# Migration and Citizenship

Newsletter of the American Political Science Association
Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship

http://community.apsanet.org/MigrationCitizenship

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Letter from the Co-Presidents

As scholars of migration and citizenship, we are accustomed to recognizing fear of “the other” as a constant element in the politics related to migration. This attitude typically comes into sharp relief in election season, as it has in this one. But this time the spotlight has shifted in an unexpected direction, toward refugees. It does not seem to matter that helping refugees has, until recently, been a matter of strong bipartisan agreement. Refugees have been thought to have the strongest claim to assistance because they are, by definition, fleeing danger and persecution in their home countries and are admitted only after extensive vetting by government authorities.

The Paris bombings, and now the San Bernardino terrorist attack, almost instantly, profoundly disrupted this pro-refugee consensus. It is important for scholars of immigration to consider how and why this has happened. This is, of course, not the first time a fear-focused populism has gripped nations that pride themselves on helping those in need. The refusal of the allies to accept Jews fleeing the Nazi onslaught at the beginning of World War II is a well-known example.

The new narrative suspects Muslims, particularly those from Syria and other nearby countries of being resistant to assimilation, and prone to radicalization. Even children have been placed under this cloud, and the yet-to-be conceived who might “radicalize.” In the United States, where expressions of this fear has found its voice in the current presidential election campaign there is deep irony. This preoccupation with dangerous refugees co-exists with no effective system for registering guns, including automatic rifles and large-capacity ammunition clips. We are clearly, in sociological terms, in a moral panic.

The panic is not, however, evenly distributed. Nations are responding in various ways to the presumed threat of migration, as are individual leaders within nations. This variety of responses offers research possibilities that may help us unravel the complex debate that is occurring. Also at stake are broader issues of citizenship and belonging in large, already multi-ethnic communities. More broadly we should be asking whether the threat of terrorism is moving democratic nations away from liberal citizenship. What once seemed a trajectory toward expanding cosmopolitanism and even post-national citizenship is seriously under challenge. Already established moves in this direction, such as the European Union, are challenged by the new emphasis on security on top of an immense flow of humanity seeking refuge from a bloody war. Never has it been clearer that the world has shrunk and that we are all, in multiple ways, connected to each other. How far will nations go with policing, surveillance, and bureaucratic procedures to guarantee the security of their citizens, and at what cost to domestic ideals and international standing? Today’s fearful political scene calls for research into how the mix of advanced security technologies and practices will affect the sense of belonging of those selected for enhanced scrutiny.
All of this suggests a need to incorporate national security concerns, political opportunity structures, international relations, and integration into our research. The scholarly urge to throw sunlight on humane practices in the field, however, poses certain dangers. There are obvious benefits to 'flying under the radar' in panicky times. Our research will reveal the complexity of the current situation in which nation states, irretrievably committed to global commerce and migration, must show that they are also committed to the wellbeing of their own citizens. The decisions now on the table are unprecedented, and there are political pitfalls and real dangers.

The issues that some of us have studied at a manageable small scale have all taken on a new breadth and urgency. This change is likely to be permanent, or at least long lasting. There are real benefits to bringing a bit closer to our own work current public concerns, including concerns that we rightly deem unreasonable. We have the opportunity to influence how students and others will frame their view of the migration and citizenship of feared "others."

In short, life in the Section on Migration and Citizenship promises to be interesting for the foreseeable future. Your officers are doing their best to help the Section move forward. We will be navigating new presentation formats this next meeting, but we intend to maintain the traditions that we have established—awards to highlight and recognize excellent scholarship in our field, good communication of opportunities for employment and conferences, shared syllabi, and a killer reception after the business meeting that is ideal for networking.

The challenges this year will be to bring off an excellent program with a new APSA-initiated program format, to perhaps initiate a new website independent from APSA’s less-than-stellar version, to keep our momentum and increase our membership, to publish our excellent journal-like newsletter, and to manage new issues that arise in promoting this Section within the profession and the world.

To accomplish all this, we welcome our new officers: co-president Kamal Sadiq, treasurer David Plotke, program coordinators Sara Goodman and Anna Law and council members Audie Klotz, Natalie Masuoka, Shyam Sriman. Many thanks to those who are rotating off their duties: co-program chairs Elizabeth Cohn and Daniel Tichenor, co-president Rogers Smith, treasurer Tom Wong, council members Joseph Cobetto, Alexandra Filindra, and Monica Varsanyi. Huge thanks also to all who served on awards committees. Onward!

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Letter from the Editor

The idea of the APSA Migration and Citizenship newsletter has always been to also feature methodological discussions besides debates on specific themes such as gender and migration (issue 2-1) or current events such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris (issue 3-2). We already had symposiums on policy index construction (issue 1-2) and interpretive methods (3-1).

For this issue I invited Claire Adida from UC San Diego to organize a symposium on survey experiments in the migration fields. Experiments have become a very popular methodology in political science over the last decade—especially in surveys but also in labs and the field. This new hype has also been criticized as not all topics in political science allow experimental manipulation, and the limitations of experiments are often ignored. And sometimes researchers are so eager to run an experiment that answers are given to questions nobody asked.

A recent study that has been published in the journal Psychology (2015, no.6) found out (in what the authors call a playful study) that a randomized group of students who were asked to drink sauerkraut juice supported right-wing and xenophobic statements more often than students who drank a glass of Nestea or nothing at all. The effect is called “moral self-licensing”—if you do something moral you can then do something immoral. That there are more important factors to understand attitudes towards migrants and related issues becomes evident in the various contributions to our symposium. As Claire Adida argues and the contributions convincingly show, the field of migrations lends itself particularly well to experimental research.

In further contributions Alexandra Filindra discusses the recent refugee and European governance crisis. Bridget Anderson and Emma Newcombe present their Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS). Finally, the news section features again information on the latest book and journal publications, as well as member news. A very big thank to everybody who contributed to this issue, especially to Helga Nützel for her assistance. To continue the high quality and range of contributions we rely on your ideas and contributions. If you have any suggestions for the various sections of the newsletter, please contact me.

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Introduction
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One of the most compelling critiques of the experimental fad that has overtaken the political science discipline over the past few decades is that not all questions lend themselves to experimental manipulation. In political science in particular, many of the most interesting questions cannot or should not be studied experimentally. The variables we study as political scientists – conflict, institutions, ethnicity... – are not easily manipulated and even if we could manipulate them, we may not want to for obvious ethical reasons.

I would like to propose that the study of immigrant integration is particularly well-suited for experimental methods and with this symposium, showcase the contributions made by scholars relying on one particular experimental method: the survey experiment. In an effort to highlight a diversity of topics and approaches, I have asked five scholars – some junior and others more senior, some researching ethnic and immigrant integration in the United States and others researching these questions in Europe – to share some of the insights they have gained on immigrant and ethnic integration through the use of experimental methods. The diversity of scholars and approaches will be apparent in the articles that follow, but three common lessons emerge from these articles.

The study of immigrant integration lends itself particularly well to experimental methods
Understanding the conditions that facilitate or exacerbate immigrant integration is a critical research, policy, and basic human-rights endeavor. Yet the inferential challenges this question presents are intimidating for at least two reasons. First, as Efrén Pérez, Maria Sobolewska et al, and Alex Street highlight in their contributions, selection biases mar our ability to identify the conditions that might cause greater or lower immigrant integration. These selection biases characterize the immigration process in at least three different ways: who immigrates, how, and where to. If we aim to identify whether religion has a causal effect on immigrant integration, for example, comparing the experience of Lebanese Christians to that of Lebanese Muslims in Western host soci-
eties cannot bring us closer to an answer (Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2016, chapter 3). The bulk of Lebanese emigration occurred during the Lebanese civil war, which differentially affected its Christian and Muslim populations. Furthermore, Lebanese Christian immigration to the West long preceded Lebanese Muslim immigration, meaning that Christian Lebanese immigrants have an entire Maronite network they can leverage when choosing where and how to settle. Here, the identity, timing, and manner of immigration confound our ability to say anything about the role religion might play for immigrant integration. Scholars who study race and ethnicity know these challenges all too well. As Sen and Wasow eloquently put it in the context of studying race, “everything is post-treatment.” (Sen and Wasow 2014). The same can be said of immigrant integration.

Second, as Rachel Gillum and Vincent Tiberj emphasize in their contributions, the question of immigrant integration itself is a sensitive topic, both for host society respondents trying to say and do the politically correct thing (Tiberj) and for immigrants themselves trying to protect their often-vulnerable positions (Gillum). Survey experiments offer a solution to this type of response bias by making the politically-correct response, and the topic of investigation, much less obvious to the respondent.

Survey experiments offer a relatively inexpensive way to marry internal and external validity
A (valid) critique of experimental methods is that – for all the fuss we make over securing internal validity – they lack external validity. So we may have causally identified the effect of X on Y for a group of 40 students invited to play games on a computer, but what does this say about real-world phenomena where decisions are made by a diverse population experiencing a multitude of stimuli? To be fair, experimental methods are now much more sophisticated than this example suggests, with more representative samples exposed to more realistic cues in more natural settings. But these types of interventions typically require large amounts of money. If finding the right empirical strategy is a tanglema between external validity, internal validity, and affordability, then survey experiments offer perhaps the optimal solution. As Alex Street explains, the “survey” part gets you better external validity, the “experiment” part gets you closer to internal validity, and thanks to technology, it is now “easier than ever to embed experiments in surveys.” No wonder, then, that survey experiments have become so appealing to so many graduate students.

We can make survey experimental research better
In their critique of the survey experimental methodology, Barabas and Jerit (2010) demonstrate significant attenuation of effects between survey and real-world results. This compelling cautionary tale suggests that we can and should improve upon survey experimental research if we want to speak to complex real-world phenomena such as immigrant integration. The articles in this symposium illustrate two ways forward:

(1) By digging deeper into conditional effects. This is not a popular suggestion among experimental purists, because heterogeneous treatment effects – as Alex Street warns – often take us away from the experimental world of causal inference and bring us back into the observational world of correlation. So, when Efren Pérez shows us that it is the high-Latino identifiers who respond most strongly to xenophobic rhetoric; when Vincent Tiberj explores differential prejudicial attitudes among cultural progressives and conservatives; when Rachel Gillum points out divergent attitudes toward the police between US-born and foreign-born Mus-
lins; when Alex Street compares preferences for political candidates with typically immigrant names between respondents who express feeling more or less threatened by immigration, we should be careful not to interpret these patterns in a causal manner.

Instead, we should use these results to illuminate our understanding of how and why immigrant integration occurs, in other words, of the mechanisms at play. Rachel Gillum’s finding that US-born Muslims are significantly more distrusting of the police than are foreign-born Muslims should direct us to seek a better understanding of the conditions and experiences Muslim immigrants face within the United States. Vincent Tiberj’s result that cultural conservatives consistently blame minorities for their predicament while cultural progressives consistently blame society should shed light on the kinds of rhetorical frames most likely to appeal to various audiences. The same holds true for Efrén Pérez’s finding that, in response to xenophobic rhetoric, high-identifying Latinos display greater ethnocentrism than do low-identifying Latinos. In all these cases, heterogeneous effects help steer the questions and conversation more precisely toward how and why immigrant integration or exclusion occurs.

(2) By improving upon the classic survey experimental method. Maria Sobolewska and her co-authors, building on work by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) and Hainmueller et al. (2015), discuss and demonstrate just how well-suited conjoint survey experiments are to studying a phenomenon as complex as immigrant integration. Relying on a method that enables researchers to incorporate various operationalizations of a multi-dimensional concept, Sobolewska et al. bring our empirical investigations closer to our theoretical understanding of immigrant integration. By doing so, they also address the Barabas and Jerit critique that survey experiments often deal with a single cue when the real world typically bombards us with multiple stimuli at once. Relatedly, Rachel Gillum and Alex Street improve upon the well-known limitations of survey experiments by combining them with other empirical approaches (interviews, cross-sectional data analysis) that bolster their findings and enrich our understanding of a complex and sensitive phenomenon.

Not all political science questions lend themselves to experimental investigation. But, as the articles that follow make clear, our understanding of immigrant integration and exclusion has benefited greatly from the survey experimental method, and stands to benefit more as we improve upon it.

References
Understanding Muslim-American Views towards U.S. Law Enforcement: Why Greater Integration Can Lead to Expectations for Unfair Treatment

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Over the past year, there has been no shortage of news coverage about U.S. law enforcement’s relationship with minority communities and the fairness of the American criminal justice system. While recent media events have largely focused on the tensions between poor African American communities and police forces, another community that continues to experience extraordinary attention from American law enforcement is the largely immigrant Muslim American community.

Much of my research examines Muslims’ attitudes towards U.S. law enforcement in the post 9/11 security environment. Understanding attitudes about the fairness of the justice system is critical, as such views are known to color residents’ perceptions of much of the rest of the political system (Lind and Tyler 1988). Police interactions with immigrants might be particularly impactful on their views, given their relatively minimal experience with the government as newcomers, and because exchanges with law enforcement are as close as many come into contact with government.

In addressing the central theme of this symposium—how experimental methods can improve our knowledge on topics of migration, ethnicity, and citizenship—I explain how a randomized survey experiment allowed me to gain a clearer understanding of what segments, and under what conditions, the Muslim American community feels that American law enforcement behaves fairly. The findings of the experiment reveal when Muslims’ attitudes differ from non-Muslims, and provide insight into why and how they change across immigrant generations.

Policing Minority Communities

Given the “securitization” of the Muslim American community in the post 9/11 environment, I was surprised to learn that very little social science research had systematically explored Muslims’ perspectives and expectations of U.S. law enforcement.1 While political science has relatively little to say about attitudes towards law enforcement, a handful of studies have noted that American racial and ethnic minorities tend to be less trustful towards police than whites, and that this distrust only increases in later generations (Michelson 2003; Portes 1980; Correia 2010). The literature is mixed and somewhat unclear on what is driving the wedge between attitudes of ethnic minorities and whites, and what explains differences across immigrant generations. However, scholars largely suggest that negative interactions

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with the police reduce overall trust in law enforcement.

While the explanation of direct negative interactions reducing trust undoubtedly rang true in my in-depth interviews with hundreds of Muslims around the United States, it was also clear that many Muslims believed that context could shape whether U.S. law enforcement behaved fairly. Even among individuals who had no direct interactions with the police, many appeared to have internalized the scrutiny targeted at the Muslim community and were increasingly sensitive towards discussing police interactions with other Muslim Americans.

**Muslim American Police Interactions in Post 9/11 Environment**

While many police departments and law enforcement agencies continue to work hard to build sincere relationships with the Muslim-American community, a series of security policies targeting Muslims—particularly immigrants—were put in place in the chaotic aftermath of 9/11 that have stuck a lasting fear across various segments of the community. An example of such a policy is the 2002 “special registration” program where immigration authorities registered, fingerprinted, photographed, and questioned male foreign nationals from countries that the U.S. identified as supporting terrorism or harboring terrorist groups. Including a companion effort at U.S. airports and other U.S. ports of entry, over 175,000 men from countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, and Syria among others, voluntarily went through the program. Beyond the 150 or so who were found to have committed crimes in the United States, nearly 14,000 of these individuals were shocked to learn that they were to be put into deportation proceedings. Many of the affected friends and family members felt their loved ones were unfairly swept up in post 9/11 chaos, concluding that it was better for Muslims to avoid contact with the government if possible.

While the special registration program openly targeted Muslim immigrant communities, perhaps most disturbing to Muslims I spoke with were secret law enforcement activities. Uncovered in 2013, the most widely discussed of such programs was the New York Police Department’s unprecedented collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency. The special NYPD spying unit infiltrated Muslim student groups, put informants in mosques, monitored sermons and dispatched teams of undercover officers into ethnic neighborhoods, even when there was no evidence of wrongdoing. Normally such a program would be considered a violation of American civil liberties; however, the NYPD was able to throw out a federal court order that previously limited intelligence-gathering tactics in order to preemptively detect any plots before they occur. The NYPD even went beyond its jurisdiction of New York to spy on Muslims in neighboring states, and a group of Muslims have filed suit against the department.

Even though since its creation in 2007 the NYPD acknowledged that the program did not lead to any terrorism investigations, the program solidified concerns in Muslim communities that they were being unfairly targeted and that one did not have to be a criminal to become the subject of an investigation—innocuous acts, or merely your identity, could make you a suspect. Such events also reinforced a view that the U.S. government and its monitoring of Muslims was omnipresent. With some Muslims feeling they had little recourse against such federal spying, many Muslims I spoke with cautiously framed their beliefs about the government and law enforcement, trying not to sound overly critical in an effort to avoid unwanted attention on themselves or their community. In fact, when answering my question
about his beliefs of the FBI’s monitoring Muslim community members, one interviewee assured me that the FBI was listening to our phone conversation right then, and thus he would temper his words about how the FBI might target one group more than another.

The Experiment

While qualitative research is invaluable to understanding Muslim American views towards law enforcement, to better identify how context shapes Muslim attitudes, I employ a randomized survey experiment to measure whether the Muslim community believes that police treat Muslims systematically differently than non-Muslims, or instead whether distrust in police is systemic and not necessarily related to one’s identity as a Muslim. While a seemingly simple distinction, identifying it has significant implications for how Muslims interpret police actions, and why we might observe a gap in the levels of trust in police between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The survey experiment was administered as part of a larger online political survey I designed for a national sample of Muslims through YouGov. YouGov administered the survey to individuals living around the United States from a sample of millions of Americans who had previously been surveyed and had identified themselves as Muslim. This allowed me to target those who had independently self-identified as Muslims. This feature was key to my study design because the participants did not know they were given the survey because of their religious affiliation. The bulk of the survey made no mention of Islam, and respondents were only asked about their religious beliefs at the end of the survey. This limits the degree to which individuals may either refuse to engage in the survey due to suspicion, or might respond to certain questions in a way that aims to provide a particular representation of themselves or of Muslims. Respondents instead believed they were answering a run-of-the-mill survey targeted at Americans about the government and various policies.

To assess American Muslims’ expectations of U.S. law enforcement in a day to day interaction, respondents answered a series of questions after reading a theoretical criminal investigation about a suspect preparing to commit a major crime. Subjects are told, “The police have received an anonymous tip that a 23-year-old American citizen, a man without a criminal record, is planning to commit a major crime.” Half of the respondents are randomly assigned to read this vignette about a criminal suspect named Jake Lewis, while the other half read an identical vignette differentiated only in that the criminal suspect is named Umar Sayyid.

The idea behind randomly varying the name of the suspect is to prime respondents to think about police interactions with different types of Americans. In the “Umar Sayyid” condition, I wanted to prime respondents’ underlying expectations about police interactions with Muslim Americans, whereas the “Jake Lewis” condition aimed to prime respondents’ underlying beliefs about police interactions with non-Muslim Americans. (Indeed, post-treatment checks confirmed that well over 90 percent of respondents assumed that Umar was Muslim and Jake was non-Muslim. Nearly all respondents assumed Jake was Christian.) I chose not to explicitly state the religious affiliation of the suspect to avoid signaling to the respondent that the religion of the suspect should be relevant to the scenario. I wanted to see if respondents would react to the perceived religious identity of the suspect on their own, without prompting.

After reading the vignette, respondents are asked about their expectations of police fair-
ness. Specifically, respondents were asked, “Generally speaking, do you think U.S. law enforcement will treat this person fairly?” Respondents were able to express the degree to which they agreed or disagreed on a seven-point scale. By randomly varying the religious identity of the criminal suspect in the scenario, we are able to determine whether and how the identity of the target influences respondents’ expectations for how police will behave. The design allows me to observe whether Muslims on average expect Muslims and non-Muslims to be treated differently by police, without forcing respondents to individually say so—something that during the course of my in-depth interviews many Muslims were hesitant to do. I administered this same experiment to a nationally representative sample of Latinos through YouGov, as well as to a sample of U.S. residents through MTurk.

The Findings
Consistent with other research on racial minority views towards police, a first cut of the data reveals that Muslim American respondents expect police to treat Muslim suspects less fairly than non-Muslims in identical situations. Specifically, Muslim respondents are 13 percentage points less likely to think that the police would treat Umar fairly compared to Jake. This was a statistically significant difference that confirms my suspicion as a researcher that while Muslim interviewees were somewhat hesitant to openly criticize the police, on average, Muslim Americans expect police to behave differently towards Muslims.

Cutting the data a bit more, major differences appear in how first and later generation Muslims assess the police. The entire treatment effect—or the difference in how fairly respondents think police will behave towards Jake vs. Umar—occurred among Muslims born in the United States. Put another way, U.S.-born Muslims anticipate that the police will behave significantly less fairly towards the Muslim suspect, while foreign-born Muslims do not. U.S.-born Muslims are 20 percentage points less likely to believe Umar will be treated fairly compared to Jake, a statistically and substantively large difference. Foreign-born Muslims however do not express significantly diverging views of how they expect Umar to be treated compared Jake.

Now why would U.S.-born Muslims be more sensitive towards police treatment of fellow Muslims? In short, I argue that levels of integration is one explanation. With greater integration—or as Muslims become more similar to other Americans through time, experience, and across generations—Muslims also become more familiar with the American system and American norms. This heightened American cultural sensibility that comes with integration is precisely what enables native-born Muslim-Americans to first recognize significant group cleavages in society, and secondly recognize when the government treats some groups differently than others. Compared to newcomers, better-integrated individuals have an enhanced ability to identify when there is a stigma attached to one group, but not another. U.S.-born Muslims, being raised in the same schools with the same knowledge of their constitutional protections and high expectations for fairness and equality under U.S. law, are far more sensitive to mistreatment towards Muslims.

Foreign-born Muslims on the other hand appear to be less sensitive to the stigma attached to Muslims in the United States. It was clear in my interviews that while foreign-born Muslims recognized certain police behavior as harsh, it was U.S.-born Muslims who had the historical context of other racial and ethnic groups in American society and knowledge of what police behavior “should” look like to articulate that
Muslims were experiencing less than standard circumstances.

In fact, in looking at the Jake condition alone, the data show that U.S.-born Muslims have identical expectations for how the police will treat Jake as the Latino, black, and white non-Muslim respondents that I surveyed. This suggests that Muslims do not inherently or fundamentally distrust the American law enforcement apparatus overall. But with a greater understanding of the American landscape than foreign-born Muslims, U.S.-born Muslims are more likely to recognize that Muslims on average could be treated better and hold law enforcement officers to higher standards.

Foreign-born Muslims, while not assessing police behavior through the lens of the identity of the suspect, viewed the police through the lens of their home country. Specifically, I found that immigrants’ beliefs about how fair the police would behave towards both suspects was significantly correlated to the fairness of law enforcement in their country of origin. That is, those coming from societies with fair, non-corrupt government agencies and institutions bring to the United States beliefs that police will similarly behave fairly towards all Americans. But with more time and experience in the United States, especially among those who came to the United States at a younger age, foreign-born Muslims’ attitudes become more negative, and look more like U.S.-born Muslims by the time they have naturalized.

Conclusion
The methodological design of this study contributes to our understanding of why attitudes towards law enforcement change across generations of immigrants, specifically those who are racial and ethnic minorities. The extant literature, largely focusing on the experience of Latinos, observes that trust in government declines over successive generations due to increased awareness of injustice (Michaelson 2003; Correia 2010). The design of this study more clearly identifies that what appears to change across generations is an increased awareness of group-based injustices. While general trust in police is not significantly different among Muslims (both foreign and U.S.-born) and non-Muslims, U.S.-born Muslims are more likely to recognize and have internalized the differential treatment of their fellow Muslims by U.S. law enforcement. This affects their interpretation and expectations of seemingly innocuous interactions between police and Muslim criminal suspects.

In addition to improving internal validity, using a subtler prime in this survey experiment offers a slightly harder test for determining whether Muslims, without explicit prompting, view religious identity as an important factor to be considered in analyzing police interactions. In the context of an interview about Muslims’ relationship with the U.S. government, respondents may be more prone to focus on how religion plays into interactions with the government, even if it is not normally something toward which they are particularly sensitive.

Secondly, the design of this study is a potentially useful way to capture more honest sentiments towards delicate issues. I learned over the course of my research that gauging feelings towards law enforcement among Muslim interviewees can be difficult with conventional survey questions, given the potential vulnerability that Muslims feel when discussing topics related to international and domestic security. This randomized survey design allows respondents to express views towards police without having to explicitly criticize the police for treating Muslims differently than non-Muslims.
As scholars continue to study the attitudes and experiences of migrant and ethnic minority communities in the West, coupling randomized survey experiments with qualitative data will provide a richer and clearer picture of their experiences and how attitudes are formed.

References

Self-Fulfilled Prophecy: How Elite Rhetoric Politicizes Immigrants and Their Co-Ethnics
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It is a stinging rebuke of immigrants in nations throughout the globe. Foreigners and their children seem to refuse, if not reject, the cultural mainstream of host societies. They keep to themselves, many say. They are untrusting of outsiders, complain others. And, they place far too much emphasis on their ethnicity and ethnic group. These charges are leveled so often one gets the impression that they are undisputedly true. But do immigrants hunker down because this is how they are? Or is their stance a reaction to the xenophobic rhetoric that often swirls around them? I study these questions in the context of U.S. Latino politics. Using a survey experiment, I illuminate why, when, and among whom xenophobic rhetoric has politicizing effects.

In a world without experiments, a positive correlation often emerges between anti-immigrant contexts and heightened political engagement within immigrant groups (Pantoja et al. 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003). But correlation is not the same thing as establishing that xenophobic rhetoric causes immigrants to become politicized, something a well-designed experiment can illuminate. Yet additional challenges block the path to a deeper understanding of xenophobic rhetoric’s political effects, challenges that can be resolved via experimentation. One of them is uncertainty over the concept of xenophobic rhetoric (Adcock and Collier 2001).
What about rhetoric makes it xenophobic, *per se*? Is rhetoric drawing attention to immigration by definition xenophobic—or does xenophobic rhetoric entail something stronger? If one can pin down the conceptualization of this key concept, then one can manipulate it and observe its effects.

Another challenge involves the psychology behind immigrant reactions to political contexts. We know that hostile climates can shift the political attitudes and behavior of some immigrant group members (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Ramírez and Fraga 2008; Merolla et al. 2013). But these “black box” findings neglect to clarify how individuals psychologically process such contexts. Immigrant group members vary by their strength of identification with co-ethnics (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Lien et al. 2004), as well as their acculturation level (Jiménez 2010; Branton 2007). Yet without more attention to micro-foundations, it is hard to pinpoint why this reaction assumes a specific character, when such a response arises, and who within immigrant groups react to xenophobic rhetoric.

I dissipate this fog by first developing a framework that explains xenophobic rhetoric’s politicizing effects on immigrants and their co-ethnics. Drawing on social identity and self-categorization theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987), I conceptualize xenophobic rhetoric as political communication that raises the salience of ethnic identity while devaluing its worth (Ellemers et al. 2002). When ethnic identity is threatened like this, I argue that individuals react politically based on how strongly they identify with their ethnic group (Ethier and Deaux 1994; Ellemers et al. 1997). High identifiers engage in political efforts that assert their identity’s worth by intensifying ingroup favoritism and ingroup pride (Branscombe et al. 1999; Leach et al. 2010). Low identifiers shun political opportunities to counter their group’s devaluation and sometimes dissociate from the ingroup (Doosje et al. 2002; Garcia Bedolla 2005).

I use this framework to illuminate why rhetoric about illegal immigration is xenophobic and how it politically galvanizes Latino immigrants and their co-ethnics. When politicians decry illegal immigration, my theory suggests they accomplish two things among Latinos. First, they increase the importance of ethnicity relative to other identities. That is, they encourage Latinos to think of themselves as ethnics, rather than as Democrats, Catholics, working class, etc. Second, this rhetoric impugns the worth of Latino identity. By homing in on a negative aspect (i.e., illegal immigration) of a larger group (Latinos), the high value that some Latinos place on their ethnicity is degraded. It is akin to focusing on welfare recipients when talking about African Americans or centering on terrorists in discussions of Muslims. Rhetoric like this jeopardizes the cachet of one’s group, yielding political effects that hinge on the strength of Latino identity, with high identifiers psychologically rescuing their group and low identifiers abandoning it.

The evidence for this comes from a nationally representative online survey of Latino adults that I commissioned in late 2011 through GfK (formerly Knowledge Networks) (Pérez 2015a and 2015b). The first part of my survey measured several opinions, including subjects’ strength of Latino identity. I did this by asking them to answer the statement: “Being Latino is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.” Insofar as one has a stronger level of Latino identity, one should disagree or strongly disagree with this statement. And, inasmuch as one has a weaker Latino identity, one should agree or strongly agree with this declaration.
Thus, high identifiers on this scale score "4" and "3," while low identifiers score "2" and "1."

Well after this, during the middle of the survey, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) a control group, where they received no information; 2) a non-xenophobic condition, where an unnamed Member of Congress drew attention to the issue of illegal immigration; and, 3) a xenophobic condition where the same lawmaker focused on illegal immigration and made negative allegations about illegal immigrants. This last condition is what should roil high identifying Latinos, while leading low identifying Latinos to politically forsake their group. In order to gauge this reaction, I had participants answer questions gauging their level of support for pro-group politics, political trust, and ethnocentrism.

Pro-group politics is a scale of three statements running from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4), including “Latinos should always vote for Latino candidates” and “Latino children should study and maintain the Spanish language” I measured political trust with a standard item reading “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?” Lastly, I gauged ethnocentrism by having subjects use a 0-100 feeling thermometer to rate Latinos, Blacks, and Whites (in random order). I then averaged subjects’ ratings of Blacks and Whites and subtracted them from subjects’ ratings of Latinos to obtain a relative of measure of ethnocentric thinking.

These outcomes allow me to show that xenophobic rhetoric rouses high identifying Latinos to express more group-centered opinions than they would in its absence. Figure 1 illustrates that when the politician in the non-xenophobic condition says that Congress should address illegal immigration, no reliable difference emerges between low and high identifiers as far as their support for pro-group politics measure is concerned. But when the politician says the exact same thing and makes negative allegations about illegal immigrants (i.e., “they take away American jobs, threaten U.S. culture, endanger national security”), high identifiers are reliably more supportive of such policies, as reflected in the gently upward sloping line.

\[ \Delta \text{Pro-Group/\Delta Identity} \]

\[ \text{Latino Identity} \]

\[ \text{A. Non-Xenophobic Condition} \]

\[ \text{B. Xenophobic Condition} \]

Xenophobic rhetoric also leads high identifiers to shrink away from political trust. Insofar as a perceived affront to one’s sense of Latino identity spurs a turn inward toward one’s ethnic group, we should find a distancing from mainstream society, as reflected by decreases in political trust: “the degree to which people perceive the government is producing outcomes
consistent with their expectations (Hetherington 2005: 9).” Political trust is lifeblood pulsing through democratic polities like the United States, nurturing cooperation between diverse constituencies and interests (Brewer 1999). Yet xenophobic rhetoric obstructs its flow.

Figure 2 shows that high identifying Latinos are much less likely to express political trust when exposed to xenophobia. In its wake, the likelihood of trusting government “most of the time” declines across higher levels of Latino identity, as seen in the downward trending line. Among low identifiers in the xenophobic condition, the likelihood of trusting government “most of the time” is 26 percent. Among high identifiers, the probability of displaying this attitude drops to 18 percent. This gap is reliable and contrasts with the pattern displayed by low and high identifiers in the other two conditions, where no trust gap emerges between high and low identifiers.

More troubling in some ways, xenophobic rhetoric also stimulates greater ethnocentrism among Latinos. As Kinder and Kam (2009: 31) explain: “To those given to ethnocentrism, in-groups are communities of virtue, trust, and cooperation, safe and superior havens. Out-groups...are not.” The signature mark of ethnocentrism is to favor one’s co-ethnics and view them favorably, a streak sometimes accompanied by hostility toward those outside one’s group. Figure 3 shows us that only in the wake of xenophobic rhetoric do high identifying Latinos express more ethnocentrism, while low identifiers express reliably less—a trend reflected in the fact that both effects are distinguishable from zero in this condition.

Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Immigration Rhetoric on Ethnocentrism by Latino Identity (with 90% confidence intervals)

This ethnocentric stance, however, is driven entirely by pro-Latino sentiment—which is to say, Latino favoritism is decoupled from any hostility toward those who are not Latino. Table 1 unpacks my relative measure of ethnocentrism into its component ratings. This lets me examine whether the affective charge behind Latinos’ ingroup favoritism spreads beyond it to stimulate anti-Black and anti-White hostility.
I find that neither of the latter occur. Although high identifying Latinos who are exposed to xenophobic rhetoric do become reliably and discernibly more pro-Latino, this favoritism yields trivial and statistically insignificant shifts in feelings toward Blacks and Whites. Thus, high identifying Latinos bolster their ingroup without dragging down outgroups.

Table 1. High Identifying Latinos: Ingroup Favoritism and Outgroup Derogation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latinos (0-100)</th>
<th>Whites (0-100)</th>
<th>Blacks (0-100)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ Group rating/</td>
<td>7.50*</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Xenophobic</td>
<td>(3.20)</td>
<td>(3.45)</td>
<td>(3.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhetoric</td>
<td></td>
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Notes: Entries are marginal effects of xenophobic rhetoric on individual group ratings, when Latino identity is at its highest. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates were produced by taking the original model for ethnocentrism and substituting single group ratings as the dependent variable (on a 0-100 range). Positive coefficients indicate greater favorability toward a group. Negative coefficients reflect greater unfavorability toward a group. *p < .05, one-tailed.

A second point worth further attention involves partisanship and its null moderating effects. My manipulation consists of a political figure making a political statement. This implies that my treatment should activate a political identity rather than its ethnic counterpart. Because subjects in my study reported their level of partisanship during their enrollment to GfK’s panel of respondents, I can test whether partisanship moderates the effect of xenophobic rhetoric on my dependent variables. This entails a statistical interaction between my treatments and levels of partisan identity alongside the interaction between my treatment and Latino identity that produced the results in the figures I have reported. Yet in no instance does partisanship moderate any of my treatments effects, as indicated by a battery of block tests on these interactions that cannot distinguish them from zero. It appears, then, that ethnicity really drives these patterns, not partisanship.

A third ancillary point is that levels of acculturation moderate the interaction between xenophobic rhetoric and Latino identity, where acculturation is measured by a scale consisting of immigrant generation and whether one usually speaks Spanish rather than English at home. This second-order interaction reveals that the effects of xenophobic rhetoric among high identifying Latinos are strongest among the foreign-born (first generation), present but weaker among their children (second generation), and dissipate among their grandchildren and great grandchildren (third generation or later). Thus, for example, high identifying Latinos who are the least acculturated express the most ethnocentrism: an effect that is absent among high identifying Latinos who are the most acculturated.

Together, all of these findings underline the point that politics can limit the incorporation of immigrant groups into America’s political and cultural mainstream. A popular ideal that the United States and other countries aspire to is having immigrants and their offspring assimilate, such that the relevance of ethnicity weakens for members of these groups (Alba and Nee 2003; Waters 1990). Within many immigrant groups, this process unfolds monotonically over time and across generations. Yet this linear trend toward assimilation is sometimes interrupted and segmented (Portes and Zhou 1993). The results discussed here illuminate such breaks in trends toward assimilation. In particular, they underscore the point that the assimilation of immigrant groups can be facilitated through politics—and, it can be made much more difficult just as well.
References
Survey experiments have long been a popular method for hypothesis testing in the area of public opinion. They offer great advantages over the usual, non-experimental forms of survey measurement. They overcome social desirability bias, causality problems in cross-sectional data and offer an unobtrusive measurement that can mimic a natural way of presenting information to respondents and engage similar cognitive processes of decision making that are engaged in real life, such as responding to visual cues (Mutz 2011). It is therefore not surprising that their use in the study of public opinion on immigration is wide-spread (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, 2004; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Harell et al., 2012; Iyengar et al., 2013). We argue that the growing popularity of more complex forms of survey experiments greatly adds to these established uses by enabling political scientists to more accurately study concepts that are poorly defined, or multifarious and hard to operationalize with typical survey questions or experiments. Immigrant integration is one of such concepts.

Immigrant integration has been studied relatively little by scholars of public opinion, and political science and sociological research has far from reached a consensus over its meaning and measurement. Indeed, its study has been characterized by limited, segmented and necessarily incremental contributions at best. Issues of statistical power, survey length and related costs all make it impossible to research more than two or three aspects of this complex concept at the same time. Examining relationships between the different facets of the concept, such as moderating mechanisms and interactions, is also difficult. These complications add to the existing and well known challenges of studying public opinion on contentious issues, such as social desirability bias. We will describe one particular method, long established in the field of market research, but recently brought to the attention of political scientists by Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), and show how this conjoint survey experiment can address measurement issues characteristic of a complex and contentious concept like immigrant integration. We will showcase how we adapted this method to our purposes and reflect on what we feel we gained by using this particular approach.

Integration: definitions, dimensionality and public opinion

Why is the issue of public opinion on immigrant integration particularly hard to study with the usual survey measurement, including standard survey experiments? It comes down to three challenges: (1) our understanding of what integration is presents problems and controversies; (2) the definitional difficulties result in inconsistency of measurement, especially problematic because research now hints at complex relationships between different areas of integration (which we call dimensions); (3) finally, in contrast to this contentious and multifarious nature of integration, public opinion measure-
ment of attitudes towards immigrant integration has been one-dimensional and limited. We will discuss these three obstacles before we offer a way of using the conjoint survey experiment method to tackle them.

In academia, defining what the word ‘integration’ means is a challenging task, primarily because the term is highly contested even though it is itself an improvement over another contentious term: immigrant assimilation. Assimilation has traditionally been used by Americanist scholars and implies that immigrants will progressively abandon distinctive cultural, religious, linguistic and social traits to fully assimilate into the societal mainstream (Park and Burgess 1969: 735 as cited in Alba and Nee 1997: 828). In contrast, the term ‘integration’, which is more widely used in the European context, emphasizes the role played by the institutions and majority group in the receiving society in the process of inclusion of migrant and ethnic minorities as well as the right of the latter to maintain their distinctive identities while respecting the fundamental norms of the host country (Castles and Miller 2009: 247). ‘Incorporation’ has also been adopted as a third, more neutral term (Hochschild 2013: chapter 1). Ultimately, all terms share a focus on the inclusion of ethnic and immigrant groups in the receiving society. However, they diverge in their implied mechanisms, expected outcomes, and in the role that the societal, political and institutional mainstreams play in this process (one-way or two-way process).

The difficulty in defining integration does not only relate to providing a clear and effective terminology, but also to describing how the integration process develops, as well as how it can be effectively measured and assessed: both in terms of measuring immigrant outcomes and their perceptions by the public.

Classical assimilation theory, for example, sees integration as a one-directional process through which successive immigrant generations are expected to fully and successfully assimilate into all spheres of the host society (Gordon 1964; Park and Burgess 1969). In recent decades, however, this one-directional and substantially one-dimensional view of integration has been questioned and uneven integration patterns were observed between the post-1965 waves of migrants and their descendents in the US and elsewhere.

Alba and Nee (1997; 2003) proposed a revised version of classical assimilation theory that emerged out of the messier world of empirical findings. This ‘new’ assimilation theory shares with its classic version the idea that there is a straight-line trajectory of acculturation that requires minorities to assimilate to the sociocultural mainstream. However, this theory refers to ‘boundary blurring’ rather than ‘boundary crossing’, where groups influence one another in a mutual exchange. Yet, success in achieving integration in one domain is still expected to translate into success in other domains, somehow recalling the original idea of straight-line assimilation (Bean et al. 2012).

Segmented assimilation theory, in contrast, takes a more serious account of the potential tensions between different dimensions of integration. Its main insight has been that while some immigrants and their children can experience linear assimilation into their host society, the departure from immigrant culture and traditions can be a risky integration outcome for others. Downward integration into the ‘underclass’ of the host society might happen when children take on mainstream culture and behaviors faster than their parents. Conversely, successful upward economic mobility can occur even as immigrants and their children keep their strong cultural attachment to their immi-
grant cultures and norms (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Indeed some regard the conservation of links with ethnic communities as beneficial and leading to upward mobility (Waters et al. 2010) and improved integration in some dimensions, such as politics (Bloemraad et al. 2008, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008).

Many empirical findings on integration outcomes imply that unsuccessful integration in some domains does not hinder (and in some cases might even favor) more successful integration in other domains (Balakrishnan and Hou 1999; Musterd 2003; Phillips 2007; Maxwell 2013). In recent work in the UK, Lessard-Phillips (2015) argues that within ethnic minority immigrant-origin populations, integration is not only multi-dimensional: specific clusters of integration outcomes exist, sometimes involving a cultural trade-off.

Against this growing complexity of scholarly understanding of integration, the research on public opinion on the issue of integration still focuses on the dichotomous and one-dimensional concept of integration. The existing literature primarily focuses on relative popularity of multicultural and assimilationist models of integration, usually offered as broadly sketched, pre-packaged alternatives with no possibility for overlap or interaction between the different dimensions of integration. This research suggests that host populations in most countries hold a strong preference for cultural assimilation over multiculturalism (Arends-Tóth and Vijver, 2003; Breugelmans and Van De Vijver, 2004; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, and Buunk, 1998).

This literature shows strong support for cultural and value assimilation and a rejection of the term ‘multiculturalism’ and policy packages associated with it. However, this research sheds no light on whether the public considers success in other dimensions of integration (political, social, or economic) as important or irrelevant. Does the public simply think of these dimensions as less important than, or incompatible with, cultural integration? Does it perceive the trade-offs between different dimensions of integration, as described in the scholarly literature? With at least four possible dimensions of integration that cluster in four different ways, and with each dimension potentially measured in various ways, just as inter-marriage, friendships and other relationships measure social contact for example, the traditional two-by-two or three-by-three experimental vignettes are insufficient for exploring this issue.

A survey experimental approach suited to complex and multidimensional phenomena

Given the mismatch between the conceptual complexity of integration and the empirical strategies we have employed to measure public opinion on it, more work is needed in this area. When we started designing a survey (generously funded by the British Academy grant no SG121823) of the British public’s perceptions of immigrant integration, we quickly discovered that even scales and indices would not be sufficient to capture the complex nature of what was to be asked of the public. Traditional survey experiments centered on variations in question wording and vignette experiments in which attributes of immigrants could be manipulated also came short of enabling us to examine perceptions of more than three dimensions of integration at once, or to see meaningful relationships between them. Another issue has been the lack of statistical power in a classic survey setting with just over a thousand respondents.

The main advantage of the conjoint experiment described by Hainmueller and colleagues
(2014) is that it allows a significant increase in statistical power as it moves from an individual respondent to their responses as a unit of analysis. These experiments rely on the same principle as traditional survey experiments: randomly manipulating elements of the survey question for each respondent to measure the impact of these changes. However, the analysis of conjoint survey experiments differs in a way that allows the number of these manipulations to increase significantly, thus making it possible to address more complex issues and phenomena like integration. This difference in analysis relies on multiple outcome variables from a single experiment. As the same randomly varied vignettes or questions are presented more than once to each respondent, each one will see a greater number of random combinations of attributes (although randomly generated identical variants have to be excluded). In our case each respondent was presented with multiple opportunities (within one experiment) to express their opinion about the integration level of immigrants, increasing the lines of data available for each individual respondent from one response per experiment to a much larger number. This design not only increases the statistical power of the experiment, it allows us to manipulate up to ten attributes in a single experiment (Hainmueller et al. 2014). This in turn makes it possible to explore the impact of up to two different measures of each of the four core dimensions of integration in a single experiment, and to study the interactions between them.

As an example, we designed an experiment based on a choice between three pairs of immigrants, which allows us to identify the relative impact of the immigrant’s attributes in the public’s evaluation of the immigrant’s level of integration. In this experiment, we present each respondent with six descriptions of an immigrant, in pairs of two, and ask the respondent to choose the immigrant they think is more integrated (Sobolewska, Galandini and Lessard-Phillips 2014; Lessard-Phillips, Sobolewska and Galandini 2015). As a result we have six outcome variables per respondent from a single experiment, which randomly varied the same nine measures of integration.2

This experiment varies four main dimensions of integration: social, cultural, economic and political/civic. In addition we test two measures per dimension (and in one instance, three): inter-marriage and inter-ethnic friendship for social integration; the language spoken at home and cultural norms on women’s place and religiosity for cultural integration (religiosity being important in the largely secular UK); white vs. blue-collar employment and tax status for economic integration; and citizenship status and voting for political/civic integration (non-citizens of Pakistani origin are entitled to vote in the UK). Such complexity of design would usually require many experimental questions with little hope to test their relative impact all at once and even less so the interactions between them.

Without revealing too many findings from our as-yet unpublished papers, we have found a number of interesting patterns about the public perception of immigrant integration. Primarily, we find that the general public understanding of integration is very complex and reflects the multidimensionality of the phenomenon: while the language spoken at home was overall the most important determinant of perceived inte-

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2 We have proposed a slight adjustment of the original method: instead of presenting attributes of immigrants in tables, we embedded attributes within a traditional vignette, thus losing the ability to randomly vary attribute order. Still, we prioritized making our measurement more unobtrusive and thus more in line with the classic vignette treatments. The vignette approach is particularly well suited to this type of measurement as it is thought to be relatively unobtrusive (Mutz 2011).
migration, the habit of voting also ranked very highly (Sobolewska et al. 2014). Secondly, the public’s perceptions mirror the trade-offs observed in real life immigrant integration (Maxwell 2013). Many respondents were trading off different dimensions of integration when choosing the most integrated profiles, with some respondents valuing political over cultural integration, and others prioritizing cultural rather than political integration instead (Lessard-Phillips et al. 2015). This shows that the public is more attuned to the complexity of the relationships between different integration outcomes and that while some may be demanding full integration on all dimensions; many are prepared to accept success in some areas even if others are lacking.

New experimental approaches such as conjoint analysis are better suited to tackling big questions, such as what is perceived as successful immigrant integration by the general public of the host countries. They allow us to go beyond the simple dichotomy of preference for multiculturalism or assimilationism and see a more complex world of how differential integration success in multiple areas is perceived and how well it matches the realities of integration for the immigrants themselves.

References


Among the big questions raised by migration are whether, and how, immigrants can become full participants in the politics of their new country. When the new homeland is a democracy this should, in principle, be possible. But immigrants, especially those from non-democratic regimes, may need extra opportunities to learn democratic habits and to acquire the resources that facilitate participation. For their part, native residents may resent and resist immigrant political power, due to prejudice or competition over resources. Studying these processes of learning, mobilization and counter-mobilization can provide insights not only into the effects of immigration, but also into the workings of democracy more broadly. Are today's democracies open to new democrats, with distinctive backgrounds and some fresh demands? Of course, there are many ways to tackle these questions. In this paper I shall argue

Studying Minority Politics with Survey Experiments and Election Data
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that combining survey experiments with parallel observational data on elections is a particularly promising approach.

Survey experiments make use of random assignment to treatment conditions, within a survey. For example, scholars may randomly split survey respondents into two groups, to test the effects of different question wording. Or the manipulation may be more complicated, with sub-sets of survey participants receiving different kinds of information, or having the chance to make a series of choices in different scenarios. In general the research subjects do not know that they are being sent down a certain track, nor that their responses will be compared with those of subjects on other tracks. Random assignment ensures that the effects of the manipulation are not confounded by other differences between research subjects. In addition, using data from a broad sample of the population, rather than a convenience sample (e.g. undergraduates), may increase our confidence that the results from the experiment will also apply in the real world. In short, survey experiments aim for both internal and external validity.

The first survey experiments in political science required innovative computer programing to ensure that telephone interviewers shifted quietly from one experimental condition to another, without alerting the respondents (Sniderman 2011). Now, many surveys are conducted with computers, whether via computer-guided scripts on the phone, or, increasingly, via online surveys that can include not only variation in question wording but also other kinds of treatment such as images or videos. It is easier than ever to embed experiments in surveys. There is also a literature with advice on how to design such studies (Mutz 2011).

And yet, despite the advantages of survey experiments, and their growing popularity, there are limits to what this tool can do. Many of the theories that we wish to test cannot plausibly be studied by randomly varying the design of a survey. A survey cannot move you to a new country, or give you a different neighbor. In addition, the effects of the experiment are usually measured later in the same survey, raising the suspicion that any effects may be fleeting rather than durable (Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk 2007). Finally, while the sample of people in the survey may be representative of the wider population, the context in which the experiment is conducted is not naturalistic—the research subjects are taking a survey, not engaging in real political debates or casting actual votes. This raises doubts about external validity (Barabas and Jerit 2010).

I propose that one way to mitigate concerns about external validity with survey experiments is to match the experimental data with parallel observational data. There are many opportunities for this approach when studying elections, since official election returns are readily available. Scholars can easily gather data on races that involve different sets of candidates, running for offices in different branches and at different levels of government, and seeking the support of varied electorates. As a result, there are opportunities to match experimental treatments with real-world variation in a similar set of causal factors. In the rest of this paper I describe one such study that I conducted (Street 2014).

The survey data: hypothetical candidates in German elections

Germany is home to a growing immigrant population. Although citizenship laws have long been restrictive, the immigrant-origin share of the electorate is rising, to around 10 percent of
the state and federal electorate. Belatedly, German political parties are courting migrants as voters. Growing numbers of immigrants and their offspring are also running for office, especially for parties on the left, although migrants remain under-represented compared to their share of the population (Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert 2011).

Despite these changes, there are reasons to expect that immigrant-origin political candidates face barriers. Considerable numbers of German voters express negative attitudes toward immigrants, especially stigmatized groups such as Muslims (Heitmeyer 2012). One might expect voters with prejudice against immigrant minorities, or those who feel threatened by minorities, to vote against political candidates with names suggesting an immigrant background. Such group-level attitudes could translate into a penalty for particular candidates.

Besides the attitudinal mechanism, it is also possible that German voters stereotype immigrant candidates, by assuming they belong on the political left. There is some evidence that migrant voters in Germany lean left (Wüst 2011b), and the great majority of immigrant-origin political candidates run for the Greens, the Social Democrats or the Left Party (Wüst 2011a; Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert 2013). Thus the inference that immigrant-origin candidates lean left may be accurate on average, but it is still an act of stereotyping to assume that it applies in any single case. This kind of stereotyping has been shown to affect support for women in US politics, who are assumed to be liberal, even compared to other candidates from the same party (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; McDermott 1997). In the case of immigrant-origin candidates in Germany, such stereotyping is likely to bring benefits from voters on the left, but a penalty from those on the right.

A survey experiment provides opportunities to test for evidence of such mechanisms at work. Since surveys gather many pieces of information on each respondent, it is possible to compare experimental effects among sub-sets of survey participants. In this case, people surveyed shortly after the 2009 German federal elections were randomly assigned to be given information on hypothetical candidates for the federal parliament (Bundestag) with either typically German or typically Turkish names, and were then asked whether they could imagine voting for them, and which political party they thought would propose such candidates. Native Germans were eight percentage points less likely to say that they would vote for otherwise identical Turkish-named candidates (significant at p=0.02).

In an earlier round of the survey, the same respondents were asked about their social and political attitudes, including questions that measure feeling threatened by immigrants. This allowed me to compare responses to the experimental treatment among people who were and weren’t threatened by immigrants, to test the attitudinal mechanism. I was also able to test whether German voters stereotype candidates with immigrant names as belonging on the left. These comparisons suggest that both of

3 The share is higher in cities such as Berlin, Hamburg or Bremen. The number eligible to participate in local elections is also higher, since EU citizens can vote.

4 Both candidate name and gender were randomized, yielding four candidates: Anna Kramer, Andreas Kramer, Ayla Celik, and Ali Celik (the latter two are the typically Turkish names). This experiment was designed by Dr. Ina Bieber and Prof. Dr. Sigrid Roßteutscher, as part of the 2009 German Longitudinal Election Study.

5 I used a measure of agreeing or disagreeing with the statement, “The many Muslims here sometimes make me feel like a stranger in my own country,” and obtained similar results with the statements “There are too many immigrants in Germany” and “Muslims should be banned from migrating to Germany.”
the mechanisms were at work.\textsuperscript{6} Support for the Turkish-named candidates was 20 percent lower among those threatened by migrants. German voters were also more likely to guess that the Turkish-named candidates would run for parties on the left, and right-leaning voters were about 20 percent less likely to support such candidates. The results also suggest overlapping effects, since most of the people who expressed resentment or negative attitudes toward minority groups identified with parties on the right.

While these findings on the mechanisms of discrimination were in line with theoretical predictions, they had somewhat surprising implications for actual elections. Since immigrant-origin candidates run mainly on the left, and the people inclined to penalize such voters are mainly to be found on the right, the direct effects of electoral discrimination should be limited.

\textbf{The observational data: election returns and candidate names}

In order to test this prediction of “representation despite discrimination,” I turned to election data. Specifically, I merged district results for the federal elections of 2005 and 2009 with data on candidate names. The lists of candidate names were coded to identify people with names that indicated membership of stigmatized groups in Germany: those from predominantly Muslim parts of the world, as well as the former Yugoslavia and Africa (in line with the groups identified in Alba, Schmidt and Wasmer 2003).\textsuperscript{7} The electoral data matched the survey data, since in each case the key cue to the voter was the candidate’s name. Other observational data also suggests that candidate names are relevant. For example, the Turkish-origin politician Ekin Deligöz reports that other Green party members initially had reservations. “There were people who said: not with a migrant name” (quoted in Jenkner 2007).

For the analysis of the electoral data, I took further steps to avoid confounding. The districts where candidates with non-German names were nominated differed from those where this did not happen; for instance the share of foreign residents in the local population was 50 percent higher on average. Rather than simply comparing across districts, I therefore studied over-time variation in the support for candidates from a given party, within each district. I estimated the effect of changing from a German-named candidate in one election to a candidate with a name suggesting an immigrant background in the subsequent election, while also including controls to account for overall swings in support for the main political parties across the two elections. The results were consistent with the predictions based on the experiment: migrant candidates ran exclusively on the left, and there was no evidence that they received a lower vote share than German-named candidates for the same party, in the same district, and in the previous election.

Returning to the question of whether the rapidly diversifying democracies of Western Europe and North America are open to new democrats, these findings suggest that the prospects are mixed. Immigrant-origin candidates may be able to avoid some of the direct effects of voter discrimination, but only as long as their ambi-

\textsuperscript{6} One should be careful when interpreting experimental effects among sub-sets of the survey population. There may also be other factors at work that distinguish the people in each group. Since group membership (e.g. feeling threatened by immigrants) was not experimentally manipulated, the experimental design does not guarantee a causal interpretation of variation across groups of survey respondents.

\textsuperscript{7} To ensure reliability, I confirmed that my coding was similar to that of two other scholars of German politics.
tions are limited. At the highest level, such candidates must appeal to a broad electorate, and this will be difficult even if voter discrimination is concentrated in certain sectors of the electorate.

**Conclusion**

Political scientists studying migration and citizenship commonly turn to survey experiments to test competing theories (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Pérez 2015). It is now easy to embed experiments within surveys, and scholars should continue to do so. But survey experiments have limitations, especially with regard to external validity. We may be able to make faster progress by deliberately matching survey experiments with parallel observational data. This strategy is especially promising in research on voters and candidates, since election results are readily available for a wide range of contests. Broadly, scholars can gather election data, design surveys with outcome measures that parallel the choices that voters face when completing the ballot, and use randomization within the survey to test their theories.

I have described research on the effects of voter discrimination. Another option, especially relevant in countries with high levels of residential segregation, would be to use a similar approach to study positive preferences for (co-ethnic) minority candidates. In addition to measuring aggregate electoral effects, survey experiments could test potential mechanisms, such as a preference for descriptive representation, or a belief that one’s substantive interests are better represented by a co-ethnic. Alternatively, scholars who suspect that mixed aggregate outcomes are due to offsetting effects in different sub-sets of the electorate could use survey experiments to test this idea, to see whether the experimental effects are consistent with the observed election results. Yet another strategy would be to pair natural experiments with survey experiments. For example, Abrajano, Nagler and Alvarez (2005) focus on actual races in which candidate ethnicity and ideology were crossed. The authors might have learned even more by using a survey experiment to study the kind of people whose support was swayed by these factors. In short, the survey experiment is a valuable tool, but those of us studying migration and citizenship should also keep the tools of observational research at hand.

**References**


Jenner, Carolin. 2007. „Türkischstämmige Politiker: Gefangene Ihrer Herkunft.“ [Turkish-Origin Politicians: Trapped by their Origins], *Der Spiegel*, July 12.


Social desirability bias is one of the most-documented biases in attitude surveys. Pollsters and academics know quite well that respondents are reluctant to declare certain opinions or behaviors, such as abstention from voting or votes for extreme right parties. This is even more salient when prejudice is concerned and particularly in recent years. As general levels of education increase, so does the capacity of respondents to decode what political scientists are looking for when they administer traditional survey questions. Some critics of mass surveys in France, following the path opened by Bourdieu, argue that if college-educated respondents appear to be more tolerant, it is only because they are better able to provide the acceptable answer (Lehingue 2011).

These concerns are particularly salient in the study of race relations. James Kuklinski and his colleagues (1997), for example, have demonstrated how answers about racial equality in the US cannot be taken at face value. Affirmative action creates much more animosity among the general public than what the traditional Q and A design can capture. To prove it, their experimental design is simple and smart: respondents are provided with two identical lists of issues, but one version of this list includes an “affirmative action” item. Respondents are randomly assigned to one or the other version of the list. They are then asked to count the number of issues that anger them. Evaluating the real level of anger produced by affirmative action is only a matter of subtraction.
This experimental design becomes particularly effective in the context of the evolving debates about immigration and integration in contemporary Europe. European polities are creating their own version of symbolic (Kinder and Sears 1981) or subtle racism (Pettigrew 1989), particularly vis-à-vis Muslims. As in the US, the time of biological racism is behind us. Since the beginning of the 2000s, only 8 to 14 percent of French believe that "some races are more gifted than others"; and those that do belong to cohorts born before the Second World War, at a time when such prejudice was considered common sense. But prejudice has not disappeared, it has mutated. First, racial hate has taken a cultural disguise (Taguieff 1987), and is now hidden behind mainstream values. A political observer from the 1980s would be quite surprised to see today extreme right parties struggling for gender equality (rhetorically), the freedom for women to dress as they want, or the freedom of speech of a leftist satirical newspaper such as Charlie Hebdo. These mainstream (and in France these Republican) values are frequently used to express and hide xenophobia and prejudice in Europe, in much the same way that opponents of affirmative action argue for "equal chance among candidates" in the US. Consequently, Islam becomes a very convenient source of opposition, much like race four decades ago and immigration more recently.

Overall, the normative mainstreaming of prejudice complicates the task of surveying public opinion. This growing trend, and the increasing capacity of respondents to decode survey questions, requires a more systematic use of experimental design. In order to make my point, I will present the results of two experiments. The first will demonstrate how experiments are superior to the traditional Q and A design in measuring prejudice. The second will address the interaction between mainstream principles and prejudice.

**Why experiments matter?**

In November 2005, France experienced 21 days of riots in deprived suburbs, resulting in the declaration of the state of emergency by President Chirac, a constitutional disposition previously only used once in 1961 during the war in Algeria. A month later, Sylvain Brouard and I had the opportunity to conduct a poll to investigate the perceptions of these events among the general population. These suburbs represented the accumulation of various disadvantages: urban relegation, social inequalities, a high level of immigration (often seen as Muslim immigration though this is more complex). Were these events and the inhabitants of these neighborhoods perceived through a social lens (a revolt of the poor, of the outsiders)? Or were they considered primarily as immigrants, and therefore as non-French, non-Catholic, or non-Like-us, resulting in "ethnic riots"? Some intellectuals such as Alain Finkielkraut, clearly disregarded the social reading of these events: he declared that these riots were a "revolt with an ethnic-religious characteristic" (Ha'aretz, November 17, 2005).

Two types of questions have been developed to sort out this issue. The first was constructed using the traditional Q and A design, the second was an experiment. In the first, respondents were asked successively whom to blame for unemployment: the unemployed themselves who do not put in enough effort to get a job, or society which offers no work opportunity. The same question in the same format was asked regarding more specifically the unemployment problem in the suburbs. In the second type of question, support for three public policies in support of specific groups was tested. For example, respondents were asked whether they will favor or oppose the state giving more mon-
ey to specific schools where some groups are present. These groups were randomly identified as “poor families”, “migrant families” or “suburban families” (the term “suburban” here refers to the “banlieues”, a term that has grown to describe disadvantaged and disenfranchised immigrant or immigrant-heritage communities on the outskirts of urban centers). A similar approach was used to evaluate support for an increase in welfare benefits for poor / migrant / suburban families and the allocation of social housing to poor / migrant / suburban families.

Figure 1. Society is Responsible for Providing Jobs (predicted probabilities)

Source: Suburb crisis survey, 2005 (co-principal investigators: S. Brouard and V. Tiberj)

The traditional Q and A design points to a false conclusion (see figure 1). The suburban unemployed seem to be treated as if they were “regular” unemployed, no more no less. No one can be accused of harboring a double-standard, since the two answers are strongly correlated (r= 0.56). Additionally, cultural conservative respondents8 consistently blame the unemployed for their predicament, while cultural progressive respondents blame society. But I interpret this result as response bias. Even if question order was randomized, respondents are likely inclined to answer consistently across questions, particularly if they want to hide their prejudicial attitudes against suburbs. This interpretation is validated thanks to the experimental design (see figure 2). In what follows, I present only the case of money for school, but the results for the two other policies are consistent.

Figure 2. Financial Support for School (predicted probability)

Source: Suburb crisis survey, 2005 (co-principal investigators: S. Brouard and V. Tiberj)

In addition to measuring public opinion toward suburbs, the experiment aims to accomplish several other objectives: how to frame social public policy to increase acceptance from a wider audience? To understand whether the French oppose such policies no matter the target group? To evaluate whether the French are ready to accept a French version of affirmative action? Clearly, respondents favor giving more money to schools in deprived areas (which is not so common in the reality of the French educational system): overall, 86 percent of respondents favor this in the “poor family” condition, 69 percent do in the “suburban family” condition, and 64 percent do in the “migrant family” condition. A strong majority of French support helping out those who try to help themselves.

8The level of cultural liberalism is measured with an attitudinal scale based on questions regarding gender roles, death penalty and authority and the number of immigrants. It ranges from 0 to 10; 0 means that the respondents have given a conservative answer to all questions, 10 means they have given systematically liberal ones.
But the experiment also provides us other conclusions. First, as is the case for the traditional type of question, support for any of the three policies depends on the respondent’s level of cultural liberalism. Cultural progressives are ready to help any disadvantaged group, whereas cultural conservatives are less supportive. Second, the level of support very much depends on the targeted group. Sixty percent of cultural conservatives are supportive when the targeted group is the “poor family”. This drops precipitously to 20 percent when the targeted group is the “immigrant family”. This clearly demonstrates that support for—or in this case opposition to—social public policy is fueled by racial prejudice. What about suburbs? Are they seen through a social or an ethnic lens?

Among cultural conservatives, variation in support for suburban families mirrors the pattern observed for immigrant families. This experiment reveals how the French perceive suburbs, a fact that would have been obscured by traditional survey question design. For all three policies, only the most cultural progressives treat all three groups equally; cultural conservatives strongly distinguish between social groups (the poor) and ethnic groups (immigrants and suburbs).

What lies behind the general principles
As I mentioned in the introduction, the debate about immigration and integration in France and Europe, has adopted a new disguise, notably the quasi-systematic reference to general principles supposed to define Western norms shared by entire host societies. The newcomers are either suspect regarding their commitment to these values or regularly asked to prove their commitment to these principles (see among others Joppke 2007). This can be with regard to acceptance of homosexuality, gender equality (for example in the Netherlands), or in France laïcité (secularization) or freedom of expression (though of a very different sort than in the USA) and various other Republican principles (for a presentation of their various implications in this country see Chabal 2015).

Advocating for or referring to general principles (even on pure rhetorical grounds) is in itself perfectly legitimate. But do ordinary citizens and politicians really reason as philosophers? Do they actually judge and opine using general principles or do they rely on these types of concepts to hide other motivations, such as prejudice? Do they apply the same rule of thumb to comparable situations or do they rationalize their positions in order to act in a more socially acceptable way? This is particularly important with regard to xenophobia. It is possible that behind the same denunciation of Islam as a gender conservative religion you can find either a cultural progressive genuinely concerned about gender equality or a cultural conservative who uses gender equality as a guise for their racist attitudes. The work of Sullivan, Marcus and Pierson (1982) on political tolerance has shown that Americans may seem committed to this principle in the abstract, but apply it selectively following their like or dislike of various political groups; they will deny the right to rally for an extreme-right group but will support this right for a group closer to their political leanings for example. Sniderman and Jackman (2002) have found the same in France regarding the right to rally, and I have discovered a comparable mechanism regarding freedom of expression. This experiment was in the field in 2006 (Tiberj 2008) but remains particularly relevant today in France, in the post-Charlie Hebdo world.

It tells the (fictional) story of a high school art teacher. He is presented to the respondent randomly as "French", “Magrebi” or “Black”. This teacher has drawn in class a caricature of Magrebi or Blacks if he was French, of Blacks or
French if he was Maghrebi, or of Maghrebi or French if he was Black. The school headmaster has suspended the teacher. Respondents are asked if they support the teacher or the headmaster. This experiment is a "test of principles": attachment to the freedom of expression (or to the neutrality of the school) is supposed to remain constant, whatever the characteristics of the teacher or the targeted group.

This not the case: the origins of the teacher weight a lot on the support he receives (whereas the caricatured group has only a marginal influence on the response). Overall, the teacher is supported by 49 percent of the respondents if he is French, 60 percent if he is Maghrebi and 78 percent if he is Black. Clearly, respondents are quite supportive of freedom of expression, even in schools. But this support is conditional on the ethnic description of the teacher. Additionally, the experiment tells a more interesting story when the level of cultural liberalism is taken into account (see figure 3).

The pattern for the two other cases, however, diverges. Support for the French teacher decreases with the level of cultural liberalism (from 61 percent among cultural conservatives to 44 percent among cultural progressives). But when the teacher is Maghrebi, we see the opposite phenomenon: support increases with cultural liberalism (from 47 to 67 percent). Commitment to this general principle of freedom of expression is undoubtedly situational. Clearly xenophobic prejudice fuels rejection of the Maghrebi teacher and support for the French teacher among cultural conservatives. But this double standard is also present among cultural liberals. They probably suspect the French teacher to be racist, and therefore condemn his behavior; on the other hand, they are highly supportive of the Maghrebi (and the Black) teacher, as if he were immune to racist motives.

Concluding remarks
Experimental designs have opened large avenues of research in mass surveys in the last two decades. Furthermore, experiments provide us with a dynamic explanation of prejudice, which are typically considered to be stable. They provide a better understanding of how frames reveal racial prejudice, and by doing so, they may provide insights into how to fight prejudice. For example, an experiment about the crisis in Syria can test the degree of acceptability of immigrants as compared to refugees. Combined with other forms of experiments, such as the ones proposed by game theory or field experiments, survey experiments give us a better understanding of the conditions under which minorities are accepted by host societies. Nevertheless, as experimental methods have proliferated, so have their fragmented and sometimes-contradictory set of results. Cumulation and comparability may be the next objectives of this research.
Syrian refugees that are crossing into Europe by the thousands and their inexorable movement north and west have exposed the fissures at every level of the European Union architecture in ways that go well beyond the management of migration. As Greek islands and many cities and localities across Europe transform into tent cities and makeshift refugee camps, conflicts about finances and identity have emerged at all levels of government. The outcome of this multi-level crisis is likely to have even more lasting effects than the economic crisis of recent years and to reshape the Union in more ways than one.

The EU system of migration governance rests on the Dublin regulations enacted in 2003 and tweaked in 2013. Dublin was designed primarily as a framework for irregular migration. It requires refugees and irregular entrants to apply for asylum and be fingerprinted at the country of entry. At that stage, the receiving country can issue registration documents pending full review of
the application which can take years. Registration enables individuals to travel within the European Union, or at least across Schengen countries that allow free movement of people across their borders. Individuals who fail to receive asylum are returned to their country of origin or to a safe country outside of the European Union.

The failure of the Dublin regulations which were temporarily suspended along with the Schengen agreement earlier this fall has led to a crisis of governance that is manifesting within states in conflicts between localities and national governments, across states in straining relations between neighbors, and between European institutions and member states testing the ideological and political foundations of the European Union.

Crisis of Governance within States

Greece which was already cited by Amnesty International for violation of human rights because of abusive administration of migration (Amnesty International 2010), has become the de facto point of entry for the majority of Syrian refugees. According to Greek authorities, 244,928 refugees and irregular migrants entered the country in the first eight months of 2015 - a 750% increase relative to 2014 (UNHR 2015). In the first three weeks of September, the Greek Island of Lesvos alone (population: 26,000) received 70,721 refugees and migrants. The stream of individuals and families crossing the Aegean on plastic rafts and walking hundreds of miles along the Anatolian coast, through the Balkans and through Central Europe is a phenomenon that Europe has not seen in two generations.

The daily arrival of thousands of refugees on Greek islands has exposed the weaknesses of the Dublin logic which envisioned an orderly, bureaucratized process of migration management. The islands have never been conceived as border control outposts and therefore island authorities are not equipped to handle the registration of refugees. Coordination, management, and capacity issues have meant that Athens has largely been incapable to provide resources to impacted islands, creating the first set of bottlenecks in the process. Refugees were forced to spend several days (sometimes weeks) in makeshift camps in city parks, beaches and harbors waiting for “papers.” Local and regional authorities lodged harsh complaints against the central government protesting its failure to provide expert support, policing, and money. As refugees were moved on dedicated ferries to the mainland, loud complaints about the anemic response of central authorities have been issued by the municipality of Athens.

### Timeline of the European Refugee Crisis

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| 9/23 | • €1 billion to aid organizations in transit countries such as Jordan, Turkey  
       • Council President Tusk criticizes German “open door” policy; countered by Commission President Juncker |
| 9/22 | • Germany threatens use of qualified majority voting; gets agreement on formula for allocation of 120,000 refugees |
| 9/19 | • Recriminations between Greece and Hungary  
       • Hungary to build fence on Croatia & Romania border |
| 9/17 | • Recriminations between Hungary and Croatia  
       • Croatian authorities scrambling to neutralize 50,000 mines on border with Serbia |
| 9/16 | • September the deadliest month of refugee crisis according to IOM  
       • Germany seeks agreement with Turkey to control human smuggling |
| 9/15 | • Suspension of Schengen by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia  
       • Poland rejects German allocation formula |
| 9/11 | • Merkel thanked by refugees after announcement that Germany will accept 800,000 refugees and suspension of Dublin II |
which also hosts several makeshift camps, one in a central square.

Although Greek localities are facing the most acute crisis because of the growing number of arrivals and their resource limitations, localities throughout the continent have been called on to accommodate the needs of increasing numbers of refugees. Improvisation is the name of the game as tent cities have sprung up from Hamburg to Paris to Berlin to Sicily. School gyms, churches, community centers, stadiums have been turned into reception and hosting centers for refugees, but makeshift tent cities have appeared practically everywhere during the summer months. As backlogs in processing of asylum applications mount while more refugees arrive every day, local and regional governments are taking on more responsibility and cost straining budgets and relationships with local societies.

Crisis of Governance at the inter-state & EU levels
The stream of refugees and resultant “domino effect” of border controls, have also caused interstate relationships to fray revealing fundamental political and ideological differences especially between East and West. Not without infighting, the leftist Syriza government in Greece abandoned the hardline border policies of its predecessors and suspended operation “Xenios Zeus” which included sweeps in Athens and major cities and inhumane detention of irregular migrants. Syriza adopted a laissez-faire approach to refugees: it left them to their own devices without much material support but also without police harassment hoping that they would find their way to the Macedonian border.

Neglect has not been the only response. As refugees crossed into the Balkans and Eastern Europe, states rushed to close borders and/or push the flow toward neighbors, abandoning both Dublin regulations and the Schengen treaty on the way. Police and border control violence followed the advance of refugees into Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Hungary. Recriminations ensued. Long-standing conflicts, like the one between Serbia and Croatia, threatened to bubble up as countries retaliated to their neighbor’s emergency border controls and accused each other of violating EU directives.

The fragility of the EU migration governance system was readily exposed when not only Eastern European countries from Poland to Slovakia reinstated border controls, but also Austria and Germany announced that they are temporarily suspending Schengen after Hungary opened the doors to refugee camps and showed thousands of people the road West. Hungary’s anti-immigrant leaders took the extra step of ordering the Army to use non-lethal force against refugees. Premier Orban has also passed legislation which ensures that few if any of the thousands of refugees held in camps will receive asylum.

The unabated flow of refugees has created a cruel NIMBY response: countries that prefer not to host refugees have two options, either to close their southern border and push refugees back south or to provide quick and easy passage to the next country hoping that their neighbor will not opt for temporary border controls to stem the flow. At the two extremes stand Germany and Greece (Italy too, to a certain extend). Since the vast majority of refugees are headed to Germany, an open border system means that Germany will have to accommodate even more refugees than the 800,000 that it has promised. At the other end of Europe, any suspension of Schengen rules at points north could lead to Greece, currently the Union’s most economically challenged member,
having to accommodate thousands of refugees for long periods of time.

The emergency summit of September 23rd made clear how deep the rift has become on the issue of refugee resettlement. In an effort not to repeat the stalemate of the June summit, countries agreed on the lowest common denominator: throw money at the problem. The summit eschewed the issue of a common border enforcement policy which is what Greece and Italy need. Issues of sovereignty and constitutional order made that discussion too fraught for this meeting. Germany had to threaten the use of qualified majority voting to get agreement on a refugee allocation formula modelled on its federal system. The formula applies to 120,000 refugees; it is unclear who will host the hundreds of thousands more that are in Europe or will arrive over the next several months. The EU leaders pledged €1 billion in aid to organizations and transit countries such as Lebanon and Turkey in hopes of keeping refugees away from European shores.

Crisis of Identity
More serious than the crisis of governance is the crisis of identity that the influx of refugees has triggered. On one hand, many Greek and German citizens provide voluntary assistance and resources to refugees, with Germans even offering space in their homes to refugee families, and German officials arguing that immigration is the solution to the country's demographic problem. On the other hand, Eastern European countries express fears about the impact of diversity on their culture and ethnic identity. The extreme right, fueled by the growth in immigration, is on the rise in practically every European country. This puts a lot of pressure on mainstream conservative and even centrist parties as welcome signs may have significant electoral costs. In Greece, the fascist Golden Dawn is the country's third largest party and is now threatening “popular” action against refugees if the government does not remove makeshift camps from public spaces.

Ultimately, European citizens and their leaders will have to decide which vision of Europe they want: the one promoted by Hungary's Orban and the Golden Dawn which privileges ethnic purity over humanitarian compassion and sees barbed wire fences along national borders as key, or the one promoted by Germany and the European Commission that embraces diversity and sees in refugee resettlement not only a burden but an opportunity to deepen European integration.

References
Migration is a highly controversial issue. At Oxford University’s Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS) we don’t deny that our researchers have very different approaches and opinions but rather seek to use these differences and disagreements creatively. From questions about the nature of integration, to whether it is appropriate to use the term ‘illegal’, to disputes about the relation between race, racism and responses to migration, we have found our intellectual disagreements to be high productive. They have, moreover, ensured that COMPAS is a highly agreeable place to work and to study.

COMPAS was established in 2003 with a grant from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Our team has from the outset been based in the School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography (SAME) at the University of Oxford. Originally led by Professor Steven Vertovec, the centre soon became more than the sum of its parts with an integrated group of researchers, students and support staff. Under the subsequent leadership of Professor Michael Keith, COMPAS has continued to strengthen its interdisciplinary work, and our staff has included sociologists, economists, political scientists, geographers and demographers. The study of migration by its very nature breaks disciplinary boundaries. It is a phenomenon that does not make sense if we look at it only through the lens of one discipline or methodology. Nor can migration be approached in isolation. Broader questions such as ‘how can national labour markets be protected whilst maximising competitive advantage in a global arena?’, ‘how should we respond to rapid growth in our cities?’ cannot be considered without taking migration into account. Just as migration research cannot ignore wider social, political and economic factors. Societies are diverse and complex, and diverse in increasingly complicated ways. Analysing this diversity requires drawing on the insights of different disciplines.

It also requires us to examine different scales and their intersections. COMPAS is interested in the big picture, considering global governance and multi-lateral issues, broad economic, social, political and environmental drivers of migration and the international systems and structures that affect how migration is enabled or constrained. Research on migration flows and dynamics has analysed the relationship between migration processes and social, economic and political change, particularly in the context of global, regional, national and local disparities in human development and security. Work on topics such as mixed migration, has
examined the ways in which the co-existence of poverty, inequality and conflict, as well as migratory flows and processes, shape diasporic and migrant communities. It has also aimed to understand how migration dynamics play out at different levels, from individuals and households to regions and states.

The national and subnational institutions, bodies and systems, the social networks linking people in sending and receiving states and the political ramifications of migration and the responses to migration have been a particular focus of COMPAS work. So for instance we have undertaken a body of research on demand for migrant labour, exploring how the structures of particular labour markets shape demand for particular types of worker and how immigration controls themselves help to create suitable labour i.e. are not simply taps that switch labour on and off. We have examined the nature, determinants and potential policy responses to employer demand for migrant labour, and mapped the relation between the control of geographical mobility and the control of labour as far back as the 14th century.

COMPAS also researches the detail, the lives lived by those who move and those who stay, revealing how the bigger factors that shape or are shaped by migration concretely affect the human beings at the centre of the story. From Kenyan Pentecostals ‘Between Home, London, and the Kingdom of God’, to the employment relations of migrant domestic workers with employers in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, to ways that Europe is imagined in Ukraine, Turkey, Senegal and Morocco, our research spans different regions at the same time as forensically engaging with the individual and their many social relations.

Migration raises dilemmas and trade offs that are both ethical and scientific. The scholarship of migration inevitably invokes questions of the ‘ought’ as well as of the ‘is’. How we consider the cognitive framing and utility optimising of neoclassical economics or contemporary political science, alongside the charged dilemmas of moral obligation, international law and the weight of historical injustice challenges researchers and the public alike to consider how commensurable these different policy goals and structures of scholarship might be. Migration questions the fundamental relationship between people, our obligations to the stranger as well as the familiar, and implies a political economy and a research agenda that speaks both to moral sentiments and the hidden hand of market imperatives. COMPAS sits across the analytical and normative, recognizing the logical and epistemological differences between the two but encouraging an endeavour that strives to be up close and then at a (critical) distance from its subject matter.

Migration is a topic that attracts simple stories in the public sphere—the benefits tourist, the hard-working migrant, the brain drain and the refugee. But the job of rigorous social science is to challenge the assumptions behind these simple stories, while working to provide a narrative that starts to make sense of this complexity. At COMPAS we have always prioritised engagement with the general public. In recent years we have undertaken two major initiatives to maximise this kind of research and impact. The Migration Observatory was established in 2011. It was created as an arms-length organisation, kept firmly distanced from the (perceived or genuine) political positions of any past or present staff to provide accessible, politically neutral and strictly evidence-based analysis of key issues that affect the UK, and more recently the EU, setting them in an international context. The Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity (GEM) is a more recent initiative, established to facilitate the sharing of knowledge,
ideas and experience on migration and diversity between academics, policy makers, service professionals, civil society, lawyers, foundations, school students and others in the field.

Engagement outside academia is helped by using more than words. The annual COMPAS photography competition, whose winning entries are used in all our materials, was initiated partly to support the development of more creative, less stereotyped images of migration. We have also disseminated our work through poetry and theatre. The COMPAS project, ‘Undocumented Migrant Children’, investigated the impact that lack of legal immigration status has on migrant children’s daily lives, their access to schools and healthcare. It found they were caught in a maze of cuts in public spending and broader welfare reforms and excluded from citizenship rights, with the risk of producing a generation of disenfranchised youth. On completion of the research COMPAS commissioned a theatre company to script five monologues based on interviews collected during the research with a view to a stage performance. These monologues have been taken into schools and we have worked with students to develop them into public performances, enabling both students and audiences to engage with the issues imaginatively, encouraging them to ask questions and to think of their own approaches to the issues raised.

COMPAS is also a vibrant place to study. Oxford’s MSc in Migration Studies is jointly hosted by the School of Anthropology and the Department of International Development. This nine-month interdisciplinary master’s degree analyses migration from a global perspective and as an integral part of development and social change. COMPAS staff teach core courses, supervise dissertations and offer options courses. We also have a thriving community of doctoral students, studying Romanians in London, the movement of people from Libya to the European Union, the impact of the deportation of foreign national prisoners. We are enriched by our visiting academic programme which hosts people, usually for between three months to one year, and often maintain longstanding relations with them.

It is our ability to share, debate and disagree that is key to our identity as a research centre. In recognising this, we recently did away with our thematic cluster groups that were becoming time consuming and not useful to our research. Instead, we have established three ‘forums’ on: ‘Politics, Citizenship and Ethics’, ‘Mobility and Immobility’ and ‘The Everyday’ in order to carve a space to come together and discuss topics from our very different experiences and approaches. These meet once a term to discuss readings, usually, but not always academic; sometimes we choose a news article, a novel, an image, a film or a practitioner intervention. The ensuing conversations are noted on the web, so please contribute!

More than a decade of impact – some COMPAS Highlights:
1. Setting the micro within the macro: Close study of particular groups and geographies—from undocumented migrant children to particular places encountering change as a result of migration has helped shape a picture of the interactions between individuals and national or global change.
2. Rethinking Urban Diversity: This work helped to move academic and policy debates away from established and sometimes limiting ideas about “multi-culturalism” and towards a more nuanced understanding of the interactions between groups in complex modern societies. Among other important developments it led to the coining of a new term, “super-diversity”, which now helps inform many new approaches to the study of immigration and
diversity, and to policy making in this field.

3. **Trade offs:** COMPAS’ work has highlighted the trade-offs that characterise migration decision making at every level, from the personal to international policy making. These can be seen in decisions unrelated to immigration that stimulate or otherwise affect migration or in responses to migration that lead to unwanted consequences.

4. **Broadening the context:** By developing our understanding of the history of immigration controls COMPAS research has shone a light on the modern world and attitudes to poverty and the movement of people. Also detailed analyses of mobile communities and diaspora around the world have helped to inform a clearer understanding of contemporary migration.

5. **EU Migration:** COMPAS was at the vanguard in the study of the implications of widening the EU on mobility and on both the sending and receiving countries. COMPAS’ work during the 2004 accession of 10 countries to the EU provided unique insights that have subsequently formed the basis of academic and policy responses to the mobility of EU citizens. More recent work has detailed the realities of the new Europe on our understanding on borders, identity, security and place.

6. **Dispassionate analysis:** The Migration Observatory was established by COMPAS to inject dispassionate and evidence-based analysis of migration, into media, public and policy debates in the UK, and has rapidly become the UK’s most trusted independent voice on the subject.

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**Section News:**

**July – November 2015 in Brief – APSA, Books, Journal Articles, Member News**

**APSA Section Awards 2015**

**Book Award**

**Selection Committee:**
*Jeannette Money* (University of California, Davis), *Louis DeSipio* (University of California, Irvine), *James McCann* (Purdue University)

**Winner:**
“The authors ask why states in the western hemisphere adopted racially based immigration admission policies in the 19th century and phased them out to ethnically neutral policies in the 20th century. In contrast to prior research that focused on liberalism in democratic states, the authors posit that domestic politics is a central component in the development of racist policies, based on class interests, racial ideology and the structure of domestic political institutions. A novel component of their argument posits that the forces that dismantled the ethnically biased policies originated in the international system. The authors explore the role of state security concerns, policy diffusion and networks of domestic and international non-governmental organizations and epistemic communities. Their most original and provocative argument focuses on the role of weak states in the international system that worked through multilateral institutions to pressure strong states to change their policies. The authors present an entirely original perspective on a long-standing debate, through a genuinely comparative analysis of 22 countries in the western hemisphere. The quantitative evidence is supplemented by meticulous research and extensive use of primary documents to trace the mechanisms through which political actors work, in six detailed case studies. This elegantly presented research raises issues about the dark side of democracies that are central political concerns today—a real tour de force.”

Honorable mention:


Best Article Award

Selection Committee:
Antje Ellermann (University of British Columbia), Daniel Hopkins (Georgetown University), Paulina Ochoa Espejo (Haverford College)

Winner:

“Dancygier’s article considers a vital but largely overlooked issue. Whilst most studies of political responses to immigration have focused on political attitudes, she focuses on the question of the political representation of minorities. Dancygier studies the electoral representation of British Muslims at the municipal level—looking at both candidate selection and candidate election—in order to examine the role of minority demographics in conditioning the ways in which electoral rules can facilitate or hinder ethnic minority representation. Rather than positing a simple relationship between electoral rules and minority representation, Dancygier shows that the electoral representation of British Muslims is first and foremost shaped by the degree to which their size and spatial concentration translates into electoral leverage. As one of the first studies to look at the selection stage, Dancygier finds that electoral rules shape Muslims’ access to electoral politics and that the effect of electoral rules on descriptive representation is conditional on Muslims’ electoral clout. The article makes a significant theoretical contribution by considering the role of parties and candidate selection in
shaping political representation. Dancygier makes a strong case for distinguishing between candidate selection and candidate election in the study of political representation. The article further shows that the electoral clout of minorities matters, and that both the effect of electoral rules and the potential for institutional discrimination largely depend on a minority population’s size. Finally, the committee was impressed by the article’s nuanced empirical analysis and its remarkable and extensive data collection effort: the author gathered candidate-level observations for 7 election years in 68 local authorities with varying electoral rules, covering both successful and unsuccessful candidates.” (abridged citation)

Chapter Award

Selection Committee:
Anna Sampaio (Santa Clara University), Marc Morjé Howard (Georgetown University), Anna Law (CUNY)

Winner:

"In this chapter the author traces changes in the scope and practice of immigration law over the past century (primarily in the U.S. and Europe) paying particular attention to the shifting dynamics of sovereignty and how that has impacted questions of citizenship, belonging, and more recently security. More than simply a recitation of juridical and regulatory changes, the author engages an interpretive reading of the law that illuminates struggles for access and inclusion within and across countries, yielding a rich conceptual and political understanding of changing norms of justice."

Dissertation Award

Committee:
David Leal (University of Texas at Austin), Katrina Burgess (Tufts University), Maria Koinova (University of Warwick)

Winner:

"Lamis’ dissertation asks the extremely timely question of what determines state responses to refugee flows. Specifically, she explores the conditions under which states open their borders to refugees and/or “outsource” refugee policy to organizations such as UNHCR. Her main finding is that countries are selective in their exercise of sovereignty and that this selectivity is less about material resources or humanitarian concerns and more about foreign policy and domestic politics. In the international sphere, nations seek to help allies and pressure rivals through the acceptance or denial of refugees. Domestically, leaders in ethnically divided states favor refugees from their own group. Lamis develops a theory of selective sovereignty, which will undoubtedly draw the attention of scholars working in multiple fields. This project has a very original argument and
uses a well-executed, multi-methods approach that combines regression analysis with detailed case studies of refugee policies in Egypt, Kenya, and Turkey. It investigates questions that are both substantively and theoretically important to migration scholars and opens up a broader discussion of the ways in which states use international organizations to outsource problematic policies. Moreover, it integrates multiple literatures on refugees and migration and contributes to an emerging literature on non-OECD receiving countries. In addition, the author displays an admirable willingness to discuss how her theory might be modified to account for anomalies.

Paper Award

Committee:
David Cook-Martin (Grinnell College), Scott Solomon (University of South Florida), Dara Strolovitch (Princeton University)

Winner:

“Professor Kawar’s imaginative paper explores the extent to which a court-centered response to immigration policies affects political, legal and administrative actors response to immigration policy making. Relying on close analysis of legal cases and legislation, she argues that the stripping of legal jurisdiction from courts to which immigration activists had recourse prior to 1980s and early 1990s resulted in a new policy-making dynamic among new actors and sites of interaction between legal activists and immigration policymakers. ‘Understanding the mechanics of regularized practice—as opposed to the rules enunciated by judges in these cases’—she more broadly argues—‘is important if we want to fully understand the responses that organized litigation elicited beyond the courtroom.’”

Honorable mention:

Books


Bakewell, Oliver, Godfried Engbersen, Maria Lucinda Fonseca and Cindy Horst (Eds.) (2015). Beyond Networks • Feedback in International Migration. Palgrave Macmillan.


**Journal Articles**

**American Behavioral Scientist**


**American Journal of Political Science**


**British Journal of Political Science**


**Comparative Political Studies**


**Ethnopolitics**
Zeynep Kayaa and Outi Keranen (2015). "Constructing Identity through Symbols by


**European Journal of Political Research**


**International Organization**


**International Studies Quarterly**


**Journal of Common Market Studies**


**Journal of Politics**


**Law and Society Review**


**Party Politics**


Political Geography


Nicole Gombay (2015). "'There are mentalities that need changing': Constructing personhood, formulating citizenship, and performing subjectivities on a settler colonial frontier.” Political Geography 48(1): 11-23.

Political Research Quarterly


Political Studies

Politics, Groups, and Identities

Public Opinion Quarterly

Third World Quarterly


World Politics
Member News

Kristy A. Belton (Human Rights Center, University of Dayton)
• Organized “Social Practice of Human Rights second biennial conference”, October 1-3, 2015, University of Dayton, OH.
• Received the UNHCR Statelessness Award 2015 for best doctoral dissertation (“Precarious Belonging: Stateless people in a ‘Postnational’ World”).

Antje Ellermann (Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia)

Joel S. Fetzer (Political Science, Baruch College CUNY)
• Published Open Borders and International Migration Policy: The Effects of Unrestricted Immigration in the United States, France, and Ireland. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sara Wallace Goodman (Department of Political Science, University of California)
• Was promoted to Associate Professor with tenure in the Department of Political Science at the University of California.
• Published "Conceptualizing and measuring citizenship and integration policy: Past lessons and new approaches." Comparative Political Studies 48(14): 1905-1941.
• Published (with Gregory C. Baldi) "Migrants into Members: Social Rights, Civic Requirements, and Citizenship in Western Europe." West European Politics 38(6): 1152-1173.

Els de Graauw (Political Science, Baruch College, City University of New York)

Iseult Honohan (UCD School of Politics and International Relation, Belfield)
• Published (with Nathalie Rougier) „Tolerance of religious and cultural diversity in Irish institutions: comparing hijabs in schools and turbans in the Garda reserve” in Tolerance and diversity in Ireland, North and South, edited by Iseult Honohan and Nathalie Rougier. Manchester University Press.
**Konrad Kalicki** (Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia)
- Joint Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Program on U.S.-Japan Relations) as Postdoctoral Fellow.

**Leila Kawar** (UCD School of Politics and International Relation, Belfield)
- Began a new position as Assistant Professor of Political Science and Legal Studies at University of Massachusetts Amherst.
- Published *Contesting Immigration Policy in Court: Legal Activism and Its Radiating Effects in the United States and France*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

**Melanie Kolbe** (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva)
- Started as Assistant Professor at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

**Stefan Rother** (Department of International Relations, University of Freiburg)
- Published (with Nicola Piper): ”Alternative Regionalism from Below: democratizing ASEAN’s migration governance.” *International Migration* 53(3): 36-49.

**Anna Sampaio** (Ethnic Studies and Political Science, Santa Clara University)
- Published *Terrorizing Latina/o Immigrants: Race, Gender, and Immigration Politics in the Age of Security*. Philadelphia: Temple.
- Was appointed Director of the Ethnic Studies Program at Santa Clara University.

**Gerasimos Tsourapas** (Department of Politics and International Studies, University of London)
- Was appointed Senior Teaching Fellow in International Relations at SOAS, University of London.
- Received (with Dr. Maria Koinova, University of Warwick) an International Studies Association venture research workshop grant.

**Beth Elise Whitaker** (Department of Political Science and Public Administration, UNC Charlotte)
- Published ”Playing the immigration card: the politics of exclusion in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.” *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 53(3): 274-293.

**Abigail Fisher Williamson** (Political Science and Public Policy & Law, Trinity College)