Executive Leadership in International Organisation: 
A Case Study of WTO Directors-General (1995-2013)

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2015

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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFT</td>
<td>Aid For Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union, formerly the OAU</td>
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<tr>
<td>B(R)ICS</td>
<td>Brazil, (Russia), India, China, and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>Swiss Franc</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDA</td>
<td>Doha Development Agenda</td>
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<td>DDAGTF</td>
<td>Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Dispute Settlement Body</td>
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<td>DSM</td>
<td>Dispute Settlement Mechanism</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>G18</td>
<td>Group of 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of 20 major economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77 developing nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>HoDs</td>
<td>Heads of Delegations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICITO</td>
<td>Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization</td>
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<td>ICSC</td>
<td>International Civil Service Commission</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ITO</td>
<td>International Trade Organization</td>
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<td>ITC</td>
<td>International Trade Centre</td>
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<td>JITAP</td>
<td>Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme</td>
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<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAMA</td>
<td>Non-agricultural market access</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTC</td>
<td>Organization for Trade Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quad</td>
<td>USA, Canada, Western Europe/the EU, and Japan</td>
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<td>RTAs</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trade Negotiations Committee</td>
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<td>TPRM</td>
<td>Trade Policy Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>TRIPs</td>
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<td>UNCEB</td>
<td>United Nations Chief Executives Board</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTR</td>
<td>United States Trade Representative</td>
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<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
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<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Abstract

The University of Manchester

Laura J White

Understanding how executive leadership matters in international politics: an assessment of WTO directors-general (1995-2013)

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

June 2015

The thesis explores the nature of executive leadership in international organisation. Executive leadership is often praised or blamed for outcomes in international agencies, and yet, the disciplinary literature fails to incorporate the executive head into institutional analyses of politics, power, and change over time. The thesis aims to address this lacuna and the role of executive leadership by analysing if and how it matters in international politics. The thesis draws on a composite literature from other areas of political research to establish what is known. A review of the literature and prevailing approaches to leadership studies reveals that an overwhelming majority of scholarship relies on exclusively structural or agential accounts of leadership. This somewhat determinist literature has distorted the limited knowledge on the nature of executive leadership in international organisation. Approaches that focus on agency-based explanations argue that executive heads matter greatly. Approaches that utilise structure to interpret executive leadership find that it matters little, if at all. Rejecting these narrow frameworks, the thesis uses a dialectical approach, supported by critical realism, to analyse four cases of executive leadership in the World Trade Organization to address the research questions and lacuna. The case studies draw on over 70 years of multilateral trade governance to reveal a set of core and subsidiary findings about politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. The thesis argues that executive leadership matters, but that how it matters is contingent on the executive head and the circumstances of their term. By incorporating the executive head into the disciplinary literature, the thesis argues politics, power, and change over time can be more accurately understood.
Declaration

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Acknowledgements

First, foremost, and always, I am indebted to my partner, Will, who gave up everything that wouldn’t fit in two suitcases and moved to a country he had never been to after three months of marriage and who has put his life on hold to allow me to pursue this dream, especially in the year we lived 4,500 miles apart.

I would like to thank the six supervisors who have shaped the development of this thesis, beginning with Dave Richards. Without his ingenuity, I would be without a conceptual framework, but I owe more gratitude to Dave than for his guidance on a theoretical approach. A great deal of thanks is also expressed to Ian Bruff for his contribution to the thesis, which began in 2011 though he formally became my supervisor in 2014. Thanks also goes to Huw Macartney, Inderjeet Parmar, Rorden Wilkinson, and Khalid Nadvi for their supervision of my research development.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my Manchester support network, including Claire Annesley, Francesca Gains, Cristina Masters, Ann Cronley, Philippa Wilson, Julie Tierney, Adele Burdon-Bailey, and Sarah Littlejohn, particularly for the Norman Chester and hardship awards I have received. I have also benefited from the relationships I have formed with Manchester Politics faculty, including Shogo Suzuki, Nick Turnbull, Elena Barabantseva, Danny Fitzpatrick, Stephen De Wijze, Liam Shields, Steph Collins, and members of the Global Political Economy research cluster. I also owe a great deal of thanks to my peers: Steph Rinaldi, Rob Munro, Precious Chatterje-Doody, Mel Stroebel, Fabi Mieres, Giuli Sirigu, Chris Mills, Sara Kallock, Dean Redfearn, Roisin Read, Tom Maltby, Steve Hood, Oliver Turner, Suz O’Sullivan, James Alexander, Jamie Johnson, Gareth Price-Thomas, Rachel Massey, Simon Chin-Yee, Kristina Prismantaite, Eduardo Olivares Concha, Tanya Duffy, and the many more not mentioned here.

I also must acknowledge my sister, Julie Schellberg, and my White family: Mum, Jillian, April, Holly, Noel, Josiah, Dakota, and Daryl Massey for their constant support. Additionally, I would like to thank my Colorado ‘family’, including Cheryl Hinely, Nate Jansen, Beth Woodruff, Bethie Noble, Chris Kennedy, Malliga Och, Mike Chase, and Stephen Noriega. I’d also like to thank the Oxford Road fruit and veg cart for keeping me alive these years, including Nick, Alex, and Dan. Also, thanks to my tumblr LGBT and academic community, particularly Jutta King, for helping me not lose myself in all this.

Finally, I owe a great deal of gratitude to Roderick Abbott. Without his mentorship, I would be lost between academia and the real WTO. Without Roderick, it is also uncertain whether I would also be able to thank former Directors-General Mike Moore and Pascal Lamy for their contributions. Additionally, I owe a great deal of thanks to WTO and World Bank staff, who trusted me with their opinions of their employers.
Dedicated to my grandparents, Minnie and Charlie Schellberg, married 1937, died 2012, but mostly to my Grandma, who said she would take her dementia medication when I became a doctor...
Introduction

A survey of the literature analysing international agencies or global governance reveals a tendency to focus on member states or institutions as the key unit of analysis. An important actor is neglected in research that investigates politics, power, and change over time: the executive head. The executive head is a single individual, selected by an organisation's member states, to take administrative and managerial decisions. However, history has revealed that the role of executive leadership in international organisation is more significant than these bureaucratic functions indicate (Phelan 1936; Gordenker 1967; Cox 1969; Cox and Jacobson 1973; 1976; Doxey 1979; Chesterman 2007; Hughes and Haworth 2011).

Secretariats, member states, and global governance agencies look to the executive head for leadership. The executive occupies the highest level of bureaucratic authority in an office sworn to uphold the neutrality of international civil service. Executive leadership plays a normative role in balancing political and economic interests of states in international politics, in addition to managerial and administrative functions. For example, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997-2006) launched a series of measurable development goals to bring more than one billion global citizens out of poverty. But how effective are executive heads at leading normative and empirical change? Annan’s UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been criticised for failing to advance development and exacerbating global inequality (Wilkinson and Hulme 2012). Biographies
of his leadership are numerous, but analysis on if and how his leadership affected politics, power, and change over time is limited (Gordenker ([2005], 2010; Chesterman 2007).

James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank (1995-2005), famously enhanced the organisation’s relevance by firing economists and hiring environmentalists, transforming the Bank’s narrow agenda. World Bank senior officials argued that without Wolfensohn’s leadership, the organisation’s survival, achievement, and evolution would have been jeopardised in a critical moment when dependence on development loans was negligible.\(^1\) World Bank staff and *The Guardian* recently reported that President Jim Yong Kim’s (2012-present) ‘unethical behaviour’ has plunged the organisation into crisis and negated the World Bank’s normative role in global development.\(^2\) If Kim negates Wolfensohn’s organisational transformation, did Wolfensohn’s leadership matter? If not, how can executive leadership matter over time? If praise or blame for outcomes can be assigned to executive leadership, why are executive heads rarely included in analyses of international politics? These empirical and theoretical questions shape the thesis.

The selection of executive heads to major international agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), draws media speculation about the potential of candidates to play a normative role in global governance. After IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2007-2011) was accused of sexual assault, the focus on the normative power of executive leadership intensified, for a while. Once Christine Lagarde (2011-present) was selected to head the IMF, attention on executive leadership faded, until another scandal or

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1 Interviewed 1(a), 1(b), 7(a), and 7(b) November 2012.
2 Ibid; see also Provost 2014 and Chavkin and Anderson 2015.
new crisis precipitates. This thesis investigates the role of the executive head to better understand the core themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. This chapter introduces the thesis by exploring the research questions, highlighting the conceptual and methodological frameworks, and outlining the structure of the thesis.

**Thesis Scope**

The thesis analyses the role of executive leadership in international politics, a subject of little focus in the discipline. In 1969, Cox wrote the definitive essay on the executive head. He argued: ‘the quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization’ (1996: 317). Almost twenty years later, Weiss (1982), contra Cox, posited that the transformative power of executive leadership was exaggerated. This section introduces the scope of the thesis research by offering a brief assessment of why disciplinary knowledge about the executive head is insufficient.

The division between Cox and Weiss is indicative of the disciplinary literature. Whilst the literature is set out in detail in the next chapter, a cursory sample of this scholarship reveals that researchers have limited knowledge about the role of the executive head (Cox and Jacobson 1973; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Narlikar and Vickers 2009). Two issues emerge in attempting to incorporate executive leadership. First, researchers’ access to heads of major international organisations is limited, and the decision-making process often lacks transparency and the ability to be observed. There are also issues with memory and a tendency for leaders to explain away
failures and overemphasise successes. Executive heads have an interest in preserving their legacies, and these issues dissuade empirical researchers who emphasise positivism and objective knowledge.

Second, the nature of executive leadership is complex and relies on the perceptions of individuals to analyse its impact. Individuals’ experiences lack objectivity because perspective is limited, which makes the study of leadership somewhat problematic for positivists – those who argue objective knowledge is possible in social research. Individuals may overemphasise their exposure to executive heads or filter responses based on self-interest. A large network of trusting and trusted civil servants is also problematic for the researcher to develop knowledge about executive leadership.

As a World Trade Organization (WTO) senior official described: ‘It’s the x factor that makes a good leader.’ This description highlights that effective executive leadership is difficult to define or narrow because of its complex nature. The majority of the literature argues that effective executive leadership responds to other actors and institutions rather than being a stimulus for action themselves (see Gill 2011). Analysing the leadership of executive heads of international organisations requires knowledge of both leadership and organisations, two vast areas of scholarship. These issues highlight why the executive head has failed to be of analytical interest to empirical researchers or integrated into institutional analysis.

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3 Interviewed 1 June 2011(b).
Politics, power, and change over time in international organisation have been the subject of extensive research within the discipline (Marsh 1989; North 1990a; Clegg, Hardy, and Nord 1996; Keohane 2001). The discipline has assumed executive leadership matters without knowing if or how it does, but the unquestioned nature of executive leadership impairs knowledge of decision-making in international agencies. The division between Cox and Weiss’ arguments reflects this lacuna and gives purpose to the thesis.

The thesis aims to address the lacuna by offering an empirical analysis that clarifies the role of executive leadership in international politics. The analysis is structured by two, related questions:

- Does executive leadership matter in international organisation?
- How does it matter?

These questions are addressed by investigating if and how executive heads shape outcomes. The questions use the term ‘matter’ to reflect the complex nature of leadership. The use of ‘matter’ indicates a perspective that some degree of causal significance can be attributed to executive leadership, but it also suggests the effect of executive leadership is contingent. The thesis argues that multiple actors, institutions, and agencies affect decision-making in global governance, and the executive head is a significant actor within these networks. By incorporating the executive head, analyses of international agencies are better able to explain and interpret decision-making in international organisation.

The challenge of incorporating the executive head is that there are limited frameworks for assessing executive leadership. Gill argues executive leadership is: ‘inadequately understood
and poorly theorized in the social sciences’ (2011: 10). The lack of frameworks informs why Cox and Weiss produced oppositional conclusions. Indeed, the literature broadly reflects binary positions that suggest either an executive head matters greatly or little, if at all. The thesis aims to address this divide by contributing a conceptual framework that can also serve as a heuristic for empirical analyses of executive leadership in international politics.

**Thesis Approach**

The thesis does not assume that executive heads matter, given the binary positions within the literature. This gives the thesis an opportunity to contribute an original argument on the role of the executive head. To do so, the analytical framework must reflect the complex nature of executive leadership. This section briefly outlines the conceptual and methodological approaches to the research questions that are further detailed in two chapters.

Beginning with the conceptual approach, little is known about the role of executive heads, in part, because they are distinct from heads of corporations or states (Weiss 1982). Chief executives of corporations are driven by profit. With limited exception to the World Bank and IMF, international organisations do not share this feature with heads of businesses. Executive heads are driven by personal and/or member states’ goals, which has more to do with political and economic power than profit.
Whilst executive heads and heads of state both have limited decision-making authority, the executive head’s power is largely constrained to facilitate member-driven decision-making. Any authority beyond administrative and managerial duties requires approval by members. Heads of state have limited but reserved decision-making power where they can directly affect outcomes, for example through veto power or sponsoring legislation. Executive heads do not possess such directive authority, in part, because international organisations do not make policy; this is the role of governments and ministries. Heads of international agencies can shape outcomes through traditional, bureaucratic means, but outcomes in member-driven organisations are largely the products of negotiations between states. The executive head’s ability to shape outcomes beyond their bureaucratic authority is informal, indirect, and at the discretion of member states.

There are approaches elsewhere, most notably in analyses of national administrations, that can be useful in addressing executive heads. The thesis uses an approach drawn from the canon of core executive studies. Core executive studies began by examining how the prime minister within a Westminster-style polity uses institutions, networks, and strategies to shape outcomes. The evolution of core executive studies has reflected a focus on multi-level decision-making between various actors and agencies (March and Olsen 1984; Dunleavy and Rhodes 1995). The core executive approach has averred that actors and agencies are incorporated into decision-making because of their relevance to the policy process, rather than traditional bureaucratic management (Marsh, Richards, and Smith 2003). Whilst executive heads and heads of state have few similarities, decision-making in international agencies corresponds to how the core executive has informed policy-making models.
Additionally, the scholarship within core executive studies reflects the complex nature of leadership in contemporary politics. As states respond to internal and external challenges to their power, the core executive approach has adapted, particularly through the incorporation of the power dependence model (Rhodes 1995; Smith 1999; Hay and Richards 2000; Hay 2002). The power dependence model argues that power in executive leadership is fluid, relational, and primarily the product of resource exchange. It regards actors as mutually dependent on other actors and institutions in their network. Actors, including the prime minister, have resources, and they exchange them for enhanced decision-making authority in pursuit of their goals. This mirrors the complex network of governance in international organisation. The conceptual framework, therefore, adapts the core executive-power dependence model to structure analysis of the research questions.

The conceptual framework allows both structure and agency to be taken seriously to avoid reproducing binary accounts found within the literature. The methodological framework confronts the lacuna surrounding the executive head by using critical realism to shape methodological choices. There is a focus on the idiographic tradition through the use of qualitative research methods where the thesis seeks uncover understanding of executive leadership in international politics. It uses a case study of four WTO directors-general (1995-2013) to address if and how executive heads matter. The WTO was selected from other global governance agencies because the director-general is the only executive authority in the organisation. The UN secretary-general shares executive authority with the Security Council. Executive authority in the World Bank is dispersed between the president and executive directors. Similarly in the IMF, the Executive Board is composed
of the managing director and executive directors. The WTO is one of the only major
global governance agencies where the director-general is the singular executive authority.
The WTO offers one of the most suitable cases for study to address the research questions on if and how an individual executive head matters.

Two other qualitative methods are used to address the research questions and core themes, alongside the case study method. The thesis also uses elite interviews and document analysis to investigate dominant and divergent accounts of executive leadership in the WTO. The experiences of WTO senior officials are explored, and each case study investigates two key claims about each director-general. The methodological framework employs the core executive-power dependence model to analyse structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power during their terms in office. The findings of the case studies then offer a number of broader generalisations about the nature of executive leadership in international agencies similar to the WTO.

The conceptual and methodological approaches enable the thesis to contribute an analytical framework for assessing executive heads that is absent or lacking rigour in the literature. This framework offers a nuanced approach to exploring the complexity underpinning the research questions and the core themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. The framework also allows for the executive head to be incorporated into institutional analyses to better understand outcomes in international politics. The thesis attempts to address the lacuna surrounding the executive head through the contribution of
a theoretical framework and empirical analysis from which various generalisations can be made.

**Thesis Structure**

The thesis begins by reviewing the literature on the executive head (Chapter One). The chapter highlights the lacuna surrounding executive leadership in international organisation, and scholarship from political leadership is combined with international administration to better frame the research questions. This composite literature reveals contrasting approaches that somewhat crudely aver executive heads matter either significantly or not at all. The literature that argues that executive heads matter significantly is characterised as agency-centric; they use approaches, tactics, strategies, and personality to determine influence. The literature that argues that the role of executive leadership is less significant is structurally based; they emphasise institutions, networks, norms, and power in decision-making. The chapter argues that both are overly deterministic and limited in their ability to address the research questions. It concludes by drawing on Jessop’s (1990) strategic-relational approach as an alternative to avoid overly structural or agential accounts.

Chapter Two details the conceptual framework briefly outlined in this chapter. It begins by assessing three prevailing approaches to executive leadership. The chapter compares the behavioural, power, and contingency approaches to the strategic-relational; it argues none offer the richness of the dialectical approach. The strategic-relational approach is incorporated into the core executive-power dependence model to avoid the tendency towards binary interpretations of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over
time. The chapter offers a model of executive power that is adapted from national administration to international administration, providing a rich conceptual framework for analysing the executive head.

The thesis continues to set out the complexity necessary to analyse executive leadership through a history of five epochs of the WTO (Chapter Three). The chapter contributes an in-depth exploration of the evolution of multilateral trade governance from the failure of the International Trade Organization (ITO) to launch as part of the Bretton Woods system that created the World Bank and IMF. After the failure of the ITO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) informally structured trade for almost 50 years. The GATT was a negotiating framework, not an international organisation, and the chapter explores how GATT history and norms continue to influence outcomes in the WTO. It concludes by establishing the role and authority of the contemporary director-general.

Chapter Four details the methodological framework used to address the research questions and core themes in four parts. First, a critical realist epistemology is presented as a mechanism for treating structure and agency equally to understand the observable and unobservable nature of executive leadership in the WTO. The second part of the chapter details the qualitative research design of the thesis as supported by the idiographic tradition. Following, the research questions are operationalised to inform how the case studies address the questions and core themes, including the contribution of a leadership archetype matrix that can be used to characterise leadership outside of the WTO as well. The details of the interviewing sample are discussed, and primary and secondary documents used in

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4 The World Bank was known as the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development at the time.
the analyses are distinguished. The methodological issues confronted by this particular approach are also then outlined.

Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight are case studies that analyse the leadership of the four WTO directors-general selected for study. The chapters are organised by the five analytical elements of the conceptual framework: structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power. Each chapter focuses on investigating the leadership archetypes and two dominant claims uncovered using the triangulated methodology. The legacy of each director-general is evaluated from these claims. The chapters analyse if and how the directors-general mattered. They reflect on how GATT norms and circumstance conditioned outcomes that influenced executive leadership in the WTO.

The final chapter concludes by summarising the thesis, presenting core and subsidiary findings, and exploring how the contributions to the lacuna shape future research. The thesis finds that each director-general led the WTO differently, and this underscores the contributions of the archetype matrix and conceptual framework. From these claims the chapter makes generalisations about the role of the executive head that addresses the division between Cox and Weiss’ arguments about executive leadership. The empirical and theoretical contributions are highlighted, and the chapter reflects on the limitations from Chapter Four. The thesis concludes by highlighting how the contributions influence future research, within the WTO and in the broader literature on global governance.
Chapter One: Introducing the Executive Head

Introduction

The previous chapter introduced the thesis scope, approach, and structure. The chapter drew on examples of executive leadership in the UN, World Bank, and IMF to argue that the discipline has failed to address if and how executive heads matter in international organisation. The thesis is constructed around these research questions to better understand the power of executive leadership to affect change over time in international politics. This chapter begins to address the lacuna surrounding the executive head, highlighted in the previous chapter.

The chapter frames the research questions by uncovering existing knowledge about the nature of executive leadership in international politics. There is limited scholarship on the executive head, and the chapter utilises a broader literature from political leadership and international administration to better frame the research. It is organised by the construction of a spectrum around which the prevailing literature can be categorised and compared. Scholarship is categorised as a matter of analytical convenience, and the spectrum is a visual guide in organising the literature. The review begins with the agency-centric literature, and this is contrasted with more structural contributions. It then integrates scholarship that does not prioritise structure or agency. The chapter concludes that a dialectical approach is most appropriate to frame the research questions to avoid overly deterministic accounts (Hay 2002; Marsh and Stoker 2010).
The historic role of executive leadership was envisioned to mediate states’ narrow interests in pursuit of normative development, such as lasting peace, in environments where no single state or agency had supranational power (Murray 1991). Contemporary international organisations are largely member-driven and less influenced by the executive head. This has, in part, led to the argument that international agencies are scarcely able to achieve their stated objectives, much less normative outcomes (Haas 1990; Chesterman and Franck 2007; Wilkinson 2014; Jones 2015). The chapter argues that these conclusions reflect divisions about structure and agency that characterises much of the composite literature. It aims to address the lacuna by revealing how executive leadership can be incorporated without prioritising structure or agency.

The Agency-Centric Literature

The agency-centric contributions argue that either agency matters exclusively in conditioning outcomes (agency-dominant) or agency matters more than structure (A>S). Agency is understood as conduct, political or free will, conscious action, decision-making, reflexivity, rationality, approach, or tactics (Hay 2002). Agency: ‘explains how an actor with limited resources can defeat an actor with greater resources’ (Smith 1999: 33). The agency-dominant literature review examines arguments from Weber ([1983], 1997), Paige (1977), and Murphy (1994; 2000; 2005). Burns (1978), Haas (1964; 1990), Sheffer (1993), and Tucker ([1981], 1995) are reviewed in the literature that argues that agency matters more than structure (A>S). The agency-centric literature review begins to set out how preferences on structure and agency have shaped knowledge of executive leadership in international organisation.
Agency-Dominant Literature

The great man or agency-dominant literature was prevalent in the disciplines of politics, sociology, psychology, and history in the nineteenth and twentieth century. The generalised claim was that great men of history command a high level of agency, and this is how outcomes were explained. The positivist and behavioural movements of the 1950s and 1960s purported to enhance the rigour of agency-dominant scholarship by focusing on the empirical, observable behaviour of individuals (Stoker 2010). Prior to this, Weber shaped the literature by providing categorisation for analysing and comparing great men.

Weber ([1983], 1997) argued that there are three types of authority – traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic – and a leader’s authority determined the quality of their leadership. His arguments were shaped by the literature on ancient bureaucracies (Chinese, Roman, and Egyptian) and observation of contemporary organisation (German, British, and French). For Weber, the most capable form of administration was monocratic: a system of governance by one individual.

His arguments informed how bureaucratic authority was a form of power. The authority of the monocrat or executive head was legitimised by legality or formal rules that conditioned organisational power. His emphasis on the superiority of rational-legal norms – superior in stability, discipline, and reliability – developed the notion that executive heads matter because they occupy the highest position of authority in an organisation. The executive also possessed superior authority because of their indispensable technical knowledge.
For Weber, administrative and management structures reflect systematic divisions of labour and follow a principle of hierarchy. The contribution is exclusively agential, deviating only to emphasise that hierarchical bureaucratic structures can be manipulated to achieve goals but should not be altered. He argued that leaders should allow the bureaucracy to be driven by the most powerful (material and objective) interests.

Leadership was characterised by strict adherence to formal rules and should reflect the: ‘purely objective and independent character of the conduct of office’ (Weber [1983], 1997: 332). An executive head that matters was a technocrat that manages the organisation based on a hierarchy of technical training, leads according to impersonal, formal rules, and appeals to dominant interests. Weber’s contribution bolstered the great man tradition by using authority and administrative and management power to analyse leadership (Barnard 1938; 1948). Paige (1977: 2), like Marsden and Townley (1996), argued that overreliance on Weber’s contribution has contributed to ‘myths’ within the discipline by misappropriating the capacity of ‘great men’ to shape change over time.

Paige (1977) traced the political leadership literature from its interdisciplinary, Weberian origins to the early 1950s, prior to the behavioural movement. He argued the evolution of the discipline neglected to incorporate political leadership, favouring structural analyses of power. Paige critiqued the dominant literature for: ‘the absence of a concept other than that of “political structures”’ and assuming all political elites are leaders (1977: 26). He maintained that Dahl (1976) had misrepresented leadership by confusing it with power and
suggesting that decision-making was synonymous with leadership. He rejected structural determinism and the power-based literature for arguing that leadership was the: ‘authoritative allocation of values as it is influenced by the distribution and use of power’ (1977: 22).

Paige argued that leadership matters, and how it matters can be determined quantitatively through multivariate regression analysis of six variables, including personality, role, task, and values, reflecting the dominance of behavioural studies at the time. Rarely did Paige deviate from this agency-dominant approach. Traditional of the behavioural movement, when he included structural elements, such as organisation and setting, he downplayed the effect structure has on agency. ‘We will want to know how political leadership behaviour tends to promote change in setting characteristics and how changes in these variables in turn affect factors related to political leadership’ (Paige 1977: 126). *The Scientific Study of Leadership* (1977) served as a useful collection of literature – later utilised by Tucker ([1981], 1995), Blondel (1987), and Weiss (1982) – that argued that agency and initiative characterise political leadership.

Murphy (1994, 2000, 2005) focused on leadership by examining the absence of normative, transformative power in international organisation. He argued institutions were designed to solve global problems but have been perverted by global oligopolies: ‘global-level “private” authorities that regulate both states and much of transnational economic and social life’ (2005: 138). Global oligopolies prevent executive heads from realising the economic and politically liberal vision of global governance by pressuring states to compete for power.
States assume power they do not have in institutions, but executive heads can matter by exercising agency, particularly in crisis by providing political and intellectual leadership (Murphy 1994).

Executive heads improve the normative authority of international organisation and reclaim power from states driven by global oligopolies through primary and secondary tasks (Murphy 1994, 2005). The two primary tasks were to foster development through institutional agreements and manage political conflict. The two secondary tasks were to strengthen states by promoting cooperation and broker disputes and strengthen society by encouraging responsible domestic governments. Only the first primary task featured a structural element, and the executive head’s role was to foster institutional agreements, a function of agency. Each task also reflected the importance of context, such as a conflict or crisis. Leaders possess normative, transformative power by exercising leadership in critical moments. Executive heads like UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996) and Annan (1997-2006), ‘redress the social balance’, demonstrating the emphasis he placed on agency (Murphy 2005: 173). He concedes that: ‘Nonetheless, [international organisations] usually remain the creatures of the most powerful of their state members’ (2005: 137).

Murphy maintained that executives could transform organisations dominated by powerful state and non-state interests, despite being aware of constraints on their authority. This argument characterises the agency-dominant scholarship. These contributions (Figure 1.1) reflect the great man tradition by negating the effect structures have on agency, such as
allowing the organisation to be driven by powerful interests. Even Murphy, who was sceptical about the power of executive agency to shape outcomes, at times elevated Boutros-Ghali and Annan to the status of great men. Their understanding of decision-making strongly indicates a supposition that leaders have ultimate authority.

Figure 1.1: Agency-dominant contributions

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A>S Literature

This section explores the literature that stresses agency matters more than structure (A>S) in assessing political leadership and international administration. The A>S contributions were published within a distinct timeframe (1978-1990) and reflect similar findings about the nature of executive leadership. The section develops the argument that preferences on structure and agency have distorted understanding of leadership in international administration. The agency-centric literature most often concludes that executives matter through their actions, style, approach, and personality (Furlong and Marsh 2010).

Similar to Paige, Burns (1978) criticised the reticence of the discipline to incorporate the concept of leadership, favouring power and influence in decision-making as the analytical focus. ‘Viewing politics as power has blinded us to the role of power in politics and hence to the pivotal role of leadership’ (Burns 1978: 11, original emphasis). Burns argued that
leadership was the: ‘exercise of mutual persuasion, exchange, elevation, and transformation’ and should be viewed as relational (1978: 12). ‘Leadership mobilises, naked power coerces’ (Burns 1978: 439, original emphasis). He understood political leadership as mostly a product of agency. He argued political leadership also transforms organisational values, indicating that agency has a structural effect.

Burns examines ten functions that analyse the impact of executive leadership, such as controlling hierarchies or resources, delegating work, or continuing the work of preceding leaders. The first function – to act as a critical judge of opportunity – and the eighth function – to utilise crisis – also reflect Burns’ (1978) argument that context affects leaders’ ability to transform structures. An effective executive assumes authority with confidence, diminishes opposition, engages in relationships, enhances executive functions and responsibilities, and exploits emergency powers (Burns 1978). He argued that bureaucratic leadership is merely formal power, a misconception that can be attributed to his assumption that executive heads are faceless and impersonal, as extracted from Weber.

Haas (1964; 1990) offered a richer account of bureaucratic leadership by focusing on ‘expert managers’ with superior technical knowledge. For Haas, leadership matters by: ‘combining politics with administration’ and ‘stressing common values’ (1964: 103). ‘Administration, instead of appearing in the guides of a heroic ordering of chaos, assumes the form of continuous negotiation attentive to the possibility of maximizing common values’ (Haas 1964: 103). Like Burns, he argued agency affects structure, and context conditions how agency affects structure.
Haas (1990) identified three criteria for analysing executive leadership:

- using shared normative values in agenda-setting,
- reflecting those values in policy-making, and
- managing staff to achieve the organisational agenda.

He used these criteria to analyse five executive heads and argued that international organisations may have grown too large to carry out the functions necessary to realise the scope of their vast agendas (1990). He claimed that executive leadership was ineffective in each case, even UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961), ‘the most remarkable of the Secretaries-General so far appointed’ (Chesterman 2007: 19).

He advised that executive heads should seek support from dominant coalitions, make them aware of superior executive technical knowledge, and seize opportunities during crisis. If an executive fails to shape outcomes through their agency, they risk losing decision-making power to dominant member states, ‘thus making independent leadership impossible’ (Haas 1990: 70). Whilst Haas viewed power as zero-sum and the relationship between structure and agency as oppositional, Sheffer (1993) argued leadership operates more widely and subtly.

Like Paige and Burns, Sheffer (1993) critiqued the discipline for poorly addressing the concept of leadership. He highlighted how a focus on heads of states overtook the disciplinary literature and improperly shaped our understanding of political leadership.
Most people still believe that leadership qualities are connected to personal attributes, and hence that leadership is a very individualistic phenomenon. But most scholars in this area agree that in addition to personal attributes, leadership is intimately related to the fabric of the leaders’ relevant societies, to social and political organizations, to established institutions, and to leaders’ relations with smaller and larger groups of followers and supporters (Sheffer 1993: viii).

He argued for a complex understanding of political leadership that challenged the behavioural movement, which maintained that leadership could be observed between leaders and followers.

He contributed nine conclusions about the nature of leadership in international politics and the idea that innovative leadership is distinct from ordinary leadership. Sheffer (1993) argued that innovative agency was generated by cognitive capacities of individuals – not steering too far from the behavioural tradition – that enabled leaders to shape structures in critical moments. He maintained that agency conditions outcomes more than structure, but he conceded the specific nature of organisational structures limited the predictive elements of his findings.

Predicting when such innovation will occur will remain extremely difficult, as it is dependent on a whole range of personal, institutional, domestic, and international factors, some of which are within a leader’s control and some of which have their own dynamics (Sheffer 1993: 247).

Like Sheffer, Tucker also argued that effective leadership was often influenced by factors that cannot be empirically observed.

Drawing on Plato, Tucker ([1981], 1995) averred that all politics is leadership, evidenced by the role of the politician to provide direction for the polis. For Tucker, leadership serves a directive function in critical moments of change or crisis. He concurred with the above
scholarship that effective agency changes structure, but the effect that leadership has is conditional. ‘The ways in which leaders count cannot accurately be expressed in such a dichotomy. They matter in degree, a little more, a little less depending’ (Tucker [1981], 1995: 30). Political leadership requires definition of a problem (diagnosis), a plan of action (policy formulation), and mobilisation of support (policy implementation) (Tucker [1981], 1995).

He argued leadership matters by exercising agency in critical moments to make corresponding structural changes. Effective leadership controls the power of self-interested states by recognising exploitative power politics, forming a plan, and enlisting the support of the majority of the organisation (Tucker [1981], 1995). Like Burns, Tucker’s analysis could benefit from a clearer understanding of international agencies. He assumed executive plans of action are easily implemented. The majority of global institutions are member-driven; policy originates with members, not executive leadership.

To summarise, these four contributions argued that agency matters more than structure in executive leadership. This scholarship (Figure 1.2) argued that agency can transform structure, but this requires identification and action in critical moments. These contributions consistently emphasise the importance of context for leadership to shape structures of power. The common approach produced similar findings that suggested leaders possess the capacity for transformative change, but change depends on leaders’ behaviour and context. This reinforces how utilising agency-centric approaches has shaped
knowledge about the executive head, which appears to be reflected in the structural contributions as well.

Figure 1.2: A>S contributions

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The Structure-Centric Literature

The structure-centric contributions argue that either structure conditions how executive leadership matters (structure-dominant) or structure matters more than agency (S>A).

Structure is understood as the environment: social, political, economic, and physical settings where events ‘acquire meaning’, but it implies more than environment (Hay 2002: 94).

Structure conditions how actors interact and how outcomes are shaped.

Structure indicates: ‘the ordered nature of social and political relations – to the fact that political institutions, practices, routines, and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity or structure over time’ (ibid, original emphasis). For purposes of the thesis, structure refers to decision-making environments, generally, and institutions and networks, specifically, both formal and informal. Some formal elements of executive leadership in international organisation are the legal office, authority, rules, duties, hierarchy, and distribution of resources. Informal elements are more problematic to define further; they are understood to be the exercise of authority over powers not specifically delegated. The structure-
dominant literature is first reviewed to establish how they argue executive leadership matters little, if at all.

*Structure-Dominant Literature*

This literature features the work of Meyers (1976) and Gill (2011) who argued that structure, alone, affects if and how leadership matters. The chapter is better able to investigate how knowledge has been shaped by preferences on structural or agential explanations by contrasting these literatures. This helps frame the research questions by highlighting the lacuna. Understanding the limitations of this composite literature informs the need for an appropriate conceptual framework in addressing the research questions.

To begin, Meyers (1976) used Cox’s (1969) essay and a collection of studies of secretariats from three global organisations to argue how the administrative secretary-general of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – changed from the secretary-general during the drafting of the organisation’s charter – matters.\(^5\) He argued that the potential of the OAU executive head has been constrained by examining four variables. Of the four variables, the first three – formal duties, resource distribution, and regional power – were entirely structural. Only the fourth – idiosyncratic factors – acknowledged agency, and these factors were more focused on how members’ perceptions shaped formal limits on the executive’s authority. He concluded that these constraints influence why the OAU executive head is not a powerful political figure.

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\(^5\) The OAU transferred its authority to the AU in 2002.
Meyers (1976) understood power as zero-sum and described how executive authority was dispersed amongst members. Distrustful member states reduced executive authority in the OAU to: ‘those necessary for directing the routine affairs of the secretariat’ (1976: 510). He portrayed the OAU executive head as: ‘a weak, apolitical, institution’ (1976: 520); three executive heads attempted to exercise agency only to be constrained by member states. The OAU administrative secretary-general matters but only by adhering to the purely administrative, formal functions of office. Meyers (1976) was one of few to focus on the executive head as a unit of analysis, but his structural-dominant findings could be seen to be limited by his selection of case study.

Like Meyers and Murphy, Gill (2011) was also critical of state power to facilitate normative outcomes in international organisation. He defined global leadership as: ‘an identifiable, neoliberal nexus of ideas, institutions, and interests that dominates global political and civil society – one that is associated with the most powerful states and corporations’ (2011: 1). Executive leadership in international organisation is largely structural, a ‘top down’ process that supports the larger, global neoliberal leadership structure (Gill 2011: 3). Executive heads have little, if any, agency to stimulate normative decision-making because they are coerced or conditioned to support this neoliberal nexus.

Gill (2011) maintained that executive heads are ineffective and, more so, if they attempt to lead organisations away from elite-controlled, structurally-reinforced norms of political, economic, and social behaviour. His conclusions were overwhelmingly structurally-determined but uncover how leaders reproduce structures of power.
We need to take account of the changing structures of world order and the reorganization of the global political economy, which has progressively produced a more globally integrated, albeit crisis-prone, and increasingly global capitalism. Only with a clearer ontology of world order can we more adequately begin to theorize patterns of cooperation and conflict associated with global crisis (Gill 2011: 14).

In summary, two contributions to the structure-dominant literature both found that executive heads matter little. The emphasis on structures of power in conditioning outcomes leaves little space for agency, which may inform why structurally-dominant perspectives find that leadership fails to matter. These contributions contrast with the agency-dominant approaches (Figure 1.3) where executive leadership matters greatly. The behavioural movement influenced scholarship significantly, as the remaining contributions reveal that fewer scholars rely on structural analysis. This may be also related to the behavioural movements’ emphasis on observation and limited ability to observe structures of power.

Figure 1.3: Structure-dominant contributions

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- Tucker
- Sheffer
- Murphy
- Haas
- Paige
- Burns
- Weber
- Gill
- Haas
- Burns
- Meyers
The effect of the behavioural movement becomes more apparent when examining the literature that avers structure matters more than agency. There were two contributions from the structurally-dominant literature; whereas, there were three agency-dominant contributions. There were four contributions from the A>S scholarship. Only Weiss (1982) and Blondel (1987) argued that structure matters more than agency (S>A) in exploring how executive leadership matters. As stated in the introduction, the literature reviewed in this chapter represents a sample of the larger scholarship, but structural accounts are less common within the broader literature. To continue to explore what is known about leadership in international organisation, Weiss (1982) argued that international agencies have become increasingly ineffective in facilitating normative outcomes.

Like Murphy, Weiss argued for more independent leadership in international administration. He (1982) revealed how global governance shifted from normative, post-war goals to an instrument for self-interested, power-seeking states. Like the introduction to the thesis, he argued that states have assumed a stronger role in international organisations, which has allowed them to reinforce unipolar and bipolar structures of hegemony (1982). This has weakened the agency of executive heads.

The executive head is, ‘at the apex of a complex bureaucratic pyramid’, and their vision is necessary: ‘not primarily to seek consensus on global interests but rather to compromise on national views’ (Weiss 1982: 299). He concluded that the normative role of executive
leadership in international organisation has been negated or diminished by states seeking to expand their influence. They matter little, if at all, in contemporary institutions.

Decisions are not the result of a common struggle by officials to formulate policy based on a conception of world interests, but rather bureaucratic struggles to implement programmes designed to avoid irritating member states whose views are stratified in the presence of officials… Even technical assistance becomes a field for unnecessary ideological confrontation within a politicised bureaucracy that is not pledged to overcoming parochialism… By making international civil servants more effective agents for decision-making about global interests, the international administration would gradually become more universally recognised as a voice for the interests of the world community (Weiss 1982: 301-302).

Whilst Weiss focused on international organisations, Blondel (1987) reviewed the political leadership literature and critiqued Tucker, Burns, Paige, and Weber’s agency-centric contributions. He developed nine archetypes to characterise how leadership can vary and argued: ‘the contribution of leaders is closely tied to the environment in which they operate. In particular, the environment gives different opportunities and places different constraints’ (1987: 80). Context, such as the presence of crisis can also limit or bolster leadership (Blondel 1987).

He conceded that whilst leadership is largely structural authority, leaders have informal power based on institutional norms that enable exercising agency. Blondel (1987: 41) argued that leadership matters, but how it matters is heavily dependent on formal structure, as agency or ‘political skill’ is elusive.

But the recognition that leaders somewhat modify their environment with which they are confronted also means that the qualities and role of an individual leader should be judged not by the extent to which, for instance, large reforms are introduced, but by the impact he can make given a particular ‘predisposition’ of the environment (Blondel 1987: 202).
To summarise, the contributions from Weiss and Blondel (Figure 1.4) allow the agency-centric scholarship to be contrasted with the structure-centric scholarship. The influence of the behavioural movement and proliferation of the great man tradition can be seen to have distorted the literature and helps explain why the discipline assumes executive heads matter. By emphasising observable behaviour of actors and negating the influence of structures of power, the chapter maintains that the literature inadequately characterises executive leadership in international organisation. This supports the argument made in the previous chapter that there is a lacuna surrounding the executive head, which gives purpose to the research questions.

Figure 1.4: S>A contributions

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<tr>
<th>Murphy</th>
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The Dialectical Literature

The chapter has argued that the behavioural movement significantly influenced scholarship on political leadership and international administration, and this contributed to the lacuna underpinning the thesis research. This section examines Cox’s (1969) contribution, which argued that both structures and agents matter in assessing executive leadership. Cox’s essay predated what is known within the discipline as the structure-agency debate in understanding how actors and/or structures influence outcomes (Hay and Wincott 1998;
Hall and Taylor 1998). The section concludes by setting out a dialectical understanding of structure and agency to give primacy to Cox’s contribution as a starting point for understanding executive leadership in international organisation. The chapter argues that this rich understanding can be used to avoid overly deterministic scholarship, such as the contributions reviewed above.

_A/S Literature_

Only Cox’s contribution examines both agency and structure equally in analysing executive leadership. After critiquing predominant approaches, Cox (1969; 1974) draws on Haas to focus on who and what influences organisational outcomes in global governance. His normative assumptions about the nature of international organisation led him to argue that the executive head matters.

The executive head may be the explanatory key to the emergence of a new kind of autonomous actor in the international system. If we want to answer the question, “Are international organisations merely the instruments of national foreign policies or do they influence world politics in their own right?”, then we must take a closer look at the executive head (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 317-318).

Cox (1969) argued that an executive head matters, if they use:

- the internal bureaucratic system – the secretariat and speciality divisions of organisational work – to gather intelligence,
- intelligence to maintain positive relationships with powerful member states about their issues and negotiating space, and
- the international system to promote the organisational agenda and their goals.
This contribution was applied to several case studies, and he concluded that the quality of executive leadership depends on the actor (agency), environment (structure), and circumstance (context). ‘Thus different qualities are required in different organizations at different times’ (Cox and Jacobson 1974: 398).

Figure 1.5 reveals that Cox’s contribution does not put unequal emphasis on structure or agency, and it continues to be used as the basis for the limited literature on the executive head (Doxey 1979; Chan 2005; Harman 2011). His contribution gives further evidence to how preferences on structure and agency have shaped knowledge. Agential accounts argue the leadership matters greatly; structural contributions maintain it matters little. Cox’s work argues that different leaders matter in different organisations at different times. This more complex and nuanced understanding of how structures and agents interact in context is used to frame the research questions.

Figure 1.5: A/S contribution

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A Strategic-Relational Contribution

The chapter has revealed that: ‘the ontological and epistemological position adopted had clear methodological implications that the scientific aspirations and confidence of the behavioural revolution tended to mask’ (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 195). The analytical
elements scholars employ reflect what they believe they know of a phenomenon (Hay 2002). The research questions investigate if and how executive leadership matters, and these questions highlight that the thesis seeks not to assume knowledge.

A suitable frame for the research questions is one that not assume agency or structure matter more. After reviewing the literature, the thesis avers that both structure and agency matter. They are dialectically related; they interact and iterate. As the chapter explored and Hay (2002: 127) argued: ‘neither has an existence in isolation from the other – their existence is relational (structure and agency are mutually constituted).’ The strategic-relational approach, developed by Jessop (1990, 2002) and furthered by Hay (1995, 2002), takes structures seriously but understands agents matter – an appropriate frame for the research.

The strategic-relational approach argues that actors exercise agency, which affects structure, and structure conditions agency. Structure and agency interact in particular ways depending on the context of their interaction. The interaction shapes how actors select strategies to influence structure and how structure adapts to actors’ strategies. The key relationship in the strategic-relational approach is not between structure and agency, but rather the immediacy facing actors and the environments where they pursue their goals (Jessop 1990, 2002; Hay 2002; Marsh 2010).

Jessop seeks to bring agency into structure – producing a structured context (an action setting) – and to bring structure into agency – producing a contextualised actor (a situated agent)… Yet Jessop does not stop here. A repeat move – bringing the situated actor back into the structured context and the structural context to the situated actor – yields a new conceptual pairing in which the dualism of structure and agency has been dissolved. Jessop now
identifies a strategic actor within a strategically selective context (Hay 2002: 128, original emphasis).

Strategy is purposeful action, motivated by particular outcomes and objectives and informed by strategic evaluation of the environment in which actors find themselves (Hay 2002). Jessop (1990) calls this strategic learning; both actors and institutions are strategically selective, meaning agents and structures favour some strategies in lieu of others to achieve particular objectives (Hay 2002; Marsh 2010). Context, therefore, is not neutral; it is strategically selective.

What differentiates [Jessop’s] position… is his suggestion that although, in the final analysis, social and political outcomes are contingent upon strategic choices, the context itself presents an unevenly contoured terrain which favours certain strategies over others and hence selects for certain outcomes while militating against others (Hay 2002: 129).

Leadership can be assessed based on the strategic interactions of multiple actors (agency) and institutions (structure) in diverse contexts. This makes the strategic-relational approach more suitable for understanding the complex nature of executive leadership in international organisation. The strategic-relational approach posits that individuals (agency) and organisations (structure) are not static; they are influenced by historical learning and adapt to strategic situations (Bevir and Richards 2009).

As Marsh and Smith (2000) argued, this understanding goes beyond structure and agency in an attempt to more accurately explain change over time, particularly in less observable environments. Positivists: ‘contend that social phenomena/structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements’ (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 204). However,
Kempster and Parry (2011: 109) highlight that: ‘phenomena exist at the level of events and experiences but also at a deeper level that may not be observable.’ The strategic-relational approach allows investigation of action that occurs at the observable, immediate, strategic level but also at the unobservable, deeper level to facilitate analysis. ‘For example, leadership cannot be seen. Only its effects are observed and perhaps felt’ (ibid). This fluid, dialectical understanding allows change over time to be assessed by allowing the researcher to interpret why change did or did not occur upon examination of the strategic interactions of actors interfacing with their environment. The approach serves as a mechanism for analysing observable and unobservable phenomenon where structures are not reified but includes a role for agency in shaping structure.

**Conclusion**

The chapter has set out to incorporate the executive head within the disciplinary literature to address politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. The lacuna lacks richness in framing the nature of executive leadership in international organisation, and it reflects deep epistemological and ontological divides. The chapter utilised the composite scholarship from political leadership and international administration to highlight how the lacuna and approaches have shaped knowledge. The outcome of divisions over structure and agency are that the discipline does not objectively know if or how executive leadership matters, and few contributions offer a framework for analysing or incorporating the executive head.
Whilst exploring the literature provided a frame for what is believed to be known about the role of executive heads of international organisations, it revealed that a single contribution treats structure and agency equitably. This contribution has served as the starting point for the limited literature that examines the executive head as the unit of analysis. Like the other contributions, Cox too assumes executive heads matter. To address the first research question – does executive leadership matter in international organisation – the thesis locates a heuristic that does not prioritise structure or agency. The strategic-relational approach explores the dialectical relationship between structure and agency in context. This provides a deeper means of exploring politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. It offers a more nuanced understanding of the power of executive leadership to facilitate change in international organisation.

The next chapter continues to establish the thesis approach from the strategic-relational understanding of structure, agency, and context. The chapter reviews dominant approaches within the areas of political leadership and international administration, further developing the arguments set out in this chapter. It then offers a two-part conceptual framework to explore the core themes. In doing so, the chapter establishes the theoretical framework to address the research questions – if and how executive head matter in international organisation – and lacuna.
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework

Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed the literature to highlight the lacuna surrounding the executive head to frame the research questions – if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation. The lacuna is the absence of a core literature on the executive head. As such, the chapter explored literature from political leadership and international administration to review what previous scholarship argued mattered in assessing executive leadership. These contributions were organised along a spectrum of agency and structure-centric literature and reinforced how preferences on structure and agency have shaped knowledge.

It was revealed that scholarship that focused on agency argued executive leadership matters greatly, and contributions that centred on structure found that executive heads matter little. The lacuna also reflects how agency and structure-centric literature has produced a knowledge gap where the themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time are not richly understood within the discipline. The chapter argued in favour of dialectical contributions that take structure and agency seriously whilst incorporating the element of context, which was reflected in several contributions to the literature. The chapter suggested a richer understanding of how structure, agency, and context influence outcomes could be found in the strategic-relational approach.
This chapter seeks to establish a fitting conceptual framework to begin to address the lacuna. A suitable conceptual framework enables the core themes and research questions to be assessed by not prioritising structure or agency and provides a mechanism for integrating the executive head. The introduction to the thesis highlighted that there are limited frameworks to investigate if and how executive leadership matters; this chapter reviews three approaches common to political leadership and international administration. They are compared to the strategic-relational approach with the intent of developing an appropriate conceptual framework.

After arguing that the prevailing approaches lack a dialectical understanding of structure and agency, the strategic-relational approach is developed in two-parts to integrate the executive head. First, the core executive approach, originally associated with studies of Westminster-style polities, allows the complex and dynamic nature of executive leadership to be understood through the policy-making process. Second, the power dependence model provides an empirical link between the dialectical approach and strategic contexts. Resources exchanged for power create a relationship of dependence between actors where power is seen as fluid and relative. The core executive-power dependence model is applied to executive leadership in international organisation for the first time by adapting concepts. The adaptation of this conceptual framework establishes how the executive head can be assessed and incorporated into institutional analysis.
Prevailing Conceptual Approaches

This section continues the review of the literature by examining three prevailing conceptual approaches within political leadership and international administration scholarship. The previous chapter argued that the literature was somewhat deterministic. If a scholar examined agency or an actor's conduct, they found that leadership mattered considerably. If they investigated leadership using structure or the institutional environment, the scholarship argued that executives mattered little. Cox's contribution was the singular work that examined both agency and structure, but Cox does not offer a framework for analysis beyond examining executive relations. The strategic-relational approach offers a way of consolidating competing approaches by taking both structure and agency seriously, as well as defining how context impacts their dialectical interaction. To establish why the strategic-relational approach is the most suitable foundation for the conceptual framework, the behavioural approach is reviewed first.

The Behavioural Approach: Stressing Agency

The behavioural approach became prominent after the positivist movement in the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s that argued for more scientific methods in social research. Prior, the great man approach was a common interdisciplinary framework for evaluating leadership (Weber [1983], 1997; Tucker [1981], 1995). As early as Plato's Republic, the approach was concerned with: 'who should rule and how the rulers should be educated', reflecting that the behaviour of statesmen was indicative of the health of the polis (Peele 2005: 189). Weber shaped the behavioural approach by contributing categorisation for
common types of leadership behaviour. ‘Weber had an acute sociological vision, one that focused on rationalization. Less “rational” forms of life became rationalized and expunged out of existence’ (Clegg 1994: 152). This approach was deemed problematic when Barnard (1938) argued that informal authority was equally as important as Weber’s emphasis on formal, rational authority.

Weber’s great man approach declined in favour of a more observational approach in the mid-twentieth century, which involved generating and testing hypotheses of interaction (Tucker [1981], 1995). Though the approach emphasised observation: ‘the factors considered the most important may be the attitudinal dispositions and cognitions of others, their socioeconomic and political associations, or stipulated group interests and factional conflicts’ (Edinger 1990: 513). Some of these factors were observable; others were less so.

Analytical importance became tied to personality types, personal characteristics, and leaders’ actions and values to interpret, explain, and even predict effective leadership. The approach aimed: ‘to identify the traits that leaders presumably possess that distinguish them from nonleaders’ (Phillips 1995: 59). Behavioural scholars failed to acknowledge issues with constructing a ‘natural’ leader archetype and pursued the idea that there was a single, most effective type of leadership (Gordon 2002: 155; Little 1988; Phillips 1995).

The problem with these assumptions was the rejection of structural or contextual factors that affect political leadership that agency alone could not explain. The behavioural approach was unable to account for less effective leadership as a product of structural or
contextual limitations, such as budget cuts or political conflict. Equally problematic was the belief that leadership can be distilled to one best type. The overreliance on the abstract nature of leadership archetypes limited the framework’s ability to produce rigorous analysis (Yukl and Van Fleet 1992; Ramsden 2002; Gunnell 2013). Additionally, categorisation of leadership types was ahistorical and discounted religious, socio-economic, and gender norms. Furthermore, the behavioural approach was unable to account for leaders who did not conform to a single archetype, what Jessop (1990) called strategic learners. Finally, the approach was supported by the observational method, and this is problematic to social research, as much of political and social life is unobservable (Lukes 1974; Bhaskar 1979; Hay 1999).

The behavioural approach provides an inadequate frame for analysis by discrediting too much of leadership when compared to the strategic-relational approach. The exclusive focus on agency – and only a particular type of agency (archetypes) – and emphasis on observation makes the behavioural approach unsuitable for addressing the research questions. ‘Perhaps the great difficulty of conceptualizing leadership helps to explain why many political scientists still prefer the seemingly more manageable project of analyzing politics – and leadership itself – in power terms’ (Tucker [1981], 1995: 11).

The Power Approach: Emphasising Rational Authority

Tucker ([1981], 1995: 11) highlighted that the power approach is prevalent in the discipline because: ‘politics is in essence the pursuit and exercise of power – in the interests of those who pursue and exercise it.’ The power approach borrowed from Weber’s three types of
authority, the rational actor and bounded rationality model (Etzioni 2010; Cairney 2012), and Lukes’ (1974) three faces of power. A core argument was that rational individuals hold power on behalf of governments to influence decision-making, although rationality of leaders can be limited (Simon 1957; Tucker [1981], 1995).

The quality of leadership was also reflected in a leader-follower dynamic; whereby, leaders maintain power through their followership and influencing subordinates (Phillips 1995). Power was argued to be zero-sum and transactional: ‘between calculating buyers and sellers in a political market place’ (Edinger 1990: 514). To analyse leadership, researchers evaluated rational decision-making based on what was good for the leader, which made the unit of analysis exogenous rather than endogenous to the institution. The approach assessed leadership by calculating influence through:

- measuring the degree of change in an influenced actor,
- weighing the psychological costs of compliance,
- assessing the probability of compliance,
- comparing differences in response scope, and
- tallying the number of individuals influenced (Paige 1977).

There was considerable emphasis on observation or scientific calculations. The power approach, though, ‘rich in leadership-related concepts’, could have benefited from ‘more explicit focus upon the idea of leadership’ (Paige 1977: 17). Even if power was not determined within one of these five types, other ‘power types’ exist (French and Raven 1959; Podsakoff and Schriesheim 1985).
Nye (2008) used the power approach to respond to the above critiques by investigating a similar question as the thesis – do leaders matter? He divided leadership into functions of hard and soft power, a replication of his approach to analysing state power (Keohane and Nye 1998; Nye 2004). He built on Dahl (1976) and Lukes (1974) to define hard power as: ‘power that can be used to get others to change their position. Hard power rests on inducements (carrots) and threats (sticks)’ (2008: 29). Soft power embodied preference-shaping, agenda-setting, and co-opting rather than coercion.

The distinction of hard and soft power was useful for separating the functions of leaders, and Nye utilised structure, agency, and context to address his research question. He (2008: 30) was unclear where the distinction between hard and soft power lies, arguing it was ‘one of degree’, making his approach difficult to replicate or generalise. His analysis (2008: 147) argued only ‘good leadership matters’. The antithetical of authoritarian leadership, such as Adolf Hitler or Pol Pot, challenges his argument. Most problematic was the narrow and somewhat parsimonious focus on observable, categorical power, thus impairing the ability of the researcher to produce objective knowledge claims, contra Nye.

Paige (1977), Burns (1978), Tucker ([1981], 1995), and Gill (2011) argued the discipline neglected to understand how widely leadership operates by focusing on power in lieu of leadership. The idea that power was a function of agency – defined as influence, decision-making, transactions, or rational action – dismissed structures of power. Gordon’s (2002: 152) emphasis on ‘deep structures’ argued how defining power narrowly ignored ‘historically constituted codes of order’. By defining power as power over, history and
norms were negated. This makes assessing change over time problematic in complex and dynamic environments (Marsh 1998).

The strategic-relational approach builds on the limited application of the power approach by identifying strategically-selective environments where decision-making occurs. Power is: ‘based on a conception of preferences (or interests) that is inadequate for situations in which preferences are ambiguous, changing, and endogenous to the political system’ (Marsh 1998: 144). The strategic-relational approach also does not limit power to a function of agency.

Jessop (1990, 2002) and Hay (1995, 2002) argued that the exercise of agency affects structures, and this effect – the result of the dialectical interaction of structure and agency – limits what strategies are successfully pursued in particular contexts. This furthers knowledge about how decisions are made or not made beyond Simon’s (1957) contribution of bounded rationality where rational decision-making can be limited by absence of information and time. Within the strategic-relational approach, structures of power reinforce which strategies are construed as more or less favourable over time. This also limits the scope of knowledge claims that Nye’s categorisation of hard and soft power purport to be capable of making, despite his inclusion of structure and context.
By analysing the capabilities of leaders to provide direction dependent on situational factors, the contingency approach focused on how context shapes leadership, particularly in crisis. Like the behavioural approach, leadership style was analysed, but style was seen as flexible and dependent on: ‘such contextual factors as domestic socioeconomic conditions, organizational structures, and cultural patterns, or with differences between so-called routine and crisis situations, stable and unstable national or international conditions’ (Edinger 1990: 513). Counter to the behavioural approach, this approach largely rejected the idea of a single, most effective style; it also downplayed the predictive and observational features of the behavioural approach (Phillips 1995).

The contingency approach maintained that context shapes leadership by influencing the style leaders adopt and whether leaders use formal or informal authority. This contributed that both agency and context shape structure and structure shapes agency. The approach is similar to Haas’ (1964, 1990) contribution where he argued that effective leadership requires assessment of the environment and creating a plan of action to best respond to crisis. The major premise of the contingency approach is that environment and circumstance influence how leadership is exercised (Phillips 1995). How leadership responds to structure and context depends on the leader and their assessment of how agency can affect outcomes (Edinger 1990), comparable to Murphy (1994, 2000, 2005) and Tucker’s ([1981], 1995) arguments in the previous chapter.

Like the strategic-relational approach, context, structure, and agency matter. What differs between the two approaches is the overreliance on context in the contingency approach. The approach suggested that context, alone, influences leadership strategies. The strategic-
relational approach argues the interplay of structure, agency, and context condition strategic learning. Structure and agency had little influence on context in the contingency approach. Without this dialectical understanding: ‘efforts to establish analytical generalization about political leadership are not so much distinguished by explicit, mutually exclusive causal theories as by differences in emphasizing certain factors over others’ (Edinger 1990: 512).

The approach was an improvement on the behavioural approach but can be criticised for remaining too linear in investigating the complex nature of executive leadership in international organisation. It did not develop the notion that leadership can matter outside of crisis and that, even in times of stability, structures of power and actors can manufacture crisis to achieve their goals.

Summary

Three approaches to analysing executive leadership have been reviewed. The common feature between these approaches is the absence of a dialectical understanding of structure and agency in context and the effect their interaction has on power. The emphasis on observation in the majority of approaches limits how executive leadership can be better understood within the discipline. The three approaches demonstrate how the lacuna fails to incorporate the executive head into knowledge of politics, power, and change over time when compared to the strategic-relational approach.

In the previous chapter, the strategic-relational approach was introduced to highlight the limitations of the structure and agency-centric literature. Whilst the strategic-relational approach helps better understand outcomes through the dialectical interaction of structure
and agency, it is also limited in addressing the research questions. The approach lacks attention to the theme of executive leadership, reflecting the lacuna. The conceptual framework draws on the strategic-relational approach as a basis for understanding structure and agency and fluid power in less observable, elite-run international agencies.

**From the Lacuna to a Conceptual Framework**

The literature review and assessment of prevailing approaches revealed the extent of the lacuna surrounding the executive head. This section aims to establish an appropriate conceptual framework to confront the lacuna that:

- takes structure and agency seriously,
- addresses the research questions, and
- incorporates executive leadership into institutional analysis of politics, power, and change over time.

Two conceptual approaches have been identified that address the power of executive leadership to affect politics over time: the core executive approach and power dependence model. The core executive approach disaggregates the complex nature of executive leadership through the policy-making process. The power dependence model uses a fluid, relational understanding of power, based on mutual dependence as facilitated through exchanges of resources. Drawing on the strategic-relational approach, the core executive-power dependence framework is adapted from its application at the national administrative level to international administration. In doing so, the thesis aims to make an original contribution that begins to address the lacuna.
The Core Executive Approach

The core executive framework originated with Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990) attempting to locate a fitting theoretical framework to address politics, power, leadership, and change over time within the British executive. They reviewed approaches common to assessing power in the British executive and found them inadequate to frame their research questions, similar to this chapter. They critiqued what they saw as overly determinist literature for arguing that power was observable and zero-sum; the prime minister either mattered or did not (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990). The parallels between their research and the thesis are palpable; this section explores the core executive approach to enable its adaptation to international organisation.

The core executive offers insight into how executive leadership operates beyond the formal, top-down, absolute understanding of power. Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990: 3) identified a: ‘complex web of institutions, networks and practices surrounding the [British Prime Minister], Cabinet, cabinet committees and their official counterparts, less formalized ministerial ‘clubs’ or meetings, bilateral negotiations, and interdepartmental committees’, whilst attempting to address similar questions about the nature of the British prime minister’s power in a more ‘decentralised’ government. They defined the core executive as: ‘those organizations and structures which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central government policies or act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine’ (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990: 4).

The core executive is composed of the formal institution that makes up executive office and the interconnected, overlapping networks where policy is made (Smith 1999).
Networks of actors (agency) and institutions (structure) – key elements in ‘dispersed’ theories of political leadership (Marsh and Smith 2000; Ray, Clegg, and Gordon 2004; Bevir and Richards 2009) – are essential analytical elements. Exploring policy-making within the core executive enabled researchers to identify elite policy networks that: ‘have a tendency to change rapidly and often to operate outside of the immediate sight of the centre’ (Smith 1999: 20). Like the strategic-relational approach, structure, agency, and context influence decision-making in the core executive.

The policy-making process is disassembled to assess executive leadership by examining decision-making networks: what actors and institutions are involved in a decision, how their agency impacts structure, how structure impacts their agency, the impact of context on decision-making, how context impacts structure and agency, identifiable conflicts, and how decision-making is shaped.

Contextual analysis means that the decision-making process has to be disaggregated. Power relations between the actors within a particular policy-making area depend on the particular historical development of the institutions within that arena and the way past decisions are institutionalised (Smith 1999: 35).

Knowledge of historic context is necessary to understand the complex web of executive leadership. ‘It is important to develop a historical account in order to examine how relationships have developed over time and how actions at one particular time can create the structural context for later actors’ (Smith 1999: 7).

Context is not exclusive to history; political and institutional context shape how historical relationships influence contemporary structures. ‘There may be specific values that have
developed over time concerning who should be involved in particular decisions’ (Smith 1999: 17). The core executive approach allows investigation into how these values condition power through historically constituted codes of conduct (norms) or structures of power. Addressing change over time through a dynamic and flexible understanding of structure, agency, and context fosters an understanding of power that is embedded in the policy-making process. At times, the executive holds considerable power, and other times, they hold less substantial power, echoing Tucker’s ([1981], 1995) findings from the previous chapter.

The core executive framework examined how actors exchange resources for power in the policy-making process (Smith 1999). This is because the executive’s formal role limits how they can influence outcomes (Barnard 1938). The approach argued that executives enhance their informal authority by exchanging resources: ‘but the basis of the exchange depends on a range of changing circumstances’ (Smith 1994: 346). Understanding how context shapes resource exchange improves knowledge of how executives influence policy-making, achieve their goals, and foster dependence on their leadership. Smith (1999) highlighted that executive resources can affect both structure, such as through budgetary powers, and agency, for example through patronage. The resources they exchange depend on context, actors, and institutions engaged in the policy-making process and executive objectives. Not all resources are observable at the point of exchange, but they assist in assessing leadership, power, and change over time.
Smith (1994) explained executives enhance their power through resource exchange, similar to Meyers’ (1976) argument about the limited authority of the OAU executive. Power: ‘is not fixed but varies according to: the resources available; the rules of the game; administrative ability; political support; political strategies, relationships within the core executive and external circumstances’ (Smith 1994: 346). Power within the core executive is relative and positive-sum rather than absolute and zero-sum (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990). The approach argued that how executive leadership matters is relational, relative, and dependent on context. This helps overcome problems identified with top-down, absolute perceptions of power within the literature. To analyse if and how executives matter, the core executive approach explored the nature of dependence between actors and agencies.

Cox (1969), Smith (1999), and Bevir and Richards (2009) emphasised the importance of networks in executive leadership, and the core executive approach argued that analysis should explore resource dependence between these networks. Power within executive leadership, then, is socially inscribed, as well as embedded in the context of decision-making. The approach argued that power – primarily, a product of resource exchange – conditions a structure of dependence. Actors become dependent on their networks and institutions to achieve their goals. As Smith (1999: 35-36) observes:

Dependency has important implications for conceptualising power. First, it means that power is relational and not an object. Power depends on relationships between actors and not on command… it is in every situation and alliances in order to exchange resources and achieve goals.

In summary, the approach argues that executive leadership operates as a complex web of networks, identifiable by examining the policy-making process. The executive engages in a
networked exchange of resources for enhanced power to achieve their goals in strategically-selective environments where structure, agency, and context interact to condition outcomes. Actors utilise strategic learning, based on political, institutional, and historical context and norms, to increase the likelihood that they are successful in this dynamic environment. This prevents leadership from being understood as: ‘a fill-in role, covering up for variations which cannot be explained more effectively in some other way’ (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990: 23). Executive leadership is not exclusively a mechanism of bureaucratic authority; power is seen as embedded in their loci and their interaction. Power relations are shaped through resource exchange – what is referred to as the power dependence model – and this bridges the dialectical understanding of the strategic-relational approach with the core executive.

*The Power Dependence Model*

This section introduces the power dependence model and explains how it is adapted to address the research questions on the executive head. The core executive approach was used to highlight how fluid, relational power in policy-making networks contributes to mutual dependence between actors. Emerson (1962) argued that all social relations entailties of mutual dependence, and Caporaso (1978) added that mutual dependent relations rest on structural asymmetries. For example, executive leadership has structural powers – managerial and administrative – that other actors do not possess; however, other actors hold more formal policy-making power than the executive.
The strategic-relational approach argued that context affects agency through strategically-selective environments that favour some strategies over others. Furthermore, context – particularly political, historical, and institutional – conditions structure through historically constituted codes of conduct that represent powerful relationships and values that shape agency in the policy-making process. In the power dependence model, the nature of dependence between actors is also contextual, and dependence conditions power relations by shaping structure, agency, and context as well (Figure 2.1). ‘The degree of dependence which changes according to the overall context, affects the freedom to use resources and the strategy employed’ (Smith 1994: 348).

Figure 2.1: Smith’s (1994) model of prime ministerial power
The power dependence model examines structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power to address politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. It furthers both the strategic-relational and core executive approaches through the argument that the nature of dependence conditions outcomes through the dialectical interaction of structure and agency in context.

The core executive has to be conceptualised as a set of actors and institutions that are connected because of resource dependency. The connections occur though a range of formal and informal networks, and they are governed by ‘rules of the game’ and shared values... Because no actor has a monopoly on resources, power cannot be located within a single site of the core executive. Who succeeds will depend on the circumstances and the alliances that develop at a particular time (Smith 1999: 28-29).

Power, therefore, is determined through networked resource exchange in strategically-selective environments where dependence shapes strategies based on norms, which influence who and what matter.

Hay and Richards (2000: 1) used this approach to argue against frameworks that neglect the ‘flexible, adaptive, and dynamic quality’ of networks (actors and institutions) within the British core executive. Smith (1999) argued operationalising the power dependence approach by analysing structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power helps move beyond linear causal treatment of empirical questions about the nature of executive leadership. The power dependence model can be adapted from its use in national administrations to international organisations through ‘concept travelling’ these five analytical elements.
Concept travelling occurs when ideas: ‘appear “similar enough,” that is, neither identical nor utterly different’, are adapted to different circumstances (Sartori 1970: 1035). Concept travelling allows researchers to apply existing knowledge to similar phenomena. The thesis uses the evolution of the core executive in the policy-making process to better analyse the evolution of the executive head in decision-making in international agencies. Concept travelling facilitates the transfer of knowledge from domestic bureaucratic administration to international bureaucratic administration for application to the case study of WTO directors-general.

Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990), Smith (1994, 1999), and Hay and Richards (2000) confronted a parallel lacuna and developed the core executive-power dependence framework in response. Executive heads and heads of state are not identical, but they are similarly limited in decision-making authority. The concepts used in this approach and the thesis are neither identical or utterly different, enabling the framework to be adapted for use in addressing the lacuna around the executive head. The larger concepts of the approach, such as the use of structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power, are left unchanged. The smaller concepts, such as the formal and informal authority of executive leadership, are adapted to the role of the executive head.

Specifically, international organisations do not produce policy in the same manner as states. Policy-making is adapted to decision-making; this indicates that international organisations are not supranational. Their authority does not surpass that of their member states; policy-making occurs at the national, not international, level. Decision-making is tied to the
survival, achievement, and evolution of the organisation in global governance where agencies compete for power. The director-general’s role in decision-making is evaluated to assess if they matter. How did the director-general pursue their objectives? Did the director-general play a role in decision-making? If so, which decisions; what role did they play, and how did they influence decision-making? If not, did the director-general attempt to influence and fail, or were they constrained by their limited role in decision-making?

The nature of dependence in a director-general’s term is evaluated to analyse how they matter. Executive networks and institutions are examined; the context of their term is evaluated to better understand how their role was limited or bolstered by circumstance. How did the director-general influence the organisation’s survival, achievement, and/or evolution? Did the director-general engage in networked resource exchange? If so, what was the outcome? If not, how were they constrained – did they fail to exchange resources or fail to exchange resources that heightened dependence on their leadership? What was the nature of their relationships, and were they able to facilitate dependence on their leadership? This enables the conceptual approach to be adapted for use in addressing the research questions – if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation – making an original contribution to address the lacuna.

Adapting Structure

The conceptual approach argues that agency and structure matter through their dialectical interaction and impact on outcomes. ‘What structure does, at least from a critical realist perspective, is to ‘condition agency’ and ‘define the range of potential strategies that might
be deployed by agents in attempting to realise intentions” (Hay quoted in Smith 1999: 30). The element of structure is adapted to the case of WTO directors-general to begin to better understand this relationship.

Executive leadership is conditioned by organisational structure. In the WTO, this includes:

- formal and informal authority, defined by the organisational charter and norms,
- institutions, such as the core governing bodies of the WTO, and
- networks, including internal and external actors and agencies that shape decision-making.

The director-general’s influence can be enabled and/or constrained by decision-making authority, institutions, and networks. Beginning with the director-general’s formal and informal authority, also referred to as powers, duties, and role, the WTO, like most international agencies, is member-driven. Member states possess exclusive formal decision-making power, and the executive is largely limited to administrative and managerial power. VanGrasstek (2013: 503) argued: ‘the WTO would never exist but for the will of its members and those members rarely pass on the opportunity to remind the Secretariat [and the Director-General] that the WTO is a member-driven body.’

The director-general leads member states using their formal and informal authority. Formal powers are outlined in the WTO Agreement (1999). Informal authority is reproduced through a clause in the WTO Agreement where the authority of a previous executive head is transferred to the current director-general. The director-general can also transform informal authority through resource exchange or political will (agency).
establish new informal authority, a director-general manipulates context or relies on norms, which ‘reflect past decisions and past conflicts’, to gain members’ implicit or explicit approval over new informal power (Smith 1999: 30).

Smith (1999) highlighted that decisions made by powerful actors, past or present, limit others. The director-general’s formal and informal powers: ‘limit what departments do, how problems are perceived and what actions they take’ (ibid). Over time, the director-general’s power can become so historically entrenched that they shape structure, a key argument explored in the thesis. This has been the case with the director-general’s controversial ‘Green Room’ meetings where the executive gathers members by invitation only for private negotiations, as detailed in the next chapter.

Institutions and networks are explored to analyse the role of WTO directors-general on decision-making. Institutions represent where decision-making occurs. Within the WTO, ministerial conferences host the highest decision-making body within the organisation (Figure 2.2) and are chaired by the minister of the country where the conference is held (WTO Agreement 1999). Ministers, who have been appointed by their heads of state, take decisions on behalf of their nation’s trade authority. ‘Ministerials’ occur at least once every two years, as mandated in the WTO Agreement (1999).
Figure 2.2: WTO organisational chart\(^6\)

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\(^6\) WTO (2014).
When not in session, ambassadors take decisions in the core and smaller governing bodies (Figure 2.2). Ambassadors work primarily within the organisation, unlike ministers who work from their respective states. The core governing bodies are the General Council, which oversees all bodies, Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) the legal forum, Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) the monitoring forum, and Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) the negotiations forum.

The majority of decisions are taken within the core and smaller governing bodies, which are chaired by ambassadors that have been nominated and elected by the WTO membership. The TNC is the only body chaired by the director-general, a GATT norm explored further in the case studies. The WTO employs multilevel decision-making. Ministers have more power within their state’s administration and reside in their respective capitals, and ambassadors maintain a Geneva presence – the location of the WTO – and have power in routine decision-making. However, some ministers may take decisions in the core governing bodies; some ambassadors take decisions at ministerial conference. This depends on state power dynamics, resources, decision-making, context, and perceptions of actors and agencies involved.

Ministers, ambassadors, heads of state, and chairpersons are part of the director-general’s network where they attempt to influence decision-making. Networks shape outcomes and power relations by influencing who is and is not included in decision-making. Whether an actor or agency is a member or an observer conditions the role they play in decision-making. The WTO takes decisions by consensus; observers, however, are not members, and while they can still shape outcomes, their role is not as directive as a member states. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the media, civil society, and international
organisations are also included in the WTO’s network, and the case study explores how networks, like the G20 – a group of 20 major economies – condition outcomes.

The director-general uses their formal and informal power to engage with decision-making institutions and networks in pursuit of their objectives. They manipulate context, exercise agency, and exchange resources for the power to influence member-driven decision-making. The thesis uses the element of structure to analyse how directors-general interact with structure to ensure the organisation survives, achieves, and evolves. At times, leadership is constrained by structure, and at other times, structure enables their influence. For example, though the director-general has no formal authority in negotiations in the WTO Agreement (1999), their role as chair of the TNC enables them to shape negotiations.

Adapting Context

Whether a director-general is able to shape outcomes with limited power in member-driven decision-making, in part, depends on context. Smith (1999) and Hay (2002) divide context into political, historical, and institutional; this section outlines how context is adapted and argues for another division of global context that shapes outcomes. First, political context conditions the institutions and networks included in decision-making. The WTO is the primary international agency of multilateral trade governance; however, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is a forum for developing nations’ trade governance. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also facilitates multilateral trade negotiations, as well as many smaller, regional
bodies, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Political context frames conflict and cooperation between trading nations, and if states are unable or unsuccessful in pursuing their trade interests in the WTO, they can take their issues to another fora for negotiations. Political context also has an internal and external dimension, as member states have national and international obligations.

Second, the power dependence model draws on history to better explain and interpret how codes of conduct or norms influence structure and agency (Hay and Richards 2000). The WTO is less than twenty years old. It has a rich history dating back to 1947 when the United States of America (USA) failed to ratify the ITO, the international trade agency intended to complete the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences that begat the contemporary IMF, World Bank, and UN. The next chapter explores the extent that the USA is a historical antecedent in shaping outcomes in multilateral trade governance (Anderson and Hoekman 2002). Historical context also examines how norms become institutionalised. For example, the GATT norm of informality has led members and the director-general, in many cases, to bypass formal rules based on their perception of outcomes. Historical context investigates how directors-general are limited or bolstered by past outcomes.

Third, institutional context informs how directors-general are limited or bolstered by internal factors, such as member-driven decision-making. Some institutional factors are within an executive’s sphere of influence, like facilitating organisational expansion within limited physical space. Some institutional factors are not within an executive’s sphere of
influence, such as deep divides between members about organisational work. Winston Churchill famously said: ‘never let a good crisis go to waste.’ Institutional crisis creates a unique opportunity for executive heads to demonstrate their value, especially through technical knowledge and political expertise (Burns 1978; Blondel 1987; Haas 1990; Tucker [1981], 1995; Murphy 1994, 2005).

Finally, in adapting the conceptual framework to international organisation, there is another context that conditions how structure and agency interact: global context. Global issues like hunger, nuclear proliferation, genocide, and development affect how actors strategise to shape decision-making in international agencies and how favourable their strategies are perceived. Like states, international agencies compete for power, and the power of the WTO in global governance is conditioned by global context. Directors-general can manipulate global context to enhance the power of their organisation in global governance or amongst states. They can also capitalise on global factors to increase the likelihood that they will be successful in their objectives, but this can also limit strategies. For example if organisations require extra funding to achieve their objectives and a financial crisis limits members’ contributions, this context is likely to have an affect on actors’ mutual dependence and strategies.

Adapting Resource Exchange

Actors possess resources, and exchanging resources allows them to alter dependence within organisations, which affects power dynamics. Power is understood as primarily a product of resource exchange. The more resources an actor possess, the greater the
opportunities to enhance their power (Meyers 1976; Burns 1978; Smith 1999), but some actors have more valuable resources to exchange. The director-general exchanges resources with their internal and external networks to shape outcomes and dependence on their leadership; they also use the formal and informal rules of the organisation to exchange resources. For example, the formal rules give the director-general administrative and management power, but few executives use their formal authority to influence decision-making (Barnard 1938; Jones 2015). These duties are typically delegated to senior staff, and exchanging the resource of shared leadership amongst their cabinet (delegating) allows directors-general to enhance their informal power. ‘Power depends on how resources are exchanged, and hence it is about dependence not control’ (Smith 1999: 31). Directors-general make strategic choices when exchanging resources, and their strategies shape dependence on their leadership, which also affects how they exercise agency (Clegg 1989; Smith 1994).

Adapting Agency

How actors exercise agency was called ‘strategies’ in the conceptual framework. In the adapted model, agency is divided into approaches and tactics. Approaches, unlike archetypes, are dynamic and change based on actors’ perceptions and resource exchange (Hay 1995; Smith 1999). The range of approaches and tactics actors use is ‘infinite’ (Smith 1999: 33). In adapting the model, the thesis establishes four common approaches (Table 2.1). These approaches emerged from the research undertaken within the WTO, but they can be used, generally, to frame the nature of executive leadership in international organisation.
• The facilitator approach relies largely on administrative and managerial authority.
• The broker approach uses political skill and negotiating authority to minimise conflict and promote consensus.
• The coercive approach induces cooperation through threats or intimidation.
• The interventionist approach attempts to influence decision-making by assuming authority that is reserved for member states.

Table 2.1: Common approaches and tactics in the WTO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches</th>
<th>Directors-general</th>
<th>Member states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coalition builder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventionist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Directors-general</th>
<th>Member states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td>Drafting negotiating texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating new</td>
<td></td>
<td>Building domestic support/dissent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>programmes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatening to</td>
<td></td>
<td>Offering concessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>declare an impasse</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evoking their 'bottom line'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk taking</td>
<td></td>
<td>Using the dispute settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mechanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Smith (1999) developed three approaches commonly used by ministers to counter or complement the prime minister’s approaches. These approaches appear to be similar to those used by WTO member states (Table 2.1), as highlighted within the literature (Cox and Jacobson 1974; Ruggie 1992; Anderson and Hoekman 2002; Kwa 2003; Elsig 2009; Ismail 2009a; Narlikar and Vickers 2009; VanGrasstek 2013). It is not surprising that ministers and member states have similar strategies, as they both pursue self-interests in highly politicised, competing environments.

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7 The table has been adapted from Smith (1999).
Members employ the autonomous approach to act independently to achieve their goals. Conversely, the interdependent approach can be used to block consensus by acting as part of an alliance or to pursue collective or regional goals. The G77 – a coalition of developing states – in the WTO is an example of how developing members use this approach to counter the influence of dominant, autonomous members (Jawara and Kwa 2003). Finally, members can use the coalition builder approach; this approach is used to build dependence on the member state leading the coalition. It is a useful strategy for achieving independent or synergistic goals, whilst acting on behalf of a coalition. The European Community (EC), led by France and the United Kingdom (UK), built a strong coalition during the GATT that they continue to use – under the authority of the European Union (EU) – in the contemporary WTO. How approaches affect decision-making is conditioned by organisational history and norms. The strategic-selectivity of approaches reflects how individuals perceive the likelihood of other actors and institutions favouring their influence on particular decisions.

Because directors-general are not the only actors attempting to influence decision-making, they also employ tactics (Table 2.1). Tactics are devised to affect structure, context, another actor’s agency, or increase executive influence on outcomes. Some common directors-general tactics are shared leadership with their deputies director-general, creating new programmes, risk taking, and threatening to declare an impasse. The last two are the least common. Member state tactics range from drafting negotiating texts, building national support/dissent amongst unions and NGOs, offering concessions, or using the DSB. Directors-general and member states use approaches and tactics diversely. An
approach can be used on its own, in combination with tactics, or strategically combined with other actors’ approaches and tactics to target specific decisions. This helps establish why narrow accounts of agency, such as the behavioural approach, lack richness in explaining how agency affects power dynamics.

Adapting Power

Power is primarily assessed as a product of resource exchange; it is understood as relational and embedded in strategically-selective contexts. Beginning with how power is adapted to analyse directors-general, Smith (1995: 35) argued that: ‘in order to achieve goals, actors have to negotiate, compromise and bargain.’ Power is analysed by investigating the relationships on which Cox (1969) focused. He argued that the quality of executive leadership depends on their relations with the internal bureaucratic system, most powerful members states, and international system – a core claim explored in the case studies. His focus on the most powerful member states highlights that Cox’s contribution is perhaps outdated. International organisation has changed considerably since 1969, particularly in the WTO where decisions are taken by consensus (Kim 2010). This decision-making institution empowers less dominant members should they elect to block consensus.

The thesis examines executive power relations within the internal system, which includes the Secretariat and internal divisions, member states – with a focus on dominant and less dominant states and coalitions – and global governance agencies, which includes but is not limited to the major organisations of the UN, IMF, and World Bank. Power is also assessed by analysing if and how directors-general enhanced their power in strategically-
selective contexts (environments). The case studies reflect on political, historical, institutional, and global context to investigate if and how executive heads influence outcomes at critical moments. This allows the thesis to develop models of executive power in the WTO (Figure 2.3) by adapting Smith’s model of prime ministerial power (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.3: A model of the WTO director-general’s power

Summary

The core executive approach and power dependence model offered a mechanism for incorporating the executive head in a manner that takes both structure and agency seriously. This framework has previously been used to analyse executive leadership in national administration. The chapter has adapted the framework for use in the WTO, and
it may have utility in analysing executive leadership in other international agencies. The framework overcomes the limits of approaches that prioritise structure or agency by examining them through their dialectical interaction. Executive leadership can avoid being viewed as zero-sum or the top-down exercise of formal authority by understanding power as relational, a product of resource exchange, and embedded in political, institutional, historical, and global context. This adaptation provides a theoretical contribution to the lacuna and establishes how executive leadership can be incorporated into institutional analysis of politics, power, and change over time.

Conclusion

The chapter continued the progression of the thesis by examining the effects of the deterministic scholarship that argued either executive leadership mattered considerably or little. The strategic-relational approach offered a mechanism for understanding that both structure and agency matter in assessing outcomes. Additionally, the strategic-relational approach posited a relational and fluid understanding of power that was identified in the introduction of the thesis as indicative of member-driven international agencies. This chapter reviewed prevailing approaches to political leadership and international administration to uncover the challenges to the thesis research, identified in the first two chapters. The behavioural, power, and contingency approaches failed to accurately capture the relationship between structure, agency, and context. The chapter argued the strategic-relational understanding helps establish an appropriate framework for incorporating the executive head.
Alternative areas of political research were consulted with a focus on better framing the theme of executive leadership. The core executive approach and power dependence model, used with the strategic-relational approach, offered a suitable alternative to the prevailing approaches reviewed earlier in the chapter. This conceptual framework was used first in Westminster-style polities to address similar questions about prime ministerial power and the evolution of national administration. After identifying a series of parallels with the WTO director-general, the conceptual framework adapted the elements of structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power to the context of the WTO. This adaptation begins to address the lacuna the thesis aims to confront by incorporating the executive head into analysis of politics, power, and change over time.

The next chapter continues to establish a base for analysing the leadership of four WTO directors-general selected for study. Throughout the chapter there has been an emphasis on history through historical context and historically constituted codes of conduct (norms). The following chapter draws out how historical context and norms were formed and how they shape contemporary WTO decision-making. The chapter provides a history of the WTO through five epochs in the development of multilateral trade governance. The chapter explores a history of American hegemony and exceptionalism in international trade and the prevalence of crisis and informality in the GATT. Exploring historical context and norms allows the conceptual framework to be operationalised in Chapter Four to address how the research questions – if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation – can be approached.
Chapter Three: History of the WTO

Introduction

The previous chapter established the conceptual framework that enables the executive head to be incorporated into disciplinary knowledge of politics, power, and change over time. The core executive-power dependence model takes structure and agency seriously in addressing the research questions – if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation. The conceptual framework maintains that context – past and present – shapes the interaction of structure and agency and resources exchanged for power. This chapter explores the history of multilateral trade governance to better understand outcomes in the WTO.

The chapter uncovers the role of the contemporary director-general through five epochs of history (1947-1995). It investigates historical norms or the ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990b: 4) through a history of informality, hegemony and exceptionalism, and crisis to frame inherent tensions between executive heads and states in international politics. As argued in the previous chapter, the director-general’s power is deeply-embedded in how GATT executive heads exercised their authority. The role of executive leadership is vaguely defined in the WTO Agreement (1999), and the chapter argues that this was members’ intention. The chapter examines over 50 years of trade governance to explore how historical context and norms shaped the role of the director-general and continue to influence outcomes in the WTO.
The five epochs are used to trace the evolution of multilateral trade governance in response to the interests and needs of states, as they are the dominant unit of analysis in prevailing scholarship. However, an international organisation and its executive head are deeply connected; the survival of one ensures the tenure of the other. They are not analytically separate. With limited exception, the history of multilateral trade governance has failed to incorporate how executive heads contributed to change in the multilateral system (Curzon and Curzon 1974; VanGrasstek 2013). The chapter begins to address the lacuna around the executive head by integrating GATT leaders into WTO history, starting with the post-World War vision of trade as an instrument of peace.

**The Failed ITO (early 1940s to early 1950s)**

The ITO began with bilateral trade negotiations between the USA and UK (Irwin, Mavroidis, and Sykes 2008). They aimed to: ‘reduce tariffs, eliminate quotas and preferences, discipline the use of other trade instruments, and deal with such diverse subjects as labor rights, boycotts, exchange controls, subsidies, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 43). ‘These two powerful states helped to establish and enforce rules that granted judicial equality and economic opportunity to other states that would, in earlier periods of history, have been subject to much more naked and one-sided exercises of power’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 4). The USA proposed creating a trade organisation to aid post-war reconstruction efforts that would serve as the third arm of the 1944 Bretton Woods system in an effort to foster peace through international economic development (Hull 1948; Anderson and Hoekman 2002). The USA also wanted inclusion in preferential trade relationships between the UK and its
colonies, as well as the French, Belgian, and Dutch Imperial Preferential Systems (Cottier and Elsig 2011).

The USA led the drafting of the ITO charter, conferring with British, Canadian, Indian, French, and Australian leadership (Wilcox 1949). Koremenos et al. (2001: 762) argued that states participate in international organisations to further their own interests and ‘design institutions accordingly’. The post-war American hegemony in international politics shaped the structure of the ITO, as well as international organisation more generally (Wilcox 1949; Diebold 1952; Krueger 1998; Zeiler 1999; Foot, MacFarlane, and Mastanduno 2003; Jawara and Kwa 2003; Wilkinson 2006; Kim 2010; Wilkinson 2011). Wilcox (1949: xv) argued that states empowered American leadership in international order because the USA: ‘displayed a readiness to assume the responsibility that goes with power’ by hosting the Bretton Woods, Dumbarton Oaks, and San Francisco conferences that negotiated the contemporary IMF, World Bank, and UN. ‘It is an inescapable fact that vast asymmetries exist between countries, and it is inevitable that the larger countries in the system can deploy more resources and exercise greater influence’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 35).

Similar to the IMF, World Bank, and UN, the ITO was to be led by an executive board, supported by a permanent staff and secretariat, and headed by a director-general. The executive board comprised of eight permanent members – including the USA, UK, and countries of ‘chief economic importance’ – and ten rotating seats for states with ‘different types of economies or degrees of economic development’ (ICITO – Havana Charter, forthwith – 1947: article 78, paragraphs – paras, forthwith – 1 and 2(c)). The executive board’s powers included calling for a conference, assembling necessary commissions,
nominating and selecting a director-general, and serving as a dispute settlement body. The power of the ITO executive board – what Hudec (1990: 27) referred to as a ‘ruling Directorate’ – was ultimate, and the director-general was limited as the ‘chief administrative officer’, similar to Meyers’ (1976) assessment of the OAU executive (L/189 1954). The director-general had no voting rights and was mandated to register members’ acceptance or non-acceptance of agreements, assemble annual budgets and reports, and appoint staff (Havana Charter 1947: articles 84, para 4 and 77, para 85).

As prospective member states awaited the USA’s congressional ratification of the ITO, the multilateral trading regime was gaining momentum. The Geneva Round, the first conference of trade negotiations organised under the Preparatory Committee of the Interim Commission of the ITO (ICITO), was held in 1947. The Annecy Round (1949) was held under Chapter IV – the General Agreement – of the ITO charter. The General Agreement, or GATT as it became known, did not require USA congressional authorisation, and trading nations were eager to lower tariffs and increase shares in trade (Zeiler 1999; Irwin et al. 2008; VanGrasstek 2013). ‘Vive le Provisoire! – the General Agreement embraced its own impermanence and lack of structure’ and began informally governing multilateral trade (Kim 2010: 46).

As the failure of the [ITO] Charter to gain acceptance became evident, considerable energy had to be put into extending the GATT [originally concluded for three years], and in particular into preventing extensive cancellation of tariff concessions previously negotiated (Diebold 1952: 28).

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8 The ITO charter refers to the power and duties of the executive board 43 times in its 103 articles and to the director-general only 18 times.
GATT in the Interim (1949 to the mid-1950s)

Aside from the emergence of the GATT, there was a lack of urgency in the USA’s ratification of the ITO due to the Marshall Plan’s success, emergence of the Cold War, and the Korean War (Zeiler 1999; Wilkinson 2011). ‘Thus, negotiators did not sever the link that tied the GATT to the ITO: they intended to see the GATT eventually come under the institutional umbrella of the ITO’ (Irwin et al. 2008: 103). The GATT had no permanent staff or secretariat because it was not a formal, legal organisation; it relied heavily on the ICITO and the UN. ‘Little by little GATT began to grow, initially overcoming severe budgetary problems’ (Lacarte quoted in Cottier and Elsig 2011: 15).

GATT in the interim was feeling its way, making up rules as it went along (L/348 1955). ‘It might come from the US; it might come from Britain; it might perhaps come from France; it might come from the Executive Secretary, and this would give rise to some initial discreet exchanges between two or three of these members’ (Lacarte quoted in Cottier and Elsig 2011: 14). Decisions were made by secret ballot or open vote one week (L/162 1953) and by committee or panel the next (L/169 1953). ‘But rather than formalise its rules and procedures with increasing degrees of bureaucratisation and stipulation, the creeping institutionalisation reinforced and entrenched its slippery character’ (Wilkinson 2006: 38). The early history of multilateral trade governance reflected informal decision-making by dominant contracting parties to the GATT. The ‘odd circumstances of [the] birth of the GATT as an institution … left it with certain defects that … plague[d] its efficient performance’ (Wilkinson 2006: 36).
The ITO did not exist and neither did the executive board; there was a leadership vacuum. Trygve Lie – first Secretary-General of the UN – appointed Sir Eric Wyndham White⁹ (1948-1968) to head the ICITO Secretariat, supported by delegations from the USA, dominant European trading states, Canada, Australia, and India (VanGrasstek 2013). Wyndham White absorbed powers delegated to the ITO executive board as a matter of practical necessity, which transformed the role states envisioned of the ITO director-general (Havana Charter 1947: article 84). This was not without the informal authorisation and occasional checking of powers by dominant contracting parties. India and select Latin American delegations also contested the power of the USA and dominant European trading states to shape the informal GATT in the absence of an executive board (ibid).

Curzon and Curzon (1974) argued that Wyndham White used his position of authority to lead states to develop the multilateral system. ‘Wyndham-White may be cited as the principal practitioner of leadership that is exercised through the trust that the community places in the director-general’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 524). The GATT was a treaty, an informal institution that had not been ratified, and Wyndham White’s expansive authority violated no rules. Curzon and Curzon (1974: 307) noted that when it came to executive power in the GATT: ‘informality has been the watchword from the onset.’ States depended on Wyndham White’s technical and political leadership to pursue their trade interests.

Nobody could agree on anything on this particular issue, opinions were sharply divided and a new meeting was called to try to find a solution. At the beginning of the meeting, Wyndham White patted his pocket and he said ‘I’ve got the solution right here.’ Everybody clamoured ‘Well go on, say it.’ And he replied ‘I’ll say it, provided you agree beforehand you’ll accept it.’

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⁹ See Appendix 1.
dissent, everybody complied with his condition. He pulled out the piece of paper, read it, and that was the end of the problem... He could do that, thanks to his vigorous personality and his prestige among member countries (Lacarte quoted in Cottier and Elsig 2011: 15).

Wyndham White was entrusted with expanded executive duties, but whenever a move was made to formally constitute them, it was resisted (L/348 1955). The role of the GATT executive head can be categorised as: budgeting, heading the secretariat, administration and management, negotiating trade agreements (brokering), and liaising with other international organisations (coherence) (Figure 3.1). ‘From the first day and for many years it was Sir Eric Wyndham White... Eric was a very strong Executive Secretary and he was wedded, if I may put it that way, to North Atlantic unity and understanding... between North America and Western Europe’ (Lacarte quoted in Cottier and Elsig 2011: 15).
Wyndham White struggled to balance power asymmetries that began to reveal problems with GATT in the interim (L/348 1955). Dominant contracting parties, like the USA, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan, known as the Quad, united to reclaim the role of the ITO executive board (Wilkinson 2011). The de-facto GATT was taking on a flexible structure of informality that dominant contracting parties could manipulate to pursue more narrow trade interests (Kim 2010).

GATT’s personality simply grew, more or less spontaneously out of the complex situation in which it was launched... governments began to look more closely at what they had wrought, and found, to their surprise, that GATT had acquired a distinctive character much to their liking (Hudec 1990: 54).

A ‘small group’ of ‘good friends’ from developed states that ‘knew each other intimately and who clubbed together’ made collective decisions for the GATT (Lacarte quoted in Cottier and Elsig 2011: 14, 16). The informal GATT developed a culture where

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contracting parties wanted to give little but receive significant gains through market access or tariff reduction. This culture benefited North American and Western European trading states predominantly, and this coalesced with Wyndham White’s vision for trade liberalisation (Curzon and Curzon 1974).

The ‘entirely accidental international institution’ became an organisation run by a handful of dominant states and their executive head, who shared their vision of liberal, Western economic prosperity (Finlayson and Zacher 1981: 562). Developing contracting parties were: ‘highly reluctant to provoke Capitol Hill by proposing that the institutional weaknesses of GATT be corrected’ whilst awaiting the USA’s ratification of the ITO (VanGrasstek 2013: 45). The norm became an absence of formality in decision-making, which enhanced the power of dominant states and the executive head but made the GATT difficult to administer and manage. As Barnett and Duvall (2005: 23) argued, the ‘rules of the game’ are resilient and not easily changed.

The Ill-Fated Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) (1952-1959)

As early as 1949, there were signs the USA would not ratify the ITO (Diebold 1952; Odell and Eichengreen 1998; Zeiler 1999). In 1950, Wyndham White commissioned a working party to produce a report on ‘the Continued Administration of the General Agreement’ (CP.5/49 1950). The report assessed whether a standing committee, similar to the ITO executive board, might be better suited to administer the Agreement (CP.5/SR.25 1950). The report concluded there was: ‘not a sufficient measure of agreement on the
establishment of a standing committee to justify proceeding with the suggestion’, but the inquiry could be reopened (GATT 1952: 206).

A year later, the inquiry resurfaced and recommended that an ‘experimental arrangement’ of an ad hoc Committee for Agenda and Intersessional Business serve instead of a more permanent substitute for an executive board (Wilkinson 2006: 39). The Committee acted exclusively on behalf of the contracting parties, was limited to urgent matters and agenda-setting, and possessed no executive authority. The Committee would reflect the ITO’s executive board – countries of chief economic importance – though developing contracting parties dissented to their exclusion. On the surface, the Committee was a convenient solution to administrative informality; ‘it nevertheless contributed to the institutionalisation of ad hoc-ery that came to characterise the GATT’ (ibid).

In the mid 1950s, the Committee began to absorb some of Wyndham White’s powers that he took from the Havana Charter articles on the executive board. The Committee assumed authority in directing preparatory work, assembling working parties, managing technical assistance and balance of payments, and consulting with the IMF. Powers delegated to the Executive Secretary under the authority of the ICITO were transferred to the Quad plus Australia. Despite its ‘experimental’ status, the Committee had: ‘very real opportunities to influence’ decision-making (Wilkinson 2006: 40). This inspired the second attempt to institutionalise global trade, a ‘little known and ultimately unsuccessful attempt’ to formalise the GATT (Kim 2010: 70).
The OTC emerged in 1955 as a ‘stripped-down’ version of the ITO (Bronz 1956: 477). The differences between the ITO and OTC were cursory; it was ‘desirable’ that the OTC, like the ITO, be an organ of the UN (L/327 1955; Bronz 1956). The director-general’s duties were limited, as they were in the ITO to: budgeting, staffing, serving as the ‘legal representative’ of the OTC, participating in meetings without the right to vote, and any additional powers still not decided ‘to be guided’ by the contracting parties (L/292 1954; L/327 1955; Bronz 1956). The outlook was positive; ratification of the OTC looked possible (L/436 1955; L/498, 517/Rev.2, 603/Add.1 1956; L/682 1957). Contracting parties remained cautious of the USA’s preference towards an informal agreement, like the GATT, where existing national legislation could supersede institutional obligations (Wilkinson 2006; VanGrasstek 2013).

Wyndham White reserved his use of informal authority in these years. He was aware that his actions were being monitored by the UN secretary-general and contracting parties that would prefer a powerless executive secretary to a powerful executive committee (L/547 1956). He gained powers in facilities management and coherence to shape GATT work programmes (L/254 1954; L/398 1955; VanGrasstek 2013). His network expanded to the ILO, OAU, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, which became the OECD in 1961, and various domestic groups. He expanded the ICITO Secretariat by creating new programmes – a power he shared and later regained from the Committee – and wrote reports at contracting parties’ request (L/363 1955; L/542 1956).
A fresh attempt was made to bring the OTC to debate in Congress in 1957, but by autumn of 1958 it emerged that the OTC would likely fail (L/854, 868, 939, 942 1958; Kock 1969). Wyndham White and less dominant contracting parties were right to be cautious of the trepidation of American lawmakers to formally institutionalise trade (Diebold 1952). ‘The preferences of the United States continued to function as a key veto point in any GATT attempts to reform in this area’ (Kim 2010: 76). Wilkinson (2011: 48) argued these years of institutionalising American preferences in trade: ‘further cemented a post-war US-centred sphere of influence which was as strategic as it was economic.’ The GATT began to structure multilateral trade as an instrument of American policy (Ruggie 1992; Goldstein 2002). ‘The result was the construction of a commercial framework that drew from, and entrenched, practices and principles long used within the US as well as in relations with its primary trading partners’ (Wilkinson 2011: 47).


This epoch witnessed: ‘the biggest leaps forward in international trade liberalization’ through the Dillon Round (1960-1962), Kennedy Round (1962-1967), and Tokyo Round (1973-1979) (WTO 2011: 16). The GATT widened both its agenda – to new areas of trade in intellectual property, for example – and membership, a result of de-colonisation (L/2205 1964; L/4846 1979; L/5345 1982). To facilitate expansion of the GATT, Wyndham White used internal resources without seeking assistance from the UN (L/1966 1963). The GATT was carving out its own existence without a link to the UN Common System, and this unusual exception – coupled with the unorthodox absence of formal rules – demonstrated the power behind GATT machinery.
Jawara and Kwa (2003), Blustein (2009), Narlikar and Vickers (2009), Kim (2010), Cottier and Elsig (2011), and VanGrasstek (2013) highlighted how the GATT became powerful. The USA was the most desirable trading partner, and it urged its trading partners, particularly in Western Europe, to pursue their trading interests through the GATT (L/1950 1962). The GATT supported their vision of international trade, but they could not steer it alone. The Treaty of Rome (1957) and Common Agricultural Policy (1962) established the common interests of Western Europe through the European Economic Community (EEC) (Goldstein 2002). With their interests aligned, they were better suited to lead the GATT with the USA.

Canada, Australia, and Japan were also eager to reap the benefits of American preferences (Hainsworth 2001; US International Trade Commission 2003; Hopa 2012). Over time, the GATT not only reflected but also favoured the trade interests of the Quad (Kim 2010; Wilkinson 2011). This institutionalised trade dominance of developed states whilst putting less dominant contracting parties, mostly developing and post-colonial nations, at a distinct disadvantage (Wilkinson 2011).

Dominance of the Quad was normalised to such an extent that GATT’s legitimacy as a multilateral trading forum, rather than transatlantic, was at risk. With their membership increasing and technical assistance and training programmes steadily expanding, developing contracting parties realised they had power in their growing majority. The USA threatened to abandon the GATT to trade exclusively with its developed nation partners (Goldstein
2002; Barton, Goldstein, Josling, and Steinberg 2006); the GATT was in crisis (Wilkinson 2006). The USA is the only country that the multilateral trading system needs more than the USA needs the multilateral trading system (Wilkinson 2011; VanGrasstek 2013).

If this crisis had a point of origin, it would likely be near the time that UNCTAD developed in response to developed state dominance in the GATT – sometime between 1955 and 1962 (Friedeberg 1969). There were two dimensions to GATT's legitimacy crisis: internal and external. The internal crisis catalysed in developed contracting parties’ response to developing and least developed countries’ (LDCs) trade needs. The external crisis was embodied in the formal establishment of UNCTAD. Though the internal is explored first, these two events occurred somewhat simultaneously, influenced each other, and continue to affect politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time.

As GATT pursued ‘definitive’ acceptance of its legitimacy, as opposed to the ‘provisional’ status of its former years, questions about its capacity to govern multilateral trade took priority (L/2024 1963; L/2049 1963; L/2281 1964). Contracting parties were forced to confront their responsibility to LDCs. With the rapid ascension of developing states and LDCs, they agreed the GATT must promote trade as economic development. Brazil and India drafted a chapter (Part IV) on trade and development to be included with contracting parties’ definitive acceptance of the GATT (L/2128 1964). Part IV of the General Agreement committed contracting parties to increasing the exports of poorer countries and established that developed states should not seek reciprocity with developing contracting

11 The thesis acknowledges that narratives of crisis typically represent a challenge to the status quo.
12 See GATT documents, LDC/M1 to LDC/M106 and LDC/TS1 to LDC/TS53.
13 This idea has a contentious history in the WTO, particularly significant for Chapters 6-8.
parties in lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Developing contracting parties were to receive ‘special and differential treatment’ in the GATT/WTO (Curzon and Curzon 1974; Jawara and Kwa 2003; VanGrasstek 2013).

Almost fifteen years later (1978), the GATT continued to extend the deadline for definitive acceptance of its status as a result of disagreement on Part IV (L/2534 1966; L/2898 1967; L/3964 1973; L/4448 1976; L/4736 1978). ‘This, in turn, ensured that the smallest and most vulnerable of the contracting parties were locked out of setting the tone and agenda of the negotiations’, particularly in the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds (Wilkinson 2011: 48). Wyndham White responded by increasing technical assistance, but it was difficult for the GATT to deliver new services that catered to the needs of developing and LDC contracting parties. Curzon and Curzon (1974) argued that the creation of UNCTAD – and the external threat it posed to the GATT’s legitimacy – pressured those seeking North Atlantic unity to expand the scope of the GATT.

Over decades, developed states had institutionalised their exceptional treatment through GATT rules and norms (Wilkinson 2006, 2011). Within a short timeframe, developing contracting parties began requesting similar exceptions through special and differential treatment.\(^\text{14}\) The GATT lacked formal rules, and developing states were learning how to use developed contracting parties’ tactics to their advantage, increasing the difficulty in administering the GATT. A culture of crisis was unfolding, and UNCTAD’s emergence, formalisation, and link to the UN Common System enhanced the environment of crisis.

\(^{14}\) See Whalley (1990) for further information on special and differential treatment.
The overlap [between GATT and UNCTAD] led inevitably to rivalry in the early years. During the period of the Kennedy Round negotiations, it has been said that UNCTAD had more people on the Kennedy Round than GATT. Indeed, UNCTAD followed the negotiations very closely and, with a speed untypical of organizations, produced a report at the end showing how few benefits there were for [LDCs] (Curzon and Curzon 1974: 311).

UNCTAD was created exclusively to maximise the potential of trade to further develop and integrate developing states more effectively into multilateral trade governance (L/2171 1964). In response to the external challenge of UNCTAD, the International Trade Centre (ITC) was created to facilitate coherence between UNCTAD and the GATT (L/2362 1965; Curzon and Curzon 1974). Manifested in the GATT’s legitimacy crisis was the realisation that the norms of informality and American hegemony and exceptionalism were too problematic to structure multilateral trade.

Wyndham White suggested contracting parties accept the definitive status of the GATT, giving the administration more formal rules (L/2375 1965). Contracting parties responded instead by changing Wyndham White’s title from Executive Secretary of the ICITO to GATT Director-General (L/2419 1965). The change of title formalised his informal authority, which would be transferred to all who hold the office of director-general. This enabled Wyndham White to transform the executive head from a constrained administrator to an essential actor in facilitating global trade (Figure 3.2).
The expanded powers of the GATT director-general indicate the emerging institutional tension between the role of contracting parties and their executive head. Parties were content to allow Wyndham White more informal authority to shape outcomes when the GATT was composed of mostly North Atlantic states and a handful of developing nations. The evolution of the director-general reflected that power became more contested between contracting parties in this epoch. The enhanced executive authority conditioned a powerful director-general with resources beyond the control of contracting parties.

‘If it were not for Eric Wyndham White at the head of the GATT secretariat for twenty years, one could dismiss the question of the individual’s role in GATT as being interesting but inessential’ (Curzon and Curzon 1974: 318). He shaped the role of the director-general well beyond what the ITO charter stipulated, and this was only possible through the

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absence of an executive board and a shared vision of North Atlantic unity in the GATT’s early years. After his twenty years in office, contracting parties selected a new director-general, Olivier Long (1968-1980). They also limited the tenure of the director-general to three periods of three years to redress the power imbalance between themselves and their executive (C/77 1968). As is apparent from Long’s twelve-year tenure, this rule, like all GATT rules, was informal and could be altered based on states’ perception.

In 1967, Long first enhanced executive authority by intervening in the USA’s attempt to impose trade restrictions on states that lapsed in their balance of payments or were slow to implement Kennedy Round agreements. He gained the power to consult with members regarding implementation of agreements and distribute findings of international monitoring bodies when GATT decisions were found invalid (L/3007 1968; L/4505 1977). He was also permitted to field requests for observer status from other organisations and NGOs and author reports to address the changing direction of organisational work (L/3116 1968; L/5893 1985; L/5906 1985). Long led by facilitating effective administration and management of the GATT – exactly what contracting parties required to continue negotiating trade liberalisation (L/4048 1974).

Multilateral trade was changing fundamentally. Economies, through their interconnectedness, were more vulnerable, and developing contracting parties had fought for, and won, a seat at the decision-making table by emulating the tactics of dominant states. Long initiated the Tokyo Round to manage the ‘1971 environment of crisis’ and prevent a loss of momentum in trade liberalisation (L/3766 1972: 1). He was, as he urged

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16 See Appendix 1.
contracting parties to be, ‘cautiously optimistic’ about overcoming crisis (L/3766 1972: 4). Though the GATT survived, Long and dominant contracting parties neglected to address the development gap between parties that underscored crisis.

In 1975, the idea of an executive board re-emerged to help the GATT cope with the development gap. The ‘Group of 18’ (G18) was provisionally authorised for a year – and later extended – to expedite decision-making; they were supervised by Long and possessed no executive authority (L/4204 1975; L/4440 1976). Though the G18 was composed of a balance of developed and developing parties, the Quad, including all members of the EEC, was fully represented. The 1970s witnessed the continued economic unification of Western Europe through the EEC, which began to streamline their political, as well as economic, interests. This regional alliance became the model for gaining power in the GATT (Kindleberger 2002).

Several African states entered a coalition to address trade issues with Europe as a result of decolonisation; later post-colonial Caribbean states joined, creating the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP). This model of using common trade interests to enhance decision-making power was replicated extensively in the GATT, including the Caribbean Community and Common Market, Latin American Free Trade Association, Central American Common Market, Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement, South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement, and ASEAN.
The emergence of these regional power blocs, coupled with the difficulty administering the GATT and multiple economic and political crises of the 1970s and 1980s, resulted in Uruguay, led by Julio Lacarte Muro\textsuperscript{17}, authoring a report on improving implementation of the GATT work programme (L/5647 1984). The crux of the document – and Lacarte’s prescription for the divisive and crisis-prone GATT – was a new round of trade negotiations that would create a formal, rules-based organisation for multilateral trade. The G18 began preparing for what would be the final and most contentious round in GATT’s history: the Uruguay Round, named in honour of Lacarte (L/5887 1985; Schott 1994).

\textbf{The Forward-Looking GATT (1986-1994)}

Arthur Dunkel\textsuperscript{18} (1980-1993) was the second longest-serving director-general, second only to Wyndham White who served for twenty years. As the case with Long, contracting parties were willing to break their rules to keep a director-general they trusted. In 1986, parties again changed terms limits for directors-general; they limited their executive to two, four-year terms – the contemporary WTO term limits (L/6099). Dunkel’s term should have expired in 1988, but the GATT norms of informality reflected there was room for ‘flexibility’ in these rules (L/6099 1986: 2).

Developed contracting parties began using existing GATT rules to justify protectionism as debate on special and differential treatment (Part IV) continued (L/6399 1988).\textsuperscript{19} The USA was particularly adept at moulding the GATT to fit their preferences, citing domestic

\textsuperscript{17} See Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} See GATT documents, 1985-1990.
politics as reason why (L/6080, 6085, 6103 1986; L/6475 1989; Wilkinson 2011). Narlikar and Vickers (2009) argued that without systemic preferences in their favour, the USA defers to regional trade agreements (RTAs), such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Whether provisional or definitive, the GATT was not liberalising trade in a manner that reflected the USA’s preferences (Wilkinson 2011). In 1990, an American legal scholar was contracted by the Canadian delegation to further a proposal he made to staff and delegations on formalising a new organisational structure to accommodate for GATT’s ‘birth defects’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 56). The EC, as the EEC was then called, also favoured the proposal, and the Canadians began drafting the WTO Agreement (VanGrasstek 2013). The Uruguay Round needed to conclude for the WTO to be launched, which proved more difficult that Dunkel imagined.

In response, Dunkel created one of the most contentious practices, the ‘Green Rooms’: ‘a highly efficient tool of management’, where ‘the Director-General could act as a facilitator and as a spokesman for the multilateral system and the interests of the membership as a whole’ (Blackhurst and Hartridge 2005: 464). Named for the green walls in the room, Dunkel invited delegations to his quarters to broker difficult negotiations (VanGrasstek 2013). At times, three-fourths of trading nations were represented; other times, if they were informed of the meeting, less dominant contracting parties waited in the hallway.
(Jawara and Kwa 2003; Kwa 2003; Blackhurst and Hartridge 2005; Odell 2005). No written reports were/are allowed.20

The list of invitees did not vary greatly, but developing contracting parties, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Egypt, Morocco, and India were regularly included (Jackson and Sykes 1997; Odell 2005). Regional trading blocs, like ASEAN, would send one representative to speak on behalf of the group. After less dominant contracting parties complained: ‘Dunkel shifted to hosting private dinners in his home’ (Odell 2005: 429).

Dunkel hoped these dinners would help create a core of individuals who would identify personally, in their hearts, with the success of the Uruguay Round as a common enterprise, while also defending their national positions. Assembling them regularly as a team contributed to espirt de corps (ibid).

In 1991 when the Uruguay Round was at an impasse, he authored ‘an informal single negotiating text’, famously known as the Dunkel text.21 Dunkel took ‘personal responsibility’ for the outcome – mimicking Wyndham White, by telling members they could either accept the text in full or wholly reject it – and ‘to add to the pressure to settle, he announced that he would be leaving as Director-General’ (Odell 2005: 430).

The replacement of Mr Dunkel as director-general, which was not entirely voluntary on his part, was an EC-US response to the sense that negotiators were stuck on disagreements over essentially technical points and had lost track of the larger rationale for completing the round (VanGrasstek 2013: 69).

Dunkel expanded the role of the director-general in budgeting, heading the secretariat, administration and management, brokering, and within the dispute settlement mechanism

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20 See VanGrasstek (2013), Box 6.1 for more on Green Rooms.
(DSM) (Figure 3.3). He also initiated the ‘good offices’ role (L/6244 1987: 1). Similar to the good offices of the UN secretary-general, the role evokes the director-general’s position of prestige and weight in international politics to resolve conflict through decision-making institutions (Whitfield 2007; Wolff 2008). He created the TRPM, the monitoring body, where contracting parties undergo reoccurring reviews of their trade policies by the Secretariat. Dunkel believed the TPRM would reduce protectionism through ‘peer pressure and publicity’ (VanGrasstek 2012: 280). He also expanded the role of the director-general by appointing panel members to DSM hearings (Davey 2008).

Figure 3.3: Expanded duties of the GATT director-general (1980-1993)

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22 VanGrasstek (2013) argued that the WTO director-general’s good offices role has expanded, as most directors-general have been politicians with greater prestige than the GATT technocrats.

23 See VanGrasstek (2013) pgs. 280-287 for further information on how Dunkel shaped the TPRM.

Dunkel’s tenure was consumed with budgeting as a result of increased activity in the DSM and increased membership. The G18 suggested they would be agreeable to an enhanced, administrative role (L/6731 1990). Instead, Dunkel delegated some of his administrative powers – such as derestriction of documents – to the Secretariat (L/6025 1986). His unwillingness to share power with the Quad in the G18 may have contributed to his ‘not entirely voluntary’ decision to vacate executive office.

Sir Leon [Brittan, the new European Trade Commissioner] and Mr [Mickey] Kantor [the new US Trade Representative] thought that new blood was needed… There had been a breakdown of trust between Mr Dunkel and the major negotiators, and it was time to replace the detailed knowledge of a specialist with the instincts of a politician (VanGrasstek 2013: 69).

Peter Sutherland25 (1993-1995), the shortest-serving director-general, was the last director-general of the GATT and the first of the WTO. He embodied ‘political acumen’ rather than ‘an intimate knowledge of the intricacies of [trade]’ (ibid). European and American trade envoys recruited Sutherland, who was also a proponent of transatlantic unity and prosperity, for one purpose: to close the Uruguay Round (Friedman 1994; VanGrasstek 2013). After defeating Lacarte for the position of director-general, he: ‘had to hit the ground like a bomb or else it wouldn’t work’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 69-70). The conclusion of the Uruguay Round and subsequent establishment of the WTO were enveloped in ‘uncertainties’, and big players from both the developed and developing states were not eager to return to negotiations in the crisis-prone GATT (L/6244 1987: 1; VanGrasstek 2013).

It was widely felt that given the current environment, it was essential to push forward the Uruguay Round negotiations as rapidly as possible, even though the full results of the Round would show themselves only in the medium and

25 See Appendix 1.
longer term and could not be expected to resolve current tensions between
governments (L/6244 1987: 1).

Sutherland’s approach was to create: ‘a sense of unstoppable momentum’ by shaping
perceptions (VanGrasstek 2013: 70). He ‘aggressively’ impressed a sense of urgency on
GATT deadlines and embraced the environment of uncertainty in a way that had never
been done in the GATT (VanGrasstek 2013: 188). Sutherland (2008: 52) recalled: ‘there
was no need for political spin, the problems and challenges were self-evident.’ He added a
third deputy director-general to his Cabinet, which, in addition to select members of the
Secretariat, he relied on extensively. ‘The group played an important role in helping the
DG to analyse the evolution of the negotiations and the positions of key delegations… and
thus enabled the DG to craft and target his messages to political leaders so as to move the
negotiations forward’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 71).

Assuming his role as the head of the TNC that Dunkel established, Sutherland introduced
an informal rule that once a text was accepted in the TNC it was a binding agreement. ‘He
gavelled deals through, declaring them accepted, when he knew some members were not
satisfied. He believed a failure after all those years would be catastrophic for the world
trading system’ (Odell 2002: 433). He expanded the director-general’s network to
presidents, prime ministers, and congressmen, alongside GATT ministers and ambassadors
whom he threatened to ‘go over their heads’ if they were noncompliant (WTO 1996a;
VanGrasstek 2013: 529).
Sutherland (2008: 53) believed: ‘Sometimes political leadership is best generated through fear.’ Odell (2005) stated that one of the boldest moves for a director-general is to threaten to abandon negotiations, which Sutherland did (VanGrasstek 2013). Sutherland (2008: 53) maintained: ‘for effective leadership in the trade field, there needs to be a shared sense of potential loss, in the event of failure, as well as shared sense of gain accompanying success. However, the sense of loss needs to be real – not rhetorical.’ He used this sense of loss to convince the USA that a formal, rules-based trade organisation would not threaten American sovereignty (VanGrasstek 2013). The USA opposed transitioning from informal to formal multilateral trade governance unless they were granted ‘exceptional’ status through waivers, what US Trade Representative (USTR) Andrew Stoler (2003: 1) referred to as: ‘the ugly birthmark on the new-born baby’.26

In the fervour of the last days of the Uruguay Round, Sutherland was ‘knock[ing] heads together’ just to get the deal done (VanGrasstek 2013: 526). Sutherland (2008: 54) said that: ‘Arguably, the Uruguay Round worked because it was not always inclusive’. Members conceded his enhanced authority (Figure 3.4) during the Uruguay Round was necessary but were quick to ‘put the DG in his place’ (WTO 1996b; VanGrasstek 2013: 506). Sutherland’s leadership fragmented relations internally – between dominant and less dominant states – and externally with public relations (Wilkinson 2006).

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26 See VanGrasstek (2013) pgs. 62-73 for detail on how the USA negotiated their ‘exceptional’ status in the WTO.
Establishing the Role of the WTO Director-General

The chapter has provided a history of the WTO to establish the historical context and norms that condition the role of the contemporary director-general. The chapter has revealed that each GATT executive shaped the office through their interpretation of the role. The GATT’s history and norms of crisis, informality, and, particularly American, hegemony and exceptionalism, also influenced the role. The GATT directors-general were more powerful than envisioned in the Havana Charter. Figure 3.5 lists the authority of the first, full-term WTO director-general, as established by the GATT executive heads.

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The chapter highlights the director-general’s formal authority to better understand how executive heads exercise their influence. Formal authority allows them to:

- hold all agreements, protocols, and instruments of members’ trading preferences and distribute technical information (WTO Agreement 1999: article XIV, para 3);
- hold and distribute withdrawal of membership (WTO Agreement 1999: article XV, para 1);
- appoint and determine duties and conditions of service for staff and Secretariat (WTO Agreement 1999: article VI, para 3);

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28 Compiled from Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.
• head the Secretariat (WTO Agreement 1999: article VI, para 1);
• inherit powers of GATT directors-general (WTO Agreement 1999: article XVI, para 2);
• ‘not seek or accept instructions from any government or any authority external to the WTO’ (WTO Agreement 1999: article VI, para 4); and
• author the annual budget estimate and financial statement (WTO Agreement 1999: article VII, para 1).

Members were hesitant to further outline the director-general’s formal authority when drafting the WTO Agreement (1999). They continue to rely on GATT history and norms to facilitate expansions of informal executive power in the WTO. This informal authority allows directors-general to:

• manage facilities;
• co-appoint the ITC head with UNCTAD secretary-general;
• appoint the Standing Appellate Body with the Committee of Six, composed of the director-general and chairs of the DSB, General Council, Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade in Services, and Council for Trade-Related Investment Measures;
• offer good offices for conflict mediation and resolution;
• interpret original text;
• appoint panel members to DSB when agreement cannot be reached between disputing parties;
• provide technical assistance and training programmes for developing and LDC members;
head TNC;

utilise internal and external networks in their brokering capacity;

liaise with other organisations to ensure compliance with international laws;

provide directional leadership,²⁹

initiate a new round of multilateral trade negotiations;

broker negotiations and disputes, including Green Rooms, and capacity to author single negotiating text,³⁰

distribute memorandum; and

remind members of unfinished work.

These formal and informal powers are divided into functions of structure (S) or agency (A), with context (C) shaping their interaction. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 organise executive authority in the WTO into these categories to enhance understanding of how structural or agential powers might be exercised in strategically-selective contexts. Some powers have exclusively structural or agential functions; whilst, others can affect both structure and agency, as shown as overlapping in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.

³⁰ Sutherland (2008) and Elsig (2010) argue this power has steadily declined; the case studies assess their argument.
Figure 3.6: Formal powers of the WTO director-general

1. Register & Distribute: Members' Agreements & Protocols
2. Register & Distribute: Members' Withdrawal
3. Staffing
4. Head Secretariat
5. Inherited Informal Powers
6. Freedom from Members' Influence
7. Budgeting
The divisions of authority in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 are not strict; they are flexible and dynamic. As Hay (2002) highlighted, one interpretation of structure may overlap with another’s understanding of agency. Structural and agential powers can be better understood along a continuum instead of opposing categories, as used in the literature review. What connects the majority of executive powers is their dialectical interaction. For example, the informal power to distribute memorandum – a written expression of agency –
affects context by drawing attention to deficiencies identified by the director-general, and the solution might necessitate a structural change.

The context of a director-general’s term can shape how structures and/or agents respond to executives’ strategies for influence. The case studies explore the extent to which international political context conditioned the leadership of the directors-general. These factors include:

- relations between dominant and developed states and less-dominant, developing nations, particularly divisions between them over the role of the WTO in global development,
- GATT norms, such as informality in decision-making, and the WTO’s relationship with UN Common System and Bretton Woods agencies,
- support from civil society and major global economies, such as the Quad – particularly the USA – and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS),
- and global political economic conditions, such as the 1997 Asian or 2008 financial crises or, particularly the September 11th, terrorist attacks.

This allows the case studies to assess the competence of a director-general’s leadership when confronting structural constraints in the dynamic context of international politics.

The director-general’s powers are also resources that can be exchanged within their networks for the opportunity to enhance their authority. The dialectical interaction of structure and agency in resource exchange enables and/or constrains how executives seek to heighten their power. Over time, the powers and resources used by executive leadership
also enable and/or constrain their influence. This suggests that: ‘the DG carves out his role… according to his charisma, professional strengths, ability to interpret government trends and interests, and personal relationships’ – a core claim within the thesis (Lacarte quoted in VanGrasstek 2013: 518).

The role of the director-general is to: ‘push the system ahead, even cornering countries or people to try to achieve what they should be doing’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 505). This view is widely but not universally held in the WTO, which contributes to the contested role of the director-general to pursue normative change. Some GATT directors-general, such as Long and Dunkel, did more to pursue normative outcomes; whilst others, like Wyndham White and Sutherland, were committed to advancing trade for developed contracting parties, not for development. The chapter highlights that the inability to understand if and how executive heads matter is bound in whether executive leadership has a role in facilitating normative governance. This, the chapter argues, is a primary reason why WTO members have vaguely defined the role of the director-general.

**Conclusion**

The chapter explored five epochs of WTO history to bring to the fore the historical context and norms that shape contemporary outcomes.

- Early 1940s to early 1950s, the failed ITO was part of the USA’s post-war legacy of institution building, and whilst the ITO was awaiting ratification, the USA discovered they had unintentionally created the GATT, which was preferable to the formal, rules-based ITO.
• 1949 to the mid-1950s, the GATT in the interim allowed contracting parties to pursue their trade interests without much regard for rules. The UN funded the temporary apparatus, and the GATT began to take on its own character. It became clear that the USA had little intention of ratifying the organisation it proposed.

• 1952-1959 witnessed an ill-fated proposal for the OTC – a less-ambitious, formal organisation – to govern trade with power concentrated in an executive committee. A formal, legal organisation did not coincide with North Atlantic preferences for multilateral trade governance. The GATT continued to informally structure trade, increasingly divided on developed and developing lines of dominance.

• 1960-1985, the GATT became more formalised, and trade was widely liberalised amongst developed states. Divisions on the development gap between contracting parties resulted in a proposal for a new trade round; within this proposal, a debate emerged on how to structure a formal, rules-based organisation for international trade negotiations and dispute settlement.

• 1985-1994 saw the GATT moving forward through formalisation but standing still by failing to confront the development gap. The earlier years revealed the extent of USA hegemony and exceptionalism in the GATT, and dominance of European regional interests emerged in this epoch. The GATT was unable and unwilling to uncouple from its vision for North Atlantic unity. After almost ten years of negotiations, the formal, rules-based WTO replaced the GATT.

Deeply-embedded norms continue to condition decision-making and how the WTO attempts to address the development gap. The WTO emerged as an organisation with a history of informality, crisis, and, particularly American, hegemony and exceptionalism.
The governance of multilateral trade began as a transatlantic experiment. Whilst Europe has slowly come to more equal terms with other WTO member states – likely a product of their post-colonial legacy – the USA continues to exercise considerable dominance in the WTO, as the case studies reveal.

It is one of the ‘Ten Commandments’ of the GATT/WTO to: ‘commit no disrespect towards the Director-General for thou shouldst honour thy shepherd’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 525). The chapter has explored the inherent tensions between four executive heads and contracting parties in the GATT to establish the role of the contemporary WTO director-general. VanGrasstek (2013: 504) argued that: ‘the precise role of the director-general nevertheless remains a matter of some dispute, illustrating the struggles that sometimes take place’. The chapter endeavoured to address the lacuna surrounding the executive head by clarifying their role, authority, and power. It has also highlighted how directors-general use their formal and informal authority to affect structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power. This is necessary because the role of the director-general is poorly defined in the WTO Agreement.

The chapter argued that members intentionally leave the role of executive leadership vaguely defined in the WTO because there is a normative role that leadership plays in global governance. States compete for power to influence and pursue their goals, and in this environment, the normative interests of states are often secondary to securing more narrow trade interests. The chapter does not argue that the GATT/WTO are driven by American hegemony and exceptionalism because the USA pursues its self-interest
exclusively. Multilateral trade is dominated by the USA because they possess vast resources, arguably more than any single state or coalition of WTO member states. They gained these resources by historically dominating structures that condition outcomes and providing leadership at critical moments that has enhanced dependence on their presence in the multilateral system. Executive leadership plays a normative role not to overcome the power of self-interested states, but to represent the values inherent in the multilateral system.

In the WTO’s almost-seventy years of history, the role of the director-general could have been clarified at multiple junctures (Sutherland, Bhagwati, Botchwey, FitzGerald, Hamada, Jackson, Lafer, and de Montbrial 2004; Petersmann 2005; Cottier 2007; Warwick Commission 2007; Steger 2009; Jones 2015). Members guard the member-driven machinery of WTO decision-making but are aware that, in the past, executive leadership has, in some part, reminded them of their obligation to the multilateral system, particularly in crisis. This is why the thesis investigates if and how executive leadership matters – to better understand the role of executive heads in international organisation.

The next chapter establishes the methodology used to conduct the empirical analysis. The epistemological perspective within the thesis is detailed, research design discussed, research questions operationalised, and limitations of the methodology presented. The first half of the thesis lays a path for analyses of four WTO directors-general: Renato Ruggiero, Mike Moore, Supachai Panitchpakdi, and Pascal Lamy. Through these four case studies, the thesis investigates if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation.
Chapter Four: Methodology

Introduction

The previous chapter established the role of WTO director-general through five epochs of multilateral trade history, which begins to address the lacuna surrounding the executive head. The chapter aimed to uncover historical context and norms, such as informality, hegemony and exceptionalism, and crisis that influence contemporary outcomes in the WTO. It argued that members intentionally vaguely define the role of the director-general; they are aware of the critical role leadership has historically played, particularly in crisis. The conclusion posits that there are inherent tensions between resourceful executive heads and powerful states that influence power dynamics. These tensions have contributed to the authority of the director-general being contested in member-driven decision-making.

This chapter continues to lay a path for empirical analysis by outlining the methodology used to address the research questions – if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation. The chapter is organised in four parts. The first part continues the argument made in previous chapters about overly deterministic preferences on structure and agency to support a critical realist perspective. The second part introduces the research design to assess dominant and contrasting narratives of executive leadership in international organisation.
The research questions are operationalised in part three to highlight how the case studies are analysed. The fourth part addresses limitations of the methodology, which reflects on generic and practical constraints encountered in the research. The introduction to the thesis highlighted that the complex nature of executive leadership in international organisation has been a barrier to incorporating the executive head into disciplinary analysis of politics, power, and change over time. The chapter argues that a critical realist epistemology facilitates the incorporation of the executive head in a manner that does not prioritise structure or agency.

**Part One: Critical Realist Epistemology**

The literature review revealed that scholarship using an agency-centric perspective produced the finding that executive leadership matters greatly; whilst, scholarship that was more structure-centric concluded that leadership matters little. The thesis aims to address the lacuna surrounding the executive head, which requires avoiding overly deterministic approaches to make a contribution to knowledge (Patomaki 2002; Fairclough 2005). This part establishes the critical realist epistemology that takes both structure and agency seriously.

Epistemology confronts: ‘the nature of the relationship between the knower and what can be known’, and shapes methodological choices (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 185). By exploring the epistemological perspective, the chapter is able to establish a firmer grounding in the debate about structure, agency, and causation. This allows the chapter to
connect the research design and methodology to contributions to knowledge made within thesis.

Two core epistemological traditions divide the discipline on what can be known: positivist and post-positivists.³¹ Positivists contend that a real world exists, and this world can be observed to produce objective knowledge. Post-positivists argue that reality is a construct of those that experience that particular reality; researchers are limited in observation and reduced to contributing subjective knowledge. Furlong and Marsh (2010: 193) argued that epistemological perspectives are: ‘reflected in what is studied, how it is studied and the status the researcher gives to his/her findings.’ The contribution of the thesis is bound in how the research is approached.

The thesis investigates if and how executive leadership matters by examining politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. It argues that there is a real world where structures and agents interact to condition outcomes (objectivity). It also argues that situated actors experience strategically-selective environments differently (subjectivity). At times, the interaction of institutions (structures) and networks (agents) can be observed, and researchers can claim that causal relationships exist. For example: executive leadership possesses the power to affect political change over time because they can be observed exercising authority. Other times, their interaction cannot be observed or cannot be observed wholly, making causal claims difficult to establish. For example: executive leadership may have the power to affect political change over time, but they cannot be observed (objectively) exercising authority.

³¹ See Furlong and Marsh (2010) for discussion.
The literature review and conceptual framework argue that power is contextual and relational. At times, executive leadership can be observed exercising power and causal links can be interpreted. At other times, the power of executive leadership cannot be observed. As Kempster and Parry (2011) argue, this does not mean that leadership does not exist and has no causal effect. Therefore, a perspective between the positivist and post-positivist epistemologies is necessary. The thesis acknowledges that observation of executive leadership is limited and actors experience structures and agents differently, but observations can be made. Understanding the nature of executive leadership (ontology), then, helps identify how the research is approached (epistemology/methodology): a critical realist argument.

The thesis argues that executive heads interact with structures and agents, and experiences of the executive head and actors who are influenced by executive leadership occur on a subjective level. Critical realism argues there are three levels of reality: the empirical realm of experienced events, actual realm of events and experiences where not all events are experienced, and real realm where events and experiences may be unobservable. Critical realism shapes the thesis research design by positing that knowledge of causal mechanisms is limited by subjectivity, making objective knowledge problematic. ‘For critical realists, phenomena exist at the level of events and experiences but also at a deeper level that may not be observable. For example, leadership cannot be seen. Only its effects are observed and perhaps felt’ (Kempster and Parry 2010: 107).
To understand how the real, actual, and empirical realms influence knowledge, critical realists: ‘need to identify and understand both the external ‘reality’ and the social construction of that ‘reality’” (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 205). Critical realists argue that reality is composed of overlapping levels where agents and structures interact. These realities are internal (intrinsic) and external (extrinsic) (Patomaki 2002). The dialectical interaction of structure and agency is explored through the three realities where decision-making occurs to understand how actors experience the world. ‘Outcomes are the product of the interaction between agents and structures, not merely the sum of the effect of structures or agents’ (Marsh and Smith 2000: 11).

Critical realists argue that structure and agency have causal powers, and causal statements can be made through their dialectical interaction, ‘which occur only in shifting and changing open systems’ (Patomaki 2002: 106). Patomaki (2002) highlighted that causality, from a critical realist perspective, cannot be attributed to a single causal mechanism, such as structure or agency. Causation is a complex process of interacting institutions and networks in the context of decision-making. The literature suggests that at times, executive heads matter greatly; at others, they matter less, and this depends on the complex interaction of decision-making structures and agents.

A critical realist epistemology maintains that rarely can researchers objectively and completely know the real world of causal mechanisms behind political outcomes. Outcomes can be explained from various realities (internal and external, observable and unobservable, and empirical, actual, and real) by investigating the interaction of structure

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and agency (Marsh and Smith 2000). Of ultimately more use is examining how situated actors (agency) influence strategically-selective environments (structure) in the context of decision-making (Jessop 1990). This helps overcome issues Jessop (1995) and Hay (2002) identified with the abstract categorisation of structure and agency as causal mechanisms, but it also supports a critical realist understanding of power.

Power, within critical realism, has less to do with subjugation (power over) and more to do with enabling and/or constraining the influence of actors at particular junctures (Jessop 1995). Power is understood to be fluid and embedded in social relations, and it reinforces the strategies of some actors whilst rejecting others (Emerson 1962; Hardy and Clegg 1996; Jessop 1990). This is because structures are strategically-selective, and the strategies that reproduce and/or transform structures are also shaped by past and present outcomes (Jessop 1990; Smith 1999; Hay 2002). ‘Power will always be inscribed within contextual “rules of the game” which both enable and constrain action’ (Hardy and Clegg 1996: 634). Actors discern which strategies might be favoured in strategically-selective context by demonstrating strategic learning about the rules of the game or norms (Jessop 1990). Therefore, the nature of executive leadership has influenced how structure and agency are approached, which shapes the methods used in analysing how situated actors affect strategically-selective environments using strategic learning.

In summary, the relationship between ontology and epistemology has been discussed to outline their relationship to and influence on the methodology. The thesis aims to avoid overly deterministic conclusions – identified in the literature review – by drawing on critical
realism. This epistemological perspective allows the thesis to make limited generalisations about the causal nature of executive leadership by exploring competing realities through the dialectical interaction of structure and agency. To do so, the research design aims to examine the influence of networked actors, who exhibit strategic learning in strategically-selective context, on institutions and vice versa. This helps the thesis overcome methodological and ontological issues with explaining and interpreting complex causal mechanisms. Part two connects this epistemological perspective to the methodology by discussing the research design.

**Part Two: Research Design**

There is a range of diverse methods researchers use, including qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods, and critical realism influences the research design. This part establishes the qualitative research design that draws on the case study, elite interviewing, and document analysis methods to address the research questions and core themes. The research design uses triangulation to investigate dominant and contrasting accounts of executive leadership in the WTO. Triangulating, as explored below, supports the critical realist perspective by adding rigour to analysis of overlapping realities where observation and objectivity is limited. To begin, the rationale underpinning the qualitative research design is set out.
A Qualitative Design

It was argued above that the critical realist epistemology allows the thesis to make limited generalisations. This is necessary because the research questions regard the role of executive leadership in international organisation, not the role of executive leadership in the WTO. Similar to how the conceptual framework was established, concept travelling allows the discipline to apply knowledge of a phenomenon in one context to knowledge in similar contexts. This is the nature of limited generalisations made in the thesis, in contrast to the nomothetic tradition of the behavioural movement where the findings could be applied to executive leadership outside of the context of international organisation.

The behavioural movement of the 1950s and 1960s, as discussed in the literature review, attempted to apply the nomothetic tradition of the natural sciences to social sciences (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen, and Karlsson 2002). The nomothetic approach, like positivism, generalises causal outcomes in objective phenomenon, such as executive leadership in general (Wallerstein 2001). Contra this, the idiographic tradition draws attention to the unique combination of circumstances that influence causal outcomes (ibid). Reflecting on the complex nature of executive leadership in international organisation, the idiographic approach is more appropriate. This idiographic tradition – the tendency to specify causal outcomes to unique phenomenon, such as executive leadership in international organisation – shapes the qualitative research design.

Devine (1995: 138) highlights that qualitative methods are: ‘most appropriately employed where the aim of research is to explore people’s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to these experiences.’ This makes a qualitative design more appropriate for investigating if and how executive heads matter in international organisation – questions
about the subjective experiences of situated actors. Qualitative research involves collecting in-depth information within a relatively small number of cases; whereas, quantitative research involves collecting extensive information within a larger number of cases (Burnham, Lutz, Grant, and Layton-Henry 2008). There are only limited cases that examine the executive head as the unit of analysis, and none have addressed if executive leadership matters; they assume it does (Cox 1969; Meyers 1976; Doxey 1979; Chan 2005; Harman 2011). This makes the qualitative design more appropriate.

A qualitative research design emphasises deep explanation over wide generalisation or prediction, which reflects the scope of the research questions. Qualitative methods enable researchers to uncover how actors interpret the world in which they operate, which aids critical realists in identifying the real, actual, and empirical realms in which structure and agency interact (Gordon 2002). Conger (1998) also argues that studies of leadership are most appropriately pursued through qualitative methods. A qualitative research design, therefore, is shaped by the critical realist epistemology and offers the most appropriate method for analysing the research questions. Within the qualitative design, the focus is on assessing the power of executive leadership to affect political change over time. To allow change over time to be investigated, the case study method is used to complement qualitative methods.

The Case Study Method

Yin (2009) highlighted that the case study method is appropriate for ‘how’ or ‘why’ research questions, such as: if and how executive leadership matters in international
organisation. The method involves systematic data collection and organisation of a single research topic as an: ‘empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’ (Yin quoted in Berg 2009: 6-7). Collier and Mahon (1993), Grix (2001), and Berg (2009) further advocated the case study method where the aim of research is in-depth explanation of complex social relationships. Because executive leadership is a complex, relational experience between actors engaged in social, political, and economic relationships, the case study method offers a suitable mechanism for organising analysis of four directors-general.

Kempster and Parry (2011) argued the case study method is particularly suitable for exploring the effects of leadership within the critical realist tradition. Critical realism emphasises how context influences the interaction of structure and agency. This emphasis helps develop complex explanations of how actors interpret their identities and interests will be favoured in strategically-selective contexts (Jessop 1995). The case study method allows for complex, social relations to be explored, and this is precisely what the conceptual framework aims to address. The case study method is used to investigate the role of the WTO director-general to address if and how executive leadership matters. Through this specific case study of WTO directors-general, the thesis aims to reflect on the more general nature of executive leadership in international organisation.

Single-case studies offer value in exploring complex phenomenon, but increasing the number of case studies can improve the quality of findings extrapolated from case study research (Grix 2001; Berg 2009; Yin 2009). Because the thesis examines change over time,
the research is designed to investigate more than one case of WTO leadership. This also improves the nature of generalisations made from the case studies (Patomaki 2002). ‘When case studies are properly undertaken, they should not only fit the specific individual, group, or event studied but also generally provide understanding about similar individuals, groups, and events’ (Berg 2009: 330). The case studies of WTO directors-general inform the broader research questions on the role of executive leadership in international politics. This gives the research design the additional advantage of being able to compare findings across cases.

Comparing case studies enables researchers to interpret and explain presumed complex causal links, describe decision-making in real-life context, and illustrate core themes and their role in causal links (Yin 2009). Comparing is: ‘a natural way of putting information in a context where it can be assessed and interpreted’ (Burnham et al. 2008: 69). Mackie and Marsh (1995: 173-174) highlight that social researchers compare because: ‘unlike physical scientists, we cannot devise precise experiments to establish, for example, the extent to which an individual leader affects policy outcomes.’

The case study method enables change over time to come into sharper focus across contexts that are both unique and similar (Grix 2001). As Berg (2009) highlights, the findings of specific studies do not mean that all similar studies conform to generalisations made from the case study findings. Rather, it suggests an explanation for why some similar cases are likely to conform to the same findings, staying within the critical realist and idiographic traditions. To understand the specific and general nature of executive
leadership, elite interviewing offers a fitting method to understand how actors interpret their identity and interests.

The Elite Interviewing Method

Richards (1996: 199) defined elites as: ‘a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society, and, as such… are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public.’ Interviewing elites helps the researcher gain insight into ‘closed systems’, such as decision-making in international organisations (Richards 1996). Elite interviews can provide researchers with information not available elsewhere in the public domain, such as uncovering motivations behind actors’ strategies. The research questions explore the nature of executive leadership in international organisations – a closed, elite world with privileged access – and for these reasons, elite interviewing is used as the primary method of data collection.

Elite interviews are often semi-structured; flexible, open-ended questions are asked, and in-depth, probing questions are used to clarify vagueness in explaining actors’ perceptions of outcomes. Semi-structured interviews are designed to foster trust between the interviewee and researcher, keep the interviewee on topic, and ask similar questions from related perspectives. However, elite interviews can be costly in terms of time and resources (ibid). The number of elites willing and able to be interviewed is often small (Richards 1996; Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, and Tahvanainen 1999).
‘Compared to non-elites, access to elites is regarded as particularly difficult because they, by their nature, “establish barriers that set their members apart from the rest of society”’ (Hertz and Imber 1993 quoted in Welch et al. 1999: 7). Devine (1995) and Richards (1996) advise that snowballing – networking with interviewees to uncover potential new interview sources – can improve access and sample size. The snowballing technique and networking with gatekeepers who restrict access to elites can also help the researcher: ‘develop a better understanding of the decision-making routines and authority structures of the organizations which they were studying’ (Welch et al. 1999: 8).

Elite interviews typically garner rich data necessary to analyse the complex nature of executive leadership in international organisations. There is always the risk that: ‘a high degree of openness does not necessarily equate to a high level of usefulness’ (Welch et al. 1999: 15). Richards (1996) highlights that elites may have agendas of their own and may intentionally evade difficult questions. ‘Elite interviews are a key tool of qualitative analysis for political scientists, but… interviewees can be awkward, obstructive, unforthcoming, or even deceitful’ (Richards 1996: 204). Elite interviewing is supplemented with other sources of data to improve interpretation of data, further explored below (Moisander and Valtonen 2006; Silverman 2011).

The Document Analysis Method

Document analysis helps uncover institutions, networks, resource exchange, and context that influence how situated actors strategise in strategically-selective environments. Document analysis is a rich method of data collection on its own, or it can be used to
validate data from elite interviews – a practice known as triangulation, discussed below. It helps: ‘to ‘tell the story’ or recreate a historical sequencing of events’, which is most appropriate in interpreting and explaining how outcomes are shaped in closed systems where decision-making occurs (Vromen 2010: 262). There are various ways to categorise documents (Burnham et al. 2008). The research design divides materials into primary and secondary sources.

Primary documents, such as archival records, often lack analysis and are considered: ‘original documents produced by political actors’ (Vromen 2010: 261). What distinguishes primary and secondary documents is the position of situated actors within an organisation with the capacity for strategic action. Secondary documents, such as books or journal articles, frequently include analysis and are written and published by actors outside the decision-making circle. The research design aims to use mostly primary documents to confirm and further explore data from elite interviews. It uses secondary sources to substantiate technical or contextual knowledge, as well as filling in the gaps of decision-making where more networked researchers were able to gain better access to elites.

Document analysis provides an excellent opportunity to add credibility to data gathered in elite interviews. However, primary sources rarely represent conflict or anything more than the official position, and secondary sources can suffer from lack of rigour, misinformation, and bias. Additionally, data within elite interviews can be problematic to confirm through primary and secondary documents, such as confidential or ‘closed-door’ discussions that
The thesis employs a triangulated approach to enhance the level of analytical rigour.

**Triangulation of Data**

One of the greatest strengths of elite interviewing is its ability to uncover how actors interpret their world and how their interpretations shape strategic learning. The strengths of this method can also serve as a weakness. Data from interviews: ‘impose[s] certain perspectives on reality’, by relying on elites’ interpretations of events – namely, that the subjective accounts of elites are insufficient sources of reliable data (Berg 2009: 5). As outlined above, it can be difficult or problematic to confirm these accounts through document analysis.

Triangulating methods means that more than one source of data are combined to improve generalisability (Moisander and Valtonen 2006; Silverman 2011). ‘Triangulation usually refers to combining multiple theories, methods, observers and empirical materials, to produce a more accurate, comprehensive and objective representation of the objective of study’ (Silverman 2011: 369). The justification for a triangulated research design is twofold: epistemological and methodological.

First, critical realism offers that phenomenon occurs across three realities (experienced, actual, and real). Triangulating attempts to explore realities not uncovered in the primary

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33 An example is Green Room negotiations, detailed in the previous chapter, that are not transcribed or available outside of the memories of those in attendance.
source of data (elite interviewing). Using other sources helps to clarify dominant and contrasting narratives of decision-making in explaining and interpreting various and competing realities. Triangulating also aids in understanding other experiences that may have shaped outcomes that were either not observed and/or experienced by elites who were interviewed or by elites who were not interviewed, such as directors-general who have since deceased.

Second, elite interviewing has its disadvantages. Richards (1996) highlights that, in addition to small sample sizes, having an agenda of their own, and being vague in responses, elites can suffer from imperfect memory recognition or recall, exaggeration or misattribution of their role in decision-making, and competing narratives that impair clarity and reliability. ‘Thus, the interviewer must constantly be aware that the information the interviewee is supplying, can often be of a highly subjective nature’ (Richards 1996: 201). Triangulating helps to establish validity in dominant and contrasting accounts that may suffer from imperfection of memory. Dominant narratives are established in elite interviews with multiple actors; contrasting narratives appear infrequently or singularly. Rather than discount these experiences as cursory, triangulation aims to confirm both dominant and contrasting accounts to better understand strategies and strategically-selective environments.

‘Triangulation, from this perspective, is not a way of obtaining a “true” reading but “is best understood as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry”’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2000 quoted in Silverman 2011: 371). Silverman (2011)
argues that it is assumed that if findings produced from multiple sources highlight corresponding conclusions, then the findings are more reliable in absence of highly generalisable and perfectly replicable data. The research design reflects how triangulation can be used to substantiate subjective accounts of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time (Richards 1996; Richards and Smith 2004; Burnham et al. 2008).

Summary

The second part has detailed a research design that reflects the salience of the research questions and core themes, and a qualitative approach is fitting of the idiographic tradition within critical realism where deep explanation is prioritised over prediction. The case study method is used to organise and analyse data, which enables comparison. Elite interviewing offers the most suitable method of data collection because the research questions reflect the experiences of situated actors. Various issues have been identified with this primary source, and document analysis is used to confirm dominant and contrasting narratives to triangulate data from elite interviews. This enhances the interview data with the potential to uncover unobservable events or experiences not revealed through elite interviewing. Detailing the research design allows the chapter to proceed by operationalising the research questions to address how the methodology analyses the four case studies of executive leadership in the WTO.

Part Three: Operationalising the Research Questions

By operationalising the research questions, the third part outlines the methodology used in the case study. First, the case study selection and comparisons are discussed. Second,
details of the elite interviewing process are explored to introduce the sample used in the primary source of data collection. Third, the selection and use of primary and secondary documents is described, and this is followed by a brief review of how data is triangulated in the case studies.

The Case Studies

Beginning with the selection of the case study, the previous chapter traced the inherent tensions between GATT executives and contracting parties to establish the role of the contemporary WTO director-general. The WTO executive head is unique because executive power is not shared with an executive board. Unlike the UN, World Bank, and IMF – the other major pillars of global governance – the WTO director-general is positioned at the apex of a complex decision-making hierarchy (VanGrasstek 2013). The thesis aims to address if and how the leadership of a single executive influences politics, power, and change over time. This, the chapter argues, makes the WTO executive an appropriate case address the research questions.

The thesis examines four cases of continuous WTO leadership – Ruggiero (1995-1999), Moore (1999-2002), Supachai (2002-2005), and Lamy (2005-2013) – to investigate the power of executive leadership to affect political change over time. These four directors-general are selected because of their continuity (1995-2013) to address the research questions and core themes. GATT Director-General Sutherland (1993-1995) served as the first head of the WTO from 1 January to 1 May 1995. Because of his limited, four-month term, he was not selected as a case study. Ruggiero was the ‘first full-term WTO director-
general’, hence, the first case study (VanGrasstek 2013: 58). The current director-general, Roberto Carvalho de Azevêdo, began his term in 2013. The thesis timeline ends prior to Azevêdo’s term; therefore, he was not selected as a case study. The four directors-general selected as case studies each served at least three years in office, and this common minimum term also makes them suitable for comparison.

The case studies enable interpretation and explanation of multiple causal mechanisms by disaggregating complex phenomenon (Yin 2009). As highlighted in the first part of the chapter, critical realism rejects the idea that single causal mechanisms condition outcomes. Instead, critical realists seek to interpret and explain detailed accounts of multiple causal mechanisms. The idiographic tradition also supports understanding causation as rooted in specific, rather than general, cases of executive leadership. Data sourced from elite interviews and document analysis is organised through the five elements of the conceptual framework to compare the four directors-general.

In each case study, structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power are used to address if and how the director-general mattered. Structure is divided into institutions and networks to explore how directors-general use their formal and informal authority to influence member-driven decision-making. Political, historical, institutional, and global context are investigated to understand how strategies were favoured/disfavoured in strategically-selective environments. By examining the resources directors-general exchange, power dynamics and strategies can be better understood. Agency is divided into examining approaches and tactics that were outlined in the conceptual framework chapter.
The approaches and tactics of directors-general are evaluated to interpret and explain how they aimed to influence decision-making in strategically-selective environments. Finally, power is analysed through relationships and strategically-selective context to reveal how executive leadership can affect decision-making in member-driven organisations.

Analysing the leadership of four directors-general enables the thesis to address if and how their leadership mattered. The findings of each case of executive leadership in the WTO are examined to contribute limited generalisations about the nature of executive leadership in international organisation. As outlined in the first part of the chapter, these findings are specific to the context of the WTO. At a more generic level, the thesis reflects on the extent to which the findings can be applied more generally to other international agencies. Through critical realism and the idiographic tradition, the case study method is used to address the lacuna around the executive head and allow executive leadership to be incorporated into institutional analysis.

The Elite Interviews

Continuing with the primary method of data collection, elite interviews took place over three years in Geneva (May-June 2011, September 2011, and December 2011), Washington, DC (November 2012), and Paris (April 2014). Elites were identified from the researcher’s network, secondary sources, and snowballing – discussed below – that had served under at least three of the four directors-general. The majority of elites interviewed had tenure at the WTO that exceeded the duration of the case study (1995-2013), and
many were involved in the GATT, which fostered better development of how historical context and norms shaped strategies for influence.

Over 45 elites were identified as potential interviewees, based on their access to three or more executive heads. Beyond this, individuals were identified based on their role within decision-making networks and those most likely to be affected by executive leadership due to the nature of their work. For example, deputies director-general strategies are influenced by their authority and role within the director-general’s cabinet. Ambassadors’ negotiating strategies are shaped by their capitals but also by their power as committee chairperson and the director-general’s oversight in that committee. Some elites, such as ministers who take decisions at ministerial conferences held once every two years, were less agreeable to interviews. Their objection was likely related to classified negotiating positions within the Doha Round, which has not officially concluded.

Elites were contacted via email using a standard letter that was individually tailored. The sample was composed of deputies director-general, chefs du cabinet, ambassadors and heads of committees, division heads, and directors-general. Twenty-six were agreeable to being interviewed (Figure 4.1). Nineteen were current WTO officials, and one recently retired. Two of the four WTO directors-general (1995-2013) were agreeable to interviews: Moore and Lamy. Ruggiero’s personal assistant declined on his behalf for health reasons; he died approximately a year after the interview request. Supachai, who was then the exiting UNCTAD Secretary-General, was contacted for an interview but ultimately declined.

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34 See Appendix 2.
Four World Bank senior officials were also interviewed to better understand coherence programmes between the WTO and World Bank, created or led by WTO directors-general. World Bank President Kim (2012-present) had just taken office at the time World Bank senior officials were interviewed, but all served under the three preceding presidents (1995-2012). Interviewing World Bank senior officials also improved institutional knowledge that was used to confirm the findings generated by the case study selection of the WTO.

Interviewees allowed notes to be taken, but no recordings were permitted; they expressed deep concerns for anonymity. Interview notes were immediately typed up to improve reliability, password protected, and interviewee names were coded to ensure confidentiality.

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35 After gaining ethical approval of the University review board, it was advised that the researcher should offer elites the ability to contribute anonymously due to of the sensitive nature of the interview questions. Anonymous contributions mandated that no video or audio recordings were permitted, nor would it be permitted to identify interviewees by name or position title. See ‘Participation’ in Appendix 3 for detail.
Quotes were verified via transcript approval.\textsuperscript{36} Interviews were conducted in the offices of elites and typically lasted thirty minutes to an hour and half, depending on time constraints and interviewee engagement. Interviewees were asked semi-structured and probing questions.\textsuperscript{37} Additionally, if the researcher was unclear about an interviewee’s response, the response was read back to improve clarity.\textsuperscript{38} In many instances, interviewees offered access to potential interviewees (snowballing). The snowballing technique was used; however, the majority of sampling was purposeful, as detailed above.\textsuperscript{39}

With the exceptions of Moore and Lamy, all interviewees requested anonymity; names and job titles are not attributed to sources. Interviews followed Chatham House Rules: the researcher is ‘free to use the information received but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed’ (Chatham House 2014). Quotes are permitted but without attribution to the individuals’ names or job titles; all interviewees are identified as WTO or World Bank senior officials.

Moore and Lamy agreed to on-the-record interviews with the provision that they be entitled to review quotes prior to thesis submission or publication of data. There is debate on the advantages and disadvantages of recording elite interviews (Peabody, Hammond, Torcom, Brown, Thompson, and Kolodny 1990; Byron 1993; Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Harvey 2011). The researcher did not record the Moore and Lamy interviews to

\textsuperscript{36} After the interview, the researcher sent a follow up thank you email to interviewees, and they were asked to approve the interview transcript. Non-response, as indicated in Appendix 3, \textit{Participation}, was interpreted as approval.
\textsuperscript{37} See Appendix 3 and 4 for interview questions.
\textsuperscript{38} See Devine (1995) pg. 142-145 on this interview technique.
encourage deeper trust between the directors-general and researcher and more candid reflection on their leadership. Replicating the interview process used in other interviews, described above, interview notes were taken, typed up immediately following the interviews, and all quotes used in the thesis received their approval.

Document Analysis

Turning to document analysis, this method of data collection was used in the previous chapter. Primary and secondary documents were used to uncover historical context and norms to establish the role of the contemporary WTO director-general. They are used similarly in the case studies. Primary documents are identified by their publication from the WTO.40 They include declassified official documents, legal texts, speeches, podcasts, webcasts, and publications from the Secretariat, WTO newsletters, director-general communiqués, and statistics. Primary documents are used to explore the formal decision-making process as outlined in the conceptual framework.

Secondary documents include publications from academic and non-academic journals, newspapers (online and print), NGOs, and directors-general outside of their role as head of the WTO. They are verified from their publication sources: peer-reviewed academic journals, major media sources, such as the Economist, the Guardian, NGOs accredited by the WTO, and publication houses. Secondary documents are used to uncover the informal elements of the decision-making process. The use of primary documents to uncover formal and secondary documents to explore informal decision-making is not exclusive.

40 The WTO’s online database includes over 100,000 documents from 1995 onwards and is updated daily.
41 From 2002, see WT/L./452 for the process of derestriction of classified documents.
For example, some secondary sources, such as *Bridges* – a weekly newsletter from a Geneva-based, WTO-accredited NGO – have access to formal decision-making and offer detailed accounts of outcomes.

Primary and secondary documents are selected by their relevance to the decision-making process, and they are used to validate or further explore data sourced from elite interviews. For example to better understand decision-making at ministerial conference – where researchers have great difficulty gaining access and elite memories might be less reliable because of intensity of the conference\(^{42}\) – primary sources, such as daily ministerial conference reports, and secondary sources, such as media coverage, are used. In almost all cases, primary and secondary sources are used to confirm data from elite interviews, what is known as triangulation.

**Triangulation**

In the case studies, where possible, data is confirmed through other sources. Elite interviews are supported by document analysis, and document analysis is supported by elite interviews. This is particularly the case where elite interviews and document analysis revealed contrasting narratives. For example, a minority of WTO senior officials claimed that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was responsible for the launch of the first trade round. Most senior officials argued that Moore’s leadership was responsible. Where this was the case, sources are organised by what they argued, and the researcher interprets

\(^{42}\) WTO senior officials and directors-general said that the exhaustive and continual pace of negotiations means that participants get an average of three to four hours of sleep a night during the conference.
the data using technical knowledge regarding the interaction of structure and agency to make an: ‘inference to the best explanation’ (Hollis and Smith 1991: 207).

Using the two sources of data, the thesis examines dominant and contrasting accounts of executive leadership to narrow the case studies to investigate two core claims about each director-general’s term in office. Triangulation structures the case studies by analysing the accuracy of the two core claims about each director-general. The case studies, as highlighted above, investigate the core claims through analysis of structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power. The triangulated sources of data are also used to investigate the creation of an archetype of executive leadership in international agencies.

In assessing the data, it emerged that there are consistent ‘types’ of leaders in the GATT/WTO. There is a spectrum of politicians and technocrats. Executives draw from their experiences, and these experiences shape how they lead. Politicians use political skill to achieve their goals; technocrats use technical knowledge to gain influence, and political-technocrats use a combination of political skill and technical knowledge. With this spectrum of politicians and technocrats, there is also a spectrum of how leaders aim to achieve their goals, which can be characterised as active and passive. Active leaders pursue their own goals, and passive leaders pursue member states’ goals. Whether directors-general aim to pursue their goals or members’ conditions how they lead, and each case study investigates the extent that the director-general fits into the archetype.
The thesis uses a matrix (Figure 4.2) to organise these two spectrums around how directors-general lead. The four GATT executive heads have been plotted on the matrix as an example. Sutherland pursued his goal of completing the Uruguay Round and used mostly political skill to influence outcomes. Wyndham White and Dunkel were driven by succeeding in their goals and used mostly technical knowledge to shape negotiations, although Wyndham White was more of a politician than Dunkel. Long was the only GATT executive who was directed by contracting parties’ goals rather than his own and used almost exclusively technical knowledge in his leadership.

Figure 4.2: Archetype matrix (GATT executives 1947-1995)
Whilst the literature review chapter argued against the compartmentalisation of behaviour models or archetypes to analyse executive leadership, the archetypes are used to complement the analysis. Along with investigating the two core claims from the triangulated methodology, each case study explores the extent that the archetype accurately reflects the leadership of the director-general. They are used to categorise how each director-general led, which enables comparison in the conclusion chapter (Hague and Harrop 2013). Interviewing World Bank senior officials was also helpful in developing the archetypes, and the matrix could be adapted to analyses of executive leadership in other international agencies.

Summary

The research questions have been operationalised by detailing how the methodology is applied to empirical analysis. The case studies reflect the epistemological perspective and qualitative research design developed in the chapter. They enable comparison that aids in making generalisations about the nature of executive leadership in international organisation. Almost 30 of the 45 elites identified were interviewed to investigate the research questions, which reflects a high response rate and a suitable sample size for the scope of the thesis research. Document analysis is used to validate data from elite interviews and improve understanding of observable and unobservable decision-making in international organisation. Triangulating the data from interviews and documents allows the case studies to explore two core claims and investigate the extent that directors-general conform to an original archetype. It is desirable that future research of executive leadership in international organisation can build and improve on this methodology, as every methodology has its limits.
Part Four: Limitations of the Methodology

‘It is impossible to produce flawless research design; the trick is to acknowledge, and cope with, as many of the problems as possible’ (Mackie and Marsh 1995: 180). This part identifies and responds to limitations within the thesis methodology. Two categories of limitations have been identified: generic and practical. The two generic limitations relate to the nature of social research. The first involves the presence of the researcher, and the second is the use of qualitative data. Two practical limitations are linked to the research design: resources and access to elites. These four limitations are acknowledged to recognise the constraints inherent to the research design.

Generic Limitations

The first generic limitation responds to the idea of political ‘science’ by addressing boundaries on knowledge claims. Critical realists argue that there are limits on knowledge claims because of limited observation and objectivity in overlapping realities. Acknowledging these competing realities allows critical realists to make generalisations, knowing that knowledge is neither entirely objective nor subjective. Following the idiographic tradition, critical realism maintains that generalisations should be limited to the context in which they occur.

The knowledge contributed in the thesis is particular to the WTO, but the scope of knowledge claims is applied more broadly to international organisation. The thesis findings are limited to executive heads of international agencies, particularly organisations similar to the WTO, such as the UN, IMF, ILO, and World Bank. Even within this context, critical realism takes seriously the constraints of complex causal mechanisms in strategically-
selective environments, which means that methods may need to be redesigned to reflect specific organisational characteristics.

There is an explicit limitation on critical realism that explanations do not seek to infer generalization beyond the substantive study because no two contexts are the same. Different contexts might share similar properties but each configuration of such properties, over-laden by unique histories and evolved practices, is a unique mix. Thus universality is highly problematic… At best, critical realists suggest tendencies towards applicability in other contexts’ (Kempster and Parry 2011: 117).

The second generic limitation discusses the nature of qualitative data. Devine (1995) maintains that qualitative methods are designed to explore subjective accounts of political life. Rather than combat claims made against qualitative data, she argues that it ought be embraced as a suitable method when it fits the research questions. Similarly, Dunleavy and Rhodes (1990: 5) argue that though data from document analysis, such as cross referencing interviews with primary and secondary documents: ‘may not give fully authoritative accounts’, this data contributes to deeper insights than can be gathered by ‘platitudinous observations’, such as used in the behavioural approach. Accommodating for subjective experiences through a critical realist epistemology acknowledges the limitations of qualitative methods without wholly discarding the data. These generic limitations also shape practical limitations on the thesis’ contribution to knowledge.

Practical Limitations

Practical limitations are individualistic and represent the idea that in a perfect world, the research would be conducted differently. The first practical limitation concedes that the resources of funding and time limit the research. Because the research is self-funded and
must meet timelines set by the University, data and methodology are finite. A larger sample size and an embedded ethnography, for example, could enhance the research design were additional funding and time available. Multiple case studies of executive leadership in international agencies, for example in the WTO, World Bank, IMF, and UN, could offer a more nuanced and richer means of addressing the broader questions within the thesis about the role of the executive head in international politics. The research design reflects accommodations made to the researcher’s financial capability and timeframe for completing the thesis.

The second practical limitation is access to elites, who, by definition, are ‘less accessible’ than those not privileged in decision-making (Richards 1996: 200). The sample size (26) and response rate (approximately 60%) are adequate in consideration of the researcher’s limited network, elites’ perception of the thesis research, gatekeepers, scheduling conflicts, and geographic impossibilities (due to funding and time constraints). Access to elites and sample size could have been greater had these impediments been less significant. Attempts to cope with this limitation were made by targeting elites who served under three or more executive heads. ‘This allows the interviewer to understand the perceptions of that player and what may, or may not, have led that individual to think or act in the way s/he did’ (Richards 1996: 204). Additionally, Richards (1996) argued that combining data from elite interviews with other sources, such as document analysis, enhances the research design and helps overcome access limitations.

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43 For example, the researcher contacted ministers and ambassadors within USTR, but they were uninterested in contributing to the research.
Summary

All research has imperfections, and it is best to disclose them (Hay 2002). Just as acknowledging an epistemological perspective allows a researcher to centre themselves amongst disciplinary debates, acknowledging limitations of a research design allows strengths to be understood alongside inevitable weaknesses. The contribution to knowledge made within the thesis focuses on the specific and unique nature of the research questions, and the underlying conceptual and epistemological perspectives allow for generalisations from this context to similar contexts. This enables the research design to investigate leadership in the WTO and apply these findings, more generally, to leadership in international organisation. Rather than view limitations as weakness, they underscore how the idiographic and critical realist traditions shape the research design; whereby, ontology has shaped epistemology, which has shaped methodology. The research design and corresponding methodology reflects the most appropriate mechanisms for addressing the research questions and core themes.

Conclusion

The chapter has outlined the methodology used to address the thesis research on executive leadership in international organisation through a qualitative case study of four WTO directors-general using elite interviews and document analysis. The literature review and conceptual framework chapters argued that the composite literature on political leadership and international administration has been shaped by researchers’ preferences on structure and agency. Prioritising structure or agency in analysis has contributed to a divisive literature where executive heads either matter greatly or little, if at all. The conceptual
framework and critical realist epistemology have been used to support the claim that if and how executive heads matter is contextual and based on relationships that condition how situated actors seek to influence decision-making in strategically-selective environments.

The chapter outlined a methodology to avoid reproducing previous scholarship by seeing structure and agency as interwoven and equally important in analysis. The first part of the chapter did so by establishing a critical realist epistemological perspective. Critical realism enables causal claims to be made by advising how researchers can cope with interpreting and explaining subjective experiences in worlds where observation and objectivity are limited. This epistemology has important implications for methodology and what can be known about the power of executive leadership to influence political change over time. The second part detailed the research design through a discussion of qualitative, case study, elite interviewing, and document analysis methods.

The third part of the chapter operationalised the research questions by detailing how the empirical analysis is conducted. Elite interviews are the primary source of data collection because of the closed nature of executive leadership in international organisation where it is difficult to find information from situated actors elsewhere. Elite interviews are also the most appropriate method of data collection because interviewees are asked open-ended and probing questions about their subjective experiences. Through interview data, dominant and contrasting narratives are identified, which are further explored through document analysis.
This triangulation of data is used to confirm primary sources, which enables two core claims and a leadership archetype to be assessed in each case study. The case studies are similarly organised through the elements of the conceptual framework: structure, context, resource exchange, agency, and power. The fourth part reflected on generic and practical limitations of the research design. These constraints are managed by relying on critical realist and idiographic traditions and utilising the most appropriate methods to address the research questions.

The methodology outlined in the chapter enables analysis of the four WTO directors-general to address the research questions. The themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time are explored to assess if and how each director-general mattered. The methodology pulls together the foci of the previous chapters – the lacuna, conceptual framework, and history of the WTO and role of the contemporary director-general – to address the research questions in a way that does not succumb to behaviouralist or structuralist tendencies that divide the literature on executive leadership. The methodology makes a contribution by offering how executive heads can be integrated into institutional analysis to enhance disciplinary knowledge.

The next chapter begins the case study analysis by investigating the leadership of the first, full-term director-general. The chapter argues that Ruggiero, an active political-technocrat, failed to launch the first WTO trade round but established the role of the youngest international organisation in global governance. As detailed here, the chapter is organised by the five elements of the conceptual framework. The chapter concludes by addressing if
and how Ruggiero mattered. This enables the thesis to continue to confront the lacuna by taking structure and agency seriously, answering the research questions, and incorporating the executive head.
Chapter Five: Director-General Ruggiero (1995-1999)

Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the methodology used to address the research questions – if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation. It draws together the first half of the thesis where the themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time have been explored through a literature review, conceptual framework, and historical narrative. This chapter is the first of four case studies that investigate the leadership of the WTO directors-general (1995-2013), beginning with Director-General Ruggiero (1995-1999).

The chapter investigates the key claims that Ruggiero formalised the rules-based WTO but failed to launch the first trade round. It explores the extent to which he led as an active political-technocrat to achieve his goals using his political skill and technical knowledge to shape members’ preferences. The chapter avers that his objective to launch a round was in conflict with the interests and needs of the majority of members (developing states). The chapter examines how his active political-technocrat leadership shaped decision-making and inherent tensions between members and their director-general that prevented a round from launching in his term.

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44 See Appendix 1.
The chapter explores institutions, networks, context, resource exchange, approaches, tactics, and relationships to analyse if and how Ruggiero’s leadership mattered. Figure 5.1 indicates how Ruggiero established the power to lead the WTO through varied approaches and resource exchange. His legacy reflects the limitations of active leadership in the WTO’s initial years of member-driven decision-making. It also reflects how deeply-embedded GATT norms conditioned his leadership. To begin, decision-making structures are analysed to better understand how inherent tensions between GATT contracting parties and the director-general shaped Ruggiero’s term.

Figure 5.1: A model of Ruggiero’s power

Structure

The thesis argues that structure conditions agency by narrowing actors’ strategies for influence. This section uncovers the institutions and networks Ruggiero engaged with in
attempting to influence member-driven decision-making and pursue his goals. Members limited him to the formal duties of office, almost exclusively, and he struggled to transform institutions to enhance his influence.

_Institutions_

The WTO was designed to govern three areas of multilateral trade: negotiations, monitoring, and legal disputes. The highest decision-making body gathers at ministerial conference, held once every two years (WTO Agreement 1999). When ministerial conferences are not in session, the General Council oversees decision-making and is also where trade negotiations are discussed outside of their specialised committees, such as the Council for Trade in Services. The TPRM – initiated by GATT Director-General Dunkel – is the monitoring body, and the DSB is the legal arm where trade disputes are resolved according to international law. This section uncovers how Ruggiero used formal authority from the WTO Agreement and informal authority that he inherited from GATT executive heads to influence these core governing bodies (Table 5.1) (WTO Agreement 1999: article xvii, para 2).
Table 5.1: Ruggiero’s role in governing bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>General Council authority</strong></th>
<th><strong>DSB authority</strong></th>
<th><strong>TPRM authority</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present annual budget</td>
<td>Address the media following DSB ruling</td>
<td>Author annual report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register trade protocols</td>
<td>Appoint Standing Appellate Body with Committee of Six</td>
<td>Direct research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure conditions of service for staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement Uruguay Round agreements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call working parties</td>
<td>Appoint DSB panel members when agreement cannot be reached</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author reports at members’ request</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspect resources for ministerial conferences</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare ministerial conference agenda drafts</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Report on external events</td>
<td>Negotiate terms of WTO headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administer technical assistance</td>
<td>Liaise with other organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notify intentions to appoint deputy directors-general</td>
<td>Report on training activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker negotiations through informal consultations</td>
<td>Remind members of unfinished work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appoint ITC executive head with UNCTAD secretary-general</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

When Ruggiero entered office on 1 May 1995, the organisation was four months old. ‘There was no actual work to be done in the WTO then, as it was still so new, but Ruggiero institutionalised it. He selected chairs and did really tedious, bureaucratic stuff.’ Ruggiero initiated informal consultations on a new work programme in advance of the first ministerial conference in 1996 to encourage a new round of trade negotiations. His consultations revealed there was much work left to be done on GATT implementation before a new round could be initiated (WT/GC/M/16 1996).

A significant difference between the GATT and WTO is in implementation. In the GATT, contracting parties took an ‘a la carte’ approach to implementing trade

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45 From 1995, WT/GC/M/5, WT/GC/M/7, and WT/GC/M/8, from 1996, WT/GC/5, WT/GC/M/9, WT/GC/M/11, WT/GC/M/12, WT/TPR/OV/2, and PRESS/56, from 1997, WT/GC/M/18, from 1998, WT/GC/M/25, WT/GC/M/27, WT/GC/M/28, and WT/COMTD/W/35, WTO (1996), and WTO Agreement (1999).

46 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 1996, WT/GC/6 and WT/GC/7.
agreements.\textsuperscript{47} Whereas in the WTO, all agreements are implemented under the single undertaking, which requires members implement all agreements as a package.\textsuperscript{48} Member states cannot, for example, implement agreements on investment measures but not agriculture.

\textquote{The role of multiculturalism has changed the institution and the job of the DG. All these different cultures have different opinions on trade and the role government should play.}\textsuperscript{49} As of 1 January 1995, the WTO had 76 members (WT/TRP/OV/1 1995). During Ruggiero’s term, more than fifty states joined; thirty more were in the process (WT/INF/6/Rev.5 1999; VanGrasstek 2013). He increased technical assistance to improve implementation amongst new and developing members (WT/GC/M/9 1996). ‘In implementation, leadership matters more so because this requires oversight management, and there are many informal interactions, like calling the capitals.’\textsuperscript{50} Accommodating this rapid increase in membership somewhat limited his ability to influence members’ perceptions on a new round.

He used his active political-technocrat leadership to urge members to focus on implementation and the ‘built-in agenda’ – an informal understanding from the conclusion of the Uruguay Round that agreements on financial services and basic telecommunications would follow shortly after the launch of the WTO (PRESS/97 1998; WTO 2000; VanGrasstek 2013).

\textsuperscript{47} WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{48} See Cottier and Elsig (2011) and VanGrasstek (2013) for more on the single undertaking.
\textsuperscript{49} WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{50} WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
[Ruggiero] did have a lot to do with the financial services agreement. He had an appetite for details and an interest in financial services. He personally got things done. He persuaded the head of [American International Group, AIG] to the agreement with his smooth talking and bullying.51

He used his political skill and technical knowledge to complete the built-in agenda, but members reminded Ruggiero that he had no formal authority to initiate decision-making.52 They limited his role by issuing mandates, such as to establish coherence (WT/GC/M/9 1996). He used their mandate to establish the Integrated Framework – an agreement between the WTO, ITC, UNCTAD, IMF, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on technical assistance. Through the Integrated Framework he aimed to improve developing members’ participation (WT/MIN(98)/2 1998; PRESS/1222 1999).

In this period, the WTO became concerned at its relatively limited activity to help developing countries, in general, and the ineffective co-ordination of technical assistance with other agencies, UNDP and UNCTAD, mainly. The WTO gradually asserted its leadership in the Integrated Framework.53

He also continued the traditional role of the director-general to appoint panels in the DSB. A WTO senior official explained: ‘the two disputing parties are charged to select a panel of three members to observe the dispute. If they cannot agree, which happens often, the DG is charged with appointing the panel.’54 He also created an internal legal counsel to improve access to the DSB for developing members (WT/BFA/W/27 1999). He initiated several new institutions to develop the formal, rules-based multilateral trade organisation that worked for most members, explored further in the chapter. Whilst he was able to use

51 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
52 WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
53 Ibid.
54 Interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
his authority to make small changes to decision-making institutions, he was not satisfied with how members constrained his leadership. Authority is delegated out, and the DG’s power is derived from how he manages his position. The DG has enough authority to be praised or blamed for an outcome, so that gives you some inclination of the scope of his authority.

In summary, Ruggiero began to lead members towards a formal WTO that relied more on rules than the GATT norm of informality, but he encountered resistance. They allowed him to actively participate in completion of the built-in agenda but limited his leadership through mandates. He aimed to launch a new round, but developing members required improved technical assistance to accommodate their enhanced participation in the rules-based system. He found he was more able to influence decision-making where members could not agree, such as in the financial services agreement and DSB, reflecting the pivotal role that executive leadership can play. Members allowed Ruggiero’s influence when they lacked resources to achieve common goals, and this was also true in establishing the WTO’s network.

Networks

Networks condition the interaction of situated actors in strategically-selective environments by influencing who and what is included in decision-making. This section explores how Ruggiero influenced the WTO’s internal and external networks. His large transatlantic

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55 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19 and 26(a) May 2011; see also from 1998, WT/MIN(98)/2.
56 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
57 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
network, built over his years in international civil service, shaped decision-making in the WTO’s initial years.\(^{58}\) Internally, Ruggiero headed the Secretariat: the research forum, staffed by approximately 500 during his term. It supports WTO bodies and administers legal, technical, and training assistance programmes, amongst more routine tasks such as derestricting documents (WTO 2011). ‘The Secretariat has to appear without bias because they are heavily scrutinized by member states. The Secretariat, although headed by the DG, is there to serve the research interests of member states.’\(^{59}\) Whilst some WTO senior officials argued that it would be inappropriate for the director-general to run the Secretariat, others said that the director-general protects the Secretariat by ensuring members are not micromanaging the research body.\(^{60}\) ‘Within the Secretariat, the DG has to find a balance; he has to get members states to be subordinate, and the leadership here is difficult.’\(^{61}\)

Ruggiero’s internal network was also composed of ambassadors – who conduct Geneva negotiations – and ministers – who take decisions at ministerial conferences. Division heads, chairpersons, and Ruggiero’s Cabinet were also essential actors that shaped decision-making. He expanded his internal network by adding a fourth deputy director-general to his senior management team (WT/GC/M/2 1995; VanGrasstek 2013). Ruggiero used his internal network to pursue his objectives, such as beginning negotiations for a new round, following domestic trade issues, appointing panels to the DSB, and managing the WTO’s

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\(^{58}\) See Appendix 1.

\(^{59}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).

\(^{60}\) Interviewed 19, 23, 24, 25, 26(a), 26(b), 27, 30(a), and 30(b) May, 1(a), 1(b), and 6 June, and 11 December 2011.

\(^{61}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.
early research outputs. "Of course, it was not perfect, but the infrastructure was set. All of this happened in the period of one year, 1995, which was quite difficult."

His external network was composed of presidents, prime ministers, international organisations, politicians, NGOs, the media, and civil society. "He managed to gather the most disparate group to endorse the organisation: Clinton, Mandela, Castro, and Blair."

Ruggiero engaged this network through high-profile public and private events, such as those organised by the G8, G20, Bilderberg, and UN System Chief Executives Board (UNSCEB), which gathers executive heads from the UN Common System and Bretton Woods organisations (WT/TPR/OV/3 1997; PRESS/108 1998; Wilkinson 2006; WTO 2014b; Bilderberg 2014; UNSCEB 2014). "The DG is a figurehead, spokesperson, and political leader." He used this powerful network to shape outcomes where members' constrained his authority. Ruggiero: ‘knew a lot of elites, especially, the US east coast crew’ and was well received by the media.

He was what senior officials referred to as an Atlanticist, an influential actor on either side of the Atlantic. "He was known as the “American DG”… Ruggiero was charming, and he used this charm, for example, in the financial services agreement."

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62 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
63 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 1996, WT/GC/6, and WT/GC/7, as examples of the limited agenda of the WTO.
64 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
65 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
66 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a); see also from 1998, WT/FIFTY/1.
67 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
68 Interviewed 26(a) May and 20 September 2011.
69 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
agreement only wanted to work with Ruggiero. He used his political-technocrat background to demonstrate his value to members in attempts to enhance his authority. ‘He was effectively active. In retrospect, he was a very good DG; he worked very hard.’

Summary

After Sutherland forced through Uruguay Round agreements without consent from all contracting parties in the GATT, members’ preferences on active leadership changed. Ruggiero attempted to use his experience and background to pursue his goals, but members resisted. This shaped how he utilised his networks to influence decision-making. He established the infrastructure of the organisation quickly and wanted to launch a new round of trade negotiations to promote the WTO. The context of his term, as the following section reveals, was not conducive for a new round.

Context

This section investigates the political, historical, institutional, and global context that affected Ruggiero’s leadership. It explores the claim that he failed to launch a trade round and the circumstances that limited his objective. It also analyses how his goal of establishing the formal, rules-based organisation was bolstered by context, the other core claim. Ruggiero needed political will to formalise the WTO in consideration of the deeply-embedded norm of informality that conditioned outcomes over fifty years in the GATT.

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70 WTO senior officials, interviewed 20 May, 19(b) and 20 September 2011.
71 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
Political context helps establish the perceptions of actors who seek to achieve their goals through the WTO, and it focuses on how Ruggiero was unable to foster the political will necessary to launch a round. Beginning with members’ preferences, states have options in where they pursue their trade needs. In each forum, there are national, international, and institutional obligations that shape states’ strategies. For example, in Ruggiero’s selection process, the two dominant trading powers – the USA and EC – were divided on candidates. The EC and ACP supported Ruggiero; the USA and Latin America supported the Mexican candidate, who eventually withdrew after his brother precipitated political scandal (Jones 2004; VanGrasstek 2013). “The US was, at first, anti-Ruggiero, but it was geopolitical; [they believed] Ruggiero had a very European view of the world.”

Ruggiero was selected in a deal between the EC and USA where he was limited to one, four-year term and the next director-general would not be European (ibid). VanGrasstek (2013: 519) argued that beginning with Ruggiero each director-general – except for Lamy – has witnessed: ‘the number or the length of their terms truncated by deals made in the selection process.’ The political context that conditioned Ruggiero’s term was a union between the two most dominant member states, supported by two, equally large coalitions of members. ‘The members elect the DG, but they are not in a position to judge the effectiveness of him. They judge based on their own bias towards the issues. They want him to be a leader but respectful of their authority.’

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72 WTO senior officials, interviewed 26(a) May and 20 September 2011.
73 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(b).
Ruggiero’s initiative to launch a round was mostly supported by the EC and USA.\textsuperscript{74} He actively pursued a new round his first year in office by influencing the location for the first ministerial meeting. ‘The Singapore location was very strategic and beneficial. Ruggiero helped the long, informal search for the location of the new round’s launch.’\textsuperscript{75} His consultations for the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, however, had, ‘by no means been conclusive’ on an agenda for a new round (WT/GC/M/16 1996).

Four issues emerged from the Singapore ministerial as most likely to structure a new round: investment, competition, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation (WT/GC/M/18 1997). Members were divided over whether these ‘Singapore issues’ – which reflected developed members’ trade needs almost exclusively – or implementation should take priority in the new agenda (Jones 2004; Wilkinson 2006; VanGrasstek 2013). In the mid to late-1990s the proliferation of RTAs, such as NAFTA, reflected states’ preferences for regionalism over multilateralism in the WTO. Ruggiero created the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements in an attempt to bring RTAs into the WTO, but formal institutionalisation failed to unify members around a common agenda. ‘Part of this had to do with the frequency at which [RTAs] are done between small nations. Because many of them are eager to their exports out, it’s not terribly difficult to complete a bilateral or regional agreement.’\textsuperscript{76}

In summary, Ruggiero initially had political support from a wide selection of member states. As he began consultations for an agenda, he found there was little support outside

\textsuperscript{74} WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.  
\textsuperscript{75} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.  
\textsuperscript{76} WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
the USA and EC. Both dominant members favoured a round but had substantial disagreements; the EC wanted the Singapore issues, and the USA wanted labour in the agenda.\textsuperscript{77} Ruggiero’s efforts to formalise WTO rules aimed to improve participation in and functioning of the multilateral system, but they may have appeared too rigid for members to negotiate their trade interests in the WTO. This may be particularly true considering the historical context of informality in the GATT. Without support from members outside of the USA and EC, Ruggiero’s ability to pursue his goals was limited.

**Historical Context**

Historical context helps explain how norms – discussed in the history chapter – condition outcomes. The WTO inherited a history of informality, hegemony and exceptionalism, and crisis from its predecessor (Wilkinson 2006; Elsig 2007; Kim 2010; Wilkinson 2011; Cottier and Elsig 2011). Ruggiero reflected: ‘when I came here the WTO was four months old; the atmosphere was one of hope, but also of scepticism, where every issue was considered “a test of credibility”’ (WT/GC(99)/ST/3 1999). The WTO was the youngest international agency, which limited Ruggiero, but it was also supported by the GATT’s tenure.\textsuperscript{78}

As part of his initiative to formalise the WTO, Ruggiero broke historic ties with the UN Common System by establishing the independence of the WTO in 1998 (WT/GC/M/28 1998). Most international organisations are in the UN Common System or, like the Bretton Woods organisations, have an agreement with the Common System (ICSC 2014a). After establishing independence, Ruggiero and the WTO’s legitimacy were endangered

\textsuperscript{77} WTO senior officials, interviewed 26(a) and 30(a) May and 11 December 2011.
\textsuperscript{78} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
with no formal ties or role in global governance. While the international system, the DG is a symbol or expression of the systemic importance of the WTO and multilateral trade. The DG must express the importance of trade as it leads to peace. It’s a tall order, but it’s what we expect. Historical context and norms affected how Ruggiero led to ensure the WTO’s survival in its initial years.

He discovered that tensions between members prevented meaningful negotiations on a new agenda when holding consultations for the 1998 Geneva Ministerial Conference (WT/GC/M/21 1997). This impaired his ability to launch a round, limited the scope of the second ministerial of his term, and threatened the WTO’s survival with a functioning forum for negotiations. The 1998 Ministerial: ‘was largely for show, being an occasion to mark the 50th anniversary of the multilateral trading system’ and held to remain consistent with WTO rules (VanGrasstek 2013: 375; WTO Agreement 1999: article iv, para 1).

USA President William Clinton (1993-2001) tied his presidential legacy to the success of the WTO and publicly supported a new round at the Geneva Ministerial (WT/FIFTY/H/ST/8 1998; Foot et al. 2003; VanGrasstek 2013). However, developing members successfully argued the development gap that divided members – rather than exclusively a product of national economic policy – was tied to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Their dissent to the continued hegemony and exceptionalism of developed members’ paralysed negotiations. With Ruggiero as director-general, the agenda

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79 WTO senior official, interviewed 19, 25, and 27 May 2011.
80 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
81 WTO senior official, interviewed 24 May 2011; see also Elsig (2004).
82 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a); see also Jawara and Kwa (2003), Ismail (2009a), and Narlikar and Vickers (2009).
for a new trade round continued to gain momentum amongst developed members
(WT/GC/M/16 1996; WT/GC/M/18 1997; Jones 2004; Wilkinson 2006; VanGrasstek
2013).

To summarise, Ruggiero’s leadership was limited because he broke ties with the UN
Common System, which left the WTO and its executive without a clearly defined role in
international organisation. ‘He hated that he was received by presidents and prime
ministers, but in Geneva, he was “the boy who filled the water glasses”’.83 This and a
growing divide between developed and developing members on a new round threatened
his and the WTO’s legitimacy. He continued to pursue his goals of formalising the WTO
and launching a round by relying on the hegemonic and exceptional power of dominant
members, demonstrating the extent to which he was an active director-general. However,
the WTO was no longer the GATT, and developing members utilised their coalitions to
oppose the dominance of GATT norms in decision-making. An institutional crisis began
to emerge.

Institutional Context

‘There is an institutional-cultural effect on DGs, and this is a very important element of
executive leadership.’84 A WTO senior official argued that institutional context conditions
how actors interact in the organisation, what strategies they pursue, and how they
participate. This section explores how Ruggiero aimed to achieve his goals in crisis by
relying on his political and technical skills. After leaving the UN Common System, the

83 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
84 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
WTO was self-funded for the first time in its 50-year history. The strain on the WTO budget contributed to the environment of crisis that limited Ruggiero’s ability to launch a round.

The 60 per cent increase in WTO membership in Ruggiero’s term was overwhelmingly from developing states (WT/INF/6/Rev.5 1999). Eighty per cent of WTO membership, overall, was from developing nations, markedly different from the old club of GATT (WT/GC/W/74 1997; VanGrasstek 2013). Their majority did not result in enhanced influence, partly because of Ruggiero’s active pursuit of a new round. His consultations were limited to members in Geneva, and many developing members did not have a Geneva mission. He also lacked consensus on an agenda for a new round because he was unable or unwilling to address the development gap beyond increasing technical assistance. ‘It’s not enough anymore for the big industrial powers to agree; the Quad can’t run the world anymore.’

Members were divided on how to proceed with the WTO work programme, and Ruggiero’s agenda-setting authority was limited. The WTO passed its third birthday without a trade round, despite holding two ministerial conferences. Its negotiations forum was not functioning, which impaired the legitimacy of the WTO as an international trading forum. As such, the negotiations forum, the TNC – traditionally headed by the director-general – was not in session, further limiting Ruggiero’s ability to achieve his objectives. ‘In 1997, no one bit for a round, and the developing nations didn’t really want a round. So, it

85 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011.
86 WTO senior officials, 30(a) and 30(b) May and 19(b) September 2011.
led to negotiations being pursued in agriculture, which had a limited agenda, intellectual property, the EU’s Singapore issues, and the US’ agenda in environment and labor.\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).}

The WTO had yet to establish a clear work programme; its agenda overlapped with the ITC, UNCATD, IMF, World Bank, UN, UNDP, OECD, ILO, and FAO. Compounding this legitimacy crisis, three months prior to the second ministerial conference, it was rumoured that Ruggiero was involved in the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on Investment. This would have violated his terms of office, as the OECD is composed mostly of developed states (WTO Agreement 1999: article vi, para 4). He issued a press release to counter negative publicity, but developing members argued that the WTO was merely an extension of the GATT under Ruggiero (PRESS/9 1998). Their perception was likely influenced by his active leadership, as he was pursuing his goals, not their’s.

If there is a crisis of multilateralism today it is principally a crisis of legitimacy or so it is widely argued… Since the turn of the twenty-first century this disjuncture between the actual distribution of global power and the effective distribution of power between the major institutions of global governance has grown increasingly apparent… This legitimacy deficit is inseparable from the systemic failings of governance (overload) and effectiveness. Accordingly, the ‘crisis of multilateralism’ is not simply one of representation but also of institutional design, namely the demise of the old ‘club model’ of multilateralism (whether the G8 or the Green Room) and the shift towards a more inclusive and less hierarchical mode of global governance (McGrew 2011: 24).

In summary, a combination of events and experiences limited Ruggiero’s leadership. The separation from the UN, how he led, the development gap, the absence of a clearly defined role for executive leadership, divisions between the two dominant trading powers, overlapping agendas of international agencies, poor public relations, and missed
opportunity at ministerial conference culminated in the WTO’s first crisis. Under Ruggiero, the WTO was a formal, rules-based organisation where GATT norms limited the organisation’s ability to survive, achieve, and evolve.

**Global Context**

Global context explores how the USA and European dominance shaped WTO outcomes and how the 1997 Asian financial crisis affected dependence between members and their executive. Beginning with the GATT norms of hegemony and exceptionalism, developed members’ dominance limited Ruggiero’s ability to gather consensus around a new round, but it also bolstered his ability to establish the formal, rules-based WTO.

The USA and EC supported Ruggiero’s initiative to launch a trade round, and this aroused developing members’ suspicion around Ruggiero’s leadership (Jawara and Kwa 2003; Kwa 2003). ‘Clinton came to Geneva and asked the WTO to hold the next Ministerial in Seattle; he wanted to broaden the WTO’s agenda.’ The next ministerial would be held in Seattle in 1999, and this support from the world’s major economy helped the WTO survive its institutional crisis. ‘If domestic political considerations doomed the ITO, then they worked, on balance, to save its functional successor, the WTO’ (Foot et al. 2003: 36-37). Although, Ruggiero was in a difficult position; without better integrating developing members’ trade interests, the formal, rules-based organisation was in jeopardy (WT/GC/M/28 1998).

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88 WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.
At Singapore, NGOs protested the WTO on developing members’ behalf (VanGrasstek 2013). Ruggiero used his mandate on public relations to institutionalise a role for NGOs to counter bad publicity and increase the likelihood of launching a round (PRESS/123 1999).

In July 1998, the Director-General announced enhanced cooperation between the WTO and non-governmental organisations, including regular briefings, a special section on the WTO’s website for NGOs and a procedure allowing NGOs to submit to the Secretariat position papers and newsletters which would be made available to Members on demand (WT/TPR/OV/4 1998: para 28).

His initiative began a tradition of the director-general working to improve transparency and public relations to achieve their goals. ‘Ruggiero was in a good place, and he did okay. He held things together.’ However, as a WTO senior official highlighted: ‘the WTO is evolving in a changing world.’

The 1997 Asian Financial crisis gave Ruggiero an opportunity to distance himself from his reliance on dominant members for the WTO’s survival. Though the effects of the financial crisis were limited to east and southeast Asia, it was widely feared that the crisis would spread globally (VanGrasstek 2013). Ruggiero actively promoted the WTO in crisis by closely monitoring trade in affected states through the TPRM and being outspoken about protectionism (WT/GC/W/87/Rev.2 1998). He argued that executive heads had a normative role to play, particularly during crisis, and the WTO could better respond to the changing needs of interconnected states by launching a new trade round.

These are tensions that only global leadership and global vision can resolve. The choice we face – as the current crisis has so starkly underlined – is between moving forward on the basis of shared rules, or on the basis of

89 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
90 Interviewed 25 May 2011.
power. Between stability or uncertainty. Consensus or conflict. A united future. Or back to our divided past – with all of its conflicts and tragedies. How we managed the challenges in the months and years ahead will depend on the choices we make today. For in reality, the financial crisis is just the tip of iceberg. What we need is to improve the management of this new, complex, and growing interdependence we call globalisation (Ruggiero quoted in PRESS/113 1998).

Summary

This section has highlighted the competing interests that shaped Ruggiero’s leadership. The USA and EC were competing for control of the agenda, and Ruggiero was caught in between their powerful influence and the interests of the majority of WTO members. Developing members challenged Ruggiero and developed members by refusing to accept their agenda for a new round. Ruggiero was unable to resolve developing members’ objections to developed members’ hegemonic agenda-setting power to achieve his objective of launching a round. ‘He can prod and cajole, but he can’t force an agreement. He also cannot manufacture an outcome if members aren’t ready.’ The context of his term reveals a number of limitations but also the limits of active political-technocrat leadership where he lacked the authority to: ‘steer [members] toward consensus and away from constituent positions’.

To cope, he exchanged resources to heighten dependence on his leadership.

Resource Exchange

Executive heads possess valuable resources by occupying the highest office within organisations, and they exchange them to enhance their power. This section analyses how

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91 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
92 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
Ruggiero exchanged resources with internal and external networks and how he used formal and informal rules to improve his ability to shape outcomes (Figure 5.1). These categories represent a way of organising data and are not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive; for example, labelling a resource as informal does not negate the effect it may have on internal power dynamics.

**Resource Exchange with Internal and External Networks**

Directors-general attempt to enhance dependence on their leadership internally and externally to achieve their goals. This section explores Ruggiero’s exchanges of shared leadership with chairpersons, independence from the UN, and political skill to better understand how he failed to launch a round but formalised WTO rules. Beginning with shared leadership, Ruggiero relied on experience and expertise of existing chairpersons to lead the WTO.

In the transition between the GATT and WTO, several chairpersons, such as Celso Lafer (Brazil) and Ali Mchumo (Tanzania), remained in their position or transferred their chairmanship to another body to improve continuity (WTO 2007). Lafer was chair of the DSB in 1996 and chaired the General Council in 1997; Mchumo chaired the TPRM in 1998, then the General Council in 1999 (ibid). Directors-general must share leadership with chairpersons, as: ‘most people feel they do not work for the DG, but they work for
their chair. Sharing leadership improved stability and allowed Ruggiéro to develop and disperse his vision for a rules-based WTO.

Second, he exchanged the resource of financial support from the UN for WTO independence from the Common System. Most international organisations receive critical funding to pursue their various mandates from the UN Common System. The GATT Secretariat was funded by the ICITO, a UN body that also financed the WTO Secretariat until 1998. Ruggiéro initiated establishing independence for the WTO Secretariat in 1995 as part of the built-in agenda by holding consultations with staff, member states, and UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (WT/GC/5 1996; WTO Agreement 1999). Members were divided; some argued there were considerable benefits to remaining part of the UN, but Ruggiéro ultimately took the decision to establish the independence of the WTO (WT/GC/M/19 1997; WT/GC/M/23 1997).

This exchange enhanced his capacity to formalise WTO rules. It legitimised the institution of consensus decision-making, which was designed to force cooperation between self-interested states (Cottier and Elsig 2011). Most UN organisations take decisions by voting, which has contributed to the argument that states’ interests impair cooperation in the Common System (Chesterman and Franck 2007; VanGrasstek 2013). The exchange deepened mutual dependence in the WTO through formalisation of consensus decision-making. Developed members’ trade liberalisation became dependent on developing members’ trade needs and vice versa. It also enhanced the informal authority of the

93 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
94 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 1998, WT/GC(98)/ST/1 and Ismail (2009a).
director-general in negotiations to prevent members’ divisive politics from stalling progress in the organisation overall. ‘Much is done because of executive leadership.’

Third, Ruggiero used his political skill, developed in his years as Italy’s Foreign Affairs Minister, to improve dependence on his leadership. He used his political skill to complete the built-in agenda, particularly the financial services agreement. ‘He knew politics and people.’ He exchanged this resource in building support around establishing the WTO’s independence and to negotiate the Singapore issues alongside increases in technical assistance, which also made the agenda of a new round dependent on improvements in implementation (WT/GC/M/9 1996).

In summary, Ruggiero’s exchange of resources with internal and external networks affected dependence intrinsic and extrinsic to the WTO. His exchanges fostered both continuity between the GATT and WTO and a WTO that was distinct from the GATT. His exchanges altered power dynamics between developed and developing members at a critical moment when their divisions prevented progress in the negotiations forum. He attempted to exchange resources to enhance dependence on his leadership to improve opportunity to pursue his objectives. He also exchanged the authority he possessed in formal and informal rules.

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95 WTO senior official, interviewed 24 May 2011.
96 See Appendix 1.
97 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19(b) and 20 September 2011.
98 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
Ruggiero, more than successive directors-general, was constrained by members’ perception about the role of executive leadership, explored later in the chapter. The formal and informal rules he exchanged were similarly limited; he used his staffing power, members’ mandates, and technical knowledge to foster dependence on his leadership. To begin, establishing the independence of the WTO from the UN exponentially enhanced his management authority. He gained staffing power outside of the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), which regulates and coordinates the terms of service for staff in the Common System (WT/GC/M/28 1998).

‘The United Nations itself had described the WTO staff as a drop of water in the ocean of the UN’ (WT/GC/M/23 1997: para 1). Weiss (1982) argued that the leadership of the executive head is weak because it lacks a key resource – the ability to dismiss recalcitrant staff. Few executives possess this resource because the ICSC has strict standards on hiring and firing (ICSC 2014b). Executives have little authority to manage staff within their organisation: ‘for fear of irritating particular member states’ (Weiss 1982: 299). ‘Directors-general will sometimes seek to enhance the authority of the institution in general, and their own offices in particular, but members tend to resist these initiatives. That was especially evident in the very yearly years of the WTO’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 506). For example, when Ruggiero added a fourth deputy director-general, members resisted to such an extent that Ruggiero was forced to rework the annual budget to justify enhancing his Cabinet.
Ruggiero’s enhanced staffing power gave him the ability to manage staff without consultation from member states (WT/GC/W/83 1998; WT/L/282 1998). ‘Members had always controlled staff numbers very closely, a tradition started by the ‘careful’ management of the Swiss directors-general.’ Ruggiero gained (limited) authority over members through this exchange (WT/GC/W/74 1997). This made him less dependent on members’ perceptions, improved dependence on director-general, and increased his formal authority when members were restricting his informal authority.

He relied on members’ mandates because his informal authority was constrained. He used their mandates on improving public relations to incorporate NGOs into WTO decision-making, as detailed above. He also used their mandate on establishing coherence to create the Integrated Framework, an institution of six international agencies (WT/COMTD/W/36 1998). This enhanced dependence on his leadership; elements of the WTO work programme were integrated into the agendas of these agencies, which allowed him to spread his vision for the WTO to other organisations. It also allowed developing members to be less dependent on developed members for extra-budgetary contributions to technical assistance (WT/BFA/W/20 1996; WT/BFA/10 1997; WT/BFA/W/27 1999; VanGrasstek 2013). The exchange helped him use the Integrated Framework to explore his opportunity to influence launching a new round outside of the WTO.

99 WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
Ruggiero was previously the Italian Trade Minister in the GATT (1987-1991), and he used his technical knowledge in a similar way to his political skill. He used this resource to complete the financial services agreement, for example. A WTO senior official argued that though Ruggiero used his technical knowledge to achieve his objectives, such as formalising the rules-based system, it was in service of members. This is an important distinction when comparing Ruggiero to Lamy. WTO senior officials highlighted that Lamy’s objectives frequently conflicted with the member-driven nature of WTO work.

Haas (1964, 1990) argued that executive heads make themselves indispensable by possessing superior technical knowledge, and WTO members became dependent on Ruggiero’s technical superiority. ‘Objectively, the Chair of the [General Council] often cannot be equated with the DG in diplomatic skills and trade experience, and you cannot pretend that members are competent to manage the organization.’

Summary

The section has uncovered how Ruggiero used internal and external networks and formal and informal rules to shape power dependence in attempting to influence decision-making. It has also highlighted how members’ restriction of executive authority shaped his strategies for influence. He exchanged resources widely to accommodate for his lack of authority. Ruggiero was not powerless; he possessed valuable resources. ‘Why do you think everyone reiterates that the WTO is member-driven? Because they need to keep

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100 See Appendix 1.
101 Interviewed 19 September 2011(a).
102 WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
saying it to keep power.\textsuperscript{103} He used resource exchange to adhere to members’ limits on his authority; he also used varied approaches and tactics.

**Agency**

The Weberian and great man literature assumed agency was static, reducing leadership to a single approach. The thesis has argued for a more dynamic conceptualisation of agency, based on actors’ changing perceptions of strategically-selective environments. This section analyses the approaches and tactics Ruggiero used to influence member-driven decision-making and achieve his goals, beginning with his varied approaches (Figure 5.1).

**Approaches**

After the Mexican and Korean candidates withdrew in the 1995 director-general selection process, Ruggiero became the fifth consecutive European director-general of the GATT/WTO. Prior to his selection to office, he was a senior international civil servant, working in Rome, São Paulo, Moscow, Belgrade, and Brussels, and an Italian politician throughout the late 1970s and 1980s (VanGrasstek 2013). He served as the Italian Minister for Trade (1987-1991) and ambassador and Italy’s permanent representative in the European Community during the GATT years. A background as both a politician and bureaucrat informed his approaches to executive leadership in the WTO.

\textsuperscript{103} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
In the conceptual framework, it was argued that directors-general use a range of approaches. There are four general approaches they use: the facilitator, broker, interventionist, and coercive. Beginning with the coercive, Ruggiero used this approach to negotiate the terms of the WTO headquarters agreement. The coercive approach relies on inducements, threats, or coercion to achieve desired outcomes. In 1995, Ruggiero utilised a competing offer from the city of Bonn (Germany) to host the WTO to secure costly extras for the Geneva headquarters from the Swiss Federation (WT/L/69 1995; WT/GC/M/4 1995).

WTO senior officials and secondary documents suggested that the coercive strategy was ‘his natural method’. ‘Ruggiero came from some of the most hierarchical systems around; this strategy did not sit well with member states and the Secretariat’. He attempted to use the coercive approach soon after taking office to begin setting the agenda for the first ministerial conference. When the General Council chairman firmly reminded him of the limits of his office, he adapted his approach to increase the likelihood of achieving his goals. ‘Ruggiero, for instance, was very tough and rough when he had to be – I mean really rough – but he also handled things with a certain class’ (Secretariat staff quoted in Jawara and Kwa 2003: 192, original emphasis). His use of the coercive approach...

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104 A WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011, recalled the Swiss offered renovation of the old ILO headquarters at the Centre William Rappard, a new General Council auditorium, and the promise of an underground car park to win the competition with Bonn. While this cannot be confirmed in primary documents from 1995, WT/GC/1 and WT/GC/2 because they remain classified, the statement by Swiss Ambassador Rossier from 1999, WT/GC(99)/ST/3 suggests this is accurate.
105 Interviewed 26(a) May and 19 and 20 September 2011; see also VanGrasstek (2013).
106 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
107 WTO senior officials, interviewed 26(a) May and 11 December 2011.
underpinned his active political leadership; he would often use it to shape members’ perceptions of his objectives.\textsuperscript{108} ‘He thought he was doing what his predecessors did.’\textsuperscript{109}

He employed the facilitator approach, which relies on administrative and management authority, to influence the selection of Singapore as the location of first ministerial conference in attempting to launch a round.\textsuperscript{110} ‘He is the caretaker of the system. He is the administrator over agreements, monitoring, and implementation.’\textsuperscript{111} He also used this approach in complying with members’ mandates, authoring reports, adjusting the budget for new members, and improving technical assistance using extra-budgetary contributions from members (WT/MIN(98)/2 1998). He used the facilitator approach, combined with the brokering approach, to shape the decision to establish the independence of the WTO from the Common System. He used this approach to pursue his goals without encroaching on the limits members imposed on his authority.

The brokering approach reflects the directors-general’s role in promoting the interests of the organisation, particularly through Green Room meetings.\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{quote}
The main function of the DG is to facilitate negotiations. When brokering, a DG looks for the emergence of the best political deal, and the instrument the DG uses is the Green Room. Stage one is interacting with the ambassadors here; they set the weather. The ministers give broad statements, not detailed. The DG needs to look over the relationship the ambassadors have to ministers.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{108} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{109} WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
\textsuperscript{110} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 1996, WT/GC/5.
\textsuperscript{111} WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{112} WTO senior officials, interviewed 1(a) and 7 June 2011.
\textsuperscript{113} WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
In the brokering approach, the director-general weighs the interests of the organisation with member states’ trade needs in seeking consensus in decision-making. ‘The value of consensus, in the perspective of action, is to diminish the fear of Members to be bound by an undesired decision’ (WT/GC(98)/ST/1 1998: 3).

This approach enabled Ruggiero to determine if there was consensus on his proposal to launch a ‘finance and technology’ round of trade negotiations (WT/GC/M/12 1996; WT/MIN(98)/7 1998). Ruggiero also used the approach to resolve conflicts in the General Council and DSB, to complete the built-in agenda, in consultations on the work programmes for the 1996 and 1998 ministerials, and in new members’ accession negotiations (WT/GC/M/12 1996; WT/GC/M/19 1997; WT/GC/M/27 1998). ‘The job is hard work; you’ve got to be able to read the room. He’s saying x, but what is his body saying? Ruggiero was a great listener.’

He did not use the interventionist strategy, although there was an opportunity for him to employ this approach that may have aided him in launching a round. The interventionist approach draws on the directors-general’s formal authority to oversee general activities and allows the executive to intervene in member-driven decision-making. Ruggiero was aware that trade was expanding, albeit not equally, and the development gap was dividing members on a new agenda (WT/TPR/OV/3 1997). Developing members’ did not want a new round, in part, because of the difficulty they were having in implementation (PRESS/122 1999; Jones 2004). Ruggiero could have used the interventionist approach to ease divisions around the development gap and broker an inclusive agenda for a new

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114 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
round, but he opted for the facilitator approach and increased technical assistance. His approach may have affected how members perceived his leadership in launching a round. ‘When the DG attempts to move beyond his role as a facilitator, members welcome or unwelcome that attempt as the case is.’

In summary, Ruggiero used varied approaches to influence networks and institutions in pursuit of his goals. WTO senior officials highlighted that his goals reflected the interests of the multilateral system. ‘A good DG is one that is trusted, one who is impartial and honest, and one who is not pushing his own agenda but pushing the agenda of the organisation. Ruggiero was a bit of a bully, but he wasn’t pushing his own agenda.’ He used his role as caretaker of the system to shape his objectives to better accommodate members’ preferences, which influenced his success in formalising the WTO. The agency discussion transitions to examine the tactics Ruggiero used in attempting to achieve these goals.

**Tactics**

Tactics can often be conflated with resources. Here they are understood as tools used to shape structure and context to increase the likelihood that an actor’s strategies will be favoured. This section explores how Ruggiero used the tactics of risk taking, shared leadership with deputies, and creating new programmes to improve his opportunities to establish the formal, rules-based WTO and launch a trade round. Beginning with risk

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115 WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.
116 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
taking, Ruggiero contested the limited formal authority afforded to him through the WTO Agreement and took risks by seeking to expand his authority.

Members were mandated to formally define the role of the director-general in the Marrakesh Agreement that concluded the Uruguay Round.\textsuperscript{117} Neither the 1996 nor 1998 Ministerial Conferences negotiated the role of executive leadership, leaving the director-general vaguely defined. It has been argued that it was the intent of members to leave the executive head ill-defined, as they are aware of the pivotal role leadership has played but were unwilling to cede power to the director-general. ‘The WTO can’t have fixed DG rules, formality does not serve to function.’\textsuperscript{118}

Ruggiero wanted more authority to pursue his goals and reminded members of this unfinished work.\textsuperscript{119} Members and the internal system resisted.

The Secretariat kept telling him that he couldn’t do certain things. I kept urging him against it, saying that a formal description would only decrease powers. The best bet was to push the envelope of authority until they told him no, which was his natural method since he was sort of a bully. An undefined DG has its benefits. Almost everything about the WTO is undefined, and that helps for organizational flexibility and functioning.\textsuperscript{120}

Reflecting on this tactic and how directors-general have expanded the role of executive leadership over time, as revealed in the case studies, formally defining executive office would likely have resulted in a more constrained director-general and a WTO that is paralysed by divisive interests of member states. Asking members to formally define his

\textsuperscript{117} The Marrakesh Agreement was drafted in 1994, but after members fulfilled most of their obligations was finalised as the WTO Agreement in 1999.

\textsuperscript{118} WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.

\textsuperscript{119} WTO senior officials, 19 and 26(a) May and 11 December 2011.

\textsuperscript{120} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a); see also VanGrasstek (2013).
office, therefore, was a considerable risk, knowing how they had continually restricted his authority throughout his term.

A second tactic he used was sharing leadership with his deputies. First, to secure the nomination for director-general, Ruggiero bargained with the Korean candidate, Kim Chulsu. Should Chulsu withdraw, Ruggiero would appoint him as one of his deputies director-general, increasing the number of deputies from three to four (WT/GC/M/2 1995). “There is a belief internally that the DG should have less managers below him. Right now he has four, and there was talk of a reform movement that he should only have one or two, at most.”\(^{121}\) This tactic was not entirely successful, although Ruggiero did win the selection process over Chulsu.

Members – through the Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration – closely monitored Ruggiero and requested he reduce his deputies by half (WT/GC/M/4 1995; WT/GC/5 1996). He responded by recommending a 1:2:1 restructuring, where the director-general would lead the organisation, supported by two deputies director-general and one assistant director-general or senior director to be selected from senior Secretariat staff (WT/GC/W/74 1997). The decision was discussed over three years, revealing, again, the inherent tensions between director-general and members. Members did not act on Ruggiero’s recommendation, reflecting the norm of informality that continues to condition

\(^{121}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
the relationship between members and their executive. ‘He has to be allowed to exercise authority and delegate the appropriate resources’.\textsuperscript{122}

Deputies director-general do not share executive power; they serve as envoys when the director-general cannot attend or oversee WTO bodies (WT/GC/M/25 1998). ‘Moreover, the Deputy Directors-General had to act as the link between the senior professional staff and the Director-General, facilitating a continuous feedback’ (WT/GC/M/19 1997: para 7). Through sharing leadership with his four deputies, Ruggiero was able to delegate administrative and management tasks and focus on his goals.\textsuperscript{123}

The DG is a bit of administrator, although most people who become the DG are not really interested in administrating; they are more interested in pushing through trade agreements. So the DDG is often delegated to do this sort of work, for example the hiring, contracts, construction. The DG has to be an efficient delegator.\textsuperscript{124}

Ruggiero also initiated new programmes, such as the Integrated Framework, Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, and Technical Cooperation and Training Division in the Secretariat (WT/GC/M/8 1995; WT/MIN(98)/2 1998). He convened a series of High-Level Meetings on Integrated Initiatives for LDCs (High-Level Meeting, forthwith) that directors-general have continued to better administer technical assistance and training programmes. He also improved transparency and public relations through the launch, maintenance, and monitoring of the WTO website (WT/GC/W/158 1999). Creating new

\textsuperscript{122}WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{123}WTO senior officials, interviewed 24 and 27 May and 11 December 2011; see also from 1997, WT/GC/M/19 and 1998, WT/GC/M/24.
\textsuperscript{124}WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
programmes allowed Ruggiero to continue to influence the WTO’s formalisation and a future trade round after his term expired.

Summary

This section has explored the approaches and tactics Ruggiero used to pursue his goals. The director-general must be strategic in their influence because they have limited authority to affect decision-making. It also highlights why the majority of WTO directors-general (1995-2013) led actively, not passively, using political skill or a combination of political and technical knowledge to shape outcomes. Approaches and tactics shape how the internal system, members, and global governance agencies perceive executive strategies for influence. These perceptions affect the likelihood of his strategies being successful and how he can enhance his power in strategically-selective context.

Power

Rather than subscribe to a zero-sum concept of power, the thesis argues that multiple actors have power in international organisation; power is understood as fluid, contextual, and embedded in relationships. How much power actors possess depends on decision-making – institutions, networks, actors, and context – and resource exchange. This section explores Ruggiero’s power relations through three, mutually dependent relationships and how he attempted to enhance his power by capitalising on context.
Power Relations

Ruggiero had relations with the internal system, member states, and agencies of global governance. Beginning with the internal system, a senior official argued that how a director-general exercises power in the Secretariat depends on how they lead (active/passive, politician/technocrat). ‘Some DGs delegate, and some want to have the final say. It is up to your judgement which way is more effective and efficient. Also, DG relations with the Secretariat are on a continuum, and it’s important to know that this is also based on past experience.’125

Another senior official said that how a director-general enhances his power with the internal system is through motivation, and this is: ‘the main challenge of the DG’ in the WTO’s multicultural environment.126 ‘A leader knows how to (formally) produce motivation. The task is finding an iconic leader, and it is difficult because it is hard to define what makes a good leader.’127 Ruggiero led the internal system using his experience as a politician and technical negotiator, which the Secretariat respected.128

With member states, Ruggiero struggled with the lack of authority afforded to him. He wanted to begin preparations for Singapore when members constrained his influence on decision-making.

There were no doubt precedents for the DG to organize ‘agenda preparations’. Nevertheless, Ruggiero was hurt and offended by the way it

125 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
126 Interviewed 6 June 2011.
127 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(b).
128 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
was done; he was obliged to issue a public withdrawal of the invitation to a meeting to discuss the agenda for the Singapore Ministerial in 1996.\textsuperscript{129}

The irony of members checking Ruggiero’s power was that shortly after they invited him to hold informal consultations (WT/GC/7 1996).

‘For the first couple of years, Ruggiero had a lot of power, with the Singapore Ministerial being the high point. But just because he was strong at the Ministerial, doesn’t mean he was strong in Geneva.’\textsuperscript{130} In the WTO’s initial years, members allowed the director-general to broker at ministerial conference but restricted him in Geneva negotiations, informing why directors-general must use political or technical skill to enhance their power in the Geneva process. ‘The best thing a DG could do would be to pretend not to have power, this would also help relations with member states and the Secretariat… The member states will have power over the DG, and then it will change, where the DG has power over members.’\textsuperscript{131}

Ruggiero had good relations with both the USA and EC, which in part, enabled him to enhance his power. Support from the USA bolstered Ruggiero’s initiative to establish an independent WTO, as they were one of the final members to agree to his conditions.\textsuperscript{132} He was less able to rely on the power of dominant members in attempting to launch a round. Whilst a senior official argued that: ‘you cannot be a successful DG without good relations

\textsuperscript{129} WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
\textsuperscript{130} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 1998, WT/GC/M/28.
with the US’, their power and resources only occasionally supported his ability to achieve his goals.\textsuperscript{133}

Within global governance, the WTO could have become isolated, as the GATT was, when Ruggiero removed ties to the UN Common System. However, the Integrated Framework connected trade to the agendas of six international organisations. This made global governance dependent on the WTO and helps establish how the young organisation with the turbulent past carved out a role for itself in global governance after years of GATT isolationism. ‘Within the international system, he is a symbol or an expression of the systematic importance of the WTO and multilateral trade.’\textsuperscript{134} Ruggiero established the WTO’s role in global governance, which enhanced the organisation’s survival in its early years. ‘He successfully established the new Organization as a central pillar not just of a more open world economy, but of a staple of international order’ (WT/GC(99)/ST/6 1999).

\textit{Power in Strategically-Selective Contexts}

By utilising strategic learning, situated actors can enhance their power in strategically-selective context. This section examines how Ruggiero attempted to capitalise on political, institutional, and global context to enhance his power. He was unsuccessful, but it appears his lack of success was related more to members’ perceptions about active leadership than Ruggiero’s strategies.

\textsuperscript{133} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{134} WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
To begin, he attempted to manipulate political context to heighten his power. Members were divided on a work programme, and Ruggiero was unable to increase his ability to launch a round though he networked with powerful heads of state. With no work programme, members were dependent on Ruggiero to lead them towards consensus on a new agenda, but, again, his authority was limited. He attempted to use this institutional context to direct members towards a work programme that would achieve his goals. They rejected his attempts and continued to limit his leadership through mandates. “The members want the DG to lead, not direct.”

Globally, there was support for a new round, especially from the organisation’s two most powerful members. The increasingly globalised world was entering a new century and trading in new areas like information technologies (WT/GC/W/68 1997). The Asian financial crisis demonstrated the extent that globalisation had linked members trade interests. Ruggiero attempted to use this context and the narrative of crisis to emphasise the importance of the WTO by arguing in favour of an information and technology round (WT/TPR/OV/4 1998). As in the other instances, members resisted; a round was not in the majority of members’ interests (WT/GC/M/9 1996).

Summary

The analysis of Ruggiero’s power revealed that he was unable to enhance the limited power of the director-general though he used varied approaches and exchanged resources widely.

135 Ibid.
He had positive relations with the internal system, the most powerful member states, and agencies of global governance, in spite of withdrawing from the UN Common System. A senior official argued that: ‘it was the right climate for Ruggiero’.136 This enabled him to establish the formalisation of WTO rules, as he needed mostly formal authority to achieve this goal. He was unable to enhance his informal power to launch a trade round, and this may be because, as a senior official highlighted, ‘within negotiations leadership matters at the margins’.137 Additionally, members’ experiences with Sutherland’s active politician leadership likely shaped their preferences around how Ruggiero attempted to achieve his goals. ‘Power lies from where authorities find it; a DG can’t determine the behaviour of a committee.’138

**Conclusion**

The chapter has analysed Ruggiero’s term to assess if and how his leadership mattered. It was argued that Ruggiero led as an active political-technocrat, and this shaped how he pursued his goals of formalising the WTO and launching a trade round. How he led also conditioned how his leadership was perceived.

- Examining structure revealed that Ruggiero used his formal authority to establish the rules-based system, but members restricted his informal authority. This limited his ability to launch a round.
- By exploring context, the chapter argued that he was able to overturn members’ historic reliance on informal rules but continued to rely on dominant members’ hegemony and exceptionalism for the WTO’s survival in its initial years of crisis.

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136 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
137 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
138 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
• Through resource exchange, Ruggiero heightened dependence on his leadership internally and externally, but he was unable to use his enhanced power to affect members’ perceptions on a new round.

• The section on agency posited that Ruggiero actively pursued his goals though members constrained his influence in Geneva negotiations. His goals reflected both the interests of the multilateral system and those of dominant member states. These interests were in conflict, as developing members vastly outnumbered developed members.

• Investigating his power relations and how he attempted to enhance his power revealed that he refused to allow the WTO to be an informal instrument of states’ trade policy. This combined with competing interests made a new round unlikely.

Ruggiero led as an active political-technocrat consistently, but his ability to pursue his goals and use political and technical expertise was limited by members’ perceptions and preferences. The chapter argues that Ruggiero mattered by establishing the independent, formal, rules-based multilateral trading system, which continues to shape trade governance. He mattered by being a caretaker of the organisation; this includes improved resources for developing nations, though he failed to address the development gap that limited his ability to launch a round. Had Ruggiero succeeded in launching a round, negotiations would have focused on information and technology or the Singapore issues, which would have furthered entrenched the interests of developed members in the multilateral system.
Ruggiero’s leadership did little to reconcile international political tensions over the development gap between WTO members and amongst civil society, which culminated at the Battle in Seattle after he left office. Ruggiero did begin a slow transition from the old club model of the GATT to a 21st century organisation that reflects the needs and challenges of a diverse membership. He established the WTO’s legitimacy in a system of global governance that had little purpose for a forum for multilateral trade by demonstrating the WTO’s essentiality in mitigating global crises, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

The themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time have been explored through a case study of executive leadership that was influenced mostly by factors outside the director-general’s control. The following chapter will reveal how a round focused on developed members’ trade interests would have destabilised the WTO in its first five years. Ruggiero’s legacy reflects inherent tensions between members and the director-general, developed and developing members, and the GATT and WTO. His active political-technocrat leadership may have been perceived favourably in a different time – one not so conditioned by negative externalities of the Uruguay Round.

The thesis turns to exploring the leadership of Ruggiero’s successor, Moore, the third director-general of the WTO (1999-2002) to continue to investigate the research questions. The chapter investigates how Moore’s active politician leadership launched the first trade round and fundamentally changed the WTO. The case of Moore’s leadership allows for
comparison to better address the research questions and core themes, as Moore’s term differed considerably from Ruggiero’s.
Chapter Six: Director-General Moore (1999-2002)

Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the first case study of executive leadership in the WTO. Director-General Ruggiero’s leadership (1995-1999) was assessed to investigate the core themes and research questions regarding if and how executive heads matter. The chapter argued that Ruggiero established the formal, rules-based system but failed to launch the organisation’s first trade round. It explored how members’ failure to formally define the role of the director-general and GATT norms limited his leadership. This chapter continues to address how executive leadership matters through the second case study of Director-General Moore (1999-2002).

The chapter investigates the key claims that Moore was responsible for the launch of the first round of multilateral trade negotiations and altered the WTO by transforming GATT norms. It explores the extent that he led as an active politician by pursuing his goals over members’ self-interests, using his political skill to influence decision-making. It avers that Moore shaped the WTO and role of the director-general to overcome divides around the development gap that impaired Ruggiero’s ability to launch a round in the previous chapter. The chapter examines how Moore used his political background to lead uncharacteristically when compared to other GATT/WTO executive heads.

\^{139} See Appendix 1.
The chapter analyses how Moore affected institutions and networks, exchanged resources, capitalised on context, used approaches and tactics, and developed relationships to enhance his power to address if and how he mattered. Figure 6.1 sets out the varied approaches and resources he used to influence outcomes. His legacy reflects the transformative power of leadership in international organisation, but legacy is malleable. Institutions are resistant to change, and the case of Moore's leadership reveals the extent that the WTO can serve as a mechanism for global development. To begin to analyse Moore's leadership, structures of power are explored to better understand his influence on the role of the director-general.

Figure 6.1: A model of Moore's power
Structure

This section analyses how Moore used his formal and informal authority to shape decision-making. It focuses on how he transformed institutions and networks to enable more executive and developing member influence to launch a round and change the WTO. As highlighted in the conclusion to the previous chapter, Moore was constrained by the circumstances in which he took office. Rather than a four-year, renewable term – the formal limits on executive leadership in the WTO – he was limited to a three-year, non-renewable term. These conditions are detailed later in the chapter, but this context affected how he exercised his authority.

Institutions

The institutional analysis reflects on how members constrained Ruggiero’s leadership and how Moore aimed to achieve his goals by enhancing the role of the director-general. As a WTO outsider, Moore lacked technical knowledge and relied on his political skill to affect outcomes.\(^\text{140}\) ‘It is key to be familiar with your subject but also know that you don’t need to know everything. The best leaders are specialised but also generally knowledgeable.’\(^\text{141}\) Beginning with how Moore used his authority (Table 6.1), three member-driven bodies govern the WTO when the ministerial conference is not in session: the General Council, DSB, and TPRM.

\(^{140}\) Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012; see Appendix 1.

\(^{141}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
Like Ruggiero, Moore needed enhanced executive authority to achieve his goals. Implementation of outstanding GATT agreements continued to constrain a work programme, and the organisation was not fully functioning without a trade round (WT/L/384 2000; WTO 2011). Developing nations maintained that their support for a new round was dependent on improvements to implementation and technical assistance (WT/L/425 2001). As Wilkinson (2006) highlighted, they were largely excluded from agenda-setting at this time, and Moore aimed to improve how the WTO responded to their trade needs. ‘We were doing developing nations no favours by excluding them.’143

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143 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2011.
He organised special sessions on implementation in the General Council and restructured administration of technical assistance to improve coherence between international agencies (PRESS/184 2000; WT/GC/M/66 2001; WT/BFA/W/70 2002). ‘Moore was good at getting the WTO moving on the ground levels, on functioning levels.’ He was less active in the General Council and TPRM than other directors-general (Table 6.1). Whilst this could reflect his lack of technical knowledge, it could also indicate his objective of better integrating developing members instead of overseeing core governing bodies. A WTO senior official contributed that as governing bodies gained experience, they became less dependent on the director-general.145

Within the DSB, Moore created a role for the director-general to use his position of authority in international politics to resolve conflict before it escalated to arbitration (good offices) (WTO Agreement 1999). He argued that expanding executive influence in the DSB reduced costs in the legal forum (WT/DSB/M/106 2001). He used his good offices role to improve developing members’ access and expertise in the DSB. ‘The DG has to be careful how he exercises his power in the DSB. If there is even the appearance of bias, the most powerful legal precedents could be in question.’146

Prior to Moore, developing members were largely unable to bring dispute against developed member states due to inadequate resources (Janow, Donaldson, Yanovich 2008). Moore also used his authority in the DSB to appoint panel members to dispute cases when parties could not agree, as Ruggiero did (WTO Agreement 1999: article 5, para 6). From

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144 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
145 Interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
146 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
2000 to 2002, members requested Moore appoint panel members in 58 per cent of DSB panels, and this ‘exceptional procedure’ became ‘the rule’ (TN/DS/W/7 2002; Davey 2008).

Moore also explored opportunities to influence decision-making outside of the core governing bodies. He was the first director-general to attend meetings of the Committee on Trade and Environment and was active in the Committees on Trade and Development and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. With the launch of the MDGs in 2000, these smaller decision-making bodies became important institutions (WT/CTE/W/178 2000; WT/COMTD/LDC/W/22 2001; G/L/485 2001). He was more active in these bodies because they focused on developing members’ trade issues, and he needed to shape their preferences on launching a trade round. ‘Moore believed that perception mattered more than reality, but he had to bring perception in line with reality.’\textsuperscript{147} His ability to influence was enabled by the TNC – the GATT negotiating body – convening for the first-time in 2002 (TN/C/M/1 2002).

Moore successfully launched the first round of trade negotiations at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference. With a round to negotiate, the TNC was given purpose. Members debated the GATT tradition of the director-general chairing the TNC – the primary negotiating forum outside of ministerial conference. Though some opposed, Moore was selected as chair. His role required the director-general to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item be impartial and objective;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{147} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
• ensure transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making;
• facilitate and evolve consensus;
• reflect consensus, where it was lacking, and differing positions in reports;
• ensure the transition of authority and functioning of the TNC with transitions of executive leadership; and
• work in close cooperation with the General Council chair (TN/C/M/1 2002).

Heading the TNC granted the director-general formal negotiating authority, and this occurred at a critical moment when members were debating the director-general’s role in the Geneva process (PRESS/184 2000; WT/GC/W/412 2000). ‘The powers of the DG are limited, but it’s necessary for the DG to be the chair of the TNC.’\(^{148}\) He was expected to lead negotiations as a chair and not use his power as director-general to pursue his objectives. ‘If a DG were to look at negotiations between party A and B and try to find an outcome, his would be outside of his role.’\(^{149}\)

In summary, Moore was initially constrained by the limited authority of the director-general. He pursued his objectives of launching a trade round that reflected the majority – rather than a minority – of members’ trade needs and used his political skill to expand his influence. Whilst Moore was less engaged with core governing bodies, he facilitated his and developing members’ influence by improving implementation, technical assistance, coherence, and inclusivity. His ability to influence decision-making was enhanced by receiving formal authority as TNC chair. Improving his and developing members’ role in

\(^{148}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
\(^{149}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
decision-making increased the likelihood of launching a trade round, but Moore also needed to expand his network.

Networks

Moore had not worked outside of New Zealand prior to becoming director-general.150 This section explores how he expanded the WTO’s decision-making network through his initiatives and how he used this network to pursue his goals. Networks are not static between directors-general; inclusion is often determined by the issue, actors’ perceptions, context, and other factors.

In his internal network, the Secretariat became more familiar with WTO institutions during his term. As with the General Council and TPRM, Moore engaged less with the research body compared to other directors-general (PRESS/236 2001). Being less active in these bodies helped him expand the WTO network to new actors and agencies, like parliamentarians.

I reached out to Congresses and Parliaments. Staff thought I shouldn’t be doing this, but this is where the WTO was more democratic because we knew [negotiations] had to pass domestic law. Where it impacts domestic policy is not an easy thing. The dirty secret is that the toughest negotiations are at home because of entrenched interests.151

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150 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May; see also Appendix 1.

151 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012; see also from 2001, PRESS/223 and VanGrasstek (2013).
Moore met with developing members in Asia and Africa to better understand how their participation in Geneva was constrained. He created ‘Geneva Week’, a week-long programme on WTO and European political issues for non-residents: WTO members or observers that do not maintain a Geneva mission. Twenty-five members and nine members-in-accession lacked Geneva representation, and like Ruggiero, Moore lacked consensus on a new round without their inclusion (WT/LDC/SWG/IF/16/Rev.1 2001).

He commissioned a daily electronic newsletter of WTO activities and two ‘mini-ministerial’ conferences at the regional level to further improve inclusivity in decision-making (PRESS/132 1999; PRESS/210 2001; WT/LDC/SWG/IF/16/Rev.1 2001; PRESS/295 2002; Jawara and Kwa 2003; VanGrasstek 2013).

Mini-ministerials helped prepare ambassadors and ministers to take decisions at conferences. ‘We had a completely different type of person coming to Ministerials after these training programs; before, we had flexibility but a lack of precision.’ Moore’s network expansion initiatives improved inclusivity and transparency, which fostered consensus on a new round. ‘He had an instinct for putting coalitions together. A successful DG can deal with the daily tasks in front of him and have the political smarts for coalition work. Without this, a DG will have a limited effect.’

Externally, Moore needed to transform public perceptions of the old club of GATT to be more favourable to a new WTO trade round. Poor public relations culminated at

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152 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012; see also from 1999, PRESS/132 and PRESS/133.
153 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
154 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
155 Ibid; see also from 1999, WT/GC(99)/ST/6.
Moore’s first ministerial in 1999, known as the ‘Battle in Seattle’, where tens of thousands of protestors gathered in the USA to protest the WTO. He expanded his network to the Commonwealth Secretariat, international standard-setting agencies, and regional development banks to improve external relations (PRESS/262 2001; WT/GC/46/Rev.1 2001). These agencies targeted improvements in implementation, technical assistance, and coherence to meet developing members’ conditions for a new round, but anti-WTO graffiti and protests in Geneva continued to limit Moore’s capacity to transform perceptions about the WTO and a new round.  

Moore introduced the annual WTO Public Symposia that gathered over 700 members of civil society in Geneva to discuss WTO work (PRESS/139 1999; WT/GC/M/48 1999; PRESS/240 2001; PRESS/290 2002). He used goodwill from his network initiatives and attitudes towards developed member dominance to influence a round launching at his second ministerial conference in 2001 in Doha (Qatar). He invited over 600 NGOs and authorised full access to the conference for civil society to improve the likelihood of launching a round that better integrated developing members into the multilateral system (WT/GC/M/61/Add.1 2001; WT/GC/M/66 2001). Expanding the WTO’s network and improving external relations enhanced his ability to launch the first trade round, his most significant achievement.  

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156 WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
157 WTO senior officials, interviewed 20, 26(a), and 26(b) May, 6 and 7 June, and 11 December 2011.
Summary

Moore expanded his formal and informal authority to improve the WTO for developing members and enable a new round of trade negotiations – his objectives. He restructured institutions and prioritised particular decision-making bodies to achieve his goals, a characteristic of active leadership. He integrated new actors and agencies into the organisational network and used his background to shape perceptions of his leadership and the WTO. ‘He was very integrated and would talk to all sorts of people involved with an issue.’ He engaged institutions and networks differently than previous GATT/WTO directors-general by focusing on developing members’ trade needs. The next section examines how context limited and bolstered his leadership.

Context

This section assesses how Moore’s selection to director-general and political, historical, institutional, and global circumstances shaped his term. Members began their search for a new director-general in July 1998 after Ruggiero made clear his intentions to leave the WTO at the end of April 1999 (WT/GC/W/130 1998). By March 1999, the Canadian and Moroccan candidates withdrew from the selection process. Members were split between the Thai candidate, Supachai, and Moore (WT/GC/M/36/Add.2 1999). Supachai was the majority of members’ first-choice candidate, but when Ruggiero left there was no clear consensus on the next director-general (WT/GC/18 1999).

The vacancy was “both tragedy and farce”, in the words of The Economist (1999), which observed that the stalemate was “hampering preparations for a

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158 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.  
159 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
big WTO summit in Seattle in November” and added to the “growing risk that the Seattle summit will be a failure” (VanGrasstek 2013: 521).

This context shaped Moore’s term and his ability to pursue his goals.

**Political Context**

The analysis of the political context of Moore’s term focuses on the development gap that Ruggiero failed to address, Moore’s management of the post-Seattle crisis, and how he transformed crisis into consensus to launch the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Beginning with the development gap, the Moore/Supachai split may not have occurred had developing members not challenged developed members’ dominance, as highlighted in the previous chapter.160 Over fifty years, developed states – particularly the Quad – used GATT norms to condition outcomes in the multilateral trading system. Developing members used their increasing familiarity with formal rules – in part, facilitated by Ruggiero’s increases to technical assistance and new programmes – to challenge Quad dominance. This paralysed decision-making.

GATT was the developed nations’ club. The developing nations did participate in GATT, but until the Uruguay Round they could select how they wanted to participate… But since the WTO has grown to near universal membership and since the application of WTO rules has become universal, things have changed.161

Divisions on the development gap limited Moore’s ability to launch a round at Seattle (Wilkinson 2006). The EU’s Singapore issues and USA’s inclusion of labour on the agenda

160 WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011; see also Blustein (2009).
161 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
further divided members.162 Prior to the Seattle conference, Moore had been in office only two months and his deputies just four weeks (PRESS/144 1999; Wilkinson 2006; VanGrasstek 2013). He was also constrained by members’ preferences on the role of the director-general in the Geneva process. These conditions limited members’ preparations for Seattle and Moore’s ability to launch a round.

The Battle in Seattle was the largest anti-globalisation protest to date, and blame for the collapse of the ministerial shifted between USTR Charlene Barshefsky, Moore, the Secretariat, and developing members (WT/GC/44 1999; Jawara and Kwa 2003; Blustein 2009; VanGrasstek 2013). ‘When Seattle was called off, it was all politics, not security,’ a WTO senior official argued to counter claims made in secondary documents about the roles of protestors and Seattle authorities in the collapse.163

At the height of tensions in Seattle, Clinton attempted to: ‘justify new trade restrictions [through labor regulations] against developing countries’ to coerce the WTO into including labour in the new round.164 Clinton’s speech and the emergence of an ‘ad hoc’ working group on labour aggravated tensions on the development gap. Ministers accused Moore of being in the pocket of USTR, and Seattle collapsed (Jones 2004; Bhagwati 2008; VanGrasstek 2013). Moore conceded: ‘we were outflanked in Seattle’.165

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162 WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011; see also from 1999, WT/GC/M/43, Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and Anner (2004).
163 Interviewed 6 June 2011; see also Jawara and Kwa (2003), Blustein (2009), and Wilkinson (2006).
164 WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011; see also Jones (2004, 2010), Blustein (2009), and VanGrasstek (2013).
165 Interviewed 6 November 2012.
Post-Seattle, the WTO was in crisis, and Moore used the crisis narrative to bolster launching a round at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference (WT/MIN(99)/12 1999; WT/COMTD/IF/2 2001; Odell 2002; VanGrasstek 2013). From the end of 1999 to the beginning of 2001, Moore travelled to over 180 cities to build consensus around an agenda for a new round (PRESS/265 2001; VanGrasstek 2013). He visited Africa more than any other director-general, which helped to repair relations, promote advances in technical assistance, and hold informal consultations.166

From Seattle to Doha, Moore: ‘developed superior intelligence about countries actual positions’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 395). He built trust and direct lines of communications with capitals – techniques WTO senior officials, Cox (1969), Haas (1990), and Tucker ([1981], 1995) maintain is hallmark of an effective executive head.167 ‘[Moore] changed, settled in, and understood things more cohesively. He was learning bottom lines, and this process enabled him to develop the Doha Development Agenda.’168

Just prior to the 2001 Ministerial Conference, Moore introduced a package of ‘confidence-building measures’ to be negotiated at regional and national trade meetings and built support for a new round in the Integrated Framework, G8, and G77 (WT/COMTD/INF/2 2001; WT/LDC/SWG/IF/15/Rev.1 2001; PRESS/238 2001; PRESS/239 2001).169 Unlike Seattle, Doha preparations were so extensive that only a ‘manageable minimum’ of decisions was required of ministers (WT/MIN(01)/12 2001).

166 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012; see also Blustein (2009).
167 WTO senior officials, interviewed 20, 23, 26(a), 27, and 30(b) May and 7 June 2011.
168 WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
169 The G77 refers to the group of developing nations that founded UNCTAD, which has since expanded to more than 130 nations.
VanGrasstek (2013) argued that a reason the round launched successfully was the streamlining of the draft declaration text, brokered by Moore and 2001 General Council Chairman Stuart Harbinson (Hong Kong). ‘He had a good working relationships with hardworking people like Stuart Harbinson.”

In summary, the political context of Moore’s term bolstered and limited his goal of launching a round. The Battle in Seattle and divisions between members made a launch improbable at his first ministerial conference. Moore said: ‘as the DG you ask [members] to authorize you to make decisions. There’s a certain degree of “retailing”, and it’s extremely political. It’s not right to bully if it’s not the right action.” He used the post-Seattle crisis to enhance his influence and intelligence on trade needs by communicating across multiple levels of national, regional, and international authority. He also used the historical role of the GATT director-general to enable his influence on the Geneva process.

Historical Context

This section investigates the role of the director-general and GATT norms to detail how historical context influenced Moore’s term. Beginning with the role of the director-general, the five-month executive leadership vacuum impaired WTO functioning. ‘When Ruggiero left, member states realized they needed somebody there and that they had, perhaps, taken him for granted.’ Between Ruggiero and Moore, members’ preferences
and dependence on executive leadership changed, and this may explain why Moore was able to expand executive authority; whereas, members restricted Ruggiero. Moore’s active politician leadership may have also played a role in changing their preferences. ‘How effective and efficient the DG is depends on circumstance and personality… The more a DG understands what is at stake, the better the DG can work on members’ perception. He needs the ability to persuade.’

The launch of the DDA shaped members’ perceptions of executive leadership in the Geneva process (PRESS/248 2001). Under Ruggiero, members argued the director-general’s brokering should be limited to ministerials, but as they debated who should chair the TNC, limits of member-driven brokering emerged. Several WTO senior officials argued the director-general must play a role in Geneva negotiations to lead members away from divisive politics. ‘Motivation is key in leadership, and this can come from outside of his formal role as DG. He should be able to give [members] what they need… He needs to be a fire starter.’ Moore was able to expand executive influence to broker Geneva negotiations by resuming the historic role of GATT directors-general as TNC chair.

His goal of launching a development round was challenging for reasons explored below, and he used historic norms to improve the likelihood of a launch. He linked the collapse at Seattle to problems with GATT norms (WT/MIN(99)/12 1999; Moore 2003). ‘It is significant to consider that if after the Singapore and Geneva meetings the needs of the least developed and developing countries were truly addressed, the unfortunate events of

174 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
175 Interviewed 30(b) May, 1(b), 6, and 7 June, and 19(b) September 2011.
176 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(b).
Seattle could have been avoided’ (WT/L/425 2001: para 7). A new round, he argued, would enable the WTO to combat poverty and terrorism, similar to how the GATT contributed to the post-war peace between developed nations (PRESS/281 2002; PRESS/290 2002). He used GATT norms to influence developed members’ perception that they were obligated to launch a round to benefit poorer countries (WT/L/425 2001). ‘I annoyed a few people, but it’s not a question of popularity; it’s a question of confidence. The international civil service lives in bubble… but no trade round was done without risks.’

In summary, Moore drew on dependence between members and the director-general to increase his influence. He was able to pursue his goal of launching a round that redefined WTO work by evoking GATT norms. The WTO was at a critical juncture during his term. Either members failed to launch a round and continued to face poor public relations, or they united under a new development agenda to advance the multilateral system. He used the interests of the organisation to pursue his goals, not a personal agenda, similar to Ruggiero’s active leadership but distinct from Lamy’s, as the case studies reveal.

Institutional Context

Moore’s selection to office and change in the WTO are explored to better analyse how GATT norms conditioned his leadership. When members were unable to come to consensus on Ruggiero’s successor, they temporarily appointed David Hartridge (UK) as the ‘director-general in charge of the WTO’ (PRESS/130 1999). The ‘pseudo DG’ was:

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177 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
178 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2012.
‘doing the full functions. I was running the organization and the main advisor to the General Council, but it was a very unpleasant period. I wasn’t calling members in, and I wasn’t working in the Green Rooms.’ 179 Without a director-general to broker negotiations, members were ill-prepared for the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference. 180 ‘There was no one to lead the organization. Things were extremely difficult, and we needed a head, someone to represent the organization.’ 181

A full year passed since members initiated the process of selecting a new director-general (WT/L/308 1999; PRESS/131 1999). American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright – who contributed a campaign strategist to Moore’s candidacy – suggested scrapping both candidates (WT/GC/M/40/Add.2 1999; Blustein 2009). Out of desperation, a coalition of members suggested that Moore and Supachai split a six-year term, each with three years without the possibility of re-appointment. 182 When Moore took office in September 1999, the organisation was deeply divided. 183 ‘When the new DG dispute was going on, there was no common EU position on the new DG; they all spoke individually, which was never done.’ 184 This context limited Moore’s leadership before his term began, as the GATT norm of informality continued to shape the WTO.

179 Interviewed 19 September 2011(a).
180 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19 and 26(b) May, 6 and 7 June, and 19 September (b) 2011; see also from 1999, WT/GC/M/43 and WT/MIN(99)/W/1.
181 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
182 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b); see Blustein (2009) for further detail of the Moore/Supachai selection process.
183 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19, 20, 25, 26(b), and 27 May, 6 and 7 June, and 20 September 2011; see also Jawara and Kwa (2003) and Wilkinson (2006).
184 WTO senior official, interviewed, 19 September 2011(b).
Once in office, Moore forced members to confront their history and future. They resolved ‘never again’ to be limited by circumstance due to lack of procedure for selecting their leader and formalised the selection process.185

The Moore/Supachai split was not a good compromise, but it was one way to get out of an impossible situation. It was unfair to both Moore and Supachai, however. It was a bureaucratic decision that should have never been made. The WTO was only a toddler then, and there was this feeling that if it started with a leadership crisis, people were afraid the house of cards would fall. But after the decision was made, we could all move on and get some work done. Because the decision of what to do had paralyzed the organization for four to five months.186

He used members’ perception of crisis to enhance his authority and support his objectives of transforming WTO decision-making from the old GATT club model that previously supported developed members’ hegemony and exceptionalism. Moore’s initiatives on inclusivity and transparency bolstered his strategy for a WTO that worked for all members, regardless of levels of development. Upon launching the round, Moore stated: ‘I think we can now claim with confidence that we have truly given birth to the WTO. It is now not the old GATT with a few, symbolic gestures to the new global realities, but better reflects the new needs of our wider membership’ (Moore quoted in PRESS/265 2001). To summarise, the Moore/Supachai decision forced members to confront what they needed from a director-general, and this bolstered Moore’s ability to enhance his power. He took advantage of this context to transform the WTO; he similarly capitalised on global context to achieve his goals.

185 WTO senior officials, interviewed 26(b) and 27 May, respectively; see also from 1999, WT/L/308.
186 WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.
Global Context

The assessment of global context examines how poor public relations and the terrorist attacks of September 11th affected Moore’s leadership. Beginning with public relations, at Seattle, he argued the clamour of protestors was evidence of the WTO’s unexpected global significance (Moore 2003). The GATT, though controversial, was not prominent in global governance because it was highly technical.187 ‘The WTO, despite what it does as an organization, is designed to serve the interests of international civil servants. So, in many ways, it is removed from reality.’188

Moore urged members to consider how the WTO could serve the needs of poor countries, as well as rich (PRESS/137 1999). He encouraged them to launch a round at Doha where countless NGOs and members of civil society would gather to improve the organisation’s image. ‘Communication of policy and transparency with civil society was limited before, but now civil society needs this knowledge. It’s not meant to spin the WTO but to give the public their right to know.’189

Before members could act on a launch at Doha, the 9/11 attacks in the USA shook members’ confidence about security, particularly because the World Trade Centre in New York was a major target. Moore worked with Ministerial Conference Chairman Youssef Hussain Kamal (Qatar) to ensure high-level security measures.190 Some members wanted to cancel or relocate the conference, but Moore argued this would empower terrorists who

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188 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
189 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
190 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
wanted to affect global trade. He convinced them to continue with the ministerial as planned, and their confidence in his leadership during difficult circumstances bolstered his ability to launch the round. ‘It was a bad time, and it took a while to rebuild confidence and goodwill, but he did it successfully.’

Summary

Moore believed effective executive leadership was contextual. ‘There are different times for different people, but as DG, you set the table.’ The analysis of political, historical, institutional, and global context highlights how Moore’s leadership was both limited and bolstered. He consistently manipulated context to improve his ability to achieve his goals. ‘The key differences in leadership action come down to background and circumstance – some general, some specific. Things have to progress naturally and genuine. This was a difference between Moore and Supachai or Lamy.’ Moore was driven by his goals of launching a round and changing the WTO and used his ability to persuade to achieve his objectives despite limitations. To continue to examine if and how his leadership mattered, his resource exchanges are analysed.

Resource Exchange

Moore exchanged internal and external and formal and informal resources for the opportunity to shape member-driven decision-making (Figure 6.1). The analysis of Moore’s resource exchange aims to explore how a WTO outsider, who lacked technical knowledge,
was able to change the organisation and launch the first trade round. The section begins with how he exchanged resources with his internal and external networks.

Resource Exchange with Internal and External Networks

Moore exchanged resources with internal networks to influence relations within the organisation and external networks to shape power relations outside of the WTO. The analysis reveals how he used his background as a politician to achieve his goals. He exchanged shared leadership with chairpersons, his role in Chinese accession, extra-budgetary contributions, political skill, and trust to increase dependence on his leadership.

Beginning with his shared leadership with chairpersons, Moore lacked consensus amongst developing member states on launching a round weeks before Doha. He shared leadership with General Council chairmen to influence their perceptions of a round and his oversight and intelligence in negotiations. 194 ‘A good leader can both formally and informally manage the staff and information and know how the formal connects to the informal. But know that you can’t do it all perfectly; therefore, you must rank and prioritise.’ 195

In 2001, Moore and General Council Chairman Harbinson led a series of phased work programmes – similar to GATT preparations for ministerial conferences (PRESS/215 2001; PRESS/299 2002). This evolved into the Doha Ministerial Draft Declaration that met developing members’ requirement to support a round (WT/GC/M/53 2000;

194 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2011; see also from 2001, WT/GC/W/441.
195 Ibid.
Moore also had a resource in his role in China’s accession, and the effect of this exchange shaped power relations with internal and external networks. China’s accession was the longest and ‘most arduous negotiation in the history of the GATT/WTO system’ and has shaped multilateral trade more than the accession of any other single state (Kim 2010: 121). Moore played a critical role in their accession – although he believes he was given too much credit – which accompanied the rise of Brazil, India, and South Africa (the B(R)ICS) in WTO decision-making. The rise of the B(R)ICS changed the nature of dependence at Doha, as the Quad lost dominance over agenda-setting and power dynamics shifted in favour of developing members under Moore. He linked Chinese membership to a new round at Doha, and his role in their accession increased dependence on his leadership (PRESS/241 2001; PRESS/243 2001).

Moore also exchanged members’ extra-budgetary donations to enhance his ability to shape outcomes. For example, he used donations from the UK, Norway, and Switzerland to finance his Geneva Week initiative, and in 2001, he used extra-budgetary contributions to fund the DSB’s Appellate Body when costs accelerated (PRESS/141 1999; WT/BFA/W/57 2001). Developing members made increases in technical assistance

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196 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a); see also from 2001, WT/GC/M/67, para 60, WT/MIN(01)/14, and WT/MIN(01)/ST/31 and VanGrasstek (2013).

197 Russia was not a member of the WTO until 2011, hence why it is not excluded from the reference and the R in the BRICS acronym is in the parenthetical.


199 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
contingent on their support for a new round. Moore requested extra-budgetary contributions from members who supported a new round and received over 4.1 million Swiss Francs (CHF) and $8 million (USD) (PRESS/214, 218, 225, 234, 257, 264 2001; WT/GC/M/66 2001). He used these contributions to improve his power with developing members and the Budget, Finance, and Administration Committee to gain approval of his 2002 budget proposal, which increased regular funding for technical assistance by 80 per cent (PRSS/269 2002).

Ruggiero was dependent on goodwill donations for technical assistance funding, which were unpredictable and difficult to manage.

Moore was a good DG; he was the last one to get something done. He could drive people mad, but he was genius. He had a gift for the politics of the job that no one has since had. He wasn’t always in focus, but he saw what works. This is what the job of the DG is about. Moore established the DDA Global Trust Fund (DDAGTF) after the round launched and organised a ‘pledging conference’ to secure financial momentum for a 2005 conclusion to the DDA (PRESS/277 2002). He estimated the WTO would receive CHF 15 million from members, NGOs, and international agencies and received over CHF 30 million (PRESS/279 2002). His capacity to influence outcomes would continue after his term expired because he secured these resources for the DDA and WTO.

200 This estimate may not be exhaustive, as it relied on primary documents publicising contributions. Though the WTO budget is in CHF, members determine what currency they contribute.
201 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
Moore did not possess the resource of technical knowledge, but he exchanged political skill to shape dependence on his leadership. For example, NGOs were resistant to a new round after the Uruguay Round disproportionately disadvantaged developing states. ‘He would simply ask them where the problem was. He would locate the problem and determine if it needed fixing and then if it could be fixed… He forced them to confront their own hypocrisy… He is a good politician.’ The WTO needed Moore’s political skill to survive, achieve, and evolve, and he exchanged this resource for enhanced power.

Moore didn’t have the advantage that many of these other very elite educated men did, but he was a true politician, out of all the DGs, which gives one very helpful skills. He was good at Doha because of his political gifts… Without Moore, we might not have pulled it off.

Moore also used the resource of trust to shape inherent tensions between members and the director-general (WT/GC/M/70 2002). He expanded executive authority in member-driven decision-making, but member states consented, which suggests his active leadership inspired trust. ‘Trust is an important part of the DG’s job. A DG cannot expect to dictate without trust.’ A WTO senior official argued that most members never trusted Moore because of how he came into office. Most others disagreed and recalled Moore working to improve members’ trust in his leadership, which Ruggiero did not appear to do. ‘He was good at building confidence, especially under the circumstances of [his term].’

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202 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19, 23, 25, and 26(a), 19 and 20 September, and 11 December 2011 and Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
203 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
204 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
205 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
206 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
207 Interviewed 25 May 2011; see also Wilkinson (2006).
208 Interviewed 20, 26(a), and 26(b) May and 1(a) and 6 June 2011.
209 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
exchanged the trust he gained with developing member states to build consensus on launching the round; without their trust, it is unlikely he would have achieved his goals.\textsuperscript{210}

In summary, the analysis of Moore’s exchange of resources explored how he aimed to influence internal and external networks through shared leadership, his role in Chinese accession, extra-budgetary contributions, political skill, and trust. He used resource exchange to empower his goals of launching a trade round and changing the WTO. He fostered dependence on his leadership, particularly between Seattle and Doha, which allowed him to enhance executive authority where Ruggiero was unsuccessful. The analysis of Moore’s resource exchange transitions to focusing on formal and informal rules.

\textit{Formal and Informal Rules Exchanged for Power}

This section examines how Moore used communications and mandates to enhance his power. He delegated the majority of his administrative and management authority to deputies, division heads, and chairpersons to focus on launching the round.\textsuperscript{211} In retrospect, he believed he did so to accommodate for his poor technical knowledge.\textsuperscript{212} ‘The DG is a political job; it doesn’t matter if you are a bad administrator. There are people in your office who will be good at that’.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{210} WTO senior officials, interviewed 24 and 26(b) May 2011 and VanGrasstek (2013) pg. 407.
\textsuperscript{211} WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{212} Interviewed 6 November 2012.
\textsuperscript{213} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
He exercised his executive authority uncharacteristically from other directors-general as an outsider in pursuit of his objectives, including how he delegated most of his authority. For example, Moore wanted more oversight at ministerials, but ‘[members] said I didn’t have this power’.\textsuperscript{214} He believed his request improved inclusivity and transparency, but senior officials thought he lacked adherence to the limits of his authority.\textsuperscript{215} ‘Moore and Dunkel may have been the most effective DGs, and was it because of this? Who knows, but it must have made some difference.’\textsuperscript{216}

Firstly, Moore’s use of communications was influential in shaping outcomes at Doha (PRESS/228 2001). He consulted a special advisor on launching a new round to accommodate for his weakness as an outsider.\textsuperscript{217} A WTO senior official believed this exchange helped Moore: ‘keep his ear to the ground.’\textsuperscript{218} ‘At Doha, the DG had to handle the servicing and [public relations] of the potential of the round.’\textsuperscript{219} Managing communications was essential in Doha’s launch, and Moore utilised intelligence he had gathered to shape the launch (Blustein 2009). ‘Leadership requires recognizing the informal and forward-thinking, and this is fed by intelligence’.\textsuperscript{220}

Moore used communications to highlight that members, the Qatar host government, and himself were mutually dependent on a successful launch at Doha.\textsuperscript{221} ‘When Doha was

\textsuperscript{214} Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
\textsuperscript{215} Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012 and WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{216} WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{217} WTO senior officials, interviewed 7 June and 19 September 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{218} Interviewed 20 May 2011; see also Cox (1969).
\textsuperscript{219} WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{220} Interviewed 23 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{221} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 2011, PRESS/248 and Wade (2004).
launched so many people said that global trade will collapse without this round.”

He timed the release of the annual TPRM report at the Doha Ministerial Conference to increase pressure on members for a new round (PRESS/251 2001). ‘I knew I couldn’t be reappointed. I thought, “I’m bulletproof.”’

Moore also used communications to draw attention away from fake WTO websites created to undermine a new round (PRESS/151 1999; PRESS/230, 232, 235, 241 2001). He also promoted progress in key areas of negotiations, such as implementation, agriculture, services, and the Doha draft declaration he brokered with Harbinson through external communications (PRESS/212, 215, 239, 248 2001).

Secondly after Seattle, public relations were not conducive for a new round. Moore exchanged members’ mandates on transparency and public relations to invite NGOs and civil society to Doha (PRESS/256 2001). ‘The DG must have a global presence. There needs to be a dialogue with civil society, and often, they need a scapegoat.”

He used these mandates and his political skill to improve conditions and the likelihood of a successful launch in Doha after 9/11. Moore used mandates to serve as the WTO spokesperson and instil confidence in his leadership. ‘He must reflect the expectations of members. He must increase their confidence and speak to their challenges and values.”

His use of their mandates improved their confidence in his ability to lead them into a new, multipolar WTO.

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222 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
223 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
224 WTO senior official, interviewed 24 May 2011.
225 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
226 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
‘Moore had the charm of the devil without the Sutherland thuggery, and that made him persuasive.’ Moore believed: ‘You’ve got to stand up to some formidable people.’

Summary

The analysis of Moore’s resource exchange has argued how he was able to enhance his limited authority for the power to launch a round and change the WTO. He was an outsider, without technical knowledge, and led uncharacteristically in an organisation resistant to change (Wilkinson 2011). He exchanged resources to improve members’ perception of his active politician leadership. He used his and developing members’ enhanced power to transition the WTO into an organisation that abides by the principles to which it subscribes. He also used varied approaches and tactics to influence decision-making.

Agency

The chapter has argued that Moore led as an active politician. He used his political skill to achieve his goals by shaping institutions, networks, and power relations. This section examines his approaches and tactics and how he used them to further shape perceptions of his leadership. The analysis begins by exploring the four approaches he used to pursue his objectives.

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227 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
228 Interviewed 6 November 2012.
Approaches

Before the 1999 director-general selection process narrowed between Moore and Supachai, the Moroccan candidate made a series of: ‘critical comments regarding the process undertaken for the selection of the future Director-General which called into question the entire process and even its legality from the standpoint of the principles of multilateralism’ (WT/GC/M/36/Add.2 1999, para 1). Support for Moore was declining, but he remained a prime candidate because he retained the USA’s support. He lacked the elite educated, prestigious technocratic background typical of GATT/WTO directors-general. VanGrasstek (2013: 587) countered that Moore: ‘played a leading role in launching the Uruguay Round as minister of overseas trade and marketing’, as well as provided political leadership in one of New Zealand’s biggest RTAs. Prior to the WTO, Moore worked as a labour union activist and was both the youngest New Zealand member of parliament as well as the shortest-serving prime minister for two months in 1990 (VanGrasstek 2013).

A WTO senior official described Moore as: ‘an agent with a principle towards member states.’ Whilst Moore pursued his goals as an active director-general, his objectives reflected the needs of the majority member states – an important distinction, particularly in comparing Ruggiero and Moore to Lamy. Moore believed: ‘if you had ideas, they were drive by people. The executive head is a vehicle for others.’ Most wanted a round; those who opposed wanted organisational change. This section analyses how Moore selectively used four approaches to achieve his goals, which were conditioned by needs of the internal system and members.

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229 Interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
230 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
231 Interviewed 6 November 2012.
Beginning with the facilitator approach – where the director-general seeks to influence outcomes through administration and management – Moore stated his aims to:

- ‘facilitate and to assist all participants to get the most balanced outcome from the new negotiations, an outcome which benefits the most vulnerable economies’ and
- ‘strengthen the WTO and its rules, to build on and maintain its reputation for integrity and fairness, and to reshape the organization to reflect the reality of its membership and their needs’ (PRESS/137 1999).

He transformed the role of the director-general to have a normative purpose by improving inclusivity and reshaping the WTO through the facilitator approach. ‘If a DG was clever, he would use his influence in a sensitive way to have considerable influence.’

Focusing on ‘the most vulnerable economies’ allowed him to transform GATT norms, and restructuring the WTO enabled the organisation to respond to the needs of the majority of members rather than a select few (the Quad).

Using the facilitator approach, he built support for a new round with ambassadors, ministers, heads of state, and international agencies in his first year in office (VanGrasstek 2013). However, two months before Seattle, members were without a framework for a new round (PRESS/139 1999; PRESS/143 1999; WT/MIN(99)/W/1 1999; Odell 2002, 2005; Wade 2004; Narlikar 2004; Payne 2005; Wilkinson 2006; VanGrasstek 2013). ‘Moore was

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232 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
premature in launching a round. It was a bad time. Whilst he failed to launch a round in Seattle, he transformed conditions for a launch at Doha through the brokering approach.

Moore’s background shaped his success in brokering. ‘He was a politician and a very effective one at that… He was used to dealing with labor disputes, and, therefore, was usually direct and to the point.’ The failure at Seattle bolstered Moore’s resolve to launch at Doha, but members were quick to remind him that: ‘the preparatory process in Geneva remained a member-driven process’ (WT/GC/M/61 2001: para 202). Without brokering authority as chair of the TNC, Moore used this approach to encourage members to begin Geneva negotiations for a new round. WTO officials highlighted that: ‘Moore was good at this.’ ‘A good DG can sense where a deal can be struck by thinking about people who aren’t in the [Green Room].’

Moore used the brokering approach to influence the DDA and establish an informal role for the director-general in Geneva negotiations before receiving formal authority as head of the TNC. Moore and Harbison’s shared brokering revealed that consensus was gathering around a new work programme in the months prior to Doha (WT/GC/M/67 2001). He pushed members beyond their ‘bottom lines’ in Green Rooms to better understand negotiating positions and how to shape an agenda for a round. ‘He would ask for things, however, that were impossible if he really wanted them.’

233 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
234 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
235 Interviewed 7 June and 19(b) and 20 September 2011 and 6 November 2012.
236 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
238 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
The evidence of how Moore used the coercive approach is somewhat limited and partial. Some WTO senior officials emphasised Moore’s use of the coercive approach over others, similar to Ruggiero’s ‘natural method’ of bullying. His coercive strategy was described as ‘a bit too unpredictable’, ‘not very politically correct’, and ‘not nuanced in his bullying’. Another WTO senior official argued that: ‘Moore thrived on chaos; if there was none, he would create it’. These perceptions are difficult to confirm, but it is a common characterisation of Moore in secondary sources (Jawara and Kwa 2003; Wade 2004; Blustein 2009). Payne (2005) and Wilkinson (2006) suggested Moore’s coercive approach was limited but spread across a large network of individuals. It is likely Moore used this approach as part of his active politician leadership to counter dissent to launching a round.

A coercive strategy is, historically, not as effective in GATT/WTO leadership; the interventionist approach – if used strategically – can influence outcomes. The interventionist approach is precarious because the director-general is required to be neutral and free from influence of or by member states (WTO Agreement 1999). To intervene is to play asymmetrical politics in an apolitical role.

Moore attempted to intervene by targeting LDC inclusivity; he was less likely to encounter resistance to his approach due to low-levels of tariff concessions necessary to better integrate LDCs. He conducted informal consultations on improving LDC market access, which required the Quad renegotiate their trade protocols – a great deal of work for

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239 Ibid.
240 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
dominant members in exchange for little economic gain. ‘The representative of Japan said that the Director-General had rightly termed this initiative autonomous and voluntary, in which case one might wonder why so much should be made of it’ (WT/GC/M/55 2000: para 67). Japan’s opposition highlighted that if Moore was brokering, not intervening, this should be resolved between members, as Quad dominance conditioned how the interventionist approach was received.

He used the approach again to shape outcomes for LDCs at Doha. He released his reports on LDCs’ trade development at the conference to improve the likelihood of their integration into the agenda. If the new round focused on development without including LDCs, he would not receive consensus (WT/GC/M/55 2000). Moore’s use of the interventionist approach was successful this time because he targeted low-risk decisions when members were mutually dependent on consensus. He used the interventionist approach to achieve his goals and make a launch dependent on his leadership (WT/MIN(01)/8 2001). The success of the approach transformed the WTO through a round that countered Quad dominance. ‘Moore was the first DG to confront the new multipolar, developing nation power structure of the WTO. He gets credit for launching the Doha Round, and he deserves it.”

To summarise, Moore used a variety of approaches to improve executive influence on decision-making and achieve his goals. He used the facilitator, brokering, coercive, and interventionist approaches to support his active leadership (Figure 6.1). A WTO senior

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241 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
242 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
official believed Moore: ‘wasn’t good at the approach he needed to have to work well within the institution’.\textsuperscript{243} Perhaps this is why he used varied approaches selectively, but he forced members to confront their self-interests and led them to an outcome that satisfied the majority’s trade needs. He had a normative effect on international organisation by linking his goals to members’ values and needs, such as development and peace. His approaches – along with tactics, explored below – allowed him to reproduce structures that enabled his influence and transform those that constrained him.

\textit{Tactics}

Tactics are used to shape actors’ strategies, institutions, and networks. Moore used shared leadership with deputies director-general, risk taking, and new programmes to heighten his influence. Beginning with shared leadership, Moore selected his deputies to accommodate for his weaknesses, but he also had to adhere to the new norm of geographical representation in his Cabinet.\textsuperscript{244}

\begin{quote}
The USA must have a deputy; you need someone with financial knowledge. Of course, you have to pull a European in. I wanted an African. I saw myself as the Asian-Pacific deputy, and I got a Latin guy. They had tasks that we collectively set. They were like a war chart on the wall.\textsuperscript{245}
\end{quote}

Stoler (USA) managed the budget and staffing.\textsuperscript{246} Deputy Paul-Henri Ravier (France) was responsible for administration of technical assistance and training programmes (WT/INF/31 2001; PRESS/260 2001). ‘Who directors-general choose for various administrative tasks, like budgeting, requires a safe pair of hands, such as an American or

\textsuperscript{243} Interviewed 23 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{244} WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011 and Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
\textsuperscript{245} Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
\textsuperscript{246} WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011; see also from 2001, WT/GC/53.
Ablassé Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso) was the first African deputy and first from an LDC in the history of the GATT/WTO. He administered training programmes and represented the WTO at UN and High-Level meetings (WT/COMTD/M/34 2001; WT/COMTD/M/35 2001; PRESS/245 2001; G/L/485 2001). Deputy Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza (Venezuela) was responsible for derestriction of documents and consultations on implementation (WT/GC/M/70 2000; WT/GC/53 2001). Sharing leadership allowed Moore to delegate his authority to accommodate for his limited technical knowledge. Moore said the Secretariat did not approve, but it enabled him to transform decision-making by enhancing deputies’ authority and his oversight in negotiations.248

‘He wasn’t what anyone wanted in a DG, but he took decisions that no one else would make.’249 Moore said he used the tactic of risk taking because he was not eligible for reappointment – a result of the Moore/Supachai split decision. ‘I thought what is the worst that could happen. I could lose office? I thought I’m not dead yet.’250 Moore took risks by delegating his duties to accommodate for his weak administration and management skills.251

‘I’ll admit I didn’t know enough.’252

He took risks in his approaches, travelling for over a year after Seattle, and challenging GATT norms. He took risks by inviting over 600 NGOs to Doha and by bringing new language of ‘equity and fairness’, ‘poverty alleviation’, ‘sustainable growth’, ‘vulnerability’,}

247 WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
248 Interviewed 6 November 2012.
249 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
250 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
251 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19, 20, 23, and 26(a) May, 1(a) and 7 June, and 19(b) and 20 September 2011.
252 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
‘marginalisation’, and ‘sustainable development’ to the WTO that would have been controversial language if challenged by members (PRESS/134 1999; PRESS/181 2000; WT/COMTD/INF/2 2001; PRESS/240 2001; WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 2001). Moore maintained that: ‘there are terrible cultural problems with institutions. You have to be the LDCs’ advocate, and you have to convince the big guys that you aren’t against them.’ He took risks in suggesting the Budget Committee use surpluses from Stoler’s 2000 and 2001 budgets to increase regular funding for technical assistance. This transformed developing members’ dependence on developed members’ extra-budgetary donations. ‘But he still got work done; so he got away with this sort of behavior.’

He also recognised WTO management of the growing Integrated Framework after the Doha launch was straining human and financial resources at a critical moment. He temporarily transferred management of the Integrated Framework to the World Bank (WT/LDC/SWG/IF/17/Rev.1 2001). The loss of power over the six-organisation coherence programme was a risk, but members commended his oversight and: ‘his determination and support in turning around what had been a failing programme’ (WT/GC/M/65 2001: para 74). Moore used risk taking to shape perceptions and achieve his goals, but like creating new programmes, he would not have been successful in these tactics without members’ trust.

Moore initiated several new programmes, including non-resident programmes, explored previously. He created a WTO Training Institute to better administer technical assistance.

253 Ibid.
254 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
and the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) to satisfy developing members criteria to support a new round (PRESS/256 2001; WT/COMTD/W/89/Rev.1 2001). JITAP integrated the World Bank, ITC, UNCTAD, and WTO experts into administration and management of technical assistance. The majority of his new programmes targeted improving the WTO for developing members, but one WTO senior official believed Moore’s new programmes: ‘damaged the Secretariat’. Another believed Moore saw the ‘big picture’ and used this tactic to transform dependence on GATT norms. ‘The DG is disposable; the DG can take risks. You’re gone but the institution stays.’

Summary

Moore aimed to launch a trade round to better integrate poorer members into the multilateral system (PRESS/134 1999; PRESS/142 1999). He used varied approaches and tactics in pursuit of his objectives, and this confirms the dominant narrative that he was an unorthodox director-general. He was coercive, intervened, and took risks, even in sharing leadership and creating new programmes – strategies that members resist in the GATT/WTO. Moore said: ‘looking back there are lots of things we could have done better. But you can only commit suicide once… We knew what we wanted, and we knew we had only three years.’ Considering he entered office during the ‘worst period of the

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255 Interviewed 23 May 2011.
256 Interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
257 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
258 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19, 20, 23, 26(a), and 26(b) May, 1(a), 6, and 7 June, and 20 September 2011.
259 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
WTO’s history’, his success, in an organisation resistant to change, is all the more surprising.260

**Power**

The final section of the analysis examines the fluid, relational nature of power in Moore’s active politician leadership. His relations with the internal system, member states, and agencies of global governance are investigated to better understand if and how his leadership mattered. This section also explores how Moore enhanced his power in political and global context. The analysis of power argues that for an outsider who used his authority uncharacteristically, Moore facilitated WTO survival, achievement, and evolution.

**Power Relations**

This section analyses how Moore’s relations with the Secretariat, members, and agencies of global governance improved his ability to achieve his objectives. First within the internal system, Moore lacked power to lead the Secretariat. Several WTO senior officials highlighted that his lack of education – technical and formal – and poor administrative skills negatively impacted his relationships with the internal system.261 ‘Moore was not accepted by the bureaucracy. They wanted the DG to be one of them, and he wasn’t’.262 He temporarily restructured the role of the Secretariat in negotiations before the TNC was revived to stimulate preparations for Doha (WT/MIN(01)INF/1 2001). He also created a

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261 Interviewed 19, 20, 23, and 26 May, 1 June (a), 19 September (b), and 20 September 2011.
262 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
new research programme that helped him establish the authority to direct the internal system, regardless of their perceptions about his education.

In the Doha Ministerial Draft Declaration, Moore and Harbinson authorised the director-general to direct research in support of negotiations (WT/MIN(01)/17 2001). This new role deepened executive influence on the internal system by requiring his oversight on research, which he used to shape negotiations. The director-general is the head of the Secretariat, but the research body is in service of members and committees, not the director-general.263 Considering his disfavour with the Secretariat, it is doubtful whether he would have had power in the internal system without the new role in the Draft Declaration.

‘Within the Secretariat, it’s about power relations and collective action.’264

In relations with member states, Moore’s enhanced power within the internal system occurred at a critical moment when members disagreed about his role in the Geneva process (WT/GC/M/58 2001; WT/GC/M/61 2001). In 2000, the EC proposed to revive the GATT’s G18 – similar to an executive board, a group of developed, middle, and developing economies to improve WTO decision-making – as the director-general had no: ‘expressly recognised right of initiative and normally acts on the basis of mandates specifically given by Membership’ (WT/GC/W/412 2000). Members agreed that the director-general’s informal power should come at their request (PRESS/184 2000), which was later contradicted when they agreed that the director-general may initiate informal consultations (WT/GC/45 2001). They also decided the director-general should retain the

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263 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
264 Ibid.
highest brokering power at ministerial conferences but not the chair the conference, which was most likely a reaction to Barshefsky’s mishandling of the Seattle ministerial.\footnote{WTO senior officials, interviewed 26(a) May and 11 December 2011; see also Jawara and Kwa (2003), Jones (2004), Wilkinson (2006), Blustein (2009), and Jones (2010).}

In general, Moore had positive relations with members, including powerful member states in the Quad and B(R)ICS and key allies from smaller, but influential states like Singapore, Norway, and Finland.\footnote{WTO senior officials, interviewed 26(a) and 30(a) May, 1(a), 6, and 7 June, 20 September, and 11 December 2011.} He was also able to rely on effective relationships between ministers, such as USTR Robert Zoellick and EU Trade Commissioner Lamy.\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011 and Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012; see also from 2001, PRESS/256 and WT/COMTD/W/89/Rev.1.} Moore also had positive relations with USA President George W Bush, who obtained fast-track authority prior to Doha (PRESS/210 2001). Fast track authority enables the American executive to bypass legislative debate of trade agreements to accelerate implementation (VanGrasstek 2013).

Jawara and Kwa (2003) argued that Moore had little power with developing nations, but WTO senior officials highlighted inaccuracies with their characterisation of Moore.\footnote{Interviewed 20 May and 7 June 2011.} Several developing members, such as Kenya, Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Panama, Jamaica, and the Philippines, threatened to block consensus on launching a round at Doha (WT/MIN(01)/ST/52, 58, 67, 80, 81, 85 2001; WT/GC/W/441 2001; PRESS/265 2001). However, Moore’s institutionalisation of regular funding for technical assistance and improvements to implementation, communication with their capitals, and the text brokered by Moore and Harbinson cemented development as the core of the new work programme.
He also ensured developing members’ requests for reductions in developed members’ subsidies and waivers were negotiated in the DDA – rather than ignored, as they were under Ruggiero (WT/MIN(01)/ST/58 2001; WT/MIN(01)/ST/67 2001).

When developed members resisted these conditions at Doha, Moore stated: ‘this is just something we have to do. We all have to swallow something we don’t like. We can’t afford two failures. Two failures will be more than the system can handle’ (quoted in Blustein 2009: 166). This transformed dependence between Moore and developing members but also between developed and developing members. ‘For the first time, developing countries had put conditionality on the developed, by demanding capacity-building and technical assistance in order to fully take part’ (Moore quoted in PRESS/279 20002).

Moore pressured his network to support a launch at Doha, including GATT Director-General Dunkel, Russian President Vladimir Putin, the government of Qatar, USTR, Canadian, Korean, EU, Mexican, Indian, Japanese, and Pakistani ministers and ambassadors, the G8, G77, and executive heads of the UN, World Bank, UNCTAD, ITC, IMF, OECD, UNDP, and heads of the Asian, African, European, Inter-American, and Islamic Development Banks (PRESS/136 1999; WT/COMTD/INF/2 2001; PRESS/216, 238, 241, 269 2000; PRESS/269 2002; PRESS/290 2002; Moore 2003). Moore ensured powerful actors and agencies were dependent on his leadership for a positive outcome at Doha through his resource exchanges. ‘It’s the DG’s job to take risks, and we took risks at Doha… I just wanted a deal up. I was able to say I want nothing… The DG finds the negotiating space, but you can only push members as far as this allows. A little bit of
humility goes a long way.’\(^{269}\) After the DDA launched, he continued brokering with ministers and ambassadors. This affected power relations by closely linking their accountability to successfully conclude the DDA by 2005 (PRESS/255 2001). ‘The DG is of an institutional class. Preserving the institution is his most important job.’\(^{270}\)

With global governance agencies, Moore’s relationships focused on launching and continuing the DDA. In the Integrated Framework, agencies cooperated to incorporate the DDA into their agendas (PRESS/275 2002). Ruggiero established the role of the WTO in international organisation, and Moore cemented the WTO as one of the four pillars of global governance.\(^{271}\) The UN was one pillar; the IMF and World Bank served as the other two, which made major international organisations dependent on the launch and success of the DDA for global development (VanGrasstek 2013).

In summary, Moore’s relations with the internal system, members, and global governance changed over time and with it his power and influence. At times, he had more power and other times, less; he aimed to achieve his goals through positive relationships. ‘For the 5 minutes he talked to you, you were the most important person in the world.’\(^{272}\) Moore understood he needed powerful members like the USA and France to succeed, but WTO membership was changing.\(^{273}\) The changing WTO needed to reflect the needs of the majority of the membership, and Moore used his relational power to launch the DDA and change the WTO.

\(^{269}\) Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
\(^{270}\) Ibid.
\(^{271}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
\(^{272}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
\(^{273}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
Power in Strategically-Selective Contexts

This section examines how Moore capitalised on context to enhance his power in critical moments. It explores global and political context to better argue how Moore actively pursued his goals. Beginning with global context, Moore was able to enhance his power by linking a new round to fighting the ‘war on terror’. ‘9/11 is sometimes given too much credit for launching the Doha Round. There was a lot of hard work that occurred between Seattle and Doha.’

Jawara and Kwa (2003) and Blustein (2009) argued that 9/11 was directly responsible for the launch at Doha. A WTO senior official confirmed: ‘at Doha, the USA had that either you’re with us or against us approach. Arab countries feared invasion, which happened anyhow, and developing nations feared bad press for being responsible for collapsing the round.’ Moore countered that this narrative lacked agency.

‘What they say about Doha being a done deal because of 9/11, it wasn’t a done deal. We didn’t have India, Pakistan, or Africa.’ He argued that some ministers arrived at Doha resolved against a round. ‘To be sure, the road from the disastrous Seattle Ministerial to the approval of the Doha Declaration was a rocky one. The odds on holding a successful Ministerial gathering at Doha that could initiate a new round were very small’ (Zedillo 2008: 274)

275 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
276 Interviewed 6 November 2012.
277 Ibid.
63). Whilst a WTO senior official argued that: ‘the Doha Round was hugely influenced by 9/11’, Moore also capitalised on political context after 9/11 to heighten dependence on his leadership for a new trade round.278

Going into Doha, Moore, members, and the Secretariat agreed that: ‘the multilateral trading system cannot afford another failure or further setbacks’ (WT/COMTD/INF/2 2001: item II, para 9). He told members that three things were at stake at Doha: trade liberalisation, organisational legitimacy, and confidence in the world economy (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 2001). The survival, achievement, and evolution of the multilateral system rested on a new round, adding to the pressure they were already under from global media, NGOs, world leaders, and their constituents. Moore believed he had to ensure they knew the consequences of failure at Doha and manipulated this context by linking Chinese accession to a successful launch (PRESS/241, 250, 251 2001). ‘The institution cannot take risks. This is why the DG must create situations because there are different needs at different times.’279

Whilst members were finalising the details of the DDA, he seized the opportunity to name the round (VanGrasstek 2013). ‘There’s a reason we called it the Doha Development Agenda.280 GATT rounds were named after the location of the ministerial conference that hosted their launch, such as the Uruguay Round, with limited exceptions to the Kennedy and Dillon Rounds named after American politicians. Moore capitalised on historical context by naming the round after Doha, but he dubbed the round an ‘agenda’ to influence how likely members were to launch at Doha (Moore 2003; Blustein 2009; VanGrasstek

278 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b) and Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
279 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012.
280 Ibid.
An agenda would structure future work, but a round achieves its targets and closes.

Moore regarded the name as his sole prerogative. He had been refraining from announcing it until the last minute because he thought he might need to use the moniker as a bargaining chip. One thing he was sure of: The word “development” must be included, to assure low-income countries that their needs were being addressed and to provide a constant reminder to the high-income countries of the overarching goal that the negotiations were supposed to achieve (Blustein 2009: 129).

After Doha, he used political momentum and resources from other organisations to pursue a 2005 conclusion for the DDA. He met with ministers following a World Economic Forum meeting and planned similar meetings to follow UN and OECD conferences (WT/GC/M/73 2002). He continued to facilitate and broker to shape preparations for the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference when he would no longer be in office (PRESS/269 2002; PRESS/271 2002). Moore believed: ‘it mattered that we didn’t have a DG before Seattle… It was a big thing to help [developing members]… you have to convince the big guys that you aren’t against them.’

The DDA represented a critical juncture for the WTO. Moore believed: ‘the success of Doha has been making agriculture part of development’. The DDA distanced the WTO from the GATT because of its inclusivity and focus on development. As the following case studies reveal, this transition from old club to development organisation was: ‘a heavy case-

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281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid; see also VanGrasstek (2013).
load for the system’ (WT/TPR/OV/7 2001). Moore conceded that: ‘the tragedy of Doha is that injustices are locked into the system.’ He manipulated context to ensure the DDA launched, but this transformative power may have been stronger than members’ ability to negotiate such an extensive agenda.

In hindsight, of course, the DDA was too broad for solutions, and maybe should have just stuck to agriculture and services objectives. Adding more objectives made accomplishing the round more difficult, but of course this was not the decision of the DG but of the member states. This was unfair to the DG.

Summary

The analysis of power has examined Moore’s relations with the internal system, member states, and global governance. It has also analysed how he enhanced the likelihood of achieving his goals by capitalising on context, highlighting how he used his active politician leadership to influence outcomes. ‘The DG has power, but the extent to which he used it depends on the DG himself.’ Moore maintained there was more at stake at Doha than his legacy and used his power to structure normative change in the WTO.

Conclusion

The chapter has analysed Moore’s term to address if and how his leadership mattered. It was argued that Moore’s active politician leadership was responsible for launching the first

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284 There is evidence from primary documents during the final weeks of Moore’s term that the DDA was too large to manage.
285 Moore, interviewed 6 November 2012; this will be furthered in Chapter 8.
286 WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.
287 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
WTO trade round and fundamentally changing the organisation. Moore argued that ‘a bad executive head matters more than a good one’.288

- The analysis of structure uncovered how Moore expanded executive and developing member influence on decision-making. He used his enhanced authority to extend the WTO’s network to agencies that he perceived as likely to support his initiatives to better integrate developing members.

- The context of his term reflected that members were divided when Moore entered office – a result of the Moore/Supachai split decision. He improved conditions for a new round and transformed historic dependence on the Quad and GATT norms.

- By examining his resource exchange, the chapter detailed how Moore fostered this dependence on his leadership. He exchanged resources widely, albeit uncharacteristically, to enhance his power to achieve his goals where Ruggiero was limited.

- He used a variety of approaches and tactics to shape institutions and networks to favour his influence. In analysing these approaches and tactics, the chapter revealed that Moore’s active politician leadership was atypical of executive leadership in the WTO but effective because he was trusted.

- The analysis of power revealed that there were few outcomes where Moore was unable to enhance his influence. He relied on positive relationships and used his political skill to shape perceptions and decision-making structures. He increased his influence by evoking normative assumptions about the transformative power of the WTO.

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288 Interviewed 6 November 2012.
Moore consistently led as an active politician to pursue his goals using political expertise. He was a WTO outsider without technical knowledge or a global network who launched a development agenda agreed upon by over 150 states that transformed the WTO. He distinguished the formal, rules-based organisation from its troubled GATT past. The chapter argues that Moore mattered; his leadership at the WTO mattered. He changed the WTO, and he did this partly by launching the DDA but also by shaping the role of the director-general. He altered the organisation internally – by institutionalising the integration of developing members and altering the nature of dependence – and externally – by removing ‘the stain of Seattle’, opening the WTO to civil society and non-residents, and establishing the WTO’s role in international organisation as a development agency (Moore quoted in PRESS/265 2001).

Moore bridged historical divides between developed and developing member states over the WTO’s role in global development. He was able to transform the WTO and elevate its profile in global governance by emphasising how trade could advance development and peace. The Battle in Seattle served as a turning point for the WTO, and Moore used this critical moment to consistently reinforce the practical and normative necessity of a united, multilateral response to 21st century challenges. His leadership empowered major economies’ assumptions about trade liberalisation, allowing them to resume their role as global leaders, and less-dominant states’ essentiality in a more integrated, global economy.

The themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time have been explored through an exceptional case of executive leadership in the WTO. Moore’s
leadership was exceptional because of the circumstances that affected his term, how uncharacteristically he led, and the impact he made. The chapter highlights that the DDA became unmanageable, and the remaining case studies explore how the Doha Round has changed since Moore’s term. He is credited with launching the DDA, but few WTO senior officials reflected upon the changes Moore made to the organisation because these changes have been dulled or negated through succeeding directors-general. His legacy reflects that an organisation can change – in part or temporarily – but history and norms are powerful antecedents. Legacies of executive leadership can be manipulated to serve various interests, which underscores the importance of evaluating leadership in context to better understand change over time.

The next chapter presents the third case study of the fourth WTO director-general to continue investigating the research questions and core themes. The chapter analyses the extent that Supachai’s passive technocrat leadership (2002-2005) failed to advance the DDA and facilitated a return to GATT norms, particularly Quad dominance. Supachai’s leadership of the WTO was conditioned by the same terms as Moore’s: a three-year, non-renewable term. The case offers a unique opportunity for comparison. It can be compared to Moore but also to the two, full-term directors-general, one of which served two terms, to better argue if and how executive heads matter in international organisation.
Chapter Seven: Director-General Supachai (2002-2005)

Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the second case study of executive leadership in the WTO. Director-General Moore’s leadership (1999-2002) was explored to investigate the research questions – if and how executive leadership matters – and core themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. The chapter concluded that Moore’s leadership facilitated the launch of the organisation’s first and only round of multilateral trade negotiations. He also transformed GATT norms that constrained Ruggiero. This chapter continues to explore how directors-general shape the role of executive leadership in the WTO through the third case study of Director-General Supachai (2002-2005).

The chapter investigates the key claims that Supachai failed to progress the DDA and facilitated a return to GATT power dynamics. It explores the extent to which he led as a passive technocrat by being directed by members’ goals and relying on technical knowledge to shape outcomes. The chapter avers that he accommodated members’ narrow self-interests and dulled Moore’s transformation of the WTO as a development organisation, as highlighted in the conclusion to the previous chapter. The chapter examines how his passive technocrat leadership influenced his inability to advance the DDA and prevent a return to GATT norms in decision-making.

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289 See Appendix 1.
The chapter examines how he engaged institutions and networks and used context, resource exchange, approaches, tactics, and relationships to assess if and how Supachai’s leadership mattered. Figure 7.1 outlines that he did not capitalise on context, exchange resources widely, or use varied approaches to enhance his power. Supachai’s legacy highlights that member states have a formal monopoly on decision-making power, but they remain largely incapable of governing institutions. The chapter uncovers how passive leadership is inadequate to protect the interests of the multilateral system and reveals the importance of informal, relational power that directors-general rely on to shape members perceptions. It begins by analysing the institutions and networks that conditioned outcomes in Supachai’s term.

Figure 7.1: A model of Supachai’s power
Structure

Members restricted Ruggiero’s authority, but Moore expanded executive influence by gaining member states’ trust. On 1 September 2002, when Supachai entered executive office, members were dependent on his leadership to conclude the DDA by the end of his term. Though he possessed enhanced formal and informal authority (Table 7.1), he self-imposed restrictions on his informal role in governing bodies. This section reveals how Supachai engaged with institutions and networks to influence member-driven decision-making. The analysis begins by focusing on how he attempted to influence WTO institutions, such as the General Council, where directors-general traditionally use their informal authority to achieve their goals.290

290 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
Table 7.1: Supachai’s role in governing bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Council authority</th>
<th>DSB authority</th>
<th>TPRM authority</th>
<th>TNC authority</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present biennial budget</td>
<td>Offer good offices</td>
<td>Author annual report</td>
<td>Chair primary negotiating body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure conditions of service for staff</td>
<td>Register trade protocols</td>
<td>Direct research</td>
<td>Broker negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspect resources for ministerial conferences</td>
<td>Implement Uruguay Round agreements</td>
<td>Author reports at members’ request</td>
<td>Report consensus and/or differing positions to General Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administer technical assistance</td>
<td>Prepare ministerial conference agenda drafts</td>
<td>Remind members of unfinished work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Broker disputes</td>
<td>Comply with mandates from members</td>
<td>Liaise with other organisations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Notify intentions to appoint deputy directors-general</td>
<td>Broker negotiations through informal consultations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on technical assistance and capacity building</td>
<td>Provide regular assessment of the Integrated Framework</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appoint Appellate Body with Committee of Six</td>
<td>Provide consultations on changes to Appellate Review Body</td>
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<tr>
<td>Appoint DSB panel members when agreement cannot be reached</td>
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Institutions

‘The key to being a successful director-general is working with the member states and ambassadors here in Geneva.’

LDCs constituted 20 per cent of overall membership, and they wanted Supachai to expand his role in their accessions. He declined and argued this was the role of members, not the director-general (WT/GC/82 2003). Each director-general determines his spectrum of influence, and some directors-general interpret areas of

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292 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
decision-making as ‘too political’ to exercise their authority. Supachai was the organisation’s first director-general from a developing state, and his Cabinet: ‘thought about this a lot; equality was important’. A WTO senior official said: ‘the developing nations expected him to work for them.’ As a passive director-general, he allowed all members, not just developing nations, to direct his leadership.

In the DSB, Supachai attempted to use his good offices role, as Moore had, but members perceived this as too political for executive leadership (TN/DS/M/5 2002). ‘I tried to promote the possibility of having mediation… but it was not very popular and people seemed to be critical of me trying to avoid going to dispute settlement’ (Supachai quoted in VanGrasstek 2013: 232). WTO senior officials disagreed on whether the DSB was too political for executive influence. The majority agreed that his authority was limited to appointing panels. Davey (2008) calculated that Supachai appointed over three quarters of all dispute panels in his term, an increase from the 58 per cent that Moore composed. Whilst Supachai’s influence on DSB mediation was constrained by members’ perceptions – as many WTO senior officials argued it should be – he shaped who influenced legal outcomes by appointing panels.

As chair of the TNC, Supachai’s role was to broker consensus in DDA negotiations to enable a January 2005 conclusion to the round. The institutions of consensus and single undertaking also required negotiations be approved by all members and completed as a

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293 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26(a), 26(b), 27, 30(a), and 30(b) May and 1(a), 6, and 7 June 2011.
294 See Appendix 2; WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
295 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
package, rather than the a la carte GATT approach (TN/C/M/15 2005). ‘The job of the DG has become more difficult.’\(^{296}\) Negotiations were simultaneously occurring in meetings of the General Council, TNC subsidiary bodies, and Heads of Delegations (HoDs) (WT/GC/M/78 2003). The USA further suggested that whilst Geneva remained the ‘locus of work’, negotiations should also be pursued at the national or regional-level and within the G20 or OECD (TN/C/M/15 2005: item 3, para 5).

Negotiations being spread across internal and external fora limited Supachai’s influence on decision-making and progression of DDA negotiations. Had he shaped members’ preferences to negotiate in the TNC and not accommodated their narrow interests within national and regional fora, he may have improved his intelligence and oversight in negotiations. ‘Supachai would listen and take advice given to him to his detriment. He was ineffective as DG; he wouldn’t take decisions put before him. He didn’t have oversight on negotiations because all of his information was so layered.’\(^{297}\)

In 2002, Supachai contracted ‘the Sutherland Commission’, chaired by former GATT/WTO Director-General Sutherland to: ‘study and clarify the institutional challenges that the system faced and to consider how the WTO could be reinforced and equipped to meet them’ (Sutherland et al. 2004: 2). Composed mostly of former GATT officials, the report suggested changes that reproduced GATT institutions and networks, like the G18 and an executive board (PRESS/345 2003; Sutherland et al. 2004). Members did not take action recommended by Supachai and the Sutherland Report (2004); WTO senior officials

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\(^{296}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).

\(^{297}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
argued that members want a director-general to lead, not direct, change. ‘He has responsibility to lead, but leadership is different than giving direction. He needs to give guidance, support, be a facilitator, a decision-maker.’\textsuperscript{298} The Sutherland Report did not enable Supachai to influence institutions because he was passive and allowed GATT norms to recondition decision-making.

The institutions that shaped Supachai’s leadership reflected the constraints of passive leadership in an organisation run by its members. ‘The way the organization is structured there are many bosses to satisfy. However for the organization to function, you need to be selfish.’\textsuperscript{299} He benefitted from the enhanced executive authority that Moore facilitated, but he failed to use it to transform structures to favour his influence over dominant members. For example, he allowed the USA to direct the level of negotiations and did not lead them in the TNC. As a result, he had little power or oversight to progress the DDA. The analysis continues by assessing how Supachai engaged WTO networks.

\textit{Networks}

Twenty-six countries, mostly developing and LDCs, applied for membership during Supachai’s term, and the WTO grew closer to universal membership (PRESS/318 2002). The majority of WTO members were developing states, and Supachai needed to engage development networks to conclude the DDA. He expanded the role of the IMF and World Bank through his mandate on improving coherence (WT/GC/M/89 2004). He also incorporated the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and United Nations Industrial

\textsuperscript{298} WTO senior official interviewed, 7 June 2011.
\textsuperscript{299} WTO senior official interviewed, 20 May 2011.
Development Organization into WTO work (WT/GC/M/83 2003; WT/L/520 2004; PRESS/352 2004). Despite expanding decision-making networks, negotiations were not progressing.

The inefficiency of decision-making institutions and networks was Supachai’s motivation behind the Sutherland Commission, but the Commission aimed to reproduce GATT norms to economise decision-making. Their interests supported continued Quad dominance and countered Supachai’s ‘development-oriented’ objectives, but his passive leadership allowed dominant actors to direct the organisation (WT/WGTDF/W/3 2002). ‘Usually the DG is important only when something needs to be done. He should oversee the situation, identify the key players, identify holes, and the bridges that can be made.’

The director-general must serve as a caretaker of the system. Supachai did not progress the DDA or WTO as a development organisation because his leadership focused on members’ goals, not his or the interests of the multilateral system. He allowed GATT networks to resume their role in conditioning outcomes, which was not compatible with the WTO’s new focus on inclusivity and development.

Summary

As the previous case studies have highlighted, directors-general transform structures to enable their influence on member-driven decision-making. Supachai was the first director-general from a developing state; developing members expected he would continue to enable their participation by transforming structures, as Moore had done (Jones 2015). His

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300 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
reluctance to appear favourable towards developing members, explored further below, weakened executive and developing members’ influence on decision-making. Powerful actors and institutions responded by reproducing dependence on GATT norms that Moore transformed, and this did not improve Supachai’s capacity to conclude the DDA.

**Context**

WTO senior officials expressed difficulty in assessing if and how Supachai mattered given his brevity in office. ‘It is difficult because of the limited term.’\(^{301}\) They outlined his term as: trust-building or ‘lame duck’ in year one, working in year two, and lame duck in year three.\(^{302}\) ‘[Moore and Supachai] were both weak DGs because of how they were elected.’\(^{303}\) Another senior official said that dominant members, fearing Supachai would favour developing members, doubted his ability to lead, which may inform why he led as a passive technocrat.\(^{304}\) The contextual analysis examines political, historical, institutional, and global circumstances during his term and begins by exploring the political context that limited and bolstered Supachai’s leadership.

**Political Context**

This section explores the momentum to conclude the DDA within Supachai’s term. When he took office in 2002, negotiations were meeting their deadlines in preparation for the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference (WT/GC/M/72 2002). He used this momentum to bolster agreement on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) that improved access

\(^{301}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.

\(^{302}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 20 and 27 May 2011.

\(^{303}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.

\(^{304}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
to pharmaceuticals for developing and LDC members. ‘He did a lot to put forward the TRIPs agreement to allow poor nations to import generic drugs. He helped convince the USA and the Swiss to allow it.’ With the TRIPs agreement, the DDA expanded, but it also bolstered preparations for progress at Cancún. ‘If the Doha Development Agenda fell behind schedule, it would certainly be read negatively, making a bad situation worse’ (TN/C/M/3 2002: para 21).

Supachai’s approach to Cancún was to pressure members on unfinished work; time ‘could not be replaced or recycled’ (TN/C/M/3 2002: para 16). He failed to meet with Cancún Ministerial Conference Chairman Luis Ernesto Derbez to ensure adequate preparations and resources for the conference (WT/GC/M/81 2003; WT/GC/M/88 2004; Jawara and Kwa 2003; VanGrasstek 2013). Less than six months before Cancún, agriculture – the crux of the DDA – missed crucial deadlines (PRESS/336 2003). Complicating matters, Supachai pulled Harbinson from chairing the TNC group on agriculture to head his Cabinet. Two months before Cancún, more than a dozen issues required action in Geneva to develop a framework for negotiations, and the Singapore issues stirred past political tensions about the development gap (WT/WGTI/M/22 2003).

Cancún collapsed before negotiations outside of the Singapore issues could begin. ‘Negotiations were not moving forwards in Geneva; there was a lot of looking backwards to the Uruguay Round. Cancún wasn’t a good moment. We had missed deadlines, and after

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305 Ibid; see also from 2002, PRESS/301.
306 Ibid.
307 WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
308 Ibid; see also Bridges (2003).
that, it got worse.\textsuperscript{309} At the ministerial, USTR Zoellick and EU Trade Commissioner Lamy promoted a bilateral agreement on agriculture that backfired.\textsuperscript{310}

In one sense, the Cancún Ministerial Conference… might be considered a bigger setback than the Seattle Ministerial Conference was four years earlier, for while the outside protestors may get some of the blame for the collapse in Seattle the failure in Cancún was entirely the product of the members themselves (VanGrasstek 2013: 439).

In the post-Cancún crisis, Supachai did not lead effectively compared to Moore and Ruggiero. 2003 General Council Chairman Carlos Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay) led negotiations, not Supachai in the TNC.\textsuperscript{311} Supachai pushed for a framework for negotiations to be completed by January 2004; when members missed this deadline, he pushed it back six months.\textsuperscript{312} On the last day of July 2004, members agreed to a framework (WT/L/579 2004). ‘In 2004, there was redemption for Supachai with the Framework Agreement.’\textsuperscript{313} His role in brokering the Agreement was limited, which shaped members preferences about the role of the director-general in the Geneva process. ‘During the July crisis, they spent three days [negotiating] in the Green Room, and you know what Supachai said? Not one word. The DG has to speak, especially in the Green Room. The DG has to speak for who isn’t there and the system.’\textsuperscript{314} Supachai put pressure on the internal system and members, and they argued he provided little leadership in return.\textsuperscript{315} ‘The ministers and ambassadors lost respect for him.’\textsuperscript{316}

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid; see also VanGrasstek (2013).
\textsuperscript{311} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 2003, WT/GC/M/81, item F and G, para 13 and WT/MIN(03)/11, from 2004 WT/GC/M/84, and Wilkinson (2006) and VanGrasstek (2013).
\textsuperscript{312} WTO senior officials, interviewed 27 May and 20 September 2011; see also from 2005, TN/C/M/15.
\textsuperscript{313} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
\textsuperscript{314} WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{315} Interviewed 20, 25, and 30(a) May and 1 June(a) 2011.
\textsuperscript{316} WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
In summary, the political context of Supachai’s term both limited and bolstered his ability to shape a 2005 DDA conclusion. When he entered office, there was momentum; members were meeting deadlines. After these initial months, negotiations in key areas broke down. Tensions from the Uruguay Round and Singapore issues exacerbated conflict between members, and he offered little political leadership to stall collapse at Cancún or to recover from the post-Cancún crisis. The analysis continues by investigating the historical context that limited his ability to progress the DDA and prevent a return to GATT power dynamics.

Historical Context

The analysis of historical context explores how Supachai facilitated a return Quad dominance, the GATT power bloc composed of the USA, EU, Canada, and Japan. Throughout the 1999 director-general selection process, Supachai was the majority of members’ first-choice candidate (WT/GC/W/128 1998; Jawara and Kwa 2003; Wilkinson 2006). Moore was the USA’s preferred candidate, and they contributed a campaign strategist to improve the likelihood of Moore winning.317 As indecision prolonged (from December 1998 to March 1999) support for Moore decreased by twenty per cent (WT/GC/18 1999). When it became clear that members were not willing to accept the USA’s candidate, they negotiated the terms of the Moore/Supachai split. Moore secured the first term, in advance of Supachai.

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317 WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011; see also from 1999, WT/L/308.
Supachai may have gained full support and been appointed to a four-year, renewable term were it not for the norm of American exceptionalism and hegemony (WT/GC/W/128 1998; WT/GC/18 1999; Jawara and Kwa 2003; Wilkinson 2006). The USA and their network did not trust Supachai. He needed to engage institutions and networks that these members preferred to gain their trust and enhance his influence. This offers clarity on why he selected Sutherland – whose brokering of the Uruguay Round produced questionable results for developing states – to address institutional failings in 2002 (Sutherland et al. 2004).

Supachai was perceived as weak because he allowed dominant members and GATT norms to condition outcomes. The Quad, with limited exception to Canada, disengaged with WTO institutions during most of Supachai’s term; they perceived his leadership to be counter to their interests. They took their trade interests to other fora, such as the OECD or G20, where they could better shape outcomes in their favour (Narlikar and Vickers 2009). A WTO senior official reflected that this is also how the Quad shaped outcomes in the Uruguay Round. Their absence stalled progress on the DDA, as Supachai, the internal system, other members, and global governance were dependent on their participation in the WTO. Actors, like Pérez del Castillo, seized power to advance their interests. Jawara and Kwa (2003: 274) argued that Supachai’s leadership institutionalised ‘non-transparent, anti-democratic’ decision-making.

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319 Interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
320 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
Supachai stated on multiple occasions that certain member states were failing to offer serious concessions, particularly in agriculture – an attempt at active leadership. When Zoellick and Lamy introduced the EU-USA Joint Text on agriculture at Cancún, other members argued the Quad was up to its old club tactics. Supachai was silent; Lamy blamed the formal, rules-based system, which entrenched the idea that WTO institutions were inefficient (Steger 2009; Jones 2015).

Lamy placed the blame on the procedures and rules of the WTO, which he said were not able to support the weight of the organisation’s tasks and steer discussions among 146 Members in a manner conducive to consensus. “The WTO remains a medieval organisation” (Bridges 2003).

For almost 60 years, GATT norms, such as Quad dominance, shaped multilateral trade, but GATT institutions were not compatible with the WTO’s emphasis on formal rules and development that Ruggiero and Moore facilitated.

The GATT system was primarily about negotiating market access for merchandise trade. But the WTO’s extension into new substance areas, its intrusiveness into domestic policy-making, and its strict dispute settlement process, with the possibility of cross-retaliation had extended its authority into areas of domestic regulation, legislation, governance, and policy-making that were central to the development process (WT/GC/M/79 2003: item B, para 5).

Like Ruggiero, Supachai’s failure to continue to address the development gap affected WTO survival, achievement, and evolution.

A WTO senior official argued that when assessing executive leadership: ‘it is important to look at when it changed from the DDA to Doha Round.’ A WTO senior official argued that when assessing executive leadership: ‘it is important to look at when it changed from the DDA to Doha Round.’

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321 Interviewed 30 May 2011(a). In elite interviews, few WTO senior officials used the term ‘DDA’ unless referencing Moore’s leadership, and in primary and secondary documents, the use of the ‘DDA’ appears less frequently after negotiation of the July 2004 Framework Agreement.
began to disappear from WTO discourse. The DDA became the Doha Round before the end of Supachai’s term. The GATT/WTO required strong executive leadership to lead self-interested member states away from their constituent positions towards international cooperation. Supachai led as a passive technocrat and was not a strong executive.\textsuperscript{322} ‘That made him something of an herbivore in a system that the carnivores had long dominated’ (VanGrasstek 2013: 526).

To summarise, Supachai’s passive leadership revealed a power vacuum, and actors used the opportunity to enhance their influence. Dominant members disengaged with the WTO, and Supachai failed to mediate self-interests and promote internal cooperation. WTO scholarship has argued that dominance of the Quad and GATT norms has been continuous and absolute (Jawara and Kwa 2003; Wilkinson 2011). The chapter argues this is inaccurate. Slowly under Ruggiero and rapidly under Moore, executive and senior leadership, developing members, the Secretariat, and NGOs challenged and transformed reliance on GATT norms. Supachai’s leadership facilitated a return to GATT norms. Arguing the WTO has been a continuous extension of the GATT dismisses dynamic, relational power and ignores the role of executive leadership.

\textit{Institutional Context}

Turning to institutional context, the organisation celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2005. Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) argued: ‘surviving the Doha Round was

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{322} WTO senior officials, interviewed 19, 23, 26(a), 26(b), and 30(a) May, 1 June(a), 19(b) and 20 September 2011.}
without question the WTO’s biggest problem at ten’ (2008: 63). This section explores how internal circumstances limited Supachai’s leadership.

The WTO continues to face important new challenges: the widening of the Doha negotiations, an expanding membership, a rising number of disputes, a quantum leap in technical assistance and capacity building, and an increasing focus on security and safety measures (Supachai quoted in WT/BFA/SPEC/118 2004).

Members failed to meet Supachai’s deadlines for progressing the DDA throughout his term (VanGrasstek 2013). Both the content and framework for negotiations were perceived as problematic; agriculture, the Singapore issues, consensus, and the single undertaking were particularly difficult in advancing negotiations (WT/GC/M/84 2004). It was unclear where negotiations were being led – in the TNC, General Council, HoDs, OECD, or G20 – and Supachai failed to lead.323

Six months before his term expired in 2005, he was selected to head UNCTAD. He stayed at the WTO until the end of August 2005 to facilitate members’ preparations for the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference (PRESS/397 2005). UNCTAD was organised in opposition to developed state dominance of the GATT in 1964. The appointment to UNCTAD isolated Supachai amongst developed members and exacerbated his ‘lame duck’ year. Four months prior to Supachai’s departure to UNCTAD, members selected Lamy as the next director-general, and this further limited Supachai’s ability to shape outcomes (PRESS/407 2005). ‘2005 basically fell apart for Supachai’324. Without active executive

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323 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19, 20, 23, 26(a), and 26(b) May and 19(b) September 2011; see also from 2004, WT/GC/M/84, particularly para 29.
324 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
leadership, there was: ‘a deep concern about what the Doha Round has turned into and its consequences for the future of the multilateral trading system’ (Zedillo 2008: 63).

In summary, the institutional context of Supachai’s term limited his ability to achieve his goals. ‘Where there is no will, there is no way’ (Bridges 2003). The chapter argues that incorporating executive leadership into institutional analysis reveals that lack of political will was not the only contributing factor to failure to advance the DDA. Supachai’s passive leadership played a significant role by failing to address the divisions over WTO rules and the DDA work programme and returning to GATT power dynamics. His immediate exit to UNCTAD and Lamy’s selection to office highlight the degree to which his passive technocrat leadership was too weak to lead the multilateral organisation. The analysis of context concludes by investigating the global conditions that shaped his term.

Global Context

This section focuses on global perceptions of WTO work. Poor public relations limited progress at Cancún, as they had in Singapore and Seattle. Supachai’s ‘dialectical’ strategy – preferring technical discussions over political negotiations – did little to challenge the relatively small focus international organisations placed on the DDA during his term. International organisations compete for power in global governance, and without progress on the round, his passive technocrat leadership did not prioritise the DDA in the

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325 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
international system.\textsuperscript{326} To begin, the analysis examines how Supachai exacerbated poor WTO relations.

After Supachai’s first year in office, members encouraged him to exercise active politician leadership for progress at Cancún. ‘It was now up to the in-coming Director-General to carry on with the negotiations despite the difficult international economic environment and bring the ship safely into harbour’ (TN/C/M/3 2002: para 129). Moore had highlighted that poor public relations and decreased global growth figures disproportionately affected developing members. These conditions manifested at the Cancún conference where a South Korean farmer fatally stabbed himself in protest of developed members’ agricultural subsidies (Watts 2003). Zoellick and Lamy’s Joint Text on agriculture further inflamed perceptions that the WTO was a continuation of the GATT’s developed nations’ club.

Supachai’s approach to global politics was shaped by the influence of human rights and social issues in Geneva, and the suicide-protest at Cancún encouraged him to pursue development in the WTO.\textsuperscript{327} He convinced the Bretton Woods organisations to redouble their efforts on the DDA through the Cotton Initiative, which integrated international agencies into an African-led strategy to seek an equitable outcome in agricultural negotiations (WT/GC/M/83 2003).

\textsuperscript{326} WTO senior officials, interviewed 25 May and 19 September (b) 2011.
\textsuperscript{327} WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
He was less successful in prioritising the DDA over UN, IMF, and World Bank collaboration on the MDGs (WT/GC/M/79 2003). The reluctance of global governance agencies to support the DDA over the MDGs reversed Supachai’s short-lived active leadership, and the DDA declined in relevance. ‘There was no doubt the MDGs were going to be supported in the WTO. Supachai was more receptive to this than Moore.’

Supachai allowed his leadership to be shaped by hierarchy in global governance, as well. ‘How much the director-general matters in the international system is measured by success towards completion of the Doha Round.’

The WTO’s development-orientated agenda weakened under Supachai, and the MDGs appeared the most appropriate mechanism for structuring development. The scope of his failure to prioritise the DDA emerged when incoming, 2005 General Council Chairwoman called for the MDGs to alleviate poverty, not the DDA (WT/GC/88 2005). However, as a WTO senior official highlighted: ‘Supachai must have been valued by senior UN leadership, and he must have performed quite well because he became sectary-general of UNCTAD.’

**Summary**

The contextual analysis examined political, historical, institutional, and global conditions that shaped Supachai’s leadership. His term began with momentum on advancing the DDA, but internal and external competition for power limited how he could pursue members’ goals. The DDA became unmanageable and less relevant, and the dominant

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328 Ibid.
329 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
331 Ibid.
discourse at the time reflected the organisation was in crisis without active politician leadership. To continue to investigate if and how Supachai mattered, his exchange of resources is examined.

**Resource Exchange**

Directors-general have limited decision-making authority, but they exchange resources to enhance their power to influence. Despite the resources he exchanged, the section shows how he failed to improve his authority to progress the DDA or the WTO as a development organisation. This failure is most likely related to his inability to pursue the interests of the multilateral system. The analysis begins by assessing his internal and external networked exchange of resources.

**Resource Exchange with Internal and External Networks**

Supachai exchanged communications, extra-budgetary contributions, and trust to shape internal networks; none were particularly effective (Figure 7.1). He also attempted to exchange his mandate on coherence to affect power relations amongst external networks. Influence on internal and external networks often overlapped; for example, how he exchanged authority internally to oversee DDA negotiations also affected external networks, such as the Bretton Woods organisations. Beginning with exchanges in his internal network, he attempted to exchange communications to enhance his power to progress DDA negotiations.
Supachai aimed to use his communications to impress deadlines for critical work (PRESS/325 2002; PRESS/329 2002). ‘Nothing in his communications is surprising. I understand the need for it; it is a political tool. But I don’t take his communications as very creditable. I would be more interested on the leadership around negotiations than these updates.’ 332 He did not vary his use of communications at critical moments in the DDA, as Moore did at Doha, and was not effective. 333 Several senior officials highlighted that Supachai’s ‘Asian style’ or Thai approach did not facilitate strategic exchanges of resources. 334 ‘He didn’t thrust himself forward.’ 335

The press asked Supachai for a statement on DDA progress; he declined and requested his staff speak with the press. ‘But you’re the director-general, and that’s who they want to speak to. He was good with the press when he did engage them. He was never at ease speaking in groups. He was better at one-on-one.’ 336Whilst Supachai sought to stress his neutrality, the director-general is the spokesperson for the organisation. ‘The issue of how to do what by when is compounded for the DG due to the multicultural aspect of the WTO. He must do so through personality and speech style. He has to be a good speaker.’ 337 Supachai failed to gain influence through communications and ‘was notable only by his absence.’ 338

332 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
333 Interviewed 20, 27, 30(a) May and 20 September 2011; see from 2003, PRESS/343 an example.
334 Interviewed 20, 23, 27, and 30(a) May and 19(b) and 20 September 2011.
335 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
336 Ibid.
337 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(b).
338 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
He needed to strengthen dependence on his leadership and aimed to do so by managing extra-budgetary donations. In his three years in office, Supachai garnered CHF 25.5 million for the DDAGTF (PRESS/320, 326, 327 2002; PRESS/340, 347, 349, 359, 361, 369 2003; PRESS/370, 372, 375, 377, 381, 388, 392 2004; PRESS/399, 403, 405, 408, 410, 413, 414 2005). Moore raised CHF 30 million in 2002 alone. Members and international agencies entrusted Supachai with fewer resources for progressing the DDA. The largest contributions came from Germany (CHF 4.4 million), the Netherlands (CHF 4.3 million), Norway (CHF 3.7 million), and the USA (CHF 2.5 million). The Quad contributed CHF 25.1 of 25.5 million. His inability to gain extra-budgetary contributions served to enhance dependence on the Quad, not the director-general.

A WTO senior official argued that Supachai had the resource of trust, and he exchanged this resource for the power to influence outcomes.\(^{339}\) How Supachai used trust to advance DDA negotiations was difficult to assess because no other senior officials believed he was trusted.\(^{340}\) They argued he was passive, absent, or failed to take decisions. Whether he was trusted was less significant than the majority who maintained that he had little political skill and declined to use the authority he had to shape outcomes.

With external networks, Supachai attempted to use his coherence mandate to support DDA progress. For example after attending a UN Summit on Sustainable Development, he offered WTO resources to the African Union’s (AU) New Partnership for African Development (WT/COMTD/W/104 2002). He linked the DDA to poverty alleviation for

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\(^{339}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.

\(^{340}\) Interviewed 27 and 25 May and 1 June (a) 2011.
African LDCs. In exchange, he received pledges of support for advancing the DDA from the UN and AU, which did not significantly increase his power. He may have enhanced his power more by exchanging resources with the Cotton Four, all of which were African LDCs and WTO members involved in critical areas of DDA negotiations.

Supachai’s resource exchange with internal and external networks had little effect on his power. WTO senior officials highlighted that enhanced power was not Supachai’s objective. This left him little to bargain with in an organisation where power is exchanged relative to negotiating authority. His poor exchange of resources facilitated Quad dominance in internal networks and UN dominance in external networks and failed to advance the DDA or WTO. The analysis continues by investigating how he used formal and informal rules.

Formal and Informal Rules Exchanged for Power

This section focuses on how Supachai aimed to exchange his management authority, shared leadership with General Council chairpersons, role as head of the TNC, and technical knowledge to affect outcomes. In the majority of these exchanges, he failed to enhance his influence. Beginning with his management authority, he used his formal authority to contract the Sutherland Commission. This exchange had the potential to transform institutions and heighten his influence on WTO survival, achievement, and evolution.

The Cotton Four or C4 as they are referred to in primary and secondary documents are the major cotton exporters of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.
‘Supachai had received the very important task of concluding the negotiations on a successful note’ (TN/C/M/3 2002: para 52). He aimed to use the Sutherland Commission to shape decision-making because he was passive. Members took the Sutherland Report (2004) as evidence of the faults in the formal, rules-based system and rejected cooperation in negotiations until Supachai remedied institutional idiosyncrasies. He did not possess the power to alter decision-making structures, and members disconnected from his leadership, pursuing negotiations in other fora.\(^{342}\)

As the DDA expanded, members argued oversight of negotiations: ‘placed a tremendous burden on shoulders of the TNC Chairman, which was not necessarily compatible with his other responsibilities as Chairman and as Director-General’ (TN/C/M/3 2002: para 365). They preferred to negotiate in the General Council, not the TNC, which detracted from his authority in negotiations.\(^{343}\) As he was directed by members’ goals, not his own, Supachai responded by sharing leadership with General Council chairpersons. This increased the chairpersons’ power and members’ dependence on the General Council, not the director-general (VanGrasstek 2013).

Supachai also failed to use his powerful position as TNC chair to improve dependence on his leadership. ‘A good DG uses his offices and respective directors for helping be an arbitrator, a consensus-maker of agreements. But he also has a formal role, within the TNC, and this is really the only formal role he has.’\(^{344}\) Supachai allowed members to direct

\(^{342}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).

\(^{343}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 2003, WT/GC/M/81, from 2005, WT/GC/M/92, and VanGrasstek (2013).

\(^{344}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
the level of negotiations, which reduced his influence. The exchange also decreased legitimacy and inclusivity in decision-making. Benin – part of the Cotton Four – issued a complaint that their proposal had not been included in the Cancún draft text brokered by Pérez del Castillo in the General Council (WT/GC/W/515 2003).

The failure of Supachai’s oversight was aggravated by his decision to lead the group on cotton at Cancún. He volunteered after members refused to chair the politically sensitive negotiations. Supachai, a technocrat, lacked political skill, and the Cotton Four accused him of taking the USA’s position. The USA was also displeased with his decision to separate cotton from general agricultural negotiations, and he lost power in this exchange (VanGrasstek 2013). ‘One can be hamstrung by circumstance. The way an individual behaves greatly affects the outcomes.’

Supachai possessed technical knowledge, which Hass (1990) linked to powerful executive leadership. One of Supachai’s strengths in the 1999 selection process was his technocratic background. He exchanged this resource to expand his influence on the TRIPs agreement, but WTO senior officials argued: ‘he needs to be a politician plus a technocrat.’ Senior officials confirmed that Supachai was highly skilled and technically knowledgeable, but he lacked the political skill to market his technical strengths.

During the GATT years, the DG needed to be a technical manager; that made a good DG. But the WTO has changed politically and visibly. Now we need

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345 See Appendix 1.
346 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
347 Interviewed 27 May and 1(a) June 2011.
348 Interviewed 20, 25, and 27 May and 20 September 2011; see also Jawara and Kwa (2003).
someone who is a technical and political figure. You can’t have just a technician at those meetings. Personality is so important.  

Summary

The analysis of Supachai’s resource exchange investigated how he aimed to use internal and external networks and formal and informal rules to enhance his power. With exceptions to shared leadership with chairpersons and his technical knowledge – which increased as well as decreased his power – he failed to use his resources effectively. His exchanges did not enhance his influence, achieve members’ goals, or improve dependence on his leadership. Members and staff looked for leadership elsewhere, which reproduced GATT power dynamics in response to passive leadership. The next section examines the approaches and tactics Supachai used in attempting to shape outcomes.

Agency

The chapter has argued that Supachai led as a passive technocrat. In most cases, he failed to shape institutions, networks, context, or dependence because of his lack of political skill and reliance on members to set the agenda. Moore was able to enhance dependence on his leadership despite his lack of technical or administrative skills. Whilst the WTO is member-driven, the director-general must enhance their power to shape the agenda. This section examines if and how Supachai’s approaches and tactics reproduced or transformed executive influence on decision-making. The analysis begins by exploring his approaches to executive leadership.

349 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
350 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011(b).
Approaches

As highlighted above, Supachai had the majority of member states’ support for his candidacy in 1999. His education and background mirrored and surpassed that of previous GATT/WTO directors-general; his doctoral research was supervised by a prestigious Dutch Nobel Laureate. After a twelve-year career in banking, he was elected to Thai parliament (1986) and became deputy prime minister in 1992 (VanGrasstek 2013). He held various positions in the Thai government into the late 1990s, including as their signatory to the WTO Agreement in 1995. In many ways, his background was more characteristic of a WTO director-general than Moore’s.

The majority of WTO senior officials reflected on Supachai’s leadership with only a single-sentence response, such as: ‘Supachai was a very weak executive, in my opinion’, and ‘Supachai was merely holding the fort’. The analysis of his approaches highlights how his passive technocrat leadership failed to progress the DDA or WTO. A WTO senior official attempted to explain: ‘the reason you don’t hear much about Supachai is the link of his personality; he didn’t show emotions or feelings’.

Four objectives underpinned his leadership:

(i) strengthening the legal framework which binds the multilateral trading system together;

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351 Interviewed 19 May and 26 May (b) 2011, respectively.
352 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
(ii) assisting developing and [LDCs] through technical assistance and capacity building to be better equipped to participate in the multilateral trading system;

(iii) greater coherence in international economic policy-making; and

(iv) strengthening the WTO as an institution to serve its membership even more effectively (WT/BFA/SPEC/82 2002).

To achieve these goals, Supachai utilised the brokering approach.\textsuperscript{353} He promoted his approach as neutral.\textsuperscript{354} Impartiality and equality were paramount to how he led.\textsuperscript{355} His emphasis on neutrality and impartiality detracted from his ability to pursue development-orientated objectives, which offered little for developed members.

Progress on the DDA slowed after his first year in office, and beyond discouraging ‘delaying tactics’, Supachai provided little political leadership on how to stimulate negotiations (TN/C/M/4 2002: para 170). Though he had authority as head of the TNC and ‘a huge advantage because he has so many resources’, he did little ‘hands-on’ brokering.\textsuperscript{356} ‘Supachai was too concerned with seeking an even keeled accord, and he didn’t stand by his own views. He wasn’t 100 percent honest with his own personal views. Supachai was looking for a perfect world and didn’t get the job done.’\textsuperscript{357}

\textsuperscript{354} WTO senior officials, interviewed 20, 23, and 27 May 2011; see also WTO Agreement (1999).
\textsuperscript{355} WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{356} WTO senior official, interviewed 26(b) and 30(a) May 2011.
\textsuperscript{357} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
As argued in the previous chapter, members fail to adequately prepare for ministerial conferences without active politician leadership from the director-general. Supachai’s passive technocrat leadership and weak brokering approach can be associated with collapse at Cancún (VanGrasstek 2013).

He expected people to behave as if he was the Thai Minister; it was unfortunate what happened at Cancún. Pérez del Castillo thought Supachai wasn’t strong enough so he took the reins in getting the job done and picked up the pieces after Cancún fell through.\footnote{\textsuperscript{358}}

After Cancún, Supachai suggested delegations: ‘work even harder’ and ‘maintain pressure’ to prepare for the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference when Lamy would be in office (TN/C/M/8 2003: para 9; WT/GC/M/88 2004: item 2, para 2; PRESS/379 2004). ‘He was very knowledgeable. But he wasn’t a decision-maker.’\footnote{\textsuperscript{359}} Supachai’s use of the brokering approached involved little political brokering; he would set and revise deadlines and expect members and chairpersons to negotiate amongst themselves.

He occasionally used a facilitator approach in seeking to influence the DDA. He used the approach to manage the DDAGTF to ensure the DDA survived if members failed to conclude the round by 2005 (WT/COMTD/W/104 2002). He also used this approach when he commissioned the Sutherland Report (WT/TF/COH/S/7 2003). His use of the facilitator approach was not effective; he did not advance the DDA or prevent a return to GATT power dynamics.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{358} Ibid.}  \footnote{\textsuperscript{359} WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011; see also from 2003, TN/C/M/5 and WT/COMTD/LDC/W/30, particularly item F, para 3.}
In summary, Supachai’s approach was almost exclusively brokering, but his reliance on this approach did not improve his influence on decision-making because he lacked political skill. WTO officials underscored the importance of political leadership in preserving the organisation. ‘Supachai just floated above everything and everyone’.360 His passive leadership and weak brokering culminated in Cancún Chairman Derbez’s decision: ‘to pull the plug on the talks’ (Bridges 2003). The WTO held five ministerial conferences in ten years. Only Singapore (1996) and Doha (2001) progressed the organisation’s agenda, and the outcome of Singapore progressed only developed members’ trade interests (Jawara and Kwa 2003; Wilkinson 2006; Narlikar and Vickers 2009). Supachai’s tactics are examined to understand how he attempted to influence members’ perceptions.

**Tactics**

Directors-general employ tactics based on how favourable they perceive their strategies will be interpreted by institutions and networks. This requires directors-general to evaluate mutual dependencies and consider how they can most effectively shape members’ perceptions. Supachai principally used the tactic of shared leadership with his deputies. He attempted to initiate new programmes but was not entirely successful.

Before he took office, Supachai assembled his senior management team, composed of: Roderick Abbott (UK), Kipkorir Aly Azad Rana (Kenya), Francisco Thompson-Flôres (Brazil), and Rufus Yerxa (USA) (PRESS/309 2002). ‘His Cabinet was very selective, very

360 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
calculated and controlled.\textsuperscript{361} WTO senior officials argued his emphasis on neutrality led him to delegate many of his executive functions to his deputies director-general.\textsuperscript{362}

In the way that the DG is a manager, he makes decisions that feed down. The DG is at the top, and there are approximately three chains that feed up to the DG. The chains are short, which is good, but it is also difficult because there is a concentration of power.\textsuperscript{363}

Rana supervised and wrote reports for the Committee on Trade and Development, chaired sessions of the Integrated Framework, and supervised trade policy courses (PRESS/313 2002; WT/GC/M/76 2002; WT/IFSC/2 2003; WT/COMTD/M/43 2003). The delegation of these duties to Rana, who was from a developing nation, focused exclusively on development, and members could have perceived Rana’s work as favouritism towards developing members. Thompson-Flóres, also from a developing country, supervised the Committee on Trade and Development, as well. He led consultations on coherence, primarily with the World Bank, and on a WTO annex (WT/GC/M/78 2003; WT/TFCOH/S/6 2003; TN/C/M/15 2005).

Yerxa chaired special sessions in key areas of negotiations in the General Council and assumed Supachai’s good offices role in the DSB to accommodate for his passive technocrat leadership (WT/GCW/486 2002; WT/GCW/492 2003). ‘The DG can have no formal influence in the DSB… A good leader can both formally and informally manage staff and information and know how the formal connects to the informal.’\textsuperscript{364} Abbott managed budgeting of technical assistance and scheduling TNC meetings to improve

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{361} WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{362} Interviewed 27 and 30(a) May 2011.
\textsuperscript{363} WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{364} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
\end{footnotesize}
inclusivity with smaller delegations and non-residents (WT/GC/M/78 2003; WT/COMTD/M/43 2003). ‘[Supachai] increased the power the DDGs had, which was risky at times, but many outsiders appreciated him.’

He also attempted to initiate new programmes to shape institutions, networks, and context to achieve members’ goals. He proposed ‘trade clinics’ to provide consultation on technical negotiations, but this initiative was unsuccessful (WT/COMTD/M/44 2003). ‘Supachai was highly logical and intelligent.’ He aimed to transform stalled negotiations in agriculture, market access, and services – critical elements of the DDA – using his technical leadership before, during, and after Cancún (Wilkinson 2006; VanGrasstek 2013). A new programme that was successful was the *World Trade Report*, an annual Secretariat research publication.

Through the new publication, Supachai focused on deepening ‘public understanding of pressing [trade] policy issues’, as well as monitoring and analysing developments in global trade (WTO 2003: Forward). ‘Where executive leadership matters the most and has a long-term impact is research.’ As head of the Secretariat, the director-general can determine the scope of research, and this tactic reflected Supachai’s intellectual and technical strengths. ‘[The *World Trade Report*] was more influential in economics and research because of Supachai.’

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365 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
366 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
367 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
368 WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011(b).
369 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
Supachai’s initiative in publishing the *World Trade Report* also reflected his development-orientated agenda, and in this way, he influenced the DDA and the WTO as a development organisation. Like the competing networks he enabled in decision-making, this transformation was not compatible with Quad dominance, and DDA negotiations stalled (PRESS/348 2003). ‘There is a clash between the DG and the developing nations’ agenda, with the role the developed nations play. There is an underlying conceptual clash here, and it’s the conflict of the institutional agenda.’

**Summary**

Supachai primarily used a brokering approach and the tactic of shared leadership with deputies to achieve his objectives. The majority of WTO senior officials interviewed argued his passive technocrat leadership was a product of his personality or nationality. The thesis rejects deterministic, personality-based assessments of executive leadership. Rather than reduce his failures to personality, the thesis argues that Supachai failed because he pursued members’ divisive, self-interested goals. In this regard, he failed to uphold the neutrality of his office. He also failed to provide political leadership, which is essential in contemporary international organisation. This, not his nationality or personality, limited his ability to progress the DDA and prevent a return to GATT norms.

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370 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
The thesis regards power as fluid, relational, and a product of resource exchange – another reason the thesis rejects personality-based assessments of executive leadership. Supachai was less able to shape outcomes because he was not effective in resource exchange. The analysis of his power examines his relationships and how he attempted to enhance his authority in critical moments. To begin, his relations with the internal system, member states, and agencies of global governance are explored.

Power Relations

This section uncovers the nature of Supachai’s relationships. Beginning with the internal system, he challenged the Secretariat to support members in negotiating the Framework Agreement and launching the World Trade Report. ‘He was very popular with the Secretariat’, but his popularity with the Secretariat did not enhance his ability to lead them. With Supachai, the Secretariat was not moving in a clear direction, and there was no motivation he gave them.

Several WTO senior officials and Weiss (1982) argued that executive leadership must motivate the internal system.

A strong executive is quite important for the organization and the Secretariat. They need stability. An organization with a weak DG – one who didn’t want or was unable to put their stamp on the organization – will produce a scattered Secretariat and decrease their ability to influence events.

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371 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
373 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
A WTO senior official noted that during Supachai’s term the internal system: ‘became a lot more UN-like here, more transparency, many big meetings, and more formality.’\textsuperscript{374} In relations with member states, Supachai’s authority decreased when committee meetings and informal negotiations became more transparent, inclusive, and formal. As the thesis has highlighted, the GATT/WTO relies on informality to function. This was also another reason why some members took their trade interests outside of the WTO under Supachai.\textsuperscript{375}

‘The DG is in a constant flux with the members, as far as power. The member states will have power over the DG; this was true with Ruggiero, slightly with Moore, and with Supachai.’\textsuperscript{376} For example when Supachai failed to secure more funding for technical assistance, conflict with LDCs limited progress on DDA negotiations (WT/COMTD/M/43 2003). ‘If the DG builds trust with the members, if he earns their respect and reflects good judgement, the members will want to work with him.’\textsuperscript{377}

Members’ preference for Derbez or Pérez del Castillo to broker negotiations can be interpreted as a reaction to their perceptions of Supachai’s passive technocrat leadership. During Moore’s term, members agreed the director-general should broker negotiations in Geneva and at ministerial conferences (WT/MIN(03)/SR/1 2003). As was the case with the GATT, members’ adherence to rules changed based on their perceptions of executive

\textsuperscript{374} Interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{375} WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{376} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{377} WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
leadership (TN/C/M/8 2003). This reduced their dependence on Supachai to advance negotiations. ‘A DG must carry delegations’.\textsuperscript{378}

With global governance, Moore transitioned control of the Integrated Framework to the World Bank, and this reduced Supachai’s ability to shape IMF and World Bank agendas to progress the DDA (WT/WGTDF/W/17 2002). The IMF and World Bank were also without observer status in the TNC (WT/GC/M/89 2004). This impaired coherence and lessened his influence in the Integrated Framework. He needed members to grant observer status but had little power to influence their decision.

Within the international system, of course he matters some, but it is a matter of degree. Trade is only one element of the global system… In the multilateral system, [international organizations] need to hear the contribution the WTO can make to those corresponding institutions.\textsuperscript{379}

Supachai attempted to mainstream trade into global development policies and poverty reduction by sending DDA negotiation drafts to the UN (WT/COMTD/W/108 2002). Ruggiero established the independence of the WTO, and Moore cemented the WTO as the fourth pillar of international organisation. Supachai integrated WTO work into the Bretton Woods and UN Common System organisations, which decreased the WTO’s independent authority and his power to prioritise the DDA in international politics (WT/MIN(03)/10 2003).

\textsuperscript{378} WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{379} WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
Supachai was also not an ‘Atlanticist’ – someone influential on either side of the Atlantic – and this reduced his opportunity to influence global governance.\textsuperscript{380} A WTO senior official argued the decline in the Washington Consensus has cost the IMF and World Bank clients and contributed to a reduction in their relevance.\textsuperscript{381} They attempted to increase their power by co-opting other organisations’ agendas. ‘Other organizations may jealously guard their mandate in global governance or not care or consult the DG. Consider that overlap matters in determining who is important.’\textsuperscript{382} Supachai’s integration of the MDGs into WTO work resulted in agencies of global governance focusing on poverty reduction and development in the UN, not through the WTO.

To summarise, the internal system, member states, and global governance lacked dependence on Supachai’s leadership. The internal system and members perceived him as passive. Whilst he was also perceived as technically knowledgeable, the WTO director-general must reflect the needs of the multilateral system, not only the most dominant members. He failed to advance the round by having ineffective relations and not prioritising the DDA in global governance. The analysis concludes by examining his ability to enhance his influence in strategically-selective context.

\textit{Power in Strategically-Selective Contexts}

This section analyses how Supachai attempted to manipulate political, institutional, and global context to heighten his power. Beginning with political context, he attempted to use

\textsuperscript{380} WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{381} Interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{382} WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011.
political momentum to improve the likelihood of a framework agreement at Cancún. He promoted the agreement he brokered on TRIPs (PRESS/350 2003). He also capitalised on political context to remind members of how they would be perceived if they failed to progress the DDA at Cancún.

He did not think it would be an exaggeration to say that nearly the whole world was watching what happened in this meeting and in the next couple of weeks or months. He was certain delegations were aware of this, so he wished them every possible success, including the opportunity to be as cooperative, compromising and flexible as possible so that the final outcome would allow everyone to share in its benefits (Supachai quoted in TN/C/M/3 2002).

Before the July 2004 deadline for the Framework Agreement, he manipulated political context again to suggest members: ‘inject a sense of urgency to force positions to be moved’ (TN/C/M/13 2004: para 277). He could have used a coercive approach in this context but argued that: ‘cooperation should not be forced’ (PRESS/385 2004) – a contested argument about the nature of executive leadership in international organisation. ‘When they criticized me for some of the work I’ve done… they said, “You don’t knock heads”’ (Supachai quoted in VanGrasstek 2013: 526). Supachai perceived this as: ‘a very barbaric way of doing negotiations’ (ibid). He failed to use varied approaches, networked resource exchange, or active politician leadership to lead members through divisive negotiations (Figure 6.1).383 ‘He should encourage people whereby challenging them.’384

He similarly failed to use institutional context to heighten his power to progress the round. ‘Seattle had clearly shown that very few Members wanted to drive this Organization the

383 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
384 WTO senior official, interviewed 24 May 2011.
same direction and the result had been a Member-driven disaster’ (TN/C/M/3 2002: 103). Supachai said he would reconvene negotiations in the TNC, ‘at the right moment’, to ‘put the WTO’s work under the Doha Development Agenda back on track after the Ministerial Conference in Cancún’ (WT/GC/M/83 2003: item 3, para 3).

He was attempting to identify a critical moment to increase his influence, but such a juncture did not emerge because negotiations were not advancing under his passive technocrat leadership. ‘Once member states get control, they don’t know what to do with it. The member states need a strong DG’. The EC argued that members needed the guidance of the director-general to meet the July 2004 Framework Agreement deadline. ‘The membership looks to the DG for leadership, and it’s hard to provide from elsewhere.’

Supachai also attempted to use global context to improve his ability to shape decision-making. He tried to use the sluggish global economy to focus negotiations on development (PRESS/363 2003; PRESS/373 2004). He asked UNCTAD to support the DDA in their agenda and requested the G8 and G20 use their meetings to put the round back on track (PRESS/380 2004; WT/GC/M/84 2004). ‘The DG of the WTO has to be someone who has influence, who can pick up the phone and call presidents and prime ministers.’ He

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385 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
386 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
387 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
appealed to the G90 – a group of the smallest and poorest economies – to be flexible until DDA negotiations resumed, which made him appear dependent on the Quad.  

A WTO senior official argued that the ideal DG has:

- a sense of vision that comes from a clear sense of the organisational role and progress,
- the ability to set the agenda and identify how to put that agenda into action,
- the ability to maintain the course of the organisation, to read the tea leaves, and
- good communication abilities, in the WTO and across all levels, the G8, G7, indigenous peoples, NGOs, the Secretariat.

Exploring how Supachai attempted to use context to enhance his power has revealed that if he had these characteristics, he failed to apply them in his term. He was unable to use political, institutional, or global context to improve his influence where he was constrained, and this limited his ability to enhance his power to alter members’ perceptions of his leadership.

**Summary**

Supachai had little power in his relations with the internal system, members, or global governance; he also failed to manipulate context to enhance dependence on his leadership.

‘The key differences in leadership action come down to background and circumstance –

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388 Members of the Quad are also members of the G8 and G20.
389 Interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
some general, some specific. This was a key difference between Moore and Supachai or Lamy. Things have to progress naturally and genuinely. When compared to Moore – also limited to a three-year, non-renewable term – these key differences emerge. Supachai was a passive technocrat, and he did not effectively exchange resources for the power to pursue members’ goals.

Conclusion

The chapter has analysed Supachai’s term to investigate if and how his leadership mattered. It was argued that his passive technocrat leadership influenced perceptions of his ability to progress the DDA and mediate states’ self-interests. How he led also facilitated a return to GATT norms and power dynamics.

- Exploring structure revealed that Supachai did not facilitate his influence on decision-making structures. He benefited from how Moore enhanced executive authority, but he delegated his authority and engaged GATT networks, which conflicted with this development-oriented objectives.
- The contextual analysis explored that his term was conditioned by deeply-embedded American exceptionalism and hegemony. Though his term began with momentum on closing the round, his leadership did little to mediate members’ self-interests or downplay crisis in negotiations.
- Analysing his networked exchange of resources uncovered that he did not exchange resources widely to enhance dependence on his leadership. WTO senior officials argued that Supachai was not concerned with power and lacked the resources necessary to lead the WTO at the time.

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390 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
Supachai’s predominant approach and tactics were ineffective in progressing the DDA and preventing a return to Quad dominance. Rarely did he vary his approach, and his tactics resulted in dominant members looking to RTAs, not the WTO, to pursue their interests.

Examining his power relations and attempts to enhance his authority in critical moments revealed that though he had good relations with the Secretariat and UN, he had little influence over outcomes. He did not foster the trust and relations necessary to influence perceptions.

One interpretation of these findings would suggest that because Supachai led almost exclusively as a passive technocrat, he did not matter; this is not the case. He stalled DDA progress and negated changes made by Ruggiero and Moore to facilitate the WTO’s survival, achievement, and evolution. His leadership had an impact, albeit not a positive one, but he mattered. He did not progress the DDA, mediate members’ self-interests, or promote the interests of the multilateral system, but he mattered by being in a position to affect outcomes. As Tucker ([1981], 1993) highlighted, some leaders matter more; others matter less. Supachai mattered less when compared to the other directors-general, but he mattered by maintaining the enhanced authority that Moore established. Considering the inherent tensions between members and the director-general and Supachai’s passivity, this was one way he influenced international organisation.

Supachai’s leadership failed to mediate competing interests of developed and developing members as the DDA expanded in scope or tensions of the WTO’s role in global
development. Aware that he needed support of the major economies, he accommodated their preferences, weakening development-orientated aspects of the WTO work programme. The latter interpreted his strategies as weak and took their trade needs to other fora. He provided little incentive for less-dominant members, civil society, or global governance agencies to engage with the WTO. Moore’s promotion of trade as an instrument of peace was disregarded, as Western states’ war on terror took priority.

The themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time have been explored through an exceptional case that resembled the case of Moore’s unorthodox term. Moore and Supachai were both constrained by the terms the USA negotiated to ensure their preferred candidate would be selected. The irony was that Moore, not Supachai, advanced the interests of developing members and reduced dependence on GATT norms, which – in all likelihood – served as an antecedent for the USA’s disinterest in the round during Supachai’s term.

Supachai’s legacy reflects that passive technocrats are ineffective at leading international organisations, particularly by failing to neutralise political conflict, mediate states’ self-interests, and encourage cooperation. From GATT to WTO, American hegemony – supported by the Quad – remains resilient in conditioning outcomes in international politics. His legacy highlights that whilst executive leadership can matter in critical junctures, institutions are resistant to change (Haas 1990). Members have a formal monopoly on decision-making, and for executive leadership to matter outside of critical junctures, directors-general must advance the interests of the multilateral system. Three
case studies have revealed that some executive heads matter significantly; others matter less. For a director-general to matter more, it appears they must be active, enable their influence on decision-making, exchange resources widely, and use their relationships to shape outcomes.

The next chapter analyses the final case study analyses the two-term, eight-year leadership of former EU Trade Commissioner Lamy to continue to address the research questions and core themes. It investigates how Lamy’s active political-technocrat leadership failed to conclude the Doha Round and blurred decision-making roles. His case offers an opportunity to compare the limited, restricted, and/or constrained leadership of the three previous directors-general to an executive that appeared to have infinite power in the WTO and global governance. The final case study enables the thesis to conclude by making generalisations that reflect on the power of executive heads to lead organisations where decision-making is dominated by members’ adherence to historic norms.
Chapter Eight: Director-General Lamy (2005-2013)

Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the third case study of executive leadership in the WTO. Director-General Suapchai’s leadership (2002-2005) was investigated to address the core themes and research questions: if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation. The analysis revealed that Supachai failed to progress the DDA and facilitated a return to GATT norms through his passive technocrat leadership. This chapter sets out the last of the four case studies of executive leadership in the WTO, focusing on Director-General Lamy (2005-2013).391

The chapter investigates the key claims that Lamy failed to conclude the WTO’s first and only trade round and reduced organisational performance by conflating the roles of decision-makers. It explores the extent to which he led as an active political-technocrat, similar to Ruggiero, using his political and technical background to pursue his, not members’, goals. The chapter avers that he significantly expanded the role of the director-general in attempting to achieve his goals, but he restricted who was included in decision-making, which constrained organisational performance and completion of the Round. The chapter examines how his active political-technocrat leadership contributed to failure to conclude the Doha Round and disaggregation in decision-making.

391 See Appendix 1.
Institutions, networks, context, resources, approaches, tactics, and power are examined to analyse if and how Lamy mattered. Figure 8.1 outlines the diverse approaches and resources he employed to shape pursuit of particular goals and the context that conditioned his leadership. His legacy reveals something of a paradox; though he was able to enhance executive authority considerably compared to his predecessors, he was unable to achieve his goals. The chapter explores this paradox to highlight how resourceful executives are often unable to affect member-driven decision-making, reiterate the importance of relational power from the previous chapter, and reinforce the limits of active leadership from the Ruggiero case study. The analysis begins by investigating the institutions and networks that Lamy used to enhance his authority to affect outcomes.

Figure 8.1: A model of Lamy’s power
Structure

This section examines decision-making structures that Lamy engaged with to enhance his influence. It reveals how he used his formal and informal authority (Table 8.1) to expand the role of the director-general in decision-making. The analysis begins by exploring how he used his enhanced authority to influence outcomes and how perceptions of institutions constrained a 2005 conclusion to the Doha Round.
Table 8.1: Lamy’s role in governing bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Council authority</th>
<th>DSB authority</th>
<th>TPRM authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present biennial budget</td>
<td>Register trade protocols</td>
<td>Call working parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker disputes</td>
<td>Appoint ITC head</td>
<td>Author reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspect resources for ministerial conferences</td>
<td>Prepare ministerial conference agenda drafts</td>
<td>Comply with mandates from members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold consultations with members in arrears</td>
<td>Report on external events</td>
<td>Liaise with other organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure conditions of service for staff</td>
<td>Implement Uruguay Round agreements</td>
<td>Remind members of unfinished work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administer technical assistance</td>
<td>Appoint Integrated Framework Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Manage Integrated Framework through Executive Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on technical assistance and capacity building</td>
<td>Broker negotiations through informal consultations</td>
<td>Negotiate terms of Headquarter Agreement with Swiss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Institutions

This section explores how Lamy enhanced the role of the director-general in decision-making. It also introduces the paradox, highlighted in the introduction, by exploring how his power was constrained, despite increased executive authority. For example, the highest decision-making body, the ministerial conference, is mandated to meet at least once every

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two years (WTO Agreement 1999). During Lamy’s two terms, only three ministerial
conferences convened: Hong Kong (2005), Geneva (2009), and Geneva (2011). Between
2005 and 2009, ministers did not meet at Lamy’s suggestion (WTO 2015f). He developed
the authority to persuade members not to hold a ministerial conference, but in doing so, he
limited progress on negotiations, which contributed to negative perceptions about his
active political-technocrat leadership.

When Lamy entered office he wanted a fifth deputy director-general.393 Members opposed
his initiative to enlarge his Cabinet, as they did under Ruggiero. Lamy countered members’
resistance by adding a Chief of Staff and delegating oversight of three to six decision-
making bodies to each deputy director-general to shape Doha negotiations.394 ‘He wants to
have total knowledge in all situations, and he has never felt at ease with the flat nature
of the WTO… Lamy has tried to turn the WTO into Brussels.’395 He argued that Ruggiero’s
leadership established that it was the power of the director-general, not the membership, to
manage staff (WT/GC/M/97 2005; VanGrasstek 2013). He reorganised his office into a
central hierarchy to improve his oversight, but this restructuring was in conflict with the
institutional design.396 ‘The leadership structure of the WTO is intended to be flat, not
hierarchical, to allow for a de-centralisation of management.’397

393 WTO senior officials, interviewed 23 and 26(a) May, 6 June, and 11 December 2011.
394 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May(a) and 11 December 2011; see also from 2005, WT/INF/98
395 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
396 WTO senior officials, interviewed 19, 20, 23, 26(a), and 27 May, 6 and 7 June, and 11 December 2011
397 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
He replicated the decision-making structure of the European Commission within the WTO executive, but WTO senior officials argued that these changes negatively impacted decision-making.398 “The structure of the executive now is not efficient... But it is the interesting way in which the institution has evolved, which has actually decreasing functioning.”399 Lamy acknowledged that his ‘more traditional, Westphalian view’ shaped his reorganisation of executive office.400 He was an active director-general, and his reorganisation reflected that he pursued his goals and resisted being constrained by members.

Controlling information was critical to Lamy’s enhanced executive authority, and he used his deputies and ‘Task Forces’ to process intelligence (TN/C/M/27 2007). In 2008, he used their information to author a negotiations text, similar to the Dunkel text that helped conclude the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). ‘In 1991, Dunkel put together a text that he did not author, and he didn’t change one word of what was agreed; it was all from the Chairs of the negotiating groups.”401 Lamy’s 2008 package offered what he perceived to be a middle ground on negotiating positions, rather than reflecting the negotiating groups’ texts (Blustein 2009; Ismail 2009a, 2009b; VanGrasstek 2013).

‘Lamy issued a list of 20 topics where he invited suggestions in moving them forward. This list was basically a table of contents of the Doha Round. People didn’t trust this. He tried

398 Interviewed 20, 23, 26(a), 27 May, 1(a), 6, and 7 June, 20 September, and 11 December 2011.
399 WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.
400 Interviewed 11 April 2014.
401 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
to force it to pass.” This attempt to influence negotiations surpassed the limits of his informal authority, and members questioned his initiative. ‘He has since thought about writing another Lamy text, but has been advised against it, as it will make it more apparent how disconnected his leadership is. He is not modest and wants to be a part of the glory, which has made the WTO more polar.’ His objective to close the round reflected his active political-technocrat leadership, but he had inadequate intelligence about the preferences of the majority of members and bad timing. ‘If the Round was done in July 2008, Lamy could have been a hero.’

He expanded his good offices role to developing nations’ accessions – where Supachai refused to play a role – and the DSB, composing three-quarters of DSB panels in his term, as Supachai had (Davey 2008; WT/GC/M/112 2008; PRESS/578 2009; WT/GC/M/128 2010; WT/GC/M/146 2013). He also used his good offices to promote Aid For Trade (AFT), an initiative he launched with one of his deputies in 2005 to improve technical assistance and non-tariff barriers for developing nations, such as a north-south transport corridor in Africa (TN/C/M/20 2005; WT/GC/M/103 2006; VanGrasstek 2013). ‘I didn’t ask for the mandate for Aid for Trade in 2005 – which is how developing countries know the WTO, not for subsidy reduction in cut flowers – and for reworking the WTO website.’

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402 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
403 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011; see also Blustein (2009).
404 Ibid.
405 Ibid.
406 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
407 Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014; see also Lamy (2008).
He upgraded the virtual and physical facilities, including cancelling Supachai’s plans for a WTO Annex (WT/GC/M/112 2008; VanGrasstek 2013). ‘Lamy stopped the contract on building the Annex because it was his opinion that all of the WTO and its personnel should be “under one roof”.’ Renegotiating the WTO’s expanded headquarters allowed him to enhance his authority by relocating the Integrated Framework from the World Bank to the WTO after Moore transferred authority of the six-agency coherence programme. The Integrated Framework was also given a secretariat and executive secretary under Lamy’s direction (WT/GC/115 2008). He believed: ‘the DG should engage’ and was aware of how the ill-defined role of the director-general constrained his predecessors.

The role of the DG was to be defined by the members at the first ministerial conference, but this was never done. It may have taken 10-15 years if they had tried to do so… There was a cartoon I had in my office done by [Mike Moore’s former Deputy Director-General] Andrew Stoler. It was of a tree, and in the tree was a car that had crashed. The inscription was ‘Member-driven car’.

Lamy maintained that decision-making institutions constrained completion of the Doha Round. ‘Members are not efficient, not coherent, so it is a contradiction to have a member-driven organization.’ He attempted to use his expanded authority, background, and experience to build consensus (Bridges 2003). ‘Lamy has training in how to persuade people to do things, and its what he has tried to do as DG. But with 153 countries, this is impossible.’ The single undertaking also required negotiations be completed as a package and was particularly problematic. Agreement on trade facilitation, for example, could not be reached without agreement on non-agricultural market access (NAMA).

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408 WTO senior official, interviewed 24 May 2011.
409 Interviewed 11 April 2014.
410 Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
411 Ibid.
412 See Appendix 1.
413 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
Members suggested an ‘early harvest’ or ‘Doha-lite’ package to implement agreements where there was consensus (WT/GC/M/110 2007; TN/C/M/28 2008; Blustein 2009; VanGrasstek 2013). Lamy refused, despite potential gains to developing and LDC economies and a successful, albeit partial, conclusion to Doha during his term (PRESS/502 2007). He argued that the single undertaking was designed to force consensus on highly political issues, like NAMA (WT/GC/M/137 2012). The single undertaking – rather than facilitate consensus – supported members’ inability to conclude the DDA under Lamy’s leadership.

In summary, Lamy enabled his influence on decision-making by transforming institutions. The expansion of executive office prioritised Lamy’s influence over members, which they resisted, and this constrained conclusion of the Doha Round. He encroached upon the limits of his formal and informal authority, and this impaired organisational functioning. His active pursuit of a conclusion to the round did not compensate for restrictive decision-making institutions intended to coerce members’ cooperation in the multilateral system. His ability to pursue his goals was constrained, and he attempted to use his network to influence negotiations.

Networks

The WTO network expanded under Lamy, but he relied on an elite group of dominant decision-makers, including the G20, whose role in the WTO deepened. Beginning with the enlarged network, AFT and the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference incorporated
over 200 international and regional agencies into WTO work (WT/MIN(05)/13 2005; WTO 2015c). Rather than spread his influence across this diverse network, he used a small circle of WTO insiders and outsiders and his political and technical skill to influence decision-making.

‘Lamy has developed a good network, and it is in consideration of the tough negotiator he was before his term. When he wants something done, he will give multiple orders to his staff. He doesn’t always go through the most direct lines, but it always gets done.’414 He used his elite network to gather and process intelligence, but it did not improve his capacity for influence.415 ‘Lamy has the potential of being the best DG. He certainly had all the qualities and characteristics, as well as background, for the job, but it didn’t work out because he listens only to his advisors; he’s too much on one side of the political spectrum.’416

He envisioned global governance as a triad between member-driven organisations, like the WTO, UN, and G20.417 ‘From Supachai to Lamy, the WTO has become a big organization. The WTO was always invited into the G20 and G8, but now it’s fully integrated.’418 Lamy used the G20 to influence negotiations, integrate finance into WTO

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414 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
415 WTO senior officials, interviewed 20, 23, 26(a), and 27 May, 1(a), 6, and 7 June, 19(b) and 20 September, and 11 December 2011.
416 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
417 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011; see also WTO (2015h).
418 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
work, and improve the TPRM (WT/L/621 2005; VanGrasstek 2013). ‘I worked with the G20. I did not have an official explicit mandate for this; I just did it full stop.’ \(^{419}\)

Though Russia joined in 2011, the B(R)ICS – also part of the G20 – were critical actors in Lamy’s terms. The B(R)ICS used their coalition to counter the hegemony and exceptionalism of the Quad in decision-making. ‘He’s got a WTO in transition because of the fact that the emerging economies have become a big part of the world economy… Lamy has to bridge the gap’ (Lacarte quoted in Cottier and Elsig 2011: 18). In the majority of General Council and TNC meetings, Brazil spoke ‘on behalf of the G20’, which deepened its influence on WTO outcomes (TN/C/M/14 2011). A new group of dominant decision-makers emerged: Lamy, supported by his Cabinet and external advisors, and the G20 (Quad+B(R)ICS).

**Summary**

In his eight years in office, Lamy used his authority and an elite network to pursue his goals when he perceived institutions, such as consensus and the single undertaking, constrained decision-making between over 150 members. His structural changes did not improve decision-making; negotiations were constrained because Lamy’s changes limited who engaged, as explored further in the chapter. His leadership blurred the roles of decision-makers and reduced the ability of the WTO to achieve its goals, which limited a conclusion to the round.

\(^{419}\) Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
Context

WTO senior officials argued that Lamy was the strongest candidate nominated for director-general in 2005. His competitors included a Mauritian minister, Brazilian ambassador, and Pérez del Castillo (Uruguay), the General Council chairman who seized power under Supachai’s passive leadership (WT/GC/M/91 2005). ‘Lamy easily won the office of DG.’ VanGrasstek (2013) argued that Lamy was the only director-general whose term was not limited by deals made in the selection process, as highlighted in the Ruggiero chapter. This, along with his extensive political and technical background, supported his ability to pursue his objectives over members’, as he was not bound to accommodate their preferences. WTO senior officials recalled most members initially ‘worshipped’ him, but this changed after two years.

He ran unopposed for a second term in 2009 (WT/INF/9 2009). His lack of support and opposition signified: ‘either Mr Lamy had done very well in his term, or the position of WTO Director-General was so demanding that it was a deterrent to many potential candidates’ (WT/GC/M/118 2009: item 5, para 2). This section explores the political, historical, institutional, and global context that affected Lamy’s leadership. It addresses the extent to which his active political-technocrat leadership contributed to the failure to conclude the Doha Round and blurred decision-making roles, beginning with political context.

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420 Interviewed 20 and 23 May 2011.
421 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
422 See Appendix 1.
423 Interviewed 26(a) May and 19(b) September 2011.
Political Context

This section explores the failure to conclude the round and how this limited Lamy’s leadership. It reveals that as his term progressed, members became more entrenched in their divisions. Beginning with the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, the conference was the singular ministerial success of Lamy’s term. ‘The definition of a successful negotiation was one where neither side was completely happy’ (WT/MIN(05)/SR/12 2005: item 4). Under Lamy, ministers had ‘put the Round back on track’ after ‘a phase of slow-motion’ with a ‘clear roadmap’ for a 2006 conclusion (ibid).

After Hong Kong, progress slowed in agricultural and industrial products (NAMA) negotiations, and deadlines lapsed (WT/GC/M/101 2006). ‘After Hong Kong, we needed the DG to declare it a disaster of politicians. He could have identified problems, and this would have given us an opportunity.’\textsuperscript{424} By July 2006, negotiations shifted from deadlock to crisis, and in October, Lamy suspended DDA talks (TN/C/M/26 2006; WT/GC/M/103 2006; Schwab 2008; Zedillo 2008; and Kondo 2008). He focused on divisions, not commonality, and many saw the collapse as political conflict between Lamy, Indian Minister Kamal Nath, and USTR Susan Schwab (Blustein 2009; VanGrasstek 2013; WTO 2015c; WTO 2015d).

‘Lamy left for India right after the collapse in 2006. There was a battle of egos with Lamy.’\textsuperscript{425} He transitioned WTO resources from the DDA to AFT (Petersmann 2008; WT/GC/M/120 2009). Members responded by negotiating RTAs outside of the WTO

\textsuperscript{424} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{425} Ibid.
Negotiations resumed in February 2007, and Lamy urged members to conclude (WT/GC/M/107 2007). When a 2007 conclusion looked unlikely, he pushed the deadline to 2008, similar to Supachai; members came close to concluding the round in July 2008, but talks in agriculture, NAMA, and cotton collapsed (WT/GC/M/114 2008; TN/C/M/28 2008; Ray and Saha 2009). Former Director-General Sutherland announced: ‘I don’t want to be apocalyptic about the world trading system, but it is in danger, no doubt about that’ (Kennedy and Drejam 2007). Lamy elected to cancel the 2008 ministerial conference for fear of: ‘running an unacceptably high risk of failure which could damage not only the Round but also the WTO system as a whole’ (TN/C/M/29 2009: item 1, para 7).

By moving around the schedules of Ministers for the 2008 meeting, he made a lot of ministers upset, and Lamy did not recognize this or the constituents. You have to convince them it’s the right thing to do. You can’t just push people around with intellectual power, and then the DG compounded this problem. It made all the faults worse.  

To summarise, the political context of Lamy’s terms was tumultuous. Several WTO senior officials believed that Lamy did not handle the failed negotiations well, and most connected this to how he led. ‘In Lamy’s parallel universe, no one challenges him, and this is why there is no real feedback to the DG… Lamy is in the wrong place for his sort of

[426] Ibid.
[427] Ibid.
personality.

Lamy’s active political-technocrat leadership differed from Ruggiero’s because Lamy’s goals did not reflect the interests of members or the multilateral system. His leadership contributed to progress from 2005 to 2008, but political tensions divided members, which deepened historical tensions that the analysis now explores.

**Historical Context**

The analysis of historical context examines how Lamy aimed to distance the WTO from GATT norms that conditioned WTO outcomes since its inception in 1995. By distancing the WTO from its history, he limited his ability to succeed in his goals. For example, at the Hong Kong ministerial, he argued that GATT negotiation tactics were no longer suitable, and member states must reflect on those who do not speak (WT/MIN(05)/13 2005). Lamy expected members to change their strategies because he was unable to push through a collective bargain.

A majority of WTO senior officials believed the director-general matters by speaking for those who are not in the room, and without this, Green Room negotiations that occur by executive invitation would lack legitimacy. The DG has to speak for who isn’t there and the system. Members connect to the organization through the DG. The director-general also needs to interact with the ambassadors to be effective in Green Rooms, and Lamy did not. ‘The DG needs the ambassadors; without them he is crippled.’ He also

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428 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
429 WTO senior officials, interviewed 23, 26(a), 26(b), 27, and 30(b) May, 1, 6, and 7 June, and 19(b) and 20 September 2011; see also Jawara and Kwa (2003) and Zhenyu (2008).
430 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
431 WTO senior officials, interviewed 20, 23, and 26(a) May and 6 and 7 June 2011; see VanGrasstek (2013) for details on the roles of ambassadors and ministers.
told ministers at Hong Kong they must take risks, which a WTO senior official and Moore identified as the role of the director-general.\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).} Lamy’s leadership attempted to distance the WTO from the GATT by asking more of ministers, and this impaired clarity on the roles of ministers, ambassadors, and the director-general. ‘Lamy isn’t an efficient leader. He hasn’t built relationships’.\footnote{Interviewed 1(b) June and 6 November 2012.}

Lamy further limited a conclusion to the round by leading an examination of the workability of ‘developmental aspects’ of the DDA (WT/COMTD/W/143 2005). This further diluted the development-orientated work programme, as members were still divided over the WTO’s role in global development. Agriculture continued to be the crux of the round, but the development gap – rooted in exceptionalism of developed nations’ subsidies from the Uruguay Round – stirred historical tensions (WT/GC/M/103 2006). Costa Rica argued that development did not have a single definition within the WTO, and Lamy’s belief that there was only one definition limited progress (WT/GC/M/101 2006). ‘Part of this has to do with Lamy’s use of his Cabinet. He has effectively doubled the work of the committees, and he only listens to his ‘experts’ not the directors, the ambassadors, or the committees.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).} Unlike Moore, Lamy was not engaging with development networks, and this limited his oversight and ability to conclude the Doha Round.

In summary, Lamy limited his leadership by attempting to distance the WTO from its history. He constrained decision-making by conflating the roles and responsibilities of
ministers, ambassadors, and the director-general. He preferred to work with his elite network, but disengaging from the majority of decision-makers limited his intelligence on members’ positions, particularly on development that the round aimed to improve. Lamy’s leadership focused on a WTO that worked for all members, but he underestimated the power of GATT norms to condition members’ strategies.\textsuperscript{436} He was driven by his goals, not members’, and his ‘contempt for the ambassadors’ and lack of understanding of the resiliency of GATT norms shaped his failure to conclude the round and conflation of institution roles.\textsuperscript{437}

\textit{Institutional Context}

The political and historical context of Lamy’s terms affected institutional divisions that threatened organisational survival and achievement. This section examines how Lamy’s leadership limited organisational functioning by failing to build relationships with members. ‘He didn’t understand the strength of members’ views. He failed to accept his mistakes, or at least I have never heard him say it.’\textsuperscript{438} His active political-technocrat leadership was limited because he did not engage well with member states beyond the Quad+B(R)ICS.\textsuperscript{439} ‘Lamy will always be disappointed because he is constantly trying to impose his will.’\textsuperscript{440} He did not accommodate members’ preferences in pursuit of his goals, and this affected perceptions and how he attempted to shape them. ‘Most important is how connected or

\textsuperscript{436} WTO senior officials, interviewed 23 and 20 May and 20 September 2011; see also Narlikar and Vickers (2009) and Charnovitz (2008).
\textsuperscript{437} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{438} WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{440} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
well fed an executive is with information. It is important how he exchanges, accesses, and controls information. This could be a critical determinant in who has power.  

In 2009, his TNC reports continued to state there was no progress because his intelligence was not inclusive of most members and he was not engaging ambassadors. He suggested members abandon existing negotiation drafts in agriculture and NAMA. The USA, EU, Japan, Australia, China, India, Switzerland, and the Cotton Four agreed, as this allowed the Quad to refrain from cutting their Uruguay Round subsidies and an early harvest for the Cotton Four (WT/GC/M/118 2009). ‘Lamy’s accomplishments were problematic because he couldn’t accept that there was no progress.’ Members ‘deeply deplored’ his suspension of negotiations and argued abandoning almost ten years of negotiations would plunge the WTO deeper into crisis (WT/GC/M/103 2006: item 1, para 15; WT/GC/M/120 2009).

With a disconnected executive that was pursuing his own goals, members looked to RTAs to fulfil their trade needs. ‘When you lose big countries like Argentina in a round on agriculture, something has gone wrong… Lamy’s inability to carry us is a huge failure.’ Compounding political, historical, and institutional divisions, new members were being asked to make deeper concessions than existing members to join the WTO (Charnovitz 2008; WT/GC/M/146 2013). Developing members asked Lamy to report on this but found his reports unsatisfactory (WT/GC/M/125 2010). With Russia and 28 other

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441 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
442 Ibid.
443 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
444 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
nations in accessions, Lamy’s failure to listen to members threatened WTO survival (WT/MIN(09)/WS/R/1 2009). ‘Multilateralism is at a crossroads. Either it advances in the spirit of shared values and enhanced cooperation, or we will face a retreat’ (Lamy quoted in WT/GC/M/138 2012: item 1, para 23).

Furthermore, his decision not to hold a ministerial conference between 2005 and 2009 magnified the institutional crisis and wasted valuable time to conclude Doha (Blustein 2009). The Uruguayan delegate argued that this failure had three consequences: (i) prevalence of informality replaced the rules-based system, (ii) conclusion of the round defined WTO success and failure, (iii) and ministers singular role was to take major decisions (WT/GC/M/120 2009). The first consequence – a return to the GATT norm of informality – was mostly the result of Lamy’s decision to suspend formal meetings of the TNC. From July 2010 to December 2012, the TNC only met informally and failed to meet at all in 2012, despite an impasse between ministers (WT/GC/M/121 2009; TN/C/M/31 2012). ‘A lot of people will say if Lamy had done this and not that the outcome would have been different, but it is impossible to know.’

To summarise, Lamy failed to build relationships necessary to lead the WTO. He lacked accurate intelligence on members’ perspectives, and this limited his ability to affect negotiations. Members lost confidence in their executive, and divisions threatened organisational survival, particularly without consistent ministerial and TNC meetings. Lamy’s failure to conclude the round and conflation of decision-making roles limited his

445 WTO senior official, 1 June 2011(a).
ability to achieve his goals. It also directly contributed to the WTO’s most recent legitimacy crisis, and global circumstances did not bolster his opportunities for success.

*Global Context*

Throughout his term, the global economic and political context imposed a clear set of limitations on his capacity to achieve his goals. Trade began to shrink in 2005 and failure to conclude the round further reduced growth. Lamy used the 2008 financial crisis to push for a Doha conclusion to improve global economic conditions, but the recession: ‘obviously slowed some things down’.\(^{446}\) Members were hesitant to make further concessions in negotiations, which culminated in the impasse. ‘If the economic crisis had not happened, Lamy could have been more successful.’\(^{447}\)

Developed members instituted domestic reforms to insulate their economies from the recession. The USA was particularly adept at using existing rules to protect agricultural and non-agricultural industry through exceptions, waivers, non-tariff barriers, and subsidy classification systems (WT/GC/M/120 2009). ‘Lamy should have recognised [the effect of the 2008 recession] and put negotiations on hold.’\(^{448}\) Instead, he used the 2012 World Trade Report to focus on tariff and non-tariff barriers as a result of the recession and to warn against protectionism.

\(^{446}\) WTO senior officials, interviewed 30(a) May and 1(a) June 2011; see also from 2005, PRESS/417 and 2006, PRESS/437.

\(^{447}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011.

\(^{448}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
‘Lamy permits a lot more research than other DGs. It’s because he’s not scared of member states, and he recognizes the power of ideas.’ Lamy’s decision to explore developed members’ protectionist measures further aggravated already poor relations between Lamy and USTR (WT/GC/M/137 2012; Narlikar and Vickers 2009). ‘I piloted and drove the research closely, more hands-on, it seems, than other DGs.’ To summarise, the global context of his terms and his responses to global circumstances considerably limited his ability to close the round. ‘Lamy’s overview fluctuates because he doesn’t listen or his timing is really off.’

Summary

The contextual analysis argues that the political, historical, institutional, and global events of Lamy’s terms did not bolster his ability to pursue his goals. The DDA was to conclude by 2005, but the agenda expanded and became increasingly divisive. His disconnect from GATT history contributed to deadlock amongst members and conflated decision-making roles (Panagariya 2008). The WTO was driven more by his goals than those of members, who preferred regionalism to multilateralism under Lamy. The WTO was in crisis; in 2011, senior officials argued: ‘Doha is pretty much dead.’ The survival of formal, member-driven multilateral trade governance was threatened. The analysis of his leadership continues by examining how he exchanged resources for the power to influence.

449 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
450 Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
451 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
452 Interviewed 19 and 25 May, 1(a) and 7 June, and 19(b) September 2011
Resource Exchange

This section examines Lamy’s exchange of resources in seeking to secure his objectives. Like previous directors-general, his resources were in internal and external networks and formal and informal rules. The analysis aims to show that despite exchanging many resources, he did not enhance dependence on his leadership after his first two years in office (Figure 8.1). It begins by exploring how Lamy limited his exchanges to his elite network.

Resource Exchange with Internal and External Networks

Lamy exchanged the resources of shared leadership, communications, and extra-budgetary contributions but lacked the resource of trust with his internal and external networks. The effects of his resource exchanges were not limited to either internal or external contexts. For example, Lamy’s shared leadership with the G20 affected his power within his external network, but it also affected his power relations with internal actors, such as with the Quad+B(R)ICS.

He exchanged shared leadership with 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference Chair Minister John C Tsang for the ability to shape the draft declaration (WT/GC/M/98 2005; WT/MIN(05)/13 2005). When less dominant members expressed concern for how their positions appeared in the draft, he said his shared leadership had: ‘served members well, even if it had not been perfect’ (TN/C/M/23 2006). ‘Lamy wanted public relations to reflect that Ministers declared a new start [to negotiations] after Hong Kong. [Ambassador
and TNC Agriculture Chairman Crawford] Falconer didn’t want to wait for this, and started it up on his own. This poisoned things between the DG and staff.\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011; see also from 2007, WT/GC/M/107, Blastein (2009), and VanGrasstek (2013).}

Lamy’s inability to share leadership with ambassadors or those outside his elite network reflects the limits of active political-technocrat leadership. ‘All DGs until Lamy were content to let the directors do the work in their respective committees.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.} He was an accomplished politician and had impressive technical knowledge, but he could not build support for his leadership without exchanging resources more widely.\footnote{See Appendix 1.} ‘He should be consulting people like [the division heads], but he doesn’t. He doesn’t use internal intelligence or information.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011; brackets indicate that individuals’ identities have been concealed due to anonymity in interviews.} He pursued his goals through particular networks. His limited exchange of shared leadership increased dependence on the director-general, but it also blurred decision-making roles. His active political-technocrat leadership contributed to the perception that he was not facilitating member-driven decision-making. ‘Lamy wants to decide everything; he has reduced the functioning of the Secretariat to the functioning of his Cabinet.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.}

He traded his resource of communications to improve his influence on negotiations and WTO relations.

Lamy’s use of the media is more strategic than other DGs, especially Supachai and Moore. But here there is also the consideration of the length of term and the relationship each DG had with the media. The DG has power, but the
extent to which he uses it depends on the DG himself. Lamy is hands-on, and he runs a tight ship.\textsuperscript{458} He identified twenty percent of his time as being spent in communications. ‘The way you structure your agenda is leadership too. Time is a strategic instrument. It is a scarce resource, time.’\textsuperscript{459} He increased communication between working bodies and with civil society, such as online question and answer sessions (WT/COMTD/W/142 2005; WT/TPR/OV/W/5 2011; VanGrasstek 2013). He also improved communications through his Future of Trade publication that extended the TPRM’s monitoring from country to country to the international system.\textsuperscript{460}

Lamy also improved communications by visiting capitals (TN/C/M/23 2006; PRESS/486 2007; PRESS/513 2008). ‘The WTO is one of the most important organizations. The DG is going to be influential, but the travel is gruelling. The DG will have 10-12 meetings a day. Every meeting is a negotiation, and these meetings aren’t necessarily all in the same place or country.’\textsuperscript{461} He was driven by his goals and had both political and technical skills to enhance his power through communications. ‘But there are advantages and disadvantages of this… Some have an interest in pursuing the negotiations themselves and not being real arbitrators. Lamy is a DG who exercises his executive decision-making power daily.’\textsuperscript{462}

\textsuperscript{458} WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{459} Lamy, interviewed 11 April 214.
\textsuperscript{460} Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014 and WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011; see also VanGrasstek (2013).
\textsuperscript{461} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
\textsuperscript{462} WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
When using his communications, such as publishing his weekly schedule or the ‘DG communiqué’, he did not seek a mandate from members.\(^{463}\) His use of communications did not heighten his influence with his internal network because he transposed the limits of his power. This begins to clarify the paradoxical nature of his leadership. His enhanced authority did not improve his ability to conclude the round; members resisted being directed, as they did under Ruggiero and Supachai. It did, however, improve his power with his external network, particularly amongst NGOs.\(^{464}\)

Lamy also had resources in extra-budgetary contributions. Before the financial crisis, he garnered 1 million Euros, USD 1.4 million, 8.72 million Danish krone, and approximately CHF 14.5 million (PRESS/416, 419, 422, 425, 430 2005; PRES/435, 436, 438, 440, 443, 444, 445, 446, 449, 450, 452, 453 2006; PRESS/467 2007; WT/GC/M/108 2007). Between July 2007 and July 2009: ‘the economic situation had continued to worsen for all Members’, and there were no known extra-budgetary resources (WT/GC/M/120 2009: item 1, para 2). Between July 2009 and July 2011, he obtained only CHF 5.5 million from the USA and France (PRESS/567 2009; PRESS/589 2009). There were no known contributions for the remainder of Lamy’s term except for USD 800,000 from China for AFT and almost 1.2 million Euros from the EU (PRESS/632 2011; PRESS/666 2012; PRESS/681 2012). In eight years, he received CHF 20 million, USD 2.2 million, 2.2 million Euros, and 8.72 million Danish krone from members; Moore received CHF 30 million in a single year. This underscores that Lamy did not possess the resource of trust with his internal and external networks, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis.

\(^{463}\) Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
\(^{464}\) WTO senior officials, interviewed 25 and 27 May 2011.
The absence of trust, at least amongst his internal network, began with his commentary on the archaic nature of WTO decision-making at the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference.\textsuperscript{465} ‘He lost the capacity to run things when he was EC Trade Commissioner.’\textsuperscript{466} He also was not trusted because of how he led the WTO. ‘I needed my team to help me think and implement ideas. They were my intermediary between what you think should be done and what is actually done.’\textsuperscript{467}

Lamy had poor relations with member states because he was driven by his objective to close the round and expand the WTO’s agenda rather than accommodate their concerns about the state of the multilateral system. The director-general and members compete for power to drive the organisation.\textsuperscript{468} The director-general’s objectives should connect with members’ goals but uphold the interests of the multilateral system above all. ‘There is an inherent conflict between what the member states can and do commit to in the organization. Preserving the organization itself is vastly more important than concluding the Round.’\textsuperscript{469}

Unlike Ruggiero, Lamy was pursuing his own agenda.\textsuperscript{470} ‘A good DG is one that is trusted, one who is impartial and honest, and one who is not pushing his own agenda but pushing

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{465} WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011; see also Wilkinson (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{466} WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{467} Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{468} WTO senior officials, interviewed 26(a), 26(b), and 30(a) May, 6 June, and 19 September 2011 and Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{469} WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{470} WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
\end{itemize}
the agenda of the organisation.\textsuperscript{471} Unlike Moore, Lamy was an agent with less of a principle towards member states. ‘He is a good leader if he has trust with the members; this is built over time through interactions with members. His values need to be consistent with the majority of the membership. Then trust comes.’\textsuperscript{472} This indicates the limits of active political-technocrat leadership in the WTO and why a director-general with such power was unable to affect decision-making. ‘Lamy has been very active and strong, whether the members appreciate it or not.’\textsuperscript{473}

In summary, Lamy exchanged the resources of shared leadership, communications, and extra-budgetary contributions with his elite network but lacked trust amongst internal and external networks. He exchanged his vast resources but did not enhance dependence on his leadership because he prioritised particular institutions and networks throughout his term and blurred decision-making roles. Extra-budgetary contributions rarely came from outside the Quad+B(R)ICS, and their contributions declined as Lamy stayed in office. He possessed the capacity to achieve and evolve the WTO agenda, but how he led: ‘created a new kingdom in the DG office, one that is disconnected from the rest’.\textsuperscript{474} The analysis of resource exchange now examines how he used formal and informal rules in his leadership.

\textit{Formal and Informal Rules Exchanged for Power}

The analysis examines how Lamy used formal and informal rules to enhance his power by exploring his role as head of the TNC and Secretariat, report writing, and technical

\textsuperscript{471} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{472} WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
\textsuperscript{473} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{474} WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
knowledge. First, Lamy aimed to influence negotiations through his resource as head of the TNC. He restructured TNC meetings to be ‘brief, business-like, realistic, and action-orientated’ to facilitate consensus and the single undertaking (TN/C/M/20 2005; Harbinson 2008).

He led negotiations at the ‘senior level’ that engaged ministers, not ambassadors (WT/GC/M/114 2008). ‘Here is where Lamy has failed; he often goes above ambassadors’ heads.’ He used his role to bring finance and AFT into negotiations, which he conceded were not part of the DDA, and members resisted negotiating these issues in the TNC (WT/GC/M/136 2012). ‘He might have had the authority for anyone to not disagree with him as [TNC] chair for two years, but he doesn’t now.’

As TNC chair, Lamy was to broker consensus and identify where consensus was absent; this was the limit of his authority. ‘They would not, for example, like him trying to force a consensus. Small initiatives may be okay, like he can try to prod and cajole in different sectors. He can’t say that everyone should focus on NAMA, but he does have the ability to influence or impact.’ However in TNC meetings, he instructed members to focus on particular areas, like agriculture (TN/C/M/21 2006). ‘The ideal DG needs to allow members to steer themselves toward consensus.’ Lamy believed the director-general needed more authority because the Secretariat had little role in negotiations.

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475 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
476 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
477 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
478 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
There is a problem with the way decisions are made in the WTO, not decision-making, but how decisions are brought up. If the Secretariat had more responsibility for tabling proposals, decisions would be pre-digested. But they are not, and as such, they go through five years of negotiations. The problem is that diplomats’ motivation is not aligned with the system, and this is a problem with the structure of global governance. Capitals are self-serving, and it takes five years to decontaminate their proposals, which leads to a big debate, resulting in pure time lost.479

Lamy’s critique is valid, although, in part, working with ambassadors rather than ministers could have rectified this problem. His argument continued to neglect that member-driven decision-making is the foundation of the WTO. ‘The problem with the Secretariat is that it has been rightly criticised for serving the powers of old.’480 Brazil argued that: ‘the main responsibility [in negotiations] lay with Members’ (WT/GC/M/103 2006: item 1, para 23). Lamy believed decision-making could be improved with more executive influence. ‘You have to make sure the clock works.’481

Second, he used his resource as head of the Secretariat to influence outcomes in and beyond his terms. ‘Though there may be problems in the WTO now, it doesn’t mean that he cannot influence the research, and thus influence the organization in the next generation.’482 After concern was expressed that developed members’ ‘stimulus packages’ were not included in TRPM monitoring, he used his power to influence the Secretariat’s methodology for evaluating trade and competition policy (WT/GC/M/125 2010). Some

479 Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
480 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
481 Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
482 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
WTO senior officials believed this was beyond his authority and scope of his technical skills, as the Secretariat is composed of highly qualified economists.\textsuperscript{483}

‘The DG can have significant scope in determining the focus of research, but that’s as far as it goes.’\textsuperscript{484} The Secretariat is mandated to carry out the requests of member states, and Lamy’s hands-on management blurred institutional roles (WTO Agreement 1999; Zhenyu 2008). ‘A DG has to take initiative, but he also has to balance being visible and less so, especially with Lamy.’\textsuperscript{485} Members resisted his attempts to exercise more influence over the Secretariat, and his power declined relatively. This led Harbinson to teasingly referring to Lamy as the ‘janitor’ of the organisation – someone who attempts to ensure the organisation functions to facilitate decision-making but has little power to affect outcomes.

Third, he used the resource of report writing in attempting to enhance dependence on his leadership. In cotton and other areas of negotiations, he would write reports without members’ mandates to shape the agenda and direction of work (WT/GC/97 2005; WT/L/702 2007; WT/MIN(11)/5 2011).

A good DG needs a series of things. Knowledge, and it was there with Lamy. Political intelligence: Lamy doesn’t use or use this enough. Trust: it was not there with Lamy, or it was given on a need to know basis. Those are the main three, but there is also modesty, which Lamy is not.\textsuperscript{486}

The underlying characteristics of Lamy’s leadership show that though he was qualified – perhaps more so than other directors-general – his active political-technocrat leadership contributed to him exercising power beyond his authority. In some cases, this increased

\textsuperscript{483} Interviewed 23, 26(a), 27, and 30(a) May and 1(a) and 6 June 2011.
\textsuperscript{484} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{485} WTO senior official, interviewed 24 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{486} WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
dependence on his office, but in most cases, his excessive use of power failed to increase his capacity for influence, highlighting the paradoxical nature of his leadership.

Finally, Lamy possessed the resource of technical knowledge. He was: ‘a rock star of international trade if there was one’ because of his extensive technical knowledge. He used his technical knowledge to resolve the 18-year banana preferences dispute, select panels for DSB disputes, write reports, provide the consultative framework on cotton, and influence negotiations and WTO activities. A WTO senior official recalled Lamy was not afraid to say he didn’t know enough about a topic but would learn more on his own.

Several others have highlighted that he should have used division heads, ambassadors, or the Secretariat. They also argued that Ruggiero used his technical knowledge extensively, such as in the financial services agreement, but did so in service of members and to facilitate familiarity with the formal, rules-based system. Lamy used this resource without respect for the limits of his authority or members’ objectives, but he was also more technically knowledgeable than most actors. ‘Every decision comes from Lamy.’ They were dependent on him whether they wanted to be or not, particularly during the financial crisis.

487 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
488 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011; see also Appendix 1 and VanGrasstek (2013).
489 Interviewed 24 May 2011.
490 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
Summary

This section has analysed how Lamy exchanged resources to enhance his power. He was resourceful, but the elitist nature of his exchanges limited how he could exercise influence. ‘There are many ways to lead things forward. I was led by ideas, but this is the culture I come from.’

Lamy was an active director-general, and to an extent, all executive heads are led by their goals. Interviews revealed that Lamy prioritised his goals over members’, which is not the norm in member-driven organisations; they also highlight how a resourceful director-general can fail to influence outcomes. The next section analyses Lamy’s approaches and tactics and how his leadership affected the WTO.

Agency

The chapter has argued that Lamy’s background as Trade Commissioner conditioned his leadership (Jawara and Kwa 2003; Blustein 2009; VanGrasstek 2013). Lamy shaped the WTO, but how he changed the organisation impaired functioning by failing to complete Doha and blurring roles of decision-makers. This section examines his approaches and tactics to determine if and how his leadership mattered and begins by analysing his approaches to leadership.

Approaches

Lamy emerged as the obvious candidate in the 2005 and 2009 director-general selection processes. After a prestigious French education, he began his career in the French civil

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491 Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
service, working with European Commission President Jacques Delors (1985-1988, 1992-1994) and Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy (1981-1984) (VanGrasstek 2013). After a subsequent short career in banking, he was appointed European Trade Commissioner (1999-2004), during which he published on democracy and European politics. His background in management, European political economy, and finance was a notable influence on his approaches to executive leadership in the WTO.

Lamy argued that he used ‘a range, a spectrum’ of approaches to achieve his goals. The analysis of his approaches examines how he used the facilitator, broker, interventionist, and coercive approaches to shape outcomes. Though he used a range of approaches, his active political-technocrat leadership and hierarchical management limited his strategies for influence. When Lamy took office in 2005, he stated that conclusion of the round was his ‘main purpose’ and took priority in his objectives (WT/GC/M/97 2005). His approach as a facilitator is first examined to analyse how he failed to achieve this goal.

The WTO started to become more UN-like under Supachai, and Lamy continued this transition through a facilitator approach. ‘In the EU system, a more classical model where a Commissioner is much more than a facilitator, there is room and space for initiative.’ He used his interpretation of the facilitator approach to influence negotiations, which required initiative. He believed taking the initiative was within his authority, but members and staff perceived it as interventionist. ‘When the DG attempts

492 Ibid.
493 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
494 Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
to move beyond his role as a facilitator, members welcome/unwelcome that attempt as the case is.\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.}

For example, he used his facilitator approach to influence negotiations by appointing a Task Force to determine the scope of development-orientated work (TN/C/M/20 2005). Members argued because his Task Force was composed of WTO outsiders the findings could not be incorporated into member-driven negotiations (WT/GC/M/120 2009). His use of the facilitator approach was not always obtrusive. At Hong Kong, he facilitated member-driven decision-making by calling it the ‘Ministers’ conference’; the evolution of the WTO was up to them (WT/MIN(05)/13 2005). He also used this approach in limiting the scope of negotiations and holding informal negotiating sessions (WT/COMTD/W/143 2005; TN/C/W/33 2005). Lamy’s facilitator approach had little effect on negotiations, and his brokering approach was similarly weak.

Lamy said his brokering approach was underscored by the ‘Geneva consensus’, which should have relied on ambassadors to condition ‘open and inclusive’, general to specific negotiations (TN/C/M/21 2006; Pangestu 2008: 150). He used this approach in drafting the Hong Kong declaration, and this enabled ministers to know where they needed to intensify negotiations to not waste time at the conference (TN/C/M/22 2006). As his term progressed, his brokering became more active. ‘Lamy tried to do the job as if it were the European Commission. And the worse it gets, the worse it gets.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).}
One WTO senior official observed that to be a good broker a director-general needs to allow divisions, ambassadors, and the Secretariat to support negotiations. Lamy’s brokering approach rarely engaged these actors.497 ‘A good DG uses his offices and respective directors for helping him be an arbitrator, a consensus maker of agreements. But he should be an informal arbitrator, a quiet broker among members.’498 He was brokering as if he were still Trade Commissioner, not director-general.

A DG has to listen to what people are not saying otherwise his ability to guide the organization is constrained. People often think: “if I say that I will get fired”. There are things they cannot say, concessions their governments could offer that could lead to consensus. So they have to give hints, and the DG needs to listen. Moore was good at this. Lamy is technically competent, but he doesn’t listen to what is not said.499

A WTO senior official argued that Lamy approached brokering with set ideas on outcomes.500 This may indicate why members resisted his influence and why his brokering failed to conclude the round, despite his political and technical skill.501

The effects of Lamy’s active brokering came to a head in 2010 when the Mexican delegate highlighted that: ‘the dimension of the discrepancies between members was in several cases broad-ranging. In other words, Members did not know how big the gaps were between their positions’ (WT/GC/M/126 2010: item 1, para 22). Lamy’s brokering approach failed to fulfil his obligations as TNC chair – where he obtains his formal brokering authority – by not reporting where consensus could be forged and where it was absent. The broker approach: ‘should oversee the situation, identify the key players, identify the holes in

497 Interviewed 20 May 2011.
498 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
499 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011.
500 Interviewed 20 September 2011.
501 WTO senior official, interviewed 7 June 2011; see also Kerremans (2011) and VanGrasstek (2013) pgs. 454-455.
negotiations, the bridges that can be made, but Lamy changed the system to be very French.\textsuperscript{502} His structural changes supported his active brokering and left little agency for those who did not comply with his enhanced role in negotiations.

Lamy also used an interventionist approach, such as writing reports for members without mandates and integrating finance and AFT into negotiations. ‘There should be no DG agenda of their own, but the DG does seek to put his stamp on the institution and push his own agenda into the institutional agenda.’\textsuperscript{503} He used the interventionist approach to advance both his and the institutional agenda. For example, he urged a chairman to implement new rules on transparency in RTAs in attempting to dissuade members from advancing regionalism over multilateralism (WT/GC/M/106 2007). He used this approach in negotiations and to resolve the 18-year dispute on import-preferences of bananas (TN/C/M/21 2006; WT/GC/M/114 2008). When the Caribbean Community expressed dissent to his influence, their objection was overcome by Lamy’s goal of resolving the dispute (TN/C/M/28 2008). ‘Where a strong DG is important, it is not to say a dictator is good. It can lead to an internal dispute.’\textsuperscript{504}

Lamy was ambitious, and he embodied what members perceived as an ideal director-general.\textsuperscript{505} ‘In reality, we know that it doesn’t work this way.’\textsuperscript{506} Lamy conceded there was pressure on him to fulfil this ideal. ‘The way they get to be guys like that is being 	extit{guys like that}. They are hard-working, dedicated; they are univision-esque, and they are strong

\textsuperscript{502} WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{503} WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
\textsuperscript{504} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{505} Interviewed 19, 23, 24, 25, and 30(b) May 2011.
\textsuperscript{506} Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.
Lamy’s approaches failed to secure a conclusion to the Doha Round, partly because he exceeded his authority, but ironically he was selected because of his strong leadership credentials. Members want a director-general to lead, not direct, but they also: ‘want someone like Sutherland, who could make the right decision at the right time.’ This requires a developed set of political skills, such as those Moore used to launch the DDA. Lamy’s leadership represents the conflicting nature of what members expect of the director-general. Whilst he may have surpassed his authority on many occasions, it is also a consequence of members’ failure to formally define the role of the director-general.

In summary, the analysis of Lamy’s four approaches support the notion that he failed to conclude the round and conflated decision-making roles because of how he led. He was a facilitator, broker, interventionist, and coercive leader, but his background influenced his leadership more than this spectrum of approaches. Members wanted him to take decisions but respect their authority. To an extent, Lamy was limited by an organisation in transition – old and new members, informal GATT norms and formal, UN-like WTO – but he exacerbated these limitations through his narrow strategies for influence. ‘The DG does not have as much control over diplomats and so the quality of results is outside your remit’, Lamy said; ‘You are the environment taker, not maker, like, say, someone from USTR.’ The examination of Lamy’s agency continues by investigating the tactics he used to influence decision-making.

507 WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.
508 WTO senior officials, interviewed 1(b) and 7 June 2011.
509 Interviewed 11 April 2014.
Tactics

Directors-general use tactics to influence how favourably the internal system, members, and agencies of global governance receive their leadership. This requires accurate intelligence about the internal system, members, and global governance, which Lamy did not have (Cox 1969; Haas 1990). He shared leadership with his deputies, took risks, and initiated new programmes to shape outcomes in his favour but like his resource exchanges, was unsuccessful because of how he used these tactics. Beginning with shared leadership with his deputies, he was an effective delegator; something a senior official argued is necessary for directors-general.\(^{510}\)

Under Lamy’s reorganisation of executive office, each deputy director-general was responsible for overseeing areas of WTO work and negotiations (WT/INF/98 2005). Deputy Valentine Rugwabiza (Rwanda), the first female deputy in GATT/WTO history, focused on development in the Doha Round, particularly through AFT (TN/C/M/28 2008). Yerxa (USA), also deputy under Supachai, was responsible for informal consultations on difficult areas of negotiations.\(^{511}\) Deputy Alejandro Jara (Chile) managed the DSB, including improving use and reducing costs of use for developing members (PRESS/667 2012; WT/GC/M/146 2013). Deputy Harsha Vardhana Singh (India) was involved in negotiations on e-commerce and improving coherence (WT/GC/M/141 2012).

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\(^{510}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011.

\(^{511}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September 2011 and from 2009, WT/GC/M/121.
Lamy relied on his deputies to provide him with intelligence in their respective areas.\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011; see also VanGrasstek (2013).} ‘You have to lead by proxy, through your DDGs… They were a way to have perspective on how I run my shop and my career.’\footnote{Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.} Lamy’s shared leadership with his deputies decreased WTO functioning by replicating the internal system within his Cabinet. ‘There does not need to be an expert on x, y, and z in the office of the DG. It’s a parallel structure, which is how it is here now. If you want experts, you have a whole committee for x, y, and z.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).} Lamy’s exclusive reliance on his Cabinet was a significant risk, but it was not the only risk he took.

The most significant risk Lamy took was failing to abide by the formal rules of the organisation in not holding regular TNC or ministerial meetings. He took risks in not seeking members’ mandates and in authoring the 2008 Lamy package that did not accurately reflect negotiating positions.\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011; see also Narlikar and Vickers (2009) pg. 13.} ‘I think he was expecting to have more power, and it was maybe frustrating to him that he didn’t.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.} He took risks by ignoring ambassadors, division heads, and the Secretariat and asking ministers to continually make further concessions to progress negotiations, which eventually led to the impasse. Zedillo (2008: 84) argued: ‘[Lamy] too must exercise personal leadership in the final stages of this endeavour, and take some risks of his own in “banging heads together”.’

The final tactic Lamy used was creating new programmes; he shaped institutions to enhance executive influence. ‘There was nothing I started in the WTO that did not come
to fruition, apart from the Round. Part of the skill of leadership is not bumping into walls. It’s a question of diagnosis.\footnote{Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.} He initiated a scheme of accrediting NGOs and the WTO Open Day to improve public relations, although: ‘members thought it was risky.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011; see also from 2009, WT/INF/152 2009.} ‘But there is nothing Lamy could do behind their backs, without their informal approval at least, even though he did this on his own.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011.} He created the WTO Chairs programme to improve teaching, research, and outreach in developing nations (PRESS/593 2010; VanGrasstek 2013). He worked with international organisations on his Made in the World initiative that focused on value-added trade or global supply chains to improve country of origin labelling, which targeted Doha negotiations.\footnote{See VanGrasstek (2013) for detail.}

‘With the Made in the World initiative, I didn’t ask for authority from members; I just did it. The G20 gave me enough legitimacy to do that; the role is dynamic.’\footnote{Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.} This was also the case with incorporating finance and AFT into the WTO agenda. The director-general has no formal power of agenda-setting, but informality in his role enables him to initiate new programmes. How those programmes come to define WTO work is subject to members’ approval, but Lamy used the Doha impasse to further integrate AFT (PRESS/429 2005). ‘Lamy has responded to the needs of the organization and facilitated the evolution of the organization via innovations in the institutions. Whether formal or informal, approval from the member states is required.’\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011.}

\footnote{Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.}
\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011; see also from 2009, WT/INF/152 2009.}
\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011.}
\footnote{See VanGrasstek (2013) for detail.}
\footnote{Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014.}
\footnote{WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011.}
The manner in which Lamy executed new programmes – such as his panel of Stakeholders on the Future of the WTO – to pursue his goals isolated him amongst members, even those that he had positive relations with like South Africa and India (WT/GC/M/136 2012). ‘Each Director-General has his own problems, and he faces them in terms of his own personality’ (Lacarte quoted in Cottier and Elsig 2011: 18). Lamy was unable to achieve a conclusion to the round; he used the tactic of creating new programmes to evolve WTO work.

Summary

The section has investigated the approaches and tactics Lamy used to condition decision-making and argued his active leadership adversely affected the round and WTO. The context of his terms did not bolster his efforts, but Lamy’s structural changes and strategies for influence decreased organisational functioning. The WTO did not achieve its goals under Lamy, but it did evolve. ‘Being an effective DG, to some degree, means being the right man, in the right place, at the right time, and having that “finer touch”’. Lamy did not have a nuanced approach; he asserted his authority and disengaged from those who challenged his power, highlighting the differences between his active leadership and Ruggiero and Moore’s. The analysis concludes by investigating if and how Lamy mattered by examining power.

\[523\] WTO senior official, interviewed 6 June 2011.
Power

The final section of the chapter analyses Lamy’s relations with the internal system, members, and global governance and the context that influenced Lamy’s ability to enhance his power. The chapter has argued that he had poor relations with staff and members, and this section emphasises the importance of relational power in executive leadership. To begin, the analysis investigates his limited ability to influence outcomes as rooted in his failure to exchange resources outside his elite network.

Power Relations

Actors and institutions engaged in decision-making typically change with respect to their relevance to the decision. Lamy’s elite network – his Cabinet and external advisors, the Quad+B(R)ICS, and the G20 – maintained consistent power to influence throughout his term. This section examines how Lamy’s power declined by excluding the Secretariat and less dominant members from decision-making. It also examines how his positive relations with agencies of global governance were damaged by his personal initiatives. Beginning with his relations with the internal system, sixty per cent of WTO senior officials interviewed believed Lamy had poor relations with the Secretariat because of his hierarchical management.\textsuperscript{524}

The institutional design of how the DG should interact with the Secretariat and personnel resembles two slightly overlapping circles. However, the way Lamy runs the DG is a very small circle at the top and a disconnected larger circle intentionally below it. Because of this the Secretariat do only what they are told, no more, no less. They are highly capable but they cannot do much

\textsuperscript{524} Interviewed 20, 23, 26(a), 27, and 30(b) May, 1(a), 1(b), 6, and 7 June, 19(b) and 20 September, and 11 December 2011.
because of how disconnected they have become. So as a consequence, everything falls back on the DG and his small elite circle.\textsuperscript{525}

He aimed to enhance his power with the Secretariat by directing research to shape the agenda and negotiations, similar to how Moore led the Secretariat despite their poor opinions of his education. A WTO senior official argued this was not within Lamy’s authority: ‘the Secretariat is in the service of committees, not the DG.’\textsuperscript{526} Lamy controlled information and decision-making either directly or through his deputies rather than allow member-driven institutions to function (WT/GC/M/135 2012). ‘The DG’s Cabinet maintains the divisions and authority, and the Cabinet is also charged with keeping him informed in order to keep the DG functioning. But the DG should rely on the expertise of the divisions, not duplicate that effort in his own Cabinet.’\textsuperscript{527}

He attempted to improve relations with the Secretariat by increasing their salary, but salary is a poor motivator in international civil service.\textsuperscript{528} ‘They have to feel that they are working for someone who appreciates what they are doing.’\textsuperscript{529} He decreased organisational functioning because he mismanaged the Secretariat. ‘Lamy alienated the Secretariat, and… by alienating them, he alienated a lot of knowledge.’\textsuperscript{530}

His limited power with the internal system affected members’ ability to negotiate; they were not receiving the support they needed from the Secretariat, as information was

\textsuperscript{525} WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{526} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
\textsuperscript{527} Interviewed 27 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{528} WTO senior officials, interviewed 1(a) and 6 June and 11 December 2011; see also Weiss (1982).
\textsuperscript{529} WTO senior official, interviewed 11 December 2011.
\textsuperscript{530} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 May 2011.
concentrated with Lamy. His AFT initiative became so embedded in negotiations that Lamy was compelled to remind members that it was not part of the single undertaking (WT/GC/M/108 2007). For the first two years, he had productive relations with members. He clarified ‘multi-layered decision-making’, and he was able to heighten his decision-making power and members’ dependence on his active political-technocrat leadership in negotiations.\(^{531}\) They needed Lamy: ‘to pull the rabbit out of the hat sooner rather than later. Otherwise, the WTO rules-based multilateral trading system ran the risk of withering in the vineyard of irrelevance’ (WT/GC/M/120 2009: item 1, para 31).

After the first two years of productive relations with member states, Lamy’s exclusion of ambassadors also reduced organisational efficiency (WT/GC/M/124 2010). Developing, LDC, and non-resident members highlighted that his preference for working with ministers was problematic for inclusive decision-making (WT/GC/M/120 2009; WT/GC/M/121 2009). He argued his reorganised decision-making structure was performing well, and individual member states’ accessibility issues should not stall negotiations (WT/GC/M/129 2011). He also preferred to negotiate with the Quad+B(R)ICS, which decreased his power with less dominant members. ‘The big players [in the Round] are the US, EU, China, India, and Brazil. These are the people you need to work with to get things done; without them on board, forget it!’\(^{532}\)

\(^{531}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b) and from 2009, WT/GC/M/121.

\(^{532}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011 and Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014; see also Blustein (2009).
Not all dominant members preferred to work with Lamy, and his poor relations with the USA was an essential factor in the failure to conclude the Doha Round.\textsuperscript{533} ‘Doha needs friends in America. The US feels Lamy will set them up as the villain.’\textsuperscript{534} The USA began to disengage with Doha under Supachai. When Lamy’s colleague, former USTR Zoellick, was selected to head the World Bank (2007-2012), his power with Zoellick’s replacement (Schwab) noticeably declined.\textsuperscript{535} ‘It’s Lamy’s major weakness that he’s “just a European”. The US doesn’t trust him, and in this organization, you have to have the US on your side. You cannot be a successful DG without good relations with the US.’\textsuperscript{536} The USA was not the only member that had poor relations with Lamy; his power with the EU and B(R)ICS also declined.\textsuperscript{537} ‘The big players don’t want Doha badly enough for it to be finished.’\textsuperscript{538}

Poor relations and lack of trust amongst members did not enhance his ability to conclude Doha, clarifying the seemingly paradoxical nature of his powerful role (Kerremans 2011).

Similar to his relations with the internal system or member states, Lamy had positive relations with global governance agencies in his first term. He was active in international organisation, attending or sending his deputies to G20, G8, and UNCEB meetings where UN executive heads discuss leadership in global governance.\textsuperscript{539} He also worked with the IMF, UNCTAD, OECD, ILO, UNDP, WIPO, and UN Environment Programme.\textsuperscript{540} He worked to cultivate strong relationships with global governance to influence the conclusion of the Doha Round. He also used his power in international organisation to pursue his

\textsuperscript{533} WTO senior officials, interviewed 23, 25, and 26(a) May, 19(b) and 20 September, and 11 December 2011.  
\textsuperscript{534} WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).  
\textsuperscript{535} WTO senior official, interviewed 20 September; see also from 2006, PRESS/439 and Blustein (2009).  
\textsuperscript{536} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).  
\textsuperscript{537} WTO senior officials, interviewed 19(b) September and 11 December 2011; see also Ismail (2009).  
\textsuperscript{538} WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).  
\textsuperscript{539} WTO senior officials, interviewed 24, 26(b), and 27 May 2011.  
\textsuperscript{540} Lamy, interviewed 11 April 2014 and WTO senior official, interviewed 25 May 2011.
objectives, like AFT, rather than attend to more general concerns about the multilateral system. A lot of Lamy’s regime is about schmoozing, but not for the WTO.

The chapter has argued that Lamy conflated the roles of WTO decision-makers, but he also blurred the role of the WTO in global governance. Whether intentional or unintentional, he used his power to pursue his objectives in global finance after the 2008 financial crisis. ‘Lamy proposed a global counterpart organisation to the WTO for financial regulation in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis.’ Three other WTO senior officials and Lamy’s speeches confirm he wanted to use his expertise on trade and finance to reshape global governance because it was ‘too weak’ to solve issues. ‘DGs are not member-driven, they seek their own policy direction. But there is the question of what drives that direction.’

Lamy’s leadership was driven, at least at times, by his future goals. He used his power with global governance to pursue his objectives, rather than address the changing nature of multilateral trade, which detracted from concluding the round. How he used his power within global governance contributes understanding on why active political-technocrats, like Lamy and Sutherland, are selected to conclude difficult negotiations, like the Doha or Uruguay Rounds. Active leaders seek to leave a legacy and can amass authority that enables them to overcome limitations. The chapter does not argue that Lamy abused his power. The role of the WTO director-general is informally defined because: ‘formality

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541 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
542 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
543 WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
544 WTO senior officials, interviewed 24, 25, and 30(a) May 2011; see also WTO (2015i).
545 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
does not serve to function.\textsuperscript{546} However, some formal definition could prevent active directors-general from becoming more powerful than members and impairing organisational functions.

To summarise, the analysis examined Lamy’s relations with the internal system, members, and global governance. Initially, his relationships were productive, and actors, agencies, and institutions were dependent on him to achieve and evolve WTO work. His power declined as he increasingly relied on his elite network and pursued his goals. Despite poor relations, he remained able to shape structures, actors, agencies, context, and power, because he expanded executive influence on WTO decision-making. This relatively weak power yielded apathy towards the WTO, which continued to impair a conclusion to Doha.

\textit{Power in Strategically-Selective Contexts}

The analysis of Lamy’s power concludes by exploring if and how he enhanced his power in strategically-selective context. The section examines institutional and global context to better understand how he exercised power over member-driven decision-making. Beginning with institutional context, the role of the director-general and of the TNC chair became indistinguishable under Lamy, and members were unclear who led negotiations (WT/GC/M/124 2010). In 2007 – when members edged towards a conclusion to the round – the Philippines argued this critical juncture required leadership: ‘by the Chairman of the [TNC] as Director-General’ (TN/C/M/27 2007: para 222). Lamy used this opportunity to broker with ministers, which gave him the advantage of a direct line to

\textsuperscript{546} WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
capitals. By working at the senior-level of negotiations, he transformed decision-making institutions. Members agreed he should engage with ministers, but they could not have foreseen that Lamy would expand his power and exclude ambassadors.

The 2005 Hong Kong ministerial also enhanced his authority through a coherence mandate. He used this mandate to relocate the Integrated Framework under his authority (WT/GC/M/115 2008). Lamy capitalised on expanding his authority by timing his initiatives when Doha was progressing. ‘How much the DG matters in global governance is within the G20 and UNCEB, and this depends on how important the Round is.'547 In 2006 when he suspended negotiations, the IMF, World Bank, and UN issued a joint statement that reflected his power in global governance had declined (WT/TF/COH/24 2006).

The global community looked to the G20 to resume negotiations, not Lamy (WT/TF/COH/25 2007). He attempted to heighten his authority by arguing that: ‘trade is the missing piece of the development puzzle’ and a ‘fundamental tool’ in fighting poverty (WTO 2015a; WTO 2015b). Once the round moved to the impasse, he used his initiatives on AFT, finance, and trade and the environment to maintain the WTO’s relevance in international organisation (WT/TF/COH/25 2007). ‘Lamy has increased the WTO’s interconnectedness on trade and climate change, but he has a hard time being important where the issue is not key in the WTO.’548

547 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 September 2011(b).
548 WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
He was astute at drawing on global financial and economic conditions to enhance his ability to pursue his goals.\(^{549}\) He obtained world leaders’ support against protectionism, and his leadership was instrumental in preventing the spread of protectionist policies, particularly in the USA and Australia (TN/C/M/29 2009; WTO 2015g). He used the 2009 World Trade Report to increase dependence on the WTO to resolve the financial crisis and linked WTO work to environmental sustainability, renewable energy, and peace (PRESS/565 2009). ‘An ideal DG can assume the future of the organisation, for example like an agenda item that could impact the future of trade, like Lamy did with climate change as a trade-related issue.’\(^{550}\) On most occasions, he was able to shape context and expand his role in decision-making.

**Summary**

The analysis of Lamy’s power revealed that he reduced WTO functioning by relying on elitism in an organisation that relies on consensus. In strategic terms, he never realised the potential of how to lead the WTO as the director-general, not Trade Commissioner. He was accustomed to pursuing his narrow interests through political and technical skill. As director-general, he needed to pursue objectives that facilitated consensus amongst members, not for members. He possessed considerable power in his first two years, but he did not adjust to the fluid, relational power embodied in WTO executive relations. This left him unable to conclude the round. He wanted to retain absolute power, more similar to a minister, and failed to respect the limits on his authority.

\(^{549}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(a); see also from 2007, PRESS/472 as example.  
\(^{550}\) WTO senior official, interviewed 30 May 2011(b).
Conclusion

The chapter has analysed Lamy’s term to address if and how his leadership mattered. It argued that Lamy’s active political-technocrat leadership influenced the failure to conclude the round that began in 2001. The Uruguay Round, the longest round in GATT/WTO history prior to Doha, spanned eight years, and members resolved never again would they negotiate such an expansive agenda. How he led also disaggregated multilevel decision-making that characterises trade governance, and this blurred institutional roles and impaired organisational functioning.

- The analysis of structure explored how Lamy expanded executive authority, including enabling more G20 influence on decision-making, but he led the WTO more like the UN or European Commission. This blurred roles and contributed to the impasse in concluding the DDA.
- The divisive context of his term reduced focus on development, and the absence of a ministerial conference for four years and economic recession did not bolster Lamy’s ability to achieve his goals. Members looked to protectionism and RTAs, and with negotiations in crisis, he focused on promoting his initiatives over members’ needs.
- Examining his resource exchanges revealed that though he was resourceful, he failed to enhance dependence on his leadership long-term because he used his resources to pursue his objectives, not organisational goals. He also limited his exchanges to his elite network, which did not improve his influence on negotiations.
• His approaches and tactics were limited by his inability to adapt his hierarchical background, unlike Ruggiero who came from a similar, traditional Westphalian system. He lacked trust, and this affected how his strategies were perceived.

• Investigating his relations and attempts to enhance his power in critical moments showed that Lamy failed to foster dependence on his leadership after two initially productive years. He had poor relations with the Secretariat, members outside the Quad+B(R)ICS, and global governance agencies. He used his power to develop his legacy, and actors and agencies disengaged from the WTO.

The case study has shown, like Supachai, that an ineffective director-general may have more of an impact than a ‘good one’, as Moore argued. Senior officials maintained that Lamy was the most qualified director-general to date, in large part because of his active political-technocrat leadership. It appeared paradoxical that though he consistently led this way, he was unable to influence a conclusion to the longest round in GATT/WTO history. The chapter clarified this paradox by showing how Lamy was too focused on expanding his power in a particular way.551 His strategies did not shape or accommodate members’ preferences enough to foster the trust and relations he needed to pursue his goals. However, Lamy’s eight years of leadership had profound effects on the organisation; he mattered. The chapter argues he mattered by expanding executive authority, but his inability to accommodate members’ trading needs and the interests of the multilateral system conditioned the extent to which he mattered.

551 WTO senior official, interviewed 23 May 2011.
Lamy’s leadership failed to address the changing nature of the multilateral system in which RTAs were perceived as preferable to deadlocked Doha negotiations where members remained divided on the role of the WTO in global development. His reliance on informal decision-making within his elite network furthered perceptions that developing members and development were not mainstreamed into the WTO. Though Lamy encouraged deeper engagement with civil society, major economies withdrew from Doha negotiations. This and his responses to the 2008 global financial crisis contributed to perceptions that the WTO was an inadequate forum for trade negotiations and development.

The themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time have been investigated through a case of the longest-serving WTO director-general. Lamy’s successor was in office for less than two years when he and members declared a conclusion to the Doha Round. The agreement on agriculture remains problematic, particularly between the USA and India, and the single undertaking has yet to be implemented. The WTO inherited the flaws of the GATT, such as, particularly American, exceptionalism and hegemony in decision-making, and to an extent, Lamy’s failures reflect these historic flaws and tensions. The WTO evolved in Lamy’s eight years, but he blurred roles of decision-makers and the organisation’s mandate within global governance. Some of Lamy’s changes enhanced the organisation, such as integrating the environment into WTO work; others limited organisational functioning, such as the reduced role of the Secretariat and ambassadors. Whilst Lamy’s leadership may have damaged the organisation, GATT norms continue to condition outcomes.
Four case studies have been explored to address the research questions on the nature of executive leadership in international organisation. The final chapter concludes the thesis by offering generalisations about if and how executive heads matter by adapting the knowledge produced in the specific context of the WTO to international organisation, more generally. The generalisations draw on the summaries, conclusions, figures, and tables produced from the four case studies. The conclusion is organised by first summarising the scope of the thesis and transitions to detailing the findings of the case studies. The chapter then discusses implications for future research and concludes by reflecting on the thesis’ contributions to the lacuna surrounding the executive head.
Conclusion: Power of Executive Leadership in International Organisation

Introduction

The thesis has argued that WTO directors-general (1995-2013) mattered, and how they mattered was conditioned by how they led and circumstances of their terms. This chapter summarises the thesis, discusses findings, and reflects on contributions to knowledge. The core findings explored in the chapter are that executive heads matter through:

• leading as an active politician,
• transforming structures of power,
• developing positive relations with the internal system, member states, and agencies of global governance, and
• enhancing power in critical moments by capitalising on context.

The chapter is organised around these four core claims; they are most likely to indicate if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation. The core claims allow the thesis to address the:

• research questions on if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation,
• core themes of politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time, and
• lacuna around the executive head.
The four core claims also support the thesis contribution to knowledge by establishing a heuristic for future research on politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time that takes both structure and agency seriously. The chapter develops how this heuristic may operate across different loci, and this establishes how the executive head can be incorporated into institutional analyses outside of the context of the WTO. It begins by summarising the thesis with a particular focus on the claims explored in the case studies.

**Thesis Summary**

Cox’s (1969) argument that executive heads matter was challenged by Weiss (1982) who contended that such claims had been exaggerated. This disjuncture served as the starting point for the thesis research. A review of the composite literature and limited approaches to incorporating the executive head can be organised around two distinct approaches – those that utilise agency-based explanations and those that assess leadership based on structures of power.

These approaches have produced a divided literature that argues that executive leadership matters greatly or little, if at all. The literature also lacks a focus on the executive head as the unit of analysis. This has contributed to a lacuna that, for example, lacks the ability to analyse whether Annan’s MDGs contributed to empirical or normative change or Kim has negated Wolfensohn’s transformation of the World Bank. The lacuna around the executive head characterises literature that lacks clarity in explaining why executive heads appear only to matter for the short duration of their selection process, as was the case with Lagarde replacing Strauss-Kahn at the IMF, or in crisis (Sengupta 2014). The current literature
reflects how researchers have poorly theorised and inadequately integrated the executive head into institutional analyses. This characterises the knowledge gap that the thesis aims to address.

The thesis seeks to move beyond the somewhat deterministic perspectives on executive leadership. It aims to offer a richer, more nuanced conceptual approach that enables leadership of executive heads – within and outside the context of the WTO – to be assessed. The thesis argued that the nature of executive leadership in international organisation is complex – involving actors with competing goals in highly politicised environments – and requires general and specific knowledge of leadership and international agencies. Building on GATT and WTO history, the case studies explored if and how the vaguely defined director-general shaped outcomes in member-driven decision-making. In this context and across other loci, the conceptual framework offers a mechanism for incorporating executive leadership to more accurately understand politics, power, and change over time in international organisation.

The first case study assessed the leadership of the first full-term director-general of the WTO, Ruggiero (1995-1999). Chapter Five explored the claims that he:

- established the formal, rules-based WTO but
- failed in launching the first round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Ruggiero was an active political-technocrat who was constrained by members’ failure to clarify the role of the director-general at the first ministerial conference. He established the
WTO as a major, independent agency of global governance but was unable to launch a trade round because of his leadership around divisions on the development gap.

Ruggiero’s successor, Moore (1999-2002), was able to launch a round despite the constraints of his term. Chapter Six investigated the claims that he:

- was responsible for the launch of the first round of trade negotiations and
- fundamentally changed the WTO, in consideration of its history.

He built on Ruggiero’s legacy by transforming the organisation’s reliance on GATT norms. The case study analysed how, as active politician, Moore enhanced executive and developing members’ influence on decision-making. He contributed to the organisation’s survival, achievement, and evolution in a critical moment in the WTO’s history. He supported the WTO’s mandate to liberalise trade with a normative focus on development.

Supachai (2002-2005), the first developing nation director-general, was constrained by the same, three-year, non-renewable term that shaped Moore’s leadership. Chapter Seven assessed how his passive technocrat leadership:

- failed to progress the DDA or WTO as a development organisation and
- failed to prevent a return to GATT power dynamics.

He allowed members’ self-interests to shape his goals and led as if he was a minister, not a director-general. Under his leadership, the WTO became more UN-like – paralysed by a plurality of interests with an exclusive decision-making network. His leadership eroded the
enhanced influence of the director-general and developing members that Moore facilitated and reproduced the Quad’s dominance over decision-making.

Lamy (2005-2013), the subject of the final case study, led the WTO as if it were the European Commission, through an exclusive, hierarchical decision-making network. Chapter Eight examined the claims that he:

- failed to conclude the Doha Round and
- blurred institutional roles.

An active political-technocrat, Lamy furthered executive influence on member-driven decisions, but the chapter revealed a paradox. Though he had extensive power, he failed to affect decision-making after his first two years. His focus on his goals, over members’, revealed a disconnected Secretariat, membership, and WTO. A new coalition of dominant decision-makers emerged, as many members elected to pursue RTAs over the DDA.

Chapters Five through Eight argued that each of the four directors-general mattered because their leadership affected outcomes. How they mattered was contingent on how they led and the circumstances of their term. Within the case studies, Moore mattered most by launching the DDA and fundamentally changing the WTO, intrinsically and extrinsically. Supachai’s leadership affected international organisation least, but he facilitated a return to GATT power dynamics, which affected outcomes in the WTO and global governance. This summary enables the chapter to reflect on findings from the case study to make a series of wider generalisations about the nature of executive leadership in international politics.
Thesis Findings

This section makes generalisations about the nature of executive leadership in international organisation from the case study of WTO directors-general to address the research questions. Like the conceptual framework and archetype matrix developed in the thesis, findings are applicable to international agencies, particularly ones that are ‘similar enough’ to the WTO (Sartori 1970: 1035). These are major international agencies with near-universal membership where executive authority over member states is limited.

Generalising findings, or ‘concept travelling’, is: ‘the effort to achieve broader knowledge through analyzing a wider range of cases’ (Collier and Mahon 1993: 846). Extending findings on executive leadership in the WTO to other major global governance agencies broadens understanding of the role of the executive head in international organisation. When findings, conceptual approaches, and methods are extended to organisations that are not similar enough, ‘concept stretching’ can occur (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993).

Beginning with the first research question, the thesis argues that executive leadership matters because executive heads affect organisational outcomes. Some leaders, like Moore, matter more by actively shaping decisions that lead to a series of normative changes in international organisation. Others, like Ruggiero, matter by establishing the role of the organisation and its executive head in global governance but perhaps less so. The
executive that matters more uses their authority to shape power dynamics that are fluid and relational. Executive heads have power to shape actors’ strategies for influence and how those strategies are perceived.

Executive heads – even in member-driven organisations where their decision-making authority is limited – possess superior administrative and managerial power (Weber [1983], 1997). This gives them considerable authority and resources to affect member-driven decision-making. The case study revealed that four WTO executive heads influenced decision-making that affected internal and external, national and international outcomes. Executive leadership, within and outside of the context of the WTO, matters by possessing the ability to impact politics, power, and change over time. ‘Executive leadership matters, but it is conditional of the functions that it serves.’

To address the second research question, the thesis avers that how an executive head matters is contingent on how they led and the circumstances of their term. Some executive heads matter more than others, but this is contingent. The conceptual framework adds value to the contingency approach, reviewed in Chapter Two, where the major premise was that circumstance influences how leadership matters, particularly in crisis. Contra the contingency approach, the conceptual framework argues that context, alone, does not condition executive leadership. Institutions, networks, resource exchange, approach, tactics, relationships, and strategically-selective environments influence how executive leadership matters. This framework allows for deeper understanding of how leadership matters beyond its role in crisis.

552 WTO senior official, interviewed 19 May 2011.
Some executives matter more because they have the power to achieve large goals, like launching a trade round. Others possess less power but achieve smaller goals, like formalising the rules-based system. The case studies reveal that, like some executives, some findings matter more than others. Four core findings, outlined in the introduction, are more likely to indicate how executive leadership matters or explain how some executive heads matter more than others. This is because the core findings focus on power relations that affect mutual dependence in international politics. Some executive heads are unable or less able to influence power relations because of the circumstances of their term. The chapter also presents three subsidiary findings on how less powerful executive leadership matters. Whilst the core findings are more likely to indicate how executive leadership matters, the subsidiary findings reflect how less powerful executive heads also impact international organisation.

Core Findings

The core findings reflect how executives with limited decision-making authority are able to use their position to affect power dynamics. This study reveals that in the case of the WTO, executive heads are more likely to matter where they have:

- been an active politician: pursued their goals, not members’, and used political skill to achieve their objectives,
- transformed structures of power: improved their influence on decision-making where their authority was limited,
• had positive relationships with the internal system, members, and agencies of global governance: used these relationships to develop their vision of leadership, and
• enhanced their power in critical moments: reflexively responding to their strategically-selective context to enhance dependence on their leadership.

I. Pursuing Objectives with Political Skill

Beginning with the finding that an active politician is more likely to matter, WTO and World Bank senior officials argued that how an executive head matters is shaped by how they lead, which they referred to as ‘vision’. ‘Vision can bring a fundamental shift in the Bank’s culture.’

A WTO senior official argued that the director-general has power, but the extent that they use their power depends on the specific director-general. ‘Authority is delegated out, and the DG’s power is derived from how he manages his position.’

Weiss (1982), Shaffer (1993), Murphy (1994), and Cox and Sinclair (1996) also emphasised an executive’s vision in maintaining the neutrality of their office and facilitating the liberal vision of international organisation, which responds to normative ideas on how global governance should respond to global issues like development. Vision can be interpreted as being driven by the individual leader or member states’ goals, which allows it to be categorised as ‘active’ or ‘passive’ on the archetype matrix (Figure 9.1). When plotting executive leadership on the matrix, the extent to which an executive head falls within the archetype should be indicated spatially. For example, Lamy was more of a technocrat than

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553 World Bank senior official, interviewed 7 November 2012(a).
554 Interviewed 30 May 2011(a).
555 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(b).
a politician; his leadership is plotted more towards the technocrat side of the politician-technocrat spectrum.

Figure 9.1: Archetype matrix (WTO directors-general 1995-2013)

The finding highlights that active leaders are more likely to matter because they pursue their vision for international organisation, not members’ goals. Hay (1999) made a similar argument when examining the strategies of the British ‘New’ Labour Party. Vision is similar to what Hay (1999) called ‘preference-shaping’ and ‘preference-accommodating’ in ‘refining, defining, and redefining’ executive strategies for influence (Hay 1999: 95). ‘Vision
helps when he is trying to influence or persuade member states, and vision is important for the evolution of the WTO.\textsuperscript{556}

As the case studies and senior officials argued, the executive head must protect the organisation from being co-opted by members’ self-interests, and this helps establish why active leadership matters more. An organisation and its executive head are deeply connected; the survival of one ensures the tenure of the other. This is more the case if the executive head pursues their goals, underpinned by the interests of the multilateral system. Members’ goals, unlike the executive’s, are not tied to organisational survival, achievement, and evolution. If members fail to achieve their goals in an organisation, they are free to pursue those goals elsewhere, as many WTO member states have elected to do through RTAs, UNCTAD, or the OECD.

Ruggiero, Moore, and Lamy were active directors-general. Their vision aimed to better integrate developing and LDC members into the multilateral trading system. They attempted to shape and accommodate members’ preferences on trade and development to integrate developing states, which constituted the majority of WTO membership. They mattered more because they actively pursued their vision for trade governance in the new multipolar organisational dynamic, which was tied to the survival, achievement, and evolution of the WTO. Whereas the success of dominant member states was not as strongly linked to better integration of developing members, and this helps explain why Supachai’s passive leadership mattered less.

\textsuperscript{556} WTO senior official, interviewed 1 June 2011(a).
Supachai allowed members to direct him, and he accommodated dominant members’ preferences, which facilitated a return to GATT norms and failed to advance the DDA. His leadership did not reflect his vision for developing members or shape dominant members’ preferences around his vision (see Panitchpakdi and Clifford 2002). The WTO, like most international organisations, is member-driven; a director-general should be guided by members. However, the role of the executive head is to steer members away from their constituent positions, towards cooperative decision-making to preserve the functioning of the multilateral system. In Chapter Eight, members struggled with the single undertaking, and Lamy argued the decision-making institution was intended to coerce members’ cooperation, particularly in establishing consensus in difficult negotiations. The executive head is another institution designed to facilitate cooperation within the multilateral system.

The finding also indicates that a politician matters more than a technocrat or political-technocrat. WTO senior officials reiterated that a technocrat was better suited to lead the GATT. Conversely, the WTO, a major organisation of global governance, needs a leader with a developed set of political skills. Moore was not a technocrat. This made him unpopular with the Secretariat, but it encouraged him to engage with less dominant institutions and networks, take risks, and share leadership more widely to accommodate for his weaknesses. A politician uses political skill to enhance their power and identifies the appropriate actors and institutions to facilitate cooperation. They have powerful networks or know how to construct them to exchange resources strategically to foster dependence. A politician knows that if they fail, they lose their job; they are aware of the consequences of failing to persuade.
II. Transforming Limited Executive Authority

The second core finding suggests that an executive head is more likely to matter if they transform structures of power to confer their influence on decision-making. There are similarities and differences that emerge from the case studies around how executive heads use their authority. Table 9.1 lists how the directors-general used their formal (F) and informal (I) authority in the core governing bodies. Formal authority, as highlighted in Chapter Three, is authority granted in the organisational charter, such as the WTO Agreement (1999). Informal authority, as the first core finding argued, reflects how directors-general carve out their authority. ‘Unanimous authority’ indicates that all four directors-general exercised the powers listed on the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unanimous authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present budget (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct research (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call working parties (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register trade protocols (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comply with members’ mandates (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author reports at members’ request (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure conditions of service for staff (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appoint DSB panel members when agreement cannot be reached (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker disputes (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on external events (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaise with other organisations (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administer technical assistance (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remind members of unfinished work (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement Uruguay Round agreements (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appoint Appellate Body with Committee of Six (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare ministerial conference agenda drafts (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspect resources for ministerial conferences (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker negotiations through informal consultations (I)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several WTO senior officials argued that if and how a director-general matters is less determined by their authority and more dependent on how they lead and the circumstances of their term. This contingent nature of leadership in international organisation conditions
if and how executive heads are able to transform structures to enhance their power, which the archetype matrix and conceptual approach provide a mechanism for exploring. Table 9.1 reflects the myriad resources that executive heads can exchange to transform structures and reinforces the argument that executive leadership in the WTO – and perhaps in other international agencies – is contextual and relational.

Table 9.2 focuses on the ‘Divergent authority’, which reflects powers that not all directors-general used, to better understand the contextual, relational nature of executive leadership. Table 9.2 reflects that Ruggiero’s ability to transform structures was constrained. His political-technocrat leadership, relations with developing member states, and the context of his term contributed to his authority being restricted to seven of the 18 powers that succeeding directors-general were able to utilise. Moore exercised six; his constraints reflect his lack of technocratic leadership and his poor relations with the internal system. Supachai used eleven of 18, and Lamy employed 15 of the formal and informal powers of the director-general. Lamy’s enhanced authority reflects his political-technocrat leadership, but his inability to use this enhanced authority is indicative of his poor relations with the internal system, members, and global governance agencies.
Table 9.2: Expanded authority of the WTO directors-general (1999-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divergent authority</th>
<th>Ruggiero</th>
<th>Moore</th>
<th>Supachai</th>
<th>Lamy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author independent reports</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold consultations with members in arrears</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appoint Integrated Framework executive secretary</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Future of Trade</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide consultations on changes to Appellate Review Body</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair primary negotiating body</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broker negotiations in TNC</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report consensus and/or differing positions to General Council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on technical assistance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offer good offices</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide regular assessment of the Integrated Framework</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address the media following DSB ruling</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author annual TPRM reports</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiate terms of WTO headquarters</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Integrated Framework</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on training activities</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notify intentions to appoint deputies director-general</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.2 also indicates how technocrats are able to expand their authority using their technical knowledge, as Haas (1964, 1990) and Murphy (1994, 2005) argued. Executive influence in core governing bodies improved under Supachai. Executive authority was
mostly enhanced when members reproduced the GATT norm of the director-general chairing the TNC, although this power was expanded under Moore, not Supachai. This is not reflected in Table 9.2 because Moore received this authority in January 2002, eight months before his term ended. The TNC met only twice before his term concluded, and the second time, Moore transferred authority to Supachai.

Table 9.2 shows that directors-general have enhanced their authority over time, and their improved authority has facilitated their increased role in decision-making, which was highly constrained in the WTO Agreement (1999) and Ruggiero’s term. It highlights that under Supachai and Lamy, particularly, dependence on executive leadership increased. This increased dependence has afforded directors-general the power to transform structures to enhance their influence on member-driven institutions. This reveals the extent to which executive heads can matter in member-driven organisations by affecting structures of power (Haas 1964, 1990; Cox 1969; Cox and Jacobson 1974; Burns 1978; Weiss 1982; Sheffer 1993; Tucker ([1981], 1995).

III. Developing and Dispersing Vision

The third core finding posits that an executive head is more likely to matter if they have secured positive, working relations with the internal system, member states, and global governance agencies. This supports Cox’s (1969) contribution but also updates his arguments about the most powerful states to reflect the multipolar dynamic in contemporary international politics.
Positive relationships help executive heads to develop their vision through gathering intelligence and dispersing that vision by shaping actors’ strategies and transforming institutions. With the internal system, an executive head needs to motivate and allow the secretariat and divisions to function independently; this is done through delegating and information management. Cox (1969) argued that an executive head uses intelligence to motivate secretariats but also to monitor dominant member states.

The thesis argues that Cox’s contribution, while offering a useful mechanism for examining executive relations, is somewhat limited in contemporary international organisation. The conceptual framework adds value to Cox’s contribution by examining executive relations outside of dominant member states. Executive heads that matter more gather intelligence on all members, not only the most powerful, as Moore did in the year between Seattle and Doha. In the WTO, dominant members possess more resources, but less dominant members have power through consensus decision-making. They also constitute the majority of the membership and can use their majority in forming alliances or other tactics.

It appears an executive’s relations with the USA, in particular, has a significant impact on the extent that leadership can influence outcomes. Lamy’s relationship with USTR emerged repeatedly as an explanatory factor for his inability to conclude the Round. Conversely, Ruggiero and Moore’s positive relations with the USA appeared to bolster their leadership. The significance of good relations with the USA, in the case of the WTO, reflects on the importance of historical context and norms in executive leadership. World Bank officials expressed similar arguments about the importance of positive relations with
the USA. It is likely that this is also the case in other major global governance agencies, such as the UN and ILO, reflecting that the conceptual framework may have utility in other loci.

The finding reflects that in 21st century international organisations, executive heads cannot rely on dominant states alone in developing and dispersing their vision. They should also use intelligence to disperse their vision in the internal and international system. This could have improved Lamy’s ability to conclude the Doha Round, particularly in the drafting of the Lamy text, transitioning resources to AFT when Doha was at an impasse, and his initiatives on finance regulation. Having positive relations with both dominant and less-dominant actors fosters trust-building in organisations that operate on consensus, even if formal decision-making is conducted through voting. In the WTO and World Bank, senior officials regarded trust as the most important factor in an executive’s relations with both the internal system and members. “Trust is key. Without trust, he cannot function; he has no influence, especially in the Secretariat, asking them to work harder for longer. Trust can improve or decrease cooperation between members.”

Cox (1969) also argued that an effective executive uses global governance to promote their leadership and the importance of the agency in international organisation. An executive head matters by making their goals part of the global governance agenda. Moore, in part, mattered more because the DDA distinguished the WTO from the GATT as a development organisation. This cemented the fundamental importance of the WTO in

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557 World Bank senior official, interviewed 7 November 2012(b) indicated that most decisions by the Board of Directors are taken by consensus and rarely come to a vote.
558 WTO senior official, interviewed 27 May 2011.
securing development objectives within global governance, beyond its highly technical trade negotiations, monitoring, and legal fora. The DDA supported the MDGs, and the MDGs reinforced DDA objectives, making the WTO and UN mutually dependent. How much an executive head matters then can be assessed through mutually dependent relations with global governance, member states, and the internal system. This finding updates Cox’s (1969) argument and supports the use of the conceptual framework in other contexts.

IV. Enhancing Dependence in Strategically-Selective Environments

The fourth core finding reflects that an executive that matters more enhances their power at critical moments; this can be done by manipulating context, exchanging resources, or using varied approaches. In Figure 9.2, Ruggiero’s failure to launch a round can be attributed to his inability to enhance his power in strategically-selective context, particularly when compared to Moore (Figure 9.3). Both Ruggiero and Moore exchanged resources widely and used varied approaches, which highlights the importance of manipulating context to improve the ability to influence member-driven decision-making.
Figure 9.2: Ruggiero’s power model

Figure 9.3: Moore’s power model
Figures 9.4 and 9.5 – Supachai and Lamy’s power models – further establish the importance of manipulating context. Supachai was unable to further enhance his power in strategically-selective context, which contributed to his failure to prevent a return to GATT norms and inability to advance the WTO as a development organisation. Figure 9.4 also reflects that Supachai did not exchange resources widely or use varied approaches, which contributed to his leadership mattering less when compared to the other directors-general. Lamy’s power model (Figure 9.5) mirrors Moore’s (Figure 9.3), but Lamy was unable to use his enhanced power because of his active political-technocrat leadership, poor relations, and lack of trust. When compared, these findings begin to reveal a generalisable pattern of executive influence in the WTO that can be extended to similar international agencies.
Figure 9.5: Lamy's power model
To summarise, these core findings reveal how executive heads matter by affecting power dynamics through: how they lead, their influence on structure, their relationships, and their ability to enhance their power in critical moments. As highlighted above, a pattern emerges that contributes understanding about the inherent tensions between member states and executive leadership. The pattern is particularly observable in the contextual factors of Figures 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. Ruggiero’s power was constrained; Moore enhanced executive authority; Supachai was unable to use this expanded authority; and Lamy expanded the office of the director-general further. The pattern mirrors an alternating pendulum that indicates members’ preferences on executive leadership. This can be understood in terms of the nature of power in international organisation as being ‘in constant flux’.

There is a dialectical relationship here, in terms of executive leadership being shaped by perceptions and legacies of previous leadership, further demonstrating the contingent nature of how leadership matters.

**Subsidiary Findings**

The core findings best reflect how an executive head can matter more by affecting power dynamics, but executive heads that matter less can have a significant impact on organisational change over time. The subsidiary findings highlight how leadership matters if executives are unable to affect power relations. For example, Ruggiero’s lack of power to launch the first trade round may have more to do with fresh memories of Sutherland forcing through Uruguay Round agreements than Ruggiero’s leadership, as highlighted above. He established the formal, rules-based system, and while this may appear to matter

559 WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
less – in comparison to Moore – Ruggiero shaped the historical and contemporary WTO.

Three subsidiary findings argue that executive leadership matters by:

- exchanging resources widely,
- facilitating and brokering, and
- taking risks and creating new programmes.

First, an executive head must exchange resources widely to effectively achieve their goals. Exchanging the resource of shared leadership (delegating), for example, can support an executive head’s strategies for influence and ability to prioritise. Lamy may have been able to gather better intelligence to improve his oversight and strategies if he delegated more authority outside of his Cabinet. Similarly, Supachai may have been able to influence outcomes at critical moments of DDA negotiations if he exchanged resources more widely.

Second, an executive head is important in terms of acting as a facilitator and broker. ‘Authority and influence come with being an honest broker. Perception is important. In this respect, facilitators are the most successful’\textsuperscript{560}. The facilitator approach was developed as being indicative of executive leadership in the GATT/WTO. Similar claims have been made about executive leadership in other international agencies, which further supports the claim that the conceptual framework may have utility outside of the context of the WTO (Meyers 1976; Gordenker [2005], 2010; Chesterman 2007; Hughes and Haworth 2011; VanGrasstek 2013). ‘Organizations are resistant to change’, and these approaches appear

\textsuperscript{560} WTO senior official, interviewed 26 May 2011(a).
to be effective in enhancing executive leadership’s ability to persuade. The coercive and interventionist approaches can be effective at times, but as Moore learned, they must be used strategically and target low-risk or noncontroversial outcomes.

Third, an executive head that matters takes risks and creates new programmes, but this requires the resource of trust. Both of these tactics allowed Moore to create a legacy in his three short years as director-general. Moore took risks, and his risk taking could be attributed to how he led the organisation. A WTO senior official recalls Moore believed: ‘Sometimes violence is the answer’. Another recalled Moore: ‘operated with these sheets of yellow paper, and he would scribble something short down on them, hand it to someone, and expect it to be done; no matter how ridiculous it was… but he took decisions that no one else would make.’

A World Bank official offered an almost identical account of former Managing Director (1991-1995) and occasional acting President Ernie Stern. This also reflects on the inherent tensions between members and executive leadership; they want executive heads to lead, not direct, but also take difficult decisions when members are unable to decide amongst themselves. Members are perhaps not in the best position to select or assess their executive head, as their self-interests inhibit them from understanding the pivotal role leadership can and has played in international organisation. This contributes understanding as to why Lamy created many new programmes and took consequential risks, like working

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561 World Bank senior official, interviewed 1 November 2012(b).
562 Interviewed 6 June 2011.
563 Interviewed 23 May 2011.
564 Interviewed 1 November 2012(b); see also Thomson (1993).
almost exclusively with G20 ministers. He was aware of the limitations of member-driven
decision-making in organisations where states pursue their self-interests.

In summary, the subsidiary findings reflect that while leadership that matters more affects
power dynamics, there are executives that are unable to do so because of circumstances
beyond their influence. The core and subsidiary findings represent significant
contributions to knowledge about politics, power, executive leadership, and change over
time that have utility in other cases of executive leadership in international organisation.
The contributions of the conceptual framework and archetype matrix also allow the
executive head to be incorporated as the unit of analysis or to complement institutional
analysis for a richer understanding of how actors, institutions, and context affect outcomes.
The chapter discusses how contributions to knowledge made within the thesis shape future
research to conclude.

Thesis Contributions

From the Introduction chapter to Chapter Four, the thesis argued that the lacuna
surrounding the executive head was problematic. The difficulty of addressing if and how
executive leadership matters with a composite literature are obvious barriers to research. A
greater challenge confronting the research was the extent to which it aimed to address the
research questions and core themes with an absence of suitable conceptual frameworks
available from within the limited literature. This section outlines the theoretical and
empirical contributions of the thesis; it discusses the limitations of these contributions and
how the thesis shapes future research.
Contributions to the Lacuna

First, the thesis makes a theoretical contribution by adapting a rich conceptual framework for incorporating the executive head into the WTO literature and the broader literature within global governance. The core executive-power dependence framework allows for the complex nature of executive leadership to be investigated in a way that does not prefer agential or structural approaches. The analytical framework argues that both structure and agency matter through their dialectical interaction, which helps researchers better understand observable and unobservable political life.

It draws on institutional history, contextual rules of the game, and power dynamics to analyse leadership in context and its impact on change over time. It offers the ability to investigate leadership that has a deep impact on international politics, such as Annan’s MDGs, and leadership that has a smaller, more localised effect, like Wolfensohn’s transformation of the World Bank. It has utility in analysing leadership in crisis but also contributes understanding on how executive heads matter beyond the brief media sensation over their selection process, such as Lagarde’s selection to the IMF. The contribution of the conceptual framework has enabled the lacuna, research questions, and core themes to be addressed and provided a heuristic for incorporating the executive head. The prospects for incorporating the executive head have larger implications for knowledge about the efficiency and effectiveness of decision-making institutions.
Within the WTO, the failure to include the director-general has stimulated a ‘reformist’ literature that argues the organisation requires restructuring to improve decision-making, which derails confidence in the multilateral system (Blustein 2009; Ismail 2009a; Narlikar and Vickers 2009; Steger 2009; Wilkinson 2011). This assumption has furthered the proliferation of extensive RTAs, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Additionally, WTO scholarship that includes the executive head lacks focus on how executive leadership affects decision-making (Wilkinson 2006; VanGrasstek 2013). Disciplinary knowledge will continue to lack richness as long as executive leadership remains cursory and tangential in institutional analysis.

The second contribution is empirical. Much of the existing literature simply assumes leadership matters without seeking to either question or at least make the case as to whether it does so. This thesis argues that understanding the nature of executive leadership contributes knowledge about complex causal mechanisms and change over time. With this knowledge, future scholarship should include the executive head to overcome the issue. Additionally, only a limited literature analyses how executive leadership influences outcomes, and only Cox’s essay offers equal treatment of structure and agency in explaining how leadership affects change over time. A core contribution of the thesis is to reveal both the contingent nature and influence of executive leadership, even in organisations where executive authority is perceived to be highly constrained.

The thesis contributes four core and three subsidiary findings on how executive leadership matters. Just as Chapter One argued there is no singular way to lead effectively, there are
myriad ways that an executive head can affect change, large or small, within the organisation or global governance. What the thesis reveals is that legacy is malleable. The change an executive produces can be negated or dulled by succeeding leaders, as was the case with Moore and Wolfensohn.

Executive leadership may be more effective at shaping short-term or transitional change than the long-term evolution of international organisation. Organisational norms are deeply-embedded in institutional cultures, and the most powerful leaders are still limited by the durability of norms in conditioning strategies. Few, if any, WTO scholars would argue that the WTO today is the development organisation as it was from 2001 to 2004. Whilst executive heads matter, this underscores that change in international organisation is largely member-driven. Member states remain the core drivers of change, and their preferences shape, but do not necessarily accommodate, executive leadership. Member states – at least the most powerful, as it has been argued – prefer stability and continuity to fundamental change and transformation (North 1990b).

The empirical contribution not only improves understanding about outcomes in international politics, but it also allows researchers to build on knowledge about politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time. Knowing how executive leadership matters enables researchers to incorporate the executive head into their particular area of research. For example, research interested in:

- exploring the actors and institutions driving economic development in global governance (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010) could examine the durability of
structural transformations made by executive heads as part of an institutional analysis or

- investigating how individual and/or collective actors facilitate long-term change (Moravcsik 1999) could assess the impact of new programmes initiated by executive heads as part of this inquiry.

The empirical contributions of the thesis allow the executive head to be incorporated into the discipline as the unit of analysis or to complement institutional analyses.

Limitations on the Contributions

The theoretical and empirical contributions are limited in two ways. The first limitation concerned a well-established methodological challenge at the doctoral level involving limited access to elites. The method and sample size of elite interviews were constrained due to the junior researcher’s limited network. Limited resources of funding and time further restricted methodology, discussed in detail in Chapter Four. As is normally the case with a PhD thesis, access to greater resources, most notably time and finances, would have allowed for the empirical element of the study to have been broadened to investigate executive leadership in the WTO, World Bank, IMF, and UN. This, in turn, would have allowed for a richer and more extensive comparative understanding of the role of executive leadership in global governance. Whilst it is doubtful that these limitations affected the overall findings and contributions of the thesis, the rigour could be enhanced with increased access to elites, larger sample size, and enhanced funding and time to conduct the research. Most specifically, the inability to secure interviews with both Ruggiero and
Supachai and a number of senior officials serving under them, resulted in partial accounts of their terms in office, compared to the other two cases.

The second limitation concerns the critical realist and idiographic traditions about the nature of generalisations. To allow for concept travelling – and avoid accusations of concept stretching – the findings confront the extent to which the case of executive leadership in the WTO is atypical or can be applied to other loci. The WTO is one of the only major international agencies where executive authority is not shared with a committee or board, as highlighted in Chapter Four. This makes the WTO an appropriate case for investigating the research questions, but how similar are other executive heads to the WTO director-general?

The ILO director-general is the most similar to the WTO executive, but the organisational structure differs considerably (Hughes and Haworth 2011). The Bretton Woods and UN Common System organisations disperse executive authority, although administrative and management power is concentrated with a single executive. It is important to reflect on the core and subsidiary findings to accommodate for idiosyncrasies across executive leadership in international organisation.

The findings posit that an executive head matters more by affecting power dynamics, and an executive head that does not share power is in a more advantageous position to influence power relations. For heads that share executive authority, they are more likely to matter in ways highlighted in the subsidiary findings, as they typically have a reduced ability
to shape power dynamics. A reason the conclusion has discussed seven findings is because it is difficult to generalise from a single case study with respect to the epistemological and idiographic position of the thesis. However, the contributions and limitations of the thesis can be used to shape future research.

Contributions to Future Research

There are two areas that the thesis can contribute to future scholarship: within the WTO and the broader literature on global governance. Beginning with how the thesis shapes future knowledge of the WTO, it has been highlighted that Director-General Azevêdo (2013-present), concluded the Doha Round. Whilst this is accurate, it is not entirely true. At the WTO’s ninth ministerial conference in 2013, Azevêdo and members completed the ‘Bali package’ of Doha agreements. The Bali package is ‘Doha lite’, which Lamy refused during his term to uphold the single undertaking rule.

Even by narrowing the DDA, Azevêdo has had difficulty leading members through the recent impasse on the Bali package, particularly in agriculture with the USA and India and the single undertaking (Bellman 2014; Bridges 2015). The GATT norms of American hegemony and exceptionalism and informality continue to shape outcomes in the WTO, and the conclusion of the Doha Round has achieved little development, for which the DDA was named (Wilkinson, Hannah, and Scott 2014). The WTO, like many international organisations, has failed to evolve (long-term) towards 21st century, multipolar global governance (Wolfe 2015).
Whilst the thesis could be extended to include Azevêdo’s leadership, his first term does not end until 2017, and there is no indication of whether he will run for a second term. Future research could examine Moore’s transformational leadership at the WTO, the actors, institutions, and agencies that negated Moore’s pro-development influence on the WTO, and Azevêdo’s efforts to preserve development. Further exploration of the WTO directors-general could also examine how candidates conform or deviate from the traditional backgrounds of GATT/WTO executives and how their conformist or deviant background conditions perceptions of executive leadership. The emphasis here would be on well-established studies of elites, which might offer different perspective on the role played by historical and institutional norms in shaping the role of executive leadership by potentially reproducing Western, neoliberal trade governance (see Gill 2011). The scholarship would also be better placed to address normative global governance through trade liberalisation over time by examining the role of the director-general and collective actors in promoting development. This research would indicate the extent to which executive leadership shapes normative outcomes, which could aid the WTO in holding its leadership and/or membership accountable for failure to deliver on objectives.

With regards to WTO survival, achievement, and evolution, the body of reformist scholarship about the health of multilateral trade organisation is growing. Jackson (1990) pioneered this literature by arguing how the GATT could be reformed, and his work influenced how contracting parties designed the WTO. The reformist literature gained greater resonance after the Sutherland Report (2004) highlighted institutional constraints on decision-making (Warwick Commission 2007; Steger 2009; Wilkinson 2014; Jones 2014).
It has been further bolstered by the partial conclusion to the Doha Round that has yet to be implemented by member governments.

It has been argued that the WTO, after twenty years, is incapable of governing multilateral trade, particularly as RTAs increase in size and scope (Aggarwal and Evenett 2013; Allen and Monaghan 2014). RTAs are not a viable solution to perceived inadequacies of the multilateral system. For example, the recent Trade in Services Agreement between the USA and EU threatens to curb states’ regulatory power (Neslen 2015). If WTO scholars better understood the normative role of the director-general, this literature could better argue if and how the WTO needs to be reformed.

Beyond the WTO, the utility of contributions made in the thesis could be extended to include studies of the World Bank, IMF, and other global governance agencies, particularly those where executive heads share power with executive boards. Harman (2011) used Cox’s essay to investigate executive leadership in UNAIDS, the agency responsible for global action on HIV/AIDS. Hughes and Haworth (2011) and Gordenker ([2005], 2010) have analysed the normative capabilities of ILO and UN executive heads. Whilst occasional works have conducted longitudinal studies of executive leadership in international organisation, the discipline needs better generalisations about how executive heads affect international politics over time, short and long-term. For example, are active politicians the most effective at leading? To reiterate this chapter and Chapters Six and Seven, the transformative changes of executive leadership in international organisation can
be negated over time. The discipline requires better knowledge about how leadership affects long-term change.

In highlighting how the thesis contributes to future research, it is essential to reflect on methodological choices, particularly elite interviews. Whilst elite interviews are an essential source for uncovering actors’ perceptions and strategies, their reliability in assessing change over time is not as clear. For example in retrospect, most WTO senior officials attributed the launch of the DDA to Moore and senior officials’ agency, not 9/11. Their accounts contrasted with the majority of secondary literature written nearer to the time of the launch. Their accounts of actors’ perceptions and strategies may have been influenced by hindsight.

It is also essential to consider that elites have vested interests in supporting the continuation of the multilateral regime, as stability ensures employment continuity. Therefore, elites may downplay conflict in interviews. To overcome any gap between revealed – as opposed to actual preferences – the investigation of further archival documents would have offered a useful means of enhancing the element of triangulation underpinning the research. In the context of the WTO, archival documents frequently indicated conflict – contra arguments made within the discipline about the reliability of primary documents. Additionally though access is limited and costly, embedded ethnographies – in Geneva and at ministerial conferences – offer a rich source of data to better validate perceptions, strategies, and conflict uncovered in elite interviews and document analysis.
The contribution to knowledge made by the thesis could also be extended to future work on executive leadership in regional agencies, such as the EU, AU, or ASEAN that does not tend towards the great man approach (Meyers 1976; Ross 1995; Drake 1995). Future work should not be limited by agencies of political economy. It would be advantageous to explore politics, power, executive leadership, and change over time in regional security agencies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At present, only case studies of two NATO Secretaries-General have been pursued (Hendrickson 2004, 2005), which does little for understanding the power of executive leadership to affect regional security over time.

The thesis has highlighted the degree to which the role of executive leadership in international organisation in the existing literature has been both neglected and marginalised. This facilitated theoretical and empirical contributions on incorporating executive leadership to better understand politics, power, and change over time. The discipline can better explain and interpret outcomes in international organisation by knowing more about the power of executive leadership. Executive leadership, the thesis argues, is a critical element in understanding the growth and scope of normative global governance. Whether it is the ‘the most critical single determinant’ has yet to be known (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 317).
Appendix 1: Biographies

**Arthur Dunkel** (1932-2005) served as GATT director-general from 1980 to 1993, making him the second-longest serving executive head of the GATT. Prior to heading the GATT, he headed the OECD’s sections on developing nations and world trade policy, within which he was appointed permanent representative to the GATT and served as head of the Swiss delegation in the Tokyo Round and various UNCTAD conferences.

**Julio Lacarte Muró** (1918-) is a Uruguayan trade representative for which the Uruguay Round is named. He served as one of Wyndham White’s Deputy Executive-Secretaries (1947-1948). He was nominated for the position of director-general during the 1993 selection process that Sutherland won.

**Pascal Lamy** (1947-) of France is the first two-term WTO director-general (2005-2013). Previous to heading the WTO, Lamy served as the EU Trade Commissioner (1999-2004) in the Doha Round. After beginning his career in the French civil service, he served as former European Commission President Jacques Delors and French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy’s advisor. Since leaving the WTO, he has returned to his previous post as president of Notre Europe, a European think tank located in Paris.

**Olivier Long** (1915-2003) was a Swiss academic who held doctorates in law and political science from French and Swiss universities. He served as director-general of the GATT from 1968 to 1980. After working for the International Red Cross, he held a series of diplomatic positions in Switzerland, the USA, the UK, and Malta; he also served as head of the Swiss delegation to the European Free Trade Agreement. He presided over the GATT during the oil-price shocks, abandonment of the fixed exchange-rate system, and economic turmoil of the 1970s.

**Mike Moore** (1949-) is a New Zealand politician and former Prime Minister who headed the WTO (1999-2002). He has served as a trade union leader, Labour party leader, and held several ministerial positions with the government of New Zealand in the area of trade, particularly at the launch of Uruguay Round. In 2010, he was appointed as New Zealand’s Ambassador to the USA, a position he currently maintains.

**Renato Ruggiero** (1930-2013) served as the first full-term director-general of the WTO (1995-1999). Before his selection as WTO director-general, he was chairman of the Executive Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. He was the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister (2001-2001), Italian Minister for Trade (1987-1991), and the European Community’s ambassador and permanent representative in the GATT. Prior to his death, he served on the Bilderberg Steering Committee and the board of Citigroup.

Peter Sutherland (1946-) is the shortest serving director-general of the GATT or WTO (1993-1995). He is a former attorney general of Ireland (1981-1984), certified by not only the Irish Bar, but also the English and New York Bar. He also served as European Commissioner from 1985 to 1989.

Eric Wyndham White (1913-1980) served as the first and only Executive Secretary of the ICITO and the longest-serving executive head of the GATT (1948-1968). He was a member of the English bar, assistant lecturer at the London School of Economics, member of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare during World War II, and served in diplomatic positions at the British Embassy in Washington, DC and the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
Appendix 2: Standard Elite Interview Request Letter

Dear [contact title and name],

My name is Laura White, and I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom. I am emailing you to politely request a meeting while I am in [Geneva/Washington, DC] from [date range] in regards to my research.

My research investigates if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation. I am using the WTO directors-general as a case study. I hope to provide a theoretical and empirical contribution, and respectfully, I would like to ask for your contribution to my research. I believe your position as [title] has afforded you the unique insight into executive leadership that I seek to better understand. I would like to meet with you approximately 30 minutes to ask about your role in the [WTO/World Bank] and your experiences with executive leadership.

In light of the sensitive nature of my research and in respect of your workplace, your contributions will not be used in analyses of specific directors-general unless you refer to them by name. I am also able to offer anonymous contribution; if you prefer to contribute anonymously, our meeting will not be recorded. However, I will request your permission to take notes to ensure I remember your viewpoints accurately. After the interview I will send you my typed transcript – password protected with your name coded for security purposes – for you to review and determine how you would like to be identified in my research (ex: senior WTO official, former cabinet member of a director-general, etc) to adjust for anonymous contribution.

I believe your contribution to my research would be of tremendous value to developing accurate academic accounts about real life in international organisations. I am happy to provide validation of my study, potential interview questions, or references at your request. If you are agreeable to do so, please inform me of your best availability during [dates range].

My highest regards,

L. White

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Appendix 3: Semi-Structured Questionnaire Used in Elite Interviews

**Participation:** I will ask you four topical questions and various, in-depth follow up questions to clarify my understanding. Your participation will be anonymous, as agreed in our email exchange and not attributed to your name. When the interview is over, I will email you the transcribed transcript to ensure I have accurately recorded your responses. I would like you to validate the transcript and, per the information in the transcript, identify a position title you are comfortable with for attribution of the interview data used in my empirical analyses. If I do not receive confirmation of the transcript or identification of title, I will imply consent and refer to you as a ‘WTO/World Bank senior official’. **Are you agreeable to this?**

**Before I begin do you have any questions about how I will conduct this interview or how I will use the information I collect?**

**Q1.** Can you please describe your role within the WTO?

**Q2.** How do you interact with the (office of the) director-general? How and in what ways does executive leadership affect you, in your role?

**Q3.** Do you believe that executive leadership matters in the WTO; if so, how?

**Q4.** Do you believe that the WTO executive leadership matters within the international system of global governance; if so, how?
Appendix 4: Semi-Structured Questionnaire Used in Interviews with Former Directors-General

Participation: I will ask you a series of general and specific questions about your term as director-general to better understand if and how executive leadership matters in international organisation. I will not record your responses; I will take notes, immediately transcribe the interview, and email your secretary the transcript so that it can be approved for use in my empirical research. Are you agreeable to this?

Before I begin do you have any questions about how I will conduct this interview or how I will use the information I collect?

Q1: Can you describe your leadership as director-general?

Q2: What were your goals/objectives as head of the WTO, and did your goals change whilst in office; if so, why/when?

Q3: The role of the director-general is not well defined in the WTO Agreement; can you talk about the formal duties and powers of office, first, and then reflect on informal duties and powers of the director-general?

Q4: Can you help me understand some of the directors-general resources – internal and external – and how you utilised these resources?

Q5: Can you discuss important relationships for the director-general? How did these relationships affect your leadership?

Q6: What does a director-general need to matter?

Q7: How did your leadership matter in the WTO and in the international system of global governance?
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