The Rational Extremist:
Reconciling religion, attitudes to politics, and support for violent protest in the UK

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of PhD in the Faculty of Humanities

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Mark Andrew Littler

School of Social Sciences
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Abstract

The University of Manchester
Mark Andrew Littler
PhD in Social Change
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PhD

The Rational Extremist:

Reconciling religion, attitudes to politics, and support for violent protest in the UK

This thesis is an investigation into support for terrorism and political violence in the UK. It has two principal aims: to advance a new application of rational choice theory capable of providing an explanation of support for violence that accommodates the impact of religion, and to test it using quantitative data.

Drawing on existing work from criminology and political science, it hypothesizes that amongst those with a political grievance violence will be supported most often where the benefits of democratic political engagement are viewed unfavourably. More than this, it argues that regular exposure to those holding extreme religious views may deplete political trust, and thus lower the favourability of these perceptions, thereby increasing the likelihood of an individual supporting violence.

Two distinct approaches were adopted to test this theory. The first employed multivariate analysis of secondary data, drawing on the European Values Study (EVS) and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) to test for a relationship between attitudes to democratic political engagement and support for violence in the British population at large, and to explore the impact of religion on these attitudes amongst a sample of British Muslims. The second approach sought to build on these findings, using data from an experiment conducted over the social networking site Facebook to explore whether attitudes towards democratic political engagement could be manipulated to trigger a shift in support for violence.

The results of these analyses offered limited support for my theory, with outputs from both the EVS and EMBES data showing a significant relationship between attitudes to democratic political engagement and support for violence, despite the failure of the experiment to find evidence supportive of a causal relationship. Analysis of the EMBES data similarly affirmed a role for regular exposure to those holding extreme religious views in predicting both attitudes to democratic politics and support for violence, though this was shown to be non-linear.

The implications of these findings for existing scholarship on - and policy responses to - extremism and support for violence were considered, alongside the limitations of my approach. The opportunities for future research were then presented alongside a summation of my key findings.
Declaration

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About the Author

Mark Littler was born in Manchester and grew up in Cheshire. He attended Lymm High School from 1996-2003, enrolling at University College London in 2004. He graduated with an LL.B. in Law in 2007, and following a period of employment in the private sector, returned to education in 2009, completing an M.St. in Applied Criminology from the University of Cambridge. He commenced studies for his doctorate at the University of Manchester in 2010.
1. Introduction

In a world of scarce resources and irreconcilable wants animals are fated to compete to survive. The ensuing struggle, awarding to the winner spoils and the loser a slow and often painful death, is the embodiment of perhaps the most famous principle in the history of science – evolutionary selection. While Western man has, in many cases, evolved beyond such struggles, the basic necessities for survival – water, food, shelter – being almost universally available in the developed world, demand for less tangible political and economic resources continues to elicit fierce competition. However unlike competition for the necessities of survival, contemporary struggles are largely passive.

As Berman and Berger (2007) note, the modern world is a remarkably safe place, with little occasion for violence; the advent of parliamentary democracy, the free market, and the rule of law have provided alternative - and less costly - avenues through which political goals may be pursued and disputes resolved, while the growth of societal norms against violence and the professionalization of policing have given rise to a social environment in which the use of force is not merely shunned, but actively punished.

Philosophers have long sought to explain the reasons for this surrender of individual rights, with early works by Plato (2007, [c.380 BC]) and Epicurus (Laertius, 2012 [c.350]) providing a basis for enlightenment scholars including Locke (2003 [1689]), Hobbes (1984 [1651]) and Rousseau (1998 [1762]) to advance a model through which the legitimacy of government was viewed as dependent on the consent of the governed. This contract is argued to represent the most beneficial balancing of costs and benefits to the
individual: while losing the right to enact violence against others in pursuit of their goals, the individual gains the protection of the state against the violence of others, gaining the freedom to live a peaceful life that would, without the state, be likely “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1985 [1651]).

Almost immediately after publication these arguments came to be taken as justification for violence. As the accommodation between state and individual assumes a beneficial outcome, those who no longer believe the state to represent their best interests may, under this framework, argue the right to turn to force of arms to redress their grievances. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, this approach was drawn upon to defend the French and American revolutions and latterly, through the writings of Marx, many of the revolutionary movements of the 20th century. Under circumstances where the state no longer represented the interests of its citizens they would, as Marx identified, “…have nothing to lose but their chains. They [would] have a world to win.” (Marx, Engels and Hobsbawm, 1998 [1848]).

The conditions under which individuals come to decide that violent revolution is preferable to democratic engagement are many and varied, as are the modes of expression it may take. Despite this, as the state possesses superior strength any violent action against it will be an act of asymmetrical warfare (Cordesman, 2002)¹. Whether this is through civil war, insurrection or terrorism depends largely on the strength of the movement: a state which faces the ire of a large numbers of its citizens may face a civil war, while a state that rouses smaller numbers may face only an insurrection. Terrorism,

¹ Or conflict defined by significant inequality in power and resources between participant groups.
however, is the strategy that requires the smallest number of actors, with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and 2011 Norway attacks suggesting that only one dissatisfied citizen is needed (Feldman and Jackson, 2013).

Despite this, many have argued that terrorism is an intrinsically social activity, and that those engaged in its commission are – even when acting alone – invariably part of a larger movement of supporters. More than this, research and policy evidence suggests that it may be through support for violence and radical action that individual actors come to engage in the commission of violence (HMSO, 2013).

This thesis is an attempt to explore the factors that shape this support. Placing the individual at the heart of the question of causation, it draws on work from across the applied social sciences to argue for a new understanding of the roots of support for political violence, linking non-violent political engagement, attitudes to mainstream politics and feelings of political efficacy to advance a new model of how individuals come to support violence.

Simultaneously, this thesis is also an attempt to explain how religion shapes support for violent action. Supplementing my core theory with insights drawn from the sociology of religion, I argue that certain types of religious practice may promote ill feeling towards government and mainstream politics, and thus may increase the likelihood of individuals endorsing violence by reducing the relative attractiveness of non-violent politics.

Importantly, while my theories are capable of providing an account of individual involvement in terrorism and violent action, my enquiry is restricted
to investigating *support for violence* alone. While anecdotal evidence on those involved in the commission of violence (presented in the following chapter) seems to suggest a picture consistent with my theory, ethics restrictions, cost constraints and the scarcity of data capable of sustaining statistical analysis prevent the unproblematic quantitative study of this phenomenon.

As a proof of concept for my approach this thesis will offer the results of a series of analyses conducted using data from large-scale social surveys (the 2008 UK wave of the European Values Study and Muslim data from 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study) and an online experiment administered over the social networking site Facebook.

This first chapter provides a brief background to this endeavour, offering a justification for the project that is grounded in the social and political milieu of contemporary politics, and in particular in British counter-terrorism policy. I argue that a nuanced understanding of the root causes of violent radicalisation is an essential pre-requisite for any effective counter-terrorism strategy, but that despite this the radicalisation process is poorly understood and subject to little scholarly attention. Without an understanding of the processes by which norms against violence are subverted I assert that it is difficult – if not impossible – to establish policy ‘best practice’, leaving interventions to be formulated on the basis of conjecture and popular opinion alone.

In defence of this view I present a brief overview of the contemporary counter-extremism approach in the UK and a critical discussion of the broad trends shaping academic work in this area, highlighting the shortcomings of
current scholarship and the implications that this has for existing policy. I then specify my broad research questions, before outlining the assumptions, definitions and conventions that my thesis has adopted to frame and limit the scope of its enquiry. I then conclude by offering a synopsis of the structure and content of the remaining chapters.

1.1 Background

"I was at the base of the second tower ...that was hit on a busy morning. If you wanted to choose timing, that would be the time to do it. 9:15 in a complex of buildings where 50,000 people worked. There was an explosion, I didn't think it was an explosion, but the base of the building shook. I felt it shake, and I thought that can't be right. It felt like a big weight, a construction weight, falling from a great, great, height. People moved out very, very calmly - no screaming or anything like that - but you could see moisture on their eyes and you could hear the fear in their voices, and then, when we were outside, the second explosion happened, and there were then a series of explosions."

Steve Owens, BBC New York Correspondent

At 8:46AM EST on the morning of September 11th 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North tower of the World Trade Centre. Less than 20 minutes later, a second plane, United Airlines Flight 175, crashed into the South tower, leaving hundreds of people trapped on the upper floors of the building. After burning for less than an hour, the South tower collapsed,
followed shortly by the North tower. As the dust settled over lower Manhattan in excess of 2,000 people were dead, with countless more left to suffer serious long-term illness as a result of the attacks.

No discussion of contemporary terrorism – religious or otherwise - can avoid the long shadow cast by 9/11. Like the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the moon landings, or the fall of the Berlin wall, the events of that day marked a watershed in human history, beyond which things were to be different.

Bringing terrorism to the forefront of global politics, 9/11 shattered the post-cold war utopianism of the ‘End of History’ (Fukuyama, 1992) marking the beginning of a decade of war, recrimination, and social tension that saw the West adopt a ‘siege mentality’ (Ahmed, 2005), engaging in foreign wars of attrition and recrimination (Litwak, 2007), experiencing increased inter-community conflict on the domestic front (Feldman and Littler, 2014), and a rise in the risk of violence both at home and abroad (Woods, Eyck, Kaplowitz, Shlapentokh, 2008). While Mohammed Atta’s destruction of the Pentagon and World Trade Centre showed the West to be (in some respects) impotent and unable to defend its citizens, perhaps its most significant legacy lay in its promotion to public prominence of a debate raging since the start of the Islamic revolution in Iran – how (if at all) the dictates of a dogmatic faith could be reconciled with the demands of secular modernity.

In the weeks and months that followed 9/11 Islam became a subject of significant public debate, with questions regularly asked about the nature of its theological position on violence, governance, and the rights of the person (Feldman, 2012). Despite regular protestations from religious leaders at pains to highlight the non-violent nature of the faith, the writings of firebrands
and extremists were frequently drawn upon - alongside decontextualized verses in the Qur’an - to ‘prove’ that Islamic values were irreconcilable with contemporary Western democracy (Halliday, 2002).

The events of 7/7 did little to assuage these concerns, with the home-grown nature of the threat augmenting general concern over militant Islam with fresh fears of an Islamic ‘enemy within’ (Abbas, 2007). With the revelation that one of the bombers, Jermaine Lyndsey, was a convert (Home Office, 2006), public concern increasingly came to focus on domestic ‘radicalisation’, and the process by which individuals came to be involved in violence. In the weeks and months that followed 7/7 a bewildering array of policy initiatives were unveiled in an attempt to address this concern. Yet despite this, questions were – and continue to be – asked as to the coherence of the overall approach (Dhami, 2013), and in particular of the efficacy of the interventions used to deliver it and their evidential basis. Despite significant refinements to the overall counter-terror strategy in recent years (HMSO, 2013), significant questions continue to be asked as to how, if at all, policy relates to real-life practice.

1.2 The British Response to Home Grown Terrorism: CONTEST, PREVENT and Channel Guidance Framework

The UK’s counter terrorism strategy – CONTEST - was first issued in 2003, with the express goal of protecting Britain from the risk of terrorism in the post-9/11 world. Unlike the response to the IRA campaign of the 1970s-1990s, with their reliance on traditional ‘hard’ policing tactics (such as
enhanced border controls and intelligence gathering), CONTEST aimed to adapt the traditional approach to the demands of 21st century religious terrorism, bringing a fresh focus on the upstream processes by which individuals come to be radicalised (Bettison, 2011). With significant revisions made in 2006, 2009 and 2011 (HMSO, 2013) in an attempt to address political and academic criticism regarding the narrow focus of the strategy (Brant, 2013), the current framework purports to provide coverage against a diverse range of risks including dissident Irish republicans, far-right movements, and religious terrorist groups (HMSO, 2013).

Comprised of four discrete components – PREVENT, PREPARE, PROTECT, and PURSUE – the strategy embraces a multi-dimensional model of radicalisation and public protection, with the focus on early identification and pre-violent intervention provided under the PREVENT strand. It was significantly refined after 2006 in an attempt to respond to the criticism made by Lady Justice Hallett during the 7/7 inquest (Home Office, 2006) that poor inter-agency co-operation was hampering counter-terror efforts – especially in advance of the attacks – with groups capable of identifying at-risk individuals unable to feed into security processes focussed on the early identification of attackers. To address this, the Home Office issued the Channel guidance (HMSO, 2012) framework, outlining the processes through which PREVENT should be delivered and mandating that intelligence gathering should be undertaken by a range of stakeholder groups (including the police, local authority PREVENT team, local educational providers, Regional Youth Offending Team (YOT), UK border agency, social services, probation services, and select voluntary, community
and charitable bodies). This information was to be shared with a regionally appointed coordinator (often a Policeman), who – working as part of a multi-agency panel – would decide whether an individual was ‘at risk’ and – where appropriate - manage the development and provision of a safeguarding package (ACPO, 2009). Direction was given as to the recommended content of such interventions - with potential themes including peer involvement, ‘faith guidance’ and civic engagement (ACPO, 2009) - and the indicators to be used to identify individuals at risk, including the possession of extremist content, the expression of anti-government opinions, and experiencing a crisis of identity (ACPO, 2009).

This approach has proved controversial, and opinion over the legitimacy and efficacy of Channel - and other elements of the PREVENT strategy - remains divided. While senior Police and policy makers have praised the programme as a vital and effective tool in fight against terrorism (ACPO, 2009), others have argued that it is little more than a spy’s charter singling out the Muslim community for special attention (Awan, 2011). Alongside this moral and political critique academics have been swift to condemn it for misrepresenting complex causal processes (Spalek, 2011), for lacking validity in respect of non-Islamic risks (Harris, 2012), and for being predicated on the basis of an insufficiently rigorous evidence base (Dhami, 2013). While this is accepted, if the PREVENT strategy is devoid of serious empirical support, the blame must lie at the feet of the Britain’s academics; despite the growth of scholarly interest in terrorism more broadly, and the importance of providing a robust evidence base to support the development of counter-extremism policy, few serious attempts have been made to
subject the presumptions underlying PREVENT to empirically rigorous analysis. As such, we are no closer to understanding how and why radicalisation happens than in the pre-7/7 era.

1.3 The Contemporary Academic Context: Limitations, assumptions and bias

While the last decade has been characterised by an explosion of terrorism-focussed research activity and the growth of ‘Terrorism Studies’ as a discipline, little attention has been paid to questions of causation on either a theoretical or empirical level (Franks, 2006). As Horgan (2005) notes, of the thousands of books and articles have been published addressing ‘terrorism’ post-9/11, few have focussed on why it is perpetrated (Franks, 2006), leaving a literature that makes little or no contribution to our understanding of the roots of the phenomenon (Lacquer, 2003). The reasons for this are many and varied.

Perhaps most obviously, the predominance of International Relations scholars within the ‘terrorism studies’ field has led to a disciplinary bias in favour of macro-level work with practical application (Franks, 2006). The lack of interest in micro-level factors and the difficulty in securing publication for work with this focus has stifled research interest, as has the comparative ease of securing funding for work with clear practical application (Franks, 2006). As Stevens, Wineburg, Herrenkohl, and Bell (2005) argue in respect of education, research follows funding, and as policy makers are the major funders of counter-terror and counter-extremism research, work lacking a
clear practical application has been a harder ‘sell’ than work with a clear path to implementation.

Alongside this the niche nature of radicalisation and terrorism studies in other parts of the applied social sciences – most notably sociology, political science and criminology – has resulted in a shortage of academic interest, while the lack of reliable and easily available data has hampered attempts to explore the roots of violence. Where researchers have sought to explore underlying causation, the oft-repeated mantra that ‘there can be no general theory of terrorism’ (Crenshaw, 1981) has deterred the framing of research insights as theoretical accounts, leaving scholars frequently presenting their work in the form of narrative alone. While quantitative data has become more readily available in recent years (largely as a result of the inclusion of measures of support for violence in large-scale social surveys such as EMBES, EVS .etc), this data remains largely unexploited.

Alongside this, investigation has been hampered by the absence of a widely accepted definition of what, exactly, terrorism is. While widely understood in common usage, academic attempts to isolate the precise meaning of ‘terrorism’ have floundered over the role of legitimacy, state action, and the proper relationship between victim and attacker (Ganor, 2002).

Consequently, a review of existing work by Martin identifies over of 100 mutually irreconcilable definitions in current academic use (Martin, 2009), making the production of research that commands broad credibility difficult.

If more effective policy responses are to be formulated then fresh research is
necessary, both to provide an account of the process that lead individuals to support violence and to explore the factors that shape them. This thesis aims to take a first step towards this goal by advancing and testing a new theory of support for terrorism that draws on rational choice models and insights from the sociology of religion to explain how individuals come to support violent action.

1.4 Assumptions

Given the diversity of possible approaches to the subject of enquiry it is important to make clear the assumptions that have been made to frame and limit the scope of this project. First and foremost amongst these is the choice of level and disciplinary focus.

This thesis is interested in individual level motivation. As such, it does not provide in-depth consideration of International Relations literature that focusses on the macro-level determinants of terrorism and political violence. Similarly, while this thesis draws on insights from elsewhere in the social sciences – most notably Political Science, Sociology and Social Psychology – it is first and foremost a work of Quantitative Criminology. As such, its application of rational choice theory is shaped by research using this approach to explain human deviance, with the individual actor assumed to be an amoral *homo penalis*, seeking to maximise individual utility on the basis of a rational process of cost-benefit analysis.

Secondly, this thesis views political violence and support for political violence as related phenomena, with the latter a vital precondition for the former. It is
clear from qualitative life histories of known terrorists that the commission of terrorism is the culmination of a process of radicalisation through which individuals – through repeat exposure to pro-violent views – ‘drift’ into the commission of acts of violence. Schmid (2005) argues that violence has both long term structural causes and proximate trigger causes, which - if it is accepted – suggests that the latter are likely to be common to the process by which violence is supported. Given the paucity of literature exploring support for violence as a distinct focus for theoretical enquiry, this thesis will draw on literature exploring the structural causes of violence (where relevant) to shape its enquiry.

1.5 Definitions

Isolating the meaning of abstract concepts is always difficult, and defining controversial ones such as ‘terrorism’ or ‘religion’ is significantly harder. Despite this, any serious academic enquiry requires clarity over what behaviour, exactly, is the subject of investigation (Schmid and Jongman, 1988), and consequently, any thesis seeking to explore support for terrorism and the impact of religion must first direct itself to providing a working definition of its terms.

*Defining ‘Terrorism’ and ‘Political Violence’*

At a basic level, the linguistic connotations of the word ‘terrorism’ (defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the
fact of terrorising or condition of being terrorised” (OED, 2008) seems an obvious starting point for any definition. However, such a broad approach invites questions over who the ‘terrorised’ victims are, and the extent to which a group’s aim must be the creation of terror for them to be considered ‘terrorist’. Policy definitions have sought to address this shortcoming, with the United States adopting perhaps the most straightforward, classifying terrorism as: an offense that is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and is a violation of one of several listed statutes, including § 930(c) (relating to killing or attempted killing during an attack on a federal facility with a dangerous weapon); and § 1114 (relating to killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the U.S.) (GPO, 2014).

While the United States definition makes important steps towards addressing questions of targets and tactics, the issue of the classification of violence against civilians is left unaddressed. The UK’s Terrorism Act (HMSO, 2000) provides a more nuanced view in respect of this question, giving several key requirements that a group must meet in order to be classified as ‘terrorist’. Principally, it states that a group will be considered a terrorist if their action involves serious violence against the person, serious damage to property, the endangerment of life, a health and safety risk, or the disruption of electronic communications and involves either guns and explosives, or is a deliberate attempt to influence the government, an international organisation, or to intimidate the public in furtherance of political, ideological or religious
goals.²

However, while more comprehensive in its coverage of targets and consideration of goals than the American approach, the British definition moves no closer to answering the question of who the terrorists are, save that they are non-governmental actors; the basis on which groups like Al-Qaeda, who are classified by the government as terrorists, may be separated from groups like the Nicaraguan Contras, who the government supported as freedom fighters, remains unclear. This arguably reflects the fact that there can be no clear or objective answers to such questions as they rest on issues of legitimacy – for which moral rather than objective criteria are invariably applied (Schmid and Jongman, 2008); consequently, no clear or universally accepted definition is possible.

A perfunctory review of the existing literature illustrates that in excess of 100

² In full (From the Terrorism Act, 2000)
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—
   (a) the action falls within subsection (2),
   (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
   (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
   (a) involves serious violence against a person,
   (b) involves serious damage to property,
   (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,
   (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
   (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.
(4) In this section—
   (a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,
   (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,
   (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the UK
   (d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.
different and often mutually irreconcilable definitions of terrorism are in contemporary use (Martin, 2009), each articulating a subtly different opinion on what, exactly, the essence of the subject is (Breton et al., 2002) and how it ought to be measured. Similarly, policy definitions such as those outlined above offer little unity, espousing different requirements for a group to be labelled as terrorist and bringing risks of bias associated with the political agenda of those who frame them (Burns, 2009).

Some have sought to avoid this difficulty by using the less contested and ambiguous term ‘political violence’. While still subject to debate (Weingarten, 2004), such an approach invites disagreement in fewer areas. Unlike terrorism, there is no need to consider the perpetrator or victim - often the sources of most contention. Rather, all that is required is a definition for violence and politics. Such an approach certainly encompasses terrorism, which is – clearly – a form of violence pursued towards (broadly defined) political ends, but also encompasses a range of other, less serious, forms of violent political action.

While there is much to recommend this approach, I submit that this thesis does not need to clearly define either terrorism or political violence beyond a common sense definition. My unit of enquiry is not the group but the individual supporter, and I seek to make no judgement – moral or otherwise - as to the nature of the act, the legitimacy of its perpetrator or the identity of its victim. Taking a strategic view of terrorism (Harris, 2006), I only require the identification of a given act of violence as a strategy employed in pursuit of a specific goal or outcome (Harris, 2006).

Furthermore, as the instruments used to capture support for terrorism and
political violence were neither drafted nor administered by myself\(^3\), any further discussion would, in any event, be moot, as my feelings cannot shape or influence the data. In completing the questionnaire, each respondent furnishes their own definition of terrorism, and as such, it is sufficient to merely assume a common sense approach in their interpretation.

*Defining ‘Religion’ and ‘Religious Terrorism’*

The issue of what this thesis will consider ‘religious’ is less straightforward. What religion is or ought to be has been a subject of significant scholarly debate for many years, with differing definitions attempting to isolate the essential characteristic of religion advanced by social scientific luminaries including Freud (1913), Marx (1976), Hume (1956) and Durkheim (2008). While some have sought to argue that the term defies definition, being amongst the most abused and over-used in the English language, it is possible - broadly speaking - to divide most definitions into one of two groupings (Ali Reza, 2009): substantive approaches which seek to identify religion by reference to beliefs or practices in respect of supernatural beings or powers (Tylor, 1871), and functional approaches, which seek to define religion by reference to its social role (Malinowski, 1916).

Both understandings are subject to significant critiques: functionalist approaches are argued to be flawed for their encompassing of organizations which provide social ritual and support but are not, under a ‘common sense’ (Bruce, 1997) understanding, religious - such as football teams (Hamilton,

\(^3\) Excluding the experiment, where the measures were chosen in conjunction with my supervisors on the basis of feedback from pilot study participants.)
1995) - while substantive approaches struggle to encompass the variety of beliefs found across the practices and philosophies of all widely accepted ‘religions’ (Southwold, 1978).

Perhaps because of this, some have sought to overcome the problems inherent in both approaches by combining the two (Dobbelaere and Lauwers, 1973) to produce composite definitions, including requirements for both belief and practice (Durkheim, 2008), or by allowing for the self-definition of a religion by the views of its adherents (McConnell, 1991).

While there is clearly merit in all of these arguments, in the context of this thesis the issue of what constitutes the ‘religion’ is perhaps less complicated. The phenomena of ‘religious’ terrorism, as identified by Rapoport (2002), is clearly recognized as a product of religions – such as Islam, Christianity, Aum Shinrikyo, Sikhism, etc – and while it is true that a rigid substantive approach may risk the exclusion of some groups widely accepted as religious but not easily accommodated by such an approach, it is clear that the alternative approach would risk encompassing terrorism by ideological but not conventionally religious groups – a phenomena not, generally speaking, considered religious terrorism.

As such, it is sufficient for the purposes of this thesis to give the term its ‘common sense’ (Bruce, 1997) definition – as belonging to a group that is united by its practice of a religion (OED, 2008) - with religion defined using a hybrid approach to include both practice and belief, allowing for the consideration of terrorism by all groups identified by ‘common sense’ (Bruce, 1997) as religious.
Consequently, this thesis will follow Durkheim (2008) in viewing a ‘religion’ as "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things… that unite into …[a] single moral community…all those who adhere to them".

It is, however, worth noting that the religious elements of the theory advanced by this thesis may equally be applicable to functionally religious groups. Indeed, as the theory focuses on the social characteristics of religious groups, it is entirely feasible that avowedly secular but structurally similar terrorist movements such as the Baader Meinhof Group, LTTE and Japanese Red Army may also influence attitudes in a fashion similar to substantive religions.

1.6 Thesis Structure

This thesis will use quantitative methods to explore the role of feelings about government and the political process in shaping support for terrorism in the UK. Starting with an examination of the existing scholarly literature, the following chapter will offer an overview of the most widely used explanatory theories of support for terrorism, offering a critical discussion of their strengths and weaknesses with reference to the existing evidence base. It will then specify my theory in detail, attempting to place it in the context of broader criminological and applied social scientific scholarship on rational choice and the role of religion in shaping human behaviours.

Following this, three distinct empirical chapters will seek to subject my theory to quantitative testing. The first will employ data from the 2008 European Values Study to test for a relationship between feelings about government
and support for terrorism in the British population at large. The second will use Muslim data from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study to replicate this analysis and explore the role played by religion in shaping perceptions of government and the political process, while the third will use experimental data to test whether the linkage between feelings about government and support for violence is causal.

The final chapter will offer an overview of the findings of my thesis, framing them with reference to both the core research question and the existing academic literature. It will then offer an overview of the significance of my findings for British counter terrorism and counter extremism policy, before offering an outline of the opportunities for future research in this area.

1.7 Conclusion

This chapter has offered an overview of the social context in which this thesis is placed, an account of the current state of academic knowledge in the field, and an overview of the policy response this has facilitated. It has detailed my core research question, and offered an overview of the definitions and assumptions that will frame my investigation. It has also given an overview of the structure of this thesis and a brief synopsis of the content of each section. The following chapter will provide a more detailed discussion of the existing academic work on support for – and engagement in – terrorism, as well as a more in-depth explanation of the theory that this thesis seeks to advance.
2. Review of Theory and Research

This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the academic background underpinning my explanation of the causes of support for terrorism and political violence. Beginning with an overview of the state of terrorism studies as a discipline, it will present a critical discussion of the dominant theoretical approaches used to explain the causes of support for violence within criminology and security and terrorism studies, alongside relevant insights drawn from elsewhere in the social sciences.

It will then offer a précis of the theoretical model I use to explain support for violence, drawing on anecdotal and research evidence to support my argument. It will then outline the analytical approach that has been adopted to test my theory, finally concluding with an overview of the structure of the remaining chapters of my thesis.

2.1 The State of Contemporary Terrorism Studies

Despite the growth of popular interest in terrorism and political violence post-9/11, academic research in this area remains a niche enterprise characterised by large volumes of ‘theoretically mindless’ commentary, much of which has questionable academic value (p.26, Horgan, 2005). Dominated by think-tanks and policy bodies (p.37 Burke, 2008), populated by a small number of individuals (p.48, Reid and Chen, 2007) and characterised by endless debates as to the nature and meaning of terrorism (Hoffman, 2013), quality work has long been the almost exclusive preserve of those with a
background in international relations (Franks, 2006), frequently working as part of larger departments for whom terrorism and political violence are of limited research interest (Wilkinson and Stewart, 1987).

While the events of 9/11 have effected a shift in focus towards religious – and principally Islamic – terrorism (p.10, Lacquer, 2003), the emergence of this new threat has done little to catalyse research on the theoretical roots of violence. Such enquiry – where attempted – has been disparaged by the doyens of security studies on the basis that the disperse nature of causation prevents the structuring of a unified theoretical approach (Crenshaw, 1981; Lacquer, 2003; Borum, 2004). As a result of this, the framing of empirical findings in the language of theory remains uncommon, with research that does attempt to explore the roots of violence left to follow the ‘Raw Empirical Approach’ (Borum, 2004) of identifying correlation but providing no theoretical context, leaving a discipline that is rich in observational data, but poor in narrative.

Despite the absence of home grown theories it is, however, possible to discern a range of distinct approaches in the existing research. Adapting insights from the physical, psychological and social sciences, these attempts range from the application of ‘orthodox’ international relations discussions of revolutionary and reactionary violence (Franks, 2006) to the biological determinism of ‘sick terrorists’ (Borum, 2004; Alcorta, 2010), repurposed criminological Strain theory (Agnew, 2010), and symbolic interactionism (Gibbs, 1989). This diversity, while seemingly indicative of a thriving discourse, is perhaps narrower than it seems, and can be divided into three broad traditions (p.317, Ross, 1993): one assuming that the decision to
engage in and to support terrorism is a rational choice, the other suggesting that the decision is a result of structural factors arising from the social environment, and a third, assuming that motivation rests on the psychological qualities of the individual.

Of these approaches, structural theories have attracted arguably the most research attention, with scholars in the international relations tradition frequently contributing work in this area. Drawing on macro-level data this work frequently explores the society-wide correlates of violence, frequently focussing on the impact of factors including modernization level, geographical locale, and type of political system (Ross, 1993) on the existence of violent groups. As such, structural approaches have significant descriptive power in respect of identifying the preconditions required for violence to thrive (Volgy, Imwalle and Corntassel, 1997), but cannot – due to their macro-level focus - identify the factors shaping individual motivation to engage in or support violence.

Of the scholars focussing on individual motivation, rational choice based approaches have dominated (Caplan, 2006), with the framework providing an easily applicable and simple to understand ‘workhorse’ (p. 28, Meierrieks, 2014) on which quantitative individual-level investigations into motivation may be modelled. Policy makers in particular have been quick to adopt this outlook, with its clear and direct language and obvious implications for implementation in counter terror policy (suggesting action that prevents violence through shifting costs and benefits via deterrence and benevolence - Frey and Luechinger, 2003) making it an attractive choice.
However, alongside this recent scholarship (Jurgensmeyer, 2000; von Hippel, 2002; Habeck, 2006) has sought to advance a more ideologically grounded understanding of violence, arguing that the motivation for terrorism stems from the impact of theological texts and ideological imperatives rather than a weighing of costs and benefits. Given the prominence of theological justifications in the outputs of many contemporary terror groups, such an approach would seem logical, and it is therefore unsurprising that it has also gained significant traction amongst the media and policy communities, many of whom now frequently identify terrorist action as the end result of an evil ideology (p.119, Snow and Byrd, 2007).

Both cannot, however, be true, but as with all the applied social sciences, difficulties arise in identifying which approach is ‘correct’. The evidence claimed in support of each theory is often subject to significant debate and it is frequently possible to present empirical findings in support of more than one approach, with the interpretation chosen solely at the discretion of the researcher. More than this, the relative paucity of evidence presents serious problems. Writing in 2001 Silke (2001) identified fewer than 4,000 studies investigating terrorism as a whole, the overwhelming majority of which focussed on definitional and abstract questions rather than individual motivation (Horgan, 2005). While later work by Silke (2009) identified that the volume of literature had increased significantly post 9/11, particularly around religious terrorism, the question of motivation remains neglected (Ranstorp, 2007) and the employment of empirically rigorous quantitative methods continues to remain rare (Findley and Young, 2011).

Of those studies that seek to investigate motivating factors for involvement in
terrorism, the overwhelming majority employ data from one of a number of macro-level data sets: most notably, the Rand-St. Andrews Chronology, the University of Maryland’s START project, or the US Government’s Trends in Global Terrorism series. In all cases, the data do not include detailed information on individual terrorists, without which the extrapolation and drawing of reliable inferences about terrorist characteristics is methodologically questionable. While attempts have been made to counter this shortcoming by linking data sets with information on other potential causal factors (for example, the occupation status\(^4\) of the country – as with Pape, 2005 – or target hardening\(^5\) – as with Berman, 2009) such linkages are, invariably, problematic. Consequently, any inferences made regarding individual motivation risk the possibility of ecological fallacy.

Widely reported problems (see Reid, 1997; Li, 2005; Sandler, 2010) also exist in relation to the availability of information on terrorist attacks, with many incidents left unrecorded or deliberately omitted from public data. Particularly in the context of secretive authoritarian (for example, North Korea, Iran, and the People’s Republic of China) or failed (Somalia, Iraq, Syria) states, it is highly unlikely that details of each individual occurrence of terrorism would be recorded or made available to Western researchers. Without a comprehensive data set, any analysis would be subject to bias, and as such, any inferences made using it would be unreliable.

Even in democratic states, problems exist with the recording of data, with Masters (2011) noting that divergence in the classification of terrorist and

\(^4\) In this context, the presence of a significant foreign presence in the country.

\(^5\) Here referring to the process by which targets are protected using barriers to access and defensive aids.
extremist groups in official governmental data – for example, the exclusion by the US government of terrorist acts perpetrated by domestic groups and those friendly to US interests – would pose problems in respect of comparisons across national boundaries. The exclusion of individual groups on the basis of arbitrary assessments about the desirability of their actions has the effect of inducing significant bias into any analysis, and as a result, analysis relying solely on Governmental data must be treated with caution.

Qualitative research, while more plentiful, is equally problematic, with the usefulness of its findings often limited on the basis of the same critiques levelled against quantitative research. In addition, while qualitative approaches avoid many of the issues inherent in the use of macro-level data, they suffer from a series of alternate biases in respect of generalizability and the robustness of insights derived from interviews.

Significant problems exist in respect of the post-attack recollections of terrorists and their associates, the analysis of which forms the bedrock of the existing qualitative literature. Particularly in the case of suicide bombings, it is entirely possible that the family and friends of the terrorist may deliberately distort the details of the individual’s pre-attack life to present a more positive picture of their motivation, or to diminish or magnify their own role in shaping the decision to engage in violence. It is also likely – particularly given the secretive nature of terrorist groups - that family and friends may simply be unaware of the factors that motivated the individual to turn to terrorism in the first place.
While analysis of the information provided by terrorists themselves – through face-to-face interviews with those captured and secondary sources such as martyrdom videos – may counter this critique, it nevertheless remains possible that information collected in this fashion may exhibit significant bias. Indeed, Jurgensmeyer (2000) notes that martyrdom videos are often used to recruit future terrorists, suggesting that the terrorist group may have much to gain by presenting an unrealistically positive picture of their member’s motives. More than this, the terrorist themselves may be unaware of the process by which they became engaged in violence, may be unable to articulate it, or may lie to present a more favourable picture of their motivation, all of which would render any information collected subject to a significant propaganda bias.

Additionally, given the emotive nature of the subject, it is entirely plausible that researchers may imbue the responses of their interviewees with unintended significance on the basis of their own views. The inherent difficulty in setting aside a priori knowledge and prejudices makes the conduct of neutral interviews and interview analysis difficult. As such, any inferences made about motivation from single researcher qualitative interview data may present an inaccurate and misleading picture, and thus must be regarded with scepticism.

Further significant problems exist in respect of generalizations made from the findings of limited qualitative studies, particularly as the focus of many such investigations is often a broader phenomenon or collection of groups. The difficulty in sourcing a sufficiently large number of interviewees to provide saturation of responses means that many studies are forced to formulate
their results on the basis of analysis using interviews from only a handful of respondents. This reduces the chance of studies recording accurate results, making generalizations to broader populations of interest intrinsically unreliable. As such, qualitative data derived from a single context cannot be claimed as a basis on which to support for a theory of terrorism, and thus any theory advanced purely on the basis of such research should be considered unreliable.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, little of the existing literature employs either randomized experimental designs or the advanced analytical techniques (such as instrumental variables or structural equation modelling) required to facilitate the robust testing of claims of causation, making the verification of theories of motivation difficult (Dhami, 2013). While correlation can be identified by both survey analysis and qualitative interview, the discrimination of causal factors from merely correlated ones is unachievable without recourse to more complex analytical tools. As the existing evidence does not generally utilise such tools, no reliable causal inferences can be justified on the basis of its findings, and as such no theories can currently be regarded as truly robust.

Despite this, there is much of value in the existing literature, particularly in respect of the formulation of rational choice models examining the impact of democratic engagement, and ideological discussion of the role of religion in shaping engagement in, and support for, violence. The following section will offer a review of these literatures, starting by examining attempts to explain recourse to violence in terms of ideological imperative and theological mandate.
2.2 Theories of Moral and Religious Imperative

Perhaps more than any other aspect of contemporary terrorist groups, the moral and religious imperatives of theological texts that are claimed as justification for violence have been considered the key motive for engagement in and support of acts of terrorism. Indeed, with the rise in prevalence of ‘Fourth wave’ (Rapoport, 2002) terrorist groups, academics have increasingly come to focus on the ‘distinctiveness’ of terrorism in the name of religion, both in terms of its outcomes and motivations (Wilkinson, 2006). Consequently, scholars have sought to use its distinctive characteristics to advance theories capable of explaining it, frequently starting by focussing on what is, arguably, its defining characteristic.

That religion was capable of promoting violent action should come as little surprise to anyone with more than a passing familiarity with human history (Guiora, 2009) – it has always been closely linked to violence and has frequently been called upon throughout history to legitimise horrendous and savage acts (Silberman, Higgins and Dweek, 2005). In the context of terrorism, some of the earliest groups argued to possess the characteristics of modern terrorist organisations – the Zealots, Thugs, and Assassins – derived both their tactics and motivation from religious texts (Sedgwick, 2004). Indeed, prior to the enlightenment it was commonly believed that, religion was the only acceptable justification for violence by either states or non-state actors (Rapoport, 1984), with the appeals to defend the faith a
characteristic of many savage conflicts (Silberman, Higgins and Dweek, 2005).

In the context of modern terrorism, such justifications continue to be relevant: contemporary groups frequently seek to justify their actions by reference to religious beliefs, and often claim religiously mandated goals as their reason for engaging in violence (Fine, 2009). Indeed, in a post-modern and increasingly secular (Bruce, 1997) world it seems logical to assume that, for a rational, educated and socially secure individual (Hoffman, 1999) to suspend the moral norms of polite society and support an action as transgressive as violence, a total and unquestioning belief in the rectitude of the action would be necessary (Pratt, 2010). As a result of this, Hoffman (2006) has characterised those involved in religious terrorism as the ‘ultimate altruists’, convinced of both the beneficial nature of their actions and divine approval legitimating the harm that they cause (Jurgensmeyer, 2000). Such a view is lent credibility by the work of Bowman-Grieve (2009) and Merari (2004) whose studies of abortion clinic bombers and suicide bombers respectively highlighted the terrorist’s belief in the divinely inspired and ‘good’ nature of their acts as a response to the evils of a corrupt and secular world, and by Mueller and Stewart (2012) who identified a desire to protect Islam from American aggression as a key cause of Islamic violence.

However, while many accept the possibility of religion playing a role in shaping the decision to support violent or illegal action, there is surprisingly little consensus around the process through which religion’s ideology comes to exert an influence. Two distinct explanations are commonly presented: The first focusses on ideology, suggesting that the religious may be capable
of justifying terrorist atrocities because their religion’s precepts are, by their nature, brutal, cruel and aggressive, giving rise to a moral imperative to violent action which the believer must obey. The second, by contrast, advances a more nuanced understanding of religion’s behaviour shaping properties, rooted in the wedding by contemporary extremist discourse of secular and political concerns with religious symbols and ideological justifications for action, focussing on the role of belief in legitimating, rather than mandating, violence (Kepel, 1994).

The first view draws heavily on Max Weber’s classic work on the role of belief in shaping behaviour - *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Weber, 2001 [1905]) – in arguing that religious values and beliefs - as opposed to religious practices and networks - are the key aspect in shaping the behaviour of religious adherents. In this context, the ‘Weberian thesis’ (Pemberton, 1957) has been adapted to contend that religious values shape the behaviour of extremists, with the content of theological treaties providing both the justification and imperative for the commission of acts of violence (Hoffman, 1993).

While such a view has some roots in classical sociology, and is frequently espoused by political and media commentators (see Morano, 2002; Murphy, 2001), its simple application to religious terrorism rests on a ‘very selective’ interpretation of the facts (Iannaccone, 1996). Indeed, if a religion’s teachings mandated violent action, then one would legitimately expect to find a significantly higher number of religious adherents engaged in terrorism than is currently the case. Estimates of the prevalence of religious practice in Europe suggest that (in most countries) the overwhelming majority affirm
some religious belief, with generally less than 30% of the population identifying as atheists (World Values Survey, 2012). Of these believers, research suggests that as little as 1 in 5,000 are engaged in terrorist activity, with a further 1,200 providing non-violent support to terrorist groups (AVID, 2011) - in total, only 1,400 per million, or around 0.14%, are engaged in illegal activity supporting terrorism.

Such low prevalence statistics suggest that no mainstream religion has teachings that automatically mandate violence, rendering interpretations which do seriously deviant and thus, the argument that any single religion is inherently evil unsustainable.

As a result, a more feasible suggestion would be that those religious groups employing terrorism are sectarian or schismatic, espousing a deviant ideology legitimated by reference to the symbology of a more mainstream religious tradition or group of traditions (Brackett, 1996). While such an interpretation seems possible, particularly given Halliday’s (1996) view of religions as fundamentally collections of symbols, Bruce (2008) notes that such a view neglects the fact that some combinations of symbols are more mainstream than others. If this is true, then for an adherent to accept an extreme interpretation of a religion, their group must first ensure that any more mainstream interpretations are discredited or disregarded.

With this in mind, the second approach to religious belief advances an understanding capable of explaining how extremist groups come to reject mainstream theological and political positions. Academics advocating this more nuanced understanding suggest that, far from mandating violence on a
theological level, the power of religion to compel violence comes from its wedding of secular concerns with religious rhetoric (Jurgensmeyer, 2000; 2004; Kepel, 1994). It has been argued that, with the end of the cold war, the failure of secular modernism to prevent ‘moral decline’ (Murray-Brown, 2002) created a vacuum in which religious groups could provide both a convincing and well-articulated critique of secular society and a ‘radical’ blueprint for a new social order (Kepel, 1994). This critique of the secular world is frequently placed in the context of a ‘cosmic war’ (Jurgensmeyer, 2000), allowing religious groups to ‘Satanize’ (Jurgensmeyer, 2000) their opponents, and thus, engage in acts of violent resistance and terrorism without limit. In such circumstances it is but a short step from accepting that an enemy is evil to requiring their extermination, with theologians in all major religions authoring tracts that could be used to justify such actions (Jurgensmeyer, 2000).

Pratt’s (2010) sequential model of religious violence details the process by which individuals come to embrace such extreme and impositional interpretations of their faith, recognizing that fundamentalist violence requires a removal of the social controls which inhibit violence, suggesting that adherents develop their beliefs via a series of stages, transitioning through passive and assertive ideologies before becoming impositional, and thus

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6 Impositional faith is, under Pratt’s (2010) model, the final stage of a process of radicalisation that sees the individual progress through passive fundamentalism (the mere holding of extreme views) and assertive fundamentalism (the delegitimization of alternative interpretations of their faith and the merging of personal and group identity) to embrace an interpretation of their faith that requires its imposition. This centres on the otherness of non-believers, with their lack of appropriate faith mandating harsh remedial action – often including terrorism or violence – to secure the ends they believe to be mandated by their scriptures.
ready to inflict their views on others. Only at this final stage would an individual become ‘likely to be a terrorist’ (Pratt, 2010).

Such an argument is hard to refute at face value: certainly, religious terrorists regularly extol the virtue of their actions as a service to a greater good (Merari, 2004; Hoffman, 2006), stressing their piety in the service of God and their belief - particularly in the case of suicide terrorists – of a divine reward for their actions (Hoffman, 1999). Jurgensmeyer’s (2000;2004) research, drawing on examples from a number of different socio-cultural traditions, accords with such views, while work by Gambetta (2005) presents evidence which, while expressed largely without recourse to the language of theory, can be read in such a way as to support this view. Similarly, Brackett’s (1996) study of Aum Shinrikyo, Sedgwick’s (2004) study of Al-Qaeda, and Blanchard and Prewitt’s (1993) study of abortion terrorism all stress the role of ideological commitment in facilitating terrorist action.

However, while a significant body of literature exists in this field, it is subject to a critique on a number of grounds. Firstly, the over-reliance of ideological explanations on qualitative analyses using limited samples precludes the making of reliable inferences about religious terrorism as a whole (for the reasons discussed in the preceding section). Secondly, while qualitative data often support such an explanation, quantitative data, where analysed, have tended to reject a distinctive role for ideology in shaping support for, and engagement in, religious terrorism (Pape, 2005); indeed, no mainstream

7 Pape’s (2005) work, using macro-level data, applies rational choice theory to explain the commission of suicide terrorism, suggesting that occupation status – the presence of foreign troops – is the main factor determining whether suicide terrorism occurs. Under his model, religion plays a role only in reinforcing the visibility of the boundary between the domestic population and the occupying ‘other’. This is consistent with the criminological literature –
quantitative literature affirms a link of any kind between religious belief and recourse to, or support for, violence.

Thirdly, the broader sociological literature on the role of religion in shaping the actions of its adherents presents a picture at odds with the relationship postulated by research on religious terrorism. Criminological studies in particular (see Regnerus, 2003; Baier and Wright, 2001; Johnson et al, 2000) have consistently affirmed a Durkheimian (2008 [1897]) approach to religion’s influence, suggesting that regular practice and network religiosity, rather than belief, are the essential elements shaping adherent behaviours. In the context of research on terrorism, only Ginges, Hansen and Norenzayan (2009) have approached the subject in this manner – though their consideration was limited only to support for acts of suicide terror. Given that the social aspects of religion are more commonly found to influence the behaviour of adherents than their beliefs, it is surprising that a search of Google Scholar and the British Library yielded no further research in this tradition.

As the extant qualitative literature can be read to suggest support for the role of religious practice in shaping recourse to terrorism, the lack of work examining religion’s social impact is problematic. Particularly as Abrahams (2004) notes that terrorism is inherently a social activity, with the majority of terrorists enmeshed in cells and broader groups either on or off-line, it seems odd to suggest that religious affiliation and involvement have no effect on support for violence. Indeed, research has consistently stressed that most particularly seminal work by Hirschi and Stark (1969) that identifies the deficiency of religious ideology as a force capable of shaping individual behaviours.
terrorist groups are tight-knit and closely controlled social units (Berman, 2009), and that involvement in religious terrorism comes, for most individuals, through involvement in a religious institution (Malik, 2009). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that even the most isolated and individualistic of terrorists – Timothy McVeigh – was in regular contact with ideologically sympathetic members of his religious group who approved of and encouraged his actions (Turk, 2004).

Furthermore, the argument often presented in literature that religious ideology mandates a terrorism that requires no audience save God himself (Rapoport, 1984) is inaccurate. The characterisation of religious extremists in general, and specifically Islamic groups, as insular and disinterested in those outside of their religion is misleading: Islam is a missionary religion (Tingle, 1985), as are most (excluding Judaism - Doi, 2001) involved in religious terrorism. A cursory inspection of the media outputs of many Islamic terrorist groups reveals a preoccupation with converting repentant *kufr* at least as serious as the desire to defeat the West. Osama Bin Laden regularly called on citizens of Western countries to ‘embrace Islam’ (Freauuf, 2007) as a means of avoiding further terrorist attacks, while religious groups targeting abortion clinics often seek to convert opponents by strength of argument while actively recruiting both within and without the religious community (Altum, 2003). Such findings mirror the contention made by Esposito (2002) that the most successful terrorist groups are a key part of the social environment in which they exist, providing services and support to members of their religious communities – a point picked up by Berman (2009) in his study of religious suicide terrorism. The development of social explanations
of religion’s influence – in particular with respect to the recruitment and radicalisation process – is clearly therefore a project of great importance.

2.3 Rational Choice Theories

In contrast to explanations grounded in an assumed moral or theological imperative to violence many scholars have drawn on the framework provided by economics to advance an alternative view, using its focus on individual choices (Berrebi, 2009) and decision calculus to give insights into the motivation of terrorists (p.302, Sandler and Enders, 2004). Frequently termed rational choice (or rational actor) theories, these approaches explain the decision of individuals and groups to engage in and support political violence using insights that derive from studies of financial transactions (Blume and Easley, 2008), arguing that each individual will seek to maximise utility in pursuit of their goals through a process of costs-benefit analysis (Hedstrom and Stern, 2010).

These theories do not assert that the end goal of any process is itself rational (Wintrobe, 2005), but rather, focus on the decision making calculus through which the strategy to advance such goals is selected. In this, the classical formulation from economics suggests that decisions are rational if they represent the logical outcome of independent actors pursuing rational preferences, seeking to maximise their utility on the basis of full and relevant information (Bruce and Yearley, 2006). As the factors considered as costs and benefits are accepted to vary significantly from model to model, rational
choice theory may be argued to represent more an epistemological framework than a fully developed theory, with this core formulation the sole common component of all approaches in this tradition (Anderton and Carter, 2005).

While debate continues to rage over the rationality of terrorists themselves, work by Caplan (2006) suggests that the supporters of terrorism should be considered rational on the basis of the existing evidence. Assuming that this threshold is met, rational choice theories tend to focus on utility maximisation and the process by which costs and benefits are weighed. Given the interests of economists (by far the largest group seeking to advance rational choice explanations of support for terrorism), the overwhelming majority of these have sought to examine the impact of economic circumstance on support for violence, with models frequently arguing that individuals are more likely to endorse radical action where they are subject to poverty or socioeconomic disadvantage. Early work by Fearon and Laitin (2003)\(^8\) provides some support for this view by showing low economic development to be a predictor of support for violence. Yet despite the clear and straightforward nature of the theoretical link, subsequent work\(^9\) by Fair and Shepher (2006), Krueger and Maleckova (2003), Abadie (2005) and Kueger (2008) has questioned the presence of a linear relationship by finding no clear connection between economic development, poverty, relative financial disadvantage and support for violence. Berrebi (2009) argues that this lack of consensus discounts a simple model, suggesting that any relationship is

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\(^8\) Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) work used macro-level data to map the conditions in which support for violence – particularly civil wars – emerged in the post-cold war world.

\(^9\) As with Fearon and Laitin (2003), this additional evidence generally employs macro-level data.
probably the result of a more sophisticated process of influence, and in this, work by Matovich and Worgotter (2007) linking poverty with corruption offers a potential explanation. Indeed, Abadie (2005) highlights that political suppression is a potent indicator of support for violence, lending support to the assertion that poverty and inequality may simply proxy the presence of broken political systems.

Work exploring the impact of political circumstance on support for violence is, however, equally unclear, with the so-called Strategic School positing a link between democracy and increased incidence of terrorism (as democracies are more open and less able to retaliate against attackers) and the Political Access School suggesting the opposite (arguing that democracies provide numerous alternative avenues for political engagement, and therefore raise the relative cost of terrorism) (Eyerman, 1998). Both arguments possess prima facie validity, with numerous studies providing support for both the former (Pape, 2005; San-Akca, 2013) and the latter (Crenshaw, 1981; Corrado and Evans, 1988; Kivimaki, 2007; Nasir, Ali and Rahman, 2011) views. Recent work by Pedahzur (2013) has sought to resolve this contradiction by arguing for a greater focus on differences in the modus operandi and goals of domestic and international terrorist organisations, however more recent analysis by Lutz and Lutz (2010) has suggested that the picture may be more nuanced still, arguing the need for a more involved consideration of individual level motivation.

Indeed, as much of the data used to explore this relationship addresses macro-level governance characteristics, its use to support a theory of individual motivation falls foul of the ecological fallacy identified as a
shortcoming of much research in this area. More than this, in assuming that
democracy is a monolithic structure it fails to take account of national
differences capable of influencing its attractiveness as a strategy – for
example, corruption, remoteness, and fairness – neglecting the role of the
individual perceptions that play a crucial role in shaping the decision making
calculus (Berrebi, 2009).

A broader, albeit less well investigated, model is offered by Wintrobe’s
(2005) calculus of discontent, with its focus on the factors driving the
individual level decision making process. While not a model of support for
terrorism as such, Wintrobe’s work represents an attempt to provide a
general economic framework through which the influences shaping the
decision to engage in radical action may be considered. Drawing on
Galeotti’s (2002) typology of extremism, he distinguishes between extreme
action (of which terrorism is an example) and extreme ideology (for example,
the desire to implement a religious theocracy), arguing that terrorism and
violent action (and thus, support for both) need not be the exclusive property
of groups and individuals who are in possession of an extreme ideology
(Wintrobe, 2005, p4). Noting that extreme methods are intrinsically risky, he
identifies that their adoption is most likely where groups are ‘frozen out’ and
denied access to alternative strategies by which to achieve their goals, citing
refusal to engage with a groups’ political demands on the part of mainstream
parties, barriers to political access, and the possibility of securing enhanced
concessions through violence as potential triggers for terrorism (Wintrobe,
2005, p8). In this, he draws close links between his work and that of
criminological theorists including Becker (1968) and Agnew (1992) whose
work posits that criminality is the result of a similar calculus, with criminal action chosen by individuals faced with few alternative options, or where crime represents an improved chance of securing their goals.

The factors that shape whether individuals perceive themselves to be ‘frozen out’ are, however, left unspecified, as is the role played by ideology in shaping the selection of tactics. Indeed, few attempts have been made to employ rational choice theory to explain the role of personal philosophy in influencing the choice of violence, despite evidence to suggest a clear linkage between certain – particularly religious – beliefs and support for violence. Work by Zhirkov, Verkuyten and Weesie (2013) for example suggests that support for violence may well be higher amongst those holding extreme religious ideologies, while Haddad (2004) found that the espousal of political Islam was a determinant of greater support for suicide attacks in the Lebanon.

This lacuna arguably reflects the intrinsic irrationality – in economic terms – of ideology and religious belief (Bruce, 1993), the self-conscious secularity of social scientists (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985), and debates over the irreligious nature of allegedly religious terrorists (Berrebi, 2009, p.152). As a result, only one major attempt has been made to use rational choice models to explain religion’s influence on terrorism, with Lawrence Iannacone (1992;1994;1998) advancing the so-called ‘club goods’ model to explain the growth in, and use of, violence by extreme religious sects. His contention, subsequently reiterated and extended by Berman (2009), suggests that radical religious groups prosper because they can successfully recruit and retain members through the provision of social services unavailable outside
the group. The sacrifice of resources and adoption by adherents of external signifiers of group membership imbued with social stigma reduces the risk of defection, countering free-riding while also making the group more tightly integrated, interdependent, and thus, more capable of engaging in extreme actions such as terrorism (Iannacone and Berman, 2006).

**Critiques**

Rational choice approaches are subject to several general criticisms, most commonly in respect of the allegedly 'impoverished' view of human motivation (Miller, 1999) that approaches rooted in economics present. As Posner (1997) notes real-world decision making is seldom as rational as it appears in the laboratory setting, and critics have subsequently sought to argue that humans do not – in the real world - make decisions on the basis of the core principles of classical rational choice theory (Bruce and Yearley, 2006); in short they do not always behave rationally, make decisions on the basis of the facts, or receive a benefit for their actions.

In respect of the latter point, criticism focusses on the classic formulations of rational choice theory that argue that the sole motivation for rational actions is self-interest. These criticisms cite the fact that many outcomes – particularly in respect of violence - do not offer a direct personal benefit, and are, therefore, difficult to explain using a traditional application of rational choice theory. In the context of the study of terrorism and political violence suicide attacks are frequently cited as an example of this paradox, with their
high personal costs and non-obvious benefits hard to explain under this framework (Pape, 2005).

Such critiques are similar to the arguments advanced to challenge the use of rational choice theory to explain political participation, with Olson’s (1965) seminal work on the economics of political science, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, arguing that rational actors shouldn’t engage in collective action to pursue common ends. In response to this, Whiteley (1995) identifies three broad approaches under which collective action may be deemed rational – the first assuming that the costs and benefits are too low to be calculated, the second drawing on folk theorem to assert an N-case prisoners dilemma (subject to a focus on future gains, an ongoing game, uncertainty as to its end, and the ability of the group to punish defectors), and the third arguing for altruism.

While Whietely (1995) concluded that none of these approaches provided an adequate explanation for mainstream political co-operation, instead arguing that rational choice was an incomplete and limited theory when applied to political collective action, his work expressly identified the possibility that each explanation could – in isolation – be successfully applied to explain specific modes of political engagement. In the context of support for violence, perhaps the most obvious would be his first and final suggestions, implying that the costs are either too low to justify calculation or the result of a mix of personal benefit and altruistic concerns for the broader group. In respect of the former approach, while public declarations of support for violence may incur cost via social censure and unwanted state attention, it is unlikely that such sentiments would be expressed in public, being instead left unsaid or
restricted to discussion with other known supporters of violence. More than this, in the context of quantitative data collection affirming support for violence has no personal consequences at all – it is confidential, lacks consequences, and is thus unlikely to represent a cost. As such, it seems unlikely that support for violence could be considered to incur cost at all.

Similarly, the goal in support of which terrorism was endorsed would seem an obvious example of an outcome with both personal and altruistic benefits; the individual, as a member of a broader social movement, is likely to benefit from the actions of any group that he endorses. As such, this line of criticism is unlikely to pose serious problems in terms of the subject of enquiry of this thesis.

The former critiques are, however, harder to refute, particularly in respect of evidence suggesting that individual behaviours are frequently chosen on the basis of emotions or feelings rather than a rational weighing of costs and benefits (Bourdieu, 1995). More than this, the assumption that decision making employs full and relevant information (Bruce and Yearley, 2006) seems easy to refute, with many decisions clearly made on the basis of irrelevant or partial information. This is accepted, however the basic premise of rational choice approaches – that individuals choose what appears to be the best possible approach (rational) on the basis of a decision making process (choice) – seems irrefutable, even if the inputs considered as part of this process are imperfect.

Arguments accepting this imperfection are frequently advanced under the banner of bounded rationality, a family of sub-theories that accept the
decision making process to be limited on the basis of factors including the information the individual possess and the length of time they have to decide. Under such an approach, the objective standard for full and relevant facts is accepted to be unrealistic; rather, the individual is believed to make what they perceive to be the best choice possible on the basis of the information they have and subject to the time limits they face.

In respect of emotions no academic consensus is clear (Archer and Tritter, 2000), with some scholars arguing that classical rational choice presents emotions and cognition as discrete spheres (Thaler, 2000) and others arguing that boundary between them is blurred (Barbalet, 2002). Certainly, as England and Kilbourne (1990) note, the idea that cognition and emotion are wholly unrelated processes seems unrealistic; emotions are clearly capable of shaping preferences and perceptions, and can therefore be accommodated in rational choice models (Minagawa, 2013).

In addition to these general comments, specific critiques are also possible for the evidence claimed in support of the specific rational choice models identified above. Pape’s (2005) work in particular has been criticized on a number of fronts, most notably by Fine (2008) who suggests that the theory’s findings rest on inaccurate data produced as a result of ‘gerrymandering’ out inter-group Islamic violence in the Middle East, the consequence of which is an inaccurate representation of the volume of religious terrorism, possibly biasing the subsequent assertion that religion does not shape recourse to suicide terrorism. Additionally, the CPOST Suicide Terrorism Database, on which Pape’s study bases its analysis, is plagued by large amounts of missing data, particularly in respect of the demographic characteristics of
individual attackers (CPOST, 2011). The absence of such data renders the making of inferences about the individual characteristics of suicide terrorists impossible, raising serious questions about its usefulness. Similarly, Berman’s (2009) research is subject to critique on the basis of its failure to adequately explain the use of suicide terrorism against seemingly poorly defended targets, something that has grown to become a hallmark of Islamic violence since the 7/7 bombing of the London Underground.

A broader critique of both approaches focusses on assessments of the efficacy of violent tactics, noting that terrorist groups generally do not define success on the basis of an increased body count. While the underlying logic of both Berman (2009) and Pape (2003) suggests that increased lethality improves the chance of a group extracting concessions from their targets, it is hard to see how a raised death toll would automatically lead to more concessions. While the early use of suicide attacks may well have had success in triggering the withdrawal of Western forces from Lebanon (Kaplan, 2008), and much has been made of the role played by the Madrid bombings in toppling the government of Jose Maria Aznar (Canel, 2012), there is little evidence to suggest that terrorism is successful in securing the goals and objectives of its perpetrators in the current political climate. Indeed, while it is possible that terrorism may force a popular revolt against the government, forcing a change in policies to address the alleged cause of violence, it is equally possible that a raised death toll may simply provoke a more robust response from the attacked state – as with the ‘war on terror’ – ultimately impeding or halting the group’s progress towards the fulfilment of its ultimate goals. While some (Rapoport, 1984) have argued that such a
robust response may in itself be a rational tactical aim, it is hard to see how such a view can be sustained when the fortunes of many terrorist groups engaged in such action in recent years - not least Al-Qaeda - have not been positive.

Furthermore, while Iannaconne’s theory can explain why, in some cases, radical religious groups are successful at recruiting members and organizing terrorist activity, they cannot explain why religious terrorism has expanded so dramatically in recent years. Indeed, the suggestion that religious groups succeed in recruiting members to terrorism because of their provision of social services (Berman, 2009) neglects the fact that, historically, far more social services were provided by religious groups than is currently the case (Hall, 2002). Thus, were the provision of social services the main factor facilitating religious group terrorism (Berman, 2009), one would expect to see a more consistent volume of activity over the last 100 years. While it is possible to counter such an argument by suggesting that the increase in religious terrorism reflects a combination of factors, including the decline of religion’s social influence, such an argument is fallacious: rather, if religious groups were to rebel against the coming of secularism, one would have expected an earlier start.

Additionally, while such an explanation is capable of explaining the recruitment and retention of individuals from low socio-economic groups in developing states in which religious groups provide many services, it cannot adequately explain the recruitment of prosperous individuals in Western nations. Particularly given the demographic profile of most religious terrorists active in Europe and the USA (see Quillam, 2010) such an argument is
highly problematic; the provision of services by the welfare state would seem to negate the rationale for involvement in a religiously extreme group.

Similarly, despite the support lent to the assumption of terrorist rationality by case and psychological studies of known terrorists, there is a clear tension between their broader findings and those of studies using principally quantitative macro-level data. Indeed, the latter tend to neglect the role of individual level factors in shaping the decision to engage in acts of terrorism (see Pape, 2005; Berman, 2009; Iannacone and Berman, 2006), while the former often affirm a prominent role for peer influence and religious imperatives (see Jurgensmeyer, 2000; Malik, 2009; Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010).

Furthermore, as Victoroff (2005) notes, rational choice theory is restricted to explaining terrorism as a rational choice, and cannot provide any explanation of the underlying reasons that drive an individual to support – or become - a terrorist. If terrorism were purely the outcome of a rational weighing of factors, then one would assume that more people would chose to engage in such action; clearly this has not been the case, suggesting the need for a consideration of additional underlying grievance in furtherance of which terrorism is supported.

However, perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the rational choice approach is, as Crenshaw (2000), has noted, the lack of rationality in the expectation of success. Indeed, given the relative inefficacy of terrorist campaigns, few can have a legitimate belief in the benefit of their actions which, from a rational choice perspective, ought to preclude the employment
of such tactics. However, while this critique is accepted, from the standpoint of rational choice it is submitted that such a question is, in some respects, redundant: the rational individual need only show that the employment of terrorism yields a better return than any less costly alternative for the decision to be considered rational. The motive to act at all, and the belief on the basis of which action is made, are, it is submitted, outside the bounds of rationality, representing properly beliefs and preferences that, by definition, need not be ‘rational’ at all.

2.4 Other approaches

While rational choice and moral imperative approaches dominate the study of contemporary terrorism, a number of other theories have been advanced to explain the phenomenon, perhaps the most significant of which are individual level biological and psychological theories.

Approaches considering the shaping of behaviour through the paradigm of mental health are not new. Indeed, the investigation of such individual level factors can be traced back to the work of Lombroso (1876) in attempting to isolate the biological characteristics that separated criminals and non-criminals.

While his work was subsequently discredited (Coleman and Norris, 2004), recent research has rekindled an interest in the behaviour shaping role of biological factors, suggesting that far from being deterministic and irrelevant, they are one of the main factors influencing involvement in delinquency (Rutter et al, 1998). Monozygotic twin studies (Raine, 1993) and research on
the impact of adoption (Mednick et al, 1987) have strengthened this view, leading some to affirm a role, albeit ill defined, for genetic factors (see Mednick and Finelloa, 1983).

In the context of terrorism, the picture presented by the current literature is somewhat less clear, as a significantly smaller volume of research exists on the role of biological factors, making the definitive identification of their role extremely difficult.

Despite this, recent research by Alcorta (2010) suggests that biological factors may yet be capable of shedding light on the issue of terrorist motivation, identifying that, in the context of male adolescence, a range of physiological factors combine to increase the susceptibility of the individual to involvement in terrorism. While her argument seems convincing, no further research expressly investigating the role of biology is available; however, as criminological research indicates that biological predisposition may well be one of the most important factors in determining involvement in criminal activity (Rutter et al, 1998), a similar relationship for terrorism cannot be ruled out. In the absence of further research, all that can be reliably stated is that biological factors may influence predisposition to involvement in terrorism, though the extent, if any, to which such factors have an impact remains unclear.

A similarly 'scant' body of evidence exists on the psychological profiles of terrorists (Shafqat, 2010), with the little research available often painting a picture at odds with itself. For example, research by Akhtar (1999) suggests that, in general, terrorist leaders are deeply psychologically traumatized...
individuals, a point lent credence by Kellen’s (1990) study of West German terrorists and Hubbard’s (1971) profile of those involved in skyjacking. By contrast, Rash’s investigation of West German terrorism (1979), Clark’s study of ETA (1983) and Heskin’s evaluation of the IRA (1984) suggest that terrorists have no discernibly psychopathic traits, while research by Jurgensmeyer (2000) suggests that Islamic extremists are in most psychological respects ‘normal’.

Review papers by both Hudson’s (1999) and Borum (2007) have, to some extent, clarified the issue, reiterating Colvard’s (2002) contention that terrorists are, in the psychological sense of the word, normal. However, it is important to note that the shallow research base may present an inaccurate picture.

Additionally, as with research on biological factors, it seems logical to suggest that, as Akhtar’s (1999) study of terrorist psychology identifies, predisposed individuals require an external environmental ‘trigger’ to initiate their involvement in terrorism. If this is the case, then psychological factors, much like biological factors, would, in isolation, be insufficient cause for involvement; they are less the ultimate cause and more a proximate factor predisposing the individual to involvement in terrorism.

If this is accepted then the issue of a terrorist profile, while interesting, is unlikely to lead to policy relevant findings; traits that predispose involvement may well have a broader prevalence in society than just those involved in terrorism, making the identification of would-be attackers impossible using this information alone (Hudson, 1999).
Similarly, a range of theories from another mainstream tradition, based on research into social and environmental factors, are subject to much scholarly disagreement; a number of distinct theoretical expressions exist in this tradition, the most notable of which is the material deprivation hypothesis.

Such an approach suggests that, far from being a rational choice, terrorists are drawn or driven to take part in terrorism (Berrebi, 2009) because of a lack of education, finance, or social stature. The disparity between actual worth and perceived worth, in the absence of solutions capable of raising the individual's stature to the level they deem appropriate, results in engagement in violent action as a result of frustration (Gurr, 1970; Berkowitz, 1987). Agnew’s (2010) strain theory presents a similar interpretation, differing only in its assertion that terrorism is an attempt to alleviate the ‘strain’ of failure arising from an individual’s inability to realise their self-expectations rather than as a frustrated or aggressive response.


By contrast, work by both Malik (2009) and Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2011) advances an alternate view, suggesting that individuals may be drawn to violent extremism because of the ‘street cred’ conferred by involvement in violent and terrorist groups.
Such an approach seems convincing, particularly in light of research on peer group value adoption, indicating that individuals adapt their views to match those of their peers (Suhay, 2010). This lends support to the view that exposure to a radical group may well lead to realignment and radicalization of the views of individual members (Goldberg, 1954). However, while such a suggestion seems logical, it is important to remember that terrorism is subject to significant social censure in the developed world. Adopting violent political views requires a substantially greater change than adopting a group’s opinions on a less serious issue; thus, while one could imagine that individuals may engage in such groups because of the potential increase in ‘respect’ from their peers, it is a huge leap of reasoning to suggest that they would automatically engage in terrorism because their fellow group members pressure them so to do. Particularly in the context of suicide terrorism, some degree of commitment to the cause seems a pre-requisite for sacrificing oneself in its name; if the decision to become a member of an extremist group is as opportunistic as Malik (2009) suggests, one cannot help but question whether members would have the requisite degree of commitment to make such a sacrifice.

2.5 A Revised Theory of Support for Terrorism

As a result of the deficiencies identified in the existing theoretical approaches, it is submitted that a new way of understanding the drivers of support for terrorism is possible. Specifically, the opportunity exists to develop a revised application of rational choice theory that addresses the
criticisms made of existing approaches, offering an insight into both the motivation of the supporters of violence and thus the structural roots of violence itself. More than this, as both current applications of rational choice theory and explanations grounded in assumptions of moral imperative fail to account for the sociological literature on the impact of religious practice on values and behaviours, opportunities also exist for a new theory to break fresh ground. The remainder of this chapter will seek to address this shortcoming, advancing a fresh application of rational choice theory that is capable of addressing these shortcomings.

**The Background**

While Hudson (1999) is right to identify that terrorism is a multi-causal phenomenon, the goals and causes for which differ from group to group, at a basic level it would seem logical to assert that the endorsement of violence requires a grievance. Terrorism and political violence are, as Bloom (2011) identifies, tactics of last resort, with their high costs deterring uptake except amongst the most dissatisfied. As such, for violence to be endorsed, an individual must – as suggested in the preface for this chapter – believe that the social contract between the individual and the state has been contravened.

Assuming the presence of such a grievance, a valid theory should be able to provide an account of the reasons that violence has been chosen in preference to other non-violent strategies. While different terrorist groups have diverse goals, it is entirely logical to assume that – as both Wintrobe
(2005) and Eyerman (1998) acknowledge – the existence of alternative strategies should reduce the likelihood of an individual endorsing violence. Given Hudson’s (1999) work asserting the rationality of terrorists and the likelihood that the supporters of violence will also therefore be rational, it seems fair to suggest that the choice of strategy will be made on the basis of the individual’s assessment as to which approach represents the best balancing of costs and benefits.

However while such an approach is *prima facie* convincing, it is important to remember that each alternative does not have fixed costs, and that different actors may perceive a single strategy in different ways. Having access to an alternate strategy for pursuing policy objectives is therefore not, in itself, sufficient to prevent support for terrorism. From the standpoint of a rational actor, confidence in the capacity –on a practical level – of alternative actions to yield results would seem an important pre-requisite for its adoption; to prove an attractive strategy, the individual must believe that it will be effective.

If this argument is accepted, then support for violence would depend not merely on the presence of alternative options, but on the influences that shape how these alternatives are perceived. In the context of democratic political engagement – perhaps the most obvious alternative to violence (at least in the developed world) – this would comprise the factors that shape how mainstream politics is perceived, including (but not limited to): trust in government, trust in politicians, political influence, and fairness.
However, if democratic politics was seen to be fair, but the systems through which policy was implemented were seen to be corrupt, democratic engagement would not represent an attractive strategy. Consequently, support for violence may also be influenced by concerns related to the probity of those responsible for the implementation and enforcement of policy.

Similarly as the literature on religious and political group ideology suggests that certain organizations may be ideologically hostile to democracy, membership of these groups may dictate the adherent’s willingness – on a systemic level – to consider the idea of political engagement as a strategy (most notably the assertion by some radical Islamic clerics that democracy is haram (forbidden) - Saalih al-Munajjid, 2014). In such circumstances, even if democratic alternatives to violence were accessible, and were seen to be an effective, their uptake would be unlikely.

Considering these factors together will – it is submitted – provide a basis for approximating an individual’s perception of the attractiveness of democracy as a strategy for pursuing their political goals. As such, this thesis argues that these attitudes to democratic politics will predict support for terrorism and political violence. More than this, as the academic literature suggests that types of group involvement (including certain types of religious groups) may shape perceptions of the factors underpinning individual’s perceptions of democratic engagement, it seems reasonable to argue that this approach offers the possibility for rational choice theory to explain religion’s influence on support for terrorism. Structurally, such a model can be represented as detailed below.
In support of this assertion, the following section offers an overview of the anecdotal and academic evidence capable of supporting this approach.

2.6 Attitudes to Democracy and Violence: Academic Evidence

Despite the paucity of empirical literature exploring the role played by individual perceptions of the efficacy of democratic engagement on support
for violence, it is possible to make a preliminary case for my theory using existing research.

Indeed, it has long been argued that individual perceptions play a significant role in shaping recourse to violence, with Crenshaw (1981) – while denying the possibility of a unified theory of terrorism- noting that individuals are more likely to endorse violence if they believe there to be no viable alternatives. Piazza (2007) has similarly drawn a link between failed states and violence, while Corrado and Evans (1988) work on radical leftist terrorism has argued that political organisations chose violent means precisely because of the perceived deficiencies of democratic engagement.

On an more quantitative level, in addition to the research evidence claimed in support of the Political Access School of rational choice theory, work by Nasir, Ali and Rehman (2011) suggests a link between terrorism and social repression or the restriction of civil and political rights, while Morse (2006), working on selectorate theory\(^\text{10}\) and support for terrorism, showed a positive correlation between the size of a governing party’s electoral majority and support for violence by non-state actors. Similarly, research on the English Defence League (EDL) by Bartlett and Littler (2011) affirmed a relationship between support for political violence, generalized trust and confidence in public institutions, with those that strongly agreed with the statement that ‘Violence is justified to ensure the right outcome’ more likely to exhibit low levels of generalized trust and confidence in political institutions (including

\(^\text{10}\) With roots in the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) selectorate theory argues that political leaders aim principally to stay in power, and that to this end make decisions principally to appeal to those whose support makes the difference between retaining and losing power (the winning coalition) rather than benefiting either the broader community contributing to the selection process (the real selectorate) or those eligible but non-contributing (the nominal selectorate).
the Government, Police, Parliament and Judiciary) than those who less strongly supported or rejected the statement.

Cherney and Povey’s (2013) study of support for violence in majority Sunni Muslim countries found that membership of the Shia Muslim minority correlated with support for violence, while Morgenstern (2009) found that Muslims were less supportive of terrorism if they lived in a functioning democracy, highlighting the importance of asymmetrical power relationship\(^\text{11}\) in determining the strategic calculus suggested by my theory.

In respect of the impact of religion on democratic valence, a broad body of literature has affirmed the possibility of certain types of group involvement eroding social and political trust – the so-called ‘dark side’ of social capital (Portes and Landolt, 1996) – with Welch, Sikkin, Sartain and Bond (2004) highlighting that the high levels of bonding social capital that characterise some conservative and fundamentalist groups depletes the bridging social capital on which out group trust depends, something that Putnam (1993) – although broadly affirming a positive relationship between religion and social trust – implicitly affirms with his suggestion as to the impact of pre-Vatican II Catholicism on trust and co-operation norms in Italy. Work by Diamond (1995) expands this argument, suggesting that certain extreme and fundamentalist Christian groups are characterised by distrust of (particularly US federal) government,

In the context of Islam Traunmuller (2011) asserts that many Muslims see themselves as outside the political mainstream, leading them to distrust the

\(^{11}\) That is to say, the strategic calculus is shaped by the comparative weakness of the attacker, and the comparative strength of the state.
institutions of the secular state, a point affirmed by both Uslaner (2003) and Macua, MacDonald and Haug (2005), who highlight that Muslims distrust Western secularism (Macua et al, 2005) and are less trusting than Christians (Uslaner, 2003, p.181) respectively. While Maxwell (2010) questions this picture, suggesting that British Muslims are often more trusting of politics than the indigenous Christian mainstream, Crul and Vermeulen (2003) highlight the possibility that this may be complicated by generational effects, while Field (2007) suggests an opposing picture in claiming that British Muslims are, in many respects, politically alienated.

Research by Haddad (2004) operationalises this link, showing a clear relationship between the endorsement of militant and political Islam and support for suicide attacks in the Lebanon, with work by Zhirkov, Verkuyten and Weeisie (2013) providing further credibility for claims of a link by showing that support for violence was higher amongst those who oppose democracy on religious groups, frequently citing the alien nature of democracy and the problem of Western economic interference in the affairs of the Islamic world.

2.7 Attitudes to Democracy and Violence: Real-World Perspectives

In addition to the academic research evidence, it is also possible to make a case for my theory using real world examples. Evidence on groups including Hezbollah (Harik, 2005), the Christian Identity Movement (Sharpe, 2000), American Abortion Activists (Glendon, 1987), the Khalistan Commando Force (Jurgensmeyer, 2004), Jewish extremists (Ben-Yehuda, 2010) and
Aum Shinrikyo (Brackett, 1996) supports the approach I have suggested, linking violent activity and involvement in democratic processes. However, given the comparably short durations of these campaigns, it is difficult to claim them to provide definitive support.

A closer examination of two long-running struggles – the IRA in Northern Ireland, and the Israel-Palestine conflict – provides a more nuanced picture, giving a more reliable basis for the linking of democratic valence and support for – and engagement in – violent action and terrorism.

*Israel-Palestine Conflict*

The Israel-Palestine conflict has roots that reach back over a century, arguably starting in the years directly following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by allied forces at the conclusion of the First World War (Smith, 2010). Finding common cause against a mutual foe, Muslims and Jews were initially willing to work together (as evidenced by the 1919 Faisal-Weizmann agreement), with discord between the two groups rising only after the emergence of more hard-line Arab nationalism in the British Mandate of Palestine following the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian War in 1920 (Chaitani, 2007).

With the expiry of the British mandate in Palestine the establishment of a Jewish homeland became a reality, with international backing outside of the Middle East ensured through the passage of United Nations Resolution 118(II). Opposition from neighbouring states ensued throughout the following
years, quietening only after the 1967 Six Day War that established *de facto* Israeli sovereignty in Gaza and the West Bank (Smith, 2010).

The population of these territories were left under Israeli military control, but without access to democratic representation and means of raising political grievances. Consequently, from the early 1970s onwards dissatisfied Palestinian militants began to engage in acts of terrorism against Israel, with a view to forcing its withdrawal. Rocket attacks and assassinations grew to become common through the 1980s, with Israel continuing to respond with violence and repression. Following the first intifada in the late 1980s the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 saw a reduction in levels of violence and a return to relative peace, with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the introduction of – albeit limited -democracy with elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council offering a conduit through which grievances could be resolved. However, Israeli-imposed limitations on the movement of members (preventing meetings) and restrictions on its interaction with the international community prevented its effective operation, lead to growing frustration amongst the Palestinian community. With the election of Hamas in 2006, and the resulting Israeli crack-down, the parliament has – in essence – ceased to function. While recent moves to normalize the status of Palestine under international law – most notably, through the United Nations General Assembly – have done much to promote Palestine’s cause, the absence of a functioning democracy or meaningful engagement with the Israeli state have prevented this from providing a realistic forum through which Palestinians can advance their political goals, resulting in a return to violence.
Republican Violence in Northern Ireland

As with the Israel-Palestine conflict, the roots of ‘The Troubles’ stretch back a significant length of time, arguably stemming from the Norman invasion in 1169 (Coogan, 1996), the plantation of Ulster in the 1600’s (Muldoon, 2004) or the great potato famine (Derkins, 2003). Non-state violence had long played a part in Ireland’s quest for independence from Britain, with attacks by the Fenian Brotherhood on Canada (then a part of the British Empire) occurring on several occasions throughout the Victorian era (Senior, 1991). With the Easter rising and resultant civil war resolved by the partition of Ireland in 1922, six counties from the province of Ulster (Co. Antrim, Co. Armagh, Co. Down, Co. Fermanagh, and Co. Tyrone) were preserved under British administration as Northern Ireland. Each possessed a significant protestant majority, leaving Catholics unable to exert significant influence on the democratic process.

The subsequent gerrymandering of boundaries in the 1920’s (Tonge, 2012) further exacerbated this problem, making the goal of the Catholic population – reunification of Ireland – unlikely through political means. In so doing, the Northern Irish authorities set the conditions for violence to be embraced as a strategy, a point lent credence by the sporadic nationalist violence that took place through the following decades.

The prospect of a non-violent resolution to the Catholic community’s demands was, however, present through the 1920’s-1960’s, and as such, the incidence of violence remains comparably low. Demonstrations in favour of enhanced civil rights protection for Catholics occurred into the 1960’s,
however with hostility from Unionists fearful of back door unification with Ireland triggering a crack-down on non-violent demonstrations and leading to the fall of Terence O’Neill’s (comparably conciliatory) government, access to these alternative options was curtailed.

As it became harder to secure political concessions through non-violent means the republican community increasingly became engaged in violence, with the following thirty years showing a clear link between levels of republican violence and the success of mainstream republican politics. Violence was low – and sometimes even non-existent – during periods of negotiation with the British, and often high when negotiations stalled or collapsed. This pattern persisted until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, after which the majority of militant republican groups laid down their arms.

In both cases the evidence suggests a clear link between meaningful democratic engagement and the suspension of violent activity. The success of negotiations between the IRA and the British Government shadowed the level of terrorist violence throughout the late 20th century, with the onset of negotiations marked by ceasefires and collapses followed by a return to violence. Only with the Good Friday agreement securing meaningful concessions towards the goals of the group was violence ended. Likewise, in respect of the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict the success of negotiations links clearly with the level of violence perpetrated against Israel. The Oslo Accords heralded a period of relative calm, with the violence of recent years
mirroring the difficulties in implementing its goals. Of particular interest is the recent increase in violence, despite the presence of a legislature and nominally democratic political system - suggesting that (in line with my theory) recourse to violence is contingent on the political process being perceived as effective and capable of delivering real change.

2.8 Conclusions

This chapter has sought to offer an overview of the academic context in which my work is sited. It has presented the principal theoretical approaches used to explain individual involvement in terrorism, focussing on rational choice and ideological motivation approaches as the predominant strands of contemporary thought, alongside a critical discussion of their deficiencies and limitations. On the basis of these shortcomings it has argued for a fresh understanding of the roots of support for political violence that concedes the importance of individual perceptions of democratic efficacy, identifying the key elements that shape these perceptions as a basis for specifying a new theory. It has also provided a discussion of the supporting anecdotal and academic evidence alongside a consideration of the limitations of this approach.

More than this, it has illustrated how support for religious terrorism may be accommodated in this model through a consideration of the social impact of religious practice\textsuperscript{12} on attitudes towards political engagement, highlighting

\textsuperscript{12} While social exposure to co-religionists is accepted to be possible across a range of situations – for example through socialising, shared education, or in the workplace – other than through attendance at a place of worship, this thesis will limit its exploration of religion’s
literature showing the impact of extreme and hierarchical group participation on perceptions of democracy and government.

The remainder of this thesis will seek to subject the elements of this theory to detailed investigation, employing the analysis of both existing social survey data and an on-line experiment. These approaches have been chosen in preference to the collection of fresh data given the cost and time limitations imposed by PhD level study, and the analysis of aggregate level data as – while more common, and thus easier to compare to the existing body of literature – such an approach would not allow for the exploration of the individual level relationships underlying my theory, preventing the making of reliable inferences in respect of personal motivation. Similarly, while the additional use of qualitative data would have provided for a more thorough investigation (and was envisioned in the original proposal), University ethics guidelines prohibited the conduct of interviews with known supporters of violence, precluding the use of this approach.

The following chapter presents the results of the first block of secondary data analysis, employing data from the most recent wave of the European Values study to provide a *prima facie* test of my theory in respect of the British population at large. This is followed by a chapter presenting the results of analysis using the Ethnic Minority British Election Study as a means of validating the results of the first empirical chapter, and of exploring the application of my theory to explain support for religious terrorism. Finally, the social impact to regular religious practice (as measured by frequency of attendance at a place of worship). It is accepted that this is an imperfect proxy - and that bias may therefore result from this choice - however in the absence of variables facilitating a more in-depth exploration of the phenomenon, no better approach was possible (a fuller discussion of the potential limitations stemming from this choice is provided in the methodological preface to the chapter presenting the results of the analysis using data from EMBES [Chapter 4]).
third empirical chapter presents the results of analysis using experimental data collected using the social networking site Facebook, with a view to providing a robust basis for the making of causal inferences in support of the correlations identified in the preceding chapters.
3. Democratic Valence and Support for Terrorism: Methods, Data, Results and Discussion

This chapter provides a preliminary investigation of the theory advanced in the review of theory and research, specifically arguing that support for political violence is shaped by the individual’s perception of the attractiveness of democratic political engagement. It employs quantitative analysis to explore the role of a range of factors—trust in politicians, executive agencies, and political institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and perceptions of access and fair treatment—in determining satisfaction in with democratic political engagement (hereafter democratic valence), as well as the role played by political grievances in shaping the relationship.

Adopting the rational choice approach outlined in the preceding chapter, I start from the assumption that terrorism is a strategy (Bassiouni, 1975) chosen by rational actors (Hudson, 1999) in pursuit of political goals (Harris, 2006), and that as such those with a grievance should decide whether to endorse it—as a course of action—by weighing its potential costs and benefits against a range of strategic alternatives. Building on insights from work examining terrorism (Berman, 2009; Pape, 2005), criminal activity (Leeson, 1993) and electoral behaviour (Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley, 2011), I argue that the intrinsic attractiveness of any strategy is shaped by the individual’s view of its likely efficacy, and that as such the most appealing course of action will be the one that offers the greatest chance of success relative to its perceived costs.
As violent approaches generally incur higher costs (including public censure, provocation of state response, risk of reprisal) and lower benefits (as a result of factors including target hardening and target group non-response) than non-violent approaches, they will usually be avoided. Crucially, however, if the perceived efficacy of non-violent alternatives is low, violent methods may – despite their high cost - represent better ‘value’ and individuals may choose to endorse them as the most attractive course of action. I argue that these views as to the attractiveness of democratic protest are shaped by a number of factors including trust in politicians, parliament and the police, beliefs concerning fair treatment by government, systemic satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of political influence and access, and that as such, where these are negatively perceived, democratic action will be viewed less favourably, reducing its attractiveness compared to violent alternatives and therefore increasing the chance of support for violent action.

In isolation democratic valence may, however, present a misleading picture. Given the view of terrorism and political violence as strategy (Bassiouni, 1975; Harris, 2006) it seems logical to suggest that violence will not be employed by all who report negative democratic valence; rather, violence should be supported only in pursuit of a political grievance. If such a view is accepted only those who report both negative democratic valence and a grievance are likely to support violent action: those with positive democratic valence and a grievance are likely to turn to democratic politics, while those without a grievance are likely to remain disengaged – though more or less open to non-violent politics depending on their perceptions of the political
process. A schematic representation of this model is presented in Figure 2, below.

**Figure 2 - Schematic Representation of Proposed Rational Choice Model of Support for Terrorism and Political Violence**

Starting by detailing my hypotheses I will present an overview of my method before giving the results of the bivariate tests and the findings from the regression analyses. I will then offer a discussion of the academic and policy
significance of my results, before concluding with an overview of the research' limitations and a brief conclusion placing this chapter in the context of the thesis as a whole.

3.1 Hypotheses

To summarize, my research and null hypotheses are as follows:

- **H₁**: Democratic Valence directly affects support for violence.
- **H₂**: The effect of Democratic Valence on support for terrorism is contingent on the presence of a Grievance.

3.2 Null Hypotheses

- **H₀₁**: Democratic Valence has no impact on the probability of supporting violent demonstrations.
- **H₀₂**: The effect of Democratic Valence on support for terrorism is not contingent on the presence of a Grievance.

3.3 Methods

3.3.1 Data

Analysis employed the British sub sample of the fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS). Collected by Quality Fieldwork & Research Services
during 2008, the data comprised responses collected from 1,561 face to face interviews. Respondents were targeted on the basis of a sample designed by UK Geographics, employing a multi-stage cluster design that targeted respondents on the basis of local authority and Office for National Statistics Super Output Area in order to provide proportionate coverage of all geographic areas excluding the Scottish Isles and Highlands\textsuperscript{13} (GESIS, 2010). Despite a low response rate\textsuperscript{14} (GESIS, 2010) the final sample was representative in terms of Age, Gender, and Education level (GESIS, 2010), with weights used to correct for low response.

The decision to use the EVS was taken as it offers a large nationally representative sample while also offering indicators of support for terrorism and social and political attitudes allowing for the formation of measures for grievance and democratic valence.

Of the study’s participants, 48.4% were male (n = 756) and 51.6% were female (n=805), with ages ranging between 16 and 103 (M = 48.597, SD = 18.566) and almost half of participants (44.4%) reporting that they were married (n = 691). Respondents were generally employed (n = 458), with significant numbers serving as homemakers (20%, n=218) or studying on a full-time basis (13.2%, n = 144). Educationally, the majority (73.3%) of respondents had no post-secondary education (n = 1144).

\textbf{3.3.2 Measurement}

\textsuperscript{13} Though not Inverness, which while part of this area was included in the sample. In total, only 0.43467\% of the Great British population were excluded.
\textsuperscript{14} 23.2\% according to the Great Britain methodological report (GESIS, 2010).
The EVS survey included a wide range of potentially relevant variables encompassing attitudes towards government, politics and political institutions. While many of the items retained for use in analysis suffered from high levels of ‘Don’t know’ responses the comparably small percentage of outright missing cases allowed for the use of missing data imputation procedures. A full list of variables used in secondary analysis can be found below, alongside details of their treatment (including measures taken to address non-response and ‘missingness’). Appendix 1 contains further background information on these items, including question texts and response categories.

Measuring Democratic Valence

In respect of the measurement of democratic valence, several problems were manifest. The attractiveness of democratic politics has been argued to be influenced by factors including the trustworthiness of political actors, beliefs regarding political efficacy and access, and conceptual satisfaction with democracy as a governance approach.

While the concept of democratic confidence (identified by Rothstein, 2011\textsuperscript{15}) offers a close analogy to the construct which I argue affects support for political violence - acknowledging the multi-dimensional nature of confidence in government and political actors and its susceptibility to influence by a range of factors (including individual perceptions of politician's

\textsuperscript{15}Rothstein’s (2011) work argues that confidence in government is multi-dimensional, being shaped both by raw trust in political institutions and actors themselves, but also by the individual’s view as to the fairness and impartiality with which the policymaking process is conducted.
trustworthiness and fairness) - such a measure fails to specifically capture the individual assessments of efficacy that are core to my theory. Indeed, it is entirely possible that a respondent could either have low democratic confidence while believing in the efficacy of political engagement (as a result of personal contacts and feelings of political influence), or high democratic confidence while not believing in the efficacy of political engagement (as a result of perceived systemic inefficacy).

As a result of this, any measure of confidence in democratic efficacy used in my analysis must also contain indicators of perceived governmental efficacy, systemic satisfaction and political influence as well as indicators of raw political confidence and fairness. The EVS included several relevant measures, which I combined to produce a factor approximating the concept under investigation (detailed below).

Levels of missing data (including refusals to answer) ranged between 0.1% and 0.3%, while many respondents elected to answer using the 'Don't Know' option (between 2.9% and 8.1% across all indicators). As refusal levels were comparably low, all of these cases were excluded from further analysis, while cases reporting a 'Don't Know' response were recoded with the rounded average score.

Principal Axis Factoring was employed to analyse these data, as democratic valence is unmeasured in the EVS (being an underlying latent construct - UCLA, 2012). A quartimax rotation was chosen to increase the likelihood of components loading onto a single factor (Field, 2005), while outputs were saved as simple regression coefficients to facilitate easy analysis. The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy exceeded .5 (0.681), indicating an adequate sample for analysis, while the Bartlett test of Sphericity was highly significant (p<0.001), indicating that the relationship between variables was strong enough to sustain factor analysis.

Under both Kaiser's criterion and the Scree test (Field, 2005) only one relevant factor was identified, the component loadings for which are displayed in Table 1 (below). Field's (2005) criteria were employed in its analysis, with all components crossing the .3 threshold considered when determining meaning.
Table 1 – Component Loadings for EVS Democratic Valence Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component Loadings</th>
<th>Component Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Parliament</td>
<td>0.887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Political Parties</td>
<td>0.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Police</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. 1 factors extracted. 17 iterations required.*

These outputs show that the factor has high loadings for trust measures and democratic satisfaction, with those participants reporting higher scores for all measures awarded a higher factor score. This produced a measure consistent with the theoretical construct the factor was designed to proxy, and as such it was retained for inclusion in subsequent analysis.

Measuring Grievance

In respect of the measurement of political grievance, the general population sample and the resulting wide range of potential causes and issues in support of which violence may be endorsed presented significant problems. While the EVS data included a number of measures identifying political causes and issues capable of classification as a grievance, none possessed
validity in respect of all respondents. Consequently, political grievance was quantified using a measure asking respondents to score their happiness on a four point scale (not at all happy, not very happy, quite happy, very happy). Of the 1,561 participants, 1558 responded with 42.5% reporting they were very happy (n = 664), 49.3% quite happy (n = 770), 6.8% not very happy (n = 107), and 1.1% not at all happy (n = 18). Given the low number of extremely dissatisfied respondents the measure was collapsed to form a binary indicator of happiness and unhappiness, with the latter considered to have a grievance. This left 8% (n = 125) coded as having a grievance and 91.8% coded as having no grievance (n = 1,433).

Measuring Support for Terrorism

In respect of support for terrorism the EVS contained only one relevant indicator, a trichotomous measure of the individual’s willingness to condemn terrorism. Respondents were asked to choose between three outcomes: one suggesting that terrorism might sometimes be justified, another indicating that it must always be condemned, and a third option identifying the respondent as endorsing neither position. Of the 1561 respondents in the EVS sample, 1525 answered the question with 99 were prepared to endorse terrorism, 1407 reporting that it must always be condemned and 18 choosing

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16 Analysis in the following chapter, drawing on data from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study, employs a more targeted measures. This is possible given its particular resonance for members of the sample, with both the grievance and outcome measures addressing the substantive issue of government backed military intervention overseas.

17 The happiness indicator required participants to score their general life satisfaction using a four point scale (further detail on the question text is presented in Appendix 1). While it is possible that this may encompass more than merely the existence of a political grievance, its placement in the EVS questionnaire – directly following a question addressing engagement with politics – provides some basis for its use in this manner.
the third non-committal option. Levels of missingness were low, with a small number of participants reporting either non-applicability (n = 18) or ‘do not know’ (n = 21) answers. Given the non-ordinal nature of the measure and the interest of this study in support for violence, the measure was dichotomised to produce a clear division between supporters (n = 99) and non-supporters (n = 1462).

Confounding and Mediating Measures

As both democratic valence and support for terrorism are believed to be influenced by a range of factors, control measures were employed in multivariate analysis to provide for a more rigorous test of my hypotheses. Pertinent items from the EVS were included on the basis of a reading of the existing literature on political trust and the causes of violence.

Prior to use all variables were recoded, with missing data excluded to preserve degrees of freedom in the model. Further detail on the control variables used in both regression models are presented in Table 2 (below), while question texts are response categories are presented in Appendix 1.
### Table 2 - List of Control and Moderator Variables for EVS Multivariate Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Subject</th>
<th>EVS Variable</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Recoded?</th>
<th>How Recoded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>V302</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Male=1, Female=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>V303</td>
<td>Scale(^{18})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Subtracted from 2008 to form a measure of current age at the time of data collection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>V313</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Married=1, Unmarried=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status</td>
<td>V337</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>30 hours a week or more</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Employed=1, Unemployed=0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{18}\) EVS data on respondent age was not recorded, with the variable capturing year of birth used as a basis for computing a measure of respondent age.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Subject</th>
<th>EVS Variable</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Recoded?</th>
<th>How Recoded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment Type</td>
<td>V339ESec</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Lower Managerial and Higher Supervisory</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>NSSEC 1 (Professional, Managerial, and Small Business Owner =1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NSSEC 2 (Clerical, Sales, Foreman or Supervisor=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NSSEC 3 (Skilled and Unskilled Manual=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combined Never Worked/Refused/Don’t Know/Other used as reference Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>V335</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary or Below=0 Post-Secondary=1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3.3 Procedures

Exploratory analysis used bivariate non-parametric tests to check for evidence of associations between variables before controlling for confounder influences. Independent samples T-tests and chi-squares were used to test hypotheses 1 and 2, with further hypotheses left to be tested in subsequent chapters.
Multivariate analysis used logistic regression to subject these preliminary results to more rigorous analysis. Control measures were included in all models (as identified above), with variables introduced in thematically homogenous blocks. Model diagnostics were undertaken using Nagelkerke pseudo-R² and Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit tests to assess block contribution and overall model fit.

The decision to calculate significance at the 10% level was taken for several reasons, principally resulting from the preliminary nature of the test. While the 5% level is most commonly used in social science research this is merely an arbitrary convention (Gerber and Malhotra, 2008), with the 10% level often used in studies employing small data sets or in cases where the risk of identifying a false positive is outweighed by the consequences of type II error (for example, in studies making a first test of a new theory). As this thesis represents exactly such a situation (testing a new theory), the risk of a false rejection is argued to outweigh the consequences of incorrectly identifying a relationship, justifying the use of the 10% level.

While I accept this essentially doubles the chance that my analysis will return a false result, it is submitted that the repeated testing of the relationship across multiple data sets (as in the following chapters) will significantly reduce this risk, with the thesis as a whole less likely to return false results than a single test working to a more conventional alpha level (Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1989).
3.3.4 Ethics and other considerations

Despite the widely-held belief that secondary data analysis negates the need for detailed ethical consideration (ESRC, 2012), there are several practical and procedural points that require discussion, perhaps the most notable of which pertains to issues of participant consent.

While the EVS data collection provides a general consent for secondary analysis, the Research Ethics Guidebook's (ESRC, 2012) stipulates that care must be taken to ensure that data is not used or interpreted in a way to which participants may object. Particularly as this research seeks to show that some social and political attitudes may have anti-social effects on support for violence, it is highly likely that some participants may oppose their data being used in this way. This is accepted, however it is submitted that, while participants may be against the project’s findings, they have no general right to prevent the use of their data on the basis of potential research outcomes; the right to draw adverse inferences on the basis of empirically rigorous analysis is a core component of academic freedom.

Both ONS Research Guidelines (ONS, 2011) and the Research Ethics Guidebook (ESRC, 2012) suggests that care must be taken to ensure participants anonymity and confidentiality, even in cases where secondary data are used. Both assert the importance of ensuring that no results are reported that may allow for the ‘jigsaw identification’ of participants, with the ONS suggesting a blanket ban on the reporting of results where the total number of participants in a given category is less than 5 (ONS, 2011). While this risk is understood on a theoretical level, the EVS data contains no
information capable of directly identifying any participant, with most sensitive
data stored at a categorical level to prevent participant identification; while
this may generate categories containing less than five respondents, the
chance of accidental identification remains slim, particularly in the absence of
further information. Particularly as the analyses employed in this study seek
only to infer macro-level correlations between democratic valence and
support for political violence no individual cases will be discussed, and no
data sets will be linked: thus the chance of individual participants being
identified is extremely low, if not impossible.

Finally, the Research Ethics Guidebook (ESRC, 2012) suggests that care
must be taken to ensure that use of secondary data sets does not
contravene legal obligations or the license under which such work is made
available. In particular, they highlight the ‘best practice’ requirement that the
researchers responsible for collecting the original data are made aware of
the nature and type of project for which the data has been used, and are
provided with copies of any outputs. While this is not a condition of the EVS
license, my results will be publicly available, with copies made available to
the UK co-ordinator of the EVS data collection, Prof. David Voas.

3.4 Bivariate Analysis

Bivariate analysis was undertaken to provide a first preliminary test of the
hypothesis. Further detail on the variables, including information on response
categories and question texts, can be found in Appendix 1.
3.4.1 Hypothesis 1

An independent samples t-test was used to compare mean levels of democratic valence between two groups: those who supported terrorism and those who did not. As the Levene test returned an insignificant result, the assumption of equal variances was met and analysis therefore used uncorrected t-scores. Results showed a significant difference in levels of democratic valence between groups, with those who supported terrorism (M = -0.162, SD = 0.859) reporting more negative democratic valence than those who did not (M = 0.012, SD = 0.915): t(1365) = 1.781, p = 0.075.

This is consistent with my hypothesis in suggesting that the supporters of terrorism are less likely to view democratic strategies favourably than those who oppose violence. This suggests that the intrinsic attractiveness of democratic political engagement may be a predictor of support for terrorism, with negative views of political engagement correlated with increased support for terrorism. As such, the cost-benefit model advocated in the preceding chapters may well be correct. As, however, there are numerous unmeasured influences (discussed at length in the review of theory and research) capable of shaping support for terrorism and political violence it remains possible that my results may, while indicative of a relationship, be biased. Consequently multiple regression analysis is necessary to provide a more robust basis for the making of claims about the direction and extent of the relationship.
3.4.2 Hypothesis 2

Two independent samples t-tests were used to compare mean levels of democratic valence between groups of supporters and opponents of terrorism: the first utilising only those cases reporting a grievance (n = 124) and the second only those without a grievance (n = 1433).

*No Grievance Sub Group*

The Levene test returned an insignificant result, suggesting that the assumption of equal variances was met and that analysis should use uncorrected t-scores. Results showed no significant difference in levels of democratic valence between supporters (M = -0.042, SD = 0.856) and opponents (M = 0.017, SD = 0.913) of terrorism: t(1255) = 0.552, p = 0.581.

*Grievance Sub Group*

The Levene test returned an insignificant result, suggesting that the assumption of equal variances was met and that analysis should use uncorrected t-scores. Results showed a significant difference in levels of democratic valence between supporters and opponents of terrorism, with those who supported terrorism (M = -0.739, SD = 0.614) reporting less positive democratic valence than those who did not (M = -0.055, SD = 0.937); t(107) = 2.819, p = 0.003
These results are consistent with my hypothesis in suggesting that democratic valence exerts an effect on support for terrorism only amongst those who have a grievance. This validates the application of a rational choice framework, with support for violence seen as the product of both propensity (democratic valence) and utility (grievance). As, however, there are numerous unmeasured influences (discussed at length in the review of theory and research) capable of shaping support for terrorism and political violence it remains possible that my results may, while indicative of a relationship, be biased. Consequently multiple regression analysis is necessary to provide a more robust basis for the making of claims about the direction and extent of any relationship.

3.5 Regression Analysis

Regression analysis was undertaken to provide a test of the hypothesis that controlled for possible confounder influences. To preserve degrees of freedom and reduce the risk of type II error control variables were included only if unambiguously identified as influences in the existing literature. All other variables – including measures subject to on-going scholarly debate – were excluded to produce the most parsimonious model possible. A full list of control variables, alongside information on coding, can be found in the methodological preface to this chapter.
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1

Binary logistic regression was used to conduct a multivariate test of the role of democratic valence in predicting support for terrorism. The model was specified to contain control measures as identified in methodological preface to this chapter alongside a factor capturing democratic valence (on which further detail is presented above). Prior to running the model collinearity statistics were produced to ensure that the data adequately conformed to the assumptions of the model used (further details and results are presented in Appendix 1).

Variables were added in two blocks: the first containing all control measures and the second adding the factor approximating democratic valence. The outputs of this analysis are detailed below in Table 3 (below)

**Table 3 - Logistic Regression Outputs Investigating the Role of Democratic Valence as a Predictor of Support for Political Violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.230</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>1.584</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.537</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-0.321</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Type of Work**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Work</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>z-score</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>1.089</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>1.175</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Don’t Know</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>1.785</td>
<td>0.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>1.208</td>
<td>0.491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Valence</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Nagelkerke pseudo-$R^2 = 0.032$ For Step 1, pseudo-$R^2 = 0.038$ for Step 2. N = 1366

*a NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

The model chi-square for the first block was 14.327, with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.074$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 7.359 with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.498$), indicating that the observed data did not significantly differ from the predictions of the model.
(Field, 2005). Nagelkerke’s pseudo-$R^2$ confirmed moderate but adequate goodness of fit ($R^2 = 0.027$).

Only gender (OR = 1.584, $p = 0.042$) and marital status (OR = 0.584, $p = 0.022$) were found significant in the first block, with males showing increased support for terrorism. Being married was shown to be negatively associated with support for terrorism, with all other variables non-significant at the 10% level. This, alongside the modest Nagelkerke values, may be taken to indicate that demographic factors alone are poor predictors of support for terrorism, a possibility discussed at length later in this chapter.

The second block of variables introduced the factor approximating democratic valence. The overall model chi-square rose to 17.605 with 9 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.040$) as a result of a block contribution of 3.278 with 1 degree of freedom ($p = 0.070$). The Nagelkerke pseudo-$R^2$ increased slightly to $R^2 = 0.033$, showing that the addition of democratic valence improved the overall fit of the model, while the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic remained insignificant (chi-square of 12.620 with 8 degrees of freedom, $p = 0.126$), indicating that the model continued to predict the observed data well.

Of those variables retained from the first model both gender (OR = 1.573, $p = 0.046$) and marital status (OR = 0.593, $p = 0.026$) remained significant, with males and the unmarried continuing to show elevated levels of support for terrorism consistent with the scale and direction of effects shown in the first block. The measure for democratic valence attained significance at the 10% level (OR = 0.802, $p = 0.074$), with the odds ratio suggesting that increases
in democratic valence decrease the chance of supporting terrorism. On this basis, hypothesis 1 is supported.

### 3.5.2 Hypothesis 2

Binary logistic regression was used to conduct a multivariate test of the impact of political grievance on the role of democratic valence in predicting support for terrorism. As before, two sets of models were run: the first set including only participants without a grievance, the second including only participants with a grievance. In both cases the model was specified to contain control measures and a factor capturing democratic valence as identified in the methodological preface to this chapter. Prior to running the model collinearity statistics were produced to ensure that the data adequately conformed to the assumptions of the model used (Further details and results are presented in Appendix 1).

Variables were added in two blocks: the first provided all control measures, while the second added the factor approximating democratic valence. The outputs of these analyses are detailed below in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 - Logistic Regression Outputs Investigating the Role of Democratic Valence as a Predictor of Support for Political Violence amongst Participants reporting No Grievance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.201</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>1.201</td>
<td>0.459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.484</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td>0.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Non-Manual)</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>1.032</td>
<td>0.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>1.275</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.187</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>1.198</td>
<td>0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.480</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.731</td>
<td>0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>0.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Non-Manual)</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE B</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>1.305</td>
<td>0.371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Valence</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>0.510</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Nagelkerke pseudo-$R^2 = 0.014$ For Step 1, pseudo-$R^2 = 0.015$ for Step 2. N = 1262

a NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

In the no grievance condition the model chi-square for the first block was 14.327, with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.074$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 14.488 with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.070$), indicating that the observed data significantly differed from the predictions of the model (Field, 2005). Nagelkerke’s pseudo-$R^2$ confirmed moderate but adequate goodness of fit ($R^2 = 0.014$).

Only the constant (OR = 0.111, $p < 0.001$) and marital status (OR = 0.616, $p = 0.053$) were found significant in the first block, with being married shown to be negatively associated with support for terrorism. All other variables non-significant at the 10% level. This, alongside the modest Nagelkerke values, may be taken to offer further indication that demographic factors alone are poor predictors of support for terrorism, a possibility discussed at length later in this chapter.

When the factor approximating democratic valence was added the overall model chi-square rose to 6.897 with 9 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.648$) as a result of a block contribution of 0.439 with 1 degree of freedom ($p = 0.508$).
The Nagelkerke pseudo-$R^2$ increased slightly to $R^2 = 0.015$, showing that the addition of democratic valence improved the overall fit of the model, while the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic became insignificant ($\chi^2$ of 11.258 with 8 degrees of freedom, $p = 0.188$), indicating that the model predicted the observed data well.

Of those variables retained from the first block both the constant (OR = -2.187, $p < 0.001$) and marital status (OR = 0.619, $p = 0.055$) remained significant, with the unmarried continuing to show elevated levels of support for terrorism consistent with the scale and direction of effects shown in the first block. The measure for democratic valence failed to attain significance at the 10% level (OR = 0.916, $p = 0.510$), despite the odds ratio suggesting that increases in democratic valence decrease the chance of supporting terrorism.
Table 5 - Logistic Regression Outputs Investigating the Role of Democratic Valence as a Predictor of Support for Political Violence amongst Participants reporting a Grievance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.492</td>
<td>1.599</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>0.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.014</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>20.371</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.851</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.995</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>2.704</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>-2.521</td>
<td>1.074</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>-2.877</td>
<td>1.196</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Non-Manual)</td>
<td>-2.246</td>
<td>1.347</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>-1.263</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.420</td>
<td>1.599</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2.881</td>
<td>1.231</td>
<td>17.833</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.507</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>1.650</td>
<td>0.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>-1.826</td>
<td>1.116</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>-2.196</td>
<td>1.244</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Non-Manual)</td>
<td>-1.944</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the grievance condition the model chi-square for the first block was 22.885, with 8 degrees of freedom \((p = 0.004)\). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 10.785 with 8 degrees of freedom \((p = 0.214)\), indicating that the observed data did not significantly differ from the predictions of the model (Field, 2005). Nagelkerke’s pseudo-\(R^2\) confirmed moderate but adequate goodness of fit \((R^2 = 0.334)\).

Only gender (OR = 3.014, \(p = 0.015\)) and NSSEC Class A (OR = 0.080, \(p = 0.019\)), NSSEC Class B (OR = 0.056, \(p = 0.016\)) and NSSEC Class D (OR = 0.106, \(p = 0.095\)) were found significant in the first block. Being male was shown to be positively associated with support for terrorism, while membership of NSSEC Classes A, B and D were shown to be negatively associated with support for terrorism, with all other variables non-significant at the 10% level. This, alongside the modest Nagelkerke values, may be taken to add further support to the view that demographic factors alone are poor predictors of support for terrorism (as argued above), a possibility discussed further later in this chapter.

When the factor approximating democratic valence was added the overall model chi-square rose to 27.242 with 9 degrees of freedom \((p = 0.001)\) as a
result of a block contribution of $4.359$ with $1$ degree of freedom ($p = 0.037$). The Nagelkerke pseudo-$R^2$ increased slightly to $R^2 = 0.390$, showing that the addition of democratic valence improved the overall fit of the model, while the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic remained insignificant (chi-square of $5.022$ with $8$ degrees of freedom, $p = 0.755$), indicating that the model predicted the observed data well.

Of those variables retained from the first block only gender ($OR = 17.833$, $p = 0.019$) and marital status ($OR = 0.593$, $p = 0.026$) and NSSEC Class B membership ($OR = 0.111$, $p = 0.078$) remained significant, with males continuing to show elevated levels of support for terrorism and members of NSSEC Class B continuing to show lower levels of support for terrorism, consistent with the scale and direction of effects shown in the first block. The measure for democratic valence attained significance at the $10\%$ level ($OR = 0.383$, $p = 0.056$), with the odds ratio suggesting that increases in democratic valence decreased the chance of supporting terrorism. On this basis, hypothesis 2 is supported.

3.6 Discussion

My findings offer a number of important insights into the processes by which individuals come to support terrorism; in showing that democratic valence is a correlate of support for terrorism and that its effect is contingent on the existence of a grievance, I have provided a first test of my theory, offering a prima facie rationale for accepting the application of a rational choice framework. While this is clearly significant, and it would therefore be tempting
to view my results as a vindication of the research hypotheses, it is important
to be circumspect when interpreting such findings and to be clear about
possible limitations imposed by data, design and analytical process.

Particularly in respect of my analysis it is important that I be honest about the
robustness of the tests used, and in particular that I acknowledge the
elevated possibility of error resulting from the use of the 10% significance
standard. While it is true that the more common 5% level is itself ‘arbitrary’
(Gerber and Malhotra, 2008), and that there are clearly compelling reasons
for my analysis to use the 10% level (discussed in the methodological
preface at the start of the chapter), it nevertheless remains true that the more
forgiving threshold gives rise to a significant increase in the risk of reporting a
false positive. While the actual results from the regression analysis place the
effect of democratic valence closer to the 5% level (p = 0.074) this still allows
for a 50% increase in the chance of type I error.

This is accepted, however it is submitted that the consequences of accepting
a false positive is, in this case, dramatically less serious than the risk of
rejecting a valid result. Given that this chapter is a first step towards the
investigation of an uncommon phenomenon, and that subsequent chapters
will seek to corroborate its findings through the use of different data and
analytical approaches, the risk of the thesis – as a whole - reporting a false
positive is extremely low. While this chapter does, in isolation, have an
increased risk of error Rosnow and Rosenthal (1989) suggest that this is not,
in itself, intrinsically serious. They argue that false but statistically significant
results are common, and thus argue against over reliance on single studies
in favour of claims grounded in the replication of consistent effects. In this,
the failure of this chapter to cross an arbitrary threshold should not be cause for concern if a larger corpus of work seeks to triangulate the picture it presents; it is as Medawar (1969) notes – the exposure and punishment of error would do little to ‘propel [the] science forward’, particularly given the originality of my approach. As such, it is submitted that the results of this chapter – while not significant at the conventional 5% level – provide an interesting insight into the relationship which may, when taken alongside the findings of later chapters, be viewed as a robust test of my theory.

In respect of my design, I must also be careful not to over-play the consequences of my findings. While survey data can illustrate a correlation between democratic valence and support for terrorism they cannot show that shifts in democratic valence causally alter support for terrorism – it may well be the case that democratic valence is associated with a third unmeasured variable and that it this is that the root cause of support for violence. Likewise, while it seems likely that the correlation I have identified is indicative of a real relationship, it is impossible to exclude the influence of unmeasured confounders that may have prejudiced the findings without recourse to randomization and experimental control. While my findings are clearly interesting as an indicator of the national picture, further analysis employing an experimental design is necessary to provide a robust basis for the making of causal claims (this is addressed in part through experimental analysis in Chapter 5).

Finally in respect of data it is important that I acknowledge the strictures imposed by both coverage limitations and collection approach. While my theory is believed to have cross-cultural validity, analysis of solely UK data
cannot be claimed as a basis for making such broad claims. While the UK EVS data can be used to indicate the presence of a relationship in the British population, it cannot be used to make claims in respect of non-British groups, and consequently, if my theory is to be accepted as having broader applicability, replication with data from other countries is required.

Likewise, while the EVS data provides representative coverage of the British population, it cannot be employed to provide a reliable basis for the making of inferences in respect of small sub-national communities. Particularly in respect of Muslims the low overall number of cases within the EVS (n = 40) precludes the conduct of analysis focussed on this groups. As research evidence asserts a significant relationship between religion and political trust (Putnam, 1995; Uslaner, 2011, 2008, 2000; Welch et al, 2007), it cannot be assumed that any linkage found in the context of a largely secular national sample will be replicated amongst members of the Islamic community. Consequently, for claims of general applicability to be sustained – even within the UK - replication across these sub-national groups is necessary.

This shortcoming is partially addressed through the following chapter, where data from the Ethnic Minority British Election study is used to explore British Muslims. However it must be acknowledged that this thesis still leaves many high-risk groups – including the populist-right, deep-greens and far-left – unexplored. Further research is thus necessary to provide a more a test of my theory in respect of these groups.

These problems are further compounded by weaknesses in the 2008 EVS’ data, particularly in relation to the low overall response rate in the UK. Fewer than 25% of approached participants took part in the study, with many
demographic groups under-represented and some wholly absent from the final data (GESIS, 2010). If these cases are considered to be anything other than missing completely at random then the overall representativeness of the data set would be called into question and the robustness of any inferences made on the basis of my analysis would be subject to suspicion. This is accepted, however the scarcity of appropriate alternative data sources necessitated the utilization of the EVS. While replication using other data (as in Chapters 5 and 6) does much to counter this risk, the absence of further national-level data remains a significant problem, and it remains possible that this chapter may – in isolation - present a misleading picture.

Despite this there is still much in my findings that is of interest. While the discovery that a political grievance is a precondition for the support of violent action is perhaps unsurprising, the identification of a relationship is an important step towards validating my theory. More than this, in identifying the need for a grievance I have highlighted a deficiency of the existing approaches which exclude explicit mention of this precondition.

Simultaneously, my results offer tentative support for rational choice theories of terrorism and political violence in general, and my theory in particular, offering the prospect of a unified approach to violent causation with descriptive validity across multiple groups, individuals and ‘waves’ of terrorist activity (Rapoport, 2002). While Crenshaw's (1981) widely cited work has been used to argue that there can be no general approach to terrorist motivation owing to the diverse factors underpinning each group’s struggle, Schmid's (2005) separation of violent motivation into root (or structural) and proximate (or trigger) causes allows for an overarching theory capable of
accounting for Crenshaw's critique. Indeed, it seems logical to argue that while individuals turn to terror because of wildly variant trigger causes, the structural roots of violence are common, with the processes by which violent action is legitimated and social norms against its use negated consistent across multiple groups.

In showing that levels of support for terrorism are inversely correlated with the perceived attractiveness of non-violent democratic strategies in the UK, I offer evidence for a common theory of structural causation that argues for the individual's weighing of the costs and benefits of different courses of action. In this my findings build on research on terrorism by both Pape (2005) and Berman (2009) in suggesting that violence is a ‘strategy’ (Harris, 2006) chosen by the desperate in pursuit of political goals, and Hudson (1999) in suggesting that the supporters and perpetrators of terrorism are rational actors. While further research is clearly necessary (as identified above) to justify claims of general applicability, these findings remain an important first step towards this goal.

Similarly my results represent a significant challenge to the work of ideological theorists such as Jurgensmeyer (2000) and Griffin (2012), and their suggestion that terrorism is a result of ideological imperatives. While my model did not control for the impact of religious ideology or perceptions of 'life meaning', in showing that practical considerations of efficacy correlate with support for terrorism I have logically challenged their arguments. Indeed, it seems unlikely on the basis of my findings that violence would be endorsed for the desire to appease a God or moral principle; if ideology were the structural cause of violence, one would expect the impact of democratic
valence to be non-significant. While it remains possible for my model to account for the effects of ideology through its impact on the individual's perceptions of the democratic process, further research is necessary to explore this. Anecdotal evidence on extremist aversion to democracy (Avram, 2010) and the impact of extreme religious adherence on social and political trust (Schoenfeld, 1978; La Porta et al, 1997; Welch et al, 2004; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Uslaner, 2008, 2011) suggests that some ideologies may negatively impact democratic valence, thereby reducing the favourability of perceptions of democratic protest and increasing the relative attractiveness of, and thus support for, violence. Alternatively, it is also possible that ideological predisposition could exert an independent effect on the decision to endorse violence by shaping perceptions of cost (through the violation of religious or moral dictate) and benefit (through pleasing a higher being or retaining ideological coherence). Further research is necessary to explore which is the case (this is addressed in the context of British Muslims in the following chapter).

Alongside this my findings also have significance in terms of their contribution to academic understanding of the demographic traits of supporters of terrorism. While a small but growing body of evidence has shed light on the characteristics of Muslim supporters of political violence (Fair and Shepherd, 2006; Cherney and Povey, 2013), my analysis is one of the few attempts to explore the effect of demographic predictors in the general population, and the only one to employ the EVS' UK data to this end. In showing that men and the unmarried were more likely to support violence, I have failed to replicate the results of studies of Muslim supporters of
violence, suggesting that there is, in general, no single extremist 'profile' and thus that demographically targeted interventions should either be highly tailored for each discrete extremist risk (as advocated by Fair and Shepherd, 2006) or avoided altogether.

Such arguments would accord with critiques of Britain's counter-extremism programme PREVENT, and in particular with criticism of the evidential basis on which it is predicated. It has long been argued that PREVENT suffers from a number of significant shortcomings, most notably its strong negative associations in minority communities (Armstrong, Chin and Leventer, 2008), impotence in respect of non-Islamic groups (Harris, 2012), and over over-reliance on demographic targeting (Spalek, 2012). In showing that practical considerations around democratic efficacy correlate with support for violence, and that demographic markers such as education level and age are poor predictors of support for violence I have generated fresh evidence in support of these concerns and paved the way for a new approach capable of addressing them.

My findings suggest that the existing strategy may miss many in danger of extremist 'drift' while simultaneously creating a culture of Muslim victimhood conducive to the fostering of further extremism. By focussing on young, economically marginal, Muslim men at the expense of other non-Islamic groups, PREVENT has been argued to have ignored academic evidence and pathologized the communities on whom it relies for information and support (Pickard, 2010), reducing its efficacy and engendering hostility likely to impair its effective function. Simultaneously, by focussing on the alleged theological drivers for violent extremism it has also deprived itself of validity in respect of
non-Islamic risks – most notably from the radical right (Harris, 2012) – while further compounding the sense of Muslim grievance identified by Armstrong, Chin and Leventer (2008).

My results suggest that the fostering of pro-democratic attitudes and the promotion of perceptions of political efficacy and procedural fairness may be a more fruitful way to reduce net extremism while also securing a broader social dividend through increased trust in the institutions of the state. Such an approach is particularly appealing given falling levels of trust in British political institutions (EUROBAROMETER, 2013) and declining levels of political participation. By delivering early intervention through school-based education programmes, fostering increased access to political actors, greater use of direct democracy and enhanced political transparency, policy makers can, my results suggest, reduce support for violent extremism amongst the next generation and foster a more active, civically engaged, Britain.

Outside of my substantive focus on the supporters of terrorism, such an approach would have significant ramifications in respect of Britain's broader counter-terrorism policy. As noted by Marshall (2009), PREVENT was principally conceived as a core element of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST, alongside practical strands PURSUE, PREPARE and PROTECT. By focussing on extremism, policy makers recognized that terrorism depends on the endorsement of broader communities of passive supporters (Dragu and Polborn, 2009), and that engagement in radical and extreme groups is often a first step towards the commission of violence. If Schmid's (2005) contention that political violence is the product of trigger and structural causes is accepted, and support for
violence as a strategy is viewed as a precondition for its perpetration, then any intervention targeted at reducing support for terrorism would also play an important role in reducing the risk of terrorism.

Aside from these implications my results also raise a number of important questions about the nature and extent of support for terrorism in contemporary Britain, and the proportionality of the current policy response. While evidence from surveys of Muslim support (Sobolewska, 2009) suggests a relatively low (sub 5%) figure, the EVS data indicates that as many as 10% of the British population are prepared to support violence. While it remains possible that this finding may reflect a lower degree of willingness to publicly endorse violence rather than differences in levels of support per se, if my findings are taken at face value then it seems that the general population may be more supportive of violence than British Muslims, and consequently the overt policy focus on this group may be argued to be disproportionate.

Likewise, the comparably high level of support for violence in the general population has important ramifications in respect of ongoing debates over the reach of anti-terror measures and the cost of anti-extremism intervention schemes. The high price of the PREVENT strategy has been a subject of significant debate (estimates place its 2008/2009 cost at over £140 million19), with many media commentators and policy makers arguing for a reduction in spending in this area. If support for terrorism is as widespread as my results suggest, and the argument outlined in the review of theory and research is

correct (with support for violence seen as a vital first step towards its commission), then the number of potential terrorists may be far higher than previously estimated. If such a view is accepted, then not only is the current counter-terrorism framework likely to be proportionate, but a greater allocation of resources and broader interventions may be desirable.

3.7 Conclusions

While my results offer a picture consistent with my theory, it is important to avoid claiming them as definitive proof of its veracity. While protest efficacy and support for terrorism have been shown to correlate, limitations resulting from the data collection approach and mode of analysis preclude a definitive answer in respect of causation, while further research is necessary to support the making of generalizations outside of the narrow frame of the 2008 UK EVS.

In particular, more sophisticated analyses and replication with non-majority population and non-UK data are required if my claims to general applicability and causation are to be sustained. Nevertheless, these findings represent an important first test of my theory, giving an indication that, if sustained in further analysis, can be taken to validate the approach outlined in the review of theory and research.

I have detailed the academic and policy significance of my results, in particular with respect to ideological theories of support for terrorism and literature on the demographic traits of extremists, and have considered their policy ramifications in respect of the PREVENT and CONTEST programmes.
I have highlighted the need for a revision of current British counter-extremism policy, with a fresh focus on fostering pro-democratic attitudes and access to political institutions a way of reducing extremism and securing a broader social benefit through enhanced political trust and civic activism.

The following chapters aim to build on and extend this work, presenting the results of analysis using secondary data from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study to examine the views of British Muslims, and an experiment administered via the social networking site Facebook to explore my claims of causation. They aim to provide further empirically rigorous tests of the theory, providing a more reliable basis for the making of causal inferences and inferences in respect of the Muslim sub-population, as well as the religious element of the theory outlined in the review of theory and research.
4. Democratic Valence and Support for Terrorism amongst British Muslims: Methods, Data, Results and Discussion

This chapter focuses on exploring the relationship between religion and support for political violence amongst British Muslims, using data from Islamic respondents in the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) as the basis for its analysis. Alongside this it present a second test of my core theory, exploring whether the decision to support terrorism and political violence is correlated with individual assessments of the efficacy of democratic engagement (democratic valence), and whether the presence of a political grievance is a prerequisite for the relationship.

In respect of the core focus of this chapter, my argument is that regular involvement with members of extreme religious groups may deplete democratic valence. Research has consistently shown that membership of an extreme or overly hierarchical religious organization can lower levels of social trust relative to demographically similar moderates or seculars (Schoenfeld, 1978; La Porta et al, 1997; Welch et al, 2004; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Uslaner, 2008, 2011). Scholars have argued that involvement in such groups fosters the internalization of norms of out-group distrust (Brehm and Rahn, 1997, p.1003), and while little direct evidence exists on religious extremism’s influence on political trust, there is consensus that these norms may negatively shape political trust. Indeed, social and political trust are accepted to be related phenomena (Brehm and Rahn, 1997), with Inglehart (1999), Jackman and Miller (1998), and Putnam (1993, 1995) all
reporting that those who trust others show greater trust in both government and politicians. If this is accepted, then it seems logical to assert that regular contact with those who hold extreme religious views will correlate negatively with democratic valence, with the latter falling as the former increases.

A structural representation of my full model is presented in schematic form in Figure 3 (below), illustrating both the link between democratic valence and support for violence highlighted in the previous chapter and the mechanism through which religious ideology and group involvement shapes democratic valence.

Figure 3 - Schematic Representation of a Rational Choice Model of Religion, Democratic Valence and Support for Political Violence
This chapter will explore these relationships using bivariate correlations and multiple and logistic regressions, and will discuss the results and their implications both in terms of academic research and current British counter-extremism policy. Starting with a detailed list of the hypotheses under investigation and the findings of the bivariate analyses, this chapter will then present the results of the multivariate analyses before concluding with a discussion of the results significance and implications for further research.

4.1 Hypotheses

To summarize, the research and null hypotheses to be tested in this chapter are as follows:

- $H_1$: Low democratic valence increases the probability of supporting violent demonstrations.
- $H_2$: The effect of low democratic valence on support for violent demonstrations is contingent on the presence of a grievance.
- $H_{3a}$: Extreme Islamic ideology undermines confidence in democracy
- $H_{3b}$: Extreme Islamic ideology directly affects support for violence.
- $H_4$: The effect of Muslim ideology on support for political violence is contingent on religious group involvement.

4.2 Null Hypotheses

- $H^0_1$: Confidence in democracy has no impact on the probability of supporting violent demonstrations.
• $H^0_2$: The presence of a grievance has no impact on the probability of supporting violent demonstrations.

• $H^0_{3a}$: Extreme Islamic Ideology has no impact on confidence in democracy...

• $H^0_{3b}$: ..and no impact on support for violence.

• $H^0_4$: The effect of Muslim ideology on support for political violence is not contingent on religious group involvement.

4.3 Methods

4.3.1 Data

The hypotheses were tested by analysing secondary data, namely from Muslim respondents to the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES). These data were collected during 2010 as part of an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded project to provide a source capable of allowing for analysis of the political norms and behaviours of British minority ethnic groups. It comprises responses collected from face-to-face interviews and a mail-back survey distributed to UK-based Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African and Black Caribbean adults aged over 18. Recruitment employed a stratified cluster sample (Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders and Sobolewska, 2013) drawing on the postal address file, with 25-75 addresses selected at random from each of 596 primary sample units (either Lower Level Output Areas in England and Wales, or Data Zones in Scotland - Howat, Norden, Williams and Pickering, 2011). These units were chosen on the basis of their percentage coverage of the ethnic groups.
targeted by EMBES, with all those required to provide at least 80% coverage included in the core sample (Howat, Norden, Williams and Pickering, 2011). Each address was screened for ethnic minority presence (Heath et al, 2013) with the first eligible adult contacted invited to take part. A Kish grid was used to select one dwelling unit if the address applied to multiple households (Howat, Norden, Williams and Pickering, 2011). A booster sample was used to increase coverage of the Bangladeshi community, with the primary sampling eligibility threshold lowered to include all units necessary to give 55% coverage of the population (Howat, Norden, Williams and Pickering, 2011)20.

My decision to use EMBES was taken as it offered the largest publicly available representative sample of British Muslims, alongside indicators of support for political violence, political grievance and democratic valence.

The Muslim data comprised responses from over 1000 participants who self-identified as following Islam (n = 1096), 553 of whom were male and 539 of whom were female. Ages ranged between 18 and 97 (M = 36.230, SD = 13.478), with the overwhelming majority of respondents (68.7%) reporting that they were married (n = 707). In line with the national picture (ONS, 2012), Sunni adherents made up a majority (83.4%, n = 910) of the sample, with Shi’a (2.5%, n = 27), Sufi (0.3%, n = 3), and Ahmadi (0.5%, n = 6) Muslims present in only comparably small numbers.

20 Further detail on the EMBES survey's sample design can be found in both the appendix to Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders and Sobolewska's (2013) book and Howat, Norden, Williams and Pickering’s (2011) technical report.
In terms of ethnicity, the subset was 52.3% Asian British/Pakistani (n = 572), 21.2% Asian British/Bangladeshi (n = 232), and 12.6% Black British/African (n = 138). As a result, data analysis used a trimmed face-to-face weight designed to correct the sample for analysis of the five ethnic groups together, reflecting the fact that respondents in the Muslim subset were not ethnically homogeneous.

A large proportion of respondents were employed (42.0%, n = 458), with significant numbers serving as homemakers (20%, n = 218) or studying on a full-time basis (13.2%, n = 144).

4.3.2 Measurement

The EMBES survey included a wide range of potentially relevant variables; however as response rates for many items were low – particularly for the mail back element of the study - I elected to employ only variables collected via face-to-face interviews, for which levels of missingness were lower. Despite this, many of the items selected for use in analysis still suffered from relatively high levels of missingness, particularly evident through ‘Don’t know’ responses for measures of support for Sharia law and political violence. The comparably small number of outright missing cases (usually below 10%) did, however, allow for the use of missing data imputation procedures. A full list of variables used in secondary analysis can be found below, alongside details their treatment (including measures taken to address non-response and ‘missingness’). Appendix 2 contains further background information on these items, including question texts, and response categories.
Measuring 'Religious Extremism'

As identified in the opening chapter of this thesis, the question of how social scientists should measure religion remains contentious (Lorch and Hughes, 1985; King and Crowther, 2004). The difficulty of selecting a single aspect of what is, by definition, an enormously complex phenomenon presents significant challenges in respect of all religious groups; however, when such a question is posed in reference to an under-studied group such as British Muslims, these difficulties are magnified.

Traditional sociological approaches to the quantification of religion have roots in the study of Christian groups in the developed world (Weber, 2001; Durkheim, 1952), most often seeking to capture religion's impact through 'religiosity', an intangible, often non-manifest, variable commonly quantified by combining measures of salience, practice and belief (Clarke, Bannon and Denihan, 2003). Such an approach assumes that the most 'religious' are those who believe and practice their faith most frequently, and who believe their religion to be of greatest importance (Francis and Katz, 1992). However, while such an approach is well tested - and thus may be regarded as having validity - in respect of mainstream Christian groups, questions may be asked as to how well it provides for the quantification of 'extremism', particularly in the context of those from other religious confessions.

In respect of British Muslims, the key dimensions of religiosity are acknowledged to differ significantly from the norms of Christian groups (Jana-Masri and Priester, 2007), with those practising Islam evidencing different norms of religious practice and salience, being generally more frequent in prayer and attendance at a place of worship than Christians.
(World Values Survey, 2012) and being more likely to view religion as important due to its role in shaping perceptions of group identity (Savage, 2004). As a result of this it is possible that the use of a common approach may simply capture cultural affinity amongst Muslims rather than religiosity.

Furthermore, as this chapter focuses on religious extremists it is hard to see how an orthodox approach to the quantification of religiosity would help identify outcomes of interest. It is not simply the case that those who are most religious are the most extreme; rather extremism is a matter of ‘values’ (Glaser, Ponzetto and Shapiro, 2005), with those who hold ideals beyond the fringes of acceptability (as defined by their mainstream co-religionists) most frequently identified as extremists. While such an approach may seem tautologous, rendering extremism an intangible quality which we know when we see but cannot easily define (Sotlar, 2010), the EMBES variable measuring support for Sharia law provides a simple (albeit clearly approximated) solution. While not a proxy for extremism in respect of non-Muslim groups, support for Sharia has long been acknowledged as a hallmark of Islamic extremist discourse (Alexiev, 2011), with Genasci (2006) identifying it as a potent indicator of extremist predisposition. While both Eatwell (2006) and Marshall (2005) caution against taking a simplistic view of support for Sharia, noting that it can encompass a variety of positions ranging from support for ‘harsh’ criminal penalties to the softer endorsement of Islamic civil and family law, the EMBES indicator separates supporters by reference to the degree of their support for Sharia relative to current UK law, allowing for the separation of those who hold extreme, moderate, and oppositional positions on its implementation.
While this doubtless helps with the identification of 'extremists', classical sociology of religion as applied to the study of delinquency and criminality suggests that ideology is, on its own, insufficient to affect significant change in individual behaviour (Hirschi and Stark, 1969). In the context of this thesis – particularly given the argument advanced as to the nature of religion’s influence on democratic valence – regular involvement with those who hold similar views is argued to be a requirement for the reinforcement of negative out-group stereotypes, the internalization of which is argued to be a vital precondition for adherents to report increased support for political violence.

As the EMBES measures of frequency of religious practice was designed to encompass attendance norms across a number of confessions, its use may fail to perfectly capture the nuances of Islamic religious practice; it is certainly the case that the distribution of Islamic respondents differs significantly from those of other religious confessions, with frequent attendance more common amongst Muslims than other groups surveyed in the EMBES data. This is accepted; however, it is submitted that no more appropriate measure is available in the EMBES survey, and that differences in frequency of attendance between religious confessions matter far less than the level of attendance itself – Stark (1996) having identified that it is raw frequency of contact with co-religionists that best predicts the ability of a group to shape behaviours.

In this respect, the failure of the data to account for the close-knit nature of Islamic communities and the difficulty of disentangling cultural religiosity from genuine faith present greater problems. The possibility of using additional measures to develop an index of religious network involvement – adding
familial and cultural contact as well as raw frequency of attendance at a Mosque - presented a possible solution to this issue; however, the high levels of missing data in many relevant variables, and the difficulty of identifying the level of extremism of those with whom the respondent interacted, precluded the use of such an approach. As such, frequency of religious practice was retained as sole measure of group involvement, despite its imperfect nature. The possibility of bias arising from the use of such a simple proxy for a complex phenomenon is accepted; however, in the absence of more robust alternative measures no alternative approach was possible.

The religious practice measure used was therefore an ordered categorical variable comprising response options ranging from 'daily' to 'never'. The total number of participants reporting either a 'Don't Know' response or refusing to answer was relatively low (n = 10) and as such these cases were excluded from analysis. The remaining cases were collapsed into three groups in order to increase the power of the test, with daily and weekly attenders forming one category (n = 602, 55.6%), monthly and occasional attenders another (n = 242, 22.4%), and those who never visited a Mosque or attended only for festivals a third (n = 238, 22.0%).

The variable measuring support for Sharia comprised three ordered categories, 'Support in all cases', 'Support when penalty does not exceed that provided for by UK law', and 'Do not support', alongside two non-response options: 'Don't know' and 'Refused'. A comparatively small number of participants refused to answer the question, while almost 40% responded that they did not know the answer. These clear refusals were excluded from
further analysis, leaving four groups: unconditional supporters (n = 190, 18.5%), conditional supporters (n = 212, 20.6%), opponents (n = 218, 21.2%) and those who responded that they did not know (n = 409, 39.7%).

Measuring Democratic Valence

In respect of the measurement of democratic valence, different problems were manifest. While the simple replication of the measure used in the preceding chapter presented an obvious option, the presence of additional relevant indicators – not least variables measuring perceptions of political fairness and influence - offered the opportunity to formulate a more comprehensive measure that is more clearly aligned with my conceptual framework. As a result of this a revised measure of democratic valence was used, including indicators of perceived governmental efficacy and political influence, as well as measures of raw political and executive trust and systemic satisfaction: six separate manifest variables in total.

Levels of missing data (including refusals to answer) ranged between 0.1% and 0.3%, with many respondents electing to answer using the 'Don't Know' option (between 2.9% and 8.1% across all indicators). As refusal levels were comparably low cases recording this response were excluded from analysis, while those reporting a 'Don't Know' response were recoded with the rounded average score.

Principal Axis Factoring was employed to analyse these data, as the construct under investigation was an underlying latent variable (UCLA, 2012). A quartimax rotation was chosen to increase the likelihood of components loading onto a single factor (Field, 2005), while results were
saved as simple regression coefficients to facilitate easy analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy exceeded 0.5 (= 0.772), indicating an adequate sample for analysis, while the Barlett test of sphericity was highly significant (< 0.001), indicating that the relationship between variables was strong enough to sustain factor analysis.

Under both Kaiser's criterion and the scree test (Field, 2005) only one relevant factor was identified, the component loadings for which are displayed in Table 6 (below). Field's (2005) criteria were employed in its analysis, with all component loadings scoring 0.3 or above considered when determining meaning.

**Table 6 – Component Loadings for EMBES Democratic Valence Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component Loadings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Parliament</td>
<td>0.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Politicians</td>
<td>0.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Police</td>
<td>0.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Influence</td>
<td>0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Fair Treatment by Government</td>
<td>0.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Satisfaction</td>
<td>0.546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. 1 factors extracted. 8 iterations required.*
These results show the high loadings for trust, democratic satisfaction and belief in fair treatment, consistent with the theoretical construct that the factor is designed to proxy. However, the failure of political influence to exceed the 0.3 threshold raises important questions in respect of my theory. The result seems to suggest that political influence only weakly contributes to the democratic valence factor, suggesting that either perceptions of political influence have little impact on feelings about the efficacy of democratic protest, or that the factor I have compiled does not adequately represent the underlying construct I have sought to test.

While this may seem worthy of concern, it is important to note that the failure of a component to return a high loading may reflect not a lack of influence but merely an anomaly resulting from the distribution of responses or the limited range of options recorded in the component (Field, 2005). Alternatively, as factor analysis determines loadings on the basis of the correlation between analysed variables, a failure to present a high loading may simply indicate that the political influence shapes perceptions of political efficacy (and thus, democratic valence) separately to the other measures. Such an account would seem logically plausible – it is, for example, possible to distrust politicians, dislike democracy, and feel that the system is unfair, yet simultaneously believe that one can influence it themselves. Alternatively, it may simply reflect low levels of political influence amongst those with both high and low levels of political trust. If either explanation is accepted, the low loading for political influence would neither be surprising nor disconcerting. As result of this, the factor was determined to be an adequate proxy for the
underlying theoretical construct, and was consequently retained for use in analysis in this chapter.

Measuring Support for Political Violence

In respect of support for political violence, the EMBES survey contained several relevant binary indicators of support for violent activity. These were designed to address specific rationales for violence – for example, in response to government tax rises, job cuts or foreign wars - and accordingly it may appear that their usefulness as 'pure' indicators of support for political violence was limited. However, one of the issues most likely to attract support for political violence amongst Muslims is government support for wars in the Islamic world (Lorgan and Preble, 2011) – opposition to which remains a prominent feature of contemporary extremist discourse (Barker, 2009). It therefore seems reasonable that the use of an indicator thematically focussed on this issue would, in respect of Muslim groups, act as an acceptable proxy in lieu of a more open measure of support for political violence.

My analysis therefore focussed on the measure of support for violent demonstration in response to government wars as the indicator of support for violence. Of the 1,092 Islamic respondents in the EMBES sample, 20 missed or refused to answer the question, while 147 responded with 'Don't Know'. This small number of non-respondents were excluded, while those who responded 'Don't Know' were recoded as opposing violence, leaving a
dichotomized measure of support (n = 107, 9.8%) or opposition (n = 984, 90.2%).

*Measuring Political Grievance*

The review of theory and research argues that the impact of democratic valence on support for violence is contingent on the presence of a motivating grievance. While analysis using the European Values Study (presented in the preceding chapter) employed a measure of general happiness as a proxy for such grievance, the EMBES survey did not contain a directly analogous indicator. However, in the context of a Muslim population, the use of a more targeted indicator was possible, with political concern over foreign wars and the ‘War on Terror’ used as a proxy for more generalized grievance.

Such an approach would seem logical given the use of support for violent demonstrations in response to government intervention overseas as the indicator capturing support for violence (see above), and the prominence of British military intervention in the justifications of violent Islamist groups (Honderich, 2006).

Consequently, the analysis presented in this chapter employs a binary measure of political grievance formed from the EMBES indicators capturing concern about political issues, with those reporting that their paramount concern was the war in Iraq, war in Afghanistan, or ‘War on Terror’ marked as having a grievance. As a result, of the 1092 Islamic respondents in the
EMBES sample, 12% were coded as having a grievance (n = 131) leaving 88% without (n = 961).

**Confounding and Mediating Measures**

As both democratic valence and support for political violence are shaped by a range of factors, control measures were employed in the multivariate analysis to provide for a more rigorous test of the hypotheses and to take account of potential confounding factors. Pertinent items from the EMBES survey were included in one or both sets of regression models on the basis of a reading of the existing literature. Given the relatively small sample size, and the resultant need for a parsimonious model to conserve statistical power, no variables were included unless a consensus was identified as to the nature of their effect on the relationship under investigation. The literature used to identify these variables included work on political trust, social trust, political violence and terrorism. Age, gender and marital status were included in all models, alongside standard socio-economic control measures including employment status, employment type, and education level.

In addition to these variables, the regression models investigating religion's influence on democratic valence included measures for financial dependence on government (Edlund, 1999), interest in politics (Newton, 2001), migrant generation (Sobolewska, 2009), media exposure (Moy and Scheufele, 2000), economic optimism (Chanley, 2002), concern about crime (Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 2000) and political party involvement (Christensen and Laegreid, 2002).
Prior to use, all variables were recoded, with missing data replaced with an average value (either mean or modal) to preserve degrees of freedom in the model. Further detail on the control variables used in both regression models is presented in Table 7 (below), while question texts and response categories are presented in Appendix 2.

**Table 7- List of Control and Moderator Variables for Multivariate Analysis with EMBES**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Subject</th>
<th>EMBES Variable</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Recoded?</th>
<th>How Recoded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>bq88</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Dummy) Male =1, Female=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>bq89</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>bq90</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Dummy) Married=1, Unmarried=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status</td>
<td>eq65_1</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Dummy) Employed=1, Unemployed=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Type</td>
<td>bq98_1</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(3xDummy variables created to reflect NSSEC 3 classes)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NSSEC 2 (Clerical, Sales, Foreman or Supervisor=1)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NSSEC 3 (Skilled and Unskilled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Subject</td>
<td>EMBES Variable</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Recoded?</td>
<td>How Recoded</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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<td>Migrant Generation</td>
<td>bq102_1 and bq102_2r</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd} Generation Used as Reference Category</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Internet User=1 Non-Internet User=0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Newspaper Reader</td>
<td>bq88a</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Newspaper Reader=1 Non-Newspaper Reader=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>bq71_a</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Interested in Politics=1 Disinterested in Politics=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financially Dependent on State</td>
<td>bq107</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Financially Dependent on State=1 Not Financially Dependent on State=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned about Crime</td>
<td>bq2a</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Concerned about Crime=1 Not Concerned about Crime=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Subject</td>
<td>EMBES Variable</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Recoded?</td>
<td>How Recoded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party or Community Volunteer</td>
<td>bq55b</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Dummy)</td>
<td>Party or Community Volunteer=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not a Party of Community Volunteer=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Pessimist</td>
<td>bq26</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Dummy)</td>
<td>Economic Pessimist=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Economic Pessimist=0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.3 Procedures

Exploratory analysis using bivariate non-parametric tests was undertaken to check for evidence of associations between variables before controlling for confounder influences using regression analysis. Independent samples t-tests (Hypothesis 1 and 2), a one-way ANOVA (Hypothesis 3a), and chi-square tests (Hypotheses 3b and 4) were used for initial investigation of Hypotheses 1-4, with logistic regression used to test the relationship between democratic valence, political grievance, and support for political violence (Hypothesis 1, 2, 3b, and 4) in more detail. Linear regression was also used to further explore the relationship between religion and democratic valence as a test of Hypothesis 3a. Control measures were included in all multivariate models (as identified above), with variables introduced iteratively in thematically homogenous blocks.

Assessment of fit was undertaken using the following statistics and tests: $R^2$, Nagelkerke pseudo-$R^2$, and Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit tests. This
was both to assess block contributions, and overall model fit. Consistent with the preceding chapter, significance was calculated at the 10% level.

4.3.4 Ethics and other considerations

As highlighted in the preceding chapter, despite the widely-held belief that secondary data analysis raises no ethical issues (ESRC, 2011), there are several practical and procedural points that require discussion, perhaps the most obvious of which pertains to issues of participant consent.

As previously noted, while Grinyer (2009) suggests that best practice for secondary data analysis requires the obtaining of consent from each participant for every act of re-analysis, both the ESRC Research Ethics Guidebook (ESRC, 2011) and University of Manchester (University of Manchester, 2012) guidelines do not mandate such action. Particularly in respect of secondary data analysis, the seeking of participant consent for fresh analysis is uncommon. The agreement signed by all participants in the EMBES survey acknowledges that the data will be made publicly available for such work, and consequently while participants will not have consented to this project's specific analysis, they have provided a general authority under which my analysis can take place.

A more problematic issue arises from the Research Ethics Guidebook's (ESRC, 2012) stipulation that, when consent is not sought, care must be taken to ensure that data is not used or interpreted in a way to which participants may object. Particularly as this chapter seeks to show that some
aspects of religious adherence have anti-social effects on democratic valence and support for political violence, it is highly likely that some participants may oppose their data being used, particularly given the potential that aspects of their faith may be presented in an anti-social light. This is accepted; however it is submitted that, while participants may be against the project’s findings, they have no general right to prevent the use of their data on the basis of potential research outcomes. Indeed, the right to draw adverse inferences on the basis of empirically rigorous analysis is a core component of academic freedom.

Both Office for National Statistics (ONS) Research Guidelines (ONS, 2011) and the Research Ethics Guidebook (ESRC, 2012) suggests that care must be taken to ensure participants anonymity and confidentiality, even in cases where secondary data are used. Both assert the importance of ensuring that no results are reported that may allow for the ‘jigsaw identification’ of participants, with the ONS suggesting a blanket ban on the reporting of results where the total number of participants in a given category is less than 5 (ONS, 2011). While this risk is understood on a theoretical level, the EMBES data contains no information capable of directly identifying any participant, with most sensitive data stored at a highly aggregated level to prevent participant identification. While this may generate categories containing less than five respondents, the chance of accidental identification remains slim, particularly in the absence of further background information. As the analyses employed in this study seek only to explore broad correlations between democratic valence, political grievance, religious characteristics and support for political violence, no individual cases will be
discussed, and no data sets will be linked: thus the chance of individual participants being identified is extremely low, if not impossible.

Finally, the Research Ethics Guidebook (ESRC, 2012) suggests that care must be taken to ensure that the use of secondary data sets does not contravene legal obligations or the licenses under which such work is made available. In particular, they highlight the ‘best practice’ requirement that the researchers responsible for collecting the original data are made aware of the nature and type of project for which the data has been used, and are provided with copies of any outputs. While this is not a condition of the EMBES licence, Professor Anthony Heath, Principal Investigator of the EMBES survey, was aware of my work in his capacity as my PhD supervisor.

4.4 Bivariate Analysis: The Relationship between Islamic Extremism and Democratic Valence

4.4.1 Hypothesis One

The first hypothesis concerned the relationship between democratic valence and support for violent demonstrations, as tested in the previous chapter. As before, an independent samples t-test was run to compare mean levels of democratic valence between those who supported violent demonstrations and those who did not. As the Levene test returned an insignificant result, the assumption of equal variances was met, and subsequently analysis used uncorrected t-scores. Results showed a significant difference in democratic
valence between those who supported political violence (M = 0.165, SD = 0.974) and those who did not (M = 0.159, SD = 0.899), with those who supported violence reporting significantly higher scores; t(1074) = 3.510, p = 0.0001.

This is consistent with both the first hypothesis and the results of analysis employing data from the EVS, showing that those who supported political violence had lower levels of democratic valence than those who opposed it. This supports the assertion that democratic valence is a robust predictor of support for political violence; however, more complex analysis is required to definitively test whether this is the case amongst British Muslims, particularly given the range of potential confounder influences capable of shaping the relationship.

4.4.2 Hypothesis Two

The second hypothesis concerned the impact of a political grievance on the relationship between democratic valence and support for violent demonstrations, as tested in the previous chapter. An independent samples t-test comparing mean levels of democratic valence between those who supported violent demonstrations and those who did not was first run with data from only those respondents reporting no grievance. As the Levene test returned an insignificant result, the assumption of equal variances was met, and subsequently analysis used uncorrected t-scores. Results showed a significant difference in democratic valence between those who supported political violence (M = 0.031, SD = 0.921) and those who did not (M = 0.181,
SD = 0.891), with those who supported violence reporting significantly higher scores; *t*(946) = 2.143, *p* = 0.032.

The same test was repeated using data from those respondents reporting a grievance. As the Levene test returned an insignificant result, the assumption of equal variances was met, and subsequently analysis used uncorrected *t*-scores. Results again showed a significant difference in democratic valence between those who supported political violence (M = -0.914, SD = 0.945) and those who did not (M = -0.004, SD = 0.927), with those who supported violence again reporting significantly higher scores: *t*(126) = 3.670, *p* = 0.0001. In sum, I found a positive, rather than the expected negative correlation between democratic valence and support for political violence in both cases: British Muslims with no apparent grievance against government foreign policy, and those with a grievance.

These results raised significant questions in respect of my theory, challenging the findings of my previous analysis of the EVS in finding significant relationships between democratic valence and support for violence both amongst those with, and those without, political grievances. If this picture is replicated in the multivariate analysis, then my second hypothesis must be rejected. However, the difference in magnitude of effect and significance level across the groups – with members of the grievance group evidencing more significant effects of greater magnitude – raises important questions that cannot be answered without recourse to more sophisticated analyses. Given that the relationship is likely to be subject to the influence of other, unmeasured variables, it cannot definitively be said that the outputs produced by these tests are a complete and accurate
representation of the actual relationship. Multivariate analysis is therefore necessary to definitively reject the null hypothesis.

4.4.3 Hypothesis Three (A)

A one-way ANOVA was used to explore the first part of the third hypothesis, testing for differences in mean scores for democratic valence between those who supported the introduction of Sharia in all circumstances ('unqualified support'), those who supported its introduction only when its penalties did not exceed those provided for by British law ('qualified support'), those who opposed its introduction in all cases ('opposition'), and those who were unsure ('don't know'). Games-Howell post-hoc comparisons were used to present an 'honest' picture of the significance of the differences between groups, in order to avoid the 'fishing expedition' problem identified by Altermatt (2012).

As the Levene test returned a significant value (p = 0.002), the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met; as such, I used corrected results from Welch’s robust test in all analysis. Mean scores for democratic valence differed significantly across the groups (F(3, 463.054) = 10.423, p < 0.0001), with results of the Games-Howell tests indicating that those offering unqualified support to the implementation of Sharia (M = -0.072, 95% CI [-0.218, -0.075]) had significantly lower levels of 'democratic valence' than those who opposed its introduction (M = 0.278, 95% CI [0.155, 0.402], p = 0.002) or were unsure (M = 0.235, 95% CI [0.155, 0.316], p = 0.002). Similarly, comparisons also showed significant differences between those
offering conditional support to Sharia $(M = -0.083, 95\% \text{ CI} [-0.205, -0.039])$
and those who opposed its introduction $(0.278, 95\% \text{ CI} [0.155, 0.402], p < 0.0001)$ or were unsure $(M = 0.235, 95\% \text{ CI} [0.155, 0.316], p < 0.0001)$. All
other comparisons were non-significant at the conventional level $(p \leq 0.1)$.

These findings raise a number of interesting questions. While they provide
some support for Hypothesis 3a by showing that those who support the
introduction of Sharia had lower levels of democratic valence than those who
do not, the fact that the lowest scores were found amongst conditional
supporters of Sharia may indicate that the argument outlined in the review of
theory and research may be inaccurate. Indeed, these results may be argued
to suggest that conditional supporters are not more moderate than those
offering Sharia unconditional support.

While it is possible that this difference may simply reflect the impact of an
unmeasured suppressor or moderator variable (Field, 2005), there are
several alternative theoretical explanations that may account for this
discrepancy. The Games-Howell test's failure to show significant differences
between 'extreme' and 'moderate' supporters of Sharia may indicate that
Eatwell's (2006) argument for a two-tier division of Sharia supporters into
'moderate' and 'extreme' groupings is incorrect – the two groups may well
be equally 'extreme', perhaps suggesting that the measurement approach
taken by this thesis is incorrect. Conversely, it may be the case that data on
support for Sharia reflects the influence of demand characteristics amongst
respondents - support for Sharia is a sensitive issue, and it is not beyond the
realms of possibility that many participants may have given a more moderate
response to due to its social desirability.
Alternatively, the results may be correct, with the Games-Howell results reflecting simply that the hypothesis is wrong. This would suggest that depleted democratic valence is the result not of Islamic ideology but of an alternative factor by which conditional supporters differ from those in the other categories. As answers to such questions cannot be provided by bivariate tests, further multivariate analyses are required.

4.4.4 Hypothesis Three (B)

Hypothesis 3b was tested using a cross-tabulation with adjusted standardized residuals and Pearson chi-square tests. The chi-square statistic for the test was 12.373 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance score of \( p = 0.006 \), indicating a robust association between variables. Table 8 (below) presents the tabular form of this analysis, showing small differences in the percentages supporting political violence between those opposing the introduction of Sharia and those offering it conditional support, with 10.1% and 12.3% of these respondents affirming support for violence. This compares with 15.8% of those who supported the introduction of Sharia in all cases, and 6.8% of those who were unsure, presenting a picture at odds with earlier analysis and consistent with Marshall (2005) and Eatwell's (2006) comments on the significance of differences between 'moderate' and 'extreme' supporters of Sharia.
### Table 8 - Cross tabulation of Support for Violence and Support for Sharia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unconditional Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>84.20%</td>
<td>15.80%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditional Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>87.70%</td>
<td>12.30%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>89.90%</td>
<td>10.10%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>93.20%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
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<td>-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>89.70%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 12.733, df = 3, p = 0.006

The adjusted standardized residuals exceeded the significance threshold of 2 (Bandyopadhyay, 2011) for those cells covering the highest and lowest scores (unconditional support for Sharia and uncertainty of support) only, suggesting that significant differences existed between respondents in these categories and the sample as a whole. Conversely, conditional supporters and those who were opposed to Sharia could not definitively be said to differ on the basis of this analysis.
Despite this, the overall relationship was consistent with hypothesis 3b, suggesting that those who supported the imposition of Sharia in all cases were more likely to support political violence. This is in line with the theory under examination, suggesting that more 'extreme' supporters of Sharia are more likely to support political violence than those who are unsure, opposed to Sharia, or offering it only conditional support.

However, given the results of the previous test such findings are surprising, indicating that differences in support for political violence between groups cannot be attributed to the influence of democratic valence, given its lower mean level amongst those who offer Sharia conditional support. This poses interesting questions in respect of the theory as a whole, suggesting that the mechanism through which religion and support for political violence interact may differ from that hypothesized.

### 4.4.5 Hypothesis Four

My fourth hypothesis was that the effect of Muslim ideology on support for political violence was contingent on religious group involvement. This was tested using a three-way cross-tabulation\(^\text{21}\) with adjusted standardized residuals and a chi-squared test. The chi-square statistic was only found significant for cells covering weekly practitioners \((\chi^2 = 14.219, \text{df} = 3, \ p = 0.003)\), suggesting that support for Sharia was only associated with support for political violence amongst the most regular practitioners. Table 9 (below) provides a simplified illustration, offering detail on the rates of support for

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\(^{21}\) Employing support for violence (column), support for sharia (row) and frequency of practice (layer)
political violence amongst weekly practitioners. This shows that almost 20% of unconditional supporters backed political violence, compared to only 7.6% of conditional supporters and 11.5% of those who opposed its introduction (Table 9, below).

**Table 9 - Cross tabulation of Support for Sharia by Support for Political Violence amongst Weekly Religious Practitioners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unconditional Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>80.20%</td>
<td>19.80%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditional Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>92.40%</td>
<td>7.60%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>88.50%</td>
<td>11.50%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unknown</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>92.60%</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Residual</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 14.219, \text{ df } = 3, \text{ p } = 0.003 \)

As before, the adjusted standardized residuals for most cells did not exceed the significance threshold of 2 (Bandyopadhyay, 2011), suggesting that although there was a general association between support for Sharia and support for political violence, it cannot confidently be said that those who did
not support Sharia differed in their support for violence from the sample as a whole.

These results raise a number of interesting questions, most notably in relation to the role of religious practice as a mediator influencing support for Sharia: while it is true that the Sharia-violence relationship was found significant amongst only weekly religious practitioners, and that the level of support for political violence amongst unconditional supporters of Sharia increased greatly compared to the levels found in the test for Hypothesis 3b, the results of Hypothesis 3a continue to pose a challenge in respect of the mechanisms through which support for political violence is believed to be influenced. While it is true that the results of the ANOVA neglected the role of religious practice, and that as such, unconditional supporters of Sharia that practice most frequently may have levels of democratic valence that are lower still – and thus, that the theory may yet be proved correct – these results provide no evidence on which to base such an assertion.

Furthermore, the failure of the relationship to be found significant in respect of other practice groups does not preclude the presence of a relationship. Rather, unmeasured suppressor or mediator variables may be exerting an influence over the results. If this is the case, then further multivariate tests are required to definitively answer the question.
4.5 Multivariate Analysis

Multivariate analysis was undertaken to provide tests of the hypotheses that controlled for possible confounder influences. Linear and logistic regression models were used to predict participant responses for dependent variables as employed for bivariate tests while controlling for range of other potential influences. Due to the limited sample and the subsequent risk of Type II error, control variables were included in the models only if identified as influences on the dependent variable on the basis of a reading of the relevant literature. Other variables – including measures identified in the literature as having no effect – were excluded, in order to allow me to specify the most parsimonious model possible.

4.5.1 Hypothesis 1

Binary logistic regression was used to conduct a multivariate test of the role of democratic valence in predicting support for political violence, replicating analysis undertaken in the preceding chapter. The model was specified to contain control variables as identified in Table 7 alongside the factor score for democratic valence (detailed at the start of this chapter). Prior to running the models, collinearity statistics were examined, with variance inflation factor scores (VIFs) indicating that the variables were not collinear and were therefore suitable for analysis.

Variables were added in two blocks, the first containing all control covariates, while the second added only the measure of democratic valence. The outputs of these models can be seen below in Table 10.
### Table 10 - Logistic Regression Investigating the Role of Democratic Valence as a Predictor of Support for Political Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>1.132</td>
<td>0.594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>0.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>1.423</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>1.863</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>1.302</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>1.107</td>
<td>0.662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>0.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>1.477</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>1.181</td>
<td>0.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>1.326</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>1.877</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>1.376</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Valence</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.753</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.100</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2 = 0.122$. For Step 1, pseudo $R^2 = 0.133$ for Step 2.

*NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

The model chi-square for the first block was 64.387, with 8 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 11.981 with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.152$), indicating that the observed data did not significantly differ from the predictions of the model (Field, 2005). Nagelkerke’s pseudo $R^2$ confirmed this, indicating moderate but acceptable goodness of fit ($R^2 = 0.122$).

Only age (OR = 0.944, $p < 0.001$), NSSEC class D (OR = 1.863, $p = 0.40$) and the constant (OR = 0.374, $p = 0.60$) were found significant, with age and the constant being negatively associated with support for political violence, and NSSEC class D membership being positively associated with support for violence. All other variables were non-significant which, alongside the modest Nagelkerke values, may be seen to indicate that demographic factors are, alone, poor predictors of support for political violence. However, given the consensus in the literature as to their effect, this contention seems unlikely. Rather, it is more likely that these findings reflect the anomalies of the sample, issues of question ‘fit’ in relation to Muslim norms, or simple measurement error.

The second block of variables introduced the factor score for democratic valence. The overall model chi-square rose to 70.247 with 9 degrees of
freedom (p < 0.001) as a result of a block contribution of 5.860 with 1 degree of freedom (p = 0.015). The Nagelkerke pseudo R² increased slightly to R² = 0.133, showing that the addition of democratic valence improved the fit of the model, while the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic remained significant (chi-square of 8.762 with 8 degrees of freedom, p = 0.366), indicating that the model continued to predict the observed data well.

Of those variables retained from the first model age (OR = 0.946, p < 0.001), NSSEC class D (OR = 1.877, p = 0.039) and the constant (OR 0.333, p = 0.036) remained significant, with a unit change continuing to predict only a minor shift in the chance of supporting political violence. The measure for democratic valence attained significance at the 5% level (OR = 0.753, p = 0.015), with the odds ratio suggesting that increased democratic valence decreased the chance of supporting political violence. On this basis, Hypothesis 1 is supported. This confirms the picture presented in Chapter 3 showing that, amongst British Muslims, democratic valence is a predictor of support for violence.

4.5.2 Hypothesis 2

Binary logistic regression models were used to conduct a multivariate test of whether the existence of a political grievance influenced the relationship between democratic valence and support for political violence. Models were specified to include controls as used in the testing of Hypothesis 1. Two models were run, with the first including data from only those respondents reporting a political grievance, and the second including only data from those
without a political grievance. Prior to running the models, collinearity statistics were examined, with VIFs indicating that the variables were not collinear and were therefore suitable for analysis.

**Table 11 - Logistic Regression Investigating the Role of Democratic Valence as a Predictor of Support for Political Violence amongst Respondents without a Political Grievance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>1.112</td>
<td>0.673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td>0.285</td>
<td>0.839</td>
<td>0.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>1.536</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>1.174</td>
<td>0.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>1.408</td>
<td>0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>1.604</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.513</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>1.670</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Valence</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.417</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2 = 0.129$ For Step 1, pseudo $R^2 = 0.138$ for Step 2.

a NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

In the first iteration (exploring those reporting a political grievance) the model chi-square was 52.941, with 8 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$). The Hosmer-
Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 7.059 with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.530$), indicating that the observed data did not differ significantly from the predictions of the model (Field, 2005), a point lent credence by the modest Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2$ values indicating modest goodness-of-fit ($R^2 = 0.117$).

Of the control variables age (OR = 0.953, $p = 0.002$) and the constant (OR = 0.242, $p = 0.012$) were found significant, with a unit change in both associated with a reduction in the chance of supporting political violence. Post-secondary education (OR = 1.670, $p = 0.046$) was also found to be significant, with results indicating that it was positively associated with support for violence. Crucially, the measure for democratic valence failed to attain significance at the 10% level (OR = 0.848, $p = 0.198$), although the coefficient sign suggests that increased democratic valence decreased the chance of supporting political violence in line with my theory.

**Table 12** - Logistic Regression Investigating the Role of Democratic Valence as a Predictor of Support for Political Violence amongst Respondents with a Political Grievance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>2.007</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>1.474</td>
<td>0.656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>1.846</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Type of Work**

<p>| NSSEC-3 Class A | 0.630  | 1.391 | 1.878 | 0.650 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>-1.093</td>
<td>1.268</td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>2.407</td>
<td>1.276</td>
<td>11.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>-1.683</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Valence</td>
<td>-1.814</td>
<td>0.601</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.582</td>
<td>2.119</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2 = 0.129$ for Step 1. pseudo $R^2 = 0.138$ for Step 2.

*NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping.

In the second iteration (exploring those reporting a political grievance) the model chi-square for the first block was 39.230, with 8 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 1.478 with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.993$), indicating that the observed data did not differ significantly from the predictions of the model (Field, 2005), a point lent credence by the Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2$ values suggesting good model fit ($R^2 = 0.333$).

In this iteration, age (OR = 0.896, $p = 0.055$), NSSEC class D (OR = 11.103, $p = 0.059$) and post-secondary education (OR = 0.186, $p = 0.029$) were found significant, with age and post-secondary education negatively associated with support for political violence, and NSSEC class D membership being positively associated with support for political violence. Crucially, democratic valence was, in this iteration, found highly significant (OR = 0.163, $p = 0.003$), with a unit increase in democratic valence dramatically lowering the odds of supporting violence. This finding is consistent with the results of the previous chapter, in affirming that the
existence of a grievance is essential in determining the impact of democratic valence on support for violence. On this basis, hypothesis 2 is accepted, with the impact of democratic valence on support for violence shown to be contingent on the presence of a political grievance.

4.5.3 Hypothesis 3a

Next, a linear regression model was run using democratic valence as the dependent variable, alongside support for Sharia as an independent variable with demographic and attitudinal covariates as identified in the methodological preface to this chapter. The model was run three times, in each iteration adding a new block of variables. The first block contained only demographic controls; the second added attitudinal controls; and then finally the third introduced measures of support for Sharia law. All categorical covariates were dichotomised prior to inclusion, with detailed collinearity checks undertaken with all variables to ensure suitability for analysis. Model diagnostics were undertaken at each step, with $R^2$ statistics used to assess goodness-of-fit. The results of these three models are presented below in Table 13.
Table 13—Linear Regression Results Investigating the Role of Support for Sharia as a Predictor of Democratic Valence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.301</td>
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<td>0.017</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>-0.356</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary Education</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Generation Migrant</td>
<td>-0.565</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>-0.292</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Generation Migrant</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>-0.298</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary Education</td>
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<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.005</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.5 Generation Migrant</td>
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<td>0.062</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Generation Migrant</td>
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<td>0.102</td>
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<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet User</td>
<td>-0.233</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Reader</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political or Community Volunteer</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financially Dependent on State</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Pessimist</td>
<td>-0.431</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>-0.222</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Concerned About Crime</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Step 3**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>SE</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>P</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.544</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary Education</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Generation Migrant</td>
<td>-0.488</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>-0.252</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Generation Migrant</td>
<td>-0.243</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet User</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Reader</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political or Community Volunteer</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in Politics</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financially Dependent on State</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Pessimist</td>
<td>-0.422</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Concerned About Crime</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional Sharia Supporter</td>
<td>-0.203</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Sharia Supporter</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia Opponent</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note $R^2 = 0.129$ for Step 1, $\Delta R^2 = 0.077$ for Step 2, $\Delta R^2 = 0.018$ for Step 3 ($p < 0.001$)
a 'Don’t Know' responses were used as reference category for the group of variables encompassing support for Sharia, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

The first model evidenced good predictive fit ($R^2 = 0.129$), with subsequent iterations showing marked improvement. In the final model several variables crossed the 10% significance threshold, with NSSEC Class A ($\beta = -0.116$, $p < 0.001$) and Class B ($\beta = -0.082$, $p = 0.011$), post-secondary education ($\beta = 0.089$, $p = 0.006$), 1.5 generation migrancy ($\beta = -0.068$, $p < 0.001$), second generation migrancy ($\beta = -0.252$, $p = 0.017$), internet use ($\beta = -0.114$, $p = 0.002$), political and community activism ($\beta = -0.049$, $p = 0.082$), interest in politics ($\beta = -0.137$, $p < 0.001$) and economic pessimism ($\beta = -0.217$, $p < 0.001$) all found to be predictors of democratic valence.

Measures of support for Sharia were also shown to significantly predict democratic valence, with both unconditional ($\beta = -0.085$, $p = 0.005$) and conditional ($\beta = -0.092$, $p = 0.002$) support evidencing potent negative effects. However, while the result of this analysis shows that unconditional support for Sharia is indeed a predictor of democratic valence, the greater effect size for conditional support compared with unconditional support does little to address the questions raised by the bivariate tests, thereby adding further weight to arguments against the trichotomous measure employed to quantify support for Sharia.
Nevertheless, while these issues are accepted, the results do show an effect consistent with the contention that extreme Islamic Ideology undermines confidence in democracy; as such, hypothesis 3a is accepted and the corresponding null hypothesis is rejected. In other words, religious ideology has been shown to be a predictor of democratic valence, with supporters of Sharia likely to have lower levels of democratic valence than those who oppose it.

4.5.4 Hypothesis 3b

A binary logistic regression model was next run with support for violent demonstrations as the dependent variable, alongside support for Sharia as an independent variable, and the same set of covariates as employed in the testing of Hypothesis 1. The model was run in three iterations: the first of which contained only control measures (as in Step 1 of Hypothesis 1); the second of which added variables measuring support for Sharia; and the third of which introduced my measure of democratic valence. The results of the second and third models are displayed below in Table 14.
Table 14—Logistic Regression Results Investigating the Role of Support for Sharia as a Predictor of Support for Political Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>1.098</td>
<td>0.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>1.433</td>
<td>0.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>1.219</td>
<td>0.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>1.337</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>1.792</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>1.329</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional Support for Sharia</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>2.563</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Support for Sharia</td>
<td>0.682</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>1.977</td>
<td>0.022</td>
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<td>Opposition to Sharia</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>1.725</td>
<td>0.077</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>1.083</td>
<td>0.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>1.463</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>1.261</td>
<td>0.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>1.797</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE B</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>1.395</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional Support for Sharia</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>2.378</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Support for Sharia</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>1.833</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
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<td>Opposition to Sharia</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>1.746</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic valence</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.794</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.524</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Nagelkerke pseudo R² = 0.144 for Step 2. Pseudo R² = 0.151 for Step 3.
a ‘Don’t Know’ responses were used as the reference category for the group of variables encompassing support for Sharia, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.
b NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as the reference category.

The first iteration of the model (including only control measures) returned a chi-square of 64.387, with 8 degrees of freedom (p < 0.001). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 11.981 with 8 degrees of freedom (p = 0.152), indicating that the observed data did not significantly differ from the predictions of the model (Field, 2005). Nagelkerke’s pseudo R² confirmed this, indicating moderate but acceptable goodness of fit (R² = 0.122). As before, only age (OR = 0.944, p < 0.001), NSSEC class D (OR = 1.863, p = 0.040) and the constant (OR = 0.374, p = 0.060) were found significant, with age and the constant being negatively associated with support for political violence, and NSSEC class D membership being positively associated with support for violence. All other variables were non-significant.

---

22 Details of the first iteration are not shown as they are identified as being identical to those in the first block of the model run for Hypothesis 1.
The second block of variables added only the measures of support for Sharia. Following their inclusion, the new model returned a chi-square of 76.299 with 11 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$), with a block contribution of 11.912 with 3 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.008$). The Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2$ indicated an overall improvement in the predictive strength of the model ($pseudo \, R^2 = 0.144$), despite the Hosmer-Lemeshow test suggesting that the inclusion of the new variables caused poor fit, returning a chi-square of 15.482 with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.050$).

In this revised model, only controls for age (OR = 0.945, $p < 0.001$) and NSSEC class D membership (OR = 1.792, $p = 0.057$) attained significance at the 10% level. Alongside this, unconditional support for Sharia (OR = 2.563, $p = 0.001$), conditional support for Sharia (OR = 1.977, $p = 0.022$) and opposition to Sharia (OR = 1.725, $p = 0.077$) all attained significance at the 10% level. While the impact of age was consistent with the effect shown in the first model, unconditional support for Sharia was responsible for a significant shift in the likelihood of supporting political violence, with the odds ratio indicating that members of this group were much more likely to support political violence than those offering Sharia only conditional support and those opposed to Sharia.

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23 The failure of the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test to return a non-significant result in this iteration is – while indicative of model over- or under-prediction – not a cause for concern given the result in respect of the final iteration of the test, where the model is more fully-specified. Rather, the significance of the result may simply indicate volatility in the model (Allison, 2014).
A third model was run to attempt to isolate whether this effect was the result of democratic valence or other unmeasured factors. The model returned a chi-square of 80.027 with 12 degrees of freedom (p < 0.001), with the block contribution of 3.278 with 1 degree of freedom (p = 0.054). This model returned a non-significant Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-square ($\chi^2 = 6.539$, df = 8, p = 0.587), and an increased Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2 = 0.151$, indicating a slight improvement of fit. In this model, democratic valence attained significance at the 10% level (OR = 0.794, p = 0.053), with a unit increase predicting a reduction in the odds of supporting violence. Alongside this, the control measures and indicators of support for Sharia found significant in the previous model remained significant.

While the significance of democratic valence may be taken to challenge the theory I have advanced – with the influence of religious ideology exerted through democratic valence – the fact that it evidenced a lower magnitude of effect than in models where it was included without measures of support for Sharia (as in the testing of Hypothesis 1) is consistent with my theory. In particular, the results of multivariate analysis for Hypothesis 3a (showing that democratic valence is shaped by a range of factors in addition to religious ideology) highlight that possibility that its independent effect merely proxy the continuing impact of these other influences.

Despite all measures of support for Sharia (including opposition) predicting an increase in the odds of supporting violence, the fact that unconditional support evidenced the highest impact can be taken to support my theory. On this basis of these results, the requirements of Hypothesis 3b can be regarded to have been satisfied, and the corresponding null hypothesis can
be rejected. In other words, support for Sharia has been shown to be an indicator of increased support for violence.

4.5.5 Hypothesis 4

To test the final hypothesis, a binary logistic regression model was run with support for violent demonstrations as dependent variable, alongside simplified quasi-interaction measures created by categorically combining different combinations of support for Sharia and frequency of religious practice alongside covariates as employed in the testing of Hypotheses 1. The model was run in three iterations, the first of which included only control covariates (as in the first iteration of the model used to test Hypothesis 1), the second adding the combined measures of support for Sharia and frequency of religious practice, and the third adding a measure of democratic valence. The results of these models are shown below, in Table 15.

Table 15 – Logistic Regression Results Investigating the Relationship the Impact of Frequency of Religious Practice on the Relationship Between Support for Sharia and Support for Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.792</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.808</td>
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<td>0.289</td>
<td>1.546</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE B</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class A</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>1.316</td>
<td>0.425</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class B</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSSEC-3 Class D</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>1.761</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional Support for Sharia and Weekly Attendance</td>
<td>1.800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional Support for Sharia and Monthly Attendance</td>
<td>1.469</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>4.346</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional Support for Sharia and Infrequent or No Attendance</td>
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<td>Not Estimable</td>
<td>Not Estimable</td>
<td>Not Estimable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Support for Sharia and Weekly Attendance</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>2.303</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Support for Sharia and Monthly Attendance</td>
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<td>8.515</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Support for Sharia and Infrequent or No Attendance</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>2.501</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Sharia and Weekly Attendance</td>
<td>1.368</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>3.928</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Opposition to Sharia and Monthly Attendance</td>
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<td>0.587</td>
<td>3.127</td>
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<td>Opposition to Sharia and Infrequent or No Attendance</td>
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<td>0.736</td>
<td>1.329</td>
<td>0.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know about Sharia and Weekly Attendance</td>
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<td>0.496</td>
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<td>0.095</td>
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<td>Don't Know about Sharia and Monthly Attendance</td>
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<td>0.590</td>
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**Step 3**

<table>
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<th>SE B</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>P</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>SE B</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>P</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.922</td>
<td>0.755</td>
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<td>0.487</td>
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<td>for Sharia and Weekly</td>
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<td>Attendance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional Support</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for Sharia and Infrequent</td>
<td>Estimable</td>
<td>Estimable</td>
<td>Estimable</td>
<td>Estimable</td>
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<tr>
<td>or No Attendance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conditional Support</td>
<td>0.733</td>
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<td>2.082</td>
<td>0.175</td>
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<td>for Sharia and Weekly</td>
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<td>Attendance</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7.970</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Support</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>2.361</td>
<td>0.204</td>
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<td>for Sharia and Infrequent</td>
<td>Not Estimable</td>
<td>Not Estimable</td>
<td>Not Estimable</td>
<td>Not Estimable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or No Attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Sharia</td>
<td>1.377</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>3.964</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Weekly Attendance</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Sharia</td>
<td>1.144</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>3.139</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Monthly Attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition to Sharia</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>1.344</td>
<td>0.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Infrequent or No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know about Sharia</td>
<td>0.826</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>2.285</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Weekly Attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know about Sharia</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>2.442</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Monthly Attendance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE B</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic valence</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.147</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2 = 0.187$ for Step 2, pseudo $R^2 = 0.194$ for Step 3.

\(^{a}\) The variable measuring unconditional support for Sharia and infrequent or non-practice was retained in analysis despite the model’s failure to estimate reliable standard errors or coefficients. I believe that this reflects the small number of positive responses ($n = 30$) in this variable, and while best practice dictates that such problems should be addressed by collapsing the measure into another variable, I believe that such an approach would have been inappropriate given the nature of the variable and its centrality to the hypothesis test being undertaken.

\(^{b}\) ‘Don’t Know’ about Sharia and Infrequent or No Attendance’ responses were used as the reference category for the group of variables encompassing combined frequency of religious practice and support for Sharia, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

\(^{c}\) NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as the reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

The first iteration of the model included only control measures as used in the testing of Hypothesis 1, returning a chi-square of 64.387, with 8 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 11.981 with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.152$), indicating that the observed data did not significantly differ from the predictions of the model (Field, 2005). Nagelkerke’s pseudo $R^2$ confirmed this, indicating moderate but acceptable goodness of fit ($R^2 = 0.122$). As before, only age (OR = 0.944, $p < 0.001$), NSSEC class D (OR = 1.863, $p = 0.040$) and the constant (OR = 0.374, $p = 0.060$) were found significant, with age and the constant being negatively associated with support for political violence, and NSSEC class D membership being positively associated with support for violence. All other variables were non-significant.
The second iteration added the dichotomized measures for different combinations of support for Sharia and frequency of religious practice, returning a significantly increased model chi-square of 99.934 with 19 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$), and a block contribution of 35.547 with 11 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square of 14.506 with 8 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.070$) indicating moderate predictive fit, while the Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2$ rose dramatically to $R^2 = 0.187$ indicating a significant improvement in the model's predictive power.

In this iteration age (OR = 0.949, $p < 0.001$) and membership of NSSEC class D (OR = 1.761, $p = 0.069$) reached significance at the 10% level, alongside unconditional support for Sharia with weekly attendance (OR = 6.049, $p < 0.001$), unconditional support for Sharia with monthly attendance (OR = 4.346, $p = 0.017$), conditional support with monthly attendance (OR = 8.515, $p < 0.001$), opposition to Sharia with weekly attendance (OR = 3.928, $p = 0.11$), opposition to Sharia with monthly attendance (OR = 3.127, $p = 0.052$), and uncertainty regarding Sharia and weekly attendance (OR = 2.290, $p = 0.095$). Only age was associated with decreased support for political violence, with each increase in year of age causing a slight decrease in the odds of supporting violence. All other significant variables were associated with an increase in support for political violence, with the greatest change found for monthly attendance with conditional support for Sharia.

A third model was then run to ascertain whether these effects were the result of variation in factors other than democratic valence. Once this measure was added, the model chi-square rose to 103.913 with 20 degrees of freedom ($p < 0.001$), with a block contribution of 4.039 with 1 degree of freedom ($p =
The Nagelkerke pseudo $R^2$ rose significantly ($R^2 = 0.194$), with the Hosmer-Lemeshow test found insignificant ($\chi^2 = 10.646$, df = 8, $p = 0.223$) suggesting good model fit.

In this iteration, all items found significant in the second model remained significant, with age (OR = 0.951, $p < 0.001$) and membership of NSSEC class D (OR = 1.796, $p = 0.061$) reaching significance at the 10% level, alongside unconditional support for Sharia with weekly attendance (OR = 5.627, $p < 0.001$), unconditional support for Sharia with monthly attendance (OR = 3.871, $p = 0.029$), conditional support for Sharia with monthly attendance (OR = 7.970, $p < 0.001$), opposition to Sharia with weekly attendance (OR = 3.964, $p = 0.11$), opposition to Sharia with monthly attendance (OR = 3.139, $p = 0.052$), and uncertainty regarding Sharia and weekly attendance (OR = 2.258, $p = 0.096$). As before, democratic valence also achieved significance at the 10% level (OR = 0.781, $p = 0.045$), suggesting that it continued to exert an independent effect on support for political violence, consistent with the argument outlined above.

On this basis Hypothesis 4 must be rejected, and the corresponding null hypothesis accepted. In other words, I have failed to show the hypothesized link between religious practice, religious ideology and support for violence, questioning the model I outlined in the review of theory and research.
4.6 Discussion

First of all, it should be made clear that the results of these analyses do not offer clear or unequivocal support for my theory about support for political violence. In particular, the results of tests for Hypotheses 3 and 4 paint a picture seemingly at odds with my argument on the nature and direction of religion’s influence on support for political violence, showing only an inconsistent and oblique relationship between religion, democratic valence and support for violence. While it is tempting to claim this as clear proof of the invalidity of some aspects of my theory, the complexity of the phenomena under investigation, the difficulty inherent in its measurement, and the susceptibility of results to influence by unmeasured third factors prevents the drawing of simple and definitive conclusions, requiring a more detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of my analyses and their results, as is developed below.

However, to start with a focus on the least clear findings would be to overlook what is, perhaps, my single most significant result: the offering of further evidence in support of the existence of a relationship between political grievance, democratic valence and support for political violence. In replicating the results of the previous chapter’s analysis of the EVS data, I have shown that support for political violence in the Muslim community is – as in the British population at large - contingent on the existence of a political grievance. Alongside this, I have shown that, amongst British Muslims, support for political violence is also dependent on the attractiveness of alternative strategies: political and executive trust, belief in political fair treatment and feelings of efficacy have been shown to exert an effect on the
support for violence which is consistent with my theory. Perception of the efficacy of democratic means of pursuing policy goals indeed appear to influence the relative price of violent activity, and thus the chance that individuals will lend such actions their support.

While further research is required to conclusively establish the validity of my theory - particularly in respect of providing a reliable basis for claiming causation - if consistent findings are forthcoming, profound questions will be raised in respect of current academic theories of, and governmental responses to, both the support of violence and those engaged in its commission. As highlighted in the previous chapter, academic orthodoxy has long asserted the group-specific nature of motivation (Crenshaw, 1981) and denied the possibility of common causes shaping the decision to endorse violence across multiple groups (Crenshaw, 2000). The finding that support for political violence is correlated with a factor exerting a common influence across multiple groups renders such arguments fallacious, lending support to my theory (and rational choice approaches more broadly defined) and raising the prospect of an explanatory framework with validity in respect of multiple groups.

Similarly, the failure of demographic measures to attain significance at the 10% level raises important questions in respect of existing work on support for (and engagement in) political violence – particularly by British Muslims – affirming the contention made in the previous chapter that many widely-accepted indicators of violent extremist sympathy may lack predictive
validity. While the fact that age was found significant in all of the logistic models was consistent with Jurgensmeyer's (2000) work on youth and Islamic violence, his explanation implied that this effect was because the young have least to lose – being generally unmarried and without children or financial dependents who would be affected by their involvement in violent activity. While such an argument seems reasonable in respect of involvement in terrorism, my results question such a simple formulation by showing that the young are also more likely to support political violence, an activity with low real costs.

If my analysis is correct, it seems fair to suggest that the young support violent action – and thus, are involved in its commission – in greater numbers for reasons of substance rather than pure practicality. As age failed to reach significance in the linear regression models, this difference seems unlikely to be the result of a pure age or cohort effect on democratic valence. Rather, it seems likely that it is a proxy for another, unmeasured influence. Academic work on the role of idealism in shaping involvement in violent action offers one possible explanation (Corrado, 1981), with the young argued to be more idealistic than their elders (Kenniston, 1969) and thus, more willing to be involved in the commission and support of revolutionary action. While such an argument seems plausible, the lack of a consensus in the literature and the absence of relevant measures in the EMBES survey prevents me from uncritically advancing such an argument: further research is necessary to determine whether this is the case.

Similarly, the failure of the other control measures to reach significance at the 10% level also raises important questions in respect of existing work on
terrorism, questioning the usefulness of many indicators identified as
influences on support for political violence amongst British Muslims (see Fair
and Shepherd, 2006, and Cherney and Povey, 2013). In showing no
significant effect in any model, the findings of my analysis suggest that the -
largely qualitative - body of existing literature may be inaccurate in respect of
British Muslims, or that different factors may motivate involvement in and
support for political violence. It does not seem to be the case that single men
(Jurgensmeyer, 2000), the highly educated (Gambetta, 2011), the socio-
economically advanced (Lee, 2011), or unemployed (Goldstein, 2005) are
any more likely to support political violence than their female, married,
uneducated, socio-economically disadvantaged and employed peers. While
these results may reflect simply the small sample employed in my analysis,
measurement error, or the exhibition of demand characteristics in relation to
the measurement of support for political violence, if my results are correct
then significant questions must be asked in respect of current counter-
extremism policy. My findings question the demographic targeting of
resources, particularly the much-reported focus on young Asian males and
Muslims in Higher Education (Talwar, 2010; Travis, 2009). The security
services’ focus on these groups has been a source of disquiet within the
Islamic community, with academic research highlighting the fact that many
feel unfairly targeted on the basis of characteristics protected by anti-
discrimination legislation (Spalek, 2012). Accepting that ‘trust is undermined
by ... [targeted] policing’ (Spalek, 2012), my findings raise the possibility not
only that the current approach may engender hostility to the security
services, making the 'soft' policing of extremism difficult (Gregory, 2009), but
that current practice may actually *increase* support for the political violence it seeks to prevent. If this is the case, then new interventions are clearly necessary; however, for such an argument to be accepted, further research is required.

In any event, my findings offer the possibility of a new approach to counter extremism and counter terrorism policy, with common causation presenting opportunities for reshaping current practice. Sparse resources and assumptions of inter-group motivational difference have led to policy being focussed on only the most prominent threat - Islamic political violence (Jurgensmeyer, 2000) – with interventions informed by ideologically grounded assumption about the nature of extremism. Most obviously, these suggest that the supporters of violence are poorly integrated, theologically extreme zealots seeking to undermine the West (Horgan, 2005) in pursuit of a religious imperative (Hoffman, 1993). Policy grounded in this assumed 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996) and its 'them' and 'us' dichotomy has left many non-Islamic security risks – most notably dissident Northern Irish groups (Harris, 2012) and ‘fifth wave’ identity movements (Feldman, 2013) – outside of the intervention framework, while simultaneously leaving many within the Islamic community feeling persecuted on the basis of an overly simplified characterisation of risk (Sobolewska, 2009). If democratic valence is found to affect support for violence similarly in respect of other groups, a response targeting this may prove equally effective in respect of Islamic extremism (particularly given the role, discussed below, of extreme ideology as a determinant of democratic valence) and a better option for all other groups, allowing policy makers to address multiple risks with a single
intervention, cutting delivery costs while simultaneously avoiding the criticism that certain risk groups are 'singled out' for special attention. Indeed, such an approach would have the benefit of being capable of being presented as a response to the broader social ill of declining political trust, rather than as a specific counter-extremism and counter-terrorism measure, negating this latter concern in its entirety.

The question of how such an intervention could be operationalized remains tricky, with the results of tests of Hypothesis 3a identifying a number of key influences on democratic valence that policy measures could target. As it is entirely possible that further influences exist which were not controlled for in my model (due to a lack of evidence as to their effect or because of the absence of relevant measures in the EMBES survey), I am unwilling to identify any single approach as the best course of action. However, the strength of association between democratic valence and a number of indicators found significant in my model offers some, albeit tentative, possibilities. In particular, the role of interest in politics as a determinant of increased democratic valence suggests the need to promote greater political education, while findings in relation to internet use argue the need for technical education to play a greater role in combating extremism. In respect of the former issue, better political education in schools and greater outreach by political parties may go a long way to improving perceptions of, and interest in, politics, by raising trust and increasing democratic valence through better knowledge of political processes, the lack of transparency of which has been identified as a source of much contemporary disdain (Roy, 2001). In respect of the latter, while it is impossible to identify definitively
which aspect of internet use is responsible for its significant impact on
democratic valence, the differences in magnitude and direction of effect
between regular newspaper readership and internet use argues that the
difference may be a result of the type of content that internet users consume.
Bartlett and Miller (2010) have already identified the significant challenge
posed by factually inaccurate information on the internet, and the risk this
presents by encouraging the adoption of conspiracy theories, particularly
amongst the young. If this is accepted, then their (Bartlett and Miller, 2011)
recommendation that schools teach how to evaluate the accuracy and
impartiality of online content as part of their compulsory information
technology syllabus seems sensible.

In respect of other influence on democratic valence, the significant impact of
migrant generation, and in particular the low levels of confidence found
amongst second generation Muslims, merits discussion. My findings were
consistent with the work of both Uslaner (2012) and Maxwell (2010) in
suggesting that those in the second generation were likely to be less trusting
than those in the first or 1.5 generation, a characteristic that Maxwell (2010)
attributes to their increased expectations of society relative to those in the
first generation. He suggests that children of migrants born in the UK
commonly articulate attitudes and expectations similar to those of the
indigenous population, and in this respect, the high levels of trust found
amongst first generation migrants are the exception rather than the rule. If
this is the case, then the lower levels of democratic valence found in respect
of second and 1.5 generation Muslims are not, in security terms, particularly
concerning, representing merely the convergence of expectations with the
national mainstream. However, if Malik (2009) is correct in identifying that those in the second generation experience society differently, with exposure to discrimination giving rise to resentment of the political mainstream and depleted democratic valence, these results may be far more concerning. As my analysis did not compare democratic valence levels of different Muslim generations with the broader national average\textsuperscript{24}, there is no way of identifying whether Malik or Maxwell is correct, and as such, identifying an appropriate response – or indeed whether a response is necessary – is impossible. Further research is clearly necessary to definitively answer this question, though the continued promotion of measures capable of addressing perceived discrimination should continue, regardless of whether they are ultimately found to influence support for violence. As Sobolewska (2009) identifies, such aims should be pursued as ends in themselves rather than simply to address the risk of extremism and terrorism.

In either case, the findings of Hypothesis 3b offer an interesting perspective on the role of religious ideology, showing that, as hypothesized, those who endorsed Sharia were more likely to support political violence. While the results indicate that the greatest association was found for those offering Sharia only conditional support, it is entirely possible that this reflects a deficiency – most likely, a false distinction – in respect of the measure used to quantify support for Sharia. While it is true that Eatwell (2006) has argued that important differences exist between 'extreme' and more moderate supporters of Sharia, both bivariate and multivariate analyses found little evidence that this extended to support for political violence, with Games-

\textsuperscript{24} The lack of direct comparability between the factors used in this and the preceding chapter precluding such an approach.
Howell comparisons evidencing no significant difference between groups and later analysis showing that, in the multivariate test, the overall effect of both positions was remarkably similar. Particularly as the coefficients for each group of Sharia supporters fell within the 95% confidence interval for the other, it seems reasonable to assert that – in purely analytical terms – moderate supporters are no different from their more radical co-religionists. Given this finding, and the fact that opposition to Sharia was shown to be associated with increased democratic valence, it seems fair to assert that my results suggest that Muslims are, in general, not a particularly high risk group. In this respect, I offer a picture in accord with work identifying British Muslims as generally well integrated, pro-British (Maxwell, 2006; Heath and Roberts, 2004) and in favour of democratic governance (Maxwell, 2010), suggesting that problems arise not from Muslims in general, but from a small, ideologically extreme minority.

The findings of tests of Hypothesis 3 further support this contention, with more ‘moderate’ categories of practice and ideology showing (albeit insignificant) association with opposition to violence. While the high levels of support for violence amongst infrequent practitioners offering Sharia only conditional support questions such a linear interpretation, it seems likely (as identified above) that these findings reflect the artificial nature of the conditional and unconditional support distinction and difficulties inherent in the measurement of religious practice. I had argued that regular practice was required to facilitate the transmission of the norms of distrust necessary to deplete democratic valence, and thus that those involved in regular practice would be most willing to support violence. While this suggestion has been
disproved, there are several possible explanations as to why this may be the case.

Firstly, these results may simply reflect inadequacies of coverage by the measure of religious practice. The work of Stark and Bainbridge (1985) identifies that the transmission of behavioural norms in religious groups occurs through a range of social situations including, but not limited to, regular attendance at a place of worship. While it is true that the measure of frequency of religious practice is often used as a proxy for this broader network involvement – not least in Stark’s own work (Stark et al, 1982; Stark, 1996) – such a measure cannot encompass contact with co-religionists outside of formal worship settings. Such exposure is not contingent on frequent involvement in formal practice, and thus it is entirely possible that those attending a place of worship only infrequently may be more involved in their religious community than regular practitioners through contact with group members in other social settings. As the EMBES survey includes no measures quantifying the frequency of such interactions, regressions were unable to control for this possibility, and consequently, it is impossible to say whether the influence of these unmeasured factors affected the results.

Similarly, it is also possible that regular practitioners may be associating, through regular worship, with more ideologically moderate adherents and may, therefore, not be receiving the normative reinforcement necessary to internalize political distrust. A simple measure of frequency of practice says nothing of the ideological bias of those with whom the individual is
consorting, and consequently it cannot be assumed that these individuals will automatically share the ideological position of the respondent. As the absence of measures encompassing the ideological orientation of the practice groups precludes the ability of the model to control for this risk, it is hard to say that it has not affected the results. As such, the measure cannot be claimed as a reliable proxy for network involvement.

While such arguments can account for the results of Hypothesis 4 it is also possible that my findings may reflect not the inadequacy of the measure of practice, but rather, the inadequacy of the theory which underpinned its inclusion. It is entirely possible that those in the middle category are, in fact, subject to less informal social control than either the regular practitioners or those outside of the religious community, with Matza's (1964) work on the role of ‘drift’ – the process of disengagement from mainstream social norms and the adoption of counter and sub-cultural beliefs and attitudes – suggesting the loosening of social bonds as a pre-condition for delinquency, offering a theoretical framework capable of explaining these results. Such an approach would suggest that social controls inhibiting support for violence are transmitted through involvement in secular or religious groups, with those ‘drifting’ between extremes (either religious or secular) enduring a period of low social control in which deviant behaviours can flourish.

Such an argument would be supported by the work of political scientists investigating differences in political participation rates amongst members of ethnic communities, with findings indicating that involvement is often promoted by an individual’s engagement with secular community (Jacobs and Tillie, 1999) or religious (Putnam, 1995) organizations. Anecdotal
evidence in respect of Mohammed Atta and the 7/7 bombers further support such a view, with reports suggesting that those involved in the commission of political violence were at best only marginally involved in their communities and mainstream religious and ethnic groups.

If such an argument is accepted, then it may well be the case that the increased effect found for those in the middle category of ‘conditional supporter with monthly attendance’ merely showed the influence – or lack thereof – of community and social bonds likely to influence members to reject violence, painting a picture of marginality as a key indicator of support for political violence. Such a finding would merit serious investigation, raising the prospect that counter extremism policy should target not just those actively engaged in extreme religious practice, but rather, those on the fringes of ethnic, secular, and religious groups.

4.7 Conclusions

While my analysis has raised a number of interesting findings, it is important to be honest about its limitations. Particularly in respect of generalizability, I should consider the extent to which my findings provide proof of a general theory of support for political violence. The previous chapter analysed national-level data from the EVS, while this chapter has analysed data encompassing British Muslims. As such, while a relationship may be claimed in respect of these broad groupings, no further validity can be claimed on the basis of my results. My theory cannot therefore be extended (on the basis of
my research) to encompass other faith groups and political movements, or organisations operating outside of the UK, despite the fact that they are likely to be susceptible to similar influences (for the reasons outlined above). To claim a more extensive relationship would be pure speculation; my findings give no basis for generalization outside of their narrow focus, and it therefore remains entirely possible – though I believe unlikely - that the relationships I have identified may not be present in other groups. Additional analysis is therefore necessary to provide validation of my theory’s claim to general applicability (a point discussed at length in the conclusion to this thesis).

Questions are also presented in respect of process and measurement, particularly in respect of political grievance, democratic valence, and religious extremism. As complex phenomena, I have identified that any measures employed in my analysis act as simple proxies. While chosen to indicate a broader underlying construct they are not exhaustive or unambiguous measures, and their impact on individual participants may vary, leaving the burden of explanation with the researcher. Indeed, while quantitative data are well suited to exploring trends and testing theories, the results of such analyses cannot be taken to reliably expose the deeper processes which underlie the relationships under examination, and as such, any discussion of these processes is mere speculation. Such issues were most pronounced in respect of my findings on religious extremism’s influence on political trust, with definitive answers in respect of the processes of influence not provided by the data. Given the contentious nature of this relationship, further qualitative investigation is necessary to validate my
arguments and assumptions, however such work is beyond the scope of this thesis.

In respect of measures of democratic valence, the limitations of the items in the EMBES survey have prevented a more detailed investigation of the data, particularly in respect of the measurement of democratic valence. As a result of this, my analyses may be compromised and subject to bias, and while attempts have been made to address this through robust analytical processes (including axis factoring), such approaches fall far short of a perfect solution. Similarly, in respect of outcomes, my theory has sought to link perceptions of the efficacy of violence with individual support. As the EMBES survey includes no direct measures of the perceived efficacy of violence, analysis exploring this relationship was not possible.

Despite these issues, I have affirmed the findings of the previous chapter in showing both a linkage between democratic valence and support for political violence and a significant impact for political grievance as a precondition for this relationship. I have also shown how religious ideology and practice influences democratic valence, providing evidence supporting the core contentions of my work. While Hypothesis 4 was not proved, I believe I have identified the reasons why this was the case, highlighting opportunities for future work to refine and improve my approach.

As the key difficulty with cross-sectional analysis is that of inferring causality, the following chapter will seek to build on the findings of both this and the preceding chapter through the use of an experiment. In presenting the
results of analysis undertaken using data from an experiment administered to
British adults recruited via the social networking site Facebook, it seeks to
demonstrate (via the use of stimuli designed to exert an influence on
perceptions of politics) a causal relationship between democratic valence
and support for violent political protest.
5. Experimental analysis of Democratic Valence and Support for Political Violence: Methods, Data, Results and Discussion

Having identified a relationship between democratic valence and support for political violence in the previous two chapters, this section of my thesis will seek to establish whether the relationship is causal in nature.

I have argued that trust in legislative and executive actors, systemic satisfaction with democracy, and perceptions of political access and fair treatment are weighed - using a cost-benefit framework - to produce an assessment of likely efficacy determining the attractiveness of democratic political engagement (democratic valence). Under this model I suggest that political violence is more likely to be supported where democratic alternatives are unfavourably perceived, and that as such, shifts in perceptions of political efficacy are likely to inversely affect support for political violence. This chapter will provide a final test of this theory, seeking to establish a reliable basis for making causal claims through the analysis of an experimental data set.

Starting by detailing the hypothesis that will be tested in this chapter, I offer an overview of the methodological and ethical considerations relevant to my experiment alongside details on the pilot process and the results of randomization and manipulation checks. Following this, I provide the findings from both bivariate and linear regression analyses, before offering a detailed discussion of my results addressing both their academic and policy
implications. I will then conclude with a brief synopsis of the limitations of my approach and an overview of the opportunities for future research.

5.1 Hypotheses

To summarize, the research and null hypotheses to be tested in this chapter are as follows:

- $H_{5a}$: Democratic Valence is causally related to support for political violence.

5.2 Null Hypotheses

- $H_{05a}$: Democratic Valence is not causally related to support for political violence.

5.3 Methods

This chapter will use an experimental design to attempt to induce a change in levels of support for political violence. The decision to use this approach was taken to provide a robust basis for the making of claims in respect of causation (Field, 2005), complementing existing survey data analyses that substantiate the existence of correlationary relationships amongst British Muslims and in the UK population at large.
In this design participants were randomly allocated to one of two groups, receiving a stimulus text designed to either enhance or deplete the positivity of their feelings about British government and politics.

5.3.1 Interventions

Stimulus tests were chosen following discussion with the project’s supervisors and were refined following feedback from participants involved in the early stages of experimental piloting. Given the difficulty of engineering a neutral text, and the presumption of a small effect, stimulus texts were engineered to both negatively and positively affect participant’s democratic valence. Both high and low valence stimuli employed a standard format, with a short, publicly-available narrative excerpt provided, followed by three bullet points to clarify the excerpt and supporting references to buttress the claims made in the stimulus text. Copies of the texts used in the final pilot and experiment are provided in Figures 4 and 5, below.
Figure 4 – Experimental Low Valence Stimulus Text

"The expenses scandal has led the public to regard all politicians as frauds. Blair and Brown, who seemed such mighty figures in 2004, now look like nincompoops who could not see the crisis coming in a financial system whose plutocrats they flattered. The banks are bust. The debts they approved so carelessly now cripple households and the wider economy"

Nick Cohen, columnist for the Observer.

This quote highlights the reasons why many people dislike politicians. A number of issues it raises are supported by the facts:

* Opinion polls from before the 2003 invasion show that over 50% of the British public opposed British involvement in attacking Iraq [1]

* Less than 40% of the voting age population voted for the Government [2]

* Sir Thomas Legg, the independent auditor brought in to examine parliamentary expense abuses, identified that 389 MPs had submitted wrongful claims. Of these, only 4 have been prosecuted. Opinion polls indicate that over 90% of the public are unhappy with this outcome [3]
"The vast majority of politicians are overworked and underpaid...do a fantastic job in the face of huge pressures, and [deliver] far more than most people acknowledge or understand. Democratic politics can and does affect and shape people’s lives. It saves lives. It forges a sense of collective endeavour, social support and a sense of humility"

Matthew Flinders, Professor of Politics at the University of Sheffield.

This quote questions the popular view of politics and politicians, painting a positive picture of those who govern us. Despite our often negative preconceptions, there are a number of reasons to have a better view of politicians.

* All MPs found to have broken the law during the expense scandal were tried in court. All were subsequently found guilty, and served time in prison [4]

* Backbench rebellions, where MPs vote against their party for personal moral reasons, have increased significantly over the last 5 decades. Over 100 Labour MPs voted against their own government to oppose the war in Iraq [5]

* MPs have to declare the source of any donations they receive, to show that they are not behaving inappropriately [6]

5.3.2 Measurement

Controls

Control measures were selected for inclusion in the experiment to mirror the analyses conducted in the previous chapters. Standard demographic measures (age, gender, marital status, employment status, employment type, and education level) were included alongside items known to influence democratic valence in order to allow analysis to control for random inter-
group variations capable of biasing the results. All measures used question texts drawn from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study (a full list of questions texts and response categories used in the experiment can be found in Appendix 3).

Measures of trust in politicians, trust in parliament, democratic satisfaction, political influence and perceptions of governmental fairness were also included in order to allow for the formation of a democratic valence factor for a post-randomization manipulation check. This was done to test whether the stimulus texts had induced meaningful differences in levels of democratic valence between the two conditions. These items appeared after the measures of support for violence (so as not to risk demand characteristics), and as with the demographic measures employed question texts and response categories from the Ethnic Minority British Election Study. Full details can be found in Appendix 3.

**Outcomes**

Outcome variables were chosen following discussion with both the project supervisory team and participants involved in the early experimental pilots. Unlike in previous chapters, the design of the experiment allowed the possibility for more specific measures to be used to capture support for a range of modes of political violence of escalating severity.

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25 While previous chapters employed a democratic valence factor including a measure of trust in the police, the pilot experiment was run before the decision to include this item had been taken. Consequently, the factor used in the pilot study includes only measures of trust in parliament and politicians, democratic satisfaction, political influence and perceptions of governmental fairness, in line with earlier drafts of the preceding chapter.
Three measures were chosen from an initial list of ten potential variables (selected from existing social surveys including the mail-back survey element of the EMBES survey), with the selected items encompassing support for violence against property, support for violence against government employees, and support for violence against civilians. All measures took the form of a statement, with participants asked to score their agreement utilising a 10-point Likert scale ranging from ‘entirely disagree’ to ‘entirely agree’. Further detail on the form of these questions can be found in Appendix 3.

5.3.3 Piloting

A series of six online pilot studies were undertaken to refine and develop the format of the experiment. Focussing on structure, technical presentation and stimulus content, all iterations of the pilot utilised samples constructed to gain feedback from a wide range of potential participant types. Alongside this, specific feedback was sought from expert audiences including graduate students, academics and policy experts. Feedback was collected via an anonymous comment box on the final page of the questionnaire, and was used to inform the design of subsequent revisions. Any changes were then discussed with the project’s supervisors before implementation in the next iteration of the design.

Final Pilot
Following the implementation of final changes, a larger scale pilot was conducted to provide a more robust test of the experimental manipulation. From 29-31 November 2012 a social media snowball (Brickman-Bhutta, 2011) sample was used to recruit participants via the sharing of a link to the survey website across my social media network (an example of this is given in Figure 6 below).

**Figure 6 – Example Pilot Study Advert**

Over three days one hundred respondents replied, yielding 74 complete responses of which 29 were allocated to the high valence condition and 32 were allocated to the low valence condition. Given the small sample size, and attendant lack of statistical power, only simple comparisons of inter-group averages were made to give an indication of the efficacy of my interventions.
A democratic valence factor was calculated using the process employed in the secondary data analysis chapters, combining measures of trust in parliament, politicians and the police, systemic satisfaction with democracy, political access and perceptions of political fair treatment. As democratic valence is a latent construct, principal axis factoring was used, with a quartimax rotation chosen to increase the probability of the components loading onto a single factor (Field, 2005). Full details of the factor score are presented in Appendix 3.

A manipulation check, comparing mean levels of democratic valence across the two experimental conditions, showed that members of the group receiving the pro-democratic stimulus (the high valence condition) had higher levels of democratic valence (M = 0.253, SD = 0.990) than members of the other group (M = -0.230, SD = 0.846) receiving the anti-democratic stimulus (the low valence condition), suggesting that the experimental manipulation had been effective.

Similarly, a descriptive comparison of mean levels of support for violence between the two groups was also consistent with my hypothesis, with members of the low valence group reporting higher mean scores for all support for violence indicators than members of the high valence group (more detailed results are provided in Appendix 3).

As a consequence of these findings the experiment was approved for final data collection in September 2012, and uploaded to the survey administration site on the 29 November 2012.
5.3.4 Recruitment of Experimental Participants

The main experiment employed targeted social media river sampling (Poynter, 2010, p. 9-10) to recruit participants via Facebook. As with the secondary data analysis, all participants were UK-based and aged 16 or older in compliance with the requirements of the University Ethics Policy. The Facebook advertising tool was used to ensure the exclusion of any unsuitable participants, with only those meeting strict requirements (UK-based, aged 16 or above) able to see the advert containing the link to the survey. A copy of the exact text used in the final advert is displayed below (Figure 7).

Figure 7 - Sample Advert for Final Experimental Recruitment

Facebook identified a total target population of 18,600,000 potential participants, of whom 6,650,173 saw the advert during the 6 days it was available\(^\text{26}\). Of these, 1,649 responded and 498 completed the questionnaire.

The decision to recruit participants using social media was taken for several important reasons. Most notable amongst these was the fact that it facilitated the cheap, speedy and easy recruitment of a large number of respondents, while simultaneously reducing data processing costs by providing an

\(^{26}\) Figures correct as of 29 November 2012.
automated mechanism for the formatting and cleaning of data for use in computerized analysis (in this case using SPSS), eradicating potential bias arising from human administration and the re-entry of paper responses.

However, using such a strategy presented significant methodological challenges (Brickmann-Bhutta, 2011), not least because online samples often evidence systemic bias (Schmidt, 1997) as a result of the unique characteristics of those who respond. Critics note that internet users are, in many ways, qualitatively different from non-internet users, with research indicating that certain types of internet use affect political engagement (Di Gennaro and Dutton, 2006) and trust (Shah, Kwak and Holbert, 2001), and my own analyses (in Chapter 4) suggesting that internet use is a determinant of democratic valence.

While these obstacles are accepted, it is submitted that alternate approaches would have presented obstacles of similar – if not greater - magnitude. The use of existing secondary data could not – as identified earlier in this thesis – have provided a reliable basis for the making of causal claims, while the use of an offline experiment would have incurred significantly higher data processing, time and recruitment costs in addition to risking data entry errors. While the influence of internet use on political engagement would, in the context of a survey design, be problematic, traditional experimental design are, by definition, devoid of external validity (see Lynch, 1982; Berkowitz and Donnerstein, 1982) focussing instead on the identification of a relationship in the context of a small sample. Consequently, any bias resulting from internet
use would, theoretically, affect both groups equally, and should therefore be addressed by randomized participant allocation.

5.3.5 Data

Participants were assigned at random across the experimental groups in order to reduce the risk of systematic selection error (Lindquist, 1953; Rosenthal, 1966). Of those who took part in the experiment, 277 were allocated to the low valence condition and 221 were allocated to the high valence condition. In line with Mutz’ (2012) recommendation, randomization checks were undertaken to test for differences between groups in respect of demographic measures, with average scores for each compared using chi-squares and independent samples t-tests. Only marital status evidenced a significant difference between groups, suggesting that insufficient variance existed in respect of all other measured confounders to prejudice the results of analyses. An overview of the results of these analyses are presented in Table 16, below.

**Table 16 – Experimental Randomization Checks**

*Interval Variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Low Democratic Valence Group Mean</th>
<th>High Democratic Valence Group Mean</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>23.050</td>
<td>23.330</td>
<td>0.568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly, a manipulation check was undertaken to ensure that the stimulus
texts had succeeded in effecting change in democratic valence. A factor was
formed using the process employed in previous chapters, with an
independent samples t-test employed to compare mean scores between high
(M = 0.081, SD = 0.952) and low valence (M = -0.064, SD = 0.894)
conditions. A significant difference was found, with members of the high
valence group reporting elevated scores; t(493) = -1.739, p = 0.042. The
manipulation can therefore be regarded as having been successful, and any
difference between conditions in levels of support for political violence was
therefore attributable to the effect of the intervention.
5.3.6 Experimental Data Analysis

As the survey administration system allowed the download of data in SPSS format, all analysis was undertaken using version 16 of SPSS. Prior to analysis the data were 'cleaned' to exclude deliberate false responses from 'trolls' (employing the process outlined in Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler, 2011) and incomplete responses, with new values imputed to cover missing data using a hot-deck method\(^\text{27}\).

Both bivariate t-tests and logistic regression models were used to test for the significance of differences in outcome measures across conditions. In line with Lindquist’s (1953) comments on balancing the risk of Type I and II errors in experiments, and consistent with the approach adopted in the preceding chapters, significance was calculated at the 10% alpha level.

5.3.7 Experimental ethics and other considerations

Ethics approval was sought and gained from the University under a School of Social Sciences ethics pro-forma covering non-contact human participant research projects. While this provided a legal authority to conduct the research, best practice dictated that a more detailed consideration of risks was made in order to minimize the chance of ‘participant harm’ (Shamoo and Resnik, 2009) and to ensure compliance with the generally-accepted principles of good research. As such, the most prominent sources of potential risk are discussed in detail below.

\(^{27}\) Imputing a value chosen at random from demographically-similar respondents.
In the context of this project, perhaps the most serious consideration related to the issue of informed participant consent. It is a widely accepted principal of good research that participants be aware of the subject of inquiry (Fraenkel, Wallen, and Hyun, 1993) and that they consent to the use of their data knowingly. Despite this, revealing the focus of study would have risked the exhibition of demand characteristics (Orne, 1962) capable of biasing the results and depriving the study of validity. In order to mitigate this risk, participants were informed of the general subject of enquiry as part of the preface text recording consent at the start of the survey, but were not told about its specific aims until after they had completed all of the items measuring support for political violence and democratic valence. The stimulus texts, while potentially capable of allowing participants to deduce the subject of enquiry, were identified as tests of information recall, with more detail on the study’s aims and the opportunity for retrospective withdrawal of consent provided only as part of the debrief on the final page of the survey. Despite the option to withdraw, no participants elected to do so.

Risk was also manifest in terms of participant harm, with the possibility of both long- and short-term depletion of confidence in government, increased cynicism about politicians, and increased support for terrorism and political violence all potentially possible as a result of exposure to stimulus texts expressly designed to manipulate the participant’s feelings in respect of government. To mitigate this risk, a rigorous participant debrief was employed (Smith and Richardson, 1983), with all participants able to download a document explaining the aims of the study and giving contact details for the research project and its supervisors as part of the final page of
the survey. Alongside this, the low ‘potency’ of the stimulus text also rendered the chance of a serious change in subject views unlikely. As both texts employed in this research expressed commonly articulated sentiments often found in mainstream political debate – actively drawing on texts found in the public domain - the risk of serious harm from a ‘one off’ dose was arguably low, and certainly no greater than that of reading a daily newspaper.

Additional consideration of the risk of participant harm would have been necessary if the research were to include ‘vulnerable’ subjects (Penslar, 1995) who may be more susceptible to influence by the stimulus texts; however, as this project focuses on ‘normal’ adults over the age of 16, no such risk was present. While it was possible that individuals from high-risk groups – in particular the mentally ill - may have found their way into the sample through their presence in the broader population of interest, efforts were taken to mitigate this risk by mandating that all participants respond to a question on whether they had received treatment for a mental health condition in the preceding 12 months. Participants responding in the affirmative were directed away from the questionnaire by the survey administration system before exposure to stimulus materials, and any recorded data provided on the basis of their earlier responses was deleted.

It was equally possible that individuals who had experienced terrorism – either directly or via friends and family – could have been included in the sample, and as this may have meant that involvement in a study investigating support for terrorism would have been traumatic (and would also have risked prejudice in their responses), these individuals were
similarly automatically excluded depending on their answer to a question on personal experiences of terrorism and political violence. As with vulnerable participants, any data they had provided prior to this point in the survey was also deleted.

Considerations around legal compliance (Shamoo and Resnik, 2009) were also made: as the research included no participants younger than 16, the completion of a researcher Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) check was not necessary. Similarly, informed parental consent was not required, though informed consent was sought and gained from the participants themselves via agreement to consent statements presented at both the start and end of the experiment – failure to agree to either barring further participation in the research and triggering the automatic deletion of any stored data.

Ethical and legal considerations relevant to the storage and handling of data were also observed; all data capable of identifying participants were kept in a digitally encrypted format at my home, and were destroyed on completion of the research in compliance with the Data Protection Act. Other information (though not the responses to questions for the experiment) collected through the online experiments was anonymized with a view to being made available after the completion of the thesis via a digital repository28.

28 Specifically, additional items on religion and juvenile delinquency, attitudes to ‘new atheism’ and political engagement, carried on behalf of Dr. Andrea Hatcher (Sewanee), Dr. Amy Unsworth (Cambridge), and the Bill Hill Charitable Trust were anonymized to allow for deposit and re-use.
5.4 Bivariate Analysis

Bivariate analysis employed independent samples t-tests to explore the impact of shifts in democratic valence on support for political violence as quantified by three scale items and one composite index. The three scale items recorded participant agreement with statements expressing support for violence against property, government employees and civilians using a 1-10 scale, while the final measure summed the three scale items to produce a composite index of support for violence. Cronbach's alpha was calculated for the composite index, with the result exceeding the 0.7 threshold ($\alpha = 0.85$) indicating high reliability (UCLA, 2013). Copies of all questions can be found in Appendix 3.

5.4.1 Support for Violence against Property

An independent samples t-test was used to examine differences in mean levels of support for violence against property between the low valence ($M = 2.289, SD = 2.060$) and high valence ($M = 2.520, SD = 2.249$) groups. No significant differences were found, with members of the high valence group reporting marginally greater levels of support for violence than members of the low valence group: $t(496) = -1.196, p = 0.232$. On the basis of this result the requirement of my hypothesis cannot be claimed to have been satisfied.

5.4.2 Support for Violence against Government Employees
An independent samples t-test was used to compare mean levels of support for violence against government employees across the low valence (M = 1.758, SD = 1.695) and high valence (M = 2.023, SD = 2.006) groups. No significant differences were found, with members of the high valence group reporting marginally greater levels of support for violence than members of the low valence group: \( t(430.674) = -1.565, p = 0.118 \). On the basis of this result the requirement of my hypothesis cannot be claimed to have been satisfied.

### 5.4.3 Support for Violence against Civilians

An independent samples t-test was used to compare mean levels of support for violence against civilians between the low valence (M = 1.513, SD = 1.545) and high valence (M = 1.710, SD = 1.752) groups. No significant differences were found, with members of the high valence group reporting marginally greater levels of support for violence than members of the low valence group: \( t(442.088) = -1.138, p = 0.188 \). On the basis of this result the requirement of my hypothesis cannot be claimed to have been satisfied.

### 5.4.4 Support for Violence (Scale Measure)

Finally, an independent samples t-test was used to compare mean levels of support for political violence (measured along a scale) between low valence (M = 5.560, SD = 4.721) and high valence (M = 6.253, SD = 5.249) groups. No significant differences were found, despite members of the positive valence group reporting higher levels of support for violence overall:
t(447.159) = -1.532, p = 0.126. On the basis of this result the requirement of my hypothesis cannot be claimed to have been satisfied.

5.4.5 Implications

These results suggest that the hypothesized causal relationship between democratic valence and support for violence may be inaccurate. While the failure to cross a significance threshold is not, in itself, indicative of the absence of a relationship (Field, 2005), the direction of the relationship shown by these results presents a significant challenge to my theory. While the employment of a randomized allocation of participants across conditions should negate the influence of unknown confounders and fluctuations stemming from interactions with known measures, it nevertheless remains possible that they may exert a small but significant impact on these results, and it is therefore important that - before rejecting my hypothesis - a multivariate test of the relationship is undertaken.

On the basis of these results, however, no causal relationship can be claimed between democratic valence and support for political violence, and if further testing replicates this picture, then my theory will have been proved incorrect and I will be unable to reject the null hypothesis.

5.5 Multivariate Analysis

Multivariate analysis was undertaken to provide a more robust test of my hypothesis, controlling for fluctuations in known influences as identified in
section 5.4. Due to the limited sample and results of the randomization check, only demographic variables were included in my models. All other items were excluded in order to allow for the most parsimonious specification possible.

5.5.1 Support for Violence Against Property

Linear regression was used to conduct a multivariate test of the role of group affiliation in predicting support for violence against property. The model was specified to contain control measures as identified above, alongside a binary indicator of group membership. Prior to running the model, collinearity statistics were examined, with VIFs for all measures falling beneath the 0.2 threshold (Field, 2005). This indicated that no variables were collinear, and as such that all were suitable for inclusion in this regression analysis (full results are presented in Appendix 3). The outputs of the model are detailed in Table 17 (below).

29 While not described in this chapter, verification checks of my multivariate analyses were undertaken replacing demographic measures with only the attitudinal controls as identified in the methods preface to this chapter, and including the attitudinal controls alongside demographic measures as used below. Across both sets of replications no significant effect was found for group assignment, validating the picture presented in the results discussed in this chapter and justifying the decision to exclude attitudinal controls from my analysis.
Table 17 - Linear Regression Investigating the Role of Democratic Valence in Support for Violence against Property

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.088</td>
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<td>0.113</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.362</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.444</td>
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</table>

**Type of Work**

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<th>P</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
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<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.091</td>
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<td>0.756</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.033</td>
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**Type of Work**

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<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first iteration of the model evidenced poor predictive fit, with only marital status ($B = 0.692, p = 0.027$) and the constant ($B = 3.334, p < 001$) crossing the 10% significance threshold. The second iteration of the model reiterated this picture, with marital status ($B = 0.670, p = 0.033$) and the constant ($B = 3.266, p < 001$) again the only variables to reach significance. The measure of group membership was found non-significant, with members of the high valence group ($B = 0.182, p = 0.351$) more likely to support violence than those in the low valence group. On this basis, Hypothesis 5 cannot be accepted.

### 5.5.2 Support for Violence Against Government Employees

Linear regression was used to conduct a multivariate test of the role of group allocation in predicting support for violence against government employees. The model was specified to contain control measures as identified above, alongside a binary indicator of group membership. Prior to running the model, collinearity statistics were examined, with VIFs for all measures falling beneath the 0.2 threshold (Field, 2005). This indicated that no variables were collinear, and as such that all were suitable for inclusion in this regression analysis. The outputs of the model are detailed in Table 18 (below).
Table 18 - Linear Regression Investigating the Role of Democratic Valence in Support for Violence against Government Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.972</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>-0.077</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
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</table>

Note: \( R^2 = 0.019 \) for Step 1, \( R^2 = 0.025 \) for Step 2. (\( N = 498 \)).

* NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as the reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

Both iterations of the model evidenced poor predictive fit, with no variables bar the constant (Block 1: \( B = 3.026, p < 0.001 \); Block 2: \( B = 2.923, p < 0.001 \)) crossing the 10% significance threshold. The measure of group membership was shown to be a non-significant, with members of the high valence group (\( B = 0.273, p = 0.102 \)) again more likely to support violence than those in the low valence group. On this basis, Hypothesis 5 cannot be accepted.

### 5.5.3 Support for Violence against Civilians

Linear regression was used to conduct a multivariate test of the role of group allocation in predicting support for violence against civilians. The model was specified to contain control measures as identified above, alongside a binary indicator of group membership. Prior to running the model, collinearity statistics were examined, with VIFs for all measures falling beneath the 0.2 threshold (Field, 2005). This indicated that no variables were collinear, and as such that all were suitable for inclusion in this regression analysis. The outputs of the model are detailed in Table 19 (below).
**Table 19 - Linear Regression investigating the Role of Democratic Valence in Support for Violence against Civilians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.603</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.407</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
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<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-0.395</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>0.155</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Work</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
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<td>0.286</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.003</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.527</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.296</td>
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<td>-0.217</td>
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### Table 20

<table>
<thead>
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<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
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<td>High Democratic Valence Group</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.149</td>
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<td>0.173</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note $R^2 = 0.016$ for Step 1, $R^2 = 0.019$ for Step 2. (N = 498).

*NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as the reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

Both iterations of the model evidenced poor predictive fit, with no variables bar the constant (Block 1: $B = 2.603$, $p < 0.001$; Block 2: $B = 2.527$, $p < 0.001$) crossing the 10% significance threshold. The measure of group membership was shown to be a non-significant predictor, with members of the high valence group ($B= 0.203$, $p = 0.173$) again more likely to support violence than those in the low valence group. On this basis, Hypothesis 5 cannot be accepted.

#### 5.5.4 Support for Political Violence (Scale)

Linear regression was used to conduct a multivariate test of the role of group allocation in predicting support for violence as measured by a composite scale. The model was specified to contain control measures as identified above, alongside a binary indicator of group membership. Prior to running the model, collinearity statistics were examined, with VIFs for all measures falling beneath the 0.2 threshold (Field, 2005). This indicated that no variables were collinear, and as such that all were suitable for inclusion in this regression analysis. The outputs of the model are detailed (below) in Table 20.
Table 20 - Linear Regression investigating the Role of Democratic Valence in Support for Political Violence as Measured using a Composite Index

<table>
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<th>β</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.963</td>
<td>1.747</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
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<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.249</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-1.002</td>
<td>0.841</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.234</td>
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**Type of Work**

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.800</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
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<td>0.376</td>
<td>0.578</td>
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<td>0.515</td>
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**Step 2**

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<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.716</td>
<td>1.753</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>0.456</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-1.013</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Type of Work**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>P</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>-1.180</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>-0.847</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE B</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Don’t Know</td>
<td>-0.639</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>0.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
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<td>0.578</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Democratic Valence Group</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>0.451</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note $R^2 = 0.013$ for Step 1, $R^2 = 0.017$ for Step 2. $(N = 498)$.  

*a NSSEC-3 Class C responses were used as the reference category for the group of variables encompassing type of employment, as these represented the single largest grouping of participants.

Both iterations of the model evidenced poor predictive fit, with no variables bar the constant (Block 1: $B = 8.963$, $p > 0.01$; Block 2: $B = 8.716$, $p > 0.01$) crossing the 10% significance threshold. Once again, the measure of group membership was not shown to significantly predict support for political violence ($B = 0.658$, $p = 0.146$), and on this basis Hypothesis 5 cannot be accepted.

When considering these findings alongside results from previous analyses a picture is presented which is at odds with my hypothesis, with group allocation shown to be a non-significant predictor of support for violence across all measures. More than this, as the direction of effect shown for group allocation is also inconsistent with my theory across all models, Hypothesis 5 must be rejected. As a result, the corresponding null hypothesis, that democratic valence does not significantly predict support for political violence, cannot be repudiated. The consequences of this decision, and the possible reasons for these findings, are discussed in more detail below.
5.6 Discussion

The results of this analysis represent a substantial challenge to the picture presented in the earlier chapters of my thesis, and to the central principles around which I have sought to build a theory. In not finding a significant relationship between group allocation and levels of support for political violence, my results raise several important questions, potentially arguing the need for a broadening in the range of possible causal mechanisms considered as influences shaping support for violence under my theoretical framework.

Despite this it remains possible that my results may simply be anomalous, and that the relationship I have identified throughout my thesis – via the analysis of the EVS and EMBES survey data and through the experimental pilot study – may still be an accurate representation of the facts. The results presented in this chapter may therefore be merely the consequence of deficiencies in the design and execution of the final version of my experiment, and in particular, in the analytical techniques used to produce my results. As sensitivity testing confirmed that my data violated the assumptions of both the t-test and linear regression model, both of which require a normal distribution of residuals (Field, 2005), it remained possible that my data may simply have reflected the influence of a handful of highly leveraged outlier cases. Plots of the standardized residuals from my regression analyses evidenced similarly skewed distribution, supporting this view and confirming that a small number of highly leveraged cases were present in all iterations. As a result of this, results from t-test and linear regression analyses may have presented a misleading picture, and thus
further analysis was necessary to validate my findings. The Mann-Whitney U-test and ordinal regression models were used as substitutes, with both producing outputs consistent with the picture shown in the tests reported above. As further replication excluding cases with residuals exceeding a threshold of 2 again supported the picture shown by my earlier findings arguments regarding analysis methodology lack credibility.

An alternate approach focuses on the power of the tests used (Cohen, 1988), and in particular the possibility that the modest impact of the stimulus may simply have been too slight to detect given the comparably small sample size. While such an argument seems logical, the fact that mean levels of support for political violence were higher across all indicators in the high valence group prevents such an argument.

It is also possible that my results may reflect the influence of unobserved and unknown factors shaping either democratic valence or support for violence. Given the diversity of influences shaping these phenomena, and the strong possibility that such unmeasured and unknown pressures exist, such an argument would seem sensible. However, the random assignment of participants across the two experimental conditions renders such an outcome unlikely, with any such influences expected to be evenly distributed across the two conditions and therefore incapable of inducing bias. While a pre-stimulus measure of support for violence could have addressed this risk, its inclusion would have jeopardised the experiment by potentially inducing Hawthorn (or demand) characteristics (Mutz, 2011), with participants at risk of deducing the intent of the experiment and altering their behaviour.
A more credible argument - lent support by the difference in effect direction between the results of analysis in this chapter and those in the pilot study and preceding chapters – suggests that my findings may stem from peculiarities of the data, and in particular from a biased sample resulting from the online and self-select nature of participant recruitment. Scholars have long recognized the elevated risk of bias represented by self-select participants (Harrison, Lau, Elisabet Rutstrom (2009)) and online samples (Bethlehem, 2010). While random assignment of participants across experimental conditions (Christensen, 1988) should have negated the risk of bias resulting from my use of this sampling approach, as my theory argues that support for violence is contingent on democratic politics being unfavourably perceived it is sensible to assume that a threshold effect may operate, with democratic valence needing to fall below a certain level before violence can be endorsed. If this is the case, then it is possible that the use of online participant recruitment may simply have produced a sample with unusually low democratic valence, with that the stimulus may have triggered a rise in democratic valence but failed to cross the threshold needed for violence to be rejected. A comparison of mean levels of democratic valence against the EMBES data (analysed in the previous chapters) provides some basis for this assertion, with results from the EMBES survey showing a higher mean level of democratic valence (0.128) relative to both the low valence experimental (-0.070) and the high valence experimental (0.087) conditions.
While such an argument would seem credible, it is also important to consider alternative explanations. At a theoretical level, in failing to show that group affiliation was related to support for violence my results may be taken to suggest that my theory is incorrect, and that democratic valence and support for violence are unrelated. However, given the findings of both the pilot studies and analyses undertaken in previous chapters showing clear correlations between support for violence and democratic valence across both the EVS and EMBES data, such an argument would lack *prima facie* credibility.

Literature on social control, and in particular work on the processes by which behavioural norms are subverted, highlights the long-term nature of behavioural change, with Rock (1997) noting that social norms against violence and delinquency are amongst the most deeply-entrenched of all social attitudes. As such, significant and sustained reinforcement is needed to facilitate engagement in (Elliott, 1994) and support for violence, and it is therefore possible that my intervention was simply too brief to effect change. Indeed, literature on experimental design in psychology (Christensen, 1988) highlights this risk, identifying the difficulty inherent in attempts to shift complex and deeply-held attitudes and beliefs with single exposure stimuli. However, as the manipulation check highlighted a significant difference between groups in respect of levels of democratic valence, it cannot be the case that my stimulus was simply impotent. Rather, it is possible that the differences between groups reflects only a short-term emotional response rather than a more substantive attitudinal shift and that as such, the stimulus was unable to effect change in support for violence.
While under researched in the context of terrorism a significant body of criminological literature supports this view, and it is well established that sustained reinforcement is an important determinant of the extent and rate of erosion regarding norms against violence. Research on 'honour' crimes (Horowitz and Schwartz, 1974), hate-crimes (Heitmeyer, 2003) and violent crimes more broadly (Bernburg and Thorlindsson, 1999) highlights the need for a process of 'drift', with participants moving away from socially-sanctioned normal behaviours only after a prolonged period of exposure to non-conventional norms (Matza, 1964). Given consensus as to the social nature of political violence and extremism, research arguing that political violence is a learned behaviour (Koseli, 2006) and anecdotal evidence suggesting that individuals are frequently 'radicalized' through repeat exposure to extremist peers (Silber and Bhatt, 2007), such an argument would seem sensible; if this is the case, then the failure of my experiment may not, in itself, be cause for the rejection of my theory despite the failure of my results to justify the acceptance of Hypothesis 5.

If this is view is accepted then the academic significance of findings outlined in previous chapters would persist intact, and this chapter would contribute to scholarly understanding not through its rejection of my theory but by affirming the deep-seated nature of norms against violence and by arguing the need for further research employing a more prolonged intervention. Likewise, the policy implications of the previous chapters would also remain correct, with my results continuing to argue for a revision of the PREVENT and CONTEST counter-extremism strategies and the abandonment of demographic targeting in the deployment of counter-terror and counter-extremism
resources. The results presented in this Chapter would strengthen the argument for sustained intervention strategies by suggesting that single, one-off initiatives may be insufficient to effect change in levels of support for political violence, and as such that long-term interventions focussed on the promotion and reinforcement of conventional norms against violence and the development of favourable perceptions of the political process may be both desirable and effective. Given research evidence on social bonding and the development of behavioural norms prohibiting deviance (Rock, 1997), policy-makers may wish to target extremism through early interventions delivered via the principal agents of child socialization: the family and school.

Research has long affirmed the important role played by parents in facilitating the development and enforcement of pro-social behavioural norms (Rock, 1997). Academic scholarship has repeatedly argued that pro-social behaviours are not automatically acquired (Okin and Reich, 1999), and while policy-makers have accepted this (most notably in the Government's social mobility strategy), current policy adopts a laissez-faire model offering little oversight for pre-school child development (HMSO, 2011). Evidence from other countries suggests that this early period is crucial in addressing the risk of poor parenting and anomic social circumstance, with intervention capable of securing a range of beneficial long-term outcomes. Programmes such as Australia's Head Start (Fish, 2002) and America's Triple P (Sanders, Markie-Dadds, Tully, & Bor, 2000) provide practical evidence in support of this argument, with children of families involved in these programmes reporting higher education achievement, greater literacy and lower levels of involvement in crime and delinquency. A focus on educating care-givers
about the benefits of good parenting and the fostering of conventional
behavioural norms is therefore clearly desirable, and action to promote this
should be considered as a way of reducing the long-term risk of violent
extremism and support for violence alongside other pro-social outcomes.
Likewise, evidence on the role of educational institutions as agents of social
control (Jensen and Rojek, 1999) argues for school-based programmes to
augment work with families and address elevated risks in respect of those
left uncovered by other intervention strategies. Government policy already
recognizes that much can be achieved through school-based interventions
(NOMS, 2010; HMSO, 2011), with existing research evidencing positive
effects for social mobility and delinquency programmes beginning at primary
school level (Hao and Pong, 2008). While teachers are not employed as
surrogate parents, their high level of pupil contact, position of authority and
power to sanction bad behaviour allows for the provision of an environment
in which discipline and good behaviour can be rewarded and violent actions
punished. By policing inter-pupil contact and punishing early signs of
violence (for example, bullying) as well as fostering cooperation and mutual
respect, teachers are well placed to lay the foundations for the internalization
of norms against violence. Likewise, classroom-based teaching, particularly
through the citizenship curriculum, offers another way for teachers to
promote pro-social behaviours and the importance of non-violent dispute
resolution.
Similarly, school-based education programmes offer a unique opportunity for policy makers to enhance engagement with, and understanding of, the political process. Interest in politics has been shown in Chapter 5 to be a significant predictor of democratic valence, with more engaged parties reporting higher scores than other respondents. Likewise, trust in political actors, satisfaction with democracy and feelings regarding fair treatment and access have been argued to form a key component of individual perceptions of political efficacy, with low scores triggering low democratic valence. As engagement with politics is understood to be lower amongst the young (Glenn and Grimes, 1968) and significantly reduced in respect of recent cohorts (Loader, 2007), with poll data indicating that youth party membership and electoral turnout are at all-time lows (Webster, 1999), it seems likely that democratic valence will be lower amongst the young. As the results of Chapter 5 corroborate this picture in showing that the young are also more likely to be supportive of political violence, policy-makers should consider enacting programmes to promote greater understanding of our political system - indeed, compulsory politics education - as part of the national history or citizenship curricula.

Outside early intervention, religious institutions offer great opportunities for norms against violence to be promoted, and anti-social and extremist tendencies to be identified and addressed. While the preceding chapter has shown that certain types of religious practice deplete democratic valence and thus increase the risk of individuals supporting violence, a strong body of work has affirmed that most moderate forms of regular religious practice foster pro-social attitudes (Putnam, 1993) and behavioural norms (Littler,
inhibiting violent and delinquent activity (Hirschi and Stark, 1969; Stark et al, 1982). While the government of a secular, pluralistic state should not seek to promote, sponsor or regulate religious adherence, policy-makers should be aware of the potential benefits of a broader engagement with faith communities, and opportunities for joint-working against extremism – as in the aftermath of the Woolwich attacks (Copsey et al, 2013) - should be taken when presented.

Research evidence on the role of online groups in the radicalization process (Bartlett and Miller, 2010) also argues for a greater focus on the dissemination of extremist content online and its role in facilitating the development of non-conventional social and political norms. Research evidence has suggested that many young people are unable to evaluate the probity of content found online, often believing that search engine content is indexed on the basis of truthfulness rather than hit rate (Bartlett and Miller, 2011). In this, perhaps one of the most straightforward ways to support the retention of conventional norms and ideas may be to teach children the importance of sceptically evaluating information found online.

Further research must first subject my revised theory to empirically rigorous testing, with a more sustained intervention employed to attempt to shift support for violence (subject to ethics approval). If this is successful, then further research may wish to focus on replicating this work in other extremist and non-British contexts, and on evaluating the efficacy of these suggested policy interventions.
5.7 Conclusions

This chapter sought to explore whether democratic valence and support for terrorism were causally linked, presenting the results of bivariate and linear regression analyses using experimental data collected over the social networking site Facebook.

My findings presented a significant challenge to the theory in suggesting that democratic valence and support for violence are – while correlated – not causally linked. This has profound significance for my theory, perhaps suggesting that I am incorrect in asserting a causal relationship between the two factors. However, given the correlation present in this and my other data sets, I have sought to argue that this failure stems not from the inadequacy of my theory but from limitations related to the intervention, specifically with respect to the short time frame over which it was sustained. Given the strong norms operating against the endorsement of violence, I have argued that a stronger, more long-term intervention is necessary, and that further research is required to explore this contention further.

I have argued that this interpretation preserves the academic significance of the findings of previous chapters in general, and specifically my assertion of a relationship between democratic valence and support for violence and my findings in respect of the demographic traits of supporters. Likewise I have argued that the results of this chapter augment and support the critique of PREVENT made earlier in my thesis, and further strengthen the argument for sustained intervention strategies rather than one-off corrective programmes.
I have offered a template for these interventions focussing on institutionally-embedded pre-emptive education and greater political responsiveness, particularly in respect of access to political decision makers. I have argued for greater use of direct democracy – particularly referenda - and a more flexible political process capable of responding rapidly to popular concerns. I have also highlighted the need for further research, particularly through experimentation with more sustained interventions and secondary data replication in non-British contexts, and have provided a discussion of the form this research may take.

The following chapter offers an overview of the key findings of my thesis as a whole, an attempt to place my work in the context of broader debates around extremism and terrorism. It gives a more involved summation of the opportunities for further research and a detailed discussion of the requirements for policy implementation.
6. Conclusions

This thesis sought to provide an answer to the question of why people support terrorism and political violence. Drawing on existing scholarship on the roots of terrorism and insights from political science and criminology, it has argued for an approach to understanding motivation grounded in rational choice theory, linking attitudes to democratic engagement and support for violence through cost-benefit analysis.

It has justified this approach with reference to both anecdotal evidence on the roots of terrorism and the findings of academic research, both from terrorism and security studies and elsewhere in the social sciences. It has presented three empirical tests of its approach, drawing on survey and experimental data to provide a comprehensive test of the theory, and has contextualised its findings with reference to both the existing scholarly literature and the broader social and political context in the UK.

This chapter offers both a précis of this work, and an attempt to place my findings in the context of the broader academic and policy debates about terrorism and extremism from which this thesis grew. Starting by providing an overview of the social and political milieu in which my research was grounded, it offers a summary of the academic background to the study of support for violence and a detailed account of the theoretical model I have advanced to explain the process by which violence is supported. It then summarizes the empirical findings of my survey analysis and experimental chapters, focussing on their significance for my central research question, before engaging in a broader discussion of the implications of my work for both the academic study of terrorism and political violence and the domestic
policy response deployed to combat violent risks. It then concludes by offering a consideration of the limitations of my work and an overview of the opportunities for future research.

6.1 The Background

The trend towards the control of violence by government, and the concurrent de-legitimation of non-state violence, is a characteristic of modern society. The creation of police, courts, and democratic political structures designed to facilitate the non-violent resolution of conflicts has de-legitimated the use of violence by private individuals, leaving violent action the sole preserve of the state.

Both strong social norms and legal sanctions operate to deter those who would seek to employ it from engaging in violence, a backdrop against which the decision to support violence is difficult to understand; the likelihood of social censure and state punishment should act to deter violence by individuals. Yet despite this, violence – and in particular, political violence – has persisted and, in some cases, increased, during the early years of the 21st century.

This shift has been one of defining issues shaping 21st century politics, with 9/11, 7/7, and the Madrid bombings presenting a challenge to the power of the state to protect its citizenry. The collapse of post-cold war utopianism embodied in Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ (1992) and the re-emergence of sectarian violence – particularly those claiming an Islamic character – has served as a trigger for significant changes in both domestic and international
politics, with a broad arsenal of responses deployed by the state in an attempt to re-assert its authority and protect its citizens.

The scale of this policy response has been unprecedented, with billions of dollars of government money spent on foreign intervention and domestic counter-terrorism. In the UK, this response has taken two forms: military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the development of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy. Delivered using four discrete programmes – PREPARE (with a focus on mitigating the impact of unstoppable terrorist attacks), PROTECT (focused on target hardening and border controls), PURSUE (aimed at capturing and prosecuting known terrorists) and PREVENT – it aims to address both the risk of transnational terrorism and, crucially, violence by so-called ‘home grown’ radicals. The PREVENT strand in particular focusses on this latter group, seeking to target those at risk of radicalisation and extremist drift into violence. It aims both to deter engagement in violent action by at-risk individuals themselves, and to reduce the pool of support on which successful terror groups rely.

Given the importance of this work and the scale of the financial commitment made in its support by successive governments, it is perhaps surprising that so few academic studies have sought either to provide a theory of terrorist motivation, or to explore the principles embedded in the CONTEST strategy. In particular, the lack of research aiming to explore the drivers of support for violence – particularly amongst British Muslims – is troubling; despite the growth of terrorism studies as a discipline, the majority of published work has focussed on attempting to define terrorism rather than exploring the processes by which violence is chosen or the traits of those who engage in
its commission (Franks, 2006). Ethics restrictions and security concerns prevent researchers from investigating potential terrorists pre-attack, while lack of access, bias, and inaccurate recollections make meaningful post-event analysis difficult. While some – most notably Pape (2009) and Berman (2005) - have attempted to sidestep these issues through the analysis of macro-level data, I argue that their results cannot, as a result of the nature of their data, sustain the making of assertions as to the nature of individual level causation, a subject of paramount importance in both investigating the efficacy of current policy responses and validating theoretical models.

I assert that, given the relationship between support for, and the commission of, terrorism, research should seek to address the causes of support for violence; however, despite lower barriers to investigation, this too remains an under-explored field. Difficulties in identifying supporters for qualitative interview and the lack of appropriate and publicly available quantitative data have hampered attempts at research. However, with the propagation of measures of terrorist support in recent social surveys – most notably the EVS and EMBES – researchers now have little reason not to explore the factors which shape the willingness of individuals to engage in and support violence.

To this end, I proposed to investigate support for terrorism in the UK, using EVS and EMBES data to explore both the population at large, and British Muslims in particular. In order to limit the scope of my enquiry, I adopted a restrictive working definition for religion – defined by Durkheim (2008 [1897]) as ‘a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things… that unite into …[a] single moral community…all those who adhere to them’ – and
an open approach to terrorism, employing a ‘common sense’ test in order to
negate the difficulty in choosing a single overarching designation beyond
Harris’s (2006) assertion that terrorism is a strategy employed in pursuit of a
political goal.

6.2 The Theory

Expanding the argument made in my introduction, my review of theory and
research asserted that terrorism and support for political violence are related
phenomena, with the process by which individuals come to support violent
action a key cause of direct involvement in terrorism; for individual actors to
engage in violence, I argue that they must - logically - first come to embrace
it as a strategy capable of delivering their political goals. Consequently I
accepted Schmid's (2005) separation of causation into long term ‘root’ and
short term ‘trigger’ causes, and argued that research insights derived in
respect of the drivers for involvement in violence would, if they address long-
term root causes, also have validity in respect of support for violence. Given
the absence of a distinct literature addressing the theoretical roots of support
for violence, I included research addressing this phenomenon – where
appropriate - alongside insights drawn from more mainstream Criminological
work on motivation for violent delinquency.

I identified two dominant theoretical approaches - rational choice, and
ideological motivation - and presented a critical appraisal of the pros and
cons of each with reference to the empirical literature on support for terrorism
and political violence. I concluded that evidence of rationality amongst known
terrorists discounts the use of the biological and psychological approaches and that criminological literature addressing the impotence of religious ideology as a force shaping delinquent behaviours and actions challenged arguments grounded in assertions of theological and moral imperative. Given the overwhelming consensus amongst scholars of the sociology of religion as to the centrality of religion’s social characteristics in determining its influence on adherent behaviours, and drawing on Harris (2006) characterisation of terrorism as a ‘strategy’, I proposed a revised version of the rational choice approach capable of explaining both support for religious terrorism, and terrorism in general.

I argued that the principle of actor rationality logically dictates that individuals will determine which strategy is the most attractive means of securing their goals by balancing its costs and benefits in comparison with other alternative approaches. As violence is intrinsically more costly than democratic engagement I argued that the decision to support terrorism was shaped by the individual’s perception of the likely efficacy of democratic engagement, asserting that trust in politicians, political institutions and the police, perceptions of political access and procedural fairness and systemic satisfaction with democracy would therefore be key determinants of willingness to endorse violence.

Alongside this, I argued that participation in extreme religious practice would increase the odds of supporting violence. I cited research evidence linking participation in organizations or movements that foster negative perceptions of the out-group – for example, religious cults or extremist groups – with negative perceptions of the attractiveness of democratic engagement,
drawing on research by Brehm and Rahn, (1997), Inglehart (1999), Jackman and Miller (1998), and Putnam (1993, 1995) to show a link between social and political trust to support my argument.

I then highlighted the anecdotal support for this approach, drawing on the Israel-Palestine conflict and the troubles in Northern Ireland to illustrate the links between democratic policy engagement and violent protest, and extremist group involvement and unfavourable perceptions of these alternatives.

6.3 The Findings
Analysis using quantitative data from the European Values Study and Muslim respondent subset of the Ethnic Minority British Election Study was undertaken to provide a robust test of my theory. To facilitate rigorous testing I specified detailed hypotheses quantifying the relationship between variables and direction of effect. I provided detail of the data and the processes undertaken to prepare it for analysis, identifying the measures to be used as controls in multivariate testing and justifying their inclusion with reference to the existing literature. I also provided a detailed consideration of the ethical implications of my work, drawing on ESRC guidelines and University ethics policy to shape my research approach.

As a preliminary step prior to performing my analysis I produced factors approximating the attractiveness of democratic engagement (termed Democratic Valence) using measures of trust in politicians and political parties, satisfaction with democracy, political fairness and political access. I
presented a discussion of the rationale underlying this approach, and a
detailed overview of the processes taken to achieve it.

My analysis then employed bivariate and regression analyses to test each
hypothesis in turn, exploring first the link between democratic valence,
political grievance and support for violence before addressing, via my
analysis of EMBES, the role of religion. My results offered tentative support
for the theory advanced in my review of theory and research, evidencing a
correlation between democratic valence and support for terrorism and
political violence, both in the population at large and amongst British
Muslims. My initial test, using data from the EVS, showed a significant
relationship between democratic valence and support for terrorism which
was exacerbated by the existence of a grievance, a picture replicated in the
preliminary analysis of the EMBES data. In both the population at large and
amongst those with a grievance support for violent action rose as democratic
valence fell, though the effect was of a smaller magnitude amongst those
without a grievance, with results for this group failing to show significance at
the 10% level.

In respect of the relationship between religion and support for violence, my
results again offered a broad validation of my approach with the majority of
null-hypotheses rejected. Extreme Islamic ideology was shown to predict
both democratic valence and support for violent demonstrations, with further
analysis exploring the impact of frequency of religious practice suggesting
that regular contact with co-religionists did, in general, increase the
magnitude of this effect amongst those holding the most extreme views,
despite the highest level of support for violence being found amongst less
frequent and less extreme respondents. While the results of this final hypothesis test were not unambiguous in their support of my theory, I identified several possible explanations for this finding.

Experimental analysis then sought to return to the core research question and ascertain whether shifts in democratic valence could induce support for violence in a lab environment. Participants recruited via the social-networking site Facebook were randomly allocated to either a low or high valence condition and presented with a stimulus text designed to affect their attitudes to British democracy as a means to induce change in levels of democratic valence.

A pilot study using a convenience sample provided a vital pre-experiment test of the data collection instruments, with results evidencing small (non-significant) differences in levels of democratic valence and support for violence across the two groups. Despite this, the results of the final experiment presented a different picture, with a post-stimulus manipulation check suggesting that the stimuli had been effective in triggering small shifts in levels of democratic valence but failing to evidence significant inter-group variance in levels of support for all types of violent action. Considering this result, and the implied possibility that the hypothesized relationship between democratic valence and support for violence may be erroneous, I argued that there was still reason to regard my theory as robust, and the results of the experiment as an anomaly. In particular, I highlighted the possibility that the experimental results may have stemmed from a quirk of the sample (a fact lent credence by the results from the pilot study), a lack of participant
grievance, or the impotence of the stimulus materials, emphasising the importance of further replication as a means of providing a definitive answer.

6.4 The Policy implications

My findings have significant implications for counter-extremism and counter-terrorism policy in general and the PREVENT framework in particular. By showing that democratic valence predicts support for political violence I have validated a core component of the PREVENT strategy (Home Office, 2010) endorsing the identification in the channel guidance (Home Office, 2011) of attitudes to democracy and government as indicators of extremist risk. More than this, I have also – through the analysis of the EMBES data - validated the linking of extreme religious views, regular contact with extremists and support for violence.

Given the paucity of research and evaluation activity focussed on the PREVENT strategy (Dhami, 2013; Thomas, 2010), any research findings are likely to be welcome. However in showing a link between democratic valence and support for violence that is consistent with my theoretical approach, my results have particular significance. Implicit in the PREVENT strategy is the assumption that attitudes to government, extreme religious views, and regular contact with known extremists are symptoms, rather than causes, of support for violence, leaving the root reasons for individual radicalisation opaque. In framing the linkage between these factors as a causal relationship, my theory – if it is correct – raises the prospect of a different approach to counter-extremism focussed not on delegitimizing the cause or
goals that violence is employed to support (as suggested by the channel guidance framework) but on the structural factors that underpin recourse to violence on a strategic level. Such an approach would question the efficacy of current multi-stakeholder action plans as a means of addressing extremist drift in, and instead argue the need to augment a focus on goals with increased attention to the processes by which violence is endorsed. This presents opportunities for a range of fresh interventions, particularly pre-emptive programmes designed to reduce the risk of radicalisation prior to the decision to endorse violence – in essence, focussing on the prevention of radicalisation as an ends in itself, rather than merely as a process through which individuals come to engage in violence.

If my argument is correct, then my research may be seen to argue the need for policy makers to employ the multi-agency partnerships envisaged by PREVENT to deliver pre-emptive interventions. Particularly in respect of the young, opportunities exist for teachers, youth leaders and social workers to engage in the promotion of democratic governance and political engagement. Particularly as the young are most likely to be involved in the commission of political violence (Combs, 1997)30, such an approach would also seem a sensible way of pursuing the broader aim of CONTEST in reducing participation in violent extremism.

At the broadest level such an approach could be delivered through schools by granting citizenship education greater prominence within the national curriculum. Research evidence highlights the fact that the teaching of

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30 While this seems to clash with my analysis of the EMES data, which found age non-significant as a predictor of democratic valence, higher rates of involvement in terrorism and political violence by the under 40s can be explained on the basis of economic cost, with the established having more to lose through involvement in terrorism than the young.
citizenship has historically been optional (Frazer, 2000), with little done to challenge the pervasive and negative views of politics often held by the young (Frazer, 2007). Research evidence further suggests that many young people do not adequately understand the British political system (Henn, Weinstein and Forrest, 2009), and that as a result they remain suspicious of its efficacy, probity, and the motivation of those engaged in its management (Bartlett and Miller, 2010). Given that the young are less likely to be engaged in traditional politics (Henn, Weinstein and Forrest, 2005) than earlier generations, it is unlikely that they would have opportunities to gain sufficient exposure to mainstream democratic politics to challenge these negative preconceptions. Making the study of politics a core part of the national curriculum (perhaps via an enlarged citizenship programme) could go some way to achieving this goal, with the study of parliamentary process, political history, and contemporary political issues providing the young with a better understanding of our political system, providing a basis for improved perceptions of its fairness, accessibility and probity, increasing democratic valence and thereby decreasing their risk of supporting violence.

Alongside this, results from the analysis of the EMBES data, specifically those examining the determinants of democratic valence, also raises important questions as to the role of regular internet use as a potentially structural cause of extremist sentiment. While it is clearly not the case that regular internet use should, in and of itself, be a trigger for low democratic valence, research evidence suggests that – particularly amongst the young – the internet, and specifically social media, may play an important role in promoting negative perceptions of politics (Bartlett and Miller, 2011). It has
long been recognized that extremist groups are amongst the most prolific users of web 2.0 technologies (O’Callaghan, Greene, Conway, Carthy, and Cunningham, 2013), with the comparative ease with which content can be made available, and the lack of editorial oversight, providing a fertile ground for the promotion of views which are biased, factually inaccurate, and shaped by a covert political agenda (Bartlett and Miller, 2011). Indeed, the PREVENT framework (Home Office, 2010) accepts this risk, identifying certain types of internet use as an indicator of extremist sympathies, with frequent visitation to known extremist sites expressly identified by the channel guidance framework (Home Office, 2011).

Despite this, few attempts have been made to help internet users – particularly the young – identify which content may be trusted. In the absence of robust third party mechanism on which users may rely to validate the veracity of online content, it is incumbent on the individual to decide the appropriate level of trust and belief to invest. However, particularly amongst the young, fundamental misunderstandings as to the nature of net regulation – for example, the commonly held assumption that search engines rank results on accuracy and truthfulness (Bartlett and Miller, 2011) – and the absence of experience and knowledge capable of facilitating the weighing of inaccurate content presents a significant risk. Against this backdrop, Demos (Bartlett and Miller, 2011) suggestion that schools teach digital citizenship as a core component of their curriculum, seems reasonable as a check against the risk of inaccurate online content poisoning trust in politicians and political institutions.
Similarly, however, mainstream media coverage of politics is, as Flinders notes, also characterised by portrayals of politicians as sleazy, corrupt, greedy and inept (2010, p. 309). As a result, the public are unlikely to perceive politicians in a favourable light, with democratic valence likely to be adversely affected (a contention lent credibility by the low levels of democratic valence evident in both the EVS and EMBES data). The adoption by the media of a more positive tone in coverage of political events - focussing on the significant successes delivered by democratic politics (for example, universal free healthcare, public education) rather than the personal shortcomings of the actors involved in its day-to-day life - would doubtless do much to raise democratic valence. However greater engagement with the public on the part of mainstream parties and political organisations would also do much to improve perceptions, with anecdotal evidence from election campaigns highlighting the popular view that politicians are disinterested in the public outside of the election period. A shift in the outlook of political parties to viewing the public as citizens rather than mere voters is an essential pre-requisite for broader change, however more outreach work by politicians – by spending more time in their constituencies, greater involvement in local non-political organizations, and greater use of direct democracy – may also do much address this risk.

Analysis of the EMBES data also highlighted a particular risk amongst members of the 1.5 and 2nd generation of Muslim migrants, with both groups evidencing low levels of democratic valence compared to members of the 1st generation. While this arguably reflects the adoption of expectations and attitudes in line with the domestic population (Maxwell, 2010), it equally
remains possible that the low levels of democratic valence stem from hostility to a political system that many 1.5 and 2nd generation migrants view as intrinsically racist and biased against them. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that many second generations migrants feel unrepresented by mainstream political parties (Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders and Sobolewska, 2013), and if this is the case, then it stands to reason that 1.5 and 2nd generation migrants will be at a significantly increased risk of supporting violence given their likely lower base levels of democratic valence relative to the population at large - a view leant further credibility by anecdotal evidence from the 7/7 attacks, with all of the bombers members of the 1.5th or 2nd migrant generation. If this argument is accepted, then serious questions must be asked as to how policy makers may frame a response. A reduction in overall societal racism would seem likely to deliver an increase in democratic valence amongst members of the 1.5 and 2nd generation of Muslim migrants, and would be a valuable social benefit in and of itself. However such change is notoriously difficult to effect as the stubborn persistence of racism – albeit now largely covert and operational on a structural level (Mitchell and Tetlock, 2006) – shows, despite numerous government-funded initiatives designed to combat it (Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders and Sobolewska, 2013).

6.5 The Opportunities for Further Research

Significant scope exists for the academic community to facilitate the development of terrorism studies as a discipline. In particular, opportunities
exist for researchers from outside the dominant traditions of international relations and political theory to bring their unique outlooks and research approaches to the study of support for, and engagement in, terrorism and political violence. Quantitative contributions from political scientists and criminologists in particular would be of benefit, with their focus on the individual and interest in motivation complementing traditional macro level strategic and definitional concerns to provide a more holistic understanding of the roots of violence.

The engagement of such academics is, however, dependent on a growth in the range of data sources carrying measures of support for violence. While both EMBES and the EVS carry such indicators few other, including recent iterations of closely related, data sets (for example, the British Election Study and World Values Study) incorporate measures of support for violence, with a search of the ESDS repository yielding no hits bar the EVS and EMBES. Without data, there can be no analysis, and without analysis, there can be no theory; thus, if the study of terrorism and political violence is to develop further, this issue must be addressed as a matter of urgency.

In terms of my research specifically, opportunities exist for scholars to further test my theory via the replication of the experiment and through survey analysis with data from other populations. The failure of my experiment to induce significant inter-group differences left open the question of causation, and while it remains possible – as identified in the preceding chapter – that my results may reflect an anomaly in the sample, a lack of stimulus potency, or the need for a more sustained intervention, it is also possible that they may reflect the absence of a causal link. If my theory is to be considered
robust, future research employing more potent stimuli, more sustained interventions, and more robust sampling methods is required to provide validation.

Similarly, while the results of my secondary analyses provide *prima facie* support for my theory, the limited chronological, cultural and religious scope of the data used prevents unproblematic generalization to populations outside of the UK. Particularly given the significant variance in social and political norms across different national and geographical contexts, it cannot be uncritically assumed that relationships present in the UK will also be evident elsewhere. Replication of my analysis with data from other nations is therefore a vital requirement if a comprehensive validation of my theory is to be provided. In the first instance researchers may wish to draw on the unused data from the 2008 EVS to ascertain whether the linkage identified in the UK persists elsewhere in Europe. However if a comprehensive test is to be performed then data from outside Europe must also be employed. The absence of freely available data sets containing appropriate indicators presents an obstacle, however polling data such as that gathered by organisations such as YouGov, ICM, or Ipsos MORI could, in the first instance, be used to provide a first test. Alternatively, researchers could draw on data from the 3rd wave of the World Values Study - an approach which would have the additional benefit of also offering a test of my theory in a different chronological context – or on panel data tracking young people through adolescence into adulthood.

Relatedly, replication with data from members of at-risk sub-groups – for example, extreme right-wing organizations, militant nationalists and deep
greens – is also vital if my theory is to be regarded as a comprehensive approach to motivation. In this, data such as that collected as part of Demos’ Digital Populism and New Political Actors initiatives provides a vital source of information, offering researchers the opportunity to validate my theory outside of the mainstream political milieu. However fresh data, exploring other groups – particularly outside of the Western world - needs to be gathered. Given the limited infrastructure in many countries with active groups of interest, qualitative approaches may need to be employed to facilitate data collection.

Finally, as the indicator of extreme religious ideology used in the analysis of the EMBES data has a specifically Islamic bias, further research is necessary both to develop measures of extremism with validity in respect of non-Muslim groups, and to test whether these operate in a similar fashion to those used in this thesis.

6.6 Conclusion

This thesis set out to advance a new theory of support for terrorism and political violence capable of addressing the deficiencies of orthodox approaches. Given the prominence of terrorism and counter terrorism in public life, it argued the need for a robust theoretical account of the causes of terrorism and violent extremism that had validity in respect of the major sources of contemporary risk as a basis from which a sensible and effective policy response could be derived.
To achieve this aim I have advanced an approach focussed on the individual as the unit of enquiry, arguing for a strategic understanding of violence that addresses the question of motivation from the standpoint of criminological rational choice and the economics of cost-benefit analysis. Under this framework I have made a case for linking attitudes to democratic politics and support for violence as related phenomena justified on the basis of both anecdotal evidence and existing academic research. I have positioned this view against the exceptionalism of ideological accounts of terrorism in general, and religious terrorism in particular, arguing for an approach to religious violence that grounds itself in mainstream scholarship on the group characteristics of extreme religious adherents, linking extreme religious practice and depleted social and political trust.

I have tested these theories through the analysis of survey and experimental data, and in so doing, have provide a first – albeit imperfect - validation of the core arguments of my approach. If replicated and extended by other researchers, this offers the tantalising prospect of a unified theory of motivation capable of explaining support for violence across diverse groups. In this, it is an important step to the advancement not just of scholarly understanding of support for violence, but of the long-term structural roots of violence itself.

This chapter has offered a range of suggestions as to how future researchers may seek to accomplish this goal, highlighting the limitations of existing data sets and arguing for greater participation in the study of support for violence by academics from across the applied social sciences.
Alongside this, my conclusion has also provided a discussion of the policy significance of my results, in particular with respect to the UK’s PREVENT counter-extremism strategy and the channel guidance issued in its support. It has argued for a greater focus on early intervention, and highlighted opportunities for such interventions to be delivered, focussing in particular on opportunities for engagement by schools and the education system.

As popular attitudes to mainstream politics continue to shift significant questions must be asked as to the nature of contemporary perceptions of democracy and popular willingness to invest belief in the efficacy of non-violent political engagement. With survey data and anecdotal evidence following the 2014 European Elections raising the prospect of popular disengagement with mainstream politics, my results offer the grim possibility of an increase in support for, and recourse to, violence across Europe. For the time being, dissatisfaction with politics has confined its focus to politicians and mainstream parties themselves, ignoring the structures and mechanics of democracy, and leaving public faith in the ballot box, and the power of the citizenry to effect social change through it, intact. While this persists, the risk of violence is low.

However the possibility remains for popular dissatisfaction to broaden to encompass the democratic constitutional settlement itself. If the protest parties that have gained in strength since the onset of the Eurozone crises disappoint when placed in positions of power – as with the Liberal Democrats in the UK – or the bureaucratic structures of government act to neuter their initiatives (as is already happening in Italy – see Anderson, 2014), then the risk of violence will in all likelihood grow.
This is not to prophesy that the streets of Europe will run with blood, as the majoriy will most likely choose less costly non-violent engagement strategies such as organized demonstrations, engaging in strike action, and non-violent resistance, but to note that for those with the least to lose and the most to gain, the allure of violence may prove irresistible.

Public safety may therefore come to depend on the willingness of elites to visibly engage with the concerns of the disenfranchised, and the will of those in the political establishment to forge a new settlement that broadens political engagement. Greater use of direct democracy through referenda and public consultations is an important part of this, however politicians must also seek to harness the connective power of the internet, and social media in particular, to reach those most at risk. Whether such change will be forthcoming, however, remains to be seen.
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Appendix 1 – EVS Data

i. Question Texts and Response Options

ii. Collinearity Statistics

i. Question Texts and Response Options

a. Age

(v303) Q87 Can you tell me your year of birth, please?

1900-1999 (Free Response)
98 – Don’t know
99 – Refused

b. Gender

(v302) Q86 Sex of respondent?

01 – Male
02 – Female

c. Marital Status

(v313) Q97 What is your current legal marital status?

01 – Married
02 – Registered Partnership
03 – Widowed
04 – Divorced
05 – Separated
06 – Never married and never registered partnership
08 – Don’t know
09 – Refused

d. Employment Status

(v337) Q111 Are you yourself gainfully employed at the moment or not? Please select from the card the employment status that applies to you.

Paid employment
01 – 30 hours a week or more
02 – Less than 30 hours a week
03 – Self employed

No paid employment
04 – Military Service
05 – Retired/pensioned
06 – Housewife not otherwise employed
07 – Student
08 – Unemployed
09 – Disabled
10 – Other (Please specify)
88 – Don’t know
99 – Refused
e. Employment Type

(v339) Q112
What was the name or title of your main job?

Coded for v339ESeC
01 - Large employers, higher mgrs/professionals
02 - Lower mgrs/professionals, higher supervisory/technicians
03 - Intermediate occupations
04 - Small employers and self-employed (non-agriculture)
05 - Small employers and self-employed (agriculture)
06 - Lower supervisors and technicians
07 - Lower sales and service
08 - Lower technical
09 – Routine
98 – Not Asked
99 – Refused

f. Education Level

(v335) Q109
At what age do you expect you will have completed your education?

05-62 (Free Response)
00 – No formal education
88 – Don’t Know
99 – Refused

g. Confidence in the Police, Political Parties and Parliament

(v210, v212, v221) Q63
Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?

01 – A great deal
02 – Quite a lot
03 – Not very much
04 – None at all
08 – Don’t Know
09 – Not applicable

h. Democratic Satisfaction

(v223) Q64
On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?

01 – Very satisfied
02 – Rather satisfied
03 – Not very satisfied
04 – Not at all satisfied
08 – Don’t know
09 – Refused
i. **Support for Terrorism**

*(v267) Q77*

Terrorism is everyday news. In principle, most people are against it, but there is still room for differences of opinion. Which of these two statements do you tend to agree with?

01 – There may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified
02 – Terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned
03 – Neither
08 – Don’t know
09 – Refused

J. **Happiness**

*(v8) Q3*

Taking all things together, would you say you are?

01 - Very happy
02 - Quite happy
03 - Not very happy
04 - Not at all happy
08 - Don’t know
09 - No answer

ii. **Collinearity Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
<th>VIF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>1.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>1.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td>1.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary Education</td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td>1.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Appendix 2 – EMBES Data

iii. Question Texts and Response Options

iv. Collinearity Statistics

iii. Question Texts and Response Options

a. Age

[bq99]
What was your age last birthday?

18-97
For 97+, Code as 97
DK REF

a. Gender

[bq98]
INTERVIEWER TO OBSERVE AND RECORD: GENDER OF RESPONDENT
1 Male
2 Female
NO DK
NO REF

b. Marital Status

[bq100]
Can I just check, which of these applies to you at present?
Please take your answers from this card

1 Married
2 Living with a partner
3 Separated (after being married)
4 Divorced
5 Widowed
6 Single (never married)
DK REF

c. Employment Type

[bq110a]
From this card please tell me which best describes the sort of work you do. (If you are not working now, please tell me what you did in your last job).

1 Professional or higher technical work
2 Manager or senior administrator
3 Clerical
4 Sales or services
5 Small business owner
6 Foreman or supervisor of other workers
7 Skilled manual work
8 Semi-skilled or unskilled manual work
9 Other (WRITE IN)
d. **Education Level**

[bq103]
At what age did you finish full-time education?

ENTER AGE
1 Never went to school
2 Still at school in full-time education
3 Still at university in full-time education
DK REF

e. **Migrant Generation**

[bq71a]
In which country were you born?

1 England
2 Scotland
3 Wales
4 Northern Ireland
5 India
6 Pakistan
7 Bangladesh
8 Other
DK REF

[bq71b]
In which year did you first move to Britain?

Write in Year or Age
DK REF

f. **Internet Use**

[bq93a]
Do you regularly use the internet?

1 Yes
2 No
DK REF

g. **Newspaper Reader**

[bq88a]
Do you regularly read a daily newspaper – either the paper version or online?

1 Yes
2 No
DK REF

h. **Interest in Politics**

[bq1]
Let’s talk for a few minutes about politics in general. How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in British politics?
1 A great deal
2 Quite a lot
3 Some
4 Not very much
5 None at all
DK REF

i. Financial Dependence on the State

[bq107]
Which of these is the main source of income for you (and your partner) at present?

1 Earnings from employment (own or spouse / partner’s)
2 Occupational pension(s) - from previous employer(s)
3 Private pension(s)
4 State retirement or widow’s pension(s)
5 Jobseeker’s Allowance/ Unemployment benefit
6 Pension Credit/ Minimum Income Guarantee/ Income Support for pensioners
7 Invalidity, sickness or disabled pension or benefit(s)
8 Other state benefit or tax credit (WRITE IN)
9 Interest from savings or investments
10 Student grant, bursary or loans
11 Dependent on parents/other relatives
12 Other main source (WRITE IN)

j. Concern over Crime

[bq2a]
Now, I’d like to ask you a few questions about the issues and problems facing Britain today. As far as you’re concerned, what is the single most important issue facing the country at the present time?

1 Asylum seekers
2 Britain’s membership of the European Monetary Union (the Euro)
3 Britain’s relations with the European Union
4 Law and order
5 Education
6 Environment
7 National Health Service
8 Inflation, Prices generally
9 Public transport
10 Taxation
11 State of the economy
12 Unemployment
13 My standard of living
14 Price of petrol
15 War in Iraq
16 War in Afghanistan
17 War against terrorism
18 Immigration/People coming to Britain
19 Other (WRITE IN)
88 There are no important issues
DK REF

k. Party or Community Volunteer

[bq55b]
Over the past few years, have you volunteered to get involved in politics or community affairs?

295
1 Yes - I have volunteered
2 No

I. Economic Pessimist

[bq25]
How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months?

1 Get a lot worse
2 Get a little worse
3 Stay the same
4 Get a little better
5 Get a lot better
DK REF

m. Trust in Politicians, Parliament and the Police

[bq20a, bq20b, bq20d]
Now, thinking about British political institutions like Parliament, please use the 0 to 10 scale to indicate how much trust you have for each of the following, where 0 means no trust and 10 means a great deal of trust. Firstly, how much do you trust [the Police, Parliament, Politicians]?

0 No trust
1 one
2 two
3 three
4 four
5 five
6 six
7 seven
8 eight
9 nine
10 A great deal of trust
DK REF

n. Satisfaction With Democracy

[bq82]
On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in this country?

1 Very satisfied
2 Fairly satisfied
3 A little dissatisfied
4 Very dissatisfied
DK REF

o. Political Fair Treatment

[bq22a]
Please tell me how far you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: The Government generally treats people like me fairly

1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
DK REF

p. Political Influence

[bq79]
On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?

0 No influence
1 one
2 two
3 three
4 four
5 five
6 six
7 seven
8 eight
9 nine
10 A great deal of influence
DK REF

q. Support for Sharia

[sharia]
And looking at these statements about Sharia courts being introduced in Britain, which of these come closest to your view?

1. Introduce Sharia law, that is traditional Islamic law, in all cases
2. Introduce Sharia law, but only if penalties do not contravene British law
3. Do not introduce Sharia law.
4. Don't know
5. Do not want to answer

a. Religious Practice

[EDS_BK1]
In the past 12 months, how often did you participate in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals?

1. At least once a day
2. At least once a week
3. At least once a month
4. Occasionally (but less than once a month)
5. Only on festivals
6. Not at all
DK REF

b. Support for Violent Demonstrations

[Conviol]
Would you ever support violent demonstrations or protests in the following situations: If the British government was about to start a war that you didn’t agree with?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Do not want to answer
iv. Collinearity Statistics

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Appendix 3 – Experiment

I. Final Pilot and Experimental Questionnaire (Questions and Response Options)

II. Pilot Study
   a. Democratic Valence Factor Matrix
   b. Outcome Mean Comparisons

III. Main Experiment
   a. Democratic Valence Factor Matrix
   b. Collinearity Diagnostics
   c. Regression Diagnostics

I. Final Pilot and Experimental Questionnaire (Questions and Response Options)

Thanks you for agreeing to take part in this project, which is investigating the relationship between religion and politics as part of a PhD project at the University of Manchester.

In the next few pages you will find a series of questions exploring your views on society and politics, alongside some questions on your background. It is important that you answer these questions honestly, and that you carefully read the text before you move on to the next section.

There are around 30 questions, and it should take no more than 10 minutes to complete the whole survey. Involvement in this project is voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any time prior to completion of the survey.

Any responses you give will be recorded, but all your answers will be held anonymously, and no information will be collected that could identify you. Any information you do give will be treated as confidential.

1. By checking the box below, you signify your agreement to these conditions, and consent to the use of your data in this research.

   I am happy to take part in this research, and agree to the terms outlined
above. This page contains some background questions about your life in general. Please answer these questions as honestly as you can, checking that you haven't missed any before moving on to the next page.

2. What Gender are you?

☐ Male
☐ Female

3. What was your age last birthday?

4. Which of these applies to you at present?

☐ Married
☐ Living with a partner
☐ Separated (after being married)
☐ Divorced
☐ Widowed
☐ Single (never married)

6. At what age did you finish full time education?

7. Which of the following descriptions best applies to you?

☐ In paid work
☐ In full-time education
☐ Unemployed for six months or more
☐ Unemployed for less than six months
☐ Permanently sick or disabled
☐ Retired
☐ Looking after the home

8. From this list please choose which best describes the sort of work you do (If you are not working now, please tell me what you did in your last job)

☐ Professional or higher technical work
☐ Manager or senior administrator
Clerical
Sales or services
Small business owner
Foreman or supervisor of other workers
Skilled manual work
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual work
Other
Never worked

9. Do you regard yourself as belonging to a religious group?

Yes - I am a Christian
Yes - I am a Muslim
Yes - I am a Hindu
Yes - I belong to another religious group
No - I do not belong to a religious group
This page contains some more background questions. Please answer these questions as honestly as you can, checking that you haven't missed any before moving on to the next page.

10. In which country were you born?

☐ England
☐ Scotland
☐ Wales
☐ Northern Ireland
☐ India
☐ Pakistan
☐ Bangladesh
☐ Other

11. If you were born outside of the United Kingdom, how old were you when you first moved to Britain?

☐ Under 13
☐ Over 13
☐ Not Applicable (Born in the UK)

12. Which of these is the main source of income for you (and your partner) at present?

☐ Earnings from employment (own or spouse/partner's)
☐ Occupational pension(s) - from previous employer(s)
☐ Private pension(s)
☐ State retirement or widow's pension(s)
☐ Jobseeker's Allowance/Unemployment benefit
☐ Pension Credit/Minimum Income Guarantee/Income support for pensioners
☐ Invalidity, sickness or disabled pension or benefit(s)
☐ Other state benefit or tax credit
☐ Interest from savings or investments
☐ Student grant, bursary or loans
☐ Dependent on parents/other relatives
☐ Other (please specify)

13. Have you ever been referred to a specialist in relation to any mental illness?
14. Has anybody you know been killed or seriously injured in a terrorist attack?

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No
- [ ] Prefer not to say
This page contains some questions about your social practices and activities. Please answer these questions as honestly as you can, checking that you haven't missed any before moving on to the next page.

15. How often do you use the internet?

- Daily
- Weekly
- Monthly
- Less often
- Never

16. How often do you read a daily newspaper (either the paper version or online)?

- Daily
- Weekly
- Monthly
- Less often
- Never

17. Do you think the next twelve months will be better, worse or the same, when it comes to your life in general

- Better
- Worse
- The same

18. Over the past few years, have you volunteered to get involved in politics or community affairs

- Yes
- No

19. How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in British politics?

- A great deal
- Quite a lot
- Some
- Not very much
- None at all
21. As far as you're concerned, what is the single most important issue facing the country at the present time

- Asylum seekers
- Britain's membership of the European Monetary Union (the Euro)
- Britain's relationship with the European Union
- Law and order
- Education
- Environment
- National Health Service
- Inflation/Prices generally
- Public transport
- Taxation
- State of the economy
- Unemployment
- My standard of living
- Price of petrol
- War in Iraq
- War in Afghanistan
- War against terrorism
- Immigration/People coming to Britain
- Don't Know

Other (please specify)
This page contains some questions about your religious practices. Please answer these questions as honestly as you can, checking that you haven’t missed any before moving on to the next page.

22. In the past twelve months, how often did you participate in religious activities or attend religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals?

- [ ] At least once a day  
- [ ] At least once a week  
- [ ] At least once a month  
- [ ] Occasionally (but less than once a month)  
- [ ] Only on Festivals  
- [ ] Never
27. For each of the following, please indicate your agreement with the statement on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that you very strongly disagree, and 10 indicates that you agree unreservedly.

I believe that violence against property can be justified as a method of pursuing political goals

1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10.
   Very Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Disagree
   Disagree

I believe that violence against government employees can be justified as a method of pursuing political goals

1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10.
   Very Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Disagree
   Disagree

I believe that violence against civilians can be justified as a method of pursuing political goals

1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10.
   Very Strongly Disagree
   Strongly Disagree
   Disagree
This page contains some questions about your political views. Please answer these questions as honestly as you can, checking that you haven't missed any before moving on to the next page.

28. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all, and 10 is totally, how much do you trust the following:

Politicians

1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. 
Not At All

Parliament

1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. 
Not At All

The Police

1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. 
Not At All

29. On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in this country?

- Very satisfied
- Fairly satisfied
- Fairly dissatisfied
- Very dissatisfied

30. How far do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Government generally treats people like me fairly?

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
31. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 means a great deal of influence and 1 means no influence, how much influence do you feel you have on politics and public affairs?

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<td>A Great Deal of Influence</td>
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Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.

The data collected in by these questions is intended for analysis in a PhD project led by Mark Littler and hosted by the University of Manchester. This project explores the relationship between religion, trust in government and support for radical political protest.

To download a file containing more information on this project, please click the link below [Download]

Any questions regarding any of the preceding questions, or on either project, should be addressed to mark.littler-3@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk

32. By checking the box below, you signify your continuing agreement to these conditions, and consent to the use of your data in this research.

☐ I am happy to take part in this research, and agree to the terms outlined above and in the disclaimer on the first page of the survey.
II. Pilot Study

a. Democratic Valence Factor Matrix

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Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
a. 1 factors extracted. 9 iterations required.

b. Outcome Mean Comparisons

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<td>Standard Deviation: 2.697</td>
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<td>I believe that violence against government employees can</td>
<td>Mean: 1.65</td>
<td>Mean: 2.16</td>
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<td>be justified as a method of pursuing political goals</td>
<td>Standard Deviation: 1.810</td>
<td>Standard Deviation: 1.986</td>
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<td>I believe that violence against civilians can be</td>
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<td>Mean: 1.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>justified as a method of pursuing political goals</td>
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III. Main Experiment

a. Democratic Valence Factor Matrix

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a. 1 factors extracted. 6 iterations required.

b. Collinearity Diagnostics

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