In the Shopping Centre: Experiments at the Limits of Ethnography

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

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**Abbreviations**

Throughout this work the texts below are referred to by abbreviations and these are followed by page numbers where relevant or necessary.


*(K)* Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1986) *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*,}


Abstract

What is the shopping centre, and how can the works of Gilles Deleuze, help us to understand it ethnographically? In light of a growing interest in Deleuze’s work across both the humanities and social sciences (see Jensen and Rodje, 2010) as well as the long-standing calls to “take Deleuze into the field” (Bonta, 2005) and develop what research methodologies might emerge in conjunction which his philosophy (see Coleman and Ringrose, 2013), this thesis explores the possibilities of an ethnography which tries to take seriously the questions surrounding an ethical practice of working with philosophy in the field, grappling not only with Deleuze’s concepts during and as part of fieldwork but attempting to meaningfully engage with the incongruities between the philosophical assumptions which underpin ethnographic practice and Deleuze’s metaphysic (often labelled a “transcendental empiricism”); the most salient of these being “the subject”. In unfolding the stories of the shopping centre, a behemoth of social machination which is both reflective and productive of the contemporary sociocultural milieu, this thesis will explore the various forms of “madness” which populate the field, threading connective lines between the highly plural groups of interlocutors, widely separated spaces and the varying rhythms and temporalities which can be said to correspond to the shopping centre. Focusing on central issues of bodies (space) and time as they are encountered in the shopping centre, this thesis shall take, as one of its major points of inquiry, the questions surrounding the writing of ethnography and the ways in which this represents and reaffirms the metaphysic which is taken-for-granted as a part of the ethnographic encounter; at times delving into what might be called the ‘pataphysical or the absurd, playing with thick and thin description and taking various flights of madness in order to find ways of pushing against what Deleuze calls, the ossified and dogmatic images of thought at the core of Western philosophy.

The University of Manchester
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Doctor of Philosophy
In The Shopping Centre: Experiments at the Limits of Ethnography
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Declaration

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This text also owes its very existence to all of the people who we encountered in the shopping centre, who spoke to us, made us feel welcome, told us their stories, ate and walked with us; we thank you for your generosity and openness and hope that the stories of this text do not seem to malign or misrepresent your interests or histories.

This thesis would also not have been possible without the financial support of the author’s family. Thank you for affording us the chance to study for so long and having such inspiring confidence in our ability to come out on top.

To everyone else who helped in some way; whether through comments at a conference, discussions over coffee, insight or inspiration; thank you sincerely.
Introduction: On triptychs, ethnography, and the ethics of writing (with Deleuze)

Introductions are always problematic because they confront us with the question of how to begin; how to begin a conversation or dialogue, how to begin a relationship, and in case of this thesis, how to begin the story of an ethnographic study of the shopping centre. The problem of the introduction is thus exacerbated because, by the end of the thesis, the reader may understand that there could never have been an introduction to the shopping centre. Its mores, manners, culture, moments and madness- its chaos- could never be introduced, for one would have to presume to know them as a totality or understand and apprehend them comprehensively before one might introduce them to another. Thus, this introduction is compelled away from the act of introducing, towards the kinds of meta-commentary which will perhaps only be understood when the lines of their thought re-emerge in the conclusion of this text; when all of the concepts that this work has sought to develop are advanced and all descriptions of the many answered and unanswered questions of the shopping centre are exhausted. At that point, perhaps the reader will be all too aware that this thesis functions in and by the logic of triptychs and all too familiar with the various patterns of three in the shopping centre and all of their multiple significances which shape and pulse through this text; through lines, through words and through the spaces in-between; thus making it pointless to speak of them here. Perhaps the reader will understand fully the need for developing various experiments in writing and the presentation of text and thus to seek to “introduce” them here will have been pointless. However, even if it may prove an exercise in futility, this introduction will endeavour to make some of the key motifs of this thesis transparent and thereby aid the reader in parsing the text to come. To that end, this introduction is structured in the expectation of a dialogue with the reader, answering in advance questions that they may have as they follow the different debates with which this
thesis concerns itself. However, as with all introductions, doing this is likely to raise more questions than it answers; questions which may never find comprehensive address within this work.

What is a tryptic (of discipline)?

Let us firstly be explicit on the question of the triptych, for this thesis has its terms and possibilities set by the logic of a disciplinary trio: Critical Management Studies (or more broadly Organizational Studies), Anthropology and Deleuze Studies; all focused upon and positioned within the milieu of the shopping centre. These three disciplines are at once its limit conditions and the cradle of its potentials and possibility. One might justifiably ask why each of these disciplines might have an interest in the shopping centre and though it will perhaps have proved more insightful to ask what discipline would not have an interest in the shopping centre, it is important to dwell briefly upon this question for it is one that holds significant insight into the ways in which this thesis will speak about its field.

For CMS; itself a heterogeneous and fringe group on the edges of the Business School’s scholarship, interested in the reflexive, broadly-Leftist, questions of the ethics and sustainability of dominant forms of organization and management (Adler et al., 2007; Parker, 2002a; Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Grey and Willmott, 2005; Fournier and Grey, 2000); the shopping centre must seem such an appealing object of critique that it is a wonder that no real extensive inquiry has taken place into it before. That is to say, via its roots in Labour Process Theory (Knights and Willmott, 1990; Parker, 1999) which link it to the works of such philosophers, sociologists and cultural theorists such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Zygmunt Bauman, Henry Braverman, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri and Anthony Giddens, as well as to those who might be called “postmodern” authors (Cooper and Burrell, 1988), CMS explores a wide variety of political agendas, including
those of feminism and postcolonial theory, in a continued project of attempting to challenge an “orthodoxy” or series of silences and unarticulated concerns within the Business School (Linstead, 2016) all of which can be easily related to the shopping centre. However, through this research agenda, CMS might be inclined to read the behemoth of social machination that is the shopping centre as either a hovel of capitalist excess or as a nexus of the consumer society (Baudrillard, 1998) and thus dismiss it as a proving ground for the descent into the one dimensionality of advanced industrial civilization (Marcuse, 2002) or even think it as a disciplinary social apparatus which functions as a highly-evolved part of the “control society” (see Munro, 2002) in order to keep the general populace servile through the overwhelming nature of its spectacle as the developed world itself comes to resemble the shopping mall (Crawford, 1992). This is perhaps an overgeneralization, for CMS is difficult to define within the terms of a single discipline or set of conversations, but it is still a cause for concern that the shopping centre has thus far garnered little more than passing mentions in avant-garde poetry (Linstead, 2006) or research on resistance to urban planning (Thanem, 2012) or studies of the use of humour in organization (Collinson, 2002) and discussions of “critical marketing” (Papatya, 2013) because the “critical” readings (see for example, Langman, 1991) which decry the horrors of the shopping centre are now quotidian in their reflection of the apathy and disengagement from mainstream consumer culture that can be found in newspaper or periodical pieces (see Swanton, 1998; Cowley, 1999) and are thus more limited than the one which this thesis will pursue, for, as we shall discuss, the ethnographic investigation of the shopping centre neither begins nor ends in such presuppositions over its nature and character. Furthermore, it is our intention to call into question what is “critical” about such readings. Indeed, CMS has long been asking itself of the potential and “future of critique” (see Grey, 1999; Gabriel, 2001) and, in what follows, we will address what this thesis, and specifically the products of the disciplinary triptych at its core, might contribute to this future.
For Anthropology, the shopping centre arguably provides a central point within the contemporary social milieu from which to understand the evolving currents of what one might overgeneralize to be the culture of a globalized, kinetic, placeless society (Augé, 1995), but more often the shopping centre becomes a site to study topics with have long been the concern of Anthropological discourse such as family, kinship, communal membership and collective negotiations of ethics (see Miller, 2001). Beyond this, the shopping centre has also attracted much attention and mention from anthropologists (and cultural geographers) for its involvement in discourses and debates around the shifting nature of the city and attempts at urban rejuvenation (Hetherington, 2007), political economy and the question of public space (Harvey, 2006; Goss, 1993), the rituals and rites of passage of consumerism and material culture (see Miller 2001; Miller, 1998), and collective memory (see Crimson, 2005); all of which converge around and in the shopping centre. In light of these debates, ethnographic inquiry into the shopping centre has been attempted before (see Stillerman and Salcedo, 2012; Miller, 1998; Miller, 2014; Brody, 2006) and there is thus no shortage of cross-disciplinary accounts of either the experience of the shopping centre or “thick description” of its architecture, art and aesthetics (see Williamson, 1993; Crawford, 1992; Self, 2015). However, the conversation within which these accounts are conveyed is, broadly speaking, remote from the highly reflexive or philosophically charged debates around representation and the influence of the various schools of thought (Marxism, feminism, post-colonialism, poststructuralism, the postmodern etc.) within the discipline that stemmed from the publication of Writing Culture (see Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Clifford, 1999; James et al., 1997; Starn, 2015; Zenker and Kumoll, 2010; Marcus, 2007). This is far from problematic in and of itself, but, for reasons that shall become clear, in dialogue with the aforementioned developments, this thesis seeks is to push the boundaries of the ethnographic encounter and explore ways of engaging with the shopping centre beyond antecedental ethnographic
projects, in order to find ways of description beyond those to which we have grown accustomed.

As for our third discipline, Deleuze Studies has expanded dramatically over the last decade, now having its own dedicated conferences and journals. However, before one can ask why the shopping centre might be of interest to Deleuze Studies we must instead turn our attention to the more mundane question: “What is the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze?” Along with an ever-expanding library of “Reader’s Guides” many have tried explaining and mapping the past and future contributions of Deleuze across a variety of disciplines; from politics (see Thoburn, 2003; Buchanan and Thoburn, 2008), to social theory (see Fuglsang and Sørensen, 2006), to architecture (Ballantyne, 2007; Buchanan and Lambert, 2005), to film studies (Bogue, 2003; Angelucci, 2014), all the way to the Business School (Linstead and Thanem, 2007) and Anthropology (Biehl and Locke, 2010). The fact that it seems a-disciplinary in its appeal should already give the reader some kind of indication as to the polymathic nature of Deleuze’s work, particularly his collaborations with Felix Guattari. However, after a certain point each of these analytical guides, despite their usefulness, seems to merely reprise and rehash the same central theme— that Deleuze’s philosophy is one which dwells upon immanence, becoming, multiplicity, and difference, rather than transcendence, being, singularity, and identity— and thus appear to prove true Lambert’s (2002) observation that texts written with the aim of providing exegesis on the Deleuze works often trade in a certain “stupidity”, assumed on the part of the reader, the author, and the philosopher about whom the text is penned, in order to represent understanding. We note this not to say that Deleuze’s work is unconcerned with the aforementioned philosophical issues, because it is and is thus written as part of an attempt to move beyond the representation of the world by a transcendental subject through the development of a “groundless” form of thought or a “transcendental empiricism” (DR, p.56), but rather to make it clear to the reader that this text
is not one that hopes to trade in rigorous exegesis, not only because there are perhaps better instances of this, but because this text seeks to take seriously the spirit of Deleuze’s project, namely the preoccupation with the creation, development and play of concepts (WIP, p.15). That is to say, if Deleuze saw his own project as a monstrous exercise in buggering the works of the great authors in history of philosophy (N, p.6), in order to produce novel and useful concepts, then this text seeks the same. It is perhaps only after the reader participates in the plays of the concepts of this text as they work and live that they might understand what it means to experiment with concepts; with different modes, forms, fractures, slippages, habits and images of thought. Within this context, the shopping centre, as a fieldsite, offers a space and time which affords the experimentation of concepts as a means to describe its logics, systems and designs. This is where Deleuze and Guattari’s work can be most “useful” to us, in creating concepts to help us deal with the complexity of everyday life in the shopping centre. Furthermore, the study of the shopping centre is a means to engage the growing academic interest in the effects and affects of space (Buchanan and Lambert, 2005) and their relation to a given social milieu.

It is in the midst of these debates, enquiries and concerns, across all three disciplines that this thesis positions itself with the intention of developing a uniquely Deleuzian method of telling stories from the field and, thereby, carrying out an ethnography. In this text we take “the field” to emerge not just in the shopping centre but at the intersection of the works of Gilles Deleuze and the shopping centre- as mediated through contemporary debates and concerns within Anthropology and CMS; a liminal or border space at the edges of sites and disciplines. The question of “limits” or margins has long been an object of concern for philosophy in general and research focused on Deleuze’s work in particular (see Bernet, 2014; Stevenson, 2009), with much of Deleuze’s own writing seeking the limits of thought. Indeed, at boundaries, phenomena seem to break down or other themselves, at limits
discipline seems to blur and become less ossified or relevant, at margins the self seems more questionable as a unity. It is this limit of disciplines that this thesis takes as its focus and thus addresses itself to the limits of ethnography and the question of what, at its boundaries, it is capable of doing. Problematizations and redefinitions of “the field” are by no means novel intellectual moves for an ethnography to make (see Clifford, 1992; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997)- particularly in the light of the long-standing trend towards multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995; 1999)- here we pose them in a different light, one which will be developed throughout the work, namely the problem of looking at the shopping centre (as organization) through Deleuze’s corpus, even as much as Deleuze’s work is examined through the shopping centre, for the purpose of testing the limits of them both. It is thus that we can pose the central question of this thesis: “What is the shopping centre, and how can the works of Gilles Deleuze help us to understand it ethnographically?”

The reader might justly ask how these three disciplines came to be so integrated and interlinked in the production of a thesis, addressed towards this particular problem of thought and text. Indeed, as we shall discuss in the subsequent chapters, many more disciplines than these have a claim to interest in the shopping centre so it would seem odd that these three emerged. We might, in answer, misrepresent the issue(s) of this work by citing the aforementioned increase in popularity of Deleuze’s writings and method of creating concepts across the humanities and social sciences and suggest CMS and Anthropology to be the areas where there is the greatest scope for the development of a conversation around Deleuze’s work. We might thus represent for the reader that the author is a coherent and thinking subject who engineered this conjunction of CMS, Anthropology and Deleuze in the shopping centre as the result of a careful or strategic choice at the end of a lengthy deductive process; the conclusion of which revealed this thesis to be a worthwhile and valuable endeavour that would make a significant contribution to knowledge, serving the research agendas of both the
school in which the thesis is to be examined and, with nods to the politics of academic work, the discipline(s) with which the author’s supervisors identify. Indeed, we might even succumb to the urge to point towards the kind of “daddy-mommy-me” relation which Deleuze and Guattari sketch (*AO*, p.23), in a mocking of Freud’s reading of Oedipus, and say that the thesis was produced of a similar familial dynamic between author and their supervisors. This would, however, be a reductive move that would depict the imparsable politics of starting out on a PhD as a process orderable by retrospection and reflection; a rationalization which would seek to render as organized the fundamentally fragmented and chaotic process of the production and authoring of a thesis. As we shall contend, it is never clear from where ideas, concepts, connections and directions in ethnographic research emerge. The fallacies of the principles of “research design” in the social sciences have long been under critique, particularly where the myths of ethnographic fieldwork are concerned (*see* Fine, 1993). Thus, for this thesis, to merely problematize the ways in which ethnographic work is represented is, in itself, an insight into the nature of the ethnographic account of this text, one that is prepared to redouble upon itself in its questioning; embracing impossibility, paradox, unanswered questions, and indeed, the incommensurability of the three panels of the triptych which forms its basis. As such, this thesis is one which will seek to denaturalize the so called norms of academic practice or conventions to which we commonly adhere. For example, a statement along the lines of “X is what Deleuze can offer scholarship on the shopping centre,” or “Y is what CMS or Anthropology can learn from the shopping centre,” or “Z is what a Deleuzian Anthropology can bring to CMS,” is usually expected at this point in the exposition, and indeed, we made many analogous statements above. However, doing this is, firstly, disingenuous for the reasons that we just mentioned (that is, the construction of the façade of coherent authorship), and, secondly, a recurrence of the “arborescent” logic (*ATP* p.16) of discipline and tradition which Deleuze and Guattari encourage their readers to resist.
and undermine in ways which are radical but that still allow a text to be intelligible as academic writing. While all theses will inevitably enact some kind of clarification of their position, this work is as much a thesis on the intersections of CMS and Anthropology and Deleuze Studies in the shopping centre as it is an examination of the conditions which produce such a work, and as such, the text that follows will seek to call into question the norms around writing, institutionalized practice and the production of text. There is thus a playful doublethink which we will enact in this way; a means of unlearning discipline and academic authority. In a radical invocation to seek out this kind of work which subverts the disciplined and taken-for-granted Deleuze and Guattari say: “write to the n\text{-}1 power, the n-1 power, write with slogans: Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant! Don’t sow, grow offshoots!” (ATP, p.24).

Thus, we will pursue no further the questions of how these three relatively disparate areas of study came to be interrelated for this text or what the thesis can offer to each in isolation; the three disciplines together produce this work and as such what it offers may be un-disciplined. While it may be possible at times, for the purpose of exegesis, to separate the address of the different disciplinary concerns and not render the text as nonsense, the aggregate- or rather the tensions present in the haptic space and time at the intersection- of these three was essential for creation of this work and thus will be crucial for its appreciation. What this implies is that the concepts, literatures and debates of these three, though they may often appear separately, are treated as commingled for the purpose of this thesis, for it is by the logic of the entanglement of these three that the text produces itself and, as such, the text may serve and not serve the interests, audiences and institutional allegiances of any one of its progenitorial disciplines at any given point. In what follows we will examine the possibilities that this trinity affords as well as those that it denies in the demarcation of the limits of each, particularly with regard to writing and the production of text, not for the purpose of starting a
conversation or involving diverse groups of authors in debate but “of providing little gaps of solitude and silence in which they might eventually find something to say” (N, p.129).

Why study the shopping centre ethnographically (to be examined in the Business School)?

Though in its nature not quite equitable to the artistic challenge of Bacon or compositional complexity of Bosch, we highlighted the disciplinary triptych for the reader not only because of the importance of the questions that its presence in the text raises, nor merely because each part is hinged to the others in the same way but because patterns of three are also all too common in the shopping centre and become particularly salient during a long ethnography. In fact, one might go so far as to stipulate that an understanding of triptychs is essential for thinking the shopping centre. Threes appear in the sounds of the shopping centre as a 3/4 rhythm; a kind of waltz which permeates into its art and its routines; from the number of spurts of water emanating from a fountain on the malls to the number of cleaning trolleys which rumble by per hour. Threes appear in the distance separating the columns in the Great Hall as well as the number of external entrances in its south-west facing side. Threes appear in the number of anchor stores placed at different ends of the malls in order to optimize the flows of customers. Patterns of three even appear in the sequence of the tiles on the floor. It is only through an obsessive observation which participates in the life of the shopping centre that threes could become available for inscription through ethnography. It is only through becoming lost in a space, seduced by its madness, inculcated into its mores, etc. that patterns of three emerge in the mind; even if they are not created by it. It is, as we have said, in the encouragement of the eschewing of the presuppositions of “critical” readings of the shopping centre that ethnography legitimates and justifies itself as both a practice and a mode of inquiry.
Details. This alone should justify the ethnographic study of the shopping centre. While the ethnography was by no means the inevitable conclusion of the linkage of this thesis to Anthropology (nor is the converse true), it came about in this work as both an extension of an understanding of the need for a more nuanced address to the question of the shopping centre and in part from the questions surrounding how one should even hope to conduct an ethnography of a shopping centre while taking seriously the ethical responsibility invoked in the etymological roots of the word, *ethnos-graphia, people-writing*, to say nothing of one which might be consistent with Deleuze’s metaphysic. There is, however, perhaps no other forum for the discussion of the philosophical assumptions which underpin ethnographic practice (*see* Adams, 1998), as developed as that within current anthropological discourses. Thus, Chapter I addresses what is perhaps the most salient challenge for this text, the reconciliation of the taken-for-granted assumptions which underpin most ethnographic work (thus contending that with few exceptions, ethnographic work in all of its plurality is carried out based upon a similar set of underpinning philosophical tenets) with Deleuze’s philosophy, namely what has been termed his “transcendental empiricism” (*see* Baugh, 1992; Bryant, 2008, 2009). We argue that previous work has thus far neglected that the heterogeneous philosophical assumptions which underwrite both areas of research mean that paradoxes emerge in the ethnographic account, many of them being irreconcilable, which must be attended to if one hopes to make any kind of meaningful contribution to Deleuzian scholarship or produce something which either Anthropology and CMS might describe as its own buggered yet consequential Deleuzian method. We place the interweaving of Deleuze’s metaphysic with ethnography in the context of the many ethnographers who have been exploring the implications of the *Writing Culture* project (*see* Clifford and Marcus, 1986) and, more recently, what has been called “the ontological turn” (*see* Holbraad et al., 2014; Mol, 1999, 2002; de la Cadena, 2010; 2015; Kohn, 2013) or pursuing non-representational
theory (Thrift, 2008), cosmological perspectivism (Viveiros de Castro, 1992, 2012a; Stengers, 2010, 2011), object oriented philosophy (Harman, 2011) in concerted attempts to give meaningful address to problems like the questions of reflexivity, “crisis of representation” (Marcus and Fischer, 1999), the dominance of a metaphysics of identity and being (Coleman and Ringrose, 2013) and our relationships to what is “beyond the human” in the context of the Anthropocene (Kohn, 2014). Chapter I makes the case that these theoretical and methodological moves can be thought to be parallel trends to the approach that this thesis will try to advance through Deleuze’s work, for there is much scope for Deleuze’s theoretical project to be developed in order to lend perspective to these debates.

As shall become clear, however, with few very recent exceptions (see O’Doherty, 2015; 2016; Papazu, 2016; Sage et al., 2014) this kind of examination is far removed from the methodological discussions of the Business School, seeming thus to cement the audience for this text as those ethnographers who might be interested in Deleuze’s work or Deleuzian scholars with an interest in research methods (see Coleman and Ringrose, 2013) and the question of “practical” or lived philosophy. Indeed, we can see exactly how far removed this kind of inquiry is by considering how the ethnographic method gets “justified” across the social sciences in general and within contemporary organizational research in particular. It is often legitimated by saying that one wants to uncover “processes and meanings that undergird sociospatial life,” (Herbert, 2000. p.551) or through value placed upon narratives emergent from “walking a mile in the shoes of others” (Madden, 2010. p.1) and stories about what it is like to “be somebody else” (see Van Maanen, 2011) or otherwise understand the lived realities of how things “really work” in contemporary organizations (see Watson, 2011) by being immersed in their culture. Indeed, one might peruse any guide to “Qualitative Research in Business and Management” (see, for example, Myers, 2013) and find definitions,
explanations and rationale such as these, as well as the focus on detail that we suggested above.

All of this, however, is highly problematic for this thesis, not just because of the unconsidered metaphysic which governs and grounds these definitions and research directions but because these are not just statements which clarify purpose or draw lines around the practice of ethnographic work by characterizing or describing it, nor are they merely justifications, rather they are defences against some assumed opposing ideology. One might argue that to ever seek to justify, legitimate or otherwise garner acceptance for the practices of an ethnography, even within the unique political context of the Business School, is to inadvertently delegitimize it by corroborating the notion that certain kinds of scholarship are and are not appropriate for research (in the Business School). As we shall suggest, the Business School is far too heterogeneous to be thought of and defied in these terms of Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions; too nuanced to be thought in terms of dominant powers and resistance. However, academics have been defending so called “radical” or “alternative” (Parker et al., 2007) modes of inquiry into organizations or calling for “ideological pluralism” (Learmonth, 2008), for so long that it is a wonder that the practice has not yet rendered itself obsolete. As Jeffcutt (1994) notes in passing, attempts to legitimate organization studies, itself usually outside positivistic norms, have been taking place since the early 1990’s, a conversation which, as we shall discuss in Chapter II, is still ongoing with contemporary CMS. One must thus conclude that either we are extremely ineffective at convincing anyone of the legitimacy and relevance of our research or we have internalized some manner of outsider-complex, believing ourselves the repressed minority and finding the requisite statistical evidence to support the conclusions of our disenfranchisement (see for example, Grey, 2010).
All of this is not to say that ethnography is devoid of difficulties or without any further justification or not subject to complication and reflexive problematization; all three of which the reader will find in the chapters to come. Rather, it is to suggest that this thesis will not begin from the assumption that its methods can or should be defended as acceptable and appropriate for the disciplinary apparatus of the University, for with the university increasingly being regarded as a “business” (Thompson, 1970; Saliterer and Rondo-Brovetto, 2011; Greatrix, 2011) we will inevitably come to the conclusion that to study the shopping centre ethnographically by engaging with Deleuze’s work is only a worthwhile endeavour because it has the potential to be profitmaking (whether in terms of consultancy or career prospects or the attraction of research grants) and attract a wide market share (readership) because of its unique selling point. Perhaps nothing so indicates this, as the statement “Remember that you are being examined in a business school!” which can serve at once as a useful pedagogical device and as a yoke to bind this thesis to a concept of “appropriate” topics and methods of research in the Business School. This should come as no surprise, for as Deleuze and Guattari say, “they will not let you experiment in peace” (ATP, p.150). It is, however, worth examining what this reminder might mean.

To understand this, one might consider the history of the Business School and thus render problematic the question of what it might mean to be “examined” there; for the issue will never be as simple as addressing oneself to the various debates within a select few journals nor is it merely a question of a doctoral thesis producing a novel contribution to a specific body of knowledge. We might thusly also call into question the nature of these boundaries and how and by whom their discipline is maintained, acknowledging thus the work on “post-disciplinarity” coming from within the Business School itself (see Delbridge, 2014; De Cock and O’Doherty, forthcoming). As Ehrensal (2005) notes, the modern Business School’s faculty was born in the 1960’s by acquiring staff from more “established”
departments of the university like Economics, Sociology, Psychology and Engineering. In
different ways, the legacies of these disciplines survive either in dominant paradigms like the
“mainstream acceptance” of positivistic research assumptions or the plethora of departments
devoted to different interests within the school. Indeed, with the recent increase in the
number, size and scope of business schools across the globe we can observe both the
“identity crisis” of which Pfeffer and Fong (2004) wrote from the perspective of the inherent
ambiguity question of what should be studied there and the “curious dual insecurity” on
which Grey (2001) comments, leading one to call into question anything studied there.
Should a thesis produced in the Business School mirror its entrenchment in a circular system
which seeks to, on the one hand, simplify content to please either increasingly disaffected
students or the strawman of the “typical manager” who exists nowhere but within the
Business School’s ideology and, on the other, proliferate technical jargon and insularity
because of feelings of inadequacy in the comparison to “traditional” academic disciplines
across the social sciences (see Starkey et al, 2004)? Should it be relegated to merely the
“critique” of this cycle? What place would Deleuze have in this? Taking the last of these
questions first as a means to answer the others, the discourse at work within the contemporary
Business School would doubtlessly seek to find some way to make Deleuze “relevant” (see
Butler et al., 2015; Knights, 2008; Knights and Scarbrough, 2010; Grey 2001) to some image
of what “Business School scholarship” has to have been about; to find a “use” for Deleuze,
and address why one might want to study his work, or what novel contribution it offers.
Indeed, many within the Business School have tried to address the question of what
Deleuze’s philosophy is and how it might be “useful” (see Chia, 1999; Thanem, 2004, 2005;
Linstead and Thanem, 2007; Carter and Jackson, 2002; Sørensen, 2003). However, and it is
difficult to make this case, what occurs most often is that the obtuse nature of Deleuze’s work
makes it, neither inevitably “useless” or “irrelevant” nor impossible to commodify. Rather it
is the case that, as this thesis shall explore in subsequent sections, Deleuze’s work is difficult to engage with ethically, leading one to capitulate to the ingrained obsession over performativity, pragmatism and “use value” that prevails within the academy as a whole but within CMS in particular (Spicer et al., 2009); the logic of which is what Marcuse (1965) called “repressive tolerance”. That is to say, the Business School’s seeming pluralism gives us the freedom to pursue widely varying and even radical research agendas, just so long as, in so doing, one conforms to the expected formulas of work and pays the necessary lip-service to what has become consensually accepted as that which is “examined in a Business School”, for it is politically (see Marsden, 1993) and financially important that this image of thought be maintained. This is not to imply that this “image of thought” has not been challenged or, in the least, noted in various ways (see Sørensen 2006), it is merely to observe that the question of “relevance” and “use” is one which is highly political and, thus one that this thesis tries to subvert, and is perhaps uniquely positioned to do so because of its triptychs. Indeed, taking the field of this thesis into full context, it becomes impossible for us to speak of the “use” of asking questions around the interfusion of the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and the philosophical underpinnings of most ethnographic work or the “value” of exploring different systems of and experiments in writing, to the Business School. Even the question of a “novel contribution to knowledge” becomes impossible because of the difficulty of avoiding inflecting the response to such questions with either the systems of capitalist valuation that are inherent to the shopping centre or the tone of the many offers which the shopping centre markets to its consumers: “Find out about how you too can explore your becoming-ethnographer!” or “Rhizome your writing: 5 simple ways in which you can think a transcendental empiricism!” There is perhaps nothing inherently wrong with co-opting the shopping centre’s linguistic tropes or its logics and indeed, this thesis will pursue further the question of how the shopping centre speaks, for if the university is increasingly thought of as
a business there would be much that academia could learn from the shopping centre’s language. However, one can only imagine how such overtly market-driven slogans becoming section headings in a thesis would appal “academic sensibilities” (particularly within CMS), perhaps even more than the fact that this kind of marketing would very likely have clear appeal within the contemporary Business School.

What is it like to study the shopping centre ethnographically?

We will thus hold it to be self-evident that ethnography is the only means by which the shopping centre can become available to be written, for no other set of practices can so collaborate between philosophy and lived experience. One will very quickly learn, however, that a study of the shopping centre, undertaken while wandering the long lines of the malls (either alone or with an interlocutor), requires neither triptychs and the kind of interdisciplinarity which an intersection of Deleuze’s work, CMS and anthropology might imply, but nothing short of the competency of a polymath. There is, of course, an askesis to becoming an ethnographer, the practice of a discipline that spreads across disciplines as one learns to respond to the challenges of the field, but arguably, the shopping centre presents a very intense and possibly unique series of challenges. In order to study the shopping centre, one must cultivate the gaze of an architect in order to understand spatial flows; an ear for detail and tolerance for bureaucratic minutia which would rival the corporate lawyer; the attention to aesthetics of the artist and indeed, the ability to appreciate art from the various historical periods which the shopping centre either parodies or presents; the aptitude of the musician to parse the shopping centre’s many sounds and rhythms; the insight of the journalist when making sense of either gossip or stories from afar with many-sided narratives; the acumen of the film critic when drawn into conversations about recent events in cinema and television; the palette of the chef when asked for commentary on the shopping
centre’s many restaurants; the wit, charm and interpersonal skills of the thespian when negotiating access to various groups; the training of the marketing manager when criticism for new displays or shops or store policies present themselves to the discussion; the diagnostic skill of the kinesiologist in order to understand the problems of walking and movement; the competencies of the linguist to divine place of birth via accent and pick up on the shopping centre’s many neologisms, affectations and linguistic plays; and, of course, the wisdom of the philosopher to hold all of the various disciplines to scrutiny and critical judgement. Further expertise in fashion trends, British politics, football strategies, pub trivia, etymology, general medical knowledge, the geography and history of the Greater Manchester region as well as troubleshooting for Android phones is also required to fit into the various conversations of which one will become a part. Above all, one will have need of a keen sense of irony and a willingness to see the absurd (in both the sense of Camus’s (2005) usage as well as that of common parlance), for the shopping centre is replete with both and one will at times be confronted with seemingly unbelievable scenarios like searching the first-floor for hare while being late for tea or watching the shopping centre’s general manager give a speech to a food court full of people who are ignoring him. Perhaps these are merely the challenges which confront every ethnographer in the field but it is also likely that this is a singular set of demands that emerge in response to what, after the Austrian architect, Victor Gruen, is known as the Gruen Transfer (Csaba and Askegaard, 1999); that sense of being overwhelmed, disoriented and cast-adrift into a dream which the consumer feels as they enter the shopping centre. Though we dare not postulate as much because of the many other fields that might be able to contribute to this discussion, it might be that there is something unique in the shopping centre which affords one the opportunity to think through Deleuze’s concepts, to live as Deleuze describes the writer who “returns from what he has seen and heard with bloodshot eyes and pierced eardrums” (ECC, p.3). Regardless of how it is
described, it seems apparent that, as with all fieldsites, there is nuance beyond what would be presented to cursory examination.

As with most fieldsites, to study the shopping centre is to be confronted to issues like the movement, control and significance of bodies, the practice and conceptualization of time, and the rituals and manifestations of history and memory. Again, we might here misrepresent the issue of this work and suggest that what follows in in Chapters II through V is a systematic analysis of the issues of respectively bodies, time, history and memory, and subjectivity in CMS and Anthropological scholarship; areas of ongoing research where Deleuze’s work can offer significant insights and lend to reciprocal development of the debates within all three of the disciplines in the tryptic with which we are concerned.

However, this would, again, be to retrospectively falsely characterize the process of a thesis and its “position” as an ordered and intelligible thing. In truth, each of these concepts was, in the first instance, encountered in the field in the course of the ethnographic work and then pursued through whichever literature and set of concerns was most useful in making sense of the concepts which the field presented. Still, in the text that follows the reader might observe us to, for example, speak of how the concept of a concept (specifically what Deleuze, drawing upon Antonin Artaud, calls the Body without Organs) can be useful to CMS in helping it to reconsider what “the critical” means, particularly as regards its work with Deleuze, in Chapter II; or address how Deleuze’s first or passive synthesis of time, explored via the conceptual personae of the insomniac, might enable both Anthropology and Organizational Studies in general to rethink the metaphors and models that they utilize to understand time, habit and ritual, in Chapter III; or comment on how the discourses around collective or organizational memory might be related to Deleuze’s notion of the pure past in Chapter IV; or how the third synthesis of time might be used to meaningfully engage with conversations around the status of the subject in organizations in Chapter V. Indeed, we shall
even call into question the ethnographer as a subject who must necessarily have had all of the
aforementioned aptitudes in order to study the shopping centre. The reader may choose to
view this as either a necessary (and perhaps hypocritical) by-product of the institutional
conditions of the production of a thesis, or as a playful and deconstructive form of
doublethink necessary, to paraphrase Deleuze comments on philosophy in *L'Abécédaire*, for
getting out of discipline by means of discipline.

**What does it mean to experiment with writing (through concepts)?**

There are several interrelated issues to this question, the first of which is the question
of writing. For Deleuze, “writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the
midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience” (*ECC*,
p.1). Elsewhere he phrases this problematic differently, but the emphasis is still very much on
the question of incompleteness, that which exceeds subjectivity and life: “you don’t write
with your ego, your memory, and your illnesses. In the act of writing there’s an attempt to
make life something more than personal, to free life from what imprisons it” (*N*, p.143). As
Braidotti (2005) astutely notes, what this means is that writing is part of a series of different
modes of engagement (others include thinking and painting) which all have the same
impetus: *experimentation*. Throughout his oeuvre, Deleuze invokes and demonstrates this
ethic of experimentation and the pressing need to explore what may emerge in the
conjunction of different concepts, modes of being or systems of thought; something which
has been noted either in depth or in passing by many authors working with Deleuze from a
diverse array of disciplines (*see* Stengers, 2008; Sørensen, 2009, Rajchman, 2000; Baugh,
2005 *as a small sampling*). In this regard, Paul Patton (1997) describes a “dual and
paradoxical relation” between Deleuze and the philosophers about whom he writes, whereby
he reads texts both faithfully and against themselves, appropriating their words, tropes,
examples and logics in order to make his point, thus disrupting the authorial function and what we will describe as, building upon Assis (2011), the author(ity) which it implies. More than merely an origin, the point of author(ity) is a central moment of public confidence, professional respect and trusted knowledge upon which the edifice of academia seems to hang and from which the walls of writing and text that come to constitute the thesis are drawn. Of course, the problem of “ethnographic authority” has been long debated and, as James Clifford (1988) chronicles, its acceptance and legitimacy are synonymous with the growth of the discipline of Anthropology. Deleuze is, however, not so much concerned with the questions of “power” (see Coffey, 1996) or even the co-optation of indigenous narratives or their misrepresentation within the context of postcolonial debates, as he is with “the power to say I,” (ECC, p.3): the power to say “I think” and understand oneself to be constituted as a coherent unity, to trust and have trusted your account of the experiences of the field. It will perhaps take the duration of the entire thesis for us to fully contextualize and develop this, but we read the problem of author(ity) as one of subjectivity and its relation to writing, both of which are core concerns within Deleuzian scholarship. To experiment with concepts is, for this work, to seek ways of writing without author(ity).

This has a basis in Deleuze’s own writing which functions as expérience, an open-ended experiment in the experience of philosophy. As the voices of the text blur and it becomes difficult to distinguish Deleuze from either his co-author or the philosopher about whom he writes, it becomes possible to speak of “free indirect discourse” (ATP, p.80) or text emergent from different intertwined and interwoven collective “subjects of enunciation”, having thus no clear author or subject from whence they emerged. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari, “there isn’t a subject; there are only collective assemblages of enunciation” (K, p.18). What is achieved through this is, to recall Stengers’s (2005) comments, a practice of experimentation whereby one no longer thinks by proxy through or in the name of another,
but an encounter productive of something novel. What we aim in this thesis is to treat the
field in the same way that Deleuze treats the authors about whom he writes, treading always
the line between love and irreverence, rendering the shopping centre “veritably” while trying
to deconstruct it.

All of this is a part, not so much of what one writes but the question of how one
writes, and as such this thesis endeavours to write itself through the creation of concepts to
think the shopping centre, or rather, to track those concepts which might be at work in the
shopping centre and develop them. To adapt Deleuze’s comments on the films of Godard and
their effects (DI, p.141), this text won’t have thoughts on the shopping centre, nor will it put
more or less valid thought into the shopping centre, instead it starts shopping centres thinking
for the first time. There are two ways to read such statements. In the first instance, they may
refer to “thought of the shopping centre”; its characters and models abstracted to understand
wider social life and other forms of organization and in the second instance, in light of what
has been termed “the ontological turn” in Anthropology one may be entered into a dialogue
with the shopping centre, being thus the first to take seriously its dreamings (see
Glowczewski, 2016) as an interlocutor which manifest in various forms of text and
conceptual personae. This in itself should give the reader some insight into how philosophy is
to be employed in this work, not as an afterthought which follows the fieldwork but as a
means for calling into question the thoughts of the field; a practice which is, for this work,
broadly consistent with Deleuze’s philosophical project.

The thesis will indulge both ways, taking thereby small opportunities for
experimentation, for disorganization cannot come all at once, it must come prudently, an art
of dosages (ATP, p.160). Already in this introduction we have sought to expose the reader to
experiments around the paradoxes of denaturalizing the practices and powers inherent in the
production of a thesis (i.e., problematizing a writing practice while demonstrating it).
Neglecting this and thus failing to denaturalize the mores around the production of a thesis in producing one would amount to a sanctioning and a substantiation of the creation of author(ity).

This manner of concern with the question of ethnographic writing is, however, not altogether novel. Building upon the work of Roland Barthes on the death of the author and Steven Tyler on “postmodern ethnography”, Hastrup claims the following (1992, p.115) “Addressing the question of how to write ethnography is not solely a matter of experimentation with style, it is also a rediscovery of the world,” echoing Deleuze and Guattari’s simpler formulation “There is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made” (ATP, p.4), no difference between ethnos-graphia, the writing of a field and the intersections of thought and time which produce the text. A text written (in part) on and by a bench in the shopping centre could not have been otherwise. Various explorations of Deleuzian writing, particularly with regards to exercises in collaboration like the JKSB assemblage (Wyatt et al., 2010; 2011; 2014) - a cooperation between four authors to explore the poetics and problematics of collective writing via Deleuze’s work - speak not only to the need to continue explore different writing practices, but the imperative to continue exploring the very possibilities which writing can afford for:

“blurring fact and fiction, challenging the dividing line between biography, history, writing, autobiography, memory, performer, performed, observer, and observed.”

(Wyatt et al, 2014. p.413)

It is, however, not just collaborative enterprises that have garnered interest. Honan and Bright (2016, p.733) call into question our ability to write a thesis differently, advocating merely that we “not begin writing according to what is expected, but writing to create – to bring something to life,” thus railing against the disciplinary apparatuses that govern doctoral work and the production of theses. However, what this work tries to achieve is an experiment, less
in the way of conception and giving life and more in the way of the openness that allows for other forms of life and mode of thought to be acknowledged as they appear in the text. As such, this text will no doubt seem strange and perplexing at times, testing and trying various methods of writing, such as indulging the “fourth person singular tense” in order to explore the madness of the shopping centre and the spaces it affords for alternative conceptions of subjectivity in Chapter I, or playing with two lines which run away on the page in order to tell a story of the interrelation of bodies and lines in Chapter II, or utilizing a bastardized and pastiched version of the style of J.G. Ballard’s novel *Kingdom Come* in order to explore the relation between history, memory and violence in Chapter IV or lengthy sections of largely unedited fieldnotes in order to explore notions of habit and subjectivity in Chapters III and V respectively. These experiments emerged at random, at times clearly produced by certain forces and trends at work in the shopping centre and other times less clearly so. Were one to consult one of the many guides to the production of PhD theses with which candidates are inundated (*see, for example*, White, 2011; Eco, 2015; Thody, 2006), they would advise against these types of experimentation, suggesting formulas and rules of thumb for the safe and administration-approved production of a thesis (Honan and Bright, 2016); or at least conformance to the demands of encroaching managerialism, and its effects upon thought, despite what critiques of these exist in the academy (*see* Parker, 2014). While these experiments may not be as beautifully poetic, as playful or as radical as those of other authors working with Deleuze (*see* Guttorm, 2012; 2016) they are essential to this thesis, being undertaken, not so much with the intention of “transporting” the reader to the shopping centre or combating the fact that while we might embrace pluralism in terms of research methods “pluralism in the ways in which research can be reported is much less accepted” (Thody, 2006, p.xv) or even which the aim of denaturalizing the author(ity) of the text (though we shall eventually have argued the case of all three positions). Rather, it is simply the case that
the conjunction of Deleuze and the shopping centre could not have been *ethically* written in any other way. Much more radical experiments might be proposed, which disorient, for example the reader’s habits around reading sinistrodextral text. Perhaps text that runs in zig-zags up the page; text- like that of Christine Brooke-Rose’s (2006) *Omnibus*- that runs in spirals, circles, flowers and feathers; perhaps these are the experiments that are needed to both inscribe the shopping centre and shock the disciplinary trio of our concern out of their dogmatic stupor.

However, questions of writing and the production of text are also germane to Critical Management Studies which has frequently posed itself the question of how to write differently (Grey and Sinclair, 2006) hoping - through notably different tensions- to be more “legitimate” in the eyes of the positivism that it rejects and to serve some revolutionary or otherwise political purpose which would necessarily involve its language being rendered more accessible for the managers about whom it writes. In a more general sense, discussions of writing in CMS have ranged as reflexivity (Rhodes, 2009) and questions of the role of fiction and the representation of organization (Rhodes and Brown, 2005) or most poignantly, the invocation of revolt and revolution against the dominant paradigms of the Business School.

“We demand the impossible. A politics of the impossible, in which the very act of writing becomes an arena of playful creation, of participation, experiment and becoming, a form of writing through which the boundaries between fact and fiction are risked or even blurred.” (Jones and O’Doherty, 2005. p.7)

Though with politics and revolutionary overtures of a different kind, Anthropology has arrived at many of the same conclusions regarding writing and questions of textuality, developing in the wake of *Writing Culture* (Clifford and Marcus, 1986) dialogues concerning the nature of fieldwork and the relationship to others in the field, the identity of the
ethnographer and the question of autobiography as well as the debates surrounding the violence of inscription and the production of text (Hastrup, 1992; Fabian; 2014). What emerges from these developments, most linked to questions of “the postmodern” (Spiro, 1996), is an awareness that, not only is the author complicit in the writing of a particular culture, but that the self, blurred through the plays anxieties and confrontations of the field is reconstituted in the production of the ethnographic monograph. In the same moment as it integrates these various calls to explore different kinds of writing, what this thesis tries to achieve is a schism, leaving the author(ity) of the author dissolved and irrecoverable from the field produced at the intersection of these varying discourses.

In summation, a thesis, via the Greek *tithenai* carries connotations of placing, of constituting a space. The space that we aim to constitute shall operate not so much inside/outside the objectified edifice of the “Business School” as it shall seek to live in the field, that space where Deleuze offers up commentary on the everyday of the shopping centre. The thesis thus presents itself as a series of concepts, each with its accompanying styles, encounters and engagements (and thus to a degree its own method and literature review). What we propose to address ourselves to is the development of conceptual personae, the literal writing of a people, and thus the composition of a compendium of the varying madnesses of the shopping centre. That is to say, throughout this text we will place the shopping centre into dialogue with Deleuze’s concepts and trace for the reader the various lines which emerge from what is produced of these encounters. Some will be strange, some will appear to be *disciplined* (as though they were of CMS or Anthropology) and others will appear mad, all with the aim of walking the line of disorganization, testing the limits of what experimentation is possible within the bounds of the conjunction of the mentioned triptychs when placed within the shopping centre. In these aims, the text may thus even suspend the reader’s understanding of themselves *qua* reader, that status thus called into question along
with what sensibility and assumptions- what discipline- produces the text. “Experiment, never interpret,” says Deleuze (D, p.48) and this may well be an invocation to which this text commends the reader, asking that whoever comes to this text does so with the willingness of one involved in an ethnography of the shopping centre.
Chapter I: Approaches to the Shopping Centre

Schizophrenia. Insomnia. Paramnesia. Synesthesia. Melancholia. These are not individual pathologies. “Madness is rare in individuals- but in groups, political parties, nations, epochs, it is the rule” (Nietzsche, 1998. p.70). It is perhaps an all too banal reading which suggests that these conditions are responses to the current socio-cultural milieu- a world of haste, global movement and interconnection, fleeting interpersonal connection and zombie capitalism (Harman, 2009)- and it may be the case that the works of Gilles Deleuze take us beyond this, claiming an art to the practice of a certain madness which lies in the exploration of _dosages_ (ATP, p.160), enacted in small slips into other forms of thinking; into ontologies from and of the margins of the social which produce a world which is anomalous and unexplored by the well-worn and naturalized passages of thought (_DR, LOS_). Such slippages are always somehow at work in various discourses, habits, behaviours and thoughts of the shopping centre- an automatic movement, a dance, a dream-like feeling of disorientation and _déjà vu_ or an involuntary memory- but these remain elusive to us because

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Figure 1: The Practiced Face of XL

1 The reader will always place their own meaning into sketches and diagrams, reading their own faces into the organization of the work. Here, a pattern which began on a curious paisley dress in June 2013 is sketched in a way that is itself inflected with the jostling, turning and shaking of a bus called XL and thus also provides a speculum in which the reader might reflect upon the patterns present in their thoughts. It is these habits or images of thought which this thesis will call into question.
our ways of thinking and apprehending the world are ill-equipped to grasp them. As an approach or a way of working with the problems of the shopping centre, one may risk madness, deliberately and purposefully, in order to explore what thought can do, but at a certain point it is no longer clear what is a calculated ethnographic experiment in exploring the margins of thought and what is a peculiar form of frenzy, disorientation and insanity that the shopping centre has produced from its dreaming. As this chapter unfolds, we will try to trace some of those moments of madness which seem to compel us out of our taken-for-granted ways of thinking and thus, through engaging with Deleuze’s work, explore the ways that they might develop our understandings of the shopping centre as a vibrant part of a milieu on the borders of madness.

The shopping centre is, however, far from a marginal or border object. In the Introduction, we considered not only that CMS, Anthropology and Deleuze Studies might be interested in the shopping centre but that the academy in general has reason to be interested in its nature, culture, artifice, and design. Indeed, the last century has seen a shift in the centre of our socio-cultural milieu, away from the town square, away from the parliamentary building, and even out of the church, but not towards virtual spaces as popular opinion seems to believe. It is towards the shopping centre that the contemporary world seems to bend. It is where we launch political protests and activist campaigns, such as those in London in late 2014 (Siddique and Smith, 2014). It is involved in religious movements like the Mormon Church (Kelly, 2013). Furthermore, it is commonly seen as a tourist destination and a place of leisure, self-describing as a place of “retail therapy”. Whether such “therapy” might be a cure or cause of the madness which seems to dwell within the shopping centre is irrelevant as within Deleuze Studies there is a growing awareness that the “maladies” of modern life, from feelings of ennui to melancholia, deserve the kind of attention which focuses on “points of intensity” where these conditions can be clearly observed or are thought to be produced (see
Buchanan and Lambert, 2005). The shopping centre is, as we have and shall contend, such a point and, as such, calls for further study and exploration of its details.

However, even if there are many ways to get to the shopping centre (one might walk, run, bike, go by car, by bus or by canal boat to get to its spaces on the edge of the city), “getting to” the shopping centre *ethnographically* in order to study its details is not easy. Beyond concerns of negotiating access and with a particular attention to the question of how one studies such a vast and interconnected organization, what emerged for this work was a study on the fringes of organization, becoming one which was less concerned with the formal aspects of a corporate program (hierarchy, policy and reports- though there is unquestionably value in the study of these) and less interested in uncovering what has been described as the hidden rational systems that lie behind the shopping centre’s facade (Ritzer, 2012) and even uninterested in what Burrell (1997) called “the underbelly” of organizations, and one which gravitated towards the margins, to the interstices where different forms of organization and life emerged, asking simply but persistently the question which emerged for us as the central one for this thesis, “*What is the shopping centre, and how can the works of Gilles Deleuze help us to understand it ethnographically?*”. Given their prevalence within our society (Britain being home to around twenty which are over a hundred thousand square feet in size), as well as their ability to survive recession and economic shift, it is perhaps staggering that, as we have suggested, we do not have a meaningful answer to this question or, more accurately, that what answers we do have seem always fragmentary and disjointed or, in the least, too myopic. Addresses to the shopping centre itself are at once diverse and few and far between. Some may be historical, explaining the shopping centre’s genesis, others seem architectural, describing its space and shape and while some are celebratory of its convenience and beauty, others are critical of it and its status as an icon of contemporary consumer capitalism.
In this chapter we will explore some of these different voices which have aimed to speak on the shopping centre in the context of advancing what we suggest to be the beginnings of a Deleuzian ethnographic practice via a development of what Deleuze calls transcendental empiricism. In continuing to develop a writing practice out of the cross disciplinary contexts which we explored in the Introduction, this chapter also seeks to tell a series of stories; using devices such as the “fourth person singular tense” (a mad and a-subjective mode of writing) as a practical mode of engaging with Deleuze’s metaphysic in the context of fieldwork; in order to speak to the question of “getting to the shopping centre”.

May 2013: Out for a Stroll...

The suspended crescendo of the sounds of the shopping centre; hustle and bustle, voices and cries, all lingering in a low B-flat, is one that Wagner might envy. The bright fluorescent lights pulse and flicker in the daylight, coming in waves that do not ever recede; a drone in this veritable hive of activity. The schizo out for a stroll is hearing with his skin, seeing with his tongue, speaking with his eyes; synaesthesia abounds. He has done with the Judgement of God in a move to recover his organ-less body. “The schizophrenic is the universal producer” (AO, p.7), a factory for experience and connection. His body is a sieve that catches each event as it moves, doing so in a kind of hallucinatory form (LOS, p.99), his senses calling forth the inherent luminosity of the world rather than passively receiving its stimuli (ES, p.5). He is always many, a multiple and knows that “two schizophrenics converse or stroll according to laws of boundary and territory that may escape us” (ATP, p.320), blurring the lines around the body, around time and space and making connections with far off experiences, or rather, shirking off the attention to any notion of the “here of the body and the now of the present” (Berger and Luckman, 1991. p.22).
He has entered into a great hall of anachronism, which being so ostentatiously rendered, is legitimated into sensibility, such that most do second-guess the faux-marble facade of the pillar which screams at the schizo, “I was once a tree! They have killed me and reorganized my body into this pseudo-arborescence...” while dying palm trees stand and watch. Nor does one call into question the absurdity of the representations of New Orleans, China and Italy that come to constitute an “Orient” which are then placed onto a Greco-Roman mise en scène along with forcible attempts to evoke the majesty of the Baroque via high arches and large stucco pillars. The schizo walks through demon gates, observing the caked dust on the blue sky, watching dirty laundry hang on a line and stand still in the high and stubborn air. He would call these simulacra if he did not already know that they had reproduced themselves into the real, proliferating and multiplying in an orgy of signs (see Baudrillard, 1994) which serves to seduce themselves and all other passers-by with connections to places far off and exotic. Combray rises up as well and the schizo happily enjoys the smells of tea and madeleines while a shop’s window display proudly proclaims: “Moreover the walls of my castle are broken.”

The schizo’s bones resonate with the glossolalia of The Historian as he stalks the long arc of the malls, pausing to stare at arrays of sewing machines and be hypnotized by disco-lighting. The Historian is wracked with dis-ease because he is not sure where the shopping centre comes from. From amid the clutter of his desk, the short, balding man speaks of Britain of the 1920’s and 30’s and the emergence of the council estate (Dawson, 1983). He says that these suburban complexes were accompanied by a small cluster of stores which in ethos pre-cursed what we would now recognize to be the shopping centre, if only in the spirit of a shopping space that was abstracted from the main street or town square and into the suburbs. In the same breath, he mentions the emergence of the arcade, le passage, in Paris in the late 18th century (Benjamin, 2002). These narrow, covered passages between streets
represented not only the culmination of several different architectural innovations- their expansion into Britain being largely attributable to changing patterns in population growth, the nature of stores and the growth of cities- but a new kind of controlled shopping experience wherein spectacle itself becomes a commodity for which the consumer pays. Perhaps, thinks The Historian, the pluralistic decor of the contemporary shopping centre is an attempt to recover the exoticism of the Greek ‘agora’ (Dennis, 2005), or the ‘souks’ which were scattered around Jerusalem during the Crusades (MacKeith, 1986), a recovery of the spectacle of the different, of distant travellers displaying their wares to the townspeople, the simple village marketplace. The Historian thinks that these may constitute spiritual predecessors to the shopping centre. However, such speculation makes him uncomfortable. He speaks to a passer-by about a “Festival Village”, a collection of small artisanal stalls which occupied a corner of the shopping centre until they were erased by the coming of a large department store. The shopping centre seems to swallow the memory of its forbearers and conversation of them with the drone in B-flat. The Historian comments further, his accent changing to over-enunciate vowel sounds in a manner characteristic to the people of the shopping centre, telling the schizo of the long development and planning process for this shopping centre, mentioning its approval by Parliament in 1995 after an almost decade long battle over the possibility of traffic congestion, its opening in 1998 as with newspapers of the time reporting fears that the shopping centre might eat the city (causing a fall in business from nearby towns) and the rebirth of the cult of Mammon (Swanton, 1998). The schizo wanders off, leaving the Historian wrapt amidst the dream of the marshland from which the shopping centre would be born.

The schizo suddenly becomes aware that he has walked into a bare room. He wonders why the room is so bear. A bare room for a bare life and the sound of bears rumbles in his belly, claws scratching at his insides, itching, twitching; to reach a pulsing spot on the skin
that cannot be soothed. He watches people bend and prostrate themselves, speaking in
tongues, some native, others not. Prayers of different kinds always seem to find their way into
the shopping centre; all too often it is a place of worship. While he hears the discontent of
those who reject the idea of the shopping centre as a sacred space (Pahl, 2007), he thinks to
return later to speak to the worshipers of their prayers. So many have thought the shopping
centre as a cathedral (Ritzer, 2012) or as an altar where the consumer might worship and
noted that churches are increasingly resembling shopping centres in order to attract larger
congregations (Koolhaas et al., 2001), that the schizo would be remiss to try not to dwell
upon the concept, but of course he does not, a stroll, *derive*, being without purpose or
direction.

He bumps into The Architect. Tall and proud, the Architect tells him of the tumult of
the post-World War period where a need for something as banal as parking spaces on the
High Street drove developers to search for sites outside the city to establish shopping spaces.
The Architect has a similar accent to The Historian when he describes the ‘rebirth’ of
aesthetics in the rise out of the limitations imposed by Modernist minimalism and the
material shortages of the post-War period; a return to the highly-stylized and grandiose scope
of the Baroque Cathedral. Indeed, for The Architect, the shopping centre is a triumph of his
engineering- enclosure, protection and control (Kowinski, 1985)- a managed environment,
policed by sensors and cameras, in which everything from *balustrade* to *voussoir* becomes a
component part of the increasingly grand stage of the theatre of consumption (Scott, 1989)
where various actors of varying natures can play. Everything from escalators to air-
conditioning collaborates to construct and maintain this “junkspace” (Koolhaas, 2001) toward
the end of facilitating shopping. With a shaking head, the Architect remembers the
construction of this particular shopping centre, with all of its pitfalls and triumphs, renting the
largest crane in Europe to place a six-and-a-half-tonne capstone upon the great dome, going
over initial cost estimates by hundreds of millions of pounds, initial reviews critiquing the neo-classical design (Narain, 1995), all with a tone that seemed to request praise for his work. As the schizo feels both The Architect and The Historian struggle to remember the past, he reflects that past, present and future seem undifferentiable, and inseparable block of the a-causal relations of his life and as such the shopping centre seems to be a space with only an in-between.

If Paul Klee (1972) can take lines for walks then surely we can take the words and trajectories of our thoughts? Of course there is nothing more subversive than a line, but can a walk be a similarly wandering exercise. The schizo continues to experiment with being an Italian astrologer. He descends a shifting staircase towards a blue sun, fascinated by the way the tendrils of golden light seem to radiate from it, diffusing across the floor. The Theorist calls out to him from the cinema which is playing Dulac’s La Coquille et le Clergyman. To The Theorist, the shopping centre is a nexus of contradictions; a privately owned property, maintained for capitalist profit, which masquerades as a public space (Goss, 1993). The latter, The Historian reminds him, was what the shopping centre was originally conceived to be (Gruen and Smith, 1960). Still, the image of the face splitting in two plays on the schizo’s senses. He sees the faces of the crowd, the stone floor of the shopping centre itself, come asunder and collect, tear and re-join; fragmentation of the body and the self. The Theorist tells him that the shopping centre has become the new factory floor, wrenching the product of labour from the worker (Shields, 1993). “Labour” here is not to be understood merely in the Marxist context of the process of production but in the sense of the construction of multiple identities through the accumulation and assimilation of objects and the symbolic meanings attached to these (Elliott and Wattanasuwan, 1998). For The Theorist, the shopping centre colludes with other forces within capitalist society, advertising in particular (Baudrillard, 1998), to become a site of alienation par excellence; acting to strip the individual of their
freedom, depressing them into a one dimensional existence through the propagation of endless lacks which need to be satiated through the plays of symbolic consumption. Even as it gives birth to this lack, the shopping centre evolves (as a pseudoplace) to provide opportunities to satisfy them, perceiving society’s needs and changing itself. At this The Architect falls silent, since it means that the shopping centre’s very aesthetics breed domination through addiction and pathology, such that desire itself, caged within the walls, comes to desire its own repression (AO, p.105). The schizo loathes such forms of coding, more strata on the Body without Organs, that attempt to trap him into claustrophobic and narrow spheres of signification and so feels inclined to agree when The Theorist shows him a list of the world’s ‘worst buildings’ (Allen, 2014) with the shopping centre on it. He does not, however, fear experimentation- it is his ethic- and is therefore is not sure how to regard these various becomings: to engage in quiet experimentation by exploring lines and limits, inside, in-between and through what would be thought possible.

The Flâneur wanders past, perhaps the greatest student of the mores of the shopping centre, even before its birth. He carries a large, heavy, black briefcase which seems, a mirror of the shopping centre itself, “an unimaginably massive and labyrinthine architecture- a dream city” (Benjamin, 2002. p.xi), mirroring the schizo in the reflections of his walk. The schizo follows him around the rings of Saturn for a time, attending to the insightful musings of this detached bourgeois dilatant, enthralled by his “anamnestic intoxication” and is thus conducted with and by him into routes and times not of either of their makings. Stumbling upon a number of elephants decorated for charity the schizo is compelled to pause. Some come with flowers, others with flags, others with “oriental designs” and yet more still with superhero regalia and other images of popular culture. The schizo begins to feel all too much like he is facing the absurd, not in the sense of meaninglessness but in the sense of confronting the unintelligible, the unknowable. What is the shopping centre dreaming with
these elephants? The schizo might conclude that curiosity rather than suicide (Camus, 2005) is the best response to this question, but no amount of curious questioning will make elephants make sense. Instead they will be accepted; legitimated as are so many other oddities of the shopping centre.

The schizo pushes finger into the interstitial spaces of a palm frond, for why wouldn't there be an oasis in this desert? He is intrigued by this photosynthesis-machine but he is tired of trees. The Researcher approaches with clipboard and questionnaire and after some preamble he asks the schizo: “Can you rate your perception of the level of crowding in this store on a scale from one to seven?” Response: “My name is Louis Wain. These are my cats. They can only count in terms of fractals, gradients, potentials, intensities and planes of colour.” Confused, The Researcher tells the schizo more about the experiment that he has designed, broadly indicative of the research paradigm in which he works, to test the impact of ambient odours on the emotions of shoppers and, by extension, their spending patterns (Chebat and Michon, 2003). Indeed, though the schizo does not know it, The Researcher has conducted many such inquiries all treating the shopping centre as a social laboratory, finding that, for example, positive perceptions of the shopping centre’s atmosphere directly correlate with perceptions of merchandise and can prompt hedonic spending (Michon et al., 2005) or that music can stimulate—through high volume—increases in the rate of purchases (Turley and Milliman, 2000). The Researcher has even tried to understand the differences between male and female ‘shopping styles’ through an African Savannah hypothesis (Dennis, 2005) arguing that, on the plains of the shopping centre, men take up the role of the incisive and goal-oriented hunters while women take up the searching, comparing and loving role of gatherers.

The Historian smiles knowingly. The schizo finds these narrow bands and metrics suffocating. They remind him too much of the analyst’s couch so he leaves The Researcher to continue his walk.
The schizo is translated onto the bow of a ship. The ship is unstable; a modern ‘ship of fools’ (Foucault, 1988). He feels nauseated. He is in Bouville, he is a disaffected historian, he is sick, he is in the shopping centre. He thinks that the shopping centre does not seem to be a pseudoplace or a non-place (Augé, 1995) or a theatre or an architectural marvel or a localized site or a replacement savannah or even an agglomeration of variables to be studied. It is a body organized, covered in machines, strata which act upon it, producing lines and codes. It lives, it eats, it breathes, it shits, it proliferates; spreading its logic through contemporary society, “malling” and “centring” (Feinberg and Meoli, 1991) as it goes. Its voice is pitched in a low B-flat but it does not speak or perhaps, given everything else that is paid for within and by the shopping centre, no one has been paying attention.

June 2013: On the “subject” of writing XI

If, however, one were to pay attention to this margin of the centre of society, this point of intensity and production, through a combination of convenience and coincidence, a practice of what Deleuze calls “transcendental empiricism” could become possible; but only by asking itself, reflexively and consistently, “Can there be a practice of transcendental empiricism?” for it is in that intense redoubled scrutiny that opportunities for exploring the boundaries of thought may emerge. In what follows, we shall make the case for the importance of understanding transcendental empiricism and develop further the theme of the wandering schizo by examining how we might foster a transcendental empiricism through writing practice.

If ever the work of Gilles Deleuze; from his collaborations with Felix Guattari, to his writings on the history of philosophy in the early stages of his career, to his essays and comments in interview shortly before his death; could be said to have had a single project which unifies and connects such a diverse corpus towards a single aim, it would be the
advancement of a transcendental empiricism. To be more precise, transcendental empiricism is the response to the problems which Deleuze’s works seek to address and thus serves as necessary context, without which concepts are easily misappropriated, misunderstood and maligned. Understanding this, attempts have been made to engage with transcendental empiricism in the context of political activism (Svirsky, 2010), ethics (Buchanan, 2000) and in order to elaborate connections between Deleuze and other authors such as Kant (Lord, 2008), Hume (Margarit, 2012) and Hegel (Baugh, 1992). It is thus continuously surprising that neither Anthropology nor CMS has asked itself of the possibilities of a transcendental empiricism; for though both have, as we shall establish, begun meaningful work with Deleuze, it remains questionable whether or not CMS has truly gotten a taste of the road to the Deleuzian future that it promised itself (Thanem, 2005) or Anthropology has been able find a way of working with Deleuze which is other than what Skafish (2014. p.15) calls a mode of “interpretation-through-imposition”, to say nothing of either discipline working to develop a way of engaging with Deleuze which is, in the least, internally consistent with the ethics of Deleuze’s project or even trying to make novel contributions to Deleuzian scholarship. It is cause for further bewilderment then, that practicing ethnographers, both within Deleuze Studies and without, have yet to ask this question, given the weight of the calls to “take Deleuze into the field” (Bonta, 2009. p.141) and thus develop a practical mode of engagement with Deleuze’s philosophy.

It is to these issues that this chapter addresses itself. To begin, we must ask, “What is transcendental empiricism?” Though Hipwell (2004) reduces transcendental empiricism to a simple “wisdom of the body” it is a much more systematic metaphysic which addresses itself to undermining what Deleuze calls a ‘dogmatic image of thought’; an entrenched orthodoxy which, from Plato to Kant, presupposes a “pre-philosophical and natural image of thought” (DR. p.167). That is, a set of assumptions which we make about the nature of reality as given
and about how thought and experience are possible. It is crucial to understand here that modern conceptualizations of thought and experience are attributable almost entirely to the triptych of Descartes, Hume and Kant and, more generally, to the wave of scholarship which characterized the age of Enlightenment (including the works of Newton, Bacon and Locke). What this implies is that the foundational basis for thought (including assumptions of what thought and experience are and how these are possible) has changed little since the middle of the 18th century. What we must also be clear about is that every time we look at an object, speak to an interlocutor or write of an experience in the course of fieldwork, we stand upon this same philosophical grounding and make certain assumptions about what is given, about what thought and experience are and how they are possible. This is an image of thought. For Deleuze, it is crucial to examine these taken for granted assumptions, for in perpetuating the presuppositions of these thinkers in our philosophy, as well as our everyday practices, we stifle creativity, spontaneity and neglect the radically subversive character of thought itself; leaving so much un-thought and so much wasted scope for critical inquiry.

For Deleuze, the problem can be picked up in the Cartesian Meditations. While Descartes (1998) was similarly hostile towards the assumptions which underpinned the philosophy of the 17th century, his search for truth via methodological scepticism ended with the subject, who must necessarily exist by virtue of the analysis. That is to say, Descartes questioning of the certainty of experience and veracity of knowledge ends with the conclusion: I am thinking, therefore “I” exist. The thinking, singular “I” becomes the first principle of Cartesian philosophy, that which is established as veritable beyond all doubt and skepticism. It is possible to read the eight postulates of the image of thought, which Deleuze discusses in Difference and Repetition, as a detailed exegesis and subsequent renouncement.

Transcendental empiricism, being a project which spans Deleuze’s corpus, can be couched in different terms other than those of this triptych. Hughes (2009) for example, explains it through a negotiation with Husserl and phenomenology.
of this most stable and ardent foundation of Western philosophy: the Cartesian placement of
the subject at the core of epistemology. We will hold a more thorough analysis of these eight
postulates beyond the scope of this work and merely note that within the metaphysic of
transcendental empiricism there cannot be even the vaguest redux to a Cartesian subject as a
thinker whose thoughts have an affinity for truth or the true nor is there space for one who
can appeal to a or “good” or “common” sense as a thing assumed to be shared among men
(Toscano, 2010). More accurately, there is no space for these assumptions to remain
unchecked or unquestioned, for the “I think” to be treated as an unproblematic given or
beginning for philosophy. It is likely that Deleuze is either echoing or furthering Nietzsche’s
(1998, p.16-17) criticism of the prejudices of philosophers, expressed as:

“When I analyse the process expressed by the proposition ‘I think’, I get a series of
audacious assertions that would be difficult if not impossible to prove; for example,
that it is I am the one who is thinking, that there must be a something doing the
thinking […] that an “I” exists, and finally, that we by now understand clearly what is
designated as thinking.”

It is possible to say that Hume’s (1960) empiricism answers Nietzsche and Deleuze’s
challenge in the sense that it does not treat knowledge as the product of the ‘immediate
certainties’ of an introspective “I think”; rather it places its faith in experience. If Hume’s
empiricism could be summarized as a model of human understanding, it would be as one
which built immediate sensations (perceptions of light, pain, hunger etc.) into aggregated
impressions and impressions into ideas (forms of impressions used in thinking) which form
the basis of the Humean subject. Ferrell (1995, p.590) describes this subject as “a collection
of impressions and ideas coupled with a tendency to association” This subject, referred to as
“myself” in the Treatise, is always that which is perceiving something, and, in the absence of
perception disappears, becoming ‘insensible’. It is thus a by-product of experience and, in Humean terms, a fiction.

Though they respond in different ways, Deleuze shares Kant’s critique of these moves within Hume’s work which, in the latter, takes the form of an interrogation of the “human nature” to which Hume attributes the availability of experience (KCP, p.11). That is to say, in the Critiques, Kant attempts to think through the conditions of the possibility of experience, proposing that while knowledge must certainly begin with experience there are also pre-existent or a priori structures of the mind which must necessarily be present for there to be experience at all. Where Deleuze breaks with Kant is with the latter’s theory of the syntheses and faculties wherein a “common sense” (in accord with “good sense”) creates a harmonious exercise of the faculties of sensibility, understanding and imagination, each of which relates to the syntheses of apprehension, recognition and reproduction in imagination (Kant, 1998). There is, however, no space in a transcendental empiricism for thought unconcerned with escaping from the dominance of recognition, where the world conforms to the structures of the mind and in being so re-presented, the “I think” returns and difference is lost to the re-production of identity and same (for a more nuanced treatment see Bryant, 2009). That is to say, in Deleuze’s reading of Kant, there is no immediate sensation, merely thought mediated through the existing structures of the mind.

For the purposes of this thesis, however, the central problem is that in both Kant and Hume, the subject returns, not as one who discovers truth through Cartesian introspection, but as one who either experiences the world by acting as a locus for perceptions and or as one who is a transcendental arbiter for the faculties. Thus, if classical philosophy asks “What is given?” and the revolutions of Hume and Kant are to ask “How is the subject constituted within the given?” and “How can the given be given to the subject?” respectively, then Deleuze’s move is to reshape the question, asking “How can there be a given, how can
something be given to a subject and how can the subject give something to itself?” (ES, p.87). This is an elegant way of prompting a turn towards thinking the subject, not as consistent, ordered and whole but as fractured and dispersed; as simultaneously produced by and productive of an environment, field or world. Via such thinking, our experience of the world and our construction of it are thus simultaneous, the subject being “as much the product of self-invention, as it is the consequence of a conformity to existing structures” (Buchanan, 2000. p.86) and hence, the given is neither origin nor precondition but is an effect of the “habit” of subjectivity (Bryant, 2009). As Claire Colebrook (2002, p.xxix) puts it:

“Deleuze’s method is transcendental because it refuses to begin with any already given (or transcendent) thing, such as matter, reality, man, consciousness or ‘the world’. But it is a transcendental empiricism because it insists on beginning with ‘the experienced’ or ‘given’ as such.”

While such a move may seem germane to a constructivist sociological inquiry, such as those derived from the work of Alfred Schutz, it also insists upon calling into question the taken-for-granted conditions of and for experience and beginning the divestment of these from an autonomous, autobiographical, constant and intentional subject. As Bryant (2008, p.9) puts it, “Deleuze seeks to comprehend sensibility in general as producing the objects of intuition rather than merely receiving them passively.”

Deleuze’s engagement with Bergson addresses itself to precisely this problematic in the form of a quest for the sentiendum or “pure perception” (DR, p.140); a vision that reconciles the inherent luminosity of things rather than one that represents them by the phenomenological light of consciousness and is thus capable of illuminating chaos, if only for a moment. The senses are here understood, not as passive receptors that collect the signals of the external world, reporting them to a synthesising and governing subject, but rather as producers, constructing the world in a perpetual ‘calling forth’ (B). “In pure perception we
are actually placed outside ourselves, we touch the reality of the object in an immediate intuition” (Bergson, 1991. p.84). Pure perception allows for an understanding of the world as a multiplicity of interrelated and interlinked processes, rather than a series of separate entities (division and classification being key functions of the intellect in Bergson’s reading), in such a manner which can draw no distinction between the intuited and the rationally constructed, garnering an understanding which defies the patterns of contemporary writing and description. Transcendental empiricism is thus perhaps Bergson’s ‘intuition’- that instinct independent of the intellect which is capable of apprehending the world without mediation or representation by Kantian concept- fully realized as a method; a path towards what might be called the very being of the sensible. As Deleuze says, “empiricism truly becomes transcendental [...] only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible” (DR, p.68). Such a path leads us to violently push each of the Kantian faculties in a manner which jars thought out of its dogmatic stupor (DR, p.139). Perhaps a useful analogy is the practice of auscultatory percussions but only in so far as these turn upon themselves, knocking out an understanding of the world in echo and reducing the subject to fragments in the process. Indeed, if we recall the distinction that Plato establishes in The Republic between the two types of sensation: those that leave the mind inactive, operating via recognition in an appeal to a kind of common sense and those that shock and jar the mind, violently forcing thought to think; it is the latter, termed ‘signs’, that Deleuze concerns himself with; unsettlings that form parts of the “fundamental encounter” (Patton, 1997). Deleuze is here engaged in an attempt to move towards an embodied sense of relation, an active sensing (and an active philosophy) which the dogmatic image of thought is not capable of permitting.

Deleuze’s rephrasing of Kant and Hume’s questions about the given also has important implications for “the subject” which both transcends and is constituted within the
given through the habitual synthesis of time. We will explore this synthesis at length in subsequent chapters but for our current purposes, it is sufficient to note that this synthesis takes place in and not by ‘the mind’ (*ES*, p.96), independent of a subject, without a fixed constructing agent which possesses a determined form and a stable identity. In short, the Deleuzian ‘subject’ becomes, an unstable flux in the sensible, a shifting territory within the given, a becoming that is not limited to any particular subset of becomings. To explain this through an engagement with Hume, the ‘passive synthesis of time’ is, in Deleuze’s work, not a part of the *a-priori* as it is for Kant. Rather it is something produced by the contractive mechanism of the synthesis which habitually and unconsciously strings together the “larval subjects” (*DR*, p.78) or momentary lived states of the present to create an understanding of a persistent subject; pulling the present, past-presents and the expectation of future presents together to create time and, as a by-product, subjectivity.

Such a ‘subject’ is not an origin from which meaning or text emanates, nor is it a centre which holds the faculties, rather, it is more akin to a residuum, a by-product of the habitual synthesis of time. This is precisely what it becomes in *Anti-Oedipus* where it is not the locus of desire or that which can be overcoded with pathology but is a by-product which roams the Body without Organs and functions on it in the periphery of desiring-machines (*AO*, p.20). That is to say, all of our rich and diverse subjectivities, portrayed in consumer practices, linked to occupation or wilfully tied to other demographics like gender and sexuality; those which we examine and construct so carefully in existential work and those which we build in the shopping centre; are for Deleuze little more than habits: the habit of saying “I” (*WIP*, p.48). “Why have we kept our names? Out of habit, purely out of habit.” (*ATP*, p.3), say Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, the idea that the subject is a manner of habit to be overcome occurs elsewhere in Deleuze’s corpus. In *Negotiations* (p.6), he argues that “individuals find a real name for themselves [...] only through the harshest exercise in
depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere within them, to the intensities running through them.” What this implies is that there is, within Deleuze’s project, a profound and far-reaching ethical challenge to reject or otherwise reconsider the status of the subject. In introducing *Pure Immanence*, John Rajchman explains the problem thusly:

> “transcendental empiricism may be said to be the experimental relation we have to that element in sensation that precedes the self as well as any ‘we’ through which is attained, in the materiality of living, the powers of ‘a life’.” (*PI*, p.11),

Rajchman thus presents the problem of transcendental empiricism and the reconsideration of the subject as a lived one, rather than one for abstruse epistemological contemplation; a problem for ‘a life’ rather than one divorced from a life. Understanding that transcendental empiricism functions “in contrast to everything that makes up the world of the subject and the object” (*PI*, p.25) forces a radical reconsideration of experience, tending towards what may seem, within the image of thought, to be surreal and absurd or, in the least, a radical experiment in experience and sensation.

As we shall explore in the remainder of the chapter, the divesting of the faculties from a transcendental subject as well as the move towards, depersonalization, ‘larval subjectivity’ and an active theory of sensation presents a profound challenge, not only to the image of the ethnographer as a coherent and thinking subject, but to the practices of ethnography. This challenge is one which asks us to be attentive to the pre-individual, the impersonal, to the a-subjective singularities which may appear in the dancing of traffic lights, in a draft, in involuntary memories of art or novels that emerge in the field (*N*, p.141). This is to be confronted with the distinction between the “I think” and “it thinks” (Bryant, 2008), or more accurately, between “I think” and “*a thinking*”. There are various ways in which this thesis might tackle this distinction, particularly because it has not yet been taken up by any social
scientific authors, perhaps because of the fear of being called a “vitalist” (Dema, 2007) or being seen to be sympathetic to ‘pataphysics (Hugill, 2012). However, because of the intimate relation of ethnographic work and questions of writing (Humphreys and Watson, 2009), we shall focus on the deceptively simple question of how to negotiate the Deleuzian challenge to reconsider the centrality of the thinking subject by focusing on questions of text.

Let us develop an example. In October 2009, a new express bus route was opened to the shopping centre. Pseudonymed “XL”, it would travel via a more direct route to the shopping centre than existing bus services, cutting the journey from the city centre down to around thirty minutes. Tracing a route that shirks housing districts and heads straight onto major roads towards other “tourist attractions” like an industrial park, a war museum and a football stadium, XL becomes a carrier of a sprawling cross-section of the populace of the city (as all transport systems inevitably do), taking commuters to and from work or eager shoppers to worship at what Ritzer (2012) called the “new cathedral of consumption”. The necessity of such a route emerges due to a certain discourse which preoccupies itself with ease of access to the shopping centre. Indeed, this preoccupation with “getting there” extends to the opening of a “stress-free canal cruise” (Hyde, 2013), which, beginning in 2013, flowed along the city’s historic shipping canal system in order to transport shoppers during the busy Christmas period. Within this discourse, ease of access becomes a unique selling point which attracts the shopping centre’s reported thirty million annual visitors. Indeed, with many of its stores now being a part of large chains or franchises that can be found on city High Streets as well as ever escalating competition with online retailers, the shopping centre obsesses over, as a pamphlet distributed to shoppers in September 2015 describes it, “getting here…and getting home (missing you already)”; a complete preoccupation with getting shoppers through the doors. Given both its importance to the field itself and the wealth of existing literature on buses and transit routes (see, for example, Latour, 1996; Couser, 2005) it would
be impossible to present an ethnographic account of the shopping centre that did not deal with the context of the life of XL.

However, the question which preoccupied this thesis became about how one could write this account without naturalizing the “I think”; without neglecting the imperative to experiment with a transcendental empiricism and the lived challenge to subjectivity. What follows is a largely unedited section from the fieldnotes that were generated during the initial encounters on this bus route. Because of how important they are to any ethnographic project, much has been written on the nuanced topic of fieldnotes (see Sanjek, 1990; Taussig, 2011; Didion, 2001) and how to write them (Emerson et al., 1995; Wolfinger, 2002; Walford, 2009). Indeed, more specifically, if one were to consult any guide or introduction to “organizational ethnography” one would find sections on fieldnotes or writing (see for example, Neyland, 2008). While we are aware that the various jottings, scribblings, sketches, artefacts and diary entries that constitute fieldnotes create and construct the field and that previous work has have problematized their veracity and even experimented with their forms in relation to new technologies (see Wang, 2012), what this thesis suggests is that ethnographers may have yet to fully consider that, inherent in the act of graphia itself, they legitimate and maintain the subject via the function of saying “I am I” (Widdler, 2013). We have numerous instances of fieldnotes or diaries from various famous ethnographers (see for example, the infamous: Malinowski, 1967) demonstrating how they think in the field and to what their attention is given when they write in regular and systematic ways about what they observe and learn while in the field (Emerson et al., 1995; p.1). These notes are, however, always underpinned by the author(ity) of the “I think”. They write of “I observed”, “I experienced” or “I saw”. In the Introduction to this work we made the case that there were calls for different kinds of writing across all three of the disciplines in our trypptic and here we wish to develop this in light of the twin problems of author(ity) and subjectivity. The subject,
it would seem, is the limit condition of ethnographic work, acting as, to summarize Van Maanen (2011), the one who writes, and in so doing, is shaped by particular academic discourses and concerns. If we are to take seriously Deleuze’s challenge to the subject, however, exploring thus the limits of ethnography then it follows that we must ask what other kinds of fieldnote might look like. Consider the following:

“Hello.” he says. I am XL. I was XL. I became XL when you stumbled through my insides, leaving bits of yourself behind as you did so. Sometimes I forget what XL means. XL moves through the black-blue-grey of life, always parallel to lines. It is not interested in lobster-gods or trees, bodies or madness. His heart is a handbag, a purse full of metal and oil, belts and fans, explosions and flows, little machines, moving parts and part-bodies. He takes an exit. This is not an exit. Thank you for reminding us, Patrick. XL loses himself being chased by a black-blue-grey Heffalump, by a van which announces its gender as mail. “Catch us if you can Holden Caulfield!” I am not a phony, I am XL. I am crumpled-up newspaper, a woman eating fries, a gaggle of giggling tourists, a phone playing ten second loops of electronica, a weary stretch a great yawn, a pink Hummer for rent, rolling bottles, chatter and call, the smell of sweat, the burning June sun, the bushy green of the suburbs, the sounds of construction, the remains of an industrial park, the bump in the journey that is always unexpected and the pull of force as I dance around a circle. “We’re not at all sure we’re persons: a draft, a wind, a day, a time of day, a stream, a place, a battle, an illness all have a nonpersonal individuality.” (N, p.141). I am XL. I say it so I don’t forget because XL has been reskinned, bought and sold, changed from bold red and covered in oranges while moving fast and sitting still. I cross a line. “Sir, could you please stay behind the line.” Lines are made to blur and so are we; moving fast but still over black-blue-grey. We do not have much further to go before we can rest. XL
shakes, jostles, bounces up-down and left-right watching the bright June sun pulling the lines off the black-blue-grey road; making us expand and sweat, sliding, always sliding along a melting canvass splattered in earth bones and rubber. It is not clear if the traffic light is dancing or if I am. We hit it hard and spit glass all over the curb as sounds of panic burst forth from the inside. It hurts but I keep going because we are almost there. Sometimes she takes turns that we are not supposed to, so says the voices of the many inside, rejecting the land and streets of port and choosing to Hyde instead. We are reminded: No left turn, “This is not an exit”. Thank you again, Patrick but I am not a videotape so I can return to where I should have been on my own. I am close to empty but far from home. I have seen your face before, always with the morning sun in your hair. Hats would suit you well, I wonder why you don’t wear them. I hear the questions you ask and the banter you have before you take your space. Why are you so curious? Es muss sein. Perhaps I will see you again when the time is right, when enough lines trace your body for you to want to return. How you must pity those souls with selenophobia who tremble and quake like an exit sign when they travel these long, straight, black-blue-grey lines with me to homes of old. This is my function. This is how I work, a rumbling beast traversing lines, a machine full of hats, Heffalumps and crying toddlers. I am XL.

This style of description might seem absurd, surreal or as nonsense; comprised not of reporting of “what happened and when” but filled instead with sporadic and ephemeral connection to literature, to film, to passing signs, to memories of works of fiction or philosophy, to dreams, to the people of the bus, to overheard speech and sound, and to the looming shopping centre-to-come. What such fieldnotes pursue is an attempt to write without the author(ity) of the “I think”. Considering how central the author(ity) of a speaking “I” is to an ethnographic work, its quality often stemming from the voice of the author and their
“disciplined subjectivity” (Kutz, 1990), this is a hazardous experiment. The reader might be quick to point out that this section still uses the first person “I”. We would, however, suggest that it is not clear who the “I” is in this passage (whether there are multiple “I”, prompting questions around who is “we” and who is “I”, whether it is always the same “I” asking questions etc.). Furthermore, while this thesis generally avoids the first-person “I” in order to implicitly communicate its critique of the unity of the author, on the issue of any occurrences of an “I” in the text, Deleuze and Guattari offer in *A Thousand Plateaus* the observation that, they tried “to reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I” (*ATP*, p.3). While the reader might say that an “I” still had to be there in order to experience, sense and then inscribe these notes; it is again, unclear which “I”, whose experience (interlocutor or ethnographer), whose quotations or whether any “I” were with XL at the time of writing. This mode of inscription, based in uncertainty rather than ambiguity, is what we shall explain in the following section to be a means of engaging with what Deleuze refers to as “the fourth person singular” tense (*LOS*, p.103). Indeed, “the schizo, out for a stroll” was, for this thesis, a fledgling experiment in writing a “literature review” in the fourth person, or, in the least, in conveying via text the highly plural and disparate voices which tried to speak authoritatively on the shopping centre.

We will, however, pause in our exposition of this style of writing for it is first necessary to place it in context by considering what headway other researchers, or parallel trends in ethnographic research, have made. While ethnographers explored variously “kinky” empiricisms (Rutherford, 2012) and others (*see* Spencer, 2001; Spiro, 1996) have tried to negotiate the “postmodern” manifestations of the reflexive turn which followed *Writing Culture* (Clifford and Marcus, 1986) as well as its predecessors- Tyler’s (1984) commentary on the “vision quest” and Geertz’s (1973) consideration of modes of representation- and discussions of the “crisis of representation” (Marcus and Fischer, 1999) in the human
sciences, there is perhaps no real address to the problem of experience, sensation and the foundations of thought in the context which we have presented here. What address can be found is in the context of the discourse of “reflexivity” (Marcus, 1994; Foley, 2002; see also Chia, 1996; Linstead, 1994), but most often this move leads to further glorification of the “I think”, congruent with the extension of the scope of the ethnography into considering the full effects of a culturally bound, emotional, embodied, living, subject-position upon the ethnographic work. It is perhaps unheard of that an ethnographer should seek, in response to Deleuze, to altogether abandon the pretence of the “I think” and thus eschew the corollary identity politics by whatever means available. Indeed, whether one considers ethnography as a study of the Other (Adams, 1980)- who can only be defined in opposition to the self/subject- or a study by the “empirical lantern” whereby an intentional phenomenological consciousness returns to “illuminate the dynamism of the everyday” (Biehl and Locke, 2010, p.318) or through the identity of the “professional stranger” (Agar, 1980) or even as “storytelling or science” (Aunger, 1995), in most cases all of our notions of “what to do in the field”; which come to facilitate the interpretation, description and observation that ground most ethnographic inquiry (Sperber, 1985); are reliant upon a thinking “I” since concern for the ethnographer qua subject is justifiably not in calling into question the foundational theory of experience and sensation via Descartes, Kant and Hume but in trying to tell the story of a people or place. As such even the most progressive or reflexive accounts do not extend this far and indeed, they cannot for as Geertz (1988, p.143) notes, the “capacity to persuade readers […] that what they are reading is an authentic account by someone personally acquainted with how life proceeds in some place, at some time, among some group” is the author(ity) upon which the legitimacy of ethnography as a method rests. That one could seek

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3 As Foley (2002) chronicles, it is this moment within the reflexive discourse which allows for the flourishing of autoethnographic work (see also Short et al., 2013) which has itself been enthusiastically taken up by scholars throughout the Business School (see Learmonth and Humphreys, 2012; Hayes, 2013; James, 2012; Doloriert and Sambrook; 2012).
to disease this politically important author(ity), and thus the bounds of a discipline, by simultaneously telling a story (of the shopping centre) while calling into question the terms upon which the story is told is thus one of the central contentions of this thesis. That is to say, for this work, in order to engage with Deleuze’s philosophy in a meaningful way, we will use concepts in order to tell stories of the field; concepts which will redouble and call into question how we think of and understand the field itself.

However, this manner of inquiry into the philosophical ground upon which the ethnographer stands is, in the contemporary academy, far from welcome, there being, across the community of ethnographers, a broad nostalgia and longing for the days of the unproblematic practices of fieldwork as simply “being there” and then, after following a group for some time, one would leisurely write up one’s observations (Van Maanen, 2011; see also Cunliffe, 2010). Indeed, it is worth reflecting upon the fact that, despite the bridges to Anthropology which have emerged after the Writing Culture project (see Linstead, 1997; Czarniaw ska, 2012; Ybema et al., 2009), it is still a popular opinion within Organizational Studies that ethnography has the potential to unveil the “realities of how things work” in an organization (Watson, 2011. p.203). As an example, which demonstrates that we can often be unaware of our epistemological assumptions, Watson (2011. p.213) outlines a perplexing argument that suggest that we not seek to write about the “lived experiences” of interlocutors, for these are unknowable, but write instead about the actions of interlocutors within “cultures, discourses, narratives, and social, economic, and political structures.” That is to say, the ethnographer cannot know their interlocutors but can distil the fundamentally chaotic nature of the field through the “I”, thereby rendering it as organized it and making it manageable. This is far from an uncommon assumption despite the fact that and no organization is, at once, more immediate to our thinking, and more obtuse, than the “I”.
In order to progress with this thesis it will be necessary to disabuse ourselves collectively of this idea that ethnography could ever have been a-philosophical and thereby arrive at the conclusion that there are disjunctures between Deleuze’s metaphysic and what philosophical underpinnings the ethnographer takes for granted, for example, the assumptions around the “I think”. Our enquiry is thus doubtlessly more relevant to those ethnographers who have endeavoured to write with Deleuze, as their work often shows an often ineffable awareness of the need to work towards a practice of transcendental empiricism. Some note, for example, that ethnography, like all methodologies, is “always already connected to our conceptions of ontology, epistemology and ethics” (Dyke, 2013. p.151) while others attempt to try to engage with a concept like the rhizome in terms of their lived experience (Douglas-Jones and Sariola, 2009) or attend to cities and their various gastric voices (Dolphins, 2004) while exploring the possibilities of a Deleuzian ethics based in immanence or “the compositions of relations or capacities between different things” (SPP, p. 126); the relations, processes, reactions and functions of food that emerge from the different field sites in a study. What we see in many of these approaches and experiments is the birth of a method, working with Deleuze to, almost in reply to the classic ethnographic invocation to “make the strange familiar and the familiar strange”, disorganize assumptions of the field and disrupt “good sense” (Dyke, 2013): the core of a transcendental empiricism.

Projects in “practical Deleuzism” (Buchanan, 2006) are not altogether new, but arguably none of the aforementioned have tried to take so core and so intractable a part of Deleuze’s work as transcendental empiricism and fully explore its lived ramifications through ethnography. Indeed, it remains a central contention of this work that in each case, what occurs is not the blurring of the lines between theory and fieldwork, which thus renders these two categories inseparable and unintelligible (and thereby Deleuze’s metaphysic becomes an inextricable if intractable part of the work), but an attention to identity via recognition and
appeals to “common” and “good” sense whereby the subject as author(ity) and locus of text always returns; and a practice of transcendental empiricism thus neglected renders Deleuze’s work in a perilously limited way. While in the main we wish to encourage what intersections and developments might be made of Deleuze’s work with ethnographic methods, it is all too often the case that we are not seeking to experiment or denaturalize the foundational assumptions of our thought and thus rich, complex and oftentimes beautiful ethnographic work is forced to contain what are little more than cameo appearances by Deleuze (and Guattari) where the relief image is composed of the sacrosanct tasks of ethnographic work (or our constructions of them) and the background contrast is the uncontested metaphysic which informs this work.4

In order to understand this proposition we might consider two bodies of work on the fringes of this critique. Firstly, in working with Guattari and Australian indigenous populations such as Warlpiri in order to develop an altogether novel reading of “dreaming” and “schizoanalytic” cartography which is developed out of the creation myths of her interlocutors, the combined works of Barbara Glowczewski (2005, 2011, 2014 2016), in one sense confronts and challenges the reader with a metaphysic that is vastly different from their own which renders dreaming as a social, geographical, collective and prophetic phenomena. However considering further the traditional modes of storytelling employed in Glowczewski’s monograph, *Desert Dreamers*, it becomes clear that she has little interest in disrupting the author(ity) of the ethnographer as the one who has “been there” nor any concerns about the “I think” and its role in the narrative. A similar provocation for treating an interlocutor’s metaphysic as a meaningful counterpoint to that of the ethnographer can be found in the works of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1992, 1998, 2012a, 2012b, 2014, 2015).

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4 This trend is much more systemic, extending well beyond the realms of ethnographic work and is, however unfortunately, the defining characteristic of Deleuzian intersections with organizational scholarship. We will address this further in Chapter 2.
amongst the Amerindian peoples of Amazonia, as he overtly seeks a practice wherein “anthropology becomes comparative metaphysics even as metaphysics becomes comparative ethnography” (Viveiros de Castro, 2015). Of the two, Viveiros de Castro’s work is the closest to our project. His recent work, *Cannibal Metaphysics*, tries to overcome “the old illuminist thaumaturgy where an author purports to incarnate a universal reason come to scatter the darkness” (Viveiros de Castro, 2014b, p.41) of the unknown field through, as is his intellectual project, a postcolonial approach to building upon the “imaginative powers” of the society which is under-study; taking seriously their myths, rather than treating them as mysticism to be analysed. However, though both works seek “a permanent decolonization of thought” or a discipline wherein this might be possible, that is, one where, after Nader (2011), ethnography can be thought as theory, this thesis’s address to the same problem lies in the rejection of the reason and knowledge of “the author” and a closer reading of Deleuze in order to achieve the outcome of “the possibility, the threat or promise of another world contained in the ‘face/gaze of the other,’” (Viveiros de Castro, 2015. p.13). For this thesis, the “Other” is the shopping centre itself and though the approaches of these two authors might not realize a Deleuzian empirical method or an ethic of experimenting with concepts in the field in the way that this thesis seeks, it is possible to say that the ontological turn in its various forms (Holbraad et al., 2014; de la Cadena, 2010, 2015; Kohn, 2013), can all be considered as an “a parallel evolution” (Viveiros de Castro, 2010. p.220) to the developments of this thesis.

Given our concerns, it is thus comparatively intriguing that many in the academy consider the work of Latour and the approaches associated with either Science, Technology and Society Studies (STS) or Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the “sociology of translation” (*see* Callon, 1986; Law, 1992, 1994; Latour, 2005; Hardy et al., 2001; Law and Hassard, 1999) to be a mode of integrating Deleuze’s metaphysic into empirical practice.
beyond anything more than terminology. While a full exploration of the intricacies of the connections and disagreements between the likes of Latour, Stengers etc. and Deleuze is beyond the scope of this thesis, we shall note that, though it is true that the attention to assemblages (DeLanda, 2006; Müller, 2015) or the decentered network of non-human actors synonymous with these approaches has done much for moving the social sciences as a whole towards thinking about agency, intentionality and, by extension, the status of the subject in critical ways (in the context of organization studies see Czarniawska, 2009; Woolgar et al., 2009; McLean and Hassard, 2004; Lee and Hassard, 1999; Alcadipani and Hassard, 2010), it is worth noting that Latour (2003, p.23) himself says “while I have read everything of Deleuze, I am not always convinced he is so useful in my empirical enquiries,” which is to say that Latour himself does not envision his project as one which is close to Deleuze’s metaphysic.

To establish why this is important, we might explain what this work seeks to achieve, as regards a Deleuzian method, in a further simplified manner. In What is Philosophy (p.208), Deleuze and Guattari outline what they refer to as the three “daughters of chaos”: art, science and philosophy. Dealing with chaos is here understood as the fundamental human endeavour, underpinning and informing our fears, drives, desires and our greatest technological advancements. While all of its daughters share an aptitude for creativity, each has a designated task and specific function. Art creates affects and brings variety to our understanding of the world. Science creates functions and propositions that aim to slow down chaos, to freeze it in a single state that can be analysed in terms of its variables. Philosophy creates concepts, variations on and perspective from which one can apprehend chaos, inventing conceptual personae to make it possible to engage with chaos without diminishing it or reducing its productivity. One might think then, that as philosophers, Deleuze and Guattari place themselves amongst those in this final category and, indeed, there is much
evidence for this conclusion. However, his frequent claims to want to “get out of philosophy by means of philosophy” (Ab) as well as the exercise of producing monstrous and buggered offspring from the history of philosophy (N, p.6) lead us to suggest that there is also an interstitial space, somewhere between the lines of this triptych, into which Deleuze slips at times; creating a seamless melding of poetic verse, scientific experimentation and conceptual play with each alternatively playing the foil of the other. It is into the interstitial spaces of its own triptych that this work would like to fall. However, perhaps considered on a spectrum which follows Deleuze’s own distinction via Pius Servien, his writings are closer to the lyrical and the poetic, where each term is an irreplaceable singularity, than they are to the language of science, where defined terms may be substituted for equivalent others (DR).

This simple demarcation of the lines between science, art and philosophy has been neglected by those who would propose “Deleuzian intersections” (see Jensen and Rodje, 2010) and, indeed, more generally, by many of those who would seek to work with Deleuze’s concepts. If these lines of division hold, then the ethnographer must necessarily find herself at an impasse, for if she holds to any pretence of being a social scientist (and subject), her approach must be one which seeks to attenuate the chaos of the field, interpreting it in cross-section, a textual Eugene Louis Doyen, cutting the body of a field into sheets, into blocks to be labelled; tracing genealogies to study collective histories, conducting interviews to quote interlocutors as sources, following material relations and practices, differentiating “winks” from “twitches” (Geertz, 1973) and always returning as a subject who unifies the faculties and focuses them upon the singular object of the various identities of field. Not only are there tools more apposite for this work than Deleuze’s concepts but the introduction of philosophy into ethnographic inquiry serves as little more than a distraction since it is, in the main, an ex post facto addendum to fieldwork which cannot be developed without detracting from the ethnographic narrative because it has perilously little to do with the relations and problems of
that field, “interpretation-through-imposition” (Skafish, 2014). Thus, the question becomes not only how does ethnographic writing take place without the “I think” but how does one, being within a the disciplined intersection of these various debates and intellectual projects find a way of working with Deleuze?

March 2014: Tongues on Asphalt:

If we are to have any means of negotiating the throes of the paradox of arriving at the field as a “disciplined subject” at the aforementioned intersection and the imperative to think otherwise than the bonds of subjectivity and discipline allow, it is necessary for us to consider further how a writing practice of transcendental empiricism could present itself. It is clear that the practices of fieldwork, thought in the full context of a transcendental empiricism, place the ethnographer qua subject in a double bind but perhaps the violence of inscription, wrought upon both inscriber and inscribed might allow for some kind of recourse. The method of such writing may lie in truly embracing chaos (something all of its daughters are scared to do, in fear of the madness which this brings) in order to write a kind of description which, unlike Geertz’s (1973), does not interpret the relations for the reader, but rather presents a mess of entangled relations, made sensible only by concepts, poetics and connections. The reader is thus confronted with an experience of the field which has been neither rendered disconnected and abstract through after-the-fact conceptual work nor has it been entirely mediated through a subject/interpreter. *Madness in dosages.* It is, of course, not uncommon for an ethnographer to think of themselves as “a mad poet on the loose, desperate for new experience, dreaming of exaggerated realities” (Taussig, 2004. p. 174) (and indeed there are shades of an a-subjective poet throughout Taussig’s work). Though untranslated to ethnography, commentary on ‘other writings’ is even more commonplace within Deleuze Studies which has always celebrated the figure of madness (Artaud, Rimbaud etc.) and which
is perhaps more sympathetic towards the fact that, as Foucault (1988) tells us, madness used to be regarded with reverence (before it was ostracized and vilified in the modern age, silencing and containing the figure of madness). Indeed, following Deleuze himself many have begun to investigate the usage of the “fourth person singular” tense (see Bradley, 2015) which we began to develop previously.

In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze explores this idea of the “fourth person” in cooperation with the poet/author Lawrence Ferlinghetti. The reader will doubtlessly be familiar with English pronouns: the first person “I”, the second person “you” and the third person “he, she, they”, so what might the “fourth person” be? There are a number of ways to read and think the problems of the text but the simplest way is to say that the “fourth person” may be thought to speak when the “tone” of the text is occluded or when the voice of the author is unclear. *When it is not clear who speaks.* The fourth person thus becomes “heuristic for exploring the notion of free indirect speech” (Bradley, 2015. p.185). It is worth noting, however, that in the world of Ferlinghetti’s *Her* (1960) the “fourth person singular” is more of a curse than a gift, haunting visions of a life which plays out like a film, independent of will or action, eventually driving the protagonist towards suicide (Ianni, 1967). This is perhaps a show of bad faith on Ferlinghetti’s part, ignoring the creativity and spontaneity that the “fourth person singular” can afford since, for Deleuze, the “fourth person” becomes a way to articulate impersonal and pre-individual singularities and the splendour of the event itself.5

“Only when the world, teaming with anonymous and nomadic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities opens up, do we tread at last on the field of the transcendental” (*LOS*, p.118). To be able to create the kind of rupture which would allow for the ‘field of the transcendental’, the ethnographer would need to be attentive to these singularities, admitting neither “self” nor

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5 Though Deleuze himself does not note it, others like Gramling (2009) have spoken about the “fourth person” tense in *The Castle*, where through switching almost imperceptibly between first and third persons Kafka manages a kind of “indirect discourse” which creates ambiguity around the protagonist.
“I” and writing not of I observe, I think or I report; for this, following the logic of Benveniste (1971), is to reaffirm oneself as “subject” and reaffirm that author(ity) which is ingrained in the ethnographic method by the logic of what Clifford (1998, p.22) describes as “You are there…because I was there.” Writing in the fourth person, as has been happening in this chapter (with the schizo and with XL), is perhaps a way to begin account for the plurality of voices which present themselves in the field of the shopping centre or, in the least, give attention to the plethora of singularities which emerge while being both absent and present, an acknowledgement of ‘larval subjectivities’.

Let us develop another example. In a short text that shades into the autoethnographic, Lundy (2014) explores the concept of the stroll, that purposeless and undirected wandering common to both the schizo and the flâneur. The lines of words on the page of a diary of fieldnotes can similarly be taken for a stroll, meandering through different intersections and subjectivities. Academia has long understood ethnos-graphia to mean “writing about people” and has done much to interrogate the question of “Who speaks/writes?” through reflexivity but, reduced to its most basic form, the “fourth person” comes in answer as a dismissal, restating the practice through a transcendental empiricism as “another writing” and turning violence of inscription, in all its furore, upon the author who must always exist within the text. His status as a logos, an identified flâneur, an ethnographer as social scientist, as a thinking subject, begins to be stripped, prompting the subordination of these identities to the field of difference of the “fourth person” which allows for the emergence of a world of “pre-individual, impersonal singularities” (DI, p.144. and LOS p.172). What follows is another example of fieldnotes which explore this kind of writing after a long walk to the shopping centre.

*We have tasted hundreds of kilometres, sometimes swallowing whole ranges and districts in a day. We have savoured chalky Welsh mountain, sweet Scottish Loch*
and dined on the rich dirt of English countryside but they say that we will have nothing but tart and bitter asphalt upon which to feast today. They say that the journey is short and that it will be over soon but this is small comfort to a refined palate, now all too used to the finer things in life. There must have been someone else that they could have chosen to go. Still, we are grateful for the mildly sweet taste of dew and the crisp tremors of cold on this still, March morning. In the great tales, the heroes always travel east, into peril and danger but we are heading west with the warm, savoury sun on our heels.

We chew past the clouded pâté of detritus that lines a lower income neighbourhood, home to one of the city’s many diasporic communities, drinking deep the murky water of potholes and the morose tang of motor oil. The rumble in the earth is more than that of passing car, passing trains perhaps? We turn and the air takes on a refreshingly woody quality, as though someone has been cutting or trimming trees and hedges nearby. These boots are military-issue and go high up the shins, making it impossible not to goose-step; the impact on the pavement is loud and seems to echo far. Engulfed now by the plain but peppered aftertastes of suburbia we are aware of the peculiar cacophony of sweat and joy, a playground, multiple playgrounds. Our tongues scrape against something sharp and foul, a bitter and unwelcome sensation amidst cool and wet air. A duck pond! A bench, littered with the scars of years of hurt, wounds that it was born to embody it tastes sore and weary, as if it wished to go home. Is this a journey, a pilgrimage or a return?

We continue on and the ambrosial tones of many kinds of prayer seep into air amongst the just palatable notes of red brick, all bedsits and small apartments, crunchy paved driveways and sweet overhanging trees but with something older and deeper behind the notes. The asphalt is still bitter with the memories of a gas-station
but the taste of petrol is not fresh. There is a hum in the pavement, a slow dance. We feel it with each caress, each lick says waltz. A main street filled with stores but yet to be filled with people for we do not dive and dodge and they said that it was too early for that. We keep moving amidst the refreshing sensations of water borne on the burst of green that is the spring wind, a small body of water maybe; it is in the air hidden behind something dense, a deep reservoir of stacked, identical houses? The world shakes as though we are bridging across some great chasm. We are struck with the aged tastes of kings and books which are still difficult to discern from amidst the overtones of red-brick. We scrape roughly on the pavement as a roar cuts us off, still stewing in the March mist. Iodine, Chlorine, motor-oil and the whip of summer wind, our palate is overwhelmed but we keep going, for miles, in a large rectangle, sometimes stopping to kick our heels on a wall, sometimes stalling for the sounds of others. It will be a long walk home.

It is not clear who is speaking here as the “fourth person” becomes an advanced form of the Benjaminian (2006) storyteller, lost in the craft of the story; time, space and subjectivity blurring around them. This is almost the opposite of what ethnographers-in-training are taught to do and while the “meticulous” and ordered record has its uses, it is often the case that “the fieldwork diary is built upon a sense of failure—a foreboding sense that the writing is always inadequate to the experience it records.” (Taussig, 2011. p.100). Perhaps the “fourth person” is also a means of speaking to this fear of inadequacy, embracing the strangeness, messiness and chaos of the field by refusing to order it; chronicling instead fragments and ephemera. There is a kind of madness at work here, but it is not without its reasons. Indeed, when asked why this text chose to use “the fourth person”, we might not only problematize what it means to “choose”, but also appropriate out of its context and ask the reader to reflect
upon Levi-Strauss’s aphorism: “Laissez-vous porter par le terrain (Let the field decide for you)” (Descola, 2005. p.69). As such, here is what the shopping centre says:

“Take a spin on the traditional Victorian carousel,”

“Beep, Beep! You’ll find extensive free parking,”

“Getting here ...and getting home (missing you already),”

“It’s free to surf on our turf!”

“Meet us on the Malls!”

“Relax, hop on a bus.”

While it is clear that the sign or the back cover of the periodically published “Centre Guide” is speaking to potential visitors via the second-person, “you”, it is not clear who is speaking. An intern in the public relations office? A management group or team who met and decided that this familiar tone would resonate most with shoppers? The seductive voice of the shopping centre itself, putting on an air of friendliness? Moreover, who is the collective “we” or “us” referring to? The stores and staff? The shopping centre’s general manager? The shopping centre itself? Consider this:

“Moreover the walls of my castle are broken; the shadows are many and the wind breathes cold through broken battlements. But still, in none of the rooms there is a mirror.”

Who speaks this quote, painted on the wall of the shopping centre in November 2012? Is it really Bram Stoker? A marketing executive with a tremendous sense of irony? Or is this the shopping centre itself speaking of its broken walls? One acts disingenuously to try to find the speaker or origin and one might even spend a day asking around to learn the origin, meaning and significance of this quote but there will be no answer. Indeed, the question of “who writes” is in itself misguided for it implicitly seeks a thinking subject to function as an author. When asked “who speaks” Deleuze says “whenever we write we speak as someone
else. And it is a particular form that speaks through us.” (DI, p. 143). Thinking in the fourth person encourages us to see the ambiguity, paradox and irony in the field, to see that the discourses at work in the field are highly plural and without traceable origin, either from the “I think” or any other subject in the field. In this sense, we cannot say what contribution the fourth person might make to any of the three disciplines that govern this thesis, for we do not know what it might say and cannot be sure from where it came.

However, with the fourth person, exceeding claims to be several and to write a book as a crowd (ATP, p.3), it is not sufficient to merely note the fourth person in the field saying, for example, that it is not clear whether a statement is from an interlocutor met at the shopping centre, a quote from a book read while waiting for an interview to begin, an excerpt from a novel, a snippet of overheard conversation, a moment from a dream or a piece of academic meta-commentary. It is also insufficient to enact what has been described as a “transcendental empiricist ethics”, where a writer embraces that of which he would rather not speak, not his personal histories or anecdotes, but his shame, his perversity and his madness (Buchanan, 2000). Practicing a transcendental empiricism means making space for the forms of the fourth person to speak, for other notes, tones and voices to emerge, thus holding the author to the promise which Foucault and Barthes made regarding his mortality. Indeed, it is to take seriously the question asked by Colebrook (2015, p.218): “Does not any question, any temporality, presuppose one for whom there is a world? Can the subject think its own non-being?” In answer this thesis will suggest that the unmaking of the subject is possible, but perhaps only through a series of sustained experiments in madness. It may thus be that the fourth person makes space for the shopping centre itself to speak, answering (almost in interview), one of the fundamental metaphysical questions: “Who am I?”

May 2015: Getting There
There are many ways that one could have gotten to the shopping centre. Through many paths, many literatures and many histories; attentive to the work of marketing, to the plays of consumer identity construction, to the minutia of architecture, to the movement of people or walking while caught between Deleuze, Anthropology and CMS. In chronicling them, this chapter is one that aimed to transport the reader to the shopping centre- “transport” here used in the sense of the old French transporter meaning not just to carry or move but to emotionally and affectively overwhelm. Here the fourth person finds its purpose not only as a means to develop a practice of transcendental empiricism but as a way to confront the reader with an altogether new experience of the shopping centre. In this sense, the shopping centre is neither as simple nor as complicated as we may wish it to seem but there is a kind of madness and delirium that lives there, the experience of which, though not from the perspective of a subject, is always strange and alien, uncomfortable and overbearing. Provided that one is not yet acclimatized to it, this space and the society of which it is the centre exposes one to a “harrowing, emotionally overwhelming experience, which brings the schizo as close as possible to matter, to a burning, living centre of matter” (AO. p.21). We concede that it will always have been impossible to render these madnesses through writing practices. Further, if Artaud (1965. p.38) is to be believed then “All writing is Pig Shit” and the entire enterprise of experimenting with modes of ethnographic inscription is at risk of becoming an overwrought and pretentious facsimile of the schizo’s madness rather than a confrontation with their experience. However, our concern is beyond these misgivings and it is our contention that the fourth person is the tense of modern life- for it is always unclear who is speaking. When an interlocutor speaks or one reads the annual report of the corporation which owns the shopping centre, it is never clear whether what one encounters is a discourse re-articulated, a populist opinion given new voice or a reactionary trend to some broader social formation. Writing in the fourth person is perhaps the best way to express this particular experience; paralleled,
however problematically, to that of the experience of the wandering schizo who can live a transcendental empiricism.

To be clear, we do not say that schizoid behaviour, or madness, in general should be fetishized nor do we wish to rely upon representations of the disease. Rather, we need to “seek out the creative element to what we called the madman’s transcendental dimension” (Dosse, 2013, p.47) in experience and a mode of description that is neither bound to the tyranny of the “I think” nor to the subject nor by representation nor to the image of thought. The fourth person gives a strategy for courting madness within the field and rendering it as an unmediated shock to the reader in text (both fieldnote and chapter). Remember that it is because his experiences of the world are unmediated through an image of thought and because his actions do not conform to social convention that the schizo earns his stigma. Indeed, here we find the “truth” of Deleuze’s empiricism as neither a reaction against concepts nor merely an appeal to experience but as “the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard” (DR, p.xx) and it is this which we will try to pursue in the chapters to come, not because it may be useful as a stream of future revenue generation for the Business School via consultancy, nor because the thesis harbours “revolutionary” hopes nor even because doing so could make a “novel contribution to knowledge” but because, as Baugh (1992) surmises, for Deleuze a concept or a reading may be useful simply because it inspires us to think differently about what the practices and ideas that we hold allow us to do and prevent us from doing.

It would seem that the practice of a transcendental empiricism lies in a field of paradoxes, one uniquely positioned at the limits of the ethnographic. To “get there” it would seem that one must go and (not) go. (not) Go as a subject whose body is to be a tool to study the field and from whom an interpretation must necessarily spring; dismantle the self and thus remain open to disconnecting and reconnecting the faculties in different synesthetic forms,
dis-organ-izing the body. (not) Go to be immersed in the field but remain attentive to those voices, both present and absent, which speak of, to and about the shopping centre. (not) Go to be bowled over by the absurdity of experiences of the shopping centre; finding unattributed quotes from Bram Stoker on the walls, searching for a hare on the first floor during an “Evening in Wonderland”, hearing Wagner playing in the Square, having conversations about the history of a carousel; for these encounters are themselves rife with irony, unforeseeable cultural references and a special kind of madness that one would act in bad faith to try interpret or make sane. (not) Go to practice the tracing of concepts, thinking through conversations about bodies and time in terms of organless bodies and the syntheses of time while writing fieldnotes in the fourth person on XL shortly before midnight. (not) Go to try to apprehend the given in the ‘here and now’ and simultaneously call it into question, thereby risking madness. (not) Go to ask the shopping centre what it is, for there is no greater paradox.
Chapter II: Wandering Lines: Bodies, Organization, and Shopping Centres

Figure 2: The Line of the Body

In the previous chapter we alluded to this thesis’s rejection of the identity politics around the reflexive turn in ethnographic work on the contention that these were tantamount to a re-establishment of “the subject” and an affirmation of its author(ity). In order to advance this critique it is necessary for this work to address the specific question of “the body”, or embodiment in general; for no matter how this work entreats the reader to consider the a-subjective or the prepersonal as a part of the project of a practice of transcendental empiricism, the sceptical reader will maintain that a distinct, corporeal body moved to the shopping centre in order to conduct an ethnography and that that “body proper” had experiences of the shopping centre. This chapter will suggest that Deleuze’s reading of the body can help us move beyond this legitimation of subjectivity. As we shall explore, the body and all of its ancillary questions have long been an object of preoccupation for both Anthropology and CMS, in terms of debates around (inter alia) the production of masculinity and femininity (Coupland, 2014, Knights, 2015; Godfrey et al., 2012); movement and dance (Slutskaya and De Cock, 2008; Serres, 2011; Ness, 1992); medical contexts such as health,

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6 In sitting on a bench, often waiting for an interlocutor or a set time to arrive, one might take to the habit of sketching concepts. Often these will be nonsensical and will indicate the evolution of an understanding over time. For example, Figures 4, 6, and 7 illustrate this with an evolving attempt to sketch Deleuze’s theory of time. Figure 5, by a similar logic, illustrates an attempt to sketch or otherwise chronicle a repeated snippet of music, often heard in the Square next to the shopping centre. The above figure illustrates an attempt to sketch the relation between the Body without Organs and strata as described in A Thousand Plateaus, an understanding which similarly evolves into Figure 3, which constitutes an attempt to think the shopping centre along similar lines.
age, disease and weight (Mol, 2002; Brewis, 2011; Pretence, 2013); the body as text (Trethewey, 1999) or as a research tool (Wacquant, 2004; Woodyer, 2008) and studies of kinship, familial relation and mythology (Godelier, 2011). As such, the conversations around the discipline and organization of the body are so extensive that it is beyond the scope of this work to consider all the lines, from the feminist to the postcolonial, that notions of “the body” pursue. However, while Deleuze’s work occasionally emerges as a matter of concern within these conversations, research exploring the unique reading of the body which he develops throughout his corpus, particularly in relation to what Deleuze calls the “Body without Organs” (see Linstead, 2000; Thanem, 2004; Linstead and Pullen, 2006), has been limited and problematic, at least where Organization Studies is compared to wider scholarship (see Guillaume and Hughes, 2011).

Having thus far made the case for the importance of textual experimentation this chapter will develop these connections to the body by continuing to explore its potential for disorganizing the representation of the coherency and author(ity) of the “I think” on the page by following two interwoven lines of thought. Similar plays with textuality can be found in the works of Jacques Derrida (1986) or, the ethnographic accounts of Annmarie Mol (2002). However, the project for this chapter is much less ambitious than theirs and furthermore, the lines of the stories below are much less well defined than the ones which occur in those works. The reader may pursue one at a time, both at once, or look for the many points of intersection in the concepts that they trace and move between these. As the chapter unfolds, we hope that it becomes clear that this chapter could not have been written other than with lines for the lines shown here are more than a formal exercise in structuring the work, they are indicative of the way in which the work pursues and tracks a line of thought; not representing order and control but encouraging the schism, the random offshoot, the tangent and that which the voice of author(ity) would seek to efface in order to validate itself. We
thus ask for the reader’s wanderlust as they follow these lines, for they may often eschew the expected style of academic writing and its tendency to position, analyse, align and legitimate itself, in favour of flowing and discursive trains of conceptual exploration which may meander, violently cut-off, stutter, and descend into self-referentiality. Both lines trace what emerged in this work as fundamentally connected issues when considering the body and the shopping centre, namely the concept of the Body without Organs, the status of “the critical” in CMS, death, alternatives, diagrams and lines. As we shall discuss, the concept of the Body without Organs and the way in which it can be consistently related to lines within Deleuze’s corpus offers significant insight into the ways in which the shopping centre is and can be thought, not just ethnographically but critically.
A life (f)or the Body without Organs  

Here stands the shopping centre’s general manager, on the deck of a ship. He speaks to an audience held captive within velvet ropes and also, though he does not acknowledge them, more generally to an audience of shoppers having lunch in the food court. His body is average and almost nondescript in its conformance to the stereotype of the balding, middle-aged, suit-clad, male manager. The occasion is the 15th anniversary of the shopping centre’s opening. His tone, however, is not one of cheer, good will, and bright prospects for the future. It is one of gratitude and reminiscence. It is a memorial. And as he speaks of the shopping centre’s various accomplishments over the years, of all that it has done to raise money for charity, of how many customers it has attracted and of how much it does for shareholders, the eulogy reveals itself. Good words at the end of a life. But as the life of the shopping centre carries on just outside the ropes (bins changed on schedule, conversations about where to go and what to

A Eulogy for Critical Management Studies  

When one asks “What is a eulogy?” it becomes obvious that one has never had to write one. There is so much entangled in the act of mourning that will perhaps always be opaque and unavailable, other than through experience (much like the shopping centre). Death itself marks a crushing finality, a point of zero, beyond which no creative act can take place. In one reading, the eulogy, itself always after death, is the last creative moment before the abject and final disorganization of a body sets in. As much as one might wish to set aside the terrors of the paradoxes of the shopping centre which we discussed in the previous chapter - the tensions around text, the “I think” and the fourth person- in seeking to identify the shopping centre as it answers the one who asks, “What are you?”, there is an attempt to resolve the tension of a paradox that itself prompts a protracted kind of funeral procession which, through revolution, returns us to thinking only in terms of identity; to a coffin with no way out of the systems of
do, crying children, spills and sales), one wonders who this work of mourning is for and whether life in the shopping centre will always have continued as normal.

One never knows from where an idea comes. While in the main we believe ourselves to be autonomous, thinking subjects, whether through notions of social dreaming or a collective unconscious (see the works of Gordon Lawrence, Carl Jung etc.), or as in the previous chapter, a “fourth person”, the academy has long held in question the notion that our thoughts are entirely our own. The preceding vignette reflects such an instance, where it was not clear how the image of the eulogy emerged as a descriptor for what was taking place; by all other accounts a celebration of the 15th anniversary of the shopping centre’s opening. Perhaps the word was overheard while sitting in the food court. Perhaps it emerged from what might elsewhere be referred to as “the secondary literature”. Perhaps it was part of a dream. This thesis will contend that it is not productive to chase this origin; that we organization and signification which have become habits of text and thought. This is perhaps sufficient reason for this thesis to try to develop a practice of transcendental empiricism; not as an alternative but as a critique of thinking in terms of identity, in terms of truth, error and the cogito; with the hope of an ethical mode of engagement with Deleuze’s philosophy of difference for the social sciences. There is, however, perhaps nothing that such a philosophy can do for Critical Management Studies since it has been over ten years since many of its pioneers agreed amongst themselves that CMS was dead and for all that it can offer, transcendental empiricism is not a necromancy. Indeed, as will become clear, contra Fleming and Mandarini (2009, p.333), CMS research has little in common with what Deleuze “celebrates as a bastard empiricism.”

Ten years ago, amidst growing fears that CMS had lost any manner of revolutionary purpose and; unable to effect change in either the modern corporation which it studied, the
should instead, after the fashion of Deleuze and Guattari, “follow the line” (Stivale, 2008) and pursue the thought to see where it leads.

In his eulogy for Deleuze, Jacques Derrida (2001) mourns that, in continuing to wander alone on the long roads that they should have taken together, he will have to answer for himself the question of the Body without Organs and Deleuze’s reading of Artaud. “How do you make yourself a Body without Organs?” (ATP. p.165) Derrida might ask, knowing that there is perhaps no question more subversive than this. None which so prompts the scrutinization of functions, habits, identities, and connections with a view towards breaking them; disorganizing. For what are the organs if not accretions of organization, accumulations of carefully delineated function and form which agglomerate upon the body throughout its life as so many articulable points of order and control. However, the vitiating of the body by its organs is not necessarily a form of illness or maleficence. As Deleuze and capitalist system in which it operated or the education system in which it grew; was to be little more than a navel-gazing game played by bored academics (Jones and O’Doherty, 2005; Parker, 2002a), many began a eulogy. In fact, for some CMS “died a long time ago. Out of pity” (Jones and O’Doherty, 2005. p.6). It may be that the death was, even then, still happening. We can speculate that the moment that CMS died was when Grey and Willmott (2005), echoing Thompson (2004), noted with pride that it had become an identity or brand that was widely taken up, betraying an awareness that it was now an identity politic to be played with (an organised body) rather than a practice of critique or even a form of scholarship. Perhaps it was later, when Thompson and O’Doherty (2009, p.107) reminded us that “CMS is now the mainstream” and that the boogeymen who CMS has perhaps always needed (Parker, 2002)- whether we name them positivistic social science or the modernist search for grand narratives- were now ghosts of their former selves that CMS
Guattari claim, “the enemy is the organism” (ATP. p.158). That is to say, what Deleuze and Guattari object to is not organization per se, but rather the ossification and delimitation of function by masses of organization or the point at which “organization” becomes the norm. In A Thousand Plateaus, they work with a number of examples that one might take as explanatory of the logic by which terms like “organization” and “organism” are deployed here. God and his judgement, medical and psychiatric discourses on the body, systems of imposed forms and functions; these all formulate the organism (see Gaynesford, 2001) by accumulating organization.

The organization of the organism takes place on what Deleuze and Guattari call the Body without Organs. For Deleuze and Guattari, the Body without Organs necessarily resists social organization with its smooth and slippery surface (AO, p.9). It is not gendered, nor is it sexualized or couched along racial lines. It is the absolute point of zero organization with no intensities, no was still trying to bury, itself wishing to be a necromancy. Perhaps CMS was always dying, even from the start, inheriting the slow death of the political left after the 1960’s and still signalling “the continuing desire to bury Marx” (Hassard et al., 2001, p.357). Indeed, for those with a sociological imagination (Mills, 2000), it would it be unsurprising to learn that the ideological effects of McCarthyism and the Red Scares still lingered in the collective unconscious and that CMS died from the stress, fear and paranoia that it might one day be branded a leftist or otherwise labelled a traitor by the capitalist enterprise of the contemporary Business School of which it was a part, for CMS has never let go of the questions of its own purpose and legitimacy that it had at the very start (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992), thus maintaining a kind of outsider identity. Or maybe, ten years ago, CMS was not quite dead but was ready to die and what had to happen was a euthanasia, assisting in the suicide of a body that had always struggled to be relevant, always so riven by the history of
controls, no identities and no forms of subjectivity. Rather, it is where these things break down. It is “what remains after you take everything away” (ATP, p. 151). It is the body “outside any determinate state, poised for any action in its repertory” (Massumi, 1992, p.70). It is “opposed to the organising principles that structure, define and speak on behalf of the collective assemblage of organs, experiences or states of being” (Message, 2005, p.33). This is not the statement of a teleology or an absolute definition. Rather, it is merely the beginning of a line, one that we shall continue to pursue until it opens into a diagram of the questions which vitiate the discourse of the body.

Let us, considering O’Doherty (2007b), indulge the ‘pataphysical: what if an organism asked itself how it might become a Body without Organs? What if, maddened and enamoured in and by its own vitalism, a shopping centre said: “I want to see with my nose, breathe with my skin, speak with my stomach… I want a life on terms other than formalized hierarchy, defined roles and labour process theory and the legacy of Marx via Braverman and the Frankfurt School and thus the need to maintain some pretence of ‘resistance’ to dominant paradigms (Thompson and O’Doherty, 2009), always so riddled with angst and terror over the fact that the Business School might one day reject it (Ehrensal, 1999) like the dead body that it was becoming and have it buried or keep it confined to the niche of a limited, coffin-esque space; a half-life on the fringes of the Business School. It was perhaps a collective kindness which lead to the decision to pronounce its death and so help it die or, maybe, it was a shared hope of resurrection via suicide whereby the body of the self would not be destroyed but could be put back together again in a way which freed it from the conditional reflexes of all of its organizations (Artaud, 1965, p.56), a freedom from all of its trappings (for all resurrections are revolutions of a kind). At some point, we should have all gathered to bury CMS then, knowing that the moment of the eulogy, a time to say a few good words at
functions, genitals and labour relations, ingestion and excretions, departments and project teams.” As we outlined in the previous chapter, for the shopping centre, the management of its own body extends into the management of other bodies; considering, through exhaustive academic research, their speeds, their health, their performances of gender or race, their age, their response to music and smells, their accumulation and the formation of crowds, their movement and their lines (Mattsson, 2015). However, the shopping centre does not seem to suffer itself to be vitiated by the “politics” of these bodies. It is only concerned with bodies as problems to be managed and functions to be solved. It is thus likely that the tyranny of organization prompts the shopping centre to dream of a Body without Organs every day, considering not just disorganization or nonorganization but an-organization (the organism will perhaps never disappear from our language), for the Body without Organs is not just that towards which one might disorganise but that which is impossible to the end of a life, had come.

But CMS didn’t die, or at least it seemed not to and, as it had always done—either as a vehicle convincing itself or others—continued to speak in terms of broadening management scholarship, remaining devoted to the ideals of: denaturalization, anti-performativity and reflexivity (Fournier and Grey, 2000). Indeed, it continued to expand the boundaries of what it was and could be into “radical” critiques of patriarchy and imperialism, long after it was believed dead (Adler et. al., 2007). It may be that despite all of the tumult caused by and over the “missing subject” (O’Doherty and Willmott, 2001), CMS still harboured a belief in the revolution-to-come, whereby the systematic deskilling of the global populace and the pathological expansion of managerial control could be halted, and this is what kept it alive, an inability to give up on what it believed to be a good fight. Whether or not one believes in the paradox of the revolution-to-come, CMS seems alive and well; thriving within its own journals, textbooks claiming.
organize, that which is not even open to the possibility of organization-to-come. After the long tyranny of the organism the fantasy of freedom will doubtlessly be at work in the unconscious of the shopping centre. One might hear this, unacknowledged, speaking through the eulogistic tones of the general manager or through the almost inescapable images of the ‘dead mall’ in popular culture (see films like George Romero’s *Dawn of the Dead* (1978) or David Fincher’s *Gone Girl* (2014) as well as novels like J.G. Ballard’s *Kingdom Come* (2007) or Catherine O’Flynn’s (2012) *What Was Lost*) or, indeed, in the growing number of “dead malls” whose corpses litter the developed and developing worlds as other forms of retailing become more popular (Uberti, 2014). As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, these images are not manifestations of a death drive (*ATP*, p.160) for the question of *an*-organization cannot be as simple as a wish to die) but a desire for freedom from the organism and its organizations. Sometimes one can go too far in pursuing disorganization, risking death, “critical” orientation (Parker and Thomas, 2011) and bi-annual conferences; all growing in scale and scope. There are, however, always signs of decay, *chipping paint, a smudge on a rail, a dying potted plant, dust on a statue, a strewn bit of tissue, odd smells, water-damage on a ceiling tile, broken light fixtures, cobwebs, mold, stores boarded up because of increasing rents, a general malaise* and the most recent CMS conference which was subtitled “management after critique” as though we knew that critique was over, as though what had died was not CMS at all but “the critical” itself and what survived was a body or a discipline without critique, left to survey and chart the aftermath; left crippled to carry out the work of mourning. So let us say some kind words at the end of the life of “the critical”. Despite meaningful questioning of its nature within CMS (*see* Parker and Thomas, 2011) the critical seem ready to be eulogized, but any attempt to do so ethically, without perverse necrophiliac variation or crude *translation* of
and indeed, it is easy, though by no means inevitable, for attempts at a Body without Organs to end in chaos or madness, but death is not the only possibility for the body.

It is thus that the Spinozist question of “What can a body do?” (SPP) remains relevant not only because it has begun to garner interest within CMS (see Thanem and Wallenberg, 2015) but because it can act as a starting point for the question of the Body without Organs, for we do not yet know what a Body without Organs can do. For Deleuze and Guattari, Spinoza’s Ethics is “the great book of the BwO” (ATP, p.153). It is, however, often the case that the complexity of the relationship between the body and the Body without Organs is underestimated, as is the case for Buchanan (1997) who is fully aware that the Body without Organs is a consequence of Deleuze’s understanding of the body but is either unable or wisely unwilling to begin thinking the body from the point where it is least coded by the social field, to begin thinking without identity (and the question of what it is) at the point of its body, would have to acknowledge its own impossibly since the custom of the eulogy, and indeed the meaning of the word itself, involves only speaking well or kindly of the deceased and even then only speaking about what “has” happened. Nothing about such a practice would be critical since the critical was what evolved out of the response of “the critic” to a crisis and often, in crisis, unkind responses are mandated. Etymologically, the words ‘crisis’, ‘critic’, and ‘critical’ all coevolve from the Greek krinein (κρίνω); a word which carries a notion of judging, separating and deciding, of sifting a truth from the tumult of the world. Even via this simplest of definitions CMS held claim to “the critical” for “whether we like it or not, we speak and write today either in or out of crisis.” (Jones and O’Doherty, 2005. p.1), the crisis in question, to which we responded was fundamentally capitalism, which must, by its very nature, itself always exist in crisis (Žižek, 2012) since capital must constantly revolutionize the means of production in order to maintain control of the economic
organization = 0.

What this implies is that our conceptualizations of both the Body without Organs and the body are simply too reliant upon an all too narrow series of definitions of what a body is. That is to say, our understandings of the body are caught up with questions of gender, race and class (Mason, 2013), inextricably intertwined with discussions of the animality and the post-human (MacCormack, 2012) and trapped in the perceived neglect of the body in philosophy (Colebrook, 2011). Such are these definitions that it never occurs to us to ask, for instance: what combinations can it make? What will decompose it? What affects can it pursue? These are Spinozist questions of possibility that more readily occur to us by thinking with the Body without Organs, thus revealing that taken for granted categories of the body to be little more than accumulated organizations (producing organisms) which cling to the body as a result of its passage through the social order. Artaud is useful here in articulating how much the body system and the implications of its crisis are far reaching. Far from a necessity now, the responsibility to respond has been vilified in popular culture and thus “the critical” is currently synonymous with captiousness, detraction and petty fault-finding (save within medial discourses where a “critical” patient is one who is important by virtue of being close to death) and so the critic becomes a pretentious snob rather than the artist of the creatively destructive; a naysayer and a parasite on the work (even though Miller (1977) admirably tried to convince us that this was not the case) rather than one who responds in such a way that every line which is written, is followed to denaturalize, to destruct or disrupt some orthodoxy or otherwise dominant mode of thinking or practice, thus producing something novel and creative through the work.

One could presume that the demonization of the critic is why CMS has struggled for so long to even articulate what “the critical” might have been, at times delineating only a relationship of opposition
suffers under these repressive regimes of coding. “They pressed me until the idea of body and the idea of being a body was suffocated in me” (Artaud, 1947). What Artaud can be read to suggest is that we are enmeshed into a particular image of thought about what it means to “be a body”.

This is perhaps best seen in the critique of the “disembodied subject” (Hekman, 1992) which suggests that the Cartesian “I think” represents a subject that is rational, autonomous and free from “the unreason associated with the body.” (Grosz, 1994. p.4). While this is certainly the case, delineations of this critique all too often fall back into their own forms of “disembodiment” via an essentialism around the binary terms which are used to depict the body, particularly that of masculine/feminine. This is, however, less of a concern (largely because of the political importance of this critique- see Acker, 1990) than the fact that the very notion of the “disembodied subject” continuously reasserts the separateness of mind and body. That is to say, contra Grosz to the neoliberal assumptions of “the business School” and at others relying upon its intellectual heritage in either the Frankfurt School or Marx or Labour Process Theory to call itself critical. Regardless of which historical legacy one might wish to hold to, it would seem that the responsibility to respond, to create, to judge and to critique has become, for us, synonymous with “searching for an alternative”, for a sign that the revolution-to-come may still come or for an alternative to the revolution-to-come or for an alter-native as the revolution-to-come.

Whether it is alternatives to the body of mainstream management theory (Adler et. al., 2007) which reject the idea that “There is no alternative” (Fournier and Grey, 2000) or more contemporary publications which might seek to discuss alternative identities for the male body (Kachtan and Wasserman, 2015), or those which find alternative forms of resistance in political bodies like Occupy (Munro and Thanem, Forthcoming), or alternative models of organizational change (Chia, 1999) which are more focused on the
(1994. p.4), whose work on the body has become increasingly popular within CMS (see for example, Ball, 2005; Painter-Morland and Deslandes, 2014; Knights, 2015), the body was never absent from philosophy. That this binary is maintained is the legacy of the chains of Plato’s cave and the idea that experiences might be shadows, somehow disconnected from the shackled body. It is, however, the body of Socrates, out for a stroll, which encounters Theaetetus and sits with him over a conversation of the nature of knowledge. It is the body of Descartes, sitting in the chair by the fire and fondling a piece of wax which doubts its own reality, wondering whether or not it is asleep or deceived. It is the magnum opus of Spinoza, who Deleuze calls the “prince of philosophers” (EIP, p.11), which is concerned almost entirely with the composition and decomposition of bodies in relation. It is the body of the schizo (sieved, fragmented and dissociated) comprised of no surfaces, which encounters the voices of shopping centre, learning its histories, its fluid and processual; the current landscape of CMS is overrun with “alternatives” or instances of what Murtola (2012) calls “micro-resistance” as though one of them might be the revivivalist life-line that breathes new life into critique itself and sets up the revolution which ends capital. While the logic of seeking alternatives to “market managerialism” (Parker et al., 2007) can be traced to attempts to respond to the aforementioned Thatcherite claim that “there is no alternative” to neoliberal capital (and the looming crisis that such an ideology would imply), the idea that this response was adequate enough to be considered as critique or that should come to stand in for critique rather than supplement it, is highly problematic; for it is all too easy for the logic of “alternatives” to be co-opted by an organized corporate body like the shopping centre and turned into a viable marketing strategy for the advancement of capitalist ends. It is for precisely this reason that Schreven et al., (2008) council prudence in the pursuit of alternatives.
architectures, its subjectivities and its organizations. Sørensen (2006) notes a similar point and draws attention to the embodied walking practices of Kant, Rousseau and Diderot. As Johnson (1990, p.xix) puts it: “our reality is shaped by the patterns of our bodily movement, the contours of our spatial and temporal orientation, and the forms of our interaction with objects.” What this implies is that all of our thoughts are of the body. We simply have no way of thinking either the mind or a world which is without the body, which is not in some way informed by the logic of a body. To push this claim further, we have no way of thinking the body which is not a redux to the representation of these same systems, this same myth of separateness, which identify the body as either a possession of a *cogito* or being possessed of certain characteristics which we assume that everyone knows (of course it is “my” body, of course it has a gender and a race). The body is complicit in the image of thought which we confronted the previous chapter and thus it is the

Even if, as Adler (2002) speculates, that the demand for blueprints or alternatives may simply have been a red-herring, a facile argument which came as a response, by those outside CMS, to an inability to refute or otherwise address CMS’s claims, this thesis does not seek to deny “alternatives” either as a possibility or as having intrinsic value or a use as examples. Rather, we merely wish to suggest that it is necessary to understand that what we in CMS often pursue are not alternatives to capital, merely alternatives of capital, different forms of the same profit-making (whether monetary or not) enterprise. Nowhere is this more clear than the shopping centre for the discourse which surrounds it is similarly rife with “alternatives” of differing degrees: stores which retail alternative medicine, adjacent hotels provide alternatives to staying in the city centre, a plethora of restaurants to provide a wide variety of alternatives to the discerning gourmet, alternative uses of the space by patrons who would appropriate it in ways for which no manager or architect could have planned,
assumptions which we make about it which we must confront critically: everyone knows what it means to have a body and everyone knows that a body navigating the shopping centre is subject to all manner of problems and complexity (which lines to travel on, how fast to travel etc.). Everyone knows that their body is marked as separate from other bodies by clear lines and everyone knows that their body is divided along binary systems of descriptors or organization.

To make this explicit, there is an entrenched orthodoxy, a dogmatic image of thought, which separates the body from the mind and, as a by-product of it, the academy has convinced itself of the need to recover a “philosophy of the body”. While he notes that the social sciences have done much to try to shake off this mind-body dualism, Hopkinson (2015) also notes how entrenched it can be. This entrenchment can be said to be a peculiar form of masochism on the body’s part, for it seems always complicit in thinking its own subordination. The problems of gender or race or definitions of “the alternative routes back to major roadways on days when the traffic out of the shopping centre sits at a standstill for hours, advertisements for alternative modes of travel to the shopping centre, many alternatives of style and price when dress shopping and, of course, alternatives to shopping itself including watching a film, playing a round of mini-golf, riding a carousel and skiing. Indeed, the shopping centre is also always seeking alternatives. Finding new discourses to attract customers is the only way that the shopping centre can continue to profit, or rather, its ability to unfailingly co-opt and capture any attempt at escape or subversion and turn it to the service of its own ends, vampirically draining it and investing it with new life (Massumi, 1998), is the reason that the system of capitalism which it embodies has survived as a mode of social organization and has become as all-encompassing as it has, always expanding itself to speak of, to and for each new trend.

If we adopted alternatives in the attempt to make CMS more hopeful and less
human”- none of which have anything to do with the body but which the body reproduces and re-performs in order to beg its own subordination- confront us with the need for an empiricism which can go beyond the bounds of thinking the body as an addendum to a thinking “I” which watches the world in a “here and now”, (both as presence and present, possession and possessed) from the inside. Stated simpler still, the problem is never that of the masculine versus the feminine, the cognitive versus the embodied, the inside versus the outside or even one of moral goodness (for as Featherstone (2010) notes, the body can be construed as a reflection of inner character), “the question is fundamentally that of the body- the body they steal from us in order to fabricate opposable organisms.” (ATP, p. 276). The theory of the body which Deleuze develops throughout his work, radically rejects the assumptions of unity and separateness. “A tree, a column, a flower, or a cane grow inside the body; other bodies always penetrate our body” (LOS, p.99). Bodies impotent- less like what King (2008) called “Cynical Management Studies”- then it is necessary to acknowledge that the quest for alternatives might be pursued too far and have the same effect as its “alternative”. Consider that each one of the “alternatives” proposed by the shopping centre seems critical by the reckonings that have come to dominate CMS’s thoughts, rejecting some form of mainstream, part of some avant-garde or informed by some revolutionary ethos. This compels us to ask simply: “What’s more critical than a shopping centre?”, a question to which there can perhaps be no critical response, for the shopping centre seems to offer up so many alternatives that it seems impossible to deny it. That is to say, it is not enough to have examples of “alternative” organizations, for “alternative” becomes as much a brand as CMS is, and, in being commodified as such, undoes its own rhetoric.

The reader may ask, if we are not to seek out alternatives and hope that things may change, what should we do? Quoting from
connect and disconnect in ways which we have not yet begun to contemplate. It is only when a Body without Organs is captured by the social order, completely covered over and made to desire the perpetuation of this subordination that the body can be though in these terms. As Featherstone (2010, 1982) chronicles, within the contemporary milieu the body becomes an image; something to work on and out, to be shamed, to be corrected or maintained in terms of adornment and posture, to be perfected digitally and sold, to be transformed surgically; organized and reorganized without end. Within such a system of valuation, the body is repurposed and re-tasked, reorganized and revalued, as everything from a weapon (Thapan, 2009; Dingley and Mollica, 2006), to a contested site which can be turned to resistance through “deconstructive” practice (Pillow, 1997) to a research tool (Woodyer, 2008). This is absolute triumph of the organism: that we cannot ever know what a body can do, having been sold so many different uses that Blanchot’s 1971 text *L’amitie* Deleuze and Guattari (*AO*, p.341) suggest that an effective strategy is often found “in agreeing to flee rather than live tranquilly and hypocritically in false refuges.” Not just fleeing the logic of alternatives but the entire edifice of organized capital and the Business School which produces and is produced by it. This may be too radical and isolationist a solution for most. It may take a figure akin to Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1966)- or one who is otherwise “disembodied” and detached enough from the body of the discipline to think the critical on radically different terms- to walk away from the discussion of what the critical is, to stop asking of its purpose or legitimacy and depart, wondering in awe that we could not have known of its death, dreaming instead of what the body of the critical can do.

The death of the critical also parallels what has been called the “streamlining” of theory in other fields, such as architecture. Frichot (2014) draws out the tendency towards the “diagrammatic”, towards
we do not see an alternative.

Thus the question becomes, why not try to think the body without all of these accursed organizations (dualisms, organisms and plagues) and begin again, asking only of what it can do? Quoting psychiatrist Roger Dupouy, Deleuze and Guattari reassert: “The body is the body. Alone it stands. And in no need of organs.” (*ATP*, p.175-176). Previous research has speculated ways in which this engagement might emerge. Bruns, for example, (2007) speaks of the performance artist Orlan who, through cosmetic surgeries, seems to both realize the dictum of “Dismantle the face.” (*FB*, p.20) in order to realize the head and perform this kind of thinking, disorganizing the body to see what it can do. In the shopping centre, one can see many other possibilities for the body. A body can scream like a beast resounding which the voice of a crowd as one walks through the high, glass doors. It can maintain stasis like the hundreds of meters of brass handrail that are polished every day. It can distort itself beyond all recognition like the store on a simplicity and ease of readability when it comes to thought and theory. In its death, the critical has become diagrammable as the dead were in the early days of photography or when “death masks” were still common practice. Indeed, the reduced or abridged diagram inherent in the eulogy cartographically maps the various tracks, trails and lines of a life but can only do so because the life is over; a living diagram or body being always incomplete. That is to say, of course, not all diagrams are eulogistic. The chapter on the Body without Organs in *A Thousand Plateaus* begins with a diagram, a Dogon egg, an example of strata and lines cutting across a surface or plane, which also serves to make a linkage to *Anti-Oedipus* where Deleuze and Guattari comment that: “The body without organs is an egg.” (*AO*, p.19), the shell being without striation or stratification, without organization. This diagram, however, is not a method of fixing the image the Body without Organs, nor does it appear as a proffering of definition. It is, instead, a very particular type of connection:
temporary contract which migrates around the shopping centre on an almost monthly basis; with no one understanding how or why a new location is selected. It can tear itself apart and connect to new things like the décor which integrates a beach-like aesthetic into the Greco-Roman revivalism of the Square to celebrate summer.

To return to a distinction drawn in the previous chapter, a “science” of the body is entirely contingent upon understanding these moments of screaming or bending in terms of functions and technical problems such as those of kinesiology or physiology—dividing the body into a near infinite series of subparts which need to be labelled and categorized, their functions analysed in order to organize and apprehend chaos. That is to say, though Harriet Cole shows us her body dis-organized as a series of lines, she is also a labelled nervous system, every form and function fixed, every nuance organized. Thinking the body thus always returns to the reductive myths which we mentioned earlier and, more importantly, act as a block, so that you will a catastrophe, a critical moment.

But were one to believe that diagrams showed only the simple, one might come to say that, in its death, the critical has become a diagram of the Body Without Organs but only in the sense that the Body without Organs has been spoken of within Organizational Studies. That is, not as a concept which might connect to other concepts, breaking some and producing others by working critically but as a thing dead or on the verge of death and not allowed to die; abstracted, unfunctioning and disconnected. Rarely the core or life of a paper and barely spoken of within its body, the Body without Organs can most frequently be found in the penultimate section of the text, attached to our work on monstrous theory (Thanem, 2006), dangerous fluids (Linstead, 2000) or “gender as multiplicity” (Linstead and Pullen, 2006); nothing more than a eulogy or a few good words at the end. One might be tempted to dismiss this trend as a part of the logical “way in which chapters and journal articles are organized”,
never even try to reach a Body without Organs.

Conversely, a “philosophy” of the body begins with a diagram. Crucially, such a diagram is neither one which is a detailed anatomical model, like those of Henry Grey, nor is it a photograph of a cross section, like those of Eugène-Louis Doyen, nor is it akin to those sketches entombed upon the Voyager probe (see Frichot, 2014) nor is it similar to the maps which adorn the shopping centre (established as “You Are Here” displays or distributed as pamphlets). It is a single line. “Run lines, never plot a point!” (ATP, p.24). In the tradition of Paul Klee who took lines for walks, Jackson Pollock who subverted the trends of the world of art with his “all-over lines” (Karmel, 1998) and Tim Ingold (2007, 2012, 2015) who turned lines into an obsession- following lines made by slugs, clouds, words and philosophy- one could think the body as a series of lines, curving around form. “Whether we are individuals or groups, we are made up of lines” (D. p.124) As Ingold explains, rather thus revealing not only that organization and its inevitability are the limit conditions of our thought but also that the trend of eulogistic, a-critical scholarship is entrenched and inescapable. For example, in speaking of the Body without Organs and “nonorganizational” desire, Thanem’s (2004) text serves to “critique” this very pervasive trend of reducing concepts, particularly the Body without Organs, to metaphors; the metaphor being the cornerstone of a taken for granted series of linguistic associations which remain ossified in our thought (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). However, Thanem’s work cannot be considered as critical, not because it regards the Body without Organs as a thing with a fixed meaning which should be studied more closely in Deleuze’s texts and thus develops little which is novel or innovative but because in trying to destroy our over-simplistic habit of working with concepts, Thanem’s work cannot itself escape the trappings of organization. That is, for Thanem, “nonorganization” becomes
than bodies, our understanding of the world may very well be shaped by lines even though there are no lines in nature; the borders which we see around human bodies, clouds and shopping centres being the product of habitual formations of a series in the mind, a habit of neglecting difference and understanding things to be cut off and identifiable. Lines, in this sense, may very well form a part of the image of thought, representing forms and experience in a manner ossified and unquestioned. To expand upon an example from Claire Colebrook (2002), the lines of colour which we see in the spectrum are the result of the differentiation of white light. These lines are, however, reliant upon the redux of thought to the Same (difference diminished to only the difference between two colours) which cannot fully consider either the complexity of white light or, indeed, the myriad of colours that exist beyond those which are apparent to trichromatic vision. More pertinently, the body of the shopping centre stretches out of the lines that we bind it within, connecting to understandable in that “unexpected incidents produced by forces of excess change things when and where they crop up.” (Thanem, 2004. p.207) with examples like mad cow disease and the AIDS virus being used to show that there will always be that which escapes the predictability and control of organizational systems, and furthermore the Body without Organs becomes “the accidental, serendipitous and unpredictable result of desire” (ibid, p.208) rather than that which cannot be organized and thus that upon which organization takes place. What Thanem demonstrates is that we continue to underestimate the possibilities for there to simply be no organization, thereby implying the naturality of the organism and legitimating an understanding of the body in the phenomenological “here and now”, bound by lines, flesh and bone. He says that the “BwO is not reducible to a metaphor for organization […] Instead, it should be treated as a body of flesh and blood” (p.215). While, for Thanem, this fleshed body is “capable of extraordinary things” such thinking thus
a blasted heath, a disused ruin, a fascist palace, a quiet suburb, a Greek agora, a Victoria carnival, a bustling high-street, disjointed limbs and hearts; images all spreading like tendrils along the black-blue-grey of so many motorways.

Let us travel this line further still. An understanding of the body as a diagram or based on what the Body without Organs can do, begins with understanding how the latter works as a concept, for it is pointless to think it as a fixed or definable property of a system or as a tendency of an aggregate towards entropy and disorder (where lines falter). Concepts, within Deleuze’s corpus, are a response to a series of problems, and change as the problem does, twisting and turning with each new encounter. In The Logic of Sense, the Body without Organs is at once Deleuze’s response to the problem of the anal and the oral (partial objects) in Kleinian psychoanalysis and a way of beginning the expression of a schizoanalysis, which would be taken up with Guattari in a few years’ time, by trying to think about social coding proves itself unable to continuously call into question the conditions upon which thinking takes place (the task of a practiced transcendental empiricism); the concept, the Body without Organs becoming nothing more than a few lines which follow the logic of some alternative; flattened down to be a tool in some a crude “critical toolbox” (or coffin) as it returns to the same image of “the body” that we all know.

In Letter to a Harsh Critic Deleuze responds with condescension and contempt to those critics for whom the text is a box in which to search for forms of fixed signification, organisms and other dead things. He suggests that they ask not of its identity but simply: “Does it work, and how does it work?” (N, p.8), a question not of death and stillness, but of ethics, life and critique. The body of the text becomes not one to mourn over with platitudes like “The immense complexity of their work is also acknowledged. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of the body as a discontinuous series of flows and
through language and the repression of both desire and the body. It is thus that Deleuze introduces the figure of the schizo who rejects social organization—whether it comes in the form of the suffocating grasp of what Artaud called “surface languages”, or in the Oedipal ministering of the psychoanalyst or in the judgement of the priest or god—and thus tries to recover his body. Indeed, in *The Logic of Sense*, the Body without Organs becomes a method for understanding the schizo’s self-perception. Though still connected to these problems, in *Anti-Oedipus* the analysis shifts to the primacy of the unified subject whereby the subject becomes just another organization which exists upon the Body without Organs (*AO*, p.20) with other forms of organizations. It is thus not my Body without Organs, nor is it the Body without Organs of the shopping centre, both the shopping centre and the Cartesian “I” are on it. The marks (striations) of occupation and culture (strata) are on it. The flows of capital are on it. Desire is on it. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari try to use the processes…” (Ball, 2005. p.102) which, in addition to their inadvertent reductionism, read like works of mourning (all too literally in the case of Janning’s (2013) polemic on Deleuze’s death) but rather, it is one which is meant to be taken from behind in order to produce something monstrous, something new and alive, which is still consistent with the ethic of that particular author or concept. Perhaps it was the death of the critical that allowed us to think in ways which mandated of us this mournful scholarship.

In this regard, Faucher (2010) warns against precisely the previously discussed problem with “alternatives”; by asking simply “What’s more rhizomal than the Big Mac?”, demonstrating, in an incisive satire, that McDonald’s follows what might be termed a “rhizomic” business strategy, echoing both the infamous article on the “rhizomic” organization by Robert Chia (1999) as well as Žižek’s (2004) fear, shared by Kristensen et al. (2014), that Deleuze and Guattari’s work is so seductive that it would eventually be turned towards the service of
Body without Organs as a response to the problem of trying to find a way to think of desire as non-individual, influenced by the social and as liberatory force, rather than as a lack (as it is in Lacanian psychoanalysis). To think a Body without Organs here involves thinking a body which breaks free from its socially articulated, disciplined, semioticised, subjectified and organized states to become disarticulated, dismantled and absolutely split from its traditional forms of existence (deterritorialized) and this is also the role which the concept plays in A Thousand Plateaus. However, here it pursues a different line in the absence of desiring-machines (a concept which does not appear in this text), being at once what we desire, that by which we desire, and desire itself. Even more radically, in this text the Body without Organs becomes “not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, a set of practices” (ATP, p.149-150) thus takes on the role of a vehicle whereby Deleuze and Guattari can speak with the tone of the Stoics and call for prudence, not wild corporate ends. The rhizome here becomes a “cool concept” which is marketable by the management consultant like so many other models and schema for “thinking organizations”. It would seem that, having targeted academic work more broadly with the “one-size-fits-all” logic of journal tier lists (Mingers and Willmott, 2013), this is surely the next logical step in the progression of Ritzer’s (1996) McUniversity (see also Parker and Jary, 1995): the ideology of the definable and the predictable, the homogenized and the banal, where the Body without Organs is reducible to a metaphor for the “Organization-without-Organs” (Linstead, 2000) and organisable into an alternative to “mainstream approaches to business and management”. Indeed, to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari (ATP), it would seem that we, in order to extract something “useful” from the Body without Organs, had to incorporate it into a perilously organized view of the world, mourning over it and representing it either in and as a metaphor or within the logic of organization,
destratification, not completely destroying the organization of organs that is the organism but carefully experimenting with new forms of life, breaking habits, inventing small self-destructions, trying to find out what else your body can do and seeking madness in dosages (a problem for a life). It is the madness of the art of Francis Bacon which gets explored when Deleuze returns to the Body without Organs for the final time in *The Logic of Sensation* where, though still opposed to the organism it becomes a “limit of the lived body” (*FB*. p.45). What Deleuze sees in Bacon’s work is not just the long overdue destruction of the face to allow the animal head to emerge but a realization of the Body without Organs via art rather than lived experience where the contorted meat of the Baconian figure; with no clear mouth, no anus, no face, no arms, no legs; shows an organism dismantling itself, splitting off into and along new lines.

Even this, however, is still a facile analysis because, in the first instance, it cannot account for the Body Without Organs thus stripping it of the potential which it had to be critical. Presumably this also reflects a “loss of the ability to theorize” (*see* O’Doherty, 2007b) within CMS, but it is perhaps the case that we never had the ability to do so. Indeed, in order to be aware of its own philosophy, organizational studies had to organise it, turning the multifaceted work of generations of philosophers into a 2x2 matrix (Burrell and Morgan, 2005). And as O’Doherty (2007a) slowly deconstructs this text, the eulogy reveals itself. This was the foundation of CMS’s engagement with philosophy and it was not a critical reading at all. It was the reverent placement of the body of philosophy in a square coffin that would serve as a catalyst for a school of scholarship which would be unable to acknowledge that to have a work of philosophy “summarized in a couple of sentences for the purposes of grounding forms of organizational analysis in the respectable pantheon of philosophical thought does little more than invite the normalization of an orthodoxy.” (O’Doherty,
becoming a practice rather than a concept in *A Thousand Plateaus* nor indeed can it address the fact that by the time that they pen *What is Philosophy?* in 1991, Deleuze and Guattari have abandoned the Body without Organs for the plane of immanence and in the second instance, is far too preoccupied with what the Body without Organs *is* or *did*, rather than what it *can do*. This concern is based in a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the concept. Each time that a concept appears in the text it is put to work on a different problem and thus, critically, is in no sense the same. Though the Body without Organs implies that Deleuze, like Artaud, wanted to be done with the judgement of god, the Body without Organs is unmistakably a critical concept, a series of responses to a series of problems, as though the critic would speak, creating something new, a new series of connections, every time the concept appeared. Each time a concept appears it is made anew as it produces new linkages through the encounters which it has in the text. Though astute authors like 2007a. p.33). O’Doherty’s analysis of this orthodoxy is, however, problematic and needs to be pushed further, for what we encounter most frequently is not a few lines of philosophy which act as a foundation for a work but rather, unquestioned foundations upon which philosophy appears, like so many lines; so many strata. As he says elsewhere, we currently write about organization by “matching Foucault (typically) with a dash of Deleuze, a seasoning of Serres, all finished off with a dose of Derrida” (O’Doherty, 2007b. p.838). Philosophy appears not as a core part of the work but as a few good words at the end. One might thus suggest we do not yet know what it means to think, for the conditions of the body of thought continue to go unquestioned. The orthodoxy which remains unchallenged as we continue to proliferate new organs and perpetuate the Same being, ultimately, the organism.

Thus, it would seem that we have never been either critical or Deleuzian (Styhre, 2001) and thus, that we have never managed to destruct or disrupt the foundations of our
Torkild Thanem (2004) can note that in its appearances in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, the Body without Organs takes on different forms, what they neglect is that each time, each and every time the Body without Organs as a concept appears, there is something new, even within the same book. This reflects not only the emphasis of Deleuze’s philosophy on “becoming” but the idea that there are no universals and, as such, it is pointless to propose that the concept is one which defies the fixity of meaning, being an irreplaceable and non-substitutable singularity within the text or thought, because it could never have been otherwise.

There was never an alternative within the context of Deleuze’s metaphysic and it is only a mind entrenched within the paradigms and prisons of organization that would allow one to think that it was possible.

Thus, the Body without Organs of the shopping centre is not to be seen in the simple reappropriation of the space. To quote from JC Miller (2014, p.17). “A BwO in the mall then, refers to the ongoing processes of thought as regards the critical and thus that we have not yet begun to think in novel ways about anything which we presume to study “critically”, least of all Deleuze, a philosopher whose work seems too far removed from thinking organization. It is therefore probable that we have taken to eulogizing the concepts of Gilles Deleuze, particularly those which emerge in his collaborations with Felix Guattari, not as an alternative but because of the intellectual limitations placed upon our thinking by the nature of our very discipline, *Organization*, which offer us no alternative other than to organize.

It would seem then that the role of philosophy itself is in question. Seminally, for Montaigne (2006) to study philosophy has always been a question of learning to die well. It is with his characteristic irony that Deleuze inverts this in *L’Abécédaire*, claiming that it is only the animal (la bête, though not stupid, being supposedly without philosophy) who knows how to die because they are wise enough to seek out solitude and
affectual encounter that often exceeds those generated by the malls spatial technologies (regimes of sound, light, colour, design, etc.)”. Miller calls this the signalling of a “Mall without Stores” and points to moments and instances when the space is co-opted and repurposed beyond the limits of the alternatives proposed by management. One might look to the mall walkers as a group which similarly tests the limits of the shopping centre. Consider this excerpt from fieldnotes:

_They meet once a week. Every Wednesday at 10:00am they walk an almost two mile circuit around the malls; passing employees opening stores and shoppers going about their daily routines. Today, they explain their practice to me with semi-truths, “it gets us out of the house” or “it gets the heart-rate up” but it soon becomes abundantly clear that they are an almost quintessentially “postmodern community” that is at this point held together by shared sentiment and affection and not collective desire to exercise. This, despite the fact that_
they do not all walk together, nor do they all
even walk the same route. Each carves out
their own series of lines, some travelling on
only the lower floors, others go quickly
around the length and breadth of the malls.

It is very tempting to point to the actions
of the mall walkers as disorganization or, in
the least, resistance to the managerial regimes
of the shopping centre which seek to incite
constant consumption because they are not
there to shop and rarely buy things after their
walk. Miller himself cites similar instances of
repurposing space, what he terms the
“transgressive” event, such as homeless
people sleeping in the food court, people
lying down on benches etc. and we might
point to many others from both fieldwork and
the world at large (flash mobs, political
protests, performance art, fashion shows,
concerts and impromptu art galleries) but
this is far too limited of an understanding of
what a Body without Organs can do. For an-
organization, is not just a question of
alternatives, of breaking out of a system of
coding to enter another slightly different
settings and identity plays—so too does
philosophy seem to provide a “critical
therapy” for the weary Business School
academic—a flight into grandiose systems of
thought where one can purchase some
alternatives, lifestyles and identities; making
the body a diagram or a simple geometric
2x2 box, marked out by lines.

To return thus to the previous discussion
of theory being made “diagrammable” it is
worth noting that Deleuze’s work on the
diagram defines the term uniquely. Indeed, as
DeLanda (2000) notes, there is no connection
between the diagram and the visual
representation. We can see this best when, in
order to understand Foucault’s theory of
sexuality, thought and subjectivation,
Deleuze himself draws a diagram (F), a fold.
But the fold which could make that which
was far away be the nearest and the inside
turn to outside, is neither a representation of
“Deleuze’s Foucault” nor is it a full
delineation of the limits of strata. Similarly,
when he discusses the work of Francis
Bacon, Deleuze makes it clear that the
arrangement which is still within the same overarching structure. Again, to make yourself a Body without Organs is to go after a place of zero organizations, one without even the potential (intensities) for organization to emerge. Of course, small steps are necessary along the way but we must not think to stop there. It is thus that if, in the simple analysis, the body of the shopping centre is one bounded by the lines which demarcate entry and exit, the public roads that surround it and the enclosed private property which borders it, then to begin to think of its Body without Organs is to begin with a single line, a levelled plane, but this line is not the one traced by the mall walkers on their route, no matter how disjointed it might become. Consider another fieldnote:

_Dismemberment! Disorganization! The standard route of the mall walker is disjuncted by a stitching of high-vis-jacketed employees who disbar a segment of the shopping centre in collusion with an array of wailing sirens. Something has happened._ A diagram which emerges because of Bacon’s visceral relation to the canvas; his practice of crashing against it, splattering paint, scratching out lines; is not a representation. It is a catastrophe wrought upon the canvas. Suddenly a face, an organized form like a shopping centre or critique, is destroyed and replaced with a desert or an ocean or a piece of animal skin; with a “suddenly outstretched diagram.” For Deleuze (FB. p.100), Bacon’s diagrams are irrational, involuntary, accidental, non-representative and non-illustrative; a dismantling of the organism in favour of the body. Thus, a Body without Organs is perhaps impossible to diagram, itself already being a diagram. A catastrophe. A sudden disaster. A crisis? Perhaps a critique of sorts finds ground in the diagram. A response to the body and all of its reductive representations (all of the organism), the diagram being made by Bacon for something to emerge. Still, what defines the diagram is not its lines or its shape or its critique but its inarticulablity and its impossibility to
limb removed. The mall walker tries to discern a reason for this inter-ruption, speaking to long forgotten acquaintances in an attempt to discern a cause for the commotion. A fire drill? A bomb scare? No one seems to know. As the alarms continue to decry disorder a gaggle of good British citizens form a queue to re-enter the cordonned off space in an orderly fashion. The mall walker thus strikes out along unusual paths, habits disrupted, in search of some direction (Where to now?), uncomfortable until the routine of conversation takes over once again. [...] Bodies suffer from being organized. They rebel against it, enlisting their old friend entropy to aide them in their disorganization but this interruption is perhaps too violent of a destratification and it dwells in the collective conversation for weeks to come.

The mall walkers can identify that “something happened” (Knox et al, 2015). It is a moment of abject confusion where the organizational systems of the shopping centre seem to either fail or represent failure or to organize into speech. Perhaps, Artaud was able to do it with La projection du véritable corps, a body ripped into an amorphous black chasm, in much the same way that Bacon did with the head of the pope in Study after Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X. What is noteworthy is that in each case, the lines begin to show for the body of the diagram is made up of lines. For Artaud, there are lines of black-blue-grey which schism off the body in smudges and stutters, taking on hues of yellow and red as the face splits apart. For Bacon, they are lines of black which intersect the whole of the body from above and below, lines which shoot out from under the Pope’s robes, lines of yellow and red which seem at once to cut across and constitute the Pope. To put it another way, these lines must be ignored to see the Pope as in Velázquez’s original since they were always there. One might argue that we have been ignoring lines for some time, or choosing which ones to pay attention to, reproducing the re-presentations of the body to which we are accustomed, forgetting the
operate by other means but this is not enough to make a Body without Organs. Though a line of movement is diverted and new lines are cut, the potential for organization to emerge, to always recapture any even vaguely divergent system is not to be underestimated and even as their route is disrupted, the mall walkers will shortly return to their normal course, have drinks in their usual spot and chat about the important news items of the day. Though their bodies will be enriched by connections to the walk, to movement, to the social, they are quickly coded over again by the shopping centre. It is thus disingenuous, and not critical, to try to read anything more than momentary disorganization in either the event that disrupts their habits or their practice which interrupts and reconstitutes the space of the malls for both are quickly subsumed, co-opted and can be marketed by the shopping centre as an attraction. The shopping centre is much like critical management scholarship in that way. The Body without Organs offers something more, a radically different way of projection of what might be called the “true” body, but such a point would not be critical. Indeed, it is paradoxically too many lines which hold sway over our thoughts of the body of the critical: the disciplinary lines of CMS and organization, the lines of alternatives, the lines of the traditional politics of bodies etc. Perhaps we might find a way to say something kind about the critical at the end by rendering Bacon’s violence onto the page as text, a simple diagram of two interweaving lines, capable of pronouncing a eulogy and saying goodbye to a mode of scholarship that regards philosophy as something secondary or outside itself. Perhaps what we need is not an alternative but something critical.
thinking about organization which begins
with the assumption of its impossibility.

Figure 3: Lines followed by bodies moving through the shopping centre

The lines of these stories are bound together. This chapter has tried to follow two lines
of thought, not themselves segmented into sections or clearly defined but discoursing and
wandering, meandering and roaming, haptic sequences of ideas. So much of this thesis was
born while walking around the shopping centre that it was inevitable that this should happen,
that the mode of inscription should itself become a critique within and of the text. In trying to
follow the lines of this polemic, the body of the reader may have returned to the most
familiar of sensations in the shopping centre, déjà vu (a lesser form of the paramnesia that
will be explored in Chapter 4), when seeing new moments, concepts and ideas connect and
reconnect again. The reduction of the body to something which is simply outside the mind,
manageable by thought and organisable by social systems, runs alongside the lines which the
critical makes as it traces its own eulogy and causes the body to mourn its own death. A
similar mourning takes place for the Body without Organs in CMS, which has been
disciplined, to only see in terms of organization. As we have tried to show, the “image of
thought” need not only pertain to experience, nor only to the a-priori structures of the mind.
It may be the image that we have of the body or of the critical etc. To simplify, we may come to refer to this image as “organization”. In subsequent chapters we begin to think the body in time, pursuing those lines which emerge once we begin to think of time as non-linear, discontinuous and asynchronous. Indeed, as we have noted, along with bodies, the other noteworthy problem encountered during fieldwork at the shopping centre is time. As such, Chapters III, IV and V are all devoted to descriptions of time and the various temporalities of the shopping centre which co-develop Deleuze’s threefold theory of time with three salient instances of the madnesses of the shopping centre. However, whether we can manage to do this without perpetuating the fallacies that surround either the body (as metaphor, as organism, as organized, as gendered, as racially constructed) or the Body without Organs, remains to be seen.
Chapter III: The Insomniac’s Time-machines: The Passive Synthesis of Time

Figure 4: The Passive Synthesis

In Chapter 1 we alluded to the fact that, via his reading of Hume, Deleuze understood the subject to be a habit of thought. The relation between subjectivity and habit is, however, much more complex than that chapter had the scope to portray. In his initial book on Hume, *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, Deleuze says the following: “habit is the constitutive root of the subject, and the subject, at root is the synthesis of time” (*ES*, p.92-93). It is thus important for the project of developing a practice of transcendental empiricism, or a method of ethnographic enquiry without the “I think” at its core, that this work dwell upon the question of time and habit. As such, this chapter will explore the first part of Deleuze’s tripartite understanding of time, what he calls the “the passive synthesis”, and place a reading of it in the context of a study of the habits of time in the shopping centre.

Even a surface analysis, however, reveals that considerations of “time” as a research problem are far from novel within either Anthropology or CMS. The former is characterized by seminal works like Fabian’s (2014) *Time and the Other* and an innumerable number of narratives which chronicle the relations of specific people or cultures to time (see Munn, 1992) and the latter being typified by work which tries to understand time as a core problem.
of human organization that has recently been considered in relation to issues as diverse as “centres of calculation” in the context of STS debates (Czarniawska, 2004), responses to climate change (Slawinski and Bansal, 2012) and, following the work of Thompson (1967) on “time discipline”, considerations of a pervasive “culture of busyness” which dictates experience of time (Snyder, 2013). Perhaps the most salient area of commonality between these two disciplines is that the continued study of time is justified by ritualistically noting time’s under-theorization. Within Organization Studies (see for example Roe et al., 2009, Butler, 1995; Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988) one could even make the case that each new paper notes the need to expand our thinking about time but then discounts both the reason that our philosophy of time is underdeveloped (perhaps because cataloguing the broad and general history of thinking time across the social sciences and philosophy is almost an impossibility because of its scope) and the more basic question of whether it is possible to think or theorize time-in-itself in a meaningful way. That is to say, as we shall argue throughout this chapter, both CMS and Anthropology extensively discuss the concept of time as it occurs in either the organization or the fieldsite but neither fully explores the philosophical underpinnings of time as a concept without recourse to other means of representation. Indeed, after a prolonged retrospective of major authors in anthropological canon, Munn (1992, p. 93) notes that “the problem of time has often been handmaiden of other anthropological frames and issues (political structures, descent, ritual, work, narrative, history, cosmology, etc.),” which is to say that, much like the scientist in Bergson’s (1999) provocative and infamous comments, the ethnographer may very well measure time in the field for herself and her interlocutors but does not meaningfully ask what it is that is being measured. Similar conclusions are drawn by Lee and Liebenau (1999, p.1035) who suggest simply that “while there is much ‘time related research’, there is little ‘research on time’”.
Thus, this chapter shall consider the metaphors, binaries and taken for granted assumptions which characterize contemporary thought across CMS, Anthropology and the social sciences in general on the nature of time in order to garner an understanding its philosophical foundations. We shall then contrast this to the way in which time functions within Deleuze’s metaphysic, specifically as regards the passive synthesis of time and the notions of habit in relation to the subject. Finally, we will link our reading of the passive synthesis to the way that time can be felt and understood in the shopping centre, in the context of what Deleuze and Guattari call “the refrain” in order to propose that, via the metaphysic which underpins the three syntheses of time, Deleuze offers a way of thinking time-in-itself. Throughout the arguments of this chapter, we will maintain that something unique in the shopping centre’s temporality, a series of strange and wonderful times, and we shall explore this through the conceptual persona of “the insomniac”. For the insomniac, we shall argue, the shopping centre “keeps time with a rubato waltz.”

The two(?) sides of time

_The watch beeps. It is 10:00am. The sound of 10:00 am is a low rumbling B that pervades, tickling the high ceilings and setting a trembling through the faux-marble floor. It is an aggregation of the murmuring of pre-caffeinated conversations, the high-pitched wails of security gates opening, the clatter of the unsteady wheels of cleaning carts and other early morning sounds of the shopping centre through which the cry of the watch pierces into pre-eminence. The subtle vibrations of sound pass up the arm, shivering under the skylights._

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7 Thus far, this thesis has made the case for experimentation in different forms of text, for example, following on from Chapter I, the fieldnote. This chapter features another play with modes of writing, this time one which centres around habit. As such, each section of the chapter begins with approximately a paragraph of mostly unedited fieldnotes which detail a ritualized notation of the sensations of the shopping centre at a particular time. While these will occasionally be subjected to further analysis, they span the entire duration of fieldwork and, as such, we suggest that these tell their own story about habits and time in the shopping centre.
How do we understand time in the shopping centre? To the unfamiliar, the shopping centre; seeming overtly to be always bustling and bright with light- to be always clean, polished, conditioned and pristine- may seem to be a space without a sense of time. Indeed the shopping centre might appear to encourage an experience of atemporality, not only through its design, the Gruen effect, and its seeming resistance to change either seasonal or diurnal, but because, much like the casino, of the absence of any visible clocks. Furthermore, via the status of the shopping centre as a non-place (Augé, 1992) and its frequent concurrence with work on the postmodern or the condition of late capitalism (Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1991, Baudrillard, 1998), the shopping centre may be construed as having either an atemporal quality or being understood as evidentiary of the trend of the “speeding up of everyday life” (Menzies, 2005). In either case, despite the fact that little attention is paid to the shopping centre when compared to other non-places (see Sharma, 2009; Merriman, 2004) it is easy to read it through the same lens. That is to say, that the shopping centre seems to be utterly cultureless and homogenous, interchangeable with any other retail space across the developed world, indistinguishable due to the presence of the same shops which retail the same mass-produced products available anywhere, and so, being managed by the same large, real estate investment trust\(^8\), one’s experience of spatial difference is blurred and consequentially the shoppers experience of time is disoriented.

Such readings have been part of the popular discourse around the shopping centre for decades and are now so commonplace that they are worth critical scrutiny that is beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest that such readings have a basis in a certain romanticism for a past wherein we were all less disciplined by clocks and capital,

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\(^8\) It is a little appreciated fact that eighteen of Britain’s largest shopping centres are either owned or part owned by the same large organization. This compounds their homogeneity with ubiquitous corporate branding and exacerbates their difference as subtleties both those which escape management control and especially, those produced of managerial control.
traceable in part to the E.P. Thompson’s (1967) seminal work on which argued that it was the clock and the consequent forms of work and discipline which catalysed the industrial revolution, ushering in a new era of control wherein routine, ritual and everyday life became dictated by the clock. While Thompson’s analysis is contentious (see Glennie and Thrift, 1996) it remains the case that the clock and not the steam engine or telephone which was the key machine in the birth and proliferation of the modern age (see Mumford, 1946). In Mumford’s reading, the mechanization of our civilization begins with the measurement of time in order to facilitate the routines and habits of the monastery, spreading eventually to govern all spheres of social life. Indeed, though no longer only in service of regular intervals of prayer, we have collectively been developing and refining our measurement of time to ever finer, ever more precise and generalizable degrees. In one sense, then the shopping centre is kept in-time by the ubiquity of various mobile computing devices, meaning that one is never far removed from a globally-synced network of timekeeping, maintained by a prodigious system of measurement which is standardized around the alternating energy levels of Caesium 133 atoms; the current⁹, though problematically decided upon (Leschiutta, 2005), standard for the operation of the atomic clocks which provide a backbone for all telecommunications networks. This connection is renewed every time that one checks one’s watch to make sure that one is oriented with regards to time, a little dance that the organized body performs, indicating its place under the ever-expanding purview of the shopping centre; its logics etched through the lines of the clock and onto the body, in much the same way that it is renewed for the shopping centre in deliveries, scheduling etc.

What this understanding of time demonstrates is a fundamental distinction, drawn between what has been called “social time” and “natural time” (Hassard, 1991) or “clock time” and “rhythmic time” (see Hassard, 1989; 2008); the former kept by the systems of

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⁹ Within the last few years, new more accurate clocks based on Strontium have been developed but are not yet adopted as international standards (Ghose, 2015).
clocks and machines and the latter as a part of lived human experiences, rhythms of the body, etc. It is, however, the contention of this work that these binaries are underpinned by the same assumptions about the nature of time.

In order to understand this we might consider the work of the cognitive linguists, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) who astutely observe that our perception of the phenomena of time, within the contemporary milieu, is entirely shaped by metaphors. That is to say, our thoughts are shaped in their very possibility by certain entrenched images, by particular habits of speaking about time. They point to the old adage “Time is money”, coined by Benjamin Franklin, not as a poignant aphorism reflective of some capitalist truism or as indicative of the alienation of labour in the Marxist sense (see Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988, p.302) but as that which fundamentally structures and shapes our perception of time, thus becoming, as an image, a nearly inescapable precondition of thinking time, guiding our thoughts towards understanding it as a commodity or resource; something to be kept, spent, bought, made, taken, got, found, killed, allocated, divided, wasted, deserved, served, travelled through, looked at, lost, measured, used, and misused. Indeed, as we shall discuss, it is perhaps the case that, more than any acculturated rhythms, it is the establishment of time as a fungible commodity which is most complicit in the shaping of our collective discipline or what might be described as the existential state of the human-condition in Western civilization; the “being-of-the-clock” (Scott, 2006), where the assumption that time is scarce leads to a plague of fears around wasting and efficiently using time, emerging particularly in the wake of the Industrial Revolution but more significantly attributable to the obsessive move towards maximizing productivity through task control as well as the general “time-consciousness” that characterized the popular Taylorist/Fordist (Littler, 1978) working practices at the turn of the 20th century. The implications of thinking time as a commodity are also evidenced in the philosophy emerging throughout the last hundred years in various
reactions to the breaking of what one might call “the dream of ease” or the Fordist Deal or the hope of modernity (see the collective works of the Frankfurt School), particularly regarding the end of work (see Granter, 2008). Indeed, in the absence of our collective enslavement to the clock, there would perhaps be no theory of existentialism, no being-towards-death (Heidegger, 1996) as we understand it now.

So pervasive is this image of time as a thing which might be possessed, that the discourse surrounding time within organization studies is entirely shaped by this notion of time as a scarce resource. It is this notion which vitiates our discourse with the language of working deadlines, opening hours, wages, overtime, vacation time, efficiency, productivity or reducing reaction-time to crises (Hardt, 2014). It is this which compels organizational scholars to study “clock time” and, aside from a few outliers who are able to suggest time as a more complex socio-cultural phenomenon worthy of rigorous philosophical investigation (see Dawson, 2014; Chia, 2002 among others), time is here something to be managed as a “variable” (Butler, 1995) in the equations of profitability, something equated with the value-making capabilities of the organization, something which can be carefully controlled through astute decision-making for the benefit of the corporation as a whole. In the meta-analysis, time thus becomes something whose management can be improved through quasi-aphoristic and vacuous “guru guides” (Knights and Willmott, 1999), such as that of Mackenzie and Nickerson’s (2009) The Time Trap, or else something which, reflective of Marx’s observation that “time is everything, man is nothing; he is, at the most, time’s carcase” (Marx, 1955), acts as the vehicle for the systematic devaluation of the human condition as it devolves in the transition into alienated labour. In the former analysis, time itself becomes a profit making tool and in the latter, once time became something divorced from internal life which we had to sell in order to survive, time becomes a means of alienation. In contemporary scholarship, this latter view is informed not just by the body of “critical” sociology within organization
studies, but by classic ethnographic work which emphasises the subjective or intersubjective nature of time; time as based in the ritual. Most notably, Roy’s (1959) seminal exploration of the ways in which workers developed a time-reckoning system around specific events which recurred during their working days as an escape from the imposed and repressive monotony of their jobs. Time is here something viewed as cyclical and based in social ritual or routine as opposed to (and thus defined by) commodifiable clock time.

However, what informs Lackoff and Johnson’s commentary, we contend, is what Henri Bergson called the “spatialization” of time. Throughout his work but particularly in *Time and Free Will*, Bergson addresses himself to a theory of lived duration, to time as a reflection of man’s condition as opposed to time as that thing measured scientifically by the travel of the hands of a clock through space, or more generally, through representations of space. Bergson (2005, p. 79) says:

“We involuntarily fix at a point in space each of the moments which we count […] No doubt it is possible, as we shall show later, to conceive the successive moments of time independently of space; but when we add to the present moment those which have preceded it, as is the case when we are adding up units, we are not dealing with these moments themselves, since they have vanished for ever, but with the lasting traces which they seem to have left in space on their passage through it.”

The core idea upon which we wish to focus is that of *time as space*, for via Bergson’s critique, we might understand time-in-itself to have been neglected in favour of thinking it through images of space. “Time events are things in space” (Núñez, 1999. p.41). Time as that

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10 Whether it is “the line of time” (*ligne du temps*) mentioned often in *Difference and Repetition*, itself a response to Bergson’s evidence of experiencing time via drawing a line with one’s finger across a sheet of paper, or the notion of the synthesis itself being a “contraction”, or the commentary which sees time “unfold” in the expanding living present, time returns as depicted via spatial metaphors even within Deleuze oeuvre. Perhaps the return of the spatial metaphor is merely reflective of a comparative overdependence of Deleuze’s reading of the first synthesis of time, upon the Empiricism and Subjectivity project of demythologizing the unified subject rather than Bergson’s experience of pure duration. Perhaps this is an excessive observation of the limits of language in its ability to convey a phenomena as complex as time, suggesting perhaps that might have need of a turn to ‘pataphors or the descriptive arts of an author like Artaud.
through which one can metaphorically move or that which is itself ‘moving’ or that which can be occupied or allocated as one does spaces for shops on the malls. What Bergson alludes to here is that we have no recourse to thinking of time, particularly in terms of its passage marked by numbers, as anything other than a spatial problem. For example, the objective/subjective (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002), linear/cyclical (Hassard, 2001), commodification/construction/compression (Hassard, 2002), chronological/narrative (Pedersen, 2009), Kairotic/Chronological (Czarniawska, 2004) “binaries” which Organization Studies uses to describe time are, at best resultant from the ways in which we think time in terms of space and, at worst, oversimplifications that distort our understanding of the complexity of time-in-itself. That is to say, they are all predicated upon images of time as measurable, as quantifiable and as organisable; as a spatial problem. Indeed, all the aforementioned metaphors about time which paint it as a commodity also render it either spatially or with physical properties.

It is not clear when, where or how this practice begins. Perhaps it was in October 1884, when The International Meridian Conference divided the world into twenty-four time zones, that our understanding of time as not just a standardized measure but one standardized by place, was solidified. The covering of the earth with time-lines not only facilitates the growth of rail and other transportation networks as well as trade, but sets the stage for the last hundred years of thinking time in terms of space (from the world of physics to the domain of popular metaphors). Or perhaps it was before, when Othello said “for I am declin’d into the vale of years” representing a period of life and aging via an image of topography, a valley. Perhaps it was earlier still, when Plato, in Timeaeus, calls time “the moving image of eternity”, and thus pairs time with both number and the progression through space. Concurrent with Bergson’s comments, that we refer to time through images of space seems to transcend the logic of either capital or, broadly speaking, the Indo-European language groups.
For example, the work of Rafael Núñez et al. (2012; see also Núñez and Sweetser, 2006; Núñez and Cooperrider, 2013) with the Yupno of Papua New Guinea (time flows uphill) or the Aymara of South America (the future is behind us) shows that the rendering of time as space or time in terms of direction, is spread across various cultures and language groups; trends also broadly illustrated by the depiction of time via hand gestures (Cooperrider and Núñez, 2007). Indeed, Núñez’s work traces this phenomenon thoroughly, through all of its formulations, understanding thus the corporeality of time. Similarly, via her work with rural communities in Guatemala, and in conjunction with Aveni (1990), Mahler (2008) also comments on this spatialization via the Mayan ‘body count’ or usage of the base twenty counting system due to the organized body’s phalanges. This notably centres the present as that moment self-evident to consciousness in which the body’s now necessarily is, with the future and past spreading out from it as the time in which the body will be and was, respectively. As such, though starting points or the directions of future and past may change, that time can be thought without a spatial metaphor seems almost an impossibility. Indeed, here we see the wisdom of Hodges (2008) who notes the unexamined “temporal ontology” within Anthropological cannon which manifests through the worrying recurrence of the metaphors of time as flow, flux or process. That events take place in time becomes part of the taken-for-granted conditions of the field and any experiences thereof.

It is thus that we suggest that across disciplines and throughout the academy we have perpetuated these and many other metaphors, oppositions and myths about the nature of time, unable to understand that all of these images are bound in systems of reciprocal interrelation which shape the ways in which it is possible to think time, thus rendering it impossible to ever meaningfully understand time-in-itself. For the purposes of our work at the shopping centre, it is crucial to note this, not only because understanding the depiction of time via spatial metaphors is an entrenched part of the image of thought, which the a practice
transcendental empiricism must overcome, but because to neglect it is to reproduce the same taken for granted tropes and images of time in the shopping centre (that is, either those of the repressed, capitalist subject, disciplined by the clock or those of the liberated subject escaping discipline through intersubjective rhythm). What the experience of time in the shopping centre offers is a glimpse into other ways of thinking time beyond the now all too familiar distinctions between subjective and objective, physical and philosophical, linear and cyclical, embodied and clock time.

Towards a theory of time in Shopping Centre

The watch beeps. It is 5:00pm. 5:00pm is hot and sticky, clinging to the clothing and giving a gloss and sheen to the skin. Words and memories move sluggishly, as if just waking up from a fire-soaked dream; making conversations about changes in the shopping centre’s management structure seem viscous. There persists a kind of lazy-afternoon malaise that slips inside, in-between and through the everyday activities of the space [...] Suddenly, the floor of the ‘great feeding pit’ opens up. What seems to be an enormous chasm is carved out within the context of the sondering routines of Tuesday afternoon by a sundering practice, casting tables and chairs aside; disrupting normal patterns of organizing, feeding and shopping. There it moves, with a 3/4 rhythm with a strong accent on the first beat; the waltz. A twofold rotation. Revolutionary motions! The left foot crests outward and the right follows, gliding backwards in an unencumbered arc, with the left following swiftly behind it again. It is visible only for a moment before it changes to a shuffling quickstep and so disappears from view. [...] The Dancers meet weekly, and have done so for years, practicing their hobby to the alternating intrigue and disinterest of those others who are gathered in the space. Most are retirees rotating slowing around a cordoned-off
space, glad for an excuse to get out of the house [...] It transpires that the shopping centre’s management have been orchestrating the dance, hiring the band, supplying tea or coffee (or sherry and mince pies at Christmas time) and organizing discounts for The Dancers at different stores. For now, however, these are remote concerns and The Dancers wax and wane; pausing to chat as new members arrive.

Building upon seminal meditations on the nature of time as entrenched in routine (see Cohen and Taylor, 1992) and reflective of the trend of sociological and ethnographic work which is attentive to time as something made in the field (see for example, Watts, 2008) one might say that clocks or time-machines in the shopping centre might be said to take form of rhythms - by-products of the pounding beat of the shuffling of hundreds of feet or the result of the intersections of the excesses of pop-songs emanating from different stores which oscillate in their combination between a horrid discordance and a kind of musical genius. Indeed, it is perhaps these time-machines which are the most salient of all the shopping centre’s affects, they which most characterize its experience and encounters. One is aware of them from the moment one crosses the threshold. There is a sensation or affect which comes from the accumulation of time-machines onto the body as it becomes embedded in systems of organization which we often mistake for fatigue. The intersections of the body’s lines and the rhythms of the shopping centre produce new discipline, disrupting old habits and rituals.

There is a music to this aggregate, a song or refrain in the key of B-flat, which plays itself as context for the events of the shopping centre. It is this, rather than simply a disorientation which itself is by-product of the shopping centre’s architecture and design, which one’s interlocutors will often comment on when they simply say that they have, once again, “lost track of time”. This oft heard phrase necessitates examination, if not merely for its ubiquity, then because it also gives the image of the interlocutor as a hunter of some kind of spectral
apparition or mystic animal whose trial has vanished. One can be all too aware of philosophy’s history of following animals (see Derrida, 2002) and in tracking the meandering and therefore rhythmic\textsuperscript{11} forms that life can take. Thus the interlocutor reveals herself as a student of lines, constituting everyday life, not in following, but rather in losing the trail of time, derailing and getting lost while wandering the shopping centre.

These points require further exposition but first it is necessary to explain that it is not merely the rituals of loss, dance and rhythm, either broadly speaking or in the specificity of either the interlocutor who hunts time or the dancers, which speak to the uniqueness and curiosity of time in the shopping centre. Indeed, returning to the notions of time as cyclical or in routine, we have long used bodies solar and lunar, seasonal and supplicatory, to chart and measure time (see Ingold, 1993). “Time was measured also by heartbeats, the rhythms of drowsiness and sleep, the recurrence of hunger, the menstrual cycles of women, the duration of loneliness” (Lightman, 1993. p.117-118). That time in the shopping centre should be viewed as a novel accumulation of various subjective rhythms is to be expected within the discourse outlined above. What makes the shopping centre unique, however, is the way in which its time-machines seem organized in order to be productive; a fact to which one can become attuned. What makes it unique is that the shopping centre keeps time with a rubato waltz.

As a dance, the waltz itself is a form of movement which originates in the tradition of the landler. The Historian credits the period of 1750-1900 as “the age of the waltz” (Sachs, 1963. p.430) claiming that the waltz had “character expression, spirit, passion” and everything else that an era of revolution in Europe demanded from a dance (it is perhaps no accident that the waltz goes in circles and has ostensibly the same movements for the man

\textsuperscript{11} In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari note the opposition between rhythm and cadence but arguably stop short of realizing that rhythm always emerges from within cadence, melody from meter. It comes as a line, snaking inside, in-between and through the fixed points and structures of the stave. In its unpredictability it seems to vibrate; a trembling, an oscillation.
and the woman). Claire (2009) notes the scandal that the dance caused, particularly among
the medical community with many claiming that because of its revolving nature the waltz
could be responsible for general states of weakness, sterility and risk of death, particularly
among women. Its modern form, for the most part unchanged by time, is characterized by a
returning 3/4 rhythm with a strong accent on the first beat of each new bar. 1,2,3, 1,2,3. The
waltz is a dance with a moderate tempo and is usually kept by a strictly maintained rhythm,
for a rubato waltz would be fairly difficult to dance well. When translated literally, the term
rubato means “stolen” or “borrowed” time, referring to the tempo of a piece of music when it
is played, not precisely or according to the instructions for the exact duration of each note as
delineated by the score, but according to the experience and affect of the musician;
“redistributing” duration within the composition as he or she feels appropriate; playing
around the beat by lengthening some notes and abbreviating others. For many pianists, the
compositions of Chopin (see Hudson, 1994), for example, necessitate varying intensities of
touch, differing in style between hands and subtleties in the use of pedals; that is to say, it
requires expressiveness in and via rubato- something which makes the piece live, which
creates difference within the melody so that it is never fully repeated. Modern composers like
John Cage mark rubato as an instruction on scores like Dream (1948) indicating that the
piece is to be played with an almost meandering rhythm, each new note unexpected in its
beginning and end, many coming and going unnoticed. Rubato will thus always seem to
emerge from within the discipline imposed by the metronome (itself a rhythm born of a
cadence), something not merely spontaneous but which requires a sophisticated
understanding of time itself to enact.

However, the waltz need not only be thought as just a dance which is spontaneously
enacted by the dancers in the food court. Previous research has studied the corporeality and
politics of dance (Kavanagh et al., 2008) and indeed, we might follow in the tradition of
ethnographers like Sklar (1991) and try to understand the waltz as cultural knowledge or Martin (1992) and engage with the way in which dance is represented or Chandler (2011) in order to understand the rhythms of work as dance. This genre of analysis builds upon the seminal work of Lefebvre (2004) on “rhythmanalysis” or the attention to the various rhythms and repetitions of everyday life, and as such we might address ourselves to the nuance of Lefebvre attempts to think time and space differently, as we are trying to do here. However, what we wish to focus on is simply the ways in which the waltz can help us to understand time in the shopping centre via Deleuze.

The 1,2,3. of the waltz is the product of a process taking place within the mind as it attempts to make sense of time in the shopping centre; the socially learned habit of dividing time and this is the shopping centre’s unit of measure. As art, a rhythm is an answer to chaos (ATP, p.313). It emerges suddenly as a coalescence of differing effects. The waltz thus presents itself based on the recurrence of a series of events within the shopping centre that are self-evident to one equipped to appreciate time. For, it is not that time operates in some pre-existent/objective or even intersubjective sphere which a metronomic tick measuring out each bar simply solidifies. Rather, it is the case that with each beat of the waltz, time is created. It is far too simple to characterize this as a kind of “rhythm of social life” (see Durkheim, 1964) which manifests in the actions and rituals of the space. One might see this in the timing by which two young mothers hold their infants to their chests and pat their backs. They do not appear to notice each other but the movement of their hands and the gentle rocking of their upper bodies are in perfect sync, in time with a simple 1,2,3. 1,2,3. One might see it in the mechanism of the fountain which repeats the same cycle of patterns over 90 seconds, patterns of 1,2,3. One might hear it in the morning wails of warning as security gratings all over the shopping centre are raised by moaning motors. One might feel it as a kind of habit of the step, in the way one moves through the space as part of a group, appearing prominently in the
awkward moments where one tries to politely allow someone walking towards you to pass by, doing a quick waltz to get around them. One might think it to be a kind of pulse, a throbbing of the carotid, heartbeat and breath as air circulates through long lines of ventilation ducts; the movement of the contractions of the shopping centre itself, for the process of creating time is not exclusive to the human mind. Still, this is too limited for it inevitably sees a return to some kind of pre-existent, spatialized and indeed, measurable time, even if it is only by opposition to this in the underscoring of rhythm.

Reading via the first synthesis of time which Deleuze develops in *Difference and Repetition*, each moment of the waltz is, in its succession, inseparable from those which preceded and follow it. Each beat presupposes the last and expects another, as a contraction takes place between these moments and creates time with the subject as a by-product. That is to say, to recall Bergson’s point about the inseparability of instants, each moment of the waltz, interpenetrates each other, intersects each and every other in an unimpeded flow. The process of this contraction, which Deleuze terms the first or passive synthesis of time (*DR, ES*), is one in which repeated or successive instants are habitually contracted in order to constitute a living present. As Deleuze notes, similar rhythms are found in the work of Hume (the AB, AB, AB pattern) and Bergson (the A, A, A, A of the clock striking the hour of four). There is no inherent or causal relation between any of the events of the series, but still there is an anticipation, an expectancy that B should follow A or that there should be a fourth A in the series after the third. This expectancy is evidence for the passive synthesis, the series is contracted into a living present where the past is held and a sense of anticipation for the future is born. There is only this expectancy by virtue of the fact that there is a passive synthesis. It is the passive synthesis which dialogues with the waltz, a kind of butterflying out from the living present, connecting in revolutionary movement to pasts and expectancy of the future. In this sense, the passive synthesis is not so much a circular movement, statically in
place and revolving around a fixed point but a spiralling pattern, a twisting though
directional, movement that pulls past memories and anticipation of the future into the living
present, which passes and is passed into. The waltz, however, is not to be understood only as
a separated habit of counting 1,2,3. As will be discussed further in subsequent sections of this
chapter this kind of metronomic cadence- measurement and meter- is a dogma that gets
reshaped by the permeating and drifting rhythm of the player who indulges rubato.

In summary, Williams (2011) suggests that the passive synthesis creates an ever-
expanding present which reaches into both past and future by interweaving the repetition of
instants such that one dismisses the notion of their independence, their separateness from
each other as instants. Indeed, Williams’s example of the learned habit of the most efficient
and painless way of extracting water from a water-pump is analogous to the ways in which
the passive synthesis functions to create the expectation of the next step of the waltz (as
future) as well as the understanding that a step as just occurred (as past). Thus, with regards
to the 1,2,3 of the waltz, on the second beat the first is retained within the living present and
the third is anticipated or expected. From the view of this living present, neither future nor
past have any existence which may be conceived of as separate or distinct, thus denying
simultaneously the possibility of an objective linear form of time as well as an intersubjective
or shared one since both always presuppose the forward moving progress of a spatialized
representation of time. The living present shows not a straight line moving forward but a
spiralling arc, a waltz across the dancefloor.

Though best exemplified by habits (the dance, the water pump), it is important to note
that the passive synthesis is itself always a habit. The oft quoted passage from Empiricism
and Subjectivity is here important to reiterate: “Habit is the constitutive root of the subject,
and the subject, at root, is the synthesis of time” (ES, p.96-97). As a process in the mind
contracts past into present and expects the future, there is produced a need for a thing which
exists through all three temporal periods by virtue of which there are the periods. What is crucial here is that the by-product of the habitual synthesis of time is what Deleuze terms “larval subjectivity”. It is not the case that there is a constant or fixed subject who exists unchanged through time nor is there one who produces time in the interrelation to other subjects in the world (e.g.: ritual). The slow spiralling of the synthesis, as opposed to the projectile of the arrow of time, produces momentary larval subjects who exist for that hang in the melody until the next note or beat comes, fatigue sweeping in to cause the present to pass away and taking the larval subject with it.

**Time in habits**

*The watch beeps. It is 1:00pm. 1:00pm is the fast and frenetic buzzing portending the slight blur around the edges of vision that follows a double espresso. It is time to change the bins. Her movements are deft and dexterous as she moves along the deck. Pull, unclip, tie, lift, open, spread, secure, push to close. Over and over. Her eyes, however, do not show the disinterested glaze of one locked into a monotonous and mindless task, but attention to detail and care. Each move seems calculated and precise, as though she was focusing her entire will upon conserving energy, or else was locked in a dance with an unseen partner and was not going to be the first one to lose the rhythm and break time. Only a fool could assume that her focus was the result of inexperience, the routinization of the task into something unthinking still being to come. She is all too aware of what her job is and is not (paying the bills) but retains her focus. Pull, unclip, tie, lift, open, spread, secure, push to close.*

Perhaps no practice evidences habit so well as does the custom of wearing a watch which beeps on the hour, reminding one always of what time it is and, more importantly, that there
is a 60 bpm metronome attached to the wrist, from which can be extrapolated more complex rhythms, but the wonders of the caretaker seem relevant still, hunting time in her practice. We might here draw out the theme of the waltz by exploring, as Chandler (2011) does, the notions of work as dance, for there is certainly a corporeally rendered rhythm in the caretaker’s actions. However, we wish to focus on the habit itself. These are the time-machines, each one counting, each one interacting with others in intersection; habits constituting the organized body. In reading this consistently with Deleuze’s thought on the nature of repetition— not as the recurrence of an event or thing with a stable identity but as “the repetition of a difference for something that is not the repeated thing” (Williams, 2011. p.23)—the habit becomes something other than a mindless, mechanical action. One might, for example, note the slight differences in the ripples which the resonating tones of the watch send through the skin or the subtle changes in the way time feels in the shopping centre today (fast or slow; easily tracked or easily lost by the interlocutor) or the variations in the way a bag contacts the hollow space of the bin or the slight differences in weight of the removed bag or the ways in which the organized body, in terms of its movement and its intersections, conveys the transportation of the bag to a nearby trolley. Each time there is something novel (i.e., difference) produced. There are no universals. What emerges as novel is ineffable and to be sure, no casual question can disentangle the myriad complexity of something so seemingly straightforward, so entrenched a part of everyday life, as changing a bin liner. However, from the films of Charlie Chaplin to seminal sociological commentary like that of Blauner (1964), we have collectively lamented the seeming mind-numbing tedium experienced by the late-capitalist worker; bemoaning the repeated nature of the task which disenfranchises in its deskilled nature (Braverman, 1998) and as such, we shall not rehearse or try to advance such arguments here. We shall merely note that all tasks are, in the colloquial sense, repetitive and thus their character is inconsequential from the perspective of
thinking of subjectivity as emergent out of larval states as the task itself will always have an element of habit. The work of most skilled artisanal craft practice and the factory worker are analogous on these terms. Indeed, in Deleuze’s reading of Hume there is the essential observation that the subject is itself produced by the habit of producing time; the subject is, in itself, a habit. The habit of saying “I”. Furthermore, Deleuze says “to speak of the subject now is to speak of duration, custom, habit and anticipation.” (ES. p.92) which is in itself a radical redefinition that eschews consciousness, identity, truth, humanity or any of the other characteristics attributed to the concept of subjectivity over its long history. By Deleuze’s logic, ossified habitual practices define all of our subjectivities. That is to say, the subject becomes readable as a body onto which various forms of habit or organization have agglomerated. The subject in the shopping centre thus becomes one defined by the waltz, and the habit of time which it signals.

To advance this further, in the shopping centre, one can see the waltz as simultaneously the product and the method of the contraction of the synthesis, in that the waltz itself becomes the rhythm by which the shopping centre puts together time. As Deleuze himself deduces, the passive synthesis is intratemporal. That is to say, if the habitual contraction of past-presents into a present, creating expectations of a future present (and producing the self as a by-product to exist through all presents) is within time it must also itself be possessed of a habitual contraction or a rhythm, and can thus be said to have a rhythmic character. We might define this as the “rhythm of duration” of which Bergson (1999) speaks or as a rubato waltz. Indeed, when defining the experience of lived duration for a being who has no spatial understanding of time Bergson (2002, p.101) turns to rubato, commenting that to dwell on a single note for longer than indicated prompts a qualitative change in the entire composition. That it can be done evidences that there is something other than a metronomic and measured understanding of time at play in the action of the musician.
which is or could be evident to one who was attuned to the subtleties of the experience of time. The contraction of the passive synthesis has perhaps always seemed to have a rhythmic quality, a 1, 2, 3 of which little has been said and one may suggest that past, present, future are pulled together with a waltzing habit that also renders sensible what it means to waltz.

Bergson’s own provocations on the nature of time can be usefully considered here in order to make sense of the notion of the production of time via an expanding living present being itself within time. Bergson (1999, p.30) asks the reader to consider:

“A melody to which we listen with our eyes closed, heeding it alone, [that] comes close to coinciding with this time which is the very fluidity of our inner life; but it still has too many qualities, too much definition, and we must first efface the difference among the sounds, then do away with the distinctive features of sound itself, retaining of it only the continuation of what precedes into what follows in uninterrupted transition [...] Such is immediately perceived duration, without which we would have no idea of time.”

It is worth noting here that, reading via this quote, Deleuze would later add a temporal character to philosophy itself saying: “It seems clear to me that philosophy is truly an unvoiced song, with the same feel for movement music has” (N, p.163). What is crucial here is that in calling for a move beyond the “difference between” successive notes or “distinctive features” Bergson is foreshadowing a metaphysics beyond identity where difference is relegated to that which separates two stable identities. Herein one can also begin to see the idea of duration as a continuous flow; alluding thus to time’s immeasurability (the impossibility of separating instants from each other), its constant incompleteness and its ephemera. The notion of the ‘lived present’ as encompassing adjacent temporalities is also here legitimized, since in order for the melody to be intelligible at all, the notes of the composition must be heard as conjoined, the difference between them erased, leaving only
the contractive mechanism of time itself. Of course, the melody still takes place in time but this time is the time of the pure past (of which we will speak further in Chapter IV). What remains to be explained is how time passes, either from or within the eternally still moment of the expanding living present- into which past, present and future are contracted- or in any other sense and particularly how is this experienced, for it is perhaps the case that within the paradigm of understanding time as either commodity or spatial phenomenon we have muted our ability to perceive and describe time-in-itself.

Enter the Insomniac

The watch beeps. It is 7:00pm. The smell of 7:00pm is cold and sweat, giving way to charred meat and fried dough. The square outside the shopping centre has taken on the form of a distant memory, a village of small stalls- each with different seasonal wares. There is a stillness here that is not reflected in the melancholy of the stone benches, busy but sombre, storing the chill for the coming months. Winter has called the children away from the carousel, making its songs ring high and hollow. The cold-fearing crowd has abandoned this space to ruin; making it vibrate with a hitherto unencountered intensity; shuddering the lungs with its symphony. The approach of the holiday season has multiplied the bodies that pass through the malls but only a few are drawn to the outside. On the inside we celebrate the season with fireworks and dust covered lights, already hedging our bets and waiting for the coming of the hallowed four-letter word: sale. [...] What none of this overruns is the pursuing hues of blue seeping through the deliberately warm lighting, as though Picasso himself was painting visions of the square slipping through time to the tune of another sweet but sacred word: melancholia.
On a stroll through the shopping centre, the schizo might encounter the spirit of Cottrell’s (1939) Railroader reincarnated in the figure of the insomniac, the dancing subject of the shopping centre or one who is characterized by the excess of time-machines. Such is the totality of his experience of time that all of the insomniac’s habits are time-machines. While one could thus call “insomniac” the body which has become covered in time-machines and; unable to stop counting, to stop organizing and disrupt its habits; persists in a kind of wakeful-metronomic-obsession, the insomniac is something other. Indeed, the insomniac’s nature goes beyond the self-interested need to keep track of time, lest they become disoriented by the absence of what is perhaps the most fundamental of natural cycles (asleep/awake), for, as the example of the caretaker shows, the social persists, in part, by installing time-machines upon us all. A metronomic click is the most simple of time-machines and we extrapolate to live our lives at 4/4 at 60 beats per minute. One can also see their installation at work in the socialization of the infant as it learns to eat and sleep at preordained times or in the schoolchild as it is disciplined into embracing a timetable that will eventually prepare it for the world of work (see Foucault, 1991) as well as in the indoctrination of new workers on a tour of the malls as they are explicitly taught the rhythms and routines of the space. Indeed, it is only the schizo who is able to rid himself entirely of time-machines in his journey towards recovering his body (without organs). The insomniac is, however, unique because in such an instance, the installation of time-machines is so excessive that he is rendered as a connoisseur of time par excellence; counting in different modes, so obsessively that even minor variance becomes salient and thus difference in terms other than numbers and space becomes evident. It is, perhaps, of the insomniac’s perceptions which Núñez (1999) connects when he asks “Could the future taste purple?”. It may be to the

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12 There are two tangential points which we must note about the insomniac. Firstly, though we may say, “one” who is attuned to the aesthetics of time, we note this conceptual persona, much like the schizo, as desubjectivated and secondly, that the agglomeration of time-machines onto the body demonstrates that not all organization is bad or unproductive.
insomniac’s attunement which the physicist, Alan Lightman (1993, p.47) alludes, when he speaks about an “aesthetics of time”. What Lightman discusses is the ability of time to feel differently within differing social paradigms; sticky in some, smooth in others; at times rough and coarse and at others gently undulating; sometimes seeming to freeze coldly and hold in stasis and at others to slip by as though wet and warm.

Time as that which has its own aesthetic characteristics. Under the sleepless tumult of insomnia, it is possible to discern the inherent beauty and differing qualities of many types of time. The insomniac sees time as red, blue or sometimes a black-blue-grey; feels it as a texture, perhaps jagged or sanded; tastes it as everything from sweet to savoury; hears it as music whether harmonious or discordant; smells it in different possibilities from ripe and pungent to fresh and clean; feels it when it begins to tremble or heat up or starts moving away or perhaps the insomniac experiences time as nothing like this at all and these are the only conditions through which we can render a fundamentally ineffable experience through language. Nevertheless, it is these aesthetic qualities of time which the insomniac can understand to be the result of the varying rubato played within the series of past, present, future. While Ashton (2008) discusses the “feeling” of time via the concept of the “time image” which Deleuze develops in his work on cinema, what the insomniac experiences is altogether different. The insomniac is attentive to the ways in which the aesthetic of time in the shopping centre is often fashioned after and by the waltz. It is not sticky or viscous, rendering one trapped in time that seems slow to move, eager to progress. Nor is it overly liquid, runny or frenetic. It impels but affords re-turns and revolutions. It is sometimes slippery, allowing for slippages into what we will come to call the pure past, that time during which the passive synthesis takes place, but moreover it is high and bright, loud and buzzing, ostentatious and charming, sweeping in grand circles. “A waltz” says the insomniac when asked to describe time in the shopping centre. This is not simply a question of noting the
relativity of time which has been entrenched within the popular consciousness since Einstein and which manifests more specifically when Ian Phillips (2013) and other contemporary philosophers speak about the changing perceptions of duration when consciousness is exposed to traumatic events. The insomniac’s operation is their attention to the varying rhythms of the passive synthesis, the varying qualities of the lived present- of which the *rubato* waltz is only one, unique to the shopping centre but echoing out through its various reaches and networks.

There is, however, still more to the insomniac’s relation to time-machines. When out for a stroll, the insomniac is confronted by an antagonistic mechanism, a curious interplay between fatigue and time-machines. While a certain manner of tiredness is to be expected from the insomniac, fatigue is here not so much a reference to the general lethargy that results from an organized body being deprived of sleep as it is a depiction of the point where contraction, the action of the passive synthesis, is no longer possible (*DR*, p.98). When Deleuze introduces the concept of fatigue it is to present it as the mechanism of the “passing present”, in that it is how the present moment passes away, enabling the synthesis to continue in a manner analogous with the way in which the combination of forces and charges running through the circuits of a watch allow a beep to happen. Without the passing of the present, time becomes a stasis, centred on an eternal moment, a frozen present, living but expanding out of control as it can neither pass nor be passive. What the insomniac shows is that fatigue, at its most extreme, can botch or, more accurately, alter the rhythm of the action of the synthesis as it takes place in the shopping centre. As the insomniac approaches a beyond “tiredness” close to “exhaustion”, he encounters a manner of failure in the synthesis, an absolute triumph of difference since the interstitial space between the A,B; 1,2,3 becomes protracted; elongated such that one becomes frozen on the 1 with the present unable to pass. Such is the passive synthesis for the insomniac in the shopping centre; not measured,
tempered or predictable, but rhythmic. Here the waltz begins to lose its melody, or rather, transitions into another mode of melody, as fatigued musician inadvertently inserts *rubato* into the composition, creating the effect of A\(_2\)B; \(I.23\), a fluid pause wherein the passage of the living present fails and the insomniac himself becomes able to experience larval subjectivity- becoming thus a momentary subject with all contractions, contemplations and habits suspended, temporarily disconnected from past and future with no sense of time. To phrase it differently, it is in the liminal space of the fatigued *rubato* that the experience of what Julia Mahler (2008) calls ‘passive time’ becomes possible. Mahler recounts the story of sitting in the kitchen of her interlocutors, listening to the radio and watching as they tended the fire, attentive to the rhythms of cooking, cutting the wood, stoking the fire etc.

Summarized by the line: “Time seems to stand still” (ibid, p.75) which recurs as a refrain throughout her text, the stillness of allowing time to, in one sense, “pass by”, in all of its weight and import, is notably juxtaposed against the powerful existential urges to keep “moving forward” or the lived discomfort and disease of squandering commodified time.

The insomniac is no stranger to the perils of time and can experience it, in the uncertain rhythm of a *rubato* waltz, as absolutely relaxed, enduring the full weight of the contraction of past, present and future in an eternal and still moment of the delicate living present. It is perhaps in the frozen moment of “passive time”, when metronomic counting stops, that the aesthetics of time become clear.

**The Refrain**

*The watch beeps. It is 11:00am. The sound of 11:00am is the refrain of the shopping centre. As an accompaniment to the anniversary celebrations, the shopping centre produces a commemorative song. It emanates from the big screen and speakers dotted along the malls for months following the director’s speech to a captive*
audience. It is cheerful and upbeat computer-generated music which gets lost among the other songs of the shopping centre and thus must be hunted for with the ears.

Each time the song plays, one returns to the space where it last was, conversations re-emerge and ideas re-present themselves as the present spreads over various pasts, forming new connections and disjunctions. The refrain becomes a home base to which the shopping centre always returns, a frozen state, waiting for time to pass again.

Perhaps it can only make sense to describe time in the shopping centre, assuming that one wanted to avoid reductive moves back to describing time in terms of space and the image of thought, by saying nothing more than: the insomniac experiences time in the shopping centre as a rubato waltz. It thus becomes necessary to establish why this time, described in the full range of its characteristics as a waltz, is uniquely of the shopping centre, why it might seem localized to “a space” which exists as a privately owned, cordoned-off and barriered by a system of lines. As one walks out of the high glass doors of the shopping centre with cool wind biting one’s face, the song of the shopping centre stands in the air at one’s back, not incomplete but open, hung with the expectancy of another coming note. When the shopping centre sings, in its undulations around a low B-flat, it sings to remind us (and itself) of home.

When a song provokes a dance- a waltz, a rhythm like a line running through the body- a territory is formed. It is here far more relevant to speak of “territories” than “spaces” for when Deleuze and Guattari speak of the refrain in A Thousand Plateaus they discuss it in the context of rhythm and melody which can become affective to the degree that it can be said to construct a particular territory, to characterize a space, a time, a mood, a colour, an aesthetic. Deleuze and Guattari discuss the refrain of the scared child who sings to remind herself of the safety and comforts of home, the song acting to connect the territory which she inhabits to past and future; to the memory and the expectation of a home. They say: “We call a refrain
any aggregate of matters of expression that draws a territory and develops into territorial motifs and landscapes” (ATP, p.323). When the shopping centre plays a song repeatedly in celebration of its own existence, a song of comfort, this is also a refrain. The first mentions of the refrain occur in A Thousand Plateaus where the term is notably translated from the word ritournelle, a three-step much like the waltz. This seeming dance is explained as: “the refrain is rhythm and melody that have been territorialized because they have become expressive” (ATP, p.317).

There are two things worth of note here. The first can be seen in the connection that Sørensen (2005) makes to Grass’s (1959) novel The Tin Drum, where the refrain can at once demarcate a territory, that of a fascist state, and mark out a line of escape from within it. Sørensen describes a scene from the text wherein the protagonist transforms a song to herald a visiting Nazi dignitary into a waltz; beating the titular drum to cut through the military march with a line of subversion, something other and uncontrollable. In the 1979 film by Volker Schlöndorff, the military march in question is Fürst’s Badonviller Marsch, which is subverted and overwritten by Strauss’s The Blue Danube Waltz. It is by a similar logic that the shopping centre constructs its waltz, not as a military cadence, rigidly kept, but in rubato, varying in intensity, feel and sensation; seeming to cut into other sounds, conversations and moments in order to produce something new. The second is that the above quote itself repeats is repeated throughout the chapter on ‘The Refrain’ in A Thousand Plateaus, each time making a new territory, coming back on, with and to a measured rhythm. Each time it invokes something new, each time it connects to other concepts in different ways. The text, of philosophy as much as the text which the field presents itself as, is thus made music in and by this chorus, this returning habit, thus becoming that unvoiced song which Deleuze discusses in Negotiations and evidencing, by other means, the passive synthesis. What is important to note is that though the refrain always carries with it time and earth (ATP, p.312) and though it
links a rhythm to a territory, it is not a spatialization of time. It is merely a contextualization of the time (the pure past of memory) in which the passive synthesis takes place. A territory, furthermore, is not limited to “a space” but to all the aspects of the refrain and all of the concurrent connections. The refrain, it seems, confronts one with the Bergsonian “melody of time” but as one organized, identified and made to serve specific ends, that is, to function as a reminder of the spaces of the shopping centre.

There are however, many other relevant connections to the refrain. As Deleuze and Guattari say: “so just what is a refrain? Glass harmonica: the refrain is a prism, a crystal of space-time.” (ATP, p.384) The crystal image would, of course, appear in Deleuze’s later work on cinema (TI). The crystal image occurs when the audience is confronted with that conjunction of images which allows them to see time in its most fundamental operations and distinctions. Deleuze here speaks explicitly of “the crystal of time as being a ‘ritornello’ par excellence” (TI, p.92). Deleuze also speaks of a visionary or a seer as “the one who sees in the crystal, and what he sees is the gushing of time as dividing in two, as splitting” (TI, p.81). This dividing of time into actual and virtual is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is sufficient to note that the one who is able to see time in the crystal with all of its beauty and characteristics has important resonances with the conceptual persona of the insomniac. What is unique and perhaps crucial here is that the glass harmonica, an instrument made of a series of at times overlapping, at times differently sized, at times separate glass bowls which, through the friction of the musician’s fingers generate ethereal and haunting sounds that were once feared to send both musician and listener careening into madness (Rosenberg, 2014), into flights of vision and encounters with the supernatural. It is perhaps no accident that Benjamin Franklin, after linking time to money, invented the Glass Harmonica.

To explore the link between the insomniac and the refrain further, the refrain constitutes a territory for the insomniac during which he can be attentive to the aesthetics of
time. To expand, it is possible to argue, there is only a crystal image by virtue of the fact that there is the passive synthesis. The latter constitutes the former through the contractive mechanism and the creation of an expectancy of time and as such, it might be said that, with regards to the shopping centre, what we see in the crystal, that image of time, is itself a waltz, understood by the insomniac. The refrain, in as much as it constitutes a territory, creates one for the insomniac to see time, in its various shades, colours and textures in the song that returns, again and again as they visit to shopping centre, each time repeating with new context, new affect, new connections. The refrain “colours” or “tones” the time of the shopping centre as the insomniac understands it, connecting past and future presents to the lived presents, uniting “when it has been” and “when it will have been”, the synthesis becoming thus observable on a larger non-individual scale, exterior to a mind. This is crucial to note because, to reiterate, the synthesis, for Deleuze, does not necessarily take place by the action of a mind, nor is it only possible within a mind. In the shopping centre one can see illustrated what it would take Deleuze more than a decade to find (and only then in his work with Guattari); the refrain is the passive synthesis of a territory.

Conclusion: Thinking Time

The watch beeps. The hour is a black-blue-grey, a mirror of the asphalt that moat-like surrounds this bastion of odd-communities and capitalist retail space. Even now, the shopping centre does not seem to sleep. Even as the last bus leaves, fire-gates descend and the miles of parking lot stand moonlit and empty, there is a kind of restlessness in the air, an urge to go on. A story uncomfortable unless told. An urge to keep dancing.

This chapter has endeavoured to trace a line of thought beginning with the idea that time is something more or other than we represent in common metaphoric systems and schema
That is to say, time is, neither merely commodified by capital nor merely a rhythm in defiance of this commodification capital; though it is frequently depicted as both of these by authors across disciplines. The wandering lines of this train of thought go through what Deleuze calls the passive synthesis of time, the conceptual persona of the insomniac, the ethnographic encounter with the waltz, and finally, the refrain. The astute reader might ask, “What has been the point of these meandering lines and connections? Surely the ‘reality’ of the clock is more important to the shopping centre, insofar as it dictates shift hours for workers and opening hours for the centre itself.” While this is indeed a valid question, it is perhaps the most myopic for it neglects the major project of this thesis, namely trying to develop transcendental empiricism as a practice for and of fieldwork. In this regard, it is important to remember that Deleuze’s attempt to overthrow the dogmatic image of thought and establish a metaphysics of difference is inseparable from his attempts to write about time as a phenomenon more complex and varied than it is commonly thought to be. Indeed, what is the perverse topology of thinking time as metaphor, as a commodity, as that which is secondary to space, other than a by-product of the thinking subject, itself reflective of an entrenched system of representational thinking? Thus we must not only ask what else thought can do but experiment in doing it, pushing thought and description into the seemingly unreal, the impossible, the ‘pataphoric, the denaturalized, the glass harmonica playing a waltz which the insomniac hears as black-blue-grey time. More broadly then, the conceptual personae of the insomniac functions to demonstrate a more focused or acute version of the synesthetic experience of a space offered by the schizo in Chapter I, here rendered through excerpts from fieldnotes that try to portray time in ways which subtly subvert the metaphors of spatialization in appeals to other senses. In so doing, time itself is rendered a thing estranged, one which is no longer possible to ignore or take for granted.
For now, it is sufficient to reflect upon the ethnographic story of the insomniac, a fatigued connoisseur of the aesthetics of time, which enacts a kind of play with(in) the passive synthesis, the fatigued-*rubato*, making rhythmic movements that can render foreign one’s relationship to an all-too familiar space and that we can see this same play at work in the shopping centre through the refrain. Thus we confront, time not as a line, or a circle or a spiral but as madness.
Discussion is just an exercise in narcissism where everyone takes turns showing off. Very quickly, you have no idea what is being discussed. […] Conversation is something else entirely. We need conversation. But the lightest conversation is a great schizophrenic experiment happening between two individuals with common resources and a taste for ellipses and short-hand expressions. Conversation is full of long silences; it can give you ideas. But discussion has no place in the work of philosophy.

(TrM, p.390)

Thus far, this thesis has pursued many experiments in writing around the theme of challenging the positioned centrality of the “I think” to ethnographic work; seeking to deliberately and purposefully obfuscate the function of author(ity). However, the experiments presented so far have maintained a careful distinction between fieldnotes and retrospective analysis; between an account of the shopping centre and the assaying of it in what storytelling can be rendered through the taken for granted “academic style” in which one is expected to write in order to be examined in a Business School. In this chapter, we seek to destruct this
separation entirely; for the privileging of the fieldnote is an extension of the power of the author or “I think” and we must continue to call this into question for, as we have previously explained, if either CMS or Anthropology are to develop, out of this work, a Deleuzian method, the thinking subject has to be challenged, much more stringently than previous chapters have been able to do, as the core of our methodology. That is to say, the fieldnote legitimates ethnographic authority by the logic of “you are there…because I was there” (Clifford, 1998. p.22) assuring the reader that the “I think” or a fundamental or genetic identity exists at the core of the work for it is this authority who stood in the field and made the note. As such, even if the intellectual confines of a thesis cannot accommodate the complete disappearance of the position of the subject, it is worth considering what other forms the textual experimentation of this work might take. Thus this chapter will adopt, not just the form and tradition of Socratic dialogues, but writing through these, a conversation between J.G. Ballard’s novel, Kingdom Come (because it is itself set in a shopping centre), and Deleuze’s work.

Within Organization Studies, the question of how to engage with so called works of “fiction” in general (Rhodes and Brown, 2005; Philips, 1995; Patient et al., 2003; Czarniawska, 2006; De Cock, 2000; De Cock and Land, 2005) and Ballard’s novels in particular (see Zhang et al., 2008), has attracted previous interest but Kingdom Come is yet to be considered in depth (much like the shopping centre upon which it is based). Furthermore, aside from a few outliers (see Van Maanen, 1995) the question of engaging with “fiction” is yet to be developed in the context of ethnographic work or inquiry. Within Anthropological circles, however, ethnographers have long grappled with the questions around realism (see Marcus and Cushman, 1982) and through it, with the distinction between fiction and non-fiction (Narayan, 1999; 2007; Tierney, 2007; Jackson, 2009; see also Castaneda, 1974) as well as the role of the ethnographer in the production of a “creative non-fiction”; as author, as
a persona in the work or even as an editor, cutting together different sentences, paragraphs and memories from sources within the field (Behar, 1992). Experiments with the line between theory and fiction will always be an uncomfortable exercise for both disciplines, as both are sensitive to questions of legitimacy and the risks of aestheticism (Geertz, 1988). The possibility that style might overtake substance, or worse, that the ethnographer’s status as a truth producing social-scientist, their “credibility” (De Cock and Land, p.521), might be called into question, being a real fear with institutional ramifications. It is, however, necessary for this work to push past these concerns for after long periods in the spaces and times recognized as “the shopping centre”, one gets the sense that something else is speaking; that is, to return to the question of the “I think”, something other than a singular subject; constructing the words, the sentences, the paragraphs, the pauses, and the shared moments that make up discussion; as though all of it were somehow a part of the shopping centre’s grand design. One acts in a kind of “bad faith” to try to find out from where this speaking comes or who is responsible for it. “Bad faith” in this sense is the converse of Sartre’s (2003) original usage of the term to indicate instances where one acts as though he does not have freedom. Here we employ it to refer to cases where one believes oneself to be possessed of agency, self-determination and author(ity) and is thus almost inevitably led to seeking out some genesis or font of this information, either in the self as ethnographer or in the field.

It is all too often the case that conversations in the shopping centre seem to have this ineffable quality, whether the topic is the weather or British politics or the interlocutor’s love of “Catcher in the Rye”, discussions seemingly come from and lead to spaces with widely varying tone, topic and affectual response; careening from Christmas shop decorations to the migrant refugee crisis that gripped Europe for the majority of 2015, from the results of the local pub quiz to the funeral plans for a member of an interlocutor’s family. One can only speculate that with the same method that the shopping centre affects a homogenous facade, it
effaces the emotional dimensions of conversations, or, in the least, blunts its affectual
variances, compressing highs and lows in its open spaces but this is perhaps reductive. Here,
a careful analogue can be drawn to Ballard’s work, for it is perhaps the case that one of the
defining characteristics of the genre of transgressive fiction (of which Ballard is arguably a
part) is its dialogue, where characters speak in odd combinations of recycled conversations
and cultural references, where individuals seem to reply to questions not asked and raise
issues not previously brought up. Their discussions have a kind of beautifully speculative
ephemerality and transience while simultaneously having horrifying weight and import. The
following section of this chapter will try to convey this through playing with the form of the
conversation/dialogue.

It is however, not only this chapter’s intention to further the disordering of the writing
practices which sustain the subject, but rather to continue to understand how the subject is
constituted with relation to time by considering Deleuze’s second synthesis, that of memory
and the pure past. Previous work on organizational memory has considered it as a kind of
“storage bin” (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Fiedler and Welpe, 2010) for so called “knowledge
assets” such as memories, histories, myths and stories; leading many to speak instead of
“organizational remembering” (see Feldman and Feldman, 2006, Rowlinson et al., 2010;
Rowlinson et al., 2014; Adorasio, 2014) in order to distinguish an approach that was less
concerned with “knowledge management” and more concerned with remembering as a
“collective, historically and culturally situated practice” (Feldman and Feldman, 2006.
p.861). It is this line of inquiry which has begun to consider work around the notions of
collective (Halbwachs, 1992) or urban memory (see Crimson, 2005) which are more closely
related to ethnographic inquiry. However, where ethnographic work is concerned neither
discipline has any response to the notion that the entire edifice of memory is also informed by
the logic of an “I think”, or more accurately, an “I remember”, which, as this chapter shall
advance, Deleuze’s second-synthesis may be understood to call into question. That is to say, though the many “aparallel trends” that we mentioned previously have accomplished much in the way of achieving reflexive and self-aware ethnographic writing, they have never gone as far as one might in reading Deleuze’s antagonism towards the author as subject and the subject as “the one who remembers”, suggesting thus that the remembering of the field is complex, juxtaposed, entangled and impossible to parse.

This chapter will thus endeavour to extend the boundaries of ethnographic writing by combining many snippets of conversation (borrowed or stolen from the field), with memories from the shopping centre’s archives and libraries, with descriptions of the space and observations from fieldnotes into the form of a dialogue. The long history of the philosophical dialogue begins, as all things, with Plato. One might say that the Platonic dialogue demonstrates an advanced analytic technique which, in keeping with the epigraph of this chapter, makes conversation impossible, with Socrates pre-empting responses and cutting across the interlocutor with new lines of conversation before they begin to speak. Socrates seems to turn his friends into concepts through the crucible of the dialogue, slowly distilling and refining them through interrogation. However, the undiscussable problems of love and rhetoric in Phaedrus or unassailable questions of knowledge in Theaetetus are posed by Socrates in ways which seem to prompt answers which come from nowhere, with questions addressed to no one, almost as though passing in a void. This kind of play will push the poetic labours of what Gabriel (2013) describes as “storywork”, translating field experiences into a coherent narrative, past their breaking point. Purely as a formality, traditional in-line references will be retained and quotations from published sources will be italicized; a last vestige of the organism that is the academy which cannot yet be let go. Perhaps we shall eventually be free of it, and so acknowledge the impossibility of origin, that the encounters in the field prove inextricable context for the re-reading of Deleuze’s theory of memory, co-
implicated with the second synthesis of time, which this chapter will also present. Indeed, the collective memories of the shopping centre cannot be separated from how one might develop a way of working with Deleuze in the field as they are, in no uncertain terms, the material conditions of the production of such an understanding of memory.

Slipping into a long conversation

“The fact that the last few decades have seen the shopping centre become a target for organized violence and acts of terror is at once appalling and in no way surprising.” says Jay, his messy brown hair blowing in the wind and falling over his eyes. The two sit together on a south-facing, stone bench in the open square, looking at a carousel which is currently still and not in use. The warm June sun stands just above the high, green dome of the shopping centre. Both seem to stretch far away from the pair, as though their distance from the bench and the square was immeasurable. The square itself is the definition of postmodern pastiche, seeming to strive for the opulence of a style which, revivalistically, celebrates the memory of architects like Charles Garner in calling forth images of Monte Carlo, while reaching out to different forms of neoclassicism through large polished columns, long arcing lines and an assortment of Greco-Roman statues. All of this in an attempt to escape modern functionalism and a need to construct an air of ostentation and grandiosity, to build a great stage upon which the consumer can play.

Jay thinks for a long time before he continues to speak. When he does, it is with a flat affect and a stare that fixes itself on the surface of the bench, as though reading from an invisible scrawling or pile of notes drawn from an archive or else divining the words from the ripples of colour in the stone.

“History tells us as much,” he continues. “In September 2013, al-Shabaab militants stormed the Westgate Shopping mall in Kenya, killing dozens (Howden, 2013). In June 1996,
the IRA orchestrated the bombing of the environs of the Manchester Arndale, costing the city millions of pounds in damage (Schofield, 2009). In March 2015, three people were injured when gunmen opened fire in a shopping centre in Copenhagen, Denmark (Hall, 2015). In September 2015, an unknown man set off a small incendiary device at a shopping centre in Preston, UK (Dearden, 2015). One has to wonder at the increasing synonymity of terror and shopping. Is it coincidental or is it a part of a broader set of socio-cultural forces, desires and influences- those mobilized against the perceived evils of capitalism, which the shopping centre represents- or is attributable to something in the shopping centre itself, some unknowable drive towards a violent end? Indeed, this very shopping centre recently played host to a “simulated terrorist attack” drawing in police from across the region to take part in a training exercise (Halliday, 2016). Why choose the shopping centre as a site for this activity? It seems that we can only speculate.”

“It may be that a fascist has always lived at the shopping centre, orchestrating violences of different kinds but it may be unwise to trust such a claim to history,” comments Giles. He continues: “Histories are always too neat and too political to be believed and there is a kind of violence, a war machine, that is always at work in the archive of collective memory, rewriting histories. One might say that a war machine looms up and bears down from without, killing memory (ATP, p.459) for there is and can be no political power without control of the archive and, by extension, memory (Derrida, 1995). Germany in the 1940’s showed us the violences that could done to memory by the fascist’s propaganda machine (Herf, 2006) but we also know all too well that a war can very quickly turn towards the people, the streets they live on, the cites that those streets compose and thus to the archive of what a people are and their ideology. We can see this with the actions of any fascistic state that captures and takes a war machine into itself in order to realize its own nihilism as well as the violences of which it dreams. Even if the war machine is not inherently violent (ATP,
p.253), it can be put to the task of slavish destruction by the state. Indeed, violence is itself the trade of the state and it is thus that, when co-opted, the war machine can be put to work burning libraries and destroying museum artefacts (Shaheen, 2015), more often selling off artefacts to fund further conquest, thus rendering memory as a commodity to be traded for political gains. However, compared to such wanton destruction on such a pitiless scale, the violences of the shopping centre seem altogether less overt, or rather, its violences are much more like the structural and disciplinary ones which are necessary for the existence of the state (ATP, p.447), even if it similarly trades in memory and nostalgia value. When violence emerges in a shopping centre like this one, it is not in a thunderous crash as the glass doors of a bank shatter while being opened nor is it in the sound of boots stamping on faux-marble tile as security guards chase a shoplifter nor in genuine tragedy like a small child being crushed by a balustrade in 1998. Rather violence lies in the impulse to form an orderly cue rather than a messy crowd. It is the mild anger that you feel when someone cuts into the line. It is the jealousy that one experiences when you see someone confidently carrying a large number of bags. Micro-fascisms (ATP, p.214); the fascist impulse internalized and working through the everyday. One can feel it every time someone breaks the unspoken rules of “decorum” in the shopping centre: cutting a line or sitting inappropriately. Thus, there may be a yearning in the minds of all of these people, and the shopping centre itself, for a return to the past, for the past to be sold to us (Goulding, 2000) as easily as a carousel ticket,” ventures Giles. “For all of us at some point yearn for stasis, the tyranny of the Same, for the past to be captured, controlled and sold back to us. Why else would the Square look like this?”

Jay segues, in an indelicate swerve, “I remember a story about a man who tried to hunt for a war machine. He searched for it but could not find it, probably because he thought that the nomad war machine refers to war in its primal state: female, unconstrained, mobile. He thought that the war machine might be a metaphor for thinking of gender relations and
war, for thinking about how women get co-opted and commodified by advertising driven capitalism” says Jay (see Desmond, 1997. p.338).

“The war machine is a concept and though it doesn’t have a fixed meaning it should not be reduced to a metaphor. Metaphors, by their very nature, limit possibility and dilute meaning. It is also simply ridiculous to think of the war machine outside of the context of violence and the state.” comments Giles indignantly. “And to think that the war machine was something that could or needed to be scientifically evidenced or proven or related to the petty identity politicking of discussions of gender...” his voice trails off as he shakes his head in disbelief.

“To return to what you were saying before, maybe it is easier to see the obfuscation of memory by the shopping centre in the moments where we try to remember and cannot, or are not clear about what we remember, where, as you say, memory seems itself to be bought and sold,” proposes Jay.

“What store was here?”

“Didn’t they have these decorations last year?”

“When is our annual dinner again?

“Where can I find the snow pants? I know that they were around here somewhere...”

“Under such conditions,” says Giles, “remembering becomes a process of actively looking for traces, for a sliver of a memory, a sign or record of some kind, an archive of the past. However, rather than focusing on what is done to memory by the state or the shopping centre, or how it is tracked by the individual subject, might it not be more productive to think about a ‘pure past’ where all memories, including those which have slipped away with no traces or artefacts to mark their passing, are held? Not a past which is simply what just was, but an absolute and general past, consisting of all that could have happened within the walls of the shopping centre, including a past where the walls had never been built. Such a past
would hold every event that will ever have happened in the shopping centre, every different form of it, every conceivable iteration of the space. A living museum. ’"

“Are museum artefacts examples of memories of the past or history?” inquires Jay, a genuine curiosity in his tone, “It seems like one might refer to an overly-rationalized version of the past while the other might speak to collective experience and a shared social consciousness of events. (Halbwachs. 1992) This is perhaps why the last fifty years have seen the growth of various movements on the Left, all intent upon discovering local, oral histories (Lindqvist, 1979) and narratives of events which run contra, inside, in-between and alongside stories produced by dominant discourses and regimes of power. Histories from below, one might say (Bhattacharya, 1983); though whether these admirable historians are uncovering little memories not acknowledged by the predominant historical narrative, or they are actively constructing memories of the past in their search is perhaps too abstract a question to be answered.”

“Its history may be a part of the order and organization of the body of the archive,” Giles instructs over the sounds of the carousel starting up again, beginning to spin and, terrifyingly, seeming to wobble on its axis, “but memories of the shopping centre’s past are also always precarious, always balanced on an edge, always under threat of being overwritten or lost amidst the shopping centre’s constant process of rejuvenation and maintenance. Each day everything seems to reset and reset again. Always it is difficult to recall specific details and minutia.”

“I remember,” contributes Jay “that this shopping centre used to be owned by a different company. They had different uniforms; red, I think. If we were to ask people at random what they thought of the new blue uniforms, they would probably either nostalgically reminisce about how much better the shopping centre was when the uniforms were red or else be confused and incredulously ask, “What new uniforms, weren’t they always blue?” That
things could have ever been otherwise seems as though it is a part of a dream. Though it may be necessary, there is still a kind of violence in that, in forgetting I mean, even if it might not be the violence of war.”

Giles waits briefly until the carousel stops before he speaks again, “Remember that the State will always produce thought that is striated (Holland, 2013); thoughts ordered, thoughts systematically and carefully delineated like so many meticulously laid out rows of suburban housing stretching out from this place. Indeed, this is perhaps the true insight into the fascist impulse, a reflection of its enduring blocky concrete architecture: the state’s thoughts are ordered, its memories are controlled and systematically delineated, extending out in straightened lines for as far as the eye can see. Thought that falls outside this paradigm can thus be anything, any one that is not yet captured and made into a striated and ordered surface. However, the ‘outside thoughts’ (ATP, p. 415) of a schizo or an insomniac cannot be allowed to survive, for, so much like machines of war, they wander and have the power to absolutely annihilate traditional structures, like the “I” or the archive or the shopping centre as a state. Thoughts and memories can also be incredible in that way, and so, in simple terms, every trace that things could ever have been otherwise has to have been erased, lest the old regime return in memories of an-other past. However, maybe the shopping centre functions differently from the State, with memory not restrained and dictated through threat of violence via the control of a war machine, but perhaps the memory of the shopping centre will always have functioned like a palimpsest, dwelling in erasure, keeping traces below the surface. What happens then is not unlike the mechanism of the wax tablet, in that memories are overcoded and overwritten, but something remains, unintelligible but not lost. This might be a simple analysis but the shopping centre seems antagonistic to time itself, keeping clocks and signs of temporality out of sight unless age or time become something that it can sell, for example, as in an anniversary. Closer scrutiny always reveals the signs of ruin and the way
that memories get carved into the space. Sometimes one simply has to look at an angle which is contra to that which one is expected to look in, to stand in place and turn away from the neon-sign or much analysed and debated over store-window-display, looking instead towards a water-damaged ceiling tile or at an out of reach cobwebbed corner or a ceramic-potted tree which is dead and caked in layers of dust or towards the scrapes and scuff marks on the walls of an underused stairwell. One can always see the ruin in progress if one looks hard enough; see entropy at work, playing a refrain that recalls the disused marshland from which the shopping centre grew.”

Jay moves as though he would speak, but is interrupted as Giles continues without noticing him because his eyes are fixed on a “Caution: Wet Floor” sign which has been placed by an employee near the large ornate fountain at the centre of the Square. “Indeed, this place no doubt has a history which records its growth from the marsh, retained perhaps in some digital archive or on the dusty shelves of a local library or records office. One might spend hours in such a place, trying to find some hidden truth of what a shopping centre might be or to unearth some under-considered dispute which emerged during the shopping centre’s construction or find a clue as to how the current circumstances of the shopping centre emerged. One might find, for example, set amidst the announcements of local raffle winners and obituaries, years before even the first brick was laid, various articulations of fears over the coming of the shopping centre. Amidst the fever of the archive one might learn of two major points of contention which became salient during the building of the shopping centre in a debate that unfolded over many years: the potential for traffic congestion and the effects on local economies and the high streets of neighbouring towns. Indeed, one might spend hours in the archive reading of the different concerns, or the fact that these became so controversial that they resulted in more than a decade of High Court appeals and hearings- a decade during
when the shopping centre was only a dream that could have been. But what would this tell us of the memories of the shopping centre? Very little, I fear.”

Jay speaks up, “One imagines that the shopping centre dreams of all kinds of debates and discussions. I’m sure that the archive holds many and speaks of them as such. *Will shop city turn into a dream or a nightmare?* (Spilsbury, 1995) The shopping centre is undoubtedly the dream of the suburbs, the actualization of its different violences. Does the archive not prove its usefulness in helping us trace what made the shopping centre, even if it presents only fragments and ordered histories?”

“Again, such a quest seems ultimately futile,” replies Giles, “more of an attempt to build a narrative of history than to discover one; to coalesce some coherent story from chaos, as though that were possible. For one might represent a coherency to the past in an attempt to tell a logically ordered story and so take away its agency, stripping it of its disorder in order to make it bearable, but anyone can see that history’s memories are more than can be told. This is the violence of the state: order, discipline, and control; even of memory.”

Giles stops momentarily to observe a small child with a plastic sword and a dinosaur backpack who runs past. He smiles as he continues: “Our faith in the archive is indicative of an all too simple way of thinking about memory. It is not just that the past is, daily, eulogized in memory but rather that the eulogy is always being written as it is being read. We need a way of understanding the problem of memory which does not reduce memories to repetitions of the same, to simply past moments as past which return to me as I think because it is memory which is the foundation of time (*DR*, p.101). Perhaps we can consider all present moments as being part-memory, as being already part of the past. Maybe we can think of the present as passing into a time contemporaneous to all past events or understand that the past coexists with rather than succeeds the present. Lived-prese...
(Williams, 2003), independent of any records, traces, signs or human recollections, there is a remembering. It seems that if we think of ourselves not merely as fixed things unchanged by the passage of time, which is what we were inadvertently doing before, but rather as co-implicated in the processes of producing time while passing in time constituted-as parts of the remembering- it follows that there must be another time in which the constitution of time occurs (DR, p.100), a pure past independent of politics or agenda where all memories are. So, the past might not return or repeat, but with each new experience in time, memories slip, involuntarily from one point in the pure past to another. Memories are thus not so much facts dredged from the perfect archive as they are constructions, formed in light of new experiences and connections. They are coalesced in the present as a creative power for the new rather than by a mechanism recalling and reproducing the same things, pretending to repeat what has already happened but is really gone beyond recall.”

Jay waits for a while before contributing. There is much that he could say but also much about which he is not certain. “It seems that the confusion between realities is rife. Might we go so far as to say that the native condition of the shopping centre is paramnesia? Not in the contemporary medical sense where a patient feels certain that a place has been duplicated (as in “reduplicative paramnesia”, see Politis and Loane, 2012) or wholly in the sense of conflating dream and reality but in the sense of that constant feeling of déjà vu. It is the sense that we’ve been here on this bench before, having this conversation before, seeing that child run past which his dinosaur backpack before, listening to the refrains of the carousel again. One might say that it is not clear where memories begin and the present ends or that we are remembering a past where these presents will already have happened.”

Giles hesitates to follow the conversation away but eventually suggests “According to some philosophers, ‘paramnesia’ (B, p.71), the illusion of déjà-vu or of having already had an experience, simply makes this obvious point perceptible: there is a recollection of the
Philosophers believe that there can be a kind of disjunction between sensation and perception where one experiences the illusion of the repetition of moments, of a lived-present returning, of things happening again. This is really the experience of different points of the pure past that we were speaking of connecting or different pasts as “slipping together”. The paramnesiac apprehends something as past in the very moment in which he experiences it (PS, p.38) and thus experiences the coexistence rather than the succession of past and present. Paramnesia remembers the present and, as such, its memories always seem to be involuntary because they could not be intended. These are the “thoughts of the outside”, the memories that come unbidden by means of which we are not wholly sure. This has nothing to do with what some philosophers might call anamnesis (Allen, 1959) because it has nothing to do with either an immortal soul or the assertion that all learning is really a recollection of things learned in past lives. Rather, it is about memories without a clear genesis. One never knows from where an involuntary memory comes. When a flash of previous conversation comes up while in a faraway place, or Combray seems to rise up out of the flagstones or the taste of a madeleine (DR, p.107), we cannot assert that an “I” made it rise. We must acknowledge that there is something else remembering for much of what is recalled is recalled without a trace.”

Jay sits still, lost in thought again, and when he does speak, his eyes fix upon the carousel, as if in a trance or as if he has finally decided to stop ignoring this previously unheeded, third-party to the conversation. “This thing’s history lies in training boys to war. A long memory might take us back to the Crusades, to tests of accuracy where the knight tried to get his lance through a brass ring. At times, its revolutionary movement makes present a game on horseback played by knights-errant, going in circles as nights tend to do. At times, its movement triggers memories that come in a rush, unbidden and uncalled for; a small town-fair in the American Midwest, a carnival on the fringes of a Victorian-era British city,
Holden Caulfield and his sister, and finally, the shopping centre as a deserted ruin, flooded and filled with koi. The materials of wood, iron, songs and tears produce these spaces and times which at once seem far away and near at hand, as though one cannot tell from where or when a thing is being remembered. This song; which surrounds, provokes and recalls; is no doubt the protected intellectual property of the same traditional fairground company which negotiated a space in this Square, this adjunct to the shopping centre, a space thus both without and within. How fitting it thus seems to be confronted with memories of the carousel from inside and, seemingly, from without? The music itself, though upbeat and in C Major, seems to alternate in its harmonization with what sounds like Schubert coming over the loudspeaker. Wanderer Fantasy? Whoever is playing has a sluggish left hand and a heavy foot. The territory that emerges in this juxtaposition is one in four seasons. At times there is a frost laden chill which slips into sun and sand which slips again into the crunch of dead leaves and again into gusts and drizzles. To have a certainty of which, when and where is perhaps an impossibility and for all of its garishness that blindingly yellow “Caution: Wet Floor” sign is not enough to stop a slippage from occurring between them. A slippage into different presents with winter, summer, autumn and spring all spinning past while the present-present stands still. One must have a feeling that it is the Square that is slipping, even if there is a stillness in all of these things, the carousel especially. Its movement extends into a quaint, little, Christmas-card village, bringing with it the smell of fried dough and cold marble. Another move shifts into a beachside resort with sand, surf, the screams of children and the tremors of the summer sun. It slips again into images of the agora, provoking involuntary memories of Tristan’s tragic fate because this must be Wagner that is playing, or thoughts of travellers from distant spaces coming to trade long forgotten secrets and other wares. The carousel perhaps feels still even though it may be lost in moving; it expands and contracts, creaks with age; bears chips, scratches, mould and the weight of knights-errant.
Each song brings a new life and new revolutions begin each time a chorus dies. One can almost hear a waltz coming out of the comingling of sound…”

“We shall have to dance at some other time,” declares Giles, “for the experience of paramnesia, of not being able to place memories, seems to be movement enough. However, even if its histories are commingled with memories of war, none of this makes the carousel a war machine. We might, however, say that the carousel lives in the world of involuntary memories, experiencing *the being in-itself of the past* in much the same way that we experience the processes in the mind which passively and habitually produce time (*DR*, p.106). Its time is not linear and forward moving but rather it dwells in the fullness of the past, slipping between seasons, still while spinning. All of these involuntary memories are not merely associations or connections which unite two points in time based on their resemblance to the same. The shopping centre reappears in the form of a past which was never present: the past in-itself of the shopping centre. If only we had the strength to endure these memories which seem to come from nowhere, memories of another past (Al-Saji, 2004), like recollections of Holden Caulfield’s love of the carousel or the insistence of the black-blue-grey of the sky, then we might see, as the paramnesiac does, the eternity which they offer (*PS*, p.41). We might also think of them as a kind of resistance against the movements of the propaganda arm of the fascist body; for even as the fascist in this place tries to efface all signs of time, all memories that things could have been otherwise, something slips, not on the wet floor but through the past. Indeed, we might best understand involuntary memories as slippages, rather than mis-rememberings or errors, which connect to a part of the pure past which was not a part of the lived present. The paramnesiac thus lives much like Billy Pilgrim; as one who has become unstuck in time, slipping from different points to other moments in one’s life. Or maybe this is how regimes- totalitarian or managerial- function; by producing memory or, more accurately, by trying to prompt involuntary memories of a past which was
not a part of the lived-present; the carousel was always here, the jackets were always blue, the shopping centre has always been warm and bright, Combray was always magnificent, seeming to say that things could never have been otherwise. Both histories and memories have always been vulnerable to being reinscribed and so it is all too easy for the fascist to encourage us to slip.”

“I remember a story,” Jay interrupts, “where a group of people sealed themselves off in the shopping centre (see Ballard, 2007). There was some kind of terrorist attack, it may have been a bombing; it may have been a shooting. Regardless, the people of the town, fearing that the shopping centre was in danger, rushed to its aide. When police and fire-services responded, they found that the people refused to leave. For months before the attack, a protracted ‘marketing’ campaign, more closely resembling a political campaign, had led to the shopping centre establishing itself as an increasingly fascistic state, complete with pseudo-military uniforms, racial discrimination and xenophobia as well as a despot who established himself through his persona as a kind of talk show-host. He did not tell the people what to want, how to feel or when to desire but he opened to them the possibilities of the shopping centre, an infinite series of limited choices. I think that it may have been his attempted assassination that triggered the event, the uprising, the revolution, and caused the people to lock themselves inside. Whatever the reason, once the initial uproar died down, police and military laid siege to the shopping centre and so its fire-doors become the policed or impassable boundaries of a state. However, those trapped inside- they may have been in there for a couple of months- did not resort to violence or slip into barbarism and looting. Instead what violence took place seemed to oscillate from the continued disciplinary and authoritarian actions of certain factions that emerged within the lock-in- that is, violence as if by a state- to the extent that there was a manner of passive acceptance on the part of the people of the town. I think that they even began to clean and maintain the space, once they
realized that the limited power to the generators meant heat and heat, of course, meant melting or rotting produce in the shopping centre’s groceries, an atrocity that could not be borne. It seemed almost as though they could not suffer themselves to see the shopping centre falter, a violence of a wholly different kind.”

He continues after taking a pause to look around, “I remember reports talking about a sickness spreading among the people trapped within the shopping centre, *not physical illness but a deepening passivity, and a loss of will and any sense of time* (Ballard, 2007. p.222-223). The ultimate violence is to legitimate a mode of being, to take away both memory and history and thus say that things could never have been otherwise. Perhaps this sickness was also a form of paramnesia, not merely *déjà vu* but an inability to remember life outside the shopping centre while also remembering yourself free of it; remembering the shopping centre’s present as decayed, dry and desolated at the same time as one remembers its present as perfect, polished and pristine. In the end, someone had to burn it down, to kill the fascist by carving a ruin out of the body of the burgeoning state, in order to get everyone out and end the siege. It took tremendous violence to end the siege, to return to a new form of life but just as much to keep it going (Matthews, 2013). However, I’m not sure if that *really* happened; if the story was a dream, something that I read in a novel or a news story that I saw on TV.”

“Though the point about the shopping centre’s violences is sound, one wonders if it is too simple an analysis which connects the shopping centre to the memories of fascism.” says Giles sceptically.

Jay stares at the bench again as he responds, a defensive tone creeping its way into his voice despite himself, “Perhaps the true signature of fascist architecture is not its “blocky structures” but its theatricality, not just in the sense of spectacle but in the sense of its ability to manufacture awe and wonder. It is always a demonstration of the power and wealth of the state. The connections to fascism are evident not just in the “micro-fascisms” which
constitute control mechanisms but because the shopping centre prompts involuntary memories of the fascist. That is why he seems so present here; he is being built again as a way out of consumerism. The wide open spaces, the statues of golden eagles, the marble arches and the high domes are all in place to try to evoke the sublime and the fear of the power of the state. Every single balustrade is a part of the construction of an exorbitant stage upon which to watch and participate in the plays of consumerism.” He pauses, weighing his words carefully. “Consumerism is the greatest device anyone has invented for controlling people. (Ballard, 2007. p.145) Maybe religion was a better opiate but consumerism is where the religious instinct turned when religion itself began to capitulate to increasing secularism (Ballard, 2007. p.253). Perhaps the only way to stop it now might be fascism. Perhaps this was the reason for the siege, that the shopping centre became a fascist state in order to save the people from consumerism.”

Over the sounds of the carousel spinning Giles says, “Someone in the canon of philosophy has perhaps written about this already, that when you confront people with freedom they will run to fascism (Fromm, 2012). It may very well be that the fascist architecture of the shopping centre itself takes the form of a co-opted war machine, incorporating its various styles alongside the body of the carousel in order to create this most perfect stage. The archive tells us that initial impressions of the “neoclassical” design of the shopping centre were a profound dissatisfaction. Perhaps this was an expression of the fear of the fascist’s coming. We also know that this shopping centre was built upon the permission of the High Courts and so we might read the movements of the shopping centre itself as those of a captured war machine attempting to mirror state control and authority, mastery and dominance.”

“The people who barricaded themselves inside the shopping centre did it with nationalist zeal, wearing flags to communicate their allegiance. Consumption was the means
of communicating citizenship. Perhaps consumerism was itself is the true face of fascism, the shopping centre thus masquerading as its own antagonist. The state is easy enough to see. This is not the politics of different parties or media control. This is a politics which sells the dreams becoming nightmares of the suburbs, that is, the shopping centre, back to them.” contributes Jay.

“One might say that the shopping centre has a dream, of which itself, the carousel and all the things that you just mentioned are a part; a dream of fascism. Who knows if this dream begins with Oedipus or somewhere else, but it may very well be that the fascist in the shopping centre who always calls out for violence, speaking for something unacknowledged within or collective social coding, a desire for repression,” speculates Giles.

Jay replies: “One might say that the shopping centre is neither an aggregate of stores, nor a convenient setup for shoppers. It is itself a single store selling off its reserves of this dream. The people who come here, come in search of a new dream that that can buy. The shopping centre dreams them all (Ballard, 2007. p.250). In many ways this ‘pure past’ seems to be a dream. A collective memory of what could and will have been or perhaps it was and has to be built again so that we might slip into it at different points. This is why the same things seem not to come back again. However, the dreamings of the shopping centre reach far beyond anything that the stockpiles of clothing and food can accommodate. The suburbs dream of violence and the larders of the shopping centre respond to demand, already overflowing with an accumulation of violence in potentia, the machinations of a captured war machine, thus ready to sell us the memory of another past on the promise that we can save it for ourselves. The fascistic state established around and in the shopping centre when those people sealed themselves within it is perhaps where a war machine, as ideology, was captured, resulting in a state determined to suicide, to bring death and see itself and its memories burn.”
“Jay,” says Giles quietly, “I think that I am enjoying this conversation.”

The lines of memory and the mechanism of the paramnesiac

![Diagram](image.png)

*Figure 6: The paramnesiac and the Square*

Where do the lines of this conversation begin and end? In the field of the shopping centre, this chapter seemed to emerge out of the many conversations with various interlocutors and passers-by about their pasts and their memories of the space as it was, as well as from trends recorded in fieldnotes, but it evolved into something wholly other: an attempt to speak to some of the shopping centre’s violences while explaining both the nature of Deleuze’s comments on memory and why it necessarily existed in the pure past, that time in which the first synthesis takes place, through a distortion of the assumptions around fictive and real, the scientific and the imaginary, which sought to play with the style of the Ballardian novel and its tendencies toward lengthy exposition and characters providing
reflexive exegesis. It is impossible to trace this transformation, to see each moment of it evolving or find a genesis or the first moment of concern for memory.

Indeed, it is difficult to say that this conversation was “authored” at all. To do so, one would have to neglect the insight of offered by the likes of Foucault and Barthes about the death of the author. To adapt Barthes, conversation, as text, does not have definite meanings instilled by an author but rather, is “a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash” (Barthes, 1977. p.146). Thus the chapter itself has endeavoured, taking as much liberty with academic convention as was prudent, to present its arguments in a manner and style which would reflect not just the dispersal of authorship into the conceptual personae of Jay and Giles but the field from which it was produced. To recall Deleuze and Guattari’s comments on the matter “writing weds a war machine and lines of flight, abandoning the strata, segmentarities, sedentarity, the State apparatus,” (ATP, p.24) which is to say that writing can and perhaps should take on the disobedient lines of that which cannot be wholly controlled or disciplined by a state or the state of a discipline. To paraphrase the well-known quote from McLuhan, the mode of writing (even if it be in the manner of the war machine) is inseparably a part of the message of this thesis.

There are, however, a number of issues which require more traditional assaying particularly in relation to the concept of the ‘pure past’, if only to understand the framework for these textual experiments.

1. **On the question of the war machine and the pure past**

_Only a few months before field-work begins the shopping centre undergoes a major rebranding initiative. All the newspapers carried stories of the original owners being bought out by another holding corporation which would itself be changed into a new form. The morphing, changing, shifting sands of ownership and what strategies for_
leveraging risk would always have been far removed from the conversations on the malls but an overt rebranding draws attention; a crack in the seemingly polished surfaces of the shopping centre. In a post GFC world, conversations would, for some time, carry the echoes of broader discontent with large corporate machinations, manifesting in dissatisfaction with the new uniforms (the changing of the long-standing red jackets for a more formal black with yellow and black ties) and sporadic comments on cleanliness.

One would assume that a corporate buyout would be the great break in the shopping centre’s history; a dynamic reshaping with new logos, colours and management personnel and thus that this thesis would seek to analyse the events surrounding the change of ownership and the implementation of the new managerial paradigm that followed, contributing to the already saturated field of the ethnographic study of organizational culture change (Casey, 1999; Willmott, 1993; Heracleous, 2001). However, from the perspective of the shopper on the malls, the shopping centre designs itself so that little changes, and thus though a store might leave or close down due to increasing rent or a uniform might change, the shopping centre dreams itself the same as it always has been. The war machine erases memory and renders histories and pasts irrelevant in order to serve its ends.

As we noted in Chapter III, the question of time has long fascinated philosophers, but it is necessary to acknowledge that the issues around the past, history and memory take pre-eminence. “It is memory that grounds time,” (DR, p.79) Deleuze says as he develops his work on Bergson and Proust through much of Chapter II of Difference and Repetition, by dwelling on the question of memory, believing it to be central to understanding time, and understanding time as being key to developing a theory of repetition as more than the return of the same, and thinking repetition thusly as a way out of the metaphysics of identity- of which the entire text can be said to be a critique. Several authors have developed this point in
Deleuze scholarship, such as Parr (2008) on the subject of collective remembrance or Pearson (2010) on the relationship between Deleuze’s thought on Proust and Nietzsche. Indeed, the pure past is perhaps a Deleuzian reading of what Nietzsche called “Historia Abscondita” saying that “there is no telling what may yet become a part of history. Maybe the past is still essentially undiscovered!” (Nietzsche, 2001. p.53-54). Most notable, however, is Alia Al-Saji’s (2004, 2008, 2015) work on “the memory of another past” or the “past which has never been present” which develops Deleuze in conjunction with Bergson and Merleau-Ponty in reference to the concept of the “pure past”, that past where all things are remembered with seemingly no trace. That is, regardless of how they are recorded historically, there is what Deleuze would term a “virtual” recording of events. Al-Saji reads out of Deleuze the insight that the past is neither immutable nor without agency. Contra our basic assumptions about experience, the past is not removed from the present but rather coexists contemporaneously to it. Deleuze puts it thusly: “we cannot say that it was. It no longer exists it does not exist, but it insists, it consists, it is” (DR, p.103). What this implies is that, where the first synthesis was the contraction of the present, the second is the insistence of the past. What is noteworthy here is the recurrence of the Latin *sistere*—“to take a stand”. Inherent in each descriptor is the image of the past as standing still (which holds resonance with other work on the first synthesis, see Mahler, 2012). This is to be noted if only because it is precisely the converse idea that Deleuze is trying to advance. As Al-Saji suggests, the relations of the past are not still, sterile, dead or fixed. Rather the past is plastic, materially changeable and can be experienced in variance in much the same way that the empirical experience of the present *(see DR, p.83)* might be found to be rhythmic and affected by the shopping centre. The insistence of the past is not its dictation of the present, but in simultaneous rather than causal relation. This is to say that an event which will have happened in the shopping centre will always be in the process of taking place and being recalled, even those events which have
passed away without any traces or those which were never a part of the lived present. What this leads to is the conclusion that memory can be creative, neither making errors nor (mis)representing the past as it was, but constituting novel connections, new intersections, and new lines.

Enquiring along this line about whether or not memory can be creative rather than representative, leads one to the question of whether this creativity can be controlled, and thus to the “war machine”. Even though the question of memory emerges circuitously through unexplored mentions of “universal history” within A Thousand Plateaus (p.418), Deleuze and Guattari’s comment about the war machine’s relation to memory are cursory (ATP, p.459); a passing thought amidst a much larger and more significant discussion of politics and the machinations of the state. The interlinkage of these concepts, however, is one which is provocative enough to require elaboration, not just because of the obvious ethnographic concern with history and memory, but also with an ear to notions of ethnography as the production of an archive (Marcus, 1998b) and the growing body of anthropological literature interested in Deleuze’s work on the past (see Blanes, 2011; Bryant, 2016).

Paul Patton (1984) links the question of thought to the war machine through a discussion of la pensee du dehors, the thought of the outside, which Deleuze first raises in his analyses of Foucault via Blanchot. Elaborating upon Patton’s comments, one might say that such thought of the outside is, within the current dogmatic image of thought, the realization of a transcendental empiricism; though its practice, other than as wandering through the shopping centre, remains undefined. The thoughts of the war machine, uncaptured and unbridled, run in unmeasured lines around the pasts of the shopping centre. That is to say, it is possible to read, in the shopping centre, a State-function which alternates between sets of overt disciplinary mechanisms or subversive control of internalized micro-fascisms as functioning only through the domination and capture of these thoughts of the outside.
Broadly speaking, though counter-examples of “the unmanaged organization” (Gabriel, 1995) are available, the contemporary milieu is rife with example of the capture, co-optation and destruction of memories and histories by organizations through means of violence. Previous commentary makes these links in terms of the Israel/Palestine conflict (Curti, 2008), the modern building society (Parker, 2002b), the obligation of German firms like Bertelsmann (Booth et al., 2007) or Volkswagen (Janssen, 2013) to “set history straight” (Spiliotis, 2006) in the wake of the Third Reich (particularly with regards to the fascist’s tendency to write himself out of history), and even to the contemporary business school (Parker, 2014). The shopping centre’s largely a-historical self-image, seen in its tremendous ability to change and the reset itself- residing thus in a kind of stillness or stasis as, for example, miles of Christmas lights and decorations are placed overnight and then removed in a similarly secretive fashion away from the gaze of shoppers- attests to its ambition for this kind of control over memory. It is with this intent that the shopping centre can so insouciantly appropriate and juxtapose different elements and images of the past, from the Square decorated with ostentatious statues and golden fountains, to various elements of Kitsch. The shopping centre simply understands that thought which is left uncontrolled or allowed to be liberated, has the potential to recode the experience of the present or, to appropriate its language, to disrupt and disorder established brand images.

The question which Deleuze asks: “How can we save [a pure past] for ourselves?” (DR, p.107) is therefore relevant for the “answer” which emerges in Difference and Repetition is both complicit in an understanding of the third synthesis of time (which we shall address in Chapter V) and involved in the turn towards involuntary memory. That is to say, in the acknowledgement that the remembering which takes place (in the sense of the pure past) retains no clear origin, that involuntary memories may arrive spontaneously from nowhere- memories which themselves may never have been lived. To suppose that these involuntary
memories could, by the various states of the shopping centre, be overcoded, controlled and captured is to overestimate the reach and potency of the war machine over memory, there is always a remembering even without a trace. Ethnographically, this makes history an impossibility, understanding thus that, for example, the circumstances which produced the carousel as a central feature of the Square to be too convoluted and cryptic to be rendered sensible or that the minutia of the High Court case which allowed the shopping centre to be built are more than could ever have been recorded or that the reasons why the State will always have appropriated the war machine (ATP, p.418) are too many to reason. One may try to trace out the intertwined relations, tracking various discussion and negotiations, debates and dialogues across different spaces and times (thus mirroring the function of the captured war machine) but this will only ever lead to a past. Once one stops actively seeking out order, the paramnesiac experience becomes much more readily apparent as pasts seem to slip together, lines of thought seem to stretch from forgotten fieldnotes to present conversation and the distinction between memory and imagination, ethnographic monograph and novel (a relation explored more insightfully in Tierney, 2008) begins to blur and one experiences involuntarily that a priori or pure past.

2. On the question of ethnographic memory as involuntary

I am a boy with a sword and a dinosaur backpack. They have turned me into a carnival by the beach. I eat sand and feel sick on the teacup ride as my mother windowshops. I dip my hands into the cool water of the fountain, trying to reach the pennies that people have thrown in. I wish I was a snowman riding the carousel. Instead, I ride my mighty steed around a marble pillar that is still melting in the warm July sun. I fall asleep wrapped in a cold stone bench that smells like night. I am a phycus, a bucket in the sand, an Olympic sprinter, a statue holding grapes, a
bouncing trampoline, a teacup on the moon. Dad tries to throw me into the fountain. I let go and fall through a dolphin’s mouth. Still in his arms, I tumble through the dolphin’s granite soul, breathing chlorine through the waves as I go. Today it is summer. Today I am a wasteland. The parade of sunshine has been trundled over by ceramic elephants, replacing blue and yellow with grey. I am grit and dirt, fading colour, mist and mold. Tomorrow will be a memory before I know it.

As with rereading the first synthesis through problems of the shopping centre and positing it as itself having a rhythm (a rubato waltz) we have pushed Deleuze’s second synthesis beyond its limits to make something novel, something undeniably of both Deleuze and the shopping centre. As other commentators have noted (Pearson, 2010), the role of the second synthesis in *Difference and Repetition* seems to be only to yield the Bergsonian notion of the pure past to the superior Nietzschean doctrine of the eternal return. While this is an insightful reading, the question of memory is, however, still important to our work because the memory of the ethnographer is itself one which is constantly under test, always propped up and aided by tape recorders, fieldnotes, transcripts, artefacts, diagrams, sketches or other visual methods. Anne Whitehead (2009) notes that we always seem to have either too much or too little memory and, as such, memory seems always to be in a state of crisis. In some sense, ethnographic work is always of memory on the edge of this crisis. Not just in the sense of Ingold’s (2014) redefinition of “the ethnographic” as a retrospective judgement (the judgment of the critic being etymological implicated, as discussed in Chapter 2, with crisis) made by the ethnographer upon the field experience but in the simple observation that all ethnography is an attempt to tap into and join with the collective memories of a space or a people, with a time, and the consequent richness of an ethnographic text is usually contingent upon how much can be retained by the ethnographer in memory until the inscription of the finished ethnographic work. What we tried to suggest in this chapter is not merely that the past will
always exceed that which can be remembered and transmitted as part of the ethnographic monograph but that the ethnographer *qua* subject might not be able to discern from where memories come. That such a one might become lost in many pasts, here deliberately skewing Deleuze’s analysis towards the proposition of the *a priori* or pure past, is perhaps a thought of the outside, not ready to be understood. Indeed, of those ethnographers who have attempted to engage either generally with Deleuze’s work on the second synthesis (Hodges, 2008) or specifically looking at time/history in the context of the traumatic event (Alexandrakis, 2016) or in terms Deleuze’s reading of repetition and its relation to crisis in Cyprus (Bryant, 2016; 2014; 2012), there is little consideration given to the perplexing question of the pure past.

It is necessary to consider such a question, because the grounds of memory have always been fickle and the memories of another past, that past which will never have been present, will always have been a part of our analyses, not in what we might interpret as the lapses of memory which occur when one struggles for forgotten dates, names, places but creeping in via the stories of interlocutors which are always untraceable in their origin (even in the form of contradictory or unstable biographies—see Blanes, 2011); the reminiscences of the field. In the context of the pure past, an ethnographer may, even now, be watching the conversation chronicled in this chapter, eagerly scribbling it down, uncertain of what the genesis of these sentences might be; whether repeated from long forgotten books of philosophy, cribbed from train-station novels, replicated from television or film, whether spontaneous, premeditated or dream. The lines of thought of the story, as they unfold and connect to different moments— to lines of television programs or half-forgotten snippets of old conversation—are impossible to attribute or ascribe to a singular author (such is the oral tradition both within philosophy (Yamagata, 2005) and anthropology (Vansina, 1985)).

Thought via the pure past, and specifically “involuntary memory”, however, we might go
beyond the mere idea of the story which emerges spontaneously to those recollections which arise in the conversation without prompting or attempt to recall. This is less in the sense of the surfacing of the repressed Freudian trauma and more in the vein of the way that Deleuze reads the Proustian encounter with the madeleine.

“Combray reappears, not as it was or as it could be, but in a splendour which was never lived, like a pure past which finally reveals its double irreducibility to the two presents which it telescopes together: the present that it was, but also the present present which it could be.” (DR, p.85)

This thesis accounts for these reminiscences as “slippages” (a term whose genesis is itself, within fieldnotes, uncertain) between different parts of the pure past, memories and conversations that, unbidden, seem to emerge from spaces and times of which we cannot be certain. What we can be certain of, however, is that involuntary memories emerge from and of partial objects. While one might acknowledge, as Schuster (2016, p.60) does as part of his attempt draw out the connections between Deleuze and psychoanalytic cannon, that “involuntary memories are partial temporal objects”, it is a more literal sense which this thesis will pursue. Remembering the shopping centre in such a frame becomes less about re-presenting a coherent narrative of a people and a time than it does about noting the spontaneous connections that prompt the shopping centre to return. The bluest, swirling line. A stick of gum erotically caressing a lower lip. A parade of sunshine and elephants. Stories of a trip to Venice. A pair of jeans with open zips on the thighs on a high street. A blur with a sword and a dinosaur backpack. The angle of a knee during a fall. Fingers gripped around a phone. A long line. Six suitcases and square glasses. The smell of urinal cakes. A countenance steeped in confusion in response to a fire alarm. Every single “Caution: Wet Floor” sign. Each of these prompts the shopping centre to return as a part of the new. Each marks a slip into a part of the pure past where such moments are reconstituted, not in a return
of some fecund past, but as contemporaneous to, interconnected with and emergent from the present and its passing away. None of these field experiences are remembered intentionally by a thinking subject but function as uncontrollable lines, connecting to and from the shopping centre when encountered. The more one explores the various conversations around urban (Crimson, 2005) or collective memory (Halbwachs, 1992; Truc, 2012) the more unsustainable the ‘memory work’ of the ethnographer seems to become around questions of the “truth” of “who” said “what”. This, it must be said, is not a critique (for even the notion that the ethnographer might “create” their own fieldnotes has previously been regarded contentiously—see Jackson, 1990) rather, it is, in the first instance, another acknowledgement of the Gruen effect or that “dreamlike state in which consumers lose track of time and place” (Csaba and Askegaard, 1999. p.34) and the effects of this upon the memory of the ethnographer and, in the second instance, it is, to return to the problem of the subject presented in the preceding chapters, an attempt to give attention to the pre-individual, the untraced as well as that which slips away without a trace, all in defiance of traditional author(ity). Stories of the shopping centre seem to emerge unbidden and more in parts or fragments than as cohesive narratives. This is why Ballard’s novel became important to this thesis, for it blurs the line between real and imaginary, memory and a dream, ethnography and fiction, such that one might discuss it with an interlocutor who will suggest that they remember a similar story, “in the news recently” about a shooting at a shopping centre, though the interlocutor will struggle to remember the details of it.

It is in and by these contexts that the madness of the paramnesiac emerges; for the paramnesiac is the one who lives in the pure past, experiencing the terror of involuntary memory, accepting that the fear is not that the space repeats or has been duplicated or, more apropos, the fear is not that memories of the field are not true but rather it is that the memories with which we leave the field are not those that can be subsumed into the
managerial logic of order and control which produces the thesis; that we might get lost remembering the present. It thus may be that only the paramnesiac can remember what the war machine can do, for it is a memory intimately involved with the pure past that can see the shopping centre’s violences and the shifting currents of its truths as all of these pass away without a trace.
In all of the preceding chapters, this thesis has sought to call into question the status of the ethnographer *qua* subject, contending thus that the image of the “I think” which observes, records, and authoritatively reports on the field is a fallacious one. We have, however, yet to fully develop “the subject” as a concept. Thus, following on from the work of the previous chapters on the first and second syntheses of time, we will foreground this argument by working though the problem posed by Deleuze’s third synthesis of time. The question of the subject is where Deleuze’s work on the third synthesis can assert its relevance because it is a protracted attempt, via Kant’s reading of time as a “pure and empty form” (*DR*, p.86) and Nietzsche’s eternal return as a basis for a model of repetition, to develop a genetic account for thought and understand how it comes to be about and of a subject (Williams, 2011). As this chapter shall explore, the third synthesis constitutes yet another blow to the unity of the subject, fracturing it along the fault lines of time and opening a space for thinking such subjects as other than the genesis of thought. This is important, not only as a means to be liberated from the dogmatic image of thought but because to recognize that thought forms the “I” rather than the “I” thought is crucial for this thesis as a step towards a practice of
transcendental empiricism. We shall show that the third synthesis offers ways to thinking the subject in time-in-itself, rather than as that constancy which exists through or despite time.

Philosophically, critiques of “the subject” are well-established and are perhaps as present in Nietzsche and Kant as they are in the work of so-called “poststructural authors” like Derrida and Deleuze. As such, within both CMS and Anthropological discourses, the subject and the problems of subjectivity have had extensive address. Indeed, within Organization Studies theorization of “the subject” occurs in areas as diverse as studies of masculine culture on the factory floor (Collinson, 1992) and attempts at developing a Lacanian modes of organizational analysis (Arnaud and Vanheule, 2007; Hoedemaekers and Keegan, 2010). However, discussions of the subject most frequently occur within conversations of power within the organization and how it shapes the subject and thus, consequentially, conversations of resistance to power, most often with a Foucauldian inflection (see Knights and Morgan, 1991; McMurray et al., 2010; Newton, 1998; Burrell, 1988; Skinner, 2012). Readers familiar with this discourse and thus Foucault’s attempt to “decentre the subject” will no doubt have been sympathetic to the project of this thesis, or will, in the least have been able to read the denial of author(ity) and the rejection of the subject through Foucauldian lenses of discourse and subjectivation. However, the reader may also have disagreed with the seemingly “a-political” or “anti-realistic” (see O’Doherty and Willmott, 2001) reading of the subject or in the least been disconcerted, thus reprising old labour process debates, by the seeming neglect of issues of gender, race, class, nationality etc. and how these are constructed by capital. These debates are longstanding and are better covered elsewhere (see McCabe, 2007), as indeed are the traditional questions of subjectivity—freedom of choice, self-determination or social construction, structure or agency, (see Hall, 2004) along with all of the binaries which sustain them. As such this work will focus its attention on the comparatively less considered problem of the “ethnographic
subject”. While there is an awareness within the discipline of the need to re-examine subjectivity, particularly in the context of “theoretical concerns about the fractured nature of subjectivity” (Biehl et al., 2007. p.13), the predominant address to calling the ethnographic subject into question has been either in the context of the highly significant attempts to understand ethnographic reporting as historically contingent and culturally situated that characterised the critiques of the 1980’s in Anthropology (see Marcus, 1985) or else it is dismissed as a fad, as if to say that “no meta-argument, reflexive turn or navel-gazing can effectively question” (Van Maanen, 2006, p.16) the foundations upon which ethnography is based, that is, that a subject went into the field and returned to interpret, provide examples, report on tropes and findings etc. It is, however, necessary for us to dwell upon the question of the ethnographer qua subject, even if it means being implicated in a kind of “doublethink” whereby the subject can call itself into question, for, as we have contended throughout this work, despite what philosophical challenge has been posed to the subject, it is still preserved by ethnographic practice and, as part of a Deleuzian method we need a way of thinking without the subject or rather, a way that understands the “I think” to be a by-product of thought rather than that which is responsible for it. Such analysis is apposite in light of moves within the academy at large to ask “Who comes after the subject?” (see Cadava et al., 1991; Colebrook, 2015) and contemporaneous to a flourishing affinity for work that looks toward the pre-individual, such as non-representational theory (Thrift, 2007), as it opens up further questions around what it might mean to think without the “I” and what demented times might emerge without it; acknowledging that under the scrutiny of the reflexive gaze of such questioning, the subject might disappear; unable to function as a font of knowledge, wisdom, interpretation, stories or answers to the many unanswerable questions of the field, and thus what space and time occupies the subject becomes a reflector of the field and all of its madnesses.
The sticky sweet smell of the archive: a mixture of old newspaper, plastic folio sleeves, glue for binding and the laminated “wood” furniture that always seems to populate Local Records offices. It washes into one’s clothes and through them into one’s skin; through them into the mind, producing that curious fever that accompanies even the most surface of archives— the allure of their power and the promise of some hidden or secret knowledge. On a shelf with an assortment of books recording local histories, sit two large, blue folders. Opening them reveals over a decade of newspaper clippings and though one might enquire as to who chose them, or indeed, who decided to keep a special record of the various goings on at the shopping centre, such questions will never be answered by the otherwise helpful staff of the Local Records office. The entries are not catalogued or ordered chronologically, presenting a disjointed picture of the shopping centre’s media history. Set amidst announcements of raffle winners and obituaries, the first page and the earliest mention of the shopping centre is a headline reading “Fears as Superstore casts long shadow”— a presentation of the fears that, five years before it would officially open, the coming of the shopping centre would mean the death of small, local business. However, the next entry is from over two years later articulating concerns over the traffic congestion, identical (aside from mentions of social media) to a story that one might have read on the bus that morning complaining about the long lines of traffic outside the shopping centre. It might seem as though the shopping centre dreamed itself this fear of what horrors would be wrought upon the suburbs, and that these dreams have echoes in the collective consciousness ever since.
Borrowing some additional folio sleeves and Post-it notes from the front desk, one might spend hours in the Local Records office, cataloguing and putting folders into chronological order, creating in a notebook an index of different topics and matters of concern that are discussed and debated over the decade of local news publication. However, as one chronicles the battles to open the shopping centre in the British High Court, the different deaths and violent crimes that occur within the shopping centre and its environs or further concerns about traffic, the effect upon local economies and the shopping centre’s “neo-classical” design; a picture of its history becomes no clearer. One might begin to feel that the various lines of the pasts of the shopping centre are untraceable, that, for all its promise, this small surface archive might hold nothing more than forgotten words like “Dumplington” (which may have once shaped the mapping of an area before the coming of the shopping centre- now retained in the address of only one small local business) or stories that have passed into the collective unconscious like the dispute between the shopping centre’s developer and the City Council. This does not come all at once, as the rush of realizing a conspiracy, but slowly, a growing dread that facts learnt and information stored in the mind or the notebook would offer no insight into how the shopping centre functioned as a social entity or answer any questions that an ethnographer might have about it. The fever of the archive may very quickly give way to a cold, mirroring the glorious grey of the storm that hovered over Northern England at the time.13

One may sit in a Local Records office and pour over various press clippings. One may sit in an office and discuss the contents of various filing cabinets or cupboards as the shopping centre’s management contemplates setting up an archive. One may even search around the

13 Far from being a return to a legitimation of the subject, the use of fieldnotes to tell the two central stories of this Chapter is, we contend useful in order to show the cut of the third synthesis and thus the unmaking of the subject.
organization for various “heritage symbols”; plaques, logos and signs engraved in stone or etched onto glass; which are more difficult to change or remove during and after corporate rebranding efforts. This, of course, assumes that there is a “one” who was in the shopping centre to study its pasts. As the story of this thesis has unfolded, the text has addressed itself to the questions of the present as regards the first synthesis and the insomniac and has also explored the concepts surrounding the past, memory, the second synthesis and the paramnesiac. While the reader might also infer that what is to follow is the discussion of the third synthesis of the future, what one might suggest is that the presupposition of a future, to come, is itself grounded in a specific set of metaphysical assumptions which the text has already begun to call into question; the subject or “the one in the Local Records office” being a core concern. That is to say, a line of time, straight as that arrow fired by Eddington (Layzer, 1975), divides itself into before, now and after; past, present and future etc.. This division is sustained by a number of images of thought which we have already discussed: the spatialization of time, the body as an anchor to the here and now, metaphors which have become an entrenched part of our language etc.. The last and most enduring of these images is the subject, not merely in the Cartesian sense of that human mind which must necessarily exist in order to perceive the wax or solely in the Kantian sense of the aperceptual unity of consciousness (see Atkins, 2005) but in the more pragmatic sense of the one which sits in the Local Records office and experiences the traces of the dreamings of the archive, the one who participates in the enactment of the various worlds of the shopping centre, the one who wanders the “Evening in Wonderland”, that is to say, the ethnographer.

However, while we might collectively be aware of the various developments in the theorization of subjectivity, which take us away from the author(ity) of the subject, when in the midst of ethnographic fieldwork, thought seems always drawn back towards the subject and thus to the self, towards relations and the intersubjective, towards the reflexive and the
personal. Despite propositions that “good ethnography is theory driven” (Wilson and Chaddha, 2009, p.549), the seduction of the subject, and its affirmation in the stories of the field, seem to prove too much for ethnographic practice to follow the aforementioned deconstruction of the subject. This is not to imply that there have been no attempts at undoing the bind of subjectivity. Among many, we might consider the example of Glowczewski (2016, p.15), who in reflecting upon the experience of fieldwork among the Warlpiri, says the following: “I learned to unlearn myself from myself.” There is perhaps no more succinct summary of the ethnographic experience, as well as the negotiations of identity, politics, ritual and custom that go along with it nor any which so capture the current trends of the discipline vis a vis reflexivity and the ontological turn. However, in light of Deleuze’s reading of time, this thesis holds that there is room to advance this “unlearning”.

The ethnographic moment in the Local Records is interesting not merely because it is seemingly not “in” the spaces of the shopping centre nor only because of the unanswered questions with which it confronts the ethnographer, but more so because it brings to the fore this “unlearning”; a moment where what one knows about the field seems to fall apart or is at least rendered other and somewhat strange. Every field site is rife with ethnographic moments like these and whether it is to be found in fleeing from the police after a Balinese Cockfight (Geertz, 1973) or in realizing that an intimidating drug-dealer is illiterate (Bourgois, 1999) or in the death of a cherished interlocutor (de la Cadena, 2015; Biehl, 2013), it remains that often an event reshapes our understanding of the field, a break in the order of things which renders open the possibilities of the future and, as we perhaps neglect, disorients the subject. Indeed, in such moments, the complexity of the events of the field do not prompt the dissolution of the subject but perhaps a reaffirmation of it, as new identities and modes of relating are negotiated with interlocutors or in their absence. It is these moments which we wish to consider further as they make it seem that whole of time is gathered up, coalesced
into a single static moment and then cut into an unequal series; a before wherein every event seems to lead up to or cause the cut, and an after where every event seems to follow from or be caused by the cut. It is this cut that Deleuze calls the third synthesis of time.

What is this third synthesis? If the first or passive synthesis is the contraction of past-presents and future-presents into the lived present, and the second synthesis is the reconciliation of the lived present within the context of the pure past, then for Deleuze, the third synthesis is the cut in the line of time which constitutes past and future, before and after around the fracturing of the subject, rendering thus both past and present as dimensions of the future. To summarize Deleuze’s own comments, (DR, p.93) where the first synthesis provides a foundation for temporality and the second a ground upon which that foundation might stand, the third gives order, placing events in sequence (and not just the sequence of before and after by the form and arrangement of time).

The third synthesis is, importantly for the purposes of our argumentation, what finally separates the subject from time. While a subject emerges as by-product of the first synthesis to exist momentarily within the pure past of the second synthesis, we need the third synthesis to return us to the start, to see the subject as constituting time while living in time constituted, or, to see the subject as both and neither a source of time nor a passive agent living in time. James Williams’s formulation of the third synthesis (2011, p.81) is a useful starting point for understanding what is at stake here:

“The subject presupposes the self. The self passively presupposes a form of determinability. This form of determinability implies a fracturing of the self and hence of the subject because it is a pure and empty form.”

14 Much has been written about the distinction between “self” and “subject”, “me” and “I” (see, for example, the works of G.H. Mead), despite the fact that the two terms are regularly conflated. Deleuze himself never interrogates this distinction in any meaningful depth. It is safe to postulate that the “self” might be constituted by the agglomeration of the larval subjectivities produced as a by-product of the first synthesis.
What Williams is suggesting here is that the self, as it exists in time is determined out of and by the contractions/expectancy of the first synthesis, is broken by the openness of the future; by- as the chapter shall explore- becomings. It is perhaps a reductive characterization, but the process of the third synthesis may thus be depicted as the continual fracturing of the “I”. The breaking of the subject is, for Deleuze, necessary not only in order to understand repetition but in order to preserve the pure past of the second synthesis as that which cannot be identified, represented or known as a totality. It is essential to understand that Deleuze is adopting an overtly Kantian reading of time here and that while all three of the syntheses of time are implicitly dialogues with Kant, it is in the third that Deleuze begins to explore Kant’s time explicitly, continuing this project in *Kant’s Critical Philosophy* by working through the framework of *The Critique of Pure Reason* as regards the mind’s mechanisms for understanding space and time. It is thus also crucial to understand Kant’s project as revolutionary, in the sense that it eschews the Platonic subordination of time to movement, for it is from this point that Deleuze develops the three syntheses. That is to say, in *Timaeus*, Plato espouses a theory of time which constructs time as “the moving image of eternity”; a by-product of the creation of the universe by a first-father whose eternal-aspect or stillness could not be replicated (see also Sallis, 1999). That movement should come before time implies the latter’s determination in what are circular movements (those of the planets, the moon, the sun etc.) which, for Plato, would constitute the numbered days, nights, months and years which make up time. While this resonates with Bergson’s critique of the spatialization of time which we discussed in Chapter III, there is a more pertinent problem. As Somers-Hall (2011) puts it, time becomes only that which gives movement order and makes it rational.15

Kant’s revolution is to decouple time and movement, establishing the apperception of time as a part of the mind akin to the faculties; an interior form. Indeed, as Hoy (2009) and others

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15 We should note as an aside that the decoupling of movement and time is a documented phenomenon among schizophrenics. The schizo might see his hand move and not be aware of the temporal relation between his mind sending the instruction and the movement.
note, for Kant, time is not understood from experience (intuitions), rather, it is the form
which experiences takes, thus defined by Kant as “pure”. The form of time is also considered
“empty” because it is open to determinability, that is, it is such that we can know its structure
but it’s content is yet unknown. Taken together, what all of this implies is that, rather than
being an external condition, or a part of movement, space and time are “ways in which that
which is to be thought by the subject is given to the subject” (Somers-Hall, 2011, p.61) or,
more simply, Kant places the Cartesian “I think” in time, creating what Deleuze would call
“A Cogito for a dissolved Self” (DR, p.58).

For Deleuze, this dissolved self is one which cannot be identified either through
appeal to a god, transcendence or some otherwise enduring form of receptivity such as the
Kantian faculties. It would thus be important to him to go beyond Kant’s conclusion for while
Deleuze praises the revolution of Kant, he is also critical of Kant’s “psychologism” (DR,
p.135) and failure to escape the dogmatic image of thought. In other words, while Kant calls
into question whether the “I”, determined as thinking in Descartes, exists as a thinking unity
which is still in time, he does not do so without undetermined conditions, developing thus the
distinction between what Hume would call the “empirical self” and what he, Kant, called the
“transcendental subject” (Azeri, 2010). The distinction is established around Kant’s assertion
that there must necessarily be an a-priori knowing which understands what an experience is
and makes experience itself possible. However, this does not itself eschew the unity of the “I
think”, it merely places a crack or cut in it, the fracture of time, and renders the subject in
paradox, at once constituting time and existing in time constituted for, as we recall, Kant
places the subject within time (time being outside experience) but also at the centre of time as
the transcendental arbiter of the faculties. It would, for Deleuze, always be impossible to
realize a truly pure and empty time while time remained a part of the faculties of the subject.
As he suggests: “thought is covered over by an “image” made up of postulates which distort
both its operation and its genesis. These postulates culminate in the position of an identical thinking subject” (DR, p.265). Deleuze (DR, p.86) thus develops this simple formulation of the third synthesis (which the earlier quote from Williams expounds): “Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the I and a passivity in the self”.

The significance of this can be meaningfully explained by looking at the two dramatic formula which Deleuze employs in order to develop the problems that he sees in the Kantian Critique: Rimbaud’s “I is an other” and Shakespeare’s proclamation via Hamlet that “Time is out of joint” (Voss, 2013a, 2013b; Somers-Hall, 2011; Loraine, 200316).

Let us first examine Rimbaud’s comment: “Je est un autre”, given in an 1871 letter to Georges Izambard. In another letter of the same period Rimbaud (2005, p.375) says:

“For I is someone else. [...] I am present at this birth of my thought: I watch it and listen to it: I draw a stroke of the bow: the symphony makes its stir in the depths, or comes on to the stage in a leap.”

It is clear why this formulation fascinated Deleuze. To watch, as an-other, as one’s own thought takes shape, aware that one is not the producer but that, in the watching, one has some involvement, fits into Deleuze’s overall critique of the subject, of his conception of thought, and indeed, the poststructural move to ask “Who comes after the subject?”. It is worth noting, however, that this is not reflexivity nor is it lucid self-awareness both of which, we contend, might be said to watch thought after the “I” is finished thinking. Rather, it is to understand thought as taking place external to what process might traditionally be depicted as the “I” and, as such, observable by an-other who is also and thereby complicit in this thinking. To elaborate and return to Deleuze’s work on Kant, the subject is the self that observes itself in this way. He says, “I am separated from myself by the form of time and yet

16 Loraine (2003) draws a link between the third synthesis and Aion, the “time of the Stoics” which Deleuze develops in The Logic of Sense, an a-chronological time wherein every event on the line of time has already happened and is still yet to take place. Though this is closely related to the questions raised by Timaeus and while others have pursued similar relations (see, Williams, 2011), this text shall leave Aion and Chronos (numbered time) beyond its scope.
I am one because the I necessarily affects this form by bringing about its synthesis” (*ECC* p.30). What Deleuze is sketching here is the mutual interrelation between the subject and time, each constituting each other. The tensions of being, simultaneously interior to and productive of, split, double and hollow us, constituting time by “a giddiness, an oscillation”¹⁷ (*KCP*, p.ix). The third synthesis is thus meaningfully understood as a break, a fracturing, a disjointing. The word which signifies this fracturing of the “I” in *Difference and Repetition* (p.89) is, notably, *caesura* (**/**), used in literary studies and music to indicate a brief, silent pause during which ‘metrical time’ is not counted. The lines of the caesura are important because they separate the “I” from itself and also disjoint time. Deleuze finds the dramatic formulation for this in Hamlet, at the end of Act 1, where it seems that Hamlet would indicate that it is late and that he and his companions should return inside for the night. What he says, however, is:

“The time is out of joint: O cursed spite,
That ever I was born to set it right!”

What we see in the events surrounding this quote is not only that experience of “giddiness” in Hamlet’s actions but that he feels this caesura; the order of filial succession- father to son- is disrupted by Claudius’s plot for the throne. Time can thus be said to be disjointed around the event of the former king’s death with fracture-lines radiating out into the presents of the play’s protagonist. Building upon multiple mentions by Deleuze, Voss (2013b) addresses the formulation “time is out of joint” in relation to the final act of Sophocles’s *Oedipus Rex*, via the work of Hölderlin (2001) on the caesura. Here there is a split in time which renders Oedipus other than himself. All of Oedipus’s memories and expectations for the future are censured by the disjunct which occurs from the moment that Tiresias speaks to tell Oedipus

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¹⁷ Deleuze says “*un vertige*” and it is worth noting here that this is translated by Smith and Greco as “vertigo” for Essays Critical and Clinical (1997) but was it was originally translated by Tomlinson and Habberjam as “giddiness” for the 1984 edition of Kant’s Critical Philosophy. We have retained the latter for the sense of possession and madness at the etymological root of the term.
that he has killed his father, Laius, and married his mother, Jocasta. The revealed truth of Oedipus’s life, acts to prevent past-presents from converging or contracting into the lived present. In the context of the arguments of the previous chapter, one might think of this, not as a break in time, but rather, as a slippage, a more violent formulation which sends one careening out of a particular series of past-presents into memories of another past that will never have been a part of the lived present. Such slippages rewrite what the “I” remembers with new pasts, those where a stranger in the wilderness was a king and one’s bride is one’s own mother or those where the goodly old king was murdered by his brother, impelling his son to revenge, rather than those where he died peacefully in his sleep, pushing his son into melancholy.

Deleuze, however, considers this problem via the distinction between the “cardinal” and the “ordinal” (DR, p.88). The cardinal points of a circle (north, south etc.) might allow us to measure the revolution of planetary bodies and thus give number to time itself, much as the hands on the face of a clock do. Rejecting *Timaeus*, Deleuze reads Hamlet and Oedipus as experiencing ordinal time, time centred around the event (notably an act of storytelling by either the Ghost or by Tiresias). As Deleuze explains:

“Time is no longer coiled up in such a way that it is subordinated to the measure of something other than itself, such as, for example, astronomical movement. [...] time unrolls itself like a sort of serpent, it shakes off all subordination to a movement or a nature, it becomes time in itself for itself, it becomes pure and empty time. It measures nothing anymore. Time has taken on its own excessiveness. It is out of its joints.” (Deleuze, 1978a)

For Deleuze, Hamlet’s time overcomes the subordination of time to nature and all of its rhythms. It is thus pure because it is not determined by experience and empty because it (in being disjointed) has been voided of the contents given to it by cardinal points, by nature,
habit and laws of succession etc.. To reiterate, the caesura orders time into before and after, the incision of the event giving time a form but not content. This is what is meant by ordinal time. Thus it is that, within the third synthesis, the habits of the first and the memories of the second fade and what remains is only the structure, the pure and empty form of time, abjured of content and experience. This is “time in itself for itself”, without even the cogito to contain it and notably in both instances disjointed time seems to be productive of a certain “madness” in the plays’ protagonists.

This is where we see the relevance of the third synthesis to ethnographic work at shopping centre. The events of the vignette with which we began this section served as such a radical caesura in the midst of fieldwork; a disjointing of time into madness whereby the shopping centre seemed to offer more unanswerable questions than answers; the subject sitting in the archive asking about the shopping centre’s history seeming increasingly insane and disarticulated as it watched the stories of the shopping centre unroll in so many directions that it became impossible to trace. This moment of “giddiness” is the cut in time that separates the ethnographic “I” from itself by causing it to call itself into question. This fractured “I” is caught amidst the memories, dreamings and thoughts of the shopping centre, and thus cannot claim function as author(ity), interpreter, origin or thinking subject.

While the reader may object that no ethnographer who is serious about their profession would leave the field with the assumption of complete knowledge or conclusive understanding, this is not how the “I think” is represented in publication. Statements are definitive, and unanswered questions remain in the notebooks and diary entries, never to surface. There are, of course, many exceptions such as the work of Marisol de la Cadena (2015, p.xxv) who notes that knowing the earth-being, Ausangate, would always be beyond the epistemic tools available to her, but the point upon which we wish to dwell, is that there were many of these open queries in our study of the shopping centre, such as the question of
who created the special folio on the shopping centre in the Local Records office, or that of who placed a Bram Stoker quote in a shop window, and even that of who decided upon the familiar tone of the shopping centre’s publications. We here wish to highlight such unanswered questions as those which are usually effaced from the ethnographic narrative (see Marcus, 1998a); that which we are tempted to hide, for the identity of the academic is that which we reaffirm through having knowledge; the ethnographer who understands the field being a construct of this same entrenched need for identity and author(ity). To admit that there are unanswered questions, or more accurately that there are perhaps questions without answers, and thus suggest that the unanswered will always be a part of the understanding of the shopping centre, seems to be the core of what an ethnography of the shopping centre can demonstrate. While we in no way wish for this to become regarded a “revealed truth” of the field, for it did not emerge, as it did in Hamlet and Oedipus Rex, all at once but through the process of telling a story (of the shopping centre) it is nevertheless important to note that there is a caesura or cut in the line of time which disjoints this academic “I think” and suggests to it that the pasts of the shopping centre are not merely unknowable to a subject, or unrepresentable via discourse, nor even politically contested but fundamentally in chaos. The event of the ethnography itself thus restructures the field into a “before” where the shopping centre was merely another space to study, and “after” where the impossibility of telling a story about the shopping centre became apparent and the ethnographer fractures along the lines of the caesura. Perhaps no encounter so illustrates this as the “Evening in Wonderland”.

Wonderland: The caesura in the field

*It is billed as an “Evening in Wonderland”. The night wind scrapes across your face and the cold December drizzle taints your glasses. As you cross the threshold, you are greeted by a woman, short in stature, dressed in an elf costume. As*
you contemplate whether there is not something politically incorrect in this oddity, she gives you a wide-eyed and well-practiced “customer-service smile”; handing you a leaflet and telling you all about the evening’s special sales. The thundering echoes of the mall have a different note tonight. It wavers through different pitches and tones, interminglings of song and speech. A brass band plays despite its struggling trombonist. Stilt walkers and unicyclists parade by as you wander, barely noticing the one metre long red carpets and velvet ropes that have been laid out in front stores participating in the evening’s events. As you enter one of them, you notice a sign “Come up to the first floor and have your picture taken with the hare!”. Curiouser and curiouser indeed, but it is November not March. Incredulity abounds but let us not pretend that you have not read Carroll and that this has nothing to do with why you are here. You take the escalator to the first floor where you expect to see a crowd of people huddled and gawking at a hare, which, given that hares are larger and faster than rabbits, might actually be on time for tea if his pocket-watch is running correctly. After five minutes of searching futilely for this crowd, you decide to ask a guard where you might be able to find the hare. He looks at you with an expression that is a mixture of wary and quizzical, reaches for the walkie-talkie on his belt and radios someone who is presumably his supervisor. He asks if there is a rabbit on the first floor to which the voice on the other end of the radio responds, in a tone of shock and awe, “There’s a rabbit on the first floor!”

While the guard is distracted with the labour of speaking on the radio and explaining what was said, you wonder that you could have made better friends with Time over the past few months. If you had, you mightn’t be stuck shortly after six o’clock, longing to be shifted into another equally demented time wherein the hallucinatory experiences of the shopping centre are more intelligible. Amused, you
thank the confused guard for his troubles, motioning to your watch and mouthing that you are late for tea, and leave the store, acknowledging that there might never be enough madness in the shopping centre to contain or explain this experience.

While images of the ethnographer “tumbling down the rabbit hole” as they enter the field are trite and clichéd (see, for example, Allbon, 2012) the shopping centre itself presents Carroll’s imagery to shoppers in the form of a sale on an afternoon in November 2012; presumably to evoke the same feelings of disorientation, awe, fascination and hedonistic curiosity that populate Carroll’s novel. Looking closely at the resonances between Carroll’s Wonderland and the shopping centre, these are perhaps undeniable and were thus inevitable. Indeed, Carroll’s text itself is structured as an ethnography, with Alice wandering from site to site and trying to learn the norms and practices of the interlocutors who she meets there. There is a kind of madness in both spaces and this thesis has spoken previously about the need to treat such madnesses seriously. In commenting on Carroll’s Alice, Deleuze (ECC p.22) says as much:

“Carroll’s uniqueness is to have allowed nothing to pass through sense, but to have played out everything in nonsense, since the diversity of nonsenses is enough to give an account of the entire universe”

Indeed, there is much in the shopping centre which might seem as nonsense or as challenges to thought and understandings of everyday life which we conflate with sense; moments- like chasing an “imaginary” hare around the first floor- where the world seems like a ‘pataphysical fever dream, too strange and steeped in irony to be believed- too filled with experiences which cannot themselves be subsumed into “good sense”. As Alan Lopez (2004, p.113) notes, what is at stake in these moments of nonsense is “ourselves”, the field confronting one with “a specular trauma in which one’s self or “I” disappears and can no longer be guaranteed.”
It is upon this “specular trauma” that we will dwell, for the simple reason that it is impossible to understand this encounter fully from the perspective of a rational, perceiving subject. In the least, it was impossible to say “I think this is what was happening here…” and thereby make a return to the author(ity) of the subject because it was painfully obvious that any answer would have been reductive and inadequate. To put this another way, in the confluence of madness, or “specular trauma” with which patrons of the shopping centre are confronted, there is a grain of what Deleuze saw in the moment of “time out of joint” or “a brief moment [where] we enter into that schizophrenia in principle which characterises the highest power of thought, and opens Being directly on to difference” (*DR*, p.58). Thus, though there might be many ways to read the confluence of marketing rhetoric and playfully lucid insight into the character of the shopping centre that was the “Evening in Wonderland”, we contend that there was something else at work there; the blur between fictive text and lived experience exacerbating what, within the context of the reading of the third synthesis presented here, might be read as a caesura, a vicious line which separates past and future, ordering time into a time before, where the shopping centre could be known or understood as a totality and a time after, when the shopping centre would consistently confront the ethnographer with unanswered questions, pastiche and frenetically juxtaposed imagery from Carroll’s imagination; as a space riven with the madness of a demented time where it would always be six o’clock rather than one measured by metrical (clock) time; thus rendering the ethnographer *qua* subject itself in question.

There are two interrelated issues here that are relevant to the practicing ethnographer and the question what to do in the field without the subject: becomings and the eternal return. It is possible to develop these by experimenting with the two dramatic formulations of the third synthesis of time in the context of “Evening in Wonderland”. Time out of joint becomes apparent where the “demented time” (*temps affole*) of the experience sets in, where much like
Hamlet being tempted to the flood or the edge of the cliff by the Ghost, one is drawn into the shopping centre’s madness in chasing after a hare that no interlocutor seems sure exists. Deleuze insists that “time must be understood and lived out of joint and seen as a straight line which mercilessly eliminates those who embark upon it” (DR, p.371). Life in the shopping centre pushes time out of joint, disrupts habits, breaks the ordering of events. It is by no means the only space and time to achieve this- Murphy (2016), for example, chronicles the splits/fractures in time around the events at the Rodez clinic in the life of Antonin Artaud; the schizo’s life bearing always a tenuous relation to time- and indeed, it is by no means the only fieldsite to do this to the ethnographer. Ethnographically, to inhabit a space where time is out of joint is to risk the “I think” becoming other, to live with the giddiness of the caesura as one would on the edge of the cliff. The continuous fracturing of the “I” is, however, not analogous to the broadly speaking "postmodern” notion of fragmentary or “schizoid selves” nor is it merely an extension of the Gruen effect (of which we have spoken previously). Ethnographers have laudably been dealing with this and the various concerns of the postmodern and the “crisis of representation” (Marcus and Fischer, 1999) in various ways, for example, through reconsiderations of the “performative-I” (Spry, 2006) or an engagement with the works of Jameson on late capitalism (Strauss, 1997) but this is, however, simply not what is at stake in the third synthesis. It is also not, as we have alluded to previously, a matter of the reflexive redoubling to reaffirm the subject by considering, for example, its positionality (see Collins and Gallinat, 2010; Bourke, 2014; and also Cruz, 2014; Dallyn, 2014), that is to say, its status and identification with various cultural discourses.

Simply put, living the third synthesis lies in the openness of a life towards becomings. That is to say, as the I, fractured by the incisive line of time, recoils upon itself, watching its own thought and playing a symphony (a waltz, perhaps) separate from itself, it is confronted with an ontological challenge. To say “I is an other” is to accept rather than deny that there is
an ontology other than the one into which we have corralled ourselves; a by-product of both
the metaphysics of identity and the shopping centre’s capitalisms which produce the
assumption of the autonomous, self-determining subject. Indeed, what we contend about the
third synthesis is that, it is the most ontological of the three. While one might note that
“thought only occurs at this extreme point of the fractured I,” (Voss, 2013a, p.210) and thus
relate the problem of the fracturing of the subject back to that an epistemic problem of a
transcendental empiricism, this neglects the immediate implications for life in the world, for
the reshaping power of moments of fracture. Indeed, to build upon Williams (2011), when
taken in the context of the first and second syntheses, “expectancy” and “archiving”, the third
suggests that we can think free of the fetters of the past, with order and self disjointed, and
thus make of the future something new.

Though co-implicated with the broader turn towards “process” philosophy across the
academy (particularly surrounding the work of A.N. Whitehead, see for example, Halewood
and Michael, 2008; Helin et al., 2014), Deleuze’s invocation of becoming (devinir) is part of
the metaphysic of difference which he advances (May, 2003), tracing many different
typologies throughout his corpus, particularly in the discussion of becoming-animal,
becoming-imperceptible etc. in A Thousand Plateaus. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming is
not about imitation. Nor is it about a change between two fixed and identified states or
movements between two points or even the continual process of such. Becoming is the
overall dynamism, the nonstative and generative nature of the event or world, thought within
a metaphysic that privileges pure difference rather than identity. In short, it is about the future
as something new. It is with reference to this that we say that Deleuze is not acting to restore
or solidify the distinction between future and past or return to an “event based time” (see
Hassard, 1989) in speaking of the ordering process of the cut of the third synthesis. Rather, in
much the same way as the first synthesis can be said to undermine the idea of the opposition
between machine and lived time or modern and ancient times (as well as all the other binaries that we discussed in Chapter III), and the second sought to give agency back to the past, the third synthesis subsumes both pure past and lived present into itself; the pure and empty third time and thus renders the future completely open and unidentifiable. Of this notion of becoming, Deleuze says, “Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once” (LOS, p.1). An ontology committed to a basis in becoming is thus not about the movement between stable identities but about a perpetual slippage, pulling in every direction.

As regards time, the question of becoming is intimately linked in Deleuze’s work to that of the Nietzschean eternal return; the provocation that a moment of one’s life might recur infinitely, again and again (Nietzsche, 2001. p.194). In a seminal reading, Kundera (1995) suggests that the provocation of the eternal return is that if an event of great import eternally returns, then its significance diminishes as it is experienced infinitely. Conversely, if one of little impact recurs, its importance is magnified exponentially because it must be lived repeatedly. Every event thus carries simultaneously an unimaginable weight and an unfathomable lightness. Pertinently here, what this implies is that the eternal return of events like the days at the Local Records office or the Evening in Wonderland are no more or less significant than those of the everyday wandering the shopping centre; insofar as any of them could have produced the connections between the shopping centre’s time and the third synthesis, each moment of the fieldwork can become a cut or caesura in time.

While a full exploration of the relationship between Deleuze and Nietzsche as well as that between Nietzsche and what Malabou (2010) calls the great coup of French philosophy to read the eternal return as the return of difference rather than the same, as Deleuze does (NP), is beyond the scope of this thesis, we note that, for Voss (2013b) the Nietzschean
return, is where Deleuze turns after exhausting the possibilities of Kant’s work, as regards the third synthesis. Indeed, while the three syntheses of time work together as interrelated and inextricable concepts, in some sense they are a groundwork, a foundation for Deleuze to address the eternal return. It is possible to see in Nietzsche’s account of the eternal return, the cut or caesura which we discussed above. The death of god of which Zarathustra (Nietzsche, 1966) speaks is a caesura, reordering time and dissolving the self. That is to say, the fracture created in the ordering of time by the realization that god is dead renders other the immortal soul or “I” whose conditions were determined by god, and opens one up to the possibilities of becoming. We might also see in Zarathustra’s actions the “giddiness” of living the third synthesis. When the dwarf tells Zarathustra that “all truth is crooked, time itself is a circle,” (Nietzsche, 1966. p.158) he becomes angry, afraid and faint, perhaps as much at the great reordering of time that has just occurred as from the terror that the Same might endlessly return. Deleuze, however, is careful to distance himself from the reading of time as a circle or cycle (D’Iorio, 2014). Indeed, the aforementioned reading of the eternal return as a problem of “the passing away of that which is innate in sameness and identity and the eternal return of multiple forms of difference,” (Williams, 2011. p.123) not only serves to circumvent this reading of time as circular but confronts us with the need to re-read the profound existential challenge of Nietzsche’s proposition. The eternal return, for Deleuze, opens the possibility of “a world without identity, without resemblance or equality” (DR, p.241). Spinks (2005) reads the difference in the returning event as joyful in itself, the transformation of a life in the shirking of identity. Taken together, what all of this suggests is that the eternal return is a lived problem and indeed, Nietzsche’s revolution is to make time an ontological question and it is by this logic that Deleuze insists that time must be lived out-of-joint. In living the eternal return, “I deactualize my present self in order to will myself in all the other selves whose entire series must be passed through” (Klossowski, 1997. p.57), not returning as the same for
all times (pour toutes les fois), nor a stable position upon which one might reflect, but in that moment that time goes out of joint, compelling the subject to perpetual variance; embracing thus the experience of “I” as an other by watching what may become. This reconnects us to the “sentiendum or the being of the sensible” (DR, p.140) which we discussed in Chapter I, that experience which is at once immediate to thought and poses a problem to thought; sensation which forces thought outside of the model of recognition. It is this thought that the ethnographer qua subject confronts in the Local Records office and during the Evening in Wonderland, an ineffable frisson as time cuts and with it, the subject itself fractures in specular trauma, becoming thus a reflector of the field and its chaos, rather than one who can order, represent or subsume it in comprehending.

To return thus to the issue of the ethnographic subject with which we began this chapter, Biehl (2013, p.591) notes the distinction between the philosopher who tells stories with concepts, and the anthropologist who tells stories with “instances of human becomings”. The third synthesis confronts us with the insistence of a median concern, one which, we acknowledge may lie beyond the limits of ethnography; that the process of telling stories might break and reconstitute the “I”, that is itself a concept within the text, into new becomings. It is often that the caesura of the ethnographic moment impels the ethnographer to write, to tell the story of the field even as it reshapes their understanding of it. However, beyond this, the ontological challenge of the eternal return and indeed, the search for an amalgam of Deleuze’s metaphysic and ethnographic practice is thus to begin to write stories through many other concepts; acknowledging thus the unknowable infinity of the field, as well as the plethora of conceptual personae who occupy it; other than the ethnographer qua subject who becomes not only fractured, but open and giddy. A story can thus unfold to trace the concept of “the subject” through Rimbaud, Shakespeare, Deleuze, Nietzsche and instances where the shopping centre seemed to become incomprehensible, in order to develop
the concept itself. In so doing, the story of a concept can become as much a story of a people and a place and time. It is to this that we turn in the next chapter of this thesis, where we will address ourselves to the question of conceptual personae in more detail.
Chapter VI: Conceptual personae, capitalisms and the madness of the shopping centre

A “dictionary” of madness

It is possible for us to break down the theoretical arguments which this thesis has mapped thus far into four simple propositions, which, if accepted, inevitably lead to this point in the work. First, that both CMS and Anthropology; either through overt statement, repeated engagement, or aggregate trends; seek a “Deleuzian future” or, in the least, some more robust means of engaging with Deleuzian scholarship than that which has previously been attempted. Secondly, that without a thorough understanding of transcendental empiricism or the metaphysics of difference which underpins Deleuze’s theoretical project, there can be nothing more than superficial attempts to work with Deleuze’s concepts, or rather, attempts which do not fully develop the implications of his metaphysic. Thirdly, that at the core of transcendental empiricism lies a critique of the subject (as cogito; as representational; as a universal and static thing which functions as an arbiter of the faculties etc.). Fourthly, that the subject is maintained by the ways in which ethnography as writing is practiced, namely as an extension of the author(ity) of the text. Thusly, we arrive at the position of having traced

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18 One never knows from where ideas and perspectives come. In the course of the fieldwork, one may develop the habit of sketching patterns (in floor tiles, in the movement of crowds, in dresses, in the way food was assembled on a plate). Patterns, often became the basis for conceptual work; patterns of three becoming the *rubato waltz* of time, patterns in lines becoming the basis of a theory of the body etc. and as such we include some of these patterns, like the one above, in order that the reader might draw their own conceptual connections.
several experiments with ethnographic writing; via the fourth person singular, via lines of thought, via fieldnotes, via plays between theory and fiction and via calling the ability of the subject to know in question; each one seeming to stem from encounters in the field (whether it be the tense in which the shopping centre “speaks” in the “Shopping Centre Guide” or the salience of lines in the field or the importance of fieldnotes to ethnographic work or discussions of novels with interlocutors), each seemingly enacted with a view towards either elucidating or otherwise developing one of the above propositions. As such, the shopping centre functions not only as a fieldsite (and thus we recall the question “What is the shopping centre, and how can the works of Gilles Deleuze help us to understand it ethnographically?”) but as that which determined how and which conceptual lines (bodies, times etc.) the text pursued, serving thus as a means for experimentation, the ethic which governs Deleuze’s own engagement with philosophy. However, in this pursuit, the reader will have been confronted by a number of terms, concepts or conceptual personae which may have seemed strange and thus in need of further definition. Whether it be the schizo or the line or the insomniac or the paramnesiac or the subject, the reader may have had questions about how these were employed throughout the text. In this sense, we do not deny that the text has been constituted of mad scrawling, unsensed script, sketching, irreverence and play across the lines of the “good sense” of academic practice. The reader may thus, at this point in the text, desire a “dictionary” of some kind; or in the least some summary statements of references and meanings, some clarification of what a given concept “is”, if not generally then within the context of Business School scholarship.

For this text to fulfil such a role is, however, inherently problematic, not only because, as Annoni (2014) notes, dictionaries are and always have been delineations of power and the crystallization of certain kinds of authority but because the idea that there might be a dictionary which operates at the intersection of CMS, Anthropology and Deleuze Studies in
order to apprehend the madness of the shopping centre is almost an absurdity; the various discourses and debates at work within these disciplines pre-empting any kind of systematic series of definitions by virtue of their plurality alone; for each would hold to its own heterogeneous interests, concerns, and logics in constructing definitions. Indeed, each of the three have either their own dictionaries and listings of key concepts (see respectively Tadajewski et al., 2011; Rapport and Overing, 2000; Parr 2005; Zourabichvili, 2012; Young et al., 2013) or calls for their own dictionaries to help each make sense of the incommensurability of their own internally varying research paradigms and agenda (see McKinley and Mone, 1998). Furthermore, such a text would be as problematic as a “Deleuzian dictionary”, for in seeking to fix concepts so that they might be applied and identified in the world, it would neglect that concepts should not be designated stable functions, rooted or otherwise curtailed, because doing so would be contra to the logic of difference which Deleuze advocates and which this text has tried to trace. Here the impossibility of the thesis itself is revealed for within the increasing managerialised or corporatized conditions which characterize the modern university (see Ritzer, 1996; Parker and Jary, 1995; Readings, 1996; Parker, 2014; Thompson, 1970), in the context of the “condition” (Shore, 2008) that has been described as “audit culture” (see Strathern, 2000), disciplinarity and insularity are encouraged insofar as they facilitate a thesis being efficient, predictable, calculable and controlled; a carefully weighed and measured contribution to a specific and “relevant” (see Butler et al., 2015; Knights, 2008; Knights and Scarbrough, 2010; Grey 2001) literature. Here either the reader’s need for discipline or the thesis’s rhetorical construction of the reader’s need for discipline forms a part of the conditions of the production of a thesis or what Honan and Bright (2016), following St. Pierre (2011), describe as an “orthodoxy of qualitative research” which dictates the form, style, writing and even conclusions of a thesis in advance.
This is perhaps why George Marcus (1998, p.233) notes of doctoral projects that those who might have looked there for change, creativity or practices “worthy of the name ‘experiment’,” would be disappointed; such projects usually being consigned to times where career status and politics afford more freedom. The thesis is, by this logic, not just rite of passage but a mode of constructing the possibilities of thought within the context of a discipline and thus producing a very specific kind of subject. Deleuze himself comments on this system:

“What now seems problematic is the situation in which young philosophers, but also all young writers who’re involved in creating something, find themselves. They face the threat of being stifled from the outset. It’s become very difficult to do any work, because a whole system of “acculturation” and anticreativity specific to the developed nations is taking shape. It’s far worse than censorship.” (N, p.27)

It is this orthodoxy and consequent institutional conditions which produce the need for a dictionary, or, in the least a specific kind of dictionary which deals in fixity, identity and definition rather than concepts; for it is, by Deleuze’s logic, this system into which we have been “acculturated”. Massumi (1996, p.399) alludes something similar in the context of a reader’s reaction in terms of “has-beens to-be”; the painful cracks which affective philosophy opens in the mind- birthing half-thoughts, visions and reconstituting memories- eliciting censuring responses: it “has to be” otherwise because it “has been” otherwise. Taking all of this into account, though Styhre (2002) notes the “mobility” of the Deleuzian concept and suggests the benefits of thinking, via Deleuze’s logic, with the open “and” rather than with the affixed “is”, and Thanem (2004) demonstrates an understanding of the concept (of the Body without Organs) as an “experimental practice” rather than a thing with fixed meaning and defined properties, it would seem that Organization Studies, or more broadly the Business School, still lacks the concept of a concept. Furthermore, though Skafish (2014)
suggests that anthropologists have gotten better at negotiating the methods and language of concepts in the context of the ontological turn, the same can be said of Anthropology specifically as regards the Deleuzian concept.

Thus this chapter will seek to explore the problematics of the dictionary by, in lieu of a conclusion or formal end to the arguments of the thesis, replaying the core concepts of this work, in order to see what new connections might emerge at their intersection and thus extend the arguments of the thesis by considering the institutional conditions around the thesis and how they affect its text and concepts. Let us thus not say dictionary, but rather, an interstice, an interval or similarly liminal time and place in and from which each of the conceptual personae of this work might stand and tell some aspect of the story of the shopping centre. One might say then that this is a dictionary written for a discipline or territory that is “yet to come” (ATP, p.5). Not so much postdisciplinary or in line with the shift in organizational scholarship towards the “transdisciplinary” (Czarniawska, 2012) but a discipline whose boundaries are yet to be defined, somewhere in the nebulous territory between and thus beyond the limits of CMS, Anthropology and Deleuze Studies.

The schizo

For this thesis, getting to the shopping centre has meant being receptive to the play of concepts for it is the concept which allows us to positively propose new ways of thinking about the shopping centre. It is thus that only after the exploration of the preceding chapters that we can get to the question of what a concept is. Deleuze and Guattari explicitly say that “Concepts are centres of vibrations, each in itself and everyone in relation to all the others” (WIP, p.23) but such a definition necessitates further exegesis. In Chapter II we began this examination by noting that the concept of the Body without Organs was fundamentally amorphous, changing not only between the different texts within Deleuze’s corpus but even
varying in usage within the same text; a stark contrast (with few exceptions; see Thanem, 2004) to how that concept is treated within organizational studies. Indeed, Chapters III, IV and V, treat the concepts of the three syntheses of time in the same way, not as scientific terms with invariable meanings rooted in Deleuze’s works, based on the logic of equation and definition, but as malleable and mercurial terms offering varieties of perspective. This is, for us, consistent, not only with the ethics via which Deleuze himself works with the history of philosophy, but with the overt statements of the relation between the “history” of a concept and the “becoming” of a concept in What is Philosophy? (p.17-18). That is to say while a term might have an etymology and a set of previous usages, treating it as a concept means being willing to risk what else it can do. These concepts exist and live here not only as the productions of the field, but as the beginnings of a language. Indeed, for Deleuze (ECC, p.5-6), developing Proust’s comments, every writer is obligated to construct their own language, perhaps even their own Borgesian-style bestiary (if such a practice might not be too much in the way of establishing a dictionary), in order to tell a story. Even if “they will not let you experiment in peace” (ATP, p.150) you must try to build your language and what is ethnography if not the process by which a story garners the language and means to tell itself. This “fabulation” or story-telling process always employs constructions of this kind, building out of itself a missing people, who in absentia and by virtue of such, shape the narrative and tell the story. While in Cinema 2 such a people are those such as the native Americans who have had their storytelling co-opted and thus restored in the films of Pierre Perrault, here we refer to the conceptual personae who have come to live, breathe, heat, eat, shit and fuck amidst the lines of this thesis.

However, what all of this implies is that the concept of a concept is not itself a concept, or rather it cannot be, but only insofar as this prevents the concept itself from becoming a thing of fixity, an identified body with clearly demarcated lines of boundary. The
same is not true of the conceptual persona, the missing people. In addressing the importance of the conceptual personae, Deleuze and Guattari argue that “philosophy constantly brings conceptual personae to life” (WIP, p.62). It is the conceptual persona which affords the play of concepts. They are not abstract personifications, fetishizations, vehicles for vicarious experience or parables, they are the lives of the text. Deleuze and Guattari trace various conceptual personae which populate the history of philosophy, from Plato’s Socrates to Descartes idiot. Others have developed the conceptual personae as the means by which the philosopher might adopt the position of the “everyman” and thus reason their way out of the image of thought (Marks, 1998) or as indicative of philosophy’s dramaturgy (Lambert, 2015) or in relation to sex and cinema (Rodowick, 2010). For this thesis, the conceptual personae served as a means to disrupt, disorder and disturb the expectations of author(ity) and ethnographic writing by cultivating a language both reflective and productive of the shopping centre. What this text has tried to argue is that the shopping centre, in all of its chaos, is not knowable other than through the generation of concepts through conceptual personae in order to understand the shopping centre’s different facets and faces. The schizo out for a stroll illustrates this best because it functions not only as a conceptual personae, but as the beginnings of a methodology; a means of getting out of the problem of the “I think”. The schizo thus becomes a means to de-structure and de-subjectivate experience, affording a space outside, in-between and through the ways in which writing constructs “authority” by disseminating it into personae like the Historian or the Architect, all this while telling a story about walking the malls.

There has been much written on ethnography and walking (see Ingold and Vergunst, 2008) and indeed, walking itself has been a key preoccupation for scholars across disciplines, from Thoreau’s Walking to Solnit’s (2000) Wanderlust. While one might get to the shopping centre in many different ways, including walking, it is easy to get lost there while wandering
around, losing track of people, time and stories. One loses count over how many stories and things unsaid are part of an ethnography of the shopping centre. Indeed, in arguing that “stories walk”, Berger (1982, p.285) claims that “every step is a stride over something not said”. The “unsaid” might be tracked in different ways, but we wish to pursue it here via the lingering question of “What does it mean to stroll?” To stroll is perhaps to realize the concepts of poet Antonio Machado (cited in Horton and Freire, 1990) when he says “se hace camino al andar”, “you make the way as you go”. What this implies is that a schizo out for a stroll is in the practice of dérive but without the practiced or processual identities of the flâneur, the academic or the ethnographer. This also speaks to the fact that there could never be a concretization of the “method” of transcendental empiricism (beyond the imperative to ethically experiment with concepts), for each new field, each new set of encounters, each new array of interlocutors would produce a new method. One might wander through any space and time and still develop the kind of conceptual meshwork which this thesis has tried to develop- indeed, Tim Ingold has been doing precisely this around the theme of lines (see Ingold, 2015)- but it will not be the same in terms of its conclusions, conceptual personae or its stories. That is to say, the psychogeography of the shopping centre shapes the stroll, producing the concepts and intersections which make the text. However, what is crucial is less the space and time and more the openness to the encounters which they can afford. These encounters will not always follow ideas or trends to their “conclusions” leaving things unsaid or questions unanswered, but they will always be creative of new stories.

What the schizo thus confronts us with is one who lives a transcendental empiricism, one who experiences life in the fourth person, having had their habits of saying “I” disrupted. The schizo out for a stroll is a synesthetic-machine, a factory producing sensation and forms of sense-making which is not subordinate to those naturalized processes which we have come to accept as experience, that is, those which correspond to the dogmatic image of thought.
The schizo is one for whom perception and sensation function along radically different terms other than those of good, disciplined, subjects of capital who see only ordered systems of relation; those for whom a chair and a table in the shopping centre’s food court will have specific functions and clearly defined boundaries such as sitting and supporting food trays while separate from both the sitter and the floor. Conversely, the schizo sees the forest from which the furniture will have grown and, simultaneously, the one to which they will return when the shopping centre finds its ruin once again, roots shooting out in tendrils that grow deep into the different temporal and corporeal lines which the shopping centre negotiates.

The schizo thus offers us a means to demonstrate that, recalling O’Doherty (2013, p.226) in disordering “customary forms of practical being-in-the-world, channels of communication are opened up across the senses,” affording space to think without the “I” or the classical systems of binaries (objective/subjective) which have become a taken for granted image of thought.

**The disembodied (the line)**

Deleuze says “whether we are individuals or groups, we are made up of lines” (*D*, p.124) echoing a sentiment expressed in *A Thousand Plateaus* regarding the composition of life by a variety of lines, such as those of writing and the spaces in between. What becomes clear in the longitudinal analysis is that, for Deleuze, the line replaces the point as the focus of concern or, put another way, the connections between ideas, thoughts, moments or regimes of coding become more important than the identification and categorization of the things themselves. The body of the line is a most twisted, contorted, winding thing; even though and perhaps especially when the line seems straight, for what in a two-dimensional view might seem to be a straight line, might be, from a three dimensional view, rendered as a line which is convulsing, writhing, waving and wrung out into layers of maddening agony. Thinking in these terms, we might see the shopping centre as constituted entirely by lines. Parallel lines
mark the escalator, flowing uphill into the shopping centre and downhill into the network of roads which connect its spaces to nearby towns and cities. Lines created by tiles form seemingly infinite grid, breaking only to betray areas of wear and tear, repair and heavy traffic; signs of heavy scuff marks, scrapes, prams dragging, and cleaning carts grating. These lines, extending from the floor, travel up the walls and intersect with ostentatious patterning which in turn weaves its way around signs adorned with various other lines of text. Diagonal white lines on a black dress adorn a mannequin in the window display of a trendy store because that particular pattern, already endorsed by fashion gurus, is back in style this summer. Lines buzz in the mind from books read on the bus while travelling to the shopping centre, intermingled with the lines of the multi-lingual conversations with which the bus route resonated. Policed and surveilled lines surround the shopping centre, creating a bordered and sovereign territory within which there are specific laws and codes of conduct; rules that often seem not apply in the world outside. Lines themselves are, at times, the enemy; an indicator that further resources must be allocated in order to deal with the customers who have formed a queue, lest there be something which negatively affects the shopper’s perception of the space. However, lines themselves can be desired, like the sleek lines of a car sold in a temporary pop-up-store which are both often the subject of conversation. It seems that lines have the power to function as everything from an aesthetic choice to a vector, demonstrating variously despotic power, as they marshal men and women to attend to it, and a passive permeation, as they float around the collective consciousness.

If you lose members of your party please meet at the customer services desk in the main dome. Thank you. A line fracturing its way into all conversations, so penetrative that it appears in dreams, text and diagram. A reminder that thoughts are never one’s own.
In Chapter II this thesis developed the question of the line in conjunction with the concept of the body. In so doing, we noted the interest of other scholars, for example, Tim Ingold, in the lines of the world. However, it is not the lines made by slugs (Ingold, 2012) or those implicated in the history of writing and inscription (Ingold, 2007), or even the many observable lines of the shopping centre mentioned above which are of interest to the question of the disembodied. What the shopping centre confronts us with is a series of lines, flowing in different directions, none of them being of clear origin. These lines thus function as unanswerable questions and disjunctures in the assumed knowing of the “I think”. Pursuing this to its conclusion, we might contend that the lines of the shopping centre will always exceed attempts to either code and codify them or to reduce them to a finite politic or otherwise cut them off from their far ranging connections. The lines of a thesis may appear to flow in a different manner; ordered, disciplined and prescribed, but might a thesis not attempt to push the boundaries of organization? This leads us to a much more poignant question: “What is the Body without Organs of a book?” (ATP, p.4). If it is that which resists coding, existing at the point of zero organization, then how might a thesis seek to realize the disembodied state of the Body without Organs? The answer to this question is elusive for perhaps a book with no organization is simply a blank strip of paper folded into a Mobius strip. Perhaps it is not paper at all, the medium itself being too arborescent and thus it is more akin to plumes of smoke on the wind, the exhale of a burning forest; a final, explosive deterritorialization. There is, however, a line between madness and the analysis of madness, between organization and the analysis of the organization of organs that is the organism, between unthinkingly legitimating the subject and calling the subject into question, which a text might walk and so continuously seek to disorganize itself even as it writes itself; a trajectory before it might reach a point of zero-organization and the violent chaos that this implies. It is this line which this thesis has attempted to follow; a thesis which simultaneously
tells the story of a year in the shopping centre and develops concepts which tell their own story in their own lines- one which is as much a story of the shopping centre as it is a story of how a thesis on the shopping centre tells itself. That is to say, while it is structured and organized into chapters, while it employs the English language and sentences which flow from left to right, from the top of the page to the bottom and while it also follows most of the rules of consensually accepted style guides and while it at times mirrors the effusive referencing of writing trends within Organization Studies, the text has also sought to jar the reader and make them aware of these organizations, opening thus the question of disorganization and thence to that of the zero-organization or the Body without Organs.

For this thesis, however, there was a very real danger of losing the critical project as it pursued the Body without Organs; this critical concept being possessed of the ability to drive us into a-critical scholarship that is concerned with nothing more than the absolute rejection of all organization. In the least this provides contrast, for one might argue, following Eagleton (2015), that the University as a whole has been pursuing the opposite agenda, seeking out more organization, enacting its own death as what he calls “a centre of humane critique.” Indeed the death of the critical which we discussed in Chapter II must certainly parallel the situation of the modern university, increasingly impelled towards the service of a corporate agenda and, as such, a move towards radical disorganization may not be so bad. We can acknowledge, however, that both these outcomes, corporate colonization and absolute disorganization, can be repressive and this is why the critical project- creating something novel in response to a crisis, if only to see what and how the resultant series of concepts might work- is worth continuing to cultivate; a field of lines of chance (ATP, p.24) sown with the potential for random offshoots, growing through disciplinary boundaries; into and out of different points of sensibility. Perhaps no quote emphasises this as much as the following from Deleuze (DI, p.192) “No book against anything ever has any importance; all that counts
are books for something, and that know how to produce it.” Which is to say that, though this thesis has engaged in a critique of the current status of “the critical”, particularly within CMS, we by no means wish to reject it. What we wish instead is to convey that the recovery of the critical, as regards Deleuze’s work, can and perhaps should, involve new ways of engaging with philosophy, and by extension writing a thesis, particularly in a Business School where, though philosophical questions are of increasing importance (see Jones and ten Bos, 2007), they are all too often taken for granted or seen as outside the lines which demarcate its discipline by conservative readings which seek to prevent its fragmentation by discouraging excesses of theoretical and methodological pluralism (see Pfeffer, 1993; 1995).

The insomniac

The watch beeps. Stepping into another world: an interlocutor might speak of the experience of wearing a deceased relative’s watch for a day, only to discover that it is broken and might, for long periods, remain stuck displaying 3:30 for hours at a time. She will tell this story cheerfully, despite the work of mourning that made her lose her own watch, not dwelling upon the ontological importance of this statement. This is hardly surprising, not only because as we developed throughout Chapter III, the metaphysical assumptions which underpin time are largely neglected, even with the most developed academic discourses, but also because there will always have been many different times, rhythms and patterns within the walls of the shopping centre and it is perhaps only the insomniac who could have hoped to study them all.

It is difficult to describe the impact that sleeplessness has upon the experiences of the shopping centre but it seems to change the experience of time. In Chapter II we saw how the schizo, as Artaud, thought the body a prison or an image forced onto him. Classically, the schizo has also seemed to have trouble with time- their understanding of time being
disorganized into a discontinuous flow, with what we might understand as the normal rhythms of past, present and future breaking down—specifically when distinguishing synchronous and asynchronous events. To quote Chapman (1966, p.243) “When I start walking I get a fast series of pictures in front of me. Everything seems to change and revolves around me.” Though we wish to continue to avoid fetishizing schizophrenia, it seems that there are several resonances between what the schizo experiences in body and time and what experiences confront the ethnographer in the shopping centre: bodies warping along different lines and time having varying aesthetics. The conceptual personae of the schizo out for a stroll can thus become a starting point and a trajectory for rethinking the ethnographic encounter.

After seventy-two hours without sleep, the strange and surreal scenarios of the shopping centre seem hyper-exaggerated in their character. While, in medical fields, insomnia is associated with a host of physical and psychological consequences (Roth, 2007), its most salient function in the shopping centre is the loss of time, or rather, time as it is commonly thought, for when the habit of time is disorganized, what the insomniac is confronted with is an obsession over time and its various rhythms; and when rhythm itself comes into question, with the aesthetics of time. That is to say, the disjunction of the rhythms of sleeping and waking, of habits of thought, pushes the insomniac into the practice of a transcendental empiricism, insofar as the nature of thought can be reconsidered in being pushed out of a dogmatic image of thought. We do not say that all ethnographers should seek the insomniac’s dimension, merely that this can be an *askesis* which results not in the dulling of the sensations of time but in a hypersensitivity to the different aesthetics of which time might be at once possessed and produced (sticky, warm, fluvial, coagulated, meandering, rough, black-blue-grey). Madness, not just as a key component of life in the shopping centre but as a methodological device which might aid an ethnographer in the exploration of the
problems with which one might be confronted in the course of trying to meaningfully engage
with the works of Gilles Deleuze over the course of an ethnography, facilitating the
disruption of the understanding of the ethnographer *qua* subject. While this dimension of the
fieldwork could have been dismissed, ignored or otherwise treated as an irrelevance, it was
crucial for this work to have taken the opportunity to develop the insomniac as a conceptual
persona, not only because this offered a novel means of experimenting with Deleuze’s
reading of time, but because it offered a way out of the entrenched system of binaries
(objective/subjective, clock/rhythmic, linear/cyclical etc.) which characterize understandings
of time across the academy.

Indeed, it is only the insomniac who could note time in the context of the waltz of the
shopping centre; the triptychs of time perhaps being imperceptible without this discipline
which breaks discipline. That is to say, the insomniac perceives the rhythm of a waltz in the
shopping centre, not because he is already aware of the different patterns, functions, scales,
modes and compositions in and by which a waltz may be played (i.e., because he is possessed
of *a priori* mental representations of it) but rather because he remains open to the possibility
of the rhythm- to the possibility of stepping into another world where there are things unsaid
and unsayable. One might thus walk a careful line around madness and take small risks to
lose time and- as the passive synthesis functions, independent of the mind of a thinking
subject, to pull past present and future together- thus be attuned to the various rhythms of
time-in-itself. The refrain thus becomes important because it demonstrates how the passive
synthesis can function independent of a mind and a subject, for the refrain functions as the
expression of the passive synthesis within a territory. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, “the
refrain fabricates time [...] the refrain is the a priori form of time, which in each case
fabricates different times” (*ATP*, p.349). The refrain is thus the clearest expression of what
we call the aesthetics of time, the territory of the shopping centre constituting a unique series of qualities and affects for time.

**The paramnesiac**

In the same way that the experience of sleeplessness becomes ineffable, it is difficult to explain the strangeness of the Square which opened as an outdoor extension to the shopping centre in 2008, its description thus becoming part of what is not said, an unanswered question within the text. In addition to being ordained with stone statues and scored with a classical music soundtrack that seems to range from Mozart to Stravinsky, the Square plays host to a variety of seasonal attractions, including the carousel. In Chapter IV we endeavoured to provide a manner of thick description of some of its subtleties through a play between the lines of theory and fiction but perhaps there is no way to render the life of a space which exists in such juxtaposition and pastiche; the placing of consumerism on the stage of such ostentation being difficult, if not impossible, to render via language.

We raise the issue of this impossibility if only because the feelings of **déjà vu** experienced by the paramnesiac are similarly impossible to communicate. If the insomniac is, in sleeplessness, vested with a sensitivity to the different aesthetics of time, then the paramnesiac occupies almost the opposite function, lost in the memories of the present. We always assume that it is the “I” which recalls and represents the past, but the paramnesiac, having no memories which are not involuntary cannot speak for a singular point from which memories emerge. This is not only an insight into how the fracture of the line of time of the third synthesis affects the past but, more importantly, it is also a way in which we can begin to think the mechanism which supports collective memory and thus address the question of how the shopping centre remembers. Whereas ethnographers and anthropologists have catalogued collective memory via oral histories and storytelling (Vansina, 1985), archives
etc. other than through cinema’s capacity for storytelling/fabulation in *Cinema 2*, Deleuze never really addresses the questions around collective memory and thus there is scope for this thesis to advance a claim. This might also speak to the tendency toward “psychologism” that some have noted (*see* Rowlinson et al., 2010) in our readings of organizational memory. That is to say, what the *déjà vu* experienced by the paramnesiac suggests to us is that the space in which we are repeats, but not as it was in the version of the past which corresponds to our lived presents, rather as it was at some other point in the pure past. Memory independent of experience and the remembering subject, as seen in “Combray like it never was, is, or will be lived; Combray as cathedral or monument” (*WIP*, p.168). Collective memory via the paramnesiac thus functions in critique of the unity of the conscious subject as various discourses, dreamings and unconscious imaginings.

Here again we see the importance of the conceptual persona. The conceptual persona of the paramnesiac is important as he remembers the present, thus folding the contractions of the first synthesis into the second. It is thus that Chapter IV argues that the paramnesiac’s memories always seem to be involuntary because they could not be intended, because pasts which we never a part of the lived present collide with the lived present, slipping and stumbling into each other. To build off of Deleuze’s comments in *Proust and Signs* (p.41) enduring paramnesia unfurls eternity. Indeed, all of human history might dwell in a single story told by an interlocutor in the shopping centre. Each one, like looking through a crystal, reveals fragments and fractures, the lines of the pure past. The paramnesiac mechanism is important because of the associations that can be made, particularly to partial objects- a certain smell, the angle of a leg, a sign- which prompt the reconstitution of the field, rather than merely a return or a re-membering. This kind of involuntary memory is well documented in ethnographic cannon, for example the smell of creosote on his notebooks prompts Levi-Strauss (1995) to go careening into the Brazilian forest. Similarly, regardless of
where, every single “Caution: Wet Floor” sign that we have seen since the summer of 2013 has caused the Square outside the shopping centre to be reconstructed in a new form that intersects the present, not as it was or will be and certainly not willed into being. Every sign returns fragments of classical music and the smells that varied based on season; new juxtapositions and constitutions of memories. Even while one is in the Square, one might have such involuntary memories. The subject is thus confronted with its own unmaking by that beyond its control, even as the paramnesiac sees time-in-itself in the involuntary memory of the present.

**The subject/The reader**

Was Nietzsche or Zarathustra the conceptual personae? In Chapter V we turned to the subject as a concept, subject to all of the same plays, passages, properties and permeations of other concepts (impermanent, changeable, discoursing etc.). However, as Deleuze (1991, p.94) remarks, “a concept does not die simply when one wants it to, but only when new functions in new fields discharge it.” The subject will not die simply because poststructuralism and other significant moves in western philosophy say that its time has come and would thus read its eulogy; it must be replaced by something new. Perhaps the experimental form that replaces it need be only as small as a new series of conceptual personae which try thus to address the pre-personal in the dreamings of the shopping centre. The schizo, the line of the disorganized body, the insomniac and the paramnesiac might each be a different strategy, a new function in the field of a practical transcendental empiricism which emerges to replace the subject for each is produced, neither *a priori* nor by an author but by the milieu of the shopping centre.

The reader might wonder, beyond the denial of author(ity), why this thesis would take such pains to avoid saying that the author or subject produced a concept. The answer is
because the subject is as much a conceptual persona as any of the aforementioned, and as such, without its death each of the conceptual personae would have no independent life; remaining locked together in an insipid mutualism. Deleuze and Guattari phrase the problem differently, saying: “I am no longer myself but thought’s aptitude for finding itself and spreading across a plane that passes through me at several places” (WIP, p.64). The philosopher (or the ethnographer) becomes a mechanism for the articulation of the conceptual personae, while they take on their own forms, histories, relations etc. but must eventually let the concepts live their own lives; opening up a trajectory through which the conceptual personae of the ethnography write the story of themselves. It thus becomes unclear where the ethnographer starts and the conceptual persona begins. One of the central contentions of this thesis is thus uncertainty: uncertainty of whether there can be a “Deleuzian ethnographic method”, uncertainty of the who, what, where and when of experience, uncertainty of memories, uncertainty of origin, uncertainty of oneself qua subject and uncertainty of where the “the author’s voce” is subsumed by a conceptual persona. To paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy?, Zarathustra becomes the philosopher at the same time that Nietzsche becomes Zarathustra. We might here push this further to say that, via this process, the philosopher becomes rendered as a concept and thus functions like a concept within the text. Each time we invoke the name of the philosopher, like Nietzsche, to speak of the eternal return, we are working with the concept of a Nietzsche. What space in the discourse is accorded to an author changes with each repetition of their name (there are no universals) and it will always have failed to fulfil the role of author(ity) which we invoke it in order to fulfil. One never knows from where an idea comes and thus the citations which populate this thesis are as adulatory capitulations to discipline and the façade of organization, retained largely for the reader’s benefit. They and other habitual invocations of names (including “we” and “Deleuze”) could be set aside in order that the conceptual personae of the work be
allowed to live. In such a world of concepts, the subject as author thus becomes lost amidst
the crowds of the shopping centre. Not in the sense of a loss of identity or, indeed, a loss of
difference, but in the sense of a different set of becomings, another order of lines that let the
lines of a different story emerge.

But the subject cannot be let go. The subject is, at this point so apparent to our
“common sense” understanding of reality and so central to the edifice of academia that it is
impossible for us to think without it while still operating within the confines of language and
the institutional formation of the University. As Deleuze and Guattari themselves note, “You
will be a subject, nailed down as one […] otherwise you’re just a tramp” (ATP, p.159). No
matter what is said or what arguments are levied, what experiments are tried or what
provocations are offered, the author *qua* subject will be hounded down, dragged out and
made responsible and accountable for the text. Even while absorbed by this thesis, the reader
may have been looking for signs of the author or an “I think”; for some indication that there
was an ethnographer in the shopping centre thinking and constructing the present narrative.
Whether this is done in order to establish veracity, maintain professional credibility (and thus
protect funding, public perception etc.), critique the lack of political awareness of this denial
or simply out of habit, the point remains that letting go of the subject within the regimes of
the modern university, or more accurately, the Business School becomes an impossibility.
Even were one to try to use differing conceptual personae, each with their own textual style,
to experiment with something other than the unity of the author; the pedagogical refrain:
“*Remember that you are being examined in a Business School!*” (which the reader may often
have thought to advise) is a prime example of the ways in which a singularly disciplined
subject can be produced out of a highly plural and post-disciplinary institution which is riven
with peculiar and often contradictory tensions, varying research agendas, paradoxical trends
in the literature, political game playing; with dominant norms becoming naturalized, taken-
for-granted and then defended with the “myopic rhetoric of relevance” (Knights, 2008). Much like the shopping centre, the Business School can easily be reified and made to forget the conflicts and discontinuities that produce or exist within it. This is the situation which Deleuze describes in Negotiations, acculturation and anticreativity, all based upon the assumption of the subject: in each of the conceptual personae, the subject will be dragged out, either through examination or some other aspect of the discipline, and thus proves a blockade to the development of conceptual personae, including itself, and thereby a limitation to the work.

However, if this work neglected the status of the subject as a concept then it has thoroughly maligned “the reader” for this is perhaps the conceptual persona in this thesis who has simultaneously received the most and the least address. The reader has worked throughout this text, most times as a strawman or playing the fool in order to facilitate exposition and at others standing in for some unknown or imagined voice of authority and dogmatism who would seek to rigidly maintain the status quo of the academy. The reader is constructed implicitly by the text, making inferences about what the reader knows, how they politically align and identify, how they read, what conferences they attend, which journals they may belong to the editorial board of, who they co-publish with etc.. The reader is thus penned into every chapter and verse of the thesis: it is for them that footnotes are generated and in their interest that certain texts or debates are “strategically referenced”. This is much more systemic a concern that relates to the conceptual personae, that is, as Coffey (1996) notes, the writing of the characters of an ethnography is often influenced by how the author expects the text to be read or rather, the thesis dreams itself a reader in whose gaze it becomes disciplined. It is thus that, in the process of constructing its reader that an author is also necessarily constructed as other, or more accurately, as a disciplined and produced subject. The reader becomes the fourth person of the text, for it is never clear when they are
speaking and they are perhaps more responsible for the text than any other presumed source of authority. This is not to restate the point from Barthes (1977), that the meaning of the text is contingent and lies with the reader, rather, it is to say that the very inscription of the text works through the reader. Thompson (2001) calls this the “reader-in-the-text” and uses it to explicate the ways in which an author or writer will make assumptions about the reader and play the text off as a dialogue between the two. The fixity of the reader is, in part, an extension of the function/fiction of author(ity) which it will always have been impossible to replace or usurp.

This is the central paradox of this thesis, stated at the end because perhaps the reader always knew it to be the case that no matter what plays or textual experiments the work might have attempted in order to destabilize the legitimacy and constancy of the assumptions around the author, the reader would always have maintained confidence in their position and status qua subject. The text will thus always have a subject but as there are no universals, it will at least always be unclear who it is: the author dragged into accountability, the confident reader or the conceptual personae produced by the behemoth that is the shopping centre.

The Capitalisms of the Shopping Centre

What follows from this compendium of madness? What this final Chapter has tried to develop is a concept of the conceptual persona and show its relevance to this thesis as a whole. However, as Deleuze says: “The philosopher creates concepts that are neither eternal nor historical but untimely and not of the present.” (NP, p.107). It is thus difficult to couch the conceptual work of this text in terms of the “relevance” or “use value” or “the strategic aims of the Business School” for it may well be that concepts and conceptual personae arrive untimely and unheimlich, strange yet familiar, unwanted by any discipline for a time. No doubt some other author(ity) could make the concepts in this “dictionary” commodified,
marketable and fungible, and thus appealing to those who one might assume are the audience of the Business School, with slogans like “How a little madness can help grow your start-up: Lessons from the shopping centre!” or “Using classical music to fuel the insomniac organization: Top tips from Manchester Business School”. Indeed, as Sørensen notes in passing (2003, p.50) “neoliberals everywhere are targeting non-commodifiable knowledge.” However, this thesis will leave this issue open and unanswered, not because it is non-commodifiable (because it is), instead asking the reader only what they would like “Business School scholarship” to be, both in terms of the questions of philosophy and their conveyance via a metaphysics of identity. For indeed, any question of what a concept “is” can immediately be linked to a corporate question of how it can be used to enhance profitability, all of this mandating that a dictionary or some similar source of linguistic authority should be provided.

A meaningful connection can be made here to the questions of “What is the shopping centre, and how can the works of Gilles Deleuze help us to understand it ethnographically?” with which we began this work. The ontological question of “is” being one rooted in a metaphysic of being and concerned with identity and stasis rather than difference. As such the position that this thesis has tried to carve out is less one where and when we develop the concepts to consider the capitalisms of the shopping centre and thus address, in even the most basic terms, the question of what it “is” and more one that considers what it can do, that is to say, Deleuze’s metaphysic prompts a refiguration of the central question of the thesis. Indeed, one might argue that the relevance of this thesis, and its “contribution to knowledge”, lies not in its answer to this question but to the ways in which it has prompted the reconsideration of the other “key terms” of this question: “ethnographically” through its experimentation with text and the question of how one writes an ethnography and “shopping centre” through the
ethnography itself and thus the tracing of a line of becoming which is distributed and disturbed along different spaces and times.

If we follow the implications of this, we recall that throughout this text, allusions have been made to the fact that the shopping centre straddles a line between producing and reproducing the phenomena of the social fabric; a machine locked into a Klein bottle-esque production process, with no clear beginning or end, only a single surface through which the ethnographer might thread a line. It is beyond the scope of this work to trace this process in detail by, for example, following the conceptual personae beyond what spaces and times are thought to correspond to the shopping centre but we still note that one might watch the schizo wander through the high street, see the paramnesiac at the airport, follow the line through the laboratory or the classroom etc. The concepts and their processes do not stop and wave goodbye as one wanders out of the glass doors of the shopping centre. They populate the entirety of the social fabric, always producing new functions and connections. In coming to rest in the shopping centre they are re-produced there, recreated anew each morning as the top of the high glass dome catches the sunlight and the security gates open in order to let in the thousands of people who will make the shopping centre a home for the day.

It is via the “uncontainability” of these conceptual personae that we can see the capitalism of the shopping centre at work. We say capitalism because while there is an economy at work, trading in money to facilitate the exchange of goods and services and reliant upon the private ownership of wealth in order to generate profit, there are other forms of economy in the shopping centre. Not merely the gift economies and other informal networks which were beyond the scope of this inquiry and have been covered comprehensively in anthropological cannon (see Skyes, 2005), but economies of thought. Indeed, in the logic of oikos-nomos, there is a management of the thoughts of the house which takes place, not from a manag(er) or source of author(ity) but across the entire social
milieu of which the shopping centre is part. Whether we describe this milieu as Deleuze and Guattari do in Anti-Oedipus as “the socius”, or as they do in A Thousand Plateaus as “the social field” or even if, following Jameson (1991), we call it late-capitalism, it is irrelevant to the fact that the shopping centre produces and reflects schizoid, disembodied, insomniac, paramnesiac and subjectivised tendencies in and of the broader system of which it is a part and these come to be the conditions of the possibility of thought which in themselves become the limit conditions by which we experience the social. The blurring of experience, the questions of lines of the body, the obsession over time, the warping of perceptions of space and the fracturing of the subject itself, are all as reflective as they are productive of the shopping centre and the contemporary milieu of the social. This cyclical relationship is noted by Deleuze and Guattari (AO, p.303):

“Capitalism is constructed on the ruins of the territorial and the despotic, the mythic and the tragic representations, but it re-establishes them in its own service and in another form, as images of capital.”

The shopping centre thus reveals itself to be the image of capital par excellance, forever rendering in its own service whatever representations and ruins it finds across the social field, producing some and exacerbating others (though the question of which is which will perhaps always remain unanswered, for it is never clear from where one comes). While reading the shopping centre as an “image of capital” might seem common place amongst those who describe shopping centres as the “secular cathedrals of the late twentieth century, dedicated to the twin gods of commerce and profit,” (Gardner and Sheppard, 1989. p.97), as we have suggested throughout this work, such a reading is too simple and based on little more than generalization of the shopping centre as yet another homogenous, banal, advertising-littered, managed landscape in the periphery of the contemporary city. Through experimenting with
concepts in the field, we have tried to suggest the shopping centre as something in excess of this.

So, what becomes the shopping centre? The concepts which we have built in dialogue with those of Gilles Deleuze have given us the means to sketch out a project at the limits of ethnography through the construction of a language via which the shopping centre might be sketched in an open diagram. It becomes a space and time of madness and play; where the schizo walks, the body pursues its own lines, the insomniac counts, the paramnesiac remembers and the subject, no longer useful in its stories, can finally be let go; a relic of the madness of the past.
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