EMBODYING RESURRECTION:
CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF THIS LIFE AND THE NEXT IN THE
UNDISPUTED PAULINES

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of
PhD
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Religions and Theology
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ABBREVIATIONS

§(§) section(s)

1 En. 1 Enoch

2 En. 2 Enoch

3 Bar. 3 Baruch (Greek Apocalypse)

AB Anchor Bible / Anchor Yale Bible


AGJU Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums


Apoc. Ab. Apocalypse of Abraham

Apoc. Zeph. Apocalypse of Zephaniah

AR Archiv für Religionswissenschaft


BETL Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium


BibIntS Biblical Interpretation Series

BLG Biblical Languages: Greek

BTB Biblical Theology Bulletin

BZNW Beiheft zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft

cf. confer, compare

CEJL Commentaries on Early Jewish Literature

ch(s). chapter(s)

CLR Cognitive Linguistics Research

CogSci Cognitive Science

col(s). column(s)

comp. compare

ConBNT Coniectanea Biblica: New Testament Series

Contr Contraversions

CTL Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics
CTSRR  College Theology Society Resources in Religion
CW  Classical World
Did.  *Didache*
diss.  dissertation
DJD  Discoveries in the Judaean Desert
DSD  *Dead Sea Discoveries*
Ebib  Études bibliques, Nouvelle série
e.g.,  *exempli gratia*, for example
esp.  especially
et al.  *et alii*, and others
f(f).  and the following one(s)
frag.  fragment
ftnt(s).  footnote(s)
HB  Hebrew Bible
Hippolytus  Hippolytus
Trad. ap.  *Traditio apostolica*
Homer  Homer
Il.  *Ilias*
HTR  *Harvard Theological Review*
HTS  Harvard Theological Studies
HUT  Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie
ICC  International Critical Commentary
JAAR  *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*
JAJSup  Journal of Ancient Judaism Supplements
JBL  *Journal of Biblical Literature*
JJS  *Journal of Jewish Studies*
JLCRS  Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion Series
Josephus  Josephus
A.J.  *Antiquitates judaicae*
B.J.  *Bellum judaicum*
Jos. Asen.  *Joseph and Aseneth*
JSJSup  Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism
JSNTSup  Journal for the Study of the New Testament: Supplement Series
JSOTSup  Journal for the Study of the Old Testament: Supplement Series
JSP  *Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha*
JSPSup  Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha: Supplement Series
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<td>Jub.</td>
<td>Jubilees</td>
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<tr>
<td>L.A.E.</td>
<td><em>Life of Adam and Eve</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>[Gk.]</td>
<td>Greek Recension (= <em>Apocalypse of Moses</em>)</td>
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<td>[Lat.]</td>
<td>Latin Recension</td>
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<tr>
<td>LHR</td>
<td>Lectures on the History of Religions</td>
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<td>LSTS</td>
<td>Library of Second Temple Studies</td>
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<td>LXX</td>
<td>Septuagint</td>
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<td>OG</td>
<td>Old Greek</td>
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<td>Θ’</td>
<td>Theodotian</td>
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<td>ms(s).</td>
<td>manuscript(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Masoretic Text</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIGTC</td>
<td>New International Greek Testament Commentary</td>
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<tr>
<td>NovT</td>
<td><em>Novum Testamentum</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>NovTSup</td>
<td>Supplements to Novum Testamentum</td>
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<td>NT</td>
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<td>NTL</td>
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<td>NTS</td>
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<td>OT</td>
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<td>p(p).</td>
<td>page(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philo</td>
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<td>Deus.</td>
<td><em>Quod Deus sit immutabilis</em></td>
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<td>Her.</td>
<td><em>Quis rerum divinarum heres sit</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Leg.</td>
<td><em>Legum allegoriae</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Opif.</td>
<td><em>De opificio mundi</em></td>
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<td>QG</td>
<td>Quaestiones et solutions in Genesin</td>
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<tr>
<td>PhoSup</td>
<td>Phoenix: Supplementary Volume</td>
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<td>Plato</td>
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<td>Phaed.</td>
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<td>Resp.</td>
<td><em>Respublica</em></td>
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<td>Tim.</td>
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<td>Plutarch</td>
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Virt. vit.  De virtute et vitio
Ps(s). Sol.  Psalm(s) of Solomon
RBL  Review of Biblical Literature
RevQ  Revue de Qumran
SBLDS  Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLSCS  Society of Biblical Literature Septuagint and Cognate Studies
SBLSymS  Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series
SBT  Studies in Biblical Theology
Sir  Ben Sira (or Sirach)
SJSHRZ  Studien zu den Jüdischen Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit
SNTSMS  Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SPBI  Scripta Pontificii Instituti Biblici
SSU  Studia Semitica Upsaliensia
STDJ  Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah
s.v.  sub verbo
trans.  translation
T. 12 Patr.  Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs
T. Levi  Testament of Levi
T. Mos.  Testament of Moses
TS  Theological Studies
VT  Vetus Testamentum
WBC  Word Biblical Commentary
Wis  Wisdom
WUNT  Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
Xenophon
Symp.  Symposium
ABSTRACT

The University of Manchester

Frederick S. Tappenden

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Embodying Resurrection: Conceptualisations of this Life and the Next in the Undisputed Paulines

2012

This study examines the centrality of the body in the apostle Paul’s resurrection ideals. It is argued that Paul holds to a non-propositional understanding of resurrection that is grounded in recurrent patterns of human embodiment. Such an assertion stands in stark contrast to the pervading scholarly consensus, which is exceedingly cognicentric in its outlook and premised on an untenable opposition of body and mind. In contrast to this consensus, which disembodies resurrection, the present study demonstrates the extent to which Paul’s resurrection ideals are somatically grounded.

Working within a theoretical matrix that integrates the study of cognition and culture, this study utilises methodologies drawn from cognitive linguistics. Three theoretical concepts are particularly elaborated in relation to Paul: (1) Mark Johnson’s understanding of image schemata, (2) George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s understanding of conceptual metaphor, and (3) Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner’s understanding of conceptual blending. These three theoretical concepts are utilised in concert with one another and thus constitute this study’s methodological apparatus.

After demonstrating the inherent cognicentrism of standard scholarly approaches (ch. 1), this study examines four aspects in which resurrection can be seen as an embodied concept. Chapter 2 establishes a conceptual framework in which resurrection texts can be both identified and interpreted. It is argued that the concept of RESURRECTION is necessarily abstract and metaphorical in nature, though fundamentally grounded in recurrent patterns of human embodiment. In ch. 3 attention is directed to Paul’s transformation metaphors and notions of both dualism and monism in the apostle’s thought. It is argued that Paul works within a dualistic framework characterised not by opposition (e.g., body vs. soul) but rather by tensive integration (e.g., the embodied soul). Building on this assertion, in ch. 4 we examine the extent to which Paul understands resurrection as a present (and not merely future) experience. Critically assessing the apostle’s eschatological outlook, this chapter argues that the somatic interior functions as the location of present resurrection. In ch. 5 this experience of present resurrection is further elaborated in light of Paul’s broader participationist ideals. It is demonstrated that Paul’s eschatology fosters a specific kind of resurrection experience in the present, one that is mapped onto the human body itself and elaborated via an in-out transformative interplay. Finally, ch. 6 offers a synthesis of the argument, scholarly contribution, and suggested avenues for further research.
DECLARATION

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Most important of all, I must thank my loving wife Danielle, whose undying support and strength has not only seen this study through but also sustained me in the process. It is my pleasure to dedicate this study to you, my dear.
I was born and raised in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, though over the past 4 years I have resided in both Vancouver (BC) and now Montreal (QC). Prior to coming to Manchester I completed a Master of Arts degree in Biblical Studies at Trinity Western University (Langley, BC) and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Religion and Theology at Taylor University College (Edmonton, AB). While at Manchester I also spent a year and a half as a visiting research student at McGill University (Montreal, QC).

My research interests are largely interdisciplinary and extend beyond Paul into the study of nascent Christianity generally. My BA senior paper focused on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, and in my MA thesis I employed collective memory theory so as to examine the development of the apostle Peter’s reputation in the Synoptics and Acts. In addition to theories of embodied cognition (employed in the present thesis) I also have enduring interests in ancient media, orality and literacy, memory and ritual, and the cognitive science of religion.

The present study began as an examination of early Christian resurrection traditions in light of collective memory theory. However, the need to more adequately ground social memory within human cognition ultimately led me (albeit indirectly) to cognitive linguistics and an assessment of Paul’s resurrection ideals specifically. My broader interests still endure, however, and my next research project will build upon the present thesis by examining the negotiation of Paul’s resurrection ideals in a selection of his early interpreters. Pending funding, this study will be conducted at McGill University and will draw on recent advancements in the cognitive science of religion.
Chapter 1

The Disembodiment of Resurrection:
Literature Review, Problem Definition, and the Integration of Cognition and Culture

1.1 Introduction

One of the most distinct aspects of the apostle Paul’s writings is the overt focus that is placed on the body.¹ This theme finds particular expression in Paul’s resurrection ideals,² as the apostle looks toward a future embodied existence that is both patterned on and transformatively intertwined with Christ’s risen body (e.g., Rom 8.23; 1 Cor 15.35-57; 2 Cor 5.1-5; Phil 3.21). In this way, we can say that Paul’s resurrection ideals are *topically* somatic – that is, Paul focuses on the body as the *state* or *mode* of post-mortem existence. In a much more immediate sense, however, we can also say that Paul’s resurrection ideals are *locationally* somatic. This is particularly evident in the apostle’s focus on transformation as part of the resurrection experience. In Paul’s view, transformation is not only a future but also a present experience (e.g., comp. 2 Cor 3.18 with 5.1-5). Believers are variously described as currently dying and (in some sense) rising with Christ (e.g., Rom 6.1-11; Phil 3.10-11; 2 Cor 4.7-18), and Paul locates this death and life pattern *in* believers’ bodies – thus 2 Cor 4.10, “[we are] always carrying the death of Jesus in the body so that the life of Jesus might also be revealed in our

¹ See, for example, John Robinson’s assertion that one can easily make a case for the concept of the body as the “keystone of Paul’s theology;” Robinson continues, “to trace the subtle links and interactions between the different senses of this word σώματι is to grasp the thread that leads through the maze of Pauline thought” (John A. T. Robinson, *The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology* [SBT 5; London: SCM Press, 1952], 9; see also 48). More recently, Troels Engberg-Pedersen has recounted a comment by Wayne Meeks: “I cannot think of anybody in antiquity who spoke so much about the body as Paul did” (Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 3).

² The present study uses the term “ideals” (as in, “Paul’s resurrection ideals”) so as to denote what is otherwise referred to as “theology.” Ideals is preferred to theology in as much as the latter has come to imply a propositional and exceedingly noetic system of thought. When seen in this view, the term theology is connotative of a problematic understanding of human reason (see §1.2). Accordingly, the term “ideals” is adopted because it implies not only Paul’s rational capabilities but also his hopes and expectations; that is to say, though “ideals” might be a more fuzzy term, it points to a more holistic and integrative conception of Paul’s thinking.
bodies.” Taking these two aspects together, Paul understands resurrection not only as a *topical* issue that looks ahead to a future embodied existence but also as a *locative* issue that understands transformation as an experience that is currently happening in the body itself.

The somatic focus of Paul’s resurrection ideals has not gone unnoticed in Pauline interpretation, though this balance between *topical* and *locative* foci is not always maintained. As early as the 2nd/3rd centuries the issue of bodily resurrection became an increasingly divisive topic among Christians, though focus shifted to the much more specific claim of a future resurrection of the flesh. From the patristic period through the medieval ages, much theological discussion continued to stress the fleshly or material nature of resurrection vis-à-vis a more spiritual or immaterial understanding. In modern scholarship, while it is widely acknowledged that “body” functions as a more general category in Paul’s thought (i.e., bodily does not necessarily imply fleshly), focus has remained largely on the eschatological nature of resurrection. That is to say, emphasis is given to the *topical* rather than *locative* nature of Paul’s ideals, focusing specifically on resurrection as a literal, post-mortem event. As we will see, such a temporal focus produces an understanding of resurrection as a theological proposition that Paul subscribes to rather than a somatic process that Paul engages in. By stressing the *topical* rather than *locative* importance of the body, modern treatments have produced an ironically *disembodied* view of Paul’s resurrection ideals.

The following study will address this problem of disembodiment in detail.

Drawing on theories of embodied cognition as developed within cognitive linguistics, it

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will be argued that Paul’s resurrection ideals are non-propositional in nature and fundamentally grounded in recurrent patterns of human embodiment. Pointing specifically to the somatic foundations of Paul’s thought, this study will demonstrate that resurrection is not a theological proposition but rather a metaphor that Paul and his communities live by.\(^5\) We will see that this is true for both the *topical* and *locative* aspects of Paul’s resurrection ideals, both of which are thoroughly *embodied*.

1.2 Theoretical Orientation: On Cognicentrism and Mind–Body Dualism

We begin by introducing a concept that, when the relevant scholarly literature is viewed in its light, more clearly illuminates the problem at hand. The concept in question is *cognicentrism*, which (to this study’s knowledge) was first employed by Michael Harner.\(^6\) For Harner, cognicentrism is the analogue of ethnocentrism, the latter being concerned with the “narrowness of someone’s *cultural* experience” and the former with the “narrowness of someone’s *conscious* experience.”\(^7\) At issue for Harner is the legitimisation of non-scientific modes of knowing, specifically with respect to shamanic practices and altered states of consciousness.\(^8\) In Pauline studies, Colleen Shantz has recently followed Harner’s cognicentric critique in her recent assessment of religious experience in Paul.\(^9\) Shantz helpfully clarifies the term as follows:

> The bias of cognicentrism is rooted in the constructs of scientific enlightenment, especially the idea of objective truth as the product of critical thinking stripped of personal investment. A cognicentric stance purports to arbitrate what counts as acceptable knowledge as well as what counts as acceptable ways of coming to know.\(^10\)

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\(^5\) To adapt the language of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).


\(^7\) Harner, *Shaman*, xx (emphasis original).

\(^8\) Harner distinguishes between what he calls Ordinary States of Consciousness (OSC) and Shamanic States of Consciousness (SSC), both of which must be recognised as fundamentally real to the participants in Shamanic contexts (Harner, *Shaman*, xix). Thus Harner: “‘Fantasy’ can be said to be a term applied by a person in the OSC to what is experienced in the SSC. Conversely, a person in the SSC may perceive the experiences of the OSC to be illusory in SSC terms. … The myth of the SSC is ordinary reality; and the myth of the OSC is nonordinary reality” (Harner, *Shaman*, xix-xx).


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Taken in this direction, cognicentrism is not only about legitimating altered states of consciousness, but more fundamentally about an epistemological stance (indeed, bias) that permeates the modern academy more broadly. Within biblical studies, this aligns with Pieter Craffert’s call for ontological pluralism in historical methodology, or Troels Engberg-Pedersen’s recent insistence that much of Paul’s theology be understood not metaphorically or cognitively (as he puts it) but rather as “non-metaphorical, concrete and basically physical” (a position that we will critically engage – §1.3.1).

Building upon these positions, the present study uses the term cognicentrism to denote a deep-seated and persistent Enlightenment bias whereby theology (and indeed human cognition more generally) is understood as propositional in nature. In this tradition, theological concepts such as resurrection are understood as noetic abstractions; they are mental-ascents that are upheld as objective and their truth claim exists independent of space, time, culture, and even humanity itself. In this light, cognicentrism refers to the preference given to the noetic at the expense of the somatic. The term cognicentrism, therefore, denotes the disembodiment of knowledge.

At the heart of this cognicentric bias is the Cartesian separation of mind and body whereby human cognition (i.e., rationality) is isolated from the physical matter of the natural world (i.e., the human body). This anthropological dualism, which has persisted in the academy since the enlightenment, undergirds the traditional Objectivist paradigm and also gives rise to a number of opposing Subjectivist paradigms (e.g., post-structuralism, strong social constructivism). On the one side, Truth is propositional,
absolute, literal, and fits the world as is; on the other, *truth* is contextual, relative, metaphorical, and socially constructed.\(^\text{14}\) The former assumes a *ghost in the machine* that can attain a God’s-eye perspective, while the latter stresses the *blank slate* of human nature, which asserts “we are nothing until we are inscribed by the discourse into which we are socialized.”\(^\text{15}\) For both camps, however, the separation of mind and body is a central tenet, producing fantasies of epistemological objectivity (on the one side) and presuming a fundamental disconnect between cognition and biological embeddedness (on the other).\(^\text{16}\) We are of course speaking of the strong expressions of these epistemological camps, and while varying shades of both extremes exist in the academy today, Cartesian mind-body dualism permeates scholastic agendas.\(^\text{17}\)

Over the last half century, a growing body of interdisciplinary academic literature categorised under the label Cognitive Science has emerged which seeks to address (among other things) questions such as *how is human thought produced, how does meaning emerge from such thought, and how are such thoughts then reproduced.*\(^\text{18}\) Edward Slingerland, for instance, has argued that the divide between the natural and human sciences in the modern university has led to a disembodied conceptualisation of human culture.\(^\text{19}\) In response to this institutionalised Cartesian dualism, Slingerland contends:

\(^{14}\) Cf., e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 186-89.

\(^{15}\) Edward Slingerland, *What Science Offers the Humanities: Integrating Body and Culture* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 15. Slingerland continues by noting that, in this view, it is taken as axiomatic that “language and/or culture [go] *all the way down*” (emphasis original).

\(^{16}\) On this latter point, while the Subjectivist position asserts the formative nature of linguistic and cultural embeddedness, what is at issue in this critique is the assertion that there is “nothing significant about the way in which we think or act [that] is a direct result of our biological endowment” (Slingerland, *What Science Offers the Humanities*, 15). That is to say, in this view the human mind is fundamentally disembodied in as much as the *body* plays no determinative role in the development of reason and consciousness.

\(^{17}\) For an excellent overview and critique of both the Objectivist and Subjectivist paradigms in light of cognitive science, see Slingerland, *What Science Offers the Humanities*, esp. 31-147.


the manner in which we engage in the study of consciousness and its products – that is, the traditional domain of the humanities – should ... be brought into coordination with the manner in which we study less complex (or differently complex) material structures, while never losing sight of the strange and wonderful emergent properties that consciousness brings with it.\textsuperscript{20}

Slingerland is here advocating what he and others have called the vertical integration of body and culture, or more specifically, \textit{cognition and culture}.\textsuperscript{21} By vertical integration, this theoretical agenda envisions a single explanatory chain (which ascends vertically from the natural sciences to the humanities) where “different levels of explanation can, and must, coexist with one another.”\textsuperscript{22} In contrast to the traditional Objectivist view whereby consciousness is seen as the ghost in the machine, and critiquing the Subjectivist view whereby consciousness is nothing more than a culturally inscribed blank slate, Mark Johnson has rightly asserted, “there is a growing mountain of empirical evidence from the cognitive sciences that there can be no thought without a brain in a body in an environment.”\textsuperscript{23} Though seemingly trivial, this assertion stands in stark tension with the strong body-mind dualism that dominates the Western philosophical tradition.\textsuperscript{24}

It is this vertical integration of cognition and culture that will serve as the theoretical apparatus within which the present study is conducted. We take it as axiomatic that \textit{cognition} (understood as a \textit{body-brain complex}) and \textit{culture} (understood to emerge from that \textit{body-brain complex}) must be integrated with one another such that the two are studied interdependently. The present study will achieve such vertical integration by employing methodologies developed in cognitive linguistics. We will

\textsuperscript{20} Slingerland, \textit{What Science Offers the Humanities}, 10-11.
\textsuperscript{22} Slingerland, “Who’s Afraid of Reductionism?,” 384.
\textsuperscript{24} Though the integration of cognition and culture may seem reductive to some, we follow Slingerland in insisting on the importance of different (though integrated) levels of explanation. That is to say, while cognitive science may enable \textit{explanation} at some levels, it does not enable \textit{explanation} at all levels. Herein lies the value of the vertical integration paradigm; by studying human culture in light of both cognitive and socio-cultural processes, a rightly elaborate and heuristic theoretical foundation is envisaged. To this end, if we are to be reductive, our goal is “productive, explanatory reductionism [and not] crudely eliminative reductionism” (Slingerland, “Who’s Afraid of Reductionism?,” 387).
examine these in more detail below (see §1.4); for now we can insist that the aforementioned notion of cognicentrism is symptomatic of the separation of mind and body (i.e., the disembodiment of the mind). With respect to Paul, cognicentrism results in the abstraction of the apostle’s resurrection ideals as being propositional and thus lacking concrete grounding within human perception.

1.3 Literature Review and Problem Definition

With this broader theoretical framework in mind, we can now turn our attention to the relevant scholarly literature on Paul’s resurrection ideals. We will specifically focus on three issues that are germane to the topic: the problem of identifying resurrection (§1.3.1), the nature of dualism and monism in Paul’s thought (§1.3.2), and finally the relationship between Paul’s participationist and resurrection ideals (§1.3.3). As we will see, scholarship on these issues suffers from the fundamental problem of cognicentrism just outlined.

1.3.1 The Problem of Identifying Resurrection

A methodological problem in any study of resurrection belief in both Paul and second temple Judaism generally is the fact that, in many instances, it is not entirely clear how one is to either discern and/or demarcate what constitutes a resurrection text. To be sure, certain passages stand out as prime examples (e.g., Dan 12.1-3; 1 Thess 4.13-18; 1 Cor 15), though beyond these one can point to several pericopes that may or may not refer to resurrection (e.g., the Qumran sectarian literature; Rom 6.1-11). We will have occasion to explore this issue in depth in ch. 2, though for now it will suffice to show that at the heart of these concerns stands the question: how does one identify the idea or concept of resurrection within a given text? Scholars have proposed various solutions to this problem; we examine three.

One common solution is to isolate individual lexemes and common resurrection vocabulary. In this approach, the identification of resurrection is located at the semantic
level and limited by a fixed set of lexical signs. While this approach has been conducted in both Hebrew\(^{25}\) and Greek,\(^{26}\) it fails to account for the contextual nature of resurrection descriptions; that is to say, identification of resurrection has much to do with literary contexts and the frames employed in rendering such lexemes meaningful.\(^{27}\)

Nonetheless, this approach persists in contemporary scholarship.\(^{28}\)

A second approach is to reduce the richness of resurrection traditions to uniformity at the literary level. One way that this has been achieved is by distinguishing that which is \textit{literally} resurrection from that which is \textit{metaphorically} resurrection.

Consider N. T. Wright’s statement:

\begin{quote}
\text{YHWH’s answer to his people’s exile would be, \textit{metaphorically}, life from the dead (Isaiah 26, Ezek 37); YHWH’s answer to his people’s martyrdom would be, \textit{literally}, life from the dead (Dan 12).}\(^{29}\)
\end{quote}

Though Wright elsewhere suggests that a hard distinction should not be made between differing thematic contexts,\(^{30}\) the parsing of the period literature into \textit{literal} and \textit{metaphorical} categories creates an ontological distinction between that which is \textit{really} resurrection and that which is \textit{secondarily} resurrection.\(^{31}\) Accordingly, \textit{literal}

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\(^{26}\) Jerzy Chmiel builds on Sawyer’s work; based on LXX to MT translation equivalents he proposes a reduction of the five Hebrew terms down to two Greek terms – \textit{εγέρθη} and \textit{ἀναστήσατε} (Jerzy Chmiel, “Semantics of the Resurrection,” in \textit{Studia Biblica 1978: I. Papers on Old Testament and Related Themes} [ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone; JSOTSup 11; Sheffield: Dept. of Biblical Studies, University of Sheffield, 1979], 59-64).

\(^{27}\) Cf. James H. Charlesworth, who argues “the concept of resurrection … can be detected only by examining exegetically a cluster of words in a particular context” (James H. Charlesworth, “Prolegomenous Reflections Toward a Taxonomy of Resurrection Texts [1QH, 1En, 4Q521, Paul, Luke, the Fourth Gospel, and Psalm 30]” in \textit{The Changing Face of Judaism, Christianity, and Other Greco-Roman Religions in Antiquity} [eds. Ian H. Henderson and Gerbern S. Oegema; SJSHRZ 2; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2006], 237-64 [p. 238]).


\(^{29}\) N. T. Wright, \textit{The Resurrection of the Son of God} (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 127 (emphasis added).

\(^{30}\) The point is made in addressing what he refers to as the fallacious either/or distinction between individual resurrection and national restoration (Wright, \textit{Resurrection}, 116).

\(^{31}\) Similar language is used by other scholars too. Collins notes that Ezek 37 and Hos 6:2 speak metaphorically of resurrection while Dan 12 refers to “actual resurrection” (John J. Collins, \textit{Daniel: A
resurrection is often reduced to recurrent theological propositions such as post-mortem corporeality, while metaphorical resurrection is seen merely as a literary device that is (at best) only an indirect description of what a given author wishes to say (potentially interchangeable with other metaphors).

The problem becomes acute when one considers Paul’s resurrection ideals. On this point we can again turn to Wright, who insists that Paul understands resurrection as both a future literal event and a present metaphorical event such that the future literal event metaphorically “colour[s] and [gives] shape to present Christian living.”32 In addition to Wright, similar descriptions can be found in Alexander J. M. Wedderburn and Joost Holleman.33 As the present study will demonstrate, such parsing is both theoretically problematic and theologically imprecise; in short, by contrasting literal and metaphorical, Wright’s present metaphorical resurrection is understood as a disembodied (or cognicentric) concept that is propositional in nature. This is clearly seen in Wright’s insistence that present resurrection is a “worldview [that] Paul developed and did his best to both teach and to embody.”34 Wright has here put the proverbial cart before the horse, understanding present resurrection as an external and independent proposition that Paul (rationally) develops and conceptually applies to life

32 Wright, Resurrection, 210, comp. pp. 371 and 373.
33 Wedderburn argues for an “obstinate corporeality and physicality about the language of resurrection … which only gradually and under considerable pressure yielded to attempts to introduce a figurative, non-corporeal and non-physical sense” (Wedderburn, Baptism and Resurrection, 231, though see pp. 164-232 generally). Wedderburn’s cognicentrism is explicit here, as he asserts that only under later “intellectual and spiritual” pressures did resurrection come to be used metaphorically (p. 84). Similarly, Hollemann insists the “metaphor” of presently dying and rising with Christ (e.g., through baptism and suffering) “should be distinguished from … the eschatological resurrection” (Holleman, Resurrection and Parousia, 198, though see pp. 188-98 generally).
34 Wright, Resurrection, 371. To be certain, Wright comes close to grounding Paul’s descriptions when he admits that both metaphorical and literal descriptions have “concrete referents” (Wright, Resurrection, 371), though he has inverted the conceptual grounding by insisting that resurrection is a proposition that must then be applied to one’s life.
in Christ. As we will see, Paul understands resurrection as thoroughly embodied in and emerging organically from present Christian experience. For Paul, the perception that resurrection has already begun is as important as the claim that it will fully happen in the future, and we will see that both are metaphorical in an important respect.

It is in response to views such as Wright’s that Troels Engberg-Pedersen has recently stressed the concrete and physicalist nature of Paul’s language. Engberg-Pedersen’s main interest is Pauline pneumatology, though with respect to resurrection he makes striking statements such as “Christ-believers’ bodies of flesh and blood literally die – or atrophy – while they are living here on earth to become fit for the final transformation” (speaking of 2 Cor 4.16); and later he offers the following translation of Rom 8.17: “we [literally] co-suffer (with him) in order that we may also become [literally] co-glorified (with him).” In these ways, Engberg-Pedersen views Paul’s worldview as “materialistic, concrete, and tangible” rather than “idealistic,” and in this way he rightly seeks to move past the cognicentrism of exegetes such as Wright. Where Engberg-Pedersen errs, however, is in the consistent pitting of literal and metaphorical against one another, thus implying that metaphor has no place in a concrete, tangible, or physicalist understanding of Paul. Given that the literal vs. metaphorical dichotomy functions as Engberg-Pedersen’s methodological departure point, one cannot help but wonder if such linguistic woodenness is required. That is to say, must Paul be taken literally to be taken seriously?

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35 Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 45 (emphasis added).
36 Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 53; the citation is reproduced exactly as is from Engberg-Pedersen, and thus all emphases and bracketed content (both square and curved brackets) are original.
37 Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 19.
38 This dichotomy pervades the book, even being introduced in the first several pages as the primary topic that is at issue (Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 1-2, 51-55, 82-83, 147-153, 173-75).
39 Thus Engberg-Pedersen admits that he “always start[s] out from the literal interpretation,” to which he further insists, it is “generally advisable as a methodological principle to adopt this line of interpretation since our own intuitive penchant for the metaphorical reading makes us less susceptible to finding traces of the literal one that may point to Paul’s own understanding” (Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 83). Accordingly, the language of literal, concrete, and tangible pervades his analysis (see, e.g., pp. 41, 44, 48, 51, 52, 58, 69, 82, 83, 93, and 150).
A better way forward can be found in the theory of conceptual metaphor that has been developed primarily in the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, and which we will employ in this study.\(^{40}\) It is a striking feature of human language that metaphor pervades discourse, but even more striking that language users are able to, as Steven Pinker notes, “effortlessly transcend the metaphors implicit in their language.” Pinker continues,

> This implies that speakers have the means to entertain the underlying concepts: the abstract idea of an approach to a climax, not the concrete idea of the head of a pimple [as in, coming to a head]; the abstract idea of a profusion of problems, not the concrete idea of a can of worms.\(^{41}\)

For Lakoff and Johnson, metaphor is not a poetic device that can be reduced to literal expressions (as asserted by Objectivists),\(^{42}\) nor is it merely a linguistic phenomenon that underscores the disconnect of language and reality (as asserted by Subjectivists).\(^{43}\) Metaphor is, rather, a central aspect of human cognition. Lakoff and Johnson focus on what they term conceptual metaphors, which are grounded in patterns of human embodiment and are structured in relation to recurrent image schemata. We will have occasion to return to this (and other) theoretical concepts below (§1.4); for now it will suffice to note that within the theory of metaphor advanced here, descriptors such as \textit{literal} and \textit{metaphorical} are in need of revised definition. As we will see, the vast majority of human language is metaphorical in nature, and while this does not preclude \textit{literal} linguistic descriptions, \textit{metaphor} functions as the norm.\(^{44}\) When viewed in this


\(^{41}\) Steven Pinker, \textit{The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature} (New York: Viking, 2007), 248.

\(^{42}\) Indeed, for Objectivists, metaphor is essentially superfluous and not easily accounted for within a theoretical model where language fits the world as it is (cf. Slingerland, \textit{What Science Offers the Humanities}, 161-62).

\(^{43}\) Subjectivists rightly identify the pervasive nature of metaphor in all human communication (i.e., not just poetry but discourse generally), but they understand metaphor as a “[creative] reference connected not to a real world of bodies and things, but only to the free movement of the hermeneutic Geist or Dasein” (Slingerland, \textit{What Science Offers the Humanities}, 161).

\(^{44}\) In delineating literal and metaphorical from one another, Lakoff suggests: “… there is nonetheless an extensive range of nonmetaphorical. Thus, a sentence like ‘The balloon went up’ is not metaphorical, nor is the old philosopher’s favorite ‘The cat is on the mat.’ But as soon as one gets away
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theoretical apparatus, Wright and Engberg-Pedersen represent opposing views on the same cognitcentric spectrum, with the former presuming a fundamental disconnect between language and experience while the latter strenuously asserts that that which is real must be literal and cannot be metaphorical.\(^{45}\)

Returning to the question at hand, the parsing of resurrection into both literal and metaphorical descriptions is furthermore problematic in that it presumes the existence of a singular and unified conception at the literary level (that is, the identification of what is literally resurrection). By seeking unity through narrowly identified motifs (e.g., post-mortem corporality), such treatments sacrifice cultural nuance at the altar of homogeneity. Standing in direct contrast is the equally problematic tendency to overly fragment notions of resurrection. Such is the approach taken in a recent essay by James Charlesworth, where he sets out a preliminary taxonomy of resurrection texts.\(^{46}\) Charlesworth identifies 16 categories that classify the concept of resurrection, some of which are complementary while others are “mutually exclusive.”\(^{47}\) Where Charlesworth’s treatment falls short is not his recognition of variety, but rather his failure to offer a framework by which to tie these various categories together. For instance, several of Charlesworth’s categories concern motifs of redemption and vindication, but what have these to do with other categories such as spiritual awakening or the raising an apocalyptist to heaven?\(^{48}\) That Charlesworth offers no such framework from concrete physical experiences and starts talking about abstractions or emotions, metaphorical understanding is the norm” (George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” in *Metaphor and Thought* [ed. Andrew Ortony; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 202-51 [p. 205]).\(^{45}\) In this light, Wright is seen to actually be more Subjectivist in nature (despite his critical realist stance) while Engberg-Pedersen is shockingly more Objectivist. Of note, Wright shows no awareness of contemporary advancements in metaphor theory, and while Engberg-Pedersen is aware of Lakoff and Johnson, his cursory reference to their work evinces a fundamental misperception (Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “The Construction of Religious Experience in Paul,” in *Experiencia, Volume 1: Inquiry into Religious Experience in Early Judaism and Early Christianity* [eds. Frances Flannery, Colleen Shantz and Rodney A. Werline; SBLSymS 40; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008], 147-57 [p. 153, ftnt. 26]).\(^{46}\)

\(^{46}\) Charlesworth, “Taxonomy,” 237-64.

\(^{47}\) Charlesworth, “Taxonomy,” 260.

\(^{48}\) The closest that Charlesworth comes to offering such a unifying framework can be found at the conclusions of his article where he offers the single maxim: “the varieties and differing taxonomies of resurrection beliefs represent not a system but an expression of the common human hope that God will have the last word and the future of the righteous will be blessed” (Charlesworth, “Taxonomy,” 261).
ironically renders his taxonomy impotent in actually determining what constitutes a resurrection text.

It is perhaps because such an overarching framework might be perceived as reductive that Charlesworth is so silent on the issue. Here Charlesworth’s (implicit) Subjectivist commitments are laid bare, and his analysis suffers accordingly. Taking Charlesworth’s taxonomic fracturing alongside the lexical-semantic approach and the literal/metaphorical dichotomy noted above, it becomes clear that a more precise and holistic approach is needed, one that moves past the cognicentrism inherent in these various positions and thus seeks a more unified and integrative framework. While identifying such a framework is in some sense reductive, it is not to be shrunken away from; if we are going to move forward we need to be reductive in a good way, looking deeper than lexical signs and literary motifs to instead uncover recurrent conceptual structures.49 Such will be the focus of ch. 2, where cognitive linguistic analyses will be applied to a selection of second temple Jewish and Pauline texts. As we will see, resurrection is fundamentally an abstract domain of human thought, one that is necessarily metaphorical and structured in relation to more concrete and familiar human experiences. In so doing we will move beyond the approaches critiqued here by offering an explanatory framework that illuminates why one reader’s expectation of post-mortem recompense may be another’s hope of national restoration.

1.3.2 In What Sense Dualism, and is Monism the Only Alternative?

As we have asserted above, the present study eschews dualistic notions of the human self whereby mind and body are disconnected and held in strong opposition. That such an assertion is germane to our theoretical commitments should not, however, preclude the possibility that Paul may or may not function with a particular set of dualistic

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49 On reductionism, see fn. 24 in this chapter.
assumptions. In the history of Pauline scholarship, however, the dualistic commitments of many exegetes have often unduly influenced Pauline interpretation. Descriptions of Paul’s resurrection ideals have not escaped this influence, not because the concept of resurrection itself is understood dualistically (per se), but rather because resurrection is wrapped-up part-in-parcel with many other topics that have been especially susceptible to dualistic interpretation. To speak of resurrection is to also touch on issues of Jewish apocalyptic and anthropology, both of which are scholarly hot beds of dualistic debates.

Before turning to the relevant scholarly literature, it will be helpful to more clearly demarcate what we mean by dualism, a term that Philip Alexander has correctly remarked is unfortunately “‘fuzzy’ and hard to define, but [which] no one seems able totally to avoid or to replace with a less problematic substitute.” From our theoretical perspective, there is good reason to suspect that this inability is a by-product of human embodiment. There is a growing body of cognitive science literature that suggests dualistic modes of thought universally pervade human consciousness. While it is well known that Western philosophy is steeped in dualistic assertions, Edward Slingerland and Maciej Chudek have recently demonstrated the presence of folk mind-body dualism in pre-Qin China (pre-221 B.C.E.). At issue here is not the formal dualism of the West, but rather a more folk understanding of dualism as a characteristic aspect of human consciousness that arises organically from the nature of human embodiment.52

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51 Edward Slingerland and Maciej Chudek, “The Prevalence of Mind-Body Dualism in Early China,” CogSci 35 (2011): 997-1007. Elsewhere, Slingerland rightly insists, “when the ‘dualistic West’ is contrasted with other, presumably more holistic, cultures, what is really being picked out is the singular intensity with which mind-body dualism has been articulated” (Slingerland, What Science Offers the Humanities, 3).

52 This assertion will become clearer in chs. 3 and 4 (esp §§3.2.3 and 4.2). Related to this is the growing body of evidence that posits the naturalness of “theory of mind” (i.e., folk understandings that, from a very early age, cause human beings to distinguish between animate and inanimate things), thus suggesting that humans are “born to be dualists” (Slingerland, What Science Offers the Humanities, 26). While some take this in a strong, Cartesian sense (e.g., Paul Bloom, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes us Human [New York: Basic Books, 2004]), Slingerland and Chudek’s more nuanced and historically informed distinction between “strong folk dualism” and “weak
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In light of this (seemingly) universal tendency we must rightly enquire into the nature of dualistic constructions in Paul. If we (rightly) reject Cartesian dualism (body vs. mind) on anachronistic grounds,® can Paul be seen to function with notions of cosmic dualism (heaven vs. earth), temporal dualism (now vs. then), ethical dualism (good vs. evil), social dualism (us vs. them), anthropological dualism (body vs. soul), material dualism (matter vs. non-matter), or even cultural dualism (e.g., Jewish vs. Greek). Much of the following chapters will explore these (potential) dimensions of Paul’s thought, always working with a definition of dualism as a conceptual framework involving two different values that stand in relation to one another, and where that relationship is characterised by either opposition or interrelation. In this way, the present study understands dualism in a general sense, and while some might prefer to distinguish dualism from duality, our definition transcends such distinctions.® With this definition in mind, we can now examine the scholarly literature on Paul’s apocalyptic orientation and his anthropological presuppositions as they relate to his resurrection ideals; we examine both in turn.

One of the most important contexts in which Paul must be read is that of Jewish apocalyptic, which arguably forms the cradle in which the apostle’s resurrection ideals were nursed. While Albert Schweitzer directed modern Pauline scholarship toward the context of Jewish apocalyptic, it was Ernst Käsemann who became the most influential

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® This has been expressly argued by Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 3-37. Martin rightly notes, “all the Cartesian oppositions – matter versus nonmatter, physical versus spiritual, corporeal (or physical) versus psychological, nature versus supernature – are misleading when retrojected into ancient language” (p. 15 [emphasis original]).

® In this view, dualism is narrowly defined as a radical and ontological break between opposing concepts/forces, whereas duality is understood as a weaker and more attenuated term whereby a broad range of distinctions stand in varying degrees of opposition (cf. N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992], 252-56).

® Indeed, our definition’s built-in characterisation of either opposition or interrelation enables both strong and weak expression of dualism.

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20th century proponent of Paul’s apocalypticism. For both Schweitzer and Käsemann, apocalyptic essentially means *eschatological*, and it is marked by a strongly demarcated set of dualistic propositions. Käsemann, for instance, insists that humanity always exists in relation to the cosmos, which is to say that Man stands in relation to one of two opposing cosmic powers (either God/Christ or Sin). Central to Käsemann’s thesis is the positing of a fundamental eschatological break between the two aeonic spheres of human existence; one that is earthly, conditioned by the flesh and characterised by disobedience, the other that is heavenly, conditioned by the πνεῦμα and characterised by obedience. Within this framework, human existence is essentially passive and always understood vis-à-vis external cosmic lordship. Käsemann speaks, for example, of the fleshly man as “demonically enslaved” and under “alien rule” to the cosmic power of Sin, which is the “opponent” of God. Käsemann’s apocalyptic dualism is at its strongest here, and while he (rightly) understands the human body as inextricably tied to the cosmos, such dualistic commitments fight against and ultimately preclude his one-world ideals. This can be clearly seen with respect to his insistence that the hallmark

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58 That is, “there is no such thing as man [sic] without his particular and respective world” (Ernst Käsemann, “On Paul’s Anthropology,” in *Perspectives on Paul* [trans. Margaret Kohl; Philadelphia: Føtress Press, 1971], 1-31 [p. 27]). Käsemann is here responding to Bultmann’s existential analysis whereby the individual believer stands in relation to him/herself.

59 For example, the key eschatological distinction for Käsemann is the realm within which humanity exists: thus, the human being “is qualified by [its] present Lord, by [its] present allegiance, because the power of the cosmos in the σάρξ and the power of Christ in the πνεῦμα are fighting over [the human] body” (Ernst Käsemann, “The Pauline Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper,” in *Essays on New Testament Themes* [trans. W.J. Montague; London: SCM Press, 1964], 108-35 [p. 133]).

60 All quotes are made with respect to Rom 7.14-25 and are found in Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans* (trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1980), 204, 208, and 205 (respectively).

61 Thus Käsemann, “corporeality is standing in a world for which different forces contend and in whose conflict each individual is caught up, belonging to one lord or the other and representing this lord both actively and passively, … it is clear that we are never autonomous, but always participate in a definite world and stand under lordship” (Käsemann, *Romans*, 176). Our analysis will seek to retain this cosmo-somatic interrelation by specifically eschewing the dualistic particulars that Käsemann took for granted.
of Paul’s resurrection ideals is the radical break between the old and the new; that is, “discontinuity is the mark of both existence and history.”

The influence that Käsemann has exerted on NT scholarship cannot be overemphasised, and it has proven particularly formative in many discussions of resurrection belief in Paul. Martinus de Boer, for instance, presumes this dualistic portrayal of Jewish apocalyptic though takes issue with Käsemann’s description of death as a cosmic power of the old aeon that still persists. Insisting that death “marks ‘this age’ as radically discontinuous from ‘the age to come,’” and further that Paul understands death as a “hypostatized … quasi-angelic … power,” de Boer argues that Death has been brought under the cosmic lordship of Christ in as much as “the gospel … has unmasked the fact that behind the universal human reality of physical dying there is an inimical, cosmological power at work, a power of ‘this age’ that as such is doomed for destruction.” Here and throughout de Boer’s study dualistic language abounds, as opposition is understood as the taken-for-granted axiom of Paul’s resurrection ideals.

De Boer is to be commended in that he at least recognises that “apocalyptic eschatology” is, as he says, a “construct of scholars.” As such, this vision of Jewish apocalyptic must be susceptible to critique, and Crispin Fletcher-Louis has recently

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63 Käsemann, “Paul’s Anthropology,” 9. Käsemann goes on to insist that continuity between the earthly and risen states “only results from the divine faithfulness.”
64 See esp. Robert C. Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology (BZNW 32; Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1967). It should be noted that Tannehill studied briefly with Käsemann in Tübingen prior to the completion of this monograph (see Preface).
66 Boer, Defeat of Death, 88.
67 Boer, Defeat of Death, 139, comp. pp. 21-23.
68 Boer, Defeat of Death, 138.
69 See, e.g., de Boer’s conclusion, which includes some of his most strikingly dualistic expressions including the strong oppositions of the two ages, descriptions of division between the “human world and God,” and the description of the present age as “the all embracing epoch or sphere of death, viz., the epoch or sphere in which human beings are separated or excluded from the divine presence and life” (Boer, Defeat of Death, 181).
70 Boer, Defeat of Death, 7.
offered such a treatment. Fletcher-Louis notes that such dualism found particularly strong articulation in German scholarship. For example, Philipp Vielhauer (and Georg Strecker) argue(s) that dualism is “the essential feature of Apocalyptic.” Such emphases are less pronounced in the Anglo-American tradition, though they still persist. John Collins, for instance, uses the language of *transcendence* rather than *dualism*; he stresses the revelatory nature of the apocalyptic genre as being concerned with a “transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another, supernatural world.” Though Collins’ definition rightly stresses both verticality (cosmological) and horizontality (temporal), Fletcher-Louis correctly notes that this emphasis on *transcendence* is not counterbalanced by any significant treatment or consideration of a corresponding *imminence* (thus retaining a dualistic quality). More preferable is the work of Christopher Rowland, who also stresses both vertical and horizontal axes but does so within a more fully integrated system. For Rowland the key feature of apocalyptic is its “revelation of the divine mysteries through a vision or some other form of immediate disclosure.” Formulated in this way, dualism is not an essential feature of Jewish apocalyptic, even though some apocalypses may stress concepts or contain language that lean in such directions. This is achieved, as Fletcher-Louis rightly notes, by removing eschatology as the centrepiece of apocalyptic, thus problematising de Boer’s narrowly

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74 Fletcher-Louis, “Jewish Apocalyptic,” 2.1577-88, see esp. p. 2.1586.


76 That is to say, Rowland understands the apocalypses as concerning both eschatology and history (thus, the horizontal axis); both the transcendent heavenly realm and also the purposes of God here on earth (thus, the vertical axis – cf. Rowland, *Open Heaven*, 73-189).

77 Rowland, *Open Heaven*, 70.
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defined scholarly construct and displacing many of the traditional dualism that
Käsemann (and others) take for granted. In this light, there is a renewed need to assess
Paul’s resurrection ideals within the context of a non-dualistic apocalyptic framework;
the present study will address this issue in chs. 3-4.

As noted above, Käsemann understands cosmology and anthropology as
inextricable, and while he views the former as fundamentally dualistic, his
anthropological commitments are much more monistic. That is to say, Paul envisions
the “whole man [sic]” rather than any kind of partitive anthropology, and on this point
Käsemann is in general agreement with the scholarly consensus of his day.

Käsemann’s Doktorvater Rudolf Bultmann also argued for anthropological holism in
Paul, though his understanding of such a concept differed significantly. Bultmann
understood Paul’s use of σῶμα as referring to the individual believer who exists as a
unified being in relationship to him/herself, thus able to distinguish self (the “I”) from
self (the “not-I”). In place of a partitive body-soul dualism (really antithesis or
opposition), Bultmann instead upholds Man as a “living unity” that exists in a constant
state of introspective tension. As a neutral category, σῶμα can be used by Paul to
refer either to the “the self under the rule of sarx” (as in Rom 6.12; 7.24) or the self
under the rule of the πνεύμα; i.e., the “Spirit-ruled soma.” Bultmann’s real
distinction, however, is not between two soma-ruling powers, but rather the introspective
tension between “I” and “not-I.”

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78 In Käsemann’s own words, “anthropology is cosmology in concreto” (Käsemann, “Paul’s
Anthropology,” 27).
80 For example, John Robinson stresses the (then) scholarly consensus that, “in his anthropology
[Paul is] fundamentally … a Hebrew of the Hebrews” (Robinson, Body, 11).
81 Indeed, a significant debate ensued between the two, and it has been conveniently summarised
in Emma Wasserman, “The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Revisiting Paul’s Anthropology in Light of
83 Bultmann, Theology, 1.209; on body-soul dualism see p. 1.201.
84 Bultmann, Theology, 1.200-01.
85 For Bultmann this is specifically evident in Rom 7.7-25. Here Bultmann’s Paul personifies sin
and the flesh as a way of asserting that “self and self are at war with each other; i.e. to be innerly divided,
rejecting a strong Gnostic/Greek body-soul dualism, he unreflectively advocates an implicit (and ontologically stark) *Cartesian dualism* of knowing subject (I) and known object (not-I). Bultmann here stands within the Augustinian-Lutheran tradition, and his insistence upon anthropological monism is undermined by his own dualistic presumptions.

Bultmann’s hegemonic relationship of self to self vis-à-vis the power of God has exerted its most lasting impact on interpretations of the phrase σῶμα πνευματικόν (1 Cor 15.44). For Bultmann, σῶμα refers not to an individual part of man (i.e., the material body) but rather the whole person; “man does not *have* a soma; he *is* soma.”

With respect to resurrection, though Bultmann concedes that πνεῦμα is the substance of the risen body in Paul’s thought, the apostle’s “real intention” is not “a body formed of an ethereal substance, but [rather] that the self is determined by the power of God.”

The risen body, then, is not a body *per se*, but rather a mode of existence in which the Spirit of God is infused. Though often critical of Bultmann, this sense of the Spirit-rulled self has been taken up by many subsequent exegetes. Murdoch Dahl, for instance, argues that the earthly and risen bodies are animated by the soul and spirit respectively. More recently, the trio of James Dunn, Anthony Thiselton, and N. T. Wright have all

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1. Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.245. In 7.22, however, Paul’s description of the “inner man” is understood as a reference to the “real self who can distinguish himself from his *soma*-self. … the ‘inner’ is man’s real self in contrast to the self that has come under the sway of sin” (Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.203).


4. Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.194. Bultmann later insists that Paul’s “capacity for abstract thinking is not … developed,” thus resulting in the apostle’s inability to “distinguish terminologically between *soma* in the basic sense of that which characterises human existence and *soma* as the phenomenon of the material body” (p. 1.198).


6. Again with Bultmann ironies abound, as his understanding of σῶμα as self is thoroughly disembodied, stressing the body-independent and immaterial ghost in the machine that characterises Cartesian dualism.

7. Dahl, *Resurrection of the Body*. Though Dahl attributes this position to the accepted exegesis of his day (see p. 15), his own analysis recasts it in light of a presumed and more radically drawn Hebraic monism (see p. 81).
1. The Disembodiment of Resurrection

(independently) made similar claims. We will have occasion to explore these positions in more detail in §3.2.2, though for now it can be noted that, despite the monistic veneer, all these exegetes implicitly ascribe to (at least) a folk-dualism that understands the human body as a container in which differing agents dwell (either body–soul or body–spirit).

There is, to be certain, nothing wrong with this kind of a dualistic conception, and our study will demonstrate that such folk understandings result from recurring patterns of human embodiment. Where such scholars err, however, is in their lack of self-critical reflection which causes them to shoehorn Paul’s resurrection ideals into a truncated and strenuous scholarly construct of unitary Jewish monism vs. partitive Greek dualism. This is, as it were, a certain kind of cultural dualism that is methodologically problematic, though exceedingly ubiquitous in Pauline scholarship. Indeed, it is hard to find an area of Pauline theology that has been more divided on issues of dualism than scholarly treatments of Paul’s anthropology. The standard scholarly position is presented as an either/or choice between Jewish monism and Greek dualism, and preference is overwhelmingly given to the former. John Robinson, for instance, insists

92 Dunn and Wright both distinguish between two different bodies, one that embodies the soul and the other that embodies the spirit (James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle [Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1998], 60; Wright, Resurrection, 347-56). In a similar way, Anthony Thiselton argues that Paul envisions a body that is “more than physical but not less [than the earthly body],” and further that σῶμα πνευματικόν refers to a “mode or pattern of intersubjective life directed by the Holy Spirit” (Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text [NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000], 1277).

93 With respect to resurrection specifically, Jeffrey Asher’s recent assessment of 1 Cor 15 stands as a prime example of this kind of cultural dualism (Jeffrey R. Asher, Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and Resurrection [HUT 42; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000]). Asher’s study is premised on the assertion that the Jewish belief in resurrection is all together other and different from Greek modes of thought. In this way, Asher insists that Paul was required to adapt his resurrection ideals to include notions of polarity and change, presumably because they had not been there before. Though Asher is aware of the cultural dualism that we note here (see p. 17), he nonetheless operates with it (see, e.g., p. 205).

94 Compare, for instance, the older work of John Robinson with Emma Wasserman’s more recent treatment. Though Robinson argues that the “Greek presuppositions … are simply misleading if made the starting point” (Robinson, Body, 12), Wasserman insists that the recognition of Platonic categories in Paul helps construct a more coherent picture of the apostle’s anthropology (Emma Wasserman, “Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide? The Case of Pauline Anthropology in Romans 7 and 2 Corinthians 4-5,” in The New Testament in its Hellenistic Context [eds. Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts; Leiden: Brill, forthcoming]).
that Hebrew anthropology stands in stark contrast to its Greek counterpart, and a similar distinction has been retained in the work of (e.g.) Hans Dieter Betz, Udo Schnelle, and (with respect to resurrection) Alan Segal.

To a large degree, such cultural dualism is doomed from the start in as much as it constructs an idealised monistic view that stands in contradistinction to what is essentially a dualistic straw man. On the Jewish side, we can rightly ask what traditions/writers are to be taken as normative, and even if these could be identified we are still left with the recognition that anthropological presuppositions are often only tacit. On the Greek side, the most dominant philosophical school in Paul’s day was thoroughly monistic (i.e., Stoicism), and even Plato’s body–soul dualism was often characterised by body–soul interaction (as we will see in chs. 3 and 4). To a large extent, then, the Greek view that scholars such as Bultmann and even Segal reject is really a peculiar conflation of Cartesian dualism within Platonic categories.

Seen in this light, scholarly overgeneralisations regarding Paul’s anthropology are problematic precisely because they constitute ahistorical caricatures that are falsely held as dichotomous; such views cannot be critically held. As we will see, once the straw men of both “Jewish monism” and “Hellenistic dualism” are dispersed and we instead turn our attention to ancient conceptions of the embodied soul, it becomes less problematic to view Paul as holding a view of Man as a whole comprised of various...
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Following the recent work of (e.g.) George van Kooten and Emma Wasserman, our analysis will locate Paul’s anthropological descriptions within a broader, more integrative cultural matrix of both Jewish and Greek traditions. As we will see, this has implications for the apostle’s resurrection ideals, precisely because such ideals are somatic in nature.

In conclusion, then, we have seen a peculiar mixture of dualistic and monistic tendencies in Pauline scholarship. On the one hand there is a general trend toward understanding Jewish apocalyptic as being exceedingly dualistic, while on the other hand there is an assertion that Paul’s anthropology is essentially monistic. In both cases claims to dualism/monism are overextended and result from a lack of critical self-reflection on the part of individual exegetes. Bearing this in mind, there is a pressing need to more clearly delineate both dualism and monism in Paul, and doing so will have significant implications for Paul’s resurrection ideals in at least two (interrelated) ways. First, the present study will more clearly identify the nature of both continuity and discontinuity across earthly and risen somatic states. Contra Käsemann’s insistence on radical discontinuity, and Bultmann’s (and others’) stress on the continuity of the self and/or human personality, we will instead locate such (dis)continuity as a somatic issue, one that is related to Paul’s partitive (though integrative) view of the human being (see chs. 3 and 4). This naturally spills over, as we will see, into the second issue, which concerns the effects of resurrection upon the body itself. As we will see in chs. 4 and 5, Paul’s resurrection ideals include a present dimension that is worked out in relation to that same partitive (though integrative) anthropological construction. However, such conclusions are only tenable if the nature of both dualism and monism are more clearly identified in Paul’s writings (which we will do in ch. 3).

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100 See, e.g., Gerd Theißen, Erleben und Verhalten der ersten Christen: Ein Psychologie des Urchristentums (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007), 80-81.
1.3.3 Paul’s Resurrection and Participationist Ideals

As with the rest of Paul’s theology, participation in/with Christ permeates the apostle’s resurrection descriptions, and this extends to both sides of the resurrection equation. On the one hand, in Rom 6 Paul insists believers have been crucified with (συνταφήρομαι), buried with (συνθάπτω), and thus died with Christ (ἀπεθάναμεν σὺν Χριστῷ), thus insisting that believers are deeply enmeshed or intertwined (σύμφυτος) in the likeness of Christ’s death (vv.4-8). This latter image has resonance in both horticultural and biomedical frame structures, both of which denote two separate entities that are united into an organic and living singularity; the image is that of “indivisible, organic unity with Christ.”

In Rom 6.5 this reference to being deeply enmeshed (σύμφυτος) in Christ’s death is balanced by an anticipated future enmeshing in Christ’s resurrection, what Paul later refers to as living with (συζάω) and being glorified with (συνδΩξάζω) Christ (Rom 6.8 and 8.17 respectively). More striking still are those instances where Paul speaks of believers being morphed together with (σύμμορφος) Christ’s risen existence (Rom 8.29 and Phil 3.21). Alan Segal has noted the difficulty of capturing this expression in English, insisting that σύμμορφος is similar to our metamorphosis “but with a more intimate and transformative meaning. … it [suggests] that the reformation will explicitly take place ‘together with’ (syn-) [Christ’s] glorious body.”

The following discussion will map three modern scholarly trends in addressing this participatory dimension of Paul’s resurrection ideals. Returning to the category of

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102 The adjective σύμφυτος occurs only here in the NT, and its etymology is contested. For some it denotes a horticultural frame whereby believers and Christ are said to be grafted or implanted together, thus denoted the image of a plant and a branch organically growing together (so Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [1st ed.; AB 33; New York: Doubleday, 1993], 435). Others suggest a bio-medical frame whereby the two edges of an open wound are sewn together (James D. G. Dunn, Romans [2 vols.; WBC 38a-b; Dallas, Tex.: Word Books, 1988], 1.316).

103 Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 400.

104 Thus following most commentators in supplying σύμφυτος in the apodosis of 6.5 (e.g., Dunn, Romans, 1.318).

105 Alan Segal, Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in Western Religion (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 419; Segal is here speaking of Phil 3.21. While we take Segal to be working in the right direction, it should be noted that σύμμορφος can simply denote the morphing together of two distinct entities into a “similar shape or form” (LSI, BDAG) and thus does not necessarily denote the organic unity that σύμφυτος does.
cognicentrism, it will now become clear that many of the dualistic presumptions just noted yield cognicentric understandings of resurrection. Where modern scholarship errs is in the recognition of *participation through mental awareness* at the expense (or even rejection) of any meaningful description of *somatic union*. This was, in part, the point that E. P. Sanders drove at in his *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, though confined by cognicentrism Sanders was forced to self-consciously admit that the modern scholar “lack[s] a category of ‘reality’ [by which to understand] real participation in Christ.”

The present study will not suggest such a category but rather refocus our theoretical orientation so as to better appreciate the *categories of reality that Paul himself worked with*. This is in part connected to the issues of dualism/monism noted above, but it is also (and more foundationally) a matter of the inappropriate imposition of cognicentric modes of thought onto Paul’s participationist and resurrection ideals.

The first scholarly trend is the tendency of some exegetes to downplay or even reject the experiential dimension in Paul. Bultmann stands as a prime example. Indebted both to his existentialist analysis and the primacy given to the justification by faith metaphor, Bultmann understands participation with Christ primarily as an act of *acknowledgment*; so Bultmann,

> ... recognition takes place only as acknowledgment. This is the decision-question which the “word of the cross” thrusts upon the hearer: whether he will acknowledge that God has made a crucified one Lord, whether he will thereby acknowledge the demand to take up the cross by the surrender of his previous understanding of himself, making the cross the determining power of his life, letting himself be crucified with Christ.

For Bultmann, Paul’s participationist ascriptions constitute a kind of *mental assent*; one does not so much die and rise *with Christ* as they acknowledge the theological

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106 E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 522. Sanders is trying to navigate a course that lies between Käsemann and Bultmann. As we have seen, modern dualisms permeate both views, and the unmasking of said dualisms may actually serve as the hermeneutical key that Sanders is looking for.

107 That is to say, the problem lies not so much in the need for a new category of reality, but rather a better and more acute theoretical orientation that enables appreciation of *Paul’s categories of reality*.

108 Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.303 (emphasis added). Compare further, “the union of believers into one *soma* with Christ now has its basis … in the fact that in the word of proclamation Christ’s death-and-resurrection becomes a possibility of existence in regard to which a decision must be made” (Bultmann, *Theology*, 1.302).
1. The Disembodiment of Resurrection

proposition of the crucified one’s lordship. This is, as it were, an exceeding cognicentric understanding of Christ-believer participation in that the moment of faith is understood as a disembodied noetic activity.

A similar critique can be levelled against Joost Holleman, who understands Paul as “systematizing” early Christian eschatology, and further insists that participation in Christ’s death and resurrection is an “idea” that Paul develops and which carries a certain kind of rational force. While Holleman’s study makes important contributions to the traditio-historical study of Paul’s thought, it fundamentally errs in that it assumes an unbalanced picture of human cognition. Holleman essentially presents Paul’s resurrection ideals as a history of ideas that are rationally worked out in the mind, independent of the body. As we have seen, such a view is dubious on theoretical grounds.

A second scholarly tendency is to locate participation in Christ’s death and resurrection as past and future events respectively. While such interpretations have the advantage of aligning with some passages in Paul (e.g., Rom 6.4-8), they are (to be certain) overdrawn and a product of 20th century scholarly reactionism. In the late-19th/early-20th century it was not uncommon for scholars to identify notions of an already realised resurrection in Paul’s thought. Albert Schweitzer, for example, understood “redemption [to be] realising itself in the present” precisely because believers had already “mysterious[ly] … shar[ed] the dying and rising again of Christ.”

The earlier religiousgeschichtliche Schule (of which Schweitzer was critical) made similar assertions, proposing that Paul’s baptismal theology had been influenced

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109 Holleman, Resurrection and Parousia, 130.
110 Thus Holleman, “if one accepts that Jesus has been raised, and believes that Christians are united with Christ, then one can and must also believe that all Christians will be raised at the end of time” (Holleman, Resurrection and Parousia, 206 [emphasis added]).
111 Schweitzer, Mysticism, 75 and 96 (respectively). Though critical of Schweitzer, William Davies similarly sees in Paul an assertion that believers have “died and risen with Christ and [thus are] already being transformed” (W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology [London: S.P.C.K., 1962], 317-18).
by the cultic drama of the Hellenistic mystery religions. Paul was thus understood to either promote a cult patterned on the initiate’s dying and rising with the deity in baptism, or to confront certain baptismal developments that had arisen through (in)direct cultic influence. By the mid-20th century Käsemann had incorporated the latter into his apocalyptic reading of Paul, suggesting that the apostle opposes a pre-Pauline eschatological enthusiasm within the Greek churches; thus Käsemann insists (with respect to Rom 6.4-8):

[Paul] builds in a remarkable caveat in the shape of an eschatological reservation. Participation in the Resurrection is spoken of not in the perfect tense, but in the future. Baptism equips for it, calls to it, but does not itself convey this gift. … Further than this Paul … is not prepared to go.”

The attention Käsemann draws to Paul’s temporal description is important, and any discussion of a present participation in Christ’s resurrection must account for this nuance. Among modern scholars it has become axiomatic to stress this temporal distinction. The issue has been particularly addressed by Alexander Wedderburn, who sufficiently problematised both the conclusions of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule and Käsemann’s claim of pre-Pauline enthusiasm. Wedderburn argues that passages such as Rom 6.4-8 advocate a fundamental “asymmetry” that stresses participation in Christ’s death without a corresponding participations in resurrection.

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113 Wilhelm Bousset, for instance, understood Paul’s mystical and cultic participation with the risen Christ as having been patterned on the mysteries (Wilhelm Bousset, Kyrios Christos: A History of the Belief in Christ from the Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus [trans. J. E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970], 188-200).


117 With respect to Paul’s baptismal descriptions in Rom 6.1-11, for example, see Dunn, baptism “is linked only with Christ’s death, … [and Paul] refus[es] to extend the association to resurrection” (Dunn, Romans, 1.314), and more recently Matera, “[baptism] into death … is the central notion Paul is trying to communicate” (Frank J. Matera, Romans [Paideia; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2010], 150).

118 Wedderburn, Baptism and Resurrection.

119 Wedderburn, Baptism and Resurrection, 232. Thus Wedderburn, Paul is unable to “bring himself to speak of resurrection in the present” (p. 395).
While this conclusion rightly accounts for Paul’s temporal distinctions, the logic by which it is reached is flawed. For example, Wedderburn insists that though Christ’s death could be shared now, it was the literal and physical nature of resurrection that precluded a similar participation in the latter. Given this (dubious) insistence on literal resurrection, it is not readily apparent why a (similarly dubious) literal understanding of death and burial should not be understood. Indeed, was not Christ’s death a literal, physical event too (to extend Wedderburn’s terminology)? On this logic, then, why should participation be extended to the one but not the other? Surely the apostle is interested in both, for even though Paul is cautious to place believers’ resurrection in the future (Rom 6.5), the baptismal analogy is drawn according to both Christ’s death and resurrection (6.4), and Paul later instructs believers to present themselves as “those who are living from the dead” (ἐκ νεκρῶν ζωντας – 6.13). While Wedderburn suggests that believers presently participate in a kind of “true ‘life’” that is different from resurrection, such an assertion seems artificial (even unnatural) in that it obscures the logic of the baptismal metaphor.

Slightly more preferable to Wedderburn is the earlier work of Robert Tannehill, who argues:

the believer participates in the new life in the present, but Paul is careful to make clear that it does not become the believer’s possession. It is realized through a continual surrender of one’s present activity to God, a walking in newness of life, and at the same time it remains God’s gift for the future.

Tannehill at least remains open to some form of present participation in risen life, though he conceptualises this possibility within the context of Käsemann’s aeonic dualism. According to Tannehill (here speaking of Paul’s insistence that believers have died with Christ):

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121 Compare further with Phil 3.10-12, where Paul simultaneously looks ahead to the future resurrection while speaking of a present knowing of Christ’s resurrection power. The force of this present experience is underscored by Paul’s self-perceived need to locate resurrection as a future event.
123 Tannehill, *Dying and Rising*, 12 (emphasis original).
[Paul] is speaking of the destruction of the dominion of sin, of which all believers were a part. … [Such destruction] is an inclusive event, for the existence of men [sic] was bound up with this old aeon, and what puts an end to it also puts an end to them as men [sic] of the old aeon.\(^{124}\)

Tannehill here objectifies the soteriological event, abstracting it as a “theological foundation.”\(^{125}\) Participation \textit{in/with Christ} is not something believers \textit{do}, but something they \textit{know}.\(^{126}\) The logic runs from abstract \textit{theological ideal} to ethical activity, and such propositional priority produces a thoroughly disembodied or cognicentric view of Paul. Everything is contingent on an objectified view of Christ’s death that is once-removed from believers such that life is mediated through opposing aeons. In this way, apocalyptic dualism has unduly coloured Christ-participation, which is seen not as \textit{participation} \textit{in/with Christ} but rather \textit{participation in the conditions} that Christ enables.

As we can see, then, much hinges on the way one understands Paul’s participationist ideals, and it is the nature of this understanding that constitutes the third scholarly trend that we must critically engage. One approach, which has a long scholarly history but has nonetheless met with much hesitation, is the locating of Paul’s participatory language in the context of either mysticism and/or religious experience.

This was particularly prevalent in the early 20\(^{th}\) century, specifically in the contributions of Wilhelm Bousset and Adolf Deissmann\(^{127}\) though perhaps most lastingly in work of Albert Schweitzer. Identifying what he labelled the “mystical doctrine of the dying and rising again with Christ,” Schweitzer sought to place mystical Christ-participation at the centre of Pauline theology.\(^{128}\) Insisting that such mysticism is not “merely metaphorical

\(^{124}\) Tannehill, \textit{Dying and Rising}, 30.
\(^{125}\) Tannehill, \textit{Dying and Rising}, 81.
\(^{126}\) For Tannehill, ongoing participation with Christ’s sufferings is a pastoral issue: “this continuing participation in death … prevent[s] the believer from trusting in himself and so falling back into the old life” (Tannehill, \textit{Dying and Rising}, 77, see also p. 127). The more Tannehill stresses the absolute and definitive nature of Christ’s past death/resurrection, the more obscure Paul’s insistence on ongoing participation becomes. This is because, in Tannehill’s view, sharing Christ’s sufferings is about \textit{remaining cognisant and aware} of the decisive break rather than actually participating in such sufferings (see esp. p. 127). In this way, Tannehill is thoroughly cognicentric.
\(^{128}\) Schweitzer, \textit{Mysticism}, 97. For Schweitzer this was an either/or choice between juristic and participationist language; thus he famously insisted “the doctrine of righteousness by faith is therefore a
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... but a simple reality,” the great irony of Schweitzer’s work is that mysticism is understood purely from an intellectual standpoint. For Schweitzer, Paul’s mysticism is coherent to those who “think consistently” because it is a “logical inference;” that is, “[Paul] is a logical thinker and his mysticism is a complete system.” Schweitzer, therefore, does not posit Paul the mystic so much as Paul the theologian, and his entire understanding of Christ-believer participation is thoroughly cognicentric.

While the work of Bousset, Deissmann, and Schweitzer all stressed (at least conceptually) a more experientialist understanding of Paul’s theology, such initiatives waned in the mid-20th century. Pushing the category of experience (esp. mysticism) to the side, and further rejecting Schweitzer’s relegation of Paul’s juristic language as a subsidiary theme, much 20th century scholarship put forth thoroughly cognicentric understandings of Paul’s participationist ideals. As we have seen above, Bultmann demythologises being in Christ as a mode of self-understanding, while both Käsemann and Tannehill re-mythologise it through the idea of opposing aeonic spheres of influence. Wedderburn is less fixated on aeonic dualism and instead understands Christ as a representative figure; in this view, one does not so much participate with

subsidary crater, which has formed within the rim of the main crater – the mystical doctrine of redemption through the being-in-Christ” (Schweitzer, Mysticism, 225).

129 Schweitzer, Mysticism, 15.
130 Cf. John Ashton, The Religion of Paul the Apostle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 143-44. For Schweitzer, the eschatological disjunction of Christ’s past resurrection (one the one hand) and the anticipated existence of believers in the messianic kingdom (on the other) is a presumed problem that leads “Paul as a thinker to his Mysticism” (Schweitzer, Mysticism, 97).
131 Schweitzer, Mysticism, 98 and 139 (respectively).
132 Cf. Dunn, Theology of Paul, 393.
133 By putting experience at the heart of Paul’s faith, many saw theology as standing on a rather shaky foundation. For example, Käsemann argues: “the Pauline doctrine of justification is a protection not only against nomism but also against enthusiasm and mysticism” (Ernst Käsemann, “Justification and Salvation History in the Epistle to the Romans” in Perspectives on Paul [trans. by Margaret Kohl; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971], 60-78 [p. 73]). Elsewhere Käsemann contrasts proper expressions of faith with those in which “faith must be rescued from the dimension of recurrent religious experience” (Ernst Käsemann, “The Faith of Abraham in Romans 4,” in Perspectives on Paul [trans. Margaret Kohl; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971], 79-101 [p. 82]).
Christ as they acknowledge their solidarity with Christ.\textsuperscript{135} Similarly, Holleman combines the representational figure and aeonic spheres theories,\textsuperscript{136} thus resulting in a strongly cognicentric understanding of Paul’s participation and resurrection ideals (as noted above).

Despite Sanders’ renewed focus on “participationist eschatology” in the late-1970’s,\textsuperscript{137} discussions of Paul’s \textit{in Christ} language and its relation to his resurrection ideals have remained largely propositional in nature. In recent decades, however, discussions of religious experience in Paul have undergone a renewed resurgence,\textsuperscript{138} and many have placed Paul’s understanding of resurrection at the analytic fore. For some this is an issue of \textit{visionary experience}, thus focusing not on participation but rather the historical nature of the resurrection claim.\textsuperscript{139} More to our interests is the work of Alan Segal, who has compellingly argued that Paul’s understanding of resurrection is patterned not merely on an encounter with the risen Christ but more fundamentally on a temporary “experience of the resurrected body.”\textsuperscript{140} Segal argues that Paul’s resurrection and participationist ideals are formulated in relation to ecstatic experiences of heavenly ascent. In this way, Segal envisions something closer to our sense of embodiment.

\textsuperscript{135} Thus Wedderburn, “the ‘dying’ that takes place in baptism is but an ‘echo,’ a realization, of a past death with Christ” (Wedderburn, \textit{Baptism and Resurrection}, 392).
\textsuperscript{136} Holleman, \textit{Resurrection and Parousia}, 174-87 and 189-90.
\textsuperscript{137} Sanders, \textit{Paul and Palestinian Judaism}, 549. Sanders specifically avoids the term “mysticism” (see p. 434, ftnt. 19).
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Though he retains many theoretical and historical dualisms that the present study eschews, the following analysis will build upon and expand Segal’s claims.

In light of the three scholarly trends noted in this section, it becomes clear that the relationship between Paul’s resurrection and participationist ideals is largely understood within cognicentric contexts. As we have seen, such treatments are not only theoretically problematic, but they unduly impose a post-Enlightenment worldview onto Paul. The present study will seek to remedy this situation, not by seeking a new category of reality (as Sanders puzzled over) but rather by seeking to re-envision the categories that Paul himself works with. This will be done largely with respect to issues of cosmology and anthropology (see chs. 3 and 4), though it will also call for a reassessment of Paul’s eschatology (ch. 4) and the relationship between the apostle’s participationist and resurrection ideals (ch. 5). As we will see throughout this study, Paul understands both resurrection and life in Christ not propositionally but rather as grounded in recurrent patterns of bodily experience. Such a contention is, we can insist, not tenable within either the Objectivist or Subjectivist paradigms, both of which hold a general prejudice against “experience” as an analytic category. While there are important critiques and concerns to be mindful of here, the present study’s focus on recurrent patterns of human embodiment offers a theoretically informed and historically sound perspective that yields much explanatory power.

1.3.4 Problem Definition

Though the preceding literature review has pointed to several problems in the current state of scholarship, three specific issues have come to the fore. First, there is a pressing need to more clearly demarcate a conceptual framework within which resurrection texts can be identified and interpreted. As we have seen, the current scholarly tendency to

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141 See §1.3.2 (ftnt. 98).
bifurcate resurrection into literal (i.e., real) and metaphorical (i.e., non-real or secondary) expressions is theoretically problematic and in need of revision.

Second, we have seen that scholarly constructions of dualism and monism are fundamentally overdrawn and often implicitly premised upon modern assumptions. Such scholarly retrojections are particularly prevalent in treatments of Jewish apocalyptic and Paul’s anthropology; given the centrality of these topics to Paul’s resurrection ideals, there is an acute need to more clearly delineate the nature of dualism and monism in Paul’s thinking. In so doing it will become clear that Paul’s resurrection ideals are grounded in the body, not only looking ahead to a future somatic existence but also correlating that existence with somatic transformation in the present.

Finally, we have identified three scholarly understandings of the relationship between Paul’s resurrection and participationist ideals: (a) a noetic understanding, (b) a temporally disjunctive understanding, and (c) a propositionally drawn experiential understanding. As we have seen, all of these treatments abstract Paul’s participationist ideals, either relegating participation to a passive engagement in dualistic aeonic spheres, or equating participation with the noetic act of faith and/or interpersonal solidarity. In light of Paul’s own descriptions, which speak of an organic morphing-together-with Christ’s death and resurrection, there is a profound need for a less abstract, more embodied account of Paul’s resurrection and participationist ideals.

At the heart of these issues, however, is a pervasive scholarly trend toward understanding resurrection as a propositional, cognicentric category. We have demonstrated that such a trend is premised on the traditional Cartesian opposition of body and mind. When projected onto Paul, such body–mind dualism produces a view of resurrection that is fundamentally disembodied. In light of this general and problematic cognicentric bias, a renewed examination of Paul’s resurrection ideals is in order, one that takes seriously the integration of body and mind and which more clearly examines the extent to which Paul understands resurrection as embodied.
1.4 Theory and Method: Integrating Cognition and Culture

The present analysis employs theories of embodied cognition as developed in cognitive linguistics. By grounding both language and human thought within recurrent patterns of human embodiment, cognitive linguistics provides, as Slingerland notes, “a clear way out of the postmodern prison house of language without committing us to a rightly discredited form of Enlightenment realism.”\(^{142}\) Seen against the backdrop of the above literature review, cognitive linguistics thus enables a move past the otherwise ubiquitous problem of cognicentrism. Our analysis will draw heavily on the work of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Gilles Fauconnier, and Mark Turner.\(^{143}\) Rather than focusing on traditional linguistic analyses (e.g., grammar, syntax, semantics),\(^{144}\) we are interested in the way in which the products of human imagination and creativity are not only grounded in but also arise organically from recurrent patterns of human embodiment.

Three theoretical concepts are particularly important – image schemata, conceptual metaphor, and blending theory – each of which can be briefly introduced and further illuminated with respect to 1 Cor 15.3-4.

We can begin by acknowledging the growing consensus among cognitive scientists that human thought is primarily image-based and derived from patterns of sensory-motor experience.\(^{145}\) While there is much empirical evidence to support this claim,\(^{146}\) Mark Johnson has explored its philosophical implications in greatest detail and specifically pointed to the image schema as the basic unit of human meaning creation.\(^{147}\)

Image schemata are conceptual structures that are skeletal in nature (i.e., they do not

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\(^{142}\) Slingerland, What Science Offers the Humanities, 218. The present study has found Slingerland’s overview of vertical integration extremely helpful in as much as Slingerland is a Humanities scholar (working primarily in early Chinese religion) who has specific interests in the historical and cross-cultural applications of embodied cognition.\(^{143}\) See esp. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By; Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh; Johnson, The Body in the Mind; Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool Reason; and Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

\(^{144}\) For an excellent cognitive linguistic overview of these issues, see William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, Cognitive Linguistics (CTL; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

\(^{145}\) Cf. Slingerland, What Science Offers the Humanities, 56.

\(^{146}\) See, e.g., Slingerland, What Science Offers the Humanities, 56-59 and 162-63.

have rich but rather schematic content) and which arise experientially as a result of the kind of body we have functioning in the kind of world we live in. Such schemata exist at the conceptual level and are what Johnson refers to as gestalt in nature – that is, they function as recurrent, organised, unified wholes. One example of an image schema is the VERTICALITY schema, which we will return to throughout this study. The concept of VERTICALITY is something we learn with our bodies, through, for example, perception (e.g., looking up at the sky and down at the ground) and general somatic movement (e.g., standing up, lying down). Seen in this light, VERTICALITY is not an abstract proposition but rather a concept that one learns with their body, and in this way emerges organically from patterns of human embodiment.

We have already introduced conceptual metaphor above, so our comments at this point can be more focused and precise. Conceptual metaphor is rooted in the assertion that human thought is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. To again cite Johnson,

Metaphor is not merely a linguistic mode of expression; rather, it is one of the chief cognitive structures by which we are able to have coherent, ordered experiences that we can reason about and make sense of. Through metaphor, we make use of patterns that obtain in our physical experience to organize our more abstract understanding.

Conceptual metaphors arise when one, often more abstract, conceptual domain is understood in relation to another, often more concrete, conceptual domain. These more concrete domains are the image schemata noted above, which serve as conceptual templates by which more abstract domains are understood, and whereby conceptual metaphors emerge. Though conceptual metaphors are reflected in linguistic constructions, it is important to note that they are conceptual in nature and thus pre-linguistically formulated. Accordingly, conceptual metaphors are expressed variously

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148 For an excellent and succinct introduction to image schemata, see Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green, Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction (Mahwah, N.J.: L. Erlbaum, 2006), 176-205.
149 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 44.
150 Following the convention outlined in Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, image schematic concepts will be designated by the use of small caps, thus distinguishing between lexical signs and the concepts they represent (e.g., verticality is a lexical sign; VERTICALITY denotes the concept behind the sign). Exceptions to this rule include standard scholarly abbreviations (e.g., B.C.E., C.E., etc.) as well as discipline-specific shorthand (e.g., YHWH, HB, NT, etc.).
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across differing cultural mediums – not just in language but also gestures, art, and even ritual. One example of a conceptual metaphor is the RESURRECTION IS BEING AWAKE metaphor, whereby the concept RESURRECTION is understood with respect to experiences of waking and sleeping; before we can sufficiently demonstrate this metaphor, however, it will be beneficial to introduce blending theory.

Whereas Lakoff and Johnson envision a process of uni-directional projection from concrete source domain to abstract target domain, Fauconnier and Turner describe a more general mental operation of conceptual integration wherein conceptual domains are simultaneously blended with one another so as to produce emergent meaning not found in either. This process is called conceptual blending, and it has been demonstrated as “a general, basic mental operation … [that is] fundamental to all activities of the human mind.” Blending happens through the organisation of conceptual networks that always consist of at least two input spaces (i.e., the domains being blended), one generic space (which establishes cross-space correlations), and one

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152 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 57. Conceptual metaphor has been shown to undergird various different languages (including English, French, Japanese, Chinese – cf. Slingerland, What Science Offers the Humanities, 171), and it has recently been introduced to NT studies as well (Petri Luomanen, Ilkka Pyysiäinen and Risto Uro, eds., Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism: Contributions from Cognitive and Social Science [BibIntS 89; Leiden: Brill, 2007] and Bonnie Howe, Because You Bear This Name: Conceptual Metaphor and the Moral Meaning of 1 Peter [BibIntS 81; Leiden: Brill, 2006]). Beyond linguistics, conceptual metaphor has been demonstrated in political ideology, poetry, religious discourse, and even mathematics (respectively, see George Lakoff, Moral Politics: What Conservatives know that Liberals Don’t [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996]; Lakoff and Turner, More than Cool Reason; Edward Slingerland, “Conceptual Metaphor Theory as a Methodology for Comparative Religion,” JAAR 72 [2004]: 1-31; and George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez, Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being [New York: Basic Books, 2000]).

153 Again following Lakoff and Johnson (Metaphors We Live By), conceptual metaphors are articulated via the small-caps formula A IS B (or A AS B), where A and B refer to the conceptual domains being cross-mapped. This stylistic notation should be understood not as a statement in its own right (e.g., resurrection is being awake), but rather as a symbolic description of cross-domain mappings: the target domain (RESURRECTION) is mapped to the source domain (BEING AWAKE), with the mapping represented by the copula (IS) – cf. Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 58.

154 See esp. Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think. Applications of this theory in NT studies include Hugo Lundhaug, “Conceptual Blending in the Exegesis of the Soul,” in Explaining Christian Origins and Early Judaism: Contributions from Cognitive and Social Science (eds. Petri Luomanen, Ilkka Pyysiäinen and Risto Uro; BibIntS 89; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 141-60; and Howe, Bear This Name.

155 Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think, 37-38. Like conceptual metaphor, blending undergirds not only linguistic discourse but understanding more generally. For examples of conceptual blending at work in numerous aspects of human life, see the various examples throughout Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think, esp. 17-73.
blended space (where emergent structure is created). Drawing on image schemata and conceptual metaphors, blending happens on-the-fly as human communication unfolds. Mental spaces are created from working memory, cross-mapped with one another through vital relations and blended to create emergent meaning. Though much of this process happens unconsciously, emergent meaning is said to achieve human-scale when it becomes intelligible and consciously perceived; that is, recognised in a moment or “flash of comprehension.”

By way of demonstrating this methodological matrix, a brief examination of a very common resurrection metaphor will suffice (see Diagram 1.1). In 1 Cor 15.3-4 Paul recounts an early Christian traditional unit wherein Jesus is described as having “died” (ἀποθνῄσκω) and been “woken” (ἐγείρω) on the third day. Though the metaphor in this case is entirely conventional and pre-dates Paul by several centuries (e.g., Dan 12.2), the underlying conceptual network is no less relevant. The metaphor reflects the blending of the more concrete experience of waking and sleeping (I₁) with the more abstract understanding of life and death (I₂). Through the construction of general correspondence in the generative space (G), vital relations are drawn between the two inputs, thus linking paired counterparts between I₁ and I₂ (e.g., linking death with

156 Conceptual networks are typically structured according to certain patterns – i.e., simplex networks, mirror networks, single-scope networks, or double-scope networks (see Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think, 119-35; see also pp. 337-45).
157 Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think, 44.
158 Lakoff and Johnson note that what are often referred to as dead metaphors are (in most cases) linguistic expressions in which the “conceptual metaphorical mapping is still alive, but the term has ceased to be a linguistic expression of that mapping. … conventional metaphors are relatively fixed, unconscious, automatic, and so alive that they are used regularly without awareness or noticeable effort” (Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 125). The key distinction between a dead or living metaphor, then, is not whether the author of a text is consciously speaking metaphorically, but rather whether the unconscious mapping is still utilised in conveying meaning. Alternatively, dead metaphors are limited to those instances where the metaphorical mapping has been completely severed. For example, Lakoff and Johnson note the English term pedigree is derived from the French ped de gris (“a grouse’s foot”), which originally functioned as an idiom for a “family-tree diagram” though such cultural concepts cease to convey meaning in English (p. 124).
159 Each of these input spaces (I₁ and I₂), as well as the blended and the generic spaces, are what Fauconnier and Turner refer to as mental spaces (Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think, 102-06). Mental spaces are “small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action. They are very partial assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive models” (p. 102). On a physiological level, Fauconnier and Turner contend that the elements within each mental space correspond to activated neuronal assemblies that operate within working memory.
Diagram 1.1: 
LIFE IS BEING AWAKE Metaphor

Generic Space: VERTICALITY Image Schema

UP

DOWN

Awake

Life

Asleep

Death

LIFE IS BEING AWAKE

DEATH IS SLEEP

Blended Space: The Corpse Wakes

I₁: AWAKE/ASLEEP

I₂: LIFE/DEATH
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As demonstrated in Diagram 1.1 and Table 1.1, the perceptual connections are quite robust but are generally mapped according to the VERTICALITY schema. Once these links are established, various elements from the inputs can then be selectively projected to the blended space. What emerges in the blend are the conceptual metaphors LIFE IS BEING AWAKE and DEATH IS SLEEP, which, when framed with respect to the afterlife, entails the actual “waking up” (εγείρω) of the physical corpse that had died and was buried. In this way, the blend contains emergent structure that was not found in either of the inputs – e.g., though actually being dead is not the same as being asleep, it is now possible to conceptualise death as sleep. What results is the structuring of the concept RESURRECTION in relation to the basic human experience of waking from sleep; hence the conceptual metaphor, RESURRECTION IS BEING AWAKE. As we will see, this (and other) metaphor(s) enable Paul and other ancient writers to reason about the abstract idea of resurrection – in this case, the activity of waking from sleep characterises the resurrection process.

This brief cognitive linguistic analysis of 1 Cor 15.3-4 demonstrates the robust nature of the methodological tools employed in this study. While Lakoff and Johnson’s

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160 These cross-spaces correlations are called vital relations (Fauconnier and Turner, Way We Think, 92-102). Physiologically speaking, vital relations link mental spaces through neurobiological binding (e.g. co-activation – p. 102). Such relations are not random connections, but are rather characterised by specific types of correspondence (e.g., Identity, Time, Role-Value, Analogy, etc.).

161 Note: for the sake of brevity, not all the elements of Table 1.1 have been diagrammed in the generic space in Diagram 1.1. Instead, Diagram 1.1 has been drawn to include the VERTICALITY schema and the corresponding contents for I₁ and I₂. The reader should note that all contents listed in Table 1.1 (and perhaps more) should also be included in the corresponding spaces.
embodied mind (i.e., image schemata and conceptual metaphor) provides an anchor point by which to ground human cognition, Fauconnier and Turner’s blending theory provides an analytical tool by which to examine such metaphors and their emergence at human scale. When applied to Paul, this methodological triad enables us to ground the apostle’s resurrection ideals within patterns of human embodiment while still accounting for the fundamental role and importance of cultural and historical analyses. In this way, cognitive linguistics enables us to integrate cognition and culture in a productive and informative way.

1.5 Overview of the Thesis

The chapters that follow will argue for a non-propositional, embodied understanding of Paul’s resurrection ideals. Our analysis will be directed toward the undisputed Pauline epistles, though we will also have occasion to examine a number of Jewish and broader Hellenistic traditions as well. While preference will be given to epistle-specific analyses, we will also consider Paul in his entirety, seeking to offer a holistic reading that understands the apostle as a consistent though not systematic thinker.162

The study will unfold as follows. In ch. 2 we will identify a framework within which resurrection texts can be both identified and interpreted. Rather than focusing on Paul specifically, we will instead examine a selection of second temple Jewish texts so as to uncover broader patterns of resurrection thinking. As we will see, Paul fits squarely within this cultural context.

In ch. 3 we will examine the cosmo-somatic categories of reality that Paul works with, specifically applying them to the transformation metaphors of 1 Cor 15.35-50 and 2 Cor 5.1-5. Here again we will contextualise Paul in his historical world, though

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162 So following Sanders’s characterisation (Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 433). One of the advantages of our methodological apparatus is that it enables the identification of recurrent conceptual structures that lend themselves to differing – even contradictory – manifestations at human scale. In this way, it is possible to indeed show Paul as a consistent though not systematic thinker. On this point, the present study stands in stark contrast to those who remain sceptical of the idea of a holistic Paul (e.g., Asher, Polarity and Change, 208).
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attention will be given to both Jewish and Hellenistic traditions. This chapter will specifically address issues of dualism and monism, and further examine the extent to which Paul envisions (dis)continuity across earthly and risen somatic states.

Chapter 4 will further develop the issue of trans-somatic (dis)continuity. Turning our attention to Paul’s descriptions of dying (and rising) with Christ in baptism (Rom 6-8), it will become clear that, by clarifying the nature of (dis)continuity we also clarify the extent to which Paul understands resurrection as a present experience. Such a task requires, however, a critical reassessment of Paul’s eschatology, which we will see to be thoroughly somatic in nature.

Continuing with the issue of resurrection as a present experience, in ch. 5 we will examine the relationship between Paul’s *in/with Christ* language and his resurrection ideals. As we will see, resurrection is understood as a participationist experience precisely because Paul perceives it to be currently enacted on the human body; that is to say, believers are currently in the process of being resurrected, continually dying on the somatic exterior such that life is continually manifested on the somatic interior.

Finally, we will conclude in ch. 6 by summarising the main contributions of chs. 1-5 and further suggest some avenues for subsequent research.
Chapter 2

Imaging Resurrection: Toward an Image Schematic Understanding of Resurrection Belief in Second Temple Judaism and Paul

A methodological issue that must be overcome when studying resurrection beliefs in Paul and second temple Judaism more broadly is the problem of demarcating the topic or concept of resurrection within the period literature. While certain passages stand as prime examples (e.g., Dan 12.1-3; 1 Thess 4.13-18; 1 Cor 15), several pericopes are disputed. Within broader second temple Judaism, the sectarian literature at Qumran is a prime example. Despite Émile Puech’s two volume encyclopedic treatment in favour of resurrection belief at Qumran, others such as John Collins consistently insist that there are no clear references to resurrection within the sectarian literature. At a more specific level, what are we to make of a tradition like Jub. 23.29-31, which affirms post-mortem existence but is variously interpreted as referring to either immortality of the soul or resurrection proper. The Enochic Book of Watchers poses a similar problem in as much as most scholars uphold the work as early evidence for Jewish resurrection belief, despite the fact that no explicit reference to resurrection can be found in it. Concerning

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3 Jubilees 23.29-31 is commonly held by exegetes as proposing something closer to the idea of immortality of the soul rather than resurrection (cf. H. C. C. Cavallin, Life After Death: Paul’s Argument for the Resurrection of the Dead in 1 Cor 15; Part 1: An Enquiry into the Jewish Background [ConBNT 7; Lund: Gleerup, 1974], 38). The immediate context of 23.22-32, however, does not mention a final judgment or historical break (though compare with 5.13-16; 10.7; 23.11), thus causing some to de-eschatologise the passage and instead see it as anticipating future judgment (thus N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003], 143-44). Alan Segal takes a middle ground, arguing “a sort of resurrection is blended with a sort of immortality of the soul, though neither one of them is a typical example of that belief” (Alan Segal, Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in Western Religion [New York: Doubleday, 2004], 355).
4 The reference in 1 En. 22.13 to the inhabitants of the fourth hollow not rising seems to imply that the inhabitants of the other three hollows will rise, though this is conjectural. This description,
the substance of resurrection discourse itself, though many texts speak of resurrection in
relation to notions of life and death, how are we to account for those that speak of ethno-
geographic (e.g., land and exile) or religio-political motifs (e.g., persecution and
injustice). The interrelation of these differing descriptions under the one topic
“resurrection” is surely part of the problem here, and any account of resurrection belief
in broader second temple Jewish thought (including Paul) must accommodate such
flexibility.

The problem is also evident in Paul. While certain passages certainly look ahead
to an eschatological resurrection-event (e.g., 1 Cor 15), in many instances the apostle
speaks of death as a present event that implies some form of resurrection in the present
(e.g., Rom 6.1-11; 2 Cor 4.7-18). Indeed, in one instance Paul’s resurrection ideals are
so strongly orientated toward the present that the apostle feels compelled to immediately
and emphatically insist the not-yet nature of risen existence (Phil 3.10-14).

The present chapter will address this issue of how one identifies the concept of
resurrection, specifically answering the question: what enables recognition of
resurrection within various discursive contexts? This analysis will make no attempt at
taxonomic classification but rather aims to illuminate interpretive flexibility. It is
suggested that any such analysis must meet three criteria. First, we must identify
recurrent patterns that are general enough to be found across the texts being studied, but
also specific enough to warrant distinction and cogency. Second, we must demonstrate
how such patterns are able to cut across discursive and topical contexts (e.g., addressing
issues of death, persecution/martyrdom, social injustice, national exile, etc.). Finally,

coupled with the recognition that resurrection likely necessitates some kind of post-mortem intermediary
state for the dead, causes many exegetes to see the Book of Watchers as presuming resurrection.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the Book of Watchers does not explicitly mention resurrection, even in
the description of the great judgment in chs. 1-5. Proponents include Segal, Life After Death, 279; Wright,
Resurrection, 157 (though Wright unfortunately evaluates all the Enochic material together as opposed to
individually); Cavallin, Life After Death, 41-42; and George W. E. Nickelsburg, Resurrection,
Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism and Early Christianity (Expanded ed.; HTS 56;
this analysis also needs to demonstrate how such patterns can give rise to differing (even contrary) understandings of resurrection while still retaining their overall systematicity.

This chapter is split into two parts. In §2.1 we will draw on cognitive linguistics so as to illuminate the image schemata and conceptual metaphors that structure, even constitute, the concept of RESURRECTION within second temple Judaism. Methodologically speaking, this analysis will be textual in nature and will focus upon those passages that stand as prime examples of resurrection beliefs within the pre-70 C.E. period literature – esp. Dan 12, 2 Macc (esp. ch. 7), the Epistle of Enoch, and the Similitudes of Enoch, but also Enoch’s Dream Visions, T. Mos. 10, and Ps. Sol. 3. Where needed, our analysis will also examine a number of biblical traditions so as to identify the conceptual world in which such notions are framed. In §2.2 we will then turn to Paul so as to examine the extent to which the image schematic patterns identified in §2.1 can be seen to also constitute the apostle’s resurrection ideals. Throughout the chapter our analysis will focus on identifying recurrent conceptual structures that work in concert with one another so as to constitute conceptualisations of RESURRECTION.

2.1 Second Temple Judaism and the RESURRECTION Gestalt

2.1.1 RESURRECTION IS UP – The VERTICALITY Schema

Perhaps the place to begin is with the framing of resurrection in relation to conceptualisations of LIFE and DEATH. We are justified in starting here for the simple

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5 Accordingly, we will not examine such literature as the Qumran sectarian documents (which are contested on the issue of resurrection), texts that refer to non-resurrection post-mortem existence (e.g., Wisdom), nor Puech’s reconstructed Hebrew Ben Sira fragment (cf. Émile Puech, “Ben Sira 48.11 et la Résurrection,” in Of Scribes and Scrolls: Studies on the Hebrew Bible, Intertestamental Judaism, and Christian Origins, Presented to John Strugnell on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday [eds. Harold W. Attridge, John J. Collins and Thomas H. Tobin S.J.; CTSRR 5; Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990], 81-90). Other notable exclusions include the T. 12 Patr. (which in their present form are Christian texts that date from the 2nd century C.E.) and the Enochic Book of Watchers (which perhaps refers to resurrection but not explicitly enough to warrant examination here – see fnnt. 4 of this chapter).

6 I use the term “biblical traditions” to refer to those works that emerged within Hebrew culture prior to Alexander’s conquest in the late 4th century B.C.E. The terms Hebrew Bible and Old Testament are intentionally not used so as to avoid anachronism. Though much of what we refer to as biblical overlaps with what eventually became know as the HB/OT (e.g., the Torah and Deuteronomistic history, the Prophets, the Psalms, and most of the Wisdom literature), in some cases the literature is much later, dating to the Hellenistic period (e.g., Dan, Eccl, Sir).
fact that, while resurrection can be identified in relation to notions of social injustice or national exile (for example), such descriptions are frequently expressed in the language of life and death (as we will see). Accordingly, notions of life and death provide entry points into the network of interlocking concepts that structure RESURRECTION. Because human experiences of life and death are so pervasive, several metaphors are required to make sense of said experiences;¹ the following will focus on Hebrew traditions that conceptualise LIFE/DEATH via the VERTICALITY schema, though we will stress similar descriptions that are premised upon the PROXIMITY schema below.

One of the most pervasive image schemata that Lakoff and Johnson identify is the VERTICALITY schema (or UP-DOWN schema – see Diagram 2.1), of which Johnson provides the following description:

We grasp this structure of verticality repeatedly in thousands of perceptions and activities we experience every day, such as perceiving a tree, our felt sense of standing upright, the activity of climbing stairs, forming a mental image of a flagpole, measuring our children’s heights, and experiencing the level of water rising in the bathtub. The VERTICALITY schema is the abstract structure of these VERTICALITY experiences, images, and perceptions.²

Lakoff and Johnson examine a handful of ways that the UP-DOWN image schema structures human thought.³ Of particular note for us are the metaphors LIFE IS UP and CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP, along with their corresponding opposites DEATH IS DOWN and UNCONSCIOUSNESS IS DOWN. Both of these metaphors share an interrelated experiential grounding. Humans experience life, for instance, through active, erect agency in the world. To be a living human being is to be able to stand up and walk around, while death conversely forces the otherwise erect and active body to fall down and lay limp, thus ceasing active agency. Correlated with this is the human experience of

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¹ Thus Lakoff and Turner, “life and death are such all-encompassing matters that there can be no single conceptual metaphor that will enable us to comprehend them” (George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989], 2). In their study of poetic metaphors in the Western literary tradition, Lakoff and Turner note at least 19 conceptual metaphors for LIFE/LIFETIME and 14 for DEATH (pp. 221-23). This list is not meant to be exhaustive, and it likely includes some metaphors that are exclusive to Western literature and others that are found in several cultures.


Diagram 2.1: Gestalt Structure of the VERTICALITY (or UP-DOWN) Schema
CONSCIOUSNESS, which Lakoff and Johnson understand generally as the experience of being able to exercise agency and perceptual awareness in the world (e.g., being asleep or in a coma are experiences of unconsciousness). Since the state of being awake and able to perceive is experienced in relation to erect agency, the CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP metaphor is rendered meaningful because it corresponds with recurrent embodied experiences. (The same is true of the obverse metaphor UNCONSCIOUSNESS IS DOWN, where conscious perception ceases when one physically lies down and sleeps.) In these ways, the conceptual metaphors LIFE IS UP and CONSCIOUSNESS IS UP arise because of the type of physical bodies that we have functioning in the environmental and habitual contexts in which we live.

The conceptual correlation of LIFE/DEATH with UP/DOWN can be nicely evinced in Hebrew tradition already in many biblical texts. Death, for instance, is repeatedly conceptualised in relation to downward directionality. It is described as something people dig for (Job 3.21; cf. Amos 9.2), and the Psalmist parallels the dead with those who “go down” (ךָ֣בִּיתָם) in silence. Job describes human death as lying down (ךָ֣בִּיתָם) and compared to rivers and lakes that dry up (14.10-12). Just as the water level is high when rivers and lakes are full, so too humans are characteristically up and erect when

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10 It should be noted that death is described variously in biblical tradition, many of which have been catalogued by Philip Johnston. For example, in some passages death is described as terminal (Ps 39.13; Job 7.21), while in others the dead have some kind of continued existence in the earth (e.g., Ps 22.30 – taking the BHS editors’ suggested reading). Other examples include the portrayal of יָהָּוֶה’s power over and presence within Sheol (e.g., compare Ps 88.5-6 with Amos 9.2), as well as the portrayal of death as both (in Johnston’s terminology) a friend (cf. Job 3.13) and an enemy (cf. Ps 55.4). For a full and succinct overview, see Philip S. Johnston, Shades of Sheol: Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 23-46.

11 The verb כָּבִּיתָם, which generally denotes downward movement, is used specifically of the dead in reference to going to Sheol (e.g., Gen 37.35; Num 16.30, 33; Ezk 31.15-17; 32.27; Ps 55.16; Job 7.9), to the Pit (with כָּבִּיתָם, see Isa 14.19 and 38.18; with כָּבִּיתָם see Ps 30.10; Job 33.24), to death (e.g., Prov 5.5), and to the dust (e.g., Ps 22.30).

12 Though the dating of Job is disputed, the present analysis includes the book among biblical materials (as defined in fn 6 of this chapter). We do not think the evidence of Job should be construed so as to affirm a post-mortem rising of the dead. Job 19.25-27 should thus be read against the backdrop of Job’s broader attitude towards death and therefore does not refer to resurrection (cf. Wright, Resurrection, 105).
they are alive. Likewise, just as water bodies dry up and leave only the parched ground, so too do the deceased leave only the dust of the ground; thus Gen 3.19: “from it [the ground] you were taken; you are dust, and to dust you will return” (cf. Job 34.15; Ps 22.30). Similarly, standing in cosmological opposition to heaven is Sheol, which exists at the lower strata of world (e.g., Job 11.8; Ps 139.8; Amos 9.2) – i.e., downward in relation to the plane of human existence. Like death, accessing Sheol requires that one descend into the earth (e.g., Gen 37.35; Ps 55.16; Prov. 9.18; Isa 14.15), while escape requires ascent (e.g., Ps 30.4; comp., e.g., Ps. 40.3). It is not surprising that the inhabitants of Sheol, the shades, are consistently described within the context of vertical orientation – either as being located downward or (un)able to rise up.

13 A similar image is found in 2 Sam 14.14 where human futility is likened to water that is poured on the ground and which cannot be gathered up again. The image here is a blending of both downward movement (in the act of “pouring” ) and displacement (in the futility of being able to gather again).

14 The same life-cycle referred to in Gen 3.19 is also described in Job 14.1-2, where the course of human life is likened to a flower that grows and then withers. This blend clearly correlates and contrasts life/vitality/erectness with death/inaction/lowness via the same UP-DOWN image schema.

15 In addition to Sheol, the related underworld term Abaddon occurs 6 times in biblical tradition (Prov 15.11; 27.20 [Qere]; Job 26.6; 28.22; 31.12; Ps 88.12), thrice paralleled with Sheol (Job 26.6; Prov 15.11; 27.20 [Qere]) and specifically having a downward orientation in Ps 88.12 and Job 31.12. Additionally, several synonyms for Sheol betray the same downward orientation. Most significantly are פָּרֹת (e.g., Pss 30.4; 88.5; 7; Isa 38.18) and פָּרֹי (e.g., Ps 16.10; Job 17.14; Isa 38.17), which in some contexts refer to “pit” (ertura and parai), “cistern” (parai), or “grave” (parai), but also clearly refer to the netherworld. To these we can also add כָּפָר, which is often translated “pit” or “well” (see, e.g., Gen 14.10; 21.19; Prov 5.15; Song 4.15) but is used twice to refer to the underworld (Pss 55.24; 69.16). We should also mention כָּמָר, which is also used to denote the lower levels of the earth, often in conjunction with the modifier יֵלֵדָה so as to emphasise downward directionality (e.g., Isa 44.23; Ps 139.15). In Ezek 26.20; 31.14, 16, 18; and 32.18, 24 this pairing refers specifically to the underworld, even being linked to פָּרֹת (except in Ezek 31.18) and כָּפָר (only Ezek 31.16). For similar usages, comp. Exod 15.12; Ps 63.10; Jer 17.13. For a full discussion of these terms, see, Johnston, Shades of Sheol, 83-85.

16 To this we should also add Isa 7.11.

17 Following Robert A. Oden, Jr., the “great majority of biblical texts assume the three-storied universe so clearly assumed in other, ancient traditions” (Robert A. Oden, Jr., “Cosmogony, Cosmology,” ABD 1.1162-71 [pp. 1167-68]). Generally speaking, this three-tiered cosmology included the heavens (where the gods dwelt), the earth (where living humanity dwelt), and the netherworld (where the dead and various chthonic deities dwelt). Notable exceptions may include Job 11.8-9 and Ps 139.8-9, which perhaps betray a four-tier universe.

18 Compare also the description that, should the ground open up, one would be swallowed (פָּרֹת) down (пар — Num 16.29-33). The personification of Sheol along consumptive lines is relatively common (e.g., Prov 1.12; Isa 5.14; Hab 2.5; comp. Prov 27.20; 30.16) and may reflect Canaanite mythological personification, though this has been questioned (cf. Hans M. Barstad, “Sheol וה 사람은 DDD 768-70).

19 This is particularly expressed in passages where the cosmological mapping is blended with experiences of pain/suffering, such that Sheol and its various synonyms stand for despair or trouble, from which YHWH will raise up the afflicted (e.g., Ps 40.3).

20 Cf. Isa 14.9; 26.14, 19; Ps 88.10; Job 26.5; Prov 2.18; 9.18; 21.16.
The correlation of death with downward movement in biblical tradition is also expressed in relation to language of sleeping and waking, which is reflective of the conceptual metaphors LIFE IS BEING AWAKE / DEATH IS SLEEP introduced in the previous chapter (recall Diagram 1.1). In biblical tradition these metaphors are expressed in discursive units where the dead are said to be “sleeping with their fathers,” an idiom used to describe the death of national leaders in the Torah and historical books. By extension, this conceptual structure enables subsequent reasoning about post-mortem life – namely, that the activity of entering post-mortem life is waking from death. Neither insignificantly nor surprisingly, the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS BEING AWAKE is pervasive in resurrection discourse. One of our earliest texts to evince this is Dan 12.2, which looks ahead to a time when many of the “sleepers in the dust of the earth” (אֶלֶף כְּסֵף כִּפְרֵשׁ הַנָּשִׁים) will be “woken” (אַרְגָּף). The same metaphor is also found in 2 Macc 12.44-45 and perhaps 1 En. 92.3, and related conceptions can be seen in 1 En. 100.5-6 and Ps. Sol. 3.1-2.

21 In biblical tradition, several contexts that use sleep related language likewise have correlations with death. The verb לְרַעְשׁ (“to lie down”) is elsewhere used in reference to the dead/death (e.g., Isa 14.8; 43.17; Ezek 31.18; 32.21, 27, 30; Job 3.13; 14.12), to lying in a grave (e.g., Ps 88.6), and to lying down in the dust (e.g., Job 7.21; 20.11; 21.26). Similarly, פֹּטַר, which is elsewhere used in reference to natural sleep (e.g., Gen 41.5; 1 Kgs 19.5; Ps 3.6; Isa 5.27; Ezek 34.25), is used by Jeremiah to refer to “a perpetual [or everlasting] sleep” (Jer 51.39, 57; cf. Job 3.13; Ps 13.4), and also by the Psalmist to refer to “all who sleep in the earth” (Ps 22.30 – following the BHS editors’ suggest to read פֹּטַר rather than פֹּטַר). The cognate פֹּטַר “sleep” is used in Job 14.12 (cf. Jer 51.39 and 57) to refer to the sleep from which mortals neither “wake” (גָּהָב) nor “rouse” (הַגָּב). The verb פֹּטְרָה “to wake” is used elsewhere to denote the impossibility of waking from the dead (cf. Jer 51.39, 57), though its usage in Isa 26.19 suggests the opposite.

22 E.g., Jacob (Gen 47.30), Moses (Deut 31.16), David (e.g., 2 Sam 7.12; 1 Kgs 2.10), Solomon (1 Kgs 11.43 // 2 Chr 9.31), and several other monarchs. The related idiom “gathered to his people” is found in the Torah and is used of all the Patriarchs when they die (Gen 25.8, 17; 35.29; 49.33), as well as of Moses (Num 27.13; 31.2; Deut 32.50) and Aaron (Num 20.24; Deut 32.50); the phrase also has some parallels in the historical books (Judg 2.10; 2 Kgs 22.20 // 2 Chr 34.28).

23 Both the OG and θ̱ use the same verb “to sleep” (καθέναιο), though with different descriptions of the earth.

24 In addition to other UP-DOWN language in 2 Macc 12.44-45, death is described as those who have “fallen asleep” (κοιμώματι – 12.45).

25 In J En. 93.2, the description of the righteous one waking and walking in the way of righteousness may be a collective singular speaking of resurrection, though this is disputed (cf. Loren T. Stuckenbruck, 1 Enoch 91-108 [CEJL; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007], 227-29).

26 In J En. 100.5-6, the focus seems to be upon those righteous who have already died and are now awaiting a future judgment. This passage is reflective of the DEATH IS SLEEP metaphor, though it does not mention a correlated future waking (cf. George W. E. Nickelsburg, 1 Enoch: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch, Chapters 1-36: 81-108 [Hermeneia; Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 2001], 501; Stuckenbruck, 1 Enoch 91-108, 442-43).
The gestalt nature of the up-down image schema requires that one not only identify the elements associated with up but also those associated with down. Put differently, we must identify both the activity of rising and the context that occasions such rising (what cognitive linguists identify as the profile-frame relationship).\textsuperscript{29} Within the period literature we can point to several different frames wherein resurrection is emphasised. Some texts call forth the social injustice frame (e.g., Epistle of Enoch) while others see resurrection as a response to persecution (e.g., 2 Macc). Depending on the frame employed, the roles of protagonist(s) and antagonist(s) take on differing values. For example, texts framed by social injustice fill such roles with the values poor/rich respectively, while the persecution frame provides values like martyr/wicked ruler(s).\textsuperscript{30} Each frame provides the skeletal gestalt structure with a richer set of contextual nuances, thus enabling the concept of resurrection to take varying and distinct nuances across discursive settings.

For example, the persecution frame, which is employed in 2 Macc, frames resurrection in relation to a series of grotesque Antiochan martyrdoms, thus looking ahead to the regaining of corporeal bodies (e.g., 7.10-11; 14.43-46).\textsuperscript{31} This focus on corporeality demonstrates the extent to which conceptual metaphors such as life is being awake / death is sleep enable emergent meaning not otherwise possible. In biblical tradition the correlation of sleep with death was initially in the service of

\textsuperscript{28} In Ps. Sol. 3 the language of sleeping and waking frames the entire passage. Though it is not used to describe resurrection specifically, emphasis throughout the Psalm is placed upon both being awake (vv. 1-2) and the value of life (vv. 9-12). Further, the description of the Lord as “awake” (γρηγόρησις – v. 2) coheres well with the Psalm’s focus on life, light, and other up-orientated images.


\textsuperscript{30} Such frames and their values are, of course, culture-specific and thus demonstrate variance.

We have proposed here typical values (e.g., the poor and the rich); in actuality we see at times many synonymous values existing within a single frame. For example, the Epistle of Enoch, which is framed to a great extent with the social injustice frame, refers to the protagonists and antagonists variously (e.g., protagonists: righteous, wise, suffering ones, etc.; vis-à-vis antagonists: sinners, foolish, rich, etc.).

\textsuperscript{31} We should of course not make too much of such presumed post-mortem corporeality, for it is doubtless tied to the martyrriological situation that 2 Macc addresses. Corporeal resurrection is envisaged as a response to the horrible and gruesome deaths that are described, and such cannot be disconnected from the frame structure inherent in the texts narratological world.
describing death vis-à-vis sleep, though it is now extended to enable post-mortem speculation concerning renewed life. When extended in this way, the blend entails the conceptual metaphor RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS, where the experience of conscious human agency in the world provides a set of conceptual mappings that inform one’s understandings of resurrection. In this way, the RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor enables interpreters to conceptualise resurrection variously, including (but not limited to) resurrection state (i.e., as awake, standing up, even being embodied, etc.), the resurrection event itself (e.g., as waking up), or even certain characteristic activities (e.g., risen beings are active agents, they can perform certain actions, etc.). There is much interpretive play here, as the conceptual metaphor allows for variance in meaning depending on how certain readers use it.

Another context that frames Jewish notions of resurrection is that of (CELESTIAL) LUMINOSITY, which is expressive of a more general trend toward the clustering of UP-structured concepts with a given frame’s protagonists (e.g., the righteous) and DOWN-structured concepts with the antagonists (e.g., the sinners). A prime example is the association of light/darkness with said protagonist/antagonist. From an embodied perspective, light is most commonly experienced during the day and darkness at night, both of which naturally cohere with the LIFE IS BEING AWAKE and DEATH IS SLEEP metaphors. Similarly, light is perceived as coming primarily from the sun and moon (which are orientationally up), while darkness is found in caves and places that are hidden from the sun/moon (i.e., in the earth, which is down). Within the period literature, the highest resurrection ideal in Dan 12.3 is that the wise are elevated to shine as celestial bodies/beings. Similar post-judgment luminous elevation is also found in passages that either characterise the protagonists with light terminology or simply speak

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32 Though perhaps it was minimally focused upon the after life with the existence of the shades. On this, Wright astutely notes: “The minimal sort of ‘life’ that the shades had in Sheol, or in the grave, approximated more to sleep than to anything else known by the living. … They were not completely non-existent, but to all intents and purposes they were, so to speak, next to nothing” (Wright, Resurrection, 90).
of them as standing in the light of the Lord, often in contrast to the antagonists (e.g., 1 En. 58.2-6; 62.15-16; 104.2; Ps. Sol. 3.12; T. Mos. 10.9; comp. 1 En. 39.7). The conceptual metaphor at work in such passages is reflective of the more general RESURRECTION IS UP metaphor, here understood via the specific frames LUMINOSITY or even CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY.

One final frame that structures conceptualisations of RESURRECTION via the UP-DOWN image schema is that of NATIONAL RESTORATION, which correlates LIFE/DEATH with LAND/EXILE. Though the concept of LAND is not readily associated with notions of VERTICALITY, the correlation of land with life, which stretches back into biblical literature, enables metaphors such as LAND IS LIFE (UP) and EXILE IS DEATH (DOWN). The Deuteronomist, for instances, correlates “life,” “land,” and “Torah” such that obeying the Lord’s commands will bring life and blessing in the land (Deut 30.11-20).33 In the prophets, Ezek 37.1-14 envisions the post-exilic restoration of the nation as an instance of dry bones “standing” (מגnoticed – 37.10) such that the nation will come “up” (יָשַׁב) from the grave and thus return “to the land of Israel” (לארשי, אַבְרָם – 37.12).34 Similarly, Isa 26.19 refers to the dead coming to “life” (חיים), “rising” (חדש), and “waking” (תעורר). Within the Isaianic context such references are most likely concerned with national restoration,35 though in light of the LAND IS LIFE metaphor it is perhaps not surprising

33 While Deut 30.16 correlates “life,” “land,” and “Torah,” the converse is upheld in vv. 17-18 where disobedience and the worship of other gods is said to lead to death and a truncated stay in the land. Moses continues by paralleling life/blessing and death/curse (v. 19), and he explicitly connects “land” with “life” in v. 20. Unlike the LIFE IS BEING AWAKE metaphor discussed above, here the UP-DOWN image schema does not tie the various conceptual domains together (i.e., LIFE/DEATH and LAND/EXILE) but is rather projected from one domain (LIFE) onto the other (LAND). This is what Fauconnier and Turner refer to as a single scope blend (Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities [New York: Basic Books, 2002], 126-31).

34 The nation is also described in 37.12 as coming “up” (יָשַׁב) from the grave.

35 Donald Polaski has recently argued that this verse is not only consonant with the broader chapter (and therefore not a later interpolation), but that the focus of the passage is squarely upon the national restoration of Israel. Thus Polaski: “the most telling piece of evidence … is the focus of ch. 26 on corporate bodies, including ‘national’ groupings [comp. 26.2, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16-18, and 20-21]” (Donald C. Polaski, Authorizing an End: The Isaiah Apocalypse and Intertextuality [BibIntS 50; Leiden: Brill, 2001], 214). Several other exegetes concur with Polaski’s assessment (see, e.g., Brian Doyle, The Apocalypse of Isaiah Metaphorically Speaking: A Study of the Use, Function and Significance of Metaphors in Isaiah 24-27 [BETL 151; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000], 304-305 and John J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature [2d ed.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998], 25).
that many interpreters – ancient and modern – see this passage as referring to resurrection.

Within subsequent Jewish tradition, the framing of RESURRECTION in relation to Israel’s ethno-geographic identity thus produces the metaphor RESURRECTION IS RESTORATION TO THE LAND. *Enoch’s Dream Visions*, for example, describes the post-judgment reuniting of many who were dispersed and destroyed (*1 En. 90.33*). Similarly, in several other texts the recipients of resurrection are the members of Israel herself vis-à-vis foreign rulers/oppressors (e.g., *Dan 12.1-3*, *2 Macc; T. Mos. 10.7-10*). In these texts both eschatological resurrection and national restoration are structured by the same UP-DOWN schema, which allows these ideas to not only signify each other but also enables later interpreters to find one in the other.

We have demonstrated that the VERTICALITY image schema is pervasive within second temple Jewish notions of resurrection. All the metaphors examined thus far are expressive of the very general conceptual metaphor RESURRECTION IS UP, a conceptual mapping that has little meaning on its own. However, when framed in relation to differing aspects of Jewish experience (e.g., erect human agency [CONSCIOUSNESS],

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36 In the Septuagint tradition, for instance, the focus is more explicitly upon the act of rising (note the renderings ἀνεστήσονται and ἐγερθήσονται for the MT יָשָׂר and יָשָׂר). Wright suggests that during the Hellenistic period this passage was understood as referring to resurrection (Wright, *Resurrection*, 116-18). Alternatively, the MT’s third reference to those who will live again (“awake and sing for joy, oh dwellers of the dust” [*1 En. 90.33*]) is translated “and those in the earth/land will rejoice” (καὶ εὐφρανθήσονται οἱ ἐν τῇ γη). Given this shift away from the actual description of “rising,” at least one modern commentator has argued that the Greek text looks ahead to those who will survive the judgment in the land (cf. Cavallin, *Life After Death*, 106-107).

37 E.g., Nickelsburg sees in *Isa 24-27* the simultaneous affirmation of Israel’s restoration and the resurrection of those Israelites who are deceased (though the resurrection of the wicked is not affirmed – Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life*, 31-32).

38 Such a tendency is compounded by the presence of other motifs and themes that are representative of later resurrection descriptions (e.g., the affirmation of cosmic catastrophic destruction [*Isa 24*], the promise that YHWH will destroy death [*Isa 25.8*]), which in turn betray other image schemata that structure resurrection conceptualisations (as argued in this chapter).

39 Thus following those who read Dan 12 as a resurrection of some of the righteous and the wicked, which then results in contrasting fates of these two groups (cf. John J. Collins, *Daniel: A Commentary on the Book of Daniel* [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993], 393). For an alternative view see Émile Puech, “Resurrection: The Bible and Qumran,” in *The Bible and the Dead Sea Scrolls, Volume 2: The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Qumran Community* (ed. James H. Charlesworth; Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2006), 247-81 (pp. 252-55).

40 The references within many texts to a post-judgment restoration and inheritance of the earth might also fall within this category as well (e.g., *1 En. 51.5b*), though this is broader than a strict understanding of exilic return.
national restoration [LAND], etc.), the metaphor can be specified so as to find distinct meanings across discursive contexts.

2.1.2 RESURRECTION IS GOAL – The PATH Schema

Another image schematic structure, which functions at both a macro and micro level in structuring second temple Jewish understandings of resurrection, is the PATH schema (or SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema). In an important respect, the PATH schema supplements its VERTICALITY counterpart so as to enable conceptual structure not made possible by the latter. As with UP-DOWN, the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema functions as a gestalt structure – i.e., the schema has a basic set of interdependent elements that all work in concert with one another (e.g., a SOURCE, a TRAJECTOR, a PATH, etc. – see Diagram 2.2). Like all image schemata, the PATH schema is pervasive in human experience; thus Johnson:

> Our lives are filled with paths that connect up our spatial world. … Some of these paths involve an actually physical surface that you traverse, such as the path from your house to the store. Others involve a projected path, such as the path of a bullet shot into the air. And certain paths exist, at present, only in your imagination, such as the path from the Earth to the nearest star outside our solar system.

Though no one in the Graeco-Roman world would ever conceive the path a bullet would travel, they would certainly perceive the path of an archer’s arrow, or of a thrown stone. Johnson is here illuminating an image schematic structure that is commonly shared by the human animal across cultural contexts.

2.1.2.1 The Macro-PATH Structure:

At the macro level, the PATH schema provides the concept of RESURRECTION with a more robust structure than the VERTICALITY schema alone permits. This robustness is akin to the difference between a one- and two-dimensional object; where the VERTICALITY schema enabled conceptions along a single axis (orientated vertically), the PATH structure creates a second axis, which can be conceptualised as running horizontally.

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41 For an overview of the PATH schema, see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 32-34.
Diagram 2.2: Gestalt Structure of the PATH (or SOURCE-PATH-GOAL) Schema

The PATH schema contains the following elements (or roles).

A trajector (TR) that moves
A source location (the staring point)
A goal (i.e., an intended destination of the trajector)
A route from the source to the goal
The actual trajectory of motion
The position of the trajector at a given time
The direction of the trajector at that time
The actual final destination of the trajector, which may or may not be the intended destination

Based on Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 32-34.
The most common expression of the PATH schema is via the structuring of time as progressing toward looming divine visitation. For example, Dan 12.1-3 looks ahead to “the time of the end” (11.40) in which a great judgment will take place (12.1-3).

Several other texts likewise point to similar teleological judgments, which are reflective of the same schematic structuring (e.g., Enoch’s Dream Visions [esp. 1 En. 90.20-27]; the Epistle of Enoch [esp. 1 En. 99.11-102.3]; the Enochic Book of Similitudes [esp. 1 En. 51; 62]; Ps. Sol. 3.11-12; and T. Mos. 10).

In some instances the SOURCE and GOAL elements are characterised by values such as present conflict and resurrection/judgment (respectively). Other texts, however, scale the PATH structure to a much larger degree, thus identifying the present distress as a single event on the path toward resurrection. Such is the case in 2 Maccabees; the martyrdom of the seven brothers and their mother in ch. 7 is particularly worth noting. In 7.23, the mother asserts that the creator of the world, who has “formed” humankind, “will give breath and life back to you again” (v. 23). Of note is the mother’s focus upon God as the “creator” (v. 23) who restores life in the end (GOAL) on account of his creative impetus in the beginning (SOURCE). The hope of these Antiochan martyrs is premised upon the assertion that history has an inevitable outcome, a teleological drive

43 Other expressions of this schema can also be demonstrated, such as the use of Two-Ways theology in the midst of resurrection contexts. While Nickelsburg suggests that the blending of Two-Ways theology with resurrection was only possible once the idea of resurrection became a topos and thereby eschewed its initial associations with suffering/persecution, we suggest that such blending was possible because the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure easily lent itself to Two-Ways descriptions (see Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 214-15).

44 Collins rightly sees this as referring primarily to the anticipated end of the present crisis (i.e., the Antiochan conflict) but also as drawing upon a “mythic pattern,” attested within Hebrew tradition, which is concerned with the destruction and restoration of Israel (Collins, Daniel, 389). Not surprisingly, such a mythic pattern is littered with tight correlations between UP-DOWN and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schematic structures. An excellent example is Isa 14.1-20, which speaks of Judah’s return from exile. The passage stresses the abasement (e.g., ð sworn and ð11-12, 15) of the King of Babylon, a kind of setting right of the social order such that the exiles who were once under foreign rule will one day be themselves rulers (14.2). The entire passage is premised upon an UP-DOWN interplay where the downfall of the King of Babylon is juxtaposed with the elevation of Israel to a place of political independence. This restoration manifests the HAVING CONTROL IS UP / BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL IS DOWN metaphors (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 15), articulated here in relation to the metaphor (RETURN TO THE LAND IS UP (cf. 14.1). This entire UP-DOWN drama is envisioned as a promised future event (GOAL), and thus is yet to come (cf. 14.1). Though Isa 14 is not explicitly identifiable within Dan 12.1-3, the shared coupling of the UP-DOWN and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schemas constitute the shared mythic ideal of future redemption in the face of current calamity.
that flows from SOURCE to GOAL, and which thus diminishes physical death in light of anticipated resurrection (7.9).\textsuperscript{45} Such a teleological feature further demonstrates the inherent sense of purpose that accompanies conceptualisations of RESURRECTION, which is doubtless tied to the presence of the PATH schema.\textsuperscript{46}

Beyond the mere structuring of time, the interrelation of the PATH and VERTICALITY schemata creates tight correlations between the constituent elements. This is expressed in two ways: (1) through the correlation of DOWN-structured concepts with the SOURCE element (e.g., death, exile, injustice), and (2) the correlation of UP-structured concepts with the GOAL element (e.g., renewed life, national restoration, just recompense). What results is a PATH structure that is, conceptually speaking, vertically inclined so as to denote sequential movement from DOWN (SOURCE) to UP (GOAL) via PATH (see Diagram 2.3). As we have noted above, the roles of protagonist(s) and antagonist(s) are filled with either UP- or DOWN-structured values respectively. With this in mind, the gradient structure that we have just outlined is, of course, described from the point of view of the protagonist(s) (i.e., SOURCE [DOWN] to GOAL [UP]). Because the concept of opposition is not only inherent in the UP-DOWN schema (i.e., UP is opposite from DOWN) but also presumed in many of the frames employed (i.e., opposing character roles), an obverse path is projected for the antagonist(s) (i.e., SOURCE [UP] to GOAL [DOWN]). The resultant structure is vertical sequential movement wherein opposing

\textsuperscript{45} Though the youngest brother’s comments in 7.36 may imply the immediacy of these martyrs’ resurrection, on the whole 2 Macc understands resurrection as an eschatological event (cf. 12.43-45). Moreover, the martyrs of ch. 7 speak of both resurrection and the judgment of their oppressors as a future event (cf. 7.9, 19, 36), and though the temporal period is not specified, a broader teleological focus is likely in mind (cf. Wright, Resurrection, 150-52).

\textsuperscript{46} Lakoff and Johnson note that one of the primary metaphors that the human animal uses to conceptualise purposes is that of PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, which is built upon the PATH schema (Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 52-53). The primary experiences from which this metaphor arises are, as Lakoff and Johnson suggest, embodied experiences such as “reaching destinations throughout everyday life and thereby achieving purposes (e.g., if you want a drink, you have to go to the water cooler)” (Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 53). In 2 Macc, and other period literature too, martyrdom is seen as an acceptable end precisely because natural death is not an end in and of itself. Rather, natural death is only one step along the temporal path (i.e., PATH) towards resurrection (i.e., GOAL). The same idea is found in other period literature too (e.g., Collins rightly notes that “Daniel 10–12 ... provides a rationale for martyrdom. ... The hope for salvation is beyond death” [Collins, Daniel, 403 (emphasis added)]).
Diagram 2.3: Integrated
PATH and VERTICALITY Schematic Structure

Diagram 2.4: Reciprocal
Protagonist and Antagonist TRAJECTORS

Legend:
TR – P: Protagonist(s)
TR – A: Antagonist(s)
role-value figures traverse reciprocal paths, one toward GOAL (UP), the other toward GOAL (DOWN). (This is sketched in Diagram 2.4.)

The reciprocal nature of this gradient structural interrelation results in the concept of REVERSAL, expressed via the conceptual metaphor RESURRECTION IS REVERSAL and thus facilitating the elevation of the protagonists vis-à-vis the abasement of the antagonists. The structure is readily apparent in the Epistle of Enoch (esp. 1 En 99.11-102.3), where the righteous enjoy post-mortem recompense/reward, including luminous existence (104.2), while the unrighteous/sinners go down to Hades into darkness and great judgment (103.7-8). Similarly, Dan 12.1-3 holds that some will be raised to “everlasting life” (ζωή αἰώνιον) and others to “shame and everlasting disgrace” (τιμωτική ἀναστάσεις – 12.2).

We should of course note that ideas of anticipated judgment and post-mortem reversal are not exclusive to resurrection contexts but are also found in other Jewish afterlife reflections (e.g., Wis. 5). Nonetheless, we have demonstrated a tight connection between the PATH and VERTICALITY schemata in structuring conceptualisations of RESURRECTION. Accordingly, these tight correlations result in varying frames of second temple Jewish experience producing varying expressions of resurrection – e.g., death/martyrdom (RESTORED LIFE IS GOAL), national restoration (RESTORATION TO THE LAND IS GOAL), or even social injustice (JUST RECOMPENSE IS GOAL). All are reflective of the more general RESURRECTION IS GOAL metaphor.

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47 Both OG and θ’ “everlasting life” (ζωήν αἰώνιον).
48 OG “to disgrace, and others to dispersion and [and contempt] everlasting” (εἰς ὀνειδισμόν, οἱ δὲ εἰς διασπορὰν [καὶ αἰσχρον] αἰώνιον – note: the bracketed words are a doublet found in papyri 967 [cf. Collins, Daniel, 369, fnnt. 8]); θ’ “to disgrace and everlasting shame” (εἰς ὀνειδισμόν καὶ εἰς αἰσχρόν αἰώνιον).
49 Wisdom 5 presumably looks ahead to a judgment where the righteous and the wicked will receive their respective recompense. In its current form the text does not speak of resurrection, but does affirm the immortality of the righteous (cf. Cavallin, Life After Death, 126-34; Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 112-15).
2. Imaging Resurrection

2.1.2.2 The Micro-PATH (CHANGE) Structure:

In addition to offering an overarching framework (at the macro level) whereby UP- and DOWN-structured concepts can be organised, the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema is also used to structure a specific sub-set of resurrection ideals – namely, the idea of post-mortem transformation. In this regard, the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema is employed twice in constructing the concept of RESURRECTION – once at the macro level to provide an overarching framework, and again at the micro level to enable the concept of CHANGE in relation to post-mortem form.

As noted already, texts such as Dan 12.3, 1 En. 104.2, and T. Mos. 10.9-10 frame their resurrection ideals with celestial categories. In Dan 12 celestial association is reserved only for the wise whereas in 1 En. 104 it is for the righteous and in T. Mos. 10 it is a national hope. In Dan 12.3 the comparison is made with the stars and luminous heavens, and is specifically characterised by temporal length (i.e., shining forever).\(^{50}\) Because angels are at times described with such luminary imagery (e.g., Job 38.7; 1 En. 86.1, 3; 90.21), this comparison may be understood in terms of angelic likeness and even angelomorphic transformation, though this is not explicit in Daniel. Very similar language is used in 1 En. 104.2, where the comparison is directly correlated with heavenly beings in the Ethiopic text (cf. 104.4, 6).\(^{51}\) By contrast, in T. Mos. 10.9 God will raise his people and fix them in the “heaven of the stars,” a celestial elevation that is specifically contrasted with Israel’s enemies on earth (10.10).

\(^{50}\) In Dan 12.3 it is said that the wise will be “like” (ז) the stars and the brightness of the sky (v.3a, b); the ז here is certainly comparative but could also be understood as an assertive expression of identity (i.e., categorical change – using Williams’s categories [Ronald J. Williams, Hebrew Syntax: An Outline (2d ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), §256 and §261]). The Greek translations of Dan 12.3 retain the same comparative quality – the OG uses ως (v.3a) and ωςει (v.3b), θ only uses ως (v.3a, b).

\(^{51}\) Similar to Daniel, in the Epistle the righteous are said to shine and appear “like” (ωςει) the stars of heaven (104.2), and later called “companions” of the angels of heaven (104.6). Though the references to angels in vv. 4 and 6 are only found in the Ethiopic text, Stuckenbruck suggest they were originally in the Greek Vorlage and even offers a reconstruction (Stuckenbruck, 1 Enoch 91-108, 567). Nickelsburg’s translation is used here.
The introduction of **CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY** to resurrection conceptualisations results in the metaphor **RESURRECTION IS CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY**, which differs significantly from the aforementioned **RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS** metaphor. That said, both metaphors have strong elements of **VERTICALITY** built into them (as noted above), and they also presuppose the concept of **POST-MORTEM CHANGE**. In the **CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY** metaphor, the envisaged change is more imaginative and radical (i.e., pre-mortem human bodies neither shine like stars nor exist up in heaven).

Alternatively, the **CONSCIOUSNESS** metaphor envisions the reconstitution of the human body, which requires the changing of the decomposed corpse into a corporeal state. Thus, while the **CONSCIOUSNESS** and **CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY** metaphors result in very different resurrected states, both presuppose post-mortem change.

From an embodied perspective, experiences of change are ubiquitous within human life patterns. The human body experiences change in mundane tasks such as sitting up (change of position) and walking across the room (change of location). Throughout the course of life, the process of human maturation is marked by many physical (e.g., growth, fitness conditioning, puberty, etc.) and social (e.g., shifting social circles, relationships, marriage, work, etc.) changes, and the process of growing from a baby into an adult is both immediately experienced and observed in others. One of the most common and basic experiences of change is that of using force to manipulate an object from one shape into another, such as a potter moulding clay into a bowl.  

Given both the ubiquitous and complex nature of such experiences, several different metaphors are used by the human animal to conceptualise change. One of the most basic is the **CHANGE IS MOVEMENT** metaphor, which is premised upon the **PATH** image schema, thus enabling **CHANGE** to be conceptualised as **movement** from one...

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52 Lakoff and Johnson highlight this experience, providing examples such as changing a log into a canoe, or lead into gold (Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 208-09).

53 For other change metaphors (e.g., **CHANGE IS REPLACEMENT**), see Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 206-11.
location to another. In addition to this, however, one must also account for differences between both pre- and post-change states. Such states are commonly conceptualised via the CONTAINER schema (see Diagram 2.5), which is orientated along a simple IN-BOUNDARY-OUT axis. When constructed in this way, both locations and states are conceptualised as containers that can be either moved into or out of. Both the PATH and CONTAINER schemata work interdependently with each other so as to form a CHANGE gestalt (see Diagram 2.6). Here the SOURCE and GOAL roles of the PATH schema are supplemented such that each is characterised by opposing CONTAINERS. These CONTAINERS represent differing states/locations (i.e., A and B), and the TRAJECTOR represents the subject undergoing the change in question. What results is a conceptual structure that facilitates the movement of a TRAJECTOR from one CONTAINER (state/location A) to another (differing) CONTAINER (state/location B). This coheres with Lakoff and Johnson, who characterise the CHANGE IS MOVEMENT metaphor as “a change of state as a movement from one bounded region in space to another.”

Returning to conceptions of RESURRECTION, the CHANGE IS MOVEMENT metaphor functions at a micro level in as much as it structures the GOAL element of the larger SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema (see Diagram 2.7). As such, it characterises the UP-structured associations that are made with the protagonists in two significant ways, both of which can be nicely demonstrated with respect to the RESURRECTION IS CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY metaphor. On the one hand, the CHANGE IS MOVEMENT metaphor expresses

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54 Like the other schemata examined here, the CONTAINER schema arises from human embodiment; thus Johnson, “[o]ur encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most pervasive features of our bodily experience. … From the beginning, we experience constant physical containment in our surroundings (those things that envelope us). We move in and out of rooms, clothes, vehicles, and numerous kinds of bounded spaces. We manipulate objects, placing them in containers (cups, boxes, cans, bags, etc.). In each of these cases there are repeatable spatial and temporal organisations. In other words, there are typical schemata for physical containment” (Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 21).

55 This builds upon Lakoff and Johnson’s STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor, where they define “locations” as “bounded regions in space. Each bounded region has an interior, an exterior, and a boundary” (Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 180). Earlier in the same work, Lakoff and Johnson explicitly define the container schema as denoting “a bounded region in space” (p. 31). In my analysis I am stressing the CONTAINER image schematic structure of the STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor.

56 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 183-84.
Diagram 2.5: Gestalt Structure of the CONTAINER (or IN-OUT) Schema

The CONTAINER schema contains the following elements (or roles).
An interior (IN)
A boundary for the interior
An exterior (OUT)

Adapted from Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 31-32.

Diagram 2.6: The Micro-PATH (CHANGE) Gestalt

STATE/LOCATION A

TR

STATE/LOCATION B
Diagram 2.7: Integrated Micro-PATH Structure
a change of *location* such that the elevated protagonists are no longer on earth but in the heavens (e.g., Dan 12.3; *1 En* 104.2 [cf. v.6]; *T. Mos.* 10.9-10). In this regard, the change in question is concerned with movement (i.e., a *TRAJECTOR* moving along the *PATH* toward the *GOAL* [celestial placement]). In a more categorical way, however, the same metaphor can also be extended to refer to stative or *transformative* change. Conceptually speaking, this *CHANGE* is *both* locative (i.e., point *A* to point *B*) *and* stative (i.e., state *A* into state *B*) change, thus producing descriptions of both celestial ascent *and* celestial transformation.

Similar change dynamics can also be demonstrated for the *RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS* metaphor, though the meaning that arises from the CONSCIOUSNESS frame vis-à-vis the CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY frame differs. On the one hand, the CONSCIOUSNESS frame produces the idea of *restorative transformation* (i.e., restoration of the natural body), which gives rise to understandings of resurrection such as redemption and a kind of setting right that which has gone awry. On the other hand, the CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY frame produces the idea of *categorical transformation*, which is usually seen as transformation into a more desirable state and thus produces notions of an improved and even beatific future. These two notions are central to resurrection modes of thought, and while they are both somewhat inherent with each other, it is helpful to contrast them in this way.

**2.1.2.3 Summary: The PATH Schema**

Our examination of the period literature has demonstrated that the PATH schema structures many conceptual aspects of second temple Jewish resurrection ideals. This schema functions at both macro and micro levels, the former constructing notions of time and purpose while the latter concerns conceptions of transformation. We have also demonstrated that the PATH schema works interdependently with its VERTICALITY
counterpart, thus resulting in notions of reversal as well as opposing protagonist/antagonist TRAJECTOR movements.

2.1.3 RESURRECTION IS NEAR – The PROXIMITY Schema

In §2.1.1 we demonstrated that the VERTICALITY schema is utilised in structuring notions of both life and death. Because experiences of life and death concern all aspects of human existence, several conceptual metaphors are required to make sense of said experiences. An important counterpart to the VERTICALITY metaphors examined above is the structuring of LIFE/DEATH by the PROXIMITY (or NEAR-FAR) schema. Within this metaphor system, LIFE and DEATH are conceptualised not as opposing verticality but rather opposing proximity values; life is understood as being near to something (LIFE IS NEAR) while death is marked by a certain degree of separation or distance (DEATH IS FAR). Such PROXIMITY metaphors find expression in both biblical and second temple Jewish traditions – we analyse both in turn.

John Collins identifies two “strands of thought” in the HB that were “conducive” to second temple Jewish resurrection ideals: (a) the emphasis on union and enjoyment of God within God’s presence, and (b) the restoration of the nation.57 We have already examined the latter above (§2.1.1); we now turn our attention to the former. The LIFE IS NEAR / DEATH IS FAR metaphors emerge from Israel’s rich textual traditions, esp. the Psalter. In Ps 73, for instance, the psalmist insists, “those far from you will perish … but for me, nearness to God is good” (בּוֹפֶל יִנְשָׁא לִימַל שֵׁם יִהְוֵה – 73.27-28). This same psalmist earlier speaks of entering the sanctuary of the Lord (v.17), confesses his desire for the Lord (vv. 25-26), and even speaks of the Lord holding the psalmist’s hand and guiding him such that they are always together (vv.23-25). In all these instances the PROXIMITY schema is framed by descriptions of divine-human propinquity, and while death is explicitly correlated with distance (DEATH IS DISTANCE FROM YHWH – v.27), the

57 Collins, Daniel, 394-98 (citations from p. 394).
corresponding opposite is implied (LIFE IS BEING NEAR TO YHWH). 58 The same metaphors are also at work in Ps 91, where the psalmist addresses those who “dwell in the shelter of the Most High, who lodge in the shadow of the Almighty” (v.1). This very intimate expression of divine-human proximity results in both the protection and sustained-life of the protagonist vis-à-vis the antagonist (91.3-6, 7-8, 14-16). 59

Like other image schemata, PROXIMITY is rooted in recurrent patterns of human embodiment. It emerges from experiences such as walking toward an external object such that one’s location is measured relative to that object (e.g., walking toward a tree is movement from FAR to NEAR relative to said tree). As embodied social beings, one of the primary ways humans experience PROXIMITY is within relationships. Those we are intimate with are close to us (spatially speaking); likewise, those whom we do not wish to associate with are (ideally) kept at a distance. As Joseph Grady highlights, this recurring social phenomenon constitutes a correlation between affection and physical proximity, which itself gives rise to a number of conceptual metaphors (e.g., EMOTIONAL INTIMACY IS PROXIMITY). 60 In the contexts examined here, these experiences of human intimacy are projected onto the divine figure himself, thus resulting in the LIFE IS BEING NEAR TO YHWH metaphor.

One of the most striking features of the biblical material is the way the PROXIMITY, VERTICALITY, and PATH schemata are already correlated with one another. In Amos 5, for instance, the prophet instructs the house of Israel to “seek the Lord and live” (v.6; cf. v.14), specifically contrasting this imperative with

58 Psalm 73 also stresses other motifs that we have already encountered: e.g., the contrasting of protagonists (i.e., the upright, 73.1) with antagonists (i.e., the wicked, 73.3, 12), both of which are characterised by either life or death respectively. Given the prevalence of these image schemata and motifs, it is perhaps not surprising that many scholars have found in Ps 73.23-24 a possible allusion to resurrection (e.g., Wright, Resurrection, 105-06).

59 The passage characterises nearness in terms of cohabitation in the same space, thus also containing notions of CONTAINMENT (i.e., one actually abides in the same space as YHWH – cf. 91.9; see also Ps 84).

warnings of death/destruction expressed through the language of exile (cf. vv.6, 11, 16-20, and 27). Here we see the PATH and PROXIMITY schemata working interdependently such that movement toward YHWH (i.e., a TRAJECTOR on a PATH) denotes the achievement of life (i.e., LIFE IS NEAR/GOAL).\textsuperscript{61} We also see a similar correlation of the PROXIMITY and VERTICALITY schemata in biblical traditions that stress the absence of YHWH in Sheol (e.g., Ps 88.5-7; Isa 38.18; comp. Ps 16.10);\textsuperscript{62} in these contexts, the understanding of YHWH as UP and Sheol as DOWN (cosmologically speaking) lends itself to assertions that those in Sheol are FAR from YHWH. Generally speaking, then, in these biblical traditions we already see a correlation of UP/NEAR/GOAL vis-à-vis LIFE and DOWN/FAR/SOURCE vis-à-vis DEATH, all of which create a conceptual web wherein schematic patterns lend themselves to later resurrection descriptions.

Turning to the second temple literature we again see that metaphors for pre-mortem life (i.e., LIFE IS NEARNESS TO YHWH) are projected onto post-mortem existence (i.e., RESURRECTION IS NEARNESS TO YHWH). In 2 Macc 7.33 the seventh brother anticipates the post-mortem “reconciliation” (καταλλάσσω) of the Lord with his servants (cf. v.16). Similarly, the Book of Similitudes anticipates a time when the chosen will “eat” with “the Son of Man,” and where the “Lord of Spirits will abide over them” and their garments of glory “will not fade in [his] presence” (1 En. 62.14, 16 [emphasis added]). We can also point to those texts that speak of post-mortem luminous existence not as celestial transformation but rather as the protagonists abiding in the presence of YHWH (e.g., Ps. Sol. 3.12). Additionally, those texts that speak of post-mortem upward celestial movement (e.g., Dan 12.3; 1 En. 104.2, 6) denote an anticipated closeness between YHWH and his people, where the latter are transformed so as to dwell with the Lord in the heavens. As we can see, then, the PROXIMITY schema is conceptually

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Compare further with Ezek 18, where this early account of individual retribution is framed in relation to paths that lead to death and/or life.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Contra Ps 139.8, Job 26.6, and Prov 15.11, all of which hold to YHWH’s presence/power in/over Sheol.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
integrated with the VERTICALITY and PATH schemata, further enriching the concept of RESURRECTION within Jewish thought (see Diagram 2.8). By orientating the entire macro-PATH structure on the fixed point of YHWH’s presence (signified by θ), the macro-GOAL of the protagonist’s PATH is characterised by divine-human propinquity while all other role-value locations are characterised by distance.

In sum, then, the PROXIMITY schema works interdependently with its PATH and VERTICALITY counterparts. In this light, notions of resurrection are seen to have a very robust schematic grounding, one that is thoroughly metaphorical and premised upon recurrent patterns of human embodiment.

2.1.4 Summary: The RESURRECTION Gestalt

The preceding discussion has demonstrated that a network of interdependent image schemata and conceptual metaphors constitute the concept of RESURRECTION in second temple Jewish thought. This network is specifically structured by the VERTICALITY, PATH, and PROXIMITY schemata, each of which contributes differing structural elements. First, the VERTICALITY schema provides notions of spatial orientation (i.e., UP, DOWN) and opposition (i.e., UP verses DOWN), as well as experiential links with concepts such as LIFE/DEATH, LIGHT/DARK, and HEAVENS/Earth. The PROXIMITY schema likewise provides notions of spatial orientation (i.e., FAR, NEAR) and opposition (i.e., FAR verses NEAR) while also introducing relational elements (i.e., divine-human propinquity). Finally, the PATH schema introduces elements of sequence (i.e., from SOURCE to GOAL), purpose (i.e., achievement of GOAL), change (i.e., from state/location A into state/location B), and reversal (i.e., switching of UP and DOWN – achieved through combination with VERTICALITY). The interrelation of these schemata is not a simple matter of overlay but rather a dynamic intermixing, resulting in a gradient structure that enables sequential vertical movement for either protagonists or antagonist TRAJECTORS (upward or downward movement respectively).
Diagram 2.8: Integrated NEAR-FAR Structure
The overall structure has been sketched in Diagram 2.9. As is apparent, the structure itself is quite general, even abstract. In this way, we have identified a recurrent structure that is coherent in and of itself, and which displays a recurrent set of internal interrelations that thus give rise to different components of meaning, but which is also general enough so as to not be tied to or dependent upon any one set of resurrection motifs and/or themes. Contextual specificity is achieved through differing cultural frames (e.g., PERSECUTION, SOCIAL INJUSTICE, etc.), which are used to flesh-out such skeletal structure with richer, more robust, sets of information.

To demonstrate this point we can examine the conceptual metaphor RESURRECTION IS UP. As noted above, this metaphor is very general and has little meaning on its own. When framed in relation to UP-structured concepts, however, the metaphor gives rise to varying and even divergent conceptualisations. The focus in 2 Macc upon corporeality, for instance, is doubtless an expression of the RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor, which projects elements of the one domain NATURAL LIFE (e.g., walking, talking, physical body, etc.) onto the other domain RISEN LIFE such that risen bodies are understood as reconstituted natural bodies. Conversely, the focus on celestial ascent in the Epistle of Enoch is reflective of the RESURRECTION IS CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY metaphor and thus envisions post-mortem life vis-à-vis astral (even angelic) categories. Despite the fact that these two metaphors reflect the general RESURRECTION IS UP metaphor (by virtue of shared conceptions of VERTICALITY), they nonetheless give rise to differing resurrection descriptions.

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63 The schematic structure mapped here should not be taken as a definitive articulation of what constitutes second temple Jewish resurrection thinking. It rather functions as a recurrent gestalt that underscores many understandings of resurrection. It should be noted that this structure stands along side (and perhaps blends with) other resurrection descriptions. Further attention should be given, for example, to those texts that envision resurrection not as rising up but rather as giving back (e.g., 1 En. 51.1), a description that may play on the PROXIMITY aspect of the gestalt noted here (on the metaphor of giving back, see Richard Bauckham, The Fate of the Dead: Studies on the Jewish and Christian Apocalypses [NovTSup 93; Leiden: Brill, 1998], 269-89). With this caveat in mind, the schematic underpinnings identified here seem to constitute the primary ways that resurrection is conceptualised in pre-70 C.E. Jewish thinking.
Diagram 2.9: The RESURRECTION Gestalt
We can also note that some texts are able to trigger several different, even divergent, metaphors simultaneously, thus resulting in differing interpretations of the same text. Daniel 12.1-3 is a prime example. Many scholars find in 12.2 the affirmation of bodily resurrection, a point that is made on the grounds of intertextual associations with Deutero- and Trito-Isaiah. Verse 2, however, does not address the issue of risen form and instead only speaks of the activity of rising – i.e., many who sleep will awake. Here we have the concept of RESURRECTION being framed via the DEATH IS SLEEP metaphor, and while readers can use the LIFE IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor to find corporeality in Dan 12.2, such an interpretation is not explicitly warranted. The very next verse, moreover, upholds celestial ascent as the highest post-mortem ideal. The assertion that the wise will be granted heavenly luminosity calls forth the RESURRECTION IS CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY metaphor and thus projects astral (potentially even angelic) categories onto the envisioned risen form. That the language of this text triggers both conceptual metaphors betrays not only the richness of the literary unit (intertextual echoes and all), but also exposes the degree to which differing readers are able to frame a text like Dan 12.1-3 via differing (though interrelated) conceptual metaphors.

2.2 Paul’s Appropriation of the RESURRECTION Gestalt

The preceding analysis has identified a RESURRECTION gestalt that undergirds a wide variety of second temple Jewish resurrection ideals. With this conceptual structure in

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64 The association centres primarily on the use of the word “abhorrence” (חֹרְדוּת), which in the Hebrew occurs only in Dan 12.2 and Isa 66.24. In its Isianic context the focus is specifically upon dead corpses, which cues exegetes to intertextually see in Dan 12.2 a reference to corporeal resurrection (e.g., Cavallin, *Life After Death*, 27). Others stress intertextual connectivity with Isa 26.19, which speaks of dead bodies rising (e.g., Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life*, 38). We should not forget, however, that intertextual connections are not fixed but are always constructed within reading communities. If one removes the Isianic background, such corporeal conclusions cannot be sustained. Despite this, others who see in Dan 12.2 references to corporeality without relying upon Isianic traditions include Wright, who strongly asserts “there is little doubt that [Dan 12.2-3] refers to concrete, bodily resurrection” (Wright, *Resurrection*, 109), and also John Day, “The Development of Belief in Life after Death in Ancient Israel,” in *After the Exile: Essays in Honour of Rex Mason* (eds. John Barton and David J. Reimer; Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1996), 231-57.


66 The argument could of course be made that Dan 12.3 deals more with the concept of exaltation rather resurrection, and while this may indeed be the case, we should not make too firm of a distinction between the two (cf. §3.1.1).
mind, we turn our attention now to the ways in which Paul appropriates this gestalt into his own understanding of resurrection. Our focus in doing so will be global in nature. That is to say, while the microscope will be focused much more acutely on epistolary specifics in the chapters that follow, we will attempt here to see Paul in his entirety. Such a move is justified for the simple fact that resurrection has, as N. T. Wright correctly notes, “woven its way into the very fabric of Paul’s thinking, so that it emerges all over the place not as one topic among others … but as part of the structure of everything else.” With this more global perspective in mind, attention will be given to the frame, TRAJECTOR, macro-PATH, and micro-PATH elements of Paul’s resurrection ideals, all of which will be finally anchored in 1 Thess 4.13-18. Through the course of doing so we will not only illuminate the broader patterns of Paul’s resurrection ideals, but also anticipate a number of specific issues that will be addressed in the chapters that follow.

2.2.1 Frame Structure

While one could point to several different frame structures at work in Paul’s resurrection ideals, there is one overarching concept that gives structure to the whole. This concept centres on the figure of Christ, who stands at the fore of Paul’s thought and determines the values that Paul assigns to schematic roles. We will refer to this frame as the CHRIST frame. While such an identification may seem overly vague, it is appropriately so in as much as Paul understands all of God’s promises to be realised in Christ (cf. 2 Cor 1.19-20). Far from being ambiguous, then, the plasticity of this frame actually serves to enable the tying together of several different cultural frames under the single rubric of CHRIST.


For example, in addition to notions of CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY (e.g., 1 Cor 15.35-57; 2 Cor 5.1-10; cf. 2 Cor 12.1-10) and RECONSTITUTED LIFE (e.g., 1 Thess 4.13-18), one can point to issues of SOCIAL INJUSTICE (e.g., the reversal of social hierarchy in the Corinthian correspondence) and even NATIONAL RESTORATION (cf. Daniel Boyarin, the central message of Paul’s gospel is the “constitution of all the Peoples of the world as the new Israel” – Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* [Contr 1; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994], 112).
As noted above, frames arise within contexts (e.g., martyrdom occasions the PERSECUTION frame). To speak of Paul’s CHRIST frame is to say that the risen Christ stands at the centre of the apostle’s experience. To this end, E. P. Sanders is surely correct that Paul’s theology develops not from an experience of introspective restlessness but rather proceeds from solution to plight.69 But this of course raises the issue of identifying the kind(s) of experience(s) from which this CHRIST frame emerges.70 We can of course point to Paul’s adoption of early traditions regarding Jesus’ resurrection (e.g., 1 Cor 15.3-5), and further the apostle’s own experiences of having seen the risen Christ (cf. Gal 1.11-16; 1 Cor 9.1; 15.8; 2 Cor 12.1-10). In addition to this we can note Paul’s descriptions of the indwelling Christ/\pi\nu\e\v\i\m\a (e.g., Rom 8.9-11), his anticipation that Christ will be glorified in the earthly body (Phil 1.20; also 2 Cor 4.10-11), as well as the ecclesial experience of the collective as the body of Christ (e.g., 1 Cor 12.12-27). Though giving precise definition to many of these experiences is difficult, the ubiquity of Paul’s Christ-experience is clear. In the chapters that follow we will examine this experiential basis in greater detail, though for now we can concur with James Dunn that, “in some sense, [Paul] experienced Christ as the context of all his being and doing.”71

2.2.2 TRAJECTOR Role-Values

Within the CHRIST frame Paul always describes protagonists and antagonists with respect to the risen Christ himself; that is to say, Paul distinguishes the TRAJECTOR values on the basis of each TRAJECTOR’s relationship to Christ. Depending on the epistolary context

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69 E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 434-47. We here touch (albeit briefly) upon the challenge of identifying the so-called centre of Paul’s theology, which is traditionally construed as an either/or choice between juristic and participationist foci. If such a centre can be identified (and this is by no means certain), the present study follows Sanders’ insistence that the juristic and participationist need not be opposed, even though the latter leads much more naturally into a wider array of Paul’s thought.

70 It should be noted that asking where the CHRIST frame emerges from is different than asking how Christ came to be understood as resurrected. The present study makes no attempt to address this latter issue.

the apostle uses several different role-designations, though the distinction is consistently drawn with respect to issues of faith – protagonists are “believers,” antagonists are “unbelievers.”

It is particularly noteworthy that Paul does not contrast protagonists and antagonists along ethno-religious lines but rather insists that Jews and Gentiles stand equally before the Lord (Rom 1.18–3.31). The apostle’s entire system of thought is framed according to an ethnically inclusive description of those who have faith in Christ. In a most curious manner, however, Paul does draw a dividing line according to an in-out somatic distinction. This is especially seen in Rom 2, where the soteriological problem and solution are understood to lie in the human being, not on the surface; the one who is justified before God is so on internal rather than external grounds (2.25-29).

Though Paul is speaking here about humanity apart from Christ, this in-out somatic characterisation highlights the apostle’s distinction between protagonist and antagonist – i.e., one is in right relationship to the divine when they are such inwardly, not outwardly. This is not to prioritise the interior over the exterior, but rather to locate the dividing line between protagonist and antagonist as somatically drawn. As we will see in ch. 4, this has implications for Paul’s resurrection ideals.

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72 The sheer variety of terminology underscores the plasticity of the CHRIST frame. In Romans alone, protagonists are “believers” (1.16), “saints/holy ones” (1.7), “righteous ones” (5.19), those “in Christ” (8.1), “a great family” (8.29), and even “all those who call upon [the Lord]” (10.12-14). Conversely, antagonists are “unbelievers” (15.31), “sinners” (5.19), “the ungodly” (5.6), and “enemies” (5.10). (Note: neither this list nor its citations are exhaustive.) Outside of Romans, see also the contrasts Paul draws between opposites in 1 Cor 1.18–2.16, as well as the familial metaphor that characterises believers as “sons of the light and sons of the day” rather than of “night or darkness” (1 Thess 5.5; comp. Gal 1.2; 6.10; Rom 8.14-23, 29).

73 Thus Boyarin, speaking with respect to Rom 2, “‘true Jewishness’ ends up having nothing to do with family connections (descent from Abraham according to the flesh), history (having the Law), or maintaining the cultural/religious practices of the historical Jewish community (circumcision), but paradoxically consists of participating in a universalism, an allegory that dissolves those essences and meanings entirely” (Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 94-95).

74 Here Paul constructs a conceptual mapping that favours inner to outer; succinctly put, the apostle gives preference to those who embody the law on the inside rather than obeying it from the outside. In 2.12-16 Paul elevates those gentiles who, apart from the law, do what is written “in their hearts” on account of their “conscience” (2.15). By contrast, earlier in the same passage he describes a “hard and unrepentant heart” (2.5) as a precursor to eschatological wrath. Thus Paul insists that one is a Jew not “outwardly” (φανερός – i.e., “visible, known, or plain” [2.28]) but rather “inwardly” (κρυπτός – i.e., “hidden or secret” [2.29]). Accordingly, eschatological judgment is executed not according to an external signifier but rather the “secret [thoughts] of men” (2.16).
2. Imaging Resurrection

2.2.3 The Macro-PATH

Another way that Paul articulates protagonist/antagonist role-values is through the identification of such TRAJECTORS with Christ and Adam respectively. The analogy of the two figures is found in only two Pauline texts (Rom 5.12-21 and 1 Cor 15.21-22, 45-49), though the nuances of each differ from one another. As we will see, the Adam-Christ typology in Rom 5 is articulated with respect to the macro-PATH, while in 1 Cor 15 it is used with respect to the micro-PATH. We examine the former here (and the latter below [§2.2.4]).

It is important to recognize that, in many respects, the relationship between Adam and Christ is antithetical; Adam represents sin/trespass, death, and condemnation, while Christ represents righteousness, grace, life, and justification (Rom 5.12-21). Ole Davidsen stresses the “structural typology” of the Adam-Christ correlation, specifically noting that Adam represents a movement from Provisional Life to Definitive Death, while Christ represents the opposite movement from Provisional Death to Definitive Life. The two are each other’s obverse in as much as they cross-map opposing VERTICALITY role-values. With respect to the RESURRECTION gestalt, the Adam-Christ typology reflects the conceptual metaphors ADAM IS DEATH [DOWN] and CHRIST IS LIFE [UP] (Rom 5.12, 17-19).

Within the logic of this gestalt, Adam and Christ stand metonymically for opposing TRAJECTORS (ADAM FOR UNBELIEVERS / CHRIST FOR BELIEVERS). Adam as the metonymic value for the antagonists represents a movement from SOURCE [UP] to GOAL [DOWN] via declined PATH, while Christ stands metonymically for the...

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75 Despite the relative infrequency of Paul’s references to the primordial patriarch, most scholars suggest the Adam-Christ typology is generally more pervasive in Paul’s thought (e.g., C. K. Barrett, From First Adam to Last: A Study in Pauline Theology [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1962], 6).
77 By metonymy we mean that references to Adam and Christ can be understood as references to unbelievers and believers respectively via the conceptual metonymies ADAM FOR UNBELIEVERS and CHRIST FOR BELIEVERS. What is envisioned here is a PART FOR WHOLE relationship. On metonymy as a conceptual structure, see Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 35-40.
2. Imaging Resurrection

protagonists’ obverse movement from SOURCE [DOWN] to GOAL [UP] via inclined PATH. In this way, the Adam-Christ typology is premised on the macro-PATH symmetry of the RESURRECTION gestalt. This schematic structuring has important implications for how we understand Adam and Christ as corporate referents. Though these metonymic correlations do not preclude the representational figure theory, they stand in sharp contrast to the common scholarly parlance of spheres of influence. As we can see, what are typically understood as spheres are better identified as contrasting PATH structures that set their TRAJECTORS on obverse routes. It is in this way that Adam and Christ determinatively impact those for whom they metonymically stand; each figure’s referents traverse opposing paths, one toward death (DOWN), the other toward life (UP).

Given that Paul evinces a strong degree of permeability between these two PATHS, it would be erroneous to understand their obverse nature as a soteriological dualism.79

2.2.4 The Micro-PATH (CHANGE)

One of the most striking features of Paul’s resurrection ideals is the emphasis he places on post-mortem transformation. This is particularly seen in 1 Cor 15.35-57 and 2 Cor 5.1-5 (comp. Phil 3.21, Rom 8.29), and perhaps implicit in 1 Thess 4.13-18 (esp. v.17 – see §2.2.5). While some have suggested that Paul’s emphasis on post-mortem transformation is a mutation of the Jewish worldview, and others see it as evidence for a development in Paul’s thought,80 our analysis suggests otherwise. As we have seen

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79 That is, Paul envisions a system wherein the lines between protagonist and antagonist are permeable and thus not ontological drawn. This is especially true for the possibility of coming to faith in Christ, and Rom 11.21 suggests such permeability runs both ways.


81 Such development is usually identified as movement from a Jewish (1 Thess 4.13-18) to a more Hellenised anthropology/cosmology (2 Cor 5.1-5), with 1 Cor 15 standing as an intermediate point.
above, notions of change are inherent in the RESURRECTION gestalt. In this way, though Paul stresses post-mortem transformation, one goes too far to insist that he has altered the Jewish view. Indeed, Paul is better seen as exploiting a conceptual structure already inherent within the RESURRECTION gestalt.

Paul develops his transformation ideals in relation to the Adam-Christ typology. In 1 Cor 15.21 the apostle speaks in a way similar to Rom 5.12-21; the typological contrast centres on the death and life that Adam and Christ respectively impart. Paul’s focus shifts in 15.22, however, as he now insists that those associated with Adam die “not only because of Adam’s sin, but ‘in Adam.’” This terminological modification is accompanied by a universalising tendency (note the use of πᾶς) and a corresponding reference to Christ – just as all die “in Adam” (ἐν τῷ Ἀδὰμ), so all will be made alive “in Christ” (ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ).

While the language of influential spheres seems more apt to this particular context (i.e., being in the sphere of x or y), the idea of representational figures seems wholly incongruent (i.e., one is not merely associated with but located in the representative). The locative nature of this modification becomes much more clear when we consider 15.45-49. Here Paul again contrasts Adam and Christ, not as differing TRAJECTORS (as in Rom 5.12-21 and 1 Cor 15.21) but rather as differing somatic states that are cosmological drawn. Adam is described as being “from the earth” and thus the “image of dust,” while Christ is both “from heaven” and the “image of heaven” (15.47, 49). Again the ADAM IS DOWN / CHRIST IS UP metaphors persist, though they are applied so as to denote earthly (DOWN) and heavenly (UP) somatic states.

To a large extent, the positing of such a development makes two assumptions that are rejected by this study: (1) that Jewish and Greek modes of thought oppose each another, and (2) that Paul’s resurrection descriptions are not (or cannot be) shaped by individual epistolary contexts. For an overview of the relevant scholarship and critical assessment, see Ben F. Meyer, “Did Paul’s View of the Resurrection of the Dead Undergo Development?,” TS 47 (1986): 363-87 and more recently Richard N. Longenecker, “Is There Development in Paul’s Resurrection Thought,” in Life in the Face of Death: The Resurrection Message of the New Testament (ed. Richard N. Longenecker; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998), 171-202.

82 Kister, “In Adam,” 685.
2. Imaging Resurrection

Given that the focus of 15.35-57 is upon post-mortem transformation, Paul here understands the Adam-Christ typology not with respect to the macro- but rather micro-path structure. More precisely, the figures of Adam and Christ are mapped onto the micro-source and -goal elements respectively, thus standing as the opposing container states in the change structure. Paul conceptualises the micro-path as transformational movement from Adam (earthly body [down]) to Christ (heavenly body [up]). Accordingly, to die in Adam is to die in the earthly body, whereas to live in Christ refers (in this context) to being made alive in the heavenly, risen body (15.22). While this interpretation differs significantly from that found in Rom 5.12-21 (and 1 Cor 15.21), the Adam is down / Christ is up metaphors are consistent. In this way we see conceptual coherence in Paul’s thought despite a lack of human-scale systematicity across epistolary contexts.

Much of the following chapters will examine Paul’s transformation language in greater detail, specifically fleshing out this understanding of Adamic and Christic somatic states. For now it will suffice to note that Paul conceptualises pre- and post-transformation states in various ways, including (but not limited to) opposing Adamic and Christic bodies. In all instances, however, Paul’s emphasis on transformation exploits an inherent aspect of the resurrection gestalt.

2.2.5 The Resurrection Gestalt and 1 Thess 4.13-18

With the exception of 1 Cor 15, the preceding overview has focused on many Pauline texts that are not primarily concerned with resurrection. Such analysis demonstrates the ubiquity of the resurrection gestalt in Paul’s thought more globally. Turning now to 1 Thess 4.13-18 we will examine one of Paul’s earliest and most explicit treatments of

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83 In this view, Adam stands metaphorically for the “likeness of an image of [that which is] mortal” (Rom 1.23), the “body of humiliation” (Phil 3.21), or the “form, … likeness, … and appearance of humanity” (Phil 2.7).
resurrection. As one expects, the RESURRECTION gestalt functions as the conceptual structure upon which the apostle’s resurrection ideals are premised.

Much of what scholars typically identify as “resurrection” is really concerned with the macro-GOAL element of the RESURRECTION gestalt.\(^{84}\) This is particularly evident in 1 Thess 4, where Paul’s address is occasioned by a concern for the fates of those who have died prior to the Parousia (v.13).\(^{85}\) Paul formulates his response by focusing his readers’ attention on the macro-GOAL element, which is here characterised by an eschatological drama that includes events such as the Parousia (vv.15-17), resurrection of the dead (v.16), and heavenly transposition of the living (v.17).\(^{86}\) The sequential nature of this drama underscores the PATH structure inherent in Paul’s thought (note, πρῶτος and ἐπείτη [vv.16-17]), and by stressing the macro-GOAL Paul is able to characterise hope (4.13, 18 – as noted in §2.1.2.1, notions of hope are conceptualised as the assured achievement of a GOAL]).

Paul also draws heavily on the VERTICALITY and PROXIMITY schemata. For example, the DEATH IS DOWN / LIFE IS UP metaphors permeate Paul’s address, here framed by notions of sleeping (vv.13-15) and standing (vv.14, 16). More pressing, the entire eschatological drama is characterised by vertically structured movement (esp. vv.16-17). Paul contends that the Lord will “descend from heaven,” at which point the

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\(^{84}\) This is of course not surprising, as one of the ways resurrection is conceptualised is via the RESURRECTION IS GOAL metaphor.

\(^{85}\) It is sometimes argued that Paul’s initial proclamation to the Thessalonians (and perhaps the Corinthians too) concerned only Christ’s resurrection and future coming and thus did not address the issue of a future general resurrection (e.g., Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 234-35; comp. Holleman, who argues that 1 Thessalonians is the first instance in which the Parousia and general resurrection have been “systematized” in early Christian thought [Joost Holleman, Resurrection and Parousia: A Traditio-Historical Study of Paul’s Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 (NovTSup 84; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 123-30]). While such a view should not be placed out of hand, it does not pose a significant problem for the present analysis. Indeed, we should not presume that Paul had an underdeveloped understanding of a future resurrection (his Pharisaic background suggests otherwise) but rather that his heightened sense of eschatological immediacy was coupled with his conviction that heavenly ascent and resurrection produce the same effect (comp. 1 Thess 4.17). In this way, it is not so much that Paul has added the idea of a general resurrection but rather that he has more fully elaborated the correlation between resurrection and transposition to heaven.

\(^{86}\) We could perhaps include future judgment here as well (see 1 Thess 1.10; 5.2-4), though Paul does not explicitly incorporate it into the present narrative (see elsewhere, 1 Cor 15.24; 2 Cor 5.10; and Rom 2.1-16). It should be noted that Paul offers no systematic account of eschatological events, and any attempt to construct a coherent narrative from Paul’s various descriptions should be cautioned against.
dead will be “raised” and the living will be “snatched [up]” (ἀρπάζω) into the “clouds/air.” Though ἀρπάζω does not typically imply verticality, in both Paul and emerging Jewish tradition it is used to denote transposition to the heavenly realms. Accordingly, believers are elevated from the ground up into the sky to meet the Lord. Such an anticipated divine-human propinquity betrays Paul’s use of the PROXIMITY schema. Paul insists that the Lord will bring the dead “with him” (4.14), and later stresses that both the dead and the living will be “with the Lord forever” (4.17).

Finally, though notions of transformation (i.e., the micro-PATH) are muted in 1 Thess 4, we suggest that they are implicit in Paul’s description. The key reference here is again Paul’s use of ἀρπάζω (v.17), which is understood as the parallel experience of the living vis-à-vis the rising of the dead (v.16). As we will see in §3.1.1, heavenly ascent often presumes some form of somatic transformation, and Paul’s own somatic uncertainty regarding heavenly ascent may attest to his placement in this tradition (2 Cor 12.2-4). In this way, though Paul does not use metaphors of CHANGE in 1 Thess 4, such may well be presumed in his characterisation of the living being “snatched [up]” to the heavens.

In sum, then, it is apparent that the entire RESURRECTION gestalt undergirds Paul’s resurrection (indeed, his eschatological) ideals in 1 Thess 4.

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87 The verb ἀρπάζω is commonly glossed “to snatch away, carry off” (LSJ; LEH; BDAG; PGL), “to seize hastily” (LSJ; LEH), “overpower” (LSJ; PGL), and even “steal, carry off” (LEH; BDAG). In both septuagintal and non-Pauline NT usage it can have any of these senses. The verb can carry violent overtones such that something is forcibly (re)moved (cf. W. Trilling, “ἀρπάζω,” EDNT 1.156-57), and in several instances it is used to denote involuntary movement under divine impetus (e.g., Acts 8.39; Rev 12.5; Jos. Asen. 12.8 and 11, and L.A.E. [Gk.] 37.3).

88 In Paul, see 2 Cor 12.2-4. In Jewish literature see esp. Wis 4.11, where Enoch is characterised as being “snatched away” (ἀρπάζω) by God. Though Wisdom lacks explicit vertical reference, within the context of contemporary Enochic traditions it is very likely ascent overtones are intimated (cf. Christopher Rowland, The Open Heaven: A Study of Apocalyptic in Judaism and Early Christianity [London: SPCK, 1982], 385-86). For example, the Hebrew of Ben Sira describes Enoch as having been taken into God’s presence (mss B, 19 recto, line 4 [= 49.14]; comp. mss B, 13 verso, line 18 [= 44.16]), and the Greek tradition includes an explicit vertical orientation (49.14). The notion of ascent is explicit here, and it is complemented by many pre- and post-Sira traditions that describe Enoch as a heavenly ascender (e.g., 1 En. 14-16; 39.3; 70-71; 2 En. 1.8, 3ff.).
2.3 Conclusions

The present chapter has sought to identify factors that enable the recognition of resurrection within a variety of second temple Jewish texts. In doing so we have identified a recurrent gestalt structure – the RESURRECTION gestalt – which is constructed through the dynamic interplay of various image schemata and grounded in recurrent patterns of human embodiment. Though this gestalt is schematically fixed and quite abstract, it can be variously elaborated within a number of different frame structures so as to yield a wide variety of resurrection expressions. We have also seen that Paul appropriates this gestalt in its entirety, constructing not only his resurrection ideals but also much of his theology upon it. While we will more precisely examine Paul’s use of the gestalt in the following chapters, our analysis here has justified our placement of Paul within this tradition.

Returning to the scholarly literature examined in §1.3.1, it seems appropriate to refocus our critical engagement in light of the present chapter’s analysis. Contra the lexical-semantic approach of Sawyer and Chmiel (among others), we have seen that lexical signs such as ἐγείρω, ἀνίστημι, ἀνέστη, or ἀνέστησα do not themselves denote resurrection but rather trigger underlying conceptual structure vis-à-vis the frames employed within a given text. We have labelled this underlying conceptual structure the RESURRECTION gestalt, and we have seen that it is variously elaborated through differing conceptual metaphors. Rooted in this insight, our analysis moves past the standard scholarly distinction between literal and metaphorical (which we saw at work in Wright and Engberg-Pedersen); as we have seen, all expressions of resurrection are metaphorical nature. The RESURRECTION gestalt that we have identified has the further advantage of containing enough recurrent conceptual structure to warrant identification as RESURRECTION. For this reason, it is unhelpful either to limit resurrection to narrowly focused theological motifs (e.g., post-mortem corporeality [e.g., Wright, Wedderburn]) or to overly fragment resurrection at the expense of an explanatory framework (e.g.,
Charlesworth). By grounding resurrection within recurrent patterns of human embodiment, our analysis has thus demarcated a recurrent image schematic structure that can be variously elaborated within several different frames (e.g., national restoration, post-mortem life, etc.). In sum, we have seen that resurrection is a non-propositional, embodied concept.
Chapter 3

“We Will All Be Changed:”
On Dualism/Monism, Plants, and the Peculiarity of Wearing a House

One of the most striking features of Paul’s resurrection ideals is that they are ubiquitously concerned with notions of change. Scattered throughout the undisputed Paulines are several references to somatic transformation wherein the earthly body will (or is) undergo(ing) alteration into a heavenly somatic state (e.g., Rom. 8.29; 1 Cor 15.35-54; 2 Cor 3.18; 5.1-5; Phil 3.21; and perhaps 1 Thess 4.17). For Paul, transformation is the central process by which resurrection is achieved; indeed, though some believers will escape death at the Parousia, Paul confidently insists, “we will all be changed” (1 Cor 15.51). Central to Paul’s transformation ideals, however, are certain built-in assumptions regarding both cosmology and anthropology. For Paul, eschatological transformation concerns not only the body but also the body’s location within the cosmos. In this way, the apostle’s resurrection ideals are premised upon his cosmo-somatic outlook.

At the intersection of cosmology and anthropology lie issues of both dualism and monism. As noted in §1.3.2, dualistic presuppositions abound in Pauline scholarship. In many modern treatments Paul is read within the context of an apocalypticism characterised by opposition (e.g., heaven vs. earth; now vs. then), thus advocating a strong degree of contradistinction between earthly and heavenly somatic states. At the same time, however, Paul’s anthropology is usually understood within the context of an assumed Jewish monism, and while proponents of this view expressly reject certain forms of Greek dualism, modern dualistic tendencies are often implicitly imported. As noted in §1.3.2, both views are problematic and there is a need to more clearly
demarcate the nature and character of Paul’s dualism/monism, especially as it relates to his cosmo-somatic presuppositions.

The present chapter will address issues of dualism and monism in Paul’s cosmo-somatic outlook. Rather than searching for what Sanders called a new category of reality, we will instead attempt to better appreciate the categories that Paul works with. In doing so we will contextualise Paul within a broader cultural matrix while at the same time identifying the particulars of his own worldview. The chapter is broken into two halves. In §3.1 we focus on what are identified as concentric circles of cultural embodiment, specifically identifying the character of dualism and monism in many Jewish and Hellenistic traditions; attention will be directed to issues of cosmology and anthropology so as to identify broader cosmo-somatic presuppositions in Graeco-Roman antiquity. With these in view we will then turn in §3.2 toward the transformation metaphors of 1 Cor 15.35-50 and 2 Cor 5.1-5, specifically examining the nature of Paul’s cosmo-somatic presuppositions and the extent to which continuity and discontinuity characterise such transformations. To anticipate our conclusions, it will be argued that Paul’s cosmology and anthropology are characterised not by opposition but rather interrelation, which is to say that Paul distinguishes between parts while stressing their overall integration within the whole. In this way, overly drawn descriptions of both dualism and monism are set aside in favour of a more nuanced and integrative approach.

3.1 Concentric Circles of Cultural Embodiment

To insist that all human meaning is embodied is not to deny the impact of culture but rather to recognise the formative and fundamental role culture plays in the meaning making process. To again cite Mark Johnson, “there can be no thought without a brain

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1 E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 522. Though Sanders is looking for a category by which to better understand Paul’s participationist language, we suggest that such language is rooted in Paul’s cosmo-somatic presuppositions (see chs. 4-5 of our study).
in a body in an environment.”² It is this *environmental embodiment*, which has as much to do with culture as it does with the natural world, that we now examine. The following discussion will illuminate the cultural environments within which Paul is embodied. We suggest that Paul is best located within many interlocking contexts (e.g., within both Jewish and Greek traditions). This is not to deny that certain traditions are more prevalent in Paul than others, nor to unhelpfully conflate differing cultural streams with one another. Rather, it is to recognise that Paul is able to draw on several differing backgrounds in constructing meaning. The following analysis will travel from the inside out through three concentric circles of cultural embodiment – Jewish apocalyptic (the inner circle), second temple and early Judaism generally (the broader circle), and Hellenistic philosophy (the broadest circle). As we will see, in each of these circles issues of cosmology and anthropology are premised upon a one-world model that is often characterised by integration rather than opposition.

### 3.1.1 The Inner Cultural Circle – Jewish Apocalyptic

Though Paul draws on several cultural contexts in constructing his resurrection ideals, it is Jewish apocalyptic that (arguably) constitutes the formulaic core of his thought. Of particular interest in the following discussion are traditions of heavenly ascent. We focus on such traditions for two reasons. First, we have already seen in 1 Thess 4.13-18 (§2.2.5) that Paul understands resurrection and heavenly ascent as analogous experiences, which suggests Paul’s resurrection ideals are correlated (at least in part) with such traditions. Second, ascent traditions reveal much about the dualistic nature of Jewish apocalyptic, specifically with respect to issues of cosmo-somatology. Taking these points together, the following analysis will demonstrate that heavenly ascent traditions presume a one-world model premised upon cosmological permeability.

An overview of the relevant period literature reveals a cosmological model wherein heaven and earth are vertically aligned such that heavenly ascent requires upward spatial movement. The Enochic Book of Watchers stands as an early witness to these traditions (1 En. 14.8-9), and the later Similitudes recounts two heavenly ascents (1 En. 39.3; 70-71), the latter of which may presume a storied heavenly structure. The existence of multiple heavenly layers is common in the broader period literature, with descriptions of one, three, five, or even seven layers all denoting a vertical structure that extends upward toward a cosmic pinnacle. Such layers are explicit in Paul (cf. 2 Cor 12.1-10), and they are variously articulated in ascent apocalypses that postdate the turn of the eras. For example, the post-Pauline Apoc. Ab. envisions seven heavenly layers and describes an ascent (15.4-7; cf. 12.10) whereby Abraham is directed in ch. 20 to look down at the stars beneath him (a cosmological reversal of Gen 15.5). Though alternative understandings of heaven-earth spatial relations existed, what is of importance here is the construction of heaven and earth as vertically distinct locales that are mutually permeable.

Many of these traditions correlate heavenly transposition with some form of transformation, specifically in the direction of angelomorphism. The so-called Self-
Glorification Hymn from Qumran stands as a striking (though extreme) example; the Hymn’s speaker repeatedly insists that he shares in angelic “glory” (τιμή – lines 13-15, 18), that his desires are not according to the flesh (line 14), and that he is reckoned with the “angels/gods” (εἰρήνη – lines 12, 14-15, 18). The language is unequivocally strong, and it seems to point to the angelic transformation of a human figure. While other traditions use more graphic images such as flesh melting off the ascender’s body (e.g., 1 En. 71.11), the most common metaphor is that of clothing exchange. This is particularly evident in the post-Pauline comparative literature. In 2 En., for instance, the patriarch is “extracted” and “put … into the clothes of glory,” a process that results in “no observable difference” between Enoch and the angels (22.8-10 [A]; [J] is similar). We can also point to several traditions (both pre- and post-Pauline) wherein the righteous dead are said to acquire a heavenly garment. Though transformation is not presumed in all ascent traditions, in those where it is the ascender’s proximity to the divine is a key feature; the closer the visionary comes to the divine being, the greater the need for transformation. Taken together, these texts correlate both locative change

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7 Though this fragmentary Hymn does not have an explicit reference to heavenly ascent, such may well be implied. The Hymn is likely sectarian and the surviving manuscripts date to the turn of the eras (Joseph Angel, “The Liturgical-Eschatological Priest of the Self-Glorification Hymn,” RevQ 96 [2010]: 585-605 [pp. 585-88]).

8 All references correspond to Recension B (4Q491 11 I).

9 Davila, for instance, has rightly noted the similarities between the Hymn and the much later 3 Enoch on the issue of heavenly transformation (James R. Davila, “Heavenly Ascent in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in The Dead Sea Scrolls after Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment [eds. Peter. W. Flint and James C. VanderKam; 2 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1999], 2.460-85 [p. 475]).

10 Though initially titled “Cantique de Michel” (M. Baillet, DJD 7 [Oxford: Clarendon, 1982], 26-29), the majority of subsequent scholarship has strongly suggested a human figure that describes angelomorphism (even apotheosis).

11 One cannot overlook the priestly nature of these ascents (Himmelfarb, Ascent, 9-46); heaven is conceptualised as a celestial temple in which the angels and the ascender function as priests, and the endowment of a heavenly, priestly garment (= transformation) enables priestly service before the Great Glory.

12 See, for example, Apoc. Zeph. 8.3-4 [Akminic text]; 1 En. 62.15-16; and Apoc. Ab. 13.14.

13 For example, the Apoc. Ab. attributes no transformation to Abraham during his ascent, though looks ahead to a future time when Abraham will be clothed with Azazel heavenly garment (and Azazel with Abraham’s corruptibility – 13.14).

14 This theme comes to full articulation in the much later Hekhalot literature, though its roots are found already in Jewish apocalyptic (Christopher R.A. Morray-Jones, “Transformational Mysticism in the Apocalyptic-Merkabah Tradition,” JJS 43 [1992]: 1-31).
(i.e., earth to heaven) and somatic transformation (i.e., earthly body to heavenly body) within a one-world model of cosmo-somatic interrelation.

Given the texts just examined, we can now see there are important image schematic parallels between heavenly ascent and resurrection traditions. In addition to cosmological transposition (VERTICALITY), divine-human propinquity (PROXIMITY), and celestial transformation (CHANGE gestalt), both rapture and resurrection are premised upon the PATH schema – i.e., the movement of an ascender (TRAJECTOR) from earth (SOURCE) to heaven (GOAL). This is not to say that these traditions are identical, but rather to demonstrate a shared conceptual structure that enables blending with one another. It is for this reason that Paul is able to describe both eschatological transposition and present heavenly ascent with the same descriptor (ἀρπάζω – 1 Thess 4.17; 2 Cor 12.2-4); the two are understood as correlated precisely because Paul understands his experience of heavenly ascent as an experience (or foretaste) of resurrection.

The relationship between resurrection and rapture has long been noticed by NT scholars (e.g., Wilhelm Bousset, “Die Himmelsreise der Seele,” AR 4 [1901]: 136-69, 228-73). Alan Segal has offered a structuralist account of this correspondence, positing an underlying and pervasive “mythical structure” of ascent/descent that finds expression in numerous antique cultures (Alan F. Segal, “Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and their Environment,” ANRW 23.2:1333-94). Segal focuses on culture as a generative matrix, thus arguing that myth is always created in relation to external stimuli (not vice-versa). While Segal’s analysis is illuminating, by pitting culture against any kind of transcultural grounding, Segal rejects a broader foundation upon which such a “mythic structure” could stand. In short, Segal offers no explanation for (a) why the structure exists, and (b) what causes the structure to find widespread, cross-cultural appeal. In contrast, the present study deepens Segal’s analysis, as the conceptual correlations between rapture and resurrection are seen to be more robust and somatically grounded. (However, our analysis is confined to second temple Judaism and thus more limited than Segal’s.)

In Jewish tradition, ascents are (typically) understood to happen in the present, while resurrection is relegated to the future. Such temporal variance results not from schematic differences but rather different PATH-structure scaling. In resurrection the PATH schema is both temporally and spatially elaborated, while in ascent it spatially elaborated. Accordingly, resurrection and rapture exist as distinctly different expressions that share a strong degree of image schematic structure.

So following Alan Segal, “Paul’s Thinking about Resurrection in its Jewish Context,” NTS 44 (1998): 400-19. While many understand the ascent apocalypses as “literary documents in which the depiction of the hero’s experience needs to be understood as an act of imagination … rather than as a literary representation of the author’s own experience” (Himmelfarb, Ascent, 98), such a view unduly pits experience and language against one another. The present study sees no reason for insisting that the textual/literary nature of the ascent apocalypses precludes meaningful discussion concerning presumed religious experiences that may lie behind such texts. Such preclusion unduly juxtaposes experience and language and presumes a fundamental disconnect between the two. While it is erroneous to read the ascent traditions as first-hand accounts, it is equally erroneous to presume such traditions are not grounded in human experience (ecstatic or otherwise). Indeed, the theoretical insights utilised here may provide a fruitful way forward in examining such traditions.
The traditions examined here point toward a worldview in which heaven and earth stand as vertically configured spatial locales that are mutually accessible via the process of heavenly ascent. Such traditions take for granted the permeability of the cosmos. Far from denoting any kind of radical or oppositional dualism, Martha Himmelfarb finds in the ascent apocalypses the “possibility of transcendence,” noting:

The descent of a divine figure expresses the certainty that God cares enough for the righteous to send them help. But the ascent apocalypses make greater claims for the nature of humanity: human beings … have the potential to becomes like the angels, or even greater than the angels.\(^{18}\)

Within this worldview, heaven is not ontologically other but rather interconnected with the earth; heaven lies just beyond the scope of human perception (hence the need for “uncovering or revealing” \([\alpha\pi\omega\kappa\alpha\lambda\upsilon\pi\tau\omega]\)). In this way, integration rather than opposition is the mark of cosmology.

3.1.2 The Broader Cultural Circle – Second Temple / Early Judaism

Continuing with the theme of angelomorphism, we now extend our analysis to include biblical and pseudepigraphical traditions that concern notions of an idyllic or angelomorphic Adamic existence.\(^{19}\) As we will see, the lines between earthly and heavenly somatic states are not ontologically drawn, which is to say that permeability extends to somatology as much as cosmology.

In the period just after Paul a number of traditions describe Adam’s pre-lapsarian existence as a state of angelomorphic glory. Some texts insist that Adam was created as “a second angel” (2 En. 30.11 [J]), while others assert that the angels were directed to worship the pre-lapsarian couple (L.A.E. [Lat.] 13-15).\(^{20}\) Related description can be found in L.A.E. [Gk.] 20.1-2 and 3 Bar. 4.16, both of which characterise the lapsarian event as the loss of a garment of glory (note the clothing metaphor). These descriptions

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\(^{18}\) Himmelfarb, Ascent, 71.

\(^{19}\) Attention is given to Adamic traditions for the simple fact that Paul himself stresses Christ as the “last Adam” (1 Cor 15.45). For other commemorative figures who similarly described angelomorphically, see ftnt. 27 in this chapter.

\(^{20}\) See additionally L.A.E. [Lat.] 4.1-2 and 47 (// ch. 39 [Gk.]).
all betray a strikingly high view of Adam (and Eve), one in which the pre-lapsarian couple are perceived as being created in a state of divine/angelic “glory.” That such descriptions likely have a broader anthropological referent is clear in the Enochic Similitudes (for example), which insist “humans were not created to be different from the angels” (1 En. 69.11). The ADAM FOR HUMANITY metonymy is doubtless at work here, likely playing on the collective sense of the Hebrew גַוֵּר (“humankind”) and thus stressing Adam as an ancestral representative.

The evidence from Qumran is also informative, even if it reflects a sectarian perspective. It is well known that the Qumranites perceived their communal worship in concert with the angels, a feature that may reflect an ideal angelomorphic human form. Fletcher-Louis has argued this point; focusing on the intersection of the liturgical genre and the Qumran cultus, he argues that through the liturgy of the Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice the Qumran community, specifically its priesthood, is seen as embodying the Great Glory of the Lord. In this way, the cult restores humanity to its pre-lapsarian divine/angelic glory. Though Fletcher-Louis’s treatment is not without problem, it is complemented by exegetical work that examines the aforementioned Self-Glorification

21 Indeed, Fletcher-Louis notes, with respect to L.A.E. [Lat.]: “not only is Adam angelomorphic in this text, he is also unequivocally set over the angels” (Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, Luke-Acts: Angels, Christology, and Soteriology [WUNT 94; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997], 142).

22 This aspect of the Qumranite self-identity has garnered much scholarly debate. Fletcher-Louis’s emphasis on the experience of angelomorphism represents a maximalist position. Others such as Björn Frennesson argue that the concept of liturgical communion pervaded the sectarian literature but found concrete expression in only a few liturgical texts. At the other end, Devorah Dimant see the Qumranite’s worship as analogous with the angels (see Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam: Liturgical Anthropology in the Dead Sea Scrolls [STDJ 42; Leiden: Brill, 2002]; Björn Frennesson, “In a Common Rejoicing:” Liturgical Communion with Angels in Qumran [SSU 14; Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1999], and Devorah Dimant, “Men as Angels: The Self-Image of the Qumran Community,” in Religion and Politics in the Ancient Near East [ed. Adele Berlin; Bethesda, Md.: University Press of Maryland, 1996], 93-103).

23 Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam, 356-94. Thus Fletcher-Louis, “[there is] an analogous identification of the pre-lapsarian Adam with the Glory of God, … [a connection that is] likely made because of the belief that the high priest recapitulates the Adamic identity and the notion that the cult is a restored Eden or pre-lapsarian world” (Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam, 382).

24 As several reviewers have noted, the maximalist nature of Fletcher-Louis’s analysis results in a “keen [interest to] read several ambiguous texts in such a way as to support his thesis” (George J. Brooke, “Men and Women as Angels in Joseph and Aseneth,” JSP 14 [2005]: 159-77 [p. 163]), a feature that comes across as “heavy handed” (Matthew Goff, review of Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam: Liturgical Anthropology in the Dead Sea Scrolls, RBL 5 [2005]: n.p. Online: http://www.bookreviews.org).
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Hymn together with the attached “Cantique des Justes” (Recension B). Joseph Angel examines correlations between the singular and plural referents of the Hymn and “Cantique” respectively, insisting that the speaker and the community inseparably mirror each other such that they share in a number of experiences, including exalted heavenly status. In this way, the Hymn’s transformative ideal has a communal focus, one that moves in the direction of angelomorphism.

We point to these Adamic traditions not to stress a unitary picture of Adam’s pre-lapsarian glory, but rather to demonstrate that the boundaries between angels/divinity and humanity are blurred in many traditions, thus stressing an idyllic human form premised on angelomorphic descriptions. Heavenly and earthly somatic forms may be distinct, but they are not strongly disconnected, as many traditions affirm the possibility of transformation from one into the other.

Within a conceptual world where humanity can be described angelomorphically, it is perhaps not surprising that angels and other divine beings are often described anthropomorphically. A prime example is the angelic figure of Dan 7, whose description as “son of man” may not be titular but rather connotative of his “manlike form.” Similarly, it is not uncommon to find references to angels as men (e.g., Dan 9.21; cf. 10.5-6, 16-18), to the Enochic Watchers as being able to lay and procreate with women (e.g., 1 En. 6-7), and to angels being able to speak (e.g., 1 En. 19.1), look (e.g., 1 En. 9.1), stand (e.g., 1 En. 39.12-13), and exist in a perpetual state of wakefulness (e.g.,

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25 Angel, “Liturgical-ESchatological Priest,” 598. Philip Alexander advances a more tentative conclusion (Alexander, Mystical Texts, 86), while Michael Wise suggests that through liturgical performance each individual member of the community spoke of themselves as ascended to heaven (Michael O. Wise, “מַעֲשֶׂה יִשְׁרָאֵל: A Study of 4Q491c, 4Q471b, 4Q427 7, and 1QHa 25:35-26:10,” DSD 7 [2000]: 173-219 [pp. 216-19]).

26 John Levinson has rightly cautioned against such an approach (John R. Levison, Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: From Sirach to 2 Baruch [JSPSup 1; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1987]).

27 The fact that similar angelomorphic descriptions are ascribed to a number of commemorative figures (e.g., Abel, Enoch, Noah, Jacob/Israel, Moses, Elijah, and the High Priest) underscores this cosmomatic permeability. On this angelomorphic theme, see (e.g.) James H. Charlesworth, “The Portrayal of the Righteous as an Angel,” in Ideal Figures in Ancient Judaism: Profiles and Paradigms (eds. John J. Collins and George W. E. Nickelsburg; SBLSCS 12; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1980), 135-51.

Indeed, in several instances angels are indistinguishable from humans, thus denoting an anthropomorphic angelic form.

Related to angelic anthropomorphisms are the descriptions of God via somatic categories. Already in biblical tradition references to the Glory of the Lord (יהוה דּוֹצָא וַעֲרוֹרֵי וּ/ δόξαν κυρίου) came to acquire the near technical meaning of God’s human appearance. Carey Newman has offered a detailed treatment of this glory language, arguing the phrase Glory of the Lord is not attributive but rather denotes “the visible, movable divine presence. To see or experience Yahweh’s Glory is to see or experience Yahweh.” Such anthropomorphised glory language is associated with eschatological promise (i.e., GOAL = being NEAR to YHWH), and it also becomes a key motif in early Jewish throne-chariot and later Merkabah mystical traditions. Ezekiel stands as an early text in this tradition, where the prophet describes the Glory of the Lord as an enthroned, man-like figure with a luminous, fiery body (1.26-28). Within post-biblical tradition, this Glory figure is increasingly identified as the heavenly agent encountered at the pinnacle of ascent (e.g., I En. 14.18-21), and the enthroned figure is often characterised as a luminous human form or glory-body (comp. Ezek. Trag. lines 68-72).

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29 For example, see in the HB, Gen 19.1.29 and 32.25-31; in the NT, Heb 13.2; and in the Pseudepigrapha, Jos. and Asen. 14.3(4).
30 E.g., see Exod 33.12-34.9, especially the anthropomorphisms of 33.17-23 and 34.5-6. In addition to anthropomorphism, the glory of the Lord is associated with both clouds and fire such that the presence of YHWH is understood as having appeared in both (Exod 16.7 and 10 [comp. 13.21-22]; 40.34-38).
33 In biblical tradition, glory language is not only associated with the future GOAL generally (e.g., Isa 40.5; 58.5; 60.1-3), but also with divine judgment (e.g., Isa 59.19; Ezek 39.13, 21 – cf. Newman, “Resurrection as Glory,” 64-70).
34 For a full discussion, see Segal, Paul the Convert, 34-71.
35 The same anthropomorphic Glory appears again in Ezek 8.2, 9.3-4, and 10.4, and there seems to be no distinction between this luminous body of Glory and YHWH himself (esp. in 9.3-4; cf. Jarl E. Fossum, “Glory, δόξα, δόξα,” DDD 348-52 [p. 349]).
In such cases, the anthropomorphistic descriptions used of YHWH are hypostasised, and this embodied glory functions as the material or visible expression of the divine.

The importance of these cultural traditions for our understanding of Paul’s resurrection ideals cannot be understated. On the one hand, Paul characterises resurrection via the category of “glory” (e.g., Rom 8.17-18; 1 Cor 15.40-41), and even insists that the risen Christ has a “body of glory” (Phil 3.21; cf. 1 Cor 2.8; 2 Cor 3.18; 4.4-6; Rom 8.29). For Paul, then, Christ is the Great Glory, but he is also described as the “last Adam” (1 Cor 15.45). While many scholars would like to find in Paul the assertion that Adam’s forfeited pre-lapsarian glory is regained in Christ, such conclusions cannot be extended to the whole of Paul’s letters. Indeed, in 1 Cor 15.45-49 Paul contrasts the pre-lapsarian Adam with the risen Christ, and he does so without recourse to notions of initial Adamic glory. The passage has important Philonic parallels (see §3.1.3), though Paul’s description of Christ as the “last Adam” does not cohere with said parallels and is best understood within this broader trend toward an

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36 The term hypostasis is used by many scholars to denote an independent personal being who stands in close relation to the divine, while others use it to refer to a linguistic personification that lacks independent reality (see Charles A. Gieschen, Angelomorphic Christology: Antecedents and Early Evidence [AGJU 42; Leiden: Brill, 1998], 36-45). The present study leans in the direction of the independent being theory while acknowledging that we are certainly not dealing with a static tradition (indeed, one can point to several hypostasised figures – e.g., the Danielic son of man, the Angel of the Lord, Enoch, Wisdom, Logos, and [arguably] Christ).


38 Paul cites Gen 2.7 (LXX) in 15.45, taking from it the phrase ψυχήν ζώσαν “natural-living being” which he thus maps as being both down and in need of transformation. Similarly, Paul’s use of χοίκος, which only occurs four times in the NT (all within 1 Cor 15.47-49) and is rare outside of the NT, may be derived from χοῦς (dust) and was perhaps coined in relation to the Greek text of Gen 2.7 (H. Balz, “χοίκος,” EDNT 3:469-70).

39 Paul never explicitly describes primordial Adamic glory, let alone contrast Christ’s risen state with Adam’s pre-lapsarian state. Indeed, while Paul frequently speaks of Christ as the “image” or “form” of God (see, e.g., Rom 8.29; 2 Cor 3.18; 4.4; Phil 2.6), he never speaks of the pre-lapsarian Adam with such language and only once speaks of humanity currently bearing said image (1 Cor 11.7). George van Kooten’s suggestion that Paul “forgets about the temporary and very brief period in which … man did effectively possess pneuma” is unpersuasive (George H. van Kooten, Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity [WUNT 232; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008], 304).
idyllic Adamic state. In this way, Paul looks not backward but forward, focusing on an *eschatological* Adamic form that is premised upon Christ’s risen glory-body. Paul’s resurrection descriptions presume both human angelomorphism and divine anthropomorphism; the two are interrelated, and they cohere in the resurrected Christ and those who share in his risen existence.

In summary, if the descriptions of human beings via angelic or divine categories serve to elevate the human form, then the related expressions that anthropomorphise the divine stand as the former’s obverse. The traditions examined here demonstrate a worldview that does not distinguish sharply between heavenly and earthly realms. Two worlds exist, yes, but their relation to one another is constructed not via an oppositional dualism but rather characterised by permeability. The possibility of vertical transformation exists; human beings can become angelic and thus possess anthropomorphised glory-bodies.

3.1.3 The Broadest Cultural Circle – Hellenistic Philosophy

Expanding our analysis even further, we turn our attention toward Hellenistic philosophical traditions so as to understand the nature of dualism and monism in Paul’s broadest cultural context. We can begin by noting that the integrated, one-world model that we have thus far described has an important correlate in broader 1st century Mediterranean thinking. Focusing on popular Hellenistic philosophy, Dale Martin illuminates a cosmo-somatic mapping wherein the body, like the universe and society, is conceptualised as a hierarchical spectrum. At the bottom end of the spectrum are those things that are less desirable – thick, heavy, weak, passive, ugly, and feminine (which include bodily traits such as being cold, moist, and soft); by contrast, the upper end

\[40\] On this Wright is certainly correct in asserting “the pneumatikos state is not simply an original idea in the mind of the creator, from which the human race fell sadly away; this model of humanity is the future reality, the reality which will swallow up and replace merely psychikos life” (N. T. Wright, *The Resurrection of the Son of God* [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003], 355 [italics original]).

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comprises the more desirable – fine, thin, strong, active, beauty, and masculine (which includes bodily traits such as warmth, dryness, and hardness). Within this mapping, earthly and heavenly are understood as both spatially and qualitatively different, though not ontologically opposed. That is to say, “a ‘one world’ model is much closer to the ancient conception, and, instead of an ontological dualism, we should think of a hierarchy of essence.”

The most dominant philosophical tradition at the turn of the eras – Stoicism – ascribed to this one-world model, and Stanley Stowers has noted that the 1st century C.E. was largely dominated by philosophical monism:

All of the [non-platonic] schools of philosophy were so-called materialists or physicalists. Everything in the universe, including God or the gods, is one part of the “natural” or physical order and can in principle be investigated by humans.

Within this broader physicalist worldview, concepts that we moderns take as immaterial or incorporeal were not understood as such. A prime example is the category πνεῦμα. The Stoics understood πνεῦμα as the all-encompassing material substance that permeates and holds the cosmos together, and Martin has shown that pneumatic materiality was generally accepted in broader Hellenistic thought. Within this worldview, incorporeal does not necessarily denote immaterial, which means that πνεῦμα can be perceived as both a material and incorporeal substance at the same time.

Though many treatments of Paul understand πνεῦμα as the immaterial aspect of Man’s composition (a truly Cartesian dualism), Engberg-Pedersen has compellingly argued

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42 Martin, Corinthian Body, 15.
43 See, e.g., Troels Engberg-Pedersen, who stresses the Stoic material πνεῦμα as the all-encompassing substance that permeates the created world (Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010]).
46 See esp. Martin, Corinthian Body, 21-25. Martin notes that πνεῦμα was commonly linked with the air/wind (though not exclusively) and was commonly understood as “the life giving material for the members of the body” (p. 22). Πνεῦμα was a substance that was both inherent within and also external to human beings; as an entity within the human body, πνεῦμα was particularly linked to the optical system, though it was also tied to motion, reason, and life itself.
47 A few examples will suffice. Despite his insistence that πνεῦμα does not stand in contrast to either body or nature, Rudolf Bultmann nonetheless defines πνεῦμα as the “miraculous divine power that stands in absolute contrast to all that is human” (Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament [trans.}
that, throughout the epistles, Paul’s pneumatology is thoroughly materialistic.48 This is, as we have seen, consistent with the broader one-world model that we have been characterising.

To insist on such a unitary worldview is not to eschew but rather refocus our understanding of dualism. It is well known that Plato advocated an anthropological dualism drawn primarily along sense–thought lines, though Thomas Robinson rightly points to developments in Plato’s thought from the strong body-soul opposition in the *Phaed.* to the more nuanced inner tension of the trichotomous soul in the *Resp.* and *Tim.*49 In this way, he who is often upheld as the staunchest proponent of dualism in antiquity is seen to hold a much more attenuated view. Standing in the Platonic tradition is Philo of Alexandria, whose exegesis of Gen 1-2 is commonly identified as the closest historical parallel to the ideologies Paul confronts at Corinth.50 While there are several points of connection between Philo and Paul,51 the key issue is the Philonic distinction

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48 Kendrick Grobel; 2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951-1955], 1.153). Similarly, though Robert Gundry is critical of Bultmann, he too asserts πνεῦμα as ontologically distinct from σῶμα, thus arguing (with respect to 1 Cor 10.10) that “sôma retains its purely physical connotation over against pneuma,” and later, “the contrast with pneuma makes sôma exclusively physical” (Robert H. Gundry, *Sôma in Biblical Theology: With Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology* [SNTSMS 29; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], 48-49). Writing at about the same time as Gundry, James Dunn maintains the Cartesian divide between nature and supernature, insisting “pneuma denotes that power which humanity experiences as relating it to the spiritual realm, the realm of reality which lies beyond ordinary observation and human control” (James D. G. Dunn, “Spirit and Holy Spirit in the New Testament,” in *The Christ & the Spirit: Collected Essays - Volume 2, Pneumatology* [Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1998], 3-21 [p. 3]).

49 T. M. Robinson, “The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato,” in *Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment* (eds. John P. Wright and Paul Potter; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 37-55. Robinson notes that Plato’s description of the soul in the *Tim.* advocates a tripartite soul-division wherein the highest part of the soul (i.e., Reason) is understood to be both immortal and material (p. 47). This is, as Robinson notes, a development from the earlier *Phaed.* and *Resp.* (which held a more immaterial view), and it evinces the degree to which the one-world system pervades even Plato’s descriptions.


51 With respect to resurrection, the key connections are fourfold: (1) Paul’s use of Gen 2.7 in 1 Cor 15.45. (2) The contrasting of the heavenly and earthly men (e.g., comp. 1 Cor 15.47-49 with Philo, *Leg.* 1.31-32; *Opif.* 134). (3) The description of Adam as the “first man” (e.g., comp. 1 Cor 15.45, 47 with Philo, *Opif.* 136-50). While modern scholars usually read Philo’s earthly man as the second man (e.g., Pearson, *Pneumatikos-Psichikos Terminology*, 20), van Kooten rightly notes that in both Paul and Philo...
between the heavenly man (who was created in Gen 1.26-27) and the earthly composite man (who was created in Gen 2.7). For Philo, the former is the imperishable, incorporeal heavenly ideal that was created according to the divine image and is only perceptible by the mind (Opif. 134). By contrast, the latter is a composite being who, as both body and soul, is mortal, formed of the dust, and perceptible by the senses (Opif. 134).

Philo envisions the relation between these two men in various ways. In some cases the two are contrasted according to a Platonic Form–Image distinction, thus denoting the heavenly archetype vis-à-vis the earthly and visible expression of that Form (e.g., Opif. 24-25; 35-36).52 In other places, however, Philo speaks of these two figures being somatically interrelated.53 In Her. 56, for instance, Philo insists that the inbreathing of the divine breath at creation (Gen 2.7) causes the earthly man to be formed “after the image” (Her. 56). Such a description of the earthly man is not insignificant, as Philo elsewhere and much more ubiquitously reserves such image language for the heavenly man (e.g., Opif. 134).54 Here, then, the two men overlap with one another, and their correlation has a somatic location. Philo understands the earthly man as a trichotomous mind/spirit–soul–body,55 and he correlates the heavenly man with the earthly man’s mind/spirit.56 The key distinction for Philo is less about body–soul opposition and more about the proper interrelation of the two: the earthly man lives

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52 Thus Levison, speaking of QG 2.56, notes that the “Platonic distinction between noetic pattern and sense copy” is unequivocally present (Levison, Portraits of Adam, 85).
53 Here following Kooten, Anthropology in Context, 64-66.
54 Noted by Pearson, Pneumatikos-Psychikos Terminology, 19.
55 It was more common in the Hellenistic world to draw a trichotomous distinction between mind–soul–body (νοῦς–ψυχή–σῶμα), and indeed Philo himself employs this construction very frequently. Nonetheless, at several points Philo correlates mind and spirit (νοῦς and πνεῦμα), which has led some to argue for a specifically Jewish interpretation of the Platonic trichotomy (not mind–soul–body but spirit–soul–body). Berger Pearson argued this in his influential 1968 Harvard dissertation, and while Richard Horsley sought to problematise it, van Kooten has recently revived the idea (see Pearson, Pneumatikos-Psychikos Terminology, 17-21; Horsley, “Pneumatikos vs. Psychikos,” 270-75; Kooten, Anthropology in Context, 279-80).
56 So van Kooten, “[when] Philo focuses on the spirit-part of [the] second man, he is in fact speaking of the first type of man. … The overlapping area consists of the uppermost part of the second type, in which he has been inbreathed by God’s Spirit” (Kooten, Anthropology in Context, 64).
either according to the lower soul (the ψυχή) or the upper soul (πνεῦμα/νοῦς). Thus Philo continues in *Her. 57* by stressing two opposing human “forms” (or “races” [*Leg. 1.31*]), one that is the earthly man who lives according to “blood and the pleasure of the flesh,” the other that is the heavenly man who lives according to the “divine spirit-reason.” Here Philo does not have a Form-Image opposition in mind, but rather contrasting modes of ethical behaviour; that is to say, the earthly man becomes the heavenly man when his trichotomous mind–soul–body is submitted to the divine breath. While Philo is otherwise a stricter dualist than many, on this point his cosmo-somatology is much more integrative than oppositional.

Taking the above traditions together, we see a general trend wherein cosmology and anthropology are understood within a one-world model. In most traditions this is understood as a thoroughly materialist construction premised on a hierarchical scale of cosmo-somatic qualities. In other traditions that are Platonically influenced, while a stronger Form-Image dualism is maintained, we nonetheless see that anthropology is often characterised by body–soul interrelation rather than opposition.

3.1.4 Summary: Concentric Circles of Cultural Embodiment

The preceding excursion through these concentric cultural circles has demonstrated a widespread one-world model characterised less by opposition and more by integration. The Jewish traditions we examined demonstrate this in two ways. On the one hand, heaven and earth are upheld as distinct spatial locales that each require their own somatic state. On the other hand, these locations are characterised by a high degree of permeability; travel between them is possible, and transformation from one somatic state into another (more idealised) state is expressly articulated. Accordingly, the obverse possibilities of human angelomorphism and divine anthropomorphism demonstrate that, though distinctions between celestial and terrestrial exist, they are not sharply delineated. Within broader Hellenistic thought, the philosophical milieu of the first
century C.E. was dominated by one-world, monistic conceptions. Even those who held a more radical dualism of sense–thought perception nonetheless advocated the interdependency of (for example) mind–soul–body.

The present study adopts the term polarity so as to characterise this one-world model of interrelations. Polarity is adopted not in the sense of opposition (e.g., “polar opposites”) but rather in the sense of an integrated system; it implies a unified whole wherein opposing forces exist in interdependent tension. This tension is interdependent because the individual parts of the system are understood to be inextricable with the whole. This kind of interconnection is essential to understanding Paul’s resurrection ideals, and we will see that the apostle perceives contrasting categories as systemically characterised by integrative polarity rather than determinative opposition. Paul does not oppose earth to heaven (down to up) or body to soul (out to in) but functions with a strong sense of interconnectivity between distinct elements.

3.2 Transformation and Resurrection

In light of the cultural contexts just examined, we now turn our attention to Paul’s transformation metaphors in 1 Cor 15 and 2 Cor 5, both of which are expressive of the apostle’s cosmo-somatic presuppositions. In ch. 2 we examined the overall role-value relations of the RESURRECTION gestalt in Paul’s thinking. We now focus much more explicitly on the micro-PATH (CHANGE) structure of the RESURRECTION gestalt, as it is this element that enables Paul to articulate post-mortem transformation from the earthly body into the idyllic or angelomorphic heavenly body. Our examination of both 1 Cor 15.35-50 and 2 Cor 5.1-5 will be conducted using conceptual blending analysis, though before turning to these passages it will be helpful to more clearly explicate the micro-PATH (CHANGE) structure (or simply, CHANGE gestalt) in greater detail.

57 In this way, the present study differs from Jeffrey Asher’s recent monograph on 1 Cor 15, where he employs the term polarity as a synonym for opposition (Jeffrey R. Asher, Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15: A Study of Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and Resurrection [HUT 42; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000]).
3. “We Will All Be Changed”

3.2.1 The CHANGE Gestalt Refocused

As noted in §2.1.2.2, notions of change are often premised upon the CHANGE IS MOVEMENT metaphor. This metaphor is schematically structured by opposing CONTAINER structures that are correlated with the SOURCE and GOAL elements of a PATH schema (see Diagram 3.1 [= Diagram 2.6]). The TRAJECTOR that moves between these poles is understood as the changee, and each CONTAINER structure represents differing locations and/or states. Depending on the discursive context, the CHANGE IS MOVEMENT metaphor can denote either locative change (i.e., point A to point B) or stative change (i.e., out of container A into container B), and both are central to Paul’s resurrection ideals.

So as to more fully substantiate this CHANGE gestalt, the following analysis will examine the extent to which the CHANGE IS MOVEMENT metaphor undergirds various descriptions of change/transformation. Consider the following examples, all of which have been drawn from the NT.

1. \( \chiωρισθείς \, ἐκ τῶν \, Ἀθηνῶν \, ἠλθεν \, εἰς \, Κόρινθον \)
   He [Paul] departed from [or out of] Athens and went to [or into] Corinth (Acts 18.1)

2. \( \, ἐγένετο \, εἰς \, δένδρον \)
   It [the mustard seed] became a tree [lit. into a tree] (Luke 13.19)

3. \( \, ἡμείς \, δὲ \, πάντες ... \, μεταμορφούμεθα \, ἀπὸ \, δόξης \, εἰς \, δόξαν \)
   But all of us … are being transformed from one degree of glory to another [lit. from/out of glory into glory] (2 Cor 3.18)

4. \( \, ὃς \, ἐρρύσατο \, ἡμᾶς \, ἐκ \, τῆς \, ἐξουσίας \, τοῦ \, σκότους \, καὶ \, μετέστησεν \, εἰς \, τὴν \, βασιλείαν \, τοῦ \, οἰκού \, τῆς \, ἀγάπης \, αὐτοῦ \)
   He [God] rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of his beloved son (Col 1.13)

5. \( \, ὁ \, γέλοιος \, ὑμῶν \, εἰς \, πένθος \, μετατραπήτω \, καὶ \, ἡ \, χαρὰ \, εἰς \, κατήψεις \)
   Let your laughter be turned into mourning, and your joy into gloom (James 4.9)

Number (1) is a clear example of the kind of somatic experience upon which the CHANGE IS MOVEMENT metaphor is premised, and while the TRAJECTOR (Paul) is not
3. “We Will All Be Changed”

Diagram 3.1:
The CHANGE Gestalt

(4) He rescued us from (ἐκ) the power of darkness and transferred us into (ἐις) the kingdom of his beloved son (Col 1.13)

(3) It [the mustard seed] became a tree [ἐις δένδρον – lit. into a tree] (Luke 13.19)

(5) Let your laughter be turned (μετατραπήσω) into (ἐις) mourning, and your joy into (ἐις) gloom (James 4.9)

Diagram 3.2:
Fore-Grounding and Back-Grounding the CHANGE Gestalt
leaving or entering a physical container, the geographical regions are metaphorically understood as such. In number (2), such change is metaphorically projected so as to allow movement into (εἰς) another state. Louw and Nida (§13.62) note that εἰς is commonly used to denote the state into which something is changed, and this coheres with the CHANGE gestalt outlined here. This is particularly evident in ἀπὸ … εἰς (3) and ἐκ … εἰς constructions (4), both of which clearly denote movement from/out of one place (understood as a CONTAINER) into another. In (3), for example, differing types of δόξα are conceptualised as bounded regions (i.e., containers) that one departs from (ἀπὸ) and then enters into (εἰς). Accordingly, categorical change is conceptualised as transposition from one container into another; this is evident in examples (2), (4), (5), and several other examples too.

As we can see in these examples, not every element of the gestalt structure is utilised in every case. At times the entire structure is accounted for (e.g., [4] – see Diagram 3.2), whereas at other times certain elements are fore-grounded and others back-grounded (e.g., in [3] the SOURCE/CONTAINER element is back-grounded – see Diagram 3.2). In still other instances, the same PATH-CONTAINER gestalt is utilised in a slightly different way (e.g., [5] – see Diagram 3.2). Here a TRAJECTOR is envisioned.

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58 While no verb of movement is made explicit, it is perhaps implicit. Compare further with Matt 19.5 // Mark 10.8, 1 Cor 6.16, Eph 5.31, and Luke 3.5, which all use “to be” verbs with εἰς so as to denote change. Given that many of these passages include scriptural citations (Matt 19.5 // Mark 10.8, 1 Cor 6.16, and Eph 5.31 = Gen 2.24; Luke 3.5 = Isa 40.4), we may be dealing with a conceptual structure that is shared by both Semitic and Greek cultures; on this point, however, further study is required. 59 In addition to number (2), see John 5.24; Acts 2.20; 26.24; 1 Pet 1.3; 1 John 3.14; and Jude 4. 60 E.g., Gal 1.6 and Rom 8.21. 61 E.g., Mark 1.29; Luke 10.7; John 5.24; Acts 13.34; 1 Pet 2.9; 1 John 3.14. 62 A few examples will suffice: (1) The verb ἀναπερνάω denotes the birthing image of movement from one container (the womb) into another metaphorical container (the world), and this container structure is explicit in 1 Pet 1.3 – God has given believers “new birth into a living hope” (ἀναπερνάω … εἰς ἐλπίδα ζωῆς). (2) The verb μετατίθημι is found 6 times in the NT, most commonly with the meaning of movement or transference from one location to another (e.g., Acts 7.16; Heb 11.5). In both Gal 1.6 and Jude 4 this movement is metaphorically projected onto more abstract categories, though still retaining the sense of movement into something (i.e., μετατίθημι … εἰς). (3) Though μεταστρέφω only occurs twice in the NT (Acts 2.20; Gal 1.7), in both instances it has the sense of radical alteration or change (note the use of εἰς in Acts 2.20). (4) The verb περιτρέπω is commonly glossed “to turn and bring around, to turn upside down” (LSJ). The verb occurs only in Acts 26.24, where Festus says to Paul: your learning is “driving you insane [or, turning into insanity]” (εἰς μανίαν περιτρέπει).
3. “We Will All Be Changed”

whose projected PATH is altered (or *turned*), thus resulting in an alternative LOCATION.\(^{63}\)

In each case, even though certain elements are explicit and others muted, the same gestalt is at work – i.e., *change* is conceptualised as movement between differing containers.\(^{64}\)

Though the five examples cited above should not be taken as a definitive representation of broader Greek usage, we nonetheless see conceptual consistency across several lexical signs. While this must be tested further, these examples point to a recurrent and common gestalt that undergirds notions of change within the conceptual milieu of the early Christian movement. Returning to Paul, we will now examine the way this gestalt is utilised in constructing notions of eschatological transformation.

3.2.2 “Sown in X, Raised in Y” – The Plant Metaphor of 1 Cor 15.35-50

Within the broader cultural contexts sketched above, Paul’s use of the plant metaphor in 1 Cor 15.35-50 is extremely robust and culturally nuanced. We can begin by noting that the apostle utilises this metaphor in response to the rhetorical question of how the dead will be raised, specifically addressing the nature of risen bodies themselves (15.35).\(^{65}\)

Paul asserts (15.42-44) that the higher, more desirable *σῶμα πνευματικῶν* is characterised by “imperishability, glory, and power” (αὐθερσία, δόξα, and δύναμις), while the lower, less desirable *σῶμα ψυχικῶν* by “perishability, dishonour, and weakness” (φθορά, ἀτμία, and ἀσθένεια). This language is multivalent, as Paul

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63 In this case, both the SOURCE and INTENDED GOAL are understood as identical container states (i.e., STATE A), and the UNINTENDED GOAL is STATE B. Nonetheless, the same gestalt structure is at work in this description.

64 It should of course not surprise us that verbs of movement denote change, as the *change* gestalt emerges from somatic experiences of locative movement (among others). Of the 12 NT occurrences of *μεταβάσις*, for instance, 10 denote spatial movement while the remaining two project this somatic experience onto more abstract categories (e.g., John 5.24, believers have “passed from [or out of] death into life” (ἀλλὰ μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωήν; comp. 1 John 3.14). Other verbs of movement evince similar trends – e.g., *στρέφο, προκύπτω, φέρω, πίπτω*, and *ἐκπίπτω*.

65 Demarcating the precise meaning of the Corinthian’s resurrection denial (1 Cor 15.12) has garnered much scholarly discussion. The three most dominant theories are (1) Paul is addressing a certain kind of realised eschatology at Corinth; (2) Paul is confronting a particular kind of Hellenistic Jewish wisdom philosophy from Alexandria that is particularly indebted to Philo’s two-man exegesis of Gen 1-2; and (3) that some in Corinth had a problem not so much with the afterlife or even resurrection, but rather with resurrection of the body. The present study leans in the direction of Philonic influence while remaining open to the possibility that these views may not be mutually exclusive.
locates apocalyptic notions of heavenly glory-bodies within an overarching cosmosomatic status-hierarchy. Here, then, Jewish apocalyptic and Graeco-Roman popular philosophy coalesce. Turning now to conceptual blending analysis, we will see that Paul uses the plant metaphor to stress somatic differentiation configured along vertically drawn cosmological lines. Because several mental spaces are constructed through the course of 15.35-50, it will be helpful to describe each in turn before assessing the blended spaces themselves (for a mapping of the blend, see Diagram 3.3a).

The first input (I₁) is cued in 15.35 and framed by the concept RESURRECTION. The space includes elements such as the risen σῶμα (signified by [?] in as much as Paul seeks to explicate the character of this risen body), the earthly σῶμα (signified by [x]), as well as some degree of continuity between the two (z and z). By virtue of the strong correlation between resurrection and verticality, the space is structured by the VERTICALITY schema, which opposes these earthly and risen bodies as DOWN and UP values respectively. The space has not (yet) been structured by the CHANGE gestalt because Paul has thus far only insisted that the dead will rise, hence the ambiguity of [x] and [?].

In 15.36-38 Paul introduces the second input space (I₂), which is initially triggered by the reference to sowing (σπείρω – v.36) and is thus structured by the PLANT GROWTH frame. This input space includes several different elements – the seed that is sown in one form (signified by [x]), the plant that eventually grows in another form (signified by [y]), the process of CHANGE between the two (hence the CHANGE gestalt, which is here inclined so as to signify vertical plant growth), as well as continuity between the two (z and z).

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66 Paul refers generally to a “seed” (κόκκος / σπέρμα – 15.37-38), though κόκκος can refer to a kernel of various plants (e.g., mustard, wheat, etc. – BDAG).

67 The example Paul gives is “wheat” (σίτος – 15.37).
Diagram 3.3a:
The Plant Metaphor
(1 Cor 15.36-38)

B₁₂: Content
“you do not sow the body that is to be, but the naked seed” (15.37)
“to each seed he gives its own body (i.e., plant body)” (15.38)
3. “We Will All Be Changed”

As one can see, both I₁ and I₂ share a significant amount of schematic and general content, which constitutes the generic space (G₁₂).68 The blend itself is expressed in 15.36-38 and includes several emergent elements.69 The cross-space mapping of both “seed” with “earthly body” and “plant” with “risen body” enables the recognition of two bodies that are at once different and yet continuous with one another. Once the blend is elaborated, it projects back onto I₁ a clearer understanding of the risen body as (dis)continuous with the earthly body (i.e., z[?] becomes z[y]), while also charactering the relationship between the two as that of change rather than mere vertical opposition (see Diagram 3.3b, where I₁ is now revised). In light of the above cultural contexts, this conceptual mapping aligns with broader trends in antique Judaism that posit both earthly and heavenly somatic existences characterised by transformation.

How these two somatic forms are continuous with one another does not concern Paul in the present text; he simply asserts that just as a wheat seed is linked to a wheat stalk, an earthly body will be raised a heavenly body. Paul now turns his attention toward more clearly delineating somatic differentiation. The blend that we have just

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68 The generic space consists of opposing down and up role-values, which map a single value z that is differentiated as “form [x]” and “form [?/y].” Despite the fact that Paul does not presume death as a necessary precursor to resurrection (cf. 15.51-52), the generic space also includes the idea that seeds must die before they change into a plant (15.36; cf. John 12.24). Moreover, the reference to being “made alive” (ζωοποιέω) is certainly at home within the resurrection transformation frame (cf. 15.22, 45; Rom 4.17), but it is also used as early as the 4th century B.C.E. to refer to the growth of plants (in the middle voice, as here [ζωοποιείται] – Rudolf Bultmann, “ζωοποιέω” TDNT 2:874-75).

69 For instance, the reference in 15.37 to sowing the body is a projection of both the “sown seed” element of I₂ and the “body” element of I₁. Though σῶμα can be used to refer to the form/body of a plant, this usage is less common than when σῶμα refers to a human or animal body (LSJ only lists 1 Cor 15.38 as an instance of σῶμα referring to a plant, whereas BDAG has a handful of examples). Xenophon may be the earliest documented usage of σῶμα for plants that survives in Greek literature (Symp. 2.25), but within the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha σῶμα is only used to denote human or animal bodies, never to refer to a plant (Eduard Schweizer and Friedrich Baumgärtel, “σῶμα, σωματικός, σύσωμος,” TDNT 7:1024-094). Nonetheless, the metaphorical nature of Paul’s description can be seen within the blended space where the earthly σῶμα (I₁) is cross-mapped with the sown seed (I₂) – “you do not sow the body that will be, but the naked seed” (οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὸ γεννησόμενον σπέιρες ἄλλα γημὺν κόσκον). This cross-space characterization of the sown seed as a σῶμα is further articulated by the description of said seed as “naked” (γημὺν). While Fitzmyer rightly notes that some seeds, prior to being sown, must be stripped of their natural coverings (e.g., the sheath in which grain grows – Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary [AB 32; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008], 588), it is surely more natural and elegant to read the reference to the “naked seed” as referring not to a botany procedure but rather to the human body that the seed is cross-mapped with. This presumes the clothing metaphor in 15.49, 53-54 (see discussion in §3.2.3).
3. “We Will All Be Changed”
elaborated is now itself blended with a third input space ($I_3$) so as to create a megablend (see Diagram 3.4). This third input is constructed in 15.39-41 and is framed by a cosmo-somatic mapping that contrasts lower and higher body types. Consistent with our findings above, Paul holds to a one-world model wherein qualitative differences (rather than ontological opposition) are mapped along a vertically drawn cosmological spectrum. In this respect, the conceptual mapping denotes transformation within the material world (i.e., seed to wheat; earthly to heavenly). This is further filled out with respect to Paul’s Adam-Christ typology, which we have already seen is vertically configured (i.e., ADAM IS DOWN / CHRIST IS UP). When framed cosmologically, Adam stands metaphorically for the earthly, natural body, while Christ stands for the celestial, risen body. This is borne out in 15.39-41, where Paul asserts that different types of “flesh” ($σύρξ$) exist on earth (that of humans, animals, birds, and fish – 15.39), while differing types of “glory” ($δόξα$) exist in the heavens (the sun, moon, and stars – 15.41). The key concept, however, which ties these contrasting states together, is that of the “body” ($σῶμα$ – 15.40). For Paul, the various fleshes-of-earth and glories-of-heaven are differing somatic types (e.g., a “body of flesh” vs. a “body of glory”), which are conceptually perceived as DOWN and UP respectively and thus correlated with Adam and Christ. Paul is doubtless drawing on the matrix of Jewish traditions that speak of both divine and human glory-bodies (i.e., the “Great Glory” vis-à-vis the angelomorphic human form; the apostle perceives all celestial bodies within this matrix, though each

70 So argued in §2.2.4.
71 Paul is here drawing a cosmological mapping that gives rise to the contrasting metaphors FLESH IS DOWN / GLORY IS UP. These correspond with the aforementioned Adam/Christ mapping, thus linking earthly Adamic existence with flesh and heavenly Christic existence with glory.
72 The language is reminiscent (for instance) of the Self-Glorification Hymn from Qumran. As already noted, the glorified figure is said to share in incomparable angelic “glory” ($τιμίωσις$ – 4Q491 11 I.13-15, 18), and his desires are expressly not of the “flesh” ($σώματι$ – 4Q491 11 I.14). On earthly flesh being incompatible with an angelomorphic state, see further 1 En. 71.11.
Diagram 3.4: The Plant Metaphor
(1 Cor 15.39-44)

Megablend Content (15.42b-43):
It is sown in (ἐν) perishability,
... in (ἐν) dishonour, ... in (ἐν) weakness
It is raised in (ἐν) imperishability,
... in (ἐν) glory, ... in (ἐν) power
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one differs in glory from the others (a reference that perhaps preserves the highest glory-body for Christ, the “Glory of the Lord”). 73 This coheres with our findings in §2.1, where we identified CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY as a common frame structure for understanding resurrection; here, CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY denotes the angelomorphic human form.

In light of this cosmological distinction, the schematic structure of $I_3$ consists of a simple VERTICALITY schema that opposes DOWN (i.e., Adamic, earthly, flesh bodies) and UP (i.e., Christic, heavenly, glory bodies) somatic states, thus highlighting differentiation (i.e., [x] vis-à-vis [y]). Despite this structural difference, both $B_1$ and $I_3$ are blended together on account of shared schematic and general correspondence in the generic space ($G_{B1-3}$). 74 The emergent blend (i.e., the megablend) is realised at human scale in 15.42b-43. Here, Paul contrasts that which is “sown in x” but “raised in y,” and he thrice repeats the formula, each time denoting the contrast between opposing container states.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{σπειρεῖται εν φθορα, ἐγείρεται εν ἀφθαρσία:} \\
\text{σπειρεῖται εν ατμία, ἐγείρεται εν δόξῃ:} \\
\text{σπειρεῖται εν ἀσθενείᾳ, ἐγείρεται εν δυνάμει.}
\end{align*}
\]

It is sown in perishability, it is raised in imperishability;  
It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory;  
It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power (1 Cor 15.42b-43)

As our mapping demonstrates, these references to being “sown” and “risen” can be traced back to $I_2$ and $I_1$ respectively. Of particular note is the attribution of container structure to these various states (note the use of ἐν), a description that arises from the CHANGE gestalt projected from $B_1$. What emerges in the megablend is a single entity that has two forms (i.e., movement from SOWN $Z[X]$ to RAISED $Z[Y]$ via inclined CHANGE structure), and thus resurrection is understood as transformation from an earthly to

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73 Though Paul’s contrast in 15.40 suggests that there is a measure of “glory” that can be ascribed to the earthly body, the passage clearly insists that the glory of the heavenly is greater (i.e., higher) than the earthly. It should not be overlooked that Paul elsewhere insists the risen image/form of believers will be the same as that of Christ’s (e.g., Phil 3.21; Rom 8.17, 29), who is the “divine glory.” Within this context of cosmic glory-bodies (which is drawn from broader Jewish traditions), Martin’s claim that Paul is “redefining σῶμα” is seen to be overstated (comp. Martin, Corinthian Body, 129).

74 For example, the generic space includes the VERTICALITY schematic axis as well as shared references to more concrete ideas such as Earth (e.g., the seed/body is associated with the earth [Blend 1]; Paul speaks of “earthly” bodies in $I_3$) and also differentiation between oppositions (e.g., seed/body vs. plant/body in Blend 1; earthly vs. heavenly bodies in $I_1$).
heavenly somatic existence. Paul’s resurrection ideals are framed via the RESURRECTION IS CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY metaphor, which here points toward an angelomorphic glory-body that differs from its earthy counterpart. While we should not, in light of the one-world model articulated above, understand these bodies as ontologically opposite, they are distinct. In this way, Paul fore-grounds discontinuity of the external somatic state, despite the fact that both continuity and discontinuity are implicit in the megablend (i.e., \( z[x] \) and \( z[y] \)).

In 15.44, however, Paul alters his description of the earthly and risen bodies in what appears (at first glance) to be a significant way; the text reads as follows:

\[
\text{σπειρέται σώμα ψυχικόν, ἐγειρέται σώμα πνευματικόν}
\]
It is sown an ensouled body, it is raised an enspirited body (1 Cor 15.44a)

As we have seen, the plant metaphor of 15.35-50 has thus far focused upon contrasting container structures (i.e., sown in \( x \), raised in \( y \)) as a way of differentiating the external (i.e., earthly \( σόμα \) vis-à-vis heavenly \( σόμα \)). In v.44, however, Paul now draws a distinction between internal referents (i.e., \( ψυχή \) vis-à-vis \( πνεῦμα \)). This shift is both sudden and stark, and it warrants a more detailed analysis.

This problem has not gone unnoticed by modern scholarship, even if it has been articulated differently; three common positions can be briefly problematised. First, given the one-world model outlined above, we can put aside the claim that the phrase \( σόμα πνευματικόν \) is oxymoronic.\(^{75}\) As we have seen, incorporeal does not necessarily denote immaterial, and thus there is no compelling reason to understand the adjective \( πνευματικός \) as ontologically opposed to \( σόμα \) (or even \( σάρξ \), for that matter). Second, many have argued that the phrase \( σόμα πνευματικόν \) denotes the material composition of the risen believer (i.e., a body made of \( πνεῦμα \)).\(^{76}\) While this

\(^{75}\) For example, Segal insists that \( σόμα πνευματικόν \) “is a complete contradiction in terms for anyone in a Platonic system” (Segal, “Paul’s Thinking,” 418).

\(^{76}\) Martin is a recent proponent of this view (Martin, Corinthian Body, 126-27). He insists on a somatic refinement such that at the resurrection the heavy material of flesh is “sloughed off,” leaving only the light material of \( πνεῦμα \). This view is problematic for two reasons: first, Paul elsewhere rejects the idea of an eschatological stripping (cf. 2 Cor 5.1-5); second, Paul is fundamentally concerned with
view coheres with the one-world model that we have posited, it fails to address the parallel description of the σῶμα ψυχικόν (which is not a body composed of ψυχή). The third scholarly position, which we have already introduced in §1.3.2, suggests σῶμα πνευματικόν denotes a body that is under the rule of the Spirit. While this view is dominant in Pauline scholarship, it presumes an anthropological dualism that is often uncritically recognised and which places the emphasis of transformation on the somatic interior (ψυχικός vs. πνευματικός) rather than exterior (σῶμα). As our blending analysis has demonstrated, Paul’s focus in 15.35-50 is squarely on the somatic exterior. Taken together, none of these views are wholly preferable.

Paul’s address in 1 Cor 15.45-49 is particularly indebted to some form of Philonic exegesis of Gen 1-2. Although the apostle confronts this exegesis (see 15.46), in one important respect he is aligned with it. As we saw §3.1.3, in certain instances Philo stresses the interrelation of the earthly and heavenly men; that is to say, the earthly man becomes the heavenly man when he lives in subjection not to the lower soul (ψυχή) but rather the upper soul, which is the inbreathed πνεῦμα (= νοῦς). On this point Paul seems in agreement with Philo, and he uses it to his rhetorical advantage. In 1 Cor 2.14-3.3 Paul similarly contrasts the “ensouled man” (ψυχικός … άνθρωπος) with the “enspirited [man]” (πνευματικός), not with respect to the future but rather the present. The “enspirited [man]” is specifically said to have the “mind of Christ” (νοῦν Χριστοῦ), while the “ensouled man” is correlated with the flesh. Thus Paul’s characterisation of the Corinthians as “fleshy” (σάρκινος – 3.1-3) serves as a critique that cuts to the core of their pneumatic identity; Paul is insisting that they are in fact dominated by the lower, earthly part of the soul rather than the higher, heavenly part.

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positing a heavenly container that stands in contrast to the earthly container (i.e., body vis-à-vis body [15.44], or garment vis-à-vis garment [15.49, 53-54]). In this way, Martin fails to recognise the conceptual structure of Paul’s argument.

77 This view is the current communis opinio; for proponents see §1.3.2 (ftnts. 88-92).
3. “We Will All Be Changed”

The rhetorical thrust of Paul’s address, then, is his insistence that the Corinthians are not submitting to the upper soul (πνεύμα or νοῦς Χριστοῦ).

It is important to note what Paul and his interlocutors take as implicit; namely, because the upper soul is presently embodied there exists an inherent tension between the πνεύμα/νοῦς and the ψυχη/σάρξ. But for Paul the problem is not one of embodiment, but rather the kind of body in which the πνεύμα/νοῦς exists; that is to say, rather than positing the soul’s disembodiment as the eschatological ideal, Paul instead posits the soul’s re-embodiment. In light of 1 Cor 2.14-3.3, it is now possible to see that Paul draws a caricature in 1 Cor 15.44 between two embodied extremes – on the one hand, the ensouled earthly body (σῶμα ψυχικόν); on the other, the enspirited risen body (σῶμα πνευματικόν). In this way, Paul is contrasting two different embodied states (the body subjected to the ψυχη/σάρξ vis-à-vis the body subjected to the πνεύμα/νοῦς), neither of which is characteristic of believers in the present.

With the exception of certain moments of rhetorical critique (e.g., 1 Cor 3.1-3), Paul otherwise characterises life in Christ as an embodied existence that lies between these two poles – i.e., an enspirited earthly body. Seen in this light, in 15.44 Paul is essentially saying: if there is an ensouled body that is designed for and thus trends toward body-soul coherence (i.e., fleshly existence), then there is also an enspirited body that is designed for and thus enables body-spirit coherence (i.e., pneumatic existence).

The key interpretive issue is the stress that Paul places upon body-soul interrelation, which can only be recognised when dualism in Paul is seen to stress integration rather than opposition. In ch. 4 we will more clearly identify this interrelation as an intra-somatic polarity, though at this point we can see that such polarity is only resolved in the future resurrection when the πνεύμα/νοῦς will be ideally matched within a heavenly glory-body. Consistent with the blending structure

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78 On this point Paul stands in contrast to Philo and perhaps his Corinthian interlocutors.
79 Van Kooten has similarly noted this caricature (Kooten, Anthropology in Context, 301).
that we have mapped, Paul’s focus is squarely upon the expectation of a transformed 
*exterior*, specifically one that does not exhibit intra-somatic tension with the 
πνεύμα/νοῦς. Returning to the scholarly positions noted above, Paul is not so much 
stressing an embodied existence that will be *under the rule of the S/spirit* as he is 
stressing an embodied existence *perfectly suited for the S/spirit’s rule* (hence the third 
 scholarly position above). Moreover, while we cannot exclude the possibility that said 
body will be compositionally pneumatic (hence the second scholarly position), for Paul 
the risen body is essentially an angelomorphic glory-body (framed by the RESURRECTION 
is CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY metaphor). In this way, Paul is best seen as synthesising 
various Greek and Jewish traditions into a single explanatory system. 

In conclusion, the plant metaphor creates a conceptual space where Paul is able 
to focus on contrasting container states (i.e., sown *in* x, raised *in* y), demonstrating them 
to be of varying earthly and heavenly qualities. What we find in the emergent structure 
of the plant metaphor is a consistent focus upon somatic opposition – the σώμα of the 
grown wheat is visibly different and distinct from the seed that was sown. Despite such 
radical opposition, notions of trans-somatic continuity are nonetheless implicit though 
only tacitly found. Indeed, Paul does not locate where such continuity is but rather 
draws an extreme caricature between the *ensouled earthly* and *enspirited heavenly 
* bodies. In doing so he stresses somatic transformation of the exterior (i.e., body), thus 
looking ahead to a mode of embodiment perfectly suited for the πνεύμα/νοῦς.

3.2.3 On Wearing a House – The Clothing/Housing Metaphor of 2 Cor 5.1-5 

Given that the *change is movement* metaphor is premised on a transposition of 
containers, it is not surprising that Paul elsewhere utilises metaphors for eschatological

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80 Paul likely has subjection to both the human πνεύμα and the divine πνεύμα (i.e., Christ, the 
πνεύμα ζωοποιοῦν [1 Cor 15.45]) in mind, whereby the efficacious power of the former is enabled 
through the granting of the latter (see §4.2).

81 That is to say, just as the risen Christ is both pneumatic (1 Cor 15.45) and characterised by a 
glory-body (Phil 3.21), so too will believers be. It is worth noting that issues of somatic composition are 
not wholly absent from 1 Cor 15 (see esp. v.50).
transformation that specifically stress this container aspect. This is particularly evident in the clothing and housing metaphors of 2 Cor 5.1-5 (and 1 Cor 15.49, 53-54), though it is already prevalent in the broader discourse of 2 Cor 3-5. Here Paul oscillates between outer and inner somatic referents (esp. 3.12-18), he makes reference to an inner shining light (4.6), he likens the body to a clay jar (4.7), and he draws a distinction between outer decay and inner renewal (4.16-18 – for a full discussion, see §5.2.1). By the time his readers arrive at ch. 5, Paul has already primed them for an understanding of resurrection as transposition from one container to another, and the images of both clothing and housing take centre stage.

Consistent within our theoretical framework, the body itself is the primary medium through which human beings experience containment; so Johnson, “we are intimately aware of our bodies as three-dimensional containers into which we put certain things (food, water, air) and out of which other things emerge (food and water wastes, air, blood, etc.).” The primary metaphor that arises from this aspect of human embodiment is the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor, which enable descriptions of the human person configured around the IN-BOUNDARY-OUT axis of the CONTAINER gestalt. Put differently, the human body is understood as having both an interior and an exterior.

Though the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor emerges organically from embodied experience, it is doubtless constructed in diverse and various ways across cultures. We will examine both Jewish and Greek anthropological descriptions in §4.2, though at this point we can insist that Paul fits within a broader cultural pattern that maps the human constitution along an IN-OUT axis. As we have seen all along, Paul’s transformation ideals emphasise contrasting CONTAINER states, and it is the BODY IS CONTAINER

metaphor that enables such descriptions.83 This is expressly clear in 2 Cor 5.1-5, where Paul elaborates two other CONTAINER-structured metaphors.

The first is cued in 5.1-2a, where Paul speaks of the body as a dwelling place. It goes without saying that buildings are conceptually perceived as containers that people constantly moved in and out of (i.e., BUILDING IS CONTAINER). By virtue of this shared schematic structure, as well as other frame elements, the domains BODY (I₁) and DWELLING PLACE (I₂) are blended together so as to create the BODY IS HOUSE metaphor (Diagram 3.5).84 Here again, Paul contrasts two different somatic/dwelling states. On the one hand, the “earthly” (ἐπίγειος) is susceptible to “destruction” and described as a “house, which is a tent” (οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους), a phrase that is at home in Greek philosophical traditions.85 On the other hand, the heavenly (οὐρανός) “house” (οἰκία) or “building from God” (οἰκοδομήν ἐκ θεοῦ) is “eternal” (αἰώνιος), “not built by [human] hands” (ἄχειροποίητος), and further carries shades of Jewish apocalyptic.86 Taken together, Paul is best seen as synthesising these cultural traditions, and by virtue of the BODY IS HOUSE metaphor he posits both earthly and heavenly somatic dwelling places.

83 It is partly for this reason that notions of containment were coherent within the plant metaphor; despite the fact that seeds and plants are not usually thought of as containers, bodies are, and thus Paul is able to successfully contrast earthly and heavenly bodies. Paul further develops this line of thinking briefly in 1 Cor 15.49 and 53-54, where he characterises eschatological transformation as a process of putting on clothing.

84 The content of this blend is comprised of aspects associated with DWELLING PLACES, and includes structure such as Builders, Interior (IN), Exterior (OUT), a BOUNDARY, as well as qualitative associations such as Home. As Paul introduces the concept HOUSE, I₁ and I₂ are blended on account of their shared CONTAINER structure, thus creating the metaphor BODY IS HOUSE.

85 The appositional use of σκήνος with οἰκία is not insignificant (οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους is a genitive of apposition – BDF §167), as it denotes not only the temporary nature of this dwelling (BDAG) but is also used in classical literature to denote the body as the “tabernacle of the soul” (LSJ). The metaphor was common in Greek philosophical traditions – for more, see David E. Aune, “Human Nature and Ethics in Hellenistic Philosophical Traditions and Paul: Some Issues and Problems,” in Paul in his Hellenistic Context (ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 291-312 (pp. 301-02).

86 The image of an eschatological building is common in Jewish (esp. apocalyptic) tradition (e.g., 1 En. 90.28-38), and though the focus of the present passage is not upon a renewed Jerusalem and/or temple, Paul’s own description of the body as the temple of the spirit (e.g., 1 Cor 6.19; cf. 1 Cor 3.16-17; 2 Cor 6.16) suggests we should not rule these associations out of hand.
Diagram 3.5:
The BODY IS HOUSE Metaphor

BODY IS EARTHLY HOUSE

G: \( I_2 \rightarrow I_1 \)

In: \( \text{Interior} \rightarrow \varepsilon\sigma\omega\ \varepsilon\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\omicron \) 

Boundary: \( \text{Walls} \rightarrow \varepsilon\xi\omega\ \varepsilon\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\omicron \) 

Generator: \( \text{Builders} \rightarrow \text{Parents} \) 

Genesis: \( \text{Construction} \rightarrow \text{Birth} \) 

Composition: \( \text{Tent Materials} \rightarrow \text{Flesh/Blood} \) 

End: \( \text{Destruction} \rightarrow \text{Death} \)

BODY IS HEAVENLY HOUSE

G: \( I_2 \rightarrow I_1 \)

In: \( \text{Interior} \rightarrow \varepsilon\sigma\omega\ \varepsilon\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\omicron \) 

Boundary: \( \text{Walls} \rightarrow \varepsilon\xi\omega\ \varepsilon\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\omicron \) 

Generator: \( \text{Builders} \rightarrow \alpha\chi\epsilon\rho\sigma\omicron\omicron\iota\tau\omicron\sigma\omicron \) 

Genesis: \( \text{Construction} \rightarrow \text{Parousia} \) 

Composition: \( \text{House Materials} \rightarrow \alpha\iota\omega\nu\omicron\omicron \) 

End: \( \text{Destruction} \rightarrow \)
3. “We Will All Be Changed”

The second CONTAINER-structured metaphor focuses on the concept of CLOTHING, and it is introduced in vv.2b and 4. We have already demonstrated that characterisations of celestial transformation are commonly described through the dawning of a heavenly/angelic garment. While much antique (i.e., Graeco-Roman) attire was designed to wrap around the body, it was common to conceptualise clothing via the CONTAINER schema. For instance, the verb ἐνδύω, which is commonly used to describe the act of putting clothing on, is also used to denote movement into an object or state (i.e., go into or enter into – LSJ). This sense of moving into and out of clothing is reflected in many garment designs as well. The χιτών/tunica, worn by both men and women, was tubular in design (for lack of a better term) and was either slipped over the head and pulled down or stepped into and then pulled up so as to cover the length of the body. It was not uncommon to wear two χιτών (i.e., both an under- and over-garment), and it was usually covered over by another garment such as a ἰμάτιον (or Pallium/Palla [men/women]). This latter garment was not so much moved into as adorned (i.e., wrapped around the body), but we can conclude that Graeco-Roman dress consisted of several different layers, some of which were “put on” and all of which

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87 In this way, the embodied grounding of ἐνδύω is tied to the CONTAINER schema. The word itself is a compound formed from ἐν and δύω. The former is a familiar preposition that commonly denotes the state of being in a location, in (see §5.1.1). The latter is commonly glossed (LSJ) to “cause to sink or plunge into” (causative) or “go into” (non-causative, particularly with respect to places and even clothing [e.g., Homer, Il. 5.845; 6.340; 18.416]).

88 For helpful visuals of the χιτών/tunica and other garments, as well as differences between male and female garb, see esp. Norma Goldman, “Reconstructing Roman Clothing,” in The World of Roman Costume (eds. Judith Lynn Sebesta and Larissa Bonfante; Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), 213-37. Much of the analysis here moves interchangeably between descriptions of both Greek and Roman clothing. This descriptive flexibility is founded on Goldman’s assertion that the basic design and structure of Greek and Roman dress was the same within the broader Graeco-Roman period (despite differences in style and ornamentation – p. 217).

89 Men would wear the ἰμάτιον draped over the left arm and wrapped around the torso, while women could wear the ἰμάτιον draped over the head (such that it covered the entire body) or simply over the arms. Roman citizens also wore the toga, which was similar in design though differed in cut. The garment functioned as Roman formal dress, and it was given as a rite of passage to signify a boy’s transition to manhood (cf. Fanny Dolansky, “Togam virilem sumere: Coming of Age in the Roman World,” in Roman Dress and the Fabrics of Roman Culture [eds. Jonathan Edmondson and Alison Keith; PhoSup 1; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008], 47-70). At times women also wore the toga as a sign of adultery.
encompassed the torso. This all points to a cultural understanding of clothing as a type of container that humans move in and out of, and is thus reflective of the conceptual metaphor CLOTHING IS CONTAINER.

What is of immediate interest, however, is that Paul is concerned not with the putting on of different clothes but rather with the putting on of a different body. When blended with the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor, a relatively straightforward blend is created that establishes cross-space mappings between the BOUNDARY role-values, thus linking clothing → body (Diagram 3.6). Accordingly, Paul contrasts differing somatic states as instances of wearing different types of clothing, thus establishing the BODY IS CLOTHING metaphor. With respect to eschatological transformation, in 1 Cor 15 Paul has already insisted that what is perishable and mortal must be clothed with (passive form of ἐνδύω) the imperishable and immortal (vv.53-54). Similarly, in 15.49 Paul insists that though believers currently “wear” (φορέω) the image of the earthly man, they will one day “wear” (φορέω) the image of the heavenly man. Returning to 2 Cor 5, Paul utilises this metaphor as a way of describing the process of eschatological transformation. In 5.2b and 4 the apostle speaks of “clothing over” (ἐπενδύουμαι); the image is that of moving into one garment (i.e., the heavenly body) that is put on over another (i.e., the earthly body). What is most interesting, however, is the way Paul

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90 The garments listed here are by no means exhaustive, and one can also point to other types of garb including jewellery, footwear, and occasion-specific dress (e.g., bridal garments, military garb). Of particular note is the στολή/stola; despite being a standard female over-garment that signified marriage, in the NT στολή is used to describe garments of honour (cf. Luke 15.22; Mark 12.38), salvation (cf. Rev 22.14 and other passages in Revelation), and even angelic/celestial status (Mark 16.5). This usage seems at home within Hellenistic Jewish literature (e.g., Ps. Sol. 11.7), esp. with respect to priestly vestments (e.g., Josephus, A.J. 15.403-08).

91 This brief exposition is not meant to downplay or overlook the social or cultural significance of Graeco-Roman clothing; indeed, dress was tied to social values such that differing levels of wealth and/or status were conveyed based upon one’s attire (e.g., the toga as a sign of Roman citizenship). Much contemporary research on Graeco-Roman clothing is interested in such issues. For a general introduction, see Alicia J. Batten, “Clothing and Adornment,” BTB 40 (2010): 148-59, and on Paul specifically, Jung Hoon Kim, The Significance of Clothing Imagery in the Pauline Corpus (JSNTSup 268; London: T&T Clark, 2004).

92 The clothing metaphor may actually be introduced as early as 15.37, where Paul’s description of the sown seed as “naked” (γυμνός) coheres with the CLOTHING frame.

93 Via the BODY AS CLOTHING metaphor, the use of ἐπενδύουμαι in both 5.2 and 5.4 (the only NT occurrences) clearly points to a view wherein the earthly body/dwelling is one kind of clothing that will
one day be clothed over by the heavenly body/dwelling. In this way, the image that Paul seeks to convey is not that of container removal, nor even container replacement, but rather further containment.
blends the clothing and housing metaphors so as to describe post-mortem transformation. The conceptual blend reflected in 5.2b and 4 is extremely robust, drawing on all the input spaces and conceptual metaphors that we have identified in the discourse thus far (see Diagram 3.7).

The blend consists of three inputs spaces. The first (I₁) is comprised only of the natural human body and does not include notions of heavenly bodies, since this has not been the focus of Paul’s address in the broader epistolary context. The second input (I₂) consists of vertically opposing earthly and heavenly dwelling places. The final input (I₃) contains the process of putting one garment on over top of another, and thus includes the CHANGE gestalt. What links the three inputs together are a series of sub-generic spaces, which consist of the BODY IS HOUSE metaphor (G₁-2), the BODY IS CLOTHING metaphor (G₁-3), as well as the recognition of opposing containers, configured either vertically or along a PATH schema (G₂-3). The generic space that ties these sub-generic mappings together is the CHANGE gestalt, which maps the opposing container elements as well as the process of transformation between the two, and in this way has enough schematic structure within itself to enable the blend. The blended space itself consists of emergent meaning not found elsewhere. Most pointedly, Paul is able to characterise believers as “longing to be clothed over with our dwelling from heaven” (τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιποθοῦντες – 5.2b), and to

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94 Indeed, since 4.7 (and even as early as 3.2) Paul has been fixated on the earthly human body (see discussion in §5.2).
95 These dwelling places are vertically opposed on account of the cosmological mapping (cf. 5.1), which presumes the VERTICALITY schema.
96 This was introduced already in 5.1-2a. Because I₁ lacks any kind of opposing structure, the vertical opposition of containers is not linked in the sub-generic space.
97 Because the PATH structure is not found in I₁, it therefore does not find articulation in this sub-generic space.
98 The two axes are not (yet) subsumed into one inclined PATH structure, but rather stand side by side so as to enable the blend of I₁ and I₂.
99 From G₁-2 the contrasting earthly body/tent and heavenly dwelling elements are mapped to the SOURCE and GOAL containers respectively. Similarly, the (earthly) BODY AS CLOTHING element of G₁-3 is mapped to the SOURCE element. Along with G₁-2, G₂-2 similarly maps vertically opposing container structures onto the SOURCE and GOAL elements of the CHANGE gestalt, while also mapping the PATH structure itself; taken together, both the VERTICALITY and PATH structures of G₂-2 correspond to the inclined CHANGE gestalt in resurrection contexts.
Diagram 3.7:
Putting on a House
(2 Cor 5.2b, 4)
further speak of earthly/heavenly dwellings as garments that are worn (5.4). Not surprisingly, Paul carries this metaphor forward into 5.6-10, where he speaks of being at “home” (ἐνδήμεω) in the earthly body but desiring to be “home” (ἐνδήμεω) with the Lord. Taken together, Paul’s ability to speak of wearing a heavenly dwelling draws from all three inputs in that it presumes an earthly body (I₁) that puts on (I₃) a heavenly house (I₂).

As our analysis demonstrates, the blend is enabled in part because of a shared CONTAINER structure, but it is the CHANGE gestalt that organises the disparate elements together. The blend is premised upon an understanding of the human body as a container (i.e., BODY IS CONTAINER), and eschatological transformation is not a radical or ontological break but a continuous somatic transformation within a unitary, one-world model. But what in all of this is continuous? Indeed, Paul is rather clear that the mortal is “swallowed” (καταπίνων) by life (5.4b), an image that implies the terminal end of that which is consumed.100 Rather curiously, in 5.3 Paul insists that, even if “we have taken [the earthly body] off, we will not be found naked” (ἐκδυσάμενοι οὐ γυμνοί εὑρεθησόμεθα). Here Paul extends the frame structure of the clothing metaphor to imply that believers already in their earthly form possess some kind of heavenly-quality garment that is not disrobed at death.101

At this point we can note the inherent logic of the CLOTHING frame: namely, the act of putting on one garment entails taking off another whereby a period of nakedness ensues. Paul seems to have picked up on this logic in 5.3, and wanting to avoid notions

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100 The swallowing metaphor denotes the destruction of the earthly tent through the process of eschatological consumption (to extend the SWALLOWING frame). It should not be overlooked that the swallowing metaphor is also premised upon the CONTAINER schema. Here the movement of the mortal body into the risen body is now characterised as the act of a perishable object (e.g., food) entering into a consumer’s body. The same metaphor is found in 1 Cor 15.54, where it is similarly used in conjunction with the clothing metaphor.

101 Paul here seems to presume an intermediary state between death and Parousia (James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle [Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1998], 489-90), of which two points can be made. First, such an intermediary state is not without parallel in broader Jewish tradition (e.g., I En, 22). Second, Paul is not interested in describing such a state for its own sake, nor does he see it as the eschatological ideal (comp. the language of longing in 5.2 and 4). Paul remains clearly focused on risen embodiment, and if such an interim state exists, he insists that it too will be (in some fashion) embodied (i.e., not naked).
of a disembodied soul, thus posits some form of interim clothing. Having insisted that
the earthly and heavenly bodies are differing *outer* garments, the logic of the *clothing*
frame provides Paul with an alternative to interim nakedness – namely, an interim
undergarment.\(^{102}\) Consistent with his emphasis upon *further containment*, then, Paul
extends the clothing metaphor to thus denote both inner and outer containers, one of
which *can be* taken off at death, the other of which is permanent and survives death.

What are these eternal-quality (under-)garments that Paul perceives as having
already been given and surviving death? The answer cannot be the earthly body, as Paul
feels quite free to suggest that it can be destroyed (5.1) and will be taken off (5.3). Nor
can this be the heavenly body, which is an over-garment (5.2, 4) and will be given in the
future. The best answer is the indwelling presence of Christ, the πνεῦμα, which Paul
here insists is the “deposit” (ἀρραβών) or guarantee of risen existence (5.5). While we
must acknowledge that Paul *does not* speak of the πνεῦμα as being *put on*,\(^{103}\) he does
ubiquitously map the πνεῦμα to the somatic interior, thus locating it *within* the earthly
body (or *underneath the earthly garment*). In this way, Paul envisions a strong degree of
continuity between the earthly and heavenly bodies, which he maps to the somatic
interior and links to the presence of the πνεῦμα. Here then is the point of continuity
across earthly and heavenly somatic existence (see further, ch. 4).\(^{104}\)

In summary, we have seen that the clothing/housing metaphor of 2 Cor 5.1-5 is
premised upon the *body is container* metaphor. Seen within the one-world model
noted above, Paul conceptualises transformation between these somatic states as a

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102 As we have seen above, this is consistent with typical Mediterranean garb whereby both
under- and over-garments are worn. To extend that discussion, in Roman times men and women had
different kinds of under-tunics. For example, the *indusium* (for a matron) and the *supparus* seem to be
specific kinds of female undertunics that were worn underneath the regular tunic; they were likely light
and functioned as a kind of “slip” (Kelly Olson, “Roman Underwear Revisited,” *CW* 96 [2003]: 201-10
[pp. 201-03]). In addition to this, however, Olson suggests it is unlikely that either men or women
regularly wore any kind of loincloth underneath the tunic (pp. 205-09).

103 Paul does, however, speak elsewhere of believers “putting on” (ἐνδυόμενοι) Christ in the present
(Gal 3.27; Rom 13.13-14; cf. 1 Thess 5.8).

104 This aligns with what we saw in 1 Cor 15.44, where the risen body is understood as a somatic
existence that is perfectly suited for the πνεῦμα.
3. “We Will All Be Changed”

process of both difference and continuity; that is, while the external somatic states are cosmologically distinct, the internal πνεῦμα persists.

3.3 Conclusions

The overarching aim of this chapter has been to better understand the categories of reality that Paul works with, specifically with respect to cosmology and anthropology. Locating the apostle within a series of concentric cultural circles, we have seen that Paul holds to a dualistic framework that is characterised by integration rather than opposition; that is, Paul thinks in terms of unified wholes wherein opposing forces exist in interdependent tension with one another. With respect to Paul’s transformation metaphors, we have demonstrated that the apostle envisions somatic states that are uniquely fashioned for their cosmological locations. In 1 Cor 15 Paul draws a caricature between the ensouled earthly body and the enspirited heavenly body, both of which are radically discontinuous with one another because of their cosmo-somatic locations. The difference between these two caricatures is drawn largely with respect to issues of intra-somatic polarity; that is to say, Paul is contrasting two embodied extremes so as to stress that the risen body will be perfectly suited for the indwelling πνεῦμα. While notions of continuity are only implicit in 1 Cor 15, in 2 Cor 5 Paul points more specifically to the location of trans-somatic continuity (esp. 2 Cor 5.3 and 5). Here, Paul envisions a process of radical discontinuity of the somatic exterior but sustained continuity of the somatic interior.

Returning to the secondary literature examined in §1.3.2, we can now see that the standard scholarly constructions of dualism and monism are hermeneutically unhelpful and historically imprecise. On the one side, the strong dualism that is often attributed to Jewish apocalyptic (generally) and Paul (specifically) is seen to be fallaciously overextended. More specifically, neither Käsemann’s radical break between cosmic aeons nor de Boer’s insistence upon dualistic opposition are characteristic of Paul’s
cosmology. As we have seen, Paul has a much more integrative worldview. On the other side, the strong monism that Bultmann, Betz, and Schnelle attribute to Paul’s anthropology is similarly problematic. As the transformation metaphors of both 1 Cor 15 and 2 Cor 5 demonstrate, Paul is quite capable of understanding the human composition as partitively drawn. Indeed, we have seen strong evidence that suggests the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor is extended not only to denote external transformation but also to map trans-somatic continuity of the interior (this point will be further elaborated in ch. 4). In this way, notions of anthropological dualism are germane to Paul’s resurrection ideals. Taken together, Paul is best located between these two scholarly constructs – Paul upholds a one-world model that is partitively drawn and yet characterised by *intra-cosmic* and *intra-somatic polarity*.
The preceding chapters have examined two aspects of Paul’s resurrection ideals. In §2.2 we demonstrated that the apostle utilises the entire RESURRECTION gestalt in structuring much of his theology. In the last chapter we specifically focused on Paul’s transformation metaphors, thus examining the CHANGE gestalt in specific detail. In both instances we focused on the temporal scaling of resurrection as being an event in the future; this is how resurrection is traditionally configured within scholarly discussions, and it constitutes what many have (dubiously) identified as “literal” or “real” resurrection.

In the present chapter we turn our attention to instances wherein the RESURRECTION gestalt is projected onto believers’ present lives. What is at issue here is the extent to which Paul’s resurrection ideals are not merely orientated toward the future but rather have a present referent as well. The issue is particularly evident in Rom 6, where Paul insists that believers have been “crucified with,” “buried with,” and thus “died with Christ” (vv.4-8). The absolute nature of such death is clear in Paul’s address, and the ethical implications for his Roman readers are that they consider themselves “dead to sin” (6.11). While such a participation in Christ’s death is sure, the precise nature of resurrection within this passage is less clear. To be certain, Paul explicitly looks ahead to a future resurrection that has not yet happened (6.5, 8). At the same time, however, Paul insists that believers now “walk in newness of life” (6.4), that they present themselves as “those who are living from the dead” (6.13), and further that they consider themselves “alive to God” (6.11). While such descriptions are not explicitly
identified as resurrection, they nonetheless suggest (even presume) some kind of present resurrection experience.

Several problems emerge when we speak of resurrection as being (in some sense) already realised. How does Paul understand present resurrection? What exactly does it mean to be risen in the present? How does this present resurrection relate to the future resurrection that Paul explicitly holds to? These are all issues that will be addressed through the course of this chapter, but they all centre on the larger issue of Paul’s eschatological outlook, specifically his understanding of “already” and “not-yet.”

Traditional scholarly treatments of Paul’s eschatology have overwhelmingly insisted that the apostle has modified the Jewish eschatological outlook. Given this study’s insistence on a recurrent resurrection gestalt that is shared by Paul and his Jewish predecessors, it seems that such claims to modification might seriously wound our overall thesis. In this light, the present chapter will address not only the nature but also the extent to which such modifications can be claimed.

The following discussion will focus specifically on Rom 6-8 so as to examine the extent to which Paul understands resurrection as not just a future but also a present experience. Our argument will unfold in four steps. We will first examine Rom 6.1-11

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1 A few prime examples will suffice: C. H. Dodd, “in the New Testament … [we have] a profound difference” such that the church “proceeded to reconstruct on a modified plan the traditional scheme of Jewish eschatology” (C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments: Three Lectures with an Appendix on Eschatology and History [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963], 84 and 37); G. Vos contrasts “the original scheme” of Jewish eschatology with “the modified scheme” that Paul employed (Geerhardus Vos, The Pauline Eschatology [2d ed.; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1961], 36-41); O. Cullmann, “the new feature in the Christian conception of time, as compared with Jewish conception [sic], is to be sought in the division of time” (Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History [trans. F. V. Filson; Rev. ed.; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962], 82); A.T. Lincoln, “Paul modified the sharp contrast between the two ages” (Andrew T. Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet: Studies in the Role of the Heavenly Dimension in Paul’s Thought with Special Reference to his Eschatology [SNTSMS 43; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], 170); J. D. G. Dunn, Jesus “disrupted the previous schema and required it to be modified” (James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle [Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1998], 463); and N. T. Wright, the dividing of history into two moments of resurrection is one of two “mutations within the Jewish worldview” (N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003], 372).

2 Though eschatology and resurrection are by no means synonymous, they are interrelated. Eschatology is a broader category, in which expectations of resurrection are but one expression. For this reason, conceptualisations of resurrection (i.e., the resurrection gestalt) naturally include built-in eschatological structure (e.g., macro-path structure), though the obverse is not necessarily true. In examining Paul, because the apostle’s eschatological ideas are also resurrection ideals, it therefore follows that the resurrection gestalt functions as the primary structure of Paul’s eschatology. Accordingly, claims of eschatological modification are also claims of resurrection modification.
so as to determine the extent to which the baptismal metaphor presumes some form of present resurrection (§4.1). Suggesting that baptismal death entails baptismal resurrection, we then turn in Rom 7 toward more clearly identifying what this present resurrection looks like (§4.2). In §4.3 we will examine Rom 8.9-11 so as to assess the precise relationship between present and future resurrection experiences. Finally, in §4.4 we will broaden our analysis so as to critically engage the *communis opinio* that Paul has modified the traditional eschatological schema. To anticipate our conclusions, we will demonstrate that Paul has a singular resurrection event in mind, one that is dynamically played-out on the σῶμα such that the nexus of already/not-yet is mapped onto the human body itself. In this way, Paul holds to an eschatological somatology.

4.1 Already Dead, but Not Yet Risen? – Baptismal Death in Rom 6.1-11

We begin with Rom 6.1-11, a passage that has garnered no shortage of scholarly debate regarding the temporal nature of Paul’s resurrection ideals. The following analysis will examine the baptismal metaphor of Rom 6.4 in depth. Again offering a blending analysis, we will specifically identify the extent to which notions of a present resurrection are inherent therein.

At the beginning of Rom 6 Paul turns his attention toward the relationship between grace and ethics. In the previous chapter Paul has concluded that grace increases on account of sin (Rom 5.20), and this assertion leads him in 6.1 to pose the rhetorical question, “should we not continue in sin?” To his rhetorical interlocutor Paul counters with the emphatic “by no means,” and the rationale for what he takes as self-evident is the assertion that believers have already “died to sin” (6.2). The key text for our purposes is 6.4, which reads as follows:

συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν θάνατον, ἵνα ὡσπερ ἤγερθη Χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς, οὗτος καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν

Through baptism we have been buried with him into death, so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, thus we too might walk in newness of life (Rom 6.4)
4. Eschatological Somatology

This passage betrays an elaborate blending structure that consists of three inputs as well as several (sub-)generic spaces (Diagram 4.1). Given the hermeneutical importance of this passage, it will be of benefit to examine the blend in detail.

The first and third input spaces are concerned with the figures of Christ and believers respectively. Given the focus in 6.4 upon Christ’s death and resurrection, the first input ($I_1$) is framed by the protagonist elements of the RESURRECTION gestalt.

Accordingly, this space includes structural elements such as the protagonist’s macro-PATH and micro-PATH (CHANGE), as well as specific elements such as Christ himself (i.e., the TR-P, signified by $\chi$), Christ’s death (signified by $D\chi$, understood as an event along the macro-PATH), and Christ’s risen existence (signified by $R\chi$). By contrast, the third input ($I_3$) is framed by the believer’s pre-baptismal existence. This space includes the structural element antagonist’s macro-PATH, as well as specific elements such as believers themselves (i.e., the TR-A, signified by O.M. [“old man,” ὁ παλαιός ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος – 6.6]) and the projected antagonist’s death (signified by $D_O\text{M}$).

The second input space ($I_2$), which concerns the baptismal rite, requires a greater deal of description. Though the rite has, in many ways, been lost to history, this does not preclude meaningful articulation of how Paul and his Roman readers would have constructed $I_2$. This is especially evident in light of the present study’s theoretical commitments. Because conceptual metaphors are conceptual in nature and thus pre-linguistic, they find manifestation in non-linguist contexts; that is to say, in addition to language, conceptual metaphors can be expressed through ritual praxis.

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3 Given that the entire pericope is premised upon the contrast between pre- and post-baptismal existences (e.g., 6.6, 11), $I_1$ consists of the former while the blended space will consist of the latter.
4 Cf. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 57. The present cognitive linguistic analysis aligns with recent trends in the cognitive science of religion. Risto Uro has recently offered a succinct primer of ritual studies as related to early Christianity, specifically identifying genealogical, functionalist, and symbolist approaches (Risto Uro, “Ritual and Christian Origins,” in Understanding the Social World of the New Testament [eds. Dietmar Neufeld and Richard E. DeMarrais; London: Routledge, 2010], 220-32). The present analysis falls squarely within the symbolist camp, which focuses upon the semiotics of ritual acts and explores the extent to which a given rite is a culturally interpreted
Diagram 4.1: 
Baptismal Death and Resurrection (Rom 6.4)
forward is to look for correlation between resurrection and baptism at the conceptual rather than the human-scale level.

Such conceptual coherence can be demonstrated through both linguistic and historical analyses. To the former, in general usage the linguistic sign βαπτιζω⁵ implies downward movement (dipping or submerging in liquid)⁶ that often results in a tragic end (e.g., death),⁷ thus Albrecht Oepke notes, in the Hellenistic period “the idea of going under or perishing is nearer the general usage [of βαπτιζω].”⁸ In linguistic expression, then, βαπτιζω is conceptually correlated with DOWN (i.e., ΒΑΠΤΙΖΩ IS DOWN). We see a similar trend within the limited historical data concerning early Christian baptismal practices, where we have good reason to suspect the rite included some form of vertically configured somatic movement. Such is certainly the case with Jesus’ baptism in Mark (and Matthew after him), and the Lukan author provides a related description in Acts 8.39.⁹ Though the Did. may evince an alternative practice,¹⁰ the much later Hippolytus (3ʳᵈ cent. C.E.) speaks of a threefold immersion (Trad. ap. 21.14-19).¹¹ While the practices of Paul and his communities are ultimately lost to history, it seems reasonable that the baptismal rite involved some form of down-up somatic movement; in

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⁵ In 6.3 βαπτιζω is used, in 6.4 the noun βαπτισμα. The latter points to the established practice, which is here understood instrumentally as the means by which “burial with” (συνθάπτω) Christ is achieved.

⁶ So LSJ glosses the term generally as to dip or plunge. LSJ offers several further glosses too, many of which are premised upon downward movement (e.g., to be drowned [where one moves down into the water], or to dye cloth [a practice that may be linked to the act of plunging]).

⁷ The sign is often used in contexts that denote some kind of tragic end: e.g., it is used of sinking ships and drowning humans (e.g., Josephus, B.J. 3.525-27), of passions likened to water which threaten to destroy the soul (Philo, Leg. 3.18), and also (without reference to water) of Jerusalem’s destruction (cf., Josephus, B.J. 4.137).

⁸ Albrecht Oepke, “βάπτω, βαπτιζω, βαπτισμός, βάπτισμα, βαπτιστής,” TDNT 1:529-46 (p. 1.530). Oepke particularly stresses this point in contrast to other meanings such as to wash.

⁹ Mark 1.10, “coming up out of the waters” (ἐν θάλασσαι έκ τού υδάτων); Matt 3.16, “he came up from the waters” (ἀνέβη ἐπ’ τού υδάτων); and Acts 8.39, “they came up out of the water” (ἀνέβησαν ἐκ τού υδάτων).

¹⁰ Didache 7.1-4 prefers that one be baptised “in living water” (ἐν θάλασσαι ζωντι), which is likely a reference to a running stream (Kurt Niederwimmer, The Didache: A Commentary [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998], 127). The passage makes no mention of vertical movement into or out of the water, though neither does it describe the practice at all. In vv.2-3 concessions are made for the absence of θάλασσαι ζωντι, and while v.3 speaks of thrice pouring water over the head of the baptisand, it is unknown if such an act would be practiced in the preferred context of θάλασσαι ζωντι.

¹¹ The thrice immersion is recounted in all the surviving traditions (cf. Paul F. Bradshaw, Maxwell E. Johnson and L. Edward Phillips, The Apostolic Tradition: A Commentary [Hermeneia; Minneapolis, Minnesota: Fortress Press, 2002]).
this way, the rite may well have enacted the VERTICALITY schema (i.e., BAPTISM IS DOWN / EMERGENCE FROM BAPTISM IS UP).\textsuperscript{12}

Given this schematic correspondence, the insistence of many exegetes that there is no “clear analogy” between baptism and Christ’s death/resurrection is overstated.\textsuperscript{13}

Grounded in the VERTICALITY schema, the baptismal rite was thus susceptible to cultic enactment of the DEATH IS DOWN / RESURRECTION IS UP conceptual metaphors.\textsuperscript{14}

Retuning to Rom 6.4, I\textsubscript{2} can be reasonably constructed to include sequential vertical movement comprised of the old man’s (O.M.) initial descent into water (\(\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\zeta\omicron\omega\)) followed by an ascent out of water.

Taking the entire structure of Diagram 4.1 together, the sub-generic spaces are all cross-mapped with one another by virtue of the RESURRECTION schematic structure (G),\textsuperscript{15} which here functions as a gestalt in as much as all the elements work interdependently so as to create meaning.\textsuperscript{16} In the blended space we find emergent meaning not found in any of the inputs alone. The most important aspect of this emergent meaning is the joining of the antagonist’s macro-PATH to the protagonist’s

\textsuperscript{12} Wayne Meeks, moreover, has conjectured that baptism was accompanied by several other vertically structured practices (e.g., recitation of the vertically rich Phil 2.6-11 – cf. Wayne A. Meeks, \textit{The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul} [2d ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003], 155).

\textsuperscript{13} So Robert Tannehill, and James Dunn and Robert Jewett have more recently concurred. Tannehill is worth quoting in full: “there is no clear analogy between the act of entering the water and Christ’s death, for Christ was not drowned. Nor is there a clear analogy between entering the water and burial, for burial at sea is not the normal means of burial” (Robert C. Tannehill, \textit{Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology} [BZNW 32; Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1967], 34; James D. G. Dunn, \textit{Romans} [2 vols.; WBC 38a-b; Dallas, Texas: Word Books, 1988], 312; Robert Jewett, \textit{Romans: A Commentary} [Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007], 398). The judgment is made on the basis of genealogical or thematic parallels, and at this level they are correct that analogy cannot be found.

\textsuperscript{14} It is not insignificant that in Rom 6 baptism is \textit{not} signified to resurrection through the metaphor of washing. Though the idea washing would naturally fit both the ritual act and the linguistic sign (perhaps see 1 Cor 6.11), the washing image does not lend itself to notions of death/resurrection. In this way, in Rom 6 Paul exploits those aspects of the ritual that enable blending with Christ’s death and resurrection.

\textsuperscript{15} Of the sub-generic spaces, G\textsubscript{1-3} includes several disparate elements (e.g., PATH structure, a death event [D] correlated with the path’s GOAL, and the opposition of UP and DOWN) and specifically cross-maps the TRAJECTOR’s (\(\chi\) and O.M.) and their respective deaths (D\textsubscript{\(\chi\)} and D\textsubscript{O.M.}). I\textsubscript{2}, on the other hand, is cross-mapped with I\textsubscript{1} and I\textsubscript{3} via opposing vertical structures such that G\textsubscript{1-2} denotes progression from DOWN to UP (i.e., vertical incline) and G\textsubscript{2-3} denotes progression from UP to DOWN (i.e., vertical decline). In both cases the progression corresponds to the event sequences in the various input spaces, while the vertical structure corresponds to either baptismal motion (I\textsubscript{2}) or trajector movement (I\textsubscript{1} and I\textsubscript{3}).

\textsuperscript{16} In this way, the RESURRECTION gestalt brings together the disparate elements of each sub-generic space.
micro-PATH (CHANGE), both of which are projected from $I_3$ and $I_1$ respectively. This is achieved by virtue of the vertical movements enacted in the baptismal rite ($I_2$), and on account of $G_{1,3}$, the two death events of $I_1$ and $I_3$ ($D\chi$ and $D_{OM}$) are cross-mapped. Accordingly, Christ’s death/resurrection is correlated with the baptismal act in the blended space, thus creating the element Baptismal Death (which is seen as the terminal end of the “old man” and the point of transference between the two paths). Because the death event is the key focal point of the entire system, this means that only the protagonist’s micro-PATH (CHANGE) and not the macro-PATH is projected from $I_1$ to the blended space.\footnote{This is confirmed in two ways. First, in 6.4 Paul is clearly focused on Christ’s risen state, and thus the believer’s post-baptismal state is likened not to Christ’s pre-resurrection state (i.e., the macro-PATH) but rather to his existence as a risen, transformed being (i.e., the micro-PATH [CHANGE]). Second, Paul’s focus in 6.1-4 is clearly upon baptism as a watershed moment in which transformation is enacted.} This is evident in the fact that Paul characterises baptismal effectiveness as a transformation between contrasting container structures; that is, life “in sin” (ἐν αὐτῇ [i.e., ἁμαρτία] – 6.1-2) vis-à-vis “in newness of life” (ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς – 6.4). What emerges in the blended space, then, is the conceptualisation of believers as having once traversed the antagonist’s macro-PATH but currently transformed through baptismal death into a new, risen state.\footnote{Such transference was not possible in the RESURRECTION gestalt by itself, and it underscores the soteriological permeability (rather than opposition) of Paul’s thought.} Put differently, believers already live in a transformed state; because death has happened, so has resurrection.

In this light, then, though Paul’s address in 6.1-11 is unmistakably focused on believers dying with Christ in baptism, notions of a co-joint resurrection are a natural entailment. That is to say, the correlation of death with the verb βαπτίζω results in the conceptual metaphor BAPTISM IS DEATH, which entails the obverse metaphor EMERGENCE FROM BAPTISM IS RESURRECTION. The two metaphors are inextricable, and while co-burial/death may be the dominant point that Paul stresses at human-scale, co-resurrection is no less implicit.\footnote{With regard to other baptismal texts, in Gal 3.27 Paul explicitly links the rite to the activity of being “clothed” with Christ. We have already seen that this metaphor has resurrection overtones, which suggests the imparting of risen existence at baptism. More enigmatic is the Corinthian’s practice of being “baptised into Christ.”} It is for this reason that Alexander Wedderburn’s characterisation
of Rom 6.4 as “asymmetrical” is fundamentally erroneous;\textsuperscript{20} Paul may be foregrounding the experience of death with Christ, but the entire resurrection equation is in mind.

For Paul, soteriology is ritually embodied. Baptismal death is not only a conceptual issue but also a bodily issue; that is, the somatic actions of the baptisand do not merely represent the transference from death to life, they actually constitute it.\textsuperscript{21} In this vein, while transference is somatically enacted in the ritual, transformation is somatically enacted in believers’ post-baptismal lives. Thus Paul’s insistence, just as Christ was raised, so believers “walk in newness of life” (ἐν καινότητι ζωής περιπατήσωμεν – 6.4). The image is that of an upright, erect human being “walking” about, and Paul here extends the RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor to now frame post-baptismal rather than post-mortem existence. In the present context, the CONSCIOUSNESS frame is particularly understood with respect to ethics. Thus Paul insists that believers are no longer enslaved to sin (6.6) and should present themselves to God as those who are “living from the dead” (ἐκ νεκρῶν ζωντας – 6.13). Herein lies the ethical rationale that was presumed in 6.2, and it is premised upon the metaphor entailment that, if believers have died with Christ, they too have risen with Christ. In this way, notions of a presently experienced resurrection are pregnant in Rom 6, and they are framed by the familiar RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor.

It cannot be overlooked, however, that though Paul’s description of baptism in 6.4 entails a present conjoined resurrection with Christ, the apostle does not explicitly


\textsuperscript{21} Without the baptisand’s down-up action (I\textsubscript{2}), trajector transference is impossible. This becomes clear when we recognise that, were we to remove the somatic actions of I\textsubscript{2} from the network, the entire blend would fall apart and the emergent structure of the blended space would vanish. In this light, propositional descriptions of baptism fail to capture the somatic underpinnings of Paul’s descriptions – e.g., Tannehill: baptism refer[s] to the significance of Christ’s death (Tannehill, \textit{Dying and Rising}, 42-43); Wedderburn: baptism “remind[s]” believers of Christ’s death/resurrection (Wedderburn, \textit{Baptism and Resurrection}, 358); Dunn: metaphor and sacrament (or language and experience) are opposed (James D. G. Dunn, “‘Baptized’ as Metaphor,” in \textit{Baptism, the New Testament, and the Church: Historical and Contemporary Studies in Honour of R. E. O. White} [eds. Stanley E. Porter and Anthony R. Cross; JSNTSup 171; Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999], 294-310 [p. 310]).
speak of resurrection as a present reality. This is expressly clear in 6.5 and 8, where Paul’s use of the future tense denotes resurrection as a still unfulfilled expectation. We here push up against the already/not-yet nature of Paul’s thought, and how we account for this nuance is crucial. Rather than retreating to the dubious distinction between a future literal and present metaphorical resurrection,22 or to the tendency among modern scholars to stress baptismal death at the expense of baptismal life,23 we must chart a course that more clearly explicates this already/not-yet phenomenon. Put differently, Paul’s language is pregnant with some kind of present resurrection, and the task at hand is to more clearly delineate not only what this some kind is, but also how it relates to the future resurrection. It is to the former issue that we now turn in Rom 7 (the latter will be dealt with in §4.3), and we fortunately follow Paul’s own train of thought regarding the human composition so as to uncover what this some kind might be.

4.2 RESURRECTION IS IN – Anthropology and Ethics in Rom 7

It is perhaps not insignificant that Paul’s description of the “old man” who died in baptism (6.6) is not correlated with a parallel reference to a “new man” who now lives. Paul does, however, speak of the “inner man” (τὸν ἑσσὸν ἄνθρωπον) who delights in the law of God (7.22), and while Paul is here speaking as a rhetorical “I,” he elsewhere uses the same expression with respect to those in Christ (cf. 2 Cor 4.16).24 Indeed, throughout Rom 6-7 Paul locates the locus of the believer’s present transformation as being in the somatic interior. Believers have become obedient from the “heart” (καρδία – 6.17) and are not to allow sin to reign “in [their] mortal bodies” (ἐν τῷ θνητῷ … σώματι; best understood as the visible outer body [note the qualification, μέλος] – 6.12-13; cf. 6.19). While the exterior μέλος can be directed to opposing ethical

22 So critiqued in §1.3.1.
23 So Wedderburn and many commentators noted in §1.3.3.
practices, it is the renovation—better, *resurrection*—of the somatic interior that enables the μέλος to serve God rather than sin (6.18-19). In this regard, though Paul contrasts ethical states via opposing container descriptions (i.e., being either “in sin” or “in new life” [6.1-4]), his rationale for doing so is directed toward the *somatic interior*.

In §3.2.3 we introduced the *BODY IS CONTAINER* metaphor, which emerges organically from embodied human experience. We should of course insist that, despite such universality, the *BODY IS CONTAINER* metaphor is doubtless constructed in diverse ways across cultures. Walter Burkert has demonstrated that both Semitic and Greek traditions as far back as Akkadian and the Homeric hymns (respectively) understand phenomena such as thought and emotions as being correlated with organs such as the heart, liver, bowels, and even the diaphragm; this is what we might call a folk dualism, and it is premised on the *BODY IS CONTAINER* metaphor. At this early stage these descriptions do not represent a strong bifurcation of the human being, though they do attribute to the organs those activities that are later given to the soul. In Greek tradition, it is only in the classical period that this inner referent becomes abstracted and the soul becomes an independent entity. Personhood/consciousness is no longer correlated to the organs but instead stands on its own, still located within the body though variously thought to be composed of πνεῦμα, fire, aether, or some other substance (or a mixture thereof). Though philosophical traditions differed on the precise description of the soul, all located it within the body and further understood it as the centre of human intelligence. In contrast, classical Hebraic culture continues to

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27 Thus Burkert notes, speaking of the Homeric and lyric poets, “there is no separation of corporeal organs and activities of the soul” (Burkert, “Towards Plato and Paul,” 69).
29 Compare with David Aune, who differentiates various philosophical traditions from one another and then offers a synthesis of seven commonly held views regarding the soul (David E. Aune, “Human Nature and Ethics in Hellenistic Philosophical Traditions and Paul: Some Issues and Problems,”
locate the epicentre of personhood/consciousness with the “heart” (ἐγκαταστάσεως or ἡμῶν), thus retaining a strong level of correlation between the physical organ and the self.\(^3\) In both instances, however, the locus of personhood or consciousness is correlated with the somatic interior, either to the soul or some organ such as the heart.\(^4\)

One of the most explicit Pauline descriptions of this in-out somatic interplay is found in Rom 7.14-25. Here, Paul repeatedly refers to sin as dwelling in him (ἐν ἐμοί – 7.17, 18, 20, 23; comp. also 7.8), and the apostle variously refers to a tension between the exterior and interior.\(^5\) The distinction is made explicit in 7.22-24, where Paul characterises a futile intra-somatic battle (ἀντιστρατεύομαι) between the “inner man/mind” (ὁ ἡμῶν ἅμαι ὁδοιποιός/νοῦς – IN) and the “body parts/body of death” (μέλος/τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου – OUT). The logic of the passage is premised upon an interconnection of the somatic interior and exterior, where IN affects OUT, and vice-versa – if sin is inner, Paul is helpless to do the good that he wants because the sin-ruled somatic exterior precludes him from such action (7.20).\(^6\)

The rhetorical sketch that Paul draws in Rom 7.14-25 (really vv.7-25) is of particular importance for our study in as much as it points to a teleological trajectory of somatic transformation, one that extends from the pre-baptismal and through the baptismal rite and looks ahead to the ideal risen form. The present study takes it as axiomatic that Paul is speaking in 7.7-25 not of an actual experience of uninhibited moral abasement, but of a teleological trajectory of somatic transformation, one that extends from the pre-baptismal and through the baptismal rite and looks ahead to the ideal risen form. The present study takes it as axiomatic that Paul is speaking in 7.7-25 not of an actual experience of uninhibited moral abasement.
but rather draws a rhetorical caricature of torah observance portrayed from the perspective of his (Paul’s) present life in Christ.\(^{34}\) This is not to say that the experience described is completely unrelated or detached from Paul’s (or believers’\(^{3}\)) present ethical situation(s); indeed, the apostle speaks as a rhetorical “I” under the Law so as to demonstrate the efficacious moral potential of present life in Christ (hence 8.1ff.). In this way, 7.7-25 presumes traditions of ancient moral psychology or self-mastery,\(^ {35}\) and Paul’s understanding of resurrection is thus elaborated within such frame structures.\(^ {36}\)

Working within the context of such traditions, Emma Wasserman has compellingly argued that 7.7-25 reflects an anthropological mapping that exploits the so-called worst-case scenario of extreme immorality as envisioned in Platonic moral psychology.\(^ {37}\) In this view, the soul’s irrational faculty rebels against and rules over its rational faculty, thus resulting in the passion-ruled self.\(^ {38}\) In 7.7-25 Paul draws on these traditions, envisioning the soul as split between its rational bit (\(\nuους\) or \(ο\ \epsilon\sigmaω\ \alphaνθρωπος\ [7.22-25]\)) and irrational bit (\(\alphaμαρτια\ [7.20]\)).\(^ {39}\) By describing what

\(^{34}\) On this, Engberg-Pedersen seems correct when he says: “viewed in light of that (new) possibility [namely, life in Christ], life under the law should be experienced as being inescapably entangled in sinfulness in the way he explains in 7:7-25” (Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000], 243 [emphasis original]). The closest historical parallel to such an address is the Greek literary technique προσωποποίησις (or “speech-in-character” – Stanley K. Stowers, “Romans 7.7-25 as a Speech-in-Character [προσωποποίησις],” in Paul in his Hellenistic Context [ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995], 180-202). Precisely who this rhetorical “I” is to be identified with is a matter of much dispute (see Jewett, Romans, 441-45).

\(^{35}\) In addition to Engberg-Pedersen and Stowers (noted in fn. 34 of this chapter), see most recently Emma Wasserman, “The Death of the Soul in Romans 7: Revisiting Paul’s Anthropology in Light of Hellenistic Moral Psychology,” JBL 126 (2007): 793-816.

\(^{36}\) It cannot be overlooked that the immediate epistolary context of Rom 7 is concerned with Torah observance vis-à-vis unmitigated sin. In this regard, after demonstrating that patterns of self-mastery were promoted variously across late empire/early republic philosophical schools, Stowers points specifically to Jewish traditions wherein the Mosaic Law was understood as a tool by which self-mastery was achieved (Stanley K. Stowers, “Paul and Self-Mastery,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook [ed. J. Paul Sampley; Harrisburg, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 2003], 524-50 [pp. 531-34]). In this light, self-mastery seems the best historical and contextual analogue for Paul’s address in 7.7-25.


\(^{38}\) Wasserman finds comparative analogues in Plato (esp. Resp., 9.571-77), Philo (Leg. 1.105-08 and Deus, 111-13), Plutarch (Virt. vit. 101A), and Galen (On the Passions and Errors of the Soul). While the earlier Platonic material demarcates a trichotomous soul (i.e., the reasoning, spirited, and appetitive parts), many Middle Platonic authors conflate the irrational faculties into a singular lower soul that is distinct from the higher reasoning faculty (Wasserman, “Death of the Soul,” 809). Paul clearly stands within this latter tradition.

\(^{39}\) As the personification of the irrational soul, \(\alphaμαρτια\ is thus described as living “in” the speaker (7.20) in as much as it is part of the anthropological composition. On this point, Wasserman has
happens when the lower soul subjects the higher, Paul thus contrasts a past state of unmitigated immorality with the efficacious moral aptitude enabled in Christ. That is to say, present life in Christ is characterised by the need to continually mediate this intra-soul tension (comp. Rom 6.12-14), and thus 7.7-25 has both a rhetorical function (i.e., describing \textit{past} ineptitude) and an exhortative one (i.e., describing \textit{present} potential).

That Paul does not use the term \textit{ψυχή} in Rom 7 should not deter us from this reading. The anthropological division of body and soul was quite widespread by the early Imperial period,\(^{40}\) and George van Kooten finds in Paul a notion of the soul that is, “despite some distinctively Jewish features …, basically Greek.”\(^{41}\) The strength of Wasserman’s reading is her recognition that, though Plato and others do at times pit corpse against soul, such an antithesis cannot and should not be understood as a summary of Plato’s thinking. Wasserman rightly notes that the opposition of body and soul at death neither implies nor requires a similar opposition during life;\(^{42}\) indeed, during life “the goal is not to destroy or be rid of the body but to use reason to subdue and dominate the lower parts of the soul and its menacing allies.”\(^{43}\) When approaching Paul’s anthropology from a Platonic perspective, it is far better to stress notions of the present \textit{embodied soul} rather than future body-soul opposition.\(^{44}\) This coheres with our findings in ch. 3, where Paul was seen to work within a one-world model characterised

\(^{40}\) See Martin, \textit{Corinthian Body}, 112-17.

\(^{41}\) George H. van Kooten, \\textit{Paul’s Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity} (WUNT 232; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 298, though see pp. 298-302 more generally. Van Kooten demonstrates that even those Pauline uses of \textit{ψυχή} that are usually labelled as septuagintal find parallel in broader Greek usage.

\(^{42}\) Wasserman, \textit{Death of the Soul}, 58.


\(^{44}\) The term “soul” in this sentence is used to refer to the entire soul complex (i.e., upper and lower soul). This differs from our several contrasts between \textit{ensouled earthly body} and \textit{enspirited earthly/risen bodies} – in these cases, the former refers to a body that is dominated by the lower soul, while the latter refers to bodies that dominated by the upper soul.
by dualistic interrelation; anthropologically speaking, this can be expressed as an *intra-somatic polarity of parts within a system*.

The apostle’s most pointed description of the passion-ruled state in Rom 7 is via the death metaphor (7.9-13). Though death metaphors are not often used of the soul in Platonic discourses, Wasserman points to an important parallel in Philo where the souls of Adam and Eve are described as dying in the lapsarian moment. Following this Philonic context, Wasserman understands life and death as “moral-psychological metaphors for dominance,” and thus Paul uses the death metaphor to characterise the soul as inept rather than dead. From the present study’s perspective, however, the use of the death frame necessarily imports conceptual structure that differs from that imparted by metaphors of dominion, slavery, and war (cf. 6.14-23; 7.23); though correlations exist, the metaphors are certainly not multivalent, and this is particularly important with respect to Paul. Indeed, the death metaphor of 7.9-13 should be understood in the context of Paul’s broader description of baptismal death in 6.1-11, and thus Paul is not only describing intra-soul subjection but also articulating a more fundamental transformation. The soul is not just set right in terms of hierarchical domination; it actually transitions from death to life. In this way, Paul’s use of self-mastery traditions are incorporated into his resurrection ideals, thus locating present baptismal resurrection in the somatic interior. For Paul, believers are dead to sin (i.e., no longer dominated by the soul’s irrational bits – 6.2, 7, 11) and able to live morally by virtue of the properly aligned, risen interior.

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45 Likely due to the soul’s immortality (Wasserman, “Death of the Soul,” 808).
46 Philo also uses the death metaphor of moral inability – “the death of the soul is the decay of virtue and the acquirement of wickedness;” it is a “peculiar and special death, which is the entombing of the soul in passions and every kind of wickedness” (Philo Leg. 1.105-07).
47 Wasserman, “Death of the Soul,” 811.
48 Romans 6.1-11 describes a process of death, while 7.9-13 presumes the state of being dead. Thought this difference is important, it is not detrimental to our reading. Indeed, as noted in §2.2.3, Paul conceives of Christ as imparting Definitive Life vis-à-vis Adam’s Definitive Death, and the process of such transformation is resurrection.
This is not to say that self-mastery and resurrection are the same; they are not. It is to say, however, that Paul integrates moral psychology traditions into his broader resurrection ideals as a way of characterising the resurrection effected in baptism. Looked at from the other angle, baptismal resurrection is the efficacious process by which self-mastery becomes possible, and Paul works this out with respect to the \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \). For Paul, just as the future resurrection is characterised by an organic interlacing of believers into Christ’s body (cf. Rom 8.29; Phil 3.21), so too do the human and divine \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) interlace each other in the present. While Paul does speak of the human \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) (1 Thess 5.23) and even contrasts it with the divine \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) (e.g., Rom 8.16; 1 Cor 2.11), in many instances it is not easy to distinguish the two from one another (e.g., Rom 8.4-6, 10). Thus perhaps we do not need to; Paul likely has subjection to both the human \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) and the divine \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) in mind, which is to recognise that the former’s ethical aptitude is enabled through the granting of the latter. To this end, the imparting of the divine \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) results in the resurrection of the human \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \); the two are interwoven together, and this highlights the participationist nature of Paul’s resurrection ideals (both future and present).

As a cosmo-somatic category, \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) is bi-correlated with both the heavens (UP) and the soul (IN); similarly, as a divine agent, \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) is bi-correlated with the risen/exalted (UP) and indwelling (IN) Christ. These tight pneumatic correlations

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49 So noted by Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, 75-76.
50 Though expressed differently, this is in line with van Kooten’s insistence that “through Jesus Christ … man’s [sic] mind once again becomes fully operative” (Kooten, *Anthropology in Context*, 382-83). Van Kooten has compellingly argued for a trichotomous anthropology throughout Paul’s letters, and in Romans he sees Paul developing a universalist anthropology whereby Christ enables the renewal of the debased mind (pp. 340-92). Van Kooten understands this renewal as a *restoration* back to the original Adamic state. While such may indeed be the case in Romans (cf. Rom 1.18-32), we have seen above that such a thesis cannot be extended to the Corinthian correspondence (see §§2.2.4 and 3.2.2).
51 Recall Philo, where the soul’s higher rational faculty is correlated with the divine breath (*Her.* 55; cf. *Opif.* 135). Martin has also noted the generally accepted idea that “whatever substance comprises the stars … also comprises the soul” (Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 120). In this way, we see a correlation of somatic interior (IN) with the cosmological apex (UP).
52 For Paul, the risen/exalted Christ (UP – Rom 8.34) is also the indwelling pneumatic presence (IN – Rom 8.9-11). Paul describes the risen Christ as \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) (e.g., 1 Cor 15.45; 2 Cor 3.17-18; Rom 1.4) and also uses \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\omicron\mu\alpha \) synonymously with Christ (e.g., Rom 8.1, 9-11). Elsewhere Paul ascribes similar
between \textit{UP/IN} thus enable Paul to project his resurrection ideals onto the present; that is to say, \textit{space} and \textit{time} are coordinated such that $\pi\nu\varepsilon\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$ links both future (\textit{UP}) and present (\textit{IN}) resurrections. It is in this sense that the indwelling $\pi\nu\varepsilon\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$ functions as the deposit (cf. 2 Cor 1.22; 5.5) of that which is to come, a guarantee that is located \textit{within} the believer’s body (indeed, in the heart – 2 Cor 1.22; 3.17–4.6; cf. Gal 4.6). Given that this interior transformation results in exterior moral actions (i.e., \textit{resurrection is consciousness}), it is not surprising that Paul describes such activities pneumatically (e.g., the bearing of pneumatic fruits [Gal 5.22-23], living according to the $\pi\nu\varepsilon\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$ [Rom 8.4-17; Gal 5.16-26]). Moreover, Paul locates divine-human fellowship (i.e., \textit{NEAR}) as a present pneumatic experience \textit{within} the believer (Rom 8.16). With respect to Paul’s broader resurrection ideals, time is curtailed such that that which is traditionally understood as \textit{FUTURE/UP/NEAR} is now understood as \textit{PRESENT/IN/NEAR}.

As we can see, then, Paul blends his resurrection ideals with his anthropological understanding. In the wake of baptism, the infusion of the divine $\pi\nu\varepsilon\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$ into believers’ bodies (Rom 5.5; 8.15) thus realigns the soul and enables moral behaviour. Just as eschatological resurrection produces a somatic transformation, so too does baptismal resurrection; the former is \textit{external}, the latter \textit{internal}.\textsuperscript{53} This, in turn, gives rise to a novel resurrection metaphor – \textit{resurrection is in}. In Rom 6-8 Paul frames this metaphor via cultural notions of \textit{self-mastery}, which is itself premised upon the \textit{body is container} metaphor. Here, the lower faculties (\textit{DOWN}) implicate the body/flesh (\textit{OUT}) vis-à-vis the higher faculty of reason (\textit{UP/IN}). What we see, then, is a schematic correlation of \textit{DOWN/OUT} and \textit{UP/IN}, which enables Paul to both combine and roles to the two (comp. Rom 8.26-27 with 8.34), and even refers to both Christ and the divine $\pi\nu\varepsilon\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$ as the “first fruits” of the resurrection (comp. 1 Cor 15.20, 20 and Rom 8.23).

\textsuperscript{53} So van Kooten: the baptismal “break with the past … has radically changed [the believer’s] anthropological constitution” (Kooten, \textit{Anthropology in Context}, 381). Taken in another direction, Engberg-Pedersen’s emphasis on the material nature of $\pi\nu\varepsilon\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$ further underscores this somatic alteration; thus, the reception of the $\pi\nu\varepsilon\tilde{\eta}\mu\alpha$ was a “physical, literal take over (if only an incipient one) brought about by a literal infusion of physical pneuma coming from above” (Troels Engberg-Pedersen, \textit{Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit} [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 71).
fluidly move between the metaphors RESURRECTION IS IN and RESURRECTION IS UP.

Moreover, the SELF-MASTERY frame enables this inner resurrection to find external expression in ethical praxis and thus further clarifies Paul’s use of the RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor in 6.4. Taken together, Paul’s resurrection ideals are projected onto the human constitution itself, and baptismal death is understood to enact a transformation of the somatic interior.

In summary, Paul’s sense of already/not-yet has become more clearly identified; resurrection has already happened to the somatic interior, but not yet to the somatic exterior. In this way, the above discussion has pointed to what we also identified in 1 Cor 15, namely, that Paul understands believers as presently existing as enspirited earthly bodies (vis-à-vis the rhetorical “I’s” ensouled earthly body [7.7-25]). For Paul, the human form is partitively drawn, not via an opposition of body and soul but rather an intra-somatic polarity of in and out. Within the context of self-mastery traditions, to say that resurrection has happened to the somatic interior is to insist that the properly aligned interior enables exterior ethical actions (understood by Paul via the RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor). Turning our attention now to Rom 8, we will see that this intra-somatic polarity characterises present life in Christ and also anticipates the idyllic eschatological form (i.e., the enspirited risen body).

4.3 Eschatological Somatology in Rom 8.9-11

To say that believers exist as enspirited earthly bodies is to locate human existence within a temporal trajectory between differing embodied states. For Paul, the baptisand’s body has been somatically altered through the granting of the divine πνεῦμα, thus enabling ethical action in the present and anticipating the transformation of the somatic exterior in the future. Such is the direction in which Paul moves in Rom 8, where the apostle now outlines the pneumatic nature of life in Christ. As we will see in the following discussion, the present baptismal resurrection is not a separate
resurrection event (as though Paul were speaking of two resurrections – one present, the other future) but rather part of the anticipated eschatological resurrection. That is to say, the baptismal resurrection of the human πνεῦμα connects to the future resurrection of the human σῶμα such that both are interconnected aspects of a singular resurrection event.

To better understand this temporal trajectory between somatic states it is important to first recognise that Paul perceives intra-somatic polarity as the hallmark of embodied earthly existence. This is true for both the rhetorical “I” (the ensouled earthly body) and believers generally (enspirited earthly bodies). We have already demonstrated the former, where the “inner man/mind” (IN) and the “body parts/body of death” (OUT) exist within a futile combative tension.54 The latter is evinced throughout Rom 6-8 more broadly, where Paul instructs the Romans to continually subject their lower soul/body (DOWN/OUT) to the higher soul (UP/IN).55 In Rom 8.5-17, believers either set their minds on πνεῦμα (correlated with life [UP/IN]) or on σάρξ (correlated with death [DOWN/OUT]).56 Though the baptismal resurrection of the human πνεῦμα enables ethical action, the same intra-somatic dynamic remains precisely because believers exist within an earthly body. As such, intra-somatic polarity underscores earthly embodiment. This demonstrates the extent to which Paul’s anthropology in Rom 6-8 is characterised not by neat partitions of in and out, nor by intra-soul division, but rather by conjoined parts within a whole; that is to say, Man is a unified polarity of parts.

54 Though Wasserman correctly locates the struggle of Rom 7.7-25 as an intra-soul struggle (i.e., between the higher and lower faculties), it is perhaps more accurate to say that Paul generally envisions an intra-somatic struggle in as much as the apostle views the soul’s lower faculties as so intertwined with the body that it becomes impossible to distinguish them. This is seen in the rhetorical “I’s” insistence that immorality exists “in my flesh” (ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ μου – 7.18), and his later yearning to be free from the “body of death” (τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου – 7.24). In both instances the soul’s lower faculty (αμαρτία [DOWN]) is conflated with the somatic exterior (σάρξ/σῶμα [OUT]).
55 See, e.g., Rom 6.12-14, 19; 7.5-6; and 8.5-13.
56 Accordingly, believers must continually orient the somatic interior (i.e., the “mind” [φρόνημα – 8.6-7] or the πνεῦμα [8.13, 16]) not toward the earthly exterior (i.e., the σάρξ or “deeds of the body” [τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος – 8.13]), but rather the divine πνεῦμα (8.9-11).
Though polarity characterises earthly embodiment, Paul’s resurrection ideals anticipate a future suspension of said polarity (the *enspirited risen body*). We have already seen this in 1 Cor 15, where we suggested that the σῶμα πνευματικόν is a body that is perfectly suited for the indwelling πνεῦμα, thus marking the cessation of such intra-somatic tension. In a similar manner, Paul insists that believers currently “groan” (στέναζω) inwardly in the earthly body, looking ahead with anticipation for the swallowing of the mortal by the immortal (2 Cor 5.2, 4; cf. Rom 8.22-23). The already risen interior thus awaits the achievement of the not yet risen exterior, and in this way the *enspirited earthly body* has a decidedly future orientation. This can be nicely demonstrated by examining Rom 8.9-11, where Paul locates present human embodiment within his larger resurrection outlook. The passage reads as follows:

> But you are not in flesh (ἐν σαρκί), but in spirit (ἐν πνεύματι), just as the Spirit of God dwells in you (οἴκει ἐν ὑμίν). But if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, they are not his. But if Christ is in you (Χριστός ἐν ὑμίν), though the body is dead because of sin, the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of the one who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you (οἴκει ἐν ὑμίν), the one who raised Christ from the dead will make alive your mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwells in you (ἐν ὑμίν).

As with a number of the passages examined above, Paul again contrasts two opposing container states; on account of the indwelling πνεῦμα, believers are no longer ἐν σαρκί but rather ἐν πνεύματι (v.9; comp. 8.1 [ἐν Χριστῷ]). Standard scholarly treatments of these opposing containers have largely followed Ernst Käsemann’s dualistically configured apocalyptic anthropology, where human beings stand as passive participants within one of two opposing aeons or “sphere[s] of subjection.”

The problem with this reading is not only that it is founded on an overdrawn apocalyptic dualism, but that it also objectifies these so-called *spheres of influence* and thus detaches them from the realm of human experience. As noted in §1.3.3, this results in an

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57 Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans* (trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1980), 223. Among modern scholars, see (e.g.) Dunn, Paul insists that a “decisive transfer of allegiance and lordship has already taken place” (*Dunn, Romans*, 444); Jewett, believers are “members of the realm of Christ” (*Jewett, Romans*, 489); and Frank J. Matera, believers are “not in the realm of flesh but in the realm of the Spirit” (*Frank J. Matera, Romans* [Paideia; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2010], 195).
exceedingly cognicentric view of life in Christ, one where believers participate in the conditions that Christ enables rather than in/with Christ himself.

A better and more profitable step forward is to view Paul’s descriptions in 8.9-11 as premised upon his resurrection ideals, specifically with respect to alternative somatic states. This is preferable for three reasons. First, v.11 points unmistakably toward the future event of resurrection, which thus contextualises this passage within the RESURRECTION frame structure.58 Second, the use of σάρξ as a CONTAINER is congruent with Paul’s broader somatic mappings,59 and the corresponding use of πνεῦμα as a CONTAINER finds parallel resonance with Paul’s understanding of the risen body.60 Third, the description of the body in v.10 and the language of the indwelling πνεῦμα/Christ points unmistakably toward a somatic interpretation. Taking these together, 8.9-11 thus contrasts not opposing aeons or apocalyptic spheres, but rather differing somatic states. The pericope thus has an inherent temporal dimension, bringing the ensouled earthly and enspirited risen bodies to bear on the enspirited earthly body.

The blending structure reflected here consists of two input spaces (see Diagram 4.2). The first (I₁) is cued by Paul’s container descriptions in v.9a, though fully framed by the reference to resurrection in v.11. This space is specifically marked by the transformation of the ensouled earthly body into the enspirited risen body. The former is understood in light of Rom 7 as a σάρξ–ἀμαρτία unity (signified by σ and α respectively), while the latter is understood as a pneumatic unity (signified by π and π).61 Both body types function as values that are mapped onto the CONTAINER roles of

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58 Indeed, the language of v.11 is similar to that of 6.4 in as much as Christ’s resurrection is understood as analogues to believers’; in this way vv.9-11 point to the present inner pneumatic resurrection that we have been expounding throughout this chapter.
59 In light of the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor, σάρξ is the material structure of the container.
60 As noted in §3.2.2 (ftnt. 81), the risen body may in fact be pneumatically composed, though this is conjectural. More important, however, is the description of being ἐν Χριστῷ (see 8.1 and 10), which may imply being in the Christic somatic state (as in 1 Cor 15.22, 45-49 – see §§2.2.4 and 3.2.2).
61 On account of the phrase ἐν πνεῦματι the space certainly contains a pneumatic container (where πνεῦμα is understood as the container itself). On account of 1 Cor 15.44 and 2 Cor 5.5 we have also included πνεῦμα as that which is contained in the container. In this ways, though Paul does not explicitly describe this risen body here in Rom 8, it can be reasonably constructed as such. Indeed, we
have seen that Paul's resurrection ideals are pneumatic in nature, looking ahead toward a somatic existence that is pneumatically constructed.

Diagram 4.2:
The Enspirited Earthly Body (Rom 8.9-11)
the CHANGE gestalt. The second input (I₂) consists of the present, post-baptismal body of the believer. The space is cued in vv.9b-10, where Paul’s description shifts from contrasting external referents to instead focus on the interior referent. Framed by the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor, this space is characterised by the intra-somatic polarity of inner πνευμα (signified by π) and outer σὰρξ (signified by σ).

The two inputs are blended on account of the generic space (G), which includes the general metaphor BODY IS CONTAINER (i.e., somatic interior and exterior), as well as the recognition of an intermediary somatic state. This intermediary state is the focus of the blended space, where the trajector of I₁ is cross-mapped with the post-baptismal believer of I₂. Because structure is projected from both inputs, the overall network is a double-scope blend. From I₁ the entire CHANGE gestalt is projected, while from I₂ the CONTAINER structure of the baptisand’s body is projected onto the TRAJECTOR role-value. In this way, the TRAJECTOR of I₁ is now identified as an intermediary somatic existence that is partly drawn from the SOURCE-CONTAINER (i.e., σὰρξ [OUT]) and partly from the GOAL-CONTAINER (i.e., πνευμα [IN]). In the blended space, then, believers are placed within an overarching trajectory of transformation wherein part of the body has been already transformed (the interior) while other parts still await transformation (the exterior).

Three aspects of this blended space are particularly worth noting. First, we see that Paul understands the process of resurrection transformation not as a future reality but rather one that is somatically enacted in the present. That is to say, Paul does not envision two resurrection events (one in baptism and one at the eschaton) but rather one

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62 By intermediary state I do not mean a post-mortem intermediary state, but rather an intermediary state located between the SOURCE and GOAL roles of the CHANGE gestalt.

63 In Diagram 4.2 I have signified the projection of structure by the contoured arrows that extend from I₁/I₂ to the blend space. On double-scope blends, see Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 131-35 and 340-45.

64 Note the cross-space mapping, where the interior πνευμα of I₂ is linked to the interior πνευμα of the GOAL-CONTAINER in I₁, and the exterior σὰρξ of I₂ is linked to the exterior σὰρξ of the SOURCE-CONTAINER in I₁.
ongoing process of transformation. Rather than relegating the change gestalt to a future period, Paul instead locates it in the present and temporally scales it such that believers are currently in the midst of being transformed.

Second, we can now see exactly what continuity and discontinuity look like in Paul’s resurrection outlook. Between the ensouled earthly body and enspirited risen body there is in fact nothing that is continuous, as both the somatic exterior and interior are destroyed and replaced with their risen counterparts. But this does not mean that earthly and heavenly existences are completely discontinuous (as Käsemann insisted). Paul understands the somatic interior as having already been brought to life and looking ahead in eager anticipation for a body in which it is perfectly suited. Thus, continuity exists at the level of the risen somatic interior, which is already realised in the present and sustains through the eschaton. 65

Finally, it now becomes clear that, for Paul, the baptised σῶμα becomes the location of eschatology. Resurrection is projected onto the body itself, specifically according to the in-out axis of the body is container metaphor. In this respect, Paul’s eschatology and anthropology are intertwined, which is to say that temporal polarity and anthropological polarity interlace. Paul neither thinks in terms of body–soul nor present–future opposition, but rather conceptualises both in terms of tensive interrelation that exists at the nexus of the human σῶμα. In this way, eschatology is somatically drawn such that resurrection is embodied in the present.

For this reason it is indeed appropriate that we speak of opposing spheres of influence in 8.9-11. Such is appropriate, however, not because of a supposed apocalyptic opposition of cosmic aeons or lordship, but rather because of the intra-somatic polarity that characterises human embodiment. The language of spheres is appropriate given Paul’s ubiquitous use of the body is container metaphor. To be èv

65 This is, in effect, the eternal-quality (under-)garments that we noted in 2 Cor 5.3, though Paul has here dropped the clothing metaphor.
σαρκί is to have one’s moral actions governed by the lower soul (personified by sin); conversely, one is ἐν πνεύματι if they, on account of the indwelling πνεῦμα, practice self-mastery. Being ἐν σαρκί or ἐν πνεύματι, then, refers to opposing modes of human embodiment, and the language of spheres is appropriate in as much as it captures the container nature of Paul’s thinking; embodiment and the intra-somatic polarity that characterises the present is the way in which such spherical influence is best understood.

In summary, then, Paul locates present human embodiment within a larger trajectory that anticipates the future pneumatic alignment of both the somatic interior and exterior. For Paul, eschatology and anthropology are inextricable, and both are projected onto the baptised σῶμα such that believers not only look ahead to resurrection but also embody it in the present. Paul has a singular resurrection event in mind, and it has already begun. In this way, we have identified both the already/not-yet nature of Paul’s resurrection ideals and the nature of (dis)continuity across earthly and risen existences.

4.4 Reassessing Eschatological Modification

In light of the preceding discussion we are now in place to extend our analysis to an examination of Paul’s eschatology more broadly. As we will see, though Paul does adapt his eschatological outlook in light of the CHRIST frame, claims of mutation or even modification are overdrawn. We will specifically demonstrate this in light of our theoretical insights, which enable a more precise understanding of the eschatological structure Paul works with.

We can begin by acknowledging that the already/not-yet paradox of Paul’s thought is not limited to his resurrection ideals. The watershed moment within this paradox is the Christ event. With the coming of Christ the “fullness of time had come” (/vnd ἐν τῷ πληρώμα τοῦ χρόνου – Gal 4.4), and the location of Christ’s resurrection as a past event means that the eschaton has (in some sense) already dawned. In other
passages Paul speaks of an eschatological “crisis” that is either “present” or “impending” (ἔνιστημι – 1 Cor 7.26-31), and later in the same epistle he insists (in passing) that the conclusion of the old aeon has arrived (1 Cor 10.11). With equal consistency, however, and across the Pauline corpus, we can also point to several instances where eschatological judgment and resurrection are understood as looming in the (admittedly near) future; thus Paul speaks of Christ returning during the apostle’s own lifetime (1 Thess 4.15, 17; 1 Cor 15.51-52; cf. 1 Cor 1.7), he expresses that salvation is nearer now than it was before (Rom 13.11-14), that the Parousia could arrive at any time (1 Thess 5.1-3), that the end is very close (Rom 8.18; 16.20; 1 Cor 7.29-31), and that resurrection is still to come (e.g., Rom 6.5; Phil 3.11-16; 1 Cor 15; 2 Cor 5.1-5). Taking all these texts together, we see a temporal oscillation of already and not-yet within Paul’s thought.

In line with the general scholarly trend toward cognicentrism identified in ch. 1, descriptions of eschatological modification are largely understood as a doctrinal or propositional problem. Paul is understood to have encountered a problem of logic, one that required resolution precisely because the rational structure of the exiting model (Jewish eschatology) failed to accommodate the Christ event. Such was the approach taken by Albert Schweitzer, who posited a number of presumed eschatological puzzles.

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66 Elsewhere in Paul, ἔνιστημι is always used of the present in contrast to that which is future (Rom 8.38; 1 Cor 3.22; Gal 1.4), and for this reason it seems best to see the crisis (ἐνάγκη) of 7.26 as a present reality. In the broader period literature ἐνάγκη is used to denote the distress of the eschaton (e.g., 1 En. 1.1; 100.7; 103.8; Luke 21.23). Paul is not clear on the nature of this crisis in his own view.

67 The precise meaning of the phrase τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰῶνων κατήγγειλεν is contested, though it has been variously translated as either “the ends of the ages have come” or “the ends of the ages have met.” In the former stress is placed upon the conclusion of the previous/present aeon, while the latter stresses the intersection of two opposing aeons. For our purposes the issue is perhaps moot, as the point to be made is that the aeonic conclusion/intersection has now arrived – thus καταντάω, which is commonly glossed “to come, arrive” in the sense of reaching a destination (LSJ, BDAG, LEH). The verb fits marvellously within the PATH structure of the RESURRECTION gestalt, whereby the GOAL (i.e., destination) has already been reached (note the perfect tense – κατήγγειλεν). For scholarly discussion, see Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 32; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 387-88; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2000), 743-46.
that led “Paul as a thinker to his Mysticism.” More recently, Andrew Lincoln has configured issues of transcendence and imminence both spatially (up and down) and temporally (now and then) while at the same time locating the already/not-yet paradox in heaven; so Lincoln,

In thinking about the believer’s present experience of the age to come Paul’s focus can be in heaven, because for him, with Christ’s resurrection and exaltation, the eschatological centre of gravity had moved to the heavenly realm.

Lincoln is heavily indebted to his analysis of Colossians and Ephesians, and by stressing heaven as the eschatological centre he has overlooked the fact that notions of verticality and horizontality do not alone bring eschatology into the present. Indeed, both refer to locations out there (either up or then) that the believer must embrace propositionally, we will return to this point below. Taken in still another direction are the assertions of some that the Christ event was of such uniqueness that it spurred the aforementioned mutation. Thus N. T. Wright, “what caused these developments-from-within …? Paul himself would have answered: it was Jesus’ own resurrection.” Such an assertion is fundamentally acultural and ahistorical. That is to say, this view essentially removes the resurrection event from its cultural frame-structure, thus presuming that Christ’s resurrection was self-evident and further that the categories of Jewish eschatology were not ultimately needed to identify Jesus as resurrected. Taking these various

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68 Albert Schweitzer, *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle* (trans. William Montgomery; New York: Seabury Press, 1968), 97, but see pp. 70-100 generally. As we saw in §1.3.3, Schweitzer’s mystical doctrine is really a cognicentric doctrine of mysticism.


70 In this way, “the believer’s present experience of the age to come” is really a theological assertion that one intellectually embraces (Lincoln, *Paradise Now and Not Yet*, 172).

71 Wright, *Resurrection*, 373. A similar assertion underscores William Davies’ much earlier statement, “the character of [Paul’s] eschatology was determined not by any traditional schema but by the significance which Paul had been led to give to Jesus. … his eschatology was subservient to his faith and not constitutive of it” (W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology* [London: S.P.C.K., 1962], 290).

72 Stressing the antiquity of the gospel Easter narratives, Wright contends that the empty tomb and the appearance traditions are accurate historical accounts, and that the combination of these two events presents both the sufficient and necessary conditions by which the resurrection claim gains historical validity (Wright, *Resurrection*, 706-10). For Wright, the only tenable conclusion can be that Jesus did indeed rise from the dead, which he further insists cannot “mean that [Paul] was simply having a ‘religious experience’ without any objective correlate” (p. 378). Accordingly, the resurrection of Christ can be nothing other than a self-evident historical event; thus Wright adds the very far-reaching qualification, “all experience is interpreted experience, but not all experience can be reduced to terms of the interpretation” (p. 378 [emphasis added]). While the present study fundamentally insists that all
4. Eschatological Somatology

perspectives together, cognicentrism abounds and eschatological modification is understood propositionally.

It cannot be denied that specific motifs and/or elements of Paul’s eschatology differ from those of his contemporaries. These kinds of disputed specifics, however, are characteristic of many eschatological accounts across the period literature, and we must certainly not overlook the breadth of such narratological richness. What is at issue, rather, is the more substantial claim that the underlying structure of Paul’s eschatology has undergone mutation. This is particularly evident in the “schematic” diagrams that scholars such as Geerhardus Vos and James Dunn construct (reproduced in Diagram 4.3). Here the traditional Jewish view, which is one-dimensional and strictly teleological, is contrasted with Paul’s newly modified view, which is two-dimensional and consists of a temporal (Dunn) and/or cosmological (Vos) overlap.

It should not be overlooked that neither Dunn nor Vos use the term “schema” with the same degree of technicality that we have. Both (seem) to use “schema” to denote an ordered and recurrent system, and despite their claim to have represented the underlying structure of Paul’s eschatology, their analyses are conducted exclusively at the level of human-scale (e.g., recurrent motifs, specific events). For this reason, such an approach cannot help but uncover a modified “schema,” for neither Dunn nor Vos have penetrated beyond the narratological level. Extending from our discussion in §2.1, our theoretically informed analysis enables a more precise adjudication of Paul’s

interpretation is experientially grounded, experiences of resurrection do not constitute the kinds of embodied experiences that one can critically posit as foundations of meaning.

73 Most notably the resurrection of Christ, which we have already noted as the watershed moment; so Lincoln, Paul’s eschatology has been transformed on account of “what he knew to have happened to Christ and the new situation his death, resurrection and exaltation had effected” (Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 172).

74 One need look no further than Schweitzer’s maximalist account to see that any attempt to fit Paul into a static narrative is doomed to failure. Schweitzer erred in that he works at the level of human scale, thus seeking to identify a coherent and singular narrative that accounts for all the details of Paul’s various eschatological descriptions (including his doctrine of the two resurrections, his understanding of two different streams of Jewish eschatology, his insistence upon two kingdoms, etc. – see Schweitzer, Mysticism, 75-100 [on Paul, see esp. pp. 90-100]).

75 The diagrams are reproduced exactly as is from Vos, Eschatology, 36-41 and Dunn, Theology of Paul, 461-66.
Diagram 4.3:
Scholarly Depictions of Paul’s Modified Eschatological Schema

** Reproduced from Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, 464.
eschatology and any schematic alterations he may have made. In light of the RESURRECTION schematic structure it is possible to demonstrate that Paul has not modified or mutated his eschatology. Quite the opposite in fact, as Paul’s eschatology coheres with and is built upon the RESURRECTION gestalt that he shares with his Jewish contemporaries.\textsuperscript{76}

The schematic mapping can be described as follows, and we have diagrammed it so as to denote both the gestalt structure (see Diagram 4.4) and Paul’s specific appropriation of that gestalt in light of the CHRIST frame (see Diagram 4.5). Holding to the conviction that Jesus has been raised from the dead, Paul perceives the eschaton to have dawned and thus locates himself and believers in the macro-GOAL. It is Christ’s death/resurrection that cues this emphasis upon the macro-GOAL, and the Parousia stands at the macro-GOAL’s still expected completion. In this way, the two events are mapped onto the RESURRECTION gestalt, and while they mark specific historical moments in Paul’s appropriation (Diagram 4.5), they themselves are not inherent to the overall structure (Diagram 4.4). Where Paul has adapted the gestalt is with respect to the micro-PATH (CHANGE) structure, which is now temporally scaled so as to denote the ongoing process of transformation and thus locates the Parousia as a still future event. By virtue of baptismal death believers are inwardly raised and are currently in the midst of being transformed from one somatic state to another. That is to say, Paul has a singular process of resurrection in mind, one that begins with the imparting of the divine πνεῦμα and culminates with the enspirited risen body. That being said, the key difference for Paul vis-à-vis his contemporaries is this temporal scaling of the micro-PATH such that the TRAJECTOR itself comes into focus;\textsuperscript{77} in light of the CHRIST frame, Paul understands believers as traversing the micro-PATH (CHANGE) structure as part of their achievement of the macro-GOAL. We must stress, however, that this is not a substantial modification

\textsuperscript{76} On the relationship between eschatology generally and resurrection specifically, see fn. 2 in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{77} As noted in Diagram 4.2.
Diagram 4.4: Paul’s Eschatological Gestalt

Diagram 4.5: Paul’s Eschatology

Legend:
α = ἀναστίς
ς = σιωπάς
π = σωτήριον
(certainly not a mutation), but rather an intuitive adaptation of the gestalt. Indeed, Paul neither adds to nor subtracts from the schematic elements but rather frames the entire gestalt in light of the Christ event, thus producing distinct nuances at human scale that are not found in the comparative traditions analysed in §2.1.

What we see in Paul, then, is not an aeonic overlap, nor a bringing of the future back into the present, but rather a somatically drawn polarity of in and out such that the human interior becomes the location of revelation and the exterior the location of earthly persistence. In this way, Paul does not work with a temporal linearity so much as an intra-somatic polarity between σῶμα and πνεῦμα (IN-OUT), now and then (SOURCE-GOAL), and earthly and heavenly (UP-DOWN). At the centre of all this is the human σῶμα. For Paul, eschatology is somatically mapped; that is, it is eschatological somatology. To highlight this we can return briefly to the work of Lincoln noted above. Though rightly stressing the relationship between Christ and believers as the location of imminence,78 Lincoln’s relegation of the “eschatological centre of gravity … [to] the heavenly realm”79 thus produces a strenuous emphasis upon the heavenly, exalted Christ that is not sufficiently counterbalanced with Paul’s focus on the indwelling, pneumatic Christ.80 Though Lincoln rightly focuses on cosmology (earth and heaven) and temporality (now and then), our analysis suggests that Paul’s eschatology must also be extended to include anthropology (somatic interior and exterior).81 In this way, that

78 For Lincoln this is expressed through the recognition that Paul’s understanding of heaven has a much more immanent nature than is usually ascribed to dualistically configured Jewish apocalyptic. For Lincoln, Paul represents a “decisive break” with such a dualistic worldview, further underscoring the claim to modification (Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 170).
79 Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 172.
80 Even where Lincoln does stress the pneumatic presence of Christ in believers, the focus of discussion moves toward Christ’s heavenly position rather than his pneumatic indwelling (e.g., Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 187). In this way, Deissmann’s much earlier critique finds renewed resonance: “th[e] certainty of the nearness of Christ occurs far more frequently in Paul’s writings than the thought of the distant Christ ‘highly exalted’ in Heaven” (Adolf Deissmann, Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History [trans. William E. Wilson; 2d rev. and enl. ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1957], 140).
81 Lincoln does address issues of anthropology in his discussion of 2 Cor 5, though his treatment moves toward spatial and temporal issues rather than any kind of somatic mapping; thus Paul does not hold an “anthropological dualism but rather a temporal duality” (Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 70). In Lincoln’s view, this future age to come already exists in heaven and thus is abstracted from the believer him/herself.
which is traditionally ascribed to the cosmos (up) and temporal future (then) is now correlated with the somatic interior (in). It is this third dimension of anthropology (specifically somatology) that enables imminence in Paul’s eschatological outlook, and further constitutes the demarcation of already and not-yet in Paul’s thought.

4.5 Conclusions

We have demonstrated in this chapter that Paul understands resurrection as both a present and a future event, one that has already begun through the imparting of the divine πνεῦμα in baptism and will one day culminate in the somatic transformation of the exterior body. Paul maps this present experience of resurrection onto the somatic interior (RESURRECTION IS IN) and further locates the believer within a broader transformative trajectory. In their present state believers exist as enspirited earthly bodies that are in the process of transformation from being ensouled earthly bodies to enspirited risen bodies. Here, Paul has a singular resurrection event in mind, one that focuses on the human σῶμα such that both cosmology and chronology are somatically mapped. Without recourse to eschatological modification, we have clarified the nature of Paul’s already/not-yet ideals – eschatology is somatically grounded such that believers are already raised inwardly but not yet raised outwardly. In Rom 6-8 Paul understands this present experience of resurrection via the RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor and further frames such life via the categories of SELF-MASTERY. To this end, believers are to live under the rule of the indwelling divine πνεῦμα, whose presence in the body revives the human πνεῦμα and thus constitutes the resurrection of the somatic interior.

Returning to the scholarly literature examined in §1.3, the present chapter’s major contributions can be summarised as follows. First, while Wedderburn and many others locate participation in Christ’s death and resurrection as past and future events respectively (see §1.3.3), we have instead demonstrated that Paul holds to a single
resurrection event that is temporally drawn-out and somatically mapped. For Paul, resurrection is an ongoing experience that has both present and future manifestations; both are important, and it is erroneous to draw a sharp distinction between *future literal* and *present metaphorical* resurrections (see §1.3.1). Accordingly, our analysis has demonstrated the fundamental importance of recognising Paul’s present resurrection assumptions, which are expressed in Rom 6-8 as ethics (RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS) rather than transformation of the somatic exterior (RESURRECTION IS CELESTIAL LUMINOSITY – as in 1 Cor 15 and 2 Cor 5). Second, by identifying the location of present resurrection we have also uncovered the location of continuity across earthly and risen forms. Both are mapped to the somatic interior and correlated with the πνεῦμα (both divine and human). In contrast, then, to Käsemann’s dualistically drawn discontinuity and Bultmann’s Cartesian-esque continuity of self, our analysis has instead grounded trans-somatic continuity in the transformed somatic interior (see §1.3.2). Finally, in contrast to Tannehill (see §1.3.3) we have argued that dying and rising with Christ is not a matter of passive participation in dualistically drawn aeonic spheres. Instead, Paul’s focus is squarely on the body, as the somatic interior becomes the location of transformation and participation in Christ’s resurrection is a matter of oneness with the indwelling divine πνεῦμα. On this point, however, we anticipate our final chapter, to which we now turn.
Chapter 5

Participating in Resurrection:
On Union, the Body, and In-Out Affectivity

In the previous chapter we have argued that Paul’s language of being ἐν σαρκί vs. ἐν πνεύματι is reflective not of dualistically configured cosmic spheres of lordship, but rather of differing embodied states. Paul is blending his anthropology with his eschatology, thus understanding resurrection as a process in which the human body is presently engaged. To follow this conclusion through, however, requires that we examine the full range of Paul’s container descriptions, which include not only references to being ἐν πνεύματι but also (and more pervasively) ἐν Χριστῷ.

Like so much of his theology, Paul’s resurrection ideals are always trending toward participationist expressions. As noted in ch. 1, Paul speaks not only of believers participating in Christ’s death and resurrection but also of their being enmeshed with Christ in the process of doing so; thus Rom 6.5, believers are organically intertwined (συμφυτος) in the likeness of Christ’s death, and Phil 3.21, believers will be morphed together with (συμμορφος) Christ’s risen existence (cf. Rom 8.29).¹ These passages point not to a propositional assertion of participation in/with Christ, but an experience of divine-human oneness. Paul understands resurrection as a joining together, a kind of intertwining of Christ and believers. His descriptions trend not just toward being in the Christic form, but also toward a more complete and unitary engulfment into Christ himself. This understanding of resurrection is related to but differs markedly from the traditional metaphors examined in §2.1. The emphasis is less upon renewed corporeality (Resurrection is up) and more upon divine-human proximity (Resurrection is near);

¹ See esp. fncts. 102-05 in §1.3.3.
indeed, not just proximity but a kind of hyper-proximity. Paul is looking ahead to being completely and fully subsumed into Christ (i.e., RESURRECTION IS IN).

The present chapter will explore this issue in detail, particularly examining the interrelation of Paul’s participationist language and his present experience of ongoing resurrection. It will be argued that the nature of Paul’s eschatology fosters a particular kind of resurrection experience that is grounded in Paul’s participationist ideals. On this point we suggest Albert Schweitzer was not completely wrong when he insisted that Paul’s eschatology created “the conditions for a peculiar Mysticism,”2 though the specifics of this claim are in need of re-description. The present chapter will offer such re-description in two ways. First, we will examine the conceptual structure of Paul’s participationist language and further locate it vis-à-vis the nuances of Paul’s CHRIST-framed eschatology (as outlined in §4.4). In so doing, Paul’s understanding of resurrection as joining together will come into clearer focus. In this light we will then examine the nature of Paul’s present experience of resurrection, specifically as it relates to the IN-OUT somatic interplay noted in the previous chapter. As we will see, this present experience of resurrection is a participatory experience, one wherein the power of Christ’s risen life is understood to be actively at work within Paul’s body via a dynamic interplay of IN-OUT somatic affectivity. This dynamic will be most clearly seen in 2 Cor 3-4 but also demonstrated more generally across the undisputed Paulines.

5.1 Resurrection and UNION

Paul’s participatory language is one of the most important yet diversely contested themes in the apostle’s thought. The following discussion will examine the conceptual structures that undergird Paul’s participationist ideals, specifically analysing the convergence of resurrection and the apostle’s in/with Christ descriptions.

5. Participating in Resurrection

5.1.1 *ἐν Χριστῷ* in Cognitive Linguistic Perspective

The most ubiquitous phrase that Paul uses to articulate his participationist ideals is the designation *ἐν Χριστῷ*. Throughout this study we have pointed to several different ways in which notions of being *ἐν Χριστῷ* are to be understood. We now turn toward the linguistic construction itself, specifically seeking to determine the function a preposition like *ἐν* conveys in Paul’s broader participationist language.

In light of the cognitive linguistic perspective advanced throughout this study, it should come as no surprise that traditional grammatical categories are in need of revision. Of particular concern is the fracturing of the linguistic sign into multiple, homophonous meanings. This is particularly true of the preposition *ἐν*, which has often been noted as the “maid-of-all-work” amongst Greek prepositions. While some grammarians limit the functions of *ἐν* to a handful of broad categories, others have fragmented the preposition into as many as 12 (or more) distinct functions. In large part these categories are defined on contextual grounds (e.g., a *locative* *ἐν* is identified when someone is “in the market” [*ἐν τῇ ἁγιασμῷ – Matt 20.3*]). This creates problems, however, when the context in question is not entirely self-evident nor easily identified via the grammarian’s categories. Such is the problem we encounter with Paul’s *ἐν Χριστῷ* descriptions, which have been described by one grammarian as “utterly

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3 For example, we have seen that being in Christ can refer to being in the risen body (which is patterned on Christ’s body – §§2.2.4 and 3.2.2), and we have also seen that the figures of Adam and Christ can stand metonymically as representational figures for contrasting communities (§2.2.3).

4 So James Moulton, Nigel Turner and Wilbert Francis Howard, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek* (4 vols.; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1906), 1.103; comp. BDAG: “the uses of this prep. are so many and various, and oft. so easily confused, that a strictly systematic treatment is impossible. It must suffice to list the main categories, which will help establish the usage in individual cases” (p. 326, s.v. *ἐν*).

5 H. Dana and Julius Mantey, for example, list what they deem the root meaning (*within*) and two resultant meanings (*locative* and *instrumental* – H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey, *A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament* [New York: Macmillan, 1939], 105-06). They also note three remote meanings.


7 Thus Dana and Mantey, “the best way to determine the meanings of a preposition is to study it in its various contexts and note its various uses” (Dana and Mantey, *Grammar*, 98-99).
def[ying] definite interpretation”\(^8\) and are even listed by others as a separate and unique prepositional category.\(^9\)

To be certain, we would be grossly mistaken to neglect contextual concerns in interpretation, as the function of a preposition like ἐν can only be determined in the midst of linguistic usage. This does not mean, however, that the preposition itself does not impart meaning or conceptual structure to the discursive unit. Indeed, it is only because a lexeme such as ἐν triggers certain conceptual mappings that it can thus be meaningful within discursive contexts. Such is (one of) the challenges that cognitive linguists offer to the grammatical treatments noted above. Rather than focusing only on linguistic context, cognitive linguists also examine the embodied grounding of the linguistic sign itself. In her recent analysis of ἐν Χριστῷ in 1 Peter, Bonnie Howe has outlined the cognitive linguistic perspective succinctly.\(^10\) Unlike the standard grammars, Howe insists:

we do not have five (or more) different, homophonous words, ἐν. Instead, we have one emergent concept ἐν [sic.], one word for that emergent concept, and multiple metaphorical concepts in which ἐν [sic.] serves to partially define emotional states, theological relationships between beings, the nature of instrumentality, and so on.\(^11\)

It should be noted that Howe does overstate the case a bit, as she also (more accurately) notes that the same lexical sign (e.g., ἐν) can, depending on the context, also trigger other conceptual structures\(^12\) (such as cause and effect, for example).\(^13\) The point that is of relevance for us is the recognition that the lexeme itself triggers conceptual structure that is essential to understanding the discursive context. Such conceptual structures are image schematic in nature, and the primary schema that ἐν triggers is the CONTAINER gestalt; in this light, a preposition like ἐν is not defined only by usage within specific

\(^8\) BDF §219(4)
\(^10\) Bonnie Howe, *Because You Bear This Name: Conceptual Metaphor and the Moral Meaning of 1 Peter* (BibIntS 81; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 233-48 (esp. 235-37).
\(^11\) Howe, *Bear This Name*, 237.
\(^12\) Thus Howe, “a single word like ἐν can evoke multiple image schemas,” and again later, “the word [ἐν] is the same in each case, but the conceptual structuring is different” (Howe, *Bear This Name*, 235 and 236 respectively).
\(^13\) Whereby X happens because of or on account of Y (e.g., Acts 7.29).
contexts but also (and more fundamentally) by embodied human experiences (most notably, the experience of being contained).  

In response to the traditional grammatical treatments noted above, three points can be made. First, though many grammarians similarly suggested that prepositions evince a basic spatial sense that is then metaphorically elaborated in various ways, these same grammarians fail to see that a single schematic structure can constitute various senses of ἐν. For example, where some grammarians distinguish between a locative and spherical use of ἐν, cognitive linguists question the degree to which these senses differ. Both utilise the CONTAINER schema in constructing meaning; the former does so with respect to geographical placement while the latter with respect to influence and hegemony.

Second, we should not seek to over-extend the use of ἐν with respect to Paul’s participationist ideals. A prime example is Maximilian Zerwick’s description of ἐν Χριστῷ language as a Sociative use of ἐν. Zerwick’s analysis errs in as much as he himself admits that ἐν is “practically reduced to the expression of a general notion of association or accompaniment, which would be rendered in English by « with ».” Here Zerwick understands ἐν in light of an altogether different image schema (that of PROXIMITY rather than CONTAINMENT), and while such a conceptual triggering is not

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14 This is not to suggest that the lexeme ἐν must always trigger the same conceptual structure, or even the CONTAINER schema. Indeed, the instrumental usage triggers a conceptual mapping that denotes movement through (rather than placement within) a CONTAINER, while the causal usage invokes an entirely different image schema (namely, the PATH schema).

15 See, e.g., Porter, Idioms, 142 and Dana and Mantey, Grammar, 99.

16 The approach advocated here should be distinguished from that of Stanley Porter, whose visual representations should not be confused with our discussion of image schemata. Porter describes his visual representations as a tool designed to aid modern readers in grasping a preposition’s “basic meaning” and subsequent “metaphorical extensions” (Porter, Idioms, 142). As a pedagogical tool, Porter insists that no “Greek speaker or writer began by thinking of the basic sense of the preposition each time it was used” (Porter, Idioms, 142). In contrast to Porter, the image schemata that we point to are not a pedagogical aid but rather constitute the actual locus of commonality that enables the transference of meaning across temporal and cultural boundaries. For both ancient and modern Greek-readers, the lexeme ἐν triggers the CONTAINER schema, thus structuring and organising the meaning of a given text.

17 See, e.g., Porter, Idioms, 156-57.

impossible, there is ample Pauline evidence to suggest that the CONTAINER schema is more germane in the apostle’s usage.

Finally, and most problematic of all, is the relegation of Paul’s ἐν Χριστῷ descriptions to their own category of prepositional usage. Such is the approach taken by Stanley Porter, who theologises the preposition as a unique case of the spherical use.\(^\text{19}\) Porter imports a particular brand of apocalyptic dualism such that the linguistic sign contrasts states of cosmic subjection (i.e., to be in Christ is to be controlled by Christ; to be in Adam is to be controlled by Adam). A similar move is made by A. T. Robertson, who relegates Paul’s in Christ/Adam language to a separate category of prototypical association – this is something closer to the representational figure theory.\(^\text{20}\) Both Porter and Robertson theologise the preposition, thus isolating Paul’s ἐν Χριστῷ descriptions and detaching them from broader patterns of usage.

Taking the above views together, and in light of our theoretical commitments, it is problematic to overly fragment or even isolate Paul’s ἐν Χριστῷ language. We do much better to instead examine the conceptual structure that the emergent concept EN imparts to Paul’s participationist ideals. As we will see below, ἐν is best seen as triggering the CONTAINER schema, thus conceptualising Christ as a container in which believers exist – i.e., the CHRIST IS CONTAINER metaphor. This is not to argue that such uses of ἐν are necessarily locative; this would mean that our analysis degrades into a kind of crude literalism. Instead, to say that the lexical sign ἐν triggers a CONTAINER schema means that Paul utilises the lexeme as a way of understanding abstract experiences or ideas by means of the common physical experience of being spatially located within a container. It is not that Paul sees Christ (or πνεῦμα, or Adam) as actually being a container (though in some instances he does – see §§2.2.4; 3.2.2; and 4.3), but rather that the CHRIST IS CONTAINER metaphor enables a conceptual system

\(^{19}\) Porter, *Idioms*, 159.

wherein Paul is able to describe the relationship between Christ and believers via the categories and structural relations inherent in the CONTAINER schema (e.g., being located in or out, passing through, relation of part to whole, etc.). In this way, then, the preposition ἐν imparts conceptual structure that is fundamental to understanding Paul’s participationist ideals.

5.1.2 Conceptual Trends in Paul’s Participationist Language

When we speak of Paul’s participationist language we are really speaking of two interrelated descriptions that are reflective of two related but distinct image schematic structures. The first is Paul’s language of oneness, which is premised upon the CONTAINER schema (e.g., ἐν Χριστῷ; εἰς Χριστὸν; and even διὰ Χριστοῦ); the second is his language of togetherness, which is premised upon the PROXIMITY schema (e.g., σύν and σύν- prefixed words). To a large extent, the former (oneness) functions as the dominant idea, though this is only the case because the two expressions are inextricable and reflective of the more general gestalt structure UNION. Before articulating this UNION gestalt specifically, it will be helpful to examine the oneness and togetherness dimensions separately.

Paul articulates Christ-believer oneness in a number of different ways, all of which are premised upon the CONTAINER schema. The most well known and obvious is the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ (Ἰησοῦ) and its correlates,21 which we have just seen creates a mental space wherein Christ is conceptualised as a co-container that believers exist in. The ubiquity of the CHRIST IS CONTAINER metaphor is evinced in other prepositional phrases as well. One example is the διὰ Χριστοῦ construction,22 which Paul almost always

21 On ἐν Χριστῷ (Ἰησοῦ), see (e.g.) Gal 1.22; 3.26; 5.6; Rom 6.11; 8.1; 15.17; 16.3; 1 Cor 1.2; 4.17; 2 Cor 3.14; 5.17; 12.2; Phil 1.1; 3.9, 14; 4.7; 1 Thess 2.14; 2.14; Philm 8, 20. Related phrases include ἐν κυρίῳ (e.g., 1 Thess 1.1; Rom 14.14; 16.2, 8, 11-13, 22; 1 Cor 4.17; 9.1; 11.11; Philm 20); ἐν πνεύματι (e.g., Rom 8.9; 14.17; 1 Cor 6.11; 12.3, 9, 13, and 1 Thess 1.5); ἐν οὐρανῷ (e.g., 1 Cor 1.5; 2 Cor 1.19-20; 5.21; Phil 3.9); and perhaps ἐν θεῷ (1 Thess 1.1; see also Rom 5.11 and 6.11).
22 In addition to διὰ Χριστοῦ (e.g., 2 Cor 1.5; 3.4; 5.18), compare also διὰ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ / Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (e.g., Rom 1.8; 2.16; 5.21; Gal 1.1; Phil 1.11), διὰ οὐρανοῦ (1 Cor 8.6; 2 Cor 1.20), διὰ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Rom 5.11; 15.30), and διὰ πνεύματος (Rom 5.5; 1 Cor 2.12; and 12.8).
expresses as διά + genitive (through) rather than διά + accusative (on account of).23 The sense for Paul is not only the instrumental means by which God and believers act, but more fundamentally the spatial proximity between God and believers; divine-human interaction happens through Christ. Paul further describes believers as having entered εἰς Χριστὸν.24 For example, in Gal 3.27 Paul speaks of baptism as an entry “into Christ” (εἰς Χριστὸν) and further elaborates this to mean that believers have therefore “put on” (ἐνδύομαι) Christ. The clothing image clearly coheres with the Christ is container metaphor, and both it and the baptismal image find resonance with Paul’s broader resurrection ideals (here again correlated to the temporal present). Taking all these prepositional descriptions together, the Christ is container metaphor is seen to pervade Paul’s thought.

Perhaps Paul’s most vivid expression of this metaphor is the image of the church as the body of Christ.25 It is not surprising that some exegetes read Paul’s ἐν Χριστῷ phrases as denoting one’s presence within the ecclesial community,26 though we overstep if we equate ἐν Χριστῷ to a mere synonym of ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ (a phrase that occurs only sporadically in Paul and does not carry overtones of Christ-believer union).27 We instead do far better if we understand the coherence between the ecclesial...

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24 In addition to εἰς Χριστὸν (e.g., Gal 3.27; 2 Cor 1.21; cf. Rom 16.5; 1 Cor 12.13; Philm. 6), see also εἰς Χριστὸν Ιησοῦν (e.g., Rom 6.3, and perhaps Gal 2.16), and contrast with εἰς τὸν Μωυσῆν (1 Cor 10.2).
25 See 1 Cor 12 and Rom 12.4-8.
26 So Ernst Käsemann, who argued that the concepts of being in Christ and of the ecclesial body of Christ “belong together in that they mutually interpret one another” (Ernst Käsemann, “The Theological Problem Presented by the Motif of the Body of Christ,” in *Perspectives on Paul* [trans. Margaret Kohl; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971], 102-21 [p. 106]). For Käsemann, the “Body of Christ of the Church … is the earthly sphere of the lordship of Christ” (Ernst Käsemann, “Corporeality in Paul,” in *On Being a Disciple of the Crucified Nazarene: Unpublished Lectures and Sermons* [eds. Rudolf Landau and Wolfgang Kraus; trans. Roy A. Harrisville; Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2010], 38-51 [p. 46]).
27 The only occurrences of ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ are in 1 Cor 6.4 and 12.28, where Paul is speaking of the congregation itself. Moreover, though the dative ἐκκλησίᾳ occurs far more frequently in Paul’s letters, it always denotes the community itself, not Christ-believer union. The contrast can be made clear in Gal 1.22, where Paul recounts that he had been unknown “to the churches” (ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις) of Judea “which are in Christ” (ταῖς ἐν Χριστῷ).
metaphor and Paul’s ἐν Χριστῷ descriptions as resulting from shared container
structure mapped onto the figure of Christ vis-à-vis Christ’s relationship with believers.

The ecclesial metaphor is but one expression of Paul’s broader description of Christ-believer oneness. As a metaphor for oneness, this corporate image is an exceptionally lucid expression of the CONTAINER schema; via the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor, being ἐν Χριστῷ denotes being part of his very body.

The CHURCH IS BODY (OF CHRIST) metaphor is particularly important in that it provides Paul a structure within which to organise part and whole in relation to one another; this is true not just for the relationship between believers and Christ, but also for the individual and community.28 Within the frame structure of the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor, the distinction between integrative parts within a whole is upheld, and Paul can accordingly stress either side of the somatic equation. For example, Paul can assert that the members of Christ’s body are not their own but belong to each other and to Christ (cf. Rom 12.5; 1 Cor 6.19), and further that the individual is interdependent within the collective (e.g., 1 Cor 12.7 and 26).29 Conversely, in 1 Cor 6 Paul can address the community (ὁμόν) while speaking of the πνεῦμα dwelling in the singular σῶμα, thus exhorting the Corinthians to glorify God in their (plural) body (singular – ἐν τῷ σῶματι ὁμόν). The lines between the individual and the community are blurred here (e.g., οὐκ ἔστε ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῷ [6.19]), despite the fact that Paul’s primary interest is an instructional address concerning individual bodies (6.15; cf. 6.17 [singular ἕν]).

Comparing 1 Cor 6.19 with 1 Cor 3.16 further underscores the mutuality of individual and community. In 3.16 Paul insists the community is the temple of the divine πνεῦμα,

28 The most explicit text is 1 Cor 12.12-13, where Paul makes a distinction between the general “body” (σῶμα) and the specific “limb/member” (μέλος), and cross-maps this somatic construction onto the general community of faith and the specific individual believers. What results is a view of the community that acknowledges the individual within the context of the communal, with the focus resting on the intra-somatic polarity of part and whole.

29 This sense of mutual interrelation permeates Paul’s letters, especially with respect to notions of togetherness (as we will discuss below – e.g., 1 Cor 4.8; 12.26; 2 Cor 7.3; Phil 1.7, 27; 2.2, 17-18; 4.14; cf. Phil 2.1-5). For this reason, Paul cannot be diminished into a hyper-individualism configured either existentially (so Bultmann – see §1.3.2) or ecstatically (so Adolf Deissmann, Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History [trans. William E. Wilson; 2d rev. and enl. ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1957]).
while 6.19 denotes the *individual’s body* as the temple of the ἁγίον πνεύματός; both descriptions presume the BODY IS HOUSE metaphor and map the pneumatic presence of Christ to the interior. In this way, Paul simultaneously thinks of the individual and the community as somatically interdependent. The apostle makes no sharp divide between the individual and community (i.e., between part and whole), nor does he monistically subsume one into the other; rather, intra-somatic polarity extends to the community via the CHURCH IS BODY (OF CHRIST) metaphor.

Such is Paul’s ἐν Χριστῷ language, but the apostle is not concerned merely with notions of *oneness* but also with the closely related notion of *togetherness*. Whereas Paul’s oneness descriptions are premised on the CONTAINER schema, his togetherness descriptions are structured by the PROXIMITY schema and thus characterise believers as participating with Christ (i.e., NEAR rather than IN). Here the conceptual structure of Christ-believer participation differs from that noted above, and the image schematic shift from the CONTAINER to PROXIMITY schema is marked by a prepositional shift. The most pervasive way that togetherness is articulated is through the expression σὺν Χριστῷ and (esp.) Paul’s various σὺν- compounds,30 thus describing believers as existing and acting with Christ.

Paul evinces both weak and strong expressions of togetherness, both of which demonstrate the extent to which oneness and togetherness interlace each other. In its weaker form, Paul’s heightened sense of divine human propinquity is expressed via notions of *belonging* such that believers are understood as God’s possession. This is particularly evident in Rom 8, where the language of *belonging* to Christ (v. 9) is used in

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30 The phrase σὺν Χριστῷ only occurs in Rom 6.8 and Phil 1.23 (used in the former to denote past baptismal death with Christ and in the latter to denote post-mortem life with Christ), though compare further the phrases σὺν Θεοῦ (2 Cor 4.14), σὺν αὐτῷ (e.g., Rom 8.32; 2 Cor 13.4; 1 Thess 4.14; 5.10), σὺν κυρίῳ (1 Thess 4.17), as well as the obverse σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ (1 Cor 11.32). Dunn has conveniently listed 43 different σὺν- prefixed nouns and verbs, spanning both the undisputed and disputed Paulines (Dunn, Theology of Paul, 402-03, fnnts. 62-63).
conjunction with the reciprocal *Christ in you / you in Christ* description;\(^{31}\) thus E. P. Sanders, “to belong to Christ is not different from being ‘in’ him. … we see [in Rom 8] the close connection between belonging, indwelling and being indwelt.”\(^ {32}\) As we can see, while the image of being Christ’s possession denotes divine-human proximity (i.e., NEAR), oneness and togetherness closely correspond with one another.

In its stronger form, Christ-believer togetherness denotes not merely proximity but rather *shared experience*. This is most explicit in Paul’s descriptions of believers becoming organically enmeshed with Christ (e.g., σύμφωνος [Rom 6.5]; σύμμορφος [Rom 8.29; Phil 3.21]). In each of these instances, the image is of two separate entities that are united into an *organic and living singularity*.\(^ {33}\) Seen within the broader context of our study, Paul is here looking ahead to the cessation of *intra-somatic polarity* that will accompany transformation from the *enspirited earthly body* to the *enspirited risen body*; believers will thus exist in a somatic unity *with Christ*, the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν (1 Cor 15.45). In these συν- compounds, then, the stronger shades of Paul’s togetherness descriptions intimate a kind of hyper-proximity that is marked by co-participation in the salvific drama; as we can see, togetherness and oneness bleed together in Paul’s descriptions.

Taking the above discussion together, Paul’s participationist language trends in two image schematic directions – both Christ-believer oneness (CONTAINMENT) and togetherness (PROXIMITY). Such descriptions are, however, interdependent; believers participate with Christ because they are both *in* and *near* Christ, and Christ is both *in* and *near* them. This interplay of *in* and *near* is reflective of a more general schematic structure – the UNION gestalt – which correlates both the CONTAINER (IN-OUT) and

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\(^{31}\) On believers belonging to Christ, see 1 Cor 3.23; 6.19-20; 15.23; Gal 5.24; and Rom 14.8. Further examples include Paul’s use of the slave metaphor, in which believers now have a new slave owner (e.g., Rom 6.16-23). Paul also frequently describes the churches of God (e.g., 2 Cor 1.1 [ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ]).


\(^{33}\) Again, see discussion in §1.3.3 (esp. fncts. 102-05).
PROXIMITY (NEAR-FAR) schemata with one another.\textsuperscript{34} The gestalt structure has been represented in Diagram 5.1, where it is portrayed as a container with a bi-directional plane that enables a TRAJECTOR to move between IN-NEAR and OUT-FAR positions (with other possible locations in-between). As we can see, both the CONTAINER (IN-OUT) and PROXIMITY (NEAR-FAR) schemata naturally integrate with one another, and this is readily apparent in a number of embodied experiences of union. One of the richest and most primal of such experiences is the gestation process, where both mother and child experience union as CONTAINMENT (e.g., in gestation) and PROXIMITY (e.g., as two separate human beings).\textsuperscript{35} Similarly, in sexual intercourse partners who were once disconnected (FAR) come together (NEAR) such that the one is able to penetrate and actually be inside the other (IN).\textsuperscript{36} In these ways, the UNION gestalt integrates both the CONTAINER and PROXIMITY schemata, and this emerges organically from recurrent patterns of human embodiment. The integration is so tight, in fact, that the one schema (CONTAINER) actually entails the other (PROXIMITY). That is to say, being inside (IN) the container is a kind of hyper-proximity (NEAR), whereas movement away from the container places the trajector both OUT and FAR. Accordingly, there are conceptual correlations that link IN-NEAR vis-à-vis OUT-FAR. Being in something entails nearness, while being outside is characterised by varying degrees of distance.

From an image schematic point of view, then, the interconnection of Paul’s oneness and togetherness descriptions is both intuitive and natural in as much as they reflect the one UNION gestalt. For this reason, it is perhaps not surprising that the sex metaphor is not absent from Paul’s participationist descriptions. In 1 Cor 6.12-20 Paul

\textsuperscript{34} Though UNION is undoubtedly constructed in different ways by various cultures, what is of immediate interest for us is the image schematic gestalt that emerges from recurrent patterns of human embodiment.

\textsuperscript{35} More precisely, in the gestation process both mother and child are connected as one and the child actually grows within the mother until it is delivered out of the mother’s body and thus becomes a separate human being.

\textsuperscript{36} What is in view here is the physical act of intercourse and not the social values and constructions of that experience. In Graeco-Roman antiquity sexual relations were widely understood as asymmetrical, consisting of one active, superordinate participant and another passive, subordinate partner. For more, see Bernadette J. Brooten, \textit{Love Between Women: Early Christian Responses to Female Homoeroticism} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1-2, 126-27, and 250-52.
Diagram 5.1:
The UNION (CONTAINER-PROXIMITY) Gestalt
describes believers as being united to God as one πνεύμα via the metaphor of a man and a prostitute being united as one σύρξ in sexual intercourse (1 Cor 6.16-17). The context here is an appeal on resurrection grounds (6.14), thus insisting that the future pneumatic state has present pneumatic implications. Within the metaphor, Paul insists that both fleshly and pneumatic unions are bodily in nature. The preferred union is that between believers and God, and it constitutes a oneness of πνεύμα rather than flesh. Sanders has rightly noted that the issue for Paul is not the immorality of fornication with a prostitute (per se), but rather the assertion that such fornication produces a union that is mutually exclusive to that shared between Christ and believers. Believers constitute one body with Christ, not a fleshly body (as in sexual union) but rather a pneumatic body (as in resurrection); that is to say, the character of this union is not only somatic, but specifically pneumo-somatic.

In summary, we have seen that notions of both oneness (CONTAINER) and togetherness (PROXIMITY) are interconnected in Paul’s thought precisely because they cohere in the UNION gestalt. Seen in this light, Paul’s participationist language trends toward the IN-NEAR location of the UNION gestalt, thus characterising Christ-believer relations via notions of hyper-proximity (both indwelling and propinquity). This is primarily achieved through the CHRIST IS CONTAINER metaphor, which enables Paul to conceptualise believers as existing in Christ, acting through Christ, standing near to Christ, and even participating with Christ. Such descriptions are particularly prevalent in Paul’s resurrection ideals, where the process of dying and rising with Christ is characterised not simply by participation but a more fundamental entwining of Christ.

37 Thus Sanders, “it is easy to miss how strange the logic behind it is for us and how natural to Paul. … to say that one should not fornicate because fornication produces a union which excludes one from a union which is salvific is to employ a rationale which today is not readily understood” (Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 455).

38 Closely related is the idea of believers existing in one spirit. The phrase is explicitly used in 1 Cor 6.17 (ἐν πνεύμα), and Paul elsewhere speaks of the baptism of believers into one body as happening in one pneuma (ἐν ἐν πνεύματι – 1 Cor 12.13).

39 Indeed, given that the CONTAINER schema is the dominant aspect of the UNION gestalt, it is not surprising that notions of oneness (e.g., ἐν Χριστῷ πνεύματι) dominate Paul’s participationist ideals.
and believers. That is to say, Paul has a view toward pneuamo-somatic union, both in the present and the future.

5.1.3 Eschatology and UNION

With the preceding discussion in mind, it is now possible to more clearly see exactly how notions of UNION and RESURRECTION coalesce in the apostle’s descriptions. The key component in this correlation is Paul’s CHRIST-framed eschatology, which we noted in the previous chapter is characterised by believers traversing the micro-PATH (CHANGE) structure as part of their achievement of the macro-GOAL (§4.4). Such an eschatological outlook fosters two important foci; first, emphasis on divine-human proximity (i.e., the NEAR aspect of the macro-GOAL [recall §2.1.3]), and second, emphases on somatic containment (i.e., the TRAJECTOR of the micro-PATH in Paul’s eschatology [recall §§4.3-4]). As we will see, it is the interrelation of these two aspects of Paul’s eschatology that fosters the apostle’s particular emphasis on resurrection as a joining together or intertwining of Christ and believers.

As outlined in §2.1.3 the macro-GOAL element of the RESURRECTION gestalt is partially structured by notions of divine-human proximity (NEAR). Given that Paul locates himself within this macro-GOAL element, it is not surprising that Christ-believer propinquity pervades the apostle’s eschatology. We have already seen this with respect to Paul’s past and future ideals – believers have died with Christ in baptism (Rom 6.1-11; cf. Gal 2.19) and at a future date they will rise “with Jesus” and be brought into the divine presence (2 Cor 4.14; cf. 2 Cor 13.4; 1 Thess 4.17; Phil 1.23). In addition to these temporal bookends, we have also seen that Paul characterises believers as currently belonging to Christ (e.g., Rom 8.9-11), thus locating divine-human proximity in the temporal present. Seen within the context of Paul’s CHRIST-framed eschatology, it is precisely because Paul perceives himself and believers as existing in the macro-GOAL – where divine-human nearness is most strong – that notions of Christ-believer
propinquity are so pervasive. In this way, Paul’s eschatology fosters his emphasis upon Christ-believer togetherness.

As we have seen above, however, the more dominant structure in Paul’s participationist ideals is the CONTAINER structure, which thus enables notions of Christ-believer oneness. This too has an important correlate in Paul’s CHRIST-framed eschatology, as it is specifically linked to the micro-PATH (CHANGE) structure. As we saw in §4.4, Paul’s CHRIST-framed eschatology temporally scales the micro-PATH (CHANGE) structure such that the CONTAINER-structured somatic nature of the TRAJECTOR him/herself comes into focus. Paul’s emphasis is squarely on the present human σῶμα understood via the IN-OUT dynamic of the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor. It is precisely this emphasis upon containment within Paul’s eschatology that fosters the correlation of resurrection and participation. What results is a kind of hyper-nearness – the divine is actually in believers.\(^{40}\) By correlating the divine presence with the somatic interior, Paul’s eschatology fosters his participationist ideals in as much as divine-human propinquity has been located at the IN-OUT nexus of the human σῶμα. This enables Paul to speak of resurrection as something that will happen with Christ in the future and in believers in the present (via the indwelling πνεῦμα).\(^{41}\)

We must of course recognise that Paul’s language of Christ-believer participation has an important temporal dimension. Joseph Fitzmyer has articulated this dimension well: “χρυν pregnantly expresses two poles of the Christian experience, identification with Christ at its beginning, and association with him at its term. In the meantime the Christian is en Christo.”\(^{42}\) Here Fitzmyer has unconsciously intimated the micro-PATH

\(^{40}\) For Christ being in believers (e.g., ἐν ἐμοί, ἐν ὑμῖν, ἐν αὐτοῖς), see, e.g., Gal 1.16; 2.20; 4.19; Rom 8.10; 2 Cor 13.5. For Christ working through believers (e.g., δι’ ἐμοῦ), see, e.g., Rom 15.18.

\(^{41}\) We cannot overlook the centrality of the pneumatic Christ in all of this; it is only because Christ is πνεῦμα that he can at once indwell believers while at the same time stand as the already risen and exalted one.

(CHANGE) structure of Paul’s eschatology, and while these trends are certainly identifiable in Paul, they are best seen as interrelated rather than distinct nuances. This is especially evident in the cause-and-effect relationship that Paul attributes to this temporally drawn togetherness-oneness dynamic. In Gal 2.19-20, for instance, Paul insists that his past crucifixion with Christ (συσταυρώσω) results in Christ’s present indwelling life (ζηδε ἐν ἐμοί Χριστός – Gal 2.19-20). More important, however, is James Dunn’s recognition of the force of the perfect tense in 2.19 (συνεσταυρώσωμαι), which suggests Paul perceives himself in an ongoing state of co-crucifixion.43 In this way, death with Christ is not only a past experience but one that has lasting effects in the present (we will explore this dynamic in greater detail in §5.2). Notions of oneness and togetherness are inextricable, and they together reflect Paul’s understanding of the Christ-believer relationship as one of hyper-proximity (IN/NEAR).

Though our focus on the human σῶμα as the location of divine-human participation may seem to prioritise the language of Christ in you rather than being in Christ, we can insist that the nature of Paul’s eschatology precludes such a lopsided conclusion. Though the synonymity of these expressions may seem conceptually incongruent (Christ in you / being in Christ), they are interchangeable precisely because they reflect two aspects of the one conceptual structure.44 This has been demonstrated in Rom 8.9-11, where being ἐν πνεύματι (or ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ – 8.1) anticipates the idealised risen form, while expressions of the indwelling Christ/πνεύμα reflect the somatic make-up of believers in the present (recall Diagrams 4.2 and esp. 4.5). With this conceptual mapping in mind, such descriptions are isomorphic because they refer to constituent parts of a single conceptual system. The language of being in Christ and

43 Thus Dunn summarises Paul, “I have been nailed to the cross with Christ, and am in that state still; I am still hanging with Christ on that cross” (Dunn, Theology of Paul, 485 [emphasis original]). As we will in §5.2, such an understanding of ongoing co-crucifixion is best understood within the context of Paul’s IN-OUT somatic mapping; that is, Paul continues to die externally while life is continually manifested internally.

44 To this we can also add similar isomorphic descriptions regarding the πνεύμα (e.g., Rom 8.9, 11; 1 Cor 3.16; 6.19; cf. 1 Thess 4.8 [τις ὑμᾶς]).
Christ in you is thus synonymous, and while Paul’s eschatology is somatically grounded in the conviction of the indwelling Christ, it is precisely this indwelling that points to the CHRIST IS CONTAINER metaphor. In this way, Paul’s eschatological somatology and his participationist ideals are inextricable and premised upon one another; to be in Christ in the present is to be located within an eschatological trajectory of transformation.

Taking the above together, the emphases upon PROXIMITY in the macro-GOAL (one the one hand) and CONTAINMENT in the CHANGE gestalt (one the other) function as points of schematic coherence between Paul’s participationist and resurrection ideals. On the one side, the language of togetherness (e.g., being with Christ, belonging to Christ) fits with the notion of the eschaton as a period of divine-human nearness (i.e., macro-GOAL). On the other side, the language of oneness (e.g., in Christ / Christ in you) fits with the CONTAINER emphasis of the CHANGE gestalt and is mapped by Paul onto the human body itself. The two are inextricable in Paul’s thought and they reflect the integrative, already-unfolding nature of Paul’s eschatology. The key point to be stressed, however, is that the human σῶμα becomes the location of divine-human participation. To be in Christ is to have Christ in oneself, already alive on the interior in expectation of exterior transformation. Paul’s broader eschatological trajectory is in view here, and the human σῶμα stands as the nexus point of divine-human interrelation.

5.1.4 Summary
At the outset of this chapter we suggested that Albert Schweitzer was moving in the right direction when he argued that Paul’s eschatology created “the conditions for a peculiar Mysticism” (the so called “mystical doctrine of the dying and rising again with Christ”). At the very least our analysis has shown why such conditions exist in Paul’s thought – namely, Paul’s CHRIST-framed eschatology presumes that believers traverse the micro-PATH (CHANGE) structure as part of their achievement of the macro-GOAL. In

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45 Schweitzer, Mysticism, 99 and 97 respectively.
5. Participating in Resurrection

this way, the UNION gestalt and its entailments (both oneness and togetherness) intertwine Paul’s resurrection and participationist ideals, specifically locating such convergence at the IN-OUT nexus of the human σώμα. Schweitzer erred, however, in two significant respects. First, Paul’s eschatology does not constitute a modification of the traditional Jewish schema (so noted in §4.4); for this reason, Schweitzer overreaches in suggesting that Paul’s participationist ideals are a product of eschatology. More importantly, however, Schweitzer’s propositional understanding mysticism unduly abstracts – or disembodies – Paul’s eschatology. Paul does not posit a mystical doctrine of dying and rising with Christ, but rather promotes recurrent patterns of embodiment wherein the RESURRECTION gestalt and its constituent metaphors are used to frame present life in Christ. In contrast to Schweitzer’s doctrine of mysticism, then, we do better to identify patterns or modes of embodiment wherein notions of RESURRECTION and UNION are seen to converge in the human σώμα. The remainder of this chapter will explore one aspect of such embodied patterns, specifically illuminating in greater detail Paul’s present experience of resurrection via the dynamic principle of IN-OUT somatic affectivity.

5.2 Life Through/In Death – Resurrection as a Pattern of Embodiment

A ubiquitous motif throughout Paul’s letters is the assertion that life in Christ is to be characterised not by pride or power, but by humility and weakness; that both suffering

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46 We have preferred here to speak of Paul’s eschatology *fostering* rather than *creating* his participationist ideals. Schweitzer’s emphasis on generative origins is doubtless due to the propositional nature of his analysis; that is to say, mysticism is seen as a logical solution to a number of presumed eschatological puzzles, and Paul’s participationist language therefore emerges in course of such problem solving. Given the somatic nature of Paul’s participationist ideals, if generative origins are to be found, they may lie in Paul’s somatic experience. On this point, Colleen Shantz has made important strides in light of neurobiological approaches to ecstatic experience, specifically pointing to the apostle’s “somatic memory of union” (Colleen Shantz, “The Confluence of Trauma and Transcendence in the Pauline Corpus,” in *Experientia, Volume 1: Inquiry into Religious Experience in Early Judaism and Early Christianity* [eds. Frances Flannery, Colleen Shantz and Rodney A. Werline; SBLSymS 40; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008], 193-205 [p. 203]; see also her larger study, *Paul in Ecstasy: The Neurobiology of the Apostle’s Life and Thought* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009]).
and death are to be embraced with the expectation that comfort and life lie not far off.\textsuperscript{47}

At the heart of this motif is the concept REVERSAL, which we have already seen is an entailment of the RESURRECTION gestalt (i.e., the RESURRECTION IS REVERSAL metaphor [§2.1.2.1]). Within the CHRIST frame, though the death and resurrection of Christ stand as the programmatic example of this reversal pattern (cf. 2 Cor 13.4), the RESURRECTION IS REVERSAL metaphor is most strongly expressed in Paul’s insistence that participation in Christ’s sufferings paradoxically brings one into closer fellowship with Christ and the ecclesial body (Phil 1.29; 3.10-11; 2 Cor 1.3-9).

Pauline scholars often characterise this paradox as the motif of dying and rising with Christ. Robert Tannehill correctly sees this as the “structure of the new life,”\textsuperscript{48} and Troels Engberg-Pedersen has more recently pointed to the “through death to resurrected life” nature of Paul’s thought.\textsuperscript{49} Alexander Wedderburn, on the other hand, acknowledges the life through death pattern but prefers to speak of life in death,\textsuperscript{50} which he sees as the more prominent Pauline theme.\textsuperscript{51} A key distinction for Wedderburn is the assertion that life through death speaks primarily of past and future events (e.g., Rom 6.5) while the motif of life in death is orientated to the temporal present (e.g., 2 Cor 4.10-11). In light of the present study’s findings, this distinction is somewhat artificial. As we have already seen, Paul evinces a strong degree of coherence between UP/IN and DOWN/OUT schematic role-values (§4.2), thus enabling the apostle to conceptualise life

\textsuperscript{47} The theme finds articulation throughout Paul’s letters (e.g., Rom 8.12-17; Gal 2.19-20; 1 Cor 1.17-2.5; 9.27; and 1 Thess 2.13-16), though it is especially prevalent in 2 Corinthians and Philippians. In his so-called “fools speech,” for instance, Paul boasts in his weaknesses so that Christ’s power will be made perfect in him (2 Cor 12.9-10; comp. Phil 4.11-13). In Phil this paradox is expressed as a radical reorientation of values (Phil 3.4-11), and it also undergirds communal ethics that are modelled on Christ (Phil 2.1-11); the former is a reversal of social values, the latter a reversal of social structures.

\textsuperscript{48} So quoted from the title of Tannehill’s extended chapter on the topic (Robert C. Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology [BZNW 32; Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1967], 75, though see more generally pp. 75-129). Tannehill stresses Paul’s pastoral concerns as the impetus for this structuring: “this continuing participation in death … prevent[s] the believer from trusting in himself and so falling back into the old life” (Tannehill, Dying and Rising, 77, see also p. 127).

\textsuperscript{49} Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 45.


\textsuperscript{51} Wedderburn, Baptism and Resurrection, 382.
and death via both VERTICALITY and CONTAINMENT (LIFE IS UP/IN / DEATH IS DOWN/OUT). Given this correlation, Paul can speak interchangeably of DOWN to UP via PATH (i.e., life through death) and OUT to IN via PATH (i.e., life in death).52

It is this latter conceptual structure – OUT to IN via PATH – that interests us in the following discussion. As we will see, Paul maps the DOWN to UP via PATH structure of the RESURRECTION gestalt onto the human body itself according to the IN-OUT structure of the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor. For this reason, it is better to speak of life through/in death in as much as Paul projects the transformative death through life sequence onto the human body such that life (is manifested) in death. What results is not only the framing of life in Christ via notions of resurrection, but rather the more fundamental assertion that resurrection is currently happening to the body itself through a process of ongoing outer death and resultant inner life. Accordingly, participation in Christ’s death/resurrection is not seen as a propositional concept but rather points to a dynamic process that is currently enacted in the body.

5.2.1 OUT to IN via TRANSFORMATIVE PATH in 2 Cor 3-4

In §4.2 we demonstrated that Paul understands intra-somatic polarity as a mutually affective interplay of IN and OUT, which is to say that what happens inwardly directly affects what happens outwardly, and vice-versa (IN \(\rightleftharpoons\) OUT).53 In Rom 6-8 this interplay is framed by self-mastery traditions such that the properly aligned interior produces external, ethical actions (i.e., IN \(\rightleftharpoons\) OUT). In 2 Cor 3-4 Paul again stresses IN-OUT affectivity. The key passage for us is 4.7-18 (esp. vv.10-11 and 16-18), where the IN-OUT dynamic is understood as a process of carrying Jesus’ death in one’s body such that

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52 As we have stressed all along, conceptual coherence does not imply systematicity at human scale. Wedderburn is certainly correct that life through death has a more sequential nature that lends itself to temporal expressions, while the life in death pattern has a more immediate orientation. The key point that we stress, however, is that these expressions are not independent but rather reflective of interrelated aspects of Paul’s resurrection ideals.

53 I use the term affective (and affectiveness, affectivity, etc.) not to denote emotional states (e.g., moods, feelings, etc.) but rather to denote reciprocal influence. That is to say, IN-OUT affectivity means that OUT affects IN, which in turn affects OUT.
Jesus’ life may be made visible in that same body (4.10-11). Paul’s participationist ideals are particularly evident here, as the process of dying and rising with Christ is seen as a present (rather than past and/or future) dynamic at work in the body.

Before turning to 4.7-18, however, it will be helpful to trace the argument from 3.12ff. This is particularly important because the entire discourse of 2 Cor 3-4 presumes a somatically drawn IN-OUT affective dynamic. In 3.12-4.6 this dynamic is framed not by notions of self-mastery but rather Jewish divine-glory traditions. A major point of comparison for Paul is the contrasting of the old covenant with the new, both of which are characterised by “glory” (δόξα). According to Paul, the glory of the new surpasses that of the old (3.9-10); indeed, Paul insists the glory of the old has been “nullified” (καταργεῖται – 3.7, 11; cf. 3.10), and he goes on to characterise the new (i.e., the ministry of the πνεῦμα) as something that will come in glory (3.8, cf. 3.12) and yet already abounds in glory (3.9, 11; cf. 3.16-18). Here we encounter Paul’s already/not-yet interplay, and it is again mapped along the IN-OUT axis of the human σῶμα. This is expressly clear in 3.12-18, where the logic of Paul’s argument flows from the somatic exterior to interior (OUT to IN), and then again from interior to exterior (IN to OUT); we examine each movement in turn.

In 3.13 Paul recounts an initial outward action – that of Moses veiling himself.

In Paul’s view, Moses does this so as to hide or conceal the diminishing glory of the old

54 This interplay is found as early as 3.2-3, where Paul characterises the Corinthians as a letter written on the human καρδία with the πνεῦμα. The frame of reference is clearly the somatic interior, though Paul also insists that this inner letter is public and able to be “known and read by all” (3.2). Paul is here linking that which is somatically inward with that which is outward such that what happens inwardly is directly connected to what happens outwardly. Though the Corinthians are written on Paul and his companions’ hearts, they are on public display and thus stand as the only “letter of recommendation” that Paul needs.

55 The principle intertexts concern the biblical accounts of the giving of the Law and Moses’ repeated encounters with YHWH’s glory (esp. Moses veiling practice – see esp. Exod 19.9b-25; 24.9-18; 33.7-23; 34.1-35; 40.34-38). Specific allusions are found in 2 Cor 3.7, 13, and 16, the latter of which may be a citation of Exod 34.34 (so NA27, though there is enough textual variance to suggest it is best seen as an allusion). It should not be overlooked that a rather intriguing conceptual blend is at work in 2 Cor 3.3, where Paul moves seamlessly from the domain EPISTOLARY CORRESPONDENCE (cued by the reference to “ink” [μελανζ]) to that of the TORAH (cued by the reference to “stone tablets” [πλακίζων λίθινας]). The blend is a key transition point in the broader discourse, as it begins to cue the scriptural intertexts that permeate 3.1-4.18.
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The veil functions as a kind of container (CLOTHING IS CONTAINER metaphor) that shields the visible glory upon Moses’ face from the eyes of the Israelites. The frame of reference is clearly the external world, as Paul is speaking of a garment that Moses puts on (i.e., the veiling of his face). From this external referent, Paul next turns his attention somatically inward, insisting that the “minds” (νόημα – 3.14) of those Israelites who looked upon Moses were hard. Of particular importance for us is the Pauline contention that the external Mosaic veil has an internal effect; Paul insists that, whenever Moses is read (note the MOSES FOR SCRIPTURE metonymy), the Mosaic veil exists upon the “hearts” (καρδία – 3.15) of those who hear. Paul’s CONTAINER-structured anthropology is presumed here, and the mutually affected internal-external dynamic is explicit. What happens externally affects the internal, and this even crosses interpersonal and temporal planes. Just as Moses wore a veil when he wasn’t in the Lord’s presence (i.e., FAR), so those who read the scriptures are internally veiled and separated from the Lord’s presence (i.e., FAR).

56 That is, “to prevent the sons of Israel from looking at the end of the [glory being] nullified” (3.13). The construction πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀπετένισαι (πρὸς + an articular infinitive) denotes purpose, which suggests that Paul sees the veiling as an intentional act on Moses part (cf. Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text [NIGTC; Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2005], 297). Though this suggests an act of deception on Moses’ part, it is worth noting that earlier (3.7) Paul has described the veil as shielding Moses from the Israelites “because of the glory of his face.” This earlier reference suggests the glory was in need of mitigation rather deceptive hiding. Of note, the biblical intertext (both MT and LXX) recounts Moses’ veiling as a means of keeping the Israelites from being afraid of him (cf. Exod 34.30).

57 While it may seem odd for a veil to be considered a container, it is conceptualised as such on account of (a) its function as an article of clothing (recall the CLOTHING IS CONTAINER metaphor), and (b) the recognition that, when dealing with a physical instantiation of the CONTAINER schema, the boundary of the container restricts one’s view (e.g., objects in a wooden box cannot be seen from the outside – cf. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought [New York: Basic Books, 1999], 32). The word “veil” (καλυμμα) occurs only four times in the NT (all in our passage), and it is the same word used in the septuagintal version of the intertext (cf. Exod 34.33-35). In addition to Exod 34, LXX uses καλυμμα variously to refer to a curtain (Exod 27.16), a covering for various furnishing from the tent of meeting (Num 4.8-14), and even as a synonym for bodily clothing/armour (1 Mace 4.6), all of which suggest the CONTAINER schema and the kinds of entailments identified in point (b) above. The exact nature of what kind of “veil” Paul has in mind is not entirely clear. From the Homeric period to the Roman era a καλυμμα was a woman’s veil (often worn by a bride), and it was also superficially connected with mourning (among others things – cf. Liza Cleland, Glenys Davies and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, eds., Greek and Roman Dress from A to Z [London: Routledge, 2007], 101-02). It should be noted that according to LSJ a καλυμμα can refer to a “hood,” and while this would cover/contain the entire head, we cannot be certain that this is what Paul has in mind. In any event, there is enough evidence that suggests a καλυμμα would be conceptualised as a container, and Paul’s logic in 2 Cor 3 seems to lend itself to this conclusion.

58 The use of “until today” (εἰς τὸ σήμερον) and “whenever” (ἡμερὰς ἀν) indicates both generality and temporal length (i.e., the veil has always been there and is present in all readings of the Torah – 3.15).
Such is Paul’s move from the somatic exterior to interior (i.e., OUT to IN). In 3.16-18 Paul not only reverses that movement but also shifts his attention to those who have “turned to the Lord” (3.16). Paul here echoes his intertext explicitly (cf. Exod 34.34), though rather than referring to Moses (as in the intertext), those who have “turned to the Lord” are believers. Before examining the obverse movement of IN to OUT, three aspects of this inner somatic location must be stressed.

First, both Paul and the biblical intertext draw important schematic correlations of UP/NEAR/IN with “glory” (and conversely, DOWN/FAR/OUT with “non-glory” [or “veiled glory”]). Considering the broader pattern of Moses’ movement to and from YHWH’s glory, the Exodus narrative is premised upon a CONTAINER structure that has a vertical point at its centre, and which has a natural entailment of proximity whereby nearness means both going to the centre of the container and to the highest point of the vertical structure. While we must be cautious not to overextend the intertext, in 2 Cor 3.16 Paul plays on this correlation of UP/NEAR/IN with “glory.” The removal of the veil is marked by approaching the Lord’s presence (i.e., NEAR), though the frame of reference is no longer the prescribed Sinaic boundary but rather the interior of the human body (i.e., the veil is removed from the human καρδία – 3.15). Within this context, the

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59 See esp. those passages noted in fnnt. 55 of this chapter.
60 Two schematic aspects of the intertext are worth noting in detail. First, the site of Moses’ encounter with the “glory of the Lord” (הָגֵן הָרֹבֵעַ / θῆκος θεοῦ – Exod 24.16; cf. v.17; 33.18, 22) is at the top of Mount Sinai, thus requiring both ascent (Exod 19.20; 24.1, 9, 12, 15; 32.30; 34.4) and corresponding descent. Accordingly, both VERTICALITY and PROXIMITY are correlated in this text such that divine “glory” is characterised by both UP and NEAR role-values. Second, this correlation is complemented by a CONTAINER structure that is imposed upon Sinai itself. This CONTAINER structure is concentrated on proximity to YHWH’s presence at Sinai’s peak (19.12-13, 17, 21-25; 20.21; 34.3) vis-à-vis exclusion from said presence at the base of the mountain. According to Exod 19, Moses is to set up a “boundary” (הַבָּעָד), which “surrounds” the mountain and which the Israelites are not to penetrate (cf. 19.12-13, 21-25). Only Moses and a select few are permitted past the boundary and thus ascend the mountain to the presence of the Lord (19.20; 20.21; 24.9-18; 34.3), and it is only Moses that can stand before the Lord (24.1-2). In this way, the biblical intertext already contains the schematic mappings that Paul is stressing, thus blending notions of VERTICALITY, CONTAINMENT, and PROXIMITY with one another vis-à-vis the location of divine “glory.”
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intertextual echo of 3.16 resounds with the insistence that, when one turns to the Lord (NEAR), the veil is no longer required on the (somatic rather than Sinaic) inside.\(^{61}\)

Second, Paul presumes that the glory of the Lord is pneumatic in nature (3.17-18; 4.6).\(^{62}\) This pneumatic glory is encountered inside the human σῶμα (again, in the καρδία – 4.6). The key distinction for Paul is the IN-OUT axis of the body, and the somatic interior (rather than Sinai’s peak) is the location of divine-human propinquity. This is consistent with our findings in §5.1, where identification with Christ trends toward somatically mapped hyper-proximity (i.e., the IN/NEAR aspect of the UNION gestalt).

Third, though the language of resurrection is not explicit in 3.12-4.6 (though see 4.7-18), in 3.18 Paul stresses the ongoing “transformation” (μεταμορφώω) that believers currently experience. This coheres with our insistence that the somatic interior is the location in which transformation has already taken place (§§4.2-3); that which is inward (the καρδία) is already unveiled and near to the Lord, while that which is outward (the πρόσωπον) is also unveiled though not yet fully transformed into the anticipated glorious image. It is for this reason that Paul can later insist that those in Christ are “new creations” (καινὴ κτίσις) who are to be regarded not according to the somatic exterior (i.e., κατὰ σῶμα) but rather according to the pneumatic nature they share with Christ (5.16-17).

In light of this inner unveiling, in v.18 Paul reverses the spatio-somatic movement of vv.12-15 so as to draw attention to believers’ already “unveiled faces” (ἀνακεκάλυμμένο προσώπῳ). Here the mutually affective relationship of IN and

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\(^{61}\) To recall 3.12, it is this activity of being IN and NEAR that constitutes the great boldness with which believers act; boldness that the Israelites did/do not have in as much as they were/are veiled (both externally and inwardly). The NEAR/IN correlation happens within the believer him/herself (an un-veiling of the καρδία), thus reversing what is described in 3.15.

\(^{62}\) Though there has been much exegetical debate as to the identity of κύριος in 3.16, 17a, 17b, and 18, the present analysis presumes that Paul makes not firm distinction between either the κύριος of the intertext or the κύριος whom he has encountered pneumatically. That is to say, the two figures are conflated for Paul. For an overview of scholarly positions, see Margaret E. Thrall, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (2 vols.; ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 1.278-82.
OUT (IN ⇔ OUT) is brought to the fore, as the *already* unveiled inner heart results in the *already* unveiled external face (note the use of the perfect tense). That Paul has the somatic exterior in mind is confirmed by his use of κατοπτρίζω, which is used here in the middle sense of *beholding oneself in a mirror*. The mirror metaphor is significant precisely because it enables Paul to express the functional relationship of *allowing the internal to view the external*. It is a determinative limitation of the human body that one is physically unable to see their own face without an external reflective aid. A mirror facilitates such sight, and Paul here uses this metaphor as way of characterising the unveiled, already radiant inner heart as looking out at the external, physical face that awaits future pneumatic glory. What is in view is the external human σώμα, which is characterised as already unveiled precisely because it is currently in the process of resurrection transformation.

We should of course not preclude the possibility that this mirrored reflection is imprecise or dim (cf. 1 Cor 13.12), and thus the transformed inner heart sees the earthly, exterior face only partially reflecting the glory of the Lord (i.e., unveiled but not fully transformed). In the present passage, however, Paul makes no reference to the quality of the mirrored image; he simply stresses believers’...
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physical, external faces as being unveiled on account of the inner heart’s unveiling. For Paul, then, what happens to the somatic interior affects the somatic exterior.

To summarise, in 3.12-18 Paul’s argument progresses from the somatic exterior to interior and back again, specifically stressing the mutually affective interplay of IN and OUT (IN ⇔ OUT). Paul insists that that which is enacted on the somatic exterior is determinative for the interior, and vice versa. As we have seen throughout this study, Paul understands this IN-OUT affectivity as fundamentally integrative rather than oppositional. Because inner determines outer, believers’ bodies (specifically their faces) are unveiled and thus in the process of transformation. Moreover, Paul’s participationist ideals are grounded in this IN-OUT affectivity in as much as the unveiled body (interior and exterior) becomes the location of divine-human propinquity (i.e., the IN/NEAR aspect of the UNION gestalt).

Though Paul only implicitly refers to resurrection in 3.12-4.6, in 4.7-18 he now elaborates this IN-OUT affective dynamic as it relates to the life through/in death pattern of the RESURRECTION gestalt. In 4.7 Paul makes explicit that which has undergirded the discourse thus far; the earthly body is a “clay jar” in which the “treasure” of renewed life has been encased (note the BODY IS CONTAINER metaphor).⁶⁹ Paul is here describing the enspirited earthly body that we have already identified, and he now goes on to characterise death/resurrection as a process of intra-somatic IN-OUT affectivity. This becomes particularly evident in Paul’s description of an “extraordinary power” that has been given him by God. In vv.8-12 Paul describes this power by recounting a series of contrasting negatives and positives, all of which culminate in the organ ising concepts DEATH and LIFE (vv.10-11). In Paul’s view, this ongoing suffering is an experience of carrying Christ’s death in one’s body such that Christ’s life is revealed in that same

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⁶⁹ The precise identification of this treasure is contested; it has been variously identified as the gospel (so 4.4), as the ministry of the gospel (so 4.1), and as the inner revelation of divine glory (so 4.6 – see discussion in Thrall, Second Corinthians, 1.321-22). Given the pervasive emphasis on IN-OUT affectivity that we have here noted, the third option seems best. Paul is now making the IN-OUT somatic mapping explicit, and the inner revelation of divine glory is part of the risen interior life.
In this way, the “extraordinary power” described in v.7 refers to this ongoing process of Christ’s death and resurrection enacting itself in the apostolic body; that is to say, Paul perceives the power of Christ’s resurrection to be fully integrated into his (Paul’s) somatic composition.\footnote{In addition to the present text, in Phil 3.10 Paul speaks of the “power of [Christ’s] resurrection” (τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ) as something he wishes to know, and he further correlates this with an ongoing experience of Christ’s sufferings. Paul elsewhere insists that both resurrection and somatic transformation specifically happen by “power” of God (δύναμις – 1 Cor 6.14; 2 Cor 13.4; ἐνέργεια – Phil 3.21). Other connections between resurrection and power can be found in Rom 1.4; 1 Cor 15.43; and perhaps 2 Cor 12.9. To this we should also add those passages that speak of the πνεῦμα as the instrument of resurrection (e.g., Rom 8.11); elsewhere Paul similarly correlates πνεῦμα with God’s power (e.g., 1 Cor 2.4-5; Rom 15.13, 19; 1 Thess 1.5).}

The precise location of this resurrection power is worth noting, as Paul envisions no less than three somatic locales. First, in vv.10-11 Paul maps both death and life to the somatic exterior (i.e., ἐν τῷ σώματι [v.10], ἐν τῇ θνητῇ σαρκί [v.11]). Second, in v.12 he maps death to the apostolic body and life to the ecclesial body, thus denoting a communal dimension of the life through/in death pattern. Finally, in vv.16-18 Paul distinguishes between the inner and outer man (ὁ ἐσω ἀνθρωπός and ὁ ἔξω ἀνθρωπός) so as to denote the ongoing renewal of the former and the ongoing destruction of the latter. As Engberg-Pedersen astutely notes, the image is of an exterior body that is dead and decomposing while the interior is continually being given life.\footnote{Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology, 47-48.}

Taking these three somatic referents together, Paul is outlining an intra-somatic polarity whereby in and out mutually affect one another; death on the somatic exterior enacts life on the somatic interior (vv.16-18), which in turn enacts life on the somatic exterior (both of the individual apostle [vv.10-11] and the ecclesia generally [v.12]).

Given the richness and complexity of this somatically mapped life through/in death pattern, it is worth exploring the underlying blending network in detail (see Diagram 5.2). Three inputs are in play here. The first (I₁) is cued in 4.7 and consists of the believer’s body, which is conceptualised as a container on which death and life are mapped to the exterior and interior respectively. The second (I₂) is comprised of Paul’s
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Diagram 5.2:
Resurrection and IN-OUT Affectivity
(2 Cor 4.7-18)
eschatology and is cued by both the apostle’s temporal outlook (4.17-18) and his insistence that death leads to life (vv.10-12). The final input (I₃) is comprised of the IN-OUT affective relationship (IN ⊆⊇ OUT) that Paul has been describing since 2 Cor 3. The three inputs are blended on account of a series of sub-generic spaces, all of which are linked via the RESURRECTION gestalt and its various conceptual metaphors (G).\(^{72}\)

The blend created in 4.7-18 is perhaps the most robust of those examined in this study, and its novelty is found in the way I₂ and I₃ are projected onto the somatic container of I₁.\(^{73}\) The key element in the blend is the projection of IN-OUT affectivity (from I₃), which is now blended with the CHANGE gestalt of I₂ to denote an IN-OUT affective transformation (i.e., OUT to IN via TRANSFORMATIVE PATH); that is to say, it is not just that exterior and interior affect one another, but rather that the nature of their affective relationship is now characterised as transformation (hence the three curved CHANGE gestalts in the blended space). Seen in this light, outer death produces inner life, which similarly produces outer life. The reciprocal nature of the relationship remains in as much as transformational affectivity moves from OUT to IN and IN to OUT.

Regarding the OUT to IN affect, external suffering and/or death produces risen life in one’s interior (i.e., καρδία or ὀ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος [cf. 4.6, 16-18]). Seen in this light, suffering is the means by which risen life is produced in the somatic interior. Death and life are interdependent for Paul, and they are mapped onto his body such that the death of the exterior produces life in the interior. That this resurrection processes is currently at work in Paul’s body underscores the participationist nature of the experience. The life through/in death pattern is not just a motif but an intra-somatic dynamic; Paul locates

\(^{72}\) The sub-generic spaces all include familiar content: G₁-₂ includes the identification of believers as TRAJECTORS in the RESURRECTION gestalt, G₁-₃ includes the metaphors LIFE IS IN / DEATH IS OUT as well as the CONTAINER schema, and G₂-₃ includes the CONTAINER schema as well as Paul’s assertion that the human interior and exterior are interdependent.

\(^{73}\) Note: the CONTAINER in the blended space of Diagram 5.2 should be understood as a human body (BODY IS CONTAINER). For ease of viewing it has been represented as a CONTAINER.
himself within an ongoing process of dying (externally) and rising (internally) with Christ.

Regarding the IN to OUT affect, an important structure has emerged in the blended space that was not found in any of the inputs. On account of the temporal dimension of I₂ and the focus on inner life in I₁, this IN to OUT affectivity is bifurcated. This is because resurrection is understood to have both present and future referents. On the one hand, risen life is externally manifested in the temporal present in two distinct ways:⁷⁴ (a) it is seen in the individual’s body that is in the process of transformation, and on which glory is seen as in a mirror (as in 3.18; 4.10-11); and (b) it is seen in the ecclesial body wherein the sufferings of the apostles impart life to the Corinthians (4.12).⁷⁵ In both cases we are dealing with an intra-somatic polarity (either the individual’s body or the ecclesial body), and the death of the one component is understood as imparting life to the other.⁷⁶ In addition to this temporally present dimension, the external manifestation of risen life is also orientated toward the future when the somatic exterior will be transformed and brought into pneumatic alignment with the interior (5.1-5; comp. 1 Cor 15.35-58). This is explicit in 4.16-18, where Paul’s present experience of IN-OUT transformation anticipates the future “eternal weight of glory beyond measure” (4.17). Taking this bifurcation together, the process of transformation from IN to OUT correlates inward resurrection with both present and

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⁷⁴ Both of these external manifestations of risen life should be understood to complement the findings of §§4.1-2, where it was demonstrated that the RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor frames life in Christ with respect to notions of ethics.

⁷⁵ That such experiences of suffering belong to the apostles and not the whole community does not preclude the fundamental communal orientation that Paul has; indeed, Paul insists that what one member of the body experiences, all members experience (cf. 1 Cor 4.8; 12.26; 2 Cor 1.3-7; 7.2-3; Phil 1.7; 2.17-18; 4.14). As we saw above, the CHURCH IS BODY (OF CHRIST) metaphor provides Paul a way of organising individuals within the whole. By virtue of his insistence on intra-somatic polarity, it is artificial to oppose individual and community, and it is also problematic to emphasise the community over individual alone. Paul holds both in tensions while at the same time insisting on their mutual interdependence.

⁷⁶ It should be recognised that Paul has already mapped his relationship to the Corinthians according to the somatic interior and exterior – see 2 Cor 3.1-3, where the Corinthian believers are mapped to the apostles’ hearts (IN). Seen in this light, the external sufferings of the apostolic body (OUT) produces risen life for the Corinthian community (IN).
future outer resurrection; succinctly put, *outer death results in inner life, which in turn results in outer life (partially seen now, fully seen later).*

As we can see, the full complexity of Paul’s resurrection ideals are expressed in 4.7-18, as both present and future experiences of resurrection are integrated within a pattern of *intra-somatic IN-OUT affectivity* (i.e., OUT to IN via TRANSFORMATIVE PATH). In this way, Paul understands resurrection as a process that is currently happening to the body (both of the individual and the ecclesia) with a determinative orientation toward the anticipated goal of full somatic transformation. Central to all this, however, is Paul’s participationist ideals. For Paul, the extraordinary divine power that raised Christ from the dead is now perceived to be working in believers themselves. Through the process of ongoing exterior death, ongoing interior life is intensified, thus resulting in external expressions of resurrection. The IN-OUT somatic interplay becomes the way Paul conceptualises life in Christ, and it is particularly marked by divine-human hyper-proximity.

5.2.2 OUT to IN via TRANSFORMATIVE PATH in Broader Pauline Usage

Looking beyond 2 Cor 3-4, we have already seen the pattern of *intra-somatic IN-OUT affectivity* to be at work in Rom 6-8 with respect to ethics. Now taking a broader perspective, it is possible to demonstrate the ubiquity of this pattern across the undisputed Paulines.

In some passages this IN-OUT affectivity is orientated toward the future; such is the case in 1 Cor 9.25-27, where Paul insists that he “punishes” (ὑπώπτω) his body (OUT) so as to not be disqualified from future life. This passage fore-grounds both present exterior suffering/death and future exterior life while back-grounding present exterior life. Here the teleological focus of resurrection is explicit, and it is premised on the eschatologically mapped IN-OUT affectivity demonstrated in Diagram 5.2.
In many other passages the focus is unmistakably on the temporal present. In 1 Thess 5.1-11, for instance, Paul distinguishes believers from unbelievers according to a series of elements consistent within the CONSCIOUSNESS/UNCONSCIOUSNESS frame structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
<th>UNCONSCIOUSNESS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>awake (v. 6)</td>
<td>asleep (vv. 6-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day (vv. 6, 8)</td>
<td>night (vv. 5, 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>light (v. 5)</td>
<td>darkness (v. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sobriety (vv. 6-8)</td>
<td>drunkenness (v. 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clothed for action (v. 8)</td>
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Paul is here exhorting the Thessalonians towards a lifestyle that is framed by the RESURRECTION IS CONSCIOUSNESS metaphor. Though the passage is not explicitly premised on IN-OUT affectivity, the characterisation of believers via the categories of resurrection suggests the structure may be at work here. Indeed, given Paul’s most explicit reference to the anthropological trichotomy of *spirit–soul–body* (i.e., the *enspirited earthly body*) is found in 1 Thess 5.23, it seems likely that notions of intra-somatic IN-OUT affectivity are not foreign to this early epistle.

In Gal 5.16-26 Paul insists that those who belong to Christ have crucified the “flesh” (σάρξ) such that its “passions and desires” (πάθημα and ἐπιθυμία) have now been subjected to the divine πνεῦμα (vv.24-25). Here, the death of the external results in the proper subjection of the inner desires to the πνεῦμα, thus constituting the inner risen life noted in Rom 6-8. Not surprisingly, this inner life is to be characterised by the bearing of pneumatic fruit with one’s life in the present (5.22-23), thus denoting visible, external effects.

The same logic underscores Rom 12.1-2, where the apostle insists that believer’s offer their “bodies” (σῶμα) as a “living sacrifice” (θυσίαν ζῴσσαν) to God so as to be “transformed” (μεταμορφώ) by the “renewal of their minds” (τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοοῦ). The peculiarity of this image should not be missed; Paul describes a body that is at once living and yet continually being given over to sacrificial death. Here the transformative nature of the OUT to IN via PATH structure is obvious, as the external act
of somatic sacrifice (death) results in a revitalisation of the inner mind (life). For Paul, the *intra-somatic polarity* of \( \text{LIFE} \Leftrightarrow \text{DEATH} \) is the basis of practical teaching (so 12.3ff.).

Finally, perhaps the best examples of this OUT to IN via TRANSFORMATIVE PATH pattern can be found in the epistle to the Philippians. In 1.20-26, for instance, Paul expresses his expectation that Christ will be “exalted” (or “made large” – \( \mu\varepsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\nu\nu \)) in his “body” (\( \sigma\omicron\mu\alpha \) – v.20). As Paul perceives his present situation, neither death nor life are of any consequence, as the apostle expects that the former will result in post-mortem propinquity to Christ, while that latter will result in fruitful service on earth (1.21-23). Paul is here contrasting the bifurcated manifestations of outward-affected life; he is contemplating the merits of risen life in the present vis-à-vis risen life in the future, and while Paul admits the latter is more preferable (1.23), in the end he consciously chooses the former (1.24-26). The same logic is at work in 3.2-11 (and v.12 too), where Paul rejects any sense of confidence in the somatic exterior (i.e., \( \sigma\acute{\rho}\zeta \) – OUT; 3.3-6) and instead boasts in his loss of all things for the sake of Christ (3.7-9). Again, the logic is that of reversal, and Paul’s participationist language is overt. The text of 3.10-11 is worth quoting in full:

[I want to] know him, and the power of his resurrection [\( \tau\eta\nu\ \delta\acute{\nu}\nu\mu\mu\nu\ \tau\acute{\omicron} \\alpha\nu\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\sigma}\sigma\epsilon\omicron\\omicron\alpha\upsilon\upsilon \)], and the fellowship of his sufferings, being morphed together in his death [\( \sigma\omicron\mu\mu\rho\rho\iota\zeta\omicron\omicron\omicron\mu\nu\nu\nu\ \tau\omicron \\theta\varepsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\upsilon \ \alpha\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon \)], if somehow I may attain the resurrection of the dead.

Paul’s language here is particularly intimate, and his characterisation of resurrection is again bifurcated into present and future expressions. As in 2 Cor 4, Paul speaks of participating in Christ’s death and life, even characterising the latter as a “power” (\( \delta\acute{\nu}\nu\zeta\mu\zeta \)) that is presently knowable.

Taking the above examples together, we see widespread evidence throughout the undisputed Paulines that this pattern of IN-OUT affectivity permeates Paul’s resurrection.
and participationist ideals, thus constituting a pattern of embodiment whereby resurrection is understood as presently enacted on the human σῶμα.

5.2.3 Summary
To summarise §5.2, we have identified in Paul a pattern of embodiment whereby participation with Christ is somatically mapped according the dynamic of IN-OUT affectivity. With respect to resurrection, this pattern manifests itself in the ongoing external death of believers such that the somatic interior continually experiences risen life and thus produces external expressions of said life. Paul understands resurrection as a process that is currently unfolding in the body, and in this way the power of Christ’s death/life is at work in Paul.

5.3 Conclusions
This chapter has probed the conceptual correlations between Paul’s participationist and resurrection ideals. In so doing we have suggested that the human body stands at the nexus of divine-human interaction. As demonstrated in §5.1, Paul’s participationist ideals are premised upon the UNION gestalt, an embodied structure that enables Paul to speak of both oneness and togetherness such that Christ and believers are both in and with one another (i.e., the so-called hyper-proximity of IN/NEAR). As demonstrated in §5.1.3, the UNION gestalt is projected onto Paul’s eschatological somatology such that the enspirited earthly body becomes the location of divine-human propinquity. This fosters particular kinds of resurrection experiences in the present, which we have seen are characterised by the process of IN-OUT affectivity whereby the human body itself is understood as currently dying (externally) and rising (internally) with Christ (§5.2). Paul characterises this current experience of resurrection as Christ’s resurrection power, and in this way the apostle points to a somatic experience of Christ-believer union that is premised on the hyper-proximity of the UNION gestalt (i.e., IN/NEAR). Taking these points together, Paul envisions resurrection as an ongoing somatic event whereby
Christ’s death is continually manifested in the body such that Christ’s life is continually manifested in that same body. In this way, resurrection is an embodied experience.

Returning to the scholarly literature examined in ch. 1, the present analysis has advanced our understanding of Paul’s resurrection ideals in three specific ways. First, we have further underscored the dubious distinction between a future literal and present metaphorical resurrection. As we have seen, Paul has a singular resurrection event in mind that has both present and future manifestations. The preceding analysis has demonstrated that these bi-temporal manifestations are worked-out via the process of IN-OUT intra-somatic affectivity. In addition to this we can also insist that Engberg-Pedersen’s focus on the “literal” nature of Paul’s present resurrection ideals is equally dubious. Recognising the metaphorical nature of resurrection does not relegate Paul’s language to a second-class expression but rather enables us to see how differing concepts relate to one another (e.g., life through death and life in death). For Paul, resurrection is the structure by which life in Christ is organised, and in this way it is a metaphor that he and his communities live by.

Second, the present chapter has more clearly articulated the nature of the enspirited earthly body’s present experience of resurrection – i.e., it is characterised by an ongoing somatic process of outer death and inner life (i.e., LIFE ⇔ DEATH). Recognising this process is only possible, however, once Paul’s categories of reality have not been construed as dualistically oppositional or monistically idealised but rather understood as an experience of intra-somatic polarity. In this way, the process of continually sharing Christ’s death and resurrection is somatically grounded by mutual IN-OUT affectivity.

Finally, we can recall the three approaches to Paul’s participationist ideals outlined in §1.3.3: (a) a noetic understanding, (b) a temporally disjunctive

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77 The use of the term “body” in this sentence is intentionally vague, as it points not only to Paul’s body but also the ecclesial body (and perhaps also to Christ’s body too). As noted in §5.2.1, these ideas overlap each other in Paul’s thinking.
understanding, and (c) a propositionally drawn experiential understanding. As we saw, each of these approaches are thoroughly cognicentric in that they abstract and thus fail to meaningfully ground Paul’s participationist ideals. In contrast, our analysis has made two significant contributions. First, we have seen that Paul’s in/with Christ language is non-propositional in as much as it is structured by the UNION gestalt and thus grounded in recurrent patterns of human embodiment. For this reason, even if Paul’s descriptions of being in/with Christ are only conceptual in nature, they are still embodied in as much as they are structured by experiences of containment, proximity, interpersonal relationships, and the like. We have seen ample evidence, however, to suggest that Paul understands being in/with Christ as a somatic reality. Our second contribution, then, is the recognition that Paul’s in/with Christ language is projected onto the eschatological body such that the IN-OUT somatic structure functions as the nexus of divine-human interrelation. In this way, Paul’s participationist ideals are not concerned with passive aeonic engagement, nor noetic acts of faith and/or interpersonal solidarity; Paul is concerned with the somatically drawn pneumatic fellowship that believers share with Christ. This is particularly evident in Paul’s resurrection ideals, where the death and life of Christ are continually enacted in the body itself.
The present study has argued extensively for a non-propositional understanding of Paul, one in which the apostle’s resurrection ideals are grounded in recurrent patterns of human embodiment. This stands in stark contrast to the exceedingly cognicentric outlook of the pervading scholarly consensus. Drawing on methods developed in cognitive linguistics, we have seen Paul’s resurrection ideals are embodied in two important respects. On the one hand, the concept of RESURRECTION is somatically ground in recurrent and familiar human experiences (e.g., verticality, proximity, containment). On the other hand, Paul projects RESURRECTION onto the believer’s σῶμα such dying and rising are understood as dynamically at work within the human composition. While the former is reflective of human cognition more generally, the latter is a Paul-specific construction. For Paul, the body functions not only as the mode of post-mortem existence but also as the location of pre-mortem transformation. Given that these points have been argued in various ways throughout the preceding chapters, it behoves us to offer a synthesis of our major conclusions and scholarly contributions.

6.1 Major Conclusions

In §1.3 we outlined three ways in which scholarly treatments of Paul’s resurrection ideals suffer from the problem of cognicentrism: (1) the problem of identifying resurrection, (2) the nature of dualism and monism in Paul, and (3) the relationship between Paul’s participationist and resurrection ideals. In response to these issues we can summarise four major conclusions that have emerged in the preceding chapters.

First, this study has demarcated a framework within which resurrections texts can be both identified and interpreted. This was accomplished in ch. 2, where theories of
image schemata and conceptual metaphor were applied so as to identify a RESURRECTION
gestalt structure. In doing so we stressed the axiomatic assertion that resurrection is a metaphor, and further that it is both theoretically problematic and hermeneutically unhelpful to distinguish between “literal” and “metaphorical” resurrection expressions. To insist on the metaphorical nature of resurrection is not to suggest that it is disembodied or lacking a concrete foundation. Quite the opposite, as the image schematic nature of the RESURRECTION gestalt grounds this abstract concept within recurrent patterns of human embodiment (e.g., experiences of verticality, proximity, and movement along a path). In this way, resurrection is understood to be an embodied rather than propositional category.

Second, in chs. 3 and 4 we examined the nature of dualism and monism in Paul, particularly with respect to issues of cosmology and anthropology. Seeking to better understand the categories of reality that Paul works with, we demonstrated that the apostle holds to a dualistic framework that is characterised not by opposition but rather by tensive integration. We described this integrative dualism as polarity, a term that points to a unified whole wherein opposing forces exist interdependently with one another. As we have seen, such polarity underscores much of Paul’s resurrection ideals. In ch. 3 we analysed Paul’s cosmo-somatic presuppositions, noting that the transformation metaphors of 1 Cor 15.35-50 and 2 Cor 5.1-5 are premised upon the assertion that earthly and heavenly bodies are uniquely fashioned for their respective cosmological locales. Building on this, in ch. 4 we saw that intra-somatic polarity is the hallmark of earthly embodiment and further characterised by intra-temporal polarity (i.e., already and not-yet are correlated with the somatic interior and exterior respectively). While much modern scholarship has problematically stressed Paul as either a radical aeonic dualist or idealised anthropological monist, the recognition of integrative polarity in Paul’s thought provides a more holistic understanding whereby cosmology and anthropology are brought into coordination.
Third, much of our analysis has focused on the wide variety of Paul’s transformation metaphors (chs. 3-5). We have seen that metaphors of change lie at the intersection of dualism/monism (one the one hand) and Paul’s participationist ideals (one the other). This became expressly clear in Rom 6-8, where baptismal death with Christ is understood to produce a somatically inward resurrection with Christ. In Paul’s view, believers are understood to exist as *enspired earthly bodies* that are in the process of transformation from being *ensouled earthly bodies* to *enspired risen bodies*. Such a temporal and transformational trajectory constitutes Paul’s eschatology, which is somatically constructed such that the IN-OUT nexus of the human body becomes the location of already (IN) and not-yet (OUT). In this way, resurrection is not only a future but also a present reality; Paul envisions a single, ongoing process of transformation that begins with the infusion of the divine πνεῦμα (thus resurrecting the somatic interior) and culminates with the transformation of the body (thus resurrecting the somatic exterior). In this light, we have seen that the location of continuity across earthly and heavenly bodies is also the location in which believers have already been transformed. Resurrection, then, is somatically grounded in as much as the believer’s earthly body has already been inwardly raised but still awaits external transformation.

Finally, by stressing the present dimension of Paul’s eschatology we have more clearly articulated the relationship between participation and resurrection. In ch. 5 this was seen largely through the blending of the UNION gestalt with Paul’s eschatological somatology such that believers’ bodies become the location of divine-human propinquity. Accordingly, Paul does not abstract participation with Christ’s death/resurrection as passive engagement within aeonic spheres, nor does he understand participation as a noetic act of faith and/or interpersonal solidarity; rather, Paul understands the *life through/in death* process as currently happening to the body itself. This was most strongly seen in 2 Cor 4.7-18, where sharing Christ’s death and resurrection is understood via the dynamic process of *intra-somatic* IN-OUT affectivity.
The same LIFE (IN) ⇔ DEATH (OUT) process also underscores Paul’s ethical appeal in Rom 6-8 and has been demonstrated across the undisputed Paulines. This breadth of evidence suggests that both present and future participation in/with Christ’s death are inextricable. Just as believers’ risen bodies will one day be intertwined with Christ’s (Phil 3.21), so too is the indwelling πνεῦμα presently intertwined with believers’ πνεῦμα. Paul’s resurrection and participationist ideals thus coalesce and they point to a single, ongoing process of resurrection that is currently being enacted on the human σώμα.

6.2 Scholarly Contribution and Potential Areas of Further Research

In addition to the four major conclusions noted above we can briefly outline some of the ways the present study advances modern scholarship. Three points are particularly worth noting, each of which is correlated with suggested avenues for ongoing research.

First, by putting aside the problematic divide between literal and metaphorical, we have provided a theoretically sound and hermeneutically helpful framework within which to identify and interpret resurrection traditions. This is a welcome advancement in that it rescues notions of resurrection from narrowly configured temporal and/or thematic constraints while at the same time enabling meaningful scholarly discussion as to what resurrection is and how is it understood within the period literature. Building on this framework, it remains to be seen how the RESURRECTION gestalt and its constituent metaphors are adopted within other early Christian communities. Looking beyond Paul, one group of texts that may be particularly illuminated are the gospel appearance narratives. In comparison with other strands of gospel tradition, the appearance narratives emerge relatively late (e.g., they are absent from both Mark and Q) and evince a much different set of intra-gospel parallels (e.g., Luke and John are closer than Luke and his synoptic counterparts). These peculiarities suggest the appearance narratives did not develop in the same way the rest of the gospel traditions did (i.e., by a process of
6. Embodying Resurrection

oral/written mnemonic recounting). Rather than positing a historical core for such traditions, a better way forward is to examine resurrection as a piece of embodied culture, one that is transmitted through conceptual structures that are variously expressed in ritual dynamics (e.g., baptism, eucharist), interpretive praxis (e.g., scriptural exegesis), and rhetoric (e.g., proclamation). What is in view here is the extent to which conceptual metaphors manifest themselves in various discursive contexts, and further how such metaphors are later inscribed into narrative (e.g., Luke 24; John 20-21).

Second, this study’s theoretical commitment to vertical integration has yielded much explanatory leverage when analyzing the experiential nature of Paul’s resurrection ideals. By grounding Paul’s participationist language within recurrent patterns of human embodiment we have been able to meaningfully employ the category of experience without recourse to overly subjective conclusions. The key focal point in all this has been the body itself, which we have seen to be both heuristically useful (in that it grounds cognition) and topically useful (in that it grounds Paul’s understanding of resurrection). Looking beyond the present study, because antique religious communities neither hold nor presume a separation of mind and body within their cultus, the theoretical apparatus of vertical integration provides historians with an indispensable tool set. The recognition that culture is grounded in the body may yield fresh insights in the relationship between religious experience and textual expression (as in the ascent apocalypses or the Qumran community’s self-identity). Moreover, the vertical integration paradigm provides a matrix in which to re-envision the intersection of myth, memory, and ritual (e.g., how is myth grounded in ritual, how does ritual function as a communicative medium, what is the role of both social and individual memory within this myth-ritual matrix). Such insights may particularly illuminate the Lukan Eucharist tradition, which is orientated toward both Christ’s death (Luke 22.19-20) and resurrection (24.30-31, 35) and has not only commemorative (22.19-20) but also revelatory overtones (24.35).
Finally, this study has provided a way of engaging the complexity of Paul’s thought without recourse to either idealised systematicity nor overly drawn fragmentation. By focusing on both human scale blends and their underlying conceptual networks we have been able to demonstrate coherence across diversity. With respect to Paul’s resurrection ideals this was seen in the dynamic oscillation between both up/then and in/now expressions. Such fluidity is reflective of two distinct conceptual metaphors – RESURRECTION IS UP and RESURRECTION IS IN – that produce markedly different though related understandings of resurrection at human scale. In this way, coherence can be found in Paul’s thought even if systematicity cannot. Looking beyond Paul, the present study may serve as a solid foundation on which to examine the development of resurrection belief in early Pauline interpretation. Of particular note is the issue of present vs. future resurrection, which becomes exceedingly divisive (e.g., 2 Tim 2.18) and is perhaps reflective of the difficulty Paul’s early interpreters faced in appropriating the apostle’s conceptual complexity. That is to say, while Paul was able to hold the RESURRECTION IS UP and RESURRECTION IS IN metaphors in intra-somatic tension, these concepts were not easily systematised and thus resulted in divergent yet equally Pauline understandings of resurrection. In this way, the variegated nature of 2nd/3rd century Pauline interpretation may have its roots in Paul himself.

6.3 Final Observations

In conclusion, it is important to recognise that our critique of cognicentrism has ended in a place much different than where it began. It is one thing to critique scholarly presuppositions and methods (as in ch. 1), but it is another to insist that Paul himself might actually presume a certain degree of theological embodiment (as in ch. 5). The former is essentially an issue of theory and method, the latter an issue of history and theology. When considering Paul’s resurrection ideals, this study insists that a historical understanding of Paul must make the latter jump. Paul understands resurrection not
propotionally but rather grounded in the body itself; resurrection is not only something that will happen to the body in the future but also something that is happening in the body in the present. For Paul, then, resurrection is embodied.
A. Formatting Style
This thesis is formatted according to *The SBL Handbook of Style* (P. H. Alexander et al. eds.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999). Where exceptions have been made (e.g., primary text references – 1.1 rather than 1:1), consistency has been the rule. All footnotes and the following bibliography are formatted according to SBL Style.

B. Primary Literature
The following list includes all original language and translation texts consulted. All translations of Greek, Hebrew, and Aramaic in the thesis are the author’s own (unless otherwise stated).


C. Secondary Literature

The works listed here include only those referenced and/or cited in the thesis itself. Exceptions are made for standard scholarly reference tools (e.g., LSJ, BDAG), which are listed with bibliography in the Abbreviations list (pp. 6-9).


