Deliberative Peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the Faculty of Humanities

2016

Yoshito Nakagawa

School of Arts, Languages and Cultures
Contents

List of figures and maps ........................................................................................................... 5
List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................ 8
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. 11
Declaration .............................................................................................................................. 12
Copyright statement .............................................................................................................. 13
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 14

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 15

Chapter 1: Leading to ‘deliberative peacebuilding’: unpacking the key policy narratives and the theoretical models, and analysing gaps ................................................................. 44
  1-1. Key policy narratives for peacebuilding ........................................................................... 45
  1-2. Three models of peacebuilding ...................................................................................... 49
  1-3. Gap analysis .................................................................................................................. 67

Chapter 2: Theorising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ .................................................................. 76
  2-1. ‘Legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context ............................... 78
  2-2. ‘Post-colonial’ deliberation: situating deliberation in the post-colonial context .......... 81
  2-3. Conceptualising the pre-conditions of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation ............................. 85
  2-4. Four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation ........................................................... 95
  2-5. ‘Deliberative peacebuilding’, deducing a hypothetical mechanism ........................... 102
  2-6. Merits and challenges in practising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ ............................... 110
  2-7. Dilemmas in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ .................................................................... 114
Chapter 3: Research methods for the empirical inquiry of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ .... 120

3-1. Explanatory strategy .............................................................................................................. 120
3-2. Methodological choice: the case and comparative methods............................................ 123
3-3. Applying the methods to the cases and formulating the field questions ..................... 127
3-4. Issues relating to the fieldwork .......................................................................................... 132

Chapter 4: The backgrounds of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland
.................................................................................................................................................. 146

4-1. The cultural background ...................................................................................................... 146
4-2. The historical background .................................................................................................. 156
4-2-1. The historical background in East Timor ...................................................................... 156
4-2-2. The historical background in Somaliland ...................................................................... 166

Chapter 5-6: ‘Deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland .................. 178

5. ‘Deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 ........................................ 180
5-1. Forming a ‘deliberative political disorder’ from 1999 to 2002 .......................................... 181
5-2. Deteriorating a ‘deliberative political disorder’ from 2002 to 2007................................ 192
5-3. Forming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 2007 to 2012 ............................................. 199
6. ‘Deliberative peacebuilding’ in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005 ...................................... 212
6-1. Forming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1991 to 1993 .............................................. 213
6-2. Deforming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1993 to 1997 ......................................... 221
6-3. Reforming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1997 to 2005 (and thereafter) ............ 227

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 245

7-1. Review of the cases .............................................................................................................. 247
7-2. Answer to Q1: what caused the UN to have ‘failed’ in East Timor? ............................. 265
7-3. Answer to Q2: what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced
‘equifinality’ in building peace? .................................................................................................. 273
7-4. Implications for research and policy, and limitations of the framework.............. 291

References........................................................................................................................................ 299
Personal communications ............................................................................................................. 324
Appendices ....................................................................................................................................... 326

Word count: 78,803
List of figures and maps

Introduction

Figure 0.1: Chronological sequence in the key historical events in East Timor and Somaliland ................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Figure 0.2: Non-Western, post-colonial polity, subject to external intervention, facing the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences.............. 26
Figure 0.3: Causal mechanism of political (de)legitimation in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.. 28
Figure 0.4: The matrix of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation................................................................................................................................. 28
Figure 0.5: Four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation given agential reflexion on the pre-conditions ........................................................................................................................................... 30
Figure 0.6: Processes leading ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to ‘deliberative political (dis)order’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ ...................................................................................................................... 32
Figure 0.7: Hypothetical mechanism of ‘equifinality’ either with or without external intervention.................................................................................................................................................. 33

Chapter 1

Figure 1.1: Liberal model........................................................................................................................................................................ 51
Figure 1.2: Statebuilding model................................................................................................................................................................ 56
Figure 1.3: Societal model......................................................................................................................................................................... 61
Figure 1.4: ‘Legitimacy gap’ in (neo)liberal statebuilding ................................................................................................................................. 69

Chapter 2

Figure 2.1: ‘Legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context in transition. 80
Figure 2.2: Endogenous and exogenous contexts where ‘post-colonial’ deliberation takes place in the non-Western, post-colonial context............................................................................................................. 85
Figure 2.3: Causal mechanism of political (de)legitimation in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.. 93
Figure 2.4: The matrix of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation................................................................................................................................. 94
Figure 2.5: Four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation given agential reflexion on the pre-conditions ........................................................................................................................................... 101
Figure 2.6: The causal mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ ................................................................. 107
Figure 2.7: The matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ ................................................................................................................................. 108
Figure 2.8: Hypothetical mechanism of ‘equifinality’ between ‘with’ and ‘without’ external intervention………………………………………………………………………………………………… 110

Figure 2.9: Dilemmas rooted in the two processes of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’…………… 118

Chapter 3

Figure 3.1: Explanatory strategy: the key variables in the system of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’………………………………………………………………………………………………… 122

Figure 3.2: Application of the cases of East Timor and Somaliland to ‘deliberative peacebuilding’………………………………………………………………………………………………… 131

Figure 3.3: Relationality between the researcher and the research context ………………… 133

Figure 3.4: The representation of participants in personal interviews…………………… 142

Map 3.1: Map of East Timor…………………………………………………………………… 140

Map 3.2: Map of Somaliland………………………………………………………………… 140

Chapter 4

Figure 4.1: Major (sub)clans in Somaliland ………………………………………………… 151

Map 4.1: Map of the Horn of Africa in the early 1910s ……………………………………… 168

Conclusion

Figure 7.1: A ‘hybrid’ path in transition towards ‘deliberative political order’ in East Timor …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 252

Figure 7.2: An ‘agonistic’ path in transition towards ‘deliberative political order’ in Somaliland………………………………………………………………………………………………… 257

Figure 7.3: Difference in the paths towards ‘deliberative political order’ in East Timor and Somaliland………………………………………………………………………………………………… 260

Figure 7.4: Causal mechanism of conflict deformation through ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ in East Timor …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 267

Figure 7.5: The causes and effects in the three conflicts ……………………………………… 269

Figure 7.6: The modified causes of the 2006 crisis in East Timor ………………………… 270
Figure 7.7: Causal mechanism of conflict transformation through ‘hybridisation’ in East Timor .................................................. 278

Figure 7.8: Causal mechanism of conflict transformation through ‘agonisation’ in Somaliland .................................................. 281

Figure 7.9: Causal mechanism of conflict transformation through the ‘equifinality’ .......... 284

Figure 7.10: Nexus between measures for power-sharing and electoral engineering and ‘success’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation ................................................................. 285

Figure 7.11: Measures for power-sharing and electoral engineering and their effects on the approaches to deliberation in East Timor and Somaliland ............................................. 287
**List of abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>Parliamentary Majority Alliance (<em>Aliança Maioria de Parlamentar</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APODETI</td>
<td>Popular Democratic Association of Timor (<em>Associação Popular Democrática Timorense</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Timorese Social Democratic Association (<em>Associação Social-Democrata Timorense</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAVR</td>
<td>Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (<em>Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRM</td>
<td>National Council of Maubere Resistance (<em>Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT</td>
<td>(as resistance movement) National Council of Timorese Resistance (<em>Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNRT</td>
<td>(as political party) National Congress of Timorese Reconstruction (<em>Conselho Nacional de Reconstrução de Timor</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD-RDTL</td>
<td>Popular Committee for Defence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (<em>Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrática de Timor Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>District Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETTA</td>
<td>East Timor Transitional Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (<em>Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-FDTL</td>
<td>FALINTIL-Defence Force of East Timor (<em>FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRETI LIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (<em>Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulmiye</td>
<td>Peace, Unity and Development Party (<em>Kulmiye Nabad, Midnimo iyo horumar iyo</em> in Somali)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Consultative Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Democratic Party (<em>Partido Democrático</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Decentralised Development Programme (<em>Programa de Desenvolvimento Descentralizado</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDID</td>
<td>The Integrated District Development Planning Programme (<em>Programa de Planeamento de Desenvolvimento Integrado Distrital</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDL</td>
<td>Local Development Programme (<em>Programa de Desenvolvimento Local</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNDS</td>
<td>National Programme for Village (<em>Suco</em>) Development (<em>Programa Nacional de Desenvolvimento dos Sucos</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNTL</td>
<td>National Police of East Timor (<em>Polícia Nacional de Timor Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PSD</strong></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (<em>Partido Social Democrata</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RDTL</strong></td>
<td>Democratic Republic of East Timor (<em>República Democrática de Timor Leste</em> in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SNL</strong></td>
<td>Somali National League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SNM</strong></td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SONYO</strong></td>
<td>Somaliland National Youth Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRSG</strong></td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYL</strong></td>
<td>Somali Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TNG</strong></td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UCID</strong></td>
<td>Justice and Welfare Party (<em>Ururka Caddaalada iyo Daryeelka</em> in Somali)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UDT</strong></td>
<td>Timorese Democratic Union (* União Democrática Timorense* in Portuguese)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UDUB</strong></td>
<td>United Peoples’ Democratic Party (<em>Ururka Dimuqraadiga Ummadda Bahawday</em> in Somali)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN</strong></td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMISET</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNOSOM</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNTAET</strong></td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

This thesis is a theoretical and empirical inquiry into ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, seeking to explain the ‘failures’ and ‘successes’ of peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland. While warfare has increased globally since the end of the Cold War, the UN has made efforts to build peace (e.g. Boutros-Ghali 1992). While peacebuilding has become an internationally applied set of ideas and practices, one of the theoretical gaps is deliberation. This research thus conceptualises ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and associates this with peacebuilding in the non-Western, post-colonial, and (post-)conflict context.

This research identified East Timor and Somaliland as its case studies. Despite similarity in the ‘legitimation problem’ with vertical (state-society) and horizontal (‘modernity’-‘tradition’) inequalities/differences based upon cultural and historical backgrounds, East Timor and Somaliland undertook different approaches in a decade after the end of their civil wars. While East Timor accepted UN peace operations, Somaliland rejected them. Yet both experienced similar transitions to make political order between ‘failure’ (political de-legitimation/societal dissent) and ‘success’ (political legitimation/societal consent).

Accordingly, this thesis poses two questions: 1) what caused the UN to have ‘failed’ (to prevent the ‘crisis’ from recurring in 2006) in East Timor, and 2) what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced ‘equifinality’ (making similar progress along different paths) in building peace (in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 and in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005). Findings, among others, include different paths in transition: a ‘hybrid’ path with external intervention in East Timor and an ‘agonistic’ path without it in Somaliland. Asymmetry in power relations urged deliberative agencies to address the ‘legitimation problem’ differently.
Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree of qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
Copyright statement

The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the ‘Copyright’) and he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.

The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the ‘Intellectual Property’) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (‘Reproductions’), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

Further information on the conditions under disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, the University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in the University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.
Acknowledgements

While this thesis largely owes its existence to my experience as an aid worker over the last two decades, I would like to acknowledge those who have inspired me to undertake this research. Firstly, I appreciate all the counterparts and colleagues who shared with me their insights into socio-political challenges in Brazil, East Timor, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Somaliland, and South Sudan. I am also grateful to those who funded me to work for these countries, among others, the Government of Japan, the Japan Platform, and the United Nations. Secondly, I deeply appreciate those who were willing to spend time to speak to me for interviews, as well as old colleagues and friends, among others, Mr. Luciano Freitas in East Timor and Prof. Abdurahi Odowa in Somaliland, who facilitated me to undertake the fieldwork. Thirdly, I am also thankful to academic advisors in Manchester, among others, Prof. Oliver Richmond who read all drafts and helped me organise idea, and Prof. Roger Mac Ginty who read the final draft. It is also other staff, colleagues, and friends at HCRI (Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute) who helped me brainstorm thoughts and overcome challenges over the last three years. Moreover, I truly appreciate two examiners, Prof. Christopher Clapham, Cambridge, as the external and Dr. Sandra Pogodda as the internal, as well as the chair, Prof. James Pattison, who agreed to validate this thesis although I bear full responsibility for errors, if any. I am also grateful to HCRI and SALC (School of Arts, Languages and Cultures) in the University for partly meeting the costs incurred in the fieldwork. Finally, I extend my heartfelt thanks to my family who have been always supportive of me doing practice and research far away from home.

Without your support, I could not have completed this thesis. Thank you very much.
Introduction

‘Thank you for your intervention, Mr. Yoshi. Although we appreciate UN’s support, we also regret that the UN sees us as an experiment of peacebuilding. We have says’ (a Timorese counterpart in the Government to me in 2005).

‘Yes, Yoshi, we made many mistakes…. but we are proud of building our country and peace. Our determinations made, make and will make for it’ (a Somalilander counterpart in the University of Hargeisa to me in 2011).

The ‘research puzzle’

This thesis is a theoretical and empirical inquiry into ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, seeking to explain the ‘failures’ and ‘successes’ of peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland. While warfare has increased globally since the end of the Cold War (e.g. Cramer 2006), the UN has made efforts to build peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Whereas peacebuilding has become an internationally applied set of practices, the UN upholds political and economic measures for democratisation (i.e. political liberalisation) and development (i.e. economic liberalisation) to enforce, make, and build a so-called ‘liberal peace’ (i.e. a peace built upon liberation) (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1994, 1995). This, however, caused mixed results in the 1990s (UN 2000). Empirical studies indicate that 72% of the countries that hosted UN missions from 1988 to 2002 ended up with authoritarian regimes (Call et al. 2003: 234); and nearly half of them returned to conflict within five years in the 1990s (most notably in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia) (Collier et al. 2003). In response, while the UN (2000) associates these ‘failures’ with managerial and operational issues, advocating internal reforms for peacebuilding, such as funding, planning, and coordination, the OECD (2005) links them to a ‘fragile’ state as a
threat to (in)security, urging donors to support statebuilding. Nevertheless, the outcomes of peace operations remained dismal and even deteriorated in the 2000s, given that more than 90% of external interventions arguably ‘failed’ to prevent recurring conflict (Call 2012: 2). In turn, critical theorists have challenged the mainstream ‘business-as-usual’ approach to peacebuilding and explored a radical change (e.g. Bellamy et al. 2004). They often link these ‘failures’ to the dominant ideas and power of liberalism, idealism, and conservatism, which have been embedded in international peacebuilding (e.g. Begby et al. 2009, Chandler 2010b, Newman 2013).

East Timor also experienced a relapse into ‘crisis’ in 2006, having hosted UN operations since 1999. After five centuries of Portuguese colonisation and twenty-four years of Indonesian occupation, the Timorese people, less than one million living in a half-island in the South Pacific, gained an opportunity for self-determination in a UN-arranged referendum in 1999, yet fell into political violence between pro- and anti-Indonesian factions following the overwhelming vote for independence. In response, the UN swiftly established a mission in East Timor and granted it full sovereignty and governorship to enforce, make, and build peace and attempt to demonstrate its capacity in the new millennium (e.g. Suhrke 2001). The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTATE) set up state institutions for constitutional democracy from 1999, and handed them over to the Timorese administration in 2002. The UN’s self-proclaimed ‘success’, however, did not last, since the UN’s successor state of ‘Timor-Leste’ ‘failed’ to prevent political conflict from recurring in 2006.

Among other attempts to seek the causes of this ‘failure’ (e.g. UN 2006, Barbara 2008, Moxham 2008), Boege et al. (2008), observing ‘successes’ in an indigenously-driven
approach to employing the customary governance system for peacebuilding elsewhere (e.g. Francis 2008), link the ‘failure’ to the UN’s ‘top-down’ approach to constructing a ‘modern’ state vis-à-vis marginalising the ‘traditional’ culture and societal legitimacy, and thus undermining political legitimacy. In testing this empirically, they compare the UN’s ‘failure’ in East Timor (i.e. leading to violence from 1999 to 2006), and the home-grown ‘success’ in Somaliland in exploring the locally-available resources and capacity in the customary governance system (i.e. leading to stability from 1991 to 1993). They contend for the institutional merit of integrating the ‘traditional’ customary governance system into the ‘modern’ political system, thus ‘hybridising’ the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ institutions so as to effectively restore political legitimacy and order (i.e. ‘hybrid political order’) in the non-Western, post-conflict context, and challenge the UN’s ‘modern’/liberal approach to statebuilding for peacebuilding.

Somaliland is in the North-western part of Somalia, where approximately three million people reside. After a century of British colonisation and thirty years of rule from Mogadishu, Somaliland’s resistance movement (SNM: Somali National Movement), together with similar movements across Somalia, ousted the authoritarian regime in Mogadishu and then declared independence from Somalia in 1991. However, while the soldiers-turned-politicians resumed political conflict due to their internal divisions soon thereafter, traditional and religious leaders explored their authority in the customary governance system, organising inter-clan meetings and reconciling warring parties. Their ‘success’ in a ‘bottom-up’ approach allowed the societal leaders to urge the warring politicians to settle a ceasefire, institutionalise the Council of Elders as the legislature into the state system, and thus establish the ‘hybrid’ polity in 1993. In the meantime, Somaliland had repeatedly rejected the UN’s intervention to deploy
peacebuilders as part of the peace operations based in Mogadishu (e.g. Bradbury 2008, Renders 2012).

Although the short-term evidence in East Timor and Somaliland supports the contention for ‘hybrid political order’ (Boege et al. 2008), if the timeframe is extended, the long-term evidence undermines the ‘order’, since the ‘hybrid’ polity in Somaliland also ‘failed’ to prevent political conflict from recurring soon thereafter in 1994, and could neither contain nor mediate it until the consolidated government led a political settlement with a ceasefire in 1997 (SCPD 1999, Bradbury 2008, Renders 2012). Moreover, while East Timor and Somaliland required a couple of years to cease the resumed conflict, they have similarly ‘succeeded’ in restoring political order thereafter (up to June 2016 when this thesis was completed). The medium-term evidence, therefore, shows a similar transition in East Timor and Somaliland from building peace to re-building peace via recurring conflict over a decade after the end of their civil wars. Figure 0.1 shows this chronological sequence in East Timor and Somaliland (see the relevant events in the clear/non-shadowed space in Figure 0.1).

However, no attempt has been made to explore the causality of the similarities and differences in the peacebuilding processes in East Timor and Somaliland so far. This research ‘puzzle’ between theory and evidence indicates a need for further research to construct a theory and (re)visit the causal mechanism, not only of the ‘failure’ in East Timor, but also the ‘success’ in East Timor and Somaliland after the ‘failure’, and explore their implications for policy and practice.
Figure 0.1: Chronological sequence in the key historical events in East Timor and Somaliland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key events</th>
<th>East Timor</th>
<th>Somaliland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonisation</td>
<td>16th century: Portugal began colonisation.</td>
<td>19th century: Britain began colonisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>1975: East Timor declared independence from Portugal.</td>
<td>1960: Somaliland declared independence from Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002: East Timor restored independence.</td>
<td>1993: Somaliland established a ‘hybrid’ polity, yet rejected UN intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-building peace</td>
<td>2007-2008: The ‘crisis’ ceased.</td>
<td>1997: Ceasefire was settled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012: The UN terminated its peace operations.</td>
<td>2005: The first cycle of elections ended.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Research objectives and questions

This research ‘puzzle’ is also closely linked to personal, academic, and social motives. First, this research is deeply ingrained in me as a practitioner in the peacebuilding and development field, including these two countries. While I witnessed the resuming conflict and exposed
myself to criticism within the UN and beyond as a member of its staff in East Timor from 2004 to 2006, I also saw the remaining challenge of peacebuilding as an NGO worker in Somaliland from 2011 to 2013. These observations helped me to formulate a critical view of, and interest in, the UN-led peacebuilding vis-à-vis the home-grown approach to peacebuilding. Second, although the seminal work on ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege et al. 2008) has challenged a ‘top-down’ approach to international peacebuilding vis-à-vis a ‘bottom-up’ approach to local peacebuilding, it remains contentious (Fischer et al. 2009, Hoehne 2013, Luckham et al. 2013), and even falsified if its causality is mis-conceptualised and mis-understood. This research thus aims to add value to the existing theory and knowledge in the critical strand of peacebuilding studies and beyond (to be further discussed in the subsequent section: ‘contributions to theory and knowledge’). Third, this epistemological endeavour and its findings and suggestions will offer an ‘alternative’, critical view of peacebuilding not only to researchers, but also to policy-makers and practitioners, contribute to improving the quality of policy and practice, and enhance their relevance to addressing, engaging with, and responding to, socio-political challenges in peacebuilding.

Accordingly, this research aims to investigate the causal mechanisms not only of the ‘failure’ in East Timor in 2006, but also the ‘success’ in East Timor and Somaliland thereafter, and explore their implications. As Figure 0.1 indicates, after East Timor and Somaliland ended civil wars in 1999 and 1991 respectively, they both experienced a recurrence of conflict, yet achieved political stability thereafter: the former ceased hosting the UN missions in 2012, and the latter concluded the first cycle of elections without major security breakdowns in 2005. Their security records have been unbroken since then, at least as of when this thesis was completed in June 2016. Given this, two research questions are set out as follows: 1) what caused the UN to have ‘failed’ (to prevent the ‘crisis’ from recurring in 2006) in East Timor,
and 2) what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced ‘equifinality’ (making similar progress along different paths) in building peace (in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 and in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005)? While the former highlights the ‘failure’ (i.e. recurring violence), the latter examines the ‘success’ (i.e. established order). Although the first question highlights the UN’s ‘failure’ in East Timor, it also engages with the home-grown ‘failure’ in Somaliland. In turn, the second question implies a hypothetical ‘equifinality’: that the two countries made similar progress towards ‘success’, yet along different paths. It assumes the significance of differences in approach between the UN-led in East Timor and the home-grown in Somaliland to conditioning peacebuilding (to be further discussed in the subsequent section: ‘central argument’).

**Ontological, epistemological, and normative positions**

In formulating a theory for empirical inquiry, it is important to briefly clarify the key positions of the thesis, among others, the ontological, epistemological, and normative positions, as follows: 1) ontological dualism between objectivism and subjectivism in stratifying the world at real, actual, and empirical levels, 2) epistemological ‘critical’ realism, highlighting interactions between agency, structure, and culture at meta level, and exploring a causal mechanism of social change over time and space, and 3) a normative position in valuing equality and social justice when it comes to defining the ‘failure’ and the ‘success’ in the theoretical framework. First, given the disciplinary nature of social science, to investigate the interplay between human agency and social structure and its results in social events, sequences, and invariances, the realism school of ontology acknowledges the existence of a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ in an essentialist or foundationalist tradition (objectivism), yet also highlights a role for researcher and research subject in interpreting this according to his/her
norm and value system (subjectivism). While the former believes structural power determines human behaviour, the latter highlights the instrumental power of agency to construct socio-political realities. However, attempts have been made to balance them or interpret interaction between them (e.g. Giddens 1984, Bourdieu 1989 in Wacquant 1992: 20-26, Archer 1995), leading to an ontological position of realism which is placed between objectivism and subjectivism (Hay 1995). This ontological dualism admits a difference between what is seen as the ‘fact’, what is unseen yet supposed to happen as the ‘norm’, and what the ‘real’ world is (Bhaskar 1975, Habermas 1996). Sayer (1992) delineates, among others, the key characteristics of ontological realism as follows: 1) ‘the world exists independently of our knowledge of it’, 2) ‘our knowledge of that world is fallible and theory-laden’, 3) ‘the world is differentiated and stratified’, and 4) ‘social phenomena such actions, texts and institutions are concept-dependent’ (1992: 5-6). This worldview is central to this thesis in challenging the Western universalism, formulating a contextualised theory, and abstracting a hypothetical mechanism from it in a deductive manner. In doing so, however, the heavy reliance on Western literature to conceptualise the framework and examine non-Western socio-political phenomena in this thesis can be subject to criticism (e.g. Lyotard 1984, Dallmayr 1996). The deductive approach will also face anti-deductive critiques, among others, on its limitations in understanding social phenomena (e.g. Ezzy 2002: 9).

Second, in this connection, in order to formulate a theory, abstract and test a hypothetical mechanism from it, and reformulate the theory if necessary, an epistemological position of ‘critical’ realism focuses on acquiring empirical evidence through investigating agency-structure/culture interactions, appreciating agential reflexivity to interpret, affect (socialise), and change (reproduce/transform) the structure/culture over time (Bhaskar 1979, Archer 1995, Jessop 2001, cf. Giddens 1984). Despite different propositions for modelling agency-
structure/culture interactions, such as the ‘transformational model’ (Bhaskar 1979), the ‘morphogenetic approach’ (Archer 1995), and the ‘strategic-relational approach’ (Jessop 2001), a school of ‘critical realism’ has viewed agency, structure, and culture as separate entities, vis-à-vis structuration theory which sees them as conflated (Giddens 1984), or discourse theory based on post-structuralism (Laclau et al. 1985, Glynos et al. 2007), and has examined the two-way interactions in view of agential reflexivity at meta level, vis-à-vis the one-way effects of the agency on the structure/culture at micro level or the structure/culture on the agency at macro level (Bhaskar 1979: 31-32), and has thus seen these interactions not as static but as dynamic in causing social change over time. This thesis adopts these ontological and epistemological positions due to their effectiveness in ‘empirically’ investigating, and formulating a frame to ‘actually’ explain and understand a dynamic casualty of social ‘reality’ in the process of peacebuilding over time and space. Third, this thesis, echoing critical theory and tradition, promotes equality and social justice as the general principle of making a socio-political order (e.g. Rawls 1971, Habermas 1996). For this purpose, it broadens the concept of legitimacy from the vertical, modern/state-centred to the horizontal, traditional/society-oriented (adapted by Holsti (1996), Englebert (2000, 2002)), and the form of ‘power’ from the coercive (i.e. power-‘over’) to the non-coercive (i.e. power-‘against’/’to’/’with’/’within’) (adapted by VeneKlasen et al. (2002: 45)), given that inequality delegitimises politics, exacerbates social contradictions, and thus causes agential, structural, and cultural conflict to undermine peace (e.g. Galtung 1969, 1990, Stewart 2000). This normative position, interacting with the ontological position, forms a view of inequality and injustice as the cause of violence and conflict vis-à-vis equality and justice as the cause of order and peace, and associates this with defining ‘failure’ and ‘success’ in the framework (to be further discussed in the next section). Ontological realism, however, makes a
framework built on a theory-laden worldview in a certain ‘norm’ fallible and falsifiable between ‘fact’ and the ‘reality’ (Sayer 1992).

Central argument: a theory for, and a hypothesis from, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’

A cause of conflict can be related to, among others, inequality from a relational to a structural form that delegitimises politics (Galtung 1969, 1990, Stewart 2000). If so, what measures can address it and restore political legitimacy? Given that the increasing inequalities/differences in the political economy in the Western democracies caused the ‘legitimation crisis’ in the late 1960s and 1970s (e.g. Habermas 1976, Held 2006), ‘deliberation’ has gained considerable academic attention so as to address them and re-legitimise the Western liberal democracies (e.g. Manin 1987, Fishkin 1991, Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996). Although the Oxford English Dictionary (Soanes et al. 2005) defines deliberation as ‘long and careful consideration or discussion’, political philosophers have interpreted it as more than mere discussion, rather as a means for the political elite to rationalise political discussion and achieve an interest-free consensus (i.e. ‘overlapping consensus’) (Rawls 1993) and a process by which the societal non-elite form a societal consensus for self-determination (i.e. ‘agreement of free and equal persons’) (Habermas 1996). Although the concept of deliberation has been evolved to address the politico-economic ‘legitimation crisis’ in the stable Western democracies, it can also be associated with, and applied to, the politico-societal ‘legitimation problem’ in the war-torn, non-Western (non/quasi)democracies.

The ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context is often related to its culture and (post-)colonial historicity. While colonisation to build a ‘modern’ state in the
‘traditional’ stateless society (Young 1988) formed vertical (colonial state vs. colonised society) and horizontal (‘modernity’ vs. ‘tradition’) inequalities (Bayart 1993, Mamdani 1996), post-colonisation often deformed and radicalised them (Migdal 1994, Chabal 1994, Chabal et al. 1999), leading them to the ‘legitimation problem’. Applying the concept of deliberation, however, requires acknowledging both utility and challenge. Deliberation will be useful to address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the radicalised vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences, and to re-legitimise the post-conflict polity. Yet the challenge remains: to contextualise the Western concept of deliberation for application to the non-Western, post-colonial polity, where deliberation often takes place in the state-society interface, vis-à-vis the Western polity, where deliberation is assumed to take place in either the state or the society in a Weberian view of the state-society divide (Weber 1991, Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996). This is because colonisation created the state-society interface where intermediary agencies, such as the ‘traditional’ leaders and the ‘modern’ youth, interlinked colonisers and their subjects for ‘indirect rule’ (Bayart 1993, Mamdani 1996). The post-colonial state often remains so, allowing ‘post-colonial’ deliberators representing the ‘modern’ state (e.g. political ‘modern’ elite such as state politicians and bureaucrats) and the ‘traditional’ society (e.g. societal ‘traditional’ non-elite such as traditional and religious leaders) to deliberate the inequalities/differences subject to power relations between the state and the society (e.g. Migdal 1994, Chabal 1994, Englebert 2002). Moreover, its vulnerability in the international political economy has made the post-colonial polity prone to external intervention materially and ideologically (e.g. Clapham 1996, Van de Walle 2001, Cooper 2002). Accordingly, an assumption can be made that the non-Western, post-colonial polity accommodates the ‘post-colonial’ deliberation in the state-society interface, subject to external intervention, where the reflective agencies de/re/trans-form the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences (Figure 0.2). This thesis
thus defines ‘post-colonial’ deliberation as a politico-societal means that takes place in the state-society interface to address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences in connection with culture and (post-)colonial historicity in the non-Western, post-colonial polity.

**Figure 0.2:** Non-Western, post-colonial polity, subject to external intervention, facing the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences

Subsequently, this thesis sets out the pre-conditions of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation as a politico-societal means of addressing the ‘legitimation problem’, as follows. First, while ‘Western’ deliberation often identifies inclusion and equality as its pre-conditions (e.g. Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996, Fung 2003), these ‘quantity’-based pre-conditions (i.e. spatial expansion in inclusivity and power equality between deliberators) may undermine the ‘quality’-based pre-conditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. For example, while spatial expansion cannot always address pluralism in a multi-cultural polity (Taylor 1994), power equality may exacerbate identity/difference between deliberative agencies in a divided polity and radicalise them (Connolly 1991). These concerns underline the ‘quality’-based pre-
conditions, such as mutual respect and recognition in the deliberative space (Connolly 1991, Taylor 1994) and the cooperative dimension of power (Giddens 1984, Benhabib 2002). ‘Post-colonial’ deliberation will thus require the pre-conditions not only for the ‘quantity’ of space (inclusivity vs. exclusivity) and power (equality vs. inequality), but also the ‘quality’ of space (recognitiveness vs. non-recognitiveness) and power (cooperativeness vs. coerciveness) to lead the reflexive agencies towards deliberating the inequalities/differences, and (re)legitimising the non-Western, post-colonial, post-conflict polity. Therefore, the deliberative ‘success’ leads the polity and agencies to societal consent to political authority, while the ‘failure’ causes societal dissent and thus requires the state (or political authority) to coerce the society (or societal agencies). While Figure 0.3 illustrates the causal mechanism of political (de)legitimation in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, Figure 0.4 translates this into a matrix of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, where the X-axis and the Y-axis indicate the pre-conditions of quantity and quality in space and power. This matrix also makes it possible to trace the dynamic process between legitimation/consent and de-legitimation/dissent, and visualise the complexity in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, whose ‘success’ in legitimation/consent does not always emerge in a linear manner, but often through complex processes in combinations of progression (‘success’: political legitimation and societal consent) and regression (‘failure’: political de-legitimation and societal dissent) over time. This thesis thus defines the ‘success’ of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation as political legitimation and societal consent, and the ‘failure’ as political de-legitimation and societal dissent, depending on the pre-conditions of quantity and quality in space and power for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.
Second, this thesis makes a further assumption that these pre-conditions would lead the reflexive agencies representing the ‘modern’ state and the ‘traditional’ society in the non-
Western, post-colonial polity to ‘strategically’ choose the best possible approach to deliberating inequalities/differences from among ‘rational’, ‘agonistic’, ‘hybrid’, and ‘engaging disagreement’ approaches in view of state-society relations. Firstly, deliberative agencies would adopt a ‘rational’ approach to deliberation (‘rationalisation’) if the ‘modern’ state imposes a ‘rational’ consensus on the ‘traditional’ society in ways such as the Rawlsian ‘overlapping’ and the Habermasian ‘aggregating’ reasoning (Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996). The coercive pre-conditions for space and power would allow the agencies from the ‘modern’ state to assimilate those from the ‘traditional’ society, and exacerbate the vertical and horizontal inequalities. Secondly, deliberative agencies would adopt an ‘agonistic’ approach (‘agonisation’) if the ‘traditional’ society is empowered and able to contest and thus ‘agonise’ the ‘modern’ state and seek a ‘conflictive’ consensus in place of a ‘rational’ consensus (Connolly, 1995, Mouffe 1999). The improved quantity will allow the agencies from the ‘modern’ state and the ‘traditional’ society to unpack asymmetry, and critically negotiate and work it in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation; yet face the risk of antagonising it. Thirdly, deliberative agencies would adopt a ‘hybrid’ approach (‘hybridisation’) if the ‘modern’ state and the ‘traditional’ society exercise a cooperative form of power, although power inequality remains (Bhabha 1998). The ‘hybrid’ approach allows the cooperative agencies to explore ‘in-betweenness’ across their inequalities/differences (Bhabha 1998), and articulate a third, ‘hybrid’ consensus rather than a ‘choice’-based consensus (e.g. rational, social, conflictive, etc.). Fourthly, deliberative agencies would adopt an approach to ‘engaging disagreement’ (‘agreeing to disagree’) if the ‘modern’ state and the ‘traditional’ society equalise power relations, accept their inequalities/differences, and agree to disagree on them (Connolly 1991, Gutmann et al. 1996). If it is difficult to reach a ‘rational’ or ‘agonistic/conflictive’ or ‘hybrid’ consensus due to deeply-protracted inequality/difference (Geertz 1973, Laitin 1986), deliberative agencies will employ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation not to seek a consensus, but to
transform a ‘naked’ difference into a ‘moral disagreement’ (Gutmann et al. 1996) or disagreement within a political ethos of ‘agonistic respect’ (Connolly 1991). Figure 0.5 illustrates a relationship of the four approaches in the matrix of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. This thesis thus defines ‘rationalisation’, ‘agonisation’, ‘hybridisation’, and ‘engaging disagreement’ according to the pre-conditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.

Figure 0.5: Four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation given agential reflexion on the pre-conditions

Third, the thesis makes another assumption that ‘success’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation leads to a ‘positive peace’. Galtung (1969, 1990) popularises the concept of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ dimensions of peace, underlining the former as the mere absence of violence subject to coercion and the latter as the ‘real’ peace if the agential, structural, and cultural causes of violence are addressed. While dichotomising peace is contention (Davies-
Vengoechea 2004), this thesis adopts this two-dimensional view of peace, assuming that the ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will induce agential, structural, and cultural changes to address the key causes of violence, and transform the inequality/difference in the protracted conflict into a ‘positive’ peace. Firstly, the ‘successful’ deliberation will transform an agential relationship into the ‘peaceful’. While the equality of power relations between deliberative agencies turns an ‘unpeaceful’ relationship into a ‘peaceful’ one (Curle 1971, Lederach 1997), agential cooperation will allow deliberative agencies to enhance communication and address the protracted conflict, if any (Deutsch 1983). The ‘successful’ deliberation will thus pacify an egalitarian yet conflictive inter-subjective relationship to become cooperative and mutually-respectful and thereby transform conflict. Secondly, the ‘successful’ deliberation will enable societal actors to address structural exploitation and marginalisation and basic human needs in deliberative policy-making and change (Fischer et al. 1993), and thus discharge them from employing violence (Galtung 1969, Burton 1979, Max-Neef et al. 1991). Moreover, as ‘post-colonial’ deliberation is integrative and inclusive with societal authority, its ‘success’ will boost legitimacy not only vertically but also horizontally (Holsti 1996, Englebert 2000). Thirdly, the ‘successful’ deliberation will transform a ‘culture of violence’ into a ‘culture of peace’. If culture is primordial or impermeable (Geertz 1973, Laitin 1986), culturally-rooted, identity-based conflict is likely to be protracted (Galtung 1990, Stewart 2000). However, the inclusion of the societal authority, which often conducts the culturally-based, restorative justice, will not only legitimise politics, but also change the culture of violence at the grassroots level (Benhabib 2002, Appleby et al. 2010, Bleiker et al. 2011). Synthesising these contentions, the ‘successful’ deliberation will change the agential, structural, and cultural conditions and transform conflict into a new form of political order, namely a ‘deliberative political order’ as a ‘positive’ peace. Figure 0.6 illustrates the nexus between ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and ‘deliberative political (dis)order’ in ‘deliberative
peacebuilding’. Adopting the concept of ‘positive’ peace (Galtung 1969, 1990), the thesis defines ‘deliberative political order’ as peace that emerges after agential, structural, and cultural changes as a result of ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, and ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ as the comprehensive process leading ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to ‘deliberative political order’.

**Figure 0.6**: Processes leading ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to ‘deliberative political (dis)order’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’

![Diagram showing processes leading to deliberative political order and disorder](image)

The theory of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ will thus deduce a hypothetical mechanism on the different causality between an internationally-led (‘with’ external intervention) and a locally-driven (‘without’ external intervention) approach to peacebuilding. While the internationally-led ‘asymmetry’ in material and ideological power would undermine national/local deliberative agencies’ attempts to meet the inequalities/differences, the home-grown ‘symmetry’ would allow them to address these. Accordingly, a hypothetical mechanism of
‘equifinality’ (making similar progress along different paths) in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ can be abstracted as deliberative agencies would adopt a ‘hybrid’ approach to a lasting asymmetry among the international, the ‘modern’/political, and the ‘traditional’/societal ‘with’ external intervention, vis-à-vis an ‘agonistic’ approach to a relative symmetry in the state-society relations ‘without’ external intervention. This hypothesis is illustrated in the matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in a ‘hybrid’ path ‘with’ external intervention (the lower curve) and in an ‘agonistic’ path ‘without’ external intervention (the upper curve) in transition over time (Figure 0.7).

**Figure 0.7:** Hypothetical mechanism of ‘equifinality’ either with or without external intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity (space &amp; power)</th>
<th>Quality (space &amp; power)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusive and equal</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recognitive and cooperative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusive and unequal</strong></td>
<td><strong>Non-recognitive and coercive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>An ‘agonistic path without external intervention</strong>** Agonistic approach (agonisation) ‘Power-against’: a rejective and resistive relationship**</td>
<td><strong>Deliberative political order</strong> Engaging disagreement approach (agreeing to disagree) ‘Power-with/within’: a delegative, integrative, self-confident, conscientious relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rational approach (rationalisation) ‘Power-over’: a dominant and manipulative relationship</strong></td>
<td><strong>A ‘hybrid path with external intervention</strong> Hybrid approach (hybridisation) ‘Power-to’: a consultative and associational relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Timeline
Methodology

For its empirical inquiry, the thesis sets out the key variables of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ as follows: the pre-conditions for quantity and quality in space and power in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation as the independent variables, the outcomes of ‘deliberative political (dis)order’ as the dependent variables, and the contextual changes in agential, structural, and cultural conditions as the intervening variables, as well as the in-country political, economic and social settings as the endogenous variables and the external interventions as the exogenous variables. Since these variables are largely interpretive and unquantifiable, the thesis employs a qualitative, small-N, within-case and cross-case, process-tracing approach to the case method given its methodological merit in studying contextual peculiarities, complexities, and temporal and spatial variations in transition, despite some shortcomings, such as selection bias, subjectivity, falsifiability, and a possible interruption in transition (e.g. King et al. 1994, Brady et al. 2004, George et al. 2005). Also, the thesis employs the comparative method due to the research objective to examine similarity and difference in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland as well as its methodological merit in enhancing generalisability in the findings and suggestions across social phenomena across time and space (i.e. ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland in this case) (Mackie et al. 1995). In doing so, this thesis employs a combination of Mill’s methods of agreement and difference and the process-tracing approach to highlight a residual similarity (‘legitimation problem’) causing the overall similarity (‘deliberative political order’), as well as a critical difference (whether ‘with’ or ‘without’ external intervention) causing the overall difference (whether a ‘hybrid’ or an ‘agonistic’ path in the deliberative process) (Skocpol 1984, Tilly 1997, George et al. 2005). These methodological choices will enable the researcher to compare the cases of East Timor and Somaliland in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, examine causes for the ‘equifinality’, and abstract generalisable findings and suggestions.
After reviewing the methodological (dis)advantages, the thesis reviews the key issues in the fieldwork, reviewing relationality between researcher and research context, and setting out protocols and procedures for implementation in data collection and analysis. Firstly, I examine the relationship between researcher and research subject/object and its implications for data collection, ethical and political impacts, agential positionality and reflexivity, and the verification of data and findings, and review these in merit and challenge. I identified semi-structured interviews as the principal technique to collect primary data, for its strengths in flexibility and openness (Leech 2002) for empirical inquiry about the complex hypothetical mechanism (George et al. 2005, Hammett et al. 2015). Secondly, I set out the protocols and procedures for implementation. I gained full approval for research ethics on human subjects from the University of Manchester in April 2015, and undertook a three-month fieldwork in East Timor from 20 July 2015 to 3 September 2015 and in Somaliland from 22 September 2015 to 28 October 2015. I set research sites in Dili and Hargeisa, the capital cities of East Timor and Somaliland, and undertook a field visit to the two communities in East Timor, although constraints of cost and security did not allow me to do this in Somaliland and thus obliged me to replace it with document review. For sampling the participants, I identified seven units in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation for content analysis, and 69 participants in semi-structured interviews after assessing their relevance to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation (i.e. purposive/relevance sampling). My prior professional experience in East Timor (from 2004 to 2006) and Somaliland (from 2011 to 2013) was particularly helpful in identifying and approaching the relevant interviewees and understanding the context of interviews. Acknowledging a complex relationality between researcher and research context, I set out the interview and stress protocols in consideration of ethics, health, and other risks. Subsequently, I processed the collected data, coding and categorising them into the respective
variables for content and unit analysis, in order to compare and test the hypothetical mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland.

**Key findings and suggestions**

The review of the two cases identifies, among others, the following four points: 1) the risk of international peacebuilding, 2) the risk of local peacebuilding, 3) the need for a coalition of peacebuilding and development in theory and practice, and 4) the limitations of the framework. First, whereas international organisations, such as the UN and the OECD, have promoted external intervention to war-torn societies in view of specific policy goals (e.g. Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1994, 1995, OECD 2005, World Bank 2011, see Chapter 1 (1-1)), their (neo)liberal statebuilding in a ‘top-down’ approach increases the risk of reproducing the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences, delegitimising politics, and thus resuming political disorder in the post-colonial, post-conflict context (see Chapter 1 (1-3) and Conclusion (7-1 and 7-2)). This finding suggests that international peacebuilders should acknowledge the role of deliberative interaction between and within the international and the national/local agencies, and the power of the latter to consent, resist, and cooperate with the former, and thus adopt a multi-dimensional view of power vis-à-vis a single-dimensional view of coercion. Accordingly, they should moderate the (neo)liberal/‘modern’-centric rationalisation for statebuilding, and enable the national/local deliberators to address their positions and needs in an emancipatory way. Therefore, the external power and idea in intervening in conflict for peacebuilding should be critically interrogated.
Second, in turn, the ‘hybrid’ polity also increases the risk of (re)producing the inequalities/differences as the dilemmas or side-effects of deliberation if they are not properly addressed, given the empirical evidence of ‘failure’ of the ‘hybrid’ polity in Somaliland in preventing violent conflict (see Conclusion (7-1 and 7-2)). This finding rejects any romanticisation of the locally-driven indigenous approach to peacebuilding vis-à-vis the UN-led interventionist approach. Also, since ‘success’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ requires a complex mix of (pre)conditions and settings, and thus remains precarious and conditional, this finding suggests that further research is required to refine the causal mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in theory, and explore the empirical evidence in other contexts in practice (see Conclusion (7-3)).

Third, even if deliberation is proving ‘successful’, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ increases the risk of forming ‘new’ inequalities/differences over time (see Conclusion (7-1 and 7-3)). This finding suggests an urgent need to make an inter-disciplinary coalition between peacebuilding and development theory and practice in order to address and meet the remaining challenges in a transition from peacebuilding to development despite their different objectives (e.g. peace formation vs. poverty reduction) and timeframe (e.g. medium vs. long term) (e.g. Uvin 2002, Jantzi et al. 2009). Among other positions, it is important for the critical strand of peacebuilding and development studies, due to their common normative positions (e.g. upholding equality, legitimacy, justice), to contend for an emancipatory approach ‘from below’ to allow the powerless to address their grievances and needs, and the remaining challenges.
Fourth, the theoretical framework, however, implies limitations in relation to methodology and positions, and thus requires further research to critically examine its fallacy and falsification. Firstly, while the case method highlights the explanatory effectiveness in abstracting and retroducing social causality (e.g. George et al. 2005), a small-N comparison between East Timor and Somaliland limits this thesis in generalising the findings/suggestions, and applying them to other contexts. Secondly, the ontological and normative positions view inequality and injustice as the causes of conflict, and political order as the effect in ‘peace’, while undermining other perspectives on conflict and peace (e.g. Richmond 2005b, Mac Ginty 2006). Also, while the ontological and epistemological positions underline interactions between agency, structure, and culture, their change process would not always be concerted and harmonious, but often disconnected and contradictory due to complexity in (pre)conditions and settings outside the system of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’.

**Contributions to theory and knowledge**

This research will make contributions to theory and knowledge, among others, in four disciplinary areas: 1) peacebuilding studies, 2) development studies, 3) deliberation theory, and 4) area studies. First, this thesis will add value to the critical strand in peacebuilding studies. While the mainstream strand underlines the capacity of the state in politico-economic liberalisation and securitisation (a ‘capacity-based’ approach) (e.g. Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1994, 1995, OECD 2005, World Bank 2011, see Chapter 1 (1-1 and 1-2)), the critical strand often contends for politico-societal equality, legitimacy, and justice, and thus explores measures to meet them, such as re-distributing national wealth (e.g. Pugh et al. 2008), addressing human security (e.g. Futamura et al. 2010, Tadjbakhsh 2011), empowering the
civil society (e.g. Lederach 1997, Paffenholtz 2014), and exploring the customary governance system (e.g. Boege et al. 2008) (a ‘legitimacy-based’ approach). Sympathising with the latter, this thesis constructs an emancipatory concept of deliberation into peacebuilding studies (‘deliberative peacebuilding’), highlighting the critical role of human agency in hermeneutic acts of deliberation so as to address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the inequalities/differences in the non-Western, post-colonial context. This is because the theory of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, adopting the position of critical realism (e.g. Bhaskar 1979, Archer 1995, Jessop 2001), allows researchers to highlight agential reflexivity and interaction with structure and culture in a dynamic process of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and thus abstract more comprehensive findings and suggestions than others, whether the mainstream or the critical, which are often static and structurally-focused. Moreover, this thesis challenges the significant academic attention paid to an internationally-led, interventionist approach to peacebuilding, which undermines not only a locally-driven, indigenous approach (Francis 2008), but also a rigorous comparison between them. While Boege et al. (2008) have attempted to do this, yet show a shortcoming in case selection (the duration of research period), this thesis overcomes and adds value to it.

Second, this thesis will also make a contribution to development studies, identifying a gap between peacebuilding and development studies. Despite the urgent need to address the remaining challenges in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, peacebuilding and development studies have faced not only internal competition in different positions and paradigms, but also mutual exclusion (e.g. Uvin 2002, Jantzi et al. 2009). While peacebuilding studies tend to highlight ‘exit’ from (post-)conflict settings, development studies often underline ‘entry’ to a development paradigm in poor yet stable settings. A clear disciplinary boundary will make the two disciplines cost-effective, yet increase the risk of disintegrating and undermining
research on the interface and transition between peacebuilding and development. Given this, challenges exist in 1) linking a critical strand in peacebuilding and development studies, and 2) stretching peacebuilding studies to the sustainable development phase, and development studies to the post-conflict, fragile settings, thus creating an inter-disciplinary space where peacebuilding and development studies address the remaining challenges in interface and transition. With this aim, this thesis not only identifies the remaining challenges, but also encourages both disciplines to do further research in an inter-disciplinary way, and challenge the disciplinary boundary.

Third, this thesis will also contribute to deliberation theory, proposing a new inter-disciplinary theory of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. As reviewed above, this thesis newly conceptualises ‘post-colonial’ deliberation in attempt to apply this to addressing the ‘legitimation problem’ in the war-torn non-Western (non/quasi)democracies given their culture and (post-)colonial historicity (e.g. Bayart 1993, Mamdani 1996). This creation and innovation of knowledge allows deliberation theory to demonstrate its epistemological utility, applicability, inter-disciplinarity, and feasibility. While deliberation has been under-researched in peacebuilding research or applied differently (e.g. Barnett 2006, Braithwaite et al. 2012, on a ‘republican’ approach to deliberation), the theory of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in a critical tradition will make deliberation theory inter-disciplined to examine a nexus between deliberation, legitimacy, and peace.

Fourth, moreover, this thesis will make a contribution to area studies. A number of studies on peacebuilding have been made separately either in East Timor or in Somaliland, largely focusing on the ‘failure’ (i.e. the UN’s ‘failure’) in East Timor and the ‘success’ (i.e. the
home-grown ‘success’) in Somaliland (e.g. Beauvais 2001, Chopra 2002, Bryden 2003, Interpeace 2008), yet undermining the ‘success’ (i.e. the re-legitimation ‘success’) in East Timor and the ‘failure’ (i.e. the home-grown ‘failure’) in Somaliland, and their remaining challenges in a transition from peacebuilding to development. This thesis not only sheds light on the under-researched latter, but also interacts with the well-researched former, and offers a new and holistic explanation and understanding of these across time and space. While Boege et al. (2008) are among the few to have done so comparatively, their research has shown a shortcoming in case selection (i.e. the duration of research period only focusing on ‘failure’ in East Timor and ‘success’ in Somaliland). It is examining both ‘failures’ and ‘successes’ in peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland that not only enhances generalisability in the findings and suggestions, but also adds value to interdisciplinary area studies.

The organisation of the chapters

Finally, the organisation of the subsequent chapters is as follows. Chapter 1 unpacks the key policies and discourses in contemporary international peacebuilding and explores gaps in mainstream peacebuilding research. First, it reviews the UN and OECD’s policy narratives and sets out three theoretical models of international peacebuilding: liberal, statebuilding, and societal models. This theoretical review identifies the ‘legitimacy gap’ in the mainstream (neo)liberal statebuilding upon procedural democratisation, growth-centred development, and the securitisation of the state, and its cause of eroding political legitimacy and effect on recurring conflict in the recipient countries. Second, the chapter then briefly reviews classic debates on social contract and legitimacy, and increasing attention given to deliberation so as to meet the ‘legitimation crisis’ in the Western liberal democracies. The application of deliberation to peacebuilding has, however, been limited to a republican approach and largely
under-researched. This implies room for conceptualising deliberation in an emancipatory approach to peacebuilding. Accordingly, Chapter 2 constructs a theoretical framework of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. It identifies the ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context due to its culture and (post-)colonial historicity, and the need to contextualise the ‘Euro-based’ deliberation for its application to addressing it. The chapter then conceptualises ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, links this to ‘deliberative political order’ as a ‘positive’ peace in the framework of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and also abstracts a hypothetical mechanism of different causality in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. It then reviews strengths and weakness in this new framework. Chapter 3 explores the methods for empirical inquiry about ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. It identifies the key variables in the causal mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and contends for the methodological choice of case and comparative methods. It then applies the framework to comparing the cases of East Timor and Somaliland and formulates the key field questions. It finally reviews relationality between researchers and research contexts, and sets out the key protocols and procedures for the implementation of the fieldwork.

Chapter 4 reviews the cultural and historical backgrounds of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland. The chapter highlights the overall similarities in causing the ‘legitimation problem’ in a transition from colonisation to de/post-colonisation (yet also acknowledging the contextual differences). First, the chapter examines the cultural background, underlining the societal structure and cosmology, the societal practice of deliberation, and the implications for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. Second, it reviews the historical background for the (post-)colonial impact on (de)forming and exacerbating the vertical (state-society) and horizontal (‘modernity’–‘tradition’) inequalities/differences in East Timor and Somaliland towards the end of their civil wars. Subsequently, Chapters 5 and 6
examine the political and societal foregrounds in de/re/trans-forming the ‘legitimation problem’ with the inherited inequalities/differences in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor (Chapter 5) and Somaliland (Chapter 6) respectively. While the chapters underline the overall differences, they also focus on the similarities in processing ‘equifinality’. Accordingly, both chapters are divided into three sections: 1) the first phase of building peace (i.e. forming a ‘deliberative political disorder’ in East Timor from 1999 to 2002, and forming a ‘deliberative political order’ in Somaliland from 1991 to 1993), 2) the second phase of recurring conflict (i.e. deteriorating a ‘deliberative political disorder’ in East Timor from 2002 to 2007, and deforming a ‘deliberative political order’ in Somaliland from 1993 to 1997), and 3) the third phase of re-building peace (i.e. forming a ‘deliberative political order’ in East Timor from 2007 to 2012, and reforming a ‘deliberative political order’ in Somaliland from 1997 to 2005). Adopting the same structure and format in the longitudinal analysis enables this thesis to highlight the differences (e.g. exogenous input: ‘with’ and ‘without’ external intervention) and the similarities (e.g. endogenous setting with ‘legitimation problem’ and ‘equifinality’ towards ‘deliberative political order’) in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland. Finally, the Conclusion abstracts findings and suggestions from reviewing the cases, seeking answers to the research questions, and exploring implications for research and policy and limitations of the framework. First, the chapter reviews the two cases comparatively and examines the relevance of the hypothetical mechanism to the empirical evidence and its plausibility. Second, it explains the causal mechanisms of the ‘failure’ and the ‘success’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland. Third, it addresses the key challenges for peacebuilding research and policy and the application of the framework to other contexts. The analysis and discussions enrich the findings and suggestions for a ‘legitimacy-based’ approach to peacebuilding, vis-à-vis a ‘capacity-based’ approach which has dominated in the mainstream theory and practice.
Chapter 1: Leading to ‘deliberative peacebuilding’: unpacking the key policy narratives and the theoretical models, and analysing gaps

Introduction

This first chapter aims to unpack the key policies and discourses in contemporary international peacebuilding, and identify and analyse gaps in mainstream peacebuilding research. International peacebuilding has been interpreted in various ways, such as a ‘measure to build a positive peace’ (Galtung 1976), ‘action for democratisation and development’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992), ‘statebuilding’ (OECD 2005), ‘conflict resolution and mediation upon diplomacy’ (Lederach 1997), and ‘liberal peace’ (Duffield 2001, Richmond 2005b, Mac Ginty 2006). This variation indicates that there is no universally accepted concept and definition of peacebuilding (Barnett et al. 2007). Instead of re-defining such a contentious concept as peacebuilding, this chapter examines the key policy discourses of peacebuilding in the global policy space, unpacks the theoretical models, whether supportive or critical, and identifies the ‘legitimacy gap’ in the mainstream research and practice. It then reviews contentions on legitimacy and deliberation to meet the ‘legitimacy crisis’ in the Western liberal democracies, yet limitations in applying this to address the ‘legitimacy gap’ (e.g. Barnett 2006 on republican deliberation). Accordingly, this chapter is composed of three sections. The first section examines the policy narratives of the UN and OECD on peacebuilding. The UN is the key international peacebuilder, assembling and representing the voices of all member states including both interveners and intervened, while the OECD is more exclusive, due to its organisational objective to offer policy advice for a small clique of donor states (major interveners). The different membership compositions and organisational objectives result in contrasting perspectives on peacebuilding. The second section reviews
relevant theories that are both supportive and critical of the global policy narratives. In order to do so, the section constructs three causal models: 1) a liberal, 2) a statebuilding, and 3) a societal model, in order to unpack the global policy discourses. While the first two are supportive of the UN and OECD policy discourses, the latter offers an alternative perspective to the former, mainly based upon a critical perspective. The third section examines gaps in the mainstream peacebuilding research. It argues that a narrow understanding of the form of democracy and development in the mainstream (neo)liberal statebuilding causes a ‘legitimacy gap’ in peacebuilding theory and practice. A subsequent review of the arguments of legitimacy indicates deliberation as a potential to fill in the ‘legitimation crisis’ in the Western liberal democracies, yet it has seldom been applied to the mainstream research of peacebuilding. Although a republican approach to deliberation in peacebuilding (Barnett 2006) is one such attempt, its state/elite-centric view suggests a theoretical need for a more critical approach to deliberation in peacebuilding.

1-1. Key policy narratives for peacebuilding

This first section briefly reviews the concepts of, and approaches to peacebuilding, which have been dominant in the global policy space, such as the UN and OECD. The UN has developed a discourse of peacebuilding, centring on democratisation and development, and their nexus to peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1994, 1995). As the UN extended peace operations across the globe, in particular, after the end of the Cold War, its field operations have often faced the resumption and escalation of violent conflict in such countries as Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia in the 1990s (UN 2001). While the UN has undertaken measures for operational reform in the new millennium (UN 2000), the OECD (2005) has been increasingly assertive in an interventionist approach to securitising peace.
1-1-1. The UN’s discourse

In *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali 1992), the UN introduces peacebuilding as one of the key responses to an increasingly insecure world in the post-Cold-War era, and defines it as ‘action to identify and support the structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992: para 21). However, this simple definition hardly answers ‘which action, structures, and peace’ are to be undertaken.

Subsequently, *Agenda for Development* (Boutros-Ghali 1994) and *Agenda for Democraatisation* (Boutros-Ghali 1995) specify the policy goals of peacebuilding as to establish procedural democracy and economic growth, and link political and economic liberalisation and peace. The critical strand, however, associates this normalisation of the ‘liberal peace’ with the hegemony of power and ideas in the global policy space, and the emergence of a new form of liberal imperialism in international peacebuilding (Duffield 2001, Bellamy et al. 2004, Pugh 2004, Richmond 2005b, Mac Ginty 2006).

The post-Cold-War international peacebuilding in the 1990s, however, generated mixed results. The UN itself acknowledges both ‘successes’ (e.g. El Salvador, Mozambique) and ‘failures’ (e.g. Somalia, Rwanda, Balkans) (UN 2001: 2-3). Empirical studies indicate that, while 72% of the countries that hosted UN operations from 1988 to 2002 ended up with authoritarian regimes (Call et al. 2003: 234), nearly half of them returned to conflict within five years (Collier et al. 2003). In response, the UN takes a more expansive approach. In *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (UN 2000), known as the Brahimi Report, the UN redefines peacebuilding as ‘activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace… something that is more than just the absence of war’ (UN 2000: para 13), and ‘thus, peace-building includes…reintegrating former combatants;
the rule of law...; respect for human rights...; democratic development...; and conflict resolution and reconciliation’ (UN 2000: para 13). Broadening measures for human rights and reconciliation in addition to democritisation and development can be interpreted as the consolidating dominance of ‘liberal peace’ in the global policy space, ignoring its foundational critiques (Pugh 2013) or underplaying the dilemmas (Paris 2004, 2009). Moreover, the UN trivialises the ‘failure’ as management problems with a) funding and budget; b) programming; c) operational capacity; and d) weak coordination, and highlights measures for reform, including the organisational set up of Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office, and Peacebuilding Fund (UN 2005). The critical strand contends that this ‘problem-solving’ approach continues to mask the hegemony of ‘liberal peace’ in the UN policy space and practice (Bellamy et al. 2004, Pugh 2004, 2013).

1-1-2. The OECD’s discourse

Even while the outcomes of peace operations deteriorated in the 2000s, with arguably more than 90% of external interventions ‘failing’ to prevent recurring conflict (Call 2012: 2), the OECD, an exclusive policy forum for the Western industrialised states, has increasingly vocalised its concern about the role of the state in peacebuilding. Whereas the UN’s discourse tends to be less interventionist due to its wide representation, the OECD’s discourse is more specific with its aim to offer policy advice for donor states (major interveners). In Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations (OECD 2005), the OECD synthesises peacebuilding with statebuilding, arguing for ‘strengthening the capacity of states to fulfil their core functions’ (OECD 2005 para 3). While this does not specify ‘which statehood’ and ‘how’ it is supported, an influential voice has emerged to transfer/transplant the Western statehood into the ‘failed’ states (Fukuyama 2005). Subsequently, in Whole of
Government Approaches to Fragile States (OECD 2006), the OECD identifies a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to interconnecting diplomacy, defence, and development (i.e. 3D) given its nexus with peace (OECD 2005, 2006). Boege et al. (2008) interpret this as modelling ‘Western statehood’ in a ‘top-down’ approach to securitising peace. In practice, however, evidence shows the negative implications of the ‘top-down’ approach for undermining the local political economy (Duffield 2001) and the customary governance system (Boege et al. 2008). Moreover, the securitisation of peace causes coordination problems between diplomats, security and development agencies in policy-making and implementation (Duffield 2001, Chandler 2007). Moreover, the OECD (2005) regards civil society as a complement to the state, arguing that ‘civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery’ (OECD 2005: para 3). Yet limiting the civil society to service delivery is criticized as undermining a ‘critical’ role of societal actors in civic emancipation and social movement (Duffield 2007, Pugh 2010, Richmond 2011a), as well as in sustaining peace at the local level (Lederach 1997).

Other than the UN and OECD, bilateral and multilateral agencies have adopted different definitions and concepts of peacebuilding, reflecting their respective mandates, history, interests, and worldviews (Barnett et al. 2007). For example, the World Bank and the IMF focus on economic and financial ‘reconstruction’, while the UNDP emphasises socio-economic recovery. Accordingly, a need for inter-agential policy co-ordination is identified at multiple levels, not only at the global level (UN 2004), but also at the national level (Paris 2009). However, the top-down and normative approaches to peacebuilding, which are commonly adopted by the interveners, are exclusive and ignorant of, and even conflictive with, the intervened and the locally-driven initiatives for peacebuilding, which are often invisible and hidden from the eyes of the interveners (e.g. Francis 2008). Local evidence
shows that the imposition of external intervention often aggrieves the intervened, who are not merely ‘out there’ but able to resist the interveners through various tactics, such as armed insurgency, revolt, civil disobedience, and non-participation (Richmond 2011a, Mac Ginty 2011, 2012).

1-2. Three models of peacebuilding

In view of the global policy narratives, this second section constructs three causal models for peacebuilding, and assembles the relevant theoretical pieces under the models with the aim of unpacking the key contentions of peacebuilding. The three models are: 1) a liberal, 2) a statebuilding, and 3) a societal model. The first two are supportive of the UN and OECD discourses, while the latter is alternative or critical of the former. Each model is composed of several critical paths which show causality between cause and effect, since no single theory is able to holistically explain peacebuilding. First, the liberal model is based on the liberal pacifism: that political and economic liberalisation causes a liberal form of peace (Rummel 1983, 1995, Doyle 1983, Russett 1993). Yet a liberal scepticism, such as the ‘dark side’ of liberalism (Mann 2005), argues that liberalisation exacerbates political and economic inequalities and destabilises the state and the society (Huntington 1968, 1991, Snyder 2000, Stewart 2000, Cramer 2006, Keen 2008). Second, associating liberalisation with crisis, statebuilding discourses emerge. While the conservative approach supports the securitisation of the state for peace (Huntington 1968, 1991), the institutionalist promotes the institutionalisation of the state for peace (Carothers 2002), setting policy goals such as ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ (Paris 2004) and ‘good’ governance for peace (World Bank 2011). These propositions generally highlight the capacity of the state, while often undermining the role of the society as a mere complement to the state (World Bank
Third, the critical strand, however, relates the mainstream (neo)liberal statebuilding to the crowding out of societal initiatives (Boege et al. 2008) and provoking societal resistance and resentment (Mac Ginty 2010, Richmond 2011a) and the cause for another form of crisis. They alternatively underline an emancipatory approach to peacebuilding, highlighting a local/societal role in building a locally/socially-cohesive form of peace (Chopra et al. 2004, Barnett 2006, Mac Ginty 2010, Richmond 2011a).

1-2-1. The liberal model

This sub-section reviews the liberal model linking the causal paths from an open economy to a liberal form of peace through economic development and democracy. The liberal model is based on the following narratives: an open economy leads to economic development through growth; economic development interacts with the formation, maintenance and consolidation of democracy; and both democracy and economic development respectively contribute to forming a liberal form of peace (i.e. ‘liberal peace’). The model is thus composed of four paths as follows: 1) a path from an open economy to economic development, 2) an interaction between economic development and democracy, 3) a path from democracy to peace, and 4) a path from economic development to peace (Figure 1.1). Liberal pacifism and optimism (e.g. Doyle 1983, Russett 1993, Rummel 1995) have been, however, increasingly challenged by liberal scepticism associating liberalisation with conflict (e.g. Snyder 2000, Stewart 2000, Mann 2005). Accordingly, this sub-section reviews both economic and political accounts of peace, examining liberal pacifism, optimism, and scepticism respectively.
1-2-1. Economic accounts of the liberal peace

The link between economic liberalisation and peace is strongly influenced by modernisation theory. While classical economists, such as Smith and Cobden, have viewed an open economy as the key condition for industrialisation and economic growth, Rostow (1971), an early modernisation theorist, extends this, arguing that wealth and benefits from economic growth will gradually trickle down from the rich to the poor in the process of modernisation. He then relates economic development to peace, arguing that economic development reduces poverty, improves the standard of living, and thus makes human relations more peaceful (Rostow 1971). Given that industrialised nations have long maintained domestic stability (Collier et al. 1998, Henderson et al. 2000, Ellingsen 2000, De Soysa 2002, Fearon et al. 2003), the modernisation theorist often identifies poverty as the key cause of civil warfare to motivate the political elite to exploit the state to seek rent (Fearon et al. 2003), or reduce the cost to mobilise the poor to join violence (Collier et al. 1998, De Soysa 2002). Accordingly, Collier (2007) argues that poverty reduction is the most effective tool for breaking the ‘conflict trap’ and building peace in poor countries, even at the cost of external interventions.
However, economic growth does not guarantee an equal distribution of national wealth. While Kuznets (1955) highlights inequality as a side-effect of modernisation, deforming the mode of production from small-farming in the ‘traditional’ societies where surplus was minimal to large-Industries in the ‘modern’ societies which introduce hierarchy to labour forces, Olson (1963) argues that modernisation polarises the ‘modern’ societies between a few ‘winners’ and many ‘losers’. Empirical evidence suggests that the ‘trickle-down’ from the rich to the poor does not take place universally and this results in increasing inequality even as the economy grows (UNDP 1990). Increasing inequality raises concerns about insecurity. While Apter (1987), from a Marxist position, contends that industrial innovation marginalises the economically weak and turns them into rebels, Sen (1974) relates inequality to political conflict, saying ‘the relation between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one, and it runs both ways (1974: 1)’. More recently, Stewart (2000) conceptualises ‘horizontal inequality’ with multiple dimensions of inequality, such as economic, political, and social, and argues that conflict is caused not by poverty as intra-group heterogeneity (i.e. vertical inequality), but by polarised animosity based upon cultural causes such as ethnicity and religion (i.e. horizontal inequality). Subsequently, empirical studies have contended for the inequality-insecurity nexus (Berdal et al. 2000, Ostby 2008, Murshed et al. 2009), vis-à-vis the poverty-insecurity nexus (Collier et al. 1998, De Soysa 2002). The complex dimensions of inequality suggest that research on conflict requires a multi-dimensional analysis of the political economy (Cramer 2006, Keen 2008).

1-2-1-2. Political accounts of the liberal peace

Rostow (1971) further contends that economic and political developments are mutually interactive and enhancing. Inspired by this, Lipset (1959) relates economic development to
democracy: ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain
democracy’ (1959: 75). Similarly, Przeworski et al. (2000) contend that economic
development helps to sustain democracy: ‘wealthy countries tend to be democratic, not
because democracies emerge as a consequence of economic development under dictatorship,
but because, however they emerge, democracies are much more likely to survive in affluent
societies’ (2000: 137). In turn, Sen (1999) indicates democracy’s contribution to economic
development, crediting democracy with: a) enhancing human capacities; and b) encouraging
citizens to identify and conceptualise their needs, and claim them from their political leaders.
Empirical studies support a nexus between industrialisation and democratisation (Collier et
al. 1998, De Soysa 2002). However, the debate on developmental state in view of the ‘Asian
Tigers’ indicates a contradiction between growth and dictatorship, challenging the concurrent
view of growth and democracy (Leftwich 2008).

A nexus between democracy and peace is often argued on a monadic and dyadic basis: while
the former asserts the peaceful nature of democracy, the latter contends that democracies
seldom fight each other. From a monadic perspective, Rummel (1983) argues the institutional
rationality of democracy. Procedural arrangements of democracy, such as elections and
parliamentary politics, raise the cost of violence (Muller et al. 1990, Benson et al. 1998) and
urge political leaders to solve political tensions without violence (Rummel 1983). However,
the nexus between democracy and peace ignores the ‘dark side of democracy’ (Mann 2005).
While elections intensify political competition between elites, they may urge them to exploit
social identity (Horowitz 1993, Gurr 1994, Snyder 2000), or allow winners to take all and
underlines the liberal tolerance of pluralism and the tendency to decentralise power, in
contrast to the authoritarian regimes that concentrate power and increase the risk of state-
sponsored mass murder. He argues that ‘power kills, and absolute power kills absolutely.
Democracy is a general method of non-violence’ (Rummel 1995: 25-26). Yet the dichotomy
between democracy and dictatorship ignores democratising democracy. Empirical evidence
suggests that democratising democracies are more prone to violent conflict than either liberal
democracies or authoritarian regimes (Hegre et al. 2001, Rotberg 2002, Vreeland 2008,
Cederman et al. 2010). Democratisation has various socio-political impacts, such as making
societal actors conscious of their class and interest and active in social movements and
political contests, and increasing inter-class competition and conflicts of interest (Moore
1969, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Excessive social mobilisation may increase the risk of civil
disorder if democratisation outpaces the institutionalisation of the state (Huntington 1968).
Also, democratisation can destabilise power relations between the ruler and the opposition,
unbalancing the costs of repression and toleration and allowing the opposition to challenge
the ruler if the ruler’s cost of repression increases or the cost of toleration decreases (Dahl
1971: 15-16). Accordingly, while both democracies and authoritarian regimes are able to
exploit forces and effective institutions, democratising democracies compromise both
(Huntington 1968, Dahl 1971), and thus increase the risk of internal contradictions and

From a dyadic perspective, Doyle (1983) argues that ‘good’ morality and culture based on a
‘good’ constitution prevents democracies from fighting each other. Yet while Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (1992) focus more on the human rationality of democratic leaders who focus
on the cost-benefit analysis of warfare, Russett (1993) agrees that a rational calculation deters
a decision for warfare and creates room for negotiation. In this connection, he proposes an
institutional constraint of democracy that prevents leaders from going to war, arguing that ‘a
structure of division of powers, checks and balances will make it difficult for political leaders
to go to war’ (Russett 1993: 38). At the global level, Russett et al. (2001) contend that the cosmopolitan frameworks and organisations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, function as ‘pacific unions’ to prevent and mediate interstate warfare (Russett et al. 2001). This claim can be, however, refuted by the fact that the international organisations were mostly powerless in front of power politics, as the UN itself admits (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Moreover, Russett et al. (2001) argue that free trade will increase economic interdependence between democracies and reduce the risk of interstate warfare. Capitalists who benefit from foreign trade and investment will press political leaders to secure their economic interests in peace. In this extension, while the discourse of the ‘capitalist peace’ emerges (Gartzke 2007, Schneider et al. 2010), De Soysa et al. (2010) argue that the states ‘captured’ by capitalists effectively repress internal dissent and avoid conflict through the ‘hidden hand’ (2010: 295). However, these dyadic claims are increasingly irrelevant to contemporary peacebuilding, since its causes are mostly related not to inter-state but to intra-state conflict after the end of the Cold War (Mac Ginty 2006).

1-2-2. The statebuilding model

Within both liberal optimism and scepticism, the statebuilding discourse emerges to highlight the role of the state in democratisation and economic development for peace (Figure 1.2) in such measures for intervening and containing a radicalised liberalisation (e.g. Huntington 1991, Fukuyama 2005) and consolidating and promoting a further (neo)liberalisation (e.g. Carothers 2002, World Bank 2011). In turn, increasing criticism of external intervention for statebuilding as exacerbating political, economic and societal tensions in the recipient countries (e.g. Duffield 2001, Bellamy et al. 2004, Luckham 2004, Paris 2004) suggests that
‘international involvement in the reconstruction of war-torn states is Janus-faced’ (Luckham 2004: 483). This sub-section thus reviews contentions for statebuilding and their critiques.

Figure 1.2: Statebuilding model

1-2-2-1. State interventions for democratisation and development

The statebuilding discourse views the state as the enabler of democratisation from various positions, including: 1) a conservative position, 2) an institutionalist position, and 3) contention for external intervention. First, the conservative contends for the role of state in securitising democratisation. While Weber (1991) legitimises the monopoly of the state in the use of forces, Tilly (1975) applies this to defining statebuilding as a process of establishing the ‘superiority of the state’ over other entities within a territory (1975: 71), as well as a measure for enforcing the rule of law and securing democracy. Given the increasing risk of insecurity in democratising democracies, Huntington (1968, 1991) argues that the democratising state should be more coercive and repressive of the unruly society, employing force as an effective measure to swiftly complete the democratic ‘transition’. Extending this, Fukuyama (2005) advocates using force to contain the ‘failed’ state as a hotbed of terrorists. Second, as opposed to securitising peace, the liberal institutionalist underlines the institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of state as the priority of democratisation. Carothers

On the other hand, economists argue for economic measures by the state, including a) ‘good’ governance and b) the securitisation of development. First, the World Bank focuses on ‘good’ governance in statebuilding. In response to criticism against the structural adjustment programmes in the 1970s and 1980s as leading the poorest nations to economic and financial crises (e.g. Van de Walle 2001, Hartzell et al. 2010), the World Bank (1991) attributes the ‘failure’ in peacebuilding to the ‘weak’ state institutions, and argues for ‘good’ governance
and its nexus in economic development (1991: i). More recently, the World Bank (2011) has extended the nexus of ‘good’ governance to security, contending that ‘strengthening legitimate institutions and governance for citizen security [coercion], justice [the rule of law], and jobs [service delivery] is crucial to break cycles of violence’ (2011: 2); ‘institutional transformation and good governance [is thus] central to these processes’ (2011: 11). The discourse on a governance-security nexus became popularised outside the World Bank (Collier et al. 1998, De Soysa 2002, Fearon et al. 2003). Second, in this connection, contentions for diverting developmental aid to security have emerged. While Sachs (2001), a senior advisor to the UN, urges donors to boost aid for security, arguing that global inequality causes insecurity in the South, Collier (2008), an advisor to the World Bank, concurs that ‘bad’ governance and poverty are the key causes of relapse into conflict after international peacebuilding, contending for the ‘securitisation of development’. Assembling these contentions, Zoellick (2008), the then President of the World Bank, urges donors to ‘secure development - bring security and development together first to smooth the transition from conflict to peace’ (2008: 69). The discourse of the ‘securitisation of development’ creates a new field of developmental aid for security. In implementing this, Collier (2007) promotes a ‘quick-and-dirty’ approach to statebuilding. He argues that the war economy and poverty trap should be swiftly fixed or destroyed, and replaced by the new economy with a massive influx of external intervention, and if necessary, even with the force. Following his advice, the World Bank (2011) urges the Western donors to quickly disburse aid for securitisation.

**1-2-2-2. Criticism of external interventions to statebuilding**

However, external intervention in statebuilding is subject to much criticism due to the mixed results in practice. While some insist on contextual difficulty as causing external intervention
to ‘fail’ (e.g. Fukuyama 2005), others argue dilemmas and contradictions in it (Luckham 2004, Paris 2009). The latter include competing ideas and actors in statebuilding (Paris 2009, 2010), and asymmetry in power relations between the interveners and the intervened (Chandler 2010b). First, the broad range of activities and complexity in statebuilding makes it difficult for the interveners to coordinate and harmonise their ideas and activities. For example, the interveners could face multiple dilemmas in the field operations, such as tension in different timeframes and aims between diplomats and development and security agencies (Youngs 2008). Accordingly, Paris (2010) proposes agential coordination and harmonisation between donor agencies to improve aid effectiveness and ‘save’ external intervention for statebuilding from dilemmas and contradictions. Second, asymmetry between the interveners and the intervened is also contentious (Chandler 2010b). Critiques view a top-down, internationally-led statebuilding project, the ‘mission civilisatrice’ (Paris 2002), as the new governmentality of imposing a Western statehood in the non-Western context. This neo-colonialist approach to external intervention dichotomises the positions of the interveners and the intervened (Duffield 2001, Bellamy et al. 2004, Chandler 2004, Pugh 2004, Richmond 2004). The domination of the interveners in the field operations will increase the risk not only of marginalising the intervened, but also of eroding local societal cohesion between the intervened and as a result, the political legitimacy of the interveners. Duffield (2001) warns that ‘a common strand within liberal governance…erodes the cohesion of society’s culture, customs and traditions…to transform societies as a whole, including the beliefs and attitudes of the people concerned’ (2001: 123). Chandler (2007) similarly posits an ideational tension between the global policy norms and the local realities in the non-Western context. The significant asymmetry in power and ideas between the interveners and the intervened, however, leaves the latter not merely out there, but often ‘resisting’ (Scott 1990). Empirical evidence suggests that the intervened often confront and challenge the interveners (Mac
Ginty 2010, Pugh 2010, Richmond 2011a, Chandler 2013), and make the interveners aware of local resistance (Mac Ginty 2011). In this sense, some critiques thus even contend for scrapping liberal statebuilding and confronting any attempt to ‘save’ it (Jahn 2007, Cooper et al. 2011, Tadjbakhsh 2011, cf. Paris 2010).

1-2-3. The societal model

These contentions on external intervention for statebuilding urge both liberal and critical strands to increase their attention to, and recognition of, the civil society and its contribution to peacebuilding. However, their views of the civil society are diverse. While the mainstream liberals view the civil society as a third sector complementary to the state in service delivery (e.g. World Bank 2011), the critical strand understands the civil society as the ‘critical’ agency able to contest and challenge the interveners and the state as their subject (e.g. Mac Ginty 2010, Pugh 2010, Richmond 2011a, Chandler 2013). Another model thus highlights the role of societal agencies in democratisation and development (Figure 1.3). Yet the recent epistemological exploration of grassroots agencies for peacebuilding highlights not only its merits but also the controversial nature of the local ‘civil’ society (e.g. Belloni 2001, Schaefer 2010). Accordingly, this sub-section reviews contentions for a societal contribution to peacebuilding and its local reality.
1-2-3-1. Societal contributions to democratisation and development

The civil society is viewed variously, among others, from an associational and an emancipatory perspective (Lewis 2002a, Chandhoke 2007, Spurk 2010). The associational position interprets the civil society as a school of democracy (Tocqueville 1994), arguing that democracy works when the civil society networks civic engagement and interactions horizontally, and nurtures social trust and bonding (Putnam 1993). Putnam (1993) calls this civic quality ‘social capital’. He regards the civil society as aiming to maintain and strengthen a peaceful relationship between citizens; ‘the denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit’ (Putnam 1993: 173), as well as to complement the state; ‘strong society, strong state’ (Putnam 1993: 176). Echoing the associational view, the liberal interprets the civil society positively as able to promote democracy (Carother et al. 2000) and to train and mediate local populations for a sustainable peace (Lederach 1997), or more neutrally as a societal ‘watchdog’ to balance the state (Belloni 2001, Spurk 2010). In contrast, the emancipatory position sees the civil society as able to challenge the state and explore social justice. While Gramsci (1971) views the civil society as the political arena where the state establishes its ideological hegemony over
populations, the hegemony of the state is contestable and challengeable. Habermas (1989), for instance, regards the civil society as the public sphere where societal agencies generate an ‘unbiased’ discourse through communicative action, which is legitimate to challenge the state. This emancipatory perspective is critical of the hegemony of the state, and legitimises social movements to challenge the state and urge it to hear societal voices and ensure social justice (Howell et al. 2001). These two distinct views of civil society, one as a complement or balancer to the state in the associational/liberal view vis-à-vis as a contender or challenger to the state in the emancipatory/critical view, are conflictive and contentious. However, donors in peacebuilding are often selective and supportive of the former as a safe choice that is less political and more technical in practice (Howell et al. 2001). The critical strand challenges such a ‘tamed’ approach of international peacebuilders to the civil society, arguing that the ‘de-politicisation’ or ‘NGO-isation’ masks the ideational and power hegemony of liberal statebuilding (Richmond 2005a, Duffield 2007). Instead, the critical strand underlines the ‘critical’ capacity and role of the local civil society in bringing about socio-political change from below. While Mac Ginty (2010), for example, contends for local societal actors to confront and challenge the elite politics, Chandler (2012) urges donors to support the ‘resilient’ capacity in the society. A variety of approaches are proposed for a societal contribution to peacebuilding, including 1) a participatory, 2) a hybrid, and 3) a republican approach.

First, Chopra et al. (2004) propose a participatory intervention. They argue that ‘traditional’ societal structures can coexist with, or even evolve through, ‘modern’ political structures in democratic politics, given the political role played by traditional leaders in Afghanistan, East Timor, and Somalia. ‘There is never a vacuum of power on the ground... traditional structures evolve, social organization is redefined, and people continue to survive, filling the space’
(Chopra et al. 2004: 298). Papagianni (2008) extends this, arguing that civic participation even improves political legitimacy in war-torn states. Second, Mac Ginty (2010) and Richmond (2011a) promote ‘hybridisation’ as interaction and integration of ideas between international and local peacebuilding. Given that an ‘everyday’ form of peace is often established locally, yet invisible or hidden from the eyes of externals, a close interaction between international and local peacebuilders makes the former reflective upon the ‘everyday’ form of peace and helps to establish the ‘infra-politics’ of peacebuilding (Richmond 2011a: 17). Therefore, ‘hybridity’ is useful not only as a theoretical tool, but also as a policy tool for reforming international peacebuilding, in such a way as to address structural asymmetry at the global, national and local levels (Richmond 2011a), and appreciate indigenous capacities for peacemaking (Mac Ginty 2010). Third, and less emancipatory, Barnett (2006) proposes republican peacebuilding. He contends for a republican principle of deliberation, such as constitutionalism in rightfully exercising force and guarding the common good such as security (2006: 89). He attempts to apply this republican principle to international peacebuilding in order to make a ‘contract’ between international and national/local elites and thus consolidate or restore political legitimacy (Barnett et al. 2009: 24-25). His view partly echoes a recent contention of the UNDP by exploring a social contract in international peacebuilding (UNDP 2012).

On the economic side, Putnam (1993) argues that ‘social capital’ enhances civic trust, norms and networks, and thus resolves collective action problems and reduces transaction costs. As a result, the market economy improves efficiency and effectiveness leading to economic development. His argument for ‘strong society, strong economy’ (Putnam 1993: 176) is, however, often associated with the (neo)liberal economic policy to minimise the state and complement it with the society. While donors are keen on forming and promoting NGOs as
the civil society for peacebuilding (Spurk 2010), the practice of NGO peacebuilding is critically examined. Paffenholtz et al. (2006), for example, argues that NGO peacebuilding has been ineffective for the last two decades due to its failure in delivering services. Moreover, Richmond (2005a) criticises ‘subcontracting’ peacebuilding to NGOs as another form of liberal statebuilding to exacerbate inequalities on the ground. Instead, the critical strand seeks civic emancipation and social movements to transform the socio-economic structure. While Duffield (2007) calls for a civic solidarity to challenge the governmentality of the (neo)liberal economic policy globally, Pugh et al. (2008) urge societal actors to address social injustice in peacebuilding from below. In doing so, Pugh (2010) identifies local resistance as the trigger and driver of exploring social justice, while Richmond (2008a) promotes ‘hybrid’ politics between international and local peacebuilders as a political instrument to turn the course of liberal statebuilding to a welfare focus.

1-2-3-2. Local reality: contentious views on societal plurality and capacity

The recent epistemological attention to, and recognition of, the role of local societal agencies in peacebuilding offers a new frontier in peacebuilding theory and practice (Mac Ginty et al. 2013: 763). The World Bank (2006) has recently expanded its view of local civil society from ‘modern’, secular, and urban actors and organisations (e.g. NGOs, advocacy groups, trade unions, professional associations) to ‘traditional’ and religious leaders and grassroots groups (e.g. women’s and youth associations). Yet the former have benefitted more from external intervention than the latter. Due to their concentration in capital cities or major towns, the former are more visible than the latter in the eyes of externals, and often associated with the ‘modern’ state and political elite. A growing ‘modernity’, however, undermines or crowds out the ‘traditions’ in activities, capacities and potentials of the local civil society. While the
latter often represents religion, traditions, customs, and culture, its grassroots origin and focus make it invisible and hidden, and therefore ‘mysterious’, ‘difficult’, or even ‘problematic’ for the interveners. Indeed, the UN (2010) problematises these ‘traditional’ grassroots agencies, arguing that ‘complicating factors [in peacebuilding] can include the roles played by traditional leaders’ (2010: 17).

The role of ‘traditional’ agencies in peacebuilding is, however, contested. While Mamdani (1996) calls traditional leaders ‘decentralised despot’, and relates them to the cause of inter-ethnic and intra-tribal inequality and identity-based grievances to undermine democratisation and modernisation in post-colonial Africa, Huntington (1996) famously sees religion and culture as the cause of inter-civilisational ‘clashes’. In contrast to these negative views of traditions, customs, religion, and culture as being anti-democratic, anti-development, and therefore harmful for peacebuilding, Englebert (2002) sees political and economic potential in the resurgence of traditionalism in Africa, even though ‘their propensity to become a building block for a more democratic and more developmental African state is hard to assess and will likely vary widely across the continent’ (2002: 63). Etzioni (2006) argues that the inter-civilisational delineation is a faulty attempt to associate religious beliefs with radicalism, reflecting the suspicion of secular liberalism towards religion. The recent ethnographic studies offer positive insights into local plurality and capacity for peacebuilding. While war-torn states are often labelled as ‘failed’, ‘fragile’ or ‘weak’ (Rotberg 2003), this does not necessarily mean that local governance collapses, but masks the emergence and resilience of ‘traditional’ actors (Herbst 2000, Englebert 2002, Francis 2008, Logan 2013). Many of the local populations see the ‘traditional’ actors and their political role as legitimate due to their representation of local traditions, customs, religion and culture (Logan 2013). In reality, some societies succeed in maintaining security by integrating the
‘traditional’ societal system with the ‘modern’ political system (Boege et al. 2008). Boege et al. (2008) call this ‘hybrid political order’, challenging the conservative view, such as Huntington’s (1968), of problematising the ‘modern’-‘traditional’ hybridity as a security risk in changing societies. Their contention is closely associated with an attempt to institutionalise ‘hybridity’ in international peacebuilding, as argued by Mac Ginty (2010) and Richmond (2011a).

However, the societal model is not a panacea for a ‘successful’ external intervention. As civil society is a Western concept, tension can exist between the Western idea of civil society and the non-Western local reality. Belloni (2001) problematises the civic quality of local societal agencies. As the civil society is often ‘uncivil’, ‘nationalist’, ‘polarised’, ‘fragmented’, ‘politicated’, ‘unaccountable’, and ‘business-oriented’ and thus conflictive with the ‘objectives’ set out by donors, ‘the international effort to build civil society has not produced the desired results’ (Belloni 2001: 175). Given agential pluralism, Sisk (2008) urges donors to identify the ‘good’ civil society; ‘the promotion of civil society cannot occur in a platitudinous fashion that sees all civil society as an inherent good for peace and democratisation. Quite the contrary, there needs to be a short strategy of differentiation in civil society promotion’ (2008: 255). Accordingly, Sisk (2008) urges donors to collectively select the ‘right’ civil society. Yet Kappler et al. (2011) are concerned about this as liable to squeeze out ‘critical’ emancipators in the civil society. In turn, Appleby et al. (2010) emphasise a more inclusive and expansive approach to coordinating donors, state elites, and societal actors, and interacting efforts for peacebuilding ‘from above’, ‘from below’ and ‘from across’ in a more holistic, and thus ‘strategic’ manner. Yet local ‘traditions’ are often contradictory to global human rights principles (Schaefer 2010). In an elderly-male dominant society, for example, traditional leaders (aged males) exclude women and youth from
decision-making and agenda-setting, contrary to the principle of equality in gender and age.

Moreover, Richmond (2011b) is concerned about romanticism. Romanticism may exist at three levels: from internationals to locals, from locals to internationals, and towards themselves. First, when internationals meet locals, the former may romanticise the capacity of the latter. Second, the latter may mysticise the capacity, power and technology of the former. Third, both romanticise their capacities and subsequently undermine and underestimate each other (Richmond 2011b).

1-3. Gap analysis

This third section analyses the gap in the mainstream peacebuilding research. The previous two sections suggest that the global policy narratives and their theoretical models for (neo)liberal statebuilding are contentious and controversial: ideationally selective but discursively hegemonic in the global policy space. In this connection, the first sub-section below examines the mainstream research of (neo)liberal statebuilding and identifies its ‘legitimacy gap’ in theory and practice. Subsequently, the second sub-section briefly reviews the scholarly contentions on legitimacy, and identifies deliberation as potentially meeting the ‘legitimacy gap’. The third sub-section then critically examines deliberation in the current research on peacebuilding.

1-3-1. A ‘legitimacy gap’ in the mainstream peacebuilding theory and practice

The previous sections indicate that the key global policy narratives (the UN and OECD) and their supportive models promote selective forms of democracy and development: i.e. a procedural form of liberal democracy and a growth- and market-based economic
development in the liberal model; and an elite- and state-centred form of securitisation, institutionalisation, and external intervention in the statebuilding model. The liberal model envisions liberal pacifism and optimism for nexuses between modernisation and peace, such as between a procedural democracy and peace based upon democratic culture and rationality (Doyle 1983, Rummel 1983, Russet 1993), and between a growth-centric development and peace based upon improvement in well-being and poverty reduction (Rostow 1971, Collier et al. 1998, De Soysa 2002). In turn, with the aim of containing conflict and improving stability, the statebuilding model asserts measures for securitisation (Huntington 1991, Fukuyama 2005), institutionalisation (Carothers 2002, Paris 2004), ‘good’ governance (World Bank 2011), and external interventions (Paris 2004, Chesterman 2004, Krasner 2004, Collier 2008, World Bank 2011). However, these selective approaches to democratisation and development entail serious trade-offs. A procedural democracy, such as electoral and parliamentary politics, would exacerbate competition between political elites (Snyder 2000, Mann 2005). The institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the state would not necessarily improve political legitimacy, due to top-down, state-centred politics undermining civil society and local efforts for peacebuilding (Boege et al. 2008) and exacerbating politico-societal inequalities (Mac Ginty 2010, Richmond 2011a). In turn, despite a normative idea of ‘trickle down’ (Rostow 1971), inequality between the rich and the poor is often widened (UNDP 1990) as industrialisation makes progress (Kuznets 1955, Olson 1963, Apter 1987). ‘Good’ governance often prioritises the protection of a liberal economic regime over an equitable distribution of wealth (World Bank 1991). To make matters worse, external interventions for (neo)liberal statebuilding further exacerbates the politico-economic inequality and social injustice (Pugh et al. 2008), and the risk of civil warfare and insecurity (Stewart 2000, Duffield 2001, Cramer 2006, Keen 2008). These contentions suggest that the mainstream (neo)liberal statebuilding would exacerbate political and economic inequality and societal
marginalisation, and thus cause a ‘legitimacy gap’ leading to political, economic, and societal crises (Figure 1.4). This ‘legitimacy gap’ can cause dismal results in international peacebuilding (e.g. Call et al. 2003, Collier et al. 2003, Paris 2009, Call 2012).

Figure 1.4: ‘Legitimacy gap’ in (neo)liberal statebuilding

In light of the ‘legitimacy gap’ in (neo)liberal statebuilding, the critical strand problematises the ‘liberal peace’ doctrine that masks the ideational bias towards liberalism on the Right, which is dominant and hegemonic in the global policy space, as the primary cause of insecurity in the recipient nations of international peacebuilding (Duffield 2001, Richmond 2005a, Mac Ginty 2006, Cooper et al. 2011). These critiques propose a fundamental change in the ‘liberal peace’, emphasising an inclusive and participatory dimension in democratisation, a social justice, social welfare, and human security in development, and society-building in international peacebuilding (Pugh et al. 2008, Futamura et al. 2010, Richmond 2011a, Chandler 2012). These propositions for liberalism on the Left are radically different from, and even conflictive with, the conventional account of liberalism on the Right in the ‘liberal peace’ doctrine, although both liberalisms can be contained within a liberal gradation (Richmond 2005b). Namely, the mainstream policy discourses built upon a mix of
normative narratives have caused theoretical divisions between liberals on the Right and on the Left, as well as empirical crises on the ground, causing a serious ‘legitimation crisis’ in international peacebuilding in a global policy arena. While legitimacy is scholarly contentious (e.g. Call 2012: 41), what can it be and how can the ‘legitimation crisis’ in international peacebuilding be met?

1-3-2. Deliberation as meeting the ‘legitimation crisis’ in the Western liberal democracies

The Oxford dictionary simply defines legitimacy as ‘conformity to the law or to rules’ (Soanes et al. 2005). If so, why do (or should) people consent to obey the law/rules? Among other contentions, Hobbes (1968) presented a realist view of legitimacy as a social contract that requires all individuals to surrender their rights to the state and allow it to impose the law with absolute authority (1968: 81, 190-191). Liberals rejected the Leviathan state and sought a liberal reason for social obedience without state coercion in political ‘rightness/correctness’. Locke (1948), for example, urged individuals not to give up their rights but to make a social contract with the constitutional government in exchange for protecting their liberties and maintain the right to social resistance (1948: 48-50). In doing so, Rousseau (1973) contended for democracy as the measure of individuals to form the general ‘will’ through voting so as to make a social contract (1973: 95, 249-251). Experiencing a widening inequality at the dawn of the French Revolution, Rousseau (1973) argued for such a liberal democratic reason to make the elected government in the state treat its citizens in the society equally (1973: 175), free individuals from inequality and oppression (1973: 88-89, 167, 169), and thus make the law/rules legitimate (1973: 193). Extending this, Kant (1991) universalises the liberal democratic reason not only within a state but also beyond it (1991: 165), broadening the
general ‘will’ to the ‘will’ of the rational being (Kant 1991: 79, 139-140). He argues that the rational ‘will’ improves political morality and legitimises the law/rules which even curtail one’s liberty for the sake of coexistence with others (Kant 1991: 74, 173). His idea of a perpetual peace based upon the liberal democratic reason and the universal law for a just and lasting order (Kant 1991: 93-94, 99, 102) has underpinned the League of Nations and United Nations, and the liberal model of peacebuilding (e.g. Doyle 1983, Russett 1993, Rummel 1995).

If legitimacy embodies the ‘will’, it is, however, contentious whose ‘will’ counts (or ought to count). Marx (1962) problematised the rational, yet exploitative ‘will’ of the bourgeois class in the capitalist system (1962: 38-46). Instead, he urged the working class to form its own ‘will’, and rule the state for the sake of self-determination (Marx 1962: 53, 62-63). While rivalry escalated between a liberal democratic reason and a socialist communist reason for legitimacy after the Russian Revolution, Weber (1991), who was critical of both positions, insisted on the need to depoliticise the ‘will’ through modernising the polity, and establishing a ‘modern’ rationality over ‘traditional’ myths (1991: 155). Accordingly, he contended for the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of the state to make political decisions impersonal, scientific, and rational, and thus the law/rules legitimate (Weber 1991: 78-79, 83). While Weber (1991) upheld the ‘will’ of bureaucrats and experts, Schumpeter (1992) emphasised the ‘will’ of political leaders who comply with democratic procedure (1992: 269-270, 293-294). He redefined democracy as a mere means of ‘free and fair’ elections to legitimise the leaders and the law/rules that they make (Schumpeter 1992: 295, 269). Weberian and Schumpeterian views of legitimising the state with measures of the rule of law, the state monopoly of force, and democratic and electoral institutionalisation have
underpinned the statebuilding model of peacebuilding (e.g. Huntington 1968, Tilly 1975, Carothers 2002, Paris 2004).

While the classic contractarians had often been concerned about how to save individuals from disorder for the sake of their liberties, the contemporary political philosophers have increased their attention on deliberation to reconstitute a social contract and re-legitimise politics in the new dynamics of state-society relations, given the ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas 1976), a vicious cycle from political apathy and economic inequality to societal unrest and authoritarian response in the Western liberal democracies in the late 1960s and 1970s (Held 2006: 191-196). Acknowledging a growing role of the state and social need in the modern democracies, Rawls (1971) contends for a social contract to reduce disorder by optimally distributing public goods to those in need (1971: 453-454). In doing so, he proposes a principle of social justice to ensure that worse-off groups can gain the most compared to all other options (Rawls 1971: 40-45), vis-à-vis an utilitarian principle of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ (e.g. Bentham 1977: 393). Assuming that the ‘rational’ being can calculate the best possible choice (i.e. ‘rational’ choice) in a Kantian sense, Rawls (1971) asserted ‘rational’ coalitions across the polity, and urged them to engage in law/policy-making (1971: 42-47). For him, deliberation is a new political means of making a social contract in modern times to rationalise the law/rules and make a just and lasting political order (Rawls 1971: 17-20). In turn, Manin (1987), in a republican tradition, reduces deliberation to the two-step voting act in a Schumpeterian sense: first for citizens to select their representatives, and second for elected politicians to form the majority ‘will’ as the ‘will’ of all (1987: 358-360). Stating that ‘in the vote, the process of the formation of the wills [deliberation] is finished’ (Manin 1987: 359), he contends that the division of power can prevent the elected leaders from abusing power. These affirmations for political elitism in
deliberation have, however, raised critical responses. Fishkin (1991), for example, lamented the deliberative elitism in that ‘we seem to face a forced choice between politically equal but relatively incompetent masses and politically unequal but relatively more competent elites’ (1991: 1-2). In view of a downward voter turnout as political de-legitimation on elitism (1991: 55), Fishkin (1991) promoted a face-to-face form of participatory deliberation to make the political and societal ‘wills’ interactive and reflective (1991: 2). If Fishkin’s approach to deliberation is moderate and reconciliatory between elite and non-elite, Habermas (1996) took a radical step towards bringing deliberation to the latter in the society. In view of the ‘legitimation crisis’ as a result of the inevitable tension between liberals on the Right and on the Left over the distribution of public goods, he emphasised the civil society (e.g. public sphere) as the forum where the non-elite deliberate their ‘will’ through communicative action (Habermas 1996: 340-341). Assuming that all human subjects can agree to a ‘rational’ consensus through irreducible inter-subjective communication, Habermas (1996) considered deliberation as the societal means of consensus-making, with electoral and legal procedures to ensure an ideal speech situation and the transformation of societal ‘will’ into political/administrative action in order to transcend the ‘legitimation crisis’ (1996: 28-29, 332-333). Accordingly, the contentions for deliberation as meeting the ‘legitimacy crisis’ in the Western liberal democracies can be ranged from political deliberation on the Right (e.g. Rawls 1971, Manin 1987) to societal deliberation on the Left (e.g. Habermas 1996).

1-3-3. Deliberation in the current research on peacebuilding

Although the above literature on legitimacy and deliberation was not written with contemporary post-conflict societies in mind, Barnett (2006) is one of the few who have highlighted a role of deliberation in meeting the ‘legitimacy gap’ in international
peacebuilding. Yet his theory and its application are elitist and statist in line with Manin’s approach to republican deliberation. In *Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing states after War* (Barnett 2006), he attempts to ‘develop a concept of republican peacebuilding - that is, the use of the republican principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation to help states recovering from war foster stability and legitimacy’ (2006: 89). Barnett (2006) regards deliberation as an institutional means of protecting the state from liberal despotism in the new democracies in the post-conflict context. ‘Public deliberation encourages individuals to “escape their private interests and engage in pursuit of the public good”… To domesticate these instincts and nurture an enlightened self-interest, republicanism recommends that political discussions be public’ (Barnett 2006: 97-98). He confines the role of deliberation in disciplining the state rather than bridging the state and the society, and applies this to the case of Afghanistan for empirical inquiry. Following the defeat of the Taliban, a *Loya Jirga* (Grand Assembly of Elders) was convened in 2002 and 2003 to form an ‘inclusive’ government and share local governorship with subnational warlords. After the general elections in 2005, President Karzai explored using cabinet positions to ‘tame’ warlords. While the political elite had engaged in political deliberation in Kabul, disorder was exacerbated locally. Barnett et al. (2009), from a republican view, interprets this as a result of ‘captured peacebuilding’ in which deliberation was ‘captured’ since the ‘despotic’ elite inflamed conflicts of interest. In turn, Mac Ginty (2011) interpreted this as the resistance of the local non-elite who had seen elite deliberation as exclusive and unjust (2011: 108). Their different accounts of the causes of the local violence (i.e. the conflict of interest between elite vs. the resistance of non-elite) suggest that conceptualising deliberation at the elite level is theoretically narrow and empirically short-sighted. The theory of deliberation for peacebuilding should be inclusive of not only political elites but also societal non-elites, and allow researchers to explain and understand their interactive processes over time. Such an
emancipatory approach to deliberation for meeting the ‘legitimacy gap’ in the non-Western post-conflict context has been, however, under-researched. In this regard, a gap exists in theorising the role of deliberation in peacebuilding in a critical perspective, and applying it to examining, explaining, and understanding its outcome empirically.

**Conclusion**

This chapter reviews the key narratives on peacebuilding in the global policy arena, and constructs three models of peacebuilding (the liberal, statebuilding, and societal models), in order to unpack and re-group theoretical contentions. This theoretical review reveals that the normative bias in the mainstream (neo)liberal statebuilding approach to peacebuilding causes a ‘legitimacy gap’ leading international peacebuilding to political, economic, and societal crises. While the concept of legitimacy is contentious, deliberation has gained academic attention as a political and societal means of meeting the ‘legitimation crisis’ in the Western liberal democracies (e.g. Manin 1987, Fishkin 1991, Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996). Its application to peacebuilding is, however, limited, as it is seen in Barnett’s approach to republican deliberation for peacebuilding. Barnett (2006) highlights deliberation as a political means to make a ‘rational’ consensus between political elites, yet undermining it as a societal or a socio-political means to allow societal non-elites to interact, contest, and challenge political elites between consent and resistance in the process of peacebuilding. As a gap is identified in the lack of a critical approach to deliberation for peacebuilding, the next chapter will make an attempt to theorise ‘deliberative peacebuilding’.
Chapter 2: Theorising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’

Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed the relevant literature on the three models of peacebuilding: the liberal, statebuilding, and societal models. This review suggests a ‘legitimacy gap’ in the mainstream (neo)liberal statebuilding, leading to political, economic, and societal crises. While deliberation has the potential to fill in the ‘legitimacy gap’, it has been under-researched. While Barnett (2006) highlights the role of deliberation in peacebuilding from a republican perspective, his approach (i.e. ‘republican peacebuilding’) is elitist and statist. This second chapter thus aims to theorise a critical approach to ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context. In doing so, this chapter will be divided into seven sections as follows: 1) ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context, 2) ‘post-colonial’ deliberation: situating deliberation in the post-colonial context, 3) conceptualising the pre-conditions of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, 4) four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, 5) ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, deducing a hypothetical mechanism, 6) merits and challenges in practising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and 7) dilemmas in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’.

To begin with, the first section will briefly review the ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context in connection with its culture and post-colonial historicity. While colonisation to build a ‘modern’ state in the ‘traditional’ stateless society formed vertical (colonial state vs. colonised society) and horizontal (‘modernity’ vs. ‘tradition’) inequalities/differences (Young 1988, Bayart 1993, Mamdani 1996), post-colonisation often deformed and radicalised them (Migdal 1994, Chabal 1994, Chabal et al. 1999). The second
section will underline utility and challenge in applying the Western concepts of deliberation (e.g. Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996) to addressing the ‘legitimation problem’. The contextual difference induces a new concept of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation vis-à-vis ‘Western’ deliberation. In this connection, the third section will conceptualise the pre-conditions of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. It contends that the ‘quantity’-based (i.e. inclusiveness and equality) pre-conditions in ‘Western’ deliberation (e.g. Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996, Fung 2003) are inadequate due to the cultural pluralism and divisions in the non-Western, post-colonial polity (Connolly 1991, Taylor 1994). Instead, it will underline the ‘quality’-based (i.e. recognitiveness and cooperativeness) pre-condition, and synthesise both the quantity and the quality dimensions in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. It will then set out the ‘success’ of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation as the pre-conditions are met to lead deliberative agencies to addressing the ‘legitimation problem’ and establishing political legitimation and societal consent. The fourth section will examine how deliberative agencies approach addressing the ‘legitimation problem’. It contends that the pre-conditions are determinant for reflexive agencies to choose the best possible approach to deliberation from among ‘rationalisation’ (Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996), ‘agonisation’ (Connolly 1995, Mouffe 1999), ‘hybridisation’ (Bhabha 1998), and ‘agreeing to disagree’ (Connolly 1991, Gutmann et al. 1996) approaches. Subsequently, the fifth section will formulate ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, connecting ‘post-colonial’ deliberation with ‘deliberative political order’ as a ‘positive’ peace (Galtung 1969, 1990). The ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation would change agential, structural, and cultural conditions and transform the inequalities/differences in the protracted conflict into a new form of political order, namely ‘deliberative political order’. This framework of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ will then deduce a hypothetical mechanism of causality in a different path and process of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ either ‘with’ or ‘without’ external intervention. The sixth section will delineate merits and challenges in practising ‘deliberative
peacebuilding’. It will also identify the risk of insecurity in conducting ‘post-colonial’ deliberation in the liberalising ‘traditional-cum-modern’ (or ‘modern-cum-traditional’) polity. Finally, the seventh section will examine dilemmas in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. It will link them to tensions and contradictions in the two processes of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. These concerns underline the methodological importance of carefully observing, interpreting, and understanding ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in the research context.

2-1. ‘Legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context

The ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context is often related to its culture and (post-)colonial historicity. Colonisation to build a ‘modern’ statehood in ‘traditional’ stateless societies made socio-political ramifications, leading to the ‘legitimation problem’. First, colonisers faced multiple challenges in colonisation, among others, to promote and economise a stable political order (Clapham 1985, Young 1988). Accordingly, they employed the traditional leaders (e.g. kings, chiefs, elders) to effectively control the majority of indigenous populations as their ‘subjects’, yet introduced a new socio-political hierarchy to the pre-colonial polity (Bayart 1993, Mamdani 1996: 17-19). While this ‘indirect rule’ enabled a limited number of colonisers to rule the societal majority at a minimum cost (Young 1988), the asymmetry between the colonisers and their subjects allowed the former to coerce the latter, yet also formed vertical inequality between the colonial state and the colonised society at the polity level (Mamdani 1996). Second, in parallel, the colonisers undertook measures to ‘modernise’ their ‘uncivil’ subjects, and employ the ‘civilised’ ones in order to economise in running the ‘modern’ colonial state (Young 1988). Local education and employment, however, created ‘modern’ elite strata in the ‘traditional’ non-elite segments, and produced horizontal inequality upon segmental divisions between ‘modernity’ and
‘tradition’ at the agency level (Bayart 1993). The colonial project thus reconfigured the pre-colonial politico-societal structure with vertical (state-society) and horizontal (‘modernity’-‘tradition’) inequalities and differences, leading to the ‘legitimation problem’ with tensions and divisions at the polity and agential levels. The societal actors, especially the emerging ‘modern’ elite were, however, not passive but active in interacting and collaborating with, yet often resisting the ‘modern’ state to meet their interests (Bayart 1993). State and ‘modernity’, and society and ‘tradition’ were thus interactive, overlapping, coexisting, yet conflictive as colonisation progressed. However, the approach of the colonisers was not monolithic but diverse, ranging from the British ‘indirect rule’ to the French ‘association’ and the Portuguese ‘assimilation’, and the process of colonisation and cooption of indigenous elites in the colonial projects was also multiply-phased (Clapham 1985, Young 1988).

The end of colonisation, whether de-colonisation (the late stage of colonisation) or post-colonisation (the stage after independence) often left the ‘legitimation problem’ with the inherited vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences unaddressed, re-producing, deforming, and even radicalising them. ‘Modernisation’ often exacerbated them, causing political disorder (see Chapter 1 (1-2-1)) since an ahistorical/a-contextual and structural approach to assimilating ‘tradition’ into ‘modernity’ undermined them in transition from coloniality to de/post-coloniality (Bayart 1993, Mamdani 1996). Rampant corruption, for example, is evidence of re-producing and deforming the inherited inequalities/differences as the ‘traditional-cum-modern’ political elite and the ‘modern-cum-traditional’ societal non-elite exploited and explored economic rent and societal relationality in post-colonial politics (Lemarchand 1988). The exacerbating vertical and horizontal inequalities distanced the rulers in the ‘modern’ state from the ruled in the ‘traditional’ society, and weakened the accountability of the former to the latter (Clapham 1985: 51-52). As the crises escalated, the
post-colonial state often militarised itself, ‘securitising’ the polity, yet jeopardising human security and political legitimacy (Ninsin 1988, UNDP 1994, also see Chapter 1 (1-2-2)). In response, the politico-societal challengers, whether the state army or the societal guerrillas, explored various means, such as coups and insurgencies, to attempt to resist and overturn the tyrannising, delegitimising state (e.g. Clapham 1985, 1998). The post-colonial state-society and ‘modernity’-‘tradition’ relations thus became increasingly conflictive and ‘precarious’ over time (Kohli et al. 1985, Rothchild et al. 1988, Chabal et al. 1999). Figure 2.1 illustrates the ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context in transition from colonisation to de/post-colonisation.

**Figure 2.1:** ‘Legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context in transition
The colonisers introduced the ‘modern’ state to the ‘traditional’ stateless society, but partially hybridised the state and the society for the ‘indirect state’ (the left figure). As colonisation progressed, an emerging ‘modern’ stratum in the ‘traditional’ society was increasingly incorporated into the ‘modern state’ (the central figure). Independence allowed the political elite to take over the post-colonial state, yet keep the state-society interface for their own interests (the right figure) although its size varied from one context to another (Englebert 2002). In the meantime, the ‘modernity’ and the ‘tradition’ formed, deformed, and transformed the vertical and horizontal inequalities in the de/post-colonisation processes, multiplying them as ‘modernities’ and ‘traditions’ yet increasing their interactions and interdependence as well as tensions and divisions within and between them.

2-2. ‘Post-colonial’ deliberation: situating deliberation in the post-colonial context

While the concept of deliberation has been evolved to address the politico-economic ‘legitimation crisis’ in the stable Western democracies, it can be also applied to meeting the politico-societal ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities in the war-torn non-Western (non/quasi)democracies. Although the Oxford English Dictionary (Soanes et al. 2005) defines deliberation as ‘long and careful consideration or discussion’, political philosophers have considered it as more than a mere discussion, rather a means for the political elite to rationalise political discussion and achieve an interest-free consensus (i.e. ‘overlapping consensus’) (Rawls 1993), as well as a process by which the societal non-elite form a societal consensus for self-determination (i.e. ‘agreement of free and equal persons’) (Habermas 1996) (see Chapter 1 (1-3-2)). Deliberation, however, requires acknowledging both utility and challenge. It will be useful to address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the radicalised inequalities/differences, and to re-legitimise the non-Western, post-colonial, post-
conflict polity. Yet the challenge remains: to contextualise the ‘Western’ deliberation for application to the non-Western, post-colonial polity, where deliberation often takes place in the state-society interface, vis-à-vis the Western polity, where deliberation is assumed to take place in either the state (e.g. Rawls 1993) or the society (e.g. Habermas 1996) in a Weberian view of the state-society divide (Weber 1991).

The active debates between Rawls and Habermas on deliberation (Rawls 1995, Habermas 1995) have become influential in conceptualising ‘Western’ deliberation, among others, Rawlsian ‘political (state-led)’ deliberation based upon liberalism on the Right in the republican tradition and the Habermasian ‘societal (society-led)’ deliberation based upon liberalism on the Left in the critical tradition. Their differences can be summarised as follows, given three concerns with deliberation: 1) where deliberation takes place, 2) who deliberates for whom, and 3) how deliberation is institutionalised. While Rawls (1993) argues that 1) deliberation takes place in the state, 2) the ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ officials and citizens deliberate public good for the Other (i.e. ‘irrational’ and ‘unreasonable’) in the society, and 3) deliberation is institutionalised by a fair procedure, Habermas (1996) contends that 1) deliberation takes place in the society, 2) argumentative citizens formulate the societal will in the communicative action upon self-interest, and 3) deliberation is institutionalised in a procedural democracy. Despite these differences, both Rawls and Habermas situate the concept of deliberation exclusively in the Western polity where 1) the realms of the state and society are separated in the Weberian view of state/public-society/private divide, 2) the citizenry is liberal: individualistic and reflective upon capitalist norms and values, and 3) the democratic procedure is well established. Such a ‘Western’ concept of deliberation, however, would require to be re-constituted in applying it to the non-Western, post-colonial context.
which accommodates agency and structure in a different culture and historicity (Dallmayr 1996).

The politico-societal ramifications of colonisation also include the form of polity. The ‘indirect rule’ introduced the Western polity (e.g. in the Weberian and Gramscian sense), yet partially hybridising the state and the society to allow intermediary agencies, such as ‘traditional’ leaders and ‘modern’ youth, to interlink the colonisers and their subjects on behalf, and in favour of, the former (Boone 1994: 112, Migdal 1994: 26, Mamdani 1996). The post-colonial state often left the spatial dualism intact (Englebert 2002), turning the state-society interface into a new ‘democratic’ space which enabled the political and societal actors to compete and struggle for power (Migdal 1994: 27), as well as negotiate and collaborate (Cornwall et al. 2007: 1). In turn, despite the end of the colonial era, the former colonial power continues to control the international systems of governance, business, trade and development aid, and consolidates its politico-economic supremacy over the post-colonial ‘subjects’, and keeps the latter vulnerable and powerless both materially and ideologically (Clapham 1996, Van de Walle 2001, Cooper 2002, Jabri 2013). Despite a great risk of over-simplification and generalisation, socio-political settings in the post-colonial context can thus be characterised as follows: 1) the state and the society are partially hybridised, and the political and societal actors interact both positively and negatively in the state-society interface, 2) the citizenry is plural, divisive, and collective along the vertical and horizontal lines of inequalities/differences, and 3) the post-colonial polity remains subject to external intervention.

These socio-political realities in the non-Western, post-colonial context make a significant impact on deliberation in practice. Ethnographic research shows that active deliberation takes
place between political and societal actors in the state-society interface. Ferme (1999), for instance, observes politico-societal deliberation that takes place in the ‘secret settings’ in Sierra Leone. During elections, local chiefs and elders invited political leaders and exchanged their views to form their opinions in their houses, and shared these with their ethnic/tribal ‘subordinates’ who belong to the traditional structure of hierarchy and network prior to the ballot (Ferme 1999: 164, 174). Hashim et al. (2004) similarly see politico-societal deliberation in Jigawa state in Nigeria. The international aid agencies led the federal government to formulate a poverty reduction programme centring on economic growth at the state level. While a discursive gap on poverty reduction emerged between the state and the society, local emirs and chiefs who head the ‘traditional’ Zakkat system (a local taxation or fund-raising system) addressed local needs for livelihood and wellbeing, and mediated the discursive gap, which led to modifying the (neo)liberally-narrated policies from ‘below’ (Hashim et al. 2004: 248, 251). Moreover, De Sousa Santos et al. (2005) highlight an emerging wave of ‘deepening’ democracy in the South. Civic participation and ‘co-production/governance’ becomes expansive, even in the areas of security and budgeting, which have been central to state affairs, and address democratic deficits, such as social injustice and exclusion upon race, education, and work, in elite politics (De Sousa Santos et al. 2005: lix-lxi). As a result, emancipatory state-society interactions nurture ‘a culture of peace, dialogue and solidarity’ (De Sousa Santos et al. 2005: lvi).

These examples suggest that 1) deliberation actively takes place in the state-society interface as a ‘deliberative space’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context, 2) it is often undertaken by societal leaders who head the traditional structures in the socio-political hierarchy and network (e.g. traditional and religious leaders), or engage in civic activism and movements (e.g. CSO leaders), and represent collective interests and claims, 3) its institutionalisation
requires regular interaction between deliberative agencies in the deliberative space who represent the ‘modern’ elite in the state and the ‘traditional’ non-elite in the society, and 4) external interveners remain influential in the post-colonial polity (Figure 2.2). ‘Post-colonial’ deliberation thus takes place in the ‘deliberative space’ where political and societal actors encounter, interact, argue and sometimes reach consensus, yet often struggle, compete and fall into conflict, and is never simply dominated by the ‘modern’ state or the ‘traditional’ society. However, the mainstream approach to ‘Western’ deliberation and (neo)liberal statebuilding often undermines these socio-political dynamics and contextual particularities in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, and fails to address them.

**Figure 2.2**: Endogenous and exogenous contexts where ‘post-colonial’ deliberation takes place in the non-Western, post-colonial context

### 2.3. Conceptualising the pre-conditions of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation

In this connection, questions can be raised. What pre-conditions are required for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to address the ‘legitimation problem’? The theorists of ‘Western’ deliberation have often identified inclusion and equality as the pre-conditions (Rawls 1993,
If so, what do ‘inclusion’ and ‘equality’ imply? First, ‘inclusion’ can imply the ‘expansion’ of the deliberative space in quantity so that more societal actors can participate in deliberation. In particular, those who promote citizenry and civic participation in deliberative democracy have contended for increasing the quantity of societal participants in decision-making in the state. These activist thinkers would see deliberative ‘success’ if the deliberative space is inclusive and thus expansive, and allows more citizens to participate in political deliberation (Cornwall et al. 2007: 1). Societal actors are then advised to ‘claim’ the deliberative space, to broaden and transform its characteristics from a ‘closed’ and ‘invited’ space, where societal participation is nominal or limited, to a more open and substantial arena, where all relevant societal actors can articulate their ‘will’ in deliberation and address their everyday needs and practice (Cornwall et al. 2007). An increase in inter-subjective communication and interaction, however, could impel deliberating agencies not to reconcile their inequalities/differences, but compete and exacerbate them. Indeed, the classic deliberation theorists, whether Rawlsian or Habermasian, consider deliberation as a political means or process of aggregating the competing reasons while singling out the most ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ reason upon such criteria as ‘rational’ choice (Habermas 1996) and ‘social’ choice (Dryzek 2000). This socio-political search for a consensus may turn the act of reasoning from agonism to antagonism, and radicalise the competing interests. An inclusive and expansive, yet competitive and conflictive form of deliberation may politicise socio-political divisions and differences. In this respect, Mouffe (2000) argues that ‘a vibrant clash of democratic political positions’ will be likely to break out in a plural society (2000: 104). ‘Inclusion’ in a plural, divisive socio-political setting will thus face the risk of exacerbating inter-subjective competition and enmity, and antagonising and radicalising the ‘legitimation problem’. 
As opposed to such a quantity-focus on spacial inclusion and expansion, Taylor (1994) contends that, if the deliberative space is ‘recognitive’, although it remains plural and divisive, it will enable contestants to recognise, accept, and meet disagreement over difference. Similarly, Benhabib (2002), from a constructivist perspective, argues that a divisive yet ‘recognitive’ space will encourage deliberating agencies to, at least, sit down and talk, and thus reframe and bridge their differences. She posits an example of the ‘politics of difference’ in a civil divorce case in a multicultural India (Benhabib 2002: 91-94). There is a Moslem couple in which the husband practised polygamy and divorced his wife according to the customary law, yet the wife rejected it and appealed to the state court for marital maintenance. A legal difference on marital life split the traditional leaders who sided with the husband and the court judges who supported the wife. The legal tension between the customary and the secular laws led to a wide range of socio-political deliberation involving government agencies, international development organisations, traditional and religious communities, women’s groups, and the national and local media (Benhabib 2002: 115-117). The ‘recognitive’ space for deliberation, however, enabled the traditional leaders to seek discursive ‘in-betweenness’, accepting dialogue with the other, and reaching an agreement to reform the customary law. This case indicates that even culturally-persistent identity and traditions are never rigid but transient to being re-positioned if the deliberative space is ‘recognitive’. This is because the ‘recognitive’ and ‘acceptive’ space impels deliberating agencies to meet and reconcile competing reasons even alongside resilient differences, such as tradition, religion, ethnicity, gender, and age. Deliberation in a plural, divisive socio-political setting thus requires improving both quantity and quality in the deliberative space which allows contestants to recognise each other and reconcile differences in position and view.
Second, in turn, ‘equality’ can imply ‘equality before the law’ in the opportunity of contestants to access the deliberative space so as to enhance ‘rationality’ and ‘reasonableness’ in political deliberation (Rawls 1993), and thus promote a procedural and legal/institutional form of equality in opportunity (Habermas 1996). However, the procedure and law/institution would not necessarily ensure that contestants are heard and able to speak equally, but rather be undermined by power relations between them (Knight et al. 1997). For example, the aforementioned divorce case in India indicates that, although both husband and wife were able to access societal deliberation, they were not treated equally due to the traditional, religious and cultural structure of hierarchies in the socio-political setting (Benhabib 2002). It is thus important to equalise not only access to the deliberative space, but also power relations between deliberating agencies, and if necessary, empower the weak.

While inter-subjective power relations are complex in such dimensions of power ‘over’, ‘against’, ‘to’, and ‘with’/’within’ (adapted by VeneKlasen et al. 2002: 45), they are often conceptualised in the frame of ‘power-over’. Dahl (1969) famously argues for a ‘visible’ form of power, describing it as ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (1969: 80). His behaviourist view is contested by many (Gaventa 2006a), including Bachrach et al. (1969: 95) who argue for a ‘hidden’ form of power in social norms and institutions as well as Lukes (1974: 23) who interprets an ‘invisible’ form of power in knowledge and discourses. Yet they commonly interpret power in a dimension of ‘power-over’, highlighting a dominant and coercive relationship between the powerful and the powerless. This asymmetry allows the powerful to control deliberation for justifying and legitimising their argument, and thus make it no longer ‘free’. In this sense, while Fraser (1996) warns of the negativity of asymmetry in deliberation, Mouffe (2000) argues the impossibility of a ‘free’ and unconstrained deliberation. Deliberative ‘success’
thus requires equalising power relations between deliberating agencies and preventing the powerful from dominating the powerless in deliberation. However, equalising power may not automatically guarantee ‘success’ since it may also destabilise power dynamics and allow the powerless to break silence and resist the powerful. Foucault (1980) highlights this dimension of ‘power-against’, underlining the power of the weak, who no longer passively comply with the powerful, but challenge and contest them. ‘There are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to power…exists all the more by being in the same place as power’ (Foucault 1980: 142). In practice, the weak can explore various tactics to resist. Scott (1990) observes the ‘arts of disguise’ such as non-cooperation, disobedience, ignorance, mocking, rumours, gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, and jokes, indicating complexity in the ‘hidden transcript’, the everyday form of resistance (1990: xii-xiii). The power equation can thus make deliberation no longer consensual for reasons, but deliberating agencies increasingly competitive, resistive, and thus agonised in the plural society (Connolly 1991, Mouffe 2000). ‘A vibrant clash of democratic political positions’ in a symmetrical condition will enable continuous deliberation over inequality/difference to be agonistic, and prevent it from falling in antagonisation and radicalisation (Mouffe 2000: 104, Ramsbotham 2010).

Such a quantity-focus on power ‘over’/‘against’, however, undermines agential affinity in cooperation and collaboration. Giddens (1984) argues that ‘power is not necessarily linked with conflict in the sense of either division of interest or active struggle, and power is not inherently oppressive’ (1984: 257). Alternatively, he contends for power as ‘transforming capacity to achieve outcomes by reflexive monitoring of conduct’ (Giddens 1984: 15), highlighting a dimension of ‘power-to’ that enables deliberating agencies to talk with, reflect
upon, and learn from others, and subsequently reframe and transform their differences. This quality dimension of ‘power-to’ does not dismiss the quantity dimensions of power ‘over’ and ‘against’, but adds value to them by recognising the reflexive capacity of deliberating agencies to reposition their differences in the ‘politics of difference’ (Taylor 1994, Benhabib 2002). Yet repositioning does not necessarily impel agencies to give up difference in their value systems. Instead, strategic approaches to conversion, compromise, and integration in deliberation, such as ‘incompletely theorised agreement’ (Sunstein 1995), ‘common ground’ (Rothman 1992), ‘give and take’ and ‘win-win’ (Follett 1949), enable them to reposition their differences, while maintaining their norms and value systems at the same time. However, the reflexive agencies cannot escape from the problem of the asymmetry which enables the powerful to employ deliberation for their benefit. It is thus important to address asymmetry in the dimension of ‘power-to’. In this connection, Follett (1949) proposes another dimension of ‘power-with’ that enables someone to have the same chance of ‘influencing you as you have of influencing him’ (1949: 105). Deliberating agencies in this dimension will address asymmetry in the dimension of ‘power-to’ in such ways as empowering the weak and delegating or transferring power from the powerful to the powerless. These cooperative dimensions of power: ‘power-to’ and ‘power-with’ are an antithesis of the coercive/resistive dimensions of power: ‘power-over’ and ‘power-against’. Yet ‘power-with’ may keep agencies unconscious of the underlying structure of asymmetry. In this sense, Starhawk (1990) contends for a psychological dimension of ‘power-within’ that makes actors more self-assertive and confident, and thus conscious of their rights for self-determination.

Nevertheless, addressing the agency-level dynamics of power relations remains inadequate to conceptualise ‘success’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. This is because ‘post-colonial’ deliberators who represent the ‘modern’ state (e.g. political ‘modern’ elites such as state
politicians and bureaucrats) and the ‘traditional’ society (e.g. societal ‘traditional’ non-elites such as traditional and religious leaders) in the state-society interface are subject to power dynamics between the ‘modern’ state and the ‘traditional’ society at the polity level (e.g. Migdal 1994, Chabal 1994, Englebert 2002). The reflexive deliberators cannot fully deliberate if they are situated in a conflictive setting where the ‘modern’/political dominate the ‘traditional’/societal, or the ‘traditional’/societal resist the ‘modern’/political although there will never be the perfect deliberative environment in reality. The state-society relations make a significant impact on, or even determine agential dynamics between ‘post-colonial’ deliberators who are reflexive in the state-society interface.

These contentions over space and power indicate that ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will require not only spatial ‘inclusion’ and power ‘equality’ in quantity, but also spatial ‘recognitiveness’ and power ‘cooperativeness’ in quality, at the polity and agential levels. While space and power in deliberation are not mutually exclusive but co/inter-related, space is particularly influential in power relations. While an inclusive and expansive space will empower the powerless and lead them to address asymmetry, an exclusive and narrow space will limit the access of the powerless to deliberation and increase asymmetry. Similarly, a recognitive and reflexive space will enable deliberative agencies to recognise and accept their differences, build a more cooperative relationship with others, and facilitate transforming the differences. It will thus enhance the self-confidence and conscience of the powerless. Yet power relations also affect the deliberative space. Even if the space is closed or narrow, it will become inclusive and expansive as the empowered weak challenge the dominant powerful and demand their access to deliberation. Similarly, if the space is non-recognitive, it will be transformed into recognitive if cooperative agencies increase their interactions and
communication. The pre-conditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation thus require both quantity and quality in space and power at the polity and agential levels.

Accordingly, the ‘success’ and the ‘failure’ of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation can be modelled as follows. First, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will require the deliberative space to expand its inclusiveness in quantity so that more ‘traditional’/societal agencies can participate in deliberation, as well as to improve the quality of its recognitiveness so that deliberative agencies recognise and accept their inequalities/differences across the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal spectrum. Second, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will also require it to meet not only a procedural and legal/institutional equality in opportunity so that asymmetry between deliberative agencies is addressed, but also an empirical and substantial equality in power relations so that deliberative agencies transform the expression of power from a coercive to a cooperative manner. As a result, deliberative agencies are willing and able to address the ‘legitimation problem’ and transform their inequalities/differences. It is thus assumed that, if the pre-conditions are met, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will lead the reflexive agencies to deliberative ‘success’ in addressing the ‘legitimation problem’ in an emancipatory way, and thus the societal agencies to consenting to political authority (i.e. ‘success’ as political legitimisation and societal consent). If not, it will cause societal dissent and impelling political authority to coerce societal agencies (i.e. ‘failure’ as political de-legitimation and societal dissent). Figure 2.3 illustrates the causal mechanism of political (de)legitimation and societal consent/dissent as consequences of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.
This mechanism can be further translated into a matrix to illustrate a relationship between ‘success/legitimation’ and ‘failure/de-legitimation’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation across time and space (Figure 2.4). The X-axis and the Y-axis indicate the quantity and the quality of space and power respectively. While the X-axis scales quantity in space and power (from exclusive to inclusive in space and from inequality to equality in power), the Y-axis indicates quality in space and power (from non-recognitive to recognitive in space and from coercive to cooperative in power) as well as a timeline. The matrix places the dimension of ‘power-over’ in the lower-left quadrant, the ‘power-against’ in the upper-left, the ‘power-to’ in the lower-right, and the ‘power-with/within’ in the upper-right. Also, the indication of a timeline allows the matrix to trace the dynamic process between political legitimation/societal consent and political de-legitimation/societal dissent over time, and illustrate the complexity in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, whose ‘success’ in political legitimation and societal consent does not always emerge in a linear manner, but often through complex combinations of progression (‘success’: political legitimation & societal consent) and regression (‘failure’: political de-legitimation & societal dissent) in reality.
When space is closed and non-recognitive, and power is asymmetrical, the powerful will tend to express their power ‘over’ the powerless (in the ‘power-over’ category). However, as space becomes open and power becomes balanced, the powerless will start expressing their power ‘against’ the powerful, and contending with and challenging them (in the ‘power-against’ category). In contrast, when power is asymmetrical yet cooperative (or co-opted), and space is closed yet recognitive, the powerful will start expressing their power ‘to’ consult and associate with the powerless (in the ‘power-to’ category). Yet asymmetry remains. As both space and power improve their quantity, this will empower the powerless, who start expressing their power to cooperate and collaborate ‘with’ the powerful and enhance self-confidence ‘within’ themselves (in the ‘power-with/within’ category). Accordingly, the matrix allows the processes of ‘success’ and ‘failure to be traced as follows. When a
‘successful’ deliberation addresses the ‘legitimation problem’ and restores political legitimation and societal consent, a deliberative path progresses towards the upper-right quadrant in the matrix. In turn, when a ‘failed’ deliberation further exacerbates the ‘legitimation problem’ and causes societal dissent, a deliberative path regresses towards the lower-left quadrant in the matrix.

2-4. Four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation

Given the pre-conditions of quantity and quality in space and power, what approaches do ‘post-colonial’ deliberators adopt to address, respond to, or transform the ‘legitimation problem’ with the inequalities/differences? There are theoretical contentions on the approaches to deliberation in the ‘politics of difference’, being classified into, among others, four approaches as follows: 1) a ‘rational’ approach, 2) an ‘agonistic’ approach, 3) a ‘hybrid’ approach, and 4) an approach to ‘engaging disagreement’. While the first three largely underline deliberation to seek a consensus over difference, the last highlights deliberation not to reach a consensus but to transform difference into disagreement in view of the deeply-protracted nature of the difference. These approaches are also closely related to power relations between deliberating agencies. First, given the ‘legitimation crisis’ with ‘winner-take-all’ politics in the Western liberal democracies, deliberation theorists, such as Rawls and Habermas, propose ‘rational argumentation’ to meet inequalities/differences between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, make a ‘rational’ consensus, and thus restore political legitimation (Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996, see Chapter 1 (1-3-2)). Yet their universalist attempts to rationalise ‘modernity’ over ‘tradition’, in either the Rawlsian ‘overlapping’ or the Habermasian ‘aggregating’ methods of reasoning, have been challenged by those who highlight cultural heterogeneity (Lyotard 1984). Echoing anti-universalist critiques, pluralists
have argued for the ‘irreducible’ difference in socio-cultural traditions in non-Western societies. Given the liberal value of societal tolerance, Taylor (1991, 1994), for example, contends for recognising the minority’s right for socio-cultural difference and accepting their representation in political deliberation. With a liberal (or Kantian) belief in the ‘coexistence’ of difference, liberal pluralists have advocated structural and institutional measures for consociationalism and confederalism, as well as policies to nurture cosmopolitan and national imagination and citizenry with the aim to manage and accommodate socio-cultural difference (e.g. Parekh 2000, Kymlicka 2001). Their respect for difference at the decentralised/community level, however, remained uncritical of ‘rationality’ at the central/governmental level, and caused critical concerns, such as an incessant polarisation and politicisation of difference, the so-called balkanisation at the decentralised/community level, as well as an ideational pressure of the majority/‘modern’ on the minority/‘traditional’ to contain, tame, or silence difference at the central level (e.g. Benhabib 2002). These ethnocentric arguments in the global north, however, may not assume the inequalities/differences between the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal in the non-Western, post-colonial context.

Second, challenging such a ‘rational’ yet coercive form of deliberation to manage difference and reach a ‘rational’ consensus, another contention has emerged to empower the minority/‘traditional’ and enable them to address asymmetry in deliberation. Challenging a liberal discourse for the ‘old’ pluralism to accommodate difference (e.g. Taylor 1991, 1994, Parekh 2000, Kymlicka 2001), Connolly (1995), for example, contends for the ‘new’ pluralism to problematise a ‘rational’ argumentation as blinding asymmetry between the majority/‘modern’ and the minority/‘traditional’, and critically (re)negotiate and (re)work it. Given Nietzsche’s worldview and Foucault’s understanding of power, he advocates an
‘agonistic’ argumentation and the creation of a political space that allows the minority/‘traditional’ to contest and ‘agonise’ the majority/‘modern’ for their difference (Connolly 1995: xix). In doing so, Connolly (2004) attempts not only to ‘recognise’ difference as the ‘old’ pluralists do (e.g. Taylor 1991, 1994), but also expand ‘inclusion’ to assemble both the majority/‘modern’ and the minority/‘traditional’ in deliberation, and ‘form “chains of equivalence” or collective assemblages across differences constructively’ (2004: 167). In turn, Mouffe (1999), from a Marxist perspective, regards an ‘agonistic’ argumentation as exploring an alternative consensus falling outside a ‘rational’ consensus of dominant modernism/(neo)liberalism. Criticising both Rawlsian and Habermasian reasoning (‘rational’ argumentation) as essentialising ‘modernity’, she highlights an ‘agonistic’ contestation to address the inter-subjective asymmetry which has been structurally entrenched in the capitalist, late-modern society (Mouffe 1999: 755, 2000: 104-105). Mouffe (1999) contends for this ‘radical’ form of argumentation as a politico-linguistic means of constructing an ever-renegotiable ‘conflictual’ consensus, and to employ it to displace a non-negotiable ‘rational’ consensus built upon the impossibility of being free from inequality and exclusion in the (neo)liberal regime (1999: 756). While contentions on deliberation have been dichotomous between a ‘rational’ and an ‘agonistic’ argumentation, Honig (1993), with her sympathy with the latter, underlines a precarious balance to renegotiate the dissonance of the minority/‘traditional’ in liberal democracies (1993: 5, 201).

Third, despite a strong tendency of both ‘rational’ and ‘agonistic’ argumentation to differently yet commonly explore a consensual ‘choice’ (i.e. rational, social, conflictual, etc.), Bhabha (1998) proposes a co-productive form of power and a permeable nature of difference, enabling deliberation to open up a ‘third space’ for ‘equivocal’ argumentation where both top-down (majority/modern) and bottom-up (minority/traditional) forces
reflectively/reflexively explore and articulate ‘in-betweenness’ across their difference (1998: 34). For him, a ‘hybrid’ argumentation will enable contestants to generate a new consensus that displaces the difference (Bhabha 1998: 31). Yet Bhabha’s positive view of hybridity has been criticised by those who highlight, among other issues, 1) the fragility of hybridity in situations of asymmetry, and 2) the tendency of hybridity to essentialise agencies. Said (1978), for example, problematises the power of the strong in hybridity, regarding ‘Orientalism’ as a hybridised discourse built upon asymmetry between the powerful West and the powerless Orient (1978: 3). He indicates that hybridity in ‘Orientalism’ is thus not ‘organic’ but ‘intentional’, given the Western dominance in producing a new ‘consensus’ of ‘Orientalism’. On the other hand, Spivak (1988a) highlights the power of the weak, warning about the essentialisation of contestants in hybridisation, in particular the powerless subaltern, such as the essentialised ‘Orient’, and insists on unpacking it. Yet she also sympathises with the ‘strategic essentialism’ that enables the subaltern to temporarily essentialise their voices in order to unite and resist the powerful (Spivak 1988b). This, however, may increase the risk of exaggerating, overstating, and thus radicalising the socio-cultural difference. While scholarly discussions continue, Benhabib (2002), from a social-constructivist perspective, applied the ‘organic’ concept of hybridity to deliberation as generating a new, overarching ‘hybrid’ consensus over differences if the conditions are met (i.e. egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription, and freedom of exit and association) (2002: 8-11, 19-20). Yet, her contention for a ‘hybrid’ argumentation cannot escape from the limits of asymmetry and essentialism in hybridisation, as Said and Spivak have problematised. Kompridis (2005), for example, sees ‘anti-essentialist essentialism’ in Benhabib’s argument, suggesting the risk of an asymmetrical ‘hybrid’ argumentation in masking asymmetry between contestants, and creating a new form of dominance in
hybridisation. A question is raised about how to ‘balance strong universalism with “sensitivity”’ to the politics of difference (Kompridis 2005: 333).

Fourth, although the scholarly search for consensus over difference remains strong, another contention has evolved, which sees deliberation, not as reaching or making a ‘consensus’ over difference, but as a way of transforming difference into disagreement if difference is deeply-protracted. In the tradition of ‘rational’ argumentation, Gutmann et al. (1996), for example, view deliberation as rationalising disagreement, not to seek a ‘rational’ consensus, but to turn difference to ‘moral disagreement’ (1996: 1, 17). ‘When citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions’ (Gutmann et al. 1996: 1). They assume that civic reciprocity enables deliberating agencies to justify the difference-turned-disagreement, and thus constrain themselves to accept it (Gutmann et al. 1996: 17, 53). In turn, from a critical standpoint, Connolly (1991) proposes to ‘cultivate reciprocal respect across difference and negotiate larger assemblages to set general policies’ through agonistic argumentation, whether reaching a consensus or not (1991: xxvi). Acknowledging the right for non-consensus or dissensus, he highlights ‘agonistic respect’ as a political ethos of ‘a civic virtue that allows people to honour different final sources’ (1991: xxvi), and trusts agonised parties to engage with disagreement constructively (1991: xxvii, 64). Their contentions for deliberation as transforming a ‘mere/contingent’ or ‘naked’ difference into a ‘moral disagreement’ or disagreement upon ‘agonistic respect’ can be an effective alternative, to escape from the essentialist propositions (i.e. rational, agonistic, and hybrid argumentation) in search for ‘the’ consensus, as well as to avoid falling in political relativism. Yet, despite differences in the conception (either rationally agreeing to disagree or engaging with the non-consensus/dissensus) and manner (either a ‘rational’ or an ‘agonistic’ way), their common
views in engaging difference/disagreement in a liberal political order (even if it is in a radical form) should be critically interrogated (e.g. Macedo 1999, Schaap 2006, Campbell et al. 2008). Moreover, challenges should be carefully examined in applying these liberally-crafted approaches to deliberation to the non-Western, liberalising, post-colonial, post-conflict context (e.g. Shinko 2008, Peterson 2013, Aggestam et al. 2015, see the subsequent section (2-6)).

In turn, the above contentions suggest that the four approaches to deliberation and the four dimensions of power are highly interactive. While a ‘rational’ approach justifies a coercive power of the ‘rational’ ‘over’ the ‘irrational’ (‘power-over’), an ‘agonistic’ approach underlines a critical capacity of the weak to contest, challenge, and thus ‘agonise’ the powerful (‘power-against’). Similarly while a ‘hybrid’ approach highlights a cooperative expression of power in exploring ‘in-betweenness’ even if asymmetry remains (‘power-to’), an approach of ‘agreeing to disagree’ enlightens mutual respect, either ‘rationally’ or ‘agonistically’, being free from power inequality (‘power-with/within’). It is thus assumed that reflexive/reflective agencies in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation choose the best possible approach in view of power relations in the state-society interface, among: 1) a ‘rational’ approach (‘rationalisation’) given the ‘modern’ state’s ‘power-over’ the ‘traditional’ society in rationalising a ‘modern’ consensus, 2) an ‘agonistic’ approach (‘agonisation’) given the ‘traditional’ society’s ‘power-against’ the ‘modern’ state in agonising an emancipatory ‘conflictive’ consensus, 3) a hybrid approach (‘hybridisation’) given the ‘modern’ state’s ‘power-to’ the ‘traditional’ society in articulating a third ‘hybridised’ consensus, and 4) an approach to ‘engaging disagreement’ (‘agreeing to disagree’) given the ‘modern’ state’s ‘power-with/within’ the ‘traditional’ society in respecting difference, either ‘rationally’ or ‘agonistically’, and transforming it into disagreement. Figure 2.5 translates the nexus between
the four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and power relations given agential reflexion on the pre-conditions.

**Figure 2.5:** Four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation given agential reflexion on the pre-conditions
2-5. ‘Deliberative peacebuilding’, deducing a hypothetical mechanism

If ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation restores political legitimation, what leads it to ‘peace’? Galtung (1969, 1990) popularises the concept of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ dimensions of peace in view of the former as the mere absence of violence subject to coercion and the latter as the ‘real’ peace if the agential, structural, and cultural causes of violence are addressed. While dichotomising peace is contentious (Davies-Vengoechea 2004), this thesis adopts this two-dimensional concept of ‘peace’, assuming that ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation can cause a contextual change in agential, structural, and cultural conditions and transforms the protracted conflict rooted in the ‘legitimation problem’ into the ‘positive’ peace. First, the ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will transform an agential relationship into ‘peaceful’. Drawing on Curle (1971), Lederach (1997: 65) argues that an ‘unpeaceful’ relationship turns into a ‘peaceful’ one as the balance of power and the awareness of conflict progress. Yet, while the balance of power may cause agential competition, Deutsch (1983) underlines agential cooperation as allowing deliberative agencies to enhance respectful communication and address the protracted conflict, if any (1983: 450). Adopting these insights, imagine that actors A and B are in a ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. When A expresses its power ‘over’ B, the relationship between A and B will become dominant and coercive. Yet when B becomes as powerful as A, and both express their power ‘against’, their relationship will become adversarial and competitive. Accordingly, these two relationships, even though the latter is more emancipatory than the former, remain ‘unpeaceful’ due to the precarious balance between ‘agonism’ and ‘antagonism’ or an ‘all-or-nothing’ or ‘winner-take-all’ relationship between A and B (Galtung 1996: 96). On the other hand, when A expresses its power ‘to’ B, their relationship will become more associative and cooperative. This would make both A and B willing to split
the benefit in a ‘give-and-take’ manner along a ‘zero-sum’ line (Galtung 1996: 96), yet the remaining asymmetry allows the powerful A to continue to hold a stronger stake in decision-making. In this sense, a more ‘peaceful’ relationship will remain uncritical, un-emancipatory, and even unethical (Jabri 1995). However, if both equalise power and express their ‘power-with’, their balanced relations will enable them to build a ‘win-win’ relationship over an ‘all-or-nothing,’ or ‘zero-sum’ one (Galtung 1996: 96). The latter two expressions of power, namely power ‘to’ and ‘with’/’within’, even though the former is less emancipatory but co-optive, enable an agential relationship to become more ‘peaceful’ due to mutual cooperation and respect. The transformation of an ‘unpeaceful’ into a ‘peaceful’ relationship will further make a positive impact on changes in the structure and culture in the long run (Lederach 1997). Moreover, the dimensions of ‘power-to’ and ‘power-with/within’ will make the deliberative space increasingly recognitive and receptive, and thus enable deliberative agencies to be more aware and conscious of conflict and the need to transform it (Curle 1971, Zartman 1993, Lederach 1997). In view of these pre-conditions for space and power, a ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will transform and pacify an agential relationship as deliberative agencies enhance inter-subjective cooperation, recognition and awareness of conflict.

Second, the ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will enable societal actors to address the structural causes for the (re)production of inequalities in deliberative policy-making and change (Fischer et al. 1993). As Galtung (1969) links the cause of structural conflict to the political economy, many associate it with an economic cause of poverty and inequality (Uvin 1998, Cramer 2006, Collier 2007), as well as a political cause of governance crisis and state fragility (Boutros-Ghali 1992, OECD 2005, World Bank 2011). How does ‘post-colonial’ deliberation contribute to addressing these structural causes? Economically, for example, in
the above-mentioned case in Nigeria, traditional leaders were central to policy deliberation at
the grassroots levels, establishing a local committee, addressing everyday needs, and liaising
with the federal government for policy-making and change. The deliberative act bridged the
discursive gap on poverty reduction between the state and the society and modified the
(neo)liberally-narrated national policies (Hashim et al. 2004). This indicates that deliberative
policy change enables societal actors to engage in policy deliberation so as to address basic
human needs themselves (Galtung 1969, Burton 1979, Max-Neef et al. 1991), and thus
discourages them from using violence to address societal deprivation and grievances.
Politically, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will consolidate social contract and political
legitimacy. Holsti (1996) contends vertical and horizontal forms of legitimacy, associating
the former with the centralised force in the Hobbesian/Weberian perspective, yet linking the
latter to a contractual relationship on societal membership in political decision-making (1996:
97). As ‘post-colonial’ deliberation is integrative and inclusive of societal authorities, such as
traditional and religious leaders, it will promote the horizontal, ‘informal’ form of political
legitimacy (Clements 2014). Empirical evidence shows that horizontal legitimacy is not only
positive for progressing democratisation, development, and security (Englebert 2002), but
also effective in transforming conflict (De Sousa Santos et al. 2005). For example, a case of
community peace in Colombia indicates that societal stability requires not the demonstration
of coercive power of the state to contain societal violence, but the socially-agreed
membership in political deliberation that enables the state to solicit and assemble non-armed
collective voices in the society (Uribe de H. 2005). That is to say, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation
helps the state not only to address social justice and needs, but also to consolidate social
contract and horizontal legitimacy, and thus enhance political authority in the eyes of the
societal majority.
Third, the ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will transform a ‘culture of violence’ into a ‘culture of peace’. Galtung (1990) views prejudice and discrimination in the value and belief systems interwoven by culture and history as the cultural causes of conflict. Since culture is resilient and persistent (Geertz 1973, Laitin 1986, Galtung 1990: 294), the culturally-rooted, identity-based violence is often protracted (Stewart 2000, Rothman et al. 2001). However, ‘culture is an essential part of conflict and conflict resolution’ (LeBaron 2003: 1, emphasis added). Deliberation can inspire culture to heal and restore those victimised and traumatised by conflict (Bashir et al. 2008). In particular, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation is effective in this regard, since deliberative agencies include societal authorities, such as traditional and religious leaders, who have engaged in a broad range of communal affairs in many non-Western societies (Murithi 2008: 26). They often employ societal deliberation as a means of dialogue to increase inter-personal/group contact and interactions, exercise restorative justice according to the customary law, and promote socio-cultural justice and reconciliation, which contribute to transforming conflict (Allport 1954, Fisher 1997, Ropers 2004). In turn, societal deliberation enables them to mediate cultural differences (Bleiker et al. 2011), reframing and repositioning culturally-crafted identity and prejudice (Rothman et al. 2001), and even inventing an inter-cultural vision, or a ‘third culture’ (Broom 2004). In Niger, for instance, the measures of the post-colonial state for secularisation and modernisation dismantled societal norms and value systems based upon a blend of Islam, traditional animism and myths, and caused social tension and disorder. Considering societal contentions on spirituality and piety as the key cause of violence, religious and traditional leaders made a joint effort for social dialogue to reconfigure and reinterpret the Islamic and traditional meaning of justice and preside over the restorative justice system to address the prejudice and discrimination prevailing across clan groups in conflict (Masquelier 1999). This case, like the above case of divorce mediation in India, indicates that traditional values
and religious beliefs are not rigid, but flexible and transient to social change (Benhabib 2002). Moreover, these cultural actors are able to employ societal deliberation not only to restore justice, but also to organise truth-telling and promote social reconciliation (Appleby et al. 2010, Wanis-St. John 2013). Since tradition, religion, and culture have been long since and deeply embedded, societal deliberation exploring these is locally cohesive, effective, and thus legitimate. In this sense, a ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation encourages deliberative agencies not only to reframe and reposition a ‘culture of conflict’, but also to explore and reinstitute a culturally-cohesive system and approach to transforming conflict.

These contentions indicate that the ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation would transform the agential, structural and cultural conditions into the contextual foundations for a ‘positive’ peace, and lead the war-torn societies to bring in a new form of political order, namely the ‘deliberative political order’ (i.e. political order upon deliberation). Figure 2.6 illustrates this causal mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. While the pre-conditions for quantity and quality in space and power are determinant of either ‘success’ or ‘failure’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, a ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will cause a contextual change in agency, structure, and culture, and transform the protracted conflict in the ‘legitimation problem’ into the ‘deliberative political order’ as the ‘positive’ peace. In turn, its ‘failure’ will exacerbate the conflict, deforming it into violent conflict towards ‘deliberative political disorder’.
Figure 2.6: The causal mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’

![Diagram](image)

This mechanism can be further translated into Figure 2.7 by employing the aforementioned matrix for the four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation (Figure 2.5). The agential relationships are classified into the four dimensions of power: a dominant/manipulative relationship in the dimension of ‘power-over’, a rejective/resistive relationship in the dimension of ‘power-against’, a consultative/associative relationship in the dimension of ‘power-to’, and a delegative/integrative relationship in the dimension of ‘power-with/within’. The path and process towards ‘deliberative political (dis)order’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ can be traced not in a linear manner but in a non-linear manner, since a complex causality is subject to the pre-conditions for space and power in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, as well as the conditions for agency, structure, and culture in conflict transformation. In this sense, the matrix is useful for plotting sequential paths and processes at any given moment over time, and addressing 1) where ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ came from, is located now, and will go next, 2) to what extent the peace is achieved, and 3) what
gap remains. It will allow researchers to undertake comprehensive longitudinal analysis of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’.

Moreover, the framework of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ will make it possible to deduce a hypothetical mechanism in different approaches to peacebuilding between the internationally-led (‘with’ external intervention) and the locally-driven (‘without’ external intervention). It is assumed that international and local peacebuilders would address the ‘legitimation problem’ differently in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. First, in internationally-led peacebuilding, the external ‘asymmetry’ in material and ideational power would distort the pre-conditions for
‘post-colonial’ deliberation and undermine societal actors, such as traditional and religious leaders, who preside over societal deliberation to meet the ‘legitimation problem’ at the grassroots level. As a result, the international peacebuilders would begin exercising ‘power-over’ the local societal actors in a ‘top-down’ approach to ‘rationalisation’, shifting the expression of power from ‘power-over’ to ‘power-to’ between the international and the political elite at the national level and adopting a more cooperative but elite-centred approach to ‘hybridisation’ over time. However, it takes time to transform ‘power-to’ into ‘power-with/within’, making the elite-centred politics inclusive of the societal non-elite to address the remaining asymmetry. Accordingly, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ ‘with’ external intervention is likely to experience a ‘hybrid’ path in the progression towards ‘deliberative political order’ from ‘power-over’ to ‘power-to’ and ‘power-with/within’ thereafter. Second, in turn, in locally-driven peacebuilding, the home-grown ‘symmetry’ would allow the societal non-elite to interact and contest with the political elite in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. Even if local peacebuilding starts the elite’s exercise of ‘power-over’ the non-elite, it leaves room for the latter to express ‘power-against’ the former in a ‘bottom-up’ approach to ‘agonisation’, and subsequently gradually change the expression of power from ‘power-against’ to ‘power-to’ in a cooperative approach. As a result, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ ‘without’ external intervention is assumed to progress towards ‘deliberative political order’ in an ‘agonistic’ path from ‘power-over’ to ‘power-against’ and ‘power-with/within’ thereafter. This hypothetical mechanism of ‘equifinality’ (making similar progress along different paths) in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ distinguishes a transitional path ‘with’ and ‘without’ external intervention: a ‘hybrid’ path ‘with’ external intervention and an ‘agonistic’ path ‘without’ external intervention. This hypothetical mechanism can be illustrated in the matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ (Figure 2.8). While the former (international peacebuilding
‘with’ external intervention) may pass along a lower curve, the latter (local peacebuilding ‘without’ external intervention) is likely to progress via an upper curve in the matrix.

**Figure 2.8**: Hypothetical mechanism of ‘equifinality’ between ‘with’ and ‘without’ external intervention

2-6. **Merits and challenges in practising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’**

While awaiting empirical inquiry about ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, practising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ requires acknowledging both merits and challenges vis-à-vis (neo)liberal
statebuilding. First, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ is emancipatory. A ‘successful’ ‘post-colonial’ deliberation will lead war-torn societies towards improving agential self-confidence, addressing structural injustice, and establishing a culture of dialogue and peace. These agential, structural, and cultural changes will address and transform not only the ‘old’ ‘legitimation problem’ but also the ‘new’ ‘legitimacy gap’ caused by (neo)liberal statebuilding (see Chapter 1 (1-3-1)). Second, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ is practical. Reflection on socio-political realities in the non-Western, post-colonial context will make ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ more context-specific and practical than (neo)liberal statebuilding, which normalises the Western experience of state formation and modernisation. A set of measures for (neo)liberal statebuilding, such as procedural democratisation, growth-centred development, and societal marginalisation, can thus be largely irrelevant, or even harmful when addressing the ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western post-colonial context. Third, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ is locally-owned. While (neo)liberal statebuilding relies on external expertise and resources, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ underlines the skills and capacity which are locally available, and thus cohesive and legitimate, as well as low-cost and sustainable. However, such a ‘local turn’ (Mac Ginty et al. 2013) does not dismiss a positive role for externals. Their support remains important for deliberative ‘success’ in empowering the powerless, enhancing the local capacity of recognising, accepting, and learning from others, and addressing injustice and grievances in the deliberative space (Lederach 1997, Paffenholz 2014). It is clearly important to balance local skills and external support, and cultivate and nurture societal capacity for ‘agonisation’, ‘hybridisation’, and ‘agreeing to disagree’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. Fourth, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ is comprehensive. While (neo)liberal statebuilding largely highlights a structural cause of conflict (Bourtros-Ghali 1992, OECD 2005, World Bank 2011), it often leaves the relational and cultural causes unaddressed (Curle 1971, Galtung 1990, Lederach 1997). Such a
structural focus limits research, policy, and practice in examining and addressing complex interactions and interrelations between multiple causes of conflict. Fifth, in this context, ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ underlines a long-term vision. It pays close attention to understanding the transformation of multiple causes of conflict in a non-linear manner over time. This comprehensive and longitudinal approach to research and practice will allow researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners to map out remaining gaps and requirements more thoroughly. In contrast, due to a short-term vision of a linear transition to peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992), (neo)liberal statebuilding tends to solve problems in a ‘quick-and-dirty’ manner (Paris 2004), and undermine or neglect an in-depth analysis of local history, culture, capacity, and power (Bellamy et al. 2004, Pugh 2004, 2013).

In turn, practising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ will face the risk of insecurity, given internal and external contradictions in a non-Western, liberalising/modernising, post-conflict context. Internally, the nexus between deliberation and stability in liberalising/modernising the post-colonial polity can be contested if institutions are weak (e.g. Huntington 1968, Moore 1969, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, see Chapter 1 (1-2-1 and 1-2-2)), and even if a liberal regime is in place, liberalisation is likely to exacerbate inequality and exclusion, exacerbate the ‘legitimation problem’, cause a ‘legitimacy gap’ in (neo)liberal statebuilding, and lead to political, economic, and societal crises. This is because undertaking deliberation in a liberalising/modernising polity will face a continuing challenge in asymmetry between the empowering ‘modern’/political and the disempowering ‘traditional’/societal in the deliberative space, which will allow the former to ‘other’ the latter, as Connolly (1991) warns, as a source of insecurity upon difference-turned-identity (identity/difference) (1991: 64-65). For Connolly (1991), the symmetrical equation is a pre-condition for deliberation with ‘agonistic respect’. Otherwise, ‘asymmetrical agonisation’ will politicise

Moreover, the limitations (e.g. pre-maturity) of a liberalising/modernising polity to uphold the norm of liberal/modern pacifism will impel the modern-cum-traditional (or traditional-cum-modern) contestants not to engage in difference/disagreement with the liberally-assumed ‘rational’ or ‘agonistic’ respect, but to exacerbate and radicalise it (Ramsbotham 2010: 394).

Given this, Ramsbotham (2010) distinguishes the destructive ‘radicalised disagreement’ vis-à-vis the constructive ‘moral/agonistic disagreement’, arguing that if the difference/disagreement is radicalised (in the former case), an ‘agonistic’ dialogue to keep the antagonised contestants talking will be the only way to allow them to explore discursive ambiguity between the ‘radicalised’ and the ‘agonised’ differences/disagreements, and to manage them (Ramsbotham 2010: 94, 104-108). In turn, the imminent risk of insecurity in the deliberative space will be likely to impel the liberal regime and its rulers not to tolerate or engage in difference/disagreement, but to regulate and securitise it (Jabri 2007: 158). Securitising deliberation will, however, exacerbate asymmetry, undermining the pre-conditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.

Externally, contradiction will also exist in external intervention. While Chapter 1 (1-1 and 1-2) indicates that the global policies for peacebuilding have been crafted on the normative models of (neo)liberal statebuilding in line with the Western ontological/epistemological positions, this global ‘consensus’ (e.g. Richmond 2005b, Jabri 2007) will frame the discourse of international peacebuilders in engaging in difference/disagreement with local societal agencies in the non-Western, (post-)conflict context. Yet a significant asymmetry between the interveners and the intervened in power and resources will be likely to allow the former to impose the globally legitimate ‘consensus’ over the latter in the deliberative space at various
levels, and thus increase the risk of insecurity if the Western ‘modernity’ ‘others’ the non-Western/local ‘tradition’ as ‘irrational’ or ‘immoral’, and polices it (Jabri 2007: 158). Given this ‘insecurity of external modernity’, radical critiques have contended for the space to allow the national/local contestans to raise the locally-legitimate claims and articulate a consensus with the internationals through ‘agonisation’ (e.g. Shinko 2008) and ‘hybridisation’ (e.g. Richmond 2005b, 2010). In this sense, they commonly promote and endorse measures to empower and enable the national/local contestans to critically enunciate, iterate, and challenge the interveners in the deliberative space. Success in such an ‘agonistic’ and ‘hybrid’ approach will thus be conditioned if the interveners and the intervened address the entrenched asymmetry between them, and nurture a political will to make an ‘agonistic’ or ‘hybrid’ consensus. Yet, in reality, it is unlikely that the interveners hear and engage with the intervened in deliberating their difference/disagreement in equal terms (Pouligny 2006, Autesserre 2014). Rather, the former will be likely to label the resistive latter as ‘spoilers’, ‘perpetrators’, ‘criminal gangs’, and ‘warlords’, and police them in the name of security (e.g. Newman et al. 2006, Jabri 2007: 158); or, even if deliberation takes place between them, the intervened are hardly essentialised, but can be plural and divisive. If the interveners empower only the national ‘modern’/political, yet undermine the local ‘traditional’/societal (Chandler 2010a), the asymmetry will allow the empowered national ‘modern’/political to securitise and regulate the disempowered ‘traditional’/societal in deliberation, causing and exacerbating the identity/difference, and echoing and interacting with the internal contradiction thereafter.

2-7. Dilemmas in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’

Moreover, the theory and practice of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ cannot shy away from dilemmas, among others, 1) deliberation dilemma, 2) hypocrisy dilemma, and 3)
transformation dilemma. These are mostly rooted in the two processes of ‘post-colonial’
deliberation and conflict transformation in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. First, the deliberation
dilemma relates to the deliberative act of speaking. Three scenarios can be considered: 1) people do not speak, 2) people speak, but their norms and values are contradictory to internationally-recognised principles, and 3) people speak, but think differently. The first scenario can be related to a deep conflict where people distrust each other. If agencies suffer from deep differences, grievances and injustice, even if the deliberative space is inclusive and
recognitive, they may be unwilling or unready to speak. In particular, in the (post-)conflict context, victims speak, but may not be willing or ready to address their grievances with perpetrators, due to deep traumas (Hutchison et al. 2013). In the second scenario, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation may cause another conflict over inequality/difference between international and local norms and values. A tension was seen in the civil divorce case in India where different discourses on gender (in)equality were inflamed between international and local agencies in deliberation (Benhabib 2002). Also, another tension can be caused by the interveners who reject deliberation with the locally ‘legitimate’ but ‘uncivil’ deliberators in a Western sense (Belloni 2001, Schaefer 2010). This case is related to the external contradiction reviewed in the previous section. The third scenario is related to contradictions between what people say and think in deliberation. A reason can be associated with behavioural immorality, dishonesty, and insincerity (Gutmann et al. 1996, Kuran 1998). Even after having agreed, ‘spoilers’ may act otherwise to exploit socio-political divisions and polarisations and exacerbate them to continue to fight (Newman et al. 2006). They may even prefer a ‘lose-lose’ impasse to a ‘win-win’ cooperation or a ‘win-lose’ competition in deliberation. In such a case, their malicious intentions will manipulate deliberation not to reach a consensus or engage disagreement, but to exacerbate and radicalise conflict, even if the pre-conditions for deliberation meet the criteria of ‘success’. Yet another reason can be
outside the moral realm. Scott (1990), for instance, suggests that contestants often exercise
double standards between ‘public transcript’ and ‘hidden transcript’ when they face a power
gap. The weak may speak differently on front and back stages, indicating their resistance. In
this case, the inconsistency is neither irrational nor immoral, but political. The resistive may
defer decision or employ the tactics of disobedience and non-participation to disengage from
deliberation (Sharp 1973). Giddens (1984), on the other hand, explains a psychological gap
between what people think and say at the ‘ego’ level.

Second, the hypocrisy dilemma can be associated with a disconnection between what people
say and do. Similar to the above inconsistency between what people say and think, a reason
for the contradiction can be explained not only morally but also politically. Brunsson (2003)
refers this inconsistency to ‘hypocrisy’, linking it to political difficulty in dealing with
complex conflicts of interest and translating a consensus into a concrete set of actions in
practice. When deliberating agencies face high pressure or expectations to address and meet
complex inequalities/differences, they may take an easy option by agreeing on a measure that
is simple, general and conciliatory, yet highly difficult to implement. This solution will be
favoured when pressure for deliberation is high yet time is limited. It may also be favoured in
some non-Western cultures where cosmology is more receptive of inconsistency and
contradiction (Galtung 1996). Moreover, the risk of hypocrisy can increase when deliberators
(decision-makers) and implementers are different (Brunsson 2003). Since war-torn societies
often lack capacity and resources for coordination and implementation, organisational
difficulty prevents what people say from being delivered. Third, the transformation dilemma
can be linked to the act of implementation. Even if actors are willing to implement what they
agree on, they cannot foresee all risks and conditions in advance and thus face the
‘unintended’ consequences of action (Giddens 1984). For example, ‘deliberative
peacebuilding’ assumes a complex set of agential, structural and cultural measures for conflict transformation. The outcome cannot be entirely predicted, but cause tensions and contradictions in progress. Moreover, conflict may not be always ‘transformable’, but often ‘protracted’ (Azar 1990).

These dilemmas are largely embedded in the two processes of deliberation and conflict trans/de-formation in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. First, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation faces the following three realities: 1) a reality at the discursive level (what people speak), 2) a reality at the cognitive level (what people think), and 3) a reality at the action level (what people do). In turn, conflict transformation requires complex interactions between agential, structural and cultural changes. Dilemmas in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ are thus related to the inconsistency, tension, and contradiction that appear between three realities and interactions in two processes (Figure 2.9). Namely, what people speak, think, and do is often inconsistent and disconnected, in particular, in a difficult situation like a (post-)conflict context, while agency, structure and culture do not always change harmoniously and coherently. These tensions and contradictions, whatever causes lie behind them (e.g. political, psychological, emotional, institutional, cultural, moral, etc.), however, do not necessarily negate the utility of the framework, but remind researchers to observe and interpret not only what people say, but also what people think and do, and, if necessary, to reconcile them, and carefully examine what, how, and why people ‘actually’ engage in the complex interactions that take place in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. In other words, research into ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ requires the critical skills and capacity of researchers to comprehensively observe and understand human discourses, intentions, and actions as well as agential, structural and cultural conditions at an in-depth level (e.g. Young 1996).
Conclusion

This chapter has theorised ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in view of historical-cultural and socio-political realities in the non-Western, post-colonial context; yet it also acknowledges shortcomings of relying on the Western literature to conceptualise and understand the non-Western socio-political phenomena. To begin with, it set out the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences in connection with the non-Western culture and post-colonial historicity. Given the utility of ‘Western’ deliberation in meeting the politico-economic ‘legitimation crisis’ in the stable Western democracies (Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996), the chapter reconstituted this and conceptualised ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to address the politico-societal ‘legitimation problem’ in the war-torn non-Western (non/quasi) democracies. It highlighted both quantity and quality in space and power
at the polity and agential levels as the pre-conditions of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, vis-à-vis ‘Western’ deliberation, which largely emphasises quantity in space and power. If the pre-conditions are met, ‘post-colonial’ deliberation is assumed to lead deliberative agencies to ‘successfully’ addressing the ‘legitimation problem’ and establishing political legitimation and societal consent. Subsequently, the chapter identified four approaches to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation: ‘rationalisation’, ‘agonisation’, ‘hybridisation’, and ‘agreeing to disagree’, given agential reflexivity to the pre-conditions for space and power. It further contended for a nexus between ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and ‘deliberative political order’ as the ‘positive’ peace (Galtung 1969, 1990) as a result of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to cause the agential, structural and cultural changes and transform conflict in the ‘legitimation problem’. The framework then deduced a hypothetical mechanism of different causality between ‘with’ and ‘without’ external intervention in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. The chapter then delineated merits and challenges in ‘practising’ ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and dilemmas that are embedded in the complex processes of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. Accordingly, the next chapter will set out a strategy and methods to be employed for empirical inquiry to examine ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ and test its hypothetical mechanism in East Timor and Somaliland.
Chapter 3: Research methods for the empirical inquiry of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’

Introduction

After theorising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, this chapter aims to set out a strategy and methods to be employed for empirical inquiry about ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland. For this purpose, the chapter will be divided into the following four sections: 1) explanatory strategy, 2) methodological choice: the case and comparative methods, 3) applying the methods to the cases and formulating the field questions, and 4) issues relating to the fieldwork. To begin with, the first section will set out an explanatory strategy, identifying the variables given the causality of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. Subsequently, the second section will review the methodological choice, examining both merits and challenges of the case method in a qualitative, small-N, cross-case and within-case approach, as well as the comparative method in use of Mill’s methods of agreement and difference and the process-tracing approach. The third section will explain the application of the chosen methods to the cases, formulating a possible narrative on ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland and the key questions for the fieldwork. Finally, the fourth section will examine issues relating to the fieldwork, firstly on a relationship between researcher and research context, and secondly on protocols and procedures for the implementation.

3-1. Explanatory strategy

This first section will identify the key variables and their causation and correlation in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. The system of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ is composed of three
layers: the ‘core’, the ‘endogenous’, and the ‘exogenous’ layers. First, the ‘core’ layer is made of the causal process from ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to ‘deliberative political (dis)order’. While the pre-conditions for quantity and quality in space and power are determinant of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, its ‘success’ or ‘failure’ makes an impact on a contextual change in the agential, structural, and cultural conditions which transform or deform the protracted conflict in the ‘legitimation problem’. Second, the ‘endogenous’ layer is composed of the interactive process between the outcome of deliberating the ‘legitimation problem’ and the political, economic, and social settings in the internal context over time. This interaction between the outcome and the macro settings is assumed to change the pre-conditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation thereafter. Third, the ‘exogenous’ layer is made of the interactive process between the ‘endogenous’ layer and the external intervention given (neo)liberal statebuilding (Boutros-Ghali 1992, OECD 2005, World Bank 2011) which makes a significant impact on the second layer in the internal context. In synthesising causality and interactivity in these three layers, the system of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ is composed of the five causal and co-relational variables as follows: 1) independent variables: the pre-conditions for the quantity and the quality of space and power in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, 2) dependent variables: conflict trans/de-formation as the outcome of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, 3) intervening variables: contextual changes in agential, structural and cultural conditions to link ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and conflict trans/de-formation, 4) endogenous variables: political, economic, and social settings at the research context, and 5) exogenous variables: external intervention as the impact of (neo)liberal statebuilding on the research context (Figure 3.1). This explanatory strategy will be employed to understand and explain ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor (Chapter 5) and Somaliland (Chapter 6).
Figure 3.1: Explanatory strategy: the key variables in the system of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’
3-2. Methodological choice: the case and comparative methods

Among other methodological choices, this thesis adopts the case method due to its effectiveness in examining and inferring causality and correlations in socio-political phenomena (e.g. King et al. 1994, Brady et al. 2004, George et al. 2005). George et al. (2005), for example, delineate, among others, four advantages in the case method: 1) conceptual validity, 2) deriving new hypotheses, 3) exploring causal mechanisms, and 4) modelling and assessing complex causal relations (2005: 19-22). These are relevant to this research seeking to prove the hypothesis, explore the causality of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and employ complex variables. This research will then employ a qualitative, small-N, within-case and cross-case, process-tracing approach, due to its strength in studying contextual peculiarities, complexities, and temporal and spatial variations in causality. First, a qualitative approach underlines its merits, among others, in giving room to studying particularity and complexity in social experiences, interactions, culture, and history in the research context (Flick 2007: xi). This methodological merit is effective in investigating ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in a context-specific manner, and testing the hypothetical mechanism from it. Moreover, the variables that are set for ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ are mostly unquantifiable yet empirically qualifiable, relying on the skills and capacity of researchers to carefully observe, interpret and understand the research subjects, objects and their interactions in the research context. Even if they are quantified, statistical data are often difficult to obtain or contested, or even do not exist in the conflict-affected areas. In this sense, the qualitative approach is suitable, since it allows researchers to ‘emphasise episodes of nuance, the sequentiality of happenings in context, the wholeness of the individual’ (Stake 1995: xii). Second, using a small number of cases allows researchers to sketch ‘meaningful but complex configurations of events and structures’ and compare and contrast their
similarity and difference in and between the socio-political phenomena (Ragin 1997: 30). Also, the purposefully-selected cases enable researchers to undertake an in-depth analysis of the social phenomena which are often neglected, undermined, or truncated as error in the large-N approach, such as ‘equifinality’ (i.e. multiple causality towards a similar outcome) (Ragin 1997, George et al. 2005), historical sequences and transitions (Tilly 1997, 2001), and turning points (Abbott 1997). Third, a within-case and cross-case approach enables researchers to contrast and compare the research units across time and space. Gerring (2007) sees the examination of temporal and spatial variations within and across social phenomena as ‘dynamic’, since it allows researchers not only to effectively validate the inferred causality (2007: 155), but also to seek both depth (within case comparison) and breadth (across case comparison) in the cases study (2007: 49). Fourth, a process-tracing approach allows researchers to conduct the longitudinal analysis of transitions, sequences, and processes in a causal mechanism, and thus infer and test them (Tilly 1990, George et al. 2005). Since the matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ enables the longitudinal analysis, the process-tracing approach is appropriate for empirically investigating the transitional paths and processes in the causality of ‘deliberative political (dis)order’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’.

These advantages are, however, balanced by several limitations, such as selection bias, subjectivity, falsifiability, and possible interruption in transition. First, the case method, whatever approach is employed, cannot be entirely free from selection bias (King et al. 1994, Brady et al. 2004, George et al. 2005). If researchers deliberately choose the cases that produce particular and extreme outcomes, this may lead to causal effect and mechanism in the selected cases being understated, overstated or overgeneralised (Collier et al. 2004: 95, 98). In this sense, researchers should carefully select cases, noting the risk of researcher-borne bias in case selection. Second, although the qualitative and small-N approach has
strengths for social inquiry, it remains difficult to measure to what extent the respective
variables are correlated and how often the outcome arises (George et al. 2005), as well as
facing a risk of subjectivity in politicising data and undermining research rigour and ethics in
data collection and analysis (Ezzy 2002: 33). It may also cause a representation problem
since the case cannot represent all populations and the limited number of cases makes it
difficult to assess whether variables are either necessary or sufficient (Ragin 2000). Third, it
is not easy to assess whether outcomes occur independently across the cases. Inter-case
correlations and interactions, if any, will lead to false conclusions and increase the risk of
falsifiability (Goldthorpe 1997). Given this ‘Galton’ problem, George et al. (2005) propose
process-tracing as an effective approach to examining processes between cause and effect at
an in-depth level and detecting inter-case correlations and interactions, if any. The process-
tracing is particularly useful in examining ‘equifinality’, since it allows researchers to analyse
and verify the processual correlations and interrelations across the cases. Fourth, in this
connection, although process-tracing enables researchers not only to detect the ‘Galton’
problem, but also to examine the transitional process at an in-depth level, it is difficult for
researchers to observe the process if it is interrupted or highly complex (George et al. 2005:
222). While interruption weakens the appearance of causality, complexity makes it difficult
to assess and test causality.

Moreover, this research adopts the comparative method, since it aims to examine the theory
of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ and test its hypothetical mechanism in East Timor and
Somaliland. The controlled comparison between the cases has the merit of explaining
causality in the social phenomena and inferring a hypothesis deducted from a theory across
time and space, if any (Mackie et al. 1995: 175-176). For comparative analysis, among
others, Mill’s methods of agreement and difference are useful to examine causality and test
hypotheses, as John Stuart Mill outlined in *A System of Logic* (Skocpol 1984, Tilly 1997).

While the method of agreement highlights a residual similarity within the overall difference in a cause leading to the overall similarity in an effect (similarity-similarity), the method of difference underlines a crucial difference within the overall similarity in a cause leading to the overall difference in an effect (difference-difference). In general, the method of difference is considered ‘more powerful for establishing valid causal associations than the method of agreement used alone’ (Skocpol 1984: 378-379) since it explains a determinant cause between the positive and the negative cases. Although Mill acknowledged the practical difficulty in applying these methods to the discipline of humanity, due to the impossibility of researchers previewing and controlling all variables and conditions (Tilly 1997), they remain popular in social science (Skocpol 1984, Tilly 1997). However, the overall focus of Mill’s methods on cause and effect undermines the paths/processes between them, and makes it insufficient to analyse ‘equifinality’ if any exists (George et al. 2005).

Returning to the ‘research puzzle’ in the Introduction, Boege et al. (2008) attempted to examine the impact of external intervention given Mill’s method of difference. In their seminal work on the ‘hybrid political order’, they highlighted the difference in the cause: (neo)liberal statebuilding which East Timor accepted, yet Somaliland rejected, and the effect: it resulted in conflict (i.e. the recurred violence in 2006) in East Timor and stability (i.e. the ‘hybrid’ order in 1993) in Somaliland (Boege et al. 2008). While the former led a new state of East Timor to unrest under the auspices of the UN, the latter led a new state of Somaliland to stability largely through indigenous self-help efforts (Boege et al. 2008). Given a crucial difference (whether ‘with’ or ‘without’ external intervention) within the overall similarity (building a new state after the civil war) in the cause and the overall difference (whether conflict or stability) in the effect between the two cases, Boege et al. (2008) inferred and
compared negativity in international peacebuilding vis-à-vis positivity in local peacebuilding. However, a shortcoming exists in case selection, since both experienced a similar transition from stability to re-stability via conflict over a decade if the timeline is extended. While East Timor established political stability under the UN peace operations, and fell into civil unrest, yet restored political stability towards the closure of the UN mission in a ‘hybrid’ path/process, Somaliland similarly established political stability under traditional leadership, yet fell into civil unrest, and restored political stability towards the orderly conclusion of the first electoral cycle in an ‘agonistic’ path/process. Accordingly, this thesis combines Mill’s methods of difference and agreement, and the process-tracing approach in comparing the two cases. Mill’s methods highlight a residual similarity in the context (‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context) causing the overall similarity in the outcome (‘deliberative political order’) (i.e. similarity-similarity in the method of agreement), as well as a critical difference in the input (whether ‘with’ or ‘without’ external intervention) causing the overall difference in the path/process in deliberation (whether a ‘hybrid’ or an ‘agonistic’ path/process) (i.e. difference-difference in the method of difference). The research periods are then divided into three sub-periods: 1) from stability to unrest, 2) during unrest, and 3) from unrest to stability, in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 and in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005 respectively, in order to examine the ‘equifinality’ in the process-tracing approach.

3-3. Applying the methods to the cases and formulating the field questions

The application of the above methods to the cases will formulate a possible narrative as follows. To begin with, focus is given to similarity in the ‘legitimation problem’ in East Timor and Somaliland. First, both societies have developed a strong kin-based relationship between members who belong to the same house or clan since the pre-colonisation period. In
East Timor, it is the ‘uma lulik’ (‘sacred house’) that spiritually and politically relates its members to the shared land in their sedentary lifestyle. In Somaliland, it is the ‘diya’ (‘blood compensation’) -paying group in the lowest branch of clan structure that allows its members to collectively share social and material risks in their nomadic lifestyle. These ‘uma lulik’ and ‘diya’-paying groups have established common norms and practices for decision-making in their society, such as ‘nahe biti’ (‘stretching mat’) and ‘shir’ (‘lineage-group council’) which encourage participants (village elders in East Timor, and adult males in Somaliland) to ‘speak’ in the ad-hoc assembly with the primary aim to resolve everyday conflict, but also to broadly manage differences that emerge from time to time (e.g. Babo-Soares 2004, Trindade et al. 2007, Lewis 1961, Farah et al. 1993). Second, in turn, both societies have experienced (post-)colonisation that formed, deformed, and exacerbated vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences across the polity. While the Euro-colonisers, such as the Portuguese and the British, began colonisation by introducing the ‘modern’ state to the ‘traditional’ stateless societies in East Timor and Somaliland in the 16th and 19th centuries respectively, they formed inequalities/differences vertically between the colonial state and the colonised society at the polity level and horizontally between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ at the agency level. Thereafter, the post-colonisers, such as the Indonesian and the Somali in Mogadishu, deformed them, aggrieving the societal majority and causing them to join the societal resistance for the civil wars.

Despite the similar ‘legitimation problem’, the political agencies have approached the local societal agencies differently since the end of the civil wars. In East Timor, with their aim to build a (neo)liberal state, the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) had increasingly marginalised the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), an umbrella organisation which had assembled the resistance movements and enjoyed political legitimacy at the ‘uma
'lulik’ level since 1999. The UN’s rushed approach to the national elections triggered political competition and the dissolution of the CNRT in 2001. The post-UN state continued to dismiss the customary governance system and antagonise the society. While the state left the ‘legitimation problem’ unaddressed, political conflict at the state level led to violence across the society from 2006 to 2008. During the unrest period, the UN missions pushed the government to undertake the national elections promptly, yet deformed political competition and the ‘legitimation problem’. In contrast, the new AMP (Parliamentary Majority Alliance)-coalition government has undertaken extensive measures to decentralise the state and integrate with the traditional leaders in an attempt to meet the ‘legitimation problem’ since its inauguration after the conflict-ridden elections in 2007. In Somaliland, in turn, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which established statehood in North-western Somalia after the civil war, intensified internal divisions from 1991 to 1993. This political conflict was halted by a series of deliberative initiatives by the elders who represented the diya-paying groups. This ‘post-colonial’ deliberation led to the integration of the Council of Elders (Guurti) into the state system as the legislature in 1993. Nevertheless, although a deliberative space had been created, it was soon politicised by the government. The co-opted Guurti elders failed to deliberate the resumed conflict in 1994, partially influenced by the UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II). Following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, the conflict was mediated by the local elders and supported by the societal groups. After a ceasefire in 1997, the state democratised the polity, introducing a customised electoral system and moderating the ‘legitimation problem’ through the local and national elections from 2002 onwards.

This equifinality can be translated into the framework of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ as follows. In East Timor, both the UNTAET and its successor FRETILIN government similarly undermined the societal deliberative norm and practices in their exercise of ‘power-over’ and
exacerbated the ‘legitimation problem’. The subsequent AMP-coalition government adopted a more consultative approach to the traditional leaders and created space for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation in the exercise of ‘power-to’. Recent measures for local development have empowered the society and turned the expression of power from ‘power-to’ to ‘power-with’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. In turn, a strong Somaliland society undertook society-led initiatives for deliberation and exercised ‘power-against’ the state to recognise the customary deliberative practice of ‘shir’. The newly-established ‘Guurti’ as the institutional symbol of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, however, became increasingly co-opted by the government, and failed to address the inter-clan conflict that was deeply protracted. After the local elders and civil society resumed action for peace-making, the government democratised the polity, introducing a competitive but consensual party system to embrace inter-clan competition and differences for the upcoming elections to take place. This home-grown democratisation drove to transform state-society relations from a ‘power-against’ to a ‘power-with’ dimension. East Timor and Somaliland seem thus contrasted in their transitional paths towards ‘deliberative political order’: a ‘hybrid’ path (from a ‘power-over’ to a ‘power-to’ and a ‘power-with’ dimension in the lower curve) in East Timor, and an ‘agonistic’ path (from a ‘power-over’ to a ‘power-against’ and a ‘power-with’ dimension in the upper curve) in Somaliland. Figure 3.2 illustrates the application of the cases to the matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. 
In view of this, this research sets out the field question for data collection and analysis as follows: ‘how did the political actors approach the societal agencies who had upheld the customary deliberative norms and practices such as “nahe bitti” in East Timor and “shir” in Somaliland, (dis)engaging with them in addressing the “legitimation problem” in “post-colonial” deliberation, and leading to “deliberative political (dis)order” after the end of the civil wars in East Timor (1999-2012) and Somaliland (1991-2005)?’. Answering this requires data and information on how the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal agencies deliberated the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences in the protracted conflict, given
the pre-conditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. Accordingly, the field question is broken down into the three sub-questions in view of the causality of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ from ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to ‘deliberative political (dis)order’: 1) ‘how were space and power employed by the deliberative representatives from the “modern”/political (e.g. (sub)district administrators, MPs representing the communities) and the “traditional”/societal (e.g. liurai, aquil, and chefe de suco/aldia) segments in the deliberative space?’, 2) ‘what change did “post-colonial” deliberation cause in agential relations, policies and institutions, and local culture?’, and 3) ‘what consequences followed during the (sub)research periods?’.

Approaching human subjects for data collection, however, requires the researchers to sensitise themselves to multiple issues in the fieldwork.

3-4. Issues relating to the fieldwork

Accordingly, this final section examines issues in the fieldwork, among others, firstly on relationality between the researcher and the research context that includes the research subject and object, and secondly on the protocols and procedures for implementation, such as setting and sampling, interview procedure and data processing, and ethical considerations. While the first sub-section reviews relationality in a general term, the second sub-section specifies the research design which was actually employed in the fieldwork to ensure some level of replicability in data collection and analysis.

3-4-1. Relationality between the researcher and the research context

This first sub-section reviews relationality between the researcher and the research context. When a researcher approaches the research context for data collection, (s)he should take note
of his/her impact on the research subject and object in the context. After (s)he collects data, (s)he should also bear in mind not only how to verify and interpret data and findings, but also how his/her life experience and positionality affect them. Similarly, the research subject is not neutral, but reflexive upon his/her life experience and positionality in explaining and understanding the research object. Accordingly, the sub-section highlights, among others, four issues as follows: 1) data collection, 2) researcher’s impact on research context, 3) experience and positionality, and 4) the validation of data and findings (Figure 3.3).

**Figure 3.3: Relationality between the researcher and the research context**

First, this research employs individual interview as the source of primary data in the fieldwork, yet also complements it with document review as the source of secondary data. Firstly, interviews are, in general, effective for ‘discovering and portraying the multiple views of the case’ (Stake 1995: 64), and the ‘everyday life world’ to reconcile contextual specificity/focus and personal ambiguity (Kvale 2007: 11-13), despite their contentious quality as ‘unscientific’, ‘subjective’, ‘person-dependent’, ‘biased’, and ‘unreliable’ (Kvale 2007: 84-85). In particular, this research adopts a ‘semi-structured’ interview technique, due to its methodological strengths in flexibility and openness that allow researchers to obtain
specific answers to questions, solicit a detailed, deep, and insider’s perspective (Leech 2002), and put the respondents at ease (Aberbach et al. 2002), as well as its practical utility in seeking answers to common questions in a ‘structured’ and ‘focused’ way, but also to explore complex causality in reconciling a ‘yes or no’ type of data in a ‘structured’ way and a free-flowing conversation in an ‘unstructured’ way (George et al. 2005: 67, Hammett et al. 2015: 141). The semi-structured interview thus enables the researcher to solicit factual and conceptual answers to open-ended questions to reconcile a rigorous comparison between the cases and a flexible investigation into complex causality in the hypothetical mechanism.

Secondly, this research also explores document review. This will complement personal interviews by providing secondary data, since past publications, including anthropological and politico-sociological works, are widely available in the two countries. Researchers should note, however, that these secondary data are vulnerable to the selectivity and objectives of the original writers (Lustick 1996, Thies 2002).

Second, it is important to note the impact of the researcher on the research context. While the researcher is not neutral but political, data collection and publication will generate socio-political ramifications in the research context. While the researcher may play multiple roles such as teacher, advocate, evaluator, biographer, and interpreter (Stake 1995), as well as detached observer, empathetic observer, faithful reporter, mediator of languages, reflective partner, and dialogue facilitator (Blaike 2000), his/her approach to the research context will affect the life and livelihood of the research subject, especially in conflict zones where security situations are volatile and prone to the ‘information economy’ (Goodhand 2000: 13). Implicit messages of researchers, for example, could raise not only expectations of the research subject, but also concerns of the local authority and armed groups, and put the researcher and research subject to security risk, and even stimulate old wounds and trauma,
harming the research context (Goodhand 2000, Mertus 2009). East Timor and Somaliland are not exceptions. Although both countries ended communal violence in 2008 and 1997 respectively, popular resentment and grievances remain or have not been fully addressed. Local authorities could use fragile security situations as a good excuse to limit researchers’ access to the research context, breach human rights, or politicise and intimidate the research subject. Thus the researcher, in particular in (post-)conflict areas, faces ethical and political challenges. These can be met by multiple measures, including 1) assessing the political impact of research in advance, 2) acquiring informed consent in whichever form, whether written or verbal, from the research subject in advance, 3) carefully managing anonymity and confidentiality of the research subject and local expectations, 4) holding the research objective and activity accountable, 5) closely liaising with locally-active organisations, such as international/local NGOs, and 6) keeping the profile of the researcher low (Goodhand 2000, Mertus 2009). These measures help the researcher not to harm the research context, but to protect the research subject and his/her daily life and livelihood, and to be sensitised to potential risks.

Third, it is also important to reiterate the significance of experience and positionality of the researcher in research and research context. Above all, ontological, epistemological, and normative positions of the researcher are influential in social inquiry (Hay 1995:192). As the Introduction clarifies, this thesis adopts: 1) ontological dualism between objectivism and subjectivism in stratifying the world at real, actual, and empirical levels, 2) epistemological realism, highlighting interactions between agency, structure, and culture at meta level, and exploring a causal mechanism of social change over time and space, and 3) a normative position in valuing equality and social justice when it comes to defining the ‘failure’ and the ‘success’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ (see the Introduction). These positions require the
researcher into ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ to acquire, observe, and interpret the 
(pre)conditions and settings in the research context carefully, and understand human
‘reflexivity’ in the agency-structure-culture dynamics in the research context (Giddens 1984, 
Bourdieu 1989 in Wacquant 1992), yet they are subject to the life experiences of the 
researcher (Hertz 1997). For example, as researcher, I am not only externally reflexive on the 
research context, but also internally subject to my prior work experience in East Timor and 
Somaliland and life experience as aid worker in Japan and elsewhere. My life experience has 
made a significant impact on forming the research design and theory in this thesis.
Accordingly, the researcher should take note life experience such as ‘positionality’ in his/her 
politico-economic status, cultural background, race, nationality, gender, age, etc., since these 
affect not only research, but also power dynamics between the researcher and the research 
subject (Gregory et al. 2009: 556-557). Any gap in power dynamics will affect the validity of 
data obtained due to asymmetry (Fujii 2009, Henry et al. 2009). For instance, my 
positionality of political (‘leftish’), economic (rich), cultural (Japanese), racial (Asian), 
gender (male), age (middle), and linguistic (English/Portuguese) status would seriously affect 
the attitudes and behaviour of the research subject who is mostly poor and indigenous in East 
Timor and Somaliland. For example, while my ‘Japaneseesness’ may associate me with 
economic richness and opportunities, my ‘maleness’ may affect the attitude of, and my access 
to, both male and female interviewees. Also, the interviewees may associate me with the 
organisations where I previously worked (i.e. the United Nations in East Timor and the 
University of Hargeisa and the Ministry of Interior in Somaliland) even though I underline 
the political ‘neutrality’ and independence of this research. Yet, notably, these positions and 
positionality also exist on the side of research subject when the latter explains and 
understands the research object and other subjects in the research context. Accordingly, when 
the research subject faces the researcher, the former is neither passive nor weak. (S)he is in a
good position to explore tactics to manipulate the researcher, such as misleading (Berry 2002, Fujii 2009) and resisting (Bott 2010, Kappler 2013).

Fourth, the above review highlights problems with reliability and falsifiability in data and findings due to bias, politicisation, reflexivity, positionality, reactivity, and miscommunication in research. The contestable data and findings thus require verifying to ‘partially overcome the deficiencies that flow from one investigator or one method’ (Denzin 1989: 236). The techniques of verification can include, among others, four approaches to triangulation: 1) data triangulation, 2) investigator triangulation, 3) theory triangulation, and 4) methodological triangulation. Firstly, data triangulation aims to broaden and diversify data sources, and minimise error and bias in relation to a single source. This will be particularly relevant to this research, since its epistemological position is interpretive, primarily relying on intra/inter-subjective accounts. In this sense, multiple units and multiple participants should be identified to triangulate collected data for content analysis (see the next sub-section (3-4-2)). Secondly, investigator triangulation aims to employ multiple researchers in observing the same phenomena. It is also associated with peer review, feedback, and member checks (Stake 1995, Maxwell 1996). This will allow the researcher not only to overcome error, bias, and misinterpretation (Denzin 1989), but also to acquire new perspectives from others (Stake 1995). This research will therefore actively seek advice from the counterpart institutions and beyond, if necessary and appropriate (see the next sub-section (3-4-2)).

Thirdly, theory triangulation aims to explore more than one theory in view of the same phenomena. The fieldwork aims to empirically examine ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland. However, the socio-political phenomena have been also explained upon other frameworks such as ‘hybrid political order’ (Boege et al. 2008). This research will thus effectively refer to these, if appropriate, in order to verify data and findings. Finally,
methodological triangulation is an approach to employing more than one method in data collection. The methodological combination of interviews and document review in this research will improve the reliability of collected data. Despite these merits, it is also important to acknowledge several limitations in triangulation. First, constraints in time and budget will limit the researcher’s ability to explore multiple methods of triangulation (Denzin 1978). Second, data and findings may remain contested and inconsistent since no two researchers interpret a social phenomenon in the same way. Accordingly, the researcher is required to mediate competing accounts, if necessary (Denzin 1989). Third, the use of multiple methods will be epistemologically unsound. This is particularly the case in collecting data from secondary sources (Lustick 1996, Thies 2002). Whichever methods are used for verification, however, ‘facts’ in data and findings are reflexively and subjectively interpreted, and thus can never be objectively ‘true’ according to the ontological and epistemological positions of ‘critical’ realism in this research (Bhaskar 1975, Habermas 1996, see Introduction).

3-4-2. The protocols and procedures for implementation

This final sub-section spells out the key protocols and procedures that were actually carried out in the fieldwork. Before the fieldwork, this research collected secondary data from document reviews, and identified the information gap in examining and testing the hypothetical mechanism. For the fieldwork, the research gained full approval from the University of Manchester Research Ethics Committee in April 2015, and undertook a three-month fieldwork from 20 July 2015 to 3 September 2015 in East Timor and from 22 September 2015 to 28 October 2015 in Somaliland respectively. The fieldwork was conducted in Dili and Hargeisa, the capital cities of East Timor and Somaliland, and based at
the Peace Center in the National University of Timor-Leste and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in the University of Hargeisa. These host institutions offered local expertise and advice in the protocols and procedures for implementation, such as selecting settings and participants, validating data and findings, and considering ethics in the research. While I viewed them not as ‘gate-keepers’ or ‘overseers’, but as ‘peers’ with experience of hosting foreign researchers, I also took note the risk of politicisation and biases in their ‘advice’ or ‘opinions’ (Kaufmann 2002, Clark 2011). Accordingly, this sub-section explains, among other things, 1) interview setting and participants, 2) interview procedure and data processing, and 3) ethical considerations.

First, this part stipulates interview settings and participants. For interview settings, in consultation with the counterpart institutions, I identified two local communities to travel to for data collection: Comoro sub-district in Dili and Vemassi sub-district in Baucau district in East Timor (Map 3.1) and Central area in Hargeisa and Burao town in Burao district in Somaliland (Map 3.2). The reasons for choosing these two communities in each country were, among others, to compare the different impact of urban/central and rural/local settings on agencies approaching ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. While rapid urbanisation and social mobilisation dominates in the capital cities, the ‘traditional’ governance system and communal culture largely remains in the rural districts. However, since the field visit with police escort in Somaliland raised both material (e.g. constraints of cost and security arrangements) and power (e.g. the impact of police on the research context) concerns, I replaced the field visit with a document review given that the case of Somaliland is largely historical (from 1991 to 2005) and relatively well-documented. On the other hand, the field visit was essential in the case of East Timor since the research object is ongoing (from 1999
to 2012), and the impact of the recent local development on ‘post-colonial’ deliberation has been under-researched.

**Map 3.1: Map of East Timor**

For sampling the participants, I identified seven units in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation as follows: 1) a ‘modern’/political unit in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, 2) a ‘traditional’/societal unit in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, 3) a ‘modern’-state unit, 4) a ‘traditional’-society unit, 5) a donor unit, 6) a local-CSOs unit, 7) an ‘intellectual’ unit for local and international researchers. I then identified the interviewees after assessing their relevance to the field

---


questions in the respective units. My previous work experience was helpful in selecting the participants although I fully acknowledged the risk of bias in whom I spoke with and what I heard in interviews. This purposive/relevance sampling has advantages for a limited number of in-depth ‘semi-structured’ interviews for content analysis (Krippendorff 2013: 120). Subsequently, I conducted personal interviews with 43 participants in East Timor, including: 4 from the ‘modern’/political unit in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation (2 sub-district administrators, 1 local MP, and 1 security officer), 8 from the ‘traditional’/societal unit in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation (2 suco chiefs, 2 local elders, 2 youth coordinators, and 2 women coordinators at the suco councils), 5 from the ‘modern’-state unit (3 politicians and 2 bureaucrats), 4 from the ‘traditional’-society unit (3 youths and 1 woman), 10 from the donor unit, 5 from the local-CSOs unit, and 7 from the ‘intellectual’ unit, as well as 26 participants in Somaliland, including 4 from the ‘modern’/political unit in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation (4 members of political parties) and 2 from the ‘traditional’/societal unit in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation (1 local elder from a majority clan and 1 from a minority clan), 4 from the ‘modern’-state unit (2 politicians and 2 bureaucrats), 2 from the ‘traditional’-society unit (2 youths), 3 from the donor unit, 3 from the local-CSOs unit, and 8 from the ‘intellectual’ unit (Figure 3.4). While the participants often represent multiple units, they are classified in the unit which is most relevant during the (sub)research period. The gap in the number of participants between East Timor and Somaliland is mainly derived from the field visit in which I interviewed 12 people in East Timor, but I did not do so in Somaliland. The diversity and variation in socio-political representation of the interviewees (e.g. clan, religion, gender, age, etc.) helped me not only broaden the understanding of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, but also triangulate data and findings.
Second, I set out and followed the protocols and procedures for data collection and processing to standardise them for analysis. Before the interviews, I made a meeting appointment, using the ‘Participant Information Sheet’ (see Appendix 1) to explain the research objective and questions. Due to the rich oral culture in the two countries, I firstly sent my request for a meeting through email or text messages, and secondly gave a call to those who answered me for appointment. Given the political sensitivity, I also wrote a letter to the political authorities, such as ministries, political parties, and district offices for the field visit in East Timor. For the interviews, I used public places, such as offices and cafeterias, mostly in their offices, and met them in the daytime between 9 am and 5 pm according to their convenience and preference. During interviews, I used the ‘Consent Form’ (see Appendix 2) to gain consent, either written or verbal, from all interviewees, and explained the interview procedure, and then asked them to inform me at any time when they were uncomfortable or wished to stop the interview. After gaining their consent, I introduced myself and began the interview in three steps as follows: 1) asking the interviewees to explain their experience in witnessing, perceiving, and participating in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, 2) encouraging them to address the causality and correlations in it, and 3) concurrently analysing them on my side, interacting with the field questions. In doing so, I made notes in front of the interviewees without tape-recording. Before ending the interview, I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>‘Political’ deliberators</th>
<th>‘Societal’ deliberators</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>CSOs</th>
<th>Intellectuals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
summarised the contents, and re-iterated the confidentiality, anonymity, and protection of data and interviewees, and asked them to contact the University according to the ‘Participant Information Sheet’ if something went wrong. After interviews, I emailed, texted or phoned the interviewees with a thank-you message. I will also share a piece of work with them after this thesis is completed. Subsequently, I processed data, coding and partly transcribing them if necessary, and categorising them into the respective variables to examine causality and correlations in the explanatory strategy (see the above section (3-1)). For example, I reduced interview statements to the categories of the respective variables for content and unit analysis, coding improvement or deterioration in the variables (e.g. quality and quantity of space and power) in such figures as ‘↑/+’ or ‘↓/-’, identifying connections and correlations between them, and delineating the key measures for contextual changes and their consequences. I also undertook data collection and analysis concurrently, acknowledging the merit in continuous review and reformulation of theory and hypothesis upon evidence (Ezzy 2002, George et al. 2005). I also verified and triangulated data and findings carefully, paying particular attention to contradictions and inconsistency across them, if any. Moreover, I employed local interpreters if interviewees preferred to speak (or only spoke) the local languages and agreed to me accompanying them in the meeting. I selected interpreters who belonged to the counterpart institutions, and assessed their good command of language as well as their knowledge of the research area and sensitivity to the research context and local culture. I then trained them in the objective and ethics of this research, and the power dynamics between researcher, interpreter, and participants.

Third, in this connection, I took note of ethical considerations, among others, sensitivity to research subject, data protection, and confidentiality. My prior professional experience provided me with preliminary insights into ethical context, such as security concerns and
inter-subjective and socio-political power relations. Firstly, I was sensitive to the risk and safeguarding of the participants. Although both countries had ceased communal violence, in 2008 in East Timor and in 1997 in Somaliland respectively, popular grievances remained prevalent. While informed consent is integral to interviews, it may discourage interviewees from speaking freely, or provoke suspicion about the research. Given this, I did not record interviews, but made interview notes in front of them to avoid or alleviate their suspicion, if any. I also told them that their participation was entirely voluntary, and if they decided to stop, I would respect their decisions. While the interviewees were all adults, and the questions were asking their experience of making peace rather than conflict and violence, a risk remained that interviews could cause a high level of stress and emotional pain to the participants. Accordingly, I set out and followed a distress protocol, listing the key local contact addresses, such as local hospital and police station, stopping interview and contact them if necessary, and sharing my interview schedule with the counterpart institutions to follow up the case of emergency. In turn, I had also been aware of the risk in a contestable discourse of ‘peace’ that could make the interviewees sensitive to mentioning this openly. Moreover, I was also sensitive to the local culture and research context which the participants inhabited, avoiding discussing any topics that could distress them. I also scheduled each interview to end within 45 minutes, noting that in-depth talk would exhaust the participants. Secondly, I underlined data protection and confidentiality, making maximum efforts to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of participants, both interviewees and interpreters. I thus refer them to their initials in this thesis according to their consent (see Personal communications). I stored all interview notes and signed forms in the safe in the residence or a locked bag while travelling during the fieldwork. I did not share the interview notes or statements with any other researchers or organisations. Since I returned to the UK, I have stored them in the locked cabinet at home and office in the University. I have also stored the
processed and electronically-transcribed data on a password-protected laptop or an encrypted USB. After the submission of this thesis, I will hold them for a minimum of five years according to the regulations of the University of Manchester (The University of Manchester 2015). If I re-use them in the future, I will contact and inform the relevant interviewees, reminding them of their rights to withdraw from the future studies at any time.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the strategy and methods used to examine and understand ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland. To begin with, it set out the explanatory strategy to be employed in the case studies, delineating the variables in view of causality and correlations based upon the theory of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. It then reviewed both strengths and weaknesses in the case and comparative methods for empirical enquiry, and formulated a possible narrative for ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland. The comparative case studies will highlight the utility in a combination of Mill’s methods of difference and agreement and the process-tracing approach to examining the difference in the UN’s intervention, which East Timor accepted, yet Somaliland rejected, the similarity in the ‘legitimation problem’ upon the end of their civil wars, and the implications for processing ‘equifinality’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. Finally, the chapter reviewed the key issues in the fieldwork, firstly in the relationship between the researcher and the research context, and secondly on the protocols and procedures for implementation. The next chapter will examine the cultural and historical backgrounds that caused the ‘legitimation problem’ in East Timor and Somaliland.
Chapter 4: The backgrounds of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland

Introduction

This chapter aims to review the cultural and historical backgrounds in East Timor and Somaliland. While culture remains resilient (e.g. Geertz 1973, Laitin 1986, Galtung 1990), (de/post)colonisation to introduce a ‘modern’ state to the ‘traditional’ stateless society has (de/trans)formed vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences, causing the ‘legitimation problem’ (e.g. Young 1988: 29, Chabal 1994: 200, Migdal 1994, Herbst 2000: 22, see Chapter 2 (2-1)). In view of this, the first section will review the cultural background in societal cosmology, structure, and deliberation that characterises the ‘traditional’ stateless societies in East Timor and Somaliland. Subsequently, the second section will examine the historical background in (post-)colonisers’ approaches to establishing political order and societal response in the two countries. Despite the depth of Timorese and Somali culture and history, this chapter will briefly and selectively review them, acknowledging the limitations in national generalisation, and local variations and fragmentations. Given Mill’s methods, this chapter will focus more on similarity than difference in comparing the two cases.

4-1. The cultural background

Since long before the Euro-colonisers arrived and introduced Euro-‘modernity’, both Timorese and Somali communities had commonly formed a cultural ‘tradition’ upon the extended families that shared the same ancestors, and established kinship-based structures and institutions, including the sacred house (uma lulik) in East Timor and the diya (blood
compensation)-paying group in Somaliland (Hohe et al. 2002, Lewis 1961, 1994). With the principles of self-help and reciprocity, these units became the most stable and foundational societal units to provide security and welfare for their members who faced risks and needs in the subsistence economy. In return, individuals as members of the unit obeyed the rules and decisions made, and contributed to the collective activities in societal everyday, such as war and peace, justice and reconciliation, marriage, inheritance, and resource management. This reciprocal relationship between the unit and its members granted its leaders political authority in presiding over collective decision-making. In this sense, both the uma lulik and the diya-paying group had functioned as politico-societal institutions rather than mere kin-based units of relationship. These societal units are, however, not always rigid and closed, but often flexible and open to outsiders, adopting new norms and values. Given this flexibility, academics often debate whether the local societal claims on lineage and identity are primordial or constructed (e.g. Scambary 2009, Besteman 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2000, Lewis 1998, Helander 1998). In practice, these claims have commonly bound the Timorese and Somali societies under the customary governance system central to a participatory and consensual principle of societal deliberation. This deliberative practice is interpreted as ‘old democracy’ in East Timor (Cummins 2010) and ‘pastoral democracy’ in Somaliland (Lewis 1961) vis-à-vis Western liberal democracy. These non-Western approaches to making a social contract upon deliberative practice in the uma lulik and the diya-paying group have played a key role in maintaining societal order and peace, even though both societies were ‘stateless’ without any centralised political authority in a Western political sense (Gramsci 1971, Weber 1991, Herbst 2000). This first section will briefly review the cultural background in societal cosmology, structure, deliberation, and their implications for the ‘traditional’ stateless societies in East Timor and Somaliland, largely relying on a document review of past anthropological works. In doing so, the first sub-section will assess societal
cosmology and structure in terms of externality, internality and continuity. The second sub-
section will examine societal deliberation as a norm and practice to govern the society in line
with societal cosmology and structure without political institutions. The third sub-section will
analyse the implications and limitations of societal deliberation in Western political terms.

4-1-1. Societal cosmology and structure

Both the uma lulik in East Timor and the diya-paying group in Somaliland have displayed
unique characteristics of societal cosmology and structure in externality, internality, and
continuity. First, inter-house and group marriage has been employed as a means of extending
inter-house and group cooperation and alliance. Evidence shows that warring houses and
groups often exchanged women for marriage as a symbol of truce and reconciliation (Hohe et
al. 2002, Lewis 1994). In East Timor, a continuous and lengthy exchange of money, goods
and services between wife-giver and wife-receiver houses consolidates and maintains inter-
house relationships and inter-generational cooperation (Hohe et al. 2002). Due to the societal
association of woman with reproduction, an inter-house relationship even becomes
hierarchical between wife-giver (higher) and receiver (lower) families (Hohe et al. 2002). In
Somaliland, on the other hand, relations have been more horizontal and fluid between wife-
giver and receiver. This is partly because the different lifestyle between the Timorese and the
Somali (i.e. sedentary vs. nomadic) urges the Somali inter-group structure to prioritise a
patrilineal relationship over a matrilineal and an affinal relationship in inter-familial relations,
and limited a material exchange between affinal groups (Lewis 1994). Yet this does not mean
to undervalue affinal significance in inter-group dynamics. The nomad men often share a
herding pen with their affinal families, and even occasionally switch their diya-paying
membership from a patrilineal to an affinal group (Lewis 1994). Inter-house/familial
marriage has thus allowed both the Timorese and the Somali to extend their lineage relations outside their kinship groups and ameliorate the risk and hardship in relation to subsistence livelihood.

Second, an intra-house and group structure has been segmented and instrumental. In East Timor, the *uma lulik* establishes an intra-house hierarchy from the ‘trunk’ house to the ‘branch’ house, and finds an intra-familial seniority in the ‘trunk’ house at societal everyday events such as tribunal arrangements and ritual ceremonies (McWilliam et al. 2011). A male who ‘opens new land’ (Hohe et al. 2002: 21) sets up a ‘branch’ house, yet maintains affiliation to the ‘trunk’ house attached to the original land. The extended families in the ‘branch’ house then pay tribute to the ‘trunk’ house at harvest and play a subsidiary role in the collective activities (Hohe et al. 2002). In contrast, intra-group relations are more egalitarian in Somaliland. The *diya*-paying group is the lowest segment whose common patrilineal ancestor can be traced back to between four and eight generations within the agnatic groups (Lewis 1961). It is, however, often divided into smaller lineage groups in a practical sense. While these subsidiary groups take ‘full’ responsibility for blood wealth, the upper *diya*-paying group is complementary if its subsidiaries cannot afford to meet their obligations (Lewis 1961: 173). Yet individual males within a group are treated equally in principle, although this is not always the case due to differences in age, wealth and knowledge in reality (Lewis 1961). The intra-group equality and solidarity motivates the nomad Somali to share a grazing encampment for the most valuable livestock such as camels with other members from the same *diya*-paying group (Lewis 1961). Intra-house and group relationships are thus corporal and stable in both Timorese and Somali societies regardless of whether their segmental divisions are hierarchical or egalitarian.
Third, both *uma lulik* and *diya*-paying groups uphold a worldview of continuity based on their common ancestry. The Timorese believe that, if the spirits of ancestors are in harmony, past events are orderly linked to the present and future. If they are unquiet, the ‘curse’ will disrupt the ‘flow of life’ and jeopardise an outward and inward expansion of *uma lulik* (Hohe et al. 2002, Babo-Soares 2004, Trindade et al. 2007). This belief has separated authority in the *uma lulik* between the spiritual domain, where spiritual leaders conduct rituals for the spirits of ancestors and the wellbeing of the house, and the political domain, where political leaders such as local kings (*liurai*s) and nobles (*datos*) employ their capacity and knowledge in making executive decisions (Hohe et al. 2002, Babo-Soares 2004, Trindade et al. 2007, McWilliam et al. 2011). Outsiders have been regarded as younger brothers, and even accepted as political leaders according to their merit (Traube 1995, McWilliam et al. 2011).

On the other hand, the Somali associated their clan ancestors with the Arabian nobles who were linked to the Prophet Mohamed and migrated to Somalia approximately thirty generations ago (Lewis 1961: 5). As opposed to the constructivist claims on genealogy (e.g. Mansur 1997), a primordial position assumes that the nomadic pastoralists in Somaliland mostly belong to the clan families who are descended from the Arabian-origin ancestors, such as Dir in the West, Isaaq in the central, and Darood in the East (e.g. Lewis 1961: 131). These clan families produced mythical offspring some twenty generations ago who founded clan segments, such as Iise and Gadabursi in the Dir family, Habar-Awal, Habar-Jalo, and Habar-Yunis in the Isaaq family, and Dulbahante and Warsangeli in the Darood family (Lewis 1961: 10) (Figure 4.1). The population of each clan segment ranges from approximately 50,000 to 150,000, containing 30 to 70 *diya*-paying groups (Lewis 1961: 5). Although census has not been conducted for years, the Isaaq is dominant in Somaliland, and its sub-clans, the Habar-Awal, the Habar-Jalo, and the Habar-Yunis sub-clans are relatively equal in size (Lewis 1961: 10). In addition, there are smaller clans, including those who have developed the caste
system due to their slave or conqueror ancestry (Lewis 1961, Mohamed 1997: 149). In this sense, clan families are mostly affiliated to lineage and Islam in Somaliland. Yet the Somali, like the Timorese, have largely separated authority in the political (e.g. sultan, ugaas) and religious (e.g. sheikh, wadad) realms, although they sometimes overlap (Lewis 1961).

**Figure 4.1:** Major (sub)clans in Somaliland (adapted from Lewis 2008: 109 and Bradbury 2008: 257-258)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clans</td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>Isaaq</td>
<td>Darood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iise</td>
<td>Habar-Awal</td>
<td>Dulbahante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gadabursi</td>
<td>Habar-Jalo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Habar-Yunis</td>
<td>Warsangeli</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4-1-2. Societal deliberation

Although lineage is central to the societal cosmology and structure in the *uma lulik* and the *diya*-paying group, this alone does not explain the political system. Both societies have developed societal codes, such as customary laws (*bandu* in Timor and *xeer* in Somaliland) and traditional norms and values (*lisan* in Timor and *aado* in Somaliland). With the view that a breach of societal codes dishonours and humiliates the ancestors and causes natural disasters and violent conflict due to their curses, both the *uma lulik* and the *diya*-paying group have established a political system to deliberate and enforce the rules and the systems to maintain societal order, justice, and peace (Trindade et al. 2007: 21, Lewis 1961: 161-162,
Mohamed 1997: 149). They have undertaken deliberative practices (*nahi biti* in Timor and *shir* in Somaliland) and incorporated them in the political and judicial systems and processes. Despite variations in form and purpose, participants in societal deliberation have been commonly encouraged to ‘speak’, pay respect to others during deliberation, and explore mutually-acceptable consensus, even though differences and disagreements remain contentious (Trindade et al. 2007, Lewis 1961, Farah et al. 1993).

In East Timor, when societal conflict emerges, disputants seek justice at various levels in the *uma lulik*. While they begin seeking justice in an intra-family negotiation at the lowest level, if settlement fails, they bring the case in an inter-family negotiation at the upper level, and if necessary, seek a third-party mediation and negotiation (Nixon 2012: 176). At either level, elders with experience and knowledge of societal codes play an important role as arbitrators (Trindade et al. 2007: 21). As the ‘owners of words’ (*lia nain*), they have judicial authority to determine the terms of fines, compensation, and physical punishment (Trindade et al. 2007: 21). In doing so, they preside over a ritual ceremony, called ‘stretching the mat’ (*nahe biti*), bringing parties in conflict together to sit down on a traditionally-woven mat to ‘speak’. The mat is usually kept open until all parties agree on the verdicts and undertake a blood oath (*juramentu*) to ratify them (Trindade et al. 2007: 21). Any flaw in the ceremony is regarded as invalidation or failure (Babo-Soares 2004: 28). Subsequently, political leaders (e.g. *liurai*) with executive authority take responsibility for sanctioning and implementing the decisions made.

In Somaliland, although the customary law has been inherited from the ancestors, as need arises (e.g. for revision, addition and change), all adult males are called to participate in the lineage councils (*shirs*) that take place on an ad-hoc basis in the *diya*-paying group. When
they deliberate with other diya groups, they choose elder representatives (aquils) and dispatch them to the inter-group councils, including the elder council (guurti) at the highest level (Farah et al. 1993: 17). Participants in these councils often sit down in a circle in the shade of an acacia tree in the country or in the coffee shops in the village or town. Despite some variations (Lewis 1961: 196, Mohamed 1997), equality is a general principle for societal deliberation (Lewis 1961: 198). Any disgraceful behaviour during deliberation is banned and if it occurs, is fined. Although elder representatives (e.g. sultan, ugaas at clan and sub-clan level, aquil at diya-paying group level) are highly respected, their executive authority for sanction is limited due to the principle of equality. Rather, their role is often confined to inter-group communication and coordination (Lewis 1961: 205, Bradbury 2008: 28). They also consult with religious leaders (e.g. sheikh, wadad) to ensure that the decisions are valid according to Sharia (Lewis 1961: 162, 213).

4-1-3. Implications of societal deliberation

Both nahe biti (stretching mat) and shir (lineage council) have been interpreted as non-Western forms of political space. Babo-Soares (2004), for example, likens nahe biti to ‘a venue, space or place where family and wider societal issues are discussed, debated and settled’, indicating ‘its meaning has been broadened to encompass mending differences’ (2004: 23). Lewis (1961) similarly views shir as political and judicial spaces where all males or their representatives deal with collective business, from political affairs to unite against hostile forces, collect and distribute compensation, and regulate land and water resources (1961: 199) to the judicial affairs to judge offences and seek mediation (1961: 228). In these spaces for deliberation, disputants and participants in nahe biti and shir are commonly required to engage in a series of deliberative acts, such as witnessing and participating in
discussion, expressing their opinions and concerns, carefully listening to and understanding others, maintaining honesty and respect between self and others, continuously acknowledging and bridging mutual differences, and if necessary, amending and reconciling their opinions for individual and collective benefit.

Accordingly, both nahe biti and shir have often been associated with non-Western forms of deliberative democracy vis-à-vis a Western form of liberal democracy. In East Timor, Tilman regards nahe biti as ‘a pre-existing organic democracy that ordered society before modern democracy came into Timor’ (Tilman quoted by Brown et al. 2011: 122). An elder describes the practice of nahe biti as ‘if we nahe biti inside the house, we put there tobacco and betel nut and we chew and smoke and talk until it is over. Everyone has to talk. There is not one person silent. I am used to this. This is democracy’ (an elder quoted by Cummins 2010: 904-5). Although ‘everyone’ may exclude women and youth in this context, Cummins (2010) argues that ‘nahe biti is designed to encourage political participation within a community, to resolve conflict, reach consensus and keep communities together’ (Cummins 2010: 905).

Similarly in Somaliland, Lewis (1961) argues that shir guarantees ‘all adult men as elders [for] the right to have an equal say in principle and speak and deliberate matters of common concern’ (1961: 196). As a result, ‘all men are councillors and all men politicians… Men sit or squat on the ground at a shir and when they wish to speak often rise to their feet’ (Lewis 1961: 198). These participatory, inclusive, and consensus-oriented principles for deliberative democracy in nahe biti and shir can be contrasted with an elite-centred, winner-take-all, and thus exclusive form of liberal democracy to explore efficiency and effectiveness in decision-making. Cummins (2010) and Lewis (1961) thus refer to this direct and egalitarian form of societal deliberation as ‘old democracy’ in East Timor and ‘pastoral democracy’ in Somaliland respectively. Although both East Timor and Somaliland did not have the
'modern’ state that had centralised political authority in a Western political sense, these ‘traditional’ stateless societies had thus established a governance system upon customary law and societal deliberation in a non-Western approach.

However, both nahe biti and shir also face serious challenges, among others, from internal inequality and external threat. First, as reviewed above, the societal cosmology and structure in the two societies are male-centred, especially elder-oriented. As a result, the floor of nahe biti and shir has been dominated by senior men, undervaluing or excluding the voices of women, youth, and those belonging to the lower societal status with slave and defeater ancestry (Kammen 2003; Farah et al. 1993). The ‘inclusion’ in nahe biti and shir appears to consolidate the existing structure of societal inequality, while reproducing and exacerbating the inequality and exclusion of the weak from decision-making. It is therefore important to carefully examine the quantity and the quality of space and power in the practice of societal deliberation such as nahe biti and shir, and avoid romanticising them (Cummins 2010: 905; Hoehne 2013). Second, (post-)colonisation, especially the introduction of the ‘modern’ state made a significant impact on agency, structure, and culture in the ‘traditional’ stateless societies in East Timor and Somaliland (e.g. Babo-Soares, 2004, Trindade et al. 2007, Cummins 2010, Brown et al. 2011, Geshekter 1985, Samatar 1988, Samatar 1989, Cabdi 2005). Although culture could remain resilient (Geertz 1973, Laitin 1986, Gultung 1990: 294), (de/post)colonisation (de/trans)formed the local political economy (e.g. Young 1988) and affected the inherited ‘tradition’ (e.g. Bhabha 1994) elsewhere. It is thus important to examine (post-)colonial implications, among others, for the political, economic, and societal settings that (de)formed the ‘legitimation problem’ and pre-conditioned ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ thereafter.
4-2. The historical background

One of the implications of colonisation is making a ‘modern’ state in ‘traditional’ stateless societies (e.g. Young 1988: 29, Chabal 1994: 200, Migdal 1994, Herbst 2000: 22, see Chapter 2 (2-1)). Although the ‘modern’ state is ‘a particular form which originated in Europe’ (Young 1988: 29), it was diffused by Euro-imperialists, reconstituting and de/trans-forming the non-European societies. How was the ‘modern’ state constructed in the ‘traditional’ stateless societies? What kind of dynamics did (Euro-)state-making cause? Given that East Timor and Somaliland experienced the external rule of Euro-colonisers (i.e. Portugal and Britain) and non-Euro-post-colonisers (i.e. Indonesia and Somalia) thereafter, this second section will briefly examine both colonisation and de/post-colonisation, and their politico-societal ramifications. In doing so, the section will examine the historical backgrounds of (post-)colonial political orders and societal responses in East Timor and Somaliland respectively. In doing so, focus is given to a (post-)colonial impact on forming, exacerbating, and radicalising the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences in a transition from colonisation to de/post-colonisation.

4-2-1. The historical background in East Timor

This first sub-section will examine the Timorese experience of (de/post-)colonisation and its politico-societal implications in focus on interactions and tensions between (post-)colonisers’ political order and societal response during five centuries under Portuguese rule and then 24 years under Indonesian rule. These external rulers undertook different approaches to establishing the ‘modern’ state in the ‘traditional’ stateless society, and de/trans-forming agential dynamics and societal structure in the *uma lulik*. The Portuguese, as Euro-
imperialists, had exploited traditional leaders for ‘indirect rule’ since the 16th century. The Great Rebellion of 1911-1912, however, caused the Portuguese to disempower the traditional leaders and contain them in the colonial governance system, yet introduce the ‘assimilado’ policy and create a ‘modern’ stratum in the indigenous populations thereafter. This led to societal divisions and tensions within and between the ‘modern’ elite and the ‘traditional’ majority. As de-colonisation caused political crises in mid 1975, the Indonesians, as non-Euro-imperialists, took over the state of East Timor in late 1975, and ‘Indonesianised’ the society thereafter. Facing the Indonesian coercion, the resistance network mobilised the traditional leaders and ‘traditionally-engaged’ youth at the uma lulik level in the 1980s and 1990s. In the meantime, new societal actors such as the Catholic Church emerged and thrived.

4-2-1-1. Colonisers’ political order and societal response: a Portuguese approach

The abundance of sandalwood had attracted the Portuguese who reached the island of Timor in the 16th century. Since then, a small Portuguese-speaking community including mestizo populations known as Topasse (Black Portuguese) had gradually emerged along the coastline. The Timorese often accepted these newcomers as their ‘younger brothers’, and even appointed them as political leaders according to the traditional cosmology. At the early stage of colonisation, due to Portugal’s decline and Timor’s remote location, the Portuguese rule was largely nominal, granting substantial autonomy to liurais (local kings) in exchange for their recognition of colonial sovereignty. The Portuguese rule thus relied heavily on societal authority at the local kingdom and uma lulik levels (RDTL 2003). Its administrative and military weakness allowed the colonial subjects, such as Topasses and liurais, to constantly resist, and the Dutch, a colonial competitor, to mobilise them as allies (Andaya 2010). This
security challenge continued until the Lisbon Treaty in 1859 on the territorial division of the Timorese island allowed the competing Portuguese and Dutch to intensify colonisation in their respective territories thereafter (Taylor 1999: 3-5, McWilliam et al. 2011: 6, Nixon 2012: 25-29). In the meantime, the Portuguese gradually inserted themselves into the local political economy, extracting a proportion of tribute from the finta (customary tribute) system in which liurais had established upward flows of goods and services from their subjects (Nixon 2012: 29). After the Lisbon Treaty, the Portuguese started transforming the subsistence economy into a surplus-exploitation economy with measures of opening land for coffee plantations, constructing roads, and levying a poll tax on the indigenous males. The mobilisation of forced labour and the direct taxation, however, eroded the authority of liurais and caused a large-scale resistance led by Dom Boaventura, a liurai and his allies in 1911 (Taylor 1999: 11, Nixon 2012: 30). The years-long resistance claimed 15,000 to 25,000 lives, approximately 5% of the Timorese population at that time (McWilliam et al. 2011: 8).

This Great Rebellion of 1911-1912 became a turning point in state-society relations under Portuguese rule (Nixon 2012: 30). The Portuguese consolidated the colonial administration to ‘pacify’ societal rebels, abolishing the old kingdoms and incorporating them into the four levels of administrative structure from district (concelho) and sub-district (posto) to town/village (suco) and hamlet (recently aldeia or previously povacao). They then appointed the Portuguese or mestizo administrators for the upper two ‘modern’ tiers and the Timorese liurais or datos (nobles) as the village and hamlet heads (chefes de suco and aldeia) at the lower two ‘traditional’ tiers. Most of the liurais who led the local kingdoms at the district/sub-district levels were uniformly demoted (McWilliam et al. 2011: 8). The Portuguese compelled the new village and hamlet heads to collect tax and relay directives to their societal subjects in daily administration, and granted executive power to the district and
sub-district administrators to replace the disobedient liurai (RDTL 2003: 41, McWilliam et al. 2011: 8). The formalised structure and relations between the colonisers and their subjects, however, made little impact on the indigenous societal practice. The village and hamlet affairs remained largely autonomous. While the demoted liurai became closer, and more accessible, thus more legitimate to the societal majority, the elders continued to mediate local disputes and conflicts (RDTL 2003: 41). The agency network at the uma lulik level endured, was perpetuated, and even reproduced. If the village/hamlet heads were not liurai descendants, they acquired recognition from the liurai. In reality, the ‘indirect rule’ allowed the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal to co-exist, yet in an ‘uneasy truce’ (Taylor 1999: 12).

The Portuguese then escalated centralising colonial rule. The newly-introduced ‘assimilado’ (‘assimilated’) policy created a new societal stratum of the ‘indigenous-turned-Portuguese’ as the ‘assimilado’ in the indigenous populations. The key requirement for the Timorese to obtain this ‘civilised’ status was to mimic the Euro-Portuguese, educating themselves at school and abandoning their traditional values and practices. Although the number of the assimilado was limited (approximately 0.35% of the Timorese population as of 1950) (Jolliffe 1978: 42), this policy dichotomised societal actors between the ‘modern’ assimilado and ‘traditional’ others in such areas as worldview (e.g. Lusophone universe vs. traditional cosmology) and lifestyle (e.g. urban vs. rural) (Taylor 1999: 13, Nixon 2012: 35). The assimilado positively evaluated this newly acquired status in ‘modern’ livelihood. Xanana Gusmao, who later became the resistance leader and the first President of RDTL (Democratic Republic of East Timor), for example, recalled a mimetic characteristic of his father. ‘My father loved reading and subscribed to the Catholic magazines… He was to be our chance to break away from our small world, move to Dili where I could get an education and, according
to my father, become a good Portuguese’ (Gusmao 2000: 5). The educated assimilado, however, increasingly awakened the Timorese awareness of underdevelopment in the 1960s and 1970s. A Catholic newspaper in Dili, for example, published opinions from local elites, including Jose Ramos-Horta, who later became the second President of RDTL, and Mari Alkatiri, who later became the first Prime Minister of RDTL. ‘While Ramos-Horta argued that East Timor is a beautiful country but the Timorese did not appreciate it, Alkatiri replied that the problem was … structural; …retarded by the colonial system’ (Jolliffe 1978: 56). These assimilados romanticised ‘decolonisation’ and approached it within a small clique, yet were largely disconnected from the societal majority.

The Carnation Revolution in 1974 overthrew the dictatorial regime in Lisbon and allowed the assimilado in the colonies to set up political parties across the colonies. Among others, three parties became significant in East Timor. First, the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) appealed to the conservative wing in the upper-middle class. Second, the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT) attracted the lower-middle class including young assimilados. Both aimed for a gradual independence (Taylor 1999: 27). The post-Revolution influx of the Marxist youth in Lisbon, however, increasingly radicalised the latter. The ASDT was renamed the Revolutionary Front of an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) and set out a strategy to ‘mobilise students to take part in the grassroots work for political conscientization’ (Ramos-Horta 1987: 38), and ‘fight independence’ (Taylor 1999: 33). Third, the Popular Democratic Association of Timor (APODETI) aimed for ‘an autonomous integration into Indonesia’ (Taylor 1999: 28). While the first two associated with the Portuguese, the last rejected them in consultation with the Indonesians. Measures for constitutional democracy, such as undertaking the local suco elections and preparing the transitional government in the process of decolonisation, however, intensified political
competition, suspicion, and divisions among the emerging Timorese political elite (Gusmao 2000: 19).

Besides Portugal’s incompetence in leading East Timor to decolonisation, intervention from the regional powerhouses, notably Indonesia and Australia, made the fragile situation increasingly complex (Jolliffe 1978, Ramos-Horta 1987, Taylor 1999). A precarious freedom at the local level, in conjunction with a strong anti-communism front at the regional and international level, eventually led the local political struggles to the civil war in mid 1975, starting from the failure of UDT’s coup attempt to FRETILIN’s declaration of independence, and ending with the armed intervention of Indonesia (Jolliffe 1978, Taylor 1999, Nixon 2012). This civil war experience left ‘eighty per cent of the elite [fleeing] the country to various foreign destinations’ (Nixon 2012: 70) and scars and schisms among the Timorese political elite thereafter. This political conflict, however, had made little impact on the societal majority. While ‘tradition’ endured locally, tension within the ‘modern’ elite was a mere urban phenomenon and mostly irrelevant to the local societal everyday (Nixon 2012: 71, 73). Although Ramos-Horta (1987) argued that ‘five hundred years of Portugal’s “civilising mission” had little, if any, impact on Timorese animist religion and culture’ (1987: 14), it was not only the Portuguese but also the Timorese elite, as the by-product of the ‘Euro-colonisation/modernisation’, who had disengaged with the cultural ‘tradition’, worldview and societal structure.

4-2-1-2. Post-colonisers’ political order and societal response: an Indonesian approach

Defeated UDT and APODETI leaders requested Indonesia to overthrow the FRETILIN government. While the Indonesian invasion in December 1975 was initially limited to the
Urban area, the ‘encirclement’ and ‘annihilation’ campaigns drove the FRETILIN into the mountains in the next few years (Budiardjo et al. 1984: 23). In the meantime, the Suharto regime annexed East Timor as the 27th province in July 1976, and appointed the UDT and APODETI leaders to key positions in the provincial government (Saldanha 1994: 97). However, the Indonesian security operators dominated the provincial administration and soon resented the Timorese leaders (Budiardjo et al. 1984: 97-98, Saldanha 1994: 110). The militarisation of the state also affected the societal majority. First, the Indonesian dis/re-located the rural majority into the urban ‘settlement’ camps. More than half of the Timorese population (372,921 out of approximately 700,000) were contained in up to 150 camps (Budiardjo et al. 1984: 50-51, McWilliam et al. 2011: 10). These ‘captured’ societal were forced to ‘integrate’ into the Indonesian systems, voting for the given candidates (Budiardjo et al. 1984: 114; Taylor 1999: 132-133), working for the army business (Budiardjo et al. 1984: 108, Taylor 1999: 123), and learning the Indonesian language in the state-run schools (Budjardjo et al. 1984: 111, Taylor 1999:128). Second, in this connection, the Indonesians urged the ‘captured’ societal to collaborate with the army. While the regime rewarded them with privileges, it seriously abused non-collaborators and anti-Indonesians (Budiardjo et al. 1984, Pinto 1997, CAVR 2005a). The ‘divide and rule’ significantly eroded social cohesion.

‘Indonesianisation’ also undermined the customary governance system at the uma lulik. The Indonesians largely retained the administrative structure and units (e.g. district, sub-district, village, and hamlet) (Hohe et al. 2002, RDTL 2003). However, they introduced local elections in 1982, and formally abolished hereditary appointments at the village level. The regime deliberately selected candidates according to criteria such as societal status or political background. Given the massive displacement and the Indonesian migration, the Timorese were compelled to vote for candidates irrelevant to their familial ties, especially in the newly-
created ‘open’ villages where families from different backgrounds were forced to live together (RDTL 2003: 44). A clear division between the *de jure* ‘elected’ authority and the *de facto* ‘traditional’ authority made many of the ‘elected’ chiefs who were disconnected from the *uma lulik* illegitimate in the eyes of the societal (RDTL 2003: 49). ‘There were not really democratic elections, since Indonesian militaries were exerting pressure on the population to elect the candidate favoured by the Indonesian government’ (a liurai descendent quoted by Hohe et al. 2002: 48). The de-legitimation of local governance resulted in a rapid increase in land disputes and conflict across the villages (RDTL 2003: 49). The societal majority had acknowledged tensions in ‘Indonesianisation’. ‘The law system of Indonesia was different from the Timorese culture. What we considered as serious, they considered as light and the other way round’ (a hamlet chief quoted by Hohe et al. 2002: 50). Moreover, the regime had forced the societal majority to discontinue their ‘tradition’ at the *uma lulik* and hurt their dignity (Pinto 1997, McWilliam et al. 2011). ‘In Indonesian times, we didn’t conduct many ceremonies. The *camats* (sub-district chiefs) always had to check how much people spend on rituals. The village chief had to give permission for it, and therefore he had to be paid’ (a community member quoted by Hohe et al. 2002: 50). Yet the societal actors were often flexible. While rituals were conducted in a ‘simplified’ form, a small replica was constructed in place of the *uma lulik* (Barnes 2011: 37).

The campaigns of ‘encirclement’ and ‘annihilation’ nearly defeated the FRETILIN in 1979 (Budiardjo et al. 1984: 67). The ‘long walk’ afterwards, however, provided a small number of survivors with an invaluable opportunity to consult and interact with, and relate to the ‘traditional’ authorities (Gusmao 2000: 64-65). After that, these survivors increased engagement with the societal majority. The resistance movement was reorganised into three fronts: a) political and military front (for political and armed resistance), b) clandestine front
(for societal mobilisation), and c) diplomatic front (for external unification). Their guerrilla strategy allowed the military front, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL), to move across towns and interiors and link itself with the clandestine front in the 1980s (Hohe et al. 2002: 50-51, CAVR 2005c). For societal mobilisation, the resistance movement formed a village-based network across the territory including the concentration camps. This network allowed the resistance to gain support from, and communicate with, the ‘captured’ majority, and link them with each other (Cristalis 2002: 57, Hohe et al. 2002: 51). Societal leaders were appointed *nureps* (nucleus representatives) at village level and *celcoms* (cells of communication) at hamlet level. These *nureps* and *celcoms* were selected not only based upon individual capacity and collective affiliations, but also upon societal status at the *uma lulik*. Their appointment often followed ritual ceremonies undertaken by spiritual leaders at the *uma lulik* (Hohe et al. 2002: 52). The *uma lulik* (sacred house) was thus transformed into the ‘house of resistance’ (McWilliam 2005: 35), legitimising the resistance in the eyes of the societal majority. The clandestine network was further extended to, and embraced youth groups and associations (Pinto 1997, CAVR 2005c). The student nucleus often linked with international NGOs for human rights and helped the resistance to boost its profile internationally (Pinto 1997, CAVR 2005a: 119). In the meantime, the number of resistance cells reached more than 1,700 (Cristalis 2002: 57).

Effort was also made to reconcile the divided political elites both inside and outside the country. Xanana Gusmao, the guerrilla leader, attempted to depoliticise the resistance, separating the FALINTIL from the FRETILIN in 1984 (Gusmao 2000: 132). He re-named the resistance, initially the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in 1988, and subsequently the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in 1998 (Gusmao 2000), to affiliate all resistance factions and overcome past political conflicts (CAVR 2005a: 98,
Although his departure from FRETILIN was resented by some FRETILIN and FALINTIL leaders, such as Alkatiri and Gama (CAVR 2005c: 32, Nixon 2012: 80), his inter-party, reconciliatory approach boosted societal support for the resistance (Pinto 1997: 123). In turn, the diplomatic front headed by Ramos-Horta had also been active (Ramos-Horta 1987). He arranged dialogues between the Timorese diaspora in conflict after 1975 (Saldanha 1994: 357, CAVR 2005c: 36). The ideological departure from Marxism helped the resistance to increase and broaden support from the West as the Cold War was about to end (Saldanha 1994: 357, CAVR 2005a: 108). The international profile of the resistance culminated when a Nobel Peace Prize was granted to Ramos-Horta together with Bishop Belo in 1996. These political developments in the late 1990s helped the resistance to consolidate legitimacy both internally and externally, and the societal to overcome ideological differences, past antagonism, and rivalries, and unite under a non-partisan umbrella of CNRT in 1998. The CNRT set up the political, executive and judiciary commissions as the supreme organs. Yet the top positions were dominated by the former assimilado diaspora (CAVR 2005c: 37), vis-à-vis the national ‘traditionally-engaged’ leaders and soldiers who had led the resistance at the grassroots level (Nixon 2012: 84). The CNRT was in a precarious balance and awkward coalition between the diaspora elite and the national/local leaders (Cristalis 2002: 90).

While the resistance revived, other societal forces had been emerging. Among other things, the Catholic Church grew rapidly: the Catholic population in East Timor increased from 30% in 1972 to 90% in 1992 (Saldanha 1994: 365). Reasons could include Indonesia’s Pancasila policy which compelled the Timorese to adopt a religious faith as well as the escalating warfare which obliged the Church to localise the clergy (Budiardjo et al. 1984, CAVR 2005a). Although the Church contained clergy that were an odd mix of Timorese, Indonesian, and other nationals (Budjardjo et al. 1984, Smythe 2004, CAVR 2005a), it had largely
sympathised with the societal majority, accusing the regime of atrocities and repression (Kohen 1999, CAVR 2005a: 98), and offering a shelter and sanctuary that enabled the Timorese to congregate and take refuge (Pinto 1997: 111, Hohe et al. 2002: 53). While the regime confronted ‘tradition’ at the uma lulik, the Church did not compete, but supplemented it. The Catholic icons in the mass, for example, ‘served as substitutes for many indigenous forms of ancestor worship’ (Aditjondro 1994: 35 quoted by Carey 1999: 84, Nixon 2012: 105). In turn, the intellectual youth were also formed and vital to driving local civic activities. The tertiary institutions were established in Dili; the local NGOs were set up; and the local newspaper was circulated between the Indonesian-literate readers. The emerging intellectuals energised local societal forces, being critical of the regime in injustice and malpractice, and sympathising, even engaging with the resistance (Saldanha 1994, Pinto 1997). On the other hand, ‘uncivil’ activities prevailed at the grassroots level. The regime employed collaborative youth and elders to confront the reviving resistance. It transformed local martial arts groups into a civil defence force, militias, spy, and death squads (CAVR 2005b: 21-28). The pro-regime militia increased to more than 10,000 in 1996 (Nixon 2012: 102). The regime also recruited an elder in every 10-15 families to detect suspicious acts and behaviour (Taylor 1999: 129). The rising suspicion, fear and secrecy at family level damaged social cohesion, affiliation, and trust. ‘People are afraid - they are scared - they do not even trust their own family. People are becoming less willing to utter their disagreement and agreement’ (quoted by Taylor 1999: 129).

4-2-2. The historical background in Somaliland

This second sub-section will examine the Somaliland experience of (de/post-)colonisation and its implications by focusing on interactions and tensions between the (post-)coloniser’s
political order and the societal response under British rule from the late 1880s, and then the Mogadishu government from 1960 to 1991. As in East Timor, these external rulers explored different approaches to making the ‘modern’ state in the ‘traditional’ stateless society, and de/trans-forming the agential dynamics and societal structure in the *diya*-paying group. The British introduced ‘indirect’ rule, selectively co-opting traditional leaders. Although the British rule was light and limited, it affected the local political economy, sedentarising and urbanising pastoral life, commercialising livestock, professionalising and localising trade and state, yet exacerbating inter-clan competition. While the post-independence state was united with Southern Somalia in 1960, constitutional democracy had largely failed, allowing the Barre regime to emerge in 1969 and dismiss the customary governance system and value in ‘Scientific Socialism’ in the 1970s. The defeat in the Ogaden (Ethiopian-Somali) War of 1977-1978, however, motivated the regime to re-activate clan politics and re-order the ailing state upon the principle of ‘divide and rule’. As the national politics became exclusive, the Northern Somali organised and mobilised clan militia to resist it in the 1980s.

4-2-2-1. Colonisers’ political order and societal response: a British approach

It was in the early 19th century that the British settled in Aden, Yemen to secure the Red Sea route that links Europe and India (Lewis 2002b: 40) (Map 4.1). The British needed the Somali northern coast (e.g. Berbera) as a stable meat supplier to feed the soldiers stationed in Aden (Lewis 1994: 4, 2002b). On the other hand, while the Somali nomads had been in a lengthy rivalry with the Christian Ethiopians in the Somali hinterland, they faced an imminent threat from the Ethiopian Empire which moved its forces to conquer the Somali territory (Samatar 1989, Lewis 2002b). As Ottoman Turkey and Egypt had withdrawn from the Somali northern coast in the mid 19th century, the Northern Somalis asked the Europeans
for protection (Geshekter 1985, Lewis 1994: 4). While divided Somali clan leaders played political games with the Europeans and Ethiopians, Somalia ended up in partition between the British, the French, the Italians, and the Ethiopians, largely without the consent of the Somalis, in the late 19th century (Samatar 1988, Samatar 1989, Lewis 2002b). The arbitrarily-drawn colonial borders limited the Somali nomads in travelling for grazing land, and have aggrieved them since then.

Map 4.1: Map of the Horn of Africa in the early 1910s

The British gained the largest area in the North and named it British Somaliland. Yet Somaliland was, except for animal grazing, unattractive for the British to settle in, due to the lack of natural resources and the harsh natural environment (Lewis 2002b). The British aimed, therefore, to rule Somaliland at minimum cost, prioritising societal order to secure trade and production (Samatar 1989, Lewis 2002b). In doing so, the British initially co-opted the titled elders such as sultans and ugaass, giving stipends to them in exchange for their

---

control over smaller clan segments (Samatar 1989, Lewis 2002b). Acknowledging their limited power to sanction, the British extended co-option to *aquils*, elder representatives of *diya*-paying groups, granting them ‘local authority’ (Lewis 1961: 200) in exchange for their role in liaising between the colonial state and the societal subjects (Lewis 1994). *Aquils* were salaried and empowered to assist the colonial state in ‘indirect rule’, although they had not possessed political ‘authority’ traditionally (Lewis 1961: 201, Samatar 1989). This colonial creation of ‘chiefdoms’ was socio-politically significant, causing competition over the position of *aquil* within *diya*-paying groups and conflicts of interest between the British and *diya*-paying groups (Lewis 1961: 201-202). When *aquils* started residing in town, their sedentarisation increased the gap between the urban eldership and the rural majority in clan politics (Geshekter 1985: 28, Schwoebel 2001: 7). The co-optation of *aquils* in ‘indirect rule’ increasingly marred social cohesion and weakened stability at the *diya*-paying group level (Lewis 1961: 203).

As the Somali pastoralists resented colonial borders and the erosion of societal tradition, Sheikh Said Mohamad organised a ‘jihad’ against the Christians, initially the Ethiopians in the highlands, and subsequently the British in the coastline (Geshekter 1985, Samatar 1989, Lewis 2002b). Although the Somalis had traditionally separated political and religious authorities (Lewis 1961), they mobilised their lineage groups under his religious leadership. The British and Ethiopian coalitions required twenty years to defeat the rebels, until 1920 when the end of the First World War enabled the British to undertake massive armed operations (Geshekter 1985, Samatar 1989). This Dervish rebellion in the early 20th century cost more than £6 million and 200,000 lives (Geshekter 1985: 18) and left legacies to the colonisers. Among others, the British became increasingly cautious and dependent on the *aquils*, the ‘local authorities’ in governance. They also relocated the capital from coastal
Berbera to interior Hargeisa and established the district administration in the inner regions (Samatar 1989). These measures to strengthen ‘indirect rule’, however, centralised the ‘modern’ state in the ‘traditional’ stateless society and disempowered the authority of titled elders, such as sultans and ugaas (Samatar 1989). Also, the armed campaigns left a huge deficit. Failing to introduce a poll tax for fear of local resistance, the colonial administration had no option but to seek budget support from London (Samatar 1989). Since the taxation system was poorly developed, the financial constraints had caused serious under-investment in all areas (Geshekter 1985, Samatar 1989).

A light and limited approach to colonisation, however, slowly transformed the local political economy. In order to increase revenue, the British promoted trade, granting trading rights to the Somali merchants in place of the European and Indian traders (Geshekter 1985: 19). As the Somali merchants expanded their trade network in the hinterland, the subsistence economy was gradually commercialised, marketised, and urbanised (Geshekter 1985: 21-22, Samatar 1989: 53-55). The nascent capitalism encouraged the pastoralists to seek surplus in grazing, consume commodities, and cultivate plants (Geshekter 1985, Samatar 1989). Strong competition over land and water between the pastoralists and the agro-pastoralists, however, degraded the environment and increased societal tensions (Mohamed 2004). When the colonial state intervened, the different views of the British on land as ‘individual property’ and the Somalis on it as a ‘collective asset’ often resulted in aggrieving the latter (Schwoebel 2001: 6-7). At the same time, as the merchants had dominated the market (Mohamed 2004), an income gap increased among and between the merchants, the agro-pastoralists, and the pastoralists, and impoverished the economic losers (Geshekter 1985, Samatar 1989, Mohamed 2004). The ‘modernisation’ of the socio-economic structure had an adverse effect, increasing societal inequality, competition, and grievances.
In the meantime, a growing interaction between the colonial ‘modern’ state, the rural ‘traditional’ society, and the urban ‘capitalising’ sectors transformed agential dynamics. The capitalising economy produced the petit-bourgeois who engaged in commerce, business, and colonial administration (Geshekter 1985). Despite difficulty in definition, they commonly left rural hardship, living in towns and schooling their offspring. Regardless of clan differences, the educated youth gathered in coffee shops and engaged in political discussion, organising social clubs and welfare societies, and started demanding public spending for wellbeing (Geshekter 1985, Samatar 1989). While the inter-clan ‘solidarity’ emerged, the inter-clan ‘rivalries’ also stood out. Within the Isaaq clan families, while the coastal Habar-Awal clan dominated business, the central-midlander Habar-Yunis and Habar-Jalo clans increased their rivalry between the Habar-Yunis majority in the civil service and the Habar-Jalo majority in the army (Bryden et al. 2000). In the West, the Iise and Gadabursi clans in the Dir family extended cultivation, yet caused tensions over land and water with the Isaaq pastoralists (Mohamed 2004). In the East, the Dulbahante and Warsangeli clans in the Darood family were increasingly isolated from politico-economic opportunities (Bradbury 2008). This related to an academic argument on the Somali clan identity as ‘constructed’ (e.g. Samatar 1988, Samatar 1989). Ultimately, the Somalis faced an awkward equilibrium between inter-clan (and somehow nationalistic) solidarity and inter-clan (and somehow tribal/regional) rivalries as colonisation advanced.

The East African campaigns during World War II strengthened nationalism among the Somali elite. At the end of WWII, the British occupied all five Somali regions and allowed the Somalis to freely move across the regions. The Somali dreamed of the integration of a ‘Greater Somalia’, yet it crumbled shortly. The British decision to return the occupied
territories to the respective colonial powers inflamed the anti-colonial sentiment in general, and the anti-British feeling in Somaliland in particular, given that the return of the water-abundant highlands constrained pastoralist livelihoods again (Lewis 2002b: 129). The pre-war social clubs and welfare societies were then promptly transformed into political parties, including the Somali National League (SNL) in British Somaliland and the Somali Youth League (SYL) in Italian Somaliland. Both SNL and SYL allied for the return of the Haud and Ogaden highlands from Ethiopia (Lewis 2002b: 152). In response, the British enhanced ‘Somalisation’. At the national level, the Protectorate Advisory Council was created in 1946 as the governor’s advisory board with appointed members (Samatar 1989, Lewis 2002b: 150). At the local level, the Local Authorities ordinance was enacted in 1950 to allow the governor to select the aquils to liaise with the District Commissioners and their clan groups (Lewis 2002b: 149). As the Somali elite increased their presence in the state in the next decade, they intensified demands for self-determination (Lewis 1961: 272, Geshekter 1985, Samatar 1988). While the Pan-Somali movement prevailed in the 1950s, the national elections took place for the Legislative Council in February 1960 (Touval 1963: 106, Lewis 2002b: 154-155). Muhammad Egal, who later became the second President of Somaliland, was inaugurated as the first/last Prime Minister and declared Somaliland’s independence on 26 June 1960. Four days later, on 1 July 1960, Somaliland united with Southern Somalia which had achieved independence from the UN trusteeship (Touval 1963, Lewis 2002b).

4-2-2-2. Post-colonisers’ political order and societal response: a Mogadishu approach

The high politics in the post-colonial state of Somalia had been, however, largely irrelevant to the societal everyday. Although constitutional democracy and state institutions had been in place, the political elite were increasingly disconnected from the ‘traditional’ pastoral
majority (Samatar 1988: 60). While nationalism had masked clan rivalries in decolonisation, independence unpacked it, urging the elite to engage in ‘traditional’ patronage (Lewis 2002b: 166). The emerging clan politics in Mogadishu, however, increasingly marginalised the remote Somaliland. While the Somaliland elite gained minor positions in the cabinet, Hargeisa was downgraded to a mere provincial town (Samatar 1988). The growing discontent of the Northern Somalis about the political inequality and marginalisation was allegedly linked to the SNL’s boycott against the constitutional referendum and the abortive coup-attempt in Hargeisa in 1961 (Samatar 1988: 61-62, Lewis 2002b: 172-173). While corruption became rampant, political reformers and conservatives competed for the state leadership from the mid to the late 1960s (Samatar 1988: 68-70). After the former were defeated, the latter elected Muhammad Egal, the former Prime Minister of Somaliland, as the Prime Minister in 1967. Although Somalia became one of the few African states which democratically changed its government in the 1960s (Samatar 1988: 70), this does not mean that a democratic culture had been established. As constitutional democracy became increasingly dysfunctional, the assassination of the President paved the way for the bloodless coup of Siad Barre, a Soviet-trained army general, in 1969 (Samatar 1988).

The new military regime aimed to re-establish political order by eliminating clan nepotism and intervening in all areas according to Soviet-style ‘Scientific Socialism’ (Lewis 2002b: 207). While rapidly replacing old politicians with young ‘modern’ technocrats in the army and civil service (Lewis 2002b: 207-208), the regime disempowered ‘traditional’ aquils who had remained influential under the civilian government, renaming them ‘peace-makers’, and incorporating them in the local civil service. It banned diya payment, replacing it with state subsidies to social events, such as weddings and funerals, which had been under clan auspices (Samatar 1988, Lewis 2002b). The regime also constructed ‘Orientation Centres’ everywhere
and urged the societal majority to use them for social events and civic education. The regime’s slogan of ‘less talk and more work’ limited societal deliberation, yet empowered the state officials at the Socialist Party and Local People’s Assembly to monitor and control the society (Lewis 2002b: 210). The repressive approach of the state to ‘modernising’ the society was contrary to the deliberative ‘tradition’ in Somali pastoral society, and caused the most outspoken opponents to flee abroad, such as to the West and the Middle East where the oil economy was booming (Lewis 2002b: 213). Despite the state domination and its consequence of ‘brain drain’, however, the clan system did not disappear, but endured and even resurfaced, encouraging the political opponents to take refuge in clanism. ‘In the absence of legitimate fora to express their opinions, the people who are caught in the highly compartmentalized clan system, organize themselves along the thing that they know best: the clan’ (Ahmed 1994: 20-21).

While the British and the Italian Somalilands united in Somalia in 1960, other Somali regions had also explored self-determination. The Socialist Revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 offered an opportunity for the Ogaden Somali to integrate with Somalia. Engaging in the Ogaden resistance, the Barre regime invaded Ethiopia in 1977. A year-long warfare, however, ended up with the loss of more than 8,000 Somali troops and the withdrawal of Somalia from Ethiopia, which obtained full support from its Eastern allies (Laitin et al. 1987: 142). This defeat caused a crisis in the political economy of Somalia. Losing legitimacy, the regime departed from Socialism to clan particularism upon Barre’s patrilineal (the Marehan clan), matrilineal (the Ogaden clan), and affinal (the Dulbahante clan) lineage alliances (Samatar 1988, Lewis 2002b). This ‘divide and rule’, however, marginalised the non-allied clans, including the Northern Isaaq, and led to their expulsion and defection from the state. The prominent figures included Ahmed Mohammad ‘Silanyo’, an Isaaq technocrat and then the
Minister of Commerce who later became the resistance leader and the fourth president of Somaliland (Samatar 1988). While the elite struggled in high politics, the ordinary Somalis also faced increasing tensions on the ground. The structural adjustment adopted in the 1980s after the Ogaden War exacerbated poverty in the subsistence economy after the decade-long nationalisation (Samatar 1988). Local business and international aid were exploited in the Northern Isaaq communities which had hosted a massive influx of 400,000 refugees (Africa Watch 1990: 34). The Isaaq competed with the Ogaden refugees who had allied with the regime over resource allocation (Samatar 1988, Africa Watch 1990). The regime’s arming of the refugees as pro-regime militia exacerbated violent conflict between the Isaaq hosts and the Ogaden refugees in the societal everyday (Laitin et al. 1987: 161-162, Africa Watch 1990: 31).

The Somali National Movement (SNM) was established in 1981 to address the grievances of the Northern Somali, especially the Isaaq clans. It was, however, neither socially rooted nor militarily oriented originally, but created in London by the Isaaq diaspora who had migrated to the West and the Middle East (Samatar 1988, Lewis 1994). The resistance aimed to resuscitate the Somali ‘traditional’ norms and values, proposing ‘a new political system built on Somali cultural values of co-operation rather than coercion; a system which elevates the Somali concept of Xeer or inter-family social contract in which no man exercised political power over another except according to established law and custom, to the national level’ (Samatar 1988: 142). Its leadership had been shared and rotated between the Isaaq’s three largest clans, the Habar-Awal, the Habar-Jalo, and Habar-Yunis since its inception (Lewis 1994, Bradbury 2008). The escalating insecurity in Somaliland urged the SNM to move its base from London to Ethiopia and engage in the armed campaigns from 1982 onwards, absorbing the Isaaq civilian elite and soldiers who defected from the regime. After a short-
term military leadership, the SNM elected Ahmed Mohammad ‘Silanyo’ as the chairman in 1984. The SNM membership had been expanded from the diaspora as the key financier to civilian and army elite as the executive leaders. The societal majority, however, had known little about this foreign-supported, foreign-based movement (Prunier 1991). A turning point was reached in 1988 when a truce between the Somali and Ethiopian regimes pushed out the SNM from Ethiopia to Somaliland (Lewis 1994). A full-scale civil war soon broke out, killing nearly 60,000 and displacing more than 800,000 people in the North (Africa Watch 1990: 10). This mass atrocity impelled the Isaaq elders to fully engage with the SNM in mobilising their affiliates for resistance. The stratified societal groups, such as diaspora, civilian elite, soldiers, elders, and societal majority were united for their clan survival under the SNM. ‘There is a mutual feedback here between the movement and the ordinary peoples. The movement brought urban cadres - the teacher, the army officer, the student and the medical doctor, the politician - into the rural areas who then interact with the clans and their elders. Here, at the level of the fighting unit, the SNM found the opportunity of integrating traditional authority and methods into the democratic practices and needs of the movement’ (Samatar 1997: 44). Yet another analysis suggests that the elitist approach of ‘Silanyo’ was so unpopular that he was ousted from the SNM chairmanship despite the escalated warfare in the late 1980s (Prunier 1991: 120, Compagnon 1998). Although the Isaaq coalition finally defeated the regime in 1991, a daunting task remained to reconcile inter-clan and elite-majority tensions and divisions across the Northern Somali.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has briefly and selectively reviewed the cultural and historical backgrounds of the ‘legitimation problem’ in East Timor and Somaliland, highlighting their overall
similarities. Both East Timor and Somaliland were known as ‘traditional’ stateless societies in a Western political sense, since both lacked centralised political authority/hegemony (Gramsci 1971, Weber 1991). However, this does not mean that both societies were orderless. Rather, there were established traditional governance systems in the *uma lulik* (sacred house) in East Timor and the *diya* (blood compensation)-paying group in Somaliland, which had formed the customary laws and traditional values, undertaken the deliberative practices, and maintained societal order and social contract. Both Portuguese and British colonisation to build the ‘modern state’, however, made a significant impact on the ‘traditional’ stateless societies. Although the ‘indirect rule’ created the state-society interface, political deliberation did not take place due to asymmetry between the colonisers and the colonised. Rather, colonial ‘modernity’ marred indigenous ‘tradition’, stratifying the political elite out of the societal majority, and causing vertical and horizontal inequalities. Constitutional democracy did not resolve but reproduced and exacerbated them. As the crises prevailed, while both Indonesian and Mogadishu regimes militarised the state, both societies mobilised traditional actors, engaging in resistance. Despite these similarities in the ‘legitimation problem’ (yet acknowledging contextual differences), East Timor and Somaliland undertook different approaches to transforming it. After the withdrawal of the Indonesian and Mogadishu states, East Timor accepted UN peace operations, while Somaliland rejected them. Accordingly, the next chapters will examine the politico-societal foregrounds of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland.
Chapter 5-6: ‘Deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland

Introduction

Given that the ‘modern’ state and the ‘traditional’ society in East Timor and Somaliland radicalised the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical (state-society) and horizontal (modernity-tradition) inequalities/differences towards the end of their civil wars, the next two chapters aim to examine how they employed ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to (dis)engage and re/de/trans-form it in the protracted conflict into the ‘deliberative political order’ in East Timor (Chapter 5) and Somaliland (Chapter 6). How did political and societal agencies deliberate to address, respond to, or transform the intractable inequalities/differences? They could approach deliberation over the ‘politics of difference’, among others, in the following four approaches: 1) a ‘rational’ approach (‘rationalisation’), 2) an ‘agonistic’ approach (‘agonisation’), 3) a ‘hybrid’ approach (‘hybridisation’), and 4) an approach to engaging disagreement (‘agreeing to disagree’) (see Chapter 2 (2-4)). While the first three approaches underline deliberation as reaching a consensus over difference, the last highlights it as transforming difference into disagreement in the process of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’.

Practising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ will, however, require examining the risk of insecurity in relation to internal and external contradictions in a non-Western, liberalising/modernising, post-conflict context (see Chapter 2 (2-6)). Accordingly, the next two chapters will examine the political and societal foregrounds of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ and its risk of insecurity over a decade after the end of the civil wars in East Timor (Chapter 5) and Somaliland (Chapter 6). In doing so, the chapters will employ the explanatory strategy, qualitatively examining causality and correlations between the set variables in the framework for ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ and interacting with the four approaches to deliberation (see
Chapter 3 (3-1)). Moreover, given the research questions: 1) what caused the UN to have ‘failed’ (to prevent the ‘crisis’ from recurring in 2006) in East Timor, and 2) what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced ‘equifinality’ (making similar progress along different paths) in building peace (in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 and in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005), the research period is divided into the three phases as follows: 1) building peace, 2) recurring conflict, and 3) rebuilding peace, in East Timor and Somaliland respectively (see Introduction: research objectives and questions). Attention will be then given to examining the similarity in shaping ‘deliberative political order’ after having faced the similar ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial context, as well as the difference between the role of international intervention and the approach to deliberation, given the methodological choice for Mill’s methods and the process-tracing approach.
5. ‘Deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor from 1999 to 2012

This chapter will examine how the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal actors employed deliberation to (dis)engage the inherited ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical (state-society) and horizontal (modernity-tradition) inequalities/differences in the protracted conflict, and re/de/trans-form it into the ‘deliberative political order’ in East Timor from 1999 to 2012. In view of the research questions seeking causality between ‘failure’ and ‘success’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, the chapter is divided into three sections: 1) forming a ‘deliberative political disorder’ from 1999 to 2002, 2) deteriorating a ‘deliberative political disorder’ from 2002 to 2007, and 3) forming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 2007 to 2012. Each section will begin with the review of the exogenous and endogenous variables in the explanatory strategy, and then examine the state-society relations that make an impact on deliberation in view of the three variables, such as the independent variables (i.e. quantity and quality for space and power in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation), the intervening variables (i.e. contextual changes in agential, structural and cultural conditions), and the dependent variables (i.e. conflict de/trans-formation). The first section will highlight the UN’s role in implementing the global ‘consensus’ on (neo)liberal statebuilding, and its negative impact on the state-society dynamics and consequences of forming a ‘deliberative political disorder’. Due to the UN’s handover of sovereignty to the new state of ‘Timor-Leste’, the subsequent two sections will focus on the two different approaches of the state to the society that deformed and exacerbated the disorder yet turned it around by acknowledging the society under the FRETILIN government (the second section), and then formed an order by empowering the society under the AMP government (the third section), interacting with external interventions. For analysis, as the focus is on peacebuilding, less space will be provided for analysing conflict in the second section, while more is given to examining the
remaining challenges in the third section. For data collection, the chapter firstly acquired secondary data from document review, and secondly obtained primary data from interviews with the ‘modern'/political and ‘traditional'/societal actors in the fieldwork which was undertaken in East Timor from 20 July 2015 to 3 September 2015 (see Chapter 3 (3-4)).

5-1. Forming a ‘deliberative political disorder’ from 1999 to 2002

Changes in the global political economy, among others in the leadership in the UN in 1997 and in Indonesia in 1998, brought a breakthrough to the resistance movement in East Timor (Suhrke 2001). This led to a ‘consensus’ on East Timor in the UN’s global policy arena. While Kofi Annan, the new Secretary-General, needed ‘success’ in the UN peace operations, Habibie, the new President of Indonesia, faced pressure from donors to address the humanitarian crisis in East Timor. Their common interests allowed the UN to make a tripartite agreement on East Timor with Portugal and Indonesia, the de-jure and the de-facto rulers, and the Timorese to choose their political future in a vote. While the UN organised a popular referendum, the CNRT contained the resistance army (FALINTIL) in cantonments. The overwhelming favour for pro-independence, which reached nearly 80% of the cast vote in August 1999, however, radicalised the dissensus of the Indonesian regime and its militia regarding Timorese secession (e.g. de Araujo 2000, Babo-Soares 2000, Cristalis 2002). The week-long unrest claimed the lives of nearly 1,000 people, displaced more than 250,000 people (a quarter of the population) to West Timor in Indonesia, and largely looted and ruined the territory (e.g. Achmad 2000, de Araujo 2000, Babo-Soares 2000). Due to the escalating insecurity, the Security Council authorised the deployment of the Australian-led force (INTERFET: International Force for East Timor) in mid-September 1999, and subsequently established a peacekeeping mission (UNTAET: United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor) in late October 1999. As the peacekeepers pushed out the Indonesian forces and militias from East Timor, the security situation rapidly improved (Martin et al. 2005).

The abrupt withdrawal of the Indonesians, however, forced the UN to change the post-referendum strategy from a gradual transition to a rapid deployment of international forces, as well as the leading agency from the DPA (the Department of Political Affairs) to the DPKO (the Department of Peacekeeping Operations). This shift of responsibility for Timorese affairs in the UN system made implications for the field operations. In contrast to the DPA which had adopted a more inclusive approach to the Timorese with historical understanding, the DPKO relied on a small clique of UN technocrats to set up the mission based upon (neo)liberal statebuilding (Cliffe 2000, Beauvais 2001, see Chapter 1 (1-1)). As this ‘New York orthodoxy’ (Pugh 2004) had been largely exclusive of the Timorese from the UN’s policy arena in the name of ‘risk of politicisation’, ‘lack of capacity’, and ‘non-sovereignness’ (Suhrke 2001, Goldstone 2004, Martin et al. 2005), the mission plan deliberated in New York caused tensions between the interveners and the intervened in Dili. For example, the INTERFET’s view of the FALINTIL as a military ‘faction’ was highly resented by the latter (Suhrke 2001, Cristalis 2002, Power 2008). However, acknowledging the local legitimacy of the CNRT, the newly-appointed SRSG Sergio de Mello made an effort to interact with the Timorese leaders, among others, Xanana Gusmao (Power 2008). He then set up the National Consultative Council (NCC) in December 1999 with the aim to deliberate responsive measures to the post-conflict challenges between the UNTAET and the Timorese. De Mello appointed fifteen representatives from the UNTAET (4), the CNRT (7), the pro-Indonesia groups (3), and the Catholic Church (1) (the number of representatives) (Beauvais 2001, Matsuno 2008, Power 2008). Yet his heavy reliance on a bilateral relationship with
Gusmao (and Ramos-Horta to a lesser extent) in decision-making was often criticised as ‘exclusive’ and ‘untransparent’ (Niner 2009, B.J.F. 2015).

The challenging post-conflict settings, however, exacerbated the asymmetry between the UNTAET as the interveners and the Timorese as the intervened, and made the NCC where SRSG De Mello ‘invited’ the Timorese for political deliberation insignificant. Politically, the sudden withdrawal of the Indonesian regime left the UNTAET an administrative ‘vacuum’, which could not meet basic but broad and urgent public functions from tax collection to service delivery. International recruitment, however, marginalised locally available resources, skills and knowledge. Similarly, the UNTAET’s sole accountability to the Security Council undermined deliberation at the NCC as a mere local ‘consultation’ or ‘information-sharing’ for the sake of ‘political impartiality’. De Mello acknowledged the growing asymmetry, saying ‘the UN Administrator is nominated by the Secretary-General with little or no consultation with those who are to be administered… the Administrator is authorized to impose directives and policies as well as to use force more or less at will’ (De Mello quoted by Beauvais 2001: 1101). Critiques described this top-down form of rulership as a ‘UN kingdom’ (Chopra 2000) and ‘benevolent despotism’ (Beauvais 2001). Reflecting this, Gusmao lamented, ‘we felt we were being used… We were there to put our rubber stamp on Sergio’s regulations, to allow the UN to claim to be consulting’ (Gusmao quoted by Power 2008: 307). Economically, donors extended an unprecedented level of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, pledging more than US$500 million (Cliffe 2000: 239). This ‘bonanza up for grabs’ and the subsequent inflow of international contractors, however, brought a material inequality to the local subsistence economy. For example, while a wage gap between international and local staff in the UNTAET reached more than 60 times (e.g. US$7,800 vs. US$123), a fiscal gap between the UNTAET and the ET TA (East Timor Transitional
Administration) extended more than 6 times (e.g. $500 million vs. $75 million) (La’o Hamutuk 2001). While complex requirements for UN procurement excluded the local businesses from bidding, the Timorese were exploited as ‘cheap labour’ under unfair contracts (Aditjondro 2000b). An argument was then made that only 5% of foreign aid had reached the Timorese population (Beauvais 2001, La’o Hamutuk 2001). Also, the (neo)liberal ‘consensus’ to keep the state lean and effective (Cliffe 2000) shrunk the ETTA budget to less than half of the provincial budget under the Indonesian regime, and hindered service delivery (RDTL 2003: 45). The sudden influx of external cash thus led the local subsistence economy to material inequality, monetary inflation, and aid dependency, disempowering the societal majority who had suffered from extreme poverty and destruction. Socially, in this connection, while the politico-economic asymmetry increased between the international and the local, the latter was hardly essentialised. Due to the requirement for high qualifications, the NCC members were mostly ‘modern’-educated diaspora-returnees in a bid for power, and often benefitted from their assistance in planning and implementing the international contracts, yet largely distanced themselves from the societal majority who had upheld socio-cultural ‘tradition’ and stayed home during the resistance (Aditjondro 2000b, Cristalis 2002). The CNRT remained institutionally weak and neither consultative with nor transparent to the societal majority (Aditjondro 2000a). The new political economy brought by the UNTAET thus created and exacerbated the asymmetry between the ‘modern’, diaspora-turned political elite and the ‘traditional’, home-stayer societal majority within the Timorese. The UNTAET, however, did not make substantial efforts to moderate this asymmetry due to the ‘invisibleness of the subaltern’ in the eyes of international peacebuilders (Matsuno 2008).

The impact of the UNTAET was, however, largely limited to the national level, and it was the societal majority that gradually restored the societal order with self-help effort at the local
level. While the oppressive regime left the Timorese divided between pro- and anti-
Indonesian supporters, the complex administrative transition left the land claims intermingled and entangled between those who had held, gained, and lost land in the ‘modern’ way as well as those who had managed it as the communal commons in the ‘traditional’ way (Fitzpatrick 2002). These agential and structural causes of conflict failed to improve the societal perception on security and convince many of the IDPs, who were often pro-Indonesian, to return home despite the repeated pleas of the UNTAET (Achmad 2000, Babo-Soares 2004).

The departure of the Indonesians, however, allowed societal actors to restore the mechanism of societal deliberation and mediate the societal difference/dispute. Those who remained in the community, among others, the liurai (local kings) and the lia nains (elders) became instrumental in re-establishing the uma lulik (sacred house) and deliberating with the antagonised disputants (McWilliam 2005, Thu 2008). Although their authority remained weak or eroded, when communal disputes arose, they attempted to mediate the differences between them. The traditional leaders also received IDP returnees who reached 100-200 individuals per day in each district, and organised welcome ceremonies for them (Nixon 2012: 118). If necessary, they employed the nahe biti (stretching mat) to encourage the returnees to address the recipients on their positions, and the offenders to confess their acts and offer apologies to the offended (Babo-Soares 2004, Thu 2008). These traditional leaders largely remained engaged with the CNRT. While the key agencies in the resistance network, such as nureps at the suco (village) and celcoms at the aldeia (hamlet) levels, had been active, they employed the nahe biti to select and appoint their chiefs and heads with the consent of the CNRT and FALINTIL, its military front, and if necessary, replace those who had been appointed by, or collaborated with, the Indonesian regime (Hohe et al. 2002: 56, RDTL 2003). Partially acknowledging the societal resilience (Fitzpatrick 2002, F.A.F. 2015), the UNTAET asked the CNRT to lead the community to facilitate and expedite the return of the
IDPs (CAVR 2005d). Accordingly, the CNRT and traditional leaders engaged in the community reconciliation programme (CRP) from mid-2000 onwards, organising the expanded nahe biti, namely nahe biti ‘boot’ (stretching a ‘large’ mat) nationwide, and facilitating the offenders and the offended to reconcile (Larke 2009: 655). The national reconciliation largely empowered the CNRT and traditional leaders in the community despite the relative demotion of women and youth (Hohe et al. 2002, RDTL 2003, CAVR 2005d, Larke 2009).

Echoing the rapid restoration of societal deliberation, the Timorese elite in the CNRT had been increasingly assertive in complaining about the asymmetry in the NCC, and claiming the UNTAET for the expansion of space and power in political deliberation. Societal riots in early 2000 triggered the UNTAET to expedite ‘Timorisation’ (Power 2008). The UNTAET’s reactive measures to create and expand the deliberative space for ‘rational argumentation’ at the national and local levels in a top-down manner, however, led the divisive polity not to engage with the ‘legitimation problem’ with the inherited inequalities/differences, but to exacerbate it with the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ inequalities/differences. Nationally, the UNTAET replaced the NCC with an expansive National Council (NC) and established a transitional cabinet in July 2000. While the NC was composed of 33 representatives from political parties (10), civic organisations (10), and each district (13), the transitional cabinet was constituted from 9 ministers from UN internationals (4) and the Timorese (5) to execute the ETTA (Beauvais 2001, Matsuno 2008). Appointing these members, the UNTAET insisted on this institutional arrangement as ‘power-sharing’ with the Timorese to deepen the Timorese ‘participation’ in political deliberation (UNTAET 2000). The delight of the Timorese elite, however, rapidly waned as the UNTAET continued to ‘retain full responsibility’ (Power 2008: 330). In response, the Timorese elite demanded more space for deliberation. The fact
that the Timorese elite kept asking Gusmao ‘how long? how long? how long [would internationals rule]?’ (Power 2008: 330) indicates their desperate outcry for political freedom from the UN ‘kingdom’. Accordingly, while Gusmao, the speaker of the NC, asked the transitional cabinet to set out the ‘transition timetable’, the growing pressure impelled the UNTAET to expedite political moves towards constitutional democracy. In January 2001, the UNTAET announced the national elections for the 88 member Constitutional Assembly, to take place in August 2001. Preparation for the elections, however, exacerbated the entrenched differences between the political elite over issues, such as when they started fighting (e.g. colonial period vs. occupation period), and where and how they fought (e.g. diaspora vs. home-stayers, and armed/military vs. civilian/clandestine) (Aditjondro 2000a, Cristalis 2002, Shoesmith 2003). While each sought political recognition and representation, the UNTAET relaxed conditions for party setup and registered 16 political parties (Walsh 2001: 26, King 2003: 747). The sudden emergence of multiple parties, however, intensified elite competition, leading to the dissolution of the CNRT in June 2001, and undermining the quality of deliberation in the NC and transitional cabinet. The Timorese elite struggled with mutual distrust and animosity, which stretched back to the colonial period and thereafter (King 2003, Shoesmith 2003).

Locally, the UNTAET established the District Advisory Council (DAC) in July 2000, appointing the UNTAET, the CNRT, and societal actors, including traditional and religious leaders, youth, and women (Matsuno 2008, Nixon 2012). Yet the ‘administration without budget’ (less than 2% of the ETTA budget) (Matsuno 2008: 54, Nixon 2012: 116) made the new local deliberative entity largely dysfunctional (RDTL 2003: 53, Hohe 2002: 584, Nixon 2012: 116). Instead, the World Bank commissioned a two-and-a-half-year project for community empowerment and local governance (CEP) (Matsuno 2008). With the aim of


‘modernising’ local governance, the CEP established the Community Development Council (CDC) as the ‘legislative’ to oversee the sucoaldeia chiefs as the ‘executive’ of the community, requesting each aldeia to ‘elect’ a pair, consisting of one man and one woman, as its representatives to the suco-level CDCs, and each suco-level CDC to further ‘elect’ a pair (also one man and one woman) for the sub-district-level CDCs which are responsible for allocating the fund (Cliffe et al. 2003). The introduction of an ‘electoral regime’, however, excluded local chiefs and traditional leaders from candidacy at the CDCs (Cliffe et al. 2003), and juxtaposed three different lines of deliberative authority at the local level: 1) sucoaldeia chiefs under the CNRT, 2) DACs under the UNTAET, and 3) CDCs under the World Bank (Hohe et al. 2002). The emergence of parallel institutions, however, confused not only themselves but also the societal majority on their respective authorities and responsibilities, and exacerbated difference between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ across the institutions. The ‘modernity’ represented in the DACs and CDCs ‘clashed’ with the ‘tradition’ upheld by the sucoaldeia chiefs and elders (B.J.F 2015). As the sucoaldeia chiefs often felt uneasy with the CDCs for mobilising the community without their knowledge (Hohe et al. 2002, RDTL 2003: 54), villagers who remained ‘traditional’ and unfamiliar with the ‘modern’ concept of governance often saw the DACs and CDCs as challenging the authority of chiefs and elders in deliberating community affairs and representing themselves in the ‘outer’ world (Hohe 2002, Hohe et al. 2002). As a result, power relations between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ actors became increasingly precarious (Hohe et al. 2002). The powerful chiefs and heads often undermined or co-opted the powerless CDC members (Hohe et al. 2002: 101).

Conversely, the chiefs and heads were sometimes challenged by the empowered CDC members because of the rapid urbanisation and erosion of traditional values, especially in the urban and ‘open’ sucos (Jones 2010: 565).
Moreover, the preparation for the elections of the Constitutional Assembly made these ‘new’/‘old’, politico-national/societal-local inequalities/differences deformed. As the escalating inter-party competition dissolved the CNRT, the political differences at the national level increasingly politicised the societal differences at the local level. While the FRETILIN’s placement of its representatives at district and sub-district levels in March 2001 for the electoral campaign had caused the struggle of legitimacy between the FRETILIN representatives and the sucolaldeia chiefs who affiliated with the CNRT (RDTL 2003: 54), the dissolution of CNRT undermined the authority of the latter, and allowed the local political factions to divide the community along party lines and to politicise the local institutions (Hohe 2002: 583). The exacerbating agential animosity undermined deliberation in the DACs and CDCs (Hohe 2002: 584; Jones 2010: 565). Meanwhile, the interaction of the national parties with the local political factions deformed the pre-existed regionalism upon societal bias (Fox 2001). While the FRETILIN deepened its stake in the eastern regions, others did so in the western and central regions where the leaders of the respective parties were born and based (King 2003). Accordingly, despite the Church’s appeal to the political parties to restrain mutual provocations (Walsh 2001: 28), the growing socio-political differences/divisions and their interactions frightened the societal majority who associated political contest with violent events in the past, such as the civil war in 1975 and the post-referendum violence in 1999 (NDI 2001). Popular turnout at political rallies and enthusiasm for the elections had waned as the ballot approached (King 2003: 749). Yet the heavy presence of international forces made the elections of the Constitutional Assembly largely free from security disturbances, and they ended with a high voter turnout (more than 90% participation). The FRETILIN was awarded the overall majority (55 out of 88 seats) with 57% of the votes cast vis-à-vis other parties which gained less than 10% each (King 2003: 747). Accordingly, the UNTAET dissolved the NC and asked the FRETILIN to form the
transitional cabinet and draft the constitution. The subsequent ‘winner-take-all’ politics, however, enabled the ‘winner’ FRETILIN to dominate the Constitutional Assembly nationally (Matsuno 2008: 61), as well as its local representatives to supersede the sucolaldeia chiefs and DACs locally (RDTL 2003).

The constructed ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ not only created and exacerbated the socio-political inequalities/differences, but also generated some key policies/measures for public administration and aggravated the agential, structural and cultural conditions thereafter. Agentially, ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’, for example, allowed a handful of the Timorese elite to politicise the armed forces. While the UNTAET established the national police (PNTL: National Police of East Timor) and recruited more than 350 former Indonesian police officers in early 2000, it had been indecisive on the prospect of the defence force, retaining the FALINTIL in cantonments since the referendum in 1999 (Cristalis 2002, Rees 2003). As the FALINTIL’s frustration became irresistible, in view of the fiscal sustainability and the continued insurgency of militia, the UNTAET decided to integrate only a third (approximately 650 out of 2000) of the FALINTIL soldiers into the new army (F-FDTL: FALINTIL-Defence Force of East Timor) in February 2001 (Rees 2002). Given the dysfunctional deliberation towards the elections, the UNTAET requested Gusmao to select who should remain or be excluded (Rees 2003). The closed-door rationalisation on the fate of the FALINTIL, however, angered those who were expelled from the new forces, and caused them to challenge the legitimacy of the F-FDTL and even the pro-Indonesian records of the PNTL. Some of the ‘Gusmao-opponent’ veterans became disaffected, forming their associations such as Sagrada Familia (based in the eastern regions) and Colimau 2000 (based in the western regions), and relating to the political radical (e.g. CPD-RDTL), societal gangs, and paramilitaries (Rees 2003, Shoesmith 2003). Structurally, after creating the deliberative
institutions, the UNTAET and donors placed international ‘advisors’ to make them functional and operational for mainstreaming (neo)liberal statebuilding. The dismissive judgement of these ‘advisors’ on the local socio-cultural resilience as a ‘lack of (Western/’modern’) capacity’, however, established the Western/’modern’ superiority over the Timorese/’traditional’ in the public administration (C.A. 2015). Emilia Pires, a Timorese expert, regretfully said, ‘the perception grew that the (World) Bank had adopted the driver’s seat of our planning processes, and this was accompanied by a loss in confidence in our own ability to drive the car again’ (Pires quoted by Davis 2010: 198). Culturally, the landslide victory in the Assembly elections enabled the FRETILIN to pass its ‘modern’ draft constitution, which was largely copied from the constitutions of other Lusophone states (Kingsbury 2009, Nixon 2012). Despite a series of public consultations, the FRETILIN ‘modernisers’ agreed on a few revisions, including granting Tetum the official language status together with Portuguese (Garrison 2005). Yet, although only 5% of the Timorese population then spoke Portuguese (UNDP 2002: 3), the transitional cabinet had promoted the latter in the public offices, arguing the former’s linguistic ‘primitiveness’ (Simonsen 2006). This linguistic favouritism resulted not only in excluding the societal majority from political deliberation, but also seriously undermined the societal right for self-determination.

Meanwhile, the UNTAET expedited the handover of executive power to the FRETILIN government. It also advised the Assembly to stay on as the National Parliament following the adoption of the new Constitution in March 2002. Subsequently, the UNTAET organised the presidential elections in April 2002 (King 2003). As broadly expected, Gusmao was elected overwhelmingly, garnering more than 80% of the votes cast (King 2003: 749). The swift withdrawal of the UNTAET in May 2002 marked the birth of a new state, ‘Timor-Leste’. While the UN commended the achievement of constitutional democracy as a ‘success’ (e.g.
UN 2002), this uncritical self-assessment and proclamation masked the deteriorating ‘legitimation problem’ with the growing socio-political inequalities/differences in the global periphery, due to the ‘failure’ of the ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.

5-2. Deteriorating a ‘deliberative political disorder’ from 2002 to 2007

Accordingly, the constructed and institutionalised asymmetrical ‘rational argumentation’ significantly deformed the internal settings. Politically, the Westminster type of electoral regime legitimised the ‘winner’ FRETILIN to dominate the public offices where diaspora returnees occupied nearly half of the cabinet positions, yet sidelined the opposition and societal voices (Kingsbury 2008). The increasing tension between the FRETILIN and the opposition, however, empowered PM Alkatiri, a ‘modernist’ diaspora-returnee, and President Gusmao, a more ‘traditionalist’ home-stayer, as the leaders of the respective factions under the semi-presidential system in high politics (Shoemsh 2003). Economically, the end of the ‘UNTAET bubble’ caused a serious economic downturn (Hughes 2009: 153, OECD 2010: 23-24). While the FRETILIN government negotiated with Australia to share the undersea oil/gas revenues, the budget support of donors had fulfilled the fiscal gap. Yet the continued dependency on foreign aid perpetuated the (neo)liberal economic policy (Clifton 2005, Sakabe 2008) and left the delivery of public services shrunk and high unemployment and urban-rural/intra-urban inequalities unaddressed (Barbara 2008, Moxham 2008). Socially, in this relation, the tyrannising state and the weakening economy affected the societal everyday and undermined societal order (Moxham 2008). A growing population, especially the jobless rural youth who moved to the towns, became loosely organised and interacted with other disaffected groups, such as veterans and militia, and exposing themselves to the political
manoeuvring of competing elites and political parties (Babo-Soares 2013). In turn, the UNMISET (United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor), the successor mission of the UNTAET, kept guiding the FRETILIN government on (neo)liberal statebuilding (UN 2002, Sakabe 2008), while largely shying away from these internal contradictions which had become increasingly apparent.

These contradictions increasingly aggrieved the disaffected groups and caused them to resort to various forms of resistance. The notable actors included veterans, youth, and religious groups who had limited access to political deliberation. First, veterans were the most vocal. The veteran associations, such as Sagrada Familia and Colimau 2000, organised a series of political protests and social gatherings in connection with the politically-radical CPD-RDTL from 2002 to 2003. They occasionally clashed with the police, including their attack on the Baucau Police Headquarters in late 2002 (Rees 2003, Babo-Soares 2013). Second, partly echoing this, the youth increased their opposition to the government. In December 2002, the arrest of a student on a gang-related charge led to a student protest in Dili. The youth collaborated with other rebel groups, such as the antagonistic veterans and gangs, to loot public and private facilities, including the National Police Headquarters and the National Parliament, as well as PM Alkatiri’s residence and his relatives’ properties (Shoesmith 2003, Babo-Soares 2013). Third, the aggrieved Church also stood up to the government’s decision to secularise public education. Their campaign to preserve religious classes in schooling gained socio-political support from the political opposition to the societal majority, and enabled the Church to organise mass protests in April and May 2005 (McGregor et al. 2012). These events indicate the growing societal defiance/dissensus against the ongoing form of asymmetrical political deliberation, as well as a fluid relationship between the antagonising groups in the society.
Despite the growing signs of societal resistance, the formal deliberative institutions, such as the National Parliament, DACs, and CDCs, had been largely unresponsive, and thus allowed the government to co-opt and coerce the societal rebels and to politicise and securitise deliberation. First, the government selectively interacted with the antagonising veteran groups. The Ministry of Interior recruited some 500 veterans to the national police, and invited the leader of Sagrada Familia as the ‘security advisor’ (Shoesmith 2003: 249-250). The political opposition, including President Gusmao, however, saw this government’s offer of jobs to the selected veterans as the politicisation of the police to counterweight the ‘Gusmao-loyalist’ army. In response, the F-FDTL deployed soldiers in the outskirts of Dili. While this move was broadly interpreted as the army’s intrusion into policing (Rees 2003), the PNTL took up the defence-related border control that the UNMISET had handed over to the government (Nixon 2012). These chains of reaction caused institutional rivalry and animosity between the two forces, and impelled them to interact with the antagonising differences between the Alkatiri/FRETILIN-led government and the Gusmao-led presidency, and their respective followers/constituents across the polity (Rees 2003, Shoesmith 2003).

Second, given the increasing societal uprisings, the government extended measures to strengthen control over the society. While the end of the Assembly elections and the CEP funding had terminated the function of the DACs and CDCs, the government appointed FRETILIN affiliates to key public positions at (sub)district level, and introduced the suco council and its elections in 2004 (Shoesmith 2003, RDTL 2004, Simonsen 2006). The elections of suco chiefs, aldeia heads, youths, and women as the members of a suco council was aimed at integrating the formerly overlapping and competing institutions, and hybridising them in suco governance (Cummins 2015: 62-63). The introduction of an electoral regime at the local level, however, made it difficult for ‘hybrid argumentation’ to occur. The extensive electoral contest left the societal majority open to the competing
claims/positions between the ‘traditional’ (e.g. elder/veteran-dominant suco chief and aldeia heads) and the ‘modern’ (e.g. youth and women) (Gusmao 2012, Cummins 2015), and divided the elected members along their respective claims/positions (Gusmao 2012: 183, Boavida dos Santos et al. 2012: 211). The ‘modernisation’ of suco governance resulted in unpacking the societal differences/divisions that the ‘traditional’ suco structure had managed to contain.

The lack of an effective means for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation exacerbated and radicalised the socio-political differences towards the ‘crisis’. In February 2006, a dispute on regionalism was revealed in the army. The new recruits from the western regions deserted from the army with their accusations that the high command showed favouritism to the old guards from the eastern regions (e.g. Kingsbury 2009, Babo-Soares 2013). A sharp difference in response to this between the PM’s rejection and the President’s sympathy adversely radicalised the contestation of the deserters. While their number reached nearly half of the army (595 soldiers), the deserters increased their association with the societal rebels including the veteran and unemployed youth, most notably, Colimau 2000, a ‘Gusmao-opponent’ veteran group based in the western regions (e.g. Kingsbury 2009, Scambary 2009, Babo-Soares 2013). Given the police’s inability (or unwillingness) to coerce them in the increasing societal fragility, PM Alkatiri ordered the ‘Gusmao-loyalist’ army to take charge of internal security (e.g. Harrington 2007, Kingsbury 2009). His unilateral decision, however, escalated hostility in and between the F-FDTL and the PNTL, which descended into security breakdowns. While the PNTL split its military police unit led by Major Alfredo Reinado, a Westerner, to join the deserters, the F-FDTL’s attack on the Police Headquarters broke down the PNTL in Dili (e.g. Kingsbury 2009, Scambary 2009). In response to this, President Gusmao increased pressure on PM Alkatiri to resign, addressing a controversial discourse to the nation to
undermine the FRETILIN, and the PM in particular (Silva 2010). Gusmao’s antagonism against the FRETILIN caused the political opposition and the societal rebels in his constituency to interact and assemble around him. Despite his limited constitutional power, Gusmao eventually succeeded in replacing the inimical Alkatiri with the conciliatory Ramos-Horta as Prime Minister in June 2006 (Kingsbury 2009). In the meantime, as the national police was disbanded, the security vacuum allowed ‘uncivil’ groups, both politically and criminally motivated agencies, to cause a wide range of destruction across the urban centres, especially in Dili, and internally displaced more than 150,000 people (e.g. Kingsbury 2009, Babo-Soares 2013). This unrest allowed the UN to step in to ‘fix’ the ‘broken state’ (the then SRSG Hasegawa quoted by Nixon 2012: 139) with measures to deploy the security forces and supervise the upcoming general election which was scheduled in 2007 (UN 2006).

The conditionality of external intervention in exchange of elections for forces, however, worsened the ‘crisis’ thereafter. While societal mechanisms for deliberation had been weakened, especially in the urban centre, the UN’s rigid template for the national elections deepened and deformed the radicalised differences and prolonged the ‘crisis’. Even before the ‘crisis’ broke out, although the society seemed to have restored the customary practice of societal deliberation, such as nahe biti, the degree of the ‘resurgence of tradition’ had depended on the level of societal cohesion in each community. This was particularly the case in the urban, ‘new’, and ‘open’ sucos, where a massive demographic change made it difficult to find the qualified leaders to unite the community, and mediate and deliberate the societal contestations (da Costa Magno et al. 2012, Gusmao 2012). For example, while a massive population influx since the end of the civil war had undermined the traditional authority in Dili, the community faced protracted differences, such as land disputes, and reached a ‘tipping point’ to break out (Streicher 2011, Carapic et al. 2012). Their reliance on, and the
presence of, the community-based armed groups for self-protection, however, exacerbated inter-communal insecurity (Streicher 2011, Carapic et al. 2012). In this fragile societal context, the ‘isolados’ (the ‘isolated’), such as Major Reinado, his followers, the army deserters and splitters, brought new dynamics locally, socialising the anti-state and regional discourses and associating with the disaffected veterans and youth (Harrington 2007, Matsuno 2009: 51, Scambary 2009). Accordingly, although peacekeepers had increased their presence towards the end of 2006 (e.g. Kingsbury 2009), the force did not address the dysfunctional mechanism of societal deliberation and the clear separation and lack of communication between the state and the society. As a result, the disaffected societal groups remained supportive of the resistive ‘isolados’, in particular, in the western regions where the communities had helped them to hide, roam, and cross the border (Kingsbury 2009). The continuous roaming of the ‘isolados’ not only kept the anti-state and regional discourses alive, but also re-cultivated the societal culture of resistance (Streicher 2011). Although the socio-political tensions remained high, the UN had been assertive in undertaking the elections as scheduled (UN 2006). The electoral contest, however, allowed political and societal conflicts to interact, deform, and become prolonged. The political candidates often employed both civil and ‘uncivil’ groups, including informal security groups, to mobilise their affiliates for their campaigns (Scambary 2009). These interactions of socio-political conflict caused the societal majority to fear electoral violence (Scambary 2009, Streicher 2011). Accordingly, despite a political truce between the army and the rebels on the eve of the elections, minor incidents, such as arson and house destruction, remained high, and displaced more people as the ballot approached (UN 2007: 6, Babo-Soares 2013).

Despite the continuous urban unrest, the preparation for the elections had also nurtured the socio-political conditions to turn around the ‘crisis’. The most notable includes Gusmao’s
broad engagement with the societal non-elite during the elections. While President Gusmao had maintained a close tie with the former CNRT network throughout his presidency (Gusmao 2005), he formed his own party, the National Congress of Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT), and joined a bid for the premiership. The adoption of the same acronym as the former resistance network indicates his political base. He approached the societal non-elite, among others, traditional and religious leaders, veterans, and even the formally pro-Indonesian groups who had been marginalised in the ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ in the liberalising/modernising politics, invited them to the party board, and listed them as the party candidates for the national elections (Weldemichael 2012: 309, D.S.N. 2015). His ‘traditional’ approach to the electoral campaign was also effective in the community where cultural symbolism matters, in contrast to the ‘modern’ approach taken by others, in particular the ruling FRETILIN (McWilliam et al. 2008). Moreover, although societal radicalism remained high, some rejected it, keeping or turning their discourses moderate and forming their own parties or affiliating to the existing ones to join mainstream politics. While the former included senior-level societal leaders, such as the leaders of the Sagrada Familia who formed their party for veterans, the latter were mostly community leaders and opportunists who had been able to mobilise their affiliates but did not meet the conditions to set up their own political parties (e.g. Scambary 2009, 2013, Cummins 2015). The elections allowed the disaffected yet moderate ‘traditional’/societal groups to participate in political contestation.

The conflict-ridden elections were, however, largely turbulent. Although the tight security and oversight of international forces and electoral observers allowed the popular vote to take place in an orderly manner, a number of pre- and post-election incidents were reported. The former were largely related to political confrontations between different party supporters,
while the latter were linked to the cause of the electoral ‘loser’ (McWilliam et al. 2008, Leach 2009). In the presidential elections in May 2007, Ramos-Horta defeated the FRETILIN opponent, and in the parliamentary elections in June 2007, the FRETILIN retained the first place, yet lost its majority in the Parliament. The CNRT secured the second place, acquiring nearly half of the votes that the FRETILIN lost in this election (McWilliam et al. 2008). The Sagrada-Familia-based party for veterans also gained two seats (Leach 2009). As no party won the majority and the enmity between the FRETILIN and the CNRT was inflamed, the formation of government had been a struggle. The eventual request of President Ramos-Horta to Gusmao to form the CNRT-led coalition government led to post-electoral violence, since the FRETILIN’s call for ‘civil uprising’ agitated its ‘militant’ supporters from Dili to the eastern regions until the international forces intervened (UN 2007: 6-7, McWilliam et al. 2008: 78, Leach 2009: 228). Gaining the Church’s endorsement, the new PM Gusmao was sworn in, bringing a wide range of supporters from the ‘modern’/‘traditional’, political/societal, and elite/non-elite segments in the AMP (Parliamentary Majority Alliance) government in August 2007, yet firmly rejecting the FRETILIN as he did similarly in the late 1980s when he, as the then supreme resistance leader, separated the FALINTIL from the FRETILIN (Guterres 2008, Leach 2009). A fierce antagonism between the electoral ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ remained.

5-3. Forming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 2007 to 2012

The AMP government was a power-sharing scheme, often depicted as a ‘big tent’, assembling the formerly excluded political elite and societal non-elite in the search for a more equitable distribution of state power and resources (ICG 2013: 15). As the liurai descendants
occupied the majority in the new Parliament (T.J. 2015), this new composition allowed a more fluid politico-societal and ‘modern’-‘traditional’ interaction, articulation, and argumentation to take place in the national deliberative space, and improved the pre-conditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. Politicians now regularly used the Tetum language in deliberation, which closed a linguistic/communicative gap between the state and the society (Wallis 2013: 137). Yet the internal settings remained challenging to transform ‘rational argumentation’ in the ‘modern’-crafted deliberative space into ‘hybrid argumentation’ to make the divisive deliberators ‘equivocal’. Politically, agential relations remained highly antagonistic in and out of the ruling coalition. While the four-party coalition firmly rejected the FRETILIN, internally it faced conflicts of interest between the established elite and the non-elite-turned politicians, in contrast to the FRETILIN government which had been coherent due to a strong party discipline under the then PM Alkatiri. While the internal fragmentation allowed new PM Gusmao to lead political deliberation, his informal and incoherent approach adversely personalised politics and raised criticism within the coalition (Shoesmith 2013). Economically, the (neo)liberal policies had aggravated the economic fragility. Economic deregulation kept the key economic areas, such as job creation, seriously underinvested, despite the growing numbers of youth who accounted for more than half of the population, and made the jobless youth rebellious towards the state (Barbara 2008, Nixon 2012: 155). Also, the fiscal austerity imposed by the UNTAET and the FRETILIN government and the following unrest had shrunk the GDP by more than 3% on average per year (Barbara 2008: 310). However, the FRETILIN’s firm position to make the state ‘small’ saved the oil fund, which reached US$5 billion in 2008, from the state’s discretion (Kingsbury 2009: 201). Socially, the prolonged ‘crisis’ generated more than 100,000 IDPs, of whom nearly 30,000 were living in the refugee camps in Dili in 2007 (ICG 2013: 2). Despite the visible decline of violence after the elections, the roaming ‘isolados’ continued to
discourage the IDPs from returning home (Boughton 2008). The lack of effective communication with the state made the societal majority suspicious of the state’s ‘traditional’ turn, such as the state-organised *nahe biti* ceremonies for national reconciliation (Kingsbury 2008, Wallis 2013: 150-151). A survey suggested that more than half of the population distrusted the state in law enforcement in 2008 (The Asia Foundation 2014a). Meanwhile, the UN and donors extended operations from humanitarian to peacekeeping and development during and after the ‘crisis’, and took advantage of the fragility of the state in consolidating their claims on (neo)liberal statebuilding (Anderson 2013: 229).

In view of the devastating socio-economic setting, the then President Gusmao and PM Ramos-Horta had campaigned to employ the accumulated oil fund to address the economic cause of the ‘crisis’ (Aarons 2007). Their electoral win allowed the AMP government to shift the economic policy from (neo)liberal austerity to developmental intervention, and reach a new ‘consensus’ to employ the oil fund and improve the state-society relations. While the government expanded the national budget from US$120 million in 2005 to US$348 million in 2008 and US$1.7 billion in 2012 (Anderson 2013: 229, ICG 2013: 1, 3-4, Wallis 2013: 142-143), the new measures transformed the agential condition in the short term and the structural condition in the medium/long term. In the short term, the government introduced cash payment to the societal rebels and the weak who had been undermined by the FRETILIN government. To begin with, a pension scheme for veterans and their widows started in 2008 (ICG 2013, Wallis 2013). It covered more than 125,000 persons (ICG 2013: 3) and exceeded the combined budget of the health and agriculture sectors in 2012 (Valters et al. 2015: 26). Second, the more conventional cash transfer to underprivileged groups also began in 2008. While the elderly and disabled received a monthly allowance for their ‘basic needs’, the female-headed households were assisted in raising and educating their children
Moreover, income tax was exempted or reduced for those who earned annual incomes below $500 (Kingsbury 2009: 202). However, these ‘social security’ programmes amounted only to half of the veteran pension in size in 2012 (Valters et al. 2015: 25). Third, a one-off cash handout to the IDPs was also launched to facilitate their return (Wallis 2013). The religious sector also gained financial assistance (Guterres 2008: 367). These measures for ‘buying a peace’ in a ‘big-tent’ approach enabled the coalition government to co-opt the disaffected societal groups. The improved state-society relations, in turn, diminished the societal space which had hidden and protected the ‘isolados’. In February 2008, the stalemated negotiation with the government impelled the desperate Major Reinado and his followers to attack President Ramos-Horta and PM Gusmao, and nearly killed the former (Babo-Soares 2013). Although Reinado was shot dead and others were injured and arrested, this blood-shed event abruptly ended the ‘crisis’. While the improved societal perception on security expedited the IDP’s return, the joint operations under the command of PM Gusmao to capture the remaining fugitives helped the army and the police to alleviate the institutional enmity (Babo-Soares 2013). Among others, the assassination plot on the state leaders shocked the political elite and the societal non-elite, and united them to delegitimise the use of violence for any socio-political causes whatsoever (Brown 2009: 151, B.F.M. 2015, D.S.N. 2015, M.E. 2015).

Subsequently, the government introduced structural measures to moderate the state-society relations. First, the government revised the electoral law for the suco elections in 2009. The aim was to ameliorate the excessive local partisanship. In contrast to the ‘old’ law to elect each council member (RDTL 2004), the ‘new’ law was to elect a set of suco chief and his/her ‘team’ at the suco council (RDTL 2009). Despite a concern about this ‘package’ system to ‘nepotise’ deliberation (F.A.F. 2015), electing a ‘team’ helped not only the suco elections to
reduce political competition but also the elected council to maintain internal cohesion and unity (The Asia Foundation 2014b). The elected team then added a lia nain (‘owner of words’ as judicial elder) who presides over nahe biti and guards bandu (customary law) at the community as an extra, external member. The inclusion of lia nain enabled the suco council to link and hybridise the ‘modern’ political and the ‘traditional’ societal mechanisms of deliberation, and improve spatial quantity and quality for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation at the local level (Gusmao 2012, The Asia Foundation 2014b). Accordingly, the enhanced societal cohesion in suco governance helped the community to restore the societal order (Brown 2012: 64, Valters et al. 2015: 32, E.S.A. 2015). Second, after the institutional reform, the government adopted measures to substantiate ‘hybrid argumentation’. Requesting all 422 suco councils to produce the suco development plan, the government massively invested in the suco-level ‘consensus’, among others, through the Local Development Programme (PDL) and the Decentralised Development Programme (PDD) in 2010 (Cummins et al. 2012: 12, ICG 2013, Kingsbury 2013). The former was introduced on a pilot basis by the FRETILIN government, but rolled out nationwide by the AMP government. The key feature was to allocate a block grant to the projects proposed by the suco council. The latter was newly established by the AMP government with an aim to encourage local businesses to participate in the state-led investment (Cummins et al. 2012). As both programmes required state officials and suco leaders to interact and deliberate, the state-society interface for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation was restored, exercised, and forged locally. Political respect for socio-cultural tradition moved local administrators to incorporate a set of practices for societal deliberation, such as nahe biti and bandu, in planning and implementing the PDD and the PDL (Wallis 2013, F.A.F. 2015). While the official recognition on customary governance empowered societal deliberators to mediate the societal differences (Wallis 2013: 151, F.A.F. 2015), ‘hybrid argumentation’ also empowered the ‘modern’ segment in the society,
especially women and youth, to be conscious of their rights to participate in local political deliberation directly as well as through their representatives (C.D. 2015). Also, tangible changes in the economic setting, such as the construction of public facilities, roads, water systems, schools, and health centres, improved social indicators at the gross level (Wallis 2014: 170-171).

These agential and structural measures were largely effective in turning the state-society relations from enmity to cooperation, and the deliberative approach from ‘rational argumentation’ to ‘hybrid argumentation’. The empowering society increased its bargaining power with the state in the deliberative space, and even addressed a contradiction in juxtaposing the PDL and the PDD for local development. While the PDL was bottom-up in requesting the suco council to identify needs, design projects, and deliberate priorities with other sucos at the sub-district level, the PDD was top-down as opposed to its name, allowing the suco council to identify needs, but the state to design, select and approve projects through political deliberation in Dili (Cummins et al. 2012). A huge gap in size between PDL and PDD indicated the persistent asymmetry between the state and the society. While the ‘society-led’ former was merely budgeted US$6.2 million, the ‘state-led’ latter was allocated US$52.5 million in 2012 (Cummins et al. 2012). Yet the increasing societal dissatisfaction in the result of the top-down PDD had impelled the empowering society to push back the state through ‘hybrid argumentation’ and revise its approach to local development. In response, the government integrated both the PDL and the PDD into the bottom-up PDID (Integrated District Development Planning Programme) at the district level in 2012, and introduced the PNDS (National Programme for Village (Suco) Development) at the suco level in 2013. In particular, the creation of the latter reflected a strong societal contestation against the state to directly allocate a block grant to all sucos (C.M.P. 2015). This emancipatory, deliberative
policy-change suggests that the empowering society had addressed the asymmetry and pushed the state to delegate more power and resources for local self-determination. This positive effect was, however, accompanied by structural and cultural side-effects. Pumping in ‘big money’, for example, caused high inflation in the rural subsistence economy, crowding out the agricultural sector, and exacerbating the hardship of the most vulnerable (Wallis 2013: 146, B.S.D. 2015, M.A.F.K. 2015, V.S.C. 2015). While heavy capital investment has increased societal dependency on the state and its resources, the increased economic rent has promoted rent-seeking attitudes, rampant corruption, and increasing greed, thus exacerbating patronage and nepotism across the polity (C.D. 2015). Also, the ‘modern’ concept of value for money exacerbated the socio-cultural ‘tradition’ in a competitive bid for the selection of local projects, and caused inter-communal jealousy (Hughes 2009). Due to the subverted societal perception of ownership and effectiveness of local projects (Cummins et al. 2012), the overall improvement in societal indicators did not satisfy the societal majority with the quality of public services (Wallis 2014: 170-171). Moreover, the government’s insufficient consultation and coordination with the recipient communities in local projects have increased the risk of undercutting the socio-cultural structure. Constructing houses and appropriating land, for example, often undermined the uma lulik and the nahe biti, which had managed land conflict (Carapic et al. 2012, W.T. 2015).

Although the state-led ‘hybrid argumentation’ empowered the society and ameliorated the ‘old’ vertical inequality/difference, it has also caused and exacerbated the ‘new’ inequality/difference across the polity, and made it difficult to transform these differences into disagreements. In the state, a rapid increase of the national budget enlarged the cabinet to 55 members, making it nearly equivalent to the size of the parliament. However, this enlargement of the cabinet exacerbated the political differences over resource allocation.
between the political elite both intra- and inter-generationally (ICG 2013: 12). Intra-
generationally, the political difference, in particular within the Portuguese generation,
remained protracted. Although antagonism between Gusmao and Alkatiri had been well-
known to the population (e.g. Leach 2009), the difference was exacerbated within the
governmental coalition. First, one of the ruling parties left the coalition in 2008. Francisco do
Amaral, an ASDT leader and the first president of independent Timor in 1975, accused PM
Gusmao of his informal approach to political deliberation as ‘nepotism and corruption’ and
departed from the coalition (Shoesmith 2013). Second, mutual accusation over the alleged
corruption between PM Gusmao and his deputy Mario Carascarao, a PSD leader and a former
governor under the Indonesian rule, led the latter to resign and threaten to leave the coalition
in 2009 (Shoesmith 2013). An increasing animosity between the CNRT and the PSD caused
another confrontation between PM Gusmao and PSD’s foreign minister Zacarias da Costa.
As harsh words were exchanged, Gusmao allowed the media to televise a cabinet meeting
where the PM humiliated the FM in 2010 (Shoesmith 2013). Asymmetry between the
paternalising Gusmao and his CNRT party and their junior partners in the coalition caused
the former to centralise deliberation and caused the latter to accuse Gusmao of ‘bad’
governance (ICG 2013, Shoesmith 2013). The continuous partisanship between the ‘oldies’,
however, impelled the ‘younger’ elite to quietly stand up. While the youth-based democratic
party (PD) sought alliance with President Ramos-Horta, who had been increasingly critical of
the patronising/centralising PM Gusmao in the government, the FRETILIN’s emerging
leaders attempted to reach new constituents in problematising the government’s ‘centralised’
deliberation (ICG 2013: 10-11, B.F.M. 2015). Meanwhile, Gen. Taur Matan Ruak, the long-
serving army chief, prepared his bid for presidency in a non-partisan approach (ICG 2013: 9).
In the society, the massive cash inflow to the rural subsistence economy has made a significant impact on the local socio-economic settings. The state-led measures for ‘buying peace’ in a ‘big tent’ approach have generated and broadened a ‘new’ inequality/difference between the ‘winners’ who gained benefit from the state and the ‘losers’ who did not. The abundance of the oil fund allows the government to rely on a monetary means to ‘fix’ societal problems, such as awarding cash to the pardoned ‘isolados’ to assist them in returning to civilian life, as well as lucrative contracts to the local ‘strongmen’-turned businessmen to mobilise the jobless veterans and youth (ICG 2013, Wallis 2013). These measures, however, nurture the culture of patronage as the ‘necessary evil’ to contain the locally disaffected groups for the purpose of stability (Valters et al 2015). Moreover, the government’s pardon to the ‘big men’ who were allegedly linked to the crimes during the 2006 ‘crisis’, including the prominent elites and ‘isolados’, has eroded societal trust in the state justice system and generated a public perception of impunity for the ‘powerful’. The Minister of Justice himself acknowledged this as cultivating a societal culture of injustice in exchange for political stability (Babo-Soares 2013). In turn, the government’s award to the powerful ‘winners’ has alienated and angered the powerless ‘losers’ who gained nothing from the state and were therefore aggrieved towards the state and the ‘winners’. They include those who participated in the underground activities at the last stage of the resistance and the youth who moved to the urban centre yet remain unemployed. Although the participants in the underground resistance could number up to half of the whole population, the government has not compensated their actions, unlike the veterans (Wallis 2013: 146). Also, the continued (neo)liberal policies for poverty and unemployment have not resulted in wealth trickling down to the uneducated and unemployed youth (Sousa-Santos 2010, B.S.D. 2015, W.R.C.S. 2015). In this situation, the cash handout and impunity for the alleged criminals in the 2006 ‘crisis’ have exacerbated their grievances and ‘jealousy’ of the ‘winners’ (Wallis 2013).
Moreover, while ‘hybrid argumentation’ has been substantiated locally, relations between suco chiefs/council members and the societal majority are diverse. In particular, the liurai-descendent suco chiefs are sometimes opportunistic, seeking rent for self-interest (Wallis 2012), monopolising benefit from local projects, and eroding their socio-political legitimacy (Cummins 2015: 108). While the quality of local deliberation often depended on their ‘good’ will (e.g. da Costa Magno et al. 2012, T.J. 2015), the uneven quality of traditional leaders has failed to acquire further support to empower the traditional leaders in national and local governance, as in the attempt to create the National Council of Elders (T.J. 2015).

While the state and the society have faced growing inequalities/differences, the channels of communication to address them remain underdeveloped. Challenges include, among others, the weak capacity of civic organisations, such as political parties and CSOs, to meet and deliberate these inequalities/differences. Political parties had faced structural weakness in engaging in the societal inequalities/differences. While the current electoral system of listing political parties in a single national constituency (i.e. a closed-PR system at the national level) is merited for the gender quota and the proliferation of small parties in a country with a relatively small size of population, it does not allows the constituent to elect their local representatives (Garrison 2005, C.A. 2015). This electoral system helps the political party to centralise intra-party deliberation, prioritise party agenda before local interest, and thus disengage in the societal will and affairs (Shoesmith 2013: 136). In turn, the lack of local representatives in the National Parliament makes it difficult for the local constituents to transmit their voices to the national deliberative space (E.S.A. 2015, M.A.F.K. 2015, V.S.C. 2015). Similarly, CSOs remained weak. Although NGOs have been vibrant since the resistance era (Harmer et al. 2009), they engage more in service delivery than as societal watchdogs (Valters et al. 2015: 34). As the growing state funding has allowed the state to co-
opt the NGOs (B.O. 2015, Y.R.C.S. 2015), few of them keep themselves critical but constructive in engaging the socio-political inequalities/differences (B.J.F. 2015, F.H. 2015b). Instead, the Church has made an effort to address them. The Church’s ex-officio role in arranging the ‘Maubisse Dialogues’ in 2010-2011, for example, brought political heavyweights to explore common ground and rejuvenate politics (Valters et al. 2015: 24, F.H. 2015b). Their initiatives had been noted for easing partisanship between the ‘big brothers’ (maun boot) across the competing parties including the CNRT and the FRETILIN, devolving power to the younger generations towards the upcoming general elections in 2012, and transforming the political difference into mutual disagreement with ‘agonistic respect’ (B.F.M. 2015, D.S.N. 2015, F.H. 2015b). In the society, their moderation is also effective, in particular in the urban area where traditional leaders have found their authority eroded due to the growing demographic diversity (F.A.F. 2015). Yet, as with traditional leaders, their acceptance of state funding has undermined the Church’s impartiality as a socio-political mediator and deliberator (McGregor et al. 2012). Furthermore, the constitutional framework to modernise and secularise the state and the insufficient understanding of the socio-political inequalities/differences have limited traditional and religious leaders to fully engage and address them (C.S.C. 2015, F.H. 2015b, Y.R.C.S. 2015).

Despite the remaining challenges, a ‘forming’ political order enabled both the political elite and the societal non-elite to head the national elections in 2012 without a major security breakdown, in stark contrast to the turbulent elections in 2007 (ICG 2013). While the political difference was largely contained by the ‘dialogued’ political leaders, the societal difference was mostly managed by the empowered societal leaders such as traditional leaders and veterans. The orderly elections resulted in the advent of the ‘younger’ elite and veterans in the political landscape. While Gen. Ruak was elected as the President with support from the
CNRT, the FRETILIN succeeded in ‘rejuvenating’ leadership to some extent (ICG 2013, Shoesmith 2013). This generational transition led to the ‘political pact’ on a change in premiership from CNRT’s Gusmao to FRETILIN’s Rui Araujo in 2015, following the ‘Maubisse Dialogues’ (F.H. 2015b). In turn, it harshly affected the ASDT and the SPD, which relied on the ‘old’ figureheads such as Amaral and Carascarao. The society led by the empowered elders and veterans favoured the CNRT which had allocated state resources to them, yet confronted the political parties that were led by those who did not play a combatant role in the resistance movement, such as the ASDT and the SPD (ICG 2013, Shoesmith 2013). Meanwhile, this socio-political exchange of state resources for societal vote between the state politicians and the ‘traditional’ societal leaders, allowed the ‘winner’ PM Gusmao to continue to buy a ‘peace’, and then urge the UN mission to withdraw in the end of 2012 (UN 2012). However, the ‘peace’ bought by the oil revenues and the authority of ‘big brothers’ (maun boot) seems to be unsustainable and structurally flawed. While the oil and gas reserves will be depleted, possibly within a decade (Scheiner 2014, Valters et al. 2015), the ‘dialogued’ and ‘pacted’ politicians without the effective political opposition in the state and the excessive ‘resurgence’ of tradition in the society have allowed the state to ban the radicals (e.g. CPD-RDTL and some martial arts groups) and securitise political deliberation, yet ‘crowd out’ the ‘losers’ such as women and youth in the ‘modern’ segment from resource allocation (The Asia Foundation 2015: 1, B.J.F. 2015). Accordingly, while the political difference has been largely transformed into the mutual/agonistic disagreement, the societal difference remains disengaged politically. Yet deliberative actors in the society, including traditional leaders, have faced difficulty in engaging it, and political parties and CSOs remain uncritical of it. As a result, the unemployed urban youth and women, for example, have expressed their resistance, barely participating in religious and community activities, and increasingly engaging with martial arts groups in street-level troubles (McGregor et al. 2012,
deliberation have increased the risk of exacerbating and deforming the unaddressed societal
difference and grievances.
6. ‘Deliberative peacebuilding’ in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005

This chapter will examine how the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal actors employed deliberation to (dis)engage the inherited ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical (state-society) and horizontal (modernity-tradition) inequalities/differences in the protracted conflict and re/de/trans-form it into the ‘deliberative political order’ in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005. In view of the research questions that seek causality between ‘failure’ and ‘success’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, the chapter will be divided into three sections: 1) forming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1991 to 1993, 2) deforming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1993 to 1997, and 3) reforming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1997 to 2005 (and thereafter). Each section will review the exogenous and endogenous variables, and subsequently examine the state-society relations that make an impact on deliberation in view of the three variables: the independent variables (i.e. quantity and quality for space and power in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, the intervening variables (i.e. contextual changes in agential, structural, and cultural conditions), and the dependent variables (i.e. conflict trans/deformation). Since Somaliland was largely free from external interventions at the outset, in contrast to East Timor, the first section will highlight the internal dynamics in a society-led approach to state/peace-building and its consequences for forming an order. Despite the importance of societal resilience, peacebuilding in Somaliland needed to consolidate the state and to balance a precarious state-society relationship. The subsequent sections will examine the different state-society dynamics that deformed an order yet turned it around by consolidating the state (the second section), and then reformed an order by introducing constitutional democracy (the third section), as well as external interventions that made both positive and negative impacts on these from time to time. For analysis, similarly to the Timorese case, less space will be provided for the analysis of conflict in the second section,
while more is given to examining the remaining challenges in the third section. For data collection, this section firstly acquired secondary data from document review, and secondly obtained primary data from interviews with ‘modern’/political and ‘traditional’/societal actors during the fieldwork which was undertaken in Somaliland from 22 September 2015 to 28 October 2015 (see Chapter 3 (3-4)). Although the historical review ends as of 2005, since the interviewees situated themselves in the context of 2015, the final section will also imply the post-2005 politico-societal development as the ‘2005 (and thereafter)’.

6-1. Forming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1991 to 1993

Towards the end of 1990, the nationwide societal uprisings destabilised the Barre regime, and paved the way for the SNM to lead a ceasefire in Somaliland. Although the regime’s policy of ‘divide-and-rule’ had exacerbated inter-clan competition between the Isaaq (in the Central), the Dir (in the West), and the Darood (in the East) clan families, especially the former as the fierce opposition vis-à-vis the latter two on the side of the regime, the apparent defeat of the regime encouraged the Isaaq-led SNM to employ a clique of non-Isaaq fighters for inter-clan dialogues from early 1990 onwards (Interpeace 2008, Walls 2011, F.A.A.A. 2015). Despite its military dominance, the SNM explored a consensual approach for such reasons as the lack of resources and the clear understanding of traditional clan territories (Farah et al. 1993, Bradbury 2008, Interpeace 2008). A series of small inter-clan meetings led the SNM to the assembling of all major clans in the northwest and the organising of two major inter-clan conferences, firstly the ‘Brotherhood Conference of Northern Clans’ in Berbera in February 1991, and secondly the ‘Grand Brotherhood Conference of Northern Clans’ in Burao from April 1991 to May 1991 (Interpeace 2008). In the meantime, external
intervention was largely absent in Somaliland, as the UN and the Western donors had heavily focused on the political and humanitarian crises in Mogadishu. This external absence enabled the domestic factions to explore the socio-cultural tradition of deliberation in order to engage in the ‘legitimation problem’.

The home-grown deliberation in the two conferences was largely aimed at reaching a political consensus on ceasefire and governance in the post-Barre era. In Berbera, a primary focus of the two-week meeting was given to concluding the inter-clan talks between the SNM and the non-Isaaq clans. The SNM reached a consensus on the overall ceasefire in consultation with the elder representatives from all major clans. Yet differences remained in the detail, such as community security and national governance. Accordingly, the elder representatives returned home to consult with their clan constituents, including intellectuals, religious leaders, businessmen, and diaspora, anticipating the next conference to be larger in scale and scope. They formed the societal will, and raised funds for their participation (Interpeace 2008). After two months, the expanded members met in Burao. An introductory one-week meeting decided to grant an equal number of voting rights to the elder representatives from the Dir and the Darood, and a slight majority to those from the Isaaq (Interpeace 2008). The will-formation was undertaken in two ways, combining a bottom-up with a top-down process. Firstly, the divisive elder representatives explored common ground on the Somali norms and values, addressed the grievances exacerbated by the regime, and then shifted the more contentious agenda items from community matters, such as land and asset disputes, to political affairs, such as the independence of Somaliland (Interpeace 2008). Secondly, taking over this bottom-up talk, the SNM central committee concentrated on deliberating the political affairs, among others, a dichotomous contention on Somaliland’s secession from the South, which the elders and ranked soldiers had ardently supported,
although the SNM leadership had largely doubted its politico-economic feasibility (Interpeace 2008). While the SNM elite had attempted to subvert the societal contention for secession, the declaration of the Southern faction (USC: United Somali Congress) on the formation of a unilateral government without consultation with the SNM angered the societal majority, and pushed the SNM central committee to endorse the elders’ recommendation for secession in view of a large-scale societal protest organised outside the conference venue (Interpeace 2008). In compromise, the Burao Conference concluded with declaring Somaliland’s independence, yet electing Abdirahman ‘Tuur’, the SNM chairman as the President, and transforming the SNM central committee into the constituent assembly (Interpeace 2008). Although the SNM elite partly compromised their federalist position with societal conservatives, they established the national deliberative space for ‘rational argumentation’ in order to ‘modernise’ the new Somaliland state. Yet the internationally-unrecognised, self-proclaimed independence and its politico-economic consequences (e.g. constraints for foreign travel, aid, trade, and business) have deeply aggrieved Somaliland since then.

The new SNM administration, however, faced multiple constraints to govern the war-torn polity. Politically, the SNM had been highly divisive alongside multiple lines, such as an intra-leadership rivalry between the civilian and the military factions, and an intra-clan competition between the Habar-Awal, the Habar-Jalo, and the Habar-Yunis within the Isaaq sub-clan constituencies. The end of the civil war unpacked the political differences, which were masked before the Barre regime as the common enemy, between the civilian faction headed by President ‘Tuur’ and the military conservatives (aka ‘Alan As’; ‘Red Flag’) dominating the security forces. This civilian-military tension had existed since the early 1980s when the SNM chairmanship was competed for by two factions, one headed by an
army colonel and the other by a civilian minister (Farah 1999, Bradbury 2008). This intra-leadership rivalry was connected with the intra-clan competition between their respective clan constituencies, such as the Habar-Yunis who backed President ‘Tuur’, and the Habar-Jalo who supported the key Alan As fighters. Economically, the SNM administration inherited not only the ruined economic infrastructure to be reconstructed, but also more than 50,000 guerrilla forces and incalculable amounts of weaponry to be demobilised with limited internal revenue due to the lack of external aid (Forberg et al. 1999: 44, Bradbury 2008). The largest tax bases, namely the Hargeisa airport and the Berbera port, had been controlled by the local clan militias, the former by the Habar-Yunis and the latter by the Habar-Awal militias. The leadership struggle prevented President ‘Tuur’ from taxing the Berbera port which had been under the control of his political opposition. Socially, in this connection, the budgetary constraints and their consequence of delaying reconstruction and demobilisation allowed the local clan militia to remain armed and to partly transform themselves into opportunistic freelance bandits (as known as ‘deydey’) (Farah et al. 1993). In addition, the lengthy war had eroded traditional norms and cultural values. Limited parental care in the displaced families, for example, led the youth to stay away from a pastoral livelihood and engage in delinquency and petty crimes (Cabdi 2005). These rebellious militia and youth set up private checkpoints along the major roads, and intimidated and harassed traders and travellers to collect charges from them, thus exacerbating the societal perception of insecurity (Farah et al. 1993, SCPD 1999, Bradbury 2008).

These challenging settings made it difficult for the state and the society to address the inherited ‘legitimation problem’. In the state, the growing political tension between the ‘modern-educated’ and the ‘soldier-turned’ politicians forced the desperate President ‘Tuur’ not to engage with the latter but to expel them from the cabinet and to dismiss them in the
constituent assembly (J.A.H.I. 2015). The civilian-led ‘rational argumentation’ in the exclusive cabinet antagonised the dismissed hardliners and their clan constituency, and cemented their resistance to surrender the Berbera port (Bradbury 2008, Interpeace 2008). As the arms and war culture prevailed due to the delay in disarmament and demobilisation, the political difference was soon radicalised to violence in Burao in February 1992, and then spread to Berbera from March to October 1992 (Interpeace 2008). The first two years under the SNM administration were thus often interpreted as ‘wasted’ on elite competition over state power and resources and its consequence of political violence (J.A.H.I. 2015). In turn, the society also faced the exacerbated land conflict. A combination of the shrinking pool of common land, unclear land ownership and illegal documentation, and the repeated aggressions and retreats in the past fighting left the traditionally demarcated clan territories entangled, and aggrieved those who had lost their land (Farah et al. 1993, APD 2008: 14-17). The end of the civil war unpacked these land-related disputes across Somaliland from the East where four major pastoralist sub-clans (the Habar-Yunis and the Habar-Jalo from the Isaaq and the Dulbahante and the Warsangeli from the Darood) had claimed adjacent boundaries, to the West where the regime’s favouritism for the Gadabuusi in land distribution aggrieved the Isaaq agro-pastoralists (Farah et al. 1993). An increasing return of IDPs and veterans and their demand for land also added new dynamics to land conflict (Bradbury 2008).

While the polity had maintained their intractable differences, the societal actors, such as elders, religious leaders, women, and poets, became more effective than the state in engaging them. Above all, elders, whether the titled (e.g. sultaans and ugaas) or the non-titled (e.g. aquils), who had been undermined by the Barre regime (Samatar 1988, Lewis 2002b), rapidly re-established their authority for societal deliberation (shir) according to the customary law
(xeer) (Farah et al. 1993, SCPD 1999). Given the growing societal differences, they often presided over intra/inter-clan councils of elders (guurtis) to mediate and deliberate on grassroots disputes, secure trade routes, and explore inter-clan reconciliation (Bradbury 2008). They organised more than twenty inter-clan meetings across the territory from 1991 to 1993 (Jimcaale 2005, Bradbury 2008). Religious leaders (e.g. sheikhs) had also made a contribution. While their moral engagement in practising Sharia and addressing congregations at the Friday prayers helped the war-torn communities to restore societal cohesion based on religious values, their witness in the inter-clan meetings legitimised the elders in societal deliberation for judgement and argument (Farah et al. 1993, SCPD 1999, Ducaale 2005). In addition, their engagement in service delivery in running schools, clinics, and mosques, given the traditional norm to separate political and religious roles in the community, enhanced societal respect and appreciation to them (Ducaale 2005, Bradbury 2008). Women were also vital in proceeding to societal deliberation. Despite their exclusion from the male-dominant shir, women supported it backstage by lobbying forums and raising funds (Farah et al. 1993, Jama 2010). Women’s dual kinships between natal and affinal clans were often helpful for linking the antagonised clans to restore inter-clan communication, crossing territorial boundaries, and conveying messages blending with their own perspectives (Farah et al. 1993, Jama 2010). Given the importance of women as agents of communication, inter-clan deliberation often ended up with an exchange of women for inter-clan marriage to enhance cooperation (Farah et al. 1993). Moreover, due to the rich oratory culture, poets had also acted as an agent of social media (Farah et al. 1993, Ducaale 2005). As shir and guurti typically began and closed with poetry recitations, the ‘encoded messages’ in verses elaborated by poets set the agenda and summarised the deliberated consensus/agreement (Farah et al. 1993).
The resurgence of societal deliberation to meet and mediate the societal differences empowered the societal non-elite to intervene and mediate the radicalised political differences in a bottom-up manner. To begin with, a group of Gadabursi elders made an effort to mediate between the antagonised Isaaq sub-clans. Their modest approach turned the Isaaq’s initial suspicion to their appreciation. Their initiatives to broker agreement between the Habar-Yunis and the Habar-Awal, for example, reached a consensus to organise an inter-clan conference in Sheikh in October 1992. The conference named ‘Consensus’ assembled societal deliberators who had played prominent roles in the inter-clan meetings (Farah et al. 1993, Bradbury 2008). Following a poetry oratory in the opening, the conference was chaired and deliberated by elders, witnessed and certified by religious leaders, prepared and lobbied by women’s groups, and funded by clan-affiliated businessmen (Farah et al. 1993, el Bushra et al. 2004, Bradbury 2008, Interpeace 2008). The two-week conference announced a ceasefire in Burao and Berbera, and re-affirmed clan-based autonomy, declaring that ‘each clan is responsible for whatever is committed in their territory’ (Interpeace 2008: 48). The successful societal intervention gave legitimacy to the Gadabursi to host a scaled-up inter-clan conference in Boroma to deliberate about post-SNM governance given the upcoming termination of the mandate of the SNM administration in May 1993.

The Boroma ‘Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland’ was indicative of its name in the culminated role of the restored societal deliberation in intervening in the radicalised political antagonism, and transforming it into agonism through ‘agonistic argumentation’ in socio-political deliberation. The largely self-funded conference assembled the largest number of representatives in Somaliland history, including 150 elders from all major clans and more than 2,000 religious leaders, women, and diaspora (Bradbury 2008). It started in January 1993, yet, given the Somali norm that ‘voting is fighting; let’s opt for
consensus’ (Warrabe quoted by Interpeace 2008: 52), required an elastic timeframe to last up to May 1993 (Bradbury 2008). A five-month long interaction of more than 2,000 participants allowed socio-political deliberators to meet, negotiate, and reconcile the antagonised agencies, as well as to produce the structural measures that were culturally coherent to the context. The conference reached two landmark agreements: the Peace and the National Charters, and the post-SNM governance. The Peace Charter aimed to reiterate the principles of clan determination in governance and establish the channels of socio-political deliberation from sirs at diya-paying groups to guurtis at local and national levels (Interpeace 2008). The National Charter, as the national customary law (xeer) and the provisional constitution, was stipulated to integrate the national Guurti into the state system as the legislature (i.e. the Upper House of Elders and the Lower House of Representatives), and authorised the Upper House of Elders to elect the President and ensure national security (Interpeace 2008). The elder representatives then elected Mohamed Egal as the President and Colonel Abdirahman ‘Aw Ali’ Farah as his deputy with a two-year term. While Egal was the only son of one of the wealthiest businessmen of the Habar-Awal and a ‘modern’-educated and experienced politician as the former Prime Minister of Somaliland in 1960 and then Somalia from 1967 to 1969, Col. ‘Aw Ali’ was a Gadabursi, an SNM veteran in the ‘Alan As’ group who bridged the Isaaq and the Gadabursi in the past reconciliation meetings (Bradbury 2008, Interpeace 2008, F.A.A.A. 2015, J.A.H.I. 2015). Their selections convinced many, given the Habar-Awal’s turn for the presidency, the Gadabursi’s role in mediating the intra-Isaaq conflict, the disapproval of the SNM administration over the last two years, yet above all, the overall ‘success’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. The societal approach to ‘agonistic argumentation’ in the Boroma Conference as an inclusive/recognitive and symmetrical space for socio-political deliberation resulted in establishing the culturally-cohesive beel (‘clan-based’) system of governance to facilitate the political elite and the societal non-elite to meet and
engage in the socio-political differences, such as the ‘federalist’/‘nationalist’ and ‘modern’/‘traditional’ positions (Bradbury 2008, Interpeace 2008). The Guurti, as the national ‘hybrid’ institution, was thus expected to address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences in the protracted conflict, and transform them.

6-2. Deforming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1993 to 1997

An emancipatory and agonistic ‘success’, however, failed to endure, reflecting the new internal and external dynamics. In the post-Boroma politics, the promotion of the ‘Alan As’ members and their clan constituencies, the Habar-Awal and the Habar-Jalo, in the state had adversely aggrieved the ousted ‘Tuur’ and his clan constituency, the Habar-Yunis (Bradbury 2008, Renders 2012: 136). The latter perceived their relative demotion as a breach of inter-clan consensus and started challenging the government. In turn, the budgetary deficit pushed President Egal to explore his own clan constituency, the Habar-Awal, to allow the government to access revenue from the Berbera port and borrow up to US$7 million from their clan businessmen (Bradbury 2008: 111-112). Also, the introduction of a new banknote, the Somaliland Schilling in 1994, brought a fortune to the government from selling the Somali Schilling. The improved budgetary conditions made public services operational and functional, and allowed the government to further expand taxation on commercial products, such as khat, and disarm and integrate clan militias into the national army which thereby mushroomed in size between 10,000 and 15,000 in 1995 (Bradbury 2008). The government also established regular payment to the Guurti members and the registered elders. The integration of the Guurti into the state, however, not only narrowed the deliberative space in the state-society interface for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, but also turned its deliberative role
from ‘agonistic argumentation’ to rubber-stamping the executive, and caused and exacerbated the ‘new’ and ‘old’ societal differences (SCPD 1999, Jimcaale 2005: 76-77). Since the access to state power and resources made eldership not only socio-politically prestigious but also economically profitable, this new rent in eldership led to the proliferation of self-claimed ‘elders’, and impelled the rural elders to open their offices in town, and even religious leaders to explore their bid for eldership (SCPD 1999). An emerging competition over eldership exacerbated the protracted urban-rural and ‘modernity’-‘tradition’ differences/divisions, and undermined societal cohesion (Farah et al. 1993). In turn, new political dynamics had emerged in Southern Somalia. A precarious balance between two fighting factions in Mogadishu (i.e. Aideed vs. Ali Mahdi) created space for the UN to ‘enforce’ peace (Brons 2001). The UN-led approach to re-centralising the Somali state, however, caused tension between the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and the Egal government in Somaliland (Brons 2001, Bryden 2003, Renders 2012). While the former had urged the latter to participate in the UN-led conferences, the latter rejected it because of its desire for self-determination. President Egal issued the persona non grata to the UN envoy who visited Hargeisa to assess the deployment of UNOSOM peacekeepers in Somaliland (Bryden et al. 2000, Bradbury 2008). Given Egal’s resistance, the UN deliberately invited the ousted former President ‘Tuur’ and his allies as the Somaliland representatives to the UN-led conferences on Somalia and introduced them to high politics in Mogadishu. The UN’s manoeuvre from Mogadishu acquired some sympathy and support from the aggrieved Garhajis (the Habar-Yunis and the Iigadale), yet at the same time, exacerbated contestations between the government and the opposition and between the nationalists and the federalists, and intertwined them (Bryden et al. 2000, Bradbury 2008).
The consolidating government, the opposition interacting with the UNOSOM II in Mogadishu, and their clan constituencies, rapidly radicalised the political difference, and led to another turn of violence that broke out in Hargeisa in late 1994, then spread to Burao in early 1995 (Bradbury 2008, Renders 2012). As the then opposition Habar-Awal refused to hand over the Berbera port to the SNM administration, the opposition-turned Garhajis revengefully resisted surrendering the Hargeisa airport to the Egal government (Bradbury 2008, Renders 2012). While tension amounted, President Egal gained consent from the moderate elders in the opposition, and dispatched forces to capture the airport (F.A.A.A. 2015, I.O.A. 2015). The week-long confrontation ended up with an open firefight between the government backed by the ‘Alan As’ in coalition with the Habar-Awal and the Habar-Jalo, and the opposition Garhajis driven by ‘Tuur’ in Mogadishu. While the army dissenters joined the clan militia, the spreading violence from Hargeisa to Burao claimed up to 4,000 lives and displaced as many as 180,000 people (Bradbury 2008: 116). Despite the rapid escalation of violent conflict, the Guurti had been largely dysfunctional in mediating and deliberating over the radicalised difference since its members had accepted bribery from the consolidating government to unanimously resist and subvert the UN-supported discourse of the opposition in the national deliberative space. As a result, the opposition saw the Guurti as no longer politically impartial and neutral, for example, interpreting a motion of the Guurti to grant President Egal an eighteen-month extension of his mandate in mid-1995 as the Guurti’s favourite for the government (Bradbury 2008: 121, Renders 2012: 142). The dysfunctional Guurti as a ‘hybrid’ institution undermined the quality of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and protracted the radicalised differences, even if the level of violence was mostly sporadic and less intense.
While the Guurti became less effective in engaging with the radicalised differences, conflict was stalemated until another home-grown initiative arose from the civil society led by the diaspora and echoed by local elders at the diya-paying groups (aqils). A volunteer group of diaspora set up the ‘Peace Committee for Somaliland’ in 1995 with the aim to bridge the government and the opposition and deliberate the radicalised difference (Abdi 1996, Bryden et al. 2000, Walls 2011). As the inter-clan violence spread to the Ethiopian highlands, the Ethiopian government also supported the Committee to travel, organise peace caravans, and promote intra/inter-clan dialogues. Following the traditional footsteps for societal deliberation, the Committee undertook a bottom-up approach to engaging the differences, finally bringing elders of the Garhajis and the Habar-Jalo for inter-clan negotiation in Gashaamo (in Eastern Ethiopia) in June 1996 (Abdi 1996, Bryden et al. 2000, Renders 2012). A participant in the Committee recalled, ‘the Peace Committee with a good mix of different clans explored every possible measure to reach out to those in conflict from Hargeisa to Burao and bring them to a negotiation table in order to bridge their differences’ (I.O.A. 2015). The Gashaamo meeting was coordinated by the Committee, hosted by the Garhajis clansmen, deliberated by the local elders (aqils), and supported by religious leaders, clan businessmen, women, and cultural actors in the affected communities, yet largely excluded state politicians and warlords (Abdi 1996, Renders 2012: 145). The ‘agonistic’ dialogue was extended to the follow-up meetings in Balidhaye (in Eastern Ethiopia) and Durugsey (in Somaliland) in the next few months (Bryden et al. 2000, Walls 2011, Renders 2012).

Although the actual impact has been contentious (Walls 2011: 144), the Committee’s initiative played a catalyst role in assembling the antagonised societal non-elite and deliberating ambiguity between consensus on ceasefire and difference in clan interests (Bryden et al. 2000, Bradbury 2008, Renders 2012, I.O.A. 2015). The progress made by the Committee echoed the local elders who had led the grassroots initiatives elsewhere (Abdi
A Committee-facilitated consensus on ceasefire in Hargeisa, for example, urged the local elders in Burao to agree to allow the IDPs to return and establish a representative administration for societal stability (Bryden et al. 2000).

Meanwhile, the government did not watch the societal progress idly, but waited for an opportunity to push it back. Despite his initial support and endorsement, President Egal had carefully monitored the progress of the ‘agonistic’ dialogues, given his fresh memory of the Boroma process by which the emancipatory deliberators ousted the incumbent President (Bradbury 2008, I.O.A. 2015). In the meantime, the changing internal and external settings had allowed President Egal to intervene in the ‘succeeding’ ‘agonistic argumentation’.

Internally, President Egal had demonstrated his shrewd skills in making the executive operational, taming the Guurti, and taking advantage of the SNM’s power struggle between the civilian and the military factions in order to establish his authority in high politics (Balthasar 2013). The technical defeat of the resource-poor opposition also empowered President Egal (Bradbury 2008, Balthasar 2013). Externally, the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in 1995 and the death of his protégée, General Aideed in 1996 disgraced ‘Tuur’ and his federalist claim from Mogadishu, yet legitimised President Egal as the political ‘winner’ (Bryden 2003, Bradbury 2008). Given the favourable settings, the empowered President viewed the emancipatory ‘success’ as a political ‘threat’, and decided to ‘hijack’ and intervene in it with such measures as to discontinue or disrupt the ongoing inter-clan meetings in Mandera (between the Habar-Yunis and the Habar-Awal) and in Beer (between the Habar-Yunis and the Habar-Jalo), and demand that the Peace Committee dissolve itself (Abdi 1996, Renders 2012). A former Peace Committee member regretfully said, ‘Egal then went on the offensive and mobilised the awesome and usurped public resources at his disposal to obstruct and dismantle the ongoing peace process’ (quoted by Renders 2012: 225)
The President also rejected the mounting societal call to have another ‘clan conference’ given the upcoming expiry of the government tenure in late 1996, and instead decided to organise a government-led conference for his political survival (ICG 2003).

The ‘National’ Conference held in the capital Hargeisa in October 1996 indicated not only the changed relationship between the consolidated government and the weakened Guurti after the ‘Clan’ Conference in Boroma, but also the determination of the government to push back societal forces in the ‘national’ deliberative space. Accordingly, although the Guurti convened the conference in its name, the government managed it, setting the agenda and listing participants for political deliberation. Official delegates numbered 315, which was double the Boroma conference in size, including the incumbent pro-government parliamentary members (150) as well as clan representatives (165) (Bradbury 2008). Yet the government’s tight grip on the Conference had offset the deliberative quality and ended up with mixed results. The state was expanded to accommodate and share power with the opposition in state institutions, both in the cabinet and the Guurti. The government also created a special fund for the reconstruction of Burao, the socio-political base of the opposition. These measures ameliorated both vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences. In turn, President Egal deliberately diminished the SNM’s presence in the state. While he had not only delegitimised the SNM’s civilian faction for its connection with Mogadishu, but also removed the ‘Alan As’ conservatives and hardliners from the cabinet, he replaced Colonel ‘Aw Ali’, an Alan As hardliner, with Riyale Kahin, a non-Alan As low-key security officer from the Gadabursi, as the running mate for his bid to the presidency in the conference (F.A.A.A. 2015). This measure, however, deeply aggrieved the SNM politicians. Finally, the representatives overwhelmingly re-elected President Egal for his second five-year term in the heavily-corrupted elections (e.g. it was reported that he paid each elector from US$1,500 to
US$5,000), and granted another extension to the Lower House for five years and the Upper House for six years respectively (Jimcaale 2005, Renders 2012: 156). Since the process of the political settlement had been largely unaccountable to the societal majority under the dysfunctional beel system of governance, the societal majority saw the co-opted and corrupt political deliberation largely illegitimate as the national xeer (Jimcaale 2005, Renders 2012). Yet at the same time, they welcomed the peaceful conclusion of the Conference and its resulting ceasefire due to the deep fatigue of warfare (Bradbury 2008: 126, Walls 2011: 154).

6-3. Reforming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1997 to 2005 (and thereafter)

The rises and falls of the home-grown initiatives in the Boroma and the Hargeisa processes showed that both societal resilience and state consolidation were required to manage the radicalised inequalities/differences. It was the consolidated government that ‘hijacked’ the societal-led ‘agonistic’ dialogue and adopted the mixed measures at ‘agonistic argumentation’ in the Hargeisa Conference. The mixed measures, however, brought mixed dynamics into the internal settings. While the extensive power-sharing in the state de-radicalised the enmity between the government and the opposition, this measure for ‘buying peace’ made public offices significantly redundant. The absorption of clan militias, for example, made the national forces double or triple what was actually required (i.e. up to 20,000 in the army and 4,500 in the police) (Forberg et al. 1999: 29, 32, 44). Similarly, the enlarged ministerial positions increased the civil service (i.e. from 15 to 26 in the ministerial positions and up to 42 in the presidentially-appointed positions in 2002) (Jimcaale 2005: 72). The expansion of the state required the government to allocate up to 97% of the national budget to the recurrent expenses and seek additional revenue sources (Jimcaale 2005: 102).
Due to the dearth of foreign aid, the overstaffed yet resource-poor government targeted the material power of local and diaspora capitalists. Meanwhile, the diaspora’s remittances had risen to US$200-500 million per year, which was considerably more than the government’s annual revenue of US$20 million (Jimcaale 2005). Since financing President Egal at the outset, the capitalists had been active in engaging public activities, such as providing materials to the forces and launching public-private partnership in service delivery (SCPD 1999, Bradbury 2008, Ibrahim 2010). The expansive government approach, in turn, allowed the capitalists to push the government to accelerate modernisation in the state and the economy, and to address the lack of international recognition as the key constraint for business and trade (Jimcaale 2005, O.A. 2015). The emergence of the capitalists in the national political economy was also helpful for, and interactive with, the societal weak in the ‘modern’ segment, such as women and youth, for the establishing and running of civic networks such as NAGAAD (National Women’s Network) for women, and SONYO (Somaliland National Youth Organisation) for youth after the Hargeisa Conference (SCPD 1999: 26, Warsame 2010, Kibble et al. 2012a, Renders 2012: 158, M.N.Y 2015).

The fiscal requirement for ‘buying peace’ also caused the government to extend taxation from the centre to the peripheries where local governance had been resilient despite the repeated political conflict. Local elders had been instrumental in (re)establishing public functions, collecting tax, mobilising clan militias/forces, and maintaining the rule of law according to the community-level shir and xeer (Jimcaale 2005: 93, Renders 2012). As the growing remittance and the economic recovery after the ceasefire had also helped the local entities to restore their functions, the government approached them with increased bargaining power, requiring them to clear the checkpoints set along the major roads for private/local taxation, and accept the government-appointed officials, such as governors, mayors, and
executive secretaries in the local administration (SCPD 1999: 42, Jimcaale 2005: 107, Renders 2012: 159, M.A. 2015). The growing interventions from Hargeisa, however, made a central-local relationship increasingly frictional, given the lack of a legal framework for the government to intervene in the local entities (Jimcaale 2005, Renders 2012: 160, M.A. 2015). Their difference in view of the role of local governance also became apparent. For example, while the government viewed it as the implementation of national policies locally, the local entities, in turn, interpreted it as the defence and promotion of self-determination of local interests (SCPD 1999: 37). While the government and the local entities had contested their differences, the former explored money politics locally, hiring local elders for community policing and bestowing official recognition on their eldership to co-opt and cajole them in an attempt to undermine the authority of the resistive latter (APD 2006b, Ahmed 2010). A local elder expressed his discontent with the government’s self-centric approach, saying ‘they (the central government) miss us only when they need our support, but do not help us in the resolution of local disputes and conflicts. When resources are an issue it is their concern. If there is a local dispute, the problem is ours’ (quoted by Jimcaale 2005: 93).

On the other hand, the ‘traditional’ segment in high politics continued to undermine its own political relevance and legitimacy. Given the Shahad (‘begging to those whom you know’ in a derogative term) culture in the society, President Egal had employed bribery, in addition to monthly payment, to ‘divide and rule’ the politician-turned elders, not only to patronise his political allies, but also to buy and disempower the opposition in the Guurti and beyond (A.A. 2015a, A.O.S. 2015, I.O.A. 2015). Although his own professional integrity and familial wealth had been well-known (A.A. 2015a, A.A. 2015b, H.A.I. 2015, I.O.A. 2015), the President’s money politics exacerbated economic rent in eldership, proliferated the offices of elders, either elected or self-claimed, and continued to undermine the integrity of the political
(politician-turned) elders, while separating them from the societal (local) elders (SCPĐ 1999: 25, Jimcaale 2005: 76). Moreover, the poor capacity of the political elders in ‘modernity’ made it impossible for the Guurti and the Lower House to produce a single piece of legislation themselves from 1993 to 2002, and thus forced them to continue to rubber-stamp the executive decisions (Jimcaale 2005: 76-77). The repeated extensions of the term of the government upon the request of the government, for example, undermined the political impartiality of the Guurti (Fadal 2012, Hersi 2012). Also, the Guurti had faced heavy criticism regarding institutional and individual legitimacy. The government’s improvement in the security agencies as well as its own failure in mediating the past political violence raised a societal question about the institutional legitimacy of the Guurti as the national ‘guardian’ (A.A. 2015a). In addition, the new members of the Guurti sometimes did not meet the criteria for eldership since they were often family members or political appointees of the aged or deceased members since its inception in the Boroma Conference in 1993 and re-selection in the Hargeisa Conference in 1997 (Fadal 2012, Moe 2013). As nepotism and politicisation had advanced in high politics without the ‘rule of the game’ to unseat the executive and the legislature, the political opposition and societal majority were increasingly discontent with the continuous dysfunction in the beel system of governance (Ahmed 2010, Hoehne 2013).

A Somali-owned, bottom-up approach to democratisation was, however, far from easy. ‘Agonistic argumentation’ to make the draft constitution was soon deadlocked over which institution, whether the executive or the legislature, should hold more power than the other in the state (Walls 2011, Renders 2012). The stalemate continued until two external threats pushed the agonised politicians to resume deliberation. First, Puntland, the adjacent Somali region to the east, declared a ‘self-governing autonomous state’ to unite the Darood sub-clans within Somalia in 1988, and claimed sovereignty over the Darood sub-clans in Eastern
Somaliland, such as the Dulbahante and the Warsengeli (Bradbury 2008: 129). Its offer of senior positions in the Puntland state to them angered Somaliland (Renders 2012). Second, the TNG (Transitional National Government) was formed in Mogadishu in 2000 by the UN’s brokerage to the key Somali actors. Its (re)claim of sovereignty over Somaliland and appointment of a Somalilander (a Dulbahante) as its Prime Minister also provoked Somaliland (Bradbury 2008). These external threats pushed the executive and the legislature to re-engage in meeting the political difference on the draft constitution. Although some ambiguity remained, for example, on succession to the presidency, the final draft, as the by-product of political compromise, was adopted for the public referendum in May 2001 prior to the end of the presidential term (Walls 2011, A.A. 2015b). It was approved overwhelmingly, with over 98% of the votes cast in favour, although the referendum was partially boycotted in the eastern regions claimed by Puntland (Bradbury 2008, Renders 2012).

While public attention was primarily focused on the declaration of Somaliland’s independence in the Constitution, there was less focus on the introduction of an electoral multi-party system (ICG 2003, Ibrahim 2007). Yet contentions between the ‘modernist’ and the ‘traditionalist’ in the deliberative space made it difficult to implement it. Despite the government’s justification for democratisation as a key milestone to obtain international recognition, this ‘modernist’ claim roused opposition from the ‘traditionalists’ whose interests had been deeply entrenched in the beel system of governance (e.g. SCPD 1999: 28).

In August 2001, two months after the referendum, the formation of political organisations was legalised and the electoral schedule was announced: to hold the local elections in December 2001 and the national elections in February 2002 respectively. Subsequently, President Egal formed his political organisation, UDUB (United Peoples’ Democratic Party), and urged the opposition to follow (Bradbury et al. 2003: 463). The government’s hasty move
to political ‘modernisation’, however, united the ‘traditionalists’ and the opposition, including the titled elders in the Guurti and the ‘Alan As’ conservatives who had been expelled from the cabinet, in connection with the disaffected Habar-Jalo who lost their presidential bid at the Hargeisa Conference. While the former regarded the elections as a threat to their vested interest in the ‘hybrid’ polity, the latter had explored this ‘agonisation’ as an opportunity to challenge President Egal (Y.H. 2015). Accordingly, they formed an anti-government coalition, and attempted to impeach the President in the Guurti and convene another ‘clan’ conference to unseat him (Bradbury et al. 2003, Ibrahim 2007). President Egal responded to this with a coercive measure to arrest the key leaders of the opposition (Bradbury et al. 2003, Ibrahim 2007). As the securitisation of deliberation antagonised the opposition, a broad range of societal segments, regardless of the ‘modern’ or the ‘traditional’, including local elders, religious leaders, businessmen, diaspora, women and youth groups, rose in an attempt to mediate the radicalising political difference (Ibrahim 2007). Although the societal proposal for rescheduling the elections and granting the President another term extension failed to moderate the tension, the sudden death of President Egal in May 2002 reunited the antagonised politicians (Bradbury et al. 2003). While the Puntland state had become increasingly destabilised, the internal and external crises impelled the confronting politicians not to fight but to set aside their differences (ICG 2003, Renders 2012, Hoehne 2015: 64). Despite the constitutional ambiguity, the mediated ascension of vice president Riyale Kahin to the presidency eased the heated political contestation (J.A.H.I. 2015). While the opposition underestimated the new low-key Gadabursi-origin President, the societal majority was largely supportive of new presidential directives, such as improving external relations with Ethiopia and Djibouti and appointing female ministers (Renders 2012). Although the socio-political honeymoon soon waned, it caused even the most radical in the opposition to re-think, and not to radicalise their claims but to join the electoral contest and
turn their antagonism to agonism (ICG 2003). Although these developments in the state realm had been largely unaccountable to the societal majority, the smooth constitutional transition and the political unity after the death of President Egal relieved many, and led Somaliland towards discontinuing political turmoil and liberalising socio-political deliberation in a Somaliland-specific way thereafter (J.A.H.I. 2015).

The designed electoral system contains both strengths and weaknesses. Based on his own experience as the Prime Minister ousted by the military coup in the fragmented constitutional democracy in Somalia in the late 1960s, President Egal aimed to prevent political fragmentation given the complex clan dynamics (A.A. 2015b, J.A.H.I. 2015). Accordingly, he proposed to modify the former electoral system in the 1960s, which had met proportional representation in local multi-member constituencies, to restrict the number of political parties (Krennerich 2003, Jama 2009). In view of the three major sub-clans in the Isaaq, namely, the Habar-Awal, the Habar-Jalo, and the Habar-Yunis (J.A.H.I. 2015), his proposal was to relax the creation of political organisations to contest the local elections, yet qualify only three of them to turn to the political parties, based on the results in the local elections, and contest the national elections, such as presidential and parliamentary elections (Jama 2009: 94-96). The condition for a political organisation to upgrade to a political party is to acquire more than 20% of the votes cast in all regions, or otherwise the highest number of the votes cast in the local elections. Those which failed to meet the criteria shall be dissolved and merged into the qualified ones (Progressio 2006: 7, Jama 2009: 56). Although concern was raised that the forced dissolution and merger could undermine ideological and disciplinary cohesion within the political party and limit the voters for political choice in a single electoral cycle (Yusuf 2010: 20), it would be offset by some merits. First, limiting the number could facilitate the three national parties to enhance inter-party interaction for political deliberation (Jama 2009).
Second, it could also encourage party members to increase intra-party interaction and cooperation (Lindeman et al. 2003). Given the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), a growing inter- and intra-party contact between elites from different societal backgrounds would alleviate or avoid inter-clan antagonisation and regional polarisation which had repeatedly caused political violence in the past. Third, electing local representatives at the national elections could force the political parties and members to be held accountable to their local constituents (APD 2006a: 36), thus restoring the eroded link between the state and the society. While the system was designed to prevent the polarisation of clanism in the political contest, it was also expected to expand the space for deliberation from the controversial Guurti to the political party where the political elite and the societal non-elites re-engage in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation (J.A.H.I. 2015).

Accordingly, the first electoral cycle of three elections was undertaken from 2002 to 2005. The outcome was largely instrumental in transforming ‘agonistic argumentation’ into ‘engaging disagreement’ in deliberation. Firstly, six political organisations contested the local elections in December 2002 (Bradbury et al. 2003, ICG 2003). They largely blended ‘modernity’ in party politics and ‘tradition’ in electoral operations. The clan origin of senior leaders in the political party/organisation was determinant in recruiting and selecting the party candidate since the clan took the lead in mobilising the clan constituency for electoral campaign (ICG 2003). The most-populated clans have an advantage in diversifying (or concentrating) their clan constituents across (or on) the parties/organisations to minimise the risk of electoral defeat. Most parties/organisations thus contained some factions from the major (sub)clans and formed an inter-clan coalition at the leadership level (Lindeman et al. 2003). This inter-clan, intra-party power-sharing system in the ethnic party/organisation allowed multiple clan factions to nurture ‘agonistic’ respect in deliberating party agenda and
undertaking electoral activities. The result qualified three political organisations to be the national political parties, namely the ruling UDUB and the opposition Kulmiye (Peace, Unity and Development Party) and UCID (Justice and Welfare Party). The inter-clan, intra-party power-sharing system facilitated the transfer of members from the disqualified to the qualified to agonise yet hybridise the political difference in the ‘multi-ethnic’ parties (Lindeman et al. 2003). Secondly, the presidential elections were contested in April 2003, five months after the local elections (Bradbury et al. 2003, ICG 2003). The result was uncomfortably close. The margin was only 80 votes between the UDUB candidate, President Riyale and the Kulmiye candidate, Ahmed Mohamoud ‘Silanyo’, the former SNM chairman and veteran minister in Somalia and Somaliland (Bradbury et al. 2003, ICG 2003). While the opposition challenged the result, a combination of political mediation and his own personality urged ‘Silanyo’ to manage the dispute constitutionally and accept his defeat in the end (Bradbury et al. 2003: 469, ICG 2003, Phillips 2013: 64, J.A.H.I. 2015, Y.H. 2015).

Although the opposition’s self-restraint saved Somaliland from radicalising the difference, their supporters had averted the risk of electoral defeat, to some extent, in diversifying their clan factions across the political parties. Accordingly, despite a concern about the ‘one party rule’ in view of the domination of the ruling party in the deliberative space (e.g. Bradbury et al. 2003, ICG 2003), the inter-clan, intra-party power-sharing system in the ruling party enabled the state to allocate power and resources to the major clans, and thus share common ground with the opposition (J.A.H.I. 2015). Indeed, despite growing inter-party competition towards the upcoming parliamentary election, the three parties had been cooperative in deliberating on the key decisions, such as demarcating regional constituencies for the next elections and handling the exacerbated conflict with Puntland that led to the first armed confrontation between Somaliland and Puntland in the contested eastern region in 2004 (APD 2006a: 22, Renders 2012: 249, Hoehne 2015: 67-68).
Finally, the parliamentary election for the Lower House (the House of Representatives) took place in September 2005 (APD 2006a, Progressio 2006). The result reflected the merits of the inter-clan, intra-party power-sharing system in the multi-ethnic parties. Despite a visible correlation between the party leaders and their clan constituencies, all parties gained at least two seats from all regions and one representative from more than seven sub-clans (APD 2006a: 41-42, Progressio 2006: 21). This indicates that all political parties acquired nationwide and inter-clan support to some extent. Also, the defeat of the ruling party forced the minority government to cooperate and collaborate with the opposition-ruling legislature for political deliberation. Moreover, the new House was largely ‘modernised’, including more MPs who are professionals, women, and youth (Progressio 2006: 22). While about one-third of the MPs were from the professional diaspora, their average age had significantly declined (Progressio 2006: 10, Ibrahim 2010: 48). Accordingly, the national deliberative space was transformed to juxtapose the Guurti (the Upper House) so as to promote societal ‘tradition’ in the consensual politics, and the new local councils and the Lower House to represent political ‘modernity’ in the majority rule (Progressio 2006: 23, J.A.H.I. 2015). The bottom-up form of democratisation in the transition from the ‘hybrid’ polity to the multi-party system thus seemed to have reformed the national deliberative space where the ‘traditional/society’ and the ‘modern/state’ are ‘re-hybridised’ to re-engage the socio-political differences/disagreements.

Although democratisation seemed to have expanded the quantity of deliberation, in particular spatially, it did not necessarily improve its quality in facilitating the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’ deliberators to engage in difference/disagreement. Rather, the electoral regime
has engendered a new inequality between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ in the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ segments, thus undermining deliberative quality. In the ‘modern’ segment, the wealthy capitalists, such as businessmen and diaspora, have increased their stakes in the state. While the average cost of electoral campaign reached US$70,000 per candidate, both the candidates and the political parties have increased their dependency on the material power of the capitalists, and have allowed them to patronise the political parties, intervening in candidate selection and party activities (Progressio 2006: 10, Jama 2009, Verjee et al. 2015, A.A. 2015a). The ‘monetization of elections’ (Verjee et al. 2015: 41) thus allowed the diaspora to make up a third of MPs in the Lower House, although their large presence was also interpreted as ‘professionalising’ and ‘modernising’ the state (Progressio 2006, Ibrahim 2010: 48, Hammond et al. 2011: 100). The high cost of entry to high politics has, however, generated adverse side-effects. Firstly, the financial burden constrains the resource-poor actors, notably women and youth, from running for elections (APD 2006a, Progressio 2006, NAGAAD 2007). Although female/youth candidates often need to travel more than male competitors to reach out to women/youth voters nationwide, they cannot afford the expenses due to their limited access to funding (NAGAAD 2007: 28, Warsame 2010: 49). Secondly, costly elections have exacerbated the Shahad culture and preserved political corruption and malpractice. The code of conduct signed by all parties was not legally binding but was a mere ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ (APD 2006a: 25). The lack of a legal framework, institutional weakness in the judiciary, and socio-political culture allowed the capitalists, party candidates, and elected politicians to employ bribery and vote-buying to seek public positions for private gain (Progressio 2006: 10, Verjee et al. 2015: 17, 39-40), and disgrace high politics in the eyes of the societal majority (IRI 2011: 54, Verjee et al. 2015, A.O.S. 2015). Thirdly, besides the elections, the politico-economic influence of the capitalists has been extended to the civil society. As with political parties, local NGOs and media are often funded by capitalists, such
as businessmen and diaspora, in setting up and running (SCPD 1999). Their dependency on the capitalists leads the civil society to be self-restrictive or even co-opted by the state on the capitalist side, rather than be active in critically engaging with the state in addressing social inequality and injustice (Ibrahim 2010: 51, A.O.S. 2015). Otherwise, they rely on foreign aid and align themselves with (neo)liberal statebuilding (Moe 2013).

Yet the emergence of ‘modernity’ has not waned ‘tradition’, but revived and reinforced it. While more than 70% of voters are assumed to be clan constituents (Yusuf 2010: 18), the most politically and economically viable way for candidates to secure the popular vote in the clan-based elections is to mobilise the affiliated clan constituencies and resources. Accordingly, clan elders, especially titled elders, have increased their stakes in nominating clan candidates, as well as re-indoctrinating women and youth on clanism (APD 2006a: 37, Warsame 2010: 47, A.A. 2015a). The proportional representation system also assisted major (sub)clans in maximising benefit from the elections. For example, the result of the parliamentary elections shows that the Isaaq, including the three major sub-clans (i.e. the Habar-Awal, the Habar-Jalo, and the Habar-Yunis) increased their domination in the Lower House from 59% to 70% (the Isaaq) and from 32% to 60% (the ‘big three’) respectively, yet undermined and disempowered others in the peripheries (APD 2006a: 44, Progressio 2006: 21). In the East, the Darood have been uneasy with the Isaaq-Dir coalition in high politics since the Boroma Conference (SCPD 1999: 33-34). Their grievances created space for Puntland to manoeuvre, and caused the security concern that impelled the government to limit the polling stations for the elections in the eastern regions. However, the Darood interpreted this as allowing the Isaaq to ‘rig the vote’, justifying their claim to secede from Somaliland (APD 2006a: 27). Within minorities, for example, the Gabooye, a ‘caste-like’ clan which had engaged in menial labour (e.g. shoemakers, hairdressers, blacksmiths, etc.)
faced difficulty even in obtaining candidacy from the political party in the elections and lost an appointed seat that they managed to acquire at the Hargeisa Conference (APD 2006a: 36). Also, the elderly-male dominant tradition adversely disempowered women and youth. Women’s candidacy was generally unsupported by clan elders, as challenging the male-dominant tradition as well as splitting clan constituency between the natal and marital clans (NAGAAD 2007: 24, Warsame 2010: 49). The age limit (over 35) for the candidacy of MP prevented youth under 30 who reportedly amount to 70% of the entire population from running for the elections (Kibble et al. 2012a: 41, Ahmed 2013: 100). As a result, while only two women were elected in the local (out of 332) and national (out of 82) elections respectively, the age of the youngest MPs remained in the late 30s, although these were also interpreted as an overall rejuvenation of MPs and the general improvement of female presence from zero to four in the new political landscape (Progressio 2006: 22, K.H. 2015, M.N.Y. 2015). The civic plea to introduce electoral quotas to women has, however, repeatedly been rejected as ‘unconstitutional’ by the male-dominated, conservative Guurti (Yusuf 2012, K.H. 2015, M.N.Y. 2015). Moreover, the Isaaq domination in high politics made the intra-Isaaq dynamics more significant than ever. While the Habar-Awal and the Habar-Jalo dominated the Kulmiye party, the Garhajis (the Habar-Yunis and Iidagale) split themselves between the ruling UDUB party and the UCID party (Bradbury 2008, ICG 2015: 5, 19, O.A. 2015). The ‘modern’ electoral politics, however, increases the risk of breaking the intra-Isaaq rotational presidency, which has been carefully deliberated by elders off stage during the marathon conferences in the past (Bradbury 2008: 68). If the breaking of the presidential rotation or the loss of the presidential bid aggrieves the electoral ‘loser’, it may undermine a ‘deliberative political order’ as similarly occurred in the political conflict after the Boroma (Habar-Yunis’s grievances) and Hargeisa (Habar-Jalo’s grievances) conferences.
While the ‘winner-take-all’ democracy increases the risk of radicalising the aggrieved ‘losers’ (e.g. Hoehne 2015 in the case of the Darood’s radicalisation in the eastern regions), a challenge also remains in the growing differences among the ‘winners’. The emerging animosity between the ‘winners’ in the ‘modern’ segment (e.g. capitalists) and the ‘traditional’ segment (e.g. elders and major clans) has not only undercut deliberative quality, but also caused another horizontal inequality (Yusuf 2010, Hammond et al. 2011, A.A. 2015a). For instance, an elder MP regretted, ‘I would not like them [the capitalists] to get involved in the internal affairs of the clan… They love to sit on the tribal seat, or to have control over the clan elders, to either switch the clan allegiance to a particular party or the government’ (quoted by Ibrahim 2010: 38). In turn, a diaspora businessman argued, ‘when we were outside the country, they were asking us to contribute to the rebuilding process… if there is some wrongdoing, the people from the diaspora are compelled to act to rectify the situation’ (quoted by Ibrahim 2010: 38). The political requirement to engage in reconciling an ‘agonistic disagreement’ between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ in high politics has, in turn, undermined political response to societal voices. A former minister confessed, ‘when I was a minister, I spent most of my time lobbying and pleasing my sponsors [capitalists and clan elders], and nearly forgot to think about the societal needs. Of course, it is shameful, but this toxic skill [of juggling conflicts of interest] is the most important skill to enter and survive in high politics!’ (A.O.S. 2015). Yet, as political parties and CSOs remain uncritical and weak in addressing this, the societal majority has explored political alternatives, such as grassroots elders and religious leaders or Islamists, whether the radical or the moderate (Ahmed 2010: 60, IRI 2011: 42, 54, J.A.H.I. 2015, M.A.A. 2015). Yet, while religious leaders mostly stay away from politics and the Islamists are internally diverse (from the radical to the moderate) on how to engage the socio-political difference (ICG 2003, A.A. 2015a, A.M.A.S. 2015), local aquils remain largely reactive. An aquil from Burao confessed, ‘we understand this [the
disconnection between high politics and societal everyday]… But what we can do is limited because we are mostly not reformists, but trouble-shooters!’ (M.A. 2015). As a result, the status-quo politics has increasingly dissatisfied societal majority, causing youth migration and apathy to high politics (K.H. 2015). The lack of critical agencies increases the risk of re-Islamising, re-traditionalising, or re-polarising the societal difference, and thus deforming the ‘deliberative political order’.

In turn, while democratisation has attracted donor attention, increasing foreign aid generates mixed results. Although the figure is unknown (S.S.A. 2015), foreign aid is estimated to have reached more than double the national budget (Bradbury 2008: 157, Eubank 2012: 475, Phillips 2013: 29). Accordingly, the government published the first national development plan in 1997, urging donors to align their activities with the government’s priorities (Renders 2012: 168). Yet donors have been largely unresponsive to this, not only bypassing the unrecognised state, but also aiding the ‘modern’ segment yet undercutting the ‘traditional’ segment, and thus exacerbating the segmental difference/division (Hammond et al. 2011: 67, Moe 2013: 39-40, Philips 2013: 71). Also, their remote operations from Nairobi have increased indirect costs (e.g. staff salary, travel cost, etc.) and the risk of failure to address local reality in project planning. As a contention was raised that only 20% of the total aid reached local populations (IRI 2011: 54, Moe 2013: 51-52, Phillips 2013: 30-31, S.S.A. 2015), the legitimacy of foreign aid has been largely eroded. Moreover, the recent donor attention to the elections has caused tension between donors and locals. Claiming ‘a vote for peace’ (e.g. APD 2006a), donors have financed the key electoral expenses, covering 68% and 77% of the administrative costs in the 2002 and 2005 elections respectively (Verjee et al. 2015: 14, S.S.A. 2015). As the electoral costs continue to grow (Verjee et al. 2015: 14), the increasing aid dependency has undermined the local ownership and sustainability of home-
grown democratisation. Donors in Nairobi have pressed the government to adopt a donor-led rigid template and conditionality on the electoral schedule and benchmarks (S.E.C. 2015). Given this, an electoral commissioner lamented, ‘from the President to the Minister of Interior, all beg donors for money, relying and reflecting on their agendas and priorities on the electoral operations. Is this still a bottom-up approach to democratisation?’ (quoted by O.A. 2015). The increasing external interventions for (neo)liberal statebuilding have undermined and deformed the locally-owned, emancipatory democratisation.
Conclusion

Dividing the research period into the three phases: 1) building peace (i.e. forming a ‘deliberative political dis/order’ from 1999 to 2002 in East Timor and forming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1991 to 1993 in Somaliland), 2) recurring conflict (i.e. deteriorating a ‘deliberative political dis/order’ from 2002 to 2007 in East Timor and deforming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1993 to 1997 in Somaliland), and 3) re-building peace (i.e. forming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 2007 to 2012 in East Timor and reforming a ‘deliberative political order’ from 1997 to 2005 (and thereafter) in Somaliland), facilitates empirical inquiry about ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland through focus on its difference and similarity. The outstanding difference is, among others, in the role of external intervention, which East Timor accepted yet Somaliland rejected, and its politico-societal ramifications. While external intervention deformed and exacerbated the ‘legitimation problem’ and delegitimised external intervention and internal politics in East Timor, the absence of external intervention allowed local societal forces to ‘agonise’ the state to address the ‘legitimation problem’ with self-help effort in Somaliland. While the cooperative turn in the state-society relations after the ‘failure’ in the 2006 ‘crisis’ allowed politico-societal agencies to address the ‘legitimation problem’ in a ‘hybrid’ approach in East Timor, the reformed ‘agonisation’ after the ‘failure’ in preventing political antagonism enabled politico-societal agencies to democratise the ‘hybrid’ polity and address the ‘legitimation problem’ in the new deliberative space based on multi-partism in Somaliland. As a result, similarity emerges in the chronological transition from building to re-building peace via recurring conflict, and the overall progression from ‘rationalisation’ to ‘agreeing to disagree’ to shape ‘deliberative political order’ over time. In view of the differences and similarities, the next, concluding chapter will advance the analysis of 1) reviewing and
comparing the cases, 2) answering the first question on the ‘failure’, 3) answering the second question on the ‘success’, and 4) discussing the overall implications.
Conclusion

Introduction

This concluding chapter aims to abstract findings and suggestions from reviewing the cases, seeking answers to the research questions, and exploring implications for research and policy and the limitations of the framework. The first section will review the cases of East Timor (Chapter 5) and Somaliland (Chapter 6), and examine the hypothetical mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in view of the difference in the impact of the UN’s ‘asymmetry’ in East Timor vis-à-vis the home-grown ‘symmetry’ in Somaliland on the trajectory towards ‘deliberative political order. Subsequently, the second and third sections will explore answers to the two research questions: 1) what caused the UN to have ‘failed’ (to prevent the ‘crisis’ from recurring in 2006) in East Timor, and 2) what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced ‘equifinality’ (making similar progress along different paths) in building peace (in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 and in Somaliland from 1991 to 2005). Examining the causal mechanisms of the ‘failure’ (i.e. conflict deformation) and the ‘success’ (i.e. conflict transformation) will enrich the findings and suggestions. The fourth section will then briefly discuss implications for research and policy and the limitations of the framework. Finally, the conclusion will reiterate the findings and suggestions which stand out in this chapter.

To begin with, this introductory section will briefly revisit the positions and contentions of this thesis. First, the thesis has been grounded on: 1) ontological dualism between objectivism and subjectivism in stratifying the world at real, actual, and empirical levels, 2) epistemological ‘critical’ realism, highlighting interactions between agency, structure, and
culture at the meta level (i.e. in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation), and exploring a causal mechanism of social change over time and space (i.e. in ‘deliberative political order’), and 3) a normative position in valuing equality and social justice when it comes to defining the ‘failure’ and the ‘success’ in the theoretical framework (see Introduction: ontological, epistemological and normative positions). Second, according to these positions, the thesis has unpacked the policy model of international peacebuilding as (neo)liberal statebuilding, and identified a nexus between (neo)liberal statebuilding and political, economic, and societal crises due to the ‘legitimacy gap’ in the policy norms (i.e. procedural democratisation, growth-centred development, and the securitisation of the state) (see Chapter 1 (1-3-1)). While this nexus can be rectified by various measures such as economic justice (e.g. Pugh et al. 2008), human security (e.g. Futamura et al. 2010, Tadjbakhsh 2011), developmental state (e.g. Barbara 2008), and civil society (e.g. Lederach 1997, Paffenholtz 2014), this thesis has highlighted the role of deliberation in addressing the ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western post-colonial context as the current research on deliberation in peacebuilding is limited and under-researched (Barnett 2006, see Chapter 1 (1-3-3)).

Critically reviewing limitations in applying ‘Western’ deliberation (e.g. Rawls 1993, Habermas 1996) in the non-Western context, the thesis constructed a new concept of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation to address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences in connection with the non-Western culture and (post-)colonial historicity (see Chapter 2 (2-1 and 2-2)). It assumes that ‘post-colonial’ deliberation takes place in the state-society interface where the pre-conditions for the quantity (i.e. inclusion and equality) and the quality (i.e. recognitiveness and cooperativeness) of space and power would make an impact on reflexive deliberative agencies in choosing an approach from, among ‘rationalisation’, ‘agonisation’, ‘hybridisation’, and ‘agreeing to disagree’ (see
Chapter 2 (2-4), to (de/re/trans)form the ‘legitimation problem’ into the ‘deliberative political (dis)order’ (see Chapter 2 (2-5)). It then hypothesised a causal mechanism in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ between ‘with’ and ‘without’ external intervention, with a view that the externally-led ‘asymmetry’ causes deliberative agencies to choose a ‘hybrid’ path while the home-grown ‘symmetry’ allows agencies to adopt an ‘agonistic’ path towards ‘deliberative political order’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ (see Chapter 2 (2-5)). The thesis then set out an explanatory strategy for empirical inquiry into the cases of East Timor, which accepted the UN peace operations, and Somaliland, which rejected them, given Mill’s methods of agreement and difference and the process-tracing approach (see Chapter 3).

Subsequently, the thesis highlighted the similarity in the cultural and historical backgrounds in East Timor and Somaliland that formed the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical (state-society) and horizontal (‘modernity’-‘tradition’) inequalities/differences towards the end of their civil wars (see Chapter 4), and the difference in the political and societal foregrounds in which international and national/local deliberators de/re/trans-formed the ‘legitimation problem’ differently, yet similarly led to the ‘deliberative political order’ as equifinality in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor (see Chapter 5) and Somaliland (see Chapter 6) over a decade after the end of their civil wars.

7-1. Review of the cases

Accordingly, this first section reviews the two cases, examining the different trajectories in (de/re/trans)forming ‘deliberative political (dis)order’ in East Timor and Somaliland during the research periods, and tracing them in the matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. It then briefly compares the hypothetical mechanism to the evidence, and analyses the risk of insecurity in practising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in the non-Western,
liberalising/modernising, post-colonial, post-conflict context. First, in the case of East Timor, the first phase (forming a ‘deliberative political disorder’) examined the process by which the external intervention of ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ exacerbated the ‘new’ and ‘old’ socio-political inequalities/differences from 1999 to 2002. While the tripartite agreement in the global political arena allowed the Timorese to vote for self-determination, the post-ballot violence paved the way for the UN to intervene for (neo)liberal statebuilding. What happened thereafter, however, was characterised by the UN’s neo-colonial attempt to build a (neo)liberal ‘modern’ state in East Timor. The asymmetrical governorship of the UNTAET, which employed the Timorese elite as the intermediary for the UN’s ‘indirect rule’, was sometimes interpreted as ‘despotic’ and ‘kingdom like’ (Chopra 2000, Beauvais 2001). While the UNTAET struggled with the post-conflict settings in establishing a ‘modern’ state nationally, it was the societal leaders that rapidly re-established societal deliberation based on cultural tradition to mediate societal differences locally. The interaction with the local societal forces empowered the CNRT to petition the UNTAET for ‘Timorisation’, creating and expanding space for political deliberation to ‘share’ power between the UNTAET and the Timorese elite, and leading to constitutional democracy. The UNTAET’s top-down measures for the creation of deliberative space for ‘rational argumentation’ and the introduction of national and local elections, however, re-instigated the intractable differences across the polity thereafter. While the elections for the Constitutional Assembly unleashed the entrenched difference between the political elite and caused the dissolution of the CNRT, the elections for the Community Development Councils eroded the ‘traditional’ authority in the local deliberative settings. As the electoral result led the political elite, in particular the ‘winner’ FRETILIN, to take up the post-UN rule, while the societal majority was split between the ‘traditional’ (e.g. appointed sucoaldeia chiefs) and the ‘modern’ (e.g. elected members in the CDCs) segments, a ‘power vacuum’ appeared between them. In this context,
the policies deliberated in the ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’, such as politicising the army, increased dependency of the Timorese elite on the foreign advisors, and orienting the Portuguese language for political communication, were largely inimical to making a peace ‘positive’, exacerbating the agential, structural and socio-cultural conditions, and aggravating the ‘legitimation problem’ with the protracted inequalities/differences between the ‘modern’/national/political and the ‘traditional’/local/societal agencies/entities. The UNTAET’s ‘power-over’ the Timorese elite and non-elite to impose the global ‘consensus’ on (neo)liberal statebuilding thus formed a deliberative political disorder at the global periphery (Phase I in Figure 7.1).

The second phase (deteriorating a ‘deliberative political disorder’) highlighted the process by which the FRETILIN government as the successor of the ‘UN kingdom’ securitised deliberation and radicalised societal resistance from 2002 to 2007. The government’s ‘winner-take-all’ approach to ‘rational argumentation’ continued to marginalise the societal majority, and undermined the quality of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. In response to the emerging societal defiance, the government securitised it: repressing the opposition, politicising the veterans, and secularising the polity, and introduced party politics locally. These measures, however, radicalised the elite and forces in the state, as well as the disaffected in the society, over the exacerbated differences/divisions, and caused the political ‘crisis’ in 2006. Yet the ‘rational’ choices, such as the change of the government and the re-deployment of international forces, failed to contain the radicalised difference. Enforcing the elections as an external conditionality enabled the antagonised political elite and the disaffected societal opportunists to meet and extrematise their radicalised discourses, and made the electoral process increasingly turbulent. Yet the elections also brought an opportunity for the ‘modern’/political to recognise the ‘traditional’/societal and improve
deliberative quality thereafter. President Gusmao, for example, mobilised the ‘traditional’ segment in the society for his bid for the premiership, and some veteran groups joined the mainstream party politics. The defeat of the FRETILIN in the elections paved the way for the four-party coalition led by the President-turned-PM Gusmao to improve the quality of space and power for deliberation (i.e. recognitiveness and cooperativeness), and enhance the interaction between the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal in the new deliberative space; although asymmetry remained between them. The willingness of the coalition government to cooperate with the societal forces indicated a sign of the changing dimension of power from ‘power-over’ to ‘power-to’ in the polity, and a turning-around of political de-legitimation and societal dissent under the FRETILIN government (Phase II in Figure 7.1).

The third phase (forming a ‘deliberative political order’) illustrated the process by which the state’s measures for ‘hybrid argumentation’ seemed to have proceeded to a ‘deliberative political order’, yet also engendered the risk of insecurity that the state-led ‘hybridisation’ made it difficult to transform the difference across the polity into the ‘moral’/‘agonistic’ disagreement from 2007 to 2012. As the coalition government invited the societal non-elite to the state, the cabinet and the parliament became a space to ‘hybridise’ political and societal interests and discourses, and improved spatial quantity (i.e. inclusion) in deliberation. The new measures for ‘buying peace’ in a ‘big tent’ approach to employing the oil fund moderated the state-society relations. Agential and structural measures, such as social security programmes, local electoral reform, and financial decentralisation for development, were largely effective in nurturing cooperation in state-society relations, and improving the quality of power dimension in the deliberative space. One of the positive results was the diminished societal support to the armed rebels. Although this impelled the ‘isolados’ to
assassinate the political leaders, their failure ended the ‘crisis’. Yet the state-led ‘hybridisation’ under the liberalising/modernising statehood also caused the new inequality/difference to undercut the deliberative transition. While the state resources attracted the political elite to engage with the political disagreement through the ‘dialogue’/’pact’, the rapid fiscal expansion deformed the rural political economy, dichotomising the societal non-elite between the ‘winners’ (e.g. those who received benefit from the state including veterans and traditional and religious leaders) and the ‘losers’ (e.g. those who were excluded from benefit from the state such as youth and women). While the ‘dialogued’/’pacted’ politicians have ignored the growing societal difference/division, the societal forces are often on the side of the ‘winners’ (e.g. traditional leaders), or remain uncritical in addressing the grievances of the ‘losers’ (e.g. CSOs), partly due to the legacy of (neo)liberal statebuilding. Accordingly, although the government’s measures changed the dimensions of power from ‘power-over’ to ‘power-to’ for ‘hybrid argumentation’ and more recently to ‘power-with/within’ in view of the elite’s engagement in political disagreement and societal empowerment, the emerging grievances of the societal ‘losers’ as a side-effect of the state-led ‘hybridisation’ increases the risk of insecurity to reverse a forming ‘deliberative political order’ (Phase III in Figure 7.1). These accounts of the three phases in East Timor allow the mapping of a ‘hybrid’ path with the key events in transition towards ‘deliberative political order’ in the matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ (Figure 7.1).
Second, in contrast, the first phase in the Somaliland case (forming a ‘deliberative political order’) informed an emancipatory approach to ‘agonistic argumentation’ by which the ‘traditional’/societal forces ‘agonised’ against the ‘modern’/political forces in response to the latter’s failure in political ‘rationalisation’ from 1991 to 1993. Although the collapse of the dictatorial regime in Mogadishu allowed the SNM to take over the Somaliland ‘state’, the challenging internal settings constrained the SNM elite from exercising ‘power over’ to build...
a ‘modern’ state in the war-torn society. The budgetary constraints, for example, made it difficult for the SNM administration to deliver services and demobilise clan militias. The ‘rational’ choice to control the key tax bases, the Hargeisa airport and the Berbera port, however, renewed and escalated the protracted intra-Isaaq identity/differences. While the SNM elite failed ‘rational argumentation’ due to the intra-elite competition alongside their clan constituencies nationally, it was the societal non-elite, such as local elders and religious leaders, who explored societal deliberation to mediate and reconcile the societal differences locally. Their overall ‘success’ in the inter-clan meetings and conferences empowered the societal leaders and enabled them to intervene in the radicalised political difference in a bottom-up manner. In contrast to the case of East Timor, the absence of external intervention allowed the home-grown ‘agonistic’ dialogues to culminate in the Boroma Conference, where societal leaders led political deliberation towards mediating the radicalised difference, adopting the two Charters for peace and governance as the national *xeer* (customary laws), and subsequently replacing the incumbent president of the SNM chairman with a veteran civilian politician, Mohamed Egal. The ‘agonistic argumentation’ also institutionalised the *Guurti*, the Council of Elders, as the state’s legislature and the society’s *shir* at the state level, to deliberate the politico-societal inequalities/differences. In this sense, the *Guurti*, as the ‘hybrid’ space between the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal, improved the preconditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation in spatial inclusiveness and recognitiveness as well as empowering the society to exercise ‘power against’ (or ‘agonise’) the state. It was instrumental in restoring political legitimacy and ceasing political violence nationwide (Phase I in Figure 7.2). The institutionalisation of *Guurti* has been often interpreted as the political ‘hybridity’ and its outcome of security as the ‘hybrid political order’ (e.g. Boege et al. 2008, Hoehne 2010, Renders et al. 2010).
The second phase (deforming a ‘deliberative political order’) informed societal resilience in the ‘agonistic’ dialogues despite the Guurti’s ‘failure’ to engage the radicalised difference, as well as a societal limitation in that the consolidated government ‘hijacked’ the societal initiative and fought back in ‘agonistic argumentation’ from 1993 to 1997. Despite the fragile settings, the newly-inaugurated President Egal managed the budgetary deficit, yet faced contestations from the ousted former President ‘Tuur’ and his clan constituency. As the former had improved public functions, the latter was aggrieved by the limited access to state resources. In view of the internal tension in Somaliland, the UNOSOM II in Mogadishu invited the ousted latter to Mogadishu to promote the federalist position of Somalia vis-à-vis the nationalist position of the former in Somaliland. The government’s determination for dissensus on the UN intervention led to violent conflict between the government and the opposition, firstly over the control of the Hargeisa airport as the key tax base, and subsequently spreading to the peripheries. In turn, the Guurti had been mostly inactive in view of the radicalised difference. The regular payment and bribery undermined the Guurti as the ‘impartial’ space for ‘agonistic argumentation’, and led it to rubber-stamp the government’s acts. The ineffective channels of communication between the government and the opposition had stalemated the radicalised differences for two years until another cycle of ‘agonistic’ dialogues emerged in the society. It was, among others, the Peace Committee of Somaliland, a diaspora civic group, which played a catalyst role in bridging the antagonised clan constituencies, and the local elders who partly echoed it and stood up to mediate between them. In the meantime, the government boosted its position, as the opposition was delegitimised by the internal defeat and the external crisis (e.g. the departure of UNOSOM II and the death of Gen. Aideed in Mogadishu). This allowed President Egal who had feared the emancipatory ‘success’, to intervene in the societal initiative, convene a state-led ‘national’ conference, and fight back in ‘agonistic argumentation’ to form a ‘consensus’ on power-
sharing with the opposition. Yet the achieved ‘peace’ remained largely ‘negative’ since the state barely managed the radicalised differences (Phase II in Figure 7.2).

The third phase (reforming a ‘deliberative political order’) showed the home-grown democratisation which expanded the deliberative space in the multi-party system, yet also created new inequalities/differences in the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ segments as the risk of insecurity which undermined a full transition to ‘deliberative political order’ from 1997 to 2005 (and thereafter). The expanded power-sharing with the opposition to ‘buy peace’ was, however, costly, pushing the government to explore funding and taxation from the capitalists to the local entities. While the Guurti had been largely tamed by the government, the societal coalition between the emerging capitalists and the local entities led by traditional leaders urged the government to transform the ‘hybrid’ polity into constitutional democracy. This home-grown, bottom-up democratisation, however, caused multiple challenges. Constitution-making was soon stalemated by the difference between the ‘modernist’ executive and the ‘traditionalist’ legislature. It was the external threats, such as the formations of Puntland and TNG in Mogadishu, which pushed the divisive politicians to re-engage in ‘agonistic argumentation’ and reach a consensus on the draft constitution for the public referendum. A rushed move of the government towards the multi-party system, however, exacerbated the entrenched difference between the ‘modernists’ and the ‘traditionalists’ across the polity. While political negotiation had been stalemated, the sudden death of President Egal helped the contesting politicians to set aside their differences and discontinue political antagonism. The carefully-designed electoral system was helpful in the formation of the multi-ethnic political parties as the new space for ‘agonistic argumentation’. Subsequently, the three elections in the first electoral cycle from the local to the national levels facilitated the further transition of approach to deliberation from ‘agonistic argumentation’ to ‘engaging in
disagreement’ with ‘agonistic respect’ given, for example, the close presidential race in 2003 and the inter-party cooperation against the armed confrontation against Puntland in 2004. Yet challenges remain. Among others, the ‘winner-take-all’ electoral regime has created new inequalities/differences between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ in the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ segments. The ‘monetisation of elections’ in the clan-based society has dichotomised the ‘winners’, such as the capitalists and elders from the major clans, and the ‘losers’, such as women, youth, and minorities in the society. While the state politicians ‘engage in disagreement’ with the ‘winners’, they often leave the grievances of the ‘losers’ unaddressed. While the CSOs funded by the ‘winners’ are largely uncritical, societal elders and religious leaders also face systemic constraints, such as internal division, on responding to the societal grievances. Moreover, the growing attention of donors to democratisation has undermined the local ownership of democracy, delegitimised foreign aid, and caused tension between locals and donors. Accordingly, the process of home-grown democratisation and the ‘success’ of the first electoral cycle, to some extent, proves that the dimension of power has been in the form of ‘power-with/within’ where the political elite and the societal non-elite acknowledge their disagreements within the democratic rules of the game. Yet, the excessive ‘monetisation of politics’ in the liberal statehood supported by donors has caused the new horizontal inequalities to undermine the reforming ‘deliberative political order’ (Phase III in Figure 7.2). These accounts of the three phases in Somaliland similarly allow the mapping of an ‘agonistic’ path with the key events in transition towards ‘deliberative political order’ in the matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ (Figure 7.2)
Figure 7.2: An ‘agonistic’ path in transition towards ‘deliberative political order’ in Somaliland

These accounts of the three sub-periods (i.e. building peace, recurring conflict, and re-building peace) in the two countries highlight the difference in the paths towards ‘deliberative political order’ in the matrix of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ (Figure 7.3). Despite the similarity in chronological transition (i.e. stability-disorder-stability), the difference in...
progression (i.e. the lower U curve in East Timor vis-à-vis the upper U curve in Somaliland) indicates the significant impact of external intervention in peacebuilding, which East Timor accepted yet Somaliland rejected, on pre-conditioning ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and shaping the different trajectories towards ‘deliberative political (dis)order’. In East Timor, given the state’s ‘power-over’ the society, the international peacebuilders at the outset, and the Timorese diaspora-turned elite thereafter, undertook a ‘top-down’, ‘quick and dirty’ approach to the spatial expansion of ‘rational argumentation’ (e.g. NCC, NC, CDC, DAC, Constitutional Assembly and National Parliament thereafter, etc.) to ‘modernise’/liberalise the post-colonial, post-conflict polity. Yet, the created space for political deliberation was highly unrecognitive/exclusive of ‘traditional’/societal forces and asymmetrical in terms of ‘power-over’, and degraded the quality of space and power (i.e. Phase I of the lower U curve in Figure 7.3). As a result, the ‘failure’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation radicalised the inherited ‘legitimation problem’ and caused the ‘crisis’. Yet, the societal expression of ‘power-against’ during the ‘crisis’ impelled the antagonised ‘modern’/political forces to acknowledge the ‘traditional’/societal resilience (e.g. Gusmao’s approach to the societal leaders during the electoral campaign) and turn around the power dimension thereafter (i.e. Phase II of the lower U curve in Figure 7.3). After the elections, the AMP coalition government transformed the dimension of power from ‘power-over’ to ‘power-to’ in a ‘top-down’ yet more co-optive/cooperative approach to the state-led ‘hybrid argumentation’, in order to moderate state-society relations and de-radicalise the radicalised socio-political differences. The recent shift from ‘power-to’ to ‘power-with/within’ allowed the empowered societal forces to push back the state through deliberation, and the ‘dialogued’/‘pacted’ political elite to ‘engage in political disagreement’ (i.e. Phase III of the lower U curve in Figure 7.3). In contrast, in Somaliland, the collapse of the Barre regime enabled the SNM elite to occupy the vacant state and exert ‘power-over’ to set up a ‘modern’ polity, yet soon radicalised the political
differences. In turn, the lack of external intervention urged the societal forces to express ‘power-against’ and ‘agonise’ the antagonised elite to cease fire and establish the *Guurti* as the societal power base in a ‘hybrid’ polity (i.e. Phase I of the upper U curve in Figure 7.3). The institutionalised ‘hybridity’, however, did not lead to ‘hybrid argumentation’ as the *Guurti* had been prone to consolidating government in the state system. Although the external manipulation (UNOSOM II) radicalised the political differences, the *Guurti* left them largely unaddressed. While the societal resilience had re-emerged in ‘agonistic’ dialogues, it was the consolidated government that employed ‘agonistic argumentation’ to seek a consensus on power-sharing with the opposition and de-radicalise the political differences (i.e. Phase II of the upper U curve in Figure 7.3). After the ceasefire, the societal coalition of the ‘modern’ capitalists and the ‘traditional’ forces in the local entities pushed the state towards constitutional democracy. The well-designed multi-party system has been instrumental in transforming the multi-ethnic political parties into the new deliberative space, shifting the power dimension from ‘power-against’ to ‘power-with/within’, and enabling the polity to hybridise the appointed (*Guurti*) and the elected (Lower House and local assemblies) councils and socio-political deliberators to transform difference into disagreement with ‘mutual/agonistic respect’ in the first electoral cycle (i.e. Phase III of the upper U curve in Figure 7.3).
**Figure 7.3**: Difference in the paths towards ‘deliberative political order’ in East Timor and Somaliland

![Diagram illustrating the paths towards deliberative political order in East Timor and Somaliland.](image)

**Timeline**

- **Phase I**: Building peace
- **Phase II**: Recurring conflict
- **Phase III**: Re-building peace
This empirical evidence suggests the plausibility of the hypothetical mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’: the impact of the UN’s ‘asymmetry’ (‘with’ external intervention) and the home-grown ‘symmetry’ (‘without’ external intervention) on the different trajectories towards ‘deliberative political order’ (see Chapter 2 (2-5)). The UN’s ‘asymmetrical’ approach to peacebuilding based upon (neo)liberal statebuilding limits deliberative agencies in choosing a ‘hybrid’ path over an ‘agonistic’ path towards ‘deliberative political order’. In turn, the home-grown ‘symmetrical’ approach allows deliberative agencies to adopt an ‘agonistic’ path over a ‘hybrid’ path due to the relative socio-political equation. As the hypothesis assumes, the evidence in East Timor shows that, while the UN crafted the structure of asymmetry in the state-society relations, the ‘crisis’ forced the state to cooperate with the society through the state-led ‘hybridisation’ before empowering the society due to a time lag between policy measures to empower the society and turn the ‘quality’ of deliberation and their results/outcomes. In turn, the evidence in Somaliland suggests that the relative symmetry due to the absence of external intervention allowed the society to ‘agonise’ the state before nurturing a cooperative turn in the continuous ‘agonisation’ over time. This contrasts the rigidity of international peacebuilders vis-à-vis the reflectivity/reflexivity of national/local deliberators on the (pre)conditions and settings for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, and stands out the latter’s ‘strategic’ capacity in choosing the best possible approach to (dis)engaging the difference/disagreement in a protracted conflict and transforming it into a ‘positive’ peace. As opposed to the theoretical contentions in seeking ‘the’ approach in ‘Western’ deliberation (see Chapter 2 (2-4)), approaches in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation are plural and interactive with the changing state-society relations over time. As the national/local deliberators in East Timor swiftly shifted a deliberative approach from ‘rationalisation’ to ‘hybridisation’ and ‘engaging disagreement’ after the ‘crisis’, those in Somaliland have similarly transformed it into ‘agonisation’ and
more recently ‘engaging disagreement’ over an extensive timeframe. Somaliland required ten years for deliberative agencies to adopt the tailor-made Constitution and eleven years to hold the first local elections after the end of the civil war. In between, however, a precarious balance and dynamics in the state-society relations caused violent conflict, similar to the case of East Timor. This evidence refutes attempts to romanticise an emancipatory approach to peacebuilding and the capacity of national/local deliberators (e.g. Hoehne 2013).

In this connection, these two cases have shown challenges in practising deliberation in the non-Western, liberalising, and post-conflict context (see Chapter 2 (2-6)). Although a detailed analysis of insecurity is not the purpose of this thesis, the risk of insecurity can be briefly examined as follows. In East Timor, both external and internal contradictions have caused (in)security challenges. As critiques of ‘liberal peace’ have argued, the top-down imposition of the global ‘consensus’ on (neo)liberal statebuilding polarised the ‘post-colonial’ polity between the international/‘modern’/state as the ‘winner’ and the local/‘traditional’/society as the ‘loser’, and allowed the former to ‘other’ the latter through ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ under the UNTAET and its successor, the FRETILIN government. The institutionalisation of ‘rational argumentation’ structurally entrenched asymmetry between the ‘winner’ and the ‘loser’, and re-produced it. The resistive response of the ‘loser’ was evidenced from the discontent of the Timorese elite with the UNTAET to the societal dissensus on the FRETILIN government, leading to the ‘crisis’ in 2006. Accordingly, the ‘crisis’ should be understood not as a single event, but as a process of the ‘insecurity of external modernity’ (e.g. Jabri 2007: 158). As the international/‘modern’/state ‘winner’ ‘othered’ and policed the local/‘traditional’/society ‘loser’, the antagonised and aggrieved latter crossed over the ‘tipping point’ of their dissensus/dissonance (Carapic et al. 2012). The rigid conditionality of external intervention for proceeding to the elections during the ‘crisis’ allowed the
electioneering political elites to interact with the resistive and opportunist societal non-elite, and to politicise and deform the radicalised differences, as was similarly seen elsewhere (e.g. Connolly 1991, Snyder 2000, Mann 2005). In turn, the recent policy measures have exacerbated the internal contradiction. The state-led ‘hybridisation’ in the use of the oil fund has dichotomised the polity between the ‘winning’ political elite and the ‘losing’ societal ‘other’, and deformed vertical legitimacy. This has, however, also polarised the society between the ‘winners’ in the ‘traditional’ segment, such as veterans and veterans-turned-crony capitalists, and the ‘losers’ in the ‘modern’ segment, such as urban youth and women (H.Y. 2015, Y.R.C.S. 2015), and undermined horizontal legitimacy. While both vertical and horizontal legitimacies have been undermined, societal forces are often on the ‘winning’ side (e.g. leaders in the ‘traditional segment’), or face systemic constraints (e.g. CSOs) (B.J.F. 2015, F.H. 2015a, F.H. 2015b), partially as a result of (neo)liberal statebuilding (e.g. Chandler 2010a). This increases the risk that political entrepreneurs exploit the ‘legitimation problem’.

Similarly, external and internal contradictions have also caused (in)security challenges in Somaliland. The UNOSOM’s rationale for (neo)liberal statebuilding in Somalia exacerbated the contestation between the ‘nationalists’ (or the ‘separatists’ in the UNOSOM and Mogadishu’s position) on the side of the Egal government and the ‘federalists’ on the side of the opposition with UN intervention. Before the powerful externally-legitimate discourse, the internationally-unrecognised yet internally-legitimate government chose ‘agonistic argumentation’ to ‘other’ the opposition driven by ‘Tuur’ in Mogadishu in support of the UN,

---

4 This can be seen in the case of Paulino Gama (aka Mauk Muruk), who departed from the resistance movement in the late 1980s in opposing Gusmao’s move to separate the FALINTIL from the FRETILIN (see Chapter 4 (4-2-1-2)). Since his return from the Netherlands, he had accused PM Gusmao of ‘bad’ governance and radicalised his argument. After violent clashes, he was killed by the state forces in Baucau on 8 August 2015. His death attracted broad sympathy from the disaffected in the society (F.H. 2015b, K.U. 2015, P.U. 2015).
and antagonise ‘agonism’ for its political survival (e.g. Connolly 1991, cf. Mouffe 1999). Subsequently, the government explored a material means to tame the *Guurti* and radicalise the political difference so as to resist the external intervention. More recently, the growing intervention for modernisation/democratisation has undermined not only the ‘traditional’ segment, but also the local ownership of home-grown democratisation, and resulted in exacerbating the segmental divisions, de-legitimising foreign aid, and causing tension between locals and donors (J.A.H.I. 2015, S.E.C. 2015). In turn, political violence under the SNM administration was largely related to the internal contradiction. The ‘rational argumentation’ urged the SNM elite to unleash the contained differences/divisions before the common enemy (i.e. the Barre regime in Mogadishu). The prevalence of arms and war culture immediately after the civil war and the prematurity of a liberal conception of ‘co-existence’ in the ‘tradition-cum-modern’ polity ‘agonised’ the deliberative agencies and radicalised their difference (e.g. Ramsbotham 2010). More recently, the newly-introduced ‘winner-take-all’ electoral regime has added a new dimension to the internal contradiction. The ‘monetisation of elections’ has dichotomised the ‘winners’ (e.g. capitalists, elders, and majorities) and the ‘losers’ (e.g. women, youth, and minorities) across the polity. While politicians have engaged in reconciling the ‘winners’, they are largely unresponsive to the ‘losers’. As CSOs (e.g. NGOs and political parties) remain uncritical, the risk that political entrepreneurs manipulate the ‘legitimation problem’ has increased (A.M.A.S. 2015, J.A.H.I. 2015, K.H. 2015). These recent accounts show that, although East Timor and Somaliland seem to have reached the stage of ‘engaging disagreement’, they have faced the continuous challenges of (in)security, among others, in relation to the contradictions to practise ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in the modernising/liberalising context. Without measures to address these, the risk will increase of undercutting the (pre)conditions for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and deforming the ‘deliberative political order’ in the long run.
7-2. Answer to Q1: what caused the UN to have ‘failed’ in East Timor?

While the above review of the cases suggests the plausibility of the hypothetical mechanism of the different paths/processes between ‘with’ and ‘without’ external intervention in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, this second section explores answers to the first research question: ‘what caused the UN to have “failed” (to prevent the ‘crisis’ from recurring in 2006) in East Timor?’ Although the final sub-section in the previous section reviews the ‘empirical’ challenges of (in)security in practising ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, this section aims to examine the ‘actual’ causes of the UN’s ‘failure’ in East Timor given the normative flaw in intervention for international (neo)liberal statebuilding. In doing so, this section highlights tensions in and between ‘international-ness’, ‘(neo)liberal-ness’, and ‘statebuilding’. While the first and the second sub-sections focus on tensions in ‘statebuilding’ and between ‘international-ness’ and ‘(neo)liberal-ness’ respectively, the third sub-section, in this connection, discusses the cause of antagonising ‘agonisation’ in the home-grown ‘failure’ in Somaliland.

First, a tension has been argued for between ‘state-formation’ theory and its application to ‘statebuilding’ for peacebuilding in theory, policy, and practice (e.g. Egnell et al. 2013, Newman 2013, Richmond 2013). While forming a ‘modern’ state has secured political order in Europe (e.g. Moore 1969, Skocpol 1979, Tilly 1990, see Chapter 1 (1-2-2-1)), historical evidence suggests that an ahistorical and a-contextual application to ‘building’ it in the non-Western context has destabilised it due to an adverse effect of the ‘legitimation problem’ (e.g. Young 1988, Bayart 1993, Mamdani 1996, Herbst 2000, see Chapter 2 (2-1)). In response, the Euro-centric theory of state-formation was ‘revised’ to underline political institutionalisation in conservative/coercive (e.g. Huntington 1968) and idealist/liberal views.
(Carothers 2002). Although a nexus between state-formation (in an organic process) and state-building (in an intentional process) remains contentious (e.g. Martinussen 1997, Jahn 2007), the state-building policy upon the Euro-state-formation theory has been dominant in the post-Cold-War global policy arena, urging the Western donors to adopt this as the template/blueprint to re-constitute the non-Western war-torn societies (e.g. Boutros-Ghali 1992, OECD 2005, World Bank 2011). This ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of statebuilding to peacebuilding has, however, had significant implications in the global periphery (e.g. OECD 2008, Paris et al. 2009, see the ‘legitimacy gap’ in Chapter 1 (1-3-1)). Accordingly, this sub-section employs a framework for the process of conflict trans/de-formation (see Figure 2.9 in Chapter 2 (2-7)) to illustrate the causal mechanism of conflict deformation in East Timor where agency, structure, and culture interact in three different phases (Figure 7.4). First, the Portuguese and Indonesian (post-)colonisers formed the ‘legitimation problem’ by dichotomising the state and the society in the structural domain and the ‘modern’ and the ‘traditional’ in the cultural domain, and by causing the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences towards the end of the civil war (Phase I in Figures 7.4). Second, the UNTAET’s ‘(in)direct rule’ then normalised ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ on statebuilding to build the ‘modern’ state over the ‘traditional’ society, yet exacerbated the inherited inequalities/differences in the structural and cultural domains and caused defiance of the Timorese elite (Phase II in Figures 7.4). Third, the FRETILIN administration under the UN’s tutelage adopted the UN-designed ‘rationalisation’ to securitise the society in the structural domain and undermine ‘tradition’ in the cultural domain, while re-producing the ‘legitimation problem’ and causing the societal dissensus that led to the ‘crisis’ in 2006 (Phase III in Figure 7.4). To make matters worse, the UN’s conditionality on ‘force for elections’ allowed the political entrepreneurs and the societal rebels to interact and engage with violence as the electoral process advanced. It is the ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ that deformed conflict
through interaction among agencies, structure, and culture over time. This empirical evidence in East Timor suggests that, due to a tension between the Euro-centric theory of ‘state-formation’ and the normative policy of ‘state-building’, ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ of the latter in an ahistorical and a-contextual application will increase the risk of reproducing the ‘legitimation problem’ with its inequalities/differences, and resuming the political disorder in the non-Western, post-colonial, post-conflict context.

Figure 7.4: Causal mechanism of conflict deformation through ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ in East Timor
Second, if ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ is a key cause of the ‘failure’ in East Timor, a question remains as to whether the power-based (i.e. externally-hegemonic) ‘asymmetry’ or the idea-based (i.e. ‘modern’/liberal-centric) ‘rationalisation’ is more significant in the ‘failure’. In other words, whether the ‘power’ of internationals or the ‘idea’ of liberal peace is more relevant to the cause of the 2006 ‘crisis’? Although the two are closely interlinked, critical theorists have contended for both the power-based and the idea-based critiques on peacebuilding (e.g. Begby et al. 2009, Chandler 2010b, Newman 2013: 145). While the former problematise power gaps between the international/powerful and the local/powerless, the latter interrogate ideational tensions between the ‘modern’/liberal and the ‘traditional’/illiberal. On the power-based side, while Duffield (2001) interprets international peacebuilding as extending a liberal order to the world periphery where violence is normalised, Paris (2002) sees it as a ‘mission civilisatrice’ that allows the West to ‘neo-colonise’ the non-Western ‘Other’ and maintain their power inequality in the global liberal order. The power-based contenders have thus often seen hegemonic securitisation and local contradictions as a cause of ‘failure’. In turn, on the idea-based side, while Pugh (2005) understands liberal peacebuilding as a revised version of the structural adjustment programme, Jabri (2007) views it as a ‘modernisation’ project to ‘other’ the local socio-cultural ‘traditions’. Echoing this, Richmond (2011a) highlights an ontological tension between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘illiberal’/other ideas of peace. The idea-based contenders thus associate policy measures for ‘liberal peace’ with a cause of structural and cultural violence. On the ground, both sides have critically observed the UN’s operations in East Timor. While Chopra (2000) and Beauvais (2001) explore the power-based critique, claiming the UN rulership to be the ‘UN Kingdom’ and ‘benevolent despotism’, Barbara (2008) and Moxham (2008) problematise the UN policies for structural inequality and injustice in the political economy, and Boege et al. (2008) interrogate the UN’s subjugation of Timorese culture given
the idea-based critique. Yet they have not offered answers as to whether the power-based ‘asymmetry’ or the idea-based ‘rationalisation’ is more relevant to the ‘failure’ in East Timor.

The ‘failure’ can be evidenced in three conflicts in East Timor (the 2006 ‘crisis’) and Somaliland (the 1992 and the 1994 conflicts), in setting the power-based ‘(a)symmetry’ and the idea-based ‘argumentation’ as the independent variables and the resultant conflict as the dependent variable. In East Timor, a combination of international peacebuilders and their ‘modern’/liberal-centric ‘rationalisation’ led to the ‘crisis’ in 2006. In turn, in Somaliland, national actors and their home-grown ‘rationalisation’ quickly fell in the first conflict in 1992 after the SNM administration was established in 1991. Although a ‘hybrid’ polity institutionalised ‘agonisation’ in 1993, external manipulation from Mogadishu fuelled the second conflict in 1994. Figure 7.5 shows these causes and effects in the three conflicts. Despite ‘greyness’ in the degree of ‘(a)symmetry’ in the 1994 conflict in Somaliland where international peacebuilders were not physically present, it is categorised as ‘international (-manoeuvred)’ due to their discursive power as the proxy of a division between the ‘federalists’ and the ‘nationalists’ within the national/local deliberators.

**Figure 7.5:** The causes and effects in the three conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Causes (independent variables)</th>
<th>Effects (dependent variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power-based ‘(a)symmetry’</td>
<td>Idea-based ‘argumentation’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>International (-led)</td>
<td>Rationalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>National (-driven)</td>
<td>Rationalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>International (-manoeuvred)</td>
<td>Agonisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given Mill’s method of agreement, a comparison between the 2006 crisis in East Timor and the 1992 conflict in Somaliland indicates a high relevance of ‘rationalisation’ to conflict. This
implies that it is not the ‘asymmetry’ of international peacebuilders, but the ‘rationalisation’ that would have caused the ‘failure’ in East Timor. Yet another comparison between the 2006 crisis in East Timor and the 1994 conflict in Somaliland negates this due to the similarity in the international ‘asymmetry’ that would have led to conflict. Yet a close examination of the 2006 crisis in East Timor shows that the crisis broke out in 2006 after the withdrawal of the UN forces in 2005 which had significantly reduced the degree of international ‘asymmetry’ in coercion (UN 2006). In this sense, the category of power-based (a)symmetry in the 2006 crisis can be modified from ‘international (-led)’ to ‘national (-turned)’. This modification shows the similarity in the causes at the dawns of the 2006 ‘crisis’ in East Timor and the 1992 conflict in Somaliland (Figure 7.6).

**Figure 7.6**: The modified causes of the 2006 crisis in East Timor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Causes (independent variables)</th>
<th>Effects (dependent variable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power-based (a)symmetry</td>
<td>Idea-based argumentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>National (-turned)</td>
<td>Rationalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>National (-driven)</td>
<td>Rationalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>International (-manoeuvred)</td>
<td>Agonisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, the 2006 crisis in East Timor and the 1992 conflict in Somaliland can be explained as follows. The ‘modern’/liberal ‘rationalisation’ commonly excluded the political opposition and entrepreneurs (e.g. ‘isolados’ in East Timor and ‘Alan As’ in Somaliland) from the deliberative space and allowed them to interact with the aggrieved societal non-elite and perpetrators (e.g. excluded veterans and youth in East Timor and clan militias and constituents in Somaliland). This resulted in the immediate relapse into conflict in Somaliland, yet did not do so in East Timor since the UN forces had contained the (de)forming conflict since 1999, yet their departure in 2005 promptly released it in 2006. This
empirical evidence suggests that it is the ‘modern’/liberal-centric ‘rationalisation’ that would increase the risk of political disorder, yet the international ‘asymmetry’ that would enable a (neo)liberal peace to endure.

This insight implies an urgent need for international peacebuilders to revisit their approach to ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’, reflecting both the power-based and the idea-based critiques and the empirical evidence. First, international peacebuilders should acknowledge the risk of a one-dimensional view of power (i.e. ‘power-over’) in their interventions, and transform it into a multi-dimensional view of power, enabling the national/local contestants to engage in deliberation in such an ‘agonistic’ (i.e. ‘power-against’) (e.g. Shinko 2008) and a ‘hybrid’ (i.e. ‘power-to’) (e.g. Richmond 2005b, Mac Ginty 2008) way, given their capacity to both resist and consent. This will require international peacebuilders to interact with, and hear the national/local contestations. Second, in this connection, international peacebuilders should also moderate the ‘modern’/liberal-centric ‘rationalisation’ in deliberation. Although international-national/local interaction may allow the international to explore the ‘contract’ with the national/local (e.g. Barnett et al. 2009), its approach should be bottom-up, enabling the national/local contestants to address their positions and needs, such as socio-economic welfare (e.g. Pugh et al. 2008) and cultural ‘tradition’ (e.g. Boege et al. 2008), in an emancipatory way, rather than exploring the ‘veil of ignorance’ through ‘rationalisation’ in a republican way (e.g. Rawls 1971, Barnett 2006). This critical re-thinking and approach will enable international peacebuilders to understand the power and ideational biases embedded in (neo)liberal statebuilding, and learn from the ‘failure’ to which they contributed in East Timor.
Third, in this connection, the 1994 conflict in Somaliland implies that a bottom-up, home-grown approach to peacebuilding does not necessarily lead deliberative agencies to an ‘agonistic’ (cf. Aggestam et al. 2015) or a ‘hybrid’ (cf. Boege et al. 2008) form of peace/political order. The reasons for ‘antagonising agonism’ (cf. Mouffe 1999) can be explained by, among others, 1) international manoeuvring, and 2) interplay between the constructed difference and the primordial identity. First, the UNOSOM’s intervention exacerbated a discursive difference between the ‘federalist’ and the ‘nationalist’. Second, as the UNOSOM’s manoeuvre undermined deliberative quality in ‘agonisation’, the interplay between the constructed discursive difference and the primordial clan/identity had conflated them into the ‘identity/difference’ (e.g. Connolly 1991), and impelled national deliberators, especially President Egal, not to ‘agonise’ it but to radicalise it for their political purposes (e.g. Bryden 2003, Bradbury 2008, Balthasar 2013). This suggests that ‘agonisation’ or ‘hybridisation’ for conflict transformation/pacification needs to address not only a ‘visible’ form of power at the ‘empirical’ level, but also an ‘invisible’ or ‘hidden’ form of power in constructing knowledge and discourse at the ‘actual’ level (e.g. Gramsci 1971, Foucault 1980), and a primordial (or unmalleable) nature of identity in culture (e.g. Geertz 1973, Laitin 1986, Kompridis 2005, cf. Benhabib 2002). It should then underline the risk of conflating the constructed difference and the primordial identity into the identity/difference (e.g. Connolly 1991). Otherwise, the risk of ‘antagonising’ the identity/difference in ‘agonisation’ and ‘hybridisation’ will increase. As a result, turning around the ‘failure’ (i.e. the ‘agonised agonisation’) required the conditions to address these two reasons, including the continuous ‘agonistic’ dialogues (e.g. the Peace Committee, the resurgence of local elders, and the Hargeisa Conference) to keep improving deliberative quality in ‘agonisation’ between agencies in antagonism (Ramsbotham 2010), as well as the structural change in the exogenous and endogenous settings (e.g. the departure of the UNOSOM II, the technical
defeat of the opposition, and the home-grown democratisation) to turn the identity/difference to the disagreement (Connolly 1991, Gutmann et al. 1996, Deveaux 1999). The next section will explore the causality of this ‘success’ in more detail.

7.3. Answer to Q2: what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced ‘equifinality’ in building peace?

This third section explores answer to the second research question: ‘what caused East Timor and Somaliland to have experienced “equifinality” in building peace’. In other words, how did deliberators in East Timor and Somaliland depart from a ‘rational’ form of argumentation after the ‘failure’ and escape from the ‘conflict trap’ which had often been fallen into elsewhere (e.g. Collier 2007)? In contrast to the first question inquiring into the ‘failure’, this second question examines the causality of the ‘success’ (i.e. conflict transformation) after the ‘failure’. In answering this, this section focuses power-sharing and electoral measures, since both East Timor and Somaliland have adopted them to institutionalise their ‘success’. Accordingly, it briefly reviews contentions on power-sharing and electoral measures and their interaction with deliberation in divided societies, and subsequently examines their roles in institutionalising the causal mechanisms of conflict transformation through ‘hybridisation’ in East Timor, ‘agonisation’ in Somaliland, and ‘equifinality’ in the two countries, employing the framework for the process of conflict transform/de-formation as above Figure 7.4 (see Figure 2.9 in Chapter 2 (2-7)). It then discusses the key findings and suggestions from the analysis.

In response to the risk of majoritarian democracy excluding the ‘minority’/‘losers’ in plural societies, among others, power-sharing and electoral engineering have been widely considered as instrumental measures to accommodate the competing elite and moderate their
discourses, and mitigate or recover from political conflict (Lijphart 1977, Horowitz 1985, Stewart 2000). In view of the conflict-ridden, post-colonial West Africa, Lewis (1965), for example, associated the majoritarian system, as a colonial legacy, with political exclusion and conflict, and instead proposed power-sharing and electoral measures to restore political inclusion and recognitiveness. Contentions for power-sharing and electoral engineering for conflict resolution have been often linked with consociationalism (e.g. Lijphart 1977) and centripetalism (e.g. Horowitz 1985), partly reflecting differences in ontological position: viewing identity/difference either as primordial or as constructed, and in epistemological position: underlining either political accommodation or moderation (e.g. Sisk 1996, O‘Flynn 2006). While the former often seeks to accommodate the divisive elite with measures for power-sharing, forming coalition governments and granting veto rights (Lijphart 1977: 25), the latter tends to underline electoral engineering to moderate them through federalism and proportional representation (Horowitz 1985: 601). Despite their different aims (e.g. Barry 1975, Sisk 1996, Reilly 2001, O’Leary 2005), both power-sharing and electoral engineering have been increasingly adopted as policy measures to manage conflict and build peace in divided societies (e.g. Sisk 1996, Roeder et al. 2005, Call 2012). More recently, while power-sharing has been extensive from political (at the national and sub-national levels) to military and economic power-sharing (Hartzell et al. 2007), electoral measures have been revisional in view of the role of ‘ethnic’ parties in political accommodation (Chandra 2004, Birnir 2007, cf. Horowitz 1985, Sisk 2008). Yet, their mixed results in peacebuilding have raised further contentions on the reasons for the ‘failure’ and the conditions for the ‘success’ (Rothchild et al. 2005, Jarstad et al. 2008, Sriram 2008). For example, Jarstad et al. (2008) identify the vertical, horizontal, systemic, and temporal dilemmas in power-sharing, highlighting tensions between legitimacy and efficacy on the vertical level (e.g. who shares power?), between inclusion and exclusion on the horizontal level (e.g. whom do power-holders represent?).
between internal and external at a systemic level (e.g. who owns the agreement?), and between short-term and medium/long-term effects at a temporal level, given changing power relations between powerholders over time (2008: 11). In turn, Rothchild et al. (2005) suggest the key conditions for ‘success’, such as agential (e.g. elite dominance and commitment), structural (e.g. state strength, economy, demography), and cultural (e.g. cultural compatibility) conditions (2005: 41-48).

Deliberation theorists have also interacted with power-sharing and electoral measures to enhance deliberation in plural/divided societies (e.g. Dryzek 2005, O’Flynn 2006, Drake et al. 2011). While the Rawlsian scholars often engage in power-sharing to explore the ‘veil of ignorance’ in the state (e.g. O’Flynn 2006, Drake et al. 2011), the Habermasian scholars tend to explore electoral engineering to create ‘ideal speech situations’ in the society (e.g. Dryzek 2005). From the perspective of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, while power-sharing to accommodate elite dynamics may address the quantity of space (inclusion) and power (equation), electoral engineering for socio-political moderation may highlight the quality of space (recognition) and power (cooperation) for deliberation in the state-society interface (to be further discussed later, in Figure 7.10). Yet, deliberative theorists often remain cautious in upholding power-sharing due to its normative contradictions (Dryzek 2005: 222, O’Flynn 2006: 19-20). For example, an arbitrary decision as to who shares power would end up with political exclusion, and thus increase the risk of ‘failing’ deliberation (O’Flynn 2006: 120). These debates, however, often face critiques on the lack of empirical evidence, particularly in the conflict-ridden context (Ugarriza et al. 2014). Since East Timor and Somaliland commonly adopted power-sharing and electoral measures, the next sub-section examines a nexus between these measures, deliberation, and peacebuilding in the causal mechanisms of ‘hybridisation’ in East Timor, ‘agonisation’ in Somaliland, and ‘equifinality’ in the two
countries. In doing so, it highlights 1) the ‘causes’ of ‘hybridisation’, ‘agonisation’, and ‘equifinality’, 2) the ‘measures of power-sharing and electoral engineering’ to institutionalise ‘hybridisation’, ‘agonisation’, and ‘equifinality’, and 3) the ‘(side)effects’ and ‘conditions’ of ‘hybridisation’, ‘agonisation’, and ‘equifinality’, in view of interaction between agency, structure, and culture over time.

In East Timor, ‘rationalisation’ under the UN and the FRETILIN administration (de)formed the inequalities/differences that led to the 2006 crisis, yet nurtured the precedent of ‘hybridisation’, allowing the disaffected societal actors to participate in the national elections in 2007. Among others, the then President Gusmao formed the CNRT, his political party, and invited his societal allies to be parliamentary candidates (i.e. causes of ‘hybridisation’). These political newcomers failed to gain the overall majority, yet won sufficient seats to form a coalition government. In view of the available oil revenues and the societal dissensus, the coalition government deliberated extensive measures to share the state’s power with the society through ‘hybridisation’. First, it launched a variety of social security programmes to share oil revenues across the society. Second, it reformed the local electoral system to share power with the lia nains, the elders who preside over societal deliberation, at the suco council. Third, it commenced the local development programmes to devolve both political and economic power to the local entities (i.e. measures of power-sharing and electoral engineering). These power-sharing and electoral measures moderated the state-society relations, and legitimised politics. They also enabled the former resistance network and actors (e.g. traditional and religious leaders) to resurge. Among others, the Church played a catalyst role in bridging between the CNRT and the FRETILIN and forming a ‘grand’ coalition despite the protracted ‘agonism’ between their leaders. This evidence suggests that
‘hybridisation’ has reached the stage of ‘engaging difference/disagreement’ (i.e. *effects of ‘hybridisation’*).

Distributing the tangible ‘dividend of peace’ to the society has, however, also engendered side-effects. While the state-led economic measures ‘crowded out’ the local subsistence economy and increased societal dependency on the state, the societal ‘traditionalisation’ deformed the patrimonial structure not only to benefit the ‘strong men’ and preserve endemic corruption as a sign of ‘resource curse’ (e.g. Collier 2007), but also to deprive and impoverish the ‘modern’ weak, such as women and youth. The failure of the elite-centric political parties and the service-delivery-driven CSOs in addressing the emerging vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences leaves societal grievances having grown (i.e. *side-effects of ‘hybridisation’*). In turn, it is the agential, structural, and cultural conditions that enabled ‘hybridisation’ to ‘succeed’. First, resource-abundance allowed the government to employ oil revenues not only to ‘buy peace’, but also to reduce aid dependency in policy deliberation. Second, the socio-cultural practice of deliberation in the ‘old’ democracy, such as the *nahi biti*, enabled national deliberators to undertake ‘hybrid argumentation’. The hierarchical *lulik* system allowed the paternalistic leaders (‘big brothers’) to adapt the state-led ‘hybridisation’ despite its side-effects. Third, interacting with these structural and cultural conditions, PM Gusmao’s charismatic personality was essential to implementing ‘hybridisation’. As the resistance leader and the first President, he has socio-political authority and networks across the polity. Despite increasing criticism of his paternalistic tendencies, his political approach has been largely inclusive and conciliatory, distinguishing him from his rival Alkatiri who was exclusive and coercive. His charismatic leadership forced national deliberators, whether his allies or adversaries, to ‘agonise’ yet respect his ‘will’ (i.e. *conditions of ‘hybridisation’*).
Figure 7.7 illustrates these causes, measures, (side)effects, and conditions in the causal mechanism of conflict transformation through ‘hybridisation’ in East Timor.

**Figure 7.7**: Causal mechanism of conflict transformation through ‘hybridisation’ in East Timor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase I: Precedent</th>
<th>Phase II: Hybridisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rationalisation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hybridisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The societal participation in the 2007 elections</td>
<td>The sharing of politico-economic power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency: The FRETILIN admin.</td>
<td>• Forming a coalition government at the national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The socio-cultural dissensus on ‘rationalisation’</td>
<td>• Launching the social security programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td>• Reforming the electoral system at the local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Launching the local development programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditions:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agency: The AMP government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The available oil revenue that reduced aid dependency (structural)</td>
<td>The sharing of politico-economic power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The democratic culture (i.e. ‘old’ democracy) in the <em>lutik</em> system (cultural)</td>
<td>• Inviting the traditional leaders at the coalition government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The charismatic personality of PM Gusmao (agential)</td>
<td>• Inviting the traditional leaders at the <em>suco</em> council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Distributing public fund and work to traditional and religious leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effects:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict transformation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Moderating state-society relations</td>
<td><strong>Side-effects:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legitimising politics</td>
<td>• Crowding out the local subsistence economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Leading to a ‘grand’ coalition</td>
<td>• Resurging patrimonialism and endemic corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engaging ‘difference/disagreement’</td>
<td>• Forming horizontal inequalities between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Urging the ‘losers’ to resist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

278
Similarly, in Somaliland, as the precedent, ‘rationalisation’ under the SNM administration (de)formed the inequalities/differences leading to political conflict. Yet, in contrast to East Timor, traditional leaders explored ‘agonistic’ dialogues to legitimise politics, incorporating the Guurti, the Council of Elders, in the state and establishing a ‘hybrid’ polity. However, since the UN’s manoeuvring had exacerbated inter-clan conflict, violence resumed soon, and lasted until another cycle of ‘agonistic’ dialogues emerged (i.e. causes of ‘agonisation’). In response to this, President Egal re-constituted the state, embracing not only the opposition in the executive and legislative, but also the clan militias in the army. While the extensive power-sharing re-legitimised the ‘hybrid’ polity, the budget constraints pushed the government to explore taxation from business to local entities. Having nothing to offer to the emerging and locally-established non-state actors impelled the government to democratise the ‘hybrid’ polity and broaden political participation. Democratisation in Somaliland can thus be interpreted not only as an effect of state-society contestations over coercion and exploitation (e.g. Tilly 1990), but also as an institutional measure of power-sharing between political and societal agencies. The government then adopted an electoral system to limit the number of political parties, yet facilitate inter-clan, intra-party coalition (e.g. Gunther et al. 2001), and reinvigorate ‘agonisation’ within the multi-ethnic parties and beyond (i.e. measures of power-sharing and electoral engineering). The customised electoral system thus expanded deliberative space from the Guurti to the party level, moderating state-society relations, re-legitimising the ‘hybrid’ polity, and transforming ‘agonisation’ into ‘engaging disagreement’ through the regular elections. Dense and fluid socio-political interactions in democratic politics have lowered the risk of inter-clan conflict (i.e. effects of ‘agonisation’).

The home-grown democratisation has, however, also generated side-effects. The ‘monetisation’ of elections caused the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ in the ‘modern’ and
‘traditional’ segments, reproducing materialism and clanism in the polity. Also, the external support for ‘vote for peace’ has exacerbated the ‘modern’/political–‘traditional’/societal divide. While these have delegitimised the ‘hybrid’ polity, the nascent political parties and CSOs ‘fail’ to address the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences (i.e. side-effects of ‘agonisation’). In turn, similar to the Timorese case, it is the structural, cultural, and agential conditions that enabled ‘agonisation’ to ‘succeed’. First, resource-scarcity was advantageous not only in reducing external interest, but also forcing the government to seek taxation and hold the state accountable to the society, leading to the home-grown democratisation (Eubank 2012). While international ‘non-recognition’ had aggrieved Somaliland, it conversely motivated the government to keep governance ‘good’ and distinguish itself from the ‘failed’ state in Mogadishu. Moreover, the absence of direct external intervention allowed national deliberators to form a ‘hybrid’ polity despite indirect influence from time to time (e.g. manoeuvres from the UNOSOM II, Puntland, and Mogadishu). Second, the socio-cultural tradition of ‘pastoral’ democracy, such as the shir, also contributed to establishing a ‘hybrid’ polity and (re)forming ‘agonisation’ thereafter. The egalitarian principle in the diya-paying group urges the government to broadly distribute state resources, which is even limited at the inter-clan level. Linguistic homogeneity and a rich oral culture also make inter-subjective communication dense and fluid. Third, interacting with these, President Egal’s aristocratic personality was effective in (re)forming ‘agonisation’. His familial wealth/kinship and senior political authority as the PM in Somaliland and Somalia in the 1960s enabled him to broadly engage with the Isaaq majority, whether ruling or in opposition. His ‘clan-centric’ approach as the PM in Somalia, which was heavily criticised as the key cause of Barre’s emergence in 1969, nevertheless assured the traditional leaders of ‘agonisation’ in the ‘hybrid’ polity, vis-à-vis his predecessor’s ‘modern’ but exclusive approach to ‘rationalisation’ (i.e. conditions of
‘agonisation’). Figure 7.8 illustrates these causes, measures, (side)effects, and conditions in the causal mechanism of conflict transformation through ‘agonisation’ in Somaliland.

**Figure 7.8:** Causal mechanism of conflict transformation through ‘agonisation’ in Somaliland

Phase I: Precedent

- **Rationalisation**
- **Structure**
  - The establishment of the ‘hybrid’ polity
  - Agency: The SNM admin.
- **Culture**
  - The ‘agonistic’ dialogues after the 1992 and 1994 conflicts

Phase II: Agonisation

- **Agonisation**
- **Structure**
  - The sharing of politico-military power
    - Reforming the coalition government at the national level
    - Incorporating clan militia in the state forces
    - Democratisation as result of bargaining taxation between the state and the non-state actors
  - Agency: The Egal administration
  - The ‘agonistic’ dialogues after the 1992 and 1994 conflicts
- **Culture**
  - The sharing of politico-military power
    - Expanding the Guurti at the national level
    - Incorporating traditional leaders in an inter-clan, intra-party coalition in the multi-ethnic parties

**Conditions:**
- The resource scarcity, international non-recognition, and regional fragility (structural)
- The democratic culture (i.e. ‘pastoral’ democracy) in the diya-paying group (cultural)
- The aristocratic personality of President Egal (agential)

**Effects:**
- Moderating state-society relations
- Legitimising politics
- Engaging ‘difference/disagreement’
- Increasing state-society interactions and lowering the risk of inter-clan conflict

**Side-effects:**
- Monetising electoral politics
- Reproducing materialism and clanism
- Exacerbating inequalities between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’
- Delegitimising the hybrid polity
The above analysis indicates that the ‘equifinality’ in the two ‘successes’ is based on similarities and differences in the causes, measures, (side)effects, and conditions. Both polities had similarly experienced the emergence of societal dissensus on ‘rationalisation’ under PM Alkatiri and President ‘Tuur’ and initiatives for political change, as well as the cultural drive for traditionalisation in the precedent. The socio-cultural non-elite were reflexive on the political ‘failure’, granting a new mandate to Gusmao through the national elections, and Egal through the inter-clan dialogues, to transform ‘rationalisation’ into ‘hybridisation’ and ‘agonisation’ respectively (although the external manoeuvre antagonised ‘agonisation’ in Somaliland thereafter) (i.e. causes of ‘equifinality’). In response, both PM Gusmao and President Egal recognised the socio-cultural non-elite and their authority at the local level, invited them to national and local politics, and shared available resources with them. In view of the radicalised ‘legitimation problem’ with the (de)formed inequalities/differences, they undertook a series of measures, such as (re)forming the coalition governments yet sharing different types of power, notably political and economic power in East Timor vis-à-vis political and military power in Somaliland. They also launched electoral reform, incorporating the elders in the local entities in East Timor, yet democratising the ‘hybrid’ polity in Somaliland (i.e. measures of power-sharing and electoral engineering). While the economic ‘dividend of peace’ empowered the society and substantiated the local entities in East Timor, the well-designed/customised democratisation allowed the ‘multi-ethnic’ political parties to ‘equivocalise’ inter-clan identity/difference. These state-society/elite-non-elite accommodations and moderations have improved state-society relations, re-instituting ‘post-colonial’ deliberation in the ‘grand’ coalition in East Timor and the inter-clan, intra-party dialogues in Somaliland, and enabling political leaders to engage in disagreement despite their ‘deep’ differences (i.e. effects of ‘equifinality’).
Despite these ‘successes’ in the short term, both polities have formed new inequalities/differences between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ in the medium term. The horizontal inequalities emerged between those who received the ‘dividend’ from the state and those who did not in East Timor, and those who were able to mobilise material or clan resources for the elections and those who were not in Somaliland. The latter ‘losers’ have been commonly ignored by the political leaders who are ‘pacted’ or ‘dialogued’ in the state, and the CSOs which are largely uncritical or sub-contracted by the state or donors for service delivery. As a result, both countries have exacerbated not only horizontal inequalities within the society, but also vertical inequalities between the state and the society, and have shown evidence of societal resistance and defiance at street level (i.e. side-effects of ‘equifinality’).

In respect of the conditions, while the internationally-recognised, resource-abundant East Timor was able to exploit oil revenues to address the inequalities/differences, the internationally-unrecognised, resource-scarce Somaliland has relied on taxation and kept the state ‘good’ for political legitimation. Also, both societies have retained the deliberative tradition in the kinship network. Interacting with these, both PM Gusmao with charismatic authority and President Egal with aristocratic authority were politically legitimate and inclusive in the eyes of the majority, yet at the same time, needed to distinguish themselves from their predecessors with the ‘modern/rational’ authority (i.e. Alkatiri in East Timor and ‘Tuur’ in Somaliland) in engaging the inherited inequalities/differences reflexively/reflectively (i.e. conditions of ‘equifinality’). Figure 7.9 illustrates the causal mechanism of conflict transformation through the ‘equifinality’. The analysis of these ‘successes’ indicates that both power-sharing and electoral measures seem effective for transforming conflict. Yet, the complexity and variation in the process of conflict transformation will make a nexus between power-sharing and electoral measures, deliberation, and conflict transformation conditional, and thus require further research to
investigate what conditions and settings make it effective in the post-colonial, post-conflict context.

**Figure 7.9: Causal mechanism of conflict transformation through the ‘equifinality’**

**Phase I: Precedent**

- **Rationalisation**

**Phase II: Equifinality**

- **Hybridisation/Agonisation**

**Conditions:**

- The internationally-recognised, resource-abundant East Timor vs. internationally-unrecognised, resource-scarce Somaliland (structural)
- The democratic culture in the customary governance system (cultural)
- The reflexive/reflective political leaders (agential)

**Structure**

- The societal initiative for political change

**Agency**

- The cultural drive for traditionalisation

**Culture**

**Agency: Elite & non-elite interaction**

- The sharing of politico-non-political power
  - Forming the coalition government at the national level
  - (Re)forming the electoral system (e.g. the local electoral system in East Timor vs. the home-grown democratisation in Somaliland)
  - Sharing economic resources in East Timor vs. military forces in Somaliland

**Structure**

- The sharing of politico-non-political power

**Conflict transformation**

**Effects:**

- Improving state-society relations
- Re-instituting ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and legitimising politics
- Engaging ‘difference/disagreement’

**Side-effects:**

- Forming horizontal inequalities between the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’
- Emerging societal resistance at street level
The above analysis also indicates findings and suggestions, including 1) the effectiveness of power-sharing and electoral measures for institutionalising and transforming deliberation, 2) the feasibility of making ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ agencies interact, and 3) the remaining challenges in transition from peacebuilding to development. First, *power-sharing and electoral measures would be also effective for institutionalising and transforming ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.* As mentioned above, power-sharing and electoral engineering would contribute to pre-conditioning ‘post-colonial’ deliberation through the former to improve the *quantity* of space (inclusion) and power (equation), as well as the latter to enhance the *quality* of space (recognition) and power (cooperation) in the state-society interface respectively.

Figure 7.10 illustrates this nexus in adapting the framework for the process of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation in Figure 2.9 (see Chapter 2 (2-7)).

**Figure 7.10:** Nexus between measures for power-sharing and electoral engineering and ‘success’ in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation

![Diagram showing the nexus between measures for power-sharing and electoral engineering and 'success' in 'post-colonial' deliberation.](image-url)
Although measures for power-sharing and electoral engineering have been in contention between consociationalism and centripetalism (e.g. Barry 1975, Sisk 1996, Reilly 2001, O’Leary 2005), ‘post-colonial’ deliberation would require both, given their respective contributions to pre-conditioning quantity and quality in deliberation. Indeed, East Timor and Somaliland adopted similar measures for power-sharing, such as governmental coalition (i.e. inter-party coalition in the cabinet in East Timor and intra-party coalition in the inter-clan ‘multi-ethnic’ party in Somaliland), yet different electoral measures. Power-sharing allowed the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal to share state power and resources, accommodate the agential dynamics, even narrowly between the ‘winners’, and institutionalise the expansion of space and power in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation. In turn, electoral measures enabled them to moderate their discourses and relations in the deliberative space before, during, and after the elections, and thus transform the expanded space and power in ‘post-colonial’ deliberation over time. For example, interacting with political coalition at the national and local levels, the electoral system in East Timor allows political parties to compete in a single national constituency in the list-PR system, yet requires them to pass the electoral threshold (i.e. 3% of the votes cast) to enter Parliament. This relaxed the formation of political parties given socio-political plurality, yet prevented deliberative polarisation from excluding small parties in the Parliament. The national constituency, however, causes politicians and parties to prioritise national or elite/party interest before local or societal ‘will’ and centralise decision-making (The Asia Foundation 2015). While these measures exacerbate political elitism, they have enabled a small number of the political elite

---

5 The list-PR (proportional representation) system is defined as ‘a system in which each participant party or grouping presents a list of candidates for an electoral district, voters vote for a party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote’ (IDEA 2005: 178). East Timor and Somaliland have adopted this for the parliamentary elections in a single national constituency since 2007 and multiple local constituencies since 2005 (yet modified ballot structure from the closed (party-based) to the open (candidate-based) in 2012 (Kibble et al. 2012b: 10)) respectively.
to form a ‘grand’ coalition and explore an intra-elite ‘veil of ignorance’, if any, in a ‘hybrid’ path towards ‘engaging difference/disagreement’. On the other hand, in democratising the ‘hybrid’ polity, the electoral system in Somaliland limits the number of political parties able to enter the national elections (i.e. 3 parties) due to concerns about inter-clan polarisation (J.A.H.I. 2015). The multiple local constituencies in the list-PR system⁵ impel politicians and parties to prioritise local interests before national interests, yet allow clan constituents to vote for their affiliates and decentralise decision-making (APD 2006a). While these measures have culminated in clanism (ethnocentrism), they have also facilitated the ‘ideal speech situations’, if any, to emerge in the ‘multi-ethnic’ parties and beyond, in an ‘agonistic’ path towards ‘engaging difference/disagreement’. The emerging elitism in East Timor and ethnocentrism in Somaliland have made the ‘hybridisation’ in East Timor and the ‘agonisation’ in Somaliland effective in the short term, yet (de)formed the side-effects in the medium term.

Figure 7.11 compares these measures for power-sharing and electoral engineering and their effects on the approaches to deliberation in East Timor and Somaliland.

**Figure 7.11:** Measures for power-sharing and electoral engineering and their effects on the approaches to deliberation in East Timor and Somaliland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Measures for power-sharing</th>
<th>Measures for electoral engineering</th>
<th>Effects on the approaches to deliberation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Governmental coalition</td>
<td>Limiting the <strong>post</strong>-election party eligibility and designing the <strong>single national</strong> constituency</td>
<td>‘Hybridisation’ upon elitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(inter-party coalition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>Governmental coalition</td>
<td>Limiting the <strong>pre</strong>-election party formation and designing the <strong>multiple local</strong> constituencies</td>
<td>‘Agonisation’ upon ethnocentrism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(intra-party coalition)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the similar power-sharing measures (governmental coalition) became an institutional foundation for a non-rational form of deliberation to ensure political inclusion and equality, the different electoral measures (electoral system design) seemed to establish ‘hybridisation’ upon elitism in East Timor and ‘agonisation’ upon ethnocentrism in Somaliland. This evidence suggests that, while both power-sharing and electoral measures are effective for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, it is the power-sharing measures that would institutionalise it through pre-conditioning deliberative space and power in quantity vis-à-vis the electoral measures that would transform it in quality through regular elections over time. However, the complexity and variation in the process of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and measures of power-sharing and electoral engineering will also require further research to evaluate what institutional measures are effective for institutionalising and transforming deliberation, and their (side)effects over time.

Second, in this connection, interaction and power-sharing between ‘modern'/political and ‘traditional'/societal agencies would also be effective. Their relations can, however, be precarious and conditional. As the mainstream theorists of state formation have seen the ‘traditional’ culture as a threat to a ‘modern’ state in Europe (e.g. Huntington 1968, Tilly 1990, Weber 1991), and a ‘post-colonial’ state in Africa (e.g. Bayart 1993, Mamdani 1996, Chabal et al. 1999), these ‘modernist’ views have centred on the ontological position of (neo)liberal statebuilding for peacebuilding (e.g. Boutros-Ghali 1992, OECD 2005). In turn, the critical strand challenges this, highlighting the role of ‘traditional’ culture (e.g. Englebert 2002, Logan 2013) in ‘hybridising’ and ‘agonising’ with the ‘modern’ state to enhance political legitimacy and build peace (e.g. Boege et al. 2007, Shinko 2008, Mac Ginty et al. 2013). The empirical ‘success’ of ‘hybridisation’ and ‘agonisation’ in East Timor and
Somaliland supports the latter contentions, yet the ‘success’ remains precarious, since the patrimonial structure/culture has commonly re-produced the material and cultural power which is resistive to socio-political change (i.e. especially on the side of the ‘winner’) and causes side-effects in East Timor and Somaliland in the medium term. However it is also conditional, since it relies on a complex mix of exogenous and endogenous settings and conditions as reviewed above. This suggests that a normative application of ‘hybridisation’ and ‘agonisation’ for building a ‘hybrid’ and ‘agonistic’ peace in place of a ‘liberal’ peace without appreciating the internal and external settings and agential, structural, and cultural conditions is likely to increase the risk of causing unexpected/negative consequences. In this sense, researchers have raised concerns about local reality in agential ‘uncivility’ and structural/cultural constraints in theory (e.g. Lederach 1997, Belloni 2001, Schaefer 2010), as well as a ‘clash’ of paradigms between ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ in East Timor (Hohe 2002, Cummins 2010), the ‘antagonisation’ of ‘identity/difference’ in Somaliland (Bryden et al. 2000, Bradbury 2008), and the ‘insecurity of external modernity’ (Jabri 2007: 158) in practice.

Third, the above evidence also suggests that, given the remaining challenges in ‘hybridisation’ and ‘agonisation’, an inter-disciplinary coalition between peace and development studies will be required to critically address the gap that they form in the transition from peacebuilding to development. Recognising the remaining challenge of peacebuilding, both researchers and policy-makers have argued for measures to bridge peacebuilding and development (e.g. Uvin 2002). In the policy arena, for example, echoing the three agendas for peace, development, and democratisation (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1994, 1995), the UN extends a ‘modern’/liberal approach to economic growth from peacebuilding to development (UN 1998). In turn, interacting with the OECD’s position that ‘effective
states matter for development’ (OECD 2011: 11), the World Bank highlights building the capacities of the state for service delivery for post-conflict reconstruction and development (World Bank 2011: 2). These ‘structural’ approaches to ‘modernisation’ and ‘capacity development of the state’ will, however, increase the risk of exacerbating the (de)formed inequalities/differences between the ‘modern’/political and the ‘traditional’/societal in the long term. Indeed, the uncritical, liberal/state-centric approach to development has aggravated the vertical and horizontal inequalities/differences in East Timor and Somaliland (Anderson 2013, Hammond et al. 2011, Moe 2013). On the other hand, a critical strand of development studies has centred on ‘agential’ measures for ‘people-centred’ development (e.g. Freire 1970, Escobar 1995), and contended for an argumentative approach to empowering the society (e.g. Brock et al. 2004, Gaventa 2006b), making development policy ‘from below’ (e.g. Fischer et al. 1993, Brock et al. 2004, IDS 2006), and thus enabling the state to respond to, and engage with, the society in policy-making to address everyday development challenges (e.g. Houtzager et al. 2003, IDS 2005). In this line, an effective way to address the remaining challenges which ‘hybridisation’ and ‘agonisation’ have caused in East Timor and Somaliland thus far would be to re-constitute deliberation and enable the ‘losers’/‘minority’ to argue their positions and needs with the ‘winners’/‘majority’ in power. Given this, room remains for the critical strands of peace and development studies, despite differences in their views of timeline (e.g. short/mid-term vs. long term) and objective (e.g. peace/conflict transformation vs. development/poverty reduction), to make an interdisciplinary coalition based upon their common interest in equality, right, and justice, and address the remaining ‘legitimation problem’ in transition from peacebuilding to development in theory and practice (Jantzi et al. 2009).
7-4. Implications for research and policy, and limitations of the framework

This final section briefly explores 1) implications for advanced research, 2) implications for peacebuilding policy, and 3) limitations of the framework. After setting out the research questions and identifying a conceptual flaw in (neo)liberal statebuilding for peacebuilding, this thesis sets out a contention for a ‘legitimacy-based’ approach to peacebuilding in exploring deliberation so as to legitimise state-society relations, highlighting the ‘traditional’ and horizontal forms of legitimacy in the society (e.g. Holsti 1996, Englebert 2000), vis-à-vis the ‘modern’ and vertical forms of legitimacy in the state (e.g. Hobbes 1968, Weber 1991), given the former’s effect upon cultural cohesion and historicity (e.g. Logan 2013). The empirical evidence in East Timor and Somaliland supports this, suggesting that societal contestation ‘from below’ in a ‘hybrid’ and ‘agonistic’ form of deliberation is more effective than state coercion ‘from above’ in a ‘rational’ form of deliberation to address the ‘legitimation problem’ in the non-Western, post-colonial, post-conflict context. Yet exploring an alternative form of ‘legitimacy for peace’ will require an inter-disciplinary approach to research, challenging the Euro-centric view and engaging with the Southern Other. In doing so, it will be helpful to examine the interaction between human agency and contextual structure/culture at the meta level, rather than separate them at the micro (agency-focused) and macro (structure/culture-focused) levels. Accordingly, peace and conflict research should be explored, not only through politics, economics, and IRs which have been dominant in the discipline, but also through sociology, anthropology, and history, which have been relatively under-emphasised. This epistemological endeavour will keep research relevant to explaining and understanding the socio-political reality in the post-colonial, post-conflict context.
Second, interacting with the critical endeavour, policy-makers have recently extended their attention to a ‘legitimacy-based’ approach to peacebuilding. Evidence can be seen in the recent discussions on state-society relations and social contract in fragile contexts (e.g. DFID 2010, UNDP 2012). These debates, however, remain largely prescriptive in a ‘capacity-based’ approach to addressing ‘how the state responds to the society’, underlining a vertical relationship between the state and the society, yet masking a horizontal variation in the society which is often ‘invisible to’ and ‘hidden from’ the eyes of externals. For example, while DFID (2010) underlines state-society relations in peacebuilding yet views legitimacy as state capacity to meet societal expectations for service delivery, UNDP (2012) contends for legitimacy based upon social contract, yet attempts to ‘secure’ it in making an ‘effective’ state (for service delivery) and a ‘resilient’ society (for independence from the state). These state-centred ‘capacity-based’ approaches will continue to leave the vertical inequality unaddressed. In turn, global NGOs have argued for legitimacy as a by-product of socio-political negotiation and argumentation (e.g. Interpeace 2010). Although such a societal contestation addresses the vertical inequality, its Northern/Western ontological and epistemological position will exclude the non-Northern/Western Other in research and practice, and exacerbate the horizontal inequality. The empirical evidence supports this concern, for example, suggesting that the ‘modern’ approach of Western donors and NGOs has undermined ‘traditional’ authority in the society and exacerbated both vertical and horizontal inequalities in Somaliland (Hammond et al. 2011, Moe 2013, Phillips 2013). This thesis therefore suggests that policymakers and practitioners broaden their understanding of legitimacy and address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/illegitimacies in the post-colonial, post-conflict context, in order to keep the policy and practice of peacebuilding relevant to the socio-political reality. In turn, this thesis offers a theoretical framework central to a ‘legitimacy-based’ approach to addressing the
‘legitimation problem’ and measuring the (pre)conditions and settings, and the progress made in deliberating it across time and space.

Third, however, the framework faces some limitations, including 1) in control variables, 2) in its ontological view on conflict and peace, and 3) in its epistemological assumptions. First, the framework was tested in a small-N comparison, i.e. East Timor and Somaliland, which are similar in geographic and demographic size, (relatively) homogeneous in ethnicity, and in historical and cultural background. Examining its generalisability and applicability to other contexts will, however, require further studies to test the framework in a large-N comparison to broaden the control variables. Second, according to an ontological position in realism, the framework sets out inequality/difference as the key cause of conflict, and ‘deliberative political order’ as the effect of conflict transformation and ‘peace’. This ontological view, however, sidelines other views of the causes and effects of conflict and peace (e.g. Richmond 2005b, 2008b, Mac Ginty 2006: 13). Third, a limitation also exists in the epistemological assumptions on the causal mechanism. Firstly, the theory of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ heavily relies on the Western literature to examine the non-Western socio-political phenomena, yet the Western literature often does not intend to reflect or explain the non-Western socio-political realities. For example, the literature that this thesis has referred to in conceptualising ‘legitimacy’, ‘deliberation’, and ‘difference’ often examines the Western historical context, vis-à-vis the non-Western, contemporary, post-colonial, post-conflict context (see Chapter 1 (1-3) and Chapter 2 in general). Secondly, in complying with ‘critical’ realism, the theory of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ is composed of the two processes of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and conflict trans/de-formation (see Figure 2.9 in Chapter 2 (2-7)). Yet, while human agencies may differently speak, think, and act in the process of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, agential, structural and cultural changes as the effects of deliberation may
emerge disconcertedly and disharmoniously in the process of conflict trans/de-formation, as Chapter 2 (2-7) informs the dilemmas in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’. Moreover, both processes are subject to a complex mix of contextual (pre)conditions and settings which are outside the system of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, as the above sections of the Conclusion indicate. Accordingly, despite its utility, the framework of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ faces limitations in generalisation and application to other post-colonial, post-conflict situations, and thus requires further research to critically examine the fallacy and falsification of the framework.

**Conclusion**

The conclusion re-iterates the key findings and suggestions which have been abstracted from the above review and analysis. It begins with the key empirical findings from the review of the two cases as follows:

- The UN’s ‘asymmetrical’ approach to peacebuilding based upon (neo)liberal statebuilding limits deliberative agencies in choosing a ‘hybrid’ path over an ‘agonistic’ path towards ‘deliberative political order’. In turn, the home-grown ‘symmetrical’ approach allows deliberative agencies to adopt an ‘agonistic’ path over a ‘hybrid’ path due to the relative socio-political equation. This contrasts the rigidity of international peacebuilders vis-à-vis the reflectivity/reflexivity of national deliberators on the (pre)conditions and settings for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, and stands out the latter’s ‘strategic’ capacity in choosing the best possible approach to (dis)engaging the difference/disagreement in a protracted conflict and transforming it into a ‘positive’ peace.
Given this, the detailed analysis of the ‘failure’ (i.e. conflict deformation) and the ‘success’ (i.e. conflict transformation) in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ in East Timor and Somaliland has informed further findings as follows:

- Due to a tension between the Euro-centric theory of ‘state-formation’ and the normative policy of ‘state-building’, ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ of the latter in an ahistorical and a-contextual application will increase the risk of reproducing the ‘legitimation problem’ with its inequalities/differences, and resuming the political disorder in the non-Western, post-colonial, post-conflict context.

- When it comes to a nexus between the ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’ and the risk of insecurity, it is the ‘modern’/liberal-centric ‘rationalisation’ that would increase the risk of political disorder, yet the international ‘asymmetry’ that would enable a (neo)liberal peace to endure.

- Given the risk of ‘asymmetrical rationalisation’, international peacebuilders should acknowledge the risk of a one-dimensional view of power (i.e. ‘power-over’) in their interventions, and transform it into a multi-dimensional view of power, enabling the national/local contestants to engage in deliberation in such an ‘agonistic’ (i.e. ‘power-against’) and a ‘hybrid’ (i.e. ‘power-to’) way, given their capacity to both resist and consent.

- They should also moderate the ‘modern’/liberal-centric ‘rationalisation’ in deliberation. Although international-national/local interaction may allow the international to explore the ‘contract’ with the national/local, its approach should be bottom-up, enabling the national/local contestants to address their positions and needs, such as socio-economic welfare and cultural ‘tradition’, in an emancipatory way.

- However, a bottom-up, home-grown approach to peacebuilding does not necessarily lead deliberative agencies to an ‘agonistic’ or a ‘hybrid’ form of peace/political order.
‘Agonisation’ or ‘hybridisation’ for conflict transformation/pacification needs to address not only a ‘visible’ form of power at the ‘empirical’ level, but also an ‘invisible’ or ‘hidden’ form of power in constructing knowledge and discourse at the ‘actual’ level, and a primordial (or unmalleable) nature of identity in culture. It should then underline the risk of conflating the constructed difference and the primordial identity into the identity/difference. Otherwise, the risk of ‘antagonising’ the identity/difference in ‘agonisation’ and ‘hybridisation’ will increase.

- In this sense, power-sharing and electoral measures would be effective not only for transforming conflict, but also for institutionalising and transforming ‘post-colonial’ deliberation.

- While both power-sharing and electoral measures are effective for ‘post-colonial’ deliberation, it is the power-sharing measures that would institutionalise it through pre-conditioning deliberative space and power in quantity vis-à-vis the electoral measures that would transform it in quality through regular elections over time.

- Interaction and power-sharing between ‘modern’/political and ‘traditional’/societal agencies would also be effective. Their relations can, however, be precarious and conditional.

- Given the remaining challenges in ‘hybridisation’ and ‘agonisation’, an inter-disciplinary coalition between peace and development studies will be required to critically address the gap that they form in the transition from peacebuilding to development.

These findings suggest an urgent need to re-think (neo)liberal statebuilding due to its ‘failure’ not only because of the dilemma (cf. OECD 2008, Paris 2009) but also due to the conceptual flaw and limitations in understanding political legitimacy and dimensions of power as well as culture and historicity in the post-colonial, post-conflict polity. Yet, the ‘alternative’ form of legitimacy and power for ‘success’ which are embedded in, and held by, the local/societal
authority are often contentious/controversial and invisible/hidden from the eyes of external researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners.

Accordingly, further suggestions for peacebuilding theory, policy, and practice have been identified as follows:

- Although power-sharing and electoral engineering seem effective for conflict transformation, the complexity and variation in the process of conflict transformation will make a nexus between power-sharing and electoral measures, deliberation, and conflict transformation conditional, and thus require further research to investigate what conditions and settings make it effective in the post-colonial, post-conflict context.

- The complexity and variation in the process of ‘post-colonial’ deliberation and measures of power-sharing and electoral engineering will also require further research to evaluate what institutional measures are effective for institutionalising and transforming deliberation, and their (side)effects over time.

- Moreover, exploring an alternative form of ‘legitimacy for peace’ will require an inter-disciplinary approach to research, challenging the Euro-centric view and engaging with the Southern Other. In doing so, it will be helpful to examine the interaction between human agency and contextual structure/culture at the meta level, rather than separate them at the micro (agency-focused) and macro (structure/culture-focused) levels.

- Policymakers and practitioners will thus need to broaden their understanding of legitimacy and address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the vertical and horizontal inequalities/illegitimacies in the post-colonial, post-conflict context, in order to keep the policy and practice of peacebuilding relevant to the socio-political reality.

- Despite its utility, the framework for ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ faces limitations in generalisation and application to other post-colonial, post-conflict situations, and thus
requires further research to critically examine the fallacy and falsification of the framework.

These suggestions indicate the complexity of abstracting and reproducing the causality of empirical ‘failure’ and ‘success’ in ‘deliberative peacebuilding’, and the difficulty in standardising/de-contextualising it. The limitations of the framework will thus require continuous scrutiny and review to enhance its theoretical relevance to explaining and understanding the socio-political reality in the non-Western, post-colonial, post-conflict context.

This thesis (‘deliberative peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland’) has thus answered the research questions as follows: 1) the Western-centric ‘rational’ approach to deliberation will increase the risk of ‘failure’ to address the ‘legitimation problem’ with the ‘new’ and ‘old’ inequalities and differences, yet 2) the approach to ‘post-colonial’ deliberation is, however, pre-conditioned variously. The national/local socio-political deliberators in East Timor and Somaliland have reflexively learned from their ‘failure’, and strategically transformed the deliberative approach from ‘rationalisation’ to ‘hybridisation’ and ‘agonisation’, and more recently into ‘engaging disagreement’ despite the remaining challenges. Yet, the causal mechanism of ‘deliberative peacebuilding’ is complex and subject to the contextual (pre)conditions and settings. Further studies are thus required to refine the framework for generalisation and application to other contexts.
References


299


Bott, E. (2010). Favourites and others: Reflexivity and the shaping of subjectivities and data in qualitative research. *Qualitative Research*, 10(2), 159-173.


The University of Manchester (2015). Application form for ethical approval of a research project by a University Research Ethics Committee. Manchester: The University of Manchester.


Personal communications


324


Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet

You are being invited to take part in a research study with the aim to collect your view of peacebuilding. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

Who will conduct the research?

- Name: Yoshito Nakagawa
- Address: Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, Ellen Wilkinson Building, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, The United Kingdom

Title of the Research

- Deliberative Peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland

What is the aim of the research?

- The objective of the research is to examine how and why peace was built in East Timor from 1999 to 2012 and Somaliland from 1991 to 2005, and what roles the social discussion (i.e. deliberation) played in this process.

Why have I been chosen?

- You will have unique view and experience of the social discussion (i.e. deliberation) in the peacebuilding process.
- You will be one of approximately 10 participants in your community (i.e. 7-8 community members and 2-3 government officials).

What would I be asked to do if I took part?

- The researcher will conduct an interview with you.
- Please note that it will be recorded.
- If you feel uncomfortable, please tell the researcher at any time. You are free to stop or withdraw your participation at any time without giving a reason.
What happens to the data collected?

- It will be compiled and compared to information collected in the same country as well as in the other country, and will be part of the PhD thesis and other publications (e.g. journal articles) of the researcher.

How is confidentiality maintained?

- The research will maintain a high standard of anonymity and confidentiality.
- The publication will neither disclose your name nor indicate your identity.
- Information collected will be stored and kept in a secure space for 5 years.

What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?

- You can decide whether or not to take part.
- If you decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.
- If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to yourself.

Will I be paid for participating in the research?

- The research will not pay any fee to you.

What is the duration of the research?

- Each interview will last approximately 1 hour.

Where will the research be conducted?

- All interviews will be conducted in public spaces (offices, cafes, etc.).

Will the outcomes of the research be published?

- The research will be published as a PhD thesis.

Who has reviewed the research project?

- This research has been reviewed by the University of Manchester Research Ethics Committee.
Contact for further information

If you have any questions, please contact me or my supervisor at the address which is mentioned below.

- Name of the researcher: Yoshito Nakagawa
- Address of the researcher: Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, Ellen Wilkinson Building, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, The United Kingdom

- Name of the supervisor: Professor Oliver Richmond
- E-mail address of the supervisor: oliver.richmond@manchester.ac.uk.
- Telephone number of the supervisor: 44 161 275 3197
- Address of the supervisor: Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, Ellen Wilkinson Building, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, The United Kingdom

What if something goes wrong?

If there are any issues regarding this research that you would prefer not to discuss with members of the research team, please contact Professor Oliver Richmond, the supervisor of the researcher by either writing to ‘Professor Oliver Richmond, Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute, Ellen Wilkinson Building, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, The United Kingdom’, by emailing: oliver.richmond@manchester.ac.uk, or by telephoning 44 161 275 3197,

or

the Research Governance and Integrity Team by either writing to ‘The Research Governance and Integrity Manager, Research Office, Christie Building, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, The United Kingdom’, by emailing: Research.Complaints@manchester.ac.uk, or by telephoning 44 161 275 7583 or 275 8093.
Appendix 2: Consent Form

Consent Form

Deliberative Peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland

If you are happy to participate please complete and sign the consent form below.

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read the attached information sheet on the above project and have had the opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and had these answered satisfactorily.

2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to any treatment/service.

3. I consent the presence of the interpreter/translator.

4. I consent (or agree to) the interview being recorded. If no, please proceed to 5. If yes, please proceed to 6.

5. I do not wish (or agree to) the interview to be recorded. Yet I will allow the researcher to take notes.

6. I agree to the use of anonymous quotes. Although this study makes effort to ensure anonymity, what you say might make you identifiable. If no, please proceed to 7. If yes, please proceed to 8.

7. I do not wish my comment to be quoted.

8. I agree that any data collected may be passed as anonymous data to other researchers.

I agree to take part in the above project.

______________________________  ________________  __________________________
Name of participant                  Date                     Signature