THE ROAD TO WHERE?

A POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF POST-NEOLIBERALISM:
NEGOTIATIONS OF EXTRACTIVE-LED DEVELOPMENT,
INDIGENEITY AND CONSERVATION IN THE ISIBORO SECURE
INDIGENOUS TERRITORY AND NATIONAL PARK (TIPNIS),
BOLIVIA

Jessica Hope 2015

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of
PhD in the Faculty of Humanities.

Institute of Development, Policy & Management (IDPM), School of
Environment, Education and Development (SEED).
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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the demands that humans are placing on the planet. Such demands are interrogated in long-running debates about how to reconcile the tensions between development, as an immanent process of capitalist expansion (see Cowen & Shelton 1996), and the environment, taken broadly in reference to finite natural resources, landscapes and wildlife. As environmental issues become increasingly prominent in local struggles, national debates, and international policies and programmes, we need to be paying more attention to how they are produced and shaped by politics and power relations, as well as to the differences between how groups relate to their biophysical environments. In this thesis, I do this by investigating the political ecology of post-neoliberalism in Bolivia. The country has been heralded as one of the most radical political projects in Latin America and a reformed state is being implemented in the name of radical politics and revolution, appropriating discourses of indigeneity and social movements. Here, the state has blamed the global environmental crisis on the continuing dominance of capitalism and neoliberalism. This has been publically rejected by the state, whilst new ‘post-neoliberal’ forms of development and harmonious relationships between people and nature have been promoted. However, Bolivia’s post-neoliberal state project has become increasingly dependent on hydrocarbon extraction becoming the most natural resource-dependent country in the region. This has created new sites of contestation and conflict between citizens and the state, as well as complicating what the Bolivian case contributes to wider debates about development and the environment. In this project I research an ongoing conflict over the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park\(^1\) (TIPNIS) concentrating on the key themes of development, environment and indigeneity. This political ecology of post-neoliberalism contributes both to our understanding of this emerging political project and to broader debates about human/nature relationships - by questioning the dynamics of fringe politics. This means questioning how the terms and content of ‘alternatives’ and ‘radical’ politics are set and how this in turn shapes the possibilities for transformative paths towards more sustainable human/nature relationships.

\(^1\) Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure
Declaration

No portion of the work in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application of another degree of qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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This has been such an enjoyable experience because I have been continually supported by a gorgeous husband and loving family. My husband, parents and three sisters are unfailingly encouraging and wonderful. Along with my friends, they have provided encouragement, respite and fun. Thank you Dom, John, Di, Clem, Sunni, Bella, Becky, Jess, JB and Hils.

This thesis has taken three years and eight months. I have taken it with me across the country and beyond its borders. This thesis was written in:
Manchester, England
London, England
Edinburgh, Scotland
Oathlaw, Scotland
Dundee, Scotland
The Angus Glens, Scotland
Moffat, Scotland
Moray, Scotland
Wookie Hole, England
Gloucestshire, England
Berlin, Germany
Rotterdam, Holland
And, of course, Bolivia

Finally, I acknowledge that any mistakes are my own.

*This thesis is dedicated to Mum and Dad, who support us to live imaginatively and to be adventurous.*
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>APDHB</td>
<td>Bolivian Permanent Assembly of Human Rights (Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINGO</td>
<td>Big International Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russian, India, China, South Africa</td>
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<td>CIDOB</td>
<td>Bolivian Federation of Indigenous Pueblos (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CITES</td>
<td>The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora</td>
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<td>National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu)</td>
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IIRSA: Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (La Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana)

IUCN: International Union for the Conservation of Nature

MAS: Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo)

MNR: National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario)

MSM: Movement without Fear (Movimiento Sin Miedo)

NDCB: The National Directorate for the Conservation of Biodiversity

NGO: Non-Government Organisation

PIEB: Programme for Strategic Investigation (Programa de Investigación Estratégica)

SAP: Structural Adjustment Policy

SERNAP: The National Service for Protected Areas (El Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas)

SNAP: The National System for Protected Areas (El Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas)

TIPNIS: Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure)

UN: The United Nations
Maps

Map 1: South America

Source: googlemaps
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Source: googlemaps
Map 3: Protected areas in Bolivia

Source: Wikimedia commons
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Source: NACLA.org

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Source for both 1&2: authors own

Photograph 2: Graffiti Supporting the TIPNIS Opposition
Photograph 3: Police Blockade at Chaparina

Photograph 4: Chaparina

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1 Introduction

In 2005 Evo Morales was elected as the President of Bolivia, on the back of a wave of anti-neoliberal social movement protest. He pledged radical and transformative changes, promising a ‘new world in equality’ and a ‘post-neoliberal’ future. Central to this politics was his own indigenous identity, which he used to frame his new political project and anti-neoliberal stance. New forms of participatory government, new levels of indigenous autonomy and an increased commitment to environmental issues were key dimensions of his post-neoliberal narrative. These promises have resonated with wider, global concerns about the continuing pressures being placed on the biophysical world, as well as concern for issues of environmental justice – creating questions about the possibilities for progressive, transformative change.

A decade on and Bolivia’s ‘process of change’ continues, simultaneous to the state’s increasing commitment to hydrocarbon extraction. This has been used to fund new social welfare projects and has made Bolivia the most natural resource dependent country in Latin America (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014). The contradictions between promises of a new post-neoliberal socio-environmental agenda and extraction are immediately apparent. They have sparked sites of conflict and contestation within Bolivia, as individuals and groups have attempted to both negotiate and challenge extractive-led development. Firstly, these developments raise a new set of questions about how environments are created, sustained and changed in such a context and the role of both the state and its citizens in these processes. Secondly, they create questions about the spaces available for political debate and the ways that oppositional politics are treated, supported and disciplined. Taken together, these speak to wider debates about conservation and the environment, as well as to questions of radical politics and transformative change. In this thesis I deal with these questions by investigating the Political Ecology of Post-Neoliberalism, asking:
1. In what ways is extractive-led development being encountered and negotiated by civil society, specifically place-based, environmental social movements?

2. To what extent do mobilizations of indigeneity help these movements to meet their demands and access political power?

3. How has post-neoliberal politics shaped protected area conservation?

In this introduction I outline the wider context for this research, locating it in contemporary debates about the demands being placed on natural resources and the politics and power relations that determine issues of access and control. This chapter links developments in Bolivia to wider, pressing debates about the tensions between development and the environment, introducing political ecology, contemporary debates about conservation and the importance of politics and ‘the political’. I then introduce the empirical focus for this thesis, outlining contemporary dynamics in Latin America, more generally, and Bolivia, more specifically. This chapter ends with the thesis outline.

1.1 Environment and Development

The demands that humans are placing on the planet have accelerated rapidly during the past century. The world’s population, for example, is now at over six billion, with most people depending on a spendthrift energy economy (Adams 2004). These demands are interrogated in long-running debates about how to reconcile the tensions between development, as an immanent process of capitalist expansion (see Cowen & Shenton 1996), and the environment, taken broadly in reference to finite natural resources, landscapes and wildlife. In these debates concerns have been voiced about the impact that expanding, capitalist frontiers are having on the world around us – depleting resources in ways that have been felt globally, not just locally.
Contemporary shifts suggest that successes against poverty in the Global South are exacerbating environmental tensions, placing new pressures on natural resources and re-vitalizing the need to find more sustainable relationships between humans and nature. The growth of BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is a pertinent example. These states are emerging as rapidly developing economies, transforming global trade and commerce (Bebbington & Bury 2013; Sachs 2012). They have become ‘the largest sources of demand for raw materials’, with the percentage of global imports to developing and BRICS economies nearly doubling since 1971 (Bebbington & Bury 2013:39).

In relation to these developments, questions about access are intensifying in areas where there is competition for valuable land and resources. Alongside concerns for the planet are anxieties about how these tensions will affect fair and equitable access. For example, sites of conflict and contestation have created concerns for social and environmental justice (Adams 2004; Adams & Hutton 2007; Arsel 2012; Arsel & Angel 2012; Bebbington 2008; Bebbington & Humphreys-Bebington 2011; Brockington 2006; Brockington et al. 2008; Brockington et al. 2006; Buscher & Arsel 2012; Buscher et al. 2012; Chapin 2004; Dove 2006; Escobar 2010; Macdonald 2010; Martinez-Alier & Alier 2003; Sullivan 2010a). Our global environmental future is thus inextricably linked to issues of power and politics.

These developments have increased concerns for the conservation of landscapes and wildlife, strengthening calls for their enhanced protection. Pressing negotiations of conservation and development are intensified in the contemporary era as they take place ‘against the backdrop of a wider social assault on nature, through processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, pollution, and the conversion of terrestrial and marine ecosystems to industrial purposes’ (Adams & Hutton 2007:167). How to conserve and protect nature, as well as how to manage resource use and landscapes, is further complicated as understandings of nature are diverse (Escobar 1999).

Recognising the political dimension of nature and conservation is a founding principle of political ecology (Paulson et al. 2003). This ‘explicitly addresses
the relations between the social and the natural, arguing that social and environmental conditions are deeply and inextricably linked’ (Adams & Hutton 2007:149). This necessitates paying attention to the wider context of environmental issues - to politics and relationships of power, as well as to the differences between how groups encounter and treat their biophysical environments (Robbins 2011; Peet et al. 2010; Peet & Watts 2002; Guha & Alier 2013a; Neumann 2014; Paulson et al. 2003). It means identifying the politics behind environmental policies, projects, practices and agendas, as well as trying to better understand how such politics shape ecological outcomes (Adams & Hutton 2007; Peet & Watts 2004).

Such an approach illuminates the ways that natures are created and conserved. It also exposes the views and actors that are marginalised, crucial when trying to understand how natures and conservation are created through power and politics. Marginalised views contribute to contemporary debates about resource use, sustainability and environmental justice as they offer alternative ways of encountering and treating natures. These need to be explored, in case they provide radical and transformative paths towards more sustainable human/nature relationships. In this thesis, I examine the political ecology of post-neoliberalism in Bolivia. Here, the state has blamed the global environmental crisis on the continuing dominance of capitalism. This has been publically rejected by the state, whilst new forms of development and harmonious relationships between people and nature have been promoted (see Gudynas 2009, 2011, 2013; Walsh 2010). Bolivia has been heralded as one of the most radical political projects in Latin America, with a reformed state, revised approach to development and renewed focus on the environment (Escobar 2010).

Bolivia’s new state project is being implemented in the name of radical politics and revolution, appropriating discourses of indigeneity and social movements (see Linera 2012; Postero 2010; Canessa 2014; Kohl& Breshnahan 2010; Harten 2011; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Humphreys Bebbington 2010; Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Dunkerly 2007; Webber 2008a). However, Bolivia’s post-neoliberal state project has become increasingly dependent on hydrocarbon extraction, creating new sites of
contestation and conflict between citizens and the state, as well as complicating what the Bolivian case contributes to wider debates about development and the environment. Assumptions that the Bolivian state represents radical alternatives have become muddied, intimating that research is needed about the very nature of ‘radical politics’ themselves. In this thesis, I address this second dimension of the post-neoliberal project, questioning how the terms and content of ‘alternatives’ and ‘radical’ politics are set. In this introduction, I present recent debates and developments that have informed and shaped this research, before setting out my research questions and the outline of this thesis.

1.2 Conservation

Of interest firstly is the role of conservation in this wider politics – in terms of how it can best protect landscapes and biodiversity, as well as its position in relation to expanding capitalist frontiers. At this point, I am referring to mainstream conservation, namely the dominant strain of global conservation most clearly visible in the operations of the largest conservation NGOs (Brockington et al. 2008:9). These dominate conservation funding along with the discursive and spectacular representations of the values and goals of global conservation (ibid.). Over the past 30 years, international conservation NGOs have increasingly tackled their conservation objectives using the logic and tool of neoliberalism (Brockington et al. 2008; Igoe & Brockington 2007; Arsel & Büscher 2012; Büscher et al. 2014; Büscher et al. 2012; Brockington & Duffy 2010; MacDonald 2010; Fletcher 2010; Sullivan 2013; Sullivan 2009).

More than a variety of capitalism (see Allen 2004; Dore et al. 1999) neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that propose that ‘human well-being can be best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedom and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’ (Harvey 2004:2). It is a political ideology, which promotes the market as the best way to allocate resources and address inequalities. It thus aims for the privatisation and marketization of all aspects of social and political life, advocating for the replacement of state power with the market as a seemingly
de-politicised, choice-based mechanism (Büscher 2010). Neoliberal conservation, or ‘green neoliberalism’, has developed as a branch of this logic, based on the fundamental premise of ‘selling nature to save it’ (McAfee 1999). In adopting this approach, mainstream conservation has been criticised for no longer challenging the processes, logic or actors of capitalist development. Instead, it has become embedded in wider, neoliberal logics and, in many instances, has welcomed powerful corporate actors into the fold. For example, some of the largest conservation NGOs have created strong ties with the private sector, calling into question their identification as civil society representatives. By 2006, The Nature Conservancy had a number of corporate associates and sponsors, including Shell Oil, General Motors, the Ford Motor Company, Enron Corporation, Johnson & Johnson and Dow Chemical amongst others (Chapin 2004; Bailey 2006 in Corson 2010). Moreover, the practices and spectacle of contemporary mainstream conservation has been identified as significant to the expansion of new markets. Examples would include the creation of markets for carbon trading and biodiversity offsetting, as well as new toys and holiday lodges that use conservation as a profitable selling point (see Igoe 2010).

The rise of ‘green neoliberalism’ has been much interrogated in wide-ranging debates, to which I do not have the scope to do justice here. However, it is important to note three fundamental concerns. The first is that neoliberal conservation is transforming how nature(s) are understood, comprehended and treated and is thus (re)shaping nature-human ‘entanglements’. For example, in valuing local natures in terms of international markets, neoliberal conservation abstracts nature from its spatial and societal context and the multiple ways it is valued, understood and produced (Sullivan 2010b). The second concern is that neoliberal conservation consolidates and promotes elite power. Neoliberal conservation has the potential to increase and enable the control and ownership of natural resources by global elites primarily interested in its economic value, and this has profound implications for who can access natural resources and how they can be used (Brockington et al. 2006; Igoe & Brockington 2007; Castree 2010; K. I. MacDonald 2010; Holmes 2011). The third concern is that three decades on, rather than sparking
political debate about the environmental pressures created by ongoing industrialisation, expansion and growth, the environmental crisis is being combatted using the tools and logic of capitalism (Corson 2010; Igoe et al. 2009; Brockington & Duffy 2010; Büscher et al. 2012; Igoe et al. 2010; Brockington et al. 2008; Carrier 2010; K. MacDonald 2010; Robert Fletcher 2010; McAfee 1999). This approach removes the potential that conservation has to make transformative change, as it means that environmental goals do not require changes in existing political institutions, the distribution of economic power or resource flows (Adams 1995; Redclift 1994; Corson 2010; McAfee, 1999). These debates and concerns intimate that we need to know more about radical alternatives and the political spaces from which they are emerging.

1.3 Social Movements

Criticisms of mainstream conservation indicate that we must look elsewhere to question how the agendas and power dynamics of environmental politics are negotiated or challenged. There are calls to address the politics and power dynamics of environmental change, by ‘changing the very nature of global environmental order’ (Felli & Castree 2012). Within this, there is justification in illuminating environmental politics as defined by alternative civil society actors, in a context where large NGOs are increasingly tied to states, global governance institutions and the private sector (Banks et al. 2015; Banks & Hulme 2012; Bebbington, Hickey, et al. 2008). In this thesis, I do this through a focus on social movements and environmentalism.

Social movements are defined as ‘contentious politics’, which by definition are on the fringes of mainstream, dominant politics (Tarrow 2006; Tilly & Tarrow 2006; McAdam et al. 2003). This is relevant to broader debates about politics and ‘the political’. For example, critiques of the post-political argue that in the West, democracy has become a technocratic, managerial process rather than a site of ideological debate and contestation (Wilson & Swyngedouw 2014; Swyngedouw 2011; Swyngedouw 2010). Aspects of these debates are useful for understanding radical politics and social movements, specifically how they conceptualise politics and the political.
Chantal Mouffe defines politics as social order, or ‘the set of practices through which order is created’ (Mouffe 2005:9; Wilson & Swygedouw 2014). ‘The political’ is the debate, contestation and ‘dimension of antagonism’ of societies (Mouffe 2005:9; Wilson & Swygedouw 2014). Political spaces are thus the spaces in which ideas and alternatives can be discussed and can materialise, rather than the rules and structures shaping everyday lives.

Wilson and Swygedouw criticize the forms of de-politicisation that have created ‘post-political’ spaces, meaning (in brief) that there is a lack of ideological debate (Wilson & Swygedouw 2014) or an absence of opposition to elite desires (Crouch 2014), therefore reducing the possibilities for political transformation. However, Wilson and Swygedouw also emphasise instances of politicisation, important when exploring how political spaces shift and change. Instances of politicisation ‘demand transformation of the political structuring of life, against exclusive, oligarchic, and consensus governance of an alliance of professional economic, political and technocratic elites’ (Wilson & Swygedouw 2014:3). These ideas help us to understanding the scope and significance of social movements and radical politics.

Theories of environmentalisms recognise that nature is experienced and understood differently, helping us to explore the different ways that nature is valued alongside the diverse ways that degradation is perceived and challenged (see Adams 2004; Martinez-Alier 1995; Martinez-Alier 2013; Martinez-Alier & Alier 2003). In focusing on the ways that pollution and degradation are being experienced, identified and challenged, environmentalism reveals the multiple ways in which individuals and groups seek to protect nature as well as the power dynamics through which these struggles flow. Such an approach has enabled me to question the experiences and consequences of development, as well as the responses and alternatives being proposed.

1.4 Latin America
The regional context for this research is Latin America, where over the last three decades there have been multiple instances of social movement protest. Recent protests challenged the exclusionary, elitist politics created by
neoliberalism. Social movements, and in some cases states, have opposed neoliberal capitalist reforms at sites across the continent. In light of this, Latin America has been looked to as a frontier for anti-capitalist politics. The frequency and significance of these movements saw the process being dubbed a ‘Pink Tide’, as the region developed its own variants of socialism (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014; Goodale & Postero 2013; Martínez et al. 2009; Chorev & Babb 2009; Sader 2009; Arsel 2012; Castanieda 2006).

Latin America is also significant for questions about environment and development. It is an area with tremendous natural resource wealth. For example, it is home to the Amazon basin, which has the world’s largest rainforest and is the drainage area for the Amazon, the world’s second largest river. The Amazon basin is one of the most bio-diverse regions on earth, spanning seven countries (Malhi et al. 2008). The subcontinent is also rich in valuable primary materials and extraction has dominated many Latin American landscapes since the Spanish conquest in 1492 (see Bebbington & Bury 2013). Since the mid-1990s it has been experiencing a boom, as global demand for primary resources has dramatically increased (Bebbington 2008a; Veltmeyer & Petras 2014). This has predicated the growth and intensification of extractive industry.

Latin America is currently the site of a wide, extractive frontier that is moving across much of the continent, in search of gas, oil and minerals (Bebbington 2008a). There is a continent-wide push to open up frontiers for hydrocarbon extraction, as well as other forms of mining, the production of biofuels, harvesting timber and agro-industry (Bebbington 2008b; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Bebbington 2010). Between 2000 and 2008 the volume of Latin American regional exports rose by 42.4 percent (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012; ECLAC 2009). Peru, for example, has 64 identified hydrocarbon blocs that cover more than 70 percent of Amazonian territory. In Bolivia, agreed contracts cover less terrain but 55 percent of national territory has been identified as of potential hydrocarbon interest (Bebbington 2008:14).
This frontier has far reaching impact. For example, Bebbington and Bury argue that:

’a vast assemblage of humans, animals, plants, highways, railroads, power lines, energy infrastructure, communication networks, exploration equipment, mineral processing facilities, refineries, pipelines, storage facilities, and ports is necessary to support activities that locate, extract, process, and transport extracted materials across the region and into the global system of production and consumption’ (2013:54).

This indicates the scope of such a project, raising questions about the extent of its reach.

This extractive frontier is connected to wider, consumptive demands being placed on finite resources. The oil, gas and minerals being extracted across Latin America are tied to global markets, linking localized struggles ‘over there’ to the consumptive practices ‘here’ in the Global North. They also remain connected to global, corporate power, as it is the larger, global companies of extractive industry that have the technology and know-how to extract and process raw materials. Even the most radical states, where the gas industry has been re-nationalised, continue to work in partnership with such corporations (Kaup 2013; Kaup 2009; Bebbington 2008a; Bebbington & Bury 2013). Latin America therefore serves as a particularly interesting region in which to explore the pressures being exerted on communities and natural resources.

1.5 Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the most radical projects of the Latin American ‘Pink Tide’ (Escobar 2010) and one of the most bio-diverse countries in the world (Canavire-Bacarreza & Hanauer 2013). In 2005 the country elected Evo Morales, who had been a leader of social movement actions against the neoliberal state and who identifies as the world’s first indigenous president. The election of Evo Morales represents ‘a critical break from the past’ (Riggirozzi 2012:74). He was elected on the back of a campaign that promised a reformed state, the inclusion of social movement leaders in
government, an end to neoliberalism and capitalism, as well as promises to prioritise environmental well-being and indigenous ideologies of nature (see Gudynas 2013; Postero 2010). He rejected green neoliberalism and the green economy, instead promising radical, transformative change rooted in increased political and territorial rights for indigenous groups.

Natural resources have been central to the new government. The renegotiation of extractive industry was central to Morales’s election success, based on demands made during social movement protests in 2003 (Kaup 2010:128). The state has used some of the profits to fund new social welfare projects and reduce poverty levels, a key priority for one of the poorest countries in the region (see Kaup 2010; Bebbington 2008b; Veltmeyer & Petras 2014; Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Humphreys-Bebington 2010). Since the election of President Morales, the scale and intensity of natural gas extraction in Bolivia has increased. Hydrocarbon extraction has become a foundational element of the Morales’ state and drives development in Bolivia. The country has remained dependent on foreign hydrocarbon firms and some of them, such as Petrobras and Repsol YPF ‘are among the largest and most far-reaching energy firms in the world’ (Perreault 2013:72). Indeed, Bolivia has increased its dependence on primary exports to become the most natural resource-dependent country in Latin America (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014:84).

These developments create questions about emerging post-neoliberal environmental politics, especially as previous limits to exploration and extraction have been removed. On 20 May 2015 the government passed Supreme Decree 2366, allowing hydrocarbon extraction within protected areas (Corz 2015). Eleven of Bolivia’s 22 national parks currently include hydrocarbons concessions, although extraction has not yet begun in most of these parks. Seven parks have concessions covering at least 30 percent of their land area. Four parks are at least 70 percent consumed by concessions and are at risk of disappearing entirely, once these become operational (Achtenburg 2013). This suggests that commitments to protected area conservation are changing, indicating a need for more research on the form and content of post-neoliberal political ecology.
Despite the allocation of gas revenues to fund new social welfare projects, conflicts have materialised around sites of extraction (see Bebbington & Bury 2013; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010; Bebbington & AJ Bebbington 2010; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Hirsch et al. 2011; Webber 2012; Escobar 2010; Perreault & Valdivia 2010). These suggest that within Bolivia alternative environmental politics continue to be debated and that there are contrasting post-neoliberal projects - that of the state and those of social movements (Escobar 2010).

This reliance on extraction is occurring more widely across Latin America. The ‘Pink Tide’ is being increasingly connected to the extractive frontier, as extractive industry provides governments with financial independence from the global institutions of neoliberalism and their constraints (see Veltmeyer & Petras 2014; Goodale & Postero 2013; Martínez et al. 2009; Chorev & Babb 2009; Sader 2009; Arsel 2012; Castanieda 2006).

1.6 Indigeneity

Indigenous identity and the mobilization of indigenous values have been crucial to Bolivian politics, both before and after the election of Evo Morales (see Canessa 2014; 2012; 2007; Kohl & Farthing 2006; Goodale 2006; Perrault 2005). Despite the numbers of people who spoke an indigenous language falling (Caness 2007), in the 2001 census, prior to the election of Morales, 64 percent of the population identified as indigenous (INE 2001). Indigenous identity became a key political identity, uniting large sections of the population against the neoliberal regime. It has also been a fundamental element of conflicts over natural resources. For example, in 2000 a campaign against the privatisation of water was mounted using claims to indigenous values and indigenous, customary practices (Perreault 2005). Since his election, Morales has mobilised his indigenous identity to re-found the state, creating new national, indigenous traditions (Canessa 2014). Indigeneity has been a foundational tenet of the post-neoliberal project. For example, a revised approach to development, Vivir bien or ‘living well’, has been written into the constitution as the guiding ideology for the state (Gudynas 2009, 2011, 2013; Walsh 2010). Indigeneity is thus a key dimension of post-neoliberal political ecologies and emerging tensions raise new questions about how it
intersects with the post-neoliberal project, specifically its purpose and utility for marginalised groups.

Bolivia is therefore a promising site of study for conflicts and tensions of development and the environment. It remains one of the poorest countries in Latin America, yet has extraordinary resource wealth. It is rich in topographical diversity, biodiversity and highly valuable hydrocarbons. The state is articulating a radical, transformative political project, in opposition to global capitalism and neoliberalism. Empirical studies are needed, which go beyond state rhetoric. Moreover, as the state is appropriating the language and discourses of radical politics, attention must be paid to how alternative politics both falter and thrive. In this thesis, I do this by exploring an ongoing dispute over plans to build a road through an indigenous territory and national park and past pools of natural gas.

In 2010, the government began building a road through the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park\(^2\) (TIPNIS). The protracted dispute over the road encompasses issues of extractive-led development, protected area conservation and indigenous territorial and political rights - making it a decisive site of study for how development, conservation and extraction are experienced and negotiated. This is not to focus on social movements as ways to access the ‘local’ or ‘community’, as a static, homogenous entity (Gupta & Ferguson 1992). Neither is it an attempt to explore indigeneity as a window to pre- or anti-modernity politics (see Kuper 2003; Kuper et al. 2003; Appadurai 1988; Appadurai 1996; Rostow 1971). Instead, it is a way to view contemporary debates about development and the environment from the perspective of those on the fringes of conventional politics, where state development policies and state-sponsored indigeneity are contested.

It is to this space that I turn, to better define the Political Ecology of Post-Neoliberalism. To do so, I ask:

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\(^2\) *Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure*
1. In what ways is extractive-led development being encountered and negotiated by civil society, specifically place-based, environmental social movements?
2. To what extent do mobilizations of indigeneity help these movements to meet their demands and access political power?
3. How has post-neoliberal politics shaped protected area conservation?

1.7 Thesis Outline
In the following chapter, I locate these questions in contemporary debates by exploring three key themes - development, environment and indigeneity. These debates foreground my research questions and identify gaps in our knowledge and understanding of post-neoliberal environmental politics.

Chapter 3 sets out the methodological strategy that has guided this investigation. I have chosen a qualitative approach and the set of methods that guided me in research was planned but also data-driven, exploratory, flexible and context-sensitive (Mason 2006:24). In this chapter, I introduce the case study of this thesis – the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS), Bolivia. I explain why this case study has been so well suited to exploring questions of extractive-led development, identity politics and the environment. I provide an account of my time on fieldwork, explaining the challenges and opportunities that shaped both my data collection and findings.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide the context and background to the TIPNIS case study and findings. Chapter 4, ‘The Mounting Power of Indigeneity’, argues that understanding the changing meaning and power of indigeneity is essential to understanding contemporary politics. It shows that indigeneity has become a key political identity through which political power and control over natural resources have been negotiated. I look at recent mobilisations of indigeneity and raise significant questions about the gaps between government rhetoric and government action, questions addressed by this project.
In Chapter 5 ‘Lowland Landscapes: extraction and conservation’, I narrow the focus onto environmental politics and lowland Bolivia. I explore how competing and inter-related discourses of natural resource extraction and conservation have shaped the landscapes and politics of the region. I argue that examining both hydrocarbon extraction and protected area conservation is fundamental to understanding the contemporary context and for revealing the multiple and competing claims for lowland landscapes and resources, as well as the more recent policies of Evo Morales’s party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). I question how the MAS have managed these competing claims, creating many of the questions of this thesis.

Chapter 6, ‘Protest, Participation and Development’, builds on these chapters and unpacks the TIPNIS dispute. I identify multiple grievances and sites of struggle, which have developed from the initial opposition to the road. In the first part of this chapter, I examine the timeline of the TIPNIS dispute, carefully outlining the different stages of the dispute over the road. In doing so, I support those who have questioned the impact that the MAS government is having on social movement politics, meaning that I raise concerns about the continuing political spaces open to citizen groups who oppose government policies and wider political trends. In the second section of the chapter, I consider the competing narratives of development as an intentional project. I argue that the TIPNIS opposition does not indicate unshakeable opposition to ‘development’, rather the lack of opportunity to negotiate and define its terms.

In Chapter 7, ‘Mobilisations of Indigeneity’, I analyse the way that indigeneity is being mobilised and claimed during the TIPNIS dispute. I examine how indigeneity was mobilized by TIPNIS protesters during the dispute and highlight the struggles that groups face in accessing the political power that it offers. In doing so, I argue that the TIPNIS conflict is a key moment for (re)determining the political power and meaning of indigeneity and suggest that indigeneity is no longer the voice of the marginalised; instead, it is the discourse of the state. In doing so, I raise questions about the platforms open
to those marginal and oppositional to the state, once again returning to the issue of civil society, citizen power and alternative politics.

In Chapter 8, ‘The Struggle for Conservation’, I examine the different environmental agendas within the TIPNIS dispute. I argue that the state’s conservation agenda, dominated by protected area conservation, is being opened up to accommodate extractive industry. I then look at the response of international and national NGOs, to show how particular forms of indigeneity and conservation are marginalised.

In Chapter 9 I return to the key themes of development, environment and indigeneity to draw some conclusions and discuss the direction for further research that my findings imply.
2 Development, Environment & Indigeneity: contemporary debates

This thesis investigates the political ecology of post-neoliberalism. In this chapter, I explore its three key dimensions by reviewing three relevant literatures. This chapter is thus divided into three sections, which explore the key themes of development, environment and indigeneity. The first section looks at development, as both an immanent process of capitalism and an intentional activity (Cowen & Shenton 1996). Of importance firstly is to better identify development as an immanent process of capitalism. I do this by introducing theories of neoliberalism, before outlining how neoliberal policies and reforms were experienced in Latin America. I then introduce post-neoliberalism, as a relatively recent political project that developed in opposition to neoliberalism. I outline its rhetoric but question how we should best understand it – as an explicitly anti-neoliberal project or as part of an emerging developmentalist project that is linked to wider, regional trends. I then consider development as an intentional project, introducing two key participatory mechanisms – non-government organisations (NGOs) and social movements.

In the second section I introduce key debates around the environment, in response to the issues of development introduced in the first section. I firstly introduce dominant approaches to conservation. I examine how these both respond to immanent development and have become entangled with neoliberal ideology. At this stage I introduce ‘green neoliberalism’, drawing upon its central critiques as one entry point for exploring post-neoliberal environments. I then introduce the field of environmentalisms, which highlights the multiple and diverse ways that natures are valued and degradation is perceived. I identify three interrelated dimensions of environmentalism. The first dimension illuminates how wider processes of development are being
experienced and contested, because of the way they appropriate and impact local natural resources. The second highlights the multiple and contrasting ways that nature is understood, valued and treated. The third regards social justice and highlights the power dynamics and politics through which struggles over environments flow. I use this throughout the thesis as a lens through which to understand the reality of post-neoliberal environments. Such a focus permits a wide conceptualization of environments, one that explicitly recognizes the role that people play in their construction and defense. This in turn acts as a better fit to post-neoliberal environmental rhetoric, which acknowledges and promotes indigenous peoples as vital to the creation of sustainable natures and environments. At this point, I identifying the gaps that exists between rhetoric and empirical data, specifically gaps in how we understand what the post-neoliberal project means for conservation and the environment.

The third section of this chapter introduces indigeneity, which has played a crucial role in the post-neoliberal project. Although it has strong discursive ties to both Development and Environment, it is not reducible to either and is thus dealt with separately. In this third section, I consider dominant approaches to indigeneity, paying particular attention to its discursive ties to nature and conservation. I propose approaching indigeneity as a political category, fluid and responsive to its shifting contexts. However, in order to question the changing meaning and power of indigeneity, I approach changing mobilizations of indigeneity as discourse. This means highlighting the ways that particular forms of indigeneity relate to wider power structures, for example whether they gain the financial or political support of a state or of global development networks. In the context of this research, this firstly means questioning the changing meaning and discursive power of indigeneity in the post-neoliberal project. Secondly, it means asking what this means for wider environmental politics.
Section 1: Development

To understand and question the ways that development shapes environmental politics, I am using a definition of development that distinguishes between development as an immanent process of capitalism and development as an intentional activity (Cowen & Shenton 1996). Such an approach allows for the conceptual differentiation of two intersecting processes – uneven, historical paths of capitalism and planned projects of development. This is useful for analysing post-neoliberalism, as post-neoliberal governments have been explicit in their intentions to subvert neoliberal trajectories. However, they have also set out new National Development Plans, for example Bolivia’s ‘Process of Change’ (Proceso de Cambio), and state-planned development initiatives. They are themselves perpetrators of planned development, as well as continuing to host international development actors, such as non-government organisations (NGOs). The conceptual differentiation between immanent and intentional development allows for an investigation into the planned development projects within post-neoliberal states and the ways these shape and influence uneven processes of capitalism. In this chapter I firstly explore development as an ‘immanent process of capitalism’ (Cowen & Shenton 1996), defining how this manifests in the contemporary period and how it has been negotiated and encountered.

2.1 Neoliberalism

Since the early 2000s a growing number of scholars and activists have used the term ‘neoliberalism’ to discuss the rise of a new economic order and its impacts. Before exploring this in more detail, it is important to note that as it has increased in its usage, its meaning or deployment in scholarship has been criticized for lacking conceptual clarity (Brenner et al. 2010; Brockington et al 2008; Laurie & Bailey Smith 2011). For example, in a 2008 review of empirically grounded studies of neoliberalism and nature in social sciences, particularly critical geography, Castree noted that although the emerging scholarship did much to help identify and interrogate the effects and practice of neoliberalism and nature, authors used the same terms ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘neoliberalisation’ to refer to and judge phenomena and situations that are not
necessarily similar or comparable (Castree 2008:134 see also Ferguson 2010). At its worst, it has been used in reference or as explanation for anything deemed wrong in the world (Igoe & Brockington 2007). This lack of conceptual clarity is motivation to think carefully about a working definition of neoliberalism, set out below, and to question the nuances of how it has been implemented and contested, which are explored throughout this thesis.

Harvey explains neoliberalism as a theory of political economic practices that propose that ‘human well-being can be best advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedom and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’ (2005:2). He argues that it has become ‘hegemonic as a mode of discourse’, incorporated into the ‘commonsense’ that many of us accept and use to understand the world (2005:3). Neoliberalism can therefore be viewed as a political ideology, which aims to subject political, social and ecological affairs to capitalist market dynamics (Büscher et al. 2012; Büscher 2010; Büscher 2008). As a political ideology, neoliberalism promotes the market as the best way to allocate resources and address inequalities. It thus aims for the privatisation and marketization of all aspects of social and political life, advocating the replacement of state power by the market as a seemingly depoliticised, choice-based mechanism (Büscher 2010).

It is also useful to differentiate between neoliberalism as a programme and as policies (Castree 2008b; Castree 2008). This helps us to see the divergences between neoliberalism as a political ideology and neoliberalism as it ‘actually exists’ (Brenner & Theodore 2002). Abstracted concerns about the hegemonic power of neoliberal ideology can overlook the multiple and diverse ways that neoliberal ideology is implemented and contested in policy and practice. Ethnographic or empirical examples help us to recognise the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring, in terms of the ways that they are produced within national, regional and local contexts and defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles (Brenner & Theodore 2002). This helps us gain a more nuanced understanding of neoliberal processes and practice,
helping us both to recognise its successes and failures and avoid describing it as a ‘disembodied, “out there” force’ (Tickell & Peck 2002:383).

Latin America is a particularly interesting point of study for ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’ (Brenner & Theodore 2002). In the 1980s and 1990s the continent was a frontier for neoliberal structural adjustment policies (SAPs), which reformulated the state and state-society relations. Neoliberal restructuring followed the advice and policy prescriptions from Washington-based institutions, for example the World Bank, with a set of recommendations that came to be dubbed ‘The Washington Consensus’. Originally, the term described a specific mandate of policy adjustments, including privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation. However, the term became synonymous with an ideological project based on market-fundamentalism, namely neoliberalism (Williamson 2000). The neoliberal agenda has been much criticised by scholars, activists and states as having failed in its promise to generate worldwide growth (Peck 2010; Brenner et al. 2010; Harvey 2005; Harvey 2007:38; Webber 2008). In Latin America, the Washington Consensus was the template for Latin America’s engagement with neoliberalism and the reforms had devastating consequences in terms of unemployment levels and poverty (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012). Across the Latin American region, the rates of those living in poverty were higher by the end of 1990 than in the 1980s. For example, in Argentina, unemployment rose from 8.8 percent in 1990 to 19.7 percent in 2002 (ECLAC 2010 in Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012:4). Neoliberal reforms did little to improve persistent poverty and income inequality and it remains the most unequal region in the world (Martínez et al. 2009). Reforms also weakened the links between trade and national production and created greater structural unevenness among sectors of the economy (Escobar 2010).

Peck and Tickell identified roll-back and roll-out phases of neoliberalism, when the policies of states, international finance institutions and multi-lateral development institutions promoted and implemented the changes necessary to create, enable and manage a global market system (Peck & Tickell 2002). This can be clearly seen in the changes promoted by the Washington
Consensus and implemented by states across Latin America. These changed the role of the state from a service provider to a market manager, meaning that states prioritised the liberalization and expansion of markets. Policy prescriptions reconfigured states and legislative frameworks, to support the needs of global markets and to suit the needs of global capital (Tickell & Peck 2002). It was thus a deeply political project that demanded re-regulation and state-building according to its logic (Büscher 2010; Harvey 2007:2).

In Latin America, the neoliberal agenda increased the power of transnational corporations, new unelected global institutions and contributed to the consolidation of elite power (see Harvey 2007 and Chorev & Babb 2009). In Bolivia, for example, neoliberal reforms involved the partial privatisation of key industries, opening up valuable natural resources for foreign capital. New laws and regulations were written and enacted which favoured transnational corporations over the nation state. They created corporate-friendly regulatory agencies, for example cutting the national royalties and taxes on new hydrocarbon fields from 50 percent to 18 percent (World Bank 1994; Dussan 2004 in Hindery 2013:27). Multilateral agencies and the US government were integral to these changes. For example, the 1996 Law of Capitalization set out the terms of privatisation. It was financed by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), with conditions that demanded the Bolivian government create a new regulatory institutional framework for hydrocarbons and a new hydrocarbons law (Hindery 2013:29). Through the coordinated efforts of the World Bank, US government, Bolivian government and transnational corporations, partial privatisation for the hydrocarbons sector was achieved and the entrance of transnational corporations was facilitated, such as Enron and Shell (Hindery 2013:28).

In Bolivia, each state company became a corporation and shares were sold to interested workers for an amount no greater than their retirement benefits. The state’s share was transferred to Bolivian citizens of legal age, to be held in a newly created pension fund but this fund was dependent on the profitability of oil and gas development, causing them to inadvertently finance activities that were destructive to national ecosystems and some rural
populations (Hindery 2013:29). This is one example of how neoliberal reforms increased the power of a dominant transnational capitalist class, made up of corporate executives, globalizing bureaucrats, politicians, consumerist elites and globalizing professionals (Brockington et al. 2008; Igoe et al. 2010; Sklair 2001:4; Sklair 2002) and partly explains how neoliberalism became synonymous in Latin America for ruling class politics (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012).

Importantly for this research, neoliberal reforms also had tremendous ecological impacts in Latin America, for example encouraging and promoting the large-scale expansion of mono-crops such as soy, palm oil and sugar canes to meet global demand (Escobar 2010:8). In lowland Bolivia, the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), promoted by the World Bank and IMF, increased deforestation in lowland, Amazonian areas. This was primarily due to forest clearing for crops, namely intensive soya bean cultivation for export. A secondary cause was their promotion of timber exporting, from unmanaged forests (Kaimowitz et al. 1999).

2.2 Interruptions: anti-neoliberalism
As previously introduced, scholars have criticised depictions of neoliberalism that render it monolithic and unstoppable (Brenner & Theodore 2002a; Tickell & Peck 2002; Büscher et al. 2014; Büscher & Arsel 2012). They urge recognition and careful consideration of the ways that neoliberal ideology, programmes and policies are contested and negotiated. In Latin America, one of neoliberalism’s unintended consequences was that economic liberalisation led to a significant increase in level of political protest and that the reforms created new sites of dissent (Kaltwasser 2011; Arce & Bellinger 2007; Leiva 2008). Latin America is a particularly interesting site of study for resistance and alternative politics. Neoliberalism ‘failed spectacularly to contribute to the development of the Latin American region and its peoples’ (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012:10). ‘Misery’ indicators - for example poverty and unemployment - rose as a consequence of neoliberal reforms (Strange 2014:93). The region responded with dissent and protest. For Escobar, it is
the only region in the world where some counter-hegemonic processes of importance might be taking place at the level of the state (Escobar 2010).

Whilst we cannot encompass Latin America in a ‘grand reductive sweep’ (Goodale & Postero 2013:4), it is to these countries that we can look to investigate possibilities for an alternative paradigm (Arsel 2012). Since 2000, wide-scale social movement protests intensified in parts of Latin America, challenging the neoliberal project in a number of Latin American countries - a region once the cutting edge of the global free-market revolution. Diverse cultural and political projects found convergence through the crisis of the neoliberal project and a crisis of modernity (Escobar 2010). In the 2000s, the continent became dominated by left-wing governments in a regional trend that was dubbed the ‘pink revolution’ or ‘pink tide’ (Martínez et al. 2009; Chorev & Babb 2009; Sader 2009; Arsel 2012; Castanieda 2006). Across the Latin American region, a large number of progressive governments were elected, for example in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. They have often been linked to the powerful presence of social movements (Leiva 2008:2). Even before the global financial crisis, political change was underway in Latin America. A number of Left/Left of Centre governments - who talked of the improved redistribution of income and social services - gained political leverage in Venezuela (1998), Brazil (2002, 2006 and 2010), Argentina (2003 and 2008), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador (2006), Paraguay (2008) and more recently Peru (2011) (Riggirozzi & Tussie 2012:1). Within this, politics of resistance and contestation have generated political debate and new political projects that look towards the possibility of a ‘post-neoliberal’ future (Peck et al. 2010; Kaltwasser 2011; Martínez et al. 2009; Chorev & Babb 2009).

However, viewing the whole region as having moved away from neoliberalism is a mistake. In 2013, Goodale and Postero examined the region’s responses to neoliberalism’s hegemony and described it as ‘neoliberalism interrupted’. They considered how new forms of governance, economic structures and social mobilizations within Latin America are responding to, and at points challenging, neoliberalism but also recognise that there remain countries
where neoliberalism has been entrenched (Goodale & Postero 2013:1). Peru, Chile, Colombia and much of Central America has witnessed a deepening of conservative neoliberalism (Goodale & Postero 2013:5) and the less radical governments in Latin America have been compared to the ‘third way’ politics of Tony Blair (UK), Bill Clinton (US) or Jean Chretien (Canada) (Macdonald & Rückert 2009:1). However, Postero et al. also argue that interruptions to neoliberalism within Latin America do reveal important new ‘horizons of possibility’ (Goodale & Postero 2013:5). The most radical projects are in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela (Martínez et al. 2009; Escobar 2010; Arsel & Angel 2012; Arsel 2012) and the most self-consciously revolutionary are Venezuela and Bolivia, where revolution has been framed as a ‘formal rejection of neoliberalism’. In these countries, post-neoliberal rhetoric is explicitly anti-neoliberal.

Social movements played a key role in the countries that experienced the most radical political change. This sparked interest in the possible transformation of power relations and politics. For example, in the region’s most radical states, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela rose to power on the back of social movements that campaigned to strengthen the remit and capacity of the state, as a means to defend the interests of society and nature (Arsel & Angel 2012; Escobar 2010; Kohl 2002; Kohl & Farthing 2012; Kohl & LC Farthing 2006; Harten 2011; Gudynas 2011). Social movements in Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador provided the strongest backlash to neoliberal market liberalisation. In Bolivia, for example, neoliberalism became a unifying frame for social movements and brought together various groups and multiple grievances. The term became a referent for inequity and regimes of control and exclusion. However, this use of neoliberalism as a wide referent for protest makes expectations for a post-neoliberal project equally diverse and problematic to define.

As neoliberal reforms had reconfigured previous power relations, protesters also had to find new ways to mobilise (Yashar 2005). In Argentina, the community emerged as a key site for political organising, for example in neighbourhoods where unemployment rates were high due to reforms. As
previously strong labour unions declined, framings for social mobilisations emerged whereby protesters mounted their opposition to neoliberalisation by focusing on issues of unemployment and hunger in the community, for example with the placard slogan ‘The neighbourhood is the new factory’ (Silva 2012:24). In Bolivia and Ecuador, social movements developed a new ethnic politics, mobilising indigenous identity as synonymous with shared experiences of marginalisation and exploitation. Indigeneity was used to critique existing neoliberal politics and to propose an alternative. Such was the importance of indigeneity that non-indigenous individuals identified as indigenous - as a way to assert their political position (Canessa 2012b). At this moment in Bolivia, Alison Brysk argues that ‘protest was indigenised’ (Brysk 2000a), meaning that indigenous identity politics was central to the anti-neoliberal campaign. The purpose, meaning and utility of indigeneity is returned to in the second section of this chapter.

2.3 Post-neoliberalism

The promises of post-neoliberalism have raised questions about how this radical rhetoric translates into reality. There also remains a need for empirically grounded definitions that move beyond the rhetoric (Riggirozzi & Tussie 2012). At this stage, many scholars are using the term ‘post-neoliberal’ to explore an intent to move beyond the Washington Consensus, rather than a coherent new model of governance. It has being described as ‘politics, not policies’ (Kaltwasser 2011; see also Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010). In this reading, it has been understood within a neoliberal/post-neoliberal binary. For example, representing a Polyani moment in which a market-based world order is uneasily poised between political backlash and new forms of ‘progressive’ transformation (Strange 2014:5). The victories of post-neoliberal states are connected to a crisis in neoliberalism (Strange 2014).

The two pillars commonly associated with post-neoliberalism, as an anti-neoliberal project, are political aspiration and economic policies. In terms of aspirations, post-neoliberal states are re-orientating the authority of the state to reconfigure state-society relations, for example through social spending
and welfare. In terms of economic policies, post-neoliberalism is associated with desire to enhance the capacity of the state and its ability to manage markets, to ensure both growth and welfare spending. But it is also a call for a new kind of politics that is rooted in, and responsive to, local traditions, communities and a renewed pact between state and society (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012; Schneider & Soskice 2009; Filho & Gonçalves 2010; Fuentes 2012; Veltmeyer & Petras 2014). In Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for example, common features of the post-neoliberal rhetoric have been the deepening of democracy towards a more substantive and participatory model; an anti-neoliberal economic and political project; pluri-cultural or pluri-national projects within both Ecuador and Bolivia; and development models that include an ecological model (Escobar 2010:6).

In both Bolivia and Ecuador, new governments have voiced an intention to move towards a new development paradigm and away from growth-centric models. In this way, contributing to wider debates about the dominance of economic growth, for example sustainable development and de-growth debates (Thomson 2011; Acosta 2009). Their model, named Buen Vivir in Ecuador and Vivir Bien in Bolivia (translated as Good Life), is promoted as indigenous ideology that links living well, to living well with your community, to a harmonious relationship between humans and nature (Gudynas 2011; Walsh 2010). It has involved radical critiques of dominant development approaches that echo post-development critiques (Acosta 2009; see Escobar 2011; Sachs 1997; Shiva 1988) and the promotion of ‘alternatives based on the rights of nature, expanded conceptions of community’ and the ‘rejection of the linearity of history’ (Gudynas 2013:23). In Bolivia it involves four main dimensions: ‘gender, the rights of nature, pluri-nationality and indigenous cosmovisions’ (Gudynas 2013:23).

A foundation tenet of vivir bien is its revised approach to nature and it promotes ‘harmonious relationships between humans and nature’. This has been supported by a strong environmental stance in the global political arena. President Evo Morales has been outspoken about the ills that capitalism and neoliberalism are doing to the environment. He has spoken at the UN to reject
the green economy and international climate mechanism, because they are rooted in capitalist logic. Instead, he has promoted indigeneity as a solution to the world’s environmental crisis, using his own indigenous identity to position himself as a defender of the environment. In 2009 the UN General Assembly made him a ‘World Hero of Mother Earth’.

This has contributed to expectations that the MAS government would bring significant structural changes (Gudynas 2013). The first Morales administration made substantial changes in the name of *vivir bien*, namely ‘dismantling neoliberalism’, by building a new state that incorporated indigenous and campesino groups into political life, rewriting the constitution and renationalizing the gas industry (Gudynas 2013:23). However, in Morales’ second term moves towards an alternative development paradigm have stalled, to a large extent because of the increasing reliance of extraction (Gudynas 2013). The pursuit of extractivism ‘implies loosening environmental rules, conditioning popular consultation and participation, and even attacking certain civic organisations (Gudynas 2013:24). *Vivir bien* and its corresponding environmental rhetoric is returned to in Chapters 4 and 5. However, at this point it is important to note it as a key discourse of these post-neoliberal political projects.

Despite strong environmental rhetoric, in Ecuador and Bolivia a key dimension of the post-neoliberal state is that it seeks to retain elements of export-led growth models whilst introducing mechanisms for social inclusion and welfare (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012). Increasingly, scholars are arguing that resource extraction is developing as a central feature of post-neoliberalism (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014). Post-neoliberal states are being increasingly linked to a new form of extractivism and the aggressive, extractive frontier that is expanding across Latin America (see Veltmeyer & Petras 2014; Arsel & Angel 2012; Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Bebbington & Bury 2013).
Latin America has been experiencing a continent-wide push to open up frontiers for hydrocarbon extraction, as well as other forms of mining, the production of biofuels, harvesting timber and agroindustry (Bebbington 2008b; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Bebbington 2010). For example, between 2000 and 2008 the volume of Latin American regional exports rose by 42.4 percent (ECLAC 2009: Grugel & Riggirazzi 2012). In the early 1990s, Latin America received 12 percent of global investment in mining but by 2009 a third of all investments were made in the region (de Echave in Bebbington 2008:15). Peru, for example, has 64 identified hydrocarbon blocs that cover more than 70 percent of Amazonian territory. In Bolivia, agreed contracts cover less terrain but 55 percent of national territory was identified as of potential hydrocarbon interest in 2008 (Bebbington 2008:14). Even the most progressive governments, namely in Bolivia and Ecuador, are being critiqued as likely to prioritise extractive industry over indigenous social movement demands and fragile ecosystems (Bebbington 2008b). In Ecuador, for example, there has been ongoing expansion of mining, often in contradiction of their new constitution, new development paradigm and anti-mining initiatives. For example, commitments to mining are overpowering initiatives such as the Yasuni Initiative, where the state tried to raise funds from international donors for leaving oil in the ground (Arasel 2012; Arsel & Angel 2012; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011). In Bolivia, the most salient feature of post-neoliberalism thus far has been the renationalisation of Bolivia’s gas and oil (Postero 2013). The Bolivian state is voicing an intent for radical, post-neoliberal politics as a direct challenge to neoliberalism but its reliance on extraction, and support of related infrastructure, suggests that Bolivian post-neoliberalism is not ‘developing as post-capitalist, post-developmentalist (see Escobar 1992) or post-extractivist’ (Goodale & Postero 2013). In both Ecuador and Bolivia there has therefore been a disconnect between the state’s mission to provide socio-economic development and its environmental rhetoric to protect the environment from the ills of capitalism. This evident tension raises question about how this plays out in context and whether development, as wellbeing, and environmental politics can be so easily separated in everyday life.
This contradiction and key tension is explored throughout this thesis but at this point it is important to note that it has already resulted in the state side-lining civil society. It is increasingly causing clashes between the state and those groups and individuals who are speaking out against mining and advocating nature conservation. In Ecuador, for example, President Correa recently attempted to shut down a key environmental organisation, Accion Ecologica and arrested a prominent indigenous leader, Pepe Acacho, who had been speaking out against the state (Arsel & Angel 2012:205). In Bolivia, there have been a number of disputes between state extractive interests and the local groups affected. These have taken place both in the lowland departments of Beni and Tarija, as well as in the highland department of La Paz (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010; Bebbington & A Bebbington 2010; Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Humphreys-Bebbington 2012). The relationship between local communication and extraction is evidently a key site of conflict, debate and negotiation. It is shaping Amazonian environments and landscapes, as well as the communities that live there. Moreover, it suggests that the discursive separation between development and environment could be being challenged by local conflicts.

In Bolivia, the state’s continuing commitment to natural resource extraction is creating the most conflict, as it challenges previous articulations and understandings of both indigeneity and conservation (see Hindery 2013b; Bebbington & A Bebbington 2010; Bebbington 1995; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Goodale & Postero 2013). The renationalisation of Bolivian hydrocarbons has formed the central feature of the state’s post-neoliberal project and it has also created struggles and contestation over the distribution of rents and benefits. These struggles entail complex articulations of citizenship, territory and nation (Perreault & Valdivia 2010). These social welfare initiatives are discussed in Chapter 5, however, here it is important to recognise that the full impact, scale and focus of such spending is yet to be determined and the extractive regime is still creating conflict, particularly in lowland regions. Benefits are thus not evenly spread and criticism is being levelled at Morales, for example that he is ‘willing to sacrifice lowland indigenous people’ (Goodale & Postero 2013:49).
This creates questions about whether certain needs and politics are being side-lined in the name of the national interest and how this might help define the post-neoliberal project more broadly.

For Escobar, Bolivia has two contrasting projects - that of the state and those of social movements, with social movements advocating a more radical, post-liberal future (Escobar 2010). For Goodale and Postero, this distinction is also important and they argue for distinctions to be made between the state and its new mechanisms for governance - for example, by examining Bolivia’s new constitution and the ways that it has created new political and discursive expressions that underpin contemporary challenges to states (Goodale & Postero 2013:20). Looking to social movements is, therefore, a vital element for understanding the developing post-neoliberal project. An approach to social movements will be more fully introduced in the following sections.

Despite calls to define post-neoliberalism as anti-neoliberalism (Sader 2009), it is also difficult to understand this emergent politics using only a neoliberal/post-neoliberalism binary. For example, Postero argues that you can’t judge state reformulation in Bolivia by the neoliberal/post-neoliberal project alone. The rise of President Morales was based on an understanding that indigenous groups, small-scale farmers (campesinos) and social movements suffered from structures of race and class domination that were the legacy of colonialism and exacerbated by neoliberalism (Postero 2013). Neoliberal reforms intersected with existing legacies and regimes of control, for example exacerbating the existing structures of racism and class domination that were the legacy of colonialism (Postero 2013:26). If neoliberalism was used by social movements to oppose multiple and long-running forms and causes of discrimination and exclusion, as well as neoliberal policies, then the post-neoliberal project must respond to these expectations. Rather than rejecting post-neoliberalism as a site of study (Laing 2012), we must carefully question what groups are demanding from the post-neoliberal project and if those demands are being met within the post-neoliberal projects of Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina (Humphreys-Bebbington}
2010; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Jean Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012; Kaltwasser 2011).

2.4 Post-neoliberalism as New Developmentalism?
Questions are also emerging about how post-neoliberal states engage with, negotiate and manage the wider politics and projects that surround the commodities boom. Post-neoliberalism is increasingly being connected to a wider change in the hierarchies, political configurations and power relations that shaped the global political economy in the 1990s. These hierarchies are partly changing because of Chinese economic growth, the financial crisis in the US and Western Europe, added to a rising global demand for primary commodities. This is transforming international trade and allowing post-neoliberal states new levels of financial independence (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012). For example, it is anticipated that Banco del Sur (Bank of the South) will soon be able to mobilise US$20 billion following the bank’s successful launch in June 2013. Several Latin American governments have moved to free themselves from the direct oversight of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - by repaying loans early. For example, in December 2005, Argentina and Brazil announced that they would pay off $9.8 billion and $15.5 billion respectively. Uruguay, Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela followed (Riggirozzi & Tussie 2012:1). In total, South American IMF Debt has declined from “80 percent of all outstanding IMF loans in 2005 to just 1 percent in 2008” (Strange 2014: 101). For Bolivia, the reduced power of the IMF and World Bank allows them a much freer hand in their attempts to rethink their economic plans and role of the state (Weisbrot & Sandoval 2006: Poster 2013). Taken together, these developments are being viewed as part of a broader shift - away from dependence on Washington Consensus institutions (Strange 2014:101). Strange, for example, argues that post-neoliberalism is part of a transition from neoliberalism, underpinned by US dominance, to an emergent post-neoliberal, post-hegemonic world order (Strange 2014:3).

In contrast to the neoliberal era, these new forms of agency are ‘deeply re-politicising, often state-led and focused and aim strategically at developmental objectives’ (Strange 2014:5). New Keynesian regimes and new
‘developmental spaces’ are opening up at a plurality of levels (national, regional and global) within international political economy, alongside new configurations of neoliberalism (Strange 2014:4). Strategies make use of market mechanisms and a ‘common aim has been to rearticulate specifically developmentalist accumulation regimes within, rather than against, globalisation’ (Strange 2014:5). There are, therefore, calls to understand developing post-neoliberal states as developmentalist states.

Post-neoliberalism is also being tied to a new regionalism. Riggirozzi and Tussie, for example, argue that ‘alternative institutional structures and cooperation projects are, although embryonic, part of a complex set of alternative ideas and motivations affecting polities and policies across the region’ (2012:2). They define a new Latin American regionalist map, identifying ‘an overlap of and sometimes competition between three main projects:

1. Projects with a strong emphasis on commercial integration as a transit to broader multilateralism, with low socio-political content (i.e. the so-called Pacific Rim with Mexico under NAFTA, Chile, Colombia and Peru in the Andean Community);

2. Projects that advance trade at its core, deepening linkages with neighbouring countries, yet seeking alternative and autonomous trade and post-trade political projects, even reaching outside the region (i.e. Central American Common Market, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Andean Community (CAN), Union of South American Nations (UNASUR));

3. A model that more radically emphasizes political and social aspects of integration, with new economic and welfare commitments, reclaiming the principles of socialism in direct opposition to neoliberal globalization (such as the Venezuela-led ALBA grouping Cuba, Bolívia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Dominica and Honduras.’ (Riggirozzi & Tussie 2012:11)

There are, therefore, differences between the component projects of this new regionalism. However, there are also instances of dialogue and partnership.
Radical states, like Bolivia and Ecuador, are also engaging with the political objectives and projects of neighbouring countries. For example, Bolivia supports Brazil’s ambitious transport project, the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). This is a project to integrate all 12 South American countries in an ambitious series of transport and energy projects, in order to increase the region’s export capacity. This project was launched in 2000, dividing the region into a number of key hubs. It plans for the vast expansion of transport and energy networks. For example, building has just finished on an Inter-Oceanic Highway, which links Brazil and Peru (Pieck 2013; Harvey & Knox 2012).

What these debates show is that the rhetoric of radical post-neoliberal states, namely Bolivia and Ecuador, is located in a regional context where significant changes are underway. These changes and developing regionalism may influence how post-neoliberalism manifests.

2.5 Development as an Intentional Activity: NGOs and social movements

Intentional development is also important to introduce here, as it is entangled with processes of development as an immanent process, namely those introduced above. Intentional development is also connected to the environmental politics and discourses of indigeneity that will be considered in the second and third sections of this chapter. However, intentional development is a broad subject and its multiple dimensions are interrogated by rich debates. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to do justice to these debates. Instead, I focus on civil society, setting out an approach to differentiate between different strands of intentional development before introducing two key development mechanisms. The differentiation between ‘Big D’ and ‘small d’ is useful when looking at NGOs and social movements. ‘Big D’ development sees ‘Development’ as a project-based and intentional activity, for example the work of international NGOs (Hart 2001). In contrast, ‘small d’ development refers to underlying processes of capitalist development (Hart 2001). This is a useful way to approach two important development mechanisms, non-government organisations (NGOs) and social movements.
NGOs are most often associated with the third sector. This sits within a conceptual differentiation between the state, the market and the third sector (Brown & Korten 1989; Robinson 2013). This third sector is often referred to as civil society, defined as the ‘totality of voluntary social relationships, communities, and institutions that lie between the private realm, the market, and the state’ (Castree et al. 2013). NGOs are often viewed as essential for civil society, for example for ‘aiding communication and participation; for training activists; for protecting human rights; or for strengthening the ability of communities to influence states’ (Banks et al. 2015). It is their relationship with ‘the people’ that gives them their legitimacy (ibid.)

Taken collectively, NGOs are powerful development actors. For example, Hulme and Edwards consider the contemporary power and role of NGOs (2013). They show that in the twentieth century, the number of NGOs worldwide grew exponentially. Not only that, the sheer size of some of them makes them ‘significant players’ in social welfare and employment markets at national levels. The funding they attract has increased enormously and their visibility in policy-making forums, the media and with the general public has never been higher (Hulme & Edwards 2013; see also Banks & Hulme 2012). The 1980s and 1990s was a key moment for NGOs and the 1980s have been termed ‘the NGO decade’ (Hulme & Edwards 2013). This period was a key period for NGOs, in terms of consolidating their position and role, as significant development and civil society actors. For example, their spending in this same period rose from US$2.8 billion to US$5.7 billion (OECD 1994 in Hulme and Edwards 2013). Their impact and financial strength is significant. NGOs thus have the potential to speak for ‘the people’ and advocate for the most marginalized, to sit between states and markets to help our societies become more equal and just. However, the intensifying presence of NGOs and their increasing power has raised some critical questions about the work that they do. Hulme and Edwards argue that many NGO personnel and analysts now have major concerns about the contribution that NGOs are making to development and about the ways that their ‘success’ has changed them (Hulme & Edwards 2013:3). They question whether some NGOs have become too close to their Northern donors, in terms of interests, values,
methods and priorities. They question the consequences of the increasing size of some NGOs, especially the big international NGOs (BINGOs), and assess how their size and dependence on large amounts of donor funding shapes what they do and how (Hulme & Edwards 2013).

This expansion of NGOs must be contextualised within ‘the wider history and systems in which NGOs are embedded’ (Banks & Hulme 2012:5; Lewis & Kanji 2009). For example, rather than being the spokespeople for civil society, NGOs have also been looked to as a top-down project. Reimann argues that the growth of NGOs should be viewed as a top-down endeavour that has resulted from political opportunities created by donor funding and development industry planning (Reimann 2006). Coupled with the explosive growth of NGOs over the past three decades, this suggests that it is crucial to take into account the ways in which states, international organizations and other structures actively stimulated and promoted NGOs from above (Reimann 2006; Hulme and Banks 2012). For example, Reimann argues that as international institutions and regimes have expanded to handle new global issues, they have increasingly promoted NGOs as their service providers and advocates. This has created political opportunities for NGOs to grow and expand, for example, through grants, contracts and institutional support. NGOs have been welcomed into established policy arenas, such as the UN. Partnerships such as this have created an environment conducive to the growth of the NGO sector and its spread from the industrialized West to other parts of the world (Reimann 2006).

There is thus debate about where NGOs sit in relation to wider ideological and power regimes. This is important when questioning how they intersect and interact with processes of immanent development. It creates questions about who they represent and about the potential that they have to bring about transformative change. These are questions asked more widely, for example by Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin (2008). They argue that NGOs are only politically meaningful if they offer alternatives to dominant models, practices and ideas of development. They too are critical of the course that many NGOs are taking. Hulme and Edwards support their critique. They question whether
contemporary NGOs are valued because of the alternative questions they ask or because they have become socialised into the establishment, namely the development industry. The concern is that they might have lost their relationship with the poor, with the most marginalized and with radical ideas which might provide alternatives to the orthodoxies of the rich and powerful (Hulme & Edwards 2013:3).

In these critiques, the strength of NGOs lies with their linkages to the ‘grassroots’. This is viewed as enabling NGOs to design services and programmes using ‘innovative and experimental approaches centred around community participation’ (Bebbington, Hickey, et al. 2008). This is viewed as vital for empowering disadvantaged groups and helping them to gain voice in spaces from which they have been excluded (Banks & Hulme 2012). NGOs that engage with issues of power and politics (see Hickey & Mohan 2005) to adopt approaches rooted in notions of participation (see Chambers 1997) and ‘empowerment’ are therefore seen as having a greater chance of bringing about meaningful, transformative change. For example, in ‘striving to meet the needs of the poor, they aim to assist them in articulating those needs themselves through participatory, people-centred, and rights-based approaches’ (Drabek 1987 in Banks & Hulme 2012).

These debates are relevant to questions about post-neoliberal projects. Firstly, because calls for participatory and empowering forms of development echo much of the rhetoric of vivir bien. Secondly, it is relevant as it raises questions about where international development organisations sit in relation to this emergent political project.

2.6 Social Movements
Understanding social movements is also key to unpacking the complexities of contemporary development. Their relationship with NGOs and dominant development regimes are explained by the differentiation between ‘big D’ development and ‘small d’ development (Hart 2001). As introduced in the above debates about NGOs, project outputs have been criticized as having little intention of making transformative changes that challenge dominant
power relations (Bebbington, Hickey, et al. 2008). In response, I am looking to social movements as movements that seek systemic changes to processes of ‘small d’ development, meaning processes underlying capitalist developments (Hart 2001; Bebbington et al.; 2008:5).

Social movements have been defined as processes of ‘collective actions that are sustained across space and time, that reflect grievances around perceived injustices and that constitute a pursuit of alternative agendas’ (Bebbington, Humphrey Bebbington, et al. 2008; Escobar & Alvarez 1992). They are sustained by shared grievances and discourses over any clear form of social structure and can operate at a variety of scales. They are, therefore, more than an individual organisation, though these can play a key role within social movements and provide much-needed resources, knowledge and networks (Bebbington et al. 2008). Social movements are often looked to as vehicles through which concerns for the poor and marginalized are given greater visibility within civil society. For example, at points they provide ways for groups to achieve local empowerment and citizen activism. They can do this by holding the state to account and constituting grassroots mechanisms for promoting democracy. This can be seen in the social movement actions across parts of Latin America, which challenged the neoliberal state and were introduced above (see Kohl 2006; Kohl & Farthing 2006; Perreault 2008; Perreault 2005; Goodale & Poster 2013). In terms of intentional development, social movements can both work in partnership with NGOs and work to challenge the work of international development organisations.

Social movements are often looked to as ‘processes of mobilization that involve protest and a demand for some sort of alternative society and development’, with some seeking radical alternatives and some following a more reformist agenda (Bebbington, Abramovay, et al. 2008:2879; see also Peet & Watts 2002; Escobar & Alvarez 1992). They are often looked to in the hope that they can create social change and outcomes that increase social justice and wellbeing (Bebbington, Abramovay, et al. 2008). They can negotiate and contest the dominant power dynamics, discourses and policies that are shaping their livelihoods, communities and environments. They can
therefore be researched as the sites for debates about daily life, the state, democracy and political practice (Escobar 1992; Escobar 2005).

Social movements can also be defined by their politics. The contentious politics literature, for example, asserts that a defining feature of social movements is that they operate outside conventional politics. Sidney Tarrow defines social movements as ‘social mobilized groups engaged in a sustained contentious interaction with power-holders in which at least one actor is either target or participant’ (Tarrow 2001; McAdam et al. 2003). In Bolivia, for example, opposing neoliberal reforms brought together those who shared a history of exclusion and common frustration with the failures of neoliberal globalisation (Cott 2000:4). Social movements played a central role in challenging neoliberalism, contributing to early post-neoliberal rhetoric. Important questions now regard where they sit in the developing post-neoliberal project and how instances of conflict and divergence are reconciled.

Section 2: Environment

How these politics of development intersect with and affect environments is a core focus of this research and it will be explored throughout this thesis. However, here I introduce mainstream conservation and environmentalisms as two important ways that the environmental impacts of development are perceived and addressed. By mainstream conservation, I mean the larger international NGOs that dominate conservation funding and hold positions of significant power (Brockington et al. 2008:9). Somewhat ironically, the logic and projects of mainstream conservation have been identified as entangled with wider ideologies and power dynamics, namely neoliberalism. Conservation policy and practice has been regulated through the wider political economy and the last 30 years has seen an increasing number of biophysical phenomena being managed by neoliberal policy (Bebbington 2005 and Ferguson 1994 in Büscher 2010:29; Castree 2010), based on the fundamental premise of ‘selling nature to save it’ (McAfee 1999).
Although conservation and capitalism have long been linked, what has become dominant since the advent of neoliberalism is the view that capitalism ‘can and should’ save the world (Brockington & Duffy 2010:470). This has involved, among other things:

I. the creation of capitalist markets for natural resource exchange and consumption;

II. the privatisation of resource control within these markets;

III. the commodification of resources so they can be traded within these markets;

IV. the withdrawal of direct government intervention from market transactions; and

V. the decentralisation of resource governance to local authorities and non-state actors, such as NGOs (Fletcher 2010).

The primacy of market-conservation as a mainstay in global environmental policy was recently reinforced by environmental leaders at the 2012 Rio Earth Summit through the (re)launching of flagship initiatives, including The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), Payments of Ecosystem Services (PES), REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), and the Business of Biodiversity Offsetting Programmes (BBOP) (Death 2014; Brockington 2012). In a 2012 synthesized critique of neoliberal biodiversity conservation, Büscher Sullivan and Neves note the diversity of conservation strategies, institutions and commercial ventures. However, they argue for the importance of understanding and critiquing neoliberal conservation because despite this variation, the similarities and consequences are pervasive (Büscher et al. 2012:6).

It is beyond the scope and remit of this thesis to review the growing literature that carefully examines, analyses and investigates the intersections between neoliberalism and conservation (for example see Brockington et al. 2008; Igoe et al. 2010; Büscher 2008; Arsel & Büscher 2012; Buscher et al. n.d.; Büscher
et al. 2012; Sullivan 2011; Brockington & Duffy 2010; MacDonald 2010; R Fletcher 2010) or the intersections between neoliberalism and natures (Noel Castree 2008a; Noel Castree 2008b; Heynen & Robbins 2005) or neoliberalism and environments (Heynen et al. 2007). However, of note here are three key concerns being raised within these literatures, which are relevant to how neoliberalism has been contested and rejected in parts of Latin America.

The first concern noted here is that neoliberal conservation is transforming how nature(s) are understood, comprehended and treated and is thus (re) shaping nature-human ‘entanglements’. For Sullivan, in valuing local natures in terms of international markets, neoliberal conservation abstracts nature from its spatial and societal context and the multiple ways it is valued, understood and produced (Sullivan 2010b). She argues that partnerships between business and conservation emphasize the commodification of nature, for example through Payment for Ecosystem Services. Sullivan argues that this promotes a new ideational construction of nature as a provider of ‘services’ to humans. This construction begins a transformation of earth into a corporation - providing goods and services that can be quantified, priced and traded as commodities. The concern is that these representations of nature shape how it is understood and subsequently treated. Sullivan, for example, quotes the Deputy Head of the Species Programme of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) who in 2009 said:

‘…it’s time to recognize that nature is the largest company on Earth working for the benefit of 100 percent of humankind – and it’s doing it for free’ (in Sullivan 2010a:116).

A second, interrelated concern is that neoliberal conservation consolidates and promotes elite power. For example, the re-regulation of nature through forms of commodification can entail new forms of territorialisation, namely the partitioning of resources in ways that control or exclude local people (Igoe & Brockington 2007). Within conservation, partnerships with business are increasingly the norm (Igoe & Brockington 2007). For example, the largest
conservation NGOs have increasingly worked in partnerships with industry, positioning business as a central actor. The Nature Conservancy, for example, can list Shell Oil, General Motors, BP Exploration, Enron Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, and Dow Chemical, among others, as corporate sponsors and contributors (Bailey 2006 in Corson 2010:593; Chapin 2004). There is concern that these NGOs have subsequently become too closely allied to corporate interests, for example at times failing to oppose certain initiatives because they rely on the companies involved for funds (Chapin 2004; Dowie 2011).

Neoliberal conservation has the potential to increase and enable the control and ownership of natural resources by global elites primarily interested in its economic value. This has profound implications for who can access natural resources and how they can be used (Brockington et al. 2006; Castree 2010; MacDonald 2010; Holmes 2011). Moreover, the emphasis on competition, along with the rolling back of state protection and social contracts, creates spaces in which local people struggle to compete effectively in the face of much more powerful transnational interests. Igoe and Brockington, for example, argue that ‘they simply lack the resources to play the neoliberal game effectively. This does not mean that they never will, just that the deck is heavily stacked against them’ (Igoe & Brockington 2007:446).

The final concern being drawn out here is that three decades on, rather than sparking political debate about the environmental pressures created by ongoing industrialisation, expansion and growth, the environmental crisis is being combated using the tools and logic of capitalism (see Brockington et al. 2008; Igoe & Brockington 2007; Arsel & Büscher 2012; Büscher et al. 2014; Büscher et al. 2012; Brockington & Duffy 2010; MacDonald 2010; Fletcher 2010; Sullivan 2013; Sullivan 2009). This approach removes the potential that conservation has to make transformative change, as it means that environmental goals do not require changes in existing political institutions, the distribution of economic power or resource flows (Adams 1995; Redclift 1994; Corson 2010; McAfee 1997). In the 1970s in the US, a key focus of conservationists was to challenge big business, market expansion and growth,
for example by advocating a ‘limits to growth’ approach or by lobbying for regulation and legislation. Yet now, the largest conservation organisations advocate for market approaches and work in partnerships with big business (Corson 2010). They are complicit in the neoliberal system and are therefore not challenging it.

In a related point, Swyngedouw argues that the hegemony of neoliberal market ideology and the application of market mechanisms to new aspects of political life have accompanied a growing de-politicisation, in terms of how environmental problems are comprehended. He argues that technocratic management and the predominance of managerial logic has overtaken the political dimension from the public domain, meaning that political debate and decision-making have been subordinated to an administrative function. Rather than recognition of ideological differences, Swyngedouw argues that the ‘post-political’ has displaced conflict and disagreement with a narrow politics filtered through the technocratic, managerial logic of neoliberal ideology. Environmental concerns, namely climate change, are being presented in global, humanitarian terms and delinked from named contexts, process and perpetrators. They are thus de-politicized and dislocated from context-specific natures and their specific social contexts (Swyngedouw 2011; see also Wilson & Swyngedouw 2014). These three, interconnected concerns about neoliberal conservation are important for understanding how neoliberalism has been challenged in Latin America.

2.7 Environmentalisms

In addition to conservation, I am also using the concept of environmentalism to refine my questions about how development and the environment interact. Environmentalism has emerged as one of the big ideas of the 20th century (Adams 2004). Its starting point was the scale and severity of the impacts of industrial technology on nature (for example pesticides, pollution or acid rain) and it recognised the range of environmental ills that have been created by industrialization and developing patterns of human consumption (ibid). Here I consider three, interlinked dimensions of environmentalism. Firstly, concern with the widespread and diverse impacts that human activity is having on the
planet. Secondly, recognition of the multiple ways that nature is perceived, used and valued within this. Thirdly, the strong ties to social justice, which highlight the political nature of environmental issues, for example, through raising questions about whose natures are being protected and whose voices dominate debates about such issues. A focus on environmentalisms allows for a wider view, to consider how complex processes of development are experienced and negotiated.

To return to its first dimension, the nature and scale of human impacts on the planet have extended beyond the ‘wildest imaginations of early conservationists’ (Adams 2004:157). They are unlikely to decline and require careful management. These impacts go beyond particular threats to particular species. Instead, these widespread environmental impacts have come to encircle the lives of conservationists themselves and the economic systems in which they are embedded (Adams 2004:157). Thus environmentalisms are not just concerned with the aims of wildlife or landscape conservation but seek to address the broader, intensifying impacts that human lives and consumption are having on the planet. In India between 1973 and 1980, for example, illiterate peasants protested against the chopping of their local forests for exportation. They began hugging the trees to stop them being cut down because the protesters wanted and needed the forest for their household and agricultural requirements. They hugged the trees in protest and demanded community rights to collective resources. Their protest developed into a movement for the collective protection of forests through new community management schemes. Their demands developed into the broader Chipko Movement and inspired the term ‘tree hugger’. Their protest opposed the global processes affecting local forests, namely global consumptive demands for wood and timber. Such nature-based conflicts in India gave rise to the country’s environmental movement, which responded to ‘lopsided, iniquitous and environmentally destructive processes of development’ (Guha & Martinez-Alier 1997:xii).

The example given above shows that environmentalisms highlight the ways that the depletion of material resources and increasing pollution are felt at the
local level, recognising how pollution and degradation is differently experienced and countered in diverse settings (Alier & Guha 1997:xxi). As part of this, it acknowledges that different individuals and groups differently experience threats to their local environments. This means recognising that nature is encountered, experienced and valued in diverse ways. It helps us to understand that ‘nature’ is a contested term and that the meaning of nature, socially, culturally and politically, can be different for different groups. How we see and understand nature is shaped by our social context and upbringing. In other words, ‘nature’ is differently experienced according to one’s social position and that it is differently produced by different groups in different historical periods’ (Escobar 1998:5).

A focus on environmentalisms can thus constitute a vital part of debates about how environmental issues are being defined and prioritised, as well as how they can be best resolved. The ‘environmentalism of the poor’ literature, for example, has challenged the perception that poor people are only concerned with exploiting natural resources, whilst the rich are more able to worry about nature conservation. Guha and Martinez-Alier identified two broad camps of environmentalism, the environmentalism of the North, or ‘full-bellied environmentalism, which positions nature as outside of the production process’ and the environmentalism of the poor, which stems from conflicts about access to and control over natural resources often in relation to industrialisation (Guha & Martinez-Alier 1997; xxi). In researching the environmentalism of the poor, they looked at the ways that subordinate social groups perceive and value nature. They found that the lives of many poor individuals and groups were being affected by wider development processes and that these processes created particular concerns for their environments, as illustrated in the Indian Chipko example above. Guha and Martinez-Alier argue that the environmentalism of the poor centres around the defence of livelihoods and communal access to natural resources (1997). Moreover, they argued that we must view these actions as environmental, despite protesters making use-claims on natural resources, for example to use them to meet their livelihood or living needs.
In taking an anti-essentialist approach to nature (Escobar 1998), environmentalism recognises the diverse ways that natures are valued. However, this approach also suggests that place-based experiences of nature are important. By recognising ‘place-based struggles of localisation’ (Escobar 2001) and locating them in wider development processes, this approach goes some way in addressing complex and pressing questions about the consumptive pressure being placed on natural resources and the power dynamics through which these flow. Firstly, it recognises the multiple claims being made on natural resources and thus illuminates the different ways that resources are used and valued. Secondly, it raises questions about the power dynamics and politics that influence which claims win.

The power dynamics behind conflicts over natural resources are addressed by the third, interlinked dimension of environmentalism. This draws out concerns for social justice and reveals the political aspects of these struggles. The complexities and timeline of an environmental struggle, seen as a negotiation of wider development processes, helps us to understand how nature is managed but can also reveal the hidden winners and losers, the hidden costs and the differential power relations that produce social and environmental outcomes (Robbins 2011). This translates into questions about equity of access to resources and decision-making arenas. It can also be translated into questions about the ‘who’ (see Fraser 2009a; Fraser 2009b), meaning who gets to control or access natural resources? Who gets to meaningfully contribute to debates about local resource use? Who dominates debates about broader environmental agendas? Who benefits or suffers from wider processes of development? These questions, in turn, can be thought about in relation to wider priorities for development and conservation. So within environmentalism lie issues of power, social justice, and values.

Section 3: Indigenous Identity Politics

In a 2010 review of the four largest peer-reviewed journals in anthropology, *American Anthropologist*, *American Ethnologist*, *Cultural Anthropology* and
Current Anthropology, Hamilton et al. discovered a growing interest in studies of indigeneity and identified it as one of four themes of particular significance. They noted its salience as ‘a productive analytical category, conceptualized terrain… and mode of political mobilization and dissolution’ and argued that ‘indigeneity is in flux’, moving away from being characterized in any kind of definitive way and instead being articulated as a process or as ‘problems in motion’ (Hamilton & Placas 2011:249). The dynamics of the term have undergone a dramatic shift in recent years (Friedman 1999; Dombrowski 2002) and the dominant usage of indigeneity is no longer to reference fixed cultural traits and territorially bound populations (Delugan 2010). Instead, indigeneity is treated as an articulated identity - imposed, inhabited, contested and negotiated by different groups of people.

This approach reveals claims for indigeneity as involving numerous and dynamic self-representational strategies and positional identities that are multiple and fluid (Jackson & Warren 2005; Gabriela Valdivia 2005). It also intimates that the purpose of scholarship has shifted to focusing on better understanding how indigeneity is created in different contexts, as well as how different groups of people and individuals manage to use indigeneity to advocate for their communities or promote their agendas (Brockington et al. 2008:120). However, scholarship must also understand whether (and why) particular forms of indigeneity gain resonance and, importantly, power. To do so, I consider indigeneity as discourse - to better understand how particular mobilizations of indigeneity map to power, for example the political backing of the state or the financial backing of international development organisations. This means firstly, looking at how indigeneity is defined and described. Secondly, it means questioning how different forms of indigeneity relate to wider ideologies, power relations and political projects (Fairclough 2001; Chilton 2004; Herman & Chomsky 2010).

This contemporary approach to indigeneity illuminates negotiations over the changing meaning of indigeneity as negotiations to obtain a political voice, political power and to have particular agendas and views represented in the relevant political arenas (see Fraser 2008:16). They demonstrate that
mobilizations of indigeneity can be mobilizations for political power, citizenship, territory, rights or development. Moreover, they show that indigeneity can be complex politics. In order to make the shifting discursive power of indigeneity clearer, the follow section outlines dominant approaches to indigeneity and key debates.

2.8 Dominant Approaches to Indigeneity

In the American continent, the terms ‘indigena’ and Indian were born from the historical colonial encounter between native and non-native populations, first in colonial societies and then in national societies (Delugan 2010). Indigeneity was understood as the subjectivities, knowledge and practices of the earliest human inhabitants of a particular place, including the racial and legal identities that refer to these people (Delugan 2010). The term ‘indigena’ is itself derived from the word ‘native’ and has links to soil, although this definition is no longer straightforward (Hodgson 2002). However, its rootedness in colonial history means indigenous identity is not open to everyone and has a complicated politics of inclusion and exclusion. For example, some non-indigenous groups identify with indigenous politics, on the basis of similar experiences of injustice, inequality or disenfranchise. However, if they cannot tie these experiences to legitimate claims as first peoples, they cannot benefit from regimes of indigenous rights. In instances like these, these benefits become exclusionary (Igoe 2006). In Africa, for example, groups struggle to gain rights and recognition through claims to indigeneity, compared to more widely recognised groups in other continents who maintain or protect rights already attained (Bowen 2000; Hodgson 2002). For those who can make a claim as first-peoples, what it means for present day individuals and groups remains uncertain. In Latin America, those who claim indigenous heritage differ extensively from each other in identifying characteristics such as language, culture, mode of production, levels of urbanisation and degree of assimilation into dominant society (Brysk 1996). In relation to post-neoliberal environments, this elicits question about the forms of indigeneity supported by the post-neoliberal project.
Despite developments in how indigeneity is understood and treated, its rootedness in problematic colonial discourses means that indigeneity, as a political category and term, has been critiqued as being inherently problematic. ‘Indigenous’ has been rebuked as a loaded term, resonant not only with the colonial label of ‘native’ but also with understandings of the ‘primitive’ (Kuper 2003). For example, studies of the ‘native’ underpinned early Western anthropology, which assumed that native groups remained unchanged and forever tied to the place they were from (Appadurai 1988). Such studies denied people a history or complexity and positioned the ‘native’, unchanged and incarcerated to place, in opposition to Western observers – ‘the movers, the seers and the knowers’ (Appadurai 1988:37). Indigenous groups were identified and held up by industrialized nations as an example of ‘pre-modern’ social groupings, sharing the same natural history laws as ‘modern’ societies but not a history of industrialization or modernization. Within the politics of post-World War Two, indigeneity was used to explain linear conceptualisations of development and progressions towards industrialisation. The hegemonic power of modernization theories grew towards the end of World War Two and became a key common sense, guiding the US government throughout the 1950s. Early development policies, rooted in these theories, positioned indigenous groups as pre-modern man, yet to begin their linear path towards development (Michael 2000).

These ideas essentialized individuals and groups, using a dichotomy of traditional/modern to classify societies. They positioned ‘traditional’ as a natural state of underdevelopment, whilst the developed, industrialised West exemplified all that was ‘modern’ (Rist 2002). The crossover point from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ was marked by industrialisation, whilst modernity was defined by capitalism and mass-consumption (Rostow 1971). Yet this problematic application of traditional/modern dichotomies ignored the diverse histories, economics, knowledge, technologies and worldviews of multiple groups. These ideas underpinned dominant discourses of indigeneity, which associated individuals and groups with the ‘traditional’, the past, timelessness, spirituality and an innocence that existed before the corrupting influences of the modern world (Kuper 2003; Kuper et al. 2003; Appadurai 1988; Appadurai...
The concern is that contemporary indigenous discourses stem from these ideas and remain bound to this legacy.

Discourses of indigeneity have also been much influenced by the indigenous peoples of particular countries, particularly industrialised countries. American ‘tribes’ and Aboriginal Australians, for example, have served as ‘prototypes’ for thinking about indigenous peoples in international discourse, leading to particular associations of indigeneity with cultural authenticity, spiritual ties to the land and a powerful medicinal knowledge (Ramos 1998; Bowen 2000). Multiple and diverse individuals and groups in the Global South have been subsequently classified and categorised, using discourses of indigeneity dominated by the ideas and histories of the Global North. These encompassed numerous needs, histories and political contexts (Kuper 2003).

Theories that link indigeneity to capitalism are also important (Hamilton & Placas 2011; Li 2007; Li 2000) and also help to explain the opportunities and constraints that groups experience by mobilising indigeneity. Li argues that indigeneity, as a political category and space, co-emerged with capitalism. She argues that it was created to protect those deemed unable to cope with the market systems of expanding capitalist regimes in South-east Asia. ‘Indigenous’ was created as a political slot that remained outside of the market system. Similar to critiques about colonial heritage, for Li this remains a powerful strand of indigenous discourse. She argues that indigeneity is often still positioned and understood in this way - as a countermovement to capitalism (Li 2007; Li 2000). This has offered opportunities for resistance politics, for example Bolivia’s anti-neoliberal movement, but can also overlook the livelihood needs and strategies of indigenous groups (T. Li 2010; Li 2007). For example, the need to participate in the market economy is a given reality for the majority of most Brazilian Amazonian groups who identify as indigenous. They are subject to the same economic pressures and limited options for earning cash as other poor, rural Amazonians. Yet this is often overlooked, as they are thought of as indigenous and thus outside market regimes (Conklin & Graham 1995; Colchester 1989).
2.9 Indigeneity and Nature

Understanding the ties between indigeneity and nature is vital for this research, as it is important for understanding post-neoliberal rhetoric as well as emerging, oppositional environmentalisms. Moreover, although these ties have been critiqued, strong discursive bonds between indigeneity and nature remain. For example, the view of indigeneity as synonymous with living harmoniously with nature, not as a cattle rancher or through market-intensive practices, is a powerful image and still influential in global development discourse (Valdivia 2005). It is also an idea promoted by social movements, who sometimes invoke the idea that their relationships to the environment are consistent with conservation principles, as a strategy to maintain control of natural homelands (Brockington, Duffy & Igoe 2008:124).

By the 1990s the protection of biodiversity was becoming discursively and institutionally linked to cultural diversity and indigenous rights (Brockington et al. 2008:113; WWF in Igoe 2008), dominated by the idea that the world’s first peoples are tied to the world’s last wild places (Brockington et al. 2008:113). This idea enjoyed a brief but intense popularity. For example, in 1997 the World Wildlife Fund, one of the world’s largest conservation NGOs, posited a global overlap between areas of high biodiversity and high cultural diversity. They suggested that indigenous resource management and environmental knowledge were essential to conservation (WWF 1997 in Igoe 2008:96). In the 1990s, international bodies and legislation were similarly attuned to ties between indigeneity and nature conservation. For example, the 1994 UN Draft of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognized that indigenous people have ‘distinctive spiritual and material relationships with the lands, territories, waters, coastal seas and other resources’ (UNDRIP Article 25). These links between conservation and indigeneity were about more than location, they built discursive links between indigenous groups and land, territory or nature (Brockington et al. 2008:115). These ties between indigeneity and nature create both constraints and opportunities for groups who identify as indigenous (Valdivia 2005; Bowen 2000; Conklin & Graham 1995).
In the Amazon in the late 1980s and 1990s, positive ideas about indigenous groups and their relations to nature became a symbolic resource in transnational eco-politics. Images of indigenous Amazonian leaders generated unprecedented international support for local Amazonian struggles, helping groups to gain important land rights (Conklin & Graham 1995). This eco-politics was founded on the assertion that indigenous views of nature and ways of using natural resources were consistent with Western conservationist principles (Valdivia 2005). In the Amazon in the 1980s, for example, indigenous groups partnered with international conservation non-government organisations (NGOs), which represented indigenous groups as natural environmental stewards. For conservationists, this was a way to gain support for their cause. For indigenous groups, it was a way to claim both territorial and citizenship rights from the state when in-country channels were lacking (Pieck & Moog 2009; Pieck 2006). This union depended on the creation of a middle ground, where the needs of conservationists and indigenous communities overlapped (Conklin & Graham 1995).

As Amazonian environmental politics grew in coverage in international media, large conservation organisations expanded their biodiversity conservation work through much of tropical Latin America. The creation of protected areas was key to these conservation initiatives (Pieck 2006). Protected areas create set asides, a way of valuing nature and combating environmental degradation by idealising spaces of wilderness as a refuge from the ills of civilisation, or as a place to be preserved for the recreation of the human spirit (Cronon 1996). Although conservation is diverse and involves ‘disagreements and debates about the ethics, morals, principles and practices of conservation’ (Brockington et al. 2008:6), protected area conservation is a dominant method of mainstream conservation (Brockington et al. 2008:118). From a historical perspective, protected areas have two starkly different and at times paradoxical consequences for indigenous groups. They can be instrumental in dispossessing people of land and resources or a mechanism through which groups win control over land and resources and defend themselves against the transformations of development (Brockington et al. 2008:114). For example, across much of tropical Latin America the implementation of
uninhabited protected areas clashed with growing indigenous demands for autonomy and land rights, with pan-Amazonian groups decrying protected areas as another mechanism for colonial control of land and resources (COICA 1989; Escobar 1998; Pieck 2006). They critiqued the displacement of people from landscapes in the name of conservation, contested more widely by communities for the material loss of livelihoods and dwellings, the loss of power and control over their landscapes, and the ‘symbolic obliteration’ from landscapes (where people are removed from local history, memory and representation) (West et al. 2006; Theodossopoulos 2002; Adams & Hutton 2007). In parts of Amazonia, discourses of indigeneity provided an overlap with the aims of protected area conservation. A middle ground was found, where the protection of biodiversity was tied to the protection of cultural diversity (Igoe 2006). For example, in Bolivia a number of protected areas are co-managed as indigenous territories, a point returned to in Chapter 5.

Indigenous territories have also been promoted as sites for conservation because territorial lands can be designated across extremely large tracts of land, for example across the Amazonian forests of Brazil (Coombes et al. 2012; Peres 1994). Without adequate conservation initiatives, these areas are at risk of exploitation, sometimes by indigenous groups themselves. For example, by 1988 Kayapo groups in the East Brazilian Amazon had earned $33 million from mahogany logging on their lands (The Economist 1993 in Peres 1994:597). Instances like these are used to demonstrate the need for targeted conservation initiatives within certain indigenous territories. However, instances of co-management between conservation and indigenous territorial organisations are not always straightforward and issues of power and contestation can arise. For example, the links between indigeneity and nature conservation in Amazonia in the 1980s and 1990s created questions of authenticity, legitimacy and power (Valdivia 2005). ‘Authentic’ indigenous groups became those who were culturally distinct, living in remote terrains and committed to environmental knowledge and conservation. Those groups who behaved differently were deemed inauthentic and risked less support or the loss of rights (Valdivia 2005).
The ‘middle group’ between indigenous groups and conservationists involves complex politics and can be problematic. For example, like conservationists, indigenous activists have found that they must describe the complex problems of their communities in simplified narratives that distant audiences will understand (Igoe 2008:101). This has been referred to as ‘strategic essentialism’ (Robins 2003). In the case of Amazonian indigenous conservation, Amazonian identity politics became dominated by Western ideas about Indians. Brazilian indigenous activists were forced to frame their politics in images and symbols that made sense to powerful outsiders. Different groups have also fallen in and out of fashion. The Brazilian Xavante, for example, were in vogue in the 1970s and early 1980s but replaced by the Kayapo’s theatrical politics and performances in the late 1980s. This did little to build broad-based constituencies and sustained support for their causes (Conklin & Graham 1995). There is therefore a danger that the political power of these groups exists only as long as their identities resonate with Western ideas, symbols and conservation agendas (Conklin & Graham 1995).

These sorts of collaborations between indigenous groups and conservation only occur in specific collaborations of circumstances, where both groups can use globally circulating universal ideas, like biodiversity, democracy or human rights, to work towards goals that they can identify in common and share and these can shift and change over time (Tsing 2005; Brockington et al. 2008:126). This is an important power dynamic, suggesting that when institutional support is removed, the power for particular types of indigeneity is diminished.

2.10 Indigeneity and Social Movements
Since the 1970s, indigeneity has developed into a transnational identity. Throughout the 1980s, the global indigenous rights movement became more established, as groups and activists came together with shared experiences of marginalisation and exclusion to lobby for international legislation and support. The domestic weakness of groups mobilising indigeneity facilitated transnational alliances, making ethnicity a form of information that empowered a movement rich in identity but poor in everything else (Brysk 1996). Arguably,
the global indigenous rights movement has itself shaped understandings of indigenous identity, for example through the ongoing dialogues between the wide-ranging groups of the movement (Canessa 2012: Brysk 1996). This encompasses complicated entanglements between indigenous groups and the movements that support them. For example, it can be difficult to disentangle domestic indigenous social movements from international supporters of indigenous rights. In 1978 Bolivia’s Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolutionario Tupac Katari) was founded after a conference hosted by NGOs and the UN (Brysk 1996:43). The Bolivian lowland indigenous organisation, CIDOB, was also organised with the help of anthropologists and has received help from a number of NGOs, such as Cultural Survival, the Inter-American Foundation, the South and Meso-American Indian Information Centre and the Natural Wildlife Federation (Cultural Survival Quarterly 11(4) in Brysk 1996:44). There is therefore crossover and dialogue between international organisations and communities who identify as indigenous. These dialogues also occur at regional scales. For example, in Latin America groups have formed regional indigenous coalitions, such as the:

- Indian Council of South America (Consejo Indio de Sud America) (CISA).
- Regional Co-ordination of Indigenous Peoples in Central America (Coordinador Regional de Pueblos Indios de Centroamerica) (CORPI).
- Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon River Basin (Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica) (COICA), for the Amazon Basin (Brysk 1996).

International legislative frameworks have also shaped the meaning and power of indigeneity. For example, an international legislative framework for indigeneity was enacted by global institutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most notably the United Nations and International Labour Organisation (ILO). Indigenous rights became a central component of the rights regimes promoted by these institutions, who helped to promote indigeneity as a
legitimate political space (Jung 2003). The UN drafted their Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1993, following campaigning and lobbying by anthropologists and activists since the 1970s (Stavenhagen 2013; Engle 2011). The UN subsequently declared 1995-2005 the UN International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People, during which the UN aimed to finalising their drafted declaration of rights for indigenous peoples. However, this was not officially approved until 2007 (see Engle 2011). The International Labour Organisation adopted Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 1989. This is an international legal document, legally binding for the states that volunteer to sign the treaty (Stavenhagen 2013).

This global movement has helped to give indigenous identity a global currency. This, in turn, has shaped how indigenous identity is understood, represented and mobilised (Canessa 2012:3; see also Brysk 1996). Keck and Sikking explain this as a boomerang effect, where groups learn the language of global indigeneity, perhaps from local NGOs, then use it to lobby external agencies for their support in putting pressure on national governments, as a way to assist with local politics (Keck & Sikkink 1998). In this way, concepts of indigeneity circulate and recirculate into local groups, who may tailor their political language or even develop new symbols and practices to better achieve their aims (Keck & Sikking 1998). Groups and individuals can therefore learn how best to strategically represent themselves and mobilise indigeneity in ways that are most effective (see Robins 2003). For example in 1993, after frustrating experiences with the UN Working Group, indigenous leaders organised a preparatory conference in Geneva where they taught each other how to present effectively within the UN system (Brysk 1996). However, questions remain about how much power different groups have, in terms of contributing to understandings of ‘legitimate’ indigeneity.

Groups who are mobilising indigeneity, and strategically representing the identity for political voice and power, contend not only with local issues and their relationships with their state but also with transnational political and economic dynamics and the expressions of indigeneity that dominate supranational forums (Delugan 2010). Despite the evident tensions within
discourses of indigeneity, it remains an important way that marginalised
groups negotiate for resources and political voice and has become a key
political identity in struggles for power (Dove 2006). It is being mobilised by
groups both to leverage access into political debates and increase their
control over their localities and lives. It has been used to forge new political
spaces, strategies and alliances and insert new political actors into public
discourse. In Mexico, for example, Zapatistas have used indigeneity to make
claims for collective rights, self-government, regional autonomy and
communal land (Jung 2003). In Bolivia and Ecuador, it has been mobilised as
a central element of the post-neoliberal project. Yet the global dimension
inherent to indigenous identity politics suggests that the power relations within
this politics require careful examination.

2.11 Indigeneity and Neoliberalism
Despite indigeneity often being positioned as a counter-movement to
capitalism, it has a surprising relationship to neoliberalism. Indigenous
discourse has been entangled with neoliberal discourses, legislative
frameworks and transnational networks (Andolina et al. 2009:13). In the
1980s and 1990s, as neoliberal reforms were implemented in Latin America,
international indigenous rights regimes were expanding. Neoliberal reforms
increased the power of civil society groups, for example NGOs or multilateral
organisations, therefore increasing the pressure they could put on states
using international frameworks for indigenous rights (Jung 2003). In the 1990s,
social development became increasingly neololiberalised, as capitalist markets
and efficient governance became identified as social development solutions.
For example, the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank directed
funding for Latin America towards social services, building social capital and
institutional reforms. In Bolivia and Ecuador, this translated into projects
focused on market mechanisms, decentralisation and multi-culturalism and
led to new opportunities of funding for indigenous groups. For example, the
World Bank began supporting indigenous development through its
participatory Rural Community Development Programme (Andolina et al. 2009:
41-50).
Neoliberal states in Latin America increasingly recognised indigenous groups as part of the neoliberal multicultural agenda. Proponents of neoliberal doctrine endorsed a version of indigenous rights, which recognised cultural diversity. However for Hale, after researching the Maya rights movement in Guatemala, neoliberal multicultural regimes amounted to a politics of recognition that were promoted to advance neoliberal political agendas. He argues that in Guatemala, neoliberal multiculturalism was used to affirm cultural difference and discipline cultural rights within the ideals of liberal, democratic pluralism. Moreover, multiculturalism was an attempt to create enough of a political space for groups to discourage ongoing opposition, but not enough to create substantive changes. He argues that this was echoed in Latin America more widely, where neoliberal multiculturalism was a politics of recognition, which left groups economically marginalised (Hale 2002; Hale 2006; Hale 2005; see also Andolina et al. 2009).

At points, (re)negotiating with the state has involved negotiating an increased reach of the state. For example, Latin America’s Amazon region had long been identified as having had little state involvement or direct governance over large swathes of territory. Significant numbers of inhabitants were beyond the military and political control of states (Yashar 1999b). In Bolivia and Ecuador, the enduring weakness of state institutions meant that many areas and communities were able to carve out spaces in which they enjoyed a high degree of political autonomy in the governing of local lands (Schaefer 2009). However, neoliberal reforms brought great changes, for example increasing the penetration of Amazonian areas by private interests, through privatising land markets or regulated social relations through political decentralisation projects (Yashar 1999b). For example, the lowland Amazonian region of Bolivia was increasingly transnationalised as it became the target of multi-national corporations, conservationists and those seeking to protect the cultural rights of ‘exotic’ indigenous groups (Andolina et al. 2009). Indigeneity became a struggle to redefine state-society relations and set out new rights, responsibilities and identities for citizens and new ties between these citizens and the state. Throughout the Amazon, indigeneity has been mobilized to demand territorial autonomy and the recognition of territorial
boundaries in areas where reach of state has historically been weak (Yashar 1999a).

Indigenous identity was also claimed as a response to neoliberal economic and political initiatives. It was mobilised by groups to challenge the state and oppose neoliberal reform. In this context, its discursive associations as a countermovement to capitalism gave these movements legitimacy and power. Neoliberal reforms changed the role of the state, particularly citizenship regimes, as they expanded civil and political rights but diminished social rights, for example the right to a minimum standard of living (Yashar 1999b; Schaefer 2009). As governments relinquished responsibility for social and economic wellbeing, the political leverage of class identities diminished. Neoliberal reforms restructured the state and cut state ties to the institutions and organisations through which they had previously negotiated social rights, for example trade unions. Thus peasants and workers unions that had been supported by states under corporatist regimes fell, removing access to politics and power for large groups of society. As groups fought to regain political power and leverage, indigeneity emerged as a key identity through which to negotiate for resources and rights.

During this time, indigeneity emerged as a key political identity that helped groups to (re)negotiate with the state and resist neoliberal reforms (Yashar 1999a). For example in Mexico, neoliberal reforms undercut the ties of social responsibility that had previously linked the ruling party to its main (worker) constituent. As this political space collapsed, the growing international framework for indigeneity opened a new political space based on indigenous identity and gave groups a new political voice (Jung 2003). Whilst recognizing that indigenous identity has not lain dormant until the 1990s, for example by recognizing the long history of indigenous politics and long history of conflict and resistance in Latin America to colonialism (Smith 1990; Brysk 1996; Canessa 2012b; Klein 2011), the meaning and political power of indigeneity shifted throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In Bolivia, for example, it became a powerful way to challenge the neoliberal state, partly because of its discursive associations as a countermovement to capitalism and partly because of its
ties to a global rights regime. Indigenous movements came to ‘contest the foundations and contours’ of contemporary democratic and liberal institutions, using indigeneity to debate issues of territorial autonomy, legal citizenship, representation and multi-culturalism (Yashar 1999:76). These have been particularly striking in Latin America, with the most prominent movements in Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador and Mexico.

In Bolivia and Ecuador, national and transnational activism has pushed indigeneity to a position of political centrality (Yashar 1999a; Andolina et al. 2009). In Bolivia, movements raised the profile of their issues by gaining elected seats and posts in government for their members. The indigenous leader Victor Hugo Cardenas was Vice-President between 1993 and 1997, before Evo Morales first ran for President in 2002 (Andolina et al. 2009:29). Following opposition to neoliberal reforms, indigeneity has underpinned new political parties and been a central part of the changes to the state, as introduced in the first section of this chapter (Albro 2005; Goodale 2006; Goodale & Postero 2013; Paper & Canessa 2012; Laurie et al. 2005).

Indigeneity became a pluralist, urban-based project that has re-founded the Bolivian public to re-found the Bolivian state and indigenous rights became an inclusive language of cultural citizenship (Robert Albro 2005; Postero 2005).

For Goodale, young Aymara rappers in the Bolivian city of El Alto are an example of how indigeneity is currently being reimagined and reconfigured in Bolivia. He argues that an indigenous cosmopolitanism has emerged, which draws on legacies of indigenous imaginaries and new forms of global belonging to negotiate and reimagine modernity (Goodale 2006). In this context, indigeneity does not referent ‘hunter-gatherers’ (Kuper 2003). Instead, it is best understood as a contemporary social relation that is articulated in terms of the past, for example using a shared history of exclusion, to critique aspects of globalization (Canessa 2007).

There are questions about the extent to which these recent negotiations of the meaning of indigenous identity in Bolivia and Ecuador have changed the expectations of indigeneity within transnational development networks, for
example, in the institutionalisation of new agendas or official development policies (Andolina et al. 2009:2-3; Hau & Wilde 2010). Mobilising indigeneity to access rights, resources and political power, or to negotiate state-society relations, depends on subjectivity - namely the process by which identity is performed, justified and resisted within or against state projects (Goodale & Postero 2013:15-16). At this point, it is important to recognise that indigeneity can be appropriated to suit the needs of industry and to complement dominant power relations. Dombrowski, for example, argues that neoliberal states such as the UK, US, Canada and Australia repeatedly used the ‘ruse’ of indigenous self-governance to promote development-centred policies based on conditional grants of autonomy and the ‘recognition of indigeneity’. This recognition has been tied to resource harvests in areas of contested ownership. For example, Rio Tinto recently recognised indigenous rights to an area previously categorised as a protected area. For large companies or extractive interests, recognising indigenous rights can be a way to access resources, by offering compensation or benefits to desperate groups marked by 50-200 years of massive under-development, racism and colonial dislocation (2010:136-137). In South-east Alaska, indigenous claims have allowed industrial timber and pulp producers to circumvent the environmental laws aimed at curbing production, whilst allowing them to continue devastating the living conditions of large groups of people. Given levels of legal uncertainty and political-economic conditions, development forces can award public resources to indigenous groups and be relatively assured that communities will be forced by circumstance to put these resources at the disposal of industry (Dombrowski 2002). How indigeneity relates to dominant power relations, and the power it brings to marginalised groups, is in no way straightforward. Moreover, it can be negotiated, positioned and performed by those in power, raising question about how indigeneity will be negotiated in Bolivia, where the state is now making claims to being indigenous.

Indigeneity therefore must be always situated within a wider context and related to its wider politics (see Li 2010). Moreover, within mobilisations of indigeneity are negotiations of power, representation and authenticity. It is therefore important to locate discourses of indigeneity within wider political
processes (Dombrowski 2002). In relation to post-neoliberal environmental politics, this means questioning how the meaning, power and utility of indigeneity is changing in relation to both state and environmental politics. For example, analysing the role that indigeneity plays in struggles against development processes or against the state.

2.12 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have used three key themes of development, environment and indigeneity as a way to understand and question multiple dimensions of the post-neoliberal project. These themes have drawn out some central elements to consider. Firstly, a focus on processes of immanent development helped to unpack the emerging post-neoliberal project. Initially the product of anti-neoliberal protests and social movement mobilizations, its shift from rhetoric to projects and policies is clearly dominated by two competing and contradictory discourses. The first sets out a commitment to citizen wellbeing and people-led politics, whereby environmental issues are a priority and place-based ways of valuing their local environment are given new levels of political support. This can be seen in Bolivia, in Morales’ environmental rhetoric, commitment to vivir bien and support of social movements, among other things. The second crucial agenda is the escalating commitment to extraction and extractive-led development, which funds new social welfare projects. The ways that these contradictory discourses work together or collide, in practice, is evidently an area in need of research and empirical data. Ideally, this would involve analysing social movements as they negotiate both the development agenda of the state and its wider political discourses. This would contribute to debates about post-neoliberalism and more widely, to how radical, alternative political projects succeed or falter. In terms of environmental concerns, this first step would develop a better understanding of the political context and environmental pressures emerging as crucial in the post-neoliberal project.

In order to question the kinds of environments and environmental politics that post-neoliberalism is creating, it is necessary at this point to bring in the third theme dealt with in this chapter – indigeneity. This is because it is the central
discourse of the post-neoliberal project in Bolivia and is entangled with the state project, with social movements and with conservation and environmental politics. In this chapter I have argued that indigeneity is a fluid political identity that must be analysed in its broader political context. Moreover, I have also shown that it is an identity that is negotiated and mobilized by diverse groups of people, so involves issues of power, legitimacy and authenticity. In terms of post-neoliberal environmental politics, this means questioning how indigeneity is being articulated and how different mobilizations of indigeneity gain or lose power and influence. This would improve our understanding not just of contemporary indigenous politics but also of the priorities of the post-neoliberal state.

The other key theme of this chapter and thesis is the environment, specifically how contemporary development pressures are shaping environmental politics, as well as how they are being resisted. In this chapter, I introduced key debates about conservation, namely those that critiqued its intensifying entanglements with neoliberalism. This not only raised some key concerns about the kinds of environments being produced, in terms of how nature is valued and accessed, but also relevant to the post-neoliberal project. This is because post-neoliberal environmental rhetoric echoes many of these critics, promoting alternative ways of valuing and protecting nature, for example place-based, community ways of living. This could intimate exciting new levels of political support for radical and participatory environmental politics. However, this too needs clarification and research into how this rhetoric translates into practice. Moreover, this needs to be contextualised within questions about the competing discourses of post-neoliberalism, namely vivir bien and extraction.

In this chapter I introduced and explored the concept of environmentalisms. A focus on the diverse ways that people perceive degradation, as well as how they value and defend environments in light of this, can be used to question, explore and analyse post-neoliberal environmental politics. For example, this would illuminate the ways that extractive-led development affected groups and landscapes. It would reveal how and why those landscapes were being
defended, as well as the political power now available to local groups to direct how development happens in their locality. This could involve narratives of conservation and indigeneity.

In this chapter, I have focused on Latin America and, more specifically, its most radical political projects. One of these is Bolivia, where discourses of radical anti-neoliberal politics, social movements, indigeneity and conservation are currently reconfiguring. Bolivia is the case study for my research, which aims to better understand and define Post-Neoliberal Political Ecology. It brings together the questions created by these literatures to ask:

1. In what ways is extractive-led development being encountered and negotiated by civil society, specifically place-based, environmental social movements?
2. To what extent do mobilizations of indigeneity help these movements to meet their demands and access political power?
3. How has post-neoliberal politics shaped protected area conservation?
3 Methodology

In this chapter, I set out the methodological approach and strategy that has guided this thesis, as well as the particular methods chosen to answer my research questions. I first set out the research questions of this thesis to clearly show how this research project has been designed to meet the research aims. I explain why a qualitative and case-study based research design was the best fit for these questions. I introduce the case study for my research, demonstrating why it was an exemplary case study for questions that relate to post-neoliberal environments. I consider my time on fieldwork, reflecting on my positionality and explaining some of the challenges that I faced as I responded to the realities of conducting research in Bolivia. I progress to explain my choice of methods, namely semi-structured interviews and participant observation. I demonstrate that these methods allowed for empirical richness and depth, once again helping me to best answer the questions of this research project. I conclude by outlining how I analysed and coded my data, to arrive at the findings presented in the proceeding chapters.

3.1 Research Aim & Questions

Aim: To better define the Political Ecology of Post-Neoliberalism.

To do so I ask:

1. In what ways is extractive-led development being encountered and negotiated by civil society, specifically place-based, environmental social movements?
2. To what extent do mobilizations of indigeneity help these movements to meet their demands and access political power?
3. How has post-neoliberal politics shaped protected area conservation?

3.2 A Qualitative Approach

My methodological strategy is grounded in a qualitative case study approach that uses triangulation and participant observation to ensure academic rigor and validity. I chose a qualitative approach, as my research seeks to explore
dimensions of the social world, including the texture and weave of everyday life and understandings, experiences and imaginings of research participants and ways that social processes, institutions, discourses or relationships work and the significance of meanings that they generate’ (Mason 2006:1). Qualitative approaches are broadly concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced and produced. A qualitative approach allowed me to explore the perceived degradation caused by extractive-led development, namely how it was experienced and why it was opposed. It allowed me to consider how indigeneity was mobilized, for example in what forms and it enabled me to identify the kinds of environments that were being demanded. Taken together, this assisted me to successfully analyse post-neoliberal environments.

By enabling me to consider issues from multiple perspectives, triangulation (explored more carefully later in this chapter) allowed me to situate these narratives in their wider political context. In doing so, I could analyse how extractive-led development was negotiated. It also ensured rigor and validity, as I did not treat interview data as ‘social facts’, instead I have analysed interview data critically. I have considered how it is meaningful, when seen in context. This research design has been guided by the long history of successful ethnographies and research, to which I wish to contribute. For example, previous work that has explored nature as produced, constructed and negotiated (West 2006; Brockington 2002; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010; Büscher 2010; Holmes 2011; MacDonald 2005; Conklin 2002; Conklin 1997).

I adopted a research design that was pre-planned but also data-driven, exploratory, flexible and context-sensitive (Mason 2006:24). It was based on data collection methods that are flexible and sensitive to the social context in which data is produced. I used methods of analysis, explanation and argument building that involve understanding complexity, detail and context (Mason 2006:3). Whereas a quantitative approach would be more suited to a research plan focused on the size and scope of social movements, the quantity of internationally linked NGOs involved in social movements or the amount of people claiming to be indigenous, a qualitative approach and methodology allowed for an in-depth study and analysis of meanings and how
these relate to wider power structures and processes. Quantitative interviews do not allow for improvisations from the research, in terms of questions, and often set out a limited set of responses for participants (Fontana & Frey 2005:702). A quantitative approach would not have been a best fit here, for example to enable empirical depth and richness. Moreover, it would have been ill-suited to the inherent constrictions of my case-study. Social movements, for example, constitute more than one organisation. They are united by shared grievances but can be made up of NGOs, individuals, community groups, labour unions and more (Escobar & Alvarez 1992; Bebbington 2007; Bebbington, Humphrey Bebbington, et al. 2008; Bebbington, Hickey, et al. 2008). Executing a survey of all participants would have been extremely testing. The isolated and controversial nature of my case study would have raised overwhelming challenges, as will be apparent later in this chapter.

3.3 Case study: The Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS)

I chose a case study approach for this project, as I follow that context-dependent learning is a good starting point from which to develop ideas and is more valuable than a ‘vain search for predictive theories and universals for the social sphere’ (Flyvbjerg 2006). A carefully selected case study brings the strategic significance of context and of the particular, vital for developing our understandings of the social world (Mason 2002:1). This complemented my methodological design and allowed me to best answer my research objective – focusing on a conflict that engaged an extractive-based development regime, conservation discourses, indigenous rights and social movement politics.

Bolivia was an excellent case study for my research, as over the course of the past three decades social movements and mobilisations of indigeneity have intensified to oppose neoliberal reforms, re-found the state and articulate an alternative, post-neoliberal path. Bolivia provided the case study country and overarching context, whilst my research specifically focused on a conflict over the Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS). The
future of this area has been the subject of controversy in Bolivia since the state began building a road through the middle of TIPNIS without any prior consultation with residents. This infrastructure is best viewed in relation to a wider, extractive agenda being pushed through by the state and is being opposed by indigenous, lowland and environmental organisations on the basis of indigenous rights and conservation. The TIPNIS case study allowed for focused research into how power and access is negotiated in a time of political change. It allowed for research into the ways indigeneity was produced and enacted in the struggle to control TIPNIS (Denzin & Lincoln 2005:25). In other words, the TIPNIS provided an exceptional case study which speaks to wider debates about extractive-led development, conservation and indigeneity (see Flyvbjerg 2006).

In 1965 the Isiboro Secure National Park was created, one of Bolivia’s earliest national parks (SERNAP 2007). The state set aside just over 1,200,000 hectares of lowland Amazonian forest, although at this stage it was a ‘paper park’, meaning that it was without financial investment, a management plan or significant intervention. The park was also created without any acknowledgment of the people who lived within its newly created boundaries (Ibisch 2005). Their existence was formally recognised after the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity, when residents of lowland, rural areas mobilised indigeneity and marched to demand territorial rights. The state formally recognised the communities living within the park and gave it ‘double category’ status, as both a protected area and an indigenous territory (TCO). The park became the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) and a system of co-management was negotiated between the National Protected Areas Agency (SERNAP) and the TIPNIS governing authorities (SERNAP 2007).

The TIPNIS is home to Mojenos-Trinitario, Chimane and Yuracare communities, the majority of whom reside in small settlements along the riverbanks to the North-east of the park. They belong to two governing authorities, the TIPNIS Subcentral and the smaller, Secure Subcentral, which is subordinate to the first. The term ‘subcentral’ denotes the political organisation. The TIPNIS subcentral brings together 37 communities. The
Sécure subcentral represents 14 communities but it recognises the TIPNIS Subcentral as the representative organisation and therefore defers to it. The current president, who leads both these authorities, is Fernando Vargas.

The southern point of the territory crosses departmental borders into the Department of Cochabamba. It has more recently become home to Quechua and Aymara communities, who have been migrating into the park to grow coca since the 1970s. Most of the people here work on coca farms, which have been encroaching into TIPNIS throughout the last three decades (Saavedra 2011; Webber 2012). This section of the park is named Polygon 7 and has a separate governing authority, The Indigenous Council of the South (CONISUR). In total, it is occupied by around 20,000 people. CONISUR represents 21 indigenous communities who either live close to the occupied Polygon 7 (12 communities), or inside it (nine communities). In 2009, Polygon 7 was separated off from the original demarcated indigenous territory. Individual titles were granted to farmers and the area was officially recognised as distinct from the TIPNIS. It already has a road, linking Polygon 7 with the Department of Cochabamba. The National Protected Areas Service (SERNAP) also manages this part of the park and monitors the demarcated created border, the Red Line (Linea Rojo). This attempts to halt further migration into this part of the park (SERNAP 2011:3-4; Webber 2012).

In 2010, the state began building a road at Villa Tunari, a small town on the road between the city of Cochabamba and the city of Santa Cruz. The road was set to run through the middle of the TIPNIS to finish at San Ignacio de Moxos, a small town approximately in the Department of Beni, to the West of its main town, Trinidad (see Map 4). The state has said the road is to unite the departments of Cochabamba and Beni (Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Servicios y Vivienda 2012:11). It has been promoted as ‘stitching together’ the two major geographical blocs of the country and nationalizing a fundamental territorial space, in which, ‘foreign governments and companies, foreign citizens and landlords, have held more authority than the Bolivian state itself’ (Linera 2012:30).

The government have promoted the road as important for contributing to the:
‘integration of the lowlands with the valleys, highlands and north of Santa Cruz; contributing to the development of the department through a road that is passable all year, withstanding rain and floods; allowing the development and connecting of the TIPNIS communities, municipal governments and department with a central integration route (trunk axes in the country); and allowing the communities of the TIPNIS to have access to other cities of the lowlands and highlands (occidente y oriente) increasing possibilities for development’ (Ministerio de Obras Publicas, Servicios y Vivienda 2012:65).

The road has also been identified by the Vice-President as important to state sovereignty and the increased reach of state. He argues that the road ‘falls within a framework of a set of broader state policies for recovery of state sovereignty, understood as the full exercise of state laws and benefits in places where until recently forest companies, hacendados (land-owning elites) or narco-traffickers were the major authority’ (Linera 2012:29).

However, the road can be located within the wider context of resource extraction and the government’s model for national development. The road was routed to run past the three pools of gas that are in the park (see Webber, 2012) (see Map 5). It was originally financed with a loan from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and a Brazilian construction company built the first section. Although denied by the government (see Linera 2012), the involvement of Brazil has linked the road to regional development projects, centred on the increased productivity and efficiency of primary commodities extraction and exportation (see Canessa 2014). For example, The Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA), promoted by Brazil, sets out to create a linked network of roads and infrastructure, to support trade and industry across Latin America. This infrastructure would be particularly significant for extractive industry and the region’s key export of primary commodities, namely minerals and hydrocarbons (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014:1)

There was no prior consultation with any of the communities living in the park before road-building began. However, once the project was made public there was huge opposition from the TIPNIS communities. It was rejected by the TIPNIS Subcentral and then-President, Adolfo Moyo. The opposition to the
road gained support from across Bolivia and turned into a national campaign that has engaged the state. Although other TCOs in Bolivia have negotiated extraction within their territory (see Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Hindery 2013; Bebbington & A Bebbington 2010; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010; Humphreys-Bebbington 2012; Humphreys-Bebbington 2013), the opposition to the TIPNIS road has gained more attention from the media, from scholars and from campaigners. It has forced the state to respond in the public arena, testing the limits of new indigenous rights, indigenous environmentalism and the existing protected areas service. It remains a contentious and significant conflict, with renewed calls to build the road surfacing June 2015 (ANF 2015). I selected this case study as it tested the limits and contours of post-neoliberalism and allowed for a study of how rhetoric and theory exists in messy reality (see Brenner & Theodore 2005; Peck et al. 2010). The TIPNIS case study has also allowed for greater generalisations to be made about extractive-led development, indigeneity and conservation and speaks to related debates that are central to these theories (Flyvbjerg 2006:233; Vaus & Vaus 2001:237). A case study has allowed me to meet my research aims and to ‘to illuminate the general by looking at the particular’ (Denscombe 2010:30).

3.4 Triangulation
This research has been underpinned by a ‘commitment to understanding beliefs and events within their social context’ (Shaw & Gould 2001:137). Whilst planning my research approach and design, I was careful to consider how I would corroborate facts and ensure academic rigor. Triangulation, based on multiple sources and methods, has helped me to secure an in-depth understanding of the ways the TIPNIS environment is being understood and defended (see Denzin and Lincoln 2005:5). I drew on a range of perspectives and sources during my time spent in the field (Valentine 2005; Longhurst 2010), which allowed me to utilise multiple perspectives in order to clarify meaning and strengthen the clarity of my own interpretations (see Stake 2013:2453).

In practice, this meant locating my interview data in its broader context. I did not approach my interview data as social ‘facts’, instead I analysed what was
said and in the context in which it was said. This involved questioning how interviewees’ responses related to surrounding events, for example how articulations of indigeneity related to legislative reforms and the policies of the state. I devoted my time to a place and context, to identify issues and problems and to triangulate my data (Denscombe 2005:203-204). Triangulation helped me to corroborate my findings – checking that the themes and issues coming out of interviews resonated with what I was seeing and recording elsewhere. I have done this by using multiple sources, participant observation and a thorough literature review, to check and inform my findings and argument.

Participant observation, discussed again later in this chapter, helped me to learn about the context and politics of my fieldwork. My literature review helped to guide what to include in participant observation and I consulted ‘grey literature’ and policy documents and kept a daily fieldwork diary (Denscombe 2005:192-195). In my fieldwork diary, I documented any relevant articles in the national or regional press, any developments on the conflict, any related protests, debates or politics as well as my own personal observations and thoughts. The TIPNIS has been a widely reported conflict in Bolivia and thus there was a wealth of information related to the dispute. My fieldwork diary was a useful way to process and document these wider debates, whilst retaining focus on detailed, interview data. I also wrote down my observations and thoughts. It was a useful record of my own responses and ideas, which I returned to when I was analysing my data. It reassured me that I was not overlooking details that had been noted as important whilst I was in Bolivia.

I also collected documents and grey literature relevant to the TIPNIS dispute. Whilst in Bolivia, I secure copied of all press articles related to the TIPNIS since 2010. This has allowed me to chart how the dispute has been documented in the national and regional press. It has also given me another source, through which to analyse the behaviour and attitude of the government. I also collected:

- a copy of the official government consultation with the TIPNIS.
• copies of an independent review of said government consultation.
• signed resolutions from the April 2013 full community meeting within the TIPNIS.
• as well as additional books and documents related to the TIPNIS campaign.

These have helped to build my knowledge of the context for the TIPNIS dispute and link the claims of protesters to wider legislation and policy.

3.5 Ethics
To carry out this research project I had to comply with the ethical requirements of the University of Manchester. This meant presenting my project before an ethics committee, which examined whether the planned project would do any obvious harm to either myself or research participants. For example, it ensured that I was not seeking to interview vulnerable or high-risk groups. Institutional requirements stipulated that each participant was fully informed of the project and gave written consent for their involvement. In my case, this meant giving each participant a written information sheet, in Spanish, which included contact details for myself and my supervisory team.

Research participants have been anonymised and full confidentiality was ensured (Longhurst 2010; Hay et al. 2010). Participants were free to retract their involvement at any point. These measures complied with the ethical requirements set out by the University of Manchester, helping to ensure their and my accountability and responsibility for this research.

However, to behave ethically in geographical research requires that I act ‘in accordance with notions of right and wrong’ when planning and carrying out research (Mitchell & Draper 1982; Hay 2010). This meant adhering to ethics more broadly and in a way that was fundamental to my research practice. The principles that underpinned my research were that all people and places deserve to be treated with integrity, justice and respect (Hay et al. 2010; Smith 2000). A core concern was that my research caused no harm to participants and I continually questioned how people were affected by my research. For example, this meant ensuring that involvement with my research did not endanger participants – people who were enmeshed in a
dispute with power-holders. Confidentiality was key, namely protecting the identities of those who shared their experiences with me.

In doing cross-cultural research, ethical reflexive practice includes acknowledging and working with the ethical expectations of different groups (Hay 2010:35). This meant being aware that there may be culturally distinctive customs and trying to adhere to them as best I could. For example, when I was invited to a large community meeting within the TIPNIS, my husband and I contributed food to the communal pot for our boat. However, the unknown surroundings could create ethical dilemmas. For example, I confronted an ethical dilemma when trying to gain access to members of the TIPNIS sub-central. I visited their office in Trinidad but the elected President of the TIPNIS was not present. Instead, I met three men from the TIPNIS and introduced my project to them. I was asked how they would benefit from the research. One of the men present was insistent that I would benefit from the research by gaining a PhD and subsequent employment, whilst they would gain nothing. He requested financial payment in return for access to people within the office. I decided not to pay them for access, primarily because they appeared hostile towards me and my research. Instead, I continued to gain access to TIPNIS leaders through a snowball effect through others that I had met. Later, when I met the TIPNIS President, he supported and endorsed the project.

Ethics have also played a role in the narratives that my PhD has explored. In focusing on members of social movements opposing the state, my research has been committed to the social, economic and political responses to the needs of people in less powerful positions (Kemmis & McTaggart 2005:560). I am interested in whose framing of the situation is being used to identify solutions. This is not a research project defined by shared ownership or research aims defined in partnership with members of Bolivian social movements. However, I recognise that qualitative research can be used to ‘wage the battle for better representation’ (Fine et al. 2000 in Smith 2005:1031). In the case of the TIPNIS, my research helps to illuminate the voices and views of those who are being marginalised as discourses of development, the environmental and indigeneity shift and change.
I will also be sure to disseminate my findings amongst those I interviewed. Following from the work of other researchers working in similar locations and in similar situations of political protest and change, I will be careful to share my findings (Andolina et al. 2009; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010). I have remained in contact with many people I interviewed and was careful to collect contact details during fieldwork. Once the thesis is complete, I will disseminate my findings in a translated executive summary.

3.6 Positionality

Cross-cultural research is ‘challenging, enriching and rewarding’ (Smith 2010:169). However, I arrived in a foreign country, in an unknown location and the issues that this created required forethought and planning. Negotiating difference and sameness was a learning curve of different environments and cultures (Smith 2010:168). I arrived as a solo female researcher - a different ethnicity, nationality, age and, in many cases, gender, to many of those I interviewed. I did not blend in and was known across Trinidad, as I stood out to many as distinctive. However, these differences were not a barrier to my research, they just required acknowledgement and response. Firstly, the leaders I interviewed had met other researchers who were interested in the dispute. Many of my interviewees wanted their cause to become more publicised, as they considered themselves to be marginalized and sidelined by those in power. This meant they represented their cause as they wanted it to be understood by a researcher. I was sensitive to this possible dynamic and to how my presence affected my research (Smith 2010:165). The challenge was to decide ‘which truth’ was being told and whose interests were served by particular representations (Smith 2010:166). This dynamic was also incorporated into my research – through my research focus and approach (Smith 2010). For example, my research has explicitly looked at the ways that campaigners represented themselves and claimed political rights in such a context.

My research was also influenced by my own initial reading of the TIPNIS dispute. I was initially interested in Bolivia because of the radical environmental rhetoric of Evo Morales. This echoed many of the academic
criticisms being levelled at neoliberal conservation, which was my initial focus. When I learnt about the TIPNIS dispute, I became interested because it contradicted this rhetoric. It offered a chance to investigate post-neoliberalism through its margins, by identifying the views and groups that were being excluded. This shaped my research, as I prioritised in-depth interviews with the TIPNIS opposition over supporters of the road. This decision was later compounded by time constraints, owing to the time needed to gain trust from people in an extremely vulnerable political position. As my fieldwork continued, I became more convinced that the Villa Tunari to San Ignacio de Moxos highway would be detrimental in terms of rights, the environment and participatory development. These are points made more fully in the proceeding chapters.

The many unknowns of my research location meant I worked hard to cultivate the habit of observing and listening (Smith 2010:158). Although I had visited the country as a backpacker when 21, I had never visited my main research site or become engaged with the politics of the country. This meant I was careful to document and learn as much as I could. For example, I read newspapers daily and wrote in my fieldwork diary throughout each day. However, difference was at points helpful to my research. For example, it was used as a point of discussion (Smith 2010:166). This helped, for example when people explained key terms and everyday practice, as they assumed I did not understand them. As a solo researcher, I was also welcomed by many interviewees and invited to socialise with them. I was treated with much kindness and remain grateful for their willingness to help me with my research. Although I will disseminate my findings, I never over-represented what my PhD thesis might mean for them. I did not expect particular privileges as a visiting student and I never made promises I could not keep (Nash 2000 in Smith 2010:158).

The issue of unequal power relations and questions of difference is important to consider before embarking on research. Research can never escape from the power relations shaping the situations in which we conduct research (Smith 2010:164). We need to address these power relations carefully and take account of them in the choices that we make in our research practices as
well as in the interpretations that we develop (Smith 2010:165). In my case, I was aware that many participants were involved in an ongoing dispute with the state. It was this power dynamic that I was most careful of during research and in my analysis. However, I also faced questions related to representation and the creation of knowledge. The creation of knowledge is a key part of creating and maintaining power structures and research has developed and nurtured ways of seeing the world that divide countries and races, for example into categories of modern and backward or developed and undeveloped (see Said 1985; Escobar 1995). Indigenous communities have historically been vulnerable to research that has depicted them as an exotic ‘other’, noble savage or backward subjects in need of modernisation, leading to discriminatory policies that have since been much criticised (Kuper 2003; Rist 2002; Goodale 2006; Igoe 2006; Canessa 2007; Niezen 2003). However, as introduced in my discussion of ethics, my research has been designed to unpack these representations. I have addressed this dynamic explicitly in my research and have considered how particular forms of indigeneity are constructed and map to wider power dynamics.

It is also important to recognise that power dynamics work both ways or power flows in both directions. During fieldwork I was at times at the mercy of those I interviewed. I was in a foreign country, speaking a new language and alone. I depended on their kindness. In terms of my interpretations and analysis, I worked hard to triangulate my data and feel sure of what I was being told and observing. Everyone I interviewed had political agency and I would not want to misrepresent them here as lacking political awareness or a political agenda.

I designed my research from an acknowledgement that I am not a ‘neutral, scientific observer, untouched by the emotional and political contexts of places we do our research’ (Skelton 2001:89). I recognise that multiple aspects of my identity have shaped who I am, what questions I ask and how I have carried out research (Skelton 2001). However, I have remain committed to the value of this research and support the argument made by Skelton, who says that:
‘as part of the politics of reflective and politically conscious feminist and/or cross-cultural research, we have to continue our research projects, we must publish and disseminate our research. If we do not, others without political anxieties and sensitivities about their fieldwork processes take the space’ (Skelton 2001:95).

Whilst we must be sensitive to issues of ‘truth, representation and the role of the researchers as expert or knower’ we must also usefully direct these concerns in a way that allows research to continue (Mason 2002:6).

3.7 Language

Although I am experienced and trained in working with interpreters, having worked for a decade in the UK refugee sector, I was committed to learning Spanish for this research project. I spent the first year of the PhD studying Spanish and continued to study during fieldwork. I was immersed in speaking Spanish for nine months of fieldwork, spending my time speaking, listening, reading and studying the language. This not only reduced the numbers of those who may have been excluded from my research but also meant I could better learn about the wider context, for example by reading newspapers (Smith 2010:161).

There were challenges in conducting my research in a second language. I worried that my Spanish might not be good enough or that I might misunderstand key points. However, this meant that I was extremely conscientious about triangulation and in checking that my analysis fitted with multiple observations and findings. At points it was also helpful – participants were sometimes extra-careful to explain terms to me, which proved invaluable when questioning representation and the use of identity politics. To ensure accuracy, I recorded all my interviews and had them transcribed by a native speaker in Bolivia. I continue to study Spanish.

3.8 Additional Challenges

There were additional challenges in choosing this case-study. Firstly, the dispute over the road has at points dominated the national press, caused large-scale protests, divided sectors of the population and demanded a public response from the state. Whilst this made it an exemplarily case-study for my
research questions, it was also a sensitive topic to research. Controversy surrounded aspects of the dispute and there was distrust and suspicion between those who opposed and those who supported the state. As a result, it took a long time to gain the trust of those protesting against the road and in turn the state. It also made it hard to subsequently interview supporters of the state or state departments, a point returned to later in this chapter.

The location of the TIPNIS was also a challenge. As a protected area and indigenous territory, it was remote and hard to visit. I either had to be invited to stay in the territory, in the homes of TIPNIS residents, or request a visit through official channels, namely the protected areas service and the Ministry for Environment. Inhabitants of the TIPNIS were therefore far from reach in terms of being able to turn up where they live, easily meet them and arrange interviews. Instead I spent much of my fieldwork time in the nearest town, Trinidad, which served as base for many of the TIPNIS leaders and for those most active in opposing the road. This proved the most fruitful way to meet people from the TIPNIS but did shape the focus of my research. Most of my interviews, for example, are with elected community leaders who were actively opposing the road and state.

3.9 Access
Gaining access to research participants was also a demanding process (Denscombe 2005:39). Prior to arriving in Bolivia, I had set up an online forum for postgraduate researchers who were investigating Bolivia’s new politics. This became an invaluable network which helped me to meet people in La Paz and get the contact details for TIPNIS leaders. Later, it helped us to share our ideas with Bolivian colleagues, as we co-hosted a one-day conference in La Paz with a Bolivian anthropology forum. I spent the first two months of my fieldwork in La Paz improving my Spanish language skills and arranging my visa. My fieldwork work plan and research timetable are documented in Tables 1 & 2 (page 15 & 16), to clarify where I went and who I spoke to. In short, I used my time in La Paz to learn more about the TIPNIS dispute in a wider political context, following the dispute on local media and speaking to activists and organisations who had been involved. I then travelled to Trinidad,
where I lived for four months. Trinidad is the main town in Beni, one of Bolivia’s five departments. It is located in the lowlands in Bolivia’s Amazonian region. The largest part of the TIPNIS is located in the Department of Beni, although the southern part of the park, Polygon 7, stretches into the Department of Cochabamba. I then went to Cochabamba and Villa Tunari, to interview both academics campaigning against the road and coca-growers who supported the road. I then returned to La Paz to interview NGOs and government ministries. Replicating the research in these three key research sites allowed me to consider the complexity and nuances of the dispute.

Researching the TIPNIS dispute required sensitivity and time, as the protesters were in a politically vulnerable position and I needed to gain their trust before they would talk to me. When I arrived in Trinidad the election campaigns were running for the departmental governor. This provided an opportunity to meet some of the central figures in the TIPNIS protest campaign and local politics. I attended rallies and turned up in campaign offices, to introduce myself and my research. One of the candidates had the same first name as I do, which also kept me motivated during my first weeks in Trinidad. This was because her campaign songs were often played around town, extolling the many virtues of Jessica. During this period I met a lot of TIPNIS protest leaders, who helped me gain access to others. I was invited to social events and spent time getting to know people. I was introduced to more and more members of the TIPNIS community and with each interview was passed on to someone else. In this way, my interviews and contacts ‘snowballed’ (Noy 2008). This was a rewarding and enjoyable period of fieldwork but it was also slow. It took time to meet people and to arrange interviews, especially with leaders who were moving around the country to engage with the protest and dispute. Whilst in Trinidad I also travelled to San Ignacio de Moxos, the small town where the road was routed to finish.

After three months in Trinidad, I was invited to enter the TIPNIS and attend a meeting for all the communities. This was the first full meeting held since the government had entered the territory to hold a consultation on the road. Visiting the TIPNIS was a decision that had repercussions on the rest of my fieldwork, as the trip was postponed over the course of weeks. Day after day
the trip was postponed and plans altered, meaning less time in secondary fieldwork sites. However, the visit enriched my understanding of the dispute, its politics and what was at stake. I visited during a full community meeting, as one of only two foreign researchers. During the meeting, community leaders from across the territory talked about their experiences with the government and their needs. This experience added depth to my understanding of the dispute. However, it diminished the time that I had to build relationships and overcome similar time issues in the Department of Cochabamba.

After my visit to the TIPNIS I travelled to Cochabamba, where I interviewed academics who supported the TIPNIS oppositional movement. This was not a difficult group to access, as the role that many have taken on is one of publishing and promoting information and news about the TIPNIS dispute. Their contact details were online and they were quick to recommend others for interview. Whilst in the Department of Cochabamba, I travelled to Villa Tunari to interview coca-growers from the federations of the region. Gaining access to this group was extremely hard and ended up demanding more time than I had. I started by speaking with workers from organisations who had long worked with coca-growers in the region and within their federations. I had previously visited the coca-growers’ federation headquarters in Cochabamba and was granted an interview with the President of all six coca-growing federations of Cochabamba, who also gave me contacts for Villa Tunari. However, once in Villa Tunari access was difficult to gain and the contacts I had consistently led back to the mayor of the town. Arranging an interview with the mayor was a slow process that involved a lot of waiting. At the end of our interview, he gave me contacts for others to speak to but they were the same contacts given to me by the president of the coca-growers federation I interviewed in Cochabamba. It became very difficult to break out of these circles. The more I learnt about the politics of the region and how they fitted with the politics of the TIPNIS dispute, the more I felt like I would need a lot more time to build relationships in the area and meet people who might offer contrasting viewpoints. Having learnt how complex and multi-dimension the opposition to the road was, I realised that support for the road may well be similar. I did not have the time to gain access to this group and
was in a difficult situation politically, as I had spent so much time with the oppositional movement in Trinidad. I did meet a number of coca-growers from Polygon 7 and chatted to them informally. They agreed to interviews but once again stipulated that my research must first have the approval of the mayor. It was interesting and relevant to hear the official stories from those sanctioned to speak to me about the issue. However, it does also mean that I do not have the data to fully explore the views of the coca-growers who live near to the TIPNIS. This was due to the resources, timeframes and realities of my research (Mason 2002:43) and shaped my analysis and focus.

After the Department of Cochabamba, I returned to La Paz to interview some of the international and national development and conservation organisations in Bolivia. This was straightforward and enlightening, compared to some of the difficulties I faced accessing other groups. For example, access to government departments was difficult and echoed some of the experiences that I had in Villa Tunari. The controversy of the TIPNIS conflict meant I was often passed from pillar to post and I was not granted interviews with the Minister for Hydrocarbons, the Minister for Environment or the Minister for Development. However, the TIPNIS has dispute has tested new state policies and engaged them in debates about the dispute, the opposition and how it fits to their agenda. I thus focused on the policies and responses of the state to evaluate their position and viewpoint.

3.10 Interviews
People’s knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, experiences and interactions are meaningful properties of the social reality that my questions explore (Mason 2006:63). Therefore listening to people is a meaningful way to generate data, although I recognise that memories and personal accounts are not a simple excavation of facts (Mason 2006:64). Semi-structured interviews and focus groups allowed me to talk to people ‘but in ways that (were) self-conscious, orderly and partially structured’ (Longhurst 2010:103). I used semi-structured interviews as I needed to understand the depth and complexity of a person’s situated and contextual accounts and experience, rather than a more superficial analysis of surface comparability between accounts of large
numbers of people (Mason 2006:65). Interviews worked well for answering my research questions and for the practicalities of the field.

Semi-structured interviews offered the flexibility to fill gaps and achieve affirmation by asking case-specific questions that methods like surveys and open interviews could not have offered (Mason, 2002). Using semi-structured interviews allowed me to maintain a structured and systematic procedure that enhances cross-case comparisons, while offering interviewees the freedom to roam, focus and detail what they deem important (Bryman & Bell 2011; Longhurst 2010:103). Interviews were chosen to obtain a rich, in-depth, experiential account related to my research objectives (Fontana & Frey 2005). Triangulation helped me to consider not only what people said but how they said it and in what context, for example helping me to explore how people resist and embrace social categories. Selecting participants was also crucial (Longhurst 2010:108). With qualitative research the emphasis is on understanding individual’s experience and making sense of their lives, over creating a representative sample (Valentine 2005 in Longhurst 2010:108). I did ‘on-site recruiting’ (Krueger 1988 in Longhurst 2010) and relied on snowballing, meaning that each contact helped me to recruit another (Longhurst 2010).

I planned my questions to answer my central research questions. However, this was not as straightforward as it sounds. It involved finding open-ended questions in non-academic language that would allow interviewees to talk to the subject without being overly guided (Longhurst 2010). I refined these in early interviews but also with the help of my supervisors. I used these core questions in most interviews, in order to have comparable data. I used four core questions in all interviews, choosing a low number as interviews with TIPNIS protesters were shorter than those with NGOs or government ministries. However, being semi-structured interviews, they allowed for follow-on questions and elaboration. Prior to interviews, I gave participants an information sheet about my research. Initially, this said I was interested in neoliberalism. However, I soon changed this, as I suspected it had influenced what I had been told in an informal conversation that I had hoped would lead
to an interview. After this, I changed the information sheet to be as wide-ranging as my questions.

Interviews also required sensitivity to the social dynamics at work and to the topics being discussed. They required being aware of the wider context. For example, for interviews with government ministries I dressed smartly but for those with TIPNIS protesters I was more relaxed. I dressed in way appropriate to my surroundings, which I hoped helped interviewees feel more relaxed (see Denscombe 2005:171). In interviews I practised attentive, active listening, fitting my tone to that of the interview, tolerating silences and asking for clarification when needed. I was neutral to people’s comments and did not pass judgement or respond with shock to more controversial views (Shaw & Gould 2001). In meeting people, requesting interviews and managing interview dynamics, I relied on my skills and experiences gained from ten years working in the UK refugee sector. My previous employment involved multiple one-to-one interviews and informal conservations with people from diverse backgrounds. These experiences and skills helped me to meet people and secure interviews.

Although the majority of my interviews were one-to-one, I did have two group interviews. Both of these were with SERNAP park wardens, from Beni and Cochabamba respectively and both were group interviews by necessity. Park wardens usually work within the TIPNIS, however, in Beni I managed to visit their office the day before all wardens returned to the park. I arranged an interview for the afternoon and interviewed all the wardens together with their manager. The presence of the manager undoubtedly influenced the conversation. However, I was aware of this when analysing the interview and it was interesting to see how the conversation progressed with him present. In Cochabamba, the situation was much the same and I interviewed all three wardens together. Group interviews meant it was harder to ask one person to go in-depth into one of their points. However, it did allow for different members of the group to comment on previous comments or elaborate on points made by their colleague. It allowed me to witness group interaction and their responses to questions about the TIPNIS – a controversial issue about which they were interestingly placed, as state employees and residents of the
park. In this situation, I could see how their perspectives were ‘actively constructed and negotiated’ in such a setting (Shaw & Gould 2001:146).

3.11 Participant Observation

I spent a total of nine months in Bolivia, devoting this time to learning about the TIPNIS conflict, meeting and interviewing relevant individuals and observing as much as I could about the context and location of my case study. Partly this involved observing a ‘multitude of activities and exactly how they are done’ (Laurier 2010:117). It provided background knowledge and allowed me to begin to question taken-for-granted ways of being in Bolivia (see Laurier 2010:1217). There are no formal steps for participant observation (Laurier 2010:117). Rather, I responded to the context I was in and was guided by my ethics, interviews and research questions. I recorded my observation in a fieldwork diary, as mentioned.

My research meant spending time talking informally with people and attending meetings where the politics of the TIPNIS was being debated. For example, I spent ten days in the TIPNIS, accompanying leaders from Trinidad to a large, community meeting for the TIPNIS subcentral. Participant observation such as this allowed me to understand the wider context of my interviews. It also helped me to chart the protest as it developed. For example, I attended public meetings about the TIPNIS and a media launch for a review of the government’s consultation within the park. These elements of my participant observation provided the background to my interviews and allowed me to more comprehensively analyse interviews in relation to wider, unfolding politics. More broadly, participant observation helped me to relate the TIPNIS dispute to its context. I followed the key political debates in Bolivia and attended events hosted by the government. For example, in December 2012 I travelled to the Isla del Sol, a small island on Lake Titikaka. Here I attended an event hosted by the MAS, promoted as celebrating the end of capitalism. Being present to observe events such as this helped me to both contextualise and analyse my research.

3.12 Historical Analysis
This research project has looked to Bolivia, and to the TIPNIS case study more specifically, as a way to investigate the extent to which the post-neoliberal project offers a new and progressive political regime that is fostering alternative ways to encounter, value and defend nature. This project has sought to critically analyse how the radical rhetoric of post-neoliberalism, as promoted in global arenas, is being translated into policy and practice within Bolivia. The complexity of this has involved identifying and analysing three key themes – development, indigeneity and conservation. My approach has been to draw out and analyse how these discourses have been mobilized by participants, as a way to explore their meaning, power and utility within the emerging post-neoliberal project. This has involved exploring where they have been positioned, in relation to wider processes of extraction and extractive-led development, as a way to interrogate and illuminate the political ecology of post-neoliberalism.

This approach has allowed for an analysis of shifting discourses of development, indigeneity and conservation, as well as for a critical engagement with the contemporary dynamics of the post-neoliberal project. However, there has not been the scope to prioritise post-neoliberalism as a historically rooted process. Instead, successful and illuminating ethnographies that have unearthed the complex legacies of contemporary Bolivian politics informed my literature review – being used as a starting point for this project. Chapters 4 and 5 provide historical context to the TIPNIS struggle, in relation to the key themes of this investigation. However, the analysis chapters prioritise the ways that understandings of history are mobilized by participants, rather than investigating how contemporary politics have emerged from longer economic and political trajectories. For example, I have approached indigeneity as a revised political category that is being claimed by multiple groups at multiple scales. The focus is how it is being claimed and (re)defined in relation to wider processes of development, rather than in relation to longer histories of ethnic politics. This has influenced the kinds of claims being made in this thesis, for example shaping the ways I engage with unresolved historical tensions or struggles.
3.13 Data Analysis

I used a Dictaphone to record all my interviews. This allowed me to concentrate fully on interaction (and language) rather than feeling pressured to record the interview in my notebook (Valentine 2005; Longhurst 2010). However, immediately after interviews I noted down any additional observations or ideas in my fieldwork diary (see Longhurst 2010:110). Initially, I imposed organisation and order on my data by saving it chronologically as password-protected data. My interviews were transcribed in Bolivia by a native Spanish speaker. As previously mentioned, this helped me to ensure accuracy and I have subsequently listened to each interview numerous times.

When I began analysing my data, I aimed to sort my data and build explanations in ways that were strategic and internally consistent (Mason 2006:147). To deal with the challenges of interpreting and representing my data, I first coded it in an ‘effort to understand meaning’ (Cope 2010:441). Coding is the ‘assigning of interpretative tags to the text based on categories or themes relevant to the research’ (Cope 2010:440). I defined first-level descriptive codes, then subsequently divided the first-level code into sub-codes. In this way, I coded along a particular theme or concept. All in, I have five first-level codes and 31 sub-codes. In certain cases, I created a third level code. I have 53 third-level codes. This coding helped me to identify patterns, themes and connections (Cope 2010:451). It was a dynamic process, which took time. I worked between my research questions and data, using Nvivo software to assist the process.

Nvivo helped me to systematically code and organise my data, as well as to deal with the volume of data that I had (Hoven 2010:453). I was trained in using Nvivo at the University of Manchester and was further supported by my supervisors to use it. All collected documents, transcribed interviews and notes were stored and managed using Nvivo. Computer software allowed me to handle and code large amounts of written data and enabled me to better examine the relations between and within data (van Hoven 2010:453). However, there are limits to the use and role of computer software. It helped me to organise my data and be sure of repeating themes, before I carried out
more careful analysis and interpretation. I repeatedly returned to my fieldwork notebooks to ensure that no relevant observations were overlooked. Moreover, supervisory meetings and guidance helped me to negotiate this process.

Through these steps, I identified the strongest themes and narratives. From these codes and themes, I built my arguments. I constructed ‘a perspective, an interpretation and a line of reasoning and analysis’ (Mason 2006:173). My arguments have thus been data-driven. For example, indigeneity became a central element of my argument and thesis. In the following chapters, key quotes and excerpts from interviews have been chosen on the basis of being exemplary and representative. If chosen for being exceptional and unusual, it is stated in the text.

3.14 Conclusion

This chapter has set out the methodological strategy that has guided this investigation. My research design used a qualitative approach and related set of methods that facilitated rigorous research that was also data-driven, exploratory, flexible and context-sensitive (Mason 2006:24). This design aimed at ensuring complexity, depth and rigor and was influenced by the long history of successful ethnographies and research to which I wish to contribute, as well as the literature and peer-reviewed processes of supervision that led me to the point of research design. These methods were also a best fit to the TIPNIS case study, which was itself exemplary for exploring emerging post-neoliberal environments. This chapter has also been an account of my fieldwork period, explaining the process, challenges and opportunities that shaped both my data collection and findings. The following chapters present the findings from my fieldwork and answer my central research questions.
4 The Mounting Power of Indigeneity

Indigeneity underpins this research, as Bolivia’s history of indigenous politics is essential to understanding contemporary dynamics. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal indigeneity as a political identity that is shifting and contested. Although I touch on its colonial roots, the focus here is its shifting nature and contemporary forms. This chapter argues that indigeneity has become a key political identity and a central route through which political power and control over natural resources has been negotiated. This is in spite of the racism and discrimination that previously dominated the ways that indigeneity has been known and treated. However, this chapter argues that the election of Evo Morales, and subsequent mainstreaming of indigeneity as a key political identity, raises questions about which individuals, groups and politics are now being included or excluded. This chapter looks at how indigeneity maps to power. It does this by firstly summarizing early uses of indigeneity in Bolivia, showing that it was most often an identity used in insult rather than claimed in affirmation. It then argues that the neoliberal reforms, started in the 1980s, marked a turning point for Bolivian indigenous identity politics, due to both the intensifying global rights movement and the disintegration of traditional political identity categories at the national scale. Indigeneity became entangled with the remarkable intensification of social movement protest, where protest groups harnessed the emergent political power of indigeneity. They successfully mobilised this as a counter-movement to the dominant neoliberal regime, ultimately securing state reform. Finally, I explore the election and early politics of Evo Morales. I argue that this government has mobilised indigeneity as statecraft, shifting indigeneity towards being the discourse of the state, rather than the discourse of protest. I show that the government continues to mobilize indigeneity as a counter-movement to global capitalism, using it to articulate alternative visions for development and natural resource management. However, I show that there
are significant questions about how government rhetoric relates to government actions, creating some of the questions of this research.

4.1 Citizenship: methodologies of exclusion

Across Latin America, three hundred years of colonialism developed rigid, class-based hierarchies which were followed by two hundred years of oligarchic rule, where a tiny elite ruled over the majority (Cott 2000:1). Colonialism instigated a politics defined by unrepresentative and paternalistic parties with weak roots in society (Cott 2000:9). A complex mixture of new classes developed, inextricably linked to racial categories. These new racial categories were shaped by cultural signifiers, with classifications of ‘white’ and ‘Indian’ being denoted by speech, dress, eating habits and other cultural traits (Klein 1982). Racialized identity politics played a key role in negotiating how groups accessed both political power and resources. They underpinned exclusionary politics, with changing labels of race and ethnicity being used to denote status.

In 1952, a political revolution in Bolivia attempted to revise identity categorisations and bring previously marginalised groups into the state. Notions of citizenship were expanded, by creating a revised class-based identity for peasants (campesinos). The new power and status of this group was mediated by relationships of patronage. After this 1952 Bolivian National revolution, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario), known as the MNR, took power and rewarded the rural, campesino groups who had supported them. This group was granted universal suffrage, rural education programmes and agrarian reform (Postero 2010). Although identity politics grounded in race and ethnicity continued, the categories and meanings were revised. ‘Campesino’ became known as a class-based identity to denote a poor rural peasant, whilst ‘mestizo’ was generally used in urban areas, to signify a cultural project of assimilation between colonizers and colonised (Canessa 2007). Indigeneity remained marginalised. Indigenous groups continued to be associated with early man and hunter-gatherers, yet to modernise. Whilst the mestizo ideal developed after the 1952 National Revolution, as a newly
recognised political identity, the term ‘bruto indio’ remained to insult people as rural and backward (Robert Albro 2005). Until very recently, indigeneity was an identity given, rather than claimed in many parts of the country. For example, and as recently as 2007, Canessa found that communities who were identified as indigenous by outsiders, for example members of an Aymara-speaking community, would often not self-identify as such. They identified as Aymara, not ‘indigenous’. For them, indigeneity was associated with backwardness and denoted a savage from lowland areas (2007). There is thus a complex history to identity politics in Bolivia and meanings have changed over time.

4.2 Neoliberal Reform

In the early 1980s, after repeated periods of military rule in Bolivia, the country faced economic collapse and turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help and guidance. The period between 1985 and 1989 marked the first round of neoliberal reforms in Bolivia, which aligned the state with the interests of business elites and international markets. The first neoliberal reforms were implemented by in-country political elites, many of whom had business interests in the country, and who worked in partnership with the IMF and its economic advisor, Jeffrey Sachs (Kohl & LC Farthing 2006; Kohl 2002). Bolivia’s neoliberal ‘roll-back and roll-out’ phases were some of the most radical in Latin America (Kohl 2006). They aimed to change the role of the state to market manager and create a policy framework attractive to private and international investment (Perreault 2005). Following the initial success of the adjustments in lowering inflation and enabling growth in Bolivia, Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) were rolled out across the continent and implemented by the IMF elsewhere in the world (Kohl 2002).

In the 1990s, Bolivia’s neoliberal reforms continued when Sanchez de Lozada became President. He implemented the Law of Capitalization, which further opened up the country to foreign investment by partially privatizing five key industries - oil and gas, telecommunications, airlines, electricity and railroads (Kohl 2002). The Law of Capitalization meant that the state sold 50 percent of every business, theoretically keeping the other 50 percent under state control.
In reality, it offered complete managerial control to foreign companies for a token sum. For example, rather than paying their 50 percent outright, the companies buying into these state industries agreed to make investments over a four to seven-year period (V Quiroga 1997 in Kohl 2002:457). However, companies rarely made these investments. Instead, the state lost much of the revenue it had previously received from these industries, which had previously made up 60 percent of state income (Kohl 2002).

Key to the impact and consequences of these reforms was their bearing on access to natural resources. The Law of Capitalization granted foreign companies access to Bolivia’s extensive natural resource wealth, to meet the demands of global markets and benefit global corporate elites. For example, in the case of hydrocarbons, the law split the industry into activities of exploration, exploitation and transportation. This helped delineate separate processes and roles for the private sector, thus attracting more foreign firms (Spronk & Webber 2007). The Law of Capitalization and its impact on natural resources is an example of accumulation by dispossession, namely the privatisation of a public resource and subsequent acquisition by transnational capital from the U.S or other core economies (Spronk & Webber 2007:32).

The Law of Capitalization benefited foreign investors, as it increased productivity and profit. However, for Bolivian citizens the price of basic services often increased. For example, the price of gas and oil jumped in 1997, just months after the capitalization of these industries (La Razon, 1997 in Kohl, 2002:456). Neoliberal reforms were disastrous for most Bolivians, despite inflation initially slowing. Many people lost both their jobs and the support that state provided services had previously offered. Real wages fell and poverty increased (Perreault 2005). The mining sector, for example, was particularly affected by privatization, which resulted in huge job losses. Many miners subsequently migrated to the eastern lowlands to find employment on coca farms (see Canessa 2014), a key point that is returned to later in this thesis.
4.3 Neoliberal Citizenship

Neoliberal reforms were implemented at the same time as multi-cultural rights were recognised by the state. In the 1990s, President Sanchez de Lozada re-wrote the constitution, recognising Bolivia as a ‘pluri-cultural, multi-ethnic nation’ (Assies 2006). The 1994 Constitution defined Bolivia as a ‘free, independent and sovereign’ country that was also ‘multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural’ - the first time that cultural and ethnic diversity was officially recognised by the state (Assies 2006). Importantly, these reforms were also influenced by global discourses of minority rights and the growing recognition of indigenous groups. Increasingly, states were being judged on their treatment of minority groups by international institutions (Klein 2011). The 1994 Bolivian Constitution recognised the social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous groups. In 1991, Bolivia had ratified ILO 169, international legislation to protect the rights and wellbeing of indigenous groups. The ratification of this legislation linked national discourses of indigeneity to the growing, global indigenous rights network (Albro 2010a). It then informed the 1994 Constitution.

Decentralisation policies have often accompanied neoliberal reforms, seeking to build the capacity of civil society. Multi-cultural reforms were part of the neoliberal project, encouraging the growth of civil society whilst state functions were rolled back (Regalsky 2010; Robert Albro 2005). In Bolivia they helped to politicise previously excluded groups. For example, multi-cultural reform underpinned the 1994 Law of Popular Participation. This rescaled administrative governance by creating 311 new political municipalities, where neighbourhood groups and indigenous organisations were granted legal status as representatives of their constituencies. They were given new powers, for example power to veto local budgets. This law worked as a decentralization initiative, transferring 20 percent of national revenues to new municipal governments (Kohl 2002:450). Municipalities were given control over investments in health, education, roads, micro-irrigation and sports, and were given new powers to oversee and veto municipal budgets (Kohl 2002).
The Law of Popular Participation restructured politics, introducing participatory political institutions at the municipal level and granting legal status to neighbourhood and indigenous organisations, as Grassroots Territorial Organisations (GTOs). These multicultural reforms opened up formal politics to groups identified or identifying as *campesino* and indigenous (Perreault 2003; Robert Albro 2005). They gave economic and political power to many of these communities and brought previously marginalised leaders into government (Klein 2011). For example, it is estimated that following the implementation of the law, two-thirds of elected municipal mayors and council members identified as peasants or as indigenous people (Klein 2011:54).

The reforms themselves were ultimately deemed ineffective in altering the wider power relations between elites and the majority (Albro 2005: Postero 2008). The state’s recognition of multiculturalism and multicultural rights were ultimately subordinate to a set of political instruments designed to develop potential markets, prioritise access to natural resources and promote markets in land (Kohl 2002; Medeiros 2001 in Regalsky 2010:42). Newfound rights to cultural expression, ethnic territory and traditional resource use were circumscribed by neoliberal policies that undercut livelihoods and foreclosed alternative strategies for social organisation (Perreault 2004). Despite this, these reforms have still been identified as a political training ground for indigenous and *campesino* politics, as they introduced people to new kinds of claims to citizenship.

### 4.4 The Shifting Power of Indigeneity

Over the past three decades, global and national discourses of indigeneity have become entangled with Bolivia’s strong social movement ethic. Latin American social movement theorists have argued that social movements have been essential for the creation of alternative visions of democracy, economy and society across the region (Escobar 1992). In Bolivia, social movement protest has long negotiated citizenship, democratic representation and participation. The low levels of suffrage and democracy in Bolivia, for example, meant that as late as the 1952 National Revolution, only 200,000 citizens had the right to vote (Kohl & L Farthing 2006:46). Following this revolution, periods
of democracy were interspersed with eight periods of military rule. In this context, social movement protest developed into a key site of politics, a central site for political negotiation and a key form of political expression (Kohl & Farthing 2006:46). Since then, social movements have helped to transform the meaning and power of indigenous identity.

In the 1990s, social movement activity intensified as indigeneity developed into a key political identity - claimed and mobilised by social movements in their protests against the elitist, neoliberal state (Kohl & L Farthing 2006; Canessa 2012a; Canessa 2007; Perreault 2013; Radcliffe et al. 2002; Robert Andolina et al. 2005; Assies 2003). Two important movements, focused on in this chapter, redefined indigeneity. These were the 1990 Lowland March for Territory and Dignity and the party politics of the coca growing federations of the Chapare region. Both are vital to understanding how indigeneity emerged as a key identity in bids for political power, natural resources and for understanding contemporary indigenous politics.

The lowland March for Territory and Dignity is often cited as marking the beginning of Bolivia’s indigenous movement (Goodale 2006:636; Postero 2005; Postero 2010). In 1990, huge inequalities and corruption in lowland regions prompted 700 people to march for 36 days from Trinidad, in the lowland Department of Beni, to La Paz, Bolivia’s main city in the Andean highlands. Groups from the Eastern lowlands were protesting against the increasing invasions of their lands by loggers, ranchers and settlers from the Highlands (see Map 2). The march opposed these developments by mobilizing indigeneity to claim new indigenous rights. Marchers mobilised indigeneity to support their claims to territory and resources, demanding state protection from the increasing incursions of loggers and ranchers. The march was supported by NGOs and transnational networks, for example those who were working in lowland areas around conservation or development. It was thus connected to the growing global movement for indigenous rights (Roper 2003).

This protest coincided with a time of political instability in Bolivia. A crisis of exclusion, resulting from the neoliberal reforms, encouraged political elites to
be more sympathetic to an indigenous framing of the political status quo (Cott 2000). Following this 1990 march, President Paz Zamora recognized protesting groups as indigenous and tied his recognition to the accession of new rights to land and the creation of indigenous territories. In 1994, the state enacted a suit of laws that recognized a range of indigenous rights, particularly over territory. President Paz Zamora initially created four indigenous territories, which were each granted legal titles over their lands (Montgomery Roper 2003). New laws recognised the legal personality of indigenous territories (comunidades indígenas) and peasant associations (sindicatos campesinos); granted other indigenous community organisations, namely ayllus and comunidades, the right to use traditional laws; and guaranteed communal property rights (propiedad comunaria) (Klein 2011; Assies 2011). Between 1994 and 1997 the government formally recognised 13,827 territorial organisations (Klein 2011).

A central achievement of the march was in securing classified indigenous territories. On the 24 September 1990, the state enacted Supreme Decrees 22609, 22610 and 22611, which recognized indigenous territories in the Department of Beni. These were named Tierras Communitaria de Origen but are commonly referred to as TCO’s. These decrees assigned 1,236,296 hectares to Moxeños, Chimanes and Yuracaré people in the Isiboro-Secure region; 53,000 hectares to Siriono people in the Ibiato area; and 800,000 hectares to Chimane people in the Chimane Forest (Miranda and Vadillo 2012). Later, in the 1994 Constitution of the State, the rights of indigenous people to their communal lands were legally recognized, and incorporated into a new land law, the National Agrarian Reform Service Law (Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria). This is Law 1715 of October 1996 and is known as the INRA Law. This helped to define the legal scope of the indigenous peoples’ communal lands (Miranda & Vadillo 2012).

The 1990 lowland march was also hugely significant in terms of the political mobilization of indigeneity. It united groups across the country, in support of the marchers and their claims (Roper 2003). One group that supported the lowland march was the coca growers of the Chapare. In the 1960s, the Chapare region was subject to low-intensity warfare, violence, terror and
human rights abuses as part of the US global war on drugs (Postero 2010). As a result, it became politically well-organised and practised at mobilising against the state. For the coca-growers, or cocaleros, state support of the US War on Drugs clearly illustrated how Bolivia seemed to value its links to the US, over the needs of its citizens. This strengthened their resolve to ‘push for democracy on their terms’ (Harten 2011:71).

Although many members of Bolivia’s growing indigenous movement engaged with neoliberal decentralisation policies and became involved in local government, discourses of political exclusion continued to be mobilised (Harten 2011:72). Cocaleros tied their political campaign against the state to the indigenous rights movement. For example, they increasingly defended their farming of coca, a traditional chewing leaf and a base product for cocaine, by articulating it as an issue of indigenous rights. Key to their campaign was the promotion of the coca leaf as a symbol of Andean indigeneity (Jackson & Warren 2005; Albro 2005; Grisaffi 2010; Canessa 2014). In this way, livelihoods became embedded in issues of sovereignty, natural resources and the political representation of previously excluded groups (Harten 2011:70; Grisaffi 2010).

The cocaleros built alliances with human rights groups, foreign NGOs, labour unions and sympathetic social scientists, partly by engaging with global discourses of indigeneity. They articulated their goals in terms of self-determination, autonomy, the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, the political restructuring of the state, territorial rights, access to natural resources and greater control over local economic development. In 1993, the cocalero federations made the decision to enter into party politics, following the constant refusal by traditional political parties to recognise their organisation and meet their needs (Harten 2011:51). They sought to construct a political structure based on the rural union movement and their rural organisations, building it from the ground up (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:108). In 1993, the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) was created, with Evo Morales as their leader. Evo Morales had previously been the leader of his coca growing federation (Harten 2011).
At the beginning, the MAS was mainly made up of highland indigenous groups, with fewer lowland groups, labour unions and landless peasants (Postero 2010). The MAS contributed to, and harnessed, growing protests against neoliberal reforms, presenting themselves as a clear alternative to the vertical politics, corruption and broken promises of traditional parties (Albro 2005). In 2002, Morales had started to adopt indigenous rhetoric, positioning indigenous groups as the moral guardians of the nation state and best able to defend its resources (Canessa 2012). In the national elections of the same year, the MAS gained an unexpected level of success, having built and strengthened grassroots networks and alliances in support of their election campaign (Harten 2011:50).

4.5 Indigeneity as a Countermovement

Bolivia is exemplary of what has been described as an ‘indigenous awakening’ across Latin America, because of the levels of political power and transformation that has been secured in the name of indigeneity (Canessa 2012a; Canessa 2014). Throughout the 1990’s and into the early 2000’s, indigeneity was increasingly mobilised by protesters in Bolivia, as a countermovement to the neoliberal state and its reforms. It was used in an explicit critique of neoliberal globalisation, as the language of political protest became ‘indigenised’ (Brysk 2000b). In this context, indigeneity was an inclusive identity, used by multiple groups who opposed the impact of the neoliberal agenda and who demanded that their needs be met by the state (Canessa 2007; Canessa 2012a; Albro 2005). Indigeneity became a newly powerful political space from which to mobilise successfully against neoliberalism and entrenched elites. For example, the lack of consolidated democracy in Bolivia was understood as a result of ongoing exclusion and racism. Multicultural reforms were deemed insufficient and many groups demanded more meaningful rights, increased political power and increased control over natural resources (Assies 2006). Social movements focused on strengthening rights and destroying the monopoly of the old political party system (Cott 2000).
The most significant anti-neoliberal protests in Bolivia were the 'Water Wars', in Cochabamba in 2000, and the 'Gas Wars', in El Alto in 2003 and 2005. The Water Wars started with the privatisation of water utilities in Bolivia, backed by the World Bank. In the mid-1990's they extended a US$4.5 million loan to improve water and sanitation efficiency in the main cities. The public water utility in Cochabamba was in bad shape and water was available for only four hours a day. This service only reached 57 percent of citizens (Assies 2003 in Webber and Spronk 2007:39; Webber and Spronk 2007). Most citizens drilled their own water wells. For example, small-scale farmers in the Cochabamba Valley managed water according to communal principles that date back to pre-Inca times (Spronk and Webber 2007: Assies 2003: Laurie, Andolina and Radcliffe 2002). In 1999, a concession was granted to Aguas del Tunari, a consortium controlled by US construction giant Bechtel. The World Bank recommended that no money to improve the system came from the state, so the company hiked up water tariffs (see WB 1999 in Webber and Spronk 2007:39). Not only did the deal hike up prices but an accompanying Water Law, Law 2029, granted exclusive property rights over water to the consortium, for the duration of the contract. This meant that residents could not drill their own wells and threatened water use for irrigation (Spronk and Webber 2007).

In February 2000, protesters took to the streets to oppose the privatisation of water (Kohl 2002). By April, the protests had grown as more and more groups joined. Coca growers, teachers’ unions and indigenous political organisations joined the protest against privatisation and placed mounting pressure on the state. Cochabamba residents protested peacefully in the streets, shutting down parts of the city with road blocks, marches and demonstrations. In April, President Banzer responded by declaring a state of siege that resulted in violence. According to official accounts, five people were killed and 42 wounded (Kohl, 2002). When a young man was shot by a sniper, more people came onto the streets (Spronk and Webber 2007).

The leaders of this movement framed their struggle as an effort to ‘reclaim the commons’ and defend an attack on communal property rights (Spronk and Webber 2007:40). Key to the protest was the mobilization of indigeneity as a
countermovement to the neoliberal logic that underpinned reforms. For example, the privatisation of water provision had prioritised economic efficiency over social equity, casting water provision as a business transaction, not a social right. Users were recast as customers with access to water being mediated by the market (Perreault 2005). However, the protesters opposed this by making claims of indigeneity that identified water as a sacred right. In the absence of the legal standing necessary to obtain rights, irrigators relied on defending traditional customary practices to legitimise claims for water rights (Perreault 2004). In this way, indigeneity was mobilised as a countermovement to neoliberal reform and water was championed as a social good and indigenous right, rather than as a commodity.

In Cochabamba, 'The Committee to Defend Water and Life' was formed as soon as water provision was privatised. This committee was used as a platform to defend water as a sacred right, tied to indigenous cultural history (Perreault 2005). Water war protesters also engaged in a complex politics of scale, building alliances between indigenous and campesino organisations, leftist parties and national and international NGOs. The protests ultimately resulted in the amendment of water legislation and rescission of the contract. Water was returned to public management and the victory was viewed, more widely, as the first significant break with neoliberalism in 15 years (Spronk and Webber 2007:40). This was celebrated as a victory for indigenous people, despite the involvement of non-indigenous actors in the protests. This helps to demonstrate the growing ascendancy of indigeneity in politics (Kohl and Farthing 2001 in Kohl 2002:460; Perreault 2005).

Three years later, in 2003, there were large protests in the highland city of El Alto. The protesters were opposing plans to export Bolivian gas to meet the demands of regional markets. President Hugo Banzar had made a deal during his administration (1997-2001) to export gas to both Mexico and the United States through a Chilean port. The deal was made with Pacific LNG, a Spanish-British-US energy consortium. When Sanchez de Lozada became President, in 2002, he attempted to close the deal, causing huge public outcry and opposition (Spronk and Webber 2007:35). Dubbed the 'Gas Wars', these protests opposed plans to build a new gas pipeline to export the gas through
Chile. The Gas Wars (*Guerra del Gas*) ignited deep-seated and continuing resentment against Chile, to whom Bolivia lost the War of the Pacific and, in doing so, their access to the sea (Kaup 2008).

When hydrocarbons began to be more intensively exploited in the 1990’s, the national hydrocarbons company, YPFB (*Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos*), was fully functioning and well-respected. However, international lending agencies and the Bolivian media put pressure on the government to privatise the sector as part of their wider project of Capitalization (Kaup 2008:1737). As transnational companies exploited Bolivia’s natural gas for windfall profits, they failed to take into account the exclusionary effects of their extraction and distribution. Social movements linked the exploitation of natural gas to their everyday lives and the uneven development which they were witnessing (Kaup 2008:1735). The Gas Wars were a result of a long history of uneven development in the country and articulated access to natural gas in terms of livelihood, democracy and development (Perreault 2006; Kaup 2008). Community organisations and union leaders mobilized people into action and onto the streets by highlighting that whilst they burned animal dung for fuel, transnational companies and the state were exporting gas abroad (Kaup 2008).

From 8-17th October 2003 people from El Alto mobilized in the streets. They too were met by state violence. According to the highest estimates more than 80 people were killed and 400 injured by bullets (Spronk & Webber 2007:36; Olivera & Lewis 2004). The struggle moved from El Alto to La Paz and protesters were joined by La Paz residents, including those who went on hunger strike. An estimated 500,000 people took to the streets (Hylton & Thomson 2005; Spronk and Webber 2007). At its height, this movement was formed by miners, teachers, students, peasants from the valleys and inhabitants of El Alto, who were later supported by urban intellectuals and the middle classes (Postero 2008). The epicentre was El Alto but the protests ‘radiated out’ with solidarity marches and mobilizations in Oruro, Cochabamba, Sucre, Potosi and Santa Cruz (Spronk and Webber 2007:36). They called for the nationalisation of gas.
Spronk and Webber argue that the fight over natural gas posed a more fundamental challenge to neoliberalism than struggles around water, because of the political-economic importance of the resource (2007). They argue that this is because gas is ‘structurally significant’ (Jan Selby 2005) it is:

‘an important input in industrial capitalist economies, unevenly and scarcely distributed in the world, relatively easy to establish oligopolistic control over, and a central source of revenue for economic development and state building’ (Spronk and Webber 2007:33).

Thus ‘when social movements and the state negotiate over gas, they are effectively struggling over the future trajectory of the state’ (Spronk and Webber 2007:33). In this way, the Gas Wars challenged the neoliberal state and its reforms.

The Gas Wars resulted in the eventual resignation of then President Sánchez de Lozada. Vice-president Carlos Mesa became the President and, in response to the demands of the social movements, planned a referendum vote in July 2004 to decide the future direction of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector (Kaup 2008:1738). The Bolivians voted for the state to regain control of its hydrocarbon sector, for an end to favourable taxation and to cut the royalty rates for transnational corporations. 92 percent of votes cast were in favour of nationalizing all of the country’s hydrocarbons and 86 percent of votes were made in favour of cancelling the Hydrocarbons Act 1689, which had lowered the royalty and taxation rates for extraction firms (IFES, 2004 in Kaup 2008:1738).

These protests intertwined with the political campaigning of the MAS. Following their unexpected levels of success in 2002, this was stepped up a notch in the lead-up to the 2005 elections. The MAS opened up its membership to urban intellectuals, and by the time of the 2005 elections, party leaders were mainly either leftist, non-indigenous individual members or rural activists from the coca-growers movements, unions, neighbourhood organisations or indigenous organisations (Harten 2011:144). In 2005, MAS won the national elections, promising political transformation and ‘post-neoliberal’ politics (see Postero 2010). On 1st May, 2006 Morales responded
to the social movements’ demands and re-nationalized Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector. The new government gave all of the investors 180 days to renegotiate their contracts with the Bolivian state. By 1\textsuperscript{st} November 1 2006, almost all of them had complied (Kaup 2008:1738).

Neoliberalism provided many of the foundations necessary for the rise of MAS and the election of Evo Morales. Opposing neoliberal reforms brought together in groups that were linguistically, culturally and geographically distinct from each other but united by a shared history of exclusion and common frustrations with the failures of neoliberal globalisation (Cott 2000:4). The neoliberal system had failed to gain legitimacy, as its claims of being based on equality and freedom were undermined by the reality of worsening economic conditions and the increasing concentration of political and economic power (Cott 2000:5). Within this politics, Morales used indigeneity as a unifying identity and as a way to critique the state and its dominant political approach. Indigeneity brought people together with shared experiences of political exclusion and was used to articulate the possibility of change (Canessa 2007; Albo 2005). This partly accounts for the ‘unexpectedly’ large majority of the Bolivian population (63 percent) identifying as indigenous in the 2001 census, despite the numbers of people who spoke an indigenous language as their mother tongue dropping to below 50 percent for the first time (Canessa 2007).

In 2005, Evo Morales was elected as president with an absolute majority, on the back of social movements who demanded a foundational constituent assembly and the renationalization of the hydrocarbons industry (Regalsky 2010). At this stage, the government was backed by a Unity Pact, namely a national alliance of Bolivian grassroots organisations. This was established in 2004, partly to rewrite the constitution and thus help to reform the state (see Regalsky 2010). It was an attempt to re-found the state via a constituent assembly that ‘would allow the Andean and Amazonian communities and peoples to exercise expansive rather than circumscribed jurisdiction, employ a particular set of norms and protect their living areas, and restrict the power of the timber, mining, and oil multi-nationals and their land-owning allies who exploited their resources and destroyed their territories’ (Regalsky 2010:45).
The Unity Pact was between indigenous and campesino political organisations. These were:

- Unique Confederation of Rural Labourers of Bolivia (CSUTCB)
- National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous Originary Women of Bolivia – (Bartolina Sisa)
- Syndicalist Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (CSCIB)
- Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB)
- National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ)

This pact has since broken down, a point returned to in the following chapters (see Ragalsky 2010). It is also important to note that these organisations represent politically and geographically diverse groups - another point explored more fully in the following chapters.

4.6 Indigeneity as Statecraft

Bolivia has been characterised by political uprisings. Its political history is marked by discontinuity and repeated interruptions of the political regime (Dunkerley 2007). It has struggled to find national unity and a national identity, not only because of the tradition of exclusionary politics that has left the majority of the population unrepresented, but also in the wake of its creation as a buffer state between Argentina and Peru, the natural barriers of mountains and rainforests and the pockets of capitalist-driven modernity that exist in contrast to areas dominated by subsistence farming (see Kohl and Farthing 2006: 40). Since the 2005 elections, Morales and his government have used indigeneity to unite the country. They have mobilised indigeneity as statecraft, meaning it has shifted from being the discourse of protest to the discourse of the state. They have placed indigeneity at the heart of how they present their government to its citizens, as illustrated by President Morales’s inauguration ceremony in 2006. The official ceremony in La Paz was downplayed and a more ‘traditional’ celebration was held in Tiwanaku, a pre-Inca site near to Lake Titicaca (see Canessa 2014).
The MAS state is using indigeneity to build its nationalist project and, in doing so, it is creating a (new) national indigenous culture. Indigeneity is being mobilised in the creation of a national culture, for the majority, not the excluded minority (Canessa 2012). For example, they have promoted (new) national traditions that are based on those of one of Bolivia’s indigenous groups, the Aymara. Mass marriages and celebrations of the Aymara New Year have been promoted as Bolivian traditions, despite these traditions being unique to particular places and cultures in the country (Canessa 2012: Postero 2011). As will be explored throughout this thesis, this new indigeneity for the majority raises crucial questions about its effects on the indigeneity of the minority.

The radical rhetoric of the MAS has been translated into policies and legislation, most significantly through the creation of a new national constitution. The 2009 constitution is the 17th constitution that Bolivia has had since independence in 1826 and is the primary legal and political instrument of the country’s new beginning under the MAS government (Assies 2011: Albro 2010). This constitution, similar to a revised 2008 constitution in Ecuador, primarily manages to ‘codify multi-cultural entitlements, introduce new forms of representation and deliberation and identify state responsibilities in health, housing and social provision’ (Tockman 2010 in Jean Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012:7). The MAS, however, did not introduce the notion of a new constitution. Calls for one had been made since the 1994 constitution was enacted, when multi-cultural reforms were found to be insufficient in terms of redistribution and power-sharing. In 2004, a new constitution was decreed but once again was found to be insufficient. Demands for a rewrite grew throughout the 2000’s, with calls for total constitutional reform in order to ensure greater recognition of Bolivia’s previously marginalised citizens and more significant political rights (Assies 2011). The new constitution was rewritten and finally approved in 2009, as part of the project to re-imagine the state and country. It was passed after much heated debate and conflict (see Assies 2011: Regalsky 2010). New rights for indigenous campesinos were partly based on the UN declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples,
demonstrating the recurring dialectic between national politics and global discourses of indigeneity (Albro 2010).

Part of the new constitution has been to redefine the terminology for indigeneity, including how it refers to campesinos, both as individuals and groups. The 2009 constitution created a distinct set of rights for a new political subject – ‘pueblos indígena originario campesino’. This refers to an ‘Indigenous Original Peasant’ (Indigena Originario Campesino), bringing indigenous and peasants together in one political category. The definition for this indigenous Original Peasant is set out in the excerpt below:

Article 30.1 as ‘...all groups of people that share cultural identity, language, traditions, history, institutions, territory and cosmology whose existence is before the invasion of the Spanish colonialists’ (Article 30 2009 Constitution see also Fundacion Tierra 2011:5).

The term applies to all people who belong to pre-colonial nations and pueblos, who collectively enjoy the rights listed in Article 30 of the Constitution and others. These terms are used throughout the 2009 Constitution and its related laws (Fundacion Tierra 2011:5).

The MAS have also amended the terminology for territorial rights, based on this revised definition of indigeneity. Previously territory was demarcated for indigenous groups and, as mentioned, these were named TCOs. However, the MAS have amended this to TIOCs (Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino). TIOCs have the right to a prior and informed consultation over any planned projects for their territory and the right to share in the benefits of any non-renewable natural resources found in the territory. They are also granted the right to apply their own rules, administrated in accordance to their own political structures, and to define their own development in agreement with their own cultural criteria and principles of cohabiting harmoniously with nature. TIOCs include areas of production, areas for the use and the conservation of natural resources and spaces for social, spiritual and cultural reproduction (Fundaccion Tierra 2011:6).
The constitution has also moved away from discourses of multi-culturalism. Key to the new state has been a shift from recognising Bolivia as a ‘multi-cultural’ country, to a ‘pluri-cultural’ one. ‘Pluri-culturalism’ has been used to suggest some form of institutionalised power-sharing, where groups can have self-determination or autonomy (Assies 2011). Whereas multi-culturalism was recognition of cultural rights without power (see Hale 2002), pluri-nationalism suggests profound reconfiguration of the state itself (Assies 2011). Pluri-nationalism is associated with new forms of political rights, namely autonomy. This is referred to in multiple articles that equate autonomy with self-governance and the right to culture (Albro 2010).

Autonomy has long been called for by various group in Bolivia. For example, indigeneity has been mobilised as a way to claim distinctiveness and power separate from the state. In the 1970s, Aymara Kataristas, a radical indigenous movement that identified and challenged the colonial legacy in Latin America, wanted to set up an ‘Indigenous Nation’. In the 1980s and 1990s, coca growers wanted union autonomy (see Albó 1987). In 1990, the 'March for Lowland Territory and Dignity' demanded complete control for indigenous groups over their lowland territories (Albo 1996; Healy 2001 in Albro 2010:76). The re-imagining of the Aymara Ayllu, a pre-Inca form of community organisation, was also a project of re-imagining the Aymara people as distinct from the state during the neoliberal regime. A revitalised Ayllu was reconfigured by activists, policy-makers and politicians as an ‘activist Ayllu’, distinct from the state and its neoliberal regime (Albro 2010:76). In 2009, it was written into the new constitution.

However, the specifics of contemporary autonomy remain unclear. It is most comprehensively addressed in Section 3 of the 2009 Constitution, which sets out the structure and territorial organisation of the state, distinguishing between Departmental, Regional, Municipal and Indigenous autonomies. In July 2009, a Law on Autonomies and Decentralisation was circulated and is currently being debated (Assies 2011). The exact terms of autonomy are not yet clear, raising key questions about the levels of power it will assign to groups and the ways that it will engage with the wider politics and objectives of the state. This is explored throughout this thesis.
Indigeneity has also been used to express the values and ethics of the state. The constitution addresses this through its commitment to *vivir bien* or ‘living well’. This has been incorporated into the section of the constitution that outlines the ethical and moral principles guiding the state and that sets out the economic intentions of the state, to diversify economic activities (Gudynas 2011; Albro 2010a). It evokes an alternative vision and approach to mainstream development, which prioritizes economic growth. *Vivir bien* has been presented as an indigenous approach to development, encapsulating well-being within one’s community, quality of life, the well-being of nature and the co-habitation of people and nature (Gudynas 2011). Interestingly, the concept of *vivir bien* has not been directly lifted from one of Bolivia’s indigenous communities. Although described as indigenous cosmology, there is little evidence that the term is found in the everyday life of rural communities. Instead, it is a new term created by an Aymara intellectual, as a suggestion of how ‘traditional indigenous knowledge’ can respond to contemporary development paradigms (in Gudynas 2011:444). This goes some way in explaining some of the key criticisms of *vivir bien*, which doubt its relevance to the majority of groups who currently identify as indigenous. Critics of *vivir bien*, for example, suggest that the dominant model of indigeneity in Bolivia today is one that speaks to a dynamic population engaged in market activities – people who want economic growth, rather than being expected to sacrifice it (Canessa 2014). It does, however, speak to the model of indigeneity being promoted by the state in the global arena. For example, it fits well with the ways that indigeneity has been mobilised by Morales and the state to critique wider, global politics.

4.7 Evo Morales and *Pachamama* (Mother Earth)

The concept of *vivir bien* connects to the new environmentalism articulated by the MAS. A central way that Morales has mobilized and articulated indigeneity is as an identity tied to alternative views and practices towards nature. Indigenous environmentalism has been a central feature of his anti-capitalist rhetoric. For example, he has articulated a form of indigenous environmentalism in critique of dominant global environmental practices and concerns. In the global arena, these critiques have been levelled at
international climate change forums. They have admonished the influence of capitalism on climate change agendas. For example, Morales has rejected global climate change agreements for being rooted in market logic. This has been well reported in international media. For example a headline in the UK’s Observer newspaper reads:

'Bolivia's defiant leader sets radical tone at Cancún climate talks: Evo Morales is drawing on indigenous vision to challenge Western positions on rising temperatures’ (Vidal 2010)

Morales has rejected climate change agreements rooted in market logic, namely green neoliberal approaches. He has also identified capitalism as the cause of the world’s environmental crisis. This is evident in the quote below, from his speech at the Cancun Climate Change Conference in November, 2010:

‘What is responsible? What are the root causes? For the last two or three years, there has been a debate about capitalism. Reflected in several crises - the financial crisis, food crisis, energy crisis and climate.

Let us live up to our responsibility to our children and our children’s children. We have to change our policies. We have to tackle the root causes of global warming. The effects are important, but the cause is important…..

….. We are here to save the world. We are not here to turn nature into an asset. The forests are sacred to the peoples of the world. We are not here to save capitalism’ (Morales 2010).

He has also advocated that we focus on those who suffer most from environmental degradation – the families who experience its effects. His radical, people-led politics have influenced his response to environmental crisis and he encourages world leaders to think of those who suffer:

‘It's easy for people in an air-conditioned room to continue with the policies of destruction of Mother Earth. We need instead to put ourselves in the shoes of families in Bolivia and worldwide that lack water and food and suffer misery and hunger. People here in Cancún have no idea what it is like to be a victim of climate change’ (Morales 2010).
In the same speech, he advocated building policies and responses from the bottom up – listening to those who are negotiating environmental change and degradation.

‘We have an obligation to listen to the urgent demands of our peoples. We cannot here behind closed doors find ways to impose texts that do not reflect the thoughts and opinions of our peoples’ (Morales 2010).

This speech is illustrative of the radical environmental rhetoric proposed by the MAS.

In the domestic arena, Morales has promoted and constructed indigenous environmentalism in a variety of forums. He has endorsed and referenced Pachamama, or Mother Earth, as an indigenous way of understanding nature and the relationship between humans and nature (Gudynas 2011). The 2009 Constitution, for example, has incorporated this discourse of indigenous environmentalism through vivir bien. In the same year as Cancun, Morales hosted the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. This promoted indigeneity as holding the answers to the world’s environmental problems and sought to find non-market-led mechanisms for combating climate change. This conference, held in Cochabamba, Bolivia, sought to create new environmental proposals to counter those agreed at Cancun (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:21). These were presented to the UN and centred on granting rights to Pachamama, rather than applying market values. This eventually led to a new environmental law, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In 2012, the MAS hosted an event on the date of the Winter Solstice, on Lake Titicaca, to mark the end of capitalism. Taken together, these examples help illustrate the radical new, anti-capitalist politics of the MAS, which promised new people-led politics and the prioritisation of environmental politics.

4.8 Conflict and Contestation

Despite this radical environmental rhetoric, environmental issues in Bolivia have remained sites of contestation and tension. During the 2010 World People’s Conference on Climate Change, for example, there was an unofficial workshop held off-campus, named Mesa 18 (Table 18). This was organised
by indigenous political organisations and it challenged the environmental practices occurring within Bolivia, primarily the state’s continuing commitment to hydrocarbon extraction (Aguirre & Cooper 2010). The workshop debated national contributions to climate change and environmental degradation. Reports in the press estimated 1500 people attended, including national-level organisations and international supporters, such as the American author Naomi Klein (El Dia April 21 2010 in Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:22). The MAS response to Mesa 18 was one of disregard. Vice-President Garcia Linera, for example, attributed the environmentalism of Mesa 18 to foreign NGOs and their manipulations. He referred to a ‘hyper-environmentalism’ that was conspiring to prevent Bolivia from its long held dream to industrialise and democratise its wealth (in Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:23).

There have been further sites of conflict between the state and its citizens, and the power dynamics within multiple claims to indigeneity appear fraught. The mobilisation of indigeneity by the state marks a significant break from how indigeneity has been mobilised in the past, for example by marginal groups. There has already been tension between the form of indigeneity being claimed by the multiple indigenous groups within Bolivia and the indigeneity recognised by the state. For example, it has been argued that the new indigenous state is less willing to recognise alternative claims for indigeneity than previous presidents. Humphrey-Bebbington argues that the Seventh Lowland Indigenous March, which arrived and met Evo Morales in July 2010, got a frosty reception. Whilst past presidents embraced indigenous marchers (for example the reception given by President Paz Zamora to the ‘1990 Lowland March for Territory and Dignity’), Morales dismissed the Seventh March as inauthentic (2010:248). This raises questions, considered in this thesis, about possible changes in how the state regards and treats oppositional groups.

4.9 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the shifting power of indigeneity in Bolivia, arguing that it has become a key political identity for accessing rights and resources in Bolivia. It has shown how important indigeneity has become in contemporary
politics - providing an identity and political space through which to challenge neoliberal reforms and wider, exclusionary politics. It has been mobilized in critique of the status quo, to claim political power for those traditionally marginalised.

This chapter has also shown that these shifts have created new areas of tension, particularly because of the new indigenous state. The new government has used indigeneity as statecraft, for example promoting indigenous traditions as national ones. It has voiced alternative approaches to government and development within its new constitution, also using indigeneity to articulate these alternatives. However, state claims to indigeneity have created tensions with groups either marginal or oppositional to the state. Indigeneity, once an identity of the powerless, may now be monopolized by those in power, raising questions about how diversity and contestation are treated.
5 Lowland Landscapes: extraction and conservation

This chapter narrows the focus of this research onto environmental politics and lowland Bolivia. It looks at how competing and inter-related discourses of natural resource extraction and conservation have shaped the landscapes and politics of the region. I argue that a focus on hydrocarbon extraction alongside protected area conservation is crucial for understanding contemporary political dynamics and emerging post-neoliberal environmental realities. I make this argument by examining two core claims being made of lowland landscapes and resources, those of extraction and conservation. Within these, I explore the diversity of actors and ideas that are involved in negotiating these claims. In this chapter, I first describe Bolivia’s diverse topography and rich resource wealth, which has shaped how communities and societies developed. I then provide an account of hydrocarbon extraction in the region, before doing the same for protected area conservation. I finish by questioning how the MAS have managed these competing claims to date, creating many of the questions of this thesis.

5.1 Topography and Landscape

Bolivia has an extremely diverse topography. The country’s landscapes range from over 6,000 metres above sea level, in the Andes, to less then 200 metres above sea level, in the plains of the Amazonian and Chacoan lowlands. The lowland region accounts for approximately two-thirds of the country and is less than 500 metres above sea level (USAID 2008:3). Bolivia’s varied topography produces wide variations in temperature and rainfall. The Andean Altiplano, a large and level plateau, has low temperatures and a desert climate. In contrast, the Amazonian lowlands of the North-east have hot temperatures and high rainfall (US Aid 2008:3). The Bolivian Amazon area covers approximately 36 percent of the country’s total land mass, around 39,886,400 hectares (Hindery 1997). It forms a part of Latin America’s
Amazon basin, which stretches across six Latin American countries - Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (see Map 1).

This topography has shaped Bolivia culturally and the evolution of Bolivian society is often linked to the country’s geography, particularly the divide between highland and lowland areas (Klein 1982: 3). For example, arable lands, mineral deposits and grazing zones meant that the majority of the early population settled in Bolivia’s Altiplano. Aymara kingdoms dominated highland areas from the twelfth century before the arrival of the Quechua-speaking Incas in the fifteenth century (Klein 1982: 20-21). Throughout this time lowland areas remained less accessible and largely unsettled, apart from isolated, semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers. In the early 1500s Spanish colonialists arrived into Bolivia, starting the country’s colonisation. This lasted until the region gained independence in 1826 (see Klein 1982). During colonial times, there was some cattle ranching and coca growing near La Paz. However, this frontier region was largely uninviting to the Spanish. To them, it was filled with hostile communities and was of secondary interest, having few settled agriculturalists and being without valuable metals (Klein 1982: 36). The Spanish conquerors thus also predominantly resided in the Western Andean region (ibid.).

It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the lowlands became a site of intensive economic development - the first attempt by a government to seriously engage and incorporate the lowlands since colonial times (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:101). Following the 1952 National Revolution, the MNR government focused on the territorial occupation of the Eastern Lowlands. They developed a new agriculture sector, financed with contributions from US foreign assistance, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (Humphreys-Bebbington, 2010:102). Between 1953 and 2003, large tracts of agricultural lands were distributed to state-supported elites, with over half the land being distributed in units of over 500 hectares. Although the MNR government was engaged in a programme of land reform in the highlands, as mentioned in the previous chapter, they did not attempt this in the lowlands. Under the 1953 Agrarian Reform Law, lowland indigenous groups were classified as ‘jungle groups’ (grupos...
selvaticos) and thus not considered for land reform (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:103). Instead, the large tracts of land given to elites by the government allowed for the consolidation of large farms and haciendas, with no recognition of lowland indigenous populations or their territories (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:103).

Large agro-export enterprises were encouraged with fiscal incentives, agrarian credits and road building. Sugar, cotton and cattle ranching became major industries, particularly in the Department of Santa Cruz (Webber 2012; Klein 1982; Balderrama 2002 in Valdivia 2010:69; Pena 2007 in Valdivia 2010:70). From the 1980s, neoliberal reforms, introduced in the previous chapter, intensified the growth of such large-scale agro-industry within the Department of Santa Cruz, mainly soybean and timber exports. Coupled with the decline of tin mining in the Andean region, the neoliberal reforms consolidated the eastern lowlands as the economic heartland of Bolivia (Hecht 2005; Klein 2011). New infrastructure accompanied the state’s land distribution and neoliberal reforms, particularly road building. This was central to the increased industrialisation of lowland areas but also to increased migration to the area (Ibisch 2005). For example, informal colonisation and migration to the Tropics increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Thousands of families migrated from Andean regions, with most cultivating coca (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:103). In terms of the contemporary socio-political context in the lowlands, the distribution of land to elites, the lack of rural reforms for indigenous groups and the increased in-migration of small-scale farmers contributed to uneven processes of development across the lowlands. The lowland region remains diverse, in terms of histories, livelihoods and development trajectories. For example, pockets of capitalist modernity exist alongside subsistence-led societies (Dunkerley 2007).

5.2 Natural Resource Extraction
The control over natural resources has been ‘one of the central issues in Latin American states and society formation’ (Taipa 2010 in Radhuber 2012:1870). Latin America has been a key site of extraction, starting with colonial demands on its resource wealth. For example, on 12th October 1482
Columbus reached the Americas. His conquest was followed by the ‘fervent extraction of resources’, particularly gold (Bebbington & Bury 2013:27-28). This marked the beginning of the extraction of substantial quantities of natural resources from Latin America. For example, between 1492 and 1810 approximately 1,685 metric tonnes of gold and 85,991 metric tonnes of silver were shipped from the region (Garner 1988; Bebbington & Bury 2013; TePaske, Kleine & Brown 1982 in Bebbington & Bury 2013:28). Bebbington and Bury argue that if converted into contemporary market value, this would be worth approximately 210 Billion US dollars (2013:30).

For over 400 years, the rich natural resource base of Bolivia has been a site of international interest and contestation. However, since the 1980’s it has been gas extraction that has dominated political and economic life in Bolivia (Kaup 2008; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:33). Bebbington and Bury (2013) identify a ‘super cycle’ of growth in mineral and gas production in Latin America, resulting from global and regional trends (Bebbington 2013; Radetski et al. 2008 in Bebbington & Bury 2013:38; Silver 2008). They assert that between 1998 and 2008 the rapid growth of this cycle, though geographically uneven, was ‘historically unprecedented in terms of its magnitude and velocity’ (Bebbington & Bury 2013:38). In the twenty first century, the focus has shifted to minerals and hydrocarbons. Global demand for these raw materials increased rapidly since 1990 and commodity prices have risen (Bebbington & Bury 2013:39). Concessions to extract minerals and hydrocarbons increased across Latin America between 1990 and 2010. This has led to new discoveries and operations (Bebbington & Bury 2013:47). For example, during this period an irregular network of ‘natural gas super-fields’ were discovered across Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia (Bebbington & Bury 2013:52).

These shifts connect to wider developments, particularly the growth of BRICS countries. These are emerging as rapidly developing economies that are transforming global trade and commerce (Bebbington & Bury 2013:39). They have become ‘the largest sources of demand for raw materials’ (ibid), with the percentage of global imports to developing and BRICS economies nearly doubling since 1971 (ibid). Bebbington and Bury (2013:52) argue that by the
late 2000s, Latin America was ‘rearticulated into global production networks (Bridge 2000). Perreault argues that the discovery of massive gas reserves in Bolivia in the late 1990s ‘overnight transformed Bolivia into a regional hydrocarbon power’ (2013:72).

Bolivia’s neoliberal capitalization project, introduced in the previous chapter, partially privatized the state’s oil and gas company YPFB (*Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos*). This was despite it performing well as a state-owned company (Kaup 2008). In the early 1990s, as the Bolivian government altered the political and economic regulations surrounding natural gas, transnational firms moved into the country and began to accrue windfall profits (Kaup 2008). The capitalization scheme substantially increased investment and exploration in the country’s natural gas sector and attempts to extract Bolivia’s natural gas escalated. Between 1997 and 2003 ‘proven and probable’ natural gas reserves increased from approximately 9.82 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) to 54.9 Tcf (Bolivian Ministry of Mining and Hydrocarbons, 2005 in Kaup 2008:1737). However, benefits to Bolivia were partial as private firms paid reduced royalties to the state (Hindery 2004). The percentage of state earnings provided by hydrocarbons dropped from ‘some 50 percent in the early 1990s to roughly 25 percent by 1999’ (Kohl 2002; Perreault 2013). These rates were so favourable to private firms that in 2003 the Bolivian branch of Spain’s Repsol and British-owned BP Amoco were benefitting from ‘the lowest operating costs for hydrocarbons exploration and production anywhere in the world’ (Perreault 2013:7; Hylton & Thomson 2005).

Materially, natural gas is particularly difficult. In its raw form it exists as a mixture of hydrocarbon gases. As a hydrocarbon it is highly flammable and as a gas it dissipates if not properly contained (Kaup 2008). Bolivia’s terrain, spanning mountain ranges and jungle, enhances these material difficulties but they must be overcome if gas is to be extracted, transported and processed (Kaup 2008:1736). Transnational firms have the finance and the technology required to master these inherent obstacles to natural gas extraction (ibid.), and their expertise was crucial to the development of the hydrocarbons industry in Bolivia. For example, according to the Bolivian Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy (2005), in 1996 investment rose from around
US$270 million to US$604 million. This was the first year after capitalization. By 2000, firms had invested close to US 2 billion dollars (Kohl & Farthing 2006).

Throughout the 2000s, Bolivia’s growing hydrocarbon industry generated huge profits, which had significant effects in wider society. The most important to note here is the subsequent outrage from Bolivian citizens, as they watched national resources being exported to benefit others through both profit and use. As previously mentioned, the expropriation of Bolivia’s natural wealth by transnational firms was a key rallying point social movements, such as during the Gas Wars and the election campaign of Evo Morales. The re-nationalisation of extractive industry was central to Morales’s election success and based on demands made during the 2003 Gas Wars (Kaup 2010:128). However, the country has remained dependent on foreign hydrocarbon firms. Some of them, such as Petrobras and Repsol YPF ‘are among the largest and most far-reaching energy firms in the world’ (Perreault 2013:72).

This scale of an extractive project demands infrastructure. In 2012, 23 percent of fiscal expenditure was invested in the extractive sector and an additional 37.4 percent was invested in infrastructure (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014:85). As previously noted, hydrocarbons are hard to reach and to transport (see Kaup 2008). Exploitation therefore demands wider infrastructure, such as roads. In Bolivia, road building has increased from an average of 113km per year during the 40 years before Morales took office, to 276 km a year in the first three years of his administration (Presedencia de la Bolivia Republica 2009 in Filho & Gonçalves 2010:187). Morales has come to support the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), a regional project to integrate highway networks, riverways, hydroelectric dams and telecommunications links throughout the continent to ‘allow greater trade and create a South American community of nations’ (IIRSA 2009). This infrastructure is significant for extractive industry and enables the exploitation and export of a greatly increased volume of primary commodities, namely minerals and hydrocarbons (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014:1).
The IIRSA initiative was launched in late 2000 by the 12 countries of South America which form the Union of South American Nations. It is being supported by the *Corporación Andina de Fomento* (CAF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the River Plate Basin Financial Development Fund (*Fonplata*). Together the 3 institutions form the Technical Coordination Committee (CCT), which provides technical and financial support for IIRSA activities. The IIRSA has divided South-America into ten ‘Integration and Development Axes’. These are the Amazon Axis; the Andean Axis; the Southern Andean Axis; the Axis of Capricorn; the Escudo Guianes Axis; the Paraguay-Paraná Waterway Axis; the Central Inter- Oceanic Axis; the Mercosur-Chile Axis; the Peru, Brazil, Bolivia Axis; the Southern Axes (IIRSA 2015). Taken together, all ten cover the whole sub-continent in an ambitious project to structure new infrastructure around natural resource wealth. This project ties to wider, global political shifts, namely the emerging economies of BRICS countries. China joined the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in 2009 and contributed 350 million US dollars, investing in this regional infrastructural expansion (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012:13).

5.3 Extraction and Social Welfare

During his election campaign, Morales was explicit about his intentions to rebuild a strong and active state using the profits from natural resource extraction. He has since committed to a model that exploits natural resources and uses the profits to develop social welfare programmes and improve life for the country’s poor (Filho & Gonçalves 2010:183; Fuentes 2012; Veltmeyer & Petras 2014:21). Extractive-led development has become the central development agenda of the state. For example, in his 2012 publication *The Geopolitics of the Amazon* (*Geopolitico del Amazonica*), Vice-President Linera writes that ‘Extractivism is not a goal in itself but it can be the starting point for overcoming it’ (Linera 2012:33). The issue is how the profits are used. For example, Linera argues that:

‘extractivism is a technical system of producing nature through labour, and can be present in pre-capitalist, capitalist or communitarian societies. Economic systems with greater or lesser justice…will only be possible
depending on how those technical systems are used, how the wealth thereby is produced and how it is managed (2003:33)’.

Bolivia’s economy is based mainly on natural gas exports (Radhuber 2012). Since his election, Morales has re-nationalised the hydrocarbons sector and recovered state ownership (Kaup 2010:126). His nationalization of hydrocarbons is known as the Heroes del Chaco decree, referring to a historic battle between Bolivia and Chile (Perreault 2013:80). Article Four of the decree indicated that operations in the largest gas deposits ‘will be subject to an 82 percent taxation rate, with the remaining 18 percent staying with the firms’ (ibid). Morales has increased gas prices and rents, thereby increasing the state budget from 15.137 million US dollars in 2005 to 18.215 million US dollars in 2009 (Radhuber 2012:173). Between 2006 and 2010, total revenues from gas production increased from 2,905 million US dollars to 10,641 million US dollars (ibid.). Bolivia has increased its dependence on primary exports to become the most natural resource-dependent country in Latin America (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014:84).

The MAS state has pledged to spend the increased revenues from extraction on new social welfare projects, to finance multiple social policies that have been started and expanded since the election of Morales and ‘are flagships for Morales’ political agenda’ (Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012:104). This ‘relationship of dependency’ between extraction and the state budget has caused increased extraction in areas where it has been occurring for decades, as well as the ‘expansion of the extractive frontier to new locations known as ‘non-traditional’ areas’ (Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012:104). It is difficult to get a clear picture of how this new budget has been spent and who benefits. Departments and municipalities have experienced increased incomes since the election of Morales, from 4.4 percent and 7.2 percent of the total budget respectively, in 2005 to 6.2 percent and 7.8 percent in 2012 (Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012:108). Hydrocarbon revenues also fund specific social projects, including pensions and conditional cash transfers. There are three central programmes, firstly a cash transfer scheme for school age children, the Juan Pinto programme, which reaches over a million people. Secondly, there is the Bono Juana Azurdy, a scheme for pregnant women and nursing mothers
Thirdly, there is a cash transfer programme for the elderly, the *Renta Dignidad* (Dignity Pension) that provides an unconditional cash transfer to those over 60 (Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012; Riggirozzi 2010). The *renta dignidad* is a revised pension scheme, improving on the *Bonosol* pension scheme set up by the previous government (Müller 2009). It is the only non-contributory pension of its sort in Latin America and targets one of the country’s most vulnerable groups (Müller 2009; Riggirozzi 2012). This scheme is part of the government’s aims to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on poverty reduction (Müller 2009).

Despite the successes of these schemes, there remain questions about ‘coverage, impact and implementation’ (Riggirozzi 2010:75 see also Goodale & Postero 2013). Moreover, these redistributive policies do not reflect ‘serious commitment’ to the diversified economic model described in the Constitution (Radhuber 2012). This promised to promote community-based organizational forms of economic activity, as well as ‘decolonizing’ the economy and moving from the export of primary goods to a diversified economic base that includes communitarian forms (Radhuber 2012; Filho & Gonçalves 2010). Radhuber ascribes the absence of these initiatives to ‘a lack of administrative capacity and ongoing corruption’ (2012:174). She further argues that the control and distribution of royalties from this sector is highly centralised, with minimal contribution to activities that directly support indigenous groups. She argues that this centralization is important as ‘the control over financial resources is always about redistributing political power’ (2012:181). This means that the benefits of this new state model are being experienced differently by different groups and that social policies may be used in support of the state’s agendas.

Of interest here are the social and environmental problems that this extractive-led project is causing.

Examining the role that communities and local stakeholders have in negotiating these changes is one way to determine who they benefit. It is remote, rural communities that are at the leading edge of this extractive frontier (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014:1). In Bolivia, these rural communities are negotiating promises of radical new political powers and an intensifying extractive agenda. The increasing commitment to extraction has been
reviewed as contributing to structural changes in Bolivia that have facilitated ‘the indigenous community’s participation in economic, political and cultural life’ (Riggirozzi 2010:75). However, they are a controversial dimension of Bolivia’s post-neoliberal project and critics have considered a number of problematic dimensions. Firstly, the country’s ability to make a meaningful break from neoliberalism has been questioned, in terms of the states continuing relationship with global markets and capital. The renationalisation of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon industry was a renegotiation with foreign corporations rather than a break from them, as Bolivia simply does not have the enormous capital needed for oil and gas exploration, exploitation and distribution (Goodale & Postero 2013). The state is therefore engaging with the corporations and mechanics of global capitalism, despite concerns about the inherent vulnerability of being dependent on resource extraction and the ability of the state to manage the powerful corporations and coalitions that surround it (Kaup 2010; Veltmeyer & Petras 2014; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Bebbington 2008b). If the state prioritises the demands of markets over the needs of its citizens, it will not be responding to the experiences and critiques of neoliberalism in Bolivia. Secondly, the state must be able to hold companies accountable for the environmental and social impacts of their operations (see Veltmeyer and Petras 2014:27). The MAS and YPFB work in partnership with large energy companies, such as Petrobras and Repsol, and must be able to negotiate and gain from these partnerships. Thirdly, a commitment to extraction has consequences for Bolivia’s wider post-neoliberal rhetoric, for example its commitment to new forms of democracy and self-governance (see Bebbington & Humphrey-Bebbington 2012; Gudynas 2013; Canessa 2014).

There have already been instances were local groups have contested and challenged projects in their area. In the case of the Guarani in the TCO Itika Guasu, challenging extraction was difficult. Their objections were pitched as against the national interest, at a time when extractive industry had tremendous levels of support. The Guarani originally opposed extraction but found themselves without allies. The government presented extraction as a national project that was essential to the wellbeing and wealth of the whole
country, and eventually the Guarani dropped their opposition (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:120).

The environmental degradation caused by extraction has also been a site of conflict for the Guarani in Tarija. In 2010 they campaigned for an ‘environmental pause’, to allow companies to clean up the contamination caused by previous extractive activity and to provide time for a full environmental review of the environmental impacts that extraction had wrought (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:248-249). When the state did not comply, the Guarani leadership of the TCO Itika Guasu wrote a public letter to President Evo Morales. In the letter they expressed their:

‘…deep disappointment with the actions of members of your government and your own behaviour, and our sorrow at finding ourselves (as indigenous communities) abandoned and lacking any kind of support’ (quoted in Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:249).

This statement signals the need for more research into the environmental consequences brought about by a progressive extractivist state, in terms of the environmental dimensions of such conflicts. Moreover, it suggests that the new extractive project of the MAS is not managing to overcome the historical experiences of extraction in Bolivia, which have ‘been marked by episodes of environmental degradation, unresolved environmental liabilities, little local development and varying success of the state in appropriating the rents generated by companies operating in the hydrocarbons sector’ (Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012:106).

Pellegrini and Arismendi argue that a paradox remains in the new project of the MAS, namely that the harvesting of non-renewable resources is accompanied by ‘local socio-economic distress’ (2012:108 see also Bridge 2004; Gudynas 2012). For example, North of La Paz there has been a more recent conflict over an oil exploration project, named Lliquimuni. Oil activities were planned from 2007 for the Lliquimuni block, which is just outside the buffer zone of two protected areas, the Pilon Lajas Reserve and the Madidi National Park. It also overlaps with the indigenous territories of the Mostene, Chimane and Leco groups (Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012). The crossover with
indigenous territories has created sites of conflict, as the government did not consult with indigenous groups first, as required by law. Moreover, the governments consultation practices, when they did happen, have been blamed for disregarding indigenous organisations and decision-making structures. These have, in turn, been blamed for dividing communities. Compensation, when offered, has been described as ‘functional to weaken local resistance’ (Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012:111).

Extractive industry changes ‘the distribution of access to and social control over land, water and forests in way that reduce or circumscribe the access of certain groups and enhance the access of others’ (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:31). It therefore has significant political implications, in terms of who can access and benefit from natural resources and in what ways. Recent field research by Denise Humphreys-Bebbington argued that four years of a post-neoliberal indigenous government ‘finally succeeded in building bridges with national and transnational capital, while souring its relations with indigenous organisations’ (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:250). Moreover, her research concluded that the MAS commitment to redistribution and economic diversification was real, whilst their commitments to the environment were consistently ‘secondary and vague’ (Humphries-Bebbington 2010). These findings provided one of the starting points of this research and alongside the examples above, show that more research is needed into the uneasy relationship between the post-neoliberal and extractive projects.

5.4 Protected Area Conservation

Bolivia’s recent political history has generated an extensive and engaged body of literature, for example exploring developing notions of citizenship and democracy (see Kohl & Farthing 2006; Cott 2005; Regalsky 2010; R Andolina et al. 2005; Escobar 2010; Canessa 2014; Dunkerley 2007; Filho & Gonçalves 2010; Grisaffi 2010; Postero 2010; Postero 2005; Webber 2008a; Webber 2008b; Webber 2008c). However, despite the country’s significant ecological diversity, strong state environmental rhetoric and the presence of a number of the world’s largest conservation NGOs, there is a significantly smaller literature focused on conservation and environmental issues in Bolivia.
Notable exceptions include work on the political ecology of extraction (see Bebbington, Humphrey Bebbington, et al. 2008; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010; Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011; Hindery 2013b; Perreault & Valdivia 2010; Perreault 2008; Perreault 2013; Kaup 2008; Kaup 2009) and a small body of important work on lowland, rainforest areas (Hecht 2011; Hecht 2005; Ibisch 2005; Winiger 1998; Kaimowitz et al. 1999; Pacheco 2004; Pacheco 2006). Nevertheless, the realities of Pachamama and protected area conservation remain under-explored.

Bolivia’s topographical and climatic range gives it nearly unmatched levels of ecosystem diversity and the world’s biggest conservation NGOs have labelled the country ‘mega-diverse’ (USAID 2008:v-vi). In terms of species and ecosystem diversity, biological inventories indicate that Bolivia has more than 20,000 species of plants, 356 species of mammals, approximately 1,400 species of birds, 266 species of reptiles, 203 species of amphibians, and 550 species of fish (SERNAP 2010). The ecosystems with the highest species diversity in Bolivia are in the Yungas, foothills of the Andes that run into Amazon areas, and Sub-Andean Amazonian Forests (Bosques Amazónicos Subandinos) ecosystems. These are found along the north-eastern slopes of the Andes, from the Peruvian border south-east to Santa Cruz (Araujo et al. 2005) (see Map 2). Bolivia also includes four major biomes: tropical forests (544,660 km2, covering approximately 49 percent of the total surface area); high Andean grassland plains (324,932 km2; 30 percent), savannahs (218,196 km2; covering approximately 20 percent of total land area) and wetlands (11,193 km2; covering approximately 1 percent of total land area) (Government of Bolivia, 2001 quoted in USAID 2008:v-vi). The large expanse of tropical forests spans the departments of Beni, Santa Cruz and Pando, and northern areas of La Paz and Cochabamba (see Map 2) (USAID 2008:v-3).

To date, protected area conservation has been the primary conservation mechanism practiced in Bolivia, promoted by the state, international conservation NGOs and national level NGOs (Ibisch 2005). Bolivia’s first national protected area was created in 1939, when the Sajama National Park was created to protect the Kenua forests. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, more national parks were created and managed under the authority of
the central government, totalling 6,872,600 hectares of land. However, until
the 1990s there was no institutional framework created specifically for
conservation or to govern the parks. Existing laws were applied to park
management, for example the *Law of Wild Life, National Parks, Hunting and
Fishing*. In the 1990s, these were developed to create a specific conservation
agenda and framework (*Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua* 2012:10).

In lowland areas in the 1990s, the increasing industrialisation and intensive
exploitation of natural resources, as introduced in the previous chapter,
generated deforestation. For example, rates of deforestation rapidly increased
around Santa Cruz, due to intensified soybean agriculture, cattle ranching and
timber production (Pacheco 1998; Perz et al. 2005). The presence or absence
of roads was also important, in terms of the deforestation levels. The paving
of highways has been shown to be a major factor in deforestation, as it has
opened up new areas to farmers and loggers (Davidson et al. 2012; Soares-
Filho et al. 2006). They have been identified as a key issue for conservation in
the country. This is because the uneven and limited road network has
unintentionally conserved large tracts of land (Ibisch 2005). Bolivia previously
recorded some of the lowest levels of deforestation in Latin America, yet the
expansion of agri-business and paved highways increased levels at an
alarming rate (Soares-Filho et al. 2006). Between the mid 1980s and the mid
1990s the national deforestation rate increased by 200 percent (CUMAT 1992
and Pacheco 1997 in Ibisch 2005:57). By the mid-1990s, deforestation rates
were the most rapid in Latin America as regional integration and technological
change took hold (Hecht 2005:375).

Deforestation rates have since risen at a rapid speed, as lowland areas have
been developed as an agro-industrial frontier (Hecht 2005; Soares-Filho et al.
2006). International conservation NGOs placed the Bolivian Amazon at the
top of their global priority lists in the 1990s and identified the Bolivian Amazon
as a ‘hotspot’ for the global conservation agenda (CI 1993 in Hecht 2005:377;
Pacheco 2003 in Hecht 2005:377). International responses concentrated on
‘set-asides’, namely that protected areas were created and managed as part
of national patrimony. In this way, they worked with the government to protect
parts of lowland Bolivia.
During this period, the conservation agenda was supported by President Sanchez de Lozada. At the time, his daughter, Anna Sanchez de Lozada, worked for the Ministry of Environment and Water. She wrote about the country’s commitments to the environment in a book chapter for ‘Biodiversity: A Challenge for Development Research’ (Winiger 2001). In it, she is clear that the country was committed to sustainable development, with the goal to ‘profoundly change the prevailing tendency toward environmental degradation and wasteful use of natural resources, and to improve the country’s standard of living’ (Sanchez de Lozada 2001:371). This commitment was reflected in the creation of new government ministries. The Ministry of Sustainable Development and the Environment was created in 1993. The National Biodiversity Directorate was established in 1994, later split into two institutions, a General Directorate for Biodiversity and SERNAP, the National Service of Protected Areas. Whilst the General Directorate for Biodiversity has weakened with age, support from international donors has strengthened SERNAP, which still manages Bolivia’s protected areas (Ibisch 2005). The SERNAP system is the youngest protected areas system in Latin America (Miranda & Vadillo 2012).

The country’s protected areas fall under the jurisdiction of the Vice-ministry for the Environment, Biodiversity, Climate Change and Forest Management and Development (VMA). However, the laws and policy for protected areas, biodiversity corridors and special ecosystems, as well as issues of sustainable use and balancing the conservation and protection of the environment with the development and economic aims of the communities linked to protected areas, is done by the Directive of Biodiversity and Protected Areas (DGBAP). The VMA created the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP), to oversee the management of the country’s protected areas. Their operational body is the National Service of Protected Areas (SERNAP), who manage the protected areas day-to-day (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua 2012:8).

The creation of SNAP accompanied the enactment of Law 133, which defines protected areas as:

> ‘..natural areas with or without human intervention, where the purpose is to protect and conserve the flora, fauna, genetic resources, natural ecosystems,
Throughout the 1990s, Bolivia’s conservation policy and practice expanded. The number of protected areas increased and they became the central conservation strategy of the country. Importantly, all state conservation efforts were focused on lowland areas (Ibisch 2005; Soares-Filho et al. 2006; PIEB 2012). In the 1980s, Bolivia had three national protected areas - the Isiboro Secure, what is now Noel Kempff and Amboro (Ibisch 2005:60). By the 2000s, there were 22 national protected areas. These cover almost 20 percent of national territory, with most located in the lowland, Amazon region (PIEB 2012) (see Map 3). In a 2012 state review of protected areas in Bolivia, the Ministry for the Environment and Water counted 22 national protected areas, 25 departmental protected areas and 83 municipal protected areas, totalling 130 protected areas that cover 23 percent of national territory (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua 2012:8). The protected areas that span the Vilcabamba-Amboró Corridor are thought to contain the most significant levels of biodiversity. This corridor includes Manuripi through Madidi, Apolobamba, Pilón Lajas, Cotapata, Isiboro Sécure, Carrasco, and Amboró (see Map 3). (USAID 2008:6).

Bolivia’s increasing commitments to protected area conservation echoed wider trends in conservation. For example, conservation initiatives increased in Bolivia following the 1992 World Conservation Congress. The National Directorate for the Conservation of Biodiversity (NDCB) was created in 1992, aiming to create a ‘normative framework based on national priorities and international agreements and commitments’ (Sanchez de Lozada 2001:372). This meant ‘the enforcement of international agreements on conservation such as: the Convention on Biodiversity, CITES, the Ramsar Convention, the Natural Patrimony and Cultural Convention, the Decisions of the Cartagena Agreement, the Amazon Treaty and others’ (Sanchez de Lozada 2001:372-373). Following the 1992 World Conservation Congress, the Bolivian state enacted new environmental legislation and new government institutions.
During this period the conservation agenda of international conservation institutions was echoed in the development of Bolivian conservation. For example, the suite of laws enacted to support the creation and management of protected areas. These were all influenced by international agreements, primarily the 1992 Convention of Biodiversity (PIEB 2012).

Bolivian protected areas have also received help and funding from external sources, particularly international NGOs and development funders. For example, between 1999 and 2011, the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), a federal enterprise that supports the German government, funded research on the sub-national protected areas of Bolivia (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Agua 2012:9). The 2008 USAID Country Report delineates ties to Bolivia’s protected areas system. They refer to market-like payments schemes for conserving hydrological services that have been developed in municipalities bordering Amboró National Park (USAID 2008:vi). This provides an example of the ties between wider development and conservation networks and national conservation agendas.

Interestingly, before the election of Evo Morales in 2005, Bolivia was developing projects that were routed in the green economy and tied to some of the world’s largest development institutions, namely USAID, the World Bank and the UN. For example, USAID writes that Bolivia has ‘gained valuable field experience in monitoring and developing baseline conditions for carbon sequestration projects through the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from the Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project, which will serve the country well as it moves forward with the implementation of REDD’ (USAID 2008:vi). Even after the election of Morales, USAID reported that ‘the World Bank is setting up a $300 million Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), which would pilot test schemes for reducing emissions from avoided deforestation’ (2008). Bolivia was one of five countries in Latin America, and only 14 worldwide, selected in July 2008 to receive funding from the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) ‘to pilot test schemes for reducing emissions from avoided deforestation.’ They predicted that ‘negotiations in 2008 and 2009 will lead to the REDD mechanism becoming operational under a post-Kyoto framework after 2012.’ (USAID 2008:19).
Although not the focus of this research, this raises additional questions about the realities of the green economy within Bolivia, despite government rhetoric.

5.5 Parks and People
As introduced in Chapter 2, the role for people in protected areas, and conservation more widely, sparks continuing debate. In Bolivia, indigeneity has provided a discursive and political space in which people and conservation have been brought together. For example, during the 1990 Lowland March for Territory and Dignity protesters mobilized indigenous identity to oppose the deforestation of their territories and to demand better protection from the state. At this point there was a middle ground, or overlap, between the objectives of both rural communities and conservationists, echoing wider trends that aligned indigeneity to wilderness conservation (see Conklin & Graham 1995). The march coincided with the state’s developing conservation agenda, feeding into the policy framework that was emerging in the 1990s. In some cases, such as the Isiboro Secure National Park, the creation of indigenous territories conflicted with an area that had already been demarcated as a protected area (PIEB 2012). In this instance, the state recognized indigenous territories within the existing framework of protected area conservation and created a system of co-management. This worked within a discourse where lowland indigenous identity was tied to territorial rights and conservation strategies. The Isiboro Secure National Park, for example, subsequently became the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS).

Bolivia has 22 national-level protected areas and one of these is also an indigenous territory (TIPNIS), another is a TCO (Pillon Lajas) and a further 10 have ‘integrated management’ (Manejo Integrado), meaning communities live within the parks (SERNAP 2015). In these cases, Management Committees were created to ensure that local landholders participated in the management of protected areas. These Management Committees were comprised of representatives from the respective communities and other key local sectors, including indigenous peoples, peasant communities, municipalities, public institutions, NGOs and members of the Ministry for Sustainable Development.
and Environment (Sanchez de Lozada 2001:375). By 2001, eight committees had been established and three more were in the process of being established (ibid). This co-management is reflected in the five strategic aims of SERNAP, which include both biological and cultural considerations. They are:

1. To preserve national natural and cultural patrimony;
2. To develop sustainable social economy;
3. To manage the participation of communities in the management of protected areas;
4. The strengthening of management capacity of relevant actors; to link with political administration (institutional organizational and territorial); and
5. The sustainable management of finances (PIEB 2012:8).

5.6 Conservation and the MAS
How the MAS negotiate these two claims on lowland environments, namely extraction and conservation, is a subject of this thesis. To date, the government’s attitude to conservation appears conflictive. In state documentation the MAS support the existing conservation strategy of Bolivia, namely protected areas. For example, in the preface to a 2012 publication by the Ministry for the Environment and Water President Morales writes in support of the Ministry and about his approach to nature. He writes:

‘Culture emerges from the interaction between community and nature, from this unity comes what it is to be human, explained in the cosmic vision of ‘land that thinks’. From this perspective nature is conceived as outside of the community, that cannot be confused with the concept of environment, such that is presented for who does not recognise cultural history and does not belong to it. So Vivir Bien is providing in a large sense the natural patrimony that Mother Earth hosts, that will only be possible if based on the ‘equilibrium and harmony’ between the community/society and nature’ (2012:3)

In 2012 the state enacted a new piece of environmental legislation, the **Law of the Rights of Mother Earth (Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra)**. This was
first proposed by the Bolivian Climate Change Platform (*Plataforma Boliviana frente al Cambio Climatico*), a coalition of indigenous political organisations and NGOs. The law allocated rights to nature in an attempt to create a non-market-based mechanism with which to combat climate change. However, this law was adjusted by the state, to ensure that the rights of Mother Earth do not apply to resources that are underground, thereby facilitating extraction. There are clear tensions and sites of divergence between the Bolivian state’s commitment to protected area conservation and to extractive-led development. These are evident in the quote below, from Vice-President Linera:

‘We are going to construct highways, we will drill wells, we will industrialize our country preserving our resources in consultation with the people, but we need resources to generate development, for education, transport and the health of our people. We are not going to turn ourselves into park rangers for the powers of the North, who live happily, while we continue in poverty’ (in Erbol 2010).

These divergent discourses need to be unpacked and explored.

### 5.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have focused on lowland Bolivia and two competing claims being made of its landscapes and resources – hydrocarbon extraction and conservation. Bolivia’s lowland region has been shaped by global, regional and national demands for extraction as well as multi-scaled conservation priorities. This chapter has shown that the environmental rhetoric of Morales and the MAS has been accompanied by a commitment to hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. In fact, Bolivia has increased its dependence on primary exports to become the most natural resource-dependent country in Latin America (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014:84).

In this context, it is important to question how existing conservation mechanisms are treated, engaged with and negotiated. This chapter has set out Bolivia’s recent conservation goals, focusing on the establishment of protected areas across lowland areas. It has also discussed existing commitments to local inhabitants, outlining the agreements and management
plans that were created between indigenous groups and the Ministry for Sustainable Development and Environment.

What remains unclear is how Morales’ post-neoliberal regime, encompassing both a commitment to hydrocarbon extraction and a renewed commitment to environmental issues, will impact or change existing conservation strategies. More widely, extraction has significant political implications, in terms of who can access and benefit from natural resources and in what ways. The previous chapter outlined existing tensions between the state and its citizens around extraction. This chapter has further stressed the need to research about how indigeneity, extraction and conservation currently collide. To do this, I will focus on the struggle over the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS), a conflict that encompasses issues of indigenous territorial rights, extraction and conservation. This is introduced in the following chapter.
The government of Evo Morales came to power in 2005, promising alternative, radical politics. These promises were partly legitimized by their support of social movements, for example their proposals for a social movement-led government as a route to progressive, people-led politics (see Linera 2012). More widely, Bolivia’s radical, post-neoliberal politics have been set out in the 2009 Constitution. This sets out a range of new political and territorial rights, for example through increased indigenous autonomy and a new guiding ideology for the state, namely vivir bien. In this chapter I look carefully at key moments in the TIPNIS protest timeline, to see how it has engaged this new political discourse. I argue that this timeline is revealing, in terms of better understanding how post-neoliberal rhetoric translates into practice. This is partly because it illuminates the views that are becoming marginalized in this new political project. This chapter shows that the TIPNIS opposition were repeatedly undermined, allowing us to better understand the post-neoliberal project by focusing on those it excludes.

In the first part of this chapter, I introduce the TIPNIS dispute in more detail, carefully outlining key stages of the conflict over the road. In doing so, I raise concerns about the political spaces open to groups who oppose the government’s developmental agenda, namely their extractive project. I argue that the TIPNIS dispute is a story of marginalization, evident from attempts by the state to side-line and undermine their opposition. I argue that the original dispute over the road grew to encompass broader grievances and sites of struggle. For example, it developed into a protest against the perceived disregard for both old and new political and territorial rights. It was, therefore, more than opposition to a road; rather the TIPNIS was a struggle to define the reach and power of the state and to negotiate the rate and pace of development. I make this argument by looking at the beginnings of the dispute, the early rhetoric of both the state and TIPNIS leaders and the formation of a
TIPNIS opposition. I examine the state’s treatment of the protest marches, highlighting incidences of violence and moments of confusion over policy and legislation.

In the second section of the chapter, I concentrate on the theme of development as an intentional project (Cowen & Shenton 1996). I examine how competing narratives of development are being promoted and used, by both the state and by members of the TIPNIS opposition. I argue that the TIPNIS opposition does not indicate unshakeable opposition to change, rather the lack of opportunity to negotiate and define its terms. I consider this in light of *vivir bien*, to better define how this rhetoric is translating into practice. This chapter considers development in two ways: firstly, as an immanent process of extractive-led development that underpins the actions of the state; and secondly as an intentional project that is contested and conflictive.

6.1 Protest and Negotiation

In May 2010, the Bolivian national press reported that the government had started building a road that was planned to run from Villa Tunari, in the Department of Cochabamba, to San Ignacio de Moxos, in the Department of Beni (Cambio 2010) (see Map 4). What followed was months of coverage in the national media, as the road was routed to run through one of Bolivia’s oldest protected areas and earliest indigenous territories – the Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS). Moreover, the road had been rejected by TIPNIS communities, by their elected leaders and representative political organisations (Bautista et al 2012). Although there was no meeting between TIPNIS communities and the government about the road, the media reported a brewing conflict between the state and the TIPNIS. At first, Morales appeared dismissive of the opposition. For example, a report in the national newspaper *Cambio* quoted President Morales as saying:

*I want to say, to warn the department of Cochabamba, that sadly some small groups, once brothers, oppose the construction of the Cochabamba-Beni road – to which, as you know, the national government has guaranteed economic resources for its construction* (Cambio 13 May 2010).
This quote not only suggests that the government continues to support the road, through the term ‘guaranteed’, but also reveals one of the key tensions of the dispute – that it was members of Morales’ indigenous support base that were opposing him and demanding better treatment. In the same article, Morales was reported as confirming that the government would ‘persuade’ the opposition to support the road, so as not to harm its long-awaited construction (Cambio 13 May 2010).

Reports in the press also depicted the growing dispute as one that pitched development against the environment. In the same article referenced above, the then President of the TIPNIS, Adolfo Moyo, is quoted as opposing the road on the grounds that it will pass through virgin forest and affect the most bio-diverse part of the park. He is quoted below, reaching out to the government:

'(I ask them to)...put into practice respect of Mother Earth (Madre Tierra), of biodiversity and the rights of indigenous pueblos that are recognised in the constitution and to stop all building works for the road' (Cambio 13 May 2010).

During the same period, the press reported Morales’ commitment to extractive-led development. They reported him as condemning his opposition for being influenced by the meddling interference of foreign NGOs. For example, he was quoted as denouncing NGOs for ‘using some leaders’ to oppose exploration in some areas of the country that had pools of hydrocarbons, for example in the Amazon. Instead, Morales tied extraction to the national interest and issues of development. He is quoted as denouncing the supposed ties between the TIPNIS opposition and international NGOs, saying:

‘in other words, (foreign NGOs are saying) that the Bolivian people will not have money, will not have IDH (Human Development Index)....will not have the Renta Dignidad (Pension Scheme)’ (La Prensa 16 May 2010).

The media continued to report the TIPNIS opposition to the road. However, the state remained publically committed to it. In June 2010, President Morales was reported in La Razon, a national newspaper, as not backing down. The
quote below shows that he remained dismissive of the opposition and committed to building the road. He said:

‘I want to say to the alleged defenders of the environment that whether you want it or do not want it, we are going to build this road and in our term we are going to complete this route between Villa Tunari and San Ignacio de Moxos’ (La Razon 30 June).

The national press continued to report that TIPNIS leaders wanted a meeting with the government. Adolfo Moyo, then President of the TIPNIS, was reported in May 2010, when road building began, requesting dialogue with the state. He had initially requested a meeting with Patricia Ballivián, the President of the Bolivia Roads Administration (ABC - la Administradora Boliviana de Carreteras). When that meeting failed to materialise, he requested a meeting with President Evo Morales. He said:

‘Today we still have had no discussion with ABC, and neither with the Minister of Public Works (el Ministro de Obras Públicas). Because of this we have decided to request an audience with the President, so that he can listen to us and so we can make him listen to what we want to say’ (Cambio 27 May 2010).

What these exchanges in the press demonstrate is that opposition to the road was initially rejected by the state and that TIPNIS resistance was disregarded. The TIPNIS leaders stated to the press that if the government did not stop the road, the people of the TIPNIS would march. Meetings between the TIPNIS and the government did not materialise and there was no dialogue between community leaders and the President or members of his government.

By August 2011, no meeting had been arranged and a protest march against the road began. The marchers left Trinidad, in Beni, on 15th August 2011 and climbed approximately 4000m in altitude to reach La Paz (CONAMAQ et al 2012). Approximately 1,700 protesters set out from the lowlands on a march titled ‘In Defence of the TIPNIS, Territory, Life, Dignity and the Rights of Indigenous Pueblos’ (‘Gran Marcha Indigena por la Defensa del TIPNIS, los Territorios, la Vida y la Dignidad y los Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas’). They began marching to La Paz from Trinidad, approximately 370 miles away
It was titled as the Eighth March, as it was the eighth time that lowland indigenous organisations had marched to La Paz to negotiate with the state. The march was led by the TIPNIS governing authorities and by leaders of CIDOB, the umbrella organisation for lowland indigenous groups. Other lowland indigenous groups also marched, for example Guarani leaders from Tarija. Their support was also given in writing and the TIPNIS march received signed and stamped expressions of support from indigenous councils from the Guarani of Santa Cruz and the Ayorea, as well as indigenous council from the lowland department of Tarija (see Appendix 2). They also received written support from the Federation of Bolivian Miners (Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia) (see Appendix 3). This broader support for the TIPNIS protesters shows the scale of the dispute and its importance. The TIPNIS conflict was creating divides and cracks in the indigenous support base of the MAS. This support for the marchers also introduces a key argument of this thesis – that this dispute engaged and tested wider issues related to indigeneity, rights and resources.

The protesters carried an extensive list of demands, organised into 15 themes including the themes of protected areas, forests, development and education. These can be found in full in Appendix 2. The first theme was the TIPNIS, for which there were four central demands. These are listed below:

1. ‘We reject the construction of the Villa Tunari-San Ignaci de Moxos road, which affects the TIPNIS territory, as well as the TIM (Multi-ethnic Indigenous Territory) and TIMI (Mojeno Ignaciano Indigenous Territory)’ (Both TIM and TIMI are neighbouring territories to the TIPNIS)

2. (We demand) The immediate end of the:
   
i) Environmental study related to the road
   
ii) All works and activities related to the construction of the road
   
ii) And the immediate exit of all machines, camps and personnel who entered to work on the road
3. (We demand) the appeal and annulment of all laws and legislation created for the construction of the road (see Appendix 2).

These three demands were supplemented by a fourth, more general point. This sought assurance that no further encroachment into the park be permitted past the Red Line (Linea Roja) that separated the TIPNIS from coca-growing settlers (see Appendix 2).

The march was reported in the national media and in some international press, for example the BBC. Solidarity was expressed across Bolivia, for instance when the marchers arrived in La Paz, they were met by a large number of supporters lining the streets, offering food and support. In interviews, leaders told me that the march was funded by public donations. At this stage, a letter was written to President Morales on behalf of a number of international NGOs. They requested that he recognise the rights held by the Mojenos, Trinitarios and Yuracures (CONAMAQ et al 2012). My fieldwork notes also remarked on the widespread evidence of support for the issue. For example, I entered Bolivia overland from Argentina. The first city I stopped in was Tarija, over 800km south-east of La Paz. I noted graffiti I observed graffiti in support of the TIPNIS, noted in my fieldwork diary:

‘As we came in on the bus I saw some graffiti saying ‘Justice and Liberty for the TIPNIS’, so the issue has made it this far South’
(Fieldwork diary 27 October 2012)

Graffiti also marked the streets of La Paz (see Photographs 1&2). When I visited the houses of new friends made in La Paz, I saw posters on their walls saying ‘Todos Somos TIPNIS’ – ‘We are all the TIPNIS’. The point here is that the TIPNIS dispute engaged large numbers of the public and played out in the public arena, testing and defining the new post-neoliberal state.

6.2 State violence

One reason that the marchers were greeted by such support in La Paz was that during the Eighth March, on Sunday 25 September 2011, the national police had waited for the marchers in Chaparina, a small town in the Beni lowlands. The police attempted to stop the march, using violence against
protesters. The police detained a number of marchers, whilst trying to stop
the march. Seventy marchers were reported wounded. The incident was
reported in the national media, which included photographs taken by some of
the marchers (see Photographs 3&4). It was also reported in some
international media. For example, it was reported in some of the UK press,
namely the Guardian newspaper and Bolivia-focused blogs, such as the
Bolivian Information Forum, and online magazines that focus on Latin
America, such as NACLA (see Phillips 2011). The violence broadened
awareness of the TIPNIS protest and ‘sparked both a national political crisis
and debate about the validity of the government’s credentials as a progressive
government that supports indigenous rights’ (McNeish 2013:221).

In Bolivia, the incident at Chaparina caused public outcry and condemnation.
Solidarity protests were held in the country’s main cities. President Morales’
status as a global champion for indigenous rights was publicly questioned. For
example, Xavier Albo, a Spanish anthropologist and political commentator
who now lives in Bolivia, likened the violence to the repression of an
indigenous march in 1985. He argued that the Morales government had
deliberately sought to dismantle a peaceful protest and linked it to Bolivia’s
previous and much criticized regimes (La Razon 2013). The incident thus
threatened the legitimacy of the MAS government, as it undermined their
claims as being a people-led, radical new indigenous government.

The intervention at Chaparina remains steeped in controversy. President
Morales denied giving the order for the intervention. Morales, Vice-President
Linera and (then) Minister of Government Sacha Llorenti were excluded from
the official federal prosecutors’ investigation (Achtenburg 2013). Four high-
level government officials resigned over the incident, including former defence
minister, Cecelia Chacon. She testified that Morales and Linera monitored the
events at Chaparina as they occurred. She questioned how they could not
have known, considering that military planes, trucks and buses were used to
transport detainees (Achtenburg 2013).

In October 2010, the Human Rights Ombudsman, Rolando Villena, published
a report that held Llorenti responsible for ordering the attack. However,
Morales and Llorenti have refuted this claim and denounced it as ‘an attack from the right’, despite Morales having appointed Villena as Human Rights Ombudsman in 2010. Sacha Llorenti subsequently resigned from government, although he was subsequently appointed Bolivia’s UN ambassador in 2012.

There remains a campaign to force an investigation into his role in Chaparina. For example, in August 2013 lowland indigenous leaders submitted a petition with over 5,000 signatures requesting that Llorenti be included in the investigation. In March 2013, the leader of CIDOB, Adolfo Chavez and the President of the TIPNIS, Fernando Vargas, travelled to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) in Washington DC. As Bolivia is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), the IACHR has jurisdiction over human rights complaints filed by its citizens. Chavez and Vargas presented their case about the TIPNIS, focusing on the lack of prior and informed consent before road building began and the violence at Chaparina. Although the IACHR did not reach a final ruling, following the hearing Morales announced Bolivia would leave the OAS.

In my interviews, the incident was mentioned. TIPNIS protest leaders were still fighting for the confrontation to be addressed in the courts and for someone to be brought to trial. For the interviewees who discussed Chaparina, a lack of a conviction was testament to the government’s lack of consideration for their wellbeing or needs. A quote from one of the interviews is below:

“I was one of the marchers on the Eighth March…when we got to Chaparina we were put in handcuffs and punched. I lost a baby at 2 months pregnant. …it was serious, both marches were very serious and came of nothing because the government does not want dialogue with us…” (TL2).

This quote demonstrates how traumatic the incident was for those who were maltreated but also shows that the lack of a resolution cast doubts over the radical claims being made by the government. For interviewees, it called into question the government’s commitment to indigenous rights, as well as to their basic wellbeing.
6.3 Defining Protection, Undermining Success

Following the incident at Chaparina, the TIPNIS marchers continued with their protest to La Paz. The Eighth March arrived in Plaza Murillo, outside the government buildings, on the 19 October 2011 to meet President Morales and to discuss a list of demands. March leaders went to meet the President, including Fernando Vargas, President of the TIPNIS and Adolfo Chavez, leader of CIDOB. This meeting was a success, and Morales not only met the leaders but also agreed to scrap plans for the road. He renewed the state’s protection of the park, passing Law 180 to make the TIPNIS untouchable (intangible) (see Appendix 5). This law prevented any development, infrastructure or extractive projects within the park (Fromherz 2012: Paz 2012:4). As a result, the Eight March was celebrated as a success by TIPNIS leaders and more widely; for example, it was reported in the UK Guardian newspaper (Guardian 2011). The protesters returned home.

However, following this resolution, the meaning and implementation of Law 180 became a new site of conflict. This is discussed again in Chapter 8 but at this point it is important to note that this early success for the oppositional campaign developed into a dispute over the terms of this renewed protection for the TIPNIS. This was because the government interpreted Law 180 as an initiative to protect the park, as a protected area. The state planned to remove the rights that TIPNIS communities had to use the natural resources in the park, to which they had previously been granted sustainable use rights as part of their indigenous territorial rights. In my interviews with campaigners supporting the TIPNIS leaders, there was a strong sentiment that the TIPNIS leaders had been tricked. Campaigners thought that during their meeting with Morales, the leaders were led to believe that the TIPNIS was being protected from such development projects, strengthening its borders as a protected area and as a territory. Instead, the law made a clear distinction between the TIPNIS as a protected area and as an indigenous territory. It did this by limiting the way that communities could live within the park. The quote below is from one the campaigners:

‘They played with this theme of ‘untouchable’. When the Eighth March was over they held a negotiation and reached an agreement. One of the points of
This agreement was the untouchable status of the park. The idea of ‘untouchable’ is to protect the park - so the state cannot intervene. But the state understood it to mean that the communities couldn’t undertake any activity within the park. They went to the other extreme’ (AA1).

This statement reveals two important, contradictory, positions. The first is the position of the TIPNIS leaders and their supporters, who demanded untouchable status for the TIPNIS, as a means to prevent development projects in the park. They sought renewed protection for the TIPNIS, as a ‘double-category’ protected area and indigenous territory. They wanted assurance that the park was protected from state mega-development projects, such as the highway. The second position, of the state, uses Law 180 to separate the double status of the park, calling into question previous management arrangements. This point is explored further in Chapter 8 but here it is most important to note that this new site of conflict reopened the debate about the road.

6.4 Re-opening the Debate

Although the TIPNIS opposition had a great deal of support, they also attracted criticism. The most vocal was from groups loyal to the MAS, for example coca-growing federations and other indigenous organisations. This is returned to in the following chapter, where the contested nature of indigeneity is analysed. The most significant challenge to the opposition came from another march, started on 20 December 2011. This march left from the south of the TIPNIS and approximately 1,000 marchers were reported (Kenner 2012). This pro-road march was mainly comprised of coca-growing communities from Polygon 7 and the Southern TIPNIS (Fromherz 2012).

Those marching in favour of the road comprised the chief support base of the President (Canessa 2014:154). Many came from the Chapare, where Morales’ political base is and where many are engaged in cash crop coca monoculture (ibid.). The collapse of the national tin mining industry in the 1980s led to a massive movement of the population, from highland to lowland areas. A large number of these migrants settled in the Chapare and began to cultivate coca.
At this time the Chapare was known as a frontier territory, but it was not uninhabited (Casessa 2014). Canessa argues that:

‘In the 1950s and 1960s the residents of Cochabamba lived in fear of these ‘wild Indians’ but by the 1980s they were being displaced by Aymara and Quechua colonists from the highlands who treated them little differently to the way lowland Indians have been treated historically. They talked of them as ‘savage’ who ‘didn’t know how to work’, and their displacement or engagement as wage labourers for the colonists was seen as a civilising mission. The colonists, after all, were teaching them the virtues of labour’ (Canessa 2014:160)

What this passage shows is that there have been long-running disputes between groups in the area despite both being identified as indigenous. For example, coca-growers unions from the region argue against the eradication of coca leaf through ‘a discourse centred on the indigenous nature of the coca leaf’ (Canessa 2014:154; see also Grisaffi 2010).

The march of December 2011 was arranged by CONISUR, an organisation of 21 indigenous communities. 12 of these live to the south of the TIPNIS and another nine live in Polygon 7. Fifteen CONISUR communities marched - six from inside the TIPNIS indigenous territory and all nine from Polygon 7 (Kenner 2012). Although 15 CONISUR communities marched, it is only those communities that live within the indigenous territory that had territorial rights to the TIPNIS.

This CONISUR-led march demanded that the road be built, so that communities could benefit from the improved transport links and trade links that the road would create. Their reasons for wanting the road are explored in the second section of this chapter; however it is important to first note that communities from Polygon 7 have individual land titles within the area and do not have rights to the main territory. Moreover, there is already a road running into their section of the park. This second march did not receive the same levels of public support as the first march, on arrival into La Paz (Fromherz 2012). However, it was openly supported by Evo Morales, who on numerous occasions voiced his support for the marchers (Fromherz 2012; Webber
2012). The most significant result of the CONISUR-led march was that it was cited by the government to justify re-opening the debate about the road. In February 2012 Morales called for a ‘full and prior’ consultation to be held with residents of TIPNIS. This would ascertain whether the road was wanted or rejected. A new law to sanction the consultation, Law 222, was signed just 102 days after TIPNIS was declared ‘untouchable’ (Fromherz 2012).

In February 2012, the TIPNIS opposition began their Ninth March, this time to oppose the consultation. This march was titled as a march ‘For the Defence of Life and Dignity, of Indigenous Territories, Natural Resources, Biodiversity, the Environment, Protected Areas, obeying the CPE and of the Respect for Democracy’ (Marcha Indigena Originaria por la Defensa de la Vida y la Dignidad, los Territorios Indigenas, los Recursos Naturales, la Biodiversidad, el Medio Ambiente y las Area protegidas, Cumplimiento de la C.P.E. y el Respeto de la Democraci) (Paz 2012:3; Pueblos en Camino 2012). This Ninth March left from Chaparina, the site of police violence during the Eighth March. The Ninth March sought to defend the previous resolution to protect the TIPNIS and to reject Law 222, which had been sanctioned by the Plurinational Assembly in order to develop a process of consultation over the road (Paz 2012:4). For the marchers, the TIPNIS opposition to the road had already been stated and a resolution agreed. When I visited the TIPNIS for the community meeting, the issue of the consultation was discussed by a community leader, as recorded below:

> ‘We already made our decision and signed our agreement on the (eighth) march’ (Fieldwork diary 22 April 2013).

The quote above helps to show why the consultation was rejected by TIPNIS leaders. For them, the road had been clearly rejected and the cessation of building works negotiated. However, this Ninth March was ultimately unsuccessful, serving only to postpone the government consultation until September 2012 (Kenner 2012).

These key moments in the protest timeline cast doubt over the state’s commitment to indigenous territorial rights and its promises for new levels of political autonomy. Taken together, the public dismissal of the opposition, the
violent treatment of protesters, the changed terms of community access to natural resources and the re-opening of the issue suggest that the state prioritised its national development agenda, over support for new political autonomies and rights. For the protesters I interviewed, these factors were evidence that the state was not interested in complying with any rule, law or entitlement. The timeline of the dispute was seen as continually undermining collective choices over what happened within the borders of their territory. The consultation, for example, had been rejected by the elected leaders of the TIPNIS. They considered that they had clearly stated their rejection of the road, in both marches and during their meeting with President Morales. For them, the planned consultation was a clear affront to their indigenous territorial rights and undermined their political organisations, as shown in the quote below:

‘Look, the government has always planned to build the road through our territory…and now the plan to consult with our territory over the road is an empty promise. Until now they have not complied with anything and I don’t think they will’ (TL4).

This quote illustrates how many TIPNIS protesters interpreted the state’s behaviour.

6.5 Prior Consultation
The disputed timeline of the TIPNIS protest is underpinned by the issue of ‘Prior and Informed Consent’. This is a right set out in international indigenous rights frameworks, stipulating that consent should be sought before any development project begins within territory borders. This was enacted in Bolivia long before the election of President Morales. Bolivia ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1991. However, Morales made his support for indigenous rights clear, by incorporating elements of ILO 169 into the 2009 Constitution. Both pieces of legislation commit to the rights that indigenous territories have to prior and informed consultation, in good faith, before development projects are begun in their native communal lands (Article 30). In the case of TIPNIS, the communities of the TIPNIS subcentral should have been consulted, along with the 12 communities living in the south of the park who were affiliated to
CONISUR (Kenner 2012). The communities from Polygon 7 and beyond, who marched as CONISUR to demand the road, live outside of the indigenous territory and therefore cannot be consulted.

The Bolivian state, however, did not consult with the TIPNIS before road-building began. Instead, the consultation was planned three months after road-building first started. Sections I and II of the road were already built and only the central section remained. On 10 February 2012, the Plurinational Legislative Assembly passed a new law, Law 222, to sanction a 120-day consultation within the TIPNIS. This was to be undertaken jointly by the Ministry of Public Works, Services and Living (Obras Publicas Servicios y Vivienda) and the Ministry for the Environment and Water (Medio Ambiente y Agua). The ministers in charge of the consultation were representatives from the ministries behind the road-building project. They were accompanied by SERNAP staff and other state officials. There were no independent, neutral observers.

The consultation was finished 7 December 2012 (Ministerio de Obras Publicas y Vivienda 2012:13). It was described in the consultation documentation as a ‘historic act of deepening intercultural democracy’ (Consultation doc 2010:12). They found that out of 69 communities within the TIPNIS, 57 did not want the TIPNIS to be untouchable and 55 did want the road (Consultation report 2012:14).

6.6 Consultation Review

Despite the consultation results, there remained strong opposition to the road. Following the government consultation, the Bolivian Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDHB) were approached by TIPNIS governing authorities and asked to come into the territory to record the testimony of communities who had been consulted by the government. The APDHB is a Bolivian non-governmental human rights organisation. They partnered with Caritas, an international Catholic organisation and confederation. This joint group visited the territory between 29 November and 14 December 2012, beginning just as the government consultation ended. Because of bad weather and costs, the APDHB commission visited 35 communities, just over half the number visited
by the government (2013:7). The findings of their commission contradicted
government findings and raised serious questions about the methods used in
the government consultation. The most important findings are discussed here.

Firstly, the APDHB and Caritas commission found that 25 out of the 35
communities visited had rejected the government’s consultation and refused
to take part. These communities rejected the consultation because they
considered that by taking part they were implicitly renegotiating the demands
already made on the Eighth March (2013:117). This had been agreed in
community meetings according to the collective decision-making processes of
the TIPNIS. Whilst the government consultation focused on their majority
support, my fieldwork observations support the finding that the rejection of the
consultation was significant. When I visited one of the communities in the
TIPNIS, I was shown the remains of the barbed wire that had been strung
across the river to stop government boats from entering. I noted it in my
fieldwork diary and an excerpt is below:

‘(We’re in the) XXX community in the TIPNIS…. It’s also been a major site of
resistance against the road and the consultation. XXX showed Dom and I
where the barbed wire had been strung across the river to keep the
government consultation out’ (Fieldwork diary 20 April 2013)

The evident resistance to the consultation by leaders and communities was
not fully addressed by the government.

Secondly, the commission found that the government commission had not
arrived in all the communities that were visited by the APDHB and Caritas. 16
communities reported that they have not been consulted by the government.
This contradicted government findings. In those communities where the
government commission had visited, their methods were found to be
inconsistent. For example, only nine communities reported that they had been
informed of the consultation dates and arrival of the government commission.
14 communities had no previous information about the visit (there is no data
on this issue for 13 communities). For those communities that did not know
about the consultation, the arrival of the commission was a surprise. State
representatives arrived in the villages unannounced and 14 communities
reported that the commission’s reason for being there was not immediately revealed. 11 communities reported that the government commission spent their time in their communities collecting information about the families who had refused to take part in the consultation (2013:117).

Another key issue concerned the respect of community decision-making processes, a key element of ILO 169 and the government’s 2009 consultation. Five communities reported that the commission only spoke to the families who wanted the road, ignoring the collective decision to reject the consultation. In 16 of the communities who the government had identified as supporting the road, the commission found that the decision was not signed by community consensus or by all members. Instead it had been signed by one person. Six communities said that their decision to sign in support of the road had been made in a context of ‘fatigue, pressure and manipulation’ (2013:117). This lack of respect for community decision-making processes had wider implications for TIPNIS communities and their internal politics. Twelve communities visited by the APDHB expressed regret and sadness for the divisions and feuds that the consultation process had caused (2013:118).

During the meeting I attended in the TIPNIS, there was discussion about how decisions were being taken and respected. I noted in my fieldwork diary that there were discussions about these processes, related to concerns that some communities from within the TIPNIS were moving to support the government:

‘Nobody Chimane is here. One thing that they want to discuss is ‘How is our organic decision-making? What happened with the Chimane?’
(Fieldwork diary 21 April 2013)

This excerpt from my fieldwork diary shows the impacts that these shifts had on the politics of the TIPNIS and the communities. The decision-making structures are a key feature of indigenous collective organisations. The consequences of these being broken are explored further in the following chapter. However, here it is important to stress how important they were to the functioning of the TIPNIS. It was something I observed whilst visiting the TIPNIS. Travelling within the territory, seeing how large it is and how isolated the communities can be from each other made me realise how important
decision-making, community and leadership structures are. For example, whilst in the territory I noted in my fieldwork diary:

‘(I have gained) insight into community politics and how TIPNIS/indigenous leadership works:

- Community leaders
- Representation
- Long meeting gave everyone an opportunity to talk
- Problems of disseminating info over such long distances’ (Fieldwork diary 20 April 2013)

I later noted what a community leader said, in comment on the consultation:

‘We take decisions together – not for a plate of meat!’ (Fieldwork diary 21 April 2013)

The quote above shows that these decision-making practices were valued but also that they had become strained.

There were also questions about how the consultation had been framed and how well informed TIPNIS communities had been. They reported being given little information about the environmental impacts of the road, when requested. Significantly, 22 communities out of the 38 visited by the APDHB said that Law 180 had been explained to them as meaning the end of traditional hunting, fishing and foraging, as well as any community development projects (2013:118). The choice given to them was to support the road or to no longer hunt or fish within the park. This interpretation of indigenous rights and protected area conservation is explored more fully in Chapter 8.

The APDHB and Caritas also reported that there had been instances where people had felt pressured to support the road. Twenty communities reported feeling pressured or threatened to back the road. For example, 11 communities cited feeling coerced by the presence of the military or government ministers. Nine communities reported that government representatives, for example staff from SERNAP, intervened in the meetings.
to promote the importance of the consultation and to call on the communities to support the road (2013:118). Ultimately, this commission found that three out of 36 communities accepted the road and a further three accepted the conditions of the consultation. However, in 30 of the communities they visited, the road was rejected (2013:118). Seventeen communities reported that they had met with the government but rejected the consultation and the road.

The APDHB and Caritas findings cast reasonable levels of doubt on the government consultation, enough to warrant further investigation. The numbers of people rejecting the road and consultation were argued to be more significant than the levels of opposition reported by the government. This was something I observed during my own visit to the TIPNIS, when I attended a community meeting in April 2012. At the meeting I listened to accounts by community leaders, who described their experiences of the government consultation. As already noted, these testimonies contradicted the state’s finding that there was widespread support for the road and supported the APDHB concerns that the state’s methods had been inconsistent. These findings were taken seriously by rights-based organisations in Bolivia, most notably the Defensor del Pueblo, (Defence of the Pueblo), a public institution committed to human rights and their centrality in the Pluri-National State. They attended the April meeting and pledged their support for the leaders and communities opposing the state.

6.7 Development: the road as vivir bien

Development is a broad term. As discussed in Chapter 2, ‘development’, as defined by vivir bien, is a new approach that prioritises radical forms of participation and the ways that communities’ lives are tied to their environments and its resources. It promises alternative forms of development, focused on ‘living well’ rather than ‘living better’, meaning it moves away from conceptualisations of development focused on economic growth (see Gudynas 2009, 2011, 2013; Walsh 2010). Vivir bien in practice will be introduced here but is also considered in the following chapters.

At the national scale, Morales has tied the extractive project to poverty reduction. This has been addressed through the social welfare projects
introduced in the previous chapter. Official figures show a reduction in number of people living in poverty. For example, Grugel and Riggirozzi argue that the number of people classified as ‘poor’ in Bolivia dropped from 62 percent in 2008 to 54 percent in 2010 (2012:10). However, these successes do not mean the advancement of indigenous rights or participatory development, as promised by *vivir bien*. For example, Radhuber argues that ‘an analysis of the legal framework and fiscal policy related to natural resources shows the hierarchy and prioritization of the – de facto highly extractivist – development goals vis-à-vis indigenous rights and that fiscal competences of indigenous groups remain limited, as they have throughout Bolivia’s history’ (2012:181). Moreover, these figures can mask diverse understandings of poverty and development, namely those being negotiated in the TIPNIS.

It is important to note that how poverty is defined, measured and addressed is complex and much debated. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to go deeply into these debates, it is important to discuss some key critiques. Firstly, there are critiques of how poverty is defined and measured. For many, the poverty line is too narrow to fully comprehend the multi-dimensional nature of poverty (Mitlin & Satterthwaite 2013). More pertinent to the TIPNIS are debates that attached poverty to an understanding of capabilities and rights (Sen 2001; Sen 2005). These definitions argue that an important dimension of poverty is the ability people to have to change their situation or make choices about their lives (see Satterthwaite & Mitlin 2013; Satterthwaite 2008; Hickey & Mohan 2008). This understanding of poverty ties into the more radical form of participatory development (Freire 1972; Chambers 1997) proposed by *vivir bien*. Finally, it is important to note that poverty reduction measures have been critiqued for not recognising the wider political processes and power relations that create structures of inequality (Hickey & Mohan 2005; Hickey 2008). This is also pertinent to the TIPNIS case, as these communities are not experiencing the benefits of poverty reduction in aggregate. Instead, they are in danger of losing their land and rights to the state, for infrastructure and for extraction.

The narrative of development has become central to the TIPNIS conflict and the government has increasingly used promises of development during the
dispute. Initially, the state was adamant that the road would go ahead, despite opposition from communities. This is clearly shown by statements made by President Morales at the beginning of the dispute, quoted earlier in this chapter. However, as the campaign continued, the state presented the road as a key way to bring development to the communities of the TIPNIS. On 2 January 2013, it was reported in the press that the government had announced to the Pluri-national Assembly that they would stop their plans to build the road until extreme poverty had been eradicated in the TIPNIS (La Razon 2013). The government pledged to end poverty in the park by the end of 2015 and to spend 14 million US dollars on the territory. This was budgeted for basic services, such as water, electricity and health, as well as transportation, telecommunications and disaster prevention (Achtenburg 2013). The project was overseen by Juan Ramon Quinatana, who was reported as confirming that more than two million US dollars had already been invested (ibid.). This was also reported in the Vice President’s website, which promoted these projects. In January 2013, the website reported that projects had begun in the San Bernardo community, which had just received electricity. These projects were explicitly linked to the dispute over the road. For example, the article on the Vice-President’s website ends with:

‘Moreover, several community members of San Bernardo expressed their need for a road as it takes time to move from one region to another’

(Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinational de Bolivia 2013)

In June 2015 the issue of the road has re-entered the public arena, with the recently elected MAS governor of Beni announcing that a second government consultation is needed. This is a move supported by Vice-President Linera, who has once again stated that the road needs to go ahead (ANF 2015).

Whilst the TIPNIS protesters hold up the dispute as an example of how indigenous territories can expect to be treated by the MAS state, the state itself is now also using the TIPNIS as an example of how they will develop and improve lives for indigenous communities and territories. The road came to be presented as being necessary for the communities of the TIPNIS. For example, the national newspaper, La Razon, reported that Walter Delgaillo,
Minister of Public Works, Services and Living (Obras Públicas, Servicios y Vivienda) pledged his support for the road because it ‘would bring development to the region’. He was quoted in the article as saying the road was:

‘a big opportunity for them (the indigenous) to be integrated, in an autonomous manner, into the process of national development, supported by the government, supported by the nation’ (La Razon 11 July 2011)

In this quote, the road is described as benefitting the communities by bringing them into the national project. Firstly, this hints that indigenous groups remain marginal to society or even lag behind in their development. This depiction of TIPNIS communities is evident in other examples when the issue has been debated or discussed by government in the public arena. For example, the quote below is from Vice-President Garcia Linera:

‘I am sorry that NGOs and some others comment on the road from the city, without knowing that the indigenous live without light, without water, without basic services, and far from the urban centres of Beni’ (Quoted in La Razon 29 October 2014)

This quote suggests firstly that NGOs and supporters are interfering in the issue, a point explored more fully in Chapter 8. However, it also suggests that supporters of the TIPNIS opposition do not comprehend how difficult life really is for the communities. In this quote, Linera is clear that the communities need the development and (purportedly) uncomplicated benefits that the road would bring. This same narrative was present in interviews with supporters of the road. For example, in the quote below, the need for education and health care are stressed:

‘Also, with the new laws, with the new constitution, they are recognised as having all the rights to vivir bien - to have logistical support to have education, health, development. The government, along with us, and for example our companero (friend/partner) Pradel Gumercindo. are coordinating with us to achieve this development. I think its important that they have education and health’ (CG2).
The quote above also describes these kinds of projects in terms of **vivir bien**. This provides insight into how **vivir bien** is being translated in practice. Rather than an approach routed in participatory politics, in practice, it is an approach understood as providing somewhat more traditional forms of development. This can also be seen in the quote below, where the interviewee explains the rights of TIPNIS indigenous communities as rights to education, health and drinking water. According to this interviewee, these will be realised by the building of the road:

> ‘The other reason (for the road) is that it is necessary to bring light, electricity, drinking water and schools……. Primarily, their rights are to have education and health’ (MG1).

The road was also promoted by its supporters as necessary for economic development, once again contradicting the dominant narrative of **vivir bien**. The quotes below show that the road was necessary because of the economic development that it would bring:

> ‘We are always thinking, searching for development, not only for the tropics that is where we produce the coca leaf. Actually, many organisations are exporting, for example bananas to Chile and Argentina. There are citrus plants, a project for beekeeping, for honey…..They are starting this, which is development, for vivir bien’ (CG2)

> ‘We support (the road) because it will integrate the highlands and the lowlands, between Beni and Cochabamba. It will be economically productive, no? Because from Cochabamba it is one way to Santa Cruz, which is over 500km away and from Santa Cruz to Beni, to Trinidad, it is many more kilometres. It is far, no? But this road will cut that out and there will be benefits, for example taking meat to La Paz or Cochabamba from Beni. It will be helpful to the ranchers and, more generally, will bring progress to the country. So because of this, we support the road. Outside of this, there will be benefit to the indigenous. (CG2)’

> ‘They (TIPNIS communities) don’t have sustainable livelihoods but could have artisan businesses and tourism if they had the road’ (MG1).
These quotes show that a central argument in favour of the road was that it would bring economic benefits and growth to the region. However, these arguments were challenged by those from the TIPNIS, who opposed the road. Indeed, at times very similar arguments were used to reject the road. For example, the road was rejected by some precisely because it would bring no such benefits to the communities. This is clear from the quote below:

‘For us, roads are not a bad thing. We want a road but one that passes around our territory, this is what we have been saying’ (TL4).

‘I tell you, the road will not pass by any community. It will not benefit any community and because of this, we have requested a road that passes near our communities. Nevertheless, the government is planning it for where there are no communities’ (TP3)

‘Well, without doubt roads bring progress. But they also bring problems, no? I we do not want this road, instead we want a roads that will be useful to the people of these communities, that live inside the TIPNIS. Where they want to put the road now is of no benefit to TIPNIS communities, they want to put it through the heart of the TIPNIS…and we want to avoid this and we have said with all our strength ‘God, permit us to be able to defend the TIPNIS’ (TL2)

‘We don’t want a road because it will not benefit anyone here. It’s going to benefit businesses, ranchers..’ (TL3).

These quotes suggest political motivations behind the government’s planned development for the TIPNIS. The planned road is far from the TIPNIS communities and requests to have it re-routed nearer the TIPNIS and around the perimeter of the protected area have been refused (see SERNAP 2012). There was also controversy around some of the projects and initiatives already started within the territory. For example, a key issue raised about the methods of the consultation regarded the promise of gifts and development. Seventeen of the visited communities reported being presented with gifts and being promised development. These gifts were reported in the national media. For example, there were photos of President Morales giving away boat engines and televisions. However, in seven communities, which refused to sign the consultation, the gifts were never delivered (2013:117).
The government had given similar gifts to the TIPNIS communities when opposition initially began. In 2011, following the initial march against the road and before the state consultation, Evo Morales visited the TIPNIS with a number of gifts for communities, such as outboard motors for boats (see La Razon 2010). These gifts were presented as examples of the development that would be brought to the park by the road. However, a recurring complaint from TIPNIS protesters during interviews was that these gifts were bribes to convince people to support the road. These gifts were viewed as an attempt to destabilise their campaign. The quotes below, from TIPNIS protesters, shows how these gifts were understood by those who continued to oppose the road.

‘They have left these to trick us because they entered our territory for this – to give gifts, motor engines. I think that it is the duty of the government to help indigenous territories because we voted him in as president. But we never voted for this, for them to divide us…We are staying firm to defend our territory and more than that, the rights of our indigenous pueblos’ (TL3).

‘He gets hold of people by offering them gifts and they are so soft, they take these gifts and start to say that they want the road’ (TP4).

These promises of development have been divisive. As the campaign has continued, the resolve of some to oppose the road and the state has lessened. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 7 but it is important to note here that those who continue to oppose the state have lost some of their original supporters. This is explained in the quote below:

‘Because the government has come into the territory to destroy the communities, dividing communities and the leaders of our organisations and we don’t want this, no? Better that I call to unify the communities and indigenous organisations so we have more strength to be able to confront this challenge (the dispute against the state)’ (BDG3)

There is traction in offers of development and it has at times been contentious. Some of my interviewees spoke informally of the challenges of continuing with a long-running campaign against the state when needs were high. This was noted in my fieldwork diary:
‘(We were) Talking about getting TIPNIS communities together for a meeting... (He said) ‘it’s more complicated now as not all communities are against the government after they promised so much before the consultation’
(Fieldwork diary 24 March 2013)

Behind the opposition to the road lies debates about power and need. The quote below is from a TIPNIS protest leader, who explained the new sites of conflict that promises of ‘development’ had brought to their campaign:

‘In the TIPNIS they wouldn’t refuse any of these things but they should be brought without compromises. The government brings these gifts to the brothers of the TIPNIS so it can access these resources but they should not play with humanity in this way! So we think that we can create our own projects, continue to defend our territory for everyone, with education, with healthcare, with productive projects. This is essential for the people of the TIPNIS and we are moving to a point where we can help all our brothers with these things’ (BDG3).

The quotes above shows that health care, schools and electricity were not being rejected. However, the way in which they were being offered was being challenged. Those who continued to oppose the road also opposed the way that they were being treated by the government. Interestingly, one interviewee highlighted this politics by telling me that they used to have more teachers and schools in the TIPNIS. Because of this, they did not comprehend why they needed to have a road in order to have schools. This is illustrated by the quote below:

‘This idea of the government is to bring health and education … but there has always been education, there have always been these activities but now we need to have a road to have education, but before there was always education (TL3)’.  

From this quote it is apparent that the TIPNIS dispute is more complex than a choice between a road, as a means to a better life and no road, meaning environmental protection at the expense of citizens. The TIPNIS dispute reveals the nuances of how ‘development’ and ‘environment’ are negotiated. The process through which these projects have materialised also illuminate
contradictions and gaps in the government’s own rhetoric of vivir bien and autonomy. These projects accompany a major infrastructure project needed for extraction and do little to enforce or develop the political power or autonomy of the TIPNIS. This is a point returned to in the following chapter.

6.8 Development Claimed

As shown by those that wanted a re-routed road, change was wanted by people in the TIPNIS. The quotes below show that protesters themselves identified areas where they would like to see change:

‘In the first place, they don’t have a road, they don’t have anything – no teachers, no doctors … the communities of the TIPNIS continue to be poor, in truth, they are poor. The government says to us that in three years they will eradicate poverty but I don’t think so. Because, in the first place, they have to have the human resources to be able to manage new projects but there are none. Communities have to walk two, three days to the beach, to the mountain, worse if someone is ill but if there is a road there will also be consequences … So in the first place we want to protect the territory and protect it from these impacts’ (SWT2)

‘We want the territory to keep being conserved, as it is and maybe for improvements with basic things that the people need. Because the people there live happy. Sure they need things, many things, for example medical care …, health, education, they need to learn, maybe to have a university inside the territory … These are priorities’ (BDG3).

However, the government’s development project for the TIPNIS offers a narrow frame for determining what development and change could be. For many of the anthropologists I met and interviewed, who had long worked in the region, the TIPNIS communities were river people who would reject highways because they used the river ways as roads. This was supported in some of my interviews, where protesters rejected the road as out of keeping with lives that had been built along rivers. In some interviews, a road in the territory was viewed as inappropriate for TIPNIS culture, as they identified as river people and identified the river as their road, as explained to me in the quote below:
‘It is neighbourhood roads that we want but the river is our road, this is our trunk road, our transport area … we can not change because we are already accustomed to transporting ourselves in water ways …’ (TP1)

Yet for more of the leaders that I interviewed, their opposition to the Villa Tunari – San Ignacio de Moxos road was not a definitive rejection of all roads. Instead, it was a rejection of the route of this particular road, the way it had been planned and executed and the impact it would have on their territory. How this relates to discourses of indigeneity is explored in the next chapter.

Ideas of development were nuanced and did not necessarily follow the more linear path to industrialisation being set out by the state. In transcripts of the speeches made before the Eighth March left Trinidad, the tension between ideas of development and opposition to the Villa Tunari road was clear. It is illustrated in the quote below:

‘..We don’t oppose development, only we want a say in (how it is) in our own territory … We have never requested a road, because we know that if they build it, it will destroy and it will bring down trees’ (March leader quoted in CONAMAQ et al. 2012:18)

‘Development’ was wanted without compromising their rights and territory. This was noted in my fieldwork diary, from a meeting I attended in April 2013. In one of the opening addresses, on the night that the meeting officially began, I noted that:

‘XX gave a dignified speech, saying that their road ahead isn’t easy or short but they have rights and need to protect and defend their territory for their children and their children’s children’. (Fieldwork diary 21 April 2013)

‘People wearing T-shirts saying ‘Think of our children, we don’t want the road’ (Fieldwork diary 12 April 2013)

This sentiment, of appropriate development, was echoed in many of my interviews, where leaders voiced a desire for development but for projects and changes that supported their particular needs and values. The quotes below illustrate that there are conflicting interpretations of development:

‘I think that we have a fragile territory and that there isn’t a proposal of adequate/appropriate development for it’ (BDG3)
‘We want small roads that pass near our communities because we produce lots of things that we could take to market and without a road we cannot take it. But the government isn’t thinking of our needs, they are only thinking of their interests’ (TP3).

The road was thus partly being rejected because it offered no developmental benefits to communities. Instead, the road was viewed as threatening their lives in multiple ways. By highlighting the absence of appropriate or adequate development, the quotes above highlight a key tension of the new development paradigm on offer from the state. This was noted in my fieldwork diary, from the full community meeting in April 2013. Community leaders spoke of the inappropriate development being proposed by the government, as shown below:

‘The President only wants roads and this kind of development and this isn’t what others want’

‘(We) Don’t want (a) consultation because we don’t need anything – we aren’t missing anything’

(Fieldwork diary 23 April 2013)

These comments help introduce the nuances within the TIPNIS dispute and stress that ‘development’ is a contested and ill-defined term.

6.9 Alternatives

In the case of the TIPNIS, vivir bien was not being experienced as development as identified by communities, in line with their community wellbeing and relationships with their natural surroundings. Instead, developmental benefits, such as water and electricity, had been offered in return for accepting a large-scale infrastructure project. However, during my fieldwork, alternative development agendas were evident and were being debated. When I asked interviewees about what they wanted for their futures, most TIPNIS protesters spoke of wanting better lives for their communities. This was generally expressed as better healthcare and education. For example, interviewees described problems of accessing immediate, emergency healthcare, for example when a child is sick. River travel is slow
and travelling by air expensive and interviewees spoke of problems that their geographical isolation causes for accessing medical help. However, rather than wanting better access to the nearest city, namely Trinidad, they wanted healthcare and schooling within the TIPNIS. Many interviewees were also committed to education and wanted better schools and teachers for themselves and their children. Some people spoke of building a university within the park, sidestepping concerns about the possible impact that students’ leaving the park would have on communities. This concern is illustrated the quote below:

‘They (the government) never respond to the requests of indigenous pueblos, so young people go in search of a better life, they’re going to migrate, to the capital, to the cities, it is already happening and it spells the loss of the indigenous pueblos in the TIPNIS’ (AM).

Interviewees often talked about the riches of their territory and described it as a paradise that provided for them, as illustrated in the quote below:

‘The TIPNIS is our wealth, from our forest, our flora and fauna. This is why we defend the TIPNIS, because we are used to living in the countryside, in the mountains, eating meat and fish and for these reasons, the TIPNIS is gold for us’ (TP1).

However, the lack of economic resources was evident. For example, I interviewed and met most residents in Trinidad, the nearest town to the territory. The town offered work opportunities. Some interviewees talked at length about having to live in the town in order to send their children to school or find employment. They talked with sadness about leaving the park but were resigned to the necessity of doing so. There were other reasons for some people to be in Trinidad, for example so community leaders could be better engaged with the political fight to defend the TIPNIS and reject the road, but it was also a way to earn money and provide for families. This was not mentioned directly in interviews but people discussed it during informal conversations. Moreover, some leaders of the TIPNIS had moved to Trinidad to work or to educate their children
Repeatedly in interviews and more informal conversations, protesters talked about rural livelihoods and about the potential for local agriculture. They talked about being able to market and sell the wild cocoa in the TIPNIS and about creating a market for alligator meat, already available in Trinidad. These products were already being sold but many interviewees were keen to create small-scale businesses around these products. They spoke of similar projects run by NGOs in nearby areas. The quote below explains some of the rural livelihood strategies that protest leaders wanted:

‘We have always said that there has to be development that is compatible with the TIPNIS ... tourism, ranching, there is open pampa and this needs strengthened – fishing, chocolate, because (the TIPNIS) is rich in wild chocolate, so it has a lot of potential ... it should be about strengthening textiles, women’s weaving, crafts …’ (SIO1).

The issue of development was also addressed by TIPNIS protesters who accepted positions in the departmental government of the Department of Beni, following the gubernatorial elections in 2013. This alliance is explored more fully in the following chapter but at this point what is of interest is the projects that they developed for the TIPNIS. These projects were discussed with me during one interview and during many informal conversations during my time in Trinidad. However, they were also presented twice during my visit to the TIPNIS - once to a community we visited and once during the full meeting.

The protesters who had accepted positions within the departmental government had a budget for the TIPNIS and for the development of wider Beni indigenous lowland territories. They had developed ideas based around increasing rural livelihoods. For example, a central goal was to develop better river transport networks, namely boats and small ports within the territory so that people could get to Trinidad faster and travel more easily within the territory. There were also the previously mentioned plans for new agricultural projects. The projects proposed during presentations are summarised below, in an excerpt from my fieldwork diary:

‘Promises

1. ‘Development of water transport
2. Strengthening the agricultural production of TCOs in Beni

3. Development of productive, social and cultural life of indigenous people in Beni

Challenges

1. Strengthen autonomies of indigenous and campesino organisations

2. Support development in these areas

3. Work with other indigenous secretaries in Beni

4. Drive the diversification of productivity and the transformation of natural resources

Promises

1. Will coordinate with indigenous organisations and leaders

2. Will inform people about projects and investments

3. Involve community in managing projects

4. Work towards the respect of indigenous rights (and campesinos)’ (Fieldwork diary 19 April 2013)

At the time of writing these were only ambitious plans, for which I have no data about implementation. However, what they demonstrate is that TIPNIS communities and leaders were not passive recipients of development. They sought participatory forms of development, to elect and control the ways that their lives would change. The issues of poverty and development were indeed present but there were varied suggestions about how to address them: TIPNIS communities and leaders had their own ideas about their livelihoods and futures. This shows that they were not rejecting the broad concept of ‘development’ but that they wanted to influence, shape and plan a future rooted in their own needs and ambitions for future generations. The long running ambition to control their own development, lives, territories and communities is evident by their lengthy campaigns for political autonomy. As the TIPNIS rejection of the road was repeatedly undermined by the state, the lack of choice and control became key issues in the dispute. This contributes
to the findings of other researchers, for example those who have questioned the impact that the MAS government is having on social movement politics and political opportunity structures (see Humphreys-Bebbington 2010; Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012).

6.10 Conclusion

In this chapter I have approached the TIPNIS opposition as a social movement, questioning their experiences of protest as a way to better understand contemporary, Bolivian politics. This chapter goes some way in answering the first research question – *In what ways is extractive-led development being encountered and negotiated by civil society, specifically place-based, environmental social movements?*

By unpacking the TIPNIS dispute more carefully, this chapter has identified multiple grievances and sites of struggle that have developed from the initial opposition to the road. The dispute began as opposition to the road, as an isolated piece of infrastructure. However, opposition to the road has engaged the state significantly. TIPNIS protesters have experienced an increased reach of the state, emerging from the new demands being made on the TIPNIS territory and the changes being planned without their consent. The state’s desire to industrialise and increase national productivity has threatened the TIPNIS communities’ territorial rights as they understood them and revealed the road to be one part of a wider, extractive-led agenda - central to the regime of the state. This dispute speaks to wider debates about extraction, resource use and the politics that it creates. The rest of the thesis, therefore, considers the road as a frontier of the state’s extractive agenda.

In approaching the TIPNIS opposition as a social movement, I have also begun to consider the kind of alternatives that they are demanding. In this chapter, this has centred on ideas of development. This chapter has shown that despite the rhetoric and promises of *vivir bien*, TIPNIS protesters have perceived increased threats to their territory, rights and political power. The TIPNIS dispute has not revealed a new, progressive politics where grassroots politics are valued. Instead, as this chapter has shown, the TIPNIS protesters have struggled to gain a voice in the process or to have meaningful input into
the changes planned for their territory. How this contributes to our understanding of post-neoliberal development is explored in the Chapter 9. The following chapter looks more closely at how protesters are mobilising their indigenous identity to claim autonomy and access increased political power.
Mobilisations of Indigeneity

Since the election of Evo Morales, indigeneity has been presented as the ideological basis for new state policies and a new national constitution. The ties between indigenous identity and claims to rights, resources and political power have subsequently increased. A new political context and framework around indigeneity has therefore developed, with which groups must now (re)negotiate for indigenous rights. In this chapter I look at the way that indigeneity was mobilized by TIPNIS protesters during the dispute and highlight the struggles these protesters faced in accessing its promises for political power. In doing so, I argue that the TIPNIS conflict is a key moment for (re)determining the political power and meaning of indigeneity in a context where indigeneity is no longer the language of the marginalised, as it has become the discourse of the state. I make this argument by highlighting the contrasting forms of indigeneity that are being mobilised to support and justify disparate plans for the TIPNIS and its land, resources and development. I firstly examine how indigeneity was mobilised and articulated by TIPNIS protesters, as a route to challenge the state. I consider how disputes over prior consultation and autonomy have involved a struggle over indigeneity itself and how indigeneity is being claimed to access political rights and to discredit the state’s interpretation and implementation of said rights. I then look at how protesters have drawn upon indigeneity as difference, as a way to protect their territory from more local threats, namely losing land to coca-growers. Finally, I consider the contested forms of indigeneity being articulated in emergent party politics. In doing so, I raise questions about the spaces and platforms open to those who are both marginal and oppositional to the state, linking this back to the wider question of post-neoliberal environmental politics.

7.1 Constitutional Rights

Key to Bolivia’s new state is the 2009 Constitution, which sets out the state’s commitment to the indigenous population. The 2009 Constitution is the primary legal and political instrument of Bolivia’s new beginning under the
The MAS government, and the 17th constitution that Bolivia has had since 1826 (Albro 2010b; Assies 2006). Calls for a new constitution had intensified since 1994, when the previous constitution was enacted. The main criticism of the 1994 Constitution centred on the matter of multi-cultural reforms, which were found to be insufficient. Demands for a rewrite intensified in the 2000s, with calls for total constitutional reform that would better recognise Bolivia’s previously marginalised citizens and grant them more significant political rights (Assies 2006). The new constitution was rewritten and finally approved in 2009, after much heated debate and conflict (see Assies 2006). A central aim of the new constitution was to revise and re-imagine the state. As part of this, Bolivia was (re)defined as ‘pluri-national’, with pluri-nationalism being used to suggest some form of institutionalised power-sharing, for example where groups can have self-determination or autonomy (Assies 2006). Whereas multi-culturalism was recognition of cultural rights without power (see Hale 2002), pluri-nationalism suggested a profound reconfiguration of the state itself (Assies 2006).

The new constitution appropriated indigenous discourse in a number of ways. It pledged that the state would be guided by the ideology that underpinned vivir bien, as introduced in previous chapters. However, it also designated new forms of indigenous political power, which responded to call for institutional power sharing. Indigenous autonomy has long been called for by various groups in Bolivia. Historically, indigeneity has been mobilised as a way to claim distinctiveness and power separate from the state, voiced in opposition to histories of political exclusion and to dominant politics (Cott 2003; Cott 2005; Cott 2000). One of the key ways that the power-sharing of the pluri-national state has been translated into policy is through promises of increased indigenous autonomy. This is one of four new types of categories of autonomy, the others being regional, departmental, and municipal. As regards indigenous autonomy, the constitution made a promise of self-government (Albro 2010). Within the constitution are a number of articles relating to indigenous autonomy and indigenous political rights. For example, key dimensions of autonomy can be seen in the following excerpts, from Articles 30 and 304:
CHAPTER IV: Article 30: Rights of the Nations and Rural Native Indigenous Peoples

15. To be consulted by appropriate procedures, in particular through their institutions, each time legislative or administrative measures may be foreseen to affect them. In this framework, the right to prior obligatory consultation by the state with respect to the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources in the territory they inhabit shall be respected and guaranteed, in good faith and upon agreement.

Article 304

1. The Rural Native Indigenous Autonomies shall exercise the following exclusive authorities:

1. To elaborate their statute for the exercise of their autonomy pursuant to the Constitution and the law.

2. Definition and management of their own forms of economic, social, political, organizational and cultural development, in accord with their identity and the vision of each village (Estado Plurinacional del Bolivia 2009)

The 2009 Constitution began a process through which indigenous territories would be recognised as having complete political control over themselves. This was a key aim for many of the opposition leaders I interviewed. In interviews and informal conservations with TIPNIS protesters, autonomy was returned to again and again as a central aim of their activism and engagement with indigenous politics. For example, some of the TIPNIS opposition leaders were from other parts of Bolivia and from other indigenous groups. I noted that the TIPNIS dispute had gained support from lowland indigenous organisations and indigenous leaders, partly because it engaged this politics of autonomy. This was something I noted in my fieldwork diary, after being invited to lunches and parties. There were leaders present who were involved with the TIPNIS opposition, who had been campaigning for indigenous autonomy for a long time. An excerpt from my diary is below:

‘It came through that for him the TIPNIS is a part of a wider issue – the split between MAS and lowland indigenous groups and a struggle for political representation’ (Fieldwork diary 2 February 2013).
‘I think their campaign for indigenous autonomy and political power is involved in the TIPNIS but has its own goals. XXXX is from Santa Cruz. He said he came to Beni because they asked him to come and because in Beni they have opportunities…. We talked about indigenous autonomy at the beginning and about the complicated levels of government in Bolivia. They all said they want indigenous autonomy and for it to be meaningful’ (Fieldwork diary 9 February 2013).

What these excerpts demonstrate is that during my time with these campaigners, I learnt that they were opposing the TIPNIS road but also that the TIPNIS campaign was tied up in a longer and broader fight for political power, specifically autonomy.

This long-running fight for autonomy was also raised in interviews, as shown in the quotes below:

‘We have always wanted direct autonomy, that transfers political power to us because you know that with politics, many times, the conditions are that they say they will help you but then don’t give you help’ (TP3).

‘We have always looked to the rights of indigenous groups, especially for our territory. We have made demands, for better management, to our new governor. We can achieve indigenous autonomy’ (TL4).

Autonomy was entangled with development agendas. For example, many of the leaders who talked of autonomy spoke about their rights to decide their own futures but also their right to freely use the resources within the territory, as shown in the quotes below:

‘The defence of the TIPNIS, autonomy – they were born from the same necessity to be able to use our own resources from our territory, to generate resources for the same sustainability of the people that live here. Between us we have to have use of alligator – a management plan for alligators, a management plan for cocoa and with these we think that we can generate resources to sustain the families that live inside the territory …. without destroying the forest, without allowing for the diminishing of natural resources…. ’ (BDG3).
‘For me, what would be ideal, what is most important is to become autonomous because then we can manage our own economic resources, also our natural resources that we have in the TIPNIS’ (TP3).

What these quotes suggest is that bids for autonomy went further than previous forms of cultural and territorial recognition. Campaigners wanted more power over their territory, namely control over natural resources and a greater ability to oversee economic development.

The 2009 Constitution has gone further than any previous constitution, in terms of setting out new levels and scales of decentralised power. However, the TIPNIS dispute shows that the exact terms of indigenous autonomy in practice have not been defined. Although autonomy has been laid out in the constitution, it has not been translated into a working law. The Law on Autonomies and Decentralisation has been debated since 2009 (Assies 2006).

Whilst I was on fieldwork, not one indigenous territory had been granted full autonomy and the completion rate remains low at two. Instead, becoming an autonomous territory remains a long, bureaucratic process in which the terms and meaning of autonomy are being debated. The TIPNIS dispute thus provides a moment of insight into competing ideas about the power and reach of the state and the potential limits of indigenous autonomy, a point returned to in the conclusion.

Constitutional commitments to autonomy were also held up by the TIPNIS opposition to discredit the state. Key to the campaign of the TIPNIS protesters was that the state had ignored their indigenous rights, both territorial and political. This was both a strategy to claim rights and a strategy to discredit the state. The protesters I interviewed explained that the state was dismissive of its own policies, especially those that appertain to increased indigenous rights – a foundational tenet of the re-founded state. In the quote below, a lowland indigenous leader highlights the state’s failure to commit to their constitution, directly linking this failure to the TIPNIS oppositional campaign.

'It clearly says it in our constitution, in Article 30, number 1516 - they are specific about prior consultation, informed and in good faith. This has made us act…there have been two marches, requesting the government to set
aside the section of the road that is set to cut through the middle of the TIPNIS…This makes people see that indigenous pueblos…are respectful of laws. That we want to live in peace, in tranquillity….’ (SIO1).

This quote firstly helps to illustrate that protesters have struggled to claim these new constitutional rights. It also shows that TIPNIS protesters are aligning themselves to the policies and legislation of the re-founded state, whilst identifying the state as the law-breaking outsider. This seems partly an attempt to delegitimise the state using discourses of indigeneity. However, it also suggests a split between how the state and its citizens interpret the content and meaning of indigeneity, particularly when it challenges the state’s extractive agenda. This is a point returned to throughout this chapter and the next.

Related to this commitment to autonomy is a revised commitment to prior consultation. The issue of prior consultation was introduced in the previous chapter, however it is important to note that the lack of ‘prior, informed consultation in good faith’ was also held up by protesters as evidence that the state had ignored its own rules. To quickly recap - the road was planned and building works began without any consultation with TIPNIS communities. The government has explained this by stating that the road was not classified as a ‘mega-project’ (Ministro de Obras Públicas 2012). However, the issue of prior consultation remained a key focus for the oppositional campaign, located by the protesters in broader struggle for indigenous rights and political power.

7.2 Divisions – Indigenous Political Organisations

The TIPNIS opposition and their claims for autonomy partly rested on their ability to speak collectively. However, as the protest developed, fractures appeared. This was introduced in the previous chapter, where I argued that promises of development had caused some of the original protesters to switch to support the government. These divisions were influencing the indigenous politics of lowland Bolivia because an alternate, pro-MAS version of CIDOB had been following the TIPNIS dispute. Although there had been historic tensions between CIDOB and the MAS (see Kennemore & Weeks 2011), these divisions were significant in terms of representation and legitimacy. For
example, the TIPNIS protesters and community leaders who continued to reject the road recognised Adolfo Chavez as their leader. He had organised and led the Eighth March and was supported by Fernando Vargas, elected President of the TIPNIS, and Emilio Nose, his Vice-President. During the April full meeting of the TIPNIS, he was recognised as the head of CIDOB by those who attended, by supporting organisations such as the Defensor del Pueblo and the APDHB and by supporting campaigners. However, in 2012 a second CIDOB was set up with a new leader, Melva Hurtado. She had previously marched against the road but had later switched to support the central government.

These divisions were also recognised by supporters of the MAS, as shown in the quote below:

‘Before this problem with the road we worked in coordination with the organisations that are a part of CIDOB...But since then, it is evident that there is a political problem (divide). Previously, our companero Evo had formed a united organisation (Unity Pact). But the road has created problems. This opposition has divided the indigenous. Actually, there is a problem at the basis, no? After the last law some of them started to support the government but not everyone was in agreement. Fernando Vargas is on the other side.’

(CG2)

In interviews with TIPNIS protesters, many felt that their organisations had been actively divided by the state. Protesters were concerned by how the state had (dis)regarded the political organisations of the TIPNIS and indeed, of the lowlands more widely. Interviewees repeatedly talked about their organisations being ignored, partly proved by the reopening of the debate over the road. The quote below illustrates the view that the state was purposefully ignoring established political organisations of the TIPNIS:

‘They haven’t listened to or consulted with our TIPNIS political organisations (subcentrals), to our regional organisations and worse, to our national organisation for lowland indigenous groups, CIDOB. There has been no coordination because the government is on one side and the communities are defending their territory’ (TL4).
These quotes not only refer to these divisions but also hint at significant consequences, in terms of recognition. The new CIDOB was publicly recognised by Morales, with little recognition of those opposing the state. For example, it was reported in the press on 23 March 2013 that Evo Morales had met CIDOB and that they had agreed to work together, to build the ‘Patriotic Agenda 2025’. However, this agreement was with the pro-MAS organisation, led by Melva Hurtado (La Palabra 2013). The side-lining of the TIPNIS oppositional campaign can also been seen from the timeline of the dispute and critiques of the government’s consultation process, as argued in Chapter 6. More broadly, the side-lining of oppositional groups has been noted in other contemporary conflicts, for example the Lliquimuni campaign introduced in Chapter 3. Humphries-Bebbington raised concerns that in following its own agendas in Tarija, the state has demonstrated recurrent tendencies towards ‘the authoritarian imposition of its policy’ (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010:250-251). For Sarela Paz, a Bolivian anthropologist, the Eighth and Ninth Marches have been markedly different to state-indigenous interactions of the past. For Paz, the TIPNIS protesters have faced a far greater level of opposition from the state than during previous marches. They have confronted ‘an onslaught from the government’ (Paz 2012:7).

The dismissal and questioning of oppositional indigenous views is apparent in Vice-President Linera’s Geopolitics of the Amazon. He describes the lowlands as being dominated by a history of haciendas and ‘despotic landowner domination’ (2012:9). He argues that this was partially modified by NGOs, who created a clientelist relationship with indigenous leadership and promoted levels of interregional organization, like CIDOB. He also claims that lowland indigenous organisations relied entirely on external NGO funding, which paid the salaries of the leaders, and adds that they function ‘with little contact with indigenous bases’ (2012:9). This undermining of lowland indigenous political organisations was echoed in Morales’ dismissal of opposition to the road. For example, he identified opposition as ‘rogue opposition’ (Cambio 2010).

The TIPNIS opposition was not only dismissed in the public arena, but at points their campaign was actively discouraged. For example, Morales was
invited to the April 2013 community meeting in the territory but ignored the request. This was noted in my fieldwork diary at the time:

‘Feeling more hopeful about visiting the TIPNIS. The meeting is in El Deber (newspaper) today – with XXX inviting Morales and Lens (Beni governor) to attend’ (Fieldwork diary 15 April 2013).

‘Morales – by not attending shows total disregard for TIPNIS government/ autonomy/ territorial rights’ (Fieldwork diary 15 April 2013)

Whilst the new governor of Beni did attend the meeting, Morales did not, demonstrating a lack of recognition of these political organisations and structures. Moreover, there were criticisms levelled at the MAS that they tried to stop the meeting altogether. It was reported in the press that the state had restricted the available fuel for sale in the region.

‘Indigenous accuse the government of preventing their entry into the TIPNIS

The meeting of the second national commission of CIDOB started yesterday in Trinidad with the accusation by leaders of the TIPNIS subcentrales of an alleged government veto on the sale of fuel and the militarization of the nature reserve’ (El Deber 12 March 2012)

This echoed my own fieldwork notes and the reasons I was being given for our delayed departure:

‘The TIPNIS visit is seeming more and more out of reach. They are having problems with fuel and the meeting is being postponed. Once again, we’re being told we will leave tomorrow’ (Fieldwork diary 16 April 2013).

How the state responds to oppositional movements is important for understanding how political spaces, debates and projects are being shaped. For those involved in the opposition, it is important as they are losing representation and power. This was noted by an older campaigner, who had been involved in earlier claims for territorial rights. I noted in my fieldwork diary, following a conversation on the boat, that he lamented that:
Organisations were strong but now have no representation at national level and national government doesn’t respect their territory, indigenous rights, nothing’ (Fieldwork diary 17 April 2013)

More widely, the TIPNIS dispute creates questions about how particular views and groups are marginalised. In terms of indigeneity, it suggests its shifting meaning as a discursive space.

7.3 Locating indigeneity: historical struggle and an indigenous state

To claim rights from the same state that they were opposing, TIPNIS protesters mobilised their indigenous identity as more legitimate than the indigenous identity of the state. They reclaimed indigeneity as an identity marginal to the state, as part of an attempt to discredit the state’s legitimacy. For example, many of the TIPNIS protesters whom I interviewed had not only marched in the large 1990 March for Territory and Dignity but had also later campaigned for Evo Morales. Some of the leaders, mainly those in central positions, had played a role in his early government as part of the Unity Pact. In interviews they mentioned their initial commitment to the changes that Evo Morales promised but shock at what had transpired. Interviewees expressed their opposition to the changes that they had witnessed, using discourses of indigeneity to critique how the TIPNIS dispute had been handled and to claim political rights. The quote below, from a TIPNIS protester, shows frustration and concern about how they, as indigenous, are being treated by the Morales government. The protester explains that he expected there to be a different relationship between themselves and the government, because both are indigenous.

‘..In this time we should be brothers and sisters with the government…but after six years (in government) they have started to say they are going to build the road, they enter without consultation with the indigenous pueblos of the TIPNIS and this territory has a title of ownership, therefore the government should respect it and respect what is said in law. …first they will come to the TIPNIS and later start with the other indigenous territories…’

(TP4).
In this statement, the interviewee also suggests that the TIPNIS dispute should be warning to all other indigenous territories in Bolivia, illustrating that TIPNIS protesters are aligning themselves with Bolivia’s broader indigenous movement and tying the TIPNIS conflict to a wider politics of indigeneity. The failure of the state to meet their expectations was used to cast doubt on the state and its ability to meet the needs of the indigenous movement more broadly. For example, the inability of the TIPNIS protesters to access their indigenous constitutional rights has become a key part of the TIPNIS opposition campaign. The quote below shows that they are explaining the situation in terms of a hijacked indigenous movement.

‘(The TIPNIS dispute) has motivated us to say, that here they have knocked down the rights of indigenous pueblos and all that is already written in the new constitution. We have been fully recognised in the new constitution of the state, which we obey, comply with and respect, as something that was the result of huge mobilisations across the whole country…so now the pueblo is rising up against the government because they see the knocks, the abuses of the state’ (TL4).

The TIPNIS protesters rejected the state’s attempt to consult within the territory, as it only sought consultation after road building had already been started and rejected. However, the dispute has propelled the issue of prior consultation into the limelight and it has grown into a wider, regional campaign to (re)secure indigenous rights. For example, the Bolivian Climate Change Platform, a coalition of indigenous organisations that originally formed to create an indigenous strategy to combat climate change, have now refocused their work on this issue of prior consultation. This was explained to me by a member of the organisation and can be seen in the quote below:

‘Now the platform is pushing also for the construction of a law of consultation. It is linked to what happened in the TIPNIS. We are having workshops with CIDOB, CONAMAQ (indigenous political organisations), we have already had a lot, so we can make a joint proposal for a law……we are entering into processes of discussion and debate with government departments’ (TH).

Their national campaign is part of a growing regional campaign on the same issue, connecting TIPNIS protesters to other indigenous groups across the
Amazon region in Latin America. I also observed diverse and changing alliances within indigenous politics during my fieldwork. For example, TIPNIS protesters’ leaders were part of COICA, a pan-Amazonian indigenous political organisation that has members from the six Latin American countries that share the Amazon basin. COICA are mobilising Amazonian indigenous identity against multiple extractive interests and mega-development projects in Latin America. Through this organisation, the TIPNIS leaders discussed and promoted themselves as Amazonian, rooting their struggle over the road in a longer historical struggle and wider identity politics. Through their ties with these national and regional campaigns, TIPNIS protesters are promoting their indigenous identity, demanding their constitutional rights and challenging the state by casting doubt on state commitment to indigenous issues. The complexities within this illustrate that there are multiplicities of indigeneity and that it is a shifting political category, a point returned to in the next chapter.

Returning to the national frame, interviewees also referred to the conventions and agreements signed in the 1980s and 1990s. This further supported their reading of the TIPNIS conflict as yet another instance of a government overpowering indigenous communities. In statements such as the one below, interviewees aligned themselves with Bolivia’s long-running indigenous movement at the same times as distancing the government from the same movement. The TIPNIS protesters thus depict a movement hijacked and threatened by the state, as illustrated by the quote below:

‘...they went ahead without consultation but for any activity planned for any indigenous territory, the government must first sign a contract or make a law or carry out prior consultation with the indigenous pueblos and this is said in the UN Convention 169. It is ratified in the laws of our country’ (SIO1).

The quote above not only criticises the state’s implementation of its own constitution but also criticises its commitment to earlier, international legislation enacted to support indigenous territorial rights. By framing the conflict in this way, these statements position the TIPNIS protesters as indigenous, once again fighting the might and mechanics of the state. The TIPNIS conflict is told as the latest chapter in a long-running narrative about
indigenous struggle against the state. As introduced in the previous chapter, the TIPNIS protests were about more than the road. They developed into opposition to the power and reach of the state, itself guided by the wider extractive project. The quote below illustrates these wider concerns:

‘This government...what they are doing is to destroy. They aren’t complying with the same constitution that we, indigenous pueblos, have created and gave to the government...So the government isn’t credible now, in the form that it has taken. ...This knocking down of indigenous pueblos and we are the first that they are knocking down’ (BDG3).

The TIPNIS protesters have promoted their position, as marginal to the state, as proof of their indigeneity. They have used indigeneity in an attempt to strengthen their politically weak position, to challenge the state and (re)claim indigeneity. The protesters are using indigeneity to challenge their relationship with the state and negotiate its increasing reach into their territory.

7.4 Mobilizing Indigeneity against Local Threats
Despite their poor institutional footing and marginality, protesters also used the discursive power of indigeneity to challenge the state, oppose the road and garner support. This can be clearly seen in how protesters depicted themselves in contrast to the communities within Polygon 7. The relationship between the TIPNIS sub-central and those in Polygon 7 is an important dimension of the TIPNIS dispute. The presence of coca-growing farmers in Polygon 7 was perceived as a serious threat by most of the TIPNIS protesters I interviewed and spoke to. There was a significant worry that the road was being built to facilitate the entry of coca-growers into the park. This is illustrated by the quote below:

‘Because the cocaleros are here (points at map of road) and the expansion of cocaleros, well when I said that (Evo Morales) has a double discourse it is because we think that the cocaleros are not going to respect us and will advance because of the road and they will fill the park with coca and destroy our park, moreover here are the hydrocarbon reserves (points again at road)’ (LT).
In *Geopolitics of the Amazon*, Part III, Vice-President Garcia Linera asserts that the suggestion that the road will enable more coca growers to move into the TIPNIS is one of three ‘colonist fallacies’, created by those opposing the TIPNIS road. He argues that there are currently no coercive measures to prevent people from entering the park but that coca-growing unions voluntarily respect the agreed ‘red line’ surrounding Polygon 7 (*linea roja*). He argues that the coca-growers themselves set out limits to their migration into the TIPNIS and risk the support of their federations and unions if they cross the line (Linera 2012). However, prior to the dispute over the TIPNIS road, there were a number of conflicts between coca-growers and TIPNIS communities. These were documented in the national press. For example, in June 2006 *El Deber*, a national newspaper, reported that indigenous groups denounced violence within the TIPNIS (*Indigenas denuncian agresiones en el TIPNS*). Conflicts between indigenous groups of the TIPNIS and coca-growers was again reported in September 2009 in *El Diario*, another national newspaper (*Cocaleros atacan a indigenas TIPNIS*).

The problem of maintaining the TIPNIS borders also came up in interviews with SERNAP park wardens. They described their job as ‘dangerous’ and ultimately to protect park borders from infringement. This is illustrated in the excerpt below:

> ‘..*In reality, all the national protected areas have problems with illegal settlements and the exploitation of resources. This is our work, to guard the parks…*(our job is) very dangerous, very dangerous because there are narco traffickers and people illegally logging…Sometimes these people are armed…..it is very dangerous for us*’ (SWT1).

My interviews were dominated by concerns that the road would enable more coca-growers to migrate into the park, as it was planned to run directly through Polygon 7 and into the park. For many interviewees, the road was viewed as being for the benefit of the coca growing communities living in Polygon 7 over TIPNIS communities. This was because it was being routed directly from Polygon 7 towards San Ignacio de Moxos. For many interviewees, the road was being built primarily to assist the *cocaleros,*
increasing their presence in the park. These tensions between TIPNIS protesters and cocaleros are apparent in the quote below, from an interview when Polygon 7 was explained to me:

‘I will explain Polygon 7 so you understand it - Polygon 7 is where thousands of colonizers have settled, who grow coca…..This is where the President comes from – he is the President of the six coca growing federations of the Chapare and this is where all the leaves are grown for drugs. Polygon 7 is where the narco-traffickers have entered the park. They have torn apart 200 thousand hectares with their plots and grow nothing apart from coca. So we are defending the TIPNIS because the road has been designed for there (Polygon 7)…’ (BDG4).

The plans for the road were therefore being perceived as a threat to the existing territory of the TIPNIS. A key response by TIPNIS protesters was to mobilize indigeneity in a way that differentiated between themselves and the coca-growers. Although the state had created a new legal definition that united indigenous and campesinos, the TIPNIS protesters emphasised the differences. The TIPNIS protesters repeatedly stated their concerns about the impact of coca growers on their territory, culture, community and future. This is entangled with criticisms of the state, as President Morales remains the President of the Six Coca-Growing Federations of Bolivia, as noted in Chapter 3. For one TIPNIS leader, the state had made a calculated move to present itself as indigenous, precisely because of the international legislation and institutional support and favour available.

‘I don’t consider the government to be indigenous simply in recognition of the indigenous movement and the 1990 march, when they recognised the existence of indigenous pueblos. In recent years it has been fashionable, the term indigenous, and prioritized in all work, all support, all help….. The indigenous path was prioritised over the campesino/peasant.. organisations. So for this reason, the government, astutely, opted to call themselves indigenous and adopted the indigenous name… Because this was going to give them more strength to sustain themselves and gain international backing. It was important because the campesino/peasant movement didn’t have the same strength as the indigenous movement’ (TL1).
This quote not only discredits the government’s indigenous identity and its motives, it also shows that this protester has a conscious understanding that indigenous identity has a political dimension and that it can be used to access support, rights and resources. Other TIPNIS protesters stated their mistrust and doubt over Evo Morales’ relationship to indigeneity, suggesting covert motivations. This is shown by the quote below:

‘Well this is what I think...that we are seeing that the government act according to their own convenience, at the command/convenience of their people. We have always been indigenous pueblos, from the lowlands. We of the lowlands think that the government has no interest in us, and does not see that we are human beings, like them. The interest of the government is to steal our resources, the petrol that we have here, and this is their only interest’ (TPL).

Although no other interviewee was so explicit in identifying Evo Morales as indigenous for political gain, most other protesters did use his identity as a coca-grower to cast doubt on his indigenous identity. The meaning and impact of this relationship, between the coca-growers’ federation and the President, was a key concern of the TIPNIS protesters to whom I spoke. Most of the TIPNIS protesters I interviewed aligned themselves with the indigenous movement against the state, and questioned the indigenous identity of Evo Morales. Although they had campaigned for Evo Morales, as an indigenous leader and alongside coca-growers, they now used a peasant/indigenous differentiation to discredit Morales’ claims to being indigenous. By making distinctions between indigenous peoples and campesinos (peasants) and by aligning the President with the needs of campesinos coca-growers, TIPNIS protesters once again depicted indigeneity as marginal to the state. The quote below demonstrates this differentiation:

‘They don’t have the same thoughts as indigenous peoples….the government wants to put us in one bag, which is confusing for others…the government wants to put us together so we lose our territories and our house. So this is the difference between the life of indigenous peoples and campesinos – I don’t think they’re the same’ (BDG3).
The quote above also illuminates the tensions created by indigeneity as an identity claimed by multiple groups.

7.5 Indigeneity as a countermovement

Another way protesters were undermining the indigenous identity and rights of coca growers was by drawing out their differing approaches to property and ownership. Despite coca-growers having clear claim to indigenous descent and identity (Canessa 2014), protesters used a campesino/indigenous differentiation to align themselves to particular values as a way to undermine the indigenous mobilisations of the state. The quote below was typical of how protesters explained the different plans that coca-growers had for their land, focusing on coca-growers’ propensity for market transactions:

‘For my part, the government is indigenous but not like us, they are colonisers and cocaleros. But because they have seen all that we have made, as indigenous pueblos, and truly there is an attempt to be indigenous pueblos, orginarios….They have left and come to a corner of our lowlands and in the highlands the land is divided in the same way….They want to destroy where we live. We are orginarios…. We are Chimanes, Yuracares, Trinitarios - the three ethnic groups that live inside the Isiboro Secure park. (TL3)’

Whilst the statement above illustrates that cocaleros were described as colonisers, seeking to exploit TIPNIS resources, the statement below illustrates how TIPNIS protesters articulated their version of indigeneity. They maintained that indigeneity is tied to territory, nature, conservation and collectivity. Interestingly, the mobilizations speak to historical discourses of indigeneity, a point explored further in the following chapter. Whilst the next chapter looks at how this difference is used to justify entitlement and use of land, this chapter considers how it is articulated partly through expressing a different relation to the wider political economy, namely market systems based on individual profit and gain.

‘The big difference between indigenous peoples and campesinos is that campesinos are predators of the mountains, of the forests; in comparison indigenous people are conservationists. They conserve their lands, so that it will not be divided up and sold in plots…We fight and struggle together, no?’
In comparison, the campesino likes to sell, to divide their territory, so for us there is a difference’ (BDG3).

This framing of the conflict, as being between indigenous conservationists and state-supported capitalists, makes this a key case-study for uncovering the complexities of indigeneity - for example, the way in which the changing meaning of indigeneity affects rights, resources and power. In contemporary struggles for indigenous rights, multiple groups are mobilising indigeneity, including the state. The issue of who can claim the rights and benefits associated with indigeneity and how these relate to the wider, extractive agenda is a central focus of this research.

7.6 Indigenous Party Politics
In 2005 the five largest indigenous political organisations in Bolivia signed the Unity Pact, as part of the re-founding of the state and as a way to mark President Evo Morales' new ‘government-by-social movement' (Assies 2006; Linera 2012). The Unity Pact brought together indigenous leaders from across Bolivia to inform Bolivia’s ‘Process of Change’, which included forming the Constituent Assembly that drafted the 2009 Constitution. However, the TIPNIS dispute caused widespread division between the original organisations of the Unity Pact. For example, CIDOB and CONAMAQ formally withdrew in 2011 and alleged that the Pact was solely to support the MAS and their agenda (Los Tiempos 2011). Not only did the dispute fracture the Unity Pact, it left lowland indigenous organisations without representation in national government. Yet, in 2012 lowland opposition groups formed a new political party to directly challenge the MAS in the departmental governor elections in Beni.

In 2012 a new political party, the Front for Victory, was created and Pedro Nuny was introduced as a new candidate for the Beni departmental governor elections. His bid for governor went up against two larger parties, namely the MAS and the MNR. Pedro Nuny was a leader of the TIPNIS opposition to the road and acted as a spokesperson for the protesters, during the Eighth and Ninth Marches. He did not win this election, and whilst it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully explore the dynamics of party politics, the formation of
this new party still illustrates the splits that occurred as a result of the TIPNIS conflict. It shows that the MAS state is being challenged by alternative forms of indigeneity in the arena of party politics. The Front for Victory was used to articulate differences to the MAS, using contrasting mobilizations of indigeneity. These echoed many of the articulations of indigeneity made during my interviews and already discussed in this chapter. For example, the Front for Victory set out differing agendas for development and conservation. These can be seen by comparing the campaign manifestos from the Front for Victory and the MAS. The Front for Victory rooted their fight in the TIPNIS conflict. They used it to criticise the MAS, as the quote below shows:

‘The marches and resistance in the TIPNIS have taught us that it is possible to propose a different way to love family, nature and territory’ (Nuny 2013).

This quote locates their campaign in the TIPNIS conflict and re-asserts indigeneity as an alternative to the dominant political economy and ecology. The Front for Victory campaign manifesto promotes the indigenous, Amazonian identity of Pedro Nuny, stressing a distinction between the people of Beni and the central government. This is illustrated with the quote below:

‘I want to present a project not planned in the desks or buildings of the government, a project born from the urgency to preserve the spirit of Beni with its passionate and fighting people. Its forests, its rivers, its indigenous territories and our riches, that will be a part of the lives of all those from Beni, until now people forgotten and neglected’ (Nuny 2013:1).

However, the MAS campaign manifesto also stated their allegiance to indigenous values and to their grassroots foundations. The quote below is from the campaign manifesto for their candidate, Jessica Jordan. It shows how their campaign also explicitly tied their political aspirations to indigeneity, locating their political goals in indigenous teachings.

‘We will rule between all, from the pueblos to the provinces, from the frontiers to the cities, from the values that the indigenous pueblos teach us’ (Jessica Jordan 2013).
These manifestos also identify particular development goals. Jessica Jordan’s manifesto was focused on ‘Progress for Beni’ and pledged a commitment to industrialisation, economic prosperity and integration (Jordan 2013). This was pledged in terms of road-building, improved transport links and better telecommunications (ibid.). For example, the campaign set out five key aims for the region, which included plans for the management of Beni’s natural resources. These aims were guided by increased productivity and industrialisation, as shown by the excerpt below:

‘We pledge to construct a productive and modern Beni, with a programme of industrialisation for our natural resources to transform the productive matrix of our department….We will create an integrated Beni, building the best road network known until now’ (Jordan 2013)

Ultimately, the elections were a close race between the two largest parties - the MAS and the MNR. The MNR ultimately won, with 52 percent votes. The MAS came second with 44 percent of votes and the Front for Victory got just 3 percent of the votes (OEP 2013). Although Pedro Nuny lost, the MNR offered him position as their Secretary for Indigenous Affairs. For those who supported the move, it was described as an opportunity to access political power and support for their fight for the TIPNIS. This is because Carmelo Lens, the elected governor in 2013, pledged publicly. to support the TIPNIS opposition. I noted this in my fieldwork diary at the time:

‘On the front page of the newspaper it says that Carmelo Lens is making the defence of the TIPNIS his top priority. I had thought the issue might fade at the governor level with the election of Lens but I was wrong’ (Fieldwork 23 January 2013)

This support gave the TIPNIS opposition some level of political backing and legitimacy. Two other leaders agreed to work with him in the departmental government. One such leader described it as an opportunity to challenge and oppose the state and defend the TIPNIS, as shown in the quote below:

‘The invitation is to be able to take up our duty, the grand challenge….to be able to confront the monster that is our government…We think that with the Governor we can together make, with the organisations of the TIPNIS, a
proposal…, to give to the government and say that we want respect...united we are going to have much more strength to be able to confront this challenge…..’ (BDG3).

The alliance between the Front for Victory and the MNR was justified by identity politics, this time to consolidate and support a lowland, Amazonian identity. The supporters of the alliance, members of the Indigenous Office and members of the Governor’s Office explained the alliance in terms of shared interests in defending the Department of Beni, its culture and its identity. This is shown by the quote below, from an interview with a TIPNIS leader:

‘Pedro Nuny has been our candidate because…he is always defending indigenous pueblos, our territories and not just defending the interests of our pueblos - he is defending Beni society, for everyone from Beni because we have witnessed the abuses of this government….’ (TL4).

When asked, members of the Governor’s Office explained that they approached Pedro Nuny because of these shared regional interests, as the quote below shows:

‘We have the same principles, in terms of defending our territory. …..ideologically and conceptually we have the same principle…the vision more than anything else is to construct an inclusive and participatory departmental government from where we can manage the affairs of our department’ (BDG1).

This move was not supported by everyone I interviewed and it marked a significant stage of the continuing dispute. There was division and unease amongst some the TIPNIS protesters about the alliance, with some groups in disagreement. It created fractures within the protest movement, as some had chosen to opt for power where they could get it, whilst others remained dedicated to indigenous autonomy. The quote below illustrates these split views:

‘Really, at the moment there is a rupture between (those in the departmental government) and ourselves … We don’t want our brother to be appointed to this party that we don’t trust, because they too have abused indigenous
For campaigners who supported the TIPNIS opposition, the partnership with the traditional right was lamented. Interviewees were concerned about this departure from left-wing politics. MNR in Beni has strong ties to the long-standing, right-wing politics of the eastern lowlands. The alliance took steps towards the complicated politics and divisions between the traditional, ruling elites and the historic campaigns for citizenship and radical political, as voiced by the MAS. This concern is illustrated by the quote below:

‘It’s bad, it’s bad because all that’s been said and done as an effort in the defence of the TIPNIS, all that was dedicated to this electoral campaign, has been a pyrrhic victory….it is terrible- a tragedy for the Left in Bolivia….’ (CC).

The relationship between the TIPNIS opposition and the traditional, lowland political elites has continued. For example, in the 2014 general election, Fernando Vargas, the President of the TIPNIS, ran as the Green Party candidate, supported by another party from the Right, the Movement Without Fear (MSM). These developments and allegiances show the changed landscape of indigenous politics. Multiple claims for indigeneity and its associated rights have muddied the indigenous politics that dominated before the election of the MAS, when indigeneity unified groups across the country and when ‘protest was indigenised’ (Brysk 2000a). They show the contemporary ways that indigeneity is being articulated and illuminate how it is being mobilized for power.

7.7 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the way that indigeneity is being mobilised and claimed during the TIPNIS dispute, answering the second research question –

To what extent do mobilizations of indigeneity help these movements to meet their demands and access political power?

I have argued that the TIPNIS conflict is a key moment for (re)determining the political power and meaning of indigeneity and that the TIPNIS dispute reveals not only multiple, new indigeneities but also dominant and marginal
mobilisations of indigeneity to claim political power, resources and rights. In this chapter, I have approached indigeneity as a political category and as an identity mobilized for political power. In doing so, I have shown that mobilizations of indigeneity respond to contemporary political conflicts at the local and national scale. In this case, indigeneity is being claimed by the TIPNIS protesters as a route to challenge the state and provide some level of control over the changes being proposed for their territory and communities. It is being used to voice opposition to the extractive regime of the state and attempts to negotiate the state’s planned ‘process of change’. However, the TIPNIS conflict suggests a split between how the state and its citizens interpret the content and meaning of indigeneity, particularly when it challenges the extractive agenda.

In this case, I have looked to indigeneity as a mechanism open to those who are marginal and oppositional to the state and the political and financial power that it wields. I have illuminated the complexities of Bolivia’s current politics of indigeneity and have found that it is no longer a discourse for those marginal to the state, as so often defined in the literature (see Kuper 2003; Li 2007, 2010; Canessa 2007; Niezen 2003). Instead, indigeneity is now the discourse of the state. Protesters have found themselves negotiating issues of authenticity and legitimacy, in a seemingly impossible situation where they seek approval from the very power they are opposing – the state. Indigeneity is therefore shown to have limits to its powers, when mobilised as an identity to claim power from those who have it. The TIPNIS dispute thus also provides a moment of insight into competing ideas about the power and reach of the state and the potential limits of indigenous autonomy, a point returned to in the conclusion. This next chapter explores the TIPNIS conflict from the perspective of nature conservation.
8 The Struggle for Conservation

In this chapter I examine how protected area conservation was both mobilised and changed by the TIPNIS dispute. I do this by using the local, national and global scales to think about how protesters, the state and international development and conservation actors engaged with the protest. I firstly argue that the meaning of indigeneity is changing, in terms of how it maps to discourses of conservation and nature. Secondly, I argue that the state’s protected area conservation agenda is being opened up to accommodate extractive industry. To make these arguments, I firstly explore how the TIPNIS is valued by protesters, as home and territory. I then show that many of the protesters mobilise indigeneity as an identity bound to the aims and values of conservation. However, I view these forms of indigeneity in relation to the ways that their territory and identity has been entangled with state conservation agendas in the past. I then consider the plans for the Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos Highway, arguing that the road reveals shifts in how the state envisages conservation and relates it to the wider political economy, namely their extractive project. I show how the state’s treatment of the park suggests wider shifts in its approach to conservation, for example dismantling the discursive and legislative ties between indigeneity and conservation. I then look at the response of international and national NGOs to show how particular forms of indigeneity and conservation are becoming marginalised more widely.

8.1 The Local: conservation and everyday practice

An important finding from my interviews with TIPNIS leaders was the value and importance they placed in the region as their home. Over 5,000 inhabitants, living in 63 communities, live within the TIPNIS. Their communities are primarily along the banks of the rivers Secure, Isiboro and Ichoa in the eastern part of the park. For most of the leaders I interviewed, within their descriptions of the TIPNIS and their answers about the dispute, were statements that described the value and importance of the TIPNIS as
daily life and family. It had been the home of their grandparents and they wanted it to be the home of their grandchildren.

‘For us, for me personally, the TIPNIS means living, it is where I was born. It is our main house, where we all live together with nature, where we work and where we live from hunting and fishing animals. It is where they grow potatoes, yucca, and rice. It is an important place, a precious place for us because still we have all the natural resources that are there, so we could never destroy it because we are going to live in it, as our children come, as our grandchildren come, then newer generations, and they will go on living there, in the TIPNIS’ (TL2).

This sentiment is a key example from my interviews, demonstrating the importance of the TIPNIS as a home and as a dwelling. It describes a historical attachment to place, where interviewees and their families were born and raised and the importance of preserving this for future generations. This attachment to place was noted in my fieldwork diary, when an older leader spoke to me about why they defended the park:

‘When your life is dependent on trees, fish and rivers you’ll look after them. They are your world’ (Fieldwork diary 17 April 2013)

This comment echoes previous calls to recognise that the links people have to a place and the dependence they have on its resources, for example for food and livelihoods, can spur them to protect it (Martinez-Alier 1995; Martinez-Alier & Alier 2003b; Escobar 1998).

This historical attachment to the place helped determine the territorial rights that the communities attained in 1990 (see Appendix 1). It is also crucial to understanding how the TIPNIS is valued by TIPNIS protesters and why they have fought to defend it, over time. Narratives of struggle and protection were linked to concerns for home and place. When speaking of the current dispute with the state, TIPNIS protesters located the struggle within a much longer one, as the latest stage in an ongoing effort to protect their territory, homes, and communities from competing claims to their land. One leader, who played a key leadership role in the earliest protests against the highway, referred to a childhood memory of struggle.
'I have been involved in the TIPNIS as I said, as someone who is from the TIPNIS. My fight is for the TIPNIS and dates from when I was a child. The first time that we stopped a tractor that was entering the TIPNIS was in 1989. I was a child at school and we were leaving the school when the tractor passed by our community. We made two columns and crossed into where the tractor was passing. We did not allow them to enter and this is where I can remember my first fights for the TIPNIS. We sustained it thus until I was an adolescent. I was a youth and had already taken on some duties within the community, until I became the president of the TIPNIS. So my fight for the TIPNIS started when I was a boy and continues now’ (TL1).

This quote shows that multiple and long-running efforts to protect their territory were intertwined with the contemporary dispute over the highway. It is also interesting to note the lack of state support or state presence in this quote. The protester remembers defending the territory as a community, without state presence. This point is raised later in this chapter, when I consider the road as a symbol of increasing state reach and as a part of a state territorializing project. However, of note here is the importance of protest. Although the previous chapter looked closely at how protesters understood and claimed their indigenous rights and how they located these rights in a long history of struggle, it is important to include it here also. Struggle and protest are key to understanding both how TIPNIS communities were previously incorporated into state-managed conservation objectives and how protesters are challenging the road in the name of conservation.

A strong feature of protests against the road has been for TIPNIS leaders to mobilise their indigenous identity as one inherently tied to conservation. In interviews with me, in a highly politicised and conflictive environment, TIPNIS leaders made their case by mobilising indigeneity and its (constructed) links with conservation. They presented themselves as the group who are most committed to conservation goals, using their indigenous identity to legitimise their claims. Statements about commitment to conservation were prioritised in interviews, over other issues being debated within the communities and amongst leaders, such as their struggle for rights, experiences of poverty and desire for better opportunities. Instead, I found that those opposing the road
presented themselves as natural conservationists, who are an integral part of park conservation.

‘We are worried about what is coming- the threat to our territory, the TIPNIS, posed by our President, Evo Morales, who wants to destroy (the TIPNIS). But we, as indigenous pueblos, have always conserved nature and lived together with nature and we will always stand in defence of the TIPNIS’ (TL3).

In the quote above, the protester identifies opposition to the state as an environmental struggle and stresses indigenous identity as one intimately tied to nature. Interviewees expressed their indigenous identity as one bound up with conservation aims and emphasized the unique relationship between indigeneity and nature, also shown in the quote below:

‘The TIPNIS is the heart of everyone in Bolivia but for me it is my homeland and my world because it is the world where we live, where we enjoy, where we have fun, where we live together, where we suffer, where we are ill, where we are cured and where we are healthy. Where we can move freely, no? And where we live in harmony, between humans and nature, with the insects, fish, animals and amphibians,... with the crocodiles, tigers and jaguar. We live together in this area and for this reason, it is my world, and means the future existence of my indigenous pueblo’ (TL1).

The quote above is a good example of how indigeneity was explicitly positioned as connected to nature and conservation. The TIPNIS opposition was rejecting the road and voicing their concerns about the environmental impact that it would have on the area, as well as its socio-environmental impacts. A strong feature of their campaign was to emphasize the conservation value of the park and their role in creating and protecting the landscape. However, whilst discourses of indigenous peoples as ‘ecologically noble savages’ (Redford 1990) have proved to be problematic, these mobilisations of indigeneity cannot be explained solely as ‘strategic representation’ (Robins 2003). In other words, these representations are not solely about seeking legislative or political support, they are also rooted in historical experiences of being indigenous in the TIPNIS.
8.2 Entangling Indigeneity & Conservation in the TIPNIS

In 1965, the TIPNIS was categorised and defined as a protected area. It was decreed to be a national park by the state, although there was no recognition that there were communities living within it. In 1990, the lowland March for Territory and Dignity demanded territorial and citizenship rights for the communities living within the park, on the basis of their indigenous identity. State recognition of the communities in the park, and their subsequent allocation of indigenous territorial rights, coincided with the state’s increasing commitment to protected area conservation. At this point, indigeneity provided a way for communities to gain recognition and territorial rights from the state, without threatening the state’s conservation aims. There was a middle-ground or cross-over (see Conklin & Graham 1995) between the aims of the communities and state conservation aims. For example, both wanted to stop the illegal extraction of natural resources within the park. However, more than this, there was a discursive space that tied conservation and indigeneity.

Until the 1990 March for Territory and Dignity, the state had not recognised the existence of the communities living within the park, but neither had they invested a lot of resources in managing it (PIEB 2012). After the 1990 march, indigeneity provided a discursive space in which the communities and state-managed conservation could co-exist. The quote below is from a protester who also participated in the 1990 march. His statement illustrates how many of the TIPNIS protesters understood their history within the park and to the state – as one fundamentally tied to conservation.

‘The TIPNIS, for us, is an indigenous territory and also a national park, which was set up in 1965 when they decreed it as a national park, and now it is the TIPNIS. They created the national park because no care had been given to the natural resources of the area- the trees, the animals, the fish and they wanted to stop people from entering to steal wood, clandestinely, no? But they had no protection or laws for us, the indigenous pueblos, so we participated in the politics….In 1990 indigenous pueblos rose up to march. I am someone who marched in 1990, for territory and dignity. At this time, the President was Jamie Paz Zamora, and from him we obtained the supreme decree 2261, that protected the TIPNIS until now, until where we are now.”
The supreme decree set out protection from the river until the centre, 5km from the bank, so it is this protection that should continue, no?’ (TP4).

As already noted, in the 1990s the state recognised the TIPNIS communities as indigenous. The communities became a part of the state’s conservation plan and the territory was classified as a Double Category Park, meaning it was both an indigenous territory and protected area. By the 1990s the state found that new spaces for conservation overlapped with the territorial aims of indigenous pueblos (PIEB 2012). The state set up the national protected areas service, SNAP, and enacted the 1992 Law of the Environment (Ley del Medio Ambiente). Within this, there was a focus on rights and promoting social participation, echoing the wider decentralization policies in the country at the time. SNAP planned management committees, which brought together local actors and the national conservation service to co-manage parks. By 1998 there were 10 management committees and the first co-administration agreements with indigenous pueblos had started, in the TIPNIS and Kaa-lya (PIEB 2012:12). Co-administration agreements were also signed with NGOs for other protected areas, specifically Noel Kempff, Ulla Ulla, Tariquia, Amboro and Pilon Lajas. Bolivia’s protected areas are now home to around 116,000 inhabitants, 98 municipal governments, 10 associations (subcentrales) and 14 TCOs (SERNAP 2006 in PIEB 2012:8). As a result, the five strategic aims of SERNAP refer to development and conservation. As noted in Chapter 4, they are:

1. To preserve national natural and cultural patrimony;

2. To develop sustainable social economy;

3. To manage the participation of communities in the management of protected areas;

4. The strengthening of management capacity of relevant actors; to link with political administration (institutional organizational and territorial); and

5. The sustainable management of finances (PIEB 2012:8).
In my interviews with SERNAP wardens, many of them linked conservation with indigeneity. Wardens spoke of their role in terms of protecting both biodiversity and the indigenous pueblos within the park, as show in the quote below.

‘The work of SERNAP has been very important and, moreover, we have 22 protected areas in the country..... I think there has been a huge advance in preserving and maintaining our biodiversity, natural resources and the indigenous pueblos’ (SHO1).

The state allowed indigenous communities to live in the national park, whilst preventing access for others. In my interviews with SERNAP park wardens, they described their role as one of protection and defence. They protected biodiversity and indigenous pueblos but also defended park borders from others who wanted access to park resources. In interviews, wardens described the dangers of the job and the difficulties of protecting such a vast area from multiple groups. As example of this is shown in the quote below:

‘In reality all the national protected areas have problems of illegal settlers and the exploitation of resources. This is our work - to guard the park in a system of protection to ensure that they respect the resources of the protected areas’ (SWT1).

Quotes, like the one above, often described threats to protected areas and mentioned illegal loggers and ranchers, as well as illegal settlers who wanted to live and farm within the park.

### 8.3 Conservation: managing people & place

During fieldwork, I saw that the union between TIPNIS communities and conservation was not only constructed, it was also managed. The 1992 *Environmental Law 133* laid out the ways for communities to live within the park without threatening wider conservation aims. The state recognised the communities living in the TIPNIS but created a framework to manage their presence within the conservation aims of the state. This is laid out in a management plan for each national park, including the TIPNIS (SERNAP n.d). For example, the President of the TIPNIS meets the Director of SERNAP to discuss decisions about the park (SERNAP n.d). The everyday practices of
communities who live within the park also adhere to a management plan for the park. In terms of resource use, for example, communities have access to forest resources for sustainable use but do not have ownership or total control of the resources of the TIPNIS (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2012; PIEB 2012). There are different zones demarcated within protected areas, ranging from zones of ‘strict protection’ (Zona de Proteccion Estricta) to Zone of Approved Use of Natural Resources (Zona de Aprovechamiento de los Recursos Naturales) (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2012:17-18). Therefore in the TIPNIS, certain parts of the forest are out of bounds, particularly in central areas of the park, and access to these zones is prohibited by park guards. In the quote below, a TIPNIS park warden describes how these rules work day-to-day:

‘They (the TIPNIS communities) care for the environment and protect their resources…..but it is also managed by a plan and legal agreement that manages their sustainable use of the park resources’ (SHO1).

In these ways, policy and practice shape the ways that communities live within wider conservation objectives. The state and TIPNIS communities have been working together in ways that have constructed and consolidated links between indigeneity and conservation and worked to maintain their middle ground. This shows that the mobilizations of indigeneity being made by TIPNIS protesters were rooted in the ways that their lives had been stitched into the conservation objectives for the park, because of their indigenous identity.

Relationships between TIPNIS communities and conservation had been further constructed through employment and livelihoods. For example, the state had employed community members as park guards. In the Trinidad office which manages the TIPNIS park exclusively, I spoke to all the park wardens and all but one were from the TIPNIS. The following quote is from an interview with the TIPNIS park wardens. In the excerpt below, the warden describes the relationships between communities and conservation:

‘We are controlling the natural resources, so that they are not stolen by businesses and things like this, no? The other side is that we are a friend of
the TIPNIS because we control it or guard it. There are two ethnic groups inside the TIPNIS, which live inside the TIPNIS, including all the park guards that are here - we are from these communities. As the Director said, in reality we are workers but we are also from these communities, we belong to these communities and so we are striving to control our own resources because in reality the truth is that when we stop being workers we are going to go and live in our own communities, no?’ (SWT2).

 Communities are thus recognised as indigenous and so have rights to live within the park borders, protected by the state’s protected areas agency. SERNAP employs community members to enforce the rules that manage both communities and conservation, thus creating more ties between conservation and indigeneity. Taken together, the quote above helps to illustrate that indigeneity is seen as entangled with conservation at the local level by both protesters and wardens. These entanglements go some way to explaining why TIPNIS protesters mobilise indigeneity as an identity bound to conservation. However, in the following sections I consider how these forms of indigeneity map their contemporary political setting.

8.4 The National Scale: the state’s agenda
Although the government denies a link between the TIPNIS road and extraction, their treatment of the TIPNIS makes sense when seen in the context of their wider extractive agenda. The MAS state has been openly committed to developing extractive industry in the country, simultaneous to President Evo Morales speaking out in the global arena about the perils of climate change and the ongoing destruction of the planet. The uniting logic between these two positions is set out by Vice-President Linera in his 2012 monograph Geopolitics of the Amazon. He argues that nature has always been used and changed by humans. His fundamental argument is that everyone is extracting in one way or another. This is shown in the quote below:

‘As is well known, any human activity – from building a house to growing food, hunting and even walking and breathing – affects nature. No one lives solely in contemplation of nature, as naive environmentalism argues, because those who did would not live long’ (2012:27).
‘In any case, human activity is possible solely through the transformation of nature, whether in the form of a hut or a city, a sown field or some pavements, a dam or a turbine, or a dump truck;....’ (2012:31)

‘All societies and modes of production have in their own way those distinct levels of ‘raw materials’ processing. If we conceptualize ‘extractivism’ as the activity that simply extracts raw materials (renewables or non-renewables) without introducing greater transformation in the work performed, then all societies in the world, capitalist and non-capitalist, are also to a greater or lesser degree extractivist’ (2012:31)

What matters to Linera is the mode of production. For him, what is important is that this is not tied to a capitalist system (see Linera 2012).

Commitment to extraction has shaped the conservation agenda of the MAS. In 2013, for example, Vice-President Linera spoke at a 2013 mining convention in Santa Cruz. During his address, he confirmed the state’s continuing commitment to hydrocarbon extraction and announced that protected areas would pose no barrier to hydrocarbon exploitation should gas reserves be found within them (Achtenburg 2013). This was confirmed on 20 May 2015, when extraction within protected areas was sanctioned by law. Extraction was also accommodated by additional environmental legislation. For example, in 2012 the MAS state enacted the previously introduced Law of the Rights of Mother Earth. This law was developed as an alternative to the green economy and in response to climate change, granting nature rights. It was developed by the Bolivian Climate Change Platform (Plataforma Boliviano Frente al Cambio Climatico) and attempts to value nature using non-market logic. Although this has been at times been celebrated internationally as a radical move in the right direction, it is more controversial within Bolivia. The law enacted by the state has been hotly contested by those who originally drafted it because the government added a clause about extraction (Achtenburg 2012). This meant that extraction could not be challenged using this law and that Mother Earth had limited rights. Interestingly, this legislation did not feature in the dispute. One of the TIPNIS protest leaders whom I interviewed had played a role in the committee that
developed the law. When asked about the disjuncture between the law and what was happening in the TIPNIS he responded:

‘(smiles) This government can make laws but they don’t know them. It is a government that isn’t obedient to its own constitution, it is a government that doesn’t follow the laws, because they have a two-thirds majority but this will end… the government is always going to be neoliberal … it is a government with a neoliberal capitalist logic …’ (SIO1).

The changing content of conservation, namely conservation that accommodated extraction, explains some of the suggested environmental projects for the TIPNIS. Since the dispute about the road began, the state suggested a number of new conservation initiatives. For example, in 2012 the state suggested that the road could be an ‘Ecological Highway’. This would be a bridge, which would sit above much of the park and prevent environmental damage (CEDLA n.d). On 6 August 2012, Morales announced that he would create an Ecological Regiment of the armed forces (Regimiento Ecologico) whose mission would be to protect national parks and prevent any type of illegal settlement by peasants in the TIPNIS. This was held up by Vice-President Linera as a sign of the state’s commitment to conservation (see part III). However, in the context of the dispute it was viewed with suspicion by many, as they saw it as an attempt to co-opt TIPNIS youth and control the opposition. This is shown in the quote below, from a national NGO:

‘The ecological barracks will be inside the protected areas but it will not be inside the TCO. But the thing is that if they put it there … it will be a barracks inside an indigenous territory… I think that they have done it to threaten the indigenous pueblos and to attempt to change how they think …’ (NNGO6).

Although advertised on the walls of the SERNAP head office in La Paz, SERNAP officials were unclear of how the ecological regiment would operate. They explained it as a training area for local groups, to help them become better conservationists. This quote below explains these objectives:

‘There are certain forms of competencies … and in the general rules for protected areas they state that in the case of infringements or environmental crimes, the Director of the Protected Area can, in some cases, appeal to the
police or military, in compliance with these infringements or environmental crimes, no? In the case of the TIPNIS, what’s happened is based on this context and in this occasion… they are trying to strengthen the role of the military, inside, for protection. But also, accompanying this strengthening of the role of the military is a training element and training the indigenous people that live there in conservation and for the development that they want in this region of the TIPNIS. So these people that are going to be inside, the ecological regiment, they want to operate, to be called, a training regiment for conservation’ (SHO2).

These projects were unclear and potentially problematic. However, they help to build a pictures of the wider context in which the TIPNIS dispute occurred. They also suggest that the state could use its access to the area, through its status as a state-managed protected area, to facilitate its extractive project in the name of conservation.

In terms of protected area conservation, there also appears to have been a shift at the national level in how both indigeneity and conservation are imagined and treated. Actions of the MAS state suggest a shift in terms of how they understand the relationship between indigeneity to conservation. This can be seen by the confusion over Law 180, which was enacted following the Eighth March. As introduced in Chapter 6, the state enacted Law 180 as part of the agreement to stop all building works for the road and commit to the long-term protection of the park. It made the TIPNIS untouchable and protected the park from future development projects. However, what at first was treated as a victory by campaigners, later became muddied as it became apparent that the TIPNIS would be protected but community rights to use resources within the park would not. With this legislation, the state demonstrated that the presence of communities was no longer recognised as compatible with conservation. This is an important shift in the state’s treatment of indigeneity, separating indigeneity from conservation. The conflict around Law 180 suggests that the MAS state did not recognise indigenous communities as a part of protected area conservation. Instead, they have used conservation to limit the ways that communities live within the park. The APDHB and Caritas assessment of the
government’s consultation in the TIPNIS suggests that this separation was used to push through the road. Law 180 became one of the choices of the government’s consultation with communities. They were asked to choose between protecting the park from development projects, meaning they had no access to forest resources, or the road, promoted as the route to development for communities (Caritas Boliviana 2013).

This separation of people from conservation was evident in interviews with key supporters of the MAS. They described the park as no longer pristine, as it was already being utilized by the TIPNIS communities to meet their livelihood needs. This is shown in the quote below:

‘The environmentalists across the world think that all of the territory is virgin forest but it isn’t’ (CG2)

As shown in the quote below, the ideal of wilderness conservation, as previously discussed, was held up to highlight the flaws of the TIPNIS. The park was presented as already diminished by the presence of people, in justification of building a road. For example, in the quote below the interviewee suggests that the impact of one extra section of road would be negligible:

‘On the other side too there is a road and people live there….all of this place, it is only 17km, no more, that needs to open. They say it is virgin forest, environmentalists think that all of this is forest…but Polygon 7 is already inhabited and all of this is an indigenous territory…’ (CG2).

This was explained to me in similar terms by another key supporter of the road and the MAS. He showed me a map of the region and talked me through the distances, as quoted below:

..This is the TIPNIS on this map. On this side is Beni and on this side is Cochabamba. So, there is already a road up to San Antonio, OK? So it is only missing 60km before it reaches Beni and there is already a road to Santa Cruz’ (MG1).

These quotes suggest a separation of conservation and people, justifying the road by the presence of communities within the park. The environmental
impact of the road are underplayed and are instead presented as a small addition to an already inhabited region. This argument was echoed in Vice-President Linera’s monograph on Amazonian geopolitics, where he also argues that the TIPNIS is mistakenly thought of as virgin forest and is instead a site of logging, tourism, alligator hunting, cattle ranches and landing strips (2012:12-16). He also argues that the section of road needed is negligible, as 85 percent of the road presently exists though unpaved, as a cattle pass and existing road (2012:22).

Shifts in how the state comprehends and acts towards conservation can also be analysed by exploring how SERNAP envisaged their role and remit. In interviews with employees at the SERNAP Head Office in La Paz, as well as with TIPNIS park wardens, interviewees revealed their deference to the wider aims of the state. For example, when asked about the rules and laws that guided their work, interviewees in the SERNAP Head Office were reluctant to outline independent conservation aims. Instead, they deferred to the state’s wider environmental and development objectives, firmly positioning themselves as acting for the government. This is shown in the quote below:

‘We are not responsible for making the rules … we don’t have the competency as an institution to make them. The Ministry of the Environment and Executive Power has the capacity to propose them to the pluri-national assembly’ (SHO1).

One interviewee was reluctant to answer any questions about the laws, rules and principles that guided protected area conservation, deflecting them to central government ministries. This is seen in the excerpt below:

‘Your questions are good but they aren’t for SERNAP, they refer to the work of the Ministry - maybe you can talk with them?....SERNAP has been working within a law for protected areas but SERNAP has to work with lots of filters, it has to work together with the Vice-ministry, it has to presented to the Ministry for the Environment, it has to convince them…’ (SHO1).

This response both reveals SERNAP’s compliance to state objectives and the reluctance of SERNAP workers to answer questions about the TIPNIS, a controversial topic. In practice, this compliance means that the conservation
agenda of SERNAP falls within state development aims. For most of the SERNAP employees I interviewed, their work would continue whether roads were built or hydrocarbon mines constructed. What came out in interviews was that although individual wardens had concerns about the highway, the official view was that the building of a road would not curtail or jeopardize the work of SERNAP. The agency would continue to conserve the TIPNIS and manage it as a protected area, come what may. This view is illustrated by the quote below:

‘SERNAP has a specific position, it has a specific mandate for conservation and protection. If there is a road, even if there is a road we are going to continue complying with our mandate. It is a mandate for conservation and protection and, road or no road, we will continuing complying with these conditions that we have to obey, no?’ (SHO1).

What the statement above demonstrates is that meaning and content of conservation is changing and adapting to the new state. Protected area conservation will continue, although the protected areas themselves may drastically change. What these statements also show is that the workers of SERNAP, a state agency, do not see themselves to be in a position to challenge the government. They see themselves as a state agency, reliant on state direction and regulation. They did not present themselves as an agency keen to play a role in the politics of conservation. Indeed, when asked about the greatest challenges facing protected areas, an interviewee from the SERNAP head office did not mention the expanding hydrocarbon industry or the recent announcement by the Vice-president that protected areas would no longer be a barrier to hydrocarbon mining. Instead, the interviewee identified their greatest challenge as making sure they continued with their mandate to represent and protect each type of ecosystem present in Bolivia.

In an interview with a key supporter of the government, this approach to conservation was reiterated. The value of conservation was acknowledged but the environmental impact that a highway might have was not. Conservation would continue but the changes to its form and content would not be acknowledged. This is illustrated by the quote below:
‘It is important to us that it was declared a national park, because it is the lungs of our country…….The road has to pass through the TIPNIS but it will always respect both sides - there will be no destruction or stealing of trees. The Isiboro park is ours and needs to be protected.

Question: So you want a road and a protected area? To have both?

Yes, exactly, both’ (CG2).

In summary, protected area conservation is undergoing a shift. The state is displaying a lessened commitment to protected area conservation, in terms of protecting areas from the intensive extraction of resources and large-scale infrastructure projects. Moreover, it has a revised approach to indigeneity and conservation, no longer aligning indigenous rights with its conservation agenda. Moreover this suggests a shift in how protected areas addressed the competing claims on natural resources. Unlike in the past, when the extraction of resources was prohibited, state-managed conservation was being aligned to their own extractive aims.

The changing ambitions of the state had an effect on how the Double Category status of the park was perceived and how it functioned. Whilst TIPNIS protesters emphasised the importance of protected area conservation, as argued earlier in this chapter, my interviews revealed that the mechanisms managing the relationship between communities and conservation were strained. The conflict has caused shifts in how the TIPNIS was co-managed, as both a protected area and indigenous territory, and many of the TIPNIS leaders discussed the breakdown of relationships between themselves and SERNAP. Statements like the one below revealed that the TIPNIS conflict has fractured relations between communities and SERNAP wardens.

‘Previously, we were working in co-ordination between us, the (river) Secure sub-central and SERNAP - with their Protected Areas Director for the TIPNIS. We really were working in co-ordination together but since the government of Evo Morales came into power we have broken all relations with the Director, with the park guards. We don’t have co-ordination with them, absolutely none, in this management of Morales. We have totally broken all agreements. There has been an agreement for 10 years with SERNAP, which worked as a co-
administration…but these days they have totally violated us, have knocked down our rights and there is absolutely no co-ordination, and no collaboration with the state…” (TL4).

This quote describes not only the breaking-down of relations but also that SERNAP is now mistrusted because they are a state-managed agency. It suggests that this marks a change in relations between communities and park wardens. In interviews, many interviewees were sorry about this change. They described the previous relationship between SERNAP and TIPNIS communities as positive. Many mentioned the help that wardens offered communities and individuals, for example, offering them passage along the river and back. This is illustrated in the quote below:

‘I think it's important, this institution, because workers collaborate to preserve/conserve, to care (of the environment). More than all, outsiders enter that aren't from the TIPNIS, to steal the resources. So they are caring for it but now, sadly, the problem is with the government … Sadly, SERNAP is an institution of the state, so the (SERNAP) workers obey the state … It is part of the government, it obeys the government so, sadly, now they are not, and will not, support the TIPNIS … It is very sad ... They used to assist a lot of people, in previous years … for example taking people (up river) or bringing them back. But sadly, not now' (TL5).

Despite the fact that many of the park wardens are from the communities of the TIPNIS, SERNAP was also viewed with suspicion. As agents of the state they were mistrusted. The statement below highlights the doubts that some interviewees had about the job that SERNAP have been doing since the conflict. Statements like the one below further separate SERNAP from conservation aims, and in doing so support the argument of the protesters - that it is the indigenous communities who ultimately care for the conservation of the park and its continuing protection.

‘There used be a document that laid out the shared management between the park guards and people from the territory but today, sadly, they are perceived as being on the payroll of the state. They are obligated to the state and these same people are being put against their own families, who live inside the park. I think that for us, really, I know already that many communities from the
TIPNIS have said that the park guards aren’t doing their jobs that they did before, for example in caring for the park. Because it isn’t only the park guards who receive payment, it’s also people in Trinidad. So the opinion is that the park guards or SERNAP aren’t carrying out their duties as they should’ (TL5).

The mistrust of SERNAP park guards brings up another set of questions about state presence within the park. As the conflict continued, relations with the state worsened, as shown by the incidence of police violence at Chaparina and subsequent campaign for justice. In this context, SERNAP represent an oppositional state and their very presence was seen as a threat. For some, the presence of SERNAP was felt as the increased reach of the state into communities and lives. This is illustrated by the quote below:

‘SERNAP in recent times has only served the police or the military because they know the rivers, they know where there are channels, where you cannot go and where you can enter. For this reason, they have been utilised by the government’ (TL2).

The quote above also emphasises the changing perceptions of SERNAP.

8.5 The Global Scale: accessing international eco-politics

TIPNIS protesters have challenged the state by both mobilising indigeneity and by mobilising the value of protected area conservation. One way that they have done this is by fighting for protected areas protection, as a far-reaching good. Statements from TIPNIS protesters often emphasised the value of the TIPNIS as an area of protected area conservation. They explained its value in national and global terms, stating the importance of the TIPNIS as a protected area. On a number of occasions, the TIPNIS was described as the lungs of Bolivia and of the planet, appealing to international campaigns to stop the deforestation of the Amazon.

‘The truth is that we aren’t doing this just for us, indigenous pueblos: instead, it is for all Bolivians, it is a motto for all. The environment involves everyone, as does that oxygen that it gives’ (TL3).

In the past, the TIPNIS has been a site of international conservation funding and projects (see GIZ 2015). However, their affiliation to wider, conservation
and development objectives appeared changed. The role of international environmental actors and agendas in the TIPNIS dispute is contradictory to the dominant narrative. President Morales and Vice-President Linera have attributed the opposition to the road to the meddling and ‘pseudo-environmentalist’ ideologies of international NGOs. In doing so, they link the TIPNIS opposition to their wider environmental critiques. For example, Linera argues in *Geopolitics of the Amazon* that NGOs have launched a ‘local environmental crusade’, serving to consolidate the power and profit of transnational corporations in exchange for the protection of forests (2012:29).

In this way he links the TIPNIS opposition to the green economy, which he admonishes for creating a system in which companies continue to raise profits in their countries of origin without modifying the destructive patterns of their impact. In the press and in government documents about the TIPNIS, the state connects the TIPNIS opposition to the road to foreign NGOs and the green economy. In doing so, they undermine the TIPNIS protest by attaching it to outsider interests and their own anti-neoliberal narratives.

However, although discussions of the green economy have been raised at points during the dispute, for example in the initial list of demands on the Eighth March, I found little evidence to corroborate these claims. During my fieldwork, I asked protesters about the projects like REDD+. The response was very mixed. In informal conversations some leaders seemed interested in it. Towards the end of my fieldwork, some protest leaders were talking about schemes like REDD but, importantly, it would require the support of the government before it could be implemented. Many protesters had never heard of it, whilst some leaders were vehemently opposed, as shown in the quote below:

‘The TIPNIS does not have a price, we are not selling it, we are no offering it out. On the contrary we want to protect it, together. The territory does not have a price because it has cost fights, marches and the deaths of our grandparents, who fought to defend the territory … We cannot sell because it is the lungs of all Bolivians … We don't value this subject of finance, to the contrary we want help to conserve the lungs of all Bolivia’ (BDG3).
Ultimately, the green economy was not a central feature of the protest and was not evident as a principal objective of the dispute. However, it was used by the government to critique the protesters and their environmental concerns. The state also responded to the opposition to the road, and to the environmental concerns of protesters, by accusing protesters of being the puppets of foreign NGOs. They have accused them of being led by foreign NGOs and by ideals based on the green economy (Linera 2012). Key to this has been denying the kind of indigenous environmentalism being mobilised by TIPNIS protesters and to identify it as the narrative of foreign interests. Throughout the TIPNIS campaign, the state has suggested that a relationship between international NGOs and the TIPNIS protesters is paramount. This was recognised as a tactic by protesters, who denied such a link. This is illustrated in the quote below, which not only refutes the state’s claims but reasserts their own claims on indigeneity and their long-running struggle for territory and rights:

‘Sadly, from the moment we set out on the Eighth March … the government has accused us of being financed directly by NGOs … but the support we have had and accepted has been from within Bolivia … At no point have we been financed by NGOs, rather we have been supported by Bolivia - it has been the people who have supported us to defend our territory. … This is a defence of indigenous pueblos and a fight of the indigenous pueblos … What is important is that it benefits the pueblos, the communities and that in the future our children can live in their own territories’ (TL4).

I also did not discover such strong ties. Indeed, I noticed a lack of NGO presence during fieldwork, as commented in my fieldwork diaries:

‘One thing that I’ve been finding really interesting and curious is the role of NGOs. I arrived in Trinidad thinking that international NGOs are playing a big role in environmental discourse and in supporting TIPNIS leaders. But although they may still have a big role in discourse, there’s no-one here! … I’m now more interested in why they aren’t involved with the TIPNIS - a huge issue for indigenous groups in this area’ (Fieldwork diary 18 January 2013)

I found that the state’s criticism of foreign NGOs was not only a political tactic to undermine the claims being made by the TIPNIS opposition, it also helped
to create a situation for NGOs in Bolivia that appeared fraught with tensions. NGOs were negotiating complex and changing national politics. Many of those I interviewed felt constrained in the work and projects that they could undertake. The international NGOs I interviewed were clear that their projects needed to complement national development aims and not question them. This is shown by the quote below:

‘… what is new, with Evo Morales’ government is that fact that they have strengthened the principle that NGOs should not go against plans of national development, which we think is logical’ (INGO1).

Most NGOs I spoke to were supportive of the policy, agreeing that national development was a matter for the national government. This is shown by a quote from another international NGO:

‘We are not Bolivian, we do not have the right to get involved in national matters’ (INGO2).

However, my interviews also revealed the tension and complexity of the situation. They suggest that foreign NGOs had little room for manoeuvre. What this meant, for conflicts like the TIPNIS, is that NGOs could offer very limited support, even if sympathetic to the TIPNIS protesters. Foreign NGOs felt unable to criticise the policies of the national government. This is illustrated by the quote below:

‘Question: Are there limits on you doing direct work, political activism against the state or companies within Bolivia?

Oh god no, we definitely wouldn’t, we wouldn’t go into anything direct at all. In comparison to Colombia, where NGOs want you as a foreigner to make public statement to put pressure on the government and it works … there’s a lot of suspicion of any foreign involvement and what your motives are, as a foreign agency. It’s not your place to be meddling or influencing anywhere so no, we definitely wouldn’t do that or be seen to be supporting projects against the state. Possible if there were multinationals committing environmental or human rights abuses then you could lobby at an international level - that might be different. But at the moment we’re definitely hands-off anything like that - it wouldn’t help anybody. And there’s also something that although you
Although these comments raise questions about the role of NGOs more widely, the concerns of international NGOs did not seem wholly unjustified. During my fieldwork, USAID was expelled from Bolivia, amid allegations of corruption and that they had been working against the national government (BBC 2013). There were also rumours that organisations which supported the TIPNIS could find it hard to keep working in the country. For example, the APDHB report on their consultation in the TIPNIS suggests that Solidaridad Medicos Canarios, a Spanish NGO, were expelled from Bolivia because of their negative coverage of the government’s consultation (mentioned in APDHB findings 2013:118). It has also been reported that the Ministry of the Presidency in Bolivia announced the expulsion of the organization IBIS, a kind of parastatal NGO supported primarily by DANIDA (the Danish government foreign development agency). IBIS has long worked with indigenous organizations in Bolivia, supporting land reform, bilingual education, and the right of prior consultation. However, the MAS government accused IBIS of political meddling (injerencia política), though it published no allegations of specific actions. It has been suggested that the government was punishing the NGO for having weighed in on the side of CONAMAQ (an Andean indigenous organization) and CIDOB (the umbrella organization for lowland Bolivian indigenous groups) in recent conflicts with the state, for example the TIPNIS dispute (Gustafson 2013). Whilst I recognise that rumours may be unsubstantiated, what they illustrate is a climate of trepidation.

The wider political context shaping NGO work in Bolivia therefore influences the kind of work they do on their key themes, such as indigenous rights, climate change and protected area conservation. What this meant for the TIPNIS protesters is that they had little support from NGOs, despite the role that foreign NGOs have historically played in supporting rural Amazonian communities to negotiate with states, using claims to indigeneity. Despite all NGO interviewees having sympathy for the TIPNIS protesters, international NGOs felt unable to support them. They could not become involved in the dispute, seen as an issue of national development. At points, this seemed to
be an uneasy position for some NGO workers. The quote below shows that this interviewee felt torn between empathy for local groups and the limits to involvement.

‘And there’s also something that although you want to support communities or Bolivian NGOs it’s not our place to be leading on what they want ‘ (INGO4).

International NGOs also discussed their ability to intervene in the TIPNIS, in terms of the project targets that directed their work and organisation. They emphasised the organisational constraints of their work, for example wider, pre-planned objectives and constraints. Limited funding streams and project commitments were given as reasons why social movement mobilisations, such as the TIPNIS opposition, could not be fully supported. The quote below demonstrates these constraints and raises interesting questions about the role and remit of NGOs in relation to social movements. For example, regarding which issues are pursued within development and conservation agendas:

‘… on the one hand it (the TIPNIS) is extremely political and on the other, many of the projects with which we are affiliated have very specific targets and these don’t dovetail with a march. Our resources are predetermined and so what we can give is scarce … and sure, the political situation is very delicate, so for two reasons it is very hard to directly support this type of activity’ (INGO1).

International NGOs often deferred to national-level NGOs when asked about working with the TIPNIS. However, I met no national-level NGO who claimed to be working with TIPNIS protesters. Some had been involved at points in the campaign for example, they had published materials that documented the Eighth March. However, I did not find a single national NGO that was working, directly and systematically, with the protesters. Instead, many national-level NGOs discussed future projects that would be influenced by the TIPNIS - for example joining the campaign for prior consultation or moving to work in Bolivia’s Amazon region.
8.6 Conclusion

This chapter has answered the third research question – How has post-neoliberal politics shaped protected area conservation?

This chapter has argued that the TIPNIS dispute reveals cracks in the country’s national parks and protected areas system. I have argued that the relationship between communities and conservation was constructed and monitored by policy but that the MAS state is shifting the goals and form of protected area conservation to allow for the exploitation of natural resources within parks. To do this, the MAS state is dismantling policies that previously tied communities to conservation by denying previous assumptions about indigeneity. The potential restriction of access to resources that this may cause is significant. In 2004 the World Bank redefined its guidelines on resettlement, extending ‘involuntary displacement’ to include the restriction of access to resources, even when physical removal from a protected area does not occur (Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau 2006; Adams & Hutton 2007). This means displacement includes ‘the loss of rights to residence, loss of rights to use land and resources, foreclosure of rights to future use and loss of non-consumptive use-values, for example access to places of religious or cultural value (Adams & Hutton 2007:157). As the TIPNIS conflict continued, the very structures that protesters are seeking to protect were threatened as relationships between SERNAP and communities fractured. This chapter has argued that a revised form of conservation is being promoted by the state and its national parks service, SERNAP, which is compatible with large-scale state development projects, such as road-building and gas extraction.

I have also looked at how protesters have mobilised both indigeneity and protected area conservation to oppose the road. I have argued that mobilisations of indigeneity, as an identity associated with nature conservation, have lost favour and that the TIPNIS protesters have received little institutional support, either from the state or the international conservation and development NGOs working in Bolivia. However, in this chapter I have argued that the TIPNIS opposition should be understood as a form of environmentalism that seeks to negotiate the rate and scale of development.
Viewed from this perspective, this chapter highlights a gap between the place-based environmentalism of TIPNIS protesters, which seeks to accommodate their lives and needs, and wider conservation and development practice. How this informs our understanding of post-neoliberal environmental politics is explored more fully in the Chapter 9.
9 Conclusion

This thesis is concerned with the demands that humans are placing on the planet. Such demands are interrogated in long-running debates about how to reconcile the tensions between development, as an immanent process of capitalist expansion (see Cowen & Shelton 1996), and the environment, taken broadly in reference to finite natural resources, landscapes and wildlife. Scholars, some states, activists and citizens have voiced alarm about the impact that expanding capitalist frontiers are having on the world around us – depleting resources in ways that have been felt globally, not just locally. In Bolivia, these tensions are manifested in one of the poorest countries in Latin America, where natural resource extraction is being tied to new social welfare projects. Extraction has been presented as crucial to build a new nation state and vital for the protection of the most marginalised (see Linera 2012; Canessa 2014).

The fundamental aim of this project has been to understand the political ecology of post-neoliberalism. As environmental issues become increasingly prominent in local struggles, national debates, and international policies and programmes, we need to be paying more attention to how they are produced and shaped by politics and power relations, as well as to the differences between how groups relate to their biophysical environments (Robbins 2011; Peet et al. 2010; Peet & Watts 2002; Guha & Alier 2013a; Neumann 2014; Paulson et al. 2003). Political ecology illuminates how natures and conservation are created - in this project the focus has been on the people and natures that are marginalised. The reason for such a focus has been to reveal and consider alternative viewpoints, meaning those that challenge dominant practice or offer something different. This is a focus on radical politics, meaning those which offer a significant break from the mainstream.

Radical politics also demand more academic attention. This is necessitated by some of the most pressing concerns that have been raised about how environmental issues are currently framed and combatted. Critiques of
dominant neoliberal conservation, for example, have argued that it consolidates and promotes elite power - that it has the potential to increase and enable the control and ownership of natural resources by global elites primarily interested in its economic value. This has profound implications for who can access natural resources and how they can be used (Brockington et al. 2006; Igoe & Brockington 2007; Castree 2010; K. I. MacDonald 2010; Holmes 2011). Another concern, raised in Chapters 1 and 2, is that three decades on, rather than sparking political debate about the environmental pressures created by ongoing industrialisation, expansion and growth, the environmental crisis is being combatted using the tools and logic of capitalism (Corson 2010; Igoe et al. 2009; Brockington & Duffy 2010; Büscher et al. 2012; Igoe et al. 2010; Brockington et al. 2008; Carrier 2010; K. MacDonald 2010; Robert Fletcher 2010; McAfee 1999). This removes the potential that conservation has to make transformative change, as it means that environmental goals do not require changes in existing political institutions, the distribution of economic power or resource flows (Adams 1995; Redclift 1994; Corson 2010; McAfee 1997). In this thesis, the political ecology of post-neoliberalism has been investigated in response to these concerns.

Such an approach has helped to reveal an emerging political context defined by both extractive industry and claims to radical politics. It has helped us to understand and identify how environmental issues are being comprehended, addressed and compounded by this new state project. However, it has also created additional questions about how radical, alternative politics are formed and sustained. This has meant interrogating the politics of what is radical and recognising that claims to alternative and transformative politics can be both appropriated and constrained. This is a second dimension of the political ecology of post-neoliberalism. By examining these dynamics, we can question how the terms of ‘radical environmental politics’ and ‘radical development’ are being set and consider how this may shape and even limit how we conceptualise and envisage our (local, national and global) futures. I argue in this conclusion that the scope of radical politics has been reduced, meaning that possibilities for alternative environmental politics have narrowed.
The complexity of this has required a multi-dimensional theoretical framework. I have used three key themes of development, environment and indigeneity as a way to explore the particular dimensions of post-neoliberal political ecology. These themes structured my theoretical framework and, subsequently, my research questions and thesis chapters. In this final chapter, I summarise the findings of each data chapter, which correspond to the sub-questions of this research. I then return to the key themes of development, environment and indigeneity to consider what these findings tell us, more widely, about the political ecology of post-neoliberalism and the possibilities for environmental alternatives.

9.1 Research Answers

Question 1: In what ways is extractive-led development being encountered and negotiated by civil society, specifically place-based, environmental social movements?

The TIPNIS case-study reveals the reach of the extractive agenda. For example, it reminds us that the extractive project requires wider infrastructure and political changes (see Bebbington & Bury 2013; Kaup 2010; Kaup 2008; Hindery 2013b; Arsel & Angel 2012; Arsel 2012; Humphreys-Bebbington 2010). In Chapter 6, ‘Protest, Participation and Development’, I addressed how extractive-led development was being encountered and negotiated by civil society, specifically a place-based, environmental social movement. I looked carefully at key moments in the timeline of the TIPNIS dispute, to question how the TIPNIS opposition experienced protest and to better understand contemporary Bolivian politics. I found that multiple grievances and sites of struggle developed from the initial opposition to the road. More than just opposing the road, protesters were opposing the process through which the road had been planned and promoted. This was perceived as an increased reach of the state at the expense of indigenous territorial and political rights. Not only were rights being reduced but the TIPNIS opposition were discredited, discouraged and, at points, disregarded. This suggests that the political space open to oppositional movement has been curtailed, a point returned to later (see Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Humphreys-Bebbington...
2010; Bautista et al 2012). Rather than opposing any changes within the TIPNIS, this chapter also revealed that protesters were attempting to negotiate the form and content of development in their territory. However, the TIPNIS leaders struggled to control development in their territory, in the face of the state’s wider extractive agenda.

Question 2: To what extent do mobilizations of indigeneity help these movements to meet their demands and access political power?

In Chapter 7, ‘Mobilisations of Indigeneity’, I considered the extent to which mobilizations of indigeneity helped the TIPNIS movement to meet their demands and access political power. In this chapter, I showed that there are multiple claims to indigeneity but that these differently map political power, resources and rights. By approaching claims of indigeneity as discourse, this chapter revealed the TIPNIS conflict as a key moment for (re)determining the political power and meaning of indigeneity. I found that indigeneity was being claimed by the TIPNIS protesters as a route to challenge the state and assert control over the changes being proposed for their territory and communities. Protesters claimed indigenous political and territorial rights to oppose the state’s planned infrastructure and to attempt to negotiate the wider ‘process of change’. However, indigeneity is no longer only claimed by those marginal to the state, as so often defined in the literature (see Kuper 2003; Li 2007, 2010; Canessa 2007; Niezen 2003). Instead, indigeneity is now also claimed by the state itself, creating questions about the changing power that indigeneity affords marginal groups.

Question 3: How has post-neoliberal politics shaped protected area conservation?

This shifting meaning of indigeneity was explored again in Chapter 8, ‘The Struggle for Conservation’. In this chapter I questioned how post-neoliberal politics shaped conservation. I found that previously constructed ties between indigeneity and conservation were changing, for example through the access that indigenous communities had to natural resources within the park. I also found that the state’s conservation agenda, predominantly carried out through protected area conservation, was being opened up to accommodate
extractive industry. Moreover, I found that international conservation and development NGOs felt unable to intervene in the dispute or to question the development agenda of the state. This once again supports the assertion that the extractive agenda has supremacy over the states social and environmental goals. As a part of this, mobilisations of indigeneity as an identity associated with nature conservation have received little state support and have been discredited as being the result of ‘meddling foreigners’ (see Linera 2012).

**9.2 Development**

Post-neoliberalism emerged from significant and successful anti-neoliberal protests, which demanded new people-led politics. In the name of post-neoliberalism, the new Bolivia state has tried to address development, as an immanent process (Cowen & Shenton 1996). It has embarked on a new political project, or Movement Towards Socialism, and committed to the guiding principles of *vivir bien*. This project has involved development as an intentional project (Cowen & Shenton 1996), setting up new state-led social welfare projects and successfully reducing poverty levels in the country (Radhuber 2012; Jean Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012). This project is being funded by the state’s increasing reliance on the extraction of natural gas, which requires political and financial support as well as infrastructure. However, the TIPNIS conflict shows the complexities of addressing poverty and in defining development, as many of those who have opposed the road and this new government ‘of the people’ are poor, marginalised and geographically isolated.

Importantly, those who opposed the road have done so in the name of environmental concerns, discussed later, but also with demands for increased political rights and more meaningful levels of control over their territories and lives. For example, they have fought for autonomous rights over their territory, so they can decide how it is changed or developed and so they can direct their own economic futures. This was expressed both as a desire to control their lives and also as a response to years of negotiating citizenship rights with the state. This is important firstly because their opposition shows that reducing poverty is not an apolitical step that always helps the most vulnerable. In the TIPNIS case, it is not clear that TIPNIS communities have
benefitted from Bolivia’s wider state project. This is not to say that TIPNIS communities did not want development, or even that they did not want the kinds of development later offered by the state, namely electricity, drinking water, education and better healthcare. However, the protesters were prioritising the power to determine their own development, echoing wider debates and calls for development to be radical and participatory (Freire 1972; Chambers 1997; Banks & Hulme 2012; Bebbington, Hickey, et al. 2008).

What was missing from state offers of development is crucial. They lacked mechanisms to enable collective, local and community-led development. This contradicts the promises of *vivir bien* and of the MAS social movement-led state (see Linera 2012; Gudynas 2013; Escobar 2010). Political spaces were reduced and the possibilities of ideological alternatives and new politics have therefore diminished. Whilst the state appropriates the language of radical alternatives, in the TIPNIS case it has foreclosed the kinds of political spaces and policies that are needed to develop them.

A further dimension to consider here is the role and opportunities for social movements. As previously introduced, these have historically been a crucial form of politics in Latin America – a region shaped by exclusionary, elite-led governments since colonial rule (Escobar & Alvarez 1992). Recently, social movements played a central role in challenging neoliberal reforms and governments (see Arsel & Angel 2012; Escobar 2010; Perreault 2003; Hylton & Thomson 2005; N. Postero 2010; Kaup 2009). In Bolivia the state now claims to govern by social movement, or from social movement bases (Linera 2012). Yet these findings from the TIPNIS conflict support others who have raised concerns that oppositional movements are being seriously challenged and limited by the MAS government (Humphreys-Bebbington 2010; Pellegrini & Arismendi 2012; Paz 2012; Webber 2012). In the case of the TIPNIS, protesters have not been offered new political platforms or increased representation in state-level politics. Rather, the opposite has occurred and their political legitimacy has been reduced. For example, traditional forms of engagement with the state, namely protest marches, have been disregarded and side-lined. From this perspective, the role for social movements, defined
as contentious politics, is changing. One again, this suggests limited political spaces for debate and disagreement.

It could be argued that the MAS state has been limited by the economic realities of being the poorest country in Latin America and that they need to extract valuable resources in order to improve the lives of those who have long struggled with poverty and marginalisation. Indeed, this is what the state itself does argue (Linera 2012). However, this position has foreclosed the possibilities of alternative development and justifies prioritising extraction in wider state endeavours. This has created newly vulnerable and excluded groups. In the case of the TIPNIS, the opposition campaigners have been repeatedly dismissed by the state and experienced violent repression. They became politically isolated and lost representation and legitimacy at the national scale. In light of debates about the multi-dimensional experiences of poverty (see Mitlin & Saterthwaite 2013), these findings are important. They necessitate better justification, in terms of the reach and impact of the state’s wider poverty reduction agenda and new state project. They also directly contradict vivir bien as ‘living well, not living better’ by prioritising poverty reduction as an isolated economic statistic, dislodged from debates about politics, power and participation.

These emerging dynamics of post-neoliberal development raise questions about the position and purpose of other development actors in Bolivia, specifically NGOs. In the TIPNIS case NGOs felt unable to openly intervene, due to constraints made by the Bolivian government and by their own organisational agendas. Whilst recognising the precarious nature of their position, these findings support those who have called for NGOs to be more politically meaningful, as actors who support alternative, grass-roots and bottom-up politics over state and donor-approved development (Bebbington, Hickey, et al. 2008; Mitlin et al. 2007; Edwards & Hulme 1996; Banks & Hulme 2013; Hulme 2013). Escobar has argued that Bolivia has two contrasting projects - that of the state and those of social movements (2010). In this view, it is social movements which are advocating a more radical, post-liberal future (ibid.). In the case of the TIPNIS, the danger is that NGOs were complicit in legitimising those versions of indigenous rights, participatory development and
conservation that were sanctioned by the extractive-led state at the expense of the definitions, representations and politics emerging from civil society and social movements.

9.3 Environment

As discussed, Evo Morales has been outspoken about the environmental ills facing the planet. However, the actions of his government contradict this rhetoric. Firstly, there is the obvious contradiction of extraction. The MAS government has become the most resource-dependent country in Latin America (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014). Conservation in Bolivia is regulated through this extractive-dependent political economy, confirmed on 20 May 2015 when the government passed Supreme Decree 2366 to allow hydrocarbon extraction within 22 protected areas in Bolivia (La Razon 2015). This means that the form and content of protected area conservation, the central conservation strategy of the state, has shifted to accommodate the extractive agenda and its related infrastructure.

The government has been critical of protected area conservation, critiquing it as an agenda of the Global North that immobilizes the Global South as poor park wardens (Linera 2012). In many ways, their critiques echo strands of academic analyses. Wilderness conservation, for example, has been a guiding idea of protected area conservation worldwide. To a large extent it has emerged from conceptual divisions between people and nature, which have their origins in Western thought (Adams and Hutton 2007). This conceptual distinction has been criticised for understanding the relationships between humans and nature as one that will lead to the degradation of natural resources and landscapes (see Robbins 2011; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2014). It has been argued that ‘wilderness’ is frequently created, at times denying human presence and even displacing communities (Cronon 1996; Brockington 2002; West et al. 2006; Brockington 2006; Adams & Hutton 2007; Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau 2006). Such findings have led scholars to argue that wilderness conservation creates ‘the wrong nature’ (Cronon 1996). What is surprising in Bolivia, however, is that the state is shutting down fundamental conversations about how people live in nature. Despite narratives of vivir bien
and state rhetoric of indigenous environmentalism, the TIPNIS case study shows that the state is promoting similar distinctions between people and conservation.

In the case of the TIPNIS, Law 180 offered a stark choice – development and the road or conservation without people. The nuances of resource use were further underplayed when the environmental impact of the road were refuted because the TIPNIS is inhabited and because people within it use its resources. With this approach, the state is rejecting discussions about how people might live within protected areas and within nature more broadly. Post-neoliberal political ecology therefore has a narrowed scope for exploring multiple, diverse and nuanced ways in which people use natural resources and live ‘in nature’. The consequences of this are compounded because these changes are being pushed through in the name of radical politics.

9.4 Indigeneity

As discussed in Chapter 2, the utility of indigeneity as a conceptual tool has been much debated (Kuper 2003; Kuper et al. 2003; Appadurai 1988; Appadurai 1996). Developments in Bolivia have rekindled this debate, for example with Canessa calling for new conceptual tools to distinguish between competing discourses of indigeneity (2014). In this thesis, I have responded to these multiple and competing discourses of indigeneity by locating claims to indigeneity in a wider politics. I have focused on better understanding the political power that indigeneity is bringing to groups in Bolivia, specifically those on the margins. Looking at the reach and limits of indigeneity for these groups, alongside the discursive meanings of indigeneity being negotiated, has helped me to assess what this means for the progression of radical politics. This has involved exploring how different groups of people and individuals manage to use indigeneity to advocate for their communities or promote their agendas (Brockington et al. 2008:120). In the case of the TIPNIS, it has meant locating discourses of indigeneity in wider struggles over development, political power, territory and conservation. These contemporary struggles reveal shifts in how indigeneity is being understood, how it can be
mobilised, and what this means, more widely, for how radical development and environments are being conceptualised.

In Bolivia, there has been a crucial shift, as indigeneity is no longer the discourse of the marginal; it is also the discourse of the state. The political changes in Bolivia, namely the election of Evo Morales and subsequent appropriation of indigeneity as statecraft and nation-building (see Canessa 2014) has meant that TIPNIS protesters are struggling to claim indigenous rights from an oppositional, indigenous state. Furthermore, the state’s appropriation of indigenous discourse has complicated the wider support that TIPNIS protesters can access, for example from NGOs. This is particularly meaningful because the state is mobilizing indigeneity as revolution. It identifies itself as indigenous, appropriating indigeneity in support of its radical, political project. However, with the TIPNIS, the state have simultaneously delegitimized and excluded alternative, contentious voices – de-politicising indigeneity and its possibilities to speak for transformative change. This is significant because indigeneity was the main way that protesters were claiming rights to citizenship, territory and political power.

This is also important for environmental politics. As already discussed, discursive ties between indigeneity and conservation have been much critiqued yet persist (Valdivia 2005). However, in Bolivia particular ties between indigenous groups and nature are being challenged by the state, namely those who reject (or wish to negotiate) economic growth and development on the basis of environmental concerns. Indigenous environmental rhetoric is promoted by the state but its rhetoric does not challenge their extractive-based development agenda. This means that indigeneity, historically conceptualized as a countermovement to capitalism (Li 2007; Li 2010), is being realigned. This limits the scope and possibilities for radical politics, by tying discourses of indigeneity to a development discourse that at times echo modernization approaches. In terms of environmental futures, this redefines what’s plausible by suggesting that any objections to economic growth in the name of the environment can only be a fantasy dreamt up on distant shores.
Returning briefly to NGOs, this may be a crucial time for redefining a ‘middle ground’ (Conklin & Graham 1995), between social movements and development organisations. Conservation NGOs are significant and powerful because:

‘these organisations, and the scientists, intellectuals and supporters from whom they draw their vision and strength, have remarkable power to define and delineate nature, to determine who can engage with it and under what rules, and to divide landscapes into zones that structure rights and access’ (Adams & Hutton 2007:168).

The lessening political spaces for radical politics in Bolivia necessitates action on behalf of NGOs. There has already been a strong case made for why NGOs are at their most ‘politically meaningful’ (Bebbington, Hickey, et al. 2008; Mitlin et al. 2007) when they support alternative, grass-roots agendas. The TIPNIS case suggests they could be crucial in guarding political spaces to debate and in determining environmental futures. The stark need to ‘move beyond exclusion to imagine a conceptual and material place for human society within, and not outside, nature’ (Adams & Hutton 2007:171) necessitates political spaces that challenges the de-politicisation of environmental politics.

9.5 Conclusion
In this concluding chapter I have considered what my findings contribute to understandings of post-neoliberal political ecology, focusing on its key dimensions: development, environment and indigeneity. I have then argued that, taken together, these findings suggest that in Bolivia the scope for development, environmental politics and indigeneity to be articulated as radical alternatives has been reduced. This is an important contribution to wider debates concerned with the mounting tensions between development and the environment as it emphasises the importance of researching the politics of transformative change. Such research makes vital contributions, revealing and exploring the points at which ideological differences or politicised spaces both occur and are constrained. This helps us to understand the viewpoints and political dynamics that shape how
environments are negotiated, (re)produced and defended, as well as how these influence the ways that we live and co-exist on the planet.
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Appendix

1. TIPNIS Title of Territorial Rights
2. Support from Tarija

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3. Support from Miners Federation

RESOLUCION EXPRESA Nro 3
APoyo Y SOLIDARIDAD CON LOS COMPAÑEROS DEL TIPNIS

El Magnifico CONGRESO NACIONAL MINERO ORDINARIO de la Gloriosa Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia, en plenaria de manera unánime resuelve:

Considerando: Que la marcha de los compañeros campeños del Territorio Indígena del Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS), empezó con una marcha de protesta el pasado 15 de agosto del año en curso, en defensa del medio ambiente, de los recursos naturales, por la no construcción del tramo 2 de la carretera Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos, que en realidad partirá en dos este territorio de nuestros compañeros indígenas, y que además de esta marcha ya cobró vidas humanas que es de plena responsabilidad del Gobierno, el Presidente del Estado hace caso omiso ante este conflicto.

POR TANTO: Este magnifico Congreso Nacional Minero Ordinario de la Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia en plenaria de manera unánime resuelve:

ARTICULO UNICO.- Apoyo y la solidaridad activa y militant en a los compañeros del Territorio Indígena del Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure, por ser atentatorio contra los bolivianos, que no favorecerá en nada a nuestro país mas al contrario a las Transnacionales, por lo tanto exigimos que el Presidente del Estado Dn. Juan Evo Morales Ayma atienda las demandas en persona a nuestros compañeros a la brevedad posible y dar solución definitiva a este conflicto.

Es dado en la Ciudad de Potosí, en la sala de sesiones del Magnifico Congreso Minero, a los diez días del mes de septiembre del dos mil once años.

PRESIDENTES DEL XXX CONGRESO NACIONAL ORDINARIO DE LA FEDERACION SINDICAL DE TRABAJADORES MINEROS DE BOLIVIA

[Signaturas]

[Sección de firmas]

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4. Full List of Demands of the Eighth March

PLATAFORMA DE DEMANDAS DE LA VIII GRAN MARCHA INDIGENA POR LA DEFENSA DEL TERRITORIO INDIGENA PARQUE NACIONAL ISIBORO SECURE TIPNIS, POR LOS TERRITORIOS, LA VIDA, DIGNIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS DE LOS PUEBLOS INDIGENAS DEL ORIENTE, CHACO Y AMAZONIA BOLIVIANA

1. TEMA TIPNIS

Rechazamos la construcción de la carretera Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Mojos que afectan a los territorios TIPNIS, TIM y TMI.

Demandamos la paralización inmediata del estudio socio ambiental y cualquier otro estudio o actividad de la construcción de la carretera así como la paralización de las obras y actividades de construcción de la carretera, el retiro de maquinarias, campamentos y personal que se encuentran en la construcción de esta carretera.

Demandamos la abrogación y anulación de las leyes, normas y decretos sobre la construcción de la carretera.

2. TEMA PARQUE NACIONAL AGUARAGUE

Exigimos la paralización de todas las actividades hidrocarburíferas en el parque nacional aguaragüe.

3. TEMA TIERRA Y TERRITORIO

El Gobierno del Estado Plurinacional debe garantizar que los Territorios Indígenas sean respetados en la nueva legislación agraria.

Demandamos la conclusión del saneamiento y titulación de todos los Territorios Indígenas (TCCs) y los replanteos y compensaciones territoriales.

Exigimos que se proceda al desalojo de todos los terceros ilegales en nuestros territorios hasta fin de año.

Demandamos la inmediata reversión y expropiación de tierras y la dotación de las tierras fiscales a favor de los pueblos indígenas del lugar, que no tienen tierra y los que las tienen insuficientemente atendiendo las demandas de los pueblos indígenas para consolidar los derechos territoriales de los pueblos indígenas.

Demandamos la atención a las demandas territoriales de los Pueblos Indígenas en asiloamiento voluntario o en contacto inicial, debiendo garantizarse los derechos de estos pueblos de conformidad a lo establecido por el artículo 31 de la Constitución Política del Estado.

Demandamos que se convoque a la CTCO en la que se debe proceder a la planificación de continuidad y conclusión del saneamiento, los replanteos,
compensaciones y desalojos, en dicha CITCO el INRA debe informar sobre el estado de ejecución del saneamiento.

El Gobierno debe garantizar los recursos económicos suficientes para financiar la conclusión del saneamiento de nuestros territorios.

Demandamos el levantamiento de las tranzas y cobros ilegales establecidas por los colonizadores, ganaderos, agropecuarios y privados que atentan contra los derechos de libre locomoción y transito de los pueblos indígenas.

4.- TEMA CAMBIO CLIMATICO FONDO VERDE Y REDD

Demandamos que el gobierno reconozca nuestro derecho a recibir directamente la retribución (pago) por compensación por la mitigación de gases de efecto invernadero que cumplen nuestros territorios (servicios ambientales).

5.- DESARROLLO NORMATIVO Y DERECHO DE CONSULTA

Exigimos al gobierno del Estado Plurinacional, que todos los Anteproyectos de Ley de interés de los pueblos indígenas antes de ser presentados al Órgano Legislativo Plurinacional, deben ser consultados y elaborados en coordinación y consenso con las organizaciones representativas de los pueblos indígenas parte de la CIDOB. El resultado sobre este tema debe ser parte de una agenda conjunta de trabajo acordada entre la CIDOB y el Gobierno

Demandamos que en la elaboración de la Ley de Hidrocarburos se incorporen las propuestas de los pueblos indígenas del oriente, chaco y la Amazonia boliviana e inmediatamente el gobierno convoque a mesas de diálogo para la elaboración y concertación del contenido de esta ley.

Exigimos se respete el derecho de consulta y participación en todos los proyectos de exploración y explotación de hidrocarburos y minería y otros megaproyectos, carreteras, hidroeléctricas que pudieran afectar a los pueblos indígenas, entre ellos los siguientes

Carretera IPATI – MUYUPAMPA – MONTEAGUDO

Túnel Aguarague

Carretera San Borja Rurrenabaque

Carretera San Buena Ventura - Ixiamas

6.- DESARROLLO PRODUCTIVO (FDPPIOYCC)

Descentralización del FDPPIOYCC a las regiones del Oriente, Chaco y la Amazonia, con asignación de recursos económicos específicos para los pueblos indígenas del oriente, chaco y la amazonia boliviana (34 pueblos y naciones indígenas de tierras bajas)

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Incorporación de la visión de desarrollo de los pueblos indígenas de tierras bajas en las políticas de desarrollo nacional.

Demandamos la incorporación de la CNAMiB como miembro del FDPPI/OYCC.
Demandamos la consideración de exenciones tributarias a las actividades económicas para pueblos indígenas e incentivos para fomentar su desarrollo

7.- AUTONOMIA INDIGENA

Demandamos que el Gobierno del Estado Plurinacional provea los recursos económicos para la implementación de la GTI en todos los Territorios Indígenas titulados como medio para ir avanzando hacia las autonomías indígenas.

La Ley de Unidades Territoriales aprobarse en la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional, debe posibilitar el acceso a las autonomías indígenas en todos los territorios indígenas, sin hacerlas depender de la voluntad o interés político de las gobiernaciones de los departamentos que manifestamente han demostrado su oposición.

8.- LEY DE BOSQUES Y DIRECTRICES

Participación de los pueblos indígenas en la elaboración de la ley de Bosques, la que debe contemplar toda la política forestal e incorporar las propuestas regionalizadas de los pueblos indígenas.

Paralización de la aplicación de las nuevas directrices forestales que afectan a los pueblos indígenas, aplicándose las que se encontraban vigentes antes de la aprobación de las nuevas directrices.

La ABT debe cambiar a los funcionarios públicos de su dependencia que cuenten con denuncias presentadas por los pueblos indígenas y contratar personal idóneo que conozca la región y sus características.

9.- PARQUE NACIONALES Y AREAS PROTEGIDAS

En la elaboración de la Ley Especial de Áreas Protegidas, pedimos se incorporen las propuestas y visiones de los pueblos indígenas.

10.- EDUCACION

Desenrollo inmediato de los recursos económicos asignados para la construcción de la infraestructura apropiada para el funcionamiento de la UNIBOL de tierras bajas, con albergues y comedores dignos para los universitarios indígenas correspondiendo la suma de Bs. 8,996,898. 67.- (Ocho millones ochocientos ochenta y ocho mil ochocientos ochenta y ocho con 67/100 bolivianos).

Nueva ley para mejorar el funcionamiento de la UNIBOL
Respeto a los profesionales indígenas en el ejercicio de la cátedra universitaria en la UNIBOL de Tierras Bajas y en la normal superior.

Programa Nacional de atención a la mujer, niñez y adolescentes, seguridad alimentaria, revitalización lingüística, formación técnica vocacional, productiva, ecología y patrimonios culturales.

Promulgación del D.S del Instituto plurinacional de lengua y cultura con sede en la ciudad de Santa Cruz.

Aprobación de la ley general de derechos y políticas lingüística con la participación de 34 naciones de tierras bajas.

Aprobación de los currículums regionalizados en todos los niveles.

Desconcentración de la Universidad Indígena UNIBOL en el Norte y Sur Amazónico.

Creación de la Normal Indígena Amazónica en el norte Amazónico.

Participación de los pueblos indígenas en la formulación de leyes, políticas y ejecución de programas de educación.

11.- SALUD

Incorporar efectivamente a los pueblos indígenas como beneficiarios del seguro universal de salud y el acceso de niños y mujeres a los servicios de los seguros especializados.

La creación de nuevos ítems de médicos tradicionales en los centros de salud que garanticen la buena atención de los hermanos indígenas.

La creación de nuevos ítems SAFCI en los centros de salud de las comunidades indígenas de Tierras Bajas.

Creación de hospitales móviles y de tercer nivel en las regiones con población indígena.

Creación de hospitales de tercer nivel en regiones indígenas.

Participación de los pueblos indígenas en la elaboración de la Ley de Salud.

Aprobación de los programas de salud regionalizados en todos los niveles.

12.- CENSO

Se debe realizar el censo de población y vivienda lo más pronto posible incorporando a los territorios indígenas como unidades diferenciadas de secciones o municipios a los fines de obtener datos concretos en los territorios lo que
posibilitará la implementación de políticas específicas para pueblos indígenas, así como su acceso a las autonomías indígenas.

13.- VIVIENDA

Implementación de planes de vivienda para pueblos indígenas en sus territorios y regiones, así como para los indígenas migrantes que viven en las ciudades.

14.- PROBLEMÁTICA DEL RÍO PILCOMAYO

Implementación de políticas de manejo, protección y conservación de la cuenca del Río Pilcomayo para ser una fuente de subsistencia de los pueblos Weenhayek, Tapiete y guaraní.

15.- COMUNICACIÓN

Garantizar el derecho pleno al acceso, uso y manejo de la información y la comunicación de los pueblos indígenas.

Implementación y financiamiento de un canal de televisión de la nación guaraní.

Garantizar la obtención de licencias y frecuencias de funcionamiento de manera directa y gratuita de los medios de comunicación de los pueblos indígenas por su naturaleza de construcción de la plurinacionalidad y sus distintas cosmovisiones.

16.- CUMPLIMIENTO DEL ACUERDO DE MAYO 2010 CON LA APG

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LEY DE PROTECCIÓN DEL TERRITORIO INDÍGENA Y PARQUE NACIONAL ISIBORO SÉCURE - TIPNIS

Artículo 1. (DECLARATORIA DE PATRIMONIO DEL TIPNIS). I. Se declara al Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure - TIPNIS patrimonio sociocultural y natural, zona de preservación ecológica, reproducción histórica y hábitat de los pueblos indígenas Chimán, Yuracaré y Mojeno-trinitario cuya protección y conservación son de interés primordial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.

II. En el marco de los artículos 30, 385, 394 y 403 de la Constitución Política del Estado y otras normas vigentes, se ratifica al Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure - TIPNIS como territorio indígena de los pueblos Chimán, Yuracaré y Mojeno-trinitario, de carácter indivisible, imprescriptible, inembargable, inalienable e irreversible y como área protegida de interés nacional.

III. Asimismo, adicionalmente se declara al Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure - TIPNIS, como zona intangible.

Artículo 2. (TERRITORIO INDÍGENA Y ÁREA PROTEGIDA). Teniendo el Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure - TIPNIS, además de la categoría de territorio indígena, la categoría de área protegida, se constituye, en garantía de conservación, sostenibilidad e integridad de los sistemas de vida, la funcionalidad de los ciclos ecológicos y los procesos naturales en convivencia armónica con la Madre Tierra y sus derechos.

Artículo 3. (CARRETERAS POR EL TIPNIS). Se dispone que la carretera Villa Tunari - San Ignacio de Moxos, como cualquier otra, no atravesará el Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure - TIPNIS.

Artículo 4. (PROTECCIÓN). Dado el carácter intangible del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure - TIPNIS se deberán adoptar las medidas legales correspondientes que permitan revertir, anular o dejar sin efecto los actos que contravengan a esta naturaleza jurídica.

Artículo 5. (PROHIBICIÓN DE ASENTAMIENTOS HUMANOS ILEGALES EN EL TERRITORIO INDÍGENA Y PARQUE NACIONAL ISIBORO SÉCURE - TIPNIS). De conformidad al Artículo Primerio de la presente Ley al ser declarado territorio intangible, los asentamientos y ocupaciones de hecho promovidas o protagonizadas por personas...
Presidencia del Estado Plurinacional
de Bolivia

Ajenas a los titulares del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure – TIPNIS, son ilegales y serán pasibles de desalojo con intervención de la fuerza pública si fuera necesario a requerimiento de autoridad administrativa o judicial competente.

Remítase al Órgano Ejecutivo, para fines constitucionales.

Es dada en la Sala de Sesiones de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional, a los veinticuatro días del mes de octubre del año dos mil once.

Fdo. ÁLVARO GARCÍA LINERA
CIUDADANO PRESIDENTE DE LA
ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVA PLURINACIONAL

Fdo. H. Zonta Guardia Melgar
SENADORA SECRETARIA

Fdo. H. Esteban Ramírez Torrico
DIPUTADO SECRETARIO

Por tanto, la promulgo para que se tenga y cumpla como Ley del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.

Palacio de Gobierno de la ciudad de La Paz, a los veinticuatro días del mes de octubre de dos mil once años.

Fdo. EVO MORALES AYMA
PRESIDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL DEL ESTADO PLURINACIONAL DE BOLIVIA

Fdo. Carlos Rouner Bonifaz
MINISTRO DE LA PRESIDENCIA

Fdo. Walter Juvenal Delgadillo Terceros
MINISTRO DE OBRAS PÚBLICAS, SERVICIOS Y VIVIENDA

Fdo. Julieta Mabel Monje Villa
MINISTRA DE MEDIO AMBIENTE Y AGUA

Fdo. Nemesia Achacollo Tola
MINISTRA DE DESARROLLO RURAL Y TIERRAS

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