chapter, I treat Ostia as a case study with which to explore the usefulness of NIE in context. I argue that one of the problems that have beset economic studies of *collegia* is the tendency to “cherry-pick” only the evidence that best suits economic analyses and then to apply conclusions from this to all *collegia*, without drawing on wider evidence; this dispenses with the need to view that evidence in its local context and ignores the more problematic examples, all of which only undermines such studies. To combat this, I will focus on some of the largest, professional *collegia* from Ostia, as well as considering the town’s many other associations. Crucially, I examine all of the evidence available for each *collegium* and highlight potential problems where they exist, rather than cherry-picking only those *collegia* or inscriptions that might support my hypothesis. Of course, one could still argue that Ostia is not a representative sample, either in terms of the pattern of evidence or its proximity to Rome, and that therefore this approach remains somewhat guilty of selecting the best or the most agreeable evidence. The fourth and fifth chapters will therefore be aimed at examining how far the conclusions drawn from Ostia can and should be applied to the rest of the empire.

In the fourth chapter, I further examine the conclusions drawn from Ostia by considering associations from elsewhere in the western empire. I evaluate several studies that have analysed the economic impact of *collegia* in different areas, as well as looking at specific *collegia* that existed both in Rome and across the empire. Throughout this chapter, I argue that the surviving evidence does point towards many of the *collegia* having an important economic impact on the empire but that in most areas this remains frustratingly theoretical, thanks to the type of evidence that has survived and the low state of preservation. Almost all evidence outside of Egypt comes from epigraphic sources, which, I argue, are not at all well suited to communicating the more economic activities of the *collegia*. Inscriptions tend to be used for monumental purposes and accordingly show *collegia* in specific moments of activity, such as the thanking of a patron, the burial of a member or an offering to a particular deity; they are not used for recording
minutiae, such as contractual agreements or receipts for work delivered and we are therefore given a skewed picture by relying only on epigraphy.

In the fifth and final chapter, I look to deal with this problem by considering the papyrological evidence from Egypt. It is vital that evidence from Egypt is not used simply to plug the gaps in the evidence from elsewhere and I begin this chapter with a discussion of the typicality or otherwise of Egypt as a Roman province. I argue that the different body of evidence, as well as the historical and cultural differences of Egypt, means that the papyri cannot justifiably be used to speak for the wider empire. However, I argue that Egypt can, at the very least, be considered comparable to the wider empire in several respects and is therefore useful for comparative study. Using the data provided by papyri, I argue that the more professional associations in Egypt very clearly acted as economic bodies and, in so doing, had a distinct impact on their local economies. Crucially, unlike several scholars, I emphasise that the papyrological evidence is distinct to Egypt and should not be applied wholesale to the wider empire. Rather, I use this final section to demonstrate my argument that, while the evidence from much of the empire is only theoretically indicative of the collegia affecting the economy, this is mostly down to the type of evidence that has survived and is not reflective of the reality. Egypt, with its different body of evidence, provides a much more secure basis for the economic function of associations there and I finish this chapter by highlighting ways in which this comparative evidence might help us to better understand western collegia, before offering some final conclusions.

Before the first chapter, it is worth briefly summarising some of the chronological and geographical background to the collegia and explaining the scope of this thesis within that context. It is important to emphasise that private associations, known in Latin as collegia, were not a solely Roman phenomenon. However, the difficulty of nailing down precisely what the associations were, in terms of their overall function and daily activities, makes any simple historical or geographical overview of their background somewhat problematic.
The earliest evidence of private associations comes (indirectly) from the sixth century BC, from the laws of Solon. Specific epigraphic evidence, especially of associations formed around various cults, is widespread throughout the Mediterranean world and particularly from Greece from the fourth century BC onwards, although Thucydides also refers to associations with a political character (ἑταιρεία) from the fifth century. The Greek associations were known by various different names and had a similarly complicated taxonomy to the collegia (for which, see chapter one) but their activities certainly included religious worship and a more social function. It has been traditionally argued that they were organised according to existing civic or military structures and that their proliferation in the Classical and especially the Hellenistic period might reflect a weakening of the polis and particularly of the ties that bound non-elites to the wider polis. However, more recent studies emphasise that they played an important role within their societies and that, far from replacing existing polis-structures, they actually strengthened and supported them.

It is certainly true that the Roman collegia, which proliferated throughout the late republic and the empire, were in some respects moulded by the Greek associations that had gone before them. These too were often organised around cultic interests and their internal organisation was again very similar to existing political structures. Similarly, the Greek associations appear to have been influenced by the Roman collegia; Waltzing points out that any tendency to form around shared occupations and identify themselves according to their joint profession was absent from the earlier Greek associations, up until the beginning of Roman rule.

Their earliest manifestation in Rome itself, according to Plutarch, was under Numa, although the truth of this is obviously uncertain; Plutarch writes that Numa, in an effort to erase wider distinctions based on race and tribal differences,
divided people into groups based on their professions or arts.\textsuperscript{9} Pliny the Elder also indicates that the various groups instituted by Numa were formally divided according to their trade and numbered.\textsuperscript{10} Florus, however, suggests that it was Servius Tullius who divided the \textit{populus} into \textit{collegia}.\textsuperscript{11} Other literary and historical sources make no mention of the Roman \textit{collegia} having such legendary origins or of them being otherwise instituted as some sort of policy of social integration.

Besides their apparent inclusion in the XII Tables, discussed by Gaius in the second century AD, the earliest references to \textit{collegia} from within the Roman Empire come from inscriptions from the early second century BC.\textsuperscript{12} These private associations, which ought to be distinguished from the much larger priestly colleges that were instituted by the senate, included a \textit{collegium} of cooks from the Tiber Valley north of Rome and various groups of traders from around the empire that tended to organise themselves as worshippers of Mercury or of the \textit{lares compitales}.\textsuperscript{13} The contemporary \textit{senatus consultum de bacchanalibus} also reveals early mistrust of associations amongst the Roman authorities, outlawing any organisation around common values or oaths that might be perceived as being for the worship of Bacchus or indeed the performance of any rites that were not specifically permitted by the senate (“\textit{sacra ne quisquam fecise velet” - sic}).\textsuperscript{14}

As Tran points out, the references during the imperial period to the legendary origins of the \textit{collegia} demonstrate that, by then at least, the \textit{collegia} were considered to be part of the traditional narrative of early Roman history and that, furthermore, they were unifying, occupational groups that enabled peaceful

\textsuperscript{9} Plutarch, \textit{Num.} 17.  
\textsuperscript{10} Pliny, \textit{NH.} 34.1; 35.159: “\textit{propter quae Numa rex septimum collegium figulorum instituit}”.  
\textsuperscript{11} Florus, 1.6.3.  
\textsuperscript{12} Although less certain bands of \textit{sodales} appear much earlier, e.g. \textit{CIL} 1\textsuperscript{a}.2832a (c. 500 BC; Satricum).  
\textsuperscript{13} In particular, cf. Tran (2006: 1-3) and Lomas (2014: 253): \textit{CIL} 11.3078 for the \textit{“gonlegium…quae”} (sic) from the early to mid-2\textsuperscript{nd} Century BC; \textit{CIL} 14.14203(4) for the \textit{magistri} of Mercury and Maia (2\textsuperscript{nd} Century BC; Delos).  
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{CIL} 10.104 (186 BC). The decree does focus on Bacchic organisations but the wording is such that it could be easily applied to outlaw any unwanted organisation that holds a common fund, enforces regulations or makes contractual agreements.
integration. In contrast, the epigraphic evidence does not suggest any great proliferation of these groups before the 2nd century BC and moreover indicates that they were usually organised around cults and that they might easily provoke suspicion amongst the authorities. By the 1st century BC, collegia that were ostensibly religious or occupational were both in abundance around the empire, especially in areas of urban development, although there was little to distinguish between them. Towards the end of the republic, the collegia became involved in the political struggles leading up to the civil war and were subsequently banned in a series of laws from 64 BC only to be reinstated by Clodius in 58.

During the early Principate, the western collegia continued to be met with legal restrictions but nevertheless appear to have thrived throughout the imperial period. The distribution of evidence indicates that they existed across much of the Roman West but were most prevalent by far in Italy and Rome, followed at some distance by Gaul. The precise character of the collegia and of the legal restrictions put upon them will be examined in more detail below but, on the whole, the epigraphic evidence points towards private associations that continued to organise around shared religious values and, increasingly, around shared occupations. This was by no means confined to the Roman West, as associations from the Greek East also continued to flourish but these lie beyond the scope of this thesis.

While collegia did exist across the East as well, as mentioned, their origins are at least partly rooted in the societies that existed in those areas before they became a

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15 Tran (2006: 3); cf. also Verboven (2016: 175).
16 Liu (2013: 352-3).
17 For the legislation in 64, see Cicero, in Pisonem, 8; Asconius, 7C, 9-26 and for Clodius’ repeal, see Cicero, in Pisonem, 9; pro Sestio, 55; Cassius Dio, 38.13. Cf. also CAH 9.346 and Chapter 1.3, below.
18 The most important previous study of the collegia remains Waltzing’s four volume work, which includes tables showing the distribution patterns of the most common collegia (1895-1900: 4.49-80). Ausbüttel’s (1982: 32-3) survey notes that almost two-thirds of known associations are from Italy, especially from Rome, Ostia and Pompeii (although see below, Chapter 4.3). An updated list can also be found in Liu (2009: Appendix B), which shows more recent additions. Cf. also Hemelrijk (2015: 182) who breaks down the data even more, showing that Waltzing collected a total of 2216 inscriptions referring to collegia; 1,656 of these came from Italy (with 766 from Rome alone), 190 from Gaul, 165 from the Balkans and Danube, 55 from Spain, 40 from Germania and 11 from Britain. See also Ausbüttel (1982: 33), who notes that although there were a large number of collegia in North Africa, they had a strong religious focus.
part of the empire and are therefore worth considering separately. One could argue of course that this is somewhat undermined by the focus, in the fifth chapter, on Egyptian associations; it is worth emphasising again, however, that this chapter is aimed only at demonstrating that economic activity did exist amongst some associations and not as direct evidence that it existed amongst *collegia*. Regardless of their comparability in some areas, the western and the eastern associations were distinct from one another and should therefore be treated separately. Of course, I hope that the conclusions of this thesis will feed into and develop future research that can also examine the eastern empire.

As for the chronological focus, the period of the late-republic and the early principate yields many hundreds of inscriptions from the western empire and this more than anything drives the scope of this thesis. The behaviour and status of associations changed dramatically over the course of this period in various ways, as will become clear in the following chapter, resulting in their being brought slowly under state control. I am more interested in the earlier, informal bands of men that organised themselves around common interests and, by having done so, offer social historians a unique perspective into the non-elite Roman world.

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19 For more on which, see below, Chapter 5.2.
CHAPTER 1: “MESSY TAXONOMY”

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the taxonomy of *collegia* in the Roman world. Despite the range of terms used to refer to the associations, there is often very little to distinguish one from another, whether they are known as *collegia*, *corpora* or by some other name. Although broad differences can be drawn between those collegia that identify themselves according to a shared religion or according to a shared profession, for example, these do not appear to be directly linked to their choice of terminology. Moreover, close examination of the evidence reveals that the actual functions and activities of the *collegia*, whatever their stated purpose, overlapped in numerous ways. With this in mind, I will emphasise the need to focus on the actual behaviour of individual associations and on how their actions impacted upon both their members and their local communities. I will start by discussing in more detail the terminology used to describe different associations, before examining the relevant legislation that was applied to *collegia* and how it affected their status in the Roman Empire. In the second part of this chapter, I will give a more general introduction to the *collegia*. Through examination of some of the better-known evidence, I will describe their functions and activities and assess the relevant body of scholarship. Specifically, I will demonstrate that much of the historiography in this area has been undermined by common misconceptions and by a general failure to recognise the limitations of the evidence.

1. Terminology

As discussed in my introduction, finding a precise definition for the *collegia* is difficult; although they shared many common features, they were by no means simple in their formation, nor consistent in their activities. The various statutes applied to *collegia or corpora* (for which, see below) tended to treat them as though they were all the same and, although this may have affected the way in which they presented themselves to the public, most of the associations appear to have grown organically to suit a variety of purposes, rather than conforming to any pre-ordained template. A direct outcome of this is the wide-ranging terminology that was used to refer to the associations, both by themselves and by
others: the word *collegia* is typical in modern scholarship, as it appears most frequently in the epigraphic and legal evidence, but several other terms were also common in Latin and Greek, including *corpus, sodalictium, universitas, societas, secta, factio, koinon* (κοινόν), *synodos* (σύνοδος) and *synagogos* (συναγωγός).\(^{20}\)

The word *collegium* can theoretically be used to describe any instance of gathering together (*cum + legere*) of individuals, whether that be as associates, colleagues or friends, and indeed it is this notion of collegiality that underpinned the system of sharing power in republican magistracies.\(^{21}\) It also has a more concrete meaning, referring to “men belonging to the same trade, or having some common tie or interest”, that is perhaps best expressed with the words, “association” or “society”, although the OLD also suggests, “guild”, “club” or “fraternity”.\(^{22}\)

In particular, *collegium* was used to refer to one of two types of association. The first of these, the sacerdotal colleges, were officially recognised religious priesthhoods, including the *pontifices* and the *augures* as well as lesser colleges. They were formed of elite men and acted as religious advisors to the Senate, while also maintaining control over festivals and other forms of worship.\(^{23}\) The sacerdotal colleges are mentioned here only for the purposes of distinguishing them from the more informal, private associations that are the focus of this thesis.

The jurists, when referring to private associations, use a variety of terms, including *collegium, societas* and *corpus*.\(^{24}\) On the meaning of expressions, Marcellus notes that Neratius Priscus considers a *collegium* to be three or more persons but gives no further detail.\(^{25}\) No specific entry is given on the meaning of


\(^{21}\) In his *Ab Urbe Condita*, for example, Livy (10.13) writes that Q. Fabius Maximus expressed his preferred choice of co-consul with the words “*P. Decium, expertum mihi concordi collegio virum, ... mecum consulem faciatis*” – “Make P. Decius consul with me, a man shown to agree with me in colleagueship”.

\(^{22}\) *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, s.v. “collegium”.


\(^{24}\) De Robertis (1973: 1.12) notes that one might expect the jurists to have need of a more technical term but that none exists and that the above terms are therefore used indiscriminately.

\(^{25}\) *Digest*, 50.16.85.
societas or corpus, although Gaius does write elsewhere that “a societas, collegium or corpus of this sort is not always granted permission [to exist]”, indicating in my view that he considers the terms to be fairly equal.26 However, Gaius also refers to “a corpus made up of a collegium or societas”, while Ulpian refers to “collegia and other corpora”.27 These instances would seem to suggest that collegia were specific types of corpora (e.g. specifically professional or religious, illicit or licit, formally recognised or not, etc.), which would perhaps require that we treat a body identifying itself as a collegium differently to others.28 And indeed, at Ostia, the vast majority of collegia are known as corpora, prompting some to argue that corpus refers to a specific type of association that was legally recognised and sanctioned by local government or even to one that was formally instituted by the state.29

Elsewhere, however, the jurists do refer to both the collegia and the corpora together, with no indication that collegia are merely specific types of corpora.30 In the section de collegiis et corporibus, it is clear from Marcian’s reference to “a collegium or any other such corpus” that, while a collegium always refers to an

26 Digest, 3.4.1.pr: “neque societas neque collegium neque huiusmodi corpus”.
27 Digest, 3.4.1 (Gaius): “corpus habere collegii societatis”; 10.4.7.3 (Ulpianus): “collegitis ceterisque corporibus”.
28 Although note Liu’s (2009: 104, n.34) different interpretation of Ulpian, arguing instead that this indicates that the collegia and corpora were synonymous. I would argue that, in this case, collegia do appear to be a subset of corpora, rather than the terms being completely “interchangeable”, as Liu suggests.
29 See Monti (1934: 8): “il vocabulario Corpus… indica un collegio autorizzato, riconosciuto come organismo pubblico e dotato di personalità giuridica.”; cf. also Royden (1988: 2). In the first of his four volumes, Waltzing (1895-1900: 1.340-1) writes that corpus is a word that “distinguishes itself” from other terminology “se distingue de tous ceux qui precedent.”, noting that this refers to an organisation that has been authorised and recognised as a public body and that therefore holds civil rights. However, he also notes that this only applies in legal usage and that, in ordinary circumstances, “it is used concurrently with collegium”. In his second volume, however, Waltzing (1895-1900: 2.140-1), maintains that the word indicates formal recognition by the state – “Corpus exprime une idee de plus: il indique que cette association est reconnue par l'Etat et a reçu de la loi la qualité d'institution publique; nous verrons que cette reconnaissance entraînait avec elle la personification civile” – but adds that he was wrong previously to believe that this terminology referred only to colleges of the annonae and public works, such as the bakers or shippers, and not to the many other guilds of craftsmen and merchants.
30 De Robertis (1973: 1.12); cf. Digest, 4.2.9.1 (Ulpianus): “vel populus vel curia vel collegium vel corpus”; 2.4.10.4 (Ulpianus): “Qui manumittitur a corpore aliquo vel collegio vel civitate”.

association, *corpus* can also be used to refer to other types of “body”.\(^{31}\) Put simply, while a *collegium* is always a *corpus*, a *corpus* is not always a *collegium* and, in the examples above, the jurists simply mean to specify that they are referring to *corpus* in the sense of *collegium*, rather than in some other sense. Within the context of this thesis, there remain some questions about how we should distinguish the two but in fact this is usually clear from context.\(^{32}\)

The main problem with juristic terminology is that it does not necessarily reflect the terminology used by the associations themselves. Faced with the problem of referring to associations that formed for different reasons (likely known only to them) and who engaged in various activities, some of which overlapped, the jurors made use of existing synonyms to refer to associations, unions, brotherhoods or groups, resulting in the use of confusing terms such as *societas* or *corpus*, that had wider meanings, to refer to *collegia*. In epigraphic and papyrological sources, there are multiple terms used to refer to the *collegia* and they do not necessarily follow the same pattern as juristic sources. *Corpus*, for example, is commonly used by the so-called “professional associations” but not at all by “religious associations”, whereas *collegium* is used across the board.\(^ {33}\) The best summary of Latin terminology is given by de Robertis, whose discussion is based on and updates Waltzing’s list of over fifty words.\(^ {34}\) As de Robertis notes, however, many of these are used only once or occasionally, or are simply variations on the word *collegium* (See e.g. the archaic *conlegium*, which in at least one case appears as *gonlegium*).\(^ {35}\) The most common Latin names are *collegium*, *corpus*, *sodalicium* and *sodalitas*, indicating the variety of their existence,

\(^{31}\) *Digest*, 47.22.3.1. Cf. for example, *Digest*, 50.16.195.2-3 (Ulpianus): “*familiae appellatio refertur et ad corporis cuiusdam significationem*”; “*corpus quoddam servorum*”. De Robertis (1973, 1.15-6) also notes that, in the fourth and fifth centuries, the word *corpus* may have particularly indicated those *collegia* that were specifically authorised by the state but there is nothing to indicate that this was the case during the principate.

\(^{32}\) See, in particular, the discussion of *corpora* at Ostia below, Chapter 3.4.

\(^{33}\) The resulting confusion is maddening: legally speaking, as above, *collegia* are *corpora* but not every *corpus* is a *collegium*; however, within epigraphic sources, those *corpora* that are *collegia* are always professional *collegia*.

\(^{34}\) De Robertis (1973: 1.11); Waltzing (1895-1900: 4.236-242). More recent discussions exist but not with quite so comprehensive a list of terminology. Cf. in particular, van Nijf (1997: 7-8); Wilson (1996: 1).

\(^{35}\) For archaic uses of *conlegium* and *gonlegium*, see e.g. *CIL* 6.167; 11.3078; cf. also Waltzing (1895-1900: 4.237)
although *collegium* and *corpus* are by far the most widely used during the principate.\(^{36}\) In some cases, an association might also be indicated simply by referring to members in the plural alongside reference to a role or activity that was distinctive to the *collegia* (e.g. the *quinquennalis fabrum*).\(^{37}\) Members of the associations are often referred to as *sodales*, *collegiati*, *corporati*, *socii* and other such derivations of the words above.\(^{38}\)

Greek terms referring to similar private associations are just as many, some of which have quite specific meanings: *ὄργεών* and *θίασος* were used from at least the fourth century BC, especially to refer to associations formed around cults; *ἐρανὸς* refers to a communal society built around religious worship and feasting; and a *ἐταιρεία* is usually considered to be a more political association, although it had social elements too.\(^{39}\) Other terms are also used, but, similarly to *collegia* or *corpus*, these are often derived from existing words referring to some sort of body or union and it remains unclear whether they have precise implications about the type of association: e.g. *κοινόν*, *συνέδριον*, and *σύνοδος*.\(^{40}\)

The diversity of the terminology across the Graeco-Roman world and the confusion around some of the terms used are striking but are probably reflective of the way that associations were formed organically and for different purposes, across a wide expanse of time and yet had to be dealt with *en masse* by jurists. It is obviously tempting to try and draw specific meaning from the different terms, to see each as denoting a particular type of association, and it is true that some do...

\(^{36}\) *Sodalitas* was mostly confined to the republican era, while neither *sodalitas* nor *sodalicium* ever seem to be used to refer to the more professional associations. cf. de Robertis (1973: 1.18). For the *sodalitatus* as political clubs, see Gruen (1974: 228-233).

\(^{37}\) See e.g. *AE* 1988, 200; *AE* 2007, 301; *CIL* 6.321.

\(^{38}\) See e.g. *CIL* 5.4395l; 6.10231; 6.41382; 9.460; cf. also de Robertis (1973: 1.11).

\(^{39}\) P. Herz “Associations”, Brill’s New Pauly, Consulted online on 25 June 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e12200710>. See e.g. 2.4.1255, *IG* 2².1289, 2².1334 2².2361 (*ὄργεών*); *IG* 2².2345; *SEG* 20.127, 20.293, 61.1230 (*θίασος*); *AGRW* 330; *SEG* 31.122 (*ἐρανὸς*); *SEG* 56.1920 (*ἐταιρεία*).

\(^{40}\) Just as in the Latin, associations might also be referred to simply by referring to professionals in the plural (e.g. *τεχνῖτας*). See below, Chapter 5.3, for further discussion of the Greek terminology. Kloppenborg (1996: 1-4); H. Neumann and A. Burford-Cooper, “Professional associations”, Brill’s New Pauly. Consulted online on 25 June 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e215810>. See also P.Mich. 5.244; *SEG* 36.1052 and especially *AGRW* 223 for further examples of the range of terminology used.
have implications about a group’s intended function or legality.\textsuperscript{41} However, the reality is that the terms were all used in a range of contexts and that, within the epigraphic and papyrological sources at least, there is little to separate them from one another. The \textit{corpus piscatorum et urinatortum}, for example, is very similar indeed to the \textit{collegium Dianae et Antinoi}, in terms of its internal structure and advertised activities.\textsuperscript{42} Likewise, the members of each are not unlike the sodales who attend the funeral of one of their own number, D. Taurus Germanus.\textsuperscript{43} Rather than betraying their purpose, the different names and titles are more likely to reflect local trends, language change and, perhaps at times, an avoidance of the \textit{collegium} label, as the laws restricting \textit{collegia} changed so much over time.

For the purposes of this thesis, I will follow the criteria set out by Liu for what makes a \textit{collegium}. That is that \textit{collegia} had at least three members, with a structural organisation and some form of patron.\textsuperscript{44} I will use only the word \textit{collegium} throughout to refer to western associations, regardless of their function or claims of legality. The only exception to this will be in referring to those \textit{collegia} that have specifically styled themselves otherwise, e.g. the \textit{corpus} of fishermen and divers – and in this case only when referring to them by name. The variety of terms used by and about the associations has of course had an impact on both previous studies and on this one; by restricting myself to the word \textit{collegium} to refer to the associations but including all other terms in string-searches and general discussion, however, I have attempted to minimise this issue.

2. Legislation Concerning Collegia

Early studies of \textit{collegia} put particular emphasis on the legislation that surrounded them and analyses were accordingly set within this framework.\textsuperscript{45} It is not my intention to return to a wholly legal approach to \textit{collegia}, which in any case only prioritises elite views about the associations, but it is worth giving a clear outline

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Cf. n.33 above.
\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{CIL} 6.29702, 14.2112.
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{CIL} 6.6221.
\item \textsuperscript{44} See Liu (2005: 53-4) and Chapter 5.3, below, for further discussion.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Mommsen (1843), Waltzing (1895-1900), de Robertis (1973) and, more recently, de Ligt (2000) all devote a great deal of their work to comprehensive discussions of the legislation. For a straightforward, albeit rather simplistic, summary of the legislation, see also Cotter (1996). 
\end{itemize}
of the relevant legislation, as this had a direct impact both on the proliferation of *collegia* and on the way in which they styled themselves in public. I will then move to discussing the more recent body of literature and the methodological problems that run through it and to re-examining some of the most detailed inscriptions set up by *collegia*, in light of the issues raised.

The gradual tightening of restrictions on *collegia* over time might give the impression that they were rife throughout the republic and even the beginning of the principate but that they became steadily less so as time wore on and fewer of them fit the precise specifications allowed by the law. In particular, as indicated in the introduction, elite sources might suggest that there was a deep mistrust of associations and that, over time, they were stamped out.\(^46\) This has been the subject of some debate, however, as de Ligt in particular has argued that the limiting measures taken against *collegia* were mostly in response to specific events and that, besides, they were not widely enforced.\(^47\) As Liu points out, the reality is that the authorities were probably wary of the associations but that they also gave them validation and made use of their position in society.\(^48\) Certainly, any notion that the *collegia* were reduced by the continuing legislation should be dismissed – if anything, increasing attention paid to the *collegia* by the authorities suggests that the associations were thriving under the empire, despite the supposed anxieties of government, and this also follows the pattern of epigraphic evidence in the principate. Rather than dying out in later antiquity, the *collegia* came to be an important and even centrally organised part of civic life.\(^49\)

The legal evidence for *collegia* comes mainly from sources recorded in the *Digest* and a few historical accounts. As discussed above, the lack of any single, technical term for the *collegia* means that the jurists mostly stuck to that term but also used *corpus* and *societas* as synonyms. The legislation that was placed upon the *collegia* means that certain legal concepts, such as *ius coeundi*, were relevant

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\(^46\) See, in particular, Shaw’s (1981: 47) claim that “the Roman state, as most other central states in antiquity, had an almost morbid fear of any unofficial assembly or association”, as well as de Ligt’s (2000) strong rebuttal of this concept.

\(^47\) De Ligt (2000: 249-50). Cf. also Arnaoutoglou (2002 and 2005), who argues that there is little evidence that restrictions were consistently enforced in the Roman East.


\(^49\) *Digest*, 50.6.6.12 (Callistratus); cf. Epstein (1991: 17-18).
at different times; therefore, rather than attempting to deal with technical language out of context, what follows is a brief, chronological outline of the relevant legislation and a discussion of how it might have affected *collegia* in real terms.\(^{50}\) It is worth noting also that the emphasis in legal treatments has traditionally been on central, rather than provincial, regulation and that there may have been significant differences between the laws enacted in Italy and those elsewhere.\(^{51}\)

Very little is known about the legal restrictions that might have been placed on *collegia* before the 1\(^{st}\) century BC. There are only two extant examples of the authorities trying to limit the freedoms of such associations before the turmoil of the late republic, both of which have already been mentioned above. According to Gaius, the XII Tables included a statute, supposedly adopted from the Laws of Solon, that recognised a *collegium* as being any association of co-members and accordingly it permitted them to make any agreements they wished amongst themselves, so long as they did not contravene public statutes.\(^{52}\) This was hardly a restriction for the *collegia*; rather, it served to acknowledge their existence and allowed them enormous freedoms to operate however they liked, as long as it was within the law. There are no further regulations extant for almost three hundred years until, in 186 BC, the senate did their best to suppress the Bacchanalia in a *senatus consultum* that has survived on an inscription found at Tiriolo, Italy. The *senatus consultum* essentially reflects Livy’s account of the affair and the wording is such that it could plausibly be used to restrict other associations, although there is no evidence of this happening.\(^{53}\)

The first substantive changes came in the turmoil of the later republic, beginning in 64 BC with a *senatus consultum* that banned all *collegia* deemed to be acting “contrary to the state” (*adversus rem publicam*), probably as a result of their

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\(^{50}\) The most detailed summary of the legislation remains de Robertis’ double-volume work on the *Storia delle Corporazioni* (1973).

\(^{51}\) See, in particular, Arnaoutoglou (2005).

\(^{52}\) *Digest*, 47.22.4. Cf. also de Robertis (1973: 1.41-55).

\(^{53}\) *CIL* 10.104. cf. Livy 39.8-19. *Collegia* are not directly mentioned but men and women are both forbidden (lines 10-12, 19-21) from associating and from forming magistracies or holding treasuries in relation to the worship of Bacchus. For the identification of these roles and, more widely, of *CIL* 10.104 with *collegia*, see e.g. de Robertis (1973: 1.62); North (1979: 209-10); de Ligt (2000: 242); Arnaoutoglou (2002: 30).
involvement in the early riots of the 60s and 50s BC. In particular, the riot of 67 BC at the Compitalian Games, sparked by Manilius’ proposal on votes for freedmen, seems particularly likely to have raised the profile of collegia and of their potential for causing or organising civic unrest, as members of associations certainly would have been in the audience and may even have helped organise the games, although Aldrete’s suggestion that Manilius actively approached the collegia is perhaps stretching the evidence too far. Clodius restored the collegia in 58 BC and possibly even instituted new ones, according to Cicero, in hopes of creating aggressive factions that would support him over others, but again, in 56 BC, the senate passed the Lex Licinia, disbanding associations.

The bans and repeals of the 60s and 50s are often seen as representing the emergence of a hostile attitude towards the collegia amongst the authorities and the beginning of a legislative crackdown on their freedoms, although this has also been the subject of some debate. In particular, it is unclear how wide-ranging the restrictions were and whether the collegia referred to during this period should be considered representative of associations more generally. In the advice to his brother on running for the consulship in 64 BC, Quintus Cicero congratulates Marcus on securing the support of collegia and emphasises their continued importance; and yet, after Clodius reinstates banned associations in 58, Marcus refers to the members as the “dregs” of society. Whether or not Quintus is the true author of the commentariolum petitionis, the changing attitudes towards collegia at this time should at least make us wary of drawing too many conclusions from the turbulent 60s and 50s.

According to Suetonius, Julius Caesar sought to control the collegia again in the early 40s BC, banning “all except those founded in ancient times”, presumably in

54 Cicero, in Pis. 4.9; Asconius, 7C, 9-15; cf. also de Robertis (1973: 1.86); Aldrete (2013: 426).
56 Cicero, in Pis. 4.9; Cicero, Letters to Quintus, 2.3.5 (56 BC): “eodem die senatus consultum factum est ut sodalitates decurriatique discenderent.”
57 See, in particular, de Robertis (1973); Cotter (1996); de Ligt (2000); Arnaoutoglou (2002).
hopes of restricting anyone else from gathering a following.\textsuperscript{59} It is unclear how long the ban lasted but Suetonius also notes that Augustus “dissolved collegia except for those with an ancient or legitimate purpose.”\textsuperscript{60} Precisely what would have made a collegium “legitimum” or “antiquum” is uncertain and probably changed over time. Under the empire, a collegium could be formally recognised by the state as having ius coeundi – the right to assemble – but that status might have originated either with Julius Caesar’s or with Augustus’ criteria or indeed earlier; Asconius notes, in reference to the earlier Lex Licinia, that some few collegia were exempt from that law, as they were in the “public interest” (utilitas civitatis), probably referring to the non-factional nature of the associations, and it is possible that these conditions formed the early basis of ius coeundi.\textsuperscript{61}

The evidence from this point onwards has been read differently by different scholars to support two main hypotheses, namely that the authorities were consistently suspicious of collegia and legislated against them accordingly or that this fear has been overestimated and that in fact the collegia were considered a useful means of organising the populace, albeit one that needed careful control or occasional restriction in specific areas. The discrepancy is mainly thanks to the uncertain origin of a decree, known as the senatus consultum de collegiis tenuiorum, recorded by Marcianus in the late second century, given below:

\textit{Mandatis principalibus praecipitur praesidibus provinciarum, ne patiantur esse collegia sodalicia neve milites collegia in castris habeant. sed permettitur tenuioribus stipem menstruam conferre, dum tamen semel in mense coeant, ne sub praetextu huiusmodi illicitum collegium coeat. quod non tantum in urbe, sed et in italia et in provinciis locum habere divus quoque Severus rescriptit.}

\textit{(1) Sed religionis causa coire non prohibitur, dum tamen per hoc non fiat contra senatus consultum, quo illicita collegia arcentur.}

\textsuperscript{59} Suetonius, \textit{Caesar}, 42.2.
\textsuperscript{60} Suetonius, \textit{Augustus}, 32.1.
\textsuperscript{61} Asconius, 75C, 15-19; cf. also Liu (2013: 354).
“Provincial governors are directed by imperial instructions not to tolerate secret social collegia and that soldiers are not to form collegia in camp. But the lower orders are allowed to pay a small monthly fee, provided that they meet only once a month, lest an unlawful collegium be created under this guise. And the deified Severus stated in a rescript that this applies not only at Rome but also in Italy and the provinces.

(1) There is, however, no ban on assembly for religious purposes, so long as there is no contravention of the senatus consultum which prohibits unlawful collegia.”

Dig. 47.22.1.pr-47.22.1.1 (Marcianus)

This represents a softer approach towards collegia than those taken by Julius Caesar and Augustus, in that it did allow some collegia to form providing they met certain conditions, suggesting at least a subtle change in how they were perceived. The Institutiones of Marcianus were composed sometime after the death of Severus, hence his description as “divus”, but part of the edict is also very similar to the wording of the Lanuvian inscription (dated AD 136 - approximately a century before Marcianus is writing), which refers to a senatus consultum in claiming the relevant association’s ius coeundi (right to assemble), thus suggesting that the legislation must at least pre-date this. De Robertis suggests that the legislation in the Digest is from earlier still (approximately AD 60), based on an increase in the extant epigraphic material, suggesting perhaps that the law had been relaxed somewhat around this time. De Ligt has also argued convincingly that it may have even been passed very soon after the leges of Julius Caesar and Augustus were first instituted, in an effort by Augustus to

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62 Watson’s translation, adapted.
63 Ratti (1825: 446) first noticed the similarity of language, which is too close to be a coincidence, in his dissertation and it was later expanded upon by Mommsen (1843: 98-116), who also suggested (p.87) that sodalicia referred to seditious associations. Cf. also Bendlin (2011: 208, 223-4, esp. n.36 on sodalicia).
64 Cf. de Robertis (1973: 1.252-254).
“soften” his own legislation, as early as the beginning of the first century AD and coinciding with the stability achieved under his reign.65

Throughout the remainder of the principate, there are further attempts to control collegia that can be read either as part of a general fear of the associations or as localised, reactionary measures, depending on where one places the senatus consultum recorded by Marcianus. Under Tiberius, for example, Aulus Avilius Flaccus took steps to control the associations in Egypt, where he was prefect.66 Philo’s account describes his harsh approach towards collegia (disbanded because of their “drunkenness” and other bad behaviour), which Cotter suggests was probably replicated around the empire.67 Cotter does not include the senatus consultum de collegiis tenuiorum in discussion (thanks to its uncertain date) and therefore approaches Flaccus’ reforms against the backdrop of Julius Caesar’s and Augustus’ earlier regulatory policies and, quite naturally, concludes that Flaccus’ policies are simply a continuation of the status quo. There is no real evidence to support Cotter’s assumption, however: Tiberius did ban foreign cults but there is no mention of his extending this to all associations, so it can hardly be used to suggest a policy of empire-wide restriction, especially if one does place the senatus consultum in the reign of Augustus.68

Similarly, Cassius Dio notes briefly that Claudius disbanded associations (ἕταιρεῖαι) that had been reintroduced under Gaius but it is unclear whether he is referring to all collegia or specifically to the types of political clubs that had once been formed by Clodius.69 According to Tacitus, the riots of Pompeii in AD 59 also led Nero to dissolve all illegal associations (“…collegiaque, quae contra leges instituerant, dissoluta…”), which Cotter alleges is demonstrative of “the immediate response of Roman authorities to any social unrest: the “illegal” associations are closed.”70 Again, this approach is based on there being a comprehensive drive to disband all associations; Cotter assumes that Tacitus is

66Philo, Flaccus, 4.
69Cassius Dio, 60.6.6.
70Cotter (1996: 81); Tacitus, Annales, 14.17.
pointing out that all collegia were illegal, rather than simply specifying which collegia were being disbanded.

Most famously, Trajan’s discomfort with collegia is made clear from his correspondence with Pliny. The emperor addresses the possibility of allowing collegia to form on two separate occasions in the extant letters, each time making his own reservations about them perfectly clear.\textsuperscript{71} The first of these, mentioned in the introduction, has been commonly cited in reference to the authorities’ supposed “morbid fear of any unofficial assembly or association.”\textsuperscript{72} Both Pliny’s request and Trajan’s firm rebuttal indicate that collegia have caused trouble in the past and should not easily be trusted again. However, the second example, from Pontus, actually shows Trajan agreeing to the existence of an association out of respect for local constitutions, albeit reluctantly.

At the most, these instances might demonstrate Trajan’s “fear” of associations. Although Pliny is clearly aware of Trajan’s misgivings, he does not himself appear too troubled by the idea of using them to perform various useful functions. On the contrary, Pliny’s letters are written with the interests of each province at heart. He clearly recognises the potential benefits of having associations and seeks to persuade Trajan of them. Indeed, every one of the examples above refers to highly localised legislation or to specific, often reactive, restrictions that were placed upon collegia. As such, we should be very wary of using them as part of a wider narrative of strict governmental control over the associations. Taken together, it is true that they do indicate concerns about the collegia amongst individuals and especially amongst the ruling elite, but it is worth bearing in mind what a selective sample it is. The senatus consultum de collegiis teniorum alone, if it is to be included from as early as the 1\textsuperscript{st} century, has a dramatic effect on how we read the above sources.

In terms of how much impact the various laws had, it is worth considering the (abundant) epigraphic and papyrological evidence that is extant from the

\textsuperscript{71} Pliny, \textit{Epistulae}, 10.33-34; 10.92-93. One could also add Pliny, \textit{Epistulae}, 10.96-7 (regarding Christian persecution).

principate. This alone shows that, if there was a consolidated effort to disband *collegia*, whether in Italy or the wider empire, it was unsuccessful. The chronological distribution of *collegia*, according to dateable inscriptions, indicates that, far from being reduced, they actually became much more numerous in the Roman West after the late-first century AD - hence de Robertis’ suggestion that the *senatus consultum* may have been made at that time. However, Arnaoutoglou and de Ligt have also convincingly demonstrated that many *collegia* flourished in eastern provinces throughout the first century and beyond, supporting the view that regulations that did exist were mostly focused on specific areas. The regulations of Flaccus, for example – despite Cotter’s assertion that they must have reflected wider policy – do not appear to have taken hold even across all of Egypt, let alone the wider empire, and certainly not for any great length of time. Similarly, in Asia Minor, there are repeated examples of the continued existence of associations, despite the laws that were laid down by the Julio-Claudians or the misgivings expressed by Trajan.

All this is not to say that the legal restrictions referred to in our sources did not have any impact upon *collegia*, only that they did not necessarily restrict them as much as has been suggested in the past. One major effect that the legislation does appear to have had is on the way in which the *collegia* styled themselves and especially on how they presented themselves to the public. Most famously, there is a small number of *collegia* that can be understood to have received (and

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73 De Robertis (1973: 1.286-293).
74 MacMullen (1982). But cf. also Hemelrijk (2015: 30), noting the extreme variation in the so-called “epigraphic habit” in different regions. Some examples of known *collegia* from the earlier 1st century come from a few inscriptions from Rome and Italy (*CIL* 6.6220; 6.10322; 11.6017) and possibly from one inscription from Gaul (*CIL* 12.286), although the date of this is uncertain.
75 Arnaoutoglou (2002: 32); de Ligt (2000: 248). Arnaoutoglou (2002: 33-6; 2005) argues particularly that it is a mistake to consider the attitudes of individuals, such as Trajan, as representative of empire-wide policy, referring to several examples from Egypt and Asia Minor from throughout the first century.
advertised) special permission to assemble (*ius coeundi*), either from a *senatus consultum* or directly from the emperor.\(^{76}\) Holding *ius coeundi* confirmed the status of a *collegium* as “licitum”, rather than “illicitum” but the precise conditions that led to the status being granted, as well as what it meant for a *collegium* in practice, remain the subject of significant debate.

As discussed above, Julius Caesar’s *lex Iulia de collegiis* refers to “*collegia legitima*”, which is later expanded upon by the *senatus consultum de collegiis tenuiorum* – noting that a *collegium* can form for religious purposes or otherwise, provided that that they do not meet more than once a month – and it is probably these that formed the main basis of the *ius coeundi*. What is less clear is why some *collegia* sought specific confirmation of their right to assemble, even after the *senatus consultum* above had been passed. De Robertis, assuming that the *senatus consultum* was specifically aimed at permitting funerary clubs (for which, see below), suggested that all other *collegia* and especially professional associations would still have required formal authorisation by the senate, but this is mistaken on two counts.\(^ {77}\) Firstly, had this been the case, we would naturally expect it to be recorded far more often than on the twenty or so inscriptions that it has been. Secondly, and more importantly, it is now clear that the term “funerary association” is a misnomer and that, though many *collegia* did provide burial, these did not form a distinct type of association.\(^ {78}\) As de Ligt has also pointed out, the reality is that the *senatus consultum* effectively granted permission for the establishment of all sorts of associations.\(^ {79}\)

Van Nijf argues, based on the small number of recipients of formal *ius coeundi*, that the status held no real value beyond the symbolic, aimed only at enhancing an association’s prestige.\(^ {80}\) However, as Liu points out, the formal recognition that came with *ius coeundi* did allow a *collegium* access to certain privileges as time

\(^{76}\) De Robertis (1973: 1.252-4) found twelve such *collegia* from Italy alone, while Liu (2009: 105, Table 3.1) gives a comprehensive list of twenty-two different *collegia*, mostly from Italy, that express some sort of formal authorization.

\(^{77}\) De Robertis (1973: 1.285-7).

\(^{78}\) See van Nijf (2002) and below, Chapter 1.3, for further discussion of the flawed concept of funerary associations.

\(^{79}\) De Ligt (2001: 346-7).

went on.\footnote{Liu (2009: 104).} According to Ulpianus, Marcus Aurelius ruled that all \textit{collegia} with \textit{ius coeundi} would have the right both to manumit slaves and to receive inheritances as a single entity, rather than as individual members.\footnote{\textit{Digest}, 40.3.1-2.} Elsewhere, Marcianus notes in addition that any unlawful \textit{collegium} – that is, one formed without the authority of a \textit{senatus consultum} or the emperor – would be dissolved and its property shared out amongst the members.\footnote{\textit{Digest}, 47.22.3.pr.-1.} Nevertheless, evidently very few associations took advantage of the potential benefits associated with \textit{ius coeundi} or indeed of the security that it offered and, yet, they continued to thrive throughout the principate.

Throughout the principate, the \textit{collegia} were clearly subject to a complex body of legislation. Despite this, however, their overall legality at any one time remains fairly ambiguous. A traditional reading of the known regulations that were imposed upon them suggests that the authorities ensured fairly strict control and careful monitoring over the \textit{collegia} and yet the epigraphic and papyrological sources paint a very different picture of the associations as commonplace throughout the empire and, for the most part, seemingly oblivious of their perilous existence. Very few even appear to have bothered to seek out formal recognition, despite the potential benefits of \textit{ius coeundi}, and yet there is no single instance of their being dissolved by the authorities. One can only conclude that it suited the authorities to tolerate their continued existence of the \textit{collegia} and, perhaps, that they were able to find uses for them, albeit with enough regulation in place that they could be dissolved if the need arose.

3. Typology

In the past, there has been a tendency to try and group the \textit{collegia} into different categories, based mainly on their known activities. In the very first comprehensive study of \textit{collegia}, as part of his original analysis of the Lanuvian inscription, Mommsen noted two characteristics of that inscription that are central to this discussion.\footnote{\textit{CIL} 14.2112. For a translation of the inscription, see Appendix I.} First, a significant part of it is concerned with the rules and

\[^1\text{Liu (2009: 104).}\]
\[^2\text{\textit{Digest}, 40.3.1-2.}\]
\[^3\text{\textit{Digest}, 47.22.3.pr.-1.}\]
\[^4\text{\textit{CIL} 14.2112. For a translation of the inscription, see Appendix I.}\]
regulations for the burial of members; and second, it also includes some of the senatus consultum de collegiis tenuiorum, discussed above, which allows for associations to meet once a month for “religious purposes”. Based on the prevalence of the burial regulations on this text, Mommsen concluded that the “religious purposes” in the senatus consultum must refer to burial and founded on this his argument that there was a distinct category of associations that existed for the tenuiores (people of fewer means), the “collegia funeraticia”. However, Mommsen’s argument was based on implausible restorations to the text and on a general failure to take into account the other parts of the inscription.

Funerary associations, that is, collegia that were specifically founded in order to facilitate burial for members who could otherwise not afford it, did not exist in the Roman Empire. That is not to say that no collegia provided this function – in fact it was very common practice indeed for members to support one another in this way – only that it was a by-product, rather than their raison d’être. A very substantial number of burial inscriptions were set up by collegia, while several others, such as the Lanuvian inscription, make reference to it and it is partly this prominence of burial within the sources that first led scholars like Mommsen to assume that this was the founding purpose of such collegia.

However, the vast majority of all evidence for burial in the Roman world comes from epigraphic sources, thanks to memorial inscriptions; and, as so much of the evidence for collegia also comes from epigraphy, some correlation between the two is perhaps not surprising. Moreover, while the Lanuvian inscription (upon which the entire concept of collegia funeraticia was founded) certainly does reveal a preoccupation with burial amongst the collegium, it also points towards

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85 Although the inscription had previously been published in a report by Ratti (1825: 435–462), who first noted (p.446) the inclusion of the senatus consultum.
88 This is a point now little debated amongst scholars of collegia, as it has been repeatedly shown that the provision of burial was one of the many functions of almost all collegia. See, in particular, Ausbüttel (1982: 34 and passim); van Nijf (2002: 307-8); Bendlin (2011: 217); Broekaert (2011: 225); Gibbs (2011: 291, 303); Liu (2013: 364-6).
89 Ausbüttel (1982: 59) suggests that a fifth of all collegia in Italy buried their members, while van Nijf (1997: 31) notes that there is mention of funerary practices in at least a third of the Eastern inscriptions. Cf. also Ascough et al (2012: 2).
several other concerns. While approximately a third of the inscription is devoted to the regulations surrounding burial of members, another large portion details the annual feasts and the way members were expected to behave at such meetings. Furthermore, the name of the collegium suggests that its main objective was to facilitate the worship of Diana and Antinous and there is also discussion of the religious responsibilities of members, as well as some other details on membership fees and on expenditure. While burial is clearly a concern of the collegium, it should by no means be considered its only or even primary concern.  

Even though the notion of collegia funeraticia as a distinct category is now widely rejected by collegium scholars, its inclusion in this discussion is necessary because of the impact that it has had on the wider body of scholarship. Following Mommsen, the use of such categories was taken up by Waltzing as a seemingly sensible way to organise the vastness of his material. Despite focusing primarily on what he calls “Les Corporations Professionnelles”, Waltzing also refers to the “Collèges Funéraires et Collèges Religieux Privés” and the centrality of his work is such that these distinctions have dictated a large part of the subsequent scholarship.  

As Kloppenborg pointed out, however, such distinctions are problematic, as they encourage researchers to view these so-called different types of collegia entirely in isolation, rather than recognising the dynamic reality of their existence. The term “funerary association” has been particularly enduring. Based on earlier scholarship, general reference works like the Oxford Classical Dictionary or the Cambridge Dictionary of Classical Civilization continued to refer to “burial clubs” up until the late 20th century and even later and accordingly

90 For further discussion, see Gibbs (2011: 302-3), including a comprehensive list of references (n.49).
91 Waltzing (1895-1900: 4.153). Cf. e.g. on religious associations, esp. in the East: De Cenival (1972); Muszynski (1977); McLean (1993); Martti (1997); Ascough (2002); Harland (2003); Arnaoutoglou (2003); Monson (2006); on professional associations: van Minnen (1987); Royden (1988); van Nijf (1997: 2002); Liu (2009); Broekaert (2011); Verboven (2011); Verboven and Laes (2016).
there is still a tendency amongst ancient historians to think of them in these terms.\textsuperscript{93}

Rather than fitting neatly into the broad divisions used by Waltzing, the \textit{collegia} were actually complicated associations, whose members pursued a wide variety of different and often overlapping activities. This “messy taxonomy”, as Kloppenborg refers to it, greatly affects the study of \textit{collegia}.\textsuperscript{94} The following section, for example, considers five \textit{collegia} through the well-known \textit{leges collegiorum}; based on the way in which they style themselves, one might well assume that they include four religious associations (\textit{CIL} 6.10234; 14.2112; \textit{ILS} 7215a; 7215) and one professional association (\textit{CIL} 6.33885).\textsuperscript{95} Alternatively, one might consider the activities revealed in each inscription and assume that, regardless of their name, the main focus appears to be on feasting and sociability; then again, one is named after a profession and it is clear that all of them must have had a way of generating income beyond simple membership fees, pointing to more of an economic purpose.\textsuperscript{96} All five have also at some point been treated as “burial associations”, despite the fact that burial is barely mentioned in \textit{CIL} 6.10234 and does not appear at all in either \textit{CIL} 6.33885 or \textit{ILS} 7215.

The difficulty one faces in typifying the \textit{collegia} also has important implications for this thesis. Modern scholarship tends to distinguish between \textit{collegia} that are either mainly professional or mainly religious, based either on the name of the association or on the prominence of certain activities.\textsuperscript{97} However, this can

\textsuperscript{93} The \textit{Oxford Classical Dictionary} (Hammond and Scullard, 1970, “Clubs, Roman” [Stevenson]) refers directly to “\textit{collegia funeraticia} (removed in more recent editions); while Speake’s ‘Dictionary of Ancient History’ (1994, “Guilds”) notes that, despite having religious or professional names, the main reason for joining was social and “to ensure a decent burial”. The \textit{Oxford Dictionary of the Classical World} (ed. Roberts, 2005, “Clubs, Roman”), updates the OCD entry but notes that \textit{collegia} masqueraded as burial clubs, as this was permitted by \textit{senatus consultum} but actually engaged in social activities. The \textit{Cambridge Dictionary of Classical Civilization} (Shipley et al., 2006 [Parkin]) still includes a reference to “funeral clubs”, in which \textit{collegia} are described as “burial-insurance groups”, although it does also note that the \textit{collegia} engaged in many other activities. Cf. also Sano (2012) for a recent example of a discussion still dominated by the “funerary” aspect of \textit{collegia}.

\textsuperscript{94} Kloppenborg (1996: 22).

\textsuperscript{95} Beard \textit{et al.} (1998: 1.272-3) note that, although it was common, naming one’s \textit{collegium} after a deity was an act of “parading its specifically religious identity to members and non-members alike.”

\textsuperscript{96} See n.98, below.

\textsuperscript{97} See Ascough \textit{et al.} (2012); Venticinque (2016: 8) and n.91, above.
inevitably result in missed data, as there is so often overlap between the two. It also raises troubling questions in terms of consistency, especially given the limited evidence available. Attempts to counter this by taking a synthetic approach and examining the *collegia* all together can lead either to wide generalisations being drawn from isolated data or to studies that lack detail or certainty.

4. The Internal Administration of *Collegia*

Rather than proceeding with a conventional literature review, the following sections focus on drawing out specific aspects of the associations, based first of all on the evidence itself. In this way, it will be easier for the reader to gain an understanding of the way that scholars have treated *collegia* differently, depending either on their individual interests or on their own assumptions about the associations. While the central focus of this thesis is on the economic impact of *collegia*, it is necessary to give a more general introduction to the associations and the body of work that surrounds them, as, like so many of the debates within this topic, the question of economic impact is tied in with multiple other issues. Moreover, as stated in the introduction, one of the secondary aims of this thesis is to unravel the various debates that exist and particularly to show where they have become out-dated or irrelevant and should now be put to one side.

In his corpus, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, Dessau devoted an entire chapter to *collegia* inscriptions, starting with those that have, by virtue of their unusual length, received by far the most attention throughout the body of scholarship, the *leges collegiorum*. Handily collected, these five inscriptions still provide an

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98 Cf. for example, *CIL* 14.2112, which details what will happen to the “interest” that the *collegium* is able to make on a loan, and the dedication of the Collegium of Silvanus (*CIL* 10.444), which stipulates what to do with the “income from the estates” of the *collegium*. On the other hand, the professional associations (that is, those associations that are named directly after a shared trade, such as the *collegia fabrum*) frequently dedicated altars and statues to deities and buried members seemingly as standard, despite that being a ‘religious’ function according to Mommsen. Cf. for e.g. *CIL* 3.1504; 6.6220; 10.445; 12.1911.

99 See the features outlined by Venticinque (2016: 11), for example. *CIL* 14.2112 (below) provides rare insight into membership fees, while *CIL* 6.33885 refers to the careful control of membership amongst the *collegium* of ivory-workers and citron-wood traders. How far instances such as these should be applied to other *collegia* is uncertain. Cf. Verboven (2011: 190) in a similar vein.

100 *ILS*, Chapter 15.
excellent introduction to the *collegia*, as they remain by far the best documentary sources that we have. There is enormous value in focusing initially on the evidence itself before discussing the more recent scholarship, so as not to allow our perceptions to be coloured by previous misconceptions or false assumptions. Accordingly, all five of Dessau’s inscriptions have been included in the appendix with translation and some brief accompanying notes (see Appendix I) and it is particularly on the basis of these examples that the following points of discussion emerge, although further examples and references to scholarship are also given in the relevant footnotes.

Based on the inscriptions in the appendix, one can build a fairly comprehensive picture of the more administrative aspects of *collegia*, including their organisational structure, the way in which one could obtain membership, and the sorts of regulations to which they would then be subject. There is also some indication of how the *collegia* generated income and of what the likely social backgrounds of members were.

The associations followed a fairly standard organisational structure that, to some extent, resembles the kind of hierarchies visible in the army or within city administration. They often had an external patron, whose main function appears to have been financial support, in return for various honours and dedications. At the administrative head was usually the *quinquennalis* (five-year president) or perhaps a *decurio*, who relied upon various magistrates, such as *curatores* and *quaestores*, as well as messengers and scribes. The large majority, however, were simply ordinary members.

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101 Kloppenborg’s (1996: 26) reference to the *collegium* as a “polis-writ-small”, following Waltzing’s (1895-1900: 1.357-68) earlier observations that they were organised according to civic structures, is an overstatement. However van Nijf (2002) and Perry (2011: 510-12) have convincingly argued that the structure of the *collegium* did provide a convenient way of organising the population more generally. Bendlin (2002: esp. 15-18) is certainly right in arguing that the use of hierarchies does not necessarily imply the wholesale adoption of the Roman value system, although, as Patterson (1994: 235) notes, the *collegia* did play “an increasingly important role in civic life” as time went on and it is not difficult to imagine the authorities making use of them in some administrative aspects (e.g. the collection of taxes, for which, see especially Chapter 3.6, below).
The extent to which the patron of a collegium was actually named as such varied. *CIL* 14.2112 states that the collegium of Diana and Antinous was founded by one Lucius Caesennius Rufus. Rufus, given great prominence at the top of the stone, is described initially as “patron of the town” (*patronus municipi*) and, later, as “chief magistrate (*dictator*) and also patron”, of the town. He is nowhere directly named as patron of the collegium but the main purpose of the inscription is to record both an endowment made by him (on the interest of 15,000 sesterces) and the regulations of the collegium (as per his instruction).  

The order of feasts, on the second column of the inscription, is also mainly structured around the various birthdays of Rufus and his family members. Despite not being specifically named as patron, this is clearly the capacity in which Rufus is acting. Similarly, *CIL* 6.10234 records the sizeable endowments (60,000 sesterces, as well as some property) of Salvia Marcellina and of Publius Aelius Zenon to the collegium of Aesculapius and Hygia. Neither one is named as patron but instead as mother and father of the association, yet Marcellina places several restrictive conditions upon her endowment, while both she and Zenon receive regular gifts from the collegium in tribute. Despite being external to the actual collegium, these patron-figures could exercise substantial control over it, as well as gain rewards, in return for their financial support.  

As for the internal magistracies, there are several different positions mentioned within the examples from the appendix, including *quinquennalis*, *magister*, *scriba*, *nuntius*, *curator* and *quaestor.* In all cases, the *quinquennalis* appears to

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102 Cf. Bendlin (2011: 216) for further discussion of Caesennius Rufus and his role within the town and the collegium.

103 For further discussion of this and other benefactions, see Liu (2008).

104 Patterson (1992: 19-22) further discusses patronage and especially the mutual benefits that it could provide both for the collegium and its patrons; Arnaoutoglou (1994: esp. 13-15) carefully distinguishes the Roman collegia from Athenian associations on this point. Clemente (1972: 144-156) usefully indexes examples of patrons of collegia and also argues that the role varied a great deal depending on the precise circumstances of the collegium, although some functions, such as benefactions (p. 215), were particularly common. For detailed discussion of the benefactions themselves, see Liu (2008).

105 This kind of top-down structure is repeatedly manifest in the evidence for associations, albeit with some variation in the terminology used. Eastern associations had their own titles of course.
have held the most authority and was ultimately responsible for the various activities of the *collegium*, as well as ensuring that all regulations were enforced. Both *CIL* 6.10234 and 6.33885 outline the distribution of gifts according to rank and indicate that, below the *quinquennalis*, a *curator* or *curatores* had specific tasks, such as organising feasts or enlisting new members. It seems that *magister* can refer to various different magistracies, as it is referred to on *CIL* 14.2112 in a similar role to a *curator* but on *ILS* 7215a appears more like a *quinquennalis*, while, on that inscription, a *quaestor* appears equivalent to a *curator*. Below all of these are the roles of *scriba* and *nuntius*, followed by ordinary members, who are referred to on *CIL* 14.2112 as *collegiati*.

According to *ILS* 7215a, there were originally fifty-four members of the *collegium* of Jupiter Cernenis of Alburnus Major, Dacia, (reduced to seventeen by the time of its dissolution) while *CIL* 6.10234 notes that the *collegium* of Aesculapius and Hygia had sixty members. Salvia Marcellina also dictates that the number should not be allowed to exceed sixty, which is perhaps indicative of a feeling that larger numbers might be too difficult to organise or control. The fact that seventeen members were no longer enough to sustain the *collegium* of Jupiter Cernenis might also indicate that there was a lower limit, although of course the numbers are likely to have varied substantially across different areas and for different groups. It seems likely that associations often had somewhere between forty and sixty members, although occasionally much larger examples are also known. Finally, *CIL* 6.10234 also makes reference to “members exempt from fees”, while *CIL* 14.2112 mentions a special dispensation of gifts for “whoever has borne the

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(e.g. προστάτης, ἡγούμενος; cf. Chapter 5.3) while, in the West, there are also examples of *collegia* that are sorted into *decuriae*, where each group is led by a *decurio*, who then reports to the *quinquennalis*. For further examples of the positions one could hold in a *collegium*, see, for example, *CIL* 6.29700, 6.10322, 6.7960, 10.1881, 11.6017, 11.6371 and 13.2026. Cf. also Chapters 3 and 4, below, for the *collegium fabrum*, which uses a variety of more military titles, including the “caligati” (booted soldiers) to refer to members (e.g. *CIL* 14.4569). Royden (1988) also provides a comprehensive overview of the different magistracies that were held by members of *collegia* throughout Italy and the West (albeit with a particular focus on Rome and Ostia, thanks to the *alba* that have survived there) during the Principate; the main utility is in Royden’s collection of the sources in one place and in the arrangement of the material according to various different parameters, although there is frustratingly little discussion of the associations from a social point of view.

Bendlin (2011: 161-3) also estimates that the *collegium* of Diana and Antinous had approximately forty-eight members.
office of *quinquennalis* with integrity”, suggesting that members could obtain a special status within the *collegium* after serving as some sort of magistrate, not unlike the way in which civic magistrates could retain their titles and honours. Conversely, *CIL* 6.33885 notes that new members should not receive gifts in their first year of joining, all of which suggests that the hierarchy was not only administrative but had a direct impact on one’s status within the *collegium* and indeed, depending on the size of the gifts, outside it too.\(^{107}\)

Membership in the *collegia*, according to these inscriptions, was made up of males of middling to low status, although *CIL* 6.10234 shows that patron-figures could be female.\(^{108}\) The names of various members – e.g. Stertinus Rusticus (*ILS* 7215a), Artemidorus Appolonius (*ILS* 7215a), or Publius Aelius Onesimo (*CIL* 6.10234) – also suggest that they were mostly freedmen, although it is worth noting that only members holding a magistracy of some sort tend to be named. With each *collegium*, moreover, the precise status markers vary. *CIL* 14.2112 directly refers to the procedures that should be followed if a member who is a slave is freed, whereas *CIL* 6.10234 forbids the admittance of anyone who is not free.\(^{109}\) *CIL* 6.33885 notes that only ivory workers or citron-wood traders can be admitted but does not directly ban slaves, so might potentially have allowed

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\(^{107}\) It is unclear from the inscriptions exactly how a member might have risen through the ranks, as it were. *CIL* 6.33885 notes that there should be four *curatores* in each year, taken from the register “in order”, while *CIL* 14.2112 also stipulates that there should be four magistrates of the dinners at a time, done “from the order on the register, by arrangement”, both of which clearly indicate a basic rotation of that duty. The term *quinquennalis* also suggests a temporary role but there is little here to indicate how each one was chosen. Elsewhere, there is at least some evidence that members voted on who was to become president (cf. *CIL* 6.30982 and Chapter 4.1) and there are also some examples of *quinquennales perpetui* who appear to have secured the role permanently (cf. for example, *CIL* 6.29700-29702 and Chapter 2.2 for the *collegium piscatorum et urinatorum*, which was unusual in several respects). See chapters 3 and 4 in particular for further discussion of the way in which the hierarchy of the *collegium* could lead to social mobility.

\(^{108}\) See Hemelrijk (2008) and Venticinque (2016: 15) for further discussion of women in *collegia*. Female members were rare but did occasionally exist, mostly in non-professional associations (e.g. *CIL* 12.286). Although Waltzing (1895-190: 1.447-8) considered *mater* to be purely an honorific meaning “patron” within the context of collegia, Hemelrijk (2008: esp. 125) argues that there was some distinction between them and that, unlike patronesses (who appear in a range of different *collegia*), *matres* usually only appear in *collegia* that did allow women (i.e. not professional) and were probably drawn from the relatives of members.

\(^{109}\) Freedmen evidently are admitted, according to *CIL* 6.10234.
slaves from within that trade to join.\textsuperscript{110} On the other hand, \textit{CIL} 14.2112 also notes that new members should pay an entrance fee of 100 sesterces upon joining, along with a donation of wine and a monthly stipend of 5 asses.\textsuperscript{111} 100 sesterces was not an exorbitant amount of money, perhaps, but if one assumes an average daily wage of about 2–4 sesterces for unskilled labourers, it was certainly enough to make membership inaccessible for the poorest in society.\textsuperscript{112} \textit{CIL} 6.33885 also records an entrance fee, though the amount is lost, and both \textit{CIL} 6.10234 and \textit{ILS} 7215a refer to fees indirectly.\textsuperscript{113}

All of the \textit{collegia} laid strict regulations on members, although the extent of these varied considerably. The most prominent concern is with admission and on guaranteeing that only eligible people are accepted; \textit{CIL} 6.33885 reveals a particular focus on this for the \textit{collegium} of ivory workers and citron-wood traders, specifically allocating to \textit{curatores} the responsibility of ensuring new members’ eligibility and noting that they would be “rubbed out of the register” for failing in this duty, perhaps indicating that the more professional \textit{collegia} were obliged to keep careful tabs on their membership. \textit{CIL} 14.2112 is much more focused on the rules surrounding the burial of members, as mentioned above, and on enforcing the good behaviour of members more generally, whereas \textit{CIL} 6.10234 prioritises the allocation of feasts and the proper distribution of food and gifts, with a hefty fine for anything done “contrary” to regulations. All of the associations also keep lists of members in \textit{alba}, referred to in these inscriptions, which presumably enabled their regulations to be enforced smoothly.

\textsuperscript{110} Cf. Wilson (1996: 10). Joshel (1992: 100) finds that 67\% of members of \textit{collegia} were free, approximately 18\% of whom were freeborn, while Mayer (2012: 19, 104–5) suggests that the \textit{collegia} may have occupied a “middle-class” of society.\textsuperscript{111} Reference is also made in this inscription to the inability of the \textit{collegium} to pay out money to a member’s master, mistress, patron or creditor in the event of their death, which further suggests that members’ personal circumstances varied widely outside of the \textit{collegium}.\textsuperscript{112} Scheidel (2010: 444).\textsuperscript{113} Although \textit{CIL} 6.10234 does not give the cost of membership, it does note that magistrates can be fined as much as 20,000 sesterces. If we are to assume that this was actually possible for those members then their personal wealth must not have been insignificant. It is worth mentioning here also that \textit{ILS} 7215a was written to record the closure of a \textit{collegium}, one of the reasons for which was the non-payment of fees. For other inscriptions that indicate the overall status of members, see, for example, \textit{CIL} 6.6220, 10.1881, 12.286.
5. Activities

The five inscriptions in the appendix also provide useful snapshots of the different activities that occupied the collegia. The prominence that was given to certain activities on monumental inscriptions has driven a great deal of the scholarship on collegia and continues to do so. As such, it is worth highlighting here precisely what can be gleaned from the evidence itself before closing the chapter with an overview of the most recent scholarship, although it is worth noting again that the epigraphic medium does lend itself more to some activities than others.

As discussed above, the provision of burial was certainly very common amongst collegia and, amongst other things, *CIL* 14.2112 gives what is perhaps the most comprehensive description of the way in which it worked in practice, at least for the collegium of Diana and Antinous. In essence, should a fully paid-up member die, the collegium pledged to use his burial fund (*funeraticium*) of 300 sesterces to cover the cost of his funeral. 50 sesterces of the *funeraticium* were paid to members to enable them to attend and it is also stipulated that they should “observe on their feet”. The inscription goes on to outline what should be done in exceptional or unusual circumstances, such as a member dying more than twenty miles from the town (three members should be sent, with his *funeraticium* and a travel allowance to oversee his burial) or dies intestate (the other members will bury him themselves, at their discretion) or if he is a slave and his master refuses to release the body (a funeral image should be used) or if he commits suicide (his *funeraticium* will be forfeit). Both *CIL* 6.10234 and *ILS* 7215a also mention burial, albeit briefly, and it seems clear from the tone of all three inscriptions that the provision of burial was a fairly standard perk of membership.114 *CIL* 6.10234 simply notes that if a member decides to transfer his membership to another, then the new member must agree to pay half of the burial cost, indicating that it would be provided as a matter of course. *ILS* 7215a actually makes reference to the collegium having a reserved space for burial and indeed this is at least part of the reason (the other being non-participation) that it is closing, suggesting that this was an important part of its remit.

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114 For other examples of burial within the collegia, see *CIL* 3.3583, 3.633.1, 6.6221, 6.9626, 6.10322, 10.445, 12.736 and 12.1384.
More so than burial, the inscriptions also focus a great deal on collective feasting and on the distribution of gifts. *CIL* 14.2112, 6.10234, 6.33885 and *ILS* 7215 each include an *ordo cenarum*, outlining when and how feasts should be conducted and even what food should be consumed.\(^{115}\) The feasting dates are mostly unremarkable, chosen because they fall on the birthday of the patron, of his (or her) family members or of the *collegium* itself, although *CIL* 6.10234 and 14.2112 both also choose days based on their religious significance. The feasts themselves are given in some detail and range from being fairly simple to rather more lavish. *CIL* 14.2112 dictates only that bread, sardines and wine should be served, although crucially this is in setting out the obligations of the *curatores*, so it may be that there was plenty more to be had. For most occasions, *CIL* 6.33885 and 6.10234 also offer bread, wine and (in the case of 6.33885) “hot food”, although at least once a year they also add cakes, dates, figs and pears to the normal fare. In all cases, the dinners were accompanied by the distribution of cash gifts (*sportulae*) for members, where the value of the gift was dependent on rank but was usually between one and six denarii per member.

The extent to which the inscriptions describe these events is remarkable, given that their main purpose (with the exception of *ILS* 7215a) is to outline the rules of each *collegium*. The precise details of what should be consumed at feasts hardly seems worth regulating, let alone setting down in stone and I would suggest that their inclusion here is actually an effort to “advertise” the activities of the *collegium* to non-members.\(^{116}\) Admittedly, it was fairly standard practice to

\(^{115}\) See also *CIL* 3.1494, 6.29700, 10.444, 10.1881 and 11.6371 for similar examples in other *collegia*.

\(^{116}\) Donahue (2003: esp. 434) has previously pointed out that the perishable nature of food makes it an excellent way of displaying wealth, as is frequently done amongst the elite, and while the food described in regulations may not be quite the same as that appearing in Pompeian frescoes, it is made very clear that it will be hearty and there will be lots of it. There is also a context of exclusivity running through the feasts, which comes specifically with being a member of the *collegium*, and it is worth pointing out the ‘perceived’ status that comes with this exclusivity. The elite members of society are elite through their birth and wealth but are also perceived as elite, both by themselves and by the lower orders, because membership of their own (elite) club is limited, thus placing them in a privileged social position. As Donahue has also pointed out, by mimicking this exclusivity, the *collegium* is able to offer similar ‘status’ benefits to its members. The *Collegium* of Aesculapius and Hygia is a particularly good example of this, as it limits membership to 60 and the relevant inscription describes the feasts in detail, thus adding to the perceived exclusivity of the *collegium* and therefore of its status. Beyond their value as status
outline events in this way on sacred calendars and it is possible that the collegium is simply modelling itself on that practice, although the decision to honour patrons by selecting their birthdays for feasting would at least suggest that all this detail was not for a purely internal purpose. Similarly, CIL 6.33885 and ILS 7215 both also use the dinners as an opportunity to praise the emperor, which might also reflect more of an external concern.

The final activity that is directly manifest in the epigraphic evidence is religious behaviour, although this does not feature as much as perhaps might be expected. With the exception of the ivory workers and citron-wood traders, each of the collegia from the appendix is named after a deity or deities, which one could argue is suggestive of an overall religious function and that each was probably founded in order to facilitate religious behaviour of some sort, such as group worship. For the most part, however, the inscriptions make only passing references to their eponymous deities or to group worship. CIL 6.10234 notes that Salvia Marcellina’s benefaction includes space “for a temple”, as well as a statue of Aesculapius and also that the regulations were agreed to at a meeting “within the temple” but there is no reference to religion within the regulations apart from the stipulation that members should feast on the Day of Roses and of Violets. CIL 14.2112 does regulate for religious worship at the very end of the inscription, noting that the quinquennalis should provide incense and wine and perform his other duties in white clothing. ILS 7215 is slightly more direct, as it mentions that “[the worshippers of Hercules] will worship and eat in the temple.” Other inscriptions set up by collegia do have more of a religious emphasis but, given the length and breadth of these inscriptions, there is remarkably little to be said of it here.

markers, the feasts and sportulae may also have had a role in providing members with a platform from which to socialise and perhaps even ‘network’ with one another. The following chapters will discuss in greater detail the way in which one might have used one’s collegium to better one’s lot in life but it is worth highlighting here the different forms of commensality noted by Grignon. Grignon (2001: 23-33, esp. 27-8) notes that people routinely eat with colleagues and friends of the same status as themselves but also engage where possible in “exceptional” and “transgressive” commensality, by eating and drinking with people of a higher and lower status and use these opportunities to cross social boundaries. The feasts of the collegia, often held in honour of patrons and their family, fit neatly into this definition of “transgressive” commensality, providing members with what must have been a very rare chance to climb the recognized social hierarchy. Cf. for example, CIL 6.10234, where the male patron at least is invited to dine with the collegium.
That said, the religious activity of *collegia* is at least referred to, whereas there is really no direct indication of professional activity at all. Admittedly, only one of these examples is named after a profession but nevertheless one has to read quite carefully between the lines to spot any activity that might be deemed worthy of the name “professional association”. Direct examples that we might hope to see would perhaps include reference to contractual agreements, to the individual jobs of different members, to the shared resources available to the *collegium* or to previous jobs completed. However, the closest reference on the inscription is a (damaged) stipulation that “[………] should receive all of the profits (*commoda*) for their year.” Based on context, the space probably refers to the *curatores* or to ordinary members but, either way, this is a fairly tenuous case for professional activity. *Commoda* might refer to profits or salary but also to rewards or to the *sportulae* that are referred to earlier in the inscription. On the other hand, it goes on to say that any money left in the coffers (*arca*) should be distributed equally by the *curatores*, in what seems like a clear reference to leftover funds, suggesting perhaps that *commoda* does indeed refer to some kind of generated income.

I would also argue that the remarkable emphasis that is put on ensuring that all members are either ivory workers or citron-wood traders should certainly be considered an indication of professional activity. It is difficult to imagine why the numbers should be so restricted if the purpose of the *collegium* is only to act as a social club. It is important again to bear in mind that inscriptions were mostly used to record or memorialise specific events. Each of the inscriptions in the appendix, with the exception of *ILS* 7215a, may give what has become known as the *leges collegiorum* but they were all actually set up to record benefactions given to the *collegia* and to stipulate precisely what should be done with that money. It follows that burial, feasting and even religious costs are outlined but there is little reason to give the day to day minutiae of such associations. I would argue that to understand the *collegia* properly, it is crucial that historians recognise the limitations of the source material and ask what is missing from the evidence, rather than assuming that it provides a complete picture.

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6. Current Scholarship

The study of *collegia* began in earnest in 1843, with the publication of Mommsen’s dissertation, *De collegiis et sodaliciis Romanorum*. Indeed, one could argue that the study of *collegia* predates the study of Latin epigraphy itself, as by far the most important collection of Latin inscriptions – the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* – actually has its origins in Mommsen’s 1843 thesis.\(^{118}\) Mommsen was primarily concerned with examining the *collegia* from a legislative point of view, based on the fairly limited textual evidence then available, although the insights that he made into associative life and the impact that *collegia* had on the Roman world continue to underpin scholarship today.\(^{119}\)

The most important work on *collegia* remains Waltzing’s enormous publication, made up of four volumes published between 1895 and 1901. To this should also be added de Robertis’ (1973) *opus magnum*, which in two volumes expands upon the work done by Waltzing, with a particular focus on legislation. These systematic works produce lists of *collegia* according to various different parameters and categories (the mention of burial, the inclusion of a profession, etc.) and, along with the even earlier contributions of Mommsen, they are indispensable to the modern researcher.\(^{120}\) That being said, they are each very focused on legislation and there is little in terms of consideration of the *collegia* themselves, let alone the way in which they interacted with their local communities. Since the 1970s, the scholarship has developed to give far more attention to specific aspects of the associations.\(^{121}\)

MacMullen (1974) and Alföldy (1984) departed from the juridical studies that preceded them, taking a wider approach to the *collegia* and considering them

\(^{118}\) Mommsen (1843) focused on the *collegia* from a juridical point of view, arguing that proper analysis of the associations required a *corpus* of inscriptions. The final pages of his dissertation contain the “first glimmers” of the *CIL*. Cf. Perry (2001: 500); Bendlin (2011: 207). For discussion of the economic scholarship that preceded Mommsen, cf. the excellent summary recently provided by Wilson and Flohr (2016: 24-6).

\(^{119}\) See in particular, Chapter 1.3, above.

\(^{120}\) Important works on the associations in Egypt and in the East include especially Poland (1909); van Minnen (1987); van Nijf (1997); Venticinque (2010); Ascough *et al.* (2012).

\(^{121}\) E.g. MacMullen (1974); Kloppenborg (1996); van Nijf (1997) and, in particular, Verboven (2007; 2009; 2011). The uncertainty that has surrounded the precise function of *collegia* is what led to Kloppenborg’s assessment of their “messy taxonomy”.
more in terms of their social impact on the civic structure.\textsuperscript{122} Despite being strictly limited to examination of the \textit{collegia} from a social point of view (e.g. MacMullen 1974: 19: “analogy with a medieval guild or labour union is mistaken. Rather, their purpose is social in the broadest sense.”), these studies generated a wave of scholarship that analysed them from a much more global perspective, showing greater awareness of their “multi-functional nature.”\textsuperscript{123} Most of these works (cf. especially Joshel, 1992 and van Nijf, 1997) focused on the way in which members used \textit{collegia} as a means to integrate with society and achieve social prestige (by holding office within the \textit{collegium}) that was otherwise inaccessible to them as non-elites. More recent studies are also focused on the status benefits of membership but tend to believe that this status “network” was distinct from the conventional civic hierarchy.\textsuperscript{124} Liu points out that synthetic studies such as this are very useful in improving our overall understanding of the \textit{collegia}, in a general sense, but that they also “run the risk of conflating organizations and phenomena that developed in different historical moments and/or circumstances.”\textsuperscript{125}

The last decade has seen something of a resurgence in analysing the \textit{collegia} according to their different activities, with a particular focus on those associations that identify themselves according to the members’ shared occupation and it is within this context that I have based the current study.\textsuperscript{126} The messy taxonomy of

\textsuperscript{122} For the most comprehensive list of up to date scholarship, see Ascough \textit{et al.} (2012). Cracco Ruggini (1971: 59–64) also gives a very useful survey of the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century literature. Perry (2006) gives what is purportedly a survey of (mostly) 20\textsuperscript{th} century literature but those looking for a detailed history of research will be disappointed. Rather, Perry uses \textit{collegia} to demonstrate his argument that historiography is affected by the social status and historical context (especially the Italian fascist movement) of scholars. The literature from the 1970s onwards is, however, very well summarised by Liu (2009, 4-11).

\textsuperscript{123} E.g. Ausbüttel (1982); Joshel (1992); Kloppenborg (1996); van Nijf (1997); Patterson (2006).

\textsuperscript{124} E.g. Bendlin (2002); Tran (2006). Verboven (2007: 861–3) notes that the \textit{collegium} was “distinct from the civic order in which they could occupy only positions defined by inferiority and exclusion.” See also Liu (2009: 6-7) for further discussion.

\textsuperscript{125} Liu (2009: 8). See, for example, my critique of Hawkins’ approach in Chapter 5.1. Liu suggests that a synthetic approach has also led to a lack of detailed analysis of the different types of associations, although I would argue that this is rather more down to the difficulty of forming a clear taxonomy of \textit{collegia}; cf. Chapter 1.3, above.

\textsuperscript{126} E.g. Ascough (2008); Broekaert (2008; 2011); Liu (2009); Venticinque (2010; 2016); Verboven (2009; 2011); Arnaoutoglou (2011); Gibbs (2011); Tran (2011); Mayer (2012); Hawkins (2012; 2016); Wilson and Flohr (2016); Verboven and Laes (2016).
the *collegia*, however, is a complicating factor; focusing on those associations that identify themselves by their profession encourages us to view the *collegia* in a fairly one-dimensional way, perhaps overlooking other activities that might have been just as important to the members of the *collegia* as their shared occupation. Within this thesis, I have attempted to deal with the messy taxonomy by combining different approaches. My primary focus is on the economy, and, as such, I am naturally more interested in those *collegia* whose members can be linked to a particular profession. That said, my approach is grounded in Neo-Institutional Economic theory (for which, see the following chapter), which argues that all aspects (or institutions) are important and therefore I pay as much attention to the religious, social or funerary aspects as I do to the professional. I also follow recent practice by focusing first on a specific area, namely Ostia (Chapter 3), and ensuring that I gather data in a holistic way. Following this, however, in order to avoid making generalisations based on isolated material, I also consider evidence from other areas of the empire (Chapter 4) and from different types of sources (Chapter 5).
CHAPTER 2: NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS – THE APPLICABILITY OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY TO ROMAN COLLEGIA

In my introduction, I mentioned a set of papers, introduced by Koenraad Verboven and published together in the Ancient Society journal in 2011, that marked an important turning-point in the study of what they term “professional collegia” and in research on the Roman economy more generally.127 The authors’ studies were aimed at demonstrating the potential of modern economic theory, specifically Neo-Institutional Economics (NIE), as a tool to better understand the collegia and to encourage further research in this area. Those studies represented an excellent starting point but Verboven’s introductory paper also highlighted several aspects in need of development and emphasised the need for further research. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to establish NIE as a theoretical framework for this thesis and to examine the way in which the study of the economic impact of collegia has developed, as well as the direction in which it is now going. In particular, I will argue that scholarship in this area has been extremely limited by the Finleyan approach to the Roman economy but that the increasing tendency amongst historians to approach the economy from an institutional point of view is now finally beginning to shed light on the role of the collegia.

I will begin by briefly introducing institutional economic theory and assessing some of the reasons for its limited take-up in studies of ancient history before (approximately) the 1980s. The prominence of earlier studies and especially of Finley’s The Ancient Economy has led to unnecessary barriers being set up against institutional study. In particular, Finley’s objections to the possibility that collegia were ever economic actors continue to hold a surprising level of influence and are therefore worth reassessing here. On this point, I will develop on the material from the previous chapter, which argued that the complicated taxonomy of

127 See Verboven (2011: 187): specifically, the dossier considered those collegia that identify themselves according to their shared occupation and was aimed at examining precisely “what the ‘professional’ label meant” for those associations.
collegia has been given too much prominence in the literature. I will demonstrate that, within economic studies, this has manifested itself in the continuing centrality of the debate around whether collegia can be compared to mediaeval guilds, noting that it has created a standoff between those who support an institutional approach and those who do not.

I will argue that such an inflexible debate is entirely unhelpful to this topic; it is very clear that neither our evidence nor our common sense allows us to associate Roman collegia directly with mediaeval guilds. However, it is also clear that obvious and distinct similarities can be drawn between the two. I will emphasise that collegia, whilst clearly not equivalent to guilds, can certainly be considered “guild-like” and that it is time to accept the similarities they do share and move past the stagnant debate to its more fruitful ramifications.

I will then examine the approaches taken by Verboven et al. and consider some further examples. I will argue that, despite the very convincing nature of the 2011 dossier, there remain some issues in that the authors do not always go far enough in their use of NIE and are in fact somewhat guilty of demonstrating an inductive bias in their approach, which Verboven himself has specifically warned against since. In closing, I will highlight those areas in which NIE, whilst promising, remains an imperfect model, and I will identify some areas that are in need of further research or clarification.

1. Approaching the Roman Economy

In applying the NIE model to ancient history and specifically to collegia, the definitions provided by Mushtaq Khan provide a useful framework. He notes that “organisations” are “actors” – groups of individuals who have collected together and are engaged in any common purpose (or a range of various common purposes). This is precisely the case with collegia, which are made up of individuals who have formed together, certainly to perform a social function

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128 Verboven (2015: 36), notes that while economists can be susceptible to a certain “deductive bias” (see below), historians are equally in danger of engaging in “inductive bias”, frequently focusing on the particular aspects of economic theories that fit their sources, rather than really engaging with the economics in a holistic way.

and/or provide burial and potentially to improve their individual (or collective) situation, both socially and economically.

“Institutions” define the set of rules under which organisations act – these rules can be further divided into North’s formal and informal institutions, so that in the case of collegia, the “formal institutions” affecting the collegia would include any and all legal restrictions that are placed upon the members, either as a collective entity (i.e. directly restricting collegia) or as individuals (i.e. general trading restrictions, burial laws, social obligations, etc.). They would also include the formal institutions that individual members have collectively agreed to, such as the leges collegiorum that exist in reference to several different collegia. The “informal institutions” are those that are privately enforced simply by being part of the collegium, such as an unwillingness to upset the perceived norm, a desire to fit in and to uphold one’s personal reputation, sharing cultural values, etc. Within the collegium, sanctions for not adhering to institutions might result in exclusion or demotion or, more informally, being shunned by one’s fellow members.¹³⁰

Walter Scheidel, taking a firmly institutional approach, describes economic systems as “institutional frameworks which co-ordinate human competition for scarce resources.”¹³¹ This approach sees economies as frameworks that are built around various formal and informal rules or “institutions”. These rules both create and govern actors or “organisations”, which are any/all groups of individuals that engage in collective actions, such as families, societies, friendship networks, professional groups, governments, etc. Institutional economic theory initially developed out of the more traditional neo-classical approach that places a major focus on a market mediated by supply and demand.¹³² Within the neo-classical

¹³⁰ North (1990: Ch. 2-3). It is worth mentioning that the definitions set out by North provide a useful starting point but that discussion does not necessarily need to remain strictly within this framework. Indeed Scheidel et al. (2007: 7) and especially Verboven (2015: 41-51) both point out that NIE is useful because it can and should be used in combination “with other promising approaches like Behavioural Economics and Development Economics” (Verboven, 2015: 51).
¹³¹ Scheidel and von Reden (2002: 1).
¹³² Verboven (2015: 37-8); Khan (2010: 13). Neo-institutional economic theory should of course be distinguished from Ordinary (or Old) Institutional Economics (OIE). OIE originally developed as part of economic theory in early 20th century America in an attempt to try and deal with a set of fundamental questions that were not entirely satisfied by the more mainstream, neo-classical theories: Why do countries record such different performance, despite the existence of the world
model, the only institutions that govern market interactions are formal. These include “property rights” (whereby individuals have the right to use, earn income from, trade and enforce the rights of their goods) and “markets” (whereby individuals can engage in, exchange and enter into enforceable contracts).  

The problem with a neo-classical model is that it assumes that these rules can be “costlessly” enforced in an effective way, which should then result in efficient outcomes – i.e. where all individuals have exchanged their goods between each other to the point at which no one would like to exchange further, or, in other words, everyone is as happy as they could be with their current allocation of goods, given what they had originally. However, institutional economics has shown that, even if this efficient allocation was possible, it is not possible to be achieved “costlessly”, as many other costs, both financial and otherwise, do in fact exist (the costs of gaining information, facilitating supply, etc.), known commonly as “transaction costs”.  

However, as Scheidel and Verboven have both noted, most treatments of the ancient economy have avoided an institutional or even neo-classical approach until quite recently. A distinct lack of evidence that was quantifiable long prohibited any really meaningful, holistic research on the Roman economy and indeed the entire ancient economy. Verboven has pointed out that modern market? Why do some of the best performing countries have very unusual economic policies? How do the organisations and their institutionalised behaviour impact the economy? Do culture, values, politics, etc. matter? At the centre of all of these questions is the fundamental tenet that ‘institutions do matter’ and, in approaching the economy in this way, OIE took an entirely opposite approach to the more orthodox neo-classical approach, as it insisted that the political and social contexts (or institutions) that surround an economy are entirely central to the way in which that economy develops. From the 1930s onwards, however, OIE was perceived to lack a strong theoretical foundation and empirical analyses, while the opposing neo-classical economists were able to provide logical explanations (e.g. Knight, 1932; Koopmans, 1947), as well as theoretical predictions and thus this took over as the main approach taken by orthodox economists, while institutionalism was wholly relegated to the heterodox (cf. Hodgson, 1998: 167; Rutherford, 2001: 182-5). NIE, on the other hand, begins with individuals and analyses how institutions are defined through the behaviour of individuals and their interaction with one another. Put more simply, while OIE would engage with history and with formal institutions in order to try and explain economic behaviour, NIE uses modern economics (based on neo-classical theory and the theory of transaction costs) to understand better social relations and the formation of institutions, both formal and informal, in different historical contexts.

133 Khan (2010: 13).
technology in archaeology, numismatics, papyrology and epigraphy, along with modern data analysis methods, have only recently begun to give us the required insight.\footnote{Verboven (2015: 33).} Because of the limitations of the evidence, substantivist approaches to the economy and especially the Finleyan model have instead taken precedence, at least until about the 1980s. Moses Finley’s \textit{The Ancient Economy} was the first work to approach the ancient economy in a truly holistic way, which has led to it holding an unparalleled status within this topic. Finley maintained that the ancient economy cannot be discussed in terms of the economic frameworks mentioned above, such as supply and demand, holding that any kind of overarching “world market”, of the sort that we are familiar with today, simply did not exist.\footnote{Finley (1999 [1973]: 34).} Rather, he argued that the economic and social spheres were inextricably linked, leading to social factors (meaning mainly status concerns and elite prejudices) limiting economic growth.\footnote{Scheidel and von Reden (2002: 2).}

The merits and problems of \textit{The Ancient Economy} have been discussed at length by other scholars and it is worth emphasising that the Finleyan approach no longer retains anything like the hold over economic studies that it once did.\footnote{For the most comprehensive survey of discussion based on or opposing the Finleyan model, see Scheidel and von Reden (2002), especially the chapter by Andréau (2002: 33–49); Adams (2012: esp. 224-37); cf. also Derks (2002: 597-620, esp. 602-605). For a more general overview of Finley’s life and works, as well as his impact on Ancient History and Economics, see the edited collection by Jew, Osborne and Scott (2016).} In recent decades, efforts have been increasingly made to move past his stimulating but ultimately uninformed (in terms of the evidence available) model.\footnote{Scheidel and von Reden (2002: 3).} Despite the body of existing scholarship, it is necessary to begin with Finley and with a discussion of his major arguments for two reasons. First, the Neo-Institutional approach that I am supporting within this thesis runs entirely counter to Finley and it is therefore important to assess Finley’s arguments within the context of modern economic studies. Second, Finley has had a direct impact on studies of \textit{collegia}, thanks to his well-known (and rather brief) treatment of \textit{collegia}, in which he states that, “there were no guilds, no matter how often the Roman \textit{collegia} and their differently named Greek and Hellenistic counterparts are thus
mistranslated.” 141 This quotation and the focus placed on guilds have retained a remarkable prominence within collegia scholarship but, as the following sections will show, Finley’s doubts about the importance of collegia rested ultimately on a flawed premise. 142

Ian Morris, in his foreword to the latest edition of The Ancient Economy, notes that perhaps the most defining feature of Finley’s model is its argument that “we can build a coherent model of a single ancient economy … from 1000 BC to AD 500.” 143 This is not to say that Finley is claiming an entirely static economy throughout the Graeco-Roman World and over such an expanse of time. Rather, his model is determined by the belief that this enormous range shares fundamental features; namely that it lacks any kind of “rational” economy, based on supply and demand and that instead it is entirely governed by status concerns. 144 Finley argued that the overriding concern with status in the ancient world ultimately restricted any real development in terms of the economy.

In particular, Finley maintained that elite prejudices against most forms of trading led to these necessarily taking place (at least openly) amongst the lower orders only, meaning that any sort of obvious economic growth was ultimately discouraged. He argued that this resulted directly in a slave economy, as such prejudices made it difficult to persuade the lower orders to provide needed labour. Moreover, those forms of trading in which elites did participate, namely land ownership, were also status-driven. Rather than land being used to generate income, as in a modernist economy, Finley argued that it was instead used by elites to symbolise their status, while the agricultural activity of non-elites was directed only towards subsistence. 145

Previous critics have of course highlighted the flaws in this argument, noting that it is based entirely on glimpses into elite mentalities, which are unlikely to have

143 Morris, in Finley (1999: xix).
been as prevalent in society as Finley believed.\(^{146}\) Finley’s main evidence for land being used first as a status symbol, for example, is based entirely on things that are \textit{not} said by Pliny in one of his letters.\(^{147}\) This is not to say of course that Finley was mistaken about the usefulness of land as a symbol, but rather to highlight his over-reading of the evidence. I would also argue that while there are various examples of non-elites making efforts to advance their social status, there is little to suggest that they actively shunned certain forms of work in order to do so. Indeed, many \textit{collegia}, such as those known from Ostia (for which, see the following chapter), provide excellent case studies here, as they represent strictly hierarchical structures, whose members (made up of non-elites) show obvious status concerns, yet their entire existence is based upon the shared occupations of their members, including building, grain measuring, ship construction, etc.

Verboven, in his treatment of Finley, notes that his model was impressive but that it now requires the rejection of “all epigraphic, papyrological, and archaeological data, along with a good deal of literary sources, to stand its ground.”\(^{148}\) In Finley’s defence, recent decades have seen enormous developments in the ancient evidence, in terms both of its sheer amount and of our ability to access it. A fairer criticism is perhaps levelled by Greene, who notes that “Finley underestimated the spread of technological improvements, especially under the Romans.”\(^{149}\) In any case, it is certainly true that a lack of evidence was entirely central to Finley’s model and it is this factor more than any other that should lead us to put his model aside. He argued in particular that “[the ancients] lacked the concept of an ‘economy’” and that they were blasé about keeping any records or accounts, once they had served their immediate purpose, revealing an entirely substantivist economy.\(^{150}\) The evidence available to us now, however (and not least that taken from ancient associations), including from epigraphy, papyri and coinage,

\(^{146}\) Scheidel (2012: 3); Andréau (2002: 36).
\(^{147}\) Finley (1999: 113) cites a letter from Pliny (\textit{Epistles}, 3.19) in which he discusses the merits of buying a patch of land adjoining his estate, with no mention whatsoever of the ‘workable’ potential of the land. As one of the richest men in Rome, Pliny’s purchasing a house primarily for its beauty (\textit{pulchritudo}), rather than its material advantages, is hardly all that shocking. Cf. also Garnsey and Saller (2014 [1987]: 99-100), who have made the same point in relation to Pliny.
\(^{148}\) Verboven (2015: 36).
\(^{149}\) Greene (2000: 30).
\(^{150}\) Finley (1999: 21, 26).
demonstrates that Finley underestimated the attention that was in fact paid to economic concepts.\textsuperscript{151}

In the decades immediately following Finley, the debate became centred on primitivist/substantivist vs. modernist (broadly neo-classical) approaches.\textsuperscript{152} Modernist scholars tended to focus more on examples of growth and development, highlighting markets as particularly comparable features to a modern economy. In particular, they argued that the Roman Empire would have fostered an excellent environment for market growth and development through the facilitation of mass production and trade, as well as (at least some) regulation, such as coinage.\textsuperscript{153} Primitivist approaches, on the other hand, tended to follow Finley’s example, emphasising the differences between modern and ancient economies and arguing that, far from being mitigated by recognisable features, such as supply and demand, the ancient economy was controlled more by status-concerns than anything else. They argued that the conditions of the Empire would not necessarily result in the growth of markets and, fundamentally, that the absence of a single, unified system made such an outcome highly unlikely. As Scheidel has already noted, by standing so firmly in opposition to one another, these approaches present an over simplified, rather one-dimensional, view of the Roman economy, although this is now changing, as the Neo-Institutional approach and the use of other modern economic theory gathers momentum.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{151} The regulations of the salt merchants at Tebtynis (P.Mich 5.245, 1\textsuperscript{st} c. AD; cf. chapter 5), for instance, include several guidelines on what to charge customers, what to contribute to the collegium, etc. The decree announcing the closure of the collegium from Alburnus Major (\textit{ILS} 7215a; cf. Chapter 1.4) cites a lack of funds as the cause of dissolution and indeed it was not unusual for associations across the Roman world to hold treasuries or to assign treasurers to direct funds (e.g. P.Ryl. 4.586: 1\textsuperscript{st} century BC (\γρηματοφύλακας); \textit{IG} IF.1325; \textit{CIL} 6.9626; 6.33885; 11.6371). One set of tablets (\textit{ILS} 6174-5) from Ostia specifically lists the members of the collegium of accountants, which stands in direct opposition to Finley’s model. Cf. also Scheidel and von Reden (2002: 3).

\textsuperscript{152} See Scheidel (2012: 7), as well as Garnsey and Saller’s (2014: 88-90) addendum to their earlier, seminal discussion, in which they also point out the outdated nature of the primitivist vs. modernist debate and give a useful summary of the scholarship that has emerged since 1987.

\textsuperscript{153} Andréau (2002: 38). It is worth noting that, in this context, the word ‘empire’ is used to refer to the territorial expansion of Rome, rather than the actual imperial era.

\textsuperscript{154} Scheidel (2012: 9); Andréau (2002: 37-8): The structure provided by an empire must have reduced at least some transaction costs by, at the very least, facilitating more trade, although this still does not point to a single market. On the other hand, nor does this preclude the existence of
2. Guilds

Finley’s emphatic rejection of the possibility that *collegia* were comparable to mediaeval guilds came in response to the increasing attention that was paid in the twentieth century to “professional associations”.¹⁵⁵ The large number of *collegia* that identify themselves according to their occupation naturally led some, such as Meiggs, to assume that they were founded specifically to enhance the economic objectives of members, namely by controlling access to the market in a similar way to mediaeval guilds.¹⁵⁶ This assumption, moreover, does not seem altogether unjustified when one considers the evidence from epigraphy. Although direct examples of what might be considered “market activity” are lacking, plenty of the other activities that were common amongst mediaeval guilds, such as group feasting or burial, were evidently just as common amongst *collegia* and one could certainly argue that the *collegia* were therefore, at the very least, “guild-like”. The *collegium eborariorum et citriariorum* also placed a strong emphasis on ensuring that only active professionals of those trades were admitted and the mediaeval guilds were similarly exclusive; the *collegia*, furthermore, were organised according to a strict hierarchy and are known to have owned *scholae* (clubhouses) from which they could operate in the same way as guilds.¹⁵⁷

A particularly illuminating example of a *collegium* that was at least “guild-like”, in that it shared many similarities with mediaeval guilds, can be found in the *corpus piscatorum et urinatorum* – a professional *collegium* of “fishermen and divers” that operated along the length of the Tiber between Ostia, Portus and Rome in the late 2nd century. Five separate inscriptions set up by the *collegium* have survived, granting us more detail than usual about their internal...

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¹⁵⁵ See above, Chapter 1.3.
¹⁵⁶ Meiggs (1973 [1960]). For the purposes of this thesis, a mediaeval guild can be defined as an association of men of the same craft or trade who form in the interests of mutual aid and protection, maintaining standards and pursuing common interests and are formally recognised by local or central authorities. *s.v* “guild” in Collins English Dictionary <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/guild> consulted online on 13 August 2017.
administration. Like the *eborarii et citriarii*, the association links two different but related professions and, although similar practice amongst mediaeval guilds was rare, it was not unheard of. The potential benefits of this from a professional point of view are obvious, from sharing resources and/or information to creating something of a monopoly over the profession. Somewhat unusually, there appear to have been several *quinquennales* in the *collegium* at one time, at least one of whom also seems to have acted as a sort of internal patron. Some *quinquennales*, moreover, seem to have retained the position for multiple terms and all of them gave substantial benefactions to the *collegium*. This is not at all unlike the way in which a small number of the most experienced individuals, usually known as “masters”, held administrative control over their guilds in medieval times.

In order to become a master of a mediaeval guild, one had to work one’s way up through the ranks, initially as an “apprentice” and then as a “journeyman”. There is no direct evidence of apprenticeship within the *collegia* but the emphasis on rank is certainly apparent and indeed previous studies have focused on the way in which the hierarchy of *collegia* might have facilitated social mobility amongst the non-elite in the same way that it did for members of mediaeval guilds. Amongst

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158 See *CIL* 6.1080, 6.1872, 6.29700, 6.29701, 6.29702; cf. also Le Gall (1953: 268-9); Royden (1988: 139); Sirks (1991: 277); Donahue (2003: 434). The members of this *collegium* probably made a living through owning boats that they used both for fishing and for salvaging the various goods that would fall into the river around these busy ports, although it has been suggested that the *piscatores* were also a type of diver (Holleran, 2012: 75).
159 See, for example, the fraternity between the cobbler and bakers at Rottweil in 1477 (Rosser, 1997: 23). Another well-known example of a mediaeval guild that bridged the gap between professions is the guild of barbers and surgeons, although these two were linked because barbers often also acted as surgeons, which could of course also be the case for joint associations in the Roman world (Ferragud, 2014: 129-131). Cf. also Himmelmann (2007), who outlines the way in which the guild facilitated barbers’ development to become surgeons.
160 F. Annius Fortunatus, for instance, is referred to as “*quinquennalis* for the third time” (*quinquennali III*), “*quinquennalis* in perpetuity” (*quinquenali perpetuo*) and “most dignified patron” (*patrono dignissimo*) and the benefaction that he gives to the *collegium* is in part designated for the *patronis et quinquenali bus perpetuis*, suggesting that there were multiple patrons, as well as *quinquennales*.
161 For the hierarchical system in place in mediaeval guilds, see in particular Kieser (1989: 551-2); Rosser (1997: 7, 25); Epstein (1998: 685); although see also Epstein (1991: 19-20) who emphasises that there is no trace within *collegia* of the apprenticeship system that was entirely central to guilds.
162 E.g. Joshel (1992); van Nijf (1997); Verboven (2007). See also Chapter 5.5, below, on apprenticeship.
the fishermen and divers, Royden has noted previously that Sossius Filocteta was probably a member of serf origins, yet he is named here as a “two-time quinquennalis” quinquennalis II.\textsuperscript{163} Similarly, it is mentioned that Fortunatus (the patron and perpetual quinquennalis) had also been quinquennalis twice previously and that he had “performed all honours through the ranks”, indicating that he has climbed the ranks so successfully that he has been able to become patron of his own association. Whether or not these examples are representative of upward social mobility is debatable but they are at the very least comparable to the emphasis placed on the hierarchy within guilds.

As ever, there are no specific examples of what we might call “market activity” in the inscriptions set up by the corpus piscatorum et urinatorum, although it is worth pointing out that the collegium was also reasonably wealthy. According to CIL 6.29700, Fortunatus “gave 12,000 sesterces to the corpus” (corpori XII (milia) n(umnum) donaverit), from the “interest” of which sportulae were to be paid to the other members. In CIL 6.29701, each of the six active presidents also gave gifts of approximately 1000 denarii each, while CIL 6.1872 and 6.29702 both record similar gifts.\textsuperscript{164} Besides the evident wealth of at least some members and of the collegium itself – which in itself is comparable to what we know of

\textsuperscript{163} Royden (1988: 191, n.276). This conclusion is presumably based on his name, although it is also worth noting that he appears at the very bottom of the inscription.

\textsuperscript{164} CIL 6.29701 records the amounts that each of the active presidents have pledged to give to the other members, (mostly) according to their rank but the total amount of 1000 denarii is only given in two cases, making any more sophisticated financial analysis uncertain. These instances are not given any special prominence on the stone, however, and are therefore unlikely to have been substantially different. Accordingly, if we accept that 1000 denarii represented the approximate amount given by each president, we can build a more comprehensive picture. Assuming 1000 denarii was the total benefaction of Maecius Florinus, for example, then we can calculate that 128 denarii were spent on the quinquennales every time sportulae were issued. If we then imagine 5 or 6 ordinary curatores (receiving 12 denarii each), we are left with approximately 800 denarii for the plebes (each of whom is prescribed 8 denarii). In total, this suggests a membership of about 110-114 men. Notably, when this formula is applied to each of the other benefactors, all of the total amounts, with the exception of Licinius Septimius whose gifts are significantly higher, remain close to 1000 denarii, reinforcing the membership estimate above. In the case of Fortunatus, if we assume his total sportulae (which were to be paid from the interest of his larger benefaction) also to have been worth approximately 1000 denarii, this would suggest that his original benefaction (12,000) must be referring to denarii, as 1000 denarii would represent an 8% rate of interest on this amount, which is in line with Liu’s (2007: 18, Table 5) study of endowments, albeit on the larger side. N.b. If the amount were 12,000 sesterces, the 1000 denarii of gifts would represent (approximately) a 33% rate of interest, something for which we lack any comparable examples.
mediaeval guilds – of much greater interest here is the way in which this money was generated. Several inscriptions set up by collegia refer to their treasury and a great number also describe how the yearly “interest” on benefactions should be used. As Liu notes, “we have no details about how the money was invested, or how and to whom credit was extended”, and yet, at the very least, one of the options must be that the collegia “themselves functioned as sources of credit.”\textsuperscript{165}

Altogether, in many respects, the assumption that collegia played a similar role within society to mediaeval guilds seems perfectly understandable. Direct examples of “market activity” are still lacking but many other aspects of guilds are entirely present in the collegia too. There is also evidence from Egypt, moreover, that demonstrates that the associations there played a definite role in facilitating economic activity, thus invalidating Finley’s position at least as far as Egypt is concerned. And yet, Finley’s objections that there were no guilds in antiquity remain central to economic discussions of the collegia. All of the papers in the 2011 dossier agree that the collegia were “economically relevant” but the introductory paper nevertheless highlights the distinctions between guilds and collegia as problematic.\textsuperscript{166}

Considering the progress that has been made within economic study of the ancient world in recent decades, the continued prominence of this debate is frankly baffling.\textsuperscript{167} Quite apart from the question of whether or not the collegia were akin to guilds, the relentless focus on this question is flawed because it inherently assumes that the only way that collegia could have impacted upon their local economies is if they were, in fact, guilds. And yet, throughout history, there are repeated examples of organisations or bodies that are emphatically not guilds but that have still affected the economy in various ways.\textsuperscript{168}

\textsuperscript{165} Liu (2008: 16).
\textsuperscript{166} In fact, Verboven (2011: 189) is careful to emphasise that the collegia were multidimensional associations with both professional and social aspects but remains hesitant (pp.192-3) to depart fully from the Finleyan approach that denied any economic function to the collegia on the basis that they were not identical to guilds.
\textsuperscript{167} For recent discussion of the debate, see e.g. Venticinque (2016: 20-22).
\textsuperscript{168} Cf. for example modern day trade unions or co-operatives or mutual benefit societies, such as the Italian Società Operaia di Mutuo Soccorso.
Technically speaking, it is evidently true that collegia were not the same as the mediaeval guilds, despite sharing some specific features. The guilds that became so prominent in Europe during the middle ages (and beyond) were formed with the specific purpose of controlling the economy. Anyone practising a craft or trade was legally obliged to become a member of his relevant guild first, enabling the guilds to hold monopolies over the trade in the city or town in which they operated. The members were from all levels of society but higher ranking members took on an elite social status and in many areas, such as Italy, Holland and Germany, they held enormous political influence, which they used to increase their own advantage. In short, guilds were formally recognised and regulated bodies, which meant that they were subject to a range of formal institutions.

Collegia, on the other hand, were not subject to such a range of formal institutions – there is plenty of extant legislation pertaining to them but, for the most part, the scope is limited to describing the circumstances in which collegia were permitted to assemble. Moreover, it is debatable to what extent that legislation was enforced for most of the principate. While there are also plenty of restrictions on trading and other professional activities, there is very little from before late antiquity that focuses on collegia in this context.\footnote{169}

For Verboven, the perceived lack of the types of formal institutions manifest in medieval guilds is what continues to make economic analyses of collegia problematic.\footnote{170} I would argue on this point, however, that such reservations are misplaced, especially given that the 2011 volume is written to encourage using NIE as a theoretical framework. The lack of formal institutions is only troubling if one accepts the false assumption that in order for a collegium to affect the economy it had to be entirely identical to a mediaeval guild. On the contrary, being “guild-like”, in the same way that a trade union or a co-operative might also be described as “guild-like”, is more than enough. The whole premise of NIE is that all institutions matter, whether formal or informal. All that really matters

\footnote{169}{On the other hand, there are the leges collegiorum (discussed previously), which all members had to agree to and which included sanctions for misbehaviour, as well as plenty of detail regarding membership restrictions and expected behaviour, all of which should surely be interpreted as formal institutions.}

\footnote{170}{Verboven (2011: 191-2).}
within that framework is whether *collegia* can be shown to have been subject to formal or informal institutions that would, in turn, have had an impact on the local economy.

3. Application to Roman *Collegia*

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, NIE has already made its way into the study of ancient history, with proponents such as Alain Bresson, Koenraad Verboven, Walter Scheidel and others, although the discipline is still fairly new. The *Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* (2007) notes that one of the goals for 21st century economic historians should be to build upon advances in institutional economics, among others.\(^{171}\)

Clearly however, one could take the terminology of NIE or any other economic theory and successfully apply it to a range of phenomena. The mere fact that *collegia* can fit so neatly into the terms outlined in the introduction does not in itself justify the use of this methodology in the study of Roman associations. For further justification, we may look to the 2011 volume of papers previously mentioned, the 2006 thesis and subsequent work of Cameron Hawkins and to Venticinque’s most recent work on the associations in Egypt, as well as to the following chapters of this thesis, which use the 2011 volume as a starting point and aim to build upon it.

Wim Broekaert’s paper provides a particularly useful demonstration of the importance that the institutions of *collegia* had on their members. He focuses initially on all of the potential transaction costs that merchants might be subject to, dividing them into three types, including immediate transaction costs (acquiring information, finding buyers), transportation costs (moving goods) and financing costs (protecting investments, providing a financial cushion against loss, etc.).\(^{172}\) He then illustrates the ways in which the various institutions of the *collegia* are able either to remove or to lessen those transaction costs. For example, Broekaert


\(^{172}\) Broekaert (2011: 221-2) is here following a division of transaction costs as set out by Kohn (2005: 5). Of course, according to NIE and the aforementioned work of Ronald Coase (1937), all of these costs actually come under the label of “transaction costs”. Cf. also Venticinque (2016: 4-5, 55-6).
notes that trust is a vital aspect to any transaction and that acquiring the information required to trust anyone else involved in said transaction represents a significant “cost”. The best way to avoid such costs is through networking, and the social network of the *collegium* provides useful institutions for just such a circumstance, as the network is limited to those who share similar goals, ideals, rules and methods. The institutions are both formal and informal, as members can face official sanctions, such as removal from the group or a monetary fine for explicitly not following the rules, but would also see an immediate and detrimental impact on their personal reputation and standing within the *collegium*, should they even be considered to have behaved in an underhand fashion.\(^\text{173}\)

The establishment of trust networks, moreover, is just one of the many ways in which NIE can potentially explain the formation and activities of *collegia*, as well as the potential economic advantages for a *collegiatus*. Ilias Arnaoutoglou, for example, notes the potential that *collegia* held for expanding both their members’ social and professional networks, while Nicolas Tran examines a set of *collegia* that seem very likely to have been informally relied upon by the state, thanks to their pre-existing connections and relationships.\(^\text{174}\) Cameron Hawkins’ (2006) thesis was partly focused on examining the ways in which *collegia* acted as Private Order Enforcement Networks for their members, in which he argues that the (informal) institution of ‘reputation’ would have tightly controlled the actions of members.\(^\text{175}\)

Consider, for example, the *collegium* of ivory workers and citron-wood dealers and the ways in which it might have eased transaction costs for the whole group. Very little is known about the *citriarii* to whom the inscription refers, although their name suggests that they either dealt in or worked with citrus wood. A brief mention in Pliny’s *Naturalis Historia* makes clear that furniture made out of this material became very fashionable in Rome during the imperial age and notes, for instance, that Cicero had owned a table “which cost him ten thousand sesterces.”\(^\text{176}\) Their joining with the *eborarii* (‘ivory workers’), then, is

\(^{173}\) Cf. for example, *CIL* 6.33885; 14.2112.

\(^{174}\) Arnaoutoglou (2011: 269); Tran (2011: 211).

\(^{175}\) Hawkins (2006).

\(^{176}\) Pliny, *NH*, 13.92.
appropriate. Ivory was an extremely popular material that was also used for furniture (as well as writing tablets, instruments, weaponry, combs, dice, etc.). Barnett suggests that the formation of a joint collegium between the two types of craftsman indicates that they were “not strong or numerous enough to stand on their own”, although there is little evidence for this. Rather, I would argue that the most logical reasons for such an alliance would have been entirely professional, including ruling out competition, sharing resources, expanding clientele, etc.

There is a strong emphasis on the chain of command and potential sanctions for not following it. The role of the curatores, in particular, is well outlined and their position as subordinate to the quinquennalis, to whom they report on their duties, is very clear. As a single entity, the collegium owned at least one property, run by the committee of four curatores, and exercised a system of strict control over admission. In this way, the collegium ensured that it had “closure”, whereby the members were linked by a common cause and their place within the association relied upon their honesty and on following the rules, which Broekaert emphasises was key to the way in which collegia could foster good business practice. The admission costs would also reinforce the exclusive nature of the collegium from an internal point of view, while the membership requirements ensured the “professional integrity” of all members, invaluable for both clients and merchants alike.

The meals of the collegium were carefully prescribed and, whenever they attended a dinner, members would never receive less than three denarii, besides enjoying the food and wine. By holding regular feasts and giving gifts, as well as

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177 Barnett (1982: 69) notes, for example, that Seneca was reported to have owned 500 tables made from ivory. Barnett also notes that the title eborarius replaced the previous eboris faber from about the 2nd Century AD, suggesting the growing prominence of the trade.

178 Barnett (1982: 70). The collegium of Jupiter Cernenis (ILS 7215a, cf. chapter 1) does perhaps suggest that there was a minimum size for a collegium to be practical but the eborarii et citriarii were, after all, based in Rome, where there was presumably no great shortage of traders.


180 Broekaert (2011: 228).

181 See Chapter 1.5 (CIL 14.2112) for discussion of the way in which such feasts could act as status markers, especially when made public through an inscription. Over the course of the year,
allowing for other shared activities such as group worship or burial, the collegium would help to foster “multiplex relationships”, adding further strength and trust to the individual relationships of members. In sum, according to an institutional model, a collegium such as this would have acted as a trust network, providing members with a framework in which they could securely gather information, share resources and even source opportunities, thus reducing their overall transaction costs. This is not to say that such collegia were founded specifically in order to pursue an economic function but rather that the institutional constraints upon the associations would have made them remarkably efficient actors within the economy. Their founding purpose is largely immaterial; what truly matters is the extent to which the collegia had an economic impact, alongside their other activities.

4. The Way Forward

There are, of course, inevitable issues with this (growing) body of work and I will use this final section to draw out some of these and to suggest some next steps. In particular, there is a distinct lack of conclusive research, beyond isolated examples of collegia. Both Arnaoutoglou and Tran centred their research on specific examples, which, one could certainly suggest, were particularly well suited to their arguments, and did not really extend their discussion beyond those data, thus keeping their ultimate conclusions rather specific. Broekaert and Hawkins each look at collegia with a much wider lens, considering examples from around the empire. Both, however, are forced to draw upon a great deal of comparative evidence (from mediaeval guilds in particular) and some examples from Egyptian papyri, with little justification or discussion of the problems inherent to this (cf. chapter 5).

In the introductory paper to the 2011 volume, Verboven rightly points out that these issues impose severe restrictions upon each of the 2011 papers (as well as members received bonuses of at least 24 denarii, suggesting that it was a thriving and financially secure association.

183 On the importance of not seeing institutions as conscious “solutions” to problems of market development, see Ogilvie (2007: 50-51). Rather than driving the development of collegia, institutions were the result of natural human behavior within social networks.
on the work of Hawkins and others who approach *collegia* in this way). As I have already pointed out, within the context of modern scholarship, Broekaert and Verboven’s comparisons of *collegia* to guilds are unhelpful, albeit justified to a certain extent; the observations that we can make from comparative studies are not necessarily reduced by accepting that the two phenomena were not identical but rather that they shared some vital features. The use of papyri to speak for the wider empire is also very problematic, at least without proper justification.184 This is a frustrating problem in the study of *collegia*, as, while it is of course important to be wary of using papyri too freely, the vast majority of our other evidence is epigraphic (and therefore, usually, monumental), which often does not provide the level of detail or even the types of records that are visible in the tax-receipts and contracts of papyri. A vital next step, as I see it then, is for a study to draw together the papyrological and epigraphic material relevant to this topic and to analyse how far they can be compared and, particularly, how far (if at all) papyri can be used to ‘speak’ for *collegia* in the rest of the Roman Empire, besides Egypt.

Beyond the problems with the limited source material, I would also suggest that there are some aspects of NIE theory that have been left unexplored or ignored in these papers, which, incidentally, is indicative of precisely the “inductive bias” warned against by Verboven.185 Patron-client networks (clientelism), for example, are based on agreements made between people of wealth, status or power (patrons) and people without one or all of these attributes but something to offer their patrons nevertheless (clients). Besides whatever formal agreement may exist between them, both patrons and clients are also subject to informal institutions that affect their behaviour, as both have something to gain from the relationship and something to lose if it is unsuccessful. The potential of this aspect of NIE theory to be applied to the Roman economy in general is obvious, considering the system of reciprocity inherent to the Roman economy. The *collegia* themselves are well known to act as the collective ‘clients’ to a single wealthy patron. Moreover, the importance of patrons’ impact upon their client *collegia* is very

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184 Cf. Verboven (2011: 190). As well as those mentioned above, Matthew Gibbs provided an excellent paper for the 2011 volume, which demonstrated similar and further aspects of associations in line with an NIE approach, although unfortunately his conclusions are restricted to Roman Egypt.

easily demonstrable in both the epigraphic and papyrological material.\textsuperscript{186} I would also argue that the theory of clientelism is even apparent within the structures of \textit{collegia} themselves, as they are well-known to hold a strictly hierarchical structure and there is therefore every opportunity to improve one’s outlook by ‘networking’ with other members of the same profession but at a higher position within the \textit{collegium}.

Finally, it is also worth drawing attention to the fact that studies that have so far taken an institutional approach to \textit{collegia} have focused entirely on “professional” associations (distinguishable, ostensibly, from “non-professional” associations, which might be religious, social and/or burial clubs but not obviously “professional” in their membership). I would argue that this demonstrates another way in which previous scholars have taken a somewhat inductive approach, as the most central tenet of NIE is that \textit{all} institutions matter economically, and, professional or not, these \textit{collegia} are certainly organisations made up of very similar institutions to their professional counterparts. Moreover, it is worth saying that it is absolutely not clear that such associations were not professional, only that this is not how they chose to identify themselves as a \textit{collegium}. Indeed, as I have discussed at length elsewhere and Jinyu Liu (2008) has also made abundantly clear, they clearly did engage in some sort of economic activity, both internally and externally, as evidence demonstrates that many of these so-called “non-professional” associations were able to function only thanks to the endowments they received from patrons and the interest that they ‘collected’ on those endowments.

In sum, it is very clear indeed that there is more than enough suggestive evidence to justify a much larger study of \textit{collegia} from an NIE perspective. However, it is also clear that it is absolutely vital that historians engaging in such research do so fully-armed with an understanding of NIE and other economic theory beyond that which can be immediately applied to \textit{collegia}, and that such research should not cherry-pick aspects of NIE but work within all aspects of the model, including

\textsuperscript{186} See, for example, Liu (2008: \textit{passim}) on the endowments given by wealthy patrons to \textit{collegia}.

\textsuperscript{187} It should be noted that this aspect of clientelism and ‘network’ theory is touched upon by Arnaoutoglou (2011).
clientelism and the fundamental premise that *all* institutions are important. Nevertheless, despite the potential of modern theory such as NIE to better our understanding of *collegia*, economic analyses of the associations remain frustratingly theoretical, thanks to the state of the evidence available. To combat this, it is necessary to examine more data in a holistic way and especially to make use of those areas where the evidence is better preserved or where there are different types of evidence to work with (Egypt), although of course this must also be properly justified.
CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDIES FROM OSTIA

This section of the thesis will develop upon the theoretical framework established in the previous chapter, wherein I discussed the merits of applying modern economic theory (namely NIE) to the historical study of *collegia* and especially to the developing research on their overall function and activities. In particular, this chapter will consist of a fresh analysis of Ostian *collegia*, with a particular focus on the extent to which they were economic actors and whether their economic role was based upon informal, organic institutions or upon more formal, constructed institutions, such as legislation. More widely, it will also examine the civic role of the *collegia* that existed in Ostia in the early centuries AD, in terms of their status, activities, overall function and membership. This latter question is especially important, as the previous chapters have stressed the importance of viewing the *collegia* in the context of their local setting and recognising that the social status of any individual or group and its ability to affect the economy are intrinsically linked. Moreover, despite my own reluctance to continue the “typology” debate surrounding *collegia*, it is necessary to emphasise what they were not – that is, religious, social or burial associations – in order to argue effectively what they were – that is, common-objective-enhancing associations.

The town of Ostia is rarely described in documentary sources. Strabo makes only passing reference in book 5 of his *Geographica*, noting its distance from Rome (190 *stadia* - c.19 km) and the perils for ships trying to enter the mouth of the Tiber with its dangerous currents and winds. Suetonius also refers to Ostia occasionally in terms of the exploits of Emperor Claudius and others, focusing in particular on the harbour that Claudius built there in the 1st century AD, as well as Nero’s additions. Where the town does appear in ancient sources, it is in its important role as a natural and then constructed harbour for the Tiber. These brief descriptions actually sum up the town fairly well, emphasising that its main activity was as a port to receive grain and some other goods for Rome, which could then be ferried 20 miles or so up the river to the city. On the map, Ostia

188 Strabo, *Geographica*, 5.3.5.
189 Suetonius, *Claudius*, 20.1; *Nero*, 31.3.
appears only as a satellite of Rome and it is clear that as a town, it grew primarily out of its usefulness to the city, rather than as any kind of independent commercial centre in its own right.

With this in mind, it is worth briefly justifying this chapter’s focus on Ostia, rather than on Rome, for instance, which might seem the more straightforward choice. Primarily, the very high standard of preservation of archaeological evidence at Ostia, matched only by Pompeii and Herculaneum in Italy, provides unique opportunities to study the physical landscape of the town, as well as what is written about it. In examining collegia, we benefit from a very large set of relevant epigraphic data but also from a great deal of other archaeological material, including several buildings that clearly belonged to individual associations or were otherwise devoted to their use. This allows historians far more rein to compare what they might infer from the epigraphic data with what can be actually permitted by the physical settings in which the collegia acted.

Moreover, although Ostia was also an important port during the republic, it became something of a boomtown in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, leading to a concentration of evidence from this period. The swift expansion of the Roman Empire and the addition of Claudius’ harbour and the Portus Traiani (established in AD 113) meant that the town thrived, only to begin a sharp decline in the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries, as more and more traffic made use of the new infrastructure at Portus and began to bypass Ostia altogether.¹⁹¹ The swift decline (at least in epigraphic material) was a gift to modern scholarship, as the material evidence from the town, including both the buildings and the epigraphy, is far more dateable than it is elsewhere. The importance of having this fairly isolated sample cannot be overstated, as the lack of certain dates for many inscriptions can often undermine analyses.

The second reason for focusing on Ostia is the sheer prevalence of collegia within the town; despite some peculiarities, it is very clear that many, if not all of the associations were an integral part of the local economy. In this respect, Ostia is far more interesting than its better preserved rival Pompeii, where certain evidence

¹⁹¹ See, however, Boin (2013: Chapter 3) and n.200 below, challenging the notion of an overall decline.
for *collegia* is remarkably thin.\(^{192}\) This abundance of material, most of which can
be fairly well dated to at least a particular century, makes Ostia an excellent place
for the kind of micro-analytical study discussed at the end of the previous chapter.
Indeed it is remarkable that more work has not been done in this area. Since
Meiggs’ seminal work in the sixties, very little has been done towards establishing
a more complete picture of the *collegia* in terms of their daily contribution to
Ostian life and, though his *Roman Ostia* remains the most useful tool available, it
is surely in need of an update in the face of recent debates, not least regarding the
‘guild’ status of the *collegia*, which I have already discussed at length.\(^{193}\)

Perhaps uncertainty about the typicality of Ostia as a Roman town, particularly in
terms of its economy, has limited the research in this area. As a town that was
seemingly so focused on supplying Rome, it is easy to dismiss the Ostian
professional landscape as exceptional and the *collegia* that operated within it as
therefore distinctly atypical.\(^{194}\) A general reluctance to contradict the by-now-
familiar “no guilds” statement of Finley might also have affected this trend.\(^{195}\)
And indeed this is not an entirely unjustified position to take when regarding
Ostia. It is certainly clear that it was an extraordinary centre of commerce and it is
also true that the *collegia* that operated there exhibit some features that seem
atypical in comparison to others. However, I would argue that dismissing the
town as atypical, based on its extraordinary ‘boomtown’ success, is a fairly
limited way of approaching the evidence. As other scholars have noted, assessing
the realities behind the evidence often requires a micro-analytical approach and it
is only by considering the evidence at Ostia in this way that we will truly ascertain

\(^{192}\) Liu (2008: *passim*).

\(^{193}\) Indeed, considering the enormous bulk of scholarship focused on Pompeii, there has been
remarkably little attention paid to Ostia more generally: Meiggs (1973) remains the best general
work about the town and his chapter (14, pp. 311-336: The Guilds) regarding *collegia* provides an
Guilds of Ostia) provides some useful further detail on some of the individual *scholae* (called
“seats” by Hermansen) although a good deal of relevant evidence was clearly not available at this
point. For larger works on specific aspects of *collegia*, including sections on Ostia, we have to
look back to Waltzing (1895-1900) and de Robertis (1973) and to more recent works focusing
specifically on membership, such as Royden (1988) and Tran (2006).

\(^{194}\) Sirks (1991); Rickman (1980); Tran (2006).

\(^{195}\) Finley (1999: 138). See also Chapter 2.2, above.
its typicality. Certainly, the town of Ostia has many features that are very
typical indeed of the Roman town, including its own forum, baths, theatre and
temples, as well a familiar system of government, made up of elected magistrates
and a town council; I would argue that the institutions of the town, including the
collegia, were probably also fairly typical.

Moreover, even if one does argue that Ostia is unrepresentative of other Roman
towns, which I would reject, it is still worth analysing in detail in order to pin
down what makes its economy unusual and the professional activity of the
collegia so prevalent. Finally, I have previously discussed the inherent problems
of “cherry-picking” the best data and using it to form conclusions about collegia
or any other aspect of society for that matter; despite the fact that these
inscriptions yield little of the detail found in the Lanuvian inscription, or that the
kind of financial information given by the urinatores et piscatores is almost
entirely lacking, they do represent an isolated and well-defined sample, through
which it is possible to examine the civic role of the collegium and the benefits of
applying modern economic theory to a large group, rather than to specific
examples that most suit the theory.

1. Existing Scholarship

In reviewing Meiggs’ (1960) first edition of Roman Ostia in 1962, Walker noted
that “The completeness of this book is impressive; but it seriously disappoints
one’s hopes of a genuine piece of social history”; she adds that the work leaves
the impression of an “indefatigable” scholar, who has “failed to apply any method
of critical evaluation to the study of his material.” Walker’s review is more than
a little unfair. Roman Ostia remains entirely indispensable to a study on any
aspect of the city and, although undoubtedly ambitious in its scope, it does
provide the reader with useful background and an excellent sense of the way in
which the city functioned. Meiggs’ analyses are occasionally a little circular, such

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197 Meiggs (1973: 134). Cf. also Chapter 3.2, below, for further discussion of the typicality of
Ostia and its collegia.
198 Walker (1962: 110). Cf. for the grain trade in particular, Sirks (1991); Rickman (1980); Tran
(2008). For works looking at more specific trades that focus or touch on Ostia, cf. DeLaine (2003);
Tran (2008); Liu (2009); Flohr (2013).
as his use of Portus as an explanation for both the boom and the bust of Ostia (for discussion of which see below), but this is a problem that is easily forgiven in light of Meiggs’ extremely wide and valuable overview of the town, combined with useful detail on its institutions. Walker’s core issue seems to focus on Meiggs’ lack of deep sociological analysis, which is mostly a product of its time. Certainly however, by the standards of modern scholarship, Meiggs’ chapter on collegia or, as he styles them, “guilds”, can be considered no more than an introduction to the associations of the town and moreover one that could be applied to the collegia of almost anywhere, in that his main points of observation are regarding their internal structure or specific examples of patronage, rather than really examining the individual collegia. Finley does not take aim at any particular scholar but his “no guilds” argument, published only a few years after Meiggs, stands in direct contrast to Meiggs’ treatment of the collegia and it is remarkable that, given the way in which this question has pervaded the scholarship, nobody has yet sought to provide a holistic reanalysis of the Ostian collegia and their civic or economic role.

Hermansen (1982) gives another useful overview of the collegia, with a particular focus on the buildings that have been associated with them, but with no more than a cursory description of the collegia that he discusses, which themselves are few. Royden (1988) provides an undoubtedly useful tool for researchers by documenting all of the magistrates of collegia in both Rome and Ostia, although his work lacks close analysis of the collegia themselves or discussion of his findings. More recently, Tran (2008) develops considerably on the more prosopographical elements of Royden, analysing the membership of collegia at Ostia and elsewhere with a very strong focus on the social prestige and civic integration that membership could offer. Stöger (2008; 2011) adds discussion of the urban space at Ostia and particularly fascinating spatial analysis of the scholae and other buildings of the collegia, some of which had been previously identified by Bollmann (1988). The ongoing ‘Portus Project’, led by Keay, also continues to yield fascinating insights into the workings of the harbour and the wider town (see esp. Keay et al. 2012).

These works pale (in number only) in comparison to the vast collection of scholarship that has been devoted to Pompeii and yet together they represent an immense contribution to the scholarship on Ostia.\textsuperscript{200} In spite of all this, however, there remains no reanalysis of the Ostian collegia and their economic or civic interaction with the city, especially in light of more recent economic theory. Particular aspects of the economy, such as the grain trade (Rickman, 1980; Sirks, 1991; Tran, 2006) or building works (Delaine, 2003), have received more attention but in isolation from each other. The following discussion will thus present a reanalysis of the Ostian collegia, a response to both Meiggs and Finley.

2. The Town

For most of the republic, Ostia was little more than a small fort, protecting the coastline and facilitating some trade into Rome.\textsuperscript{201} In the late republic and early empire, however, it became an important harbour in its own right, as the growing population of Rome led to massive demand that could not be dealt with by Puteoli alone.\textsuperscript{202} The city underwent repeated rebuilding during the first centuries BC and AD, especially from the reign of Augustus. Augustus added temples and a theatre and, notably for this study, a large colonnaded complex behind the theatre, now known as the Piazzale delle Corporazioni. Improvements included baths and an enlarged forum, as well as many horrea, and of course the construction of the new harbour under Claudius and its substantial enlargement into the Portus Traiani in the 2nd century.\textsuperscript{203} Particularly striking in these developments is the balance between industrial/professional improvements and those that were provided for leisure; it is very clear that we should not think of Ostia only as an industrial hub

\textsuperscript{200} For a much more recent examination of Ostia in late antiquity, see also Boin (2013). Boin’s overall focus is on religion and he touches on the collegia very little but his overall emphasis on approaching the evidence in a holistic way, drawing upon archaeological and sociological methods, is, it seems to me, exactly right. The usefulness of Boin’s discussion for this thesis is particularly in his third chapter, where he examines and challenges the narrative of third-century crisis and decline in the town, noting that the reduction in epigraphic material does not necessarily indicate a decline (see esp. pp. 86-89).

\textsuperscript{201} Meiggs (1973: 23).

\textsuperscript{202} Keay (2012: 41); Meiggs (1973: 29). Puteoli did import goods from the Greek East and Egypt but was much better placed to supply Southern Italy.

\textsuperscript{203} Keay (2012: 41).
for Rome, although it undoubtedly was that, but also as a thriving town in its own right.

The Trajanic port, established in c.113, finally began to capture more of the trade that had been bound for Puteoli, as it provided what even the Claudian harbour had not, a harbour protected from the sea and direct, safe access to Rome.\textsuperscript{204} As a result of this, according to Meiggs, the economic prosperity of Ostia reached a new peak by the early second century, as traders and merchants flocked to the town. There is some uncertainty about this point however, as well as about the following decline; as Heinzelmann points out, the Trajanic port should really have damaged the prosperity of Ostia, rather than enhanced it.\textsuperscript{205} There are some signs of this, as the constant rebuilding to allow for the growing population slowed dramatically in the latter half of the second century, and yet some large projects continued, as a reconstructed and enlarged theatre was dedicated in 196, while the activity of the \textit{collegia} was higher than ever before.\textsuperscript{206} It was not until the 3rd century that, ostensibly under the weight of imperial crises and the growth of Portus, Ostia the harbour-town is thought to have collapsed and became little more than a seaside retreat, although even this perception may be a result of changing evidence, rather than a true reflection of reality.\textsuperscript{207}

It is debatable how far Portus could truly have sparked both Ostia’s second-century boom and its almost immediate (yet limited in some respects) decline, as Meiggs seems to suggest.\textsuperscript{208} The continued prevalence of the \textit{collegia} at Ostia within this transitional period is particularly striking, as one would surely imagine that groups based around a single profession would be the first to move to Portus, rather than being if anything the most consistent feature of the town. Meiggs’ suggestion was that the harbour at Ostia must have remained in constant use by

\textsuperscript{204} Cf. Tacitus, \textit{Annals}, 15.18, who mentions that in AD 62, two hundred corn ships docked in the Claudian harbour were destroyed during a storm. For discussion on the date of the establishment of Portus, cf. Keay (2012: 59, n.61).

\textsuperscript{205} Heinzelmann (2010: 7) notes that the new harbour included direct access to Rome by means of two canals onto the Tiber, which should have effectively led to Ostia being bypassed altogether.

\textsuperscript{206} Meiggs (1973: 78). Cf. also, p. 64: the floor level was raised by about a metre during the first and second centuries as part of the building work that took place. This slowed after the mid-second century.

\textsuperscript{207} Meiggs (1973: 84-5). See also Boin’s (2013: 87) rejection of the town’s decline.

\textsuperscript{208} Meiggs (1973: 59, 86-7, 278-85).
smaller vessels, hoping to avoid the traffic at Portus, and that this must have continued until changes in water flow, prompted by the new canals, led to silt piles at the river mouth that made it impassable, presumably in the third century. This makes sense but is conjecture only and does not explain in particular why collegia such as the mensores remained so active in Ostia, as they surely would have dealt mainly with the large grain ships at Portus. Heinzelmann’s proposal that we ought to distinguish between goods is intriguing; he argues that Portus quickly became very much the focus of goods bound for Rome and controlled by the annona but that Ostia remained an important marketplace in its own right and perhaps even acted as an intermediate “market hub” for provincial merchants and traders. This is complicated by the fact that the mensores are explicitly and repeatedly linked to the frumentatio, which usually refers to the discounted grain for Rome, and yet they clearly remained active at Ostia. Perhaps the key question here is in the debate over when and how much the mensores and other collegia were brought under imperial control. The continuing prevalence of the collegia at Ostia during the second and third centuries would seem to suggest that they continued to act privately in the marketplace at Ostia, while also providing for the annona in exchange for various privileges.

More recently, Keay has noted that the sheer number and size of the warehouses at Ostia have led to the assumption that these were mainly used for the supply of Rome by providing grain storage. However, he argues, “there are grounds for suggesting that some warehouses, such as the Horrea Epagathiana et Epaphroditiana, might have held other unspecified commodities, or combinations...”

210 The concentration of horrea at Portus makes it clear that the grain trade was largely based there.
211 Heinzelmann (2010: 6-8) argues, based on “small world theory”, that the continued boom in the economy at Ostia – despite the large infrastructure available at Portus, which he argues should have had a negative impact on Ostia and hastened rather than delayed its decline – was because Ostia operated as an intermediate trade centre between cities. This is based on conjecture only but is interesting, particularly as it offers an explanation for the very different types of horrea found at Ostia and Portus, for which cf. also, Rickman (1971: 15-86). This might also help explain why the collegia at Ostia were so prevalent. Cf. also “Ostia Antica 6.2” which notes that “not all roads led to Rome” [http://www.ostia-antica.org/med/med.htm#62 – Date Accessed: 28/07/2016].
212 Cf. below, Chapter 3.6.iii.
of goods.”²¹³ Considering the large number of warehouses at Portus and along the Tiber within Rome, as well as the direct passage between the two, it is difficult to see much reason for grain being stored at Ostia (effectively a large detour) beyond the establishment of the Trajanic port, unless it was meant for Ostia itself. Keay’s suggestion is that, after the establishment of Portus, the warehouses at Ostia were mostly filled with goods for Ostia (including both grain and other goods), rather than Rome, either to be used or traded there; he argues that the continued activity of *collegia* in the town was likely because their members lived in the town and were based there for most of the year. According to this narrative, the *mensores* and any other *collegia* that had need to would commute to Portus to work as and when needed.²¹⁴ This is more convincing but is still problematic, particularly as the evidence from Ostia indicates that the *collegia* often did conduct their business, both practical and administrative, in the town. This anomaly will be discussed in reference to specific associations below but it is worth emphasising at this point that, despite often receiving the blame for Ostia’s decline, Portus actually had far more to do with its economic success, rather than its downfall. For the reasons behind Ostia’s supposed decline, we might far better look to the wider crises of the third century.²¹⁵

3. Evidence

There is evidence for around 60 different *collegia* at Ostia, the vast majority of which comes from inscriptions. Many of these are called *corpora*, rather than *collegia*, as mentioned in chapter one, but there is little if any distinction between the terms in practice.²¹⁶ As mentioned in the first chapter, Liu’s excellent discussion of the *collegia* at Pompeii notes that, lacking a pre-articulated definition, we can loosely define a *collegium* as an organisation with three or more members; “structural features”, such as magistracies or a common treasury; and some form of patronage.²¹⁷ Of course, we should not necessarily expect to see all of these features exhibited in any given inscription recorded by a *collegium* but

²¹⁵ See n.200, above.
²¹⁶ See above, Chapter 1.1.
²¹⁷ Liu (2005: 53-54); cf. also Digest 50.16.85 (Marcellus) and Chapter 1.1, n.44.
it is striking that they do all appear in so many of the inscriptions of Ostian corpora.\textsuperscript{218} On this basis and despite the vagaries of terminology, it is clearly right to consider these associations as synonymous with the other collegia of Roman Italy.

Hermansen provides a useful list of more than eighty Ostian inscriptions that specifically relate to the collegia, in that they either were set up by or refer to them. Royden’s database of magistrates included most of Hermansen’s inscriptions and many others, while several also remain unconsidered, either due to more recent publication or because they did not fit the parameters of those studies. For the purposes of this study, I began by using the list provided by Hermansen in order to gain an overview of the collegia in the town and to identify those that were most prominent or active economically. I supplemented these with evidence from Royden’s sample and from the CIL. From this sample, it is very clear indeed that the vast majority of the Ostian collegia were at least nominally professional, covering almost every aspect of trade and commerce, although a small number are bound to a particular cult or a deity. In order to provide a holistic discussion of the associations whilst avoiding too much repetition, I consider the civic and economic role that they played within particular trades or within other aspects of the town by focusing on each of these in turn. Wherever possible, I have added to the epigraphic data used by Royden and Hermansen.

The dating of inscriptions is notoriously difficult and inconsistent but more straightforward in Ostia than in most areas, as several factors help to give reasonably secure dates for the material we use. Some inscriptions give a date, which can help to identify others, especially if they consist of dedications to people who are mentioned elsewhere. This is not uncommon at Ostia, as we shall see, and in particular the inscriptions and alba of the fabri tignuarii (a collegium which we know to have been established in the mid-1\textsuperscript{st} century) and of the lenuncularii are often dated by lustrum.\textsuperscript{219} Other clues are given by the buildings and the scholae of the collegia, many of which can be clearly identified and dated according to their brick stamps, or to other prosopographical details, such as the

\textsuperscript{218} Cf. for example, CIL 14.303, 14.309, 14.409, 14.4648.

mention of a particular political office or member of the *Augustales* that can only belong to the period of the Principate. 220 There remain some mysteries but the first-century rebuilding and third century decline in *collegia* activity mean that we can usually be fairly confident that such examples are likely to be from the mid-1st to mid-3rd centuries AD.

Besides the inscriptions, there are also buildings that have been identified as *scholae* for various *collegia*. According to Stöger, there are at least eighteen buildings that have been archaeologically identified, based on either *in situ* inscriptions or the nearby decoration or iconography. 221 In some cases, such as the temple and the *horreum* of the *mensores*, they are identifiable mainly because of their proximity either within or immediately adjacent to another *collegium* complex. Studies such as Bollmann (1988) and Stöger (2011), which emphasise the importance of archaeological material for providing insights to the self-representation of the *collegia*, as well as their position within the “civic and urban context”, are fundamental to this area of research. 222 Beyond the status implications, such material can also give indications about the size of the *collegia*, their activities and the way in which they conducted their business.

4. Legal Material

In terms of the legislation that was directly and definitively aimed at *collegia* in Ostia, there is very little extant. That said, there are several issues regarding the legal position of the Ostian *collegia* and particularly the way in which this changed over time that are worth remarking upon. The first chapter of this thesis has already considered Rome’s legislation at length and it is not the purpose of this section to repeat what has been established but rather to point towards the more relevant legislation for Ostia. Legal status is particularly salient to this discussion because it has a bearing on whether the *collegia* at Ostia can be considered representative of the wider empire. If one believes that the *collegia* at Ostia were public (that is, state-controlled) institutions from their very foundation,

222 As Stöger (2011: 231-2) points out, “Size and form of the buildings often correspond to physical expressions of economic and social standing and might betray a link to the status of the guild and their members.”
then this would certainly call into question the extent to which they can be compared to other collegia from Rome and further afield.

It is very clear from the legislation that does survive that many collegia in Ostia and the wider empire were brought under state control during the fourth century AD, especially if they were involved in any way with the annonae. According to the Codex Theodosianus, Emperors Valentinian and Valens ruled in 364 that anything imported ad portum urbis aeternae (i.e. at Portus) ought to be “transported by the porters themselves (per ipsos saccarios), or by those persons who desire to unite with this corpus.” Further legislation in 408 points to the various privileges and benefits that corpora could receive: some oil should be “retained from each sextarius and distributed to the benefit of certain orders (ad certorum ordinum commodum)” and that “this measure is established as a fixed benefit (certum solacium) for the corpora designated (corporibus designatis) by your recommendation.” Finally, further legislation from 364 makes it clear that the privileges given to collegia in 408 were not unprecedented as it confirms the privileges of any in Rome that have been “granted either by the provisions of ancient laws or by the humanitas of previous emperors.”

What is less clear is for how long the collegia, particularly those at Ostia, had received this kind of state support. The jurist Paul writes that the “mensores frumentarios habere ius excusationis appareat ex rescripto divorum Marci et Commodi, quod rescripserunt praefecto annonae” indicating that the collegium received excusatio from at least as early as AD 180. There is no specific mention of the corpus mensorum in this case but, considering the vastness of the grain industry it is difficult to imagine how the individual mensores might have claimed excusatio without the organising structure of the collegium to prove their connection with the trade. Sirks argues that the connection with the annonae mentioned here is suggestive of the collegium being directly instituted by the state, perhaps as part of a greater reorganisation of imperial imports, although this

223 CTh, 14.22.1 (Pharr’s translation, adapted).
224 CTh, 14.17.15 (Pharr’s translation, adapted).
225 CTh, 14.2.1 (Pharr’s translation, adapted).
226 Digest, 27.1.26.
227 See below, Chapter 3.6.iii.
is evidenced only by the fact that testimony for the *mensores* does not appear before c.100 AD. Sirks’ lack of evidence, I would argue that the *collegium* was simply recognised under Marcus and Commodus as the easiest way to help regulate the *annona*, mainly by virtue of the fact that it had already successfully provided this service for decades, as will be demonstrated below. Considering Trajan’s pessimistic response to Pliny’s request to allow bodies of firemen to form, it seems fairly unlikely that he would have chosen to found a *collegium* of his own in response to the needs of the *annona*.

5. Methodological Issues

It is worth emphasising at this point that the data themselves do not provide direct quantitative information; the nature of the evidence (i.e. monumental) means that there is very little in the way of actual numbers or other transactional information, although there is a limited amount on the costs of membership and *sportulae*. This kind of evidence is far more visible in the papyri from Egypt and will be discussed in the following section. Rather, the data from Ostia are mostly qualitative, consisting mainly of dedications among and to members of the *collegia* and of the town. Analyses are based on reading the texts and drawing inferences from them regarding the activities and civic role of the *collegia*. More sophisticated analyses are available, based on prosopographical methods, but the qualitative data are particularly worth examining in detail, especially in Ostia, as they demonstrate the extent to which the *collegia* were very much a part of the economic context of the town. This is in line with the methods suggested by Giardina and, more recently, Rives, who note that many studies are overly “schematic” and who instead advocate a micro-analytical and exhaustive

228 Sirks (1991: 263). This is not Sirks’ only line of argument for a connection with the *annona*, which is not debated, but it is the only real foundation for his suggestion that the *mensores* were “instituted” by the state.
229 Cf. also Rougé (1966: 186), supporting this view.
231 Discussion has been given earlier in the thesis regarding this kind of quantitative data, in examining the internal finances of some *collegia*.
approach to the epigraphic evidence in order to glean an understanding of the realities behind it.\textsuperscript{232}

Accordingly, the inscriptions that are considered in this section have not been chosen for their financial information, which in any case would only be useful for discussing their internal financial situation, or indeed for any reason other than their connection to the \textit{collegia}. The analyses do not deal with individual transactions but with any element that might be considered to contribute to institutional easing of economic goals whether for individual members or for the \textit{collegia} as a whole. As a result, a good deal of the analysis is based on theory and on inference and, as discussed in the previous chapter, this represents the major flaw with using modern economic theory. NIE is a useful framework to point out the ways in which Roman \textit{collegia} must have affected the economy or other aspects of the urban context but the nature of the evidence is such that it will never yield the direct, transactional examples of it actually taking place - for that we are forced to look elsewhere, namely to the papyri from Egypt.

A second issue with this study concerns the typicality of Ostia and of the \textit{collegia} in the context of the wider Roman Empire. Based on the view that Ostia was entirely driven by Roman needs, rather than functioning as a market economy in its own right, one could argue that its economic activity and the functions provided by the associations are unusual or even unique in Italy, let alone in the rest of the empire.\textsuperscript{233} Similarly, if one subscribes to the view that some Ostian \textit{collegia} were directly established by the state and acted only as private contractors, then it follows that analyses drawn from here could not be readily applied to \textit{collegia} from elsewhere.\textsuperscript{234} However, it is already clear that these assumptions are misinformed; Ostia’s continued economic success even after the establishment of Portus demonstrates that it must have acted as an independent market, albeit as one that also interacted significantly with Rome. As for the \textit{collegia} themselves, their typicality is obvious in the number of structural similarities that they share with those from elsewhere. Moreover, although there

\textsuperscript{232} Rives (2001: 132); Giardina (1977). Giardina is writing in particular about later antiquity but his argument can be equally applied here.
\textsuperscript{233} Cf. for example, Tran (2006); Temin (2013).
\textsuperscript{234} Sirks (1991: 262-263).
are certainly indications that some of the collegia acted on behalf of the state, this is not unexpected. It is well established that collegia were drawn under closer public control in the later empire – although Sirks’ argument that the mensores were specifically founded by and for the benefit of the state clearly lacks foundation.\footnote{Cf. Sirks (1991: 262-263) and Chapter 3.4, above.} As Heinzelmann notes, the sheer prevalence of the collegia at Ostia should be attributed to the economic success of the town (itself an indication of their important role in the economy) and to the excellent state of preservation, rather than to any uniqueness of the town.\footnote{Heinzelmann (2010: 7). Cf. also Tran (2006: 414), who, though he expresses his doubts about Ostia’s typicality, does note that at the most it was a difference of degree, rather than distinctiveness.}

6. Corpus Mensorum Frumentariorum

In particular, it is worth beginning with the mensores, rather than some other collegium, for the following reasons: (i) as a group with fairly clear economic activity, which is well recognised by scholars, they provide an immediate example of the anti-Finleyan notion of economic associations, discussed previously; (ii) The mensores are one of the much better attested collegia from Ostia, with visible links to many of the other associations, which makes them particularly useful as a case study; (iii) The pan-Roman nature of the grain-trade, with which the mensores were primarily involved, allows us to compare the situation at Ostia with other areas; (iv) It is clear that, at some point at least, the association is formally recognised and regulated (or perhaps even instituted) by Roman law, which will provide stimulating areas of discussion around the topic of Neo-Institutionalism.

Unlike previous works, this chapter section’s primary focus is on understanding the mensores and the way in which the collegium itself actually operated, rather than on examining the entire grain trade and only touching upon the collegium where relevant.\footnote{Cf. Rickman (1980); Sirks (1991: 105).} I come to the economic role of the collegium only because of indicators that exist within the primary texts, which compel the reader to
understand their use.\textsuperscript{238} Where I do come to address the economy, my approach is more institutional than that of Sirks or Rickman, although perhaps no more so than Tran’s, in that I focus mainly on the ways in which the \textit{collegium} provided institutional easing of the agrarian trading process, through easing transaction costs, rather than arguing that they were formally regulated bodies before late antiquity.

For background purposes, I will begin with a brief overview of the grain trade, the requirements of Rome and Italy and the importance of Ostia as a hub. I will then discuss the \textit{mensores} and their (general, rather than economic) role within Ostia based on the collected evidence. This will be followed by some brief consideration of the \textit{mensores machinarii} at Rome and what the evidence of these \textit{collegia} can contribute to the picture of the Ostian \textit{mensores}. Finally, I will demonstrate the ways in which the \textit{collegium} affected the economy through its interaction with other \textit{collegia} and official bodies, before offering some conclusions.

(i) Grain

It is arguably something of a misnomer to speak of “the grain trade” in the early Roman Empire, as though it were a single, regulated and interconnected network of farmers, tradespeople and government officials, who between them produced and supplied all of the grain that was consumed throughout the empire. Rather, it is clear that supply was met in different ways throughout the empire that changed dramatically over time. It is perhaps more justified to use such terminology, however, when referring to the grain supply of Rome itself since, as the city grew during the principate and beyond, the need for regulation and assured supply to avoid food shortages increased with it.\textsuperscript{239} It is worth emphasising the scale of the operation, in order to fully appreciate the importance of the \textit{collegium mensorum}, discussed below.

\textsuperscript{238} Cf. for example, the unusual use of “\textit{rem publicam}” to refer to a similar \textit{collegium} in Rome, in \textit{CIL} 6.9626.

\textsuperscript{239} Cf. Sirks (1991: \textit{passim}).
The *cura annonae* (ensuring a sufficient amount of yearly grain for Rome) was the responsibility of the government throughout most of the republic. In 123 BC, the first *Lex Frumentaria* was enacted by Gaius Gracchus, instituting the heavily discounted sale of grain to Roman plebs for only 6 ⅓ asses per *modius*, or a little over half the market rate. Augustus reports that the number of people receiving grain hand outs (*plebs frumentaria*) ranged between 320,000 at the beginning of his reign and 200,000 by 2 BC.\(^{240}\) The total is debatable but it suffices to say that it was clearly an enormous amount, requiring vast imports from the more fertile plains of North Africa and Egypt.\(^{241}\) Beyond this undoubtedly huge operation, storage was also required on a massive scale. Rickman notes that today, grain stacked 2 metres high exerts a pressure of 12,000 kg per square metre on the floor that it sits on but that it also flows like a liquid and therefore can put enormous pressure against the walls, doors, or cargo hold, where it is being stored.\(^{242}\) It also ‘breathes’ oxygen and gives out carbon dioxide, heat and water, creating a breeding ground for bacteria, not to mention the problem of larger pests that this would lead to. Under Augustus, the *cura annonae* became the unenviable responsibility of an equestrian prefect, known as the *praefectus annonae*, who oversaw the collection of grain as a tax and its importation into Rome via the ports of Puteoli, Ostia and, later, *Portus Traiani*. This was done not through the use of public institutions but through privileges and exemptions from other duties that were granted to (likely already existing) private bodies, such as the *navicularii* and the *mensores*.\(^{243}\)

(ii) The *collegium*

Upon its arrival at Ostia, grain had to be carefully measured and stored, before being transported to Rome. The difficulty of minimising wastage and ensuring that buyers and sellers could be confident in both the quality and quantity of their goods required a common system of accurately measuring the grain. *Mensores* are therefore found throughout the Roman world, always on hand to check and weigh the goods at every change, including loading, unloading, land transport, storage,

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\(^{242}\) Rickman (1980: 261).  
At Ostia, the measurers of the public grain formed a *collegium*, similar in many ways to those that we have already discussed. The main evidence for this *collegium* (or *corpus*, as it is styled) comes from inscriptions found in Ostia, most of which can be approximately or specifically dated (ranging from c.100 – 250 AD), and from the *schola* of the *collegium*, known today as *La Aula e Tempio dei Mensores*, which is located near the Tiber on the northern side of the *Via della Foce*. This complex has been firmly confirmed as belonging to the *collegium* thanks to an inscription on a statue base set up there and referring to the *collegium*, as well as a mosaic depicting the *mensores* at work.

These dates are in line with what we know about Ostia at this time – already the most important harbour by the end of the republic, Ostia really began to flourish after 42 AD, when the Claudian harbour was built. It is clear that the town dealt with the vast majority of imports throughout the first century AD and that this continued until the late second or early third century. Accordingly, the *collegium* appears to have flourished during the second century and into at least the beginning of the third and its “guild seat”, as it has been called, demonstrates this particularly well. As mentioned above, one of the primary reasons for this chapter’s focus on Ostia is the opportunity that the town gives to examine the buildings of the *collegia* in conjunction with epigraphic evidence, in order to build a better picture of their activities and the kind of role they played within the town, which itself is central to the question of their economic activity. With this in mind, it is worth briefly describing the *schola* of the *mensores* and particularly what it can tell us about the *collegium*.

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244 Arnaud (2015: 7).
245 *Regio* I, xix, 1.3. It is worth mentioning that the relevant, recorded inscriptions refer to the *collegium* as a whole (*corpus mensorum frumentariorum*) but also to three subdivisions of *adiutores*, *accepores* and *nauticarii*, especially in those inscriptions from the late second century. This distinction of names (or duties) is discussed below, Chapter 3.6.iii, regarding the economy, so it is enough to say here that I am convinced (in accordance with Waltzing and Meiggs) that these three groups formed subdivisions of the same large *collegium*. Cf. for example, *CIL* 14.2, 14.154, 14.172, 14.289, 14.4140.
The aula (Figure 1: 3) is likely to have functioned as the central meeting hall for the collegium and was built in 112 AD, at roughly the same time as the large Horrea dei Mensores which was set behind the schola in Regio I, xix, 4 (Figure 2).\footnote{We can be quite specific about the date, thanks to Calza’s (1953: 125, 219, 235) analysis of the brick stamps.} It sat fairly prominently about half a metre above the surface of the street, accessible by a staircase from the road and completely open to view.\footnote{Stöger (2011: 235).} The rest of the complex was available through a more private door at the back of the room, which led to an L-shaped courtyard and passage from which one could access a range of smaller rooms (1), as well as a latrine and a second exit onto the road leading towards the harbour.\footnote{Stöger (2011: 236).} At some point a temple (most likely to Ceres, cf. below) was also added among the buildings (2), with a separate colonnaded entrance from the Via della Foce, while the impressive mosaic in the aula and the fountain-well in the courtyard can both be dated to the mid-third century.\footnote{Stöger (2011: 236): Ricciardi and Scrinari (1996).}

Figure 1: Aula dei Mensores\footnote{This and the image below, based on the Scavi di Ostia, are taken from the Ostia Antica website [http://www.ostia-antica.org/regio1/19/19-1.htm – Date accessed: 28/07/2016].}

The entire complex would have been dwarfed by the enormous warehouse (Figure 2) that sat behind it, which included a long courtyard flanked by huge rooms (12 metres wide). This had access to the street (through two ornamental entranceways placed immediately adjacent to the entrance of the Aula dei Mensores) and
directly to the Tiber, as well as a small entrance to the East, likely for the convenience of the *mensores*, to access it from the nearby clubhouse.

*Figure 2: Horrea dei Mensores*

For passers-by in Ostia, the overall impression must certainly have been of wealth and success when looking up from the street at the colonnaded temple and the staircase leading directly into the decorated *aula*, with the entrance to the warehouse just beyond. One could argue that the position of the seat itself does not immediately suggest a particularly high status within the town, located as it is on the far-western edge, rather than being near the centre or being represented amongst the mosaics of the *Piazzale delle Corporazioni*. Other *collegia*, such as the *collegium fabrum* (for which, see below) sought a more central location for reasons of status enhancement and proximity to trade centres but, as Stöger notes in the case of the *mensores*, their position is more likely for reasons of being near the Tiber and having sufficient space for the *horreum*, rather than a lack of prominence within the town. Indeed, the entire complex is in absolutely prime position for working with the grain imports, thanks to its direct access to the Tiber and fairly close proximity to the sea itself. Altogether, the layout, decoration and position of the *schola* and the *horrea* suggest a collegium with a reasonably high

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255 Regio I, xix, 1.3.
civic status and a reputation to uphold, as well as an emphasis on their more functional purpose.\textsuperscript{256}

The high status of the \textit{collegium} and its members is also evidenced by the inscriptions that refer to it and its association with important and wealthy people in the town. Sometime before 102 AD, the illustrious career of Gnaeus Sentius Felix is outlined on a dedication to him, set up by his adopted son, which details his role as patron of the measurers of public grain and also of a whole host of other associations, including both those linked to grain and not.\textsuperscript{257} Clearly a wealthy man, he was also a ranking member (i.e. a magistrate of the collegium) of the \textit{curatores navium marinarum}, a Decurion, a designated Duovir (for the following year) and, through the adoption of his son, a member of the \textit{Gamalae}, one of the more traditional and elite families of Ostia.\textsuperscript{258} Later, in 184 AD, the \textit{mensores} can be seen dedicating a statue to Q. Petronius Melior, who was the \textit{procurator annonae} in Ostia at that time, having already held other important roles.\textsuperscript{259} And in 209-211 there is another for Q. Acilius Fuscus, who is also \textit{procurator annonae, patronus Coloniae Ostiensis} and probable member of the \textit{Acilii}, another wealthy Ostian family.\textsuperscript{260}

The links to these men demonstrate the respectable standing of the \textit{collegium} (as well as its business activities), which also included wealthy men among its own membership, such as Q. Aeronius Antiochus, who was \textit{quinquennalis} of both the \textit{corpus mensorum} and the \textit{Augustales} in the late second century, making him a wealthy freedman.\textsuperscript{261} L. Calpurnius Chius was also \textit{quinquennalis} of the \textit{mensores} and (often highly ranked) member of several others, including the \textit{Augustales}.\textsuperscript{262} G. Caecilius Onesimus was \textit{quinquennalis} in perpetuity, as well as becoming

\textsuperscript{256} This also correlates well with Stöger’s (2011: 245) study, which uses special syntax theory to demonstrate that the rooms of the \textit{schola} are extremely suited to internal (business/private) interaction but not external interaction. Cf. Hermansen (1981: 74), who also notes the functionality of the buildings’ design.
\textsuperscript{257} \textit{CIL} 14.409 – \textit{patronus saccomariorum, lenunculariorum et dendrophorum et lictorum}.
\textsuperscript{258} Cf. Meiggs (1973: 502).
\textsuperscript{259} \textit{CIL} 14.172. Cf. below for the \textit{procurator annonae}. This was the most important grain trade role that one could hold in Ostia, answerable directly to the \textit{praefectus annonae}. Cf. Meiggs (1973: 300).
\textsuperscript{260} Meiggs (1973: 507).
\textsuperscript{261} \textit{CIL} 14.4140.
\textsuperscript{262} \textit{CIL} 14.309.
patron of the *mensores adiutores* in 197. Granius Maturus, who was a ranking member in several *collegia*, which is very likely to have included the *mensores*, became a Decurion and, eventually, a Duovir – an impressive escalation in his status indeed.

It is notable that almost every inscription we have referring to the *corpus mensorum* is either set up by or dedicated to wealthy and/or elite men. It is clear that unlike the senatorial elites of Rome, the local elites of smaller towns such as Ostia do consider their association with trades and/or membership of the *collegia* to be status-enhancing factors that are worth advertising. Indeed, it is clear that for certain individuals, such as C. Sentius Felix, becoming involved with as many associations as possible was a tactic for both enhancing their civic status and improving their own professional interests.

In terms of its internal structure and activities, the *corpus mensorum frumentariorum* has much in common with the earlier *collegia* considered in this thesis. The ordinary members are made up of both freeborn and freedmen, all of whom could hold magistracies, such as being *curator* or *quinquennalis*. Various different patrons also support the group throughout the second century. The addition of the temple (Figure 1: 2) to the *schola* also indicates that the group engaged in some religious activity. The positioning of the temple, inside the *schola* complex, makes it clear that it belonged to the *collegium*, although Stöger does remark that its separate entrance (from the *Via Della Fuce* only, meaning that members had to cross the external threshold in order to enter it) is quite unexpected. I would point out that a single entrance is fairly normal practice for a temple and this is not dissimilar to other temples of *collegia*, such as the *Tempio*.

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263 *CIL* 14.2.
266 *CIL* 14.409.
Still, such a division might indicate that the temple formed quite a discrete part of the group’s identity. The temple itself is more than likely associated with Ceres, as the earliest of the inscriptions actually refers to the collegium as *Mensores Frumentariorum Cereris Augustae* and later, in 197, the group can be seen dedicating a well “*monitu sanctissimae Cereris et Nympharum*” in thanks to the goddess.\(^{271}\) Besides this, Ceres is frequently linked to the grain trade elsewhere.\(^ {272}\)

Notable in their absence, however, are any clear indications of shared burial, commensality, gift-giving or self-regulation, all of which we have become accustomed to seeing regularly in the evidence regarding other collegia, and one could legitimately argue that this supports the notion of Ostian collegia being a fairly special case. Of course, the fact that these aspects are not mentioned in epigraphic evidence does not necessarily mean that they did not take place. *Leges collegiorum* are extant for only a very small number of collegia but it is widely agreed that all associations had regulations and structures to which they adhered. Indeed, the hierarchal structure that is evident in the *corpus mensorum* is certainly indicative of similar regulation. Similarly, while there is no specific mention of *sportulae* in the inscriptions, the collegium does make a dedication to Q. Acilius Fuscus, “*erga se benignissimo*”, which may refer to an endowment of some kind.\(^{273}\) The decorated *aula* of the *schola* is also ideally suited as a meeting hall for the collegium and a venue for feasting, although there is nothing in the epigraphic evidence to point clearly to this taking place.

There is also evidence of a similar collegium from Rome, which is worth briefly discussing at this point. The members of the *corpus mensorum machinariorum frumentariorum* appear to have performed a similar role to the *mensores Ostienses* and it is of course very tempting to link the two, in as far as the *machinarii* can be seen as an extension of the *mensores*, active in Rome, rather than Ostia.\(^ {274}\) Three inscriptions, all from Rome, mention the *mensores machinarii*, one of which can

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\(^{270}\) Regio III, iii, 1.2: Although this temple is clearly more private and cannot be accessed externally, it also has only one point of access.

\(^{271}\) *CIL* 14.409, 14.2

\(^{272}\) Spaeth (1996: 25).

\(^{273}\) *CIL* 14.154.

be dated specifically to AD 198.\textsuperscript{275} Of particular interest are the indications, missing from extant evidence from Ostia, that this \textit{collegium} did provide burial for its members, as C. Turius Lollianus (a member) leaves the remainder of his \textit{funeraticium} to his “\textit{collegae}”.\textsuperscript{276} Moreover, Lollianus stipulates that the interest on the endowment ought to be used for sacrifices on festival days, while M. Aelius Rusticus also gives members \textit{sportulae} of two denarii each “\textit{ob dedicationem}”.\textsuperscript{277}

A few final points are worth mentioning before we move on to discuss the \textit{mensores} from an economic point of view. First of all, in terms of their typicality, it is clear that this \textit{collegium} is extremely comparable to most other associations, particularly in terms of its structure and membership but also in the evidence of its religious activity and emphasis on status. Second, although there are some common aspects that are missing, these are very clearly evident in the inscriptions regarding the \textit{mensores machinarii}.\textsuperscript{278} Third, even if one does not believe that these two \textit{collegia} should be associated with one another, it is worth noting that these missing aspects were common practice in other \textit{collegia} in Ostia, the members of whom commonly gave and received gifts and dinners.\textsuperscript{279} Altogether, in terms of their general practices at least, the \textit{corpus mensorum frumentarium} seems far from being a ‘special case’.\textsuperscript{280}

(iii) The role of the \textit{corpus} in the local economy

In spite of Finleyan protests regarding “guilds”, the status of this \textit{collegium} as an association that manipulated the local economy can be little in doubt.\textsuperscript{281} Indeed, it is not so much a question of whether or not the association should be considered an economic actor but rather the extent to which it did act and to which this was a formally-instituted process as opposed to an informal process. There is also the question of how far the association was a ‘special case’, as Tran suggests, or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{275} \textit{CIL} 6.85 is from 198. The dates of \textit{CIL} 6.9626 and 6.33883 are uncertain.
\item \textsuperscript{276} \textit{CIL} 6.9626. Cf. also, \textit{CIL} 6.33883.
\item \textsuperscript{277} \textit{CIL} 6.85.
\item \textsuperscript{278} It is worth mentioning that whether or not the \textit{collegium} participated in shared burial is not vital to an NIE analysis. The above point is made only in assessing the typicality of the \textit{collegium}.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Cf. \textit{CIL} 14.4554, 14.246.
\item \textsuperscript{280} Tran (2008: 297).
\item \textsuperscript{281} Finley (1999: 137-8).
\end{itemize}
whether it can be considered representative of a wider sample. This issue has already been discussed above but will be returned to in the following chapters.

The role of a *mensor frumentariorum* is reasonably self-explanatory. As Arnaud notes, the grain (along with other goods) that was collected in taxes from provinces needed to be weighed frequently and checked at every point of change (i.e., from land to boat, boat to harbour, harbour to transport, etc.) in order to protect everyone involved in the process.\(^{282}\) The *mensor* was therefore on hand to perform this function throughout the empire.\(^{283}\) At Ostia, one of the main hubs for grain imports into Rome, the role was supported by a large number of other professional roles, including the *navicularii* (boat men), the *sacomarii* (sack carriers) and the *codicarii* (barge men).\(^{284}\) The *mensor* would receive the grain from the *sacomarii* as it came in to Ostia by means of the *navicularii*, measure it and then see to its storage and/or transportation to Rome. The reason that it is possible to be so clear about the process is that, very unusually, we have two depictions of it happening, the clearest of which is actually in the mosaic on the floor of the *Aula dei Mensores* (Figure 3).\(^{285}\)

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\(^{282}\) Arnaud (2015:7).

\(^{283}\) Arnaud (2015: 7) cites *P.Oxy* 45, 320 from c. AD 63.


\(^{285}\) For the other image, cf. the *Isis Geminia* at *CIL* 14.4139.
Figure 3: Mosaic depicting the measuring of grain.

The sacomarius is depicted on the left, carrying the grain towards the mensor, who holds what is probably a levelling rod and is assisted by a smaller figure (presumably a slave and possibly one of the adiutores, cf. below) holding an abacus.\textsuperscript{287} Above the depiction is written V [.....]SEXHAGI[...], for which Minaud has suggested we should read “V [milia] sex(tariorum) h(odie) agi(tata) hi[c]” (five thousand sextarii were dealt with here today).\textsuperscript{288} The mosaic and the inscription indicate that, by the third century at least, the schola of the collegium was being used as a place to conduct business, which therefore links the collegium itself directly to business activities.\textsuperscript{289} The attachment of the schola to the large horrea behind (built much earlier, in 112 AD, with direct access to the Tiber) is also compelling evidence of this.\textsuperscript{290}

\textsuperscript{286} Located in La Aula dei Mensores in Regio I, xix, 1.3 [http://www.ostia-antica.org/regio1/19/19-1.htm – Date accessed: 28/07/2016].
\textsuperscript{287} Rougé (1966: 185).
\textsuperscript{288} [http://rechercheisidore.fr/search/resource/?uri=10670/1.901y7a – Date accessed: 29/07/2016] .
\textsuperscript{289} The schola can be dated to the Trajanic period by the brickwork, with some alterations, including the mosaic, dating to the third century.
It is clear that the *corpus* did not meet only under the terms outlined by Marcianus, that is, once a month or for religious purposes only, nor were members restricted to membership of that *collegium* alone, so we must ask ourselves why and how it is that the members formed a *collegium* in the first place, despite the legislation.\textsuperscript{291} The former can be dealt with easily, as the economic benefits of belonging to the *collegium* are clear. As mentioned above, the epigraphic evidence links the association with at least four wealthy patrons, three of whom are also connected to various other associations related to the grain trade, as well as being well-connected politically.\textsuperscript{292} Dedications are also made to officials within the grain trade, in thanks for their generosity towards the *collegium*, while ranking members are frequently connected to other trades.\textsuperscript{293} The previous chapter discussed the way in which the social network of the *collegium* places both formal and informal institutions upon members, as membership is limited to those who share the same goals and (in this case) business activities, but also facilitates access to those engaged in similar fields. In this case, interaction with the *procurator annonae* must have been particularly important for the individual *mensor*, which is unlikely to have been available without being part of the *collegium*.

The structure of the *corpus* itself also holds the same benefits that a more formal ‘firm’ might, as it is clear that anyone, freedman or not, could rise through the ranks, increasing his own status and social network as he does.\textsuperscript{294} Moreover, the nature of the *corpus* meant that it was flexible enough to respond to changes in the market. At some point during the second century, for instance, it is clear that a single unified *corpus* was no longer the most appropriate form and that (at least)

\textsuperscript{291} Cf. *Digest* 47.22.1.1-2 (Marcianus): “There is, however, no ban on assembly for religious purposes, so long as there is no contravention of the *senatus consultum* which prohibits unlawful *collegia*. It is not permitted to belong to more than one *collegium...*”

\textsuperscript{292} Cf. *CIL* 14.409: C. Sentius Felix is patron of very many different *collegia*, as well as being important politically; *CIL* 14.2: C. Caecilius Onesimus is patron and *quinquennalis* of the titular corpus; *CIL* 14.4620: P. Aufidius Fortis is patron both of the measurers and of the divers; *CIL* 14.362-4; C. Granius Maturus is probably the name of this magistrate, who was patron of several *collegia*, as well as becoming a *decurio* and a *duovir*.

\textsuperscript{293} E.g. *CIL* 14.4620.

\textsuperscript{294} Cf. for example *CIL* 14.2 and the case of N. Trebonius Eutyches. Eutyches is probably of servile descent (Royden, 1988: 109, #100) and yet he has twice been president of the *acceptores* for the overall *collegium*. 
three subdivisions were formed. In 184 (and in all dateable inscriptions that predate this), the *collegium* styles itself as ‘*Corpus Mensorum Frumentariorum Ostiensium*’ but by 197 we have a dedication, given by three *quinquennales* of the *corpus mensorum adiutorum*, the *nauticariorum* and the *acceptorum*, respectively. Royden has suggested that these formed entirely distinct *collegia*, who often worked together, rather than being subdivisions of the original *corpus*. However I am inclined to follow Waltzing and Meiggs in believing that the overall association continued to exist, not only because the subdivisions are often recorded together in the associations but also because it is again recorded as one group in AD 249, in an inscription that refers to the patron of the *corpus mensorum frumentariorum*.

The roles of the *nauticarii* and *acceptores* are probably fairly self-explanatory – the *nauticarii* would have measured the grain going on or coming off ships, while the *acceptores* were probably in control of it being ‘accepted’ into the warehouses. The *adiutores* are less clear in their purpose; neither Meiggs’ suggestion (that they measured the grain on its way out of the warehouse) nor Sirks’ (that they checked it as it was loaded onto the ships being sent to Rome) has any real foundation. Based on the name only, I would suggest that they were more like general assistants to the *mensores* and indeed this may be precisely what we are seeing on the mosaic of the measurers at work. For the purposes of this chapter, the main point is that in its organisation therefore, the *collegium* provides both the unification and the simplification of the individual roles of *mensores*, improving the efficiency and output of all involved.

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295 Cf. *CIL* 14.172, 14.2. For others likely preceding the change, cf. *CIL* 14.172, 14.309. For other uses of the subdivisions, cf. *CIL* 14.4140, 14.154, 14.289. The change might represent either the booming nature of the grain trade at this time and an alteration for convenience or it could perhaps be indicative of the changing times, as the Portus Traiani became the more dominant grain importer; this is worthy of further study.


297 *CIL* 14.4452. Cf. also Waltzing (1895-1900: 2.63); Meiggs (1973: 282). It is possible, as Sirks (1991: 262) suggests, that this therefore indicates a temporary change, perhaps because of intervention in the *collegium* by Septimius Severus, which was later dropped, although I would argue that this last inscriptions is simply referring to the *collegium* as a whole, rather than to any subdivisions. Cf. also *CIL* 14.4620-2, which are earlier (mid-second century) but refer to the *corpora mensorum frumentariorum*, in the plural.


299 Perhaps we should consider the smaller figure on the mosaic to be an *adiutor*. 
Other ways in which the *collegium* reduced transaction costs for members, simply through existing, can briefly be elucidated. The pooling of resources has been suggested as one of the likely natural outcomes and benefits of forming an association and this can be seen more clearly in the *mensores* than in most *collegia*. The use of the *schola* as a place for business, as well as leisure, is probable according to both Stöger’s spatial syntax theory and our common sense. In particular, the attached *horrea* would have been an important resource for all *mensores* associated with the *collegium*, effectively taking the job from being a fairly one-dimensional role, in which the *mensor* goes to wherever grain is being unloaded and performs his task (presumably at the hire of merchants), to being one where the entire process can be brought in-house, so to speak, and under the control of the *mensores*. In fact, depending on just how necessary we might consider the worship of Ceres to have been in the minds of the *mensores*, we could even consider the attached temple to be a shared resource, theoretically. More generally, the mere fact of membership is likely to have eased transaction costs by creating trust networks, peer review, increased knowledge of the market and good (i.e. fair) behaviour, through private order enforcement.

Finally, from at least the late second century, formal institutions were introduced (in the form of legal regulation) that would have made not belonging to the *collegium* professionally unappealing, to say the least. Paul records that the “*mensores* appear to have a right of *excusatio* from a rescript of the late Marcus Aurelius and Commodus.” Exemption from public duties would have been welcome indeed for any *mensor* but, as Rickman outlines in the case of the *navicularii*, the *procurator annonae* (acting on behalf of the *praefectus*) must have required some form of registration process in order to ascertain which traders should be given special privileges. Rickman’s contention is that independent *navicularii* would have struggled to be noticed, let alone hired, in the large market town of Ostia, especially against the large *collegia* that existed there, and therefore joining the association would have been imperative in order to work and

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300 Stöger (2011: 245).
302 *Digest* (Paulus), 27.1.26: “*Mensores frumentarios habere ius excusationis apparat ex rescripto divorum Marci et Commodi, quod rescripsent praefecto annonae.*”
claim the privileges. More importantly, in the *collegia* themselves, the procurator would find exactly the information he needed to establish to whom the privileges ought to be granted. This is a neat theory, the application of which to the *corpus mensorum frumentariorum* is clear, especially considering the examples we have of the *corpus* directly thanking the *procurator annonae*.

It is clear that the unusually broad evidence for *collegia* in Ostia can be very useful in ascertaining precisely what role the *collegia* played in the town. Examining the *mensores* in isolation from the other *collegia* has been fruitful, particularly in terms of learning more about the *collegium* itself, but, although this section does draw new suggestions and connections from the evidence, it does not yet yield a satisfactory impression of the way in which the Ostian *collegia* manipulated the economy in general. For this, further consideration of the *collegia* is necessary and, in particular, examination of how the *collegia* at Ostia interacted with one another and the town is vital. It can be positively noted that, certainly in the course of the analysis so far, the *collegia* do not appear wildly different from other *collegia* in Rome or the wider empire, although this does require further examination and comparison before one could successfully hope to model the economic behaviour of other Roman associations on the Ostian *collegia*.

7. *Collegium Fabrum Tignuariorum Ostiensium*

With that in mind, it is worth examining a second case study in detail. In the second century AD, the *Collegium Fabrum Tignuariorum Ostiensium*, or the Association of Ostian Carpenters, was by far the largest of the *collegia* in Ostia, with more than 330 members in 198 AD. Accordingly, it is also the *collegium*

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305 *CIL* 14.154, 14.172. There is perhaps less foundation for Sirks’ (1991, 262-3) suggestion that the *corpus* was in fact created for this very purpose, to benefit the *annona* under Trajan. Although the dating of its earliest inscriptions (cf. *CIL* 14.409 – dated to c.102) do make this a possibility, one wonders why the state would opt for a *collegium*, rather than a formally managed organisation. Not to mention the fact that the *collegium* does appear to be already fairly well established by this point.
306 *CIL* 14.4569. The *album*, which was found in the *schola* of the *collegium*, actually lists its 331 ordinary members, described as the *numinis caligatorum decuriarum XI*. This refers to the ordinary ‘booted soldiers’ (viz. the plebs, cf. below) of the *collegium* that are divided into 16 *decuriae*. We know that the three presidents of that *lustrum* (28) are not included and it is possible
for which there is the most evidence, which itself spans more than 200 years of Ostian history. There are at least 46 inscriptions that mention the collegium, around 20 of which can be closely dated, mainly thanks to the collegium recording its own existence in terms of lustra - the five-year periods in which magistri quinquennales served as presidents. It is possible to extrapolate from a few inscriptions that are dated both by lustrum and consular date that the collegium was founded in AD 60, with the first lustrum from AD 60-64.\textsuperscript{307} It continued to exist until at least AD 285, when an inscription from the 29th lustrum (200-204) was reused by the collegium in a dedication to Diocletian, indicating that, like the mensores, the fabri tignuarii continued to thrive at Ostia until the entire town began to decline.\textsuperscript{308}

Our evidence is particularly rich from the mid-second to the early third centuries AD, with 23 inscriptions spanning this period from which the schola of the association, now known as the Casa dei Triclinii, is also dateable. The following sections will focus particularly on this period and consider again what role this collegium played at Ostia, initially from a social and civic point of view and then in terms of the local economy.

Earlier examinations of the collegium focused very heavily on its foundation dates and on the fairly unusual details of its membership structure, such as the (apparent) absence of a patron.\textsuperscript{309} These are undoubtedly useful but are mostly confined to description, rather than analysis. More recently, Delaine focuses on the building industry at Ostia and notes the way in which the collegium may have provided an organising structure for some individual builders but unfortunately she does not pursue this with any detailed examination of the evidence, and her

that there may be other magistracies not shown or slave members; presumably these would each be inscribed separately.

\textsuperscript{307} The foundation was previously considered to date to AD 140 but the album above is from AD 198, during the 28th lustrum (L28) (cf. Royden), thus giving a foundation date for the collegium between AD 59 and 63 and, as Royden has demonstrated on the basis of other inscriptions, this can be narrowed down even further to between 59 and 60. See Zevi (1971: 472-8); Meiggs (1973: 331); Royden (1988: 25-7); cf. also in particular, CIL 14.172, 14.297, 14.4365, 14.4569 and 14.5347.

\textsuperscript{308} The reuse of this inscription also led to earlier scholars mistaking the foundation date of the collegium as c. AD 140: cf. Meiggs (1973: 330).

\textsuperscript{309} Meiggs (1973: 320, 330); Royden (1988: 25-7).
discussion of the collegium is limited to fairly standard assumptions about collegia, such as their burial function, feasting and membership fees, very little of which is in evidence at all at Ostia. Stöger does consider the collegium much more in terms of their social, civic and economic role within the town but her discussion is mostly focused on the spatial evidence, that is the positioning and the internal composition of the association’s physical presence in the town, its schola. This is very useful but will benefit from being placed alongside more detailed examination of the written evidence, below.

The internal structure of the collegium is unusual, likely because of its large membership. According to the album from 198, the 331 ordinary members were organised, mimicking the same collegium at Rome, according to military structure into 16 decuriae, each consisting of 22-23 members that were known as the caligati (the booted-soldiers / lower orders). Most other inscriptions also refer to the magistri quinquennales, the presidents who held office for five years that are familiar from other collegia but who served three at a time in this case, probably because of the size. Several inscriptions are also dedicated by the honorati, who were presumably ex-presidents, and by the collegium decurions, who headed each decuria and from whom the quinquennales were probably chosen. These should not be confused with the town-councillor decurions of Ostia, to whom the collegium frequently make dedications. External to the collegium was the patron, who seems also to have been known as praefectus, in accordance with the military structure.

The album from 198 does not include current or previous magistri quinquennales, who were presumably listed elsewhere, and indeed the lack of apparent rank below the magistrate level is quite striking. Although it is noted that one member (Fabius Primus) is a scribe, it does not appear to be the case that most members

311 Cf. CIL 14.4569.
312 E.g. CIL 14.299, 14.330, 14.4656, 14.371. It is worth noting that there is no evidence for there being more than one president at a time before the 22nd lustrum (165-169), when the collegium had existed for a little more than a century: CIL 14.370 and 14.5383. By the 25th lustrum, it had become common practice, suggesting that the size of the collegium required greater organisation.
held any special title or position within the *collegium*, which is not indicative of a good vehicle for social mobility. However, as Royden points out, we know that three of the members who are each listed first amongst their *decuriae* are the same members that become *quinquennales* in *lustrum* 29.\(^{315}\) Similarly, one of the *quinquennales* from *lustrum* 30 (205-9) was listed at the head of Decuria 14 in 198, while another was listed among the men of Decuria 6.\(^{316}\) This seems to indicate that a standard progression through the *collegium* might be to become an ordinary member of a *decuria* first of all, followed by becoming decurion of that *decuria*. The three *quinquennales* for each *lustrum* were then drawn from this pool of 16 men. This is worth emphasising because it is indicative of social mobility – if those members who rise to prominence within the *collegium* can also be seen to be successful outside it, then one could argue that this points to the *collegium* providing something of a career ladder, a direct economic benefit for members.

This process can be seen most clearly in the career of M. Licinius Privatus, for whom a monument is set up by the *collegium*.\(^{317}\) He is recorded as being one of the *quinquennales* of L29, after previously having been a scribe and a decurion (of the *collegium*). He is also noted to be honoured “by the *ornamenta* of the office of decurion [of the town] and entitled to sit on a Bisellium seat”, both granted in exchange for his gift of HS 50,000 to the town, while it is later added to the stone that his children were equestrians. These are no small feats for a man of probable freedman status, who began his career as an ordinary member of the *collegium*.\(^{318}\) Of course, it is impossible to pin Privatus’ success outside the *collegium* on his career within it but it is very tempting to conclude that becoming a member of the *collegium* and playing the game, so to speak, of rising through the ranks could present one with a very useful means of social mobility.

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\(^{315}\) Royden (1988: 27); cf. also *CIL* 14.4569, 14.128 14.374: T. Claudius Sospol, C. Sergius Mercurius and M. Licinius Privatus are listed first among the 6\(^{th}\), 15\(^{th}\) and 16\(^{th}\) *decuriae*, respectively.

\(^{316}\) Cf. *CIL* 14.4569, 14.5344: L. Iulius Doryphorianus and C. Epagathus. The third name from *CIL* 14.5344 is fragmentary but could perhaps be S. Pudens of the 9\(^{th}\) *decuria* on the *album*.

\(^{317}\) *CIL* 14.374.

\(^{318}\) Cf. also Royden (1988: 70).
One could argue that it was just the opposite, i.e. that the rising prominence of members like Privatus outside the *collegium* led to the enhancement of his status within it. Under this hypothesis there would still be a clear link between the internal and external status of members, emphasising that the two spheres did not function discretely from one another, although it would undermine the suggestion that the *collegium* could facilitate social mobility. Privatus appears only on these three inscriptions, so it is impossible to be certain of the truth, although I would stress that, while it is easy to see how enhanced status in the *collegium* might have led to more work and therefore more money, there is very little to suggest how else Privatus might have risen to such prominence. It would also be odd, moreover, for Privatus to appear with no distinction to separate him from his fellow *quinquennales*, Sosipol and Mercurius, as he does on one of the inscriptions, if indeed he had been promoted to the office for some special distinction.\(^{319}\) Certainly, Meiggs’ suggestion that Privatus was “probably typical of his time” seems misplaced; rather, as many of the members of the *collegium* were freedmen but were able to find significant success, I would argue that his career was more typical of the positive effects of belonging to a *collegium*.

Despite the abundance of epigraphic evidence, establishing very much about the common activities of the *fabri tignuarii* is a frustrating task. The vast majority of the inscriptions consist of dedications to political officials or to rich patrons, who have clearly helped the *collegium* in some way. The obvious conclusion to draw from this is that the *collegium* spent a considerable amount of time dealing with and thanking external people (and this will be discussed in more detail below) but it does not reveal a great deal about the other day-to-day activities of members. As mentioned, Delaine lists fairly standard assumptions about the activities of *collegia* that she suggests should be applied in this case: as well as their function to “ensure a place of burial”, she notes that they “also provided feasts and other communal activities for the living”.\(^{320}\) No references are given and it is clear that Delaine’s suggestions are based upon the same false assumptions about *collegia* that are so common to this topic, as the evidence itself simply cannot be reconciled with her point. Two of the forty-six inscriptions, both from the 3rd

\(^{319}\) Cf. *CIL* 14.128.

\(^{320}\) Delaine (2003: 727).
century, do refer to *sportulae* being given to members, a practice that can arguably be associated with feasting but this hardly justifies Delaine’s picture of the *collegium* as some sort of nucleus of social activity for the *fabri*. There is, furthermore, no mention of burial, nor of other "communal activities" in any of the relevant inscriptions.

A little more can be discerned from the *casseggiato dei triclinii*, as it is now known, found in *Regio I, XII, 1*. It is identifiable as the *schola* of the *collegium fabrum tignuariorum* on the basis of the *album* from 198 that was discussed above, which was found *in situ* on the side of a statue base to Septimius Severus.\(^{321}\) The building itself was constructed in AD 120, according to brick stamps and to the building methods used.\(^{322}\) We cannot be certain that it was built for this purpose, although this would seem likely considering its occupants and the attention given to the *opus mixtum* brickwork.\(^{323}\) The use of certain expensive materials, such as travertine door jambs, is also suggestive of this. It is located in the centre of Ostia, immediately adjacent to the forum, indicating the importance of the *collegium* to the town. The main access is from the *Viale degli Scavi*, the *decumanus* of Ostia, through a wide entranceway into a large courtyard. The entrance is flanked by two *tabernae*, which are part of the same building but can be accessed from the street only. Set back in the courtyard, opposite the entrance, there is a separate room, not dissimilar to a *tablinum*, which has led some to remark upon the similarity of the *schola* to a *domus* and even to suggest that this might have been its initial purpose.\(^{324}\) Accordingly, in front of the *tablinum* in the centre of the courtyard sits an atrium surrounded by twelve columns, with a bronze ring in the centre, presumably used to collect rainwater.\(^{325}\) Large rooms border the left-hand (East) side of the courtyard and these are lined with *triclinia*, hence the modern name of the building. On the right-hand (West) side there are smaller, more private rooms. The site also features a kitchen room in the South-West corner, a latrine in the South-East and a water basin in the North-West next to the entrance. There are

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\(^{321}\) *CIL* 14.4569.

\(^{322}\) Stöger (2011: 232-3).

\(^{323}\) [http://www.ostia-antica.org/regio1/12/12-1.htm – Date accessed: 28/07/2016] See Appendix II, also, for a plan of the town.

\(^{324}\) Stöger (2011: 233); Hermansen (1982: 63); Ulrich *et al.* (2013: 328).

\(^{325}\) Stöger (2011: 234).
also two staircases; the upper levels do not survive but could have included several stories, up to about 60 feet (c. 4 stories) according to Trajanic height restrictions.\textsuperscript{326} Behind the site there is a large latrine with twenty seats, which it is tempting to include as part of the site, especially considering the size of the\textit{ collegium}, but is more likely to be a public\textit{ forica}.\textsuperscript{327}

The \textit{schola} was clearly well set up for dining, with a large portion of the space taken up by \textit{triclinia} but there is little that can be inferred about the activities that took place there beyond this. Indeed, more remarkable for a \textit{collegium} of this size are some aspects that are conspicuous in their absence. In particular, the absence of a space large enough for all 350 or so members to congregate is notable, as is the lack of an obvious religious space, both of which were more apparent in the \textit{schola} of the \textit{mensores}. It is possible that the \textit{triclinia} were used for the former purpose, perhaps in combination with the main courtyard. As for the religious aspect, epigraphic testimony suggests that the \textit{collegium} owned a temple located 200 metres away from the \textit{schola}, just along the \textit{decumanus}, where cult activities would clearly have taken place.\textsuperscript{328} Precisely what deities were important to the \textit{collegium} is unclear, although there was a dedication to Mars found \textit{in situ} on the \textit{tablinum}-style podium inside the \textit{schola}, which makes sense considering the military nature of the \textit{collegium}.\textsuperscript{329} Other inscriptions also reveal a very strong link with the \textit{Augustales}, as many of those listed as \textit{quinquennales} also held the post of \textit{sevir Augustalis}.\textsuperscript{330}

The temple does indicate that the \textit{collegium} performed religious rites of some sort together, as might be expected of such a large group, but there is nothing to suggest that this was either the overall function or the main activity of the \textit{collegium}. This point is worth stressing because, as we saw in the case of the \textit{mensores}, the \textit{collegium fabrum} does not fit easily or discretely into any of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[326] Ulrich \textit{et al.} (2013: 331).
\item[327] [http://www.ostia-antica.org/regio1/12/12-1.htm – Date accessed: 28/07/2016]
\item[328] Regio V.I.I - the \textit{Tempio Collegiale} is identifiable by a large dedication (\textit{CIL} 14.4365) to the deified Pius Pertinax that was placed above its porch, set up by the \textit{collegium fabrum tignuariorum} in \textit{lustrum} 28 (193-99).
\item[329] \textit{CIL} 14.4300.
\end{footnotes}
major ‘types’ of collegia that it is so often suggested the groups fell into – whether burial, religious or social – nor does the evidence appear to suggest a particular focus on any of these activities. And yet, the group clearly performed an important civic role and held high status in the town, based on the positioning of their properties and their high prevalence in the epigraphic material. At this point, with the exclusion of other explanations for the importance of the collegium within the town, we can consider how it appears to have affected the local economy.

The building trade is unusual in comparison to others. We as historians cannot see the output of any other industry in quite the same way, as although we may attempt to calculate the amounts of grain measured or ground through the bakeries and though we can examine the various mosaics depicting men at work, only the builders have left the results of their industry so easily available to consider. This is especially true of Ostia, as we have already seen; conveniently for historians (though not for the residents), the town required wide-scale rebuilding at the end of the first century and was all but deserted, at least by tradespeople, by the middle of the third century. This window of time means that the buildings can and indeed have been examined in great detail, adding much to our knowledge of building practices in the Roman Empire. For the purposes of this chapter, it is not necessary to go into any great detail regarding those practices, other than to remark on some of the aspects most salient to this discussion.

Perhaps the most striking and potentially troubling observation to be made is that the building work at Ostia was clearly extremely varied. Brick and concrete were used in different ways according to different methods, indicating that each building was the handiwork of its own set of independent labourers, rather than a single large firm, working to a set template. However, the term “firm” is anachronistic and it is worth emphasising that my argument is based upon the collegium being a place for shared resources and both professional and social interaction, rather than some sort of all-encompassing “business”. And indeed, there are some indications of this kind of sharing within the building work at

331 Ulrich et al. (2013: 333).
Ostia. Delaine notes that many of the same materials and techniques were used throughout the town and that similar patterns can also be observed throughout, such as an emphasis on the use of more expensive materials on exterior walls, applied in a far more aesthetically pleasing way, or the use of travertine blocks to support vulnerable parts of the structure. Of course, these might only point to the status concerns of clients or the limitations of materials but there are also design elements that point to the exchange of ideas – the horrea epagathiana is built for an entirely different purpose from the casa dei triclinii, with different materials and layout, and yet the central tablinum is almost identical to that found in the schola of the builders, for example.

The size of many projects is particularly indicative of the need for builders to be in some way centralised. Delaine estimates that the case a Giardino must have required about 150 men to build; despite the claim that the uniformity apparent in the building techniques must be down to contractor specification, this is equally likely to be a result of the shared practice that comes from belonging to the collegium. It is worth noting that there is no evidence of there being apprenticeships among the builders at Ostia, although it is clear that this did take place elsewhere in the empire. Perhaps in Ostia, the lack of apprenticeships might point to this service already being provided by the collegia. Similarly, the “small firms” that Delaine argues were probably responsible for groups of buildings that share multiple common features – including “distinctive L-shaped door jambs, the use of decorative niches inside the buildings, and the extensive use of travertine as insets in doors” – are nowhere in evidence, appearing neither in the epigraphic record, nor manifestly in the town, in that there are no buildings that are identifiable as the headquarters of such “firms”. On the other hand, the collegium is extremely well evidenced and we can be certain that it was a common hub for hundreds of builders.

334 Ulrich et al. (2013: 331).
335 Delaine (2003: 725).
336 Freu (2016: 183-199); cf. in particular, AE 2000, 802.
337 Delaine (2003: 726); cf. also Delaine (2002: 44-84), who convincingly demonstrates a level of consistency running through certain buildings – a horrea (III.i.6, c. AD 100); the Caseggiato del Larario (I.ix.3, c. AD 116); and the horrea epagathiana (L.viii.3, c. AD 137) – that she attributes to “small firms”. 
The civic importance of the *collegium* has already been discussed, based on the centrality of the *schola* and nearby temple, but this is also worth mentioning from a practical, economic point of view. The *casa dei triclinii* is immediately adjacent to the forum (*Regio* I), on one side, and the site of the Hadrianic baths on the other (now covered by the 4th century *foro della statua eroica* – *Regio* I, XII, 2). This is the absolute centre of the town, both topographically and economically, and basic city planning would suggest that the vast majority of buildings in this area were of a commercial nature, as indeed the vast majority of the surrounding *tabernae* were. Certainly, this is no place for a simple, social society but rather has all the indications of being a major industrial and commercial centre.

Finally, from the epigraphic material, we can infer a multitude of features that from a Neo-Institutional point of view are extremely indicative of the *collegium* having a major economic impact, both in terms of the careers of individual tradesmen and in terms of the development of the building trade itself. These are more than familiar by now, so a very brief list is sufficient. First of all, the strong and organised membership base that is so integral to the theory of NIE is very clearly manifest. The *album* much discussed already demonstrates the size and carefully structured configuration of the *collegium*, while its very existence – monumentalised and displayed in the centre of the *schola*, mere steps away from the forum – emphasises the exclusivity and unity that came with being a member.\(^{338}\)

Higher magistracies, including *decuriones* and *quinquennales* are also evident, giving clear incentives to members to respect the rules of the *collegium* and perform well within its bounds. This fits with the theoretical framework of NIE, as structure and hierarchy are frequently noted as informal institutions conducive to economic success – and indeed the resulting social mobility is also manifest in the epigraphic evidence, with many examples of members who reached high status positions within the *collegium* also achieving high status within the town. For example, in the very earliest of the extant inscriptions (65-69 AD) the *quinquennalis* of the second *lustrum* is also recorded as being *quinquennalis* of

\(^{338}\) *CIL* 14.4569.
the Augustales, only the first of many examples of this phenomenon.\footnote{CIL 14.299.} The Augustales themselves held an important and high status role within the town and the very large number of magistrates from the collegium fabrum who also became priests of the imperial cult indicates that their high status within the collegium transcended the walls of the schola.\footnote{Cf. Laird (2015: Ch. 4. 100-138).}

By the onset of the second century, such examples abound of collegiati with a level of affluence somewhat above their station, such as the quinquennalis of the 21st lustrum (160-164), who was married to Metilia Acta, the priestess of the Magna Mater, and was buried in a very highly decorated sarcophagus.\footnote{CIL 14.371.} In the mid-late 2nd century, Fabius Eutychus’ career seems fairly innocuous – he had been a curial lictor, a wax scribe and a collegiatus of the fabri, eventually becoming quinquennalis sometime after the deification of Hadrian in 139.\footnote{CIL 14.4642, 14.353.} And yet, Fabius’ son was able to attain very high status within the town as a Roman equestrian, elected decurion and priest of the cult of the divine Hadrian, while Fabius himself was rich enough to donate 50,000 sesterces to the town in tribute to his son. These are impressive exploits indeed for a carpenter and his son. The successful career of Privatus, one of the quinquennales for the 29th lustrum, has already been described but is equally notable in terms of the wealth and titles that Privatus attained and the high status of his sons and descendants.\footnote{CIL 14.374.} In the third century, there is even an example of a quinquennalis, Parthenopaeus, becoming an equestrian himself, as well as decurion of the town.\footnote{CIL 14.314.} In each of these cases, there is little information given to explain how these men, many of whom are very likely to have been freedmen, were able to achieve such wealth and success at Ostia, besides their position as magistrates in the collegium. It is notable also that the relative successes of each generation of magistrates seem to reach greater heights, which is suggestive not only of the high status afforded by their position.
in the collegium but also of the increasing status of the collegium over time\textsuperscript{345} – at its foundation, a high-ranking member could expect also to hold priesthoods in the Augustales but by the second century, members could also become prominent and wealthy members of society, fathers to equestrians and politicians.

One could argue of course that these are fairly abstract examples of economic activity or even that the status enhancement that often appears to have come with attaining a magistracy in the collegium is merely coincidental. With this in mind, it is worth also considering the connections that the collegium clearly provided, both with other trades and with more elite members of society. These connections are made extremely apparent in the epigraphic record as a very great many of the relevant inscriptions are in the form of dedications to wealthy individuals in gratitude for their “generosity”. This is worth emphasising because, although we may lack evidence of contracts or trade agreements thanks to the nature of the testimony, I would argue that such dedications most likely represent the outcome of those agreements.

In particular, dedications to Q. Baienus Blassianus and to Q. Petronius Melior, both from the mid-late 2\textsuperscript{nd} century, stand out as remarkable connections for the collegium.\textsuperscript{346} Both men enjoyed illustrious careers, including praetorships and procuratorial positions; Blassianus was especially successful, holding a number of military commands and eventually becoming first prefect of the annona and then of Egypt; Melior also held military positions and became deputy supervisor of the Tiber and later of the annona in Ostia. In each case, there is no direct reason given for the dedications, beyond their “many kindnesses” towards the collegium but I would suggest the most likely reason was the successful completion of a project. Similar thanks are given by the collegium to at least three other procurators of the annona, clearly indicating a relationship between the fabri and the grain trade.\textsuperscript{347}

The most likely manifestation of this would surely have been that the annona employed the resources of the collegium for its many building projects,

\textsuperscript{345} This matches indications of the growth of the collegium, which appears to have had its three serving quinquennales from only the 22\textsuperscript{nd} lustrum (165-9) at the earliest. Before this, only one president is ever mentioned, suggesting that it grew dramatically during the late first and early second centuries.
\textsuperscript{346} CIL 14.5341, 14.5345.
\textsuperscript{347} Cf. CIL 14.5344, 14.5351, 14.5352.
particularly when one considers the sizeable number of horrea that sprang up in the second century, just as the collegium fabrum tignuariorum appears to have been at its most prosperous.

Regardless of whether or not this is an accurate portrayal, it is worth emphasising the links that the collegium fostered both with these men and with others. Thanks and dedications are given too to various emperors, at least one of which also focuses on the generosity of the emperor (indulgentissimi principis), although this was a fairly common epithet.\footnote{Noreña (2011: 282); cf. also, CIL 14.105, 14.4365, 14.128.} Elsewhere, links with other collegia are visible in the careers of men like A. Livius Anteros, who was quinquennalis from 140-144, as well as being a corporatus in both the Augustales and the fabri navales (ship-builders) or that of L. Valerius Threptus, quinquennalis of the fabri and curator negotiantium forum vinarium (the wine merchants of the forum).\footnote{AE 1989, 123; CIL 14.430.} Within the conceptual framework of NIE, it is very easy to consider all of these links with other industries as institutions of the collegium, providing networks and enhancing connections with the town, just as could be seen in the case of the mensores.

8. Conclusion

To return to the issue of methodology, in the case of the collegium fabrum tignuariorum, it is again possible to consider it as an economic association when viewed through the lens of NIE. Clearly, there is no evidence that the collegium existed in order to provide any of the other functions that are so often posited for collegia, whether that be for burial, social functions or religious purposes, although there are indications that they did at least partake in religious activity as a group. Rather, the overwhelming indication is that the collegium existed as something of an economic hub for the tradesmen. In many respects, the collegium is perfectly set up to provide resources and opportunities for enhancement of one’s career, both in terms of its status within the town and in terms of its connections with elites. Despite all of this, however, we are faced with the same problems that have already been discussed with the theoretical model. NIE is
again and again able to offer an excellent conceptual framework in which to understand the collegia but, although this association was certainly the largest in Ostia and indeed one of the most prosperous anywhere in the empire, there is still no direct or irrefutable evidence of its economic activity. Precisely as was the case with the mensores, there are no extant contract agreements or other written documents that can prove the collegium acted as an economic entity, whether it be as a ‘firm’, ‘guild’ or otherwise, nor do legal texts offer much more in terms of concrete evidence as although there is some regulation imposed on the business activities of the collegia, it can only be dated to the very end of the principate and afterwards.

This does not mean that Finleyan logic should prevail and that we should discount any and all indications of economic behaviour that do exist but does mean that conclusions must remain based on the theoretical level, which is, at the very least, unsatisfying. In sum:

- The collegium did not exist to serve any purpose other than economic gain;
- it clearly held an important and high-status position within the town;
- the building industry at Ostia was enormous and must have required some kind of regulation that does not appear to have been provided by the state;
- the collegium was very well-suited indeed to provide that regulation, both in terms of its size and resources and in terms of its organisation;
- although there is no evidence of the collegium making contracts or trade agreements, this does not exist either for individual tradesmen, whereas we can at least see a great deal of evidence of the collegia interacting with other industries and civic elites;
- the remains of building work itself show many signs of shared ability and the combination of different areas of expertise and, although there is no helpful statement so clear or obvious as “collegium fabrum tignuariorum hic fuit” recorded on the buildings, there are at least plenty of expressions
of thanks to wealthy patrons and members of the *annona*, recorded by the *collegium*.

When all other possibilities have been eliminated and all clues point towards one thing, I would certainly argue that it is logical to draw one’s conclusions accordingly. As an absolute minimum, we must certainly reject prevailing assumptions that regard the *collegia* of Ostia as a set of burial, social or even religious associations based on no evidence at all and at least tend towards the view that they held an economic purpose, based on the evidence that we do have.

9. Further Study

The previous case studies have demonstrated that two of the most prominent *collegia* in Ostia were also prominent within the town itself, held a high status and many connections with local elites and other businesses and, although they do appear to have engaged in some religious activity, this was certainly not their main function. In order to avoid repetition, it is worth examining the other *collegia* of the town *en masse* in order to ensure that this study is representative of all Ostian *collegia*, rather than simply giving the most verbose examples.

*Table 1: Non-Economic Activity*

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<td><strong>CIL no.</strong></td>
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<td>14.309</td>
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Examination of the previous case studies showed a distinct lack within those *collegia* of what we might call “other activity”, that is, activities such as sharing burial costs, practising a common religion or socialising together. The *collegium fabrum tignuariorum* certainly had the facilities available both for feasting and for worship, while the *mensores* clearly had at least some connection to Ceres and a temple within their *schola* at which to worship. There is very little indication within the relevant inscriptions, however, that these activities were in any way central to the *collegia*.\(^{350}\) Nor is this result confined to the case studies but is borne out by the evidence of other inscriptions. With the exception of *CIL* 14.4699 and 14.51, the inscriptions above all include examples of members or

\(^{350}\) Of course, one could very well take the theoretical model of NIE and apply it to other aspects of the *collegia*. If religious activity were to be considered an “objective” of the members of *collegia*, for example, then the institutions that are inherent to *collegia* would have helped “enhance” this objective in the same way as economic objectives. This thesis is focused on economic activity but, importantly, does not argue for an economic function to the exclusion of all other functions. Rather, the greater the density of one’s network (i.e. the higher the number of shared objectives), the more all objectives – whether religious, funerary, social or professional – are enhanced by the institutional nature of the organisation.
patrons of collegia that are also linked to religious groups but in each case this is clearly a separate group to the collegium (or collegia).

CIL 14.51 is slightly more complicated: here the sacomarii (sack-carriers) are dedicating an altar for Silvanus to the annona, suggesting that it was in the interest of the sacomarii and indeed the annona to worship Silvanus, which makes sense based on the deity’s links to farming. Clearly, like the mensores and the fabri, the collegium sacomariorum did collectively make tribute to a specific deity but this single case is hardly indicative of this being the main purpose behind its foundation. On the contrary, I would argue that precisely by worshipping deities linked to their nominal trades, each collegium was pursuing success within that trade.

CIL 14.4699 is completely anomalous, as it represents the only example from Ostia of a collegium providing burial for a member. This itself is not even certain, as the inscription is decidedly brief (what appears above is the inscription in its entirety) and not entirely clear, although this does seem to be the most likely reading. It is worth clarifying of course that non-economic activity, such as burial or shared worship, do not undermine an institutional analysis but rather support it, in that they lend a greater density.351 The point is not that burial does not appear amongst collegia and that therefore they must have been professional – rather it is simply that burial does not seem to have been a prominent concern amongst the collegia at Ostia. In any case, this inscription is a curiosity but little more and it remains the case that of the sixty or so collegia in Ostia that are named after a profession, there is very limited evidence to suggest that they spent their time pursuing anything other than activities that were directly related to their stated profession.

Table 2: Social Prestige

| Social Prestige |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **CIL no.**     | **Date**        | **Relevant Text** |
| 351             | See above, n.350 |                  |

351 See above, n.350.
M(arco) Iunio M(arci) f(ilio) Pal(atina) / Fausto / decurioni adlecto

... patrono cor[orum] / curatorum navium marinar[um] / domini navium Afrarum / universarum item / Sardorum

dec(urionum) decr(eto) aedilicio adl(ecto), d(ecurionum) d(creto) d(ecurioni) adl(ecto)

... patrono decuriae scribar(um) cerarior(um) / et librario(rum) et lictor(um) et viator(um) item praecunum et / (et)
argentarior(um) et negotiator(um) vinario(rum) ab urbe / item mensior(um) frumentario(rum) Cereris Aug(ustae)

Q(uinto) Calpurnio C(ai) f(ilio) / Quir(ina) Modesto / proc(urator) Alpium proc(urator) Ostiae / ad annon(um)
proc(urator) Lucaniae / corpus mercatorum / frumentarius

C(aio) Veturio C(ai) f(ilio) Testio / Amando / «eq(uiti) R(omani) patron»o et / defensori V corporum / lenuncularior(um)
Ostiens(ium) / universi navigarii(!) corpor(um)

C(aio) Iulio / Philippo / equiti Romano / corpus fabrum / navalium Ostiens(ium) / quibus ex s(enatus) c(onsulto) coire
lic(et)
s(ua) p(ecunia) p(osuit)

Table 3: Economic Markers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIL no.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Relevant Text</th>
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| 14.4142 | 173  | duumviro / mercatori frumentario

... patrono cor[orum] / curatorum navium marinar[um] / domini navium Afrarum / universarum item / Sardorum
<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.409</td>
<td>135-150 quinquennial curator navium marinum gratis adlecto / inter navicular(ios) maris Hadriatici et ad quadrigam / fori vinari(i) patrono decuriae scribar(um) cerarior(um) / et librarior(um) et lictor(um) et viator(um) item praecomon et / [et] argentarior(um) et negociator(um) vinarii(um) ab urbe / item mensior(um) frumentarior(um) Cereis Aquae (ustae)</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.309</td>
<td>101-200 quinquennalis / idem quinquennalis corporis mensior(um) / frumentarior(um) Ostiensium / curat(um) / bis / idem codicar(ium) curat(um) Ostiensium / curat(um) / et III honorarius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.303</td>
<td>130-146 Prefect of the Fabri / Tignuarii at Ostia, Patron / of the Corpora of Measurers / of the Public Grain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>... corpus mercatorum / frumentariorum / quinquennalis / perpetuo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.363</td>
<td>138-161 adlecto / corporis / curat(um) / navium marinum et mensiorum / frumentariorum Ostiensium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.3517a</td>
<td>147-161 corpus pisto(rum) / coloniae Ostiensis et / portus utriusque</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.169</td>
<td>195 corpus fabrum navalium / Ostiensium / quiquis ex s(enatus) const(ulato) coire licet / patrono optimo / s(ua) p(ecunia) p(osuit)</td>
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On the other hand, in the extracts given above there are very many examples of the *collegia* or members of the *collegia* having links with the other institutions of the town, including most notably the *procurator annonaee*, political elites and other professional associations. It is also clear from these examples that the *collegia* throughout Ostia had a similar structure to the *mensores* and *fabri* – magistracies including *quinquennalis* and *curator*, as well as more functional roles such as *scriba* abound in these inscriptions and in the rest of the *corpus*. There are also *alba* extant, similar to those discussed in reference to the *fabri*, that demonstrate the other *collegia* also kept track of who their members were. When
viewed holistically, these factors indicate that, like the collegia already discussed, the other professional collegia of Ostia were extremely well suited to fostering a successful economic environment, according to NIE theory, while they also show many examples of direct contact between different industries and civic elites that are particularly likely to be a result of economic interaction.

In closing, it is worth mentioning the Piazzale delle Corporazioni (PdC). It is not possible to definitively link this building to the collegia, hence its exclusion from previous discussion. That said, the mosaics that the PdC houses abound with references to the various industries that we have discussed, as well as to the collegia and corpora.\(^\text{352}\) In the absence of price agreements or contracts that might definitively prove the important economic role of collegia in Ostia, the PdC provides what is arguably the best confirmation of this activity. Built under Augustus near the forum, the PdC consists of a large courtyard, framed on three sides by covered corridors, to which a raised porticus was later added. Large mosaics adorned the floor, separating the porticus into a series of rooms. Four of these survive from the Claudian period, one of which shows a grain measure, indicating that it had something to do with the mensores.\(^\text{353}\) Far more compelling however are the mosaics that were installed later, sometime between AD 190 and 200. These include multiple references to grain and ships in particular, with images of grain measures and ships, as well as similarly suggestive pictures of dolphins and lighthouses.\(^\text{354}\) Statio 2 refers directly to the corpus pellionum, suggesting that it belonged to the collegium of tanners, while many of the inscriptions that make up this database were found in and around the courtyard, indicating that it was a place in common for many of the professional collegia.\(^\text{355}\)

The sum of the evidence for professional collegia at Ostia is compelling indeed. The associations of the town represented the enormous diversity of trade at Ostia very well; the number of inscriptions that can be dated to the second century is indicative of their prominence in the town at this time, reflecting the contemporary boom in the economy; the collegia themselves do not appear to

\(^{353}\) Statio 53.
\(^{354}\) Cf. in particular, Stationes 12, 17, 21, 34, 35.
have spent their time engaged in non-economic activities but rather fit very well into a neo institutional model that is extremely suggestive of their economic function, both in terms of their internal structure and external networks; and the area around the forum, the trading centre of any town, shows a high concentration of _collegia_, including the _PdC_ which arguably seems to have been designed to facilitate their business activities.

There are some issues remaining, however. The prominence of the _collegia_ during the second century is particularly problematic, especially for _collegia_ such as the _mensores_. The infrastructure available at Portus, as well as its direct access to the Tiber, would suggest that there was no need for the grain or other goods to go through Ostia. It has been suggested that workers lived in Ostia and simply commuted to Portus along the road connecting the two. This is possible but if it is the case and Ostia should be regarded as mostly a commuter town, we would surely expect to see far more indications of the _collegia_ engaging in social activities, such as feasting or drinking, rather than the economic indications. On the contrary, the large clusters of _horrea_, the streets lined with _tabernae_, the large forum and the _piazzale delle corporazioni_ would all seem to suggest a town that was abuzz with industry and economic activity. Henzelmann’s suggestion that the town should be thought of as more of a market-hub for provincial trade, rather than for supplying Rome, is certainly worthy of more research. This suggestion is entirely theoretical but might find evidence in the prominence of the professional _collegia_ in the town and especially in the _PdC_, which points to the presence of foreign traders from Africa, who were also integrated into the local _collegia_.

Recent archaeological excavations from Portus have also shown the existence of a 90m wide canal running from Portus to Ostia, via the _Fossa Traiana_, which I would argue suggests a much greater level of interconnectivity between Ostia and Portus than previously thought and that the most likely reality is that Ostia served

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356 _CIL_ 14.4142, which was found in the ruins of the theatre immediately adjacent to the _PdC_, refers to M. Iunius Faustus, who was both an elected decurion of the town and the master of African ships. Cf. also _NS_ 1953: 285, n.44 and _Statio_ 17 of the _PdC_, which includes mosaics of grain and an inscription (_CIL_ 14.4549) referring to Carthage.
both as a provincial marketplace and a working town, serving the needs of Portus and Rome.\textsuperscript{357} 

The question of the typicality of Ostia remains central, while the lack of definitive evidence, rather than theory, for the \textit{collegia} as economic actors is troubling. To deal with these issues however, it is necessary to look further afield, at \textit{collegia} from the rest of Italy and the western empire and to the contribution that can be made by Egyptian papyri.

\textsuperscript{357} Cf. Keay (2012: 48): These excavations are ongoing and the vast majority of buildings and infrastructure around Portus remain a mystery. The continuing ‘Portus Project’, led by Keay will undoubtedly provide stimulating material for further discussion around this topic and others in the future.
CHAPTER 4: TESTING THE MODEL

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the collegia of the wider western empire and evaluate how closely they conform to the model established for those from Ostia. Whether or not one believes that Ostia’s success was only thanks to its proximity to Rome and its importance as an imperial harbour, it did undoubtedly hold a special status as a result of its position. Accordingly, one could argue that the collegia there were unique or at least unusual, or perhaps that professional practices at Ostia were based on the marketplace at Rome and that therefore conclusions drawn from Ostian data should be limited to the town or, at the very most, to Rome. In this chapter, therefore, I will consider the evidence of collegia from elsewhere in Italy, namely in Rome and Pompeii, before turning to Roman Spain and then Gaul in order to produce a more comprehensive survey of associations. In particular, I will argue that NIE provides a useful theoretical framework with which to approach the collegia and better understand them in the context of the Roman world. However, NIE theory cannot replace concrete evidence and, although many of the collegia below do exhibit features that are suggestive of an economic function, irrefutable evidence is still lacking, at least from extant epigraphic material.

I will focus initially on the collegia fabrum and centonariorum that, alongside the collegia dendrophorum, made up the tria collegia principalia. Waltzing pointed out the special status of these collegia, noting that they appear in a quarter of all collected inscriptions at the time he was writing and that they held a level of prestige that was unmatched by other collegia.\(^{358}\) They are frequently discussed together and have been referred to as providing a fire service, although there is little basis for their being fire fighters.\(^{359}\) In fact, the collegia of fabri (builders)

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358 Waltzing (1895-1900: 1.129-30, 2.193-208); see also Verboven (2016: 176). CIL 11.5749 contains the only specific mention of the tria collegia principalia, although note also CIL 5.7881 and 11.5416 (Waltzing: 4.50) for further references to the tria collegia. All three collegia were widespread across the empire and were often mentioned together in epigraphic sources: e.g., CIL 3.1207, 3.1209, 3.3534, 5.749, 5.4477, 11.377, 11.6378.

359 E.g., Sirks (1991: 360); Roche-Bernard (1993: 132); Kneissl (1994: 133-46); Vicari (2001: 12); Lafer (2001). Cf. also Verboven (2016: 176-7) and especially Liu (2009: 2-3 and Chapter 2, passim). Van Nijf (1997: 177-80) questioned the assumption that the tria collegia principalia had anything to do with fire-fighting, noting that this was really only based on Pliny’s suggestion that a
and centonarii (textile dealers) share the common features of other collegia and there is little reason to distinguish them from other professional associations, except to say that they were larger, more widespread and probably more prestigious than others as a result. The dendrophori (tree-carriers) had a much stronger religious identity, named for their members’ role in carrying sacred pine trees for processions worshipping the Magna Mater, and, as such, are not discussed here. The distribution of both the fabri and the centonarii is such that entire theses could be (and indeed have been) written about their place in the empire and it is not my objective to do that here. Rather, by way of introduction to this chapter, I will take the work of More and Liu as a starting point and consider to what extent their conclusions fit within or are affected by an approach based on NIE. It is especially worth starting with the collegium fabrum tignariorum, as it provides a neat opportunity to compare the situation in Rome directly with that in Ostia.

1. The collegium fabrum tignariorum

More’s PhD thesis, ‘The fabri tignarii of Rome’, took the publication of (then) new evidence as its starting point and re-examined several features of the association in light of that evidence, including its foundation date, organisation and legal basis, as well as some discussion of how it might have fitted into public life in Rome. Royden’s valuable compilation of magistrates also includes discussion of the collegium but is based quite heavily on More’s thesis and is again limited to mostly brief descriptions of individuals and to detailed assessments of arguments regarding the foundation date of the collegium. Neither study examines in any depth how far the collegium fitted into or impacted upon the building industry; more recently, however, Delaine has done some work

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*collegium fabrum* be used for fire-fighting at Nicomedia and on the frequency with which the three collegia appear together; van Nijf argued convincingly that all three are much better understood as high-status collegia for the most successful traders and craftsmen in their respective fields. Liu (2009: Chapter 2, esp. 57-64) has subsequently deconstructed the notion that the centonarii had anything to with fire-fighting and has demonstrated comprehensively that they were made up of tradesmen and specifically textile dealers, despite their previous identification as “rag-men” or fire-fighters.

360 On the prestige of the tria collegia principalia, see Liu (2009: 52); Royden (1988: 132-4).


on this as part of wider studies on Roman building. Several facts are very well established, however, and it is certainly possible to draw an overall picture of the *collegium* at Rome which, it must be said, is extremely similar to its Ostian counterpart.

The *collegium* that existed during the principate was founded in 7 BC and recorded its own existence in *lustra* from that date. It was made up of approximately 1300 members, sorted into 60 *decuriae* of around 22 members each. Each *decuria* was led by a single *decurio* while the *collegium* as a whole was headed by six *magistri quinquennales*. After serving their five-year term, *magistri* became *honorati*, while we know also that six members served as *scribae* for each *lustrum*; all of this is fairly similar to the Ostian *collegium*.

We also know of other positions, thanks to an inscription set up to T. Flavius Hilario that documents his illustrious rise through the *collegium*. Hilario was a freedman who was *decurio in lustrum* 15 (L. 15) and then *nungentus ad subfragia* in L. 16, which More notes was probably a position based on the *nungenti* of the republic, responsible for ensuring fair voting. He later became *magister quinquennalis* and then *a honoratus* before becoming *censor ad magistros creandos* and, finally, *iudex inter electos XII ab ordine*. The precise function of these roles is unclear – the censor role clearly had something to do with the election of magistrates but we have no way of knowing what Hilario did as one of

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363 Delaine (2000). There has been little interest in the *collegia fabrum* in recent years, which is remarkable, given the status of the *collegium* and the upswing of interest in *collegia* in recent scholarship. Ulrich (2007) on ‘Roman woodworking’ is an obvious exception but the treatment of *collegia* (p. 9) is brief and based heavily on inherited assumptions about associations that are no longer valid: “The guilds provided members with social activities like feasts, a religious affiliation to a patron deity, and a promise of a decent burial.” The *collegia fabrum* are considered as part of more general works, including Tran (2006) and Verboven and Laes (2016), but More (1969) and Pearse (1975) remain the only comprehensive studies.

364 More (1969: 98-104); Royden (1988: 134-6). Cf. also CIL 6.10299; Panciera, ZPE 43 (1981) Inscription A and B. There is also some evidence for the existence of the *collegium* during the republic, suggesting that it was either dissolved or perhaps reorganised in 7 BC – e.g. Plutarch, *Numa*, 17.2: “τὰκτορεύς”; Asconius, 75C.

365 See CIL 6.33856 and 6.33858 (AD 198-200) for *alba* of magistrates and scribes of each *decuria*. CIL 6.9405 records 22 burial niches being reserved for the tenth *decuria* of the *collegium fabrum*.

366 CIL 14.230; Cf. also, AE 1941, 71.

367 More (1969: 27, 135). See also Tran (2006: 167), who notes that the mimicry of the republican *nungenti*, despite presumably not having 900 vote assessors within the *collegium*, suggests a desire to replicate civic institutions.
the twelve judges elected from the order, although Meiggs’ suggestion that the judges settled internal disputes is more sensible than More’s that they had administrative duties. The evidence of a relatively diverse selection of positions within the collegium and the complexity of its cursus are notable because, as I noted in the previous chapter (counter to my own argument), the fairly flat structure of the Ostian collegium was not especially indicative of a good vehicle for social mobility. In this case, however, it is clear that the hierarchy was both multi-tiered and closely controlled. A simple freedman or perhaps even a slave could join the association as an ordinary member of one of the 22 decuriae and could potentially rise to become one of the six magistri, at the head of 1,300 men, filling several other posts along the way.

The size and complexity of the collegium are suggestive of it holding an important civic function. The vast membership included a great many of the builders who lived and worked in Rome, all of whom were sorted into decuriae that were carefully administered by the magistri. The magistri themselves also appear to have been subject to elections, censorial review and possibly even a panel of judges. The magistri, about whom we know the most, had their own scribae and slaves to help them carry out their duties. Indications from the extant fasti and alba show that magistrates could sometimes be excused from their role and advance more quickly to being honorati. Considering that this was effectively a promotion, the change is more likely to have been in recognition of their service and the burdens of the role than as some sort of punishment. Altogether, it seems

368 Meiggs (1973: 319) wrongly considers Hilario to be a member of the Ostian collegium, based on the location of the inscription, but this does not reduce the validity of his theory. Cf. also More (1969: 156) and Tran (2006: 167-8).
369 See Chapter 3.7, above.
370 Indeed this appears to have been exactly the case with Hilario (CIL 14.2630; AE 1941, 71). Cf. also M. Valerius Felix (CIL 6.3678, 6.996), whose name surely indicates servile descent but who became a honoratus of the collegium in the early second-century, having served as a magister in the 23rd lustrum. On the evidence of slave members, see Pearse (1975: 115) and CIL 6.30982, set up by six slaves 2 BC and AD 4. Delaine (2000: esp. 121) has demonstrated the importance that the building industry held throughout the principate; it follows that those who were at the head of a group of so many individuals of that profession would find their social status inflated. Of course, it is impossible to guarantee that the status of successful men such as Hilario came from climbing the hierarchy of the collegium – it is also possible that they found external success and were given special honours as a result – but it is clear at least that one’s status within the collegium was not entirely divorced from one’s external status.
371 See CIL 6.33856 (AD 154-162) and 11.3936.
unlikely that this level of bureaucracy existed only to form some kind of social club.

In terms of what the precise function of the collegium was, there are some minor indications of religious and burial activity, but these are rare and disconnected, hardly suggestive of unified religious actions and objectives. The evidence of religious activity linked to the collegium is isolated to five inscriptions, two of which were set up to Minerva, indicating (as seen in Ostia) that Minerva acted as protectress or patron deity to the fabri.\textsuperscript{372} This makes sense considering the military organisation of the collegium and Minerva’s connections to both warfare and craftsmanship.\textsuperscript{373} Two of the remaining three inscriptions are actually dedications to other deities, each set up by a single individual, both of whom mention their membership of the collegium but also that they set up the dedication themselves.\textsuperscript{374} These were clearly not representing the collegium and should therefore be discounted. The last refers to the gift of a statue of Asclepius to the collegium from one of its honorati.\textsuperscript{375} No reason is given for the gift but one could argue that this does indicate the collegium was in some way connected to Asclepius, as well as to Minerva. It would be quite a stretch, however, to argue that the collegium was organised to act as a religious association, devoted to either one of these deities.

With regard to burial, the relevant inscription is from the inside of a columbarium, probably dating to the 1\textsuperscript{st} century AD.\textsuperscript{376} It records that 32 niches have been reserved for the members (including future members) of the tenth decuria of the collegium fabrum tignariorum. The benefactor, L. Cincius Martialis, is not listed amongst the members and does not claim any connection to the collegium himself. He leaves the remaining niches to his family members, two of whom are probably his sons and are listed as members. This is therefore an example of collective burial taking place within the collegium, although not of the collegium itself.

\textsuperscript{372} CIL 6.30982 (2 BC – AD 4), 6.36817.
\textsuperscript{373} For the military structure of the collegium, see Chapter 3.7, above.
\textsuperscript{374} CIL 6.321 (AD 124-128); AE 1941, 70 (AD 100-150).
\textsuperscript{375} AE 1941, 69 (AD 161-180).
\textsuperscript{376} CIL 6.9405; cf. also More (1969: 54).
providing some sort of burial service for members but rather of an external benefactor making space for his sons’ associates within his own *columbarium*.

To be clear, I am not arguing that such activities did not take place at all, but only that they should not be thought of as the central or objective functions of the *collegium*. Indeed, the existence of such group activities is important to an NIE approach, which hinges upon the informal bonds being formed by such pursuits. Admittedly, direct evidence for an economic function of the *collegium* is no more forthcoming. However, the building industry at Rome was enormous and scholars have previously highlighted the gaps in our understanding of how this vast industry and its many large projects were organised. Contrary to Martin, who denies the possibility that the *collegium* provided the necessary structure, Delaine does tentatively state that “it is difficult to imagine a better ready-made if informal structure to encourage co-operation beyond the capabilities of any single member in this particular case.”

By the third century, moreover, it is clear that membership of the *collegium* was an important way of assessing whether to grant immunity from various public services:

> “Immunity is granted to certain *collegia* or *corpora* to which permission (*ius coeundi*) has been given by law, namely to those (*scilicet eis collegiis vel corporibus*) in which each member is enrolled on the basis of his craft such as the *corpus fabrorum*… …immunity is not given indiscriminately to everyone enrolled in these *collegia*, but only to craftsmen.”

*Digest, 50.6.6.12* (Callistratus). Trans. Watson (adapted).

Under Septimius Severus, then, the *collegium fabrum* was officially acknowledged as a body of professional builders. The act of using the *collegium* to bestow immunities represents a direct example of the *collegium* providing formal institutional-easing for members and is therefore also a clear example of

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377 Martin (1989: 11-15); Delaine (2000: 132). Admittedly, Delaine is referring to the Baths of Caracalla building project, which must have employed thousands of builders, but I would maintain that the same logic is applicable to other, earlier projects too.
the collegium acting (and being recognised) as a collective body in a professional capacity. It is simply not accurate to assert that “there was no connection between the collegial membership and the structure and organization of construction.”

The Digest passage also goes on to note that Antoninus Pius took steps to clarify exactly who was eligible for membership in the collegium, suggesting that builders had used their membership to claim benefits since at least the mid-second century.

More informally, the inscriptions demonstrate that the collegium had a number of important connections that would have been helpful for its members. Several members were themselves freedmen of the Statilii Tauri family, a family from which came a line of influential senators in the early first century. Similarly, in the eighteenth lustrum (AD 79-83), C. Sentius Maximus was excused from his magistracy and replaced by T. Claudius Onesimus. Onesimus was an imperial freedman and also served at some point as a redemptor operum Caesarum, a contractor for imperial building projects. In the 27th lustrum, P. Cornelius Thallus, serving as magister, set up an inscription to his son Architectianus, who had been appointed decurio (of the collegium, presumably); Thallus’ father was called Architectus, which Royden notes is probably indicative of his trade. These kinds of professional connections are by no means proof of economic activity taking place within the collegium but only of the way in which the collegium, well connected as it was, was well suited to meeting the institutional needs of members. The argument, as ever, relies on the notion that members are unlikely not to have taken advantage of such connections to meet their needs.

There are only two inscriptions that mention any kind of financial activity, one of which comes from the dedication to Asclepius, mentioned above, on which the

379 More (1969: 125); Royden (1988: 151); Delaine (2000: 122). E.g., T. Statilius Chrestus who served as magister quinquennalis in lustrum 9 - AD 34-38 (AE 1941, 71; CIL 9.405); see also CIL 6.9405. There is also evidence of several slaves of the Statilii Tauri (CIL 6.9412-5) who were also fabri tignarii (although not of the collegium), suggesting perhaps that the family had special interests in the building trade.
380 AE 1941, 71.
381 Royden (1988: 164); Cf. CIL 6.9034.
dedicator also allocates *sportulae* totalling 90 *denarii* to the leading members.\(^{383}\) This is fairly standard practice and is unlikely to indicate any kind of larger transaction. However, a second inscription set up to the *numen* of the *collegium* is more interesting, as it notes that the dedicator – M. Valerius Felix, a *honoratus* – receives “double profits (*commodis duplicatis*)” from the *collegium*.\(^{384}\) More and Royden both translate this phrase as a synonym of *sportulae* without explanation, but such an interpretation makes little sense here.\(^{385}\) Gifts to members are usually referred to either directly as *sportulae* or as *dona*, never as *commoda*; indeed, according to the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, *commodum* is mostly used to refer to a profit or a salary otherwise earned, indicating that what is actually being referred to here are profits made by the *collegium* itself.\(^{386}\)

One might argue that such suggestions are based on nothing more than coincidence and that it is unfair to deny the possibility of a religious or burial function of the *collegium* whilst at the same time accepting an economic function based on similarly vague indications from the evidence. On the contrary, I would point out again that this thesis does not seek to deny the religious or burial (or indeed any other) activity of *collegia* but only to acknowledge that clearly they did also have an economic function, despite this being so often denied.\(^{387}\) Bearing in mind the choice of the *collegium* to base its identity on the shared occupation of its members, the lack of other organisational forces within the industry, and the fact that the state clearly dealt with the *collegium* as a professional entity from at least as early as the third century, the economic activity apparent here does certainly seem to have been one of the central and most important activities of of this professional *collegium* – and, I would go so far as to assert, of any such *collegium*.

\(^{383}\) *AE* 1941, 69; More (1969: 64).
\(^{384}\) Cf. *CIL* 6.3678.
\(^{386}\) *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, s.v. “*commodum*”.
\(^{387}\) For the case against any economic function of this *collegium* in particular, see Waltzing (1895-1900: 1.181-95); Finley (1999: 138); Martin (1989: 65); Purcell (1992: 180).

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2. The *collegium centonariorum*

Liu’s study of the *collegium centonariorum* is central to any discussion of the *collegia* and especially one that focuses on their economic impact.\(^{388}\) By focusing entirely on one *collegium* and limiting the conclusions accordingly, Liu has managed to avoid many of the pitfalls of previous studies which too frequently have attempted to generalise about the many and various associations based on the evidence of just one or two.\(^{389}\) Liu is cautious but emphasises that, when faced with limited evidence, it is sensible not to rule out that which is historically plausible, rather than discounting anything not directly evidenced, regardless of its historical plausibility or the indirect evidence that does exist.\(^{390}\)

Liu’s study is comprehensive but some points most salient to this thesis are worth highlighting here. In the second chapter, Liu argues convincingly that the *centonarii* of the *collegium* were textile dealers, rather than “rag-men” or fire-fighters.\(^{391}\) Their distribution is interesting; textile workers are found throughout the empire but the *collegia centonariorum* appear only in specific regions.\(^{392}\) As one might expect, they were active mainly in trading towns and cities and in areas of high wool-production, yet they are conspicuously absent in some areas, including northern parts of Gaul, North Africa, Spain and the South of Italy, despite the abundance of wool across these areas.\(^{393}\) They are also absent from nearly all areas where other dealers in textiles, including the *sagarii* and *vestiarii*, were active and exist in much greater numbers where there is little evidence for other dealers.\(^{394}\) Liu suggests that the lack of overlap might be explained by these individual textile workers/traders being “absorbed” into the *collegium*.

\(^{388}\) Liu (2009).

\(^{389}\) See Chapter 2.4, above.


\(^{393}\) Liu (2009: 30-1, 82-3).

\(^{394}\) Liu (2009: 77-8).
centonariorum or likewise by individual centonarii becoming sagarii or vestiarii or at least joining their collegia.\textsuperscript{395}

Liu does not go as far as arguing that this kind of absorption necessarily had an economic function, although I would note that the choice to unite similar professions makes a great deal of sense if one accepts that the collegium eased the transaction costs of members. In this scenario, it is likely that those practising a relevant trade nearby – such as sagarii or vestiarii – would want to join, rather than missing out on the benefits of membership, effectively meaning that the collegium did create monopolies in local areas. Conversely, if one insists that the collegium was entirely limited to a social organisation, with no economic dimension to speak of, then traders of similar but distinct trades would have little reason to form a single collegium, rather than several. Of course, unification might still occur for social or other reasons in some areas but the scale at which different types of textile dealers across the empire tended to form single collegia suggests that they had a fairly strong motivation. Liu adds that one good explanation for the absence of the collegia across large regions might be a lack of demand for organised production, which fits well with the lack of evidence from northern Gaul or southern Italy, “where estate-based productions took precedent [sic].”\textsuperscript{396} The direct implication of this is that, whether by design or not, the collegia provided an organising force in those areas where it was otherwise missing, thus allowing the textile economy to flourish.

Liu is cautious about assigning the collegium an economic function but does emphasise that it was involved in a range of activities and that these ought not to be divorced from its impact on the economy. Religious celebrations or feasts would have enhanced the public image and prominence of the collegium and its members, while also facilitating networking and information exchange amongst members, as well as offering tangible membership benefits.\textsuperscript{397} Liu does not specifically draw upon Neo-Institutional theory in making her point but it is essentially the same as that made throughout this thesis, that the economic and

\textsuperscript{395} Liu (2009: 77).
\textsuperscript{396} Liu (2009: 296).
\textsuperscript{397} Liu (2009: 276).
social dimensions of the collegium would have naturally reinforced one another. At least in theory, then, the collegium centonariorum is another that appears to be very well-suited to manipulating the economy in a tangible way.

Direct evidence of economic activity is as frustratingly scarce as ever but there are a few points worthy of mention. The collegium centonariorum had ius coeundi from at least the mid-second century AD and was probably considered to have utilitas publica under Commodus; as such, members could receive specific benefits. Like the collegium fabrum, the collegium centonariorum provided services that were useful to the state and, although the nature of their public utility is not specified, Liu’s suggestion (based on geographical distribution) that they facilitated the supply of materials for the army is a sensible one. Certainly, their usefulness as some sort of organising force for the textile industry seems the most likely way in which they could serve the state.

Finally, contrary to the notion that there is no direct evidence for economic activity, Liu also highlights the many endowments that were made to the collegia centonariorum by both patrons and external benefactors. As we have already seen with other collegia, some endowments were specifically directed to go towards members’ burial or for use in religious rites, but these expenses could only have used up a fraction of the often sizeable donations, even within those collegia that were purportedly set up for religious reasons. In the third century in Brixia, the local collegium centonariorum received (together with the local collegium fabrum) two endowments that included “tabernae cum cenaculis” and a large monetary endowment, the interest of which was to be used for funerals but also to pay for the upkeep of the tabernae. Its owning and maintaining tabernae seem to me a fairly straightforward example of the collegium playing a direct role in the textile profession.

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398 Liu, (2009: 104-5, and 111 on utilitas publica). Cf. also CIL 2.1167; AE 1987, 496; and Chapter 1.2, above.
401 See Chapter 1.5.
402 Liu (2009: 225); CIL 5.4488.
3. Pompeii

The existence of professional *collegia* at Pompeii is a subject of some debate.\(^{403}\) Waltzing included in his collection (subsequently expanded by others) a number of groups of tradesmen from Pompeii. Much of this information in fact comes from graffiti.\(^{404}\) The word *collegium* appears in only a single inscription, in what is probably a reference to a sacerdotal college.\(^{405}\) Amongst the graffiti and inscriptions that do mention groups of tradesmen, they are referred to only in the nominative plural (e.g. *fullones*, *saccarii*, *nautae*) and there is little to suggest that they were acting in a joint capacity, rather than simply being referred to *en masse*.\(^{406}\) There is not a single mention of the various magistrates with which we have become familiar, such as *quinquennalis*, *quaestor*, *decurio* or other *magistri*. Nor is there any evidence of other structural features common to the *collegia*, such as *leges* or *alba*. None of the groups receive endowments or refer to any kind of patron. The *collegia* of *fabri*, *centonarii* and *dendrophori* are by far the most common *collegia* in evidence across the empire and yet none of them appear in Pompeii.\(^{407}\)

This is not entirely surprising, however, considering the wider evidence of *collegia*. It is well known that there were attempts to control or even abolish *collegia* at least during the early first century AD and perhaps later. This cannot have been widely enforced, as *collegia* are known to have continued to form and to thrive in some areas throughout this period. However, there is a general lack of

\(^{403}\) See especially Mouritsen (1999) and Liu (2008).
\(^{404}\) See Waltzing (1895-1900: 4.49-128); Apicella (2000: 56-8); Cooley and Cooley (2004: 116-7); Liu (2008: 53).
\(^{405}\) Liu (2008: 57).
\(^{406}\) E.g. *CIL* 4.3476, 4.7164 (*fullones*); 4.274, 4.497 (*saccarii*); 4.5445 (*nautae*).
\(^{407}\) Waltzing (1895-1900: 1.129-30); Mouritsen (1999: esp. 520-2); Liu (2008: 62); Verboven (2016: 176). Previously the so-called Murecine tablets of circa AD 60-70 were held to have belonged to a *collegium of argentarii* (financiers). Found in a building not unlike the *Casa dei Triclini* at Ostia, the tablets record a number of contracts and transactions between the *argentarii* and others. The identification of the group as a *collegium*, however, was based solely on the similarity of the building to the *schola* of the Ostian *fabri*. Subsequent excavations have revealed a large number of inscriptions with the letters “SVL”, most likely referring to the Sulpicii family who also appear on the tablets. Hence it is likely that the tablets refer not to a *collegium* but to the Sulpicii, who were financiers (Terpstra, 2011: 15; 2013: 13).
In the epigraphic record from Italy at this time. Most of the data from Ostia are from the second and third centuries, where even the collegia of mensores and fabri did not form until the late first century. This may not reflect the reality, of course; it is possible that collegia continued to form and to function as normal but that they had enough sense not to publicly record their existence.

At Pompeii, there was more motivation than in other areas for informal or formal groups to lay low, so to speak, after Nero banned collegia “quae contra leges instituerant dissoluta” in the aftermath of a riot in AD 59. If the groups of tradesmen that are referred to in graffiti and other epigraphic evidence were in fact collegia, then this might explain their not advertising their existence for some time afterwards. In any case, the fact remains that the evidence needed to conduct analyses into their activities, economic or otherwise, does not exist at Pompeii. Moreover, although many collegia are evident across the rest of Italy, the vast majority of them are of the tria collegia principalia types, discussed above. Of the remainder, the state of the extant evidence does not, for the most part, permit detailed examination of their activities, of their internal structures, or of the strength and density of their connections to others. Bearing in mind that the purpose of this chapter is to consider how far the NIE model used for Ostia can be applied to the wider western empire, the most sensible course of action is now to examine those other Roman provinces where the evidence of collegia is particularly strong: Spain and the Gauls.

4. Roman Spain

The evidence for collegia in Roman Spain is fairly limited. Building on the data collected by Waltzing, Santero listed 122 inscriptions that were set up by, or refer to, collegia. Many of these collegia were nominally religious or domestic in their foundation and are less relevant to this analysis as a result. Verboven,

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408 See Patterson (1994: 235-6). Cf. also Waltzing (1895-1900: 4.49-80) and n.18, above.
410 Waltzing (1895-1900: 4.80-128); Santero (1978: 151-81). Santero is the standard work on collegia in Roman Spain and it is particularly useful for its detailed catalogue of the associations. Most other scholarship touches on the collegia only indirectly, through discussion of particular areas or professions. See in particular Blázquez (1992, 2007); Rodríguez (1991, 2000, 2006); Funari (1994); Rico (2003); Kulikowski (2004).
investigating status-building within collegia, found 69 inscriptions that he considered worthy of consideration, although several of these are from the republic. Verboven also left out collegia of Spanish merchants within Italy; this is sensible, given the parameters of his study, but is perhaps too selective, especially given the connection of those collegia to the oil trade and the Baetic region, where the greatest density of collegia within Spain is also to be found.

The evidence from the imperial period is scattered around the three provinces that make up Hispania (Baetica, Lusitania and Hispania Tarraconensis) and refers to many different and, for the most part, entirely unconnected associations, making institutional (or indeed any) analyses difficult. The Baetic province, however, is a useful exception to this, thanks to the booming oil trade there, especially around Hispalis (modern Seville). The Guadalquivir River, one of the largest rivers in Spain, was crucial to the Roman settlement, as it was navigable by sea-vessels as far as Hispalis. From there, goods could be transferred on to river barges and continue upstream to Cordoba and vice versa. The region was a major source of materials for Rome and the annona, initially because of the mining regions along the northern bank of the river and then for its agricultural produce, including wheat, wine and especially olive oil.

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411 Verboven (2009: 159-161) sets out to demonstrate that “status-achievement through collegia was markedly more significant in the Gallic and German provinces than in the Spanish provinces.” This argument is constructed around the lack of collegia in evidence in Spain in comparison to Gaul; there is admittedly a stark difference, but there is little in the argument in the way of analysis of the collegia themselves. It is worth pointing out, moreover, that the lack of evidence for collegia should not necessarily be considered evidence of a lower tendency to form associations; it might equally be the result of epigraphic or cultural habit. Verboven (2009: 162) notes that, since “inscriptions themselves testify status, we must conclude that collegiate status mattered less in the Spanish provinces than elsewhere.” This is not supported, however, by any examples that demonstrate exactly how inscriptions conferred status upon individuals, and the argument is ultimately unconvincing as a result.


413 The first Roman settlement was actually at nearby Italica (Santiponce) in 206 BC, where Scipio settled soldiers as part of his campaigns against Carthage. Roman occupation developed along the northern bank of the river in order to exploit the mines in that area. Later, in 45 BC, Julius Caesar formally colonised Hispalis as Colonia Iulia Romula Hispalis. Cf. Funari (1994: 88-91); Livy, 32.28; Isid. Etym. 15.1.71.

414 Strabo, Geog. 3.2.3.

415 Funari (1994: 92); Strabo, Geog. 3.2.3, 3.2.8. The Baetic region is well-known to have been a major exporter of olive oil to Rome and has prompted a wide body of scholarship since Dressel’s research demonstrating that the Monte Testaccio in Rome is made up of sherds from Spanish
Olive oil was an important staple across the Mediterranean, with consumption reaching perhaps as much as 25 litres per capita, and its supply was therefore brought under the responsibility of the *annona*.\(^{416}\) Olive trees were grown across the Baetic plain, where the olives were also ground and pressed in nearby mills. Once extracted, the oil was stored in *amphorae* ready for selling.\(^{417}\) Epigraphic evidence indicates the professionals that were then involved in the distribution, including *mercatores, negotiatores, diffusores* and an *adiutor praefecti annonae*, as well as various different boatmen, although the precise distinctions between each role remain uncertain.\(^{418}\) What is clear is that professionals were engaged in the immediate distribution (if not production) of oil within Hispania, as well as its transportation to other regions (namely Rome) and its subsequent importation and distribution. Evidently, these professionals also organised themselves into *collegia*.

Eleven inscriptions are of particular interest to this study, summarised in the table below. Three of the inscriptions refer to a *corpus oleariorum* in Hispalis and are all from the late-second century AD. Two further examples from Rome are set up by members of similarly-named associations, both of which emphasise their connection to Baetica, while another is set up at Portus dedicated to a wealthy *decorio* of Ostia, who is also named as patron of both the *scaphariti* (barge-men) and the *olearii*. The other five inscriptions refer to *collegia* of boatmen at Hispalis who are commonly linked to the oil-trade but who probably made a living from transporting a number of different products.\(^{419}\) Five other inscriptions are also included below that refer to various professionals within the oil trade but whose

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amphorae. For general surveys of the scholarship regarding imports from Spain, see especially Mattingley (1988: 42) and Blázquez (1992: 180). For the *olearii* (workers in the oil trade) themselves, see Panciera (1980); Blázquez (2007); Rodríguez (2006).


\(^{418}\) Cf. in particular Panciera (1980: 241); Rico (2003: 419-25). See also Rodríguez (2006: 353-4), who suggests that there was little distinction between the *mercatores* and *negotiatores*.

\(^{419}\) See, e.g. Funari (1994: 96); Blázquez (2007). One of the inscriptions (*CIL* 2.1180) is set up directly to thank S. Iulius Possessor, who (amongst other things) is the assistant to the prefect of the *annona* at Hispalis, responsible for the management of African and Hispanic oil, as well as of other produce.
membership of *collegia* is uncertain.\textsuperscript{420} Besides the epigraphic evidence, legal sources also indicate that both workers within the oil trade and those who transported oil by ship came to receive various tax exemptions and immunities.\textsuperscript{421}

*Table 4: collegia oleariorum*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inscription</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>collegia oleariorum</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>AE 2001, 1186</em></td>
<td>Dedication to M. Iulius Hermesianus, <em>diffusor</em> of oil for the <em>annona</em> and <em>curator</em> of the <em>corpus oleariorum stationum</em>. Set up by the <em>corpus</em>.</td>
<td>Baetica, Hispalis</td>
<td>AD 150-230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>AE 2002, 716</em></td>
<td>Dedication to Venus Genetrix, set up by Valeria Valentina (daughter of Valerius) in honour of the <em>corpus oleariorum</em>.</td>
<td>Baetica, Hispalis</td>
<td>AD 150-200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{420} Several scholars (e.g. Canto, 1980: 144; Kulikowski, 2004: 55, n. 71; Campbell, 2012: 117) have also referred to an additional inscription (*CIL* 2.1163) in the context of the *collegium scaphariorum* – suggesting that it in fact refers to the “annual salary” of the *collegium* – but there is actually nothing to link this inscription to the *collegium* or indeed to any *collegium*. In the *CIL* edition, Huebner simply noted that a damaged section might have referenced a *collegium* and mentions the *scapharii* as an example. This demonstrates again the importance of starting any such investigation with the evidence itself, rather than relying on the existing body of scholarship.

\textsuperscript{421} See esp. *Digest* 50.4.5 (Scaevola), which notes that in the republic, shippers and merchants of oil whose wealth was tied up in that business could claim exemption from public *munera* for up to five years. Constantine (*Codex Theodosianus* 13.5.4, 13.5.8) later confirms the privileges given specifically to the Spanish *navicularii*. 142
| CIL 6.1625b | Dedication to M. Petronius Honoratus, military prefect and prefect of the *annona* (among others). Set up by the patron and *curatores* of the *negotiatores olearii*. | Rome | AD 147 (EDR) |
| CIL 6.29722 | Dedication to C. Sentius Regulianus, equestrian *diffusor oleario ex Baetica* and patron of the same *corpus* (as well as of several others). | Rome | AD 100-200 (EDR) |
| CIL 14.409 | Dedication to Cn. Sentius Felix, decurion at Ostia and patron of many *collegia*, including the *corpora oleariorum* and *scaphariorum*. Set up by Cn. Sentius Lucilius, his son. | Portus | AD 135-150 (EDR) |

**Table 5: collegia scaphariorum et lyntrariorum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>collegia scaphariorum et lyntrariorum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 2.1182</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 2.1180</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 2.1168</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 2.1169</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 2.1183</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6: Connected to the oil-trade or to the collegia**

| **AE 1984, 526** | Dedication set up by M. Cassius Sempronianus*, diffusor olearius. | Baetica, Tocina | AD 1-130 (EDH) |
| **CIL 2.1481** | Dedication to M. Iulius Hermesianus*, diffusor olearius. Set up by his son and grandson. | Baetica, Astigi | AD 171-230 (EDH) |
| **AE 1994, 194** | Dedication to D. Caecilius Onesimus*, diffusor olearius ex Baetica. Set up by his heirs. | Rome | AD 100-200 (EDR) |
Some comparisons can be drawn with the *collegia* at Ostia, starting with the activities (or implied activities) of the *collegia*. All of the inscriptions concerning the *lyntrarii* or *scapharii*, for example, are dedications to patrons or to others who have supported the *collegium* in some way. Both *CIL* 2.1180 and 2.1183 are set up specifically by the *collegium* (as a whole) to thank the respective benefactors for their “integrity and justice”, which must refer to some kind of service rendered. Notably, the first of the individuals, S. Iulius Possessor, is an important man in the oil-trade, as he is assistant to the prefect of the *annona*, responsible for “the management of African and Hispanic oil, the transport of other comforts and the payment of shippers”; it is not unreasonable to assume that he is being thanked by the *scapharii* for services in this role.⁴²² The second man, L. Castricius Honoratus, is referred to as *primus pilus*, which might indicate that he also was a professional connection, as the army is well-known to have provided an important market for Spanish oil.⁴²³

In the same way, each of the inscriptions set up by or for the *collegia oleariorum* are also dedicatory. Two linked examples, set up by the two daughters of a

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⁴²³ See also Rodríguez (1991: 294-5) for discussion of the possibility that L. Castricius Honoratus was actually in Hispalis to support S. Iulius Possessor in making constructions or repairs to help the *collegium scaphariorum*. Rodríguez also suggests (p. 295) that this might also be the reason behind the dedications to the emperors (*CIL* 2.1168-9) but as his suggestions are entirely hypothetical, I have refrained from including them in my own analysis. On the importance of oil for the Roman army, see especially Blázquez (1992: 177) and Marzano (2013: 119).
member of the *collegium*, are arguably more religious in nature, as they are set up to Minerva and Venus Genetrix respectively.\(^{424}\) Importantly, it is the daughters who are doing the dedicating, not the members of the *collegium* itself, so it is debatable how far this can be identified as religious activity of the sort we saw amongst the *collegia fabrum* or *mensorum* at Ostia. Then again, the inscriptions are from pedestals, upon which statues of the deities were probably placed, set up “for the adornment of the *opus* built (*exornati*) by their father in honour of the *collegium*”. Canto has suggested that *opus* refers to a building constructed for the *collegium* to use as a *schola*, which, if correct, might suggest that the *collegium* had a particular connection with those deities.\(^{425}\)

The only other inscription from Baetica is set up by the local *corpus oleariorum* to M. Iulius Hermesianus, both “*diffusor* of oil for the *annona* of the city and *curator* of the *corpus oleariorum stationum* at Rome and Puteoli.”\(^{426}\) This inscription is particularly interesting as it demonstrates that there was a clear connection between the *collegia oleariorum* in Spain and in Rome, a connection which can only have been professional in nature. A *collegium* that existed only for the sake of socialising or for group-worship would hardly have felt the need to pay for an inscription and statue for a man working halfway across the Mediterranean. Precisely what is meant by *diffusor* is uncertain. The most obvious suggestion is that the nouns derives from the verb *diffundere* (to pour, to diffuse), and it has been thus interpreted to refer to someone who was essentially responsible for ensuring the quality and quantity of the oil arriving at Rome (not unlike the role of the *mensores frumentariorum*).\(^{427}\) However, Rodríguez has also

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\(^{424}\) *AE* 2002, 715-16.

\(^{425}\) This is not unreasonable, especially given the connection of Minerva to olive oil. Cf. Canto (2004: 146) and see also González Acuña (2010: 16-17) for the possibility that the area around this inscription made up a “Foro de las Corporaciones” not unlike the *Piazzale delle Corporazioni* at Ostia. Another interpretation, I would suggest, is that the pedestals were set up “in celebration of the work of [their] father (*ad cultum operis*) in honour of the *collegium*.” In this case, one could argue that the daughters are acknowledging the role of the *collegium* in their father’s professional achievements, although this is perhaps a little optimistic.

\(^{426}\) *AE* 2001, 1186. Hermesianus is also known from another inscription (*CIL* 2.1481) from Écija, located between Hispalis and Córdoba and set up by his son and grandson, in which he is also referred to as *diffusor*. In a third example (*CIL* 6.20742), from Rome, Hermesianus can be seen setting up a funerary inscription to a Iulia Zotica, his freedwoman.

\(^{427}\) Étienne (2003: 247-8), who notes that the son of Hermesianus, M. Iulius Hermes Frontinianus (*CIL* 2.1481), as well as another *diffusor* from Baetica, M. Cassius Sempronianus (*AE* 1984, 526),
argued convincingly that the role of the diffusor was actually to act as an intermediary between the olearii of Baetica and the various negotiatores or mercatores of other regions and especially Rome, specifically that is to transmit information between buyers and sellers. In any case the connection was clearly professional, indicating that the collegium did act as a single body in a professional capacity (otherwise of course, we would expect to see individual members expressing their gratitude to Hermesianus, rather than the whole body). Nor, moreover, was this an isolated case; the other inscriptions from Rome and Ostia also demonstrate the connections between the olearii and similarly well-connected men in those regions, always in the context of expressing their gratitude to those men.

Besides the dedications and their potential implications about the activities of the collegia, the only other indication of their purpose comes from the names given to the collegia either by themselves or by others. They are variously referred to as the corpus oleariorum, the negotiatores olearii, the corpus scaphariorum, the scapharii Hispalenses, the lyntrarii, the scapharii qui Romulae negotiantur, and the scapharii Romulae. There is little to be said about them naming themselves after their profession, which is after all normal practice amongst the collegia that are united by occupation, other than to highlight that their profession seems to be the only part of their identity that they chose to emphasise. Indeed, in all of the inscriptions that refer to this set of collegia, there is only one instance of the collegia acting in any capacity that is not strictly occupational, such as in a religious, burial, or social capacity. In that single instance, the (religious) activity is being carried out in honour of the collegium, rather than by its members.

can also be connected to Italian horrea thanks to their respective appearances on an amphora from Monte Testaccio (CIL 15.3897) and a brick-stamp from Ostia (CIL 15.2164; see also Taglietti, 1994: 159-60 on the mistaken transcription of this brick-stamp). On the connection of Frontinianus to Monte Testaccio, see also Rico (2003: 416-7) and Tchernia (2016: 251-2).

428 See Rodríguez (2000; 2006: esp. 355-7) for further discussion of this. Rico’s (2003: 432-3) view is broadly similar to that of Étienne, above. Canto (2004: 151-2) also suggests a third possibility, that the diffusor was a “bottler” – essentially a wholesale buyer of oil who would then repackage and distribute it locally.
429 CIL 6.1625b; 6.29722; 14.409.
430 See above, n.425.
In contrast, several other relevant inscriptions imply (at the least) that the collegia acted as a single body in a professional capacity.

NIE theory can also highlight ways in which these collegia must have had an impact on the economy in a comparable way to similar collegia in Ostia, although the theory’s usefulness here is admittedly limited, given the limited number of extant relevant inscriptions. These do not themselves specifically reveal any formal institutions that were placed upon members of the collegia, but the legal sources are worthy of mention briefly in this context. As we have discussed, the various professionals and shippers involved in the oil-trade are known to have received privileges from the authorities in return for their services to the annona, and some inscriptions do also indicate that these collegia enjoyed special connections of some description with the annona.431 In the absence of evidence of any other formal registration process, it is not unreasonable to conclude that these collegia provided a structure by means of which officials of the annona could ascertain who was eligible (as has already been suggested for the mensores frumentariorum at Ostia).432

Despite this paucity of evidence, some aspects of the collegia can also be deduced from these inscriptions that do not necessarily prove that they had an economic function but do demonstrate that members of the collegium operated within, and were subject to, an informal set of rules or institutions that were similar to those operating in the Ostian collegia. These institutions would have naturally reduced the individual transaction costs of members and of the entire group while also enforcing a certain degree of professional “good behaviour”. The three most important informal institutions identified in the previous chapter included first of all the organisational structure of the collegia, wherein members had a place in a wider hierarchy and the potential to ascend within that hierarchy, possibly enhancing their own social status or at least their personal professional development as a result. The second institution identified was the exclusivity of the collegia, whereby membership was limited to those with the same shared goal or occupation and there were benefits to that membership, therefore encouraging

431 On the scapharii and their connection to the annona, see esp. de Salvo (1992: 131).
432 See above, Chapter 3.6.iii.
“good professional behaviour”, access to a professional network and a certain amount of prestige merely by association. The third institution was the ability of the collegia to act as united bodies with their own connections to all (or many of) the members of a particular profession and especially to external, important figures whose otherwise unattainable patronage could benefit members.

The hierarchical structure of the collegia is discernible in Baetica, although only to a limited extent. Besides the role of patronus which is obviously external to the actual collegium itself, the only position that is mentioned in this group of inscriptions is that of curator, mentioned in three inscriptions. Elsewhere, the quinquennalis remains the most prominent figure, and yet there is no mention here of his position or indeed of any president, although it is perhaps possible that the curatores at Baetica acted as presidents rather than as lower magistrates. Nevertheless, there is a hierarchy within the collegia, albeit one that is rather flatter than that which we can see at Ostia. Two of the curatores, in Rome but both connected to the olearii ex Baetica, were clearly affluent men with impressive careers. C. Sentius Regulianus is of particular note: at some point he was elevated to equestrian status, having previously been diffusor for the annona and curator of the corpus oleariorum, as well as being a sevir Augustalis and a member of several other collegia around the empire. M. Iulius Hermesianus had a similarly impressive career, and his son Frontinianus can also be connected to the oil-trade, given his mention on a sherd from Monte Testaccio. It is tempting to connect these men’s success directly to their membership of the collegia (as has in fact been suggested by Verboven), but without further evidence it is very difficult to establish this for certain. As pointed out in the previous chapter, success within a collegium could just as easily be the result of success outside of it.

There is also not a huge amount of evidence to demonstrate that the collegia at Baetica operated within a system of fixed membership or that this offered them any level of prestige or exclusivity. The only people mentioned are professionals

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433 CIL 6.29722, 6.1625b; AE 2001, 186.
434 Cf. Étienne (2003: 257); CIL 15.3897.
435 Verboven (2009: 162) notes that the collegia related to the oil trade “conferred enormous prestige” upon their members, and he argues (p.164) that Regulanius’ success is particularly down to his membership and to his patronage of various collegia. Unfortunately, Verboven’s interpretation is in my view based on a rather too optimistic reading of the inscription.
from within the oil-trade and the *collegia* are named for their members’ occupations but it is impossible to be sure that membership was limited only to those active within that occupation. If one accepts, however, that the *collegia* did facilitate access to benefits and immunities then joining up would surely have been an imperative for all local professionals, if only to ensure their own eligibility to legal privileges, as well as reaping the other potential benefits of membership. It is also possible that the inscriptions set up by the daughters of Valerius were set up in a newly-built *schola* for the *collegium* and that this might have conferred a certain level of prestige upon the association, but this is hardly comparable to the level of prestige seen in the associations at Ostia.\(^{436}\)

The aspect in which these *collegia* are more comparable to those at Ostia is in the number of connections that they had, both to other professionals of the same trade and to other external contacts. *CIL* 2.1182 is a particularly good example of this, as it appears to show that the *collegia lyntrariorum* from three different areas near Hispalis (Canama, Oducia and Naeva) all operated under a single patron or, possibly, that one *collegium* was made up of professionals from all three areas. In either case, both this and the other *collegia* at Baetica clearly did bring together a number of different professionals, and this would have facilitated both the formation of trust networks and the sharing of both information and resources.

Several inscriptions, moreover, demonstrate the connections that the different *collegia* had with wealthy or important men. There can be no doubt that access to these contacts would have been useful - and indeed otherwise unattainable - for members The dedications to several important individuals (including M. Petronius Honoratus, Cn. Sentius Felix, S. Iulius Possessor, and L. Castricus Honoratus) have been discussed above; it is worth emphasising again, however, that each of them had excellent connections to the *annona* or to other professional networks, and the fact that they appear in the context of dedications suggests that they provided some kind of service to the *collegia*. Rodríguez’s suggestion that the role of the *diffusor* was to transmit information is of particular interest in this context, as it would mean (if it is correct) that information-sharing was not an

\(^{436}\) See above, n.425.
informal institution of the *collegia* but actually a formally defined process.\(^4\)\(^3\)\(^7\) Just as the *collegia* were well-placed to provide the authorities with information about their members’ eligibility for privileges, they would also be able to distribute to their members the information received from the *diffusor* or from other professionals.

Overall, although the benefits of an analysis based on NIE in a region such as Baetica are debatable, the *collegia* connected to the oil-trade here appear to be comparable to those from Ostia in several ways. There is certainly an argument to be made for the *collegia* having a fundamentally economic role, and it could be asserted further that there is little to suggest that they existed for any other reason. However, this can for the most part be inferred based on simple analysis of what the inscriptions suggest about the activities of the *collegia*, without the aid of NIE. Although NIE is a useful framework in which to think about the *collegia*, analysis of their institutional features adds little to an economic analysis of the *collegia* discussed in this section. Within this body of evidence, there is simply not enough to draw on to allow us to identify (for example) dense networks or multiplex relationships between different individuals. NIE theory remains a useful tool, I would argue, but only when it is used in combination with direct, physical evidence, rather than in place of it. That said, the implicit economic function of the *collegia* at Baetica is clear, just as it is in Ostia; the overall comparability of the *collegia* at Baetica to those at Ostia is even more evident.

5. Roman Gaul

The concentration of extant inscriptions relating to the *collegia* of Roman Gaul is second only to those of Italy. Waltzing collected 190 inscriptions from across the region; by far the greatest number comes from Lugdunum (modern Lyon) and from Narbo (Narbonne).\(^4\)\(^3\)\(^8\) Many of these refer to cult associations or to the *tria collegia principalia* - the *fabri*, *centonarii*, and *dendrophorii*, discussed above. The most extensive sample of related inscriptions, for which analysis of the

\(^{437}\) See above, n.428.

collegia and their networks is most possible, is that which relates to the collegia operating within the wine trade.

The Mediterranean terrain and climate, especially in Greece, Spain, Italy, and the southern areas of Gaul, are relatively homogeneous. Certain staples, including wine, olive oil and wheat, were grown extensively across all these areas. The quality of wine varied from region to region, and demand was high across the empire, especially in Rome; as a result, many provinces became important as both importers and exporters of wine. By the second century AD, the vineyards of southern Gaul had developed to such an extent that the region became a major producer and distributor of wine, both locally and for export. The fertile plains around Lugdunum, and the city’s importance within Roman Gaul, meant that wine traders and transporters were very active in the area and along nearby rivers, many of whom organised themselves into collegia.

These collegia included the various corpora vinariorum and corpora nautarum that transported wine and other goods up and down the Rhodanus (Rhône) and the Arar (Saône). Both groups can also be connected to other collegia, including the utricularii (land-transporters) and the corpus splendidissimum mercatorum Cisalpinorum et Transalpinorum. There were also the much larger corpora of navicularii who had a presence in harbours across the Roman world, especially at Ostia; there were also individual mercatores and negotiatores who do not appear to have belonged to any collegium. The distinction between these roles seems to be that the negotiatores were wholesalers of wine who managed both the production process and the large-scale distribution of wine, whereas mercatores bought and sold the wine for smaller markets. For the purposes of this study

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440 For evidence of wine imports at Rome and Ostia, see CIL 6.37807; CIL 6.9181; CIL 14.409.
442 Pliny remarks (Letters 8.2) that he had sold the vintages from his land to negotiatores. Legal texts discuss at length the buying and selling of wine, partly because it was a high-demand commodity but also because wine could so easily go sour during any stage of the distribution process. Hence the seller’s liability to ensure the quality of the wine was for the jurist a vexing
and in order to provide a fixed sample I shall focus in particular on the *collegia of vinarii* and *nautae* operating in and around Lugdunum, for which there are 32 extant inscriptions, summarised in the table below. Few of these inscriptions can be dated with certainty, however, it would appear on the basis of prosopographical and archaeological analysis that most of them come from the second and third centuries AD. Unless otherwise stated the dates given below are either from Wierschowski’s suggestions or by consular date.

Six inscriptions refer directly to the *corpus negotiatorum vinariorum* at Lugdunum, and four of these also mention the *corpus nautarum Araricorum*. With regards to the *collegia nautarum*, there are 25 inscriptions that refer to *nautae* operating on the Rhodanus and the Arar, most of which can be clearly identified as belonging to *collegia nautarum*. Ten refer to the *corpus nautarum Araricorum*, six others refer to the *corpus nautarum Rhodanicorum*, and five more refer to these *collegia* collectively as the *corpus nautarum Rhodanicorum et Araricorum*. One inscription refers to the *nautae Ararici et Ligerici*.

The simplest explanation is that the *nautae* up and down the Rhodanus and the Arar formed their own *collegia* and that some of them at least were also part of a

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443 The most complete surveys of the inscriptions from Gaul can be found in Krier (1981: 431-9), Kneissl (1998) and Wierschowski (1995; 2001). Kneissl (1998: 431-3) notes that, although there are no instances of the term “*corpus*” or “*collegium*” from the first century, there are nevertheless a small number of examples of traders from the first century that clearly were organised into associations (see *CIL* 11.390, 11.391, 12.1384, 12.2331, 13.941, 13.3026, 13.4481; *ILGN* 2331). The majority of *collegia*, however, and especially those involved in transport, are from the second and third centuries (see Kneissl, 1998: 434). On the *negotiatores vinarii* and their prominence in the region around Lugdunum, Kneissl (1998: 443-6) also argues that the *collegia* of both *vinarii* and *nautae* cannot have been only social societies but that their geographical spread and the connections they held must have made them economically important in their own right. Cf. also Verboven (2009: 163).

444 *CIL* 13.2033 is also given by Waltzing and is therefore included below for the sake of completeness but it is uncertain whether Murranius Verus, a *negotiator vinarius* was actually a member of the *collegium*.

445 Further inscriptions may well refer to the *collegia* (e.g. *CIL* 12.2438) but are too fragmentary to be included here.

446 Of the ten inscriptions referring to the *Ararici*, *CIL* 13.1954 is actually set up to the patron and *quinquennalis* of the *nautae Arare navigantes* and three more are set up as dedications to individual men, each of whom is called a *nauta Araricus* and who may or may not to have belonged to the *collegium*.
larger corpus Rhodanicorum et Araricorum that encompassed both collegia. Another possibility is that the collegia split apart or joined together at some point in time, but, based on known dates, the different groups appear to have been active at the same time.\textsuperscript{447} The vast majority of the inscriptions come from Lugdunum, where the Rhodanus and the Arar connect, with some also scattered up- and downstream from the city (as might be expected of a collegium of boatmen).

Table 7: Collegia related to the wine trade at Lugdunum.\textsuperscript{448}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inscription</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>corpus negotiatorum vinariorum</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.1921</td>
<td>Dedication set up to record the award of permanent high priest to S. Ligurius Marinus, the highest curator of Roman citizens at Lugdunum, quaestor and duovir. Marinus gives five denarii to the decurions, three to members of the equestrian order, the seviri and the negotiatores vinarii, and two to all others with ius coeundi. Marinus also holds public games in thanks.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE 1900, 203 = W.624</td>
<td>Dedication to unnamed sevir Augustalis at Lugdunum and Nemausus and curator of the</td>
<td>Nemausus, Narbonensis</td>
<td>2nd/3rd C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{447} CIL 12.1797 refers only to the Rhodanici and was set up in AD 119, while CIL 13.2020, referring to the Ararici, is from AD 216. The inscriptions referring to the joint collegium are also from the 2nd and 3rd centuries, indicating that all three existed together.

\textsuperscript{448} The references contained within this table are to CIL or L'\textsuperscript{Année épigraphique}. Where a second reference is given (e.g., "W.624"), it is to the relevant inscription in Wierschowki’s collection, where dates are provided whenever possible. An asterisk is used here to mark those inscriptions in which an individual’s membership of a collegium is not certain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>nobilissimi socii</strong></th>
<th>negotiatores vinarii and of the seviri at Lugdunum.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 13.2033 = W.494</strong></td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to M. Murranius Verus, trader in wine and other things.*</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>collegia vinariorum and collegia nautarum</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 13.1911 = W.443</strong></td>
<td>Dedication of a statue to C. Apronius Raptor, decurion from Trier and patron of both the corpus nautarum Ararico and the negotiatores vinarii. The statue and inscription are set up by the vinarii in honour of their patron. Raptor distributed five denarii to each of the corporati upon the erection of the statue.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 13.11179 = W.443</strong></td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to C. Apronius Raptor, patron of both corpora. Set up by his daughters, Apronia and Bellica.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>Location</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 13.1954</strong></td>
<td>Dedication to M. Inthatus Vitalis, twice curator of the <em>corpus negotiatorum vinariorum</em>, and <em>quinquennalis</em> and patron of the <em>nautae</em> sailing on the <em>Arar</em>. Patron of the local equestrians, the <em>seviri</em>, the <em>utricularii</em> and the <em>fabri</em> at Lugdunum. Also given <em>consessum cum decurionibus</em> by the <em>civitas Albensium</em>, although not a decurion. Set up by the <em>negotiatores vinarii</em>, who also dedicated statues, in return for which Vitalis distributed [...] <em>denarii</em> to each member.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 6.29722</strong></td>
<td>Dedication to C. Sentius Regulianus, equestrian <em>diffusor oleario ex Baetica</em> and curator of the same <em>corpus</em>. Also (previously?) curator and patron of the <em>negotiatores vinarii</em> at Lugdunum and patron of the <em>nautae Ararici</em> and of the <em>seviri</em>.</td>
<td>Rome</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**colegia nautarum Rhodanicarum et Araricorum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Dedication</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIL 13.2009 = W.476</strong></td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to C. Libertus Decimanus, <em>honoratus</em> of the <em>nautae Ararici</em> and <em>utricularius</em>. Set up by his wife.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>2nd/3rd C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dedication of a statue to C. Novellius Ianuarius, citizen of Vangion and <em>curator</em> and patron of the <em>nautae Ararici</em>. Set up by Novellius Faustus and Sotericus for their freedman. The place was given by decree of the <em>corpus</em>, so Faustus and Sotericus were both probably members. Ianuarius distributed three <em>denarii</em> to each member upon the erection of the statue.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CIL 13.2020</em> = W.486</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fragmentary dedication set up to an unknown man who decreed “permanent immunity on the most splendid … (<em>splendidissimum perpetuam vacationem</em>).” Set up by the <em>nautae Ararici</em>. “<em>splendidissimus</em>” is frequently used as an honorific for the <em>corpus</em>.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CIL 13.2041</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to A. Agathonis, curator of the <em>Seviri Augustales</em> and <em>nauta Araricus</em>. Set up by his client.*</td>
<td>Glanum, Narbonensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CIL 12.1005</em> = W.148</td>
<td></td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to T. Incitatus, a <em>sevir Augustalis, nauta Araricus</em> and <em>centonarius</em>, as well as</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CIL 13.1972</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.2028</td>
<td>being an honoured negotiator for the frumentum. Set up by his client.*</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 12.1797</td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to S. Placida by her husband, G. Tipurinius Sacruna, nauta Araricus.*</td>
<td>Valentia, Narbonensis</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 12.2438</td>
<td>Dedication to the most indulgent emperor Hadrian, set up by the corpus.</td>
<td>Ambarii, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.1960 = W.456</td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to C. Marius Ma[...], patron of the nautae Rhodanici sailing on the Arar, curator and patron of the Seviri Augustales. Set up by unknown.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>2nd/3rd C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.2494</td>
<td>Inscription on a (no longer extant) mausoleum set up by M. Rufius Catulus, curator of the nautae Rhodanicorum, for himself and his children.</td>
<td>Ambarii, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>Early 3rd C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.1716</td>
<td>Fragmentary inscription possibly mentioning a praefectus nautarum Rhodaicorum.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.1996</td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to L. Hilarianis Cinnamis, a citizen of Lugdunum and curator of the nautae Rhodanici. Set up by his father-in-law and friend.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.1966</td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to M. Primus Secundianus, nauta Rhodanicus on the Arar, who was also curator of the Seviri Augustales and a member of the fabri tignuarii, as well as a negotiator muriarum. Set up by his son.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.1967</td>
<td>Funerary inscription set up to C. Primus Secundus, Sevir Augustalis, curator of the corpus nautarum Rhodanicorum and member of the fabri tignuarii, as well as a negotiator muriarum. Set up by his son and heir.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.2002</td>
<td>Dedication in honour of the nautae Rhodanici, with sportulae of three denarii given to each nauta. Set up by C. Iulius Sabinianus, nauta Rhodanicus.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIL 13.1688</td>
<td>Dedication to L. Besius Superior, Roman equestrian and patron of the nautae and of other collegia.</td>
<td>Lugdunum, Lugudunensis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is little to be learned about the activities or function of the *vinarii* from these inscriptions; most are set up by other individuals and simply make brief reference to the *collegium*. The only two inscriptions set up by the *collegium* itself are *CIL* 13.1911 and 13.1954; both are used to dedicate a statue to a wealthy patron in return for which he distributed *sportulae* to all the members. In celebration of becoming high priest, S. Ligurius Marinus also gave a special dispensation of *sportulae* to members of the *collegium*.449 Nothing else is known about the members other than that they were presumably *negotiatores* and that their *collegium* headquarters may have been in the civilian settlements near to military camps (*canabae*) at Lugdunum, since three inscriptions note that they were *consistentes in canabis*.450 There is no indication in the inscriptions of group

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449 *CIL* 13.1921.
burial or religious worship, nor any direct reference to feasting, suggesting that they were not common activities. On the other hand, the giving of *sportulae* was commonly associated with feasting, so a social aspect to the *collegium* does here seem likely.

The more detailed evidence for the *nautae* permits slightly more insight into their activities. Five inscriptions are set up to patrons of the *collegia*, all of whom are wealthy local elites. *CIL* 13.2020 also notes that Ianuarius (patron and *curator* of the *nautae* *Ararici*) distributed *sportulae* to the members after they had dedicated a statue to him, similarly to the *vinarii*. The *nautae* can also be seen making dedications to others, however, including one to an unknown benefactor who appears to have bestowed permanent immunity upon the *collegium* (presumably from some sort of tax) and another to Hadrian their “most indulgent” *princeps*. These dedications to people external to the *collegium* are perhaps indicative of the *collegium* being in debt to their benefactors.

The dedication to Hadrian is particularly notable, as it comes from a bend in the river at Valentia, some distance from Lugdunum and the seat of the *collegium*, a strange place indeed for a monument to the emperor. Hadrian did not visit the province until 121, two years after the dedication was inscribed, so it cannot be merely an act of flattery.451 Tran has proposed that it might have been set up in thanks to the imperial administration for reducing or removing a toll or customs-tax on the boatmen at that location.452 This proposal is intriguing; Tran’s suggestion that the marble base is testament to the relationship between the *collegium* and the emperor is somewhat far-fetched – it seems less than likely that the emperor would be very concerned with a *collegium* of boatmen in Gaul – although more sensible perhaps is the idea that the monument could be the result of the *collegium* petitioning the authorities. This makes sense and is not without parallel.453

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451 In any case the location, far from Lugdunum, prohibits this suggestion. Tran (2011: 202–4) also notes that the monument is unlikely to have been displaced, perhaps to be used as ballast by the boatmen: it is much too heavy.
452 Tran (2011: 213)
453 For further discussion, especially of parallels, see Tran (2011: 204-9).
CIL 13.2494, which only survives in fragments and in drawings, might also indicate activities that are more traditionally associated with the *collegia*, namely burial and socialising. Attached to a mausoleum set up by a *curator* of the *nautae Rhodanici* beside the river, the inscription records the completion of the tomb and specifies that a feast should be given and *sportulae* distributed on the 14th of every month with thirty days in it. The recipients of the feast and *sportulae* are not named but the members of the *collegium* are likely candidates.

Our final indication of the activities of the *collegia* is given in CIL 12.3316-7, which record forty places at the theatre in Nemausus being given to the *nautae Rhodanici et Ararici*. As we have noted, *collegia* are typically thought of primarily (based on the evidence of feasting and gift-giving) as social clubs, and while it is probably naïve to imagine organised group-outings to the theatre, such reserved seats do fit well within this narrative. Certainly there is enough evidence to be confident that there was a strong social element to the association of the *nautae*, which, despite common modern conceptions, is not always the case amongst *collegia*.

At this point, we can move beyond examination of what the inscriptions directly reveal about the purpose and activities of the *collegia* to consider instead the kinds of transaction costs to which the various *negotiatores* and *nautae* were subject, and also to consider in particular how the organisation of the *collegium* created institutions that subsequently eased such transaction costs. Unlike the set of inscriptions from the previous section, the inscriptions in this section do not immediately reveal economic connections between the *collegia* and others, such as the *annona*. Although several are dedicated to wealthy or important elites, the reasons for those dedications are not given and their connection with the wine trade is not specified. To see professional interactions behind these connections – such as underlies (for example) Tran’s proposal that the monument to Hadrian is the result of the *collegium* successfully petitioning the authorities – requires too much inference and not a little guesswork.

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454 For detailed description and interpretation of the inscription and the mausoleum, see Buisson (1991: 141-58).
Wine was an altogether different commodity to oil in the Roman Empire because, unlike oil or other staples, its continuous supply was not a major concern of the emperor until Aurelian supposedly added it to the *annona* in 270-275.\(^{456}\) Nevertheless, it was a staple throughout the empire and features heavily in legal sources as a result.\(^{457}\) Gaius notes that the problem with regulation (specifically with regulation over prices), and the reason that this is based on “the discretion of the judge”, are that “prices of goods vary from region to region, especially of wine, oil and grain”.\(^{458}\) Professionals in the oil and grain trade, however, were somewhat protected by the fact that the officials of the *annona* had a direct interest in the overall honesty of their profession.

The buying and selling of wine was a fraught process that, despite the volume of legislation, must have entailed a wide number of transaction costs for the professionals involved. On the one hand, the regulations described by Gaius above suggest that provincial or regional judges took an interest in the price of wine and that therefore there were formal institutions upon traders, fixing prices and reducing the information-sourcing transaction costs of buyers. On the other hand, this was only one of the transaction costs to which traders were subject and the regulations also serve to highlight the variation between different areas. Responsibility for ensuring the absolute quality and quantity of goods ultimately rested with the *negotiatores vinarii* and the various other professionals with whom they worked, so that, arguably more than ever, trust networks and the overall reputation of sellers must have been crucial.

Drawing upon the central tenet of NIE that “all institutions matter”, it is clear that the *collegia* in and around Lugdunum were well-suited to provide that professional network. The *collegia of vinarii* and *nautae* both exhibit the hierarchical structure that was previously identified as an important institution of

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\(^{456}\) *HA, Aur.* 48.1. On the emperors’ disregard for the importance of wine, see, e.g., Augustus’ rebuke to the populace when they complained about the cost of wine (*Suetonius, Aug.* 42): Augustus instead reminded the people of the aqueducts he had commissioned to stop them from going thirsty. In a rescript, Marcus Aurelius and Verus refuse to get involved in a dispute over a wine transaction, stating instead that “it is in the power of the contracting parties” (*in contrahentium potestate*): *Digest* 18.1.71 (Papirius).

\(^{457}\) See Frier (1983: 257-95, esp. 258-9).

\(^{458}\) *Digest* 13.4.3.
the collegia at Ostia, affording members the chance to exist within a hierarchy outside the pre-determined social structure that was handed down by the elite and possibly to ascend that hierarchy, bettering their own lives (and status) in the process. In the inscriptions referring to the vinarii the only titles mentioned are patronus and curator, with other members referred to as corporati. Like the olearii, it seems that the corpus vinariorum operated within a fairly flat structure. CIL 6.29722 and 13.11179 are familiar from the previous section, referring to C. Sentius Regulianus. Before finding such great success as a member and then patron of the corpus oleariorum, Regulianus was also curator and patron of the vinarii at Lugdunum, where his daughters eventually set up a funerary monument to him. It is tempting to associate Regulianus’ success with his membership and patronage of the collegia, as Verboven does, and imagine that, joining the vinarii as an ordinary negotiatores and working his way up the ranks, he eventually outgrew the collegium and even graduated to the oil-trade before finding similar success and finally reaching equestrian status.459 Of course it cannot be proven that the hierarchy of the collegia facilitated the career of Regulianus but this example does again show that one’s civic status was at least mirrored by one’s position within the collegia; I would argue that it is not unreasonable to assume that the two were intertwined.

A more developed hierarchy is manifest amongst the nautae, and this might simply be the result of the greater number of inscriptions. Curator and patronus are both common here too but there is also mention of a quinquennalis, an honoratus and a praefectus of the nautae, all of which were fairly common titles amongst other collegia, especially those at Ostia. L. Helvius Frugi is a particularly interesting figure, as he was curator of the nautae Ararici twice before becoming their patron. He was also duovir of Vienna, indicating a successful career indeed. C. Novellius Ianuarius is another example of a curator who becomes patron, while M. Inthatius Vitalis also becomes patron after first serving as quinquennalis, suggesting that this was not an entirely unusual progression.

The exclusivity of the collegia is manifest in several inscriptions that record the distribution of sportulae, including CIL 13.2002, which records C. Iulius

Sabinianus, a *nauta Rhodanicus*, distributing three *denarii* to each of the boatmen (“*in honorem nautarum Rhodanicorum … locus datus decreto nautarum Rhodanicorum*”, which might also indicate the location of their *schola*). Neither this gift nor the other distributions of *sportulae* specify different amounts based on rank; rather all the *corporati* appear to have been rewarded equally. The allotment of 40 theatre seats to the *nautae Ararici* is another privilege of membership and might also indicate the size of that *collegium*.

Certainly for non-members there were obvious incentives to join a *collegium* if they were eligible. Within the *collegium* there were opportunities for advancement and for remuneration, as well as interaction with colleagues in a number of different settings. Rather than spending time seeking out *negotiator* or *nautae* who could be trusted to ensure the quality of their goods, members could simply turn to their colleagues in the *collegium*. If looking to make a deal or to air a dispute, the *collegium* was the obvious place in which to do it, as good behaviour would be naturally enforced through the density of the network, where more than just professional ties connected the members. Equally, if an issue affected several members, what better way to tackle it than with the joint support of the larger group? The iteration of all of these informal institutions does not in itself prove that the members relied on the *collegia* professionally in the way described, but rather it demonstrates that it was economically rational for them to do so. If we accept Tran’s proposal about the monument to Hadrian being the result of petitioning and group-action, moreover, it would appear that that is exactly what the *corporati* did.

Before closing, it is also worth examining the connections of the *collegia* to other groups and to important individuals that would likely be inaccessible to ordinary traders. Both the *vinarii* and the *nautae* can be frequently connected to other *collegia*, as well as to each other, usually through a shared patron. The most common link is to the *collegium utriculariorum*, whose members’ precise occupation is uncertain but appears to be related to transport, perhaps specifically to the overland transport of wine.\(^{460}\) If this was indeed the occupation of the

\(^{460}\) The scholarship is usefully summarised by Liu (2009: 136-7), who notes that an *utricularius* was originally considered by scholars to make or deal in skin bags for holding liquids, including
members, then the connections between the *collegia* could have proven very helpful for *negotiatores* needing to source trustworthy services. The patronage of local elites such as L. Besius Superior, L. Tauricus Florens and Q. Iulius Severianus, all three of whom appear to have been connected with local government in Gaul, cannot have done any harm either for the status of the *collegia* or for their prosperity. Most impressive of all are the connections of both *collegia* to C. Apronius Raptor and M. Inthatius Vitalis and of the *nautae* to L. Helvius Frugi, each of whom held important positions amongst the political elite in Trier, Alba Helvorum, and Vienna. The patronage of these men is striking, given that their primary focus must have been on the regions in which they held office. Then again, both Vitalis and Frugi had previously been active in the *collegia* themselves, as *curatores*; one explanation is that these men represented the interests of the *vinarii* or the *nautae* in their own regions.

Altogether, the *collegia* directly involved in the wine trade around Lugdunum present a useful sample for analysis based on NIE. Unlike the *olearii* at Baetica, a straightforward reading of the inscriptions does not suggest that the *corpora vinariorum et nautarum* were actors in the local economy. Rather, they appear to have been engaged in the fairly traditional activities with which *collegia* have commonly been associated. Examining the *collegia* from an institutional point of view, however, has yielded more interesting results, as I have demonstrated; the organisation of the *collegia*, the density of their networks and their connections to other “actors” must have made them a formidable force within the marketplace at Lugdunum, if the members chose to make use of them.

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wine. They were subsequently thought to have sailed rafts with inflated skins, but Kneissl (1981: 169-204) suggested they used the skins for transporting wine and other liquids themselves, based particularly on two *tesserae* that depict skin bags and belonged to the *collegium utriculariorum* (*CIL* 12.136* and 12.283*, previously considered forgeries) and on the fact that a good deal of the evidence for the *utricularii* came from areas away from rivers. See also Broekaert (2011: 229) for the intriguing suggestion that the *tesserae* were worn by *collegiati* as a sign to potential customers of their trustworthiness.

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461 *CIL* 13.1688, 13.1695, 13.1972. As patrons, the men had an interest in the success of the *collegia* and were well placed, considering their position in the local hierarchy, to assist them in a variety of ways.
6. Conclusion

Overall, the collegia considered within this chapter suggest that the professional associations of Ostia were not unique in the western empire. Like Ostia, there is little in the way of direct evidence for economic activity but it is repeatedly hinted at in the types of dedications and connections that they made and in the way in which they were organised. In contrast, although each collegium above does appear to have engaged in activities that might be considered external to their trade, such as group worship or socialising, references to this kind of activity are rare and there is little to indicate that activities such as these were ever the central interest of the collegia. Moreover, the size and complexity of collegia like the fabri, the way in which the various nautae were spread out along the riverbank or, indeed, the types of dedications that they made to important figures, are features that would seem to reject an interpretation of the collegia as merely social clubs. Rather, the religious and social aspects that existed can be better thought of as activities that enhanced the density of each network, increasing the informal institutions that affected the behaviour of members and of each collegium. With the exception, perhaps, of the collegia involved in the oil-trade at Baetica, the economic role of each collegium is mostly theoretical, based on the tenets of NIE, but convincing nevertheless. Like Ostia, however, the fact that we have access only to epigraphic evidence means that there is little empirical data to support our analyses. For that, we must look to other types of evidence and therefore to Egypt.
This final chapter of the thesis will focus on papyrological evidence from Roman Egypt. In the introduction, I discussed several problems of methodology that have affected the historiography of collegia in the Roman Empire from its earliest inception. These include but are not limited to issues surrounding the “messy taxonomy” of collegia, which do not fit neatly into any one category but are often talked about as such; uncertainties surrounding the social status of members; an over reliance on certain, individual documents to explain the activities of all collegia; the anachronistic use of the term “guild” and the damaging effect this has had on scholarship; and, latterly, a tendency to use the evidence from Egypt to plug gaps in our other evidence and to speak for the eastern and even the western empire with little justification or discussion of the problems inherent to this approach.

Most of these methodological issues have already been dealt with but it is worth turning to papyri before closing to examine the way in which this body of evidence can and – I believe – should be used, at least comparatively, to answer questions about the economic role of collegia more widely. More importantly, I seek to expose the flawed methodology of simply using papyri where convenient. Rather, we must consider the papyrological evidence in a holistic way and, vitally, we must properly justify its use within the context of the Western Roman Empire, especially given the common perception of Roman Egypt as unique. It is crucial to realise and emphasise that, at best, the papyrological material should be used for comparative study only, rather than as some sort of extension of the evidence available from the West.

With that in mind I will begin the chapter by addressing the on-going debate about the typicality of Egypt in the Roman world. I will argue that there can be no perfect resolution to this debate and that Egypt was both like and unlike the rest of the empire in a myriad of ways. I will then examine a selection of papyri that refer to associations in direct comparison with the epigraphic evidence of western collegia. Specifically, I will argue that there are distinct similarities between the two that do justify using the evidence of Egyptian associations as a comparative body with which to better understand collegia. In the final section, I will
demonstrate the economic function and activities of the Egyptian associations, with some brief discussion of how this might affect our perception of the *collegia*. In my overall conclusion, and with the comparative body of papyrological evidence in mind, I will then return to several points of discussion raised throughout the thesis. I will argue that the evidence from papyri can usefully explain, or at least shed light on, many of the more difficult to understand features of the *collegia*.

1. The Typicality of Egypt

It is fair to say that, amongst the rather select group of scholars arguing for an institutional approach to *collegia* or for general acknowledgment of their role in local economies, there has been a tendency to focus on the evidence that fits most easily into the theoretical framework.\(^{462}\) Faced with the limitations of epigraphic evidence, the same inscriptions from across the empire have been repeatedly pored over, analysed and reanalysed to demonstrate features that might point towards the *collegia* acting like guilds or other economic bodies. There are significant problems with this kind of approach that limit the applicability of each study. Some scholars have chosen to focus only on particular regions, and especially on Egypt, in order to take advantage of the different types of evidence available in those areas, but their conclusions are again limited as a result.\(^{463}\)

It is certainly tempting to combine the two approaches and to use the papyrological evidence from Egypt to supplement the epigraphy. Indeed, certain scholars have done this to very useful effect, albeit sometimes in a flawed way. Broekaert, for example, argues convincingly that Roman *collegia* provided merchants with a means and structure to operate, which was otherwise lacking in the pre-industrial world, frequently using evidence from papyri to provide the most direct examples. Broekaert’s study, however, is otherwise focused on the West and particularly on Rome and by using evidence that seems so out of

\(^{462}\) Notable exceptions include van Nijf (1997); Royden (1988); Tran (2006); Liu (2009), each of whom use comprehensive databases to study the *collegia* in a holistic way. Cf. also Chapter 2.4, below.

\(^{463}\) E.g. van Minnen (1987); Muhs (2001); Venticinque (2010).
context, with no real justification, the argument is somewhat undermined.\footnote{See, in particular, Broekaert (2011: 234-237); cf. also, Verboven (2011: 190).}
Similarly, Hawkins’ thesis relies heavily on papyri to provide some of his most convincing data but, again, the problem of whether we can or should use evidence from Egypt to supplement that from outside the province is not dealt with.\footnote{Hawkins (2016: 73); Venticinque (2010). Cf. also Cannata (2012: 608), who treats the collegia and Egyptian “guilds” as synonymous.}
Bearing in mind the methodological problems already inherent to the subject of collegia, it is vital that we address now the issue of how useful Egyptian evidence can be. Before we can legitimately use papyri to augment the evidence, we must first examine whether or not it is relevant to a study such as this.

Egypt's typicality in the Roman Empire has been much debated. In the introduction to ‘The Oxford Handbook to Roman Egypt’, Riggs notes that:

> “Current opinion rejects the view of early twentieth-century scholarship that Egypt held a special, anomalous position in the Roman Empire, but at the same time cautions that the documentation available for Egypt is distinct to Egypt, and not necessarily applicable to other Roman provinces.”\footnote{Riggs (2012: 5).}

It is true that the use of Egyptian evidence to enhance our knowledge of even the eastern provinces is fraught with problems, let alone using it to discuss Italy or the West. On the other hand, Bagnall argued in a seminal work that ancient historians have a tendency (wrongly) to ignore Egypt:

> “Some historians have dealt with a bad conscience brought on by ignoring the papyri through rationalisations that Egypt was a world apart and can be left out of account.”\footnote{Bagnall (1995: 2).}

Bagnall suggests that the debate has been largely driven by self-interest and that ancient historians, “lacking expertise in the papyri”, have too often downplayed its relevance, while papyrologists have emphasised its usefulness.\footnote{Bagnall (1995: 11-12).}
In order to place the discussion in context, the main points of the debate are outlined in footnotes below but I would argue that, for the purposes of this thesis at least, the debate surrounding the typicality of Egypt is actually of secondary importance. It is clear that the uniqueness of Egypt as a Roman province is overstated but this does not mean that the evidence from papyri can be justifiably used to plug gaps in our understanding of the Roman economy, wherever it is convenient. Rather, I would argue that Egypt should be used for comparative study to improve our overall understanding of associative life in the ancient world and to help demonstrate what might have been the situation in the West, whilst at the same time acknowledging the many differences that did exist.

Today, the overall argument against using papyri as evidence for the wider empire or even as a comparative body of evidence is mostly an argument from silence (in that those who doubt its relevance simply do not tend to use it, or include heavy caveats where they do). It can, however, essentially be summarised into two parts. The first argues that the pattern of evidence from Egypt is just too different from the rest of the empire. According to this, it is impossible to compare the detailed information from papyrological sources, such as the census data from Egypt, with the impressions gleaned from less detailed documents in the rest of the empire and, therefore, it is impossible to know whether Egypt was at all like other provinces. The second is concerned with Egypt’s fairly late addition to the empire and the fact that it already had a highly developed Ptolemaic bureaucracy that would not have needed much altering or, at the very least, would have taken a considerable amount of time to change in any significant way.⁴⁶⁹

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⁴⁶⁹ The earliest contributions to this debate are usefully summarised by Lewis (1970: 3-14), who goes some way towards rejecting previous notions of Ptolemaic continuity in Roman Egypt and emphasises that, “Roman rule brought changes more fundamental and sweeping than we have hitherto generally acknowledged” (1970: 5), focusing particularly on administrative reforms, changes to taxation and to land ownership. Lewis (1984: 1077-1084) develops on this, admitting that in the context of the traditional ways and values of the villages across Egypt, the changes to Roman rule would have had little effect but that, nevertheless, “the hard headed Roman, looking dispassionately at the administrative organization of Egypt under Augustus, would have no trouble recognizing the usual pattern of Roman provincial government”; (cf. also Brunt, 1975, 124; Bowman, 1976, 160). In stark contrast, Finley (1973: 98) refers to “the extreme and untypical case of Egypt” and later adds in reference to papyri that, “all this documentation is largely misleading in the study of ancient history” (1999: 34). Bagnall (1995: 2), however, accuses Finley of wilfully ignoring papyrological evidence to avoid his argument being undermined and, indeed, one only
The argument based on a different pattern of evidence is less convincing as time goes on, at least as it applies specifically to the existence of detailed written documentation. Bagnall noted in the 1990s that recent finds from Vindolanda and Petra demonstrated that Egypt was not alone, either in its written documentation or in its levels of bureaucracy, and I would add to these the caches of papyri found in Judea that are of similar content to many documentary Egyptian papyri, including land ownership deeds, transaction receipts and various petitions.\footnote{Bagnall (1995: 12). See Naphtali, Yadin and Greenfield (1989) on the Bar Kokhba papyri from Judea.} Also, in Pompeii, the Murecine tablets refer to the financial transactions of the Sulpicici in some detail, in another example of the way that people around the empire did record the same kind of minutiae that can be found on papyri.\footnote{See Chapter 4.3, above.}

The second point is more problematic, as it is certainly clear that Egypt was administered differently from other provinces to some extent and that many Ptolemaic structures remained in place at the local level.\footnote{Bowman and Rathbone (1992: 108).} Then again, the pre-existing structures of any province would have remained pervasive, just as they did in Egypt but, as Lewis notes, “no province could be administered for centuries by Romans without Roman influences being brought to bear on local law.”\footnote{Lewis and Reinhold (1990: 282).} The central question to ask for the purposes of this study is whether Egypt resisted all forms of gradual “Romanisation” during the early empire in ways that other provinces did not.\footnote{See Rathbone (2013: 75) on the way in which the concept of “Romanisation”, as it was used by Lewis and Reinhold (1990: 282), has since been deconstructed. It is used here, nevertheless, for want of better terminology.} Numerous studies have compared political and economic aspects of Ptolemaic Egypt to Roman Egypt and noted that there were clear changes effected by the imperial takeover. Change does not necessarily mean conformity to the Roman norm, if indeed such a thing existed, or complete...
“typicality” but I would again emphasise that Egypt does not need to be “typical” of Roman provinces in order to have comparable aspects.  

2. Different but the Same

The more direct examples of “Romanisation”, so to speak, are well known. Although Egypt was governed differently to most other provinces – by an equestrian prefect rather than a senator – this was nevertheless a substantial change from the Ptolemaic period. For Egypt, it represented the beginning of a shift towards administrative structures and practices, which made use of Ptolemaic institutions but that were ultimately part of a distinctly Roman legal framework. At the national level, Roman equestrians replaced many of the Ptolemaic elites within the political structure, while those that remained in-post often had their roles reduced. The large army stationed in Egypt after its annexation was also mostly composed of non-Egyptians, commanded by Roman equestrians.

The system of administrative nomes was, admittedly, retained, meaning that local administration remained fairly intact. Egypt was not a single, homogenous state but a collection of over forty different regions, each with their own histories, customs and, importantly, variable degrees of interaction with the Roman administration. Before annexation, moreover, the different nomes had also had very different experiences of Hellenistic administration and cultural practices. However, there were also wider changes to land ownership and the taxation system that would have undermined existing power structures and created new elites, even at the local level. Specifically, Augustus adapted existing (Ptolemaic) land categories in small but crucial ways to bring them in line with the more

476 It was also less a case of special treatment being applied to Egypt and more an example of Augustus’ fear of Egypt being controlled by his enemies.
478 For example, Bowman and Rathbone (1992: 110) note that although the position of dioiketes (finance minister) survived, “the post was redefined into obscurity.”
Roman categories of *ager publicus* and *ager privatus*. Augustus sold off parcels of state land and formalised the rights of ownership of catoecic land (previously granted to military settlers) so that it could also be formally transferred from one individual to another. In doing this, he effectively created a propertied class in Egypt, who were obliged by their wealth to perform a liturgic function, as was common practice in other provinces. These liturgies were mostly administrative and gradually replaced the local administrative positions in terms of their function.

Besides paying taxes on land (known as *tributum soli*), Egyptians were also subject to a poll tax (*tributum capitis*). The tax itself cannot be considered a Romanising feature – it had not been used before in either Egypt or Rome – but the accompanying status gradations were distinctly Roman in style, as Roman citizens were of course exempt, along with those living in Alexandria. The enhanced status given to Roman citizens would naturally have elevated Roman culture and practice above others, creating a cultural “ideal” for others to aim towards, while the formalisation of the existing disparity between those in Alexandria (non-Egyptians) and those in the surrounding countryside (Egyptians) would have had a similar effect. Further division was also made between ordinary

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481 For public land, the change was little more than nominal, as although the *ge basilike* gradually came to be known as *ge demosia*, it continued to be administered according to existing practices, namely that state land was rented out in portions and the yields taxed. Changes to private land were more complicated. It is unclear how much private land existed before annexation beyond small plots but it is clear that it grew quite substantially under Roman rule (cf. in particular, Rathbone, 1993: 84; 2013; Monson, 2006: 110-14). Bowman (2008 [1996]: 694) notes that it might have increased by up to 50% in some areas, although the evidence shows distinct variation across different areas with 63% of private land recorded in Apollonopolites Heptakomias (Upper Egypt Nome) in the early 2nd century compared to 29% in Hiera Nosos (Fayum): *W. Chr.* 341 (c. AD 113-120) and *P. Bouriant* 42 (AD 166-7).


483 Rathbone (1993: 85). It is worth noting that, in recent years, Rathbone (2013, 83-7) has updated his thinking on this, based on arguments put forward by Monson (2006, 110-114) that downplayed the extent to which privatisation was initially introduced by the Romans. Rathbone (2013) also acknowledges that the so-called liturgists of his earlier thesis may well have been paid a salary but that nevertheless they did replace the administrative positions, previously held by local Ptolemaic elites.

484 Monson (2006: 271); Bowman and Rathbone (1992: 112). The greater emphasis placed on one’s status in Augustan Egypt certainly seems typical of the situation in the rest of the empire.

villagers and metropolites (residents of the administrative capital of each nome) in favour of the metropolites, who were only required to pay a reduced tax, privileging urban trade.\(^{486}\) As Monson put it, “The impact of Roman rule was to undermine the hierarchical power structures of the former Hellenistic kingdom and to empower a larger and more dispersed network of urban elites.”\(^{487}\)

Altogether, while Egypt retained many of its features after annexation, it also changed drastically. Administrative and economic changes were followed by gradual cultural influences, such as changes in dress, food and burial practices, as well as advances in infrastructure, transmitted most likely by the non-native Roman army and by traders.\(^{488}\) Imports and exports flourished, as ships from Egypt supplied Rome with the vast majority of its grain and returned with wine, textiles and other luxuries from Rome and the wider empire, leading to greater commercial prominence for Alexandria.\(^{489}\) The second century also saw a rise in the kind of large-scale building projects familiar from elsewhere in the empire, including in particular the enormous theatre at Oxyrhynchus and a number of bathhouses and temples.\(^{490}\)

3. Associations in Egypt – The Evidence from Papyri

Within this context, it was also common for individual traders and craftsmen to form associations in Egypt. Admittedly, this was not an imperial change, as associations existed in Egypt long before its absorption into the empire just as they did across the Graeco-Roman world; as Muhs notes, however, associations do appear to have been influenced by Hellenistic traditions and were comparable to those across the Graeco-Roman world, at least in terms of their social role, and indeed the similarities are only likely to have become more acute after Egypt became a Roman province.\(^{491}\) The functions and activities of the associations in

\(^{486}\) Rathbone (1993: 87).
\(^{487}\) Monson (2006: 271). It should be noted that Monson’s argument is, overall, downplaying the impact that annexation had on Egypt, although he does accept these effects of the poll-tax. For further debate and discussion of Monson’s arguments, see Rathbone (2013: 76-80).
\(^{488}\) Rathbone (2007: 718).
\(^{489}\) Rathbone (2007: 710).
\(^{491}\) Muhs (2001: 5) notes distinct similarities between the regulations of associations from Graeco-Roman Egypt (e.g. P.Mich. 5.244 (Tebtynis, AD 43) lines 3-4) and those from elsewhere (e.g. CIL
Roman Egypt were diverse but included familiar pursuits, such as feasting, social support in the form of burial provision and group religious activity, as well as a clear focus on improving the economic situation for both the individual members and the group as a whole.\textsuperscript{492}

Nevertheless, despite specific similarities between the Egyptian and western associations, they still operated in different cultural contexts. Even if Egypt should be considered representative as an Eastern province, the use of papyri as evidence to speak for the collegia in the Western provinces and especially in Rome and Italy remains fraught with problems. I would argue instead that the value of Egypt for this thesis lies in its potential for comparative study.\textsuperscript{493} In 2002, van Nijf used the evidence of 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} century Dutch guilds to form a comparative model for collegia as a way of widening the discussion and to help suggest what the urban reality of collegia might have been, whilst also being mindful of the differences between the two.\textsuperscript{494} Based on this approach, van Nijf argued convincingly that both collegia and Dutch guilds provided people of “middling status” with opportunities for integration into the wider, hierarchical structure.\textsuperscript{495} It is worth noting that, while there may be less evidence available, Roman Egypt is surely more comparable to Roman Italy and other parts of the West than 16\textsuperscript{th}/17\textsuperscript{th} century Holland.

As Liu and Verboven have both noted in critiquing other works, turning to the papyri out of frustration at the lack of detail in epigraphic material is hardly a methodologically sound approach.\textsuperscript{496} By analysing the papyrological material entirely in isolation from the Western epigraphy, I hope to avoid this trap of misusing Egyptian evidence as Roman evidence. That said, I have previously noted the way in which some scholars, in discussing the western collegia, have too often remained tied only to the extant evidence and as a result have placed too

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{492} See Chapter 1.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{493} Cf. Kehoe (1989: 154); Frier (1989: 219); Hickey (2009: 502-7); Liu (2009: 13) for a range of similar approaches.
  \item \textsuperscript{494} Van Nijf (2002: 306-7 and \textit{passim}).
  \item \textsuperscript{495} Van Nijf (2002: 307).
  \item \textsuperscript{496} Liu (2009: 15); Verboven (2011: 190).
\end{itemize}
much focus on the burial, religious or social elements of the associations, rather than thinking carefully about the limitations of their evidence. Egypt, with its different body of evidence but strong ties to Rome, as well as its many professional and religious associations, provides an excellent opportunity to test the more theoretical aspects of my argument. 497

Before turning to the papyri, it is worth reviewing the ancient Greek terminology. There are several words used essentially to refer to associations or to their members, not unlike the Latin, including ὀργεών, θίασος, ἐταιρεία, ἕρανος, συνεργασία, πλήθος and κοινόν. 498 Attempts have been made to apply different functions to each of these, although, like collegium and corpus in Latin, the words are used fairly interchangeably to refer to associations that identify as professional or religious but often include both elements. 499 In the papyri, συνεργασία, σύνοδος, πλήθος and κοινόν are particularly common terms used to refer to the associations, which presents complications in that both κοινόν and πλήθος can also be used more generally to refer to any form of grouping. There is also a tendency to skip the collective noun altogether and refer simply to members “of the weavers” or “of the donkey drivers”. In both of these cases, it is usually necessary to infer their status as an association from textual context. 500

In modern works, the word “guild” is commonly used to refer to the Egyptian associations in English. 501 This is quite unlike the scholarship on western collegia of course, where “guild” remains a controversial and problematic term, and

498 See also Kloppenborg (1996: 17-20); van Nijf (1997: 8-10).
499 Cf. van Nijf (1997: 10, 47); Ascough et al. (2012: 2-5). See also Chapter 1.1.
500 Cf. for example, O.Fay 14-15 (Euhemeria c. AD 1): “To Maron, secretary (γραμματεύς) of the donkey-drivers”; P. Mich 5.313 (Tebtynis, AD 37): “elders of the public cultivators (δημοσίων γεωργῶν) of the same village, and Harmiysis, son of Orseus, secretary of the cultivators (γραμματεύς γεωργῶν)”; P.Mich. 2.121 recto 4.vi (Tebtynis AD 42): “president and secretary of the weavers (γερδιών)”; SB 16. 2646 (Oxyrhynchus, AD 326/7): “Hermias, secretary of the fullers (γραμματεύς κναφέων”. Unlike the Murecine tablets, which also referred to groups of traders in the plural, the papyri mention positions and titles that are well known from other Egyptian associations, making the identification of these groups as formal associations much clearer.
501 E.g. Daniel (1979); van Minnen (1987: 48-9); Venticinque (2010); Haighton (2010: 32); Cf. also Muhs (2001: 3). French and Italian scholars also use similarly anachronistic terms (e.g. “corps de métiers” in French, “corporazioni” in Italian and “Gilde” in German), demonstrating the way in which the same problems exist throughout the body of scholarship. See e.g. Tran (2006, 13); de Robertis (1973).
indeed this difference is probably reflective of the fact that, unlike the West, there is little doubt regarding the economic focus of associations in Egypt. On the other hand, this should perhaps make us wary – the passive acceptance of Egyptian associations’ economic aspects is not unlike the way in which western collegia were primarily seen in the past as “burial societies”, thanks to the prominence of epigraphic evidence for western collegia (which naturally emphasises funerary aspects). Is it the case, then, that the survival of mainly papyrological evidence from Egypt has also skewed our perception of the associations’ activities? I would argue that the use of such loaded terms is unhelpful, at best, and at worst may perpetuate the idea that Egyptian associations were entirely atypical. For the purposes of this chapter, I will use only the word “association” when referring to those in Egypt, in order to distinguish them from the western collegia.

The papyri discussed in this section come from the period of the principate, unless stated otherwise. It is not an exhaustive collection of all associations in Graeco-Roman Egypt but rather focuses on those that were clearly engaged in economic activity. This does not undermine the sample, of course, as the aim of this chapter is not to examine whether or not certain Egyptian associations were economic – this is self-evident from the papyri – but rather to examine in detail those that clearly were economic, from a comparative point of view. Most of the examples are drawn from the database held on ‘The Papyrological Navigator’, selected based on their use of the terminology referred to above, combined with direct reference to a shared occupation. Those that refer to members of associations simply by naming their trade, such as the weavers or donkey drivers noted above, without any direct reference to a formal association are naturally much more difficult to identify, although searching the metadata for modern terms, such as

502 See Chapter 2.2, above.
503 Like those in the West, Egyptian associations often label themselves either as religious or professional, although their overall taxonomy is usually blurred in a similar way to the collegia. For the sake of overall comparison, I refer to both types of association here, noting the distinctions where relevant. Muhs (2001: 4-5) notes that despite attempts to align religious associations with Egyptian culture and professional with Greek (e.g. de Cenival, 1972: 140-1; Muszynski, 1977: 145-6, based particularly on examples from early papyri (c. 6th C. BC) of associations with a nominal religious function), such distinctions are often blurred (e.g. P.Berl. dem. 3115: an association of Theban priests who made their living as “water-pourers”).
“guild” or “association” is helpful to an extent. Again, the purpose of this chapter is not to attempt an exhaustive analysis of all the associations in Egypt but rather to demonstrate that, unlike the western world, Egypt does yield professional associations that had a clear economic focus and that, crucially, these same associations can be closely compared to contemporary professional collegia.  

Table 8: Papyri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Provenance</th>
<th>Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRYL 4</td>
<td>25-1 BC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Receipt issued to the Petosiris and the other members of an association of gravediggers, acknowledging their payment of tax on drugs from the serapeum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGU IV</td>
<td>6 BC</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>Record and subsequent decree of a synod to pay a loan on behalf of one of its members. Carried out by the priest (ἱερεὺς), Iokoundos, with Primos as synagogue-leader (συναγωγός) and president (προστάτης). Ioukoundos subsequently becomes president of the association, with Primos remaining as synagogue leader. Primos is also given the title πάμφιλον and a feast is held in his honour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 5</td>
<td>AD 1-50</td>
<td>Tebtyonis</td>
<td>List of members of an association. The president (ἡγούμενος) is Phemnasis and two members, Harmysis and Herakles, also note that they have “voted” at the bottom of the papyrus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 5</td>
<td>AD 1-56</td>
<td>Kerksephis</td>
<td>Receipt issued by the president and other elders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a comprehensive survey of Egyptian associations with more general discussion, see Poland (1909), which remains the most complete collection; “Geschichte des griechischen Vereinswesens” brings together all of the known evidence of associations in Egypt and gives substantial discussion to the different types that existed. Boak (1937) also describes in detail the way in which the various regulations were administered in practice and how the organisation of the associations lent itself to enforcement of regulations (through mutual assistance, in particular, cf. Boak 1937: 217-219). More recently, Venticinque (2010) examines the way in which “guilds” reinforced existing networks, while Muhs (2001) and Langellotti (2016) are particularly focused on the associations from Tebtyonis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 5 243</td>
<td>AD 14-37</td>
<td>Teblynis</td>
<td>Regulations of an unknown association. Includes mention of the election of a new president and a feast in his honour, for which each member is expected to contribute 12 drachmae as part of his monthly dues. The record also includes the regulations, including an expectation to attend members' funerals, and possible sanctions of the association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P RYL 2 94</td>
<td>AD 15-36</td>
<td>Euhemeria</td>
<td>Letter from Petouschos, president (ἡγούμενος) of the weavers, and Aphrodisios, secretary, vouching for five weavers that have been involved in a dispute and swearing to act as sureties for them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB 6 9112 (ostrakon)</td>
<td>AD 27-28</td>
<td>Arsinoite</td>
<td>An ostrakon used to issue a delivery instruction to Heras, secretary of the association of donkey-drivers. Presumably issued by the president of the association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 5 313</td>
<td>AD 37</td>
<td>Teblynis</td>
<td>Record of a lease of land from the association of public cultivators by Herakleides. The association includes six elders (πρεσβύτεροι) and a secretary (γραμματεὺς).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 2 124</td>
<td>AD 42</td>
<td>Teblynis</td>
<td>A large collection of documents from the grapheion, recording all of the financial transactions of the village for that year. It includes several references to associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 2 121 (4.12)</td>
<td>AD 42</td>
<td>Teblynis</td>
<td>Register of contracts from the grapheion of Teblynis. Col. 4.12 records a contract between the cultivators and some cattle grazers for the lease of pasture land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 2 121 (4.6)</td>
<td>AD 42</td>
<td>Tebtynis</td>
<td>Register of contracts recorded at the <em>grapheion</em> of Tebtynis. Column 4.6 records an agreement by the president and secretary of an association of weavers to reimburse other members for their purchase of beer for the association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>P MICH 5 244</td>
<td>AD 43</td>
<td>Tebtynis</td>
<td>Regulations of an association of ἀπολύσιμοι (tenant farmers). Includes reference to burial and feasting and the expectations of behaviour on each member, as well as possible sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 5 246</td>
<td>AD 43-9</td>
<td>Tebtynis</td>
<td>Record of monthly dues paid by the members of a religious association of Harpokrates. Includes mention of a master of feasts (κλεισιάρχης [sic]).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 2 127</td>
<td>AD 45</td>
<td>Tebtynis</td>
<td>A record of the private financial transactions of Kronion, an official of the <em>grapheion</em>, including two payments to associations for wine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 5 248</td>
<td>AD 45-47</td>
<td>Tebtynis</td>
<td>List of members of an association. Four members, Diodoros, Chrates, Heraklas and Chrates (sic), also note that they have &quot;voted&quot; at the bottom of the papyrus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 5 245</td>
<td>AD 47</td>
<td>Tebtynis</td>
<td>Ordinance of the association of salt merchants at Tebtynis. Includes agreement that Apynchis will serve both as president (ἐπιμελητής) and collector of taxes (εἰσακτέον τῶν δημοσίων), as well as various trading restrictions to be adhered to by all members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P MICH 3 170</td>
<td>AD 49</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchus</td>
<td>Registration of an apprentice weaver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P WISC 1 4</td>
<td>AD 53</td>
<td>Oxyrhynchus</td>
<td>Record of an agreement between Pausiris and Apollonios, a weaver, that Apollonios will admit Dioskous, the son of Pausiris, as an apprentice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxyrhynchus</td>
<td>AD 58</td>
<td>Registration of an apprentice weaver.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxyrhynchus</td>
<td>AD 62</td>
<td>Edict issued by the prefect, L. Iulius Vestinus, taking measures against the president and other members of the association of weavers, who have made illegal charges.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxyrhynchus</td>
<td>AD 62</td>
<td>Registration of an apprentice weaver.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elephantine</td>
<td>AD 71</td>
<td>Receipt for tax paid through an association.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karanis</td>
<td>AD 135-136</td>
<td>Letter from a camelherd, Dioskoros, to the local strategos, reporting how many cattle are owned by all the herders of the village. Presence of association uncertain.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>AD 139</td>
<td>Petition from association of weavers to the strategos, requesting that they no longer be expected to fulfil public duties until they have completed a large order of clothes from the state - includes note that their numbers have been reduced from twelve to four.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tebtynis</td>
<td>AD 161-169</td>
<td>Trial proceedings referring to a case in which an association of fullers and dyers has reacted angrily to unfair tax charges.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karanis</td>
<td>AD 184</td>
<td>Letter from Epiodoros, patron of an association, to Thrax, its president (ἐπιμελητης), and his fellow members (συνοδηται). Epiodoros is resigning from his position as patron due to ill health.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Hermopolis | AD 194 | Roll of letters concerning an athletic association and the confirmation of a new member's entrance fee and subsequent admission. The roll
This brings us to the associations themselves and the question of whether or not those in Egypt can be considered comparable to those in Italy and the West. This should be a simple enough task in theory but is complicated by the “messy taxonomy” of western collegia. The collegia are diverse and each group has their own nuances and peculiarities, making comparisons difficult. However, there are some features that are common to all. In discussing the absence of collegia at Pompeii, Liu highlighted three key features that stand out amongst the collegia, professional or otherwise:

“it seems that a collegium should have had at least the following stock features: the minimum size was three; it had structural features such as magistrates, a name, by-laws, membership requirements, and some sort of common treasury (pecuniae communes); and a collegium could formally take a patron or patrons.”

This seems to me a good place to start, although I would add certain features that, though not necessarily present in every collegium, were common enough throughout all of the collegia we have seen that we should expect to see them also in the Egyptian associations, if indeed they are comparable. These include, in particular, evidence of social aspects and especially commensality, some form of religious activity, and some examples of burial provision. These need not be

507 There is a certain irony in using these features to distinguish collegia considering that a good deal of attention has been paid within this thesis to arguing that features such as burial or
present in every single association and indeed this thesis has already shown that the funerary aspect was less evident in Ostia, for example, but they are all clearly understood to be features of the western collegia, generally speaking, and we should therefore expect to see at least some of them in the Egyptian associations.

In terms of the examples below, all of the associations appear to have three or more members and therefore meet the first and simplest criterion noted by Liu. The second – “structural features” – have been widely attested in the collegia discussed throughout this thesis. Almost every single collegium considered refers to some sort of hierarchy within its ranks, including many with complicated and tiered levels, as well as several that appear to be distinctly flatter in structure. At the absolute minimum, all collegia were made up of ordinary members and a president (usually a quinquennalis), although other ranks and positions are often manifest too.\textsuperscript{508} Within the papyri, similar attestations are very common. One example refers to an association of tenant farmers from Tebtynis: in AD 47, Kronion is made president (ἐπιμελητής) of the association for one year. His duties, which are mostly regulatory, are outlined in detail and other members are also listed.\textsuperscript{509} The association was formed for the purpose of paying the members’ λαογραφία (poll tax).\textsuperscript{510} Furthermore, several associations, such as the public cultivators or the weavers in Tebtynis, also had secretaries, not unlike the scribes of the collegia.\textsuperscript{511} Admittedly, there is no indication that presidents served in five-

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socialising were by no means the primary function of the collegia and that this hypothesis is actually based on limited evidence. Nevertheless, it is very clear indeed that these were at least features of many of the collegia and therefore they are good points of comparison to use when considering the Egyptian papyri.

\textsuperscript{508} See Chapter 1.4, above.

\textsuperscript{509} P.Mich. 5.244 (Tebtynis, 26\textsuperscript{st} August, AD 43), ordinance of association of ἀπολόσιμοι. It is worth noting that there is some debate about the precise nature of the association but its status as an association is clear from the election of the president and the inclusion of regulations for members. As Husselman et al. (1944, 101) note, it cannot be that they are veterans, as they are too young; cf. also Muhs (2001: 3); Husselman et al. (1944: 100-9). For further discussion of the regulatory behaviour of this and other Egyptian associations, see Venticinque (2016: 39-43). For other examples, cf. P.Ryl. 2.94 (Euhemeria, AD 15-36); P.Mich. 2.124, recto col 2, line 19 (Tebtynis, AD 42); P.Mich. 5.344 (Kerkesephis, AD 1-56); P.Mich. 9.543 (Karanis, AD 135-136); P.Lond. 3.1178 (Hermopolis, AD 194).

\textsuperscript{510} For further discussion on the economic function of the association, see below, Chapter 5.5; cf. also Husselman et al. (1944: 101).

\textsuperscript{511} P.Mich. 5.313 (Tebtynis, AD 37), lease of pasture land from the public cultivators; P.Mich. 2.121, recto, 4.6 (Tebtynis, 98 AD) – Petheus is referred to as ἠγούμενος γραμματεύς γερδῶν
year terms like the *quinquennales* but, nevertheless, the Egyptian associations did make use of hierarchies not unlike those used by *collegia*, with a president and some administrative positions above other, ordinary members.

The other structural features that Liu describes included the use of a collective name (evidently also standard practice for the Egyptian associations), as well as some form of regulation, membership requirements and a common treasury. None of these features is apparent in every *collegium* but they are common enough that they can be considered fairly standard.\(^5\)\(^{12}\) Again, a similar sort of pattern emerges from the papyrological evidence. In the most famous example, taken from a papyrus from AD 47, the salt merchants of Tebtynis detail the various rules that members must follow with a particular focus on controlling the local trade.\(^5\)\(^{13}\) Elsewhere, the association of tenant farmers is careful to specify both the obligations and the powers held by Kronion as president of their association.\(^5\)\(^{14}\) Similar regulations are also manifest in a set of papyri referring to a travelling athletic association and again in an ordinance of an association of uncertain character.\(^5\)\(^{15}\) These last two also note the membership fees that had to be met, while the use of a common treasury is repeatedly implicit in those papyri that detail the various fines and payments involved with being a member.

One feature of *collegia* that is much less documented amongst the Egyptian associations is the employment of a patron. The only definitive example comes from a late second-century papyrus, wherein a patron notifies an association of his inability to continue in the role (νέμειν), due to ill health.\(^5\)\(^{16}\) Both the athletic synod and the association of tenant farmers previously mentioned do acknowledge Claudius as their patron deity but, although this is also common amongst the *collegia*, it does not really compare to the system of patronage seen

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\(^5\)\(^{12}\) See Chapter 1.4-5, above.

\(^5\)\(^{13}\) P.Mich. 5.245 (Tebtynis, AD 47).

\(^5\)\(^{14}\) P.Mich. 5.244 (Tebtynis, AD 43).

\(^5\)\(^{15}\) P.Mich. 5.243 (Tebtynis, AD 14-37); *P Lond* 3.1178 (Hermopolis, AD 194).

\(^5\)\(^{16}\) P.Mich. 9.575 (Karanis, AD 184).
in the West. In a first-century religious association that is dedicated to Harpocrates, there are benefactions but these are made by the members, rather than by an external patron. Another bestows the title “beloved by all” (πάμφιλον) and a crown upon a president at the end of his tenure but, again, this is more similar to the way in which *quinquennales* became *honorati* of the *collegia* than an example of patronage. One could argue perhaps that this discrepancy is a product of the different type of evidence, that is that papyri were not well-suited to public acknowledgements of patrons in the same way as inscriptions; if this were so then we could expect to see more examples of patrons in the epigraphic evidence from Egypt (for which, see below).

In terms of the activities of the associations revealed by the papyri, we see evidence of practices very similar to the *collegia*. Feasting seems to have been especially common, as several papyri refer to the provision of food and drink, including a particularly illuminating example from the weavers, which records members being reimbursed by the association for their purchase of beer. It is also clear from the various ordinances that some associations were obliged to ensure the proper burial of members and indeed there was at least one association for whom burial appears to have been their main purpose, as attested by a receipt addressed to “those who dig graves together” (συννεκροτάφοις). References to religious activity amongst the professional associations are more rare; only a few attestations are documented in the papyri and these refer simply to patron

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517 P.Mich. 5.243 (Tellynis, AD 14-37); P.Lond. 3.1178 (Hermopolis, AD 194). In the case of the tenant farmers, the title given to Heron, the president, is προστάτης, meaning literally “first among others”. The ambiguity here might point towards a system where the president acted as both leader and patron, in the same way as, for example, F. Annius Fortunatus did for the divers and the fishermen (cf. *CIL* 6.29700 [Line 1] and also above Chapter 2.2.

518 P.Mich. 5.246 (Tellynis, mid 1st century AD).

519 *SB* 22.15460 (Alexandria, 5 BC – decree of a synod devoted to the emperor).

520 Chapter 5.4.

521 P.Mich. 2.121, col 4.6 (Tellynis, AD 42). Cf. also P.Mich. 5.243-246 (1st century AD); *SB* 22.15460 (Alexandria, 5 BC); *BGU* 4.1137 (Alexandria, 6 BC).

522 P.Ryl. 4.574 (c.25-1 BC). Youtie (1940: 653-4) notes that the νεκροτάφοι were themselves professional grave-diggers, rather than an association that was set up in order to provide burial for members, although one imagines that members could probably get a fairly good deal. It is worth noting that this example comes from very early in the principate.
deities.\textsuperscript{523} However, this does seem to be mainly a feature of the papyri, as there are more examples of religious activity in the associations evident in contemporary epigraphy from Egypt.

4. Associations in Egypt – The Evidence from Epigraphy

A brief examination of some of the contemporary inscriptions is a useful way of summing up the comparability of Egypt’s associations and the collegia. Without the papyri, epigraphy would be our main evidence or associations, just as it is in the West, so if the two are at all comparable we should expect to see this most clearly in the epigraphic evidence. The evidence collected by Ascough, Kloppenborg and Harland for their sourcebook of “Associations in the Greco-Roman World” includes thirty-nine inscriptions from Egypt (including ostraka), nineteen of which can be dated to the principate.\textsuperscript{524} The majority of these are simple dedications inscribed on the bases of statues by or for the associations, usually to deities.\textsuperscript{525}

Just as in the inscriptions from the West, the most visible members are often the association presidents, singled out because they act on behalf of the association. Ammonios is one such, who as president of the perfume dealers (μυροπῶλαι) in Alexandria is dedicating a small statue.\textsuperscript{526} Elsewhere, the association (πλῆθος) of physicians honours Gaius Prokleios Themison, the “chief-physician” (ἀρχίατρος), “on account of his goodwill”.\textsuperscript{527} Formulaic, dedicatory inscriptions such as these are very common amongst the western collegia, giving away little about the complex groups behind them. A more verbose example from the Fayum region adds only more confusion:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{523} See P.Mich. 5.244 (Tebtynis, AD 43); P.Lond. 3.1178 (Hermopolis, AD 194) for examples of (primarily) professional associations that also had religious aspects. For associations for whom their religious function was obviously central, see e.g. BGU 4.1137 (6 BC); P.Mich. 5.246 (AD 43-49)
\item \textsuperscript{524} Ascough \textit{et al.} (2012). Cf. also the companion website: <http://philipharland.com/greco-roman-associations/> the number of inscriptions given here is based on the (expanding) collection on this website [date last accessed: 22/08/2017]. The sourcebook and companion website represent an expanding database that is devoted to the publication of evidence concerning associations from across Graeco-Roman world, though with a particular focus on the East.
\item \textsuperscript{525} E.g. \textit{AGRW} 286; \textit{AGRW} 294; \textit{AGRW} 285; \textit{AGRW} 279; \textit{AGRW} 282; \textit{IAlexandriaK} 98.
\item \textsuperscript{526} \textit{IAlexandriaK} 96.
\item \textsuperscript{527} \textit{IAlexandriaK} 97.
\end{enumerate}
“Herakles son of Lysis, performer of the sacrifices and chief president, built the temple of the Saviour gods from his own resources on the 13th of Epiphi. For good (fortune). Place of the stonemasons: Ptolemaios, Soter, Palemous, Ammonius, Serapion son of Soter. For good (fortune).”

The precise character of this association, professional or religious or both, is a mystery. Similar issues arise in the case of an inscription set up by “those from the banqueting hall of the Augustan images and of Faustina Pharia Sostitolos … for their fellow banqueter (τὸν συσσειτόν)” Is this a religious association or one set up purely for the purpose of collective feasting? Indeed, it is clear from several inscriptions that many of the relevant associations were formed around a common trade and yet there are no clear references whatsoever (in the epigraphic evidence, at least) to the associations acting as economic bodies.

When considered in isolation, the inscriptions from Egypt paint a fairly confusing picture of its associations. References to burial and to deities abound, even amongst those that are named after individual trades or professions. Social aspects are also prominent and one could certainly be forgiven for arguing that any of these activities was the primary purpose of the Egyptian associations. Indeed, the only remarkable difference between the impressions of the associations gleaned from Egypt and from Italy is the fact that, unlike Italy, Egypt has a separate cache of evidence in the papyri from which we can develop our understanding.

Returning to the question of whether or not we can justifiably use the evidence from papyri to speak for the collegia in the West, as some scholars have been wont to do, it is important to note that the Egyptian associations are not identical to the various collegia considered earlier in this thesis. From the papyrological evidence, some aspects of the associations are dissimilar from collegia. Hierarchical structures, for example, are certainly in place but tend to be flatter than those found in the collegia; the associations do not appear to choose their magistrates based on five-year cycles, as is common in the West; and in particular, the extent to which the Egyptian associations operated within a system

528 PHI 217957.
of reciprocity is unclear. Complicating the matter further still is the fact that associations existed in Egypt long before its annexation, just as they did in other eastern and indeed in some western provinces. Certainly then, using the papyri as direct evidence to speak for collegia is methodologically unsound.

However, while the associations and the collegia were clearly not identical, they were undeniably very similar. Moreover, while Egypt was arguably the least “typical” of the Roman provinces, it nevertheless had marked similarities to the rest of the Graeco-Roman world and its economy in particular was increasingly influenced by Rome. Therefore, I would argue that the most sensible way to treat the papyrological evidence is as a body of comparative evidence. The intentions of scholars such as Hawkins and Broekaert are undoubtedly good but their unqualified use of papyri to provide more detailed examples where convenient only serves to undermine their arguments. Van Nijf’s examination of Dutch guilds is far more useful, in that it carefully acknowledges the obvious differences between the guilds and the collegia but nevertheless uses the evidence of the guilds to enhance our understanding of how and why such associations formed in a comparable period and particularly to encourage us to ask what might be missing from the fairly limited selection of evidence that we have for collegia. I would argue that papyri can prove even more useful.

5. The Economic Impact of Egyptian Associations on their Local Economies

As already discussed, the scholarship surrounding the associations in Egypt is markedly different from that on collegia. The focus of most scholars is not on whether the associations acted as economic bodies but rather on how and why they did so and on whether this was their primary purpose for uniting or simply a natural by-product of their association. The frequent use of the word “guild”, with

530 These differences are particularly worth highlighting for the purposes of this thesis, which has already noted in particular the importance of vertical reciprocity for social cohesion and integration (cf. Chapter 2.3, above, and Garnsey and Saller, 2014: 201).
532 Van Nijf (2002).
all of its inherent economic connotations, to refer to the associations is reflective of their obvious economic nature, manifest in the papyri. 533

Unlike the evidence of western collegia, which is so often implicitly suggestive of their being economic actors and yet always frustratingly lacking in concrete examples, the papyri are full of transactional references and other economic concerns. The most famous of these is the previously mentioned papyrus detailing the regulations of the Salt Merchants from Tebtynis, some of which is given below.

“Harmiysis also called Belles, son of Harmiysis, has obtained by lot the sole right to sell salt and gypsum in the village of Tristomos also called Boukolos, for which he shall contribute, apart from the share of the public taxes which falls to him, five additional drachmai in silver; upon condition that they shall sell the good salt at the rate of two and one-half obols, the light salt at two obols, and the lighter salt at one and one-half obol, by our measure or that of the warehouse. And if anyone shall sell at a lower price than these, let him be fined eight drachmai in silver for the common fund and the same for the public treasury.” 534

There is little ambiguity about the economic activity of the association of the salt merchants within this ordinance, which also details the members’ obligations to hold monthly feasts and to follow the various regulations or risk being ejected by the president. The association is responsible for setting prices and for ensuring that all members trade according to agreed terms and only within their agreed jurisdiction. It also mentions the responsibility of the president to collect and pay all of the public taxes on trade on behalf of the association, demonstrating the way in which this association simplified tax collection for both members and indeed the tax collectors, reducing the transaction costs of everyone involved while doing so. 535

As Liu has noted, we should be cautious about inferring too much from this one example, especially given how little is known about the salt trade and about the

533 See above, n.501.
534 P.Mich. 5.245 (Tebtynis, AD 47).
535 For recent discussion of this collegium that is particularly relevant to this thesis, see Venticinque (2016: 46-9).
level of governmental control upon it.\footnote{Liu (2009: 15).} However, while this may be the most
detailed document regarding the Egyptian associations’ economic role and
therefore the most cited, it is certainly not the only one. Evidence of transactions
and contracts involving the associations is common amongst the papyri, mostly in
the form of receipts. In a first-century papyrus from Kerksephis, for example, the
association of public cultivators acknowledges the receipt of “outstanding silver
drachmai for rent” from Ptolemaios.\footnote{P Mich 5.344.}

Similarly, in a register of contracts from the grapheion of Tebtynis that dates to
AD 42, one entry records a contract between an association of cultivators and two
cattle grazers, while a second entry acknowledges the payment and subsequent
lease of allotment land “for the pasturage of sheep”.\footnote{P Mich 2.121, recto, col 4.5; 4.12.}
A third document contains
an actual contract drawn up by the same association in AD 37, leasing a specific
patch of land for sixty drachmai per year.\footnote{P. Mich 5.313.} Elsewhere, a group of weavers from
Philadelphia refers to a requisition order that they have received for military
clothing, indicating the corporate nature of their association, and, similarly,
records appear in another register from the grapheion recording payments made
by the “association of the wool-dealers”.\footnote{BGU 7.1572.} There is even an ostrakon recording
an order to an association of donkey drivers, requesting a delivery of twelve
donkeys.\footnote{SB 6.9112. For other papyri showing the transactions of associations cf. P.Ryl 4.574; P.Petaus
28; P.Oxy 44.3173; P.Oxy 12.1414.}

Where the Egyptian epigraphy above hinted at corporate aspects,
these are made far more explicit by the papyrological examples given here. The
transactions that are recorded by the Egyptian associations make it clear that they
did have, at the very least, an economic function within their local economies and,
at the same time, this evidence provides a useful indication of what such
transactional behaviour might have looked like elsewhere in the West, had the
relevant evidence survived.

Besides the documents that show the associations being involved in transactions,
some also show them acting together to solve problems they are faced with,
effectively using their combined strength to reduce their collective transaction costs. The weavers mentioned above, for example, refer to their recent requisition order because they are struggling to keep up with demand and are acting together to request an exemption from public duty.\textsuperscript{542} In a similar example, a group of fullers and dyers petition the \textit{strategos} together and even go over his head to the prefect to protest against being overcharged in tax.\textsuperscript{543} This is revealing first of all as an example of the association acting on behalf of its members to solve an economic issue but also because it demonstrates again that it was normal for the associations to pay said tax on behalf of the members. It also shows the way in which people of related trades could form larger associations together and, presumably, pool their resources, not unlike the \textit{collegium eborariorum et citriariorum}, the \textit{collegium piscatorum et urinatorum} or, indeed, the three distinct but related \textit{corpora mensorum} of Ostia or the various boatmen from Roman Spain and Gaul.

As well as seeing confirmation of the types of economic activity that are only hinted at in the evidence of western \textit{collegia}, we can also use the papyri to go one step further and examine what other economic functions the Egyptian associations might have performed, if any. The evidence of transactions described above attests to the more corporate aspects of some professional associations, confirming that these more corporate activities did take place, at least in Egypt. However, these documents also allow a greater insight into precisely what services the associations were able to provide and, as one might expect, there is a clear correlation between the names of the associations and the goods or services that they offer. Thus, the association of weavers is concerned with the production of garments, the donkey drivers sell donkeys, the tenant farmers lease land and the salt dealers sell salt.\textsuperscript{544} The point is worth making because it demonstrates that,

\textsuperscript{542} BGU 7.1572. Cf. also, Garnsey and Saller (2014: 117) who note in the context of requisitions that “Compulsory purchase may be supposed to have been a fundamental source of supplies everywhere, as it can be shown to have been in Egypt.” With this in mind, it is easy to imagine that \textit{collegia} might have provided a similarly convenient means of supply in the West as the weavers can be seen to do here.

\textsuperscript{543} P.Tebt. 2.287.

\textsuperscript{544} This is not to say of course that the associations did not engage in other activities – numerous examples have shown that professional associations had religious aspects and vice versa – but only that the way in which Egyptian associations chose to identify themselves does appear to have
within Egypt, the way that an association chooses to style itself is reflective of its character. I have suggested previously that common sense would suggest that the *collegia* of builders, measurers, divers and fishermen, wool-dealers or woodworkers are likely to have acted in pursuit of their respective trades and, although this cannot be proven beyond doubt in the West, it was evidently the case in Egypt.\textsuperscript{545}

Furthermore, the examples given above represent only the more direct instances of economic activity. Several other, less clear documents are very worthy of further study to help build a better understanding of exactly what kind of functions the associations might have served. An ostrakon from Elephantine, for example, records that a survey (γεωμετρία) over a piece of land has been paid for “through an association” (διὰ κοινοῦ).\textsuperscript{546} The purpose of the survey is unknown but seems to be required yearly. One explanation is that the association in question might have facilitated or even provided surveys for individual farmers, perhaps because they were better placed to do so thanks to an existing relationship with administrative authorities or better access to necessary resources. Elsewhere, in Euhemeria, a papyrus sent by the association of weavers to the ἐξηγητής (a municipal magistrate) assures him that they (the members of the association) will act as “sureties” for some of their fellow members and promise to “produce them” whenever he (the ἐξηγητής) chooses, to answer claims made in a petition. In this instance, the association essentially appears to be providing bail for members who have got themselves into trouble.\textsuperscript{547}

Finally, according to Hawkins, a set of papyri from Oxyrhynchus might also be indicative of the associations providing apprenticeships. Hawkins noted four

\begin{footnotes}
\item[545] See Chapter 1.3.
\item[546] P.Worp 39 (Elephantine, AD 71).
\item[547] P.Ryl. 2.94 (Euhemeria, AD 15-36). Cf. also P.Mich. 5. 244 [Line 8-15], which notes that, if any of member of the association of tenant farmers is “held for debt up to the amount of one hundred drachmai in silver, security will be given for him for a period of sixty days by the association, but if anyone is in default and fails in any respect to pay the dues of the poll-tax or the expenses, Kronion shall have authority to seize him in the main street, or in his house, and hand over him or his slaves.”
\end{footnotes}
papyri attesting to apprenticeship agreements amongst a number of weavers – three of these are letters informing third parties of the agreements, while the fourth is an actual agreement made between two of the weavers.\(^{548}\) In each case, the respective weavers are acting independently from one another and there is no specific mention of their belonging to an association but Hawkins emphasises that the men evidently had a pre-existing relationship and points to a fifth papyrus indicating that an association of weavers did exist locally at about the right time:

“...The likelihood that these craftsmen regularly transacted with other members of professional associations suggests that artisans in the Roman world relied heavily upon *collegia* as governance structures to mitigate transaction costs and to coordinate production, particularly in industries that gave rise to intensive specialization.”\(^{549}\)

This is perhaps overstating the case somewhat – indeed, I would suggest that it is a good example of the temptation to use Egyptian evidence to speak for the wider empire, often with little basis – but the suggestion that Egyptian associations fostered apprenticeships, while fairly circumstantial in this case, is ultimately a sensible one.\(^{550}\)

I would add that two of Hawkins’ three letters are addressed to the “contractor of the weavers” (ἐκλήπτωρ γερδίων) and are sent to request that the apprentices be registered as such.\(^{551}\) It is unclear precisely what they are being registered in or indeed who exactly the “contractor of the weavers” might be – one possibility is that these letters are in fact addressed to an official within the association and are requesting that the apprentice be added as members. On the other hand, the third letter makes precisely the same request but is addressed instead to the “toparchy secretaries and village secretaries of the city of Oxyrhynchus” (τοπογραμματεῖς καὶ κωμογραμματεῖς).\(^{552}\) Whether or not these should be considered examples of

\(^{548}\) See Hawkins (2016: 109-10); P.Mich. 3.170 (Oxyrhynchus, AD 49); P.Wisc 1.4 (Oxyrhynchus, AD 53); P.Mich. 3.171 (Oxyrhynchus, AD 58); P.Mich. 3.172 (Oxyrhynchus, AD 62).

\(^{549}\) Hawkins (2016: 110). The papyrus that Hawkins alleges proves the existence of the association is P.Oxy. 76.5097 (Oxyrhynchus, AD 62).

\(^{550}\) For further discussion of apprenticeships, see Venticinque (2016: 84-5).

\(^{551}\) P.Mich. 3.171-2.

\(^{552}\) P.Mich. 3.170.
apprenticeships within associations is debatable, although certainly possible. Bearing in mind the extent to which members of some associations appear to have worked together, the use of apprenticeships amongst them seems only logical. From a comparative point of view, internal apprenticeships would also go a long way towards understanding certain aspects of the *collegia*, such as the shared building practices that are apparent in the remains from Ostia, or the manifestation of the same *collegia* (particularly the *fabri* and the *centonarii*) across disparate sections of the empire.\(^553\)

6. Conclusion

The papyri and other evidence examined here indicate that the associations in Egypt were similar to the western *collegia* in several ways. However, they were not identical and should not be treated as such but instead display key differences, especially in terms of their structural make-up. On the other hand, these differences should also be viewed within their proper context. As mentioned above, the associations in Roman Egypt were predated by other associations that existed for hundreds of years in Ptolemaic Egypt. Just as the western *collegia* from the imperial period were fundamentally based on pre-existing structures, including both *collegia* from the republic and other more formal organisations such as the sacerdotal colleges, the same is true of the Egyptian associations. Therefore, while the western *collegia* might identify with models such as the Augustales and think in terms of five year periods (perhaps following the system of *lustra* used institutionally), as well as naturally forming patron-client relationships that fit well within the strong system of reciprocity so apparent in Roman society, the associations in Graeco-Roman Egypt can equally be expected to have based themselves on pre-existing models, such as the indigenous Egyptian associations from the Ptolemaic era.\(^554\)

Moreover, despite their differences, they are also much alike. The epigraphic evidence in particular demonstrates distinct similarities between the Egyptian

\(^553\) See Chapters 3.7 and 4.1-2, above.

\(^554\) For the suggestion that the associations in Graeco-Roman Egypt evolved from previous Egyptian models but were also influenced by Roman associations, see especially Préaux (1948) and Muhs (2001: 5).
associations and the *collegia*, especially in terms of the way in which they styled themselves and the activities that they chose to monumentalise. The evidence discussed from papyri has revealed further points of comparison, as well as a clear demonstration of the economic potential that such associations held. With this in mind, I argue that the differences that are apparent between the two might actually indicate that there was an economic imperative for certain professionals to form associations, in order that they might best navigate the pitfalls of the economy. In such a scenario, we would surely expect to see comparable evidence in terms of their economic activity and other behaviour, as well as a tendency to model themselves on pre-existing structures from within their own societies.
CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this thesis, I set out two major lines of inquiry. The primary research goal was to examine the direct evidence for collegia in the western Roman Empire and to demonstrate that many associations did affect local economies in significant ways. I emphasised, however, that in order for this to be possible the body of scholarship that has built up around the collegia since the end of the 19th century needs to be assessed in light of the emergence of new and different types of evidence and of research methods and that this would therefore be my secondary research goal. In particular, I noted that documentary evidence from legal and literary sources presents a very different picture of the collegia to that from epigraphy and papyri. To a certain extent the legal and literary sources also contradict one another, whilst the epigraphic and papyrological sources do have many points of comparison between them but also give very different impressions of the associations. Despite all of these differences, many studies, and especially those of the early 20th-century, have attempted to treat the collegia as completely homogeneous, drawing general conclusions about all collegia that were ultimately based on evidence specific to a single collegium.

I have also highlighted a number of methodological issues that make examining the collegia a complicated process, whatever the research focus. Foremost is the messy taxonomy of collegia, which is the subject of my first chapter and which is intertwined with the second issue, the disparate body of scholarship. The third issue, more specific to economic studies such as this one, lies in the tendency of ancient historians to dismiss the seemingly economic features of collegia as coincidental, thanks especially to Finley’s assertion that there were “no guilds.” The fourth and fifth issues relate to the use of evidence: amongst those that do recognise the economic aspects of collegia and aim to analyse them in the context of the Roman Empire, there has been a tendency to cherry-pick the evidence (regardless of whence it comes) that most suits the model and to ignore that which does not. Even then, analyses often lack empirical evidence and scholars have repeatedly turned to examples from Egypt as a result. Those examples are again

selected on an *ad hoc* basis, depending on their usefulness for economic analyses, with little or no acknowledgement of the wider debate around the utility of Egyptian material in regard to the wider empire.

There are also more general hurdles to overcome when using epigraphic evidence for the *collegia* as this thesis does. Extant Latin inscriptions relating to *collegia* come from across the western empire. Most are from Italy and especially from Rome but there are many others from other areas, especially Roman Gaul and Spain. For many professional associations, only one or two extant inscriptions refer to them and these examples are therefore of less use to a study focused on analysing the professional networks of *collegia*. Inscriptional evidence for those associations is often from different periods of the empire (if indeed the inscriptions can be dated at all) and one therefore must contend with the changing contexts from which the evidence derives. Finally, there is also the wider problem of the differences between the eastern and western empires. This thesis has focused on the west (with the exception of Egypt), partly in order to control the sample under analysis but also because the associations in the East and West evolved under quite different circumstances. Although there were doubtless points of comparison between them, and they certainly became more similar as time went on, they retained important differences, a study of which is simply beyond the scope of this thesis; it would, however, be a worthy avenue for further research.

In the first chapter, I set out to examine the body of scholarship by focusing on the most important methodological issue, namely the messy taxonomy of the *collegia*. In particular, I demonstrated the way in which early scholars drew general conclusions about *collegia* based on specific sources and how this negatively affected the subsequent body of scholarship. The burial aspect of the *collegia* is especially prominent in the evidence, as so many of the extant references come from tombstone inscriptions that include mention of an association, either because the deceased had been a member or because the association helped to set up the inscription. I demonstrated how this, combined with Mommsen’s assertions about the Lanuvian inscription, led to a widespread mistaken assumption amongst ancient historians that the *raison d’être* of many of the *collegia* was to provide
burial for members, making them essentially welfare societies. Despite the vast number of inscriptions that make no reference to burial and the fact that Mommsen’s interpretation of the Lanuvian inscription has long since been discredited, the perception of *collegia* as burial societies has remained prominent.

I proceeded to show that *collegia* were actually multidimensional societies that engaged in a number of activities and had various functions. Despite sharing many common features, each association also had its own nuances; *collegia* are therefore very difficult to categorise. There can be little distinction drawn between them on the basis of the terminology used (e.g., *collegium*, *corpus*, *societas* in Latin; κοινόν, πλῆθος in Greek); although legal sources use different terms to refer to associations, any differences are never defined. Within the epigraphic evidence, moreover, the same terms - especially *collegium* and *corpus* – appear to be used almost indiscriminately, although it is true that *corpus* is particularly common amongst the ostensibly professional associations. Broad divisions can be drawn between those that identify as religious or professional associations but their activities and functions still overlapped in numerous ways, while many inscriptions are only distinguishable as relating to *collegia* by their use of terms such as *quinquennalis*. I emphasised the overall importance of focusing on the actual behaviour of individual *collegia* rather than trying to collect them together and treat them *en masse*. Therefore, although I went on in the thesis to examine especially those *collegia* with a professional identity, I have been careful throughout to limit my interpretations specifically to those *collegia* and not to extend my conclusions to all associations or even to all professional associations. This thesis does not seek to argue that all *collegia* had an economic impact but rather to demonstrate that at least some of them certainly did and to assess what that impact looked like.

In the second chapter I focused on the scholarship more specific to *collegia* and the Roman economy. Specifically, I noted that modern economic theory has great potential for furthering study in this area but that the earlier debate around the extent to which *collegia* were like medieval guilds continues to undermine economic analyses. Such is the influence of Moses Finley that his remarks long led to the economic aspects of *collegia* being disregarded. In many ways, Finley’s
remarks, combined with Mommsen’s earlier description of the *collegia* as burial societies, worked to the detriment of objective scholarly analysis, since apparently Finley had made clear what the *collegia* were not and Mommsen had explained what they were. Although scholars of *collegia* have moved on in recent years, the perception of *collegia* amongst most other ancient historians is only now beginning to shift. In reviewing the literature I demonstrated the outdated nature of Finley’s assertions (Mommsen’s views were dealt with in the preceding chapter). I argued specifically that the *collegia* were clearly not the same as medieval guilds but that this is no reason to exclude the possibility that they had an impact on the ancient economy. I demonstrated the way in which *collegia* were at least guild-like in several respects and were therefore well-suited to manipulating or even controlling certain economic factors.

With the major barriers to economic study removed, I then set out my thesis’ theoretical framework, arguing that Neo-Institutional Economic theory (NIE) is a particularly useful tool for analysis. In comparison to previous approaches primarily based on neo-classical economics, NIE relies less on the kind of detailed evidence that we might hope to find for discussion of the economy but do not, such as contract agreements or work receipts, and focuses instead on the institutions that are inherent to organisations and affect members’ behaviour. Under an approach based on NIE, the messy taxonomy of *collegia* ceases to act as a barrier for economic analyses and instead the different aspects of the *collegia* can be incorporated into an institutional framework wherein activities such as feasting and group worship are themselves institutions that increase the density of the professional network. Rather than arguing that the *collegia* were wholly one thing or another – an impossible task given their messy taxonomy – I demonstrated that the different features of the *collegia* were themselves important institutions that governed the professional and general behaviour of members.

Having established this theoretical framework, I set out in the third chapter to apply it, using Ostia as a case study. My focus was on examining what institutions were manifest amongst the *collegia* at Ostia and, more broadly, what impact the *collegia* had on the Ostian economy. The state of the evidence from Ostia, much better preserved than in most areas, makes it a particularly good place for a case
study in several respects. The number of extant inscriptions from such a small area that are related to *collegia* is unparalleled in the wider empire; the archaeological remains, including many buildings that can be identified as the *scholae* or other buildings belonging to *collegia*, are a significant bonus. By drawing data from within the town, moreover, it was possible to collect a set of inscriptions that are relatively easy to date, that are supplemented by other types of evidence, and that represent a well-defined sample for analysis, at once combatting several of the methodological issues described in my introduction. I argued that, apart from the general state of its preservation, Ostia should not be thought of as an exceptional part of the empire in this context. Rather, I demonstrated that its basic institutions, including the system of government, public buildings and its economy, are comparable to other areas, especially in the west.

The vast grain economy was crucial for Rome and for the rest of the empire, and yet it lacked the infrastructure necessary for it to function. Using material relating to the *collegium mensorum frumentariorum*, I argued that the economic function of that association is very clear and that the *collegium* provided at least some of the necessary structure for the grain trade. *Mensores* held a prominent position in the town, in terms of both the space they occupied and their civic status. Their *schola* was imposing and expensively decorated, with a layout and position that reflected a professional purpose. I noted that the inscriptions reveal little about the activities of the *mensores*; there is no reference to burial or to feasting, as one would certainly expect if the *collegium* had a primarily funerary or social function. There are indications of religious activity, however, and it could be argued that this was a primary function, although this would not explain the positioning of the *schola* beside the river or the tiered organisation of the *collegium* as well as an economic function does. The religious activity does fit well within a professional narrative, on the other hand, as the *mensores* were devoted to Ceres - an obvious choice for a group concerned with grain.

In fact, further examination of the epigraphic evidence and the archaeological remains revealed that the *collegium* was well-equipped indeed for handling professional interests. With its own *horrea* attached to the *schola*, and with
immediate access to the river port where grain could easily be transferred on to barges bound for Rome, the collegium also boasted connections with high-status officials from within the annona. A wider network also included members of various other related trades. It was made up of three sub-groups that were divided, incidentally, according to different professional functions that the mensores performed. At some point it was also most likely the means by which members were able to claim their eligibility for excusatio. This should not be thought of as the moment when the collegium first became economically important, at the intervention of the authorities, but rather I argue that the collegium successfully facilitated the flow of grain through Ostia for most of the early principate and that it was in recognition of this that the authorities saw fit to formalise the process.

In reference to the collegium fabrum tignariorum, I noted that again it does not appear to have engaged in social or burial activities but that its institutions do suggest an important economic role, especially in terms of organising the enormous and otherwise surely chaotic building-industry. The schola of the collegium was in the centre of the town, almost next to the forum; membership was carefully registered and displayed, with a strict and complex hierarchy; there were exclusive benefits for members that would encourage good behaviour, including sportulae and access to the collegium temple; and members clearly spent a good deal of time interacting with outsiders whom who they saw fit to thank with dedications as well as other honours. No inscriptions refer to contracts or describe work done in the name of the collegium but, whether or not the collegium was founded to organise the builders professionally, its existence nevertheless must have enhanced the economic goals of all members. The institutions inherent to the organisation meant that members could easily reduce their transaction costs - such as finding trustworthy partners, ascertaining information, or seeking specific resources; at the same time, outsiders could feel confident in members’ integrity, or could at least seek assurances easily.

The Ostian case studies successfully demonstrated the usefulness of an approach based on NIE, whilst also highlighting its weaknesses. NIE theory is no substitute for direct evidence but it is helpful nonetheless: it allows us to explore the economic potential of the collegia, which goes some way towards understanding
their prominence in areas like Ostia. Based on the Ostian data, I was able to identify the institutions of *collegia* that were particularly conducive to affecting the economy, namely their organisational structure, exclusivity and network connections. I was then able to apply the model more directly to my analyses in chapter four.

The first part of the fourth chapter was focused on Italy and in particular on the larger associations, the *tria collegia principalia*. I demonstrated the ways in which the *collegia fabrum* and *centonariorum* fit easily within an institutional model, and through discussion of previous studies I highlighted those aspects that represent relatively clear evidence of economic activity. The fact that from at least the late third century the state began to deal with both *collegia* as professional entities is particularly persuasive of their having an economic function before that. The *collegia centonariorum* also appear to have monopolised the textile economy wherever they existed, and we know from inscriptive evidence that at least one such *collegium* owned and managed *tabernae*.

Moving beyond Italy, much of the fourth chapter examined some *collegia* from Spain and the Gauls. I demonstrated first of all the importance and complexity of the oil industry in Spain. I highlighted the fact that, although there was little in the way of state controlled organisation, some form of management must have been crucial, not unlike the situation with the grain industry. The evidence examined from Baetica suggests that the *collegia* there fulfilled the organisational needs of the oil industry: the various connections of the *collegia* can only really be explained if they were set in a professional context. In this case, a Neo-Institutional approach adds little to the overall analysis, as the economic role of the *collegia* is quite evident from the inscriptions. Those inscriptions that have survived, moreover, give very little detail about the other institutions of the *collegia*, limiting the potential for analysis in this case.

On the other hand, approaching the evidence for the *collegia* in the Gauls, from an institutional point of view, had a significant impact on the analysis. It is clear that, like those in Spain, the *collegia* related to the wine trade here had wealthy and important connections, but, unlike those in Spain, those connections were not patently professional. Moreover, the *collegia* in and around Lugdunum appear to
have been engaged mostly in the traditional activities with which *collegia* are often associated. However, by examining the organisation of the *collegia* and the way in which the multiple bonds they shared added to the institutions around members, as well as the connections they made with other traders, I demonstrated that they were more than capable of enhancing the economic goals of members.

Overall, although examination of the *collegia* in Spain did not necessarily demonstrate the benefits of NIE, the situation in both Spain and the Gauls does clearly reflect that seen in Ostia and in other areas of Italy. I showed that in each region the *collegia* under consideration affected their local economy and that this was often a central function. At the same time, the third and fourth chapters both demonstrate the usefulness of NIE theory while also highlighting its limitations. It is possible to demonstrate through NIE the ways in which the *collegia* had an economic impact, but again the argument always remains frustratingly theoretical: direct evidence of economic activity is very rarely forthcoming.

With that in mind, in the fifth and final chapter, I turned to a discussion of the papyrological evidence. I argued that Egypt should not be used simply to supplement the evidence from the western empire but that the papyri can be useful as a comparative body of evidence. I argued that, although Egypt was by no means a typical province, typicality itself is a problematic concept within the context of the Roman Empire. Egypt evolved from both Ptolemaic and Greek models, and the differences between it and Rome (for example) are obvious and significant. On the other hand, there were also distinct similarities between the two, particularly in terms of the power structures and overall organisation. Changes to the ownership of land and the administration of taxes effectively modified existing power structures, despite the fact that many Ptolemaic positions were retained. Various features of Roman life gradually spread to Egypt through both the enormous Roman army that was based there and the interaction through trade between Rome, Egypt, and other provinces.

Furthermore, I went on to demonstrate that many of the features of the associations in Egypt were remarkably similar to those of the *collegia* in the west. In particular, the way in which the associations identified themselves, their organisational structure and their known activities bore little difference to the
western *collegia*. Apparent differences, moreover, can be explained by the fact that the Egyptian associations and the western *collegia* evolved from different models and by the fact that we are considering a different kind of evidence. Just as the epigraphic evidence gives prominence to activities that were worth monumentalising in some way, the papyri reflect the more everyday, functional aspects of the Egyptian associations. As I demonstrated by examining Egyptian epigraphy, removing the papyri from consideration and focusing only on inscriptions presents us with an interpretation of the Egyptian associations that is almost identical to that gleaned from epigraphic evidence of western *collegia*.

Finally, I moved to discussion of the economic activity of the Egyptian associations, demonstrating that many of them played a significant role in their local economies. In fact they often acted like small firms, organising and even monopolising the trade in their local area. Whereas the epigraphic evidence, especially when analysed using NIE as a theoretical framework, often hints at the economic role of *collegia*, the papyri provide definitive evidence of the economic function of Egyptian associations. I argued in the first chapter that, in order for historians to properly understand the role of the *collegia* in the Roman Empire, it is crucial we recognise the limitations of the evidence we are using and ask what is missing. Throughout this thesis I have used NIE theory, as well as more straightforward analyses, to consider the epigraphic evidence from different areas and to demonstrate that many *collegia* were organised and behaved in such a way that they must have had a profound impact on their local economies. The institutions of *collegia* that are apparent within the epigraphy are highly suggestive of their economic function, and I argue that if we only had access to a greater diversity of evidence, especially of the kind used to record everyday minutiae rather than just that worth recording monumentally, then we would see more definitive examples of the *collegia* affecting and manipulating their local economies. This is precisely what we have in the evidence from Egypt. The associations there were comparable in almost every respect to those of the western empire. The only major difference is that a different type of extant evidence allows us to look past the social or religious aspects of the associations and understand fully that many of them had a profound impact on the economy.
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110–113.


APPENDIX I

The *Leges Collegiorum*, originally published in the *ILS* 2.2, reproduced here with translation and accompanying notes.

*ILS 7212 = CIL 14.2112 – Inscription and Translation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header</th>
<th>Column 1</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Lucio Ceionio] Commodo Sex(to) Uettuleno Ciucia Pompeiano co(n)s(ulibus) A(nte) D(iem) V idus Iun(ias)</td>
<td>[in Lanuvii] templo antinoi in quo L(ucius) Caesennius Rufus patronu[m]s municipi conuentum haberi iussuerat per L(ucium) Pompeium [-----]um q(uin)q(uennalem) cultorum dianae et antinoi pollicitus est se</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{556}\) *[conl]aturum* is given by the *CIL* and *[--- d]aturum* by Dessau, neither of which is long enough; *[condon]aturum* is suggested by Arthur Gordon which makes little sense. Most sensible of all, *[esse d]aturum* was suggested by Joyce Gordon (1958: 66).
In the consulship of Mummius Sissena (133 AD) on the Kalends of January (1st of January), the salutary collegium of Diana Nemorensis and Antinous was founded by Lucius Caesennius Rufus, the son of Lucius, third chief magistrate and the same patron.

A section of a Senatus Consultum of the people of Rome:

It will be permitted to assemble, convene and have a collegium to those who, according to the Senatus Consultum, wish to contribute a monthly payment for the purpose of conducting religious rites, but not be under this pretext of being a collegium unless once a month they come together for the purpose of bearing away the dead (and) burying them.

May this be good, happy and advantageous to the Imperator Caesar Trajan Hadrian Augustus and the entire house of Augustus, to us, ours and for our collegium and let us rightly gather

---

557 This suggested by Bendlin (2011: 272): Gordon and Gordon (1958: 66) note probability of a cognomen and Bendlin notes that the cult of Diana Nemorensis is found elsewhere at Lanuvium in CIL, 14.2128. It also appears frequently elsewhere in the epigraphic record: e.g. AE 1960, 27; AE 1982, 403; CIL, 3.1773; 14.3537; 14.2212, 14.2213. 14.2212-3 are both from Nemi, the place of origin for the cult of Diana Nemorensis. It is worth pointing out that Lake Nemi is only six kilometres from Lanuvium, adding weight to Bendlin’s suggestion.

558 CIL suggests [quod bonum faustum felix] but, as Gordon and Gordon (1958: 66) points out, this seems too short. Furthermore, the suggestion in the CIL, ‘quod bonum faustum felix’, is well evidenced in the epigraphic record: e.g. AE 1964, 69a; CIL 6.2028, 6.2065, 6.2081, 6.2084, 6.2091, 8.9796.
adque industrie contraxerimus ut exitus defunctorum honeste prosequamur ita(que) bene conferendo uniuersi consentire debemus ut longo tempore inueterescere possimus tu qui nouos in hoc collegio intrare uoles legem perlege et sic intra ne postmodum queraris aut heredi tuo controuerisiam relinquas

Lexs Collegi

**20** [plac]uit uniuersis ut quisquis in hoc collegium intrare uoluerit dabit kapitulari nomine

HS C N[ummos] ui[ni] boni amphoram item in menses sing[ulo] a(sses) V item placuit ut quisquis mensib[us]

continuis se non pariauerit et ei humanitas acciderit eius ratio funeris non habebitur

etiamsi [tes]tamentum factum habuerit item placuit quisquis ex hoc corpo-

-re n(ostro) pariuat[u]s decesserit eum sequentur ex arca HS CCC N(ummi) ex qua summa decedent exe-

**25** quiari 559 nomine HS L N[ummui] qui ad rogum (us=um) diuidentur exequiae autem pedibus

towards industriousness in order that we might honestly escort the departure of the dead. Therefore we ought to happily consent to the act of all gathering together so that we might all be able to grow old in a long time. You who wish to enter as new men in this collegium, read through the law first and enter in this way, lest you should complain shortly afterwards or leave a quarrel to your heir.

*The Laws of the Collegium:*

**(20)** It was agreed that everybody who might want to enter this collegium will give in their name 100 sesterces per head and an amphora of good (wine), as well as five asses once a month, in the same way. It was decided that whoever might not arrange for 6 held months and to whom humanity (death) may have fallen, his plan of a funeral will not be held, even if he has made a will.

Likewise it was decided that whoever might die from this body, having settled up (accounts), 300 sesterces will follow (be due to) him out of the coffer, out of which there will (25) be nominally withdrawn 50 sesterces to attend at the grave, which will be divided towards the funeral. They (the collegiati) will observe

---

559 Translated by Lewis and Reinhold as “funeral fee” (see Gordon and Gordon, 1958: 67)
fungentur

item placuit quisquis a municipio ultra milliar(ium) XX decesserit et nuntiatum fuerit eo exire debebunt electi ex corpore nostri homines tres qui funeris eius curam agant et rationem populo reddere debebunt sine dolo malo et si quit in eis fraudis causa inuentum fuerit eis multa esto quadruplum quibus [funeraticium] eius dabitur hoc amplius uiatici nomine ultro citro sing(ulis) HS XX N(ummi) quodsi longius 30 [a municipio suo] pra milliarium XX decesserit et nuntiari non potuerit tum is qui eum funerauerit testa-

[tum rem tabul]lis 560 signatis sigillis ciuium romanor(um) VII et probata causa funeraticum eius sa[tis dato amplius neminem petiturum deductis commodis et exequiario e lege collegi dari [sibi petito a co]llegio 561 dolus malus abesto neque patrono neque patronae d[omino] Column 2

on their feet. Likewise it was decided that whoever might have died beyond 20 miles from town, it having been announced, three men elected from our body must go out to that place, who should conduct the management of his funeral without wicked deceit and if a cause of deceit is discovered in those men, there shall be quadruple owed to them.

To them will be given his fund, as well as 20 sesterces apiece, as provision for the journey.

(30) But if he died more than twenty miles away, unannounced, then he who buried him – provided the tablets have been stamped by the seals of seven Roman citizens, the case tested and that nobody else is going to seek more funerary expenses, by the law of the collegium – may claim his funeral costs from the collegium, once the necessary fees have been deducted by the collegium.

Let wicked deceit be absent: neither patron or patroness, nor master

Column 2

560 The CIL entry gives testa[tor rem tabul]lis, here, which is agreed by Gordon and Gordon (1958: 67). Bendlin (2011: 11) suggests testa[tionum tabul]lis, citing a legal usage of Cicero. I propose, more simply, testa[tum rem tabul]lis, which fits slightly more comfortably in the space and seems to me a more likely usage by an association.

561 [ei debebit a nostro co]llegio is originally given in the CIL but Bendlin’s (2011: 212) more recent reading favours the version given here.
neque dominae neque creditorì ex hoc collegio ulla petitio esto nisi si testamento heres
nomina[tu]s erit quis intestatus decesserit is arbitrio quinquennalis et populi funerabitur
item placuit q[u]is ex hoc collegio seruus defunctus fuerit et corpus eius a domino dominau[e]
iniquitatae sepulturae datum non fuerit neque tabellas fecerit ei funus imag[-]

5 -]rium fiet item placuit quisquis ex quacumque causa mortem sibi adsciveri[t]
eius ratio funeris non habebitur
item placuit ut quisquis seruus ex hoc collegio liber factus fuerit is dare debebit uini [bo-
-]ni amphoram item placuit quisquis magister suo anno erit ex ordine al[bi]
ad cenam faciendum et non obseruauerit neque fecerit is arcae inferet HS XXX N(ummos)

10 insequens eius dare debebit et is eius loco restituere debebit
ordo cenarum VIII Id(us) Mar(tias)
natali caesenni[---] patris V Kal(endas) dec(embres) nat(ali)
ant[inoi]

idib aug(ustis) natali Dianae et collegi
XIII K(alendas) Sept(embres) na[tali caes]enni silvani fratrais pr(idie)

nor mistress, nor creditors will have any
claim out of this collegium, unless named
an heir by will.

He who has died intestate will be buried
by the arbitration of the quinquennalis
and the people.

Likewise it was decided that whoever out
of this collegium will have died a slave
but whose body is controlled by the
master and will unfairly not be given for
burial and who has not left instructions, a
funeral with an image (5) will be held for
him.

Likewise it was decided that for anyone
who, for whatever reason, has committed
suicide, his funeral plan will not be held.
Likewise it was decided that whoever is a
slave out of this collegium but is made
free, ought to provide a good amphora of
wine. Likewise it was decided that
whoever may be magistrate of his year
and is required to prepare the dinner, out
of the arrangement according to the
register, but does not observe this and
prepare the dinner, will pay 30 sesterces
to the coffer. (10) The following man
ought to give his and the first ought to
replace him. Order of dinners: 8 days
before the Ides of March (8th of March),
on the birthday of Caesennius […], the
father. 5 days before the Kalends of
December (November 27th), on the
birthday of Antinous. On the Ides of
August (13th of August), on the birthday
of Diana and of the collegium. 13 days before the Kalends of September (20th of August), on the birthday of Caesennius Silvanus, his brother. The day before the Nones (12th of September?), on the birthday of Cornelia Procula, his mother. 19 days before the Kalends of January (14th of December), on the birthday of Caesennius Rufus, patron of the town.

The magistrates of the dinners (done from the order on the register – four at a time, by arrangement) ought to supply (15) a single amphora of good wine (each) and for whatever number may be of the collegium, the loaves of two asses, four sardines, and the task of laying hot cloths. Likewise it was decided that whoever may have been made quinquennalis in this collegium, by the seals of his time, ought to be exempt from public service and, to him, double parts will be given of distributions.

Likewise to the scribe and the messenger by the seals, out the distribution of everyone, one and a half shares was (20) decided to be given. Likewise it was decided that, out of respect, whoever might have born the office of quinquennalis with integrity, ought to be given one and a half shares of everything,

---

562 C.f. Gordon and Gordon (1958: 68): This word has been the subject of much debate, with most tending towards quoquo, hence its use here. As Gordon points out, the meaning of the passage is clear, despite this strange usage.
faciendo idem sperent
item placuit ut quis quid queri aut referre uolet in conuentu referat ut quieti et
hilares diebus sollemnibus epulemur
25 item placuit si seditiosis causa
de loco in alium locum transierit ei
multa es
to HS IIII n(ummum) si quis autem in
obprobrium alter alterius dixerit aut
tu[mul]
tuatus fuerit ei multa esto HS XII
n(ummus) si quis quinquennali inter
epul[as]

obprobrium aut quid contumeliose
dixerit ei multa esto HD XX
n(ummum)

item placuit ut quinquennalis sui
cuiusque temporis diebus sollemn[ibus
ture]
30 et uino supplicet et ceteris
officiis altatus fungatur et die[ibus
natalibus]
dianae et antinoi oleum collegio in
balinio publico pon[at antequam]
epulentur

so that those remaining may too hope the
same, by rightly doing their duty.
Likewise it was decided that he who
wants to complain or report an issue
should complain at a meeting, so that we
may feast cheerfully and peacefully on
solemn days. Likewise it was decided that
(25) if one is a cause of strife, in that he
moves from one place to another, to him
there shall be a fine of 4 sesterces.
However, if he may have spoken to
another in disgrace or become rowdy,
there shall be a fine of 12 sesterces. If he
may have said something in taunt or
abusively to a quinquennalis during
dinner, to him there shall be a fine of 20
sesterces.

Likewise it was decided that the
quinquennalis whose time it is will
supply the incense and (30) wine for
festival days and will perform his other
duties clothed in white and, on the
birthdays of Diana & Antionous, will
place oil for the collegium in the public
bath, before the members feast.

**ILS 7213 = CIL 6.10234 Inscription and Translation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lex collegi(i) Aesculapi et Hygia</th>
<th>The Laws of the Collegium of Aesculapius and Hygia:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>
### Greek Text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Greek Text</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>Salvia C(ai) f(ilia) Marcellina ob memoriam Fl(avi) Apolloni, proc(uratoris), Aug(usti), qui fuit a pinacothecis, et Capitonis Aug(usti) l(iberti), adiutoris eius, mariti sui optimi piissimi, donum dedit collegio Aesculapi et Hygia locum aediculae cum pergula et signum marmoreum Aesculapi et solarium tectum iunctum, in quo populus collegi(i) s(upra) s(cripti) epuletur, quod est via Appia ad Martis (scil. aedem) intra milliarem I et II ab urbe euntibus, parte laeva, inter adfines Vibium Calocaerum et populum;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Greek Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>563</td>
<td>item eadem Marcellina collegio s(upra) s(cripto) dedit donautique HS L m(ilia) n(ummos) hominibus n(umero) LX sub hac condicione, ut ne plures adlegantur, quam numerus s(upra) s(criptus) et ut in locum defunctorum loca veneant et liberi adlegantur, vel si quis locum suum legare volet filio vel fratri vel libero dumtaxat, ut inferat arcae n(ostre) partem dimidiam funeratici; et ne eam pecuniam s(upra) s(criptam) velint in alios usus convertere, sed ut ex usuris eius summae diebus infra scriptis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Latin Translation

Salvia Marcellina, the daughter of Gaius - in memory of Flavius Apollonius, who was the overseer of art-galleries, and in memory of Capito, an imperial freedman, who was his assistant and the best and most faithful husband to her – gave as a gift to the collegium of Aesculapius & Hygia, space for a temple with a pergola and a marble statue of Aesculapius and a covered solarium attached, in which the people of the previously mentioned collegium may dine, which is on the Via Appia near the Temple of Mars, between one and two miles away on the left hand side, when travelling from the city, within the neighbourhood of Vibius Calocaerus and the people.

(5) Likewise, the same Marcellina gave and donated fifty thousand sesterces to the previously mentioned collegium for sixty men under this condition: that no more may be enrolled than the number written above and that in the place of those who have died, their places will be sold and free persons ought to be enrolled; that if anyone wants to allot his place to either his son, brother or freedman, they may do so provided they pay our treasury a half part of the burial cost; and that they do not want to use the above-mentioned money for any other uses but that, rather, out of the interest of this sum they celebrate in this place on the days that are written below.

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563 Understand *agrum publicum* (Dessau, *ILS*, 7213, n.3)

564 Understand *veneant* (*venere* - ‘to sell’) – Dessau, *ILS*, 7213, n.6).
locum confrequentarent;
ex reditu eius summae si quod
comparauerint sportulas hominib(us)
n(umero) LX ex decreto uniuersorum
quod gestum est in templo diuorum in
aede diui Titi con
-uenter pleno, qui dies fuit V Id(us)
Mart(ias) Bruttio Praesente et Junio
Rufino co(n)s(ulibus), uti XIII
K(alendas) Oct(oberes) die felicissimo
n(atali) Antonini Aug(usti) n(ostris) Pii
p(atris) p(atriae) sportulas diuiderent: in
10 templo diuorum in aede diui
Titi C(aio) Ofilio Hermeti
q(uin)ennali) p(er)p(eto auel qui
tunc erit a * (denarios) III, Aelio
Zenoni patri collegi(i) * (denarios) III,
Salviae Marcellinae matri collegi(i) * (denarios) III, imm(unibus)
sing(ulis) * (denarios) II, cur(atoribus)
sing(ulis) * (denarios) II, populo
sing(ulis) * (denarios) I. Item pl(acuit)
pr(idie) Non(as) Nov(embres) n(atali)
collegi(i) diuiderent ex reditu s(upra)
scripto ad Martis in scholam
n(ostram) praeentibus
q(uin)ennali) * (denarios) VI, patri
collegi(i) * (denarios) VI,
matri collegi(i) * (denarios) VI,
imm(unibus) sing(ulis) * (denarios)
III, cur(atoribus) sing(ulis) * (denarios) III, panem [a(ssium)] III;
vinum mensuras q(uin)ennali

But if there may be collected any income
from this sum, they will give presents to the
sixty members – from the decree of all the
members, which was passed in the temple of
the gods, in the shrine of the deified Titus at
a full meeting, on the 11th of March during
the consulsips of Bruttius Praesentius and
Junius Rufinus (153 AD) – that on the 19th of
September, on the most propitious birthday
of our Emperor, Antoninus Pius, the father of
our country, presents are to be given:

(10) In the temple of the deified Caesars in
the shrine of the deified Titus, it was decided
that: Gaius Ofilius Hermetius, the
quinquennalis for life, or whoever will be
quinquennalis at that time will receive three
denarii; to Aelius Zenon, the father of the
association, three denarii; to Salvia
Marcellina, the mother of the association,
three denarii; to each of the members exempt
from fees, two denarii; to each of the
supervisors, two denarii; and to each of the
other members, one denarius. Likewise it was
decided that on the 4th of November, on the
birthday of the collegium, there will be
distributed from the income mentioned
above, in our clubhouse near the Temple of
Mars, by the present quinquennalis: six
denarii to the father of the collegium; six
denarii to the mother of the collegium; six
denarii to each exempt member; four denarii
to each supervisor and bread worth three
asses.
Measures of wine: to the quinquennalis, nine sextarii; to the father of the collegium, nine sextarii; to each fee-exempt member, six sextarii; to each supervisor, six sextarii; and to each of the other members, three sextarii.

Likewise, on the 4th of January, they will distribute New Year’s gifts, just as is written above for the 19th of September.

Likewise on the 22nd of February, on the day of our beloved family, in the same place near the temple of Mars, they will distribute gifts of bread and wine just as is written above for the 4th of November.

Likewise on the 14th of March, there will be a banquet in the same place, which Ofilius Hermetius, the quinquennalis, has promised will be given every year to those present, and gifts just as it is the custom to give. Likewise (15) on the 22nd of March, on the Day of Violets, presents of bread and wine will be distributed to all those present, at the same place, just as on the days written above.

Likewise, on the 11th of May on the Day of Roses, presents of bread and wine will be distributed to all those present, at the same place, just as on the days written above.

On this condition, which was decided by everyone in the meeting, that on the days

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565 As Dessau indicates, this term also appears in the inscription that follows this one, within the ILS (7214). Strenua can be understood in this context to be derived from the New Year’s goddess, Strenia, to mean ‘New Year’s Gift’.

566 Read carae.

567 Within the Fasti, Ovid describes this day as day for celebrating one’s living kin and family gods. Cf. Ovid, Fasti, 2. 617.

568 The Day of Violets.

569 The Day of Roses.
which are written above, the gifts and bread and wine of those who have not been able to come together for the purpose of meeting will be sold and the proceeds distributed to those present, except for the gifts of those who will have gone across the sea or who are detained by perpetual ill-health. Likewise, Publius Aelius Zenon, an Imperial freedman, in memory of his most pious brother, Marcus Ulpius Capito, an Imperial freedman, gave and donated 10,000 HS, to the same, above-named collegium, so that out of the return of this sum there may be distributed in contribution of gifts.

But if they intend to use all this money, which is written above – that (20) Salvia Marcellina, the daughter of Gaius, and Publius Aelius Zenon, the imperial freedman, gave and donated to the above-named collegium - towards any other purpose than in the ways that are written above - which the body of our collegium has determined to utilise for all those things that have been outlined on the days mentioned above, so that everything can be prepared and distributed - and if the quinquennalis or the curators of each collegium (whoever is in charge at that time) did anything contrary to these things or
q(uin)q(uennalis) et curatores s(upra) s(criti) uti poenae nomine arkae\textsuperscript{570} n(ostrae) inferant HS XX m(ilia) n(umnum).

Hoc decretum ordini n(ostrorum) placuit in conventu pleno, quod gestum est in templo divorum in aede divi Titi V Id(us) Mart(ias) C(aio) Bruttio Praesente, A(ulo) Iunio Rufino co(n)s(ulis), q(uin)q(uennali) C(aio) Ofilio Hermetus, curatorib(us) P(ublio) Aelio Aug(usti) lib(erto) Onesimo et C(aio) Salvio Seleuco.

\textit{CIL} 6.33885 = ILS 7214 Inscription and Translation

\ldots8\ldots[Iulius] Aelianus ius scholae tetrastyli 
\ldots10\ldots Aug(usti,) quo conveniretur a negotiantibus 
\ldots10\ldots eborari(i)s dedit.


[Placere] item, uti K(alendis) Ian(uariis) strenuam (sic) *(denarii) V

\textsuperscript{570} Read \textit{arcae}.
ex arca n(ostra) a curatoribus n(umero) IIII sui cuiusq(ue)
[anni et m]ustacium et palma et carica et pir[a] […]osch[… dare]tur. Item
VIII[I Kal(endas)] Febr(uarias)

10 natali Ha[driani Aug(usti),
sportulae darentur *(denarii) V, et a
curatorib(us) praestari pl[a]c(uit)
[…panem et] vin[um et] cal(i)dam
passive, iis qui ad tetrastylum epulati
tuerint.

[Item … natali I]uli Aeliani sportulae
ex arca darentur *(denarii) III et a
curatorib(us)

[panem et vinum et calidam pas]sive
praestari placuit, iis qui ad tetrastylum
tuerint. Item [.5.. natali I]uli Flacci
fili(i), sportulae ex arca darentur
*(denarii) III et a curatorib(us)

15 [panem et vinum et calidam
passive] praestari placuit, iis qui ad
tetrastylum tuerint.

[Item placere] sportulae ex arc(a)
darentur *(denarii) III et pan(is) et
vin(um) et cal(i)d(a) passive, iis
[qui ad tetrastylum tuerint] tuerint.
Item placere uti cena rec[ta] III Idus
Aug(ustas) die imperi(i)

darentur a curat(oribus) n(umero) IIII
sui cuiusq(ue) anni

[Item placere ….]a *(denarii) […]
omnibus annis divideretur. Item [curatores quaterni omnibus] annis fient ex albo per ordinem. Item placere […………16………….]t sui anni commoda cuncta acciperent. [singulis annis Kalend(is) quod supere]sset in arca corporis, curatores dividerent aequis [portionibus aut si quid tardius] inferrent centesim(is) datis a curatorib(us) sing(ulis) [mensibus 3] Item placere uti adlect[i 3] ne eod(em) anno praestarent [et pariter sumpt[us ab utrisq(ue) erogentur [3] Item placere [uti quisquis adlectus e]sset inferret arcae *(denarios) […] Likewise it was decided that … denarii ought to be divided to everyone (all members) each year. Likewise (20) there will be four curators in all years, taken from the register in order. Likewise it was decided that (the curators of their year) ought to receive all the profits. Each year on the Kalends, whatever might be left over in the coffers of the order, ought to be distributed equally by portions or, if anyone might pay anything late, to him will be given a percentage by the curators, once a month. Likewise it was decided that those newly admitted should not be supplied for the same year (25) and an equal expense ought to be paid by everyone. Likewise it was decided that whoever is appointed, ought to pay … denarii.

**ILS 7215 Incription and Translation**

**Ob merita**

Claudiae Hedones et memori-am Ti(beri) Claudi Himeri fili(i) eius cultores Herculis universi iu-(5) rati per I(ovem) O(ptimum) M(aximum) Geniumque Imp(eratoris) Caesaris Nervae Traiani Aug(usti) Ger(manici) ita censuerunt: placere sibi posterisque suis, uti quodannis in perpetuum (10) VI Idus Febr(uarias) natale Ti(beri) Clau-di Himeri coherent vesce-

**On account of the merits of Claudia Hedones and in memory of her son, Tiberius Claudius Himerius, all of the worshippers of Hercules swore an oath (5) to Jupiter Optimus Maximus and to the Genius of the Emperor, Caesar Nerva Trajan Augustus Germanicus that they would devise thus:**

It is pleasing to themselves and to those following them, that for perpetual years, on the (10) 8th of February, the birthday
renturque in templo Herculis; quod si ita non fecissent tunc eo an-
(15) no quo cessatum fuisset, hi cultores Herculis qui in titulo marmoreo scri-
pti sunt posterique eorum inferrent cultoribus
20 imaginum Caesaris nostri, qui sunt in vico strament(o), annuos HS CC n(ummum)
item [...7...]
mat[...]
of Tiberius Claudius Himerus, they will worship and eat in the temple of Hercules and if they do not do this then, on the year which it is stopped, (15) these worshippers of Hercules, who were written on the marble title, will carry for their descendants and the worshippers, the (20) image of our Caesar, (and give) 200 sesterces to those who live in the neighbourhood.

Likewise....

ILS 7215a Inscription and Translation

Descriptum et recognitum factum ex libello qui propositus erat Alb(urno) Maiori ad statione(m) Resculi, in quo scriptum erat id quod i(nfra) s(critum) est:
Artemidorus Apolloni, magister collegi(i) Iovi Cerneni, et
(5) Valerius Niconis et Offas Menofili quaestores collegi(i) eius-
dem, posito hoc libello publice testantur: ex collegio s(upra) s(crito) ubi erant h(ombres) LIII, ex eis non plus rema(n)sisse ad Alb(urnum), quam quot h(ombres) XVII; Iulium Iuli quoque, commagistrum suum, ex die magisteri(i) sui non accessisse
(10) ad Alburnum, neq(ue) in collegio; sequere eis, qui pr(a)e-
sent sentes fuerunt, rationem reddedisse, et si

The recognized, copied notice of a petition, which was posted at Alburnus Major, near the outpost at Resculus, in which was written that which is written below:
Artemidorus Apollonius, the magistrate of the Collegium of Jupiter Cernenis, and (5) Valerius Niconis and Offas Menofilus, the quaestors of that same collegium, by putting forward this notice, are publically attesting:

That out of the above-named collegium, where there were fifty-four members, no more than 17 of those have stayed near Alburnus (10); that even Julius Julius, its co-president, has not come near Alburnus, nor been in the collegium, since the day of his magistracy; that he
quit eorum (h)abuerat, reddedisset sive funeribus et cautionem suam, in qua eis caverat, recepisset; modoque autem neque funeraticis sufficerent (15) neque loculum (h)aberet neque quisquam tam magno tempore diebus, quibus legi continetur, convenire voluerint aut conferre funeraticia sive munera: seque i[d]circo per hunc libellum publice testantur, ut si quis defunctus fuerit, ne putet se colle-
(20) gium (h)abere aut ab eis aliquem petitio-
 nem funeris (h)abiturum .
propositus Alb(urno) Maiori, V Idus Febr(uarias) Imp(erator) L(ucio) Aur(elio)
Vero III et Quadrato co(n)sl(ibus)
act(um) Alb(urno) Maiori
Descripsum et recognitum
(25) factum ex libello qui propo situs erat Alb(urno) Maiori ad statio nem Resculi in quo scrip
tum erat id quo<de=q> i(nfra)
s(criptum) est
(30) Artemidorus Apolloni magister colleg(i) Iovi Cerneni et Valerius
Niconis et Offas Menofili qu(a)esto res colleg(i) eiusdem
posito hoc libello publice testantur
(35) ex collegis s(upra) s(criptis) ubi erant hom(ines) LIII

(Artemidorus) was rendering an account, to those who were present, and, if he had anything of theirs, he was returning it if (it was a sum) for funerals and was taking back his own guarantee, in which he had secured them; but that now there were not sufficient funds for funerals (15) and nor did he have a single funeral space and nor had anyone wanted to attend meetings for such a great length of days, which are comprised in the law, or to contribute funeral services or fees. And that, on this account, he was publically attesting, through this notice, that if anyone should die, he should not consider himself to have a collegium (20) or to be able to have any right of claim from those men for a funeral. This was posted at Alburnus Major, on the 9th of February (5 days before the Ides) during the third consulship of Emperor Lucius Aurelius Verus and the consulship of Quadratus (167 AD).
Done at Alburnus Major. Copied and recognized notice of the petition (25) which was posted at Alburnus Major, near the outpost of Resculus, in which it was written that which is written below.

(30) Artemidorus Apollonius, the magistrate of the Collegium of Jupiter Cernenis, and Valerius Niconis and Offas Menofilus, the quaestors of that same collegium, by putting forward this notice, are publically attesting (35) that out of the above-named collegium,
ex eis non plus rema(n)sisse Alb(urni)
quam quot homin(es) XVII
L(uci) Vasidi Victo-
ris
(40) C(ai) Secundini Legitimi
Stertini Rustici
Aeli Platoris
Geldonis
Ulpi Felicis
(45) Septembris Platoris

The inscription is repeated, verbatim,
from this point onwards

where there were fifty-four members, no
more than 17 of those have stayed near
Alburnus.
Lucius Vasidius Victoris
(40) Gaius Secundinus Legitimus
Stertinus Rusticus
Aelius Plator
Geldon
Ulpius Felix
(45) September Plator

…
APPENDIX II

Figure 4: Plan of Ostia\textsuperscript{571}

\textsuperscript{571} The plan is taken from Theo Bakker’s website: <http://www.ostia-antica.org/map/plans-so/overview-color.jpg> Date last accessed: 27/08/2017.