EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN TURKEY: THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AGE

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Abstract

Framed within theoretical discussions on both New Public Management (NPM) theory and New Social Movement (NSM) theory, this thesis explores increasing religiosity in education delivery in secular Turkey. Particularly, it investigates the ways in which two Islamic religious groups, the Gulen Movement (GM) and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati (IC), engage with education as a result of neoliberalization in both the public sphere and public administration. Islam, and especially the Islamic Social Movements (ISMs), play an important role in politics and in the socio-economic spheres; therefore, it is necessary to consider their growing role in the delivery of public services such as education not only in Muslim countries, but also in secular societies. Since education is defined as a public service which has a significant role in the creation of social capital (Putnam, 1993), these movements increased their interest in education systems in order to make their own voice heard during the process of education delivery, or in other words, the creation of social capital.

This research combines three different research methods: 1) documentary analysis of official papers from the public administration reforms, government archives, the GM and IC’s own reports and web pages, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank reports on the Turkish education system; 2) in-depth interviews conducted with parents, teachers and alumni of GM an IC schools; 3) focus group analysis conducted with graduates from the IC and the GM schools. The data collected from the documents and field research suggest that in Turkey, NPM, which was applied to privatized public services and the deregulated public sphere, has created opportunity spaces for Muslims and ISMs to move upward in the social stratification ladder. The result is the emergence of an ISM controlled education service. The GM and the IC are the best examples of this process.

The researcher used the GM and the IC as examples of a collective case study. Although both the GM and the IC have emerged in a similar socio-political and economic environment, in which there is an increasing trend of Islamisation in the social structure and neoliberalization in the economy and politics, these movements responded differently to the same changes. The GM has managed to integrate into the new conditions and produced a similar discourse to NPM. Therefore, rather than establishing an Islamic order, the GM focused on political, social and economic wealth by opening education institutions. However, by demonstrating a traditional form of Islam, the IC shows the other face of religious groups in Turkey. For this reason, the researcher refers to the GM as a ‘movement’ and the IC as a ‘cemaat’. Additionally, by being visible in the public sphere and producing a neoliberal discourse, which is parallel with NPM doctrines, the GM managed to develop educational governance that increases secular and pious families’ voices in the education system.

This research provides an analysis of a new approach in public administration related to education, one that distances itself from the traditional, prescriptive structures, and instead engages in flexible and participative relationships. Finally, the findings of this research will provide a greater understanding of states where there are tensions between modernisation and democratisation, and demands for ‘traditional values’.
Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Preface

Standing at the junction between Europe and Asia, Turkey is somewhat anomalous. As a relatively new state, Turkey is characterised by dramatic tensions between socio-political changes and Islam. When this is added to a desire for closer European integration, along with the modernisation of state institutions, these tensions are prevalent in many public services, such as education. Through changes or reforms, in Turkey, Islamic Social Movements (ISM) have sought to influence the delivery of public services, which has had important implications for public administration.

The administrative reform project has been both problematised and advocated by politicians, bureaucrats, and academics on several grounds. It was the opinion of some that the Turkish Public Administration reform process, which will from hereon be referred to as New Public Management (NPM), had problems in terms of equality, responsiveness, accountability, transparency and levels of participation. However, without examining the country’s socio-political structure deeply, Turkish politicians and bureaucrats have accepted NPM as a politically and administratively acceptable method for reforming public administration throughout the application of private sector methods aimed at improving 3 Es - efficiency, effectiveness and economics.

It has been argued that NPM is the most appropriate reform model, as it is accordant with neoliberalism, private sector entrepreneurs and their political privileges, and partnership between the public and the private. Moreover, it promotes a continuous output of international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank (WB), all of which are aiming to transform certain countries’ statist policies to liberal policies. The
Turkish Public Administration structure, however, has been faced with important changes, such as the involvement of third parties and civic actors (i.e. social movements) in public service; the public administration professionals have largely overlooked these reform processes. The existing literature is not enough to indicate exactly how NPM affects Turkish Public Administration, and, therefore, the main aim of this thesis is to fill this gap, and offer a consideration of the involvement of the social movements -especially the ISMs - in the public sector during the NPM era.

1.2. Background of the Research Problem

After 73 years of the formation of the official Kemalist ideology in Turkey, a political leader who took strength from Islam and highlighted his Islamic identity succeeded to have 158 chairs in the 550-chair parliament. The coalition government, which was built in 1996 by the Welfare Party, a pro-Islamic Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, and the True Path Party with a Europhile-secularist leader Tansu Ciller, properly indicates to the reader the dualistic tensions inherent in contemporary Turkish identity (Yavuz, 2008). Although many people believed that this kind of coalition could produce some solutions for the society’s inherit problems between religious and secularist ideas, the Turkish military, known as the defender of the Kemalistic-Secularist Turkish Republic, hindered this political formation through a 1997 military memorandum named the 28th February – Postmodern Coup.

Even though Turkey’s Republican-Kemalist structure had faced an obligatory liberalization process that started with the Ozal Government (1980-1993), the political liberalization of the country has not been attained as easily as the economic transformation. The most significant

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1 Kemalist refers to those who espouse Mustafa Kemal’s ideas of nationalism and secularism.
2 The 1997 military memorandum refers to the decisions issued by the Turkish Military leadership on a National Security Council meeting on the 28th February 1997, which initiated the 28th February process that precipitated the resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan of the Welfare Party, and the end of his coalition government. As the Erbakan-government was forced out without dissolving the parliament or suspending the constitution, the event has been labeled a “postmodern coup” by Salim Dervişoğlu, and this label has stuck.
reason for this delay was that the Republican-Kemalist elites had been accepted as defenders of the Secular Turkish Republic against “reactionary” Islamic Movements by Turkish scholars (Yavuz, 2003). However, since the 1980s the Turkish scholars’ attitudes have changed year by year, and many Turkish academics, rather than understanding Islam and the Islamic Movements as a threat, accepted them as subordinate conjunctions endorsing a democratic and pluralistic society. Additionally, they believe that the Turkish Islamic Movements could be an example for other Muslim countries in the Middle East.

Yavuz (2003) sought to encapsulate the three most vital steps in giving significant importance to the Islamic Identity Movement in Turkey. First of all, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the secularizing and state-centric Kemalist elites were no longer able to supply the traditional society and its demands and necessities. Therefore, the gap between the state and society increased gradually. Gole (1997:46-58) claims that “the state elites did not develop an alternative value system”, meaning that the diverse ISMs filled the gap and produced practical moral and social paradigms for the rural part of society. Namely, they achieved that which the secular-state elites had never been able to.

Secondly, in Turkey the concepts of ‘cemaat-identity-justice’ and ‘sense of self’ have always been used by politically active Muslims, and the idea of Islam or sometimes Islam itself has been used by these political groups in order to create their own modernity perception. Yavuz (2003) highlighted that these movements redefined modernity and formed a new definition of nationalism, secularism, democracy, human rights, the liberal market, and personal autonomy by using their Islamic perceptions. In their view this meant a great combination of modern Western values with the traditional Islamic values, which annihilated the lack of Islam in society.

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3 Nilüfer Göle, Ismail Kara, Serif Mardin, and Mete Tuncay are some of these scholars who are studying Islamic Social Movements
The final step took place in the 1980s, when the idea of a national state had been weakening in Turkey. The ISMs found opportunities while creating their own social, political and cultural spaces (Yavuz, 2008). The economic spaces and the Islamic Market also can be counted among these opportunity spaces. Consequently, since 1923 the social, political, economic and cultural alterations were the drivers of the transformation of Secular-Kemalist-State perception of Turkish scholars and citizens in Turkey. As Yavuz (2003:6) stated, “the shift from the primordial o
f traditional Islamic identity to the assertiveness of the new Islamic identity is made possible by Islamic Social Movements.”

As Yavuz (2003) underlined, the rhythms and patterns of governance in state and society changed, and so did the understanding and roles of religion and religious groups. According to a comparison of different contemporary Islamic Religious Groups (IRGs), “these groups are Janus-faced and have dissimilar impacts on both society and state” (Yavuz, 2003:15). He explains that on the one hand these groups are modern, and socially and politically progressive, expressing yearnings for democracy and economic development through opening banks, schools and press media. On the other hand, however, they are conservative and authoritarian, calling for a strict moral-religious code in society.

While it is not possible to explain the ISMs’ roles or their typologies by only emphasizing their Janus-faced structures in Turkey, there are different types of Islamic Social Movements in different Muslim countries. Drawing on Yavuz’s (2008) ideas, it can be argued that the movements are two-faced. On the one hand, during the Turkish Public Administration reform process, the movements have modern and progressive faces, and seek democracy and economic development by focusing on education policies, using education as a tool for their success. On the other hand, some of the additional authoritarian-faced movements were aiming to establish Islamic-ethical codes in society. So it is visible that in Turkey,
governments and ISMs sometimes walk hand in hand, yet in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria the ISMs are seen as a threat to governments, modernization and public administration reforms.

Within this research, it has been seen that the involvement of the ISMs with the Turkish Public Administration, and especially the education system, is the result of an expanding market, changing patterns of religious authority, and political liberalization of Turkish Administration (Yavuz, 2000). Therefore, by decreasing the strong Kemalist discourse in the making of education policy (Karaveli, 2010) and emphasizing Allah’s continuous intervention in the universe (Aslan, 2009), both the GM and IC attempt to combine ‘Islam and education’ by opening ‘Community Schools’.

Additionally, the involvement of the ISMs in education transformed the positivist and behaviourist grounds of the Turkish Education System, and increased the adoption of an anti-positivist (Quantumist) and constructionist philosophy. Firstly, in the field of education, in contrast with the positivist theory, quantum philosophy argues that there is more than one right way in both life and science; multidirectional change, ambiguity, variability and flexibility are possible in both life and science (Inal, 2012). By applying quantum philosophy - whose findings suggested that there are other laws at work in the universe, operating on a deeper level than the ones we know - to education, the foundations of the Kemalist education system were being undermined. Inal (2012) writes that this is a transformation from Ataturk’s science-based national schools to religion-based conservative schools.

Secondly, the transformation from behaviourism to constructivism refers to a great change in the education of the ‘citizen-individual’. While educating the ‘citizen-individual’, the Turkish Republican Elite used techniques such as pedagogical routine and rote learning, which are criticized by Constructionists. In their view the Republican Elites apply the behaviourist model by hiding behind the positivist ideas. Rather, they believe that schools should educate
the students not by using teacher-centred class systems, but rather student-centred class systems in which the individual’s ethnic, religious and gender characteristics are highlighted. According to informal conversations between my parents and their friends, there are several drivers for these transformations, the most significant one being neoliberalism and the application of private sector ethos to the public sector; namely, New Public Management (NPM).

From a neoliberal view, state power in the education system should be broken, and rather than the central government, professionals should play a more active role in how schools are managed and curriculums created. In addition to this, as Grace (in Tolofari, 2005:84) writes, “The New Right challenge of the 1980s has been to argue that education is not a public good but a commodity in the market place and this commodity would be delivered more efficiently and effectively in [by] market forces.”. This is why the new right ideologists encouraged the involvement of the private sector in the education system.

It is possible to see the increasing involvement of the private sector in Turkey by the AKP (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, English: Justice and Development Party) Government. According to Inal (2012), by distributing free textbooks and tablet computers to students the AKP increased both its popularity in the eyes of families and the capital accumulation of some Islamic companies who supply the books and tablets to the government schools. In short, by the impact of either liberalization or NPM, education has been seen as a commodity which could be delivered by the private sector, thereby increasing their participation.

There is a parallel liberalization movement in Public Administration, specifically in the “public sphere”. The increasing tendency towards religiosity (Kepel, 1994 and Roy, 2004) and a “rising importance of religious traditions and communities” (Habermas, 2006:1) made visible the Islamic Social Movements in public and academic discourse/life (Gole, 2000,
Most of these movements have shown an interest in engaging with public life by investigating different sectors such as health, media and education (Yavuz, 2008).

In addition to the aforementioned conditions, several scholars such as Gole (2004) and Kuru (2009) suggested that there is a change in the perception of “secularism” in Turkey. According to the Turkish Constitutional Court, secularism means separation of “social life, education, family, economy, law, manners, dress codes, etc. from religion” (In Kuru, 2009:173). Instead of building the arguments on this single-Kemalist definition of secularism, people talk about different secularisms, for example, Kuru’s identification of the concept of passive secularism and assertive secularism (Kuru, 2009).

In the words of Gole (2004:93, in Kuru, 2009:13) Turkey “suffers from an excess of secularism…which involves the forced secularization of the public sphere [and]…and a total repression of any symbols or organizations of faith… Today we see how the public sphere was really under the tutorship of state, which through authoritarian means imposed a secular way of life.” Briefly, secularism left the individual alone and defenceless against an authoritarian state when it replaced a society composed of communities of the faithful with this notion (Mahcupyan, 2008:241). This means that the individual was deprived of the protection that the religious community had provided. However during the last decades, by using Islam as a unifying philosophy, ISMs “provided the vernacular for the marginalized majority, who were excluded from the top-down transformation.” (Yavuz, 2008:26).

On the basis of these investigations that point to the increasing encounters between “Educational Governance” (Altrichter, 2010) and Islamic Social Movements, this dissertation focuses on both the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati in order to analyse their role in the education system. On the one hand, as Kuru (2009:165) writes, since private Islamic schools are not allowed in Turkey, Islamic movements have opened secular private
schools, which have used the same curricula as secular public schools. These schools are still criticized by the assertive secularists because they are controlled by conservative Muslims. The state does not provide funding directly to these schools. However, in 2003, the AKP Government initiated a project to publicly fund the private school tuitions of ten thousand students from poor families. The Council of State blocked the project and President Ahmet Nejdet Sezer vetoed it, because they opposed the use of public money for private schools, some of which were run by Islamic Movements.

On the other hand, both GM and some activities of IC in education have been criticized and found religiously modern by other ‘piety movements’ (Mahmood, 2005:3). Running mixed-gender schools, teaching modern science, and not having Quran lessons in their curriculum were some of the issues attracting criticism. For many, both the GM and the IC, but especially the GM, contribute to the promotion of ideas of tolerance; for others they are a wolf in sheep’s clothing and a modern day Ayatollah Khomeini (Skatelbeck, 2011).

According to Tunaya (1991:17) the 31-March-Incident, which took place on the 13th April 1909, was one of the most important reactionary movements to the establishment of the Constitutional Government. According to the incident’s supporters the establishment of the Constitutional Government brought the idea of secularism, which should not even be considered in a Muslim state. Tunaya (1991:115) adds the politicization of the Islamist Movements in Turkey as one of the most important outcomes of the 31-March-Incident. In addition to this incident, there were another two rebellion movements that took place in 1925 and 1930 respectively. The similarities between these three movements were firstly that their supporters were from Naqshibandi Tariqaat (Religious Order), and secondly, that they were against the modernization and secularization of the country (Mardin, in Topper (ed), 1991:122). These rebellion movements’ impact was so great that it caused the abolishment in Turkey of the only opposition party in 1930.
Although because of the repression of the CHP (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, English: Republican People’s Party) and the Military Forces the Naqshibandis keep their activities limited in number, Tunaya (1991:165) says that they repeated the same words over and over again; they kept the essence the same. Mardin (Ibid: 123) adds that though their mode of activities have changed, their tasavvuf and especially Naqshibandi origin had an impact on their current organizations. Also, he draws attention to the impacts of the early Naqshibandi tradition’s impact on the modern Nurcus and current Naqshibandi Communities.

Since this research focuses on the educational activities of the IC and the GM, which are the current followers of the Naqshibandi School, the school’s influence on Turkish politics is highly important. The IC, established by M. Zahit Kotku, born in Bursa, 1897, belonged to the Naqshibandi tradition. Kotku was an Imam, a state official, in the Iskenderpasa Mosque. Unlike the Nurcu School’s leader, Said-i Nursi, no government imprisoned him, because he kept himself away from mainstream discourses. Again, unlike Said-i Nursi; “for Kotku, politics is an important tool and he had close relations with politicians such as Korkut Ozal and Necmettin Erbakan” (Yavuz, 2008:191). It is a well-known fact that Kotku played a significant role during the foundation of the MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi: National Order Party), which was the first Islamist Party in the Turkish Parliament (Yavuz, 2008). However, Kotku had criticized Erbakan’s radical political discourses frequently, too.

In addition to their active role in politics, the IC aimed to establish their own economic, educational and communicative networks in order to increase the primacy of religion in the political and social spheres (Ozdalga, 1997:137). Similarly, it is possible to see the same aim in the Gulen Movement, which is named after its founder and leader Fethullah Gulen, born in Erzurum in 1938. Gulen grew up in a very pious family and learned Arabic and Persian in his early years from his Imam father. During puberty he attended Muhammed Lutfi’s religious classes, was introduced to Said-i Nursi’s works and learned that Islam was compatible with
science, reason and modernity (Maigre, 2007:36). After the coup of March 12th, 1971, Gulen was arrested for underground religious activities and spent seven months in prison. As Maigre (2007) mentions, he became a magnet for students, doctors, academics, civil servants and businessmen because of his sermons, private conversations and conferences on topics such as religion as social, economic and philosophical.

The economic and political liberalization process of Turkey, which started during the Ozal Era (1983-1993), also influenced the religious communities and their involvement with politics, which were highly discernible. For example, in 1985 Aysal Atac, a bureaucrat who was known as a member of the Nurcu Community and put on trial for that reason, was appointed as the head of Department of Primary and Middle Education in the Ministry of National Education (Bilgili, 2006:47). Although M. Zahit Kotku did not hesitate to build close relationships with politicians, Fethullah Gulen had put some distance between himself and politicians. Nevertheless, Gulen remained highly suspicious of both the secular-Kemalist elites and military elites. He was forced to migrate to the United States, and is currently the honorary president of the Rumi forum, a platform of inter-cultural and inter-faith dialogue established in 1999 (Maigre, 2007:37).

Despite the number of community-owned private schools having increased drastically in Turkey, and across the globe; and the fact that these movements take a sizeable and important role in the development of educational projects, and their impact on the formation of education policy has not been properly studied. Whilst these communities have been studied by sociological literature, there is a dearth of research in the public administration field. In other words, there is a lack of interest in public administration literature on ISMs’ impact on public service delivery processes, especially educational services. Among other Islamist groups, the followers of GM and IC, and the founders of their schools can easily be recognized by their emphasis on the significance of education.
1.3. Research Problem and Argument of the Thesis

Although the Turkish administrative state is characterised by strong secular Kemalist values, and whose motto is “The state will be ruled by positivism not superstition” (Inalcik, 1973), Yavuz’s (2008) findings show that during the creation of Islamic Social Movements (ISMs) there were 3 important milestones that carried traces of the Kemalist motto. Firstly, since 1923 the traditional society’s demands from the state have not been delivered in the public sphere by the Kemalist administrators because of the lack of an alternative value system. Secondly, before the involvement of the ISMs in the Turkish Public Administration (PA) some terms such nationalism, secularism, liberal market etc. had peremptory meanings, which were defined by Kemalist-secular elites. By liberal market-oriented policies the patterns of PA have been changed and the combination of western values and traditional values has been made possible during the definition and application of those terms in society. The third milestone was the trivialization of the national state, by which some opportunity spaces were created for the devoutly religious people. The experience of this three-step-change got different reactions from the different segments of society.

On the one hand, the changes have been accepted as a liberalization and normalization of the Turkish PA, which has been purified from the strong secular-Kemalist values (Gole, 1997; Yavuz, 2003, 2005; Kuru, 2009). On the other hand, those changes created a shift in the definition of democracy, and changed the components of democracy. In addition to this, some scholars such as Cizre (Sakallioglu) and Cinar (2003), and Yesilada and Rubin (2010) indicate that the trial changes are not a step for liberalization, but rather they are in favour of Islamization of the Turkish PA. In other words, during the new public management era the increasing visibility and mobility of either Islam or Islamic Social Movements (ISM) in Turkish PA generated a variety of arguments. The impact of NPM and ISM on education is
one such example. While some people think it is the right way for education to move, others think it is educating the “Right” way (Apple, 2001).

The main hypothesis of this research is that Turkish Public Administration has been reshaped by using the NPM principles without examining NPM’s compatibility with the country’s socio-political structure. Changes in the education system are illustrative of this reshaping. During the reform process Turkish bureaucrats needed ‘liberal, unbiased and apolitical’ reforms that are also compatible with the Adjustment Laws of the European Union (EU). The managerial techniques proposed by the NPM to reinvent the government based on non-public sector experiences and governance – by increasing the involvement of the social movements - represented a painless way to reform public services such as education and health.

It is a current tendency among ‘the candidate states’ to turn to Western-EU member states or International Organizations (IMF, OECD, WD) to draw some positive lessons from which to undertake their own reform processes. However these transition states usually disregard their cultural and historical backgrounds. For instance, while the idea of NPM and the application of governance were increasing the involvement of social movements, this created both a more liberal and a less state-controlled structure, which affected the republican-secular grounds of the state and mobilized the Islamic Social Movements (ISMs) in the public sphere. Additionally, these changes caused an increasing anxiety in the secular-republican elite side of society; they expressed this transformation as an Islamic revivalism, which constitutes a political threat to the Republic, rather than a democratization or liberalization.

This research, therefore, seeks to explain the role of religious groups on the education system in Turkey since the 1980s, during the application of NPM ideas into the Turkish PA, by exemplifying the two faces of ISMs: a progressive face, and an authoritarian face. While the Gulen Movement has been chosen as an example of the first face, aspiring economic
development and a progressiveness, the Iskenderpasa Cemaati has been chosen as an example of the second face, aiming to establish Islamic-ethical codes in society. Education is one of the most important ideological vehicles of both governments and the social movements during the creation of social capital. Therefore, the internal actors, i.e. politicians, bureaucrats, civil servants, the external actors, i.e. non-governmental organizations, civil societies, and other third parties are highly motivated to be involved in education policies in Turkey.

In Turkey, the controversies over Religious Vocational High Schools (Imam Hatip Liseleri), Koran Courses, the ban on headscarves in the educational institutions, compulsory or elective religious education, religious curriculum and moral education based on Islamic ethics, demonstrate how educational policies have been shaped by state-oriented religious thought. Kuru (2009:187-198) highlights that these issues are examples of policies which relate to oppression in the perception of the people, and are primarily related to education policies. Although the new Turkish Republic has been structured by strong secular norms, it has not been possible to purify society from religious thought. Therefore, “the Turkish state policies toward religion are inconsistent, if not contradictory.” (Kuru, 2009: 166).

For example, on the one hand, the state follows obstructive policies towards Islam; while on the other hand, it provides Islamic instruction in public schools. The main rationale behind introducing these Islamic instructions in public schools is not to support Islam, but rather to take Islam under state control. By doing this, the state not only creates its own perception of Islam, but also controls the creation of other Islamic perceptions which would be shaped by pro-Islamic conservatives or Islamic Social Movements.

Today, ISMs are not outside of modern life, but rather they are highly involved in modern societies’ needs, and are playing vital roles while meeting the conservatives’ expectations. The cases studied in this research centre around two of these movements, which rather than
being either ‘the excluded’ or ‘the other’, by opening business associations, schools and media outlets are becoming a part of modern life. As mentioned by Inal (2004), issues such as education, curriculums and textbooks are not only a part of sociological modernity projects, but rather they are associated with political power, the state and their relations with civil society and non-governmental organizations. Thus, this research addresses how the education system, which has become an ideological tool between the state and the third parties, is shaped by ISMs in the New Public Management Age in Turkey.

1.4. Questions, Aims, Objectives and Methodology of the Research

This research is designed in order to investigate the systematic commitments of contemporary religious groups (movements and cemaats) within the Turkish Public Administration, and it considers the arguments about the propitiousness of the education system and religious groups. In particular, it analyses how the demands of these movements and cemaats are brought into union with the education system, in the practices of two particular contemporary Islamic groups in Turkey; the GM and the IC.  

The main research question of this thesis asks how it is possible to explain increasing religiosity in education in secular Turkey, which is supplemented with a more specific set of contributory investigations developed throughout the consecutive chapters. Their aim is to investigate the relationship between NPM, ISMs, and education. More specifically, these three sets of sub-questions will provide an understanding firstly, of the changes in Turkish Public Administration and changing policy rules – how does NPM open up opportunity spaces in the governance of education? (Chapter 4), secondly, the adoption and influence of green money – how have ISMs become involved in the resourcing of education? (Chapter 5),

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4 instead of the term Tariqaat or religious orders, throughout my research I use the terms “movement” and “cemaat” which are different from each other in terms of their structures and purposes. For detailed explanations about the terms, please see Chapter 6.
and thirdly, the emergence of educational governance and how it draws in religious values – how have ISMs redefined educational governance? (Chapter 6).

In accordance with the Kemalist education philosophy, which was built on positivism and behaviourism, the Turkish Government rejected the Islamic values of society, rationalized the public intuitions and reorganized public life on secular premises; Weber called this “disenchantment” in modern society (Arslan, 2009). In the Turkish case, my understanding of “disenchantment” is the creation of a “citizen-individual”, which means the citizen precedes the individual (Ustel, 2011). Since religion is considered to be a part of private life in classical modernity, the citizen-individual neither integrates the mystical dimension into modern society nor organizes public life on the basis of it. Rather, it follows Ataturk’s declaration (Oran, 2008) that “they should not confuse their principles with the dogmas of the books (here it refers to the Quran) that are supposed to be heavenly revealed, and should seek inspiration, not from the heavens but from real life.”

Although the Kemalist state and its ideology aimed at cleansing Islam from the public sphere, it is a well-known fact that the numbers of community owned private schools have increased drastically in Turkey and across the globe. Despite their rising number and the fact that these movements take a sizeable and important role in the development of educational projects, their power over the education system has not been properly studied in scholarship. This indicates the gap in the literature: while these communities’ increasing impact on societies were examined from a sociological point of view by several scholars such as Gole (2004) and Yavuz (2003, 2004), there is a lack of interest in public administration literature on ISMs’ impact on the education system and especially, educational policies. This is particularly important for the GM and the IC, as amongst other Islamist groups, the followers of the GM
and the IC, and the founders of their schools, can easily be recognized by their emphasis on the significance of education.

This thesis is based on a constructivist perspective, which acknowledges the crucial importance of human actors in a society’s reconstruction process. Based on both focus group analysis and interviews with graduate students, their families, and teachers from the GM and IC Schools, as well as secondary resources such as reports, policy papers, web pages and official documents, this research examines how these two ISMs work towards bringing together the state and religion in the making of what Altrichter (2000) calls “Educational Governance”. Although the concept of governance has gained an increasing importance and interest in political, economic and administrative science since the 1990s, the concept of Educational Governance came to the scholarly literature a bit later, and deals with the corresponding activities in the field of education, with a focus on political interaction policies in the multilevel field of educational politics between supra-national, national and sub-national actors (Schwartz, 2011:2).

In this regard, this analysis shows that by drawing on both the New Public Management theory from which educational governance developed (Fusurelli, 2004), and the New Social Movement theory which explains ISMs by focusing on their relations with society and the state (Wickham, 2002; Wiktorowicz 2001, 2004; Yavuz, 2008), one can understand how it is possible to explain increasing religiosity in education in secular Turkey, and what these Islamic Social Movements strived for in Turkey after the 1980s.

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5 For detailed explanations about the term Educational Governance please see Altrichter (2010).
1.5. The Main Concepts of the Research

The key argument of this dissertation is that the involvement of ISMs in education plays a discursive and ideological role in the religious politics of the communities through three fundamental ways, which are addressed by the above mentioned research questions: the changing concept of Turkish secularism, the creation of green money, and the increasing visibility of educational governance. These three concepts, which are illustrated in Figure 1, indicate the key changes in the education mechanism, which has also been controlled by these movements. Firstly, the changing trends in the concept of secularism in Turkey, which experienced a transformation from assertive secularism to passive secularism, created a suitable environment for the ISMs. Therefore, by involving the resourcing of education, i.e. by opening schools and private training courses, the mentioned ISMs finally built educational governance and drew in religious values to the education delivery system.

1.5.1. The Concept of Turkish Secularism (Laicism)

Due to the highly different socio-economic backgrounds of the countries, the West and the East understand secularism differently. In literature there are two ‘impediments’ that have
distracted political scientists in terms of ‘secularism’ or ‘secular state’. The first is secularization theory, which defines religion as a traditional theory (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This emphasizes that religion is doomed to wither away in developed societies (Kuru, 2009). According to Casanova (in Kuru, 2009:2-3) this theory failed due to its prediction of the inverse proportion between religion and modernization. Casanova also points out that religions can contribute to public life by defending values and protecting the common good.

The second, normative theory, argues that religion should not play an important public role, and people should involve themselves in democratic reflection by putting aside their religious doctrines, which delay agreement due to their dogmatic aspects (Habermas, 1989; Rawls, 1971). However, Taylor and Fraser (in Kuru, 2009) criticize Habermas and Rawls. According to them, these scholars defend the monolithic public sphere in which one cannot see the twin toleration (religion and state). Clearly, we can say that there are contemporary scholars who argue in favour of the importance of religion and do not believe that either religion or the non-secular state is an obstacle for democratic states.

For this study it is vital to understand the relationship between Islam-Islamic Activism (either in economy or in politics) and the term ‘secularism’, not only in Turkey but also in other countries. This will make it possible to understand the Turkish reality which is illustrated by Rubin (2005) and Turam (2004) in a highly different way. While Rubin (2005) stressed that the latest involvement of religion and religious groups in economy and politics is a threat for Turkish secularism and democratic structure, according to Turam (2004:277), contemporary Islamic forces in Turkey are neither inherently hostile nor confrontational to the secular republic. She believes that the main reason for these two ambivalent ideas is the perception of secularism in Turkey.
Kuru (2009:10) argues that “state policies toward religion are the result of ideological struggles”, and supports his argument by giving examples from communist and religious states. Consequently one can say that usually, states apply different policies because of their various roots. However, secular states which do not have any official religion, and have legal systems free from religious control, do not follow the same path in terms of public policy making. Here, Kuru (2009) mentions two different notions of secularism: “assertive secularism,” and “passive secularism”. Accordingly, while passive secularism tolerates public visibility of religion, as seen in the USA; assertive secularism aims to exclude religion from the public sphere, as seen in France and Turkey.

In this thesis, the researcher will use Kuru’s analysis and define not only Turkish secularism as an assertive secularism and a comprehensive doctrine, but also the “Turkish public sphere as an area that is under the tutorship of state” (Gole, 2004:93). Of course, there are important historical reasons behind this. For instance, religion was a significant pillar of the ancient regime, the Ottoman Empire, and this made the republican elite anticlerical (Kuru, 2009:28). This is why in the Turkish case one can clearly say that the dominance of assertive secularism means the victory of the republican elite. By bearing in mind this foundation this research will deeply consider the relations between state, religion and society in terms of an education delivery process.

1.5.2. The Concept of Green Money

In Turkey one can clearly see that “Islamism” is a regional movement. The authority of urban elites in political and economic life increased both the socioeconomic gap between the West (urban) and the East (rural), as well as the exclusion of regional actors. Thus, transformation of the socio-economic structure impacted the political preferences of these provincial entrepreneurs (Demiralp, 2006). Many called this new form of economic entrepreneurship the
‘Anatolian Capital’ or ‘Anatolian Tigers’ because of the origins of some Anatolian cities such as Kayseri, Konya, Kirsehir etc. (Beris, 2008).

Moreover, there are others who find some similarities between Anatolian Capital and Calvinism⁶ (Demir et.al, 2004: 170), which is a belief that is dependent on the strength of the individual. Consequently, the entrepreneurs who were dependent on the strength of both themselves and Islam were called Islamic Calvinists, and the new form of Turkish Islam called Islamic Calvinism (Yavuz, 2004; ESI, 2005; Ozkok, 2006). Here, we can say that Green Money or Islamic Capital emerged in an environment where money came from wealthy Islamist businessman and Middle Eastern states (Rubin, 2005). According to Balci and Miller (2012), ‘green’ refers to Islam. Occasionally the expression ‘green capital’ is used as a way of referring to capital resources that are spent to sponsor or expand explicitly Islamic causes. In Turkey the term is often used negatively as a way of referring to projects sponsored by the religiously conservative bourgeoisie.

Even though in the Ozal-era (1983-1989) the Turkish economy was liberated, economy policies promoted Anatolian businessmen - owners of small to medium-sized enterprises - and new capitalists to consolidate their place in the Turkish economy, and a new class emerged. The Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) conservative identity and liberal economic policies were a new starting point in the green capital (Beris, 2008: 38-42). The green capital, which has been referred to as AKP’s own finances by Rubin (2005:1), has become murky and worrisome, and AKP leaders have blurred the distinction between business and politics. As a consequence of this, the money that came from Islamist

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⁶ A number of people in Kayseri describe their community by reference to Calvinism and the Protestant work ethic. The former metropolitan mayor of Kayseri, Sukru Karatepe, compared his fellow ‘Kayserili’ (people from Kayseri) with ‘hardworking Protestants’, and informed us that “to understand Kayseri, one must read Max Weber” (a reference to Weber’s celebrated 1905 essay, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”, which argued that the “this-worldly asceticism” of Calvinism provided the spark for the rise of modern capitalism) (ESI, 2005: 24).
businessman increased their self-confidence, and convinced them to survive and fight urban elitism.

As Demiralp (2006:10) pointed out, “provincial entrepreneurs became the vanguards of the Islamist movement, not only because they were the most resourceful group within the movement but also because they were more aggressively interested in politics because of their immediate interests associated with manipulating politics”. Here, we can say that the liberal policies which were created in the early 1980s increased the involvement of the Islamist businessmen not only in business, but also in politics. Of course, these commercial and political activities of the Islamist businessmen had no illegal aspect whatsoever. However, as Rubin (2005:3) pointed out, “conformity with law does not mean conformity with the public conscience and with clean and transparent politics”. He concludes that “if AKP is able to translate money into power and power into money, then the main loser will be Turkish secularism” (Ibid: 6).

1.5.3. The Concept of Educational Governance

According to Inal (1998), education is one of the most important tools of political power. In order to perpetuate their sovereignty, the political powers redefine their interests by using education. The legal knowledge which is conveyed through textbooks and curriculums is a result of the byzantine power relations between certain classes, races, genders and religious views. As Apple and Smith (1991:9) state, education and political power are two peas in a pod, therefore, the power and authority-owning classes have the opportunity of making educational policies in a society (Ballantine, 1989:43).

The question of how education is defined plays a vital role in shaping this research. Philosophers such as Aristo and Socrates, who approach education in an idealistic way,
discuss that education is a ‘maieutic art’. In addition to this, Plato describes education as “the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channelled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why… education, then is a matter of correctly disciplined feelings of pleasure and pain” (Cooper, 1997:1344). Briefly, according to an Idealist approach, education is a process which aims for knowledge acquisition, happiness and goodness.

Nowadays it is not possible to think of education by cleansing it from the current political, social, ideological and economic conditions of the world. In addition to the Idealist approach, there is another view that comes from Machiavelli, which has become widespread during the nation-state era. This approach defines education as a tool by which the governors improve the state’s interests. Like many other nation-states, Turkey introduces the idea that education is not a tool which is used to improve the state’s interests, but rather education is for all society’s demands, and is unbiased.

Conversely, Inal (1998) says it is not possible to think that either state-controlled education or education policies are unbiased and unprejudiced. These kinds of education policies encapsulate the state’s official view on family, religion, history, culture, society rules etc. in the official curriculums (Ibid. 108). In brief, regardless of what the state’s official ideology is, each state keeps the schools and curriculums under its own control in order to sustain its own interests. For example, while the Soviet Union reflected the socialist ideology and collectivism in the education system, the American education system highlighted competition, individuals and success.

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7 Maieutic art is a pedagogical method based on the idea that the truth is latent in the mind of every human being due to innate reason, but has to be “given birth” to by answering intelligently proposed questions (or problems).
Today, education or educational policies are both no longer the product of the nation-state alone. The education services are being created by the collaboration of governments and policy actors who are networking, translating, mediating and constructing these policies. For Turkey, based on my observations, it is possible to see a relationship between non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil societies and governments. By networking, translating, mediating and constructing the education policies and education delivery systems, they are aiming to create a more effective education system altogether. The idea behind the creation of effective policies comes from the concept of changes in public administration and policy making, namely New Public Management (NPM).

Like the concept of NPM, which emerged at the same time, the governance perspective indicates “the rise of a profound scepticism about the possibilities of hierarchical control of complex social systems” (de Boer et al, 2007:137 in Altrichter, 2010:147). According to Altrichter (Ibid.), while NPM is a normative way for practical public administration, the governance perspective aims to remain analytically open, and to offer a tool for analysing states of governance and their transformation. Therefore, it is possible to say that governance perspective provides a general analytical framework for studying all kinds of coordination problems among actors (Altrichter, 2010).

Since the proponents of the NPM argue that “government ought to run like an efficient and effective business enterprise” (Terry, 2003 in Fusarelli, 2004:119), the involvement of the non-governmental organizations in seeking effectiveness in education systems have increased in the age of NPM. During the past decades, a number of initiatives have been taken in Turkey to strengthen capabilities in exercising effective education. This includes an 8-year Compulsory Education Law funded by the World Bank and the conducting of campaigns to encourage female students to enrol supported by UNICEF (the name of this campaign is Haydi Kizlar Okula, run in 2001). From these initiatives one can say that in Turkey, where
the impact of transnational organisations and national civil interest organisations is clearly visible, decision making without influences from international and civil society is not possible.

Based on these three dynamics, the researcher suggests that both the GM’s and the IC’s education perceptions are built on the working principle of the education mechanism, demonstrated by Figure 1: (1) major grounds of the moral values of Turkish Islam which define secularism in a Turkish understanding, (2) promotion of the global-free market economy, which is shaped by Islamic Capital (green money), and (3) involvement of the non-governmental organizations, civil societies and movements into the process of education policy formation. In other words, these groups articulate Islamic values with the notion of Turkish nationalism and economic liberalism, and create a new sense of education, which addresses the hopes and fears of ‘the others’.

For this reason it is vital to realise that there are two main theories in the scholarly literature on transforming the Turkish Public Administration and its relation between the public. In other words, a better understanding of the NPM and NSM theories, as well as bridging the gap in the literature will provide a more effective and efficient public administration view to the both public professionals and citizens.

1.6. Overview of the Thesis

In analysing how the GM and the IC engage with education and education policies, this dissertation examines both of them in terms of their practices in education and their involvement with the formation of education policy in the age of New Public Management. Before elaborating on the research topic, an outline of the thesis will be stated here briefly. The thesis is divided into seven chapters.
The current chapter provides an overview of the research problem, argument, research questions, aims, objectives and methodology summarised in this chapter. It also gives initiatory information about the research field, i.e. Cemaatler (Islamic Social Movements) and the main purposes of the project. In this chapter the researcher has also introduced the contextual background, the scope, and the motivation for this research. Since studying Cemaatler even on its own is a somewhat controversial topic in Turkey, combining Cemaatler with Turkish Public Administration and education delivery processes is a novel study, and the researcher has introduced the significance of the research to the reader in this chapter.

Chapter Two introduces the main theories which this dissertation draws on and provides a literature review. These concepts are not only conducive to forming the theoretical framework of the project, but also help to avoid any terminological confusion that may be faced in further steps. In addition, the literature review shows the core understanding of the topic and the research gaps in the studies of New Public Management (NPM) and New Social Movement (NSM) theory, and their relationships with education. This chapter also discusses the historical evaluation of the New Public Management (NPM) theory in Turkey, in terms of how NPM brought the idea of governance. The involvement of Green Money, which comes from the GM and the IC, into education was explained by the NSM theory and the concept of educational governance in this chapter. Accordingly, the changes in Public Administration and the emergence of the concept of governance inserted the idea that as an ideological tool, education should also be delivered by the non-governmental organizations.

Chapter Three examines the methodological issues. This chapter starts with an explanation of the research questions, ontological and epistemological stands of the research, the researcher’s motivation and research strategy. Finally, it illustrates how the researcher
designed the fieldwork and examines the methodological choices, documentary analysis, in-depth interviews and focus group analysis.

Chapter Four is based on the empirical data which was gathered from documentary analysis, links the general issue of the unintended consequences of NPM with the specific policy changes in Turkey, and explains the history of education in Turkey and the main transformations of the education system from state-centre policies to liberal policies. While discussing the transformation of the education system and education service delivery process, this research was built around the theoretical discussions of both the NPM theory and the NSM theory. This chapter suggests that the Kemalist state-controlled education system was marketized and cleansed from state dominance following the enforcement of the NPM in Turkish PA.

Chapter Five, based on the empirical data which was collected from in-depth interviews and focus group analysis, focuses on how ISMs moved into education by exploring the role of the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati from the perspective of Social Movement Theory. More specifically, here the reader will see that there is a burrowing down into the specifics of how the GM and the IC exploited the rules set out in the previous chapter to introduce green capital in education. By introducing the North American perspective known as resource mobilization theory, and the European NSM, this research illustrates that both seek to explain the emergence and the importance of contemporary social movements in (post-) industrial societies (Cohen, 1985; Klandermans, 1995). This chapter introduces how suitable the NSM theory is for the Turkish case.

Chapter Six, by using the same data, indicates that the politics of the GM and the IC primarily take place on the grounds of education. This chapter includes two specific sections; while the first section explores the usage of education services as opportunity spaces by the
ISMs, the second section provides information on the Islamic understandings of NPM by the GM and the IC. Briefly, this chapter focuses on educational governance and indicates how educational governance draws in religious values into education.

Chapter Seven provides a conclusion and draws on the previous three chapters to explain how a secular state shows increasing religiosity in the delivery of education, and explains Turkey’s move from assertive to passive secularism.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Outlines of New Public Management Theory and New Social Movement Theory

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to review, analyse and evaluate the studies that conducted, in order to identify gaps in the current literatures which are on New Public Management (NPM) and New Social Movement (NSM). Many theories have been proposed to explain NPM and NSM. Though the literature covers a wide variety of such theories, this review will focus on the three dominant themes of the sub-research questions: How does NPM open up opportunity spaces in the governance of education? How have Islamic Social Movements become involved in the resourcing of education? How have Islamic Social Movements redefined educational governance? To reiterate, the aim of this research is to investigate the systematic commitments of contemporary religious groups (movements and cemaats) within the Turkish Public Administration, and is considers the arguments about the increasing religiosity in education in secular Turkey.

Thus, by answering the research questions, the researcher aims to puzzle out the relationship between NPM, ISMs, and education. This chapter consist of two main sections the first section will introduce the NPM theory to the reader and its application in Turkey and on education. By following the same structure, the second section, which is on NSM theory, will be introduced in order to demonstrate the emergence of the religious groups as a social movement. Here the researcher also shows the meaning of cemaat as a religious community, and cemaatler as Islamic Social Movements. Although a deep sociological background of the terms ‘cemaats’ and ‘movement’ is not given, readers will be given an idea on the researcher’s position and the difference between these two terms for this research.
In the conclusion part, by rethinking the relation between NPM and NSM theories in Turkey, the researcher will indicate to the reader the emergence of the Islamic Social Movements in Turkish education and how this could be explained by using these two theories and their interrelation.

2.1. New Public Management and New Social Movements: Old Conflicts, New Dynamics

NSMs are usually defined as collective actions of relatively less influential social groups that cannot take part in formal decision-making mechanisms at public level. Therefore, they cannot voice their demands to public opinion or influence decision-makers (Della Porta - Diani, 1999). Meanwhile, with the changing NPM approach, which has been on the agenda since the 1980s, public administration structure has tended to shift from formal political institutions to negotiations between informal institutions and governments (Hajer - Wagenaar, 2003). In other words, pre-existing formal institutions and organizations have not been enough for our “modern-global world” for three decades. Therefore, the concepts of globalization and modernization have shaped our socio-economic life by several methods. In order to create a more controllable world and similar organizational structures, these ideologies have shaped the world by restructuring or reorganizing states’ political and social structures. Public administration reforms, which are one of these methods, are contributing to this by either changing or improving the current budget, personnel and/or local government systems.

Since the 1980s it is possible to see how public administration, or the public sector, has been ‘modernized’ and ‘changed’. The 1980s’ neoliberal policies argued that the ‘welfare state’ was the main and core source of social and economic problems, because it increases the state’s burden. This neoliberal discourse led not only to a minimized state, but also reduced
the power of the state to interfere in the economy. However, at the same time, the ideology actualized the accumulation of capital by using state power. On the one hand, the neoliberals thought that they should reduce state effects for more free zones. On the other hand, they protected the capital by using the state’s power. Marketization, privatization, managerialism, performance measurement and accountability are the main characteristics of the transformations (Tolofari, 2005).

The transformations or changes of public administration emerged with the idea of New Public Management (NPM). While the ‘Old’ or ‘Traditional’ Public Administration (OPA/TPA) ignores the informal, non-governmental institutions and believes that the core of political life is law-making, interpretation, implementation and enforcement, the ‘New’ Public Management implies that there is no difference between the public and private sectors (Olsen, 2003 in Lynn 2006), and introduces relatively uniform, market-like incentives which would produce more accountability than the rule-bound bureaucracies of the OPA (Lynn, 2006:142-143). Briefly, one can clearly say that while both seeking the responsibility of public administration, the OPA and NPM propose different answers.

Although there is no common definition of the NPM, and scholars define it in different ways (Ferlie et al., 1996), it is possible to see some core components (see table 1). For instance, NPM, like most administrative labels, is a loose term for Hood (1991:3). He argues that the term NPM is enough on its own to summarize what has been happening in OECD Countries’ reform agendas since the late 1970s. Accordingly, the post-1979 UK experience, which was dominated by a series of reforms, could be an example of NPM (Ferlie et al., 1996). Moreover, according to Pollitt (2007:110) “NPM is a two level phenomenon: at the higher level it is a general theory or doctrine that the public sector can be improved by the importation of business concepts, techniques and values, while at the more mundane level the term NPM could be the total of disaggregation, competition and incentivization”. So, Pollitt
(2007) underlines that this formulization excludes some other ideas, such as partnerships, networking and governance, which arose later than the NPM, and were to some extent ideas that were invented to counteract the perceived limitations and weaknesses of the NPM.
### Table 1: Four Key Publications on New Public Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Book/Article</th>
<th>Perspectives:</th>
<th>NPM:</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. Hood (1991)</td>
<td>“A public Management for all Seasons?”</td>
<td>The experiences are mainly from the UK, but the importance of NPM for other countries agendas, such as OECD Countries, is emphasized.</td>
<td>Hands-on, professional, management</td>
<td>One of the most cited articles on NPM which explains the key theoretical questions raised by NPM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osbourne, D. and Gaebler, T., (1992)</td>
<td>Reinventing Government</td>
<td>In the changing world the writers seek to find the true answers or solutions for the US Public Administrations problems.</td>
<td>Catalytic (steering rather than rowing)</td>
<td>Offers original thought about the government and how it should be reinvented again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollitt, C. (1990)</td>
<td>Managerialism and the Public Services: The Anglo-American Experience</td>
<td>Gives information about how British and American Public Administrations run their services after the increasing impact of new right policies.</td>
<td>Managerialism defined as an ideology</td>
<td>Defines the NPM paradigm by using a different term, which gives the book a different point of view. Although both the US and the UK have different historical backgrounds, their PA structure and transformation are analysed under the same paradigm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mc Laughlin, K., Osborne, P. and Ferlie, E. (2002)</td>
<td>New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects</td>
<td>An edited book of related articles which examine the development and critique of the NPM Paradigm from different countries.</td>
<td>“NPM should not be seen as an idea linked to the marketization of public services alone; it is more essentially concerned with the shift from the unitary government position and management of public services to the concepts of the plural state.” (Osborne and Mc Laughlin, in Mc Laughlin, K., Osborne, P. and Ferlie, E., 2002:7-14)</td>
<td>The authors neither support nor fundamentally challenge the NPM paradigm, and this will provide an objectionable view to the researcher.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conversely, in many OECD Countries there are several applications of the NPM formula (Blum and Manning, in Bovaird and Lößler, 2009), and in those states NPM is often mentioned together with ‘governance’ (Tolofari, 2005). However, as Tolofari cites from Ewalt, governance is about the overarching structure of government and the setting up of overall strategy, while NPM is the operational aspect of the new type of public administration. Since many authors and researchers use both terms interchangeably, one can see the NPM’s core ideas in a governance definition. According to an OECD Report (2005:16), governance refers to the formal and informal arrangements that determine how public decisions are made and how public actions are carried out.

Similar definitions are expressed by other international institutions. For example, according to the United Nations (habitatforum.org) governance is:

> to overcome the drawbacks of past limitations of "government" to essentially political functions and "public administration" to technocratic pursuits. Since "governance", moreover, is a term widely used in connection with private sector management, it reminds us of the fact that there are commonalities between the two sectors, in this respect.

Also, it is possible to see similar points with IMF’s and WB’s definitions, as they claim that developing countries should accept both neoliberal policies and governance models in their administrative structures (Ozer, 2006). Consequently, from both definitions it is possible to say that international organizations are encouraging not only the developing world, but also all traditional states to create governance and reform their long-established administrations.

Like other countries, the development of NPM reforms in Turkey can be explained as driven by five things in particular; the economic, the political, the social, the intellectual and the technological, all of which have a somewhat symbiotic relationship (Tolofari, 2005:76). Yavuz (in Wiktorowicz, 2004: 270) has underlined how Özal’s (1980–1993) program of economic liberalization created the ideal space, which made possible the implication of NPM.
Turkey was a state-controlled country, and in order to achieve capital accumulation she needed economic development via state-centred policies between 1923 and 1950. Therefore, ‘statism’ was the determining principle in shaping development policies until the multi-party period (Yavuz, 2004a). According to Demir (et.al 2004:167), for the market players this meant that the road to money and wealth passed through the government.

During the 1970s both social and economic life were still controlled by government regulations, and Turkey was grappling with fiscal problems, waste of resources, high rates of unemployment and inflation. In such an economic environment the Ozal Government was shifting the general ideology and creating new political thought, which was not much different from the coeval American or British examples - the ‘New Right’. The abovementioned economic and political environments changed the social structure of Turkey, and a state-supported bourgeoisie class was established during these years.

After the creation of this new class, as Demir (et.al 2004:170) underlined, we see the establishment of the second round of the Turkish Bourgeoisie. Beris (2008:33) called this process “The Formation of Partial Bourgeoisie in Turkey”. As pointed out by many scholars (Onis,2004; Cavdar,2006; Beris,2008), the neo-liberal policies of the Ozal Government blazed a trail for the Islamic revivalist movements born in the Anatolian Provinces (this is why they are called Anatolian Tigers) in 1980s Turkey. Prima facia, one might expect an opposing approach from the secularist elite of the country. However, because of the danger posed by the radical left movements at the time, they favoured the incorporation of Islamists into the larger system (Gurbuz, 2007: 106).

According to Yavuz (2003) this new Anatolian bourgeoisie had projected both a socially Islamic public and an economically liberal society. In the 1980s, the transformation of the state both economically and socially exposed the debates about the state, the constitution and
secularism. For example, in Turkey since the 1980s, with the adoption of neoliberal discourse, which both aims to decrease the regulatory role of government (Ferlie et al, 1996) and increase the economic and political liberalization (Güler, 2005), not only the private sector ethos but also some religious ideas and techniques have been applied to the public sector without question. Hence, both the ‘successful’ portrait of the private sector as being more transparent, accountable and effective, and the reliability of religion have made both private sector ethos and religious ideas flawless and inarguably true in the public sector.

Since then, the debate between Islamists and secularists has existed not only with regard to moral values, but also to socio-economic life. As Toprak (1981:22) claims, the continuous debate over religion that is taking place in Turkey between secularists and Islamists is not restricted to moral behaviour, but extends to other spheres of life as well. She links this tendency to the very nature of the ideal the Islamists have:

... The Islamic ideal stresses the importance of this-worldly activity for the building of a socio-political order on divine principles. In that respect, Islam has attempted to bridge the distance between the sacred and the profane.

Cizre (1996) and Mardin (1989) also make this point. It is clear, then, that to find a single definition of this “Islamist Approach” not only in Turkey, but across the Islamic World, is not easy.

However, since the 1980s, both the economic and socio-political dynamics of the transformation have created some common objectives for the main Islamic groups (the Gulen Movement (GM), the Iskenderpasa Cemaati (IC), the Ismail Aga Community (IAC), and the Suleymancilar Community (SC) etc.)*. For instance, the increasing participation of these groups in political and economic life has created new approaches, such as “Political Islam/Islamic Activism” and “Liberal Islam” (in terms of economy) (Demir et al., 2004).

* These concepts will be defined in the following chapters; please refer to these for further information.
which are aiming to shape society. According to Ilhan Cihaner, his humbling caused the most serious damage to the GM’s reputation in Turkey, which the movement has infiltrated into the police and justice system (BBC Radio 4’s podcast: What is Islam’s Gulen movement? 2011):

Anyone who opposes the movement faces obstacles, those who supported promoted. In my opinion the movement is less driven by faith and religion than by political and economic interest. They are not really worried about religion, they want power. And the colour of that power does not matter for them.

Conversely, Kerim Balci, the senior journalist and supporter of one of these religious groups (the GM), says that “We are (Gulen Movement) completely secular on political issues; we believe that if religion involves into the politics this corrupts both of them.” he also claims that (Ibid.):

Hizmet (Gulen Movement) does not have any projects about the society, it has projects about individuals; they believe that “good individuals create good society” but we do not know what kind of a society those good individuals that will be educated through Hizmet Institutions will create.

Briefly, as Kalantari (1998) has pointed out, the powers of persuasion and methods of enforcement of these new approaches come from religious thinking. This has led to powerful religious groups controlling the government by successfully lobbying for change in public policies and affecting and shaping public opinions (Beriş, 2008). Although Turkey tried to maintain its authoritarian control over all kinds of social movements and organizations for more than six decades, it was only by the late 1980s that the country started to tolerate the existence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with different cultural and ideological orientations, as well as their activities (Simsek, 2004:111).

Hajer - Wage-naar (2003: 3) says that the main reason behind the increasing impact of these new social movements on socio-economic life is the emergence of the NPM and governance. Accordingly, the NPM tend to identify managerialism as a prime mover of change, while
governance tends to focus on top – down analyses of change, with civil society characterized as the regulated and co-ordinated partner of the public administration (Bary et al., 2006). More than this, both approaches are derived from models that are abstracted from the so-called ‘real world’, and are used to explain and legitimate the functioning of what are seen as essentially rational processes, steered by those who seek to maintain their precarious control over those they manage, be they public-sector workers or electorates.

There is a two-way relationship between public administration and new social movements. Public administration structures may originate social movements. Similarly, social movements may control the creation of new public policies. Accordingly, the abovementioned relations between NSMs, which are religious groups in this dissertation, and NPM-governance swayed the researcher to build a research project by using NSM theory. Although in scholarly literature the European origin of the NSM theory is competing with the American origin of the Resource Mobilization Paradigm (RMP), the findings show that in terms of Turkey’s homogenizing and authoritarian features, the Turkish case has much more in common with the European experience than with the American one (Simsek, 2004:119). However, one is not able to analyse the Turkish case by only using the NSM theory.

Since Turkey established herself as an authoritarian-unitary nation-state, she has regulated not only the public sphere, but also social life. However, the increasing impact of technological advancement, economic liberalization, and communication, created opportunities for many non-state organizations (Yavuz, 2004:271-273). In this regard, as Simsek (2004) underlined, NSM theory, which is focused on culture, identity, symbolism and reflexivity, better helps one understand Turkey in terms of the increasing roles of Religious Communities during the formation of policies. However, Akan (2012) argues that because some features of those communities are not really against the governments’ policies and
ideologies, these groups’ activities cannot be explained by using only social movement theory.

Though many scholars such as Alaine Touraine, Paul Byrne and Robert Merton produced a tremendous amount of theoretical and empirical literature on social movements, which emphasise different features of them, in this study the researcher will explore the most suitable one for the Turkish case. Rather than adding a new definition or formulation to the literature, by using the existing ones the researcher will analytically show the importance of the relationship between public governance and religious groups in terms of educational policy making during the New Public Management Age. Again, bearing in mind the decrease in the predominance of the nation-state, the researcher will show why social movements (religious groups) have become visible in Turkish socio-political life. Additionally, this dissertation will undertake a comparison between two major Islamic groups: the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati.

The increase in the level of these groups’ activities is not only suggested by this research; the latest cases in Turkish political life have brought this issue to the forefront. Nowadays, the state-religion dilemma is much more visible and significant not only for the political elite but also the citizens of Turkey. For instance, on the one hand, the country’s secular and western features are emphasised by a governing political elite, while on the other hand, the Islamic characteristics of the country are emphasised by poor and marginalized sectors of the population. As Yavuz (2000) claims, Islam has become the oppositional characteristic for the excluded sectors of Turkish society.

For many years, the dual structure of the country has been largely internalized by many walks of Turkish society. However, the growing effect of economic and political liberalization, and the shifting patterns of religious authority have changed some dynamics of the country. Again,
as Yavuz (2000:22) says, the emergence of Islamic Activism is one of the domestic policy
dynamics of Turkey. Although the political elite always emphasize the secular structure of
the country and its public administration, since the 1980s the process of Islamisation has been
found in social, economic and political life. Cagaptay’s words (from the BBC, 2011), “when
a country’s billionaires change, a country changes fundamentally”, clearly summarise the
shifting patterns in Turkey.

In other words, Islam recuperates an importance not only in politics but also in the socio-
economic spheres of Turkish life. Yet one of the prominent elements of this issue, the
concept of Islamic Community and its impact on public policies, is mostly neglected by the
scholars (Davison, 1998 and Tapper, 1991). Therefore, this research attempts to close this
gap by giving a preliminary idea of the organization of these groups (cemaatler). While doing
this, it will make a comparison of the cemaatler between the pre and post-1980 coup in terms
of socio-political and socio-economic transformations.

As stated above, the rising of these groups’ activities is not a totally new suggestion. What I
will do in this research is to examine how new public management (NPM) procedures
facilitate the engagement of ISMs into education governance. Thus, I argue that these
communities’ activities can be explained with the socio-political and economic conditions of
the day and how they use these conditions for their own interpretation of Islam, rather than
using their tasavvuf tradition. Additionally, by keeping an eye on the new patterns of
activities embraced by these communities, the formation of Turkish Educational Policy in the
New Public Management (NPM) age will be analysed. It is clear from the above discussion
that Islam retains its importance not only in politics, but also in the socio-economic spheres
of Turkish life. Additionally, the lack of analysis of public administration in Turkey in
general, particularly in the international and comparative literature - a reflection of its
‘anomalous’ geo-political and cultural status - possibly EU entry, 'bridge to Asia', Therefore,
this thesis will fill the gap in the public administration literature on Turkey. Islam’s relationship with the secular state will have been discussed in both policy cycles and academia as a consequence of 9/11. According to Kuru (2007), Turkey establishes an original case in the Muslim world by combining a secular state with a multiparty democracy, which allows political participation of Islamic groups.

Kuru follows on to say that during the past decade, Islamic groups in Turkey experienced a substantial transformation by developing a positive attitude toward Turkey’s democratization, and its membership to the European Union. This transformation promises some global implications in terms of democratization of Islamic groups in other parts of the world. For this reason, the present research will aim to provide a greater understanding of states in which there are tensions between modernization and democratization, and demands for ‘traditional values’, i.e. Turkey will act as an example for possible democratization in post-conflict states such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

2.2. The New Public Management in Context

2.2.1. A Paradigm Shift: Old Public Administration vs. New Public Management

Towards the end of the 20th century, political or administrative structures of countries have been defined as inadequate for chaotic environments, and this is one of the main reasons for new quests, such as new paradigms in public administration. Namely, in old public administration, budgeting, personnel administration, organization and management categories are highly limited. Or, in other words, centralised bureaucracies, waste and inefficiency in resource use, inadequate mechanisms of accountability and redress are all defined problems of the traditional public administration.

As a result of this, a public administration structure which emphasized productivity and a private sector ethos was being aimed at. In ‘Toward a New Public Administration’,
Frederickson (1992: 372-377) summarizes the new approach by focusing on its four main features, which differentiate it from the old public administration. Accordingly, the suggested new structure, which is price-based, market oriented, non-bureaucratic, and aims for customer satisfaction, provides the ideal solution for the old public administration’s problems.

Therefore, by involving itself with the new paradigm, which brought a new understanding of the distributive, integrative, boundary-exchange, and socio-emotional processes, the public administration advocates a more public, prescriptive, normative, and client-impact oriented model, rather than a less generic, descriptive, neutral, and institution oriented one (Ozer, 2005). As a result of this, during the last few decades, liberation and market-oriented administration had become a common idea in public administration literature. For instance, according to Terry (1998), NPM focuses on how liberation and market-oriented administration conceptualizes the term of leadership in public administration literature.

Additionally, according to Hughes (2003), the implications of the new forms of public management theoretically and practically discredited the old public administration. He adds that change is not a simply a matter of reform, but a change in the role of government in society and the relationship between government and citizenry (Hughes, 2003:10). In other words, the transformation of the public administration from a strict, hierarchical, bureaucratic structure to a flexible, market-originated, non-bureaucratic structure is a paradigm shift. For this reason, according to Ozer (2005), the necessity of a NPM idea emerged as a confrontation between the traditional public administration and its limited nature, culture and principles.

Hughes (2003:1) says that “this new paradigm causes a direct challenge to some of the fundamental principles of traditional public administration such as bureaucracy, one-best-way of working and procedures, bureaucratic delivery, politics/administration dichotomy, the
public interest, a professional bureaucracy, and idea of administrative.” It has been discussed that the principles constitute a paradigm of their own – the traditional model of public administration – and that a paradigm shift has occurred due to the problems of the traditional model.

Even though the name of the concept seems new, it found its roots in the American administrative report efforts such as Total Quality Management, Planning-Programming Budgeting System, Zero-Based Budgeting, Blue Ribbon Commission and Reinvention (Priffner, 1998). The American experiences and literature indicated that (Pollitt, 2003; Hood, 1991) NPM was designed in order to “fix the problems of government”, such as performance deficiencies, less public and more bureaucratic structures, and budgeting problems. The review of the literature showed that NPM is heavily discussed and debated. Therefore, several comprehensive definitions have been drawn from the literature for New Public Management.

2.2.2. The Role of Changing Trends during the Emergence of New Public Management

There are several interrelated imperatives which caused the changes in the public sector; i.e. the changes in economic theory, the changing perception of public and private sectors on the public eye, and the technological changes. This section will introduce these changes and indicates the institutional backgrounds of NPM.

The Changes in Economy Theory

During the design process of NPM the main concept was to apply the market and business principles to the public sector, because of its basis in economy theory. Kelly (1998) points out that this is because of the nation’s commitment to the capitalistic market economy. In addition to this view, Ozer (2005) highlights the two intellectual origins of NPM, which are not always compatible sources. The first one focuses on competition, user choice,
transparency and motivation, namely a public choice group of doctrines. The second one, referred to as a managerialist group of doctrines, focuses on the freedom to manage and performance measurement (Hood, 1991: 5-6; Dunshire, 1995:29). From this point of view, we can suggest that NPM is a marriage between economy and management, both of which are fed by different theories and approaches (see Figure 2).

As Hood (1991) defined the first partner of this marriage as economy, during the late 20th century, conservative economists discussed that a strong central government was the source of economic problems, which limits economic growth and freedom. According to them, the only way of improving economic efficiency is to reduce government impact on society and make the markets more visible. In Friedman and Friedman’s words (1980), “…instead of governments forcing people to do things through the bureaucracy, markets were superior in every respect with the words ‘freedom’ or ‘choice’.” Hence, economic problems such as high inflation rates and stagflation affected countries, and politicians and governments became more concerned with economic issues.
Rather than being based on a hierarchy and duplication of tasks, the vital doctrines of institutional economics were based on disaggregation of public bureaucracies and the use of competition (Ostrom, 1974 and Hood, 1991). Briefly, as Walsh (1995) and Boston (1996) summarized, while OPA was replaced with NPM, economic theories permeate the new public management, especially public choice theory, principal agent theory and transaction cost theory. This will be discussed further below.

Public Choice Theory is the most important economic theory applied to the bureaucracy (Hughes, 2003), and discards the hypothesis that government effectively corrects market failures. There are some reasons forced to this theory’s representatives that cause them to think in this way; for instance, according to Buchanan (Ibid.), the irrational behaviours of politicians and civil servants causes inefficiency and ineffectiveness. In Bureaucracy and Representative Government Niskanen (2007) claims that public choice theory is forcing politicians to apply effective centralism, coordination and supervision. Public choice theory includes three main aspects: (1) the demanding site-electors’ behaviours, (2) political parties’ agendas, which define the policy process, and (3) supplier- bureaucrats’ behavioural tendencies. However, it also focuses on the supply and demand aspects of public goods and services.

Moreover, it proposes that if the public sectors, specifically public employees, dominate service delivery and the outcome is an inefficient and ineffective government (Blais and Dion, 1992; Boyne, 1998), then improved performance is only possible by pressure from the market. In short, this theory aims to understand the bureaucratic decision making process by using economy science’s findings. Therefore, it is called the economic theory of politics, or in Buchanan’s words, “politics without romance” (Buchanan, 1999).
The main content of this theory demonstrates that its method is individualism, and the individual is the starting point in every single analysis (Buchanan, 1990). Accordingly, the priority of the individual should be defined, and secondly, the appropriate field of activity must be created. However, some activities and institutional regulations are restricting of the individual’s behaviour (Demirel, 2005). For this reason, according to Demirel (Ibid.), the rationality in public choice theory is simple and limited. Conversely, Stigler (1975:171) says that the key assumption of this theory is a comprehensive view of rationality:

A rational man must be guided by the incentive system within which he operates. No matter what his own personal desires, he must be discouraged from certain activities if they carry penalties and attracted toward others if they carry large rewards. The carrot and the stick guide scientists and politicians as well as donkeys.

According to Hughes (2003), in any area it is possible to apply this carrot and stick metaphor, and in terms of its application there is no difference between politicians and bureaucrats; both want to increase their own benefits. For this reason, making an assumption about behaviour has some advantages, such as having a balanced supply and demand curve, testing the suggested model empirically, creating a competitive environment etc. The lack of competition and continual salaries in the public sector is hindering those advantages, and it not only creates monopolized organizational behaviours, but also causes a lack of motivation among civil servants. It has been more than three decades since public choice theory entered into the PA literature and has changed some governmental settings. According to Walsh (1995) there are mixed results, such as markets failing to work better than bureaucracy under all circumstances (Hughes, 2003).

Principal agent theory, as its name suggests discusses the relationship between agent and principal. Although the theory was developed for the private sector in order to describe the goals of managers (agents) and shareholders (principals), it has been used in PA to understand the relationship between public service suppliers and the public service demander.
Briefly, from a public administration point of view, while the principal is public, the agent is a public administrator. The theorists argue that the agent has not only more informational knowledge than the principal, but also different interests to them. For this reason, according to Hughes (2003), the theory attempts to find incentive schemes for agents to act in the interest of principals.

In the private sector the agent and the principal seek different things, and there is no answer to the general problem of accountability. While agents aim for long-term growth and higher salaries for themselves, shareholder principals seek maximum profit (Ibid.). In the public sector, it is not easy to define who the principals are and what they want; therefore, the agency problem in the public sector is much worse than the private sector. However, similarly to the public choice theorists, the principal agent theorists believe that there is no difference between public and private sector in terms of efficiency; according to Blanchard (1998) the bureaucracy is incapable of being efficient due to poor organizational design. He adds that this inefficiency can be improved if incentives in the public sector are altered to match those present in the marketplace.

Transaction Cost Theory is the other key economic theory in managerial change, and defines public organizations as open systems (Demirel, 2005). Like other organizations, public organizations want to organize the transaction of the public services and goods by utilising the most economical way. However, either the limited rationality of the decision makers or the tendencies of bureaucrats motivated by their own interests, make it hard to be economical. By taking everything into consideration from these three theories, especially the first two, combined with an ideological preference among many economists for market solutions, some intellectual coherence is brought to cutting the public service, as well as restructuring its management (Gray and Jenkins, 1995 in Hughes, 2003).
**The Changing Perception of the Private Sector**

The changing observation of public and private sectors is the second driver for the changes in public administration. The size and capability of the public sector has attracted wide-ranging criticisms (Hood, 1991, 1995; Hughes, 2003). The method of government, which is highly bureaucratic, brings mediocrity and inefficiency, as the government consumes too many resources in order to cover all the areas in which it plays active roles (Hughes, 2003). Accordingly, there were three main reasons for these attacks: the scale of the public sector, the scope of government and the methods of government.

Additionally, there is some ideological reasoning behind why the public sector was criticized while the private sector was encouraged. International organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank advised developing countries to reduce the public sector and strengthen the private sector (World Bank 1997). Both ideological reasons—globalization—and the criticisms found their responses to be different in every single country. However, reducing government spending or contracting-out are the main ways in which the government changed its scale, scope and method.

**Technological Developments**

The third driver which affected management was technological change. The relevant literature exhibits that technological change drives organizational changes, such as the application of e-government/governance. According to Pollit (2011:380):

> Technological change, by enormously increasing both the speed and the volume of communications and computations, has shrunk both space and time, and made them less important, while at the same time opened up the possibility of mass access to public decision making.

In conclusion, as the old model of public administration did not work very well and could not meet the expectations of the people, it was replaced by public management, which has advised various reforms to many countries since the 1980s. The reforms applied to the OPA
were focused on financial management, personal practices and policy making process. In other words, these reforms were not simple changes or improvements, but rather, they were paradigm shifts in public administration. The relevant literature summarizes these paradigm changes as; the raising of new-right policies, economical and financial changes, changing social values, the involvement of citizens into the formation of policies, innovations in Information Technology, the inadequacy of Weberian–bureaucracy, and globalization. In short there were two main factors; marketization and de-bureaucratization of Public Administration.

These two drivers were, of course, related to each other, and public management aims to make room for them. A decrease in bureaucratism is the process of eliminating the monopoly of a few bureaucrat-politicians in the government, by making space for the participation of citizen organizations, civil societies or NGOs in a country’s governance. As Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) state, government should meet the needs of the customer, not the bureaucracy. This statement alone is enough to indicate how strictly the bureaucratic model of management is now discredited, both theoretically and practically.

2.2.3. The “New” in Public Administration: New Public Management

As a doctrine, NPM points to the collapses and insufficiencies of public sector performance over time, and sees the problem directly lying in the nature and processes of public sector activity and public administration (Falconer, 1997). Therefore, in order to make the public sector more competitive and efficient in resource use and service delivery, NPM strategies aimed at reforming the organization and procedures of the public sector. Briefly, NPM is a collection of tools and techniques borrowed from the private sector to improve the delivery of public services. See Table 2 for its features, which have unintended consequences.
According to Hood (1991), although these seven precepts, listed in Table 2, were not equally present in all countries, they improved the public service provision (Falconer, 1997). As it can be seen from Table 2, the first doctrine is related to the hands-on professional management of public organization. Accordingly, people who are in charge of public services should not be reactive administrators, but rather, they should be proactive and play a key role during the decision making and application process. Therefore, the managers are the backbone of the public services and they should work to increase performance. Regarding this, the second doctrine concerns performance measurement. Therefore, the managers have to define the public services’ goals, targets and aims clearly. Rather than focusing on the public sector generally, they should pay closer attention to their well-defined responsibilities and objectives.

For this reason, as the third doctrine indicates, NPM outputs are more important than the inputs; or in other words, rather than focusing on the process, public sector organizations must focus on the results. In order to make this possible, NPM supports disaggregation. So, rather than having a strong central government, NPM advocates aim to establish decentralization in the public administration structure. Through decentralization in the public sector, it is possible to have more efficient and more accountable public services, because smaller units of activity are more manageable than the bigger ones.

As the abovementioned doctrines suggest, NPM builds on the idea of competition in the public sector. Accordingly, by introducing market discipline in the public sector it is possible not only to allocate the resources logically, but also to increase accountability. Therefore, as underlined in the sixth doctrine, the NPM should seek to behave in a more business-like manner by moving away from traditional public service ethic to more flexible private rules. Finally, as is stressed in the last doctrine, the public sector should pay attention to spending by cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, and limiting compliance costs.
<table>
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<th><strong>DOCTRINE</strong></th>
<th><strong>MEANING</strong></th>
<th><strong>JUSTIFICATION</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Hands-on professional management of public organization.</td>
<td>Visible managers at the top of the organization, free to manage by use of discretionary power.</td>
<td>Accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility, not diffusion of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit standards and measures of performance.</td>
<td>Goals and targets defined and measurable as indicators of success.</td>
<td>Accountability means clearly stated aims; efficiency requires a ‘hard look’ at objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater emphasis on output controls.</td>
<td>Resource allocation and rewards are linked to performance.</td>
<td>Need to stress results rather than procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector.</td>
<td>Disaggregate public sector into corporatized units of activity, organized by products, with devolved budgets. Units dealing at arm’s length with each other.</td>
<td>Make units manageable; split provision and production, use contracts or franchises inside as well as outside the public sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift to greater competition in the public sector.</td>
<td>Move to term contracts and public tendering procedures; introduction of market disciplines in public sector.</td>
<td>Rivalry via competition as the key to lower costs and better standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress on private sector styles of management practice.</td>
<td>Move away from traditional public service ethic to more flexible pay, hiring, rules, etc.</td>
<td>Need to apply ‘proven’ private sector management tools in the public sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress on greater discipline and economy in public sector resource use.</td>
<td>Cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, limiting compliance costs to business.</td>
<td>Need to check resource demands of the public sector, and do more with less.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hood (1991) says that there is no single definition or interpretation of NPM, and that NPM is a shift from a zone with many rules to one with fewer. More exclusively, this shift contains the opening up of opportunity spaces in the public sector for the private sector providers (Yavuz, in Wiktorowicz, 2004). Therefore, many academic commentators associate NPM with the political rise of the ‘New Right’ and a closer inspection suggests that Turkey is one of these examples where NPM is a result of New Right ideologies, and created opportunity spaces for the civic actors in the public sector.
2.2.4. The Changes in Turkish Public Administration Literature

During the republican era, by support of the constitutions, some public services, namely health and education, were the two main pillars of corporatist policies towards a classless nation (Kartal, 2009). Conversely, after adopting the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the 1980s, the Turkish government made cuts in social expenditures (Guler, 2005), most notably in education and healthcare (Kartal, 2009). According to Kartal (2009:24), this is a significant transformation of social citizenship and its practices in Turkey. Since the roles of the state and the market are important for determining the needs of citizens, citizenship rights should be exercised equally by everyone, regardless of his/her social and economic situation.

However, in capitalist economies where the role of markets is bigger than the state, the individual’s status within the economic hierarchy is defined by his/her relationship with the market. As a result of this, consumer rights had superseded citizenship rights in access to public services (Kartal 2009:29) by the 1980s. Kartal adds that the idea of neoliberalism was built upon this discourse of the superiority of markets; it transferred the concepts, values and practices of the private sector to the public sector, and emphasised ‘consumer sovereignty’. In conclusion, in a market economy, by the support of the neoliberal approach in public administration, citizenship has been institutionalized through the provision of education and healthcare services at a national level.

An examination of the Turkish PA literature between the 1950s and 1980s would show a close match with public administration’s reform history. According to Surgit (1972), Emre (1991), and Tortop (et.al., 1999:198), there were several reform initiatives which focused on public personnel and its hierarchical structures. They underlined various reforms, namely the Neumark, the Barker and the Martin and Cush Report, MEHTAP (Central Government Organization Research Project) and KAYA (Public Administration Research Project). These reforms, respectively, suggested the establishment of the rationalization committees in order
to develop a rational efficiency, proposed several development strategies on national education, health and administration policies of Turkey, and projected an improvement for the Ministry of Finance (Surgit, 1972; Şaylan, 2000; Basbakanlık; 1994). According to Demir (2003), these projects were completed under the same aim - to improve the Turkish public sector, especially the education and health services. However, most of the issues related to the reforms could not come to fruition.

As one can observe from the literature, Turkish scholars found a link between these reforms and the changing contents of foreign literature: The public administration needs some developments. However, rather than analysing the Turkish PA and creating a unique solution for the problems, Turkish scholars repeated the non-Turkish literature. Additionally, although the pre-1980 articles and the key literature focused on the ruling side of the state, or the status-quo-state, the post-1980 literature comprises a deep critical analysis of that status-quo-state, and underlines the necessity of reforms and transformations. It is consistent with the international and national economic and political process.

Similar to the international literature, the essentiality of the reforms in public administration seemed a new initiative in Turkish Literature. Therefore, one can see that after the 1980s there was a great tendency to expand the vocabulary of the public administration literature with the private sector’s terms. The key word which summarized the alterations is change, and the new era was known as Yeni KamuYonetimi (YKYNPM). In other words, although many Turkish scholars (Ardic, 1999; Kartal, 2009; Omurgonulsen, 1995) state that the NPM was started in 1980s Turkey, in reality it was a bit later. Since the NPM was not only a terminological change, the seven overlapping precepts summarised in Table 2 (see page 57) should be emphasised.
In this regard, relatively little work on the NPM has been done by Turkish scholars (Gunay, 1997; Ergun, 2004; Saran, 2004 and 2005; Balci, 2005), and they have largely focused on Hood’s seven doctrines. Traditional public administration values, which are inefficient, highly bureaucratic and resistant to any change (Gunay, 1997; Ergun, 2004), are not enough to respond to the changes in economic-political and social globalization, the increasing and diverse demands of the citizens. Ardic (1999) says that in Turkey, the poor PA system was getting worse day by day because of the lack of accountability and the low-quality political system. While related literature showed that the inefficient and ineffective PA system caused a waste of resources, tax boost, high inflation and high stagflation rates during the last few decades in Turkey (Saran, 2004), it emphasis that the private sector, which applies flexible management models, is more effective in many other sectors as well as the public sector. That is why the public sector reform was seen as the only solution for improvements.

Moreover, like the international literature, the Turkish literature on the NPM criticized the traditional Turkish PA not only for its highly bureaucratic structure but also because it hinders the citizens’ political participation in the policy making process. Especially after the 1980s, with the increasing citizenship consciousness, public opinion forced the governments to improve the quality of public service and efficiency. The third thing that makes the PA reform essential is for differentiating financial conditions. Since globalization and technological developments reduced the cost of international trade and minimized its difficulties, it is now possible to see multinational companies in the unitary state’s economies. These economic developments forced the governments to change the financial regulations and PA Systems. Also, the financial crisis and increased public expenditures contributed to the need for public administration reforms (Tutum, 2003; Balci, 2005).

Moreover, while the public sector has been growing, the government’s service providing strategies have not been changed or developed, and this has caused cumbersome, wasteful
and public services that are beyond public demand in Turkey (Saran, 2004). The fifth reason for the necessity of change is the increase in coactions between public and private sectors since the 1980s. Customer satisfaction, one of the most important drivers of the private sector, has become a core aim for the public sector and public administration. Thus, the public sector behaves as a private sector and this increases the competition in the favour of the citizens (Saygilioglu, 2003; Saran, 2004).

Additionally, the EU membership process has clearly affected the Turkish Political System and PA (Tutum, 2003). For instance, the EU Adjustment Laws focused on some changes to education, health, social, wealth, citizenship, consumer rights and environmental issues. As Tutum (2003) has said, these changes and regulations in public administration decreased the role of the state’s monopolistic power. The abovementioned six drivers of Turkish PA Reform are generally similar to international PA reforms. As stated, the main reasons for these reforms in Turkey, and in the world generally, are to improve public services and develop qualified public services to the citizens. Although there are similarities, it has been seen that every single state follows its own path, and they are an example of path dependency. Doubtless, the involvement of NGOs and civil societies in the reform process could be analysed in this regard.

The review of the Turkish literature has shown that the literature can act as a mirror, which clearly reflects not only the socio-political transformations of the country, but also the NPM initiatives. For instance, an analysis of The Amme İdaresi Dergisi (AID-Journal of Public Administration), one of the most important PA journals in Turkey, between 1980 and 2005 (Tas, 2007) showed how the NPM changed the terminology and inserted new terms. Between 1980 and 2005, 734 articles were published, and 55% of them - in total 403 articles - were directly related to public administration. 79 articles out of 403 were focused on Administration’s Legal and Structural Aspects, while the rest of them discussed the Personnel
System (72 articles), Management and Organization (45 articles), Development Administration and Reorganization (21 articles), Public Administration (17 articles), Bureaucracy (21 articles), Local Government (43 articles), Public Finance (24 articles), and Public Relations (18 articles).

By 1980, terms such as governance, strategic planning, strategic management, performance management, globalization, total quality management, e-government, ombudsman, privatization and NPM were inserted into the Turkish Literature (Tas, 2007). Guzelsari (2003: 17-35) highlighted that the new terminology always emphasized not only the importance of market-friendly state structure in order to have an efficient and effective state, but also the state’s disengagement from the pillar public services.

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the government had applied the planned inward-oriented development model, and was highly involved in all the social policy areas. After the 1980 military coup, a number of new economic and political policies had been applied. Talas (1992; in Kartal, 2009: 36) defines the post-1980 period as the period in which the state is most distant from social policy in the country’s history. One can call this period the social and economic transformation era, which saw the division of labour between the state and the market, the public and the private sector, and the redefinition of the state’s obligations.

The Turkish literature indicates how public administration articles and books have been reshaped during the last two decades of the 20th century. However, the changes or transformations are not enough to suggest that Turkey has been experiencing a NPM since 1980. In other words, the changes in the Turkish public administration, such as privatization, marketization or liberalization, do not indicate a paradigm shift, but rather they indicate
debates on NPM. Therefore, it would not be wrong to assert that NPM was applied two decades after it started to be debated publicly in Turkey.

In this regard, it is possible to understand the case of NPM in Turkey by refocusing on Pollitt’s (2002) “The Four Stage of Convergence.” In Turkey it is possible to see two types of convergence. Firstly, in 2002, when AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power, as a part of its 2002 Urgent Action Plan, it mentioned the necessity of public sector reform. More and more people were talking and writing about the NPM concepts, and the conceptual agenda was converging. This is called discursive convergence.

Secondly, as a result of this discursive convergence, AKP started to prepare a draft law named KYTKT (Public Management Basic Law Draft) (Beris and Dicle, 2004), which was a decisional convergence. The main proposal of this draft law was to take new public management (NPM) into consideration. Through the draft law, the concept of ‘public management’ entered into Turkish PA law texts. While until 2002 the term ‘public administration’ had been used, in order to be compatible with the NPM concept, ‘public management’ would be the ‘new’ term (Ibid.). Through the impact of the draft law and the international literature, the Turkish literature, translating from the international literature, started to introduce the terms ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘decentralization’ to the reader.

Also, from the beginning of the 2000s, such terms as ‘human rights’, the ‘role of civil societies’, ‘gender roles’ and ‘environmental issues’ entered into the Turkish PA Literature. These were assumed to be a sign of either ‘liberalization’ or sympathy towards the ‘new right’ within Turkish PA (Guler, 2005). For example, the KYTKT’s many features, such as its philosophy and its way of using language and principles, differentiate its impact on the literature from previous reform initiatives (Ibid.). In addition to Guler, Guzelsari (2003) defines KYTKT as clearly a product of globalization, and the developments in Information
Technology. For Guzelsari, KYTKT has likely had some exposure to most of Hood’s seven doctrines (see Table 2 on page 57).

2.2.5. The New Public Management: The Turkish Experience

As it has been stated above, in Turkey some NPM initiatives have found expression in the economic policies and related public sector reforms of the Ozal government since the beginning of the 1980s. Such has been the impact of these changes that the AKP government followed the same path, and since taking office in 2002, the AKP government vigorously pursued NPM policies. KYTKT is the main example of the NPM policies, and it revolved around a central goal of decreasing state intervention in the public sector and increasing the role of the private sector.

According to Guler (2005), KYTKT’s starting point was highly different from the previous ones. KYTKT emphasized decentralization, respect for human rights, predictability, accountability, participation of the citizens in policy making, the effective usage of resources, and good governance (KYTKT, 2002, articles 1 to 5). Guler (2005) states the main reason for the reorganizing or reinventing of government was to create a place for the NPM ethos in Turkish Public Administration. For instance, President Abdullah Gul gave a speech to the governors of Turkey and explained that in order to have a sustainable development in Turkish PA, it was important to change the administration mentality (Haber Turk, 31.01.2013).

As it has been mentioned already, for Turkey, changing the administration mentality meant decreased state intervention, fewer elaborate bureaucratic correspondences, and a quick decision making process. These three points were the NPM’s vision for Turkey. It aimed to establish participative, transparent and considerate public administration in order to serve equitable, effective, expressive and high quality public services. In other words, the goal of KYTKT was different from its antecedents. For example, a holistic transformation of public
services came with KYTKT, not only to reduce the possible inconsistencies between the government departments, but also to create an advisory frame for them.

Because of the term ‘management’ and new practices, Turkish literature defines the NPM as a breakpoint from tradition and Continental Europe. For example, the term ‘accountability’ and its practices became highly visible in Turkish PA after the NPM. As indicated by Balci (2003:125), NPM not only changed the political, financial and professional dimensions of accountability, but also added administrative and organizational accountability to the Turkish PA system.

Additionally, the term ‘quality’ found a place for itself in the system, and the Turkish literature generally associates the implementation of quality management in public organizations with the rise of New Public Management (Saygilioglu, 2003). Like Reeves and Bednar (1994), Saygilioglu (2003) discusses the four dimensions of quality: excellence, value for money, conformity to specifications, and meeting or exceeding customer expectations. He also adds that these dimensions are subjective concepts, and it is not possible to find a global definition of quality.

As explained above, KYTKT was one of the latest products of the post-1980 era in Turkish Public Administration history. In sum, NPM and KYTKT brought some novel breakpoints to Turkish PA and made it more customer oriented, by creating an alternative delivery of public services. Privatization of some public services caused considerable discussion about the potential conflict between public and shareholder interests in public service delivery. Article 11 in KYTKT says that when public services are delivered by the private sector, they are more effective, efficient and economic than state-delivered services. Although both NPM theorists and KYTKT were showing and explaining it in a simple manner, for Turkey and her citizens this transformation was not a simple shift from one sector to another. This is an
ideological and paradigmatic shift, which aims to build opportunity spaces for civic private actors.

Key to the accomplishment of this purpose has been major privatization and decentralisation movements via which large public services and bureaucracies have been segregated into smaller private units. Along with this privatization and decentralization attempt came the policy of marketization, by which the public sector is imitating the principles of the market. In this way, the public sector would function in a competitive market environment in which the public could make demands of the public sector, holding public service providers accountable for performance in the same way they did in the private sector.

In terms of putting into practice the central doctrines of new public management, one can say that the most important development is the establishment of the (regional) development agencies. These agencies, which operate extremely differently from classical public institutions in terms of their organisation structure and function, emerged as a pillar of governance, which increasingly pervaded all public administration. In this respect, as the most appropriate regional actor working in perfect harmony with a competitive environment of global capitalism, the agencies are supposed to play the ‘lead’ role in implementing regional development polices.

Accordingly, the principle rationale for the executive agencies and the regional development agencies was the then the AKP government’s desire for decentralisation, which increased the use of the civic actors in the provision of public services, most notably in the area of education. Briefly, as we have underlined several times, the increasing involvement of the civic actors in the public sector is the result of opportunity spaces in Turkey created by NPM.
2.2.6. A Critique of the New Public Management

As with other changes, some problems occurred during the application of the new model. Although the reform, or paradigm shift, was undertaken with the aim of improvement, there were too many changes which destroyed the quality of management (Hughes, 2003). In addition to this, there are many questions to be addressed about NPM, such as its accountability, ethics, the tension between legal and political traditions, and the universalistic principles of management, trust and cooperation (Lynn, 1998). Since NPM is aiming to insert economic values of business and the market into the government’s activities, its criticism usually consists of economic and administration issues.

The first common criticism of NPM in both international and Turkish literature is the movement’s ignorance of the country’s written laws and democracy. In their piece “The Effective Public Manager”, Cohen and Eimicke (1997:102) underlined this point; “since reinvention places a direct emphasis on entrepreneurship, public administration scholars are critical of the movement for its avoidance of constitutional law and representational democracy”. According to Terry (1998: 197), “there is a direct conflict with the promotion and protection of democratic theory in the context of entrepreneurial tone of government which is competitively motivated and market driven.” As Hughes (2003) argues, the techniques of the NPM are not the only reasons for these conflicts; by ignoring the cultural, social and historical backgrounds of the countries, administrators and bureaucrats are causing these conflicts too.

Another criticism of NPM is again linked with one of the key terms of democracy; citizenship (Kartal, 2009). NPM’s way of approaching democracy has a different perception of citizenship. According to many scholars, because of the great emphasis on entrepreneurialism and the important place on individuals’ self-interests, NPM is not compatible with democratic accountability and citizenship (Hughes, 2003; Terry, 1998;
Denhart and Denhart, 2000). However, it causes a great transformation from citizen to client. As Hughes (2003:12) underlined, the public service consumers should never have been seen as consumers; since they are citizens, and their rights are enacted by the constitution, they must not be faced with any kind of inequality during the service procurement (Guler, 2005).

The third criticism is that NPM is blemished because it was not able to keep its promise “to provide a ‘Big Answer’, to real and imagined shortcomings in public bureaucracy” (Savoie, 1995:113). Hence, NPM aimed to apply the private sector management practices to the public sector, but due to its nature the public sector did not lend itself to the ‘Big Answer’ (Ibid). As Frederickson (1997) discussed, government aims are highly different from business aims, and for this reason private sector techniques are rarely appropriate (Savoie, 1995) and often result in unethical behaviour on the part of public officials (Frederickson, 1997).

Williams’ (2000) comment indicated a different angle on this public service provision. A call for a more business-like government is also lacking a complete and historically accurate understanding of Public Administration. For instance, when risk-taking management strategies are adopted, it requires administrators to take calculated risks by using entrepreneurial strategies (Blair, 2000), which can be seen as a threat to democratic governance by both Turkish and international scholars such as Eryilmaz (2000), Guler (2005) and Kelly (1998). Furthermore, the Turkish opponents of NPM argue that the private sector ethos, such as being customer oriented, and focusing on accountability and efficiency, have different equivalence in the public sector, and, therefore, it is not possible to assume the same performance or success from both of them. People should remember that the public sector is not the private sector, and their target group is not the same (Guler, 2005).

A review of literature indicates that one of the other criticisms of NPM is related to the idea of governance; or in other words, its impact upon the third sector and civil society. NPM has
altered the role and functions of government, and has transferred numerous public tasks and responsibilities from the public to the third sector (Reichard, 2010). Consequently, third sector organizations have gained more power in the past few years by providing public services. According to Hood (1991:9) “NPM, in spite of its professed claims to promote the ‘public good’ is actually a vehicle for particularistic advantage.” Although one can think the involvement of the third parties in public service delivery is a highly democratic process, Reichard (2000) has indicated how NPM has commercialized the relationship between the government and civil society, by launching more competition and performance-based contracts. For this reason, actors in civil society should have some basic knowledge about the concepts, results and effects of NPM-related reforms in the public sector.

Additionally, as Tosun (2003) has underlined, without having any knowledge of NPM, its concepts and power, and an active consciousness of citizenship, it is not possible to create an accountable, transparent and responsible public administration. Rather, it will create an unequal environment for the members of civil society. For instance, the NPM practices, as Reichard (2000) says, provide public services such as education and health, and encourage governments to introduce performance contracts and more detailed reporting schemes. These kinds of contracts and schemes can cause a pressure on civil society.

More generally, the marketization trend within the NPM movement has intensified the competitive pressure on civil societies because the government forced them to bid for service contracts, and because commercial firms moved into the markets. Thus, it is not always true to say that governance and NPM will increase the democracy level of public administration and equality. Governments’ provision of public services by using social movements, civil societies or non-profit organizations can cause inequality or anti-democratic discourse within the society. For this reason, the literature showed us that it is vital to understand the role of civil society during the provision of public services in the age of new public management.
2.3. The Theory of New Social Movements

2.3.1. The Theoretical Perspectives of New Social Movement Theory

NPM, defined above as the latest paradigm shift in public administration, needs to meet the expectations of both the citizens, who are demanding public services, and the bureaucrats who are providing those services. Yet, it is a two-sided issue; NPM supposes, on the one hand - as a result of governance ethos by gaining support from the civil society - that the public administration should provide good quality public services. On the other hand, the quality public services provided by civil society and the non-governmental organizations should satisfy both the citizens and the government. In this respect, given the liberty of providing public services to the social movements doesn’t mean to seize either the quality or accessibility of these services.

In order to understand the compatibility of public administration, i.e. the provision of the public services, and social movements, it is better to review the concept of social movements too. Yet, social movement theory alone will not be enough to understand the attitude of a social movement vis-à-vis the public administration policy; social movements are not an entity in themselves. They are composed of institutions, associations and organizations based on the pursuit of change in certain social institutions, or the creation of an entirely new order (Heberle, 1968). Although many social movements fail to reach their aims, i.e. they merely indicate structural tensions in society and intend to challenge the established power holders, the successful ones are able to bring about a new social and/or political order (Rucht, 2000).

According to Pichardo (1997), after the rise of the post-industrial economy, there was a new wave of social movement which was different from its antecedents. Old movements had been in existence between the 18th and 19th centuries, and fought for explicit social groups such as the working class, peasants, whites, aristocrats, men. Some materialistic goals, such as improving the standard of living, or, for example, the political autonomy of the working class,
or economic wellbeing, were seen as characteristic of the old movements. According to some scholars (della Porta & Diani, 1999; Rucht & Neidhardt, 2002) these collective actors are namely a network of individuals, groups, and organizations; they are based on a sense of collective identity, aimed at effecting specific changes in public policy (Pichardo, 1997).

In their piece “Social Movements in Globalizing World”, della Porta and Rucht (1999) summarized the key components of social movements in four definitions. First of all, social movements are aiming either to change public policy or to resist some changes. Secondly, they do not have a flexible division of labour; there is always a well-defined membership. In other words, they do have a formal status. Thirdly, social movements are the example of the collective identity; there are some shared values and practices in social movements. Finally, the fourth and major tool for the movements’ visibility is their reliance upon the commitment of their constituents.

However, the new movements, rather than focusing on materialistic goals, centred on the issues related to human rights, such as environmental movements, gay rights movements, peace movements, anti-nuclear movements etc. The defining components of new social movements (NSM) - institutions, organizations etc…- are that they are not supposed to target the state, but rather to aim at liberation from the control of the state. Melucci’s (1996) objective in Challenging Codes offers an analytical context for the study of social movements and shows that NSM theory was developed to incorporate the worker groups’ perspective of organizations and their actions, which has not been given a name under any former movements. This was due to the latter promoting a sense of shared identity in their groups (feminism, environmentalism, student movements, etc.), which mainly emerged in the 1960’s.

For this reason, the NSM concentrated its efforts on social changes in identity, lifestyle and culture, as opposed to economic or political change such as mandating for particular reforms.
in public policy. Such a distinctive approach has caused much interest in the NSM, and has triggered theorists such as F. Parkin (in Buechler, 1999) to articulate this difference as a change of key actors from those in lower classes to those in the ‘new middle class’. NSM can be viewed as a loosely organised, informal, social network of devotees, rather than an official body of formal ‘members’. Such an association has further been described as ‘relatively disorganised’ (Bryrne, 1997). Essentially, the term ‘new social movement’ refers to a specific type of collective actor.

The theoretical and empirical literature on social movements indicates that the NSMs transformed not only our way of life, but also mainstream sociological and political theories. For instance, French sociologist Touraine proposes that in order to understand social life, rather than the notion of society, scholars should focus on the movements. Therefore, it is possible to find several definitions of NSM from different disciplines. According to Melluci (1996), unlike old social movements, the new social movements (NSM) are not single-dimensional phenomena; they have different types of aims and objectives in society. By challenging the administrative system NSM shows one of its different faces, and focuses on institutional change and cultural innovation. Furthermore, by building relations within politics and creating room for themselves, NSMs have been able to translate the private problems into political discourse (Roche, in Maheu, 1995).

As is mentioned above, and indicated by Table 3, different scholars have underlined the different points of NSM. In other words, the distinctive features of NSM are not only varied, but also highly subjective. Therefore, to create a new definition or make a new list to show NSM’s features will not make any difference for the existing English scholarship; however, it will be useful for this study’s analytical frame. In the Western literature, the most repeated and underlined features of NSM can be summarised as in Table 4 (summarised from Simsek, 2004: 115-116).
Table 3: The Key Concepts of NSM

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<td>• a new perspective to see things differently;</td>
<td>• seek specific goals</td>
<td>• based on new middle classes;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• an ideology maintaining group loyalty;</td>
<td>• cohesive organisations</td>
<td>• post-material oriented;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• a commitment to action;</td>
<td>• a unifying ideology.</td>
<td>• adherent to a more or less common ideology;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• a dispersed or decentralized leadership.</td>
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<td>• linked to the New Left;</td>
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Table 4: The Key Points of NSM (Simsek, 2004)

- NSM basically exhibit post-Marxist, post-modernist and post-traditional tendencies.
- NSM are generally middle class based movements.
- NSM are post-material, identity-oriented initiatives.
- NSM are proactive and particularistic movements.
- NSM display decentralized and less hierarchical modes of organization as well as new forms of action.

First of all, since Marxism, modernism and traditionalism were concerned with socialist production and sharing ethics, modernization and the creation of a nation, and secularization and welfare state respectively, new social movements existed as the critique of them. Secondly, some NSM theorists like F. Parkin (in Buechler, 1999) argues that these movements are more likely to come from the ‘new middle class’ rather than the lower classes. Thirdly, in contrast with social movements, new social movements are asking a place in the political and public spheres for their cultural characteristics, interests and problems.

Fourthly, rather than to show direct reactions to some kind of deprivation, they are voluntary and enthusiastic initiatives to raise public consciousness about a particular issue, or to put a
particular problem on the political agenda. For instance, according to Rucht (2000), in addition to other outward-directed activities, such as public education or lobbying, social movements also engage in internal activities, such as socializing in small groups, informing and motivating adherents, forging organizations and alliances, carrying out disputes over ideological, organizational and tactical issues, and planning and assessing protest campaigns. Fifthly, the new movements are more flexible and have a less bureaucratic structure, which make them freer during the decision making and application processes. In Robert Michaels’ words, they are likely to suffer less from the “iron law of oligarchy” from nearly a century ago (Simsek, 2004).

Apart from the variety of definitions, the review of NSM literature indicated that two different theoretical paradigms concern social movements (Klandermans, 1986). In the United States the theoretical response concerned the appearance of the ‘resource-mobilization’ paradigm; in Western Europe the ‘identity-oriented’ paradigm became the leading approach. Although they have key differences, both presuppose that social movements involve conflict between organized groups with autonomous associations, and sophisticated forms of communication (networks, publics) (Cohen, 1985: 673).

The Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) was built by several scholars such as Tilly (1978), Fireman and Gamson (1979) and Mc Carty and Zald (1980). It aims to explain how universal ideologies assimilate small groups and individuals. Also, RMT is built as a critique of Durkheim’s view of collective action as irregular and illogical behaviour resulting from rapid social change, and it questions ‘relative deprivation’ theory, which assumes a direct link between perceived deprivation and collective action. Consequently, the apparent conditions of deprivation and the feelings of disappointment associated with these perceptions causes a collective action. RMT pointed out that injustice and unfairness in a society could only be considered a precondition for the occurrence of social movements (Tilly, 1978).
Hence, the RMT is based on economy and sociology; it focuses on some set of contextual processes such as resource management decisions, organizational dynamics and political changes in a given society. In explains the emergence of social movements, RMT has used two main approaches; the political interactive model, and the organizational entrepreneurial model. While the first model focuses on changes in the structure of opportunities and examines the issue of political power, interests, resources and group solidarity (Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975; Tilly, 1978), the second model is more concerned with the organizational dynamics, leadership and resource management.

Briefly, the real social movements are not the subject of RMT, but rather they commonly focuses on resources, opportunities and strategies. Cohen (1985: 675) summarizes the common hypotheses of resource mobilization theorists:

...social movements should be understood through the conflict perspective of collective behaviour; there is basically no difference between institutional and non-institutional collective action; collective action enables groups to defend their interests in a rational way; the formation of social movements depends on the availability of resources and opportunities; the success of a group is measured by whether or not it is recognized as a political actor, and whether or not any increase is observed in material benefits.

As stated above, the second theory is New Social Movement Theory (NSMT), which is based on cultural analysis and questions reductionist Marxism, in which the proletariat and the class relationship are the best in shaping collective action (Canel.1992). In contrast with Marxist Theory, New Social Movement Theorists draw attention to other sources of identity, such as ethnicity, gender, sexuality (Buechler, 1995) and religion (Wiktorowicz, 2001, 2004; Oberschall, 2004). Also, it is a reaction to modernization processes in such societies (Melucci, 1980; Klandermans, 1986). Although in the RMT economy plays a vital role, the NSMT was purely developed by sociologists, such as Touraine, Melucci, Habermas and Castells, who always underline the importance of the cultural dimension of social movements. This is neglected by RMT (Buechler, 1995).
For instance, according to Castell (1977) the changes that happened in urban space were because of urban social movements. Hence, the urban issues became vital during the collective consumption; both the state and other political dynamics of the country wanted to control urban social life. This caused the emergence of urban social movements, which developed by challenging the capitalist logic of exchange, placing importance on cultural identity, and finally seeking a more decentralized form of government. For Castell, who proposed a more catholic and inclusive approach, the NSMT means “the emphasis on cultural identity, the recognition of non-class based constituencies, the theme of autonomous self-management and the image of resistance to bureaucratization.” (Buechler, 1995: 443-444).

The second set of theories on NSM comes from Touraine. According to Touraine (1985), in contrast with the Marxist theory, it is not possible to mention the domination of one single class or group; different oppositional movements are united simply by their challenging attitude, and the new social movements have great potential for shaping the future of modern societies (Haferkamp et al., 1992). In Touraine’s words, “modern society is the first type of society to produce itself and NSM are the decisive force in this process.” (Touraine, 1981).

The German view of NSM Theory is made by Habermas (in Buechler, 1995), who argues that the social movements are located in between system and life world. Therefore, there are two main features of the movements which have shaped the NSMT. First of all, Habermas says that the movements both guard the life world against the colonizing intrusion of the system, and sustain the normative consensus. Secondly, the NSM brings politics concerned with quality of life, projects of self-realization, participation, and identity, which indicate how NSM is less concerned with material reproduction and more with cultural reproduction. So, it seems that Habermas’ view is one that sees a more extensive and progressive role for movements (Ibid.).
Finally, for Melluci (1980) the NSMs are the result of the postmodern world and its conflicts, such as symbolic codes, identity claims or personal and expressive claims (in Buechler, 1995: 446). The review of literature shows that Melluci’s study helped to bring understanding of the importance of the collective identity for the social movement. The abovementioned four positions from different European perspectives indicate the main scholarly outlines of NSM Theory. Because NSM theorists Castell, Touraine, Habermas and Melluci are from different countries (Spain, France, Germany and Italy), their approaches are different from each other.

According to Buechler (1995), the diversity in the NSM literature derives not only from different national settings but also the different theoretical traditions. For instance, while Castells developed a Marxist analysis of collective consumption, Touraine focused on post-industrial society. Having examined the diversity of NSM theories, namely RMT and NSMT, by way of an overview it can be summarised that the theories see (1) the social movements as a confrontation between groups, (2) a picture of conflicting collective behaviour as a normal course of social life and (3) the actors of social movements as rational agents seeking to advance their interests.

Although the NSM Theory is diverse in itself, all these theories underline that there is a social and political transformation in the countries and societies which may be termed as post-industrial, advanced-capitalist or neo-liberal. The basic characteristics of NSM Theories could be summarised as follows; “they are a post-industrial orientation, middle-class activist core, loose organizational form, and use of symbolic direct actions, creation of new identities, characterized by statuses other than class such as religion, gender, and sexual preference and a self-limiting radicalism” (Simsek, 2004: 118; Sutton and Vertigans, 2006:101). Therefore, the review of literature has illustrated that while studying the NSM theory it is not possible to ignore a society’s political, economic, administrative, and cultural history, which shape the collective identity.
Despite the NSM theorists frequently emphasizing the importance of culture and identity, for which religion plays a vital role in some societies, the reading of social movement scholarship has indicated that in this field there has not been much interest in religious movements, such as Islamic movements. For instance, there are several introductions and edited collections on the social movements (Mc Carthy and Zald, 1996; Della Porta and Dianni, 1999) focusing on various secular social movements, but not Islamic ones. Crossley’s 2002 piece, Making Sense of Social Movements, is another example. Though his book includes the women’s movement, or ‘feminism’, the labour and trade union movements, fascist movements, anti-fascist movements, anti-racist movements, the anti-psychiatry and psychiatric survivor movements, nationalist movements, the (Polish) Solidarity movement, the environmental or ‘green’ movement, pro- and anti-abortion movements (Crossley, 2002: 1), it has no indexed reference to Islam or Islamic movements.

As Sutton and Vertigans (2006:101) tell us, Kurzman’s (2004) work on Iranian Revaluation was the only “Islamic Subject” in social movement research. However, during the last decade one can see the increasing number of Islamic Movement studies in the NSM literature. The Islamic Revival: Antinomies of Islamic Movements Under Globalization (Lubcek, 1999), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Wiktorowicz, 2004), and Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt (Wicham, 2002) are some of the novel example studies which analyse Islamic Social Movements in the context of New Social Movement Theory.

According to Oberschall (2004:34), some of the Western academics have a strong belief that in Muslim third world countries poverty, injustice, and inequality are the main reasons for social corruption. This fixated view has not allowed them to realize the importance of religion and God in terms of the given society’s social rules. As Sutton and Vertigans (2006:102) underline, Oberschall’s approach encouraged us to believe that European NSM
Theory not only had a transformation from mainstream materialism to value-based social movements, but also had found room for religious movements.

For instance, Wiktorowicz’s (2004) edited book, which addresses three main areas (Violence and Contention, Networks and Alliances, Culture and Framing), contributes to theory building in both social movement theory and the study of Islamic activism. He summarizes the aim of his book as follows:

(...) To propose social movement theory as a unifying framework and agenda that can provide effective modes of inquiry to further the boundaries of research on Islamic activism. Whereas the majority of studies on Islamic activism tend to assume that a particular set of grievances, translated into religious idioms and symbols, engenders mobilization, various generations of social movement theory and concomitant debates have demonstrated that other factors are inextricably linked to mobilization processes, including resource availability, framing resonance, and shifts in opportunity structures. By engaging social movement theory, this book demonstrates the efficacy of a shared language for comparative analysis and theory building.

2.3.2. The Theoretical Perspectives of New Social Movement Theory in Turkey

In Turkey during recent decades, the new social movements have increasingly become a focus of many disciplines, such as political science, sociology, and public administration. In other words, the dynamics of the movements have been analysed by the divergent branches of scholarship. Therefore, while some scholars have concentrated on international theories and examples of the movements, others have focused on the causes of national resurgence in an attempt to identify what has led to social movements’ revival. The review of Turkish literature showed that it defines the NSM as following feminist movements, peace movements, green movements (environmental issues), and Islamic movements.

For instance, studies of feminist movements have shown that in Turkey, there were three waves of feminist movements. These waves focused on violence, the participation of women in the workforce, and poverty (Arat, 1993; Sirman, 1989; Özbay, 1990; Tekeli, 1986, 1995).
The comparative literature of the feminist movements in Turkey indicated that like the European NSMs, these movements are oriented towards the educated middle-class, do not have any defined leader, and are responses to the politicization of everyday life (Tekeli, 1998). Also, Tekeli adds that the main difference between the first and second wave was that the first wave was state oriented and had a Kemalist state approach, while the second was more liberal (Tekeli 1998: 340-343).

The literature also indicated there are both similarities and differences between the second and third wave. While the second wave always emphasizes absolute equality, the third wave highlights the differences and diversity in society (Tekeli, 1998). Since the beginning of the 1990s the feminist movement has not been accepted as an urban oriented movement by the scholars, but rather the various projects made it a country-wide movement by underlying the identical differences (Bora and Gunal 2002). So, as Tekeli (1998) has said, the transformation in literature is a sign of the transformation of the movements, and third wave feminist movements are an example of a New Social Movement in Turkey.

In the Turkish Social Movement literature the work on peace movements is limited. While the literature defines the social movements, it always underlines that unlike with the European examples; the Turkish movements have not produced any new or unique theories which have not already been defined by the state (Dogan, 2008). As Kocak (2004) points out, the peace movements either come from left wing or Islamist groups, and they both prefer not to challenge state policies, but rather to produce supportive ideas for state policies. Similarly to the peace movement literature in Turkey, the green movement literature is also limited. Although both movements were accepted as examples of new social movements, they have not found the place that they deserve in the scholarly literature (Kadirbeyoglu, 2005).
On the contrary, in Western literature there is a variety of studies on Islamic Social Movements (ISM) in Turkey. Moreover, it is possible to see different trends from the 1960s to the 2000s. Since the country’s political and social conditions highly impact upon the shaping of these movements, one can easily see how the academic works related to ISMs are dynamic between those years. Table 5 illustrates the academic tendencies, methodological and conceptual issues on ISMs between the 1960s and the 2000s in Turkey.

As it can be seen from Table 5, when the socio-political circumstances of the country changed, the literature changed too. For example, the first approach in the literature between the 1950s and 1960s focused on the necessity of reducing the various ranges of human relations in order to understand the key points. Conversely, during the next decade, the second approach, contextualist literature emerged, which was extremely deterministic; it analysed the emergence of ISMs under three different theories: Relative Deprivation Theory, The Leadership Theory, and State-building Process Theory. Thus, one can say that the second approach is more progressive than the first approach. However, rather than understanding the human actors in the society, the second approach, Contextualism, focused on the state or citizens’ needs. Therefore, the ignorance of the changes in society and ISMs inspired a new theory, which has a constructivist view.

In this point of view, which emerged between the 1980s and 1990s, an Islamic political identity is created through the use of human catalysts eating their way through ‘opportunity spaces’, which have arisen as a result of evolving technology and the extension of democratic rights.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>KEY SCHOLARS</th>
<th>STANDING POINTS</th>
<th>MAIN ASSUMPTIONS about TURKISM ISMs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>Berkes, N (1964) Lewis, B. (1969) Lerner, D. (1964)</td>
<td><strong>Essentialism</strong> “…seeks to reduce the diverse spectrum of human relations to a few ‘essential’ causes and to identify certain defining traits and texts as keys to understanding a particular religious or cultural community.” (Yavuz and Episto, 2003:16)</td>
<td>“Kemalist ideology, particularly secularism, would be Turkey’s manifest destiny in its quest for modernity.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>Ozay, M. (1990) Kramer (2000)</td>
<td><strong>Contextualism</strong> “…a Marxist perspective that shifted the focus to conflict, rather than to consensus and economic structures.” (Mardin, 1997) “…contingencies in the study of Islamic social movements and rules out the irreversibility and teleology of modernization theory and the concomitant essentialization of Islam.” (Yavuz and Episto, 2003:18)</td>
<td>In the view of Relative Deprivation Theory (Ozay, 1990) &quot;Muslim intellectuals, and therefore ISPMs in a gradual manner, appeared as a reaction to widespread corruption in the state’s structure that deprived and marginalized the religious masses.” Kramer (2000) claims that the moderate attitudes of Islamic Business establishments are an important contribution to the preservation of overall political stability in Turkey. Organizational or Leadership Approach claims ISMs are dynamic and diverse organizations driven by leaders dedicated to infiltrating the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1990</td>
<td>Mardin (1983) Gole (1996) Yavuz (2003)</td>
<td><strong>Constructivism</strong> “…societies are the product of human construction. Thus, in order to understand Islamic political identity, a hermeneutical approach that focuses on Islamic agency and its constant interaction with the social structure is used.” (Yavuz and Episto, 2003:18)</td>
<td>“…ISMs actually strengthen civil society and contribute to establishing a pluralist democracy in Turkey through forming their separate identities, rather than accepting what the state imposes on them.”(Davison, 1962)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: The Evaluation of ISM Literature in Turkey (adopted from Tatari, 2007: 96-100)
This entails the reconstruction of an Islamic self through the Islamic movements’ use of media channels, which sparked three decades ago. Such a constructivist approach has been discerned by Yavuz (2008:41) as follows: “these opportunity spaces have come to signify differentiation, multiple articulations of the Muslim ‘self’ and interests - and generally have promoted pluralism and the fragmentation of any efforts at imposing a hegemonic Islamic ideology.”

Many comprehensive definitions have been drawn from the constructivist literature for these movements. For example, Hakan Yavuz’s (2003:23) definition is the most functional and comprehensive, as it is specifically tailored for the movements: “Islamic movements seek to reconstitute identities, institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through participating, influencing, or controlling cultural, educational and economic spheres.”

The literature on the ISM in Turkey indicated that this definition is cited by many academics focused on ISMs (Tatari, 2007, Kesgin, 2008). Since this definition underlines the political aspect of the movements that might aim to rebuild the state’s official and unofficial institutional structures. As Tatari (2007) pointed out, the literature has concentrated on these movements’ social and political aspects in an attempt to distinguish groups which have political agendas from groups having only a spiritual nature.

It seems that this difference, namely having a political agenda or having only a spiritual one, created two different concepts in Turkish literature. While some scholars, without focusing on their political or spiritual nature, prefer to call these Islamic movements ‘communities’ (Gemeinschaft- Cemaat), others called them social movements (Uluengin, 2011 and Dumanli, 2012). As we learn from Ergene (2008), the concept of community came to the agenda of both sociologists and political scientists after the 1980s, in the post-modern era. The importance of the concept derives its significance and complication from the appearance of
the ‘modern industrial society’, by which, the West is faced with the dissolution of social
organizational forms and traditional identity structures (Ergene, 2008).

Again, Ergene (2008) points out that while the Western sociologists were defining the concept
of community (Gemeinschaft - Cemaat), they approached the topic in two different ways. On
the one hand, like Marx and Weber, Tönnies (2001, ed. by Harris) emphasized the
transformative effect of modernity. He analysed the shifts from ‘traditional social life and
hierarchy’ to ‘modern social life and hierarchy’, while Marx and Weber analysed the
transformative effect of economic dynamics and social organizations, respectively. Briefly,
the common idea which was central to all three is the concept of community (Gemeinschaft -
Cemaat) as a traditional institution.

The second approach argues that the concept of community (Gemeinschaft - Cemaat) was
created by the postmodern world. Accordingly, the ‘modern-nation state’ and ‘modern
industrial society’ produced a value-gap between individuals and states (Berger, 1991 and
Saribay, 2001), and by disconnecting the individuals from traditional cultures modernity
causd ‘social alienation’ (Verfremdung) (Marx, 2004 and Jameson, 1998). Therefore, as
Habermas (1980) and Giddens (1990) pointed out, communities (Gemeinschaft - Cemaat)
emerged in order both to collect these alienated individuals under the same umbrella and
create a social identity.

Though the West has well-defined the concept of community (Gemeinschaft - Cemaat) by this
two-pronged definition, it is not possible to apply these definitions to the Islamic world, and
in this case, Turkey. According to Ergene (2008), although the first angle (methodological
approach) was created to understand the social transformation of society, the second
approach has strong ideological perspectives, and is used by some scholars, such as Roy
(1994) and Kepel (2002), in order to illustrate that the people, who were collected under
shared values (especially Islam), are “a dangerous enemy”. For this reason Ergene claims that it is not possible to apply the Western definition of the concept of community (Gemeinschaft - Cemaat) to the Islamic world. Briefly, in the East, the concept of community (Gemeinschaft - Cemaat - جماعة) is usually defined in a different way because of the dissimilar judicial, political, and ethical concepts (Thompson, 2010).

For Turkey, community (Gemeinschaft - Cemaat) refers to the group of people who are alienated from society and do not share the same values with the state, but with ‘the Others’ that were excluded by political elites. Hence, as it is underlined above, in this case, Islam is the most significant actor which brings people together, and for this reason the researcher does not see any objection to calling either religious groups or Islamic Social Movements (ISMs) ‘communities’ (Gemeinschaft - Cemaat).

As Yavuz (2003:15) has touched upon, we see that contemporary communities or ISMs show that they are Janus-faced in that they seek to “express yearnings for democracy and economic development,” but also remain “conservative ... in calling for a strict moral-religious code in society”. He also argues that since the secular Turkish state began granting new liberal political openings in the 1960s, as a consequence, Islamic groups were able to appropriate them. In this regard, his example is remarkable; The late Turkish president Turgut Ozal's policies of political and market liberalization in the 1980s helped create a “new class of Muslim entrepreneurs ... able to circumvent state controls by creating its own alternative schools, printing presses, newspapers, journals, and radio and television stations” (Ibid:10).

The review of the literature has shown that scholars agree that these two types of Islamic movements have to be placed in separate categories. However, according to Tatari (2007) some scholars, such as Saktanber (2002) and Kramer (2000), do not succeed to make this vital classification, and analyse all Islamic movements under one umbrella. This approach deflects
social truth, and, therefore, provokes artificial conclusions. For instance, although Saktanber (2002) highlights the significance of religion as a comfort zone for individuals searching for identity and happiness, and adds that besides individual commitment, religion can present a corporate public action of religiously motivated people, she emphasises that Islamist movements are rejecting Western institutions, norms and values completely, and argues that this makes their position more threatening than any other fundamentalist ideology. This indicates that she does not realize that there are different types of Islamic Movements in Turkish society.

The scholarly literature illustrates that because of Turkey’s secular and state-centric structure, many academics (Cetinkaya, 1997, Tugal, 2009, Serter, 1997, Arat, 2001) by highlighting Islam’s role in the political process, questioned whether Islamic revivalism represents a political danger to the Republic and may lead to an Islamic revolution. They share the same voice with the Turkish-Republican elites, who believe “Islamist mobilization seeks to reshape the state in the long run” (Tugal, 2009:423). This idea is similar to the West’s centuries-old fear of Islam too (Tatari, 2007). Conversely, there are other scholars such as Serif Mardin, Nilufer Gole, and Hakan Yavuz, who have realized the uniqueness of not only the country but also the Turkish ISMs. Their current works indicate the rising consciousness that social dynamics constitute the fundamental cause of political objectives. Therefore, it is obvious that the literature is becoming more and more balanced by means of analysing both private and public roles, which is a characteristic feature of Islam and ISPMs (Yavuz, 2003).

Serif Mardin’s (1989) work *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* is an important contribution to Islamic studies in Turkey. According to Yavuz (1992), Mardin is the most influential scholar who has shaped the debate on religion in Turkey. As a sociologist, Mardin’s *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey* offers a detailed analysis of one of Turkey’s most prominent Islamic movements, the Nur Movement.
His piece analyses the role and meaning of Islam in relation to reflective socioeconomic changes in Ottoman society, and is one of the successful examples of literature which explains the identity formation aspect of Islamic movements from a constructivist point of view.

According to this approach, human structures produce societies, so it is not possible to understand society and its identities, such as culture and religion, without understanding human action. For instance, Mardin (1971) argues that the republican revolution was primarily a change of values, as it is a radical break from the institutions and structures of the past. Rather than changing the institutions and structures, the republican revaluation inconsistently reinforcement the Islamic identity in the society.

In the Turkish literature, a Western point of view on the engagement of Turkish politics with Islam was offered by Tapper in 1991. In his book *Islam in Modern Turkey*, he stresses Islam’s dual function in Turkey (Tapper, 1991: 9). He (1991:6) emphasizes that “the first face is the private one of giving intellectual and emotional meaning to life, an ethics, an eschatology and the promise of salvation; the second face is the public function of providing a political ideology, a cultural and communal identity and social solidarity.”

After this definition he proposes a similar point of view to Mardin, and claims that the Kemalist ideology could not replace Islam’s multi-level appeal, which includes the citizens’ personal and social life; the movements filled this gap. However, he also claims that since Turkey is politically and intellectually much more heterogeneous than most of the countries in which Islamic movements have recently played a dominant role, the success and influence of the new Islamic movements should not been exaggerated. This point of view shows the reader the uniqueness of the Turkish case in which the human actors and their relationships with society and state play a vital role.
Turkish sociologist Gole’s (1996) “The Forbidden Modern” assesses Turkish modernization critically, and discusses how Islam or ISMs have a vital role during the recreation or redefinition of modernity. She claims that the existing Turkish Kemalist political and constitutional system has attempted to refine the cultural differences and different identities in society, such as Alevism and Islamism. However, Islamism or ISMs responded to this Kemalist-type modernity, and the movements created their own areas as a reaction. In her piece, Gole (1996) was assessing both Kemalism and Islamism from a feminist perspective, and she highlights the position of women on both sides. By employing a constructivist approach, she underlines the necessity of understanding human activities in a given society in order to realize that society’s demands.

Furthermore, in her latest work, New Public Faces of Islam, Gole (2000a) emphasizes the importance and role of these movements in the rebuilding of the public sphere in Turkey for the last 30 years. According to Gole (2000:33), by challenging the secular structure of the Turkish republic, the middle-class oriented Islamic social movements are not only aiming to control all unethical behaviours in the public sphere, but also widening their public sphere by opening universities, hospitals, and media centres. She highlights that this kind of initiative of the ISM indicates to us on the one hand, how they are different from the traditional social movements, and on the other hand, how they are responding to modernity or post-modernity in the broadest sense.

In Turkish literature, the mainstream academic work on Islamic Social Movements based their arguments on secularism and the Kemalist-Republican State, Islam, Islamic Social movements, and their relations with society. Since the majority of those works came from sociological perspectives, they tried to understand how they play a vital role in society and how they are influential. However, there is no study which analyses the importance of these movements and their relations with society in the view of Public Administration.
Moreover, the above review of both the international and Turkish national literature showed that there is an impact of New Social Movements in terms of shaping society and building relations between sides. Almost exclusively, these studies did not mention the involvement of these movements in public administration. There is a limited number of studies which explain the involvement of NSM in politics, education and media, and none of them indicate their role on policy making or public administration.

2.3.3. Meaning of “Cemaat” and “Movement” in Turkey

Before entering a discussion of the cultural or national sources that shaped the aforementioned Religious Communities or Islamic Social Movements (Cemaatler) we should start with a brief description of their meaning. This study does not aim to show the sociological background of the word Cemaat (religious community). Here, the researcher will illustrate both her positioning from the beginning of this research and define how cemaat (Gemeinschaft in German, Community in English) and social movement were formed differently in the West and in the Islamic world. As Koselleck (1989:649) underlined, terms and concepts are different things:

…ones whose terms can more easily be brought into relation to one another, as for instance “meaning and experience,” where the terms mutually condition or elucidate one another, or “text and context,” behind which both linguistic and non-linguistic conditions are hidden.

Here, it is possible to assume that one of these ‘hidden non-linguistic conditions’ could be a region’s historic, economic and political condition. Not only in the West or in the Islamic world but also in Turkey, these three factors played a vital role while generating the concepts of cemaat and social movement. Hereafter, the researcher will accept cemaat as a concept. After the 1980s, in the post-modern era, the concept of community became part of the agenda of both Sociology and modern society. The importance of the concept derives its significance and complication from the appearance of the “modern industrial society” which the West side through the dissolution of social organizational forms and traditional identity structures
(Ergene, 2008). Again, Ergene (2008) points out that while the Western sociologists were defining the concept of community (Gemeinschaft- Cemaat), they approached the topic in two different ways.

On the one hand, like Marx and Weber, Tönnies (2001, ed. by Harris) emphasised the transformative effect of modernity. He analysed the shifts from ‘traditional social life and hierarchy’ to ‘modern social life and hierarchy’, while Marx and Weber analysed the transformative effect of economic dynamics and social organizations, respectively. Briefly, the common idea which was the core of these three is the concept of community as a traditional institution.

On the other hand, the second approach argues that the concept of community was created by the postmodern world. Accordingly, since ‘modern-nation state’ and ‘modern industrial society’ produced a value-gap between individuals and states (Berger, 1991 and Saribay, 2001) and by disconnecting the individuals with traditional cultures, modernity caused ‘social alienation’ (Verfremdung) (Marx, 2004 and Jameson, 1998). Therefore, as Habermas (1980) and Giddens (1990) pointed out, communities emerged in order to both collect these alienated individuals under the same umbrella and create a social identity for them.

Though the West has a well-defined concept of community by this two-angle-definition, it is not possible to apply these definitions to the Islamic world. Although the first angle (methodological approach) was used to understand the social transformation of the society, the second approach has strong ideological perspectives (Ergene, 2008) and has been used by some scholars like Roy (1994) and Kepel (2002) in order to illustrate the people who were collected under the shared values, especially Islam, as “a dangerous enemy”. For this reason it is not possible to apply the Western definition of the concept of community into the Islamic
world (Ergene, 2008). In the East, the concept of community is usually defined in a different way because of the dissimilar juridical, political and ethical concepts (Thompson, 2010).

As mentioned above, to illustrate the Turkish reality about the context of community, rather than to illustrate a sociological definition of it, is one of the prime aims of this research. Here, the researcher must underline that so far a sufficient definition has not been found for the Turkish case, which is why she creates a tentative definition which collects both the East’s and the West’s values in the same statement. Consequently, in Turkey -a bridge state between the West and the East- although cultural and traditional institutions were shaped by Islamic rules, the context of community (Gemeinschaft- Cemaat) emerged to both collect the alienated individuals (in a western context) under the same umbrella (Islam) and create them a social identity: Muslim brotherhood.

Briefly, for Turkey, the context of community (Gemeinschaft- Cemaat) means the group of people who are alienated from society and do not share the same values with the state, but share the same values with ‘others’ who were excluded by political elites. Hence, as underlined above; in this case Islam is both the most significant factor which brings people together and an assembly language for different people. For instance, in the case of the IC, the cohesive role of Islam is very visible. Since it follows strict religious order, one can see the great organizational rigidity and inflexible hierarchical structure.

In addition to this, in the IC the current leader, whose name is Nurettin Cosan, wants to have a higher degree of social control that is exerted over members. While explaining their way, or rather their own interpretation of Islam he (Iskenderpasa.com) defines nine rules: Adherence to the Qur'an and Sunnah, Purity in Intentions, Correctness of the Faith, Dhikr, Muraqaba, 

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8 http://www.iskenderpasa.com/B3D41F31-F992-460D-A857-E2E4BAE9DD0A.aspx
Wuqūf-u Qalbî, Hifz-i Nisbet, Rabita-i Muhabbet. By these rules the IC can control the social life of their members. However, social movements do not have these strict rules and members, but followers (Della Porta and Diani, in Edwards, 2011). In social movements, according to Della Porta and Dianni (1999:16)

….Participation of the individual…can also develop within committees or working groups, or else in public meetings. Alternatively... one may support a movement by promoting its ideas and its point of view among institutions, other political actors or the media. However, the existence of a range of possible ways of becoming involved means that the membership of movements can never be reduced to a single act of adhesion. It consists, rather, of a series of differentiated acts, which, taken together, reinforce the feeling of belonging and of identity.

Consequently, it is a strict hierarchical structure and organizational rigidity that defines the cemaat, which refers to the IC in this research. However, the GM is a collectivity that has considerably large and loose boundaries. There is no initiation ceremony; that is, participation in the community is not through a single act of adhesion, as is principally the case in a cemaat. Since the meaning is behind the definitions, we must agree on them before studying the GM.

By asking whether the GM should be defined as either a cemaat (‘religious’ community) or a camia (‘social’ community, society), Uluengin (6th April 2011) wants to be clear about some hidden meanings. As he pointed out, although both cemaat and camia come from the same etymologic root, in Turkey they have different meanings. While cemaat refers to a limited number of people who are controlled by central rules and highly dependent on each other, and

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9 Sunnah denotes the practice of Prophet Muhammad, that he taught and practically instituted as a teacher of the shari‘ah and the best exemplar.

Dhikr: an Islamic devotional act, typically involving the repetition - aloud or silently - of the Names of God, and of supplications taken from hadith texts and Qur‘anic verses. Dhikr is usually done individually, but in some Sufi orders it is instituted as a ceremonial activity.

Muraqaba: a Sufi word for meditation. Literally it is an Arabic term which means “to watch over”, “to take care of”, or “to keep an eye”. It implies that with meditation, a person watches over or takes care of his spiritual heart (or soul), and acquires knowledge about it, its surroundings, and its creator.

Wuqūf-u Qalbî: observance and control of the heart.

Hifz-i Nisbet: the preservation of relationship, keeping the ties to the murshid in tariqa.

Rabita-i Muhabbet: a loving, respecting and trusting bond.
is usually used in a religious context, camia does not essentially have a religious or spiritual reference. Moreover, in this case the word refers to majority and plurality.

Uluengin adds that the Gulen case is more than a cemaat (community); hence, the movement, whose members are not sharing the same political or economic values but meet under Fethullah Gulen’s message, could be a symbol of plurality and should, therefore, be called camia (society). Moreover, Dumanli (20th February 2012) underlines that to define the people who are committed to a society inspired by Gulen and who extend material or spiritual support to this society as members of a community is not fair. Such a description restricts the scope of this society and also ignores the unity of hearts existent in all layers of the society. According to Dumanli (Ibid.) there are several reasons that one should not call the GM a community. For instance, the movement is not closed to participation from outsiders and attracts support from each political group or social entity.

The movement has grown to comprise several million followers and sympathizers, including important business groups and politicians in Turkey since the 1980s (Gozaydin, 2009). During these thirty years the movement has transformed greatly from cemaat (community) to camia (society), however Uluengin (13th April 2011) asserts that this transformation could not been understood by the others. Although by saying ‘the others’ he means the secular-political elites and Alevis in the country for whom religious groups mean ‘a Trojan Horse’ which threaten the country’s secular structure; there are several Islamist journalists or scholars (Ashton and Balci, 2008) who either criticize some of its applications or its whole existence.

For instance, according to Yavuz (H. Yavuz interviewed by Akinan, Serdar on 14th July 2008) “the Movement is like humidity, you can feel it but you cannot show it perceptibly. Besides that, it built an empire of fear in the country. For this reason I found some similarities between Opus Dei and the Movement.” However, Uluengin (13th April 2011) defines Yavuz’s effort
and also the other efforts which liken the GM to that of a monster, as a paranoia and adds that
the does not fit in this, since it has no counterpart in the Islamic world, it is unique to Turkey,
and it shines brightly in the Islamic world. It is clearly seen that it is possible to find different
definitions and explanations about the GM from supporters or critics of the movement. For
instance the question ‘what exactly is the GM?’ brings several answers in itself (BBC Radio
4’s podcast: What is Islam’s GM? 2011):

“The Gulen movement is the Islam of this century presented in a quite Western
way.”
“Its main purpose is control, control of politics, control of economy and
control of the education system.”
“It means being hardworking, representing the values you have in the most
beautiful way.”
“People are simply frightened of opposing them. The biggest problem for me
of what they’ve done is to create this climate.”

In contrast to the abovementioned definitions, the Gulen movement has been defined as a root
paradi in Turkish Society (Bilici, 2006:4)\(^\text{10}\). So the Movement turns out to be a relatively
strong root paradi that frames the cultural map of the Turkish-Muslim society. Here we can
say that although there is not a clear definition or a consensus explanation of it, the GM is a
product of either social requirements or social transformations. It could be argued that, as a
consequence of root paradi, people who are deeply attached to their traditional values may
want to be a member of some groups in order to find a social identity for themselves.

Hence, the movement aims “…to challenge the discourse of conflict and introduced the idea
of dialogue not only to the Turkish audience, but also to a global one.” according to Bilici
(2006:1) it must be defined as a civil societal foundation. Though this statement shows both
national and global importance of the movement and its aim clearly, the common criticism by
Yavuz (2003) and Uluengin (13th April 2011) is that the is not a transparent organization,

\(^{10}\)“Root Paradigm” is used by Turner in 1974 in order to characterize clusters of meaning which serve as cultural
“maps” for individuals; they enable persons to find a path in their own culture. Please see the book for details:
and by Uluengin’s word the movement has some transparency problems in public opinion. For this reason, it is a bit controversial as to why Turkish society needs this kind of organization. At this point, one should ask whether this is a result of the value-gap between individuals and states.

Another inquisition by MP Ince (2011) revealed that a civil societal foundation is the organization model which creates a broader public solidarity realm through sharing social responsibilities with an amateur spirit. By protecting its own realm in which it defends state and public interventions to its advocacy is generally named as a civil societal foundation, too. He adds that neither the nor any kind of Islamic Social Movements in Turkey cannot be called a civil society foundation or non-governmental organization (NGO). These movements are not based on any written laws and apply their own verbal rules, behaving as a parallel organization in the state. For this reason, they are not NGOs.

According to Ince (2011), while people can be a member of NGOs and drop out of the membership according to their own preferences, it is not possible to see this kind of process in Islamic Social Movements (ISMs). In those, one can talk about ‘commitments and belongings’ rather than ‘memberships or being insiders’ (Ince, 2011). Though he believes that these types of ‘commitments and belongings’ are contradistinctive with the NGO’s democratic structures, the interviews (in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, 2012) with the insiders of ISMs indicate that the case of ‘commitments and belongings’ are not considered as an anti-democratic situation, conversely they have been accepted as a driving power of the movements.

The above explanations and definitions prove that a consensus on the features of ISMs in Turkey has not been created as yet. Even though the terms Cemaat (community), Camia (society) or Civil Society Organizations (or NGOs) have been used with some hidden political choices, in this study- by ignoring their political meanings- the researcher will define the
movements, especially the GM in this chapter, as civil societal organizations. There is no doubt that Dumanli’s (20th February 2012) eleven point typology -some of them are also pointed out by informants during the interviews- has been impactful that the researcher calls the movement as a civil societal organization.

Also during the interviews the informants pointed out that the GM or in their words, ‘Hizmet Movement’ (a society of volunteers), contrary to popular myth, has too many well-educated insiders from different jobs, like engineers, military serviceman and doctors etc. One can clearly say that the movement does not have any role or power in its insiders’ decisions, which “they make in performance of their duties”. The area of activity of this Hizmet Movement that does not follow a command chain reaches out to a vast horizon (Dumanli, 20th February 2012). Moreover, informants highlighted that the movement is open to everybody. One of the insiders underlined that as a movement they will not hesitate to communicate with those who have been antagonistic to them. Hence, there is no hierarchical order in the movement; the meaning of responsibility is quite different from any kind of organization. Usually the insiders say they place their conscience before their hierarchical duties/responsibilities.

As seen from the abovementioned features, rather than being a governmental or state sponsored organization, The GM is a civil society movement. In other words, it is a civic initiative which started as a faith-initiated, non-political, cultural and educational movement dedicated to providing opportunities for the new generation of youth in Turkey (Ebaugh, 2010). Although the movement is neither a state-ideology nor a governmental policy, like a state-initiative it focuses on individual change and education of the individual. This could be explained by the transformation of state from welfare to social origins whose main key component is an inverse relationship between the extent of social spending and the size of the non-profit/governmental sector (Smith, in Edwards (ed.), 2011).
In a similar way to other countries, in Turkey one of the most important influences in the changing size and role of the non-governmental sector has been the adoption of the New Public Management. The shift to NPM has had profound effects on the size and role of the non-governmental sector or civil societal organizations. Additionally, neoliberal administration and economic policies have instigated a de-secularization process within Muslim-populated countries (Berger, 1999). The rapid emergence of Islamic Social Movements (ISMs) in Turkey may be a good example of this shift. Keskin (2009) highlighted that privatization and deregulation of the market have actually helped ISMs, or in other words Muslims and Political Islam, to move upward in the social stratification ladder and the result is the emergence of an Islamic-oriented middle class. The GM in Turkey is one of the best examples of this process.

Before a detailed explanation of the development of the movement and the cemaat, it would be useful to summarize the movement’s general features to the reader. Firstly, the movement focuses on the spiritual and intellectual awareness of the individual, seeking to form an inner self that will empower the person to effect change in society. It stresses the role that technology and new global networks can play in articulating a Muslim awareness. The GM, therefore, differentiates itself from the IC by stressing a non-exclusivist form of Turkish nationalism, the free market, openness to globalization, progressiveness in integrating tradition with modernity, and its humanistic outlook.

Hereafter the researcher will define the GM as an Islamic Social Movement which collects individuals under a single umbrella and creates for them a social identity. It is necessary to underline here that these denominations do not carry either any political or ideological reasons. However, the IC is that which historically rooted in the Naqshibandi tradition - one of the most powerful sources of political Islam in Turkey during the Republican era- rather than being a symbol of plurality in terms of having different political and economic values, shares
defined certain values. Additionally, unlike the GM, the cemaat is closed to participation from outsiders and giving explicit support to the Islamist political parties.

In sum, although the above classifications seem clear, we see that contemporary cemaats and Islamic movements show that they are Janus-faced in that they seek to “express yearnings for democracy and economic development,” but also remain “conservative ... in calling for a strict moral-religious code in society” (Yavuz, 2003:15). Yavuz also argues that since the secular Turkish state began granting new liberal political openings in the 1960s, as a consequence, Islamic groups were able to appropriate them. The late Turkish president Ozal's policies of political and market liberalization in the 1980s helped create a “new class of Muslim entrepreneurs ... able to circumvent state controls by creating its own alternative schools, printing presses, newspapers, journals, and radio and television stations” (Ibid:10).

The following two sections will provide an in-depth analysis of the GM and the IC and their involvement in education delivery in Turkey. Table 6 will inform the reader about both the GM and the IC and their active roles in education.

The table indicates the main characteristics of these two groups by highlighting the ability to enter/leave the organizations, their contribution in education delivery service and their relation with the others in the market. As it indicated by table 11 GM’s educational network is more extensive than IC in Turkey, while the IC has schools in 3 different cities which are Istanbul, Ankara and Yalova, the GM’s schools are everywhere around the country.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Gulen Movement</th>
<th>Iskenderpasa Cemaati</th>
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</table>
| **Main Characteristics** | - A transnational religious and social movement led by Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen.  
- GM is active in education since 1982 (with private schools in over 140 countries) and interfaith dialogue; and has substantial investments in media, finance, and for-profit health clinics.  
- It has been described as a "pacifist, modern-minded Islam, often praised as a contrast to more extreme Salafism."  
- Founded upon affiliations and sympathy and devotion.  
- It is usually called simply as Hizmet (The Service) by its followers. | - A discrete voluntary group with no organisation, party, membership, subscription or enforceable authority.  
- IC is active in education since 1987 by opening a private education center, than open a private high school in Istanbul in 1991 and has significant investments in media (Vefa Publishing and Marketing, AKRA FM), and for-profit health clinics (The Health Foundation).  
- No formal way of initiation and resignation |
| **Educational Activities in Turkey** | More than 200* schools in 7 regions all over the country  
*This study based on three high schools Fatih, Samanyolu and Yamanlar College (in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) | 8 schools in 3 cities Istanbul, Ankara and Yalova*  
*This study only focused on Asfa Colleges in Istanbul, Ankara |
| **Scholarship Support** | The observed three high schools in which more than 4000 students receive education, many with full scholarships. | AFA has 5 high schools in total in Istanbul and Ankara, have approximately 700 students, full scholarship not applicable for many students. |
| **Owner Companies of the Schools** | Various companies - 65 large sized enterprises, 700 Small and medium sized enterprises- are owing the schools, the focus schools of this study are owned by Çağ Schooling Institutions Inc. (Fatih College), Baskent Education and Publications Inc. (Samanyolu College), Yamanlar Education Institutions Inc. (Yamanlar College). | All schools are the under the umbrella of Asfa Education and Training Centre Inc. |
| **Gender Segregation in the Schools** | Usually mix gender (excluding high schools in which student older than 15) | Usually mix gender (excluding Asfa Arda Aсаlet ) |
| **Religious Discourse in the Schools** | There is no intensive religious discourse in the classes, the schools follow secular curriculum and no added religious classes during the formal education time, and however the GM seeks to promote informal religious education after the classes in the dorms or light houses. | Although the curriculum seems secular, both the teachers and the administrators of ASFA apply “value education” during the classes, it is possible to see how the schools promote religious discourse during the formal education hours. |

Table 6: The GM and IC in Education Delivery

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11 See Figure 14 in Chapter 5 which explains the network of GM.
Conclusion: An Analysis of the Literature on NPM and NSM

The above review of the scholarly literature showed that NPM portrays the transformation in the way in which public services were planned and controlled. In many countries, the transformation from the ‘Old Bureaucratic’ type of management overlaps with the rise of the ‘New Right’ ideology in the 1980s. For this reason, new public management is often defined as an ideological shift not only in Western, but also in Turkish literature. However, the scholarship showed that even some leftist administrations such as Australia and New Zealand adopted the NPM reforms. Therefore, the countries in which NPM reforms had been applied indicated that the reforms were practical reactions to the socio-economic situations of the 1980s, such as a global economic depression, dissatisfaction with public service, increasing taxes and the liberalization of both state and society.

The main characteristics of NPM, which were repeated in the literature by many academics can be summarized as follows: the decentralisation of the public services, the rising usage of private sector management techniques into the public sector, the increasing involvement of the private sector, the third parties and non-governmental organizations such as civil society organizations, and social movements in the public sector. In other words, this can be described as building governance in the public sector. Whether one is convinced that NPM is a pragmatic answer to contemporary needs or an ideological response to the 1980s, the emergence of NPM indicates the relationship between the state institutions and the non-governmental organizations. In other words, NPM created an environment for the non-governmental sectors to deliver public services by paying attention to customers’ expectations. The literature underlines that it is only possible to understand the application of NPM by considering any given country’s socio-political and economic background.

Likewise, NPM, NSM emerged as a response to socio-political conditions of the 1980s. As the NSM literature pointed out, by the late 1990s the social movements shifted from targeting
the state to targeting everyday life. These new movements did not focus on the economy and institutional politics, but rather they built up civil society. Although there are different theories and several definitions of NSM in the literature, the most repeated ones showed that the focus of the movements has become the creation of identity. Della Porta and Diani (1999) give us a concluding definition of social movement: informal networks based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about contradictory issues through the frequent use of various forms of protest.

As we have learnt from Melluci (1996), the power of movements is assured questions that have to do with boundaries and consciousness, rather than the reform or appropriation of institutions: “Who are we? What are our goals and means?” According to the scholarly literature, the social movements are struggles around the institutional potentials of cultural patterns of a given social type. In other words, social conflicts must be understood in cultural and normative terms; social movements are normatively oriented interactions between adversaries with conflicting interpretations and opposed societal models of a shared cultural field (Cohen and Arato, 1995).

After this brief summary of NPM and NSM literature, it is vital to underline why the issue of bringing together the state and non-state actors, or namely, governance, has come into consideration in a number of related fields of different social science disciplines, attracting scholars from different backgrounds, such as sociology, political science, and public administration (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003). Although both NPM and ‘governance’, and NSM and ‘Islamic Social Movements’ have been analysed and debated in the academy, the above review of literature indicated that they both suffer from a one-sided view of the transformation process, which is approached in some texts by way of descriptive or perspective overview (Barry et.al, 2006). For instance, while Hood (1999) mentioned the “managerial reform movement” when discussing change in the public sector, he did not
explore the derivation of ‘movement’ from within the social movement literature (in Barry et.al, 2006:439).

Overall, the literature on NPM and NSM demonstrate several weaknesses. First of all, the review showed us that in order to understand wider considerations of transformation in Public Administration, it is useful to take intellectual inspiration from social movement scholarship. As is demonstrated by Figure 3, both sets of literature have theoretical and terminological convergence on issues such as identity, governance, liberalization, transparency and participation. So, in order to be aware of this interpenetration it is vital to read NPM and NSM theories together. However, only a limited number of scholars mentioned this necessity, such as Barry, Berg and Chadler (2206, 2007) Newman (2004) and Yavuz (2008) –a way of analysing engagement through ‘opportunity spaces’-.

The review has shown that this is the major weakness of the existing literature, because it is not possible to understand the changes in public administration by ignoring the human actors.
and their demands, or the emergence of social movements. Another weakness of the literature is the limited number of qualitative research that has been conducted in the public administration area. Although sociologists and anthropologists had conducted several field studies, such as in-depth interviews and focus group analysis to analyse the involvement of the ISMs in society, these kinds of studies have not been done in relation to public administration. In other words, there is a requirement for more qualitative work in order to provide further illustrative research.

In the next chapter, which explains the methodology of the present research, the researcher will specify the research questions and the instruments that will be used to answer the questions. The data obtained from the field work is expected to clarify some of the issues discussed in this chapter, particularly those related to the education system as a public service, and the involvement of the Islamic Social Movements in the delivery of the service.
Chapter 3: Methodological Issues

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to illustrate a methodological framework for collecting data in order to determine the systematic commitments of contemporary religious groups (movements and cemaats) within the Turkish Public Administration, and particularly the education system. In particular, the research analyses how these movements’ and cemaats’ demands and education systems are brought into union in the practices of two particular contemporary Islamic groups in Turkey; the Gulen Movement (GM) and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati (IC). Furthermore, it is hoped that the proposed methodology will also bridge the gap in the literature, link the NPM and NSM theories, and provide the essential analytical tools for critically assessing the outcomes of the relationship between the Turkish Public Administration and ISMs.

Social research needs a design or a structure before data collection, and so the researcher will explain the design of her research here. As underlined by de De Vaus (2001:9), “the function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible.” This statement clearly shows that in order to answer the research questions the researcher has to understand his or her initial standing point, which creates the basic elements of the research process. It is sensible to ask Crotty’s (1998:3) questions now:

- What methods do we propose to use?
- What methodology governs our choice and use of methods?
- What theoretical perspective lies behind the methodology in question?
- What epistemology informs this theoretical perspective?

By asking these questions, the researcher aims to build a research design; Figure 4 illustrates the shape of the research and gives answers to these questions. This chapter is divided into 6
sections. The first section will identify the main research questions that shape the methodology adopted in this study. In the second section, the researcher will introduce the ontological and epistemological stands of the research. In the third section, a justification for the selection of the case studies is developed. The fourth section will show the researcher’s position as an outsider within the research context (Collins, 2004). The fifth section will illustrate why a qualitative research method (QRM) was chosen instead of other methods. The reader can find a detailed explanation, and notes of the conducted QRMs, participant observation, focus group analysis and in-depth interviews, in this section. The sixth section will present the key techniques of the data analyses utilised in the study and the constraints presented during the fieldwork.

![Figure 4: The Structure of the Research](image_url)
3.1. The Research Questions

According to Saunders (et al. 1997) the research question is the hearth of research, and specifying this question is more important than the research topic itself. As De Vaus (2001:1) has suggested, for a social science research project it is possible to ask two types of questions: one that is descriptive (what is going on?) and one that is explanatory (why it is going on?). The first set answers questions only after making sure the facts and dimensions of the research. This type of research usually defines the shape and nature of a society. The second is concerned with explaining why a certain phenomenon is as it is.

Although the essential part of this research is explanatory, some of its parts require a descriptive analysis. It is explanatory in the sense that it seeks to explore the systematic commitments of contemporary religious groups (movements and cemaats) within the Turkish Public Administration, yet it is descriptive in the sense that it seeks to verify the interaction between the education system and religious groups. Therefore, this research seeks firstly to understand the relation between Turkish public administration and Islamic social movements, secondly, to evaluate this, and finally, to develop an appropriate method which increases both the involvement of these movements and the degree of monitoring the level of implementation in their favour.

As was addressed in Chapter 1, the gap the researcher is aiming to fill in scholarship relates to why in an assertive secular society there is creeping religiosity in the education system. The researcher points out that this is a result of the way in which the features of NPM have created opportunity spaces for civic actors to introduce that religiosity. More specifically, these three sets of sub-questions will provide an understanding the following:

1. The changes in Turkish Public Administration – How does NPM open up opportunity spaces in the governance of education?
2. The impact of ISMs on public services, especially education services – How have ISMs become involved in the resourcing of education?

3. The emergence of Turkish ISMs under the perspective of New Social Movement theory, and the role of ISMs during education delivery during the NPM era in Turkey - How have ISMs redefined educational governance?

These research questions provide some basic research objectives. First of all, to investigate the impact of Islamic Social Movements (ISMs) in political and social life, and to analyse the issues in the Turkish secular process of education policy formation, along with the associated challenges these movements’ demands have on other objectives. The research questions also seek to develop an appropriate policy making model, which increases both the involvement of the ISMs and the degree of monitoring of implementation in their favour is the final objective of this research.

3.2. Ontological and Epistemological Stands of the Research

The ontological and epistemological foundations of research matter because they determine the theoretical claims that are made in a social scientific enquiry, and by implication inform the methodology that is used to investigate central hypotheses. For a social scientist, the theoretical position is significantly determinist before and after the data collection period. In sum, the production of knowledge is related with the conception people have of society. Therefore, as Marsh and Stoker (2002:15) have underlined, there are several methods of acquiring knowledge about social science and politics.

The researcher’s ontological and epistemological position provides the shape of the subject. Ontological issues are concerned with the existence of a phenomenon; the key question is whether there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of our knowledge of it. For instance, are there essential differences between genders, classes or races that exist in all
contexts and at all times? In order to understand the existing phenomena, social ontology provides two contrasting ontological positions. The first one is called the ‘critical’ view, or objectivism, which seeks to place research within society as a whole, then tries to generalize from where society is, and aims to improve society as a whole. The second perspective is called ‘constructionism’, which is about the way in which ideas are formed, and the fact that they rely on each other within the world.

This research aims to take a clear ontological position; namely, there are fundamental differences between societies, countries and their public administration systems, and these are features of their very existence. These differences persist over time and are common across cultures (Ibid.). For instance, according to Burke (et. al. 1988), the study of popular ISMs can teach us much about the historical transformations societies have experienced. Burke also emphasises the social construction of social phenomena. Therefore, this research is founded upon a constructivist ontological and epistemological position. It argues that a social phenomenon, such as the involvement of ISMs in public administration does not exist independently of our interpretation of them, but rather it depends on contingent variables of our social selves.

The rationale for adopting these ontological and epistemological underpinnings is threefold. First, social constructivism plays a key role in enabling us to understand the complexities of social life (Wanda, 2008); i.e. the relationship between religion and public administration (PA). More specifically, the relationship between religion and PA is a changing concept, and there is no single example or definition. For this reason, social constructivism aids the researcher in understanding the social construction of reality. Second, social constructivism overcomes the methodological limitations of the literature by using in-depth interviews. Finally, with social constructivism it is possible to explain the relationship between NSM and NPM theories as a process of involving ISMs into the public administration process, where
policy making and implementation takes place on the basis of citizens’ experiences, knowledge, habits and preferences. These three points suggest the need for a qualitative method of analysis between the normative issues and the empirical issues in cases of the involvement of the ISMs in public administration.

3.3. Research Strategy: Case Study Approach

In this thesis, the researcher’s defined strategy is the case study. As a research strategy, the case study is used in many situations to contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political, and related phenomena. Additionally, as Yin (1994:1) has pointed out, case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed. Here, the researcher chose the case study approach as a research methodology not only because of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, but also because this strategy does not require control of behavioural events, and focuses on contemporary events. The importance of each condition forced the researcher to use the case study as a research methodology or research strategy.

Categorizing the types of case studies Stake (2000, in Silverman, 2005) and Yin (1994) suggested different typologies. According to Stake (2000 in Silverman, 2005), there are three different types of case studies: (1) the intrinsic case study, (2) the collective case study, and (3) the instrumental case study. Like Stake, Yin (1994) classified the case studies into three categories: (1) the exploratory (traditional form), (2) the descriptive, and (3) the explanatory. There is no doubt in suggesting two different typologies, both Yin and Stake focused on different points.

Stake is pointing to the nature of data collection. So, in terms of this research, one can say that the researcher combined the second and the third types of Stake’s suggestions. Thus, in terms of the nature of data collection, the researcher adopted the instrumental-collective case
study, in which a number of cases are studied mainly to provide insight into an issue or to revise a generalization. Although the cases selected are studied in depth, the main focus is on something else (Silverman, 2005: 127). In Yin’s terms (1984), one can say that this research is an explanatory case study, where existing theory is used to understand what is happening.

Here, one should keep in mind that as a research methodology, the instrumental-collective-explanatory case study is not only a description of methodology, but also an account of the rationale for the choice of methods, and the particular forms in which these methods are employed (Crotty, 1998:7). By discussing two religious groups, the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati, the researcher will identify their impact on the education service, and their relationships with public services and NPM. The researcher also aims to investigate whether these groups affect the education delivery system, why some groups have greater impact than others, and how they manage their impact. In essence, this thesis is a case study of the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati, and is an empirical inquiry that investigates the ISMs as social phenomena within their real-life context.

As a research strategy the case study has been criticised on several levels. Yin (1994:9) summarizes three main concerns. First of all, the greatest concern has been over the lack of rigor of case studies. Yin (1994:9) underlines that the critics of case study research point out that case study investigators have been sloppy and allowed equivocal evidence, or biased views, to influence the direction of findings and conclusions. However, as suggested by Yin (1994:10), during this research the researcher follows a well-defined time table in order to reduce the problems during the observation and field work stages, and also works hard to report all evidence fairly. Although the second common complaint about case studies is that they take too long and result in massive, unreadable documents (Yin, 1994:10), by bearing in mind Yin’s suggestions, the researcher can attempt to be more organized from the beginning of the field work, and control each case separately.
A final and frequent concern about case studies is that there is little basis for scientific generalization (Yin, 1994:10); the critics always indicate that it is not possible to make generalizations from a single case. For this research it is vital to point out that by applying case study research, the researcher does not represent a ‘sample’ and the researcher’s aim is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization), not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization) (Ibid.). In the present research project, by making analytic generalization, the researcher used the previously developed theory as a template against which to compare the empirical results of the case study (Yin, 1984). Hence, it is argued that the delivery of education in Turkey has been affected by the involvement of Islamic social movements, as well as by new public management. Based on NPM and NSM theories the researcher aimed to gather some empirical results from the cases of the GM and the IC.

3.4. Researcher’s Position: Neither Insider nor Outsider

In the social sciences, researchers, and particularly those using qualitative methodologies, often face an insider/outsider dichotomy. Many social scientists (Creswell, 1994; Patton, 2002) underline how important is to clarify the researcher’s personal motivation and position for their research. Accordingly, in the field of social science, researchers frequently place themselves as ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ to their research field (Bonner & Tolhurst, 2002). Generally, insider-researchers are those who choose to study a group to which they belong, while outsider researchers do not belong to the group being studied.

The two positions have some advantages and disadvantages. For instance, according to Bonner and Tolhurst (2002), the advantages of being an insider include a greater understanding of the group’s culture; the capability to interact naturally with the group and its members, and a formerly established, and, therefore, greater relational closeness with the group. Additionally, the politics of the group and how to approach the members are
understood better by the insider-researcher than anyone else (Smyth & Holian, 2008). However, there are also some disadvantages of being an insider. For instance, having a greater familiarity can lead the researcher to a loss of objectivity (De Lyser, 2001). Also, the insider may also be required to deal with methodological and ethical issues, as well as role duality, such as balancing their insider role (instructor, nurse, geographer, etc.) and the researcher role (Ibid.).

The outsider researchers, who are not from the groups they study, act as neutral, detached observers. Simmel (in Kerstetter, 2012:100) argues that outsider researchers are valued for their objectivity, “which permits the stranger to experience and treat even his close relationships as though from a bird’s-eye view.” The outsiders confront the ability of insider researchers to analyse clearly that of which they are a part. Outsider researchers are frequently valued for their objectivity and emotional distance from a situation, but may find it difficult to gain access to research participants (Ibid.). In short, as it illustrated above, both insider and outsider researches have some advantages and disadvantages. For this reason creating a partnership between the two provides a better position for a social researcher (Pugh et al., 2000).

However, it is not a simple task to define a social researcher’s position as either an insider or an outsider. Social researchers argue that sometimes one of these positions is not able to capture sufficiently the researcher’s role in the field. For instance, in the context of this research, the researcher’s experiences and relations led her to consider herself to be neither insider nor outsider. In this respect she consider her position as a hybrid, or in Collins’ (2004: S14) words, an “outsider within”. Collins (2004) uses this term to illustrate “the location of people who no longer belong to any one group,” as well as “social locations or border spaces occupied by groups of unequal power.” Consequently, in Collins’ point of view, to be an outsider-within implies not a simple duality/plurality but the power relations which are
concerned therein. Outsiders within are able to expand access to the knowledge of the group/community which they inhabit (or visit), but are unable to either authoritatively claim that knowledge or possess the full power given to members of that group (Ibid.)

The rationale behind defining herself as an outsider within is the researcher’s personal relations with the unit of analysis, the ISMs. In undertaking this research, she acknowledged that her personal experiences influenced her decision to research the experience of living together with Turkish post-graduate students who have graduated from ISM inspired schools. Further, she accepted that her experiences also influenced the way she chose to study this topic. As we learnt from Yavuz (2008), an amalgamation of experience and moments are the motivation behind research. For the researcher, it began in 2008. During the early years of her post-graduate study, she participated in the GM’s educational dialogue activities in the UK as an “insider from outside”. Hence, this insider position enabled her to develop numerous contacts with other people from the movement and enhanced her understanding of the movement.

Although insider researchers often get criticised and report some difficulties during the data collection period, such as encountering their own reflections in the interviews (Kanuha, 2000), and complicating the interviews by the supposition among their informants that the researchers already have been acquainted with the answers (De Lyser, 2001); as “an insider outside”, or by Collins’ definition an “outsider within” the researcher did her utmost to maximise the distance in order to be objective. Hereafter it is up to reader to judge whether or not she succeeds in this aim.

3.5. Pre-Data Collection Period and the Researcher’s Motivation

Every piece of research and every researcher have a motivational history. First of all, having grown up in an educationist family who follow the Kemalist education philosophy deeply, the
researcher has been affected by the changing trends in education. The daily conversations of her parents and their friends were centred on the increasing involvement of ISMs in education, and the movements’ growing financial power. Doubtless, the Gulen Movement (GM) has always been the subject of these debates because it has been highly notable in comparison to other religious groups. The GM centres its organization on educational intuitions of various kinds to build a great educational network. As a social scientist, the researcher had always been curious about these religious groups’ engagement with modern life, politics, Public Administration and especially education. She wanted to understand how they were combining Islamic ethics and secular education in a secular private school with a secular curriculum, and how they would deal with certain questions when they teach Islamic ethics in a secular system.

Combining her family’s ideas about the community with her own questions as a graduate student, the researcher lived in one of the GM’s lighthouses (Isık Evleri) in London, UK, and carried her own observations to this research. Being a participant in the field is one of the most useful and significant research techniques in the field of observational research (Crowther and Lancaster, 2009). This technique, which is called participant observation (PO), refers to a type of sociological research methodology in which the researcher takes on a role in the social case under observation.

However, in this research it has another vitally important role. While undertaking this research, unlike the other three data collection processes (see the next section), PO had been done before the setting of the current research questions and the defining of the gap in literature as the researcher’s motivation. Clearly, it is possible to say that the PO process has helped the researcher to choose this topic as an object of research. As stated above, between 2008 and 2009 the researcher participated in the GM’s education and dialogue activities in the UK, and for 14 months lived in “Işık Evleri” (literally, Light Houses) which provide
lodgings for young people so that they can build up their Muslim personality and protect their morality.

During the 14 months the researcher also attended some mixed-gender events such as gatherings, conversation groups, and meetings organised by movement participants, in order to be informed of the insider perspective. She was always able to note her observations after the movement’s gatherings and conversations. Moreover, she listened to several selected videotapes of Gulen’s preaching and conversations weekly or monthly. Nonetheless, as a participant she expanded her most interesting data and insights at unexpected times, such as informal chats and meetings.

Macionis and Plummer (2005) define two main types of PO: covert and overt. During overt observation the researcher is open about the reason for her presence in the field of study, since the researcher is given permission by the group to conduct her research. However, in covert observation the researcher is participating without giving any information to members of the groups. Further, although in overt observation the researcher usually uses a sponsor, who is a member with a high status within the group, in a covert observation he/she needs a “gate keeper” who is a member of the group that will introduce the researcher into the group.

Both types have some advantages and disadvantages. The most significant advantage of covert observation is that the researcher may gain access to social groups who would otherwise not consent to being studied. The most important advantage of overt observation is that the group is being observed in its ‘natural settings’ and the data may be recorded openly. In this research, the researcher had an overt position, and always told the group members about her study.

As an overt participant, by living with four (sometimes this number increased up to seven) post-graduate female students, some of whom gained their degrees from Gulen Movement-
inspired schools and universities, the researcher got the opportunity of being an outsider within and collected material on the interactions between religion, state, politics and education. Living in a ‘light house’ as a housemate allowed her to build trust and networks. Since the researcher had not experienced such an environment before, those 14 months gave her information about pious family structures and those families’ expectations from the public administration or simply from the state as citizens.

As Bastin (in Walker, 1985) has underlined, participant observation’s potential contribution to policy planning should not been underutilised. This is because this research is directly related to education and the formation of education policy, and so the method will be highly useful for two reasons. Firstly, it will allow the researcher to obtain first-hand knowledge of social circumstances and the following questions: How do religious groups challenge the state and its Kemalist Secularist ideology? How have the state’s education policies changed over time? What was the relationship between state policy and social movements? What was the impact or power of the sample communities after the 1980s? Secondly, this method will allow the researcher to gain an insider perspective of the impact of green money.

Briefly, by using the PO method, the researcher aims to gain answers to these questions, which can make a significant contribution to research and shape the main three themes (see Chapter 1) of the following research instruments. Accordingly, during her observation, the researcher found that when the discussion revolved around the involvement of religious groups in education the respondents always found a relationship firstly between green money and religious groups, secondly between changing trends in secularism (from assertive to passive secularism) and religious groups, and finally between the state and religious groups. Following her first-hand observations, the researcher decided to investigate this research topic by setting the goal of understanding the origins and evolution of faith-inspired, socio-political movements and their activities in education. After two years reading related
literature and a systematic review of relevant documents on the GM and the IC, the researcher decided upon the following three methods in order to collect the data.

3.6. Data Collection Process by Using Qualitative Methods

According to the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this research there is no objective truth that the world is socially constructed, and that the role of social scientists is to study those social constructions (Marsh and Furlong in Marsh and Stoker, 2002:27). Therefore, Furlong, Marsh and Stoker suggest that quantitative methods can be blunt instruments that may produce misleading data. However, the needs of this research require utilising qualitative methods. In other words, a qualitative methodology for data collection seems to be the most appropriate way for answering the research questions identified above.

Devine (in Marsh and Stoker, 2002:197) defines Qualitative Research Method (QRM) as a generic term that refers to a range of pre-defined procedures and techniques including participant observation, case studies, analytic induction, critical analysis, diary studies, interviews, focus groups, and life histories. The pre-defined set of procedures, which seek to answer the research questions, also increase the efficiency of QRM in terms of gaining culturally specific information about values, social norms, and socio-economic status.

As mentioned above, although there are several methods of QRM, in this research the following three were chosen in order to help the researcher interpret and better understand the multifaceted reality of particular circumstances and the implications of qualitative data (Cassell and Syman, 2004): document analysis, focus group analysis and in-depth interviews. Each of these methods is particularly designed in order to gain a specific category of data. For example, while case studies are the most favourable qualitative method for obtaining data for organisations, interviews, especially intensive individual interviews, are ideal for gathering data on individuals’ behaviours and experiences. This section has aimed to
investigate the advantages of the QRM and the main reason for its preference for this research project. As it has been explained previously, this research seeks to analyse how it is possible to explain increasing religiosity in education in secular Turkey. In approaching this central research question the researcher formulated three sub-questions, which were identified earlier. In discussing how NPM opens up opportunity spaces in the governance of education the researcher uses documentary analysis as a qualitative research method (see Chapter 4).

For the second and third sub-questions the researcher used both in-depth interviews and focus group analysis (see Chapters 5 and 6). Briefly, when the research questions are overviewed the rationale of choosing the specific qualitative methods and the main characteristics of those methods which make them efficient and meaningful for this research question will be illustrated briefly here:

3.6.1. Documentary Analysis

Documentary analysis (DA) is considered one of the most appropriate and cost effective methods for adequately researching changes in public administration and the outcomes of public administration reforms. This involves a wide range of sources, in particular, a systematic analysis of policy papers on education reform, school websites, public minutes, and books of the ISM leaders.

According to May (2011), DA includes a wide variety of sources, including official statistics, photographs, texts and visual data. Moreover, Bryman (2004) adds that documents such as newspapers, books, magazines, and government minutes can be read and preserved, and so are available for analysis by the social researcher. The level of their significance depends, however, on the appropriateness of the document chosen for the phenomena being investigated. Therefore, as Payne and Payne (2004) have pointed out, it must be understood
that documents are not intentionally created for the purpose of research, but are objects with a concrete or semi-permanent existence, which tell us indirectly about the social world of the people who created them.

Bailey (1994:194) defines two types of documents that are used in DA, namely, primary documents and secondary documents. Primary documents are eye-witness accounts produced by people who experienced the particular event or the behavior which is the object of study. Secondary documents are those produced by people who were not present at the scene, but who received eye-witness accounts to compile their documents, or have read eye-witness accounts. In the present research project the secondary sources include policy papers, articles, and books about the GM and the IC, secondary websites and newspapers, in addition to primary resources such as interviews, the movements’ websites, speeches, newspapers, and magazines.

Like many other countries Turkey regularly produces crucial documents on public administration reforms that can be easily accessed. These documents can be found in the ministries’ websites and the state’s archives. For the present research on educational governance the researcher relied on published public documents such as the Public Management Basic Law Draft (KYTKT), five year annual development plans, government campaign papers (i.e. Build Your Own School, Haydi Kizlar Okula), national education statistics, the World Bank, and OECD reports on education. The researcher also collected data from the GM and IC inspired schools’ websites and national newspapers archives.

During the process of analyzing the abovementioned documents, reports, plans or web pages, the researcher used both analytical reading and content analysis. While some of the reports and plans were subjected to an analytical reading, as illustrated by analyses of political ideologies, others were subjected to content analysis to assess degrees of bias in the policy
making process (Hakim, 1987:44). Moreover, since it is not possible to see the objective
analysis of the reform processes – they are always written from the government’s point of
view - the reform papers were usually analyzed with the related newspaper articles and
academic articles in order to see the implementation process of the same policy. For instance,
while the researcher was analyzing the KYTKT, she always read it with sources such as the
Turkish constitution, critical articles about KYTKT, and newspaper articles. Thus, by doing
this, the researcher procured unbiased information about the application process of the law
paper.

3.6.2. Focus Group Analysis

In the second step of this research’s field work, the researcher will use Focus Groups
technique. This method is a type of group interview in which there is more than one
participant; there is an importance in the questioning on a particular fairly tightly defined
topic (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In this research, the researcher will interview people who are
known to have had a certain experience, in a relatively unstructured way. Here, the researcher
aims to compare her own gatherings - from the previous method: participant observation -
with the interviewers’ own answers. Focus groups, of course, offer the researcher the chance
to study the ways in which persons cooperatively make sense of a phenomenon and build
senses around it (Bryman and Bell, 2007).

Wilkinson states (2004, p. 177) that focus group research is traditionally “a way of collecting
qualitative data, which fundamentally involves engaging a small number of people in an
informal group discussion (or discussions), ‘focused’ around a particular topic or set of
issues”. Nowadays, focus group research is becoming increasingly fashionable in the field of
social science, especially among policy researchers, for investigating what citizens believe or
think, as well as why they act in the way they do. There are several advantages to using focus
group analysis in the field of social science. For instance, during the data collection period, it
is an economical, fast and efficient method (Krueger and Casey, 2000). Moreover, the method’s group dynamics provide deeper and richer data than those obtained from one-to-one interviews (Thomas et al. 1995).

The optimum number of participants for a group can vary. Since smaller groups indicate bigger potential, according to Krueger and Casey (2000) the ideal number of participants is between six and eight people. For this research, the number of participants in each group was also varied, and changed between 4 and 8. Also, Krueger (1994:17) has approved the use of very small focus groups, which he calls “mini-focus groups”, which include three or four contributors who have particular information, familiarity and/or experiences to discuss in the group.

![Focus Groups](image)

Figure 5: Focus Groups

In addition to number of participants, the number of focus groups also matters. Many social scientists, Krueger (1994) being one of them, advises that for a simple research question the number of focus groups necessary may only be three or four, and he adds that continuing with running focus groups until a clear outline appears in subsequent groups produces only repetitive information. Therefore, in this research project, three focus group analyses have
been conducted with five, six and eight people. Each group has a certain group of people who are affected by the education policy, and have graduated from the movements’ inspired schools (see Figure 5). As suggested by Krueger (1994), in each group the participants knew each other very well, and they share the same characteristics; in two groups they are relatives, and in each group they all come from similar social and economic backgrounds.

Since they knew each other from childhood, they felt comfortable talking about a number of very personal issues that affected their participation in the movements’ inspired schools, and were able to express their views on how to either widen or narrow participation. Based on the researcher’s findings from the participant observation process, the researcher started the discussion firstly by explaining the aim of her research, and then opened the discussion with a question that inspected their ideas about the first pre-defined research theme: “how do they define the relationship between secularism and education?” As the groups were not large it was possible to manage the discussion and ask additional sub-questions.

The second theme aimed to explore their understanding of the relationship between the religious groups and the state. Although the participants were generally quite responsive when answering this question, they had different understandings of “relationship”. While some defined this as the involvement of the religious groups in politics, others defined the term as financial support from the government or state. Therefore, by asking several sub-questions the researcher increased her control at this stage. Similarly, the third theme focused on the relationship between religious groups and green money. Since some of the participants (especially the participants from Yamanlar and Fatih College) defined their parents as being a part of green money and the others did not, the researcher explained the concept of green money for her research.
Additionally, during the two-three hour discussions the extension of trust amongst the members of the group encouraged the expression of their views, and sometimes they addressed issues that were not explicitly asked about. The focus groups are recorded using a tape-recorder and then transcribed. Each group interview was done after allowing limited time to transcribe the previous one. Also in focus group interviewing, it is really important that not only people’s words, but also their way of speaking is taken into consideration. That is why; the researcher has to really care about tape recordings and transcription of them.

3.6.3. In-Depth Interviews

In addition to the two aforementioned data collection methods, in this research a number of qualitative interviews were conducted with the families and teachers who are participants/followers of the GM and the IC, or families who send their children to these schools without being participants/followers of these movements. Cassell and Symon (2004) point out that, qualitative interviews are different from the quantitative ones. While in the quantitative interviews the interviewee is seen as a research subject, in qualitative interviews the relationship between the interviewer and interviewee shapes the research.

According to Bryman and Bell (2007), the main reason for this is that qualitative interviews are less structured and more flexible than the quantitative ones, which is why the researcher can canalize or govern the interview with her questions. Additionally, the interviewee’s responses play a key role in the research. For this reason, both the interviewer’s and interviewee’s roles are very important for this research. Therefore, the twenty-five pre-defined questions not only asked about the interviewees’ political, social and economic backgrounds, but also focused on their understanding of the relationship between the state and religious groups, the changing trends (social and economic) behind these relationships, and the main rationale that directed them to choose the movement-inspired schools for their children.
Furthermore, some questions were set for the teachers, and were investigating the schools’ philosophy of education, curriculums and the teachers’ commitment level to the GM or the IC. The researcher sought to validate her findings from the participant observation and focus group analysis, and also to obtain extra data not available through secondary sources. The second of these was important to fill the gap in scholarship in relation to the data required when discussing the involvement of green money and Islamic groups in the education system in Turkey (Chapter 5).

As Ozdalga (2006:276) and Balci (2005:24) underline, semi-confidentiality is one of the most important elements of the GM; even the IC has more sensitivity on some issues than the GM. Therefore, while some of the interviews were recorded and the interviewees gave permission to the researcher to use their real names, some of them did not allow either. Since the researcher accessed the informants by using ‘a sponsor’, which is an accepted way in an overt study, she had friendly relationships with all the informants. The three sponsors – one teacher and three graduate students - of this research are the researcher’s friends, who also lived in Light Houses or graduated from movement-inspired schools and come from pious families.12

After consultation, it was decided that the selection of respondents from the groups of teachers and families should be based firstly, on their long involvement with the GM or the IC – these participants should be from pious families and, in the case of teachers, those who have familiarity with the current education system and policies. To select interviewees who met these requirements a list of potential candidates was prepared and discussed with the abovementioned sponsors. A decision was made to limit the number of interviews to twenty, which included both teachers and families from the GM and IC schools (see Figure 6).

12 Now two of them are not sharing the same values with both their families and the groups in which they educated and highly against the GM and IC’s education activities.
Interviews were carried out in the schools or the individual respondent’s office in Ankara and Istanbul. At the start of the interview, the researcher explained the objectives of her research and its significance for both national and international literature.

![Interviews with teachers and families](chart)

**Figure 6: The Interview Participants**

In total, twenty interviews were conducted between April and June 2012 and August and September 2012. These interviews were in Turkish, and conducted immediately after the completion of the focus group analysis. The interviews were the last part of the data collection process; they were usually completed in one meeting which usually took around two hours. Although the families and teachers from the GM schools gave permission to use voice recorders, the families, and especially the teachers, from the IC schools were a bit timid during the interview processes. Although the interviews started with the pre-defined questions and the researcher acted as a listener paying attention to what the informants were saying, later the interview process turned to rich discussions of thoughts and ideas.

After every interview the researcher listened to them many times in order to increase her familiarity with the content and responses. The related answers were noted as themes, and potential quotations were highlighted and translated to English, these have undergone proofreading as well. Since the interview questions were formulated after the focus group analysis, there were similarities between the themes from both. As will be indicated in
Chapters 6 and 7, the themes were as follows: (i) the relationship between secularism, religious groups and schools’ (ii) the relationship between public administration, religious groups and schools, and (iii) the relationship between green money, religious groups and schools.

3.7. Analysing Qualitative Data

After the long data collection and generation process, the main aim of data analysis should be to reduce the data (Robson, 1993). Since there are several important stages after data collection, for this research, which used three different qualitative data collection methods, the most vital step was to decide upon the qualitative data analysis techniques (QDAT). Thus, in this section the researcher identifies the most suitable QDAT for the data gathered from participant observation, focus groups and in-depth interviews.

The main aim of qualitative data analysis is to identify, examine, compare and interpret patterns and themes (Hair et al., 2007). Unlike the quantitative data analysis, the qualitative data analysis involves a “loop-like” process in which the data is revisited regularly as new questions and connections emerge, or as the overall understanding of the research situation emerges (Ibid). Therefore, one can say that the qualitative data analysis’ main strength is to evaluate itself during the study (Maylor and Blackman, 2005). Qualitative data analysis techniques aim to bring meaning to a situation rather than focusing on searching for truth; thus, as this research aims to reach meaning rather than truth, QDAT was viewed as the most appropriate data analysis technique. The researcher used three main steps (see Figure 7).
The second step in the process of qualitative data analysis is data display (see Figure 7). This process helped the researcher to organize information in a way that facilitates the drawing of conclusions. Though there are several ways of analysing and displaying the data gained from participant observation, focus groups and in-depth interviews, such as constant comparison analysis, classical content analysis and key-words in context analysis, discourse analysis was found to be the most appropriate way of analysing the generated data.

According to Hodges (*et al*, 2008), discourse analysis is about studying and analysing uses of language, and since the term ‘discourse analysis’ has been used by different approaches, by creating a table these scholars simplified the definition (see Table 6). Accordingly, since the source of data is gathered from documentary analysis (policy papers, official documents, and existing literature on the ISMs) and oral language (focus groups and in-depth interviews), and the using of language is highly important during the creation of the ISMs as a social phenomenon, this research use empirical discourse analysis as a QDAT.
Table 7: Three approaches to discourse analysis (Source: Hodges et al, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation to discourse</th>
<th>Sources of data</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal linguistic discourse analysis</strong> (such as sociolinguistics).</td>
<td>Samples of written or oral language and texts.</td>
<td>Microanalysis of linguistic, grammatical, and semantic uses and meanings of text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical discourse analysis</strong> (such as conversation analysis, genre analysis).</td>
<td>Samples of written or oral language and texts; and data on the “uses” of the text in social settings.</td>
<td>Microanalysis and macroanalysis of the ways in which language and/or texts construct social practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical discourse analysis</strong> (such as Foucauldian analysis).</td>
<td>Samples of written or oral language/texts; and data on the “uses” of the text in social settings; and data on the institutions and individuals who produce and are produced by the language texts.</td>
<td>Macroanalysis of how discourses (in many forms) construct what is possible for individuals and institutions to think and to say.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we have learnt from Hodges (*et al*, 2008:337), rather than using highly structured methods to code individual words and statements in detail, empirical discourse analysis seeks comprehensive themes and functions of language in action, using approaches called conversation analysis (the study of “talk-in-interaction”) and genre analysis. Furthermore, empirical discourse analysis places more importance on sociological uses of language than to grammatical or linguistic structures of words and sentences, and is used to study human conversations or other forms of communication in order to clarify the ways in which meaning and action are created by the individuals producing the language.

Hence, empirical discourse analysis had been chosen as an analysing method; by questioning the nature of conversation between the researcher and her informants, and sometimes her flat-mates during the participant observation process, the researcher analysed the meaning of ISMs and what it meant to be a graduate student from their schools for the informants. For this research, before starting the data analysis process the researcher knew the importance of the following key points for her research: words, context, internal consistency, frequency or extensiveness, intensity, and specificity.

For example, while the informants from the GM were rigorously choosing the words that they used in both a social and political context, and there was an internal consistency even
after the researcher’s interaction; there was not a specific word used by the IC participants to differentiate them from the others. Also, while the participants or the followers of the GM talked about the Hizmet Movement (which is the way that they define the GM, usually hesitating to call the movement a cemaat) with a special intensity, the IC participants did not have a similar attitude, and a similar commitment was not obvious as it was with the GM participants.

Furthermore, although the researcher did not ask any direct question related to the 28thFebruary Coup, after asking about the participants’ parents’ relationship with the secular state, all the GM informants gave specific cases and told of their family members’ experiences during the Postmodern Coup process. There were no specific or experience-based answers from the IC participants after being asked the same question. In short, by choosing empirical discourse analysis as a QDAT, the researcher has illustrated that it is an effective method for approaching her research questions, by providing rigorous and powerful attitudes to understanding the role of ISMS on education and ISMs as a social phenomenon.

The third step in the process of qualitative data analysis is drawing conclusions and verifying their accuracy by cross checking (see Figure 7). While drawing conclusions involves deciding what the acknowledged themes and patterns mean and how they assist in answering the research question, verification involves checking and re-checking the data to ensure the initial conclusions are realistic, supportable and valid (Hair et al., 2007). In terms of her research, the researcher’s main objective during the third step was looking for and ultimately identifying the best of several alternative conclusions or explanations, not looking for a single explanation. Thus, as suggested by Hair (et al., 2007), by collecting the information from the observation, as well as the in-depth interviews and focus groups, the researcher gained more valid conclusions.
For example, information obtained in focus groups with the students who had graduated from the religious groups' schools about how important green money and changing secularism trends have been during the process of relationship formation between the state and religious groups might suggest that green money is the most vital thing during this process. However, individual in-depth interviews could reveal that the changing secularism trends, and also the new initiatives in public administration are really more important. Thus, analysing data from multiple sources involves more than deciding who may be right or wrong, or relying on who talks most often and most loudly.

3.8. Assessing Qualitative Data Analysis

After completing the abovementioned three steps in qualitative data analysis, the most important requirement in the qualitative approach is assessing the researcher’s analysis (Maylor and Blackman, 2005). Figure 9 shows the key elements of the assessment that the researcher used before, during, and after the data analysis process. As it can be seen from Figure 9, the most important features of qualitative research is that it is valid and reliable.

![Figure 9: Key elements of the assessment of qualitative research (Adopted from Hair et al., 2007)](image)

The term validity is the “extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers” (Hammersley in Silverman, 2005:210). For instance, for focus groups and in-depth interviews, this refers to whether it is rationally certain that people are talking about what the researcher thinks they are talking about. However, different scholars have defined the term differently. While some mention external and internal validity.
(Lecompte and Goets, 1982), others mention cumulative, communicative, argumentative, and ecological validity (Sarantakos, 1994: 76-7). For this research it is possible to say that by asking whether does the work reflects the reality of the issue or situation being investigated (Maylor and Blackman, 2005:363), the researcher aimed to test this research’s validity.

Similarly, the term ‘reliability’ has several meanings. While according to Neuman (2000:164), reliability is the extent to which the results of the study would be similar if carried out again by a different researcher,” from Hair’s (et al., 2007) point of view, reliability is the degree of consistency in assignment of similar words. Furthermore, Lecompte and Goets (1982) mention two kinds of reliability: internal reliability, referring to a case where more than one observer agree to what is seen and heard, and external reliability, which states the degree to which a study can be replicated.

Reliability is the extent to which a measure (such as a focus group or in-depth interview) is accurate and replicable. In terms of interviews, people and dynamics change over time, and so it is unlikely that the results would be the same in both cases. With focus groups, it is not certain that a group of people with similar characteristics, which make them suitable for the research, yet who are potentially very different, would give similar answers. However, the main points and conclusions would be fairly robust. Thus, by applying internal reliability in this research, the researcher tested the data’s consistency.
Conclusion

This chapter has explained the methods used to carry out the empirical research of this project: i.e. to investigate the systematic commitments of contemporary religious groups (movements and cemaats) within the Turkish Public Administration. It considers the arguments about the propitiousness of the education system and religious groups. The review of the literature showed that the major weakness of the ISMs’ literature is the lack of qualitative analysis that had been done with the participants of the movements, who have also graduated from the movement-inspired schools.

Figure 10: The Summary of the Way of Data Collection

Focus Group Analysis
"...comparing the previous gatherings with respondents’ answers."

Documentary Analysis
"...policy perspective of the relationship between green money and politics."

Indepth interviews
"Interviews with families and teachers"

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Therefore, this chapter began by explaining the research paradigm and the reasons for selecting the particular methodological approach employed. By coming from an outsider within position, the researcher built a close and trusting relationship with the people who are generally ignored by the scholars. Analysing the generated data by using the social constructivist view will provide the researcher with knowledge of the role of ISMs on the policy making process, and how they usually use their opportunity spaces during this process. Furthermore, it was explained that the instrumental-collective explanatory case study was adopted to collect qualitative data. The main instruments were documentary analysis, three focus groups analyses, and twenty in-depth interviews, to provide qualitative data supplemented by secondary sources. The researcher will use discourse analysis in order to analyse the gathered data (See Figure 10).

The results of the field study along with the analysis and discussion of these results will be presented in the following three chapters. Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter citing documentary sources, and is intended to show how NPM opens up opportunity spaces in the governance of education. In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the importance of education as a public service and as a creator of social capital, followed by an explanation of how NPM and ISMs affected the delivery of the education service in Turkey.
Chapter 4: New Public Management and Governance of Education in Turkey

Introduction

As was analysed and evaluated in Chapter 2, in order to understand the socio-political and socio-economic transformations in Turkey, it is necessary to focus on NPM and NSM literature. More importantly, in the age of NPM and NSM it is vital to understand the development process of education, and its importance as a tool which has been used to create social capital in Turkey, since this research aims to answer the following questions: How is it possible to explain increasing religiosity in education in secular Turkey? How does NPM open up opportunity spaces in the governance of education? How have ISMs become involved in the resourcing of education? How have ISMs redefined educational governance?

This chapter will attempt to show the importance of education for all governments from the beginning of the Turkish Republic, and its changing relationship with neoliberal policies. As the first section indicates, the researcher will present the history of education as a matter of creating social capital. In both the single party period (1923-1950) and the multiple party period (1950 onwards), the Turkish governments used education as a tool for spreading their political ideology. So there have been various implementations from secularist policies to Islamist militarist policies in the Turkish education system. After giving some information about educational policies, which have been shaped around secularism, militarism and Islamism, the second section will show the interaction between education and New Public Management (NPM).

This section will first discuss the neoliberal changes that happened between the 1980s and 2000s, and secondly, will indicate how NPM agendas transformed education from a social
service to the private service. More specifically it will look at the changing rules, using secondary and primary documentary sources, in order to find the answer of the abovementioned research question about NPM and education policies. Finally, in the third section, by underlining the importance of education and showing that it is not a coincidence that education has gradually become the main area of interest for the ISMs, the researcher analyses the emergence of new social movements, specifically ISMs, and explains how NPM opens up opportunity spaces that ISMs fill in the governance of education.


4.1.1. The Education Policies during the Single Party Era

There are several definitions of education; one of these definitions sees education an art, which raises human capital as a social capital. According to Ergun (1997), only a systemic education can raise the human capital. Since the main question of this research concerns the increasing religiosity of education in secular Turkey, it is vital to understand the historical evaluation of the Turkish education system that has experienced the political changes and public administration reforms in Turkey.

When the Turkish republic was established, it carried the six hundred-year-old Ottoman Empire’s moral and physical experiences, and the establishment committee of the Republican Government who governed for the first forty years of the Republic, was educated by the Ottoman education and state system (Ergun, 1997). Similarly to other Islamic states, the Ottoman education system had its roots in religion, namely Islam. However, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, there were several reform initiatives in the field of education. During the nineteenth century many ‘new’ schools had been opened in junior high schools - Rustiye, Idadi, and Sultani, and at higher education levels - Tibbiye, Harbiye, Mulkiye, and Darilfunun. Furthermore, during the nineteenth century there were some other
schools which were opened by Greek, Armenian, and Jewish minorities, and other missionary schools opened by foreign countries.

This multifariousness in which various generations were raised with different cultural and religious mindsets, continued until the establishment of the New Republic (Sakaoglu, 1993). Conversely, the lack of a national and unified education system had been seen as one of the main reasons for backwardness by the founders of the Turkish Republic. Rather than keeping this tolerant and diverse environment based on ‘religion-culture and language’, the Republic preferred to reform the existing system, and aimed to create a ‘secular-modern and national’ society. M. Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic, defined the importance of education as follows: “In any case, it is necessary to be victorious in education activities. The real salvation of a nation can only be in this manner.”

By stating that “teachers are the one and only people who save nations” Ataturk also underlined the significance of schooling and education for the new Republican Government. Throughout the early years of the Republic single party era between 1923 and 1946, there were three important reforms in the field of education during the building of a national education system; unification, secularization and modernization. These reforms sought to build democracy and secularism in Turkey.

The first step, the Law Unification of National Education (launched on 3rd March, 1924), brought three regulations: (1) Medreses (a total number of 479) were closed and all schools connected to the Ministry of National Education (Milli Egitim Bakanligi, with the Turkish acronym MEB), (2) the education budget was expanded by transforming the money from Religious Affairs (Diyanet) to MEB, and (3) the MEB opened a religious faculty that was responsible for training highly qualified religious experts. Furthermore, by the unification of education the traditional dependency between religion and science was broken (Kalipci,
According to Rutz (1999), these are principles of the meaning of ‘secularism’ and became inseparably associated with ‘modernity’ as key components in a Turkish national consciousness.

By emphasizing the inessentiality, or ineffectualness, of ‘religious education’ within Islamic countries, Ataturk (1924, in Soylev ve Demecler, p: 198) underlines the importance of ‘national education’ for development:

“(…) there are more than 300 million Islam (Muslims) in the world who gained decency from their parents and imams’ view of education. However, the reality is that all these people were captured by other cultures and countries, and the religious education did not give them the capability to break that captivity, since it does not aim at national education.”

Under the Law Unification of National Education, secularism and modernity were accepted as the grounds of the enlightenment, and religious courses were deleted from the curriculum of high schools in 1924, at middle schools in 1927, and from urban and rural primary schools and teacher training colleges in 1929 and 1930 (Eligur, 2010: 104).

The second step, which aimed at democratization and secularism, was adopting the Latin Script. The new Turkish alphabet was introduced on 1st November 1928 and Ataturk was personally involved in its mobilization process (Ozgen, 1999), reducing a five year transition period to three months. This example alone is enough to show that the founders of the Republic were really insistent on establishing a new country, which cut ties with the traditional Ottoman culture and reduced the influence of Islam within society. Although Akural (in Landau, 1984:134) proposed that the goal of the alphabet reform was to raise literacy rates, Inonu (in Selek, 1985:223) explains the main aim of the reform as follows:

Alphabet reform cannot be explained with just the aim of easiness of literacy. This was what aroused Enver Pasha. But, the main impact and benefit of alphabet reform in Turkey was simplifying cultural change; as a result of the reform, we unwittingly broke the connections with the Arab culture. New generations do not have access to opinion about Arabic culture and Arabic religion to the degree that we had. I would like to give an example. During my childhood, cultivated people were complaining
about the insufficiency of Turkish language, and they were saying that we should stop
the separation between Turks and Arabs, and accept Arabic in order to have a
substantial language. So, formerly they strongly support the idea that it would have
been right to accept the Arabic language while establishing the republic and creating
the Turkish language.

So, from this explanation the target of the alphabet reform may be interpreted not as an
attempt to raise literacy rates, but to close the doors of the past to the next generation, break
the ties with the Arab-Islam world, and decrease the impact of religion on the public. The
posterity would not learn the old script and the republican government would control the
works written in the new alphabet. So, since religious works were written in Arabic letters
they would not be read and, therefore, the influence of religion on the public would reduce.

The third reform was the building of a new curriculum by which the essence of absolute
monarchy in the textbooks was replaced by the idea of liberalism. Therefore, the new
textbooks included several liberal philosophers, such as Rousseau and Montesquieu. Kafadar
(in Ustel, 2011:130) points out that the changes in the curriculum were organized in
accordance with the New Republic’s discourses on nationalism and modernism. Therefore, in
the early years of the Republic, MEB controlled the textbooks and created their contents by
gaining inspiration from Western education methods.

There is no doubt that it was not easy to apply all these reforms throughout the country.
Although the cities applied the reforms and gained great transformation from traditionalism
to modernism, the villages and the rural areas were the places where the pure culture of the
nation and religious ideas were preserved as a social insurance against the moral and ethical
deterioration of the cities (Koymen, in Karaomerlioglu, 1998: 52). Therefore, the Village
Institutes were created in order to meet a very grave national emergency (Vexliard and
Aykac, 1964). The idea of these institutes was inspired by the discourses and activities of
Mustafa Kemal.
In order to increase the impact of the abovementioned reforms, the country needed specially trained teachers who were “the army of the knowledge”\(^\text{13}\). Under the law, passed in 1940, seventeen Village Institutes were opened in different regions. The major goals of these Village Institutes were to carry out the primary education of children, to promote adult education in the villages, and to raise the cultural level of the villages. The teachers were not only responsible for children’s education, but they also had to develop peasants’ cultural life, and rouse the civic conscience of the rural population.

In Karaomerlioglu’s (1998) point of view the founder of Village Institutes, who recognized them as the embodiment of Kemalism, believed that these institutes would fill the gap between the peasants and the elite by creating elites amongst the villagers. Or in other words, the founders believed that by the institutes, the socio-cultural disconnection between city and rural would be removed. Since center-periphery relations (Mardin, 1973) were always an issue in the Ottoman Empire and caused several rebellions against the Sultans, the CHP government and its elites supported the institutes in order to reduce the difference between themselves and the peasants, by increasing secularism and nationalism and decreasing the link with tradition and Islam.

On the one hand, according to Ustel (2011:127), the abovementioned education reforms and new institutions can be explained by focusing on the function of ‘school’ in the Republican era. Throughout the early years of the New Republic, school played a vital role in the individual’s socialization process, the citizens’ articulation in the new society project, and compliance to the new society’s norms and rules. Therefore, the Republican Kemalist elites always gave notable importance to the education reforms, which highlights a secular, modern, and nationalistic country, which is only possible by a standardized common education. Indeed, the Kemalist elites were targeting the same thing as Prime Minister Inonu.

\(^{13}\) Mustafa Kemal described the teachers as an army of knowledge who fight against ignorance and illiteracy.
In one of his speeches to the teachers at the Teachers’ Union in 1925, he states (in Ozdalga, 1999:419):

We want national education. What do we mean by this? This idea is easier to understand if we define its opposite. The opposite is religious upbringing or international education. You teachers should not offer religious and international, but national education. Religious education is in one sense international education. Our education, however, should be by ourselves, for ourselves. National education can be thought about as having two aspects: political and national (vatansal). Unfortunately, however, our citizens do not yet form a true nation (community). But if this generation works consciously, venturing all it has in terms of life experience and higher learning, then the Turkish polity (state), may also develop into a Turkish nation (community) marked by genuine cultural, educational, and social maturity. This national body cannot hold any other civilizations.

On the other hand, one who knows that the ideological bases of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), who governed Turkey between 1923 and 1950, included republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism, could understand why nationalism and secularism had been extremely dominant in the formation of a new educational system. During the eras of Eternal Chief Ataturk (1923-1938) and National Chief Inonu (1938-1950), scientism via education was one of the most important drives of the reforms. Scientism proposes that rationalism should substitute the role of religion in society, while religion becomes a part of private life (Hanioglu, 2008)\(^\text{14}\). In other words, scientism, rationalism, and secularism fed each other during the educational reform in the early years of the Republic.

One can see from the Turkish education history that after these reform initiatives, which emphasized that a new Turkish nation must be founded by denouncing its connection with the Ottoman Empire, due to its relation with Islamic tradition (Arslan, 2009), no significant reformist step has been carried out within the education sector since the end of the single

\[^{14}\text{It is possible to see the similarity between the definition of secularism and the role of scientism. Accordingly, secularism means “not only as separation of state and religion, but also as the removal of religion from public life and the establishment of complete state control over remaining religious institutions” (Kuru, 2009)\}
party period. In 1946, through a multi-party regime, different ideologies found the opportunity to represent their ideas in both political and social life (Ibid.).

4.1.2. Education Policies during the Multi-Party Period in Turkey

The Era of the Democrat Party from 1950 to 1960

In 1950, the Democrat Party (DP) gained a surprising majority, and came to power. They followed a more responsible political line for the citizens in comparison with the CHP, and in order to provide support for citizens the DP made concessions regarding secularism (Eroglu, 1970), and in this way shook the basic principles of the Republic and brought about the attrition of the spiritual character of Ataturk and his revolution. One of the most criticized policies of the Democrat Party was the policy of National Education. As a result of the policy of secularism followed by the party, primary and secondary schools removed religious education from the curriculum between 1924 and 1933, when it started to be taught again. All over the country vocational religious high schools were reorganized. This step, or set-back, due to the anxiety of voters was not supervised very well, and this gave rise in schools to the domination of religious orders, that have anti-revolutionary characters (Eroglu, 1970).

On the one hand, in its party program, the DP supported “national and unified education” and proposed a similar discourse with the CHP. On the other hand, it heavily criticized CHP’s education policies for aiming only at scientific and technological knowledge. According to Kaplan (1999:201), besides scientific and technological knowledge, by proposing moral and national knowledge, the DP had made a great step in Turkish education and indicated that it had a different political discourse from the CHP. One can clearly see the main difference, sometimes conflict, between the CHP and the DP; this was the DP’s approach to secularism and Islam in the field of education. In 1947 at the Great Congress, this conflict became more evident than in previous years; there were fierce arguments over secularism, Islam and
education. MP Tanriover suggested that the government should use Islam in the schools against communism, which was seen as a threat (Kaplan, 1999).

The second difference was that by the DP’s education policy Turkish education was losing its national grounds. As a result of growing relations with the United States of America (USA), the Democrat Party allowed a great influence from the USA at every level of the Turkish educational system. According to Tunckanat (1970: 174), especially after the Truman Doctrine, the national education policy lost its independence and came under the influence of America. Apart from losing its national values, one can see that after the US impact, the Turkish education system had become more liberal and democratic in terms of the involvement of families in school administrations (Binbasioglu, 1995:280).

The establishment of the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) in the late 1940s brought different voices into the school, and increased the democratic structure of the school administrations. Additionally, in 1948 the importance of ‘democratic manners’ was highlighted in the Turkish Education Policy papers by Prime Minister Saka’s government (Tunaya, 1952:666-667). In order to develop these democratic manners a commission was established, which defined the aims of democratic education to develop real democracy through active contribution by all those who attended schools, without considering the students’ gender, religion, race, and sect. In democratic education students have the right to choice in their learning, because power is shared rather than appropriated in advance by a minority of people. This transformation could be interpreted as the liberalization of education policies.

The transformation from strong state-centric education policies to liberal and democratic education policies was the result of several criticisms of the CHP’s assertive secularist policies. The critics highlighted that in terms of religious education the Muslims had fewer
rights than the non-Muslims; there were not enough Imams for funeral services in villages. Religion could find more free places in Western democracies than Turkey (Kuru, 2009:225). Not surprisingly, a dominant group from the CHP rejected these three main criticisms; however, there were some CHP members who characterized the party’s policies as too assertive. According to Arslan (2009: 168), the DP kept its power with the help of a populist discourse attacking the elitism of the CHP regime and promising the raising of individual rights against the oppressive state.

Another criticism was related to the Village Institutions and their political standpoint. The DP asserted that the Village Institutions were merely another institution of the CHP and were developing a revolutionary mentality among their students (Vexliard and Aykac, 1964). Also, although Kirby (in Karaomerliglu, 1998:64) stressed that the Village Institutions project was not a partisan attempt, the right-wing politicians who were against the institutions accused them of developing communist ideologies (Ibid: 65). The citizens in the rural regions were criticizing the new teachers and stating that the teachers did not demonstrate a good example for the religious standpoint.

Another important criticism of the Village Institutes was that since they always promoted Kemalist secular discourses and were driven by a critical approach towards religion and superstition, the Village Institutes stole right-wing intellectuals’ thunder. For example, many used the term ‘TANRI’ (God) rather than ‘ALLAH’, as is documented in the Village Institute publications. Likewise, many conservative intellectuals accused the education system of the Village Institutes of promoting contempt for religion (Ibid: 68). The Village Institutions were closed in 1950 because of these criticisms.

As a cultural conservative party, the DP continued to develop a pious discourse which met the Muslim citizens’ demands until the 1960s. Additionally there was an economic
liberalization during the DP period. Apart from a liberal political and a pious social discourse, the DP proposed a free market economy and supported liberalization against the state-controlled national economy. Briefly, this liberalization, which may be the entrance of Islamism as a political ideology into the socio-political domain of the CHP, caused several changes in the Turkish Public Administration structure. Although the CHP loosened its secularist policies and elitisms, the CHP and Kemalism had started losing importance and supremacy in the public eye. The DP marked all Kemalist policies and reforms, even the education policies, as ‘the past’ and ‘useless’, which created ‘cookie-cutter individuals’ who have no different views to secularism, and did not think differently from the Kemalist state’s ideology.

**The Three Coup D’état Period and Afterwards**

On the 27th May 1961 the Turkish military officers seized control of the Turkish Parliament; this was the first coup d’état in Turkish Political History. The military officers closed the National Assembly and some of the MPs from the Democrat Party were tried by the court martial. Prime Minister Menderes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zorlu, and the Minister of Finance, Polatkan were executed. The Constituent Assembly (Kurucu Meclis) prepared a constitution, which highlighted the country’s secular, national, democratic, and social-law state features. There is no doubt that there were several rationales behind this coup, but the most interesting one related to education was put forward by the Turkish Teacher National Federation (TÖMF) (in Okçabol, 2005 – 65):

> “Wisdom Dissemination Society, Religion-Lover Society, Imam-Hatip School Building and Sustentation Society, they are everywhere and mushrooming in every city under different names. These societies are against the Turkish constitution, Atatürk’s Principles and Reforms and even a modern state. Day by day they improved their anti-regime behaviours and any teacher who mentioned Atatürk and his ideas were relegated to a post in the east.”
Inal (in Okçabal, 2005-65) also added that the DP was the first political party in Turkey that allowed Islamisation of not only politics and public administration, but also education. During the DP period the number of mosques, religious groups and cemaats also increased dramatically. Inal (Ibid.) found this to be a threat for the Kemalist secular Republic, and he stated that the increasing number of Islamic publications such as the Quran, and literature related to Islamic History and Sufism were another threat to Turkey’s modern, national, and secular structure, since these publications would decrease the commitment of the citizens to the secular and national targets of Turkey.

One can understand that the main aims of the coup of May 27th were to cleanse the public sphere from Islam and re-establish a national secular Turkey. As a result of these targets the Imam Hatip Schools (IHSs) were controlled by the Constituent Assembly, but this de-Islamisation stopped in 1965. When the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – AP) came to power, it opened forty-six more IHSs and proposed them as an alternative to modern secular schools. This can be interpreted that the abandonment of unification of education since the religious schools were proposed as an alternative schools to pious families. This situation caused a polarization between the right and left wings of politics, which have different views on religious education and religion.

In 1971 on 12th March, the military forces interfered in politics again and send an ultimatum to the President of Turkey, Demirel. The AP government resigned and a new government was formed by technocrats, who were less political than the previous governments. However, Islamisation of politics, education, and social life, as well as the increasing number of IHSs continued to rise (see Table 7). For instance, the Forth Development Plan which encapsulated five years between 1979 and 1983, analyses the previous education policies as follows: Education plays a vital role during the creation of social capital and progress of country. However, in Turkey education and education policies were not succeeded their main tasks,
meanly they could not provide a democratic education social justice and economic development for Turkey. Also, the report underlined that the private initiatives were playing an important role in the creation of inequality and social injustice in the Turkish education system (Okçabal, 2005:81).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Institutes</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-School</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>4390</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>4909</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>39540</td>
<td>5026593</td>
<td>146474</td>
<td>44296</td>
<td>5662407</td>
<td>199245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools (IHSs-middle)</td>
<td>1925 (72)</td>
<td>852649 (36928)</td>
<td>24116 (831)</td>
<td>4103 (339)</td>
<td>1180223 (130072)</td>
<td>30930 (685)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>261092</td>
<td>11156</td>
<td>1108</td>
<td>531760</td>
<td>36198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Schools (IHSs)</td>
<td>926 (42)</td>
<td>253845 (9094)</td>
<td>15450 (704)</td>
<td>1719 (249)</td>
<td>514923 (47941)</td>
<td>28599 (5397)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: The Changes in School Numbers during the 1970s

In 1980, on 12th September a third coup d’état by the military occurred. Although it had several impacts on Turkish socio-political life, the most visible impact of the coup on education was to seek new solutions for existing problems. According to Kenan Evren administration, a new regulation on religious education was one of the primary jobs that had to be done. The religious courses had been removed from the curriculum during the single party period and then become selective during the DP period. However, after the 1980 coup, the 1982 constitution made them compulsory for every student.

The previous coups always put a distance between the state and the private sector, and state and religion; it aimed to rebuild secularism and nationalism, and received critical reactions from the Islamists. However, the 1980 coup d’état was different from its predecessor’s premises in terms of its perception on statism, secularism, and nationalism. Firstly, as part of the implementation of privatization policies after the 1980s, private schools gained an advantage over weakening public schools.
Secondly, following the coup, religion became, once more, a central political issue in Turkey. The Generals of the 1980 military coup rediscovered Islam as a stabilising social institution and tried to incorporate it into Turkish social, political and educational life. The use of Islam for such purposes affected both religious communities in general, and specifically the focuses of this research, the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati (Demirci, 2008:73). For instance, just after the coup Fethullah Gulen (October, 1980) wrote on the Sizinti editorial page\textsuperscript{15}:

\begin{quote}
Nonetheless, it is not easy to treat a country, which has been damaged with many moral attacks for many years. Therefore, in order to eliminate the cancer that has eroded national identity, a more essential and willing movement was necessary. And, now, with hope and delight, we salute the soldiers (Mehmetcik) one more time, at the point that we lose all our hope, through thinking this is a result of waiting for centuries.
\end{quote}

In addition to Gulen’s pragmatic and friendly signal to the Generals, there was another positive step from the Military towards the religious communities. The Generals gave the first signal of tolerance by issuing special permission to the Iskenderpasa Cemaati for the funeral of their respected sheikh, Mehmet Zahit Kotku, who died two months after the coup. According to Demirci (2008:75), this was a sign of relative tolerance towards informal networks of religious communities, and formed a contrast to the closure of all political parties with their associate branches, mass arrests and the trials of members of youth organizations and trade unions of both the right and left for their alleged violations of the Constitution and related panel codes.

The most significant positions in education such as management, directorship, and co-directorship were given to individuals chosen from the military, and, therefore, it was possible to see not only the Islamisation, but also the militarisation of education after 1980s. According to Inal (in Okçabal, 2005), this was similar to the DP Period, in which Islam

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{SIZINTI} is a monthly scientific-spiritual magazine published since 1979 in Turkey, and known for its close relations to the Gulen Movement. The Turkish version of this editorial can be found at \url{http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular/ayrinti/son-karakol.html}
become more visible and important in the public sphere and especially in the schools. He underlined that though Menderes and Evren were seeking to build an Islamic idea which could be directed by the state, this caused an un-controllable Islam in the country.

Moreover, several state papers and official plans indicated the Islamisation of the Turkish state from the 1980s. The State Planning Organization’s (with Turkish acronyms DPT) special report on National Culture (Guvenc et al., 1991:48) claims the following:

Being a live and vital religion, Islam should not be ignored while regulating the Turkish nation’s national culture planning. In this situation religion is the essence of the culture, and the culture is the form of the religion. It is only possible with Islam to educate an optimistic, submissive, propitious, legitimate generation.

So as it can be seen from the report, the state aimed to create a submissive generation who will never be opposed to statist ideology. Since 1923 the state, or the ruling parties in Turkey, have used not only education as a tool by which they can shape the citizens’ minds, but also religion. Sometimes both come to ground as Islamisation or de-Islamisation and sometimes as secularisation or de-secularisation. Hence, Turkey’s constitutional structure, which makes it the only Muslim secular democratic state (Eligur, 2010:1) this kind of Islamic mobilization quite often in Turkey.

The 28th February 1997 Military Memorandum (Postmodern Coup) was the result of this mobilization for many scholars, who also found that the Military define Islam as a threat to the regime (Gokacti, 2005; Okcabal, 2005). On 28th February, the National Security Council (NSC) considered themselves protectors of the Republic, and especially secularism. This was voiced in a public statement (Howe, 2000:139-144):

(…) Destructive and separatist groups are seeking to weaken our democracy and legal system by blurring the distinction between the secular and the anti-secular. ...In Turkey, secularism is not only a form of government but a way of life and the guarantee of democracy and social peace ... the structural core of the state.
Continuously, the pressure on the religious communities and cemaats increased, with some secular leaders hoping for a ‘settling of accounts’ with political Islam.

In the field of education the 1997 Basic Education Programme was the most important result of the Postmodern Coup. A new law was introduced in 1998 that increased compulsory education from five to eight years. The reform was a response to both the unwanted Islamic influence over the tender youth, and especially, the increasing concern over the lack of secular education and the mushrooming of uncontrolled Qur'anic study centres and Cemaats/Religious Groups (Gulesci and Meyersson, 2012: 3). As summarised by Gulesci and Meyersson (2012:6), before 1997 the basic education system consisted of three components; five years of primary school (Ilkokul), three years of junior high school (Ortaokul), and three years of high school (Lise). Of these three, primary school was obligatory, while the other two were not. For both junior high school as well as high school, students had two options: secular or vocational schools, where the latter included IHSs. This allowed students after primary school the option of not simply dropping out, but carrying on with their studies, focusing on religious instruction. All education is co-educational and exclusively in Turkish.

However, after the law the choice to continue with IHSs was consequently removed, and the traditional diploma that had been awarded at the end of the fifth grade was abolished, being replaced with one for successful completion of the eighth grade (Ibid: 7).

As it can be seen from Figure 11, after 1997 students were only allowed to choose the IHSs, which are under the Vocational Secondary Education, after completing an eight year long compulsory education. In addition to the weakening conditions of the public schools in comparison to the private schools, the movement or cemaat-inspired schools have been the preferred choice by pious families, since students were not allowed to continue to the IHSs. According to Arslan (2009:167), by providing not only modern science but also the moral values of Turkish culture, including religious values, to their students, the movement or
cemaat-inspired schools have had the opportunity of becoming more popular in pious families’ eyes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Literacy Rate</th>
<th>Male Literacy Rate</th>
<th>Female Literacy Rate</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>age 6 and over can read and write</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>age 6 and over can read and write</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
<td>98.3%</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
<td>age 15 and over can read and write</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: The Literacy Rate in Turkey (source: http://www.tuik.gov.tr)

Briefly, from the beginning of the Republic, several reforms, specifically in the field of education, have been made in order to create a social capital and increase the development of the country. Although the education sector has developed, and the level of literacy has increased year by year (see Table 8), the educational problems and questions are much more multifaceted and demanding today than they were during the mid-war period (Ozdalga, 1999). Today, it is possible to talk about emerging Islamic conservative citizens in Turkey, and, therefore, understanding both their demands from the government and the reasons behind their school choices is important in terms of understanding the role of religious groups in the formation of education policy.

Figure 11: Turkish National Education System after 1997 (source: National Education Statistics, Formal Education 2012-2013)
4.2. Education and New Public Management

4.2.1. Neoliberal Changes in Education

Education International, which represents organizations of teachers and other education employees across the globe, defines public education as “a system open to all without discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, culture or social class, free of charge, publicly funded, and managed and evaluated in accordance with the objectives and principles established democratically by public authorities” (Leeuwen in Ball and Youdell, 2007:3). As we understand from this definition, education is not a commodity and should not be privatized. However, at both the international and national level, there is a great tendency towards the commercialization or privatization of education, which is illustrated by the New Right governments, as the only way of modernization and reform in education (Apple, 2006).

As summarized above, as a public service is defined by constitution, education has faced several reforms in Turkey, such as restructuring, privatization, and decentralization. Similar to many countries, the trend towards the privatization of public education is hidden. It is masked by the language of “educational reform”, or introduced silently as “modernization” (Keskin, 2003). For instance, although from the beginning of the Republic to the 1980s there were limited numbers of private initiatives in the field of education, after the 1980s by these educational reforms the number of private entrepreneurs has dramatically increased in Turkey. In other words, by the 1980s the government transferred its duties gradually to the private sector. This has caused weakening conditions in public education in terms of the quality of schools, classes, and teachers.

According to Gok (2003:102), the application of neoliberal policies in the country affected families’ income levels in a negative way. However, in order to deal with the poor quality of education in the public schools, families usually preferred private schools. As Ozdalga (1995:421) has indicated, the achievements of the public and private sectors are highly different
from each other in Turkey. Since families thought the government reforms on education have not worked, wealthy families found their own way, and by choosing private schools, have spent a huge amount of money on their children’s education.

The weakening conditions of public education mostly affected the low income group, and the public schools have become education ghettos, where on average, there were twenty-six students per teacher in public schools, while the equivalent figure for private schools was seven students per teacher (see Table 9). This situation increased the discrimination between the high and low-income groups. In other words, the increasing number of private schools and quality differences between public and private education institutes caused a bipartition of education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of schools</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
<th>Number of students</th>
<th>Number of teachers</th>
<th>Number of students per teacher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public High Schools</td>
<td>3307</td>
<td>2.587.161</td>
<td>99.196</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private High Schools</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>138.811</td>
<td>20.197</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: The Number of Schools, Students and Teachers in Public and Private Education between 2012-2013

Since, as it indicated in figure 12, only a small group of people were able to demand private education, the public schools were filled by students from low-income families. As Gok (2003) has underlined, when the public schools’ classes became crowded this not only decreased quality but also made the private schools more attractive in the families’ view. The increasing number of private schools, private examination training centers, and contribution fees to education, were the indicators of the transformation of a public service to a private service. Although the 1982 Constitution, article 42, indicates that education is free for everyone in the public schools, the money collected by the public schools shows how public education was made into a market place by the state. While the public schools had limited
support from the state budget, the private school had a large amount of money from the state under several criteria, such as incentive credit, exemption from income tax, and operating return tax.

![Graph showing the number of public and private schools over the years](http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/www/milli-egitim-istatistikleri-orgun-egitim-2012-2013/icerik/79)

**Figure 12**: The Number of Public and Private Schools (Resource: http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/www/milli-egitim-istatistikleri-orgun-egitim-2012-2013/icerik/79)

Aksoy (2011) defined this process as commercialization, or the involvement of the private sector in education in Turkey. In the Turkish case, both mean the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of education. Accordingly, during this period some forms of commercialization and privatization tendencies were introduced explicitly into the public education system under the labels “educational reform” or “modernization”. Though methods commercialization or privatization of education are varied and complex, Murphy (1996) defines ten types of privatization strategies; load shedding, asset sale, self-help, user fee, contracting, franchising, voucher, grants/subsidies, deregulation and volunteerism. Furthermore, Ball and Youdell (2007) say that most of the privatizations are being done using hidden methods. They add that there are two types of privatization; endogenous and exogenous.

Endogenous privatization means privatization in public education; in order to make the public sector more like businesses, and more business-like, it involves the importing of ideas,
techniques and practices from the private sector. Exogenous privatization means privatization of public education and involves not only the opening up of public education services to private sector participation on a for-profit basis, but also uses the private sector to design, manage or deliver aspects of public education (Ball and Youdell, 2007:13). Although the first type is well established and widespread around the world, in Turkey the second one has started to grow and become more common too.

Without examining the country’s sociopolitical and economic conditions, Turkish governments supported both the endogenous and exogenous privatizations by grants and subsidies. By being given free land and buildings, the private entrepreneurs were encouraged to invest in the education sector. Doubtless, the privatization tendencies trace back to the 24th January Decisions\textsuperscript{17}, which underlined the necessity of reducing public expenditure by privatizing the public services. From the late 1980s, the privatization of education was begun implicitly by the “Build Your Own School” campaign. Since 1990 this process had been controlled systematically by global actors such as the IMF and the World Bank (WB). For instance, the Ministry of National Education (MEB) signed a protocol with the WB, which emphasized the reconstruction of primary and secondary education by localization policies (MEB, 2001).

Again, in 1998 as a part of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), the Turkish Education System was reconsidered by the suggestion of the European Commission, and the education sector was formulated under the guidance of SAPs, which offered liberalization and privatization of education in Turkey. By signing the General Agreement on Trade on Services (GATS), Turkey also accepted the marketization of education in the country, and opened up the national education systems to Foreign Service providers.

\textsuperscript{17}A package of economic stability instruments, which came to be known as the January 24th Decisions, was introduced on 4th January 1980, when Demirel was Prime Minister and Ozal was the head of the State Planning Organization. The main aims of the package concentrated on foreign trade and economic liberalization.
Also the 7th Five Year Development Plan suggested ‘the paid education model’ for secondary schools. There are several similar applications in Turkey which caused firstly, passive privatizations by collecting several fees under different names in public schools, and secondly, active privatizations by encouraging both families and private sectors to prefer/open private schools. In addition to those interventions, which were related to the financing of education, there were some others, which encouraged the localization of education in Turkey. Hence, neoliberal policies suggest decentralization, which decreases the role of central government. With the Public Management Basic Law Draft (KYTKT), the government attempted to establish a market-oriented public administration, in which the education services are controlled by the local authorities. In this model the central government, MEB, only have the right of controlling unified education when preparing the curriculum.

Additionally, during the AKP government’s rule, the private schools were supported in different ways. For instance, as the Minister of Finance, Simsek proposed that in order to both increase the attendance at private schools and reduce the state’s responsibility to education services, the government is willing to pay some of the tuition fees (Munyar, 9th April, 2012). Simply, it seems that by sharing its education tasks, the government wants to decrease its expenses on education. However, according to Serim (17th April, 2012), this project aims to transpose the state money to the private sector, and especially to the religious movements, which run significant numbers of private schools.

Briefly, during the last thirty years the idea of privatized education has been actualised, and this spread the inequality among students. While high-income groups increased their education monopolies, the low-income groups lost their futures, which could be created by a good quality education (Sayilan, 2007). Doubtless, the main reason behind these transformations was the changes in the idea of public services, in which NPM has been the
key mechanism in the political reform and cultural re-engineering of the public sectors (Ball and Youdell, 2007:19).

4.2.2. New Public Management and Education

As mentioned in the previous chapters, NPM is characterized by marketization, privatization, managerialism, performance measurement, and accountability (Tolofari, 2005). Although these key terms are always mentioned with private sector and business principles, during the last few decades, the application of these principles in the administration of education is noticeable in education. Since education is a big business, and educators themselves constitute nearly one third of the public sector, in Turkey the governments have underlined the necessity of downsizing in public service during the last few decades (Boratav, 1995). Therefore, privatization and marketization, or applying business principles in the public sector, has been thought of as a method of this economizing (Tolofari, 2005).

For these reasons especially, creating an education sector which is compatible with the market and its rules would mean a great downsizing in public services. According to the OECD (2010), the successful enforcement of these business principles, namely NPM, will make it possible for the state to offer a stable economy and increase both national and international investments. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the real application of NPM in Turkey was only possible with the KYTKT; with this draft law, the philosophy of NPM has been spread into public services and, according to Keskin (2003), there is no exception for the education services. Both the KYTKT and NPM are compatible with each other during the transformation of the education services. KYTKT proposes several reforms for the education services, and combines those reforms with the five year development plans, i.e. the 8th Five Year Development Plan emphasizes the importance of NPM for Turkish Public Services, and the government’s aim to transform education services.
Of course, there are economic, political, social, intellectual and technological drivers behind the application of NPM, namely KYTKT, in the education sector in Turkey. First of all, as mentioned earlier, the main reason for demanding a downsizing in public services is Turkey was dealing with public debts, fiscal problems and high degrees of inflation and unemployment (Boratav, 1997). Also, the country has critical shortages and has encountered bottlenecks in public finance. For instance, while in 1980 the state revenues were almost equal, from the 1990s there was a considerable difference between the revenues. Thus, public expenditures were accepted as a burden on public finance (see Figure 13). Therefore, the government found a public reform necessary and decided to reduce the government’s role in the public sector (Yasamis, 2003:94).

![Figure 13: Public Revenues and Expenditures in Turkey between 1980 and 2001](image)

In addition to the abovementioned economic drivers, the political drivers of public administration reform and acceptance of NPM were no different from other countries. Hence, Turkey has experienced a political liberalization from the 1980s, and has moved away from state-centric policies; the application of New Right ideologies accelerated when the governments and the governments’ solutions were examined by society. The solution from the neoliberal thinkers was that market mechanisms and privatization could bring discipline,
efficiency, and effectiveness to the public sector (Ferlie et al, 1996). Thus, in such a political environment, NPM was proposed as a solution for the Public Administration problems, or in the words of Hood’s well-known article, (1991) “A Public Management for all Seasons”.

In the case of Turkey, one can say that social factors were the propellant of the public administration reforms. According to TESEV (2001), bribery has become a wide-scale social, administrative, and political problem in Turkey. For this reason there are greater demands for accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness from the citizens. In addition, there is demand for modernization from the government. The reform showed its impact on the education sector too. The changes in the Public Administration literature could be accepted as the intellectual drivers of the Public Administration reform in Turkey. Since the Western literature has a huge impact on Turkish literature, scholars with reformist orientation responded to political demands for better management. Changes in technology were also drivers of public administration reform.

As a result of the abovementioned drivers, the agents of New Right ideology and NPM in Turkey suggested that the central government’s role in schools should be reduced, and, therefore, business values began to be applied in all education systems. First of all, the main aim of the draft law was the liberalization of the general structure of public administration. KYTKT points out that although the previous reforms aimed to take NPM principles into account, they only managed to create economic liberalization. Therefore, it is vital to build a sustainable liberalization in public services. As mentioned in KYTKT, there are two main drivers for these changes; firstly, the competitive structure of the private sector - which is defined as the private sector’s reason for success, and secondly, the improvements of civil society and social movements. When the developments of these two were considered together with the abovementioned intellectual, social and technological drivers, the government again polished the idea of privatization and decentralization. In this regard, in order to be a
‘reactive administration’, it has been suggested by the KYTKY that the public sector must be interactive with the social movements and market.

In this regard, how the adoption of NPM and the implementation of the KYTKT were intended to change the existing rules could be summarized in the three following key points. The first point is the restructuring of the education management. Even though the roles of central government in education service delivery were defined by the constitution, by restructuring education management, the KYTKT (article 7) delegated some of the central government’s duties to the local government (Special Provincial Administrations, SPAs). Thus, the central government would only be responsible for the determination and improvement of the curriculum; teachers and schools would be controlled by the SPAs. This does not simply change the status of the teachers and schools, but also the features of the education service as a public service.

The second point is that the decentralization of education would interrupt the law on unification of education, which made uniform education a legal obligation. Since the law on unification of education had attracted several criticisms, such as lack of competition, diversity, and alternative schools, with KYTKT the government aimed to change these by introducing localization. Under KYTKT, since the central government (i.e. the Ministry of National Education (MEB)) is not allowed to establish local authorities, those changes have to be done by the local governments and the regional authorities that will finance education by inventing their own methods. According to Keskin (2003), these will not increase the competition, diversity, or alternative schools, but rather, will leave education to the different social movements or interest groups.

The third point is the privatization of education, or in other words, the establishment of profitable education managerialism. As indicated in Chapter 2, article 11 in the KYTKT says
that when public services are delivered by the private sector, they will be more effective, efficient, and economic than state-delivered services. For this reason, both the central government and the local governments have delegated their duties to the civil societies, non-governmental organizations, and social movements. In effect, these three points indicate that the KYTKT has changed the rules of education service delivery, and created opportunity spaces for the social movements.

Before NPM education was a pure public good, which is not normally provided at all by the private sector because they would be unable to make a profit. All educators and teachers were public employees, and there was a standard ‘product’ available in the education system. After NPM the neoliberal business ethos entered into the education sector. This ethos, promoting competition, efficiency, choice, and accountability not only controlled education, but also sought to redefine education from one of public good to that of private good. (Tolofari, 2005:84).

In Turkey, like in other developing states, NPM was applied as a top-down transformation (Sozen and Shaw, 2002), and it has the same objectives and mechanisms: (1) establishing managerialism, (2) developing explicit standards of performance, and (3) institutionalizing localization and decentralization in public education. These aims have caused many structural changes in the country. First of all, by establishing managerialism the roles and relationships changed, and this increased the involvement of local authorities and stakeholders in schools’ decision making processes. Secondly, through performativity, schools and teachers were forced to make improvement plans, and this caused inequality among equals. Essentially, as a result of NPM in education, the structure of schools had been changed (Keskin, 2003).

Thirdly, the World Bank proposes the localization of education as a key tool of NPM, and it defines localization as “the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from
the central government to intermediate and local governments or quasi-independent government organizations and/or the private sector” (World Bank, Decentralization). As is clear from this definition, this decentralization, or localization, is the prior condition for the adjustment of the education services to the market conditions. Although there are many criticisms of the application of these neoliberal policies and NPM tools to education services in Turkey (Keskin, 2003), the WB indicates that Turkey is later to apply managerialisation and decentralization when compared to other OECD member states. By the 8th Five Year Development Plan, Turkey gave a response to the WB, and showed how it was willing to apply NPM ethos to education services.

First of all, the application of total quality management (TQM) and curriculum laboratory schools (CLSs) were examples of the government’s steps in this direction. By introducing such terms quality circles, governance, and internal and external customer, the government extended NPM in the education sector (Yildirim, 2002). Furthermore, the plan also highlights that in addition to the increase in the role of the private sector in education, the role of social movements and local governments should be increased by applying NPM and governance culture (DPT, 2000). Essentially, to decrease the role of central government or increase the private sector and local governments’ roles in the education sector mean that the schools will have to find their own resources, which gives a significant role to the social movements, and gives NGOs an important role in the creation of social capital.

4.3. Education and New Social Movements

4.3.1. New Social Movements in Turkey

Here, the history of New Social Movements (NSMs), and especially the Islamic Social Movements (ISMs), in Turkish Public Administration structure will be analysed. As it has been defined in previous chapters, various types of NSMs have emerged in Turkey, and are increasing their demands in the public sphere. Among the NSMs in Turkey the most
influential ones are the ISMs. According to Yavuz (2008:29), by obtaining opportunity spaces in the public sphere, some terms related to modernity, such as democratization, modernization, and economic expansion have been made acceptable in society by these movements. Therefore, it is possible to say that although there are more than ninety-thousand NGOs and NSMs in Turkey, the ISMs are playing a vital role in the shaping of society (Aksit, in Uysal, 2009:168).

Gellner (1994) has emphasized that because of the following three reasons it is not possible to discuss civil society movements or social movements in Muslim societies. Firstly, Islam resists secularism, which is a sine qua non for social movements. The puritan and radical wings of Islam not only perceived the grassroots of Islam or Sufism as a main reason for underdevelopment, but also rejected them without questioning. According to Gellner (1994), in Muslim societies, Islam, like nationalism, resists modernization in Western societies, and rather than secularizing and retiring to the private sphere, insists on being visible in the public sphere. This leads us to the second reason: the authoritative Islamist leaning in the public sphere is an obstacle for the autonomous social movements’ formation. Finally, the third reason is the extensiveness of tribes in Muslim societies.

After explaining the impracticability of social movements in Muslim societies, Gellner (1994:199-200) underlines that Turkey is highly different from other Muslim societies, as the military and political elites of the country were imposing a pluralist social movement to the civil people. As Aksit (in Uysal, 2009) has indicated, in Turkey the authoritarian, centralist-state culture paradoxically creates the ideal conditions for the social movements. He promotes his idea with Laclau’s thesis, and adds that collective identities and movements rapidly emerge in such an environment (Ibid.) The ISMs, which challenge the secularist discourses of the state, could be an example of this rapid emergence. The movements’ numbers increase in this situation.
According to Yavuz (2008:39), as a result of Kemalist modernist policies, the public sphere has been cleansed from the anti-secular or religious discourses. Although there are some contradictory attempts from the ISMs, they also indicate that how these ISMs seek more liberal and pluralistic settings. In Turkey, during the last four decades the Naqshibandi Orders and Nurcus Movements, to which the Iskenderpasa Cemaati and the Gulen Movement belong, were struggling against the dominant state to rescue marginal voices by using the media and press. To understand these movements’ role in both political and social life it is necessary to understand that they are not reactionary and opposed to modernity, but rather are challenging undemocratic aspects of modernism (Yavuz, 2008:39).

Since the 1980s the Islamic Social Movements have been creating new collective identities as a result of the liberalization of the country’s socio-political and economic policies. On the one hand, Yavuz (in Wiktorowicz, 2004) explained this process by using the term “creation of opportunity spaces”, which includes mass media and private educational facilities by which religious values and ways of life had been created and circulated (Ibid:270). On the other hand, according to Tekeli (in Simsek, 2004), ISMs emerged in a “new urban cultural group”, which occurs at the intersection of the traditional rural culture and urbanized/industrialized segments of society. In brief, as we can see from Beris’ (2008) findings, the movements started their activities in the 1980s or early 1990s at a time when the Turkish economy and society had entered a remarkable socio-economic transformation process.

In such an environment, by way of the created opportunity spaces, the newly emerged urban cultural group found a way to increase their voices. Therefore, ISMs are “specialized in creating political space for incomings, marginal populations, abandoned programs and inaudible complaints” (Yavuz, 2003:24) that were ignored by the Kemalist Secularist state. Thus, ISMs represent a ‘coming out’ of private Muslim identity in the public spaces, or in
Gole’s (2000) words, they made Islam more visible in the public sphere. For this reason, since the opportunity spaces or the ISMs enabled the creation of a new socio-political awareness, Naqshibandis and Nurcus should not be accepted that as aiming to control the state, but rather they seek the reconstruction of everyday life by transforming personal identity (Yavuz, 2003:25). This new identity would be different from the White Turks, whose identity is based on secularism and anti-religious discourses.

Of course, it is not easy to transform the mentioned everyday life which lies on following socio-political aspects of Kemalism. First of all, because of the Kemalist modernization ideology it is not possible to provide an inclusive social contract that comprises all cultural diversity. Secondly, since Kemalism was accepted as the most ideal ideology for a society, the political elites have never tolerated any other lifestyle. Therefore, through social engineering the Kemalist elites created a society by protecting Kemalist purity. However, according to Aktay (1997:282), ironically “the more democracy grows, the more religious resurgence is likely to increase”. In this environment, by directly conflicting with the Kemalist project and its states structures, the ISMs seek to mobilize and globalize their movements.

To do this, the movements used liberal economy policies. However, during the early republic “Islam was not only relegated to the private sphere, but was also used as a national asset, a force to glue the nation together.” (Turam, 2004:64). Following the neoliberal economic policies of Ozal, it has a new role: “to resist the totalitarian and homogenizing policies of the Kemalist State” (Yavuz, 2000:28) and to transform not only everyday-life, but also the state’s service tools, such as media and education. In brief, the changing socio-political and economic conditions of Turkey, such as democratization and market-economy rules, increased the role of ISMs in society.
Although in Turkey the ISMs emerged in the same environment, and are the results of a transformation in society, it is possible to speak of different types of ISMs in terms of their orientation and methods of action. As it can be seen from Table 10, while the vertical state-centric movements are aiming to control the state and shape policies, the horizontal society-centric movements are not only seeking to transform the society by using the media and communication networks, but also viewing Islam as a cultural capital (Ibid:30). Additionally, while the vertical state-centric movements aim at top-down changes, the horizontal society-centric movements aim at bottom-up transformations in society. For example, the Iskenderpasa Cemaati and the Gulen Movement, which belong to the Naqshibandi Order and the Nurcu Movements respectively, both built horizontal and vertical relations with the state and society (see Table 10).

On the one hand, in terms of vertical relations, it is possible to speak of cooperation between the Democrat Party and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati. During its ruling period, the DP enrolled the cemaats’ members, who obtained nationalistic, anti-communist, and conservative features, and were fighting against the leftist forces in the political system in order to secure the DP’s position (Yavuz, 2003:62). This case indicates how a political party and an ISM built a mutual relationship in order to protect their shared interests and values. On the other hand, in terms of horizontal relations with society, the ISMs managed to build a great network by using the media and economy. By underlining the importance of reaching the people that the cemaats cannot reach via its meetings and sermons, the leader of the Iskenderpasa Cemaat, Mahmut Esad Cosan (1993:31-32), defended his press activities:

“Why am I involved in a journal? Since this is the most critical service. (…) The most important weapon is the press. In my mosque, when I deliver a speech, I can reach two or three thousand people there. This is not sufficient. It is not satisfactory. Therefore, press is important. (…) It is the most potent force; and an effective medium to get people conscious. (…) We cannot separate ourselves from daily activities and events. Why do we have a weekly magazine? The answer is to get involved in current debate and activities.”
### Table 11: A Typology of ISMs and the Position of Turkish Movements (Adopted from Yavuz, 2003:28 and 32)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Legitimate Movements in General</th>
<th>Turkish Case of the Legitimate Movements</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targets: Education, legal system, social welfare</td>
<td>Targets: Education, legal system, social welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome: Accommodation</td>
<td>Outcome: Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Societal (everyday-life based movements)</td>
<td>Societal (everyday-life based movements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groups using the media and communications networks to develop discursive spaces for the construction of Islamic identity; seek to use the market to create heaven on earth; view Islam as a cultural capital; use associational networks to empower community</td>
<td>As a result of new opportunity spaces in economy, politics, and the cultural domain Naqshibandı and Nurcu groups are using the media and communications networks to develop discursive spaces for the construction of Islamic identities; the utilization of the market to create heaven on earth (MUSIAD); view Islam as cultural capital; use associational networks to empower community (Mazlum-der).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target: Media, Economy, (Private) Education</td>
<td>Targets: Media, Economy, (Private) Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome: Integration</td>
<td>Outcome: Integration</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Additionally, in Turkey the primary firms which produce mainstream broadcast media and printed media are the state-owned TRT, The Dogan Group, The Cukurova Group, The Ihlas Group, The Calik Group, and The Feza Group. Owned by the Gulen Movement, apart from radio stations and foreign edition newspapers, the Feza Group operates several nationally broadcasted television stations in Turkey, an English language satellite station in the United States, and also Zaman Gazetesi, Feza’s flagship product, whose average daily sales since
2007 have consistently outnumbered any one newspaper in Turkey. Zaman was originally directed toward the Gulen Movement’s followers and toward a pious literate public. According to the movement (Gulen Movement- Media Involvement):

“Media can be oriented positively to foster social compassion and charity, to critique injustice and violence, to provide voices for otherwise silenced citizens, and to hold up for societies and individuals the highest, rather than the lowest, human aspirations and ethical horizons.”

Currently, the Iskenderpasa Cemaati and the Gulen Movement are the most widely recognized and largest Islamic Social Movements in Turkey. Both have become involved in politics by either forming or allying with the political parties. Furthermore, in order to build discursive spaces for the construction of Islamic identity, they established several media institutions, business and associational networks, and private education institutions, which will be analysed in the following section. Essentially, since there has been a sympathy to the movements from the political leaders coming from the central left (Ecevit), or the central right (Ozal and Demirel), their commitment to the separation of religion and politics has not seemed incompatible with their tolerance for the ISMs’ pragmatic agendas in business and education (Turam, 2004).

4.3.2. New Social Movements and Education in Turkey

As we summarized above, the challenge between ISMs and the secular state over social and political spaces in modern Turkish history demonstrates a unique conflict. However, this conflict turned into a power struggle after the 1980s, with the emergence of neoliberal, socio-economic processes in Turkey. Both the economic and social conditions have intensified this conflict in the era of neoliberalism and new public management, and Islamic social movements have realized their power in the public sphere, especially in the education sector. In Turkey, the Iskenderpasa Cemaati and the Gulen Movement are the most important ISMs
in the liberalization period. These two movements have benefitted from the market economy and privatized education.

Since the IC and the GM understand the importance of education during the construction process of Islamic conscious, they have started to open private education institutions since the 1980s. Therefore, as Yavuz (2003:121) has underlined, “the struggle between state and society is focused on achieving influence in the educational sphere, which naturally is seen as central to shaping the future of the country”. On the issue of the secular-Islamist challenge it is possible to understand why state elites, or in other words, Kemalist elites, viewed the spread of these religious schools as a threat to both their social and political values.

As explained at the beginning of this chapter, education and public schools have been seen as the most important tool of social capital. Although the Kemalist state and its bureaucrats believed that in order to structure a new secularist Turkey, applying the secularist ethos into education is enough, the latest trends in education indicate that that is not enough. Additionally, rather than creating a uniform Turkish citizen, the system made differences more visible. The impact of the decreasing state role in public services and the private schools run by the ISMs increased year by year.

The Turkish state lost its control over the production of a state-centric secular identity after the opening of private, religiously-oriented high schools (Yavuz, 2003: 122). According to Turam (2011:83), although the state and the Islamic Movements had negotiated their own spheres clearly, this saved neither the Islamic actors nor the secular ones from tension and conflict. Furthermore, this tension and conflict between the two increased when the secularists defined themselves as the owners of both the public sphere and civil society.

When Muharrem Ince, who is an MP from the Republican People's Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the main opposition party, was asked what he means by civil
society, he replied by referencing the CHP’s political report on civil societies: “Civil society is a wide sphere of social organization and relations that stands between private life and state. The free individual is at the core of civil society. Civil society consists of social unions formed by free individuals with their free will” (Field Interview, 20/02/2011). When it has been asked if the Islamic Social Movements could be defined as civil society organizations, he clearly replied that “they are not, and being a non-governmental organization does not give them the right to be a civil society organization”. He continued to say that their involvement in the public sector, by opening and running schools, is not acceptable; however, in Turkey, by using loopholes they managed to open private schools (Field Interview, 20/02/2011).

Ince claimed the involvement of the ISMs in education was a threat, and underlined that the ISMs should stay in the private sphere rather than being visible in the public sphere, in public sectors such as health and education (Field Interview, 20/02/2011), Turam (2007:64) highlighted that this kind of recompilation of private/public has put pressure on the movements and created tension in the lives of insiders. Conversely, Turam points out that these kinds of tensions have assisted not only the ISMs in acclimatising to the secular institutional setting, by enabling integration into the Republic, but also the secular state in adopting Islamic actors and learning to accommodate Islamic ways of life (Ibid.).

In brief, one should not ignore the importance of these rearrangements and should understand that this is neither Islamisation of the state nor the state’s support of Islam; in other words, this is neither a Muslim transformation and a secular pressure, nor a secular transformation and a Muslim pressure. This is a redefinition of the boundaries between ISMs and the Kemalist secularist state, or the increasing involvement of the ISMs in education in the age of NSM. Therefore, the next chapter will discover how these movements, the GM and the IC, have negotiated over the schools without challenging the secular rules. More importantly, the
next chapter will look at how the secular state replied to these debates between the secularists and the followers of the ISMs.

**Conclusion**

The late 1980s have borne witness to several changes in Turkey. While the application of neoliberal policies in the economy and politics was changing the rules of public administration and public services, the increasing involvement of the social movements in the public sphere has made some of these movements more visible. However, this was either an unintended consequence of the NPM, or an unpredictable result of democracy. In Aktay's words “the more democracy grows the more religious resurgence is likely to increase”. This environment has disturbed the Kemalist secularist elites. Hence, they define themselves as the owners of the Republic and the protector of Atatürk's revolutions. The spread of the ISMs within the public, and especially in education, has been seen as a threat to the future of the country.

The abovementioned Turkish education history indicates to us that there have been several reforms within education which were seen as a social capital creation tool. Therefore, in order to increase the development of the country, the governments brought about several reforms. Although the education sector and the level of literacy has developed, educational problems are much more multifaceted nowadays, since there are other issues in addition to secularism – Islamism’s point of view, for instance the changing tendencies in the public administration which brought the private sector ethos to the agenda, made the Islamic conservative citizens of Turkey more demanding from both the government and public sector.

The emerging neoliberal changes in education are one of these tendencies. However, in Turkey, while education is defined as a public service and citizenship right, the trends towards privatization of public education is masked by the language of educational reform or
modernization (Keskin, 2003). The increasing number of private schools also indicates the increasing number of private initiatives in the education sector. While, in many countries the rising involvement of the private sector in education, or in other words, the application of the NPM doctrines to education service delivery, increased the quality of education because of the competitive environment, in Turkey the private sector involvement weakened the conditions of public education.

This situation directly affected the low-income group, and public schools become education ghettos. The ghettoized public schools made the private schools and private education more attractive in families’ eyes. Also, by having a large amount of money from the state, such as incentive credit, and exemption from income tax, the private schools developed their conditions and became more stunning. Aksoy (2011) defined this process as commercialization, or privatization of education.

As these summarized findings have indicated, without examining the country’s sociopolitical and economic conditions, Turkish governments supported the involvement of the private sector in education in several ways. For instance, the paid-education model was suggested in the 7th Five Year Development Plan, and the AKP government proposed to reduce the state’s responsibility in education by increasing attendance at private schools. Although the privatization of education is not a new suggestion, it is possible to say that this idea spread out the inequality among the students. For many scholars, the main reason behind this transformation was the change in the idea of public services, in which NPM has been the key mechanism in political reform and cultural recreation.

In Turkey, NPM doctrines have been spread into the public services by the KYTKT (Keskin, 2003). Since both the KYTKT and NPM are compatible with each other in the transformation of education services, and KYTKT recommends several reforms for education services, by
combining these reforms with the Five Year Development Plans. For instance, the 8th Five Year Development Plan was emphasizing the importance of NPM for Turkish Public Services, and therefore, the government aimed to transform education services. Moreover, decreasing the role of central government and giving some space to the private sector and non-governmental organizations in the education sector, were the other results of the implementation of NPM in public services.

The abovementioned neoliberal transformations raised the visibility and the involvement of the social movements, or non-governmental organizations, in public administration. For instance, although during the single party period Kemalist modernist policies cleansed the public sphere from the anti-secular or religious discourses, in the multiparty era there are some contradictory attempts from the ISMs, which are seeking more liberal and pluralistic settings. In Turkey during the last four decades, the Naqshibandı Orders and Nurcus Movements, to which the Iskenderpasa Cemaati and the Gulen Movement belong respectively, were struggling with the dominant state in order to rescue the free marginal voices by using the media and press.

Education is one of the areas that these movements can be seen in action. By producing private education, which is an alternative to public education, the ISMs played a vital role in the creation of social capital in Turkey. For example, while the Kemalist secularist education system and ideology considered education as not only an important means for economic and cultural advancement, but also an integral part of modernity, the ISMs, and especially the Gulen Movement, challenges this, and work towards building a pious perspective on education, all the while using the institutional and conceptual ground constructed by Kemalist reforms.
In brief, by using the newly emerged liberal, socio-political, and economic environment, these movements mobilized and globalized themselves and their practices. This chapter has indicated that rather than taking into account non-rational or non-positivist policy interventions, the implementation of the NPM and KYTKT doctrines created opportunity spaces. These spaces allowed new possibilities for Islamic actors to have their own voice and institutional networks in the public sphere. The ISMs, which are the outcome of the transformed Turkish social structure, described by Gole (2000) as one of the modern new social movements, such as civil rights and labour movements, are involved in a rational game, to carve out space and seek recognition vis-à-vis the state (Yavuz, 2003:25).

Therefore, in order to understand both why the Islamic social movements are not non-rational or non-positivist policy interventions, their roles in both political and social life is necessary to see that they are not reactionary opposers to modernity, but rather they are challenging undemocratic aspects of modernism (Yavuz, 2008:39). The next chapter will introduce the reader to both the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati, and their historical evolution and involvement in education, by analysing their schools and education missions.
Chapter 5: Islamic Social Movements and the Resourcing of Turkish Education

Introduction

Based on the empirical data collected by documentary analysis, the previous chapter indicated how the NPM opened up opportunity spaces for the social movements and how these spaces have been filled by the ISMs. Since the second sub question of this research is how the Gulen Movement (GM) and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati (IC) have become involved in the resourcing of education, here the researcher will address it. In this regard, by presenting the findings from the field work conducted in 2012, chapter 5 will provide historical backgrounds of the GM and the IC, with special emphasis on their educational organizations and their involvement with the Turkish Public Administration (PA) during the New Public Management era. In this chapter the argument presented is that both groups provide unique approaches in Turkish PA and education systems by using their own interpretation of Islam and the values of the free market economy.

By giving reference to the Chapter 2, in the first section the researcher gives a brief explanation of why the GM should be called a movement, rather than a cemaat (religious community) and it continues with the history of the , the movement-inspired schools and the movement’s ideas on education. The second section indicates that the IC is a cemaat rather than a movement and explains its roles within the education system.

Furthermore, this chapter will answer the question of the extent of involvement of the ISMs in Public Administration, especially in the education service in Turkey, with reference to the growth and influence of Green Capital. In the second section the reader will discover why these groups are involved in education delivery service, again with reference to the growth and influence of Green Capital and NPM.
5.1. Gulen Movement and Its Involvement in the Education in the age of New Public Management

5.1.1. The Development of the Gulen Movement as an Islamic Social Movement

This section will produce the information of the Gulen Movement’s (GM) historical background with a special emphasis on cultural sources that shaped the movement and also the different periods of the GM. By focusing on these cultural sources behind the movement’s development, it is possible to investigate the reasons that make the movement exceptional amongst other ISMs and cemaats in Turkey. The main reason behind this uniqueness is the movement’s ability to harmonize politics and culture, Islam and science, and modernity and tradition (Arslan, 2009:176). Moreover this new synthesis-model created by the movement can be seen in all the movement’s activities including education.

The founder leader of the Movement, Fethullah Gulen was born in south-eastern Turkey in 1941. After having a religious education, he became an Imam and preacher (Erdogan, 2006). In his early years of preaching, Gulen met Said-i Nursi’s ideology and joined his reading circles. One can see the influence of Said-i Nursi on Gulen’s ideas and the movement and how the Gulen Movement used the legacy of Nursi. Nursi believed that rather than rejecting modernity, Muslims should find inspiration in the sacred texts to engage with it (Erdogan, 2006). Since 1961 Gulen gave lectures in several western liberal cities including the Aegean and Marmara regions. Throughout his services he observed that there was an erosion of traditional moral values among the youth and the educated sector of society, which was indulged, into criminality and in political and societal conflict. For instance Gulen expresses that his move from Erzurum (the East) to Edirne (the West) had a strong influence on him (Erdogan, 2006). These kinds of experiences put a great influence on his intellectual and community leadership and reinforced his faith in the meaning and value of human-beings and life.
Therefore, it is not possible to ignore the social context that shaped both Gulen and the movement’s identity and its politics. First of all, one can see the influence of Said-i Nursi on Gulen’s ideas and the movement and how the GM used the legacy of Nursi. Nursi, a controversial figure, born in Bitlis, South-Eastern Turkey in 1876, was educated in the Ottoman Traditional Madrassas. In contrast to his coevals, Said-i Nursi believed that rather than rejecting modernity, Muslims should find inspiration in the sacred texts to engage with it. By accepting simultaneously scientific and technological developments, he developed a modern Islam which insisted on the requirement of a considerable role for religious beliefs in public life (Ebaugh, 2010). Rather than cleansing Islam from the public sphere, like secular Kemalist ideologists have done (Yavuz, 2005), Nursi and his followers aimed to develop a new model public sphere in which people could see the synthesis of Islam and science. Without a deep reading, Nursi’s precepts can be easily seen from his books, which are

… an acceptance of democracy as the best form of government within the rule of law, raising the level of Islamic consciousness by indicating the connection between reason and revelation, and achieving this-worldly and other-worldly salvation within a free market and through quality education.

Again, for both Fethullah Gulen and the insiders of the movement, Said-i Nursi-inspired ideas were very influential. Thus, in order to reach the Nursi-inspired ideology, creating quality education is one of the prior aims of the GM. In Turkey, as Yavuz (2003, 2004, and 2005) underlined many times, Islam is always stressed by poor and marginalized sectors of population. So the society is divided into two polar opposite; religion and the state. Since the GM and its insiders propose a balance between secular ideology and Islamic belief which is compatible with neoliberal modernity that promotes New Public Management, many people believe that the Movement epitomizes a moderate interpretation of Islam.

In Turkey the GM is perhaps the only group which attempts to bring together these two poles by using democratic, free and economically liberal discourses (Keskin, 2009). While acting
as a bridge between two poles, the movement has never produced such an Islamic Law or Shari’a discourses. It also highly criticizes the ideology which is called Milli Görus (National View) and is supported by the Refah Party (Yavuz, 2003; Gole, 1997). Even as an outsider, one can clearly say that the GM has different attitudes and interpretations of Islam and this fits both within neoliberal policies and the Ottoman Legacy (Keskin, 2009).

Thus, the movement and the insiders show that they are aware of the power of Islam on Turkish Society. As Turam added (2007), the ideology offered by Gulen is compatible with religion, modernity and the rules of neoliberalism. She underlines that Gulen-redefined modernity is different from the modernity redefined by early republicans. While they defined modernity as parallel to Westernization, Gulen defines it as a set of new economic, technological and legal opportunities which can facilitate authentic social transformation. As Bilici (2006:17) highlighted, the movement generates an effort at modernity without Westernization, that is, it seeks to create a non-Western modernity in contrast to Kemalist non-modern Westernization.

The social context that shaped the movement’s identity and its politics is conservatism, which can be seen as an ideology of sustainable change. Although it has been said that the movement was somewhat similar to the others, within its own environment the movement was like open systems which exchange either power or information, and as Bilici (2006) suggested, the GM’s conservatism emerged in this context during the first term. In contrast to the West in Turkish politics, conservatism is within an immune zone located between nationalism and Islamism (Bora, 1998), and the GM positions its identity at the centre of conservatism. Briefly, since the 1970s the conservative political style has been shaping

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18 Milli Görus: Erbakan’s ideology is set forth in a manifesto, entitled Millî Görüş (National View), which he published in 1969. The Islamist organisation of the same name, which he founded and of which he was the leader, upholds nowadays that the word “national” is to be understood in the sense of monotheistic ecumenism.
Gulen’s public discourse (Bilici, 2006:8). By being in the middle of nationalism and Islamism, the GM created its own opportunity spaces and used conservatism as an ideology of sustainable change.

Another social context that shapes this movement is its legitimizing ideology, or in other words the movement’s mission: Hizmet (The Service). In a similar way to conservatism, the concept of Hizmet emerges as a point of interpenetration between Turkish Islam and Turkish nationalism. Gulen uses the term Hizmet or service, mentioning that there is no end to the service that can be carried out to build a peaceful society. Gulen emphasized the doing of good deeds through collective action. He encouraged men and women to meet together to build communal ties and to plan and execute good works (Ozdalga 2000). At the same time he argues that a person’s energy to serve comes from belief and that serving one’s society is the most important way to gain God’s favour and a place in paradise (Aras and Caha, 2000). Hizmet, he argued, like all such religious duties conscientiously performed, also has secondary beneficial effects on the individual and the community. This is especially true for education which was always a primary concern and goal for Gulen. As he said, education is vital for both societies and individuals (Unal and Williams, 2000: 306).

By bearing in mind the aforementioned cultural sources which played a vital role during the development of the GM, it could be summarized in three periods which have complemented each other (Yavuz, 2003a:30-32). The first period, which is also called the establishment period, started in the late 1960s. During this period the movement was closed to outsiders. In the second period, which started in the 1980s, the movement not only increased its power on individuals by using the advantages of neoliberal-capitalist policies but also became more visible in the public sphere. Finally, there was the third period, which consisted of the persecution which forced the commencement of the liberalization period in 1997. In addition to these three periods, Arslan (2009:194-202) added a last phase, which is considered with
consolidation of the community in terms of its relation to the state and politics, which started in 2002 when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power.

This periodization of Yavuz indicates that the GM has achieved great development from a summer school in Kestanepazari, Izmir, to a huge network which comprises education, media and businesses. Yavuz thinks the GM and its insiders are changing into a more liberal form and are abandoning the heavy Islamic discourse in order to increase the dialogue between other religions and cultures. Like Arslan (2009), and in contrast to Yavuz, I would suggest that rather than seeing a radical liberalization, one can see that Islamic conservatism remains the core of the Movement’s ideology and practice during these periods (1970-2002). The movement works on adjusting to the changing economic and political conditions by preserving its Islamic conservatism and by articulating the emerging values, practices and discourses of neoliberalism or NPM with it.

When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Turkey saw an outspoken critique of the Kemalist Regime. Although it was not easy to see the role of religious groups on politics, after 2002 the explicit collaboration of the religious groups (who were the poor and marginalized sectors of the population) with the AKP became highly visible. Throughout this period, the movement has not only been providing education to the children of the new conservative elites who consolidate their position by cooperating with the AKP in economic and political terms (Cobanoglu, 2012), but also developed a gigantic financial and educational network (see Figure 14). Clearly, the movement has become more significant during the creation of a new hybrid identity which plays a vital role in the new type of public administration (NPM) and in conservative politics in Turkey.
After examining the development factors of the movement, the following section will indicate its unique approach in Turkish Education and Turkish Public Administration. In Gulen’s point of view education is the most significant factor of the modern world:

As for man, real life is accompanied by knowledge and education. Those neglecting learning and teaching, even if they may be alive, can be considered as dead, because the aim of man’s creation consists of seeing, understanding and teaching learned knowledge to others.

In this sense, the movement develops a Turkish, NPM practice which aims to adjust well to the changing conditions of liberalism and modernity. During the field work the researcher observed that the traditional and national values, which are always emphasized by the GM, were forced to adopt modern, economic and social conditions from the beginning of the Kemalist state. However, especially after the adaptation of neoliberalism, since the economic structures and traditional values intermingle with each other and traditional values were involved in an interaction with the modern-social norms, traditional and national values became distanced from their authentic meanings. As Keskin (2009) pointed out, within this process communities transform into market-oriented social networks.

5.1.2. Education and the Gulen Movement

Education has a significant role during the creation of social capital and it is one of the most vital predictors in terms of inheriting a considerable stock of social capital (Putnam, 1993). By bearing in mind its importance and in order to have their voice heard during the creation of social capital, Islamic Movements started and took shape in the educational sector by providing knowledge since the 1980s in Turkey. According to Agai (2002:29), in Turkey the GM has rooted itself in the widespread perception of education as a means of social change, and the fact is that Gulen-inspired schools deliver a high quality education which is the stepping-stone to a career in all those parts of society which have been reserved for the Kemalist elites since the 1920s (Yavuz, 2003).
Figure 14: The Transnational Advocacy Network (Hendrick, 2009:336)
As previously mentioned, to improve their role in education services, opening schools and dershaneler is one of the most important developing strategies of the GM. For this reason one can see the education activities of the movement in all its developing periods since the 1960s. According to Gulen, who targets the rising generation and students during the movements’ communicating works and speeches, education as an institution is as powerful as family while raising the new generation. Thus, he suggests that each nation should establish its own schools and education systems which are accordant with the nations’ mind and capability (Gulen, 1998). From this point of view one can see why he is criticising the acceptance of the western style education system as one of the core values of the Turkish Republic.

Gulen (1993:2) believes that the outcome of this kind of education system is having too many well-educated elites who are not only far from Turkish cultural values but also disjointed from the Turkish society. There is no doubt Gulen-idealized educated elites are highly different from the Republican Governments elites. They are not disjointed from the Turkish society, rather they are familiar with the problems and expectations of the poor and marginalized society. In Western-style education systems, it is not possible to find these kinds of people as a result of schooling. Thus, Gulen suggests a new type of education system which is built for the sake of the public and not against their cultural values (Ibid.).

As mentioned before, the old public administration systems did not employ different tools during policy making, and were not capable of accommodating different poles (Hood, 1991). Thus, it is not possible to find examples of the abovementioned types of education system in which public expectations and cultural values had not existed in pure state-oriented public administrations. Therefore, one cannot see Gulen-inspired schools during that age. However, after the acceptance and implications of NPM, which broke up formerly monolithic units (Hood, 1991:5), and by paying attention to the voice of civic movements in society (Rose, 2008), the number of Gulen inspired schools has increased dramatically.
Additionally, the involvement of the private sector in the Turkish education system, which is seen as a result of NPM strategies, has made possible the supply of education services by private organizations, such as private companies, civil society organizations, or Islamic Social Movements. This situation gave the GM a chance to establish new schools, which get their power from the Turkish nation and meet with their values; by these new schools he believed that the movement would minimize the problems in society. According to Gulen (1996:76-77), a lack of ambition is the biggest problem of the young generation, and the present education system is not able to sort this problem out. He strongly suggests that young generations should be rescued by directing them to sublime aims and ideals at every stage of national institutions, from schools to shrines (mosques in Islam).

He sees education as requisite for social, economic, and political modernization, and advocates that individuals will respect democratic law and human rights only if they receive a sound education. Social justice and peace, he argues, are achieved by intellectually enlightened people with strong moral values and a sense of altruism. Gulen and his followers hope to educate a generation trained with modern knowledge as well as Islamic morals. This philosophy is the core of the educational system in all the schools, primary, secondary and university level that are inspired by Gulen’s ideals (Ebaugh, 2010). He supports that younger generations should not only be instructed, but also have their awareness raised, and it should be an intention of the movement to inspire a generation aiming for high ideals, rather than a spiritless and unconscious crowd. This purpose can be achieved through an education system explained below (Ebaugh, 2010:61-63):

Everything that is taught and learnt should be appropriate to combine human nature, and it should move away from an educational model that makes students just a coolie of knowledge. The young generation should be protected from desires and wishes that prevent their reading and thinking. They should be instructed with fairness and goodness against retrogression and degeneration in the present school environment. The young generation should be instructed according to the requirements of their ages and levels. Finally, they should be freed from sluggishness and the expectation that
everything will be handed to them on a silver platter, and rather, encouraged for systematic study and suffering for this purpose.

The educational work, whose philosophical background is summarized above, began on an extensive scale in the late 1960s. Although in its first years the avoided active politics, it created access to educational institutions. The most important implication of the first term was Light Houses (Isik Evleri), which were first founded in 1968, and continue today. These provide free food and accommodation for low-income, same-sex high school and university students. In these houses students not only have collective sessions for their school classes, but also participate in prayer (namaz) and religious conversations (sohbet) under the supervision of abla or abi (elder sisters or brothers). In addition to these religious activities, such as reading the Quran and Risalas by Nursi, or watching videos of Fethullah Gulen, students develop the sense of collectivism in the Light Houses. ¹⁹ Also, the houses not only protect the students from “disbelief or corruptive influences” (Yavuz, 2003a:33), but also keep them away from religiously forbidden things such as alcohol, smoking, violence and any form of social interaction with the opposite sex.

Moreover, the interviews indicated that especially in Ankara and Istanbul, conservative families usually prefer these houses, in order to minimize the ‘corruptive influences of the secular education system’ on their children. While some of these families come from a lower economic class and were looking for some financial support for their children to get through school and find jobs after graduation, I also interviewed some secular students, whose families do not know the basics of prayer or reading of the Quran. These people mentioned that they benefited from the Light Houses without being forced to do any religious activities.

For instance, the two informants, both from different economic and religious backgrounds, had experienced the Light Houses in different cities in a similar way. Tugrul (a male

informant) and Sena (a female informant) were emphasizing similar points about the Houses\(^{20}\). Sena, who graduated from a GM-inspired private school which belongs to Yamanlar Education Institution in Izmir, and stayed in its dormitories during her high school education and in the Light Houses during her university life in Istanbul, told me the following:

The Light Houses are more important than the schools. Students do not have to be an insider in the movement’s schools. However, when you have entered the Houses you have to be a part of them. In my opinion, without these Houses, and only using the schools to educate people, they would not be that successful. The houses play a vital role in the creation of the ‘dedicated person’. In these houses, firstly you learn not to say “no” to your abla – the female leader of the female house; this will be your usual habit, which is an obstacle to exploring yourself. In such an environment you live with similar people, and you do not see different people and different perceptions, and this always produces a continuousness of the knowledge that you had gained in the movement’s schools. Also, in this continuousness, you are not searching for different things, such as friends or dialogs. However, when you decide to leave the movement or their houses, it is not that easy to continue your life again. It is like a goldfish trying to live in a new aquarium, which has a totally different biological balance\(^{21}\).

Sena is not the only example of a student who knows the movement from childhood; however, her views are more remarkable than many other informants from the GM. Since she has elder and younger sisters who are involved in the, she has experienced the movement’s education attempts first hand year by year. As she had experienced from her older sisters, who are not educated in the movement-inspired schools, simply reading the Risalas and living in the Light Houses could be enough for the creation of a dedicated person. As an inhibiter of the Houses, Sena underlines that they are the core of the movement, and the centre of “continuous education”, which starts with the family, and continues with the Light Houses and the Schools.

When I first met Tugrul in the UK, it was not easy to guess that he studied in the - inspired schools, and moreover, that he was responsible for younger students as an abi in the dormitory of Samanyolu Private High School in Ankara. Although Tugrul has never stayed in

\(^{20}\) This is a nickname which was chosen by the informant, and she added that this name is Fethullah Gulen’s most favourite name.

\(^{21}\) Field Interview, Sena: 24-26 April 2012, Istanbul.
the Houses in Turkey, during his education he used to live in the dormitory, firstly as a student, and then as a dormitory counsellor (*belelmen*). Tugrul pointed out similar things to Sena:

> When you compare the other private and public schools with the Movement’s Schools, the GM’s schools are more successful in many cities. Therefore, in my opinion the movement is using the schools and their successes as an advertising tool for itself. Also, while the GM-inspired schools are the ‘window dressing’ of the Movement, the Houses are the kitchens of them. In the schools it is possible to see plurality and different opinions, since the students come from different families; the Houses are much more monotype. Also, it is better to say that you cannot figure out the numbers of the Houses, however the schools are limited and while the schools are for limited people the houses are for everyone. They are usually controlled by the ‘abiler’- the male leader of the male houses - who come from the centre of the movement and uses the special language of the movement in order to attract outsiders and other students from the state schools. For this reason, in the movement, those from Light Houses are more than those from the -inspired schools.

As evidenced above, the first time implication of the GM, Light Houses have played a vital role in the creation of continuous and inclusive education since the 1970s. Those who lived in the Light Houses became the most important promoters of Gulen and his ideas. When these people returned to their homes and towns, they told everyone about their experiences and opportunities in those houses. Since they had a good education, they became merchants, businessmen and professionals in their areas, and began to join together to provide the financial support needed to keep the Light Houses and consequently other service projects going (Ebaugh, 2010:29).

However, these schools are harshly criticised by some of the secular social movements and non-governmental organizations for having hidden Islamic agendas and Islamic curriculums (Turam, 2011:100). The only Islam that is officially taught in the schools is in hour that is allowed by the state for religious instruction in comparative religions, with the textbook selected by the state (Ebaugh, 2010). During the interviews, graduate students pointed out

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22 Field Interview, Tugrul: 3-9 November 2012, Manchester.
similar things. Moreover, when I asked Talha about the religious education in the GM schools, he told me the following:

I come from a religious family; therefore, my father took interest in mine and my siblings’ friends, social environment, and school choices. I have one elder brother and two elder sisters who graduated from Imam Hatip Schools (IHLs). However, because of the changed rules of university entrance exams, my father thought that it would be much better to study in a religious private high school. Therefore, we chose Fatih Private High School in Istanbul. When we chose that school, we thought that Fatih and IHLs were the same, as they both teach religious. However, during my four years of study I saw that the IHLs and GM-inspired schools are very different from each other. Our curriculum was secular and scientific. Of course, we had some extracurricular activities during our spare time in the dorms, but this was not compulsory; you always have a freedom of choice. Personally, I can say that if a family sent their child to the GM schools, they had already accepted this level of religious reading and gathering (praying together or watching and listening Hocaefendi-Fethullah Gulen videos). For example, for my family these activities were not enough religious education, they were seeking more. Maybe today this is the only issue for us, not having enough religious education during my high school years.

After interviewing Talha and some others, a big question for me was whether all families chose the movements’ schools because of their relationship with religion, or for other reasons. Although many of my informants told me that they had classmates from secular families and that some of their fathers were even military officers, it is not a simple situation, since the secularist wing, and especially military officers, played the most critical role in society against the GM. Having these sorts of questions in my mind, I went to Ankara Samanyolu Private High School, in order to conduct interviews with the teachers and parents. In the school when I met Nese, I was slightly confused. As far as I was aware, there were no female teachers in the school’s personnel, and because of her clothes – she was wearing skinny trousers and sleeveless top - I thought that she, like me, was a stranger. I learnt that she was one of my informant parents, and has a son in the school, and so I introduced myself. When I asked the main reason behind her school choice for her son, she told some interesting things about the movement’s schools:

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23 Field Interview, Talha: 20-22 April 2012, Istanbul.
I can understand why you were puzzled like this when you saw me here, as you would guess that I do not come from the religious part of society and do not have many friends and relatives of that kind. I have two sons, the elder one has been studying in Samanyolu for two years, and the younger one by five years is studying in X private school. I work as an engineer in a multinational company, and like me, my husband has intensive working hours. Until 2009 my mother was taking care of my children, but she passed away (RIP). When we come home the children are already asleep and we cannot spend time with them. We realized that our older son was facing several problems at the previous school, and when I spoke with his teachers I found out that my mother’s death had negatively affected his psychology and he did get enough support from the school or from us. After one of our neighbour’s suggestions – he has a nephew in this school - we decided to register my son here. Then, we understood that the school’s success should not only be measured by its success in exams; its teachers’ relationships with the students and families, and its ability to generate solutions for students’ personal problems are also important. Samanyolu is giving my son not only a scientific and good quality education, but also it has also built a bridge between us and him.24

This interview with a secular and ‘modern’ (throughout the modernization process of Turkey, from the late Ottoman Empire period, the scale of modernization has been measured by women’s clothing) seeming mother showed me that the movements’ schools are chosen not only because of their connections with the GM and religion, but also their relationships with the students and education style. In brief, even though the establishment’s philosophy has strong a Islamic ethos and religious faith, contrary to what is believed, rather than teaching religion and forcing it upon the students, the Gulen-inspired schools focus on an ethic which produces a balance between religious, ethnic and political orientations (Agai, 2002).

During the interviews, the researcher heard similar stories from different Gulen school (Istanbul Fatih Koleji, Ankara Samanyolu Koleji and Izmir Yamanlar Koleji) graduates. They advised me that the studying and understanding ethics was the most important part of their education, and they had never been forced to study religion or practice Islam. However, after gaining a deeper knowledge of ethics they wanted also a deeper knowledge of religion and Nursi’s thought on Islam. Gulen’s books and speeches indicate that the movement’s schools

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follow Nursi’s educational philosophy, which built on the idea of creating a generation both deeply rooted in Islam and participating in the modern-scientific world (Agai, 2002).

Similarly to Nursi, both Gulen and the insiders of the movement do not follow any kind of ideology in the education field. Although it is an Islamic Movement, thus it is expected that the movement focuses on the teaching of religious subjects, the schools follow the state curriculum. Rather than running extra religious courses, they teach only one or two hours per week, which is similar to other state schools in Turkey. Moreover, the interviews showed that the movement’s schools teach extensive science courses, such as chemistry, physics, and biology, which are more than state schools. While discussing the movement’s strong role in education, I asked a chemistry teacher from Samanyolu Koleji about the place or importance of Islam in the school. This is what he said:

I am a chemistry teacher in this school and am not teaching anything different from the annual curriculum. Therefore, I cannot say that we have Islamic teaching in the schools, or in other words, the place of devotion is not the classroom. However, I cannot say that a person will not feel Islam or religiousness in our schools; as teachers we are all faithful believers and live according to the principals of Islam. For example, different to many other schools we have a prayer room here. If your question is aiming to find out whether we are teaching Islam, my answer is clear; there is no space in our classrooms for Islamic teaching. But, if your question is whether we are living in accordance with our faith, then this time my answer is yes; you can feel Islam everywhere in our schools. I think this makes our schools and education different from the others. All teachers here believe that the movement’s service does not only mean service to the students or the mission of the GM, but also to Allah. Therefore, being a teacher in a GM school is different from being a teacher somewhere else. It requires commitment and devotion25.

During my interview with Murat26, another teacher from a GM school, he underlined the importance of commitment, devotion and altruism. According to Murat, who has worked in different GM schools in different cities, education is the most important tool of the movement and without the teachers’ and students’ altruism, it is not possible to attain quality and success. He then reminded me of the increasing success of the movement’s schools in both


the international and national Science Olympics. Indeed, Istanbul Fatih Koleji, Ankara Samanyolu Koleji, and Izmir Yamanlar Koleji play an important role in these Olympics, and since 1993 students from these schools have brought many medals (gold, bronze and silver) to Turkey through their scientific knowledge. He added that in 2012 those three schools sent seventeen students out of twenty-nine (see Table 12) to the international science Olympics. Sebahattin Kasap, the CEO of Yamanlar Education Institutions has also said that “two hundred and seven out of three hundred and ninety-one medals won so far at the international Olympiads by Turkish students have been won by Yamanlar Science High School students.” (Zaman, 23/07/2013).

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Table 12: The GM Schools in the International Science Olympics

Hence, these Light Houses and GM inspired Schools are aiming to reach all parts of society without any discrimination, and not only provide accommodation but also make a contribution to social and cultural life. It is possible to see some similarities between the Village Institutes, which were created in order to meet a very grave national emergency, and
these Light Houses. The Institutes and their dorms not only provided education for adults and acted as a kind of ‘teacher factory’, but also initiated the social transformation in the country. They were the ‘front wheels’ of the ‘reform track’ in the country. Although ideologically the Institute dorms and the school Light Houses are very different from each other, when one considers their functions it is possible to see some vital similarities between them. For instance, in addition to their role in education, both of them focus on the transformation of society and some pre-defined values and norms. They realize that it is not possible to reach these aims only by schooling policies; therefore, they provide other activities, such as group reading and group debating sections in the houses and institutes.

Just as the Kemalist Republic actualized its reforms by the teachers who were educated in the Village Institutes and dorms, the GM has used the Light Houses and schools for its development. While I was interviewing two female informants – both graduates from the same GM-inspired school, I realized that rather than directly affecting a students’ career choice, the GM makes some subtle suggestions to increase the number of teachers. Moreover, one of these girls told me that after her university entrance exam, her decision, which was not to enter the faculty of education, did not please her belletmen, who became cross with her because of her choice:

For many students it is normal to be directed by their teachers and belletmen, but for me it was not acceptable. When I passed the university exam, my score was high enough for the faculty of pharmaceutical sciences. However, all my teachers forced me to study Mathematics. In those days, I could not understand my teachers, but now I can see the reason behind this. As a chemist I will not be helpful to the GM, but as a teacher I would be able to continue my service in the GM. Now I have graduated from university I will start my job in one of the GM schools. I am proud of my decision now27.

As stated above, similarly to the Village Institutes, which may be a source of inspiration for the Light Houses, the houses and their abis and ablas played an important role during the production of a sustainable education for the movement. These volunteers and the

movement’s teachers, who are all from the Muslim faith and profoundly inspired by Fethullah Gulen, created an important transformation in society by working together with the schools. A similar transformation by the secular Kemalist movements via education can also be seen in history. So, in order to shape their students according to their vision and mission, the two movements – secular and Islamic – have tried to induce the students or volunteers in the good of their beliefs and principles, and steer them away from those they view as bad.

According to Turam (2007:83), this has nothing to do with the essence of secularism or Islamism, but is more closely related to the illiberal faces and authoritarian tendencies of the Republican project. Also, as the interviews indicate, the movement has not succeeded in supplying the students with personal space in which they could freely test and make their own choices. So, like the secular Kemalist reforms the movement has used education as a tool to create future generations in accordance with its own image. One can see the increasing impact of the GM schools in its second period, between 1970 and 1983. This period has vital significance for our research too. Yavuz (2003:35) calls this period “the evolution of a market friendly educational movement”.

During these years the movement created access to educational institutions, media, the market, and other public spaces, by developing its own institutions rather than actively engaging in politics (Yavuz, 2003a:31). The neoliberal policies of Turgut Ozal in the early 1980s produced greater opportunities for the establishment of private schools in Turkey. This period provided vital opportunities for the GM to open schools in Turkey too. In 1982 the first two Gulen-inspired high schools opened, one in Izmir and the other in Istanbul. In other words, by benefiting from the privatization policies which were implications of the liberalization period and NPM philosophies, the movement increased its impact in the education service.
Over time, Gulen encouraged his followers and supporters to invest in private secular high schools. According to Agai (2002:28), One hundred and fifty private schools and One hundred and fifty dershaneler were being operated by the followers of the movement by 1999. The number duplicated by 2012 (Cobanoglu, 2012), and now throughout the globe the movement is running more than two thousand schools (Ebough, 2010) and reaching more than three million people (Munyar, 5th June, 2009). These numbers are enchanting, especially if one speculates upon the short time period involved, and the fact that these are private schools.

The third development stage of the movement started in 1997. The starting year of this period has special meaning in Turkish Politics. The 28th February 1997 is known as the “soft coup” or “post-modern coup”, which targeted a weakening in the rising political Islam in Turkey. During this period, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was closed down and banned, and by the enforcements of the military the government applied new regulations, which discouraged students from registering at the Imam Hatip Schools (IHL). The mandatory educational period was extended from five to eight years, which made it difficult for the IHL graduates to enter university departments other than those of the Faculty of Religion.

By the eight-year compulsory educational reform, which was a reflection of the 28th February on education, the Kemalist Secularist military indicated how order is more important than freedom and liberty (Ozdalga, 1999:437). With this educational reform, the Islamic social movements, or the groups with Islamist ideologies, wanting to share the public arena, were forced out. According to Ozdalga (Ibid.), this was the dilemma of Turkish politics which used so-called secular and democratic discourses in order to thwart socially,

28 In Turkey, an Imam Hatip school (Turkish: İmam Hatip Lisesi, ‘hatip’ coming from the Arabic ‘khatib’, meaning the one who delivers the ‘khutba’ (Friday sermon) is a secondary education institution. As the name suggests, they were originally founded in lieu of a vocational school to train government employed imams after madrasas in Turkey were abolished by the Unification of Education Act (Turkish: Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu) as part of Atatürk’s reforms.
economically and politically active Islamic groups from acting in the public sphere. However, the postmodern-coup can be understood as one of the central factors which enabled the GM to conduct global activities, and the movement showed how it was willing to open discussion on matters of Islam and the secular vein of Turkey.

Furthermore, by showing great expansion by opening new schools, the GM showed that it is not a threat for the secularist structure of the country. Since its third period the GM has shown an increasing involvement in education services not only in Turkey, but also in Turkish-speaking areas, particularly in Central Asia. The most attractive element about Gulen-inspired educational institutions is that their policy is not based on religion and politics. There is no doubt, although there are some exceptions that most of the students and their families come from the same political and economic background in Gulen-inspired schools. The three informants from each school Rumeysa, Hansa, and Burak (from Fatih, Yamanlar, and Samanyolu respectively) say that the school atmosphere and teaching times are not sacrificed to the imposition of any single kind of religious or political ideology.

Hansa added that the teachers of the GM schools are from the Muslim faith and are deeply inspired by Gulen – some of them graduated from GM schools, studied in GM university preparation courses, or lived in Light Houses. They are role models for the students, inspiring them to avoid bad habits and anti-social behaviours which are against Islam, and to safeguard the school community and society. Though Hansa from a highly devoted family, it is interesting that she defines the teachers as role models. When I asked the main reason for this she said that:

In Yamanlar, my teachers’ sense of commitment and sense of belonging to the schools is because of their faith; they believe that to be a good teacher and be in the service of their students is the same thing as being a devoted Muslim in the service of
Allah. Since I feel their innocence and sincerity not only in their personnel life, but also in their professional life, this has encouraged me to view them as ‘cult figures’.

During the interviews with the graduates and teachers from the abovementioned GM schools, the researcher found that in their framework of being exemplary and true to their profession, the teachers demonstrate sound characters, moral behaviour and attention to human values, in addition to being qualified in their professions. Secondly, the schools not only follow the national curriculum and prepare the students for the international Olympics, but also concentrate on keeping alive universal human values, history, and beliefs that connect people around the world, making Turkish schools rise to prominence in inculcating ethical values, which are recognized at a universal level, regardless of any faith or tradition.

The educational institutions of the GM work within the authority lay out by the existing laws of the state. In these educational institutions, direct religious education and training is not given to the students. However, the Kemalist secularist sides of society in Turkey claim that these schools are producing religious education by behaviour, through the way the teachers behave and treat students with smiling faces, teach them practically to respect elders and to love the young, to help others in the hour of need, and to be generous to others and try to forgive their mistakes. Such critics also paste a label of reactionary education over the morale education given by Gulen-inspired educational institutions.

5.2. The IC and its Involvement in Education in the age of NPM

5.2.1. The Development of the IC: from Islamic Lodge to Cemaat and from Foundation to Company

The title of this research indicates that this study is an attempt to analyse the IC and their involvement in education. By cemaat (community), the researcher means something that

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reaches far beyond the mere local community, and as explained at the beginning of this chapter, the term does not refer to a sociological classification of pre-modern life, dependent on blood, place, and mind or neighbourhood. Rather it refers to the group of people who were alienated from society and do not share the same values with the state, but rather with ‘the others’ who were excluded by the political elites.

There are several arguments about the GM’s nature, which enable its definition as a movement; however, it is rare to find such a definition for the IC (IC). As was mentioned above, although defining the term ‘cemaat’ is not easy, in 1887 Tonnies explained the main differences between community and society (cemaat and cemiyet) in his article “Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft”. Although in the Gesellschaft (cemiyet-society) human relations are built on rationality, in the Gemeinschaft (cemaat-community) a sense of solidarity and ‘common will’ are the main themes (Bottomore, 1984 in Efe 2009:654).

For our research, as a cemaat, the IC refers to a group of people who share the same belief, thought, doctrine, ideology, but are a widely dispersed community. According to Efe (2009), because of religion’s power, which can easily rebuild humanitarian dialog, when someone talks about the ‘community-cemaat’, this means the religious community-cemaats in Turkey. Like the GM, the IC operates in highly modernised circumstances; it is not an associational organization (Demirci, 2008). It has no formal body based on membership and subscription, and it has no formal way of initiation and resignation.

According to Demirci (2008:10) “the IC has founded upon affiliation, sympathy and devotion.” This is a predictable outcome for religious communities, or cemaats, where there are strong face-to-face communications and solidarity between the members (Efe, 2008:82). The IC’s own publications have defined the IC as being built on sincerity, friendship,
commitment, and sympathy; it does not have an organization system, a political party, members, or a formal acceptance or resignation mechanism (Yasar, 2004:323).

Since it is not possible to understand the IC strictly in terms of social relations or to limit it to a social space, it is more useful to discuss its tradition-based formation rather than its establishment history. The IC is historically rooted in the Naqshibandi tradition, whose doctrines reached maturity with Baha-ud-Din Naqshband Bukhari in the fourteenth century. As a major spiritual order of Sunni Islam Sufism, Naqshibandi tradition has had several impacts on the modern individual, and may be the most meaningful one for our study. From its beginning, the doctrine has been effective in urban areas and has addressed the urbanities.

In Turkey, the current circumstances of the IC go back to 1925. In 1925, as a result of Kemalist reforms, the Islamic monasteries and lodges (dergah) had been closed. Therefore, the Naqshibandi lodge was not able to continue its activities legally. However, its activities continued illegally under Mustafa Feyzi and its followers. After M. Feyzi’s death in 1926, in order to continue the Naqshibandi order in Turkey, in accordance with the principle of “being successor and predecessor to each other”, Hasib Efendi took the formal sheikhdom of the lodge (Demirci, 2008:98). After Hasib Efendi’s demise, from 1949 to 1952 the lodge was directed by Abdullaziz Bekine, who carried the lodge beyond its classic characteristics. During his term, the Iskenderpasa lodge had several members from both academic and bureaucratic backgrounds.

In 1952, when Bekine died, Mehmet Zahid Kotku obtained control and he followed Bekine’s path in terms of increasing relations with the academy and bureaucracy. In 1970 the lodge was no longer called by the name of its founder anymore, but rather with the name of the mosque where Mehmet Zahid Kotku worked, Iskenderpasa Mosque. The change was not only limited to the name; the structure of the lodge had changed too. According to Yasar
(2004:328), the new structure did not have informal and classical religious relations anymore, but had well-educated members and strong bureaucratic relations. Yasar added that there were four important steps in the transformation of the IC from lodge to cemaat: “being a political party, being a foundation, publishing magazines/ journals and being a company (incorporation)”.

Sevinc (2012: 128) underlines that the Naqshibandı tradition has been one of the most powerful sources of political Islam in Turkey during the Republican era, and unlike the GM, rather than being a symbol of plurality in terms of having different political and economic values, they share the same pre-defined values. Moreover, there were examples of supporting political parties in other Naqshi orders; the IC was the only one which showed its support openly. According to Kotku (in Yasar, 2004), power-hunger is as big a sin as money and sex. While with money and sex one can control his limits, this is not the case in terms of power and politics. For this reason, political power, or power-hunger, is the most dangerous factor for human beings.

During Kotku’s leadership term from the 1950s to the 1970s, the political conjecture of Turkey was highly supportive of the IC’s attitude towards politics. Since the existing political parties were able to meet the IC’s members, Kotku did not find it necessary to open or support a political party. However, in the 1970s, because of the governor party the Justice Party (Turkish: Adalet Partisi, AP) was not able to meet the demands of pious people, and this resulted in the demolishing of the central-right parties in Turkey. The main reason behind this demolishing, according to Yasar (2004), was that the AP and its political agenda was not enough for the demands of the new conservative middle-class of Turkey, who had either direct or indirect relations with the IC in the 1970s.
In such an environment, even if Kotku defined politics and political parties as a sin and against unity, and pointed out the necessity of new initiatives in both the economy and politics, he had to give support to the National Order Party (Turkish: Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP). In 1972 the National Salvation Party (Turkish: Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), founded as the successor of the banned MNP, followed Kotku’s path, which has a preference for the moral and cultural reorientation of Turkish society, rather than wishing to establish an Islamic state (Algar, 1990 in Demirci, 2008:154) during its first years. However, this dependence did not take too long, and the MSP soon developed an Islamic discourse. These attitudes came to the same end as the MNP and MSP after the 1989 Military Coup closed down.

Although the first step of the IC, i.e. to be a political party, did not produce a direct impact upon the IC’s development, it helped the IC to portray itself as a cemaat, which is more than a dergah (Yasar, 2004). By showing collective support or sometimes warnings to both the MNP and MSP, not only did the IC show its total identity, but Kotku also indicated his spiritual influence over the IC’s followers and party members (Demirci, 2008:157). After the 1980 coup d’état, the Cemaat had started its second period by opening charity foundations. According to Yasar (2004), this period and the establishment of the foundations played a vital role in the IC’s ‘communityalization’ (being a community). The Hakyol Foundation was the starting point of the IC’s ‘foundationalization’ (having foundations) in Kotku’s last years. By underlining the importance of these foundations, Kotku (in Saribay, 1985: 61) pointed out that the best way to struggle for the cause of Islam was through education and spiritual enlightenment.

After Kotku’s death in 1980, Mahmud Esad Cosan became the new sheikh. It is in the favour of Cosan that he started his new duty when the impact of the MSPs was reduced. Therefore, he was able to transfer the IC’s orbit from political life to socio-cultural life (Yasar, 2004). In the 1983 elections Cosan and the IC gave their support to the Motherland Party (Turkish:
Anavatan Partisis, ANAP) by only exploiting ANAP’s liberal policies, without sharing their moral and inner values. The increasing number of the Hakyol Foundation’s branches was one of the examples of this process. In addition to this, many other foundations were opened under the control of the IC, such as ILKSAV (Turkish: Ilim, Kultur ve Sanat Vakfi; English: Science, Culture and Art Foundation), and Saglik Vakfi (English: Health Foundation). This foundation opened in order to promote cultural and educational activities as well as business interests (Demirci, 2008; Efe, 2008).

Up until the 1987 elections, the balance between liberals and conservatives within the ANAP changed, and this made liberals more powerful in the party. Then, Cosan (1987 in Demirci, 2008:158) as a sheikh of the IC declared that “the Cemaat would only support a party which defended the rights of Muslims and clearly opposed the membership of the European Economic Community (EEC)”. At that time this meant that the Welfare Party, the successor of the MNP and the MSP established by Erbakan, seemed the only choice for the IC. Although Cosan and Kotku criticized Erbakan and his previous attempt to become more Islamic and anti-statist, until 1990 Cosan and the IC had to support the WP against the liberal economic policies of the ANAP. However, Cosan always underlined that as a religious figure the IC’s priorities and goals are different from the Welfare Party’s. Therefore, he mentioned in his speech that the imperfect man, whose goal is Islam, cannot struggle for the cause of Islam, and added that (Demirci, 2008:159):

> Our method is based on love, compassion and patience. There is a great deal of hardship, trouble and suffering in our method. With this method our ancestors had conquered many countries without the use of force. The war is the last option. The war in the name of God can only be legitimate when the hardship and suffering cannot be endured any longer. Before that there are many things to do. In the hands of those who try to turn the last option into the only one, Islam was associated with war, bloodshed and cruelty. We must learn how to love others and endure their troubles with the strength of patience.
Although Kotku and Cosan emphasized the danger of being involved in or opening a political party, both of them were in favour of political participation of Muslims in order to defend their interest within the legal framework. For this reason, in one of his speeches Cosan (Necatioglu, 1990) underlined that “to leave the politics to the others or anti-Muslim forces is not a suggested way, Muslims should be involved in both politics and administration of the country. This is not against either Islam or Secularism.” Therefore, the IC established a clear strategy of taking a position above party politics.

One can see that the Iskenderpasa’s third step was started by this decision. Cosan always stressed that it was significant to support eligible and genuine candidates in every existing party. As a part of this strategy politicians from different ideological backgrounds had a chance to express and publish their own view in one of the IC’s magazines, named Islam (Demirci, 2008:161-165). The aim of the IC in the magazine was to transcend existing social and political conditions, not to justify them. During its third step, publishing magazines and journals, the IC distanced itself from the politicisation of Islam, be it in the form of revolutionary fundamentalism, or in the form of a fundamentalist party.

According to Yasar (2004:338), the other reason that the IC took a position above party politics was that it built its fourth step through the incorporation process. The IC’s incorporation process was also the result of accommodating itself to the free-market economy. Since Kotku’s time, it has been suggested that members/followers of the IC should come together, and open several companies which act in different sectors from health to education, and from media to tourism. Although the idea of the free market was important for the IC, it did not find its roots in the ‘homo economicus’ philosophy, but rather in Sufism, in which prosperity has no intervention from production to dissemination (Yasar, 2004:339).
Therefore, to the Cemaat, capitalism is not a system of a true free-market economy, and it draws attention to the problems of modern mass societies, which have been created by capitalism and maintained by their educational systems. Cosan reminded that the IC’s concern in social and political life is to create the ideal Islamic system made up of men of assured self, who fully realise their potentials but have no desire for wealth and power. According to Demirci (2008:169), this is not a conception of an Islamic state, but rather a sufi utopia that exceeds, not unites, all division. In order to reach this utopia, Cosan recommended to his followers that they be free and imaginative individuals (Demirci, 2008: 168):

We do not simply want you to go to school for a diploma. We do not want you (and your personalities) to be shaped into one mould like a standard fizzy drink bottle. The system wants this kind of people because they are easily controlled and manipulated. (…) Never become simple minded people whose imaginations do not go beyond the limits of working for a few pennies (more). Like an artist, a painter, set your imagination free to portray your feeling, your thought, without setting any limit, and see what kind of world you want.

According to Cosan, to increase the Cemaat’s involvement in the education sector is one of the ways of reaching the abovementioned Sufi Utopia. By urging his followers “to circle with one foot the countries of the world but to stay rooted with the other foot in Islam” (Henkel, 2009:103), Cosan wanted to build this utopia, and he believed that the young students are the most important means of succeeding this. For this reason, the Cemaat continued to support and assist followers to follow careers in public administration and municipal companies, private businesses, and especially, in the education sector. In this manner, according to Henkel (2009), these organisations can become important places in which the Cemaat’s members can gather experience and show their talents.

Thus, the Cemaat would supply and assist an institutional infrastructure in which followers can emerge as ‘organic intellectuals’ rooted in the wider Muslim revival movement. However, as a result of the 28th February 1997’s ‘postmodern coup’, in which Turkey’s secularist military had forced the resignation of the PM Erbakan, and had started a strict clampdown on
Islamic Social Movements, or religious groups, which were viewed as a threat to Turkey’s secular order, the IC stopped or slowed down its activities (Yasar, 2004:339). Since 1997 Cosan had settled in Australia after being forced into exile, and in February 2001 he lost his life in a car accident (Henkel, 2009).

After Cosan’s death, his son, Nurettin Cosan, became the new sheikh of the IC. Due to either his educational background, consisting of a Master’s degree in Business Administration (MBA) from the United States, or his perception of the Cemaat, Yasar (2004) pointed out that rather than ruling the Cemaat as a foundation or a religious group, he approached it as a corporation. For this reason, the IC now seems to be the owner of some conglomerates (holdings) such as Server Holding. During its fourth period, the Cemaat built good relations with both the market and the business world. Although these relations had changed some of the IC’s perceptions on the economy and social life, such as the capitalist system and its negative impacts on lives, by these holdings the IC wanted to have a role in Turkey’s neoliberal economic and social structures too (Demirci, 2008:148).

Moreover, just before the 2011 elections, by giving a speech criticising the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its policies, Nureddin Cosan indicated that he wanted to enliven the Cemaat’s visibility and power in Turkish politics again. In his speech he reminded the IC’s followers of their political power during the previous elections, and suggested they unite against the AKP in order to increase plurality and decrease the AKP hegemony at the Turkish parliament (Radikal, 2011).

Although both Cosan and Kotku aimed to keep a distance between the IC and politics and opened their doors to everyone, Nurettin Cosan’s apparent support to a single political party and his critic of the current government indicated after its fourth period that the IC had
abandoned its position of remaining above party politics, and brought a new dimension to its identity - Islamic-political relations.

5.2.2. Education and the IC

According to John Dewey (1937), education plays an important role in the reinventing of the government, social life, and economy of a society. Therefore, it is not possible to think of these variables separately from each other. In other words, the educational institutions, or education itself, can create some social changes. Although education cannot build a society by itself, when it collaborates with politics, industry and technology, it can create successful social changes. Dewey’s ideas on education can find examples from the Turkish Revolution too. For instance, as has been mentioned above, and learnt from Karpat (1959), the main aim of the Turkish reforms or the Kemalist reforms, was to transform Turkish society’s lifestyle, which was based on traditions and customs. The Republican regime wanted to educate rational, modern, and secular individuals (Karpat, 1959:53). Additionally, the education systems, or the schools, were the key features of the Kemalist reforms between 1923 and 1946.

After the 1950s when the multiparty system started, education gained a different meaning. Although the secular education system was defined as a tool of modernization and nation building, after the 1950s, as a result of the Democrat Party’s ideological background and the increasing visibility of the religious groups, Islam’s role in society was redefined. Hymen, Payaslioglu and Frey (1958) reported that among Turkish students, being secular and modern was more important than being religious and following the Islamic doctrine. Thus, they mentioned in their research that the Kemalist education reforms had succeeded to create a modern and secular nation. As such, Mahmud Esad Cosan reminded his followers that education is the most important activity and agency of Islam. In one of his speeches, Esad Cosan (24th January, 1992 in Ayvalik) said that:
Schooling, training and education, teaching and disciplining are not only the most important agencies of Islam, but also Islam’s first activities. Education matter is a divine light and spirit which overflows from the mosques, reaches to every far corner of society and the house. One should be a scholar, wise, a teacher or a learner, a student. And the rest is no good. Since we wish to be a most dutiful person with the desire of being the teachers and the student, we use the (Hakyol) foundation’s resources for teaching and learning.

Since Esad Cosan is getting his inspiration from Islam, the Cemaat facilitates an institutional and intellectual framework in which followers are encouraged to educate themselves in, and shape themselves according to, the principles of the Islamic tradition as it is interpreted in the Cemaat. In defining education Esad Cosan states that (1992):

According to educators there are two types of education, informal and formal education. While informal education means to educate all people in society, women, children, craftsmen, merchant etc., formal education means a systematic education, which starts with primary education and continues with secondary schools, high schools and universities. We tended towards all of them, thank Allah! Firstly, we started by looking after the students by opening dormitories. In our dorms there were many students who are well educated and have a profession. Now those students are carrying the Cemaat on their shoulders.

As it can be understood form Esad Cosan’s words, the IC started its educational activities by opening dorms and providing accommodation to poor students from pious families. When the students graduated, in order to show their appreciation, they continue their duties in the Cemaat. The second set of the IC’s educational activities were the opening of private training centres. The ASFA Education and Training Centre was first established in 1987, in order to provide supportive courses for high school students for university entry. Additionally, these centres provide language and computer training to the all members of the Cemaat.

The ASFA Education and Training Centre showed a high rate of success in the university entrance. Even though it is a private initiative, it provides grants and free accommodation for students who cannot afford it. There is no doubt that this attempt found its roots in Kotku’s words: “One can give his zakat (alm) to a student without examining deeply. Since he is studying science and Allah gives too much credit to him, as the first word revealed to prophet was Ikra (which means ‘read’).”
Although E. Cosan has never challenged secularism or Kemalism directly, he criticised some of the policies of the Kemalist Reforms. For instance, as a result of the modern and secularist education system, which loosens the ties with tradition and Islam, E. Cosan believes that “religion is not, and must not be, in conflict with reason, with nature, society, science, spiritual and material needs of mankind” (1990:12). According to Demir (2008:173), E. Cosan may or may not have thought of Kemalism as an opposing example when he made his remark about true religion. However, he envisions a society free from domination and oppression by any group, and in which basic human rights and freedoms are observed, and justice and equality prevail. Cosan states (1993:95-96):

> Everybody is our concern. They are all brothers and sisters. We do not exclude them, we do not discriminate against them, and we do not look down on them. We want all to be free from oppression, from discrimination, from injustice, from all kinds of sins generated by the enslavement to the lower self. Therefore, we want to serve all with love, with forgiveness, with patience without discriminating against any individual, any nation.

Therefore, in order to reduce the injustice and relative discrimination between the pious and secular people, the ASFA Education and Training Centre supported and educated individuals against the Epicureanism, which suggests living in such a way as to derive the greatest amount of pleasure possible during one’s lifetime. According to E. Cosan (1992), there is only one way to be purified; this kind of thinking is soul decency, mind decency and spiritual decency. Thus, in order to build “a factory constructs factories”, to be beneficial to not only the Islamic community but also nationwide, the Cemaat aimed to educate teachers and students who firstly teach the Islamic faith and then train the conscience.

By bearing in mind Cosan’s abovementioned philosophy on education, the IC opened its first private high school in 1991. The ASFA College, established by the ASFA Education and Training Centre, gives high quality education by any standards to its students (Demirci, 2008). Although in the national public schools the students go to school five days a week, in the
ASFA education is six days a week. After completing their fifth year, students are taught Arabic as a second foreign language. For me, this feature alone differentiates the ASFA from the other private schools, which usually promise families a modern, Western education in Turkey.

Zeynep, who comes from a Ja’fari family, was my first informant from the ASFA College. We met in her office in Uskudar, Sabahattin Zaim Education Centre, where she works. During our two hour conversation I realized that although neither she nor her family have a relationship with the IC, since 1991 she and her three siblings had studied in the ASFA, and her mother had become a part of the parent-teacher association.30 Thus, Zeynep’s and her family’s experiences with the Cemaat is vital, since they offer an outsider opinion, yet have spent some years in the ASFA. Although Zeynep’s parents are Ja’fari, she has been raised with the Sunni jurisprudence; hence, she is familiar with the religious communities and their organization in Turkey, which made it possible to compare the IC with other cemaat’s or movement’s educational activities.

Zeynep told me that she studied in the same class as Mahmud Esad Cosan’s granddaughter, but only realised this when E. Cosan passed away. Since this first ASFA College was the most important step of the IC in the education service, in my point of view the teachers and managers of the school should have given some extra importance to Cosan’s grandchild, or at least, it should have been made public that one of Cosan’s family members was studying in the ASFA too. However, as I gathered from Zeynep, the ASFA’s relationship with Cosan and the Iskendepasa Cemaati was not greatly publicised. Moreover, Zeynep stated:

I had never faced any kind of pressure from my teachers to read something written by Mehmet Zahid Kotku or Mahmud Esad Cosan. Honestly, I heard E. Cosan’s name

30 The Ja’fari school of thought, is the school of jurisprudence of most Shi’a Muslims, derived from the name of Jafar as-Ṣadiq, the 6th Shi’a Imam. This school of jurisprudence is followed by Twelvers and Ismailis in general, as well as a small minority of Zaidis. It differs from the four schools or madhhabs of Sunni jurisprudence in its reliance on ijtihad, as well as on matters of inheritance, religious taxes, commerce, and personal status.
and his relationship with our school after his death in 2001, in a commemorative ceremony. Maybe because my family did not have any relationship with the IC before this day I have not been forced to read his books or attend any of his speeches by my teachers. Apart from this, I can clearly say that there was no sanction from the IC side. However, as far as I know from my younger siblings’ friends’ families who have relations with the IC, they are very dependent on the Cemaat. Another thing is that as I observed from my siblings and from my mother, who was in the parent-teacher association, after E. Cosan’s death, N. Cosan controlled the schools and the IC differently, and the voice of the IC dramatically increased in the schools year by year31.

On the same day I interviewed Zeynep’s sister, Sumeyye, who studied in the ASFA after Zeynep’s graduation in 2001. Although Zeynep did not experience the changes in the ASFA first hand, Sumeyye experienced both E. Cosan and Nurettin Cosan’s leaderships during her studies in the ASFA. She spoke of the important ways in which the ASFA introduced Islam and the IC to its students:

> It is not that common to hear about the IC, Mehmed Zahid Kotku and Mahmud Esad Cosan. However, after 2001 when I was in high school, we are heard that our school was a part of the IC and some of the families were choosing the ASFA only because of this. First, I thought these were rumours, but year by year the impact of the IC became visible in our suggested reading lists. Moreover, as far as I know from my aunt-in-law, who is a teacher in one of the ASFA schools, they started to mention some Islamic values during their classes. Although she is an English teacher, during her classes she has to mention the seven values which are based on Sufism, and this reminds me of our religion and ethics classes32.

Similarly to Sumeyye’s words, the contemporary vision statements of the ASFA Colleges indicate how the schools are paying attention to Islamic and moral values, just like Esad Cosan underlined in his sermons. For the ASFA, as an education institute of the IC, it is important to be an institute in which only good things would have been done, to educate dutiful generations who would be in service of all human being. Doubtless, in order to achieve this vision the ASFA College set some missions for itself. While discussing the Cemaat and its relationship with the ASFA schools, a literacy teacher from Asfa Ferda College, Ankara, told me how both of them are aiming to educate people by gaining inspiration from Islam. While in their mosques, which are defined as ‘invisible universities’,

31 Field Interview, Zeynep: 30 April 2012, İstanbul.
32 Field Interview, Sumeyye: 30 April 2012, İstanbul.
the Cemaat enlightens the parents’ souls, in the schools (ASFA colleges) formal education was provided for the students. She also added that:

If you see our mission statement, we mention how Allah created us differently from one stem-cell. Despite our differences we are coming from the same root, Allah’s soul. Therefore, we have to educate ourselves by taking inspiration from his words, Quran and Islam. So the ASFA College is here for this reason, to educate the students by combining the national curriculum with faith, morality, and self-confidence, which a Muslim person should already have by default.33

Nowadays there is no doubt that, not only the ASFA’s teachers aware of the role of the school, but also, the families have chosen it because of its mission. A parent who is a barrister emphasized the importance of ‘moral values education’, which is given by the teachers at the school throughout the whole year. According to him, the ASFA is not only preparing his child for university, but also, more importantly, preparing him for life by underlining moral values, such as one’s responsibilities as a Muslim. When I asked him about the importance of Islam and the moral education given by the ASFA, he answered as follows:

In Istanbul there are thousands of private schools. So, in such environment that has so many options it is not hard to find a private school which strengthens the curriculum with technology and foreign languages, but it is hard to find a school which shares the same values as my family and I. In the ASFA we do not have to have our eyes on our children as we know that they are under a reliable roof. Thus, my wife and I trust the ASFA, and know that both the teachers and the managers, who share the same faith as us, are looking after our children like their own child.34

During the interviews with the families from the ASFA College, who first came into contact with the college in the early 2000s, I realized that they feel that they belong to the Cemaat, and that is why they want to commend to their children to someone who is like them. For this reason, the children’s moral education is more important than scientific education. Another parent who has known the ASFA for nearly ten years said that while they were seeking a school for their daughter, they had a chance to see lots of private schools in Istanbul. However, none of them gave them spiritual delight and reliance as much as the ASFA did. He

33 Field Interview, Teacher: 10 May 2012, Ankara
34 Field Interview, Parent: 12 May 2012, Ankara
added that the ASFA teaches, are on the one hand “earthly hardware”, which is the requirement of the modern world, but on the other hand, spiritualize children for eternal life.

After interviewing the families and the teachers, who always underlined the importance of “moral education and spiritualization”, it was a significant point for me that all families chose the ASFA schools because of its approach to religion and faith, and more specifically, its relation with the IC. As I learned from Zeynep and Sumeyye, although the present students and their families are aware of the ASFA’s relationship with the IC, the early generation did not know that much about either the ASFA or the IC. For instance, the questionnaire designed by the ASFA, and published on their website, indicates that current students are using Islamic discourse quite often while they give their reasons for loving the ASFA (their school)35:

“The ASFA meets with my parents’ values, is close to my house and suits Islam” (Beyza Nur, eleven years)
“I love the ASFA, because of its education, morality, and religiousness.” (Nisanur, eleven years)
“Thanks very much to the ASFA, since it teaches us our religion and has a good way of education.” (Hatice, eleven years)
“I love my teachers; they and my school are faithful. They believe Islam and teach Islam. If the ASFA was not a private school, we would not learn foreign language (English and Arabic) and our religion” (Irem, eight years)
“In the ASFA we can have every sentimental value freely; all teachers and managers are tolerant and gentle.” (Esma, twelve years)
“The ASFA is not a school which only teaches the curriculum. It also teaches us how we can stand on our own feet. It conserves the spiritual and Islamic heritage, and instils Allah’s love to its students from their childhood” (Sefika, twelve years)

Moreover, current students whose ages are between six and fifteen, some of them whom are in kindergarten, say that the ASFA teaches them about the Prophet Muhammad, Kotku, Cosan, and other people who served Islamic and national culture, and their lifestyles as devoted Muslims. Besides, although they are young, the students say that they can pray in the ASFA and their teachers can wear headscarves, which are not allowed in the public sphere in Turkey. Overall, the interviews indicate that although during its first years neither the ASFA

nor the parents were using Islamic discourse and the parents and the managers of the school managed to segregate their relations with the Cemaat, it was different after 2001. As Yasar (2004) has mentioned, with Nurettin Cosan the Cemaat has entered a totally different phase.

Again, as indicated by some students and parents, unlike Esad Cosan, Nurettin Cosan does not hesitate to give open support to a single political party and call his followers to do the same. Even though the teachers from the ASFA did not want to answer my question about N. Cosan’s politicization attitude, according to Zeynep and Sumeyye, by publishing a brief about the 2011 elections, N. Cosan forced the IC followers to support the National Movement Party (MHP). Moreover, Zeynep added that:

For me it is not normal or acceptable to see this kind of brief from a religious leader and sheikh. When I asked about their ideas on N. Cosan’s statement to the families, who are deeply faithful to the IC, they did not give any interpretation. However, as far as I know from my close friends, there are some families who not only changed their children’s school, but also suggested their friends do the same. In my point of view N. Cosan was not able to manage the crisis, and lost the IC’s links with not only the AKP but also the other central-right parties.\(^{36}\)

Zeynep’s inferences about the IC were quite true. Since both Kotku and E. Cosan had experienced the disadvantages of giving direct support to a single party, during the IC’s third (publishing) period they gave other political parties the chance to express their voices in the IC’s inspired magazines. Supporting a single party through its schools and followers not only politicized the Cemaat too much, but also hindered its inclusive and global discourses.

During the interviews with the graduate students and teachers from the mentioned IC schools, the researcher realized that in their framework of being exemplary and true to their profession, the teachers demonstrate sound characters, moral behaviour, and care for human values, in addition to the high qualifications of their professions. However, different from the GM-inspired schools the teachers in the ASFA schools are not necessarily part of the Cemaat. In other words, rather than employing their followers, they sometimes prefer teachers who do

\(^{36}\) Field Interview, Zeynep: 30 April 2012, İstanbul.
not have any relation to the IC. Secondly, rather than simply following the national curriculum, the schools prefer to intersperse some Islamic values and raise awareness among the students of Islamic and moral values. Additionally, the ASFA Schools are concentrating on keeping alive Islamic human values, history, and beliefs.

**Conclusion**

This chapter initially introduced the historical backgrounds of the GM and the IC, starting from the late 1950s, by discussing their economic, political and cultural situations. During this discussion, not only because of their relation to the state and society, but also their perception of ‘Islam’, it has been underlined that neither are non-rationalist or non-positivist social movements, but rather their main aims are to establish a positivist and rational relationship with the state and society (Gole, 2000 and Yavuz, 2003). However, while building such a relationship with the state, the both had different tendencies. For instance, while the IC indicated a limited growth and accomplishment, the GM managed to expand its borders and indicated continues development from Izmir to strong networks which comprise education, business and media. Thus, I indicated that as a movement whose sociological roles are more than a religious group or a Cemaat’s, the GM is defined as a product of either requirements or social transformations.

Even though the IC has a long-established relationship with the state and political parties, in time it did not adjust to the changing economic and political conditions. Unlike the transformation of the state, the GM works on adjusting to the changing economic and political conditions by preserving its Islamic conservatism, and by articulating emerging values, practices, and discourses of neoliberalism or NPM. Moreover, this chapter indicated that by stressing a non-exclusivist form of Turkish nationalism, the free market, openness to
globalization, progressiveness in integrating tradition with modernity, and its humanistic outlook means that the GM differentiates itself from the IC.

Secondly, the researcher presented the data derived from the field. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, three focus group analyses were undertaken, and immediately after their completion twenty in-depth interviews were conducted in 2012. Within this context it has to be noted that different to what has been reported by previous studies, the researcher gained insider views from the families, teachers and students who have graduated from the schools. Their views indicated that the groups’ schools are not similar to other private schools in terms of their raison d'être, and were not simply the result of the involvement of the private sector in education services. As underlined in Chapter 3, during the field research, which included documentary analysis, focus group analysis, and in-depth interviews, the researcher defined three main themes in order to make the data more specific: the religious groups’ relationships with green money, secularism, and the state.

Responses obtained from the field in relation to the first and second themes were consistent with those obtained from the secondary sources. The respondents emphasized that they find a direct relationship between the changing trends in secularism and the accumulation of green money. In this process, the ISMs have operated as informal networks for increasing capital and taking the business interests and the green money of fellow members into the education sector. In other words, the economic growth of NPM transformed Islamic organizational networks into mechanisms for achieving upward mobility. In brief, the ISMs gained not only the advantage of resourcing of Turkish education because of the rising influence of the Islamic capital, but also the opportunity of building managerialism within Turkish education.

Therefore, as the informants pointed out while they were talking about the relationship between the religious groups and state (for this research within the education service), the
liberalisation process and new trends such as governance, civil society, and downsizing the bureaucracy play a vital role in the relationship between the state and the GM and the IC. Thus, the next chapter will introduce the reader to how these movements approach the idea of NPM, apply its philosophies in their schools, and redefine educational governance.
Chapter 6: Islamic Social Movements and New Educational Governance

Introduction

The previous chapter presented the findings about the historical development of both the GM and IC, and their expanded roles in education service delivery. This chapter will illustrate how both groups approach the idea of New Public Management, and how they have recreated NPM philosophies in their institutions. Similarly to Chapter five, the present chapter presents findings from the field, especially the in-depth interviews with the teachers and families who are playing an important role in the accumulation of green money and building educational governance.

As earlier chapters have mentioned, the application of NPM doctrines created opportunities in the public sphere and these spaces have been filled by the social movements. As a result of NPM doctrines, one can indicate the increasing relationship between state, market and the social movements, which are the key components of educational governance. Since the main hypothesis of this research is that NPM created a suitable environment for the ISMs’ involvement in education, the previous two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) illustrated the changes in the state, which created a favourable political, legal and economic environment through public administration reforms, as well as the changes in the market, which experienced growth and influence due to green money.

Here, the third component of governance, social movements, will be discussed in terms of their role in educational governance. This chapter is organized in two parts; in the first section, the reader will find information relating NPM educational governance, the GM and the IC. Accordingly, parental contribution and their involvement and parents’ new identities will be illustrated in this chapter with reference to the perception and application of the new
governance’s key characteristics, such as accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. Finally, the second section will answer the question of how ISMs have redefined educational governance in Turkey.

6.1. Education Service as an Opportunity Space and Its Usage by Society-Centric Islamic Movements

As illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the creation of new opportunities and the increasing financial role of the ISMs within those spaces also increased the voice and the visibility of ISMs. For instance, according to Yavuz (2005:13), Ozal’s 13 year economic liberalization program, which started in 1980, produced a variety of new “opportunity spaces”, which included the media sector, the financial institution, private health and educational activities. Although from the beginning it seemed an expected result of the liberalization, it created unexpected privileges to the pious side of society. As has been mentioned in the early stages of this research, the newly created opportunity spaces were not the only results of this liberalization process. According to Guler (2005), the idea of New Public Management (NPM) was born in the same political and economic environment as neo-liberalism. In other words, as a result of changing socio-political structures in Turkey, the social, administrative and economic liberalization began together in the 1980s.

According to Beris (2008), this liberalization process also meant the transformation of the statist policies, which had been applied since the beginning of the Republic. During the transformation period the governments not only reduced public spending, but also stopped market interference. On the one hand, changing trends in the Turkish socio-political and socio-economic structure had some international drivers. Both the globalisation and the Europeanization processes in Turkey have caused several shifts. It is obvious that Turkey has been impressed by the countries which have experienced strategic changes in economy and
politics (Beris, 2008:35). For instance, after the 1970s economic crisis both the US and the
UK reduced the state’s role and started to apply ‘New Right’ ideologies. In Turkey the shift
from a state-dominated economic model to neo-liberalism and market oriented strategies
were the reflection of a global trend (Onis, 1997: 749).

On the other hand, after the 1980 Military Coup this global trend was also supported by the
military government. The 1980 Junta put into effect the neoliberal reforms suggested by
policy makers and military officers (Tugal, 2012). Therefore, the Ozal government, which
gave the signals of ‘New Right’ politics in Turkey, was supported by not only the military but
also secular businessman (i.e. by writing a letter, Vehbi Koc expressed his positive feelings
about Ozal to the military leader, Kenan Evren), and pious tradesman (i.e. Ozal got direct
support from the Iskenderpasa Cemaati and its followers). As Tugal (2012:26) has underlined,
the two sides’ support for the Ozal government encouraged the 1980 Junta, which enlarged
Islam’s official sphere of influence in order to fight the Left.

According to Tolafari (2005), the social changes in a country usually bring economic and
political changes too. For instance, questioning the ability of the government and its
involvement in the economy, and applying ‘New Right’ policies drove the NPM (Tolafari,
2005:78) to apply marketization, which was proffered by the Ozal government, was the
economic driver of NPM in Turkey (Yalman, 1997). According to Gozaydin (2009) “these
policies by coming together with the social changes had the effect of increasing such people’s
social mobility, allowing them to establish their own medium and small sized firms”, and
when the Ozal government privatized the economy, education, and telecommunication
networks, well-organized Islamic Movements and Cemaats were empowered to carve new
economic and social spaces for themselves.
As a result of these policies, although it was not the main aim of the Ozal’s policies, the Turkish capitalist class has divided into two parts; the Ozalist neoliberal policies caused the emergence of a new middle class in the mid-1980s (Gozaydin, 2009:1216). This new class was called the “Green Capital”, the “Anatolian Tigers” or the “Islamic Capital”. Can (1997) divides this new class into three main groups: conservative, religious businessmen, companies owned by religious communities/cemaats, and companies with many shareholders. Since this research’s respondents are families and teachers who are either employers or employees in the second of these groups (companies owned by religious communities/cemaats), it is vital to understand the environment in which they emerged.

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<th>Goal</th>
<th>Legitimate Movements in General</th>
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<td>Societal (everyday life-based movements)</td>
<td>Societal (everyday life–based movements)</td>
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<td>Horizontal</td>
<td>Groups using the media and communications networks to develop discursive spaces for the construction of Islamic identity; seeking to use the market to create heaven on earth; viewing Islam as a cultural capital; use of associational networks to empower community</td>
<td>As a result of new opportunity spaces in economy, politics, and the cultural domain, Naqshibandi and Nurcu groups are using the media and communications networks to develop discursive spaces for the construction of Islamic identities; the utilization of the market to create heaven on earth (MUSIAD); views Islam as cultural capital; use of associational networks to empower community (Mazlum-der).</td>
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| Society-centric; associational identity oriented from below | **Target:** Media, Economy, (Private) Education  
**Outcome:** Integration                                                                                       | **Targets:** Media, Economy, (Private) Education  
**Outcome:** Integration                                                                                       |

By forming companies and foundations the religious groups gained strength year by year, and they became new interest groups in society, which desired a more Islamic character (Milliyet, 26th November, 1995). Additionally, as stated by Yavuz (2005), under the favour of the neoliberal policies these groups found places for themselves not only in the private sector, but also in the public sector, such as in health and education services. In other words, rather than challenging the state and its institutions, the society-centric Islamic movements developed
discursive spaces for the construction of Islamic identities (see Table 13 – its full version can be found in Chapter 4.)

Agai (2002) states that “many Islamic Movements, especially the reform oriented ones, started and took shape in the educational sector by providing knowledge and social capital” after the 1980s. Doubtless, it is not possible to find a space for religion and religious groups in both the public and private sectors from the early years of the Republic, since both were under the control of secular elites. However, the ISMs started to use these spaces strategically and created counter-hegemonic spaces and discourses (Yavuz, 2003: 25). Furthermore, rather than seeking to control the state and its institutions (education, health etc.), these religious groups were seeking the reconstruction of everyday life by transforming personal identity in these institutions.

Therefore, since they were not seen as a threat to the state, Prime Minister Ozal and his cabinet did not hesitate to meet with the religious groups’ leaders. For this reason, one can say that both the religious groups and Ozal used each other as a bridge between state and outcast side of society after the 1980s, while controlling the social capital. Hence, education was used as a tool during the creation of social capital and nation building in Turkey; the secular Kemalist elites always wanted to have the most active role in education. As one of the main public services, the Turkish education system has experienced various reform initiatives since 1923. Rather than understanding the needs of the citizens, all reform initiatives aimed to respond to its era’s needs; therefore, one can see how their discourses have changed from national loyalty to international market-oriented values (Akinoglu, 2008:197).

As a person who studied in public schools and GM schools, experienced both the liberalization process of the state and the 28th February, as well as being the current president
of the alumni association, Mr. Kaya’s experiences were vital to see that how being secular, and protecting state ideology were important for the education system of Turkey:

It was the late 1970s, and you could feel the unwritten, pre-defined rules which aimed to protect the Kemalist, Secularist state structure of the country in the public schools and on the streets. For instance, when my primary teacher, who had graduated from the Village Institute, learnt that I was studying Quran at the weekends, she warned my mother that I “needed science, not religious dogmas”. My mother and I were both surprised, but we did not say anything to her. I noticed that after that day, she always pointed out that we should focus on science, which was the only way of to protect our Kemalist, Secularist State. Additionally, although I did not realize when I was 10, I can now say that even the lojmans built on our street had a secret agenda: to impose secular (western) life-style on the lower-class pious families\(^{37}\). I saw from the lojmans that people who were celebrating New Year’s Eve and drinking alcohol with their families were pointed out as role models to us by my teacher. However, since the mid-1980s these strict secular norms started to change; religion and religiosity became more visible in the public sphere, as Prime Minister Ozal himself came from a religious family\(^{38}\).

Our interview with Mr. Kaya has shown how important it was to protect the secular values of Turkey for the Turkish Kemalist education system. For this reason, in order to protect the secular discourses in schools none of the reforms focused on social changes, or the increasing visibility of religion and religious families’ demands in the country. When I asked Mr. Kaya how he defines the relationship between socio-economic changes and the religious groups’ schools, he expressed his feelings with an anecdote:

Although my primary school teacher was a Kemalist, my family and I did not have any direct criticisms of her. However, after my graduation she became a head teacher in one of the public schools in which my cousins study. In 1997, after the 28th February Coup, she showed a form of pressure to the students and parents who were wearing headscarves in school. My cousins and aunty were among these. I tell this story to explain to you how we found a solution afterwards. If this happened in the 1970s, it would not be possible to show the kind of reaction that we did; however, the changing socio-economic conditions of the religious families gave them a chance to do things their own way. For instance, after having this pressure from the head teacher we decided to change the girls’ schools, and registered them at the Samanyolu Koleji\(^{39}\).

\(^{37}\) Lojman means a kind of housing benefit given by the government to the people who are working for the same company and sharing the same cultural codes.

\(^{38}\) Field Interview, C. Kaya: 17 May 2012, Ankara

\(^{39}\) Field Interview, C. Kaya: 17 May 2012, Ankara
Again, Mr. Kaya’s experiences showed that Samanyolu Koleji, or the other schools of religious groups, created an alternative way for the students and parents by not criticising their religious views and pious appearance. Again, being an alternative for the religious families, these schools reconstructed everyday life by transforming personal identity, and as new opportunity spaces they helped the families and the students to live as they wished, outside the fixed patterns of the state.

Indeed, the abovementioned alternative way was not a new suggestion for the Turkish education system. Since the late 1970s the National Ministry of Education called for assistance from the private sector because of economic problems, lack of resources, increasing migration rates and the rapid growth in school-age population. From the government’s point of view, which adopted ‘new right’ policies by investing money in the education service, the private sector can share the responsibility of the government. In other words, under the light of the six NPM philosophies that we have mentioned, the neoliberal policy makers always underline the necessity of private schools and EU supported educational reforms in the Turkish education system.

For instance, by the Eight-Year-Compulsory Education Reform the National Ministry of Education (Milli Egitim Bakanligi, MEB) aimed to reach EU standards, not thinking that the goals were difficult to achieve, but Turkey’s financial and infrastructural resources were not able to meet them. In the age of neo-liberal policies and NPM, within public administration structure it is possible to see similarities with MEB in Turkey. When the governments aimed to reform public services they usually applied policies directly, without examining and preparing the social, financial, technical and infrastructural grounds of the country.

When the governments underlined the centrality of the citizen as a customer, or the necessity of accountability for results, they did not think about the socio-political base of Turkey.
Again, when the NPM philosophies (Bovaird and Loffler, 2001; Boston et. al. 1996) sought application in education, the following things were on the agenda of the Turkish governments: (1) the developing of quasi-markets and greater competition, (2) large-scale privatisation, corporatisation and commercialisation, (3) managerialism and marketization, (4) parsimony, (5) devolution/decentralisation, and (6) the application of performance indicators and total quality management.

They also suggested that disengaging the government from the education service by privatization, corporatisation and commercialisation could meet the needs of diversity in society, since the private schools could also promote specific religious or philosophical views by using their own teaching methods (Cinoglu, 2006). Moreover, while parents demanded quality education for their children, the governments cut costs and applied the minimum amount of resources (parsimony). Therefore, the quality of public schools decreased and public schools failed to meet parents’ demands (Gok, 2003). As a result of this, while some families filled this gap by sending their children to the Kemalist private schools, other pious families preferred to send their children to the religious groups’ private schools.

6.2. The Islamic Understandings of New Public Management by the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati

As we have mentioned before, one of the common criticisms of NPM is that it is a self-serving movement designed to promote the career interests of a group of people, and a vehicle for particularistic advantage (see chapter 2: Hood, 1991). Although both the GM and IC share disproportionate percentages in terms of the number of schools (see Table 11 in Chapter 5), both managed to have the particularistic advantage, and offer an alternative to public schools not only for pious families, but also for secular families. These schools, though controlled by the central government, have their own inner control systems in relation
to decision making and assign. Thus, reducing the central governments’ bureaucracies (decentralisation) and applying managerialism to the (private) schools make the parents eligible to monitor and judge the success and performance of the schools, which is not possible in public schools, which are managed by government bureaucracies, bound by rules and regulations, and contain a prearranged set of teachers and curricula (see Chapter 4).

Therefore, the numbers of private schools have dramatically increased year by year (see Table 14), especially after the application of the KYTKY in 2003. Despite apparent growth in private education, which increased from 260 schools (in 1994) to 907 schools (in 2012), and increasing neoliberal policy suggestions, formal education is still in the Turkish government’s charge. In 2012, while public high schools have approximately 2.6 million students, the private schools only have 139,000. That is to say that 94% of Turkish high school students are under the responsibility of the state. While these numbers are not high, and indicate that private high schools account for only 6% of the education system, it is vital to understand that the Islamic movements and religious groups have managed to develop an important, devoted community of followers by combining the NPM’s structural changes and their ethical views in schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public High Schools</th>
<th>NoS per Teacher in Public Schools</th>
<th>Private High Schools</th>
<th>NoS Per Teacher in Private Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>2213</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>3307</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As it can be seen from Figure 15, in Turkey, families are the second responsible group in education expenses after the central government. According to a report on the education expenses and its costs to families in Turkey (ISMMMO, 2013), during a 16-year-education
period in Turkey there is a noticeable gap between the families. A low income family, whose annual income is app. £6000, with a 16 year income and 5% inflation rate would earn £149,042, and spend 1% of their GDP on education. A high income family, whose annual income app. £32000, with a 16 year income and 5% inflation rate would earn £794,892, and spend 28% of their GDP on education. Additionally, the report shows that the second group of families usually prefer the private schools in Turkey and spend a great amount of money on education.

The researcher gathered through the interviews with the families that the main reason behind their huge spending on education is that they found the public schools insufficient in terms of technology, foreign language and science education. Moreover, they also claimed that having a chance to participate in schooling at every level is important. For instance, according to a mother who has 2 children in ASFA College, it is really important to build good relations with the school’s administration. When she realized there was no difference between her value system and the school’s, she expressed to the teachers what she expects from the school

Figure 15: The Sources of the Education Expenses in Turkey in 2002 (Source: http://mebk12.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/61/02/744157/dosyalar/2013_01/25090527_sonuraporu.pdf)
in terms of both scientific education and moral education; she says this increased the families’ satisfaction as a ‘customer’ of these schools.

The ASFA parents defining themselves as ‘customers’ was the most important difference between them and the GM parents. While most of the ASFA families defined themselves as a customer and classified the schools as profit-making schools, the families from the GM movement were far from this approach. When I asked Burak, who graduated from Samanyolu Private High School, if he or his friends felt that they were a money-making tool of their school his answer was clear: never. He continued:

In our classes, neither teachers nor my friends talked about tuition fees or the money that our families spent. We knew our motivation was more than money, and the thing which linked us at school was our moral commitments. Therefore, one from outside of our school cannot understand the role of our dedication, work ethic and our teachers’ encouragement in our success. We know that being successful and representing our schools in the national and international Science Olympics meant that we could pay our debt of gratitude to our dedicated teachers.40

Moreover, according to Burak, his teachers in the GM schools are distinctly more devoted to their professions than teachers in other schools. While explaining the reason behind this he points to how the teachers and the parents always show their awareness of ‘accountability’ not only in the public sphere but also in their private life. Therefore, it is possible to see that how their perception of accountability is also visible in their schools. In terms of accountability, Muslims believe that (Mikallu and Maishanu, 2008):

They will be thought accountable for whatever they do in this world in the hereafter (life after death). They also have to complete the will of Allah in order to get his pleasure and the promised rewards in the hereafter. Therefore, it requires that every action and word in this world must be in line with the Islamic teachings. It does not matter what activity the Muslims do, either praying or purchasing shares in the stock market, they must follow the Islamic teaching framework carefully.

In such an environment, the teachers and the parents are not only accountable to each other, but also feel responsible towards Allah, and for this reason the idea of transparency is also important in the schools. Although Yavuz (2004) claimed that the GM is not transparent enough, during the interviews the teachers of the GM underlined many times that the schools are open to everyone, and both parents and citizens can come and learn what is happening in the schools. One teacher, Murat, from Samanyolu Private High School, says that since all the teachers are faithful in the GM schools they have to be transparent to each other and the other share-holders (families, government authorities etc.) in order to eliminate dishonesty.

Moreover, one can see the changed roles and relationships; both the teachers and the school are not managed by government bureaucracies, the school administrators are choosing their teachers, and usually the teachers’ and parents’ education ethics build on the Gulen’s discourse. In the GM schools it is also possible to see a ‘prototype of governance’ between teachers and students, teachers and parents, and the administration and the shareholders. Rather that viewing everyone as a rival or trying to marginalize others, the GM schools teach a Gulenist discourse to the students, teachers, parents and shareholders: “Let’s all grow together, all of us have potential, all of us have resources, all of us have contributions to make a better world” (Today’s Zaman, 18 November 2012). My observations and in-depth interviews show that applying a governance model, or paying attention to the views of others, could be explained by the GM’s involvement in the neoliberal era and concordances with the NPM.

However, some scholars who write about Islamic Public Administration (IPA), such as Kalantari (1998), argue that IPA is incompatible with neoliberalism and NPM. According to Kalantari, while IPA’s primary objective is the construction of an ideal society with a balance between the spiritual and material worlds (Kalantari, 1998: 1849), NPM is promoting more effective and efficient public administration without any reference to these spiritual and
material worlds. Therefore, one can assume that as an ISM, the GM cannot adopt the NPM’s doctrines. However, by associating itself with equity, equality, justice, and compassion, which transcend values such as efficiency and rationality, likewise in IPA public institutions are part of the whole Islamic paradigm and public employees are part of the community, and share similar social values, the GM showed that it is compatible with the NPM.

**Conclusion**

This chapter began by introducing the involvement of the ISMs in public administration, especially in the education service in Turkey, with reference to the growth and influence of religious values in educational governance. Secondly the chapter has discussed the main reason for ISMs’ activities in education, and the Islamic understandings of NPM by the Gulen Movement and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati. Although the education system has experienced several reforms since 1923, none of them directly focused on the needs of society, and especially the excluded religious side. For instance, one of the suggested reforms was the application of NPM philosophies in education service delivery; the main aims were to bring in the seven doctrines of Hood (see Table 2, page 57), which was understood as the involvement of the private sector in education.

This privatization and pluralism in education allowed multiple Islamic forms to become public, and the lack of alternatives created some advantages for religious groups such as the IC and the GM. In such a social context, by taking advantage of neoliberal policies in public administration many Islamic Movements, especially the reform oriented ones, took on roles in the educational sector by providing knowledge and social capital. The cases of the IC and the GM indicated that they have different ways of operating during this process.

On the one hand, though the IC has a long-established relationship with the state and its political parties, over time it did not properly adjust to the changing economic and political
conditions. On the other hand, by articulating the emerging values, practices and discourses of NPM with its Islamic conservatism, the GM successfully adjusted to the changing economic and political conditions by preserving its values. Moreover, this chapter has indicated that by stressing a non-exclusivist form of Turkish nationalism, the free market, openness to globalization, progressiveness in integrating tradition with modernity, as well as its humanistic outlook, the Gulen movement differentiates itself from the Iskenderpasa Cemaati in terms of the creation of educational governance.

In this regard, the main finding of this chapter is that the GM schools have a well-developed decision making process, and manage their education systems by integrating the families’ concerns and governance. More specifically, parental contribution and involvement is of vital importance, as this is attractive to parents and allows for the sector to be more attractive beyond the religious appeal. Secondly, although by paying for the schools parents are as customers, the GM schools define them as shareholders. Again, this is attractive to parents and improves parental involvement, accountability and transparency. In addition to this, by approaching the idea of accountability and transparency in an Islamic way, these schools have showed the possibility of marriage between Islamic ethos and NPM ethos.

As we have explained before, the first component, the state, applied New-Right ideology, and particularly NPM ethos in education (see Chapter 4). The second component, the market, was reshaped by the involvement of green capital (see Chapter 5). In this regard, it has been illustrated that although both the GM and the IC adopted the strategy of remaining above party politics, being the third component of the educational governance they made a marriage of convenience with the other two components, by drawing religious values into education delivery.
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Research Implications

Introduction

This research has been designed in order to investigate the systematic commitments of contemporary religious groups within Turkish Public Administration, and considers the arguments about the propitiousness of the education system and religious groups. In particular, it analyses how these movements’ and cemaats’ demands and education systems are brought into union in the practices of two particular contemporary Islamic groups in Turkey; the Gulen Movement (GM) and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati (IC).

As was stated in the first chapter, the central research question of this thesis was as follows: “how is it possible to explain increasing religiosity in education in secular Turkey?” This question was supplemented with a more specific set of contributory investigations that were developed throughout the consecutive chapters. Their aim was to investigate the relationship between NPM, ISMs, and education. More specifically, these three sets of sub-questions provided an understanding firstly, of the changes in Turkish Public Administration and changing policy rules (how does NPM open up opportunity spaces in the governance of education? -see Chapter 4). Second was the adoption and influence of green money (how have ISMs become involved in the resourcing of education? -see Chapter 5). Finally, the emergence of educational governance and how it draws in religious values was considered (how have ISMs redefined educational governance? -see Chapter 6).

This chapter is devoted to summarising the research and highlighting its findings and implications for implementing effective educational governance in the Turkish education system. The chapter begins with a reminder of the research aims, objectives, and the research questions, before continuing with interpretations of the findings obtained from the field study.
All this will be considered in the light of the scholarly literature, and the limitations of these findings as well as ideas for future research will be discussed.

7.1. **Summary and Findings of the Research**

This research attempted to examine how it is possible to explain the increasing religiosity in a secular education system, and looks at both the Gulen Movement (GM) and the Iskenderpasa Cemaati’s (IC), engagement with education service delivery from a public administration perspective. The main argument supporting this research is that Turkish public administration has been reshaped by using New Public Management principles without examining its compatibility with the country’s socio-political structure; the changes in the education system are one example. This research, therefore, explains the role of religious groups on the education system in Turkey since the 1980s, during the application of NPM ideas into the Turkish PA. The thesis does this by exemplifying the two faces of ISMs. While the GM has been chosen as an example of the first face, one which aspires toward economic development and progressiveness, the IC has been chosen as an example of the second face, which aims to establish Islamic-ethical codes in society.

The GM and the IC share common and unique characteristics typical of ISMs; specifically, their reactions to the modern forms of neoliberalism have taken a path that can be understood only within their economic, social and historic context. The GM and the IC, along with their leaders claim that the context of neoliberalism is not a single or unified concept, and, therefore, the implications and understandings of neoliberalism and more specifically, NPM, will look very different to not only the Western approach, but also from each other.

As stated in the beginning of this research, the researcher firstly presented the aims of this research; secondly, she formulated the research questions and hypotheses, and thirdly, she provided the main concepts for the structure of the study. The findings from the analysis of
the secondary resources and the discourse analysis of the field work provide evidence that it is not possible to understand education by cleansing it from the current political, social, ideological and economic conditions of the world.

The three concepts of NPM and NSM, namely, secularism, green money and educational governance, have been examined in terms of their impact on a secular-Muslim society. The examination of these concepts indicates that they have been related to and understood specifically within the context of neoliberalism and the sweeping advantages or disadvantages of NPM, which is embedded in the socio-economic transformation of our life.

From the researcher’s point of view, when traditional organizations and value systems, these being Islamic religious groups in this research, are forced to adapt to modern economic and political conditions, the traditional values lose much of their original meaning as the economic structures and Islamic religious groups intermingle with each other. In this process, these groups transform into neoliberal, market-oriented social networks.

With these conditions in mind, this research suggested that both the GM’s and the IC’s perceptions of education are built on the working principle of the education line illustrated by Figure 1 (see Chapter 1). There are 3 main components of this line. Firstly, reconceptualization of secularism from an assertive form to a passive form; secondly, promotion of the global free market economy, which is shaped by Islamic Capital (Green Money); and finally, the involvement of non-governmental organizations, civil societies, and Islamic movements into the education delivery system. Briefly, this research indicated that these groups articulate Islamic values with the notion of Turkish nationalism and economic liberalism, and create a new sense of education, which addresses the hopes and fears of ‘the others’.
The study has shown that although both NPM and NSM theories put economic and political developments and conditions at the centre of their paradigms, they both suffer from a one-sided view of the change process, which is approached in some texts by way of descriptive or perspective overviews. However, this study, by studying the case of the GM and the IC, argues for interaction between the NPM–NSM and changing social conditions. In other words, the thesis argues for mutual action between those promoting Turkish liberalization and Islamic movements in the case of education (see Figure 2: Chapter 2).

Furthermore, in the Turkish case both the NPM and NSM are the results of the liberalization processes in political, economical and social life, and both were shaped by Turkish social context. Therefore, their consideration and application in Turkey are directly related to the social context. For instance, as was explained in Chapter 1, the Turkish ISMs have a unique feature: “express yearnings for democracy and economic development,” but also remain “conservative ... in calling for a strict moral-religious code in society” Yavuz (2003:15). It has been found that the neoliberal transformation does not only bring economic and political changes in Turkey, but also a social shift. While this research has explained the economic changes caused by the emergence of a new class -the owners of the green money, the political transformation was explained by the idea of the New Right - the supporters of private enterprise in the public sector.

The main methods used to examine the proposals derived from the literature were qualitative methods, including documentary analysis, focus group analysis, and in-depth interviews. It was explained in Chapter 3 that the use of different data collection methods and the instrumental-collective explanatory case study as a research methodology enabled more accurate testing of expectations, and allowed in-depth coverage of the issues investigated.
In this regard, one can say that the Ozal era’s economic and political liberalization caused societal transformations and endorsed ISMs to establish great opportunity spaces for the support of their ideas in both the private and public spheres. More specifically, in the Turkish case, the application of the KYTKT, or in other words, the marriage between New Right ideas and the new class, created opportunity spaces for those excluded pious families who sought to be visible not only in the private sphere, but more importantly, in the public sphere.

As was explained in Chapter 4, education has always been used as a tool by the secular-Kemalist state elites, who explained secularism as modernity and Islam as backwardness. Therefore, the ISMs, which are not challenging the state, but rather are seeking identity and justice for their excluded members, have led to Islam’s redefinition as a dynamic form of political and social consciousness (Yavuz, 2003). Examining the case of the GM and the IC, this study emphasized that contemporary Islamic engagements with public administration, and especially education, are a part of a political and administrative struggle, a struggle over who will manage the education system as a public service and a tool that creates the social capital.

Furthermore, the discourses of education and public services, which are closely associated with the secular, have been two of the most powerful discourses in shaping the way people have created ‘social capital’ since the beginning of the Republic. However, as Chapter 4 indicated, the neoliberal transformation and NPM raised the visibility and involvement of the social movements in public administration and education service delivery. For instance, although during the early years of the Republic, Kemalist modernist policies cleansed the public sphere from the anti-secular or religious discourses, after the 1950s there was some opposition from the ISMs, who are seeking more liberal and pluralistic settings. In Turkey during the last four decades the Naqshibandi Orders and Nurcus Movements, which the Iskenderpasa Cemaati and the Gulen Movement belong to respectively, were struggling
against the dominant state in order to rescue the marginal voices by using the media and press. By using the emerging liberal socio-political and economic environment, these movements mobilized and globalized themselves and their practices.

Education is one of the areas that these movements can be seen in action. By producing private education as an alternative to public education, the ISMs played a vital role in the creation of social capital in Turkey. Therefore, this research suggests that the project of the GM and IC, i.e. to integrate Islam and the education service, is not only based on public service religiously but is strongly motivated by the desire to increase the involvement of Islamic actors and ideas into the public service. In other words, they intend to create educational governance between the secular state and excluded “others”.

This research has indicated that in accordance with the definition of a social movement (see Chapter 5), which suggests that a social movement is an informal network, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which speak out through the common use of various forms of protest, and seek to build rational relations with the state and society, the GM exhibits most of the characteristics of a social movement, while the IC displays the characteristics of a cemaat.

The cemaat is an informal network composed of different organizations, based on a shared belief in the Islamic faith and morality. These movements seek to protect and circulate the collective identity, which speak out on issues such as breaking from the past and its traditions, or influence of Western secular life-style. This is generally through the permanent use of a pacifist form of protest, which involves the creation of alternative private living spheres, and the use of various forms of persuasion to convert people.

In Turkey, the GM and the IC, along with their leaders Gulen and Cosan, who partially adopted the philosophy of neoliberalism (which was defined as a tool by which the state control the schools will be minimizes and these schools will produce an alternative education
for their followers- in their education institutions, whose power and social importance has grown most rapidly. Thus, the opening up of discussion via the schools is having a deep impact on debates over the relationship of identity, society and state.

In this sense, this research found that the Movement and the Cemaat are rooted in the extensive perception of education as a means of social change, and the fact that Gulen-inspired schools deliver a high quality education, which is the stepping-stone to a career in those parts of society which have been reserved for the Kemalist elites since the 1920s (Yavuz, 2003). Since Gulen always highlighted the necessity of building a Turkish-style education system, which is different from Western education, and in which well-educated elites who are not only far from Turkish cultural values but also disjointed to the Turkish society, by harmonizing the states policies and its agendas the GM outpointed. In other words, as a result of marketization and neo-liberalization of both public services and public administration, the Gulen Movement proposed a balance between secular ideology and Islamic belief, which is compatible with neoliberal modernity and creates opportunities for the involvement of Islamic Capital (green money) into the privatized education system.

In explaining the religious groups’ or movements’ increasing involvement in education, this study referred to the new harmonized identity, which plays a vital role in new type public administration (NPM) and conservative politics in Turkey. Accordingly, while understanding and applying the New Public Administration mentality, which aims to increase accountability, transparency and governance in their schools rather than applying them directly without question, the schools indicated that they have already had and applied those aims by their own ways (see Chapter 6).

First of all, it is vital to understand that the scholastic and professional success of graduates from GM schools has led to a popular theory that the GM seeks to penetrate corners of
authority in the Turkish economy and the Turkish bureaucracy, and eventually to facilitate a slow transformation toward a shariah-governed society. While it is clear that the GM indeed focuses its support on accruing influence, its goal is not to establish an Islamic state. Such a development would be counterintuitive to its real aim, which is social power. For this reason, rather than directly challenging state ideology, the religious groups and movements tried to reshape state ideology with their own perception.

By reinterpreting the NPM strategies, the movement’s schools showed that they are combining neoliberal ideology with Islam. Although the popular idea is that the religious group or movement-inspired schools have Islamized the state’s neoliberal discourses, I have noted that by transforming worldly practices into religious activities these groups managed to find the strategies of neoliberalism within the Quran. For instance, rather than highlighting a quantitative and mechanical transparency in the Gulen Movement schools, both the administrators and teachers underline qualitative yet non-mechanical transparency and accountability. For this reason, decision making and enforcement must not view the shareholders and the administrators any differently. Since everyone is equal in front of Allah, they should be equal in this process, too.

Additionally, rather than defining the accountability which is done in accordance with the social norms in a secular neoliberal environment, in the GM schools, transparency finds its grounds within Islam and Islamic ethics. Hence, ‘accountability on the day of judgement’ is more important than everything else for a devoted person; the schools and their God-fearing employees believe that being accountable to everyone is in a sense preparation for the day. Therefore, the superior aim of accountability is again related to Islam. Accountability is vital for making the schools answerable for their behaviour and responsive to the entity from which they derive their authority, while being consciously aware of accountability before Allah in the hereafter.
In these schools the idea of governance also has a mystical element, and finds deep meaning from the Quran. Accordingly, the Quran’s message states “(…) [And they are] those who, if we give them authority in the land, establish (system of) salah and give zakah and enjoin what is right (ma’ruf) and forbid what is wrong (munkar)” (al-Hajj 22:41). The Quran describes governance as the law of fairness, an equitable and moral order, and pursuance of rights and responsibilities in a society. The administrators and teachers from the schools always indicated the necessity of governance in their schools in order to share responsibilities, and they also suggested that when people feel that they are equal partners in the process of planning, administration and implementation, it is easy to manage the students and apply their educational ethos.

**7.2. Contributions, Recommendations and Limitations of the Research**

This research contributes to various areas of scholarly literature, but most prominently, it provides an understanding of the changing nature of the Turkish Public administration structure, the increasing religiosity due to Islamic social movements’ involvement in education, and educational governance. The focus of this research has been the emerging encounters and interactions between different fields and perspectives, such as those between public administration and religion, secularism and green money, and faith and social movements. The researcher suggested that these encounters force the traditional value systems or the ISMs transform and establish new links with neoliberalism, state and society.

In countries where neoliberal policies and public administration reforms have been imposed on a traditional society by an external force or presence, neoliberal public administration reforms are advertised as ‘a cloth for all seasons’. However, this study indicated that even in a single state two different movements can respond differently to neoliberal market conditions and public administration reforms. These two approaches can be opposite sides of
the same coin. For instance, while the GM has been very successful in adapting political and economic opportunities and promoting its ‘public service’ agenda with the NPM doctrines, the IC has thus far garnered its support through a more religious and anti-neoliberal approach. Therefore, this research provides a greater understanding of states where there are tensions between modernisation and democratisation and demands for ‘traditional values’, i.e. Turkey acts as a microcosm for possible democratisation in post-conflict states.

In this context, to study the health and media services of the GM and ICs would be a suggestion for future research. Since this research has been subject to a limited time and budget, the researcher could no focus on the involvement of the ISMs in the health and media sectors. Therefore, one important question that remains is “how can we understand the ISMs’ involvement in other public services, such as health and media, and is there any form of governance in these sectors?” In the cases of the GM and IC, this is a process in which Islam becomes integrated into the modern public sphere, while endeavouring to transform more conservative forms. In order to establish a more equitable culture in which attendants are varied and identity is expressed liberally, the ISMs in Turkey are against the existing frontiers between the state and society. The objective is not only the reincorporation of the ‘others’, but also the recognition of the marginalized traditional sides of society that constitute the vast majority of it. This is a way of reconceptualising Islam from a position at the margins, and redefining the meaning of the social code within new webs of interaction.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, in this study the researcher has attempted to explain increasing religiosity in the secular education system in Turkey through an examination of the role of ISMs’ involvement in the delivery of education since the NPM era. The central finding is that in the case of Turkey since the 1980s, neoliberalism has shaped both socio-political and socio-
economic spheres of life through social movements that use religion as their central organizing principle. In Turkey, the IC has been alienated as a result of the interaction between Islam and neoliberalism. However, rather than radicalising itself against the neoliberal conditions of the day, the GM has shown friendly attempts that enable it to pursue its interests within the market. Therefore, while the IC is still in the reactionary phase in terms of religious observance, the GM displays religious domestication.

As the above-mentioned findings have indicated, the involvement of the ISMs in the public sector, primarily by opening schools, does not pose direct danger to a democratic secular system. On the contrary, the involvement of the ISMs showed that Turkey needs a new social balance, by which the hegemony of a specific group, particularly the secular Kemalist elites, will be reduced, and all parts of society will have equal voices. Moreover, in terms of schooling, this research has shown that the way to construct this social balance in schools is to build an educational governance in which not only the state, but also, as shareholders, the families, teachers and students can hear their voices too.

The unique contribution of this research to the study of ISMs and their relationship to the public administration structure of a society is the idea that the practicability of NPM reforms, the success of ISMs, and their interactive relationship should be evaluated by their ability to redefine and transform the ‘internal landscape’ of individuals, rather than their immediate external political impact.
APPENDIX

Field Interview, Sena: 24-26 April 2012, Istanbul.
Field Interview, Tugrul: 3-9 November 2012, Manchester.
Field Interview, Talha: 20-22 April 2012, Istanbul.
Focus Group Analysis, Anonymous, 1-3 May 2012, Yamanlar Private High School, İzmir.
Focus Group Analysis, Hansa, 1-3 May 2012, İzmir.
Field Interview, Zeynep: 30 April 2012, İstanbul.
Field Interview, Sumeyye: 30 April 2012, İstanbul.
Field Interview, Teacher in ASFA College: 10 May 2012, Ankara.
Field Interview, Parent from ASFA College: 12 May 2012, Ankara.
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