CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER FOX:

A STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL ANALYSIS

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CASEDE</td>
<td>Collective Security Analysis with Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDE</td>
<td>Economic Research and Taught Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISAN</td>
<td>Centre for Research on North America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDH</td>
<td>National Commission of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMEXI</td>
<td>Mexican Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EZLN</td>
<td>Zapatista Army of National Liberation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MRQ</td>
<td>Main Research Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations’ Observer Group in El Salvador</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>National Action Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Social Alliance Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEMEX</td>
<td>Mexican Oil Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>PND</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNR</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Democratic Revolutionary Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Institutional Revolutionary Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Party of the Mexican Revolution</td>
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<td>PSN</td>
<td>Party of the Nationalist Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
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<td>PVEM</td>
<td>Green Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RQ</td>
<td>Research Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Strategic-Relational</td>
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<td>SRA</td>
<td>Strategic-Relational Approach</td>
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<td>SRE</td>
<td>Mexico’s Foreign Ministry</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAM</td>
<td>National Autonomous University of Mexico</td>
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<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>United Nations’ Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNMOVIC</td>
<td>United Nations’ Monitoring Verification and Inspections Commission</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations’ Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
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Abstract

This thesis presents a Strategic-Relational (SR) analysis of the processes of change and continuity in Mexican foreign policy during the Fox government. In 2000, the election of President Fox determined the victory of a new party after 71 years of Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) rule, producing the democratisation of the country. Domestic and international changes generated by the end of the Cold War, and the presence of new actors in the Mexican scenario created momentum for the country, helped also by the introduction of a new foreign policy paradigm. Despite the significance of these elements, the study of their reciprocal influence in foreign policy has been neglected. These transformations and the discrepancy between the discourse of change and its implementation are considered an ideal scenario for the study of continuity and change in foreign policy-making. This research focuses on the application of Jessop and Hay’s Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA), considered able to generate an understanding of this complex process of interaction. However, although the SRA theorises the impact of these interplays in policy-making, scarce consideration has been given to this approach in the study of foreign policy change. Therefore, the thesis aims to understand the dynamics grounding Fox’s foreign policy, employing the SRA to identify those conditions necessary for the implementation of change and appreciate how the interplay among different elements was manifest.

After explaining the SRA and its relevance to the study of change in foreign policy, the thesis provides a historical framework explaining Mexico’s evolution in the years up to 2000. Building on these chapters, three empirical case studies presenting different degrees of foreign policy change are then analysed through the SRA. They respectively consider Mexico’s approach to peacekeeping operations, its participation in the United Nations Security Council and its refusal to support the Iraq War, and Mexico’s international approach to human rights. The thesis compares how, in the presence of consistent general conditions, the processes of change and continuity were differently implemented. The interplay established among the fundamental SR elements is interpreted as pivotal in every empirical chapter for its capacity to account for the complexity of the foreign policy process and the generation of concrete change in foreign policy.
Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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Note on translations

All translations from Spanish texts and interviews are by the author, and any errors in translation are solely her responsibility.
To my family,

and my Island
INTRODUCTION

“The emphasis of the Mexican government’s foreign policy is clearly focused on change. The reasons supporting this direction are clear. Like any other social reality, Mexico and the world are on the move”

Foreign Minister Castañeda (2001a, 66)

The end of 2000 represented an important division between two eras for Mexico. The 2000 presidential elections and the victory of the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, PAN) generated a certain momentum in Mexican politics and foreign policy, representing a fracture with the past and freeing Mexico to follow new directions. It resulted in the substitution of the party in power after 71 years of Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) rule, representing a change in the political traditions which had persisted for nearly a century. International changes derived from the end of the Cold War influenced this shift in Mexico’s economic and political context. Between the 1980s and the 1990s the old economic elite was replaced, generating the neo-liberalisation of the system and the start of a process of political change that aimed to substitute the PRI. With the 2000 elections and the rise to power of Vicente Fox’s “new government of change”,¹ a new political class holding new ideas took power in the country and a radical innovation in foreign policy was proposed. The PAN confirmed this perspective and assigned primary importance to the renewal of Mexico’s international strategy, arguing that its:

“aim [was] to reply, with perspective and congruency, to national, regional and world transformations, as well as to the mandate for change implicit in Fox’s electoral victory. [...] Mexico can play a relevant role in these processes, contributing with its will and leadership to establish, together with a group of countries that determinately contributed to the conformation of the actual world, a new international system, where peace and security are strengthened and the defence and promotion of Mexico’s interests are guaranteed” (Castañeda 2001a, 74).

¹ Fox government titled the fifth chapter of its yearly governmental reports “The government of change”.
In order to realise this shift, the new government promoted a new foreign policy based on two principal axes: the construction of a special relationship with the US and the development of a proactive role at the multilateral level and in the defence and protection of human rights (HR). The new PAN government intended to distance itself from the traditional isolationist and internationally moderate approaches of the PRI, which had previously sought to avoid external interference that could delegitimise the domestic political system.

Differences between the rhetorical promise of change in Mexico’s international affairs and its concrete implementation during Fox government (corresponding with its tenure in office, 2000-2006) are considered in this thesis as an ideal context for the study of processes of change and continuity in foreign policy-making. The fall of the PRI should have favoured the enforcement of changes, thanks to the presence of conditions generally considered influential in the study of foreign policy: the presence of new actors, such as the PAN; the change in the international context after the Cold War; the new Mexican neo-liberal context and the political shift that determined the democratisation of the country; and the new foreign policy paradigm not limited by the protection of the domestic political system.

Starting from these considerations and in light of the consistent general conditions that should have favoured foreign policy change in each scenario, the thesis aims to present a strategic-relational (SR) analysis of how and under which conditions different outcomes in the process of Mexico’s foreign policy emerged. In this Introduction, I will firstly explain the rationale behind the research, posing the research questions (RQs) and illustrating the original contribution of this thesis. Subsequently, I will elucidate the research methodology and why the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) was considered appropriate, before finally delineating the structure of the thesis.
Rationale for the thesis

Gaps and contributions in foreign policy theories

This thesis emerges from the theoretical and empirical gap in the study of Mexican foreign policy and the necessity for an approach able to provide a comprehensive account of both ideational elements and agential and contextual changes. As the case of Mexican foreign policy will show, causal factors producing continuity and change in foreign policy are not exclusively identifiable within the realm of either agents or context. Rather, the consideration of change implies a dynamic and dialectical condition and not the predominance of a single factor, or an alternation of factors; such limited explanations misunderstand how different elements interact and how their relationships change. To explore the dynamics of foreign policy transformation these elements will be investigated fully, highlighting their processes of formation, mutual interaction and characterisation.

In this section I introduce the current literature in order to generate a theoretical framework to understand how Mexican foreign policy is made and which elements influence its change. These premises and the in-depth analysis presented in Chapter One will provide a theoretical background necessary for the explanation and development of a Strategic-Relational analysis of Mexican foreign policy after Mexico’s democratisation. This section firstly clarifies the interpretation of concepts and elements related to foreign policy-making. Then it will present an overview of foreign policy perspectives. Drawing on the idea that foreign policy is produced by a mutual and dialectical interaction among different elements, I will explore how different theories address the coexistence of agents, structures and ideas. After highlighting gaps in theories which consider the predominance of one element over the other, then I focus on how Structurationist, Critical Realist and Historical Materialist contributions deal with different elements’ concurrence. These schools of thought are treated in this thesis as missing, misinterpreting or neglecting important elements for the elaboration of an inclusive approach. The indivation of these elements will favour the complete understanding of foreign policy processes of continuity and change. Finally, I introduce the SR approach this thesis considers theoretically valid for the interpretation of this type of process. Then, in the next section, I explain that incomplete analysis and theoretical frameworks have been used to study Mexican foreign policy.
First of all, in order to clarify the concept of foreign policy this thesis considers Christopher Hill’s definition (2003, 3), which characterises contemporary foreign policy as “[...] the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor – usually a state - in international relations”. However, the thesis does not identify the domestic with the state, nor the state as the main foreign policy actor. Rather it considers its strategic and structural function in the formulation of foreign policy decisions, going beyond Realist and Constructivist considerations of the state as a central actor in charge of the foreign policy process (Waltz 2001; Zürn and Checkel 2005). Characteristic domestic and international structures should be considered as general contexts contributing to influence actors’ strategic behaviours. Domestic politics and international relations are not considered as places exerting distinct influences on foreign policy processes, but they are studied according to their function. They play a role of internal geographical characteristics in relation to SR elements. This functional conception avoid the reproduction of further analytical divisions not present at the ontological level, considering the transformation of the role of the nation-state.

This perspective situates the analysis in a contemporary framework where geographical boundaries maintain an exclusively formal role but do not contribute to the definition of inside and outside, having the state as a point of reference (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam 1993, 32). This conceptualisation allows to re-establish the centrality of dialectical processes of mutual interaction between actors, context and ideas, considered essential in this thesis. Nevertheless, I am aware of the lack of parsimony attributed to this type of theoretical perspectives by authors as Kapstein (1995, 73) and Moravcsik (1997, 514-516), and the presence of analytical difficulties constraining the development of such research. However, I strongly believe we cannot ignore that reality is complex, and theories need to take it into account “not multiply[ing] complications beyond what is necessary but introduc[ing] as many as are necessary” (Jessop 1982, 214-217). Processes of policy change cannot be closed in a glass-box when studying them: their elements cannot be studied in isolation to each other, because in reality they interact, they establish relations before generating outcomes. And this cannot be neglected.

Taking into account how these relations are developed, linking the domestic and international context, I refer to “[...] the more centrally political aspects of the activity, that is, actions, statements and values relating to how the actor wishes to advance its main objectives and to shape the external world” (Hill 2003, 4). The thesis focuses on
how these relations are dialectically interpreted as necessary elements for the production of a final linkage between the domestic and the international, generating continuity or change in foreign policy. In accordance with Carlsnaes (1992, 245-246), foreign policy will be interpreted as a dialectical and continuous interplay involving both agents and structure, which cannot be reduced to a zero-sum game because this interaction produces a dialectical result including a previously non-existent, surplus element, and this combination enables the policy change.

Considering foreign policy making in its entirety and complexity it is important to take into account how different theories have historically approached it and which characteristics they considered fundamental for the type of understanding presented in this thesis. Foundations of Foreign Policy Analysis can be individuated in the historical differentiation between *Aussenpolitik* and *Innenpolitik*, namely the primacy of international or domestic influences. In International Relations the study of the predominance of international influence is often associated with the study of Realist and Neo-Realist theories (Waltz 2001; Zakaria 1992). While the consideration of domestic determinants is related to Liberalist theories (Moravcsik 1997; Snyder 1991; Doyle 1983).

According to approaches linked to the *Aussenpolitik*, therefore to the primacy of international factors, the state is a passive actor responding to the predominance of structural and international constraints. This assumption is generally shared by Realists and, more broadly, by Structuralist theorists, who consider the state to be the central actor in the international system and in foreign policy-making (Wendt 1999, 215). The vision of the state as a single coherent actor rationally pursuing clear national interests reflects the traditional interpretation of foreign policy processes as rational decisions. Moreover, Neo-Realist focus on the international arena has generated a misinterpretation of foreign policy dynamics for a number of scholars (Hill 2003, 37). They claimed Neo-Realist theories lack of interest for foreign policy processes because they were not interested in explaining the state’s behaviour (Waltz 1996; Elman 1996). This lack of interest was shared by the Constructivist Alexander Wendt (1999, 11). These approaches neglect the role of internal and agential influences in foreign policy-making, focusing on broader international and social structures over domestic dynamics, often dismissing the relevance of foreign policy processes and presenting a reductionist interpretation of these dynamics.
On the other hand, approaches based on *Innenpolitik* perspectives focused on the primacy of domestic elements conceive foreign policy building and implementation as a result of domestic politics and constraints determined by actors (Legro and Moravcsik 1999), underestimating influences exerted by social structures and the international system. Rather, centrality is given to human being and individual actors (Hudson and Vore 1995), organisations and bureaucracies (Allison and Zelikov 1999) or different domestic institutions and political systems (Moravcsik 1993; Evangelista 1997), which are related through a causal link to international conflicts, as the case of Democratic Peace Theory (Doyle 1983; 1997; Kahler 1997). Foreign policy is studied as a product of internal state dynamics, based on the economic and social context, or considering human behaviour essential for both the creation of the international system and foreign policy decisions. The focus on rational individuals or collective actors (Jervis 1976; Levy 1994), or on national and cultural identities (Campbell 1998; Katzenstein 1996) – in other words, on domestic characteristics - is silent on how the international environment influences foreign policy-making.

Although these contributions can be considered helpful in order to distinguish perspectives favouring the interpretation of national and international behaviours, they ignore the presence of more complex domestic structures and ideational limits constraining foreign policy generative processes. In fact they have difficulty accounting for the reasons behind the development of different foreign policies in similar domestic conditions or similar foreign policy paths in the presence of domestic similarities (Rose 1998, 148). The primary problem of this type of conception is that reality and foreign policy-making are not composed of elements placed in a glass-box in absence of any connection. They cannot be considered self-explanatory and separate from the context, as proposed in these analyses. Foreign policy is a composite interplay not understandable excluding certain factors and considering only a part of the reality.

Approaches examining single causal elements, such as those included in previous sections, have been widely considered in the Foreign Policy Analysis tradition (Walt 1998). Nevertheless, their isolated interpretation of domestic and international primacy, and agential and structural influences, produce a reductionist understanding of foreign policy-making. Interactions and mutual influences between different actors and contexts are not considered from a causal point of view. Neo-Realist, Liberal and also cognitive approaches look for a generalisation of their theories, proposing predictable patterns for foreign policy processes without accounting for different
temporal and spatial characteristics. Moreover, they tend to omit ideational influences exerted in foreign policy dynamics. Nevertheless, as will be explained in the next section, regardless of the impact of such limitations, these approaches have been the most common in the study of Mexican foreign policy (Hernández-Rodríguez 2003; Ai Camp 2002; Saxe-Fernández 2002; Covarrubias Velasco 2003).

The rejection of the predominance of a single factor over others encouraged the development of dual approaches. This type of foreign policy explanation considers, on the one hand, influences exerted by domestic factors, and on the other hand those determined by the international context. The reflection on concepts of domestic and international in the field was strongly influenced by Rosenau’s work (1969) who proposed a dual interpretation of foreign policy. He introduced the bridge metaphor in foreign policy, stressing the presence of mutual influences linking the international and domestic environments and distinguishing a space of action for foreign policy-making at the transnational level (Rosenau 1987, 1). A related explanatory model called “two-level games” has been developed by Robert Putnam (1988). His work considered the formation of democratic foreign policy negotiations placed at two different but equally influential levels: the domestic and the international. Although these levels are ontologically and analytically distinct they form part of the same political game, producing a zero-sum result. The parsimony and pragmatism of this model derive from the necessity presented by game theories to produce a balance between distinct elements.

Although these works remain a significant and recognised contribution in the field, which boosted the study of influences proceeding from different spheres, they cannot be considered complete. Both Rosenau and Putnam failed to account for how the international and domestic spheres are concretely interconnected, influencing each other in the dialectical production of foreign policy. Rosenau omits to investigate how the results of this interaction are determined by different spatial, temporal and ideational characteristics belonging to specific empirical case studies. Putnam, meanwhile, neglects to distinguish how different constraints can be associated producing a causational account of relations between them and the foreign policy-making. He accounts for the presence of foreign policy influences situated at distinct ontological levels, but omits to explain how different elements interact and how their relationship changes after their linkage, not going beyond the duality of this interaction but ontologically separating the presence of different elements.
Dual models of separation between domestic and international levels explored in the aforementioned cases consider these different dimensions summative and symmetrical in the generation of foreign policy-making, nevertheless insufficiently aware of causational complexities present in this type of process (Brighi 2013, 24; 29). Other approaches attempted to include both elements in more complex conceptualisations, considering how contextual and agential influences are able to shape foreign policy processes. They distinguish the presence of rational behaviours visible behind apparently irrational political decisions, which are intended to maximise actors’ goals (Tsebelis 1990, 5-6). Tsebelis categorised this type of decision models as “nested games” (Tsebelis 1990). This name refers, on the one hand, to the co-presence actors in different dynamics placed at both levels (nested), and on the other hand, to the rational characteristics that insert nested games within game theories (game). Despite the predominant role attributed to the international system, authors such as Snyder (1991), Moravcsik (1997) and Zakaria (1998) propose alternative explanatory models aiming to go beyond causational limits characterising Rosenau and Putnam’s additive approaches, hierarchically relating the coexistence of different analytical dimensions. The presence of influences imposed at the domestic level are considered in the light of limits exerted on it by an international and superior dimension, providing a preliminary selection of scenarios and combinations of possibilities where actors can exert their agency. The typology of combinations existing between the international and domestic, between the structural environment and individual actors and decision-makers, differs depending on the approaches considered.

The relative importance of different sets of elements has been studied by authors such as Jervis (1976) and Snyder (1991), proposing a shifting importance in foreign policy influences. Although both domestic and international constraints are considered important in the definition of foreign policy-making, the oscillatory trend of influences determines the production of a foreign policy which is determined either by international or domestic politics. The swing depends on the relative strength in a specific period of domestic or international politics (Snyder 1991, 317). This change of influences, hence the change of foreign policy directions, are associated with the pendulum movement that gave its name to this type of model. This conceptualisation presents clearer proximity to empirical cases with respect to Rosenau’s model, therefore greater consideration of spatio-temporal characteristics. However, Jervis and Snyder remain silent on the causal processes at the base of the swing of the pendulum,
failing to distinguish the events causing the predominance of certain influences over others and producing foreign policy change. Furthermore, the concept of inevitability associated with this model does not explain how historical progression and social learning can determine changes in foreign policy.

Meanwhile, Zakaria’s Neo-Classical Realist conceptualisation (1998) considers the causal predominance of the international system but only a later (and secondary) role for domestic and agential elements. This model goes beyond the consideration of single influential elements, considering filters imposed by the international on domestic elements. Nevertheless, its rational understanding of causality does not provide an explanation of the mutually constitutive dynamics that exist between different factors, nor how these influences are produced and reproduced over time. The research for a rational equilibrium between international and domestic influences omits to consider dialectical dynamics, not exploring how selected possibilities are accepted or rejected at the domestic level.

Although these types of dual conception consider the presence of agential dynamics in different dimensions, the additional complexity does not help to explain how and why they operate in relation to the context. They are silent on which repercussions agential dynamics generate on international dimension, influencing it after the determination of foreign policy-making. Moreover, the inclusion of cultural and cognitive factors at the domestic level is not sufficient in order to produce an explicative account of how ideas and perceptions can address the foreign policy path.

A further important work considering the relevance of ideas in foreign policy is Goldstein and Keohane’s work *Ideas and foreign policy* (1993). Through a Neo-Liberal Institutional approach, the authors connect the domestic and international levels, considering how the presence of an international crisis can generate a malleable state structure. Although they argue that a rationalist approach is a good starting point to explain foreign policy-making, at the same time they challenge it, considering rationalist explanations insufficient to explain the complex dynamic in play. The inclusion of ideational elements in a theoretical framework is considered essential in order to provide a framework within which foreign policy decisions and political actions can occur (Goldstein 1989, 32). However, this theorisation does not take into account how ideas can influence actors individuating adequate causational processes. Ideas are mainly related to systemic changes, not considering which types of mutual processes of
influence are produced and how they are causally related to future transformations of agents and structures.

The globalisation process and the end of the Cold War reduced the role of the state as a unique actor helping to bridge the divide between national and international. Global transformations produced an increasingly complex set of interactions between global and local, between domestic policies and their projection in the international system (Checkel 2008, 77), favouring the elaboration of new approaches to foreign policy-making. States ceased to be treated as fixed containers of societies; instead, authors proposed models where societal, political and international levels of analysis should be integrated (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993) and multiple sets of actors included. This correlation is also clearly defined by Hill in his conceptualisation of the domestic and international as constitutive elements representing “two ends of a continuum rather than being sharply demarcated” (Hill 2003, 38). In the light of this interpretation, and as sustained in this thesis, contemporary domestic and international actors move together to establish their agency according to different aims. Moreover, international and domestic contexts influence economic, social and institutional dynamics, contributing to the production of limits and opportunities for foreign policy actors (Agnew 1994).

In addition to the consideration of the interaction between the material elements present at international and domestic levels, social normative and discursive interpretations have been developed through Constructivist approaches (Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner 2001). Ideas and paradigms have also been considered in Foreign Policy Analysis’ models (among others Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hay 2002; Sedelmeier 2005) providing new interpretative perspectives, and as a result the understanding of international policy processes underwent an evolution. Differentiation between international and domestic causes has produced the gradual inclusion in the field of other type of debates. They attempt to include the concept of foreign policy actors re-shaping the meaning of the word inter-national, looking for features belonging to foreign policy agents and contexts and studying their interactions (Wendt 1992).

Constructivists embracing a Structurationist perspective interpret the world as the result of a process of mutual constitution between structure and agents (Checkel 1998, 326; Wendt 1995), although structural factors are normally the dominant influence on
actors’ foreign policy behaviours. This approach can be considered relevant in order to study how different elements interact within the foreign policy field. However, they underestimate the fact that the context is not exclusively influenced by social norms or social discourses, but its evolution, as well as the evolution of agents, is also influential in the determination of foreign policy making. Nevertheless, if we consider the most positivist-oriented path of this school of thought (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Barnett and Duvall 2005), it is inappropriate to relate foreign policy processes of change and different interests to defined top-down mechanisms as every context is different from a spatio-temporal perspective. Constructivist approaches related to the post-positivist tradition (Banchoff 1999) try to take this weakness into account when interpreting foreign policy dynamics, considering events and transformations related to the foreign policy-making interpretable through the mediation of language and discourses. The role played by discursive constructions is relevant for this type of understanding because it allows us to go beyond the consideration of rational dynamics predominant in dual conceptualisations, considering the presence of ideational elements and inserting another essential layer of analysis of foreign policy. However, Constructivists do not incorporate the idea that actors strategise in an institutional or systemic setting, being influenced and influencing it at the same time. The consideration of reality as a social construct takes into account dynamics of mutual influence between actors and context but it does not explain which elements, or which evolution of these elements, causes the generation of change and continuity in foreign policy. In fact, the exclusive focus on international (Finnemore 1996; Ruggie 1998) and social norms (Haas 1992; Sabatier 1998), or on their integration rather than on other ideational factors (Boekle, Rittberger and Wagner 2001), may limit a full understanding of foreign policy processes. In order to provide a complete explanation it is necessary to consider an approach that is able to elucidate how these processes of mutual interaction and constitution influence foreign policy making. This has to include the presence of a range of ideational factors able to influence the change of foreign policy decisions, contemplating the co-existence of ideational and material elements in the same context in order to provide an heuristic explanation of this process. Although this gap remains to be filled, Constructivist interpretations provide a useful understanding of a different set of actors involved in the foreign policy making, even though the centrality of nation state is maintained (Zürn and Checkel 2005).
A further consideration of how elements belonging to international and domestic levels can be integrated, including an ideational element in the explanation of foreign policy actions, has been developed by Carlsnaes with his Tripartite approach (1986). Although the model focuses on logical explanation of foreign policy action, and not exactly on foreign policy change, his approach has the merit of proposing a more robust explanation of the interactions present between different dimensions and foreign policy elements. Distinct analytical levels, “consisting of an intentional, a dispositional, and a structural dimension of explanation [...] although analytically autonomous], are nevertheless conceived as closely linked in the sense that they can be conjoined in a logical, step-by-step manner to render increasingly exhaustive explanations of policy actions” (Carlsnaes 1992, 254). The model considers the presence of decision makers’ intentionality, giving relevance to their choices and preferences, integrating the existence of influential structures (and objective conditions imposed by them) able to contribute to determining the direction of foreign policy action (Carlsnaes 1986, 84).

As recognised by Carlsnaes (1992, 255) at a later stage, the merit of this Tripartite approach is to provide an integrative framework, relating individual foreign policy actors, their perspectives and institutional and social structures, conceptualised beyond state actor’s limitations discussed in previous paragraphs. The advance provided by this approach with respect to other dualist models is the ability to go beyond strictly rationalist or psychological and bureaucratic interpretive explanations, proposing a more robust understanding of the complexities grounding foreign policy-making and change. Moreover, it revives the epistemological discussion on the relationship between agents and structure, defining with conceptual precision the properties and relationships of the different elements involved. It provides an understanding of causality broader than limited dynamics explained by rationalist approaches, considering elements as related entities “instead of being antagonistic partners in a zero-sum relationship” (Carlsnaes 1992, 245). This structural predominance, conceived as the international framework necessary for exertion of foreign policy action, was grounded on Archer’s morphogenetic conceptualisation (Archer 1995a) with the aim to explain the complexity of the interplay between structure and agency. However, Carlsnaes’ Tripartite approach is not able to provide a proper dialectical explanation of the interaction between agents and structure. In fact, it clearly considers influences structure exerts on agency but not vice versa.
The Morphogenetic approach, together with Structurationist theories and Critical Realist approaches, attempts to provide a dialectical explanation of foreign policy dynamics accounting for specific situations which are spatially and temporally defined (Yalvaç 2014, 127). The complex puzzle presented by dialectical approaches aims to provide an explanation of the production of political change, not predictive theories. They highlight causal relationships between different dimensions and the importance of the interplay established between structures and agents over time. In this thesis these elements are considered essential in order to provide a complete account of complex dynamics underlying foreign policy change and continuity.

Although these conceptualisations consider the mutual causation of different elements, simultaneously interpreting the relationship between domestic and international and between agency and structure, structural pre-existence remains a strong limitation for these models. In Structurationist theory (e.g. Giddens, 1984) or other Critical Realist approaches (e.g. Bhaskar, 1989a; Archer’s Morphogenetic works, 1982, 1995a and 1995b; Hellman 2014), the problem is based on the fact that structure and agency are considered to be two distinct poles at both the ontological and analytical level. In the first case, duality remains between the agents and structures: in fact, Giddens’ analysis supposes the contemporary presence of both elements. Although they exercise influence upon each other, Giddens’ approach is able to consider them just one at time, as in the famous coin metaphor that conceives structure and agency as the two sides of the same coin (Giddens 1984, 25). Structure and agency are considered inseparable but different, being constantly interdependent in their interaction but not mutually constitutive.

On the other hand, in Bhaskar and Archer’s critical approaches (1998), the primary limit is determined by the ontological distinction between structure and agency and the presence of a dualism between the two different elements. In Archer’s Morphogenetic approach (1995a, 66-67), the interaction between structure and agency considers temporal transformations placing them within a temporal framework. It lends their interplay a sequential connotation that goes beyond Giddens’ Structuration approach, establishing the existence of the structure before actors’ influence. Unfortunately, the supposition of structural elements does not allow a complete intertwining between structure and agency. It limits the simultaneity of their interaction, constraining the validity of the dialectical interplay through an imbalance that favours a structure-
oriented perception, reproducing a dualism in this relationship and neglecting the process of double internalisation established between the elements.

The appropriateness of the SRA proposed in this thesis is highlighted by its ability to go beyond the duality characterising these alternative approaches. The SRA focuses on the recursive relational and dialectical interactions that ensure structure and agency are completely interwoven, including the consideration of ideational elements. As explained in Chapter One, a SRA developed using the insights of Historical Institutionalist conceptualisation of the state as an institutional ensemble would emphasise complexities existent in the dialectical interaction between material and ideational elements. The consideration of a SR framework is essential. Though the notion of ideas has been considered in dialectical studies through Historical Institutionalist approaches (Blyth 1997; Hall and Tylor 1996; Hall 1989), and relevance has been given to the spatio-temporality within which processes are developed, the SRA extends beyond certain theoretical and analytical limits. Firstly, even Historical Institutionalisists consider that agents, contexts and ideas influence the generation of behaviours, and that institutional change can be interpreted as the change of actors’ ideas. Their focus, however, remains on the relative stability of institutions, but not on the stability of other elements as explained through the SRA. Though it is considered possible for embedded ideas to provide basic patterns according to which political decisions are taken (Blyth 1997, 230-231), they are located at the bottom of the decisional process and institutions are ontologically considered separately from ideas.

Conversely, the SRA considers ideas as perfectly integrated within the dialectical process, placing their mediation at the centre of the process and considering the dialectical and material dimensions as completely interwoven. Another essential contribution of the SRA is related to the process of change. In fact, while Historical Institutionalisists consider changes to be produced by external shocks (Blyth 2002; Hall and Taylor 1996, 10), the SRA considers them to be the result of the interplay among different factors that can be influenced, but not necessarily generated, by the presence of exogenous shocks generated by strategic actors (Jessop 2001, 1229). In accordance with Carlsnaes (1992, 245-246), foreign policy is a dialectical and continuous interplay involving both agents and structure, which cannot be reduced to a zero-sum game because its interaction produces a wider result including a previously non-existent surplus element, and this combination enables the change.
The SRA is considered appropriate to explain how foreign policy changes. First, it takes into account the continuous evolution of foreign policy, complementing the ideational and material elements, and considering their development through their interactions and mutual influences. The SRA provides a set of concepts, such as ‘strategic actors’, ‘strategic selectivities’ and ‘policy paradigms’, that are useful for the analysis of change and continuity in foreign policy-making. These concepts are explored in Chapter One of this thesis. The approach does not capture an image of change in a specific moment, but rather metaphorically associates it through a video-recording of how the interplay among different factors evolves over time. The SRA individuates causal connections present over time and neglected by mono-causal and dualist approaches. It investigates the complexity present in foreign policy-making going beyond the isolated consideration of single elements, placing them within a temporal framework and considering the simultaneity of their interplay. This conceptualisation of the time enables the SRA to replace weakness present in Critical Realist approaches, providing a further step in understanding the mutual and dialectical dynamics of foreign policy-making.

Secondly, the SRA takes into account the two-way flow established between agents and contexts, considering the mediation of policy paradigms containing specific ideas and their interplay, addressing the silences of other dialectical approaches. This double interaction clarifies that the existence of structures and agents is meaningful only when they are considered in relation to each other, because their properties are characterised by their mutual and recurrent interaction. This process of double internalisation (which will be explained in depth in Chapter One) enables understanding of the complex reality that grounds the process of change in foreign policy; rather than considering different elements as separate entities, it evaluates them in their dialectical and mutual condition of existence.

The debate on structure and agency allows the SRA to go beyond these limitations, highlighting the importance of the spatio-temporal dimension intrinsic to the mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency, and essential in explaining the continuity and change processes in foreign policy. This approach has been considered preferable to other critical realist and dialectical approaches because:

“first of all it explains the dialectical interplay of structure and agency in a more complex manner, [...] secondly structures have no meaning outside
the context of specific agents [...]. and thirdly SRA gives more explicit and immediate attention to the emergent spatio-temporal properties of structure and agency” (Jessop 2005, 52; emphasis by this author).

The SRA solves the dualism present in the previously elaborated dialectical models establishing an exclusively analytical distinction between structure and agency, while focusing on a mutual and recurrent process of double internalisation that will produce a new set of fundamental factors, as explained in Chapter One. Considering structure and agency as a unique ontological construction, it is possible to focus on the duality generated by their interplay in the effective context of political interaction, transforming them into strategic selectivities and strategic actors. Thanks to this ontological explanation, it is possible to combine discursive and relational perspectives, applying Hay’s (2001) SRA interpretation that conceives material and ideational elements as fully amalgamated. Following the same ontology, material and ideational elements can only exist in relation to each other, establishing a pattern of mutual influence that weaves them together and enables ideas to play a role of mediation in the process of foreign policy change.

In this thesis, the consideration of the mutually constitutive interplay among ideational, agential and contextual factors is grounded in Jessop’s theorisation of the SRA (Jessop 2005, 2008) and Hay’s integration of ideational mediation (Hay 1995, 2001). According to Jessop (1990, 149; 1985), who shared Poulantzas’ position, state power and its policy-making dynamics can be assimilated into the understanding of other processes because they are understood as social (and dialectical) relations, legitimising the use of the SRA for this type of study. While the application of this approach to foreign policy processes has already been positively applied in one case by Brighi (2013), this thesis will broaden its application to the study of Mexican foreign policy under Fox. The way in which the SRA is applied in this thesis to Mexican foreign policy reinforces the use of the SRA in the foreign policy field, introducing an innovative application of the theory. Starting from the idea that foreign policy processes cannot be understood through the analysis of isolated elements, the SR analysis of Mexican foreign policy will apply the traditional SR concepts of ‘strategic actors’, ‘strategic selectivities’ and ‘policy paradigms’ (definitions and interplay are explained in depth in Chapter One).
Case study selection and literature on Mexico’s foreign policy

The rationale behind the decision to focus this thesis on Mexico is determined by the possibility to clearly individuate a demarcation line in Mexican foreign policy-making. Mexico represents a clear case of coexistence between significant domestic and international changes, structural and agential shifts and the simultaneous presence of a concrete proposal for a new foreign policy paradigm. Historical stability of Mexican foreign policy and the simultaneous presence of changing economic, political and ideological dynamics, both at the domestic and international level, allow us to precisely determine the presence of past and future conditions with respect to the process of change. Heuristically, this characteristic enables us to place the empirical analysis within a temporal sequence necessary for a complete understanding of mutual and dialectical interactions present between agential and structural elements over time. Methodologically, this peculiarity provides the opportunity to observe the interaction between different elements in presence of simultaneous changing circumstances for both agential and structural dimensions. This allows me to focus on their interplay not limiting my analysis to the pre-existence of structural conditions, but focusing on their interaction.

The presence of a new Mexican foreign policy paradigm enables the analysis to exactly identify a change of ideational elements. This justifies the study of the process of change tout-court inclusive of material and ideational shifts, providing a further clue for the engagement in the consideration of Mexico’s foreign policy. Suffice it to consider that the ‘transition team’ that supported Fox’s new democratic government underlined the importance of the creation of a new Mexican image, promoting Mexico’s pro-activity in order to reply to international transformations and acquire a new role in the global arena. As asserted by Castañeda (2001a, 66):

“For society and government in Mexico, perceiving and assuming a change means acquiring the capacity to lead it or, when possible, taking advantage of inevitable transformations in the international environment in order to promote the country’s interests.”.

This new set of ideas assumed an important role not only for traditional foreign policy makers, but also for other social and political actors who had recently acquired influence in foreign policy making. The presence of a new foreign policy paradigm,
which can be considered a linchpin for Mexican domestic and international transformation, constitutes a significant example of the necessity to consider ideational elements in the processes of foreign policy change and continuity. In light of the existence of both agential and contextual changes and the differentiation of Mexico’s foreign policy paradigm, a dialectical approach as the SRA that is able to combine the existence and influences among these factors is needed in order to explain foreign policy outcomes.

Moreover, a further reason for developing an analysis of Mexico’s foreign policy is that although its party system is unique in the international scene, it condenses political, economic and international pressures representative for almost every Latin American country and middle-sized state actually experiencing a developing process. The shift from an authoritarian system to democracy was developed in the same period in most of Latin American countries, being part of the third wave of democratic transitions in the region (Huntington 1991; Loaeza 2006, 32). Furthermore, same economic and trade neo-liberalisation processes were enhanced in the same period both in the region and among middle-sized countries aspiring to the obtainment of economic and trade development in a globalised international scenario.

With the aim of exploring the presence of incongruences in the evolution of Mexico’s expected foreign policy implementation, this thesis takes into account three specific case studies, highlighting the necessity of certain conditions in order to provide a concrete change of direction. The empirical cases were firstly chosen according to their connection to the main axes of the new foreign policy and to the presence of different degrees of change in their outcomes:

- The first case concerns Mexico’s participation in peacekeeping operations (PKO) and highlights the government’s total failure to implement its goal.

- The second is related to Mexico’s participation as a non-permanent member at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its position regarding the Iraq War. The case study illustrates a mixed result that includes an initial implementation of change and a later return to continuity in line with traditional foreign policy.
• The final case study explores Mexico’s promotion and defence of HR, a novel goal for the country’s foreign policy that marked an important shift in its international behaviour.

The selection of these specific cases encloses an explanatory power that allows the consideration of a deeper understanding of causality thanks to the manifestation of different results in presence of similar changing circumstances. The existence of these conditions was essential in order to progressively explain the necessity of a relational and dialectical understanding of foreign policy process of change. Limiting the risk to attribute a predominant role to certain elements over others, they methodologically enabled this thesis to replace weakness existent in other dialectical approaches. The sequential arrangement of these cases allowed to develop a gradual consideration of the necessity of structural, agential and ideational elements and their simultaneous interaction in order to explain the presence of change and continuity processes without remaining entangled in their complexity. This type of analysis will then go beyond critiques related to the parsimony of dialectical approaches producing effective explanatory and causational results.

Moreover, the different case studies facilitate the investigation of process outcomes and confront the different explanations attributable to the same spatial and temporal context (here, the Fox government). As the specificity of every foreign policy implies, the placement of these processes within a concrete reality is based on a dialectical perspective. This thesis will research how it was possible to produce either change or continuity in Mexican foreign policy. It will not focus on why determinate factors generate certain types of outcomes or why the foreign policy process is realised. Asking how it is possible to produce change and continuity in foreign policy, the thesis will explore reasons and causal connections which determine changes in foreign policies, analysing the evolution of the process. Other authors, concerned by why the foreign policy process is realised, have noted that many relationships and connections are already theorised in the process of change (Doty 1993, 298). This emphasis on the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why’ stems from the notion that every type of reality is unpredictable; it is determined by its own temporal and spatial context, so how the object of study changes, or does not, is determined by these specific conditions.

The presence of such different specificities in Mexican foreign policy creates a good object of study for the exploration of how these elements interact within a process of
foreign policy transformation, justifying an in-depth study of spatially and temporally defined cases and a theoretical approach able to consider each element previously mentioned. The selection of this case study proposes an innovative application of the SRA with respect to the existing literature on Mexico’s foreign policy. From a theoretical point of view, it complements the existing literature on foreign policy change enriched by the use of a SRA exclusively thanks to Brighi’s work (2013).

The existing literature concerning Mexico’s international activity presents limited analyses silent on dialectical interplays among material and ideational elements. The study of Mexican foreign policy under Fox is highly descriptive and principally takes into account its economic and trade relations. Much of the literature on the Fox administration is specifically focused on the neo-liberalisation of the country (Babb 2002; La Porta and López de Silanes 1999), or on its institutions (Hernández-Rodríguez 2003). In almost every case, authors focus on the predominance of specific factors not considering dialectical dynamics existent among economic or institutional actors, their perspectives and the context. The analysis of foreign policy is generally limited to historical considerations. Academic theoretical approaches are generally not considered with the exception of few works focused on single causal elements and neo-liberal approaches based on Kahler’s interpretation (González González 2001). Numerous papers and books accounting for Fox’s foreign policy give priority to the political shift Mexico has undergone over the last 20 years (Rozental 2004; Pellicer 2006), or to specific actors and public opinion (Ai Camp 2002; Schiavón and Velázquez 2010). Other works are more concerned in highlighting Mexico’s specific international relationships with other countries, mostly the United States (US) and Cuba (Fernández de Castro and Rozental 2003; Fernández de Castro 2003; Covarrubias Velasco 2003), concentrating on specific factors or addressing the theoretical perspective through mono-causal approaches considered insufficiently precise to explain causational foreign policy dynamics.

In contrast, works that consider Marxist critical approaches (Saxe-Fernández 2002; Saxe-Fernández and Salgado Ramos 2003) or neo-Gramscian perspectives (Morton 2003) are developed around the economic neo-liberalisation of the country, remaining silent on the study of foreign policy. The same focus on Mexico’s neo-liberalisation, and not on its foreign policy, is evident in the only two contributions that apply an SR model to empirically analyse Mexico’s evolution (Heigl 2011; Cuadra Montiel 2008). In sum, neither Mexico’s foreign policy, nor the study of political continuity and change in
Mexico, have been studied from a dialectical and relational perspective, or through an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis such as this thesis aims to offer.

**Research questions and original contributions**

The research questions posed by this thesis include a Main Research Question (MRQ), two Research Questions (RQ1 and RQ2), of which one is theoretical and the other empirical, and two sub-Research Questions (Sub-RQ1 and Sub-RQ2) related to the RQs and the findings of the empirical chapters. They are as follows:

- **MRQ** “What conditions were necessary for the implementation of change in Mexican foreign policy during the Fox administration (2000-2006)?”

- **RQ1** “How is the Strategic-Relational Approach able to account for the foreign policy process of continuity and change in general?”

- **RQ2** “How was the interplay among strategic selectivities, strategic agents and policy paradigms manifest in the process of continuity and change in Mexican foreign policy before and after the end of one-party in rule in 2000?”
  
  - Sub-RQ1 “Was foreign policy change implemented in each empirical case studied?”
  
  - Sub-RQ2 “Which elements among the strategic agents, policy paradigms and strategic selectivities influenced the process of change or continuity in each case study?”

The answer to these questions produces a set of three contributions. The first concerns the application of the SRA in respect of the existing literature; the second is related to the innovative interpretation of Mexican foreign policy through the SRA; and the third regards the presence of five main conditions necessary for the implementation of the process of change in Mexican foreign policy.
1. This thesis reinforces the existing SRA literature, introducing an innovative application of the SRA as distinguished from other works that applied the SRA to foreign policy processes (Brighi 2007; 2013).

In the first instance, it develops a dialectical consideration of the strategic role of the state in the generation of foreign policy continuity and change, considering it as one among multiple agents implementing the process. According to Jessop’s theorisation of the state as an institutional ensemble, I agree with the necessity to de-mythicise its role, considering it not as a unified strategic actor, but as a common institutional context able to influence the interplay between various actors and ideas, as with any other structure. For this reason other sets of actors have been considered in this thesis influential in the processes of foreign policy change and continuity.

Secondly, drawing on Hay’s work on globalisation (2001, 6/17), the further contribution produced by this thesis concerns the conceptualisation of domestic politics and international relations among other types of constraints and opportunities able to influence the foreign policy process. Despite their importance in the determination of change in foreign policy, domestic politics and international relations are considered according to their function as contexts, conceiving of them as spatial characteristics included in different SR elements, and integrated within the study of strategic selectivities influencing foreign policy’s evolution. This analytical solution avoids the implementation of a further analytical divide among the SR factors, favouring an understanding of the interplay established among them and not considering the presence of geographical limitations. Hence, the thesis moves the focus on foreign policy from the levels of analysis, as intended in Waltz’s conceptualisation (2001), to the centrality of dialectical understanding, more appropriate for an SR analysis.

Further still, the application of the SRA considers the key role played by ideational mediation, considering it indispensable in the process of foreign policy transformation. This theoretical and analytical approach is applied to the understanding of Mexican foreign policy in light of those recent changes experienced by each agential, structural and ideational category of elements in Mexico.
2. The thesis complements the literature on Mexico, by applying the SRA in the analysis of its foreign policy and introducing a more comprehensive explanation of the processes of change and continuity during the Fox government. Mexico’s foreign policy post-democratisation represents a clear case study of the coexistence between significant domestic and international changes, structural and agential shifts and the concrete proposal of a new policy paradigm. However, literature on Mexico’s foreign policy change and continuity processes has been limited to the study of influences, separately exerted by only some of these elements. Therefore, this thesis provides an innovative theoretical and empirical study on the matter, based on an in-depth empirical exploration of Mexican foreign policy, grounded upon a qualitative research design using original interviews, data and archival information collected during the fieldwork undertaken in Mexico between 2011 and 2012.

3. The study of the interplay among the SR factors in Mexico’s foreign policy individuates five main conditions necessary for the implementation of the process of change in Mexican foreign policy. They are grounded on the SR analysis of dynamics and factors that influenced the processes of continuity and change in Mexico and the study of three specific case studies through a qualitative research design. All the three confirm the necessity of basing a foreign policy analysis of change on the SR study of the interplay among structural, agential and ideational elements; such analysis should emphasise the importance of each factor undergoing change and being interconnected in order to produce a foreign policy transformation. The other two innovative findings highlight the necessity of a time-rooted process and the internalisation of the new foreign policy paradigm in order to establish a concrete and stable change in foreign policy.

**Research methodology**

With the aim of understanding the processes of continuity and change in Mexican foreign policy, this research applies a qualitative research design considered more
appropriate for the application of an SR analysis. The use of a qualitative methodology is considered appropriate in explaining more complex and path dependent case studies and in clarifying composite theoretical relationships which cannot be simplified or categorised into quantitative methodological patterns; its use enables explanation of the outcomes of the precise temporally and spatially placed case studies (Bennett and Elman 2006, 458; McKeown 1999, 187).

The dialectical conceptualisation of the processes of change and continuity in foreign policy limits the production of a grand theory, preventing the identification of general causal processes and the generation of predictions through the falsification process (Hay 2001, 4/17). Coherently to this SRA, the placement of the foreign policy process within a concrete spatio-temporal framework and the impossibility of predicting its outcomes address the focus of the thesis on how the change in foreign policy is produced, rather than why it is realised. Hence, the application of a qualitative methodology in this thesis allows the author to go beyond the limitations imposed by quantitative methodologies that tend to reproduce precise and invariable causal consequences, predicting the generation of results but not considering the specificity of the spatio-temporal context within which the process is developed.

Since the consideration of policy-making in a spatio-temporal framework is necessary in order to fully comprehend the development of a process (Jessop 2005, 52), then the SRA implies the need for a historical understanding of the process of foreign policy-making. Firstly, according to the SRA the study of the dialectical interplay between different elements imposes the consideration of previous scenarios with respect to Fox’s foreign policy. Secondly, the SRA considers actors to be self-reflexive and their strategic calculations elaborated within a specific social, political and economic context. Hence, in this thesis the knowledge of previous conditions is necessary for the explanation of actors’ internalisation of previous experiences, the understanding of their strategic choices and the implementation of change in foreign policy. Thirdly, SR ontology implies that the explanation of the processes of change and continuity in Mexico’s foreign policy considers the evolution of the mutually constitutive relationships over the time. Hence, the consideration of previous scenarios guarantees the understanding of the dialectical process and the amalgamation of material and ideational elements also emanate from an analytical perspective. Fourthly, it emphasises the presence of incongruences and the lack of coherence in the implementation of the promises of change in foreign policy. In order to individuate
them it is necessary to observe the evolution of foreign policy from its proposal to its implementation, triangulating the findings.

The use of a case study-orientated approach was necessary in order to establish comparisons to explain the patterns driving the generation of change and continuity. Studying Mexican foreign policy from different agents’ perspectives and using different types of data enables the investigation of the types of influence different SR elements can exert in the implementation of change in foreign policy. The consideration of three sub-case studies within the same general context, as represented by Fox’s foreign policy, permits the exclusion of alternative causal processes, focusing on the interplay established among the SR elements (George and Bennett 2005, 220). The identification of similarities in different cases allows the individuating of the causal paths that produce certain types of outcomes (Checkel 2009, 120), creating more solid basis for the application of the SRA to the processes of continuity and change in foreign policy. In this way it is possible to recognise the conditions under which anomalies and different types of interactions are produced, allowing to identification of causal elements sometimes neglected or excluded from other causal explanations, and producing justifications for complex interactions among different factors (Bennett and Elman 2003, 456).

**Research methods**

In order to establish appropriate causal links between different analytical dimensions this thesis triangulate data and information confirming the reliability of findings and materials. The development of a qualitative research design aiming to explore distinct set of elements and their mutual influences imposes the consideration of a wide range of methods. Their variety is due to the need to provide the most appropriate method for every set of elements explored.

The analytical individuation of structural limits and opportunities has been developed focusing on the presence of economic, political and institutional boundaries for every case study. This distinction allowed to understand influences originated from different fields considered influential in Mexican foreign policy processes (Rozental 2004; Saxe-Fernández 2002; Morton 2003; Hernández-Rodríguez 2003). The exploration of these
interactions has been principally based on archival research and analysis of policy
documents and surveys. Moreover, historical and discursive analysis was combined to
information obtained with the development of 12 semi-structured interviews (detailed
in the first Appendix) with academics, researchers and members of Mexico’s political
elite.²

These interviews have been primarily considered in order to present influences exerted
by relevant strategic actors in the policy-making process. This information was
triangulated examining Presidential and political declarations in official sources and
media and newspapers articles. In this case the historical and discursive analysis was
combined to the analysis of mass media and the archival research of policy documents.
The use of these methods was considered appropriate in order to highlight how
external and self-perceptions of foreign policy dynamics were translated in concrete
foreign policy decisions.

In order to understand the spread of ideas relating to the new foreign policy paradigm
and to evaluate political and public opinion positions and the changes in cultural values
I explored a different range of surveys. The research and analysis of surveys was
integrated into data collection in order to explore the value positions of Mexico in the
three different case studies. The analysis of mass media was used to triangulate this
type of information confirming public opinion’s positions, while historical and discursive
analysis integrated into archival research and analysis of policy documents were used
to verify which types of filters and influences were exerted by ideational elements.

The fieldwork undertaken in Mexico in two different moments of my PhD and the
application of these methods developed my understanding of the types of relations
emerging from reforms, structural changes and strategic actors. Moreover they allowed
to individuate and analyse the types of perceptions held regarding the new foreign
policy paradigm; such information is not present in the literature. They enabled me to
investigate how and which types of structures changed and which types of perceptions
strategic actors held regarding foreign policy during the Fox government. The
understanding of these points aimed to elaborate the contradictions present between
the rhetoric of change and its concrete implementation.

² The definition of “Mexican political elite” is in accordance with the definition in Ai Camp (2011). Ai Camp
defines these as “people with political prestige” according to Frank Brandenburg’s six levels of political
prestige. In order to extend this category the author took into account the incorporation of top officials
from influential political parties other than PRI (Ai Camp 2011, xv-xvi).
The planning of the research and the division of my fieldwork into two parts allowed me to approach the research systematically. The combination of different research methods and the numerous sources examined guaranteed insight into the variables I needed to consider in order to develop a SR analysis of Mexico’s foreign policy.

**Structure of the thesis**

The work presented in this thesis has been divided in five main chapters. The thesis starts with a theoretical and historical overview in Chapters One and Two, aiming to answer to RQ1. Moreover, they give the basis necessary for the analysis of the three empirical case studies developed in the later chapters of the thesis, which produce specific answers to Sub-RQs for every case study contributing to the understanding of the overall interaction among different factors. Empirical cases considered are: Mexico’s participation in PKO, analysed in Chapter Three; Mexico’s participation in the UNSC and its position on the Iraq War, explored in Chapter Four; and finally, the Mexican international defence and protection of HR, studied in Chapter Five. The comparison of different outcomes originated from these chapters enables the replay of the MRQ and RQ2, providing an overall understanding of the process of foreign policy change and continuity in Mexico during the Fox government.

Chapter One sets out the elements and dynamics characteristic of the SRA and how the SRA is able to account for the processes of continuity and change in foreign policy. The first two sections of the chapter introduce the concepts of strategic selectivities and strategic actors exploring the interplay established among them. Thus the chapter explains how policy paradigms and policy-making can be explained through the SRA. The third section explores how changes in strategic actors and strategic selectivities can influence the shift of ideas and, consequently the policy change and continuity. The conclusion of the chapter theoretically justifies the identification of key strategic actors in Mexico’s foreign policy, introducing the subsequent historical chapter.

Chapter Two produces an overview of the history of Mexican foreign policy in order to provide essential background for the study of the three empirical case studies. The first part uses the SRA to explain how the Revolutionary foreign policy did not undergo major changes during the seven decades of PRI government. Next the chapter presents
the dual political and economic transition experienced by Mexico in the passage from the PRI to the PAN and then analyses the changes that influenced the PAN’s proposal of a new foreign policy paradigm that grounds the comparison of the case studies. In order to avoid repetitions in the empirical chapters, last section then explain the impact of the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Mexico’s foreign policy.

Chapter Three to Five are the empirical chapters and present case studies respectively related to Mexico’s participation in PKO, in the UNSC and its approach to the Iraq War and eventually Mexico’s international defence and promotion of HR. The first sections of every empirical chapter starts by presenting the institutional, political and economic boundaries that constrained the generation of a change in foreign policy. It underlines how, despite other types of changes, the modification of economic limits and laws impeded or favoured the implementation of a new foreign policy course in relation to three different case studies. In the following section, chapters apply the SRA considering how different ranges of strategic actors interact with these limits, mainly justifying their validity in light of the presence of ideas strictly related to the old Revolutionary paradigm. Incoherencies between the PAN government discourses and their implementation are underlined. The last sections then explores how ideas and principles related to the new and old foreign policy paradigm are internalised by a range of actors, explaining their entrenchment within the constitutional and institutional structures.

Finally, Chapter Three argues that the absence of change in Mexico’s participation in PKO can be explained by the presence of entrenched ideas that justified the strategic actors’ refusal to alter boundaries and produced the rejection of the new foreign policy paradigm. Chapter Four sustains that the radical shift was produced by the contemporary presence of domestic and international changes not sufficiently supported by the existence of a long-term plan entrenched among Mexico’s strategic actors. While Chapter Five evaluates the importance of the mediation role played by ideas included in the new foreign policy paradigm, concluding that both the shifts in each element of the SRA and their mutual influence was essential in realising change in Mexico’s international promotion and defence of HR.

The thesis’ Conclusion summarises the findings of the research and the answers to the RQs, highlighting the original contributions of this work and the possibilities this thesis has created for future study.
CHAPTER ONE

A Strategic-Relational Approach to the Mexican foreign policy process of continuity and change

Introduction

In this chapter I set out how the Strategic-Relational Approach is able to account for the foreign policy process of continuity and change. The SRA is a relational and dialectical approach that grounds the existence of political and economic policy-making in the mutual influence and recursive relationships established among agential, structural and ideational elements. As stated in the Introduction, Jessop and Hay’s elaboration of the SRA is considered by the author to be the most appropriate theoretical approach so as to understand the evolution of Mexican foreign policy. This theoretical chapter demonstrates that the SRA represents the most inclusive theoretical framework able to explain these dynamics. It highlights that it is essential not only to identify the characteristics of the components which comprise this process, but also to understand how they are interconnected within the conceptualisation of foreign policy as a complex and composite activity. Through this innovative study, the SRA fosters understanding of how Mexico’s international approach exerted certain dynamics of continuity and change during the Fox government. Moreover, this chapter aims to answer RQ1 and this approach is used in order to address the MRQ of this thesis.

In order to apply the SRA to Mexican foreign policy, each one of the following five sections explore how the concepts of structure, agency and ideational elements interact and how they can explain the Mexican process of change in foreign policy. Initially the general framework provided by the SRA is examined, then section 1.2 explores how the SRA conceives the relationship between structural and agential elements. The analysis further considers how the state can be defined by the specific SRA concept of strategic selectivity. Subsequently, the chapter investigates the existing connection between policy-making and the concept of policy paradigms. Section 1.4 distinguishes between notions of policy paradigms, ideas and principles, studying how strategic actors and strategic selectivities change can influence the shift of ideas, promoting the
change in policy-making. The chapter concludes by identifying key agents for the process of change in Mexican foreign policy. In sum, this chapter illustrates how the interrelation of these elements is necessary for the study of change and continuity in processes of foreign policy. It demonstrates that the SRA provides the most inclusive analysis in consideration of such processes, addressing RQ1 and therefore widening the application of the SRA to the study of foreign policy dynamics.

1.1. Strategic-Relational Approach: dynamics among structures, agents and ideas

In this section, a general theoretical SR framework is provided in order to facilitate the understanding of the complex interplay among the agential, structural and ideational elements to be analysed in the following sections. The SRA is employed with the aim of interpreting the process of policy-making. Through this association it is possible to explore how the SRA is able to account for foreign policy process. The theory is applied in order to capture the mutual interactions in foreign policy-making that are caused by institutional and economic contexts, and strategic actors exercising their agency within foreign policy paradigms (Hay 2002, 163-167).

In the SRA the interplay between structure and agency is defined ‘relational’ because it is mutually constitutive and ‘dialectical’ as the interplay creates an outcome different to a zero-sum game and it is used with the meaning of “mediated by ideas” (Hay 2002, 127-134). The interplay between the two elements causes modification, where the interaction produces a new integrated version of the structure and actors. This type of interaction allows agents and structure to exist only in relation to one another. While the structure is conceived in relation to action and is treated as strategically-selective, agency is deemed related to structure and is therefore conceived as structurally constrained. As remarked by Colin Hay (2001, 7/17), “structures can only be said to exist “by virtue of their mediation of human conduct- structures constitute both the medium and condition of human agency”. This assertion is based on Jessop’s SRA (1990, 266) in that he rejects the dichotomy between structure, conceived as a set unchangeable and auto-generated external constraints, and free actors performing free-will behaviours.
The understanding of this interplay grounds on the existence of structurally specific sets of constraints and opportunities, placed in a precise spatio-temporal framework, privileges certain actions and strategies over others according to the dominant policy paradigm (Jessop 2001b, 1224-1229; Jessop 2005, 48-51; Hay 2002, 126-134). Taking into account that the processes are placed in a sequential temporal framework, and that their interaction is characterised by the repetitiveness of the interplay, Jessop’s interpretation (2008, 41) conceptualises evolutions of agential and structural elements through a process of double-internalisation that explains their ontological intertwining. The process is thus focused on the outcomes of the internalisation each element undergoes during the interplay, transforming structure and agency in a strategically selective context and with strategic actors. Thanks to this process, structure and agency become “as metal in the alloy from which [a] coin is forged. [...] though analytically separable [they] are in practice completely interwoven (we cannot see either metal in the alloy only the product of their fusion)” (Hay 2002, 127).

Furthermore, according to Jessop, power relations and state power should be analysed through the SRA because they can only exists thanks to the establishment of a dialectical interplay between the state (or the structure) and those actors acting within or and through it (1990: 269-70). This reasoning enables the association of policy-making analysis with the SR understanding of power relations and their production. In this thesis, Jessop’s theorisation will be complemented by the application of Hay’s SR interpretation. Firstly, to account for the interplay established between material and ideational factors. Secondly, to consider the mediation role of ideas in the dialectical interplay established between agential and structural elements.

Hay’s introduction (2001) of discourses and ideas as active features into the SRA plays a central role in the understanding of policy-making. Ideas are conceived as those ideational filters influencing actors’ strategies that determine limits and possibilities imposed by a strategically selective context. They are responsible for the generation of actors’ strategic intentions to achieve certain goals and limit, or extend, boundaries imposed by the context through their interpretation. This dynamic, stimulated by ideas, generates foreign policy-structured visions called policy paradigms (Hall 1993, 279). Through the understanding of this dialectical process, the SRA is able to account for foreign policy-making, determined by an interrupted two-way flow between internal and external dynamics, within which ideas represent a “point of mediation between actors and their environment” (Hay 2002, 127, 210; Hay 1995).
For example, applying this interpretation of the SRA it is possible to explain international decisions taken during the Cold War by Mexican governments. According to a Revolutionary paradigm, Mexican PRI governments tried to exercise an autonomous role of mediator within the international system, interpreting the presence of limits and opportunities through their ideational filter. The influence of these Revolutionary ideas not only encouraged actors to perceive the presence of certain constraints over others, but also influenced their strategic calculations and the generation of structural boundaries relating to Mexico’s international activity. The relevance and implications of the historical presence of these Revolutionary ideas will be evaluated in Chapter Two. While an in-depth analysis of how more abstract concepts of structure and agency interact will be developed in the next section.

1.2. The strategic selectivity of the state and the dialectical interplay between structural and agential elements

The previous section outlined the SR dynamics in order to provide a general framework for the process of double internalisation explored by Jessop. However, in order to develop an appropriate SR analysis of the continuity and change processes in foreign policy-making in post-transitional Mexico, this section considers how the SRA conceives the interplay between structural, agential and ideational elements and how state, interpreted as non-unitary element, and power are conceived by the SRA.

Jessop’s SRA re-elaborates Bhaskar’s conceptualisation (1989a) of the relationship between structure and agency, which is thus conceived as a unique ontological construction. In fact, the distinction between structure and agency is identified as exclusively analytical, while they are considered mutually constitutive, existing through their relational and dialectical interactions (Jessop 2008, 6-7; Hay 1995, 200). As a consequence of this interplay, the SR model eliminates the dualism present in the relationship between the original structure and agency (Jessop 2005, 48-49) of other Critical Realist approaches. This type of ontological explanation allows the conception of material and ideational factors as fully amalgamate within policy processes. Such SRA peculiarities restrict the possibility of the identification of a general and explicit
causational process (which cannot be falsified) since material and ideational elements are ontologically intertwined (Hay 2001, 4/17). Taking into account this starting point, it is necessary to explore the background, composed by strategic selectivities and actors’ foreign policy strategies, from which foreign policy decisions emerge, as well as the constitutive process from which this context is derived. It is also necessary in order to enquire how certain foreign policies became a possibility and how they are implemented, answering RQs of this thesis. Moreover, the knowledge of the structure at the basis of foreign policy-making is essential to understand not only the formation process of such policy per se, but also important to evaluate those concrete conditions that enable the selection of strategies and the exercise of agency for political, institutional and social actors (Doty 1993, 298-299).

In conceptualising dynamics through the SRA it is essential to highlight that, according to this approach, no elements can be considered *a priori* as explanations for the exercise of power, as done by international and domestic-driven approaches (Evangelista 1997; Rose1998) and in this thesis expressed through the foreign policy. This theoretical effort is necessary in order to explain the complexity of the reality and its policy processes in a more composite manner. In the SRA, through a dialectical and recursively reproductive interaction produced by a process of double internalisation, structure and agency became indissolubly interrelated. Both structure and agency can be studied in ‘strategic-relational’ terms, where structure is transformed in a strategically-selective context through the production of structurally inscribed ‘strategic selectivities’, and agency is determined by actors becoming ‘strategic actors’ through strategically calculating their structural orientation. According to Jessop (2009, 41), the generation of strategic selectivities means that

“structural constraints always operate selectively; they are not absolute and unconditional but are always temporally, spatially, agency- and strategy specific. [While the concept of strategic actor] implies that agents are reflexive, capable of reformulating within limits their own identities and interests, and able to engage in strategic calculation about their current situation”.

From this perspective “[...] structures have no meaning outside the context of specific agents pursuing specific strategies” (Jessop 1996, 126) and *vice versa*. This because characteristics constituting a context (identifiable as economic, political and
institutional features) are strictly related to the existence of specific actors and their opportunities to exercise agency in a determinate place and period.

Jessop (2008, 47-50) further suggests that the analysis of a structurally constrained action needs to explore how different types of actions and agents are facilitated by a spatially and temporally defined strategic context and which type of ideas and discourses generated an interpretation of the context. It allows to go beyond limitations imposed, for instance, by ‘nested games’ and the ‘pendulum model’. These dualist approaches are unable to conceptualise the evolution and change in the interplay between different elements and scenarios established over time. The specific positions agents occupy in the structure determine their capacity to act and impact on strategic selectivities. In fact, different contexts provide different mixes of opportunities and constraints generating different types of strategic selectivities. The specificity of strategic selectivities favours some courses of action over others and actors pursue their preferred strategies, that are shaped by the presence of ideas, and which reflect these different sets of limits and opportunities.

Through this process of double internalisation, the SRA creates the core concepts of ‘strategic actor’ and ‘strategic selectivities’, which constrain and shape the agency exercised by foreign policy makers and, subsequently the generation of foreign policy. On the one hand, strategic actors are those agents influenced by the existence of ideas and policy paradigms and their interpretation of constraints imposed by the context. The structure is thus conceived as an action setting able to reduce the possibility to obtain outcomes related to less-favoured strategies (Hay 2002, 129). On the other hand, strategic selectivities are determined by structural configurations and strategies actors adopted in the past. They can be thus analysed as those structural possibilities and institutional boundaries constraining the planning of actors’ strategies and their concrete possibilities to act (e.g. to implement determinate policies). Therefore, in this thesis strategic selectivities are analytically presented as a set of economic, political and institutional limits and opportunities within which social and political actors can exercise their agency. Their presence is attributable to the mediation process developed between actors supporting traditional interests and agents proposing a new or different set of interests.

Hence, the rooting of strategic selectivities is dependent on the existence of a specific policy paradigm and actors’ proposals of change, as for instance, in the case of the
Revolutionary ideology that led the PRI’s political decisions during their 71 years in power, explored further in Chapter Two. On the contrary, strategic selectivities change only when a variation in the actors’ balance of forces encourages the development of those strategic actions which address the modification of the pre-established set of interests. On the one hand, such actions modify the conditions existent in the dominant policy paradigm. While on the other, the alteration of favoured policy paradigms enable agents to change their interpretation of strategic selectivities, thus activating new possibilities for actors’ strategic calculations (Jessop 2008, 44-45). Central to this argument is the intertwined concept of structure as the outcome of previous strategies and, at the same time, the creator of future strategies through its determination of actors’ possibilities of action (Jessop 1990, 260). This function played by the structure is reflected also in the state and the imposition of its boundaries on the development of new policy paradigms. From an ontological perspective this double conceptualisation enables the SRA of a powerful explanatory interpretation of foreign policy-making, removing the limitations imposed by state centric or structurally-oriented visions typical in the Aussenpolitik tradition.

Moreover, given Jessop’s conclusion (1990, 269) that “state power can only be assessed relationally [... as] the state as such has no power [because] it is just an institutional ensemble”, it is possible to define the state as a strategic structure composed of different types of institutions. This conceptualisation reflects the idea of an interconnectedness central to the understanding and application of the SRA. Furthermore, the state is not conceived as a monolithic and rational entity per se. This strategic peculiarity is highlighted by two elements that allows to replace the interpretation of the state as unique and central actor in foreign policy. Firstly, the state is the system within which strategic selectivities operate and become effective thanks to the existence of state institutions. Secondly, structurally inscribed strategic constraints are structurally inscribed and imposed by state institutions. They are determined by the implementation of a political strategy associated with a specific policy project, ensuring that state conformation is strategically shaped.

In essence, Jessop’s concept of state, rather than remaining focused on its structurally dominant position over other actors (Rose 1998), is theorised as a strategic social relation, produced through the change of past strategies and able to favour specific political strategies over others (Jessop 1990, 248-272). Considering the state as an institutional ensemble that reflects the balance of power exercised by strategic actors,
it is possible to reject the hypothesis of a state conceived as a unified subject characterised by subjective and formal unity *a priori* (Dunne 1998). Hence, it is important to consider it as a normal institutional context among others, moving from its predominant position because its supremacy over society cannot theoretically exist within the recursive dialectical relationship between structure and agency (Jessop 2001a, 160). Through this theorisation, in his book *State theory* (1990), Jessop asserts that the very essence of the state and its policies are contradictions and movements. They are characteristics which determine the absence of the theoretical primacy of certain elements, namely structure and agents, abstracted from their specific spatial-temporal features (Jessop 1990, 85-94, 342). Hay’s analogy (1995, 200) effectively summarises this point: “the action of others (a crowd for example) represents a structure from the perspective (vantage point) of an individual who is not part of that collectivity”.

Since the state exists as a dynamic concept, it cannot be embodied as a predetermined institutional form or substantive unity. The formal unity of specific forms of state can be established around formal and informal norms based on a precise vision of the system. I share Jessop’s idea (1990: 268) that “any substantive unity which a state system might possess derives from specific political projects [which in this thesis I identify as policy paradigms] and struggles to impose unity or coherence on that system”. Therefore, state-building is a process realised by different actors exercising their political power in order to implement their preferred strategic actions according to a predominant political scheme; policy paradigms however, cannot exert any type of influence if they are not considered within the interplay. Moreover, actors’ exercise of power in the state formation is developed within and according to specific boundaries characteristic of the system in which they exercise their agency. This type of reasoning can be reproduced when considering the creation of policies, as in the case of foreign policy. The state does not represent a unique system able to influence the policy-making. Rather, policies are the result of the interaction between different ranges of actors that strategically use their power in order to implement their strategic calculations both according to a policy paradigm, and in light of those structural boundaries which influence the creation of strategic selectivities.

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3 These actors can be individuated as both collective and individual agents, depending on the existent conformation of the political and social power balance present in the original system.
In conceptualising the state as a power relation among different agents, Jessop re-propose Hudson’s (2008, 6) interpretation of the state. The state is not considered as a real subject provided with power, rather its authority is the power of those actors and institutions exercising their agency through the state. In Jessop’s words “the power of the state is the power of the social forces acting in and through the state” (1990, 269-70). Essentially, these political dynamics can express their political power via the state, determining the overall balance of forces recognised as state power; the state, therefore, does not act alone (Jessop 1990, 269-270; Jessop 2008, 37). Taking the implications of such dynamics into account, Kelly stresses that in order to understand how both power and policy are exercised within a state, it is necessary to understand “various, contingent mechanisms that form part of the dialectic of structure and strategy” (Kelly 1999, 112-113). Furthermore, the state cannot be considered a neutral entity because every state system is created throughout the strategic negotiation among different political forces in order to control (or try to exercise control over) state limits and selectivities. The state is therefore inherently related to actors’ ability to formulate strategic actions, meaning that strategic selectivities are dependent upon actors’ points of view, their meaning and relevance to others, and their exercise of power.

This means that the state and its associated power are the product of political strategies played by institutional and state agents and that the state is always acting in the interests of some actors, i.e. those most closely aligned with the overall balance of interests. Consequently, accounting for the state as an “institutional ensemble” (Jessop 1990, 269), it is interpreted in its triple conceptualisation, as an entity which limits political forces, the system within which agents operate and the result of the struggle for power. In Jessop’s words (1990, 260) “the state is a social relation which can indeed be analysed as the site, the generator and the product of strategies”. Accordingly, the consideration of the state as a non-unique actor and the necessity to consider its constituent parts in relation to strategic selectivities and policy paradigms will ground the analytical consideration of those actors influential in the process of change in Mexican foreign policy.

The SRA has been considered able to provide a comprehensive account for the explanation of foreign policy change, addressing the RQ1 of this thesis, to Jessop’s theorisation of the relational and dialectical dynamic. Furthermore, it has been reinforced by Hay’s integration of the ideational mediation in this process, considering
it a two-way flow between internal and external mechanisms (Hay 2002, 127 and 210). Although this thesis aims to complement Brighi’s application of the SRA to foreign policy (2007; 2013), her works contribute to legitimise the application of this approach to this field. Coherently to this theorisation, Brighi (2007, 104) suggests that foreign policy is a double process involving two different realities inextricably correlated, concerning the idea of a complex and composite activity, stimulated and “produced as it is at the interface of domestic politics and international relations”. Although, the approach allows to develop a complex evaluation of mutual influences, the theory applied to the foreign policy field remains, to certain extent, focused on State’s official positions. The exercise of this type of power is generally expressed through the state foreign policy, although the consideration of non-state actors follows the direction discussed in Baumann and Stengel’s work (2014): non-state actors start exerting influences on foreign policy decisions but the field remains mainly focused on state actors.

Translating the theoretical reasoning developed in the previous paragraphs to foreign policy, the conformation of state institutions determines the possibility to privilege or constrain the development of certain international policies. Thus, the state institutional ensemble especially favours the prevalence of policies and international actions constructed according to certain specific foreign policy paradigms. These foreign policy paradigms embedded into a strategically selective context correspond to the determination of political, economic and societal structures. Through this process, they become perceived as more acceptable, precise courses of action, considered to be the most appropriate for the production of strategically selected outcomes.

Moreover, if the state is conceived as an institutional ensemble, those institutions composing it become operational under the same set of rules. For instance, they cannot exist outside a specific strategic context or their interaction with agency. Applying the same reasoning to institutions implies that they are developed in specific spatial and temporal frameworks which both define their properties and distinguish them from other institutional systems. State and institutional spatio-temporal characteristics are essential for the understanding of how different frameworks of action are produced and how these patterns embedded in the structure exert influence over the implementation of strategies (Jessop 2001b, 1227), generating change in foreign policy. Changes in spatio-temporal patterns internally influence the alteration of institutions’ structural composition, allowing actors to privilege certain strategies and
producing policy changes. Considering the application of this model to foreign policy processes of continuity and change, spatio-temporal limits have the capacity to constrain some international visions of governments. Moreover, short-term limits and interests imposed by specific events, for instance the 9/11 terrorist attacks, can be transformed in opportunities as part of longer timeframes. In the evaluation of foreign policy interests, it is important to reflect on if and how projections in the long-term are perceived by foreign policy makers: whether they continue to favour the leadership associated with the existent policy paradigm or whether they are producing a shift in the structural strategic interpretation by moving their boundaries.

The types of structures and the related strategic selectivities considered may vary depending on the research focus. On the one hand, structural configurations characterised by specific constraints and opportunities can be individuated in social, economic and political contexts, networks and institutional bodies (as in the Parliament or the state). This is dependent on whether the subjects exerting agency are individuals such as a Foreign Minister or collective actors, such as Congress. Conversely, agency can be attributed to institutional bodies or the same state if the context considered covers a wider or more complex framework. For instance, as studied by Jonas While and Gibbs (2004), actors as local authorities and political parties can be considered influential in the generation of community strategies in specific localities, such as Manchester, Leeds and Lancashire in the UK. Their influence can be evaluated in light of specific environmental and political extra-local contexts; these extra-local contexts feature different types of strategic selectivities that favour certain kinds of strategic calculations due to the imposition of particular limits and opportunities. These limits and opportunities in turn generate distinct strategic actions depending on the actors and local contexts involved. While, as analysed by Cuadra Montiel (2008), institutional cooperation between Mexico and the US can be considered as not exclusively determined by economic trade relations or political actions decided by governments, it may be particularly influenced by strategically contextual factors, such as the United States’ policies and discourses against terrorism projected at the international level. In the same way, political networks can be considered embedded with the national British context or plunged into a more complex globalisation process (Hay and Richards 2000; James 2010).

In light of the elaboration of these concepts, in this thesis the Mexican state will be considered as an institutional ensemble imposing strategic opportunities and
constraints over strategic actors’ privileged international strategies. Specific domestic and international events and changes in relation to the status quo, such as the change of party in power, are interpreted as structural variations able to influence the preference of certain foreign policy strategies over others. In order to understand the limits imposed by Mexico’s strategic selectivities, it is necessary to evaluate the importance attributed to these conjunctural events. They can be considered influential, even if not the only influence, over the re-orientation of actors’ strategic calculations in favour of alternative policy paradigms and interpretations of limits and opportunities, both at present and in future. The projection of agents’ domestic and international interests can, in the presence of specific contingencies, influence the modification of institutional constraints, limiting future short-term international strategies and interests, as well as Mexico’s foreign policy paradigm.

Taking into account these peculiarities associated with the state system, it is easier to understand why state power is not directly attributable to the state entity per se but is defined as “the material condensation of changing balances of forces” in a specific conjuncture (Jessop 2008, 36). Therefore, the notion of state power (Jessop 1990, 173) should be interpreted as the ensemble of different agents’ powers operating within the complex interrelated set of institutions that constitute the state, and not considered as an unchangeable and fixed capacity. In fact, diverse actors use their power differently in order to obtain their preferred interests and pursue their goals. This process is related to the achievement of distinct political purposes in a specific conjuncture, activating a process of checks and balances not subject to any unified state control. In short, as Jessop points out (2008, 37) “it is not the state that acts, it is always specific sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts and level of the state system [where] unacknowledged conditions influence the success or failure of their actions and [where] there are always unanticipated effects”.

According to this relational-dialectical conceptualisation, this thesis will interpret the exercise of state power as the interplay between: strategic selectivities and limits imposed by the state system, individual and collective actors which exercise their power within these limits and foreign policy paradigms related to state conformation and actors’ interpretation of the system. In the empirical part of this thesis, actors will not be exclusively identified as within the Mexican state, but will be considered for their capacity to influence foreign policy decisions according to Mexico’s history and the new Mexican political situation, as in the case of the Foreign Minister and Congress. Other
sets of individual and collective actors will be individuated in light of the structural modifications realised at both the domestic and international level, which have encouraged the rise of new influential actors, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media.

In light of this logic, the next sections will provide further elements useful in order to answer RQ1 and provide a theoretical basis for the MRQ regarding the conditions for change in foreign policy. They will show how the establishment of a balance of power among different actors and the implementation of new foreign policy are strictly related to the rooting of a specific policy paradigm. Next section will explore how policy paradigms play an active role in the development of foreign policy processes. It will analyse how the acceptance, among political and institutional agents, of a specific political paradigm is needed in order to re-configure state institutional and constitutional limits and create a certain tendency toward favoured strategies, favouring a shift in the traditional conceptualisation of Mexican international affairs.

1.3. Policy-making and policy paradigms from a SR perspective

The last sections analysed the SRA’s characteristic mechanism of double internalisation; this mechanism determines Jessop’s elaboration of the two new concepts of strategic actors and strategic selectivities. This process of double-internalisation is considered a useful dynamic for the development of this section: it illustrates how Jessop’s SRA can be complemented by Hay’s inclusion of ideas in order to understand how the state can exert its power, either favouring or not favouring the policy change. Moreover, the double mechanism will be considered in developing an understanding of policy-making, both justifying the use of the SRA for the analysis of Mexican foreign policy and contributing to RQ1. These elements will serve as foundations for the examination of how policy paradigms can influence strategic selectivities, actor formation and the decision-making process. Such investigation is necessary in order to determine whether their presence is sufficiently important to produce policy change. Conclusions drawn from this section are essential in answering the MRQ as they will construct an understanding of the conditions under which policy paradigms can influence foreign policy change.
In *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place* (1990), Jessop’s analysis of social, political and economic processes is characterised by the relational and dialectical character and the strategic nature typical of the SRA. Policy-making is no exception as it too is recognised as a process, and is therefore understandable through the SRA. This assimilation makes the SRA applicable to foreign policy-making, justifying the SR study of Mexican foreign policy, as elaborated in this thesis. The understanding of institutional limits, and the intentions (of actors) to exercise a more influential role in order to implement favoured strategies, determine the basic conditions for the development of every policy-making process. These limits are also constituted by the informal conformation of the decision-making process, where the state is not the sole determinant of the decision-making process. In many cases, extra-parliamentary powers and informal dynamics of negotiation among different actors, positioned in distinct levels of power, exert a fundamental role. They are necessary for both the production of strategic selectivities, related to the type of state where policies will be implemented, and the generation of strategic outcomes on the part of the strategic actors (Hay 2001, 13/17). Despite this, new ideas necessary for the introduction of new policy paradigms should be realistic both in the eyes of the power elites and in public opinion. This is essential in order to change the structural configurations and, at the same time, gain popular support towards certain specific interests.

According to the SRA (Jessop 2001, 1228-1229), the policy paradigm concept is identifiable with the translation of a broad state project, related to the placement of specific strategic selectivities favouring general interests and goals towards a specific policy area. For Jessop and Hay’s SRA, policy paradigms are integrated within the process of double internalisation. In this process, they represent a mediation element able to give different interpretations to the strategic context and the path of strategic action selected by agents. They reinforce determinate interpretations of the social and political context, encouraging certain types of action and allowing the creation of new outcomes, consequently influencing change and continuity in policy-making and its implementation. The SRA and other dialectical approaches conceive the policy paradigm as an interpretative framework that governs policy processes and determine policy makers’ conceptualisations of policy (Hall 1993, 279; O’Sullivan 199, 311; Jessop 2005, 49). The policy paradigm concept comprehends “not just formal rules, procedure and norms, but the symbol system, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the frame of meaning guiding human action” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 947).
In fact, in the case of the SRA, the concept also constitutes the lens through which agents interpret the nature of problems and policy issues; the dominant policy paradigm also underpins the status quo of a specific policy area, for instance foreign policy.

Policy paradigms are understood in this thesis as complete and structured foreign policy visions, which are related to each other, and are created by the strategic union of specific sets of ideas concerning the foreign policy field. This study considers two policy paradigms related to Mexico’s foreign policy: firstly, the traditional and idealistic foreign policy paradigm, implemented by the PRI during its 71 years of rule in Mexico and termed in this thesis as the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm; and secondly, the new, more neo-liberally oriented policy paradigm, evolving through the 1990s and crystallising under the Fox government as a major area of change for Mexico. Here, this policy model will be termed the Fox foreign policy paradigm or alternatively PAN foreign policy paradigm.

Although Jessop conceives policy paradigms as mainly expressed by the dominant political parties (Jessop 1990, 196-220), this thesis interprets ideas constituting policy paradigms as elements which can be distinguished from the main discourse of political parties, attributing them to specific actors, such as, eminent personalities. This point is particularly important because the consideration of policy paradigms assumes precise positions and confirms the interconnection between material and ideational elements, generating discursive selectivity. Differently from a Constructivist conception, material and ideational elements are conceived as mutually constitutive, not limiting the interpretation of foreign policy-making to a discursive construction or a simple interaction between elements. The concept of discursive selectivity is introduced by Hay (2001). This concept is related to agents’ making of strategic selections that Hay directly connects to actors’ perceptions of the context within which they operate and the generation of cognitive patterns. In Hay’s words:

“Policy makers typically conceptualise the policy-making environment through the lens of a particular policy paradigm — such as Keynesian or monetarist economics. Once again, access to the context itself is discursively mediated. How actors behave — the strategies they consider in the first place, the strategies they deploy in the final instance and the policies they formulate — reflect their understanding of the context in
which they find themselves. Moreover, that understanding may eliminate a whole range of realistic alternatives and may, in fact, prove over time to be a systematic misrepresentation of the context in question. Nonetheless, for particular ideas, narratives and paradigms to continue to provide cognitive templates through which actors interpret the world, they must retain a certain resonance with those actors' direct and mediated experiences. In this sense the discursive or ideational is only ever relatively autonomous of the material” (Hay 2001, 10-11/17).

According to Hay (2001), the presence of a specific policy paradigm supplies policy makers with the means to interpret the policy-making context (and its formal and informal constraints), elaborating their strategic actions in response to their understanding of the system. Although both Jessop (2008, 48) and Hay (2001) argue that material and ideational elements can only exist in relation to one another, being “complexly interwoven and mutually interdependent”, scholars, such as McAnnulla (1998), sustain that this approach gives insufficient explanation of how actors understand and interpret the strategic selectivities imposed by the context in order to exercise their agency. The SRA is accused of being ambiguous in its theorisation of those material and ideational elements actively involved in the creation of policy decisions. Although it explains the relationship established between structure and agency, it lacks an adequate account of the interplay established between these elements and the ideational sphere (McAnnulla, 1998, 5).

In order to fill what is identified by McAnnulla as a ‘theoretical gap’, this thesis uses Hall’s theorisation to interpret the influences exercised by ideas and policy paradigms on decision-making processes. According to Hall (1993, 292), the process of struggle for political power is reflected in policy-making through its insertion in a determinate ideational context every time policy paradigms are developed. These sets of ideas legitimise state decisions and state, or institutional, actions. In fact, policy paradigms influence the vision and the strategic selection of solutions and strategies implementable in a determined historical period, characterised by the dominance (or prevalence) of specific and coherently interrelated ideas. Applying Heclo’s approach (1974, 305) to the formation of public policies, within which foreign policy is included,
“[...] Governments not only ‘power’ (or whatever the verb form of that approach might be) they also puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing”.

This implies that the exercise of control over decisions and the possession of knowledge are intertwined and influenced by the application of specific ideas dominant in a determined period of time and in a specific place (in this thesis identified as the Mexican state). Therefore, the policy-making process is not only developed concerning the structural conditions through which power is exercised or actors’ strategies as sustained by monocausal and dualist approaches. Rather, it is determined through those policy paradigms that previously shaped state institutions and that allow policy actors to impose their vision on policies. The mutual influence of these elements is particularly evident in periods of paradigm change when the persistence of the old paradigm in certain sectors or institutions constitutes a constraint for the evolution and the implementation of the new paradigm. In any case, actors and structures equally participate in this process of change, influencing and exercising pressures upon one another.

During periods of change, new societal instances or new ideas carried by different kinds of actors can destabilise the decision-making processes and status quo present in the country. The stability of a state’s institutional structure can be a barrier to the policy change processes and the implementation of new ideas. However, contrary to Weir and Skocpol’s (2006, 118) assertion, it does not guarantee decisional autonomy with respect to the development of ideas included in a broader political framework, as in the case of a policy paradigm. Often, the coherent implementation of a policy paradigm underpins the persistence of policies’ status quo and the continuity of the traditional decision-making process. When the coherence of an existing policy paradigms starts to weaken due to historical, spatial, political and social inadequacies, societal pressures become empowered, driving the possibility to realise change.

Foreign policy paradigms, in particular, need to be supported by societal actors, the international environment and, nowadays, also by knowledge and information holders, such as the media and think tanks. As previously mentioned, the coherency between a paradigm’s ideas and policy implementation is a pivotal condition in order to establish a change of policy paradigm. Uncertainty over goals and strategies, and the ability to implement new ideas, can generate policy instability and a weakness in decision-
making processes. These decision-making processes can be easily influenced by the absence of a clear pathway and the perpetuation of political configurations related to the old conceptualisation of strategic selectivities (Jessop 2005, 50). Alternatively, instability and a lack of autonomy can reinforce the validity of old paradigms for traditional supporters. Such characteristics can also motivate actors, previously open to new proposals, to preserve old paradigms due to the lack of adequate alternatives critical to the development of new ideas and change processes (Goldstein 1989, 33-34).

The pathway necessary to generate coherence in the elaboration and implementation of new foreign policy paradigms needs to be accompanied by actors’ requirements of change in structural constraints. Policy paradigms generate actors’ understandings and their tendency to accept specific interpretations of the social and political world over others. This characteristic underlines the possibility of addressing actors’ strategies and tactics, through instigating a process of reflection. Such a process is useful in interpreting the meaning of strategic selections in order to establish an effective structurally-oriented strategic calculation (Sibeon 1999,139). The existence of these frameworks highlights the presence of certain favoured courses of actions over others. They can be modifies depending on experience and organisational learning capacities developed over the time (Jessop 2005, 49).

This reflexive reconfiguration is not only related to the economic field, but is also linked to a wide range of topics inherent in the social and political sphere, and in the state, involving every agent and every type of interest. This type of comprehensive policy paradigm has been re-named by Jessop in State theory (1990,208) as the ‘national-popular project’, and it is identified as a project for the state tout-court, allowing strategic agents to pursue long-term interests which, in turn, lend stability to the change.

The national policy paradigm’s inclusion is useful as it provides insight into which strategic selectivities were favoured over others, and their impact on actors’ perception of what was appropriate for the country and what was not. It must be able to simultaneously represent the general ‘national-popular’ project whilst negotiating the struggles and competing interests typical of the specific sector without jeopardising the comprehensive general vision (Jessop 1990, 210). So, the compenetration and the interplay among different factors is necessary in order to guarantee the equilibrium
within the system. Its interests and goals projected in the long-term are considered relatively more significant and important than the short-term interests and goals, even if the actors implementing them are identifiable with the dominant leadership.

According to Jessop (1990, 209-211), the loss of short-term interests allows the maintenance of ideational coherence within the same policy project, but without modifying the pattern of strategic selectivity. In fact, structural changes can be realised only through the pursuit of long-term goals; the entire structural system of strategic selectivities cannot be constructed, or reconstructed, overnight. On the one hand, conjunctural alterations should be reflected in the power conditions of both the power elites and the state population; on the other, a new policy paradigm able to substitute the old dominant imagery and generate a broadly shared, new set of goals is needed. The perpetuation of those strategic selectivities expressed by the creation of economic, political and institutional limits relating to a specific policy paradigm favours, in the long term, the achievement of preferred interests carried by the dominant and most powerful actors. In this case, the existence of an ideological policy paradigm guarantees the balance of power among different social and political actors. The existence of a general consensus around the national-popular project gives stability, institutional coherence and unity to the structure, in this thesis recognised as a specific form of the state (Jessop 1990, 210; O'Tuathail 1998, 8).

Translating this discourse to foreign policy, a new foreign policy paradigm is considered not sufficiently powerful to produce an effective change in policy implementation when new actors (who carry a new set of international principles and goals related to a new foreign policy paradigm) interpret strategic selectivities related to state structural and institutional constraints as still useful for the obtainment of their old interests (O'Tuathail and Agnew 1992, 192). In fact, according to Jessop (1990: 266), when analysing the existence of new policy strategies, it is not appropriate to relate them to the presence of new goals and ideas alone. They should instead be placed within a more complex process that involves the consideration of new resources and the reconsideration of actors and strategic selectivities related to institutional constraints, re-balancing the relationship between the social and political agents.

In order to produce a change, it is important to connect actors’ perceptions of priorities, the creation of a new policy paradigm and, at the same time, favour the

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4 In this case, actors prefer to maintain unchanged institutional and structural constraints.
reshaping of the institutional design and its related constraints. Only when each one of these elements is present along with a shift in power relations, can a potential policy change be possible. Therefore, an understanding of how policy paradigms are related to the processes of change is essential to address RQ1 and the MRQ, and also to provide a theoretical background to RQ2 and its two sub-RQs. In order to further analyse the interplay among the SRA elements and how they influence each other, the next section considers how transformations in strategic actors and strategic selectivities can influence the shift in policy paradigms, contributing to a more comprehensive answer to RQ1 and the MRQ.

1.4. How changes in strategic actors and strategic selectivities can favour the replacement of ideas, and policy change or continuity

The previous section illustrated the influence that a change in policy paradigm can exert on the conformation of strategic actors and strategic selectivities and, consequently, on the determination of policy changes. This section manipulates that perspective in order to understand how structural and agential changes can promote a shift in ideas, complementing the reasoning regarding the process of change necessary to address RQ1. In this thesis, ideas are considered the core units characterising a policy paradigm; they can be divided into simple ideas (e.g. pro-activeness) or principles (e.g. principle of non-intervention), as well as being used to achieve strategically determinate goals ascribable to a particular policy paradigm. While strategic actors’ interpretations of the context are mediated by perceptions and interpretations of the environment, the structure of the context is a discourse-selective environment that chooses which discourses might be more appropriate, deciding to select in favour or against certain ideas, narratives or policy paradigms (Hay 2002, 209-215). In spite of this process, it is important to highlight that the context is not reducible to the ideas of agents alone as supported by some Constructivist theorists but that it actively determines the ideational filter through which actors interpret societal processes.
Therefore, in order to produce a process of change, those institutional path dependencies conditioned by old dominant ideas need to be weakened by both strategic actors and strategic selectivities. As argued by Hay (2001) and Jessop (Jessop 2001a, 162), state policies do not neutrally reflect the existence of objective and universal interests, but actors’ activity is related to the existence of a lens allowing them to interpret state and political struggles according to certain visions over others. This means that the activity of the political system and the selection of specific strategies at the expense of others are discursively-mediated and related to the policy paradigm within which they are interpreted and created. Therefore if actors in power change, the process of change will become easier because the interpretation of necessary strategic selectivities will not be related to the power dependencies imposed by the old dominant institutional design. This process favours the implementation of new ideas, introducing a different logic at the base of actors’ calculations, able to favour new actors’ interests whilst at the same time reshaping the mechanism of path dependencies. In order to do so, institutional barriers should be moved and limits reshaped establishing a new institutional design.

Actors holding new ideas are introduced to policy-making, undermining traditional policy paradigms and traditional state autonomy (Hall 1993, 290). Nevertheless, new policy paradigms also need to make coherent proposals, appropriate for time, place and societal evolutions. In fact, change is not possible without specific time perspectives and spatial scales, that is, without being considered within a spatio-temporal framework. The conceptualisation and definition of the past, by both structure and agency, allow the elaboration of new trajectories guaranteeing the internalisation of previous experiences and generating a reflexive innovation that, nonetheless, “does not condemn actors to endless repetition” (Jessop 2005, 52). As a result, agents are able to modify strategic selectivities, integrating their partial knowledge of the structural context and elaborating new ideas thanks to the reflection on limits and opportunities offered by the existent policy paradigm (Hay 2002, 129). Actors can partially change, or even totally reject, their previous tactics in order to achieve selected strategic goals. They re-shape their preferences in relation to their placement within a temporal \textit{continuum} where different policy paradigms follow over time, discursively mediating their structural context (Hay 2001, 8-10/17).

As studied by Brighi (2013) and Cuadra Montiel (2008), if actors can direct their agency to the most appropriate spatio-temporal frameworks, only then they can
change the social and political outcomes through their influence on those strategic-relational processes responsible for policy-making. Nevertheless, in a SR analysis, the context is fundamental in considering the possibility for strategy change as it is determined not only by actors but also by structures’ prior evolution, which have shaped the structure of existing and future strategies and opportunities (Jessop 2005, 52). Political outcomes are influenced by a mix of agential, structural and ideational elements which vary depending on different specific spatio-temporal circumstances (Jessop 2005, 48). Therefore, the product of this interaction is complex and composites, impossible to untangle. This is the reason for which the SRA is considered an open-ended theoretical approach where it is not possible to determine if, in the changing process of foreign policy, domestic factors are more relevant than systemic elements or *vice versa*. These conditions mean that the automatic self-reproduction of the structure is impossible, producing the scope for action and privileging certain actors and strategies over others (Jessop 2008: 33). This conceptualisation allows to the SRA to go beyond the dualism highlighted in Archer’s and Carlsnaes’ morphogenetic theorisation, providing an effective explanation of complex policy processes.

Therefore, although Jessop in his analysis of the implementation of political strategies engages in class struggles within a capitalist environment, his reasoning is equally applicable to the change in foreign policy paths through the consideration of different type of agents. According to the author (Jessop 1990: 259) “it is essential to consider these phenomena from a dual perspective of structural determination and class position.” Likewise, in order to consider policy changes we need to analyse them in terms of both state and institutionally inscribed strategic selectivities and the strategies and interests of power elites, inscribable into a determinate policy paradigm. Following Jessop’s (1990: 259-260) considerations, strategic selectivities influenced by different forms of state should be interpreted as:

“the crystallisation or material condensation of past strategies (both successful and unsuccessful). Likewise the elaboration of [actors’] strategies [identifiable in sustained positions and policies support] should be related to the constraints imposed by existing forms [ideological and political] domination as well as the prevailing balance of forces”.

In the case of Mexican foreign policy, these limits can be interpreted, as those institutional and constitutional norms political actors have to respect in order to
develop new policy approaches. Further, the balance of forces can include those formal and informal dynamics existing among different power groups which exercise strong influence upon the selection of specific strategies and their implementation. An example of this would be in the case of the informal pressures exercised by Mexican Armed Forces on issues relating to the employment of troops abroad, as studied in Chapter Three. In accordance with these ideas, the change and continuity processes in Mexican foreign policy are studied in this thesis through considering the agency exercised by different sets of actors, as considered in the next sub-sections. In the three case-studies additional actors play relevant roles in the decision-making process, e.g. the Armed Forces, undersecretaries and Mexican representatives to the United Nations (UN). Principal sets of actors will be briefly considered in the following section.

1.5. Identifying key strategic agents in Mexico’s foreign policy

With the aim of addressing RQ2 and its sub-RQ, the previous section illustrated the strategic relationship between changing elements and their influence on the shift in policy paradigm, including the strategic actors. The importance of agents’ active role in policy change is considered in this part of the chapter. Their concrete identification in light of new and old policy paradigms and within a spatio-temporal framework (in this thesis, the period of Fox’s government in Mexico) is necessary in order to apply a SR analysis in the empirical chapters of this thesis and address sub-RQ2.

According to Hay (2002, 129-131) “different actors in similar circumstances will construct their interests and preferences differently” because, differently to what sustained by Rationalist approaches to Foreign Policy, actors are not characterised by fixed preferences and that they do not continuously actuate reflexive strategic choices. Rather, their agency is filtered by different ideas and discourses when placed in different spatio-temporal frameworks reflecting distinct visions (for instance, different governments influenced by specific international events, such as terrorist attacks). The presence of different ideational and material conditions influences the exercise of actors’ agency, modifying their preferred strategies (Jessop 2005, 48). Nevertheless, the exercise of that specific form of agency can represent a constraint or possibility for actors belonging to different categories, determining contextual boundaries within
which more specific strategies and tactics are selected and implemented (Hay 1995, 200; Hill 2003, 27). Actors are not free to make decisions independently of structures, but they can generate a change in the course of a slice of history interpreting the change and establishing the type of strategies able to replace their structural constraints. This dynamic is essential for the production of an institutional propensity toward those ideas which support new specific interests and which can pave the way for the implementation of new foreign policy ideas, in turn giving different social and political agents wider possibilities of strategic action.

Analytically applying these concepts and taking into account the works on Mexico’s foreign policy studies (Ai Camp 2005; Ai Camp 2003; Velázquez Flores R. 2008b; González González 2006a), it is possible to assert that, on the one hand, members of the Parliament, Foreign Ministers and the President are considered able to influence those SR processes responsible for foreign policy change. They are considered responsible for the domestic decisional process. On the other hand, think tanks, eminent personalities and the media are considered able to reinforce or stimulate the creation of new or pre-established policy paradigms, influencing the first group of agents (Ai Camp 2002). They are examined as group of actors able to convey public opinion and epistemic communities’ specific points of view, strengthening structural and institutional constraints or favouring change.

The former set of actors is considered pivotal in the elaboration and implementation of foreign policy-making (Edwards and Wayne 1999, 473; Velázquez Flores 2007, 222-229). Mexican Presidents’ and Foreign Ministers’ role is generally exercised within formal and institutional normative boundaries, according to which their functions are regulated. Moreover, the presence of informal rules, co-existing with formal norms provides extended or restricted decisional power to influence over the foreign policy-making. Nevertheless, both formal and informal norms can vary according to the existent form of strategic selectivities, thus determining the interpretation of the concept of international affairs at the base of the foreign policy paradigm active within the specific state.

In this thesis, the analysis of the Mexican case in a specific temporal framework (2000 to 2006) determines the necessity of considering the variation in the role of foreign policy and its relationship with other types of actor. Traditionally, Mexican international affairs were conceptualised, discussed and implemented by the Executive branch and
the Foreign Ministry, while final decisions were taken by the President. The role of these actors has been considered collaborative and not in contrast with Congress, thanks to the powerful position they held, established by formal norms and informal political habits. However, the rise to power of a different party modified the power dynamics existent between the President, the Foreign Ministry and Congress, changing the strategically-selective context, empowering the Legislative branch in the matter of foreign policy making and favouring the influence of new political parties in Mexican foreign policy.

The second set of actors is considered in the light of their influence on institutional actors. Eminent personalities, acting as individual or collective actors with influence over foreign policy, can be identified as those agents deriving their power from informal norms and practices ascribable in a specific state organisation (Ai Camp 2002, 157). Usually, their role is connected to the presence of personal relationships with other actors formally occupying leading national political posts, the pressures they are able to exercise on the formal system, or the fact that they have been ascribed high political distinction. In this thesis, eminent personalities are firstly identified taking into account the presence of those strategic selectivities connected to the boundaries imposed by the existence of a rooted corporatist system in Mexico (González González 2006, 156). This type of structural conformation ensures the generation of informal policy actors, able to influence policy making by requesting the representation of their interests (Shmitter 1979, 13). The presence of these types of actor is generally recurrent within the same administration period and is especially notable during prolonged periods of power by the same party.

Secondly, the existence in Mexico of a single party regime over a 71-year period favoured the strength of a circumscribed class of political actors, frequently performing powerful roles in the government or in the PRI, approximately identifiable with the whole political arena. The contemporary presence of a corporatist structure favoured the re-election and confirmation of the same set of political leaders over long periods, allowing them to acquire informal power and credibility. Using this power and credibility, eminent personalities were able to implement clear strategic calculations and maintain influence, even during those periods when they were not formally in power. In this thesis, eminent Mexican personalities have been individuated according to their historical role in Mexico’s foreign policy and according to their relations with other influential decision-makers.
On the other hand think tanks are considered one of those ideally independent sites where traditional ideas and policy paradigms are analysed and new ideational contributions are generated, with influence over policy-making (Stone 1996, 9-18). Their heterogeneity makes it difficult to formulate a general definition. However, Stone (2004, 4) distinguishes think tanks from other epistemic communities by highlighting firstly their characteristic need for a certain degree of engagement with the government in order to exercise influence over policy, and secondly, their aim of preserving the highest level of ‘intellectual autonomy’. In this thesis, the role of this type of collective actor is evaluated in light of their ability to reinforce or stimulate the generation of policy paradigms, analysing their effects and evaluating their probable future outcomes. This type of activity aims to influence the strategic selectivities realised by foreign policy makers. Moreover, through the accomplishment of their performances they are able to convey public opinion and epistemic communities’ interpretations (Stone 1996, 86-90) of the implementation of foreign policy decisions, reinforcing or weakening the existent consensus around specific policy paradigms.

Generally, the exercise of this type of power is particularly important in order to change the interpretation of those strategic selectivities necessary for changing the dominant policy paradigm. Nevertheless, their power is determined by the specific state form and the related strategic selectivities within which the policy-making is developed. In the Mexican case, think tanks acquired a more important function with the change of the party in power. After 2000, think tanks had the possibility to increase their political autonomy, involving a wider range of relevant people from distinct sectors, whereas during PRI governments, the presence of corporative dynamics represented a constraint upon think tanks’ capabilities.

Integrally to the function exercised by think tanks epistemic communities contribute lending an intellectual input to the foreign policy change. Nevertheless, they can operate individually or as collective actors (gathering intellectuals and academics beneath the same epistemic community), playing a different role to that exercised by think tanks (Stone 1996, 87). Two relevant differences exist between epistemic communities and think tanks, clarifying their multifaceted relationship with other state actors. Firstly, epistemic communities do not explicitly aim to influence the development or the implementation of a specific policy; secondly, they can be relatively more autonomous than think tanks because they do not require engagement with the government. In fact, the contributions of epistemic communities can be merely critical
and without influence over policy paradigms. Despite this, they can, conversely, represent particular interests or political positions sustaining specific policy paradigms or policy interpretations.

Finally the media and public opinion are intrinsically related to each other. On the one hand, in the period considered, the media represented (Ai Camp 2003, 150-153) the means by which intellectual activities and public opinion illustrated their position through direct communication of a message or position to the government (Ai Camp 1985). On the other hand, state institutions and policy makers’ attitudes towards the media are useful in order to understand how certain conjunctural events are interpreted; they also clarify how important such events were deemed by strategic actors and how positions assumed by the national population and expert groups of actors can be interpreted. Moreover, the media can be considered as a strategic tool, useful for both the diffusion of new political strategies and paradigms and the communication of policy makers’ specific messages to build consensus around certain policies.

Mexico’s democratic evolution imposed the consideration of legitimate requests expressed by public opinion. In addition, the intention to implement a new foreign policy paradigm increased the importance of national consensus around the PAN’s state project. As explained in the first section of this chapter, the positive outcome of a new policy paradigm is strictly related to the realisation of a national-popular project: one which should be extensively accepted among the population. In fact, public perceptions of policy-making activities are fundamental to the determination of change and continuity processes in policy paradigms (Jessop 1990, 209-211).

In Chapter Three of this thesis, the Armed Forces were considered influential in the specific case of Mexico’s participation in PKO. This conclusion was drawn from consideration of the Mexican case in a specific spatio-temporal framework. In fact, differently to other Latin American countries, the Mexican Armed Forces historically maintained a secondary role in policy-making, conforming to presidential foreign policy strategies. However the transformation the Mexican context and the presence of new strategic actors influenced the role they assumed in matter of the despatch of troops abroad.

To summarise, this thesis is not exclusively interested on those strategic actors with influence over the determination of foreign policy change and continuity to the state.
Rather it will identify the roles played by a range of individual and collective actors, which presence and strategic role have been defined according to its specific spatio-temporal framework.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has analysed Jessop and Hay’s SRA to state power and policy-making, considering the dialectical-relational nature of policy processes and the presence of three fundamental and mutually influential elements: strategic actors, strategic selectivities and policy paradigms. Different concepts composing the theory have been individually analysed in order to understand how their peculiarities can produce a dialectical interplay. Moreover, the analysis of the theoretical framework included the SR conceptualisation of power, policy making, the state in all its meanings. An understanding of such concepts is essential in order to address RQ1. They enable the exploration of conditions necessary for the implementation of change, providing a theoretical background to reply the MRQ. The premise that the SR interplay affects the realisation of policy transformation will contribute to recognising how and which factors led the process of change in empirical Chapters Three to Five. Separate consideration of the three SR elements is not deemed sufficient to produce an effective change in foreign policy; an integrated and relational vision of all three elements is needed.

The application of the SRA to address these processes is innovative for several reasons. Firstly, the SRA’s innovation is determined by its capacity to interpret complex phenomena, taking into account the interconnectivity existent among different structural, ideational and agential elements. Secondly, it goes beyond the presence of those dual and dualist explanations present in other approaches. Finally, the application of this theoretical approach to Mexican foreign policy change and continuity processes is totally absent in previous works. Through its ability to address novel, dynamic and complex phenomena, the SRA provides the necessary theoretical tools to explain how the processes of change and continuity are realised in Mexico’s foreign policy, and which elements determined it. The analytical application of the SRA that is presented in the following chapters allows to answer to RQ2 and Sub-RQ1 and Sub-RQ2. Chapter Two provides a historical framework, highlighting the origins of those factors influencing attempts to implement a new foreign policy paradigm. Further, it
explains how these elements interacted in the past both producing the outcomes at the basis of the new processes, and providing a historical framework within which a critical understanding of the following empirical Chapters Three to Five may be developed.
CHAPTER TWO

Mexican foreign policy in the Strategic-Relational context:

from the PRI to the PAN

Introduction

Following on from Chapter One’s conceptualisation of the SR theoretical framework as the basis of this study of Mexican foreign policy during the Fox government, now I briefly analyse the historical background underpinning the case studies presented in the three empirical chapters. An historical framework is provided with the aim of identifying the elements that, according to SR analysis, are necessary for the exploration of how foreign policy change and continuity processes are realised. An understanding of the historical background is necessary to identify the SR significance of the political party change following the 2000 elections. In fact, analysis of this domestic political change will allow to answer the MRQ, RQ2 and its two sub-RQs.

In the first stance, the investigation of the changes produced by the elections and economic, political and international events enables the comparison between the old and the new system. They are chronologically retraced from the Revolutionary period, characterised by a one-party system, to the development of Mexico’s economic liberalisation and political democratisation. For every period the influence exerted by systemic boundaries and strategic actors is examined. Then, foreign policy paradigms implemented in both periods are explained in light of their principles and connected to the presence of the structural characteristics typical of the hegemonic party and the democratic period, making reference to two different national-popular projects that have been differentiated in section 1.4. Finally, in the last section international structural changes produced by the 2001 terrorist attack on the US and the Cold War are interpreted as a shift in the international context that influenced the change in structural selectivities. This chapter demonstrates that the evolution realised in Mexico offered the opportunity for a shift in foreign policy. It favours the understanding of how
and which factors impacted the process of change in foreign policy. Subsequently it questions whether these changes were sufficiently rooted to dismantle the continuity of the preceding 100 years of Mexican international activity.

2.1. Mexico under the PRI. The influence of political and economic under the Revolutionary project

The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) represents a pivotal event in the building of the Mexican national state, which was then ruled for 71 uninterrupted years by the PRI and grounded on the implementation of a revolutionary, national-popular project. The Mexican Revolution determined the end of the Porfiriato through the recognition of new socio-political actors. This event shaped a new Mexican political class and the new pivotal principles and values that led the Mexican national state during the long and uninterrupted PRI government period (Castañeda 1963). These conjunctural and domestic events laid the foundation of a political project based on Mexican ‘Revolutionary nationalism’. It supplied ideological support fundamental to institutionalising the Revolution by creating clear institutional boundaries and guidelines through the 1917 Constitutional Reform and the PRI’s creation in 1946; these cornerstones remained intact until the last decade of the 20th century (Hernández Chávez 2002, 302-346; Ai Camp 2003, 131).

The basis of understanding how it was possible to produce a change in the exercise of Mexican power in the domestic and international context has to been conceptualised and considered in light of the changes realised among Mexican strategic actors, and the ideas they both supported and which encouraged the implementation of domestic structural changes. The Revolution brought a change in the ideological national-popular project for Mexico. It produced the expansion of political participation and the entry of a new hegemonic class, in Spanish called clase política, that participated in that historical phase and was responsible for applying the new Revolutionary project, opening the doors of the political decision-making process to mass actors in a top-

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5 The calculation of the 71 years of PRI rule starts from 1928, when President Plutarco Elías Calles created a party able to represent governments born of the Revolution. It aimed to represent the whole nation and to reference every Revolutionary actor, both civilian and military.

6 This period takes its name from the dictator Porfirio Díaz who ruled in Mexico from 1876 to 1911.
down, corporatist fashion (Middlebrook 1995, 1). Moreover, the Revolution influenced the creation of different state rules driving a new state institutional ensemble. They were able to limit the existence of those policies adverse to the project, and favour those under the Revolutionary policy paradigm which supported economic and political change. In 1917, a Constituent Congress was formed in order to partial modify of the liberal Constitution of 1857 (Ulloa quoted in Krauze 1998, 357). Nevertheless, the new Constitution did not maintain the traditional elements as expected. It did not represent a common constitutional reform but the legalisation and institutionalisation of the Revolution and its values. Such values were held steadily until new parties represented concrete opponents producing a political alternation for the country.

Revolutionary ideas were institutionalised, legitimising state decisions and institutional actions in line with the national-popular project. Major Revolutionary values can be identified in the pursuit of independence from foreign countries, the involvement of new mass forces in the political process, and the idea of economic redistribution of resources. One of the principal limits imposed by the Revolutionary policy paradigm was to reduce foreign influences in both political and economic spheres, establishing formal independence in every sector and constituting one of the international policy pillars of the PRI period (Krauze 1998, 357-362; Castañeda 1963, 397-401; Velázquez Flores 2007, 125-126). The examination of the shift in its constitutional foundation and the creation of a “political mythology of the Revolution” (Ai Camp 2003, 43) enables understanding of how the Revolutionary policy paradigm was re-shaped, according to its vision of the context, state selectivities and the formal limits imposed by the Mexican state system.

The new structure of external influences upon the Mexican management of the state focused not only on its economic and entrepreneurial relations, but included a more general re-shaping of its national, social and political role in order to achieve the “Revolution’s redistributive goals” (Middlebrook 1995, 21). State activities underwent a secularisation process, that limited the implementation of the Church’s strategic action, institutionally constraining it and establishing a clear distinction between public and religious issues and the non-recognition of the Church as an influencing actor. These elements represented a central component in the reiteration of the Revolutionary policy paradigm entrenched in state decision-making and were maintained until the beginning of the political and economic transition between the end of the 1980s and the 1990s (Krauze 1998, 361-362; Ai Camp 2003, 44-45). Moreover, the presence of new
political ideas, and an innovative conception of community and the role of the state, produced the introduction of social reforms into the Constitution, generating new opportunities for the involvement of a new political class with different social roots. “The Revolution re-introduced the importance of working-class origin among Mexico’s leadership” (Ai Camp 2003, 43-44) and the concept of social justice. It created cohesion around the national party through the promotion of innovative economic, social and cultural policies related to the Revolutionary national project. While, according to a more critical interpretation of the Mexican Revolution, the new Constitution was promoted by bourgeois strategic actors and favoured the entrenchment of capitalist interests, it also indirectly recognised the mass struggle (Morton 2013, 17). Moreover, it modified the existent strategic selectivities with which the new societal actors interpreted the state system and within which they could exert their agency.

Political and social actors’ strategic decisions were addressed and limited by the creation of new constitutional constraints that generated a new set of strategic selectivities through the institutionalisation of the Revolutionary policy paradigm and the development in Mexican capitalism. Therefore, the consideration of a monocausal or dualist interpretation would be insufficient in order to explain the complexity of this process and the existence of mutual influences between elements. For instance, Article 123 and Article 27 of the Constitution formally legitimised the presence of new actors, guaranteeing social and political rights and legal and social protection for Mexican workers. Such concessions influenced other decision-makers’ calculations, but also strategically included the new categories of social actors within the institutional frame, strategically limiting the possibility for their strategic action. The new look of the relationship between mass actors and the state was considered primary in the evolution of Mexican politics during the PRI’s tenure, creating a new social contract that guaranteed support for the one-party regime until the beginning of the 1980s (Krauze 1998, 360-361; Middlebrook 1995, 46-47).

The PRI governments and the new conceptualisation of Mexican politics were built on the ideological discourse of the Mexican Revolution in which institutionalisation created new opportunities for the development and entrenchment of a new decision-making class, whilst strategically “absorbing the Revolutionary potential of class forces through the state and changes in social property relations by inducing consent, exercising coercion, and engaging co-optation” (Morton 2010, 18). The interplay among these
factors favoured the entrenchment of political and economic nationalism, social justice and collective participation in state life. According to Middlebrook (1995, 15), these new ideas:

“[…] influenced both the policy agenda for post-Revolutionary decision-makers and the form of major political institutions. Although the government actions were often at odds with the substantive and procedural content of the Revolutionary ideals, the ideas associated with the 1910-1920 Revolution had enduring importance for Mexican politics”.

In sum, their institutionalisation re-shaped the role of political actors and institutions into the domestic scenario through the creation of a structurally centralised organisation and the presence of a new actor, a strong and official leading party called PNR. On the one hand, specific strategic selectivities were constitutionally imposed in order to implement the political and economic nationalism associated to the Revolutionary project. However, on the other, the presence of mass social forces and new actors necessary to support the regime, was absorbed and legitimised within the boundaries of the institutional system. This integration was favoured by the creation of formal and informal strategic mechanisms, established by the political class which produced new strategic selectivities related to the Revolutionary policy paradigm and that influenced the production of strategic calculations by the former group of social actors. Differently from dualist approaches, a SR analysis allows to understand how the results of this process influenced the production of further changes providing a dialectical explanation of the overall complexity generated by the interaction of different categories of elements.

2.1.1. Mexican political system: limits and selectivities

The aforementioned strategic selectivities enabled the transformation of a ruling party whose hold on power was widely recognised. This created stability and rooting (in formal and informal mechanisms) the limits and conditions favouring the success of those strategies which would drive the implementation of new ideas: Mexican modernisation and economic redistribution. In 1938, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party: PNR) underwent a structural re-definition
taking the name of Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolution: PRM). The change in the strategic structure of the party was implemented by President Lázaro Cárdenas in order to dissociate the ‘Revolutionary party’ from the initial radicalism and strengthen the more progressive ideas included in the Revolutionary policy paradigm. The strategic calculation backing this change aimed to generate cohesion among the different actors within Mexican society and increase government support across the masses. The aim was to provide different categories of actors with the same set of strategic selectivities related to the presence of political and party constraints, as well as more progressive ideas. Their co-optation within the PRM was necessary for the creation of a new strategically-selective context able to reinforce the implementation of new strategies orientated by the new ideas. Through the reproduction of a corporatist pattern and the strategic consideration of its boundaries, as deemed appropriate by most of the societal actors, the PRM was transformed into a new party of the masses (Krauze 1998, 472). According to Morton (2010, 24) this period “can be regarded as the apogee of national cohesion and patriotic jubilation”.

During the Second World War period, the PRM came nearer to the middle class and its interests, even preserving its corporative model, and eight years later it changed its name to PRI, party that ruled in Mexico until 2000.

The change to PRI was produced because of the necessity to strengthen its institutions and specify the boundaries and possibilities for strategic action. The system of integrating social and class needs was improved, involving different labour sectors in governmental activity and framing them within the PRI’s state structure and its limits. The aim was to include different Mexican labour realities in the institutionalised revolution, controlling them and consequently influencing their strategic calculation (Hernández Chávez 2002, 304-305). The inclusion of every social and working sector of the society within boundaries imposed by the Revolutionary national-popular project became the basis for the PRI’s permanence in power. It legitimised the implementation (and the interpretation) of the policy paradigm identified by the party and swallowing up every form of political and social opposition (Gledhill 2000, 114).

Approaching this activity through an SR analytical lens, it appears that the PRI tried to acquire a role which fused the party and the state, and granted unlimited power to the President. The party represented the most powerful Mexican actor and structure, which contained those limits imposed by the domestic system where party interests were reflected. The party/state-system was responsible for the production and
implementation of constraints for social and political forces, the institutional framework within which they operated and the final result of the struggle for power. The identification between the PRI and the state made it the social relation that Jessop identified as “the site, the generator and the product of strategies” (Jessop 1990, 260). This evolution and the internalisation of every political conflict enabled the ruling party and its institutions to preserve political control and domestic stability. Moreover, the limited competitive political opposition allowed the growth of a presidential system and the implementation of clear strategies.\(^7\) The mix of authoritarianism and corporatism through populist policies guaranteed necessary individual freedoms and the maintenance of social and political stability (González González 2006, 156).

The Mexican system has been defined a “perfect dictatorship” (Vargas Llosa 1991, 23-24) and different from other Latin America countries (Knight 1992) because of its atypical authoritarian system. The peculiar structure of the presidential model ensured that the power was *de facto* under presidential control, establishing a hegemonic party system that could implement its favoured strategies without the necessity to mediate with other actors’ preferences. The President maintained the authority to select his successor within the party in accordance with corporatist logics of power; the presidential selection was then legitimised by popular elections according to the rule “winner takes all”. The hegemonic party formally and informally imposed strict structural selectivities through which other political actors could exercise their political strategies, constraining their freedom of action. These strategic selectivities were essentially determined by the undisputed PRI power and the imposition of its strategic vision relating to the Revolutionary policy paradigm.

This vision was maintained by the existence of institutions provided for by law (the Congress, the judicial branch and the federal system) that should have limited the Executive power, but which existed purely as formalities. As soon as these institutions were penetrated by the PRI, they lost their ability to balance the power within the system, strengthening the Executive and the impositions of its strategies. This condition created a powerful presidentialism, named “hyper-presidentialism” by Amparo Casar (2002b, 65), that represented a strategically-selective context dominated by the PRI. The presence of opposition parties was permitted in order to

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\(^7\) In Elizondo Mayer-Serra and Nacif Hernández’s (2002) *Lecturas sobre el cambio político en México*, part II entitled “El desgaste del partido hegemónico” provides a detailed explanation of how the PRI monopoly could coexist with a constitutional separation of powers and the presence (although limited) of opposition parties.
strategically legitimise the authoritarian system, but they were not able to exert any strategic influence due to the structural limits imposed by the hyper-presidentialism. Therefore, although formal separation of powers and a system of checks and balances existed, in reality, power was owned by the PRI. It was exercised thanks to the opportunities produced by corporatist dynamics intertwined within the Mexican political context (Amparo Casar 2002b, 42; Hamilton 1982, 36-37). Moreover, it was justified by the aim to spread the Revolutionary national-popular project of which the PRI was the interpreter, in order to legitimise the system and maintain political stability within the country.

Although between the 1940s and the 1970s the hegemonic party increased its presence in order to produce a trade-off among different social forces, the initial political stability was jeopardised from an internal fracture caused by the PRI’s authoritarian policy. Continuous HR abuses, cultural and ideological limitations, electoral frauds and the closed political system generated a serious social crisis between 1957 and the end of the 1960s. In 1968, the crisis achieved its peak when, in Tlatelolco, students and the middle classes’ manifestation of discontent was strongly repressed by the military (Hernández Chávez 2002, 302, 317-325; Krauze 1998, 665-736). New social and political actors tried to implement different sets of strategies but the presence of a solid strategically-selective context that favoured the persistence of the PRI limited their attempts. Nevertheless, political stability was re-obtained in the period between the 1940s and the 1970s: the golden period of the Mexican economy, thanks to its uninterrupted economic growth. The presence of more popular political strategies and economic opportunities for the population changed antagonist actors’ strategic conceptualisations of the existing political and institutional context, generating a period of stability.

Despite the difficulty of clearly defining the degree of change of the different factors, the consideration of the causal predominance or the underestimation of just one of these elements would undermine the understanding of the mutually constitutive dynamics over the time. In order to provide a clearer understanding of the causal process, in the next sub-section the strategic selectivities generated by Mexico’s economic structure will be explored. They offered a renewed set of economic limits and opportunities to Mexico that influenced international perceptions of Mexican actors thanks to the introduction of new ideas that were carried by new agents and characterised by the PRI policy paradigm.
2.1.2. Mexican economic boundaries influencing strategic selectivities

The Revolutionary policy paradigm generated structural changes that influenced the development of the Mexican political economy in accordance with the economic distribution of sources and the projection of a nationalist and defensive vision. A new concept of state which had attained national interest was introduced at the social, political and economic levels. Starting from 1935, the economic agenda underwent a deep re-organisation to affirm, as in the political field, the supremacy of national wellbeing over private and individual interests. The Revolutionary principles included in the policy paradigm and the strategy of re-distribution of economic sources commenced implementation among the different working sectors, producing social actors’ identification with the national-popular project (Hernández Chávez 2002, 276-277, 310) and promoting the endurance of existing strategic selectivities. Strategic opportunities to develop both economic and financial activities were managed according to the exchange of concessions for support between the party and the corporatist system. Such exchanges were necessary for the implementation of the Revolutionary project and the permanence of the PRI’s hold on power.

At the beginning of the Second World War, President Cárdenas (1933-1939) instigated an agrarian reform designed to re-distribute the land among peasants following its acquisition by the state. The expropriation of agricultural lands was organised through the creation of a system of ejidos and their collective or family-based management.\(^8\)

Accounting for the implementation of the economic project, the land reform triggered a series of expropriations and nationalisations.\(^9\) The implementation of this economic strategic calculation also aimed to foster the inclusion of peasants and working organisations within the state system in order to strategically obtain their political support and limit alternative interpretations of the strategic selectivities. During the same period several banks were nationalised in order to improve the financial development of the country and provide new inputs to the national economy, boosting

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\(^8\) According to Krauze (1997, 451) the ejido was "Essentially based on pre-Hispanic ideas of collective land ownership, the ejido was an agricultural unit that was the property of the state".

\(^9\) Among others, the nationalisation of the railways in 1937, and the nationalisation of the Mexican oil sector in 1938, henceforth named Petróleos Mexicanos (also known as PEMEX).
an economic growth (Velázquez Flores 2007, 133-38) that reinforced the solidity of the
existing strategic selectivities related to the Revolutionary policy paradigm.

Mexico’s demographic and economic levels soared through rapid urbanisation and a
constant increase in productivity, characterised by the strategic implementation of the
industrialisation and modernisation of the country. In the following decade, the
increased production generated an economic boom that, associated with the strong
state participation in productive processes, determined a change in the structural-
economic boundaries and a consequential change in social actors’ strategic
calculations. This dynamic generated an increase in social requests for the
improvement of formative and working opportunities, and a consistent growth in the
middle-class. Furthermore, together with the rise in agricultural workers, Mexican
manufacturing expanded quickly thanks to domestic industrialisation. The strategy,
called ‘stabilising development’, was encouraged by nationalist policies and the creation
of protectionist trade barriers aimed at limiting foreign imports and protecting national
industries (Ai Camp 2003, 242-244); this strategy had the impact of replacing those
existing strategic selectivities related to the economic sector.

The implementation of principles relating to the Revolutionary policy paradigm and the
protectionist strategies discouraged competition in the international markets however,
and created substantial investment immobility. They generated a gap between
domestic and international markets and dramatically increased inflation levels. The
“Mexicanisation” of the market (Centeno 1994, 152), interpreted as a protectionist
strategy, was perceived by both political and social actors as the best strategy
according to the principles of independence and the re-distribution of sources related to
the economic policy paradigm, necessary to maintain the PRI’s popular support.
Nevertheless, economic problems introduced extremist positions in public debate,
generating a series of strikes caused by political discontent, which in 1968 degenerated
into a military massacre of students in Tlatelolco Place. The existence of alternative
strategies was limited by the presence of institutional strategic limits that did not allow
their implementation within the structural context where the PRI exercised its
decisional-power. The presentation of the temporal framework is necessary in order to
understand how the increasing inequality and the loss of governmental legitimacy
remodelled existing strategic selectivities. This shift was interpreted by social actors as
the possibility to determine a change in decision-makers’ strategies, and it was
implemented through the realisation of protests that reduced the PRI’s negotiating
power acquired in previous decades (Davis 1993, 51) and opened the system to new strategic selectivities.

In 1970, in order to contain and dampen the protest, President Luís Echeverría, proclaimed an amnesty calling for a 'democratic opening’. This strategy was used to channel the dissent of the social masses into institutional forms controlled by the PRI, without the necessity of changing the formal and informal mechanisms of power. At the same time, populist strategies aiming to stabilise development were promoted by the government in order to relieve tension and re-acquire political legitimacy (Krauze 1998, 742-743). The discovery of large oil reserves allowed Mexico to rescue itself from imminent economic collapse and sustain populist means, producing an increase in the wealth level and re-achieving popular consensus through an oil-focused strategy (Mares 1995, 680; Grayson 1979, 427-456). Although authors as Mares (1995) and Krauze (1998) consider economic boundaries predominantly explicative of Mexico’s international behaviour, they underestimate their causal role in the generation of equally influent dynamics.

Economic reforms based on the exploitation of Mexican oil grounded the implementation of the Revolutionary policy paradigm. The generation of strategic selectivities, imposed by the Mexican institutional system and its corporatist mechanism, allowed the circumscription of opportunities for economic initiatives proposed by non-PRI actors and influenced the development of economic and financial strategies for half a century. The perpetuation of protectionist and populist policies was conceived as the most successful strategy to maintain the Mexican status quo in line with the Revolutionary policy paradigm and guarantee the equilibrium that existed between Mexican social and political forces. However, ineffectual attempts to re-address Mexican economic strategy and to replace strategic selectivities, alongside the collapse of the oil bubble in the 1980s, forced Mexico and its hegemonic party to modify the lens through which it interpreted its economic and political situation. A new class of PRI leaders holding new ideas was rising in Mexico. This category of actors became the interpreter of new domestic policy: compelling needs and promoting new economic visions acquired abroad, modifying Mexican economic development and inspiring the new range of neo-liberalist policies that are discussed in section 2.4.
2.2. *Mexican foreign policy paradigm under the PRI*

In addition to the political and economic sectors, the domestic actors’ strategic perception of international interests and opportunities was determined by the existence of the Revolutionary paradigm. Revolutionary principles led to formal and informal constraints on implementation. Strategic selectivities, influenced by corporatist and presidentialist mechanisms, determined the path of Mexican decision-makers’ strategic calculations in the matter of foreign policy. The implementation of these foreign policy strategies developed according to political and economic intertwined interests related to the Revolutionary paradigm and aimed to preserve the power balance that guaranteed the domestic predominance on power of PRI actors. Furthermore, the strategic role acquired by the Executive in the definition of Mexican foreign policy became a limit for other actors through its dominance over Congress, constraining its activities (Velázquez and Marín 2010, 3). On the one hand, final strategic decisions on foreign policy were taken by the President in order to guarantee the respect of Revolutionary foreign principles; these principles represented a constraint for Mexico’s foreign policy in that they were included in the Constitution and lead Mexican international behaviour. On the other hand, international affairs were grounded in a political Revolutionary discourse that highlighted a nationalist and populist project also in the management of Mexican foreign relations. The strategic arrangement of power across Legislative and Executive branches prevented the creation of political and social opposition, guaranteeing coherence in foreign policy decisions during the years the PRI was in power and underpinning stability with respect to Mexican foreign policy (Velázquez Flores 2008b, 114). An understanding of Mexico’s historical interplay that grounded the implementation of its traditional foreign policy is necessary in order to understand the evolution of this process, and which type of changes were realised in the Mexican foreign policy post-democratic transition. This understanding responds to the MRQ of this thesis, as well as to sub-RQ1 and sub-RQ2 by providing comparison in order to understand if and how change in Mexican foreign policy was implemented.

The existence of a Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm should be placed within a more complex process of state transformation. It cannot be understood from a Liberal or Neo-Realist perspective because they underestimate the importance of the causal interactions established between the international environment and ideas in the
production and reproduction of domestic boundaries that constrained the evolution of Mexico’s foreign policy-making. The Mexican Revolution and repeated foreign interventions represent those political limits that influenced the formation of the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm (Castañeda 1963, 392). These events contributed to determine the ideological nationalist characteristic associated with the Mexican political and economic Revolutionary paradigm implemented during PRI governments. They also influenced the birth of a foreign policy able to implement defensive, nationalist and law-oriented ideas entrenched in the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm. On the one hand, the Mexican foreign policy paradigm was developed in the context of the new political economic paradigm, and was related to a wider capitalist national-popular project for the Mexican state, and the need to promote and protect it. On the other hand, defensive foreign policy ideas were based on the preservation of domestic status quo related to the Revolutionary national-popular project. They guaranteed popular legitimacy to the centralist government and shaped the new Mexican institutional structural conformation. The creation of these new limits guaranteed the implementation of three elements: the Revolutionary project, the rejection of intromissions potentially delegitimising governmental decision, and the preservation of Mexican stability. Constitutional and informal rules leading Mexican decision-making represented those boundaries that influenced the presence of strategic selectivities addressing the PRI foreign policy proposal. These principles and goals will be discussed in the next paragraph.

2.2.1. Traditional PRI foreign policy: principles and goals

The policy paradigm underpinning traditional Mexican foreign policy sprang from the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920). It was characterised by the presence of principles and ideas linked to Mexican domestic political and economic conditions and to Mexico’s previous experiences in the international environment. It is possible to identify the fundamental principles of Mexican international policy. These were the guiding principles proclaimed after the 1917 constitutional reform, and were steadily held until 2000, when a new party generated power alternation in the country. Moreover, since 1988, Article 89, Paragraph X of the Federal Constitution of Mexico specifies that foreign policy fundamentals were based on the idea of legal equality of states and on
the defence and reciprocal respect for national sovereignty, internal legislation and institutions (Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 1917). This established that in no circumstances was a foreign state allowed to intervene in domestic affairs of another country. Principles of independence, non-intervention in domestic affairs of foreign countries, peaceful resolution of conflicts, the promotion of collective security through active participation in international organisations, the respect for international law were the fundamental ideas composing the traditional Mexican foreign policy paradigm. Most of these ideas were strategically aimed at guaranteeing Mexican political independence and reducing foreign influence in the Mexican national economy.

These principles were implemented from 1918 onwards through the application of the Carranza Doctrine, which allowed the generation of a strategic and radical change in Mexico’s foreign policy paradigm. The Carranza Doctrine was based around the principle of non-intervention and motivated by the need to preserve national natural resources during the oil conflict with the US (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 1985, 248), addressing Mexican reform of the state and the oil expropriation (Benítez Manaut 1996, 57-90). Nationalisation of natural and energy resources, the management of which was entrusted to the state, created a strong connection between foreign policy and national security policies in order to implement Mexico’s economic consolidation and generate social stability (Hernández Chávez 2002, 361-379).

Moreover, the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm was shared by social and political actors. It established a coherent link between the paradigm and foreign policy implementation that guaranteed stability within the PRI system, until the appearance of new neo-liberal ideas at the end of the 1980s. During the years of PRI’s administration, the construction of a foreign policy related to economic, political and social internal dynamics, and including national entrepreneurs’ interests, supported Mexican national industry and commercial development. Therefore, the implementation of these ideas influenced the creation of both economic and political opportunities for the Mexican state, strategically favouring and legitimising governmental actors’ decisions and reinforcing general consensus around the Revolutionary project.

The principles of non-intervention and self-government, which were characteristic of the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm, were connected to the creation of strong limitations for foreign interests in Mexico. They were strategically elaborated in order to
avoid foreign policy ideas related to the refusal of recognition justifying interference in the domestic affairs of foreign countries. Since 1930, the indication of Mexico’s position in terms of the international recognition of foreign governments complemented those principles. This Mexican position is also known as the Estrada Doctrine and, according to the Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada, it was generated by the idea that Mexico had always been victim of the recognition of its administrations by other states. Therefore, the exercise of Mexican national sovereignty had been constrained by positions adopted by foreign governments depending on the satisfaction of their requests. For this reason the Mexican administration established a formal limit, deciding not to express opinions related to the recognition of de facto governments generated by both a coup d’état or a revolution (Boletín Oficial de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores 1930, 9). During PRI administrations, strategic selectivities, influenced by ideas related to the Estrada doctrine principles, determined the adoption of international neutral positions on every occasion, for example the embargo imposed by the US to Cuba (Jessup 1993: 721-722). ¹⁰

During the Cold War governmental actors’ support of ideas related to the foreign policy paradigm and the strategic alignment to the Estrada doctrine, was the source of many disputes with the US. On the one hand, they represented an opportunity for Mexico but a limit for the development of US international strategies. On the other hand, they allowed Mexican decision-makers to conciliate internal requests and international circumstances in relation to the Cuban Revolution. During the PRI’s rule the Cuban Revolution was strategically interpreted as an important political opportunity, becoming an icon of Mexican autonomy in foreign policy and symbolising Mexican diversification strategy in the management of its international relations (Bobadilla González 2006: 64-84). Mexican actors’ implementation of isolationistic, legalist and nationalist ideas, and the promotion of the inter-American cooperation, protected Mexico’s political stability from internal and external pressures. The implementation of a defensive foreign policy paradigm allowed Mexico’s strategic actors to implement a protectionist economic model within the country. It guaranteed the maintenance of the hegemonic party’s national sovereignty, and hid the authoritarian excesses of the PRI regime, which could limit the achievement of its international strategic interests.

¹⁰ The relevant exception was during the Spanish Civil War in 1936, when the Mexican United States supported the republican faction, as Mexico believed that Spain had been victim of an external invasion.
Furthermore, the absence of a competitive political opposition permitted the growth of a presidential system and the generation of strategic selectivities that limited the development of new ideas. This was possible thanks to the presence of strategic selectivities related to the limits imposed on the mix between authoritarianism and corporatism, which favoured the implementation of populist policies and guaranteed the necessary individual freedom in order to permit the maintenance of social and political stability (Gonzáles Gonzáles 2006, 156). The adoption of a ‘foreign policy of principles’ balanced, albeit to a limited extent, the influence of the US, limiting its intromission on Mexico’s international strategies. At the same time it avoided Mexican internal destabilisation caused by criticisms coming from the external environment that could have consistently influenced Mexican domestic issues. Moreover, diversification strategies of Mexico’s international relations and the support given to multilateralism, represented a counterbalance to the limits imposed on Mexican international affairs by the US.

These foreign principles and ideas constituted the international policy pillars for the PRI governmental period, and characterised Mexican foreign policy, as well as its economic policy, with the presence of a strong nationalism and addressed it to the defence of national sovereignty (Velázquez Flores 2007, 125-126; Castañeda 1963, 397-401). The solidity of the reasons at the base of Mexican traditional foreign policy guaranteed the absence of substantial changes during PRI’s governments. Nevertheless, during the last 15 years of the 20th century the strategies used to pursue the Mexican foreign policy paradigm produced a gradual opening into the system, modifying existent strategic selectivities. This shift allowed a new group of entrepreneurial Mexican to raise the possibility of changes in Mexican international affairs. This change of perspective will be discussed in the next section.

2.3. **Mexican influential actors for PRI foreign policy-making**

During the rule of PRI governments the presence of influential political actors was limited by the existence of the ruling party and its ideas related to the Revolutionary policy paradigm. Mexico’s political and institutional structure of power represented an important constraint on the development of new ideas proceeding from environments other than the party. Therefore every political decision was taken within its components. Foreign policy decision-making was dominated by the presidential role
and the Foreign Minister was not able the exercise proper decisional power. Similarly, the Congress and the Army were totally dependent on presidential interpretation of Mexico’s interests and opportunities within the international environment. One of the few exceptions was determined by the existence of eminent personalities co-opted by the central party through corporatist dynamics. The inclusion of these type of actors guaranteed the maintenance of the status quo of PRI domination over the Mexican political system, allowing the control of social forces, the balance of power, and limiting the creation of protests or the development of ideas opposing the PRI’s Revolutionary policy paradigm. In sum, even if the PRI system allowed the presence of different ranges of actors, only the Executive and a few people coming from the influential Mexican establishment had the opportunity to address Mexican foreign policy. Although Goldstein’s and Keohane’s Neo-Liberal Institutionalism could explain the ideational influence at the systemic level, it neglects to explain how these ideas influence single actors’ behaviours able to produce the persistence or change of specific foreign policy paths. The modification of actors’ strategic role in the implementation of the traditional foreign policy paradigm is relevant for the generation of changes in the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm studied in Chapters Three to Five and consequently important in order to respond to RQ2 and sub-RQ2 and to address sub-RQ1 on the implementation of foreign policy change.

During the PRI government, foreign policy decision-making was essentially implemented by the Executive. The power remained in the hands of two strategic actors that were institutionally responsible for the implementation of the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm: the President and the Foreign Minister. They exercised a pivotal role in the establishment and implementation of international strategies related to Revolutionary ideas and paradigms. Moreover, their strategic action was limited by formal and informal constraints, represented by institutional structure and norms and the existence of political and corporatist mechanisms legitimised also within social actors. The Legislative branch assumed only an informal role in the foreign policy decisional process. The co-opting of the vast majority of politicians into the PRI helped to maintain consensus, limiting their action to the approval of the Executive’s decisions (Amparo Casar 2002a; 2002b). Therefore, Congress’ functions were considered a mere formality in the decision-making process. The vast majority of Congress’s incumbents were members of the ruling party, and therefore a plural debate within the Legislative was totally absent. This dynamic enables us to understand where foreign policy
strategies were directed during PRI governments, stressing the importance of the Revolutionary policy paradigm and strategic selectivities influenced by the presence of political and economic structural constraints.

The support to the Mexican system was exercised through the ‘silent veto’ of Armed Forces that provided public support to the hegemonic party (Ai Camp 2003, 16), not interfering in any type of political activity during the PRI regime, and developing a different role from other Latin American countries (Knight 1992). At the beginning of the PRI administration intellectuals and epistemic communities exercised an important role in the diffusion of the Mexican Revolutionary paradigm, while during the last years of the PRI administration they encouraged a shift in economic and political structural selectivities. However, civil society, the media and labour unions were subordinated to the system. They acted within the boundaries established by the strategic selectivities thanks to the belief of inclusion generated by the creation of the big ‘Revolutionary family’ that guaranteed their existence and activities in Mexico (Ai Camp 2003, 130-159; Castañeda 2000b, xii-xiv).

The existence in Mexico of corporatist dynamics, necessary to guarantee PRI’s legitimacy and political and social stability in the country, generated a set of actors who gradually became powerful in the system and were able to influence Mexican policy-making. PRI political hegemony favoured the rise of a political class composed of a close circle of political leaders that remained in power during the year of the PRI administration, and that can be defined as a power elite. Their power was transmitted through family ties or through the existence of ‘mentors’ (Ai Camp 2002, 18-29). They initiated young generations into the state dynamics, and how develop and implement their strategies according to existent strategic selectivities, formally and informally driven. Their role was particularly relevant for the perpetuation of the Revolutionary policy paradigm and the ability to impose their strategies elaborated in, and through, related Revolutionary discourses (Heigl 2011,83).

The presence of those strategic actors guaranteed a good degree of stability to the Mexican domestic system, strategically supporting the implementation of Revolutionary ideas and the realisation of Mexico’s foreign policy paradigm. However, in the 1990s the gradual entrance of new actors within these agential categories stimulated the generation of domestic structural changes, both in the political and economic field, which will be analysed in the next section.

The economic crisis inherited in 1982 by De La Madrid’s government (1982-1988) was faced by the PRI through the modernisation of the productive system, and an intensive structural reform that was able to partially change traditional structural selectivities, favouring a process of neo-liberalisation. Reforms, implemented between the 1980s and the 1990s, established the division in the management of economic and political spheres, which until then had been related, and generating new institutional barriers for the development of the Mexican Revolutionary policy paradigm. During previous administrations, the fear of losing the support of traditional economic and political actors had so paralysed the institutional party’s action that it was not able to establish new methods of pursuing its strategic interests. On the one hand, this paralysis generated clear constraints on the implementation of international strategies that could compromise the nationalist and defensive policy paradigm. On the other hand, it favoured those international strategies that preserved Mexican domestic status quo. It is necessary to provide an explanation of contextual and agential changes developed over the time in order to understand how their realisation can influence the foreign policy change. This section illustrates that the presence of these strategic selectivities encouraged the realisation of populist policies, avoiding the change of non-governmental actors’ strategies, but ignoring the result of their long-term consequences. Nevertheless, problems generated by the crisis determined a soaring loss of governmental credibility weakening governmental actors. Moreover, the corporative system, which influenced the existence of strategic selectivities that traditionally guaranteed PRI’s permanence on power and the implementation of its traditional strategies, started to show signs of internal political unrest (Hernández Chávez 2002, 478-479; Herrera-Lasso 2006, 254), disrupting the traditional balance of power established by an entire range of strategic actors.

The primary strategy used to rescue Mexico from the crisis, and promote the idea of modernising its internal production, was respect for the guidelines recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), interpreted as an opportunity for Mexico’s international interests. De La Madrid introduced a new neo-liberal economic vision,
ideologically different from the classic PRI’s economic policy paradigm and which aimed to improve the relationship between the private sector and the state (Hamilton 2002, 285-323; Ai Camp 2003, 247). However, the implementation of the neo-liberal strategy should not be considered in isolation but, in the light of the global political economy and its causal connection that determined the implementation of strategically oriented changes within the Mexican context (Morton 2003, 636-637). Structural and economic changes influenced foreign policy strategies, generating a shift towards a more pragmatic approach to the international policies that, in the 1990s, was applied to the country. This strategy led toward the intensification of relations with the US and developed countries, and represented a failure for the economic diversification, strategy previously implemented (Chabat 1991, 4; Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1983, 71-74).

Moreover, economic neo-liberalisation policies were sustained by a new political class composed of party technicians, educated in the United States, who challenged the PRI’s nationalist idea, and that sector of actors who traditionally served as guarantor of corporatist interests. The process of democratic opening was challenged by every component of the party, and was perceived as a risk for the stability of the one-party system. In fact, the neo-liberalisation of Mexican economy started in the 1980s, but the democratisation of the political system and the rejection of authoritarian processes in the country underwent a longer process. As a consequence, the decision to change the economic development paradigm maintaining traditional Mexican political pillars at the base of the foreign policy paradigm generated a double-speed transition. It prevented the coordination between the economic and democratic opening in the country, producing unequal type of limits to Mexican political and economic paradigm change, and influencing Mexico’s foreign policy (Herrera-Lasso 2006: 154; González González 2006, 157).

Conjunctural events, structural reforms carried out in the country, the attempt to normalise economic relations with the US and the worsening of the economic crisis, sharpened internal disagreements among PRI actors, reducing the undisputed influence of the party (Morton 2003, 642). Thus, agential, structural and ideational changes influenced the production of new strategic boundaries that favoured the implementation of neo-liberal strategies, thereby compromising the Revolutionary nationalist approach to Mexican foreign policy. In order to reinforce the achievement of preferred international interests, and favour actors who were members of the PRI
traditional wing, previously representing the dominant political actors, new specific strategic boundaries to foreign policy implementation were inscribed into the constitutional structure, reinforcing existent traditional strategic selectivities. In 1988 Revolutionary foreign policy principles were introduced in Article 89 of the Constitution, forcing Mexican Presidents to conduct a foreign policy consistent with these fundamentals (Iruegas, 77-79; Velázquez Flores 2007, 164-165). Foreign policy goals scheduled in De La Madrid’s *PND 1983-1988 in primis* planned to strengthen ideas of Mexican political and economic independence, and safeguard national sovereignty supporting the global peace, aims ascribable to Mexico’s traditional international policy principle. The improvement of internal economic and democratic conditions were strategically designed to establish new relations between countries, implementing joint projects in order to support a strategy aimed to support a fair, free and equal international environment (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 1983, 71-74).

Furthermore, the strategies of diversification of investments and the negotiation power, acquired in Latin America during previous administrations, allowed De La Madrid’s government to play a relevant role in Central America. During conflicts which arose in the 1980s, Mexico assumed the leadership and coordination of several regional activities addressed to peace maintenance. According to governmental actors’ perception, this strategy allowed Mexico to reaffirm its traditional and ideological ideas in defence of states’ sovereignty and right to independence among countries involved into the conflict (Iruegas 2006, 85; Grabendorff 1991, 151-152). Strategic motivations for Mexican activism in the region were explained by De La Madrid (1986, 62-76; 1988, 20), who for the first time used the concept of ‘national interest’ referring to Mexico’s foreign policy (Herrera-Lasso M. 2006, 256). These strategic goals reconciled traditional Mexican Revolutionary principles with the necessity to face the economic crisis, and re-acquire negotiation power within the international scenario. At the same time, foreign policy strategies were limited by the presence of institutional boundaries included in the Article 89 and economic constraints produced by the new neo-liberal activities that attempted to substitute the Revolutionary paradigm and, particularly, its nationalist principle.

These new limits were reflected in a deep state economic re-organisation that, during Salinas de Gortari’s government (1988-1994), dismantled the Mexican Revolutionary economic policy paradigm, its nationalist conception of the state and its economically inclusive role, substituting them with a neo-liberalist vision. During the same period the
agrarian system also underwent a drastic re-shaping. Strategic selectivities offered by the *ejido* land structure were modified, and private ownership guaranteed, favouring the presence of new economic actors who supported neo-liberal strategies. Moreover, Mexico moved away from traditional nationalist policies implemented by previous administrations, realising a shift in the ruling class, moving away from the PRI which was no longer able to represent the variety of Mexican actors, and towards the private sector (Morton 2003, 643). The interplay established between these elements cannot be underestimated because the contemporaneous change of relevant strategic actors and structural selectivities favoured the entrenchment of the new neo-liberal Mexican economic paradigm. It consequently caused the radicalisation of liberalisation and stimulated Mexico’s ambition to establish a special relationship with the US (Chabat 1991, 7-10).

From the ideational analytical point of view, the importance of the economy in Mexican foreign policy become one of Mexico’s international strategic goals, although application of traditional foreign policy principles were consistent in Mexico’s multilateral activities (Herrera-Lasso 2006, 258). The idea of Mexico’s activism, addressed to the improvement of the ‘North-South dialogue’ during the previous decade, was replaced by the strategic priority given to Mexico’s relationship with the US (Castañeda 1990, 407-422). Furthermore, the idea of *hermandad latinoamericana* (Latin American brotherhood), which had been conceived as the best choice to implement Mexican Revolutionary goals, lost the support of intellectual elites and politicians, surviving only in civil society. These changes determined the substitution of this strategic international conception with the idea of ‘Mexico belongs to North’ which favoured Mexico’s relationship with North America (Pellicer 2006a, 21-23, 83; Isulza 2001, 205-225).

According to Centeno (1994), despite the implementation of the economic neo-liberal paradigm, the same strategic selectivities were in operation at the political level. Salinas continued to maintain the classical PRI strategic behaviour, continuing to exercise control over both party and societal actors. The decision-making process remained unchanged and the presence of a minimal electoral opening, which partially changed existent boundaries, was used to channel the popular dissent. However, it does not produced any substantial innovation in the strategic management of the political sphere. If economic changes produced new opportunities for strategic action, as in the participation in the NAFTA signed in 1994, strategic selectivities present at the
political institutional level inhibited them. The existence of the dual-process allowed the preservation of the domestic governability during last PRI governments. Nonetheless, it was not sufficient to substitute boundaries that could favour the decrease of social inequalities and address the widening gap between rich and poor. It was generating increasing discontent and represented an obstacle to the implementation of favoured governmental and entrepreneurial actors’ strategies (Roett 1995, 31) and started to modify their ideational interpretations. The PRI lost its consensus, undermining the cohesion existent (at least formally) among different social sectors, which had previously strategically guaranteed the permanence in power of the hegemonic party, allowing the implementation of the Revolutionary project (Morton 2003, 642).

In 1988, besides limits imposed by internal economic and social imbalances produced by the negative impact of neo-liberal reforms, the PRI system faced a complex crisis of legitimacy generated by the suspicion of electoral fraud during the Presidential elections won by Salinas. The social and political crisis, in conjunction with the weakening of the ruling actor, determined domestic instability, which did not favour the change and culminated with the murder of the PRI’s presidential candidate Donaldo Colosio. He was replaced by Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), who was elected president in 1994 (Shultz 1995, 21-26). In order to strategically face limits imposed by the domestic situation, political reforms were promoted with the aim of giving transparency to the electoral process and removing traditional barriers that strategically protect the PRI system and the Revolutionary paradigm (Velázquez Flores 2007, 166-167). However, as claimed by Morton (2003, 645):

“In Mexico, hegemony became limited to privileged groups and was based on a central core of elite and exclusionary decision making that enacted rhetorically 'Revolutionary’ changes in the social relations of production, through the neo-liberal accumulation strategy, alongside engineered social and political reform. As Jorge Castañeda has described it, neo-liberalism as a hegemonic project only achieved a relative degree of consensual acceptance within elite circles, while any mass support was usually based on misperceived or false pretences”.

11 A few years later Mexico signed both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the NAFTA in December 1993. Nevertheless, due to the unstable domestic conditions on first of January 1994 the discontent produced an armed revolt in the State of Chiapas. The revolt was organised by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN – Zapatist Army of National Liberation), which made public Chiapas’ economic and social conditions (Castañeda 1990: 407-422; Shulz 1995).
A new economic crisis which began in 1994 constrained Zedillo’s definition of economic policy, preventing any type of change in Mexican strategies. Nevertheless, as result of an internal economic stabilisation and the establishment of clearer economic boundaries, the priority for Zedillo’s administration was to respect his electoral promises concerning Mexican democratisation. This represented a strategic opportunity for the removal of old international barriers and the opening up of Mexican foreign policy, giving to the new actors present in the Mexican scenario the possibility of implementing innovative strategies. Economic opening and the improvement of electoral reforms enabled Mexico to allow the effective presence of new parties in the process of policy-making, increasing democratic expectations of national and international actors. Neo-liberalism and the rising of electoral competitiveness produced the entrance of new political actors within the Mexican political scenario, eroding PRI legitimacy and moving traditional institutional limits (Rubio 2004, 5-34).

A dialectical understanding of these processes is necessary in order to explain the historical background influencing the evolution of Mexican foreign policy after 2000, because every elements considered until this moment played a relevant role in its definition. Transformations in the pre-existing political structure, the reformulation of institutional power and strategic selectivities, and the entrance of new politically competitive actors into the Mexican domestic scenario signified a breaking point for PRI political and social homogeneity and the implementation of the Revolutionary paradigm. The modification of the strategic relation among actors, which was weakening of the hegemonic party, stimulated actors’ strategic elaboration of a new political paradigm, while the loss of the PRI’s ideological role started representing an obstacle to Mexico’s Presidential leadership. However, such limitations were not sufficient to affect the president’s pivotal role within the decision-making process. (González González 2006, 190-191). These changes represented a limit for the ruling party (Hernández-Rodríguez 2003, 113; Ai Camp 2003, 68-72), which found its functionality compromised by the pluralism derived from the presence of new strategic selectivities.

Commenting on the PND 1995-2000, Zedillo affirmed that Mexican international positions had to sustain internal transformations, guaranteeing the creation of a solid economic and political basis. Nevertheless, the President did not reject the Mexican traditional foreign policy paradigm and its principles (Zedillo Ponce de León 1995). From the beginning of the 1990s, new parties had the possibility to strategically change
the direction of Mexico’s foreign policy. Changes in structural economic and political selectivities influenced decision-makers’ strategies creating a period of uncertainty. As a result, the Foreign Ministry maintained a low profile in both multilateral and regional spheres (Herrera-Lasso 2006, 268-270), excluding the elaboration of long and medium-term projects and waiting to understand which type of ideas were going to remain embedded in the structural institutional system. New Mexican strategic selectivities influenced by economic and political limits, generated in order to allow a wider range of possible strategies, allowed the entrance of innovative ideas. While decision-makers started feeling the pressure exercised by new economic and political actors (namely the private sector and political parties) that tried to impose their ideas and that were empowered thanks to the recent structural transformations.

What explained in this section shows the necessity to fully consider the complexity of causational processes that includes different factors. In fact, the government’s decision to remove institutional barriers that constrained the political alternation in the country allowed the acquisition of power by new actors as opposition parties, limiting the use of presidential power. In conjunction with the results produced by the economic crisis and the neo-liberalisation of the country, this removal represented the most important structural change that allowed the beginning of Mexican democratic opening and new actors’ proposals of new ideas and policy paradigms. The first concrete electoral results were marked at the 1997 mid-term elections when, for the first time in Mexican history, the PRI lost their majority in the Congress (Rubio 2004, 5-34). The removal of another important political constraint is dated 1999, and corresponds to the opening of the presidential candidate’s selection process, until then managed by PRI’s leaders (Hamilton 2002, 318). Both economic and political changes, as well as the presence of a new category of influential actors, stimulated the elaboration of a new Mexican foreign policy paradigm, the efficacy of which will be explored in the empirical chapters of this thesis. In order to be able to adequately explore changes produced within the foreign policy paradigm, giving them a temporal connotation, and understand how and which elements influence this process, responding to the RQs of this thesis, domestic

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12 The unique exception was the ratification of the ‘Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement’ with the European Union in 1998, which came into force in 2000 (European Union Press Release 3 July 2007). The agreement was accepted thanks to the ratification of the ‘democratic clause’ previously refused by Mexico. Nevertheless, Mexico imposed a condition at the base of its relations with the European Union: the inclusion, in the final part of the agreement, of its foreign policy’s traditional principles.
and international changes which occurred after the 2000 elections will be explored in the following sections.

2.5. Domestic political changes: the PAN in power

In 2000, presidential elections were won by the right wing PAN and its coalition ‘Alianza por el cambio’, that included the small Green party (PVEM). After the election the coalition obtained the support of other minority parties which had less than 0.5% of votes and that had not obtained any seat at the Congress. Components of these minority parties and other distinguished personalities, proceeding also from leftist sectors, joined the new elected government creating a ‘transition team’, with the only (formal) strategic interest of strengthening the new-born Mexican democratic system, that could guarantee new strategic spaces for innovative actors. The election of Vicente Fox determined a fundamental turning point in Mexican politics. For the first time in 71 years the Mexican president was not a person from the PRI apparatus, an event that allowed Mexico to formally achieve electoral democracy. The international community recognised it as a democratic country. It meant a change of the hegemonic actor and the consequent shift in power dynamics, until then reflected in the centralisation of decision-making processes and the pursuing of the Revolutionary project, basis for Mexican foreign policy and its principles (Mena Alemán 2005, 657-666).

The democratic opening allowed the redefinition of strategic selectivities favouring the widening of the Mexican decision-making process and the nature of political participation, previously constrained by the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm in order to legitimise the presence of traditional actors linked to the PRI. It determined a transfer of power from the hegemonic party to other types of institutional and social actors, without a collapse in the pre-existing system (O’Donnell 1992, 17-56). Through the generation of new strategic selectivities the democratic transition opened the doors to a concrete separation of powers in Mexico, modifying traditional formal and informal

13 The Election was lost by the PRI and its coalition ‘Alianza por Mexico’, composed of: Partido de la Revolución Democratica (Party of the Democratic Revolution - PRD), which represented the main party in the coalition; Partido del Trabajo (Labour Party – PT); Convergencia; Partido de la Sociedad Nacionalista (Party of the Nationalist Society –PSN); Partido Alianza Social (Social Alliance Party – PAS).

decisional mechanisms. The end of the hegemonic party system, and the decentralisation of political decisions, brought in political actors who had previously been placed outside the traditional corporatist dynamic of power. At the same time, it favoured the opening of public debate and the interruption in the mechanism of legitimisation and supremacy for the party in power, which ceased to be identified with the nation (Randall 2006, 10). This process permitted the spread of political strategies and visions different from the old PRI policy paradigm through the rise of new ideas that will be examined in detail within the empirical chapters. Moreover, from the point of view of informal political practices, the 2000 election set an important structural change for the legislative branch. After many years of presidential dominance, Congress had the possibility of contributing to political discussion and policy-making processes related to strategic Mexican international decisions and activities (González González 2007; Ai Camp 2005, 50).

The neo-liberal economic paradigm and the shift from an authoritarian system to an electoral democracy generated the idea that Mexico should leave its traditional nationalist ideas. This was encouraged by the new party’s strategic proposal of a new foreign policy paradigm. In part, it was due to the fact they were used by PRI administrations to obtain international legitimacy covering the lack of free and fair elections in the country. Nevertheless, traditional foreign policy ideas and political habits were still deeply rooted among Mexican political actors. Moreover, ideas included in the new foreign policy paradigm were lacking of a strategic framework and a clear long-term national-popular project (Starr 2006, 56-57; Chabat 2008, 5-6).

To summarise, in order to understand the causal dynamics generated in concomitance of this conjunctural event, it was necessary to explore the mutual influences among different factors and sectors. For instance, the diffusion of a new conception of Mexican politics offered a wider range of opportunities to new political and social actors, favouring the political re-structuring of the country. However, the presence of a multiparty-system and the habit of subordinating policy-making and policy implementation to pact-making, in order to avoid internal conflicts in Mexico, determined a weak system unable to generate a new dominant policy paradigm for Mexico (Loaeza 2006, 33-37).\(^\text{15}\) PAN’s power within the system could not be compared with the role traditionally played by the PRI. The absence of a sufficiently strong actor

\(^{15}\) The presence of traditional pact-making related to corporatist mechanisms clashed with the need for a transparent policy-making process expected in a democratic state.
in power, and the continuous evolution of structural limits, did not allow the production of a sufficiently powerful national-popular paradigm. The persistence of certain traditional political biases did not allow the new government to replace Mexico’s institutional limits and to create a new set of strategic selectivities within the system. Moreover, the traditional foreign policy vision constituted a constraint to legitimising the presence of different policy habits and a new foreign policy paradigm. The new international vision will be explored in the next section in order to provide a ground for the more specific examination of the empirical case studies. It is important in order to understand how structural, agential and ideational changes influenced the implementation of a new Mexican foreign policy paradigm in specific cases and allow a response to RQ2 and sub-RQ2.

2.6. The PAN’s vision for a new foreign policy paradigm

In August 2000 the new government presented its foreign policy plan for the Fox’s administration 2000-2006.\(^{16}\) The new foreign policy paradigm was interpreted by new Mexican actors as the basis for the political shift started in July 2000 with the PRI presidential defeat (Ramírez 2001). The alteration of structural domestic constraints realised during previous administrations favoured the attempt at modification of the political project, representing an opportunity for change in Mexico. On the one hand, the proposal was based on transparency strategies and the redefinition of internal political participation and administrative constraints able to redefine the strategic relation among social and political actors (Fox 2000a; Fox 2000b). These perspectives generated high expectations in Mexican social forces, which hoped to obtain quick changes in state institutions and a substantial improvement in the national economy (Rubio 2004: 5-34). On the other hand, the new government in power proposed the creation of a new country, holder of a ‘democratic bonus’, aiming to increase its negotiation power and activity in the international arena (Castañeda 2001b).\(^{17}\)


\(^{17}\) The concept of “democratic bonus” was stated for the first time by Fox’s Foreign Minister, Jorge Castañeda, attributing the concept to the achievement of democratic standards through the political alternation, long required of Mexico by the international community. See : Castañeda (2001a).
The most important strategic change proposed in the foreign policy field was the primary importance given to national interests instead of foreign policy principles, and the formal opening-up of the international decision-making process. The president ceased to play a pivotal role in Mexican international affairs, modifying the balance of social forces which had existed during PRI governments and influencing the distribution of power between Executive and Legislative branches. Moreover, the separation of powers allowed new actors such as media, public opinion, epistemic communities and NGOs, to enter into the political scenario and acquire a role in the development of political decisions (Rozental 2004, 87-114). Nevertheless, the opening of foreign policy issues did not provoke a general and widespread interest in every sector of Mexican society.

The PAN, underlining its support for the defence of democracy and HR, strongly differentiated itself from the PRI’s foreign policy paradigm. If for PRI governments the foreign policy function was to protect the authoritarian and centralistic system, promoting economic development and limiting external interferences, for the PAN government it was to legitimate the country and increase its authority within the international arena. While for the PRI the protection of national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention were pivotal for its international relations, Fox’s foreign policy agenda focused on the protection of democracy and HR that underlined how the government was imposing clear limits to its international presence (González González 2006, 159-160). Furthermore, a central economic role was assigned to the Foreign Ministry and, according to the Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda, the fundamental axis of the new foreign policy path was the establishment of a stronger relationship with the US, and more vigorous activism within international organisations (Castañeda 2000b, 333; Castañeda 2001a, 68).

According to the new foreign policy paradigm’ and concluding the traditional political isolationist phase, five principal and essential objectives for the new Mexican foreign policy were introduced in the National Development Plan 2001-2006 (Presidencia de la República 2001). They included:

1. The promotion and strengthening of democracy and HR as the basis for a renewed international system;
2. The protection of national security and of territorial integrity from threats coming from abroad, and consolidation of Mexico’s ability to protect its migrants;
3. The idea of pro-active participation in the shaping of the international system via multilateral forums;
4. The creation of a new wide range of international relations with other countries, in order to use regional relations to balance Mexico’s political agenda increasingly focused on the US;
5. Developing and encouraging economic, commercial and cultural efforts to improve Mexico’s image abroad, presenting it as a long-term perspective.18

Concretely, after the elections, Mexico enforced its active presence in international organisations both at the UNSC and with respect to the defence of HR. For the first time since the PRI was in power, Mexico requested (and obtained) a non-permanent seat at the UNSC for the period 2002-2003 and re-achieving it in 2009-2010. New Mexican promotion and defence of HR was internationally implemented through Mexican participation in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) initiatives promoting HR in the war on terror (Pellicer 2006b, 363) and exercising great multilateral pro-activeness. Nevertheless, Mexican participation in multilateral and peacekeeping operations remained incoherent with respect to the new policy paradigm. Moreover, especially during the first period of the term, Mexico strategically aimed to improve its relationship with the US and obtain a migration agreement.

Mexico’s willingness to consider a different path in its foreign policy deviated from the rationale of the new policy path introduced by the new administration, and on certain occasions, which will be explored in the following chapters produced different results than those expected at the beginning of the government. A new Mexican role in the global arena was hypothesised, and the new pro-activist idea in international affairs was included in the new foreign policy paradigm in the light of changes at both the domestic and international sphere. Moreover, the World Values Survey (WVS)19 shows a rapid change in cultural values present in the country and a consequent convergence trend between Mexico, Canada and the US in spite of, according to Basáñez (2006, 20-22), the new Mexican system of values being still in formation. In order to have a more complete historical framework of which general changes influenced the implementation

19 The results of the WVS from 1981 to 2008 are available at: www.worldvaluessurvey.org (last accessed: 15 March 2013) while for an aggregate online data analysis on Mexico from 1981 to 2000, and from 2005 to 2008, it is possible to consult the following link: www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalizeStudy.jsp Last accessed: 15 March 2013.
of Mexican foreign policy, the next section briefly considers the role played by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the end of the Cold war.

2.7. Changes in the international structure: the end of the Cold war and the 9/11

In order to understand the evolution of Mexican foreign policy within a spatial and temporal framework, this section analyses the international structural changes, and the conjunctural events, that influenced the evolution of Mexico's foreign policy. The introduction of this explanation here is exclusively due to analytical and practical reasons. It is elaborated upon with the aim of avoiding the repetition of the explanation of these facts in every empirical chapter, given that these changes influenced every one of them. Moreover, it allows the placing of the empirical chapters in a more precise temporal framework, necessary for the understanding of the temporal sequential connections established in the case studies. The influence exercised by these international events are considered in the examination of the case studies according to their function, as well as the transformations undergone by institutional, political and economic contexts, and that need to be separately studied in every empirical chapter due to their specificities that differ case by case.

Despite those perspectives focused on the primacy of domestic elements, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US in 2001 limited the spectrum of action of the new foreign policy path, affecting the Mexican conception of the new foreign policy path and the development of many plans proposed at the beginning of the administration (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 82). The event produced a decrease in Mexican activities dynamism, imposing new US priorities which were unilaterally re-addressed toward a security perspective. The US’ outlook was no longer directed towards Mexico, its economy and its border, but rather to the fight against terrorism. Its attitude constituted an international limit to the progress of the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm, interrupting bilateral progress on immigration topics and trade integration, which represented a main concern for Mexico (Chabat 2009, 11; Bondì 2004, 5).

The modification of international structures, caused by 9/11 attacks, influenced a change in the perception of existent structural selectivities, moderating foreign policy
expectations especially in relation to the USs. Rather, they reinforced the support of entrenched ideas ascribable to a traditional policy paradigm. Fox’s government tried to replace the idea of autonomy from the US, ascribable to the set of historical Mexican foreign policy ideas, with the promotion of a special relation between the two countries. Nevertheless, the rejection of deeply rooted principles of self-determination, peaceful resolution of disputes and non-intervention was not so easily implementable. These principles were included in the Constitution, continuing representing an institutional constraint for strategic action (Starr 2006, 56). The absence of an effective foreign policy change, and the persistence of the old policy paradigm, was particularly relevant in Mexican multilateral activities and its attitude towards war on terror and HR. In fact, constraints imposed by the US’ change of priorities, and its withdrawal from previous commitments undertaken with Mexico, strengthened the support for Mexican traditional principles.

The PAN criticised the traditional limits imposed by the PRI administration, asserting that it was not strategically adequate to interpret new exigencies and opportunities offered by globalisation, interpreting them through a not actual interpretative lens, and decontextualizing them from their spatio-temporal framework. According to the new political actor, the PRI did not capitalise on international conditions offered by the end of the Cold War, because it was not using the renewed international system in order to modify structural constraints, improving Mexican economic and social conditions and its international image. PAN considered strategic selectivities, produced by the creation of new international boundaries and the presence of new strategic actors, an opportunity to modify Mexico’s domestic institutional limits. New political actors wanted to take advantage of the opening of new visions, and the presence of new international constraints, to encourage the adjustment of internal structural limits. New members of the party played on political discontent and requests for the democratisation of different social sectors, underlining Mexican necessity for a new position in the post-Cold War international system. In fact, the third wave of democratisation and spreading globalisation processes, developed at the end of the Cold War, increased international and national pressures in favour of political and economic reforms in Mexico (Loaeza 2006, 33), redirecting Mexico’s foreign policy paradigm.

In summary, international events influenced the change of structural constraints reinforcing favoured strategies held by new strategic actors and stimulating the presence of new ideas in the country. International conjunctural happenings influenced
PAN discourses and perceptions of the Mexican economic and political context in relation to changes in the international environment undergone between the end of the 1980s and 2001. For these reasons, in 2000, PAN’s coalition used these structural problems to promote a ‘new government of change’, able to move Mexico from its economically declining and politically static circumstances.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has analysed the historical characteristics of Mexican foreign policy from its Revolutionary creation to the democratic political opening. Considering it through the SRA it was possible to understand how domestic and international events contributed to the creation, the implementation and the transformation of Mexican foreign policy, providing a general framework within which the three empirical chapters of this thesis will be developed. In order to understand which dynamics influenced the ideation of a new foreign policy path, the chapter illustrated the necessity to provide a dialectical understanding of simultaneous causational processes at the base of Mexican foreign policy. It has been shown that approaches considering the predominance of single elements or the simple interaction between them, neglecting their mutual influence, do not provide a complete explanation of the complexity of change processes. The persistence of a powerful Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm has been related to the existence of traditional constraints related to the old political project limited the implementation of a new foreign policy paradigm. The persistence of constitutional boundaries, and formal and informal ties allowed new foreign policy proposals advanced by the new actors and parties in power to be perceived as inadequate. They were not sufficiently able to create the structural conditions that allowed them to strategically impose their favoured interpretation as the best and most successful among others. These circumstances generated a climate of uncertainty regarding Mexican positions in the international sphere, and in Mexican decisional circles.

Starting with the presentation of the case study on Mexico’s participation in PKO, next empirical chapters explores how the interplay among these different sets of factors was developed. They attempt to understand whether changes realised during the dual-transition had an influence on the generation of change and continuity in foreign policy.
The understanding of how these interactions were developed in previous periods has been necessary in order to temporally locate the evolution of Mexican foreign policy during the post-democratic transition. Only by understanding the original context it is possible to comprehensively explore how continuity and change processes are developed in the empirical case studies providing the elements necessary to answer the RQs of this thesis. Evolutionary processes and anomalies in the implementation of the new foreign policy process are underlined and examined in order to understand how it is possible to generate contemporary change and continuity results in Mexican foreign policy to respond to RQ2 and sub-RQs.
CHAPTER THREE

Mexico’s strategic interpretation of peacekeeping operations

Introduction

The previous chapter presented the dynamics that enabled the continuity of Mexico’s traditional foreign policy during the extended period of PRI governments. The heterogeneity of the foreign policy case study outcomes under the PAN will enable a comparison and explanation of the interactions existing among the different elements, illuminating the conditions that underpinned the implementation of change and continuity in Mexican foreign policy. This chapter on PKO provides the first term of comparison; together with the outcomes of the empirical case studies in Chapters Four and Five it will contribute to the MRQ.

Mexico’s role in international PKO is considered a useful case study because PKO were promoted by the Fox government as a key theme of change for the implementation of Mexico’s pro-activity in the international arena. They were an apparent opportunity for change after 2000, and could demonstrate Mexico’s concrete implementation of one of the key ideas in the new foreign policy paradigm: international pro-activity indeed. However, this case study presents a discrepancy between the main discourse of foreign policy change (developed by the new PAN government) and the final implementation of decisions inherent in Mexican participation in PKO, since this opportunity for change did not materialise. Taking into account these features, this chapter aims to answer sub-RQ1 explaining which factors influenced the processes of continuity and change in the Mexican attitude towards PKO, specifically addressing sub-RQ2. These differences and explanations provide the first outcomes that contribute to RQ2.

This chapter underlines how the absence of sufficient institutional structural changes and actors’ consensus over the opportunity to participate in such type of missions, and the persistence of traditional foreign policy principles undermined Fox’s proposal of change in relation to PKO. In order to develop a SR analysis of Mexican foreign policy dynamics, section 3.1 evaluates the type of difficulties the change processes
underwent, and which facilities supported continuity in Mexican foreign policy, producing the permanence, or a shift, in Mexico’s strategic selectivities. Section 3.2 then seeks to understand how and why different strategic actors approached the PKO issue through supporting old and new visions. Finally, section 3.3 examines the influence of foreign policy paradigms and ideas on the processes of interaction between Mexico’s strategic selectivities and strategic actors. This section reveals either the existence of an innovative trend with respect to Mexico’s previous governments, or the perpetuation of more traditional patterns.

3.1. Mexico’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations: the presence of strategic selectivities influenced by old and new institutional, political and economic constraints

This section aims to explore how different kinds of structural boundaries influenced the presence of strategic selectivities related to actors’ strategic calculations over Mexico’s participation in PKO, one of the central dynamics in the SR interplay (Jessop 1990, 260). As we saw in Chapter Two, the victory of the PAN generated great expectations of change in the foreign policy decision-making process. Nevertheless, the existence of previous pre-conceptions and institutional limits in the matter of Mexican participation in UN PKO represented an obstacle for the new government’s will to take part in them. On the one hand, as I explain in section 3.1.1, the principles of self-determination of people and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign countries, included within the Constitution, institutionally limited Mexico’s international action, favouring the application of the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm. The existence of these constitutional boundaries is related to the generation of the strategic selectivities that constrained Mexico’s possibility to send troops abroad for war operations, similarly denying its participation in PKO, in what became an ingrained practice in Mexico during the PRI’s rule. On the other hand, as I analyse in section 3.1.2, the presence of a national economic policy represented a guideline for Mexico’s financial support to peacekeeping missions.

Mexico’s rejection of participation in PKO underwent a shift with the 2000 presidential elections. The new perspective for Mexican foreign policy was focused on a stronger
relationship with the US and a more active participation in the multilateral international sphere. As illustrated in section 3.1.2, the economic opening and Mexico’s increasing financial contribution should have encouraged its participation in this type of mission due to the removal of previous economic boundaries that had limited Mexico’s participation in PKO. Moreover, the democratic opening endorsed a redefinition of Mexico’s national political participation, through which Congress could play a participative role in foreign policy-making promoting Mexico’s presence in international operations. Nevertheless, as we see in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the controversial relationship between Congress (especially the Senate) and the Executive erupted on many occasions in relation to the decision of Mexican participation in PKO. The section demonstrates how explanations giving predominance to the influences played by domestic political structures or international economic dynamics, as those developed by Velázquez and Marín (2010), Velázquez Flores (2008b) or Castañeda (2001), are not able to provide an integral causal framework able to explain Mexican foreign policy changes. This will show that dual models presenting the coexistence of different analytical dimensions (Snyder 1991; Zakaria 1998), but neglecting their mutual constitutive dynamics, fail to integrally explain how causal influences at the base of Mexican foreign policy have generated change and continuity in matter of PKO.

3.1.1. Mexico’s political and institutional boundaries to peacekeeping operations under Fox

In order to evaluate Mexico’s political and institutional constraints, it is important to consider that, at the beginning of Fox government, the Executive and the Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda announced Mexico’s participation in PKO (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2000, 149). Nevertheless, the institutional debate at the Congress showed that PAN representatives also raised many concerns on the matter (Cámara de Senadores 2002; Cámara de Senadores 2004; Cámara de Senadores 2005). Existing strategic selectivities, reflected within the Mexican Constitution and its norms, exercised a limiting role for the new foreign policy paradigm implementation. Although the PAN dominated Senate membership for the whole period, Congress showed homogeneity in its refusal to send Mexican troops abroad and its insistence on the necessity of Senate authorisation to participate in PKO.
(Cámara de Diputados 2005c). In the following paragraph, I explore how this position avoided the replacement of constitutional limits in the matter of PKO and influenced the shift in the Executive’s positions after the mid-term elections (Román 2005).

As explained in the previous chapter, Mexico’s strong presidentialism traditionally constituted a determinant boundary for Mexican foreign policy-making (Velázquez Flores 2008b, 114). Parliament’s actions and initiatives were conditional on the President, who decided de facto on the conformation of the Parliament and the selection of its members, while Congress’ activities in international topics were limited to the passing of the Executive’s decisions (Velázquez and Marín 2010, 3). The democratic opening endorsed the implementation of new strategic selectivities able to champion a change in Mexico’s political participation. This change was underpinned by the shift in old boundaries that defined a real separation of powers in Mexico, through which Congress could play a participative role in foreign policy-making. Furthermore, the PAN presidential victory determined the interruption of traditional Mexican power dynamics, changing existing informal political conventions and allowing the creation of a different system of checks and balances between the Executive and Congress, that is explained in next two paragraphs.

From the point of view of informal political boundaries, the year 2000 set an important change in the structural constraints of the Legislative actor, who after many years had the possibility of contributing to political discussions and policy-making processes regarding Mexico’s international postures and activities (González González 2007; Ai Camp 2005, 50). In fact, following the electoral campaign, the PAN preannounced the political reform of the country, citing the modification of normative constraints in accordance with new foreign policy and promising the new and more active strategic role of the Senate on the matter. Promises were reiterated in the speech delivered by President Fox (2000a) during the inauguration ceremony in Congress on 1 December 2000. He stated that: “In this new period of democratic exercise the President will propose and the Congress will provide. This is the new power reality in Mexico”. As explained in Chapter Two, the presence of a new foreign policy paradigm allowed strategic actors to re-balance their power and interpret the new domestic and international context in order to advantage their preferred strategies. Informal dynamics, which during the PRI government assigned a dominant role to presidential and executive actors, were replaced by the application of constitutional norms.
At the beginning of the PAN administration Executive and Congress’ interpretation of constitutional norms changed. They started being read according to the new and more open political project. The Constitution granted specific functions to the Executive and Congress in the establishment of foreign policy decisions regulating power relations between the two branches. The Congress had to play a supervisory role although the Executive was constitutionally responsible for foreign policy-making. On the one hand, Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution establishes that the Executive must be responsible for Mexican international affairs according to its traditional principles, thus narrowing Congress’ possibilities of action. On the other hand, the Senate can impose its approval on the Executive in order to implement foreign policy. Furthermore, Article 76 underlines the fact that the Legislative branch has the power to analyse and approve Mexican foreign policy, despite not having the capacity to modify, formulate or authorise Executive foreign policy decisions.

Although Congress generally supported the new foreign policy paradigm and the idea (sustained by the Executive) of a new Mexican activism in the international arena, its implementation faced the presence of persistent strategic selectivities that favoured the preservation of Mexico’s neutrality. Perceptions of existing opportunities, the concrete actuation of the idea of Mexico’s pro-activity, and the right of control over the Armed Forces were debated during the first period of the administration as well as following the mid-term elections. The period between 2000 and 2003 was characterised by the debate generated by the Foreign Minister’s public assertions on PKO participation and foreign policy principles (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2000, 149 and 154), as well as their relationship with Mexico’s candidacy to a non-permanent seat at the UNSC (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2000, 157 and 164; Pellicer 2006, 2).

Incongruences in Congress’ refusal to participate in PKO and send Mexican troops abroad were partially linked to constitutional limits during this timeframe. Despite the change in equilibrium in the exercise of power and the general initial consensus around the new foreign policy paradigm, institutional barriers continued representing limitations for the achievement of new interests, such as the international legitimisation of the new party and the increase of its authority in the international arena. These constraints were conventionally related to traditional foreign policy principles. Moreover, the implementation of constitutional norms, which limited foreign policy-makers’ strategic actions, became the trigger for political confrontations between the
Senate and the Executive on the management of Mexican troops (Cámara de Senadores 2005). In fact, Article 73 section XIV of the Constitution empowers the Senate to take control of the military, supervising its budget and organisation. Even if these functions were constitutionally attributed to the Senate, they had never been exercised before the Fox administration, nor used to impose the power of the Senate on the Executive branch. More specifically, particular frictions arose around a series of reform projects are explored in next paragraphs.

These restrictions were related to the respect of traditional and pivotal foreign policy principles and the President’s related faculties and limitations included in Article 89. The presence of these limitations favoured the persistence of old strategic selectivities that constrained Mexican troops’ participation in PKO. In fact, during the Fox government the Executive used Article 89 to assert its exclusive responsibility for foreign policy planning and implementation, while the Legislative branch stressed the same section in order to compel the Executive to respect the foreign policy principles (Velázquez Flores 2008b, 121). Other types of reform were proposed in order to facilitate participation in PKO within the constitutional boundaries, namely, the Article 72 Section E, entitled ‘Law to keep country neutrality’ (Cámara de Diputados 2005a) and the reform of Article 76 Section III, which states that the Senate has to authorise the Executive to permit the departure of national troops beyond the borders of the country. Each of these projects of reform was rejected by Congress in order to avoid dispatching Mexican troops abroad.

Congress’ rigidity in changing those constitutional articles regulating Mexican international affairs was not generated by the inflexibility of Mexico’s constitutional limits. In fact, only during the Fox legislature’s 59th term of office (2003-2006) were 248 constitutional reforms realised (Cámara de Diputados 2007). As summarised in the chart below, during the period analysed between the end of 2000 and 2005, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies proposed 45 projects of reform regarding foreign policy, implying that legislative activity was relatively brisk as well as intent on addressing the constitutional barriers. From 2002 to March 2005, six of these projects

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20 For the complete list, see: Cámara de Diputados-H. Congreso de la Unión (2007) and also: www.segob.mx Last accessed: 03 May 2012.
of reform concerned the discussion of troops’ missions abroad and their activity in war and humanitarian missions.\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Foreign policy projects of reform} & \textbf{(2000-2005)} \\
\hline
Senate’s role & 7\% \\
Troops abroad & 13\% \\
Treaties & 31\% \\
Appointments & 11\% \\
Foreign policy principles & 20\% \\
Authorisation Presidential trips abroad & 18\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Foreign policy projects of reform}
\end{table} \\

It is important to emphasise the heterogeneity of the political actors proposing the replacement of institutional boundaries and the creation of new strategic possibilities of action, in spite of their political identity. Their heterogeneity explains that the general change of vision was not restricted to the PAN and the change of party in power. During the first part of the PAN administration, these projects of reform were presented by the opposition parties, and agreements were generally obtained through a bipartisan support. Similarly, during the second part of the presidential term of office (when the majority in the Chamber of Deputies shifted from the PAN to PRI hands), projects continued to be proposed by the PRI and, in one case, by a bipartisan agreement obtained in the Senate and submitted to the Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados- H. Congreso de la Unión 2005c, 87-90; Cámara de Senadores 2002;  

\textsuperscript{21} Data obtained through consultation of the Gaceta Parlamentaria the Home Office website \url{www.segob.mx} \\
Cámara de Senadores 2005a). Nevertheless, the will to change the boundaries at the base of Mexican peacekeeping strategies was not sufficient to produce an effective change in strategic selectivities, as reflected in the high percentage of rejected reforms related to this topic. Eight out of 45 projects of reform, proposed by the entire spectrum of parties, were focused on foreign policy principles belonging to both traditional and new paradigms. However, constitutional constraints related to traditional foreign policy principles were considered by policy-makers as still valid and limiting to their calculations in the matter of PKO.

Notwithstanding their political origin, parties that worked within Congress homogenously refused to send Mexican troops abroad, stressing the constitutional barriers that opposed such activity (Cámara de Diputados– H. Congreso de la Unión 2005c). The idea that PKO could be considered war activities, in opposition to what was proposed by the Executive, maintained both the PAN’s and the opposition parties’ support (Breves de México 2005). The validation of the strategic selectivities generated a strategic replacement of the Executive’s calculations, preventing military participation in PKO after 2003 (Román 2005).

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**Executive's reform proposals (2000-2006)**

- **Rejected**: 18%
- **Abandoned**: 4%
- **Approved**: 78%

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*Data elaborated from the analysis of the *Gaceta Parlamentaria* (the Official journal of the Federation) and the *Diario Oficial* (the Mexican hansard) available for the Chamber of Deputies at: [http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx](http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx) and for the Senate at: [http://www.senado.gob.mx](http://www.senado.gob.mx) Last accessed: January 2014.*
Moreover, if we consider the Executive’s 28 foreign policy reform proposals promoted during the Fox administration, the only one abandoned by the Legislative branch was the reform of Article 73 that empowers the Senate to take control over the military (Secretaría de Gobernación 2004). Another five proposals were rejected by the same branch but, as depicted in the previous chart, the total amount of proposals approved reached 78.6%. Consequently, the hypothesis raised by authors such as Velázquez Flores (2008b, 113) about a conflicted relationship between Congress and the Executive, expressed by the opposition parties’ political attacks on the President limiting implementation of new foreign policy goals, appear unfounded. These considerations show how political divergences between different parties did not represent a concrete barrier to the implementation of PKO. Rather, the presence of institutional boundaries continued favouring the existence of strategic selectivities that limited Mexico’s participation in PKO.

In summary, despite the general support given to the new foreign policy paradigm, traditional constitutional constraints related to the Revolutionary foreign policy principles were considered still valid by policy-makers who, in turn, limited their strategic calculations in the matter of Mexico’s support for PKO. They equally influenced strategic calculations of the entire spectrum of Mexico’s political parties and both the Executive and Legislative branches. In fact, taking Mexico’s legislative activity into account, it appears that any frictions limiting the approval of reforms concerning PKO existed because the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies acted quite homogeneously in defining PKO as war actions. On many occasions, the PAN voted alongside the opposition parties, defining participation in PKO as against those Mexican foreign policy principles connected to the traditional foreign policy paradigm.

### 3.1.2. Economic limits and opportunities for Mexico’s participation in peacekeeping operations

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In this sub-section I explore how the existence of economic boundaries influenced the persistence of the old strategic selectivities favouring the preservation of Mexico’s neutrality and its rejection of participation in PKO. The analysis of economic constraints in the matter of PKO completes the understanding of those structural elements impinging on the presence of one of the core concepts of the SRA: structural selectivities.

Fox’s Foreign Ministry proposal of Mexican participation in PKO, rather than being interpreted through the traditional foreign policy paradigm, should have enabled the replacement of barriers and habits in line with the new project. As a result, the creation of new opportunities and selectivities would have had to include the financial reconsideration of traditional limits in order to achieve new foreign policy goals such as international pro-activism, respect for HR and the creation of new possibilities of international political action (Castañeda 2001, 68). Nevertheless, the new conceptualisation of international activity, that included Mexico’s presence in PKO, had to face the existence of economic boundaries generated by the traditional political project and strategic selectivities imposed by the neo-liberal economic paradigm, as explained in following paragraphs.

Policy-makers and entrepreneurs, who had studied abroad during the previous decades and led the country from the ‘Mexicanisation’ of the market to its neo-liberalisation (Centeno 1994, 152), were now seated in positions of power within the Fox government. These actors imported different ideas of economic and political participation in international organisations: ideas that contrasted with the traditional foreign policy paradigm and that, after 2000, they attempted to apply to Mexican foreign policy. No further relationship should have existed between Mexico’s economic nationalism and the need to maintain a centralised economic system that guaranteed the PRI’s permanence in power. Likewise, the control of economic and human resources for the re-shaping of Mexico’s international image and activities, should no longer have been limited by the presence of traditional political and economic power dynamics. The re-establishment of the boundaries of what was acceptable within the new policy paradigm could also have allowed the implementation of the new national-popular project and its related foreign policy paradigm. In sum, the necessity of re-configuring Mexican institutions emerged in order to achieve a new normative institutional context, able to interpret the political requirements of democratisation and Mexico’s international political and economic opening (Morton 2003, 641-642).
According to the neo-liberal paradigm implemented in Mexico over the last two decades and related to the increase in Mexico’s participation in global institutions, the government and its foreign minister Jorge Castañeda encouraged Mexican participation in international PKO. In fact, the Mexican economic paradigm shift, realised during the period of dual transition, favoured the re-configuration of Mexico’s presence within the global arena after the end of the Cold War. The democratisation of the country promoted this type of re-placement, encouraging the proposal of foreign policy reforms after the dismantling of traditional political pillars. Moreover, the result of the presidential elections encouraged to overtake the dual transition started in the 1980s and explained in section 2.3 (Gonzáles Gonzáles 2006, 157; Loaeza 2006, 33) promoting Mexico’s pro-active role in peacekeeping missions.

Notwithstanding the different positions held by the PAN and the two opposition parties, the PRD and the PRI, regarding the possibility of sending Mexican troops abroad for PKO, 24 Congress approved the economic budget. It included an increase in Mexico’s financial contributions to PKO. 25 Nevertheless, the increase in Mexico’s financial contribution to UN missions was principally determined by its obligations as General Assembly member (UN General Assembly, 2001) 26 modified in the most recent period (UN Secretary-General 2009, 5-6) and not because of a shift of its limits. 27

Mexico’s economic situation at the beginning of the Fox administration was experiencing a growing trend which had started in 1996, with the annual percentage growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) reaching 6.6% in 2000. This represented one of the highest GDP levels in the previous 20 years (World Bank 2013). 28 Although, in 2000, international terrorist events decreased Mexico’s GDP, the following year the country continued generating a rise in its internal production (as below).

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24 Interview, Raul Benítez Manaut (Fox government’s deputy adviser of National Security until 2003 and president of CASEDE), 26 July 2011.
25 Contributions for PKO are calculated according to the GDP of every state member of the UN General Assembly and the assessment rate for financing PKO will be based on the UN regular budget assessment scale. PKO rates are determined by member countries’ positions within a variable scale that in 2001-2003 included levels from A to J. Economically more developed countries will make larger contributions.
26 Interview, Andrés Rozental (special Ambassador for Mexico’s candidacy at the UNSC and negotiations between Colombia and the FARC in 2001), 14 April 2011.
Considering Mexico’s financial obligations towards PKO and its decline in GDP in 2001, Mexico’s financial support to the missions diminished by about 25%, in 2002. Subsequent tables indicate how, in 2002, international structural constraints generated the homogeneous decrease in financial support among both the top and medium contributors. However, Mexico’s economic involvement in PKO rocketed in the period from 1998 to 2005. The increase in Mexico’s financial contribution to the missions was interpreted by the government as a strategic opportunity to signal discontinuity with its traditional international behaviour. Indeed, Mexico’s financial contribution during the first year of the PAN government increased more than 2.6% compared with the final year of the PRI administration (1999); it had risen by more than three times by 2005 if compared with 2000 (A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy 2007).
Table 4 Mexico’s peacekeeping financial contribution trend

Source: own elaboration from Globalization Index 2007- UNDP.
### Peacekeeping financial contribution in dollars 1998-2005

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>284.500.532</td>
<td>257.612.886</td>
<td>667.322.133</td>
<td>875.429.826</td>
<td>639.167.509</td>
<td>622.843.940</td>
<td>1.300.987.037</td>
<td>946.877.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>163.027.921</td>
<td>162.629.069</td>
<td>437.434.417</td>
<td>592.864.602</td>
<td>443.024.790</td>
<td>432.386.410</td>
<td>924.042.813</td>
<td>675.795.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>86.392.040</td>
<td>79.986.582</td>
<td>210.152.428</td>
<td>295.736.663</td>
<td>223.527.196</td>
<td>216.439.363</td>
<td>414.435.178</td>
<td>300.685.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>71.086.063</td>
<td>64.795.683</td>
<td>169.158.046</td>
<td>246.713.852</td>
<td>184.204.656</td>
<td>176.837.023</td>
<td>348.500.480</td>
<td>252.368.890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>48.360.962</td>
<td>44.309.588</td>
<td>115.971.029</td>
<td>154.080.803</td>
<td>116.648.486</td>
<td>112.213.183</td>
<td>232.374.325</td>
<td>169.573.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>5.480</td>
<td>4.905</td>
<td>12.797</td>
<td>23.275</td>
<td>22.816</td>
<td>22.151</td>
<td>25.249</td>
<td>17.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</table>

**Table 5 Peacekeeping financial contribution in dollars 1998-2005**

*Source: own elaboration from Globalization Index 2007- UNDP.*

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29 Contribution order calculated taking into account the last year of peacekeeping financial contribution considered: 2005.
Despite this pattern of increasing financial contributions to PKO, Mexico’s peacekeeping personnel contribution remained fixed at zero throughout the Fox
government (A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy 2007).\textsuperscript{30} As showed in the graph below and confirmed by Benítez Manaut and Rozental,\textsuperscript{31} this position followed a constant trend reproduced by successive PRI governments, where Mexico avoided sending any troops to UN peacekeeping missions (Rosas 2007, 995).

![Graph of Peacekeeping personnel contribution](image)

**Table 8 Peacekeeping personnel contribution**

Source: own elaboration from Globalization Index 2007- UNDP.

The data illustrated in the graph is particularly significant because, despite the rhetoric of foreign policy innovation communicated by the government, the data illustrates how limited Mexican participation in PKO was in the absence of international obligations. Old strategic selectivities constraining Mexico’s participation in PKO were reinforced by the presence of specific obligations concerning PKO contributions. In fact, the opportunity to voluntarily increase Mexico’s financial participation in global institutions was neglected in light of the presence of UN duties, limiting the support of strategic actions in favour of Mexico’s participation in PKO.


\textsuperscript{31} Interviews, Raul Benítez Manaut, 26 July 2011; Andrés Rozental, 14 April 2011.
Incongruences between financial support to PKO and the refusal of Congress to send Mexican troops abroad were not influenced, as shown in the previous tables, by economic restrictions imposed by Congress. Rather, they can be related to the interpretation of the constitutional limits analysed in the previous sub-section and related to the foreign policy principles linked to traditional PRI foreign policy paradigm. As will be examined in the following section (3.2), even Mexico’s military entrance to the American Military Conference failed to weaken its refusal to participate in such operations (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2000, 164).

Through the words of the General Director of the UN department of the Foreign Ministry, Luis Alfonso de Alba:

“Mexican military’s participation in peacekeeping missions [was] not a problem related to economic limitations, because the UN is the body responsible for the participation costs for this type of operations” (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2001, 157).

The presence of such strategic selectivities remained stable although Congress’ financial obligations regarding PKO increased (Ávila 2005) and activities to favour Mexico’s participation in such missions were promoted. In fact, seminars on PKO were organised at the Chamber of Deputies, the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Mexico’s Armed Navy, in order to analyse the feasibility of Mexican involvement in these missions (Cámara de Diputados- Congreso de la Unión 2005b). 32

In section 3.2.4, the analysis of articles from the US’ and Mexico’s top five newspapers highlights that a consistent number of articles concerning PKO clearly reproduced an adverse position toward Mexican involvement (among others: Cason and Brooks 2002; Editorial 2001a; Marín Bosh 2003; Kahhat 2005; Fuentes-Berain 2006). Notwithstanding the authors’ ideas regarding Mexico’s authorisation to send its troops abroad, no single article considered the economic barriers or the Armed Forces’ financial limits as a constraint for increasing involvement in these operations. Each explanation underlined the importance of preserving Mexico’s moral international authority, achieved thanks to its multilateral activities and its historical role of mediator within its sphere of influence. Mexico’s international involvement was invariably correlated to its application and the strenuous defence of limits imposed by

32 In Mexico, the Military and the Navy are not unified in the Ministry of Defence but they comprise two different ministries: the Ministry of Defence for the Military and the Ministry of Mexico’s Armed Navy.
the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes as an international means to resolve crisis, as in the case of Central American conflicts.\textsuperscript{33}

In conclusion, Mexico’s stance, established during PRI administrations, regarding the possibility of sending troops abroad was confirmed during the PAN’s years in power: any person belonging to the Mexican Armed Forces was authorised to participate in peacekeeping missions. Therefore, the lack of change in foreign policy relating to PKO generated a discrepancy between what was announced at the beginning of the Fox government and the concrete implementation of PKO, elements of which are further explored in the next sections using the SRA.

Ideational barriers and traditional interpretations of constitutional norms limited policy-makers’ strategic calculations and actions. Despite the absence of effective economic limits to PKO, actors’ perceptions remained rooted in foreign policy principles entrenched in Mexico’s institutional conformation. Mexico’s strategic behaviour concerning PKO was influenced by the interaction between existing legislative limits, political reasons and ideological positions influencing Congress and, in the second part of the administration, the Executive branch. Therefore, as will be further analysed in the next section, the presence of strategic selectivities related to institutional, political and economic limits imposed boundaries on the Executive’s and the President’s vision of change during the second half of the term. The change in normative constraints was not interpreted as necessary for the implementation of the pro-active idea related to the new foreign policy paradigm. Hence, the persistence of the same constitutional and financial limits regarding PKO influenced the tenacity of the old strategic selectivities limiting the implementation of actors’ strategic calculations; the behaviour of these actors is examined in detail in the following section.

3.2. **Mexican strategic actors, relevant to peacekeeping operations**

The previous sections explored the structural limits constraining Mexico’s participation in PKO that, according to Jessop (2001a, 165), were able to influence the existence of strategic selectivities through their interaction with strategic actors. In order to

\textsuperscript{33} Mexico was the driving force behind the Contadora group, which was created to achieve peace in Central America through a joint effort.
integrate the SR analysis this section explores how influential strategic actors in Mexican PKO interact with these limits driven by their perception of strategic selectivities. In accordance with Hay’s interpretation of the SRA (Hay 2001, 11/17), this interaction will be integrated into section 3.3 through the analysis of the filtration role played by Mexico’s foreign policy paradigms and ideas in actors’ interpretations of the context. The analysis elaborated in this section illustrates whether and how different types of strategic actors (presented in Chapter One, section 1.5) played an influential role in the process of change and continuity in foreign policy, contributing to RQ2, sub-RQ1 and sub-RQ2. Then case study in section 3.2. considers an additional and influential actor, not shared by the other empirical case studies, the Armed Forces. The different sets of agents will be considered taking into account their historical role and considering the changes they underwent.

As we saw in Chapter Two, the presence of renewed economic and political conditions in the country allowed the rise of a new set of actors who were educated abroad and carried with them new types of interests, no longer related to the struggle for the PRI. These actors composed the transition team that led the coalition “Alianza por el cambio” to presidential victory. As argued by Morton (2003, 646), the change of party in power had to make overtures to a different range of actors that included: left-wing intellectuals; entrepreneurs, that obtained a new space in Mexico after the neoliberal opening; and PRI politicians, that decided to re-arrange their strategies in light of the new domestic and international context. This group of actors was the herald of a new political project for Mexico based on an ideational basis, different to the traditional Revolutionary project. Hence, their collaboration allowed the creation of a government of ‘national unity’. Their cooperation mediated, with actors that supported traditional interests, the replacement of traditional structural selectivities and created the conditions necessary for the proposal of a new foreign policy paradigm that encompassed direct involvement in PKO. In order to evaluate how old and new actors approached PKO during the Fox administration, it is necessary to consider their strategic behaviour in light of this process of policy and economic change, interpreting it through the new and old policy vision to explain their calculations.
3.2.1. The President, the Executive and the Foreign Minister

The new foreign policy paradigm was promoted and sustained throughout his time in power by the first Foreign Minister of the government of change, Jorge Castañeda. Castañeda belonged to the group of new actors and expressed the need for a foreign policy able to mark the change from the old PRI governments (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 86). In an interview he defined this need as a set of “Big ideas. A vision” (Weiner 2002). Castañeda’s fundamental idea was that a positive shift in domestic political and economic barriers and the achievement of a democratic bonus (boosting Mexico’s negotiation power abroad) represented an important opportunity for the country. Therefore the structural changes Mexico underwent, in both political and economic fields, influenced the formation of Castañeda’s strategic vision. They represented an opportunity for the implementation of a new foreign policy, no longer limited by the presence of the old strategic selectivities related to the PRI’s permanent hold on power. These new structural conditions enabled the new foreign policy pathway, refining Mexico’s image and bringing new, improved international prospects as well as a relevant role in the global arena (Munoz 2001; Castañeda 2000a, 334). The new foreign policy paradigm included increased attention to HR and democratic processes, both domestically and internationally, and a renewal of Mexico’s international image (Castañeda 2001, 68). Mexico’s active involvement in PKO was a key innovation that the Foreign Minister and his team wanted to implement.

One of Castañeda’s first declarations in the new government concerned its will to participate in PKO (Coordinación de Relaciones Relaciones Internacionales 2000; Editorial 2001a). The Foreign Minister’s aim was to change the national idea of Mexican sovereignty and its existing institutional limits, interpreting the current strategic selectivities as favourable to Mexico pro-activity in the international arena and strengthening support for PKO. The PRI used the principle of Mexico’s neutrality, including it within the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm, as protection against those United States’ interventions, which questioned government legitimacy or called centralised behaviours into doubt. However, Mexican international prestige, obtained in the past through a law-oriented and non-interventionist attitude, did not match the new strategic context, Mexico’s democratic status or the new policy paradigm proposal. This was due to the fact that Mexico’s new strategic actors held novel interest, related to increasing Mexico’s authority in the international arena and not to
the protection of the domestic system. However, in order to obtain such international credibility, Mexico had to go further than merely participating in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Direct participation in terms of personnel was needed in order to show Mexico’s concrete interest in PKO.

At the beginning of the government, the Foreign Minister, the Executive branch and the President interpreted the new context as favourable to pro-active involvement in PKO (including the allocation of troops). This common vision for a set of strategic actors determined elements of Mexico’s foreign policy during the PRI’s rule. Such a position was confirmed through Mexico’s adherence to the Rio Group’s position at the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations at the UN General Assembly. The group highlighted the need to “strengthen the peacekeeping system, including cooperation among states sending troops, the Security Council and the Secretary as essential condition to the peacekeeping operations success” (Misión permanente de México ante las Naciones Unidas 2002). The position was confirmed by another new component of the Executive, Ambassador Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, who worked as an international affairs advisor in the transition team becoming National Security advisor and, afterwards, Mexico’s permanent representative and president at the Security Council when Mexico obtained a non-permanent seat. The representative asserted that, for Mexico, these operations needed to respect five essential premises that guaranteed their legitimacy and efficacy, declaring that the country needed to “intensify its collaboration with the United Nations’ efforts for the peacekeeping” (Zinser 2002a). Hence, Mexico’s initial official position was in support of its participation in PKO. It was fuelled by the change of context with respect to the PRI’s rule, the presence of new interests and a new foreign policy paradigm that respectively aimed to legitimise Mexico in the international arena and implement a pro-active role.

However, Castañeda’s doctrine was affected by global and internal constraints and the persistence of ideas associated with the traditional Mexican foreign policy paradigm which limited the strategic calculations of the Executive and the President. For example, the 9/11 terrorist attacks altered the US’ international attitude generating global challenges and limiting Mexican aspirations. Opportunities to take part in PKO were not supported by Congress and suddenly rejected by the President, compromising Castañeda’s project implementation. In fact, as explained in section

34 Mexico was member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping operations since its establishment in 1965.
3.1.1, these actors refused to implement any type of change in Mexican norms. Their refusal served to maintain existing boundaries related to the PRI period that imposed strategic selectivities challenging Mexico’s pro-activity in the international arena and its participation in PKO. At the same time, domestic political difficulties had arisen after the mid-term election of the Chamber of Deputies (won by the PRI). The increased political friction between the Presidency and Congress undermined the negotiating power of the Executive, considered essential for the implementation of a concrete pro-active role. In 2003, internal contrasts produced by differences in the interpretation of Mexico’s opportunities regarding participation in PKO, determined the resignation of actors central to the ideation of a new Mexican foreign policy paradigm; these actors were Castañeda, Zinser and Acosta. All were part of the transition team and resigned because of the President’s deviation in strategy and implementation from the new foreign policy path proposed during the first period of government.

Internal strategic divergences among members of the transition team within the Executive and the block composed by other Executive members and the President, curtailed the application of new strategies. During the second half of the administration, President Fox opposed Mexican troops’ involvement in PKO on numerous formal and public occasions. Limits imposed by the necessity during the PRI period to avoid contrasts with the Army and not generate public dissatisfaction produced a change in the preferred presidential strategies, which was justified though discourses of respect for the traditional foreign policy paradigm and principles (Chabat 2008, 4). This attachment to the traditional Mexican vision, despite initial assertions of support to military participation in PKO by the Presidency, was widely expected by foreign policy experts aware of the strength and influence already exercised by the PRI’s paradigm (Thompson 2001). Changes in the President’s position were determined by the persistence of traditional ideas despite the position taken at the beginning of the administration. Moreover, they illustrated the President’s validation of existing traditional structural constraints, guaranteeing the persistence of the status quo. Hence, despite Mexico’s structural economic and political changes, the existence of traditional institutional and economic limits favoured the President’s support of

36 Most important personalities were the Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda, principal author of the new Mexican international approach (Rocha 2005, 193; Weiner 2003); Mexico’s representative at the UN Adolfo Aguilar Zinser; and Mariclaire Acosta, the Undersecretary for Human Rights and Democracy of the Foreign Ministry.
those strategies underpinned by the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm that constrained the modification of existing strategic selectivities and opposed Mexico’s participation in PKO.

The shift in the Fox government’s initial strategies is personified by Castañeda’s successor: Foreign Minister Ernesto Derbez. Although at the beginning of the administration he openly supported Mexican involvement in PKO, it is possible to find signals of change in his strategic positions over the years. On many occasions during the radio programme “Fox Contigo” (Fox Contigo 2004a; 2004b), he justified Mexico’s humanitarian presence abroad and its international activity in light of Mexican Constitutional principles ascribable into the PRI’s political project. This shows that the traditional foreign policy paradigm was still entrenched among its representatives, and also within the Executive. As a result, the strategic conceptualisation of Mexican international pro-activity was restrained and Mexico’s involvement in international affairs re-acquired a low profile, guaranteeing Derbez’s permanence as Foreign Minister. The selection of such a different profile for a foreign minister, one who did not support strategies related to Mexico’s new foreign policy paradigm, suggests that actors’ perceptions were still linked to the Revolutionary paradigm of opposing the change in structural limits. Consequently it influenced the permanence of strategic selectivities related to the case of PKO.

Notwithstanding the growing amount of domestic contrasts rooted in Executive decisions and declarations on PKO,\(^ {37}\) Mexican diplomatic activity at the UN continued being consistent until the beginning of 2005, as proved by numerous Mexican interventions on this topic (Misión permanente de México ante las Naciones Unidas 2002; Misión permanente de México ante las Naciones Unidas 2003; De Alba 2002; Zinser 2002a; Zinser 2002b; Zinser 2003; Pujalte Piñeiro 2003; Berruga Filloy 2004; Berruga Filloy 2005). Rather, the definitive shift that imposed the abandonment of the idea of Mexico’s participation in PKO was individuated in 2005. In this year, tensions between the Executive and the Presidency exploded producing the resignation of Patricia Olamendi, the Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights at the Foreign Ministry (Curzio 2010, 14). Latent contrasts were activated and erupted during the seminar series on PKO, organised by Olamendi at the Chamber of Deputies. In that occasion the Undersecretary declared that Mexico planned to actively participate in PKO by sending its personnel to international missions. In

\(^ {37}\) They were formally opposed by the Army, which defended its autonomy and traditional position against them, and by Congress, ideologically opposing its support.
accordance with the new foreign policy paradigm, Olamendi did not interpret the presence of existing institutional and economic boundaries as constraints for Mexico’s participation. Although Olamendi specified that she had referred to civil personnel, eventually supported by the Army, her interpretation of institutional and political boundaries was not shared by the President. The Presidency’s strategic calculations were clearly still influenced by the presence of traditional constraints producing a change in his support to the new foreign policy paradigm. In fact, as confirmed by Presidency’s spokesman Rubén Aguilar in the mass media:

“The President of the Republic already specified in some other occasion that México does not plan to send troops in peacekeeping operations abroad. [...] Our position is already fixed by President Fox: the Mexican government will not participate in any peacekeeping operation with the Army of Armed Forces members” (Román 2005). 38

In sum, the substance of Mexico’s interventions at the UN changed during this period. After an initial period, the President and the Executive reassessed the supremacy of the traditional interpretation of existing boundaries and the definition of Mexico’s interest in participating in PKO, confirming the state’s ability to sustain Mexico’s neutral role in the international arena and the persistence of traditional strategic selectivities on the matter. In light of these conditions, the President and the Executive revaluated their favoured strategies on the global chessboard (Venegas 2003), confirming that they preferred Mexico’s absence in international PKO. The definition of PKO was considered in light of the Revolutionary foreign policy principles, in spite of Castañeda and Executive representatives that encouraged Mexican foreign policy change. The President’s interpretation of existing institutional boundaries and economic and political possibilities though a traditional lens constrained the implementation of Castañeda and the transition team’s strategic calculations, compromising Mexico’s participation in PKO. This shows the necessity to consider how initially selected possibilities are accepted and rejected over time by different actors, consequently influencing the evolution of mutually constitutive causal dynamics between domestic and international factors, explanation that a rational understanding of causality does not provide.

38 Author’s translation.
3.2.2. Congress and the political parties

Notwithstanding the acquisition of power by new political parties, the presence of new actors within the government and the enthusiastic proposal of a new foreign policy path, Congress clearly showed its opposition to participation in PKO through institutional and public declarations (Cámara de Senadores 2005). Internal political change and the removal of national political participation limits enabled Congress to express itself, signally discontinuity with the past. These changes determined Congress’ new capacity to impact on old strategic selectivities that constrained Mexico’s participation in PKO. However, even if Congress generally endorsed the strategic foreign policy path promoted by the government, this remained a rhetorical exercise of approval. In fact, although Congress had begun the initiation process and the recognition of PKO’s relevance was starting to disperse, general declarations and votes remained loyal to the old foreign policy paradigm considering old institutional limits as still valid. Domestic and internationally driven approaches would provide reductionist explanations of these dynamics. This is because the change in both domestic and international contexts influenced parties’ perceptions of existing opportunities and boundaries, explicitly imposing a dialectical explanation of these causal processes.

During both the first (2000-2003) and second part (2003-2006) of the Fox administration, the PAN maintained Senate majority and senators’ speeches underlined that, due to the change in international needs, it was essential to differentiate military activities and humanitarian operations. If PKO were considered humanitarian activities, they could be autonomously promoted without formal limits by the Executive; this interpretation, according to the new foreign policy paradigm, favoured Mexico’s participation in PKO. Senators belonging to both the opposition and majority in Congress agreed on the importance of this differentiation (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2001, 157; Cámara de Senadores 2005a; Aranda and Pérez Silva 2001; Benavides and Teherán 2001). However, senators’ inclusion of PKO in one category (war activities) rather than another (humanitarian activities) was determined by the possibility to differently interpret PKO’s institutional limits, favouring different interests. Namely, on the one hand, the consideration of PKO as humanitarian missions allowed the championing of Mexico’s international pro-activity, improving its presence in the international arena and bypassing existing institutional
limits. On the other hand, the definition of PKO as war activities limited their implementation due the existence of institutional constraints that favoured Mexico’s international neutrality, traditionally conceived a means to protect PRI rule.

The necessity to elaborate this distinction was highlighted by the crisis that arose between Congress and the Executive in relation to the Mexican Navy’s warfare activities and the Navy’s announcement of internal restructuring in order to participate in PKO (Aranda 2001). 39 In fact, Mexico’s participation in exercises was exclusively authorised by the President without consultation with the Senate. It was motivated by the high probability of obtaining a negative response in light of the positions held by Congress after Castañeda’s public declaration which asserted that Mexico could participate in PKO (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2000, 149; Rocha 2005, 228; Editorial 2001a; Cason and Brooks 2001). The Senate’s contrariety generated, for the first time in the history, the application of its prerogatives established by Article 88, generating the revocation of Mexico’s participation in UNITAS-43 (Arvizu Arrioja and Guarneros, 2002). 40

Motivations for the denial sustained that the President’s goals were in contrast to Mexico’s traditional foreign policy principles, as imposed by the Constitution, while the President insisted that Senate’s behaviour was limiting Mexican interests and damaging the country’s image abroad (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2002, 134). The attempt to implement the new foreign policy paradigm in the matter of PKO underlined the presence of different visions in Mexico’s international activities, influencing the Executive’s and Congress’ behaviours and their interpretation of existing strategic selectivities. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the conceptualisation of existing boundaries generated the tightening of institutional rules, favouring Congress’ interests and privileging its interpretation of institutional limits related to the persistence of traditional foreign policy principles.

In spite of the change in the political and economic context for Mexico, the Senate reasoned that the definition of PKO as war activities requiring Senate approval as fundamental. Strategically assuming this position, it re-stated the traditional interpretation of PKO, confirming the validity of existing limits and interpreting them in light of the traditional foreign policy paradigm. According to the traditional

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39 Naval exercises with France in 2001 and warfare exercise UNITAS-43 with the US and South-America States in 2002.

40 The Senate has to authorise Presidential travels abroad, though it was generally considered a formality.
definition, PKO limited the exercise of self-determination of peoples and non-intervention principles. The implementation of this strategy configured Congress’ strategic calculation within the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm, contrasting with the new international activism promoted by the PAN government and limiting Mexico’s presence in the international arena.

Influences exerted by Congress’ activities and institutional declarations officially recognising the importance of PKO, strategic actions implemented by the Executive and the transition team were not sufficient to determine shift in strategic selectivities in favour of Mexican involvement in such missions changing Congress and the Armed Forces’ strategic calculations (Zinser 2002a Misión permanente de México ante las Naciones Unidas 2003; Zinser 2003; De Alba 2002; Cámara de Diputados-H. Congreso de la Unión, 2005b). According to parliamentary declarations and interviews collected, the respect for traditional foreign policy principles was fundamental to the decision to participate (or not) in these operations (Benítez Manaut 2008, 29).

In fact, Congress politically imposed its power in relation to the Mexican Armed Forces’ participation in PKO, reiterating the validity of traditional principles that motivated its strategic position regarding the constitutional reform of Articles 88 and 76. According to the Mexican Constitution, the Armed Forces are subordinate to civilian power (Article 129) and the Senate has the prerogative to allow or disallow the Armed Forces to leave the country (Article 76 section III). The debate concerning the reform of Article 76 started in December 2002 and concluded three years later, empowering the Executive to authorise Mexico’s Armed Forces to leave the country, independent of Senate permission, only in case of humanitarian aid (Cámara de Diputados- H. Congreso de la Unión 2005c, 87-89). Nevertheless, the reform specified:

“It means that when the Mexican state receives a request of Mexican troops’ participation in order to help any peacekeeping operation or similar activities, the authorisation of the Senate is required” (Cámara de Senadores 2004).

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41 Interviews: Raul Benitez Manaut, 26 July 2011; Andrés Rozental, 14 April 2011; Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (member of the transition team and Ambassador at the UN), 27 May 2011; Enrique Berruga Filloy (Undersecretary of the Foreign Affairs from 2000 to 2003, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations since 2003 and President of COMEXI), 13 July 2011; Jorge Eduardo Navarrete(Undersecretary for Economic Affairs from 1978 to 1982 and Ambassador to the UNSC until 2002), 22 June 2011.

42 Author’s translation.
Mexican Congress also, in this case, adopted a strategically law-oriented behaviour, drawing continuity with PRI’s traditional approach to foreign policy. It confirmed the persistence of strategic selectivities that favoured traditional interests, constraining the implementation of strategies related to the new foreign policy paradigm. As confirmed in two interviews with Muñoz Ledo and Berruga, the spread of ignorance on the topic was present in Congress (Curzio 2010, 12) and the general perception was that PKO did not represent sufficient reason to generate a shift in domestic political class-favoured strategies. Despite Executive efforts to inform Congress, Congress limited the debate to the eventual opportunity to send troops abroad. As argued by Raúl Benítez Manaut, one of the vice-councillors at the Presidency’s National Security office:

“Fox had never been sustained by Congress in order to change the foreign policy. […] One of the principal topics was that Fox was interested in sending troops for PKO and the opposition parties, PRI and PRD, opposed this so strongly (as did the Army) that Fox could not realise a foreign policy change around this topic”.

In sum, Congress’ rhetoric and decision-making processes were still rooted in a traditional interpretation of constitutional principles and norms in contrast to the Fox administration’s foreign policy goals. Congress’ anti-PKO participation position was echoed by the Armed Forces, whose behaviour will be explained in detail within the next sub-section.

3.2.3. The Armed Forces

The struggle between the PAN, the Executive and Congress involved the institutional relationship these actors had with the Armed Forces. As explained in Chapter Two, contrary to the PRI governments, they were able to stake their position on this matter. The Armed Forces exercised strong opposition to the Executive’s proposals for involvement in PKO and their contrariety to constitutional reforms re- emphasised the institutional constraints for this type of operations. The assimilation of PKO to war
activities and the respect for the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts and Mexico’s neutrality were the most important reasons for both Congress and the Military to refuse PKO participation (Coordinación de Relaciones Internacionales UNAM 2001, 157; Cámara de Senadores 2005). As a result, Armed Forces, particularly the Army, expressed their position in both institutional and public contexts (Benavides and Teherán 2001; Aranda and Pérez Silva 2001). Moreover, the Armed Forces’ strategic calculations on the possibility of removing traditional and institutional limits to PKO were influenced by other two factors that could compromise their autonomy in Mexico. These were firstly, the scarce international relevance of the Mexican Army and its need for modernisation, with the potential of causing Mexico’s subjection to other foreign powers (Breves de México 2005; González Gálvez 2002, 102). And secondly, the related possibility of needing to submit to foreign decisions in the administration of the PKO (González Gálvez 2002, 102).

Contrary to the Executive, changes in the political and economic contexts did not modify the Armed Forces’ interpretation of existing limits. Moreover, they were less prone to changes because they were orientated to preserve their historically independent role with respect to civil and political issues, and these limits allowed the preservation of this interest. In fact, during the prolonged period of PRI power, Mexican Armed Forces had never intervened in political affairs, respecting Mexico’s political rules and its informal boundaries but clearly differentiating military and civil spheres. It was because of the decisional and power equilibrium existing in Mexico between civil and military sectors, generated by their mutual Revolutionary basis (Ai Camp 2005, 2-5), that both political and military leaderships were able to share the same interpretations of structural limits and possibilities. According to Hay’s strategic actor’s concept (2002, 209-215), the same interpretation of these constraints legitimised a strategically-selective context that favoured specific strategies related to the protection of Mexico’s neutrality and the rejection of PKO.

In 2000, the concept of national sovereignty underwent a shift and the transformation of corporative practices altered Mexico’s stability in terms of civil-military relations. The process represented an opportunity to propose different strategies concerning military activities, among them, military participation in international missions. According to Benítez Manaut (2008, 29), even if the officer corps reacted sufficiently flexibly to the political shift, their resistance towards the democratic process and the change in strategic boundaries affecting their organisation was made explicit on many
occasions. In order to protect their autonomy within the Mexican system, favoured by the presence of traditional foreign policy principles, they exercised their political power and:

“[…], their veto just when they thought [the new situation] could affect them […] or when proposals did not correspond to their ideology, as in the case of troops’ participation in peacekeeping operations”.46

The incarnation of the Revolutionary policy paradigm by the PRI and the correlation between national defence and respect for the party and its rules, underpinned the existence of sharply delimited boundaries between military and civil spheres. According to Article 89, the Armed Forces were strictly subordinate to the Foreign Ministry, strengthening informal rules relating to those Revolutionary principles implemented in international affairs. This means that the formal respect of Mexican foreign policy principles by the military was dictated by constitutional boundaries, limiting their strategic calculations: the same set of constitutional limits that assigned a decisional role to the President (Benítez Manaut 2004, 52).

The support of the Officer corps was essential in order to ensure PRI permanence in power, protect domestic stability and institutional efficiency, being associated with the fidelity to the nation (Ai Camp 2002, 16-35). In 2000, the change of the party in power destabilised these structural selectivities that favoured the PRI’s permanence in power, undermining the maintenance of a relationship grounded on a common ideational basis. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces continued to consider the traditional structural selectivities as valid and consequently never addressed their strategic action, in terms of encouraging or supporting Mexico’s political evolution, with the aim of maintaining their status quo. This non-dynamic attitude led the officer corps to support the traditional shape of civil-military relations, opposing those structural changes that could affect their autonomy. Hence, the limits imposed by the Armed Forces are related to the protection of the traditional system, which guaranteed military autonomy in internal matters favouring the historical military subordination to the civil sector (Benítez Manaut 2008, 4; Ai Camp 2005, 167). The modification of institutional boundaries would have signified a change in strategic selectivities that could have compromised the Armed Forces’ autonomy. In order to favour their interests, the Armed Forces attempted to influence strategic decisions by political actors, favouring their interpretation of existing institutional opportunities and

46 Interviews: Raul Benítez Manaut, 26 July 2011. Translated by the author.
constraints, while avoiding the issue of addressing their strategic action towards the media and public opinion. The role played by the media and think tanks and the influences exerted on public opinion on the topic of PKO will be analysed in the following section.

3.2.4. Think tanks, the media and public opinion

This sub-section considers the impact that the media, think tanks and public opinion had on the implementation of strategies favourable to Mexico’s participation in PKO. Mexico’s liberalisation and the political changes it underwent in 2000 stimulated the opening of public debate. The replacement of traditional structural barriers represented a stimulus for the removal of further structural barriers that limited the freedom of speech and expression, legitimising public requests for transparency and the expression of public opinion through the media and surveys. This process was supported by a slow and incomplete, but effective, shift in the institutional boundaries and the interpretation of new opportunities regarding the new and modern concept of freedom of information. Federal law’s approval of transparency and access to public governmental information (Cámara de Diputados 2002g) and the agreement to civil society’s participation in the design of foreign policy (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 2006) represented the first step in the shift of institutional boundaries. They demonstrated the new government’s will to maintain its electoral promises taking into account civil society’s demands and rebalancing the relationship between the government and the mass media. control of newspapers decreased and the progressive diffusion of television and the internet ceased the ‘suspension of disbelief’ in Mexico’s official versions of the events (Randall 2006, 3). These changes increased the number of non-governmental actors able to influence national foreign affairs.

Democratic transition remodelled how the media and public opinion interpreted the concept of internal sovereignty and the necessity of protecting the system through the implementation Mexico’s international neutrality, by introducing a system of checks and balances. The integrity of the one-party system was no longer conceived as important, compared to the necessity of political restructuring and the consequential replacement of institutional limits on the freedom of communication. Public opinion and the media started reinterpreting the opportunities offered by the new political
context, finding new possibilities to express themselves and freely supporting political strategic actions. Nevertheless, the new government also made strategic use of mass media in order to diffuse new the foreign policy paradigm, promoting its initiatives and favouring strategies through television, radio programmes and the creation of a new web platform able to reach different strata of the population.

Mass media contributions to international topics remained of a low profile despite this, although from 2001 international events were constantly present in Mexican newspapers. Topics developed around PKO revived a good dose of interest in the Mexican media and, in particular, think tanks during the second half of the Fox government. The disaster affecting the nearby island of Haiti redistributed media attention and interest in international topics (Chossudovsky 2004), also influencing the political discussion that arose around Mexico’s participation in PKO and the involvement of civil society in foreign policy (Moctezuma Barragán 2003; García 2004; Fuentes-Berain 2006). Moreover, internal diatribes on PKO involvement, which led the vice-Foreign Minister Patricia Olamendi to resign, caught journalists’ interests favouring the diffusion of the Executive’s strategic actions and pushing the issue to the front pages of Mexican newspapers (Román 2005).

Domestic and international media favoured the diffusion of the Executive’s strategic positions in favour of Mexico’s participation in PKO, clarifying its positions on participation and contributing to the creation of a new perception of Mexico’s international positions. On certain occasions, mass media gave voice to Executive members, supporting their positions and discrediting Congress positions. Moreover, interviews with Porfirio Muñoz Ledo and Ricardo Pascoe Pierce confirmed that direct and non-diplomatic assertions were frequently made by Jorge Castañeda, who openly supported sending troops on UN peacekeeping missions.\(^\text{47}\) However, it was more often the case that conflicting visions and strategies generated a struggle between the media and the Foreign Minister, illustrated by Castañeda’s response to a Los Angeles Time journalist’s question about the Mexican press (Múnoz 2001):

> “It is not me anymore [the press want to get out]. It’s Fox. When it was I, it didn’t matter. They can throw me out, but they can’t throw Fox out. The press really wants to destroy him as much as possible. I mean systematically. [...] reasons are] first, for half a century, the Mexican

press has been financing itself with official government advertising. We cut off the money. This had been its main source of revenue. Now, in a recession, private advertising and sales are down. The press is in very bad shape, and it wants the government advertising desperately. [Attacking Fox] is its way of trying to get back [the advertising]. The second reason is that we are having a democracy binge in Mexico, similar to what happened in Spain in the 1970s. The press thinks that freedom of the press means freedom to bring down the government, basically. And that's what it is trying to do”.

Considering this assertion in light of the Mexican debate over the predominance of a strategic vision concerning PKO, it is possible to detect the strong clash between the ideas supported by the Foreign Minister and those spread by the media and Congress. Therefore, the understanding of how these actors dialectically interacted with the existence of changing institutional structures is relevant to the explanation of Mexican foreign policy.

The analysis of the most relevant Mexican newspaper articles published in the period between 2001 and 2006 shows that they were mostly critical of the eventual Mexican support for PKO. Despite the important changes the new political context produced for the mass media, they generally sustained the need to be coherent with the constitutional principles and non-interventionist ideas of historical Mexican foreign policy. A consistent number of these articles were written by Mexican policy-makers and domestic and foreign experts on international affairs, who happened to be in charge of the editorials or who reproduced their opposition to Mexican involvement in PKO (Cason and Brooks 2002; Editorial 2001a; Marín Bosh 2003; Kahhat 2005; Fuentes-Berain 2006). Each explanation given underlined the importance of preserving the moral, international authority achieved by Mexico thanks to its multilateral involvement. They supported the vision of Mexico as mediator in its sphere of influence applying and respecting the strenuous defence of the principle of peaceful solution of disputes as an international means by which to solve crises. Stress was placed on the difference between active participation in multinational fora and active participation through Mexican troops’ participation in peace-building and PKO. Mexico’s involvement in peace-enforcement missions, that also planned the use of coercive means without the compulsory approval of both parties in the conflict, was automatically excluded in every newspaper article due to the clear limitations imposed
by the Mexican Constitution, considered by the media a still valid limit in the definition of Mexican foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the opening of the Mexican political context, the presence of new strategic actors and the consequent fragmentation of national needs and interests, allowed the diffusion of different ideas to those related to the traditional foreign policy paradigm. This process generated the birth of new think tanks and the re-vitalisation of old ones. Just one year after the first democratic government, Mexico and its 54 think tanks ranked fourteenth among countries with the largest number of think tanks (McGann 2007, 7). Despite the significant number of such organisations in the country and the presence of two Mexican think tanks as nominees for leading global think tanks (McGann 2007, 13), just six of them worked on international topics (Foreign policy research Institute 2007); while one further entity specifically researched security issues: the Collective Security Analysis with Democracy (CASEDE) founded in 2005.

Depending on their goals Mexican think tanks and research centres were composed exclusively of the following: academics, individuals from the Mexican private sector, executive politicians, former policy-makers and diplomats expert on specific topics. Although the great majority of relevant studies were published after the conclusion of the Fox government (Schiavón and Velázquez 2010; Curzio 2010; Trejo García and Alvarez Romero 2007; González González and Minushkin 2007; Rosas 2007), the intellectual process was useful in the development of new projects of reform connected to the new strategic interpretations of PKO. Under the presence of a new international strategic vision, they hypothesised solutions and steps that Mexico needed to accomplish in order to improve its international presence at multilateral level. Such suggestions emanated from the consideration of the Armed Forces’ new role to the removal of structural constraints through the realisation of constitutional reforms. Nevertheless, studies especially suggested the clearing of the structural limits imposed by the traditional foreign policy paradigm, whilst trying not to belittle the importance these principles played in Mexican public and political opinion. Their interpretation conceived the non-intervention principle as compatible with participation in PKO. Although these documents were not widely disseminated, they were principally accessed by experts in the sector.

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48 Interview, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 27 May 2011.
Overall, think tanks made proposals that favoured the implementation of new or traditional ideas, while the mass media tried to spread different visions of the PKO issue. Both were influenced by the development of structural changes and favoured specific interpretations of Mexican foreign policy paradigms; such interpretations supported strategic actions developed by specific sets of institutional actors and sought to influence public opinion’s reading of the political debate. However, this set of actors were unable to weaken the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm due to the fact that its principles were still considered valid. As a result, these actors were not sufficiently influential to promote the implementation of the PKO.

To conclude, this section found that despite the change in Mexico’s political and economic context and the newly empowered actors, few of them fully supported the country’s participation in PKO and the vast majority disagreed with it. Although Carlsnaes’s tripartite approach (1992) could be considered useful in order to understand these dynamics, considering how actors and their perceptions were influenced by the presence of institutional structures, this approach would omit actor’s constraints imposed to structural changes. Actors’ resistance to change existing institutional and economic limits constrained the realisation of this foreign policy goal. It impeded the modification of structural selectivities related to the implementation of Mexico’s international neutrality which was based on protecting PRI rule in the country. Motivations grounding the rejection of support to Mexico’s participation in PKO and the lack of will to address the limitations curtailing its implementation were principally linked to actors’ consideration of traditional foreign policy principles as still valid in the implementation of Mexican foreign policy. The widely held constitutional limits and principles were considered still valid for the elaboration of their strategic calculations against Mexico’s participation in PKO. The diffusion, interpretation and influence of these ideas and how they related to the old and new foreign policy paradigms will be analysed in the next section.

### 3.3. Dealing with ideas and foreign policy paradigms

As shown in sections 3.1 and 3.2, the analysis of structural selectivities and actors’ behaviours cannot ignore the presence of ideas and foreign policy paradigms in the study of continuity and change in Mexico’s attitude towards PKO. In fact, although
new government foreign policy goals were generally accepted strategies to obtain them had to respond to the persistence of Revolutionary foreign policy principles. In concrete terms, there was a general perception of the change undertaken by Mexico and the international system towards the notion that PKO could be a useful means to achieve international peace. Nevertheless, the lack of a broad consensus on the merits of being involved in these operations (due to the strength of the traditional foreign policy vision among legislators and other influential actors), and the entrenchment of these principles within normative boundaries, represented an obstacle for Mexico’s participation in PKO.

Concepts of Mexican neutrality, self-determination of peoples and non-intervention were still of great importance in Mexico (Chabat 2008, 2), and they represented a substantial constraint for the Executive’s initial request to subordinate traditional foreign policy principles to Mexican national interests (Presidencia de la República 2001). Castañeda’s doctrine, that characterised the foreign policy of the new government and promoted a new type of international activism, was perceived by political forces as a betrayal of the traditional foreign policy principles responsible for Mexico’s credibility in the international arena (Cason and Brooks 2002).

Even though international pro-activism was not under judgment and the new foreign policy paradigm could not be refused a priori by democratic institutions, strategic selectivities present within the Mexican system privileged the respect of Mexico’s foreign policy principles. A shared strategy aimed to avoid support for Mexican troop participation in PKO, highlighting the opportunity to send civil units (Galan 2001; Vargas 2002). This hypothetical option was proposed in order to avoid disappointing international and domestic opinion, conciliating the implementation of Mexican traditional principles. This confirms the importance of causal influences exerted by ideas and principles in the foreign policy-making omitted by cognitive approaches. Neglecting these elements the analysis would not provide a comprehensive explanation of causal dynamics. In fact, they were still considered the basis of Mexico’s international affairs by those strategic actors in charge of Mexico’s foreign policy decisions.

Institutional actors, and especially the Senate and the Presidency, initially agreed with the new foreign policy’s general path, giving it rhetorical support. However, their de facto behaviour was successively led by their consideration of specific events. The impossibility of coherently implementing the new foreign policy paradigm was due to
the lack of clarity and detailed knowledge in the legislative branch about how to implement the new vision of Mexico’s international role, reinforced by the validity of existing structural constraints. The lack of implementation was further related to the absence of a proper long-term international project and because of the difficulties experienced in attracting social and political forces towards the state within a more complex, national-popular project that featured long term goals. Such conditions generated scepticism and resilience to the new and weak foreign policy paradigm; it was unable to substitute the traditionally and widely accomplished paradigm, still strongly entrenched among Mexican actors and institutional norms. The shared idea was that principles held by Mexico for more than a century could not be subordinate to decisions of a new government, despite the fact that this government could represent an important national change.49

The debate analysed in section 3.2.2, represents a paradigmatic case that shows how Congress’ political behaviour related to PKO was conditional on its support of traditional foreign policy principles. The partial concession to the Executive allowed the Senate to strategically reiterate the need for its authorisation in order to realise all types of war operations deemed controversial in the eyes of the traditional foreign policy principles, PKO included. Through this strategic action, Congress was able to impose its interpretation of the institutional limits in matter of peacekeeping missions. As asserted by Mariclaire Acosta, the idea generating the rejection of a new type of participation in PKO was:

“[...]the defensive nationalism. To not believe in peacekeeping legitimacy, continuing believing that it was a means to interfere in foreign countries’ domestic affairs or to establish a powerful actor’s control. So, the logic was: if we participate [in PKO] one day or another they’ll wish to enter our house and violate our freedom. I am simplifying but...”.50

The differentiation between humanitarian aid and PKO was fundamental to Congress in order to impose its strategies. Furthermore, it underlined the presence of strategic selectivities still entrenched in the conceptualisation of foreign policy and shared among different categories of actors that influenced how the validity of existent boundaries and possibilities for strategic action were viewed. However, according to the survey elaborated by COMEXI and CIDE, Mexican leaders were more reluctant

49 Interview, Ricardo Pascoe, 10 May 2011.
50 Interview, Mariclaire Acosta (Undersecretary for Human Rights and Democracy from 2000 to 2003 and member of the transition team), 24 June 2011. Author’s translation.
than the population sustaining the new foreign policy paradigm (González and Minushkin 2004; CIDE-COMEXI 2004, 12-14). As shown in the table below, in 2004 more than half of Mexico’s leaders totally disagreed with governmental performance on foreign policy.

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<th>Governmental foreign policy performances</th>
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Table 9 Governmental foreign policy performances

*Source:* own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey “Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004”.

The boundaries existing between the rhetorical support for the new foreign policy path and the concrete implementation of the new Mexican pro-activism were significant. The CIDE/COMEXI survey (2004) quantifies that 94% of Mexican leaders supported a more general, pro-active participation in international affairs. However, the overall support for a more active global policy did not obtain a wide consensus on the merits of PKO. According to the interview conducted with Raúl Benítez Manaut, the lack of support for those activities among Mexican leaders was motivated by “principle reasons; because thinking about peacekeeping operations meant to contrast the foreign policy doctrine of non-intervention”. An additional reason that justified this political strategy was represented by politicians’ fear of disappointing Mexican public opinion, as confirmed in the interview with the former Ambassador Porfirio Muñoz Ledo. Nevertheless, the traditional foreign policy paradigm continued representing the interpretative lens through which decision-makers misunderstood the path of action followed by Mexican public opinion’s anti-PKO involvement stance, conceived

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51 Interviews, Raúl Benítez Manaut, 26 July 2011.
52 Interview, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 27 May 2011.
against Mexican involvement in PKO (Pellicer 2006, 2). In fact, according to Enrique Berruga: "Mexican International Affairs Council and other civil society’s public political fora had numerous meetings about Mexican participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the consensus in favour of them was wide". 53 These assertions are confirmed by the same survey of Mexican public opinion and foreign policy illustrated in the following table. It shows that even if 55% of Mexican leaders were in favour of Mexican participation in PKO, and a comparable proportion was evident among the wider population (CIDE-COMEXI 2004)54, illustrating the fact that neither the public nor the politicians held sharp opposition to PKO in this survey.

![Participation in peacekeeping operations](image)

**Table 10 Participation in peacekeeping operations**
*Source: own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey "Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004”*

However, a survey conducted at the end of the Fox government displays that positions regarding such missions became more polarised over time. The general opinion of Mexico’s pro-active participation in international affairs in 2006 demonstrated a slight increase among Mexican leaders, while public opinion registered a more uncertain position in comparison to the 2004 survey, with popular consensus around 56% (CIDE-COMEXI 2006; González and Minushkin 2006).

53 Interview, Enrique Berruga Filloy, 13 July 2011.
54 Survey is taken into account do not considering people who did not answer.
This shift was influenced by the evolution of international and domestic contexts. The **impasse** that determined Patrizia Olamendi’s resignation (Román 2005) triggered a change in the President’s and Executive’s official vision regarding Mexican involvement in such operations, finally bringing them in line with Congress’ position. Nevertheless, in 2004, following the Haiti crisis, the UN promoted new PKO in order to re-establish democracy on the island.  

The mission was considered by many supporters of Mexican pro-activity to be an unmissable opportunity. It allowed Mexico to demonstrate its skills and availability, as well as its interest in the area; such qualities were useful in re-acquiring Mexico’s leading role in the region and negotiating power in the global arena. Moreover, according to Berruga, such action would not have compromised Mexico’s traditional rejection of intervention in areas not under its influence as action could have been justified by the probable domestic repercussions of non-intervention.  

However, Mexico did not participate in the operation because, according to Hay’s conception of the SRA (Hay 2001, 10-11/17), these PKO were interpreted through an ideational lens related, in this case, to the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm that associated them with war activities.

The Executive’s initial declarations in support of Mexican involvement in the mission remained general pronouncements that did not evolve into concrete Mexican military activity in support of the UN initiative, with the exception of some civil reliefs (González González et al. 2006, 53). Mexico’s position, shared at 2005 meeting of the UNSC, considered the topic of “great relevance in Mexican foreign policy” (Berruga 2005) and was supportive of the international community’s efforts in the mission. Nevertheless, the Mexican delegation reasserted its position underlining the need of a “peaceful solution for the conflict” (Berruga 2004) according to the traditional foreign policy principles. It considered that “the priority in 2005 [had to] be the creation of political dialogue [...] and the humanitarian aid” and not of war activities (Berruga 2005). No troops were sent, as in the case of Mexico’s contribution to PKO in El Salvador, organised by Ambassador Rozental.

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56 Interview, Enrique Berruga Filloy, 13 July 2011.

57 The United Nations’PKO mission in El Salvador is the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) sent in 1991 and that followed the mission called "United Nations Observer Group in Central America " and aimed to monitor HR in the country after the end of the civil war.
This type of assistance was the only Mexican participation in PKO since the neo-liberalisation of the country, following which Mexico completely refused to send personnel abroad in support of PKO. Contributions were accepted because did not involve sending Mexican military troops abroad and respected the principles of self-determination and peaceful resolution of conflicts (González González et al. 2006, 53). This strategic behaviour highlights the attempt to re-propose the validity of the new foreign policy paradigm in the interpretation of this PKO, conceived as an opportunity for Mexican foreign policy and the improvement of its visibility in the international arena. However, the attempt to implement strategic actions related to the new foreign policy paradigm remained limited by the presence of institutional limits and strategic selectivities that favoured strategic calculations in line with the traditional foreign policy paradigm.

Furthermore, Mexico’s interpretation of strategic actions related to PKO, according to the traditional foreign policy paradigm, was confirmed also in other cases. For instance, during the Fox government, Mexican support for the Rio Group’s positions had been constantly integrated into Mexico’s interpretation of PKO reflecting its traditional foreign policy principles. According to this vision the new context was interpreted in the opposite way with respect to those actors who sustained the validity of the new foreign policy paradigm, discouraging the participation in PKO and favouring the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes. This position was supported by Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba (2002) in his statement at the UN in 2002:

“[… ]work actually realised by personnel of so called peacekeeping operations does not exclusively include traditional military tasks, but they incorporate every day more civil components, which provide help for the building and strengthening of national institutions, as well as humanitarian development aid. […] I would like to underline that in this new context, where we talk about peace operations and contributors in a wide meaning of the term, it is viable that the number of country contributors to the operations increase, and together with it, the efficacy in the achievement of their goals. My country evaluates its participation to peace operations, in the framework of this new reality”.

The ideas and the presence of a still entrenched foreign policy paradigm played a strong role in strategic decisions and positions taken on PKO. The constitutional

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58 Interview, Andrés Rozental, 14 April 2011
influence over the interpretation of valid strategic selectivities represented a structural barrier to decisive change. Moreover, the importance of the diffuse perception of traditional foreign policy principles, and their reflection on leaders and public opinion produced actors’ rejection of those ideas underpinning the new foreign policy paradigm. This process determined the country’s estrangement from the idea of a more proactive role in PKO, as promoted by those actors supporting the new foreign policy path.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has applied the SRA, with a stress on the mediation role played by ideas, in analysing the evolution of Mexico’s foreign policy approach to PKO. The chapter illustrated the necessity of considering the reciprocal influences established among the different SRA elements in order to understand the processes of change and continuity in foreign policy, contributing to Sub-RQ1 and Sub-RQ2. The application of the SRA to the case of Mexico’s PKO fosters understanding of how the interplay among the different elements produced continuity in Mexico’s approach to PKO, answering RQ2. Moreover, it explains how it is possible to produce negative results in the implementation of apparently innovative and shared goals.

In studying the discrepancies existing between official intentions of participation in UN peacekeeping missions and their implementation, the chapter has underlined the presence of those institutional and economic boundaries that influenced the persistence of traditional strategic selectivities. They were considered to both be still influenced by the existence of traditional foreign policy paradigms related to PRI governments and able to bind the elaboration of political and social actors’ strategies in relation to participation in PKO. In light of these elements, it is possible to answer Sub-RQ1 asserting that one of the most important goals in the new vision of Mexico’s international affairs was not implemented, providing continuity with respect to past PRI governmental experience.

In answering Sub-RQ2, the chapter discussed that the continuity was determined by the principles underpinning Mexico’s old foreign policy paradigm were still entrenched in Mexican institutions, Congress members, Mexican leaders, the population and the media. The diffusion of ideas, or against or at the base of Mexico’s participation in
PKO, was considered essential for the interpretation of the possibilities offered by the conjunctural political and economic changes and the implementation of actors’ strategic intentions. New international principles were still not internalised by Mexican actors in spite of international pressures and domestic political changes, and also because of the lack of a long-term project for Mexico’s foreign policy comparable to that of the PRI. PKO were considered through the traditional foreign policy lens and evaluated according to old international principles historically supported by Mexico, generating a substantial continuity in the implementation of decisions concerning the non-operationalisation of PKO.

These outcomes provide an initial term of comparison necessary to respond the MRQ. Contributing to RQ2, it is possible to observe that the tendency to preserve traditional Mexican foreign policy in the matter of PKO was generated by the interwoven influences among these categories of elements, which generated the impossibility to identify a unique leading factor responsible for this process. Furthermore, the variation in actors’ balance of forces and the internalisation of the new foreign policy paradigm were not sufficiently strong to either encourage the development of strategic actions regarding the modification of pre-established foreign policy goals, or avoid the modification of existing conditions and selectivities that favoured the endurance of traditional foreign policy principles.
CHAPTER FOUR

Mexico’s participation in the United Nation Security Council and its strategic interpretation of the 2003 Iraq War

Introduction

The previous chapter, focusing on Mexico’s participation in PKO, illustrated a clear case of continuity in foreign policy with respect to the traditional paradigm. While the aim of this chapter is to explore Mexico’s participation in the UNSC as non-permanent member, in 2002 and 2003, with an explicit focus on its position regarding the Iraq War in the period between 2000 and 2003. It provides a case of mixed results and shows the co-existence of different foreign policy interplays and strategic decisions that firstly favoured the partial implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm, and, at a later stage, the predominance of the traditional one. The contemporary presence of mixed outcomes is useful in highlighting how different policy paradigms influenced the strategic interpretation of existing limits, and the resistance of specific strategic selectivities. These considerations foster understanding of the reasons that grounded the presence of different outcomes within the same Mexican spatio-temporal framework. It contributes to the comparison with the other two empirical case studies in Chapters Three and Five, necessary in order to address the MRQ.

The coexistence of different Mexican foreign policy dynamics and decisions underpinning the country’s participation in the UNSC and its refusal to support the Iraq War makes this chapter a relevant case in the study of change and continuity processes in Mexico’s foreign policy. In this empirical case, the two fundamental new foreign policy axes, Mexico’s special relationship with the US and its international pro-activeness, are strictly intertwined and the possibility of change in the field is related to the change of vision in both spheres. This ambivalence highlights the transformations concerning institutional and structural limits that influenced the development of new actors’ strategies in the international field. However, in spite the initial support for the new foreign policy paradigm, the absence of a definite long-term Mexican project limited its implementation to short term interests and activities, rather than guaranteeing continuity in the implementation of Mexico’s foreign policy
change. The analysis of these elements in relation to Mexico’s participation in the UNSC and the Iraq War contributes to Sub-RQ1. The application of the SRA dynamics set out in Chapter One produce outcomes comparable with the first empirical case study adding elements for the elaboration of RQ2.

In order to analyse change and continuity processes from a SR perspective, this chapter considers the same set of categories present in the other two empirical chapters. Their consideration is necessary in order to understand to which extent the modification of each factor could determine the partial change in Mexican foreign policy. Section 4.1 examines how legislative, political and economic changes Mexico underwent in relation to this topic influenced the transition team’s strategies and generated their shift after the first period of change. Section 4.2 analyses how and why strategic actors positioned themselves with respect to Mexico’s international pro-activeness and its support for war operations according to new and old political paradigms. This explanation is particularly useful in order to ascertain which reasons underpinned the change of actors’ strategies regarding the different application of ideas in the case of the UNSC and the Iraqi War. The last section, section 4.3, evaluates the influence of ideas and foreign policy paradigms on the change in strategic limits and actors’ calculations in order to understand the implementation of foreign policy decisions. The analysis of the interplay among these elements reveals the presence of different stages of resistance in Mexico’s traditional foreign policy paradigm and principles, responsible for the production of a reverse gear in the process of foreign policy change.

4.1 Mexico’s non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council and its vision for the Iraq war: the presence of strategic selectivities influenced by old and new institutional, political and economic constraints

This section aims to investigate how political, institutional and budgetary boundaries influenced the renovation of certain strategic selectivities, offering new opportunities for actors’ strategic calculations and enabling Mexico’s participation in the UNSC. This thesis recognises the theoretical limitation represented by the difficulty to understand the degree to which different factors have changed, binding their consideration to
specific policies and freeing them from the concept of state centrality in foreign policy. This approach can be considered lacking of parsimony if compared to Kahler’s (1997) neo-liberal approach used by González González (2001) or to the existent works focused on the neo-liberalisation of the country (Babb 2002). Nevertheless, thanks to the consideration of the historical background it will provide a clearer understanding of the disregarded Mexican foreign policy complexity explaining how actors and constraints influenced each other.

As explained in Chapter Two, Mexico’s historical will to maintain its international autonomy with respect to the US and protect its regime through its international neutrality influenced the presence of strategic selectivities that constrained Mexico’s participation in the UNSC and in war missions. In order to implement a new foreign policy paradigm, this attitude had to be modified by the new government. With the aim of understanding the existent possibilities of change. Sub-section 4.1.1 explores how Mexico’s candidacy for a non-permanent seat at the UNSC is related to the presence of traditional strategic selectivities preserving Mexican traditional conceptions of political constraints. These limits were the linchpin of the debate that arose around Mexico’s possibility to support the US intervention in Iraq at the UNSC ad they are necessary in order to understand why Mexican politicians were particularly concerned about how the US could limit Mexico’s autonomy at the UNSC. In fact, according to an SR analysis, the change in the majority in Congress and the rise to power of a new party did not mean an automatic change in the new strategic actors’ interpretation of Mexican foreign policy principles. Sub-section 4.1.2 then analyses Mexico’s geopolitical and economic situation in order to understand how it influenced strategic decisions concerning its autonomy in multilateral contexts, such as its participation in the UNSC and its approach to the Iraq War.

The understanding of influences exercised by these limits is grounded on the two pivotal foreign policy axes at the base of Fox’s foreign policy. These axes were individuated by Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda through the establishment of a special relationship with the US and Mexico’s proactive participation in the multilateral sphere (Castañeda 2001a, 68). According to the PAN, Mexico would have reconsidered its interests, giving them priority through the implementation of a new foreign policy paradigm at the expenses of its traditional foreign policy principles. In order to do so, on the one hand Mexico had to consider the changing strategic limits imposed by globalisation and the new domestic context, whilst on the other, where
Mexico wanted to obtain an internationally relevant role, it had to strategically evaluate the new opportunities offered by the global arena (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 82-85; Castañeda 2001b, 43). In their most important declarations both President Fox and the Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda underlined the need to develop a new Mexican foreign policy strategy taking the new context into account (Castañeda 2001a, 67; Congreso General 2000; Fox 2002, 13).

4.1.1. **Mexico’s institutional and political boundaries, the initiation of Mexico’s activities at the UN Security Council and its interpretation of the intervention in Iraq**

In order to investigate how Mexico’s political and institutional boundaries influenced strategic selectivities, it is necessary to underline that, after the PAN presidential victory, the presence of traditional principles in the Constitution were still considered essential to protect Mexican interests and autonomy; such principles limited Mexico’s action. During the PRI governments, these principles and related institutional constraints favoured the presence of strategic selectivities necessary for the preservation of Mexico’s *status quo*, limiting its participation in multilateral fora and avoiding any type of intervention in other countries (Bondí 2004, 9-10; Pellicer 2006a, 23). According to this vision, a closer relationship with the US was interpreted as a loss of international autonomy, and a proactive presence within multilateral organisations was considered limited by US presence. In fact, historically, Mexico had refused to actively take part at the UNSC.  

The presence of traditional limits contrasted with the vision supported by the PAN and the new foreign policy experts that promoted a closer relationship with the US. They looked for a new Mexican role within multilateral institutions, stressing the transformation of international constraints and the presence of new opportunities offered by the change in international contexts and globalisation. Moreover, they promoted a new interpretation of Mexican foreign policy principles, conditional upon new Mexican interests and opportunities generated by Mexico’s democratisation.

59 Only two exceptions exist, but they are not considered determinant for this study because they were not generated by an explicit Mexican will, a change of its foreign policy paradigm or existent strategic selectivities. Previous Mexican participation at the Security Council (in 1946 and 1980-1981) was motivated by Mexico’s role in Latin America and the necessity to find a referent for the region (Muñoz Ledo 2002, 96-98).
This renewed conception of constitutional boundaries determined Mexico’s candidacy for a non-permanent seat at the UNSC, modifying the traditional foreign policy path. Nevertheless, the strength of these new ideas could not dismiss Congress’ vision of constitutional strategic selectivities, especially in relation to the non-intervention principle, influencing its rejection of Mexico’s support for the Iraq war.

The proximity of the US, historically recognised as a geo-political limit, influenced the existence of a strong Mexican nationalism and a clear position in defence of its constitutional principles within multilateral organisations due to the need to maintain Mexico’s international autonomy (Schiavon 2004, 196-197). The presence of a general consensus among the Mexican population and political elite regarding Mexico’s anti-American attitude motivated Mexican policy makers to institutionally and strategically contrast US action within international organisations and in matter of foreign policy (González González 2001, 623; Schiavon 2004, 212). During the Cold War, these limits contributed to the generation of strategic selectivities that determined Mexico’s role at the UN. They favoured the strategic affirmation of political resolutions contrary to the US and spread the concept that every Mexican activity within the UNSC could likely represent a contrast with the US.

However, even if Mexico’s strategic implementation of its institutional principles defined positions divergent to the US, the country could not permit the deterioration of its relationship with its northern neighbour. The US still remained an important economic and political interlocutor for Mexico. For this reason Mexico could not risk being involved in a direct confrontation in matter of international security with its participation in UNSC activities (Bondí 2004, 9; González González 2001, 623 and 663). Nevertheless, Mexico’s relationship with the US within the international arena was developed in light of strategic selectivities imposed by an informal agreement. Thanks to the generation of a double-rhetoric tied up with their geopolitical boundaries, the two states guaranteed the political and economic equilibrium in the bilateral relationship and the global arena.

On the one hand, US economic support and its legitimisation of the Mexican political system were determined and limited according to the maintenance of Mexico’s internal political stability. Its power of legitimisation for the Mexican domestic system was essential for the conservation of Mexico and PRI’s status quo, representing a fundamental political limit able to influence Mexican foreign policy makers’ strategies.
On the other hand, Mexico had to guarantee the security on its northern border. These constraints imposed by the US allowed Mexico’s foreign policy makers to meet their interests developing a consistent degree of autonomy on the international chessboard and within multilateral institutions. From this point of view, the US implemented a flexible tolerance in the international context in return for private and informal cooperation within the Mexican political system. This permanence and legitimacy were backed by the US without any type of international constraints (Schiavon 2004, 199). Such boundaries maintained full-validity until the change in the Mexican political scenario and the country’s democratisation.

Mexico’s democratic transition and the obtainment of the ‘democratic bonus’ that increased its international legitimacy (Velázquez Flores 2008, 92) constituted, for Mexico, the removal of traditional limits related with the protection of the PRI’s political rule from external attacks. Mexican opportunities in the international arena underwent a positive shift thanks to the increase in its negotiation power and the cleaning of its political image. As pointed out by the Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda (2001a, 44-45), the shift in international and domestic contexts and the growth of new non-state actors favoured the generation of new priorities for Mexico and the ideation of a new foreign policy strategy. In light of the new opportunities generated by Mexico’s democratisation and the permanence of old limits related to the US proximity, Mexican pro-activity in multilateral institutions was strategically interpreted as the only foreign policy strategy able to balance the asymmetrical relation with the country’s powerful northern neighbour (Castañeda 2001a, 67). Furthermore, the shift in domestic context and the consequential increase of international credibility were perceived as an opportunity to increase Mexico’s power in the international arena, improving its image abroad and developing its regional strategic influence (Chabat 2009, 14; Bondí 2004, 3-4; González González 2001, 628, Castañeda 2001b, 46-52; Fox 2002, 17).

The new foreign policy idea of a special relationship with the US and the aim of obtaining a pro-active role within multilateral institutions determined a reinterpretation of the existing boundaries, generating an intense debate on the opportunity to participate in the UNSC (Cámara de Diputados 2001b; Cámara de Diputados 2001c; Cámara de Diputados 2001d). Although many policy makers considered the coexistence of these goals barely compatible (Gómez-Robledo 2001; Interview, Manuel Tello Macías (Mexican career diplomat and Foreign Minister between 1994 and 2000), 16 April 2008. Interview, Jorge Eduardo Navarrete, 22 June 2011.
Muñoz Ledo 94-95), the US was no longer considered a limit for the implementation of the new idea of pro-activity. Hence, Mexico’s Executive strategically calculated that it was possible to develop a role within the UNSC without compromising its relationship with the US and, at the same time, respecting the foreign policy principles included in the Constitution. Providing the first answer to sub-RQ1, the interpretation of existing limits influenced by the new foreign policy paradigm, and the priority given to its goals, produced a change in Mexico’s foreign policy. The shift in the consideration of existing limits allowed the Executive to apply for, and obtain, a non-permanent seat at the UNSC for the period 2002-2003 (Castañeda 2001a). Nevertheless, despite Castañeda’s aim to develop multilateral activities that did not contrast with the US, the 11th September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks changed the boundaries within which Mexico could develop its strategic actions, effectively narrowing them.

The 9/11 modified structural conditions that allowed Mexico to maintain an ambivalent multilateral behaviour, simultaneously preserved a preferential relationship with the US focused on migration issues and a multilateral attitude consistent with its traditional foreign policy paradigm. The possibility of new war against Iraq led by the US, and developed in contrast to UNSC resolutions, imposed a Mexican re-evaluation of its strategic multilateral behaviour. The conjunctural event changed both the domestic and international context, determining new constraints. Internationally, the US could not allow the double-rhetoric of the informal agreement with Mexico; it needed Mexico’s public support and vote at the UNSC. Mexico’s rejection had the potential to undermine its special relation with the US and the complex migration agreement under construction, called by Castañeda “the whole enchilada” (Greenhouse 2011). Domestically, the Executive had to take into account limits imposed by Congress’ interpretation of Mexican foreign interests and limits imposed by the Mexican Constitution on its international activity (Cámara de Diputados 2002c). Furthermore, the 2003 mid-term elections determined a decisive political boundary in terms of the maintenance of the electoral consensus (Bondí 2004, 16).

In spite of the new interpretation of international opportunities, the presence of traditional foreign policy principles inscribed within the Mexican Constitution and the anti-American vision still entrenched within opposition parties definitely limited Mexico’s prompt support for the US after 9/11. The validation of these constitutional boundaries was related to perceived risk of both alignment with the US and participation in the 2003 Iraq war (Méndez-Silva 2007, 285). In order to avoid being
constrained by the US geopolitical position, Mexico actively participated in the elaboration of UN resolution 1441 which imposed final disarmament on Iraq (United Nations Security Council 2002), as well as in UN inspections in Iraq (Pellicer 2003a, 93-94; Blix 2006, 8). Moreover, the rejection of this geopolitical limitation was confirmed by Mexico’s participation in the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC),61 guaranteed by the presence of its representative Olga Pellicer at the College of Commissioners.62

Major exponents of the new foreign policy paradigm, such as the Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda, sustained the necessity to unconditionally support the US. However, the validity of limits imposed by Article 89 persisted and was confirmed by a significant section of Congress comprising opposition and government parties, and even by the State Secretary Santiago Creel who disagreed with the intervention (Bondí 2004, 76; Comisión permanente 2001; Cámara de Diputados 2001b; Cámara de Diputados 2002a). As stated by PAN Senator Javier Corral Jurado at the Permanent Commission that analysed the first US bombing of Iraq, Mexico had to necessarily stand in favour of

“a rejection to US attack to Iraq [...]. [It is necessary] in order to claim the constitutional Article 89 section II, where the six fundamental principles of Mexican foreign policy are included.” (Comisión permanente 2001).

According to the limits imposed by the traditional foreign policy paradigm included in the Constitution, support for the invasion of Iraq was still perceived as a loss of autonomy for Mexico. It represented an insurmountable constraint at the moment of taking definitive decisions that could clearly indicate Mexico’s placement in the international arena. Hence, institutional principles of autonomy and non-incursion in internal affairs prevailed. The Mexican policy on the UN veto and its rejection to support the Iraq war represented an instance of continuity in its foreign policy, spoiling Mexico’s special bilateral relationship with the US (Cámara de Diputados 2002d, 1917-1928, Cámara de Diputados 2002i, 143-144).

Further constraints limited the persistence of the change in Mexico’s foreign policy generating continuity with the past. Firstly, the structural reform agreed at the

61 The UNMOVIC was responsible for the verification of Iraq’s disarmament and the application of the UNSC Resolution 1284 (United Nations Security Council 1999).
beginning of the administration, between the Fox government and the opposition parties, concerning Mexico’s foreign policy had never been realised. The lack of transformation in structural boundaries reduced the opportunities to generate a definitive change in Mexico’s foreign policy on the matter. In fact, Mexico was not able to change its strategy by either adapting it to new strategic selectivities or creating new institutional norms. Rather, it continued considering those limits related to the traditional foreign policy paradigm as still valid (Fernández de Castro 2004). Such validity was underlined by President Fox in every message and discourse (Fox 2003, 193-19; Fox 2002, 13-14). Secondly, the US imposed further barriers to Mexico’s pro-activity because its post 9/11 institutional messages of solidarity with the US were not timely (Presidencia de la República 2001; Chacón 2002, 108). For “too many in the US such support appeared to be too little too late even by way of rhetoric” (Bondí 2004, 77). The clash between different conceptualisations of existing constraints for Mexico and the US was determinant in the evolution of Mexico’s strategic decisions concerning the Iraq war at the UNSC, favouring continuity in the implementation of Mexico’s traditional principles.

The relevance of these limits for Mexico’s foreign policy at the UNSC was underlined also by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, a member of the transition team, during his speech in Congress in 2002, when he was appointed Mexico’s permanent representative at the UN. Nonetheless, the Second Working Commission, which approved his nomination, and Congress expressed their concerns regarding the absence of an explicit reference to the principle of non-intervention within his working programme (Cámara de Diputados 2002a, 117). Their request was formalised to the Mexican representative at the UN (Cámara de Diputados 2002c, 1727-1730). It explicitly re-affirmed its interpretation of the existing constraints, relating them to Mexico’s activity at the UNSC and Mexico’s strategic possibilities of action in relation to the Iraq war, reiterating the persistence of the traditional foreign policy paradigm activities (Comisión permanente 2001; Cámara de Diputados 2002b, 636; Cámara de Diputados 2002c, 1723). On the one hand, PRI senators highlighted inconsistencies between Aguilar Zinser’s predisposition to respect Mexican foreign policy principles and the position expressed by President Fox and Castañeda. On the other hand, senators of all opposition parties confirmed the necessity to take into account such principles in Mexico’s activity at the UNSC, underlining the importance of the non-intervention principle (Cámara de Diputados 2002a, 119).

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63 Interview, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 27 May 2011.
In addition, this interpretation of the non-intervention principle was confirmed when discussed at the Legislative branch through the debate arisen from the reform of Article 76 section III and the reform project of Article 72 section E, which regulated Mexico’s neutrality and the departure of Mexican troops beyond Mexico’s borders. The three most important parties in Congress clearly recognised the traditional limits influencing the presence of old strategic selectivities as still valid for the regulation of Mexico’s international activities and the preservation of its international neutrality (Cámara de Diputados 2005a, Cámara de Diputados 2005c). Different interpretations of how to approach new domestic and international contexts, in order to elaborate a new foreign policy, were evident after the election. However, Mexico’s participation as non-permanent member at the UNSC and the approach of the Iraq war stressed those differences, marking constitutional boundaries for Mexican foreign policy. As illustrated in Table 1 of Chapter Three, the 20% of reform projects concerning Mexican foreign policy were inherent in the discussion developed around Mexican foreign policy principles. However, despite the existence of decision-makers that considered these types of limits inadequate in the changed domestic and international contexts, constitutional limits did not undergo any changes (Méndez-Silva 2007, 285).

Hence, despite the general initial support given to the new foreign policy paradigm determining Mexico’s participation in the UNSC, constitutional limits influenced decision-makers strategic calculations concerning the intervention in Iraq, favouring a shift from the implementation of the new foreign policy path to the re-assertion of the traditional paradigm. These constraints and the economic limitations to Mexico’s international activities influenced the US proximity, which are examined in the next subsection, limited the creation of new strategic selectivities able to favour Mexico’s pro-activity and legitimisation in the international arena.

4.1.2. Economic limits and opportunities for Mexican presence at the UN Security Council and its participation in the Iraq war

Starting with some historical considerations, this sub-section will investigate the presence of economic limits and opportunities for both Mexico’s participation in the
UNSC and the Iraq War in order to complement the set of structural elements that, according to the SR analysis, influenced the existence of strategic selectivities. From the end of the 1980s, international changes and the liberalisation of Mexico’s economic and political system modified the existent economic boundaries influencing the PAN’s international approach. The PAN criticised PRI governments, stressing their incapacity to strategically take advantage of the globalised environment and the shift of limits imposed by the re-formed economic scenario after the 1990s (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 83). The strategic re-consideration of these boundaries was interpreted by the PAN as fundamental to securing the wider legitimisation of domestic changes within the international system (González González 2001, 640-653). The new government promoted the idea that the Foreign Ministry played a relevant role in the promotion of Mexico’s economy, particularly considering the special position attributed to the US. Therefore, Mexico’s new foreign policy paradigm and its pro-activist idea were interconnected with US foreign policy (mostly depending on it) and their bilateral relationship, both from the multilateral and economic point of view (Schiavon 2004, 204-205). In fact, the possibility of realising change in foreign policy was strictly linked to the re-interpretation of existing structural limits in both spheres: the special relationship with the US and Mexico’s pro-activism in the international arena.

The Fox government and its members, in primis the foreign minister Jorge Castañeda, considered the modification of structural limits to be an opportunity to promote a new role for Mexico in the international arena and obtain a non-permanent seat at the UNSC. In fact, as showed in the following table, during the economic neo-liberalisation that created new US-Mexican trade possibilities, the correspondence between the votes of the two states at the UN rose. The trend illustrates a general increase, with important peaks during the period following the NAFTA ratification in 1994. Hence the improvement in economic relations with the US did not represent a limit for Mexico’s international pro-activity. Rather, it appeared to favour Mexico’s presence the UNSC, limiting the possibility of contrast between the two countries.

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64 In this case at the General Assembly.
Although one of the main aims of the new foreign policy (Plataforma Política 2000-2006) was to differentiate Mexico’s political and economic relationships, this goal clashed with the importance of establishing a special relationship with the US and assigning primacy to economic and trade issues (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 83).

According to a traditional foreign policy vision, the salience of Mexico’s economy and trade (linked to its special relationship with the US) should have represented a limit for the preservation of its autonomy at the UNSC. Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister discarded this type of interpretation, conceiving such strategic economic relationships as an opportunity compatible with Mexico’s autonomy in the international arena and useful for the implementation of a pragmatic foreign policy focused on Mexico’s principal interests (Castañeda 2001a). Therefore, the objective was to develop Mexico’s multilateral activities in order to both counter the lack of negotiation power Mexico had in the trade field and balance the agreements with its special partner, the US. However, the pursuit of wider trade integration with the US was interpreted by Mexico’s commercial sector as the removal of previously existing limits, pushing Mexico to increase its economic dependence on the US and constraining its freedom of action (Fernández de Castro and Rozental 2003, 105). In fact, according to Muñoz Ledo, obtaining the UNSC seat compromised both the aim to minimise frictions

Table 11 Mexico’s and United States votes at the UN (1985-1999)

between the two countries and the improvement in their cooperation regarding trade and migration. These conditions acted as significant barriers to Mexico’s autonomy in the international arena (Schiavon 2004, 205).

According to Velázquez Flores’s analysis of Mexico’s import-export activities (2008a, 112-115), Mexico’s economic attention was focused on North America. The author observed that, during the Fox government, Mexico’s direct foreign investments, its export activities and external debt, were clearly addressed towards its Northern neighbour. This element acquires relevance in the elaboration of new foreign policy strategies. On the one hand, according to the new foreign policy paradigm, the improvement of the economic relationship had the capacity to reinforce Mexico’s presence in the international arena representing an opportunity for change. On the other hand, according to the Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm, this condition potentially limited Mexico’s independent role at the UNSC, representing a constraint for foreign policy. This consideration contributes to sub-RQ2 and sub-RQ2. From a theoretical point of view it confirms the importance to temporally take into account how different interpretation of limits changed, influencing the presence of new strategic selectivities able to favour the shift in foreign policy.

Despite the new government rhetorically stressed its will to attribute an important place to Latin American countries, economic factors confirm Mexico’s priority of establishing a closer and special relationship with the US (Castañeda 2001a, 66; Pellicer 2006a, 37).

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65 Interview, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 11 May 2011.
Table 12 Mexico’s external debt

Table 13 Mexico’s foreign direct investments (2000-2006)
The increasing trend illustrated in the previous three tables is significant. It confirms that North America both represented the most important partner in Mexico in the international economic arena and the preferential channel for the country’s imports; this, despite the fact that in comparative terms, Mexico’s export activities can be considered slightly diversified. This data highlights that during the Fox government the interpretation of new economic opportunities related to the US and the implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm replaced the traditional limits that favoured Mexico’s autonomy in the international arena. The new interpretation of the international context and its economic opportunities influenced Mexico’s foreign policy, allowing the Executive to strategically consider the non–permanent seat at the UNSC as an opportunity to increase its importance in the economic and political arena. Nevertheless, both the correspondence between Mexican and US votes at the UN and the respect for Mexico’s autonomy in the international scenario underwent an extremely significant change after the first period of the administration.

The precipitating factor was the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the US, closely followed by the radicalisation of US foreign policy and the institutional debates about the importance of traditional foreign policy principles in the Mexican Congress. The potential risk to Mexican economic opportunities in the US generated huge debate in
Mexico regarding its support for US operations and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Pellicer 2003a, 97; Bondí 2004, 9; Gonzáles González 2001, 663). During the first three years of the Fox administration, Mexico’s aspirations to sign and preserve economic and immigration agreement with the US limited the country’s international activities, imposing particularly cautious strategic calculations. However, the strategic limits imposed by the bilateral economic relationship were not fully able to limit criticism within Mexico; consequently, the refusal to support Mexico’s presence in Iraq was based on the idea of non-intervention and the preservation of Mexico’s international autonomy. New economic opportunities were not considered sufficiently important to Mexican decision-makers to maintain their preference for US international initiatives over traditional principles.

Mexico benefitted economically during this period from the absence of the fiscal crises which had characterised the PRI governments of earlier decades and, as showed in Table 3 of the previous chapter, from a growing trend in GDP which had started in 1996. The impact of Mexico’s economic growth is illustrated in the following graph by the increase in the country’s financial obligations, as imposed by the UN, which ensured Mexico’s status as a major UN contributor after 2000.

![Mexico's financial contributions at the U.N. (2000-2006)](image)

**Table 15** Mexico’s financial contributions to the UN (2000-2006)

*Source:* own elaboration from the United Nations Regular Budget Contributions database.

Taking into account the analytical data and information provided in this sub-section, it is possible to underline the absence of economic constraints with the capacity to limit Mexico’s participation in the UNSC and its participation and support to the Iraq war. In
fact, as shown in Table 15, Mexico’s financial contributions at the UN rocketed precisely in 2003, the year when the Iraq war started, reaching 1.88% of the UN budget. Although these contributions are determined by UN regulations, this type of data, coupled with Mexico’s positive economic trend, further proves the absence of Mexican financial constraints to its multilateral activities. Furthermore, its international pro-activism was also underpinned by other economic factors, such as the fact that Mexico’s budgetary allocation to UN activities did not reduce its financial contributions to other multilateral organisations.

![General Direction for the United Nations’ budget (2000-2003)](chart)

**Table 16 General Direction for the United Nations’ budget (2000-2003)**

*Source: own elaboration from Mexico’s Ministry of Finance databases.*

Yearly budgets illustrated in the graph clearly confirm the absence of economic structural constraints to Mexico’s UN activities. In fact, in addition to the annual increase in the quota allocated to the UN by Mexico, the Foreign Ministry’s ‘General Direction for the United Nations’ expenditure considerably increased the level of funding directed to multilateral activities. According to Table 16, the budget consistently increased exactly between the years 2002 and 2003, in conjunction with Mexico’s attainment of a non-permanent seat the UNSC and the beginning of the Iraq war. Mexico shifted from a contribution of 177,729,990 Mexican pesos (MX$) in 2001, achieving a peak of approximately 300 million MX$ in 2002 and more than 205 million MX$ in 2003. These data sets explain that Mexico’s assessment of and financial
contributions to UN initiatives and programmes were not constrained by its participation in UN activities. They illustrate that respect for Mexico’s role within the UNSC was coherent, as it was in relation to multilateral pro-activity; this respect was supported by the increase of funding for participation.

The analysis of economic limits associated with the presence of political constraints and opportunities for Mexico were differently interpreted by different categories of policy actors. Although these barriers influenced the focus on Mexican foreign policy during the first two years of the Fox government, they did not represent an insuperable limit for its participation in the UNSC or support of the Iraq war. In fact, commercial boundaries imposed by the US were considered sufficiently solid by Congress and constituted an important factor for Mexican decision makers. Therefore, the decisions to participate as non-permanent member at the UNSC and reject the support for the Iraq war were generated by neither the existence of commercial limits related to Mexico’s relationship with the US, nor Mexico’s budgetary restrictions, as proposed by certain political actors (Pellicer 2003a, 93-96). As will be explained in detail in the following section, although Mexican actors did not oppose Mexico’s participation and financial contributions to the UNSC, their strategic calculations were still influenced by political and legislative limits, constantly reflected in the country’s international decisions. The implementation of Mexico’s strategic foreign policy suffered as a result of this double standard. This was particularly apparent during the second half of the Fox administration with regards to support for the Iraq War, where existing political and normative limits influenced actors’ strategic calculations.

4.2. Mexico’s relevant strategic actors in the policy-making process concerning Security Council activities and decisions over the war in Iraq

The last section is necessary to understand how structural possibilities and institutional barriers constrained actors’ strategic calculations analysed in this section determining the existence of strategic selectivities (Jessop 1990, 260); which are able to favour certain changes in foreign policy over others. Only through the exploration of this dynamic of mutual influence is it possible to realise an in depth SR analysis of the processes of change and continuity in foreign policy. The understanding of this
interplay are integrated in Section 4.3 with the mediation of ideas and policy paradigms, providing a complete framework able to respond to RQ2.

The economic and political structural changes that took place in Mexico between the end of the 1980s and the end of the 1990s favoured the re-configuration of foreign policy agents. This process allowed the generation of new sets of actors able to influence the path of Mexico’s international behaviour. Moreover, new strategic selectivities and actors, and the modification of their power within the country, favoured the presence of a new strategic conception of Mexico’s relationship with the US and its role in the multilateral scenario. Research into this new equilibrium of power enabled actors to propose a new foreign policy paradigm in substitution of the traditional Revolutionary paradigm. However, the presence of new actors, illustrated in Chapters One and Two, and the establishment of new power dynamics did not guarantee a stable and efficient change in Mexico’s international attitude, either in the long term, or within each category of actors. In order to explain how these different sets of actors strategically interpreted Mexico’s presence at the UNSC and its rejection of support for the Iraq war, the following sub-sections analyses their strategic positions in light of this process of change, and their influences upon the generation of new strategic selectivities related to the implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm.

4.2.1. The President, the Executive and the Foreign Minister

The focus on presidential foreign policy decisions, typical of PRI governments, and the supremacy of the Executive over the Legislative branch underwent a shift in 2000. While during PRI governments foreign policy decisions gravitated towards the Presidency and its political supremacy, the opening of Mexico’s hegemonic system generated a new equilibrium of power, concentrating on the new Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda and his ideation and implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm (González González 2006, 192). Castañeda was the fundamental promoter of this new set of foreign policy ideas and goals. His vision gave Mexico a new role in the global scenario with the aim of increasing its influence in the international arena (Castañeda 2000b, 334). According to SR analysis, the change of the party in power, the new Mexican context and those interests influenced by the new foreign policy
paradigm favoured the generation of Castañeda’s new strategic calculations. However, these changes had to be internalised by policy makers to take effect.

Mexico’s attainment of a seat at the UNSC and the strengthening of its links with the US were strategically conceived as an alternative to the traditional Mexican international isolationism and an opportunity to develop a leading role in the global arena. The conceptualisation of these new international opportunities was explained within an article by Castañeda on his strategic interpretation of the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm (Castañeda 2001a, 66):

“[…] today, Mexico’s international strategy must focus on the process of change. Our goal is to answer, with congruency and a view towards the future, to national, regional and global transformations, as well as to the mandate of change implicit within Vicente Fox’s electoral victory. We want to guarantee adequate protection and promotion of country’s interests in the contemporary world.”.

Castañeda and the new policy makers that comprised the Executive embodied the new foreign policy paradigm (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 86), their strategic interpretation of the opportunities offered by Mexico’s new international context contrasted with the vision traditionally developed by the PRI and many Mexican intellectuals and opposition parties. These actors considered the new international paradigm goals to be a risk for Mexico’s international autonomy (Pellicer 2003a, 91; Iruegas 2006, 91-93, Pellicer 2003b; Pellicer 2003c), citing that it could be compromised by the economic and political presence of the US. This perception will be discussed in the following sub-sections: 4.2.2. and 4.2.3. In spite of these aversions, the Presidency and the Executive sustained the new foreign policy paradigm supported by Castañeda, sharing the same interpretations of the context. The Foreign Minister’s new institutional opportunities to influence foreign policy, as provided by the new political context, and the joint support of the new foreign policy paradigm enabled the attainment and maintenance of the non-permanent seat at the UNSC between 2002 and 2003 (Fox 2002).

However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US represented a new constraint for the development of Mexico’s international affairs. Homogeneity between the strategic calculations of the Presidency, the Executive and Castañeda regarding Mexican foreign policy was undermined by the probability of the US intervention in Iraq. Whereas the
pre-9/11 international context allowed the coexistence of strategic selectivities favouring Mexico’s special relationship with the US, its autonomy in the international arena and its multilateral pro-activity, the post-9/11 environment imposed a clear choice between them (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 89-93). This meant that in spite of Mexico’s pro-activity in the elaboration of the UNSC resolution 1441 (United Nations Security Council 2002; Pellicer 2003, 96), the government had to re-address its strategies and goals in relation to the new war on terror.

Domestically the debate was intense. On the one hand, the President and the Executive’s strategic interpretations were still influenced by the presence of institutional limits related to the enduring Revolutionary paradigm, for instance the principle of non-intervention. Moreover they were influenced by the internal request of respect for traditional foreign policy principles (Fox Quesada 2003a; Fox Quesada 2003b), the rise of Mexican anti-Americanism and the positions of media, intellectual and public opinion against the Iraq war. Each of these elements favoured strategies in support of the traditional idea of Mexico’s autonomy over its pro-activity. On the other hand, new actors, arisen from Mexico’s economic and political transition, backed the US position and continued pushing Mexican strategies towards the creation of a special relationship with the US (Pellicer 2003, 99-100). The Foreign Ministry struggled to define its strategic vision due to three main limits determined by the contrasting visions existent among these sets of actors. The first reason was related to the undetermined Presidential position. In fact, Fox was concerned by the domestic situation and the imminent mid-term elections (Schiavon 2004, 217). Secondly there was the Executive, which adapted both its interpretation of international principles and its support of those multilateral solutions that traditionally led Mexican foreign policy, and in doing so, accepted the Constitutional constraints (Blix 2006, 8-12; Rozental 2004, 105). Thirdly, foreign minister Jorge Castañeda’s vision remained loyal to the new foreign policy paradigm and the importance given to the migration agenda with the US (Ugalde 2004, 130-131; Kaufman Purcell 2004, 156-157). The Foreign Minister interpreted the event as an opportunity to give strategic moral support to the US in order to favour Mexico’s economic relationship with the country and not compromise one of his foreign policy axes (Interview Rozental; Interview Berruga; Millán 2002).

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66 Interview, Enrique Berruga, 13 July 2011.
68 Interview, Andrés Rozental, 14 April 2011.
Despite the achievement of a UNSC seat and Mexico’s pro-active participation in the process of reform of the UN (that did not undergo excessive domestic limits), the 9/11 attacks generated a great degree of pressure from the US. This pressure modified actors’ interpretations of existing strategic selectivities, producing government hesitation in their support of the US war on terror. However, Castañeda interpreted the context through the lens of the new foreign policy paradigm, which favoured unconditional support to the US operations (Bondí 2004, 76). He considered the limitations imposed by the US as more important than those related to the traditional principles. This interpretation was necessary in order to avoid limiting the countries’ migration agreement and favour Mexico’s economic relations with the US without compromising one of the new foreign policy axes (Castañeda 2001; Millán 2002).

According to the Foreign Minister, the constitutional boundary generated by the non-intervention principle and the defence of the traditional foreign policy approach to the Iraq conflict was “an emphatic, rhetoric and ideological nationalism” (Castañeda 2003). This interpretation contrasts with the contemporary international changes; it does not consider the new structural possibilities that implied a transfer in sovereignty if Mexico had the aim of internationalising its power and role in the global arena.

This shows that the consideration of a monolithic domestic environment does not provide sufficient causal explanations of how changes in foreign policy are realised, as in the case of Mexico’s relations with Cuba and the US (Fernández de Castro and Rozental 2003; Covarrubias Velasco 2003). In fact, different actors alternatively interpret the existent strategic limits and selectivities following different ideas and interacting between each other. For instance, Fox’s strategic calculations were distinct from Castañeda positions and influenced by two contrasting elements. Firstly, by the limits imposed by the deviation of US foreign policy towards its national security, that downgraded its relationship with Mexico, in turn favouring Mexico’s strategies in support to the Iraq War as a compensatory measure (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 89). Secondly, by Congress’ strategic interpretation of the possible risks and retaliations of still-unknown terrorist cells and the Islamic world which favoured Mexico’s non-intervention (Sepúlveda 2003).

In keeping with an SR understanding of the events, traditional interpretations of these limits influenced Fox’s perception of Mexico’s strategic constraints, contributing to the shift towards a strategic selectivity that favoured the preservation of Mexico’s...
autonomy, assuming a position against the US operation in Iraq, and confirming the SRA as a relevant analytical tool. Fox’s partial rejection of the new foreign policy paradigm, reiterating Mexico’s fundamental aim of achieving wider consensus on the UNSC resolution, and curtailing any type of unconditional support to the US (Foreign Ministry 2003), was sustained by Castañeda (Weiner 2002). Different interpretations of institutional limits and opportunities generated friction among members of the Executive, such as the Minister of Internal Affairs, Santiago Creel, and the UN Ambassador, Aguilar Zinser. They aimed to maintain a more moderate position conforming to the traditional constitutional boundaries and in contrast with Castañeda’s strategy.

Consequently, new strategic selectivities based on a traditional interpretation of foreign policy modified the renewed power mechanism that had empowered the Foreign Minister, determining Jorge Castañeda’s resignation in January 2003. His successor, Ernesto Derbez, was more moderate and aligned with the Executive’s understanding of international possibilities and the limits imposed by the Constitution, re-orientating Mexico’s foreign policy towards the traditional foreign policy path (Serrano Carreto 2007, 295). This new vision of Mexico’s strategic selectivities influenced Mexico’s condemnation of the pre-emptive and unilateral US intervention in Iraq which definitively dampened Mexico’s relationship with the US (The Economist 2003b). According to Ugalde (2004, 131):

“The departure of Castañeda symbolized the end of the most recent attempt on the part of Mexico to change the foundation of the bilateral agenda. It concluded a chapter in which Mexican officials, headed by Fox and Castañeda, truly believed that they, as representatives of a newly democratic Mexico, could create a new symmetry between the two countries.”

It implied the rejection of new interests related to the creation of a special relation with the US; these calculations were considered by President Bush and Jorge Castañeda as “a failure to step up to the plate and play the game” (The Economist 2003a). As mentioned in this sub-section, the Executive and the President were also influenced by the positions taken by other strategic actors. In the next section, the position taken by Congress is explored in order to complement this analysis and provide a comprehensive understanding of how a different range of influential
strategic actors interacted with the limits studied in Section 4.1, influencing the presence of strategic selectivities.

4.2.2. Congress and the political parties

In 2000, the modification of institutional boundaries favoured the reduction of the President’s and the Foreign Minister’s foreign policy supremacy and improved the consideration of Congress’ position (González González 2001, 639). Congress and the political parties’ interpretation of the existing context produced diverse results for Mexican foreign policy implementation in the cases of UNSC participation and support for the Iraq war. Although Mexico’s position regarding the invasion of Iraq was influenced by the presence of imminent mid-term elections in 2003, it is important to underline the fact that Congress was not directly affected by the changing composition of its majority. In fact, the invasion of Iraq started on the 19th March 2003, while Mexico’s mid-term elections took place earlier that same month (6th March 2003) with the PRI obtaining their majority at the Chamber of Deputies. This means that the PAN maintained Congress majority at both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies during the period considered in this chapter. Therefore, neither the Senate nor the Chamber of Deputies represented a concrete constraint for Congress’ strategies though their lack of support of the new foreign policy paradigm or contrasts with the Executive. As highlighted by the deputies’ speeches, such frictions were spread among opposition and majority representatives (Cámara de Diputados 2002c, 1726). They were caused by the insufficient consideration of Congress’ role in the matter of foreign policy and its positions on the defence of Mexico’s constitutional foreign policy principles related to the traditional paradigm (Velázquez Flores 2008b, 144-145).

As explained in Section 4.1.1 on political limits, early Congress speeches revealed tensions between Congress and the Foreign Minister, Jorge Castañeda. The Foreign Minister sustained that Mexico’s interests were best served by maintaining a special relationship with the US, respecting the path assumed by the new foreign policy paradigm (Castañeda 2002a, 175-177). Congress, however, supported a more principle-based vision, emphasising the necessity to respect and act in accordance with the boundaries imposed by the Constitution’s enduring foreign policy principles, in order to achieve Mexico’s interests. As a result, Congress strategically supported
Mexico’s traditional neutrality and non-intervention principles in relation to both the Mexican position at the UNSC and its support for Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’. The compromise in favour of peace and multilateralism through the respect of existing constitutional limits was sustained by both governing parties, the PAN and the PVEM (Dirección de Servicios de Investigación y Análisis 2006, 142-145; Cámara de Diputados 2002c, 1726), and the opposition parties, the PRI, the PRD and the PT (Dirección de Servicios de Investigación y Análisis 2006, 211-212; Cámara de Diputados 2001c, 1011-1014; Cámara de Diputados 2002a, 116-120).

However, Foreign Minister Castañeda’s position was conceived by Congress as an imposition and an inaccurate interpretation of Mexico’s possibilities. His aggressive attitude damaged the relationship between the two branches, radicalising the planning of Congress’ strategies based on the respect of constitutional limits (Cámara de Diputados 2000a; Cámara de Diputados 2002h, 23). Although the contrast was generalised, the PRI and the PRD were the most active parties and “they reclaimed a clear definition of the Iraqi war based on foreign policy principles established from the Constitution” (Pellicer 2003a, 98). Strategically assuming this interpretation, Congress underlined Mexico’s compromise, ascribing international peace and security within the traditional foreign policy paradigm (Cámara de Diputados 2002J, 67-70).

An initial agreement between the Foreign Minister, the Executive and the President the strategic opportunity to achieve a non-permanent seat at the UNSC partially modified Congress’ calculations against it, influenced by limits related to traditional constitutional principles. On the one hand, Castañeda believed in the possibility of developing a multilateral agenda without conflict with the US. On the other hand, opposition parties would have accepted Mexico’s presence within the multilateral body so long as its representatives had taken into account the importance of the non-intervention principle and re-asserted the subordination of foreign policy implementation to this principle (Cámara de Diputados 2002b, 117-119). However, when, after 9/11, the US started showing its interest in Mexico’s clear position on the Iraq War, Congress reiterated the necessity to respect the limits imposed by traditional foreign policy principles, in contrast with Castañeda’s declarations of Mexico’s unconditional support to the US. This shows that, for Congress, those traditional limits were still valid and of primary importance with respect to the new foreign policy goals.
The reasoning given by Congress for this strategic calculation was that Castañeda was moving against Mexico’s objective of international autonomy, ceding its sovereignty to the US and betraying the Mexican Constitution’s traditional principles which were set to limit Mexico’s foreign policy. This strategic interpretation influenced members of the Executive and President Fox’s perception of limits and possibilities, which supported Congress’ strategic interpretation of Mexico’s position on the US intervention in Iraq and underlined the necessity to maintain a moderate position, respectful of Mexico’s traditional principles (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 93). However, Mexico’s official position against the US intervention was explained only after the invasion of Iraq, as result of the struggle between different actors’ strategic interpretations. Domestic pressures exercised by Congress (and public opinion) on the Executive, and the sharing of the same perception of constitutional boundaries related to the traditional foreign policy paradigm, produced the strategic rejection of Mexico’s support for Operation ‘Iraqi freedom’ (Bondí 2004, 16).

In sum, Congress’ favourable interpretation of institutional limits enabled Mexico’s participation in the UNSC, without constraining the partial change in the country’s foreign policy. However, after 9/11, Congress re-interpreted the limits constraining its strategic position prioritising the respect of traditional principles and determining a detachment from the initial calculations which had enabled the partial change in foreign policy. This confirms the importance of ideas and the interplay between strategic actors and their different perceptions of structural limits in the evaluation of state policies (Hay 2001, 10/17). The following sub-section explores how institutional limits and Presidential and Executive visions were considered by eminent personalities who sought to constrain the replacement of traditional foreign policy principles.

4.2.3. Eminent personalities

Discussions on the opportunity to support the US invasion of Iraq, with or without the presence of a collective operation authorised by the UNSC, were not circumscribed within political and institutional spheres. Many former eminent Mexican personalities, such as representatives, intellectuals and judges, stood in favour of respect for Mexican foreign policy principles and international law, supporting the UN Inspector’s intervention as the best alternative for Mexico. This set of actors comprised a highly
critical group that publically expressed its concerns regarding the invasion of Iraq in the absence of a clear UN mandate. Eminent personalities expressed their positions in order to influence the President’s and Executive’s visions and decisions. Their actions strategically supported the traditional concept of Mexico’s international role, underlining the importance of foreign policy principles and highlighting the presence of institutional constraints for Mexico’s decision-makers in order to shape the realisation and implementation of the country’s international action.

Concerning Mexico’s presence at the UNSC, one of the most important interventions was the memorandum written at the end of 2000 by Ambassador Manuel Tello (Covarrubias and Muños 2007, 187-191) and delivered to the recently appointed Foreign Minister, Jorge Castañeda. The former Mexican Foreign Minister and Ambassador at the UN strategically interpreted Mexico’s participation at the UNSC as a limit for the achievement of its foreign policy goals and not an “adequate expression of a foreign policy addressed to assume responsibilities at the international level” (Covarrubias and Muños 2007, 190). According to Tello’s vision, limits imposed by the Mexican traditional foreign policy paradigm were still valid and could not be changed without the presentation of a clear alternative. Moreover, he sustained that Castañeda was not promoting a new foreign policy paradigm but merely substituting Mexico’s short-term interests, hence the principles and ideas linked to the traditional project were still valid. Therefore, Tello suggested, the introduction of new foreign policy actors could not be deemed sufficient to replace the traditional paradigm and a real change in Mexican foreign affairs could only be realised in the presence of a radical structural reform alongside the substitution of its principles. However the positions taken by eminent personalities were also spread by other channels.

These positions were expressed by eminent personalities in both institutional and public contexts, making use of their roles and personal relationships with policy makers and politicians (Covarrubias and Muños 2007, 187-191; Navarrete 2001), and publicising their visions in the media and the academic environment (Muñoz Ledo 2002; Supúlveda 2003a; Martínez 2003; Fuentes 2003). Although many intellectuals and former decision-makers supported the traditional legalist vision of Mexico’s international activity, interpretations of the limits and opportunities related to this position were heterogeneous. Declarations of support for Mexico’s participation in the UNSC were favoured by intellectuals who, in 2000, encouraged the “voto útil” (useful

70 Interview, Manuel Tello, 16 April 2008.
71 Ibidem.
promoting a change in the Mexican political structure; this was interpreted as an opportunity for Mexico (Pellicer 2003c). Despite this, positions based on traditional limits acquired importance in the case of the Iraq war (Pellicer 2004, 97).

After Mexico’s attainment of a non-permanent seat at the UNSC through pressure from the transition team and Castañeda, the concept of Mexico’s international proactivity faced the boundary imposed by Mexico’s Constitution regarding non-intervention and self-determination principles. Although political structural changes determined the presence of a group of influential actors (Ai Camp 2011) more flexible to foreign policy changes, this type of alteration was more difficult to implement in the case of the infraction of limits imposed by the principle of non-intervention. Consequently, participation in Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ was not interpreted as an opportunity for Mexico’s eminent personalities. This pattern confirms Jessop’s assertion, through the SRA, that both structure and actors exert reciprocal influences on each other according to the dominant policy paradigm (Jessop 2001b, 1224). The participation in the mission was conceived as a break in the institutional boundary which existed to protect Mexico’s autonomy with respect to the US.

The interpretation of this constraint and the rejection of “Iraqi Freedom” was equally shared by different categories of intellectuals and politicians. On the one hand, who never supported Mexico’s participation in the UNSC (Fuentes 2003; DPA 2003; Iruegas 2006; Navarrete 2001; Covarrubias and Muños 2007, 165-168). On the other hand, those personalities that supported the election of Vicente Fox and collaborated with his transition team: former ambassadors Muñoz Ledo and Olga Pellicer, as well as Mexico’s permanent representative and president at the Security Council, Aguilar Zinser, among others (Pellicer 2006, 127-128; Aguilar Zinser 2002).

Their identification as eminent intellectual and political personalities was used in order to support Congress’ positions against the Iraq mission, contributing to reinforce pressures exercised by Congress and public opinion on the Presidency and the Executive. For this category of actors, formal and informal respect for traditional constitutional boundaries was still effective (Supúlveda 2005, 39-52) and influential, at that time, in the support of international initiatives that could compromise Mexico’s traditional positions in the international scenario. In fact, according to the judge Sepúlveda Amor (2003b, 287) “[Mexico had to implement its foreign policy]

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72 Interview, Andrés Rozental, 14 April 2011; Eduardo Cruz Vázquez (former cultural counsellor at the Mexican Embassy in Colombia), 16 June 2011.

73 Interview, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 27 May 2011.
combining the defence of its principles and the protection of its interest in a harmonic
game”. This reasserts the importance of ideas in the interplay between structural
limits and strategic actors. Hence, the change of party in power did not affect the
strength of traditional principles and their diffusion among eminent personalities. As
asserted by Ambassador Muñoz Ledo, citing the Mexican diplomat Padilla Nervo in an
interview with the author:

“Mexican diplomacy and its foreign policy had got a fundamental aim: counterbalance the
everseous US presence. International law is the only field where Mexico and the US are level. [...]as Padilla Nervo said – the most pragmatic foreign policy is the policy of principles – it should not to be mixed with the issue of the relationship with the United States.”.

Mexican support and participation in Operation ‘Iraqi freedom’ was not sustained by
eminent personalities in Mexico, none of whom supported this foreign policy change.
The solidity and homogeneity of their visions, ascribable within the traditional foreign
policy paradigm, further influenced presidential decisions regarding Mexico’s support
for the unilateral invasion. This focus on strategic actors confirms the necessity,
highlighted by the SRA, to consider how actors exert influence on each other and how
they interact with structural limits influencing their perceptions of structural
selectivities. In fact, despite the presidential uncertainty regarding Mexico’s rejection
of military intervention in Iraq, the interpretation of institutional and political
boundaries was shared by Congress and eminent personalities, influencing Mexico’s
institutional position on this topic. In the following sub-section this analysis is
integrated with the positions held by public opinion, the media and think tanks.

4.2.4. Think tanks, the media and public opinion

As explained in sub-section 3.2.4, new policy makers’ interpretations of power
mechanisms and foreign policy dynamics favoured the approval of transparency rules
(Cámara de Diputados 2002g) and promoted a wider social participation in Mexican
foreign policy-making (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores 2006). At this time, the
debate on Mexico’s participation at the UNSC acquired importance in relation to the
traditional foreign policy principles, but it was developed within intellectual boundaries
that did not widely involve the Mexican public and their opinions. Regardless of whether Mexico’s attainment of the UNSC seat obtained a place in the press (Thompson 2001), the debate was developed thanks to the birth of new think tanks that aimed to provide professional analysis of the risks and opportunities (González González et al. 2006b). It is important to highlight that, in certain cases, members of those think tanks actively collaborated with the transition team, influencing the perceptions of the Executive and Congress regarding existing limits and favouring certain strategic interpretations of the international environment.

After 9/11, Mexico’s popular involvement of public opinion on the Iraq War acquired wider space in the mass media, influencing the Presidential decisions. In particular, this was possible thanks to the realisation of numerous surveys published in national newspapers and commissioned by the Presidency in order to test the popularity of governmental decisions (Consulta Mitofsky 2003a; Consulta Mitofsky 2003b; Basañez and Moreno 2003). The request for and consideration of public opinion on Mexican foreign policy was especially concentrated in the period between 2002 and 2003, and particular attention was given to Mexico’s support for and participation in the Iraq war. The most important published surveys appeared in 2003 in the journal Este País, elaborated by the World Value Survey mentioned in the Chapter Two (Pellicer 2003, 98; Basañez and Moreno 2003), and those elaborated by the polls consultant Consulta Mitofsky which focused on “The war in Iraq” (Consulta Mitofsky 2003a).

The interpretation of these polls indicates that Mexican public opinion was influenced by economic and structural changes, which had determined a shift in its set of ideas and values. In 2000, the WVS (2002) showed that a low percentage of Mexican citizens trusted the multilateral institutions and only 36% of the population had complete belief in the US’ actions. Similarly, according to the data, the Mexican public strongly disagreed with Mexico’s support for and participation in the Iraq war, contrasting with the new foreign policy paradigm. Moreover, this rejection increased from 2002 to the US invasion. The strength of these ideas present among the Mexican population will be analysed in depth in Section 4.3. However, at this point it is important to underline how the public’s interpretation of the Iraq war was able to contribute to the shifting presidential vision of Mexican foreign policy (Schiavon and Velázquez 2010). The presence of traditional, entrenched ideas within Mexican public opinion, which did not match with the idea of international pro-activity, represented a

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74 Interview, Andrés Rozental, 14 April 2011.
75 More information about the survey available at: [www.worldvaluesurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluesurvey.org)
constraint for the implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm. Moreover, the democratic transition and the new role exercised by mass media acquired relevance for the President, the Executive and public opinion, influencing their strategic calculations. This is stressed by the results of Consulta Mitofsky (2003a), according to which the media assumed a relevant role in information sharing, becoming the predominant source of information regarding the possible war and increasing the number of citizens interested in listening to news about the Iraq war by 80%.

The removal of old constraints favoured the presence of new actors but not a new interpretation of existing foreign policy constraints. The analysis of newspaper articles and information broadcast by mass media at the time asserts that most were critical of Mexican support for the Iraq war (Moctezuma Barragán 2003; Millán 2003; Martínez 2003; Garduño and Pérez 2002b). This was in contrast to the earlier period of the administration where the debate over Mexico’s participation in the UNSC was more balanced. Public opinion and the media’s positions influenced the strategies of President Fox and the Executive, mostly because they were concerned about the risk of losing popular consensus in the imminent mid-term elections. They were able to influence governmental strategic evaluations, orientating them towards a more traditionalist interpretation of Mexican foreign policy (Gámez Robeledo 2001, 11; Aridjis 2004) as justified by the new Foreign Minister, Ernesto Derbez, in a radio programme “Fox Contigo” (Fox Contigo 2004a; Fox Contigo 2004b). Decisively, public opinion and the mass media became more influential than the economic limits imposed by the US, according to which, without clear Mexican support, the US would refuse to develop any agreement or special relationship with Mexico (Kauffman Purcell 2004, 157; The Economist 2003a; The Economist 2003b; Krugman 2003; Weiner 2002).

Both the legislative and executive branches used mass media and public opinion to back their positions, exerting pressure in relation to other political actors and influencing the discussion around the UNSC and the invasion of Iraq (Becerril 2002; Becerril, Venegas and Ballinas 2002; Múñoz 2001; Millán 2003). Hence, institutional impediments related to the presence of traditional paradigms in the Constitution were reinforced by this new set of actors, giving solidity to strategic selectivities that favoured Mexico’s international autonomy and the implementation of the principle of non-intervention. Moreover, the change in the political context and the removal of press constraints produced new opportunities for social and political actors to impose
their favoured strategies and ideas (Preston 2002; Weiner 2002). Further, Congress took advantage this new boundaries in order to spread its strategies discrediting Castañeda’s interpretations of constitutional limits elaborated in the new foreign policy paradigm and requesting his resignation (Ballinas and Becerril 2002; Garduño et al. 2002; Garduño Pérez 2002a; Garduño Pérez 2002b; Venegas, Pérez and Garduño 2002; Cortés and Teherán 2004).

In conclusion, the analysis in this section demonstrates that different actors variously considered the absence of economic limits and the presence of traditional and new principles and institutional limits. The interpretation of existing opportunities sustained by Castañeda and the transition team favoured foreign policy change, enabling Mexico’s participation in the UNSC. However, this position underwent a shift when the Mexico’s traditional principles were compromised. These findings confirm the necessity of considering the mutual influences exercised within the time under scrutiny by strategic actors and structurally specific sets of limits and opportunities, confirming the assertions of Jessop’s SRA (2009, 41). The analysis of the reciprocal influence between strategic actors and the strategically selective context highlighted that the interpretation of existent strategic selectivities is deeply influenced by the resistance of certain ideas and policy paradigms, which are explored in the next section, in both the actors’ perceptions and institutional norms, addressing sub-RQ2.

4.3. Dealing with ideas and foreign policy paradigms. Mexico’s non-permanent seat at the UNSC and its interpretation of the Iraq war

As argued in Section 4.2 of this chapter, the presence of ideational elements its necessary for the evaluation of factors that influenced Mexico’s international positions. In 2001, despite an intense debate on the strategic convenience of participating in the UNSC, Mexico had the opportunity to implement a new pro-active idea through securing a non-permanent seat. However, its participation in international activities, such as the invasion of Iraq, was met with a widespread lack of consensus. According to Hay’s interpretation of the SRA (2002, 127), this was due to the persistence of interpretations related to traditional Mexican foreign policy principles and their entrenchment within constitutional boundaries used by decision-makers in order to avoid Mexico’s involvement in the invasion. With the aim of understanding the
differences in the mechanisms that determined Mexico’s participation in the Security Council and its rejection to the Iraq war, contributing to RQ2 and the MRQ, this section will firstly consider Mexico’s acceptance of its pro-active role within the UNSC and will later explore the ideational dynamics generated on the merits of its rejection of the Iraq War.

As explained in Section 2.2.1, after the 2000 elections, despite the general rhetoric accepting the new foreign policy goals proposed by the new administration, traditional principles of self-determination of peoples and non-intervention represented a fundamental limit for the Executive’s implementation of foreign policy goals. Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.2 explain how ideational boundaries, imposed by the constitutional inclusion of the principle of non-intervention, represented a strategic selectivity able to address the conditions for participation in UNSC activities for Mexican legislative actors, and in doing so, implemented a new pro-active goal (Cámara de Diputados 2002b). As shown in the following tables, Mexico’s international pro-activity at the UN was neither contrasted by the Mexican leadership, nor its population. However, it needed to be conciliated with the limited range of possibilities offered by the strategically selective context, influenced by the presence of traditional principles within the Constitution. In fact, according to both categories of actors, the aim of strengthening the UN was considered an important goal for Mexico. These elements indicate a change in actors’ interpretations of Mexico’s international trajectory and explain the opening towards its participation in the UNSC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion on Mexico's international pro-activity</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LEADERS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>agree</td>
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<td>neither of them</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POPULATION</strong></td>
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<td>agree</td>
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<td>disagree</td>
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<td>neither of them</td>
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</table>
Table 17 Opinion on Mexico’s international pro-activity
Source: own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey “Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004”.

![Table 17 Opinion on Mexico’s international pro-activity](chart)

Table 18 Mexican goal: Reinforce the United Nations
Source: own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey “Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004”.

However, according to Basañez and Moreno (2003), one month before Mexico’s participation in the UNSC, the 62% of the population were in support, while the 27% of those interviewed sustained that decisions regarding the maintenance of international peace concerned national governments. These figures indicate that the Fox government was considered responsible for decisions taken in relation to the Iraq issue, implying that even if rhetorical support for Mexican pro-activity was guaranteed by different categories of actors, the concrete actuation of the pro-active idea depended on the domestic interpretation of specific events.
Table 19 Should Mexico be member of the Security Council?


Table 20 International policies should be decided by


In fact, the interpretation of the change in political and structural boundaries as an opportunity for Mexico, which allowed the introduction of a new foreign policy paradigm, was still subject to limits imposed by the constitutional presence of Mexican international principles. Their presence meant that the new foreign policy paradigm was realised only in accordance with short-term interests and initiatives, such as Mexico’s participation in the UNSC. This was due to the absence of a clear long-term Mexican project. The lack of a global strategic plan impeded the convergence of different actors’ strategies within a renewed policy paradigm, weakening both the paradigm and the credibility of those promoting it. This incongruence and the lack of a normative system able to replace existing constitutional boundaries impeded the
coherent implementation of the new international path. Rather, despite the initial positivity of policy makers and the population with regards to the new foreign policy paradigm’s stance on Mexico’s participation in the UNSC, the lack of a long-term, global plan eventually reinforced the traditional paradigm.

The debate which had arisen from the opportunity to participate in the UNSC, the existence of limits determined by US proximity and the imposition of limits to action determined by constitutional principles, assumed a more concrete meaning with the proposed invasion of Iraq. Whereas Mexico’s membership at the UNSC was approved by the Congress, but remained conditional on its respect for traditional principles, Castañeda’s hypothesis of supporting the US invasion was strongly opposed by public opinion and Congress (Cámara de Diputados 2002a, Comisión permanente 2001). Although Mexican support for international pro-activeness was consistent, participation in the Iraq war was not under discussion for either category of actors. Differentiation between the initial launch of the new foreign policy paradigm and the concrete implementation of international strategies was underlined by the persistence of constraints related to the non-intervention principle. The consideration of the traditional foreign policy paradigm as an adequate lens of interpretation determined the establishment of Mexican strategies on the merits of Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’.

Congress’ rejection of the project of reforms discussed in Chapter Three which envisaged the legislative modification of the “Law to keep country neutrality” and the reform related to the departure of national troops abroad highlight the stability of institutional constraints, confirming Hay’s interpretation of the context as discourse-selective (Hay 2002, 212). Applying the same interpretation of the SRA, public opinion and the Legislative branch’s interpretation of the context were mediated by perceptions of traditional foreign principles as still strategically important in the elaboration of Mexico’s international strategies. In fact, according to Basañez and Moreno’s (2003) elaboration of the WVS, 85% of the population believed that Mexico should not participate in the Iraq war. Moreover, according to the same analysis, the percentage of people rejecting Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ increased from October 2002 to February 2003. This progressive increase was confirmed by the Consulta Mitofsky (2003b) surveys quantified in the following table, showing the relevant position against it and confirming the validity of the traditional foreign policy paradigm.
Differently from the PKO’s response analysed in Chapter Three, President Fox did not try to impose the new foreign policy vision but, after a long period of unclear positions, modified his initial stance, formalising Mexico’s opposition to the mission (Bondí 2004, 16). Castañeda and many other entrepreneurs considered this rejection of support to the US as a risk to Mexico’s economy and trade relations with its neighbour (Fernández de Castro and Rozental 2003, 102). The entrenchment of traditional Mexican foreign policy principles in visions belonging to Vicente Fox and important executive actors, such as Santiago Creel and Ambassador Aguilar Zinser, influenced the perception of the context, manipulating the strategies that rejected the invasion of Iraq and the lack of a multilateral approval (Foreign Ministry 2003). Moreover, as analysed in sub-sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, the validity of such principles was also supported by eminent personalities and public opinion, reinforcing Fox’s strategic calculations.

In sum, the replacement of the Mexican foreign policy paradigm did not achieve its conclusive stage due to the presence of entrenched ideas still influencing the foreign policy process and, for the most part, actors’ perceptions of the strategically-selective context. This confirms and supports the application of the SRA and answers sub-RQ2: the necessity of considering different ranges of elements and their interactions in order to understand foreign policy change.

**Table 21 Mexican opinion upon declaration of Iraq invasion**

*Source: own elaboration of data from Consulta Mitofsky (2003b).*
Conclusion

The chapter has applied the SRA, highlighting the mediating role exercised by ideas in the development of Mexico’s international position. The analysis has focused on the case study of Mexico’s participation at the UNSC and its rejection of support for the US-led invasion of Iraq. In answering Sub-RQ2 it underlines the factors that, in the first case, determined the change in foreign policy, while in the case of Iraq, determined a mixed result. Therefore, the understanding of processes of foreign policy change in the literature of Mexico does not provide exhaustive explanations because of the focus on single causal elements or neo-liberal approaches (González González 2001), which neglect the dialectical dynamics developed between different factors. The chapter illustrated the necessity of considering the coexistence and the mutual influences among the different elements studied in order to exhaustively explain the processes of foreign policy continuity and change, in answer to sub-RQ1 and sub-RQ2.

The application of the SRA to Mexico’s rejection of the Iraq war and its activities within the UNSC elucidates how and why such processes of change in foreign policy can generate different results in spite of the presence of same new and shared goals, answering RQ2 and contributing to the MRQ.

Researching the incongruences present between the initial implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm with Mexico’s participation in the UNSC and its final rejection, the chapter has highlighted the existence of strategic selectivities that influenced the implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm. On the one hand, economic selectivities did not constitute an insurmountable limit for either the implementation of innovative foreign policy goals, or actors’ strategic implementation. On the other hand, political selectivities still endured the influence of the traditional foreign policy paradigm, representing institutional and political boundaries considered still valid by the vast majority of strategic actors. Hence, the study analysed those power dynamics present among the different categories of actors individuating: how they faced the existing political domestic and international conditions and how these processes economically limited the range of actors’ strategic options. As a final point, the chapter considered the diffusion of ideas composing the considered policy paradigms. They were categorised as ‘in favour’ or ‘against’ Mexico’s international activities considered within this case study. Moreover, they were analysed in light of the
evaluation of the transformation of conjunctural political and economic strategic selectivities and the implementation of actors’ strategic behaviours.

The outcomes of this chapter show that ideas belonging to the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm where differently applied in the two different cases present in this chapter. Contributing to RQ2, Mexico’s participation in the UNSC was the country’s response to the application of the idea of Mexican pro-activity, whilst remaining conditional on the respect of traditional principles. Conversely, the second case, demonstrates that foreign policy principles related to the PRI foreign policy paradigm remained influential in the interplay among the different elements considered and were inherent in Mexico’s rejection of support for the Iraq War. The sustained presence of these principles was due to their entrenchment within the Mexican normative system, as well as support for their interpretations of Mexico’s international activities by Congress, the Executive, the media and public opinion, determining a condition useful to answer the MRQ. The research on these related Mexican international decisions concerning the UNSC and the Iraq war underlines the presence of a double twist in the evolution of Mexican foreign policy, produced by the lack of a clear new foreign policy paradigm projected into the long term, but still influenced by traditional principles. The changing trade-off among new and old strategic actors allowed only a limited acceptance of the initial and partial implementation of new foreign policy ideas, still not completely rooted in Mexico’s strategic selectivities, representing a condition for change.
CHAPTER FIVE

Mexico’s strategic interpretation of international promotion and defence of human rights

Introduction

This is the last empirical chapter which aims to contribute to the answer to the RQ and MRQ that have driven the entire thesis. In this chapter, these questions will be addressed, producing an organic vision of how certain analytical factors were more important than others in the implementation of Mexico’s concrete actions in the matter of HR, responding to sub-RQ2. In order to respond to this question two more empirical cases have been analysed. The first underlines a total failure in the implementation of peacekeeping participation inserted among new foreign policy ideas. The second case shows a mixed result that allowed the partial realisation of Mexico’s participation in the UNSC. Also in this chapter, Mexican foreign policy evolution will be studied using the SRA. In the light of Mexico’s history, and according to this approach, the presence of concrete HR ideas and a new policy foreign paradigm were able to influence a shift in existing strategic selectivities and, at the same time, generate the shift in ideas endorsed by influential actors that produced the change in Mexican foreign policy in the matter of HR.

This case study constitutes an evident and recognisable important change in Mexico’s promotion and defence of HR, both domestically and internationally. In the opinion of specialist observers HR have been ‘the Fox administration’s major foreign policy shift’ (Bondì 2004, 25). This change allows differences with the two other chapters to be stressed, underlining the presence of certain dynamics absent in previous empirical case studies. It considers how Mexico’s attitude towards HR can be placed in relation to the traditional vision of international and domestic rights, influenced by the presence of precise foreign policy principles. Particular importance is given to the explanation of how the shift of domestic actors and strategic selectivities were influenced by the entrance of new ideas that successfully allowed the implementation of a new conception of the international promotion HR. In section 5.1 I focus on the
investigation of political and economic limits which influenced the formation of strategic selectivities favouring the change of Mexican foreign policy in the matter of HR. In the section 5.2, the influence of a heterogeneous set of actors with different conceptions of HR are considered in order to explain their interpretation of previously explained structural changes and the generation of strategic selectivities. The last section examines the presence of new and traditional ideas related to HR and to the change of foreign policy paradigm.

5.1. Mexico’s international promotion of HR. The presence of old and new political, institutional and economic limits influencing strategic selectivities

HR have been considered to be one of the most important changes in Mexican foreign policy. In order to understand how this change came about it is necessary to explore one of the core factors of Jessop’s SRA theorisation: strategic selectivities. It is important to underline how strategic selectivities, strategic actors and policy paradigms are not able to influence, *per se*, a foreign policy path. Rather, they should be considered in concomitance to the presence of strategic actors and ideas (Jessop 2001, 23-24), studied in sections 5.2 and 5.3. Contributing to the response to sub-RQ2 and RQ2, the first subsection will analyse how the generation of new institutional and political conditions, favourable to the development of more proactive human rights policies, was essential for the implementation of a new foreign policy path in this field. Sub-section 5.1.2 explores how new institutional boundaries modified the transition team’s conception that the matter needed guaranteeing by the political approval of a dedicated budget. It will also examine how the existence of trade aspirations relating to the US favoured the promotion of HR within Mexican foreign policy. The way this influenced the actors’ strategic visions will be explained in section 5.2., which will examine the idea that the most important change involved Mexico’s relationship with Cuba and HR, representing the clearest example of Mexico’s internationalisation of its HR policies. For these reasons, relations between the two countries, and their relations within the UN, will be considered representative of the change, in this section and within the entire chapter.
5.1.1. Mexico’s political boundaries and the opening to the promotion of HR

The democratisation of the country and the presence of new political and social actors, who did not aim to protect the internal system, allowed the integration of human rights to be included among Mexico’s foreign policy goals, relating Mexico’s international aims to its internal situation on the matter. In the government principles of non-intervention and respect of national sovereignty “lost importance in favour of the support to a democratic system, included at the interregional level” (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 636). Different international interpretations of the traditional foreign policy paradigm helped the introduction of a wider discussion on HR, previously considered difficult to face because it would be risky for the integrity of the domestic system that had similar problems and could easily be attacked.

The generation of a new foreign policy paradigm allowed the transformation of Mexico’s domestic and international structures. In fact, in order to propose the idea of a new Mexican state, able to became an international supporter and implementer of HR, internal changes were required. This issue has been underlined in the Human Rights National Programme (Poder Ejecutivo Federal de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2002, 25-39) elaborated by Fox’s government, highlighting that principles of HR comprehensiveness and interdependence require simultaneous implementation both at the international level, but also within state structures and institutions. The intention to give strength to political ideas relating to the implementation of HR principles was conveyed through the realisation of structural reforms, which modified the structure of Mexican institutions in consideration of the presence of HR in Mexican politics, and introduced new actors within the traditional structure of power. The following paragraphs will examine these changes.

One of the central points of Fox’s HR national programme stated that Mexico’s commitment to their protection and defence should not be subordinate to other interests. The explication of this idea represented an innovative interpretation of existing strategic selectivities that defined Mexican foreign policy as the function of the legitimisation and protection of the PRI, generating an impetus for change. According to Bondì (2004, 25) HR represented the most important foreign policy shift during the Fox government, and indeed it was. It is significant that during the first
two years of the administration, 98 out of 150 editions of the Diary of Debates of the Chamber of Deputies included HR mentions, topics, or discussions. This shows that two thirds of the Deputies’ debates included HR. However, structural selectivities relating to the possibility of improving Mexico’s commerce with the US, and the persistence of constitutional limits and traditional principles that historically underpinned Mexico’s relationship with Cuba, slowed down Mexico’s active involvement during last years of administration. Initially, consistent changes revolutionised Mexico’s traditional foreign policy practice. The principle of national sovereignty, considered fundamental until 2000, became secondary with respect to the protection of HR, allowing the removal of existing institutional barriers, and producing a “discursive environment” (Hay 2002, 209). Moreover, HR rose among top priorities for Mexico, ceasing to be an internal issue on which other international actors could not intervene.

As first signal of opening up, the Executive established a cooperation agreement with the office of the United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and a research commission for state reform, which start working on 21st August 2000. Three months later the commission presented its work which suggested the removal of existing institutional boundaries which limited the development of the new political project and, consequently, the new foreign policy paradigm. The final document underlined that Mexico had a duty to integrate within its normative system its international commitments in favour of HR. This goal was also shared by the President, who used as a strong suit the concept of ‘government of change’ (Muñoz Ledo 2004).

Nevertheless, state reform implementation faced major difficulties due to the existence of many bureaucratic barriers and the absence of strong Executive support, which interpreted the reform as a strong constraint on its political initiatives. Its co-ordinator, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, was appointed ambassador in Europe and physically separated from the reform. Not until 2005 was the initiative refreshed, thanks to the National Association for the State Reform, promoted by the same Muñoz Ledo (Cámara de Diputados 2005d), but it remained an apparent initiative. However, numerous institutional initiatives were implemented apart from the state reform “in

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77 Author’s analysis made taking into account the period between 12th September 2000 and 12th September 2002, 150 Diaries of Debates published during those years and discussions or relevant mentions to human rights by Mexican Deputies during their speeches. Used official material available at: http://www.diputados.gob.mx Last seen: 22 November 2013.
78 Interview, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 27 May 2011.
order to establish a state policy in the field of HR able to guarantee the participation of every institution involved” (Poder Ejecutivo Federal de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2002, 40). Moreover, as asserted by the Undersecretary to HR: “proposals and warnings coming from by new [for Mexico] actors operating in the HR field were received and considered.” It shows how new ideas favoured the modification of institutional limits, allowing the consideration of new actors and strategies, as sustained by the SRA (Hay 2002, 130).

Such activities were implemented thanks to an important structural change that provided an institutional opening necessary for the defence and protection of HR both domestically and abroad. A new foreign department entirely dedicated to HR was opened, and Mariclaire Acosta, a former member of the PRD and an expert of HR who collaborated with the transition team, was appointed to manage it. Acosta was firstly chosen as special Ambassador for HR, and subsequently appointed as Undersecretary to HR and Democracy at the Foreign Ministry, with direct responsibility to implement the new foreign policy agenda. The necessity to modify her charge was determined by PRI’s protests, which arose at the Congress (Chacón 2002, 104). In fact, the PRI underlined the existence of legislative boundaries ignored by the Executive (Becerril 2001a).

In order to move around this obstacle, and as demonstration of the importance of the HR and the pro-activity of its new foreign policy paradigm, the government decided to create a new Undersecretary to the Foreign Ministry, removing the existing limits on the implementation of its foreign affairs. This helps to answer sub-RQ2, by showing that the structure is not automatically self-reproducing but can privilege certain strategies and actors over other (Jessop 2008, 33). These ideas were conveyed by the institutional involvement of new actors (which will be studied in section 5.2), moving political and institutional barriers traditionally limiting HR (Rozental 2004, 92). However, ideas carried by Derbez, the new Foreign minister since 2003, were dissimilar with respect to those elaborated by the transition team. They generated a different interpretation of institutional boundaries and political opportunities,

79 The most important initiatives concern, on one hand, the extradition of the former Argentine military Miguel Cavallo, and on the other hand, the creation of a truth commission charged with investigating the violation of human rights and disappearance and homicide perpetrated by state authorities during the Seventies. However, according to Kate Doyle, at the end of the government many of these documents disappeared or they were not accessible. According to Doyle they were concealed (Doyle 2006a; Doyle 2003).

80 Interview, Mariclaire Acosta, 24 June 2011.
determining a strong change in Mexican foreign policy path and the removal of the
new Undersecretary of Democracy and Human Rights (NK 2003).

According to the foreign policy goal relating to the development of a higher pro-active
involvement with international organisations, Mexico demonstrated more interest
regarding the agreement with the OHCHR, differentiating itself from the PRI’s foreign
policy. New governmental actors encouraged a new position, in contrast to the
traditional principle of national sovereignty which traditionally led Mexican foreign
policy, conceiving “human rights as universal and absolute values” (Castañeda
2001c). Therefore, this interpretation of Mexican priorities favoured the removal of
traditional institutional barriers which impeded international organisations from
operating on Mexican state affairs, as confirmed by Vicente Fox at the UN (2001):

“Mexico firmly implement defence and promotion of human rights and
democracy, every time and everywhere, starting from its own territory.
[...]create favourable conditions to promote a constitutional reform”.

This empirically confirms the SRA concept that policy changes have to be considered
from a dual perspective, structural and agential, considering the forms of ideational
domination (Jessop 1990, 259). It will allow to fill the gap present in the literature,
mostly focused on bureaucratic institutions or relations between Mexico and Cuba
(Hernández-Rodríguez 2003; Covarrubias Velasco 2003), explaining causational
dynamics behind this process. Mexico’s OHCHR agreement had the aim of favouring
both domestic and international changes in Mexico’s attitude towards HR and, helps to
readdress internal structural issues, trying to balance its international pro-activity to
Mexico’s HR status. Traditional formal and informal barriers that forbade international
monitoring within Mexico’s territory were removed, representing an opportunity for a
more direct Mexican involvement in the international arena.81 The creation of this type
of agreement was interpreted, especially by the foreign minister Jorge Castañeda, as
an opportunity to improve Mexico’s image abroad and to stress its new democratic
status (Castañeda 2002b; Cámara de Diputados 2003).

This general vision permitted the Executive to shift strategic selectivities, allowing the
presence of the OHCHR in Mexico and the elaboration of a report on the HR situation
within the country (OHCHR 2003). In the light of numerous HR violations identified in
the country, the same report (OHCHR 2003: VII-IX) recommended the inclusion of HR

81 Interview, Mariclaire Acosta, 24 June 2011.
within the Mexican Constitution, and the completion of the ratification of international instruments. According to this connection between internal and international policies, and the interrelation between foreign policy and democracy, the Executive could realise institutional changes that influenced the creation of new Mexican strategic selectivities. It determined the modification of the existing pattern, which privileged Mexico’s international autonomy and the respect of principles of self-determination of people and national sovereignty. The process championed the improvement of Mexico’s image abroad by legitimising the new government, generating a dynamic which privileged the new foreign policy paradigm and the related national-popular project.

HR collected a wide consensus within both Mexican and international society. However, the implementation of structural normative changes faced some difficulties. On the one hand, the governmental vision of priorities faced Legislative’s perplexities. In spite of the agreement on the importance of HR (Cámara de Diputados 2002a), opposition parties at the Congress did not approve sufficient changes in the Mexican domestic system, due to the lack of their involvement in the process (Bondi 2004, 29; Becerril 2001b). However, in August 2001, a constitutional reform introduced the right of non-discrimination among its constitutional norms (Cámara de Diputados 2003). On the other hand, the resignation of Castañeda imposed a less innovative foreign policy vision carried by Derbez. This new approach lost the emphasis on HR, breaking the link that had been created between domestic and international paradigm, transferring the management of HR from the Foreign Ministry to the Home Office, and dismantling the Undersecretary for Human Rights and Democracy (Aguayo 2010, 540-542). Nevertheless, Mexico’s activity in matters of HR during Fox’s government was outstanding in comparison to previous administrations. As shown in the following graph, its institutional activity rocketed during the first term of the Fox administration, and during 2002 reached peaks never before achieved.
Table 22 Mexico’s ratified HR instruments

*Source:* own elaboration from National Supreme Court of Justice data and OHCHR ‘Diagnóstico sobre al situación de los derechos humanos en México’.

Among Mexico’s most important activities it is possible to include the active promotion of a UN resolution, which underlined the necessity to respect HR in a state’s actions against terrorism, and its intention of ratification of the International Criminal Court (ICC) statute (International Criminal Court 2003). These changes would not have been possible without the different political context offered by the new democratic configuration. This was reflected in the Senate approval (denied until December 2002) of a constitutional amendment necessary to ratify the ICC statute, although the government had to face Chamber of Deputies resistance due to the re-assertion of traditional principles of national sovereignty. In spite of this structural limit, governmental activities within the ICC were frequent, and the Senate approved them (Bondì 2004, 37-38). However, Mexican international pro-activity on the topic of HR, and the rejection of its traditional principle of national sovereignty and self-determination of people, generated many frictions with Cuba, a relationship which had traditionally been friendly and collaborative.

Mexico’s relationship with Cuba was one of the reasons for the reiteration of existing institutional limits and party ideological resistances in the matter of the implementation of HR. For opposition parties the respect of constitutional principles was essential, and the Congress had to maintain the role of guarantor of Mexican
institutional foreign policy principles (Becerril 2001b). Traditionally, the application of constitutional principles represented the boundary for Mexican foreign policy implementation, and it was used to maintain a steady relationship with Cuba thanks to the proximity of ideas underpinning their political projects (Becerril, Ballinas and Aponte 2001; Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 628). The presence of these institutional barriers became explicit in 2001, at the moment when Congress had to approve a OHCHR resolution which condemned the situation of HR in Cuba (Commission on Human Rights 2001). Both Chambers refused to allow the Executive to vote in favour of the resolution, agreeing to express an abstention at the OHCHR in Geneva (Cámara de Senadores 2001; Cámara de Diputados 2001b).

As analysed in section 5.2, despite this, part of the PAN and many other actors continued to sustain Mexican international pro-activity and the change of Mexican foreign policy paradigm, supporting the vote on favour of the OHCHR resolution. Congress decided to impose existing institutional limits, a decision determined by the interpretation of existing foreign policy principles as a guarantor of mutual respect and traditional friendship between Mexico and Cuba. The PRI justified its position at the Chamber of Deputies, asserting that traditional principles

"[...]strengthen parliamentary diplomatic links, considering them the adequate mechanism of dialogue between friend nations that consider international cooperation, especially on HR, as an activity based on principles of objectivity and justice, but selectivity.” (Cámara de Diputados 2001b).

Positions against the vote were preponderant within the Foreign Relation Commission, imposing on the Executive the abstention in defence of the maintenance of Mexican foreign policy within the boundaries imposed by the Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution (Becerril 2001b). The vote at the Congress was unanimous and justified by the idea that Executive’s position in favour of the OHCHR resolution was imposed by the US, which wanted Mexico’s support. They had regard to the possibility of Mexico compromising the economic and special relation with the US, and the implementation of Castañeda’s immigration agreement with the country, promoted by the new foreign policy. However, Congress considered the US influence related to this goal as dangerous for the persistence of Mexico’s national autonomy (Becerril, Ballinas and Aponte 2001), interest related to the old foreign policy paradigm.
Mexico’s abstention was justified at the OHCHR due to absence of equal treatment for states considered within the resolution. The consideration was supported by the Mexican Ambassador in Cuba, Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, who sustained that this decision could raise Mexico to the position of mediator between Cuba and the US.\(^{82}\) The Mexican government underlined its respect for the Commission’s role and its concerns regarding the situation of HR in Cuba. However, Undersecretary Mariclaire Acosta specified that, although “Mexico took into account intellectuals and Congress declarations, they [the Executive] was not permitting, nor in that moment, neither in the future, to receive political pressure from anybody” (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 639). This position highlighted the presence of informal and institutional limits able to put at risk the realisation of the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm and the heterogeneity of structural selectivities considered by different categories of actors. The abstention on an issue involving Cuba and the respect of HR on the island drew a demarcation line between traditional and new foreign policy ideas. Moreover, differences between the Congress and the Executive were fed by previous events concerning the support of Mexico’s new political actors for Cuban dissidents that were interpreted as an opportunity for differentiation with past governments (Aponte 1999; Becerril 2001c).

Traditionally, an informal agreement between Cuba and Mexico determined the shape of the relationship. On the one hand, it envisaged Mexican non-intromission regarding Cuban dissidence and a mutual friendship, through Mexican support of Cuba within international organisations., respecting the traditional principle of self-determination and protection of Cuba’s government. On the other hand, it included Cuban defence of Mexico’s domestic system, and the non-exportation of Cuban revolution to Mexico, in order to protect the stability of Mexico’s government (Chabat 2009, 7). According to this agreement differences between the countries should remain in the private and diplomatic sphere.\(^{83}\) These informal limits and interests were broken by the Fox government which, since 2000 with the mediation of Aguilar Zinser started receiving and listening Cuban dissidents, questioning HR status in Cuba (Cámara de Diputados 2000b; Cámara de Senadores 2000). Cuba considered this meeting as non-friendly behaviour. While the transition team interpreted the democratic change as a shift of structural constraints. It considered that in spite of traditional Mexican positions against the US embargo, Cuba’s HR condition should not be ignored or interpreted, in

\(^{82}\) Interview, Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, 10 May 2011.  
\(^{83}\) Ibidem.
the light of traditional foreign principles, as institutional barriers to its international affairs and the new foreign policy interests (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 635). However, what Mexico’s transition team interpreted as an opportunity to highlight Mexico’s new status in the international arena, was conceived by Cuba as overshooting consolidated and respectful boundaries (Guerra 2001; Guerra Cabrera 2001).

The appointment of a left-leaning personality, named Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, as Mexico’s ambassador in Cuba was considered by Fox as a re-assertion of traditional institutional boundaries able “to mend the deteriorate relation with the island”. 84 However, this strategic position was not interpreted by Castañeda’s team as a structural limit that had to confirm existing boundaries in Mexico’s relationship with Cuba in order to maintain balance in the relationship existing among traditional political forces. Rather, Castañeda favoured the change of power dynamics relating to the conception of traditional boundaries, privileging the creation of new opportunities relating to HR. This change favoured the creation of new strategic selectivities that championed Castañeda and new actors’ interests relating to the renewal of Mexico’s image in the international arena, its relationship with the US, and its pro-activity.

The shift of strategic selectivities and the concept of HR as an opportunity to realise a change in Mexico’s foreign policy is confirmed by positions internationally implemented by the new Executive beginning in 2001. In fact, although the Congress rejected the Executive position in favour of a OHCHR resolution against Cuba, imposing the presence of constitutional limits to the vote, votes realised in 2002, 2003 and 2005 showed a different result. The presence of traditional foreign policy principles within the Constitution, and negative Cuban reactions regarding Mexico’s interference on the condition of HR in the island, ceased to represent an obstacle for the implementation of the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm. In fact, for the first time in its history Mexico voted at the OHCHR for a resolution in favour of concerns on Cuban situation of HR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2002).

The governmental refusal to accept political limits traditionally imposed on Mexico’s relationship with Cuba generated an irremediable break in the relationship (Cortés and Teherán 2004) and a clear signal of change from PRI’s traditional international approach. Mexico’s votes at the OHCHR, supported by the Executive, represented the most evident change of institutional and political limits and strategic selectivities (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 643; Cámara de Diputados 2002a). It is especially

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84 Ibid.
significant because, also in this case, Mexican Congress suggested to continue applying traditional principles in defence of national sovereignty and against its alignment to the US (Cámara de Diputados 2002d; 2002e; 2002f).

The Mexico-Cuba diplomatic crisis, which developed between 2001 and 2002, was determined by the sudden shift of Mexico’s foreign policy paradigm and the removal of informally agreed barriers. It gradually generated changes in the interpretation of existing constitutional and informal limits for Mexico. Subsequently, the Executive allowed other state bodies to implement strategies previously considered inappropriate, reproducing the double internalisation process theorised by the SRA (Jessop 2008, 42). For instance, the Monterrey gate (Rozenal 2004, 94) inherent in Fox’s imposition to Fidel Castro to leave the UN Summit on financing for development (held in Monterrey in March 2002) before Bush’s arrival, underlines the removal of traditional political boundaries that aimed to preserve Mexico’s relationship with Cuba.

Therefore, the 2000 electoral result and the strategic vision of the new political class determined an interpretation of existing structural limits that influenced the renewal of strategic selectivities favouring the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm in matters of HR. The traditional consideration of institutional limits remained valid for only a small number of actors, and the powerful role acquired by the Executive allowed it to overstep them. This strategy generated a reinforcement of new strategic selectivities, favoured by the new transition team and the Executive, due to the presence of new international actors for Mexico, and in the OHCHR and NGOs monitoring the HR situation within the country. Moreover, this condition was determined by US proximity and international collaboration, which constituted an essential economic boundary for Mexico’s international aspirations.

**5.1.2. Economic limits and opportunities for Mexico’s activities on HR**

As explained in sub-section 4.1.2, the evolution undergone by Mexico in the economic and trade field deeply influenced the opening of its foreign policy, which started being considered as a relevant way of promoting the Mexican economy. In the 1990s international pressures attached Mexico’s economic partnership with the European Union to its attainment of democracy. This condition limited Mexico’s economic
opportunities in the international arena by the existence of a ‘democratic clause’ that was not accepted by Mexico, due to the belief that these type of constraints constituted a rejection of its traditional foreign policy principles of non-intromission and self-determination.\(^{85}\) Mexico’s democratisation opened up new possibilities for the country by allowing it to ratify the clause and implement the agreement. Similarly, Mexico’s support for US positions which backed the improvement of HR conditions in Cuba could favour the strengthening of the economic relations between the two countries, and the implementation of new foreign policy goals, contributing to explain how and why Mexico’s positions in the matter of HR underwent a deep change compared to past governments. This section will complement the study of political and institutional limits with the consideration of the economic constraints and opportunities that influenced the presence of strategic selectivities favouring the support of HR.

The necessity of achieving new foreign policy goals relating to the implementation of HR, both in Mexico and abroad, and Mexico’s pro-activity, were influenced by the US geopolitical position and Mexico’s aspiration to a special partnership, at both economic and multilateral level.\(^{86}\) The international protection of HR, and Mexico’s positions taken in their defence, was implemented according to the new interpretation of structural constraints and influenced by the change of political and economic context. On the one hand, they were perceived in the light of the priority given to the relationship with the US. It became an incentive to Mexico’s promotion and defence of HR, being able to influence Mexico’s strategic calculations. New Mexican strategic actors, as the transition team, believed that Mexico’s international pro-activity could be perceived, in the matter of HR, as an opportunity to promote US traditional accusations against Cuba, favouring the special relationship and improving its international image. On the other hand, according to Congress and domestic critique, this interpretation of the economic opportunities limited Mexico’s independence in the implementation of its international strategies.\(^{87}\) It jeopardised the traditional principle of Mexican international autonomy in favour of US interests (Bondi 2004, 36).

\(^{85}\) The ratification of the ‘Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement’ with the European Union is dated 1998, and it came into force from 2000 (European Union Press Release 3 July 2007). The agreement was accepted thanks to the ratification of the ‘democratic clause’ previously refused by Mexico. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that Mexico, in the final part of the agreement, included a declaration of its foreign policy’s traditional principles, which became the basis for its relations with the European Union. More detailed information in the European Community’s document (2000).

\(^{86}\) Interview, Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, 10 May 2011.

\(^{87}\) Interview, Mariclaire Acosta, 24 June 2011.
Executive attention given to Cuban dissidents, and the diplomatic problem generated by the triangulation between Fox, Castro and Bush in the Monterrey-gate (mentioned in sub-section 5.1.1), indicated that the Executive did try, to variable extent, to privilege Mexico’s relations with the US. This vision downgraded Mexico’s traditional international affairs approach, favouring the implementation of new ideas in the matter of HR to the detriment of traditional foreign policy principles. However, this approach allowed for the removal of domestic economic and institutional barriers to the defence and protection of HR. Mexico’s domestic budget was influenced by the idea that domestic and international implementation of HR could be an opportunity to assume a clearer position in the international scenario, reinforcing its democratic status and improving Mexico’s image abroad (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 637). The conception that Mexico had to link its HR promotion to the obtainment of international recognition of its new status produced an extraordinary increase in the Foreign Ministry budget addressed to HR. As the following table shows, during the first three years of Fox’s government the Mexican Foreign Ministry’s HR budget rocketed, economic resources exponentially increased by almost 1000% from 2000 to 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HR Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.182.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.046.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11.861.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>21.360.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23 Mexico’s HR budget
*Source*: own elaboration from Mexico’s Ministry of Finance databases.
In 2002, the increasing Mexican Foreign Ministry budget availability was justified by the presence of a specific goal within the Ministry of Finance programmatic analysis (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 2002). International HR activities were not limited by economic resources assigned to the Foreign Ministry for this field. According to the programmatic analysis, Mexico’s promotion and strengthening of democracy and HR were the essential basis for the creation of a new international system where Mexico could develop a renewed role. The evolution of this idea, related to the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm, was supported, not only in political terms, but also by a wider financial availability. Accordingly, new government earmarking of financial resources for HR permitted the creation of domestic projects and, especially, the improvement of Mexico’s international pro-activity.

Despite the existence of political limitations on the domestic development of HR policies, the Executive strategically gave great relevance to this topic within the Foreign Ministry. Hence, economic changes realised in the Mexican budget were strategically used in order to propel the realisation of the new foreign policy paradigm. In fact, even though Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) acquired full autonomy from the Executive in 1999, imposing constitutional limits to the power of the Executive branch (Human rights watch 2008, 14), the increase of its budget helped the implementation of new foreign policy ideas.

Table 24 CNDH net expenses on accrual basis
The graphs above show a domestic parallel increase with respect to the budget approved by the Ministry of Finance for international HR activities, which were designated to the monitoring of HR practices (Human rights watch 2008, 15). They were used by the Executive to strategically justify the change in its international approach to HR, and the distance travelled from traditional principles of national sovereignty and self-determination. Fox’s government interpreted the intertwining of domestic and international activities as necessary for the implementation of international goals relating to HR. This interpretation of Mexico’s priorities favoured the removal of still existing economic barriers to the institutional development of HR, favouring the creation of new strategic selectivities that championed the new government’s international proactivity and the improvement of its image abroad. It indicates how new ideas were able to modify the interpretation of economic constraints.

Mexico’s support for HR was not constrained by the presence of institutional or economic limits, but the importance of its relationship with the US and the creation of new specific bodies, such as the Undersecretary for HR. The possibility of attracting foreign investments in the country, especially from the US, encouraged Mexico’s international pro-activism in favour of HR, due to the increasing economic
interdependence with the US (De Castro and Rozental 2003, 108). The idea that HR are universal, and superior to other sets of principles traditionally supported by Mexico, favoured Mexico’s approach to the US in matters of trade and immigration agreements. It contributed to influence new actors’ strategies, which will be examined in the next section, limiting the traditional friendly relationship with Cuba. In fact, Executive actions in favour of HR that involved multilateral judgments on Cuba sparked an intense domestic debate. According to Mariclaire Acosta “a big part of Mexican diplomats considered that every multilateral bodies’ declaration on the topic of HR was a US imperialist manipulation” \(^{88}\) and that economic benefits could not replace traditional principles, as will be analysed in depth in the last section of this chapter.

The explanation of how recently modified boundaries influenced old and new actors’ international behaviours is omitted by studies on the neo-liberalisation of the country focusing on Mexico’s relationship with the US and Cuba (Babb 2002; Fernández de Castro 2003; Morton 2003; Morton 2013). Its understanding allows to bridge the gap exploring how the double internalisation process determined the interaction between these elements. Taking into account these changes next section explores how actors’ interpretation of these limits, influenced the process of change in Mexico’s foreign policy in relation to HR, and which conditions for changes were present, responding to the MRQ and RQ2.

5.2. **Mexican relevant strategic actors in matter of HR**

Following an SR analysis, the investigation of structural opportunities pursued in section 5.1 is now considered in order to understand how their presence influenced the generation of new strategic selectivities that favoured actors’ strategic calculations supporting HR, addressing sub-RQ2 and RQ2. This reconsideration of strategic selectivities and the presence of new actors provides the opportunity for different strategic actors “to realize their [new] interests pursuing specific strategies” (Jessop 1990, 268), producing what Jessop defines as a “structurally oriented strategic calculation” (Jessop 2001, 1224). The comparison of the influence exercised by actors in the case of HR, with the other case studies, is necessary in order to highlight

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\(^{88}\) Interview, Mariclaire Acosta, 24 June 2011.
whether the shift of actors and their interpretations were determinant in the implementation of change, providing the final elements necessary to respond to the MRQ.

The change in the balance of power among existing actors allowed the reinforcement of the presence of new international requests, directing Mexico towards the strategic pursuing of new foreign policy interests and strategies and an innovative vision of HR. Moreover, the democratisation of the country, and the removal of previous structural limits, gave political space to the social actors and NGOs, which had traditionally been unable to influence Mexico’s international path with their visions (Rozental 2004, 92). Previously, their presence was not legitimated by PRI governments that maintained total control of the supervision of HR (Human rights watch 2008, 14), considering the NGOs attempt at influence to be a risk to the stability of the domestic political system and the maintenance of its status quo. Relevance given to the new actors and new structurally orientated strategic calculations favoured the introduction of new long-term interests in matter of HR, influential in the change of Mexico’s international strategies that replaced those relating to the traditional foreign policy paradigm. However, the presence of new ideas was not unanimously shared among Mexican actors. Strategic decisions relating to the implementation of Mexico’s international strategies were subject to a struggle between new and old power dynamics, and visions of Mexico’s role in the international arena interpreted by a wide range of actors.

5.2.1. President, the Executive and the Foreign Minister

New strategic interpretations of HR, and their introduction in the new foreign policy paradigm, can be attributed to the new government transition team and favoured by the change of economic and institutional boundaries analysed in section 5.1. The inclusion among its members of important personalities in the HR field, such as Mariclaire Acosta, gave legitimacy to Mexico’s international shift. During the first months of the government, the integration of these actors into the Executive officialised Mexico’s position on HR and clarified its international strategy on the matter. In spite of the initial convergence of interests and visions among components of the Executive branch, the evolution of the events generated deep rifts among
them, presenting contradictions within the government with respect to the votes at OHCHR in Geneva (Pascoe Pierce 2004, 16). In fact, pressures external to the Executive influenced Presidential strategic interpretations that, since the beginning, were not as sharp as those supported by the Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda. Furthermore, results obtained in mid-term elections shifted the direction of Mexico’s strategic approach to HR, determining a softening of its strategic actions (Opinion 2003).

The presence of new actors and the democratisation of the country produced a change in the strategically selective context, influencing the President’s strategic calculations, addressed to attaining a new international status through Mexico’s international protection of HR. This new vision determined Fox’s support of the report elaborated by the commission for state reform, mentioned in the previous section, which suggested the effective implementation of HR international agreements and their inclusion in the domestic legislation. Fox’s discourse of presentation of the report reiterated that his strategic calculations linked international interests, related to Mexico’s proactive role in the international arena, and a renewal of its image, to the creation of a domestic strategic context favourable to their implementation. This strategy was considered by the President to be the most favourable for the generation of a change of foreign policy in relation to HR (Muñoz Ledo 2004, 283). Referring to the SR concepts, this reasoning confirms how the change of internal limits could generate a strategic selective context more favourable to the implementation new actors’ strategies in support of HR ignored by other works on Mexico’s approach to the topic (Pellicer 2006; Covarrubias Velasco 2003).

However, Fox’s position in favour of HR was still influenced by the traditional principle of non-intromission in domestic affairs, although he was more moderate in comparison to Foreign Minister Castañeda’s strategic approach. This idea is supported by Fox’s nomination of Ricardo Pascoe Pierce as Mexican Ambassador in Cuba with the “aim to improve Mexico’s rapport with Castro’s government that started being spoiled during Zedillo’s administration”. As asserted by Pascoe Pierce, when the President discussed with him his appointment as ambassador, the importance given by Fox to HR did not strategically bring into question Mexico’s relationship with Cuba. Rather, it was considered by Fox complementary to the maintenance of good relations with

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89 Interview, Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, 10 May 2011.
other governments to avoid spoiling them by formally meeting Cuban dissidents. It was a signal of Fox’s will to maintain friendly relations with Castro’s government, historically based on the implementation of Mexico’s traditional foreign policy principles, characterising his first year of government “by the dilemma between the support of change and the respect of Cuba’s status quo” (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 637).

Although the President supported the change in foreign policy, his strategies were still partially influenced by the principle of national sovereignty and the need to maintain international autonomy. For this reason, according to Fox, Mexico’s HR priorities should not be subject to direct US inference in relation to the embargo, but differentiated to avoid spoiling Mexico’s relations with Cuba (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 637). The president stressed this position during Bush’s visit to Mexico in February 2001. In spite of the aim to establish a special relationship with the country (Ruiz 2001), for Fox the increase of US economic pressure on the island was “a wrong and unproductive policy. The US’ position [on 2001 OHCHR vote] in Geneva [was] focused more on politics than on HR” (Pascoe Pierce 2004, 21).

Despite this initial persistence of traditional foreign policy principles, Fox’s promotion of HR, and their supremacy over traditional foreign policy, was confirmed in his discourses on this topic. According to his vision, multilateral organisations exercised an important role in their defence and promotion, and Mexico should support their efforts in order to implement principles included in its new foreign policy paradigm (Fox Quesada 2001).

The interpretation of the new mix of international constraints and domestic opportunities favoured the generation of new strategic selectivities. These championed Jorge Castañeda’s interpretation of foreign policy interests related to HR in the light of Mexico’s international proactivity and the legitimisation of its new democratic status. Fox’s strategic calculation relating to HR acquired a more definitive position due to the replacement of these strategic selectivities. For instance, Fox’s meeting with Cuban dissidents in 2002 was strategically conceived as an action necessary for the affirmation of Mexico’s democracy (Redacción 2002). Traditional informal limits avoided this type of international position relating to the respect of the principle of

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90 Interview, Ricardo Pascoe Pierce, 10 May 2011. According to Ambassador Pascoe Pierce “Informal meetings between Mexico’s diplomatic staff and Cuban dissidents had ever existed”, but Mexico’s informal agreement with Cuba limited public declarations that violated the principle of national sovereignty.
national sovereignty included in the Constitution. Fox made his own the idea that Mexico should internationally promote HR without any type of limitation. This motivation justified the Presidential request to Cuba to meet “human rights and democracy international standards, which validity is shared around the world” (Venegas 2002), and that underpinned Mexico’s vote at the OHCHR in April 2002.

The change in Mexico’s foreign policy approach was supported also by Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda and Undersecretary for Human Rights Mariclaire Acosta, who embodied the new foreign policy paradigm by maintaining a more strict interpretation of the strategic use of HR (NK 2001). Both of them sustained the supremacy of HR over traditional foreign policy principles (Portada 2001; Editorial 2001b); however, their strategic calculation of strategic opportunities was different. On the one hand, Acosta based her vision on the ideational importance of HR considered necessary for the development of Mexico’s democracy. On the other hand, Castañeda developed a strategic vision addressed to the obtainment of international recognition and the improvement of Mexico’s relations with the US. This was considered a priority in the new government’s foreign policy, also with respect to the Mexico’s traditional position against the US embargo supported by Fox (Guerra Cabrera 2001; Castañeda 2001a, 66). In Castañeda’s conception, the strategic implementation of HR was useful in order to acquire a recognised democratic status, transforming Mexico in a “champion of international HR challenging the behaviour of tyrants [Mexico] had long excused, like Fidel Castro” (Opinion 2003).

Nevertheless, Acosta’s strategic vision played the most important role in promoting the change in Mexico’s foreign policy. On the one hand, she sustained the implementation of domestic changes able produce a context able to favour the support of HR. She considered strategically essential the production of domestic and international coherence in the defence on HR, trying to limit the presence of double standards and promote the “introduction of international HR standards in Mexico” (Bondì 2004, 27). On the other hand, her strategic vision favoured the insertion of new foreign policy actors, promoting a real shift in Mexico’s foreign policy. In fact, Acosta gave great relevance to reports and commentaries proceeding from new social actors, such as NGOs and public opinion, which will be studied in section 5.2.4 (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 638). The importance given to new actors “especially in

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91 Interview, Mariclaire Acosta, 24 June 2011.
light of [their] professional and personal expertise in the field” favoured the predominance of ideas related to the new foreign policy paradigm in matters of HR, strongly influencing the change of foreign policy approach.

The repetitiveness of this process of mutual interaction between strategic actors and the context in which they are placed shows the importance of the consideration of the SR process of double internalisation in order to explain positive dynamics of foreign policy change. The placement of this category of actors outside the traditional domestic context favoured a radical change with respect to the past. However, the realisation of new strategies was limited by the persistence of traditional principles within incumbent’s foreign policy visions that determined the softening of the governmental international strategies after mid-term elections. The role played by parties and members of the Congress will be analysed in the next sub-section.

5.2.2. Congress and the political parties

As explained in Chapter Two, the democratisation of the country increased the power of the political parties in Congress. However, Congress and the political parties’ approach to HR can be considered slightly differently with respect to the set of actors analysed in sub-section 5.2.1 and this understanding contributes to RQ2 and sub-RQ1. In light of the change in Mexico’s political context, on his first official day in administration President Fox declared that the most important strategic aim of his government was to produce an evolution of the existing dynamics between the Executive and Congress. He asserted that “the Congress proposes and the President disposes”, legitimising the independence of the Mexican Congress and the end of Presidential domination over it (Nacif 2005, 1). Despite this promise, within a year, the Executive’s vision of HR had overshadowed that of Congress. On some occasions, the lack of consultation with Congress created friction between the two branches (Garduño, Davalos and Becerril 2002) and limited change on the matter. For instance, in the case of the Executive’s unilateral decision to appoint an ambassador and institute a new Undersecretary for Human Rights (Becerril 2001a).

92 Ibidem.
However, according to Velázquez Flores (2008b, 141) HR was a topic which obtained good consensus within Congress, achieving the 20% of approved parliamentary agreement. Congress homogeneously and rhetorically defended the importance of HR, although limitations to policy change were produced by different interpretations of existing institutional boundaries. On the one hand, part of the members’ strategic calculations, especially among opposition parties, were still influenced by the existence of enduring limitations and principles related to the traditional foreign policy paradigm (Cámara de Senadores 2000; Cámara de Diputados 2001b). These parties asserted the validity of Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution, seeking to impose its role as guarantor of institutional foreign policy principles (Becerrill 2001b). On the other hand, the presence of components of the transition team in the Congress and the PAN favoured the spread of a new interpretation of the international protection of HR (Cámara de Diputados 2002a). The new political context and its interpretation of the topic enabled a gradual reinterpretation of institutional and informal barriers, replacing strategic selectivities that aimed to preserve Mexico’s traditional principles with new ones favouring Mexico’s proactivity in the international arena.

This interaction enabled the implementation of strategic actions focused on the importance attributed by new political actors to HR, and interpreting the principle of national sovereignty through a different interpretative lens. The first step was carried out in November 2000 by the member of the transition team Adolfo Aguilar Zinser who, following a parliamentary meeting on Mexico-Cuba relations, conducted the contested meeting with Cuban dissidents. According to Covarrubias Velasco (2003, 635), Zinser’s justification of his actions, citing the need for knowledge of different political realities in Cuba, was “explanatory of the foreign policy path that, some months later, Fox and the Foreign Ministry would to follow”. This indicates that the political opening favoured the reinterpretation of traditional institutional and political barriers, because such engagement in Congress was neither implementable, nor considerable, during PRI governments.

In 2001, the OHCHR in Geneva called a vote among members regarding a request to Cuba to improve its efforts in the promotion and defence of HR. Despite the variations within Congress’ conceptualisation of the new foreign policy paradigm regarding HR, its position concerning Mexico’s vote on the matter of Cuba’s HR was quite homogeneously opposed, determining Mexico’s abstention in contrast to the Executive’s multilateral HR strategy. Homogeneity in different parties’ interpretation of
institutional limits confirms the validity of constitutional boundaries imposed by foreign policy principles (Labastida 2001). According to PRI Senator Herrera Beltrán:

“what is bringing us together is what our Constitution defines [...] our Constitution includes in its Article 89 principles that are part of the debate we are developing here, and that are fundamental principles for our foreign policy. [...] Mexico’s position in every international fora where the nation is represented must fit with these principles.” (Cámara de Diputados 2001a).

The strength of the traditional vision meant that the constitutional principles were deemed a limitation to the implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm’s HR goals, forcing the Executive to declare its abstention in the OHCHR vote (Commission on Human Rights 2001). However, the Executive’s and Foreign Minister’s strategic interpretations of Mexico’s opportunities remained grounded in the supremacy of HR over traditional Mexican foreign policy principles, publicly declaring their personal vision on the matter (Portada 2001; Editorial 2001b). The entrenchment of such principles also influenced the opposition parties’ rejection of a wider international HR approach, determined by their interpretation of those political and economic limits related to Mexico’s international autonomy (Cámara de Diputados 2002b). This position was confirmed by PRI and PRD senators and the President of the Senate Human Rights Commission, Sadot Sánchez, who asserted that the OHCHR proposal to judge Cuba for its lack of respect of HR was motivated by a US strategy which aimed to isolate the island (Cámara de Senadores 2001; Becerril, Ballinas and Aponte 2001). Hence, Mexican strategies in this matter could not overlook traditionalism.

The persistence of these traditional visions fell under the reconsideration of existing and renewed strategic selectivities that allowed new actors working for the Executive to favour their privileged strategic interests. The new transition team’s strategies were not limited by the presence of structural constraints favouring a change in foreign policy in matter of HR. Rather, they remained initially unaffected by the opposition parties’ interpretation of the validity of constitutional limits in favour of Mexico’s abstention (Becerril, Venegas and Ballinas 2002). In this case, the opposition parties in Congress were not able to implement their favoured interpretation of Mexico’s traditional principles and interests. However, the change of the majority in Congress after the mid-term election and the substitution of Mexico’s Foreign Minister and other key actors of the transition team, favoured the reduction of friction in Congress
limiting this shift. Moreover, the interaction among these elements softened Mexico’s international pro-activity in favour of HR, giving a more economic interpretation to its foreign policy path (Chabat 2009, 8). The decrease in its strength was influenced by actors’ reproduction of an institutional debate with influence in the domestic scenario that is analysed in the next sub-section. The airing of this debate in the media encouraged the advertisement of different positions, involving important personalities and public opinion in the process of institutional influence; these process and the factors entailed will be considered in Section 5.2.4.

5.2.3. Eminent personalities and NGOs

The institutional actors analysed in sub-sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 were not the only actors that influenced the HR debate. After the PRI’s constant refusal to accept the Red Cross on national territory due to its concerns about power and legitimacy, the change of actors in power and the modification of strategic selectivities allowed the interaction of new actors, able to influence Mexico’s domestic and international approach to HR (Rozental 2004, 92). Human rights NGOs, Cuban dissidents requesting Mexico’s mediation, intellectuals that traditionally supported the ideological friendship between the two states, and Mexico’s diplomats exerted an important role in the definition of Mexico’s official strategies. The vast majority of these individuals belonged to those new categories of actors that, thanks to Mexico’s democratisation, had access to influential spheres during the Fox administration.

The agreement established between Mexico and the OHCHR, the reception of its experts and the consideration of its report can be considered an important shift in the political interpretation of constitutional principles and limits based on the traditional principle of respect for national sovereignty. The presence of OHCHR influenced the legitimisation of the new foreign policy paradigm and reinforced the strategies of the transition team and the Executive in favour of Mexico’s international pro-activity and the improvement of its international image. As analysed in sub-sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, the achievement of international recognition and legitimisation was strategically important for Mexico’s government in order to pursue its principal foreign policy interests: a special relationship with the US and Mexico’s multilateral pro-activity that favoured its international image and legitimisation (Castañeda 2001a, 68).
As mentioned in sub-section 5.2.1, Mexico’s political actors started having official and public contacts with Cuban dissidents. The presence of this set of actors was favoured by the new political and institutional context, and represented an evident shift in Mexico’s strategic selectivities and its interpretation of international interests, contrary to the traditional principle of self-determination. It is necessary to underline that political and institutional actors that favoured this type of transition belonged to the transition team and carried with them a new vision of Mexico’s international role. Important dissident personalities, such as Oswaldo Payà, Elizardo Sanches (representative of the Human Rights and National Reconciliation Cuban Commission), Osvaldo Alfonso and Héctor Palacio, established close relations with components of the new Executive in order to inform Mexico of Cuba’s HR situation. The governments’ contacts with them were interpreted by actors supporting Mexico’s traditional foreign policy principles as a political strategy to interfere in Cuba’s internal affairs, thus limiting its national sovereignty. Nevertheless, their presence highlights the change in Mexico’s predisposition to consider HR and the removal of existent boundaries related to Cuba. In fact, the informal agreement established between the two countries became, for the Executive, old-fashioned and secondary to the protection of HR, favoured by the Mexican democratic transition.

Institutional relations with dissidents, human rights NGO reports and evaluations of international HR fora were able to influence new decision-makers, more open to external support and collaboration (Saldierna 2001b). Hence, these actors positively influenced the strategies implemented by new actors supporting Mexico’s international HR activity and consequently also the shift in strategic selectivities favouring Mexico’s international renewal. Furthermore, intellectuals also tried to influence Mexico’s international decisions on HR, proving most effective in establishing informal connections with dissident realities and mediating with the Cuban government (Covarrubias Velasco 2003, 636). However their influence assumed particular relevance regarding Mexico’s vote at the OHCHR in 2001 where one group of intellectuals supported, through the media, Mexico’s abstention in favour of Elizardo Sánchez Santacruz (Saldierna 2001b), while another group of intellectuals asked, together with the NGOs, for the Mexican vote against Cuba (Ballinas 2001).

This underlines how the democratisation of the country generated the replacement of structural limits and the creation of new strategic possibilities for the actions of new

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93 Interview, Mariclaire Acosta, 24 June 2011.
actors present in the system. Hence, in this case, it is possible to highlight the SR double internalisation process of mutual influence since the new strategic actors could not influence the transformation of Mexico’s strategic selectivities and HR outcomes without a previous change in Mexico’s strategic actors and strategically selective context. At the same time, these changes allowed the new actors to influence other decision-makers. Moreover, their presence favoured the maintenance of the HR issue in the media and public discussion, which is analysed in the next sub-section, emphasising the relevance of the topic and strategically helping to legitimise the new HR foreign policy approach.

5.2.4. Thinks tanks, the media and public opinion

This sub-section analyses how the shift on HR approach was influenced by the opening of the public debate and the new presence of the media and think tanks. It considers the relationship between their presence and that of the actors considered in sub-section 5.2.3. Mexico’s democratisation, the removal of political barriers, started in the 1990s and igniting the will of “owners of media outlets to gain political influence after greater freedom of expression had opened up new opportunities” (Sarmiento 2005, 285), and determining the opening of the public debate. The approval of a Federal law on transparency and public governmental information (Cámara de Diputados 2002j) and the entrance of new international actors in the field of HR represented a consistent change for Mexico’s freedom of expression.

This shift allowed the Mexican government to interpret the opening of the country’s communication as a useful opportunity to underline its new political status. It was now able to address its new foreign policy towards the acquisition of a new international image, consequently refining the possibility of achieving its international goals. Mexico’s improvements in its domestic freedom of expression and communication were strongly intertwined with the achievements of its international HR goals. As sustained by Mariclaire Acosta, the presence of a double-discourse between Mexico’s domestic and international approaches to HR was not strategically convenient for the maintenance of its international credibility. The Fox government’s activism in favour of the international protection of HR was strategically coordinated to improve the

94 Interview, Mariclaire Acosta, 24 June 2011.
internal situation, hence the removal of norms limiting Mexico’s freedom of expression and influencing the final HR outcome. The removal of this limitation had the capacity to modify the strategic selectivities that constrained international actors’ perceptions of Mexico, limiting their economic and political interactions with the country.

Moreover, on the one hand, the opening of Mexico’s communicative system allowed a wider diffusion of its new political project and foreign policy goals, and obtained achievements in the matter of HR (Gómez Quintero 2005; Becerril 2001a). On the other hand however, the removal of institutional barriers allowed the re-interpretation of existing strategic selectivities for traditional and new actors, generating a new space in the expression for international and domestic instances, especially concerning HR. This space was widely used by both institutional and non-governmental agents operating in HR field, with the aim of influencing Mexico’s focus on HR and its international implementation. The media gave great space to the debate which arose around HR, giving the possibility of expression to intellectuals who tried to influence Mexico’s positions at the OHCHR in Geneva (Saldierna 2001b; Ballinas 2001). Different political parties also used these intellectuals to strategically reinforce their actions and obtain the support of certain sectors of the population, trying to obtain public opinion consensus (NK 2001; Guerra Cabrera 2001; Redacción 2002; Ruiz 2001) and reinforcing their strategic selectivities in favour or against international HR.

Although authors as Pellicer (2006), Rozental (2004) and Covarrubias Velasco (2003) analyse the importance of the presence of new structural boundaries, they omit to consider how the change in strategic selectivities transformed the government’s concept of the media. This silence does not allow to understand how different actors’ behaviour can be causally considered influential in the achievement of the HR goal.

Government’s perception on the role of the media is underlined within the national Programme of HR, through the inclusion of a specific strategic objective which stressed the importance of mass-media and communication for the development of a HR culture. The media were considered by the programme as essential for the massive diffusion of HR principles and governmental actions among Mexico’s civil society, a condition necessary in order to give strength to the new foreign policy ideas. However, their strategic use was not exclusively considered as a strategic means for governmental propaganda, but was also proliferated to illustrate the PAN’s difference from PRI governments, using the media to “spread the job of human rights defenders” (Poder Ejecutivo Federal de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 2002x, 215).
The presence of new strategic selectivities allowed to the positive interpretation of the role played by national and international media and NGOs in the involvement of civil society in the promotion and defence of HR (NK 2003; Becerril 2001c; Ruiz 2001), allowing a further shift in structural limitations towards a wider support for HR.

According to this shift, the presence and influence of public opinion and civil society rocketed with respect to the previous government (Schiavón and Velázquez 2010, 6). The removal of Mexico’s electoral barriers allowed the public to interpret the domestic reality considering different strategic approaches. It permitted to the society to be more influential in the decision-making process, favouring the international defence and support of HR. But the influence was mutual because participation was also strategically relevant for the transformation of institutional boundaries, as in the case of the approval of the Mexican freedom of information law. This initiative, promoted by an heterogeneous group, was initated by a civil society group, Grupo Oaxaca (Bondì 2004, 30). Furthermore, according to Foreign Minister, the radical change in the relationship between the state and HR NGOs favoured “mutual trust and improved cooperation between state bodies and the civil society to face difficulties in the protection and defence of human rights” (Castañeda 2002, 183). Moreover, the Fox government’s decisions were deemed particularly sensible by public opinion polls, an element that reinforced public influence over the implementation of the HR strategy.

Civil society and NGO’s positions were interpreted by the government through a different lens; the government saw them as becoming increasingly influential and playing an important role in the re-establishment of Mexico-Cuba relations after the break in diplomatic relations (Velázquez Flores 2008a, 98). This means that the studies on Mexican foreign policy that are neglecting this double internalisation process are not providing an exhaustive explanation of the dynamics of foreign policy change in Mexico.

The opening of domestic information, the replacement of strategic structures and the government’s move away from the traditional principle of defending national sovereignty favoured the generation of think tanks interested in HR. Nevertheless, as elaborated in Section 3.2.4, the general increase in the presence of Mexican think tanks was principally focused on the analysis of domestic issues. Their function of their interest in international HR activities was generally to support important international NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, in the diffusion of their reports within specific intellectual spheres. This was due to the
fracture of previously existing barriers which had blocked international NGOs’ requests to government bodies. However, the opening of the system and the consideration of new international actors, particularly the Undersecretary of Democracy and Human Rights, favoured a direct relationship between those two actors favouring think tank support of the transition team’s strategic calculations on HR.

Moreover, the presence of domestic think tanks was particularly important for the development of new projects of reform, thanks to their consultation activities. Their role was especially important in the analysis of the dynamics present at the multilateral level and in the elaboration of the proposal of change, especially regarding the creation of a new foreign policy paradigm. Unfortunately many of these relevant studies were published at the end of the Fox government (González González 2006b; Schiavón and Velázquez 2010) becoming useful only for the following administration, rather than directly influencing Mexico’s foreign policy approach to HR.

Finally, the removal of existing communication limits and the presence of new strategic selectivities influencing the Executive increased the importance of public opinion on specific topics. On this topic, think tanks such as CIDE and COMEXI played an important role in the collection of data that could be considered influential in the elaboration of decision-making strategies. The wide collection of data published by CIDE-COMEXI (González González and Minushkin 2004 and 2007) is used in the next section in order to analyse the presence and the influence of ideas. In fact, the creation of new strategic selectivities in support of HR was possible only through the mutual influence exercised between the new institutional context and the new strategic actors. This interplay produced the modification of the structural rigidity and the entrance of additional actors, in turn generating a process of double internalisation which favoured the change in foreign policy in support of HR. However this interaction cannot be totally explained without the consideration of the filter imposed by ideas and foreign policy paradigms, bringing variation in the actors’ interpretations of a single context.

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95 Interview, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 27 May 2011.
5.3. Dealing with ideas and foreign policy paradigms. Mexico’s international approach to HR

As shown in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the shift in political and economic limits and the modification of actors’ strategies were related to the introduction of a new foreign policy paradigm in Mexican international affairs, generating interest in HR in the country. This section explores how the presence of policy paradigms, and related ideas and principles, influenced the interplay between structural elements and strategic agents, favouring the shift in the foreign policy approach to HR. In fact, the ideation and embedding of this new foreign policy idea was possible only thanks to the rejection of those traditional foreign policy principles that limited domestic and international activities on the matter. The existence of traditional structural constraints, which historically affected the Mexican Foreign Ministry’s international decisions, not only limited the existence of an international approach to HR in Mexico, but totally impeded its existence in order to preserve PRI’s power and legitimacy. The interpretation of these boundaries was justified through emphasis on their adherence to Mexico’s traditional foreign policy principles, namely national sovereignty, the self-determination of people and non-intervention. Thus, both Mexico’s interest in global human rights, and the international supervision of Mexico’s domestic situation were considered an infraction of these principles. Moreover, the lack of respect for the traditional principles not only implied the estrangement from the ideational path imposed by the one-party government, but also the violation of Constitutional Article 89, which embedded such values within the Mexican normative structure.

Therefore, the existence of traditional principles in the Mexican Constitution represented a formal institutional constraint for Fox’s foreign policy goals, inhibiting the inclusion of the protection and defence of HR. However, Mexico’s political and economic transition, which had commenced during the 1990s, and the presence of new actors with non-traditional visions favoured the development of new ideas on the matter. On the one hand, these changes in context involved the presence of new ideas and interpretations of what was strategically convenient for Mexico, i.e. the installation of democracy and the implementation of a more proactive role. On the other hand, the change of the party in power, the presence of the transition team and those new strategic agents analysed in section 5.2 favoured the implementation of new ideas that supported the universality and legitimacy of a HR structure. These
novel ideas grounded the calculations of the new actors, replacing their traditional visions and influencing their interpretations of existing boundaries (for instance, the traditional principles of Article 89) weakening the traditional foreign policy paradigm on the matter of HR. The introduction of a new national-popular project and the related new interpretations of traditional constraints necessary for a more open political and trade dynamic in Mexico generated a switch in strategic selectivities; the new selectivities favoured the international promotion and defence of HR. This process confirms the importance of the consideration of ideas and the introduction of new policy paradigms in the analysis of policy change and prove the incompleteness of neo-liberal causal explanations, as those provided by González González (2001), which does not consider the type of influence exerted by ideas on actors determinant for the understanding of foreign policy dynamics.

This ideational influences primarily occurred among a specific category of actors comprising individuals who had been educated abroad over previous decades, or who had exchanged visions abroad and had returned to Mexico with their ideas (Ai Camp 2002, 157). The introduction of these personalities within Mexican politics favoured the liberalisation of the debate in the country and the development of new economic and political ideas. The initial implementation of these new ideas in the economic field developed and improved Mexico’s image abroad (Castañeda 2002b). Such evolution was necessary in order to facilitate the establishment of commercial relations with other countries and the removal of international institutional barriers, such as the European democratic clause referred to in sub-section 5.1.1, strengthening Mexico’s negotiation power.

These ‘new ideas’ actors, regardless of their earlier political affiliations, created the transition team that supported Fox’s candidacy in the Presidential elections. However, the permanence of important political boundaries, determined by the absence of a totally democratic system in the country, was counterproductive for the implementation of their interests and ideas, both in economic and multilateral fields. As a result, the achievement of democratic status was not sufficient to obtain an adequate increase in Mexico’s international legitimacy; this was due to the presence of a fundamental cleavage between its formal status and the reality of the present situation. For these reasons, Fox and the transition team interlinked the achievement of formal electoral democracy to Mexico’s involvement in the HR issue (Castañeda 2001). In order to achieve this, it was also important to coherently relate Mexico’s
international attitude to the conditions present at the domestic level as suggested by the Commission for State Reform (Muñoz Ledo 2004). The interpretation given for the strategic replacement of traditional institutional boundaries was presented through the lens of new ideas held by those actors who did not belong to the PRI and or subscribe to its political dynamics. Although the vast majority of suggestions present in the Commission for State Reform report were not implemented, the report’s suggestion of linking domestic and international interpretations of HR was accepted by Fox (Muñoz Ledo 2004, 283) and applied by his government in spite of Congress resistance (Becerril 2001a).

The introduction of the protection and defence of HR within the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm was justified by the rejection of traditional foreign policy principles related to the PRI’s management of international affairs. The strategic interpretation of their importance was linked firstly to the idea that there is a universally shared set of rights that should be defended. Supporting this idea the Mexican government rejected the validity of the principle of national sovereignty in the case of HR (Castañeda 2001c). Secondly, it was associated with the concept that sharing a common HR approach with powerful foreign countries could improve Mexico’s international image and increase its legitimacy.

However, the persistence of the old foreign policy paradigm that had, in the past, shaped Mexico’s institutions and allowed the PRI to impose its vision, constituted a limit for the acknowledgment of the new actors’ foreign policy paradigm in the shape of Congress. In fact, even when HR obtained a high degree of consensus within Congress (Velázquez Flores 2008b, 141) and were rhetorically supported by Mexican representatives, their application faced multiple constraints. The presence of traditional foreign policy principles within the Mexican Constitution favoured the persistence of political configurations based on traditional strategic selectivities for the vast majority of Congress’ members. This alternative attitude towards HR was explicit in the case of Cuba, particularly due to Mexico’s connection with the US intervention into Cuba’s internal affairs through the embargo (Cámara de Senadores 2000; Cámara de Diputados 2001b). As shown in the following tables, although both the Mexican population and its leaders generally favoured international activities to improve HR in Cuba, Mexican leaders strongly condemned the US embargo. Therefore, despite the shift in Mexico’s application of the traditional foreign policy paradigm’s principle of non-intervention and self-determination of people from the
1990s onwards (Ruiz 1999; Aponte 1999), geopolitical events such as those in Cuba illustrate that the shift had not been completely internalised by the members of traditional Mexican political parties.

Table 26 Mexico’s international activities to improve HR in Cuba

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither of them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leaders</strong></td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Source:* own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey "Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004".
Table 27 Mexico’s position regarding the US embargo against Cuba

Source: own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey “Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004”.

This data confirms the reasons that motivated Congress’ denial, in 2001, of a favourable OHCHR resolution that promoted the respect and defence of HR in Cuba (Cámara de Diputados 2001b). As sustained by the SRA (Jessop 2005, 50), the lack of consideration of ideational elements in rationalist works or those focused on Mexican institutions (Hernández-Rodríguez 2003) inhibited a comprehensive explanation of the outcome of the mutual interaction between the Mexican strategic context and the old and new strategic actors. At the beginning of the administration, the new ideas in support of HR were still not sufficiently entrenched to override the concern that the rejection of traditional foreign policy principles might generate a loss of Mexican autonomy in favour of the US. Executive imposition of Mexico’s OHCHR stance on the resolution vote demonstrated its support of HR. Thanks to the presence of a clear path to follow and goals coherent with the new Mexican context, a gradual shift was realised also among Congress members’ interpretation of opportunities within the international system, favouring the shift in Mexico’s foreign policy on matter of HR.

In spite of the former good relationship between Mexico and Cuba, the Executive’s application of pressure on the informal boundaries between the two countries ruined
their rapport. In 2004, Mexico’s general opinion of Cuba (measured on a scale between 1 and 100) was quite negative, with approximately the 70% of Mexican leaders and the wider population voting in this manner. This data indicates that the idea of substituting Mexico’s traditional friendly relationship with Cuba with a special relationship with the US, able to favour Mexico’s trading system and its international image abroad, was not totally rejected in Mexico.

Table 28 Mexico’s opinion of Cuba. Population barometer

Source: own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey “Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004”.
This information explains that ideas supported by opposition parties in Congress and the fear of being subjugated by US dominance and losing autonomy, started being interpreted through a different lens, a development from the positions held earlier in the Fox government. This indicates that changes in economic and institutional structures and the presence of new governmental and non-governmental actors operating in the field of HR were facilitating the acceptance of new ideas. The modification in Mexico’s interpretation of existing limits and opportunities allowed a gradual shift in structural selectivities that favoured the presence of strategic actions regarding Mexico’s international proactivity and the improvement of Mexico’s image abroad. A further indicator of positive results obtained by the change of structural selectivities is indicated by the evolving status of international HR NGOs.
Table 30 Mexico’s opinion of international human rights NGOs. Population barometer
Source: own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey “Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004”.

Table 31 Mexico’s opinion of international human rights NGOs. Leaders barometer
Source: own data elaboration from CIDE-COMEXI survey “Mexico y el mundo: visiones globales 2004”.
As illustrated in Tables 30 and 31, Mexico’s opinion was divergent with respect to the traditional PRI political fear of domestic delegitimisation due to the presence of exogenous international actors on national territory. On a scale between 0 and 10, the appreciation average of this category of NGOs was, for both population and leaders, between 68 and 70. This high level of acceptance confirms that the introduction of new ideas and changes to political structures contributed to the change in structural strategic selectivities. Consequently, it generated a different perception of new strategic actors operating in the territory, favouring a shift of foreign policy regarding HR. However Fox’s loss of a Congress majority imposed a higher degree of mediation during the second half of the administration. Logically, opposition within Congress was stronger because of the presence of more deeply entrenched traditional ideas among the PRI members of the Congress, condition considered important for answering the MRQ. In fact, the PRI’s later majority at the Chamber of Deputies and the dismissal of the most important supporters of the new foreign policy paradigm curbed the favourable conditions necessary for further radical change.

In conclusion, this last section of the chapter shows how material and ideational elements are combined in the process of policy change (Hay 2001, 11/17). It highlights how consideration of the role played by ideas and policy paradigms in SR analysis is fundamental to the understanding of the change in foreign policy and the interplay between the new Mexican economic and political context and the presence of new actors, as studied in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this chapter. This finding contributes to answering sub-RQ2 and RQ1 of this thesis. New actors’ ideas in support of the universal legitimacy of HR and the new foreign policy paradigm, which aimed to bestow a new image and proactive role on Mexico in the international arena, replaced those ideas related to the traditional foreign policy paradigm determining the generation of new strategic calculations in foreign policy. The replacement of traditional ideas, focused on the protection of Mexico’s international autonomy and the legitimisation of its domestic one-party system, influenced the interpretation of strategic boundaries enabling a shift in strategic selectivities and favouring the international promotion and defence of HR.
Conclusion

This chapter has applied the SRA in the study of Mexico’s foreign policy approach to HR, with particular importance given to the mediation role of ideas in the interpretation of agents and structural selectivities. This chapter’s goal was to highlight the importance of considering the interplay and mutual influences present among the aforementioned set of elements in order to explain the change in foreign policy. The application of the SRA to the implementation of the protection and defence of HR enabled the explanation of how the foreign policy process occurs, in this case producing a change. The analysis determined that it is possible to foster change in the presence of new contexts and new actors carrying innovative ideas able to generate the replacement of traditional structural selectivities; these findings answer sub-RQ2 and contributing to the MRQ and RQ2 of this thesis. These answers will be drawn together in the Conclusion of this thesis, analysing the outcomes of the three empirical chapters.

In order to answer RQ2 and explain, through the SRA, how Mexico’s foreign policy change in the matter of HR occurred, this chapter investigated how structural, agential and ideational elements interacted. In Section 5.1 was found that change in Mexico’s economic and political context and the presence of new actors permitted the evolution of traditional limits to HR. This shift was determined by new opportunities offered by Mexico’s democratisation and economic opening and the presence of new strategic actors who interpreted the change of context as favourable for the implementation of their ideas in support of the international promotion and defence of HR. Mutual influences exercised by structural limits and strategic actors in the definition of new foreign policy strategies in support of HR were then studied in Section 5.2. Despite the initial difficulties observed in the renovation of existing institutional boundaries, a general (though rhetorical, in the case of Congress) agreement was reached on the positivity of the innovative foreign policy paradigm regarding clear HR goals. This agreement determined the entrance of new influential actors, such as multilateral organisations and NGOs, which favoured the implementation of the new HR approach and contributed to the legitimisation of change in Mexican foreign policy. As studied in Section 5.3, the deepening in entrenchment of new ideas among strategic actors and their coherency with respect to the new Mexican context enabled the realisations of initial sufficient structural changes. These modifications favoured the shift of both strategic actors’ interpretation
of opportunities given by Mexico’s structural context, and strategic selectivities that championed the achievement of new strategic actors’ interests. New strategic selectivities were focused on the improvement of Mexico’s international image and proactivity through its affirmation of the principle of universality of HR, enabling the realisations of Mexico’s foreign policy change in the matter of international protection and the defence of HR.

In conclusion, it is possible to assert that the Fox government’s change in foreign policy regarding HR, considered an essential goal for the improvement of both the government’s international image and its foreign policy pro-activity, was successfully implemented. The chapter highlighted how this change was possible thanks to the presence of fundamental HR ideas that shifted the traditional foreign policy paradigm, individuating a condition that contribute to respond the MRQ. While, providing an answer to sub-RQ2, the shift was due to the mutual influence of changed structural selectivities and renewed influential actors, the modification of foreign policy paradigm and the internalisation of new ideas, thanks to which Mexico’s foreign policy in matter of HR could change. These findings will be now used in the Conclusions in order to establish a comparison with the outcomes produced in the two previous empirical chapters and provide a comprehensive answer to the RQs of this thesis.
CONCLUSION

This thesis proposed the analysis of continuity and change processes in Mexican foreign policy during the Fox government. The research was developed using a theoretical methodology, based on Bob Jessop’s SRA and Colin Hay’s integration of ideas in the SR interplay between strategic selectivities and strategic actors. Mexico’s foreign policy under Fox was considered through the perspective of the radical innovation represented by Fox’s so called “government of change”. This innovation was due to the explicit proposal of replacing the traditional foreign policy paradigm associated with the presence of the PRI presidential power. The possibility of change represented by the post-PRI administration in 2000 was considered an ideal subject of research for its capacity to illustrate the failures and successes of the change process in foreign policy and explore the methods by which they achieved them.

In order to concretely examine these processes, three specific case-studies were considered in the last three chapters of this thesis; their study was based on the SRA. The use of this approach can be considered original in the study of Mexico’s international affairs and its interpretation of ideas in the generation of change in foreign policy innovation. The SRA provided a dialectical understanding of the interplay established between material and ideational elements. It was able to fully integrate mutual influences exerted between analytical elements. It gave an answer to weakness produced by other dialectical approaches limited by a structured-oriented conceptualisation that does not allow to go beyond the presence of a dual relationship between agency and structures. Through this study, the thesis aimed to answer to the Research Questions (RQs), which answers will be analysed more in depth in the following sections.

The thesis aimed to analytically apply Jessop and Hay’s SRA to Mexican foreign policy, highlighting the importance of ideas and foreign policy paradigms for the implementation of change and continuity process in the PAN’s implementation of Mexico’s international affairs. This work complemented the studies of Mexico’s foreign policy, which have been characterised by the use of orthodox theories and disregarding dialectical or SR engagements in the evaluation of foreign policy processes of change and continuity. In spite of Jessop and Hay’s SRA being
considered significant in the study of processes of globalisation, governance and in the field of International Political Economy by other authors (Heigl 2011; Cuadra Montiel 2008, Hay and Richards 2000; James 2001; While and Gibbs 2004; Valler and Wood 2004; Jung 2013), its use has been neglected in foreign policy. This research spoke to this silence presenting empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. From a theoretical point of view it joins the only work considering this type of approach useful to the elaboration of foreign policy analysis, which is Brighi’s work on Italy (Brighi 2007; Brighi 2013). The thesis proposed an innovative application of the SRA, although on some occasions, other authors judged Hay and Jessop’s approximations methodologically unclear and difficult to analytically apply to concrete empirical cases, due to the confusion among the levels of analysis (Kelly 1999, 114). This work presented an original methodological application of the SRA, allowing to study how the presence and absence of change in analytical elements can influence dialectical dynamics grounding the production of foreign policy change.

The thesis explored how change does and does not occur, starting from an explanation of how the SRA can be an adequate tool to explore the complexity of the process of continuity and change in foreign policy. Later, the thesis applied the SRA to three different case-studies. It provided an integrated understanding of their analytical elements, which interplay was neglected in existent empirical works only focused on single causational factors. These empirical cases showed varying degrees of change or continuity in Mexican foreign policy, starting from a case-study that establishes a pattern of continuity with respect to the traditional approach on the matter, a second case that highlights a partial process of change, and a third empirical case that represents the biggest change in Mexican foreign policy under Fox. Motivations and research questions that drove this study were established in the Introduction, illustrating how the thesis would be developed and providing grounding for Chapter One: the theoretical chapter of the thesis. This first chapter set out how the SRA is able to explain the foreign policy process of continuity and change. It aimed to theoretically identify factors taking part in the process. But it also intended to understand how they are interwoven within the complex and composite foreign policy activity, showing under which theoretical conditions the change and continuity process can occur.

Chapter Two analysed Mexico’s foreign policy historical background that, in 2000, generated the proposal of a change in Mexican foreign policy. Through the application
of the SRA analysed in Chapter One, it provided the historical basis necessary to understand the evolutionary context, actors and policy paradigms relevant to Mexico in the years up to 2000. The inclusion of foreign policy dialectical dynamics in a temporal framework addressed the weakness belonging to single and dual approaches presented in the Introduction, individuating which processes favoured the foreign policy shift. The SR interpretation of how structural selectivities, strategic actors and policy paradigm historically interacted in Mexico grounded the understanding of the analysis developed in the following three empirical chapters. The explanation of how historical strategic selectivities, strategic actors and policy paradigms evolved, from the PRI’s emergence to the democratic opening through the PAN in 2000, was necessary in order to provide a basis for comparison to understand their relevance and impact in specific case-studies. This premise favoured the explanation of how changes did and did not occur in Mexican foreign policy in each empirical chapter.

Through the study of the three empirical cases, Chapter Three to Five, this thesis elaborated a theoretical and analytical adaptation of Jessop and Hay’s SRA to the analysis of continuity and change in policy processes, such as Mexican foreign policy. It has explored the relevant differences between the case studies to investigate their varying degrees of success in implementing change. Respectively: continuity in relation to the participation in PKO; coexistence of change and continuity in Mexico’s participation to the UNSC and its interpretation of the Iraqi War; change in the defence and promotion of HR. Here I trace a conclusion based on the application of the SRA to the case of Mexican foreign policy during the Fox government, underlining how this type of analysis generates answers to the research questions proposed in the Introduction of this thesis.

The Strategic Relational approach as a useful theory to explain change and continuity in foreign policy

The first and theoretical Research Question of this thesis asked,

RQ1: “How is the Strategic-Relational Approach able to account for the foreign policy process of continuity and change in general?”

This question aimed to explain the validity of such a theory in order to provide a valid account for the foreign policy process of continuity and change, offering a theoretical
background for the explanation of the evolution of Mexican foreign policy. The thesis intended to answer this question through developing an original application of Jessop and Hay’s SRA to foreign policy. Although Brighi (2013) comprehensively proved the appropriateness of the SRA for the understanding of foreign policy, this work suggests its potential for wider foreign policy analysis, complementing Brighi’s (2013) study of the interplay between foreign policy and the domestic/international nexus. While Brighi focused her studies on how to understand foreign policy and its application as a form of action, this thesis underlined the conditions under which foreign policy can change or establish continuity with the past. Throughout, this thesis focused on how change was realised in Mexican foreign policy, taking into account the specific evolution the three distinctive SRA elements (ideas, strategic selectivities tout-court and strategic actors).

My interpretation of the SRA and its analytical application considered the presence of multiple strategic actors in foreign policy, differentiating them from the state as central foreign policy actor. The conceptualisation of strategic actors able to influence the foreign policy path assumed that the state is not a unique foreign policy actor and that their agency is determined by the generation of strategic and influential relations. This assumption was based on Jessop’s theorisation, according to which the state has to be interpreted as an institutional ensemble, unable to exercise agency per se as sustained by realist approaches. Hence, the state is conceived as a strategic structure and not a strategic actor. As an additional innovative element, in opposition to Brighi, this thesis considered influences exercised by a range of different strategic actors, concurring in the determination of the state’s international positions and not exclusively focusing on foreign policy political processes.

Secondly, the thesis included a functionalist rather than a spatial understanding of domestic politics and international relations. They are considered, among other types of constraints and opportunities, as influential over the evolution of foreign policy. Through the application of the SRA, I went beyond the concept of foreign policy as the interface of domestic and international relations. Despite their formal distinction, they were considered mutually influential in the generation of strategic selectivities, assuming an similar functional role in the generation of strategic limits and opportunities. Although they were deemed essential for the determination of a new foreign policy path, the geographical position was individuated in this thesis as one of the multiple characteristics comprising the complex interplay with potential to
generate change in foreign policy. Hence, domestic politics and international relations were interpreted according to their function and not their spatial placement collocation.

Throughout the thesis, the distinction between domestic and international contexts has been considered from an analytical point of view. The influence they exercised was included in the analysis of limits and opportunities responsible for the generation of strategic selectivities. From an ontological point of view, they were not considered separately but mutually influential. It was possible because both domestic and international contexts represented boundaries which imposed selective constraints at the structural level, as well as to the agential interpretative plan. By separating structures and actors belonging to the domestic context from those belonging to the international environment, as done by interpretations linked to the *Innenpolitik* and the *Aussenpolitik*. Their ontological distinction would have produced two different and incomplete understandings, not accounting for a complete explanation of causal instances influencing Mexican foreign policy. The domestic and the international are therefore considered intrinsic characteristics of the SRA elements. As the relationship established among SRA elements is defined as relational and dialectic, their mutual interplay cannot be limited by the presence of boundaries artificially imposed by the definition of the nation-state. This enabled the analysis to account for a complexity that cannot be simplified by the geographical distinction of same categories of elements, as structural limits and strategic agents.

My operationalization of this SR analysis of continuity and change processes in Mexican foreign policy, theoretically explained in Chapter One, was developed through the application of a qualitative research design to the historical and empirical chapters of this thesis. Mexico’s historical background and national and international context were provided due to the necessity to place the study in a precise spatio-temporal framework. This specification was related to the need to capture an abstract process, generally difficult to trace, discarding an absolute and purely rational interpretation of foreign policy-making.

Moreover, the thesis identified contradictions existing between the rhetoric of change and the promotion of a new policy paradigm and its implementation. Underlining the fact that the type of interplay among factors played a determinant role in the concrete implementation of continuity and change, both strategic selectivities and actors’ alterations were traced. The knowledge of these transformations was important to
establish a comparison between previously legitimised and supported actions and their successive rejection in order to favour another evolutionary path. Furthermore, in order to concretise the theoretical concepts at the basis of the SRA, it was necessary to demonstrate how ideas mediated the actors’ perception of the validity of structural limits and the appropriateness of strategic selectivities in accordance with the historical framework. The relation between the evolution of these elements and the presence of political discourses and ideas permitted to go beyond interpretations of foreign policy-making as an exclusively rational or social constructed process. Hence, policy paradigms obtained a certain centrality in the development of the dialectical relation between actors and structures, assuming a pivotal role in the understanding of change and continuity dynamics. This type of analytical application of the SRA enabled consideration of the concrete possibilities of foreign policy change, highlighting those reciprocal influences established in the processes rather than basing its evaluation on the rhetoric of change.

The interpretation of the process of change in foreign policy differed from Jessop’s conceptualisation of the SR interplay, reflecting the application of Hay’s mediation role to ideas. This also differs from Brighi’s interpretation of Hay’s model, lending a mediating role to the ideas and policy paradigm in the domestic political process which generates foreign policy. Situating the interplay between structure and agency (namely between those political and economic constraints present both in the context and different ranges of strategic actors) firmly within the process of domestic foreign policy-making ensures the role of ideas is included. The ideational mediation directly influenced Mexico as well as the strategic calculations of single strategic actors within the spatio-temporal framework considered. It impacted on the perception Mexico had of the international context and vice versa, but it was also manifested in the perceptions held by single strategic actors regarding both the domestic and international context and their constraints. Such dynamics were influential in determining their will and possibilities of action and the foreign policy-making. This concretisation allowed me to analytically apply Jessop’s SRA to foreign policy, favouring an understanding of the reflexive process of mutual reformulation of both structurally inscribed strategic selectivities and actors’ strategically and structure-oriented actions (Jessop 2008, 41).

Through the integration of ideas and policy paradigms in the relational and dialectic relationship of structures and actors, my re-interpretation of Jessop and Hay’s SRA
aimed to make this theoretical approach applicable to another field. Concepts elaborated by Jessop in order to explain state power and its political economy, and by Hay to interpret the globalisation process, have been re-adapted to account for the foreign policy process of continuity and change. The complex and abstract theorisation of the process of reciprocal and dialectical re-interpretation between structures and agency has been concretised; the same method can now be applied to the analysis of a range of policies. The concept of ideational mediation has been re-evaluated, giving it centrality in the interpretation of the SR dynamic and providing a more comprehensive explanation of how the SRA is able to account for foreign policy evolution. The analytical application of my re-elaboration of Jessop and Hay’s SRA was applied to three case-studies, producing answers to the sub-RQs of this thesis. These explanations are developed in the next section.

**An empirical explanation of how the Strategic-Relational interplay was embodied in the process of change and continuity in Mexican foreign policy**

In this part of the Conclusion, I aim to answer the second RQ and the related sub-questions linked to the empirical chapters. The second RQ asked:

RQ2: How was the interplay among strategic selectivities, strategic agents and policy paradigms manifest in the process of continuity and change in Mexican foreign policy before and after the end of one-party in rule in 2000?

Considering the type of elements ascribable in a SR categorisation I aimed to understand which factors were more relevant and how they combined themselves through a relational and dialectical process to produce a change in Mexican international behaviour. Three different case studies were presented in Chapters Three, Four and Five in order to explore this interplay and understand whether, despite the PAN’s initial promises and intentions, a concrete change was implemented in each case. This analysis was necessary in order to answer the sub-RQs:

Sub-RQ1: Was foreign policy change implemented in each empirical case studied?

Sub-RQ2: Which elements among the strategic agents, policy paradigms and strategic selectivities influenced the process of change or continuity in each case study?
This section firstly considers the general framework needed to answer RQ2, and it is followed by consideration of each case study in order to answer the sub-RQs.

Mexican foreign policy during the Fox government represented a useful case for analysis in order to understand the process of change and continuity emerging from the coexistence of different conditions. They represented a transformation of structures, actors and ideas connected with the evolution of Mexico’s international affairs. Through the analysis of the evolution of Mexican foreign policy during the Fox government, I have identified the following circumstances:

- the presence of a new domestic political scenario and consequently new strategic actors;
- the existence of a new economic trend with respect to the early period of the PRI leadership;
- the changed international context;
- the spread of the idea that foreign policy would represent a major change in the PAN government with respect to the past;
- the will of the new party in power to make changes in foreign policy.

The contemporary presence of all these conditions represented a hypothetically favourable scenario for a change in foreign policy international, domestic and social constructed approaches.

Despite Neo-realist interpretations and those supporting the primacy of the international, domestic and agential dynamics played an important role in the definition of Mexican foreign policy, transformations in the Mexican political system produced a decrease in the predictability of its foreign policy. This motivated a shift in political and economic limits and opportunities (both at domestic and international level) that traditionally constrained innovative strategic actions. Those changes, and a more complex relationship between the executive and legislative branches, deprived state institutions of the political homogeneity that existed during the PRI administration, generating a new set of boundaries for the implementation of the international strategic action. Nevertheless, isolated or predominant considerations of domestic and agential factors provide an unsatisfactory interpretation of complex dynamics at the base of Mexican foreign policy evolution. In fact, traditional foreign policy paradigm ideas and principles eluded the rationale of the new administration’s policy path and were able to produce results at odds with the changes expected with
the new government. Political and social actors’ will to consider a different foreign policy paradigm was certainly limited by the presence of traditional ideas entrenched in political and institutional structures and among Mexican actors. However they were also influenced by the new set of opportunities provided by the changed international scenario.

Moreover, ideas connected to the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm were still superficial and not entrenched in the institutional structures; they were therefore incapable of establishing long term change in each foreign policy sector. As well as being rooted in Mexican structures, they needed to be internalised by new actors (many of them still connected with the old political system) in order to produce effective modifications in the foreign policy-making. The new Mexican system of values was still in formation and was not able to generate a substitution of the structural system and actors’ perceptions which continued to influence the foreign policy process. This process produced mutual influences that cannot be exhaustively considered in the absence of one of the aforementioned elements, because if any of these elements had been different, the foreign policy would have been different as well. The reciprocal influence among these elements was responsible for the generation of changes in Mexican foreign policy (or its continuity). In any of the case studies it did not allow the individuation of the unique factors that led such processes or the predominance of some of them over a specific period, as theorised by the pendulum approach. How the interplay among these factors concretely worked in each empirical case will be summarised below.

Chapter Three analysed Mexico’s strategic interpretation of participation in PKO. This case-study was considered because it represented a discrepancy between the new administration’s discourse on foreign policy renovation and the concrete implementation of Mexico’s strategic actions. Answering to the sub-RQs, this chapter illustrated that none of the three categories of SR elements considered in this thesis changed in relation to Mexico’s participation in PKO. This doomed the implementation of the change process to failure. Differences between the Fox government’s discourse of change in support of Mexico’s participation in PKO and the failure of its concrete implementation implied that the preservation of the PRI’s foreign policy was defined by the consistent interaction among the SRA main elements.

Continuity provided in this case was realised due to three conditions. Firstly, traditional Mexican foreign policy principles related to the PRI policy paradigm were
still rooted in Mexican institutions, political actors, Mexican leaders, the population and the media. Although economic boundaries did not impose any specific limitations, the presence of international pressures, domestic political changes and the new foreign policy vision were not sufficient to remove the existing normative boundaries. Secondly, the presence of these limits constrained policy makers’ strategic actions imposing restrictions on sending Mexican troops abroad. Taken together, this implies that structural limits did not allow the generation of new strategic selectivities favourable to Mexico’s participation in PKO. Thirdly, Mexican actors able to influence foreign policy continued appreciating the validity of the traditional foreign policy paradigm, perceiving existent strategic selectivities and limits still valid for the regulation of Mexico’s participation in PKO.

This integrated analysis contributed to the understanding of the interplay existent between different and mutually influential elements, generating an empirical explanation of Mexico’s participation in PKO absent in the literature. It provided a causational account of relations between agential, structural and ideational elements and the foreign policy-making. Expectations of foreign policy change, framed around domestic-driven approaches, were determined by the existence of both new political and social actors, and political and economic changes in the Mexican context. Despite it, this dynamic generated continuity in Mexican foreign policy in the matter of PKO. According to a SRA, it was possible because actors’ strategic interpretation of the validity of existent boundaries remained rooted in a Mexican Revolutionary foreign policy paradigm, impeding a concrete transformation but the reproduction of old dynamics. Monocausal approaches are not able to account for their relations over time; therefore they could not explain these dynamics.

Chapter Four analysed Mexico’s participation at the UNSC and its strategic interpretation of the Iraqi War as a non-permanent member at the UNSC. The chapter presented a case study which combined the two main axes of the new Mexican foreign policy paradigm: Mexico’s will to establish a special-relationship with the United States, and Mexico’s desire for international pro-activity. This case-study was considered relevant due to the contemporary presence of different foreign policy dynamics and strategic decisions. The case-study addressed the first sub-RQ, firstly highlighting the presence of a change process, which allowed Mexico’s presence in the UNSC. Successively, it observed a reverse gear in the process, showing the continuity and preservation of the PRI’s foreign policy in relation to its support to the Iraqi war.
On the one hand, Mexico’s participation in UNSC activities reflected the implementation of new ideas, despite being formally conditional on the respect of the PRI principles. Economic limits did not represent an obstacle for actors’ strategic implementation and they were not constrained by the new strategic selectivities, allowing participation in the UNSC. On the other hand, strategic actors’ rejection to support the Iraqi war was related to the presence of traditional ideas and the absence of a long-term strategy for Mexico’s international activities. These political constraints preserved the validity of institutional and political boundaries for most of the strategic actors. This illustrates how the traditional foreign policy paradigm was still entrenched in the normative system, influencing the presence of strategic selectivities in Mexico and the strategic interpretation of the context.

This showed the incompleteness of monocausal and dualist approaches in the analysis of complex causal foreign policy explanations and the necessity to consider simultaneous influences exerted by different sets of elements in order to understand the foreign policy-making. Standing on a different position compared with Morphogenetic and Structurationist interpretations, structures were necessary to understand such dynamics but their predominance not able to provide complete explanations of changing processes. In fact, in presence of same structural and domestic conditions, this case illustrated the generation of different results thanks to the evaluation of a process of double internalisation between different elements, contradicting other structural and neoliberal interpretations (Saxe-Fernández 2002; González González 2001).

Addressing the second sub-RQ, again it is not possible to individuate a single factor responsible for the process of change and continuity. However ideas related to the PAN’s foreign policy paradigm were differently applied to the two situations considered in the chapter. The contemporary study of distinct situations during Mexico’s participation in the UNSC, showed a mixed result in the implementation of the new foreign policy paradigm, hence a partial realisation of the process of change. This empirically confirmed Jessop’s interpretation (1990) of the necessity of coherent long-term goals in order to realise structural and strategic changes.

In Chapter Five, the last case-study presented Mexico’s interpretation of international promotion and the defence of HR. Differently from the partial realisation of change in Mexico’s participation in the UNSC, this case represented the most important and successful change in Mexico’s foreign policy, clearly answering the first sub-RQ. The
importance of HR was emphasised by the opening of the Mexican system and the interaction among new types of actors during the early stages of the PRI government and the presence of new structural and international opportunities. This shift supported the diffusion of the validity of HR principles among political and social actors and the reduction of the limitations to their implementation.

As the notion of the universal validity of HR and their international support spread in Mexico, the right-based principles were inserted among the key points of the new foreign policy paradigm, modifying actors’ foreign policy strategies. These actors’ interpretations of the legitimacy of existing limits in foreign policy, traditionally linked to the old foreign policy principles, underwent an evolution and influenced the shift from existent structural selectivities in this field. International and political pressures and the introduction of a new legislation in favour of HR produced an increase in the Mexican budget. The presence of new boundaries emphasised the realisation of new preferred strategies and the consideration of those new actors supporting them. This mutual and dialectical process of transformation also favoured the implementation of Mexico’s HR promotion and defence in the international arena, changing its foreign policy positions on such matters.

Considering the presence of these initial changes, the chapter showed how social and political consensus on these topics was essential to the realisation of further structural changes. This generated a process of double internalisation favourable to the foreign policy change and that fostered the promotion and defence of HR in Mexico’s foreign policy. Results of this interaction empirically confirmed the validity of Hall’s (1993) functional role attributed to paradigms in policy-making, the centrality of their influences in the interpretation of structural selectivities and the selection of strategic solutions. In order to answer to the second sub-RQ, this case-study identified that each element involved in the relational and dialectical interplay which enabled this foreign policy transformation, also changed with respect to the past. The thesis applied an integrative framework providing further advancements with respect to Carlsnaes’ (1992) application of a Tripartite approach and his consideration of a Morphogenetic conceptualisation. The understanding of the double internalisation process among structures, agents and ideational factors enabled it to explore the complexity of mutual influences present in foreign policy-making. Considering them not just one at time, but simultaneously, this thesis was able to speak to weaknesses represented by the dual interpretation of this relationship, which limited Carlsnaes’
and Critical Realist approaches. Moreover, this dialectical explanation discarded approaches that consider single elements sufficient to explain causal foreign policy considering their analyses incomplete and unable to explore their changes over time.

Given my aim to determine the modifications in Mexican foreign policy, this thesis stressed those differences present in the case studies analysed in Chapters Three to Five, underlining the different results obtained. I have highlighted that the process of continuity and change in Mexican foreign policy was generated by reciprocal and dialectical influences established by foreign policy paradigms, strategic selectivities and foreign policy strategic actors. However, it was not possible to identify a unique factor responsible of the process of continuity and change in any of the case-studies considered. Despite this, ideas and foreign policy paradigms clearly played a key mediation role, able to favour the reconfiguration of strategic selectivities and the actors’ strategies, consequently influencing the implementation of change and continuity; the conditions under which these ideas and foreign policy paradigms thrived or faded are explained in the next section.

**Conditions for the existence of change and continuity in foreign policy**

Whereas previous RQs explained how the interplay among the different SRA factors was developed both theoretically and empirically, this RQ aims to individuate the main characteristics necessary to produce a change in foreign policy. In highlighting the findings, this section will explore how foreign policy change does and does not occur in the Mexican case, addressing the main RQ of this thesis:

MRQ: What conditions were necessary for the implementation of change in Mexican foreign policy?

The combination of the use of the SR theoretical background and the exploration of the three different case studies of Mexico’s foreign policy generated five conditions necessary for the processes of change in foreign policy.

Firstly, the different outcomes of the continuity and change processes, identified through the case studies, imply that the change of single elements, such as structures, actors or ideas, cannot be considered determinant for the process of foreign policy change. As found in Chapters Three and Four, the presence of
alternative ideas, the existence of a new political class and the possibility to obtain financial resources and create new governmental departments were not sufficient to generate participation in PKO or support for the Iraqi War. This finding confirms that independent change of material, agential and ideational conditions alone cannot generate foreign policy transformation. Hence, theories that limit the explanation of the process to these factors alone are inadequate and unable to explain the complex process of foreign policy transformation.

Secondly, in order to produce change in foreign policy, every one of the considered SR factors needs to be modified in order to perform a concrete and effective change in foreign policy. As showed in empirical Chapters Three to Five, a concrete change was possible only in relation to Mexico’s international defence and promotion of HR due to such a transformation in each one of the associated SR factors. In the case of Chapters Three and Four, the continuity was motivated by the tenacity of the traditional foreign policy principles or the insufficient entrenchment of the new ones. Therefore, if just one of these SR factors (strategic selectivities, strategic actors and policy paradigm) does not undergo a modification, the concrete implementation of the change process can be compromised due to the intrinsic relational and dialectical nature of the interplay established among these three elements. In fact, the maintenance of the status quo of just one of these elements is able to influence the resulting processes of change in the other factors; this is due to the fact that the interplay between factors has the potential to generate certain limitations for the innovation of strategic selectivities or the creation of new strategies. Therefore, the production of such constraints can jeopardise the implementation of the change and its endurance. In sum, in order to have a change in foreign policy, it is necessary that every single factor changes.

Thirdly, even if actors, structures and ideas undergo a transformation, the presence of change in all three factors is not sufficient to guarantee a transformation in foreign policy. The inter-relation of factors’ individual processes of transformation is necessary to produce a general shift in foreign policy. Chapter Three analysed the existence of a reverse gear in the implementation of the change, providing a useful explanation for the necessity of this condition. In fact, even if Mexico experimented with an initial change in its foreign policy due to the transformation of all the three factors, reasons for the impermanence of such process can be explained only by considering the existence of the mutual influences among the factors analysed and the outcomes of
these interactive dynamics. As explained in the previous section, even though the
generality of each factor under consideration changed, the absence of entrenched
ideas determined the preservation of the foreign policy path in relation to Mexico’s
support to the Iraqi War.

These first three conditions for change in foreign policy confirm that the consideration
of how different factors interact, mutually influencing their changes, is fundamental to
the comprehension of change and continuity processes in foreign policy. Hence,
dualist approaches not considering the double-internalisation present among factors
cannot account for the origin and the evolution of foreign policy change. While
Morphogenetic interpretations underestimate the causational role played by agents
and ideational factors, not explaining how intermediate changes were realised. Rather,
the SRA can provide a useful theoretical and analytical framework in order to
understand these dynamics. Therefore, consideration of both the SRA factors
(structural selectivities, strategic actors and strategies) and the foreign policy
paradigms alongside their ideas provides both a practical and a holistic approach to
understanding how changes occur in foreign policy.

The fourth and the fifth conditions concern the stability of the outcomes produced by
the process of change. The fourth condition necessary for effective, stable change is
that the transformation should be the result of a time-rooted process. This condition
recalls Jessop’s spatio-temporal framework, within which the characteristic SR process
of double internalisation, must be conceptualised. As explained in Chapter One,
according to Jessop, the spatio-temporal framework is fundamental to the
understanding of how different actions can be produced within a specific context.
Understanding the context as temporally and spatially specific in relation to the
structural composition is critical to distinguishing one system from another, a primary
condition to every type of change. However, the need to produce a time-rooted
process refers to the necessary condition of stability in order to realise effective
change in foreign policy. It is not limited to the acknowledgment of the initial
circumstances alone, but to the permanence over of essential circumstances
conditions for the implementation of change. This stability is related to the
entrenchment of ideas linked to a specific foreign policy paradigm, in both actors and
context. The importance of this condition for the realisation of the process of change
in foreign policy is illustrated in Chapter Five. A key dynamic for the fulfilment of
stable outcomes was the intertwining of HR ideas among a breadth of sectors,
diffusing the idea of their universal validity and representing the linchpin of the transformation in foreign policy. The generation of this type of stability was possible only thanks to the existence of a process rooted over time that favoured the successive entrenchment of the new foreign policy paradigm.

Finally, the fifth condition necessary to generate stable outcomes from the process of change in foreign policy concerns the necessity to implement a long-term project. Such projects should be associated with a specific foreign policy paradigm, able to link the path followed with each foreign policy area. The necessity of a long-term process is related to preservation of the outcomes obtained. It is needed in order to determine stability for the new status quo as generated by the process of change and discouraging sudden deviations in strategic selectivities and actors’ strategies. Although partial changes can be obtained in foreign policy, they do not necessarily determine a change in the general foreign policy path; they may also maintain the continuity of a traditional foreign policy paradigm. Hence, in order to establish an effective and stable change in foreign policy it is necessary to relate the outcomes obtained in each foreign policy area. As shown in Chapter Four, an insufficient entrenchment of the new foreign policy paradigm can be responsible of overall instability, undermining the success of the change through the production of temporary transformations incapable of persisting over time. The identification of this fifth condition is related to the fourth, showing the importance of temporality in the evaluation of processes of change and continuity in foreign policy, responsible for underpinning a stable and definitive transformation.

Original contributions and the expanded scenario for future studies

In developing the sections of this conclusive part of the thesis, the RQs proposed in the Introduction have been answered highlighting the main findings of the thesis and the original contributions generated by the research. This final section will restate them suggesting new possibilities offered by the wider scenario in the study of processes of change and continuity in foreign policy. The conclusion of this thesis confirms that, in first instance, the research provides an original application of Jessop and Hay’s SRA to the processes of continuity and change in foreign policy, confirming its validity for this type of analysis. This interpretation explains how, and under which types of conditions, foreign policy change can either occur or establish continuity with
the past. The study can be considered innovative with respect to Brighi’s work, as it is the only other work applying this approach to foreign policy analysis. I have developed a novel interpretation of the strategic actors involved in the process of change, differentiating them from the state. Moreover, the original contribution has also been determined by the distinct conceptualisation of the context within which foreign policy emerges, considering domestic politics and international relations according to their function, rather than to their spatial collocation.

Secondly, this thesis offers an innovative interpretation of Mexican foreign policy under Fox, alongside the original contribution of qualitative data collected through fieldwork. The operationalization of my interpretation of the SRA provides a profound consideration of the effective implementation of change in three specific case studies, underlining existent contradictions between the promise of change and its implementation. Furthermore, the application of the SRA considers the key role played by the ideational mediation, considering it indispensable in the process of foreign policy transformation. Thirdly, the thesis explores the dynamics and factors that led the processes of continuity and change in Mexican foreign policy through an SR interpretation. The analysis of the three case studies highlights the presence of five main conditions necessary for the implementation of the process of change in foreign policy. Among them the thesis provides an innovative theoretical consideration, based on the application of Jessop and Hay’s SRA to the case-studies, concerning the stability of outcomes produced by the process of change. This innovative finding underlines the importance of the presence of a time-rooted process and the necessity of the internalisation of the new foreign policy paradigm for effective and stable change in foreign policy.

However the complexity of the SR process of double-internalisation creates certain limitations in relation to its analytical application. This is primarily due to the fact that it is impossible to strictly categorise structure and agents as, depending on the focus assumed, they may be interpreted in different ways. For example, if we consider a country’s decisions within in an international organisation, other states can be interpreted both as competing strategic actors or structural constraints for the implementation of certain decisional changes. This means that the SRA imposes a clear delimitation on the researcher’s assumed perspective. A further limitation is difficulty of distinguishing the degree to which different factors have changed, forcing the researcher to consider them in relation to specific policies, and therefore making it
difficult to understand the extent to which their change has been influenced by other factors. The presence and impact of these limitations is a possible subject for further research.

The innovative use this thesis made of the SRA approach to foreign policy processes of continuity and change, and the empirical research developed on Mexican foreign policy contributes to the proliferation of possibilities for related future research. Taking into account the limited number of Mexican case studies analysed in this thesis, it would be interesting to enlarge the application of my interpretation of the theoretical approach to a wider number of empirical cases, temporally expanded. The integration of my empirical study to similar analyses developed in different periods would produce an extensive understanding of Mexican foreign policy. The study of the processes of change and continuity in foreign policy to other countries could be effectively developed from an SR perspective, enabling a more comprehensive understanding of existent dynamics. Moreover, future development of similar research would benefit the study of additional specific factors contributing to change in bilateral, multilateral or regional dynamics.

Expanding the consideration of my SR perspective on foreign policy, further research should investigate its application to those innovative processes that imply extremely radical changes. The application of the SRA as a theoretical and analytical approach to the study of policy implementation and the establishment of international agreements would also merit further attention, contributing to the diffusion of a worthy and effective approach, still neglected in many research fields.
Appendices

List of Interviews

Acosta, Mariclaire (Mexico City, 24 June 2011). Acosta was Special Ambassador for Democracy and Human Rights and Undersecretary for Human Rights and Democracy from 2000 to 2003. She is an eminent expert in human rights, currently the Director of Freedom House-Mexico, one of the leading personalities of the transition team and a central figure for the implementation of the foreign policy goal of international protection and defence of human rights during the Fox’s government. She was founding member and President of the Mexican Commission of Promotion and Defence of Human Rights, founding member and director of the Mexican Human Rights Academy and former Chair of Amnesty International- Mexico.

Benítez Manaut, Raul (Mexico City, 26 July 2011). Benítez Manaut was Fox government’s deputy adviser for National Security until 2003 and the President of CASEDE. He is PhD in Latin American studies at the UNAM, professor and researcher at the CISAN of the UNAM and expert in security, civil-military relations and defence. He has been academic and visiting researcher at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C. and at many other universities both in Mexico and the US.

Berruga Filloy, Enrique (Mexico City, 13 July 2011). Berruga Filloy is a Mexican career diplomat and the President of COMEXI. During the Fox’ government he was member of the transition team and Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (2000 to 2003) and since 2003 he is Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN. In the 1990s he also served as chief of the staff of the Foreign Minister and as Mexican Ambassador in Costa Rica. He has been professor of Mexican and US foreign policy and he is author of several publications on foreign policy and international economy.

Cruz Vázquez, Eduardo (Mexico City, 16 June 2011). Cruz Vázquez is expert in cultural diplomacy, journalist and lecturer at the Metropolitan Autonomous University in Mexico City. During the Fox’s government he was cultural counsellor at the Embassy of Mexico un Colombia and previously in Chile. He
was adviser to the Commission of Culture and Cinema at the Chamber of Deputies and to the National Institute of Statistic and Geography (INEGI).

Fernández de Castro, Rafael (Mexico City, 11 April 2011). Fernández de Castro is PhD at the Georgetown University and expert in Mexico and US foreign policy. During Fox’s government he was the Vice-Chair of COMEXI. He is founder and former director of *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*, Presidential Advisor for International Affairs and Competitiveness and founder and head of the Department of International Studies at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). He collaborates with the Wilson Center and is political analyst for several newspapers. He worked as foreign policy adviser for the Mexican Presidency from 2008 to 2011.

Muñoz Ledo, Porfirio (Mexico City, 27 May 2011). Muñoz Ledo is a Mexican politician, he is PhD at the University of Paris and candidate for the presidency in 2000. During the Fox’s government he was member of the transition team, Special Ambassador to the UN and the European Union and President of the National Research Commission for the state Reform. He was President of the PRI between 1975 and 1976, founder and President of the PRD and in 1997 he was appointed President of the Chamber of Deputies, being the first member of an opposition party to preside the Congress. Moreover since 1972 he served as member of the cabinet of the President, Ambassador to the UN until 1985, Minister and member of the Parliament at both national and federal level.

Navarrete, Jorge Eduardo (Mexico City, 22 June 2011). Navarrete is a Mexican career diplomat and Professor at the UNAM. He was Undersecretary for Economic Affairs from 1978 to 1982 and, during the Fox’ government, Ambassador to the UNSC until 2002 and Ambassador of Mexico in Germany from 2002 to 2003. He was Ambassador in other states as Brazil, United Kingdom, China and Austria, among others. He also served as Undersecretary to the Mexican Ministry of Energy. Navarrete is author of several publications on export development and on the relationship Mexico-China.

Pascoe Pierce, Ricardo (Mexico City, 10 May 2011). Pascoe Pierce is a Mexican politician, analyst and Professor at the UNAM. During the Fox’s government was Mexican Ambassador to Cuba from 2000 to 2002. He was founding member of the PRD and the first Trotskyist Deputy at Mexico’s Congress in
1985-1988. In 2003 he left the PRD but continued his political activity in Mexican institutions.

Rozental, Andrés (Mexico City, 14 April 2011). Rozental is a career diplomat and during the Fox government he was Special Ambassador for Mexico’s candidacy at the UNSC and for the negotiations between Colombia and the FARC. In the period from 1995 to 1997 he was the former Mexican Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Moreover, he is founding member of COMEXI and founding President of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, member of the Board of the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Rozental is author of numerous publications on foreign policy and international affairs and member of many research centres. He is Jorge Castañeda’s half-brother.

Ruiz Sandoval, Erika (Mexico City, 16 May 2011). Ruíz Sandoval is PhD at the University of Barcelona and expert in foreign policy, international relations and European Integration. Lecturer and researcher at the CIDE and the Autonomous Technologic Institute of Mexico (ITAM), during Fox’s government she was adviser for the Ministry of Finance and nowadays for the Foreign Ministry.

Tello Macías, Manuel (Mexico City, 16 April 2008). Tello was a Mexican career diplomat and politician expert in foreign policy. Between 1994 and 2000, during the last PRI government, he was appointed Foreign Minister. He served as Mexican Ambassador to France and the United Kingdom and worked as Permanent Ambassador to the UN. He joined the Foreign Service in 1957 and among his most relevant activities appears Mexico’s inclusion as full member at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). He died in 2010.

Valero Recío Becerra, O. Ricardo (Mexico City, 03 April 2008) Valero is expert in International Law and foreign policy and Professor at the UNAM and Colegio de México. During the Fox’s government he served as Mexican Ambassador to Chile and he was Undersecretary of International Cooperation at the Foreign Ministry from 1982 to 1992. During the 1970s and the 1980s he collaborated with the PRI and in the period 1991-1994 he was Federal Deputy of the PRD.
Investigation activities and methods

The development of the qualitative research design of this thesis is based on: historical and discursive analysis; semi-structured interviews; archival research and analysis of policy documents and surveys; and the analysis of mass media. In order to develop a specific study of every empirical case, the existing literature on the SRA and Mexico’s foreign policy was explored. Prior to the first part of fieldwork in Mexico, I acquired information necessary for data collection and the conducting of 12 semi-structured interviews (detailed in the first Appendix) with academics, researchers and members of Mexico’s political elite. Think tanks have been selected after considering their rankings in *The global Go-to think tanks research* and the *Security and International Affairs Think Tank Directory* elaborated by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (2007; McGann 2007). Secondly, I examined the reforms inherent in the three case studies and the Presidential declarations on these matters, available on the Presidential and Congress institutional websites. Thirdly, I analysed declarations in the media and newspaper articles. These articles were selected from four of the top five96 Mexican newspapers and the top five North American newspapers97 according to 2012 *Newspapers rankings* elaborated by “4 International media and newspapers”.

The first part of fieldwork was undertaken in Mexico City from February 2011 to July 2011, while the second part took place from February 2012 to July 2012. The first part was necessary in order to create networks and establish contacts to facilitate the interviews I used in this thesis and that are listed in the Appendix. Moreover, during the first period of fieldwork I had access to the national archives of the Foreign Ministry, the National Historic and Diplomatic Archive, and the “Genaro Estrada” Historical Archive.

In Manchester, between the two parts of fieldwork, I used the Internet to investigate every Senate and Chamber of Deputies meeting and assembly between July 2000 and July 2006: an average of 20 documents per month containing a high number of topics. I studied the official diary of Congress, stenographic versions of incumbents’

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96 Just four out top five Mexican newspapers were considered (La Jornada, El Universal and Reforma and El Informador). This was due to the lack of hard copies of newspapers in the national archives and online articles published by *El Milenio*.

speeches in Congress and the results of the decisions present in the *Gaceta Oficial*,
the official publication of Congress.

Information on the opinions\(^{98}\) of Mexico’s public and leaders regarding foreign policy was acquired from the survey, *Mexico y el mundo 2006: opinión pública y política exterior en Mexico* and its previous publication in 2004\(^{99}\) (CIDE-COMEXI 2004; 2006) published by CIDE-COMEXI.\(^{100}\) Information on the variations in cultural values were extrapolated using the results of the *World Values Survey* from 1981 to 2008 (World Values Survey 2002). These surveys were integrated into data collection with the aim to investigate the value positions of Mexico’s participation in UNSC and the Iraq War I considered the most important surveys that appeared in 2003 in the journal *Este País*, elaborated by the *World Value Survey* (Pellicer 2003, 98; Basañez and Moreno 2003) and those presented by the polls in *Consulta Mitofsky*,\(^{101}\) as well as focusing on ‘The war in Iraq’ (Consulta Mitofsky 2003a, 2003b).

Further information relevant to the case studies on PKO and HR has been analysed. I considered *The globalisation index* elaborated by AT Kearney/ Foreign Policy (2003; 2006; 2007) in order to understand the financial and personnel contributions made by Mexico to PKO. Moreover, I analysed the National Supreme Court of Justice data and the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR 2003) *Diagnóstico sobre al situación de los derechos humanos* en México in order to investigate Mexico’s approach to HR.

During the second part of my fieldwork in Mexico, I was employed as visiting researcher at the Centre for Research on North America (CISAN) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), where I collaborated with Prof. Raul Benitez Manaut and Dr. Silvia Nuñez, the Director of the Centre. Thanks to this collaboration I had access to the UNAM library, the National Newspapers library at the UNAM and private collections in order to complement the research carried out in

\(^{98}\) Information about the methodology used in the survey (CIDE-COMEXI) to differentiate leader and population in 2004 is available at:  
[http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu/2004/topline2004leadersingles.pdf](http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu/2004/topline2004leadersingles.pdf) and  
While information on the methodology used for the survey 2006 is available at  
[http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu/2006/lideres2006.pdf](http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu/2006/lideres2006.pdf) and  

\(^{99}\) These surveys were sponsored by the WK Kellogg Foundation, Ford Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, US Embassy, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico’s Foreign Ministry- SRE), Senado de la República LX Legislatura (Mexican Senate, 60th Administration), and COMEXI.

\(^{100}\) CIDE is the Economic Research and Taught Centre that also operates as a university, and the COMEXI is the Mexican Council for Foreign Relations, a foreign policy think tank. Both 2004 and 2006 surveys are available at:  

\(^{101}\) See [http://consulta.mx/web/](http://consulta.mx/web/).
Manchester. This collaboration allowed me to network and participate in a series of conferences, useful for acquiring more primary information on the case studies of my thesis. I was able to approach relevant personalities in the Mexican scenario and develop an excellent network, useful for future research. During the fieldwork I had access to a series of documents officially requested through the national Law of Freedom of Information. I could then explore the National Development Plan (PND) from 2000 to 2005, and the official declarations of Mexico’s representatives at the UN present through an archive produced by the Foreign Ministry. I was able to access Mexico’s Ministry of Finance databases and the Federation’s public expenditure data, necessary for the analysis of the economic limits constraining Mexico’s foreign policy activities.
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