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LANDSCAPES OF ALTERITY: CLIMATE CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY BOLIVIA

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of PhD
Social Anthropology in the Faculty of Humanities

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Abstract: Landscapes of Alterity: Climate change in contemporary Bolivia

Rosalyn Bold, PhD in Social Anthropology, 8th January 2016

This thesis considers perceptions of climate change in contemporary Bolivia. It commences with an exploration of what climate change constitutes in the small highland community of Kaata, and expands outwards, tracing the networks of migration that connect this village to the city, and looking at how the definition of climate change changes as we scale up to the national and international level.

Climate change is considered in Kaata to constitute an ontological shift from a landscape defined by networks of reciprocity which until recently held community members to one another as well as to neighbouring villages and the telluric spirits of mountains and elements. Young people now increasingly desire city made commodities, engaging in capitalist relations that lead them away from this landscape. Climate change in Kaata charts a weakening of the community of people, their fields and rituals. While a modernist perspective is inclined to separate the weather, as ‘nature’, from ‘culture’ or human actions, Kaateños consider all these conversant animate elements of an animate landscape. I take this emic definition of climate change to determine the direction of this thesis.

We explore the networks that draw the young people into the city, analysing the desires by which they are led there. Crucially, these are shaped by mimesis, in emulating the city/western other through changing dress and dancing styles. I show how these dynamics of alterity are deeply rooted, resembling classic structuralist analyses of Andean culture.

I explore efforts to reform Bolivia’s agricultural system through implementing Food Sovereignty (FS). The social movements representing Kaata hope this would connect such villages into national markets and might motivate return migration through creating local cash economies. I explore how such initiatives become clouded by a city-based discourse of an ideal rural ‘other’ as conceptually antithetical to capitalism, prevalent in the contemporary politics of the neo-indigenous state. This projection is inadequate to the contemporary reality of villages like Kaata, and limits their efficacy. The international FS discourse is similarly influenced by a search for an ideal ‘other’ removed from capitalism.

I assess President Evo Morales’ claim to be effecting a pachakuti, a ‘turning over’ or revolution equal and counterposed to the Spanish conquest. ‘Climate change’ in Kaata challenges Morales’ assertion of a pachakuti of Andean over colonial values, as it considers that it is shifting to become more ‘white’. Nationally, Indian actors are rising within a landscape determined by international capital, revealing Morales’ pachakuti to be human-centred. Rather than transforming existing landscapes to make them more indigenous, this is a pachakuti or ontological shift to the landscape of the western ‘other’, entailing the ‘death’ of the highlands and tradition. Morales’ commitments to indigenous peoples against the interests of capital are challenged on the national stage by indigenous social movements.

I conclude that while the animist landscapes Kaata evokes can help moderns conceptualise climate change, it does not provide sought after solution from animist indigenous peoples at an international level. While indigenous peoples are often fetishized as ‘the people outside capitalism’, human agency is but a small factor in Kaata’s animist landscape, and humans have not the agency to combat climate change.
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Fig. One: Map of Kaata and surrounding region
(courtesy Hisbol *La Montaña del Condor*, J. Bastien trans. A. Spedding).
View from author’s house in Kaata, across the square at the heart of the mountain to the sacred Mount Akhamani
Introduction

One: Surprises

The day had started with something of a coincidence. I woke with the smell of mist creeping into resinous wood, in the cold mountain air of Charazani, a small town some eight hours northeast of La Paz. The hotel windows, with their iron balcony rails, lend a Spanish colonial touch to the main square, filled with trees and flowers, around which adobe houses faded into the mists of late October, the start of the rainy season.

We had landed there the afternoon before, after a long and fairly tortuous bus route from La Paz, the first of many times I was to get up before the dawn and sit in that sticky, cast iron frame rattling over unpaved roads for eight hours. By breakfast time we were running along Lake Titicaca, sapphire sea of the desert Altiplano, the high plain at nearly four thousand metres above sea level in the Andes mountains. We stopped at seven and had soup in Achacachi, a lakeside town, where shacks sell stacks of shiny commodities, and the country bound passengers bought bread for rural kin. We rose up again, over the Cordillera Real, seeing stretched out alongside us, above the massing clouds, vast white peaks stretching up to six thousand metres or more, the tips of immense icebergs with their roots in the Amazon jungle far below. Great nests of whipped up stone they stand over the sparse Altiplano; majestic and hard, this landscape, as the Lake is cold and salty. Coming over the high pass, the recently dug road descends the eastern flank of the mountains towards the jungles, winding through misty mustard coloured pastures for many miles before we reach the lands of the Callaway, heralded by the herds of alpacas and llamas and washed away irrigation channels around streams, speaking of civilisations past, before we descend the hair pin curves of the steep road to Charazani, which always has me on the edge of my seat, ready to leap out of the window should we fall, as many before, from the road.

On arrival we check in at a hotel on the corner of the square, several stories high, with tiled rooms, sheets and layers of blankets, and resinous wood furniture. Our journey is eased by the hot springs, which the municipality has marshalled into a swimming pool and really hot showers of thermal water. Even from the high terrace on top of the hotel it was hard to see more than what was immediately
around us, encased in mist. This being my first visit I had not yet any sense of the shape of the landscape.

Doña Ruth was the proprietor of the hotel, the youngest of a large family, who had remained in the provinces to take care of her ageing father. I learned from this distinguished man, who was in his nineties, that this was the very hotel where Joseph Bastien had stayed when he began his fieldwork in the region forty years before. In those days he and his wife had stayed in a loft full of straw. There was no road then, and they were recovering from a 24-hour trip on the open back of a lorry over the mountains, densely squashed in with other passengers. I told them that I was another anthropologist, following in the footsteps of Bastien, and like him hoped to work in the nearby village of Kaata, where I would that day go for the first time to propose my fieldwork project to the residents. I estimate Kaata lies about six miles up the valley from Charazani, the nearest town, counted so through its being the seat of the council, and its history of plantation and shop owning residents. In terms of population however it is scarcely larger than Kaata, each containing about a hundred families.

I sat chatting to Ruth in the long reception room of the hotel, eating slightly stale bread with scrambled eggs, and drinking coca tea, when there entered from the door leading to the courtyard a complex of features deeply familiar, though at the same time intensely surprising- long tangled brown hair beneath a felt hat, slender legs in combat trousers, strong aquiline nose, and now, dark eyes, oriental but rounded at the edges, looking at me in wonder.

It was Danny, who I had last seen at my mother’s house in Liverpool two years before when he drove away towards the sea, the episode concluding three years of each other’s near constant company. Since that day we had not spoken, or communicated at all. I knew he would come to Bolivia – it may not have been so surprising to see him in La Paz, city of a million people- but here! In Charazani, where tourists rarely venture, on a road that leads to nowhere well known, and on the very day I arrived. We stared at each other in the utmost astonishment, transplanted into a dream-like existence for some short moments by this turn of events.

Dona Ruth registered not the smallest surprise at these circumstances, after we had contextualised the meeting to her, nor have the other local friends to whom
I have described them. In England however, friends and family inevitably consider the meeting an incredible coincidence. Whereas English mentality maps such an event out in terms of the probability of a random encounter of two figures in an out of the way and remote place, and concludes it is very unlikely, thus surprising, in the Andean universe into which I had stepped such a coincidence of two people linked by experiences was influenced by another understanding which rendered it normal. When I asked a friend, an anthropologist from the lakeside town of Achacachi, why the meeting was not surprising, he replied impatiently that “things like that happen here all the time”. Defining the cosmos into which I had stepped according to what it is not, it is a non-probabilistic universe, in which the unexpected is a frequent visitor.

Ingold says that astonishment is the “other side of the coin” (2011:18) to the openness of animism; whereas science tries to grasp the world in knowable categories, to open oneself to an animate world is to exist in a perpetual state of astonishment. This astonishment, the feeling born of “the sense of wonder that comes from riding the crest of the world’s continued Birth” (2011:18), is according to Ingold quite different to surprise. Surprise happens when the world, cast or confined in knowable categories, occurs in ways inimical to those categories and ways of understanding. Surprise, Ingold says,

“exists only for those who have forgotten how to be astonished at the birth of the world, who have grown so accustomed to control and predictability that they depend on the unexpected to assure them that events are taking place and that history is being made. By contrast, those who are truly open to the world, though perpetually astonished, are never surprised. If this attitude of unsurprised astonishment leaves them vulnerable, it is also a source of strength, resilience and wisdom. For rather than waiting for the unexpected to occur, and being caught out in consequence, it allows them at every moment to respond to the flux of the world with care, judgement and sensitivity” (2011:19).

Such a perspective as we shall see informs responses to the changing environment in Kaata.

By contrast, science is based, Ingold indicates, on holding the world to account, on the assumption that it is something that can be grasped within set frameworks and understood. Science makes predictions, and then is surprised when
they are wrong. This does not mean, he posits, that science and animism cannot dialogue with one another. Science should rather attend to the animate nature of the world, and be based on openness rather than closure. This openness requires the return to astonishment. Science should be resituated within the world about which it seeks knowledge (Ingold, 2011). Latour (1988, 1993, 1996, 2004, 2014) likewise argues for the radical reconsideration of agency and objectivity, for a science situated within the world it seeks to describe, and recognising the agentive roles of the non-human actors it ‘objectifies’.

What Henare et al (2007) have dubbed the ‘ontological turn’ in anthropology has emanated from the work of Marilyn Strathern, Bruno Latour, Roy Wagner, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro and Alfred Gell in a radical reconsideration of ‘nature’ which the scientific cosmos considers it has a unique capacity to understand, and over which are apparently laid the ‘cultural’ beliefs of different societies. Latour’s (2004) radical proposition that everything consists of networks of humans (culture) and non-humans (nature) coming together as intentional actors breaching the human/object divide leads us to challenge the Cartesian dualism on which, he claims, the scientific enterprise depends. Descola (2013) reflects on moderns as ‘naturalists’, who believe that humans have an interiority or soul that differentiates them from other species, making them uniquely conscious actors in a world of non-humans. Animists meanwhile see a continuity of interiorities through the different exterior forms of humans and non-humans. This latter describes the Kaateño attitude to crops and animals, as we shall see, which are widely considered capable of thinking and acting. Totemists, according to Descola, see a continuity of interiorities and exteriorities across certain species (Descola, 2013). Understanding that the scientific perspective is a lens, one way of viewing the world, among many others, opens up the possibility of egalitarian discourse across worlds. We may now in the light of this ontological turn step entirely out of the rational, modern, probabilistic universe and boldly, without a backward glance, into that envisioned by those we work with- as it seemed had just happened to me, a cosmos closing in around me the moment I arrived on the Kaateño mountain, which seemed perfectly sensible to everyone else, but entirely defied the laws of space and time I had come to expect.
Latour (2014) employs the ideas of Gaia and the anthropocene as ‘unstable’ yet ‘the best hope we have’ of ridding ourselves of the illusion of being agentive actors within a de-animated world of passive objects, urgent in the context of climate change. Geologists are considering that the contemporary age of the world should rightly be called the anthropocene, as humans are more influential in determining the constitution of the earth’s crust and atmosphere than any other factor, an idea which has been taken up by social theorists as a reflection on our contemporary situation as a species. One of the instabilities of this idea lies in its blanketing ‘all of humanity’ as having had equal part in creating this plastic coated, carbon consuming age; Donna Haraway (2014) has proposed that the current age be instead called the capitalocene, targeting corporate neoliberalism as the creator of the current environmental crisis\(^1\). The Gaia hypothesis, meanwhile, acknowledges the earth as an agentive and complex self-regulating system. Species co-evolve with their environment, thus their environmental conditions are always close to optimal. The anthropocene and Gaia appear on the surface contradictory, one magnifying human agency and the other reducing us to merely part of a network of animate beings. Yet it is, as Latour (2014) indicates, exactly as we dream of mastery over the planet and its resources in the anthropocene that this animate Gaia comes back to kick us in our surprised teeth. Climate change is indeed ‘the revenge of Gaia’ (Lovelock, 2007).

The re-eruption of agentive and unpredictable ‘nature’ into human life through climate change, and the impossibility of separating this nature from human action, must lead western ‘naturalists’ (Descola, 2013) to radically reconsider subject and agency. In trying to describe climate change from a scientific perspective, “the very notion of objectivity has been subverted by the presence of human beings in the phenomena to be described- and in the politics of tackling them” (Latour, 2014:2). There is human agency not only in the construction of facts, but in the matter those facts are trying to describe. Latour continues: “We all agree that the earth… has taken back the qualities of a fully-fledged actor” (2014:3), or as Chakrabarty (2009) has proposed, an agent of history. Confronted with climate change, or the ‘trembling earth’, says Latour, we give up on the dream

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1 See Haraway’s presentation at Anthropocene: Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet, the conference at University of California, Santa Cruz, May 8, 2014: http://anthropocene.au.dk/arts-of-living-on-a-damaged-planet/.
of mastery of the earth (2014). We share agency with other subjects, the complex systems that make up this Gaia.

As I was to discover, in Kaata the world is alive and agentive. The landscape of the village is one of telluric spirits to whom one conducts offerings and libations, and who reciprocate with harvests. In this thesis I will show the potential for connection between the Kaateño cosmos and what Latour indicates we might ‘wrongly’ call the ‘scientific approach’ to climate change or more correctly, the ‘de-animated’ approach which takes the agency out of the non-human world. Isabelle Stengers terms this egalitarian communication between worlds a ‘cosmopolitics’, where “cosmos refers to the unknown constituted by these multiple, divergent worlds, and to the articulations of which they could eventually be capable” (Stengers 2005:995).

We will start by looking at how the Kaateños interpret climate change in the landscape surrounding the village. We will trace climate change through the intermediary levels of Bolivian social movements to the government, looking at the success of programmes and policies directing state resources to indigenous communities to help them deal with climate change. Climate change is a vision that changes as we move ‘upstream’, and I found that, as we look at the level of national and international politics, this idea of the animate landscape disappears amidst modern, human-centred landscapes riven by alterity.

The fluidity of a relational animist perspective, and the acceptance of change, as Ingold above outlines, enables the Kaateños, small-scale subsistence farmers, to efficiently adapt their ‘production’, as they term the cultivation of crops, to cosmological changes the shifting climate signifies, as we shall see in Chapter One. This contradicts the common idea promulgated by such bodies as charities, NGOs and the UN that such indigenous peoples are likely to be the ‘victims’ of climate change. This assertion often rests I believe on the conception of the “west” as inhabiting a category of ‘culture’ relatively independent from the ‘nature’ that indigenous peoples are conceived to be situated within, and where climate change is largely thought to happen. Kaata’s small-scale agriculture shifts as the temperature increases from year to year, climbing higher up the sides of the mountain to cooler altitudes, and its residents continue to subsist largely from their harvests. In the UK, by contrast, we saw the second wettest summers on record in 2012, where wheat
failed, whilst on the other side of the Atlantic, the American corn harvest was
decimated by drought. Large-scale agribusiness is less than nimble in its capacity to
adapt to climate change, tending instead towards surprise at climate change.
Furthermore, the mono-cropping techniques agribusiness employs reduce the
capacity of an ecosystem to recover from extreme weather phenomena, which is
increased with the number of species it contains. The UN has therefore reneged on
the green revolution policies that saw agribusiness championed in recent decades
and are now urging that small scale farming, incorporating traditional knowledge
and feeding local markets, be implemented everywhere (UN Trade and
Environment Report, 2013). The current Bolivian government are attempting to
apply these principles in constructing a national food sovereignty policy, which
could benefit small farmers like the Kaateños, as we shall see in Chapter Three.

Global agricultural markets are heavily determined by predictions of the
produce of the year ahead, which are traded through many hands as ‘future
commodities’, as indeed are the other raw materials considered the ‘nature’ which
human cultures rely on as their basis of subsistence. This is based on predicting the
harvest before it is produced - a cereal company, say, will purchase the projected
future harvest of a farmer, a model which has existed in the USA since the late
1800s. Speculators purchase these ‘futures’, gambling that the eventual price at the
time of the harvest may be higher than that they have paid. Global agricultural
production is masked by these systems, which tie up the value of the produce in
secondary exchanges abstracted from actual productivity, rather than derived from
their utility. They are all based on a normative assumption of the future as
something calculable within fixed frameworks of understanding. In a context of
climate change harvests become uncertain, making such gambling, according to de
Schutter, UN Special Envoy on the Right to Food, even more attractive. Since
2008, de Schutter explains, crisis speculation has driven up food prices meaning
there has been ‘a silent tsunami of hunger’.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/the-real-hunger-games-how-banks-gamble-on-
food-prices--and-the-poor-lose-out-7606263.html
After the initial surprise in Charazani, I was driven up to Kaata that afternoon by Danny and his companions. That is, we had just crossed the river onto Mount Kaata before the tyre exploded, sending us veering across the one lane track, fortunately towards the earth mountainside rather than into the misted depths of the crevice to our right. We fitted the spare tyre, though it also turned out on letting the jack down, in a somewhat deflating anti-climax, to be flat. Prospects of rescue up here seemed slim, yet from the mist emerged a white 4x4 with ‘Ambulance of Ayllu Kaata’ emblazoned on the front of it. The men in the cab and riding on its open back jumped out, taking in our white features with an air of amusement, and nimbly began to help us, joking with one another in Quechua as they did so. They had an antiquated hand pump, with which we were able to inject a little more life into the tyre, enough for the company to be able to make it back down the hill.

We thanked them, when the task was done—“we’re muleteers (somos arrieros)”, one of them responded to ironic laughter, referring to the trade of carrying which is a traditional Indian role serving whites. We all drank a sip of Ceibo, the neat alcohol (94% proof- good taste- not for export, as it is labelled) used to toast the spirits of the landscape, and to beseech them for safe passage. It is considered essential for drivers to take a capful too, spilling some on the ground in libation to the spirits, knocking the rest back and then letting the momentum carry them down one-track narrow dirt roads. The lives of the families I was to stay with in Kaata were and are profoundly marked by road accidents in which loved ones had died, which feeds into the impact the road, constructed in the mid 1990s and leading to the cities and coca lands, has on the area.

I was able to explain my situation to the men, who loaded me up into the front of the ambulance with them. One of them, Ermeglio, was from Kaata, and as I later found out, the Consejal, the intermediary between the village’s own authorities and local government, representing the community on the Council in Charazani. He performs his duties with a somewhat ironic set to his jaw, mouth curled as though always repressing a laugh. He questioned me about my reasons for wanting to come to the village, watching me shrewdly. I explained I had come to ask the community if they would like to participate in my research on climate change. There was, I said, a wonderful book, written 40 years ago, by a man called Joseph Bastien, who
had lived in Kaata. Did they know of him? Sebastian, yes, he was remembered. Yet they had never seen the text he wrote about their village. This surprised me. *Mountain of the Condor* (1978) is considered a major work of Andean ethnography, well known internationally, yet not by the sons and daughters of those who were its main characters and sources. I told Ermeglio that the book talked about the mountains and the rivers, and the rains in the village- I should like to know if, with climate change, these things were changing. Ermeglio later asked me to repeat this description as he introduced me to other people from the community, saying it was nicely put. He could appreciate that it was a careful construction to make my work accessible, and to ask about cultural beliefs as well as the changing entities themselves.

*View from author’s house in Kaata, across the square at the heart of the mountain to the sacred Mount Akhamani*

**Bastien and the mountain metaphor**

The central thesis of Bastien’s (1978) beautifully written and intuitive ethnography is that the mountain on which Kaateños live was considered a living body. Kaata, at the centre, was its bowels and heart, where diviners live who could
“pump blood and fat, the principles of life creating energy, to the rest of the mountain’s metaphorical body” (*ibid.* 37), the centre from which came potatoes, the most important staple crop. Bastien reconstructs with a little social archaeology the vertical economy in which these potatoes were exchanged for meat and wool with the upper village, Apacheta, at the head of the mountain, of camelid herders and ritual specialists, and the maize-growing lower villages like Niñokorin at its legs onto which, rounding the head of the corner of the valley away from Charazani we had just turned when the tyre exploded. Together Apacheta, Kaata, and Ninokorin are a major *ayllu, ayllu mayor*, whilst each of them is an *ayllu* in itself, an Andean word denoting a community of people and within the lands it depends on, or its landscape.

This body consists of human-created, ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ elements. Highland lakes, Bastien tells us, were the mountain’s eyes, the sacred waters from which ritualists still pull the *Torokunka*, the ‘Bull’s Throat’ plant in which the weather for the following year can be read. Thus in the Kaateño mountain body humans and non-humans are likewise agentive and constantly interacting. This network of humans and non-humans resembles Latour’s (*ibid.*) hybrid networks, similarly representing an escape route or ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983) from a modernist ontology. The record of a court case, kept by the community and cited by Bastien, testifies to the long standing nature of this mountain metaphor: the leader Pocomallku, eighty years old, in 1797 defended the community against the incursion of a hacienda on its lower slopes by saying: “Niñokorin belongs to Kaata, as it is the leg of its body” (Bastien, 1978:197). After this legal process the hacienda lands were restored by the Crown in 1799, and since then the lands have legally belonged to the inhabitants who worked them. Currently belief in the mountain as a living body is waning, as we shall see, though the landscape remains in many important ways animate.

Bastien describes a classic Andean ‘vertical economy’ linking the mountain in a community of exchange across its ecological or corporal levels. Vertical economies were identified by John Murra (1972: 429-468) as the *modus operandi* of Incaic agriculture. Ethnographers explored this rapidly changing yet ancient spatial configuration in the 1970s (see eg. Platt, 1982a, 1982b; Harris, 1995a,
Bastien 1978). Since the agrarian reform occurring in the wake of the 1952 Bolivian revolution, Bastien notes, the three villages making up the ayllu mayor of Kaata, like others across the country, were looked at as disparate communities rather than a whole, with new routes taking their produce to the city, transforming the landscape into one of a more ‘horizontal’ exchange. This is the political context to which these ethnographers were contributing, and Bastien valiantly focuses on the landscape of the vertical economy, which was by then overlaid with lines leading beyond the closed corporate community. As indeed, they always had: when he was young, my research assistant Edwin tells me, they used to travel by horse to the jungle lowlands to exchange potatoes for oranges, and of course coca. Emphasising the integrity of the mountain as a body shifts attention from these ancient lines of exchange linking it to other places.

The ‘mountain metaphor’ resembles the structural-functionalist model of the social body, with segmented social institutions (‘religion’, ‘family’, ‘politics’, etc) composing its complementary organs, and working in harmony to reproduce society. The crucial difference here is that this mountain body is not only composed of the social, but combines manmade with ‘natural’ features in a landscape (Ingold, 1993), which we shall come to below. The emphasis in structural-functionalist anthropology is on continuity and equilibrium, challenged by later ethnographies emphasising the role of social change and conflict rather than harmony and stasis. Bastien emphasises the function of the ‘mountain metaphor’ in creating social cohesion and continuity: “more than rhetoric and imagery, the mountain holds together the ayllu Kaata, apparently at risk of falling apart through the economic and political forces of foreigners” (1978:37).

Since the landscape Bastien maps there have indeed been great changes, although there is also continuity. Vertical exchange is now a memory of a recent past: older people note with confusion that the Apachetans no longer come with meat and useful goods like matches to exchange for their potatoes. The alpaca and llama products of the top of the mountain are sold into the tourist circuits of Cusco, while the coca of the valley villages of course feeds into the circulation of one of the country’s top commodities, cocaine. In comparison to its wealthy peripheries, Kaata, once the centre of this mountain system, finds itself without a market for its potatoes and grains, once the staple articles of the subsistence economy, yet now
devalued relative to these luxury items, and too widely produced to sell profitably across the border to Peru. The desire for western consumer goods increasingly draws young people out of the community, migration now being the norm and almost ubiquitous. The absence of this generation in the production of food and fiestas changes the community, as we shall see here.

For anthropologists as well as villagers, time changes our analytical perspective, though we look upon the same mountain, and our view yields different insights. The structural functionalist paradigm is overtaken, and contemporary anthropology takes more of an interest in change than in reconstructing a harmonious past, or the conception of culture as a mechanism of maintaining stasis. Ingold (1993) draws on Heidegger’s notion of dwelling to conceive a landscape that is comprised of the active interrelations of humans and non-humans, brought into being anew in every moment, constantly changing and alive, which I consider well befits the Kaateño worldview or cosmos which I will convey here. It might be said that ‘westernisation’ is so intrinsic to this community, as many others across the world, that anthropology has no choice but to interest itself in change, and to ask how these changes may be different to those of the past, which was of course itself constantly changing. I will here concentrate on the lines (cf. Ingold 2007), both visible, like roads, and intangible, like desires leading to other places, that lead beyond the mountain body to take young migrants to the city or coca fields, or shopholders to buy sweets and crisps in La Paz. I will look at how the mountain landscape is changing, in terms of the relationships which constitute it for those who live there, which total phenomenon of change the term ‘climate change’ denotes for the Kaateños.

The recent revival of interest in animism and the examination of the ontological bases of ethnography (eg. Viveiros de Castro, 1992, 2004, 2013, 2014; Descola, 2013), which Henare et al. (2007) have dubbed the ‘ontological turn’ feeds into my exploration of the landscape which the Kaateños inhabit. Bastien (1972) claims that the Kaateños ‘metaphorically’ ascribe to Kaata the qualities of a living body, that ritualists ‘symbolically’ treat the mountain as a body-being (xiv). Yet he also states that the Andeans do not separate the physical body from the soul, emotions and those characteristics which western epistemes consider of the ‘mind’ or interior (43). As Catherine Allen states, “for Andeans all matter is in some sense
alive, and conversely all life has a material base” (1988:62). The Kaateño ontology as we see it emerging in its classic rendering by Bastien closely resembles what Descola (2013) would describe as totemism, where humans and non-humans share the same exteriority or body, and interiority, or soul. As Bastien’s main informant Marcelino Yanahuaya tells him, “The mountain is like us and we are like it… The mountain has a head where alpaca hair and bunchgrass grow. The highland herders of Apacheta offer llama sacrifices into the lakes, which are its eyes, and into a cave, which is its mouth, to feed the head…. Kaata is the heart and guts. The great ritualists live there. They offer blood and fat to this body. If we don’t feed this body, it won’t feed us. Corn grows on the lower slopes of Niñokorin, the legs of mount Kaata.” (1978:xix).

The ‘mountain metaphor’ is identified as central to Andean culture, a perspective shared by those working across the region including Gose (1994), who criticised the intuitive style of Bastien’s ethnography, and set out to describe more minutely the daily life of Andeans, to establish that the mountain is indeed a “central organising metaphor” in Andean life (1994:235). Gose does not analyse the importance of the mountain as a body but as a social structure visible in rituals and work. The metaphor is present partially across the Andes: Rasnake (1998), for example, reports that among the Yura of central Bolivia mountains had ‘heads’ though not ‘feet’. The Inca empire was conceptualised in terms of a body: chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega reports Cusco was in the secret language of the Incas the ‘bellybutton of the world’, at the centre of the empire (Garcilaso 1966:93). Like the Inca empire, Cusco was divided into four quarters, and during the annual ritual of citua evil would be symbolically passed on from runner to runner along these roads until a river was reached that would take the evil out the social body (ibid.413-7). This is like a ritual for healing misfortune which Bastien describes in Kaata, in which the ashes of burnt ritual items are thrown into the river, which takes them away out of the mountain like the fluids passing through a human body.

To call this body a ‘metaphor’ requires dismissing the mountain as being ‘really’ non-agentive ‘nature’, which science (alone) can describe, and on top of which are laid cultural narratives. With the arguments introduced by Viveiros de Castro (2004, 2013) or Descola (2013), we can shift away from the vision of nature
as external condition about which science seeks to produce truth, underlying all cultural ‘beliefs’ about the world, to investigate landscapes of beings, human and non-human. Ingold criticises the ascription of layers of (cultural) meaning over a (natural) landscape: in his landscape, stories enter into and explain the inherent meanings of places: “whereas with space, meanings are attached to the world, in landscape they are gathered from it” (1993:155). Like Ingold, I do not assume human activity on a blank or de-animated canvas but as inseparable and emerging from the landscape. With the ontological challenge to our assumptions about de-animated nature, we can take the leap of exploring worlds from the inside; rather than saying the Kaateños construct the mountain as a living body, we can say that they inhabit- or rather, inhabited- a mountain which is a living body.

I eventually described the ‘mountain metaphor’ to Donato, the father of the family I stayed with in Kaata, and he initially looked puzzled, before beaming in recognition, and finishing for me- “…and Niñokorin was the legs! Yes, we did use to say that!” He confirmed that they “do not believe this any more”. As we will see here, though the ‘mountain metaphor’ as Bastien phrased it does not enjoy quite the same celebrity as it did, the landscape remains agentful, apt to change, imbued with consciousness and in many complex ways, alive. The mountain is still considered to be sentient and agentive- it is the mountain who will pull a driver off the road, for example, or the spirits of waterfalls who might turn a man into a woman.

Kaata, like the surrounding villages, is known for its Callawayaya healers, who have amassed a considerable and enduring fame for their abilities to cure with plants or coca divination and accompanying rituals, and it is in this latter that the Kaateños are skilled. Callawayaya healers were honoured in Incaic times, and even today the medicine bag with which they would wander the length and breadth of the Andes, healing people from village to village, remains a powerful cultural symbol (Bastien 1978). While Bastien reports a hundred Callawayaya healers in Kaata, today there are three Callawayaya healers registered. ‘Callawayá’ is now becoming used as a largely etic blanket ethnic category for the inhabitants of the region. In the curing rituals which Callawayaya healers in Kaata carried out, Bastien reports, an illness in a human body could be read through through cutting a guinea pig open and looking at its liver, and cured by curing the mountain-body. This symmetry across scale is also the basis of coca leaf divination, still practiced, and is crucial to understanding
Kaateño views on climate change. As many Andean ethnographies have described (see eg. Isbell, 1978; Harris, 1995; Gose 1994), it is through reciprocal exchanges with the living earth that the products of the mountain, the crops which people live off, are grown, and this conception remains animating the landscape. The Kaateño universe dialogues and becomes hybrid with the city, as manifested through the school and migration, as well as climate change workshops.

As we came round the curve of the valley into the tributary valley where Kaata lies on that first day, where would have been visible, were it not for the mist, the glaciated range of Akhamani, chief apu or sacred peak of the region, I mentioned glaciers and Ermeglio commented that the mountain-deity was ‘deshinchandose’, a word commonly used in Bolivia to describe the ‘unswelling’ of a body part, or also the wasting away of the body of a sick person. Such a fluid corporeal term, used to describe a mountain that my western imagination envisioned as a hard stone thing, rather than a soft skin-surfaced thing, subject to changes, caught my attention. The animist landscape was to continue to challenge my assumptions of fixity.

Three: Atanacio and Climate change

By the time Ermeglio and I arrived on the main street in Kaata that first day, we had begun to trust one another. Yet, I was given another test. Ermeglio asked me whether I would like to start working straight away or would like first to ask for permission to start. I replied the latter, seeing as this was my main aim in coming on this first visit. Duly he went to fetch the Mallku, which means Condor, and is the title taken by community leaders. The ayllus have recently decided to substitute some of the syndicalist titles such as Treasurer and Mayor which are a remnant of the 1950s socialist revolution with more traditional Andean names, in line with the indigenist revival which has taken place at the national level. I waited on the main street of the village, near the ambulance. The wet earth was a coffee colour, which had been built up into low walls of adobe bricks along the road before the shadowed outlines of houses, over which hung delicate flowers in flame red, sharp and sudden against the mist.

The Mallku, Atanacio, soon appeared before me, puffing for breath. He had a round, amiable face, sharp eyes under a pink ch’ullu, or cap with ear flaps, striped
with designs in all colours of the rainbow, as was his scarlet poncho. I explained to him I had come to ask if they would like to be part of a study on climate change in the village. I explained this would involve me hanging about there for the next year, chatting to them and helping in the fields and tasks of everyday life, if they were interested. To my delight and relief, he was enthusiastic.

“Yes, we’re very concerned about climate change!” he replied. “With this road coming up here now” - he indicated the dirt track by which we had wound our way up to the village - “the vehicles on it pollute the air.” Shards of plastic waste on the ground, the fragments of crisp and drinking yogurt packaging, were also indicated as contamination, and above all there were batteries. Each battery, I was told with concern, contaminates ten square metres of land, and they had tried to collect them all.

This was to be my introduction to climate change in Kaata. I was to come to see these shards of material waste and fumes as elucidating a story of young people desiring and valuing city clothes, foods and lifestyles more highly than those of the village, and of their concomitant movement to the cities along these roads. They thus cease to feed the mountain with their labour, and climate change describes the weakening of an entire network of human and non-human actors interrelating to compose this landscape. I will take this emic definition of climate change as the framework of this thesis. In subsequent chapters we will explore the draw to the city and coca fields affecting the young migrants, and the difficulty of accessing a cash economy from the village. We will start in Chapter One by exploring the story of contamination and its significance within the Kaateño universe.

What initially summoned my attention in Atanacio’s account was that he talked about climate change in terms of the local and immediate, which contrasted to the treatment of it I was used to in the UK. Atanacio spoke of the mountain and the actions of the people who inhabited it. I was at first surprised that a village of subsistence farmers should apparently hold themselves culpable for what was to my mind a phenomenon to which they were making a minimal contribution, whilst wars for oil raged mercilessly across the Middle East, pipelines sucking out the spoils to economies that constituted themselves through oil, throwing its derivatives on crops as a fertiliser, using it to power their most minute journeys, and wrapping layers of it around every everyday comestibles, creating waste in vast quantities.
which was conveniently taken away and hidden from view. I had been accustomed, as most people in Europe or America, to seeing climate change as someone else’s problem, too great for my daily actions to affect, whilst taking the odd flight or shopping in a supermarket for plastic wrapped goods flown from the other side of the world. The global nature of the problem alienates it from us; climate change is everywhere and yet always somewhere else. In Kaata the series of relationships that constitute climate change and contamination, incorporating the village into the ‘capitalocene’, were visible and evident.

There has recently been debate worldwide, especially among the actors contributing the most carbon gases to the atmosphere, as to what causes climate change, whether it is human, or ‘natural’. The very question of whether it could be entirely due to either is a product of the nature-culture separation. Either climate change comes from humans, on which multiple reports affirm that 97% or more of climate scientists agree\(^3\), in which case we should modify our actions to allay it, or it is ‘natural’, proceeding from the earth itself, thus inevitable and we must modify our actions to adapt to it. The latter view seems largely espoused by Republican politicians in the USA, who are increasingly finding it hard to claim that ‘climate change’ does not exist at all.

In Kaata there was no debate as to whether climate change was happening, in terms of the weather changing, and this was expanded into a narrative of an entire landscape of weakening of humans and non-human actors, the land and winds. The nature of causality here is not uniquely natural or social. For Kaateños the term climate change conjures up a whole complex of contemporary changes in the community, unseparated into ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ categories, without the modern assumption that human agency works upon an inert and waiting nature. Such a world is well expressed by Ingold’s concept of landscape: “In a landscape”, Ingold tells us, “each component unfolds within its essence its relations with each and

\(^3\) See eg. J. Cook, et al, “Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature,” Environmental Research Letters Vol. 8 No. 2, (June 2013); DOI:10.1088/1748-9326/8/2/024024. Quotation from page 3: "Among abstracts that expressed a position on AGW [Anthropogenic, or human-cause, Global Warming], 97.1% endorsed the scientific consensus. Among scientists who expressed a position on AGW in their abstract, 98.4% endorsed the consensus.”

Landscape is relational, and causality is not human centred, in the *causa naturans* sense outlined by Heidegger (1971), making humans the agentive masters of all, but agency is dispersed among humans and non-humans. Ingold introduces a way of seeing across the nature/culture divide, which I am taking as a framework for envisioning the changing Kaateño landscape, with its shifting centres of attraction. Human agency as it is considered in Kaata could be better described by the Heideggerian *causa eficens*, causing the animate world to ‘reveal its nature’. Although Kaateños paint a very clear picture of how their own actions form part of this climate change, they do not claim they can stop it.

My aim is to compare Kaata’s view with other evocations of ‘climate change’, cosmopolitically, drawing worlds together in ‘equivocation’ over a common term. Viveiros de Castro (2015) terms the anthropological act of ‘translation’ between worlds a method of controlled equivocation - controlled in the sense that walking may be said to be a controlled way of falling. Indigenous perspectivism is a theory of the equivocation, that is, of the referential alterity between homonymic concepts. Equivocation appears here as the mode of communication par excellence between different perspectival positions - and therefore as both condition of possibility and limit of the anthropological enterprise. (2015: 5)

As Candea and Alcayna-Stevens (2012) indicate, on closer examination the ‘de-animatory’ western perspective has non-human agency all over it. Latour (2014) explains, looking at a scientific report and an extract from *War and Peace*, that once we scratch the surface moderns constantly admit the agency of actors beyond themselves, and their situation as decision makers within narratives beyond their control. Rather than seeking to place ‘us’ beyond animism in this comparison then, I will show how ideas of climate change in the community and the discourses I am familiar with overlap and converse. The animism of Kaata can highlight and remedy our lack of conceptual apparatus for ascribing agency to the world, before climate change brings this cataclysmically to our attention.

Mario Blaser (2010) conceives worlds interacting in a pluriverse (Schmitt 1996) of spatio-temporal orders or universes. Not only are the multiple ‘natures’ envisioned by different ‘cultures’ equally valid, so are the spatio-temporal orders which they project into the heavens, and in which we find ourselves situated. From this perspective, the Andean cyclical time speaking of the return of serpents and
recurring catastrophes which end ages of the world is as valid a frame for explaining climate change as western science. In Andean thought, it is the *pachakuti*, as we shall see, that calls time on an epoch in a dramatic moment of transformation or ‘world turning over’, as the term literally means, where humans might be reintegrated into the rocky earth that bore them (Classen, 1987; Bouyssse-Cassagne and Harris 1987). Climate change taken scientifically might predict the end of the world, but often lacks evocative narratives to make it convincing and relevant to everyday life.

The view of climate change taken here is scalar, with the local and global intermingling even as they do in the lives of Kaateños. As we climb towards the national level, the story of who is causing climate change and its moral implications becomes an alienated reflection on the scale of the issue and on Bolivia’s relatively meagre capacity for agency in the global environment. This is assisted in the Bolivian case by a feeling of national disempowerment relative to their wealthy neighbours, Chile and Peru, or developed countries more generally, yet resembles the ‘always someone else’s problem’ view of climate change with which I was familiar from the UK. Starting in Kaata, I trace how the vision of the ayllu is integrated into indigenous social movements. We look at how effectively these movements equivocate this cosmos at the national and international level, interweaving the local and global in the manner of Anna Tsing’s (2005) ethnography of connection. Crate (2011) calls for exactly such a cross-scalar use of ethnographic expertise in bringing local perspectives to bear on the global issue of climate change. I believe that the ontologies at play here, those of science and animism, are mutually informative in constructing strategies to understand climate change. Other scholars of climate change (Roncoli, 2006, Crate and Nuttall 2009, Crate 2011) have similarly espoused this approach, which climate change as a global problem requires, bringing local perspectives to bear upon international debates.

Consent and politics of being an outsider

After the ease of my initial reception, consent and being an outsider were to be issues that surfaced constantly in Kaata. Returning to the village for a couple of months in 2013, I was sitting in the monthly community general meeting. I started
making notes, understanding little of what was being discussed at that moment in Quechua, in my notebook, when there was a murmur of disquiet around me, and the authority member with whom I got on best came over and explained to me I would have to leave. The people were suspicious of my writing. When doña Martha, with whom I was living came home, she explained, somewhat hysterically, that she had been told off by the other women for putting me up, as I was supposedly there to ‘steal the culture’.

The village authorities change every year in January, and I did not realise that I was meant to ask for permission to continue my work every year anew. That year’s authorities wanted payment for my being there, which I contested, instead offering my services in the school, and to write a report on climate change for the community instead. Money was insisted on. At the community meetings at which my presence in the community was discussed, I was interested to note that I was fed alongside everyone else; my having to pay for this produce of the community was not even considered, but ‘culture’ had to have a price, else it was being ‘stolen’.

I was interested in these definitions of culture as finite and tangible. Callawaya culture was declared ‘Patrimonio Intangible de la Humanidad’, Intangible Patrimony of Humanity in 2003, a term that can be much abused, as we will see in Chapter Four. The ‘culture’ of the entire region was now ‘protected’. Propelling this measure was Walter Alvarez Quispe, a man from the region who has declared himself the head of the Association of Callawaya Medicine Men, along with his wife, the Bolivian anthropologist Carmen Beatriz Loza. At the first meeting called in the region to discuss the ‘Intangible Patrimony’ status, an assembly of villagers barred Alvarez Quispe and his organisation. Considering the ample reification of culture by those who feel it is being ‘lost’, and their support by prestigious international organisations, it is hardly surprising that my informants should consider it a finite object that can also be stolen.

In my own fieldwork I tried to break with this stranglehold view of what constituted ‘culture’. In their movements between the cosmos of the city and countryside, some of those who I worked with like Ermeglio are aware that the modern perspective strips agency from the elements and confines ‘magic’ to savages like themselves. Fascination with this forbidden magic leads to the

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4 See webpage (http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/RL/00048)
fetishization of those who hold it. Such has been the interest in Callaway rites of healing over the last decades, (eg. Rösing, 2003, 2010), I shied away from asking about them. I felt that by asking specifically about rituals, except in certain contexts, I would make the villagers feel I was exoticising them, or mining them for their valuable remaining commodity, culture. In the context of tense alterity, I could not reduce the Kaateños to a mirror by taking what would be constructed as a predatory attitude to the aspects of their alterity I would, as a modern, be expected to desire the most.

Sanjinés and Bastien: outsiders in Kaata

Over time the character of ‘Sebastián’, as Bastien was known, has become entwined with that of the Bolivian filmmaker Jorge Sanjinés, who made the film ‘Yawar Mallku’ (1969) in the community. People now believe the same man made both the book and film, neither of which they had ever had access to. Both Sanjinés and Bastien worked with Marcelino Yanahuaya, at that time leader of the community, and more open to ‘foreigners’ and outsiders than the rest. Neither had an easy time in convincing the village at large to accept them there; in both cases after initial suspicion, and in Sanjinés’ case, the complete refusal of everyone to come to meetings about the film, the matter was put to the coca, and following favourable readings they were allowed to carry out their projects (Bastien, 1978, Geidel, 2010). We remember Bastien’s statement that the village was “apparently at risk of disintegration due to the influence of foreigners”, and note that at this time also, the discourse of destructive alterity seems to have been rife.

Sanjinés’ film focuses on just the themes of alterity that will here shape the attitudes to climate change across scale. Sanjinés is an established left wing filmmaker whose films incorporate indigenous Bolivian lives and beliefs. In the film, a group of stereotypically arrogant Americans come to the community to set up a clinic secretly sterilising women. Learning of this, the Mallku, played by Marcelino Yanahuaya, leads the community to violently expel the Americans. Using time lapse, this background story is interspersed with the narrative of retribution, in which the Mallku is shot by the local police. His wife takes him to hospital in the city, and struggles to find the money for his treatment. The film was screened at the time in a variety of rural communities across Bolivia.
The film became so well known that it is attributed with having sparked the expulsion of the US Peace Corps from the country (Geidel, 2010) with accusations made in the national press that they were sterilising indigenous women without their knowledge or consent. The Peace Corps did distribute free contraception including coils, though to my knowledge there is no evidence of forced sterilisation having ever been carried out. Preventing the reproduction of the villagers was however a priority of USAid in this period, who espoused the idea of ‘population control’ amongst indigenous masses. The forced sterilisation is a mythic reality which seems to summarise the programme of reducing indigenous births in a manner clearer than the ‘facts’ themselves.

Despite these revolutionary national impacts, which the villagers have unwittingly been part of, they had never had the chance to see the film. There was of course curiosity as to the content of ‘Sebastián’s’ film in Kaata, which older people remembered appearing in. I was happy to able to screen it for the community at the end of my time there, as well as contributing several copies of the DVD and of Bastien’s book, which I hope may have ended up in the school library. Marcelino Yanahuaya’s daughters, Sophia and Valentina, with whom I became friends, were extremely angry about their father’s treatment by both Sanjinés and Bastien. Swayed by this, it seemed to me at first negligent on the part of Sanjinés not to have shown the film in Kaata, yet on reflection, electricity came to the village only a few years before I arrived. The village were also delighted with the images in Bastien’s book. In this case, the Yanahuayas had been able to get their own copy, as Valentina had married a Belgian man who for years worked in the area on a revolutionary education programme. The majority of the village had never seen the text, and were intrigued by it, especially the photos of their relatives and those they knew.

The Yanahuayas made complaints of Bastien mainly because he had not come back: “My father said he was his son! And he never came back to visit him”, said Valentina, in tears. They suffered much criticism from other villagers for their father’s tendency to collaborate with foreigners, which Sanjinés and Bastien were equally considered, it seems. “When my father was laid out in his coffin”, Sophia tells me, “In the community they said, the gringos must have paid for him to have those clothes”. And not a penny had they ever seen! No recognition, he had never
come back. She had gone indeed to La Paz to find Sanjinés when her father died to get money for the funeral, but was not able to find him. Indeed, the director had been expelled from the country, and my Bolivian companion’s explanation of this, when he arrived in the village to screen the film, did something to mollify Sophia. Her father’s stern portrait in red lines adorns the publicity for the film, still hanging in our favourite left wing bar in La Paz, an archetypal ‘red’ Indian leader. On the cover of Bastien’s book, the same Marcelino is performing a ritual, sprinkling blood on a mountaintop, condor-like in his woven poncho.

I eventually asked the village authorities how anthropologists might contribute to the community in a way they would find acceptable. Their specifications were humble, that the fruits of our labours should stay in the community, that there should maybe be a library where young people could read what we had written. Accordingly, I signed a document with the authorities promising to return to Kaata with a report in Spanish on climate change in the village.

Shifting skins

After my ejection from the community meeting, I asked Martha what ‘stealing the culture’ meant; what was this culture that it could be stolen? Culture is clothes, came her rapid and angry response. We have culture, as we have woven clothes, she went on to explain, whereas some of the other villages who have no indigenous clothes do not have culture. Clothes are indeed crucial in constituting identity in Kaata: as we shall see in Chapter Two, obtaining contemporary western clothes was the most frequently stated aim of migration into cash economies. From a city or international view, the reification of indigenous culture also becomes seated in cloth. The city as the capitalist world more generally desires the image of its indigenous other, which woven clothes are key in constituting. The Unesco Callawaya webpage, for example, contains images of people almost exclusively in woven clothes performing rituals or weaving; a picture of a young man setting off for the city in drainpipe jeans and winkle pickers or a miner in their overalls would not communicate the desired alterity.

5 http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/RL/00048
What eventually turned the community in my favour, as nothing else had, was dancing in a pollera, the wide skirt flouncing over many under-layers which typifies the city cholita, or ‘urbanised Indian’ (Lazar, 2004) at the August fiesta, the biggest of the year. I had danced at this fiesta, and others before, and this was looked on with approval, but when I donned Martha’s shimmering turquoise pollera and shawl, there was a notable difference in how people treated me. When I was introduced to new people at the fiesta afterwards, and met with the suspicious looks to which I had grown so accustomed on account of my white appearance, my companions said of me excitedly, “But she danced in a pollera!” clearly meaning that this changed everything. The expressions of interlocutors changed and widened happily in curiosity and acceptance. As we will see in the second chapter, clothing and dance are essential to constituting ethnic identity. I was initially identified as ‘white’ or in Quechua “Q’ara”, constituting the ‘other’ in the relationship of alterity with which Bolivia, in a contemporary moment of racist nationalism, is stricken. By wearing their clothes, I showed I wanted to make myself more Indian and less white.

In the mimetic relationship between self and other, Taussig (1993) identifies clothes as having special power, comprising contact with the ‘other’ through taking on their skin, and copying their image. I was dancing then a dance of alterity, in which clothing communicates delicate shades of a shifting and socially constructed ethnicity. The Kaateño desire to appropriate this other through clothing is currently high, like that of the average tourist in La Paz buying a poncho and ch’ullu, the woollen cap with earflaps. Young people are leaving the community in droves motivated by this desire to appropriate the desired city other, spreading the waves of climate change through the community.

Bolivia: contexts of alterity

In 2008 President Evo Morales expelled the US Ambassador Philip Goldberg. On Mayday 2013 Morales announced he was throwing out USAid, allegedly in response to a US senator’s comment about Latin America being the ‘backyard’ of the USA. USAid is involved in programmes to promote alternative crops to coca, as

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6 Following a first mention in italics, I will incorporate non-English terms into the text without highlighting their ‘foreigness’ with italics.
well as access to health care, and as we have seen has a historical weight of suspicion against it. Controversially the state also expelled in 2013 the Danish NGO IBIS, which was supporting land reform, bilingual education, and the right to prior consultation in the case of development projects on territories held by indigenous peoples. This latter is the issue which indigenous social movements took up as central following the Tipnis crisis\(^7\), which we shall look at in Chapter Four, where the residents of the Indigenous Territory-Natural Park Isiboro Sécure marched against a road the government had planned to run through their territory without initiating the consultation process to which the 2012 constitution gives them the right. IBIS was expelled for ‘political meddling’, though no specific allegations were made.\(^8\)

Defending territory against encroaching foreigners has been a theme surfacing in Bolivia since the popular protests of the Water or Gas Wars of the early 21\(^{st}\) century, huge popular uprisings contributing to a political process challenging the stream of neoliberal reforms, which became consolidated in the election of the Movement Towards Socialism (Movimiento Al Socialismo), Morales’ political party. We will explore the theme of ‘foreigners who steal’ in the third chapter, seeing how this notion emerges from a history of the increasing exclusion of indigenous communities from the benefits of economic growth over the liberal period, and Bolivia’s progress as a ‘poster child’ of neoliberalism since the 1980s, during which time its resources enriched local elites and international companies.

As Albro (2005\(^b\)) claims, indigenous rights became a key articulatory issue for various Bolivian protest movements at the time of these social uprisings. During the Water Wars conflict in Cochabamba in 2000, when the city erupted in protests over the privatisation of the city’s scanty water supply, “a rallying point for this cross-sector and largely city-based movement was the defence of the use and distribution of water as a collective cultural heritage based on indigenous rights, or ‘usos y costumbres’ [customary law], as enshrined in Bolivia’s new multicultural constitution” (Laurie, Andolina and Radcliffe, 2002; see also Olivera and Lewis, 2004, Albro, 2005\(^b\), Perreault, 2008). The MAS took up this politics of indigenous rights. Rallies were held in Quechua, and Albro (2003\(^a\)) notes that while the

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\(^7\) Territorio Indígena Parque Natural Isiboro Sécure  
\(^8\) Bret Gustafson, NACLA, 12/31/2013
President, Evo Morales, does not speak an indigenous language well he was careful to use Quechua or Aymara terms, as well as having the participation of women “de pollera” (those who wear the pollera), as powerful symbols of contemporary city-based indigeneity.

The pollera-dressed women tie the ethnic identification of the MAS to the city. The precursors of the current indigenous movement, the Kataristas of the seventies, are thought to have remained outside of mainstream political power as although they had city-based participants, they remained successful largely in the countryside, failing to attract widespread city support (see eg. Canessa 2007). The Kataristas were born out of the participation of Aymara youth in city universities in the 1960s, who articulated that the indigenous Bolivian people, who they likewise asserted constituted a majority of the population, suffered ethnic discrimination as well as the class discrimination which the socialist 1952 revolution had sought to address. The 1952 revolution had abolished the category Indian in favour of ‘campesino’, or peasant. Silvia Rivera (1987) writes of the Kataristas that the city-based leaders were keener to promote an idealised indigeneity as part of their strategy than their rural based counterparts, calling leaders Mallkus, and conducting ‘indigenous’ rituals. We see that the politics of indigeneity is never free of the mimetic influence of the other, shaping it. Indeed, ‘indigenous’ is a colonial category; the existence of the term implies alterity.

The ‘Gas Wars’ of 2004 consisted in violent conflicts centred in La Paz over a natural gas pipeline to the Pacific via Chile, controversial in the tide of widespread depredation of the country’s resources in an extractive economy supported by neoliberal policies and nationalist resentment towards that wealthy neighbour. Protesters at the edge of the city had blockaded La Paz over the pipeline, and the police and army broke the barricade to free tourists trapped in the town of Sorata, during which protestors were shot. That night, anthropologist Alison Spedding told me, you knew, somehow everyone just knew, that no one was going into work the next day (Spedding, pers. comm., June 2014). The city ceased to go about its daily business, transport stopped, and anarchic riots ensued, about which, arriving ten years later, I heard only fragments while walking through the city with friends. On the outskirts, we saw a petrol station where a woman stealing petrol blew herself up by mistake. In the main square, I was shown the bullet holes in the
buildings made by the police and army firing on each other through the conflict. Why were they firing at each other? I asked my friend, Jorge. Apparently a dispute over the control of the main square had erupted amid the general chaos, with the two liberally bombarding each other from their seats of office.

International networks in Bolivian indigenous movements

From reading accounts and consuming activist media of these uprisings in Cambridge basements as an undergraduate, I had contextualised them in terms of a rebellion to capitalism, yet the clear political narrative of two sides, underdog and overlord, indigenous/ neoliberal, right and left, is rent by these bullet holes, blown up with the unlucky mother. I had been exposed to this framing of the conflict through what was at the time known as the anti-globalisation movement, shaped by Transnational Advocacy Networks, TANs (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), of activists working around moral causes across national borders. In the wake of the Zapatista uprising in Mexico, the uprising which so eloquently put forward the motion of ‘worlds otherwise’, the anti-globalisation movement was hot on the tail of Latin American rebellion, and the riots of Bolivia satisfied the need these activists felt for mobilisation, defying the constraints of citizenship in neoliberal regimes. The anti-globalisation movement in its attitudes towards indigenous uprisings is shaped by a western search for the ideal other, the alternative to neoliberalism.

Albro (2005) notes that it was due to such TANs that Morales came to use the language of the Zapatistas, and represented indigenous peoples of the Americas at international forums. He also benefitted from contributions like the Ayllus movement, an initiative of the Andean Oral History Workshop, Taller Historia Oral Andina (THOA) associated with the construction of Aymara nationalism (Lucero, 2006). In Bolivia, Morales adroitly employed strategic essentialisms to create unity across the Andean region, which significantly were based in the perception of shared experiences of colonial disenfranchisement (Andolina 2001).

The Ayllus movement became the social movement the Conamaq in 1997, the Confederation of Regional Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyo, an indigenous social movement with considerable sway in the country, in which Kaata participates. Qollasuyo is the Quechua name for the Southeast quarter of the Inca Empire that contemporary Bolivia falls within, and the Conamaq operates largely in the
highlands. It is based on a democratic representative structure resembling the British parliament in which each ayllu sends a member to regional councils, and from these a ‘Mallku Nacional’ participates in national level organisation through the legislative seat in La Paz. The Conamaq has bene funded since its inception by UK NGO Oxfam, with the now-expelled Danish NGO IBIS, the Inter-American Foundation, and Plan International (Lucero, 2006). These strong indigenous social movements have inspired the hope of those across the world looking for opposition to the ‘capitalocene’. The main Bolivian social movements formed the Pact of Unity in 1997, agreeing to support one another to increase their national power, in a process that resulted in the election of Evo Morales.

The term indigenous often seems to express in the contemporary context something like ‘the people outside capitalism’, and is sought as a source of alterity which can furnish ways of dwelling in the world without capitalist comforts, or in the case of the Latin American uprisings above, a source of contestation to neoliberal norms. Many narratives of Bolivian resistance contain strategic use of 2001 census data that 62% of the Bolivian population are indigenous, as if this per se was an explanation of their capacity for resistance. Despite this, and confusingly, within Bolivia no one ever admits or claims to be an Indian, and to call someone such would be an insult. Canessa (2007; 2012) indicates ‘indigenous’ and ‘Indian’ have quite different connotations, and while a white city based intellectual might claim to be indigenous, being an Indian is quite a different thing, associated with poverty and the inability to cope with urban life.

While highlanders who I met were comfortable with the idea of lowlanders being indigenous, I never heard this term used self-referentially in the highlands either. The coca farmers or other highlanders like the Kaateños would call themselves peasants, a specific ethnic name like Callawaya or originarios, originary peoples, yet they would not use the term indigenous. In highland discourse ‘indigenous’ can be used to describe lowland tribes, who are also sometimes referred to as ‘bow and arrow Indians’. Canessa (2014) explains that colonists who move to the lowlands claim to be showing indigenous people the nature of hard work, civilising their idle and unproductive lands. There are thus evident differences between identities in Bolivia which internationally we might classify as indigenous.
Canessa observes that indigeneity is the foundation of a new nationalism. Morales in approximately 2002 adopted the rhetoric of indigenous peoples as the moral guardians of the indigenous state (Canessa 2014). As with the Kaateños of Bastien’s day, there is a fear that the country is being broken down by the political agency of foreigners, and the best defence against this is indigeneity. The issue is with which indigenous peoples Morales is talking about, Canessa claims, indicating that he speaks of indigenous peoples as a widespread class or majority subaltern. Of the 62% who self-identified as part of an ‘indigenous ethnic group’ in the 2001 Bolivian Census, 51% are city dwellers. When we consider the coca growers and other highland colonists to the lowlands in addition to this, it makes a sizeable number of what Canessa terms ‘deterritorialised’ indigenous peoples, who are he claims the base who Morales is representing. As profit-making monocrop cultivators, coca growers have different sets of priorities to highland peasants or jaqi, to whom they frequently claim to be superior as the jaqi have no money. Like city dwellers they wish to increase their consumption, and they fiercely oppose large foreign companies who they claim are impoverishing the country (Canessa 2014).

Like the Kaateños, this large class of ‘deterritorialised’ urban and coca growing highland migrants would not call themselves indigenous, and this influences Morales’ usage of this laden concept on the national stage, though he may use it strategically in international contexts. While speaking from the ruins of the Aymara city state (300BC- 300AD) of Tiahuanaco, on the ‘Aymara New Year’ might seem to lay claim to an indigenous identity to western eyes, within Bolivia an Aymara identity is palatable to highlanders who would not call themselves indigenous. Coca leaves, as Grisaffi (2010) indicates, are similarly used by Morales and the coca growers’ movement to symbolically appropriate what westerners would think of as an indigenous identity, while these actors would not call themselves indigenous either. Neither would they refer to themselves as jaqi, for this holds connotations of poverty and community life. Like the city dwellers, however, they might call themselves originarios, originary peoples. The mosaic of identities within Bolivia means that what might pass for indigenous on an international stage is at home quite differently classified.

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In Chapter Four we will explore the de facto treatment of certain indigenous subjects when they come into conflict with the exploitation of national resources. In the wake of the 2011 Tipnis march and its political aftermath, Morales has been widely accused of having a ‘double discourse’ towards indigeneity and the environment, or of hypocritically not living up to the discourse he was promulgating. The Conamaq went as far to say that the current government were the same as previous colonial governments, and the leader of the Conamaq when I interviewed him the following year in 2012 said that the MAS government were “not indigenous”. Indigeneity is an ideal pole of identity in Bolivia that is ever shifting, indeed I would argue that as a term in popular usage it connotes marginality, with associations of pristine ‘nature’, and ‘the people outside of capitalism’, an ideal that always shifts as actors compromise with development and the fruits of modernity.

Bolivian indigenism has been shaped by an international context, as we see in the TANs comprising the Conamaq, as well as in various initiatives from the UN in the country including UNESCO’s “Best Practice of Indigenous Knowledge” and UNDP’s “Indigenous Knowledge Program”, or the World Bank in the 1990s conducting a series of workshops aimed at ‘ethnodevelopment’ in worldwide indigenous contexts (Lucero 2011). Canessa (2012) indicates that the international interest in indigeneity affects how actors in Bolivia, as in many countries (see eg. Tsing 2005) present themselves, and that it has influenced the formation of ethnic identities. These dynamics are exemplified by the case of the Lecos in Chapter Four, apparently a lowland indigenous group that as we shall see metamorphosed out of highland migrants to the coca fields of Apolobamba, who began to claim the identity of a vanished group to access land and traditional coca production allowances. They took on with this international funding and ‘ecological’ tropes of behaviour such as opposing the construction of a road and hydrocarbon exploitation on their new territory. Rather than searching for the indigenous other, characterised by cultural continuity over time, racial separation, and an idealised alterity, we can explore its construction in contemporary situations.

The championing of indigeneity has become fused with nationalism and sovereignty, especially over the resources extractive industries were siphoning away, such that in the current context, under an ‘indigenous president’, indigenous
and national are merging as categories, and the white elite and foreigners become the other to this nebulous confraternity, which would not call itself Indian or indigenous, though its leader might speak wreathed in coca leaves from the archaeological site of Tihuanaco. On the national stage Morales talks in terms of the Bolivian people, using the symbols of Aymara nationalism, or coca growing, consolidating a national identity which is an acceptable way of talking about ‘non white’ identities.

Impact of Social Movements and TANs under the MAS

Social movements like the Conamaq have been empowered as part of an indigenous revival under the MAS, with the apparent aim of bringing the perspectives of communities like Kaata onto the national agenda. Atanacio’s work for the Conamaq as Mallku of Kaata led him to participate in the La Plataforma Nacional Frente al Cambio Climático, the Bolivian Platform for Climate Change, which aims to develop legislation on climate change, shaping policy at a national level. The Platform is comprised of international NGOs including again OXFAM International, as well as fellow British NGOs Christian Aid and CAFOD, along with the Conamaq, The Bartolina Sisa Movement, CIDOB, the federation of lowland indigenous movements, the peasant workers’ union the CSUTCB, and CPESC (the Confederation of Ethnic Communities or Towns of Santa Cruz). Fabricant (2013) reports that Platform members feel they have influenced the government, with Morales making outspoken arguments that “the climate is not for sale” at UN Climate Change conferences. The ability of this initiative to bring the attitude towards of total responsibility for the surrounding environment we see in Kaata to actually shape practice at the national level has been limited, however. In an interview with the Ministry of the Environment in La Paz I was told that Bolivia was making no efforts to mitigate climate change, as the country’s overall contribution to global climate change is negligible.

In 2010, Morales called the People’s World Conference for Climate Change in Cochabamba, an international meeting of climate activists, in response to the lack of progress in the Copenhagen Climate change summit earlier that year. A major thrust of the conference was to support Morales’ proposal of ‘climate debt’, already made before the UN, which rich countries owe to the developing world as
compensation for having taken up most of the ‘carbon space’ in the atmosphere to date. The Conamaq voiced their concerns about the contrast between the MAS’ extractivist policies and its proposals for climate justice at the conference, and were consequently ejected. They set up the alternative Mesa 18, which called for the expulsion of all extractive industries from Bolivia (Weinberg, 2010). Appealing to wealthy countries to tackle climate change, and transfer vast amounts of money to the developing world because of it, Morales manages to champion indigenous and pro-climate rhetoric whilst diverting attention from his less than ecologically sound policies including expanding resource extraction.

Among the official outcomes of the conference were a call for the return to the ayllu structure and the extension of the ‘Vivir Bien’, claimed to be an alternative to development proceeding from indigenous cultures, which we shall look at in detail below. As Fabricant (2013) indicates, these strategies fail to make concrete proposals for climate change adaptation and mitigation. A national strategy that would actually address climate change requires the bridging of urban and rural areas, and reflection on consumption and extractive models of development. An over-reliance on ‘free-floating’ indigenous constructs such as the ayllu can dangerously distract attention from the issues, and these ideas can easily be refashioned to serve right wing agendas (Fabricant, 2013). That is, the set of associations made by the international context with indigeneity can blind them to the reality of what is happening when such terms are bandied about.

The conference also resolved to create The Law of Mother Earth (Ley de Madre Tierra, LMT), drawn up by the social movements of the Pact of Unity after months of workshops and then reworked and passed in a modified version by the relevant Ministries in 2013. The LMT was an effort to extend human rights beyond humans to ‘nature’. This coincides with the return which Latour (2014) advocates to work with Gaia as an entity: “the old metaphor of the political body might take on a new lease of life, if it is another name for living with Gaia” (2014:128). Living with Gaia for Latour would involve the politicisation of all actors, human and non-human. We notice here that Gaia as Latour indicates resembles the structural functionalist ‘body’ metaphor, only reconfigured to cross natural and social lines, resembling the body of the Kaateño mountain. The LMT also seems to coincide with an animist rural cosmos like that of Kaata.
Such animist worlds of non-human political actors are having an increasing presence in contemporary activism and mainstream politics. As de la Cadena (2010) indicates, in Peruvian mobilisations to stop open cast mining on the sacred mountain Ausangate, activists claimed it was an earth spirit and would cause accidents if the mine were allowed. She reflects that the composition of the modern necessarily excludes all that science has termed ‘nature’; that “science and politics are to each other like water and oil: They do not mix” (2010:342). The prominence of indigenous movements at national level has reshaped the political, she argues, exposing the underlying hegemony of a single nature about which many cultures may have ‘beliefs’, and opening modernism to equivocation from worlds otherwise at the level of national politics.

Legislation like the LMT was widely hoped to constitute an opening to the pluriverse, the many possible universes or alternative cosmos ‘cultures’ can open up. However, there was widespread discontent with the long awaited final Law of Mother Earth as drafted by the Ministries, which drew immediate criticism from the Conamaq. In an open letter to the President of the Chamber of Deputies⁹, the Conamaq claim that the law is geared towards finding a way to promote extractivism, a form of development which puts people first, and so has a different emphasis from the original law, which sought to put the earth first rather than development. The eventual law, in comparison to the original, “plantea un modelo de desarrollo antropocéntrico supuestamente en armonía con la Madre Tierra pero no subsumido a ésta (“proposes a model of anthropocentric development supposedly in harmony with the mother earth but not subsumed by it”, my translation). The modified law fundamentally alters the concept of ‘the good life’, the ‘Vivir Bien’ envisioned by the movements, the letter claims:

The project only conserves the ‘Vivir Bien as an alternative vision of civilisation to capitalism’ and ‘harmony with the mother earth’ as propaganda. The project does not propose a change in the structural bases of the capitalist system, or a reconfiguration of the nation state”. (Conamaq, 23rd August 2013, my translation).

This thesis will explore the journey from the village to the national political level, considering climate change as a cosmopolitics incorporating non-human actors. As we shall see, travelling ‘upstream’ non-human actors are forgotten in a human-centred modern politics which considers the earth as ‘natural resources’ to be exploited, and is fascinated with its ethnic others, within and beyond the nation. Failing to take the equivocation of the indigenous movements seriously, it sends the indigenous back to the acceptable and subordinate realm of “be our other so we do not ossify, but in such a way as we are not undone”, which is according to Povinelli (2001:329) what liberalism demands of indigeneity.

The Vivir Bien

The ‘Vivir Bien’ is a supposedly indigenous concept of ‘living well’ that in fact evolved out of workshops held by a group of La Paz based intellectuals, including Simon Yampara, Javier Medina, Dominque Temple and Jaqueline Michaux, during the 1990s. The concept was made public by Medina in a publication funded by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in Bolivia in 2001. It has since become phenomenally successful. It is ‘one of the structuring principles of the country’, according to Article Two of the Bolivian Constitution. The National Development Plan, of which it is identified as the core goal, defines it thus: “the Vivir Bien will be understood as the access and enjoyment of the material goods and of subjective intellectual and spiritual fulfilment, in harmony with nature and in community with human beings” (2006:10). The concept is now used in development discourse up and down the Americas. I find it exemplifies the dynamics of alterity we are here focusing on.

The Vivir Bien also presents interesting challenges to the perceived efficacy of incorporating ‘indigenous ontologies’, into a national perspective. In the rendering of key theorist Javier Medina, the concept is elaborated to include the

10 Programa de Apoyo a la Gestión Pública Descentralizada y Lucha contra la Pobreza de la Cooperación Técnica Alemana- Program for Assistance of Public Decentralised Growth and Struggle Against Poverty of the German Technical Cooperation. Such an organisation might commonly be known as an aid agency in English, but cooperation and aid are two quite different concepts, and doubtless it is called this for a reason.

11 “el Vivir Bien será entendida como el acceso y disfrute de los bienes materiales y de la realización efectiva, subje- tiva, intelectual y espiritual, en armonía con la naturaleza y en comunidad con los seres humanos”.

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non-separation of nature and culture, of humans from their surrounding landscape, and including the dimensions of the mythic and the sacred. Medina states: “in this model of austerity, equilibrium and sufficiency of what is good, beautiful and necessary, nothing is excluded, neither the gods nor nature”\(^{12}\) (2001:33). That the Andean landscape is inhabited by spirits and non-determined by western categories of nature and culture, is something Andean ethnography has widely indicated. The categories of austerity and sufficiency are more controversial. While classic ethnographies of the 1970s depict rural communities without the luxuries of capitalism, whether this ‘austerity’ is chosen in the current context of neoliberalism is highly debateable. The Vivir Bien emanates from city-based projections positing the indigenous as the ideal ‘alter’ to the urban, immune to its temptations, who would choose austerity over abundance, equilibrium over a plasma screen TV.

The GTZ workshops were contemporaneous with an effort to translate the concept of ‘development’ into native languages in Bolivia. The workshops came up with the term Suma Qamaña, which they claimed to be an indigenous term. Javier Medina (2011:39) for example states that “there is no adequate translation into Spanish for the Suma Qamaña”, and then loosely calls it the ‘Vivir Bien’. In fact the act of translation is quite the reverse. Alison Spedding (2010) had never heard in her Aymara speaking fieldsite the term Suma Qamaña used, and if it had meaning in Aymara, she thought, it might mean something like ‘remaining in the house rather than working’ (2010). A team of researchers for a body called the UDAPE studied the state of the Vivir Bien across the nation, working with 21 communities across 14 indigenous language groups. They found that only the leaders of the indigenous communities they worked with were familiar with the term, through the national political discourse (Raul Rodriguez, personal communication; UDAPE report). Defining the Vivir Bien in a meaningful way in order to assess how the rural communities felt about it, the researchers had to return to the definitions in the constitution or national development plan, derived from the urban intellectuals, analysing the communities’ well-being according to clearly etic criteria. The Vivir Bien is thus created in the city in the image of indigenous

\(^{12}\text{En este modelo de austeridad, equilibrio y suficiencia de lo bueno, bello y necesario, nadie debe ser excluido, ni los dioses ni la naturaleza}’”
peoples. This is a process of mimesis, or imitation, whereby the city is apparently being led by the countryside, yet in fact transforms it into its ideal other.

One of the defining characteristics of the Vivir Bien is that it proposes an alternative to neoliberal development. In a 2011 academic publication on the Vivir Bien from the School of Social Sciences of the University de San Andrés en La Paz, funded by Oxfam, Evo Morales defines Vivir Bien in the following way:

The Vivir Bien as a form of life, of relating to nature, of complementarity between peoples is part of the philosophy and practice of the Indigenous Peoples. In this way, it does not only lay bare the structures of the crises (nutrition, climate, economy, energy) which our planet it undergoing, it proposes a profound criticism of the system that is devouring human beings and nature: the world capitalist system. While the indigenous peoples propose the ‘Vivir Bien’ for the world, capitalism is based on ‘living better’. The differences are clear: the living better means living at the expense of the other, exploiting the other, stripping natural resources, raping the mother earth, privatising basic services; by contrast the Vivir Bien is living in solidarity, in equality, in harmony, in complementarity, in reciprocity”. (Morales, 2011, my translation and emphasis).

The Vivir Bien is created in the city and then applied to the countryside, claiming to be a rural critique of capitalism. Capitalism is defined according to its exploitation of ‘the other’ and of the landscape. The other which is referred to is the Indian other, defined here in terms of its exploitation by capitalists. The two are mutually constituting identities.

Pachakuti

As early as 2002, Morales encouraged supporters- “Let us walk together in a pachakuti!” (Canessa, 2012). Pacha is a spatio-temporal construct constituting an entire world, a cosmos (Bouysse- Cassagne and Harris, 1987), and kuti describes a turning over, or an alternation of two parts exchanging via reciprocity (Mannheim 1986). A pachakuti thus describes a world turning over, a sense of cataclysmic change in which time and space, the world itself, is reconfigured, which Mannheim (1986) defines as a change in the ontological bases of existence. Morales frames the Spanish conquest of Bolivia as such a pachakuti, an inversion of the world order, in which the indigenous were pushed below and white people came to be above.
Calling for another pachakuti, Morales claims to be reversing the tide of this historic shock. He styles himself as inheritor of a longstanding Andean myth of return to a just order that includes the Andean revolutionary leaders Tupac Amaru and Tupac Katari, in a discourse of recovering national resources from foreigners and decolonising the country. As we see above, the social movements complain that the changes Morales is effecting do not constitute a fundamental change to the capitalist system or state, which might truly constitute a pachakuti in the sense of an ontological change, opening up of the pluriverse, and the inclusion in national politics not only an ethnic class but also of its accompanying cosmopolitics, challenging the very bases of the system. The change Morales is effecting, I will argue, is increasingly evident as the rise of Indians within a capitalist system.

Altery emerges a key theme in this thesis. As we look at ethnic dynamics within Bolivia, I keep in sight the construction of alterity in relation to the concept of the ‘west’, which I do not use in the sense of a geographical location, but as a category of continuing relevance in actors’ constructions of self and other. The west as Stuart Hall (1992) indicates is an entity defined by its alterity to a (post) colonial other. One reads in the media of the ‘westernisation’ of peoples formerly living life outside of a consumer capitalist ‘imagined community’, defined by consumption of common media like newspapers and television shows, and its common goals, such as wealth or ‘development’, and the capitalist means it uses to obtain them. This alterity feeds into and from the indigenous context in a hall of mirrors of selfhood/alterity. In this thesis I shall strategically employ this notion of a ‘west’, in the sense of a community imagined by those within or beyond it (Anderson, 1991), as it is fundamental to the thought of the actors involved. As we have seen, climate change is also riven with alterity, as it is thought more likely to affect those non-western peoples which modern thinking confines to ‘nature’, the indigenous.

Dualism of two mutually constituting and antagonistic principles is widespread in the Andean countryside (for overview see Gelles, 1995), as it is indeed in the ‘west’. Levi-Strauss (1959, etc) argued that this binarism was a universal structure underlying the human mind and shaping culture. Structuralism influenced many classic Andean ethnographies of the 1970s. Tristan Platt (1986) identified the constant attempt in Andean culture to make equal two complementary opposites, like man and woman, through yanantin, following the logical thesis,
antithesis and synthesis structure proposed by Levi Strauss. Alternatively, one of these opposites can alternatively violently succeed the other in a pachakuti. I will show here how a structure which has been seen as typical of the indigenous countryside continues to be formative in contemporary Bolivia at the national level.

In Chapter One we look at climate change within Kaata’s landscape of small-scale subsistence agriculture. Waste materials from used commodities such as plastics and batteries are identified as ‘contamination’\textsuperscript{13} crucial to this climate change. They are evidence of the young people’s desire for commodities coming from beyond the community. In Chapter Two, we explore the desires that lead people to migrate out of the community, the nature of their attraction to the city. This chapter illuminates the contemporary dynamics of alterity prevalent in the country, and shows how these are in their roots connected to an Andean dualism. Whether the new MAS regime and social movements can do anything to change this situation, reversing years of discriminatory policies against small-scale rural producers, I explore in the third chapter, with the account of a young man who attempts to return from the city to Kaata, and set up a small chicken battery to make some money. He considers this income a sine qua non of remaining in the village, underlining the importance of having access to the cash economy for young villagers. The reciprocal economy, whilst it can provide food, does not bring consumer goods like mobile phones or American clothes, which young people desire, and must be brought for money.

In Chapter Four, we examine the Tipnis conflict, in which Morales’ high handed treatment of lowland indigenous peoples led many, including indigenous social movements, to complain that the government was “no different from previous extractivist governments”. This I will argue puts them on the white/coloniser side of the ethnic dualism the electorate use to categorise the world, and thus lost them much support. At this level too, Andean dualism is influential in reproducing worlds. We discuss whether the MAS efforts to effect a pachakuti, turning the world over to create an Andean revival, are felt as such in Kaata, where other ideas about the end of the world are associated with climate change.

\textsuperscript{13} Contaminación, in Spanish. A more common translation of this would be pollution, yet I feel contamination better expresses the creeping process of harmful change which the Kaateno use of the word expresses than the airy pollution.
Methodology

I divided my time between the La Paz and Kaata, approaching the village as a multi-local site. Since early on I have been interested in constructing an ethnography that explored the overlapping spaces of countryside and city, which are often treated as separate in anthropological literature. While Bastien’s ethnography like many of its generation sought to ignore the traces of the urban in the rural, I was fascinated by the transformation in the landscape the pull to the urban exerted. Several community members who were key informants spend part of their time in the village and part in La Paz: the amiable don Luis, taking the bus a couple of times a week to stock his sweetshop; the Mallku Atanacio, travelling to conduct Conamaq business for periods of several weeks at a time; or Alejo, motoring about to attend his mine and sell minerals. I often accompanied them on their journeys.

This multi-local approach was appropriate- indeed necessary- because of the extent of migration from contemporary Bolivian villages. Indeed very few working age people live in the village all the time; it is mainly inhabited by elderly parents and young children. To include the entire demographic, movement was necessary. Blending the urban and rural was also part of the habitus of the people I worked with, along with the rituals, like washing before going to the city, or putting on rubber tyre sandals on return, the marked the transition between the two. I had hoped to have time to explore the world of the cocaleros of Kaata in the lowlands too, but due to temporal constraints and the difficulty of locating people - they are dispersed through the coca growing valleys - I had to renounce this ambition. Fortunately I have been able to rely on the fascinating work of Francis Ferrié, who completed his thesis on the coca zones of Apolobamba in January 2014 (see Chapter Four).

I travelled to Kaata initially, as described at the opening of this account, in November 2010, to solicit permission for my research. Having gained this, and been advised to learn Quechua, I spent a couple of months studying the language in La Paz and Cochabamba, and visiting family in the UK at Christmas. During this period I was introduced to Clotilde and her family, and we agreed that I would rent her brother Edwin’s house in Kaata, which he was then completing. Unfortunately, I then became rather ill, and needed
to fly back to Europe in March. In April I returned to Bolivia and went immediately
to Kaata, walking up the mountain and seeing the house I would live in there for the
first time. I returned to Kaata with Edwin, Clotilde, Alejo and their children in June
for two weeks during the fiesta described in Chapter Two, when I equipped my
house. In August I returned to Kaata with the family for another two week stay
around the festival of Santa Rosa.

In September I spent the month researching the Tipnis march, which was at
that time making its way to La Paz. I joined the march encamped in the coca
regions, as well as on its entry into La Paz, and hosted a family of marchers in the
house I shared there. The Tipnis seemed to neatly embody the principles of alterity
that I was discovering characterised climate change and indigenous politics in
Bolivia. It was crucial in drawing attention to the ‘doble cara’, the two-faced
attitude that Evo Morales had heretoforth been employing in portraying himself
internationally as an ‘indigenous ecologist’, and nationally pursuing a politics of
extractivism. Such was the relevance of this contemporary event to the themes I
was studying, and contemporary climate change and indigenous politics more
widely, that I thought it wise to extend my fieldsite again, involve myself in it and
include it here.

In October, Edwin lost his job as a security guard, and we agreed he would be
my research assistant in Kaata. I then spent most of the following four months in
Kaata with him. I spent approximately one week each of these months in the
capital. I knew by this time Kaata’s political leaders and followed the Conamaq
activities in the city, as well as visiting my urban informants. In February I returned
to the city after carnival for several weeks. I spent most of March in Kaata and part
of April in La Paz before flying back to the UK mid way through the month.

I returned to Bolivia twice whilst writing up, for two months July- September
2013, and one month in June- July 2014. During the first trip I spent nearly all my
time in Kaata, and the second trip one week there, a second based in a nearby
village where they were realising the Vivir Bien tourism projects described in the
conclusion, and another two weeks in the city. In total therefore I spent
approximately eight months in the rural fieldsite, one month investigating
the Tipnis, and twelve months in La Paz.
Multi-localism is inherent to climate change, which challenges us into embracing a global imaginary. In this thesis I take a scalar approach, starting with the articulation of the local in Kaata’s animist cosmos of climate change, then tracing attempts of social movements like the Conamaq to equivocate such worlds at the national and international levels in legislation and climate change forums. I trace the impact of this discourse at national governmental level, looking at the shift to a human centred landscape of alterity it describes. A multi-local approach is thus essential. The ethnographic materials I have included here are thus from a variety of relevant locations, from a cafe on the Ceja between La Paz and El Alto, to Kaateño houses and mines, and the headquarters of the Conamaq.

I chose Kaata as a fieldsite due to my longstanding admiration for Bastien’s Mountain of the Condor, and considering that revisiting the same place would enable me to discuss change from the times and landscape he described to that of the present. Despite my studying Quechua, and the assurances of the authorities on my first visit that “here it is all Quechua”, fieldwork in the village was eventually conducted mainly in Spanish. I had far better access to younger people of my own age, who speak fluent Spanish, and found it the more appropriate language for an outsider like myself. Many of the older people also spoke good Spanish, and my research assistant, Edwin, aided me where necessary, translating conversations with his older relatives.

At the start of my fieldwork period I was contacted by an MA student in Biology from La Paz who requested that I assist her in researching Kaata’s attitudes to climate change, in western sense, through getting people to fill in questionaires. I was paid a small salary for several months to collect the information she required, which I thought I might easily do alongside my own work. Edwin and I carried out two interviews before I realised that this was a futile method. Although Edwin’s aunt gave us a good interview, which he translated for me from my voice recorder, his grandfather, Don Ramón, considered the paid survey an insult and deliberately answered the opposite of what he really thought to each question, even with the mediation of his grandson. This prejudiced the otherwise good relations that I was establishing with this proud and redoubtable figure. I thus eventually asked Edwin to draw up the table in Figure Two, describing the agriculture of the region, which gives detailed responses to the biologist’s questions. She found the material was not
useful to her, after shifting the focus of her project, so did not eventually use it. Irrigation systems were central to her study, and on finding Kaata mainly used rainfall irrigation, she decided to switch to another site. I find Edwin’s table is however an excellent clear summary of the agricultural activities of the village, and use it here for several purposes (see Figure Two).

I was eventually able to arrange a meeting with the community to talk specifically about climate change. I am citing this at length, along with a few other accounts I was able to record with a dictophone, in Chapter One, and can thus analyse in detail and reproduce accurately how Kaateños speak about climate change. I wish by this to convey the texture of the speech of the Kaateños, allowing these voices to come through and shape my narrative, and comparing and translating through close textual analysis their and my perspectives on the ‘climate change’. I am thereby aiming to bring worlds together in a controlled equivocation (Vivieros de Castro 2015) on a common term, as explained above.

For similar reasons it seemed appropriate with concepts for which there is no adequate translation like *ayni* or *pachakuti*, after an initial italicised mention to bring them into the main body of the text rather than to continue to exoticise them with italics. Neither the ethnographies of Bastien (1978) or of Gose (1994), for all their difference of approach, contain much in the way of their informants’ voices. Some quotations are integrated into the text in the manner of a conversation, rather than shrunk and indented, as I try to allow these voices to speak with equal resonance as my own. I am thus analysing climate change as a contemporary discourse of Kaata, a conversation between myself and members of the community.

As I have detailed above, alterity made fieldwork complicated as Kaateños, like many Bolivians, have very fixed ideas of what foreigners are like, and I had constantly to battle against preconceptions of myself as ‘the rapacious capitalist’. Changing dress, I eventually worked out, was the clearest way of challenging these preconceptions. I didn’t become indigenous by donning a pollera, yet the effort was appreciated. Simply being white was considered a challenge, an assertion of cultural or racial superiority. Dressing in a pollera was a way of demonstrating my intention to become like the other, of making myself more Indian rather than emphasising my whiteness. When I wore this to dance about the village, as I have
described, it was especially significant. In Chapter Two we explore further the role of dance and dress in creating ethnic identities.

The village authorities change every year, and considered that I had to ask for permission every year anew also, which took me a while to work out, as I mentioned above. At a meeting to justify my work in the community with the authorities some time after I had started fieldwork I was aggressively and repeatedly asked what right I thought I had coming to the village, when the villagers could not walk around freely in ‘my country’. The Mallku at this time was of the MAS, who have sought to control foreigners working in the country. When I finally had the chance to speak, after about half an hour, I told them I had come from the heart of capitalism, a country fenced in with cities, where we had no way of living without working for another, to find out how free people lived. This was accepted in a silence that contrasted to the preceding barrage of angry and drunken accusations. I also said that if it were up to me they would be able to walk about freely in my country, that human beings should all be able to freely exchange with and learn from one another. When the authorities perceived that I respected them, and was coming to work with them without assumptions of cultural superiority, without trying to objectivise them as a curio of the scientific world, but in a spirit of humble learning, to understand what they might teach me, they were happy (after of course charging me for several crates of beer to seal the deal) to let me stay and work.
Chapter One: Climate Change in Kaata: A Comparative View

I will elaborate in this chapter on the narratives of climate change I found in Kaata. Rather than viewing the Kaateños as ‘victims’ of climate change, caused by a uniquely agentive western other, I will look at how climate change and contamination are considered to be acting within the landscape of Kaata, which is one inhabited by spirits crucial to the crops and human health. I address this to the international debate on whether climate change has human or natural causes, and present a vision that does not separate nature/culture, but sees agency as dispersed through a ‘landscape’ (Ingold, 1993, 2000) of human and non-human beings. By contrasting Kaateño and western landscapes, I show how the west seeks for an ideal ‘other’ in such indigenous peoples. The Kaateño world shown here does not on the whole contradict but embraces scientific narratives, where it encounters them, incorporating them into its worldview. The Kaateño view of non-human centred relational causality can contribute to an understanding of climate change by expanding isolated variables such as waste plastics or changing temperature into a network of interrelating human and non-human actors. It thus presents ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) from a modern mentality, which coincide with those of actor-network theory.

The neighbour: elemental agency

In the sunshine after the August fiesta in Kaata, I spoke to a neighbour over his garden wall, just behind the main road where I had first met Atanacio in the mist many months before. It was now the dry season, time of festivities, and around us the spread pollera skirt of the mountain terraces dried to golden dust as we awaited the start of the next rainy season in October. I nibbled on mint leaves growing out of the mazily arranged stones in the wall between the two yards, and the neighbour urged me to take as many of them as I liked. The level of the neighbour’s head was above mine, his yard being higher than that of that year’s leader of the community, don Gabriel, where I stood, and as we spoke I could see the sunlight on the thin grass of the upper pastures rising up behind the village, below the new mobile phone mast which had since my first visit been installed, connecting Kaateños to
each other and those beyond the village, to streams of videos on the internet, as well as into an economy manufacturing mobile phones.

We chatted a while, and I explained that my research was on climate change. The man spoke good Spanish, having once, he said, worked as a guide leading tourists up Akhamani, the glaciated peak visible across the valley, towering over everything. He was of an age to have grown-up children. He took up the theme of climate change with enthusiasm, and explained with concern that people in Kaata ‘before’, “would live until they were 120, and there was no sickness. Now we have more illnesses. I’ve got a sore throat, for example”.

“Me too”, I said.

“In those times”, he continued, “everything was different, the sun, winds, air, were different”.

We see here something of the complete change in the elements which for Kaateños comprises ‘climate change’. These high level shifts are connected to changes in human beings and the local landscape of fields and pastures. In those days, the man goes on to tell me, people ate the produce of the place, and he lists-oca, potatoes, wheat, barley, peas, beans and maize. Now people eat rice, pasta and city foods, which don’t have the same, and here he pauses- vitamins. “The children are different now”, he continues, the narrative seamlessly turning to humans. “We would obey our parents. Now you see them- pierced ears, lips, chin, nail varnish. We didn’t have those things before. And all manner of haircuts, colours! We used to give our children tostadas of maize, beans. They eat yoghurt now, and rice, pasta- those things. You can’t stop it. And their parents want them to be educated, while they only want machines”. I ask if, with the government’s agricultural sovereignty schemes, which might create cash income from agriculture in the village, inducing the young people to stay, climate change might be stopped. The man throws up his hands and laughs. “No, you can’t stop it! The contamination is borne on the wind, from other places, big factories…”

In Kaata climate change is an integrated discourse which tells of change across the landscape as a whole. ‘Climate change’ here described a network of actors, human and non-human, rather than restricting itself to the weather, as I was used to hearing it framed in the UK. Occurring beneath great powers, like the sun and winds, for this man it involved the actions of the young people, the
transformation of their desires towards commodities which come from outside the community, describing change in the entire landscape of the village. We remember Atanacio’s shards of plastic, the waste of consumer desires leading migrants towards the city. Suffusing this living landscape, the Kaateñño idea of climate change is dialectic; change in each sphere occurs interrelationally with changes in other spheres. We will look here at the ‘movement’ of the agricultural products, the plagues that afflict the crops and animals, as they do human health, and the health of the earth. I will here try to reproduce this interconnectedness rather than unilateral rational causality as I construct a narrative connecting them. I wish it to be understood that for the sake of analytical clarity elements such as the health of humans and plants, and migration will be taken in turn, though these are splitting incisions into a rhizomatic network narrative. Whether we talk of the crops or of human health, just as in Bastien’s day there is similarity across scale; this node is connected to every other of the narrative.

Idelfonso’s climate change workshops: tracing the discourse

In elucidating what climate change is for the Kaateñños, I will start by tracing how the term arrived in the village in the first place, and how it is reinterpreted and becomes a discourse proper to Kaata. Idelfonso, a campesino from the neighbouring village of Amarete, accustomed to working at the national level as an area representative, both for the Conamaq and for the MAS, five or six years ago led workshops on climate change in the area for the Ministry of the Environment. Since this time, he tells me, the villages talk about the contaminating effects of waste items like plastics and batteries. The workshops took place before I was in Kaata, yet I was fortunately able to talk to Idelfonso about them, and hear his perspective on climate change.

The workshops seem to have focused on the communities’ own waste, the theme of which they have taken up seriously. One wonders what motivated workshops with this content- in the city where the Ministry sits, litter is widespread, and household waste, for want of collection services, sits uncollected on corners with signs threatening fines for those caught ‘fly tipping’. Perhaps the city eye, idealising indigenous rurality, does not like to see it contaminated with its own food
culture. This is seen or rather felt to be in some way incongruent with what indigenous culture is (meant to be).

Idelfonso notes that “inorganic waste, plastic, batteries, all this is part of climate change. We aren’t so much to blame in the communities- sometimes they consider us big contaminators”. Laying the responsibility for climate change via rubbish onto the campesinos also allows the city to take brisk charge of its ‘other’, who though idealised is considered somewhat inferior in education and understanding, especially of modern matters like rubbish, whilst perhaps exculpating itself, as it has found another culprit in climate change causality.

For Idelfonso, like the neighbour quoted above, climate change is also connected into networks extending beyond the village. Shifting upstream a little, this regional deputy who connects the community to the national level has his own ideas about the source of the contamination, influenced by the context of the social movements in which he moves. He tells me that the ‘products’, as they call the crops, are shifting up the mountainsides, that they are using the natural park to protect the native flora and fauna, yet- “El viento no es de uno sólo! El humo no es de uno sólo! El viento esta moviendo. El efecto es desde allí. Desde lejos es el efecto de cambio climático”. “the wind is not of oneself alone! The smoke is not of oneself alone! The wind is moving. The effect is from there. Climate change affects from far away”.

“From other countries?” I ask.

“From multinationals, capitalists, extractivists, whatever you want to call them”, he replies firmly. In his narrative, that which introduced the theme into the village it seems, climate change is caused by capitalism. Idelfonso contests what has been taken up from the workshops he administered, years ago, by the village: “We are not so much to blame in the villages- sometimes they consider us to be contaminators”, he says. “Seriously, from our own traditional methods we don’t contaminate at all, no? This must be made clear, too”. It is not Idelfonso’s own belief that the ‘contamination’ springs sheerly or even mainly from the villages themselves, yet this is the sense in which it is taken up by those residing in the village.
Kaateño adoption of the discourse: contamination

The workshops on contamination are taken very seriously by the Kaateños, to whom accusations that they are contaminating make sense, accustomed as they are to their actions being tied into the network of an animate landscape, constantly constituting and being constituted by the soils, elements and the spirits that inhabit them. They talk to the rains to draw them out of the sky or send them away, leave offerings of flowers filled with honey and alcohol in the crevices of the mountain to feed and encourage it to return crops. Within this complex network of relationships, my view that their actions were of minimal consequence in the landscape in contrast to an all-powerful developed set of consumers in far away countries, or Idelfonso’s, that the contamination emanates from the factories of Evo Morales’ main political opponent, who also happens to manufacture cement, would make little sense.

I was eventually able to arrange a meeting one evening with the authorities of the village to talk about climate change. We met one evening in the dark mists and spotting rain, the men in their ponchos sitting around a table on which I placed a bag of coca, offering cigarettes around, in thanks for their taking the time to talk to me. Initially guarded, and poking fun, after a while we were able to enter in to the theme of climate change, led by a florid and eloquent man called don Felix. Felix explained the connection between contaminants and the weather.

“There is contamination everywhere. Before there were no batteries, no plastics, there were none of these poisons either. So it was purely”—here he pauses, searching for a adequate word in Spanish—“purely natural”, supplies the man beside him, don Valentín. “Natural! It was before. These things they’re buying from the shops, they used to buy these in uncuñas before. They weigh (the products) and put them straight into an uncuña”.

“What’s an uncuña?” I ask.

“It’s woven, the size of a napkin— but woven though”, he emphasises. “Now, these are nylon! These throw-away drinks containers that come. These are contaminating us dreadfully, dreadfully. So I say that, according to what ‘they say’, this contamination affects the ozone layer of the sun, this is why the sun doesn’t protect us like before. It falls, hell! Like it would burn us. Some burn [the plastics], this is dreadful. It would be good to bury them 40m underground. Buried rubbish is
affecting us a lot too! There inside they are wearing out, exhausting more land. Even if you bury this plastic it does not rot. The batteries they throw away, dreadful!’

‘Here people don’t know this. Rather, they think this stuff is fertiliser! One who studies, [knows] it does not work. This is why they don’t take care of it. Some of us now collect and bury those batteries. This don Valentín”, he jokes, poking fun at the man beside him, “he thinks it’s fertiliser, he goes and collects it from the streets”.

Felix did not attend the seminars led by Idelfonso himself, but reports second hand, according to what ‘they say’, showing how the material has become enveloped into the narratives of the village. Felix’s views resound with those of ecologists, exhorting the damaging nature of contaminating consumer waste. In searching for a way to express the landscape without this damaging waste, he is shown to the word ‘natural’, taking up the modernist narrative of disjuncture between the fruits of human action, ‘culture’, and ‘nature’. The ‘ontological turn’ (Henare et al. 2007) in anthropology, in its evocation of non-naturalist cosmos, has been criticised for excluding indigenous engagement with modernity, preferring to reify ‘the other’ in an animate world from which modernity is purified (Bond and Bessire, 2014). Felix’ world converses with and engages the modern, making a hybrid of the animist Kaateño world with that of the city, notably as expressed through the workshops of Idelfonso. As Viveros de Castro (2014) indicates, ontologies are not separate but continually converge. We see that a new categorisation has entered Kaateño discourse, of ‘nature’ and ‘not nature’. This latter is applied specifically to contaminating consumer waste.

What exactly is different about this waste then, compared to any other substance? What exactly constitutes it as contamination? In the recent past Felix describes, we note, there are still shops, but people would wrap their purchases in woven cloths rather than the contaminating plastics. Shopping as such does not constitute the contamination, when it is for toasted grains from the community, wrapped in an incaña. I am reminded of a woman telling me of some footage from Sanjinés’ film she would love to see, of her mother and the women of her generation sitting beside their earthen ware carrying vases, shaped in the Inca style with tapering bases and narrow mouths. The memory of having presented these
hand-made, local technologies to Sanjinés’ cameras was presented to me in terms of pride and curiosity about the past. These woven wrappings and history filled vases, as the product of a landscape, are animate with local relationships and skills, and alive in a way which the contaminating city waste is not.

We see from Felix’s teasing of his companion the difference between this waste and any other products of the household economy- everything else used up or left over is ploughed back into the land, or has another destination. Stobart (2006) recounts that on a journey, he threw bean husks by the wayside, but noticed that his companions had kept theirs, to take home and boil up for the dogs. If they were left by the wayside, he was told, they would ‘cry’. This waste is animate, like children, animals or crops, and if not tended to correctly by adults, it cries. Whilst this waste of bean husks has its place in a system of relationships composing the landscape, the plastics and batteries are ‘matter out of place’ (Douglas, 1966). Unlike the bean husks they have no proper destination. Rather than fertilising the earth, underground the contaminating substances ‘wear out’ the soil.

Dirt, as Douglas tells us, is anything which offends against order, that which “must not be included if a pattern is to be maintained”. The cultural continuity of Kaata is threatened in the current moment- as the older people told me, there are now only a few of them remaining in the village “to maintain the traditions”, and my friends feared in a generation’s time it would be deserted. As we shall see in the next chapter, it is precisely the desire for commodities like these that draws young people out of the village and into cash economies, and their waste products embody this decomposition of the social order. In this chapter we will unfurl the threatening nature of these waste materials.

Burning the contaminating things, Felix says, damages the ozone layer. Climate science agrees about the ozone layer, in that plastics burn up to become molecules in the stratosphere which deplete the ozone layer, increasing the strength of the sun’s radiation. Felix observes this, in relational terms, as the sun burning them more than before. Interestingly the matter of protection also translates into the ‘western’ naturalist discourse on the environment- the ozone is said to ‘protect’ us in common parlance from the sun’s rays, as though the environment we lived in were calibrated for our survival by the elements, in line with Lovelock’s Gaia theory. We have indeed as Latour asserts never been modern (Latour, 1993); in the
west these traces of animism enliven everyday ideas, of the environment and soils, envisioned as agentive and beneficent entities.

In a story widespread across the Andes, and described by Abercrombie (1998), the *chullpas*, ancestors of another age, were burnt alive in their houses when Jesus Christ, the sun, rose for the first time in the east. With this came the end of the era of the chullpas, and the beginning of Christian (for so the people of this age are identified) time, separated into days, nights and seasons, in a classic pachakuti. A change in the elements can signal an epochal shift, this narrative teaches us. The sun can suddenly change character, making the world unfit to live in for the chullpas, who were accustomed to damp and dark conditions, and ushering in a new cosmos or pacha. To what extent are these stories of the weather making ages still influential in the contemporary landscape of the community? To what extent have the elements still this animacy and agency?

Chullpas in Kaata, mummified remains of ancestors entombed in a crouching position, continued to be worshipped in the community until recently. David Llanos Layme (2005) describes a ritual in which they were centrally used to stop rain. When I asked the authorities whether they still carried out rituals to control the weather, they answered in terms of these chullpas. The year before (2011), they said, the mummies were sold to archaeologists from Cusco and are now absent from their situation under the main square of the upper village, from whence they “dominated everything here before”. It was the village authorities themselves who sold them to the archaeologists- as the authorities change each year, there ensued a long argument over just who was responsible for this controversial sale of ancestors who seem to have survived centuries of Christian cleansing. Bastien (1978) notes that in colonial times Kaateño chullpas were burned and thrown into the river, leading to the river to be worshipped. The presence of the remaining powerful ancestors under the square where rituals were conducted he does not mention, though he maps the place as the heart of the mountain.
The episode exemplifies the changing nature of the Kaateño landscape, where money, a means of entering new networks of exchange, becomes more important than this heart of the mountain. Before it was the exchange relations of *ayni*, the spiritual force animating relations of mutual exchange and aid, with these ancestors that lit up the networks of exchange of the mountain. Rituals and *ayni* are weakening in the contemporary context. Some of the elaborate complex of rituals are still performed, the new *chakra* or sowing site each year, for example, is awoken with ceremonies of music and offerings which through *ayni* it reciprocates with the harvest. The villagers can still perform some of the weather rituals, and they work- yet sometimes, *sometimes*, Felix tells me, lowering his voice in a frank yet mighty admission, “*en vano vamos*”, we go in vain, to beseech the elements to give good harvests. This weakening of the exchange relationships composing the landscape is exactly what climate change comprises for the Kaateños.

Such *manay* prestations to the lords of the landscape as the awakening of the *chakra* are made as part of an ongoing set of mutual rights and obligations, with spirits, connected by *ayni*, that Mannheim, citing Durkheim (1925) argues had “the character of a total social phenomenon” in the Andes (1986:268). Mannheim cites
the manifold vocabulary of ayni terms, and indicates that it composes being itself-
runa is the Quechua word for people, whereas foreigners are q’ara, naked, uncultured, uncivilised, as they do not observe the etiquettes of ayni (ibid.). Ayni is-
or was- inherent in the relations of Andean landscapes; it is through ayni, constantly being rebalanced, that the relations of exchange that centrally compose it are conducted. Few would argue with this centrality, with Gose (1994) outlining ayni relations, often constituting helping in the fields of another, as the basis of ‘commoner’ personhood, compared to ‘notables’, who buy and sell labour. Ayni is an ontological category denoting being, connecting human and non-human entities in networks of exchange.

The sale of the ancestral chullpas, remnants of another cosmos, marks the decline of these landscapes, the heart having gone out of them, and leads Kaateños into exchange with q’ara archaeologists, which are not reciprocal. The sale of these remains of a past pachakuti is a striking indication of the current pachakuti underway, as the landscape is transformed from one of animate beings interrelating through ayni. To sell and confine the mummies to a museum, their animating power is we imagine lost; ayni is weakening in the landscape, and the beings it animated it seems are transforming into inanimate materials for human exploitation.

Kaateño cultivation and change

Felix’ initial response to my enquiries about climate change was to tell me that the ‘cultivos’, crops, were ‘moving around’. We note again with close attention to the interview text that, rather than saying the villagers planted the crops higher, he emphasises the crops’ agency, saying they have ‘gone up’, subido. This is measured with reference to a mountainside measured into ‘sectors’, of a landscape partly shadoed by humans among other actors.

To shift from an agentive landscape in which crops move themselves, as he or Idelfonso describe, to a human centred perspective of causa naturans, we could translate this saying that the way cultivation levels are changing as temperature increases demonstrates a nimble (human) adaptation to climate change. The animist perspective that crops are entities that might decide to change their situations on the mountainside, as the sun or winds might change their character, contributes to an ability to deal with and conceptualise change. We can through this act of translation
bring the Kaata material into dialogue with ethnographies of climate change like Finan and Nelson (2009) or Vasquez Leon 2009, who show how ‘cultural frameworks’ aid adaptation to climate change. In this case the way in which the mountainside is separated into ecological zones allows adaptation based in the vertical economy as described by Murra (1975) or subsequent anthropologists; the verticality of the mountain itself is the cultural adaptive mechanism *par excellence* of the Andes. The mountain body metaphor highlights the interaction of these ecological niches and the reciprocal economies which constitute them. Due to the variety of ecozones provided by the mountain, in a frequently unstable climate risk is well distributed, and it is the mountain itself which is the fundament of agriculture as well as being, as Gose (1994) or Bastien (1978) indicate, culturally central.

As Roncoli et al. (2009), indicate adaptation to climate change is often through human networks and reciprocities, yet in the contemporary context of migration to the city, and the absorption of the products, the head and feet of the mountain, maize and meat, into cash economies, the reciprocal economies of the vertical economy are disappearing. This weakening of local exchange also constitutes for the Kaateños climate change in itself, and here I think their definition is especially useful in highlighting climate change/capitalism as a whole phenomenon of interrelating factors. Climate change in the wider Kaateño sense is exactly what is breaking down these networks of relationships, attracting people into cash economies rather than those of the mountain.

Kaateños lament the changing fields, and emphasising the weakening of the land, crops and people. Though they seem to be dealing with the changes for the present the current adaptations cannot hold forever: I asked Idelfonso if they were alarmed about the changes or could keep moving the crops indefinitely. Well for the moment we are alright, he responded, though if it keeps on changing, there will come a point… This contrasts and compliments studies (eg. McDonald et al, 1997; Krupnik and Jolly, 2002) highlighting how ‘local’ peoples’ adaptive strategies could not cope with the extreme ecosystem challenge presented by climate change. Vertical production provides a variety of eco-zones on the mountain, yet the time may come when none of these would function should the climate continue to change severely.
Figure Two: Kaata’s crops, their growing cycles and common afflictions. By Edwin Supo Bautista, in response to an MA Biology student’s enquiries. Translated by the author.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Where grows</th>
<th>Problems</th>
<th>Growing techniques</th>
<th>Varieties</th>
<th>Time of year sow/grows</th>
<th>Rotation and soil type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>FRIOS/ALTOS</td>
<td>Diseases- different types of insects and fungi. It depends on the year. Frost damages and dries the potatoes. It depends where they are sown- lower places have more problems. There were almost no problems in 2011, better than recent years. It depends on the rain and sun. If it rains at night and is sunny in the day, there are more illnesses.</td>
<td>Natural fertiliser, sometimes chemical but not always. There are people with no animals, they use chemical fertiliser.</td>
<td>Sani imilla, waycha, yuryma, q’illu puya, jak’u wayaqa, surymana, jiyus, yana t’apla, waqra, papa runa, tula manta waqaq</td>
<td>End of October/November. Must all be planted by All Saints Day.</td>
<td>Must be in soil which is not too stony. 8 year rotation. First year potato, second year oca, if it is low, third year barley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>Lower places. Same as maize.</td>
<td>There are some powdery growths which cover the leaves, a type of fungus. These illnesses come when there is lots of wind and rain. There is no way of curing them of this illnesses. It comes rarely, crops are usually healthy.</td>
<td>People use natural fertiliser if they have it, the crop doesn’t really need it. No irrigation.</td>
<td>Arrocillo, azul muru, barba negra, puca muru, yuraq muru</td>
<td>Plant at the end of December and January, after Christmas.</td>
<td>Rotate in yearly cycles with maize and peas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>With wheat and maize</td>
<td>Same as wheat, a powdery fungus grows, under the same conditions.</td>
<td>Almost no fertiliser.</td>
<td>No irrigation</td>
<td>Yuraq chhij-ni, lima alias, phurijha.</td>
<td>As wheat, after Christmas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crop</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Pest Control Issues</td>
<td>Fertilisation</td>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>Harvest Dates/Planting Dates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>Further down, but it is now starting to grow higher up, climbing year by year.</td>
<td>Almost none, except a type of worm which enters the head when it rains a lot.</td>
<td>No irrigation. No chemicals. Sometimes fertiliser but not every year</td>
<td>Chuma sara, q’illu sara, jank’a sara, kulli sara, yuraq sara.</td>
<td>Planting start of October, harvest end of June.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>Higher up, mid-mountain</td>
<td>No problems</td>
<td>Ash or natural fertiliser No irrigation</td>
<td>Athun jawas, p’ulu, wanta, chhije p’ulu.</td>
<td>Planting end of September. Harvest start of June, last harvest July</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>Anywhere not too high</td>
<td>Almost no problems</td>
<td>Some families fertilise. No Irrigation.</td>
<td>Q’ara cebada (has no husk), yana q’ara cebada, qasi cebada</td>
<td>Last sowing, start and end of February.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These two are planted with lower potatoes, anywhere. They grow every year without the need to leave fallow.*
| Oca (a native tuber) | Only grown with the higher (*kapana*) potatoes | Almost no problems except in lower lying soils, where some insects get into the roots, which don’t let it grow properly. It grows small and with insects inside. | No irrigation or fertiliser. | Chhaska nawi, t’int’i, waca wira, misti, laso, mansanilla, puca qhini… 8 total | First planting in September. |
The table in Figure Two, drawn up by my research assistant Edwin Supo Bautista, describes in detail the different ‘sectors’ and the crops grown in them, as well as the rotation cycles used to cultivate them. I was employed to extract this information for an MA Biology student from La Paz also working on climate change adaptation (though she did not in the end use it). The village has maintained its eight-year rotative system of kapanas, large areas divided into family plots where potatoes are planted one year, oca, a sweet tuber, the next, and the kapa then left fallow for six years. The system remains despite the fact that the sites of these kapanas have shifted upwards from their previous locations as temperatures increase. On the lower slopes by the river, where the weather is warmer, maize is grown, and the terraces above are filled in the rainy season with fields of beans, peas, wheat and barley, along with the potato kapanas.

The lowest crop, maize, is said to be producing well in the warmer temperatures. People seemed very pleased with it- Edwin, my research assistant, took photos of himself standing amongst the tall crops. The success of the maize seemed to me positive, and I asked if some crops then were not affected by climate change. This caused confusion- I had not yet understood that climate change was affecting everything, even the movement uphill of those successful products was part of it. Everything is affected! I was told.

When I asked how was the harvest that year, each year I was there, I was often given the defensive answer that it was “bien, no más”, “not bad” delivered with a certain upright strength. Asking about the specific crops, I found that some were said to be growing well each year, whereas others were afflicted with various plagues, described by Edwin in the table. He also details, at the request of the biologist, all the strains he knows of each crop- especially given that he is a young man who left the community in his late teens to complete army service, and since lived in La Paz, his knowledge of the number of varieties is ample. Potatoes, wheat and beans are those most negatively affected. The other crops, barley, maize, oca and peas, grow without problems. The crops are classified by their location in sectors, and by the other crops with which they are rotated. Growing methods require few outside inputs, many crops not even needing irrigation or fertiliser, and animal fertiliser preferred. The crops are grown and fertility of the soil maintained, as we see here, through rotating the crops.
and leaving the land to recover. In this way Kaata produces a complex system of five staple carbohydrates interspersed with peas and beans.

Kaata seems exemplary of the ‘agroecological’ approach now championed by multinational bodies including the UN; the 2013 Trade and Environment Report, entitled “Wake Up”, advocates the importance of “a paradigm shift in agricultural development: from a “green revolution” to an “ecological intensification” approach” (2013:2). Agroecology, according to the report, augments natural environments, integrating crops into an enhancement of ecological patterns, in contrast to green revolution practices like monocropping. The term is meant to describe existing subsistence farming, relying on farmers’ knowledge and experimentation, and indeed explicitly champions reverting to this knowledge rather than employing a ‘top-down’ approach. Its central features are recycling nutrients, creating microclimates and regulating hydrology, supressing undesirable organisms and detoxifying noxious chemicals, creating balanced and diverse environments, fostering biodiverse environments. Kaata’s agriculture exemplifies these methods, and as we can see continues to produce in the context of climate change. Highlighting the sustainability of these practices is indicative of the search in the current moment for the ideal ecological ‘other’, the small farmer or indigenous person, which we shall look at in more detail in chapter three.

Harvests are not what they were, and this feeds into the narrative of a moment of complete shift in the earthly and heavenly landscape, a narrative of the weakening of the fields. It is well that we bear in mind, however, for all that the Kaateños take these changes seriously, that according to UN criteria their small-scale agriculture exemplifies resilient sustainability.

Plagues and their causes: chemicals

“With respect to the plagues, they did not exist before. I don’t know what has happened. The institutions, I think they come with just more poison. The cows, the camelids, needed no medicine before. Those ambitious ones up there [in the high pasture lands] want more wool! So what did they put, medicines, vaccination plans, other things. And this is where the illnesses come from, now they’re getting worse and worse. It’s the same in the production [of crops]. The ambitious ones want to grow
potatoes this big”, Flavio says, gesturing a huge size. “It can be grown to the size it should grow to, no more!”

“Don’t exaggerate”, agrees another man.

“To this end”, he continues, “they bring improved seeds as well. In these come the illnesses that afflict the plants also. I must disagree when they say they have to spray crops. This is less convenient.

‘I am more than an agronomic engineer, and let this lot tell you if I’m lying! When we spray crops- there are creatures in the earth, which help the earth- they move it. When we spray them, we kill all this. The earth gets even harder. Some insects are good!” (Murmurs of approbation sound here).

“Let’s say, there’s a material under the ground, ‘we’ll come out in the dry season’. It hides itself under the- territory, earth. You can see it clearly. There are little holes, I think with these you see it clearly. These are real pores! This is how it breathes. So the earth doesn’t have any breath at all, we are killing it worse, when we spray”.

Flavio embraces an approach that would resonate with a biodynamic western ideal, which is the result of his experience of agricultural ‘aids’, and as we have seen the anti-contamination discourse introduced by Idelfonso, as well emanating from a Kaateño knowledge of landscape. Kaateños have chosen to keep their rotative cycle instead of engaging with chemicals in a Faustian pact to shorten the time taken to rest the soil. The reluctance to spray crops and distrust of chemicals is widespread through the village, as indeed among many people who engage the soil even in supposedly de-animated landscapes. We notice people’s ‘ambitiousness’ in the higher ayllus is associated with the cycle of contamination. Chemicals bring contamination, but what brings chemicals to be used is the ambitious desire for self-enrichment. The contamination is linked in a moral relationship with humans’ abilities to work, earn and share.

The 2013 UN Trade and Agriculture report\textsuperscript{14} also indicates that producing food via small-scale agriculture does much to mitigate climate change. As agroecology uses local, non-toxic animal fertiliser, it mitigates the high outputs of GHG emissions generated by agriculture dependent on chemical fertilisers and pesticides- it is estimated that 14-24% of global greenhouse gases are produced through agriculture.

\textsuperscript{14}\url{http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2012d3_en.pdf}
Oliver de Schutter, UN special rapporteur on the Right to Food, indicates in this report that the food price hikes of 2008-11 were partly due to the effects of climate change on the weather, and to the agricultural sector's dependence on fossil fuels, which causes the prices of foods and fuels to be linked. The contributors to this report are anxious that these links be undone, and thus champion a sustainable agriculture which does not employ hydrocarbons. Kaateños would identify both of these ‘causes’- the use of contaminating chemicals and the weather- as constitutive of climate change itself; it sees a whole which linear causality subdivides.

Flavio’s description here of the movement of the soil by earthworms, which help it to “breathe” seems to reveal an animist ontology, yet might be equally have been uttered by gardener in England. Degnen (2009) shows how in northern England gardeners regularly speak about plants as having intentionality and sentience. Weeds, for example, can be ‘clever’ and ‘sneak’ into flowerbeds (2009:157). Intersections between humans and plants “include bodily characteristics like bleeding, sleeping, and breathing” “ and “extend beyond physiology to include subjective states such as cleverness and insanity” (ibid.163). There are reciprocal identifications between plants and human bodies, which after Scott (1989) she describes as their being ‘interpretants’ of one another, presenting a “dialogical model of reciprocal identifications between people and plants” (2009:164). She draws upon Scherper-Hughes and Lock (1987), who explore the interrelationality of mountain and body as an example of “the constant exchange of metaphors from body to nature and back to body again”, using Bastien’s (1985) work as exemplary of this, and then extends the observation to her fieldsite. Bastien’s obervations about Kaata thus draw out neglected aspects of western practice.

I am interested in Flavio’s defiant phraseology- “these are real pores!” he claims, as if such local knowledge had been challenged as ‘not real’. Though our British gardener or his neighbours may have the same language of breathing soil or protecting vapours that keep the earth to the right temperature, most of them if challenged would say that this attribution of agency is ‘not real’; the ‘real’ consists only in the connections between things that we can measure with and science establish. There is the modernist dichotomy of the real and not real waiting to classify plantlore.

“Observers might claim that gardeners are speaking only ‘as if ’ plants were people but that everyone ‘really knows’ that human beings and plants occupy radically different domains, corresponding to the orthodoxy of Western naturalist
ontology… While it might be tempting to declare these relations as metaphorical and claim instead that gardeners are speaking only ‘as if’ plants were people, as everyone ‘really knows’ human beings and plants occupy radically different domains, I argue that this would be to gloss too easily over sets of meaning in everyday gardening practice that merit much closer attention” (Degnen, 2009:152).

According to Degnen, prioritising the admission that these intersections of humans and plants are ‘not real’ is an unfair prioritising of the naturalist perspective over the established thought and practice she explores.

Science agrees that through the holes pushed into the soil by insects, it needs to allow air in and out, just as Flavio describes. Here Flavio challenges the hegemony of the scientific real with a Kaateño view of a landscape of seed actors, in which the mountain has pores, and we see that the two collide and collude. We could say that the universes of Kaata and western science here converge or overlap. The Kaateño discourse of a living mountain does not on the whole oppose but embraces the scientific one, applying an extra layer of animation to the elements it describes. Conceived as a living body, the soil’s need to breathe is easily understandable.

We see that the crops, hiding themselves beneath this earth, also have intentionality in the Kaateño perspective, coordinating their exit from the soil. Flavio’s voice is tender when he speaks of these things, as if he were speaking about a child. As Stobart (2006) explains, through crying plants express their dependence on full adults. Adults in turn cry to the more powerful spirits in rituals for good harvest. Attending to crying, rather than crying, is constitutive of maturity in Macha, Stobart explains. In Kaata people seemed to be like the mothers and fathers of everything; the way in which plants or animals were referred to and treated reminded me of how children were treated the UK- though examining this reveals how in the UK plants are also treated like children. Like children, as Degnen shows, they are said to grow (both of them in nurseries), or in a kindergarten (children garden). The importance of this act of translation in the capitalocene is that in seeing the plants as beings with the same characteristics and capacities as we humans have, lies sympathy and the capacity to love them as we might love people.

Looking towards the landscape of the ‘other’, the telluric spirits fetishized by the city or ‘west’, constituting the focus of the rituals declared ‘patrimony’, and the capacity to care for and respect these as living beings, are within western landscapes.
only ignored. Seeking the other, determining the other, we seek what we feel, perhaps unconsciously, we lack. We seek ourselves, or our reflection in the mirror of alterity.

I am sitting with Idelfonso, the area representative who gave the climate change workshops, in a café on the Ceja, the ‘brow’ of the city of La Paz, the edge of the valley in which the capital lies. Here space opens out again from the valley of La Paz to the vast space of the Altiplano, with the wild and glaciated mountaintops which are hidden when one is within the walls of the city crater. Sitting at a neon plastic table, over the noise of eighties rock and folkloric music, I ask Idelfonso what the villages think about pesticides.

“They precisely think they are negative, because just in spraying you are also contaminating, as it were, with these chemicals. If you spray a lot you are contaminating the plant itself. Because we know it goes in the pores of the plants… it can get to its fruit, no? This is why we have said…. we will produce organically”. He explains- “if the earth is sick it’s not good for you either, is it?” Here he uses the word *maretando*, nauseous, or with its head spinning in circles like a drunken person. “So ecologically, naturally, nothing is contaminated”.

“So it’s a cycle”, I said.

“It’s a cycle”, he echoes. “Nothing is separated, nothing! When you are spraying, the wind is carrying the smell… to the earth itself”.

‘Before there was a program from the European Community, there were engineers and everything, they brought chemicals, taught people how to put them on, how to spray the crops. People proved it was no good afterwards. Now they say no more. This was 10, no, 15 years ago now”. The villagers found the chemicals to have damaging effects: “when you put chemicals [on the earth], for two or three years it produces well, then afterwards doesn’t produce any more- this they have proven, too!” He asserts, claiming the villagers have successfully employed the scientific method to establish the uselessness of chemicals. It seems that maintaining the rotation of the crops continues to be more useful than these chemicals in making the soil fertile.

Though considering that chemicals contaminate, sometimes people do use them-on several occasions I saw villagers with tanks on their backs spraying the crops. The chemicals were considered dangerous and treated with caution- visiting the village from the city for a month in January, Alejo and Clotilde prepared to spray the fields with pesticides with considerable anxiety, sending their little son to stand far away as
they filled the tank. Alejo carefully poured in the chemicals and strapped it on while Clotilde fretted about where to dispose of the empty bottle safely. The need for chemicals comes with the increase in blights, and the changes in temperature, so this is a cycle of contamination.

Idelfonso evokes a landscape in which humans, plants and pesticides are interrelated in a ‘cycle’, unseparated, where the health of one element will mirror the health of the others. I am reminded of divination practices Bastien (1978) describes in the village, where the liver of a guinea pig cut open will reveal the health of the solicitant, or equally it might be reflected in the throwing of coca leaves, the small scale reflecting human life, as the human body can be cured by curing the body of the mountain. This landscape resembles the rhizome which Deleuze and Guattari (1987) propose, a network of interlacing threads in which every point is connected to every other, which they claim resembles the growth of rhizomic roots like the potato, which is of course the staple Kaateño crop\textsuperscript{15}. In Kaata climate change affects such a network of actors, such that if it touches one ‘node’, a human or crop, weakening it, it will likewise weaken the others. The human actor is not separate from the fields in which she works or the crops which she eats.

“The earth is tired”

I was chatting to doña Carmen, as she sits in her backyard, weaving a poncho on a small hand loom, of sticks about half a metre long set into a square, with a complexity of coloured threads arrayed above and below. I asked her about the symbols she was copying from a set woven into a sash in pre-synthetic colours, faded with age. Several of the geometrical designs she called ‘suns’ though they were varied in form, some of them resembling the ‘ojos de agua’, ‘water eyes’ or springs, which Veronica Cereceda (1986) describes, rich in symbolism, the eyes of the mountain. I wondered if whether over time the meaning of the woven symbols was becoming less precise.

Before we had potatoes de este tamaño, this size, doña Carmen says, indicating a size greater than her hand. \textit{Ya no}, not now. Why not? I ask.

“The earth is tired”, she replies. “You have to plough it a lot. You plough in fertiliser, and it goes really far inside, and only stones come out. Only with a lot of fertiliser do

\textsuperscript{15} Technically a potato plant is a tuber, which is structurally a rhizome, with swollen fleshy growths
things grow now”. Another man expressed the addition of lots of fertiliser as ‘obliging the earth to produce’, which I understood as really pushing their part of the exchange relationship with the soil through which food is produced to elicit a response. Several other women also told me that ‘the pachamama is tired’, including don Flavio’s wife, in her kitchen one afternoon. I looked at her searching for a trace of the ‘pachamamista’ narrative so widely used these days in La Paz. As Olivia Harris (2000a) has explored, the pachamama becomes syncretised in city discourse with a benign figure rather like the Virgin Mary, not resembling the sometimes angry and destructive pachamama of the campo, rather less romantically appearing in the form of an old woman or frog. This narrative is widespread in the pro-indigenous rhetoric that has become commonplace under Morales, to the extent that those working in this line of glorification of indigenous culture are commonly known as ‘pachamamistas’ or even ‘pachamamones’- earth-mother-suckers, exaggerating their cause to reap the benefits accruing from the current fascination of neoliberal world with its indigenous other. However I saw not trace of a cynical city narrative here- ‘you know’, she explained carefully, ‘the earth?’ This tiredness can come from the contamination of plastics and batteries, which ‘wear out the earth’ they are buried under, as well as agricultural chemicals. We note that the Kaateño narrative places agency with the earth- she is getting tired and sending stony infertile soil. The chemicals that we looked at above are not considered a viable way of feeding the stony earth. We are feeding it what tires it. It is no wonder the harvests are diminishing.

Colloredo-Mansfield (1999), working with a community of weavers in Otavalo, was told that a generation ago that the earth had got weaker, and production harder, which he attributes to the increasing division of the land, with hereditary parcels becoming ever smaller. Parcelisation was widely thought to be a structural cause of migration in the Andes then as climate change is now. In Otavalo this was also the period though, like the present in Kaata, where people came to depend less on the land, having secured a relatively high cash income from selling their weavings. We remember that food in the Andes is the result of exchange relationships between people and the land. It seems to my western eyes that the Kaateño attribution of agency to the land conceals the human side of this relationship, that it is as people do not work the earth that it becomes stonier and needs more fertiliser. The relationship of exchange is what fails, as migration levels climb. The young people desire fruit not of the soil, and
the soil, devalued, unworked, unfed and littered with the detritus of these desires, becomes weaker, and production fails.

Climate change, like food, springs in the Andes from the interactive relationships of people and soil (see eg. Harris, 2000; Bastien 1978). There is no unilateral relation of causality, from humanity to an inert nature, rather actors are becoming in conjunction with one another as food circulates in this landscape. Ingold describes animism as a continual formation of beings—“an understanding of life as a creative process in which forms undergo continual generation, each in relation to the others” (2013:19). The productos of the mountain emanate, are rich in, the work and exchange relations with the earth and elements. It is these ayni relationships which constitute entities or actors; it is this richness which makes the products alive.

City foods by contrast, are considered less nutritious than those grown on the mountain, an idea which was commonly expressed. I was told that rice had no nutrition, unless it were rice that had been threshed by hand, in which case it was ‘nutritious’.

They say that before there was not so much pasta or rice. Today people go to work to earn rice. There are some originarios who are from the same place where rice is produced. They thresh it, they don’t use a machine to peel it. This is food, this threshed rice, but when it’s done by machine, it’s no use at all.

Crops are produced as the result of a relationship between humans and the living mountain to which they give their labours. Personhood, or the spirit of a thing, Willerslev (2007) observes, occurs as the product of its relationships with other actors in the landscape, thus only some things are animate some of the time. The fact that city food is less nutritious expresses its emptiness in terms of relationships as it has been made by machine, far away. The food that people used to eat, which was the produce of the mountain, was more nutritious, and made them stronger:

Now they are mainly used to rice and pasta. Dreadful. We won’t get fat, only skinnier and skinnier. But our produce, which they say we used to eat, had nothing of rice or pasta (murmurs of agreement from people around), nor did they add salt. This cannot be, but they say they used to bring salt from Peru. People ate originary things before, this is why the people of before are strong! This is why they can stand more, like don Ramón.
This is coherent with the assertion made by the neighbour leaning over his wall that city bought pasta and rice haven’t got the same vitamins, with people now living less time and being less healthy than before. People are getting older faster now; they are less strong and wearing out quicker. City food is comprised of less complex relationships in this landscape, thus when ingested it cannot contribute its animating force as nutrition.

This is a landscape alive with invested labour, shared between family and community members with the land, a landscape alive with relationships of exchange, including those with surrounding ayllus in the ‘vertical economy’. I was told that ‘before’ salt used to be brought from Peru, though the man who told me this could hardly believe that people of their now wealthy northern neighbour would come to trade with them. It is more commonly remembered that those of the higher village Apacheta used to bring meat, but these exchange relations of the vertical economy are also failing- “we’re failing in everything now” don Felix tells me of this, dismally. These human exchange relationships among villages are also constitutive of the animated landscape, and as they attract less exchange; as they networks weaken, there is a feeling of failure.

Contemporary people are weaker than the people of before, who were also harder working:

“before people used to get up early in the morning. Our ancestors, the people of before. We are become lazy now. We have a mink’a [a communal work day, in which participants are paid by the owner of the fields], let’s say, today we’re going to plant wheat. The mink’as (the daily workers) are arriving at ten, half ten, they’re chewing their coca, at eleven they start working. They work an hour, they eat lunch, there’s no progress with the work. Worse. They say that before people were mature, they were more capable than we are today. We are failing in everything now”.

These days people do not exert themselves to work for one another as they did before. Relationships between families in producing food are also weakening; again the landscape becomes less animate and animating as they weaken.

We note that the man cited above describes relations of wage labour in the village, the mink’a which has historically existed in the area, a way of richer families compensating poorer for their work by feeding them for the day in return for their labour. Alongside this has existed ayni, connoting as a verb the exchange of work
among equals, each taking turns to work days on others’ fields for a return in kind. Gose describes how mink’a expresses hierarchical relations, whereas ayni is key to creating networks of reciprocity between equals, creating a “powerful sense of moral connection” (1994:113). He describes large parties of ayni in which all the ‘commoners’ work together, and notes that one man described ayni as “having the tenderness to work for others” (ibid.). In contemporary Kaata ayni only happens between small groups of a few extended family members; I have never observed the large work parties which Gose (1994) describes. The community is increasingly rent by inequality, and the former egalitarian exchange relationships are declining. Receiving their mink’a payment the same in any case, the people work for themselves and not to contribute to their neighbours’ lot, for a return in kind, as with ayni. This failure to work hard the man cited above summarises as a lack of maturity, a concept that surfaces repeatedly, and which we will now look at in more detail.

Don Ramón: maturity and time

Henry Stobart (2006) describes the Andean life cycle as separated into two halves; that of youth, characterised by ‘crying’, need and dependency, and that of maturity, characterised by catering to the needs and cries of others. It is not only human children, but crops and animals, who cry to adults, and adults themselves can ‘cry’ to the spirits in rituals. As we remarked earlier, it is like the mature Kaateños are mothers and fathers of everything in the landscape, including their animals and crops, attending constantly to this crying (and knowing when to shoo the plaintiff away) in the mature phases of their lives. Indeed it seems maturity is constituted through feeding rather than crying to be fed (Stobart, 2006).

It is as we see, through fulfilling relationships of nurture that actors become mature. People now, as described above, are not seen to become mature as they do not tend a landscape of dependents as they once did; to merely consume is to remain a child. Like contamination or health, maturity is also a sympathetic attribute of humans and their animals and products.

Crops are also said to be less mature than they were before, and to be taken out of the ground when they are barely flowering, through hunger. Edwin, my research assistant, once told me significantly that ‘they say’ (ie. according to the lore of the village) that before the potatoes were left in the ground for two years to mature, but
that now we eat them after only one. We used to eat potatoes of this size, doña Carmen says, indicating something larger than her hand. Such assertions express a feeling that consumption is accelerating: while before things ripened into maturity, now they are seized before time.

We are referring to a recent past when we speak of these people of before- don Felix adds, “more or less, in the time of Yawar Mallku, it was good, in those days people had worth. And they ‘had heads’ [were more intelligent]. Of course they did not know how to read and write, but that which they thought they administered reading. Now we have forgotten this”. In the remembered but slightly murky times that Sanjinés’ film was made in the village, the 1960s, when the elders I speak to were children, people ‘had heads’. Don Ramón, Edwin’s venerable grandfather, seemed indeed to be the very measure of these slow-maturing people of before- Felix goes on to say of him, “they say this grandfather is a good worker…Until the moment he is struck down! He feels nothing. He has proven himself”. Don Ramón was regarded highly in the village, and I was several times told that he was 93 years old. He would cross the now deserted earth square in the upper village every day with his six bulls, up to the edge of the hillside where a grandchild would appear to take them to pasture. In his house were a discarded pair of hardy boots, a present from some grandchild, whilst he wore sandals of rubber tyres.

In the August 2011 fiesta, I was sitting with don Ramón and some other men over breakfast beers in the tavern that had opened up under the house, where a sister who had come up from Santa Cruz was selling beer to everyone. We spoke of climate change, and the man beside me said- “it’s that now there are cars and lorries, and before there wasn’t this shit. Forty or fifty years ago we didn’t use chemicals in food, and now there are chemicals- maybe in other places but not in Bolivia. We eat these chemicals. Look at this senor”- and he pointed to don Ramón, sitting beside us- “he is more than ninety years old! People grow quickly now- we’re like battery chickens”.

There is a sympathy or resonance between people, animals and plants, suffering the same changes at the same time, growing faster and yet weaker, with more diseases. Chemicals are seen to have the same effect on plants and animals as on the people that eat them. Chemical feeds are given to battery chickens to make them grow faster, as I learned through Edwin’s attempt to start a chicken battery in our yard, which involved my bringing sacks of special grain for them from La Paz, which we shall look at in
detail in the third chapter. It seems that chemicals are thought to affect humans in the same way, accelerating the course of our lives, rather than taking our time, like the potatoes under the ground, to come to a slow maturity.

Young people and desire

To return again to the scenario of the neighbour speaking over the wall with which we opened this chapter: “The children are different now, we used to obey our parents. They have all manner of piercings, haircuts, nail varnish- we didn’t have these things before. While we used to give our kids tostadas of maize and beans, they eat sweets and crisps and yoghurts now, as well as rice and pasta. While their parents want them to be educated, they desire only machines”.

It is the young people who consume the city made foods that cause the waste of plastics, and batteries. Their appetite for sweets and drinking yoghurt, which is sold in sachets and is a major processed food, was commented on with concern. As another man remarked: “Today our children don’t want this originary produce. They are used to what comes from outside. Pasta … various things from there, isn’t it, they value them. That’s it! They like them”. This desire, the changing value attached to consumption goods by young people is key to this cycle of contamination and climate change, as they are led away from the mountain and its values. Over the next two chapters, we will examine in detail these changing desires. The resonance they have for the community, as well as the contamination, is mass migration, which is inseparable from the earth being ‘tired’ and stony, the fiestas being small, and to there being no one to play music.

In the incident described above, Stobart (2006) remarks upon the difference between the care taken over bean husks and western wastefulness. Wrappers of plastic things contaminate, but they were not said to weep; they are not animated by the cycle of ayni relationships which constituted real actors. This is the major difference between the sweets which young people want and the old-fashioned tostadas with which they were often compared. The wrappers unlike husks or uncuñas do not embody relationships of work and have no useful role to fulfil. These useless things constitute contamination. In the eyes of environmentalists, informed by science, we would agree that these things are causing climate change. Continuing to the follow the networks of which these goods are constituted, we find them to be made of oil, shipped around the
world at high carbon cost. They are the evidence in Kaata of a worldwide economy of substances which are contaminating whatever medium they end up in, air, sea or land, and thus ‘cause’, in the western scientific perspective, climate change. They are furthermore substituting for what this same scientific lens admits to be a sustainable agricultural system which does not contribute to climate change, as we shall see in Chapter Three.

Seen in context with the animated materials Kaata comprises, each with its place in a cyclical of household economy, the full horror of these functionless objects, the packaging of sweets and other capitalist goods, comes into view. They have no place in a system of ayni with the earth; rather than giving to it like fertilising waste or offerings, they are tiring and contaminating it. Burning them is as sending up contaminating offerings into the air. In a western consumer world, with its systems for removing waste from the view of the consumer, they are concealed. The only function of these wrappers is to sell the product to the consumer at a value greater that the naked product could be valued at, to fetishize the commodity, to give the appearance of life to what is in the Kaateño world inanimate, as it is devoid of useful relationships. Valued in terms of the labour that produced them, the fruits of factories have little value; this meaning is encapsulated in the non-nutritious status which factory foods have in Kaata. Although considering it a phenomenon unrelated to the labour conditions that produced the food, nutritionalists would again agree with this, another strange collision of the two sets of invested meanings or universes. We can agree on some things in the pluriverse, apparently, though our methods of constructing meaning differ. Rather than the life of a product coming from labour and rhizomic relations, as with the home-grown potato or tostado, plastic packaging serves to give the appearance of life to something which embodies no fruitful, close, hardworking relationships, and is in itself the last word in functionless ‘contamination’. So much which fails to feed into the landscape, instead contaminating it- we are reminded here of don Felix teasing his friend asserting that he thinks plastics are fertiliser for the land, an obvious error! These plastic artefacts have no destination to feed into, and are devoid of animating life resulting from ayni.

I ask don Felix whether there is a solution to this climate change, and he states simply that “ya no se puede mejorar”, that it cannot now be made better. We must go back to the ways of the ancestors, he suggests, remembering how to read the hundreds
of small indicators which can tell them how the season will run. When I ask about these indicators, he is shy; there is a general feeling that knowledge like this is falling out of use. The biology Masters student of climate change in the village also wanted to know about these bioindicadores; science is looking to indigenous peoples for solutions. Orlove et al. (2000) in an article in the journal Nature describe how Andean farmers’ observations of the Pleiades can be scientifically verified as an accurate way of reading the coming of the nina/nino weather phenomenon, and the quantity and timing of the rainy season half a year in advance. The pluriverse promises possibilities for translating knowledge between worlds, connecting elements like stars and rainfall which the scientists, they report, initially thought unrelated (Orlove et al. 2002).

Music and batteries

I challenged Felix that in the past there were ritual occasions more important than the August fiesta of Santa Rosa, which has now become the biggest and most important in the village, when young migrants are most likely to return. He agrees this is so—

“There are fiestas which, more or less, we performed with rituals…. This we are forgetting now, this ‘culture’, we say. Totally, totally now. These days the kids don’t know how to play anything! They only listen to the radio- aiii, my ears! They’ll drive themselves crazy. They don’t know how to play anything. This is the culture that we are forgetting, day by day. It’s at the end now. I think it’s ending this class of before, of those who played. For our pachamama, for our… production, there were fiestas.”

Music and fiestas are key to defining the ‘people of before’, who are now disappearing. Music is key in fiestas to call the weather and seasons, a way of activating and interacting with the elements, with all the actors of the landscape. The fiestas themselves are diminishing, as is often remarked. Carmen told me, in response to my asking about climate change, “everything is changing now. The customs, the fiestas. They were bigger before, they were more beautiful”. Climate change extends to the celebrations, central to the constitution of place.

Ideas about music, as Harry Stobart indicates:

are not neatly separated from other spheres, but are deeply integrated into general ideas about ‘production’. Through rituals, you appeal to places and objects and set them in ‘communicative mode’ through offerings and referring to them in affective ways, house as nest, fields as virgin, potato as chaskanawi.
Playing music and dancing also open these lines of communication, where well being and reproductive potential are understood as linked with the quality of relations. (2006:5)

We might say that music is a becoming, that with it one can call the landscape into a certain way of being. One of the common purchases of the young migrant workers are radios, which until the village was connected to the national grid a few years ago, required batteries to power them. This music substitutes for the pipe-playing, the traditional music of the community, varying with each fiesta and ritual occasion. Idelfonso’s workshops seem to have struck a resonant chord with the village in describing these batteries as contaminants. They map a landscape of networks into the city rather than those which making traditional music, awaken the fields or call the rains.

Climate change is a mixed discourse of the weakening of the land and the people on it, of community as marked by the making of fiestas, and ‘culture’. I was told in the August fiesta that ‘there are only a few of us left up here now, to maintain the traditions’. When asked if there would be anyone left in the village in another generation’s time, my young friends living in the city responded- “exactly! This is what we are wondering”. Another man had a more dismal vision- “never mind fifty! In thirty years there will be no one here”.

Winds of change

To recap on the story I told at the start of the chapter, I asked the neighbour, leaning over his wall, if government investment in sustainable agriculture, creating local employment for young people, could stop climate change. He throws up his arms and laughs, “no, you can’t stop it! The contamination is borne on the winds, from other places, from big factories, you can’t stop it”- he looks at me and tries to explain- “you can’t stop a car polluting, for example. And here we are contaminating too…”

The neighbour’s vision leads us beyond the community, to affective moods of contamination that are borne on the wind. What is this wind? I am reminded of Taussig’s (1986) discussion of evil winds, the repressed memory of terror inflicted on Indian subjects across the Andes manifesting itself in malos aires, winds which bring various kinds of misfortune to the afflicted. Evil wind is an impersonal force: “It
appears like an agent of nature, emanating beyond the social confines and envy of the living”. The winds come, in the words of a shaman from the town of Sibundoy in Colombia, “from the streams that flow with movements of the air, clouds all joined together like strands making a skein of wool, from the spirits of the infieles, that ancient people that lurk beneath the earth in certain special places around here that christians cannot or should not enter”(1986:372). These infieles are the pagan pre-conquest dead, the same as the chullpas who used to ‘dominate everything before’ from their seat under the earth in the old square in Kaata. The wind is full of affective presences, atmospheres of the past.

As Ingold (2006) says, animism recognises the agentive elements. In Kaata the wind is a living entity: Ina Rösing (2003, 2010) notes that the wind in Qollahuaya ritual is addressed as Ankari, key in most rituals as it carries white or black magic to either the human on which it is to have a curing or harmful effect, or the spirits to be entreated, and it is celebrated as a deity. This animate wind, which can carry effects from afar, is like what we might think of in the west as ‘atmosphere’ in the artistic sense, as it is simultaneously ‘atmosphere’ in the scientific sense, in terms of the vapours surrounding humans, which we inhale and exhale. Boehme (1993) outlines a new aesthetics in which the aura or atmosphere given off by a work of art becomes considered as important as its material existence, for which we are required to consider the aura as something in-between the spectator and object, property neither entirely of one or of the other, but of the space between them. The air thus becomes animated and full of living presences, as indeed it seems to be in the Andes. Steven Connor explores how for medieval writers like Robert Burton airs were indeed infused with moods, such that that of fens or marches was melancholic, though good for remembrance16. Sloterdijk and Hoban (2011) remind us that the primary agent in which we beings exist is the air, so we may consider Heidegger’s being-in-the-world as being in the air. We breathe in and out, a most continual, unconscious and essential way of making and being made up by our environments. As Ingold (2006) indicates, when we cease to regard the world as surfaces and see it as a medium, constantly shifting, through which we move, as in an animist perspective, the air is the primary medium in which we

exist. Fitting then that the air itself should be the counterbalance to human excesses in Kaata.

Climate change, borne in the winds, has something of the texture of a mood that animates everything; when we talk of climate change in Kaata, it is in the sense of something that permutes the earth, humans, animals. Climate change conveys a mood of contamination which sweeps the fields with weakness, that causes the sickening and weakening of the landscape, of the lines of relationships connecting it, borne in the winds, or atmosphere. The atmosphere! Once again here we come up against a convergence with science, for it is indeed in a scientific sense it is this very atmosphere that is the carrier of contamination. Kaateño views agree with climate science here. The animistic perspective does not hinder but helps science; the two universes or ontologies collide and we see we are talking about the same element, that air with which human beings are constantly interacting, and the same contamination, whether in terms of named gases and particles, or as mood carrying substance. As with the breathing earth, the animistic view is so literally true in our scientific universe that it challenges the hegemony of scientific ways of seeing, expanding the material or real into its affective aspects, unsplitting the scientific, with its confining causality, into a total phenomenon. And it is precisely these aspects which western climate analyses lack. The name of this mood is contamination, or this is a visible nameable part of it. It comprises the capitalist system, and the decline of the way of life on the mountain, which kept the ancestors healthy. The difference is the animating force, which science strips from the world.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also seek to express intermingling which does not reify the human actor against a inert backdrop, but embraces the totality of the interactions of actor and place, expressing landscapes animated by mood and ‘becoming’ relationally. They use the term haccaeity to describe these landscapes, where people “cease to be subject to become events, in assemblages that are inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an air, a life”. (1987:289). This seems to well describe how climate change is in young people as much as it is in the air or fields.

Taussig (1986) relates how a splinter enters into a small girl’s foot when she is walking in the forest and causes pain up her leg- this is as malos aires (bad airs) have entered with it, and must be cured by a shaman. Historical winds are thus internalised
into bodies. As Taussig comments, in ayahuasca healing ceremonies the internal and the external merge - the merging of the self and surrounding environment, the playing out of narratives of history and memory through the site of the body. Climate change is experienced as weakening of self, community and land, in which interiority and exteriority are interconnected, in a way that challenges the western dichotomy through which they are seen.

Idelfonso’s is a self-conscious anti-capitalist narrative. With these plastics perhaps, there we are contaminating, he concedes. As indigenous peoples, we have always respected the earth- “el suelo nosotros respectamos!” - he claims, in a tone of perfect humility and reason. Like with the terraces for example, which stop soil erosion. “We are part of the mother earth!”, he asserts, “some people say it [the earth] has to depend on us, but this is the wrong way round! We are part of the mother earth”.

Idelfonso engages the pachamamista rhetoric of the city, and challenges exactly the attribution of agency on which we are here focused: he highlights the difference between humans taking care of the earth, as causa eficaz in an inanimate nature, or being part of it, as causa naturans, or one actor among an animated multitude. The ‘traditional’ village therefore does not cause climate change, except in so far as they engage with these capitalist networks. In his narrative, it is capitalism that is the contaminating force. This agrees with Haraway’s ‘capitalocene’, as well as the views of many scientists.

Contamination is capitalism, or capitalism is contaminating, or perhaps we can say, climate change is the other stroke of the pendulum of capitalism. Marcelino Yanahuaya told Bastien that the life and death cycles of society, the village, above and below, were like those of the fields, the fallow plots drawn into life again by the Qallay rituals. “Time is not a set point, but a cycle between two strokes always circulating within the mountain’s... bodies. Like the swing of a pendulum, each stroke can only go so far, and then it starts back again. Furthermore, each stroke propels the other” (1972 p.53). Gose (1994) agrees that “the principle of ayni does inform the parallel contributions of the living and dead to agriculture, and the cyclical movements of sun and water between their respective worlds, which Bastien (1978:53) aptly compares to the stroke of a pendulum” (1994:137). Related in these cycles of counterbalancing alterity then, we can read the capitalist transformation of the village and the young
peoples’ appetite for western customs and clothes, as well as inseparably contamination which acts against it, and may bring it to ruin.

For Idelfonso, indigenity itself is not the solution, nor is a return to the traditional ways, or the abolition of this capitalism. This is no cargo cult. For him the solution lies in government strategies to collect the waste in communities, to educate about its harmful effects, and with schemes to promote local economies through sustainable agriculture, so that their communities can feed the country by selling their crops. We will look at this in detail in chapter three. I ask him if such measures would stop migration, and he agrees, in full flow of his arguments. You cannot stop desire, but there is much you can do to clean it up, and to create sustainable ways of making the money that is the seat of the products it seeks. This is a middle way discourse which we will see in later chapters is harnessed by the upper echelons of the Conamaq.

Others

Don Felix states categorically, in response to my question about climate change, that it only comes from local sources of pollution. For him it is a complex of changes embedded in the landscape of the mountain, and his focus is on its networks of production. The neighbour leaning over his fence, who speaks good Spanish and has worked in tourism, connects climate change to factories, which are indeed the provenance of the non-nutritious foods and plastic wrappers. It is the same capitalism that is implicated across scale, whether we talk of the immediate spatial landscape of the village, or carry it further to the factories which are the source of the plastics.

Although the Kaateños are deeply implicated in climate change, they consider they cannot stop it. Their embrace of the role of each fragment of litter and breath of fumes in ‘climate change’, might be held up as a responsible indigenous ideal, yet- and this is the sting in the tail of the animist perspective for a western ecologist- the landscape of dispersed agency that they describe is not one in which human actions can necessarily save the whole. When one ceases to be the causa eficens, the uniquely conscious actor, this superhero potential is lost. The world of the indigenous ecologist is not the solution, for in respecting and animating the multitude of actors of ‘the environment’, humanity ceases to have sole responsibility for them.

We are at danger of falling, despite the clarity of the observation that capitalism causes climate change, into a contested zone, the creation of a reified binary opposition
between indigeneity and capitalism, which is a way of idealising the indigenous \textit{alter}. The strong indigenous movement and indigenous politics in Bolivia are championed as constituting an ‘other’ to capitalism, yet underlying them is the funding and rhetoric of precisely this capitalist other which seeks a mirror to look into. Similarly, in championing the Callawaya culture as one of ritualists in an animate landscape, we see the de-animatory perspective seeking its other, looking into the mirror for what it feels to be lacking. International institutions flock to the third world to help them deal with the consequences of the changes which to western minds we are inflicting, whilst seeking in these ‘people outside of capitalism’ a cure, a remedy, a solution to the problem. Or simply to save our souls. In the coming chapters we will explore more fully the dimensions of this alterity, looking at how it shapes the minds and practice of the Kaateños and their city relatives and, shifting up a level, the politics of the neo-indigenous state. Moving up another level, we will look at the situation of this rhetoric of the indigenous superhero within the contemporary world, where the ‘developed’ world seeks with greater avidity than ever, faced with the catastrophe of climate change, its other, that which lies beyond the whirlpool into which it feels itself to be falling.
Chapter 2- Desiring Migration

The city is a powerful centre of attraction in the landscapes of contemporary Kaata, especially those of its young people: the contaminating wrappers from new commodities are signs of the influence it exerts, as are the declining number of workers in the weakening stony fields, and the dwindling fiestas. I will analyse here the desires and motivations that underlie this movement, the imaginaries constructed by a new wave of young migrants attracted to live in the city. Comparing this to existing studies of migration in the Andes, I will analyse the changing nature of the underlying desires elucidated by migration. We are here tracing the human element of the landscape described in the last chapter, as is fitting to our discipline, but must also remember that in the view of the Kaateño elders the young people are not themselves fully responsible for the desires which lead them to the city; they are moved along lines of desire, as we shall explore in the next chapter.

With the increased influx of migrants to La Paz from many rural areas over the last two generations, I will consider the changing nature of this city, which becomes ever less a centre of white or colonial culture, and ever more a city of first-and second-generation migrants, who dynamically recreate identities, combining elements of Andean community life with the promise of urban modernity. The character of the urban ‘other’ which young migrants look towards thus also changes. Considered as two idealised poles of ‘indigenous’ and ‘white’ culture, the countryside and city are continually looking toward and adopting aspects of one another in a dynamic relationship with an ‘alternating current’ of mimesis and alterity (Taussig, 1993). In this never ending mimesis, the real or authentic is sought, the original of the images, yet never quite comes into view, as at its heart it is always already interacting with the other. The city and countryside are two distinct locations unendingly idealising and imitating one another. This alterity, taking the form of Indian and non-Indian, or colonised and coloniser, is although antagonistic a complementary relationship of two mutually composing halves. Mimesis is an attempt to make equal these two halves, over an underlying hierarchy.
Migration in Kaata: extent

As we saw in the last chapter contemporary migration makes a marked impact in Kaata, and is sometimes the subject of worried reflections on the vitality and continuity of the community. When I asked whether there would be anyone in the village in another generation’s time, my young city-dwelling friends, Clotilde and Alejo, replied- “exactly! This is what we’re worried about”, while don Felix gloomily predicted that in twenty years there would be no one left at all. Bastien records that there were 205 families living in Kaata in 1972. In 2012, there were about a hundred families, not all of whom are resident in the ayllu all year round. I did not know a family without members working in cash economies outside the village. Migration to the city or coca fields- which we shall look at in Chapter Four- has become for young people the norm.

We left the last chapter with the voices of elders lamenting the lack of players at their fiestas (“and who will play quena for us now?”), and considered the fundamental role of music in inviting or calling the elements through ritual. While the old dances and music are declining in popularity, young migrants returning from the cities bring new songs and dances which reconstitute the space of the community. I will compare at the end of the chapter the landscapes elucidated these dances.

Migration is not of course a new phenomenon- there are a large community of Kaateños living in La Paz, migrants in their forties and fifties, who left twenty or thirty years ago. Although known by all their neighbours as Kaateños, they seldom visit the village, and were eager to ask about their relatives, and hear from me about that year’s fiesta of Santa Rosa, the largest of the community celebrations; apparently only one man had travelled back for it. I did not do extensive fieldwork with this group, but many of them had worked their way through the coca fields to earn the money to take them to the city. They are a tight-knit community, as are the altiplanic Aymara speaking migrants that Sian Lazar (2008) records. Like the altiplanic migrants they have their own football team; unlike the communities Lazar describes, there was no union or common professions linking the Kaateños. Apparently this is a common experience: the market and trades of La Paz are dominated by Aymara speakers, and the Quechua speakers tend to lack the same social footholds (Nico Tassi, personal communication).
The younger migrants with whom I worked, born in Kaata and working and living outside of the village, were more likely to return for a fiesta or a holiday. This generation seemed to be more dispersed: my friends Edwin, his sister Clotilde and her husband Alejo lived together yet had few links with other Kaateños in the city. Their cousin, Valentina Yanahuaya, who we shall come across in this chapter, had set Clotilde up with her job as a maid, and she helped her sisters to La Paz. It is this contemporary generation of young migrants, still linked to the village, that I will here follow.

Despite these precedents, and the visits to the village of my young friends, migration is currently in the village feared to constitute the end of the reproduction of life, an exodus. I did not know a families without members working in cash economies outside the village, finding that many households consisted of young children and elder adults. In Chapter Three we will explore attempts to initiate new cash economies within Kaata, though at present making money requires leaving the community, for a variety of destinations. Some Kaateños work in nearby collectively-run gold mines, which it seemed was not really considered being outside the ayllu, despite being absent for weeks at a time. The most common destinations for migrants are the lowland jungles, to pick or grow coca, and the capital La Paz. Others move farther afield, to cities in Argentina or Brazil. It was often the case that those remaining in the community were mature parents and their smaller children, while young people worked outside the village, and it is these young people of whom the elders in the community speak when they talk about desire for clothes and radios.

Motivations for migration

When I asked people why they wanted to live and work outside Kaata, they replied in terms of desire for commodities, especially clothes. We shall explore here what desires are articulated by such commodities. My friends gave me to understand that secondary appealing factors about the city were its comforts - in the city you could take a shower, it was said, and indeed in our household in Kaata the young people were taking measures to install one. It was also admitted, somewhat shamefacedly, that life in the city and coca fields was easier than in the campo, allowing more time for leisure activities like watching TV, whereas in the campo there was always work to be done.
As Douglas and Isherwood (1996 [1979]) indicate, consumer goods are used to make cultural categories and social definitions. Modernist ethnographies took the perspective that commodities, like the ‘westernisation’ inevitable in movement to cities, were replacing ‘culture’, whereas the material culture school (Miller, 1995, etc) emphasise how contemporary culture is elucidated through commodities. I will look here at the nature of these commodities that entice young people to city life, and how they are used to (re)constitute identities.

I will look firstly at the causes of migration in the Andes, comparing Kaata with other regional ethnographies to see how reasons for leaving are changing over time. I will then explore the aspirations and desires that drive the decision to migrate, and the dynamics of return to the community for the annual fiesta of Santa Rosa. I end by comparing the identities elucidated when young migrants dance with older dances. I am focusing on how migrants create conceptualise the rural and urban domains which they navigate betwen.

Migration in the Andes: changing contexts

In the early twentieth century the countryside and city are characterised in anthropological literature as sharply contrasting, even antithetical. Anthropologists tended to make conceptual separations between the urban (contemporary) and rural (traditional); Raymond William’s (1972) *The Country and The City* elaborated the conceptual importance to the English psyche of these dichotomously separated domains of alterity. Robert Redfield, writing in 1930, draws clear distinctions between what he calls rural ‘folk’ and city dwellers. Folk culture is by definition rural and illiterate: when people move to the cities and begin to

“share interests which are not local but even international…they are communicating with contemporaries like themselves in other cities and in other lands; and through printing and pictures they draw upon the accumulated experience of groups geographically and historically remote. They are ceasing, or have already ceased, to be a folk people” (Redfield, 1930:3).

The separation between city and countryside is emphasised in this description. Folk culture is classified by its fragile alterity, not only to the city but as we see from Redfield’s statement above, to all things ‘western’. It is not surprising, given the drawing of these lines, that those who try to mix the city and countryside are
considered to ‘grow confused’: Redfield’s work in Tepoztlan describes the development of “an intelligentsia who live in both worlds… and are correspondingly restless and often unhappy” (1930: 209). If the boundaries of alterity are not respected, lack of harmony results. Redfield’s perspective holds much in common with structural-functionalist perspectives of Africa of the mid-century, in which city and tribe were conceptualised as two discreet, integral systems (Gluckman, 1941, 1943, 1961). This viewpoint is fundamentally one of alterity: the urban intellectual searches in the folk culture of the countryside for its other, as that which is outside of capitalism.

Followers of Redfield in the seventies conceptualised the movement to cities in terms of a one-way folk- urban continuum (Browning, Balán and Jelin, 1973), characterised by two idealised poles, the campo and city, again defined as opposites. Lomnitz (1977) focused on the networks connecting the rural and urban contexts, indicating that migrants were likely to be familiar with the culture of the city before arriving. It was assumed that migrants would become transformed as they moved from the campo to the city, and that rural norms and identities would be left behind (Lomnitz, 1977). Migration was thus posited as a one-way process of culture loss. Isbell (1978) conceptualises the village and migrant community in the city as two ideological systems, self-regulating, which interact with each other- this brings the analytical focus towards the possibility of reflection between city and countryside. Bastien (1978) mentions migration yet focuses on it little, concentrating on (re)constructing an isolated community.

Contemporary Kaateños move with fluidity between the city and countryside and I feel the concept of a network is useful to describe the movements of young people to work, or to visit their families; of don Luís, the shopholder, making his weekly trip to La Paz to stock up on the waste-bringing sweets which the children love to consume, or Alejo carting off the minerals collected from his mine for sale. Older men sometimes return after years away to fulfil community cargos\(^\text{17}\). The network of the village can stretch to great distance and fineness yet still hold: an old man I met at a fiesta had travelled by road from Sao Paolo in Brazil to put on his poncho for a few days and re-join the community. His children however did not

\(^{17}\) As taking the one-year post of responsibility, becoming a member of the authorities, in the village is known. This is crucial to being a full community member, and in the past on reaching maturity.
accompany him. The city and the countryside are in Bolivia as I shall argue mutually
influential, the rural-urban migration shaping contemporary La Paz as increased
mobility changes relations composing the ayllu. In this way I attempt to open the
study to the connections across the urban-rural divide, taking the movements and
multi-locality of the Kaateños into consideration in exploring the landscapes they
inhabit.

Paerregaard (1997, field research, 1986, 1989-91, 1993) investigated the
networks integrating rural community life in Tapay in the Colca valley with that of
communities of Tapeño migrants in Lima. By the seventies and eighties migration was
felt to be a rite of passage in Tapay, and an indispensable part of being an adult, much
like in Kaata today. Paerregaard feels that through migrating Tapeños desired to make
themselves economically and politically visible, to gain access to public resources,
enjoy civil rights, and, above all, to become members of criollo society. They do not,
he states, migrate mainly out of economic necessity, land scarcity or political conflict,
but to throw off a (rural) Quechua-speaking Indian identity, and become Spanish-
speaking urban dwellers. In Lima in this period, the city is definitely hierarchically
weighted against the countryside, such that Tapeños’ actions are shaped by the
mimetic desire to become the urban other.

One of the most extensive studies of rural migration to La Paz has been that of
Albo, Greaves and Sandoval (1981-1983). They emphasise that most of their survey
respondents, of any age or sex, claim to have migrated due to negative factors, framed
in terms of rejection of the countryside rather than the lure of the city. In the majority
of cases, these factors are economic, leading the authors to conclude: “they have to
leave the countryside because there are no economic possibilities of survival there”
(“tienen que irse del campo porque allí no hay posibilidades económicas para
sobrevivir”). Re-analysing the study’s extensive results, because of the wider range of
responses given by those attracted to the city, we find that in fact, of those surveyed, a
total of 754 gave positive motives for migration to the city, as opposed to 625 framing
motivation in terms of the need or desire to leave the campo. Here we see an
analytical tendency to view migration as caused by the inability of the ayllu to sustain
livelihoods. This was challenged by reasons for migrating I heard in Kaata, where the
changing agricultural conditions are as much a part of the results of migration as their
cause, as well as the cited surveys’ own results. Of those respondents to the survey
giving positive reasons for migration, half stated the desire for education as their main motivation, and a third other related ideological factors such as to become ‘civilised’ or ‘cultured’. The city is weighed as a centre of ‘civilisation’ or ‘culture’ relative to the countryside, and it is to embody these values that migrants move.

Marisol de la Cadena (2000) shows that with the public repudiation of racial determinism in nineteenth century Peru, the discourse of race came to be replaced or overlaid with that of ‘culture’. Culture served to maintain the existing hierarchical discrimination inherent in racist discourse: western education and rational thinking were assumed to be inherently valuable, and thus the cities and their white elites were at the top of a social scale that had now become even stronger because those reproducing it could claim they were not racist. Indians with a western education were held up as examples; one could respect the lower classes if they ‘took the trouble to educate themselves’ (de la Cadena, 2000). Seeking the city to become educated illustrates a desire to climb these racial/social hierarchies.

Sarah Lund Skar (1994), working in Matapuquio, Andahuaylas, finds similar attributions of value attached to rural and urban contexts- finding one’s way in the city is known as buscando la civilización, finding civilisation, and similarly community members in the city attempt to ‘civilise’ the village through civic works, and gifts like the statues of Santa Rosa, or virgin, which form the centres of the community festivities in both Matapuquio and Kaata, as rural communities all over the Andes, as we shall see. The city and countryside are here respectively weighted with values of civilisation and lack of it, expressed through concrete material or economic features.

To what extent are these prejudices in favour of the city still current in contemporary Bolivia? The country is now characterised by what Javier Albo (1991) has termed ‘El retorno del Indio’, the return of the Indian, one is unlikely to hear such open affirmations of desire to become criollo, in comparison to Peru or Bolivia in the eighties. As we shall see below, ‘cholo’ culture has spread through the city, making it more the domain of rural migrants than it was. The context is changing, with Bolivia influenced by decades of indigenous mobilisation culminating in the MAS government, and an international context which values indigeneity. At fiestas, men who had spent more time in the city asserted to me that they were Callawaya, in the rather defensive tones that such ethnic classifications tend to take. Spending time in the city can engage a mimetic relationship, leading one to emphasise rural identity
more strongly, as the two poles of alterity are drawn into dialogue with one another. In the Katarista movement of the 1970s, Silvia Rivera (1987) notes, ‘indigenous’ elements like calling leaders Mallkus (the Andean word for Condor and meaning leader) came from city rather than rural activists.

It would be most unpopular to assert in the current context that the city is a refuge of civilisation in comparison to the countryside, though these historical prejudices continue to underlie layers of complex hybrid identities. They are inherent in many domains, including the education system with its bias towards European languages and ‘western’ culture (Canessa, 2012). The ‘culture’ of the campo is currently championed in national discourse. The countryside is channelled through the city’s gaze and folklorised to create a unifying national identity, idealised by the city through philosophies like the Vivir Bien. We can turn again to Taussig’s (1993) conception of dynamic mimesis and alterity: the city and countryside, self and other, are engaged in constant mimesis, meaning that it becomes increasingly difficult to tell where one ends and the other begins. It is this dynamic alterity that primarily motivates movement between them. The sorts of desires that motivate Kaateños to emigrate and work in the city and coca fields are shaped by the ideals these places embody, largely as I will argue here by consumer goods to which they provide access, characterised by the hybridity- and underlying alterity- of contemporary Latin American cities (García-Canclini, 1995).

Sian Lazar (2008), speaking to migrants in the city of El Alto in the nineties, finds that people were said to live better in the countryside: “they might drink more, eat better, be stronger, or work harder” (2008:230). People told her however that services were better in the city, and they were able to benefit from the comforts of education, transport, electricity, running water, and toilets, though Lazar felt, indeed, several people said, that the countryside would be preferable if it had these amenities. Lazar’s informants here express the respective benefits of the two places in terms of access to state services. Also, they do not claim that life in the countryside is unsustainable or impossible- moving to the city is a choice made in terms of these material advantages.

Inclusion and access to rights in contemporary Bolivia are not understood to be entirely contingent upon being ‘white’ and Spanish speaking, nor upon dwelling in the city. In 1994 the Bolivian state passed the Ley de Participación Popular, the Law of
Popular Participation (LPP), which devolved spending from the state to municipal authorities. The law also devolved authority to rural communities, which had previously been represented by administrative centres, usually the main town of the region, such that they were able to directly take responsibility for providing services like education and infrastructure. Kaateños extended electricity to the village in 2010, and most houses have a tap in the yard. The community, furthermore, has a school at which young people can complete their secondary education, unusual in a village of this size. While a generation ago young people left the village to be educated, now they remain in the village to complete their secondary education. The LPP had the effect of containing migration in the country as a whole, and it could be that reasons for migration to the city is now framed in other terms owing to the success of local authorities for providing desired services in the ayllu.

Andrew Canessa (2004; 2012) argues that schooling in rural communities itself creates the desire for migration through systematically devaluing rural values and lifestyle. Schools operate on the assumption that civilisation and city values are desirable and the eventual aim of education, taking priority over teaching literacy or mathematics. Kaateños complained that the school failed to educate the young in relevant skills like agriculture and reading the seasons, or socialise them into community living. While the school enables young people to be educated in the village, therefore, its teachings nonetheless tend to encourage eventual migration and the ideological evaluation of the city as inherently superior to the campo. Furthermore, the school is the primary site of consumption of those sweets, sold at a shop in the adjoining square, whose consumption is so crucial to climate change, and thus a centre of sorts for this cultural change.

The school in contemporary Kaata may demonstrate the intention to recreate in the campo the desirable features of the city which drew people away in decades before. The young people I spoke to about migration however expressed desires for consumer goods rather than education and services, which are indicative of a changing context. We can think back again to the neighbour talking over his fence who we met in Chapter One: whilst parents want their children to be educated, he says, all they want are maquinarias, machines.

To some extent actors have the freedom to move through these domains (re)constructing their identities, becoming whiter and less Indian; Harvey (1994) indicates
that the success of this depends on how others assess your claim. Seeking the new language of urban identity, Kaateños re-write the social script, invoking new flexibilities in socio-racial constructs which consumer commodities, and new forms of wealth with which to buy them, allow them to articulate. We can celebrate with García Canclini (1995) the hybridity and cultural mixing this allows, yet there is an underlying tendency to move towards the white and the city in their claims, as I shall argue.

**Contemporary desires: clothes, cholas and commodities**

When I asked my friends why young people moved out of the community in search of work, they replied that they wanted clothes, and as a secondary factor, mobile phones. My friend Alejo explained the desire for clothes to me like this- seeing a teenager come to school after a working holiday smartly dressed, the others desire to imitate his/ her clothing, feeling themselves suddenly shabby. Capitalism perpetuates itself here without any aggressive, company-sponsored advertising; it is imitation among young people which leads them to desire these garments, and to increasingly engage in wage labour. An older man, waving his hand dismissively over the pastures of Kaata, told me, “Here there’s nothing”. When I mentioned the richness of the flocks and land he replied, “Yes, but if you want…” he paused reflectively, “good clothes, or a good house, you have to work outside [of Kaata]”. Similarly an older couple, who had remained in the community, when asked what they felt had changed since Bastien was there, also replied immediately that people wore different clothes now. This focus on clothes at first baffled me, and I will attempt to investigate here what this particular commodity symbolised, and why it was associated with change in the community as a whole.

Clothing puts us into the realm of appearances. As Daniel Miller (1998) indicates, western ontology holds that real meanings are in the depths, and surfaces are shallow and ephemeral. The Trinidadians with whom he works, by contrast, feel the surface, and clothing, key to understanding other and the self. Taussig (1993) indicates that the importance of images of commodities among the Kuna is associated with their spiritual nature: “appearance is power, and… this is a function of the fact that appearance itself can acquire density and substance. It is this quality that brings spirit soul and image into the one constellation. That this arouses fear, longing and
wonderment is surely no surprise” (p.176). We can read in the importance of clothes a reflection of mimetic desires at work: the magic of the commodity is in the image of it. Clothes are both appearance and ‘contact’: in putting on clothes of the white man, Taussig indicates, one can assume and feel the other, take on their skin as well as adopting their appearance. There is a “coursing back and forth between imitation and contact” (ibid:176), image and contact forming the basis of Frazer’s ‘sympathetic magic’ to influence or win over another.

A wealth of ethnographic examples illustrate the importance of dress in the Andes, especially in distinguishing social and racial hierarchies in the city. Whilst style for Kaateño men emulated western norms, for many women moving to La Paz, the desirable look was the distinctive chola style. This ensemble of layered skirt over ample petticoats, with shawl and bowler hat, is especially associated with migrants to the city, or those who maintain connections with the countryside. To dress as a chola is not to be ‘white’, as it is also not to be Indian. Chola women occupy a key position in between the city and countryside (de la Cadena, 2000; Weismantel, 2001). They are often associated with the marketplace: an archetypal role is a successful market seller, selling countryside produce which they will have used their connections to it to obtain, middlemen crossing the ideologically separated urban and rural zones, with their racial connotations of whiteness and Indianness, mingling alterities (de la Cadena, 2000; Weismantel, 2001). The chola is situated somewhere between the two hierarchical identities of white and Indian, which are mutually constituting meaning-laden ideal poles of alterity, like the city and campo.

Being mestizo or Indian is, as Marisol de la Cadena (2000) indicates, analysing the market women of Cusco, a social condition, connoting success or failure in the city. Women seek to ‘de-Indianise’ themselves through rejecting the aspects of identity, such as lack of education, poverty and uncleanliness, associated with this label. The successful image of the chola makes her less ‘Indian’ and more mestiza, with a traditional claim to social superiority. De la Cadena reports for example that police in Cusco stripped market sellers of their shawls and hats, as these make them mestizas rather than Indians, humiliating them into a lower place in the social hierarchy, where they should be respectful (de la Cadena, ibid.). De la Cadena’s fieldwork illustrates the traditional prejudices associated with the chola in Peru,
which as we shall see are challenged in contemporary Bolivia, though it shares a similar past.

Clothes are crucial in constituting the chola; across the Andes distinctive norms of dress are associated with them. Rondi Ericksen (cited in Seligman, 1989) asked people around the market town of Sicuani what defined cholas, and everyone agreed it was the white stovepipe hat. In La Paz, their most definitive attribute is the pollera skirt, which becomes synonymous with identity. Mary Weismantel (2001) considers the pollera in its ‘exaggerations’- its petticoat-bolstered girth and flouncing layers- almost a parody of feminine attire, and more like trousers in terms of what it signals about female autonomy and economic activity. The chola garb denotes success in the city, Weismantel indicates; the signature bowler hat may be worth hundred of dollars, and especially fetishized are the costly Borsalinos, made by an Italian milliner which moved to the Andes when bowlers went out of fashion in Europe. Similarly a mantel, of alpaca wool or shiny stuff for festive occasions, is an expensive item, and successful women will adorn themselves with a wealth of gold jewellery and fillings. With increasing status a woman may wear an ever-greater number of petticoats beneath her pollera, literally embodying wealth in her increased stature (Weismantel, 2001). The chola of the market appears liberated from patriarchal domination; she is an independent woman who makes money.

Dress is fundamental to navigation of the racialised categories of social hierarchy set out by de la Cadena (ibid.). De la Cadena indicates that in the social schema of Cusco, Indian, cholo, mestizo, white and the many degrees of ‘race’ between them are relational identities, such that a market woman may abuse her social inferior, the porter, as a ‘dirty Indian’, yet in another context be insulted as an indian herself, by someone considering themselves superior in wealth, city manners and education (ibid.). We can see here that racial identities are constituted relationally. In an interaction, it is important that one actor should be more and one should be less Indian. The two actors assume roles relationally to their interlocuteur, shifting positions according to the circumstances along a hierarchical scale between rural and urban. This game of alterity is generative of social contexts in Bolivia to a great degree.

Women in Kaata will don chola clothes if they are going to the city; they would be horrified at the idea of wearing their homely woven clothes in such a
setting, equating them with an ‘indian’ set of characteristics, of being unable to cope with the city. People would take advantage of a woman in woven clothes, connoting their lack of familiarity with prices and fares, whereas a tough business-like, bowler-hatted chola would seem better able to stand up for herself. Movement between chola dress and woven clothes in Kaata is fluid however- in the August fiesta city dances like morenada requiring chola clothes were danced alongside native cantus, which require woven dress. I met a lady dashing off down the hillside in her woven clothes after dancing cantus, who called to me gaily that she was off to change into her pollera and bowler for Morenada. Identities are constituted and reconstituted, the swift succession of mimesis and alterity between the two poles giving energy to the spectacle.

Linda Seligman (1989, 1993) indicates that to a rural community chola market women symbolise the power of commodities, the magic of buying and selling, transforming rural produce into commodities. I find this has changed over time as rural communities hybridise chola dress and city ways. A woman who came to Kaata to buy up broad beans and sell them on in the city was dressed in a tracksuit, the epitome of ‘white’ or western clothing, also worn by the village teachers,, separating her into a class above the campesinos, many of whom now dress as cholas. In the city, selling these same beans she might wear a pollera herself, connoting her connections with the countryside: identities are shifting, contextual and relational.

Some of the responses to Albó, Greaves and Sandoval’s (1981-3) survey shed light on the importance of becoming a chola for women:

“I came to the city to hide myself from the countryside, because the maids… came back to the countryside, now cholas with character, physically changed. All this influenced me to leave the countryside behind” (1981:223)

This statement indicates the power of commodities and dress to transform oneself- the chola is not only well- dressed, but a person “physically changed”, when she ‘leaves the countryside behind’. By changing clothes one can potentially become the other.

Zoila Mendoza (2000) explores the power of dress to transform identity on the outskirts of Cusco, and finds that through dancing Majeños, associated with a white, urban identity, a faction of the town have been able to emerge as a petit bourgeoisie. Lifestyle and identity are created through embodying ideals through dress and dance;
one can potentially become the identity one wears. Girls wishing to make some money and put on the pollera have the potential to become a new personage; however, as Harvey (1994) indicates, dressing as a mestizo or speaking Spanish amount to a specific claim about social status, which others may not allow one to make, despite the quality of one’s clothes or fluent Spanish (Harvey, 1994).

Becoming a chola is associated with certain freedoms - Clotilde told me that the village girls would be seen in Charazani now at the feria at weekends, well-dressed as cholitas and unaccompanied by their fathers- “They do better now than we did”, she concluded, giggling naughtily. De la Cadena (2000) indicates that with the neo-indigenista ideology of mestizaje in Peru emerging in the 1950s, cholas were sexualised in their role as reproducers of the new ideal mestizo nation. Becoming a chola is associated with independence and licentiousness, which is concordant with their ambiguous, sexualised status in Peru. Thus desire is de-territorialised from the rural mechanisms that contain it, as girls escape to become a chola or a western dressed city girl.

In contemporary La Paz, with the efforts to upturn existing racial hierarchies, the chola is held up as an emblem of the national character. As sociologist David Mendoza (2005) writes (in an attractive colour publication, supported by the Spanish embassy and the Office for Culture of the Municipal Government), contemporary Bolivia seeks inclusion for women de pollera, dozens of whom entered the Constituent Assembly and parliament in 2005. Mendoza indicates there has been since 2005 an annual chola fashion show in La Paz, and notes with approval that cholas are increasingly represented in folkloric dances, incorporating them into visible national identity.

As an indication of changing attitudes towards cholas, in the judicial elections of October 2011, the population was asked to vote for its national-level judges. The process was unpopular as few people knew of or had time to research the dozens of candidates. One inspired judge had the insight to don a bowler hat and plait her hair for the ballot paper head shot, and was elected by a landslide. When the national news programs and papers the following night ‘exposed’ her in her normal garb, sans plaits, bowler and pollera, there was outrage and embarrassment from those who now felt deceived in having cast their vote for her. We see here again the symbolic
weight of dress in creating personhood and the importance of appearance in defining identity.

In the context of increased migration to the city, cholas become more commonplace. La Paz now has an abundance of ‘locales’, party salons for hire, in the new inner city suburbs like Gran Poder where women celebrate dressed in chola finery. They are fetishized and acquire a more prestigious status within the national identity. While defining itself in relation to the west in a larger scale play of mimesis and alterity, national identity seeks for something that defines it specifically. Despite these recent connotations of choleaje, however, use of the term ‘chola’ is still an insult in many contexts. ‘De pollera’ is often preferred—*mi mamá es de pollera*, for example, would be far more commonly heard than *mi mamá es chola*, an indication of the underlying racism and negativity that remains associated with the label. It is into this deeply hybrid and contradictory city that Kaateño migrants make their way.

Not all of the young women of Kaata were cholas. In Clotilde and Edwin’s family the two elder daughters dressed de pollera, whereas two younger sisters wore western fashions, one appearing for a fiesta from Santa Cruz, the southern city where she lived, in tight jeans and a hoodie reading ‘sexy’, in a much less specifically Andean set of style norms. The other, who dresses similarly to her sister, never came to the community, a cause of sadness and some indignation among her family. The transition from chola to western dress is a common pattern in Paceaño families. Whilst mothers dress in polleras, city-born, educated daughters will often wear western clothes, reflecting their citified status, rather than an identity straddling the rural-urban. Dress reflected the increasingly ‘white’ urban opportunities which the family managed to secure for itself, the elder sister being a domestic employee, and the younger ones, who had benefitted from their sisters’ connections, shop girls. Polleras would seldom be seen at the public University of San Andres in the centre of La Paz; western clothes connote the upward mobility associated with studying and higher-paid, more socially prestigious work. Despite the capacity for mixing identities, underlying is a movement towards ‘whiter’ form of dress.

Men’s dress does not allow for the same degree of experimentation with styles as that of women, but comparable trends are evident in the consumption of other commodities. Nico Tassi (2010) indicates that wealthy cholos selling electronic goods in La Paz express an alternative set of identities through their consumption
habits, rather than adopting those of the mestizo middle classes. Much wealth is spent on the fiesta of the Señor de Gran Poder, the city’s emblematic annual fiesta. Dancing through the streets in flamboyant folkloric costumes, and consuming vast quantities of alcohol to celebrate the miraculous icon, the fiesta makes money ‘circulate’, considered more prestigious than its accumulation, strengthening social ties in the cholo community through exchange and reciprocity. Tassi argues that cholos constitute an alternative set of economic and aesthetic norms to capitalist bourgeoisie (Tassi, 2010), though we must add that displaying this wealth is in itself an aim, and a highly competitive one, of the fiesta. We can compare this conspicuous consumption to Paerregaard’s (1997) study of rural migrants to Lima, who do not wish to appear cholo. The prestige of cholo culture in highland Bolivia provides alternative channels for consumption and aspirations among the migrants to this city.

Colloredo-Mansfield (1999), working in Otavalo, in Ecuador, where the burgeoning textiles trade leads to indigenous communities becoming increasingly wealthy and entrepreneurial, argues that commodities can articulate new indigenous identities:

“Quechua culture does not just sit around a smoking hearth, sometimes it thunders down the Pan American highway in a Ford truck with the new folklore music blasting out the windows” (p.213)

His informants apparently control their new luxuries, not mindlessly imitating western style, but synthesising multiple influences with regional traditions. Identities and desires, he claims, are fundamentally hybrid in nature; actors are not involved in a process of ‘losing culture’ to become more western. However, asking a weaver what he would do if he won the lottery, Colloredo-Mansfield is told he would live like a white/mestizo. Despite the weavers’ wealth, and a tendency for cultural hybridity and mixing, he finds that they are hemmed in by a racist culture. Western culture also brings the notion of hygiene, contesting the cloths and houses of Otavaleños with its assumption of absolute superiority (Colloredo-Mansfield 1999). Whilst movements between the village and La Paz may be fluid, they remain hierarchically skewed ideal poles of racial alterity. Underlying these cultural hybrids, and the attempts to rebalance culture in contemporary Bolivia, are longstanding hierarchies instilled into rural culture.
Alejo and Clotilde were lucky enough to have some success from a mine on Kaata’s lands, and almost overnight made a sum of money. Visiting their house in La Paz, I was interested to note the stream of commodities that subsequently made their way into the living room. The first thing that appeared, surprising me considerably on my first visit after the windfall, was a 50-inch flat screen television, brought from the wealthy choloa of the Gran Poder area of the city. Some months later, Alejo was telling me about his favourite Mexican telenovela. He recounted to me with glee the story of a once humble street seller who won the lottery, and now lived a lifestyle of yachts and fast women. While he might find that La Paz is lacking in yachts and fast women, these desires are not held from Alejo by immutable categories of birth like race, rather they are shaped by the Mexican and Brazilian telenovela industries, aimed at people like himself. The west has been displaced, constituting a style rather than a location (Yates-Doerr and Moll, 2012). The contemporary ‘centre’, in the sense of a ‘desirable place’, can emanate from areas which though classically peripheral are themselves accumulating wealth and inspiring new consumers with their media and the spending patterns and values encapsulated therein.

In the dress of some young men in Kaata, I noted a focus on the very latest western fashions, such as the winkle pickers and drainpipe jeans donned by a young miner travelling to the city to sell the fragments of gold he had painstakingly extracted. I had rarely observed such a fashionable look among young people in La Paz, and wondered at seeing it recreated in Kaata by one who had spent the last few weeks working down a remote one-man mine shaft. A villager from Kaata, with sufficient attention to detail, can go into the city looking more stylish than his city-born counterparts, adopting through clothing an international language of prestige, and becoming contemporaneous with the latest fashions.

Wilk (1990) observes that fashion is produced by a ‘centre’, and the capacity to adopt and keep apace with it articulates a temporal difference between this centre and its peripheries. Local elites would formerly be the representatives of this fashion, in the centres of cities in peripheral places, but with the advent of satellite TV, even those in poorer areas could experience a phenomenon, such as a baseball game, at the same time as those at the centre. This makes the ‘peripheral’ areas contemporaneous with the centre, without their fashions being mediated by local elites. The importance of the latest fashions to commodity culture is underlined by Taussig (1993), who
argues that seeing slightly outdated commodities unmask their power. In their constant promise of being the future, and rapid descent into the past, the commodity embodies life and death, adding to its magic.

The aspirations of the young people of Kaata are no longer mediated through a ‘central’ elite urban class, in this age of the accelerated distribution of images. The internet and videos can provide ample supply of fashionable images which especially with the advent of video phones, do not have to be transmitted through the channels of a local centre. This has the effect of de-territorialising desire from the hierarchies composing Bolivia. Internet and the mobile phones which can channel it and store its images accelerate mimesis and alterity. The place to which Kaateños aspire is ephemeral and elusive; without having to pass through the intermediate spaces of chola identity, articulated by de la Cadena’s scheme of de-whitening, Kaateños can become fashionable city dwellers if they have the cash to buy the costume, and can convince others of their right to wear it. Desires and centres are de-territorialised (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), and their sudden accessibility is attractive to the Kaateños, shaping their desires towards the city.

Hybridity and racism: Valentina and Carmen Yanahuaya

Bastien (1978) remarks an emphasis on clothes in Kaata in the seventies. He mentions that the communities now prefer to sell their products in La Paz where, as well as traditional goods, they can buy “the ‘new’ world products such as clothes, sewing machines, radios, Japanese wool, and plastic pots” (1978:34). He associates these desires with the teachings of Kaata’s school, which in those days provided only four years of mandatory state education. The parents of children not sent to school were fined, and Bastien believes that it is here children are taught “the value of modern ways” and “to dress like westerners” (1978:106). Alejo’s statement that new clothing ideas were spread among young people at the school also confirms this. Seeing Valentina Yanahuaya, daughter of Carmen and Marcelino, his main informants, in her school uniform of pink blouse and blue skirt for the first time, Bastien notes: “Another layer of history was being imposed on Valentina, as so many levels of land or encrustments of earth, with its sense of stratified geological time, yet contiguity” (ibid:106). Carmen cried, whilst Bastien “barely recognised her” (ibid.). That Valentina is rendered barely recognisable by changing into a school
uniform is an indication of how antithetical Bastien felt contemporary city culture to be to those he was studying.

Bastien would be interested, no doubt, to know that Valentina now lives in La Paz, having married a left-leaning Belgian, Stanis, who set up an alternative education centre in the area, where the couple lived for many years. They now have a renowned dairy in a valley on the outskirts of La Paz in Achocalla, which as well as selling to the city’s more upmarket shops is open to customers each Sunday who come to enjoy their artisanal cheeses, wines, and warmer climes of the valley, and is frequented by European back-to-the-landers seeking to learn dairy skills. Valentina still dresses in her woven Kaateño clothes, even wearing the trademark well worn-in white felt hat now only used for fiestas in Kaata.

Though initially shy and reluctant she is persuaded to meet me, and speaks in rapid staccato Spanish as we walk across their fields, stopping to give a brusque dressing-down to a joyous dog. With her lovely teenage daughter, fluent in French, Spanish and Quechua, she cultivates the crops of Kaata and tends to her well-stocked corral of goats, pigs and guinea pigs. In the kitchen, its adobe walls cheerfully painted pink, amid souvenirs from Europe, her mother Carmen Yanahuaya herself sits on a woven cloth on the terracotta-tiled floor, peeling maize cobs. I have been searching for and hoping to meet this woman, wife of Marcelino, and one of the main actors in Bastien’s account. She is very old, and can no longer speak, though she makes a sound of recognition when I mention Bastien.

The capacity of actors to hybridise culture was undreamt of among theorists who saw a one-way transition towards ‘western’ living as inevitable on migration to the city, and this reflection of Kaata existing in the heart of this wealthy enclave of the city was surprising to me. Amongst the constant creativity of hybridity, however, racism remains. Valentina and Stanis had had a couple of swastikas graffitied on their outer walls one time I went to visit, a motif which I sometimes saw reproduced on hats and t-shirts on the bus rides from Kaata to the city. Indeed, on the very outskirts of El Alto, where the road took us in from the west side of the lake and the city first came into existence after the dusty plains in the form of warehouses of pink bricks, there was a school with a fence between white columns, on each of which was painted a curving swastika, looping between two names, and occasionally the word Nazis to underline the meaning. German Nazis escaping trial in the forties and fifties were
influential in Bolivia, and in a classic mimesis/alterity manoeuvre, ideas of racial supremacy became taken up as a defence of Aymara race against mestizos. The Poder Indio party of El Alto claim to be national-socialists, and are responsible for much anti-white graffiti, often adorned with swastikas, in the city.

I raised the issue of Nazis with Mario Quispe in Kaata, a ex-pupil of Stanis’ alternative education scheme, who would make dramatic and war-like pronouncements against Chile at fiestas, and was radically in favour of left wing Hugo Chavez and an Andean revolution. “Of course!” he said. Well, the Jews were a colonial overclass, repressing the Germans in their own land. It was good they rose up against them! I mentioned the concentration camps, women and children executed by the thousands, and he was taken aback, and said that that was taking things rather too far.

Returning to the village

When young migrants return to Kaata, dress performs the function of re-integrating them into the community. A son-in-law, born in La Paz, attending the August fiesta without his wife, was assigned a red Callaway poncho, with which he seemed most pleased, a mark of acceptance and inclusion into the family. Working peacefully in and around the family patio, a sister living in Santa Cruz had shed her clean white trainers for the rural homemade rubber leather sandals, abarcas, which Lund Skar (1994) describes as the fundamental symbol of rural personhood. Her young niece, living in the city, had also been dressed in abarcas for the occasion, which she complained hurt her feet dreadfully. Her grandfather looked on in amusement as I applied the latest technology in blister plasters beneath this symbol of peasant identity. Movement from the village to the city is marked by changing into shoes before departing, Lund Skar (1994) indicates, and it is interesting to observe that a movement back to the village can be likewise articulated through taking up this distinctive marker of person and place. This indicates a fluidity of identity and the capacity to move between categories. The city-born son-in-law was trying to keep his white trainers clean in the mud of the yard: though he could adopt a poncho, a sign of indigeneity, abarcas, as a sign of social standing, or ‘Indianness’ in de la Cadena’s analysis, were not appropriate, and though coming to visit his wife’s village and enjoy indigenous culture as an outsider, he was anxious to keep the cleanliness of his
consumer goods, rather than slipping into the dirtiness which is one of the negative connotations of ‘Indianness’. Krista Van Vleet similarly indicates that sandals are expressive of the racial “categorisation that distinguishes Indian and white, rural and urban, backward and modern, uncivilised and civilised” (2003:352). As Canessa (2007, 2012) indicates, in Evo Morales’ Bolivia it is one thing to be indigenous, and another to be an Indian. A white city intellectual may identify as indigenous, yet to call oneself an Indian connotes poverty, and the inability to cope with city life.

Commodities layer up mimesis on the city and countryside, and articulate fluid movements between them. Indian and non-Indian continue to exist as categories underlying and profoundly shaping the nation in a relationship of alterity. Actors move back and forth between these two zones, constructing and reconstructing their identities. Whilst there is fluidity, yet hierarchy remains.

Textiles: temporality, work and reciprocity

A discussion of the importance of clothes and commodities in Kaata would be incomplete without looking at the woven, hand-made textiles, replete with symbols and figures, which contemporary bought garments replace. Women living in Kaata wear an everyday finery of woven cloth; men now wear their ponchos mainly for fiestas and community meetings. Indicating the figurines on his ceremonial poncho during a fiesta, grandfather Don Ramón told me, “this is our culture”, and started explaining what the symbols were. Similarly, Edwin tapped his woven bag, one distinctive of the region, in which t’Callawaya medicine men would carry their magic curatives, in reference to ‘our culture’ in conversation.

The symbols running up and down ceremonial dress, or along women’s everyday headbands and shawls, mean that in the eyes of other community members Kaateños are covered with a living language. Denise Arnold (2006) elaborates the importance of textiles as Andean writing, a complex system of semiotics. Veronica Cereceda (1986) indicates that textiles can express the landscape, the belts of colour in a woven sack, she indicates, representing the spatial divisions of land into high, low and chawpirana productive areas. It seems that, dressed in Kaateño weavings, people are clothed in a landscape of figures, expressing a temporality and spatiality inherent to the mountain.
As we saw in the last chapter, work is thought to produce foods which are strengthening, whereas bought foods like pasta and rice are not considered nourishing. Producing foodstuffs in Kaata is a reciprocal engagement with the land. Producing woven clothes requires a similar engagement, their very existence, as well as the symbolic language which makes up their warp and weft, expresses a landscape of relationships. The work which woven textiles compound often represents the labour of one member of the family for another: a mother weaves a medicine bag for her son to carry, now used not for his healing plants, but for schoolbooks. Indeed, this is but the last stage in an extensive process of herding sheep or llamas, shearing, and then carding, spinning and dying their wool. Woven goods are very much the product of an entire household economy, of relations of people with each other as well as with the animals and places of the community, carried out over considerable time and enduring. By contrast, bought clothes are often the fruit of individual labour and represent money spent on the self rather than shared with the family, entailing rupture with the household economy and its reciprocal relations.

We can reflect on whether shop-bought clothes are as eloquent as woven articles. They are certainly not composed of the same relationships, or the landscapes these evoke. City clothes are composed of the relationships of a less earth-coated existence. They speak of a way of living without reproducing and engaging with the
earth, without carrying out regenerative work in interrelation with the fields, flocks and one’s family. They speak of individual consumption rather than the investment of effort in a landscape nourishing crops, land and people.

Fashionable clothes are comparatively ephemeral. We can recall the importance of changing temporality for Kaata as expressed in the agricultural metaphor of Chapter One: potatoes are now said to be dug up whilst the plants are still flowering, whereas before they would mature longer under the earth. This acceleration of time is one of the characteristics of climate change. Clothing may be considered expressive of this. These are not the clothes of maturity, of tending to the landscape, but of an easy and individual consumption. Colloredo-Mansfeld (1999) indicates that in a less modern house of Otavalo, with the thump of a backstrap loom, life slowed down, “paced by the couple’s careful skills” (ibid:216); hand woven clothing is eloquent of the pace of the work which makes it. Perhaps city clothes speak, not so much of hard work, which is not always remunerated with sparkling designer brands, but of the more elusive entity, success in the cash economies of the city or coca fields. This success, as we have seen, is a journey away from ‘Indianness’, and associated with the white urban ‘other’.

Colloredo-Mansfeld (1999) explores how commodities can also elucidate the continuing strength of family ties. He outlines an ‘archipelago’ theory of the incorporation of young migrants into their parents’ households through the sharing of wealth, which is calculated in specific acts of giving and reciprocity in which goods are reckoned against one another. Parents borrow money from their children for specific purposes, rather than as part of a process of generalised reciprocity. In this way, “commodities and consumer goods put a public face on intra-familial transactions” (1999:213). Colloredo-Mansfeld underlines the importance for family relationships of purchases like building materials which go into the house itself, lasting investments which will serve the whole family, rather than goods which benefit individuals or are consumed. In the cases that Colloredo-Mansfeld describes, city economies are incorporated into the household and continuation of the family. The commodities brought however, like modern building materials still articulate relations with landscapes beyond those of the village, and their prestige, as we shall explore in chapter four with regard to houses.
Rollason (2008) suggests that in Panapompom western clothes alienate people from their communities, rendering elders of the community, who dress in a bygone fashion, slightly embarrassing ‘others’. Similarly young people in Kaata, by leaving Indian identity behind, become ‘other’ to their elders. Young moneyed, semi-professional people look upon their Kaateño parents as “indios, con nada en el bolsillo”, “Indians, with nothing in their pockets”, as one older man told me. Commodities can elucidate dynamics of family sharing as well as of estrangement.

It is not only people who come wrapped up in woven textiles: they are used in a huge variety of everyday and ceremonial contexts in Kaata, coming in such shapes as carrying cloths used to transport large amounts of heavy goods like crops, smaller and thinner uncuñas to wrap up food, or a ch’uspi bag for carrying coca. We remember that don Felix in the last chapter compared the wrappers on sweets and drinks to the uncuñas in which people used to use to carry foods: the former, when discarded, cause contamination and climate change. Home-made textiles precede the plastic wrappings of alienated commodities as woven garments preceded the succession of fashions that now clothe people. It seems reasonable to posit that as the plastic wrappings on foodstuffs are not alive in the same way as woven textiles, not constituted of a landscape of relationships, the clothes of the city have not the animated life of country woven items.

People’s expertise in managing textiles, as a ubiquitous element of material culture, can lead them to be swiftly put to new purposes. When Clotilde came to stay in Kaata with her two-year old son, Rafael, a saddle was improvised out of a carrying cloth so that he could ride up the mountain on the family’s donkey from the fields where we had been working. This was quite the novelty of the week, much laughed about, and not everyday practice: the family wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to introduce this little city-born prince, adored by everyone, to work in the fields, and for everyone to be able join in the family excursion, yet although heavy to carry he was small and unused to walking so far. Watching the skilful hands of his father and uncle twisting the cloth into the shape of little stirrups, advising each other as they improvised this device, and ingeniously fastening it on in such a way as it would both hold the child and stay on the donkey, I marvelled at the malleable nature of the cloth and the ease with which it could be adapted by the skill of those used to using it to new circumstances. Remembering that ‘cloth is our
culture’, this serves as an excellent metaphor for the capacity to adapt and hybridise culture in new circumstances.

While in the community woven clothes may be evocative of landscapes of the past, at the national level woven clothes have changed from occupying a marginal and ridiculed place in social hierarchies to being a symbol of militancy. Conamaq leaders wear their ponchos with pride, and appearing in public thus arrayed, make a definite political impact in situations like the Tipnis march, as we shall see in Chapter Four. Atanacio or Idelfonso would similarly wear their ponchos to officiate for the Conamaq in La Paz.

The contemporary importance of clothes in the campo is mirrored by the city, which reifies indigenous clothes as the cornerstone of culture, or marker of alterity. Woven cloth is considered by Kaateños to be coveted by the urban other and fetishized, as indeed it is. The search for the ‘other’ extends beyond the city to the international context: tourists arriving in La Paz almost invariably buy ch’ullu hats, knitted jumpers, and woven cloth that they consider signify indigenous identity, returning the fetishisation of western garments in a superb mimetic coup de grace. Desire for the other works both ways. For these tourists, the contemporary power of the indigenous is as those who are outside of capitalism, its ‘others’.

The power of cloth is something this rural ‘other’ is well aware of as it dresses, choosing woven clothes or chola outfits. In a landscape where exchange relations are weakened; where people from the economically productive surrounding areas no longer bring their goods to Kaata to exchange for its potatoes, and every year more inhabitants move away, cloth is one of the few products of the community valued by the outside world. Don Ramón tells me that ‘cloth is our culture’; it is valued at national and international level as expressing the essence of that which he thinks I am seeking. It reifies place and people. Colloredo-Mansfeld (1999) recounts that Otavaleños regard the everyday material artefacts of subsistence farming as yanga cosas, worn-out or useless things, which he believes indicates they have lost their capacity to be productive and reproduce. Cloth, however, is the basis of the new wealth, and becomes the means to other commodities. In Kaata similarly, merchants periodically come to buy textiles, giving them a value which other products of the community, its potatoes and grains, lack.
Relationships of alterity, as we shall see, are fundamental to the constitution of power on national and international stages. Morales might don a suit with an Andean weave, yet going to the city as a Kaateño, one would do better to put on a clean shirt or risk insults and mistreatment. Although there is fluidity between the two areas, we keep coming up against an underlying power differential which renders the ‘Indian’ inferior and more open to abuse.

Three Dances

As we saw in the last chapter, the loss of young people as musicians through migration is key to climate change in Kaata. Migrants return, if at no other time of year, for the feast of Santa Rosa in August. As we learnt in the last chapter, this is a ‘local’ fiesta rather than one for the ‘production’ of crops and earth. We will also look at the Feast of the Ascension, richer in ritual context, for which some of my young migrant friends returned to cook for the community. The first dance we will look at is Chatre, a dance local to Kaata, whilst the second, Incas, is one of a cadre of national folkloric dances practiced in the August fiesta. Both of the dances enact identities associated with specific sites, and thus convey the mental landscapes in which the actors situate themselves, with their changing centres of attraction. Lastly we will examine the concept of mimesis through the “Day of the Indian’ celebrations.

Music sits alongside cloth as a nationally and internationally valued product of the ‘Callawayaya’ communities, considered a defining marker of ethnic identity. Cantus, one among the many musical styles of this region, have become part of the Bolivian folkloric canon, and recordings are made in the lower ayllu of Ninokorin and town of Charazani. Simultaneously, elders complain that the young don’t play or dance for the community anymore, this being an important contribution to the community. When little Rafael, son of city-dwelling Alejo and Clotilde, picked up a tarka flute longer than he was, his father and uncle admired him solemnly, and hung a woven medicine bag over his shoulder, to compliment this important mark of identity.
**Fiesta of the Ascension**

In early June, I attended the feast of the Ascension. Edwin, Clotilde and Alejo had come from the city, as their parents were the *pasantes*. Clotilde was given the honour and responsibility of cooking for the community on her parent’s behalf. Alejo and Clotilde’s role in feeding and serving everyone was connected to their exploitation of the mine below the community. They hosted fiestas continuously over the years in which I worked in Kaata, Alejo always turning up to an event with vast quantities of alcohol. Rather than the rotative *cargos* Kaata used to have, with couples taking it in turns to host the rest and thereby becoming full members of the community, the *cargos* are now continuously fulfilled by the same characters in connection with their increased wealth. In a time of increased wealth disparity, sponsoring a fiesta is demanded of those who do well.

On the second day of the fiesta, I had resolved to write field notes, but when I went upstairs to my rooms, I was almost immediately drawn to the drying terrace overlooking the square below by the sound of instruments. The sun shone in, warming the white walls, and there was a sweet humid smell from a heap of *oca*, a tuber, drying and fermenting on the floor. At each corner of the square, tarpaulin shelters had been erected, at the corners of which tall flagpoles capped with lilies and roses flew the Bolivian colours, rising high against the deep valley of terraces, crowned by the snow-covered Aqhamani range.

The playing came from a group of five men who now emerged onto the square. They wore long white tunics, over which hung strips of coloured woven cloth, and from their necks were layers of slender hoods on long cords, reaching far down their backs. Most wore white felt, round-brimmed Callaway hats, with flowers radiating from the headband, but two had on amazing headdresses—high up above their heads was a wheel of coloured feathers, with a sunflower at the centre, adorned with a flashing mirror.

I had no idea what this dance was about, and as everyone was busy with the fiesta, I brought it up with my city friends when we went back to La Paz. I brought over the photographs everyone had taken on my camera to Edwin one night where he was working as a security guard in a smart building housing the Brazilian Embassy.

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18 Pasantes are responsible for hosting the other members of the community, feeding them throughout the fiesta.
Sitting behind his desk, we looked at the images on my laptop, enlivening the dark night with happy memories. He admired and laughed at the ones of his family and all the assembled company squeezed into the kitchen with their bottles of beer and neat alcohol, looking in retrospect rather drunk. We came to photos of the daytime celebrations in the square, and I tried to get him to explain who the dancers were, and what it all meant, but all he would say was that they were from Niñokorin, the community below Kaata. Everyone in the past had dressed like this, he claimed, but now few did. Why? I asked. Well, they all live in the city now, like we do, he replied. It seemed obvious to Edwin that in the context of migration to the city this dance would decline in popularity.

Oblitas (1964) explains that the dance, Chatre, is one of the most popular Callawaya dances, and that it was indeed performed *en masse* at various fiestas. He also describes it as being in decline, explaining that his informants relate that the costumes were once more splendid too, with silks hanging from the skirts. The decline of autochthonous dances is not of course restricted to this dance or to Kaata; many of the styles of dancing described by Oblitas have now fallen out of use, and the same can be said for many rural dance styles in the country more widely. Stuart Rockefeller (1999) notes that in San Lucas in Cochabamba, the performance of traditional dances at fiestas is similarly widely said to be in decline:

A number of people in the town of San Lucas complained to me that the campesinos seemed to be abandoning the more authentic customs that their ancestors had practiced. The most common explanation for this was that is was due to campesinos’ increasing migration, and the growing penetration of commerce and the world of creole culture into rural communities (1999:126).

I intend to focus on this dance as a case study, exploring the complexities of the identities encompassed, and why they may no longer seem relevant.

The Chatre dance appears to be enacting identity over space; the use of tropical feathers in its costumes indicates a connection with the jungle lowlands. Dancers in Andean communities often enact characters associated with other regions, playing out conflicting identities and tensions. Sallnow (1987) memorably describes the meeting of pilgrims at the festival of the *Señor de Qollur Rit’i* enacting Collas and Chunchos: Collas are the wealthy traders of the altiplano, and are danced by those with a more mestizo and city-based identity; chunchos are Indians of the jungle, and
are here danced by Quechua speakers, and associated with autochthonous identity. The dances articulate the landscape within which the community is situated, and the tensions between the highlands and lowlands, with their associated colonial identities.

Many Andean narratives indicate that jungle Indians are a powerful ‘other’ to highland peoples. Similar tensions are expressed through dance, according to Mendoza (2000) at the festival of San Jerónimo on the outskirts of Cusco, where Colla dancers, here associated with a rural, indigenous and subordinate, though ‘authentic’ identity, and an opposing troupe of Majeños, associated with urbanness and whiteness, compete with each other. Mendoza emphasises how these dancers become the ‘others’ they are enacting, indicating the profound identification with the roles they dance, and the power of dance as well as costume to articulate local meanings and tensions. By dancing ‘other’ characters therefore, the Kaateños can perhaps become them.

Salomon (1981) similarly finds that Yumbo dancers of Corpus Christi on the outskirts of Quito, through embodying the wild Indians of the jungle, enact ever-present tensions between the expanding ‘civilised’ city and an essentially Indian, ‘savage’ identity of the Yumbo. Indian identity in this analysis is ever retreating at the margins of modernity, of the expansion of the city. As Taussig (1986) indicates, moving through the Andean landscape spatially is also a temporal movement, the highlands associated with modernity and civilisation, and the jungle a seat of savagery and true Indian identity. Identities are relative and ambiguous, with the centre of authenticity always slightly removed; the jungle or highland villages are fonts of true Indianness or authenticity in music and dance. Whiteness and modernity by contrast are perhaps most concentrated in the places imagined through telenovelas or western fashions. Either of these two ideal poles are sought as the origin point of mimesis, yet as we seek toward them, the true centre always slides slightly out of view.

I suggest that the dancers in Kaata, decked out in Amazonian feathers, are becoming jungle Indians through dancing Chatre. This region was of great importance to Callawayá healers, who would journey to the jungles to collect medicinal substances. It is thus this relationship with a significant other which is at the heart of chatre, when dancers might become this other. We remember the mirror.
at the centre of the headdress of feathers, providing a miniature reflection of the Kaateño dancers and spectators at the centre of the exotic display of feathers. When these mirrors align through dancers forming a circle, they may catch each other to create unending mimesis, the mirror showing the self in the heart of the other. This is a constant interplay of identities in the Andes, indianness and whiteness endlessly reflecting one another in the play of shifting relational identities.

The dualism inherent in these self-other conceptions is profoundly Andean and visible in community organisation into moieties, as it is in the ritual and conceptual classifications they make. Dualistic parts alternate with one another in relations of exchange (Gelles, 1995). Thus though societies are dynamic, there remains in modernity a structural binary principle which we can trace as society reproduces itself and changes.

Dancers performing morenada at Kaata at the August fiesta of 2014

The Fiesta of Santa Rosa

The second dance I will describe took place at the August fiesta of Santa Rosa. This fiesta is today considered, at least by young migrants, the most important in the village, and is certainly the best attended, as all who can return to Kaata at this time of year if at no other. Such return however, is declining: watching the first night of the fiesta wordlessly, Edwin’s father eventually turned to me and said, deliberately,
“It’s very small. Before the square would be full”. As we saw in the last chapter, Felix dismissed Santa Rosa de Kaata as “just a local fiesta”, rather than one in which rituals are central. The contemporary centrality of this festival reflects the shifting landscapes of the community; rather than agricultural rites, Santa Rosa revolves around the celebration of the saint, a bullfight, and city style dances.

Santa Rosa is a common choice of patron saint in the Andes as her feast falls at the end of August, a time when villagers are relaxing from agricultural work. Celebrating the patron saint in the ‘name fiesta’ of an area is common practice in cities, and likewise migrants return to dance for the saints of their villages (Lazar, 2008). According to Paerregaard (1997), an icon is a common gift for rural communities from migrants to Lima, as was indeed the case in Kaata. Paerregaard explores how the saint is considered a civilising presence related to the city, as well as a way of making the migrants present in the village, embodied by the icon. Santa Rosa, referred to as ‘the Virgin’ in Kaata, was robed in woven clothes, their intricate details perfect in miniature, with flowers radiating from the band of her Callawaya hat, as she was carried from corner to corner of the square.

The fiesta, which went on for the best part of a week, comprises a bullfight as a central point of interest much enjoyed by the spectators. In 2011, the usual displays of horse riding and dance troupes organised by migrants were curtailed, due to the sudden death of the man responsible for organising the city dwellers and hiring their costumes and music. There was widespread disappointment at this, and the resulting fiesta was felt to be lacklustre and inadequate- the usual centrality of the dance and horse riding was explained to me several times. Horse riding is also done at Easter, and is associated with whiteness and lordly prestige. Fortunately, paying a Christmas visit to Clotilde and Alejo in La Paz, the occasion was honoured by their showing me the family photo album, complete with pictures of them dancing Incas at Santa Rosa the year before, and I was also able to attend the fiesta myself on returning to Kaata in 2013.

Incas is one of a national corpus of dances of which one of the better known is Morenada, the most expensive dance to obtain costumes for. Two years later there were two Morenada troupes at this fiesta. Along with other classics of national folklore like Caporales and Diablada, it is widely performed at events ranging from student graduation ceremonies to national entradas like Carnival, or the Señor del
Gran Poder in La Paz. Contemporary folkloric dances, like those of rural areas, often portray identities of memorable ‘others’; Morenada is thought to derive from popular perceptions of black slaves.

In performing these national dances in Kaata, rather than existing dances like Cantus or Chatre, the young migrants enact something of the city within the ayllu. Dancing urban styles potentially has the power to make one into a city person, as we saw in Mendoza’s portrayal of Majeños dancers above. Interesting, however, was the choice of Incas- the region of Kaata is the closest area of the country to the centre of the Inca Empire in Cusco, and unlike the Altiplano it is Quechua-speaking. The Inca theme is one especially appropriate to them and their history, though reinterpreted through the lens of the city. Clotilde’s family had dressed in their chola outfits to dance it, reflecting its associations with the city. The costumes usually used for Incas in the city are sewn imitations of woven dress, an appearance based image copy of the countryside ‘original’.

Dancing Incas in Kaata layers up mimesis and identity. In the city, the dance depicts the rural ‘other’, where villagers like those of Kaata are reflected through
folklorising eyes. In this case they are its intended audience; the reflection bounces from the city back to the countryside, transposed into the heart of the alterity it depicts. The children of these rural others, through adopting a city dance, are demonstrating how they can become the urban other, in the heart of the village. By bringing back a show from the city, they are demonstrating that they can become city dwellers, and enacting a national persona connecting them to university students, electronics vendors, and all others who perform such folkloric dances in the city. The villagers are an echoed reflection within this dance, performed by their children dressed as urbanites, in much the same way as the mirror at the heart of the chatre dance reflected one (highland) self back at the centre of the feathers of jungle identity. Identity changes as this mimesis is enacted, the countryside becoming more city-like, and the city more imbued with folkloric culture, which makes the indigenous more acceptable there.

Such hybridity of identities in dance has interesting cousins in the Andes. Thomas Turino (1993), working in Conima, close to Kaata, on the eastern shores of Lake Titicaca, looks at the dance of the Achachk’umus, at the Fiesta de la Cruz in May 1986. The achachk’umu are hostile old men, who hit children with their sticks as they come into the community. When asking who the dancers are, Turino is told both that they are the achachilas, powerful mountain spirits, and ridiculous Spanish men. He takes these two apparently conflicting explanations to an older man, who tells him the dancers are in fact both. A dance must have two meanings! The old man says. By this mimetic logic, through dancing Incas one could be enacting a city persona and paying a tribute to Inca ancestors at the same time, if everything has both a colonial and a indigenous set of meanings. From whatever side the dance was seen, it would thus have an element of mimetic interpretation of the other, and the dance is said to be incomplete without this two-way mirror.

Dances like Incas and Morenada are commonly described as folklore in Bolivia, as are many popular phenomena. Folklore is apparently the static reproduction of tradition, and must be unchanging, thus forming the essence of identity and cultural patrimony, as García-Canclini (1995) points out. It is commonly defined as produced by elites for nationalistic purposes, and has the atmosphere of being outside of modernity. Analysed as folklore then, the Incas dance summons up a glorious, indigenous past, contributing to the fomentation of national
feeling, and consoling everyone that some remains of indigenous culture have survived intact the ravages of capitalism. Nico Tassi (nd.) however indicates that in La Paz, what is known as ‘folklore’ bursts the boundaries of a static, nationalistic phenomenon controlled by elites, in the usual definition of the word, to become a truly popular means of expression.

Michelle Bigenho (2002) emphasises the importance of authenticity to Paceño folkloric bands. When performed in the city folkloric dances are felt to represent the authentic, indigenous heart of the country. The countryside becomes a place of ‘origin’ within the hall of mirrors of mimesis, like the Cuna mola blouses that Taussig (1993) explains are fetishized as a heart of true indigenous identity. Like these blouses, some of which featured advertising slogans like the His Master’s Voice dog and gramophone in the traditional pattern, here the seat of rural alterity is always already a mimetic reflection of the city.

We see that Incas, like Chatre, has at its heart a mimetic enactment of an important ‘other’. This other is in both cases dictated by the sorts of relationships important in the landscapes within which the dancers are situated. In the contemporary landscape of migration, is it important to enact the urban other, as in the fading landscapes of Chatre it was important to depict the lowland other.

Analysis of this dance would be incomplete without yet another layer of mimesis made evident within it. We must remember that I was only aware of this dance as I had been shown a photograph of it. The photo adds another layer of mimesis: in reflecting the enacted dance in village in an album in the city, the image creates the space of the countryside at the heart of the house in the city. Like the headdresses in the Chatre dances so popular a generation ago, this photograph is a mirror at the centre of the dance, which, at the heart of an exotic reality reflects the village itself, two realities which, catching sight of each other, may create a moment of unending mimesis.

*Día del Indio*

I was able to return to Kaata in summer 2013 for a further two months of fieldwork. When I arrived the village was in mid-fiesta, celebrating a national holiday officially called the ‘Day of the Indian’, there not of course called by any such controversially racist title, but celebrated as the school fiesta, the centre of
nationhood in the community. Men from the community were playing *cantus* on their long *tarka* flutes, whilst some schoolchildren were throwing out an anarchic array of sounds on brass instruments from the other side of the school courtyard. I was invited to dance *Cantus* with a man, joining hands with him and taking our place in a line of couples that wound its way round the patio, finally making its way over to the brass cacophony, who we challenged and danced around before moving on.

During this time I had become quite distant from my little pile of luggage, which as I had arrived in full swing of the party, was in the patio of the school. Later the same night, I discovered my tablet computer was missing. The next day I consulted the community authorities, who eventually helped me to find it again. It turned out a child had had the tablet- he claimed to have found it on the floor, looking “like a mirror”, and when he picked it up, there were pictures of foreign countries, don Fermín explained, his voice understandingly communicating the wonder which the child must have felt on seeing the images. A couple of other people also commented on first seeing the device, once I had it back, that it was like a mirror. The device does indeed resemble a mirror, with its smooth shiny surface, which even when the device was off reflected darkly the faces of those looking into it. As we have seen there is a certain fascination with mirrors, and I was intrigued to see that it was in the capacity of a mirror, or a reproducer of images, that the tablet was taken up. Of all the features that the tablet had, the children had found the photos of other countries, with which they were fascinated, and then they had found, it appeared, the camera facility. They had taken dozens of photos of themselves, mainly on a fishing excursion to the river, in which they posed with their arms around each other- with fish, by waterfalls, in classic ‘Facebook’ poses. They had used the device to enter into the image world of the west. Images are a mirror, and through appearing in the mirror themselves, the children saw themselves reflected in the medium of the other.

Considering the tablet as a mirror illuminated to me the way that capitalism is transmitted in the village. It is as if capitalism holds up a magic mirror, showing us not as we are, but as we would like to be, commodities styling us into the self we have dreamed of becoming. In Kaata, the young people are mirrored back to themselves as independent or sexy cholas, as entrepreneurs, or dandies in shoes with pointed toes, an image projected even to the bottom of a mineshaft to a young man scrabbling for fragments of gold. The self is reflected back as the urban other. It is
this mimesis that shapes the motivation to migrate, and has been a key thread in everything we have looked at in this chapter so far.

For the urban ethnographers looking at folk culture, the countryside is the domain of alterity, which becomes ‘confused’ if mixed with international culture through migration to cities; it has to be a mirror image of the city, its inverse, its other. For the western tourist buying ch’ullus and ponchos also, the countryside is a domain of alterity they seek to appropriate. The ch’ullu, for example, is iconically worn by the musician Manu Chao on the cover of his album Clandestino. The lyrics of his songs which have been over the last decade the hymn of travellers who leave the west to immerse themselves in the other, seamlessly blend place names across Latin America with Europe with lyrics demanding ‘rebellion’ against the ‘illusions’ of the contemporary world, and sympathy with poor migrants to Europe (Clandestino, 1998). By wearing the woven clothes and ch’ullus of the non-capitalist other, many of these western tourists seek to level the hierarchy in alterity between west and other.

Remembering Platt’s words, in a classic essay based on research in highland Potosi “the fundamental structure of the cosmos is dual, and humanity must face both ways at once in order to benefit from the complementary but antagonistic forces around them” (1986:242). Contemporary Kaata and La Paz, are similarly determined by dual antagonistic and complementary forces in creating Indian/non-Indian, or rural/urban identity, as we have seen in this chapter. The complementarity of the two follows from their mutual implication: in an interaction, one can be either category, the important point is that there should be one of each. Despite the antagonism between the two, one completes the other. In their movement between the two identities, young people “face both ways at once”.

Platt (1986) argues that the concept of the mirror is essential to yanantin, the attempt to make equal two complementary opposites: men and women are not quite equal as men dominate politics, and in marriage ceremonies this difference is minimised by such practices as ritually calling them animals in which the two sexes are difficult to tell apart. This renders the two more similar, concealing the asymmetry between them. Like the classic male/female division, Indian/non-Indian are not equal in Bolivia: again and again we see the historic bias claiming white superiority. While the countryside moves en masse to the city, there is less
movement the other way. The layers of mimesis that the mirror between city and
countryside piles up, transforming what it is to be rural or urban, and the fluidity of
the movements of Kaateños between them, serve to make the countryside and city
more equal, and similar. This process of making complementary, hierarchically
skewed identities more equal resembles rituals of yanantin between men and women
in marriage. The concept of the mirror and yanantin underlie contemporary Bolivian
identity making, not merely among rural-urban migrants, but at the national political
level, influencing policies towards the countryside and climate change, as we shall
continue to see in the subsequent chapters. As society changes radically, there are
identifiably Andean social structures which continue to reproduce themselves in
widely different contexts.
In this chapter I will look at how villages like Kaata are conceptualised by the city and where reality might challenge the assumptions of this gaze. The sustainable indigenous community which social movements and politicians conceptualise as an ethnic/national ideal becomes, as we saw in the last chapter, usurped by the mimetic desire for the white ‘other’, which drives Kaateños to leave the village for cash economies in the city. In this chapter we will explore attempts to create alternative economies and attract return migration to Kaata, some of which are advanced as part of a national strategy to compensate for the historic lack of state support for the highlands.

The state and social movements are embracing the mantra of Food Sovereignty, and funds have been made available to integrate villages into the national economy through marketing their produce. Kaata’s agricultural system seems to exemplify standards of small-scale sustainable agriculture envisioned by national and international FS ideals, though as we shall see here, in other ways contradicts these expectations. Some of the idealisations of rural communities inherent in the Vivir Bien, such as the expectation that communities will desire communitarian, reciprocal, non-capitalist economies, oriented towards the production of use-values rather than of cash, create issues for the implementation of FS schemes in Kaata, and I argue that more thorough, realistic ethnography of these communities can illuminate the shortcomings of city centred suppositions of the ayllu as constituted of communal and reciprocal dynamics, as well as the immunity of indigenous persons to self-interest, corruption and exploitation, seen as firmly ‘non-Indian’ colonial tendencies which ought to be absent from the countryside. I hope that highlighting the desires and experiences of the villages might indicate how these policies might be better shaped to the reality of rural communities like Kaata.

As Harris (1995a) states, there is a longstanding contrast in the Andes between ideals of community and individualism, which conforms to the conceptual ethnic dualism between the ‘Indian’, closely associated with reciprocity and communality,
and non-Indian: as we saw in the last chapter, when people amass wealth in market transactions, they become classified as mestizos, cholos, or various other categories of ‘non-Indian’ (Harris, 1995a). I will look here at the history that has resulted in the ideal separation of ethnic identities and their association with market and non-market spheres. Whilst the notion of the ‘Indian’ is associated with reciprocal relations, the realm of the non-Indian is conceived to be profit-oriented and exploitative, so the ethnic divide maps out an ideal separation between use-value and capitalist economies. I will reflect on how this history continues to be relevant in the contemporary economic context, in efforts to support small-scale farming communities by creating a market for their produce, and in national and international markets configured to support large-scale agribusiness, which historically led to the economic exclusion of these small scale farmers.

Climate change and Food Sovereignty: an interview with Felix Becerra, Tata Mallku of the Conamaq

Climate change, in Bolivia as anywhere, is a vast imaginary, and I found that the term was taken up to talk about a metamorphosing discourse of environmental politics and indigenous rights, interweaving with contemporary national events. In 2013 climate change in La Paz was largely ‘about’ the issue of GMOs (Genetically
Modified Organisms), as the contemporary embodiment of the ‘contamination’ associated with climate change. This was the theme being debated at the time by the Platform on Climate Change, comprising the main social movements of the country, and attended by Idelfonso and Atanacio, the Conamaq representatives of the Callaway region. GMOs comprised, as we shall see, the contemporary front line of a struggle expressed in terms of highland peasants versus lowland elite interests, or small farmers versus commercial agribusiness, that had met under many flags since the MAS government took power. GMOs produced by lowland agriculture were in 2013 coming under heavy criticism in national discourse. The Law of Mother Earth (LMT, for Ley de Madre Tierra), in the version modified by the ministries, had just been released, legalising the use of GM in crops which were not considered ‘national heritage’. This outraged the social movements who had drawn up the earlier drafts of the law, completely banning all GMOs. They pointed out that this LMT contradicted the constitution, which has a clause prohibiting GMOs. The national debate raged in conferences and on the television, as well as in everyday popular discourse.

In July 2013, I spoke to Felix Becerra, leader of the Conamaq. I asked him about climate change, and he replied in terms of GMOs, these being the contemporary manifestation of ‘climate change’. As he has the same Christian name as don Felix the authority member in Kaata, whose succinct analysis of climate change in Kaata we explored in chapter one, I shall call this don Felix ‘Becerra’ or ‘the Mallku’, for the post within the Conamaq he occupied that year. Tata Mallku is the highest position within the organisation. For Felix the Mallku, GMOs are a form of ‘contamination’ associated with climate change, in contrast to the more ‘nourishing’ foods grown in highland villages, for which the Conamaq, as well as the Food Sovereignty proponents in the MAS, sought more market opportunities. For Conamaq activists in the city, as in Kaata, the idea of contamination embodies complexes of humans and material elements in regimes of production.

GMO crops, especially soya, are widely produced by large agribusiness estates in lowland Bolivia. Becerra tells me that highland small-scale agricultural products ought to have a higher value than those of agribusiness: “Our products, which we make produce (hacemos hacer producir) with greater sacrifice, organically, are just as cheap [as GMOs], there is no difference in price”. He refers to demands for a protected domestic market which would value the labour, and thus the
uncontaminated nutritional value, inherent in the products of small scale highland agriculture, which are currently being fought for under the mantle of *Soberanía Alimentaria*, Food Sovereignty (FS).

This is reminiscent of Kaata, where the hard work, and reciprocal relations expressed through small-scale agricultural practices, is what constitutes the ‘nutritional’ value of the food. As in Kaata, here too contamination expresses that which threatens the reciprocal relations between people and the land involved in small-scale household and village economies. The vision of the ayllus is communicated to the national level through the head of the Conamaq, as well as through its delegates like Idelfonso or Atancio who participate in the Climate Change Platform.

The idea of contamination seems to express the difference between two regimes, or ideal types, of labour and relationships to the land in the Mallku’s mind. One of these is the peasant *oicos*, the household economy, with reciprocal relations with the land leading to nourishment of the human and social body, and the other a capitalist economy aimed at financial gain, and the production of a fetishized crop in and of itself. The differences, moral and economic, between these two regimes recur in contemporary political debate. One of the foremost demands made upon the MAS by their supporters was land reform. Bolivia has one of the most unequal regimes of landholding on the continent, with lowlands agribusiness on vast estates held by an elite well funded over the neoliberal period. Attempts at land reform were made during the Constitutional Assembly process, as we shall see, but compromises with elites had to be reached, and the fight against GMOs has evolved out of this as the current front line of an ongoing struggle of highland farmers in a neoliberal market.

“We the indigenous for all people must go on producing a natural product”, the Mallku asserts. This fight against ‘contamination’ is that of wide and opposed forces, and by growing things ‘naturally’ the farmers would be combating contamination or climate change as a whole. Once again ‘nature’ is invoked to express a non-contaminating regime of production, as we saw don Felix hesitantly propose in Kaata, one in which chemical and man-made products do not feature. Indigeneity is on the side of this ‘nature’, and seems to be posited against contamination and climate change, which ethnic distinction we will further explore in this chapter.
Despite this ideal separation, Becerra frankly goes on to tell me—“we are also contaminating through farming” (“en el tema de la producción tambien estamos contaminando”). Even potatoes are now ‘very contaminated’ with GMOs, because it is cheaper to produce them, he tells me. Farmers, Becerra says, keep the best non-GM organic crops to feed themselves and their families. A morality value inherent in small-scale production is here counterpoised against the desire to maximise profits. This tricky situation is, he asserts, the responsibility of the government to solve, which must think up policies to make the nourishing non-GM products of labour and landscape commercially viable.

Charging the government with solving the conflictive engagement with GMOs may help to explain why the Conamaq has stepped away from the MAS, as we shall see in the next chapter. Becerra goes on to assert that this government, though in Bolivia they are said to be indigenous, “for those of us who truly live in the countryside, [the government] is not yet indigenous, only in the ranks of those governments which have always made things develop, develop, develop… there remains much work for them to do with the indigenous peoples”. Here real indigeneity is associated with the countryside. Becerra goes on to explain that the government do not carefully watch over the mother earth (velar la madre tierra). Interestingly, development comes to be an ethnic claim—the government are by definition not indigenous because they seek development, rendering them like ‘any other government’, which here in the Bolivian experience, means a white colonial elite removed from the needs of the people. Ethnicity is ascribed to a dichotomy between ‘development’ and ‘looking after the land’, another surfacing of the ethnic binary.

Becerra tells me that the Conamaq are striving for an alternative model of development, which has been codified as the Vivir Bien and developed into legislation like the Law of Mother Earth—its original version, as drawn up by the social movements. I am eager to know what their alternative model implies for extraction. What if a village like Kaata was sitting on top of a gold mine, or hydrocarbons? I ask. Well, Becerra answered, they can exploit them themselves, ‘artisanally’. If resource extraction is kept local, in the hands of those who feel a responsibility for the territory, this does not contaminate: “Indigenous peoples are not contaminating, only big megaprojects contaminate”, Becerra argues. Peasants,
argues, would exploit such resources seasonally, complementing their agricultural production, in the months when there is little work in the fields. He is here employing what has come to be considered a defining feature of Andean agriculture, seasonal employment in the fields interspersed with engagement with other sources of income, as explicated by Tristan Platt (1995 [1987]) in his classic ethnography on llama herders in Lipez. I feel here that the distinction between artisanship and simple extraction rests on the ideological, dialectical opposition of indigeneity to extractivism.

If ‘climate change’, with the change of lifestyle and exploitation of the land this consists in, ‘really is coming’, then, Becerra argues, it should be indigenous communities who manage the exploitation of the resources of which they are rightly the owners: “If we are really the indigenous, we are the owners of the territory, we have to adapt, we have to benefit, be it from our [agricultural] products, be it from our non-renewables, but in the form of administration, artisanally, without causing contamination”, says Becerra. The Conamaq themselves are not entirely opposed to resource extraction, as long as communities themselves be the beneficiaries. Using the idea of seasonality to articulate how they might engage in cash economies without ceasing to be peasants, and modest consumption, which has the sound of harmony with the mother earth, this rationality in fact weds the indigenous community to the extractive economy to which it has just been dialectically opposed. Moderating consumption can set one apart from the spectre of the rapacious white capitalist, at least rhetorically. The ethnic dualism drawn between indigenous and colonial ways of treating the land is disrupted by a more nuanced practice combining elements from both sides of the binary. We see the same situation occurs with genetically modified crops, which are classified as contamination, yet strategically used in the indigenous communities who are perceived to be the stewards of the land and of ‘nature’.

Despite the ideal rhetorical separation of indigenous and extractivist capitalist economies, the desires of the communities and of the social movements that represent them are heterogeneous. We could posit that the ideally separated realms of indigenous and extractive economies in fact mirror each other, each showing up unexpected elements of the other. The Mallku reasserts this ideal separation in saying that indigenous peoples do not contaminate, even if they exploit resources. He also
asserts that they are “the owners of the territory, they can take care of the contamination, they aren’t going to escape like transnationals”. At the time, the major project of Conamaq leader in charge of climate change was controlling the mercury contamination from unregulated gold mining by indigenous communities, of which Becerra is well aware. His statement rests, I feel, on the ideal separation of the two ethnic realms, implying that indiginity is somehow antithetical to contamination. The ideological separation between the mutually implying terms Indian and non-Indian conceals a more profoundly hybrid reality.

Becerra refers to countries ‘which are sufficiently developed’, and others like Bolivia which aren’t developed but have natural resources. In some countries, he tells me, there are mines, hydrocarbons, big businesses, contaminating even the water. The issue of natural resources and the international politics of extractivism, with calls to take the national heritage away from exploitative foreigners, has been fundamental to the MAS administration, and the demands of the actors who brought them to be elected. We shall explore here how the concept of exploitative foreigners has evolved from the liberal and neoliberal periods. The creation of an internal market for agricultural produce could create an alternative to migration and mining, Becerra explains. We will look at the efforts to transform the extractive and agricultural sectors under the MAS from the vastly unequal models handed down from the neoliberal years into a more just and socially oriented economy.

**Indians and mestizos: the development of ethnic identity since the colonial period**

Olivia Harris (1995a) indicates that the concept of Indian identity is intrinsically related to a lack of market access in the contemporary Andes, and explores the marked decline in wealth of Indian communities since colonial times. Before the nineteenth century, Indian communities controlled trade through llama trains (Platt, 1995 [1987]), and their caciques were wealthy (Saignes, 1995; Larson and Leon, 1995; Stern 1995). In addition to selling agricultural produce to pay the Colonial tribute, in a protected domestic market, ayllus had other sorts of revenue. With the introduction of the railways in the mid-nineteenth century, Harris (1995a) indicates that not only transport but trade became dominated by mestizos as well as government and judiciary in rural areas. Taking advantage of commercial opportunities, mestizos often marketed Indian produce, lent money, and obtained
Indian land by less than legal means. In some regions, Indians were prohibited from marketing their own produce. Mid-nineteenth century attempts to stimulate Indian entrepreneurs by creating a market in their land, which had in colonial times been protected, in fact tended to exclude them, Indians becoming a source of free or cheap labour on haciendas owned by mestizos, who also invested in the land little (Harris, 1995a&b).

Indians have participated in markets on increasingly unfavourable terms, such that in the current context those who leave the countryside to become traders are defined as mestizos, and Indians are defined by lack of market access and agriculture. This results in an ideological construction of two polarised ethnic domains, such that

\[
\text{Indian: white} = \text{non-market: market}
\]

Harris argues that the association of Indian identity with inability or reluctance to participate in markets came about during the nineteenth century, and was doubtless intrinsic to the mestizo exploitation of Indians. Then as now, one can become a mestizo through migration and severing ties to the community, such as by changing an indigenous to a Hispanicised surname, as well as through dress and diet, as we explored in the last chapter (Harris, ibid.).

Harris suggests that “it was precisely because the relationship between Indians and mestizos was not securely a class one that ethnic difference became so important a means for mestizos to legitimise their domination over Indians” perhaps explaining the “paradoxical nature of mestizo identity, which in some cases seems to reside in nothing more secure than not being Indian” (Harris, ibid: 367, emphasis in original). In this way, Indian and non-Indian identities are mutually constituting. Maintaining a non-Indian ethnic status depends on constructing an identity in relation, or opposition to, this other.

The abolition of the Indian tribute with the start of the liberal republics might have diminished the fixity of this ethnic category, were it not for the simultaneous compensatory growth of scientific racism which insisted that Indians were inferior and held them responsible for the failure to reach the levels of wealth and development of the European countries which the republics sought to imitate. Common racist discourse holds up the Indian as the spectre of the non-western,
conveniently hanging all the malfunctioning of the state on this racialised archetype (Harris, *ibid*).

The interlayered complementary relations of indigenous and non-indigenous constitute a society which denied Indian communities education and access to trade, which, as the mestizo, embodying both races but anxious to be white, took and abused responsibility in administering land, law or justice, exploiting those racial inferiors from which it was eager to distinguish itself (the very crux of its ‘otherness’ from them). From this racialised context the spectre of the ideal indigenous other is drawn and blamed for the failure of the Republic to live up to the liberal ideals on which it was founded by creating wealth.

I will investigate how these racial-economic alterities developed and became consolidated over the neoliberal period, and look at the sometimes valiant attempts made by the MAS to overturn existing hierarchies. I will explore the tensions between the economic interests of the state in extractivism and agribusiness, concentrated in the lowland states of the country, especially Santa Cruz, and the recent pressures exerted by social movements towards favouring small-scale subsistence farming, in combination with the environmentalist agenda of the Law of Mother Earth. In both the case of resource extraction and environmental contamination, responsibility is displaced onto a voracious white 'other', by comparison with whom one's own indigenous purity can be claimed.

This white capitalist figure, the voracious consumer, is reminiscent of the *pishtaco*, a longstanding figure of fear in the Andes. The *pishtaco* steals the blood and fat from the bodies of Indians, leaving them weakened and sure to die. It is asserted that he takes this back to his own country, and that white people make products like Nivea cream out of it (Weismantel 2001). Although this figure was never explicitly mentioned during my fieldwork, the potent image fits with a general conception of whites in the community and on the national political stage as voracious and exploitative consumers. This figure resembles in its exaggerations the stereotype of the anti-market Indian. I will show how the perfect separation in discourse of capitalism and the indigenous leads to the 'double discourse' the MAS is now accused of holding, promulgating anti-capitalist anti-foreigner rhetoric whilst embracing extractive capitalism.
State Capitalism and Neoliberalism: creating a schism between highland and lowland farmers

The commitment to rural producers comes after years of their being all but ignored in national agricultural policy through the heavily state-controlled capitalism under the MNR, *Movimento National Revolucionario*, which took power with the 1952 revolution, and returned to usher in the neoliberal period which followed 1980. Agricultural policy in this period supported the creation of what we might term a 'neoliberal food regime', defined as a “rule governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale” (Friedman 1993, 30-31).

In 1942, the USA granted Bolivia investments of $25 million for economic development programs, to be drawn up by U.S. economist Mervyn Bohan. After the 1952 revolution, the MNR, embarking on a project of state-led capitalism, began to implement this 'Bohan plan', which recommended economic diversification, monetary stabilization and import substitution. Emanating from the CEPAL school in Chile, and taken up across Latin America post-WW2, Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies aimed to develop a country's industrial production, saving it from the 'resource trap' of extractivism, exporting raw materials and importing expensive goods. In Bolivia 25% of all national imports were of cotton, meat, sugar and rice. Bohan focused on the development of an agro-industrial sector in the lowland Santa Cruz region, with transfer of public resources to build a road network, rice and cotton mills, meat processing plants, sugar refineries and textile factories as well as for investment in oil seed.

Among the immediate benefactors of this scheme was a small regional elite who had escaped the expropriation of their vast estates in the MNR's post-1952 land reform. Land reform had been extensive in the highland and valley regions of the country, breaking up haciendas and winning the support of the peasantry, but barely touched these extensive lowland holdings, as they were classified as agribusiness, 'empresas agrícolas'. The Bohan plan foresaw the transformation of these pre-capitalist haciendas into commercial agricultural enterprises (2004; 2006). As the plan was implemented under the MNR, the Santa Cruz landholders continued to benefit from government investment in price and credit subsidies, tax breaks, agricultural machinery, and marketing programs. These changes were typical of what food regime analysts term the ‘second food regime’, characterised by reversing the
flow of goods from south to north with US agricultural surpluses to the south, the
development of industrial agriculture using “Green Revolution” techniques and a
focus on cereal production (Healy, 2000).

Under this 'food regime', highland producers, who were largely small scale
peasant farmers, received little encouragement- national production of quinua, a
highland crop, for example, dropped in the sixties and seventies, while peasant
families consumed an ever greater amount of the processed white sugar and white
rice which the Santa Cruz industries laboured to produce, as well as cheap imported
wheat flour, often in the form of refined products such as noodles (fideos). Rice
remains a fundamental foodstuff in Kaata, the basis of most of our soups, although I
was told by older people, as we recall from Chapter One, that rice and fideos don't
really nourish one as do the foods grown in the village, or by the hard manual labour
of those living in other places. We see that the intervention of state politics and
neoliberal food production underlies the tension in Kaata between locally produced
and cheap agro-industrial food.

The nutritional value of beef was directly promoted in state school textbooks,
community education programs, and radio and television adverts, while the
investment of the Santa Cruz elite in cattle farming contributed to the delay in the
legalisation of llama meat (Healy, ibid.). It continues to be very difficult to buy llama
meat in La Paz, with supermarkets and central marketplaces only stocking beef and
chicken; one must walk far up the crater out of the city to find either camelid meat or
mutton, sold from a cloth on the pavement, a peasant product not befitting the
circuits of factory farmed chicken and beef. As alpaca meat is legal in Peru, while
still illegal in Bolivia, the upper ayllu of Kaata sell it across the border, the sale of
this product contributing to the break down of the vertical economy.

State-capitalist import substitution, while aiming to make the country more
self-sufficient, created a model based on western agribusiness models and non-native
foods, and indeed, in Bohan, on the ideas of a western economist. Under Banzer
(1971-80), economic guidance was likewise taken from followers of Milton
Friedman and the Chicago school. Idealisation of the western other is also tied up in
these top-level economic decisions. Tight social control allowed Banzer to impose
economic measures required by the IMF in order to obtain a 24 million dollar loan,
starting with the devaluation of the peso by 67%; this increased the cost of living that
year whilst wages rose at a lesser rate, meaning minimum loss of spending power for citizens of 19% (Dunkerley, 1984). The expansion of agro-export crops from Santa Cruz continued, with cotton, coffee, sugar and wood (from clearing the jungles of the eastern lowlands for agribusiness), fuelled by a rise in global prices in the early seventies, which fell by the end of the decade. Cocaine was also profitable for this Santa Cruz elite, who bought leaves grown in the Chapare and processed them to be exported to Colombia (Healy, 2000).

From the outside, Bolivia was seen to undergo an economic boom, based on high oil prices and agroindustry in Santa Cruz, and fuelled by short-term price fluctuations and over-abundance of credit. Despite this apparent boom, social inequality and rural poverty were so extreme that Bolivia remained one of Latin America's poorest nations. In October 1973 Banzer announced the removal of state subsidies on a variety of comestibles, meaning oil, eggs, sugar, rice, wheat, meat, coffee and pasta went up 219% in price (Dunkerley, 1984). A complicated system of bonuses compensated the urban labour force by approximately half of this value, but there were fierce protests in Cochabamba, stemming from the effect on campesinos. Many of the increases were on things peasants did not produce themselves, and they were simultaneously prohibited from increasing the market price of their produce. The protests were brutally repressed in the 'massacre of the valley', where troops and tanks were sent to quell peasant demonstrators, with a death toll between 80 and 200.

This massacre contributed to the rising indigenist social movements: the period saw the emergence of a campesino movement called Mink’a, which according to Dunkerley (1984) became by 1975 the Movimento Indio Túpac Katari (Tupac Katari Indian Movement), one of the organisations which took the name of the anti-colonial Aymara rebel Tupac Katari. Collectively known as ‘Kataristas’, these organisations were a powerful force for change. The government and capitalist policies in this period thus contributed to the polarisation of interests between agribusiness and highland peasants, which fed into growing attempt to reclaim and champion indigeneity through social movements. Feeding the interests of a white elite, under the guidance of foreign advisers, and repressing campesinos deepens ethnic schisms in the country and contributes to the impression of white foreigners are voracious thieves which many Bolivians currently espouse.
After a spell of central-left government starting in 1980, which bowed to the demands of social movements to print more currency, the MNR returned to power in 1985, taking over a country immersed in economic crisis with spiralling inflation, and commenced “the most textbook application of neoliberalism yet to appear in the Americas” (Healy 2000:51). The New Economic Policy (NEP), issued by presidential decree, removed price controls and subsidies, lowering tariffs to a single flat rate, the lowest in Latin America, and replacing export taxes with export incentives. The privatisation of state-owned airlines, railways, telecommunications and hydrocarbon enterprises gave 51% ownership and control to foreign companies. The immediate effect of the policies was to stabilise the runaway inflation that was spiralling out of control, and create positive if low economic growth rates, averaging 2.5% in 1990 (Healy, 2000:52).

The new economy continued to privilege the Santa Cruz agribusiness sector, with soybeans increasing their export earnings fivefold from 1985-88, in volume from 223 to 649 metric tons (Healy, 2000). These benefits again failed to reach the wider population, with rural and urban employment and wages falling. Opening up the country to international trade meant that urban marketplaces began to fill with foreign, often subsidised, foodstuffs, including Peruvian potatoes, barley, carrots, onions and tomatoes; Chilean fruits, jams and dairy products, and Brazilian rice and corn (Healy, 2000:52). Fuel subsidies were removed, making it more expensive for rural producers to get their food to market. The World Bank reported that the price index of agricultural products fell 29% relative to overall consumer prices from 1985 to 1988 (World Bank, 1990, cited in Healy 2000), resulting in declining production. Total agricultural production in Bolivia in 1988 was 15% lower than 1980-85.

Thus we see that small producers consistently failed to benefit from state-capitalist and neoliberal politics, which isolated them from markets, favouring an export-focused agribusiness industry. The prime beneficiaries of this were large landholders in Santa Cruz, who consolidated their regional elite status, expanding their clientelistic interests into politics. At the same time, cheap imports restricted market access for small farmers, contributing to the situation we currently see in Kaata in which crops are seldom sold. The gradual expulsion of small farmers from the market with these measures leads to the perception of the countryside as a
fetishized domain of use values and barter, which was certainly not the case during colonial times (Harris, 1995a, Platt 1995, Stern 1995).

Arze and Kruse (2004) indicate that privatisation solidified the economy's 'schizophrenic' nature, creating two economies in Bolivia, one of cheap things for an internal market with a huge labour force and very limited buying power, and a well funded export-focused economy. Gas extraction brought little or no benefit to the national economy due to the very favourable deals that privatisation offered multinationals. Arze and Kruse assert that the lowering of crop prices in neoliberal markets, especially from 1996-2001, has driven Bolivian peasants out of the highlands, to resettle in the lowlands. This schizophrenic economy, creating a schism of interests between small producers, and export-led interests of a macro-economy, again reinforces the ethnic categories of Indian and other, creating different economic spheres for them and further differentiation. It contributes to the stereotype of the Indian cut off from sources of economic power, with wealth channelled away from the popular classes.

The state and neoliberal agriculture policies all went to support what Holt-Jimenez and Shattuck refer to as the 'corporate food regime', “characterised by the unprecedented market power and profits of monopoly agrifood corporations, globalised animal protein chains, growing links between food and fuel economies, a 'supermarket revolution', liberalized global trade in food, increasingly concentrated land ownership, a shrinking resource base, and growing opposition from food movements worldwide” (Holt-Jimenez and Shattuck, 2011:111).

Polanyi (2001 [1944]) argues that capitalist markets would eventually destroy both their resource base and society if left to run unregulated. Self-regulating markets create social discontent which drives the government to reform, which in turn eventually provokes deregulation, in a 'double movement'. The transition from state-capitalism to neoliberalism, and now the return to a state controlled economy seem exemplary of this 'double movement', which as Polanyi argues, ensures the existence of the liberal state and is an essential part of capitalism. The question we will posit is, then, is whether the MAS are doing anything different from liberalism as usual, or indeed from the state-capitalist period; whether this government constitutes a revolutionary force or simply a more socially palatable liberalism. The state-capitalist period, as we have seen, contributed to the consolidation of wealth in the
hands of elites at the expense of small-scale highland producers, and thus failed to check the direction of the liberal market. Can the MAS fare any better?

Resource sovereignty and redistribution under the MAS

FS is contiguous with the current preoccupation in Bolivia to nationalise hydrocarbon and other natural resources, which was the election ticket of the Morales government, and fits with an emerging mood of defensive nationalism which characterises much of contemporary politics. There has been a strong tendency to blame ‘foreigners’ for the current poverty of the country, as they have ‘stolen’ Bolivia’s resources. The strong ethnic-class imaginary of 'indigenous' and 'white' identities has been transposed in this age onto the international level, the figure of the predatory foreign gringo extended from that of the archetypal coloniser or the white elite. This figure also bears much in common with the mythical archetype of the pishtaco, or flesh-eating gringo. Under Morales, ‘we’ are Bolivians; this fundamental marker of identity holds people together, and the threatening, exploitative other is not confined to white elites in Bolivia, but in this age of international politics, becomes extended to the world of white foreigners.

Morales came to power on the back of social protests, and in his inauguration speech made references to ‘the 500 years of suffering’ since the conquest. He set out the hope of shedding the deceits of colonialism and starting a new era based on the indigenous principles “handed down from our ancestors” of ama sua, ama llulla, ama quella, which translates as don’t be lazy, don’t steal, don’t lie. These are stereotypical traits of the mestizo local elite who have exploited indian communities over the centuries, as well as of the contemporary bureaucrat. Indigenous identity is appropriated and championed to oppose this voracious, exploitative ‘other’, seen as the cause of contemporary impoverishment.

During the water wars of Cochabamba in 2000, a subsidiary of multi-national company Bechtel was expelled in violent protests after trying to increase water rates to the city and surrounding areas. In the Gas War of 2005, La Paz exploded after a group of foreigners were rescued by the army from a rural blockade, shooting several protestors, following which the whole country was thrown into turmoil for weeks over a plethora of popular issues, among which the nationalisation of the country's
gas reserves emerged as a theme which all the actors agreed upon. In both cases there was much rhetoric about foreign companies perceived to be ravenously exploitative, and the source of the country's problems.

**Energy resources: Gas and Lithium**

Morales has fulfilled his electoral promises to nationalise gas resources, upping tax rates for the multinational companies who continue to exploit it, so that the state now receives a 54% share of profits, worth $2.2 billion a year, as opposed to $173 million a year in 2002. This was not a classic nationalisation process; companies were given six months to renegotiate their contracts, and all did so successfully. Direct taxes are given to a range of social programs, including the *Renta Dignidad*, a pension for elderly people, and the *Juancito Pinto*, which gives parents a subsidy for keeping their children in school, and is distributed to 1.7 million children. Direct payments are also given to indigenous groups, public universities, municipalities and regional governments. Bolivia does not have the capital necessary to exploit and distribute the natural gas itself, so as Weisbrot and Sandoval indicate, nationalisation through renegotiation of contracts contains the recognition that exploitation of this resource must be tied to global capitalism (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2008). This nationalisation process, allowing the continued presence of multinationals whilst increasing state revenue from them, is fundamentally a process of compromise with international capital.

Webber (2011) and Postero (2004; 2006) believe these measures have led to a very limited bettering of the poverty rate, rather than real redistribution. The poverty prevention programs mentioned above, whilst more extensive than any initiative seen in Bolivia before, are not qualitatively different to poverty reduction schemes carried out under neoliberal governments in other Latin American countries. As Gudynas (2010) indicates, nationalising the extractive industries has allowed the MAS to capture a greater part of their revenue, which it uses to fund initiatives that give it political legitimacy as a left wing government, despite pursuing traditional extractivist policies. The economy is still based on resource extraction, as it was under state-capitalism or neoliberalism, with the majority of the gas employed in fuelling the industries of neighbouring countries rather than in Bolivia. Extractive economies typically require a large input of capital and technology, thus the presence
of multinationals (in contrast to Becerra’s envisioning of community-run extractivism), and generate few unskilled jobs. Also, the environmental impact of hydrocarbon extraction is hardly compatible with the aim to protect the mother earth.

The challenge to construct an industrialised state is a great one, with Bolivia lacking infrastructure and technological education. It is estimated that half of the world's lithium supplies, for example, lie under Bolivia's Salar de Uyuni, and the government are determined they will not sell it as raw materials, but want to develop batteries and cars on site. One difficulty is that Uyuni can only be reached by one track, largely unpaved, roads; furthermore, there is a lack of technology and knowledge of exploitation. A friend doing fieldwork at the Salar reports that the access to information on how to extract lithium was so scarce that he was asked by the team to use his university login to get hold of academic articles on the subject.

Ploughed fields in Kaata

Land reform

The majority of Bolivians are agricultural workers, and Bolivia continues to have one of the most unequal land holding patterns on the continent. The MAS has compromised with lowland agribusiness elites on several accounts in their attempts
to change this inequality. In the 1984 agricultural census, 3.9% of smallholdings were over 100 hectares, and occupied 91% of total land area surveyed, while 86% of farms lay on 2.4% of land, the most acutely unequal regime in the entire world apart from Chile (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007). In 2005, the Bolivian Ministry of Farmer and Agricultural Affairs estimated that 37% of farm units were located in the Altiplano region (mainly La Paz, Oruro and Potosí) and covered 6% of cultivated land, and 17% of farm units in the Llanos region (Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando), covering 77% of cultivated land (IFAD, 2005: p. 4).

A new and more egalitarian constitution had been long demanded by social movements, key to re-founding the country on a more just basis, inverting the existing order of racial inequality. Shortly after Morales’ election in 2005, voting was held across the country to elect delegates to form a Constituent Assembly. MAS delegates held 52% of seats in the Assembly, a majority but not the two thirds required to pass resolutions on each clause of the new constitution. Various issues were hotly contested in the Assembly, land reform key amongst them, with tensions between the elite lowland landowners and other sectors becoming heated in the context of increasing civil unrest in the country at large. Land reform was among the most contentious issues, with land estates concentrated in the ‘Media Luna’ (crescent) states of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando. The fourth Media Luna state, Tarija, had 60% of the nation’s natural gas production (and 82% of its reserves), whilst Santa Cruz has another 22% of natural gas production. These regions demanded autonomy, claiming that they were supporting the impoverished highlands. In the face of unresolvable conflicts, the MAS voted to change the rules of the Assembly to allow an overall majority to pass each clause, and for the whole Constitution to be approved by a two-thirds majority. Opposition delegates responded by holding hunger strikes and marches, and boycotting the Assembly. Sucre demanded to be named capital city, and when this was not forthcoming, highland *assembleístas* were whipped and humiliated in the streets of the city. Unwilling to let the process break down entirely, the MAS finally bussed their supporters to Oruro and had them agree the final text of the new constitution there, in the absence of the opposition.

In September 2008, the country seemed on the edge of civil war as tensions from the lowland elites against the MAS reached a head. There was a regional coup in Santa Cruz, with protestors taking many civil buildings, while the Media Luna
states issued *de facto* statements of autonomy. Much of the violence across the Media Luna was perpetrated by groups of young men associated with civic committees, such as the *Union Juvenil de Santa Cruz*. The violence reached a crescendo when, in Pando, a group of eleven MAS-supporting peasants were massacred under the direction of the state's governor (*Naciones Unidas, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos, Bolivia* 2009). In the wake of this event, both the Media Luna and government began to seek compromise and peaceful resolution.

The MAS supporters and opposition agreed a constitution on the 21st October 2008. One of the most controversial articles of the new constitution in the opposition's eyes was that limiting the size of landholdings to 5,000 ha. The compromise involved a referendum on whether the size of future estates should be restricted to 5,000ha or 10,000 ha. The clause does not extend to existing landholdings, securing the large estates of the powerful lowland elite from land reform. The social movements felt this was a betrayal of the Assembly process in which there had been placed so much hope. The MAS had once again come to a compromise: the Media Luna states had demanded autonomy with full control over land distribution, which would have left it in the hands of the landed families who hold regional power. The MAS made concessions including limited autonomy to these states, and for Morales to serve only one further term in office.

While the appearance of the MAS in Bolivia seems to have made little impact on extractivism and land reform, Fabricant (2012) has explored how they have had the effect of quelling protests from the Landless Movement (MST) in the lowlands. The MST were persuaded by the MAS, whom they initially supported, to abandon their strategy of breaking up unproductive estates and redistributing them to small farmers. By 2008, however, activists were coming to see the differences between the MAS’ radical discourses and their ability to create structural change, and continued to become disillusioned with then failure to bring about land redistribution. Brabazon and Webber (2014) note a process of depoliticisation of the lowland movements. Fabricant illuminates this process through the insights of one of her informants, who claims that the whereas the movement was unified when there was a clear enemy, in the contemporary context of apparent solidarity from the MAS, and failure to deliver change, in-fighting has increased (Fabricant, 2012).
As we see, the country's economy remains rooted in the exploitation of hydrocarbons, like that of other ‘left wing’ Latin American governments in Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil or Argentina (Gudynas, 2010). Land distribution continues to be very uneven, with resources concentrated in the hands of the same lowland elite who benefitted from the neoliberal investment of the nineties, producing export crops. Both in terms of hydrocarbons and agriculture, the MAS has come to de facto compromises with national and international capital. It continues to maintain the rhetoric of an indigenous rebellion against white colonial overlords, and the contrast between this and the compromises it has had to make are leading it to be criticised as having a ‘double discourse’.

Legislating GMOs

In June 2011, Bolivia enacted the Law of the Productive, Communal and Agricultural Revolution (RPCA, for its initials in Spanish), pledging to invest $500m (£308m) annually for 10 years in guaranteeing local and self-sufficient production of high quality food, while respecting biodiversity. The law was based on draft drawn up by the Pact of Unity social movements (CSUTCB, COB, Bartolina Sisa, CONAMAQ and CIDOB). During 2011, the law was modified by the relevant Ministries, and there appeared two articles, 15 and 19, which legalise certain GMOs. Article 15 outlaws all GMOs of crops for which Bolivia is a ‘centre of origin or diversity’, such as potatoes and quinoa. The ministries evidently hoped that this would form a compromise between the demands placed on them by the producers of GM soy and cotton, and the campaigners for FS, effectively rendering highland production GMO free, whilst permitting it in the lowlands. There has been similar debate over the wording of the 2009 Constitution. In the draft agreed by the MAS delegates of the Constituent Assembly, Article 408 prohibited the “production, commercialisation, and importation of GMOs. However, this was modified in compromise settlements to Article 409: “The production, importation, and commercialisation of GMOs will be regulated by law”.

The conflict is thus channelled into ideas of defending native heritage that underlie resource nationalism, with their implied self-other distinctions, as a basis for consensus. The move caused outrage among the social movements, who referred back to Article 409, and demanded that a specific law on GMOs be enacted. In a
meeting with the leader of the Conamaq, the President explained that prohibiting GMOs in the new law would “cause him problems with the Santa Cruz businessmen” (Veterinarios Sin Fronteras [VSF], 2011), and that if they did not agree to the modification of the text the law would be delayed by years.

Minister Carlos Romero held that *trangénicos* were necessary to feed the country. However, the official policy from the Food and Agriculture Organisation is that 'we don't need GMO crops to eradicate hunger" (FAO Director General, Jose Graziano da Silva). A 2009 IAASTD report states that GM crops have mixed results, sometimes increasing yield in comparison to non-GM crops, and sometimes resulting in decreased yields. The report indicates that yields can be reliably increased through conventional methods such as selective breeding- wheat crops came to be 33% more productive from 1950-80 before the introduction of GMOs, even without fertiliser. Patenting presents an issue, as farmers can be liable if GM plants cross-pollinate with their crops. GMOs drive up costs, reduce experimentation, and potentially undermine local practices, the report concludes. The IAASTD promotes community-based research and development which emphasises participatory breeding projects and agroecology. (International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development synthesis report, Agriculture at a Crossroads, 2009).

Soya is Bolivia's third largest export, and it is estimated that almost all the soya grown in the country is GM. The industry absorbs a lot of the government's subsidised diesel fuel, of which 40 per cent, $135 million, goes to the state of Santa Cruz, with the important qualifier that not all of this is used for agriculture (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008). This means that the government is in fact investing heavily in subsidising lowland agribusiness. An attempt to remove fuel subsidies in the country as a whole in January 2011 resulted in massive social protest, and Morales had to revoke the move. Bolivian soya is not competitive on the world market despite subsidies, so Bolivia sells to the protected Andean community (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2008). The agricultural frontier is also expanding into the eastern lowland forests, with 1,400 square miles of forest destroyed each year. Soya, the fruit of neoliberal agriculture, thus relies on state investment and secure regional markets insulated against world commodity prices to keep it going; conditions by which the highland agriculture sector would hugely supported, and which totally contradict the neoliberal free market ethos that led to the expansion of this sector.
Asserting that GMOs themselves are the problem, as the Conamaq are doing, was a strategy likewise adopted in Paraguay, where activists asserted that ‘soy kills’ in a national campaign for justice. Attributing the blame to the plants themselves, Hetherington (2013) argues, comes from the relationships between them and people: in agriculture humans and plants respond to one another (response-ability). As such, we note, soya has not only response-ability as Hetherington argues but agency and character. The crop is in this depiction is a monster, causing the deaths of several people. It has taken over in Paraguay a countryside weakened by declining cotton production- as soy arrived at the frontier campesinos saw the chemicals and long hours it requires as a sort of slavery, so they sold their land and cleared more forest frontier for cotton, with the result that soy spread very rapidly, increasing the cost of land until it was beyond the reach of anyone involved in any other sector. The Ministry of Agriculture in Paraguay tried unsuccessfully to regulate soy, and even Monsanto claimed their victimhood, saying the spread of black market soy was due to its being illegal and the lack of regulation (Hetherington, *ibid.*). It is not only rural activists who construct soya as an actor, but even the international agribusiness giant Monsanto who created the seeds, and dominates to a degree here-to-forth unknown their reproductive processes through patenting their genetic makeup. Monsanto famously sued farmers for ‘illegally’ replanting soy seeds from first crops in the USA (eg. Bowman vs. Monsanto, March 19th 2013, docket 11-796). Despite this control over their reproduction, Monsanto claims it does not have agency over the spread of the seeds without state regulation to reinforce their ownership; in the discourse of the agribusiness giants, the seeds are selectively agentive, having the power to cross borders without supervision, but yet they cannot reproduce.

GM crops in Bolivia are conceived of as the latest monstrous warrior to surface behind battle lines well established through the land and resource rights battles described above. According to Felix Becerra, they are an example of the ‘contamination’ associated with climate change. Whilst this contamination is rife in the lowlands, it is capable of infiltrating highland peasant agriculture too, contaminating the nourishing foods which land and labour produce. Whilst as Harris (1995a) indicates during the colony rural communities were able to sell their surplus, their exclusion from markets by neoliberal measures leads to greater need to intensify harvests. Taking this perspective, we can have more sympathy with view
that the farmers, as the head of the Conamaq asserted, are not themselves responsible for growing GM crops.

Dynamics of ethnic separation continue to be vital in shaping the country’s agricultural system and the responses to it, as they were at the village level in influencing migration. Catering to the demands of the elite power holders and popular sectors has created the famous ‘double discourse’ which the Conamaq accused Morales of holding in 2011 over the GMO legislation\(^\text{19}\), and has since expanded to refer to MAS politics more generally, especially regarding the environment and indigenous peoples, as we shall see in the following section on the TIPNIS. With two such vehemently opposed sides to this conflict, and such historically entrenched separation, Morales’ ‘double discourse’ becomes easier to understand, though no less cynical.

The shifting standards over GM, land, and hydrocarbons are reflected in the MAS policy on climate change in the common international usage. When I went to the Ministry of Water and Climate Change, newly created under the Morales administration, reflecting the importance of water and the environment to the 2001 Cochabamba Water Wars, I found offices nearly deserted owing to a recent change in the head of staff, who had taken his people with him, apparently both of these quite common occurrences. The man had been fired reflecting changes of policy on the environment following the TIPNIS crisis, which we shall look at in detail in the next chapter. I was told, by the few remaining staff, that the MAS would not be making any attempts to mitigate their emissions as the country’s overall contribution to global climate change was so small. Instead, the administration were focusing on the issue of the ‘climate debt’, which developed nations (pointedly, like mine) owe to countries like Bolivia to compensate them for having ‘colonised’ all the ‘carbon space’ in the atmosphere to date. This idea was taken up in the wake of the Peoples’ World Conference on Climate Change, called in Cochabamba in 2010, and presented by Morales to the G77 and UN.

In proposing radical measures like climate debt which the developed world owe to the ‘third world’ and to ‘mother earth’ as compensation for this carbon expended in their development, and passing the Law of Mother Earth, Morales manages to keep an indigenist profile on the world stage, whilst in fact pursuing a

\(^{19}\) See eg. http://servindi.org/actualidad/46703
strategy of resource extraction. It is easy to lay claim to Indian side of the yanantin relation, when there is someone you can accuse of being more capitalist and predatory, a spectre you can hold up. As we can see, at this level, the discourse of complete involvement in the immediate landscape we saw in Kaata has been replaced by a discourse of complete powerlessness, all the agency lying with a (human) other. Kaateños, or Felix el Mallku, cannot claim to take responsibility for solving climate change either, yet the ‘other’ who can solve it has ceased to be the animate landscape and become the western other.

Food Sovereignty and Vivir Bien: searching for the ‘other’
The issue of how to continue to feed the world's population under climate change is increasingly pressing. In 2008 a record amount of food was produced, a record number of people went hungry, and agribusiness companies made record profits. De Schutter (2013) argues that this was due to the effects of climate change on the weather, and the rise in hydrocarbon prices, which are closely linked to food prices due to production and distribution methods. Recent literature from the UN advocates sustainable farming, in which agricultural production and consumption are taken outside of the agribusiness companies, employing traditional models which are less hydrocarbon dependent. I will explore in this chapter how the aims of the Conamaq and Kaateños can be situated within this contemporary field of debate.

Wittman et al. define Food Sovereignty (FS) as “the right of nations and peoples to control their own food systems, including their own markets, production modes, food cultures and environments... as a critical alternative to the dominant neoliberal model for agriculture and trade” (Wittman et al 2010). As we see in the Tata Mallku's discourse cited above, feeding the country on GMOs produced by lowland agribusiness doesn't count; in his definition, FS goes hand in hand with small-scale (highland) peasant production. Indeed, this is the common definition of FS among scholars. The term is usually credited to the transnational peasant organisation La Via Campesina, and as Henry Bernstein (2013) indicates, some of the key elements that frame FS are a thorough criticism of corporate agribusiness’ negative impact on environments and communities, as well as the reinstatement of the social and moral superiority of peasant (or 'small-scale') farming, extending this
to its ecological credentials, to bring about a new sustainable and socially viable world food order.

Since the MAS came to power, there has been a wealth of legislation on FS. Following the failure to impose large scale land reform, the battle lines have been redrawn, with social movements attempting to restrain large scale agribusiness and create a market for the produce of small farmers. Following Ecuador and Venezuela, FS was written into the 2009 constitution. Articles 405-409 are dedicated to 'integral sustainable rural development': Article 407 identifies guaranteeing food sovereignty and security, prioritising the production and consumption of foods originating in Bolivian territory.

As Henry Bernstein indicates, FS posits itself, and peasant agriculture, as an alternative, a strong ‘other’ to agribusiness, personified by peasants, farmers, and indigenous communities, who embody ideals of sustainable farming, capacity for stewardship of the land, ‘peasant frugality’ which moderates their consumption; and a “vision of autonomy, diversity and cooperation, versus the dependency of the market” (Bernstein 2013:12). This resembles the Vivir Bien, which also assumes indigenous peoples will choose “harmony” with their lands, “cooperation” with their communities, and frugality above self-enrichment. Both discourses depend on a projection of an anti-capitalist other, resistant to encroaching capitalism. In FS discourse, capital and modernising states are a ‘corrosive’ influence, which peasants resist by “continuing farming in certain ways, informed by agroecological wisdom and values of autonomy, community, and social justice” (Bernstein, 2013). This ‘corrosion’ bears much in common with the ‘contamination’ the Conamaq leaders or community members in Kaata expressed, yet as we see migration and desire for corrosive clothes and other commodities is high.

Bernstein contests the idealised ‘other’ inherent in these conceptions, arguing that many of the ‘peasants’ who FS theorists look towards are in fact at least partially employed in cash economies with which they supplement subsistence production. In this way, they cannot be said to exist independently of the capitalist market. The Conamaq are in fact using FS to expand market opportunities for their farmers. As Harris et al (1995) have abundantly demonstrated, Andean peasants are not the perfect other of capitalism, but integrate strategies from either side of this binary to survive and augment daily incomes, in many cases. The indigenous small-scale
producer is an ideal type, an idealised pole in a world where compromises are constantly made with consumer-capitalist economies. Kaateños combine subsistence with wage labour and mono-cropping cash crops, such as coca, as well as trading and gold mining.

Bernstein raises the issue of whether the small producers that the FS approach idealises are in fact making moral choices to adopt low input small-scale sustainable agriculture, which would endure the availability of more profitable economies. He argues that making FS a reality depends on a moral bias towards it in agricultural policies and funding—whereas to date as we have seen the moral weight has been on neoliberal agribusiness. This is reflected in the Vivir Bien’s orientation toward supporting small-scale agriculture and communities. Whilst these constitute a commendable change of direction for state funding, how are effective are these initiatives in Kaata? Can small-scale agriculture satisfy the needs of Kaateños with such funding, or are they inevitably drawn to migrate?

The ‘other’ proposed by the Vivir Bien and FS is the indigenous ecologist, a contemporary manifestation of the noble savage; arguments have surged in favour of and against this stereotype, and the variety of data leads to the conclusion that whereas some native peoples are interested in conservation, others are not (for an overview, Smith and Wishnie 2000). We trace here well-known arguments regarding indigenous people’s moral stewardship of the land: Wade (1999) argues that though indigenous peoples might justifiably be shown to conserve and foster diversity, relate to the environment as a living entity, and have an intricate and detailed knowledge of flora and fauna, to assert that they adhere to an ‘environmental ethic’ is taking things too far. Hunn (1982) distinguished incidental conservation, in the absence of capitalist market opportunities to profit from resource exploitation, from deliberate conservation. Redford (1991) claims in his ‘the ecologically noble savage’ that the deliberate conservation by native peoples of environments is a myth.

Evidently, to generalise all ‘indigenous peoples’ is absurd. Indeed even within one geographical area differences are immense. Bebbington (1996), for example, looks at a case in the Ecuadorian Andes where communities chose chemicals and ‘improved’ seed varieties over traditional techniques; having won the land back from haciendas, they felt entitled to share in the benefits of modern agriculture from which they had been previously excluded. Chemicals substituted for the long fallow
periods, as land grew scarcer. The Conamaq and Kaateños by contrast did indeed make moral decisions or statements in favour of what we might describe as agroecology, in terms of the bias against chemicals. As we saw in the Mallku’s discourse, and in Chapter One, hard work nurtures a more nourishing and morally valid agricultural product. This stems from the relational animistic perspective which sees these foods as composed of the relationships of a landscape, and in this view, Kaata’s foodstuffs are richer, or more nourishing, than city foods. We might also remember however, Felix Becerra’s views on communities like Kaata being able to extract hydrocarbon resources under the soil.

Despite this morality however Becerra says that in reality some ‘contaminating’ GMOs are grown by Conamaq farmers, especially when crops are destined for the market, and I did on several occasions observe people using chemicals on the lower potato fields in Kaata, those which were most affected by ‘climate change’ in the form of diseases. Within the community too there is considerable difference of opinion and practice, as we shall see below. In the cities, ideologues of sustainable farming constantly make the same compromises eating in a café or driving a car, thus does capitalism make a map of constant compromises, what we know to be sustainable and what we actually do. Daily realities in Kaata as elsewhere are made of a mixture of the ideal types of the capitalist and ‘other’, enjoying the goods it can provide whilst criticising the contamination of its methods. This is indeed a ‘doble discurso’ (double discourse), and a widespread one. The knowledge of the existence of a sustainable lifestyle compared with the difficulty of actually living one leads theorists of sustainability to cleave to the ‘other’, the peasant or indigenous person living outside of capitalism and immune to its charms, in the hope that someone somewhere can resist it and fulfil the dream of an alternative. In the following section, we shall return to Kaata to see how these dynamics are played out, analysing some of the FS schemes in action.

**Golden eggs**

In September 2011, Edwin, losing his job as a security guard in La Paz, decided to move back to the village. Though this is unusual in Kaata, the Mallku of the Conamaq asserted in an interview that many city migrants are making similar decisions and returning to their villages. Edwin is thus part of an emerging trend,
which the social movement is endeavouring to support. Through engendering Food Sovereignty (FS) they hope to develop the domestic market for highland produce, thus ensuring people can live in villages whilst participating in cash economies.

Although Edwin wanted to live in the village, ate with his family, and worked hard in the fields, he did not consider living merely by the subsistence household economy- he would have to make money. I was at the time renting the upper floor of the house he had built in the village, a two-storey dwelling sharing his parents’ patio, and this seems to have fed into his decision that the countryside was a viable place for young people with the potential for making money. We discussed his setting up a tourism project, but he didn’t want to have to share the income he made with the village at large, which the conspicuous nature of this scheme would make inevitable, as well as the communitarian ethos of the village, which would challenge such a scheme for individual appropriation of the resources of wealthy others.

A few weeks later Edwin came to me and asked that I fund a chicken battery. His plan was to sell eggs in Kaata and the surrounding villages at 50c, rather than the 70c currently charged in their small shops. Like the other foodstuffs available, including vegetables, tinned goods and sweets, eggs are carried in from La Paz by bus. He aimed to make cash through selling produce into a local economy. This is an interesting proposal in a context where as we shall see, there is little local market for agricultural goods, despite the efforts of FS and the Vivir Bien. The initial inputs were high- he would need £1000 to buy enough pairs of young chickens to start a battery. I was unable to help him with such a sum, but his brother in law, Alejo, eventually helped to buy seven pairs, or fourteen hens, and Alejo’s wife Clotilde sent her pair along from La Paz with them.

I was interested to note the strict separations enforced between these chickens and the family’s other animals. Firstly, we took over an area of the yard to build an enclosed stone shed. As we did so, an old wall sealing this off from the street was demolished, and we frequently had to chase away marauding gangs of pigs, oinking for all they were worth, taking advantage of this breach to get to the food stores. Whoever was closest would shout “Quchi, carajo!” (“Blasted pigs!”) and run at them with a brush, smiling slightly. Marauding pigs are a feature of life in Kaata, where animals are seldom penned; mules can wander off from a mountain trip to carry thatch and be gone for days, and horses are left on the high mountain after the
harvest until the Easter festival, when it takes a lot of serendipitous searching to find them again.

The family already had a small collection of chickens, who reproduce freely and eat scraps and maize from their fields, taking from and feeding their eggs into the household economy. The hens which were to make money, or to lay the proverbial golden eggs, by contrast, had to be enclosed and separated from the rest. Battery farming is seen in the UK as the epitome of factory farming practices, due to the cramped conditions in which the chickens are kept. Indeed this kind of intensive agriculture was something new in Kaata, where most agriculture is aimed at feeding the community.

The household economy is a ‘machine’ in the sense employed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), who emphasise process and the non-separation of things- in Kaata, as they say, people do not live nature in the alienated western sense, but as a seamless process of production from in which the self is embedded. This seamless integration of people, animals and the landscape has as its end the provisioning of the household, or the production of things as use values. When the aim was to make money, or a profit, the capitalist means of production (chickens) had to be separated from the existing workings of the household oeconomia. Returning a year later, I asked had the chicken scheme worked, and Edwin said no. His family now eat the eggs. He attributed the failure to not having had enough chickens originally.

The reproduction of the chickens was an interesting issue. When Edwin could not afford as many as he wanted, I asked if they could not reproduce themselves through having chicks, but he said no, it would take too long. Similarly, Edwin was keen that the hens eat only an enriched corn food, which had to be bought (by me) from the city, rather than the family’s maize crop as did the other chickens. After a couple of months, the chickens were released from their imprisonment in the barn and allowed to roam the yard freely. By way of explanation, Edwin’s father Donato told me they had started eating their own eggs. This appears to be an inversion of reproduction, in which the chickens consume what they are meant to generate. In the more symbolic sense, we could consider this to imply they were expensive to keep and made no money, or that this type of production turned out to be barren. When the enriched food ran out, Donato fed the chickens on the family’s maize.
It seems that in order to make money from the chickens, they could not be allowed to reproduce as the other animals and plants did, but must be reproduced by means of money. This was so important that instead of letting them lay fertile eggs and rear a brood, the scheme apparently failed for lack of numbers. This brings to mind Taussig’s interpretation of the fetishism of money in rural Colombia (1980), where the reproduction of money is considered unnatural and only actuated by means of a diabolic rite. Taussig interprets this as a reflection on the transition to a capitalist or chrenistic economy, where money becomes fetishized, replacing the use values, with their aim of human reproduction, which characterise oeconomia. The chickens also were not able to reproduce and make young; their powers had to be focused on reproducing money. This seems a separation between two types of economies, the machine of household use-values, or in Aristotelian terms, oeconomia, and one aimed at reproducing cash. The separation had to be rigorously imposed to save the two slipping in to one another, which is in fact exactly what happened after a couple of months.

Visiting the Fondo de Desarrollo para los Pueblos Indígenas, Originarios y Comunidades Campesinas (Development Fund for Indigenous, Orignary and Peasant Communities, hereafter Fondo Indígena [FI]) in La Paz in 2013, I found that there were four projects proposed for Kaata by the Alcaldia in Charazani in 2011: technological assistance with tubers, a cereal processing mill, polythene growing tunnels and a chicken battery. The FI will apparently fund such projects, but the community must first pay a technician to make an initial report on the feasibility of the scheme, which had not been done. I mentioned this to Edwin, and found he had not been aware of the FI as a source of revenue. The FI communicates with the village authorities, those fulfilling the annual cargo, aiming to reinforce existing indigenous community structures. Community authorities have been given new responsibilities under Morales, as well as the Ley de Participación Popular, passed in 1994, considered to strengthen indigenous structures and communities. Increasing their autonomy, they are now responsible for administering the new funds made available for small-scale agriculture.

The fact that Edwin did not go to the authorities to help him with his scheme struck me as typical of the distrustful attitude he and his family took towards them, asserting that they were self-interested and ‘only wanted money’. The FI funding
may in any case not have appealed to him as, similarly to the tourism scheme, the FI projects are aimed at the whole community and would have to be shared, and Edwin was seeking an *individual* source of enrichment. When we look at the commodities which young people spend money on—clothes, mobile phones, bikes—it is not hard to see why. These are not articles that can be made and thus exchanged within the village in the kind of reciprocal economy envisioned by the Vivir Bien; they require breaking away from use-values to engage in a cash economy, connecting the village into international networks of exchange. An unrealistic perception of the village as a zone of communitarian reciprocity, outside of the capitalist economy, inhibited the allocation of the funds, as did the assumption the community authorities would administer them fairly.

**Investment in Kaata: the irrigation canal**

Community members were digging a channel for an irrigation canal during 2011. The aim of it, they explained, was to irrigate land to grow alfalfa to feed cattle, and the scheme was said to be an adaptation to climate change. Idelfonso, the area representative to the Conamaq, told me that the idea was first proposed seven years before, following a seasonal drought, when the villages of the region decided to insure themselves against climate change. While other villages did not in the end act on this, in Kaata where ‘there is no water’, farmers relying on rainfall for irrigation, the canal was proposed and funding opportunities pursued by the authorities. Water has always been a scarce resource in the Andes, and ethnographers have studied the conflicts and systems of community management by which irrigation is organised, concluding that water forms a central nexus of community life: Gelles (2000) states that there are more rituals concerning water than any other area of community life. Trawick (2003a, 2003b) advocates community level organisation of resources as far more efficient than either neo-liberal privatisation schemes currently seen as best by a consensus. Andean ethnographers have demonstrated that irrigation management in communities is often accomplished in a sustainable and equitable way which refutes the ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario imagined by Hardin, and sometimes applied by development bodies in rural resource governance (Gelles, 2000; Mitchell & Guillet, 1994, Trawick, 2003a, 2003b).
When I returned to Kaata for two months mid-2013, the canal was hotly debated at community meetings as the ‘company’ managing its construction had disappeared without paying any of the people who had worked on it, as arranged, and had failed to provide the water tanks and motors that were to be located at either end, ensuring the flow of water. The canal remained an earth channel with no function. In 2011 community members told me that the municipal authorities in Charazani were paying those digging the channel. Idelfonso, the Conamaq area representative, asserted that the funds came from the FI and the municipality. I also met with two technicians from the FI in Kaata, who told me that they were employed by the government to manage the feasibility of the canal.

There were murmurs of dissent in a community meeting when these technicians specified that the milk eventually reaped from cows eating the alfalfa watered by the canal would only be for the nutrition of the village children—the community could not expect, the technician said derisively, that the milk companies collecting from the Altiplanic farmers would come all the way to Kaata. This assumption of self-subsistence was against the expectations of the village, who were looking to make a saleable product. Several people with whom I had discussed the project had explained it as a means of making cash through selling milk. The women began to suggest that they would make cheese—there would be no one to buy that either, said the technician. The wheelbarrow full of alfalfa that each cow would require, laboriously tended and wheeled up and down steep slopes began to loom large compared to the daily glass of milk per child it might make. Children in Kaata have never drunk cow’s milk, and there is an underlying prejudice against local foodstuffs and towards a European style dairy economy here. The scheme came up against a lack of infrastructure, as La Paz was an eight-hour journey away over largely unpaved roads, the same lack of market access which prevents the village from selling its other products.

When I asked in 2013 what had happened to the money from the project, I was told repeatedly and indignantly that a ‘companía’, ‘company’ had come in and absconded with the funds. A community meeting registered the complaints of community members against this company. I wondered if I could interview the said company in La Paz to hold them accountable, and pressed for details of it. No one could name this company or tell me anything more specific about them, yet seemed
content to blame the failure on them. Atanacio, Kaata’s Mallku National representing the community to the Conamaq and ministries in La Paz, refused point blank to talk to me about the canal in an interview he wouldn’t allow me to record, and told me I would have to speak to Ermeglio, who sits on the municipal council in Charazani, confirming my impression that the money was in fact administered by local authorities.

Whatever had happened to the funds, there does not seem to have been a ‘company’ involved at any stage, yet people were happy to allow the blame to fall on this spectral entity. It is easy to blame a capitalist ‘other’, here embodied in the ‘company’ with its implications of multinational predation. A social spectre had been created, a scapegoat to whom blame for the failure of the scheme could be attributed. I am reminded here of Harris’ (1995a) depiction in the liberal Republican period of social inculpation of the- equally spectral- ‘Indian’, held up to explain the inability to reach European style development. The predatory white capitalist is the counterpart to the anti-market Indian, equally caricatured and culpable. They relate as mutually constituting actors, counterbalancing one another in their overblown characteristics.

We can consider failure of the canal building as an emblematic event, showing the same dynamics as are evident at national level, especially clearly in the case of the now-famous Cochabamba water war. The company that sparked the riots, Bechtel, was called in to administer an existing system in which only the wealthy have running water, the poor having to buy it from trucks, and the middle classes having it perhaps a couple of mornings a week. A proposal to build a dam above the city which would create a water larger supply had been on the table for years- according to Cochabamba legend, enough money had been invested to build the dam nine times over under municipal governments, but it still did not exist when Bechtel took charge of the supply.

The company raised water rates aiming to fund the building of the dam and extend the water supply, which caused outrage especially on the part of communities surrounding the city channelling their own streams, which were also subject to rates. In these terse anti-neoliberal years before Morales came to power, the outrage built into full-scale riots, with Bechtel widely criticised within the country and beyond. The rallying cry against Bechtel was that of indigenous rights- many farmers claimed their rights to water were inalienable and sacred according to Andean cosmovision
(Laurie et al. 2002, p.265). Twelve years later, however, after any amount of triumphant heralding of the overthrow of the evil capitalists, of various investigating commissions and even a Ministry of Water being established, the dam is still not built, and the water situation with its vast social inequalities has not notably improved.

The MAS government and Conamaq both seek to empower rural communities through empowering their authorities. The Conamaq are creating a system of rural autonomías whereby funds would be allocated directly from the Conamaq assembly to the communities. Since the disputes with the MAS, the Mallku explained to me, they thought it better to directly channel international funding themselves. Perhaps if a viable money-making agricultural project were proposed, it might address the needs and desires of Kaata better. Despite the idea of empowerment, the tone that the technicians took was extremely patronising, and the hope of creating a project which could make money summarily dashed during the community assembly. Despite the initiative for the canal coming from the village itself, the eventual project did not seem well suited to the place, and the funds disappeared. Neither of the families I lived with trusted the village authorities, with the Supos saying they only wanted money, and Martha complaining amply that the authorities only enriched themselves and their families, and that she as a single woman had been excluded from several benefits including the system of piped water.

When I returned to Kaata in 2013, the cattle for which funding had apparently been secured on my last visit had not yet materialised, though Atanacio (the Mallku National, representing Kaata in La Paz) was promising them any day now, though heaven knows what they would eat, in the absence of the canal growing alfalfa to feed them. Likewise the canal funding had not arrived, and an attempt to create a chicken coup failed through lack of funding, so we can conclude, in the case of Kaata, that there are difficulties in getting the available funds for FS to the potentially interested community members, and for creating community led schemes.

The widespread perception of the authorities as exploitative implies that it is easy, as one takes power, to start enacting the mestizo, the white other who exploits the Indians under his care, an archetypal image which surfaces in the contemporary context, resembling the pishtaco. Again we have the relational contextual white/Indian alterity. As Weismantel (2001) indicates, pishtar is a verb, mapping
how acts of sexual violence transform victim into an Indian and perpetrator into white. This implies the act does not follow from the racial identity, but the racial identity from the act, thus: “whiteness is not an essential quality of particular bodies, but a structural position that anyone might assume”, (2001, 169). Despite the violent nature of pishtacos, she argues, the ultimate message is optimistic, implying that race is “not really our immutable destiny; it’s more like a bad habit we might learn to outgrow” (170).

Morales reflected in his inauguration speech cited above on the difficulty of breaking out of the reproduction of these colonial roles, of cleaning the colonial stain from society: “It is possible to eradicate corruption, inherited from the colonial state. We still have, even other militant brothers, who say ‘now it is my turn to be the authority, so I can take advantage of the state’”. Through feeling for our patria, through nationalism, Morales says, we can defeat this sentiment. Nationalism is pulled out discursively to defeat ethnic binaries, which contributes to displacing blame, for GMOs, as we saw above, from white Bolivians to foreigners. The categories have not necessarily changed, but the exploitative, rapacious spectre appears outside of the nation, though it can haunt transactions even in the heart of the community.

**Markets**

Bernstein, in his analysis of FS, asks how much of a surplus can sustainable peasant agriculture produce? And importantly, he asks, how do you get to distributing it 'downstream'? Capitalism has achieved distribution of food to non-agricultural communities in a profoundly unequal though unprecedented way, he indicates. This view is challenged by various FS scholars, who claim that capitalist agriculture only intensifies production per capita of workforce (eg. Van der Ploeg, 2013), and if counting individual crops rather than crop productivity in a mixed system as a whole (see eg. Altieri, 2009), Small farmers, Altieri claims currently contribute significantly to the world food supply- in the late 1980s, smallholders provided 41% of food in (largely rural) Latin America, and continue to provide up to 20% of the world food supply (Altieri 2009). It certainly seems that a large rural population is required to maintain smallholder cultivation, and considering the high rates of rural-urban migration we have seen played out in Kaata, indicative of the
region as a whole, Bernstein’s argument that a moral weight on small-scale production is required to make FS work is a valid objection.

Until recently, broad beans were the only Kaateño crop that could be sold. I saw these being brought up by the sack by a tracksuit-wearing woman who came from La Paz and carried them back to the city on the bus several days later. Families sold her a sack each, queuing up, excited to sell some produce. Produce in the Andes is often marketed thus as we saw in the last chapter, via a small-scale system involving minimal middlemen. Prices however are still low. The beans were brought up at 360bs a sack, or quintal, about £36. This raises the question of what kind of market produces cheap food for urban poor and decent prices for farmers? Here there is no supply chain taking an inordinate percentage. Bernstein (2013) indicates that capital has a long history of sacrificing ecology to make food cheap, and wonders how could this be replaced by an FS system.

There is a new initiative in Kaata to sell wheat engaged by the EU and FAO in 2012, and carried out by Willy, a man from Charazani. He worked distributing high yield wheat seed in the area, the EU providing the seeds, and crucially a van to drive them to market. There were chemicals one could use with these seeds, but the families I spoke to did not use them, and the crops still returned higher yields. I have not as yet discovered whether these seeds are GM, but given the context this would have been highly controversial. In 2013, funding for the project disappeared, but, still wearing his EU jacket, Willy went round the villages in the van and collected sacks of grain, with everyone signing for the amount entrusted, payment to be given when he has sold it. People were again eager to sell the crop: on the Sunday afternoon he appeared word spread and people were lining up to weigh in their sacks of grain. He intends to sell some to government-run grain mills, trying to keep the nation in flour for pasta, bread etc, according to FS ideals. Prices in the state-run mills are lower than on the open market, so Willy will try to sell to the FAO before them.

Asking community members why they could not sell their crops in La Paz, lack of transport was identified the key issue. Key to the market access gained here then was not only the higher yields but the availability of a van to take the produce to the city. In creating markets for farmers, a simple measure like a van can secure market access in remote Kaata, where the milk scheme also floundered due to lack of transport. The distribution of an ‘improved’ grain, and the scheme to support the
marketing of this one crop, on the other hand tends to diminish the diversity of the existing three strains of wheat in Kaata, which as we have seen diminishes adaptability to climate change, and does nothing to help market its other produce.

Interestingly, there is a line of crumbling small stone buildings along the main road as it comes through Kaata, which I am told used to be shops. While I was unable to ascertain this, their presence raises the spectre of an economically prosperous past for this central ayllu of the region, based in regional trade, which is amply supported by studies like those of Harris (1995a & b) or Platt (1995) in other parts of the country. As we know, changing trade patterns have led the top village of the ayllu to become more involved with trading alpaca products across the border to Peru, where they feed into the tourism industry in Cusco. The existing vertical economy, in which potatoes were exchanged for meat and maize, has fallen apart. The challenge of making viable markets in this context consists in forging new connections to a city centre, hampered by the lack of existing pathways.

Items sold in the shops in Charazani or Kaata like sweets and battery eggs are the fruit of city-industrial processes. In Charazani, vegetables and bread are bussed in from La Paz and resold in the shops, though grains and beans sold and consumed are traded with kin in the villages. In the current moment the landscape leans towards the city due to its desires for its products, while in the past regional trade and barter may have led to more mixed economies within the village and town.

Historically in Bolivia the moral weight been placed by neoliberal regimes on lowland agribusiness, which as we have seen absorbs vast state subsidies whilst depending on a protected market for soy. Market opportunities for highland farmers can be improved, the Mallku indicated in our interview, through channelling available state funds for school breakfasts to local production, rather than making contracts with big companies like Pil, who buy and sell milk products across the altiplano. We can sell the schools tostadas, Becerra suggested, referring back as the adults in Kaata to these old fashioned treats for children as a substitute for the sweets they currently desire, illustrating the importance of children’s diets and desires in controlling contamination. These are small measures, aimed at taking advantage of very limited amount of local state funding to contribute to the creation of a local market for crops.
Conclusion

I suggest that understanding the dynamics of ethnic alterity are key to the struggle to bring a fairer market to the highlands, and produce nourishing foodstuffs for the nation. We have seen with the attempt to build an irrigation canal that a 'company' came to be the spectre that took the blame for the failure, so far, to bring this climate change solution to Kaata. The spectre of the rapacious 'other', here the capitalist 'company', is held up, like a carnival mask one can hide behind. In fact the seed of rapacity or capitalist exploitation is not so easily separated from oneself. In the last chapter we saw the fluidity and contextual nature of ethnic identities. In different moments then actors are adopting, and are accused of adopting, attitudes ranging between the two ethnic poles of the exploiter/capitalist and Indian, with all the implications these racial stereotypes have for individualistic and honest community-oriented behaviour. It seems that there is no place safe from the spectre of the capitalist; indeed the capitalist and non-market Indian are mutually constituting identities that imply one another. The relationality implicit in this ontology allows, as Weismantel notes, a space for racial identities to be constituted through practice, yet the dualism determining market and non-market spheres, resembling the complementarity that Platt, as we saw in the last chapter, saw as deeply typical of the Andes, means that these are replicated in the moment by those taking responsibility for funds.

We can lay bare here some of the assumptions of the political context resulting in the creation of the Fondo Indígena or Vivir Bien, and look at how its reifying gaze at ethnicity may sit uncomfortably with the reality of Kaata and the Conamaq. Relying on the indigeneity of village authorities to counteract decades of engrained appropriation of resources is not in itself sufficient to ensure delivery of funding to those who need it. The assumption that young people will want to engage in community enterprises with reciprocal use-value economies does not hold, as whilst Edwin defied contemporary trends of migration to the city, if he was to stay in Kaata he wanted a scheme he could profit from as an individual. Eventually, failing this, he returned to La Paz. The case of Edwin illustrates that the city is not a universal beacon, and is not always more desirable than the countryside. Assuming the countryside as a non-market sphere ignores demands for infrastructure giving communities like Kaata market access, distracting attention from the long decades of
lack of investment in the countryside and its slow economic exclusion. Defying existing prejudices of functionaries to continue to empower village authorities is also an obstacle. Highlighting the idealisations of the ethnic binary as revealed against the ethnography of Kaata reveals ways in which agricultural funds could be better channelled to the community.

Morales is contested in his claims to create an honest indigenous state by organisations like the Conamaq, who have made a public statement to the effect that his is no different from previous colonial and republican governments. They, in turn, posit themselves as the real, the authentically indigenous, creating legislation about clean energy and sustainable agriculture in the Law of Mother Earth. As I drafted this chapter in 2014, Conamaq deputies are fighting between those who support Becerra and those who are with the MAS, with the MAS faction expelling the others from their headquarters. Understanding the role of reifying binary self-other dynamics in complicating accusations of blame for failing to stick to an ideal could lead to more honest dialogue between all parties as to how a sustainable agricultural ideal accommodating individual desires to make a profit might be implemented.

Working for a month in the coca fields, young people make 2000bs, approximately £200, whereas a sack of beans raises £36, raising the question of whether even with support, food crops can provide a viable alternative to selling coca in the current market. A fundamental issue, in mapping the journey from ‘sustainable-rural’ to ‘exploitative-contaminating’ economies, is the desire for the fruits of capitalism. We will explore the coca economy in the following chapter.

I posit the use of this research in addressing these issues, yet the belief that there are solutions to the issues of climate change and contamination is not necessarily held by the actors involved. “Yes”, says Becerra, “we will present our demands in front of the UN, all this we will do, yet, if this climate change really is coming…” This phrasing suggests climate change is here too seen as a complete transformation of a landscape comprising social and natural factors, as I found in Kaata. Here, as in the village, whilst the human role in climate change is very clear, it is a sweeping phenomenon, which extends beyond human agency. I am reminded of the neighbour in Chapter One, who when asked if FS initiatives could halt migration, and thus climate change, laughed, telling me you couldn’t now stop it, as it is borne in the winds.
Despite this, it is the indigenous movements that must go and present their perspective before the UN as supplicants, held up as both victims and solution. Acknowledging tacitly that climate change is the other side of the coin to capitalism, we seek those we consider outside it, the indigenous other, to show us the solution. The non-anthropocentric landscapes this ‘other’ can evoke are heralded by the Vivir Bien, which seeks to accommodate this other, as we saw in the introduction. It is a result of this very fetishized animacy of the landscape, however, that the Mallku must concede that ‘if this climate change really is coming’, despite their taking every action to prevent it, it is better to burn the hydrocarbons themselves, just as Kaateños felt that the climate change could not now be stopped.

Whilst they will attempt to complement the developmentalist capitalist view with their own worldview, enacting the internationally hoped for indigenous other at international forums, that which the urban intellectuals and the FS proponents hold out so much hope for, at the end of the day if the climate change does comes, it is composed of a change in the use of the land and environment. And in this case it were better that these resources were in their hands. The Conamaq leader as we saw is not per se opposed to hydrocarbon exploitation. Knowing that capitalism is the issue explains the search for the existence of people outside it, and the determination with which they are hoped by the FS or Vivir Bien to be somehow immune to its charms, opting for frugality rather than abundance, the hardworking life of the villages rather than the bright lights of the city.

We can return to the vision of capitalism as a mirrored machine, moving into a new territory with the machinery, the nuts and cogs of its interior reproduction, covered by mirrors, in which the seer sees themselves reflected as they dream to be, a magic mirror in which one can become the other. The relationship of complementary dualism we have seen in Bolivian politics is similarly predicated on a mirror, a colonial alterity, in which every action therefore has its counterpart, every spectre-the lazy indian, the rapacious naqaq- its other. In searching for its ideal other, the city/ international context, with its philosophies of FS or the Vivir Bien, envisions the village immune to capitalism; to the shining image world of the tablet and clothes, of self-image. Yet as we have seen the image world seduces those in the countryside too. This self-other distinction in fact masks continuing compromise with capitalism, brokered by desire for the resources it can provide.
Chapter four: The Wrong Pachakuti

Evo Morales posits his government as a rebalancing or ‘decolonisation’ of the country. In January 2015, for example, speaking on the newly proclaimed ‘Aymara New Year’ at Tiwanaku, the ancient city-state on the shores of Lake Titicaca, he said:

“It is a special, historic day of reaffirmation of our identity, of our democratic cultural revolution. We are living times of pachakuti, pacha means balance, kuti means return, so pachakuti means return of balance, the return to equality with politics of solidarity and complementarity for this process of change”

In this chapter we will explore how other actors- Kaateños, the social movements, the populace- assess his claim.

Bouysse-Cassagne and Harris (1987) explain that the Incaic term pachakuti was used by the early chroniclers to describe the end of an era and its succession by another, such as the death of an Inca and his succession by another, as well as the Spanish arrival in the Andes. Pacha is a spatio-temporal construct constituting not just an age but an entire world, a cosmos. The concept became mapped onto the Christian spatial concepts of the heavens, called the alax pacha, the above world, of God and the saints; the earth, kay pacha, or this world; and hell, the manga pacha or the below world. This latter is syncretised with Christian hell, though it is not morally classifiable as an ‘evil’ world, but populated with powerful ‘devils’ whose hunger drives them into exchange relationships with people, which can be profitable. Among these devils are the huacas, the ancestral idols extirpated at the time of the conquest (Harris and Bouysse-Cassagne, 1987).

Kuti describes a turning over, or an alternation of two parts exchanging via ayni (Mannheim 1986). A pachakuti thus describes the turning over of a whole world, containing the sense of the alternation of one thing with another. Harris and Bouysse-Cassagne (ibid.) explain that the term was taken up by missionaries to explain the concept of Judgement day, introducing a moral sense it had not before. Judgement as it was explained to the authors in contemporary Aymara communities described a

turning over of the world, where the *manaña pacha* would replace *kay pacha*. Crucially, the authors state, it was not taken up in the sense of a *final* judgement.

In the *manaña pacha* everything is the reverse of this world; when it is day here it is night in the *manaña pacha*, and a similar alternation occurs with the rainy and dry seasons. Aymara speakers in the seventies used to assume that where the ethnographers came from everything was the reverse of their world, and enquired as to how in their lands did they manage to walk on their heads with their feet in the air (Bouysse- Cassagne and Harris 1986). Mannheim defines pachakuti as “a turn in the basic ontological assumptions constituting an evidential model or world” (1986:269). Pachakuti thus contains ideas of spatio-temporal transformation, specifically the replacement of one world or ontological order with another. In this chapter we can assess whether this is what the ‘indigenous’ MAS government has brought. Like the concept of judgement in the Aymara communities described above, it has a significant overlap with what is implied by the Kaateño use of the term climate change - yet as we shall see there are crucial differences in how actors reconstruct this ancient notion.

Hopes for the return of the Inca and restoral of the old order in another pachakuti continued through colonial times (Szeminski, 1987; Flores Galindo 1987; Campbell 1987). Guamán Poma, in his famous letter to the King of Spain, claims that after the conquest was a *mundo en revés*, backwards world, and clearly sets out how it might be restored to the former Incan order. The cry to expel the colonial classes to restore Indian rule in a *pachakuti* sounded with the rebellions of Tupac Katari, on the Aymara altiplano, and Tupac Amaru II in Cusco in the 1780s. This restoral of historic order was also expressed as *nayrapacha*, a return to the *pacha* of the times before (Rivera Cusicanqui, 1991). As we have seen, pachakuti has the implication of an entire ontological shift, a changing of cosmos, and here a return to the world in place before the conquest. This claim of return to before times, with their connotations of ethnic reordering, was similarly espoused in more recent times by the Katarista movement which sprang up in the neoliberal years- one of its leaders, Felipe Quispe, known as “el Mallku”, called his party the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement, (Movimento Indígena Pachakuti). Morales’ claim thus has significant historical weight and contemporary resonance. As Nancy Postero indicates, Morales is relying on “utopian images and meanings to convince the people that this government is different from any other before it… this utopian talk is a cultural resource for
empowerment and for creating and maintaining political space in which to try to implement the political and cultural changes that will be necessary to end the racism that has marked Bolivia” (2007a:19). Presciently, as we will see in this chapter, she also remarks “Perhaps when the political consensus falters, the cultural discourse also provides a little extra space for continued political negotiation” (ibid.). Is this the long-awaited pachakuti, the restoration of the nayrapacha?

Morales’ contemporary pachakuti posits itself as a deposal of the ancien regime by a new class of Indians. Do Kaateños feel that the indigenous in this moment is surging in strength? In this chapter we will examine these claims to be effecting a pachakuti, looking at the new sources of wealth enriching communities like Kaata, and the efforts of the MAS to bring the fruits of this development to them. As contemporary historian Silvia Rivera (1991) and Felipe Quispe indicate, pachakuti can mean either ‘catastrophe’ or renovation²¹.

The vision projected by Morales relies on the conquest as a moment of rupture, and his own revolutionary government as another such rupture that rebalances the first. If the white people got ‘on top’ during the conquest, then in this world-turning-over moment, the Indians will rise and replace them, with a resurgence of native ontology. Olivia Harris (1995) claims that the periodization commonly employed in Bolivia, dividing time into pre- and post-conquest and the Republic, may not be the most accurate reflection of the rural way of thinking, but derive from euro-centric city education which frames history with central attention to the coming of white people. She indicates that fascination with ourselves as seen through the eyes, and made visible in the mimetic acts of, the other is symptomatic of the ‘culture of narcissism’ Lasch (1979, cited in Harris 1995) into which the USA has fallen. Harris (1995) argues that the effects of the conquest would instead make themselves felt in small villages like Kaata slowly and over time. The conquest might not have arrived in the form of a traumatic moment, but the coming of white people is framed as such widely in contemporary Bolivia. She could not say such things in contemporary Bolivia “or she would be lynched, and perhaps rightly so”- the conquest as trauma and moment of change is fundamental to the ‘decolonisation’ argument (Harris, personal communication, 2010).

In this chapter, we can keep this temporal scheme of pachakuti in mind as I examine national politics of development and climate change under the MAS from the perspective of their campesino supporters like the people of Kaata. Is the pachakuti seen as elucidating the enrichment of the peasant class, through migration to the cities and coca fields, the overturning of foreign and colonial powers? We will continue, first, to examine the effects of this ‘pachakuti’ in Kaata. As we saw in the last chapter efforts to reform agriculture and include communities in the national economy have been, in the case of Kaata, less than revolutionary, and as we shall explore later in the chapter, people are continually attracted to the coca fields and cities.

Houses

I am talking to Don Flavio and his wife about changes that have happened in Kaata since Bastien’s time one afternoon in their smoky high ceilinged kitchen, over the whiffing sounds made by the guinea pigs running about on the floor. They remarked that they were in school when he came, that in those days they sat on sheepskins on the floor, whereas now there were benches and desks. It is only since this government has come that there have been these changes, Flavio comments. Andrew Canessa, asking a schoolteacher how he might contribute to the what he considered an under resourced school in Sorata, recounts that he was told the first thing they needed was a metal flagpole, indicating that in this rural school appearances and training to become a national citizen are more important than literacy and mathematics, the flagpole symbolically linking the school into a nation (Canessa, 2012). In the case of both of these schools, difference or development is described in terms of appearances.

In July 2013, I found a team of surveyors in Kaata measuring stone patios, which were to be the foundations of new houses that the state would construct as part of a nationwide program improving rural dwellings. I was initially bemused. The existing houses in Kaata are of a good size, and in this context of high migration, there is no shortage of them. Family houses are built about a central courtyard, accommodating storehouses, kitchen and bedrooms, often with plenty of space for an adult child to start a family. Houses in the upper part of the village are largely of stone, while the houses of the more recent lower village, which was expanding when Bastien was present, are of adobe brick, and often of two stories, with outer wooden
staircases. The new houses were to be small brick rectangles, like the ones that stare with identical rectangular eyes and mouths down from the slopes about the city of La Paz, a city of red brick.

The team of surveyors were checking that all the patios, constructed by the Kaateños themselves according to state standardised specifications, were of the required shape and size, which they were. I was amazed at the skill with which sometimes a single elderly man had laid the uneven old stones they had used, jigsawing in the uneven hewn shapes in together neatly to create such level and even sided, exactly proportioned shapes, recalling Incaic stonemasonry. This style of stonemasonry is also visible in the foundations and lower levels of the older houses, and on more massive scale is famous in examples of Inca architecture such as the Sacsayhuaman fort in Cusco. Stones had been taken from old stone walls to construct the patios.

The government committee showed no surprise at the skill in construction, but meted out a few criticisms. There was a general atmosphere of nervousness as each patio was presented and checked to be of the set and standard proportions. One man, to his shame, had built his patio so the front door opened into the compost toilet, and was of course mercilessly teased by the rest. There are currently no toilets or latrines in the village, the yard or fields being used, so this idea constitutes a change.

The technicians, when I asked them about the new houses, told me happily of their green credentials. The compost toilets could be used to manure the fields, not in fact a vastly more manuring solution than the current system. The houses would apparently be fitted with super-efficient pellet burning stoves, which would be an ‘ecological’ replacement for the existing wood and sheep dung fires with their clay hearths on which people usually cook. Once again, the materials that will theoretically be burned on the new stoves are the same as the existing ones, though they may combust more efficiently. Overall, the ecological credentials of these houses are very dubious, replacing dwellings built entirely from natural, locally sourced materials with ones that must be manufactured via heat intensive industrial processes and transported, at an undoubtedly greater carbon cost.

We must surmise that describing the houses to me as ecological constitutes a sort of greenwash, though seemingly unconscious on the part of the enthusiastic technicians. What then is it that the houses really provide? As James Ferguson (1990)
indicates, the end of most development projects, despite their stated intentions, is the extension of state agency into marginal areas of the world. The ecological credentials are masking a modernising discourse, one that overrides (or attempts to override) existing ways of eating and defecating in the community. The aim, in the Heideggerian (1971) sense of acts defined strictly by human intentionality, sharply contrasts with the end, which for Heidegger, are composed of the collusion of human and non-human actors.

Walking from patio to patio with my friends, I asked them about the possible benefits of the new houses, and received answers to the effect that one shouldn’t look a gift horse in the mouth— they were free, so who would not want one? Don Fermin’s wife thought the pink colour, coralito, of the bricks nice. I asked one of the technicians from La Paz about the advantages of the new over existing houses, and he initially mentioned insects that can live in adobe walls and cause disease, chagas, before agreeing that this was only a problem at lower altitudes. Beaming, he told me that what these houses really bring “is status” (‘es el estatus’). It seems we are as with clothes, or the improvements to the school mentioned by the couple above, in the realm of appearances, the appearance of development equated with essence of it, and development itself constituted a priori as desirable for the Kaateños and countryside more generally. This status is not derived from the indigenous artisan skill in stonelaying or architecture. It is an appropriation of certain items (red bricks) which confer concrete social status, by virtue of their association with the city and ‘west’, thus an elusive ‘modernity’. Hygienic cooking and toilet facilities have similar associations. This ‘status’, furthermore, is inevitably divisive, contributing to creating inequality in the village, as not every family got a new house. According to Martha, a single woman, it was only the authorities and those close to them who had managed to secure them.

It was assumed that the new houses would require workmen to come and build them, so a team of builders was brought in from Omasuyos, a lakeside MAS heartland. This implies that Kaateños were incapable of building their own adequate dwellings, which of course they are not, the other houses in the village providing ample evidence of this. Requiring workmen to construct the new houses would tend towards the alienation of the community from the techniques of reproduction, of ‘dwelling’ (Heidegger, 1971, Ingold 2000) in the landscape.
Looking at the situation in Heideggerian terms, we could say that the stone laying, visible in the foundations of older houses as well as the new terraces, is *poeisis*, a Greek term which he translates as ‘bringing-forth’, relying on humans interacting with the stones to uncover the inchoate potential of matter, and meld that of each stone with others. Heidegger indicates that the wall or house one makes like this is the fruit of the labour of humans and materials, springing from their interaction. Human agency leads things to start to ‘come forth’, yet this consists of an interaction between materials and maker, the end brought about by all of them as actors. Agency is thus dispersed in the landscape and beyond the human actor (Heidegger, 1971).

Heidegger might argue that making and laying bricks, by contrast, is imposing human aim upon matter, expressing a change in the manner of interacting with the landscape. Rather than working with resources to reveal their shape, brick making imposes an order on material, pressing it into the shape dictated by the human creator. The bricks present a nice imagery of the change from poesis to instrumentality, the use of resources to accomplish the aim of the creator, rather than the nurturing of material to bring about a common end. Kaateños however also use bricks, lining up earth between wooden supports, packing it tight, and allowing the sun to dry it, a labour intensive process which still relies on skill of working with local materials that come to hand, and entails dependency on no one.

Latour (1988; 1993; 1996; 2004) would argue for the agentive capacity of industrially made items: in the networks he envisions, the fruits of modernity are actors as much as any stone. Regarding the modern bricks as actors also, we can say that the new houses link the community into new networks, away from the existing Kaateño relationships with the mountain landscape, from which building materials were previously drawn. Relying on outsiders to do the construction, they undeniably reduce the sovereignty and autonomy of dwelling, and the skill taken to craft a dwelling from materials hewn centuries ago from the body of the mountain. The new networks are of the city and modernity rather than the environs of the village, connected to the brick factories on the edges of La Paz, to roads and the images of ‘developed’ countries which the red bricks and tin roofs seek to emulate. With the change to ready made bricks, and dependence on another to build your house for you, comes the loss of the ability to simply live in the world, of alienation from the skill, as Ingold (2000) would have it, of making what we need from the materials of the
landscape. It is again an expression of the desire for the city ‘other’, as are the western clothes that young people wear. People and houses are together transformed with the clothes and materials of the other. Stones, or pebbles, as they are the very substance of the mountain might be animate, such as Catherine Allen (1997) indicates, and constitute exchange relations with it, these are the relations of a new nationalism.

The state houses thus present a condescending and unsought-for change. It must be stressed that the Kaateños did not especially feel the inadequacy of their own dwellings, and when I returned to the village a year later, I found without much surprise that all the new houses were empty. It seemed by the villagers’ anxiety that they should not be embarrassed before the state representatives that the operation to construct new houses had the potential to judge them as incapable yokels. The villagers were actually carrying out complex construction, laying the uneven stones being much harder than laying bricks.

So what is the house that the MAS revolution offers? It is set on Incaic stone, laid by the skill of the villagers interacting with their environment. On top of it are pink bricks in a uniform dwelling that aims for a standardised city-emulating model of ‘development’. Rather than strengthening and championing the skill of the village through its stone working techniques, the state covers them over with pink brick. This is indeed a revolution, though not an especially indigenous one. Rather than seeing the indigenous ‘resurface’, to employ a spatial metaphor sometimes used to express pachakuti, we are in fact seeing it quite literally here pushed below and hidden. In fact, as with their adoption of western clothes, the village through these houses seems to be emulating the cities and developed countries, thus becoming white or urban. If ethnic alterity is a decisive part of this pachakuti, then the villages- and this was a widespread construction project- touched by this project are becoming more ‘white’.
The road to the coca-growing valleys

Coca

I asked don Felix in Kaata about young people’s migration to the lowlands to join the legions of highland migrants planting coca. It was from the coca unions that Morales emerged as a politician. He explains:
“our production of crops comes to almost nothing, with this contamination here. It’s for this. Our crops have no market value. Who wants that? *Misti runa*, he mutters darkly, referring to non-indian mestizos. “Just to keep ourselves we’re working up here like slaves, just to eat. Once they [the young people] leave school, they go to cut and burn down the jungle [to grow coca]. And whose fault is that? It’s the very government’s fault, because the only thing they’re making go up in price is coca. They prefer to go and grow coca. Our products have no value, they prefer to grow coca. We from this place go to Chulumani— they’re buying Nissan Condors like sheep in Chulumani! As coca has a good price. They’re getting rich— who wouldn’t like that? This is why they leave. We are only a few here, there inside there is Yungas, they are going there as well. Just for that reason. And like that it will always be, because the government don’t say anything. Everything’s going up, wages are going up. But our crops aren’t worth anything”.

Felix attributes the lack of value of the crops here to contamination, the worthlessness that has pervaded the landscape and is crucially a part of climate change. He highlights the tensions between ‘*misti runa*’ and highland farmers in this chronic under support of the highlands. In this landscape of undervalued rural produce, coca has an irresistible attraction for the young people. Felix sees it as inevitable that the young people are making this exodus, drawn by the promise of riches, away from the highlands with their valueless crops to plant coca. As we have seen, it is the consumer products that the young migrants buy with their new wealth, such as the batteries for their radios, that cause contamination and compose ‘climate change’ in the village. Their new wealth then is the source of the contamination.

In the words of a young coca grower, born in Kaata but living in the valleys, “it’s all dead up there now”, meaning the highlands are ‘dead’ relatively to the lowlands. The young cocalero’s discourse on the dead highlands gives us an insight into how the landscape is changing in the context of what the Kaateños define as climate change. While coca is soaring in value, the highlands are less productive as year upon year the harvests suffer from the changes in the land and weather, and the crops Kaata produces cannot be sold for money, or only very little. They are losing their exchange value against other regional produce, including coca and the Apacheta’s meat and wool. As exchange relationships with the land are weakening, so are exchange relationships with the surrounding ayllus, all of which feeds into the discourse that everything there is dying. In the *cocales* of Apolo or the Yungas, by
contrast, there is an excellent living to be made, and highland migration to the valleys suitable for coca cultivation across the country is very high. We can remember here Marcelino Yanahuaya telling Bastien, in answer to his questions about the upper moiety of Kaata being slowly deserted, while the lower swelled in numbers, that time flows like a pendulum, each stroke propelling the next. In this time of Kaata, the highlands die and lowlands flourish, and this is the climate change, the new world created.

Expecting the government to control the market, Felix accuses them of favouring their own, the coca growers, to the detriment of the ayllu where everything is devalued beside more profitable crops. Whilst the coca boom creates wealth, and many migrate to harvest it, this wealth leads to the destruction of the highland way of life, meaning that young people leave the village to make money rather than staying to grow crops like their parents. This is expressed as the death of the highlands, and the contamination of the goods they buy. Whilst coca seems a powerful actor in this landscape, unlike GMOs which as we saw in the last chapter, are considered agents of contamination, Felix does not blame coca itself for the death of the highlands, but the government for making the coca go up in price. Unlike GMOs coca has a long presence in the community, who use its leaves in rituals and divination— we were even as this interview took place inevitably munching our way through a bag of coca I had offered to the authorities. Taking my terms of analysis from the community, it is therefore primarily the role the MAS have in creating this landscape which I will focus on in this chapter, rather than that of the crop.

Migration to cultivate coca has been a massive movement of recent decades, fed by the economic crisis of 1985-90, when many highland miners were laid off, and went to chaquear or make coca terraces, as well as the drought of 1982-3, which sent waves of impoverished peasants seeking another form of subsistence. Tassi et al (2011) argue that this was the first major impact of climate change in the country. I will here look at perspectives from the village and cocaleros on coca cultivation in the lowlands. When I asked Javier Medina, the Vivir Bien theorist, about migration as part of the vision of ‘climate change’ that the village had, he irritably dismissed it—there has always been migration. Andean peasants have always had two or three homes, he argues. Whilst this is true, I will seek to show what it crucially different
about the present, and how this change has impacted on the landscape of the village. This position denies the rupture in the present to emphasise the rupture in the past.

As Andrew Canessa observes, by the 1980s the lowlands were being colonised by migrants from the highlands who “treated them little differently to the way lowland Indians have been treated historically. They spoke of them as savages who didn’t know how to work, and their displacement or engagement as wage labourers for the colonists was seen as a civilising mission” (2012:21). Ethnic tensions are rife in this schismogenic context. The cocaleros’ capacity to make money, Canessa notes, also led them to deprecate their highland Aymara relatives, with poor and shoddy things being described as ‘jaqi’, the Aymara word for ‘people’, which highlanders use as self-description. Jaqi are thus derided as people who do not know how to make money (Canessa 2012).

Kaateños consider the valleys to be a place of abundance- they elaborate on the array of fruits that grow there, and the comparative ease of lifestyle. There, I was told, “they have no wheelbarrows nor donkeys, nothing. They live right there, right on their plots. They get up and pull off a head of bananas (to eat)”. In Kaata people must keep cargo animals to assist with the steep journey up and down the mountain to farm. The jungles, east of the piemonte coca area, are especially considered a land of untold wealth and opportunity- Alejo, who had interests in a mine in the jungles of the far east, told me starry-eyed that it was “all empty down there”, a new land, fresh and promising. I asked a young cocalero if there were people already there- can you just take the land? “Well, it’s monte”, he replied, meaning the sloping forest which seem to be equivalent to, in his mind, land which no one has claimed. “Hay que chaquear”, you have to cut and burn it.

From Kaata, aspiring cocaleros leave to travel down the valleys to Apolo, or as Felix details above, to Chulumani, which is the in heartlands of the Yungas coca production area. Like Apolo, this is classified as a traditional zone of cultivation, in comparison to the Chapare, which is a more recent area of cultivation producing bitter coca. In these areas, families have the right to produce one cato of coca. The Yungas officially had in 2010 16,900ha of coca under cultivation, of an official national extent of 25,000ha, whilst Apolo has 320ha (2012 figures, UNODC).

The cocaleros who leave the Callawaya highlands for the piemonte region of Apolobamba are joining a landscape with existing conflicts over territory and the right
to cultivate coca. There are 81 communities around Apolo, all of whom cultivate coca, which they combine with mining in the dry season and other economic activities (Ferrié, 2014). In 2013, two soldiers, a policeman and a doctor were shot in a state effort to eradicate coca in the community of Miraflores, where the number of families claiming their *cato* had risen from the 38 registered in 2004 to 63. In the region in total, 370ha were registered in official statistics from a permitted 300ha. The Alcalde claimed that the coca grown outside of the cordoned legal cultivation was grown by highland migrants who had only been there a few years so were not registered under the 2004 census.

Ferrié notes that despite a long history of migration and integration between the two zones, recent highland migrants are seen in a negative light, and called by a derogatory name, "*matawa*", although integration, or becoming native, happens very fast. While there is a history of migration to cultivate coca and intermarriage between the two zones (Ferrié, 2014), current migration is certainly on a larger scale, with the lowlands perceived to be ‘alive’ relative to the highlands.

Although stone roads between the highlands and coca plains of Apolobamba are ancient, made by the Incas who opened up the area for cultivation, contemporary roads connect them into a cash economy. Far fewer young people would go to Apolo if it were not also for the fact these traditional coca growing areas are connected into economy of cocaine and western consumers, allowing them to sell the crop at a high price and buy consumer goods. Whilst acknowledging the historical continuity of the interrelation of the two zones, and of coca cultivation, we must consider the importance of the contemporary context of economic change.

In Incaic times *mitimaes*, workers from other areas of the empire, were sent down such roads as wind into Apolobamba to pacify the wild *chunchos* of this area, whilst they supplied the empire with coca. Under the Spanish colony, articulations between the highlands and lowlands, as Saignes (1985) has elucidated, broke down, leading to the disempowerment of these piemonte zones. In the nineteenth century the quinine and rubber booms attracted colonisation of the lowland area to allow flows of resources into an economy in which cars were becoming important, leading to a need for rubber for tyres. The area operated under a system of debt peonage, replacing a

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regional vertical economy in which gifts were exchanged between highland and lowland kin. Ferrié (2014) notes that there were a few large haciendas in the region of Apolo, which like those of the jungles further to the north, kept live- in labourers in conditions of slavery. Most of the rubber-extracting haciendas around Apolo were small however. Workers had their own fields as well as contributing some rubber and quinine, and day labour on the plantation in three- to four- week periods, thus communities kept some independence as peasants. Dudley (2011) notes that the local communities perceive the 1952 revolution as a decisive change, liberating the region from the haciendas. The workers won their own plots and became affiliated to the Apolo strand of the CSUTCB, the Bolivian Confederation of Peasant Workers Syndicates, to which many remain loyal. The historical moment defined the population as peasants, though as we see across Bolivia, this was succeeded by the re-emergence of indigenous identities, starting with the Katarista struggles in the 1970s, and currently attracting international attention and funding.

The territorial issues around coca are complicated by the ethnic dynamics of the area: a newspaper article cites Zulma Torres of the Campesino Union blaming the indigenous group the Lecos, who she claims are close to the government and military, for the eradication. Seventeen of the 81 communities around Apolo in 1997 claimed territorial rights as Lecos indigenous peoples, which the remainder of the local population, affiliated to the CSUTCB, contest on the grounds that they are ‘not real Lecos’. Prior to 1997 the ‘neo-Lecos’ had not claimed to be ethnically distinguished from the rest. In 1994, a UN census reported only 9 Lecos, a figure that had shot up to 2,980 in the Apolo region alone by 2004. Like their neighbours, the Lecos speak Quechua, the Lecos language having disappeared two or three generations ago. The new ethnic line, furthermore, cuts across families. This situation draws our attention to the definition and uses of indigeneity. It is a crucible of ethnogenesis illustrating dynamics more widely at work in the country.

In 1997 the Confederation of Indigenous Leco People of Apolobamba (CIPLA) was created, and the Lecos were granted 530,000ha of land, partially within the Madidi national park, obtaining a title for the first 238,000ha in 2006. The local

workers’ syndicates affiliated with the CSUTCB marched against the Lecos in 2007, demanding a road and the exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources in Madidi. This brought national attention to the conflict which had been simmering at a regional level since the formation of the CIPLA ten years before. As Ferrié (2014) indicates, the neo-Lecos are generally of a younger generation than the syndicate members, indigeneity representing a new political strategy. The CIPLA are pursuing an ecological approach to their territory which allows them access to international funding (Ferrié, ibid.) aimed at supporting indigenous peoples and the environment.

As Ferrié indicates, we are dealing here with the difference between two types of development, ‘masked’ by ethnicity. A relation of alterity is created, expressing two sides symbolically aligned with development based on claims of ecological credentials, or with claiming the right to extraction. The ethnic split is also enacted by the inhabitants of the piemonte region as that between the highlands and lowlands: the CSUTCB and Quechua are associated with a highland Andean identity, whilst the neo-Leco are identified with a lowland ethnicity. They are trying to re-learn the Lecos language, and are being taught certain crafts by the neighbouring lowland Mosetenes. Apolobamba dances the same dances as the Callawaya, one of which, called Lecos, has now been erased from the syndicate repertoire, whilst it is danced by the neo-Leco to the exclusion of all others (Ferrié, 2014).

How like indeed is this enactment to regional dances of alterity! We can think back to the dances discussed in Chapter Two, where the Callawaya in mirrored costumes take on the role of chunchos of the lowlands, reflecting the self at the heart of alterity. One part of the populace here take on the characteristics of colonised, ecologically noble savages, whilst the others take on the mantle of highland colonisers, demanding that the land be exploited for its resources. We see a lively schismogenesis (Bateson, 1935), a constant splitting apart of two groups, articulating antagonistic yet complementary identities.

This is reminiscent of Taussig’s (1986) observation that the truly indigenous is in much of the Andes associated with the Eastern Amazon jungles, a region also connected with the past. Spatialised identities, which we can gloss as indigenous/lowländer/colonisation/ecological and highland/coloniser/exploitation map onto Andean perceptions of the lowlands as the heart of Indian alterity. The propensity of highland
migrants to ‘colonise’ lowland areas to grow coca is an emerging issue in contemporary Bolivia, as we shall see in the case of the Tipnis.

![Children on the Tipnis march at a camp near Coroico](image)

**Tipnis**

We met the march on the Cumbre, where the road to the jungles of the Yungas comes over the mountains into La Paz. The Cumbre is high above the city, and when we reached it, climbing off the truck into the crowds, I felt slightly light-headed. No other landscape feels as stark as the high mountains, nowhere else does rock seem so startled by the extremes into which it has risen. The side slopes crumble black lava rock to the road. Clouds were hanging over the heights, slowly clearing about us, and I watched a tarn surrounded by moist mustard-coloured vegetation slowly emerging out of mist.

Many people had come to welcome into the city the lowland inhabitants of the Indigenous Territory National Park Isiboro Sécure (*Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure*, Tipnis, for its initials in Spanish), protesting at a road planned across the heart of their territory. The MAS had awarded the inhabitants, of a variety of groups including the Mojeño-Ignaciano, Yuracaré and Chiman, the rights to
the territory as a TIOC, Originary Indigenous Peasant Territory (*Territorio Indígena Originario Campesina*) in 2009. In 2010 it emerged that the state with financial support from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) had planned the second, central section of a road connecting Villa Tunari and San Ignacio de Moxos to run through the centre of the park. Phases One and Three, it emerged, had already been constructed, leading to either side of the territory. No consultation with the inhabitants of the Tipnis had taken place, despite this right being enshrined in the 2009 constitution. The road purported to be aimed at connecting the cities of Cochabamba and Trinidad, though it was argued by the Tipnis inhabitants that its route was incoherent with these aims, and that it took a detour through the zone most suitable for growing coca. Significant reserves of natural gas and oil lie below the park.\(^{24}\)

The case of the lowland jungle dwellers of the Tipnis, referred to in the media as ‘*indios de arco y flecha*’, bow and arrow Indians, had caused controversy, and the nearer the march got to La Paz, the more public attention turned to them. They had the support of the lowlands indigenous movements, grouped together under the CIDOB. As the march went through the coca growing territories on its way up to La Paz, near Yucumo, their camp was attacked by police who beat up the men, women and children present.\(^{25}\) After the violence public support for the march increased enormously. A constant occupation was set up in the Plaza San Francisco in La Paz, with an information tent giving updates on the situation. Groups of citizens from all walks of life stood outside it in the day debating the Tipnis issue. People realised the relevance of such a threat to the MAS, whilst the march was widely acknowledged to have a legitimate cause for complaint against them. Among those debating were committed supporters of the MAS who defended the government, whilst there were accusations that those against them were the middle classes hostile to the revolutionary process of change.

By the time the march reached the Cumbre, the Conamaq had also declared their support for the Tipnis. As crowds of us watched, the march now surmounted the Cumbre from the jungle side, slowly emerging through the mist. The Conamaq led with their rainbow flags, a banner of indigenous diversity held by row upon row of marchers arrayed in the ponchos and hats of their regions. They smiled slightly as a

\(^{24}\) https://nacla.org/blog/2013/6/21/gas-mother-earth-and-plurinational-state-vice-president-garc%C3%ADa-linera-embodies-bolivia

cheer went up from the crowd. Behind them came the Tipnis dwellers, in travel worn t-shirts and straw hats, their shoulders bent with the effort of the climb.

I joined the march on the road back down into La Paz, keeping to the margins beside some of the Tipnis dwellers. As we have seen, the essence of indigeneity seems to comprise inability to cope in the city, and there was great concern for how these ‘bow and arrow Indians’ would manage in La Paz, especially as many were accompanied by their young children, who it was feared would suffer and catch pneumonia in the comparatively cold climate. There was much to-do about this on the early evening TV news shows that most households watch every day, a kind of community news wire connecting the city. As we accompanied the marchers down towards the city, women in polleras clutching shopping bags disembarked from a bus and lined up along the side of the road. As we approached, one of them cried “Fuerza Tipnis! Calle 16 de Julio de El Alto está con ustedes!” (Strength Tipnis! Sixteenth of July street of El Alto is with you!), and with this they ran amongst the marchers, pressing warm children’s clothes into their hands. These were not wealthy middle classes supporting the march to bring down the MAS, as the address in El Alto and their clothes indicated. Nor was this an isolated event: an announcement had to be put on the news requesting that people stop donations of children’s clothes, as the marchers had more than they could possibly take home with them.

When the march arrived in La Paz on the 19th October 2011, the city ceased its usual activities, the streets and squares packed with supporters cheering for the tired marchers, some of whom were moved to tears by the strength of the reception. I waited, squeezed into the crowds before the Presidential palace in the main square, which riot police usually block to any protest, even fiercely fighting back a march of disabled people claiming a living allowance earlier in the year. A right wing politician now attempted to take advantage of the temporary lack of favour for the MAS, marching before the Presidential palace as only winning political parties usually do, smiling to the crowd, surrounded by his entourage. “Out, opportunists!” cried the man beside me, and his cry was taken up by those around us, the crowd jeering at the dismayed candidate. The supporters of the march and those who showed up to the square were not simply from the right or trying to destabilise the MAS. Those who I spoke to considered the march an important event in its own right, yet this did not
mean that they necessarily sympathised with the right, despite the MAS attempts to portray the opposition consisting of wealthy middle classes and NGOs.

It was on the lines of ethnic classification that the Tipnis case continued to turn. When the government were eventually obliged to negotiate with the marchers, the initial outcome was that the Tipnis was declared a ‘Zona Intangible’ ‘Intangible area’. Intangible in Bolivia is used prominently in the case of the Oruro carnival, which was declared ‘Patrimonio Intangible’ (Intangible Patrimony) by the United Nations, intended to connote patrimony consisting of actions rather than things, the same categorisation that the Callawaya culture had received. Literally in Spanish, however, intangible translates as ‘untouchable’. The Director General of Patrimony of the Ministry of Cultures told me there was no set definition of the term ‘intangible’, when interviewed at the time of the Tipnis incident, but that it was coming to be used to describe, for example, the colonial houses in the city centre to mean they could not be demolished. The meaning of the word seems to have slid towards ‘untouchable’ rather than ‘intangible’, as its designation to a geographic area indicates. The government used the word intangible in the agreement they signed with the Tipnis dwellers, and then afterwards specified publicly that this meant they would themselves not be able to develop on the National Park at all, that it must be preserved as pristine nature. The term thus metamorphosed from something aimed at protecting indigenous culture to one confining it within a narrow view of pristine indigeneity.

The MAS cleverly took its role in the theatre of public politics which had challenged the road, playing on the expectation of the Tipnis, as the group of protestors became known, as Indians innocent of development. Morales appeared to concede to the marchers entirely, knowing that the reality would jar with the role of archetypal indigeneity as the ‘other’ of development that they were assigned in the public theatre of the protests. Soon there were exposé stories in the newspaper, revealing that shockingly the Tipnis had an eco-tourism and logging project; that it was not in fact the pristine natural realm that the public imagined the marchers to inhabit. The debate was thus reduced to an all or nothing approach to development,

26 MAS chief of staff Miguel Quintana “claimed that timber companies using industrial machinery and sawmills are logging a 170,000 acre tract in the heart of the reserve, building roads to transport large volumes of timber. The sale of caiman and crocodile hides has become a “million dollar” export business monopolized by four companies, he alleges. Quintana charges that an Argentinean company has an exclusive 20-year contract to fly foreigners into their “five-star” luxury
playing on the expectation of these ‘bow and arrow Indians’ as inhabiting a zone of pristine nature. The ethnic label takes on the ecologist vs. extractivist dimensions we saw above in the case of the Lecos. The wider significance of the MAS act in this theatre seems to be an attempt to make the point that everyone wants development, subliminally and without explicitly bringing the issue to debate.

Though the Tipnis were perceived to be anti-development, their rejection of the road had started as a demand that it run a different course, as the government were well aware. Within the Tipnis is a section called Polygon 7, home to around 20,000 cocalero families. The new road was planned to run though this area, and simultaneously many claimed, to skirt the altitudinal level optimal for growing coca throughout the park, opening up more of the territory to highland migrant cocaleros. The Tipnis indigenous groups had originally requested the road run along the Sécure river, where the majority of them live (see map below), precisely to connect them to the services of the cities. When this demand was ignored, their case hardened into a complete rejection of the road, an attempt to defend the territory against an influx of highland migrants taking over their land to grow coca.

Ironically then, the opposition started as a set of demands for inclusion into development and modernity, rather than opposition to it. As the movement ran on, the ethnic dualism surfacing in so many contemporary issues meant that the Tipnis came to be perceived as, and trapped into, arguing for the ‘pristine’ non-capitalist state of their jungle. Initially in fact their demands were against a development that appeared to them to be specifically oriented to benefit the coca growers who constitute the core of the MAS and a dominant economic interest of the country. The issue then was not with development in general, but who has the rights to its fruits in particular. To the agenda of the March against the road were added demands for education, housing and health services, and access to funds from climate mitigation projects like REDD.


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The planned route of the road, according to Bernard Fischer, an anthropologist who has worked years in the area, indeed seemed to skirt the altitude best suited for coca growing (Fischer, personal communication 2011), and no reason was ever given whereby a road connecting Trinidad and Cochabamba, or San Ignacio de Moxos and Villa Tunari, would otherwise take that route, which as can be seen from the map above, veers west from the two cities to arc straight through the centre of the park. The reason given was that the two connecting tramos or arms leading to the North and South borders of the park had already been built before the issue came to public attention, and it would be expensive to re-route it. On the map above, the ‘tramo propuesto’ shows the route of the planned road. The red line marks the section of the park where the cocaleros are, while the title-holding Tipnis inhabitants are at the conflux of the river to the North East.
When seen in conjunction with the newly granted oil concessions in the park, the reasons for the circuitous route of the road become clearer. Veering to the east it hugs the western seam of the planned hydrocarbon exploitation. This agenda of the road was never to my knowledge mentioned in the media coverage of the Tipnis episode. The stated purpose of the road is to connect the southern cities providing vital infrastructure. Cochabamba and Beni are only connected by road via La Paz. The Brazilian State bank BNDES loaned Bolivia the money to build the road in the interest of improving its connections to the Pacific coast. Faced with having to change the course of the road, despite the existing Phases One and Two having been built, Brazil offered to increase its loan, provided that a couple of other issues among the countries were resolved, these being stolen cars trafficked across the border and securing the titles of Brazilian landholders to certain soya concessions in Bolivia.

More widely we see irrefutably the dominance of the extractivist neoliberal context within which the drama of the road is set. Coca growers it seems are the least of the worries of the Tipnis inhabitants, who are poised to see the metamorphosis of
at least half of their territory into oil fields. As scholars of extractivism including Gudynas (2010) and Bebbington (2009) have indicated, extractivism has not slowed under the Morales government but has proceeded apace, as it has under other contemporary ‘left wing’ regimes across Latin America, including Venezuela, Ecuador and Argentina. Even before the Tipnis struggle, hydrocarbon extraction had increased under the Morales government, and was being contested by the Guaraní around Tarija (Bebbington, 2009; Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2010). In Brazil under the Partido Popular of Lula, extractivism has proceeded similarly, with projects being led by the funding of the same BNDES bank funding the road (Gudynas, 2010). The significance of the hydrocarbon reserves below the park was not an explicit element in the discussion and media coverage of the Tipnis episode at the time in Bolivian media, which focused on ethnicity, played out through the intangibility vs. development stage show, and exactly which government minister was responsible for attacking the protestors.

Andrew Canessa (2014) argues that territory is the most salient way of differentiating ‘indigenous’ peoples in Bolivia. The city dwellers/ coca growers, who he speculates may constitute an overall majority of the country’s population, he calls deterritorialised, in comparison to territory holding peoples like the Tipnis dwellers or Kaateños. After Geshiére (2009) and Gausset (2008), he terms the deterritorialised autochtonous, a settled majority who make claims on the state against those of others. It is in fact this majority, Canessa indicates, who Morales claims to serve with his extractive development projects. In representing the interests of one sector and claiming to represent the indigenous as a whole, Canessa argues that Morales is blanketeting Indians as one class, as they were in the colony, and moving away from the celebration of indigeneity as diversity which was heralded in with the plurinational state of the nineties. Tensions between the cocaleros and lowlanders in the Tipnis have been ongoing since the first March in Defence of the Tipnis in 1991, which as McNeish indicates was “widely cited as an event marking the start of the gradual transformation of the country into its current form as a pluri-national state” (MacNeish, 2013: 235). In an ‘indigenous state’ the interests of some indigenous peoples will inevitably become subordinate Canessa argues, and Morales’ state lacks the multivocality to make space for divergent indigenous voices.
McNeish (2013) argues that we need a more nuanced view of the differing demands of ‘indigenous’ sectors in Bolivia that can potentially include the coca growers, themselves ex-miners laid off in the eighties, as well as the Tipnis. In contrast to the de-territorialised indigenous majority, the Tipnis dwellers, McNeish indicates, recognise the importance of their land titles and are territory-based; his informants described the defence of territory as the ‘spear-head’ of the March. He recognises that this does not mean that we can generalise their views on extractivism to the ideal indigenous standpoint associated with ecological virtues and resistance to the developmental agenda of the state (McNeish 2013). In fact it is exactly these ideological associations of ecology and territorial autonomy carried by the word indigenous that allows Morales to pursue an extractivist agenda while maintaining his credibility on the international stage. At home however, indigenous is not a word frequently associated with or used to self-identify by the majority who Canessa (2014) identifies as Morales’ key supporters, and was not an identity he claimed at home during the Tipnis crisis.

To take such a nuanced view of how ‘indigenous’ identities work within Bolivia, we can return to the everyday situation of the marketplace. As we saw in de la Cadena’s work on Peru, one can be white, mestizo, chola, India and various other identities in between the two ideal poles of Indian and white. What is at stake in the racist insults hurled back and forth is not that ‘we are all Indian’, of some shade or another, but who is more Indian, thus who is socially superior in a certain situation (de la Cadena 2000). Indianness in Bolivia is continually negotiated and reinvented in specific encounters, relationally, so that one becomes colonizer or colonized, the weaker of the stronger, the higher or the lower. *Indígena* in Spanish is a feminine word, and connected with being colonized and weaker. While from an etic perspective the connections Morales establishes with the Aymara city state of Tiahuanaco are also a claim to indigeneity, at a national level these connections elucidate an Aymara identity, connected with the highlands, an identity palatable to the city dwelling and coca growing majority, in a way that the colonized- sounding term *indígena* is not. Ethnicity at the national level is a more complex mosaic than this blanket term can encompass. Within Bolivia Morales’ behavior was seen relationally, and it was a moment of rupture in which his claims to be leading a government of the colonized lost their validity in the public eye.
Long and increasingly fraught negotiations over the Tipnis involved the definitive split of the Conamaq and CIDOB from the MAS, breaking the Pact of Unity which had held them together since 1997, an agreement between the five main social movements of the country to support one another over common agendas which had given the left the stability needed for the MAS to be elected. In October 2012 the CAOI, Andean Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations, and the Conamaq sent a damning letter declaring that “this state is no more than the continuation of the old colonial, republican state”, over the government’s behaviour over the Tipnis, and especially the decision to send in a commission to hold an overdue consultation process, a ‘consulta’, with the Tipnis dwellers over the road. Such debate and damning pronouncements also circulated in the Platform on Climate Change, for whom the Tipnis episode now came to be the immediate manifestation of narratives of climate change. In the eyes of the indigenous movements, therefore, Morales became a coloniser, for attempt to repress the indigenous people of the Tipnis.

After the initial complaints over the lack of a consultation process over the road, when the MAS announced they would hold one in October 2011 it provoked a storm of criticism. It was argued that the consulta was not prior, as it should have been, and that the Tipnis had already spoken through the march. It seems that the vehemence with which the process was contested reveals fear that the consulta would by fair means or foul come out with the result the government desired, if it was allowed to happen. A commission was sent to the Tipnis, and in the end the government claimed that 55 of 69 Tipnis communities accepted the road. A commission comprised of human rights ombudsmen and the Catholic Church refuted this, claiming that in their shadow consultation more communities had refused the road than accepted it. Interestingly, at least 20 communities, mostly in the North-Eastern section of the park officially declared themselves in peaceful resistance to the consulta and maintained barbed wire blockades at critical entry points to their communities along the three rivers. Refusing to even let the commission enter reveals how the consulta was seen; it strikes me as like Odysseus tying himself to the mast to resist the bribery and temptations of development which the consulta would inevitably lay in their way. Other communities were promised the fruits of

development, houses and schools, and it is claimed their acceptance of these was taken as an unspoken agreement to the road.

At the very heart of the Tipnis incident, through the dynamics of ethnic alterity, we see played out the tensions between territorial autonomy and extractivism. The MAS pro-indigenous and extractivist policies came to a head-on collision, as was inevitable, as a group concerned with territorial autonomy were menaced with extractivism. Morales acted like an archetypal ‘coloniser’, taking advantage of the underlying ethnicised nature of their support to trap the Tipnis marchers within the role of the ‘true indigenous’ they were heralded as embodying. The very nature of the trickery is a stereotypical mode of mestizo manipulation of a less literate city savvy other. When the Tipnis failed to live up to the ‘intangibility’ they were tricked into accepting, if they wanted some elements of capitalism in their territory, they were held up for betraying the public faith. This was an ingenious way of dealing with the issue, though it was overall less than convincing, as the huge and continuing support for the March showed.

Of the Pact of Unity social movements, the CSUTCB and COB ostensibly maintained their support for the MAS through the Tipnis events, yet the COB also announced it was forming its own political party, as did the Conamaq. The Conamaq declaration that the MAS are ‘not indigenous’ creates a fresh line of schismogenesis, another frontier of ethnicity. The lines are redrawn to challenge extractivism with territorial rights, strapped as they are to a discourse of indigeneity as the ‘other’ of neoliberalism that this implies. Imposing extractivism on this other is the role of the white/ coloniser. The Tipnis became a front line in the defence of ‘indigeneity’ against predatory extractive industries, here contested by the uprising of the ‘true’ indigenous. Their struggle came to embody the defence of the pristine jungle against extractive economies. The coca growers as well as the MAS in this scenario become seen by the populace as the colonisers of those who are ‘really’ indigenous, which in the relational ethnic identities continually reconstructed, makes them the whiter. This stage play of alterity continually (re-) enacted in the Andes is reminiscent of the ethnic alterity performed through dances that we looked at in Chapter Two, the popular definition of an Indian being, as we have seen, their inability to cope with the city. The focus on dress as making indigenous and city identities is reflected in the ample donations of clothes to the marchers.
As Taussig (1986) has demonstrated, the eastern jungles are widely seen from the perspective of the Andean highlands as a heartland of Indian alterity and of healing. In his analysis the shamans of the eastern slopes of the Colombian Andes mediate the power of alterity and can employ it to cure highlanders. These jungles were ever the margins of the Inca Empire, inhabited by savage chunchos, and came to be seen as a refuge of the wild Indian ‘other’ of highland civilisation. In Arguedas’ *Los Ríos Profundos*, Taussig indicates, the leaders of an uprising of market women in Peru flee to the eastern jungles to rally the wild chunchos to their cause. The re-establishment of the Inca state at Vilcabamba, on the eastern slopes into the jungles, after the Spanish conquest, and the escape of the *Sapa Inca*, true or unique Inca Tupac Amaru into the jungle when the stronghold was taken, has fed into a rich mythological tradition of the return of the Inca from the jungle, and the power of this place to upset colonial dominance. Juan Santos Atahualpa, who claimed to be a descendant of the last Inca, led an uprising of jungle Indians in 1742 to liberate the highlands from colonial rule. The jungle is the refuge of savagery and true Indianness. We are in the Tipnis episode in these landscapes of the return of the Indian, or rightful Inca ruler, in the recurring myth of the jungle rising up to challenge the civilisation of the highlands with its Indianness. In this myth it is the unjust coloniser who is challenged, and the MAS is in the Tipnis events cast in the coloniser role (see also Bold, 2013; Canessa 2014). Taking the role of President, one uses power to further one’s own interests.

Simultaneously, Taussig indicates that due to the rubber boom of the early twentieth century the jungles are seen as an area which was colonised. Highlanders who visit shamans in the Colombian Sibundoy valley on the eastern slopes of the Andes feel a colonial guilt, widespread in society, which becomes manifested in ‘evil winds’, *malos aires*. The magic of alterity can heal social ills, and shamans harness through *ayahuasca*, an Amazonian hallucinogen, the healing power of the jungle, the power of the colonised other, to heal the highlanders of this guilt (Taussig, 1986). We can in part explain the huge popular resonance of the Tipnis episode as sympathy with the ‘true Indian’, the savage coming up from the lowlands to challenge the centre of civilisation, expressing the underlying feelings of guilt and identification with this colonised other, epitomising the repressed Indian alterity at the heart of the self.
Once again, we have the mirror. Reflected at the heart of the city is sympathy for the other claiming its territorial rights against the economic interests of the country at large, which according to the MAS lie in opening up the jungles to extractivism. Rivera Cusicanqui (1991) recalls the arrival of the first lowland march in La Paz in 1990, and the celebration of indigenous common identity that met them when it arrived in La Paz. Identities in Bolivia tend to be dualistic and relationally constructed. It is the Indian aspect of the self with which the highlanders sympathised in the mass demonstrations of support for the Tipnis. City dwellers supported the lowlanders against what Morales would have identified as the common national interest, as their own interests. In this way self and other are constantly desiring and overlapping one another, yet constantly redefining themselves as separate. Gazing in the mirror the lowlanders are looking towards development; seeking their ideal other, the highlanders find their reflection, their Indian other, already seeking aspects of their own lifestyle.

Let us return to the issue of rupture and continuity. Rosaleen Howard (1997) suggests that cyclical Andean time is like sailing round an island, seeing the same characters reappear throughout history in different guises. Here is Amaru again, or Atahualpa rising up out of the jungle, or Arguedas’ market women, in the Tipnis march. Within the universe envisioned in Bolivia, this mythic return resonates through time, with Incas and pachkutis rising up from the jungle, the highland colonisers challenged by the lowlands chunchos familiar from the dances enacted in the village.

The coming out of the social movements of the country that claim to be indigenous against Morales and the coca revolution is especially interesting as, as Grisaffi (2010) notes, coca was championed by the MAS as the symbol of indigeneity: “By delegating responsibilities to the millenarian hoja sagrada (sacred leaf) the coca growers do not have to be forever present doing indigenous things, because conveniently the coca leaf stands in for the people concerned” (2010:427). Coca leaf means that the Chapeare coca growers themselves do not have to ‘do’ indigeneity, as for them the label connotes dirtiness and illiteracy. They distinguish themselves, as originarios, a term connoting highland ‘originality’ rather than Indianness, from the lowland bow and arrow indígenas (Grisaffi, 2010).
In the Tipnis episode coca emerges in a coalition of actors seen as working against the ‘truly indigenous’ marchers. This challenges the legitimacy of the MAS’ claim that coca embodies indigeneity. The splitting of the Conamaq and the CIDOB from the MAS positions indigenous peoples and cocaleros as two opposed sides, recalling the ancient tropes of recurrent battles between indigeneity and colonialism, and reveals that this coca-washing has become less than convincing with the Tipnis episode.

Jumping outside of the western nature/culture worldview, another world emerges. When Morales’ claim to be an ‘indigenous’ President, along with the primordial indigeneity of the coca leaf, is seen without the ecologist implications that have come to be synonymous with indigeneity on an international stage, in the case of the Tipnis it becomes clear Morales is supporting the coca growers over the interests of some who are classified as ‘indigenous’ peoples, indeed who become the archetypal ‘Indians’ in this equation. The success with which coca as indigenous culture is sold internationally is without much sway in Kaata, where coca represents migration to enter into cash economies. Kaateños similarly saw the government as contributing to the decline of their community and the traditional way of life of the highlands by supporting coca over any other crop. Similarly, within the complex mosaic of national identities, coca emerges as a set of interests, allied with the exploitative, and money earning, against the indigenous inhabitants of a territory. Morales’ claim to represent the indigenous is challenged by the theatre of the ‘return of the Indian’, as played out by the Tipnis march emerging from the jungle to huge acclaim.

We see that, as in the description by Platt (1986) cited in Chapter Two, Morales acts as if “the fundamental structure of the cosmos is dual, and humanity must face both ways at once in order to benefit from the complementary but antagonistic forces around them”. This resounds with the accusations on the national stage, and especially emerging in the Tipnis context that he has a doble cara (double face): with one face, he looks towards the west and presents an ‘Indian’ visage; with the other, he looks towards the national level, and when considering those like the Tipnis who get in the way of development, presents an aspect that exploits people and resources, the national stereotype of a ‘white’ colonist, dialectically opposed to the Indian.
Unmasking the coca leaf in this way, we can see coca as a shadow economy of capitalism, relying on its means and routes. In the cocaine it is largely fated to produce, a central effect of which is to make the consumer desire more of the same, we see a neoliberal vision of endless consumption of resources, a world in which there is always more to be exploited, motivated by an unending desire which maps the spatio-temporal dimensions of this universe. Coca is unveiled as being the opposite of what it purports to stand for.

We can return to the claim of the conquest as a pachakuti, currently being set right by the coming of Morales in a second pachakuti. In this case Morales is not the Indian but the coloniser, according to the theatre enacted in this episode. The Indian is rebelliously returning, upsetting powerful interests, as it continually does. The oft-recited tale of the rupture of the conquest, told by a coca leaf garlanded Morales, on the ruins of Tiwanaku, is the story of now, this myth of conquest illustrating a contemporary state of change. It is now that Kaata experiences rupture with its traditions and in its continuity with the past, that the city inspired red bricks surface and the indigenous, in the form of stone terraces, or ponchos, or potatoes, is pushed underneath, in systems valuing international exchange and commodities. The nature of the landscape is becoming increasingly one of international capitalism, and this is the pachakuti here mapped. It is precisely this ontological change that descriptions of climate change allude to, as I will now argue. In contrast to Medina’s claim of essential continuity in the villages, who have always experienced migration and ‘climate change’ in the western sense, the Kaateños consider that they are experiencing rupture, a similar moment of rupture to the current evocation of the conquest. Memory is the mechanism explaining the present to itself, dressed up in a mythology of the past (Rappaport, 1990).
End of the world stories: pachakuti in Kaata

We have seen that the Kaateños are unsure about the future of the village. My young friends living in the city wondered whether there would be anyone at all there in another generation’s time, which others openly doubted. An old man told me that “there are only a few of us here now, to maintain traditions”, in the context of that year’s small August fiesta. The village then is not offered a bright indigenous future, even if its inhabitants might leave and seek prosperity through coca or the city economies with greater ease than before.

One day I was walking with Martha, a single woman, up to Kaata, and we came again to the point where Akhamani becomes suddenly visible, in this dry season, in its white peaked splendour. I ask her whether there is less snow on the mountain range each year. Yes, and it used to cover those other ones too, she says, indicating the black peaks to the south. She hesitates, unwilling to reveal to an educated person something so, well, unscientific, and then adds: ‘They say, well, they say, that when all the snow disappears the world will end.’ The mountain, it seems, is like a sand timer for the world at large. As society changes so does the mountain, heralding the end of the world.
Martha is a devout evangelical Christian, as are several Kaateño families. When I ask her at home whether the world will end, she has recourse to the Bible in answering. “It will!” she says definitely. All this is foreseen in the Bible, that there will be illnesses, that animals transmit their illnesses to humans, and the crops will not thrive. Christ will come and save the faithful, whilst those who drink, worship false idols, and have fiestas will go to the devil. The mood of evangelism in the Andes is, like the mountain stories of the village, also apocalyptic. Bouysse-Cassagne and Harris (1987) report that in the eighties in their Altiplanic fieldsites there were similar narratives of judgement and change that they associate with pachakuti, so it is not exclusively in the present villagers feel such a change imminent.

On another walk back up the valley, I am with a young man called Noel, one of the few of his generation who have chosen to stay in the village. He looks after his ailing mother, the rest of the family living in La Paz or the valleys. As we round the valley towards Kaata, again coming into view of Akhamani, he tells me that Illimani, the mountain which is a national symbol reigning over the capital city of La Paz, is in fact a volcano. If it explodes it could destroy the whole city. Earthquakes have started to happen all over the world now, have they not? Noel asks me. He refers in particular to the Japanese tsunami, and the earthquakes in Chile in recent years which are well known in Bolivia. “They haven’t come to Bolivia yet, but they will”. I ask if Akhamani is a volcano too, and he says it is.

Classen (1987:210) indicates, drawing on the seventeenth century writings of chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega, that “The pachakuti is a period of sacred and highly dangerous fluidity between the land and body during which humans emerge from the natural world and can also return to it”. Civilisation being incorporated by lava emerging from the mountains thus resembles the classic trope of pachakuti. This period of disorder, Classen shows is succeeded by a new cosmological order, as when the creator God Viracocha classically started this age of the world by drawing humans out from the caves in it. This narrative of the end of the world, or of the near future, contrasts to Morales’ equalising pachakuti, understood in terms of increased human wealth and comfort at the expense of converting the animate landscape into so many “standing reserves” (Heidegger, 1971) of natural resources presenting themselves for exploitation.
The pachakuti or ‘world turning over’ stems from an imbalance in the forces of *ayni*, or complementarity. Ayni is envisioned by theorists of the Vivir Bien as a native philosophy of reciprocity and exchange constituting an alternative to capitalist networks, and the basis of the Sumaq Qamaña, or good life. It constitutes an axis of cultural stability against cultural change in these narratives. However, as we have seen in Kaata ayni is weakening and being replaced with the exploitation by humans of other human beings and non-human entities in the landscape; the winds, the mountains. Rather than feeding the mountain soils that which nourishes them we give them weakening plastics, or burn these into the air.

Such imbalances in *ayni* can have cataclysmic manifestations, rather than tend statically towards the reproduction of the past. According to Silverblatt (1987) and Bolin (1998), imbalance in the forces of *ayni* that keep the landscape in complementary balance was seen as inevitable in Inca times. The world was not static, and there was continual disruption to universal equilibrium. This imbalance brought sickness. It was the god Viracocha, taking the form of a serpent *amaru*, who would erupt from beneath the earth, causing destruction in his wake, in an attempt to recreate equilibrium. Strangely enough white people in the Andes, including anthropologists (eg. Harris 1995) have been called Viracochas since colonial times, an appellation which Gose (2008) thinks to be Andean in origin, and associated with the idea they would bring *pachakuti*, in terms of a reordering of space and time, like the creator God Viracocha. It was he who drew from below the earth the people of this age, and those before, mapping as he did so the sites of power in the landscape.

Speaking to people about climate change in Charazani, I was told with great interest that ‘the snakes are coming up the valleys now’, and a young cocalero mentioned them to me in describing his colonisation of the valleys. The serpent has been a potent symbol throughout Andean history, with the rebels Tupac Katari and Tupac Amaru taking its name, in Aymara and Quechua respectively. It seems that with these stories of serpents rising up the valleys we are in the realm of mythic return. What is the nature of this rebalancing force surfacing from the valleys like the serpents, harbingers of climate change? Its interpretation in Kaata, where the mountains themselves call time in an apocalyptic rebalancing, does not seem to coincide with the triumphant return that Morales maps out. His pachakuti is ethnic,

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29 see eg. http://lareciprocidad.blogspot.co.uk/search/label/SUMA%20QAMA%C3%91A
articulating the rise of the Indian to power, but in fact this does not bring with it a world ordering ontology of revitalised Indianness; rather it brings the landscapes of the white other into communities like Kaata. For centuries Kaata has kept its vertical economy: its ayni relations with the spirits of the landscape and among people are only now failing. We are now in a time of extreme re-mapping of the sources of subsistence of the landscape and its interconnecting lines of ayni, so profound as to constitute a pachakuti like that of Viracocha in Incaic times, or as the arrival of the Spanish. There is it seems a pachakuti in Kaata, an ontological shift in the composition of the landscape which submerges the current world back into the stone which bore it, but it seems to be whiteness in houses and clothes that is rising to the fore, burying the Inca stones, selling the ancestors at the heart of the mountain, rather than the ethnic revival Morales claims. This is a change synonymous with climate change, and the accompanying attitude to the landscape as an accumulation of resources for human consumption, rather than a living matrix connected through relations of reciprocity. Morales is articulating, in fact, the wrong pachakuti, quite a different upheaval to that being experienced in Kaata.
In an interview in September 2013, Javier Medina outlined his plans for a scheme in the area around Kaata for a laboratory, a pilot scheme to put into practice the ideals of the Vivir Bien, through a program called Biocultura, funded by the Swiss Cooperation (the national Swiss aid organisation to Bolivia) and the Bolivian state. His idea was to create a community tourism scheme. A team will improve the footpaths on the route of the Curva- Pelechuco trek, and build hostals for walkers. When I asked Medina how the project was to differ from normal tourism, he told me that the difference lay in the creation of a local market for sustainable community agriculture, as well as the dynamically egalitarian ethos of the project, creating a meeting of two civilisations, and making young people ‘cultural mediators’ between the two. The project thus seemed to address some of the more urgent concerns I have identified in this thesis. The hostels would use food produced by the villages- there would also be workshops for these villages to improve the food they eat. The tourist would be treated not as a client who must be right, but as a guest with whom you want to share, in a tourism “más digno para todos” (more dignified for everyone). Medina sought to encourage young people in the villages to value their indigenous culture through this meeting of civilisations, seeing themselves reflected admiringly in the gaze of the tourists, would learn to combine elements of indigenous and western culture. Simultaneously the western tourists would learn much needed lessons from the villages. This assumption that each side needs to be rebalanced by the other is based in the theory of complementarity, emanating from the classic ethnographies of the villages.

Excited as to how the project would evolve, I kept in touch with it from England. One of the technicians setting up the project, an anthropologist from a Quechua speaking family was an acquaintance from La Paz, and we communicated over the internet from England about the early phases of the set up. I was thus consulted, via Facebook chat, on what ‘traditional dishes’ or platos regionales the villages ought to prepare for tourists. I replied to the effect that if it was local cuisine being sought, they ought to ask the women there. Very noble, and ethical, replied the technician, but- really- what should the tourists eat? They couldn’t be expected to eat soup every day, as did the villagers. And the preparation methods used in the villages
were not hygienic. I replied that I thought the locally grown foods very nourishing, and that I had never been sick from eating in Kaata.

Nonetheless, on returning to the communities just as workshops were training community members for the tourism project, I found women being taught to cook in a ‘hygienic’ fashion contradicting many existing practices, and effectively meaning that tourist food would have to be made in a special kitchen outside of the house. A woman had been brought in from Cochabamba to teach the ladies how to cook new meals that would be called their ‘regional dishes’, and an alpaca had been purchased from the upper villages on which the technicians feasted.

I was familiar with food as an area of concern, as when I had first gone to Kaata people were surprised that I could eat the same food as them. This stemmed from the idea that white people were a different sort of being, constituted as such by their foodstuffs. The imposition of separate food regimes, especially with the implication that local food was not clean enough for tourists, would be bound to deepen existing prejudices and tensions against white people, who had been cast as lordly and deprecating before any of them had even arrived, by the well-meaning technicians from La Paz, who were themselves much impressed at the idea of tourists. Despite Medina’s educated approach, not to mention my own attempts at intervention, the project was confirming stereotypes and antagonism across the ethnic divide.

The technician had asked me what I considered the villagers should teach tourists- their own suggestions they focus on how local colonists had been burned out of their haciendas were disregarded as rather tactless under the circumstances- and I suggested that their agricultural knowledge, which leads to adaption to climate change, was the most valuable thing to my mind they might impart to western travellers. I had hoped to influence the project towards agri-tourism, with volunteers learning the sustainable terracing techniques of the villages, and staying in family houses. However these suggestions were not heeded, and rather regarded with alarm by the technician, the idea that westerners could work the fields unthinkable (not working in the fields one of the fundamental tenets of whiteness) despite my assurances that there are an increasing number of sustainable agriculture training projects in the UK, and promises to set up connections helping to assure a flow of interested persons.
In fact the dynamics of knowledge worked in a different direction. We were taken as sample tourists to see the chullpas above the village of Chari one afternoon by an assortment of teenagers and adolescents who were being trained by the Biocultura team to be tourist guides. Tourists could be taken to the sacred sites, but this was hardly an opportunity for intercultural learning, as their nature was kept mysterious, with even the La Paz training team ignorant as to exactly what chullpas were, people or houses. I had found that such ritual knowledge was by no means easily shared, with outsiders suspected of ‘stealing the culture’, this being the role of the white capitalist other; in Kaata everyone was convinced that the existing tourists who climbed Akhamani were on their way to a gold mine.

On this little expedition to the chullperias, one of the ladies carried lunch for all of us, a total of twenty people, in a huge cooking pot, tied with a cloth on her back. When we got back down the mountain the entire group was submitted to a long and exceedingly dull lecture on how to pack a rucksack correctly, thought to be an essential element in being a tourist guide. That a rucksack- like other hiking equipment sold by large companies to enable villagers to walk the paths of their villages- should be assumed to be a superior form of carrying apparatus to existing carrying cloths indicated underlying prejudice towards western commodities and the need to ‘improve’ indigenous habits. Furthermore, the training consisted in teaching young people to carry western tourists’ things around for them, with a servile role rather than cultural sharing.

More significantly the scheme was unlikely to work as rather than being proposed by the villages it came from outside them. In Kaata, the uptake was ambivalent: Ermeglio, in explaining the scheme to the other authorities, said that on the one hand it might be beneficial, and on the other might ‘ruin the village’. The technician told me that in some areas there had been little uptake on it, where villages were immersed in profitable cash economies from coca, gold and running black market gasoline over the border to Peru and thus not particularly interested in this source of embettering revenue, completely laying bare the fallacy of expectations of them as harmonious subsistence farmers immune to the temptations of capitalism.

I took my concerns to the headquarters of the Biocultura project in La Paz, outlining the issues to Medina in an email. He was unable to see me himself, being involved in numerous projects, though he instructed those running the project to meet
with me, and a meeting was called. To which no one turned up. Whilst we tried to reschedule several times, I was never able to actually talk to anyone. I eventually wrote a letter that indicated the scheme was very unlikely to create cross-cultural, non-hierarchical dialogue, tending to confirm stereotypical roles and prejudices. I was unwilling to be a supercilious academic writing a damning critique of a development project, which so often seems to be the fate of anthropological analyses of development.

Working with actors’ supposed desires, instead of carrying out engaged fieldwork in the communities to ask them what they want and what might work, renders the Vivir Bien ineffective in realising its goals. Similarly, a narrow view of the tastes, interests and needs of the white outsiders hampered the creation of the tourism scheme. The project, as the Vivir Bien itself, ends up created in the image of rural communities in the city. When this image is projected onto the communities themselves discrepancies emerge. Without consultation, the project was unlikely to reflect their wishes. As regards the aim of slowing migration, Zorn’s (2004) work has shown that tourism is not in any case necessarily a barrier to migration. While her study of migration on the island of Taquile initially showed that it gave employment to those who might otherwise have gone to the city, she adds in an afterword that there has now been full-scale migration to La Paz among the younger generation (Zorn, 2004), much as there has in Kaata. Working in the tourist economy has eventually allowed young people to move to the city, which as we have explored here, they are increasingly drawn in recent years to do.

Embedded in the practice of the technicians were normative assumptions of the superiority of western culture over indigenous culture. As the city and countryside gaze at each other there is a well-established underlying hierarchy which is hard to shift. There was nothing in the scheme to indicate a reciprocal process of learning, rather the villages were educated into servile roles. The process of ‘becoming the urban other’ which motivated migration is accelerated, with technicians imposing new normative ways of cooking and carrying on the villagers which it assumed were inherently culturally superior, as they had emerged from a contemporary international city context. In this way the project’s ends were the opposite of its aims.
This thesis has traced two themes: animism and alterity, which are crucial to perceptions of climate change in Kaata, as well as at national and international levels. Climate change as we have seen constitutes an entire change in the lifestyles and ambience of the village, situated within a national and international context of rampant capitalism and a sense of impending ecological crisis.

In this context, the indigenous, the ‘other’ is idealised by those who consider themselves within capitalism, be they anthropologists, Food Sovereignty activists, or international delegates visiting the climate summit in Cochabamba. Thousands of climate activists upped sticks to the Peoples’ World Conference on Climate Change in Cochabamba in the wake of failed international negotiations in Copenhagen looking for Bolivia to field an alternative. In the process, as many were probably aware, they accounted for tons of burned carbon as they flew to South America. Why was Bolivia considered worthwhile expending this effort, carbon and time in reaching? It seems the delegates were looking to Morales and the indigenous revolution for an answer. It is hoped that as capitalism reaches its crisis some kind of alternative is possible, and thus we look towards those we see living in such a way as to contribute only very little to environmental ‘contamination’.

Ironically, on reaching Kaata, I was immediately told that this contamination was all around, in the- to my eyes- scarce fragments of litter which the Kaateños connect to the changing weather and weakness of the land. Uniquely among the actors in this thesis, they strongly associate their own actions with environmental change. A landscape perspective helps to illuminate the interrelated nature of soil, weather, what people eat and how they work. Those who seek the indigenous ecologist attempt to codify this landscape through the Vivir Bien, or in its material aspects, through FS. As Idelfonso says, “with our traditional tools we don’t contaminate at all. This must be clear”, which is largely true according to both western and Andean notions of contamination. Without implementing ecological living over a large scale the ‘indigenous cosmovision’ of the Vivir Bien cannot save capitalist societies. Those who continue to idealise the rural way of life through the Vivir Bien often do so from the cities, with their comforts of hot water, transport and supermarkets. Serious questions are likewise raised for the capacity of small-scale peasant agriculture to feed large cities, or the choice of peasants to remain on the fringes of capitalist comfort.
Another irony of this historical moment is that the quest for alterity is not one-way, and arriving in Kaata I found a village highly motivated to appropriate the western ‘other’, dressed, in their tight jeans and winkle pickers, much like the students I had left in Manchester. To fund this look they have left the ecologically sound landscape of Kaata to plunge down mine shafts for fragments of gold, washing a residue of mercury into rivers where it poisons the drinking supply, or gone to grow coca, its expanding frontier encroaching on the jungles of the east. Or they are living in the cities, aspiring to or even having obtained exactly the sort of carbon consuming lifestyles to which the anthropologist and activist were seeking an alternative. These changes are considered inseparable from the weakening of the fields and taciturn nature of the weather. Considering the human *causa eficens* rather than *causa naturans* in this landscape, leaders in Kaata see their young people swept up in a movement of desire, a migration which is inevitable, attracted away from their crops, which are valueless in comparison to the cash crop coca, or the commodities the city offers.

Is this the process of change that the MAS promised the countryside? It does indeed seem fair to claim that this is a moment of revolution, of *pachakuti*, an ontological re-ordering of the landscape. Whilst Morales’ claim to be indigenous is highly regarded internationally, in Bolivia as we have seen race is contextually constructed through wealth and behaviour, and an Indian can become a pishtaco. Whilst he offers an inspiring example to the migrant class in the cities who challenge the existing ‘white’ upper crust of a colonially structured society, as a cocalero he also automatically represents and favours his own, explaining some of the public outcry over the Tipnis.

The *pachakuti* that Morales promises is one in which the indigenous have risen ‘to the top’. The pink bricks of the city however superimpose themselves over the landscapes of the villages, which are abandoned fried chicken and chips, jeans and other accoutrements of capitalism, as its inhabitants become the ‘other’. If we look at the *pachakuti* as the rise of (a class or ethnicity of) people, within a landscape determined by international capitalism, succeeding or at least gaining ground on a crust of white elite, then this is a pachakuti. If we were looking for a challenge to this landscape itself embodied in uprising of the campo, bringing with it a transformation of systems of meaning and production, then we are sorely disappointed, as indeed
were the indigenous movements, who as we remember in the introduction criticised the Law of Mother Earth as failing to “propose a change in the structural bases of the capitalist system, or a reconfiguration of the nation state”. The popular sectors, the Pact of Unity which brought the MAS to power, were seeking such a radical change, an ontological shift in the national landscape. The difference between the pachakuti attained and that sought for is one of an ethnicity or of whole landscape. In contemporary Bolivia the ethnic is prevalent over alternative systems of meaning.

Whilst championing its ecological credentials, which the international media assumes will inevitably spring from an ‘indigenous government’, the MAS has sought to create the wealth needed to bring the country out of poverty through extractivism. They have battled against powerful interests in taking on the agricultural system of Santa Cruz, forced to compromise only with the country on the brink of civil war after peasants were shot by a state governor in Pando. After the public uprising of the Gas Wars, which created the climate in which they could be elected, the MAS created national wealth by taxing the companies extracting the country’s hydrocarbons resources, fulfilling the demands of the protestors. They have invested this wealth in classic poverty reduction measures, in a country ravaged by decades of being the poster child of neoliberalism, with dual economies for the wealthy and poor. Modernising the country, building infrastructure, feeding benefits to the poorest, complies with the their vision of ‘the rise of the Indian’, without seriously challenging established economic interests.

The sense of unspoken conflict inherent in an approach that embraced both indigenous territorial rights and extractivism came to the attention of many Bolivians over the Tipnis crisis. Suddenly that which stood not only for wealth but for sovereignty resurfaced and challenged the interests of power in a classic Andean way, the jungle rising up to remind the centre of its presence. Morales acted, in many ways, like a true coloniser, taking advantage of the ethnicised nature of their support to trap the Tipnis marchers within the role of the ‘true indigenous’ they were heralded as embodying. When they failed to live up to the definition of ‘intangibility’ they were tricked into accepting, as they wanted some elements of capitalism and fruits of development in their territory, rather than being held to a pristine static past, they were held up for betraying public faith. This was an ingenious way of dealing with the
issue, though it was less than convincing. The social movements stopped supporting the MAS over it, fragmenting the left.

Such a deeply hypocritical episode indicates that the pachakuti is perhaps more than human, that it can sweep up leaders like Morales into a wave of feeling, a mood, a rebalancing which individuals are powerless to act against. In the Kaateño world there is no superhero to save a world already determined by the swinging of a pendulum, by a reciprocal relationship between humans and the atmosphere in which they live and breathe. The pachakuti envisioned by Kaateños is one of an agentive landscape, in which the mountains are actors that can call time on human activities by exploding, and in which the atmosphere, which as Ingold or Heidegger remind us is the medium above all with which we are, has the power to correct us through climate change. It is precisely this animate landscape that Morales has forgotten in his human centred pachakuti, delineating the integration of the rural peasant and urban poor into a landscape of neoliberal dreams and desires. The mountains and jungles can fund this extractivism, relinquishing their resources. In Kaata the landscape used not give so simply, but required nurturing with rituals, libations and hard work, creating reciprocity.

With climate change, as Latour (2014) indicates, the animate power of this landscape is poised to abruptly remind the ‘deanimist’ world of its presence. Kaateños as non-modern animists are ready for this eventuality. Regarding humans as a part of the change rather than its causa naturans however, they think it might not now be possible to stop, thus they disappoint the hopes of those who look to the indigenous other as the solution to the excesses of the capitalocene. Kaateños doesn’t see themselves as any more agentive than those at the national level, for all that they perceive climate change as inherent in their everyday actions. This is the contrast between Kaateño animism and the call to acknowledge the living agency of the world that Latour puts forward, and I suppose that I with this narrative aim to support. It may well already be too late, and the power to remedy climate change may be beyond us humans, yet we are I feel entitled to try, or at least, to stop driving the pendulum up, and cling on ready for the fall.
Glossary: Acronyms and Social movements

Bartolina Sisa National Federation of Peasant Women of Bolivia - a rural peasant movement which focuses on women’s struggles.

Conamaq – Confederación de Ayllus y Markas de Qollasuyo. Confederation of Regional Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyo, the main highland indigenous social movement in Bolivia.

CIDOB- Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano, Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia, active in the lowlands. Currently, CIDOB comprises 34 peoples living in the Lowlands of Bolivia, in seven of the nine departments of Bolivia: Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba and La Paz.

CSCIB- Confederación Syndical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia.

COB- Central Obrero Boliviano, the Central Union of Bolivian Workers. the chief trade union federation in Bolivia, founded in 1952. Traditionally a demanding, confrontational organization, the COB has had a difficult relationship with every Bolivian president since the 1950s. The COB represents about two million Bolivian workers, bringing together workers from various branches of industry and public services as well as consultation with many peasants' and indigenous leaders, such as Felipe Quispe.

CSUTCB- Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers, the largest peasant union in Bolivia. Formed in 1979 in opposition to government-sponsored peasant unions, it immediately replaced the National Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia. Under the leadership of the Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement, the CSUTCB became an independent organization. The CSUTCB became involved in the Central Obrera Boliviana labor federation and (because of the decline of the miners' federation) became a leading force in the COB. Through the CSUTCB's pressure, the COB moved beyond a purely class-based focus to address indigenous demands, as well.

IBIS- A Danish NGO working on the theme of indigenous consultation and sponsoring the Vivir Bien workshops, expelled by the Morales government in 2014.

FI- Fondo de Desarollo para los Pueblos Indígenas, Originarios y Comunidades Campesinas Development Fund for Indigenous, Originary and Peasant Communities
FS- Food Sovereignty

MAS- Movimento Al Socialismo, Movement Towards Socialism, the current Bolivian ruling party headed by President Evo Morales.

MST- Movimento Sin Tierra- Landless Movement of Bolivia, active in the lowlands.

TIPNIS- Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure, the National Park- Indigenous Territory Isiboro Sécure over which the government had controversially planned to build a road. The title Tipnis came to be used as a collective noun for the various indigenous inhabitants of the zone during the time of their march against the road in popular discourse and media coverage.

THOA- Taller de Historia Oral Andina, The Andean Oral History Workshop

Non- English terms

Altiplano- the high arid plain between the East and West Andean chains, covering much of highland Bolivia

Apu- A sacred peak and ancestral spirit associated with it.

Ayahuasca- A hallucinogenic substance emanating from and associated with the Amazonian jungles

Ayllu- A community and the lands it inhabits, simultaneously a term of kinship and geography. According to Bastien: “Ayllu solidarity is a combination of kinship and territorial ties, as well as symbolism. (Albo 1972; Duviols 1974; Tshopik 1951; and Urioste 1975). These studies, however, do not explain how the ayllu is a corporate whole, which includes social principles, verticality, and metaphor... Ayllu also refers to people who live in the same territory (llahta) and who feed the earth shrines of that territory” (1978).

Ayni- mutual aid, often in terms of labour, and measured in precise quantities. Ayni is- or was- inherent in the relations of Andean landscapes; it is through ayni, constantly being rebalanced, that the relations of exchange that centrally compose it are conducted. Mannheim posits that given the vast array of ayni terms, both between humans and of human beings with landscape spirits, it is a total social system. The term is currently being used in looser definitions in indigenist literature where it comes to mean reciprocity.
Callaway- A (male) healer of the highland Charazani area, now becoming used as a blanket ethnic term to describe the inhabitants of the region.

Cargo- a job, such as acting community leader with its correspondent responsibilities to host the rest of the community

Campesino- peasant

Campo- countryside

Cantus- a style of music traditionally played by the communities around Charazani on long tarka flutes

Chola/cholo/cholita/o- citified Indians

Chullpa- either a pre-Incaic round, stone mummy house, the mummified remains of a leader or lineage ancestor inside one of these, or the mythological inhabitants of this previous age of the world

Chuncho- Jungle dweller, also having implications of figure of the past age of the world.

Ch’ullu- Woollen cap with earflaps traditional of the Andes.

Cocalero- coca cultivator

Consejal- Intermediary between the village authorities and local municipal council

Indígena- Indigenous person

Indio- Indian

Jaqi- Aymara word for person

Kataristas- Indigenist political movement in the 1970s influential in Bolivia, named after the Aymara leader Tupac Katari

Mallku- Quechua/Aymara word for condor, used to denote community leaders

Originario- Originary inhabitant of a place, a highland word connoting ‘indigenous’
Pachakuti- An ontological shift, the transformation of one world into another.

Piemonte- a gentle slope leading from the base of mountains to a region of flat land

Pishtaco- a longstanding figure of fear in the Andes, usually and stereotypically white, who steals the blood and fat from the bodies of Indians, leaving them weakened and sure to die.

Pollera- skirt worn by cholas, urban Indians.

Quena- Reed flute

Runa- Quechua word meaning people, and used as an autonominative for indigenous peasants, often excluding city dwellers and whites.

Tarka- Reed flute

Tostados, toasted beans or grains, an old fashioned treat for children

Uncuña- a handkerchief sized woven carrying cloth

Vivir Bien- Philosophy of ‘living well’, supposedly an indigenous concept of development emanating out of La Paz in 2001, and since adopted as the core aim of the Bolivian Constitution and National Development Plan
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