The distinction between Horace’s two Books of Satires: how is this gap justified?

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Abstract

Starting from the differences between the two Books of Horace’s *Satires*, the present dissertation focuses on featuring Horace’s evolution as a satirist moving from the first to the second Book. Chapter 1 touches on the city-country contrast with the purpose of investigating why and how Horace relocates satire to the countryside. This is a way for the satirist to challenge maybe the most recognisable quality of his genre, i.e. *urbanitas*. The father-figures who approach Horace aiming to “educate” him are discussed in Chapter 2. The protagonists of the second Book assign themselves the role of the mentor, both for morals and satiric poetry. In his turn, Horace represents his persona as a passive figure and a target, uttering no criticism even when verbally attacked. This is a new didactic method, a method that does not rely on the moralist’s instruction, but leaves more work for the reader to do in judging right from wrong.
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INTRODUCTION

Project Overview – Methodology

The differences in form - and this includes both the outward form of each Book taken as a whole, i.e. its size, and the narrative techniques employed in the individual poems within the Books-, in content and tone between the two Books of Horace’s Satires, visible even to the naked eye, are the trigger for the present dissertation. Starting from these differences, our dissertation focuses on featuring Horace’s evolution as a satirist moving from the first to the second Book. Chapter 1 touches on the common city-country polarity, arguing for the importance of perceiving Horace’s withdrawal to the countryside as a transformation of the satiric genre. The “fathers” of Horace: the biological father, the social “father” Maecenas, and, following after them, the father-figures of Book II who approach Horace aiming to “educate” him are discussed in Chapter 2. Designed to follow Horace’s route from dependence to independence, the second chapter attempts to establish a relationship between multiple voices and modes of teaching.

For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to give a brief panorama of the much-discussed differences between Satires I and II, before going on to examine the possible aitition. On the very simplest level, when we speak about the length of the Books, we have a noticeable inequality: the first Book contains 10

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1 We cannot hope to do justice to the topic ‘Lucilius’ within the ambit of the present work, but a few observations will not be out of place.
2 The truth, however, is that the unequal length is merely an illusive disparity. Sharland (2010) 1-2 n.1: in fact, the second Book is longer than the first (Book I is 1,030, at most 1,038 lines long if one adds the possibly spurious lines at the start of Satire 1.10, while Book II is 1,083 lines long). But while Satires Book II is actually longer than Satires Book I, on average its individual satires are shorter, the difference being made up by the monster Satire 2.3 which is 326 lines long. See also Gowers (1993a) 178: Book II is characterised by an unexpected shortness (“only eight poems, though 2.3 is long enough for three poems”); Oliensis (1998) 61: “The second book of satires may shortchange us, offering a mere eight satires instead of the ten we might have expected. But the missing satires are in a certain sense included all the same, rolled into the grand finale of Satires 2.8”.

7
poems, whereas the second only 8. In comparing the form of the poems contained in the two Books, we notice a monologue versus dramatic dialogue issue. Horace as “satiric speaker” disappears in his second Book of *Satires*: he leaves the satiric scene to a series of “experts”, taking himself the role of the listener. The preaching-as-monologue diminishes, and, as a result, the didactic power of the second Book is called into question. The replacement of the first-person singular by layers of voices cannot but have an effect on style too: the style of Book II is distancing. As regards the difference in content, there is in Book II a clear preference for moral subjects, and a pervasive interest in food. The difference of tone is distinct: while Book I is coarse and acrimonious, Book II is moderate. But we need not labour the point here.

The introspective orientation of the second Book - the label “walled garden” given to it by Rudd is characteristic-, the overt concentration on philosophy, and the preoccupation with new topics, indeed, signify a change. It is our contention in this dissertation that fear was not a significant factor in Horace’s change of policy. An important follow-up question then is: if not politics, what drives Horace to yearn for independence? The task demands that we escape the fallacy of autobiography, so what we propose is instead a textually-based approach that will allow us to prove that Horace the satirist had many more reasons to claim his individuality than Horace the Roman citizen. In a nutshell, an alternative way to see the shift from *Satires* I to II is one that regards the text as a dynamic literary entity with history and progress. The issue is better addressed if one sets it within the framework of the (re)definition of the satiric genre itself, namely if one thinks of the movement as a growing understanding of the genre.

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5 Generally on food in the *Satires*, see the instructive work of Gowers (1993a).
6 The commentaries on the *Satires* contain preliminary sections where the differences between the two Books are discussed, see selectively: Palmer (1971), Rudd (1966), Gowers (2012), Muecke (1997).
7 Rudd (1966) 131.
9 Satire 2.1 is then interestingly transitional, to the point that it recapitulates discussions on the generic model, and that it lays the foundations for the new Horatian satiric product.
The question of why Horace clears his satire of its aggressive hallmark, turning it into a quiet, unthreateningly-sound moral discourse, is, we think, wise to be answered by means of intratextual evidence.

The new age, having been above all poetically uncharted, called for a change. Besides, it would have been truly surprising to see an unaltered version of satire even if the political conditions had remained stable. At any rate, already at the outset of his second Book, Horace refuses to vacate the position of the satirist - he seems determined to write satire whatever the outcome of his life. After the first endeavours in Book I, what Horace needed, we think, was to break free from the traditional satiric manner, and, as such, to leave his personal fingerprint on one of the most controversial literary genres. For our purposes, the passages that are often deemed historically reliable are going to be reconsidered in their thematic contexts. We have chosen to organise this study around two axes: the city-country contrast and the father-figures. Upon setting out to tackle two major questions: a) how does the withdrawal to the country affect the satiric material and diction?, b) how does the bond between Horace and his “fathers” change as we move to the second Book?, we will realise that poetological symbolisms are hidden under the mantle of literal or first-level interpretations; that at closer examination, the aforementioned pivots bring out the inner meaning of *Satires* II.

*Moving from Satires I to Satires II: Previous discussions*

Even though it is widely accepted that Book II takes new directions in formal structure and theme, the *why* has been a matter of endless controversy among the scholars. For depending on whether the emphasis falls on the world that exists independently outside the text, or on the world created by and for the text itself, the reason/s for which Horace decided to modify his material and diction is/are understood differently. The first Book of the *Satires* was published about the year 35 B.C; the second Book about five years later. From the more traditional historical-autobiographical perspective, the shifts in both form and
content are considered the necessary consequence of the uncertain times of the late 30s, and they are thereby imputed to political and social factors. The core claim of this approach is that Satires II, being a product of its time, could not but accommodate itself to the restrictive conditions prevailing after Octavian’s final defeat of Antony. The scholars who favour such an extratextual view maintain that just after Actium, satire may have been less welcome to powerful patrons, and more disturbing to readers. Hence, they suppose that Horace, not wishing to fall into disfavour with the men of power, moderated his satiric style opting for a less abusive language and censorious tone. Another argument to the same purpose is that Horace passes the mantle of responsibility to his interlocutors, being afraid himself to accept the responsibility for what he says. By almost abandoning the satiric scene, with his voice being eclipsed by “others”, Horace is accused of handing over the position of authority he held earlier in Book I, with the intention of continuing as an inoffensive and harmless satirist. Apart from this self-cover up, the use of metaphors and symbols (Satires 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8), the replacement of an urban with a rustic setting (2.3 and 2.6), as well as the substitution of contemporary characters with mythological ones (2.5), and the many role reversals (Saturnalian Satires 2.3 and 2.7), all give a credibility boost to the impression that Horace’s desire was to hide himself. For this group of scholars, of course, the “transmuted” poems of Book II are rather a generic letdown.

Undertaking to challenge the theory that the Satires are apolitical, since they contain very few references to the events of recent history, or to the leading figures of their times, DuQuesnay counter-proposes a more “regime-friendly” interpretation. His emblematic work on the propaganda value of Book I reads the individual poems in relation to the political context in which they were written -he dates the historical context between the years 38-36 B.C., a period of power

\[11\] Contra Rudd (1966) 151-152. 
\[12\] All references are to Horace’s Satires unless otherwise specified. We have used Fairclough’s text and translations (LOEB Classical Library). 
\[13\] Equally negative is Fraenkel’s (1957) 137 remark: “the fact that Satire VII varies the theme of III and Satire VIII varies the theme of IV has still another significance. We can hardly avoid the conclusion that Horace, as he went on writing sermones, began to run short of suitable subjects and settings.”. 
\[14\] Keane (2006) 89.
struggles and military campaigns that provided an opportunity for Octavian to consolidate his power, and strengthen his reputation.\textsuperscript{15} As DuQuesnay suggests, it is hardly credible that amid such “mobilisation”, Maecenas -in his capacity as a close friend and adviser- would not have tried to meet Octavian’s need for public support, in recruiting a number of poets to celebrate his glories. By the same token, he finds it difficult to believe that Horace’s work could have been irrelevant to the preoccupations of the new political system, and that the satirist himself could have remained completely aloof from them.\textsuperscript{16} Viewed in this light, \textit{Satires} I, is, in effect, turned into a vehicle for supporting the contemporary Octavian propaganda war; a way for Horace to pay Maecenas back for his patronage. Even though DuQuesnay denies that Horace overtly praises Octavian, his triumphs, and his policies, he does accept that “His basic strategy is to present an attractive image of himself and his friends as sophisticated, cultured and intelligent men who are humane in their attitudes to others and mindful of the \textit{mos maiorum}.”\textsuperscript{17} Book I is thus thought to include -other than flattering comments for the influential friends- \textit{mutatis mutandis} some verbal attacks on political targets.\textsuperscript{18}

Another question that arises from this very discussion is why Horace chose satire as the appropriate means for him to express himself, and to communicate the wants of his coterie. In an attempt to explain Satire 1.10.40ff., where Horace justifies his decision to write satire, DuQuesnay discredits the claim that the satirist took up this genre simply because this was the only available; he instead takes the passage to mean that Horace cultivated satire because he felt that the other genres were already well treated by his friends. In the new era, nevertheless, satire could not perform the role it previously had in the hands of Lucilius. As a proponent of the Republican free speech, the satiric inventor, whose name was by Horace’s times synonymous with coarse humour and vituperation, was to be touched with caution under the new political order. While Horace endorses his predecessor’s boldness in some places, he is extremely

\textsuperscript{15} DuQuesnay (1984) 21-23 on the historical context of \textit{Satires} Book I.
\textsuperscript{16} DuQuesnay (1984) 23. For Horace as ‘\textit{amicus Maecenatis}’, see also pp.24-27.
\textsuperscript{17} DuQuesnay (1984) 19; for the full discussion, see DuQuesnay (1984) 19-20, 22-23, 24-27, 32-56.
\textsuperscript{18} Muecke (2007) 115; for the (re)reading of DuQuesnay’s view, see Muecke (2007) 115-116.
careful to distinguish the sort of abuse that has moral grounds from backbiting, which is merely designed to raise a laugh. By doing so, Horace intends not so much to criticise the practitioner, but to honour once again his powerful friends, who claimed to be champions of 

libertas. For in order to erase the stigma of the second Triumvirate being a tyranny, Horace fosters a more positive explanation for the Triumvirs’ attitude towards 

libertas. In DuQuesnay’s words: “His own redefinition of Lucilian 

libertas as something morally responsible invites the inference that the Triumvirs are opposed not to true 

libertas, which is traditional and responsible, but rather to licence, the irresponsible, malicious and divisive exercise of freedom...”. 19 Additionally, DuQuesnay reasons that Horace knew Lucilius’ close relationship with men of influence, as well as the latter’s membership in the ‘Scipionic Circle’; not any the less, the fact that he was likely to have been exploited for propaganda purposes by the Republican cause. 20

Scholars acknowledge that 

Satires I is a miniaturisation of Lucilius’ 

Satires, for it reproduces -albeit in a compressed version- the chaotic multiplicity of subject matter, and experiments with the aggressive model of the earlier satirist. On the other hand, 

Satires II seems prima facie to recede, adopting a more sophisticated and toned down pattern. The restrained character of the second Book is often attributed to the fact that παρρησία was no longer a prerogative in the aftermath of the collapse of 

Res publica, and the subsequent domination of Octavian. Freedom of speech and its constraints were concepts central to the satirists’ theoretical discussions about the role of satire, and to their practical exercise of social control. Horace, in particular, is well aware of the tension between the terms ‘libertas’ and ‘licentia’, that is between the freedom to speak the truth about society and to give offence, exploiting your moral superiority. His tactic, however, is deliberately enigmatic, as he revives the threat of 

licentia, in concerning himself continually with the limits of satire, in order to assert his exercise of 

libertas.

20 DuQuesnay (1984) 27-32. On the notion of 

libertas, see especially pp.29-31.
We witness the recurrence of the ‘free expression in poetry’ theme at Epistles 2.1.139-155, where the model of licit licence is traced back to ancient rustic festivities. But even within the festival frame, free speech has its rules: reciprocal insults, a manifestation of friendly playfulness, are censurable when turned into explicit savagery. In the passage that follows immediately after the discussion of the development of free speech from the old Italian spirit, Horace contrasts this primitive ribald abuse with the refinement that he associates with Greece (Epistles 2.1.156-161). Additionally, Horace’s claim to libertas is in tune with the method of Greek Old Comedy and with the witty criticism produced by the founder of Roman satire (Satire 1.4). Horace’s practice thus asserts his inheritance from these very poetic precedents, and while the poet proceeds to state modern stylistic criteria, we can safely assume that outspokenness is what he commends his literary ancestors for. Braund makes an interesting comment, in suggesting that “This need to claim a precedent from Greek literature for the exercise of free speech may reveal a lack of confidence about satire’s right to speak out in the old Italian way.” Nevertheless, the dynamic tension between the libertas-licentia pair, with its purely Italian flavour, and the Greek free speech-model is resolved through the motif of apologia. In Satire 2.1, the word exchange between Horace and Trebatius takes the form of a warning about the dangers of undue freedom of speech that is finally circumvented with a cunning self-justification on the part of the poet. In earlier programmatic satires, Horace had taken great pains to confute charges against him for being a malicious slanderer, by attributing his habit to his upbringing, and to the moral agenda of his genre. In 2.1 the satirist appeals to the precedent of Lucilius; to the fact that the latter’s deployment of free speech did not bring ill effects. In the evasion of the issue of offending people with his satire, Braund believes that Horace follows a pattern originated by Lucilius (frr.1000-1001, 1075, 1078, 1079-1080, 1085, 1086, 1088-1089 W). The inventor had become an emblem of outspokenness for later writers, but while Horace pretends to rework the idea of the dangers involved

in the exercise of free speech, he, at the same time, contrives ingenious ways to avoid being stigmatised as a menace to society.\textsuperscript{22}

To the anti-Lucilian character of Book II Keane adds the following words: “This new rhetorical structure of Horatian satire...bears little resemblance to the direct Lucilian mode of attack and mockery to which Horace and Trebatius refer in shorthand as the satirist’s work (2.1.21-23, 62-70).”\textsuperscript{23} In view of the fact that a legal consultation is positioned as a frame to \textit{Satires} II, Keane claims that the rest of the Book is a response to the problems outlined in the introduction.\textsuperscript{24} In her discussion about satire’s connection with violence, and its inescapable association with the world of law,\textsuperscript{25} she describes \textit{Satires} II as “a series of escape scenarios that allow the satirist to deflect the criticisms raised in 2.1”.\textsuperscript{26} The reality behind the “danger” brought up in Satire 2.1 is generally questioned on the grounds of the cheerful atmosphere of the piece, Keane nonetheless finds some seeds of truth in the otherwise confident prediction made by the poet at 2.1.59-60: \textit{dives, inops, Romae, seu foris ita iussisit, exsul, / quisquis erit vitae scribam color.} According to Oliensis, the line ‘Rich or poor, at Rome or in exile’ could be paraphrased ‘whether in Caesar’s favor or out of it’.\textsuperscript{27} Keane talks about an allusion to potential exile here, arguing that if Horace wanted to give just an alternative to Rome, he could use something like \textit{ruri} (i.e. ‘in the country’). The threat of legal prosecution that emerges in the introductory poem of the second Book manifests itself in an “exile-scenario” which, in Keane’s estimation, is actualised through Horace’s withdrawal from the urban scene, and the subsequent abandonment of the satirist’s traditional role.\textsuperscript{28} For Keane, the poems of Book II respond to an atmosphere of limitation; in her own words: “what looks superficially like a

\textsuperscript{22} My analysis here is much indebted to Braund (2004) 409-428.
\textsuperscript{23} Keane (2006) 89.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} The etymological link between satire and law stems from one of the meanings of the word \textit{satura} proposed by the grammarian Diomedes: \textit{alii autem dictam putant a lege satura, quae uno rogatu multa simul comprehendat, quod scilicet et satura carmine multa simul poemata comprehenduntur.} On the origins of the word \textit{satura}, see also Coffey (1989) 11-18.
\textsuperscript{26} Keane (2006) 89.
\textsuperscript{27} Oliensis (1998) 43-44.
\textsuperscript{28} Keane (2006) 89-90.
gesture of defiance indicates that Horace’s new program will be styled around possible limitations.”. 

And she further supports this view, stressing the fact that the poet executes his announced plan by taking on more marginal roles, and by scripting lectures from the mouths of other characters.

In the same vein of thought, Sharland argues that what informs the remainder of Book II is the major theme which comes out in Satire 2.1, namely the inconvenience that the satiric genre may cause under the new establishment. With Satire 2.2 - where Horace pretends to disclaim authority for his monologue- being the first step towards that direction, the poet proceeds with his satires not only assigning the moralising lectures to substitute speakers, but also reducing his own status to that of addressee, interlocutor, or even to that of target.

Scholars who endorse a view of the believability of the Horatian speaker that accords with what is called “return to history” may contend that we are dealing with a “historical” Horace. But however plausible and influential a historical study may be, it misses the substantial dichotomy between actual reality and the incidents chronicled in the poems; between the author and his satiric guise. Distortions of truth, deliberate omissions, comic falsifications and exaggerations are to be expected not only due to satire’s burlesque nature, but also due to Horace’s predisposition to find glaring faults. It is particularly revealing that Horace emerges complete, with a biography, a physical appearance, a moral and artistic character, but it is scientifically risky to found the assumption that Horace is ‘Horace’ on the “autobiographical” glimpses we are given. In short, to analyse a collection of poems taking their allegedly common mission as a given is, we think, at least an oversimplification that overlooks the specific nature of each piece, and does not allow bigger or smaller exceptions to exist. What is more, the politically-oriented surveys fail to recognise the scattered undercutting statements that run in parallel with the pose of flattery in the majority of the

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30 Ibid.
33 Keane (2002) 216: “The fabricated autobiographies of the satiric poet should not be discounted because of their historical invalidity, for they participate in the construction of the satirist figure, expanding it from a mere "mask" into a character with a history and experiences.”.
satires; something that contradicts the general sense that Horace’s poems obey extratextual laws. As we shall see in the main body of the dissertation, Horace, already in the first Book of Satires, had found the way to construct masks by dint of which he could shake off the burdens of his position. This is equally true of Book II, for although Horace participates in the Book’s world as a passive and marginalised actor, he is the one who retains the ultimate rhetorical control.

Horace or ‘Horace’?: autobiography, persona theories, and satiric masks

Horace makes his “autobiographical debut” in Satires I. Reminiscences about his life pervade the Book, but the reason/s for their appearance is/are not clear. Did Horace wish to write a kind of apopnemoneumata, following his forerunner Lucilius in this, or are these autobiographical elements ultimately “a superficial distraction from the real business of the poems: the putting into practice of literary and moral principles.”? The first advocates of the idea that Satires I is “Horace’s autobiography” were James Lonsdale and Samuel Lee, who considered the protagonist of the poems to be Horace himself, in his real body and soul. Since then, however, several either mutually exclusive or complementary theories have been propounded, and continue to be proposed, depending on where the arguments of each scholar are grounded. Historical-positive interpretations of the autobiographical and literary-negative ones are equally reasonable. For on the one hand, those who are circumspect about the accuracy of Horace’s accounts, argue that an autobiographical approach ignores the generic strategy behind the first-level message, and on the other hand, those committed to the idea that in

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34 Gowers (2003) 59, 59 n.19: this is the first of many different autobiographies Horace wrote in his different sets of poems: e.g. Odes 1.22, 2.7, 2.13, 2.19, 3.4; Epistles 1.1.1-27, 94-108, 1.7, 1.14 and 1.16 (on the Sabine farm), 1.20.20–28, 2.2.46–52.
35 Gowers (2003) 55: Gowers argues for a satiric convention inherited by Lucilius; 55 n.2: “Contra Harrison 1987, who argues that Horace was in fact rejecting Lucilian autobiographical satire in S. 2.1 when he referred to Lucilius laying out his whole life (32-34 omnis / … vita) like a votive tablet.”.
36 Ibid., 56.
37 Lonsdale and Lee (1874) 9.
*Satires* I we have a complete self-portrait, counter-argue that all the contradictions prove Horace’s personality no more fixed than any other real person’s.

If one considers a verdict on the fictionality of the *Satires*, having to choose between the possibilities of self-conscious invention, literal truth, and poetic falsehood (which allows a degree of historicity in real people, circumstances and events), one may not be able to distinguish literature from real life, or Horace the literary construct from Horace the historical figure. It is true that there must be some recognisable relationship between ‘Horace’ and Horace, but this is not to say that the autobiographical details should be taken at face value. The historical figure Q. Horatius Flaccus should be identified neither with the author Horace nor with the different satric personae that Horace usurps each time. There is a danger in treating the *Satires* as a collection of historical documents. The theory that the *Satires* are a medium for personal reflections, and that they should be regarded as pages of the poet’s diary has now gone, for it is hardly believable that such literary confessions are unmediated by generic, ideological or rhetorical conventions.

Gowers’ view reduces the fundamental divergence between genuine autobiography and poetic imagination, by bridging the gap between identity and *persona*. In tending to think of ‘autobiography’ as a “partial, generically, ideologically, and rhetorically determined justification of one’s life”, she proposes a moderate interpretation which moves from historicity to poetry. While Gowers admits that Horace’s satiric personality is artificially constructed, she cannot pass his historical existence by: he was a human with past and present in a particular time-period, a person who built important connections after some mishaps. For Gowers, the autobiographical elements are “soaked into the fabric of the whole book”; they are not just disjointed glimpses confined to certain parts of certain poems. Even so, however, Horace is not easy to catch. Gowers writes that “it is actually hard to get to know Horace through the poems if you do not

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39 My analysis is much indebted to the detailed discussion of Muecke (2007) 106-109, in which a well-developed bibliographical retrospection is also included.
know him already.”, for despite the illusion of authenticity created by these private revelations, Horace himself remains safely anonymous.\footnote{Gowers (2003) 59-60.} What Horace composes is rather an alternative life-story, an “anti-autobiography”, as Gowers calls it. He is eager to expose some of the most disarming and embarrassing details of his life, but he deliberately conceals some more discreditable ones, such as his involvement at Philippi, or his proscription by the Triumvirs. Throughout Book I, Horace’s standpoint is far from being influenced by the cliché that to write an autobiography means to advertise your singularity; he represents himself as a “nobody” on the edge of crowds, who needs to deflect every charge, and who owes explanations for every single move. Being faithful to the decorum of \textit{satire}, Horace fleshes his voice out with a grotesque body, vulnerable, sickly and lustful.\footnote{Ibid., 55-63.}

Freudenburg is yet another scholar who has realised that we are playing a losing game if we think we can “catch” the real Horace. For Freudenburg the rigid persona theory is not a solution either, as he insists that the downside of such an interpretative model is not so much the loss of the poet “himself”, but its over-use as a key to unlock the “truth” behind Horace’s role-playing. Freudenburg’s proposal is instead to see the written selves of Horace as rhetorically configured, as hovering between the ‘authentic’ and the ‘contrived’. With the intertextualist paradigms he offers, he shows that the life-details Horace gives us are deeply structured upon previous literary selves, pre-existing forms, remembered images, patterned words, and generic demands. An encultured auto is thus created, with the power to metamorphose itself to the needs of the moment, the poem, the book; one that at the same time can contain and not contain the life of the poet.\footnote{Freudenburg (2010) 271-284.}

Being in broad agreement with the view that the concept of a permanent, “real” Horatian self is elusive, Schlegel focuses on how an important element of Horace’s persona/ae is built around Horace’s remarks about the satiric progenitor. She is inclined to think that the actual historical Horace the writer had an ingenuous appreciation of Lucilius’ poetry, whereas the persona had rhetorical
and strategic reasons for representing Lucilius the way he does in the *Satires*. In short, Lucilius is enlisted in Horace’s satiric project only as a figure of contrast, against whom our poet can appear verbally and ethically moderate. Horace works hard to disparage Lucilius’ failings, and it is this very criticism that allows him to define his own agenda, and to convince his readers that his work has no choice but to avoid the bitter sting of the Lucilian precedent.\(^{45}\)

The *Satires* abound in realistic material -for it is the poet’s aim to invite trust, to project sincerity and candour-\(^{46}\) in much the same way as the speaker lends believability to the portrait of Horace “himself”. It is undeniable though that several inconsistent, ambiguous and floating characteristics mar Horace’s autoprospopography. It is not enough, we think, to claim that such an erratic profile makes Horace not much different from any other ordinary flesh-and-blood individual. Horace wears a variety of masks, and indeed, masks compatible with the message he wants to send each time. It is true that Horace performs disempowered and inferior roles, something that, as Plaza explains, is not at odds with the widespread principle of someone weak -but with more positive mental qualities- deriding a bigger and stronger target. The situation of the battle of low against high, which is typical in the field of mocking humour, presupposes thus that the satirist enlarges his object, or alternatively he artificially diminishes his own persona.\(^{47}\) Thus, by admitting his own flaws, Horace assumes the role of a reformed sinner, who has strong moral authority to ridicule malefactors.\(^{48}\)

Horace introduces himself as a man of poor birth, low social standing, less than handsome appearance, no great affluence, while some hints at a parasitic life close to Maecenas are also present.\(^{49}\) In creating his public “face”, Horace tells us

\(^{46}\) Freudenburg (1993) 5.
\(^{47}\) The humour used against the Roman satirist’s persona runs the gamut from ‘self-humour’ (a kind that tends to present the persona as being in full control of his presentation) to humour directed at the persona from beyond his horizon (that presents the satirist as overlooking ridiculous faults in himself, and so, as being vulnerable to derision from outside); see Plaza (2008) 167-171, and 189-221 for Horace’s satiric self-description.
\(^{48}\) For the whole discussion and corresponding examples, see Plaza (2008) 53-90.
\(^{49}\) Freudenburg (1993) 21-27: the self-parody touches even Horace’s aptitude for philosophy and his mission as a moral reformer. Internal contradictions prove that is difficult to take him at his word and regard him as a serious moralist.
a funny vignette, where disfigurement, caricature and degradation play an important part. This plan solves two problems at once: the humble persona is constructed to approximate closely to the self-deflating demands of the satiric genre.\textsuperscript{50} At the same time, in building a “self” -or parts of selves- that is far different from that of Lucilius, with his allegedly rich background -or, to be more accurate, with the portrait that Horace forms for Lucilius (something that is implied at Satire 1.6.58-59, 105)- our poet, he implies, “rides” in the footsteps of his literary predecessor, although starting from an awkward predicament; a stance that foreshadows a different route too.\textsuperscript{51}

The ‘I’ of Horace’s presence in the \textit{Satires} is a non-monolithic, non-concrete notion, and the poet often tries to reconcile irreconcilable positions.\textsuperscript{52} The Horatian \textit{ego} can, in different places, be understood as a first-person speaker, an ‘example’, a narrator of his personal experiences, a defender of his own social and literary position, a victimised interlocutor. Besides, the process of Horace trying to build up a realistic “historical” portrait is rather unorthodox, since the satirist starts to unfold “autobiographical information” concerning his birth, his education, his childhood, his relationship with his biological father and with his patron, his friendships, his private moments, and even his sex-life, without following a linear chronological/documentary order, or even a logic cohesion; discursive “snapshots”, like a jumbled life-story, appear at random throughout the two collections -flashbacks and past moments are mingled with present ones. The author stages his autobiographical entries into his poems as a theatrical

\textsuperscript{50} Muecke (2007) 109.

\textsuperscript{51} The image of Lucilius in \textit{Satires} I is that of a satirist fond of invective and coarse humour, open in the use of vulgarisms and Greek words, too prolix and bad a versifier. Horace takes his distance from Lucilius; more concerned to point out differences, he enumerates the poetic faults of the predecessor, while himself claims modification in style and focus. Against Lucilius’ outspokenness and his artistically unpolished output he sets his own disdain for publicity and his intention not to be harmful by ridiculing malefactors. Additionally, he makes \textit{brevitas} the dominant stylistic requirement for the modern satirist.

\textsuperscript{52} The disparity between the satires in which Horace justifies his satiric writing and those in which he proudly shows off his place in Maecenas’ circle is striking. Horace portrays himself as an advocate of moderation, whereas elsewhere -with a heavy dose of irony- he is a food-expert, an adulterer, a lustful person.
conundrum, the solution of which needs the sequence of the dramatic details to be built on one another so that the puzzle will be completed. The relationships between graphe and life, between persona and person, between literature and politics, and between poet and patron, questions that John Moles poses in Horace’s Epistles 1, can equally apply in retrospect to Satires II that have been traditionally regarded as the forerunner of Horace’s epistolographical work. In a direction similar to ours, to confute the view that in his second Book of Satires Horace is unable to speak for fear, Moles senses an ‘anti-Augustan’ air latent in the Epistles too. He detects signs of tension, ambiguity, and reservation in Horace’s attitudes both towards public life and towards Maecenases and Augustus; signs of tension which inform “a wide-ranging and radical debate about the pros and cons of engagement in, or withdrawal from, that public life.”. To paraphrase slightly Schlegel’s words, at every turn in the Satires the poet expresses a preference for silence. The anxiety that prompts the need for such verbal “drowning” is the lurking presence of an earlier aggressive satirist -and a corresponding satiric model- who, with his hostile pen, could attack and overwhelm his listeners. But Horace is not that kind of mischievous satirist; he is a man of few words, of low poetic output, and, as a son of a freedman, he is socially powerless and politically disengaged.

**The unique case of Satires II**

Freudenburg maintains that each of the Roman satirists who succeeded Lucilius was entering the “generic arena” with a pressure to pit his respective efforts against those of the primus inventor, hoping that ultimately his name could be subsumed in the history of the genre. Later satirists were thus engaging in an

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54 Moles (2009) 313: “No one still believes that the Epistles are ‘real letters’ and many stress the presence of motifs from the Satires, a linkage strengthened by their common status as sermones.”; for further bibliography on the link between Satires II and Epistles 1, see Moles (2009) 313 n.13.
endless shadowboxing with Lucilius, but still they were doomed to lose the battle against him; Horace, Persius, and Juvenal were not Lucilius, and they could not speak like Lucilius. Libertas, the hallmark of Lucilian satire, was an old perquisite lost together with Rome’s Republican identity. To be more specific, Horace’s contemporary reality made it impossible for him to exercise his predecessor’s freedom of speech. Muecke, explicating Freudenburg’s analysis, argues that the driving force behind Satires II is exactly this lack of freedom. The post-Actian poems of Book II, with all the restraints and lacks (of autobiography, invective, etc.), surprise the reader by “failing” to fit in the pattern set in Book I. As Freudenburg puts it, all the questions that necessarily arise when one compares the ways of the second Book with their memories of the first “are not problems that inhibit our understanding of the book [II] - obstacles to be removed to get at what it “means”- they are the point; they are the way it means.”\(^\text{57}\) To summarise Freudenburg’s view using his own words: Satires II “is no mere rehash of something already done. It is a separate, contrasting project that actually dwells on and makes the most of its not being quite the same as book I. Its most salient defining feature, in fact, the key to its relational identity, is the contrast with the first book.”\(^\text{58}\). In simple terms, the “totalitarian squeeze” that marks Satires II instead of being its impediment, becomes its secret of success.\(^\text{59}\)

The differences between the two Books of Horace’s Satires bring us to the central programmatic principles of the second Book. The dominance of the dialogue in Satires II is maybe the most intriguing turn. After its occasional use in the previous collection (especially in 1.9), the technique now finds its full development. Horace removes the mask of the first-person preacher for the adoption of an unexpected role: in almost every poem of the second Book, he lowers his satiric self to the level of a listener. Even worse, his persona is “doomed” to endure the moralising lectures of doctores inepti, would-be-experts, or incompetent speakers. It should be emphasised though that, even when the character Horace accepts the attacks against him without doing much in response,

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\(^{57}\) Freudenburg (2001) 73.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., 72-73.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 2-4, 71-82 (esp. pp.71-74). For the reception of Freudenburg, see Muecke (2007) 114-115.
Horace the author takes revenge by exposing the interlocutors’ foolishness and unsoundness of mind.\textsuperscript{60} Besides, the satirist’s loss of status in Book II is open to multiple interpretations. In the sense stressed by the historical reading, the satirist is left bare-handed. In another, textually-based sense, it is Horace that gives rhetorical power to his speakers and reduces his own, adopting himself a defensive posture; it is Horace that controls his role and orchestrates the whole process from behind the scenes,\textsuperscript{61} exhibiting his authority without loud cries. Although he is targeted, he remains present to witness his work.

Oliensis contends that in Satires II Horace retreats from the role of “satirist”, since he entrusts the bulk of his poems to other dramatic characters, speaking very little in propra persona. Oliensis allows that the three chief philosophisers of the Book (Ofellus, Damasippus, and Davus) share the common experience of having suffered a reversal of fortune, a diminution of status. And this is perhaps, in her estimation, why they seek comfort in philosophy, and most importantly, this is why they turn to satire to restore their self-esteem. For all the three interlocutors are given -at least temporarily- the licence to question Horace’s privilege to be the only voice.\textsuperscript{62} Horace’s success as a pedagogue-satirist lies in the progress made by his “students” in Book II. “Long past the stage of merely listening to lessons, the internal students of book 2 show that education can eventually destabilize the authority of the teacher.”, Keane writes.\textsuperscript{63} Analogous is the process that Horace follows as he entrenches his didactic sermo: while he starts as a Socrates, who as a teacher tries to guide depraved people towards the right path of the golden mean, he ends up as a Plato,\textsuperscript{64} inviting the readers to criticise the inadequate protagonists themselves.\textsuperscript{65}

The philosophical dimension of the dialogic form is yet another parameter that highlights the clear philosophical orientation of the whole Book II, as dialogue was indissolubly linked with the Greek philosophical teaching.

\textsuperscript{60} Anderson (1982) 42.
\textsuperscript{61} Keane (2006) 120.
\textsuperscript{63} Keane (2006) 120.
\textsuperscript{64} Fraenkel (1957) 136-137: the beginnings of Satires 2.2, 2.4 and 2.8 are meant to recall passages in famous dialogues of Plato.
\textsuperscript{65} Anderson (1982) 42-43, 46.
Admittedly, the broad moral tendency of the diatribe-mode, and the principle of moderation are elements to bring philosophical air to the first Book too, for the second Book, however, the philosophical turn constitutes a predominant feature.\textsuperscript{66} To return to Oliensis’ argument, “By situating his satirists as he does, Horace exposes satire for what it “really” is: not a disinterested revelation of timeless philosophical truths, but a consolation prize awarded to life’s losers.”\textsuperscript{67} The inclusion of philosophy -and especially of that part of ethics that can be understood to have contemporary significance-\textsuperscript{68} in the \textit{Satires} plays a decisive part.\textsuperscript{69} This is elucidated well by Muecke, who, quoting Knoche, writes that for Horace philosophy was “a means of grasping personal experience and using it to come to an understanding of the multi-faceted world and the human heart.”\textsuperscript{70}

Book II echoes sentiments of the satirist in Book I, now voiced by other protagonists. Even so however, in this Book, the poet is not to be identified with the diatribist of the first three satires of Book I, for \textit{Satires} II stages scenarios that in many ways parody their Book I counterparts. Moreover, from the urban engagement we move to the philosophical idea of seclusion -both topographical and poetic. Reciprocally-beneficial relationships give way to friendship, gossip to true conversation.

Go, lad, and quickly add these lines to my little second book.

\textsuperscript{66} Note that the problem of whether philosophy was a convenient topic prescribed by the genre itself, or was it an element of substance that gave the \textit{Satires} their unique character, finds no consensus.\textsuperscript{67} Oliensis (1998) 53.\textsuperscript{68} Muecke (2007) 109: one of Horace’s Roman models for the \textit{Satires} was Lucretius.\textsuperscript{69} See also Freudenburg (1993) 8-16: on the influence of Greek popular philosophy upon the Horatian persona of the diatribe satires.\textsuperscript{70} Muecke (2007) 117, 117 n.52.
THE CITY - COUNTRY CONTRAST

Introduction

The missing words in the title of this chapter are “as motive for writing satire”. The majority of Horace’s *Satires* involves the motif city vs. country, usually in the deep sense of exploring the ideological, philosophical and literary qualities of the two geographical landscapes by drawing a dividing line between them. In Book I we watch Horace travelling outside Rome (1.5), and taking strolls around the city (1.6, 1.9), struggling to create a place where to locate his own satire. Book II shows a change: *Satires* 2.3 and 2.6 are excellent examples of Horace’s attempt to redefine the urban identity of satire, and then to discover a new, rustic route.

The tension between city and country is a recurrent and central concern in the *Satires* of Horace. The first of many examples of the split between urban and rural life comes as early as in Satire 1.1. In his attack on *mempsimoiria*, the poet juxtaposes two opposing desires, the jurisconsult’s, who due to his urban responsibilities has praise for the farmers, with that of the farmer, who when dragged into town from the county to be a defendant in some legal case, cries that they only are happy who live in town (1.1.8–9). And Horace himself appears to be personally engaged with the city-country contrast. Throughout the *Satires*, the Horatian persona oscillates between his urban and rustic identity. Harrison is right to notice that while in Book I Horace is firmly located in Rome, in Book II we find him dividing his time between Rome and the Sabine estate.¹ The question then arises as to why this happens. Part of the answer, as we hope to show, is the role of the city and the role of the country as inspirations for Horace’s satiric poetry.

In its impersonal and atemporal version, the city-country contrast does more than denote a geographical, and thus literal, division. The dichotomy brings with it a set of complementary themes: the bustle, the transgressions, and the cares of the city are contrasted with the peace and relaxation the country promises; the

urban and the rural life are set against each other; the lifestyles paradigmatic of the two environments are characterised by anxiety and contemplation respectively; the inhabitants are likewise the embodiments of the qualities of their place. The use of the city-country contrast as a moral emblem is a common one: excess and materialism versus moderation and restraint, extravagant delights versus simple pleasures are only some of the many sides of the contrast.

*Satire and the City: satire as an ‘urban art’*

The question of why satire is so inextricably bound up with its urban surroundings has long shown up in scholarly discussions. The city is the natural locus for satire for two main reasons. First, the city provides fertile material for ridicule and attack; it is a place marked by countless mundane indignities: pretension, vain ambition, luxury, lust, moral corruption, deceit. The city is frequented by avaricious men, misers, prodigal sons, adulterers, pseudo-intellectuals, and self-important fools. This is where the deformed faces of depravity, stupidity, greed, and maliciousness with their full stomachs, their clinking moneybags, and all their luxurious possessions parade. Crime and scandal are exposed to view, making it difficult for someone-like the satirist-intolerant of the injustices of the urbs not to write satire. Second, the scene of the big city is always crowded and packed to the very point of bursting. Passers-by, businessmen, aspirant social climbers, fortune-tellers, peddlers of any kind throng the crossroads, the arterial spots and side streets, every corner, every meeting point. Everyone is on the move, some walk others rush; whatever their task is, the fact remains that the city is filled with all kinds of different individuals and miscellaneous groups of people. Satire could not have found a better chaotic canvas to project its -by definition- ‘stuffed’ nature onto.

Roman satire is routinely set in the big city; and this is not merely a standardised formula, but something of a necessity. The city provides a suitable setting for satire in no small part because the poet assigns himself the privileged

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2 The label “urban art” is given by Hodgart (1969) 129.
4 Ibid.
5 From its early beginnings, satire was linked to the city; see Muecke (2005) 36-37.
role of moral guide, teacher, healer who is concerned about the common health of the city. The city is rotten to the core, its dwellers are crooked, and their practices dishonest; all these act as stimuli. From this perspective, the satirist sees himself as performing a specifically urban function: he is socially-minded, and his frank criticism aiming to save his fellow-citizens from falling prey to their vanities is essentially a social service. So, living in the big city is a *conditio sine qua non* for a satirist seeking to observe and attack all kinds of follies and excesses around him. Walking along the busy arteries or crossroads, he is surrounded with potential subject matter. It is now that we understand the programmatic statements Horace makes for Lucilius, and later for himself: *quod sale multo / urbem defricuit* (1.10.3-4), *qui me commorit* (*melius non tangere, clamo*), *flebit et insignis tota cantabitur urbe* (2.1.45-46). Satire cannot exist outside the confines of the city, and the poet seems to have no other choice but to breathe the same vital urban air needed by his genre in order to keep living. Any attempt to remove the poet and with him satire from the city would result in disaster: no material readily available, lack of inspiration and motivation. For all its faults, the satirist cannot leave the city; he is “shackled by his very genre to a place he professes to despise”. If then leaving the city is an adynaton, as Ferriss-Hill suggests, how are we supposed to explain the satiric poet’s much-professed unhappiness with the city, which is in turn complemented with expressions of longing for the tranquillity and restfulness of the countryside?

Rome is so eminently suitable as a setting and object for satire because it is a great metropolis; a cosmopolitan place and the centre of power. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that every satiric depiction is a true reflection of contemporary life, and therefore that such a notorious crowd would be seen walking on the same streets all in one day. Hence, Braund argues that the satirists are likely to use the common technique of distortion, by suppressing and omitting the ordinary and uninteresting aspects of everyday life in the city, and by exaggerating the

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8 See Ferriss-Hill (2015) 45-61, on how Horace reworks the city-country polarity of Greek Old Comedy into his Roman genre.
colourful and fascinating aspects of it. Horace, in particular, seems to have chosen some of the less attractive aspects of city life to present, and to have omitted some of the most considerable advantages, e.g. the fact that it provides him with an audience that is learned, the opportunities for cultural edification, the enjoyment his intimacy with Maecenas brings. Notwithstanding his complaints, Horace’s attitude towards Rome is not uniformly negative. In Bond’s words: “in as complex a text as that provided by Horace’s Satires the dichotomy is not nearly as simple as town/bad and country/good”. As Harrison also points out, it is worth noting that “the dangerous luxury of the city has at least some attractions for Horace, as his slave Davus says in [2.7], which presents Horace with a number of home truths (2.7.28-32)”. By the same token, the country is not always unambiguously idyllic -cf. 2.7.118, where the threat of punishment accedes opera agro nona Sabino alludes to the hardships a rural slave has to deal with.

The most typical image of Rome that Horace gives us is that of place where superficial and antagonistic relationships prevail; of a place where everybody strives to win attention and to secure his place in the competitive field of social networking. On a more personal level, having accepted Maecenas’ friendship, Horace had to embrace obligations and social duties (ire necesse est, 2.6.26). Following his admission in the circle of the great patron, Horace could no longer live “unnoticed” in Rome, not least because he had become the butt of envy. It is likely that people were following him in order to take advantage from his position alongside Maecenas: some to get access to confidential information (2.6), and others to secure a direct introduction to Maecenas (1.9). We can imagine many potential social climbers waiting for the right opportunity or the right man to help them. In this regard, we can assume that the meeting with the pest was fortuitous only for Horace.

Although in the beginning of his satiric career Rome provided Horace plenty of material with which to fill in his tablets, the city gradually became a place of obligations, of dependence and fake affiliations. At Epistles 2.2.65-76,

11 Ibid., 42.
12 Bond (2001) 80.
Horace treats the theme of the inconveniences of city life, but this time the passage is full of poetic nuance. Worries and onerous duties is what blocks his inspiration in the city; ‘Do you think I can write verses at Rome amid all my cares and all my toils?’ Horace says, giving thus an explanation of why he cannot write poetry in Rome. But this is not exactly the case in Satires II, we think. As we hope to show later in this chapter, the satirist needed a different direction for his second Book, not so much because he was suffocated by socio-political demands, due to which he couldn’t find free moments to dedicate to writing, but because he wanted to forge a new satiric type in the countryside.

The Move to the Country (and towards Philosophy)

Just as the city comes to have particular associations in Horace, so also does the country. The country is the place where integrity, honesty, and rectitude can be found; where pure people live -if we can judge from the rural protagonists of Book II (Ofellus, Cervius, the country mouse). Especially in Book II, the country becomes a symbol of morality and truth. On a more personal level, Horace’s Sabine farm is connected with the opportunity for greater independence, while it also allows Horace moments of peace and contemplation to ponder over matters ‘of which it is harmful to be in ignorance’. And when we talk about otium-negotium, the moments in his rustic refuge enable Horace to recapture the leisure he once enjoyed within the city of Rome.

The moral superiority of country life over city life emerges as the backbone of Horace’s satiric transition. The city is condemned as corrupt and immoral, but the country provides a moral standard by which to measure this corruption and immorality. The polarity is even enhanced by the presentation of city life as dangerous, artificial, pretentious, competitive, self-centred, and the portrayal of country life as safe, calm, slow, and unselfish. For Horace, country

14 Braund (1989) 37-38. Many details in Horace’s Epistles 2.2.65-76 and Juvenal’s Satire 3 are maybe drawn from fragment 1145-1151W (Lactantius, Div. Instit., V, 9, 20: “Lucilius tenebrosam istam vitam circumscripere depinxit his versibus”), or lost parts of Lucilius.
is the place where better moral values can be found. In the country, he is insulated from the worries of city life. Escaping in a place remote from superficial and compulsory cares, the poet seeks for a philosophical haven. Contentment and satisfaction, sincerity, *otium*, true friendship, and freedom are the qualities which are located in the country.

Horace’s treatment of the country as a moral symbol is very likely to have been influenced by significant Stoic and Epicurean doctrines related to nature. Stoics famously claimed to live ‘in accordance with nature’, that is, according to virtue and the natural laws of reason, while Epicureans saw in the proper understanding of nature the key to felicity. The rural links of the Epicurean precept *lathe biosas* are also obvious: a quiet life of retirement and contemplation on all that is worthy of a wise man alike can be achieved only in the silence of the country. The choice between an Epicurean secret or unnoticed life and a life of public office is a dilemma set up already in *Satires* I, with Horace strongly favouring the former, especially as he moves to his second Book. Horace of *Satires* II, though integrated into the political elite of Rome, does not seem happy with his “entry into society”.

Freudenburg stresses that a type of levelling is essential to the satirist, as it gives him credibility. By this token, he argues that Horace knew that he must reject the status he so obviously enjoyed in Rome in favour of the simple offerings of his country estate.

As we aspire to show, Horace’s plan is to break free from the *urbanitas* which was interwoven with the satiric genre -at least to a certain degree- and to render the country the ideal setting for composing satiric poetry. But what is different in *Satires* II?

The stress on the importance of what can be described as the ‘didactic mode’, which Horace employs in *Epistles* I, is central to understanding the advisory tone of *Satires* II -and maybe to a lesser extent the instructions given in the diatribes of Book I-, the forerunner of Horace’s philosophical

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18 Morrison (2007) 112, 112 n. 31. In *Satires* II, Horace foreshadows the general atmosphere that is later captured in verses such as: *nec vixit male, qui natus moriensque fefellit* (Epistle 1.17.10); and *secretum iter et fallentis semita vitae* (Epistle 1.18.103) which is opposed to the *honos an dulce luellum* (Epistle 1.18.102).
20 Freudenburg (1993) 222.
epistolography.\textsuperscript{21} As in the \textit{Epistles},\textsuperscript{22} so in \textit{Satires} II, the main concern is with ethics, with how to behave correctly and morally.\textsuperscript{23} Differently enough from the discontinuous miscellany of \textit{Satires} I, \textit{Satires} II concentrate more clearly and more consistently on how one acts or behaves, teaching however in a style that is not overtly didactic. Leaving the authoritative manner of the diatribes behind, in his second Book, Horace is more careful in structuring a model that puts his persona in the position of the disciple, not of the preacher. There is little in the way of direct ethical instruction. Through Horace’s own “learning”, both the external and the internal addresses are thus exhorted to find real pleasure in the true joy of a simple meal, of friendship, and of a deep conversation concerning universal ethical questions; to find satisfaction in simplicity. The city and its luxury, pretention, and social obligations cannot increase one’s pleasure, or bring absence of pain. The spiritual peace is only to be found in the countryside, with its reserved men and its uncomplicated rules. While in the first Book of \textit{Satires} Horace was fiercer to denounce vices and to correct deviation from the moral norms, in his second Book, he includes a long parade of false ethical principles by which to live one’s life (wealth, luxury, ambition, eating to excess), only to reject them by means of bitter humour, irony, and sarcasm.

\textit{City and Country in Lucilius}

The ideological connotations of the opposing pair city-country had already been exploited by Horace’s generic ancestor, Lucilius. There are many fragments where one can find the theme of wastefulness in town compared with a rustic life of hardships (Book IV, Satire I); luxury of various forms contrasted with the simplicity of country-life - on the antithesis table - luxury in town ≠ coarse food in the country, in particular, (Book V, Satire II and Book XIII, Satire I); a restful life in Rome as opposed to a life embroiled in political affairs (Book XIV, Satire I); the riches and troubles of town-life contrasted with the simple everyday concerns of country-life (Book XVI).

\textsuperscript{21} For the function of the ‘didactic mode’ in \textit{Epistles} I, see Morrison (2007) 107-111.
\textsuperscript{22} Morrison (2007) 116.
\textsuperscript{23} For Socrates’ important influence especially on Horace’s \textit{Epistles}, see Morrison (2007) 116-117, 129, together with the bibliography he quotes.
A more elaborate example occurs in fragments 636-7 W (= 676 and 677 M), in which Lucilius represents his satiric persona as if it was about to depart from Rome. Lucilius, as other Roman gentlemen did, hastens to leave the big city in order to avoid the crowd that was going to gather on the occasion of a show of gladiators (organised by the Metelli family in 131 B.C.). On occasions like this, intellectual men would retire to the country, lest they should get annoyed at the bustle of the big city.

So far as we can judge in the fragmentary state of our knowledge, nothing in the use of the terms ‘city’ and ‘country’ can be understood as a Lucilian poetic declaration. Lucilius is preoccupied with thoughts of discoursing on a morally-grounded plain living. For him, the city and country are the necessary surfaces on which two different lifestyles can be reflected. On the other hand, Horace follows this model, but at the same time he goes one step further. Lucilius treats the city - country diptych satirically, exploiting its philosophical character, whereas in Horace the diptych is given poetological dimensions too - of course, alongside philosophical ones. For Horace after all, Lucilius is an urbanus poet.

Satire 1.5 and the Second Book of Satires

In her paper “Horace’s Journey through Arcadia”, Welch explores how 1.5 reworks Virgil’s Eclogues, and behind this, how the Epicurean tenets of friendship and παρρησία (here meaning ‘frank speaking among friends’), and the Lucilian precedent are interwoven into Horace’s “personal” narrative - the intertexts are so shaped that they fit in the new political realities of the 30s B.C.E. As Welch explains, offering vis-à-vis examples - note for instance the difference between Horace’s spending the night in the Pomptine marshes in 1.5,

24 This satire is perhaps an imaginary discourse of a friend on meeting Lucilius when the poet was leaving Rome. In this poem Lucilius seems to have expressed his opinions on marriage.
25 On the bustle of the fora, see also fr.1145-51 W and fr.1152 W.
27 According to Welch (2008), the intertextual nexus which informs 1.5 includes Homeric, Philodemian, Lucretian, Lucilian and Virgilian topics / passages.
suffused with an exchange of insults between slaves and sailors, a wet dream, sleeplessness forced by bugs and frogs, and, on the other hand, the pleasant shade (*umbrae*), the moments of leisure, the songs and, in short, the *ataraxia* of the *Eclogues*. In many ways, 1.5 inverts the serene atmosphere of Virgilian pastoral. In violently replacing Virgil’s *locus amoenus* with a *locus satiricus*, Horace aims to temper the former’s optimism, and to reopen the question of pastoral’s escapism. If satire casts a critical eye on the bucolic countryside, and indeed under the Triumvirate, it does so to test the relationship between involvement and avoidance; between active participation and ‘abhorrence of the forum and the city altogether’ (Quintilian *Inst. 10.1.55*). So, Welch imagines that Horace was pondering over the following dilemmas: How does pure Epicureanism fit into the system of Roman values? Can the Epicurean pleasures coexist with the real world, or must they run from it? Should poetry—in our case, *satire*—be engaged in or should it struggle to escape from such a political and cultural milieu?

Most pertinent for our purposes perhaps, is Welch’s concluding remark that “the Journey to Brundisium offers a glimpse of a better world that *might* take hold, were but honest friendship and thoughtful literature the rule rather than the exception.”. However, when she later goes on to suggest that Horace, and together with him we, his readers, stop some miles from the final destination of the journey, she probably ignores *Satires*’ II turn towards the country. Even though one could agree that Horace fails to get to the idealised Arcadia in 1.5—if one reads the poem on its own—, one could place more value on the poem once one sees it as the forerunner of the country-centred pieces we encounter in Book II; as the first in a series of Horace’s endeavours to flee from Rome. When read with an ear alert to the following Book, the questionable ending of 1.5 thus serves, among other things, to prepare Horace to seek for an alternative, non-urban setting to relocate his *satire*.

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28 For further examples, see Welch (2008) 54-57.
29 “Pastoral is often seen as an escapist genre, “an unfulfillable longing for a simpler life” that “thrives on a series of removes from reality”, set in “a pretty, fictional world into which one may escape from the real world now and then in imagination. It is not a program of reform or conversion of that world”,” see Welch (2008) 57-58, who draws from Betensky (1976) 4, Putnam (1995-1996) 310, and Coleman (1977) 1 respectively.
31 Ibid., 70.
32 Ibid., 70-71.
Since 1.5 anticipates several of the most important developments in the second Book of *Satires*, it is important to begin our examination of Horace’s changing satiric personality by examining it in more detail in the next section.

**Egressum magna Roma: a journey out of Rome (Satire 1.5)**

Although altogether different in kind from the other poems of *Satires* I, 1.5 holds the central position in the Book: it follows after the theoretically prescriptive 1.4,\(^{33}\) and it comes before the “autobiographical” 1.6. It is no wonder that in a travel-poem, the distinction between city and country is dramatised vividly, since, as Gowers puts it, 1.5 “comes as a breath of fresh air: Horace escapes from Rome on to the open road…”.\(^{34}\) But even if the poem does not convey a literal account of a journey that really happened,\(^{35}\) it does not cease to be considered a “journey” nonetheless; and we mean a literary “journey”, for on the one hand, 1.5 is part of a literary tradition of travel-writing, and on the other hand, it is a practical display of the poetic theory laid out in the antecedent 1.4 -as we shall see below.\(^{36}\)

However frustrating this may be for anyone in search of historical verisimilitude,\(^ {37}\) the incidents chronicled in 1.5 can alternatively function as embodiments of the precepts of Horace’s satire. According to more recent interpretations, the poem is read as implementation of Horace’s satiric theory.\(^ {38}\) Far from being another contribution to the Octavian propaganda, 1.5 is a

\(^{33}\) Schlegel (2005) 59.

\(^{34}\) Gowers (1993b) 50.

\(^{35}\) Scholars have proposed that we talk about historical truth, ‘poetic fiction’, conflation of several historical events, ‘a simulation of a real adventure’ (Gowers 1993b, 50), or else about an imitation of Luciliius.

\(^{36}\) Thomas (2010) 259.

\(^{37}\) Musurillo (1955) 159-162: In this paper, three possible dramatic settings-dates are tested: i) The Pact of Brundisium (early October, 40. B.C.), ii) Maecenas’ mission to Athens (autumn/winter, 38 B.C.), iii) The Peace of Tarentum (early spring, 37 B.C.). In view of the historical evidence, the list of the delegates fits the first reconciliation, the actual route of the journey would suit Maecenas’ trip to Athens, and the season of the year would best fit in with the Peace of Tarentum. See also Gowers (1993) 49-50.

poetological piece that slices Book I in two, and it anticipates much of the semantic core of Book II. In her paper “Horace, *Satires* 1.5: An Inconsequential Journey”, Gowers explains convincingly how the poem constitutes an exercise in writing Horatian satire, for the journey “is a more literal version of all the tangled ramblings, the stops and starts, asides, resumptions and suspended endings that make up Horatian satire”. Following comparable analysis of relevant texts in which conversations and narratives are compared to travelling (Demetrius, *De elocutione* 47; Cicero, *De oratore* 2.234; Varro, *Periplous* 418; Rutilius Namatianus, 2.1-4 and 2.61-62), Gowers concludes that all the way through Horace is likewise playing on the parallels between talking and journeying.

What is substantial to our discussion on the poetological nature of 1.5 is its very last verse (*Brundisium longae finis chartaeque viaeque est*, 104). With this abrupt ending, Horace tells us that he just enclosed a ‘long journey’ in a ‘long story’. Even though a lengthy description would have been expected to cover a long journey, 1.5 is in fact the shortest poem in the Book so far. As Gowers observes, the last line of the poem looks like a contribution to the Callimachean debate about whether or not to measure poetry quantitatively. Within an all-inclusive sentence, thus, the poet sets out the value of *brevitas*, while at the same time he taunts indirectly his predecessor Lucilius with having a speedy writing and thereby a muddy output. 1.5, though supposedly irrelevant to the theme of literary criticism -similar to that found in the previous poem-, raises again the problematic relationship with the satiric forerunner through a direct comparison. Although Horace seems to follow precisely in his predecessor’s footsteps, in writing a journey-poem linked in its details with scattered fragments ascribed to

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39 Gowers (1993b) 50: “The journey is a milestone in Horace’s book: it marks the half-way point in his ‘Conversations’, *Sermones*, which until this point have been a series of unstructured, sceptical discussions on how to live life in the difficult world of modern Rome.”.

40 Ibid.

41 For the detailed development of the argumentation, see Gowers (1993b) 50-51.

42 Gowers (1993b) 60: “Such a prematurely short ending is both consistent with Horace’s other satires, where aside like *ne longum faciam* (1.3.137) – ‘to cut a long story short’ – signal instant breaking-off, and with this satire so far, which has been one long string of truncations and curtailments.”.

43 Note particularly Gowers’ comment: “On paper, it is in Horace’s power to make this journey just as long or as short as he chooses.” (Gowers 1993b, 52). See also Thomas (2010) 259: the wording *longae... chartae* is at odds with the actual length of 104 lines.

44 Gowers (1993b) 52. For the Callimachean nuances in Satire 1.5, see also Thomas (2010) 261 who argues that “the poem is indeed a miniature masterpiece, a Callimachean epyllion demonstrating all the poet’s attention to artistry and poetic elevation.”. See also Zetzel (2002) 43-44.
Lucilius’ third book,\textsuperscript{45} the route and the economy of his journey are quite different.\textsuperscript{46} Notwithstanding the metaphorical hazards of his own journey, namely “mud” and (verbal) pollution, Horace succeeds in cutting his account short, and making his long haul faster on paper.\textsuperscript{47}

At this point, we should leave aside Horace’s antagonism with Lucilius, in order to focus on what can be inferred about Horace’s satire itself. If we follow the poet’s description, we learn that in the first two days of the journey the pace was slow -whereas other travellers are more in a hurry (\textit{altius ac nos / praecinctis unum}; 1.5.5-6). Additionally, the fact that Horace mentions no modes of transport in these two days can possibly mean that as far as Appii Forum the company was walking. If this assumption is correct, then, Horace for the first time in Book I foreshadows one of the most important poetological statements of Book II, i.e. \textit{Musa pedestris} (2.6.17).\textsuperscript{48} “Walking is the natural pace for satire”,\textsuperscript{49} and this is exactly the reason why a walking start is appropriate here.\textsuperscript{50} In its own way, the journey, full of stops and asides, speed variations and change in means of transport, reflects the compositional essentials of the Horatian satire.

It is true that Horace never shifts his focus to the official purpose of the journey, or indeed to any purpose at all.\textsuperscript{51} He is not even interested in sightseeing,\textsuperscript{52} since his descriptions merely associate the geographical points with the

\textsuperscript{45} Porphyrion: \textit{Lucilio hac satyra aemulatur Horatius}. The model was Lucilius’ \textit{Iter Siculum}. Gowers (1993b) 49: “The unsuccessful erotic encounter, the session of animal abuse and the grouses about the journey itself have all been linked with scattered fragments ascribed to Lucilius’ third book.”. Cf. Rudd (1966) 54-56: the scholar accepts that the Lucilian work appealed to Horace in both conception and tone, but he denies a literary dependence; he does not believe that Horace invented any episode either to provide a literary allusion or to invite stylistic comparisons.

\textsuperscript{46} Gowers (1993b) 49, 50; for the pun on the adjective \textit{Satyrienianus} (1.6.59), and Lucilius’ tie to the city of Tarentum, see also pg. 60. Gowers (2012) 184: “it is likely that Horace’s journey-poem was a conscious alternative to the equestrian Lucilius’ account… The longest surviving fragment of Lucilius’ poem (102-5W = 110-13M) suggests a leisurely approach to recording the ups and downs of travel.”.

\textsuperscript{47} Gowers (1993b) 52-53.

\textsuperscript{48} Gowers (2012) 184.

\textsuperscript{49} Gowers (1993b) 55.

\textsuperscript{50} Gowers (1993b) 56: Even when Horace appeals to the epic muse in the case of the duel between two buffoons (Satire 1.5.53), this is, in fact, the pedestrian muse in disguise. See also Schlegel (2005) 70-71: “The narrator mocks himself when he invokes the muse in his epic introduction of the clownish entertainment”.

\textsuperscript{51} Schlegel (2005) 59.

\textsuperscript{52} Gowers (2012) 182.
pleasures or adversities that their visitors meet. From the poetological angle, moving away from Rome, Horace has the opportunity to rediscover the unpretentious “Italian vinegar” (cf. *Italo perfusus aceto*, 1.7.32), the traces of the Italians’ old native wit. Gross language and humble laughter were only to be found in rustic environment. Denying the world of public affairs, the poet turns to himself, and fashions a piece that is entirely an account of personal experience. Amid buffoonery and conflicts, Horace gives up the satirist’s badges, i.e. the invective and harsh voice; he now acts as an ego-narrator whose greatest pleasure lies in the harmony found in friendship. The fact that no secret information concerning the diplomatic mission is leaked out can be attributed to Horace’s discretion. Far from being a niger satirist -as his rivals had blamed him for in the antecedent poem-, he now demonstrates in practice how unthreatening he is. Furthermore, Horace’s physical-corporeal weakness, and the low-status protagonists of the poem -acting as “alternate Horace-figures”- all contribute to build a laughable persona that by no means incites fear. Despite the fact that several details of the journey echo episodes in the Lucilian model, Horace is at pains to avoid the outspokenness and bitterness he as a rule attributes to his satiric ancestor. Horace’s aim, as he tells it, is to write satire that does not do harm, and thereby his weapons are irony, parody -sometimes against his own persona- and innuendo.

The trip to the open road depicts above all Horace’s nostalgia to discover the native roots of the satiric genre. With the route plotting his life’s progress from S. Italy to Rome in reverse, the poet seeks to redress his family and literary country origins. At long last, Horace arrives to his final (literal and satiric)

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53 One noticeable exception is detected when the hills of Apulia come into view. The tone becomes sentimental, since the place holds memories of the poet’s boyhood.
55 For the combination of Roman urbanitas with the humour of rustic Italy, and the blend of simplicity and sophistication, see Rudd (1966) 61-63.
56 Schlegel (2005) 60.
57 Perhaps the best parallel passages are 2.6.42-46 and 2.6.57-58, where Horace (prudishly) pretends that his relationship with his patron is mostly private, and it does not give him access to state secrets. See also Musurillo (1955) 162: “from Maecenas’ point of view, the prudent use of fiction in such a delicate matter would be further proof, if any were needed, of how completely trustworthy Horace could be in connection with that more serious side of Maecenas’ life, his political relations with Octavian.”.
58 For the presentation of Horace as a faithful friend and as an unthreatening speaker, see Schlegel (2005) 61-76.
destination. His movement, however, is more volatile than we might have thought. In Gowers’ words, “Horace seems to have complete freedom of movement, but it is really as though he has been released on bail: at the end of the poem he must go back to Rome and face his civic responsibilities.”  

**Strolls around the city (Satire 1.6)**

Horace’s transition from Venusia to Rome was a turning point in his early life. The poor boy from the countryside has come so far as the big city in order to receive education of advanced level, and to have better opportunities. Before his school-masters, the person who educated Horace in mind was his biological father, who believed in the intrinsic value of moral training. In 1.4, the poet confesses that his father bequeathed a habit of thought to him that is, essentially, interposed as a reflection on the satirists’ practice of collecting material for his poems. In order to safeguard his son’s reputation, the father was labelling several vices by contemporary *exempla*. ‘With words like these would he mould my boyhood’ (*sic me / formabat puerum dictis*, 1.4.120-121) Horace says, but he obscures the dramatic setting of these “important lessons”. Admittedly, at this point of the text it is not clear whether the father-son company was walking through the streets of Rome -where all kinds of follies abound- or whether the two were at their native land, and the teaching process had been completed ahead of their arrival in Rome.  

Perhaps the best poem to read alongside 1.4 is the complementary 1.6. The indication of age, *puer*, (1.6.76), together with the word *ludum* (= school where elementary literacy and numeracy were taught) (1.6.72), are likely to signpost that Horace left Venusia at an early age. The poet later continues, telling: ‘He [=my father] himself, a guardian true and tried, went with me among all my teachers…He kept me chaste – free not only from every deed of shame, but from all scandal.’ (1.6.81-84). From the parallel reading of these quasi-(auto)biographical Satires, one may thereby draw the inference that Horace depicts his persona growing up in the big city.

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60 Gowers (1993b) 61.
61 Note Gowers’ (2012) 238 comment: “a surprise: we might have expected Horace’s father to educate him at home on the farm”.
Even more significant than the “(auto)biographical” detail about Horace having reached manhood in Rome is the fact that the place where Horace was “taught” to be a satirist was Rome too. If our analysis above is correct, then the moral teachings of the biological father were prompted by urban corruption, and the various examples which he finger-pointed were drawn by debauched Roman people. Given that the corruption described is incompatible with the moral values of the country -those that Horace will spotlight in Satires II-, it is hard to believe that Venusia was the geographical frame here, or that Horace was able to acquire so deep a knowledge at such an early stage of his childhood. A (big) city is where one may expect to find the seeds of satire. As a literary genre that, by definition, travels on foot, observing what happens at street-level, at crossroads, and busy places, satire is well-situated in Rome. However, something that will become clear below in the chapter- Horace is very careful to locate only his pre-mature experiment with the satiric genre in the city of Rome. As we shall see later, the climax of this progress from urbanitas to rusticitas, and from venture to literary maturity comes at 2.6, where we find the poet contemplating a new type of satire.

In much the same way as his parent did it, Horace keeps decrying all the deviated behaviours that deserve a good lambasting. This self-improving and satirically efficient mechanism still accompanies Horace’s adult life in the city. As opposed to the praise of the biological father though, the poetry that was inaugurated by this very irreproachable character is not given prominence. Of course, owing to his defensive profile, the poet cannot portray himself as a satirist with robust voice. In both 1.4 and 1.6, the act of writing satiric poetry is presented as a leisure activity and as a private, almost secret, procedure; while its end product is rather random (1.4.137-139; 1.6.122-123).

What is of paramount importance in our discussion is the type of satire this invented generic ancestor, i.e. the biological father, inspires. Judging from the content of his moral advice, one could not fail to realise that such a concern for moral purity would dictate a more ethical-philosophical model of satire. In other words, the moralising tendency is revealed to be something more than a traditional style of education based on elementary ethics. The biological father,

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63 Oliensis (1998) 39: It is important to note that the conclusion of Satire 1.6 relegates Horace’s writing life to the “slenderest interstices of his day”.

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supplanting the real satiric inventor, acts as an alternative mentor, who recommends a turn to great philosophical issues. Thus, the budding satirist starts his satiric career by reproving wrongdoings and branding malefactors. Along the way however, he realised that the efficacy of such a pattern had already worn down, and that a new model ought to become synonymous with the Horatian “satiric print”. The philosophical turn, and by implication the biological father’s literary influence, is apparent in Book II, where Horace, after having experienced what imitation and allusivity mean -following the Lucilian path in Book I-, is mature enough to make innovations in the satiric genre. Still, Horace’s stilus does not cease to be caustic, but now it works in a way to allow him to express his criticism by means not of wounding burlesque, but of Socratic irony.

Let us now discuss the voyage-like part of 1.6. At the end of 1.6 we watch the poet taking a lonely stroll through the streets of downtown Rome (Quacumque libido est, / incedo solus;64, 111-112), where satire routinely happens, but, in fact, the scene he paints is anything but “stuffed” and crowded.65 When Horace gives an account of a day in his life, he wishes to spell out that he is located in the city. By mentioning the Circus Maximus and the Forum, the poet points to the heart of Rome. Nevertheless, it can be no coincidence that Horace chooses to walk around the streets of Rome in the evening (fallacem Circum vespertinumque pererro / saepe Forum; 1.6.113-114). The usual time for financial affairs to be conducted and politics to be debated at the arterial spots of the city was an early morning hour. But Horace “makes his entrance” after dusk, after satire’s crowds have left for the day, and the packed meeting points in Rome have been given over to marginal groups.66 At a late hour, the Forum, centre of business and political affairs, is converted into a place of otium.67 Enhancing this impression of leisure, Horace implies that his evening stroll has hardly a purpose.68 His concern is limited; he only fancies asking the price of greens, and listening to the fortune-tellers and the like, who used the stalls in the outer wall of the Circus Maximus. Therefore, Horace neither gets involved in transactions of any kind nor does he

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64 For the implications of the word ‘solus’ in this passage, see Freudenburg (2001) 61-62, and Oliensis (1998) 36.
66 Ibid., 62.
68 Oliensis (1998) 35: “In stark contrast to the single-minded determination of men bent on “going places”… Horace’s leisurely stroll has no master plot.”.
mingle with prominent personalities; on the contrary, he visits unofficial places, where he encounters unimportant people.\(^69\)

As Freudenburg stresses, “the circus and forum are satire’s best place, where greed, ambition, and vanity parade about in a glorious, gaudy, daily show.”\(^70\) However, our satirist visits the city centre in the evening, when business and socialising are at an end; and he takes us into places where personalities are not huge, and incidents are not major. Besides, his seeming indifference towards what takes place next to him -if indeed, anything worthy to be mentioned happens- gives the impression that Horace is not there to ‘rub the city down with much salt’.\(^71\) In Freudenburg’s words, Horace’s “eye-view, and thus the perspective he treats us to, is that of someone arriving on “satire’s scene” too late”.\(^72\) Yet, one tends to follow a different approach if one cogitates upon what was it that an innovative satirist, like Horace, once aspired to reform. In the very space of Lucilian satire, Horace finds his own particular space; where he can travel the streets of urban satire without attending to the crowds of statesmen and noblemen. Keeping up with the conventions of his poetic genre, Horace creates a humble walk that is shaped through some kind of conversational interaction, but that is not restricted to the agenda of high society. Instead of presenting a midday in the city crowded exclusively by the elite, the poet sees the whole city as a stuffed farrago; as a mix of low and high, and he thus plays with the varied “ingredients” of his “urban recipe”.\(^73\)

Horace undertakes to shed light on the other face of Rome. Social outcasts and rejected individuals, who become the occasional protagonists of a smaller satire that is embedded in 1.6, are equally part of the great city. What is more, these very type-characters can be regarded as Horatian counterparts. Oliensis’ insightful observation that throughout this aimless day, Horace sees no one, or no

\(^{69}\) Oliensis (1998) 35.  
\(^{70}\) Freudenburg (2001) 62.  
\(^{71}\) Cf. the three diatribes of Book I, where Horace, as an ideal Lucili ritu satirist, discloses scandals and ridicules individuals; at the same time he leaves philosophical traces owing to the adoption of a genre that appertains to popular philosophy.  
\(^{72}\) Freudenburg (2001) 62.  
\(^{73}\) Freudenburg (2001) 63: “Clearly the feast of Lucilius was differently apportioned and arranged, “stuffed” with the forum at midday, and with political scandals, and noblemen’s names, and their outlandish feasts. But, for Horace, such spectacular ingredients are the greasy, bowel-clogging stuff of miserable ambition.”.
one he sees fit to name, merits mention;\textsuperscript{74} he is a nobody among nobodies.\textsuperscript{75} Undoubtedly, Horace owes the success of his satiric persona to the many scattered references concerning his humble origins, low social standing, and disavowal of political ambition.\textsuperscript{76} Even when in the city, Horace’s refuge is his home. He stays away from crowded places, and he shuns popular activities; he enjoys being alone and -as much as he can- released from business appointments or from any client-duty.

\textit{Ibam forte Via Sacra... (Satire 1.9)}

After the brief respite of 1.5, in 1.6 and 1.9 Horace returns to Rome. The comparable analysis of the city strolls described in these two poems promises to bring considerable results. The most noticeable difference between the two is that in the latter Satire Horace does not hide himself from the public gaze. In distinction from 1.6, the location in which the poet places his persona in 1.9 allows him to see and be seen.\textsuperscript{77} A walk along the Via Sacra, the main thoroughfare of Rome, vitiates almost every right to privacy. Horace presents himself as ambling into the heart of Rome “with his head in the clouds”.\textsuperscript{78} Even so however, in seeking refuge in trifling thoughts and in being wholly preoccupied with them (\textit{nescio quid meditans nugarum, totus in illis.}, 1.9.2), Horace the celebrity cannot find solitude. What is more, the walk along the oldest and most famous street in Rome occurs in the morning, as one can infer from the temporal signal \textit{quarta iam parte diei / praeterita} (1.9.35-36),\textsuperscript{79} and from the fact that a trial is usual to take place at an early hour of a day. Therefore, a morning walk in the busy city centre is what the readers might expect to complement the leisured evening stroll of 1.6.

\textsuperscript{74} Oliver (1998) 36.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{76} Freudenburg (2001) 63: “The poet’s low social standing in Rome, his fecklessness as a satirist of Lucilian pyrotechnical punch and inspiration, and his outspoken lack of political wherewithal and drive, are all metaphors for one another in the generic self-expression of \textit{Sermones} book I.”.
\textsuperscript{77} Gowers (2012) 283.
\textsuperscript{78} Freudenburg (2001) 64.
\textsuperscript{79} Gowers (2012) 291: \textit{quarta...parte diei}: “the fourth hour from sunrise (Romans divided the day into 12 parts), roughly mid-morning (depending on the time of year).”.
What merits particular mention here is Gowers’ observation. She points out that “city life is often represented by crowds in Horace: here, it becomes a series of annoying individual encounters..., obstacles in the way of the poet’s easy progress through his adopted city.”. All the three are chance meetings (accurrut quid, 1.9.3; Fuscus Aristius occurrit, 1.9.61; Casu venit obvius illi / adversarius, 1.9.74-75), but only the last two receive a warm welcome from Horace’s side -of course, the encounters with Aristius Fuscus and the adversarius are intended to move the plot forward. It is true that apart from the unnamed bore, the likewise nameless prosecutor, and the rascal Aristius Fuscus, there is no room for other individuals or groups of people in the poem. It seems as if Horace has silenced the city around; as if the spotlight has been kept exclusively on Horace and the pest during the whole episode. The unwelcome companion with all his audacity, pertinacity, and vainglory is an integrated character and thereby a sufficient target. His poetic identity and his quasi-Lucilian traits contribute additionally to the ironic end impression of the whole piece. For Horace, the pest’s behaviour needed no other examples to be supported or compared with. The inclusion of other satiric victims in the same satire could have deprived the pest of his primacy in the narrative, and it could have moderated the intensity of criticism towards him.

1.9, however, is not merely a journey through the centre of Rome. At the beginning of the poem it is possible to see signs of a poetic announcement: Ibam forte Via Sacra, sicut meus est mos, / nescio quid meditans nugarum, totus in illis. (1.9.1-2). The urban-Lucilian satiric setting, Horace’s contemplative mood, and the term ‘nuga’ as referring to poetic trifles, all indicate that what we are given describes above all a recording of satiric material in progress. As Schlegel puts it, “Horace strolls along in leisurely, solitary, and silent contemplation of a kind perhaps connected to poetic composition”. The only “urgent business” that drives the satirist downtown, and demands that he mingle with the crowd is his poetry. An easy target falls into the trap “by himself” -we should not forget that the author of the episode is Horace- and the poet seizes the opportunity to

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81 Lewis & Short, A Latin Dictionary (online): s.v. occurro: to run up to, run to meet: to go or come up to, to go or come to meet, to meet.
82 Schlegel (2005) 110.
83 Ibid., 111-112.
compose a satire that is very different from the pattern of Book I. 1.9 is the first poem of the Satires that represents sermo in dialogue,\textsuperscript{84} but as we will see, the poem is, in essence, a deliberate failure as effective conversation. Given the fact that in conversation the term ‘exchange’ implies an alteration of the role of speaker and listener on each side, it is clear that in 1.9 there is violation of the idea of exchange. The dialogue between Horace and the pest is superficial; it is, in fact, a one-way speech.\textsuperscript{85} Misnomer is thus to call Horace’s unwelcome companion ‘the interlocutor’.

Apart from the change of form, Horace undertakes once again to put the theoretical principles set forth in 1.4 into practice. By making the pest a fellow-poet with Lucilian traits, Horace renders automatically the poem a debate about poetics; a verbal contest between him and Lucilius, disguised as the pest, held in a battlefield typical of the satiric genre, namely the city centre. Quantity and speed, qualifications of which the pest boasts (\textit{nam quis me scribere pluris / aut citius possit versus?}, 1.9.23-24) are the poetic virtues that Horace despised and called poetic faults in Lucilius (in 1.4). The association between the portrait of the pest and the poetic shortcomings of Lucilius adumbrated in 1.4 establishes the pest as one unaware of Horace’s well-articulated poetic theory and programme.\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Brevitas} is the principle that governs Horace’s satiric work. On the other hand, the Horace-defined Lucilian faults are dramatised not only by the pest’s technical skill in versification, but also by his ordinary speech. Loquacity, abundance and speed potentially endanger both Horace’s life and satire -if we are to remember the sad fate a Sabine dame had sang for our poet (1.4.29-34).

Although Horace seems to touch on the antagonism with his predecessor only in the programmatic satires, it appears that Lucilius haunts many poems through the two collections. Here, as in every other satire, Horace “uses” his literary forebear aiming to define himself as a satirist. As Freudenburg notices, at the beginning of 1.9 we find Horace wandering the streets of downtown Rome, perfectly “placed” to act as a satirist of Lucilian worth, but with no particular

\textsuperscript{84} Schlegel (2005) 123.  
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 109, 122, 123.  
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 114.
destination in mind, and no sure sense of why he is there. The key to the decoding of Horace entering again into rivalry with Lucilius in 1.9 is found in the antithesis between the dramatic silence of the Horatian persona and the talkative approach of the pest. Schlegel finds it paradoxical that Horace portrays himself deprived of the power to verbally defeat his talkative companion on the Via Sacra. The satirist cannot use his verbal skill to fight back the bore; he has his persona submit to verbal tyranny rather than engage in it. His preference for verbal impotence over harsh ridicule sets him apart from Lucilius, whose attitude towards the pest would have been very different had it been he rather than Horace on the Sacra Via. Once again, Horace has made his way into an appropriate satiric place, but he does not attack his interlocutor with a Lucilian rage. Even in the city, the poet does not adopt the typical abusive speech; he does not practise a type of speech he has denied himself. As in 1.5, so in 1.9, he implements the theoretical tenets set forth in 1.4, demonstrating in practice how unthreatening he is.

While the evidence for the existence of a Lucilian model is inconclusive, the closing line to 1.9, Sic me servavit Apollo (v.78), is a clear Lucilian echo. As Schlegel convincingly suggests, Horace translated the hybrid verse into Latin in order to illustrate his stricture against Lucilius’ practice -something that is explicitly mentioned at 1.10.20-30. Schlegel also points out that “in 1.9 it is dramatically important that Apollo has saved the poem’s narrator: τὸν has become me.” Lucilius’s direct quotation of Homer has become Horace’s own line, and the god’s action in 1.9 directly embraces the poet.” Horace is hoping for rescue.

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89 Ibid., 111, 112, 113.
90 Freudenburg (2001) 64.
92 George Converse Fiske posited a model for 1.9 in Lucilius’s sixth book of Satires, in which a follower who refuses to detach himself from Scipio’s suite hangs on tenaciously even after being abused by Scipio, who attempts to evade him; on this, see Schlegel (2005) 110, and n.5 pg.163.
93 This verse recalls a Lucilian line which in turn quotes Homer, Iliad 20.443. Porphyrio, ad Hor., S., I, 9, 78: ‘Sic me servavit Apollo’… hoc illo sensu Homericò sumpsit, quem et Lucilius in sexton satyarum repraesentavit sic dicens – nil ut discrepet ac τοῦ δ’ ἐξήρπαξεν Ἀπόλλωνι fiat. (fr.267-8 Warmington).
95 Schlegel (2005) 110-111.
However, despite the fact that it is an *adversarius* (an opponent of the pest in a law-suit) who is directly responsible for releasing Horace from the adversary’s pertinacity, the poet ultimately expresses his thanks to Apollo. Acting as the god of poetry, Apollo here recalls the programmatic beginning to Virgil’s *Eclogue* 6.3 (cf. Callimachus *Aetia* prol. 24 = fr. 1 Pf.), where the same god touches the poet’s ear and tells him to write *deductum carmen*. According to Schlegel, “Apollo is the Callimachean poetic deity apposite to the poetic principles articulated in this poem.” Consequently, Apollo saved Horace by allowing him to write a poem of compositional features that stand in opposition to the Lucilian writing faults exposed earlier.

Rounding off our analysis of 1.9, an anything but “motionless” poem, we would say that the same technique mentioned above in the case of 1.5 is easily applicable here too. 1.9 is a “journey” through the centre of Rome, with sequential ends and beginnings; or alternatively, a theoretical piece that brings forth compositional rules. Several narrative pauses or digressions are signposted by literal stops and breaks during the itinerary. Variations in pace are likewise discernible, expressed appropriately in dactyls and spondees (*ire modo ocius, interdum consistere*, 1.9.9). The poem begins at walking pace, but then it starts to vary, as Horace tries to escape from the bothersome pest; he either comes to rest or he runs to nowhere. The pest however resists the conversation-stopping signals (*num quid vis?, 1.9.6; nil opus est te / circumagi, 1.9.16-17*). The lack of interest in sightseeing is another thematic convergence. For in both 1.5 and 1.9 Horace eschews political discussions or comments that could be regarded as parts of the Augustan propaganda. His basic concern here is poetological too. Shortly before *Satires* II, the satirist stages a *sermo* and, although still in the city, he prepares the change by giving his satire a conversational dimension and a more “anti-Lucilian” tone -that will be confirmed in the programmatic poem to come, i.e. 1.10.

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97 Schlegel (2005) 118.
Horace (and satire) in the countryside (Satires 2.3 and 2.6)

Up to this point of the chapter we have seen how Horace tries to (re)define the urban roots of satire, mainly by locating his persona in Rome. In Satires II, however, Horace makes a decisive movement that manifests itself through the persona’s withdrawal to the countryside. Following the short journey outside Rome and the strolls around the city of Book I, Horace of Book II chooses the country as the new setting of satire. It is crucial to notice though, that this is not merely a change of scenery, for Horace retires to the country intending to continue his writing activities there. In this section we will closely examine the exclusively city-centred Satires 2.3 and 2.6, in order to illustrate how different a satire that is written in the country could be.

2.3

The first poem of Book II to locate the activity of writing satiric poetry in the countryside is 2.3. To borrow Holley’s words, “this is the first satire, beyond the thank-offering 2.6, after the gift of the Sabine farm. The poem thus serves as a first, self-conscious check on the state of satire after its move to the country.”

The scene of 2.3 is the Sabine farm, where Horace has retired in order to avoid the excitement of the Saturnalia in Rome. Horace has retired to the country to get some writing done, but things are not going well…

A long discourse on the Stoic paradox πάς ἀφρόν μαίνεται makes up the main body of Satire 2.3. Damasippus’ extended utterances have a monologic, sermon-like quality, while the dialogic-form serves only as a framework for the whole. Both the beginning and the end of 2.3 take the form of a dialogue between Damasippus and Horace, a dialogue however that the former takes advantage of to assault Horace. In the first 16 lines, Damasippus launches an unprovoked literary attack against Horace. From him we learn that Horace is, in essence, a proponent of Callimachean aesthetics, since in an artistic programme like that of Callimachus “one is supposed to erase, correct, take trouble over a precious few well-crafted lines.”

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100 Ibid.
comment scriptorum quaeque retexens (2.3.2) obviously allude to the principles of slow, little, and pain-staking writing. Damasippus not only misunderstands the Callimachean side of Horatian satire, but also he attributes Horace’s alleged unproductivity to sloth -more about Damasippus’ anti-Callimachean manifesto will be said in the next chapter.

What concerns us in the present section is the dividing line between the practice of composing poetry in the city and that of composing poetry in the country, which apparently Damasippus fails to discern. Here, suffice it to say that Damasippus is an urban “authority”, judging from what he says about his life before the bankruptcy (2.3.18-26). Damasippus opens his speech with a tirade against Horace’s method of composing poetry, being specific in locating Horace’s activity of writing in the countryside. If we take verses 4-5 (at ipsis / Saturnalibus huc fugisti) to mean ‘even in the Saturnalia you fled here for refuge’, what we have is again a carefully-phrased comparison between before and now, between there (=Rome) and here (=the Sabine estate), and ultimately between city and country, as we suppose it is the case here. We are thus driven to think that Horace chose to fight the writing block he was facing in Rome with a movement to the country.

Now that Horace has retired to the Sabine estate, no piece of work worth talking about comes, Damasippus observes. Notwithstanding his efforts while in sober mood, and the bibliographical material he has packed with him (Plato, Menander, Eupolis and Archilochus), Horace, in Damasippus’ estimation, cannot profit from the benefits his country refuge entails, even though, as Damasippus ironises, he had the look of someone who would ‘threaten’ great and glorious things,101 had the country farm welcomed him in a care-free life. As Hooley argues, the paradoxical situation of the satirist in retirement we find in 2.3 is neatly conveyed by Horace’s bookbag.102 This very “literary baggage” indicates at least that Horace truly intended to continue writing satire away from Rome, taking with him some of the most important literary components of the genre, namely philosophy, old and new comedy, iambus.

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101 Muecke (1997) 133: “threatening: an unusual use of the verb …, probably in imitation of the Greek apeilein which can mean ‘promise’, ‘threaten’ and ‘boast’.”.
By mentioning the names of the four authors (quorum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro, / Eupolin, Archilochum, comites educere tantos?, 2.3.11-12) - the proper names are used metonymically instead of the titles of the books - Damasippus evokes precisely four literary traditions: 1) the Plato cited is the philosopher,\(^{103}\) not the poet of Middle Comedy, whose name thus would fill out with Eupolis and Menander a list of writers of the three periods,\(^{104}\) 2) the qualities of the Greek New Comedy (especially the mild jocularity and the tendency for characterisation) are epitomised by Menander, 3) Eupolis cements his place as one of the best representatives of Old Comedy (cf. Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae / atque alii, quorum comoedia prisca virorum est, Sat. 1.4.1-2), 4) and Archilochus, a name synonymous with the caustic spirit of archaic iambus, stands for the animal fable here.

It is here for the first time in the Satires that Greek New Comedy, and in particular one of its leading exponents, Menander, is mentioned explicitly as a source-model for Horatian satire. An “incidental” revelation was made at 1.4.48, where Horace resisted the idea that real-life people and events are any different from the ones occurring in Comic plays. The example chosen to illustrate this rather strange argument is a typical New comic scene of an angry father blustering because his spendthrift son is madly in love with a wanton woman, and rejects a wife with large dower;\(^{105}\) flesh-and-blood and dramatic fathers alike would rage in the same fashion, Horace says.

Let us now return to Satire 2.3. What exactly did Menander give to Horace’s satiric poetry? Unfortunately, Horace himself furnishes no direct answer to the question; an answer can be extracted nonetheless, if one reads Satires II carefully. Before we proceed to a more in-depth examination of Menander’s influence upon Horace, we need to discuss (extremely) briefly what it was about New Comedy that attracted Horace. Put simply, New Comedy showed great

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\(^{103}\) What Horace got from Plato is going to be discussed in detail in the ensuing chapter. See also: Fraenkel (1957) 136-137, Campbell (1924) 156,156 n.4, Cucchiarelli (2001) 135-136.

\(^{104}\) Among the scholars who take the Plato mentioned to be the philosopher are: Hazeldon Haight (1947) 148, Muecke (1997) 133 ad loc., Cucchiarelli (2001) 120; Rolfe (1901) 257 ad loc., Palmer (1971) 276 ad loc. argue for the comic poet.밥찌와(2003) 35 n.53, suggests that Horace deliberately employs the ambiguity of the name Plato.

\(^{105}\) For the particular scene, see Fairclough (1913) 188.
interest in ethics and in human behaviour, it featured stereotypical stock characters, and it illustrated a wide variety of manners and of possible situations in the field of human relationships.\textsuperscript{106} The atemporality and atopicality of New Comedy – as opposed to Old Comedy, for which the separation from the ‘now’ and ‘here’ of its original Athenian context was incomprehensible - made the situations described accessible to the audience, whatever their knowledge of specific details or contemporary personalities.

Horace’s use of Menander - his presence especially in the second Book of \textit{Satires} - is discussed in detail by Hazelton Haight in her paper “Menander at the Sabine Farm, Exemplar vitae”. Hazelton Haight attributes the psychographic way in which Horace delineates his characters to Menander’s influence. More specifically, she argues that within a conventional pattern of plot and a limited list of types of character, Menander created living and memorable individualities.\textsuperscript{107} Horace seems to be aware of the formula of stereotypical characters - which persisted in the Roman writers of comedy -, as his references to the slave Davus and the \textit{senex} Chremes - protagonists in Fundanius’ comedies - (1.10.40-41), to the father in Terence’s \textit{Heauton Timorumenos} (1.2.19-22), and again his reference to the \textit{Davus comicus} (2.5.91-92) show. Already in \textit{Satires I}, Horace practises his hand in the technique, in presenting his fictitious interlocutors as types rather than individuals (\textit{avarus}, \textit{moechus}, etc.), as personifications of either a point of view or a vice. In \textit{Satires II}, the character-drawing becomes more careful: Horace produces realistic, individualised characters, integrated personalities who speak with their own “voice”. These indications, coupled with the choice of Aristius Fuscus, the writer of comedies,\textsuperscript{108} as a humorous touch in 1.9, of the \textit{servus} Davus as the co-protagonist in 2.7, and of Fundanius, the comic poet, as the narrator in 2.8, are enough to convince us that Horace has made good use of the New comic/Menandrian tradition.


\textsuperscript{107} Hazelton Haight (1947) 149-155.

\textsuperscript{108} Gowers (2012) 298 \textit{ad loc}. 

Things are rather clear-cut in the case of Old Attic Comedy and Eupolis, in view of the statements made earlier by Horace in his apologia (1.4) regarding the affiliation between Old Comedy and satire. The arraignment of vice, emanated from the censorious, but moral in its core, point of view of the Old Comedians (si quis erat dignus describi, ... multa cum libertate notabant, 1.4.3-5) is the strongest link between the two genres -a salient characteristic which descended to Lucilius and thence to Horace himself. Horace however neither admits nor denies his own dependence on the libertas of Old Comedy in the first lines of 1.4; his initial concern being merely to establish a relationship between the canonical poets of Old Comedy and Lucilius. Very differently from the opening line of 1.4 (Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque), in 2.3 we have only the name of Eupolis in the material-list. As far as we can judge from the meagre fragments of Eupolis, his comedies display characteristics similar to the comedies of Aristophanes (ridicule and attack on named individuals among others).

So, it seems that his presence serves Horace’s desire to refer to the acerbic wit of Old Comedy.

Comedy and satire are related beyond a vague similarity in spirit. As Horace implies in his contribution to the debate over whether comedy is or is not true poetry (1.4.41ff.), the two genres share some important stylistic features together. It must be stressed though, that when Horace discusses the similarities between comedy and satire, he does not clarify whether it is Old or New Comedy that he speaks about. The lines he writes -and those which Lucilius wrote in former days-, Horace himself claims, are more akin to prose (sermoni propiora), their word-arrangement and structure being such that they could be easily decomposed. Moreover, his lines lack the intensity (in language and subject matter) necessary for verses to rise to the heights of inspired poetry; hence Horace should not be called a poet. Likewise, comedy neither in diction has it the tongue of noble utterance nor in matter has it the force of inspiration, and, save that it

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109 On the relationship between Roman Satire and Old Comedy, see the instructive work of Ferriss-Hill (2015).
110 Fairclough (1913) 183-193.
111 OCD entry Eupolis: Eupolis’ style seemed ‘abusive and coarse’ to the author of Anon. De Com. 33 p.9, but ‘highly imaginative and attractive’ to Platonius, Diff. Com. 1 p.6.
differs from prose-talk in its regular beat and rhythm, it is *sermo merus*. Satire is merely versified prose, its subject matter is drawn from the sphere of daily life; in these respects, it resembles comedy.

The most unexpected name to be included in the list is that of Archilochus. Nowhere in the *Satires* does Horace explicitly acknowledge his literary debt either to Greek iambic poetry in general or to Archilochus in particular. His programmatic assertion *Parios ego primus iambos / ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus / Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamen* (Epistle 1.19.23-25) has long been recognised as a retrospective reflection of Archilochus’ influence upon the *Epodes*. But, what does it mean to find Archilochus in a list mentioning the sources Horace is said to employ in his *Satires*? There is no space for aggressiveness, indignation, acerbity, the element of the great enemy, namely all the hallmarks of iambic poetry in the toned-down poems of *Satires* II; the armour and the biting of the iambographer, together with the epodic watchwords *invidia*, *ira, furor, rabies* are missing too.

As in the *Epodes* (‘I followed the rhythms and spirit of Archilochus, not the themes or the words that hounded Lycambes’), so in the *Satires*, Horace takes from Archilochus only what meets his needs. In conceiving of his role as moral guide and teacher, Horace hardly stands apart from a general tendency that seems to have been at work in both the iambus and the Old Comedy. Even though Horace does not subscribe to the tradition of invective, he does look back to the more didactic aspect of Archilochean poetry, the use of fables. That the ainos could be incorporated into the iambus as a vehicle of abuse is shown by several Archilochean fragments, most of which are placed by the editors among the Lycambes poems (e.g. fr.174W, fr.185W). Horace employs the device for the purpose of moral instruction; a moral lesson is conveyed through a humorous story, in which non-human subjects and irrational beings, allegorically yet

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114 See Dickie (1981), on the disavowal of *invidia* in Roman iambic and satiric writing.
115 Generally on the relationship between Old Comedy and iambus, see the work of Rosen (1988); also Freudenburg (1993) 52-108.
116 Fables are also found in Aristophanes and Callimachus; in Roman satire the technique was used by both Ennius and Lucilius.
117 Rosen (1988) 31-34.
unmistakably reflect human foibles and passions. The agenda of *Satires* II calls for alternative didactic modes, and surely the fable is one of the most effective ones. It must be no coincidence that the two most extensive versions of fable in the *Satires* -smaller allusions to other fables are also found in Book I- are found in the country-centred poems of Book II: the fable of the toad and the calf in 2.3, and the fable of the city mouse and the country mouse in 2.6. So it comes that Horace does really use all the material he has taken with him in the countryside.

It appears that there is a paradox emerging from Damasippus’ reproving speech, an almost self-contradictory thought that should not be overlooked: what seems to be an attack from Damasippus’ perspective turns out to be a compliment that, apart from Horace’s debt to individual authors, also underscores his πολυείδεια. For in whatever terms the issue of literary influence is posed, it suggests that Horace has the ability to draw together material from a wide range of literary genres and forms, from diverse thematic, aesthetic, stylistic and linguistic traditions. By allowing us to cast a furtive glance at Horace’s desktop, the list, in addition, gives us an insight into the Horatian method of writing satire, and -something that is directly related to this- it partly explains Horace’s several claims of differentiation from Lucilius. There must be no doubt that Horace was painfully(!) aware of the genre’s history, as well as of the specific characteristics which satire had obtained until then, in the hands of Lucilius. This is clearly depicted in Horace’s programmatic declarations, including both the instances when he speaks about the requisites for good satire, as he himself understands it and as the Augustan age expects it to be, and the instances when he criticises Lucilius’ poetic imperfections. In his second portrait of his predecessor, and more conciliatory than his portrayal before, Horace names Lucilius outright as the *primus inventor* of satire (*inventore minor; neque ego illi detrahere ausim / haerentem capiti cum multa laude coronam*, 1.10.48-49); it is in the same passage -and even more explicitly later at 2.1.34, *Sequor hunc* - that Horace openly considers himself to be Lucilius’ successor. As often with epigones, Horace tries

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118 General introductions on the fable: Adrados (1999), Dijk (1997), Holzberg (1993); for the fable in Horace, also: Schoder (1944). Cf. Sullivan (2007), who argues that fables are the only medium for the downtrodden to speak their minds in the presence of the powerful.
to create his own distinct identity as a satirist, aspiring to leave his personal fingerprint on the genre. He cannot be a *hinc omnis pendet Luclilius*.

So, a fundamental question must now be posed anew, in light of the reference works which Horace is pictured as consulting during his stay at the Sabine farm: what does the list of the four authors reveal about Horace’s contribution to the poetic genre of satire? What is automatically striking with the list is the fact that Lucilius does not show up,\(^{119}\) while, surprisingly enough, the source models are all taken from Greek literature. Lucilius’ omission from the list is certainly deliberate, for in the countryside and in the Horatian well-refined poetry there is no place for an *urbanus* poet, a poet whose technical faults marred his otherwise praiseworthy work.

The study-list is a manifestation of Horace’s intertextual dialogue with writers preeminent in specific genres. And not only this; the list displays a great degree of generic consciousness on the part of Horace -hetero-determined it may appear. Such an ability to interact with an assortment of literary sources requires that the distinct generic identities be recognised, the norms and conventions be followed, and the boundaries between the genres be detected. A theoretical systematisation of literature, in turn, presupposes the classification of each genre according to its canonical writers and to its defining characteristics. We see then that by means of the list Horace places himself in the tradition of Hellenistic literary theorising, assuming the role of an Alexandrian philologist.

What we have at 2.3.11-12 is, we think, a foundation myth for the kind of satire Horace writes especially in the country-oriented poems of his second Book. Plato, Menander, Eupolis and Archilochus function as (initial) sources of inspiration; as models to intermingle over Horace’s *Satires*, certainly not by way of slavish imitation though. Horace studies foremost works of literature in a critical manner (*reprehendit*), namely, by artistically examining content and technicalities,\(^ {120}\) faulting details in great authors who, he believes, should not be above criticism. Horace has showed contempt for slavish imitation and wrong

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\(^{119}\) For Luclilius’ use of the same models, see Coffey (1989) 54-58.
\(^{120}\) Βαρτζιώτη (2003) 33.
literary judgment long before 2.3. Analogous statements are first introduced in 1.10: Horace’s conflict with the (imaginative) supporters of Lucilius who do not admit the latter’s poetic faults, his condemnation of Hermogenes’ ignorance of antiquity, and his contempt for one simius iste who loves to drone out fashionable neoteric poetry -‘ape’ mainly implies slavish imitation-, all emphasise by contrast his own well-founded aesthetic judgment, and his originality in writing.

The πολυείδεια theme is prime, without doubt, among the several points of significance which can be extracted from the study material-list.121 But while much has been done towards that direction by the Horatian scholarship, hardly any study involves the infinitive stipare in the interpretation of 2.3.11-12. All the existing works -to our knowledge- with the exception of Βαρτζιώτη (2003), focus almost exclusively on the four writers and the four traditions lying behind them, ignoring thus the word that, as Βαρτζιώτη has very convincingly argued, best summarises the process by which Horace comes to interact with the selected bibliography he takes away with him in the country. For although seemingly trivial,122 this small detail becomes really meaningful if approached from a poetological standpoint. At any rate, the central position the word occupies in the verse cannot be accidental. We concur with Βαρτζιώτη in maintaining that the verb stipare reinforces the message which the mixed-group of literary sources Horace draws upon already transforms, namely πολυείδεια.123 The stipare is essentially the centre over which Plato, Menander, Eupolis and Archilochus would balance. Stipo literally means ‘to press together’, ‘to stuff’, ‘to fill full of any thing’,124 but, at a stretch, the term could be also used -albeit this time figuratively- to describe the process of writing satire, as well as the end product of that process, i.e. a plate stuffed full with all kinds of heterogeneous components. And so it comes to this: two of the most celebrated ideals of the Horatian method of writing satire, the notions of variety and mixture, are embedded in and conveyed by πολυείδεια. At 2.3.11-12, Horace does not simply restate the

121 On the πολυείδεια, see also Cucchiarelli (2001) 168-179.
122 Muecke (1997) 133 ad loc.: “stipare, as a technical term for packing in cargo…is appropriate for the books as physical objects.”.
principles of composition he has proclaimed in Book I; he puts variety and mixture into actual practice. Indeed, 2.3 contains all the basic ingredients the material-list implies: the Platonic manner of dialogue, the careful character-drawing of Menander, the didactic purpose and the technicalities of Old Comedy, and the animal fable of Archilochus.

2.6

2.6 is designed to build on and develop its “autobiographical” counterpart 1.6, to the point that it “invites us to measure how far Horace has travelled since the momentous meeting with Maecenas”. If we believe the “facts” provided by Horace, his friendship with Maecenas is now long-standing (it counts 8 years so far), and it has already been corroborated by the gift of the Sabine estate -although we do not hear Horace thanking his patron for the gift. While the Sabine estate is *prima facie* the absolute symbol of Horace’s dependence on Maecenas, at the same time it constitutes the culmination of the former’s attempt to defend his individuality. The importance of the gift in Muecke’s words, “is not so much in the financial independence it bestows on the poet as the opportunity it gives him for living as he really wants”. The Sabine farm, indeed, allows Horace to live the life it pleases him. Reading, simple dinning and serious discussion with friends on universal ethical concerns are some of the activities Horace enjoys in this “rural citadel”. In the countryside, he can leave behind socio-political conventions, while being free to build and follow different habits.

In the case of 2.6, Horace’s “journey” is both literal and figurative: the actual movement to the rural house is complemented with a mind travel within a mind travel -Horace is in the farm and he pictures his busy schedule when in Rome, and inside this dream there is another one enclosed concerning the good

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126 Muecke (1997) 194; we do not know exactly when Maecenas gave Horace the Sabine estate (it must have been before 31 B.C, perhaps in 33 B.C.).
129 Rudd (1966) 252: “But whereas in 1.6 the sense of being apart is purely spiritual-for Horace had then no place in the country-in 2.6 it is geographical too.”.
times in the countryside. In 2.6, the contrast between city and country is carefully articulated. Here, the urban life, which is full of unattractive business, is contrasted with the sage-like contemplation of country life. But instead of depicting two contrasting days, the poet divides a single day, pairing thus a Roman day with a Sabine evening. Even though the poem seems to balance its length in two symmetrical parts devoted to city and country respectively, Horace’s complaints about the city as opposed to his warm praise of the country lean clearly towards the country.

Even though the dramatic setting of 2.6 does not emerge before line 16, once it comes out, we have no doubt that the Horatian persona is at the Sabine farm. The retreat to the Sabine farm, we wish to argue again, is not important in its own right. Horace’s decision to withdraw from the Roman urban scene entails dissociation from the satiric model experienced so far. To start with the description of the estate that Horace gives at the very beginning of 2.6, it is replete with clear poetological connotations. At this point it is crucial to stress that in Satires II, Horace does not refer to the countryside in a broad sense. Compared with the vivid images captured incidentally from the metropolis’ panoramic scene -1.9 is a characteristic example-, when the Horatian spotlight turns towards the country, it finds only one location to focalise upon, the Sabine estate. In the mapmaking of Rome, roads, fora, monuments, gardens, cemeteries, buildings, statues, temples have their place. In the urban scene, varied snapshots or longer accounts are so designed as to create a patchwork of both geographical and anthropological pieces. Important and unimportant people also make their appearance: poets, fortune-tellers, itinerants, and many more. But, when Horace comes to talk about the Sabine estate, he is careful to wipe every reference to topography off the map. The beauties of the farm are not attributed so much to the natural setting, as to the advantages that Horace can gain from a life of rural seclusion, from a balanced diet and from friendly discussions.

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130 Harrison (2007) 236.
132 Cf. Muecke (1997) 195: “It is only in the later works that the meaning of the farm is fully developed: in the Odes and the Epistles it is transformed into a poetic and philosophical symbol, while retaining the specificity of a real place.”.
The one and only description of the Sabine farm comes late in the collection, but early in 2.6. At 2.6.1-3, we see the estate and its surroundings through the eyes of Horace. The description is concise: *modus agri non ita magnus, / hortus ubi et tecto vicinus iugis aquae fons / et paulum silvae super his foret* (‘a piece of land not so very large, where there would be a garden, and near the house a spring of ever-flowing water, and up above these a bit of woodland’). The piece of land is *non magnus*: Horace’s holding is small, in accordance with the smallness of his poetic output, to begin with. The desirable components of the Sabine farm make it already an appropriate symbol of aesthetic production. The elements of the garden and the woodland above create a *locus amoenus*, typically containing trees and shade. The *aquae fons* is traditionally a symbol of poetic inspiration. Horace speaks of the spring beside his house, without naming it, but there is no mention of actually *drinking* from this spring.

Before we proceed to analyse maybe the most important couplet of the poem, we should tackle briefly a detail that just precedes it. Notwithstanding his self-contentment, Horace prays to Mercury for prosperity and mental health: *pingue pecus domino facias et cetera praeter/ ingeniun, utque soles, custos mihi maximus adsis!* (2.6.14-15). Here, the god is invoked as a bringer of wealth and good fortune. It should not go unnoticed, though, that Horace, by equating his flocks with his wit, makes an odd comparison. What can be deduced from the prayer is that Horace’s mind must be kept not *pingue*. *Pinguis* is a literary metaphor for turgid and bombastic works, whereas *tenuis* is the exact opposite, reminiscent in our case of Callimachus’ own ‘slender Muse’ (*παχὺ γράμμα, Callim. fr. 398 Pf.; Μοῦσαν λεπταλέην, Aetia prol. 24).*

The key to understanding Satire 2.6 is the question: *Ergo ubi me in montes et in arcem ex urbe removi, / quid prius illustrem saturis Musaque pedestri?* (2.6.16-17). Having abandoned the big city -at least temporarily- along with all

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133 For descriptions of the Sabine farm, see *Odes* 3.16.29ff., *Epistle* 1.16.8-14.
134 Note the contrast between the natural garden described here and the artificial garden of 1.8.
135 The tradition goes back to Homer, while the convention was later used by Theocritus and Virgil.
136 Crowther (1979).
137 Muecke (1997) 197.
138 Rudd (1966) 244: “Horace’s *Satires* are a product of his *ingenium tenue*; that is why his wit must be kept slim.”.
139 Gowers (1993a) 147-149.
kinds of human frailties and corruption, Horace is now wondering what is left to be illuminated with his Satires; from where the ‘pedestrian Muse’ could draw inspiration thenceforth. Horace’s city descriptions indicate that the urban environment required a careful sermo that ought to defend itself and its creator through the streets of Rome. In the big city, the Satires had in fact a double mission: to protect the patron from rumours, and Horace from the assaults of his antagonists. But in a dramatic ‘now’ in which Horace can speak from the safety of his “mountain-citadel”, the qualities of the city-centred satire are called into question.

Why is the Muse pedestrian? At On Word Arrangement 19, Dionysius treats the topic of ‘variety’ (ποικιλία, Latin varietas), arguing that the writer of prose (ἡ πεζὴ λέξις) enjoys the leisure to diversify his word arrangement, thereby avoiding any potential monotonous effect. For a style based on the use of change and variation is less likely to ‘wear the ear’ as compared with one that displays sameness, Dionysius seems to imply. Within a larger discussion of stylistic standards, in which Horace argues a case for the ‘tired ears’, he mentions that there is need for brevity, so that the thought may run on -note the verb for moving (currat)- and not become entangled in verbiage that weighs upon wearied ears (1.10.7-14). As Freudenburg explains, when Horace makes the claim verbis lassas onerantibus auris (1.10.10), he means this to apply to the size and texture of the satire as a whole, of the individual sentence, of the words within the sentence, and of the sounds contained in the words. Obviously, in his final assessment of Lucilius’ technical deficiencies -the tone is more conciliatory than before-, Horace faults his predecessor for failing to meet the requirements of sermo, that is, the blending of brevity and turgidity, of the harsh (modo tristi) and the playful (iocoso), the poetic imagination and the oratorical force, and occasionally the sophisticated wit. “Horace adapts these ideas from rhetorical theory, yet he knows that his demands for compositional variety stem ultimately

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140 Sullivan (2007) 84.
142 Some years later, in his Epistles 2.1.250-251, Horace will imagine his sermones creeping along the ground (nec sermones ego mallem / repentin per humum). See also Gowers (1993) 56-57.
143 My analysis is much indebted to Freudenburg (1993) 181-184. My own reading will attempt to incorporate the ‘foot-going diction’ mechanism into the wider discussion on the difference between the hallmarks of urban satire and those of rustic satire.
144 The idea of prolixity as an ‘onus’ for the poor ears is also found at 1.9.20-21.
145 On this, see Gowers (2012) 314 ad loc.
from generic considerations, that is, from the Protean nature of satire itself, a
genre defined by fullness and variety, which, ironically, are its only reliable
hallmarks.”.146 Freudenburg correctly observes.

Variety, mixture and fullness define the genre.147 Quintilian (Inst. 10.1.95) suggests that to innovate as a satirist is to inject more chaos into the jumble, and he proceeds to mention the type of Menippean satire exploited by Varro, with its admixture of prose and verse. Variety is to be understood in all its breadth: it must be achieved at every level (technical, metrical, thematic etc.), and it must cover everything, from the smallest (individual sounds) to the biggest part (the poem taken as a whole). Horace, Freudenburg explains, insists that variety is a very subtle entity, whose traces can be seen “in the variation of periods, clauses, words set side by side, and even individual sounds”.148 The variety scheme that Horace has in mind again relates back to another passage of Dionysius’ treatise. At On Word Arrangement 26, Dionysius discusses the type of arrangement appropriate to a class of poetry that consciously seeks to approximate ‘foot-going diction’. When poets vary (ποικίλας ποιῶσιν) the size and the construction of the periods, they make us forget the metre, Dionysius writes. In other words, the poet who seeks to imitate prose must eliminate or destroy the regularity of the rhythm. In Freudenburg’s words, “what applies to prose,… applies equally to satire, which Horace understood as a special type of versified sermo subject to the same rules of compositional variety as any good middle style speech.”.149

A scholarly consensus on the interpretation of the key phrase Musa pedestris has been mostly reached: the Muse’s walking refers to the prosaic style of satire. Admittedly, the walking per se is a critical element, but, as Plaza has suggested, the movement image is not complete unless the topography is concretised. Hence, the question is inescapable: where does the Muse walk? While agreeing with the premise that topography does matter, we cannot follow Plaza in claiming that the Muse walks through the streets of Rome. When first addressing the Muse, Horace states that he has retired from the city to his castle in

146 Quotation from pg.181.
147 Every general book on classical satire contains an introductory section where the name, the derivation and the meaning of satira are discussed; see selectively: Coffey (1989) 11-18, Braund (1992) 6-9, Hooley (2007) 13-14.
148 Quotation from pp.182-183.
149 Freudenburg (1993) 183.
the hills. The passage following immediately after lines 16-19 constitutes a daydream of Horace’s harassed mornings in Rome, so we cannot see why we should understand a return back to Rome between verse 16 and verse 23, as Plaza does.

“In 23 the word principium at the onset of the verse is immediately followed by Romae, for the beginning of satire can be nowhere else”, Plaza writes.\textsuperscript{150} The juxtaposition however is more likely to work in a different way, strengthening the contrast between the two parts rather than providing a logical continuation. If our speculation is right, it follows that the principium is not Rome, but the antithesis to Rome, namely the countryside. Besides, the internal structure of the question at 2.6.16-17 reveals that the Musa pedestris is located in the rus; most probably within the boundaries of the Sabine farm. Horace has taken himself off from the city centre (removi) in company with the Muse of satire. The perfect tense removi, along with the marker ubi (2.6.16) -here taken as an indication of time: ‘Now that from the city I have removed…’- present the city withdrawal as already complete, and the effects of this very withdrawal as just started to appear.

If then the country, and the Sabine farm in particular, is the ground on which the Muse along with the poet is walking, what remains to be answered is quid prius illustrem saturis? Now that satire, the most urban of genres, has been detached from the great metropolis and from the material this metropolis lavishly offers, Horace asks himself to what topic/s he should direct the Musa pedestris. This initial puzzlement, if not a fake hesitation, may account for Horace’s wish to experiment with the most recognisable characteristic of satire, i.e. urbanitas. Satire grows and flourishes within the big city, exploiting any opportunity for ridicule that opens up; to uproot satire from its physical environment is to jeopardise its very existence. In his second endeavour to remove his satire from its typical urban setting, Horace appears to foresee the risk of his lacking material otherwise easily accessible.

We have already seen how the city is established as the place for satiric writing; this rule, however, is not less liable to exception than any other in the Satires, since we have examples proving that the satirist can be stuck even when in Rome. Even though the logical solution to Horace’s Rome-induced writer’s

\textsuperscript{150} Plaza (2008) 173-174, 176-178; quotation from 177.
block would be to escape the city—as it is especially the case in 2.3—, Ferriss-Hill argues that a change in geographical location is not as unproblematic as we have been led to believe. “The rus does not suit the satirist”, she writes, for when in the country, Horace portrays himself as having difficulty writing. In the same vein of thought, Plaza observes that: “At the beginning of 2.3 we saw Horace withdrawn to the countryside from the turmoil of the Saturnalia in Rome—only to be struck with terrific writer’s block.” The tension, namely that the poet cannot write amid the city’s distractions, and yet that no other place will do for satiric composition, is again pointed out by Ferriss-Hill.

The terminological ambivalence in 2.6 can be misleading as to the nature of Horace’s writings. For Horace—deliberately or otherwise—uses interchangeably the words ‘satura’ (2.6.17) and ‘carmen’ (2.6.22) to designate the new literary product that will ensue from his movement to the country. In his analysis of the Horatian passages in which the word ‘carmen’ has technical-poetic significance, Cucchiarelli maintains that Horace uses the word to refer to his own poetic writings only in 2.6 (tu carminis esto / principium, 22-23). At 1.10.66 and 2.1.62-63 the term relates to the poetry of Lucilius, while at 1.10.74-75 it relates to the literary destiny of Horace’s critics. A different view is put forward by Sullivan, who takes the term ‘carmen’ at 2.6.22 as a sign of a lyric transition, and attributes the grandiose invocation to Janus—the style being itself elevated—to Horace’s decision to inaugurate the new literary era of the Odes. For Sullivan, the best text to read alongside 2.6 is Cicero’s De Natura Deorum 2.27.67, where god

154 Ennius entitled his collection “Saturae” probably because he had been influenced by Hellenistic collections of miscellaneous poems “σοῦμακτη”. Lucilius never referred to his poems as ‘satires’; he spoke simply of ludus ac sermones (‘playful chats’), chartae (‘jottings’), and schedia (‘improvisations’). For Horace, see Gowers (2012) 6: “One of the most satirical jokes of the book [II], in its drive to avoid naming names, is that Horace never names the sui generis form that he is creating. He refers to it only as (genus) hoc or haec, ‘this sort’ or ‘these things’, or qualiacumque ‘whatever these things are’. The word satira appears for the first time only in the first line of Book II, as though the genre were modest, shameful, or had only at that point come into being.”. Coffey (1989) 69: as Horace discusses poetry in 2.1 with an eminent jurisconsult, it is appropriate that he use the exact technical term.
155 Graecis intacti carminis auctor, 1.10.66; cum est Lucilius ausus / primus in hunc operis componere carmina morem eqs., 2.1.62-63; an tua demens / vilibus in ludis dictari carmina malis?, 1.10.74-75. The only exceptions are 1.8.19 and 2.1.82, where, Cucchiarelli thinks, the word ‘carmen’ means ‘magic song’, ‘incantation’.
156 Cucchiarelli (2007) 175.
Janus is presented as the god who presides over beginnings and endings of all kinds. He interprets Cicero’s passage as follows: “Cicero posits that, by presiding over all beginnings and endings, Janus also becomes a god of transitions, since the end of one journey always necessitates the beginning of another”. Despite his right interpretation, however, Sullivan concludes that what we track here is Horace’s transformation from the hexametrical poet of the Satires to the lyric vates of the Odes.\(^{157}\)

It is our contention that ‘carmen’ does indeed imply a transition, but not the one that Sullivan proposes, for the simple reason that we do not have to remove the term from its satiric context to make sense. Horace invokes Janus, the divinity from whom men originate the first labours of work and life, to be the prelude of his song; but of which song? Not until we read the section following immediately after the invocation to Janus do we begin to understand that the very song mentioned is 2.6. Janus is indeed the prelude of this song, since his name appears in the first 20 lines of the poem, just before the main theme, namely the city-country contrast, starts to unravel. Another argument to the same purpose is the fact that the term ‘carmen’ first occurs in the programmatic 2.1 (\textit{mala carmina / sed bona}),\(^{158}\) where Horace discusses the new circumstances and the direction his satire is going to take thenceforth. The reference at 2.1.82-83 is to the poetic quality of the poems to come; of the eight poems that were meant to comprise the second Book of his Satires.

The turning point in Horace’s work which Sullivan discusses, is, we think, a turn to a different satiric pattern. Horace’s request that the god play the role of \textit{carminis principium} could rather signpost his decision for a satiric change. This assumption is strengthened by the very poetological dimension of 2.6. As we have seen at 2.6.16-17, the poet looks for new satiric material (\textit{quid prius illustrem saturis}...), and the ‘pedestrian Muse’ for new satiric paths to walk on. It is hard to

\(^{157}\) Sullivan (2007) 87. See also Fraenkel (1957) 140, who describes the use of the word ‘carmen’ here as a momentary elevating of the poem to a higher level, the level of lyric. Plaza (2008) 174: the use of the lofty word \textit{carmen} for the \textit{sermones} is unique. Rudd (1966) 248: “This religious mood, for all its light-heartedness, is quite uncharacteristic of the \textit{Satires}, and so, while the poem as a whole recalls 1.6, the opening lines direct us forward to the \textit{Odes}, where we find Mercury, along with Faunus, the Muses, Apollo, and other divine company, once again associated with Horace’s deepest feelings on earthly happiness.”.

\(^{158}\) Cf. Muecke (1997) 113 ad loc.
believe that Horace would have called ‘walking’ the Muse that was to inspire his lyric *Odes*.

Horace himself furnishes a very concrete answer to the question *quid prius illustrem saturis?* when he returns to the praise of the countryside after the digression on his life in the city - if such a lengthy description can be called a digression in a poem whose plan is to balance its length between two equal parts. If we read 2.6 carefully, we will realise that what Horace *illustrates* is the quiet rural life, accompanied by dinners with friends and philosophical discussions. The poet is away from the large crowds he despises, and he celebrates real friendship. The philosophical discussions which take place in the country are the miniaturisation of the philosophical dialogues in *Satires* II. Rural life is *tenuis*, attuned to the Callimachean aesthetics. According to Harrison, the presentation of the country as a place of moderation and restraint matches the moderation and restraint of the Callimachean side of Horatian poetics. The Sabine estate is clearly presented as a model for material and moral restraint; the moderate lifestyle it represents reflects Horace’s moderation of poetry. Restrained material consumption is matched by restrained Callimachean poetry, measured by art and not by size.\(^{159}\)

It seems then that the *Musa pedestris* follows the slow pace of the countryside.

\(^{159}\) Harrison (2007) 245-246.
THE “FATHERS” OF HORACE

Introduction: Fathers and the development of Horatian satire

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the ways in which Horace and together with him some key aspects of satiric poetry change between Satires I and II. Horace goes through a period of transition: from being a son under supervision to becoming a self-governed man. But this cannot happen without help. Concentrating on the subject ‘fathers’, we hope to show that many are the father-figures throughout the Satires, who by trying to “educate” a younger Horace, essentially help him to define not only his persona, but also the characteristics of satire. Starting from the detailed accounts of his upbringing by his biological father that Horace gives us (1.4, 1.6), we will proceed to examine Horace’s dynamic relationship with Maecenas, the social “father”, and then we will turn our focus to the father-figures of Book II -we interpret ‘father-figures’ as men in a position to give advice (even if not always good advice) to Horace. This is potentially a broad topic; for this reason our study is limited to the examination of three -we think the most characteristic ones- father-figure examples of Satires II, in particular, Trebatius, Ofellus, Damasippus.

Problems of authority, influence, dependence and control will concern us in this chapter; and more specifically, two interrelated questions: how Horace came to understand his position under the guidance of his biological father, and the care of his patron in Satires I, and how he was gradually reaching maturity -we mean maturity that unfolds before us through the development of the genre-moving to Satires II. It is true that, in the first Book, Horace’s “need for protection” brings very important father-figures centre stage. Yet, given the decisive part the biological father and Maecenas played in Horace’s life and poetic career -Horace makes proud avowals in 1.4 and 1.6 respectively-, it is surprising that almost every reference to these “fathers” is eliminated from the second Book. What is the likelihood that the omission of the “fathers” results from the fact that by the time of Satires II Horace has undergone growth, being capable enough of facing the reality of his life alongside his satiric mission on his own (cf. simul ac duraverit aetas / membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice,
1.4.119-120)? In Book II, nonetheless, Horace does not cease to listen -with or without his consent- to homilies mouthed by different father-like protagonists who now dominate the satiric scene. And not only is the role of more worthy father-models diminished, but also the Horatian persona is subjected to humiliation by inadequate mentors, uttering himself no criticism, after being the target of misplaced ethical and literary attack.¹

In its own way, *Satires* II strikes the reader as a resolute movement away from the course set by *Satires* I, where Horace was wearing the faces of a first-person narrator, a preacher, and a confident literary critic. Even though Horatian scholars “agree to disagree” on the cause of this shift, they seem at least to hold the convergent view that the mechanisms of communication used in the two Books are radically different. Selecting to follow a generic approach -rather than a historical-autobiographical one-, what we are going to argue here is that the core of Book II is where the seeds of a pedagogic method are located, resonant with dialectic, rhetorical, and philosophical “sounds”. For the reason why Horace leaves the satiric scene to “others” is not so much, we think, because either his life or career are being jeopardised. As we hope to show, Horace does not try to find scapegoats on whom to devolve the indignation (aroused by his cutting remarks), for the simple reason that his voice, albeit often muted, is ubiquitous and retains much of its strength and range -more than one might have imagined at first glance. Besides, the ‘victimisation-motif’, instead of being understood as an admission of fear and lack of freedom of speech, it could alternatively be a newly-proposed satiric principle. In other words, ‘vulnerability’ is likely to have been sketched to help Horace chisel out the satiric norms anew -or create new ones-and develop a distinct poetic voice. The second Book, passing from speech to silence, and from self-confidence to self-denial, constitutes, according to our view, an opportunity for Horace to rehash the rules of his genre; to maximise its technical, expressive and, if we talk about content, its philosophical potentials. The fundamental change in the level of form indicates, after all, that the poet was not afraid of trying different techniques. The argument that extratextual constraints were imposed on Book II starts to lose some of its effectiveness inasmuch as one expects a regime, however sensitive or strict it may be, to show

¹ Anderson (1982) 42.
much more irritation over the theme and the tone (i.e. content and targets), rather than over the technical characteristics of a given genre. The replacement of the one-person speech (of Book I) -in which the staged discussions have a veneer of dialogue, and the *adversarii* are fictitious- by the dramatic dialogue was further, we think, a turn necessary to restore the conversational nature of *sermo*, and more than that, to justify the title of the whole collection, *Sermones* (= Conversations) - the philosophical side of this turn towards the dialogic form will be discussed below.

Our argument draws heavily on Anderson’s instructive discussion of Socrates’ influence on Horace’s *Satires*. Hence, we will begin our analysis by considering the Socratic resonances of both Books of Horatian satire. Then, we will move on to examine the presence of Horace’s biological father and Maecenas in *Satires* I, and consequently, the presence of particularly important father-figures of *Satires* II. As indicated above, we will confine our study to the examination of Trebatius, Ofellus, and Damasippus. Trebatius and Ofellus are located at the “bridge” between the Books, *Satires* 2.1 and 2.2, poems with clear programmatic import, while Damasippus (Satire 2.3) typifies the pattern of allowing other speakers to dominate Horace in Book II.

*Horace’s Socratic Satires*

The main contribution that Anderson made to the discussions of the relationship between *Satires* I and II is the idea that the jump from Book I to II signifies a development of style. With his analysis, in which he pursued the path that Fraenkel (1957) had first indicated, Anderson proves that Horace borrowed the Socratic style in *Satires* I, and some Platonic features in *Satires* II. Anderson wished to call attention to the fact that while at the beginning of his satiric career Horace set about depicting his satirist as a Socratic teacher, his main traits being the irony and the profound self-analysis, he then proceeded to adopt the manner of Plato. In the diatribe-satires, particularly, Horace plays the role of the inquirer, who uses ordinary conversation to compel men to think about vital ethical questions. In the following Book, however, Horace is no longer a *doctor* who instructs all and sundry, but he is a person that receives instructions. Plato
“typically wrote dialogues in which Socrates would be represented as ironically seeking instruction from someone else, asking questions which seemed easy but often led the other speaker to statements of manifest absurdity”, Anderson writes. In these dialogues, the philosophical truth was not stated by Socrates, and frequently a specific conclusion was not reached in the end. The readers were thus left to resolve the problem with their own understanding, on the basis of their rational faculties. Taking into account the considerations of Anderson’s survey, then, we see that what at first appears as Horace’s avoidance of the first-person speech, takes its sense from a didactic strategy according to which the truth is only implied, and awaits the reader’s investigation.

The position of the moralist in both Books is worth looking at in more detail. The Socratic satirist of Book I intends to tell a serious truth about fundamental human problems, with a sardonic laugh though. He teaches puerile mankind in elementary moral issues, making explicit effort to broaden his moral insights beyond the immediate case. He does not unfairly denounce, he does not ignore his own failings, and like Socrates, he tries to force people to re-examine their consciences. Very differently, in Book II the truth remains undefined, unstated, and only dramatically implied; there is no argumentation on the part of Horace, for, as he is pushed into the supporting role, he is unable to elaborate his ideas. Each interlocutor is exposed to ridicule by his own extremism, excessive zeal, or hypocrisy. For the most part, the moral interpretation must come from our own rational insights: can we distinguish between moral reality and the warped ideas of the adversarii, or between true happiness and the exaggerated values that ensure an ephemeral pleasure? If yes, then, perhaps, we may slowly work our ways towards the life in which Horace the moralist firmly believed, but only implicitly persuades us to lead.

Accordingly, it is possible to appreciate fully Horace’s presence in both Books I and II, once one traces the root of the different stance back to the models of Socrates and Plato respectively. But before we continue setting up more arguments that reinforce the view of Book II taking a step further from Book I, it

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2 For the whole analysis, see Anderson (1982) 28–49; quotation from pg.42.
3 Ibid., 34–36.
is necessary that we engage ourselves in a brief digression about the expression of
the Socratic irony in *Satires* I. Had the Horatian discourse lacked one of the most
essential features of Socratic writing, i.e. irony, it would not have substantiated its
Socratic stamp. As Anderson explains, irony is intellectual, and thereby
incompatible with uproarious laughter, or mordant jesting; it uses subtle humour
to expose human failures, but it always presupposes exercise of reason. To state it
clearly, one is entitled to be amused at the folly of those who plunge into moral
faults, only when one can understand the workings of such faults, has awareness
of their fallibility, and smiles at their own mistakes. Having rejected *iocularia*,
Horace summarises his method as *ridentem dicere verum* (‘tell the truth with a
laugh’), a phrase that vividly captures the spirit of the Socratic irony. If we see the
irony at work in 1.1 for example, we note how gently the satirist treats the miser
who claims as his model the provident ant. The use of self-irony, of course,
cannot be excluded from our discussion; the most typical example is the satirist’s
admission that he is the son of a *libertinus pater* (1.6). To round off this
digression: the ironic manner is a crucial means of instruction. Whether the satirist
assumes the role of *doctor* -but still, not the role of the saviour of mankind- or he
represents his persona as a positive model of behaviour, set as an opposite to any
deluded individual, he probes the truth utilising the special power of irony.\(^5\)

Grasping the “teachery” character of *Satires* II is, we think, what
vindicates the Book from the charge of being a failure. *Satires* II, far from being a
generic fiasco, marks a turning point in the development of Horatian satire. After
the experiment of Book I, the satirist was ready for, and therefore he decided on a
thorough reformation of the manner and the style of his satire. Horace built on and
developed his teacher-self as we know it from *Satires* I; and this, in turn,
demanded a different, more active, response from his audience. The poems of
Book II put the onus on us, in “teaching” obliquely that moral knowledge is not
internalised unless we take the initiative in extracting and utilising it. Having said
that, it is important to stress that Horace by no means effaces his didactic part; he
only changes the way he designs the “lesson”. His new method is to give scanty
hints and hardly detectable clues, to leave various contemptible fools being
ridiculed on their own. Having imparted knowledge to his “students”, having

shaped their way of thinking, the success of Horace the teacher, in *Satires II*, is measured by the skills he has equipped his “students” with, namely by the latter’s ability to judge and tell the difference between the example to be followed and the one to be avoided.

Morrison’s study on the function of the didactic addressee in Horace’s *Epistles* I and in Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura* can easily be expanded to include the role that the Horatian persona performs in *Satires* II. As he explains, in the didactic poem of Lucretius, the teacher has to battle lack of trust, and forestall objections by the ignorant addressee, who goes astray in his progress. Morrison, quoting Philip Mitsis, speaks about an “aggressive tone of paternalism” that in turn leads to the notion of ‘didactic *nepios*’, namely the presentation of the addressee as a ‘fool’ in great need of the teaching provided by the narrator.⁶ In *Epistles* I, the learning process and progress is focused on Horace. The kind of “backsliding” now touches the narrator/teacher rather than the addressee, as the poet slides from moral soundness to spiritual malaise.⁷ In *Satires* II, it is Horace himself who listens to the lesson, this time as an internal disciple; he is not the undisputed authority of *Satires* I any longer. Even though he portrays his persona as the end product of the moral teaching of his biological father and the social support of Maecenas, in the second Book, the satirist is subjected to the admonition of weak masters, despite his mental and moral advantage over them. Still, the Horatian persona of Book II is neither consistent nor homogeneous, since there are instances where we watch Horace slide from unimpeachable morality to depravity.⁸

Even if an informed reader searches for the traces of Horace’s moral progress in Book II, he is very likely to come to a dead end, because of Horace’s evident flirting with vice and indulgence. Although we would have expected to meet a mindful and sensible middle-aged man, what we see happening throughout the collection is instead a balanced battle between the ‘upright’ and the ‘corrupt’ inner self of Horace. The preacher, the devout supporter of restraint and the right path seems to have become a straw figure, belied by his own verses. The simplest

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⁷ Ibid., 127-128.
⁸ Indicative are Davus’ remarks in 2.7, as well as the specialised technical knowledge involved in *Satires* 2.4 and 2.8, which makes Horace a kind of insider connoisseur, and as such, a hypocrite.
answer might be that one’s way to moral excellence is not a straight one, a way without deviations or missteps. Horace’s “backsliding” is, we think, yet another argument to justify the technique employed in *Satires* II. Ironically enough, Horace uses his persona as a behaviour-example, and without giving any help, he leaves the decision to his “students’” discretion.

We have already considered the Socratic element in the *Satires*, and how the different pedagogical method used in the two Books accounts for the shift from first-person preaching to dramatic dialogue. By making Horace a pupil, *Satires* II gives more indirect and implicit lessons. But when was the very first time that someone taught Horace in the *Satires*? His biological father was his first teacher -albeit amateur (cf. *sapiens*, 1.4.115)-, and Horace distinctly remembers these early life lessons.

**Horace’s (biological) father (*Satires* 1.4, 1.6)**

“*Satires* 1.4 and 1.6 are the well-known loci of Horace’s upbringing by his father, told in the context of Horace’s relation to Lucilius, his satiric forbear, and to Maecenas, the man conventionally known as Horace’s patron”, to borrow Schlegel’s words.9 We concur with Schlegel in arguing that the “information” Horace supplies is motivated by its poetic context, and that the artifacts of ‘father’ and ‘son’ are *dramatis personae* structured to provide a definition to Horace’s satiric art. Paired in 1.4 with Lucilius, the biological father is given prominence so that he emerges as the father of the satiric genre too.10 In an attempt to convince his critics that his satire is not designed to give pain, Horace defends his genre by “recalling” the elementary moral teaching instilled in him by his biological father. More specifically, in 1.4, Horace describes the method he has learned from his father: the moral training was based on *exempla*. In order for Horace to steer clear of follies, the biological father was encouraging him to observe (*nonne vides?*) the examples around him, examples of opposite extremes. The biological father’s self-appointed mission was to uphold the traditional rules their ancestors have handed down; and this was *satis* for him -the word stem *sat-* (= enough,

9 Schlegel (2005) 38.
satisfaction, sufficiency) is one of the generic signals in Horace’s Satires. He acted as a guardian anxious to keep Horace’s vita and fama from harm.

*Sic me formabat puerum dictis*, Horace says, and he wants to make clear that it is this very training that still guides his life and motivates his writings. Having internalised his father, Horace replicates the practice: by observing the ugly conducts around, and by pondering over what is the better course for him, Horace improves himself and fills in his tablets, with ‘random thoughts’ though. The process is described as an inner debate, while the act of writing as a pastime for leisure hours. The biological father functions as a counterweight to Lucilius. Like the Old Comedians (*notabant*, 1.4.5) and their offspring Lucilius, the biological father was noting examples of faults. The Old Comedians set their mark upon those who deserved it with great freedom (*multa cum libertate*, 1.4.5), while the biological father has made his son *liberius* (1.4.103). Wanting to remove the suspicion that was attached to the Lucilian brand of satire and thereby to the genus hoc he has inherited from the inventor, Horace introduces his biological father as an alternative father of the genre; a father who is by definition an ethical source. The father shaped his personality and his chartae alike; the activity of noting faults with freedom was the theoretical cornerstone of a successful moral life and successful satiric writing. And so it comes that even though Horace writes the same kind of satire which exposes the faults of those who deserve it, he does not belong to Lucilius’ satiric lineage, but to a different, genealogical one.

Anderson ventures to look at the relationship between Horace and his biological father from a modern psychiatric angle, and the result is really telling. From the description at 1.4.105-121 he draws the inference that Horace’s father can be identified with an authoritarian preachy parent, and hence, the relation can be characterised as “unusually amicable”. Such a paternal personality was likely to provoke filial reaction, even disgust, nonetheless, we hear Horace paying

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11 See Dufallo (2000).
12 Leach (1971) 630: “The comparative implies a degree of excess –not great excess, but something a little beyond the mean.”.
13 Anderson uses the term ‘authoritarian’ loosely, as the antithesis of the term ‘permissive’. “Greco-Roman New Comedy had for several centuries suggested a dichotomy of father types: the father who was severe, domineering, rather frightening, and too often angry vs. the father who was indulgent and easygoing”, see Anderson (1982) 52-53 n.2; cf. 54-55: In Greco-Roman comedy, however strict or lenient a father may be, a son is more typical to rebel against him.
tribute to the very controlling aspect of his father, claiming indeed that he has inherited the same propensity in his own satiric poetry. “There is nothing unusual in the way Horace represents his father’s using examples to deter him from harmful behaviour and appealing to tradition: fathers do that. What is unusual is the totally acquiescent role that Horace assigns himself.”, Anderson writes. The confirmation of the argument comes once we notice that when Horace grew up (in Book II), he did not maintain the same inflexible moralistic strain, adopting himself a more tolerant manner (that allowed some deviations to happen).

In 1.6, Horace grants to his readers a more developed account of his father and his upbringing. Picking up the threads of his praise of the biological father, Horace returns emphatically to the topic, this time by presenting himself as the sound end product of his father’s instruction. ‘If the faults that mar my nature are trifling and few in number, I owe this to my father’, Horace says, and he opens a new chapter in the delineation of his biological father. The first thing we must know about the father is that he was poor and he owned a small farm. But despite his meagre means, he was anxious to give his son the opportunity to flourish. Horace recounts a memory concerning his father’s decision to send him to school at Rome, rather than to the local school; a decision which, as Horace implies, was motivated by his father’s desire to offer him better education and opportunities.

The father was a true guardian, who, thanks to his advice, succeeded in keeping Horace free from every shame and scandal. Being himself a tax-collector, the father was not afraid lest Horace should go into a petty trade.

Horace tends to emphasise the “fact” that he is the son of a libertinus father three times in 1.6 (libertino patre natum, 1.6.6; 1.6.45; 1.6.46). Especially, the discordant repetition of the phrase in the successive lines 45, 46, and the occupation of the same metrical position can hardly be attributed to Horace’s incapacity for versification or to his inability to find a metrical and semantic equivalent. According to the analysis of Williams, the phrase ‘libertino

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15 For the full development of the view, see Anderson (1982) 51-55.
16 Contra Williams (1995) 305: The local school, already adjusted to the needs of the sons of the Roman soldiers, would have provided an unpleasant environment for the sons of the natives.
18 For alternative phrases see: ingenuus (1.6.8), ingenuo si non essem patre natus (1.6.21), quo patre / natus? (1.6.29), quo patre sit natus (1.6.36), non ego me claro natum patre (1.6.58), non patre praeclaro (1.6.64).
patre natum’, far from being a self-characterisation of Horace, is a derisive insult against him. He argues that “in all occurrences the phrase is used in a way that can only properly signaled by enclosing it in quotation-marks”.\(^{19}\) Extending this argument, we would argue that the phrase is a mirror of the external reactions towards Horace, a public expression of reproach. By the same token, Schlegel argues that while in the private realm Horace’s father is the person only responsible for the formation of his son’s character, in the public realm, the status of this father is simply a disadvantage.\(^{20}\)

Williams, recognising the contradictions that are aggregated in the portrait of Horace’s father, attempts to clarify the real identity of this historical figure. He assumes that Horace’s grandparents belonged to the rank that was a level below the upper class in Italian towns.\(^{21}\) Following careful consideration of the passages -which we consider superfluous to repeat here- concerning Horace’s proud references to his Venousian descent, as well as focusing on the admiration that Horace expresses for the pure people dwelling in around his homeland, Williams concludes that “the poet regards himself as belonging to one of the pre-Roman Sabellian tribes, who, of course, re-established themselves in Venusia under Roman occupation.”.\(^{22}\) Considering the historical facts, Williams tends to believe that Horace’s father was among the victims that were captured during Metellus’ invasion in Venusia in 88 B.C., and then sold into slavery. However, some years later these captives regained political rights and Roman citizenship. Thus, captivitas and not servitium was the smirch that discredited the father’s past and Horace’s reputation.\(^{23}\)

As indicated above, we concur with Schlegel in seeing the biological father as a poetic construct that enters the poems to play a particular role. His portrait is an amalgamation of “autobiographical” inclusions and exclusions, of details which have been inserted to produce a certain impression for the immediate context, and of other facts that are not allowed to enter the poems lest

\(^{19}\) Williams (1995) 297-298.
\(^{21}\) Williams (1995) 299-300.
\(^{22}\) Williams (1995) for a detailed analysis of the passages, see pp.300-303.
\(^{23}\) Williams (1995) 307-309. Another argument against the historical truth of the phrase ‘libertino patre natus’ is Horace’s position as a tribunus militum; “that post normally went to young equestrians or senators starting on a career...But Brutus’ act shows that Horace’s father was most unlikely to have been an ex-slave...”, see Williams (1995) 307.
they might hurt the character of Horace the moralist. The satirist stresses the frugal simplicity of his father, while he also makes sure that distracting facts do not blur the picture. To give an indicative example: the exceptional emphasis on the financial difficulties is not consistent with the fact -known, indeed, from other sources- that Horace studied a year or two in Athens, an opportunity that only the most favoured young Romans enjoyed.²⁴

When we try to produce a coherent sketch of Horace’s father, our interpretation is impeded by many textual inconsistencies. To begin with, debatable enough is the information -also relevant to the discussion of the father’s authoritarian profile- that with his meagre means the father transported himself and his son to the city, so that the latter may have the same educational opportunities as the sons of the most distinguished Roman families. All that education would equip Horace to become a prestigious rhetorician and politician, not merely a tax-collector or a small trader, as his father wished (1.6.85-87).²⁵

At this point, it is essential that we cogitate about the further development of the biological father-strategy in Horace’s works. For as long as Horace needs to be presented as a simple down-to-earth man, he readily introduces himself as a son of an ex-slave father in the *Satires*. But when the satirist turns into a lyric poet, the ordinary experience becomes a sacred vocation, and the father is excluded. At Ode 3.4.9-20, Horace recalls a memory from his infancy, designed so as to give *dis animosus* (‘divine blessing’) special significance. According to the description, when he was a baby, he crawled away from his nurse’s house, and after a long search, he fell asleep in the woods. There, doves miraculously covered him with leaves of laurel and myrtle in order to protect him from black vipers and bears. The childhood episode, with all its artistic elaborations, serves mainly to render the Muses the permanent guardians of Horace. Their presence at such an early stage in Horace’s life could not but testify his future poetic success. When at Epistles 1.20.20-25, Horace casts his mind back to his father, he does so with no intention to give him credit -the Muses are likewise absent. Horace restates his humble beginnings only to underscore his personal achievement. The purpose of the *Epistles*, after all, requires a poet who looks for the right way to live; as such,

²⁵ Ibid., 57-58.
Horace must emphasise that the ethical salvation is essentially achieved by individual effort.  

*Horace’s other father, Maecenas (Satire 1.6)*

According to DuQuesnay, the “ostensible purpose of the poem [1.6] is to express the gratitude which Horace feels at being accepted as an amicus of Maecenas.”. What we believe though, is that the encomium of Maecenas is in the end undercut by the praise of the dominant paternal counterpart, the biological father. Undoubtedly, Horace opens his satire uttering praise for the great patron, however somewhere in the middle he deviates from what purports to have been his initial plan. If we follow the coherence of the poem, we will realise that the focus is more on the biological father, rather than on Maecenas. The comparison with the biological father does not work favourably for the patron, for Maecenas is given a fatherly relationship to Horace only to be displaced by the biological parent. As Oliensis points out, “Instead of deriving his social value from his association with Maecenas (“thank you for making me what I am today”), Horace ascribes his success to Maecenas’ recognition of his worth (“I thank my father for making me worthy of your favor”). As a result of the dominance given to the biological father, Maecenas remains deprived of the crucial role that he is believed to have assumed in the poetic career and life of Horace.

Maecenas is himself “father” of a sort to Horace. The satirist chooses to introduce himself as the son mainly of his biological father, and, to a lesser extent, of Maecenas. The son of the freedman father is now given a second, social birth by his patron. In the public sphere, Maecenas acts in paternal capacity as a powerful patron. The etymological derivation of the word ‘patronus’ from the word ‘pater’, though an extratextual factor, implies this father-son relationship. In Satire 1.6, Horace’s first contact with Maecenas, together with his entrance to the latter’s literary circle are described as a birth. Horace approached Maecenas

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29 Oliensis (1998) 34.  
30 Schlegel (2005) 54.
infans with pudor (ut veni coram, singultim pauca locutus, / infans namque pudor prohibebat plura profari, 1.6.56-57), meaning speechless as an infant. Furthermore, the friendship between the two was not ready to “hatch” immediately, but came into light nine months later (1.6.61).31

Father-figures in Satires II: Horace hands over the microphone

The majority of scholars agrees that Horace plays only second fiddle in Book II, as the lead is always granted to personages that are conspicuously lower on the social, philosophical, and literary ladder than him. We wish to argue that in Satires II Horace founds his omnipresence on his (seeming) absence from the poems. Even though we must allow that the Horatian persona -or better still, the multiple and constantly changing façades of it- is overshadowed by “the others” - at least on the surface-, we cannot just as easily take this to be an unchallengeable truism, and as such to find no room for small deviations or obliquities. At this point it would be helpful to adduce two apposite remarks, one of Plaza’s and one of Freudenburg’s, in support of our view that Horace keeps up a very energetic role in his second Book. Plaza suggests that the creation of a “subdued persona” (by Horace for himself to enter into the poems) of this kind is a rather tricky movement, for despite the fact that other protagonists act as first-person speakers, Horace retains much of his importance.32 Freudenburg has insightfully noted that “The odd thing about Horace’s scapegoats, his excoriated “others”, is that they routinely look rather like himself, sometimes remarkably so, threatening his identity …. rather than setting it neatly in relief.”.33 If one tries to combine these two approaches with each other, though they touch the same problem -namely, where is Horace in Satires II?- from different angles, one sees a new path of interpretation open; one that spots Horace everywhere even when he does not speak in propria persona, one that fosters the idea of Horace’s and his many protagonists’ being nothing but two sides of the same coin -at least in some cases.

31 Schlegel (2005) 53; cf. Gowers (2012) 235 who assumes that “Maecenas’ delay might also be due to his absence on a diplomatic mission to Athens in 38.”. The scholar however considers ‘nine’ a indeterminately large number.
The “substitute fathers”: Trebatius and Ofellus (Satire 2.1 and Satire 2.2)

In the first poem of the second Book, Horace the poet is professedly eager to secure legal advice on satiric writing. It seems that he needs someone to show him the way, and so, his persona and Trebatius engage in an increasingly broadened Q and A dialogue, with Horace acting as the one who puts the questions -at least at the very beginning. In the second poem, Horace the moralist speaks, he confesses, with a borrowed voice (that of Ofellus)-a practice which is blatantly alien to that followed by the self-reliant diatribist we encounter in Satires I. He wants to be looked upon as merely a kind of devitalised medium, yet one intent on transmitting (and not coinimg, as he repeatedly tries to deny) some important teachings on plain living -in the second case Horace had received instruction from Ofellus ahead of the poem’s dramatic present, while it is also unclear whether he had asked for this lesson or not (2.2.112ff.).

Here, as with the subsequent pieces of the Book, Horace appears to seek expert advice, and certainly, a jurisconsult and a simple peasant promise to be the best authorities on the aforementioned subjects respectively. The adequacy and fine calibre of Trebatius and Ofellus as connoisseurs, however, is not the sole reason why these two father-models come first in a series of mostly “incompetent” ones-as we shall see, the “others” of Satires 2.1 and 2.2 stand out as the most rational and venerable edifiers of the Book, and so does Cervius in Satire 2.6, if we agree that he too is given a similar role, albeit narrow; and this arrangement can by no means be haphazard.

34 The method of teaching varies: it can be a direct transfer of knowledge (2.1) or a training in watching, which is probably what happens in 2.2 (videas, 114).

35 In all the eight satires, the father-like figures are familiar with and/or have some prior experience in the subjects they come to talk about. Nevertheless, as it will become clear later, each of the (co-)protagonists who stars in the poems following immediately after the two introductory ones, i.e. from Satire 2.3 onwards, displays a different degree of expertise: Damasippus, for instance, moves between an extreme -yet flimsy- dogmatism and insanity; others (such as Catius and Davus) have gained mastery of their task by picking up some learning crumbs from other sources (firsthand or through eavesdropping), whereas others try to conceal their deep ignorance with pretence, by giving plenty of technical information which, in essence, is abstract and superfluous (just like Nasidienus). Despite this discrepancy, however, each character has been chosen to discourse upon something he knows -or he thinks he knows- better than Horace.

36 For if adequate knowledge of the subject were the sole criterion for appreciating a “father”, then Tiresias too could be considered a good guide for his “son” Odysseus (in 2.5), whom he instructs in the lucrative ways of fortune-hunting. But this is not true we think, since the advice given and the methods tried by all but Trebatius and Ofellus are incompatible with the values that the biological father had passed down to Horace. See also the note above.
Having raised the delicate “father-issue”, we propose to argue that Trebatius’ and Ofellus’ “fatherness” is deliberately designed in such a way so as to constitute a point where many lines intersect: the line of the biological father, the individual -and thus, separate- line of each and every father-figure (from those in the front line) who has an active part in Satires II, the line of Horace the child undergoing the early stages of training, and that of him gradually reaching his maturity. By implication, it could further be argued that this very “fatherness” is, to a large extent, intended to serve as the missing link \textit{inter alia} between the two Books, working to enhance even more the appearance of (thematic and structural) continuity. For Trebatius and Ofellus equally look back to the previous Book, and more specifically, to the biological father’s untiring efforts to guide his son, Horace, towards the right moral paths and to the latter’s need for life coaching, and forward, although in reverse, to the demeanour of all the aspiring mentors who are still to turn up in the remainder of the second Book, and who are glaringly but a foil to them in almost all respects.

Correspondingly, Horace’s personality, we can see, is evolving over the dramatic years chronicled in the \textit{Satires}: having already had some guiding principles under his belt (owing mainly to his nurture by the father, and perhaps to time’s advance, to a candid friend’s advice, or to self-counsel, Satire 1.4), he has then, i.e. in Book II, no slight longing -as we hope to prove, Horace only pretends to be ignorant or, elsewhere, astray in a self-mocking way under the name of both a philosophical and a satiric studiousness- to draw rules from many diverse sources. But now the situation is different: Horace is no longer the same unripe and unknowing boy, who used to swallow one piece of advice after the other; he is instead a man capable of filtering any new knowledge, and thereby of deciding either to acquire or to dispose of it -usually after having ironised the person who articulates the “theory” and/or the absurdity of the “theory” itself-, depending on

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{37} It must be clear that, despite the many points of contact, the “fatherness” of Trebatius and Ofellus is not identical; for this reason, the two cases are going to be analysed separately later. \textsuperscript{38} Lack of space and direct relevance prevent us from including father-characters of lesser importance for our argument here, as well as from referring to all the manifestations of childish behaviour, except Horace’s himself; most of the examples within Book II is detected in Satire 2.3: fathers on paternal property management, spendthrift and wastrel sons, children’s games; many more examples of both kinds are available throughout \textit{Satires} I, see selectively: waste of the patrimony, and the case of the father in Terence’s \textit{Heauton Timorumenos} (1.2), fathers showing forbearance to their children’s defects (1.3), the stern father and his prodigal son drawn from a Comedy scene (1.4).}
what its origin, utility and the method of teaching is. Our contention is that Horace endures hearing moralising, and sometimes even disapprobation accompanied by pointed comments, only in order to attain his objective, that is to emerge as an autonomous being in no need of any other (maybe more experienced, but not always wiser) adult to teach him how to think and live -he leaves his interlocutors exposed before the eyes of the audience. And it is true, Horace finds his independence slowly and critically, but not without slips in some steps of the way. Until the end he must be coming up against several wanna-be “guardians”, and he must be constantly weighting up his own position as a teacher/father against his position as a disciple/son. To do so, in short, the “Trebatius and Ofellus milestones” are the first and most crucial ones for Horace’s passing from a hetero-determined to a self-luminous state.

As it was briefly stated above, both Trebatius and Ofellus have traits which not only differentiate them from all the other father-like figures of Satires II, but also associate them with the portrait of Horace’s biological father, as we know it from Satires I. To begin at the most basic level, Trebatius and Ofellus approach Horace in an affectionate way that can be compared with the biological father’s care, and their teachings move around an axis of rationality, healthy reasoning and morality. We must, of course, be on the alert to find echoes and overlaps occurring between the persona of the biological father and those of Trebatius and Ofellus, but by saying this we do not want to suggest that these newly-appeared “fathers” have come to outshine, or even worse, to extirpate the biological one; someone, misled by the total absence of the biological father from the second Book -the title of this sub-section could be equally misleading- might think that this is the most likely scenario, but it is not. In fact, Trebatius and Ofellus pick up the torch passed to them from the biological father -needless to say, Horace is he who gives the signal for this very “relay race” to start-, and, without losing sight of the latter’s teachings, they start from where he had stopped (either endorsing or amending when necessary). And not only this; for the first time they have the opportunity to test Horace’s state of mind and moral code -the same applies to the majority of the “fathers” in Book II, though not every time with the same outcome- and the satirist, in turn, ours. Now there is discussion taking place, there is interaction, criticism, agreement or objections from Horace’s
part, ingredients that were missing from the “biological rearing”. Even so however, we still have legitimate reasons not to deny that Trebatius and Ofellus follow in the biological father’s footsteps. It is actually through them, and, of course, through his son, that the biological father is still present in Book II. After all, we are justified in calling Trebatius and Ofellus “fathers” -and, indeed, relatively successful ones- precisely because their personae are partly determined by the persona of Horace’s father. For if there were not the precedent of the biological father for them to reflect on and compete with, the two men would simply be called ‘sages’, ‘tutors’, or ‘paragons’.

The impetus behind Trebatius’ and Ofellus’ being given a leading role, it is interesting to observe, is twofold: firstly, they apparently function to restore Horace to his prior childish condition, secondly and most importantly, they obliquely bring out Horace’s much-desired mental and moral autonomy. However oxymoronic this may sound, the textual evidence -not to mention the nexus of intertextual relationships and allusions- all converges upon one thing: that Horace the satirist and main character of the poems, notwithstanding his attempt to convince us of the opposite, “uses” Trebatius and Ofellus as spotlights turned towards that independent side of his very satiric self. With Trebatius’ and Ofellus’ success being measured by the biological bonds built in Satires 1.4 and 1.6, and at the same time against the parade of anti-paragons by whom the remainder of Book II is overrun, the co-protagonists of the first two satires should be seen as a bridge; a bridge that links Horace the obedient son with his later combative counterpart in a highly self-referential search for identity.

What we wish to concentrate on in this sub-section then is the paternal mantle in which the jurisconsult Trebatius and the peasant Ofellus are wrapped; why the satirist casts his persona -although only on the surface- for the part of “a child in need of backing”, and what Trebatius and Ofellus offer to Horace’s attempt to “grow up” and to establish himself as an authority on his own right. Consequently, we will examine how this very paternal mantle works as an alternative way for Horace to conceive and (re)define the genre of satire.

39 In an analogous way, appreciating Satire 1.6 presupposes understanding of what is going on in 1.4; likewise, 2.1 and 2.2 demand a high degree of knowledge of Satires 1.4 and 1.6, while they also make the contrast with the following pieces starker, once one reads the rest of Book II having the two in mind.
Trebatius

To start from Trebatius, the name counts among those which can be identified with sufficient certainty: we talk about C. Trebatius Testa (born in (?) 84 B.C. at Velia in Lucania, died A.D. 4), the eminent jurisconsult of Cicero’s time. Trebatius was unarguably a real person -aside from Trebatius’ own output, many sources (these include: records related to the law and its exponents at that time, extracts mentioning him from the writings of both his contemporaries and subsequent fellow-jurists and legal historians, literary works) bear testimony to this fact;- a person who had indeed the appropriate credentials to be considered an influential social figure in the first place, that was his stature as a jurist, in addition to his good standing with Julius Caesar and, after him, with Octavian.

Once pieced together, the pieces of information we have about Trebatius Testa make up the image of a well-known and significant individual, with many references attesting to his rich activity and the high repute he was held in. Already a jurist with an appreciable period of legal practice behind him before joining Caesar in 54 B.C. (in his early or middle thirties), Trebatius is generally thought

41 Trebatius Testa is not a fictional character, and we are fortunate in that we know something about him both as a man and as a jurist. To begin with, many interpretations of the law and views held by Trebatius on certain controversial problems have survived (e.g. Dig. 35.1.40.4; 43.24.22.3; 43.23.2; 28.5.21pr.; 33.1.17pr.); Pomponius’ notice of him (Digest 1.2.2.45, 47). See Watson (1974) 126-127, 129. Cicero’s letters to him (Fam. 7.5-22), which convey a distinct intimation of kindly feelings, give us an insight into Trebatius’ personality and interests in his younger days (he was probably in his early thirties): Trebatius’ unsuppressed predilection for the city, his impatience for easy gain and recognition, his impetuous reactions that endanger his chances of success all deserve reproof; but at the same time, his supreme learning, his legal ability and merits are emphatically praised. Cicero was instrumental in enlisting Julius Caesar’s support for Trebatius: many letters introduce and recommend Trebatius in the most earnest and flattering terms, aiming to promote his advancement; eventually this was not a wasted attempt, for in Fam. 7.17 Cicero writes: Quod ille [Caesar] ita accepti; et mihi saepe litteris significavi, et tibi et verbis et re ostendit, mea commendatione sese valde esse commotum; and also Fam. 7.8, 7.10 [for critical commentary on this series of letters, see Shackleton Bailey 1977, vol. I, letters 26-39 and vol. II, letters 331-334; also Shackleton Bailey 1971 pp.99-104]. Trebatius’ friendship with Cicero was a lasting one, as is attested by the dedication to him of the Topica in 44 B.C. (Fam. 7.19, Top. 1-5); see Muecke (1995) 208 and Muecke (1997) 100.

42 What Roman jurists did was to interpret the law; and this involved among other things: giving legal opinions (responsa), advising orators, judges as well as other individuals on legal procedures -sometimes even on non-legal matters- and preparing documents (cavere); on the functions of the jurists (in the later Republic), see Watson (1974) 101-110. On the distinction between jurisconsults and orators or advocates, see Schulz (1946) 54 ff., 76 ff.

43 Trebatius became a friend of Caesar (familiaris, Cic. Fam. 7.14), and a legal adviser on whom the latter could rely (Cic. Fam. 7.11, 7.13 ‘Trebatius was being consulted by an imperator’), Bauman (1985) 127-129; he later enjoyed the highest respect of Augustus (maxima auctoritas, Inst. Iust. 2.25 pr.). On Trebatius’ having received marks of recognition for his services to Caesar (including a possible public career), see Bauman (1985) 124ff. For Trebatius’ role as legal adviser to Octavian, see Bauman (1985) pp.132ff.; an opinion of his to do with Maecenas’ and Terentia’s divorce case is also recorded in 16 B.C. (Digesta 24.1.64).
to have lived through the triumvirate and the greater part of Augustus’ principate.\textsuperscript{44} If this is so, there can be little doubt that Trebatius was active in the time of Horace, and if we follow Fraenkel and Muecke, Trebatius was then an established figure in his mid-fifties, something which may strengthen the likelihood of Trebatius’ identity and deeds having been known among Horace’s contemporary readership.\textsuperscript{45} 

Despite the historical evidence existing about Trebatius’ life and career, it is difficult to imagine how he could have been welcome to enter the Satires in his full “extratextual armour”. For to become a character at Horace’s service, one needs to be stripped of certain parts of his real-life self, and to accept that other parts will be “used” or even “abused”, distorted or garbled, that will slightly alter or totally change. Trebatius is playing a particular role in Satire 2.1, and the question of the precise accuracy of the picture presented so far is not germane to his role in articulating a new, changed form of satire in Book II. From this perspective, the character Trebatius, we must imagine, is tailored to fit the satirist’s and the poem’s needs, while any inference that can be drawn about Trebatius should be, again, filtered by the specific plan of 2.1. It is for this reason that we deem it safer to stick to Horace’s relationship with Trebatius as this stands in the text.

What position does the jurisconsult hold in the poem? Is the essence of the relationship between Horace and Trebatius determined in the context of utilitarianism and socioeconomic disparities, or in the context of genuine affection, sentiment and parity? Trebatius is given the role of the mentor, and although it is sometimes tempting to conceive the relationship between him and Horace as one of personal patronage (between a benefactor and a protégé),\textsuperscript{46} ‘personal patronage’ is,\textsuperscript{47} we think, a misnomer when applied to the relationship that Horace builds with his “benefactor” in the poem. For Trebatius does not give material capital; offering his advice is the only service he provides, and it is precisely his juristic knowledge that makes him a source of benefactions here. In

\textsuperscript{44} Bauman (1985) 123-136.
\textsuperscript{45} Fraenkel (1957) 145-146, Muecke (1997) 100.
\textsuperscript{46} Williams (1995) 303-304; guesses that Trebatius Testa and Asinius Pollio were patrons to the poet when the latter arrived in Rome.
\textsuperscript{47} It is important that we remember the etymological root of the word patronus (= a protector, defender, patron) patronus < pater.
2.1 there is not the slightest indication that the two men had ever had economic transactions, that they were obliged by a reciprocal “payback”, or anyhow that they were forced by the coercions of a gift economy. And it need only be added here that not a word is said in the poem about either the status (equal or otherwise) of the two men or their economic condition - for if Horace wanted to stress any inequality, he would have certainly done that.

Trebatius’ “fatherness” is of more than a passing concern to the satirist. Here are some considerations which positively corroborate this statement. The first level of understanding suggests that, in 2.1, Trebatius serves as Horace’s “tutelary guardian” - in this respect, he is perceived to be an amalgam of the biological father and Maecenas who also fall under the same title- in a number of ways, a character though much less complex than the two most important of Horace’s “guardians”, i.e. the biological father and Maecenas. The first and perhaps more straightforward comparison that can be made here is that between Trebatius and Maecenas, as both being a kind of “social father” who not only watches over Horace and supports him in the non-domestic sphere, but is also interested in his image-management, all the more so because this very public image can attract (or otherwise repel) notable acquaintances.

Trebatius feels a responsibility for Horace’s protection and betterment. He is apprehensive of whatever may incur hatred and therefore, throughout 2.1, he encourages Horace to make safe choices, among them to pursue rewards, and to try to win the particular favour of the wealthy and well-connected. He is also there to bring up the Caesaris invicti res, the maiores amici, the sanctae leges and the mala carmina, all key pointers, which, once put together, hint at what was an “open secret”: that Horace’s actions - his poetry more than anything else- should offend neither the established institutions nor the powerful “friends”; Octavian above all.

Far from being able to opine on whether Trebatius had much or little in common with Maecenas, - except maybe the obvious, namely, the high social

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48 The terms amicitia or friendship and amici (rather than the terms clientela, cliens and patronus) were used to describe almost exclusively social relations of a frequently utilitarian nature between people of different status (for example: in numero amicorum, Sat. 1.6.62; maiorum quis amicus, Sat. 2.1.61) - a quality that sets patronage off from friendship between equals. See Lowell Bowditch (2001) 19ff.
standing and the important network— we can nevertheless observe that Horace makes the jurisconsult out to be much the successor of Maecenas, whose absence from the introductory poem of Book II is anything but unsurprising. To sense this irony, one need only consider the way in which Trebatius is presented in 2.1. In the poem we see him behaving as though he were a literary patron, recommending that Horace quench his thirst for writing with a couple of “regime-friendly” genres; now he is the one who acts as the spokesman of Octavian, the one who knows the dos and don’ts, and is in a position to sound a note of warning. It appears that among the services he provides, the encouragement for social visibility and the literary endorsement or non-endorsement are the ones which define his relationship with Horace the most. In return, the poet must compose poetry, responding thus to the benefactor who explicitly or otherwise calls in the debts created by his benefactions. What is more, by usurping Maecenas’ usual role as recipient of the Augustan poet’s refusal to write an epic celebrating the new regime (recusatio), Trebatius threatens to unseat his patronus-match completely (vv.12-20). From yet another point of view, Trebatius remains dominant—as compared to Maecenas—on a scale that exceeds Satire 2.1: he becomes the first addressee of the new Book, supplanting thus Maecenas who, until that time, was the unrivalled dedicatee and privileged addressee (Satire 1.1.1, Satire 1.6.1). In a nutshell, Horace the satirist has Trebatius exercise his influence upon his own dramatic persona, to be sure, but not without undermining the corresponding influence of Maecenas. To put it in a different way, Trebatius is a “social father”, not solely but largely due to the similarities he shares with the ultimate “social father”, Maecenas, his role however is more amplified than the

49 Literary patronage is qualitatively different from social or personal amicitia, for in the case of the first-mentioned, the services provided by the patron and the duties performed by the poet are mainly those pertaining to literature and its audience; poetry itself (together with offerings embedded in the poems) is the most significant “good” exchanged. On this view, see Lowell Bowditch (2001) 25.

50 Fraenkel (1957) 148-149: draws a parallel between Trebatius and the typical Augustan literary patron who was in close contact with Caesar. The rationale behind this is the following: Trebatius’ insistence on the theme of the laudes Caesaris cannot but reveal something more than simply an attempt to dissuade Horace from writing satire; Caesar’s achievements must be sung not because there are no other themes available to be sung, but because they are the most advantageous of all themes. Muecke (1995) 216, develops the idea: “But we need to ask the question: why Trebatius? Is it because Maecenas’ literary influence was not yet fully established, or for the sake of the legal metaphor, or because Trebatius can be depicted as a man for whom literary arguments have no reality, so that he becomes by inversion ‘a foil… for the assertion of literary values’ (Zetzel 1982: 99)?”.

latter’s in the case of 2.1, and further, it fits better the needs of the new satiric project. For all his mastery, Trebatius heads a group of weak authorities that we are to meet henceforth, and from this position, he ushers in a new era for Horace, one of independence and relative autonomy -more will be said about this concept of individuality later.

Admittedly, his wisdom in combination with his age and experience render Trebatius a guiding figure, but why should we label him a “father” after all? Even though the context almost obliges the reader to make the assumption that the consultation is confined mainly to the public implications of what it means to write satire in the 30s B.C., there are affectionate addresses scattered all over the poem, followed by revelations of feelings, and moments of profound interest (on the jurisconsult’s part) which prove the discussion between Horace and Trebatius to enlarge upon more personal matters of the former’s “life”. The simplest explanation would be that this is to be expected, since the two men touch not a general and vague problem, but one that pervades Horace’s life and satiric poetry. But even if one accepts this solution as the only applicable one here, the question why Trebatius approaches Horace in such a cordial way is still open for exploration, we think. In fact, the close reading of the text shows effectively how Trebatius can be regarded as a counterpart of Horace’s biological father -this is the interpretative lens through which we propose to see Trebatius. It should be emphasised from the outset, however, that Trebatius’ social standing and educational qualifications clash with the biological father’s inferior status and elementary system of family ethics (cf. Satires 1.6 and 1.4 respectively); something that at first obscures the connection between the two.

Williams, in an attempt to solve the difficulty arising from the much-discussed passage 2.1.34-39, where we get a complicated recollection of the poet’s origins, argues that the very reference to the ambiguous tribal identity is not irrelevant at all as it is, incorporated into the consultation. In his historical survey, Williams undertakes to discover and reconstruct possible bonds that there might have existed between the families of Trebatius and Horace, so he looks for regional ties. According to his premise, Trebatius Testa, if indeed the grandson of the rebel Trebatius (a rebel leader in the Social War; Appian, BC I.228-9), may have been Venusian -the information that Trebatius had property and relatives in
Velia in Lucania is also attested (Cicero, *Fam. 7.19*). 52 Hence, Williams assumes that “the families of the poet and the jurist had been friends of long standing and shared in common the same puzzle over tribal identity”. 53 Even if so, is it sufficient to base the supposition that Trebatius was a person with whom Horace was on intimate terms (solely) on historical evidence -and, following on from that, what about Horace the dramatic character? In our intratextually-oriented approach, it is definitely not -nor satisfactory- and for this reason it is important that we take more notice of what lies “hidden” beneath the surface of Satire 2.1. The best place to start is the way in which Horace addresses Trebatius; the address *pater optime* (2.1.12), merits great mention. This phrase may work well as a respectful address to elderly people or teachers, 54 but one cannot disregard the coincidence (?): this is exactly the same phrase which Horace used to describe his biological father in Satire 1.4.105 (*pater optimus*). Similarly, one cannot disregard the corresponding characterisation of Horace as *puer* (Satire 2.1.60).

Appropriately enough, the word ‘puer’ could be interpreted as ‘young disciple’ or as ‘little friend’, but in line with the argument expounded here, literally as ‘child’ too. 55 Moreover, every time Trebatius offers his advice or expresses an objection he does it in a loving and caring way, that appears to go beyond the impartial utterance a professional like him we might have expected to turn to. The tone of phrases such as: *O puer, ut sis/ vitalis metuo* (v.60-61), *sed tamen ut monitus caveas* (v.80) 56 is revealing. But Horace too seems ready to open his “heart”, in trusting Trebatius with his concerns, in sharing body symptoms, writing

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52 For Trebatius Testa’s links with Lucania, see Fraenkel (1957) 146; Muecke (1997) 107 ad loc. Also, Bauman (1985) 126-127, who discusses Trebatius’ status.

53 Williams (1995) 301-303, quotation from pg.303. Before him, Fraenkel (1957) 146-147 had assumed that there was between Horace and Trebatius far more than a nodding acquaintance; he had backed his hypothesis with references to the easy and informal tone of the conversation (which takes place in 2.1), and -outside the text- to Trebatius’ birthplace, suggesting that the two men were, in real life, bound with strong (southern-Italian) regional ties.

54 Lewis and Short s.v. ‘pater’: II D as a title of honor, father– of a teacher, as a source or creator (Cic. de Or. 2,3,10). – as a term of respect: “pater Aeneas” (Verg. 5,348); esp. to an old man (Plaut. Most. 4,2,36; Verg. A. 5,521). For ‘optimus’ meaning a man morally good, a honest man, a man of good standing in the community, expressing excellence (with nouns denoting persons in regard to their functions, offices, occupations, and qualities), and also as a conventional courtesy and as a laudatory epithet (esp. used with nouns such as *senex, pater, frater*, etc.), see Lewis and Short s.v. ‘bonus’.

55 Lewis and Short s.v. ‘puer’: II 1 a male child, a boy, lad, young man (strictly till the 17th year, but freq. applied to those who are much older). II 2 a grown-up youth, young man. B 1 a (little) son.

56 Cf. the biological father urged upon his son the importance of his staying away from *vitia*; remember also his wit to predict potential danger, his fear (for Horace’s *fama*) and his guidance.
inabilities, earnest desires, inclinations, instincts, in giving information about his friends and his satiric predecessor, and in outlining his own poetic plans before him; a process which, in essence, approximates closely to a kind of introspective examination.

In his double capacity as a “social father” and as a quasi-biological father, Trebatius has his say on poetry, and more specifically, on his “son’s” involvement with it - though the one role contradicts the other. It is true that Horace is he who engages Trebatius in the conversation (2.1.5, *quid faciam, praescribe*) - as opposed to the biological father, who acted on his own initiative - by seeking his advice in the aftermath of the publication of *Satires* I, but, what matters most here is the very substance of the suggestions itself, and not whether the consultation was unforced, or whether it was due to Horace’s dilemma that Trebatius was provoked to speak.\(^{57}\) In any case, the jurisconsult exhorts Horace to silence, and - if this is impossible to achieve- to encomiastic epic or, failing that, to panegyric satire. For an informed reader, already, it is crystal clear that Trebatius’ view on poetry does not even slightly coincide with the teachings of the biological father, and as such, it nearly blows out the strong connection between the two paternal personae. At the precise moment when satire is at stake, Trebatius agitates against it - to be more accurate, against libellous verses altogether - as something that brings only ill fame, no reward, hatred, grief, and even strict official punishment. In stark contrast, the biological father was the man who initiated Horace into the method of fault-finding (the method of self-control included), by exposing him to all kinds of conduct which should be avoided.\(^{58}\) The various contemporary *exempla*, together with the very method itself were the raw material to be later transmuted into satiric writing, and finally, to make Horace the poet he became. In essence, the biological father, while trying to shape his son’s character,\(^{59}\) was encouraging

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\(^{57}\) Cf. other “fathers” of Book II, whose response is either unasked for (e.g. Damasippus’ first attack in 2.3), or provoked by Horace’s attitude (e.g. Davus’ attack in 2.7).

\(^{58}\) Note also that the biological father is presented indifferent to high official positions and rewards of all kinds (Trebatius in 2.1.11-12, *multa laborum / praemia laturus* cf. the biological father in 1.6.85 ff.).

\(^{59}\) 1.4.101-102: Horace’s *animus* and *chartae* are inseparable; his poetry emanates from his character. See Schlegel (2005) 39: “when Horace asks whether his poetry is justifiably *suspectum* (1.4.65), he answers by telling us who he is; the poet *is* the answer to the question about the genre.”
him to observe the follies around, and without even realising it, he was guiding his son along the right literary paths.\textsuperscript{60}

Five years have passed from the publication of \textit{Satires} I, and yet the repercussions hunt the satirist still; indeed, more intensely just when he is about to open a new chapter of satire. At the very beginning of the new Book -the chronological order suggests otherwise: in view of \textit{Caesaris invicti} (2.1.11) it would seem that the poem was written after the battle of Actium, that is shortly before the publication of Book II in 30 B.C.\textsuperscript{61} Horace the satiric poet is getting into a twofold trouble: on the one hand, he has to cope with the cost of public reaction to his work, on the other hand, he needs to focus on the “reality of now”. It is important to note that the way in which Horace is going to proceed with his satires henceforth is not only affected by the new socio-political conditions, but also by the earlier Book itself.

In the radical paper entitled “Slander and Horse Law in Horace, Sermones 2.1”, Lowrie undertakes to untangle the various strands binding literature and the law not only in a mutually-exclusive relationship but also in a comfortably intimate contact. Even though Satire 2.1 stages a dialogue between the two seemingly incompatible “worlds” of satire and the law, and indeed in terms suggestive of rivalry, Lowrie shows that the mechanisms of the poem are much more intricate than we might expect, and that the contrast between the two discourses turns out to be not sharp at all in the end. It needs no specific explanation to understand that it is difficult for satire and the law to come to a negotiation without violating each other first; the case is almost self-evident: the law places restrictions on how far the satiric poet can attack anyone both alive and of any important social standing, or, alternatively, satire needs to infringe the law in its aspiration to praise \textit{acerbitas, abunde salis, libertas}. But aside from the fact that the two zones are otherwise discrete, Lowrie argues, there are numbers of points where satire and the law emerge closely intertwined: as for the modes of representation, to begin with, both join writing to utterance (\textit{scribere - dicere}; they

\textsuperscript{60} Cf. 1.4.103 ff; Horace recognises that the Lucilian satire is descended from Old Comedy, but although he actually follows this tradition, he belongs to a different, i.e. biological genealogy. For it was the biological father, not the literary, that taught the poet how to brand and judge the human follies. For the biological father as also the ‘father of the satiric genre’, see Schlegel (2005) 39-40, 45, 49-50.

\textsuperscript{61} LaFleur (1981) 1812: Satire 2.1 was the last of all the satires in order of composition.
can also be referred to within the metaphorics of song (*carmen*); additionally, both literature and the law are discourses within which one’s social position plays a crucial role in enabling or disabling freedom of speech; both have limits; parallelisms are also found in the very first (historical) birth of the two, given that literature and the law coloured man’s emergence from primitivism; they share the same telos: both are forms of judgment, each targeting those who are not acting as they should, and both entail penalties.\(^{62}\)

Horace’s ambiguous attitude towards the law makes the possibility of his having faced the threat of prosecution moot, and as such, it has caused discord to arise among the scholars. To find an answer most scholars have turned their attention to analogous incidences of libel cases brought against poets of the Republic, so that they can align the case at hand (i.e. Horace’s) with a line of precedents. The fact that we have no recorded instance in which capital punishment was applied -although there were libel cases- along with the example of Lucilius, whose vituperation against important living contemporaries never got him into legal trouble, have driven some to believe that Roman society respected the independence of writers, at least, during the end of the second century B.C.E.\(^{63}\) On the other hand, a consideration of the historical evidence concerning the libel case against Naevius can illustrate the exact opposite, namely that the prohibition against slander restricted the respect for independence to that of the governing class.\(^{64}\) In this context, Octavian’s role is also discussed, with particular stress falling on the period of transition from his preparing to become Augustus to that of his omnipotence being stabilised: written (satirical) works remained comparatively free until Octavian prepared to become Augustus, but they began to be effectively repressed in the period of Empire.\(^{65}\)

\(^{62}\) For the whole analysis and further examples, see Lowrie (2005) 408-416.
\(^{63}\) See Gruen (1992) 295-296 n.3.
\(^{64}\) See Momigliano (1940) 120-124.
\(^{65}\) Feeney’s (1992) survey on the problem of free speech under the Principate -though confined to the example of Ovid- teaches much. The chronological transformations of Augustan ideology, and also the changes in what Augustus himself stood for at given moments in his career, are considered crucial factors for one to catch the essence of the matter; the historical sequence goes as follows: tolerance of free expression was a prerogative in the early days (Suet. Aug. 51.3), in the middle period of Augustus’ reign (i.e. from Actium to the disgrace of his daughter) the libertas enjoyed even by the highest members of society suffered irrevocable infringement, the last years of the reign saw a decisive shift towards intolerance. However, this graph was by no means (always thus) linear, since it is acknowledged that Augustus’ power enabled him to permit a certain freedom of
Trebatius is asked for legal advice, to be sure, but the questions on whether Horace’s expression of anxiety and Trebatius’ consultation are to be taken seriously are very vexing. A great deal of work has been done during the last few years on decoding the programmatic significance of Satire 2.1, with the most recent studies making a strong case for the deceptive character of the piece, the thorough-going irony, and, delving deeper into the central idea and key language, for the fictionality of the consultation itself. Unlike these literary-focused approaches, the traditional view which commentators have maintained concerning the poem’s serious intent has sprung entirely from and has been founded on a nexus of extratextual tensions, namely the changing rules and impositions of the new era, but, above all, the omnipotent Octavian’s limits of tolerance towards anything that could be considered “dangerous”. Regarding in particular the debate over 2.1, the threat of legal prosecution is only one measure of many that the adherents of such a view have been inclined to believe was being taken against potential “disturbers”; this category of people encompasses those involved with the writing of satire as well. Taking for granted that the poem deals with language, but he arbitrarily and unpredictably reserved for himself the right of determining the limits of it -for this reason the boundaries cannot be easily pinned down. See also Smith’s (1951) attempt to trace the historical development of the law of libel at Rome. These works include: Rudd (1966) 124-131, characterises 2.1 as “a deceptive poem” in terms of both structure and content. Examining the position of the poem, he underscores the numerous echoes and links with Book I. Regarding its subject matter, he is insightful enough to ponder two complementary parameters, one extratextual and one intratextual; following consideration of the law of libel he writes: “It is doubtful, however, if 2.1 reflects any real anxiety. Horace, after all, had the other seven poems before him and he knew quite well that they contained little in the way of defamatory material.”, while, when he comes to discuss the language and argumentation of the piece itself, his verdict reaffirms the lightness he tends to attribute to the Satire: “In this poem we are struck again and again by a playfulness almost amounting to farce”. Anderson (1984), concentrates on how the poet abuses the normally serious rhetorical function of preamble, resulting in a satiric self-definition which is coloured by notes of self-deprecation, self-mockery and self-irony. Clauss (1985) argues that the consultation, being only a shroud placed before a broader legal smokescreen, is, in effect, the mise-en-scène for Horace’s discussion of satire; he observes that Horace alludes to, borrows and reworks Callimachean motifs (the recusatio included) in order to determine the difference between his own careful workmanship and Lucilius’ careless poetic composition. Harrison (1987), tackles the problem of Horace’s (autobiographical?) self-portraiture (2.1.30-34), and concludes that almost every line of the poem is marked by broad humour, and is undercut, as it is, by a characteristic ironic ambiguity. Cloud (1989) 67: argues for a phoney legal consultation, indeed, for a funny parody, and he bases his interpretation on the absurdity of the advice given by the legal advisor to his Roman client: the cures prescribed against insomnia add to the ongoing joke. For Freudenburg (1990), the real programmatic intent lies in the realm of ‘compositional style’, and hence, he approves of the ironic interpretation of the piece. Trying to pin down its humour, he finds it developing through an interplay between the apparent and the implicit meanings of certain key terms; he elaborates at considerable length a list of pregnant words which have a double, i.e. sexual and technical poetic definition, whereby he effectively shows that the pretensions of 2.1 have little to do with the legal issues which are the ostensible premise of it.
with a real problem, its core being occupied by a serious discussion about the possible political-legal consequences of satiric writing under the Principate, this group of scholars has been tempted to take Horace’s edifice of “true self” at its face value, and, as a result, to accept the satirist’s promise to write harmless verses as a sincere programmatic declaration. In order to convince for the serious message of the poem, these scholars have even argued that Satire 2.1 would make no sense had it not been for its law parameter.

Given that Satire 2.1 continues the apologetic theme of the fourth and tenth Satires of Book I, it is surprising that we find scarcely any reference to the common bulwarks Horace used to turn to in difficult times -namely, his biological father, and the gang of political and literary men. With the biological father out of the frame, Horace the satirist could have held more space for his great friends and patron. But, apparently, this was not what he was trying to do. There are only two direct references to the magni amici (the first in the lines attributed to Trebatius, 2.1.61; the second one comes from Horace in 2.1.76), but no nominativ enumeration is included here (cf. 1.10.81-90). Is this simply a matter of Horace’s wanting either to avoid boring his audience and repeating himself, aware as he was that everyone knew his milieu -not only from his poems- or even to avoid being considered a coaxter, in embracing the opportunity to flatter the elite? We think that we cannot answer in the affirmative to either scale of the question.

If we pay careful attention to the emerging intratextual contradictions, we will soon realise that Satire 2.1 is nothing but a fictionalised conversation, in which law is only an element that enhances the comic effect. If we try to analyse the whole structure of 2.1, we will understand that the allegedly serious consultation is undermined by the very reaction of Horace. To begin with the language of the passage, we can clearly distinguish the terminological system of

67 For this view, see: LaFleur (1981) reads Satires II as the product of its time. As the prologue of the new Book and by recapitulating the main (apologetic) points of 1.4 and 1.10, Satire 2.1, he argues, is the best evidence for the anxiety Horace must have felt working in a restrictive environment; for it is very likely that the satirist had also experienced the society’s resentment for his slurs on certain prominent figures and several contemporaries (in the previous Book). There is no doubt, LaFleur concludes, that Horace became himself less abusive because he knew the law of defamation, had the good sense to interpret it in the context of the most current political situation, and, as he supposes, because he was ever seeking to maintain and improve his position in Rome, and to secure the firmness of Octavian’s support. In like manner, Fraenkel (1957) 145-153, regards 2.1 as “a discussion of the moral issues involved in the publication of satires, with an occasional glance at possible legal consequences”.

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law from that of poetry. Although Horace attempts to blur the limits between the two different “languages”, it is easy for the insightful reader to realise that during the whole piece the two protagonists do not communicate effectively. While Horace talks about the ‘law of satire’ (2.1.2), Trebatius interprets the word *lex* as referring to the actual law of libel. Moreover, the context where the word “praescribo” (2.1.5) can be found is double. Apart from the general meaning ‘to order, appoint, direct, command, prescribe’, the verb can be translated as ‘to bring an exception against, to except, object, or demur to’ in legal contexts, and as ‘to dictate / to write down, to put down in writing’ in literary contexts. In the world of the lawyer, the phrase *mala carmina* (2.1.82) is translated into ‘insulting verses’, whereas in the world of Horace, the phrases *mala carmina* and *bona carmina* are to be understood as terms of poetic quality. By the same token, Caesar’s judgment (2.1.84) is literal, judicial for Trebatius, but an action of literary criticism for Horace.

Horace seems to be interested to hear the advice of Trebatius, but as it will become clear, he proves to be disobedient to his “father’s” preaching. The anguished question *quid faciam* (2.1.5) purports to need the answer of the interlocutor. Even though an answer is given -indeed three alternative solutions are provided- the poet raises objections to every argument. [a) Horace: my satiric work is criticised very differently by different groups of critics - Trebatius: *Quiescas*; b) Horace: *nequeo dormire* - Trebatius: the remedies for the insomnia are swimming and drinking; c) Trebatius: if you are tortured by the passion for writing, write an epic for the deeds of Caesar - Horace: *re cusatio*. The second appearance of the *quid faciam* (2.1.24) takes only superficially the form of a question, since the lengthy answer is given by Horace himself. Instead of following the advice he asked for, the Horatian persona tries to support his own view. The second *quid faciam* gives the impression that Horace is unyielding to his decision to write satire; he purports to claim that he has no other choice. Horace’s personal delight is to compose verses and he will continue to write (i.e. satires) whatever the consequences; it is something like an irresistible impulse, an instinct. As he himself confesses, satire is his “natural weapon” (*ut quo quisque valet suspectos terreat, utque / imperet hoc natura potens*, 2.1.50-51). The voice

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68 Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*. 
of Trebatius is heard anew at verse 60. The lawyer tries again to prepare Horace for the potential dangers, but Horace again controverts the warnings. The abrupt *quid* (2.1.62) opens another lengthy counter-argument of Horace. At the end of Satire 2.1, Trebatius is only asked if he disagrees (*nisi quid...dissentis*, 2.1.78). Now, the roles of the speaker and the listener have changed: the lawyer is only asked to endorse Horace’s stable opinion.

And so the question naturally arises: if Trebatius is not a scapegoat to cover Horace’s back -since we saw that Horace unveils much of his speaking voice-, if his professional advice finally succumbs to Horace’s punning demolition of the actual law against libel, why is he then the co-protagonist of 2.1? As we mentioned earlier, we wish to work with the energy released from the diverse interlocutors of Book II, as this manifests itself as meta-satiric. For to see the “others” in their poetological-theoretical contribution is to recognise that Horace (re)builds the genre, not a defensive wall to protect himself from legal prosecution or any other retaliation. Horace needs the law for a specific reason; if we borrow Cloud’s words: “The satirist purports to be a teacher of morality and the law serves the same function”.69 Horace creates a Trebatius out of the real Trebatius, the jurisconsult and friend of Octavian, in order to make clear that extratextual restrictions cannot affect the *Satires*-at least decisively. In the first poem of the second Book, Horace introduces himself anew; he is a self-aware satirist and generically-conscious satirist. The questions of what can be said, where and when, by whom are indicative, and we think, they are the key preoccupation of the poem. In the story of Satire 2.1 Horace condenses literary criticism and the law into an alternative justification of his satire. For the first time he names his genre, *satura*, and for the last time he mentions his satiric predecessor, Lucilius. He follows the inventor (*Sequor hunc*), but he is determined to continue using his own powers: good quality (*bona carmina*) and serious moral intention (*opprobriis dignum latraverit*), 2.1.83-85.

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69 Cloud (1989) 64.
Ofellus

Early in the poem, Horace introduces Ofellus to his addressees in a brief yet all-inclusive line: Ofellus is a peasant, an unschooled wise man of homespun wisdom (rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassa Minerva, 2.2.3).\textsuperscript{70} There is nothing superfluous, nothing common, nothing trivial in this description; on the contrary, each of the words carries a whole baggage of meanings, pregnant as it is with philosophical associations and literary allusions. Rusticus admits multiple (but interrelated) readings, to begin with: the literal and most obvious sense of the masculine noun rusticus, -i is ‘a countryman’, ‘rustic’, ‘peasant’, while as an adjective it covers all the qualities -both positive and negative- pertinent to the country: namely simplicity, frugality, provincialism, roughness, coarseness. It follows then that Horace’s characterisation of Ofellus as rusticus, otherwise absolutely accurate because of the latter’s choice of farming as an occupation, additionally opens up the possibility of Ofellus’ being a representative of all the positive in this case- values that are frequently associated with the countryside.\textsuperscript{71} And this is certainly true of Ofellus, for, in corroboration of the rusticus label, both the reported discourse and the “actual words” spoken by himself supply him with country values: the concepts of plain living and the golden mean, balanced diet and friendship.

The interpretational possibilities are more than one in the case of the term ‘sapiens’ too. Commentators usually gloss the word as ‘philosopher’ and ‘sage’ - the nearest parallel is 1.4.115- in accordance with the definition of the Greek equivalent σοφός. Ofellus is worthy to be called ‘wise’, this translation however gives prominence only to Ofellus’ intellectual strengths. What we ourselves think most possible is that the (supposed) primary meaning and a culinary pun co-exist, something that gives double point to sapiens. Depending on the context, ‘sapiens’ can be also used to mean ‘tasty or savoury’, ‘tasteful’,\textsuperscript{72} and, if we apply this etymology to the food-concerned Satire 2.2, we can then easily explain why Ofellus’ distinct taste should be held in high esteem. For it is not only his wisdom

\textsuperscript{70} Abnormis is best taken as adjective with substantival sapiens. Abnormi spoils the autonomy of the proverbial crassa Minerva; this syntax follows Muecke (1997) 117 ad loc.

\textsuperscript{71} Muecke (1997) 117 ad loc.: “Though rusticus is potentially ambiguous, we are not meant to feel its negative associations (slowness, uncouthness, naivety), but rather the positive implication of unsophisticated decency.”.

\textsuperscript{72} Gowers (1993a) 132 n.92.
that renders Ofellus the appropriate person to counsel on frugal living and eating; the source whose backing Horace invokes does embody himself the very culinary ideal he cherishes.\(^\text{73}\)

Ofellus’ name does not allow the same degree of confidence as that of Trebatius; nothing is known of him beyond what we can glean from the references in Satire 2.2, and therefore the name cannot be matched with any particular extratextual individual.\(^\text{74}\) Was he a living and breathing person, and indeed of the kind that the satirist wants us to believe? In absence of any historical or other corroborative evidence, it is scientifically unwise to answer in the affirmative or otherwise.\(^\text{75}\) By no means ruling out the possibility of a “real” Ofellus,\(^\text{76}\) for our purposes it suffices to read Ofellus in his Horatian version, as a subject matter in itself being controlled by the poet’s intentions. For even if Ofellus is a historical figure, some allowance must of course be given to all the satiric distortions, maneuvers and rhetorical techniques that are capable of shifting things, making the counterfeit look authentic and the fictitious plausible.

Accordingly, the pivotal questions here are: who is Ofellus in 2.2, and why is he brought in? Ofellus’ prosopography and the role he is called to play in the poem are no doubt two sides of the same coin. But let us leave aside for the moment the question of Ofellus’ role, and focus on what constitutes his prosopography. In the case of Ofellus, it must be stressed, the satirist performs a striking and unique experiment: the satirist does not “allow” his “other” to expose his theory in his own voice, and by doing this, he passes from silence to speech, hiding himself rather obviously behind the mask of Ofellus. For the most part of the poem we “see” and “listen to” Ofellus through Horace’s “eyes” and “ears” respectively; in fact, it is difficult to distinguish where Ofellus stops and where

\(^{73}\) Another “strange coincidence” adds weight to our conjecture: the name ‘Ofellus’, with its close connection to *ofella* (= a pork cutlet), can work well as a humorously telling name. See also Rudd (1966) 144: “At first sight it seems a suspiciously neat paradox that the virtues of frugality should be expounded by a man called Mr Titbit”.

\(^{74}\) The only things we know about the name are that it has an Oscan origin, and that it is attested in an inscription (Muecke (1997) 116-117 *ad loc.*).

\(^{75}\) Cf. Rudd (1966) 143-144, who contends that we are dealing with a real person; he believes that Horace tells the truth when he “recalls” Ofellus’ moments or/and when he brings out the “very specific name” of the new owner of the farm.

\(^{76}\) The fact that Horace has Ofellus react to a contemporary historical reality does not necessarily mean that the latter was actually a living person, and indeed, a victim of the land-confiscations; especially when the last-mentioned information can be deduced from nowhere else but from the poem itself.
Horace starts, except maybe for the last 20 lines of the poem. The impression of a Horatian-filtered authenticity is tempered, in addition, by the multiple roles which Ofellus is called to play in the poem: a countryman becomes an impressive combination of a father, adviser, philosopher, literary authority, in short, a dignified model to be followed. Ofellus’ ego, we suggest, is shaped in such a way as to fit into the masks he is given to adopt at different points.

If, notwithstanding the considerable evolvement of the Horatian scholarship on the tension between historical truth and poetic verisimilitude, there are still scholars left to think that ‘fatherhood’ in *Satires* II is again a matter of historicity, they will derive little satisfaction from the leaks the poems release. What must be stressed though, is that when the satirist “lets things slip out” and when he remains mute, he does it on purpose; with the mechanisms behind either choice being just as much important as what it is told by the satirist and what it is left unmentioned. With regard to the matter at issue, shrewdly enough and with a great deal of irony, Horace avoids giving any indication as to his protagonists’ own biological offspring. But exception to this rule does exist; and this exception is Ofellus, who, if the clues *gnatis* (v.115) and *pueri* (v.128) are taken in face value, is himself a father of at least two children. Humble, inspirational and protective of his children, it is hard to think of a man who deserves the (literal though strictly intratextual) title of father more. Ofellus’ paternal instinct, as well as his whole attitude towards life in general, dictates that children should be raised with a sound mind and heart; the onus being on him to give such guiding principles so that his children will obtain sanity and preserve it whenever bad fortune hits. That is all we can draw from the text. As for the rest, Horace does not clarify whether Ofellus’ method of child rearing included only verbal advice or was it a combination of verbal advice and practical example, that of his own behaviour. And equally striking is the fact that nothing in the story comes from the children’s point of view. Are we to imagine a ‘like father like son’ situation? Horace deliberately leaves the question open until the final decision on the effectiveness of Ofellus’ fatherhood is reached.

The countryman, given the qualities of his character and the soundness of his doctrines, could stand as a source of moral wisdom in his own right, to be sure, but it is through the similarities between him and Horace’s biological father
that the former assumes responsibility for pointing out what should be avoided, and as such, he secures his place among the successful father-figures of Book II. Ofellus is designed to duplicate the results of Horace’s upbringing, his teachings being enriched with principles similar to those instilled in Horace by his biological father.

When one tries to figure out if, and -if yes- how Ofellus fits into the group of “fathers” in Satires II, one may recognise a glaring oddity in Ofellus that raises difficulties of interpretation. For there is an interesting contradiction of having a man who is presented as the greatest “father”, a man so unique that it is problematic to be classified among the lunatic father-figures prevailing in the Book. The contradiction is nevertheless resolved once one detects the subtle difference occurring between the ‘father’ and the ‘father-figure’ labels. Ofellus is not simply a ‘father-figure’ in a more general sense, not even a surrogate; but the “father” closest to Horace’s version of the paternal ideal, best embodied by the biological father -and that makes all the difference.

Ofellus’ biological gnati -whether strategically constructed or not- may have come into play as an accessory factor, to underpin the parenting abilities which Ofellus had in the first place. But what about Horace’s relationship with Ofellus? As Horace discloses, he had known Ofellus since he was a child (puer hunc ego…Ofellum / …novi, 2.2.112-113), from which one can suppose that Ofellus was an old neighbour of Horace’s family -because Horace tells us he knew Ofellus as a boy, Ofellus’ farm is presumed to have been near Venusia. Strictly speaking, the two persons were bound by regional ties, which, we think, might not have been implied if there had not been even more things to bring them together. There was between Ofellus and Horace a relationship of trust, to be sure, that probably owed something to the aforementioned same origin, but this element alone is undoubtedly not enough to explain first, why Horace was feeling a real sense of kinship with Ofellus, and second, what made his childhood experience so unforgettable.

Of all the roles Ofellus has to play in 2.2, that of the ‘father’ is the most important. But fatherhood is something more than just blood. As we hope to show, Ofellus’ paternal role transcends his rather small genealogical tree; for his
paternal involvement in the form of ‘good model of intellectual and moral values’ has a significant positive effect on Horace’s development too—despite the latter’s not being a direct descendant of his. While it is an unfounded conjecture that Ofellus used to address or treat the boy Horace in the same way as he did his own children, legitimate is the assumption that he was like a father to Horace in that he used to share his (verbal or and practical) advice—whether consciously or otherwise—with the most receptive childlike souls; of the kind that Horace was and of the kind that he wants us to be. Horace, just like his readers, does not need the direct contact with Ofellus in order to learn the right life lessons from him. In fact, a ‘father’ prepares his children for life by the way he behaves and, in the particular case of Ofellus, by the way he copes in hard times. As the verb videas (2.2.114) indicates, and because no details regarding the interaction between the two are revealed in the text, Horace was most likely an observer who was watching Ofellus’ lifestyle—the factor vision will be taken up below.

How do we go from observation to admiration? The answer, we think, lies within the similarities between Ofellus and Horace’s biological father. There is a strong connection between Ofellus and Horace’s biological father; so apparent as not to be ignored and so extensive as not to be exhausted easily. For a start, both Ofellus and the biological father once owned little farms (in agello, 2.2.114; macro agello, 1.6.71), and possibly neighbouring ones. A further similarity lies in the similar fate the two men met. Horace’s paternal home and estate were confiscated after Philippi (Epistle 2.2.50-1). Ofellus too was a victim of the land-confiscations,77 for he was evicted from his land, so that one of Octavian’s returning veterans could be settled in, a certain Umbrenus.78 However pointless or superficial the aforementioned points of contact may seem, they are useful in indicating that Ofellus and the biological father have a similar background.

The constitution of Ofellus’ mind and character, apart from being per se essential for the enhancement of the pedagogical function of Satire 2.2, has a strong analogy with Horace’s biological father’s temperament—inasmuch as we can judge from what we are given in Satires 1.4 and 1.6. And such is the

77 In contrast to Horace’s biological father, Ofellus, a father struck by misfortune, did not take his children to the city.
congruence that in many places the readers get the impression that Ofellus’ words amplify the voice of Horace’s father. As in 1.4 and 1.6, so in 2.2, the ideal father-model is a down-to-earth man who lavishes care and attention on his child, to begin at the most basic level. The similarities between the two are all too obvious. Though unschooled (1.4.115-116; 2.2.3 respectively), the biological father and Ofellus can still be called ‘wise men’: they are both armed with plain commonsense, by virtue of which they are capable of separating right from wrong, virtue from vice. Lack of formal education is a handicap to neither of them; on the contrary, it is exactly this avoidance of extremism and dogmatism - that adherence to the tenets of certain philosophical schools often entails- which distinguishes the prudent mentors from the fanatic ones in the Satires. No matter how elementary, the biological father’s and Ofellus’ system of family ethics, based on the mores antiqui, and on empirical examples, is a vehicle for qualitatively rich knowledge. Horace’s biological father and Ofellus alike define - the former does it explicitly- as their self-appointed mission the preservation and handing down of the traditional values (1.4.115-117; 2.2.89-93, 118-125); it is enough for them if they can accomplish this mission. By not becoming entangled with deeper philosophical issues, the two “fathers” differ thus from a teacher proper.

Accordingly, the views which the biological father and Ofellus set forth seem to be nothing more than the distillation of their own life-experience -which is in turn largely influenced by the rules of the ancestors. Believing in the intrinsic value of moral training, they both commit themselves to equip their children with all the necessary values conducive to intellectual and moral success. Exactly what principles do these fathers call their children to conform their lives to? The concept of the intermediate (μεσότης) is assuredly the central axis around which the biological father’s and Ofellus’ teachings turn. In order to express ideals of moderation, the two men recommend the middle course between two extremes:79 e.g. a spendthrift son is set against a stingy son (1.4); vulgar armour is set against adultery (1.4); the frugal style of living stands between the mean and the luxurious one (2.2).

79 For a short survey on the Horatian middle way, see Gibson (2007) 16-19; on the sexual middle way in Satire 1.2, pp.19 ff.
Ofellus’ equanimity in misfortune is yet another example of moderation; in Gibson’s words, “Equanimity is the avoidance of the extremes of elation and despair…; the sustaining of an equally moderate reaction to both hard times and good times”.  

Near the end of the poem, Horace takes the floor for the last time to describe his old friend as a man who once ‘used his full means on no larger scale than he does now, when they are cut down’ (2.2.113-114). And later, when the countryman is allowed to speak in first person, himself affirms that Horace’s impressions are correct. The story runs as follows: my style of living and eating was not sleek even in the good times, hence I do not have to change anything now, that a new landlord has come; having been content with little in my whole life, I am not afraid of the Fortune’s turnings.

Satire 2.2 is utterly a ‘moralising’ piece, in that it comprises a reproving sermon on erroneous ethical issues, which the speaker intends to impugn and reform. In this respect, the Satire is reminiscent of the first diatribe-triad of Book I, in which a first-person preacher was lecturing his audience on the virtues of the ‘golden mean’, and was forcefully berating the sins of those who used to plunge into extremes. In terms of form, 2.2 is again similar to the diatribes of Book I; it stands midway between dialogue and monologue, and it follows the conventions of diatribe: formulaic phrases (discite, v.4; mecum disquirite, v.7; dicam, si potero, v.8; Accipe nunc, v.70), and direct addresses in second person singular. The lessons imparted therein are, however, said to emanate from another “voice”, distinct from that of Horace. This innovation, followed by another significant change -now the “source” obtains “real beingness”, as opposed to many other instances where Horace is generally concerned with ‘what people say…’. develops the formally monologic moralising type of the first Book, looking forward to and anticipating the ‘diatribe-within-dialogue’ type of Book II; and more specifically, aspects in Satires such as 2.3 and 2.7.

From the outset of 2.2, almost at once, Horace asserts that the ‘speech’- and simultaneously also the ‘satire’- which is about to come, is not his own (nec meus hic sermo est, v.2), but it is derived from the precepts of the peasant

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82 Ibid., 209.  
83 Ibid., 197-198.
Ofellus. The impression of the existence of another, independent source, is tempered, in addition, by several references to Ofellus by name, and allusions to him in the third person (quae praecepit Ofellus, v.2; Ofello iudice, v.53-54; Ofellum, v.112; the name occurs in the final 20 lines as well, i.e. in what we are encouraged to understand as Ofellus’ quoted speech-, v.116ff.). From the statement at 2.2.2-3 it seems that Horace’s only assignment is to relay the preaching of Ofellus, acting thus himself as a mere mouthpiece. But is this the “real truth” behind the identity of the main speaker, and the intricate narrative layers of the poem? There is no consensus among scholars as to who is to be understood as the chief voice of the Satire: is it Ofellus who is the moraliser here, is it Horace who is the old rustic’s reporter, repeating either verbatim or in his own words the sermon, or rather is it a combination of the two? While a number of editors and commentators are inclined to think that the speaker of the sermo is Ofellus, others reach a diametrically opposite conclusion, in reasoning that if Ofellus were indeed the main speaker of the poem, he should have to be credited with an extensive knowledge of Hellenistic philosophy -that such an Italian rustic was unlikely to have acquired- and with a deep awareness of the urban moral laxity -since much of the poem is replete with references to contemporary Rome. In either case, though, it is important to stress that in much of the lecture, the two voices appear inseparable -yet in some places are revealed to be distinct- and to remember that Horace is Ofellus’ “attorney” as much as Ofellus is a figure created by the author.

Horace insists on keeping his mouth shut, but with what purpose? Where does he stand in Satire 2.2? Does he wishes, as Bond surmises, to expose Ofellus’ conservatism, unsophisticated wit, and limited philosophical spectrum with an intention to ironise him? Is Horace, instead, the first in the series of the doctores inepti who predominate in Book II, as Parker suggests, one who transmits, without having fully comprehended, and thereby alters, and mangles the teachings

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84 Sharland (2010) 199.
85 The argument that in 2.2 we have two different speakers is further fueled by the metrical and stylistic changes that occur in the last twenty verses. This part of the poem is more polished: in their great majority the lines end on the desirable two-or three-syllabled world, ‘end-stopped lines’ are far more frequent there, and the ‘golden line’ with which the poem ends is unprecedented in the foregoing portion of the piece; changes in content are also found, see Sharland (2010) 204-206.
86 For the whole exposition of the different views, see Sharland (2010) 199-203.
of his source? Does he make the same mistake that we see in Damasippus and Davus, who, after him, overzealously embraced the ideas of one authority, but misinterpreted them? Is 2.2 a kind of self-scolding on the part of Horace, who appears to accept his fallibility, in implicitly confessing that he has personal experience in the rich tables he so elaborately describes (cf. the discussion on adultery in 1.2)? Or is this ultimately a method for our understanding to be checked? All the possibilities are open, and Horace trusts his “students” with the final verdict.

The way Horace tries to distance himself from his source is, in fact, in tune with the satiric pseudo-modesty of the authorial persona of Book I, that in a similar manner claimed not to be a poet even as he was writing poetry, Sharland argues. But, she later goes so far as to suggest that such a ‘distancing device’, the fact that in many places in the Satire Horace attributes the irate rebuking of contemporary culinary fashions to Ofellus, is a way for the former to escape responsibility for it. For in seeing Horace’s elite and educated friends (in the circle of Maecenas) as the poem’s primary addressees, Sharland maintains that the satirist hides himself behind the mask of Ofellus to attack his audience of contemporaries, “using” thereby Ofellus as a kind of “breakwater”. Many indications-clues left here and there help us back up our argument, which is that the construct Ofellus, far from signposting a desperate move on the part of the satirist to hide himself in fear of potential retaliation, is another example of how a “source of knowledge” can be diversely deployed to fit the textual needs of the Horatian authority.

The question as to whether Horace is a boy in need of advice in the case of 2.2 is a vexing one. Two observations help to create and foster the impression that he is indeed so. First, as Sharland suggests, Horace views the contemporary urban environment from the perspective of his rural boyhood, and by doing so, he encourages us to see him reckoning what Ofellus would say if he were there to witness the decadent diet of the contemporary Roman elite. This in turn explains why Horace needs an “ally” in 2.2, one who can support, complement, or even

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90 Ibid., 213ff.
91 Ibid., 212.
correct the “not-yet-ready” moralist when necessary. Second, there are hints which direct us to believe that the Horatian persona is the first to come in for the tirade against gluttony: how it is, after all, that Horace knows all about the fancy food that he alleges is consumed by the wealthy, unless he has so indulged himself? Even if, one might protest, Horace has merely observed opulent tables, he has taken an inordinate amount of interest in them. Comparable to the extensive knowledge of the rich tables are Horace’s elaborate images and detailed descriptions about unfortunate adultery episodes in 1.2; something which again implies that Horace is (more than likely) speaking from personal experience here.\footnote{Sharland (2010) 219.} What is more, Davus in 2.7 reproaches Horace for being an epicure.

Nevertheless, a more insightful reading brings out an essential detail: we are to imagine that Ofellus has given Horace a piece of his mind, but what we read in 2.2 is rather a flashback of ego parvus (v.112). For Horace narrates what happened in an abstract past, defined by no further markers. This extremely slight nuance is, we think, what changes the roles of teacher and disciple here. For right now, in the satire’s present, Horace -after having acquired significant knowledge in his early years- is able to handle such a serious ethical topic on his own, and mature enough to transfer messages valuable for one’s life. Besides, in spite of the assertion that the authority of the plain life-lesson is Ofellus, it is really surprising that the “real voice” of the “master” is revealed only at the very end of the poem - with varied degrees of accuracy and impartiality to be expected. Undoubtedly, the presentation of Ofellus’ speech is evidently intended to lend an air of authority to Horace’s talk, and to add weight to his arguments (Quo magis his credas, 2.2.112).\footnote{Ibid., 204, 210-211, 219.} It is equally true, however, that Ofellus’ presence is ambitiously threatening to unseat the satirist himself. Why is, then, Ofellus allowed to partake of the sermon? Had he not helped Horace refresh his memory, had he not been a counterpart of the biological father and of his teachings, he would have been rather “useless” to Horace in his double capacity as a made-man, and as a full-fledged satirist.

A close analysis of the discourse can, in fact, prove Horace to be a moral authority on his own, notwithstanding his many attempts to convince us of the
opposite. An authority, indeed, whose preaching overlaps that of the biological father. To begin with, in 1.4, Horace’s biological father used to pinpoint various *vitia* by the examples of contemporary corrupted Romans (Albius, Baius, Scetanus, Trebonius). The use of names-examples is detected in 2.2 too. Horace refers to one Gallonius, an epicure who won ill repute because of his excesses; to one Avidienus and to one Naevius as negative examples of misery; to one Albucius as a negative example of strictness; to one Trausius as a negative example of selfish spending. In this series of *exempla*, Ofellus can also act as the ideally exemplary model.94 Furthermore, Horace seems to be concerned about the preservation of the traditional values, and the protection of the Roman youths. As in 1.4 the biological father handed down to Horace the moral heritage of the great ancestors (*ab antiquis morem*, 1.4.117), so in 2.2 Horace evokes the habits of the *antiqui* ‘heroes’ (v.89, v.93) who should be imitated. The *Romana iuventus* can be easily enticed and defamed by the excesses of the already corrupted adult citizens, who -something that makes matters worse- most of the time hold high offices (2.2.50-52). The theme of ‘fame’ is another focal point. The biological father, anxious to keep his son’s life and reputation pure, used to finger-point practical examples of ill fame (*non bella est fama Treboni*, 1.4.114; *vitam famamque tueri / incolomen possum*, 1.4.118-119; *inhonestum et inutile…/ …rumore malo*, Sat. 1.4.124-125). In the same way, Horace of 2.2 informs his audience that the excesses of Gallonius made his table *infamis* (v.48), while again at verses 94-111 we find an argument against extravagant eating, which leads to disgrace (*famae*, 2.2.94; *damno dedecus*, 2.2.96).

Another point that links Ofellus’/ Horace’s discourse to the teachings of the biological father is their very substance, as well as the method in which these moral lessons are transmitted. The father’s method was focusing on how Horace could avoid *vitia*, and on how he could live content with his lot and property (*contentus*, 1.4.108). In 2.2, the notion of ‘contentment’ or else ‘satisfaction with little’ plays an equally significant role. Ofellus, the bright example of frugality and prudence, is content (*contentus*, v.110) with his meagre means, and hence ready to endure every future change. Sight is the right sense to discern moral

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94 Muecke (1997) 114: Ofellus is a figure that could have been pointed out to Horace by his father.
examples. Horace’s biological father called his son to see the vices around him (*nonne vides?*, 1.4.109), in the same way as the speaker in 2.2 calls upon his listener to do (*video*, 2.2.35; *vides*, 2.2.76; *videas*, 2.2.114). Moreover, the result of Horace’s training by his father was the formation of a ‘sanus’ person (1.4.129), whereas the citizens who do not follow the principle of the ‘golden mean’ are characterised as foolish (*insane*, v.33) by Horace of 2.2.

The net effect of the aforementioned analogies, we think, is the nomination of Horace for the post of chief moral authority. Even though he refuses the title, it is more than obvious that he makes use of all the qualifications which stem from his training by the biological father. Thanks to this “informal education”, Horace has come to such a mental and ethical level that allows him to have the complete control of his life, and to make decisions without any guidance in his adult life (cf. *simul ac duraverit aetas / membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice*, 1.4.119-120). Following the father’s lessons, Horace has further realised his mission as a moralist, and has achieved his purpose as a satirist. For now that he has built his personal didactic powers, he can teach alone, by sharing life-experiences, by denoting the right path and providing examples. Horace does not question his qualifications or skills as an authority in 2.2. By leaving Ofellus standing in for him, Horace does not cover his moralising; he instead plays with the ‘layers-of-voices’ formula for the first time in *Satires* II.

Horace gives Ofellus some credit -and we say ‘some’, because Horace is not oblivious of his biological father, who was the first to teach him life lessons. Ofellus and Horace’s biological father had much in common, something which, we think, justifies why Horace treats his substitute “father” Ofellus with respect. Horace the mature satirist represents Ofellus as a bright example of lifestyle that should be imitated. But in his hands, Ofellus also becomes a source of poetic wisdom to be followed. Ofellus -as much when he speaks in *propria persona* as much when he speaks through Horace- is not the least involved in poetic discussion. But, in fact, the Callimachean aesthetic principle *tenuis* is found - although in a latent condition- in both the straightforward descriptions of him and the concepts-pillars of the discourse on plain living possess. Read in this context,

95 The same sense can also mislead people; the image, not the true substance, is what takes the corrupted citizen (*ducit te species*, 2.2.35).
Ofellus’ quality goes back to the programmatic satires of Book I, and more specifically, to Horace’s criticism against his prolix predecessor. In short, Ofellus’ genius may be said to have inaugurated a new area in satire as distinct from that in which Lucilius wrote, as *Satires* II is distinct from *Satires* I. Thus, it is not far-fetched to argue that Ofellus is owed some credit for his contribution to the genre, which the poet aspires to bear his personal stamp.

*Bowing to the “Saturnalian father”: Damasippus (Satire 2.3)*

It is the Saturnalia, and Horace has retired to his farm to order to avoid the excitement of the celebrations in Rome.\(^9^6\) In antiquity, the Saturnalia was known for its extension of greater licence to all, in a manner otherwise inconceivable. Everyone was entitled to speak freely, including slaves who could rebuke their masters with impunity. With its emphasis especially on role reversals between masters and slaves, the festival provided a space for negotiating normative codes of behaviour, conventional values and beliefs. The Saturnalia was addressing social tensions, yet ultimately, it offered an opportunity for reaffirming the very hierarchy which was temporarily inverted. The Saturnalia was in many regards antithetical to routine, and allergic to the usual.\(^9^7\)

Early in this section, a succinct account of Damasippus’ identity could help us to understand why Damasippus is the essence of the Saturnalia. While we cannot rule out the possibility of Damasippus being a real person -given Cicero’s references (*Ad Fam. 7.23, Ad Att. 12.29*)-\(^9^8\) we cannot detect his lineage. Damasippus’ Greek name may suggest someone of servile origins, but Shackleton Bailey has instead pointed to possible senatorial connections.\(^9^9\) But the name ‘Damasippus’ may also be a joke. Even the structure of the name ‘Damasippus’

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\(^9^6\) On the Saturnalia being celebrated in the country, see Dolansky (2011) 502 n.3; “Evidence for the Saturnalia in rural households is too meager to treat in detail. It was clearly part of rural practice in the middle Republic (Accius, Annales Fr. 4; Cato, *On Agriculture* 57), and is listed in agricultural calendars (*menologia rustica*) dated to the first century CE which show its continued imporat to rural religious life. The Saturnalia on a rural estate must have differed considerably from that in an urban *domus*.”.

\(^9^7\) Dolansky (2011) 488-503, provides an overview of the primary components of the Saturnalia festival. See also Bernstein (1983) and (1987).

\(^9^8\) Muecke (1997) 134 *ad loc*.

(from the combining form *Dama* -a typical slave name- which is negatively charged in the poetry of Horace, and the high suffix *–ippus*) creates an oxymoron form, congruent with the personality that bears it. What is more, while until recently Damasippus was a successful dealer in works of art, who used to access the houses and gardens of the elite, after fortune turned against him, he sunk to the bottom of society -even the method by which he was planning to commit suicide was apparently one associated with the lower classes.  

Again, as with Trebatius and Ofellus, Damasippus is a Horatian construction that enters the poem to play a particular role. In our case, Damasippus is a newly Stoic convert who reports a discourse of the Stoic sage Stertinius upon the paradox ‘all men, save only the wise, are mad’. In the opening and concluding lines of his speech, Damasippus exercises the licence of the Saturnalia to deliver a vehement attack -or, to be more accurate, two attacks- on the method of writing and on the behaviour of Horace. Damasippus, the failed businessman, the man with the possible servile origins, makes Horace the victim of his blame, taking for himself the role of the speaker and leaving for Horace that of the listener. 

The result of the opening lines of Satire 2.3 is a literary manifesto mantled in a direct, yet uncalled-for reprehension against Horace the poet. Damasippus starts by descending upon Horace for not writing often, fast and enough, despite conditions being favourable for poetic composition. And he refers to the very same conditions that Horace himself sets in *Satires* II -as proposed in the previous chapter- for a successful satire: he has now found refuge in his farm, and by implication, he has free time and quiet to read and write; on the top of that, he enjoys abundance of wine and sleep.  

This last comment, we, unlike Damasippus, should interpret figuratively: wine is traditionally associated with Bacchic inspiration, and sleep symbolises leisure.  

*Otium* aside, -undoubtedly a determining factor *per se* given Horace’s (explicit and implicit) complaints about his frantic timetable when in the city in Satires 1.6, 1.9 and then in Satire 2.6- Horace is said to have packed four pieces of “luggage” (Plato, Menander, Eupolis, Sharland (2009) 118-122, 118 n.17 and Sharland (2010) 237-239, 239 n.28.

101 Note the irony here: sleeping and drinking are regarded as alternatives to writing at Satire 2.1.5-9.

102 See Muecke (1997) 132 *ad loc.*
Archilochus) to take away with him; something which may again indicate that Horace was intending to continue his intellectual activities in the country.

Damasippus gives a lecture that could be entitled “How not to write Horatian satire”. His very first words to Horace sum it all up: Sic raro scribis, ut toto non quater anno / membranam poscas, scriptorum quaeque retexens. Horace, he observes, writes so infrequently, that he calls for new parchment only four times a year; even when he does write, however, he produces little, as the metaphor for writing retexens indicates. Damasippus hauls the poet over the coals for keeping revising his drafts before he comes to the final version of his work. By obliquely depicting Horace’s writings as a textum, a web of words and structures, that he always weaves, unweaves and reweaves, and never finishes, Damasippus perhaps unconsciously recalls the most famous weaver of them all, the Homeric Penelope; in a way, the undoing and redoing of her handiwork are comparable to Horace’s constant reworkings. But the analogy goes even further, as Sharland suggests. Like Penelope, Horace will never complete his work at the rate he is doing, while the motive behind the strategy is also parallel: Horace will preserve his fidelity to his stylistic tenets, whereby he will address himself to a limited and exclusive audience -as opposed to Damasippus’ popular reputation before his bankruptcy- in much the same way as Penelope reserved herself solely for Odysseus. The impression of unproductivity is tempered, in addition, by the personified images of the pen that is to blame for, and of the wall that must suffer in Horace’s vain efforts at composition.

103 For the study material, see the previous chapter.
104 Sharland (2010) 247 uses the phrase to illustrate the ‘un-Horatian’ nature of Damasippus’ sermon.
105 Fairclough (1929) 152 n.a: “Parchment would be needed for the final form of his words, after the poet had written and corrected his notes on the tablets.”; contra Muecke (1997) ad loc. followed by Sharland (2010) 241 n.34: membranae were probably rough practice sheets, notebooks in codex form for work in progress… The finished poem was copied onto charta, paper made of papyrus.
106 In the first Book of Satires, Horace had repeatedly expressed his desire for an exclusive audience; e.g.: ‘I want no stall or pillar to have my little works, so that the hands of the crowd -and Hermogenes Tigellius- may sweat over them.’, ‘Many there are who recite their writings in the middle of the Forum, or in the baths’. Instead, I, Horace, nec recito cuiquam nisi amicis, idque coactus, / non ubivis coramve quibuslibet (1.4.71 ff.), neque te ut miretur turba labores, / contentus paucis lectoribus (1.10.73-74); the catalogue of Horace’s preferred readers towards the end of 1.10.
107 For the ‘weaving’ image here, see Sharland (2010) 243-245.
It is patently clear that Damasippus’ glorification of speed and bulk as criteria for writing clash with the Callimachean compositional ideals of brevity and of slow, well-refined poetry that Horace has asserted in the programmatic satires of Book I. To start from the meaningful self-representation *di bene fecerunt, inopis me quodque pusilli / finixerunt animi, raro et perpauca loquentis* at 1.4.17-18, Horace defines himself in terms suggestive of the distinguishing characteristics of his poetry. “Horace’s nature is “poetically correct”; “he is unable, by nature, to produce large, lumbering verses.”, Schlegel writes. Meagre wit and lowly spirit, rare and scanty speech, namely the key concepts of neoteric aesthetics, Horace tells us, are the hallmarks of his character; of the character from which poetry of corresponding qualities emanates. In 1.10, Horace resumes the discussion on poetics. As regards the edited style, perhaps the best passage to read alongside the *culpantur frustra calami* of 2.3, is the *saepe stilum vertas*, *iterum quae digna legi sint / scripturus* (‘often you must turn your pen to erase if you hope to write something worth a second reading’, 1.10.72-74). It cannot be a coincidence that Damasippus uses exactly the same terminology when he comes to evaluate Horace’s literary product in Satire 2.3. The second accusation, more pointed and specific than the first, more general one concerning the smallness of output, is that Horace is unable to sing something worth talking about (*nil dignum sermone canas*), and -just one line later- that he is unable to tell something worthy of his promises (*dic aliquid dignum promissis*). Thus, Damasippus rebukes Horace not only for not writing much, but also for not writing something worthy of mention, worthy of *sermo*, poetry which further meets the expectations he has cultivated so far. The criticism of the poet’s failure to write much or something *axion logou* is attributed to sloth by Damasippus; something which reminds us of 1.4.12, where Horace accused Lucilius of having been lazy when it came to revision.

The Stoic Crispinus of 1.4 and the pest of 1.9 anticipate much of what Damasippus includes in his literary manifesto. Quantity is the qualification that

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109 The phrase *stilum vertere* means to erase (using the flat end of the *stilus* to smooth out the surface traced by the sharp end) what has been written on the wax tablet.
110 Muecke (1997) 132 *ad loc.*: “the phrase *dignum sermone* imitates the Greek *axion logou*…, but may also hint at a punning reference to Horace’s own sermones (‘talks’)”.
both boast of, while the pest also prides himself on his speed in writing (*videamus uter plus scribere possit*, 1.4.16; *nam quis me scribere pluris / aut citius possit versus?*, 1.9.23-24). And in similar fashion, Horace exposes the stylistic *vitia* of Lucilius, in an attempt to disengage his own satiric project from that of his predecessor. Prominent among all of the predecessor’s faults was *garrulitas*: as though it were a great exploit, Lucilius could dictate two hundred lines in an hour almost without effort, he was wordy and too lazy to remove even a thimbleful from his ‘muddy stream’ (1.4). Likewise, the passer-by in 1.9 is a prolix talker, of the kind the Sabine fortuneteller had once warned Horace to steer clear of; he witters about everything, having no fear lest he should bore his interlocutor (*garriret, vicos, urbem laudaret*, 13).

It comes as no surprise, then, that Horace the poet seems impervious to the literary criticism made by Damasippus. Does he really need to waste time and words defending his poetic principles against a man who so blatantly misunderstands them, against a man whose popular reputation marks him out as part of the *turba*? In the case of Damasippus there is no room for negotiation or compromise. The insulting remarks come to nothing, Horace the poet essentially leaves Damasippus’ unprovoked burst unanswered -he only launches an ironic counter-attack that has more to do with Damasippus’ capacity as an aspiring philosopher- and the power of Damasippus’ authoritative literary voice is already questioned.

Though he begins as a literary theorist, as the text progresses, Damasippus becomes an actual poet, who turns his theory into practice. In fact, the poem which comes out is totally attuned to the compositional standards he seems to defend, standards which are obviously foreign to Horace’s poetry. We follow Sharland in understanding Damasippus as the main speaker of Satire 2.3. Since most of the poem is ‘spoken’ not by Horace himself, but by Damasippus, it is in effect Damasippus rather than Horace who is the author of the *sermo*, she writes.\(^{111}\) Damasippus is far from an ‘unproductive’ poet; his satire is rather lengthy (326 lines long). As a matter of fact, it is the longest poem of the *Satires*.

Due to its disproportionate size, 2.3 is so boring that it can even make the reader fall asleep.\footnote{On the soporific effect of Damasippus’ discourse, see Sharland (2009) 128-129.}

In many ways, Damasippus is the antithesis of the Horatian aesthetics. But how is he as a teacher of morals? At first glance, Damasippus gives the impression of being a rationale teacher, especially one suitably qualified to advise Horace on the complex issue of madness. His motivations in reciting Stertinius’ speech seem to be primarily didactic, while the didactic strategy employed in the lesson seems to have been carefully chosen to maximise the effectiveness of Damasippus’ teaching. Damasippus illustrates the follies of mankind in a way highly reminiscent of Horace’s biological father (cf. exemplis, Satire 1.4.106).\footnote{See Bond (1998).}

Dealing with each of the five phases of human madness (avarice, ambition, extravagance, love, superstition), Damasippus –via Stertinius– subjoins corresponding examples, often antithetical examples between two extremes. His method is to enhance his arguments and convince his audience about their plausibility. The majority of the examples is drawn from Roman life. [Staberius and Opimius are misers; Servius Oppidius is the father of the spendthrift Aulus and the miser Tiberius; Nomentanus is a spendthrift and Cicuta a miser; the son of Aesopus is an extravagant person; Quintus Arrius is the father of two extravagant sons; Marius is a man who killed his lover owing to a crazy passion.] Also to be found are unnamed examples, anecdotes about philosophers (Aristippus, Polemo), as well as scenes taken from tragedy (Orestes, Ajax, Agamemnon) and comedy (the exclusus amator from Terence’s Eunuchus). The two techniques with which the central philosophical piece is framed also function as examples: the narration of Damasippus’ own unpleasant experience, and the tail-coda. Phrases such as \textit{Nunc accipe}, \textit{Nunc age}, \textit{Accipe}, are also indicative of Damasippus’ didactic role.

Despite his quasi-paternal credentials -and by this we mean his didactic purpose and the method he employs-, Damasippus is deliberately structured so as to counter the persona of Horace’s biological father. To begin with, the Stoic background of Damasippus deprives him of the pure teachings that were the only means of the real father, while the bombastic tone with which he conveys his
philosophical discourse distances him even more from the latter. Compared with the *a posteriori* attacks of Damasippus, the instructing practices of the biological father had clearly a preventive character. The father’s teachings aimed to support the little Horace to realise the world around him, and to develop his own critical thinking skills. Consider now by contrast how judgmental Damasippus is, and how offensive his utterances. Instead of forestalling the faults of his “son” with his advice, the man is present only to criticise him.

At the end of the satire, Horace’s sanus-state of mind (*ego nam videor mihi sanus*, 302; *atque etiam insanum*, 306; *quae si quis sanus fecit, sanus facis et tu*, 322) is questioned. “Horace’s fault [to imitate Maecenas] is really a transgression against decorum (‘appropriateness’);¹¹⁴ his hot temper and his mad passions are also symptoms of an unsteady personality. It is crucial to notice that the criticism of Damasippus destroys blatantly the “creation” of the biological father. In Satires 1.4 and 1.6 Horace praised his father for having handed down to him an essential ethical code, fit to prevent him from common vices. The poet was giving the impression that he had succeeded in adopting these moral rules, and that he was applying them in his everyday life. Nevertheless, as Damasippus reveals, Horace is an unreformed adult. His current behaviour shows no trace of training.

And now we have to question ourselves: why does Horace need his “Saturnalian father” Damasippus? A “father” that, above all, shows that Horace fails to live up to the ethical teachings of his own satires? The experiment has never been tried before, it is an experiment under controlled conditions nonetheless. For the first time in the second Book, Horace plays with what Sharland calls “the speech-within-speech formula”. The pairs of speaker-listener/master-disciple are three: the satirist-his audience and readers, Horace-Damasippus, Damasippus-Stertinius, while, in addition, it is difficult to separate Stertinius from his convert during Satire 2.3. Whether Damasippus transmits his own version of Stertinius’ lecture or he repeats it verbatim, he is a mouthpiece that seems to have absorbed his master’s dogma without having questioned it. Now the question of ‘addressivity’ should be considered. Unlike Stertinius’

¹¹⁴ Muecke (1997) 165.
lecture, which must have been adapted to its own present addressee, i.e.
Damasippus, Damasippus’ diatribe does not address Horace personally or
directly. Although Damasippus seems to recall the diatribe for Horace’s benefit,
the speech proves to be nothing but a “weapon” that Damasippus himself is going
to use against potential critics (2.3.296-299).\footnote{Muecke (1997) 226-228 and 257-260.}

Horace’s role as moralist is seriously challenged in Satire 2.3, but by
whom, and when? Horace leaves the answer to his “students”. None of the
personal accusations is contradicted;\footnote{Cf. Sharland (2010) 260: “For all his faults, much of what Damasippus has to say, particularly
about Horace in the final section of the satire, rings unmistakable true…”.} Horace uses irony to confront Damasippus
instead. His final exclamation \textit{O maior tandem parcas, insane, minori!} is
indicative of his intention. Damasippus needs no help to expose his inefficiency
and extremism. In accordance with the topsy-turvy inversions of the Saturnalia,\footnote{Saturnalia is a similar-sounding word to satire; see Gowers (1993a) 117.} Horace becomes the fool -after all, he confesses his folly- and Damasippus, a type
that would otherwise have been a target of Horatian satire, becomes the wise. But
once the Carnival is finished, we are left to imagine, the balance is restored.
CONCLUSION

The chasm between the two Books of Horace’s *Satires* has long been detected, the speculation on the exact action of its occurrence, however, is incessant. Scholars have proposed two main solutions to explain the distinct differences between *Satires* I and II. The historical-autobiographical approach treats the shifts in both form and content as the necessary consequence of the uncertain times of the late 30s, and thus, it attributes them to political and social factors. The other, intratextual approach is based on finding textual evidence to support the changes of the second Book. Scholars have also given a verdict on the quality of *Satires* II: divided roughly into two groups, some scholars agree that Horace went too far in Book II, and so he lost some essential virtues of satire, while others feel that the second Book reaches a poetic height that justifies all its innovations.347

The archetypical model, with which the second Book is compared, is of critical importance in the discussion. For if the Lucilian aggressive type is considered the ideal type of satire, then, Book II undeniably displeases the reader with its less forceful tone. One might have imagined, perhaps, that Book II would have moved along the same aggressive paths, or, even more, that it would have lifted aggressiveness to an unprecedented high level. Would this have been the “normal” upturn in *Satires* II? What if Horace wanted a break from the predictable satiric pattern? If one expects to see in Book II how Horace has come to better understand the conventions of his genre, as well as his own role as satirist, then, it is not difficult to understand why Horace goes off the tracks, refusing to repeat the old formula. If one expects, as a natural progress, that the satirist was mature enough to develop his stylistic devices and expressive means as he moved to the second Book, then, indeed, one may be prepared for a Book that is much more improved in the aggregate.

And this is how we move to the core of our project: what was it that motivated Horace to change his poetics in *Satires* II? The ideas we expounded in the main body of this study conform with the arguments of those scholars, who insist that the interest behind Horace’s desire to renovate satire was primarily poetic. Anderson, a typical exponent of this theory, argues that Horace decided to forge a new style after studying Lucilius’ Satires, with his *Satires* I already marking a crucial stage in the development

of the genre. It is true that Anderson focuses his attention more on the first Book, but we wished to pursue the path which he has indicated, in applying the same thought to the second Book too. For our research hypothesis was that *Satires* II was designed to bring about an even higher level of disengagement from the previously experienced satiric model. In a break with the past -including the experimentation in the first Book- Horace no longer needs to imitate the savage invective to produce genuine ‘satires’, nor the lampoons, the personal attacks, and the polemic statements. In a literary context, *control* is tasteful, not “necessary” because of the threat of juridical proceedings.

Our contention in this dissertation is that the poems of the second Book are real satire, as meaningful and full as Roman verse satire ever got in the hands of Horace. Keane’s following observation best encapsulates the spirit of our project: “satire’s abundant images of food can be read as symbolizing alternative recipes for the genre itself, discussions of pedagogy open up questions about satire’s own methods of teaching, and a journey narrative can cryptically relate the eclectic formation of the satiric genre.” ‘Fatherhood’ and ‘journey’ are valuable tools for understanding the differences between *Satires* I and II; for understanding how Horace (re)formed his genre by opening the discussion of satire’s didactic techniques and satire’s setting anew.

Our first Chapter poured a libation for the countryside, and for Horace’s Sabine estate in particular. Dedicated to the dipole city-country, the purpose of the chapter was to investigate the way in which Horace relocates satire, the most urban of genres, to the countryside. Satire, as a rule, feeds on *urbanitas*; still Horace seems to try the impossible. After the strolls around the city in Satires 1.6 and 1.9, and after the quasi “country-experiment” in Satire 1.5, in *Satires* II we find the country increasingly presented as the starting point for satire. Somewhat unusually, Satires 2.3 and 2.6, the two poems of the second Book that present themselves as written in the country, are full of programmatic references.

As we aspired to show, Horace’s plan is to break free from the *urbanitas* which was interwoven with the satiric genre -at least to a certain degree- and to render the country the ideal setting for composing satiric poetry. Horace had prepared his decisive movement already from Book I. Even within the city, our poet needs a special space for his own satire: in 1.6, we see him walking around the city centre in the evening, and visiting places where personalities are not huge, and incidents are not major. In 1.9, the urban scene is not crowded either. The antagonism between Horace and the great generic predecessor Lucilius comes into focus especially -yet obliquely- in 1.5 and 1.9. Lucilius is prolix and the pest is a chatterbox, but Horace, by contrast, is a proponent of Callimachean aesthetics, and as such, he gives emphasis to the art rather than to the size of a wok of literature. The Sabine estate *per se*, as well as the way of life it allows Horace to live, are models for restraint, something which in turn reflects Horace’s moderation of poetry. Satires 2.3 and 2.6 present themselves as written at the farm. In 2.3, we hear Damasippus accusing Horace of not writing often, fast and enough, while in 2.6 we hear Horace alone pondering over the themes which the ‘pedestrian Muse’ of the country is going to illustrate: the quiet of the country, the friendly neighbours, and the discussions on serious philosophical topics.

The question as to whether Horace’s retreat from the city caused a change in his satiric programme, or it was a change in his satiric plan that required a secluded life, should be left open. Either case dictated the interplay of the geographical place and another, figurative “literary place”. This is of course not to say that Horace decided to abandon satire. The choice shift does not affect the poetic genre itself; it constitutes merely an alteration of diction, of content, and ultimately of orientation within the domain of satire. Horace will continue to compose satiric poetry, but one characterised by other, this time, rustic qualities.

Chapter 2 aspired to take the study of “the fathers of Horace” a step further. With *Satires* II holding the spotlight, the chapter examines *why* and *how* three major father-like figures in Book II (Trebatius, Ofellus and Damasippus) pick up the torch passed to them from Horace’s biological father to exercise either influence or critical judgment on Horace. Questions of authority, power, and control come into focus, while the change in the Horatian persona itself is open to various interpretations. The use of a bunch of “others” to act as scapegoats is a scholarly dispute centred largely
over the socio-political conditions of the late 30s. The resolution our chapter offered is rooted in the didactic purpose of Book II.

In *Satires II*, Horace mutes the voice of his biological father, and sets himself under varied pervasive influences. The second part of this truism may well stand as the basic argument for the theory that sees Horace as a “victim of fear”, however the same is not true for the first part. For even if Horace was really trying to hide his true “self” behind the masks of his interlocutors, there is no reason to believe that he was oblivious of his father’s presence for fear of a potential danger. Recognising the poetological potentialities the matter of ‘paternal presence’ has, we came to understand that it was not so much due to the new establishment that Horace chose to eliminate every reference to his biological father from the second Book. By the time of Book II, Horace was mature enough to ‘swim without the cork’ (1.4.119-120).

Trebatius, Ofellus, and Damasippus are presented as moral and literary mentors, who approach Horace aiming to “educate” him. Trebatius gives legal advice about writing satire after Actium; Ofellus, who most resembles the biological father, offers a valuable life lesson; Damasippus is an unsuccessful moral and literary authority. Horace casts himself for the part of the listener / disciple / son, and he seems to endure the vituperation uttering no criticism. This is an alternative didactic method, a method which does not rely on Horace’s own instruction as a moralist, a literary theorist and a satiric poet. The poems of Book II put the onus on the readers, in “teaching” obliquely that moral knowledge is not internalised unless we take the initiative in extracting and utilising it. The roles change once again: Horace the son becomes the “father” of his readers.

What makes *Satiires II* so special? The majority of *Satires II* has an overtly philosophical orientation. Certain ethical doctrines, though sometimes filtered or ridiculed for satiric purposes, can be detected and attributed to particular philosophical schools. Epicurean, Stoic, Pythagorean, Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian are only some of the allusions that can be found in the philosophical range of Book II. In his second Book of *Satires*, Horace gives the impression that he is not so much interested to denounce human faults, as to avert them by means of philosophy. His new aim is to offer an ethical lesson to those who are hemmed in with vices. The brutal satirist gives way to the preacher.
In Book II, Horace softens the vitriol which was associated with the satires of Lucilius. Horace’s personal attacks are not only limited, but also detached and unspecified. This time, the rule is the Socratic irony which pervades the dramatic dialogues. This shift towards the dramatic dialogue gives the moralist a chance to challenge his authoritative voice, and the satirist the opportunity to play with layers of voices. On the aesthetic level, dialogue provides variety in tone and style, while it also “forces” Horace to create integral characters, with distinct voice and personality.

In the first lines of Satires II, Horace lays out the problems of writing satisfying post-Republican satire, mixing all the traditional etymologies of the word satura: Satyrs, laws, and mixed dishes (2.1.1-4):

\[
\textit{Sunt quibus in satura videar nimis acer et ultra}
\]

\[
\text{legem tendere opus; sine nervis altera, quidquid}
\]

\[
\text{composui, pars esse putat similisque meorum}
\]

\[
\text{mille die versus deduci posse.}
\]

If Horace is a Satyr, he has been caught between keen virility and drooping impotence; between being either too aggressive or too flabby. Horace is also accused of having infringed the “law”, with both the meanings ‘real law’ and ‘\textit{lex per saturam}’ merging into one deliberate ambiguity. A culinary metaphor is involved too, for, as Gowers argues, \textit{acer} also means ‘sharp to the taste’. The sharp-flavoured satire of Book I must now collide with its impact on a sensitive regime. The legal consultation which follows in 2.1 becomes the right context for a discussion on the qualities of contemporary satura.

But this is not the only case that Horace gives a cryptographic definition to his genre. On a large scale, the whole second Book can be read as an extended code written not in 1s and 0s, but rather in character-digits. Each of the eight protagonists of the second Book is the personification of either a prominent theme or a salient characteristic of satire. To follow the order of the poems in the Book: Trebatius is the law, Ofellus is the food, Damasippus is the fable, Catius is the food, Teiresias is the

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351 Rudd (1966) 199: in spite of the more objective and dramatic form employed in Book II, Horace’s opinions are still discoverable, but the poet is not.

352 See also: \textit{in ius / acres procurrunt}, 1.7.20-21.

burlesque element of travestying of heroic themes, Cervius is again the fable, Davus and Fundanius alike are the comic element (the former being a comic character and the latter a writer of comedies), Nasidienus is again the food.

Our concern in this dissertation is less to challenge the historical-autobiographical theory, than to emphasise the textual indications which prove Horace of Satires II to be an innovative satirist. Satires II builds on and develops Satires I. In a way, Satires II is the “father” of Satires I, in that Satires II would not have been born if it had not been for Satires I. Neither would Horace have been ready to try new didactic methods had he not experimented with his authoritative voice first, nor would the country have became -at least tentatively- a setting for satire without the city-precedent of Satires I. The similarities between the two Books of Horace’s Satires are equally crucial, and they cannot be ignored.

A response to fear? Answer the question too quickly and you will have stripped Horace’s Satires II of much of its power and uniqueness.
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