

**THE FOUND FOOTAGE NARRATIVE: REFLEXIVE
MYTHOLOGY OF SURVIVOR MEMORY.**

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities.

2014

ANTON G BIELECKI

SCHOOL OF ARTS, LANGUAGES AND CULTURES

List of Contents

Abstract.....	3
Declaration.....	4
Copyright.....	4
Acknowledgements.....	5
Introduction.....	6
<i>Chapter One:</i>	
The Facts of Memory.....	18
<i>Chapter Two:</i>	
The Memory of Facts.....	31
<i>Chapter Three:</i>	
The Written Essay.....	58
<i>Chapter Four:</i>	
The Cinematic Essay.....	80
<i>Chapter Five:</i>	
The Found Footage Narrative in Practice.....	103
Conclusion.....	122
Bibliography.....	139
Filmography.....	150

Abstract

In 2014, as the number of survivors dwindles, the representation of their memory and testimony after they have gone becomes increasingly important. Although it is critical to discuss the historical facts of the atrocities of World War II, those facts often do not reach the personal experiences of many survivors, who can only express many of the details of their experiences through an expression of their memories through testimony. One such testimony is that of Wanda Bielecka, a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. This practice-based research (consisting of a film and accompanying thesis) explores her memories as they are expressed through her own testimony, and the testimony of her testimony of eleven members of her family. The practice element of the PhD consists of a 73-minute film called *Wanda*. *Wanda* is a found footage narrative, a new form of film developed to answer the following research question: how is survivor experience represented in the collective memory of a survivor's family, and how can the form of the found footage narrative be used as a way of understanding the construction of that memory? This research will explore the collective memory of the Bielecka family around the events of Wanda's life during World War II from her incarceration in Auschwitz to her eventual liberation and journey to Paris. This collective memory will be explored as a mythology around Wanda's experience. The film itself will then reflexively reveal its own place in the construction of that mythology. A formal conception of the dialectical image is fundamental to the film's form. This form has been developed through research into essayistic modes in literature and film. It will be shown that the found footage narrative is a form of film that can be used to research, not just the collective memory around Wanda's experience, but also other instances of collective memory.

Declaration

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

Copyright Statement

The following four notes on copyright and the ownership of intellectual property rights must be included as written below:

- i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.
- ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.
- iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.
- iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see <http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487>), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see <http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations>) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.

Aknowledgements

I would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for their funding of this research. I would also like to thank Dr Johannes Sjöberg and Dr David Butler for their invaluable critiques and advice as advisors. I'd like to thank Craig Baldwin and Other Cinema, without whom the film would not physically exist in the form of all those hundreds of 16mm film strips sourced at their archive. My sincerest gratitude goes to my family Wanda Bielecka, Halina Bielecka, Jurek Bielecki, Mark Bielecki, Anne Bielecka, Polly Bielecka, Elin Bielecka, Amber Bielecka, Jet Bielecka, Kazimir Bielecki, Lukas Bielecki without whom this story would not exist in all its richness and beauty. And finally my deepest love and respect goes to my wife, Sarah Gallegos Bielecka, for having the patience and kindness to put up with this nonsense for so many years.

Introduction

In 2014, in an interview with the Guardian newspaper, Holocaust survivor Otto Dov Kulka discussed his attempts to write about the memory of his experiences in his book, *Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death: Reflections on Memory and Imagination*.¹ He points out that every survivor has his or her own unique story to tell, but that “we never talked about it.”² Kulka, an Israeli historian who has spent decades studying the Holocaust, had never (up until the publication of *Landscapes*) publicly discussed or even revealed his status as a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. For all those years, while conducting research on the history of the Holocaust, Kulka decided not to publish anything about his own personal experiences. A silence existed around his personal story, as though the events were so inexplicable and incomprehensible that they were beyond language or any other form of representation.

Kulka, in his historical studies, prefers to use documentary evidence and empirical methods, but he admits that, “there are matters of meaning that go beyond that.”³ In *Landscapes*, Kulka uses thoughts, memories, dreams, feelings, photographs and poems to try and reach meanings around the Holocaust that his historical research cannot. Furthermore, the writing in *Landscapes* is based on diary fragments written, and spoken onto tape over the years, rather than carefully structured and redrafted prose. Kulka deliberately uses his imagination and fantasy to explore meanings around his experience. Subjectivity, rather than objectivity, is the mode of research.

Indeed, Kulka describes the memories around his experience as a “private mythology,” with its own “mythological language” created by him.⁴ Before creating *Landscapes*, he did not think it was possible to represent this mythological language outside of thought.

What I am doing here actually runs contrary to all my decisions, all my feelings, the whole awareness of my limitations, or former limitations that

¹ Otto Dov Kulka, *Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death: Reflections on Memory and Imagination*, Ralph Mandel trans., (London: Penguin, 2013).

² Otto Dov Kulka, “Otto Dov Kulka: Everyone one of us has his or her own story of survival. But we never talked about,” <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/07/otto-dov-kulka-interview>, accessed 20th September 2014.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Otto Dov Kulka, *Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death*, p.78.

came to mind: limitations of language, primarily doubts of my ability to intermix these mythological landscapes with landscapes that are receptive to communicative transmission.⁵

Landscapes contradicts the intentions, not only of Kulka's previous historical research, but the silence that pervaded his own survivor experience. His previous belief was that his memory could not be expressed in a form external to his thoughts. And yet, the book is an attempt to represent those thoughts, memories and myths around his experience.

Similarly, the found footage narrative, *Wanda*, is an attempt to represent the *collective* thoughts, memories and myths around another survivor's experience: my grandmother, Wanda Bielecka. *Wanda* is an exploration of the Bielecka family memory around specific events of Wanda's life during World War II. As with Kulka's experience, as with all survivor experience, it is impossible to fully represent what happened. *Wanda* is an attempt to reconcile a representation of the family's collective memory, which is a representation of Wanda's memory, which is a representation of her experiences. Despite the gap that exists between *Wanda* and Wanda's experience, the found footage narrative is an attempt to understand how events exist *after* their happening, in her thoughts, and thoughts of the family members who hear her testimony. It is a history of memory, imagination and fantasy. The found footage narrative is therefore an attempt to voice silence and comprehend the incomprehensible.

It should be disclosed that this writer is in fact a member of Wanda's family; her grandchild, and son to Jurek Bielecki. Alongside Wanda herself and this writer, Jurek was also interviewed for the film. Further people interviewed were Wanda's daughter, Halina Munro, Wanda's son, Mark Bielecki, Wanda's daughter in law, Anne Bielecka and Wanda's grandchildren, Elin Bielecka, Polly Bielecka, Amber Bielecka, Jet Bielecka, Kazimir Bielecki and Lukas Bielecki. All interviews, aside from Wanda's, took place in and around London in 2013. Wanda's interview took place in London, but much earlier, in 2008. The reason that Wanda was not interviewed again, in 2013, is that by that time her memory of events had receded so much that it would not be adequate for the creation of the film.

⁵ Ibid.

I knew little of the details of her experiences until she spent a whole day with me in 1999 going into detail about her life during World War II. With memories of this new testimony in my head I recalled what Wanda had told me to other relatives who had also been told of her experiences. And yet I found that their versions of the story contradicted mine. Sometimes the contradictions were in the small details of description; the time of day; the weather; the landscape we imagined her in. And yet at other times the contradictions were much greater. We described different stories of how Wanda was arrested, or how she escaped.

Always, with each new member of the family I spoke to, new information was revealed, pieces of the narrative that I had not been told by Wanda herself, or had perhaps missed in the listening. I returned to Wanda and asked her again about what had happened to her during World War II and found that in retelling her story details had changed, or sometimes events were described in a contradictory way to how she had recounted them before. Again, new information surfaced that she had not mentioned in her previous testimony, that no other family member had told me, that other members of the family *had* told me, but that Wanda sometimes described in a different way.

Definitions of the Holocaust, and the victims of Nazi crimes, are necessarily complex. The context of Wanda's internment and abuse was different to that of Jewish Poles. However, although chapter one will make clear the distinctions between the Jewish and non-Jewish Polish experience, Wanda *is* a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp, and will be referred to as such throughout this study. Although organisations, such as *Yad Vashem*, define a survivor as a *Jewish* victim of Nazi persecution, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum defines survivor thus;

The Museum honours as survivors any persons, Jewish or non-Jewish, who were displaced, persecuted, or discriminated against due to racial, religious, ethnic, social, and political policies of the Nazis and their collaborators between 1933 and 1945.⁶

⁶ The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "How is a Holocaust Survivor Defined?", <http://www.ushmm.org/remember/the-holocaust-survivors-and-victims-resource-center/benjamin-and-vladka-meed-registry-of-holocaust-survivors/registry-faq#11>, accessed 5 April 2015.

This is the definition by which this study defines Wanda Bielecka as a survivor.

Indeed, definitions of those affected by Nazi persecution has shifted over time. Initially, Holocaust discourse defined this group as ‘victims.’ But, as Anne Rothe notes, this became a negative term metaphorically framing anyone who was murdered or survived as “a weak loser in the fight for the survival of the fittest.”⁷ Those experiencing the Holocaust were seen as passively submitting to Nazi brutalities. Indeed, as Arlene Stein attests, partly through her own experience as the daughter of a survivor, for the first two decades after World War II, discussion of the Holocaust in countries such as the United States was largely absent and seen as irrelevant to non-Jews, while Jewish survivors and their families did not openly speak about or specifically highlight the atrocities now understood through terms such as the Holocaust or Shoah.⁸ As the extent of the Holocaust was revealed, through stories such as Anne Frank’s and the Adolf Eichmann trial, this view shifted. As Daniel H. Magilow and Lisa Silverman observe, those who lived through the Holocaust “came to redefine themselves not as victims, but as survivors able to overcome suffering and become stronger as a result.”⁹ Using the term survivor became a form of empowerment for those who experienced the Holocaust.

However, defining a non-Jewish person as a survivor is problematic. Non-Jewish Poles, as a group, were treated differently to the Jews of Europe, who were systematically targeted and exterminated during the Holocaust. Furthermore, Jewish survivors often experience “survivor guilt,” in which someone who survived experiences feelings of wrongdoing because they were not one of those Jews who died during the Holocaust. However, Wanda herself experienced what many European Jews experienced, existing in the same horrific conditions, and subject to the same brutal treatments as those Jews that survived. Wanda therefore survived the concentration camps just as they did, and therefore she will be referred to as a survivor just as they are. To describe Wanda otherwise is to look upon the context of her abuse with the benefit of hindsight, without considering her specific treatment in the camps. Chapter one will explore the nuances between Jewish and non-Jewish

⁷ Anne Rothe, *Popular Trauma Culture: Selling the Pain of Others in the Mass Media*, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2011), p.32

⁸ Arlene Stein, *Reluctant Witnesses: Survivors, Their Children, and the Rise of Holocaust Consciousness*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

⁹ Daniel H. Magilow, Lisa Silverman, *Holocaust Representations in History: An Introduction*, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), p.59.

survivor experiences and explores the specific circumstances around Wanda's experience.

Similarly to *Landscapes*, *Wanda* uses spoken testimony as a foundation. Talking head interviews conducted with Wanda and eleven of her relatives about her experience in World War II (from being incarcerated in Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp to her eventual liberation) structures the film. Alongside the survivor testimony of Wanda, and the testimony of her testimony of the eleven other family members, another formal element of *Wanda* is its use of 'found footage'. As with *Landscapes*, which uses aesthetic forms such as photographs or poems, *Wanda* uses the aesthetic form of found footage reconstructions to dramatise the events described by the Bielecka family. Developed as a technique from the earliest days of cinema when Esfir Shub first started to make her 'compilation' films in the 1920s, the found footage film has often been associated with avant-garde or political filmmaking because of the methods through which it often comments upon culture, politics and history.

Although the term found footage has been used to describe specific genres of horror and monster films, such as the *Blair Witch Project* (1999) or *Cloverfield* (2008), here it is used differently. Those films present a fictional narrative as though the images and audio are 'found' material recorded by the characters themselves. However, the found footage narrative utilises the genre of found footage film in which images and audio originally derived from other films are combined through montage in a new cinematic context. Through the new context of the found footage film, alternative meanings of the images are revealed, and in turn the images reveal new meanings in the film. The found footage narrative creates found footage reconstructions using images from many different sources, which combined through montage becomes the second formal element of *Wanda*.

The found footage narrative is not a history of events, but a history of memory, and as a history of memory it is an analysis of the construction of myth. *Wanda* looks at how the collective memory of the Bielecka family constructs mythologies around Wanda's experience. Myth is constructed from real events that have been distorted in memory and take on a symbolic meaning in the representation of that memory. Indeed, the found footage narrative explores what Joseph Campbell calls "creative myth" in which an individual experiences something profound and seeks to express it through signs. "If his realisation is of a certain depth and import, his communication will have

force and value of living myth for those... who receive and respond to it themselves.”¹⁰ The found footage narrative is therefore a dialectics between history and myth through the communication of memories amongst a group, one of whom has experienced events that affect not just themselves, but the group as a whole.

Furthermore, the found footage narrative explores the ways in which people interpret the past based on memory rather than events. Wanda’s experience represented in collective memory takes the form of myth through cinema. This study explores how the memory of film informs the memory (and memory of memory) of Wanda’s experience. The memories of the Bielecka family (including Wanda herself) mythologises Wanda’s story through a wider cultural memory in order to comprehend her experience. The found footage narrative is therefore a historical representation constructed through imagination and fantasy. Expressing Barthes’ theory of a second-order myth in practice, the found footage narrative mythologises the memories of events, rather than the events themselves.

However, the found footage narrative does this while exposing how its own form helps to construct mythologies. It is therefore a *reflexive* myth that simultaneously deconstructs and reconstructs mythologies around memory. Reflexivity refers to the methods in which a film calls attention to its construction. Reflexivity in film is a subversion of the notion of a film being an objective representation of that which it represents. Robert Stam defines cinematic reflexivity as “the process by which films foreground their own production... their authorship... their textual procedures... their intertextual influences... or their reception.”¹¹ A reflexive film exposes, within its own form, *how* it is made, *who* makes it, its formal construction, and how it relates to other texts. As we shall see, the found footage narrative *Wanda*, exhibits reflexivity in all of these ways through methods developed from the essay mode.

Alisa Lebow describes these films as “first-person documentaries.” First-person documentaries are not necessarily autobiographical, but refer to the formal dualism inherent in these works. The first-person formal structure of a film can be both singular *and* plural. By the filmmaker referring to the “I” of themselves they automatically also refer to the “we.”

¹⁰ Joseph Campbell, *The Masks of God: Creative Mythology*, (New York: Penguin, 1991), p.4.

¹¹ Robert Stam, *Reflexivity in Film and Literature: From Don Quixote to Jean-Luc Godard*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p.151.

The grammatical reference reminds us that language itself, though spoken by an individual, is never entirely our own invention, nor anyone else's. Despite the fact that we believe it to express our individuality, it nonetheless also expresses our commonality, our plurality, our interrelatedness with a group, a mass, a sociality, if not a society.¹²

This interconnectedness is precisely the concern of the found footage narrative as reflexive myth. Although *Wanda* is clearly this filmmaker's subjective interpretation of Wanda's experiences using 12 subjective testimonies (including the filmmaker's own), the film shows their connection not just with each other, but with the larger cultural framework of history, cinema and literature. Each "I" is interconnected with a larger "we".¹³

Reflexivity in the found footage narrative is expressed through the essay mode, which describes a practice of representation exhibited in many forms of writing and film. Specifically, the found footage narrative derives its form from the Montaignean essay. First published in 1580, Michel de Montaigne's *Essais* (which was literally translated into English as 'Attempts') fuses personal experience, social and political analysis, and philosophical ruminations. The verb 'to essay' can mean 'to assay' or 'to test', as well as 'to try' or 'to attempt', which suggests a less conclusive, more open-ended approach. The Latin derivation of the word is *exigere*, which means to investigate, but also to drive or thrust out. This is informative as it suggests that it is a revealing of not just what lies outside, but inside. The essay is a consciously subjective analysis of a real world subject. The essay, to Montaigne, means not only an investigation into society and ideas, but also the writer. The Montaignean essay is therefore a dialectical exploration of the nature of subjectivity and objectivity.

This approach has been extended into cinematic practice where styles of documentary and fiction film combine to create new formal hybrids. Two groups in particular spearheaded this new approach to filmmaking: the Left Bank Group in France, and the New German Cinema. The essayistic movement in French cinema,

¹² Alisa Lebow, *The Cinema of Me: Self and Subjectivity in First-Person Documentary Film*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.13.

¹³ For further reading on reflexivity see Lisa Konrath, *Metafilm: Forms and Functions of Self-Reflexivity in Postmodern Film*, (Düsseldorf: VDM Verlag Dr Müller, 2010) and Jürgen Tobisch, *Film Within Film: Self-reflexivity in European Auteur Cinema*, (Norderstedt, Germany: GRIN Verlag GmbH, 2003).

the ‘Groupe Rive Gauche’ or ‘Left Bank Group’, consisted of some of the earliest film essayists. They included Chris Marker, Alain Resnais, Agnès Varda, and Georges Franju. It was these filmmakers that were among the first to apply theories of essayistic cinema to their work. As Claire Clouzot observes,

The filmmakers of the Left Bank are inspired by artistic eclecticism. As creators they are interested in the flow of mental processes, rather than cinephilic fanaticism. It is not theoretical criticism, which draws them to the cinema, but an interest in filmic writing, and relations this might have with literary production.¹⁴

Clouzot believes that the emphasis in their work is on the literary, and that these filmmakers should be seen as *authors* rather than *auteurs*, who are more interested in the “essentially novelistic preoccupations with time, memory, narration, and form.”¹⁵ It is precisely these four elements that the found footage narrative is also preoccupied.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a loose group of West German filmmakers that included Werner Herzog, Harun Farocki, Hans Syberberg, Alexander Kluge, Wim Wenders and Hartmut Bitomsky began to make essayistic audio-visual projects. This group’s films came to be referred to as the New German Cinema, a name similar to the French Nouvelle Vague, and similar in its essayistic intentions. These filmmakers began to develop hybrid films that combined elements of both documentary and fiction. In 1979 the *Hamburg Declaration* was published by “we German filmmakers,” in which a group of sixty cineastes called for an end to the counterfeit distinction of “the feature film from the documentary,” and the creation of “films that reflect on the medium (in a practical way as experiments) from the narrative and commercial film.”¹⁶ German filmmaker’s wished to collapse the distinction between the two genres of film and use techniques from both to create new genres. The found footage narrative is derived from this approach. It is a dialectics of documentary and fiction film styles.

¹⁴ Claire Clouzot quoted in Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, *To Desire Differently: Feminism and the French Cinema, Expanded Edition*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.262.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ “The Hamburg Declaration,” Eric Rentschler ed., *West German Filmmakers on Film: Visions and Voices*, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), p.4.

What is essential to a conception of the found footage narrative, as a genre of the essay mode, is the dialectical image. The found footage narrative fuses opposing concepts, such as history and fantasy, fiction and documentary, in a formal dialectics of fragmentation. Indeed, fragmentation is the fundamental formal approach of *Wanda*, just as the collective memories of Wanda's experience are fragmented. Furthermore, it is through a dialectic between images (whether they are actual images or words) that the found footage narrative constructs itself. Through montage, the dialectical image therefore combines opposing fragments of dialogue, images and sounds that have been extracted from their original context and placed together in the new context of the found footage narrative. Formal elements, which may seem thematically, ideological, conceptually or historically different are combined in order to reveal new understandings. Through this approach it is possible to formulate a better understanding of the way memory constructs myth around experience. The found footage narrative is an attempt (or *essais*) to explore the collective memory around survivor experience, just as *Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death* is a way in which Otto Dov Kulka attempts to represent his own survivor experiences. Subjectivity, rather than objectivity, becomes the filter through which history passes in the form of *Wanda*.

The formal approach of the found footage narrative reflects the way in which Wanda's story is remembered by her and her family. The members of the Bielecka family depicted in the found footage narrative, *Wanda*, have collectively listened to Wanda's testimony in most detail. As Wanda's grandchild, the events of *Wanda* have been described to me by Wanda herself. Yet, when I asked other members of the family what Wanda had told them, our stories contradicted each other. Furthermore, when Wanda herself repeated her story to me I noticed that her version of events would be different from the last time she described the story. It became difficult to surmise exactly what had happened to her.

Multiple versions of the events seemed to have been communicated around the family. Furthermore, beyond what each family member believed Wanda had told them, their perceptions had also been affected by other memories. The way in which each family member imagined the events brought out new details of images, dialogue, and sounds. These new imaginings of the events at times were also directly influenced by fictions such as scenes from Hollywood films, fairy tales and even cartoons. Fantasy and imagination clearly affect the way in which the family perceives

Wanda's experience. It became clear that although Wanda's experience was real, the way it is remembered by the family, even by Wanda herself, brings no conclusive, singular narrative to the events.

It is important to study the way in which collective memory is formulated. This is a decisive point in the history of survivor experience. Even the youngest survivors are reaching their final years of life. The passing of the most recent oldest Holocaust survivor is regularly reported in the news.¹⁷ Avner Shalev, chairman of *Yad Vashem*, has observed that there is a critical need to collect testimony and images for future generations before all Holocaust survivors die out.¹⁸ Indeed, echoing the formal approach of the found footage narrative, *Yad Vashem's* motto is "gathering the fragments."¹⁹ *Wanda's* intention, like *Yad Vashem's*, is to document survivor experience beyond the numbers tattooed on their arms. The found footage narrative wishes to document representation of Wanda's *personal* experience, and how that experience is communicated in the personal sphere of the family.

As those with living memory of the events inevitably pass on, the way in which subsequent generations remember their experiences becomes all the more crucial. Soon, those who directly experienced the atrocities committed in World War II will be unable to give testimony, and the events will only be perceived through the representations of secondary sources. This is particularly pertinent to the personal experiences of survivors such as Wanda Bielecka and Otto Dov Kulka. Beyond the wealth of historical sources that describe the context of their experience, the actual experience itself can only be expressed through them. When they can no longer provide testimony about their memories, their history will be left to representations in writing and video and the interpretations of those that live on.

Ana Carden-Coyne points out that a major question to be considered is, "how can historical truth of the Nazi genocide of Jews and many other groups be presented

¹⁷ See The Huffington Post, "Antoni Dobrowolski Dead: Auschwitz Survivor Dies at 108," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/antoni-dobrowolski-auschwitz_n_2000718.html, and BBC News, "Oldest Holocaust Survivor, Alice Herz-Sommer, dies at 110," <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26318383>, accessed 21 September 2014.

¹⁸ The Independent, "As Survivor's Dwindle, What Will This Mean for Memories of the Holocaust?," <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/as-survivors-dwindle-what-will-this-mean-for-memories-of-the-holocaust-9040133.html>, accessed 21 September 2014.

¹⁹ *Yad Vashem: The Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Authority*, "Gathering the Fragments: A National Campaign to Rescue Personal Items from the Holocaust Period," http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/gathering_fragments/index.asp?WT.mc_id=wiki, accessed 21 September 2014.

at the same time as respectful memorialisation?”²⁰ In terms of a study of collective memory of a survivor’s experience, how then can the mythologies and fantasies around these events be studied while remaining respectful to the trauma and pain of Wanda’s experiences? Cathy Gelbin has observed how classical cinema has tended to represent the Holocaust as beyond our comprehension through metonymy and synecdoche. However, a post-classical aesthetic in cinema has enabled generations who did not live through the Holocaust to better understand the experiences of survivors.

By throwing into question classical cinema’s totalising narrative authority and its suggestion of the spectator’s voyeuristic control over the image, the post-classical aesthetic has enabled film-makers to closely approach the Nazi victims’ subjective experience and with it their often-denied agency.²¹

Wanda, as a found footage narrative, therefore takes the approach of post-classical cinematic representations of the Holocaust, exploring the nature of subjectivity through the personal experiences not just of Wanda herself, but subsequent generations of her family who will continue to tell her story in the future.

By studying memory, we can better understand how the events live on, not just in the survivors who experienced it, but their families, fellow citizens, and generations to come. In Wanda’s case, those who have listened to her testimony most intimately will become testifiers themselves who have the power to shape Wanda’s story. It is therefore important to study the way in which their memories also effect the telling of the experience. The question this thesis aims to explore is, how is survivor experience represented in the collective memory of a survivor’s family, and how can the form of the found footage narrative be used as a way of researching the construction of that memory? *Wanda* therefore aims to explore how testimony is transferred from Wanda to her relatives, and how those relatives reconstruct the past. Through use of dialectical images, the found footage narrative aims to show how collective memory constructs myth from experience. By representing collective memory in this way, *Wanda* is a new form of film that is crucial to our understanding

²⁰ Ana Carden-Coyne, “The Ethics of Representation in Holocaust Museums,” *Writing the Holocaust*, Jean-Marc Dreyfuss & Daniel Langton eds., (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), p.167.

²¹ Cathy Gelbin, “Cinematic Representations of the Holocaust,” *Writing the Holocaust*, Jean-Marc Dreyfuss & Daniel Langton eds., (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), p.37-38.

of how events are, and will be, remembered, not just by the Bielecka family, but *all* families, and *all* other groups that produce collective memories.

Chapter One:

The Facts of Memory.

As the population of survivors that suffered through Nazi crimes inevitably pass on, those who bear witness to their testimony, and communicate survivor experiences through their own memory, must continually remind themselves of the social, political and historical context of that testimony. Historical context is particularly important in the performing of a found footage narrative, and the exploration of the malleable nature of memory that lies within.

Therefore, *Wanda* must also be positioned within the greater historical context of the Polish experience in World War II. The facts must be established before we move on to think about the nature of memory transference, and how the found footage narrative demonstrates the processes involved. Although the film itself provides a more general historical background to Wanda's experiences, as it is expressed in the memory of the participants, what follows is a more full account of the facts around these events. Furthermore, we must be careful not to collapse the distinction between the persecution and total eradication of European Jews in the Final Solution, and the non-Jewish Polish experience at the hands of the Nazis. As Israel Gutman points out, "Both Poles and Jews suffered, but in unequal measures; the two groups were *unequal victims*."²² The Nazis had clear plans to, and very nearly succeeded in liquidating the entire Jewish population, not just of Poland but the whole of Europe, while Nazi plans for non-Jewish Poles were less clear and less devastating.

However, this is in no way to lessen the tragedy played out against non-Jewish Poles either. A mythical version of non-Jewish Poles has dominated both popular and serious literature minimising, and sometimes even completely ignoring, the atrocities committed upon them. "This mythical version of history reduces the Polish wartime experience to the simplistic and distorted proposition that the *raison d'être* of Poland and its people during the war was anti-Semitism."²³ Anti-Semitic views were certainly widespread in Poland. Indeed, the Kielce Pogrom of 1946, which is considered by many as a catalyst for the flight of the few remaining Jews left in

²² Israel Gutman, "The Victimisation of the Poles," *A Mosaic of Victims-Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*, Michael Berenbaum ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p.98.

²³ Richard C. Lukas, "The Polish Experience during the Holocaust," *A Mosaic of Victims- Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*, Michael Berenbaum ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p.90.

Poland after the war, occurred in Wanda Bielecka's hometown. But it is also true that of the individuals awarded medals of "Righteous among the Nations" (given out by the State of Israel to non-Jews who saved Jews from extermination) those who were Polish citizens number the greatest.²⁴ Therefore, the crimes committed against the non-Jewish population must also be remembered as a way of understanding the complexities of that nation during the war. To define non-Jewish Polish history simply in terms of anti-Semitism is denial in itself. This chapter will specifically explore the *non-Jewish* Polish history of World War II, as it pertains to Wanda Bielecka's testimony, as a way of reinforcing the facts of memory that the found footage narrative explores. Facts that, while different to those of the Holocaust, still prove the specific crimes committed upon Wanda Bielecka and the non-Jewish Polish population as a whole.

Although statistics concerning Polish deaths differ from source to source, and of course exact figures are impossible to quantify, some sources estimate that about one-fifth of Poland's citizens lost their lives during World War II.²⁵ Other sources similarly state that during almost 6 years of war, Poland lost 6,028,000 citizens, or 22% of its population, which is the highest ratio of losses to population of any European country. Over 50% of these victims were Polish Christians.²⁶ According to the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN: *Instytut Pamięci Narodowej*), a research institute set up by the Polish government, the Nazi occupation of Poland claimed the lives of 2.77 million ethnic Poles, and 2.7 to 2.9 million Polish Jews²⁷, although international sources put the number of Jewish Poles killed closer to 3 million.²⁸ The Polish people were victims of torture, overwork, death camps, raids, executions, epidemics, starvation, and many other cruel and barbaric treatments at the hands of the Nazis.

If the Nazis had won the war these figures would have been even more devastating. They not only intended to annex Polish territory and eliminate all Polish

²⁴ Yad Vashem, "The Righteous Among the Nations,"

<http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/statistics.asp>, accessed 29 July 2014.

²⁵ Tadeusz Piotrowski, *Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947*, (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 1998), p.305.

²⁶ Roman Nurowski, *War Losses in Poland: 1939-1945*, (Poznań: Wydawn, 1960), p.44.

²⁷ Wojciech Materski & Tomasz Szarota, *Poland 1939-1945: Human Losses and Victims of Repressions under Two Occupations*, Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), http://web.archive.org/web/20120323161233/http://niniwa2.cba.pl/polska_1939_1945.htm, accessed 29 July 2014.

²⁸ Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews*, (New York: Open Road Media, 2010), p.403.

Jews, but also totally eradicate the Polish nation and Polish culture itself. Under *Generalplan Ost* (GPO: Master Plan East), a secret plan to colonise Central and Eastern Europe only discovered in Nazi papers at the end of the war, 80-85% of Poles were targeted for elimination from Poland either through deportation to Siberia or genocide. The remaining population would then become slave labour as Germans moved in to occupy the territory.²⁹ Under the Nazi ideology of *Lebensraum*, this plan was to be implemented during the war and completed in its aftermath.

Systematic terror and oppression were applied by the Nazis in all occupied countries. Yet, in many of those countries only indigenous citizens who actively resisted the Nazi occupiers, or were suspected of being part of resistance organisations, were murdered, tortured or deported to concentration camps. In Poland every citizen was subject to this brutality. As Anna Pawełczyńska states, “mass executions based on the principle of collective guilt were far more frequent, because every Pole, regardless of age, sex, or health, was a member of a condemned nation.”³⁰ The Poles, being a Slavic people, were considered *Untermenschen*, sub-humans in a similarly low category of life as the Jews themselves. In a speech to the *Wehrmacht* high command on 22 August 1939 Hitler declared,

The object of war is... physically to destroy the enemy. That is why I have prepared, for the moment only in the East, my ‘Death’s Head’ formations with orders to kill without pity or mercy all men, women, and children of Polish descent or language.³¹

If the Nazis were not as successful in eliminating the non-Jewish population of Poland as the Jewish population, it was certainly their intention to eventually exterminate Poland as an entire people and nation.

Those Poles that were not killed in the purges ordered by Hitler were to be enslaved and used as manpower in the German war machine. All members of the Polish intelligentsia were to be exterminated, while those that remained were denied

²⁹ Janus Gumkowski & Kazimierz Leszcynski, *Poland Under Nazi Occupation*, (Indiana: Polonia, 1961), p.12.

³⁰ Anna Pawełczyńska, *Values and Violence in Auschwitz: A Sociological Analysis*, Catherine S. Leach trans., (California: University of California Press, 1971), p.xvi.

³¹ Adolf Hitler, speech to top Wehrmacht officers, Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939, Document L-003 of the Nürnberg International Military Tribunal, cited in Janus Gumkowski & Kazimierz Leszcynski, *Poland Under Nazi Occupation*, p.59.

all forms of Polish culture and even the most rudimentary levels of education. In this Himmler was explicit,

For the non-German population of the East, there can be no type of school above the four grade elementary school. The job of these schools should be confined to the job of teaching counting (no higher than to 500), the writing of one's name, and the teaching that God's commandment means obedience to the Germans, honesty diligence and politeness. Reading I do not consider essential.³²

The Polish people, those who had not been murdered, were to become part of an industrialised level of serfdom under the control of Nazi masters, without culture, education or a nation. There can be no doubt that, in their own words, the Nazi leadership regarded the Polish citizenry as a subhuman population worthy only of extermination or slavery. Hans Frank, Hitler's head of the General Government, an occupied area of Poland that was essentially turned into a giant labour camp, declared that Hitler had "made it quite plain that this adjacent country of the German Reich has a special mission to fulfil: to finish off the Poles at all cost."³³ Nazi occupied Poland had no use for Poles such as Wanda Bielecka except as fuel for the war economy. Her culture, customs, written language, even family were denied her as she was put to work, and only work.

And so, inevitably, those ethnic Poles who had not been killed during the Nazi invasion, who had since been enslaved under Nazi rule and forced into labour, were also sent to concentration camps alongside Polish Jews. As Wolfgang Sofsky notes, "extermination through labour" was a Nazi principle that regulated the aims and purposes of most of their labour and concentration camps.³⁴ Alongside the liquidation of many concentration camp prisoners, other inmates were forced to work for the German war industry, with only rudimentary tools and low calorie food rations, until

³² Heinrich Himmler, "Some Comments on the Treatment of Foreign Nationals in the East," a "highly confidential 6-page typescript, signed and dated 15 May 1940, *Records of the Trial of Joseph Bühler* before the Supreme National Tribunal, vol. VI, pp.65ff, cited in Janusz Gumkowski & Kazimierz Leszcynski, *Poland under Nazi Occupation*, p.30.

³³ Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, *German Crimes in Poland Volume 2*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 2007), p.18.

³⁴ Wolfgang Sofsky, *The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.352.

they died of starvation, exhaustion, disease or at the brutal hands of camp guards. According to the IPN, it is estimated that about 5 million Polish citizens such as Wanda went through the concentration camp system in the service of the German war economy. While of course it is impossible to precisely quantify the death toll incurred by the Nazi prison and camp system, it is estimated that the number of non-Jewish Poles murdered in the camps, prisons and places of detention inside and outside Poland exceeds 1,286,000.³⁵

There is in fact much primary, legal and greater historical evidence that speaks to the veracity of Wanda's story. On 27 July 2001, Wanda submitted a claim form to the German Forced Labour Compensation Programme so that the German government would officially recognise Wanda's victimisation, and provide monetary compensation to her. On 12 August 2000, a German Law came into force designating seven organizations, including the International Organization for Migration (IOM), to make payments to former slave and forced labourers, and certain other victims of Nazi injustice. The German government and German companies provided the funds in equal parts. The funds were provided in the full knowledge that there was no monetary value that could truly compensate for the crimes committed.

The German Law recognizes that the injustice committed and the human suffering caused cannot be truly compensated by financial payments and that the Law comes too late for those who lost their lives as victims of the Nazi regime or have died in the meantime.³⁶

Many stipulations were made to ensure the veracity of Wanda's claim. The form had to be signed before a notary public or official authorised to attest to the authenticity of signatures and documents. Wanda also authorised the IOM to inspect all relevant third party files and databases to verify her claim, such as the German Government archives or the Red Cross International Tracing Service archives. Wanda attested that the information provided in support of the claim was true and made to the best of her knowledge.

³⁵ Waldemar Grabowski, *Polish Human Losses, 1939-1945*, Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), <http://www.bibula.com/?p=13530>, accessed 29 July 2014.

³⁶ International Organisation for Migration, "Claim Form For Slave Labour, Forced Labour, Personal Injury or Death of a Child," January 2001.

In the guidelines it describes who may file on the IOM claim form, including “Forced Labourers for a Company or Public Authority” who were defined as the following:

Persons who were deported from their own country into Germany or a German-occupied area and were subjected to forced labour for a company or public authority and were held in extremely harsh living conditions. Extremely harsh living conditions include imprisonment or restricted freedom of movement and constant police searches and controls.³⁷

The form also included a definition of “Slave Labourers”:

Persons who were held inside or outside their own country in a concentration camp, ghetto, or another place of confinement under comparable conditions and were subjected to slave labour. Comparable conditions include inhumane prison conditions, insufficient nutrition and lack of medical care.³⁸

Wanda filled out claim forms for both Forced Labour and Slave Labour. She provided various details for each application, which were verified by the German authorities. In providing evidence of being subject to forced labour Wanda stated that she was deported from Kielce on 15th February 1942 to Dresden, Halle, Stuttgart and Metz. She performed forced labour for the German Army in a munitions factory in Metz, and was also held for a time in a work reform camp (*Arbeitserziehungslager*) in Schirmeck in France. In providing evidence of being subject to slave labour Wanda stated that she was slave labour in Schirmeck some time between 1942 and 1943, and also in Auschwitz for an unknown amount of time in 1944.

Wanda was also asked to indicate which documents she had in support of her claims. She did *not* have; a Work book for foreigners (*Arbeitsbuch für Ausländer*); Work card (*Arbeitskarte*); Company work record (*Arbeitsbescheinigung*); Work requisition labour office (*Arbeitsamt*); Deportation card or attestation; Prison record (*Personoalakte*); Discharge Certificate (*Entlassungsschein*); Repatriation document; Displaced persons card; Search results from the International Tracing Service

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

(*Internationaler Suchdienst Bad Aroisen*); Passport for foreigners (*Framdenpass*); Liberation certificate; or Prison card. She did have Auschwitz tattoo number 81594. In the eyes of various authorities this was proof enough that Wanda Bielecka had indeed been a forced labourer and slave labourer who was eligible for monetary compensation. Wanda received the full amount of DEM 15,000 for Forced Labour/Slave Labour, finally receiving the last installment of these payments on May 16, 2005.

Based on the testimony (a personal statement submitted to the IOM and interview notes) Wanda gave in 2001 that eventually led to her compensation as a victim of National Socialist injustice, we are able to track the context in which she came to be subject to that injustice within the forced labour and slave labour systems. Although the specific circumstances of Wanda's arrest remain unclear (Wanda herself provides at least two different versions of events, while this author has been told at least *four* different versions), she was taken by the Nazis on the 15th February 1942.

In telling her story to this author, Wanda insisted that she was arrested while watching a film at a cinema in Kielce. Nazi guards surrounded the theatre and arrested everybody that tried to leave. Alternatively, the other interviewees believe Wanda told them that she was either arrested at the Hotel Kielce or at home. Most interviewees believe that Halina Bielecka was with Wanda when she was arrested, just a few months old. Halina herself has no recollection of the incident. There are no known facts surrounding the event.

Within the first year of occupation the Nazis had already implemented an array of racial, legal, wage and working discriminations. And by 1942, recruitment into the forced labour programme was characterised by violence, racism and its massive scale. In general it involved establishing compulsory labour laws, drafting workers by age, class and using force.³⁹ By 1944, it is estimated that 1,659,764 Polish civilians had been coerced into forced and slave labour⁴⁰ although other sources put the number closer to 1,400,000.⁴¹

Wanda describes being taken in a distressed state to a collection area where there were many other people and told, "If you run we will go back for your family."

³⁹ Edward L. Homze, *Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp.154-68.

⁴⁰ "Labour Allocation in the Greater German Reich, vol. 31.10.1944, no.10, Files of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

⁴¹ John H. E. Fried, *The Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany*, (Montreal: International Labor Office, 1945), pp.264-5.

A story like this is not at all uncommon. Threats and scare tactics like this would have been commonplace in Poland where recruitment areas could quickly become militarised zones, and partisan guerrillas (such as Wanda's husband Jan) would be active. This would cause the Nazis to be more severe in their methods. They would also have regarded Poles as racially inferior *Untermenschen* to be treated as subhuman. Recruitment degenerated into a rounding up of the healthy, the ill, the young, and the old. Many were murdered in the process.⁴² It was under these circumstances that Wanda was forced into serfdom.

She was taken to prisons in Dresden, Halle and Stuttgart, and then taken to work in a castle in Metz. It is perhaps this castle that many of Wanda's family are referring to in the film. Although it is not clear exactly what work she was doing there, it was commonplace for foreign workers to be placed all over Nazi occupied Europe. As Wanda was subsumed into the Nazi forced labour programme she would have had to wear a purple patch to signify that she was a Polish worker, something that was implemented even before the Jews were marked. She would have been subject to curfew and banned from using public transportation. Social relations with Germans outside work were forbidden, and sexual relations were punishable by death.⁴³ It is under these circumstances that Wanda began her life in forced and slave labour.

It is from here that she attempted her first escape, but she was captured and taken to the Schirmeck sub-camp of the Natzweiler-Struthof concentration camp complex in France. Himmler, in August 1941, had made a decree requiring that "all strife inciting shavelings, (all) anti-German Czechs and Poles as well as communists and similar low-life be transferred to the concentration camps for a prolonged period as a matter of principle."⁴⁴ After Wanda's escape she would have become one of these "anti-German Poles." Furthermore, the Nazis needed prisoners to fuel the war economy, and sought to expand the work capacity of concentration camps. In December 1942, Himmler had ordered the Gestapo to increase the working population of the camps. To achieve this quota the Gestapo shipped foreign labourers

⁴² Edward L. Homze, "Nazi Germany's Forced Labour Program", Michael Berenbaum ed., *A Mosaic of Victims- Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*, (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p.40.

⁴³ Nanda Herberman, *The Blessed Abyss*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000), pp.33-34.

⁴⁴ Circular Decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of German Police, August 27, 1941, RHSA Elassammlung, Section 2 F VII a, p.15, RD 3/19, BAK in Peter Black, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camps," *A Mosaic of Victims- Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*, Michael Berenbaum ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p.48.

who had fled their place of work, foreign labourers such as Wanda, to the nearest concentration camp.⁴⁵ Wanda was beaten, her head was shaved, and she was put in solitary confinement. She was there for six to eight weeks when she was again seconded for labour to Remelach, a village in Germany, where she worked on a farm. This could be the farm that is referred to in the film, where a family hid Wanda until the Nazis retreated, although chronologically this would not match the story told in the film, where Wanda is thereafter liberated.

Again, Wanda testifies that she escaped, and again she was re-captured, and this time taken to Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp. It was 1944. They tattooed her arm: *Prisoner 81594*. She was made to stand naked for half a day, and given no food at all for five days. She worked in flax fields, and was beaten with wooden and metal sticks if she didn't work up to the guards' standards. It is estimated that 150,000 Poles died in Auschwitz-Birkenau.⁴⁶ Many died in the gas chambers, but many more were killed through the policy of "extermination through labour" for Auschwitz also provided workers for the German war economy. It is in this capacity that Wanda found herself there.

Labourers in the camps worked long hours and often in dangerous conditions. The daily work schedule of eleven hours was not relaxed even in wintertime. Prisoners rarely had proper equipment or protective clothing. Similarly to Wanda's testimony, they were whipped so frequently that Himmler complained the punishment was ceasing to become a deterrent.⁴⁷ Prisoners in the concentration camps, whether Jewish or not, were regarded as "enemies of the state of the worst sort."⁴⁸ They were the very lowest of the *Untermenschen*.

And yet simultaneously, efforts were made to keep labourers in the camps alive so that they could work longer and be of greater use to the German war machine. Indeed, on 20th January 1943, SS *Gruppenführer* Richard Glücks urged camp commandants to exhaust "every possibility to maintain the physical strength of the prisoners."⁴⁹ Throughout the war Nazi policies on the concentration camps suffered

⁴⁵ Peter Black, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camps," p.52.

⁴⁶ Sybille Steinbacher, *Auschwitz: A History*, (London: Harper Collins, 2005), p.134.

⁴⁷ Secret circular of WVHA (*Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt*) Amtsgruppe D, December 2, 1942, Record Group 242, T-175/218/2756682-83, NA in Peter Black, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camps," p55.

⁴⁸ Circular of chief of WVHA Amtsgruppe D, July 27, 1943, Record Group 242, T-175/218/2726563-70, NA in Peter Black, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camps," p.56.

⁴⁹ Secret circulars of WVHA Amtsgruppe D, January 20, 1943, Record Group 238, NO-1523 in Peter Black, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camps," p53.

from a conflict between ideology and practicality. Initially, Himmler had seen the camps in terms of punishment, 're-education' and extermination. This was their primary purpose. But as the war progressed it became increasingly clear that those non-Jewish prisoners incarcerated in the camps were a valuable labour resource. On 30th April 1942, two months after Wanda was arrested, SS *Obergruppenführer* Oswald Pohl, who was placed in charge of the administration of the concentration camps, wrote a letter to Himmler implying that what was needed was "a general transformation of the concentration camps from their previously one-sided political form into an organisation responding to economic endeavours."⁵⁰ It is this shift in policy that may have saved Wanda from certain death, and eventually facilitated her transfer out of Auschwitz. A transfer that in 1944, if she had been Jewish, would not have happened.

And so on an undetermined date in 1944 Prisoner 81594 was ordered out of her barracks for inspection. As she was lined up outside with the other prisoners, the guards inspected them for sores. She was chosen for transfer and transported in cattle wagons, with hundreds of other prisoners, to a munitions factory near Metz. She describes the camp where she was housed as being newer than Auschwitz. As is described in the film, they were locked in their barracks in the day and worked at night. Their work involved producing shells for guns, dipping them in liquid to preserve them.

It was common for concentration camp labour to be used in the production of armaments. On September 15, 1942, WVHA (SS Main Economic and Administrative Department) and Armaments Ministry officials agreed at a meeting that, "the labour force available in the concentration camps must be deployed for armaments production on a grand scale."⁵¹ From 1942 to 1944 hundreds of subcamps were built as slave labour factories producing weapons for the Third Reich. If the munitions factory Wanda describes being taken to was near Metz, then it is most likely that she was placed in a sub-camp of the Natzweiler-Struthof concentration camp complex as she had been before in Schirmeck.

SS attempts to create a productive workforce out of the concentration camp prisoner population ultimately ended in failure. Brutal conditions, murders,

⁵⁰ Pohl to Himmler, April 30, 1943, Record Group 238, Document R-129, NA in Peter Black, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camps," p50.

⁵¹ Pohl to Himmler, September 16, 1942, Record Group 238, NIK-15392, NA in Peter Black, "Forced Labour in the Concentration Camps," p51.

malnourishment and disease continued, killing many and weakening even the strongest. The use of forced labour from the concentration camps, “amounted to a ruthless waste of prisoners, because the depressing psychological and physical working conditions of these prisoners generally obstructed any real increase in productivity.”⁵² Finally, from the summer of 1944 onwards, when Nazi defeat was becoming more and more obvious, the concentration camp labour system collapsed even further. As supplies and communications broke down, SS personnel and camp guards failed to distribute the already minimal food supplies to prisoners. The supply shortages were used as an excuse to treat prisoners even worse than they had done before, and revert back to the policy of ‘extermination through labour.’ Illnesses and infections were left untreated, and exhaustion amongst prisoners was rife, causing many to die. Allied bombings of the camps, such as the ones Wanda witnessed, resulted in even more deaths.

Finally, in the last months of the war, thousands of prisoners were murdered in an attempt to silence them as witnesses to the crimes committed, or perhaps to prevent them from being liberated, or even simply because the Nazis could not bear the fact that these *Untermenschen* had beat the *Supermenschen*. In the last months of the war, prisoners in the camps died much faster than at any other time during the conflict. Martin Broszat estimates that out of a total camp population of 714,211 prisoners in January 1945, at least one-third lost their lives.⁵³ Ultimately, forced labour programmes in concentration camps served as simply another method of exterminating people the Nazis regarded as having no right to live.

It was during this period that Wanda must have escaped, narrowly avoiding murder at the hands of panicking Nazi guards. If she had failed to escape, or not even attempted and been taken back east towards Germany, it is likely that she would have been killed. But what Wanda’s story proves about the difference between the experience of Jewish and non-Jewish Poles is that had she been Jewish she would never have had the opportunity to escape at all. By virtue of being non-Jewish, Wanda was enslaved rather than liquidated, and ironically it was this enslavement that eventually gave her freedom. Therefore, Wanda’s story itself proves the distinction

⁵² Martin Broszat, “The Concentration Camps,” *Anatomy of the SS State*, Helmut Krausnick & Martin Broszat eds., (New York: Collins, 1968), p.482. See also p.493.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.504.

between the Holocaust and the experience of non-Jewish Poles. She was an ‘unequal victim.’

But Wanda’s story also proves her victimisation, and by extension the victimisation of non-Jewish Poles. She was taken from her family and enslaved, an unwilling participant in the ‘extermination through labour’ programme. She was forced to work herself to the brink of death. Had the war carried on any longer, or indeed had the Germans been victorious, it is almost certain that Wanda would have not only continued to be enslaved, but murdered. Indeed, had the Nazis won World War II it is clear, from their own testimony, that the non-Jewish Poles would have also experienced their own Holocaust. Wanda’s experience of the war was not one of passive complicity with the Nazi regime. Wanda, and millions of other non-Jewish Poles, also suffered and died. She too experienced the horrors of the concentration camps. She too is a survivor.

There is overwhelming evidence proving the Holocaust as fact. There is an insurmountable quantity of information demonstrating a clear distinction between the Holocaust and the non-Jewish Polish experience. There is also clear proof that beyond the problems of anti-Semitism in Poland, non-Jewish Poles were also victims of the Nazi’s violent ideological warfare. Wanda Bielecka’s specific testimony, beyond its truthfulness as eyewitness testimony, has been affirmed by an international court of law, various government organisations, many primary historical sources, and wider historical context. As much as the found footage narrative is concerned with examining the complexities of memory, it is not an oversimplification to state that *these events did happen*.

The next chapter will explore how a study of memory and remembrance are further ways of attacking Holocaust denial. Memory and remembrance are after all the mechanisms through which a survivor’s story exists within their family, who are usually their most intimate confidantes privy to information that nobody else will hear. Memory and remembrance reach events in ways that more empirical methods cannot. Facts of the Holocaust do not include the nuances of detail that are revealed in a study of memory and remembrance. For example, those who listen to testimony may remember details that the original testifier may never mention again, or may describe differently a second time. To deny an exploration of the memory of the Holocaust as it exists not just in the survivor, but their family is to deny another level of reality of the experience. The reality of how a survivor comes to terms with their experience

after the fact, and how their family come to terms with the facts of the Holocaust, and form their *own* identities around it.

To explore the memory and even the imagination that exists around the Holocaust is to keep the events existing in the present. It constitutes a *continual* remembering where facts of events become facts of emotion and feeling that create meaning for survivor families who admit that while they can never know the reality of a survivor's experience, they can feel the residual pain of it through memory, and keep those horrors alive and never forgotten in essence. The found footage narrative, as a genre of the essay mode, makes the subject "active" rather than passive.⁵⁴ It invites the viewer to engage with history. The found footage narrative is therefore a necessary element in our understanding of the Holocaust because it keeps the Holocaust alive once all those who experienced it are dead.

⁵⁴ Noël Burch, *Theory of Film Practice*, Helen R. Lane trans., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), p.159.

Chapter Two:

The Memory of Facts.

The found footage narrative explores the memories of events (and the memories of those memories) rather than the events themselves, but this form of film in no way denies the reality of experience. The found footage narrative instead attempts to explore how events come to be expressed in testimony, extending historical analysis beyond the facts of events to how those facts are passed down through generations of oral history. As the population of survivors dwindles, this becomes more and more an essential question to be explored. How we as people who did not experience the horrors of the World War II remember the testimony of those horrors must be analysed, especially when there is no one left to describe their experiences.

The found footage narrative is therefore about *remembering*, not forgetting, for as Jean Baudrillard points out, “forgetting extermination is part of extermination.”⁵⁵ This is vital in the remembering of the non-Jewish Polish experience in World War II. By studying remembrance we shall, in Elie Wiesel’s words, “rescue from forgetfulness the suffering of the non-Jewish victims from the Nazis so that in one voice we can condemn inhumanity.”⁵⁶ The found footage narrative contemplates remembering as a way of keeping history present, as something to be continually reminded of.

Cicero wrote that history is “the life of memory” (*vita memoriae*).⁵⁷ History, in the form of written record, provides information about the past from which memory can construct an understanding of events. But memory also, in relation to *oral* history, is the life of history. Testimony, spoken history, is based upon the memory of those who have experienced the events in question. When it comes to the history of a specific individual it is often only their testimony that can provide insight into the details of what happened in their past. Although testimony can be corroborated through social, political and cultural context (and indeed other testimony), the specific actions, events, images, sounds, smells, thoughts and feelings

⁵⁵ Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1994), p.49.

⁵⁶ Letter from Elie Wiesel to Richard C Lukas, October 6, 1986 in Richard C. Lukas, “The Polish Experience during the Holocaust,” *A Mosaic of Victims- Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*, Michael Berenbaum ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p.96.

⁵⁷ Marcus Tullius Cicero, *On the Orator Volume II*, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1942), p.36.

experienced by a person can only be represented through their telling, which in turn is a product of that person's memory. Therefore, the found footage narrative is a history of memory because it is a history based upon testimony. It is a genre of film about memories, and memories of memories, because it is a representation of oral history. *Wanda*, as a found footage narrative, attempts to demonstrate how one woman's experiences during World War II are (re)constructed through their telling to subsequent generations. It is a film about the *collective* memory of one woman's experiences; how she has testified to these experiences; and how her family remembers this testimony.

Literature on collective memory is diverse.⁵⁸ So too is literature specifically concerning collective memory around the Holocaust.⁵⁹ Saul Friedlander suggests that while there should be limits to the way that the Holocaust is represented, those limits have been transgressed in many forms. As Friedlander himself puts it, "we are dealing with an event which tests our traditional conceptual and representational categories."⁶⁰ Barbie Zelizer raises the issue of the overreliance on the photograph as testimony to the horrors of the Holocaust. Photographs have a tendency to transmit symbolic rather than referential meanings. Rather than developing an informed collective memory of the Holocaust, photographs can often simply maintain tropes of the Holocaust as an "atrocious story."⁶¹ Dominick LaCapra highlights our "transferential implication" in history.⁶² In any form that we represent history, we implicate ourselves. While objective facts (such as the Holocaust) exist, our collective memory of this fact cannot wholly represent it. Indeed, Dan Stone suggests that while there is no doubt as to the fact of the Holocaust, there can never be, nor should there

⁵⁸ See Jan Assman, *Religion and Cultural Memory: Ten Studies*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Maurice Halbwachs, "On Collective Memory," (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992); Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, Daniel Levy eds., *The Collective Memory Reader*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁵⁹ See Zeev W. Mankowitz, *Life Between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied Germany*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jonathan C. Friedman, *Speaking the Unspeakable: Essays on Sexuality, Gender, and Holocaust Survivor Memory*, (New York: University Press of America, 2002); Peter Novick, *The Holocaust and Collective Memory*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2001).

⁶⁰ Saul Friedlander, *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution,"* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp.2-3.

⁶¹ Barbie Zelizer, *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera's Eye*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998).

⁶² Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*, (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2001).

be, a singular history around the event, rather it should be looked at always from a multiplicity of approaches.⁶³

Christopher R. Browning, in his examination of Adolf Eichmann's testimony to Israeli investigators and the testimony of labour camp survivors, attempts to develop criteria through which to use memory as evidence.⁶⁴ Browning states that survivor testimony should be subjected to rigorous historical analysis. He notes the "powerful capacity of popular media, especially film, to implant images and to shape the way in which stories are retold."⁶⁵ For example, some survivors of the Starachowice labour camp only recalled water (rather than gas) falling from the shower-heads at Birkenau after watching a similar scene in *Schindler's List* (1993). Although Browning agrees that survivor testimony can be contradictory and sometimes mistaken, he admits that it can reach parts of history that would otherwise not be represented through the "unusual attention to details of visual memory."⁶⁶ The specific details of events and individual experience can often only be testified to through memory.

Michael Rothberg explores further the influence of other cultural and collective memories upon those of survivors through a conception of *multidirectional memory*.⁶⁷

Against the framework that understands collective memory as *competitive* memory – as a zero sum struggle over scarce resources – I suggest that we consider memory as *multidirectional*: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not privative.⁶⁸

Rothberg suggests that far from survivor collective memory existing exclusively within the realm of specific experience, it informs and is informed by other violent historical events such as slavery in the United States, or collective memories of colonialism.

⁶³ Dan Stone, *Histories of the Holocaust*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁶⁴ Christopher R. Browning, *Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.48.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.11.

⁶⁷ Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonisation*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p.3.

Furthermore, Rothberg suggests a new way of perceiving the Holocaust through what he describes as *traumatic realism*.⁶⁹ He states that the Holocaust fundamentally challenges traditional disciplinary divisions and knowledge, in particular the division between historical and literary conceptions of the event. Instead, traumatic realism treats the Holocaust as an object of knowledge that is constituted through a combination of representations: “a demand for documentation,” which is related to historical analysis; “a demand for reflection on the formal limits of representation,” which is associated with modernist concerns with the difficulties of accurately representing the Holocaust; and “a demand for the risky public circulation of discourses on the events,” which challenge conceptions of the Holocaust through post-structuralist analysis.⁷⁰ Essentially, the aim of this three-tiered approach is to highlight “*representation* in the interpretation of history.”⁷¹ *How* the Holocaust is represented, and the validity of a combination of approaches, is at the heart of traumatic realism. As Christopher Bigsby observes, “memory, in other words, is constituted of something more than retrieved images of a former self in a former life. It serves present needs even as it offers to fuse together disparate experiences into a master story.”⁷² Memory is not just informed simply by the recalling of events. Instead, it is influenced by experiences in the present of the testifier. A memory is dependent upon a history of the present as much as a history of the past.

The medium of film itself has been a valuable but problematic influence on collective memory around the Holocaust. Film has helped document a Nazi genocide (through Allied filming of the camps for example) that may, for some, have been difficult to believe, or for survivors to discuss. And yet those films, such as *Schindler's List*, that have created a wider awareness of events, also run the risk of trivialising them through the treatment of an ontological event as a contrived drama. However, Lawrence Baron critiques the view that the Holocaust is an event outside of comprehension and meaning. “Human beings planned, implemented, condoned, perished in, resisted, and survived the Final Solution. Consequently, it should not be regarded as a supernatural phenomenon beyond human comprehension and

⁶⁹ Michael Rothberg, *Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.10.

⁷² Christopher Bigsby, *Remembering and Imagining the Holocaust: The Chain of Memory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.22.

representation.”⁷³ Baron observes a “globalisation” or “internationalisation” of the Holocaust in which, rather than a discrete genre of Holocaust films, there should be a broader selection of films that concern subjects outside of the event itself. This includes films about post-war displacement, the capture and trial of war crime perpetrators, as well as films that explore the continuing impact of the Holocaust on collective memory. “Character studies of how the Holocaust shaped the personalities and values of perpetrators, survivors, and their children fall under the rubric of Holocaust cinema.”⁷⁴ *Wanda* then, in its focus on the memories of Wanda’s family and how they have been shaped by Wanda’s experience, falls under this definition of Holocaust mode.

Toby Haggith and Joanna Newman have discerned two distinct traditions in filmmaking concerning the Holocaust. The first is the realist tradition, which in narrative films can be seen in the classical cinema of Hollywood. In the non-fiction arena this realist tradition is expressed through didactic, chronologically told documentaries such as the *World at War* series (1973). “The second tradition is the non-linear or non-chronological, poetic and occasionally reflexive approach, in which there is a particular concern, and often experimentation with, the cinematic form or language.”⁷⁵ The approach of found footage narrative falls into this second category.

Aaron Kerner describes two forms of Holocaust film that similarly describe the approach of *Wanda*; poetic documentaries and experimental films. In poetic films, “there is frequently a predisposition for visual analogies or metaphoric imagery, and rhetorical cohesion gives way to radical juxtapositions.”⁷⁶ This fundamentally describes the approach of the found footage narrative, in which archival material from disparate sources and contextually unrelated to the historical events described, are used to represent them. Furthermore, the found footage narrative fits within Kerner’s description of experimental Holocaust film; the use of assemblage; “a technique, where filmmakers collect and edit together material to fashion something entirely new.”⁷⁷ Again, this describes the fundamental technique used in the construction of

⁷³ Lawrence Baron, *Projecting the Holocaust into the Present: The Changing Focus of Contemporary Holocaust Cinema*, (Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p.3.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.13.

⁷⁵ Toby Haggith, Joanna Newman, *Holocaust and the Moving Image: Representations in Film and Television Since 1933*, (London: Wallflower Press, 2005), p.9.

⁷⁶ Aaron Kerner, *Film and Holocaust: New Perspectives on Dramas, Documentaries, and Experimental Films*, (New York: Continuum, 2011), p.12.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.12.

the found footage narrative. This includes the use of archival material as found footage, as well as the assemblage of the Bielecka family testimony in juxtaposition with one another.⁷⁸

Given the birth in the United Kingdom many years after the war of all interviewees, apart from Wanda and Halina Bielecka, it is also important to frame their role with reference to debates on the construction of Holocaust memory in a British context. Caroline Sharples and Olaf Jensen have traced British collective memory of the Holocaust since the end of the war.⁷⁹ British public consciousness of the Nazi genocide, up until the 1980s, was characterised by disinterest or incomprehension.⁸⁰ In the 1980s some memorials were erected solely to commemorate the tragedy, but these memorials were placed in obscure locations and barely noticed. It wasn't until the 1991 that the Holocaust was included in the National Curriculum, and a permanent Holocaust exhibition was established at the London Imperial War Museum in 2000. British public engagement with the Holocaust was heightened briefly during the kidnap and televised trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961, and the screenings of the television series *World at War* (1975) and the American series *Holocaust* (1978). The David Irving trial and the release of Schindler's List are also thought to have raised awareness intermittently.

Furthermore, survivors, former refugees and Jewish ex-servicemen living in the UK have also maintained a public discussion.⁸¹ Andy Pearce observes, "the development of Holocaust consciousness resists monocausal explanation, and requires reference to various dialectics from the local and the global, to the socio-cultural and the political, and the past and the present."⁸² Following the concept of multidirectional memory, the UK's collective memory of the Holocaust does not derive from a single mono-cultural source, but from changing perspectives, cultural shifts nationally and internationally, and socio-political changes not just concerning the Holocaust, but other traumatic events and histories.

⁷⁸ For further reading on the Holocaust and Cinema see Annette Insdorf, *Indelible Shadows: Film and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁷⁹ Caroline Sharples, Olaf Jensen, *Britain and the Holocaust: Remembering and Representing War and Genocide*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

⁸⁰ For an in-depth study of the British government's treatment of Jewish displaced persons see Arieh J. Kochavi, *Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States & Jewish Refugees, 1945-48*, (New York: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.5-7.

⁸² Andy Pearce, *Holocaust Consciousness in Contemporary Britain*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), p.211.

The found footage narrative, as well as clearly being concerning with Wanda Bielecka's own testimony, is also concerned with the testimony of her testimony of the other members of the Bielecka family. *Wanda* therefore explores what Marianne Hirsch describes as *postmemory*.⁸³ Postmemory describes the memories of the Holocaust developed by those generations who follow survivors themselves. Hirsch defines two types of postmemory; *familial* and *affiliative*. Familial memory describes the intergenerational transmission of traumatic events through the survivor to their descendants, while affiliative memory involves a horizontal transmission in which those descendants of survivors pass on their own memories of survivor memories. Hirsch notes that this is "not actually mediated by recall but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation... These events happened in the past, but their effects continue in the present."⁸⁴ These memories are constructed not just from the testimony of the survivor, but from other sources such as the descendant's own imagination, experience and the social, political and cultural context of their memory formation. Furthermore, Hirsch coins the term connective memory as a way to describe the transmission of memories between different traumatic events. Connective memory, "moves between global and intimate concerns by attending precisely to the intimate details, the connective tissues and membranes, that animate each case even while enabling the discovery of shared motivations and shared tropes."⁸⁵ Through the juxtaposition of different collective memories of differing traumatic events, comparisons can be made between them, while new specificities of each can also be revealed.⁸⁶

Maurice Halbwachs describes collective memory as a "social framework of memory,"⁸⁷ in which each person's memories, even memories of their own experiences, are to some extent mediated by a social group. Through a given group, such as a family or nation, each individual's memories are formed. Within this social group, a group such as the Bielecka family, Peter Burke describes "media" through

⁸³ See Marianne Hirsch, "Family Pictures: Maus, Mourning and Post-Memory," *Discourse*, 15(2), pp.3-29; *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); "The Generation of Postmemory," *Poetics Today*, 29(1), pp.103-28; *The Generation of Postmemory: Visual Culture After the Holocaust*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

⁸⁴ Marianne Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory*, p.5.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.206.

⁸⁶ For further reading on trauma and memory see Cathy Caruth, *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

⁸⁷ Maurice Halbwachs, *Les Cadres Sociaux de la Memoire (The Social Framework of Memory)*, Paris, 1925. Cf. D. Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country*, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 192f.

which collective memory is constructed: oral traditions; written records; images; and actions.⁸⁸ These media are derived not just from within a group such as the Bielecka family, but a wider nexus of groups that the family exists in, groups such as a nation or even a culture of cinema. Indeed, as we shall see, films influence many of the memories of the Bielecka family in relation to Wanda's story.

Jan Assman places these media within a system of collective memory structuration. He divides collective memory into two types: communicative and cultural.⁸⁹ Communicative memory describes those memories formed through oral transference within a group. This essentially means any communication that the group has with each other through conversation. As a result these memories are formed within the lifetime of the participants. Through dialogue within the group, these memories continually shift in meaning throughout their lifespan. This communicative memory is further expressed through the video testimony of the Bielecka family in the film *Wanda* itself. Oral history in the form of the found footage narrative becomes another form of communication in a continually shifting understanding of events through communicative memory.

Cultural memory on the other hand constitutes those memories that are constructed through a wider cultural framework of media such as written records, images, music, and action media such as traditional ceremonies and rituals. They are more static than communicative memories in the sense that they are derived from unchanging cultural objects such as a film or scene from a film. For example, Wanda's experiences, in the collective memory of the Bielecka family, are not just informed by her testimony, and through dialogue with each other, but also through a cultural memory of cinema. The found footage narrative therefore attempts to represent the influence of film on the collective memory of the Bielecka family through the creation of found footage reconstructions that represent the events of Wanda's life as described by the Bielecka family.

Communicative and cultural memory intertwine within the collective memory of a group, informing and influencing one another. This intertwining is shown, for example within the found footage narrative *Wanda*, through the simultaneous use of image media such as archival film footage, combined with video testimony (and

⁸⁸ Peter Burke, *History as Social Memory*, p.100-102.

⁸⁹ Jan Assmann, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, *New German Critique*, 65, Spring-Summer, 1995.

testimony of testimony) of the Bielecka family themselves. These two elements represent cultural memory (film footage) and communicative memory (Bielecka testimony). We see in the film that at once cultural memory (specifically film) influences the communicative memories of Wanda's testimony, while Wanda's testimony and the memory of that testimony, also manipulates how the wider cultural memory of film is perceived.

If media such as film influences the collective memory of an experience such as Wanda's, it could be argued that Wanda's experience represented in collective memory takes the form of a myth. Much has been written about myth and memory,⁹⁰ but this study is concerned specifically with how the cultural memory of film (the narratives, symbolism, themes, characters, imagery and sounds) informs the collective memory of Wanda's experience, to create a myth around her story. Collective memory mythologises Wanda's story by employing signs, signifiers, and tropes from a wider cultural memory in order to comprehend her experience. Here the term myth is based upon the Euhemeristic idea of a reconstructed account of real historical events.⁹¹ Indeed, echoing the idea of memory as history, Euhemerus himself observed that mythology is in fact "history in disguise."⁹² The Bielecka family's collective memory concerning the events of Wanda's life forms a mythos, a version of the events based not only on testimony but *interiority*, a historical representation constructed through imagination and fantasy.

Interiority is a concept defined by Andrew Irving who described it as a "complex inner life – encompassing inner speech, imaginative reverie, and unarticulated moods."⁹³ Interiority describes the filter through which memory forms itself and is expressed in oral history. The interiority of each individual affects the testimony they produce, which in turns expresses the collective memory of the group. Therefore, it is through an exploration of interiority that the found footage narrative constructs a collective memory that mythologises Wanda's experiences. The interiority of the participants is represented through collective spoken testimony and

⁹⁰ See Shlomo Biderman, Ben-Ami Scharfstein eds., *Myths and Fictions*, (New York: E.J. Brill, 1993), Robert Graves, Introduction to *New Larousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology*, (New York: Hamlyn, 1972), Bo Stråth ed., *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Society*, (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2000).

⁹¹ Lauri Honko, "The Problem of Defining Myth," *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, Alan Dundes ed., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.45.

⁹² Lewis Spence, *An Introduction to Mythology*, (New York: Cosimo, 1921), p.42.

⁹³ Andrew Irving, "Strange Distance: Towards an Anthropology of Interior Dialogue," *Medical Anthropology Quarterly*, 25:1, p.22.

filmic reconstructions. Essentially, *Wanda* is an imagining of an imagining of real events.

The found footage narrative therefore *mythologises the mythology* around Wanda's experiences. This study is concerned with how the found footage narrative explores the mythmaking of collective memory through a *reflexive* myth of Wanda's experience. The found footage narrative as reflexive myth represents the Bielecka's collective memory of the story, but also exposes and comments upon its construction. In this way it is akin to Roland Barthes' conception of a "second-order myth."⁹⁴ This second order, "experimental" or "artificial" mythologising demystifies the content from which it derives its own form. *Wanda* then, while representing the collective memory of the Bielecka family, simultaneously explores how that memory is informed by a myriad of fragmented communicative and cultural influences. The found footage narrative emphasises that while collective memory is a form of mythologising, this mythology is an important element in understanding how memories of the Holocaust are constructed and transferred.

History is not simply the representation of a series of objective events. Within these historical events lie the subjective experiences of individuals who consciously or unconsciously select, interpret and represent an event. This process could be described as memory, which although as a term has been used to represent many different ideas, here will be used to describe the way in which people construct the past. This construction of the past through memory can be divided into two tiers; the memory of those individuals who experienced the events; and the memory of a group who have not experienced the events and comprehend them through a nexus of cultural experience. Of course, individuals in the first tier also comprehend events through a nexus of cultural experience, as well as their own.

The first tier describes memory as a historical *source*, while the second tier describes memory as a historical *phenomenon*.⁹⁵ Much has been written about memory as a historical source,⁹⁶ which in one sense takes the form of testimony such as Wanda's. Her testimony is a historical source because she experienced the events in question. The study of memory as a historical phenomenon is concerned with the

⁹⁴ Roland Barthes, "Myth Today," *Mythologies*, Annette Lavers trans., (Vintage: London, 1972), p.135-137.

⁹⁵ Peter Burke, "History as Social Memory," Thomas Butler ed., *Memory, History, Culture and the Mind*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p.99-100.

⁹⁶ For an excellent summary see Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral Past*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

social history of remembering in which the principles for selecting certain memories over others is explored. It is precisely through these two tiers of memory that Wanda Bielecka's story is told in the form of the found footage narrative, *Wanda*. The individual who experienced the events is of course Wanda herself, while the secondary group is her family. The collective memory of Wanda's experience is therefore represented through these two tiers, through a historical source, and historical phenomenon. The two intertwine, informing and contradicting each other.

Beyond this, it could even be said that in the face of an atrocity as big as the Holocaust, it is impossible to accurately describe what happened. The Holocaust has often been regarded as an event horizon of history, which challenges ideas of representation.⁹⁷ Diarist and resident of the Warsaw ghetto, Chaim Kaplan, believed that it was, "beyond his pen to describe the destruction."⁹⁸ Similarly, Elie Wiesel submitted that, "between our memory and its reflection there stands a wall that cannot be pierced."⁹⁹ It has been argued by some scholars that empirical study of the Holocaust is a fallacy in the face of a crime so great that it defies rationality.

Language cannot reach any adequate description of the events. In his essay on language and silence, George Steiner states that, "the world of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it lies outside reason. To speak of the unspeakable is to risk the survivance of language as creator and bearer of humane, rational truth."¹⁰⁰ Empirical study and even language itself cannot claim to accurately represent the events of the concentration camps and ghettos because to do so would be to deny the inherent inhumanity and irrationality of the crimes committed there. The atrocities committed in camps such as Auschwitz are literally unspeakable, and lie outside of any referential or representational competence of language.

Therefore, trauma can create silence. A sufferer may be unable to articulate a traumatic experience. As Ana Carden-Coyne observes, "pain has been understood as uniquely individual and destructive of language. Like trauma, physical and emotional

⁹⁷ For discussions regarding the (un)presentability of the Holocaust see Saul Friedländer, *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the Final Solution*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), Dominick LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

⁹⁸ Chaim Kaplan quoted in Jakob Lothe et al eds., *After Testimony: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Holocaust Narrative for the Future*, (Columbus: Ohio State University, 2012), p.7.

⁹⁹ Elie Wiesel quoted in Andrew Sobanet, *Jail Sentences: Representing Prison in Twentieth-Century French Fiction*, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), p.22.

¹⁰⁰ George Steiner, *Language and Silence: Essays 1958-1966*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p.123

pain can create deep reservoirs of silence that isolate sufferers.”¹⁰¹ Yet silence can also tell you much about trauma. A lack of description or explanation can demonstrate the significance of an event. It is not the actual events that are important, but how they are expressed and listened to. In an exploration of the memory of an event it is less important to listen to the facts than the symbolic significance of the storytelling. The history of memory is a history of interiority rather than empirical fact. It is about the transference of memory to a new listener who then processes what they have heard through their own understanding.

What is important is the situation of discovery of knowledge – its evolution and its very happening. Knowledge in the testimony is, in other words, not simply a factual given that is reproduced and replicated by the testifier, but a genuine advent, an event in its own right.¹⁰²

The process of listening and the production of new memories make the past present through an expression of the interiority of the testifier and those who bear witness to the testimony. This expression in some way reaches experience through the new experience of hearing testimony.

A traumatic event can be reached symbolically through the trauma of the telling. It can therefore be traumatic to be a listener. By listening one can partially experience the trauma because one must engage with the teller’s feelings. It then follows that the listener has to engage with their own feelings. If it is the first time the trauma is being listened to, the listener plays a part in how the narrative is formed. The listener of trauma is in a unique situation because they have to look for a record yet to be made. As Dori Laub attests, “the emergence of the narrative which is being listened to – and heard – is, therefore, the process and the place wherein the cognizance, the ‘knowing’ of the event is given birth to.”¹⁰³ Testimony is only the birth of the trauma within collective memory. The symbolic knowledge of the traumatic event is subsumed into the collective memory of the group, and therefore exists beyond empirical understanding, forming part of their identity.

¹⁰¹ Ana Carden-Coyne, *Reconstructing the Body: Classicism, Modernism, and the First World War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.67.

¹⁰² Dori Laub, “Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening,” *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History*, Shoshana Felman & Dori Laub eds., (London: Routledge 1992), p221.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* p221.

Penny Summerfield has observed how collective memory is communicated differently through the lens of gender through the concept of “composure”.¹⁰⁴ Composure describes the way memory is constructed by personal motivations, group relationships, or by the representation of those memories, which reinforces certain aspects of them. Summerfield has argued that women’s experiences are often absent from public discourse around the construction of national identity through war.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, public definitions of the meanings of wartime experiences are often dictated by masculine norms. Feminine expressions of experience that do not fit this dominant discourse may be “muted”.¹⁰⁶ Some scholars have argued for the development of new interview techniques, which enable a study of women’s interiority in relation to dominant discourse.¹⁰⁷ And yet Summerfield has suggested that this duality of public and private representations of memory lead to “dis/composure”, a term developed by popular memory theorists in relation to everyday life storytelling and playing on the double meaning of the verb ‘to compose.’

(Dis/composure suggests) that in telling life stories we engage both in the cultural activity of constructing narratives ourselves, and in the psychic one of striving for ‘an orientation of the self within the social relations of its world’, which allows us a sense of self with which we can live and thus enable us to achieve ‘subjective composure.’¹⁰⁸

The found footage narrative, *Wanda*, therefore explores this subjective composure of Wanda’s experiences in collective memory. The interiority of Wanda and her family are explored through certain interview techniques that will be elaborated upon in chapter five, while these interior memories are also explored in relation the collective

¹⁰⁴ Penny Summerfield, “Culture and Composure: Creating Narratives of the Gendered Self in Oral History Interviews,” *Cultural and Social History*, 1:1 (2004), pp.63-93.

¹⁰⁵ Penny Summerfield, *Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p.29.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p.28.

¹⁰⁷ See Marie-Francoise Chanfrault-Duchet, “Textualisation of the Self and Gender Identity in the Life-story,” *Feminism and Autobiography: Texts Theories, Methods*, Tess Cosslett et al eds., (London Routledge, 2000), p.61 and Kathryn Anderson & Dana C. Jack, ‘Learning to Listen: Interview Techniques & Analyses’, *The Oral History Reader*, Robert Perks & Alistair Thomson eds., (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 157.

¹⁰⁸ Penny Summerfield, “Dis/composing the Subject: Intersubjectivities in Oral History,” *Feminism and Autobiography: Texts Theories, Methods*, Tess Cosslett et al eds., (London Routledge, 2000), p.91-92. Internal quotation from Graham Dawson, *Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities*, (London Routledge, 1994), p.22-23.

memories derived from the greater cultural influence upon their collective memory, such as cinematic memory.

Testimony, despite being removed from experience, can nevertheless symbolically represent that experience. While a survivor such as Wiesel admits that it is impossible to accurately represent his experience, he also submits that, “silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.”¹⁰⁹ While events may never be truly represented, their incomprehension must be remembered and testified to by a survivor in order to refute denial. “A survivor’s writing after the Holocaust is proof that he has defeated the “final solution”. It is indisputable evidence that he now exists, a notion that no survivor ever takes for granted.”¹¹⁰ Survivor’s testimony is an assertion of survival in the face of overwhelming and incomprehensible death. The survivor writer Mendel Mann asserts that, “I write to prove that I am, that I exist, that I too am still on the planet.”¹¹¹ For Mann writing is a testament to the fact of his existence *after* the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust. It is a remembering of extermination as a refutation of extermination.

Imagination then becomes an important element through which to explore history. Although survivor testimony, written and spoken, cannot claim to reveal the reality of the Holocaust, it can perhaps evoke what it is to have lived through and survived the concentration camps more effectively than empirical history. Lawrence Langer, in *The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination*, argues that in achieving an impression of the atrocities, “the power of the imagination to evoke an atmosphere does far more than the historian’s fidelity to fact.”¹¹² To Langer, imagination plays a vital role in furthering our understanding of an event that is failed by empirical research. In *Holocaust Testimonies*, Langer goes further and seeks to do away even with the mediating factor of the written word in order to facilitate a more immediate and direct connection to survivor memory. Here he turns from survivor literature, to videotaped interviews with survivors as the most effective way to reach their experience, as it exists in their imagination.

¹⁰⁹ Elie Wiesel, *A Jew Today*, Marion Wiesel trans., (New York: Random House, 1978), p.118.

¹¹⁰ Victor E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy*, (Boston: Beacon, 1952), p.150.

¹¹¹ Mendel Mann quoted in James Young, *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p.72.

¹¹² Lawrence Langer, *The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination*, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1977), p.79.

Holocaust literature... challenges the imagination through the mediation of the text, raising issues of style and form and tone and figurative language that – I now see – can deflect our attention from... the event itself. Nothing, however, distracts us from the immediacy of conducting interviews with former victims... or watching them on a screen.¹¹³

For Langer, spoken testimony becomes the most intimate form of communication we have with the events of the Holocaust.

Through direct communication with imagination, *spoken* testimony can reach history more effectively than written testimony. Langer argues that empirical study and the written word represent a level of mediation that misrepresents survivor experience. In trying to understand the Holocaust we are trying to reach the imagination, or memory as Wiesel calls it, of the survivor. The closest representation of that imagination and memory is the spoken voice of those who witnessed the atrocities. Therefore, the spoken testimony of a survivor becomes the most valuable insight we have into the events of World War II. James Young argues that what Holocaust testimony offers us is “knowledge – not evidence – of events.”¹¹⁴ Although empirical evidence can help to prove the facts of the Holocaust, in order to comprehend the *experience* of the Holocaust we must look to oral testimony. And so memory, as expressed in testimony, becomes knowledge. It reveals insights and descriptions of otherwise unknown historical ground.

In terms of a history of the atrocities of World War II, this knowledge represents an understanding that although we can never fully comprehend the horrors, in this incomprehension we understand the enormity of the events. This incomprehension becomes a symbolic (mis)understanding that passes through a variety of groups who are simultaneously listeners of testimony and active participants in the construction of collective memory. In telling her story to her family Wanda describes the trauma of her experience through a filter of interiority, and in doing so transfers that trauma to the group.

As listeners, the Bielecka family come to know of the event and testify to that testimony through *their* interiorities. Their interiorities are informed by their familial

¹¹³ Lawrence Langer, *Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory*, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1991), p.xii-xiii.

¹¹⁴ James Young in Kalí Tal, *Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.48.

connection to Wanda, as well as different cultural memories. The found footage narrative then (re)constructs the experiences through a collective interiority of Wanda and her family, that is then viewed by an audience who process the testimony of the found footage narrative through further interiorities. This audience could include historians with extensive knowledge of the greater historical events in question; or filmmakers with a knowledge of the form of the film or the film footage used; or perhaps viewers with neither an in-depth understanding of the content or form of the film. All these individuals will form their own understanding of Wanda's experience based upon their own unique interiorities, which are in turn informed by other memories. Through each listener, the events take on a new form, in a sense they become new events, but in doing so they retain a symbolic significance, and an inherent comprehension that *they shall not be forgotten*.

Collective memory becomes integral to the remembrance of survivor experiences because it is through collective memory that a group defines itself and what is important. As Susan Sontag observes, "what is called collective memory is not a remembering but a stipulating: that this is important, and this is the story about how it happened with pictures that lock the story in our minds."¹¹⁵ The Bielecka family's collective memory of Wanda's experiences, despite its' multifaceted and contradictory nature, is nevertheless a declaration of the importance of preserving her story. It is the fact of the communication of her experience through the generations that matters, not the exact factual detail of the myriad accounts, which could never fully represent the truth of Wanda's experience anyway.

It then becomes important to explore exactly *how* these events are stipulated. It becomes useful to analyse the processes through which memory is formed, how it expresses itself through spoken language, and how that spoken language becomes an oral history that is communicated through multiple speakers beyond those that experienced the events firsthand. It is therefore vital to explore the *collective memory* of a survivor's experience. As Yael Zerubavel puts it in his study of Zionist collective memory, we must study "how members of society remember and interpret (the past)... how the meaning of the past is constructed, and how it is modified over time."¹¹⁶ We must explore the mechanics of memory in this way because it is in this

¹¹⁵ Sontag, Susan, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2003), p86.

¹¹⁶ Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p.3.

form that survivor testimony exists at a time when fewer and fewer survivors themselves exist.

Collective memory becomes a vessel through which each individual's memories, including Wanda's memory of her own experience, can be analysed. Maurice Halbwachs contended that it is through a study of collective memory that we can also better understand individual memories.

We can understand each memory as it occurs in individual thought only if we locate each within the thought of the corresponding group. We cannot properly understand their relative strength and the ways in which they combine within individual thought unless we connect the individual to the various groups in which he is simultaneously a member.¹¹⁷

In the case of Wanda's experience, we can better understand what happened to her by exploring the corresponding memories of the group with which she shares an identity, namely her family. As mentioned before, other family members might remember details that Wanda herself does not, or they may remind Wanda of memories that bring out new information, or indeed all members of the family may construct memories based on wider cultural experiences such as films, literature, other historical sources or separate life events.

All of these interweaving memories form a collective family memory that defines Wanda's experiences. An exploration of this multiplicity of memory helps us to understand Wanda's story because as an oral history, her story is a history of memory, which is a nexus of reception, representation, and contestation.¹¹⁸ In this way it also helps us to understand exactly why her experience in essence is truthful, despite the collective memory of her experience being contradictory.

In his conception of a "social framework of memory," Halbwachs suggests that each individual constructs memories that are socially mediated and are always related to a social group. The individual constructs memory but it is the social group that determines what is memorable. As Assman elaborates, "every individual memory constitutes itself in communication with others. These "others," however,

¹¹⁷ Maurice Halbwachs, "On Collective Memory," p.53.

¹¹⁸ Alon Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," *American Historical Review*, 102 (1997), p.1399.

are not just any set of people, rather they are groups who conceive their unity and peculiarity through a common image of their past.”¹¹⁹ In the context of *Wanda*, the Bielecka family share a common image of their past that manifests itself in the experiences of Wanda. Their memories of what happened to her are not just constituted through Wanda’s testimony, but through the retelling of the story between themselves and a larger societal framework of memory.

Jan Assmann conceptualises two types of collective memory of which these media are a part; communicative memory and cultural memory.¹²⁰ For Assmann, communicative memory represents all those memories that are constructed through everyday communications whether it is conversations at the breakfast table or discussions in the workplace. Therefore, one form of media that helps to define communicative memory would be oral testimony such as Wanda’s, and the testimony of her testimony spoken by her family. This form of collective memory is temporally limited to a range of eighty to one hundred years, which brings the events of World War II into the realm of communicative memory.

Oral history is only passed on through conversation, and so by its very nature cannot extend beyond the age of a lifetime. Jan Vansina defines oral history as “verbal messages which are reported statements from present generation.” Furthermore, she elaborates that “there must be transmission by word of mouth over at least a generation.”¹²¹ Therefore, communicative memory has a limited temporal horizon: “This horizon shifts in direct relation to the passing of time. The communicative memory offers no fixed point which would bind it to the ever expanding past in the passing of time.”¹²² Essentially, communicative memory continually shifts in meaning depending upon what is said at any given moment and how that is processed by the listener.

It is clear in *Wanda* that those memories formed by Wanda Bielecka’s family come not from their own experiences but from Wanda herself. Their memories are directly constituted through communication with her, but they are also formed from conversation with each other, a sharing of stories they have been told by Wanda, as well as through retellings of the story by Wanda herself. All of these elements combine to form a collective memory of the events in question. Structures of

¹¹⁹ Jan Assmann, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, p.127.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History*, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p.27-28.

¹²² Jan Assmann, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity* p.127

communication in this sense are diffuse and varied. Kansteiner describes them as “everyday communications about the meaning of the past characterised by instability, disorganisation, and non-specialisation.”¹²³ Communicative memory is constantly altering itself based upon a continual dialogue within the group. This dialogue may not always be specifically about Wanda’s experience, but through conversation concerning other family experiences collective memory of her narrative may change.

The Bielecka family’s collective memory of these events only in part comes from communicative memory. It is from cultural memory that they (including Wanda herself) derive the rest of their understanding of her experiences. Cultural memory differs somewhat from communicative. It signifies objectivised culture; texts, film, architecture. “Cultural memory has its fixed point; its horizon does not change with the passing of time. These fixed points are fateful events of the past, whose memory is maintained through cultural formation and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).”¹²⁴

Collective memory is constructed through a schema associated with the idea that an event is represented and remembered in terms of other “media”. Peter Burke highlights media that are employed in the social organisation that affects memory.¹²⁵ One set of media employed in the social organisation affecting memory are images, whether they be pictorial or photographic, still or moving. “Material images have long been constructed to assist the retention and transmission of memories.”¹²⁶ Material images could describe cinema, photography, painting, or sculpture.

All have been used as a method through which to remember events and form memories around them. Material images express and shape the identity of a group through helping to define what should be remembered. Images have clearly impressed themselves upon the memories of the Bielecka family in relation to Wanda’s story, and sometimes the family members are explicit about their influence, where a film scene has shaped the memory of a specific event for example. The images used in the found footage narrative also impress themselves upon the viewer and define new memories of Wanda’s story based around their aesthetic criteria.

¹²³ Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,” *History and Theory*, 41:2, May, 2002, p.182.

¹²⁴ Jan Assmann, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, p128.

¹²⁵ Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” p.100-102.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.101.

The written record is another type of media highlighted by Burke, which informs cultural memory. As was discussed above, literary memoirs written by survivors are one way in which their experiences can be represented. The imagination of the survivor is a valuable resource of historical information that can express itself in writing. In the same way, the historian's written research detailing an analysis of events can also define memories. But what must be remembered in both cases is that writing is still one step removed from the memory of experience itself. "As we read the writings of memory, it is easy to forget that we do not read memory itself, but it's transformation through writing."¹²⁷ Writing itself is always mediated and therefore memory, which is informed by this writing, is mediated, at once removed from the original memory and experience in question. The Bielecka family, in forming a collective memory of Wanda's experience, are also informed by writing. This could take the form of greater historical information (from books, television or film) that the family have remembered beyond Wanda's testimony. The found footage narrative itself, as a film, is also writing. It is a mediated representation of memories and events, which viewers (including the Bielecka family) will be informed by.

Assman's theory of cultural memory attempts to reconcile the three poles of memory; the contemporised past (Wanda's testimony); the group (the Bielecka family); and culture. He highlights these links through various characteristics. First of all he describes a *concretion of identity* or a relation to the group. Cultural memory maintains a store of knowledge from which a group expresses its singularity and uniqueness. It defines what a group is and is not. He then discusses cultural memory's *capacity to reconstruct*. No memory can preserve the past. Cultural memory works by reconstructing, that is, it always relates its knowledge to an actual and contemporary situation. There are fixed stores of knowledge, but every contemporary context relates to these differently, sometimes by appropriation, sometimes by criticism, sometimes by preservation or by transformation. Finally, *organisation* is an important characteristic of cultural memory. This means the institutional reinforcing of communication through rituals or ceremony and the specialisation of the bearers of cultural memory. In other words a focusing on certain outlets (such as texts, films, music) to express the cultural memories of a group.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ James Bryan Conant, Stephen Owen, *Remembrances: The Experience of Past in Classical Chinese Literature*, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), p.114.

¹²⁸ Jan Assmann, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, p130-131.

Assman's characteristics relate to the formation of cultural memory specific to the Bielecka family and their memory of Wanda's experiences of World War II. This group experiences a concretion of identity in relation to Wanda's story through such basic knowledge as the family's Polish roots, that Wanda was a Pole during World War II, a significant "figure of memory"¹²⁹ in itself (as has been described in chapter one), and that Wanda was a survivor of Auschwitz concentration camp. This places the family history within a very specific part of the cultural memory of World War II and defines their family's cultural history through a combination of wider cultural history of the war, and a more specific knowledge of Wanda's experiences. This knowledge helps to 'locate' the communicative memories acquired through conversation with Wanda herself.

The production of the film has been one way that this collective memory has reconstructed itself. Being interviewed, and recalling their memories, maintains the cultural memory of the family. The fixed stores of knowledge are reconstructed through their speaking into camera. And when members of the family view the film, and they hear other members being interviewed, the cultural memory will be reconstructed again. Collective memories are also reconstructed through the viewing of films. As some of the interviewees mention, films may have influenced how they visualise an event in their mind. It seems that films have helped to reconstruct memory by placing those stories members have been told within the context of the filmic medium.

This is why the found footage narrative *Wanda* creates found footage reconstructions that dramatise the events described by the Wanda and her family. By depicting their collective testimony through a myriad of disparate and often unrelated archival images that complement and contradict what is being spoken, the nature of collective memory is demonstrated. Specifically, the role that cultural memory plays in informing collective memory is shown. Many members of the Bielecka family that are interviewed in *Wanda* testify to imagining Wanda's experiences in relation to specific scenes from films. It is through the media of film that Wanda's relatives are able to construct an image in their minds of her experiences. Therefore, use of found footage in dramatic reconstructions of the story express a cultural memory that in turns expresses the imagination involved in the construction of collective memory.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p129.

‘Organisation’ of these disparate narratives is in part achieved through the filmic medium and by the film itself as a media of ‘action.’ Actions are another form of media of collective memory described by Burke. Actions can define memories; for example, a parent teaching a child a practical skill is a memory passed on through action. These actions leave no trace beyond the moment in which they happen, but actions also extend to rituals and traditions such as days of commemoration. These rituals and traditions are “re-enactments of the past, acts of memory, but they are also attempts to impose interpretations of the past, to shape memory. They are in every sense collective re-presentations.”¹³⁰ Therefore, in a sense the actual *production* of a found footage narrative is also a ritual. In interpreting Wanda’s past through the commemoration of collective interviews and found footage reconstructions, *Wanda* imposes its own interpretation of history. *Wanda*, in the action of its production, is a ceremony of remembrance of Wanda’s experience.

Attempts have been made by Steven Spielberg’s Holocaust memorial organisation to film Wanda and document her experiences, but up until being interviewed during the production of *Wanda*, she had refused all offers to be interviewed. Therefore the film itself goes some way to reinforcing Wanda’s story. However, many details are left out, and it seems that Wanda herself has left out certain details that others remember. How are we to rely on memory that is based on other testimony when Wanda herself fails to communicate these stories when interviewed? Can stories told by other family members contribute to the cultural history of the family when they are told by someone who has not directly experienced them, contradict in detail Wanda’s most recent testimony, and when they are so clearly influenced by a separate cultural memory reconstructed through films?

Therefore, contradiction is a significant element in collective memory. Each member of the group, in this case the Bielecka family, construct their memory of Wanda’s experience through their own unique interiority, which is further informed by a unique influx of communicative and cultural memory. It is within this complex nexus of collective memory that Wanda’s experience is stored. Furthermore, these memories are in a constant flux based upon the relationships between the members of the family. How well a family member is getting on with Wanda for example, could

¹³⁰ Ibid.

influence their telling of her story. The present informs an understanding of the past. Relationships between each member of the family define their memories of the story.

Yet, these power relations are constantly changing, which in turn creates constant changes and contradictions in testimony within each member of the group. Deborah Cameron notes that many interviewees provide conflicting accounts of their views of events when given the chance to provide multiple testimonies. As a result, a “normal” understanding of events is by nature multiple and continually shifting rather than singular and fixed.¹³¹ Listeners to Wanda’s testimony will by no means testify to it themselves verbatim, or even necessarily accurately, but instead filter her testimony through their own interiority. Indeed, Wanda herself also filters the events she experienced through her own complex inner life. As *Wanda* demonstrates, Wanda’s own memory of events continually shifts and changes in subtle but also significant ways.

Individuals are perfectly capable of ignoring even the best told stories, of injecting their own, subversive meanings into even the most rhetorically accomplished ‘texts’ – and of attending to only those ways of making sense of the past that fit their own.¹³²

It is quite possible that Wanda herself has forgotten or reconstructed certain parts of her story and that those parts remembered by others ‘fill in the gaps’ of Wanda’s own telling. Although it seems that for the most part there is agreement as to the basic structure of her story, when it comes to details everybody, including Wanda herself, reconstruct their memories depending on when they are retelling them and in what context.

The power relations between family members, and in relation to other groups such as nations or political parties, can also influence collective memory. Power, in terms of which memories become dominant within the collective memory of the group, therefore plays an important role in the construction of a collective memory of Wanda’s experiences.

¹³¹ Deborah Cameron, *Working with Spoken Discourse*, (London: Sage, 2001), p.157.

¹³² Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), p.192.

(It) traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.¹³³

Therefore, the dominant voice within the group will hold more sway over the construction of collective memory.

Wanda, as the member of the group who actually experienced the events, holds most influence over how the story is defined. But then as she has grown older, and her memory seems less accurate, other members of the group, particularly her children, gain power in defining collective memory. I myself develop more power in defining the story through the production of *Wanda*, and my knowledge of each interviewee's story. The film itself becomes an authority on the events and further redefines each family member's perception of the narrative. Film becomes a powerful influence on collective memory. For example, the viewing of certain Hollywood produced war films has clearly influenced some of the family member's perception of certain events in the narrative. Here we see how a wider cultural memory also holds power over how events are represented in the collective memory of the Bielecka family.

The (un)presentability of the Holocaust extends to epistemological issues of history in general, which Hayden White describes as a "crisis of representation." He points to history as a *verbal* structure, which can be separated into different components. The basis of any historical account is its basic chronicle, which places events within a chronological order. However, these events placed chronologically have no meaning by themselves. Meaning is given to events through a historian (who could be a survivor such as Wanda providing testimony, or a family member recounting that testimony, or indeed the found footage narrative representing those events through film), who "emplots" them within a structure which references a form derived from an already existing cultural context. This emplotment not just finds connections between events, but derives their meaning based upon pre-existing literary forms. According to Hayden White,

¹³³ Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," *Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984*, James D. Faubion ed., (London: Penguin, 2002), p.120.

Properly understood, histories ought never to be read as unambiguous signs of the events they report, but rather as symbolic structures, extended metaphors, that “liken” the events reported in them to some form with which we have already become familiar in our literary culture.¹³⁴

History therefore functions as a symbol rather than a sign. It does not provide an accurate description of the events it represents, but points the way towards what images to look for in our culturally encoded experience in order to determine the meaning of the history being represented.

Thus, literary methods are central to historical representation. Writing history (whether that be through the written word, speech or film) requires the same linguistic operation that is applied to writing fiction. This is not say that history and fiction are the same, but that historical accounts are not constructed through events from the past, but linguistic structuration. Therefore, it is important for historians to be aware of their tropic position in relation to the events they discuss.¹³⁵ In terms of the Bielecka family’s representation of Wanda’s experience, their testimony is not just derived from communicative memory constructed around Wanda’s own testimony, but dialogue within the group, and the power structures that produce dominant narratives.

Their history of the events also includes a cultural memory of images informed not just by documentary images of World War II, but images of cinema. As they testify to themselves, a mythology of film has a direct influence upon the collective memory of the Bielecka family. Peter Burke characterises this crisis of representation with pertinent questions about the nature of history. “Is it possible to know the past? Is it possible to tell the truth about “what actually happened,” or are historians like novelists, the creators of fiction?”¹³⁶ He believes that this crisis of representation leads to a “transgression” between the meanings of history and fiction, which leads to a “crisis of historical consciousness.” If fictional tropes and imagination become legitimate ways in which to study the past then epistemological assumptions about how the past is represented must be re-evaluated.

However, this is not to lessen Wanda’s testimony. Although the collective memory of the group points to certain culturally coded experiences informed by

¹³⁴ Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p.84.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Peter Burke, “Two Crises of Historical Consciousness,” *Storia della Storiografia*, 33:1, 1998, p.6.

cinema, this culturally coded experience is also informed by Wanda's testimony, and Wanda herself is of course informed by the culturally coded experience of the experience itself. The issue is not whether Wanda's experience is distorted by collective memory, but rather how to reach those experiences through the interiority of Wanda and her family. It is a similar issue to the one Irving has expressed in relation to anthropological research.

The problem facing anthropologists during fieldwork, especially given the centrality of memory, reverie and imagination to ethnographic practices, is how to bring events from the past into life when there is no independent access to people's consciousness, memories or the past.¹³⁷

It is important to explore new ways in which memory, reverie and imagination can be explored. As we shall see, the found footage narrative as reflexive myth is a method through which to explore the interiority of a group such as the Bielecka family.

Through the collective memory of this group, the way in which survivor experience is historicised can be examined. The found footage narrative explores history in an essayistic way, to create a reflexive mythology around a historical event. The characteristics of essayistic expression (subjectivity, imagination, irony, transgression) can be utilised in understanding the collective memory of historical events. The found footage narrative, as an expression of collective memory, can be an important way in which to explore representations of the Holocaust at a time when those representations are becoming more and more prescient. The more distant the events of World War II become, and the more survivors that pass away, the more important it is to explore how their experiences are remembered by subsequent generations through a methodology that reflects the complex and contradictory interiority of history itself.

In studying how experience is represented in collective memory, the found footage narrative inevitably becomes a form of *reflexive* mythology. "The often made contention that the past is constructed not as fact but as myth to serve the interest of a particular community may still sound radical to some, but it cannot (and should not)

¹³⁷ Andrew Irving, "Ethnography, Art and Death," *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, 13:1, p.186.

stupefy most historians.”¹³⁸ In the form of the found footage narrative, and in the collective memory of Wanda’s relatives, her story takes the form of a myth.

The remembered past turns into ‘myth’ not in the positivist sense of ‘inaccurate history’ but in the richer more positive sense of a story with a symbolic meaning made up of stereotyped incidents and involving characters who are larger than life, whether they are heroes or villains.¹³⁹

Experience as filtered through collective memory goes through a mythogenesis. Members of a group, such as the Bielecka family, find connections between Wanda’s narrative and cultural stereotypes of a hero or a villain, good or evil.¹⁴⁰ In constructing the story not just through communicative memory but cultural memory, their imaginations fuse testimony with cultural symbols that mythologise that testimony.

Mythology around the history of World War II is rich and diverse, particularly in cinema. To date, there have been more than 1300 films made around the history of World War II. This expansive cultural ‘media’ clearly informs the memories of many of Wanda’s family in the construction of her story. Wanda, as matriarch of the family, takes on a hero role against the evil of the Nazis, who in the twenty-first century have become symbols of evil through the mythogenesis of film. Mythology is a way of comprehending the incomprehensibility of events such as the Holocaust. “We need myths to make sense of the world, to turn random events into comprehensible stories, and to supply such stories with a recognizable narrative structure, familiar emotions and an already-known content.”¹⁴¹ The Bielecka family mythologises the traumatic events of Wanda’s life in collective memory as a way of integrating it into their own family identity. The next chapter will explore collective memory as a mythogenesis of history in which experience, and testimony of that experience is filtered through fantasy and imagination. By utilising approaches used by essayists in literature and film, the collective memory constructs history as myth can be explored.

¹³⁸ Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History,” p.1387.

¹³⁹ Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” p.103-104.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.104.

¹⁴¹ Rikke Schubart, “Getting the Story Right: Myth, Meaning, and Gendered War: Mythology in the Case of Jessica Lynch,” *War Isn’t Hell, It’s Entertainment: Essays on Visual Media and Representation of Conflict*, Rikke Schubert, Fabian Virchow et al eds., (North Carolina: McFarland, 2009), p.61.

Chapter Three:

The Written Essay.

The found footage narrative is a reflexive myth of mythogenesis. It is, in the Barthesian sense, a second order myth. Barthes attempts to define myth in semiological terms. He bases his definition upon the concepts of Ferdinand de Saussure, who described the basic relationship between an object of description and its linguistic representation. The object is that which is signified, while its linguistic representation, the word used to describe an object, is its signifier. This signifier then comes together with its meaning to produce a sign of the signified. Working within this simple structure Barthes describes myth as a further linguistic sign, in which the original sign itself becomes a signifier. And so in myth, the sign itself is used as a signifier, and a *further* meaning is given to it. This further meaning becomes myth.

Barthes asserts that myth is a form of speech just as White describes history as a form of linguistics. It is through an analysis of Barthes theory that we can begin to see how history as a semiological form can become myth. In terms of an analysis of history, Barthes' approach reflects Hayden White's observation that history functions as a symbol rather than a sign. Barthes describes myth as turning a sign into a signifier. Myth then comes to symbolise the sign as a signifier. This creates another remove from claims that history has empirical status. Empiricism would claim that history is a sign in the sense that it uses linguistic representations to create a meaning of the past (the signified).

However, Barthes contends that history is a symbol or myth because it derives meaning from the *sign of the object*, not the object itself. History therefore derives its meaning from culturally encoded experience, including communicative and cultural memories. Collective memory, as a form of history, derives its representation from other representations of the past. Even Wanda's testimony itself for example, is a representation of the past, and it is testimony that feeds into a mythology of collective memory. Film scenes depicting events of World War II, myths of the past in themselves, also feed into the memories of Wanda's story, further mythologising the past based upon cultural encoded experience rather than the past itself.

In exploring the mythical structures of the Bielecka family's collective memory, the found footage narrative becomes a Barthesian second order myth.

Wanda is a myth of history rather than events, but a reflexive one that highlights the nature in which this collective memory and the film itself is constructed. In essence, a second order myth mythologises myth itself. In regards to Gustave Flaubert's *Bouvard and Pécuchet* Barthes asserts that, "to this first mythical system, which already is a second semiological system, he superimposes a third chain, in which the first link is the signification, or final term, of the first myth."¹⁴² *Wanda* takes testimony of Wanda and her family, who have been interviewed in terms of their memory and imagination of the events, as its source for the history of her experience. Rather than trying to ascertain what happened to Wanda, the found footage narrative is attempting to ascertain what the collective memory of that happening is, which is in turn derived from communicative and cultural memories, which are themselves signs of the events.

Furthermore, the found footage narrative attempts to reflexively expose the mythological construction of memory through the form of myth itself. The two basic formal elements of *Wanda* are Bielecka family interviews based on their memory of events, and found footage reconstructions created from a collection of filmic fragments that reflect the influence of cinematic cultural memory upon Bielecka family testimony. Through these elements the found footage narrative is able to explore the vast and complex nexus of collective memory around the events, and also how *Wanda* as a film is part of that nexus.

A reflexive mythos of Wanda's story as constructed by the found footage narrative, *Wanda*, based upon the collective memory of her and her family, does not deny the reality of what happened to Wanda, and is aware of the construction of her story through its form. Nevertheless, it attempts to explore her experience *as it exists in the present* in the form of collective testimony, as a way to understand the symbolic meaning that has been constructed around this history. If we are to understand how atrocities such as the Holocaust will be comprehended as time moves on and survivors themselves no longer exist, it is important to look at their stories in the form of a reflexive mythology. Indeed, if we are to understand *any* experience as it is constructed in a history of memory, then we should look to the found footage narrative as an expression of that construction.

¹⁴² Roland Barthes, "Myth Today," p.136.

Barthes describes myth as, “neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion.”¹⁴³ Explicit within this description is the idea that myth is a form of language. Although myth reconstructs events, it only does so as a form of representation removed from their original happening. Myth, the symbolic meaning of events, can still teach us about how events are perceived and constructed in historical representations. It is important then to analyse the form through which myth is communicated, and the language and images used to express it. This chapter will explore how the found footage narrative derives its form from conceptions of the literary essay, and how conceptions of the literary essay are important in forming a representation of collective memory. This chapter will specifically explore the found footage narrative’s roots in the Montaignean essay, as first conceived by Michel de Montaigne, and then conceptually developed by Georg Lukács, Theodor Adorno, Max Bense, Walter Benjamin, and Roland Barthes.

The Montaignean essay mode provides a framework through which the found footage narrative as a reflexive myth can be conceptualised and put into practice through a film such as *Wanda*. Explicit within this conception of the essay is an interrogation of myth. As Lukács states, “we want poets and critics to give us life-symbols and to mould the still-living myths and legends in the form of our questions.”¹⁴⁴ Through the essay mode a framework for Barthes’ conception of a second order mythology can be developed and also demonstrated through the form of the found footage narrative. Theodor Adorno, in his conception of the essay, elaborates further, “Up to the present day, a blind natural interconnectedness, myth, perpetuates itself in culture. It is precisely this upon which the essay reflects.”¹⁴⁵ Through the found footage narrative, imagination and fantasy are used as tools through which to reflexively explore mythologies that exist around historical events.

In attempting to define the found footage narrative, it is important to first analyse conceptions of the literary essay. Indeed, modes of the essay film derive their form from the literary essay. André Bazin, in describing Chris Marker’s *Letter from Siberia* (1957), wrote, “the important word is “essay,” understood in the same sense that it has in literature – an essay at once historical and political, written by a poet as

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.129.

¹⁴⁴ Georg Lukács, "On the Nature and Form of the Essay: A Letter to Leo Popper," *Soul and Form*, Anna Bostock trans., (London: Merlin Press, 1974), p.12.

¹⁴⁵ Theodor Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” *New German Critique*, 32 (Spring Summer 1984), p.166.

well.”¹⁴⁶ Through conceptions of the essay, the form of the found footage narrative can be better elucidated. And the found footage narrative, as a form of the Montaignean essay, is a film practice through which to better elucidate the way collective memory is constructed. The found footage narrative, deriving from the essay mode, combines historical representation and the contemplation of memory through cinematic form.

Michel de Montaigne’s writings are the earliest examples of the essay as ‘anti-genre’; transgressive, paradoxical, subjective, reflexive, anti-systematic, fragmentary, and inconclusive. Donald Frame has argued that the *Essais* took the form of letters to Montaigne’s deceased friend Étienne de La Boétie; a substitute for their conversations.¹⁴⁷ The observation is an astute one. The Montaignean essay is at times irreverent, free-associative, idiosyncratic, and personal. It is also complex, and obsessive of detail, in the way that a conversation between close friends can be. A conversation with a close friend can also be a time to experiment with language, voice one’s more private thoughts, and expand upon ideas; all characteristics of the Montaignean essay. The Montaignean essay is about an intimacy of knowledge. It does not derive its approach from an external system or science, but the internal workings of thought. The found footage narrative, as a form of the Montaignean essay, similarly explores this intimacy of knowledge. It concerns itself with an exploration of the memory, thoughts, and imagination around historical events rather than empirical and scientific analysis.

The central consideration of the Montaignean essay is the notion of subjectivity. The question Montaigne famously posed in his writing was, “what do I know?”¹⁴⁸ It is a question that can be answered in two different ways. Firstly, an expansive answer could be given in which Montaigne elaborates upon his accumulated knowledge, and impressions of the world. By extension, he could be asking himself what his personal experience has taught him about himself, and other people. Alternatively, it could be posed in a more reductive sense. The question could be inquiring as to the *limits* of Montaigne’s knowledge. What *exactly* does one know? Can we *know* anything? The second inflection of the question asks the value

¹⁴⁶ André Bazin, “Bazin on Marker,” Dave Kehr trans., *Film Comment*, 39:4 (July-August 2003), p.44.

¹⁴⁷ See Donald Frame, *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p.v.

¹⁴⁸ Michel De Montaigne, “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” *Essays: Volume II*, Donald Frame trans., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p318.

of judgement; the extent of human knowledge. It inquires *reflexively* as to the construction of representation.

All representational forms are mediated, and to claim that mediation can accurately represent reality is a falsehood. As Henri Bergson points out, “to perceive all the influences from all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the condition of a material object. Conscious perception signifies choice, and consciousness mainly consists in this practical discernment.”¹⁴⁹ To claim the position of god, capable of perceiving all phenomena, would be to reduce oneself to an inanimate object. It is therefore subjective consciousness, rather than ‘objective’ system, from which the essayist builds a conception of the world. Language therefore cannot claim to fully represent objects such as events. Language, but also other representations such as images and even thoughts do not reveal the true nature of objects such as phenomena and events.

The imperfection of languages consists in their plurality, the supreme one is lacking: thinking is writing without accessories or even whispering, the immortal word still remains silent; the diversity of idioms on earth prevents everybody from uttering the words which otherwise, at one single stroke, would materialise as truth.)¹⁵⁰

Language is a representation of thought which in itself is a representation of objects such as experience or events. And yet language and thought, along with other representations such as film or photography, are how we communicate our past. It becomes necessary then to analyse how it is that we formulate these representations.

Subjectivity for the essay does not necessarily mean autobiographical, but is contemplated and explored as an irrevocable position from which to better elucidate the objective world. What do *I* know of the *world*? To the Montaignean essayist, human experience cannot be represented while ignoring one’s own humanity. The essay, whether in its literary or cinematic formation, combines the socio-historical with the personal. It *consciously* fuses subject and object as a method through which to present ideas about both. In the Montaignean essay, the subject is as much the

¹⁴⁹ Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, Nancy M. Paul and W. Scott Palmer trans., (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p.48.

¹⁵⁰ Stéphane Mallarmé quoted in Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator”, *Illuminations*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p77.

object as the object is subject. The found footage narrative as a genre of the essay mode, therefore explores the objective world of historical events through the filter of the memory and imagination of its participants. By doing this events are elucidated, while the process of remembering those events is also revealed.

Aldous Huxley suggests a “three poled frame of reference” around which the essay operates: “There is the pole of the personal and the autobiographical; there is the pole of the objective, the factual, the concreteparticular; and there is the pole of the abstract-universal.”¹⁵¹ It is between these three that the essay indiscernibly fluctuates. A similar conception of the essay is suggested by Gerard Defaux in his reading of Montaigne. Defaux points to the double play of discourse in Montaigne’s approach; at once an investigation into the “measure of things,” (the external, objective world); and the “measure of sight” (the internal and subjective).¹⁵² The word “measure” here could be read as “concept,” “sight” as “subjectivity,” and again the three elements (things, concept, subjectivity) become composite.

A “measure of sight” contends that anything one communicates is subjective. Therefore a found footage narrative filmmaker only ever claims to represent singular viewpoints, and does not claim to represent the totality of the object he interrogates, or to conclude upon it. “Could my mind find a firm footing, I should not be making essays, but coming to conclusions; it is, however, always in its apprenticeship and on trial.”¹⁵³ The second assumption/warning concerns the external world to be interrogated by the methodology of the self; the “measure of things.” To the Montaignean essayist, the world is as complex and changing as the self. Any claim of mastery over a subject is a falsehood. “I cannot fix my subject. He is always restless, and reels with a natural intoxication. I catch him here, as he is at the moment when I turn my attention to him. I do not portray his being; I portray his passage.”¹⁵⁴ To claim totality over a subject is to admit that one presents only a limited view, inevitably missing out that which has not been considered.

As Carden-Coyne observes in relation to memory, there is no reality or truth to be captured or interrogated through representation. “The premise of memory

¹⁵¹ Aldous Huxley, *Collected Essays*, (London: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p.v.

¹⁵² Gérard Defaux, & John A. Galluci, “Readings of Montaigne,” *Yale French Studies*, 64 (1983), p.88-89.

¹⁵³ Michel de Montaigne, *Essays*, John M. Cohen trans., (London: Penguin, 1958), p.235.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.235.

‘distortion’ supposes a reality or truth that can be captured and interrogated.”¹⁵⁵ An essayistic approach, such as the found footage narrative, does not aim to define the past, but instead look at how it manifests itself through the constant flux of collective memory. *Wanda* does not claim to represent the truth of what happened to Wanda, but shows how her experiences are subjectively represented in her memory and that of her family. The Montaignean essayist attempts to transcribe thought processes, in all their complexity, when contemplating a theme. André Tournon suggests that, “we must always remember that these writings are the expression of personal fantasies (fancies) and as such refuse the guarantee of values which usually mask the caprices of writing – “doctrine,” authority, inspiration, or simply work.”¹⁵⁶ The Montaignean essay does not aim to define the *essential* meaning of an object, but explore the meanings that exist *around* objects, as they occur in the self.

The found footage narrative derives its own approach from this idea of representing thought. It too aims to explore the variations in thinking around historical events. *Wanda* attempts to represent the collective thoughts of the Bielecka family as they exist around the events of Wanda’s escape. As a form of the Montaignean essay, *Wanda* aims to discover information on the theme of collective memory from the complex nexus of the Bielecka family memory in relation to the events of Wanda’s life during World War II. Therefore, the found footage narrative, as a form of the Montaignean essay, is not beholden to any methodology but that imposed by the subject’s own thoughts as they occur on a subject *at the time of speaking*.

The self is not a static form, but constantly changing. The *Essais* are, as Montaigne observes, “an account of thoughts that are unsettled and, as chance will have it, at times contradictory, either because I am then another self, or because I approach my subject under different circumstances and with other considerations.”¹⁵⁷ This methodology of thought is the framework through which the found footage narrative approaches historical events. As an exploration into the theme of collective memory, *Wanda* constructs a narrative based upon the thoughts of each member of the Bielecka family as they occur at the time of each interview. As the film shows, each interviewee’s testimony changes each time they speak about the events. This means they at times contradict other testimony or even their own. Informed by

¹⁵⁵ Ana Carden-Coyne, *Reconstructing the Body: Classicism, Modernism, and the First World War*, p.65

¹⁵⁶ André Tournon, “Self Interpretation in Montaigne’s *Essais*,” *Yale French Studies*, 64 (1983), p.51.

¹⁵⁷ Michel de Montaigne, *Essays*, p.235.

communicative and cultural memory, Bielecka family testimony is as unsettled as Montaigne's thought. It is in constant flux, informed by a continually changing communicative and cultural memory landscape.

Furthermore, the Bielecka family's collective memory is filtered through this author's thoughts as a filmmaker who makes formal and theoretical decisions about how to present the information each member of the family has provided. The found footage narrative therefore extends upon the Montaignean approach by exploring multiple selves in multiple people, including the multiple selves of this author as filmmaker and also interviewee. The self, in all its forms, becomes a *methodology* of investigation; a mode of analysis into collective memory. The methodology of the self has no predefined approach, instead communicating that which the self perceives in the moment of writing, speaking or thinking, invoking the supposition that if the essay were re-communicated it would take a different form, and contain varying content, with each representation. Fundamental then to the found footage narrative is the invocation that the theme could be written about through many different historical subjects, communicated through many different selves, and represented in many different forms.

Lukács develops upon Montaigne's conception of subjectivity through the suggestion that the essay therefore need not concern itself with the veracity of its contents, but with the way it presents its contents, and reinvigorates (but does not finalise) our understanding. "The essay is a judgement, but the essential, the value determining thing about it is not the verdict (as is the case with the system) but the process of judging."¹⁵⁸ Like Montaigne, Lukács believes that the essayist must concern himself with the *form* of his work, and the methods through which an analysis of themes and content is undertaken.

For Lukács, even the most abstract philosophical tracts must revert to images (spoken or visual) to describe their meaning. Essentially, ideas must be represented in an external form in order to be communicated. Similarly, events must be communicated through an external form such as spoken testimony or visuals. Therefore, an idea such as collective memory cannot remove itself from the images that it must use to communicate itself. "Significance is always wrapped in images and

¹⁵⁸ Georg Lukács, "On the Nature and Form of the Essay," p.18.

the reflection of a glow from beyond the image shines through every image.”¹⁵⁹ Form and meaning are inextricably linked. It is through form that ideas are expressed, while meaning inhabits form.

Therefore, the essayist does not aim to expose the elemental inner meanings of an object, but show the multitudinous surface of forms. The found footage narrative uses cinematic form as a way to explore ideas, and the cinematic form through which ideas are represented in turn forms new ideas.

Form is his great experience, form – as immediate reality – is the image-element, the really living content of his writings. This form, which springs from a symbolic contemplation of life-symbols, acquires a life of its own through the power of that experience.¹⁶⁰

Form itself becomes the immediate experience of the idea, or in terms of the found footage narrative, the form of the film becomes the immediate experience of collective memory. This conception echoes Laub’s idea of the listening of testimony becoming an event in its own right. Through form, the found footage narrative becomes a new testimony of events that takes on a life of its own beyond that which it represents. Furthermore, as a new event in the production of meaning around the past, the found footage narrative creates new testimony in those that view it.

Each image, from which a representation such as the found footage narrative is constructed, forms part of a question, a question posed toward the life symbol, such as collective memory. That question is, “what is the life symbol?” (for example, what is ‘collective memory’?). Within the framework of the essayistic work, each image is phrased as the “what” of this question. For example, within the found footage narrative each image (whether video testimony or found image) is a suggestion as to how the memory could be represented. The essay essentially becomes the same question asked in varying images, in which no definite answer is given. Montaigne effectively demonstrates the point of this approach, through a simple sequence of questions.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p.5.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.8.

I ask what is Nature, Pleasure, a Circle, and Substitution. The question is couched in words, and is answered in the same coin. A stone is a body. But if you press the point: And what is a body? – A substance – And what is a substance? And so on, you will end by driving the answerer to exhaust his dictionary. One substitutes one word for another that is often less well understood.¹⁶¹

Representation (in any medium) can never truly represent the object it contemplates. Each explanation merely expands representation, but complicates the object. Through this form, “a question is thrown up and extended so far in depth that it becomes the question of all questions, but after that everything remains open.”¹⁶² For Lukács, the essay is analysis through form that aestheticises the question, but always foregoes the answer. This forms the foundation of the found footage narrative as reflexive myth. Lukács suggests that the essayist creates symbolic representations of reality, based upon existing symbolic representations. Similarly to Barthes’ idea of a second order mythology, Lukács conception of the essay mythologises myths through exploring their construction. The found footage narrative does this through form aesthetically, in turn creating a further myth, albeit one that reflexively explores its own workings as a myth at the same time.

As Adorno observes simply, “the whole is the false.”¹⁶³ Totality can only be expressed through an assertion of its absence; and one can only suggest this absence through a layering of reconstructed images of the object. “The risked, anticipatory, and incompletely redeemed aspect of every essayistic detail draws in other details as negation; the untruth in which the essay knowingly entangles itself is the element of its truth.”¹⁶⁴ The way objects are thought about continually changes, and multiplies. Adorno contends that all that can be represented of them is the impermanence of their being; the *moments* or *fragments* of objects; the transitory. Yet, in this evocation of the transitory, the *negation* of the whole, that whole can be represented through form. The aim of this essayistic technique is to demonstrate the multiplicity of meaning, and the futility of conclusion; hence the essay’s fragmentary form. Within the essay, there are no logical conclusions, only illogical conclusions and logical *inconclusions*.

¹⁶¹ Michel de Montaigne, *Essays*, p.349.

¹⁶² Georg Lukács, "On the Nature and Form of the Essay," p.14.

¹⁶³ Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, (London: Verso, 1951), p.50.

¹⁶⁴ Theodor Adorno, "The Essay as Form," p.166.

Everything must be left continually unfinished, or must end through some means external to itself, evading final definition.

The essay's common structural characteristic is fragmentation. "It thinks in fragments just as reality is fragmented and gains its unity only by moving through the fissures, rather than by smoothing them over."¹⁶⁵ Therefore, the found footage narrative layers images of Wanda's past through fragments of testimony and archival footage that suggest possible ways in which her experiences could be represented. Yet, by using multiple image fragments from multiple sources, *Wanda* also reflexively represents the multiplicity of meaning that has been constructed around the events. The essayistic aims to reconstruct objects out of their "conceptual *membra disjecta*."¹⁶⁶ An object, such as a historical event, as it exists outside of representation, is a monad. Yet, conceptually, through representation, the object is a myriad; an infinite network of potential images.

As André Tournon describes it, the essay is "an uneven textual surface, broken in places and wound around itself like a Möbius strip."¹⁶⁷ The essay disassembles the object, dividing it into conceptual fragments, and mediating it through the conceptual organisation of the self; "methodically unmethodically."¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, the essayist "freely associates what can be found associated in the freely chosen object."¹⁶⁹ Each fragment can be linked with any other fragment, from any other object, that the essayist deems associable. And so *Wanda* depicts the free associative nature of the recollections of the Bielecka family, which are then used as context for the free associative nature of the found footage narrative itself. Fragments of testimony and archival images represent the fragments of memory that form the collective memory of the events.

The found footage narrative therefore explores *aporia*, or what Friedrich Nietzsche describes as the "breath of empty space,"¹⁷⁰ that exists *between* objects. Adorno suggests that an essay's concepts are "presentable in such a way that they support one another, that each one articulates itself according to the configuration that it forms with the others."¹⁷¹ Through the juxtaposition of these conceptual fragments,

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.164.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p.169.

¹⁶⁷ André Tournon, "Self Interpretation in Montaigne's *Essais*," p.62.

¹⁶⁸ Theodor Adorno, "The Essay as Form," p.161.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p.159.

¹⁷⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.125.

¹⁷¹ Theodor Adorno, "The Essay as Form," p.161.

new conceptual fragments are created, which inform, or *go back into*, the initially fragmented objects; transforming their representation. Therefore, “in the essay, concepts do not build a continuum of operations, thought does not advance in a single direction, rather the aspects of the argument interweave as in a carpet.”¹⁷² This interwovenness of concepts highlights aporia through juxtaposition, which can then be perceived as part of the objects interrogated; essentially newly reconstructing, or *adding to*, their form. The essayistic therefore finds cohesion through *difference*.

Even *within* those conceptual fragments that are seemingly incongruously connected, a free form is often utilised by the essay. As Lukács observes, “sometimes its free flight is constrained by the unassailable facts of dry matter; sometimes it loses all scientific value because it is, after all, a vision, because it precedes facts and therefore handles them freely and arbitrarily.”¹⁷³ It is not only the system through which things are assumed relevant to one another that is subverted, but the need for veracity of the things themselves. If the found footage narrative is aiming to represent *thoughts* on an event, and in doing so attempt to represent how we as human beings might also think of the event, then veracity would in fact not be an accurate goal. Fantasy can enhance our perspective of an event as much as fact. Imagination can be applied to alter the concrete.

The essay aims to associate that which would not commonly be associated, in order to reveal new meanings in objects. “By transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes visible in the object which it is orthodoxy's secret purpose to keep invisible.”¹⁷⁴ The found footage narrative attempts to freely associate images that seem to contradict each other, or are not usually associated through empirical analysis. For example, it consciously uses fictional images such as scenes from Hollywood films to represent historical events. Therefore, the innate formal strategy of the found footage narrative is transgression. It attempts to relate representations to events that are not empirically connected to them, but connected through the imagination of the interviewees and the filmmaker.

Max Bense’s concept of “configuration” expands upon the essayistic techniques of combining opposing concepts through form. In his study, “*On the Essay*

¹⁷² Ibid., p.160.

¹⁷³ Georg Lukács, "On the Nature and Form of the Essay," p.13.

¹⁷⁴ Theodor Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” p.171.

and its Prose,¹⁷⁵ Bense discusses how the essay is an *aesthetic* form of knowledge that combines expressive and analytical means. “The essayist is a combiner, an indefatigable producer of configurations around a particular object... Configuration is an epistemological category which cannot be reached by axiomatic reduction, but only through a literary *ars combinatoria*, in which imagination replaces strict knowledge.”¹⁷⁶ Bense suggests that the essayist must search for new knowledge through a kind of rhetorical alchemy, in which the representation of objects considered morally, aesthetically, empirically, historically, or geographically separate by empirical thought are conceptually fragmented, and fused together through a methodology of the self.

The essay reveals its argument through a “combinatorial play of idea and image,” and its presentation integrates “the experimental demonstration of a natural effect and the repatterning of a kaleidoscope.”¹⁷⁷ The essay combines idea and image to highlight objects as impervious to interpretation, purely as aesthetic objects, and experientially specific, while also demonstrating how they are always altered by the very act of representation, by being interpreted, and given meaning. Moreover, despite this reflexive admission, the essay nevertheless continues to ‘repattern’ the objects it interrogates, conceptually fragmenting them to create objects transformed, and conceptually linked with other objects. Essentially, the essay deconstructs, and reconstructs, *simultaneously*.

Walter Benjamin expands upon the dialectic of configuration with his theory of “*constellation*.” Benjamin contends that the value of the essay depends upon how *indirectly* each conceptual fragment relates to the underlying idea. Benjamin defines “idea” as a pre-existent “essence,” provided to be reflected upon. All ideas form another essence, that of truth. The essayist reflects upon ideas through “concepts,” which are spontaneous products of the intellect.¹⁷⁸ Phenomena cannot become part of ideas simply as empirical objects, but must be disassembled through the essayist’s conceptual framework. In this way, concepts also play a converse role in the representation of ideas. Concepts mediate the representation of ideas through the medium of empirical reality. Ideas cannot be represented in themselves, “but solely

¹⁷⁵ Max Bense, “Über den Essay und seine Prosa,” *Merkur*, (1, 1947), p. 414-424.

¹⁷⁶ Max Bense in Graham Good, *The Observing Self: Rediscovering the Essay*, (London: Routledge, 1988), p.17.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.18.

¹⁷⁸ Walter Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, John Osborne trans., (London: Verso, 1963), p.30.

and exclusively in an arrangement of concrete elements in the concept.”¹⁷⁹ Therefore, ideas map objects, but only objects can represent ideas, while objects only hold importance in the idea as far as they are *conceptually* oriented. Furthermore, objects neither represent the whole of an idea, nor are simply the predicate of an idea. Objects contain, within them, more (or less) than ideas, and can also contain more than one idea. “Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars. This means... that they are neither their concepts nor their laws.”¹⁸⁰

Phenomena enlarge concepts, but are essentially reduced by ideas. Phenomena determine the context within which a concept can explore itself, through their existence, commonalities, and differences. The idea, the “objective interpretation of phenomena – or rather their elements,” constellates connections between phenomena.¹⁸¹ Within a constellation, ideas become aporia between phenomena, indefinable truths that are nevertheless implied through essayistic methods of phenomenological specificity, juxtaposition, and association. Benjamin suggests that the larger the aporia between objects, the more an idea becomes evident. “The idea is best explained as the representation of the context within which the unique and extreme stands alongside its counterpart.”¹⁸² If a constellation (the idea) is made up of points of the conceptual fragments of phenomena, then the form of an idea can be more clearly discerned at its perimeter, in those fragments at the outermost limits of the concept. Benjamin critiques historicism as merely showing a series of causally connected events, when not every causal moment is necessarily historical. He asserts that historical moments “become historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by thousands of years.” The historian must not approach history as a linear sequence of causally related moments, but instead constellate representations of the present with representations of the past.

Benjamin therefore uses *dialectical images* to show ideas. Sigrid Weigel analyses the form of the dialectical image in a critique of the Angel of History fragment from *Theses on the Philosophy of History*. She suggests that it creates a “constellation of non-synchronicity,” a “dialectical textual movement.”¹⁸³ Benjamin tries to present, *simultaneously*, complex, interwoven discourses (Judaism, Marxism,

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p.34.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., p.35.

¹⁸³ Sigrid Weigel, *Body-and Image-Space*, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 57-59.

Materialism), within the simple, experiential description of Klee's painting. His images are ones of conceptual juxtaposition and contradiction, within a specific experiential description. According to Jan Jevtic, the dialectical image "turns *there* into *here*, and *here* into *everywhere*. Because the image makes all positions, all points of view less than secure and definite, it destabilises the notions of the separate subject and object."¹⁸⁴ The dialectical image is the essay's formation of the universal particular. In evoking truth and ideas, it invokes a plethora of unspoken voices, unexplored perspectives, and unseen images. It becomes suggestive of the 'everything else' of representation, and in this sense, the 'whole.'

The found footage narrative utilises the concept of the configuration, constellation and the dialectical image in a cinematic form. First of all, as a film, it presents its knowledge aesthetically. It is an analysis of collective memory of historical events presented through expressive means. Imagination replaces empirical knowledge. The imagination of the Bielecka family is explored as a representation of memory and history. Furthermore, the imagination of this filmmaker is also explored, in the form of the film itself, as a representation of the imagination of the family. Configuration is achieved through the combination of disparate image fragments of dialogue and archival footage. These fragments are informed by the multiple testimonies (including the film itself as testimony), which in themselves are derived from the imagination. In turn the imagination of the participants is informed by the experience itself (in Wanda's case), and testimony of that experience (in the rest of the family's case), as well as other aspects of communicative, and cultural memory. In this way a configuration is formed around the original events of Wanda's life.

Furthermore, the found footage narrative creates a constellation of dialectical images in which the collective memory of a historical event is represented through multiple, interwoven discourses. In *Wanda*, the experiential description of Wanda's escape is not just represented by her own testimony, but the testimony of her testimony, archival images and their construction within the film itself. Furthermore, these images are informed by a much wider nexus of communicative and cultural memory which, despite their absence, are nevertheless represented through the aporia between each image. *Wanda* constellates images with wide aporia between them. For example, firsthand historical testimony is juxtaposed with scenes from narrative films.

¹⁸⁴ Iva Jevtic, *Between Word and Image: Walter Benjamin's Images as a Species of Space*, p.6, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ci/v1/v12/Jevtic%20paper.pdf>, accessed 22 September 2014.

Elements that seem conceptually distant from each other are combined in a dialectical image.

Jacques Derrida has observed that a necessary precondition of a sign's existence is the inhabitation of other signs within it. Derrida here echoes Adorno's conception of the essay as an 'interweaving as in a carpet.' "No element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each element... being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system."¹⁸⁵ Therefore, nothing is ever simply present or absent. Instead, signs become traces of other signs that are themselves inhabited by differences and traces of other signs. "Elements accordingly are eliminated in favour of traces, with language then being only a set of institutional traces and all expression in language becoming writing, supplements arising in a chain of differential references."¹⁸⁶ The sign becomes a supplement; a representation of its lack. This idea, expressed in the form of the dialectical image, reflects the representation of memory, which in turn is a representation of experience. Within those images represented exist other images not spoken or seen. The dialectical image therefore represents how survivor testimony speaks to the enormity of the atrocities that cannot be fully represented, but must be expressed through interiority to deny extermination.

The dialectical image therefore also creates a space in which the reader (or indeed viewer) inhabits his own understanding. This means that, through its 'consumption,' the image moves to the body of the consumer (the reader or viewer). Benjamin speaks of the image-space (*Bildraum*), and body-space (*Leibraum*). It is in the body-space that the image completes itself, and reconstructs itself anew. For although it is in the body-space that the image finds meaning, finds its "critical point," this meaning is one that suggest the potential for a continuous expansion of meaning. The body-space becomes the locus of truth and ideas in the sense that it represents, in each reader or viewer, a continuing questioning and expansion, of thought and representation. The audience themselves become producers of meaning. Rather than the found footage narrative becoming the final producer of meaning, its' meaning in turn is transformed within each viewer in the same way that each listener to Wanda's

¹⁸⁵ Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, Alan Bass trans., (London: Continuum, 1981), p.26.

¹⁸⁶ Allan Casebier, "A Deconstructive Documentary," *Journal of Film and Video*, 40:1 (Winter 1988), p.25-26.

testimony creates new meaning. The found footage narrative becomes another event in the transference of testimony.

Barthes' conception of "the writerly" expands upon Benjamin's idea of the image-space and the body-space. The reader becomes implicit in the formulation of the writerly. The reader of the writerly ceases to be a consumer, but a producer of the text (which could be written or indeed filmed). The writerly text is rewritten every time it is read. Its ambiguity encourages each reader to form his own understanding.

The writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized, by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages.¹⁸⁷

The writerly text produces a reader that *writes himself*. The text is posed in such a way that the reader must make their own subjective interpretation of the text in order to produce any meaning at all. As a consequence, reading produces idiosyncratic interpretations that work outside of homogenous ideologies, expanding the text through each complex nexus of the self of each reader. "This is in fact the function of writing: to make ridiculous, to annul the power (the intimidation) of one language over another, to dissolve any metalanguage as soon as it is constituted."¹⁸⁸ The writerly text oversees a multiple, and non-hierarchical, production of meaning.

The found footage narrative, as a writerly film text, essentially creates filmmakers out of viewers. The audience themselves are in a sense directing their own film by watching it. *Wanda's* narrative is constructed through multiple voices speaking multiple narratives, accompanied by thousands of different images from thousands of different sources. The multiple meanings produced in the film itself means that the viewer must create their own interpretation in order produce meaning. In this sense the found footage narrative as writerly text becomes an event in the same way as listening to testimony is an event. Through the event of the found footage narrative, a multiplicity of meaning is created in each viewer.

The writerly text is a therefore a *plural* text. The aim of an interpretation of the plural text is not to give it meaning, but to understand the plurality that constitutes

¹⁸⁷ Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, Richard Miller trans., (New York: Hill & Wang, 1970), p.5.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.98.

it; to be conscious of the multiple meanings that exist within it. “This text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds.” The writerly text has no beginning, it can be understood from many different, equal points, and the meanings that it produces are indeterminable in number. A system of meaning can be applied to the text, but it can never become the *only* system, one that finalises it. Within a text based on the “infinity of language,” there can be no finalisation.¹⁸⁹ The plural text is *infinite* in meaning because it is potentially infinite in readership, a readership that could produce an infinite number of interpretations, even within one reader. “This “I” which approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other texts, of codes which are infinite or, more precisely, lost (whose origin is lost).”¹⁹⁰ Each “I” (each reader) contains within them the fragments of all other texts that they have read.

Indeed, this does not just include the written text, but all “texts” that have amassed, and continue to amass, as the cumulative experience of each reader. The reader finds unique meaning in the text, and thus *renames* it. This new name then adjoins other names, and forms *further* names. This production is a “tireless approximation, a metonymic labour.”¹⁹¹ The text is merely a moment in the development of meaning. Barthes perceives this re-naming as perpetual, and expansive in all directions. The text then, is connected to this metonymic nexus.

If the text is subject to some form, this form is not unitary, architectonic, finite: it is the fragment, the shards, the broken or obliterated network – all the movement and inflections of a vast “dissolve,” which permits both overlapping and loss of messages.¹⁹²

As a form of the writerly, the found footage narrative therefore invokes the obliterated network of texts through its disorder and fragmentation. It is a narrative told from many different points through the multiple versions of events that amass to describe it. The found footage narrative develops a system in which to construct the fragments of images derived from the Bielecka family testimony and archival footage. But this does not finalise meaning. Instead, the multiplicity of meaning depicted in the found footage narrative is subsumed within the multiplicity of meaning already within each

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p.6.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p.10.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.11.

¹⁹² Ibid., p.20.

viewer. This produces a metonymic production of meaning in which each viewing of the film produces new meaning in the narrative. What each viewer witnesses and hears is processed through their own communicative and cultural memory.

Of course, it is not just the reader that creates the plurality of the writerly text, but the writer. The found footage narrative also essayistically fragments the self of this filmmaker. *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes* is an experiment in the autobiographical form, in which Barthes applies the writerly approach in a semiological analysis of his self. Barthes asserts that, “in the field of the subject, there is no referent.”¹⁹³ The self cannot be pinpointed exactly. That self which is, is always different to that self which is written. The process of writing is always necessarily separate from the process of being. Therefore, every moment of being that the writer wishes to represent, has already ceased to exist within the self by the time of writing. The pronoun of the Lacanian imaginary, the “I,” is irrelevant. The symbolic becomes the immediacy of the self in representation. That is, what is left of the self after the self of the imaginary has passed, becomes that which is represented by the symbolic *as the self*.

Indeed, Barthes compares writing about oneself to suicide; representing oneself through language, is to negate the genuinely immediate “I” of the imaginary. All that is represented is that which ceases to exist. The subject becomes an “effect” of language. “The subject apprehends himself *elsewhere*, and “subjectivity” can return at another place on the spiral: deconstructed, taken apart, shifted, without anchorage: why should I not speak of “myself” since this “my” is no longer “the self?”¹⁹⁴ The self in representation becomes the third person; “I” becomes “*he*.” Barthes asserts that the self is fragmented. The writer cannot incarnate an essential self, as that self cannot exist in representation. The autobiographer can only show the “galaxy of signifiers” of the self, not the “structure of signifieds.” And so *Wanda* depicts multiple selves of this author, all of whom exist symbolically, no longer representing my own voice in the present, but other versions of my self. One of my selves is represented in *Wanda* through video testimony of Wanda’s testimony. And yet another self is represented within the form of the found footage narrative itself. This self again no longer exists within my present self, but as an effect of language. It

¹⁹³ Roland Barthes, *Roland Barthes*, Richard Howard trans., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p.56.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.168.

is subsumed within the semiological system of collective memory that forms around the events described.

Through a conception of the writerly, Barthes also expands upon the notion of the essay as fragmentary. He espouses a “textual theory of heterology,” a “drifting” style of writing.¹⁹⁵ As a result, Barthes suggests that he writes multiples of *beginnings*; fragments that only develop in early stages; introductions and sketches. Therefore each image in the found footage narrative (such as a fragment of testimony or archival image) is represented briefly before being cut off by another fragment, which in turn is interrupted. These fragments only develop further in the form of a prolepsis. Each fragment develops in anticipation of corrections of other fragments. The relationship between fragments is further complicated through “figures of interruption and short circuiting”: asyndeton and anacoluthon.¹⁹⁶ These devices further blur the distinction between fragments, so that they ‘interweave’ like the Adornoean carpet.

A result of this interweaving is an increased ambiguity, not just in the distinctions between fragments, but distinctions *within* fragments. Amphibology and duplicity are common to the writerly text. In *S/Z*, Barthes observes that Balzac’s *Sarrasine* is made more writerly through indeterminate origins of statements. Certain grammatical constructions are written in which it is not clear who is subject of the sentence. It is not apparent whether any of the characters, or the narrator himself (the *discourse* itself), has spoken. “The language speaks, nothing more.”¹⁹⁷ As we shall see, the found footage narrative uses these techniques to disrupt and construct a narrative from each of the twelve different testimonies that are combined in the film.

Barthes often uses examples from fictional literature such as this in his suggestions of essayistic techniques. Indeed, he describes the essay as “a novel without proper names.”¹⁹⁸ Barthes states that fantasy creates a “double space.”¹⁹⁹ It becomes an adjunct to reality. Fantasy is disconnected from reality, and indirect in its position, but it nevertheless enhances reality. As Slavoj Žižek points out, “what emerges via distortions of the accurate representation of reality is the real – that is, the

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.100-102.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p.93.

¹⁹⁷ Roland Barthes, *S/Z*, p.41.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p.120.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p.88.

trauma around which social reality is structured.”²⁰⁰ Fantasy reveals the Imaginary and imaginary aspects of reality. It shows how our psyches propel phenomena in multiple representational directions. The found footage narrative is therefore a reflexive fantasy of history. It explores the imagination around historical events in such a way as to explore its own workings as an imagining of historical events.

Therefore collective memory can be interrogated through the found footage narrative as a form of the Montaignean essay. The prime concern of the Montaignean essay is to explore the nature of subjectivity. It wishes to reflexively explore an object from the subjective position of the author. The found footage narrative utilises this approach in the exploration of the subjective perspectives of collective memory. Both communicative and cultural memories are formed through language and images, and the testimony that is derived from those memories is also represented in language and images. The found footage narrative explores historical events through the flux of subjectivity of the testifiers, making explicit the imaginative nature of that testimony. As has been observed in the previous chapter, imagination and oral testimony can be valuable ways through which to represent the experience of traumatic events such as the Holocaust.

Formal conceptions of the Montaignean essay, such as the found footage narrative, are therefore important in constructing an understanding of how those memories are formed, and how the events described are transmitted through collective memory. The Montaignean essay is concerned with expressing notions of subjectivity through form. Lukács notion of subjectivity necessitates a concern with the formal construction of representation rather than concluding upon an object. Therefore, the found footage narrative, as a form of film, utilises cinematic techniques in order to interrogate the nature of collective memory. *Wanda* reflects the memories of the Bielecka family that are expressed through their testimony through a form that aims to approximate the construction of collective memory.

One of the central formal styles of the found footage is therefore fragmentation. The object cannot be completely represented, therefore the Montaignean style of essay formulates itself through fragments derived from the object. It is through the juxtaposition of these disparate formal elements that representations of the object are presented, but also the nature of their construction. In

²⁰⁰ Slavoj Žižek, “Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology,” *Mapping Ideology*, Slavoj Žižek ed., (London: Verso, 1994), p.26.

the analysis of collective memory, which is constructed through many different communicative and cultural memories formed in the minds of multiple people such as the Bielecka family. It is through fragments of memories that their conception of Wanda's experience is formed.

Furthermore, the dialectical image as formulated by Bense and Benjamin through concepts of configuration and constellation, is a way to consolidate seemingly unconnected fragments of memory that inform Wanda's experience in the imagination of each member of her family. It becomes possible to represent the events through a juxtaposition of multiple and often contradictory testimonies and thousands of unrelated images. This formulation of the fragment re-enacts the event of listening to testimony through Barthes' conception of the writerly. The found footage narrative itself becomes an event in the creation of collective memory around the original historical event, which adds to the network of memory already within each viewer of the film. Through its essayistic form, the found footage narrative becomes another fragment in the formation of collective memory. By utilising the dialectical form of the Montaignean essay, the found footage narrative is able to evoke the continual production of meaning in collective memory.

Chapter Four:
The Cinematic Essay.

The film essay utilises Montaignean notions of the essayistic in cinematic form. Therefore, subjectivity again is central. However, although the essay film mode is concerned with subjectivity, it also contains a documentary element. The essay film is an evolution in documentary away from claiming to objectively represent ‘the real’, to highlighting the problems of capturing truth, to positively embracing a ‘fictional’ subjectivity as another method of exploring the world around us. Traditionally, documentary has represented what Bill Nichols has called the “discourses of sobriety”.²⁰¹ These discourses include science, economics, politics, and history and claim to describe ‘the real,’ and reveal truths about the world in a neutral, objective, and descriptive way. But as Brian Winston points out, early documentarian John Grierson’s famous claim that documentary is the “creative treatment of actuality” is a suggestion of the genre’s capacity for fiction rather than it’s coherence with fact.²⁰² Documentary should not claim to be a reproduction of reality, but a *representation* of it. “Such films are not documents as much as expressive representations that may be based on documents.”²⁰³ Subjectivity is therefore inherent to the documentary.

As Michael Renov suggests, “there is no contradiction between the elemental documentary impulse, the will to preservation, and the exploration of subjectivity; indeed, it is their obsessive convergence that marks the essayistic work.”²⁰⁴ It is possible for the essay film to touch upon Renov’s four “modalities of desire” (to record, reveal, or preserve; to persuade or promote; to analyse or interrogate; to express.²⁰⁵), but in a way that is removed from the documentary form. Essayistic forms aim to achieve the four modalities through subjective expression. “The representation of the historical real is consciously filtered through the flux of

²⁰¹ Bill Nichols, *Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p.3-4.

²⁰² Brian Winston, *Claiming the Real: The Griersonian Documentary and Its Legitimations*, (London: British Film Institute, 1995).

²⁰³ Bill Nichols, *Introduction to Documentary*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001), p.13.

²⁰⁴ Michael Renov, *The Subject of Documentary*, (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), p.81.

²⁰⁵ Michael Renov, “Towards a Poetics of Documentary”, Michael Renov ed., *Theorizing Documentary*, (London: Routledge, 1993), p.21.

subjectivity.”²⁰⁶ Essentially, it is the fourth modality through which the other three are filtered.

This flux of subjectivity is informed by a documentary reflexivity developed by the *cinema vérité* films of Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin. With Rouch and Morin’s *Chronicle of a Summer* (1961), *cinema vérité* reflexively revealed that the filmmaker and his camera do not merely observe the historical world, or even reconstruct it, but act as a *catalyst* in its construction. Rouch and Morin were onscreen participants in the making of the film. They recorded a discussion between themselves about the filming experience and whether it was truly possible to ‘be oneself’ on film. They conducted interviews on camera with their subjects on the theme of French society. The interviewees were then invited to watch footage of themselves while they were filmed again, thus eliciting a second, different response from them and a self-critical view of their participants’ first interviews and the whole filmmaking process. The filmmaker, their apparatus and their methods became an active part of the film.

Chronicle of a Summer opened up the process of filmmaking as another object to be explored and another catalyst in the production of ‘reality.’ “The Rouch *cinema vérité* artist was often an avowed participant... *cinema vérité* was committed to a paradox: that artificial circumstances could bring hidden truth to the surface.”²⁰⁷ In his analysis of *Chronicle of a Summer*, Edgar Morin revealed what also lies at the very heart of the essay film:

Now I realize that if we achieved anything, it was to present the problem of truth. We wanted to get away from comedy, from spectacles, to enter into direct contact with life. But life itself is also a comedy, a spectacle. Better (or worse) yet: each person can only express himself through a mask, and the mask, as in Greek tragedy, both disguises and reveals, becomes the speaker. In the course of the dialogues, each one was able to be more real than in daily life, but at the same time more false.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Michael Renov, *The Subject of Documentary*, p.70.

²⁰⁷ Erik Barnouw, *Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction Film*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.255.

²⁰⁸ Edgar Morin, “Chronicle of a Film”, Steven Feld ed., *Cine-Ethnography*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p.263.

The cinematic essay develops upon this statement. *Through* spectacle it tries to enter into “direct contact with life”. It utilises the ‘mask’ of an audio-visual-written performance through which the filmmaker will express thoughts on a theme. The essay film also understands that what the filmmaker presents is at once ‘more real’ and ‘more false’ than reality, that ‘performance’ through film may hide certain aspects of reality, but reveal and enhance others hidden by everyday life itself. And so although *Wanda* clearly utilises the fiction of unrelated film scenes, as well as the imagination of its participants and this filmmaker, through these elements something of the way the events are represented in collective memory is revealed.

As a form of the film essay mode, the found footage narrative therefore bases its cinematic construction on Montaignean essayistic notions of constellation and the dialectical image. “Its atmosphere is contradiction and the collision of opposites.”²⁰⁹ The cinematic essay is constructed from a collection of opposing tendencies, and fundamental to this is an interrogation of the dichotomy of fact and fiction that inhabits all film. The essay film deliberately combines these two impulses. It at once inhabits the internal and external worlds; the imaginary and the historical. “Here is a form that seems to accommodate the two sides of that divide at the same time, that can navigate from documentary to fiction and back, creating other polarities in the process.”²¹⁰ It is a mode that filters the imaginary through the historical and vice-versa. The Lumière/Méliès, fact/fiction dichotomy is a fundamental concern of the essay film except that it becomes less a dichotomy than a fact/fiction *hybrid*. The idea of there being a dichotomy between fiction and documentary is derived from the assumption that the Lumière’s actualités are a representation of reality and Georges Méliès’ films exemplifying fiction. The essay mode dissolves this false dichotomy and uses techniques from both styles of film in its’ form. The essay film, in its’ form, contends that the fact/fiction dichotomy is another construct to be deconstructed.

Guy Maddin describes his essay film, *My Winnipeg* (2007), as a “*docu-fantasia*”. This description evokes the dual nature of the cinematic essay; its roots within the documentary genre and also its more fantastical tendencies. A fantasia is defined as a musical composition of a freeform, improvisatory nature. The film essay

²⁰⁹ Nora M. Alter, “Translating the Essay into Film and Installation”, *Journal of Visual Culture*, 6:1 (April 2007), p.45.

²¹⁰ Jean-Pierre Gorin, “The Way of the Termite: The Essay Film,” <http://www.cinemathequeontario.ca/programme.aspx?programeld=271&page=1>, accessed 22 September 2014.

essentially filters the socio-historical world through the ‘free form’ of the imagination. It has therefore developed out of the documentary tradition. Its’ aim is to investigate and reflect upon the socio-historical world, but it does so through a facts of subjectivity. “Sometimes you have to dream to get out the facts. Or, if not the facts, your true feelings. The facts of your feelings.”²¹¹ The aim of the cinematic essay is to investigate the *fiction* of documentary, while highlighting fiction’s ability to document interiority.

The essay film is a “dialectics of fiction and nonfiction.”²¹² The two approaches to cinema become wholly intertwined. Echoing Lukács conception of the essay, early cinematic essayist George Franju observes that filmic representation must deliberately aestheticise reality.

You must re-create reality because reality runs away; reality denies reality. You must first interpret it, or re-create it... When I make a documentary, I try to give the realism an artificial aspect... I find that the aesthetic of a document comes from the artificial aspect of the document... it has to be more beautiful than realism, and therefore it has to be composed... to give it another sense.²¹³

Fictional filmic (re)construction and the form of film itself are used to *evoke* meaning; to reveal an idiosyncratic perspective; a *poetic* sign that engages the historical referent.

Essay films therefore often have an avant-garde impulse, experimenting with the form of film and developing new and different ways in which to use cinema as way of analysing history. Jeffrey Skoller’s conception of avant-garde film is a useful way in which to understand the found footage essay film.

They work to undermine such gaps between past and present by using a range of cinematic strategies to consider elements of the past that are unseen, unspeakable, ephemeral, and defy representations not necessarily verifiable through the normal empirical means. At the same time, these films often foreground the constructed nature of narrative forms and the materiality of the

²¹¹ Guy Maddin, “Obsessions into Light: An Interview with Guy Maddin,” *Cineaste*, 33:4 (Fall 2008), p.48.

²¹² Noël Burch, *Theory of Film Practice*, p.164.

²¹³ George Franju, quoted in Trinh T. Minh-Ha, “Documentary Is/Not a Name,” *The MIT Press*, October, Vol. 52, (Spring, 1990), p.88-89.

film medium, both being integral parts of the meaning-making process... their formal and aesthetic aspects are foregrounded to become the generative element that releases history as a force acting on the present.²¹⁴

Skoller's analysis of the impulses of the avant-garde also highlight essayistic concerns.

Firstly, distances between the past and the present are explored through a re-evaluation of history. The present is considered as a factor that informs our perceptions of the past. The found footage essay film, as a form of the avant-garde, is also concerned with history as it is represented *beyond* empirical and statistical representation, in other words, it is concerned with history as memory. These films foreground the constructed nature of narrative forms because they are concerned with reflexivity and subjectivity, with laying bare the apparatus through which history and experience is represented. Form then, as with the essayistic, is the prime consideration of the avant-garde filmmaker. It is through form that he analyses notions of history and memory.

One of the earliest mentions of the essay in the study of film is found in Hans Richter's "*The Film Essay: A New Form of Documentary Film*," which was published on 24 April 1940 in *Nationalzeitung*.²¹⁵ Richter proclaims that a cinematic progeny has evolved to document the intangible. This innovative style of filmmaking, instead of displaying "beautiful vistas," aims "to find a representation for intellectual content," "to find images for mental concepts," and strives "to make visible the invisible world of concepts, thoughts, and ideas," so that viewers will become "involved intellectually and emotionally."²¹⁶ According to Richter the essay film will do away with linear cinematic presentation of time and space.

In this effort to give body to the invisible world of imagination, thought and ideas, the essay film can employ an incomparably greater reservoir of expressive means than can pure documentary film. Freed from recording external phenomena in simple sequence the film essay must collect its material

²¹⁴ Jeffrey Skoller, *Shadows, Specters, Shards: Making History in Avant-Garde Film*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005), p.xv.

²¹⁵ Hans Richter, "*Der Filmessay: Eine neue Form des Dokumentarfilms*," (1940), eds. Christa Blümlinger & Constantin Wulff, *Schreiben Bilder Sprechen: Texte zum essayistischen Film*, (Wien: Sonderzahl, 1992), p.195-98.

²¹⁶ Hans Richter in Timothy Corrigan, "Expression, the Essayistic, and Thinking in Images," <http://www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/efaden/ms5/corrigan/htm>, accessed 22 September 2014.

from everywhere; its space and time must be conditioned only by the need to explain and show the idea.²¹⁷

Richter's description of the essay film again reflects Bense and Benjamin's conceptions of configuration and constellation. Concepts can be shown through the connection of elements unconnected scientifically or empirically. Within film, phenomena can be represented not just through their recording, but through the filming of unrelated phenomena, or performed scenes, or indeed potentially any image, sound, or piece of dialogue.

However, as with the Montaignean essay, Richter seems to suggest that the essay film is *not* incoherent. An essay film would not be randomly constructed. As with the literary essay, it finds coherence through a methodology of the self.

Unlike the documentary film, which presents facts and information, the essay film produces complex thought that at times is not grounded in reality but can be contradictory, irrational, and fantastic. This new type of film, according to Richter, no longer binds the filmmaker to the rules and parameters of the traditional documentary practice... Rather, it gives free reign to the imagination, with all its artistic potentiality.²¹⁸

The found footage narrative, as part of this essay film mode, displays these traits. It too tries to represent thought in cinematic form. However, *Wanda* not only attempts to represent the filmmaker's memory and imagination of the events, but the collective memory and imagination of the Bielecka family concerning the events. The found footage narrative moves beyond the essay mode's attempt to formulate the thoughts of the filmmaker by trying to also represent multiple layers of thought amongst multiple people.

In 1948, Alexandre Astruc added to Richter's formulation of the film essay by introducing the term '*caméra-stylo*' or '*camera-pen*'.²¹⁹ Astruc contended that the filmmaker could utilise the camera-pen as a means of expressing a new language. "By

²¹⁷ Hans Richter in Jay Leyda, *Films Beget Films: Compilation Films from Propaganda to Drama*, (New York: Hill & Wang, 1964), p.31.

²¹⁸ Nora Alter, *Projecting History: German Nonfiction Cinema, 1967–2000*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), p.7–8.

²¹⁹ Alexandre Astruc, "The Birth of a New Avant-Garde: Le Caméra-Stylo," *Film and Literature*, Timothy Corrigan ed., (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), p.158-162.

language I mean a form in which and by which an artist can express thoughts, however abstract they may be, or translate his obsessions exactly as he does in the contemporary essay or novel.”²²⁰ This new language allows the filmmaker to articulate themselves in more subtle and complex ways. Thoughts and emotions will no longer need to be expressed through concrete metaphor. “Cinema is now moving towards a form which is making it such a precise language that it will soon be possible to write ideas directly on film.”²²¹ Astruc believes that, with the rise of the *caméra-stylo*, no distinction will need to be made between scriptwriter and director; the two will become one. “Direction is no longer a means of illustrating or presenting a scene, but a true act of writing. The film-maker/author writes with his camera as a writer writes with his pen.”²²² With his conception of the *caméra-stylo*, Astruc makes an explicit connection between writing and filmmaking. A film is as much the subjective work of the filmmaker as the literary essay is to the writer. He also highlights the essayistic intention of attempting to represent thought through film. Through *caméra-stylo*, film attempts to record the internal world of ideas and imagination, rather than external reality.

Noël Burch, in his analysis of Georges Franju’s early film essays, *Blood of the Beasts* (1949) and *Hôtel des Invalides* (1952), extends essayistic conceptions of cinema through a highlighting of their “active” themes. Rather than treating his subjects passively, as though they were there to be defined, Franju contemplates a theme *through* his subject. Instead of trying to place meaning *into* the subject, he explores what meanings could come *out* of it, thereby making it “active”. This method not only lays the subject open to reinterpretation, but the film itself. “These two films of Franju’s are *meditations*, and their subjects a *conflict of ideas*.”²²³ The reflections of Franju’s films are reflexive because they meditate on the antagonism of interpretation that lies within them. “A subtle but fundamental ambiguity underlies the sumptuous images of *Hôtel des Invalides*; it can be read either as an attack on war, or... as a flag-waving patriotic film.”²²⁴ Both films “set forth thesis and antithesis through the very texture of the film.”²²⁵ The (anti)thesis of the essay film is to show the continually shifting and irreducible patterns of meaning that exist within the

²²⁰ Ibid., p.159.

²²¹ Ibid., p.160.

²²² Ibid., p.161.

²²³ Noël Burch, *Theory of Film Practice*, p.159.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

objects it meditates upon. *Wanda*'s active theme is the nature of collective memory in relation Wanda's experiences. It sets forth thesis and antithesis through the aporia of every cut between every piece of dialogue and image that each present an alternative version of events. As with Franju's films, and in a Barthesian writerly way, this lays the collective memory around Wanda's experiences open to interpretation, but also the reinterpretation of the film itself must be reinterpreted by each viewer, thereby making *Wanda* "active."

André Bazin points to the active themes of Chris Marker's essay film, *Letter from Siberia*. Bazin describes how Marker uses "horizontal montage" to evoke the complex nexus of meanings in an image. This form of montage uses words to transform what we see. Bazin uses as an example a scene from the film in which a local man is seen briefly walking down a street in Irkutsk. Over the top of this image Marker reflects upon the man from three different perspectives. The first takes a positive Communist party line, the second a negative reactionary position, and third a supposed objective reflection in which he calls the man "a cross-eyed Yakout." The 'objective' view that Marker takes demonstrates that "objectivity is even more false than the two opposed partisan points of view; that, at least in relation to certain realities, impartiality is an illusion."²²⁶ Marker shows us that the image "is at once full of significance and completely neutral."²²⁷ In this style of montage "a given image doesn't refer to the one that preceded it or the one that will follow, but rather it refers *laterally*, in some way, to what is said."²²⁸ Lateral, or horizontal, montage uses words to transform what we see. Yet, this transformation is, in a sense, cosmetic. Narration manipulates image in multiple subjective ways to demonstrate the image's simultaneous *surplus* and *lack* of meaning.

The found footage narrative extends upon the practice of horizontal montage. *Wanda* depicts 12 different perspectives, as well as the perspective of the filmmaker depicted in the form of the film itself. Furthermore, each fragment of dialogue represents how that interviewee may have viewed the story at that specific moment, whereas in another moment their description may have been different. *Wanda* therefore depicts the multiple views of multiple people as well as the multiple selves within multiple people. Each image also presents an alternative vision of the events

²²⁶ André Bazin, "Bazin on Marker," Dave Kehr trans., *Film Comment*, 39:4 (July-August 2003), p.45.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.45.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, *italics my own*.

that is related either to what is being said or how this filmmaker conceives of the film. The meaning of these images is defined in part by what is said, but each image also has its own meaning separate to the verbal description and also the film itself. Each image contains within it the original meanings that were derived from the content it was initially cut from. *Wanda* uses lateral montage to show how images can be repurposed to create new meaning within them, but also how the spoken word can be an unreliable descriptor of those images.

Narration then is central to a conception of the essay film. Phillip Lopate, in his essayistic investigation into the essay film, suggests that, "an essay film must have words, in the form of a text, either spoken, subtitled, or intertitled."²²⁹ In the majority of cases however, the film essay mostly uses voiceover narration to make the essayist heard. Narrative and dialogue construction are formed in specific ways in the essay film in order to subjectivise the voice of the film. It often utilises a third person grammatical construction for example. In Patrick Keiller's essay films, *London* (1992), *Robinson in Space* (1997), and *Robinson in Ruins* (2010), the filmmaker's reflections are expressed through a voiceover referring to them in the third person, as words of another fictional character. This narrative construction echoes the Barthesian third person, which separates the Imaginary from the Symbolic, transforming the narration into a representation of the self that can be reinterpreted by the viewer. The "he/she" the narrator refers to, is separate to the presently enunciating narrator, therefore multiplying the selves represented in the film.

The found footage narrative also uses a third person grammatical construction, but in a different way to Keiller's films. The found footage narrative utilises the third person dialogue of each interviewee, which even includes the testimony of testimony of this filmmaker, whose narration is also presented as a Barthesian third person, the symbolic of the self. Furthermore, *Wanda* makes explicit, through the exposition of different versions of events spoken by each person, that the person speaking at each given moment may differ from the person speaking at another moment. This further multiplies the selves represented and interrogated by the film and the spectator.

This rhetorical pose also locates these reflections within the historical realm. The third person historicises thought itself. Keiller has rhetorically structured his film so as to place his own reflections within the world that he is questioning. Situating

²²⁹ Phillip Lopate, "In Search of the Centaur: The Essay-Film," *Beyond Document: Essay on Nonfiction Film*, Charles Warren ed., (London: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), p.107.

what is reflected within the rhetorical structure of “I am telling you what he told me,” suggests that the event of speaking those words now being told to us has happened in a historical moment of their own. Indeed, this rhetorical structure further subjectivises the narration, making its’ observations more hearsay than witness testimony. This is an overthrowing of the “expository mode” of Griersonian documentary, in which the voiceover is essentially removed from history, giving the impression that it is able to look down upon the world, and judge it from a position of total knowledge and understanding. As Stella Bruzzi states, “the negative portrayal of voice-over is largely the result of the development of a theoretical orthodoxy that condemns it for being inevitably and inherently didactic.”²³⁰ Yet, in spite of, or perhaps because of this didacticism, voiceover is an effective way of articulating subjectivity. As Michel Chion observes, “(voiceover) is constitutive of the narrative’s subject – in the double sense “of what happens” and “whom it happens to” – because it asks the question of knowledge and desire of this subject, of it’s/his *point of view*.”²³¹ The essay film reduces voiceover to the level of everything else in the film. They are more artefacts to be questioned, analysed and reflected upon. The found footage narrative extends upon this technique. Although Wanda’s testimony is based upon her own experiences, the story is further historicised through the hearsay testimony of the rest of the family. The third persons (the he’s and her’s of each family member speaking, *including* this filmmaker) historicise the narrative, making it another object of memory to be explored as part of Symbolic communication.

Lopate’s analysis of the use of the third person in Marker’s *Sans Soleil* is highly instructive here:

Putting his comments in the third person has the distancing effect of giving a respect and weight to them they might not have commanded otherwise. As Stewart reads passages from Krasna’s letters, prefacing them with “he once wrote me” or “he said,” the effect is almost like a verbal funeral portrait. Marker appears to be anticipating and celebrating, with mordant relish, his own death, projecting a more mythical figure of himself in the process.²³²

²³⁰ Stella Bruzzi, *New Documentary: A Critical Introduction*, (London: Routledge, 2006), p.47.

²³¹ Michel Chion, *The Voice in Cinema*, Claudia Gorbman trans., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.56.

²³² Phillip Lopate, “In Search of the Centaur,” p.251.

“Respect and weight” and “distancing effect” here do not mean in the Griersonian sense of being a “voice of God” removed from history, but the opposite; this is a voice of humanity; a human perspective. The third person is used by Marker as a way to historicise, and therefore subjectivise his own voice, while evoking a sense of a multitude of unheard voices that the film itself cannot represent.

The found footage narrative also utilises this sense that a third person rhetorical structure creates. In *Wanda* again a sense of history is evoked, a sense that each piece of dialogue and each image are part of a long line of interrelated fragments that reach back through time. We respond to these fragments because the film gives them a sense, through rhetorical structure, of having been ‘plucked’ from a continually disappearing nexus of historical moments. This structure evokes a sense of pathos. These fragments must be valued and reflected upon because of all the other thoughts from all the other people in history that have been lost, that have not been listened to. Representational fragments that seemingly have little specific relevance, such as an image from unrelated film, can still evoke meaning in the historical subject. This is why the use of the third person at once gives a great sense of emphatic subjectivity, but also self-reflexive *collectivity*; a unique standpoint derived from and inhabited by many other ‘hidden’ unique standpoints. This becomes an important form through which to represent notions of Holocaust memory. Through the specific rhetorical uses of the third person used by the found footage narrative, a representation of all the silent historical representations can be evoked.

The found footage narrative further evokes missing representation by developing the essayistic technique of performing monologue through dialogue. Sometimes an essay film *literally* contains representations of other voices. It is quite possible for a cinematic essay to contain reflections of people other than the enunciator, or depict other viewpoints alternative to that of the author, but these secondary voices are treated in a certain way. The interview format is the most common way in which other people are able to voice themselves in the essay film.

But within the cinematic essay, the interview, or indeed any secondary voice, will be presented as a thought being reflected upon in the mind of the author. They will be constructed as though the author is thinking about something he had heard being said at an earlier time. A secondary reflection will therefore form part of the primary reflection of the author of the film. The rhetorical structure of this formulation can best be described as; “I (the enunciator) heard someone else (the

secondary voice) say this, and now I am reflecting upon what they said.” It is the second part of this formulation (“now I am reflecting upon what they said”) that is presented to the viewer. The interview is therefore treated as another historical representation that forms part of the singular expression of the author in his own reflections upon a theme.

In Orson Welles’ *F For Fake* (1973) the cutting room becomes the equivalent of Welles’ own mind; editing the expression of subjective thought. When we see Welles reflecting upon his theme as he sits in the editing suite playing back images, it is as though we are sat inside his head with him as he thinks. Interviews of the art forger Elmyr de Hory and his biographer and literary faker, Clifford Irving, are used to express Welles’ own ideas on the nature of art. These interviews are presented as though ‘recollected’ by Welles to explain a point, but rather than being fuelled by his memory, the power of recollection is here aided by the use of interview footage and an editing suite with which to play it back. Welles is able to recollect what someone else has said through film. And it is editing and filmic manipulation that allows him to ‘recollect’ a subjective perspective, and control what is enunciated.

Welles has his interviewees finish each others sentences, finish his own sentences, takes an audio clip out of context to support a point he makes, conducts a conversation out of unrelated footage, or has his ‘recollected’ voices sit in uncomfortable silence ‘together.’ Another time he has them quite literally reiterate what he says. Welles rhetorically asks what it is that has made the twentieth century different for “we hanky-panky men” (that is the ‘fakers;’ de Hory, Irving, and Welles himself), and is answered not only by himself, but a chorus of all three of them exclaiming;

Irving: “The experts!”

Welles: “The experts!”

Elmyr: “The so-called experts.”

Welles: “Experts are the new oracles,”

Elmyr: “Who are greatly pretentious,”

Welles: “They speak to us with the absolute authority of the computer?”

Elmyr: “Pretend to know something, but they only know very superficially.”

Three different voices are here used to put across Welles' reflections. He essentially enunciates through the other two.

Welles' uses their voices to reinforce his own; uses a dialogic construction to perform a monologue. As we shall see in the next chapter, the found footage narrative utilises and extends upon these techniques in the construction of its' own narrative. The multiple voices of the Bielecka family, and of each person, including this filmmaker, are constructed so as to produce a single narrative. *Wanda* is constructed from multiple fragments of dialogue that if read may almost seem to have been written by one person. Through this technique of performing a monologue through dialogue, the found footage narrative aims to represent notions of collective memory. The multiple fragments of words that form collective memory are constructed into one narrative, which is at once singular and multiple.

Archival images in the found footage narrative are constructed on the same basis. They are at once derived from multiple sources and have different meanings based upon their original context, but repurposed within the structure of the found footage narrative they take on new meaning as part of the narrative of a film such as *Wanda*. Despite their multiple meanings as fragments from multiple different sources, they combine to tell a single narrative, and are cut together as if deriving from the same source, that source being a network of collective memory.

The way in which archival material or 'found' footage is used is therefore central to a formulation of the found footage narrative. It is another element through which to represent the construction of collective memory. Found footage is also utilised by many essay films and has become an important way in which to achieve essayistic aims. Indeed, as Astruc foresaw the development of cheaper technology with which to make and screen films, so the found footage style has become a way for film essayists to express their cinematic ideas with very little money and away from dominant discourses. Orson Welles began to experiment with the film essay later in his career when a studio picture seemed out of his grasp. Furthermore, Welles' *F For Fake* and Harun Farocki's *Images of the World and the Inscription of War* (1988/89) both made extensive use of footage meant for other films; Welles bought footage, meant for a TV documentary by François Reichenbach, to use in his film. Farocki, himself under extreme financial pressure, re-used footage from other television projects he had worked on.

Found footage films, or alternatively collage films, are constructed by re-appropriating and decontextualising a range of moving image material, such as narrative films, newsreels, advertisements, educational and industrial films, to produce new work. These films often analyse the use of images, narrative conventions, and editing styles, exposing their ideological function and questioning their authority as producers of meaning. Indeed, Adorno described early collage experiments as the “negation of synthesis” or a false unity.²³³ The found footage film takes images as fragments separate from the whole of which they were originally a part, and aims to combine different fragments (of image, sounds and dialogue) to produce new meanings, and expose dominant ones. From the very early stages of cinema found footage has therefore been used as a way of exploring representations of history.

The European avant-garde of the ‘20s and ‘30s re-purposed found footage through editing techniques, which highlighted the fantastical elements of scenes, or emphasised formal or symbolic qualities in seemingly insignificant footage. This technique of estrangement was used by filmmakers such as Rene Clair, Hans Richter, Walter Ruttmann and Charles DeKeukeleire. Other filmmakers such as Esther Shub, Dziga Vertov and Joris Ivens explored the political meanings of images, altering or even reversing meanings found in mainstream media newsreels. Indeed, as Shub observed of the footage she worked with, “it’s all in the material, in the question of the material we want to work with.”²³⁴ Here Shub makes explicit the multiplicity of meaning in each image that every found footage filmmaker attempts to extract, as a way in which express the limitless variation within. Similarly to Lukács’ idea of the essayist moulding myths into questions, so the collagist creates questions out of images, searching for new answers within them.

The found footage narrative, although also using talking head interviews as well as found footage (found footage films commonly use other formal elements as well) shares many qualities of the collage film, which in turn displays elements of the essayistic. Found footage films highlight subjective construction rather than an unmediated narrative whole. Fragmentation is central to their construction. As Paul Arthur observes, “collage renders the perception of images as disembodied, materially

²³³ Theodor Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann eds., C. Lenhardt trans., (Routledge: New York, 1984), p.233-234.

²³⁴ Esfir Shub in S. Tretyakov, V. Shklovsky et al., “Symposium on Soviet Documentary,” *The Documentary Tradition*, ed. Lewis Jacobs, (New York: Hillstone and Blake, 1971), p.35.

discrete, yet with the potential for iconographic substitution.”²³⁵ The found footage film makes clear that it is constructed by fragments of images with contexts that were originally separate from one another, but reconstituted within the collage film could take on new meaning. Jaimie Baron suggests that found footage films create an “*archive effect*,” “a potentially ambiguous experience in which multiple meanings for the same document may coexist simultaneously.”²³⁶ Through reappropriation and recontextualisation, the viewer is simultaneously aware of new meanings created through new contexts and other meanings derived from the original context. The viewer is therefore made aware of the multiplicity of meanings that could be discerned from an image. Kobena Mercer states that found footage strategies can “expose the heterogeneity of social discourses” and can “defeat monologism” by “creolizing” images.²³⁷ The collage film formally develops the essayistic notion of the image (whether it is a sound, dialogue or actual images) as a locus of multiple meanings.

The found footage narrative repurposes and reconstitutes images as a way in which to elicit the multiple responses that exist within them beyond their original context, but also uses those images as a way to instigate different responses in the testimony, and testimony of testimony, that it accompanies. The meanings of images change depending on the thematic context and their specific placing within that context. Images cannot be objectivised or freed from historical determination. Therefore, the schema through which they are arranged in collage films is decentred or divided between the enunciative trace derived from the original footage, which also includes the stylistic choices and material features of production of film stock, speed of shooting, and aspect ratio, and a second new source of definition created by the found footage work itself. These new meanings can be applied through formal adjustments in editing, sound design, image alteration, or perhaps alternative titles. As we shall see, the found footage narrative bases its form upon certain techniques developed from this collage practice.

²³⁵ Paul Arthur, “The Status of Found Footage,” *Spectator*, 20:1 (Fall 1999/Winter 2000), p.60.

²³⁶ Jaimie Baron, *The Archive Effect: The Found Footage and the Audiovisual Experience of History*, (London: Routledge, 2013), p.45.

²³⁷ Kobena Mercer, “Diaspora Culture and the Dialogic Imagination,” *Blackframes*, MBye B. Cham and Clair Andrade-Watkins eds., (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1988), p.59.

Joseph Cornell's *Rose Hobart* (1936) is regarded as an early found footage film. Cornell cuts together and slows down scenes in which the eponymous actress starred, adding a blue filter and samba music. These simple changes make strange scenes taken out of their original context. Seen separately, the images' meaning extends beyond the narrative of which they had originally been a part. In an essayistic way, removing the images from their context forces the viewer to consider the images separate to their imposed meaning, and formulate their own new meanings around them. Bruce Connor's extends this concept in *A Movie* (1958), re-contextualising fragments of feature films, newsreels, soft-core porn, and leader tape through their juxtaposition. Connor uses techniques in this film that the found footage narrative also uses. Scenes from different films are cut together so that new narratives are formed, or the action of a scene is highlighted through a repetition in another scene, or a shot is shown in such a way as to produce the opposite of its' meaning.

For example, a submarine captain is seen looking at a woman through a periscope and then ordering his men to fire torpedoes, which then causes a nuclear explosion, which in turn causes waves in an ocean upon which surfers ride. This surreal segment of the film makes sense in a linear, consequential way, but clearly the shots did not originally go together and are derived from separate sources. We are at once made aware of each image having an original context, each image simply as an image, and how those images can combine in new ways to produce new meaning. We are shown how scenes from one source can be interrelated with scenes from other very different sources, while also being left to consider our own thoughts upon them.

In another scene we witness various images cut together to repeatedly connote the idea of speed and physical force. Firstly, men on horses from cowboy movies all run in the same direction at high speeds, then an elephant run towards the camera which shakes aggressively, and then the montage develops into racing cars crashing and the notion of speed crashes with it. Connor demonstrates how these entirely separate scenes all contain the same notion and feeling, and can be linked to express an idea, even one as simple as the notion of speed or force. We are exposed to the connection between even the most seemingly disconnected fragments.

A Movie also uses shots out of context in a way that goes *against* their original meaning. This is simply expressed through the use of title cards. The film begins with the intertitle, "End of Part 4," while a card saying "The End" appears only two minutes into an eleven-minute film. Here Connor evokes the idea of something more

existing beyond the film. As we begin with part 4 it is as though we have missed the first three parts. Furthermore, by suggesting the end is only two minutes in, it is as though a new film begins within the film itself. We are given a sense of time beyond the film, and therefore other scenes beyond the film, and by extension other meanings. What is evoked in *A Movie* is the idea of a network of disparate images, some of which are connected in the film, but even more of which exist beyond the film. Therefore, the found footage narrative uses found footage in this way as a method through which to represent the network of images within collective memory that also reflect images that are themselves not present.

Another formal approach that the found footage narrative derives from the collage style is the use of narrative films to interrogate documentary or ‘real world’ subjects. Craig Baldwin’s found footage essay film, *Tribulation 99: Alien Anomalies Under America* (1991) utilises this technique to great affect. Baldwin analyses the history of U.S.A. involvement in Latin America post World War II in part through delirious conspiracy theories, and found footage of Hollywood B Movies involving aliens and monsters. Michael Zryd describes this form of found footage filmmaking as “discursive metahistory.” “Baldwin uses found footage to point away from referential reality to larger ideological and discursive systems of thought and value.”²³⁸ He tries to literally and metaphorically ‘alienate’ us from what we see and hear. If we look at these alien images under the pretence that they describe what we are being told then we are compelled to look at them afresh, even if we understand the reality of their context, and the fiction of this conceit. Baldwin deliberately fictionalises the ‘facts’ and asks the viewer to do the same in order to clear these images of presupposed meaning in order to analyse their cultural context, while the image simultaneously inform our view of the cultural context itself.

History is interrogated as network of ideological representations. Echoing notions of the Palimpsest, Baldwin describes found footage filmmaking as a “proliferation and multiplication – opening out, and a kind of complexity and layering, layering, layering.”²³⁹ The multiplicity of cultural memory is explored through the form of film. The repurposing and refiguring of cultural fragments in juxtaposition with other fragments invokes the continual production of meaning within cultural

²³⁸ Michael Zryd, “Found Footage Film as Discursive Metahistory: Craig Baldwin’s *Tribulation 99*,” *The Moving Image*, 3:2 (Fall 2003), p.56.

²³⁹ Craig Baldwin in William Charles Wees, *Recycled Images: The Art and Politics of Found Footage Films*, (Anthology Film Archives: New York, 1993), p.12

memory. The structure of *Tribulation 99* pushes the spectator “out of meaning.”²⁴⁰ Baldwin uses fiction to interrogate reality, or to expose symbolic reality as fiction literally through fiction. The found footage narrative therefore utilises this technique as a way of interrogating the nature of cultural memory as it is constructed in collective memory.

Alternatively, Bill Morrison’s film *Spark of Being* (2010), is an adaptation of the fictional story *Frankenstein* using almost purely (save for one image) documentary found footage. Hundreds of images, all from the early twentieth century, of laboratory technicians, organisms under the microscope, home movie footage of weddings and dancing, even footage from Ernest Shackleton’s Antarctic expedition, all combine to tell the singular narrative of *Frankenstein*. Morrison uses the themes of *Frankenstein*’s story and the nature of the Creature to reflect upon the nature of images and their use in found footage films. The Creature in the story is regarded as a monster because it is Other, removed from cultural definitions and divisions. Yet, Morrison has often described the film *itself* as the monster.²⁴¹ Through using documentary to describe fiction, which in turn informs the documentary images themselves, *Spark of Being* removes each image from its original context. The images can no longer be defined specifically and are left open to inhabit new meanings within the collage film. Documentary becomes fiction and fiction documentary. Morrison *constellates* image fragments that seem contextually, formally and ideologically opposed in order to instigate an alternative understanding of them.

The found footage narrative combines both of these collage impulses. It uses ‘fictional’ images to describe history and ‘documentary’ images to describe fantasy. It combines disparate footage, originally unconnected, in a form that transforms the way in which representation is constructed, or what Marjorie Perloff calls referentiality. “The question of referentiality inherent in collage thus leads to the replacement of the signified, the objects to be imitated, by a new set of signifiers calling attention to themselves as real objects in the real world.”²⁴² The collage techniques that the found footage narrative utilises do not present images as representations of reality, but treat

²⁴⁰ Craig Baldwin in Michael Zryd, “Found Footage Film as Discursive Metahistory,” p.46.

²⁴¹ See Bill Morrison in Capital, “The Film’s the Creature: Filmmaker Bill Morrison’s Investigations into Decay are Anything but Silent,” <http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/culture/2012/01/5168713/films-creature-filmmaker-bill-morrisons-investigations-decay-are-any>, accessed 22 September 2014.

²⁴² Marjorie Perloff, “The Invention of Collage,” in *Collage*, Jeanne Parisier Plottel ed., (New York Literary Forum: New York, 1983), p.40.

those images as objects *in themselves* to be explored through their organisation within the film. As William Charles Wees observes, ““The real world” for found footage filmmakers is the mass media with their endless supply of images waiting to be ripped from their context and reinserted in collage films where they will be recognised as fragments still bearing the marks of their media reality”²⁴³ The “real world” for the found footage filmmaker is the symbolic world.

Nora Alter highlights a fundamental characteristic of the essay film through the concept of the political im/perceptible. In her analysis of Harun Farocki’s cinematic essay, *Images of the World and the Inscription of War*, Alter discusses how the film shows how images simultaneously reveal the objects they capture, while also obscuring them. “The historical purpose of photography has been not only to record and preserve, but to mislead, deceive, and even to destroy: that is, to aid yet to also obfuscate vision. In other words, to be in/visible.”²⁴⁴ In Farocki’s film a highly subjective and often fictional narration is superimposed upon images to highlight the political im/perceptibility of those images.

In one scene a female voiceover is used to reflect on photos of women in Nazi concentration camps. Farocki suggests that there are less horrific meanings to these photos than we might naturally think. He suggests that one female concentration camp prisoner is smiling, while offering the idea that there were also “love stories” in Auschwitz. In another photo a female prisoner looks into the camera and the narrator suggest an alternative reason for this look; “On a boulevard she would look in the same way just past a man casting his eye over her at a shop window, and with this sideways glance she seeks to displace herself into a world of boulevards, men, and shop windows.”²⁴⁵ He posits an overtly ‘sentimental’ view of these photos; one that would commonly be considered shocking in the context.

Although Farocki’s film has been criticised on this point,²⁴⁶ it is actually supported by survivor testimony. Otto Dov Kulka revealed in an interview an experience that he did not describe in his book, a happy memory.

²⁴³ William Charles Wees, *Recycled Images: The Art and Politics of Found Footage Films*, (Anthology Film Archives: New York, 1993), p.46.

²⁴⁴ Nora Alter, “The Political Im/perceptible in the Essay Film: Harun Farocki’s “Images of the World and the Inscription of War,”” *New German Critique*, 68 (Spring – Summer 1996), p.175.

²⁴⁵ Harun Farocki, “Commentary from *Bilder der Welt und Inschrift des Krieges*,” *Discourse*, 15 (Spring 1993), p.86.

²⁴⁶ See Kaja Silverman, “What is a Camera? or: History in the Field of Vision,” *Discourse* 15 (Spring 1993).

Something like first love. In the afternoon, after the work, women and men were walking on the main street, the only street [the path between the barracks], watching the crematoria burn quietly – and not taking in what was happening. I went with a girl of 12 and we were walking among the adults. I don't remember her face but I remember her existence. She didn't survive, of course. But that was a marvellous experience to which I can return.²⁴⁷

Kulka describes a fleeting childhood romance in a death camp. This is an unexpected juxtaposition given our understanding of the genocide that went on in camps such as Auschwitz. And yet this is a memory reflecting an experience that really happened. Experience testifies to the possibility of love stories in death camps that Farocki suggests.

Farocki highlights the political im/perceptible in the image. More specifically, the in/visibility of ideology in the seeing and reading of images. “By spotlighting the tension between the visual and the audible he makes alternative narratives – opposed narratives even – possible and perhaps necessary.”²⁴⁸ Farocki confronts what we, the audience, would automatically think about these images, with an alternative. He applies a romantic interpretation (seemingly outrageous in the context), not because he wishes to deny the undeniable pain and death, but to reinvigorate our understanding. He wishes to produce alternative contemplations within each individual so that *we do not forget*, so that the holocaust and the images produced of it do not just become another set of meaningless simulacra removed from the horrifying reality of what happened, but images that are active with human possibility. The film essayist uses images reflexively, not to merely deconstruct their inherent construction, but in fact to reconstruct them within a configuration or constellation that makes us simultaneously aware of their pure artifice; the political im/perceptibility of that artifice through interpretation; and the richness of experience that *can* be evoked through combinations of image and word.

What Farocki tries to do, and what is fundamental to the relationship between the image and the word in the found footage narrative, is to combine image and word

²⁴⁷ Otto Dov Kulka, “Otto Dov Kulka: Everyone one of us has his or her own story of survival. But we never talked about it,” <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/07/otto-dov-kulka-interview>.

²⁴⁸ Nora Alter, “The Political Im/perceptible in the Essay Film: Harun Farocki’s “Images of the World and the Inscription of War,”” p.181-182.

in such a way as to create a dialectical image. One must alter the sense of the other in order to reveal the *Other*. These films therefore reveal an alternative way of seeing and thinking, that in turn reveals how dominant forms of discourse impose absolute and singular meanings upon objects and texts. The word alters our perception of the image through a counter-intuitive interpretation of that image's meaning. Words show how multiple meanings can be bestowed upon the photographic object; and how the image can 'hide' one meaning, while encouraging another.

Yet the words themselves are also made unstable by what we would expect to think that we see; images of horror. Farocki's 'sentimental' reflections on photos of female holocaust prisoners, and alternatively the use of images from fiction films in *Wanda*, is an anathema to the meaning we naturally give images and words that describe the Holocaust. As a result of these conflicting meanings we are awoken to investigate what we *personally* see, while also naturally questioning what we hear. We are then made aware of the acute subjectivity of *any* description of *any* image. Narration reveals its place amongst multiple interpretations through the image, while the image reveals its "transparent and mysterious"²⁴⁹ surface through words.

This is where the essay film becomes political in its approach. "Meaning can therefore be political only when it does not rely on any single source of authority, but rather empties it, decentralises it."²⁵⁰ The essay film reflects on a theme from an alternative, unstable position, and by doing so produces a fragmented, multi-sourced vision, in which rhetorical structures are put in place to allow for a more open interpretation that the audience can then 'fill' with their own subjective perspectives. The essay film, in its form, should become a catalyst for meaning, but meaning also unknown to the filmmaker at the time of its production, that can only be revealed by each individual viewer, a viewer that could even be the filmmaker themselves.

Laura Rascaroli, reflecting Barthes' conception of the writerly, explores how the rhetorical structure of the authorial voice integrates the viewer into the production of meaning. She calls the filmmaker's voice, as expressed in the essay film, "the enunciator." The enunciator does not just refer to the words of the film as expressed through a narrator, but the whole 'text' of the film, including images and non-dialogic sound. Rascaroli's concept expands Barthesian concepts of the writerly in the filmic

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p.111.

²⁵⁰ Trinh T. Minh-Ha, "The Totalizing Quest for Meaning," *When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, Gender and Cultural Politics*, (New York: Routledge, 1991), p.41.

form. “The enunciator addresses the spectator directly, and attempts to establish a dialogue.”²⁵¹ The “I” (the enunciator) always clearly and strongly implicates a “you” (an embodied spectator; each *individual* viewer), and the “you” is called upon to share and participate in the enunciator’s reflections.

The essay film constructs such a spectatorial position by adopting a certain rhetorical structure: rather than answering all the questions that it raises, and delivering a complete, “closed” argument, the essay’s rhetoric is such that it opens up problems, and interrogates the spectator; instead of guiding her through emotional and intellectual response, the essay urges her to engage individually with the film, and reflect on the same subject matter the author is musing about.²⁵²

Lopate’s experience of watching the essay film, *Night and Fog* illuminates the point:

What stuck in my mind for years was that voiceover phrase: “The only sign – but you have to know – is this ceiling scored by fingernails.” That “but you have to know (mais il faut savoir) inserted so cannily in mid-sentence, thrilled me like an unexpected aggressive pinch: its direct address broke the neutral contract of spectatorship and forced me to acknowledge a conversation, along with its responsibilities.”²⁵³

The structure of the essay film is one of constant interpellation. The audience watches these films as separate individuals who are asked to engage in a “dialogical relationship with the enunciator, to become active, intellectually and emotionally, and interact with the text.”²⁵⁴ As with what Laub describes as the “event” of listening to testimony, the film essayist allows new meaning to emerge from the position of each individual spectator.

²⁵¹ Laura Rascaroli, “The Essay Film: Problems, Definitions, Textual Commitments,” *Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media*, 49:2 (Fall 2008), p.32.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ Phillip Lopate, “In Search of the Centaur: The Essay-Film,” p.248.

²⁵⁴ Laura Rascaroli, “The Essay Film: Problems, Definitions, Textual Commitments,” p.32.

Humanism is, indeed, implicit in the essay structure – the assumption of a certain unity of the human experience, which allows two subjects to meet and communicate on the basis of this shared experience. The two subject positions, the “I” and the “you,” determine and shape one another.²⁵⁵

Again, through this form the essay film echoes its literary counterpart in its embracing of the Barthesian writerly. And it is through the writerly, and Rascaroli’s conception of the enunciator, that the found footage narrative constructs its’ form. By representing Wanda’s story through multiple voices that interrupt each other with alternative versions of the events based upon the memory and imagination of the interviewees and accompanied by found footage reconstructions, *Wanda* clearly implicates the “you” of the audience. The form of the found footage narrative asks the spectator to help shape its’ narrative, and in turn add to the narrative. The form of *Wanda* therefore represents the continual production of collective memory around the events of Wanda’s life.

The found footage narrative, through essayistic techniques such as collage, horizontal montage, the enunciator, a use of multiple voices and the dialectical image, becomes a cinematic expression of Barthes’ second order mythology: a reflexive myth. One form of representation, or as Trinh T. Minh-Ha describes it, “irreality,” informs another, producing new forms and new concepts. “The production of one irreality upon the other and the play of non-sense (which is not mere meaninglessness) upon meaning may therefore help to relieve the basic referent of its occupation.”²⁵⁶ The found footage narrative is the production of one irreality (or symbolic reality) upon another, producing a second order myth that comments upon the first. It uses one set of images to comment upon another, repurposing and commenting upon both in the process to create a new reflexive mythology. Through essayistic film techniques derived from literary essay techniques, the found footage narrative structures itself as a reflexive myth in order to interrogate the nature of collective memory of survivor experience, which is also informed by myth. The found footage narrative therefore also becomes another fragment in the continual production of collective memory around historical events.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., p.33.

²⁵⁶ Trinh T. Minh-Ha, “Documentary Is/Not a Name,” *The MIT Press*, 52:9 (Spring 1990), p.97.

Chapter Five:

The Found Footage Narrative in Practice.

This chapter will analyse the formal practices used in the found footage narrative, *Wanda*, in its representation of the collective memory around Wanda Bielecka's experiences. It will explore how the two formal elements (talking head interviews and found footage) are employed and also how they are combined in the film. Sigmund Freud's concept of the psychic mechanism of memory is useful in beginning to define the specific form of the found footage narrative. He describes memory as a palimpsest, a 'mystic writing pad' that "provides not only a receptive surface that can be used over and over again... but also permanent traces of what has been written... legible in suitable lights."²⁵⁷ Jacques Derrida remarks that the depth of this palimpsest is simultaneously a depth without bottom, an implication of infinite meaning, and a perfectly superficial exteriority; a nexus of surfaces, each of whose interior is but the implication of another similarly exposed surface.²⁵⁸ The found footage narrative cannot represent an event as a singular whole, but only in fragments of memories that interrelate with memories of other events in history. A moment from history can be best explored, as Mary Ann Doane puts it, "in the reverberations between events."²⁵⁹ Therefore expository qualities in which 'the real' is directly addressed are used less to describe 'facts' about the world than to poetically engage a particular historical event in order to intimate at a greater part of human experience.

The found footage narrative is a filmic palimpsest. As Craig Baldwin describes his films layering multiple representations upon one another, so too does the found footage narrative layer the multiple representations of Wanda's experience as expressed through the cultural memory of the Bielecka family. *Wanda* is constructed from two different formal elements: talking head interviews and found footage. The interviews represent communicative memory, which can also be informed by cultural memory, while the found footage represents cultural memory. The two combine in a representation of collective memory that is the found footage narrative, which in turn

²⁵⁷ Sigmund Freud, "A Note Upon the 'Mystic Writing Pad,'" James Stachey, ed., *Collected Papers: Volume 5 (Miscellaneous Papers, 1888-1938)*, (London: Basic Books, 1958), p.178-179.

²⁵⁸ Jacques Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing," *Writing and Difference*, Alan Bass Trans., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p.224.

²⁵⁹ Mary Ann Doane, "Remembering Women: Physical and Historical Constructions in Film Theory," *Psychoanalysis and Cinema*, E. Ann Kaplan ed., (New York: Routledge, 1990), p.58.

becomes another fragment of cultural memory informing a greater network of collective memory. This is the very simple formal basis of the found footage narrative. Essentially, the film depicts collective memory in the sense that Susan Sontag describes: a stipulating with pictures that lock the story in our minds. Talking head interviews stipulate what is remembered of the story, therefore declaring what is important about the narrative at least at the time of interviewing, while found footage images accompany these articulations of memory.

The film's length is predicated upon the amount of time it takes to tell the story and those incidents this author deems pertinent, not just to the narrative, but to an expression of the functioning of the collective memory of the Bielecka family. Therefore, the film's length, like other constructions and representations in *Wanda*, is subjective. It is a construction of this filmmaker, and therefore *Wanda*, and the story told within, is a memory of a memory of a memory of an event. The decision to make the film almost entirely black and white is also based upon the idea expressing my own, and perhaps other family members' collective memory around the events. As World War II films are associated with the story, making the images black and white was a reflection of the influence of cultural memory upon the memories of *Wanda's* experiences.

The audience is deliberately immersed in the narrative of the film through the sound design of *Wanda*. The sound effects used in the film are, for the most part, deliberately synchronous with the images so that the viewer experiences *Wanda's* story in a similar way to how it is described by the Bielecka family, full of diegetic details of sound that relate to the testimony through horizontal montage. "Sound achieves authenticity only as a consequence of its submission to tests imposed upon it by other senses – primarily sight."²⁶⁰ Sound and image often correspond in *Wanda* as a way to express the interiority of the interviewees. The realism of the sound design is constructed to represent the fantasies of the Bielecka family. As Michel Chion observes, film can create an "audiovisual illusion... an illusion located first and foremost in the heart of the most important relations between sound and image."²⁶¹ This illusion of sound and image is utilised by the found footage narrative as an expression of the illusory nature of memory and the sounds and images that are

²⁶⁰ John Belton, *Film Sound: Theory and Practice*, Elizabeth Weis, John Belton eds., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p.64.

²⁶¹ Michel Chion, *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen*, Claudia Gorbman trans., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.5.

created by the imagination. Music also plays a similar role in *Wanda*. As Holly Rogers observes;

It can help add spatial depth to chaotic actuality sound, but it can operate in ways very similar to those of mainstream fiction film... It can lead viewers into narrative and emotional positions in a way akin to mainstream fiction film soundtracks; and it can help turn each visual representation into a highly personal vision.²⁶²

Music is used in the found footage narrative much in the same way as it is used in cinematic dramas. The music may lead the viewer from one narrative episode to another, or may signal an emotional turning point or revelation. The music also makes clear the subjectivity of the found footage narrative. *Wanda* aims to reflexively expose its subjectivity and base its narrative and emotional revelations on the subjective viewpoints of the Bielecka family. In this way then, it deliberately utilises fictional narrative tropes of music use, and deliberately denies claims of ‘authentically’ representing real life. It is the interiority of the collective memory of the family that the film is trying to represent, which is in turn influenced by fiction films. As with the choice to present the film in black and white, the decision to design the sound effects and music based upon tropes from fiction films is an expression the influence of cultural memory on the collective memory of the Bielecka family.

Interview and found footage elements are introduced through their juxtaposition at the beginning of the film. The first image of the film (0.28) is Wanda Bielecka shown in the present, and then the second image is an actress shown gesturing in the same way. This actress is a younger representation of Wanda that appears later in the film. Similarly, Halina Munro (Wanda’s daughter), is shown, and then one of her younger representations that will ‘star’ in the film. In these four shots during the credit sequence at the beginning of the film, we witness the characters at the centre of the narrative. Wanda and Halina are to play a central role in the narrative of the film, while the talking head interviews and archival images will also be the central formal elements that represent that narrative.

²⁶² Holly Rogers, *Music and Sound in Documentary Film*, (London: Routledge, 2014), p.5.

As the film progresses, a more and more complex '*multilogue*' develops in which the testimony and testimony of testimony of Wanda Bielecka and eleven of her relatives intertwines in a dialectic with thousands of archival images from thousands of different sources including narrative films, documentaries, educational films, industrial films and even cartoons. This multilogue describe a version of the events of Wanda's escape from the Nazis, and eventual repatriation with her daughter in World War II. Prolepsis is used as a central formal strategy through which to anticipate alternative versions of events. Before one version of events (represented through a shot of found footage or quote from one of the interviewees) can conclude, an alternative version of events (represented by a *different* shot or quote) interrupts. The film progresses in this way, offering one possible representation of events, before providing an alternative, which in turn is interrupted by *another* alternative until the film becomes a complex interweaving of multiple representations that represent the multiple representations of collective memory.

After Wanda, Halina and their fictional counterparts are introduced, a montage of found footage extracted from the main narrative is shown over music that is played as though the musician is searching for the notes. The music sounds as though it is being played on a record player, scratched, fuzzy and old. This musical atmosphere accompanies images that are also aging, scratched and denatured through time. Each image represents a key narrative moment in the story. What we see in this opening montage is the film stripped down to its essential elements. The narrative flashes before our eyes before the story has even begun, representing another version of events already told. This formal structure evokes the idea of collecting memory continually reconstructing the historical narrative.

Almost all images have been transferred from 16mm film sourced from the *Other Cinema* archive in San Francisco. Images were selected for a variety of reasons. Throughout the process of selection the images thought was continually given to how the images would cut together in the final montage, and (using the technique of horizontal montage) how they would relate to what was being spoken. Firstly, some scenes were chosen as they are directly referenced by family members in their description of events. For example, the film *A Bridge Too Far* (1977) is referenced by multiple interviewees as a source of images in their conception of the scene in the film in which the bridge explodes. Images from that film were then integrated with other images to construct that scene in *Wanda*. In other instances, images were

selected by this filmmaker because they are cultural memories that I have integrated into my conception of the narrative. In other instances, images were selected because they evoked a certain feeling or mood that this filmmaker believed the interviewees expressed. At other times images are used as gestures, signifying movements or actions in the narrative.

The second formal element is the talking head interviews. Wanda Bielecka's story as it exists through Wanda's testimony, her spoken history, and the collective family memory of that testimony, represents a multifaceted version of the events of Wanda's life. And despite there being much corroborative historical evidence (as elaborated upon in chapter one), one way to explore the specific detail of these events is through her testimony, and the testimony of her testimony. During the production of *Wanda*, the Bielecka family was interviewed, as well as Wanda herself, in order to capture the valuable memories of testimony that elaborate upon Wanda's story.

An important part of the interview process was to ask the Bielecka family not what they thought to be the reality of Wanda's experience, but how they *imagined* the events. The found footage narrative is concerned with what each Bielecka family member's own subjective memory is of the events, including imagery, sounds, dialogue, colours, and emotions. *Wanda* is essentially the events filtered through the interiority of the subjects. The interviewees were encouraged to think beyond what they considered the facts of the story, and to describe what they imagined when they thought of what had happened to Wanda.

This oral history, rather than obscuring events, becomes another resource through which to explore them. Wanda's testimony and the family's collective memory are not 'wrong' or 'untruthful'. There is no predefined truth to be sought through interviewing family members, what is being sought is the subjective and emotional truth of Wanda's memories, and how those memories were formed within the minds of the other family members who pass on this testimony.

Wanda relies on talking heads to tell this story, not only because clearly it is a story rooted in the past and interviewing subjects would be the only way to retrieve such information, but for precisely the reason those purveyors of observational cinema try and often avoid the talking head interview. As Paul Henley points out;

The talking head film is clearly vulnerable to many different forms of abuse: the oral testimonies can be false, the visual archive can also be falsified in a

variety of ways and the two can be conjoined in a misleading or even deceitful manner.²⁶³

It is precisely these issues Henley raises that can show the subjective nature of memory. When each member of the Bielecka family was interviewed they were deliberately asked questions that explored their subjectivity.

Whenever anyone tells a story they have thoughts in their mind that are then translated into words. And yet these thoughts themselves contain images, and sounds and imaginary dialogue that define how a narrative is perceived. Rather than ask each Bielecka family member what they thought to be true, or even what they thought was an accurate description of what Wanda had told them, they were asked more about what it was that they *imagined* when they thought of her story. In order to capture how the event is processed through memory, it was more important to get beyond a simple description of the story and hear a description of the images in the minds of the participants when they told their stories. No matter how untrue, it is the thoughts and fantasies of the Bielecka family that form the foundation and interrogated content of the found footage narrative in order to get at the content of their collective memory of events.

Each of the twelve interviews was carried out in this way. Each interview, as far as interviews can, provides an insight into the imaginations of the participants and the memories around the events. And yet the similarities, contradictions and nuances of the interviews that combined represent the Bielecka family's collective memory of the events, could not be shown by simply playing one interview after another. Nor could they even be shown in great detail if the interviews were cut together in a way that interviews have been cut together in other films that use talking head interviews, in which entire sentences or paragraphs are spoken before a cut is made. In order to demonstrate the detailed differences, similarities and nuances of the *collective* version of events, the found footage narrative cuts between interviewees extremely rapidly. Sometimes only a word will have been spoken when the film will immediately cut to another word or sentence spoken by another person. In this way, *Wanda* is able to

²⁶³ Paul Henley, "Are You Happy? Interviews, 'conversations' and 'talking heads' as methods for gathering oral testimony in ethnographic documentary," *Interview und Film*, Ulrich Roters, Joachim Wossildo eds., (Munster: Waxmann Verlag, 2003), p.61.

compare the different versions of events, showing the multiple versions that are produced in memory.

There are thousands of cuts in the interview audio alone. The cuts were made in such a way as to tell the story succinctly and dramatically, to tell a ‘smooth’ digestible story in a way that reflects the mythologising of the events. And yet many of the cuts are noticeable and by them being noticeable make the audience realize the fragmentary nature of the story. The film at once feeds into ‘smooth’ storytelling, while reflexively exposing the fragmentary nature of historical storytelling. In fact, this is a story told through fragments as expressed through the cut and montage. The very process of cutting, of montage, becomes an expression of the fragmentary nature of the story and of memory itself. The film becomes a functioning of collective memory, a palimpsest. It continually rewrites itself with each cut of dialogue and image.

Indeed, *Wanda* makes clear very early on in the film that even Wanda’s version of events contradicts itself. One of the biggest contradictions is revealed when Wanda at first suggests that she did not escape at all (12.46). Wanda’s contradictory testimony, although not diminishing the reality of her experience, raises an important question about the pertinence of the other family members testimony of her testimony. We are there confronted with a problematic situation in which the story cannot be told without the input of those that did not experience it firsthand, but when told through the different voices, the story becomes even more confused and complex. Irony, another facet of the essay film, is therefore central to *Wanda*’s construction.

The dialogue in *Wanda* is often cut to show how different each version of events can be as it exists in memory. An example of this dialogue in contradiction can be seen at 22.50 where almost every fragment of dialogue contradicts the fragment before it as the Bielecka family collectively describe Wanda’s discovery of either a barn, a village or a castle. However, this is a prime example of how *Wanda* is able to use fragments in a way that still make its’ narrative coherent. The film therefore demonstrates processes of aural history and memory production in a comprehensible form. This form does not just speak to this specific story but to *all* oral history and the processes involved in the passing down of spoken history. This processing of history forms much of our personal and collective memory. Furthermore, beyond the story itself every dialogue fragment is connected to the context of the original interview each family member gave. Therefore each fragment contradicts another and speaks to

another version of events that simply isn't spoken, but exists outside the film.

Through rapid cut-up techniques this larger network of memory is also evoked.

This network of memory beyond the film is further alluded to in the cutting *within* each person's speech. There are several longer monologues in *Wanda* (12.13, Kazimir Bielecki, Wanda's grandson; 15.46, Jet Bielecka, Wanda's granddaughter; 40.01, Jurek Bielecki, Wanda's son; 1.03.43; Halina Munro, Wanda's daughter). Save for Halina's, the other monologues are not based upon what the interviewees have been told by Wanda or experienced themselves, but purely describe the details of what they imagine happened to her at those specific moments. These monologues show the imagination that takes hold of testimony and expands upon it in memory.

Two monologues are combined to further reveal their basis in fantasy (31.40). Elin Bielecka (Wanda's granddaughter) suggests that when Wanda wakes up in the house it is akin to the Cinderella fairytale, while Kazimir states that his version of events reminds him of the Goldilocks fairytale. Both versions are cut together to reveal the cultural memories of fairytales that have informed their understanding. Through their constellation, fairytale is exposed as a mythologising factor influencing the way that events are represented in oral history. A reflexive myth is created in their juxtaposition, one that at once further mythologises the events while simultaneously commenting upon this mythological construction through montage.

These reflexive processes are further expanded upon in the form of the monologue's themselves. Each of these speeches, including Halina's, rather than being one continuous cut of dialogue, is edited from multiple fragments of dialogue. Each fragment derives contextually from elsewhere and is recontextualised within the monologue presented by the film. Through each cut of dialogue, as in every cut of dialogue within the film, the spectator is asked, is this the telling of the story as it was intended by the protagonist, or a further fiction created by the filmmaker? Is it perhaps a combination of the two? There are multiple fragmentary layers. It demonstrates the expanding of testimony into a complex multi-sourced narrative based on a singular experience. This cutting technique is a self-reflexive expression of the processes through which testimony becomes memory which then becomes further testimony which all add to the complex ever expanding network of collective memory that continues on through the audience.

Furthermore, the use of multiple fragments of one person's dialogue to perform a monologue speaks to the multiple selves within each person. Each fragment

represents just one symbolic self of that person expressing their memory of the event at that specific time. Cut with other fragments, the form of the monologue represents the multiple selves that could describe the events in different ways each time. This concept of multiple selves within the self is further elaborated upon in the found footage narrative through the inclusion of fragments of this filmmaker's interview. By including a self of the filmmaker in the film, *Wanda* further develops formal practices, which demonstrate the multiplicity of selves. Not only are those multiple selves shown through the fragmentation of the filmmaker's dialogue, but also a further representation of self is shown in the form of the film. Despite being made up of many fragments of representation, the film ultimately is an expression of this filmmaker. Yet, it is another *symbolic* expression of the filmmaker, already changed. By including interviews with myself, *Wanda* reflexively demonstrates the subjective nature of the found footage narrative form itself.

The secondary formal element, from which the found footage narrative is constructed, is the found footage. It is important to use images in a representation of collective memory. Since the birth of cinema in the early twentieth century, film has been constructed in order to aid the retention and transmission of memories. "One of the reasons for the privileged status of images in memory construction derives from their exceptional ability to close, and at time even obliterate, the gap between first-hand experience and secondary witnessing."²⁶⁴ *Wanda* attempts to close the gap, not between the experience and secondary witnessing, but between the collective memory of experience and the representation of that memory outside of thought.

The found footage narrative attempts to use the moving image as a way of literally depicting what is being described, but in a form that does not represent the events themselves, but the memory of the experience and the testimony of that experience. Through use of film footage, *Wanda* tries to emphasise the idea of 'schema', which is "associated with the tendency to represent (or indeed to remember) one event or one person in terms of another."²⁶⁵ The film uses images that that this filmmaker has associated with the story, or images that the interviewees associate. *Wanda* at time attempts to directly describe what is being said, while at other times the images may be more dialectical in relation to the narration. At all

²⁶⁴ Wulf Kansteiner, *Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies*, p.191.

²⁶⁵ Peter Burke, *History as Social Memory*, p102.

times *Wanda* expresses the cinematic nature of the stories being told, and evokes the cinematic nature in which Wanda's story is being imagined by her family. Of course, collective memory is highly subjective in nature and is derived from networks of memory and imagination, therefore often fantastical and hallucinatory images are used to convey this.

Even the materiality of the 16mm film itself evokes the fragile and changing nature of memory. Some of this footage is badly damaged, and vibrates and blurs as it is played. Aesthetically, this evokes the feeling almost of a rift in time, of a dissonance highly appropriate to the subject. By literally witnessing the decay of the film, we are alerted to the decaying nature of memory. Furthermore, this decay evokes the idea that there are many testimonies on the Holocaust that we will never hear at all because they have decayed beyond any representation at all.

Wanda therefore 'performs' memory through found footage. It represents collective memory through filmic reconstruction. Reconstructions are often used in documentary as a way of literally showing the events being described. "'Reconstruction', often using professional actors, was a means of overcoming the limitations (some of them physical, some of them the product of social and institutional conventions) placed on the camera's access to certain 'real events'."²⁶⁶ In representing the experiences of one woman during World War II, the film's access to real events is extremely limited. Indeed, as we have seen, one of the main sources of information concerning the events of Wanda's life during this time is the oral history provided by her and her family. In representing this oral history, which is based on a collective memory of events, the found footage narrative therefore uses not just documentary found footage from the time, but found footage from other sources that represent the multiple sources of collective memory.

Indeed, the found footage used in *Wanda* constantly shifts between documentary and fiction throughout the entire film. For example, early on in the film (9.00) the film cuts from documentary footage of a factory, to fictional footage of a scene in a factory in *Metropolis* (1927), while a shot from *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (1928) (5.13) dissolves into a tracking shot of genuine prisoners in a concentration camp. These are just two examples of a constant interaction between documentary and fiction. This constellation is an expression of the performance of the memory of

²⁶⁶ John Corner, *Action Formats: Drama Documentary and Vérité*, The Art of the Record, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p31.

interviewees who process Wanda's story, not just through her testimony, but also through other cultural memories that inhabit their own memory, including fiction films.

But as well as highlighting the fantastical elements of collective memory, the use of fiction film also speaks to the historical context and narrative themes of *Wanda*. The scenes from *Metropolis* (9.00) reach a feverish crescendo of brutal sacrificial violence that in *Metropolis* itself acts as a vision of the enslavement of the workers. In terms of Wanda's story it represents her brutal enslavement by the Nazis. It has been famously argued that *Metropolis* was a foreshadowing of Nazi rule,²⁶⁷ a theory that was since debunked as "fairytale" by Lang himself.²⁶⁸ The transition from documentary footage to *Metropolis* footage shows this descent by the film into a fantastical nightmare (much like the Dr Mengele sequence). But in its use in the historical context of Wanda's story, its other meanings in other contexts are also highlighted. The images depict a feverish mythical world, totally unreal, which speaks to multiple views of history at the same time. The scene is a representation of the memory, not the event, while also commenting historically upon Wanda's experiences.

Footage from *The Passion of Joan of Arc* was also chosen for more than descriptive reasons. In the original film, a persecuted woman is subjected to torture and mistreatment. Use of the footage also raises the idea of martyrdom and how perhaps Wanda herself is a martyr, even perhaps mythologised as a person during this time through the imaginings of her family, but also the found footage narrative itself. Use of the footage therefore reflexively comments upon themes of collective memory and mythology, in which the film itself also creates a mythology around Wanda through use of the footage.

Sometimes scenes in the film, despite their clear artificiality, comment directly upon the historical context Wanda found herself in. As Jurek Bielecki describes how Wanda eventually met up with American forces the film uses footage from the beginning of *Patton* (1969). This highly artificial, almost two-dimensional image reflects upon the idea of subjective memory. It does not accurately show the arrival of American forces by any means, but symbolises it. However, there is a certain

²⁶⁷ See Siegfried Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

²⁶⁸ Fritz Lang in Peter Bogdanovich, *Fritz Lang in America*, (New York: Praeger, 1967), p.124.

amount of historical accuracy in this symbolism that goes further than merely conveying the arrival of US troops. When Wanda met up with these forces it seems likely that she was somewhere in Lorraine in the north of France. During the liberation of France, Patton's Third Army would have been in this area, and the troops that Wanda met would have most likely been in Patton's forces.²⁶⁹

In other scenes it is clear that the footage used is not based upon the historical context of testimony, or even the fantasies of an interviewee, but a subjective interpretation of the dialogue based upon the fantasy of the filmmaker. The film uses scenes from *Frankenstein* (1931) (6.17) that are clearly not documentary, or derive from what is being described, but instead derive from an interpretation of the narrative by the filmmaker. Here, fictional footage is used as a way to enhance representation to evoke the Imaginary, or the Real of the real. The trauma, upon which the mythology of Wanda's story is constructed, is depicted rather than the event itself.

However, sometimes the found footage in the film provides an alternative view of the memory of events. For example, a short sequence (7.20) uses narration that describes the conditions on the trains leaving Auschwitz, yet the images are cut together to depict the thoughts of Wanda as she sits on the train. We witness dissolves from the train furnace; to hot coals; to Auschwitz prisoners; to the eyes of a woman; to the carriages of a speeding train. This shows an imagined scene of Wanda thinking of the horrors of Auschwitz she has left behind as she is moved. It is another level of performed memory that exists alongside the voiceover describing other elements of the story.

Similarly, parallel editing between image and word (11.22) is used in which the narration describes what Wanda sees from the barracks, while the images show what is happening above as the area is bombed. At the beginning of the sequence a third audio element is added in the form of a montage of radio clips describing different moments from the war. This gives a sense of Wanda's place as an individual involved in a geopolitical situation. Words describe Wanda noticing the German retreat, while images and audio show the Allied attack, and the geopolitical context. While the film is a representation of the Bielecka family's story and their thoughts, it

²⁶⁹ Something that reinforces this idea is the fact that Wanda describes meeting African American GIs. The only African American GIs on the frontline in World War II were the 'Black Panther Regiment' assigned to Patton's Third Army.

also reflexively shows that the film is another representation in itself, and that the interpretation of the film extends beyond the interpretations of the interviewees.

The found footage narrative therefore combines image and word through many different formal techniques. The way in which the film intertwines the two formal elements of talking head interviews and found footage is clearly stated (5.19). A tracking shot approaching the actual gates of Auschwitz is shown as Mark Bielecki describes how she was made to stand in the courtyard of the concentration camp with other prisoners. The film then immediately cuts to each member of the family staring directly into the camera as though *they* are the prisoner's that have been made to stand. In this moment, it is as though each interviewee performs the event described, while this performance also becomes a metaphor for the family standing to speak their version of events. *Wanda* blurs the lines between the representation of the narrative and the narrators. It is as if they are the ones that are stripped naked and made to stand. They become protagonists themselves in the story. The film shows a re-enactment through the family's collective memory of events.

Many different formal approaches are used to show that the narrative is a fantasy derived from the collective memory and imagination of the participants. First person point of view shots are used throughout the film.²⁷⁰ As each interviewee describes the events, it not only puts them in the position of protagonist, but the first person shots also put the *audience* in this position. The audience are therefore further immersed in the film and are asked to make their own interpretation of the events from this position.

Characters in the found footage material are also shown mouthing the words spoken by interviewees. A guard is shown speaking parts of Jurek's dialogue (13.15), while a nurse seems to speak Amber Bielecka's (Wanda's granddaughter) lines (1.00.59), while a nun begins to speak this filmmaker's words before cutting back to the filmmaker's talking head (1.01.04). Interviewees are further integrated into the fabric of the narrative through use of their dialogue in actual performances of scenes from the story. This is demonstrated in a scene (15.00) where some of the family members perform lines that they imagine Wanda and her friend saying to each other just before they escape. A conversation is enacted by some family members between Wanda and the villagers (33.24).

²⁷⁰ See 16.10, 23.09, and 40.01 for examples.

Protagonists pretend to be villagers, but their questions seem to also be directed at Wanda herself. The characters in the story and the protagonists become meshed together, playing one another. Through the protagonists the historical characters come alive, and through the historical characters the protagonists perform a dialogue with one another that represent the processes of communicative memory in which the events are revealed through the questioning of oral history. In the film these lines are cut together so that the family members are in fact performing an imagined dialogue between each other, which becomes an evocation of the collective memory of these specific events.

The interviewees further interact with the found footage through the composition of the talking heads. Wanda's interviews are deliberately composed in a more traditional manner separate to the rest of the family in order to distinguish her as that person who's testimony is based on first hand experience. The rest of the family's interviews have been composed so that they are directly facing the camera and looking directly into the lense. These compositions, all in varying degrees of close-up, provide an intimacy between the interviewees and spectator. These headshots are also cut with similarly composed found footage shots. Throughout the film montages are created between fictional characters performing the narrative and family members performing their memory of the narrative.

A shot of a smiling girl 'performing' Halina (1.06.50) cuts to a sequence of family members who begin smiling and eventually look more and more upset. The scene then cuts to Kazimir who, smiling, describes Halina "classic Hollywood style" running towards her mother. As he says this the images cut to a girl crying, a representation of Halina, and then to Halina in the present of the film. At the end of the scene we cut from a young version of Halina to the older Halina herself, as though the found footage image of her is the memory she has of herself. Not only are we clearly shown the contradictions in versions of events, but the interviews of the family are used as a performance through which to dramatise the events, while also commenting upon the fantasy of memory construction.

Found footage intertitles are also used as observations, thoughts or dialogue in *Wanda*. At many points in the film (8.06, 45.18) these intertitles are used to describe simple observations of the narrative. Treated in this way, they are another layer of commentary imposed by the filmmaker. Sometimes however, the intertitles are used as thoughts of the character of Wanda performed by the film. For example, the

intertitle “How Strong is the Enemy?” is used as a thought Wanda has in the story about whether the Nazis are retreating (11.32). At other times intertitles directly contradict what is being said onscreen, such as when Wanda says, “it was night” and the intertitle states, “the next morning” (22.59). Here contradiction is used to further highlight the stark contradictions in dialogue.

Found footage *subtitles* are also used as commentary upon the specifics of the narrative, as is seen when the subtitles of a scene from *Last Year in Marienbad* (1961) seem to describe that which is being said (38.30). In this first person point of view shot, it is as though the character of Wanda, or perhaps the interviewees, or the filmmaker, or even the spectator of the film, are floating down the corridor of a chateau contemplating the veracity of events. Here subtitles, rather than translating language, translate thought.

Asyndeton is another formal strategy employed by the found footage narrative through various cinematic techniques. Through techniques of asyndeton the same event is expressed in multiple ways, and repeated through different elements to express the multiple representations around a single experience. These different expressions are not connected through cinematic conjunctions, but instead simply placed one after the other. These fragments build upon one another, unseparated by normal cinematic conventions, which would distinguish between each fragment and define them. This filmic use of asyndeton builds a dramatic continuum that demonstrates how these fragments are combined in collective memory.

Wanda uses the tone of interviewees’ voices to express different versions of events; despite the words each person speaks being the same. The film depicts 3 different versions of the conversation spoken in the different tones of voice (42.55). Wanda, Elin and Jurek all speak the guard’s line, “where are you going?” Wanda’s speaks calmly but with menace, while Elin speaks the guard’s words with more aggression and anger. Both are similar in tone if not exactly the same, but Jurek’s is more casual, even friendly, and certainly not suspicious. In the original interview Jurek states that in the version Wanda told him, the guards were not suspicious of her at all, and were in fact very friendly. Through the repetition of words, but in the nuances of speech, through the use of asyndeton, multiple dramas can unfold simultaneously within a singular story, again demonstrating collective memory.

In another asyndeton technique, *Wanda* literally rewinds back through events in order to repeat them in a different way. The film rewinds back to the same moment

in which Wanda awakes in a village house (41.28, 43.50). These rewinds are a formal expression of the story moving from one place to another, expressing how memory is also not tethered to chronology. But these rewinds also rewrite the narrative. The story is repeated with different narrative details. A similar repetitive narrative structure is found in the three times that sequences from the film begin with Wanda saying the lines, “one day there was quiet, no guards, nobody was there...” (12.40, 37.26, 44.37). The film suggests different versions of events. *Wanda* is searching for the correct telling of the story, the film is trying to be accurate, but the only way to accurately tell the story is through its contradictions, discrepancies and falsehoods. The film shows that her testimony alone contradicts itself and inevitably omits parts of the story that she may have remembered during one of those times she was speaking to another one of the protagonists.

Similarly, a shot of a child and then woman standing on top of a hill and looking directly into the camera are shown three times (1.55, 30.59, 1.03.01). The first time the shot is shown it is without context, the only narrative elements the spectator can divulge is that a woman and a child are involved. When the image is repeated it is at the end of a nightmare sequence after it is revealed that Wanda has a daughter back in Poland. Suddenly the shot takes on more dramatic power. We assume that the shot symbolises Wanda and Halina. It is imbued with all the narrative developments that have happened in between both shots.

Finally, repeated for the third time, the shot is shown to represent Halina with another mother figure, that of the nurse. It seems that the woman standing by Halina is not Wanda, but another woman. Here we not only see the shot in a different narrative context, but also thematic context. By repeated use of this shot at different stages, in different contexts, the film gives it completely different meanings. These sequences of the story are begun the same way three times, but end differently each time in order to express the way in which memory is tangential, repeating itself and then diverging from a previous thought depending upon its' context. The viewer, in experiencing three different perceptions of the image, experiences the way memory continually informs the same event in different ways.

The found footage narrative therefore also develops techniques of asyndeton to evoke a feeling of déjà vu in the spectator through amphibology. Often before sequences or images are repeated, dialogue will be looped in such a way as to instigate this feeling in the audience. For example, Wanda, in describing the family

she stayed with in the village, misses out two of the family the second time around despite beginning the sentence in the exact same way (44.12). A syntactic ambiguity between the words evokes a feeling of familiarity in difference. The film does not make it clear whether this is a cut made by the filmmaker in which family members are added or subtracted. Has Wanda forgotten people she lived with or has the filmmaker added more? The dialogue is looped in such a way as to make it impossible to know where the beginning of the speaking is. In an example of amphibology, the speech goes round in a loop, disorientating the listener, who is unsure of the source of this confusion or the beginnings of this language.

This technique could also produce a sense of *déjà vu*. The viewer has heard the words just before but in a different context. They have an uncanny air of familiarity and strangeness at the same time. By showing many images at the beginning of *Wanda* in a prologue montage the film may also create this sense in the viewer. This happens on a grander scale with the repetition straight afterwards of Wanda's dialogue, "one day there was quiet, no guards, nobody was there..." accompanied by the same music and same images. This is the third placing in the chronology of this sequence, and third time that the sequence ends with an alternative elaboration.

The film plays with this sense of *déjà vu* to trigger the very processes of memory in the audience that are happening in the film, and in the minds of the protagonists. Again, *Wanda* involves the audience in the processes of memory production. The viewer asks themselves, where have I heard that before? Why is it different? *Déjà vu* is integral to the imagining of the protagonists because memory itself tricks us into experiencing *déjà vu*. It is a manufactured experience, just as the telling of the narrative is.

Fiction films are also referenced *directly* in *Wanda*. Many interviewees use specific scenes from films in order to aid their understanding of Wanda's experience. Some of the family members discuss how when they imagine Wanda coming across a bridge occupied by Nazi soldiers, they imagine a scene from *A Bridge Too Far* (20.48). But, rather than simply show a scene from that film to describe what is being said, the found footage narrative intersperses shots from the film with other shots from other films. Although the interviewees may imagine parts of the film when imagining Wanda's experience, the two are intertwined in the fantasy. As a result, this scene in *Wanda* represents the intertwining of multiple sources within collective

memory. However, it is through fiction films that the protagonists can understand the stories they have been told. Fiction films give form to the stories, and help the interviewees relate stories to their own memory.

It is not only scenes from Hollywood films that inform the collective memory of Wanda's experiences, but also Hollywood performers. In *Wanda*, movie stars play historical figures, specifically Wanda and the characters in her narrative of memory. And so Joan Fontaine plays an unknown woman who 'plays' Wanda. Renée Jeanne Falconetti plays Joan of Arc who also plays Wanda. Yet, in the collective memory of the Bielecka family it is Wanda who is the star of the film. Indeed, in using these actresses playing these roles, the notion of Wanda existing as a heroic, mythical character within collective memory is further emphasised. Finally, Deanna Durbin playing a nurse, playing *the* nurse, sings a song (1.02.20). Here the "performance" of memory that is the film reaches a literal culmination in using an actual singing performance being used to convey the story. The Real or Imaginary of the events is symbolised in the heightened performance of a song rather than the actual events themselves.

Conversely, in the film's nightmare sequence (29.10), documentary footage that bears direct contextual relation to Wanda's experience is used prominently. Whereas before this point in the scene the nightmare consists of contextually unrelated fictional footage, from this point the horrifying footage witnessed is genuine documentary scenes and stills from concentration camps. This speaks to the trauma unspoken by the protagonists, and by Wanda in particular, throughout the rest of the film. The trauma is silently spoken. It is something Wanda does not want to talk about, but the film expresses by imagining what happens in her sleep. It is in dreams that the trauma of the survivor lives on inside them. As Otto Dov Kulka observes, "in my dreams and diaries I lived a double life."²⁷¹ As far as this writer knows, Wanda has never kept diaries. Like Kulka however, it is through her thoughts and dreams that her unspoken trauma exists in reality.

Hence, *Wanda* uses documentary footage of the horrors of the concentration camps in a dream sequence. In this scene, more than anywhere else in the film, the found footage directly relates to Wanda's experiences through documentary footage, but it is in the context of dream. The images play without words to describe them, and

²⁷¹ Otto Dov Kulka, "Otto Dov Kulka: Everyone one of us has his or her own story of survival. But we never talked about," <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/07/otto-dov-kulka-interview>.

only music to enhance their expression in the Imaginary. The dialectical image of documentary footage of the holocaust placed in the context of a surreal dreamscape represents that which is absent from the collective memory of the events. In mythologising Wanda's experience through this dialectical image, *Wanda* exposes the silent memory that cannot be communicated in representation.

Herein lies an element of the truth of the Bielecka family's collective memory of Wanda's experiences. The truth of the events is silent and unarticulated in representation. And yet, whilst the use of dialectical images in the found footage narrative confounds expectations of meaning, these techniques also further mythologise myth in order to comprehend the ways in which collective memories retain certain truths of events. These truths are not empirical or factual, but instead hold emotional resonance. The truth lies in the mythology of the events, which creates a symbolic meaning for the family and affects them emotionally. When, Polly Bielecka (Wanda's granddaughter) says, "you can't begin to imagine what it must have been like," (1.08.50) while tears roll down her cheeks, she speaks to the impossibility of recreating the events or understanding them if they didn't happen to you.

Yet, the irony is that she is crying and clearly emotionally affected by imagining the events. Whilst it may be true that myths of collective memory, and the mythologising of that collective memory by the found footage narrative, do not speak to the facts of the events, what *is* genuine about *Wanda* is the emotional responses that it elicits and represents. Whilst it is impossible for any film to claim to represent the reality of the past, the found footage narrative detours such pitfalls by aiming to represent the collective memory around historical events. In doing so it exposes the mythologies constructed around these events, reflexively mythologising these mythologies through the use of dialectical images in order to represent the processes involved in memory production.

And yet in so clearly exploring the imagination and fantasy around events, rather than their empirical reality, the found footage narrative demonstrates what truly remains of these events in the present. The emotional responses to Wanda's story demonstrate how the events continue to affect members of the Bielecka family through the mythologies of collective memory. Whether the myths of memory truly represent Wanda's experiences or not, what can't be denied are the tears on her relatives' faces, and their deep emotional connection to her experience through the mythologies of her life.

Conclusion

As the number of witnesses to the atrocities committed by the Nazis in World War II become smaller and smaller, it is important to study both the facts and memories of their experiences, but also the way those memories are expressed and interpreted in collective memory. The found footage narrative is therefore an important way in which to study these events. How the Holocaust is remembered, or indeed forgotten, is therefore at a crucial moment. There is overwhelming factual evidence that proves the context of Wanda Bielecka's testimony, and the reality of her experience as a survivor. Yet, it is important not to collapse the distinction between the persecution and almost total eradication of the Jews in the Final Solution, and the experience of Non-Jewish Poles such as Wanda Bielecka. Although the experience of both groups was horrific, there are historical differences in the way that they were treated that must be highlighted. Although the Nazis had plans to liquidate a large majority of non-Jewish Poles, in terms of the Jews themselves, these plans were actually put into place and very nearly succeeded.

However, this does not lessen the crimes committed against non-Jewish Poles, who have been regarded in some discourse as anti-Semitic and complicit in Nazi crimes. In fact, many Poles aided the Jews in Poland and saved many from extermination, while their own treatment at the hands of the Nazis was nothing less than an entire nation enslaved and brutalised. *Wanda* therefore explores the experience of a *non-Jewish* Pole who went through the concentration camp system, who *also* suffered great crimes committed against her. The group in which Wanda was identified was not as persecuted as the Jews, but nevertheless, Wanda experienced the concentration camps as many Jews experienced it. She is a survivor.

Although figures around non-Jewish deaths in Poland fluctuate, there can be no doubt that millions lost their lives after the people of that nation were subjected to torture, overwork, death camps, raids, executions, epidemics, starvation, and a myriad of cruel and barbaric treatments at the hands of the Nazis. Under *Generalplan Ost*, which was never carried out to its' full extent, the Nazis planned to colonise Poland, eliminate 80-85% of Poles through genocide and deportation, and enslave those that remained. Every Polish citizen was subjected to brutalities. The Nazis regarded the Poles as *Untermenschen*. Hitler himself encouraged the slaughter of Polish men,

women and children. Surviving Poles were integrated into an industrialised level of serfdom. They were denied all forms of Polish culture, and educated only to the most rudimentary levels. Poles were also sent to concentration camps in a policy of ‘extermination through labour’ in which they were deliberately worked to death, while assisting the German war industry.

Wanda, a non-Jewish Pole living in Poland in World War II, was enslaved and sent to various concentration camps. In order to receive compensation for these crimes committed against her, she submitted a claim form to the German Forced Labour Compensation Programme. In this form she stated that she was a forced and slave labourer in various work camps, and Schirmeck and Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camps. In 2000, after processing the application, the German government officially recognised Wanda Bielecka as a victim of Nazi crimes and provided her with DEM 15,000.

The historical context of Wanda’s testimony corroborates her story. Wanda, like millions of other Jewish and non-Jewish Poles, was coerced into forced and slave labour. Recruitment was not just limited to the men of Poland, but women too, who would provide a substantial workforce for the Nazis. Under the forced labour programme, Wanda would have been labeled with a purple patch, subject to curfew and banned from public transportation. Social relations with Germans outside work were forbidden, and sexual relations were punishable by death. Wanda was regarded as subhuman, merely utilised as labour in the German war machine. After attempting to escape, she was punished, as many other escapees were, whether they were Jewish or not, by being sent to Natzweiler-Struthof concentration camp complex in France. At this time the concentration camps, as well as liquidating groups such as the Jews, were providing slave labour around Europe. It would be in this capacity that Wanda was interned. After another escape attempt she was sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau as a slave labourer.

It is here that the film *Wanda* begins its telling of the story, and it is here that Wanda’s status as non-Jew eventually saved her. Wanda was transferred out of Auschwitz to supply the growing need for slave labour in the production of munitions. While being marched back east from this munitions factory in Metz, she escaped. Had she not escaped at this point the likelihood is that she would have been killed, but had she been Jewish it would have been even more likely that she would have been murdered *before* she had even left Auschwitz. Here lies the distinction between the

non-Jewish Polish experience and that of the Polish Jews. Wanda is a survivor, but one that survived in part because of her status as non-Jewish. There is clear evidence proving these distinctions, as well as proving the context of Wanda's story, which acted as a catalyst for her own personal experiences, the experiences represented in *Wanda*. Despite the complexities of memory that the found footage narrative explores, there can be no doubt that the historical basis upon which her story is told did indeed happen.

Yet, almost seventy years after the end of the War, when the lives of even the youngest survivor is coming to an end, the memories that they leave us must also be explored. Furthermore, it is important not only to study their memories, but the memories of their memories. The collective memory of these events represents the way that they are communicated in discourse. A study of the way a survivor's experiences are represented in discourse through collective memory can reveal how that experience exists in the present day. If forgetting is extermination, how events are remembered becomes a way to combat extermination.

However, it has been observed by many scholars that *no* form of representation can reach an adequate description of the survivor experience. Their experiences lie outside of any referential competence. The trauma of the events creates a silence in representation. But this silence in language also speaks the trauma of an event. One way in which survivor experience can be reached is through interiority. What then becomes more important than facts and empiricism is the way that the experience is expressed by the survivor, through their thoughts, and how it is listened to. The found footage narrative is therefore a history of interiority.

The process of listening, and how the testimony of survivors is remembered, then becomes crucial to the way survivor history is represented. As Laub points out, the listening of testimony becomes an event in its own right. The listener, although they do not hear the facts of the experience, hears the trauma. Symbolically, Wanda's experience also becomes her family's experience. Therefore, the way that the Bielecka family listens to Wanda's testimony, and then passes on that testimony, comes to define how history will be constructed around the events.

Despite the inexplicability of the survivor experience, the interiority of that experience is expressed as a way of denying extermination. The *incomprehension* of the concentration camps must be testified to and remembered in order to refute denial. As Langer submits, the videotaped interview can be the most direct method through

which to reach the interiority of the survivor. The spoken testimony of Wanda becomes the most effective method in documenting her history. Imagination and fantasy from which that testimony is filtered then becomes an important resource through which survivor experience can be expressed. In some cases memory may be the *only* way in which a survivor's experiences can be represented and comprehended. Furthermore, as a representation of Wanda's memory, her testimony provides complexities of experience that empirical study cannot reach. Memory can provide another level of experience that an empirical history omits.

Wanda's memory has retained unique information about her experience that no other form of representation can reach. Specific actions, events, images, sounds, smells, thoughts and feelings experienced by her only exist in her memory. In turn, this memory can only be expressed through oral testimony. This oral testimony is then listened to, recorded or written down, and through these processes becomes an oral history of Wanda's experience. This oral history is then processed through a larger network of collective memory. What is produced then, rather than a history of events, is a history of memory, a collective memory around Wanda's experience. The found footage narrative is a form through which to comprehend this history of collective memory.

Collective memory, as Halbwachs describes it, is a social framework of memory. Through this social framework, Wanda's memories are mediated, firstly through the social framework of the Bielecka family, and then the extended social frameworks of listeners to *their* testimony, and the viewers of the film, *Wanda*. In turn, the memories (of Wanda's testimony) of each family member, and by extension each viewer, is also mediated through this social framework. Assman observes how this social framework of memory is divided into two categories: communicative and cultural. Communicative memories describe memories created through oral testimony and the spoken word, while cultural memories represent the less fluid memories of a wider cultural framework, such as cinema.

As Burke states, media such as oral traditions, written records, images and actions are all methods through which communicative and cultural memories form the collective memory of the events. Communicative and cultural memories inform and influence one another within a formation of collective memory. *Wanda*, is a formal representation of collective memory in which communicative memory is represented by interviews with Wanda and her family, while cultural memory is represented by

the found footage used to dramatise the events. Just as in a formation of collective memory, the two formal elements inform and influence each other.

Through the use of these two formal elements, the found footage narrative analyses the collective memory of the Bielecka family as a mythical representation of Wanda's experience. It explores the imagination and fantasies of the Bielecka family, combined with the cultural memories of cinema (the narratives, symbolism, themes, characters, imagery and sounds) that inform them. This in turn produces a mythology around the events. In the Euhemeristic sense, collective memory as myth becomes a reconstructed account of Wanda's experiences filtered through imagination and fantasy. Interiority, as Irving defines it, can be a useful concept through which to explore the construction of history in collective memory. The inner life of each member of the Bielecka family is the filter through which Wanda's experiences are comprehended.

The form of the found footage narrative, *Wanda*, is based on this writer and filmmaker's own personal experience as a member of the Bielecka family. The version of events that I remember, based upon listening to Wanda's testimony, has always been different to other memories of testimony that other family members have had. Furthermore, Wanda's own telling of the stories change in different ways depending on at what moment she was asked about her experiences. Multiple versions of the events existed, not just between different people, but each time each person was spoken to.

History, as well as being based upon a series of objective events, is also based upon a series of subjective experiences. It is in part constructed from this subjective experience, which is then retained in memory. This construction of the past through memory could be divided into two categories: the memory of those who experienced the events themselves, such as Wanda, and those who have not experienced the events and comprehend them through communicative and cultural memories. Wanda's memory is a historical source because of its experiential qualities, while the rest of the Bielecka family's memories are historical phenomena because of their construction *separate* to the events. Memory as historical source and phenomenon intertwine with each other to form the collective memory of the Bielecka family. This collective memory of the events is not static or final, but is continually being reconstructed through a larger network of communicative and cultural memory. This memory, despite its' multifaceted and contradictory nature, is nevertheless a declaration of the

importance of remembering survivor history. It is the fact of the communication of Wanda's experience through the generations that signifies that the crimes committed in World War II have not been forgotten.

The interiorities of the Bielecka family (including this filmmaker) are therefore the filters through which the found footage narrative interrogates Wanda's experiences. Fantasy and imagination become tools with which to analyse history. The collective memory of the Bielecka family, which is based upon their fantasies and imagination, then becomes a form of myth. Memory becomes myth in its symbolic contemplation of events.

The found footage narrative therefore constructs itself as a *reflexive* myth. Using Barthes' concept of a second order myth, *Wanda* simultaneously mystifies *and* demystifies collective memory. The interiority of the Bielecka family is explored and utilised in the form of *Wanda*, but the form of the film also comments upon the construction of this memory and the role in which the film itself plays in this construction. This reflexive form is used in order to represent communicative and cultural memories so that the found footage narrative can reproduce the processes through which collective memory is constructed, becoming a part of collective memory itself.

The found footage narrative explores collective memory as myth as this is a way that Wanda's experience is communicated and exists in the present. In representing collective memory as myth, it is possible to comprehend the symbolic significance of a survivor's testimony. Although representation cannot adequately describe the survivor's experience, it can express its' symbolic significance. As survivors themselves inevitably die, the symbolic representation of their experience, as expressed through myth as collective memory, becomes a significant way in which to understand how survivor history is represented, and how their experience exists in the present. Indeed, beyond survivor history, if we are to understand *any* experience as it is constructed in a history of memory, then it is possible to look to the found footage narrative as reflexive myth as an expression of that construction.

Myth is a semiological concept. As representation rather than phenomenon, the *form* of its content should be analysed rather than the 'fact.' Therefore, it is also effective to explore myth *through* form. Approaches of essayistic work in literature and film can provide a formal foundation for the found footage narrative, which in turn can express formally the mythology of collective memory, and the ways in which

film itself informs collective memory. It is through an exploration of the Montaignean literary essay specifically that the found footage narrative can therefore begin to be defined as reflexive myth.

The found footage narrative, *Wanda*, as an essayistic form, is an attempt to represent the memory, thoughts, and imagination around the historical events of Wanda Bielecka's life during World War II. As a form of the Montaignean essay a central consideration of the found footage narrative is the exploration of subjectivity, rather than empirical and scientific analysis. This includes the subjectivity of the testimony given by all members of the family, including this filmmaker, as well as the subjectivity of the film itself. *Wanda* explores the history of Wanda's life as a semiological representation that produces mythologies around events.

These semiological representations are produced from the selves of each member of the Bielecka family who is interviewed. These selves are in constant flux, not only differing from person to person, but *within* each person, from time to time. The methodology of the self of the essay is used as an approach through which to explore the collective memory of the Bielecka family. *Wanda* depicts the unsettled nature of the communicative and cultural memories that form the collective memory of the events.

Fundamental then to a conception of the found footage narrative, is the essayistic notion that it need not concern itself with concluding upon the historical events, but explore the processes of memory production that are created around them through a form that reflects that production. It is through form, specifically the cinematic form, that *Wanda* can represent the collective memory of Wanda's experience. Furthermore, through its deliberately inconclusive form, *Wanda* becomes another fragment of memory itself. A fragment of memory that joins the continually shifting network of collective memory around the events. Therefore, as a further fragment of memory, *Wanda* produces more memories through its' viewing. By reflexively questioning its own form, the found footage narrative asks the viewer to produce their own version of events. In this way, the form of *Wanda* is akin to the listening of testimony. The found footage narrative becomes a further event in the production of history around Wanda's experiences.

Through fragmentation *Wanda* connects and juxtaposes seemingly disparate words, images and sounds from thousands of different sources that in their original context seem to have no bearing upon one another, but recontextualised as connected

fragments form a representation of collective memory which represents Wanda's escape. As elements of the thoughts of the Bielecka family, these fragments do not need to have any empirical, historical or even logical connection to Wanda's story. Yet, the fantasy of these fragments is harnessed as a force influencing the memories of the Bielecka family.

Configuration and constellation are essential formal strategies utilised by the found footage narrative in order to construct a representation of memory out of thousands of different words, images and sounds. *Wanda* deconstructs words, images and sounds from their original context and configures them into a narrative formed from fragments of communicative and cultural memory. Furthermore, the found footage narrative also constellates fragments into dialectical images. These dialectical images are formed through a juxtaposition of ideologically opposed fragments. Wanda's firsthand testimony of events of her life are constellated with images that bear no contextual relation to the events at all. Conceptually opposed fragments combine in the same way that fragments of memory combine to form collective memory.

Through the dialectical image, which represents disparate ideas in form, aporia are opened up in which the viewer themselves interpret the meaning of *Wanda*. The body space of the viewer becomes the space in which collective memory continually rewrites itself. *Wanda* is constructed as another event in the production of memory through a writerly approach. The film, as a representation of collective memory, essentially continues in the mind of each person who views it. And each spectator produces new versions of the film creating further multiple meanings not just between each person but also within each person. In this way the found footage narrative speaks to the infinite variations of memory produced around a historical event.

Through a conception of the writerly, formal structures of the found footage narrative are developed. *Wanda*, utilising an essayistic form that is fragmentary, constructs its narrative out of the beginnings of words and images. Therefore, each word or image fragment is interrupted by other fragments, before they can conclude. Literary techniques of prolepsis, asyndeton, anacoluthon and amphibology are all developed in a cinematic form to express collective memory.

Fantasy is also another way in which *Wanda* explores collective memory, but it does so reflexively, in a way developed from the documentary reflexivity of *cinema*

vérité. The found footage narrative demonstrates within its' form how the film itself becomes a catalyst in the production of collective memory. *Wanda*, constructed from fragmented dialogue and images, clearly represents multiple versions of events that are informed not just by personal experience, but imagination and fantasy.

These versions of events are further filtered through the subjective interpretation of this filmmaker, who constructs the film so as to expose the artificiality of the film as a historical representation. Yet it is in this artificiality that notions of collective memory, and the nature of Wanda's experience as they exist in the present, can be explored. The spectacle and performance exhibited within the imagination of the participants, or scenes of actors performing in films unrelated to Wanda's experiences, reveals ideas about collective memory.

The found footage narrative therefore inhabits both the internal and external worlds; the imaginary and the historical. In terms of film, it contains both documentary and fictional impulses. The two forms of film are wholly intertwined within the singular form of *Wanda*. The found footage narrative is avant-garde and experimental in nature. The present, which includes the materiality of the film itself, informs the past, and memory is its proper consideration rather than empiricism. As Richter foresaw in his conception of the essay, rather than simply record external phenomena as they occur, impossible when representing events such as Wanda's experiences, the found footage narrative uses interview testimony based upon interviewees' imaginings and historically unrelated archival material to demonstrate the idea of collective memory.

In the found footage narrative, the camera becomes the *caméra-stylo*, a form of writing. Memory as history is treated as semiological, and its expression in filmic form is therefore treated as a form of language in which ideas and imagination can be represented beyond mere filming of present-day reality. *Wanda* uses *caméra-stylo* as a film subjectively 'written' by this filmmaker to express the internal rather than external world of memory. The found footage narrative therefore expresses active themes rather than passive reflections. *Wanda* reflexively explores the contradictions in memory around Wanda's experiences. But rather than simply setting forth thesis and anti-thesis, it is a *multi-thesis*, in which twelve different testimonies are combined with thousands of different images to construct a version of events within the film.

Horizontal montage is used as a technique through which to expose the subjectivity of each fragment used within *Wanda*. The found footage narrative

expands upon Marker's use of horizontal montage, in which images are commented upon to show the subjectivity of the speaker and the multitudinous surface of the image. *Letter from Siberia*'s narration is still contextualised in relation to the images shown, whereas *Wanda* constructs a montage of images almost entirely *(de)contextualised* from the words being spoken. And yet these images are arranged in such a way as to inform the narration. The narration transforms the meaning of the images, re-contextualising them within the narrative of the film. In turn each image speaks to how the fragments of narration, and the construction of those fragments, is itself subjective and removed from the original happening of Wanda's experiences.

The political im/perceptibility of images is therefore highlighted through constellations that deliberately combine fragments that produce an alternative understanding. A dialectics is revealed in image and word in which the Other of these fragments can be understood in terms different from dominant discourse. Fundamentally, the found footage narrative exposes the fantasy of history, and the historical aspect of imagination.

Narration is therefore a central element in the form of the found footage narrative. This narration takes on the form of the Enunciator, in which the spectator is drawn into a dialogical relationship with the film. But whereas previous film essay works develop a dialogical relationship simply between the spectator and the enunciators of the filmmaker and their film, the found footage narrative constructs multiple dialogues between each spectator and the multiple enunciators of the film. The spectator engages not just with the enunciation of the film itself, but each enunciation of each interviewee (including another self of this filmmaker), as well as each image enunciation. All these enunciators are derived from separate contexts with their own further set of enunciations. The multiplicity of meaning and interpretation produced in collective memory is therefore demonstrated in the form of *Wanda*. Multiple enunciators configure and constellate to produce a writerly production of meaning that represents the processes of remembering.

Wanda also develops the essayistic technique of using a third person narrative construction. It specifically uses the third person narratives of multiple interviewees as a way to historicise testimony. By historicising dialogue, *Wanda* places the testimony itself within the realm of archival material. The interviews then become further materials to be cut together and recontextualised using collage techniques. By then fragmenting these interviews, and editing them with other out of context archival

material, the found footage narrative can evoke the way in which collective memory is informed by a network of communicative and cultural memories.

Each fragment of dialogue or image becomes a representation of either communicative or cultural memories that construct the collective memory of the film. But in turn the film itself becomes yet another fragment in the continuous formation of collective memory. Through a use of the third person the structure of *Wanda* therefore not only represents the fragments of memories shown and heard in the film, but all those fragments and memories about the Holocaust and World War II that are unheard and unseen. Through its form, the found footage narrative reflexively exposes its lack of representation, and the impossibility of attaining a true representation of the events of the Holocaust.

The concept of collective memory is further represented through the technique of performing a monologue through dialogue. A singular narrative is expressed through the multiple voices of the Bielecka family, and the multiple voices that exist within each person, including this filmmaker, whose selves represented on film are not only shown through fragments of dialogue, but the form of the film itself. Furthermore, this approach also extends to the way images are used. A singular narrative is not only represented through multiple voices, but multiple film scenes from multiple sources. *Wanda*, which uses dialogue in the same way as film scenes are used in collage films, cuts both together using found footage techniques. Techniques of collage film are developed, which take image fragments (film scenes, dialogue) out of their original context and combines them through montage with other image fragments to produce new contexts and create new meanings in each fragment. The processes of collective memory can therefore be represented through the development of collage's formal strategies.

Fundamental techniques that *Wanda* uses include cutting together images from different films and dialogue to create new narratives, highlighting the action of images through their repetition in other images, and juxtaposing images in such a way as to produce alternative meanings. The found footage narrative develops the form of collage film by using archival material to *dramatise* history, while also treating dialogue and historical testimony itself as archival material to be edited in the same way as collage material.

Furthermore, central to the formulation of the found footage narrative is the collage technique of using the fantasy and imagination of narrative films to

interrogate documentary or 'real world' subjects. In this way, the semiological network of collective memory is explored. Simultaneously, *Wanda* also uses 'real world' images, whether they are Wanda's own testimony of her experience or documentary footage from World War II, to inform fantasy and imagination. These elements are shown to influence the way in which fantasy and imagination are formed around actual historical events.

These methods transform representation and create new referentialities. Image fragments themselves are analysed, rather than the actual events, producing a reflexive mythology that simultaneously creates a new myth around events while exploring its own workings as myth. The found footage narrative form is composed of two basic elements: talking head interviews and found footage. Combined, these formal elements represent collective memory. The interviews represent a combination of communicative and cultural memory, while the found footage represents cultural memory.

Wanda's story is told as a multilogue, just as her experience is remembered by the family as a collective. This multilogue develops in the form of a prolepsis. Each interruption in the cutting between fragments of dialogue and fragments of images, and the overlapping of both, provides a formal representation of the layering of collective memory. Each element is unable to conclude itself, at once taken out of its context and recontextualised by the forthcoming fragment, but simultaneously unable to conclude upon its new context. The form of *Wanda* fragments the viewer's understanding, just as collective memory itself is fragmented. Multiple versions of the memories of the events are presented to the viewer in rapid succession, evoking the rapidly multiplying representations continually produced in collective memory.

The entire narrative of the film is told in the first few minutes in rapid montage before the viewer can fully comprehend what they have seen. Images representing the cultural memory that informs collective memory flash past the screen within seconds of each other. This introductory montage represents the many forms in which cultural memory influences the family's understanding of Wanda's experience by producing that same effect in the viewer. Before the film even begins, this prologue has instilled cultural images in the viewer that could inform the way they comprehend the story about to unfold.

After this montage of cultural memory, a talking head sequence is played in which the protagonists of the film discuss the malleability of the story. The practical

approach of the found footage narrative differs from other films seeking to reflect historical events in that each member of the Bielecka family was deliberately asked about their imagination and fantasies around the events, rather than what they perceived to be the reality. It was important to explore the interiority of the subjects as a way of exploring the way in which collective memory defines itself. This interviewing technique essentially asked the interviewees to look beyond their perceived notions of the facts, and to the images, dialogue and sounds that their imaginations formed around what they had heard through listening to Wanda's testimony. In this way it is possible for the Bielecka family to express, not just the communicative memories that inform their understanding, but the cultural memories that create the mythologies around Wanda's experience.

And so each interview represents the interiority of the interviewee in relation to the events of Wanda's life. But in order to represent the interiority of the collective, all twelve interviews are combined using rapid cut up techniques. Through these techniques of rapid montage, it is possible to tell a *collective* narrative that represents collective memory. Furthermore, it is possible to tell multiple versions of a story in a way that can be comprehended by the spectator, not only cogently, but as a fragmented story which reflexively reveals the nature of its construction.

The twelve different versions of the events are cut together in such a way as to tell a story that can be understood by the viewer, but at the same time makes visible the construction of these multiple stories. The narrative is told in a way that echoes to the mythologising nature of collective memory, but also its fragmentary nature. Montage and the cut become formal expressions of collective memory by constructing a story from fragments just as collective memory does. The film functions as a formal palimpsest.

Although the story is told in such a way that the narrative progresses in a cogent manner, contradictions are still revealed in the cutting between fragments. Wanda's own version of events is shown to contradict itself, which raises the importance of the family testimony of her testimony. Exposing the contradictions in Wanda's story does not suggest she is lying, but instead reveals the malleable nature of memory. The story unfolds differently in every telling, revealing different parts.

Therefore, contradiction is used also as a way to justify the use of other Bielecka family members' versions of events. Ironically, with them the story become more complex and fragmentary, but without them important elements of the story

may be missed. Contradictions are then also shown *between* each version of events. The dialogue may move from one interviewee to another even after a single word, and that new word may well contradict the last. But this montage of fragments can still be understood as a collective story. And yet while this specific story can still be comprehended through the form of the found footage, it still expresses a greater network of memory through absence. Through prolepsis, each fragment interrupted speaks to memory, which continues in absence after the film has cut to another fragment.

The specific fantasies of interviewees demonstrates how imagination takes hold of understanding and creates new narratives within those based on testimony. Monologue sequences demonstrate this, while two monologues combine to tell a fictional version of Wanda's experience that combines two different fairy tales in one fragmented story. This juxtaposition of two fairytales reveals the influence cultural memory has on collective memory. The mythology of collective memory is shown through the reflexive mythology of the found footage narrative.

The film's monologues are also cut in such a way as to evoke the multilogue *within* each person. Sequences in which interviewees express a fantasy they have around a specific moment from the story are cut rapidly between fragments of words and sentences. Despite the audience hearing words that played alone would seem uncut, by visibly *showing* the cuts in the video testimony the found footage narrative reflexively demonstrates the fragmentary nature of collective memory despite its mythogenesis.

The process of myth is further exposed through the interviews of this filmmaker. By showing the multiple selves of the filmmaker through interviews *and* the form of the film, *Wanda* reflexively reveals its own place within the continual symbolic reconstruction of Wanda's story. This device is another way in which the film is shown not as concluding upon collective memory, but another fragment in it's construction that continues in its viewing.

Wanda's representation of collective memory is further complicated through the use of a secondary formal element: found footage. It uses images derived from found footage in the evocation of memory, not to better describe the external, concrete world, but *internal* world of fantasy and imagination. Furthermore, found footage is used as a way to represent the cultural memories, and specifically cinematic cultural memories. *Wanda* performs memory through found footage by creating filmic

reconstructions of the memories of history. The filmic reconstructions create a hybrid of documentary and fiction through combining the two to describe a singular story. Each image fragment no longer carries the genre-specific meanings of its old context. Recontextualised, the image fragments act as comments upon the story, which in turn comments upon the meaning of the images.

Found footage is used in various ways in order to represent memory. Scenes from fiction films heighten reality into fantasy, while also symbolically reflecting the themes of the film. In other scenes images from fiction comment directly upon historical fact. Sometimes the images express the Imaginary or Real of the narrative as subjectively interpreted by this filmmaker, while in other instances the images diverge from the dialogue and present another element of the story unspoken. Found footage of first person point of view shots are used to demonstrate the subjectivity of the film, putting the multiple stances of the family, this filmmaker and the audience in Wanda's position.

The found footage narrative therefore constellates images and words just as collective memory constellates them. Not only are images from fiction films used to represent history, but talking head interviews discussing history are used to perform myth. *Wanda* makes the family members perform the mythology of Wanda's experience alongside the found footage. The Bielecka family become actors in their own family history who 'perform' the events of Wanda's life. Characters in found footage images mouth the words of interviewees, while dialogue of the interviewees becomes dialogue in the action of the found footage reconstructions. The composition of the interviews themselves (close-up, looking directly into the camera) further integrate the narrative with the interviewees. Intertitles and subtitles flash up as subjective descriptions of thoughts or dialogue.

Asyndeton is used as a formal technique through which to constellate disparate fragments of images and words into a single narrative. A dramatic continuum is therefore built from fragments, just as collective memory creates myth through fragmentation. Interviewees' voices, repeating the same lines, but in different tones of voice, describe the events differently. The film literally rewinds back through the narrative to repeat the story in a different way. Asyndeton is also used as the found footage narrative presents the same dialogue or image but in a different context, and at different points in the narrative. The story returns to the same place, but diverges as it progress, fragmenting into multiple versions.

Another feeling of memory is evoked through amphibology: *déjà vu*. Not only are words and images repeated, but they are also looped so that the spectator is unable to source the origin of the fragment. Syntactic ambiguity between words causes a sense of familiarity despite a difference in dialogue. The spectator is again unsure of the original beginning of the sentence, and therefore becomes unsure of the subjectivity and veracity of the description. The formal techniques of the found footage narrative instill a sense of *déjà vu* in the spectator that triggers a functioning of memory. The distortion of memory is demonstrated through the film triggering those distortions in the viewer themselves.

Found footage from fictions films are referenced directly by interviewees in their comprehension of Wanda's story. Furthermore, Hollywood actors 'starring' in Wanda's narrative help the interviewees and the viewer to understand the symbolic and thematic meanings of the story that exist in the collective memory of the Bielecka family. Conversely, documentary footage is used to illuminate dreams. And yet despite the mythogenesis through which Wanda's experience is transformed, the trauma of the events remains a reality. In Wanda's silent thoughts and dreams the truth of the events lives on. Therefore, the found footage narrative creates a nightmare sequence from footage *actually* filmed in the concentration camps. The silent trauma that exists but is not spoken is expressed in *Wanda* through images that most directly represent the reality of her experience.

Furthermore, this trauma is passed down through generations of the family and is also a reality for Wanda's children and grandchildren. We witness her family breaking down in tears, unable to imagine what Wanda, and Halina, must have experienced, and yet are deeply emotionally affected nevertheless. Herein lies the reality of collective memory that is shown through the found footage narrative. The truth of Wanda's experience is expressed precisely through its' impact upon the interiority of the family. Despite the impossibility of truly reenacting or representing the events themselves, the *trauma* of the events is passed on through the generations, informing the identities of Wanda's relatives.

Therefore myth becomes a valuable form through which to evaluate memory, and the ways in which the trauma of events exists beyond the concrete realities of the experiences themselves. Through various cinematic formations of the dialectical image, the processes through which Wanda Bielecka's experiences exist in the present can be demonstrated. The found footage narrative is therefore a form that

demonstrates the *functioning* of memory. The form of *Wanda* can be utilised not just in the telling of this specific story, but *all* representations of collective memory. *Wanda* is a cinematic palimpsest, creating a myth around myth that exposes how experience exists beyond events, and continually reoccurs through a dialectics of memory and fantasy. The found footage narrative shows that the reality of the past in the present, is in myth.

Bibliography

- Adorno, Theodor, *Aesthetic Theory*, Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann eds., Christian Lenhardt trans., (Routledge: New York, 1984).
- Adorno, Theodor, "The Essay as Form," *New German Critique*, 32 (Spring Summer 1984), pp.151-171.
- Adorno, Theodor, *Minima Moralia*, (London: Verso, 1951).
- Alter, Nora, "The Political Im/perceptible in the Essay Film: Harun Farocki's "Images of the World and the Inscription of War,"" *New German Critique*, 68 (Spring – Summer 1996), pp.165-192.
- Alter, Nora, *Projecting History: German Nonfiction Cinema, 1967–2000*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
- Alter, Nora M., "Translating the Essay into Film and Installation", *Journal of Visual Culture*, 6:1 (April 2007), pp.44-57.
- Arthur, Paul, "The Status of Found Footage," *Spectator*, 20:1 (Fall 1999/Winter 2000), p.57-69.
- Assmann, Jan, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, *New German Critique*, 65, Spring-Summer, 1995, pp.125-133.
- Assman, Jan *Religion and Cultural Memory: Ten Studies*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
- Barnouw, Erik, *Documentary: A History of the Non-Fiction Film*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Baron, Jaimie, *The Archive Effect: The Found Footage and the Audiovisual Experience of History*, (London: Routledge, 2013).
- Baron, Lawrence, *Projecting the Holocaust into the Present: The Changing Focus of Contemporary Holocaust Cinema*, (Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
- Barthes, Roland, "Myth Today," Annette Lavers trans., *Mythologies*, (London: Vintage, 1972).
- Barthes, Roland, *Roland Barthes*, Richard Howard trans., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
- Barthes, Roland, *S/Z*, Richard Miller trans., (New York: Hill & Wang, 1970).
- Baudrillard, Jean, *Simulacra and Simulation*, (Michigan: University of Michigan, 1994).

- Bazin, André, "Bazin on Marker," Dave Kehr trans., *Film Comment*, 39:4 (July-August 2003), pp.44-45.
- BBC News, "Oldest Holocaust Survivor, Alice Herz-Sommer, dies at 110," <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26318383>.
- Belton, John, *Film Sound: Theory and Practice*, Elizabeth Weis, John Belton eds., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
- Benjamin, Walter, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, John Osborne trans., (London: Verso, 1963).
- Benjamin, Walter, *Illuminations*, (New York: Schocken Books: 1968).
- Bense, Max, "Über den Essay und seine Prosa," *Merkur*, (1, 1947), pp.414-424.
- Berenbaum, Michael ed., *A Mosaic of Victims- Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis*, (New York: New York University Press, 1990).
- Bergson, Henri, *Matter and Memory*, N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer trans., (New York: Zone Books, 1991).
- Biderman, Shlomo, Scharfstein, Ben-Ami, eds., *Myths and Fictions*, (New York: E.J. Brill, 1993).
- Bigsby, Christopher, *Remembering and Imagining the Holocaust: The Chain of Memory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- Blümlinger, Christa & Wulff, Constantin eds., *Schreiben Bilder Sprechen: Texte zum essayistischen Film*, (Wien: Sonderzahl, 1992).
- Bogdanovich, Peter, *Fritz Lang in America*, (New York: Praeger, 1967),
- Broszat, Martin & Krausnick, Helmut eds., *Anatomy of the SS State* (New York: Collins, 1968).
- Browning, Christopher R., *Collected Memories: Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).
- Bruzzi, Stella, *New Documentary: A Critical Introduction*, (London: Routledge, 2006).
- Burch, Noël, *Theory of Film Practice*, Helen R. Lane trans., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981).
- Burke, Peter, "Two Crises of Historical Consciousness," *Storia della Storiografia*, 33:1, 1998.
- Butler, Thomas ed., *History, Culture, and the Mind*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

- Campbell, Joseph, *The Masks of God: Creative Mythology*, (New York: Penguin, 1991).
- Cameron, Deborah, *Working with Spoken Discourse*, (London: Sage, 2001).
- Capital, "The Film's the Creature: Filmmaker Bill Morrison's Investigations into Decay are Anything but Silent,"
<http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/culture/2012/01/5168713/films-creature-filmmaker-bill-morrisons-investigations-decay-are-any>.
- Carden-Coyne, Ana, *Reconstructing the Body: Classicism, Modernism, and the First World War*, (London: Oxford University Press, 2009).
- Caruth, Cathy, *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
- Casebier, Allan, "A Deconstructive Documentary," *Journal of Film and Video*, 40:1 (Winter 1988), pp.34-39.
- Central Commission for Investigation of German Crimes in Poland, *German Crimes in Poland Volume 2*, (New York: Howard Fertig, 2007).
- Cham, MBye B. & Andrade-Watkins, Clair eds., *Blackframes*, (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1988).
- Chion, Michel, *The Voice in Cinema*, Claudia Gorbman trans., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
- Chion, Michel, *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen*, Claudia Gorbman trans., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius, *On the Orator Volume II*, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1942)
- Conant, James Bryan, Owen, Stephen, *Remembrances: The Experience of Past in Classical Chinese Literature*, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986).
- Confino, Alon, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," *American Historical Review*, 102 (1997), pp.1386-1403.
- Corner, John, *Action Formats: Drama Documentary and Vérité, The Art of the Record*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996).
- Corrigan, Timothy, "Expression, the Essayistic, and Thinking in Images,"
<http://www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/efaden/ms5/corrigan/htm>.
- Corrigan, Timothy, ed., *Film and Literature*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999).

Cosslett, Tess, et al eds., *Feminism and Autobiography: Texts Theories, Methods*, (London Routledge, 2000).

Dawidowicz, Lucy S., *The War Against the Jews*, (New York: Open Road Media, 2010).

Dawson, Graham, *Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities*, (London Routledge, 1994).

Defaux, Gérard, & Galluci, John A., "Readings of Montaigne," *Yale French Studies*, 64 (1983), pp.73-92.

Derrida, Jacques, *Writing and Difference*, Alan Bass trans., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

Derrida, Jacques, *Positions*, Alan Bass trans., (London: Continuum, 1981).

Dreyfuss, Jean-Marc, & Langton, Daniel, eds., *Writing the Holocaust*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).

Dundes, Alan, ed., *Sacred Narrative: Readings in the Theory of Myth*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

Farocki, Harun, "Commentary from *Bilder der Welt und Inschrift des Krieges*," *Discourse*, 15 (Spring 1993), pp.78-92.

Feld, Steven, ed., *Cine-Ethnography*, (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

Felman, Shoshanna & Laub, Dori eds., *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History*, (London: Routledge, 1992).

Foucault, Michel, *Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984* James D. Faubion ed., (London: Penguin, 2002).

Flitterman-Lewis, Sandy, *To Desire Differently: Feminism and the French Cinema, Expanded Edition*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

Frankl, Victor E., *Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy*, (Boston: Beacon, 1952).

Freud, Sigmund, *Collected Papers: Volume 5 (Miscellaneous Papers, 1888-1938)*, James Stachey, ed., (London: Basic Books, 1958).

Fried, John H. E., *The Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany*, (Montreal: International Labor Office, 1945).

Friedländer, Saul, *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the Final Solution*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

Friedman, Jonathan C., *Speaking the Unspeakable: Essays on Sexuality, Gender, and Holocaust Survivor Memory*, (New York: University Press of America, 2002).

Good, Graham, *The Observing Self: Rediscovering the Essay*, (London: Routledge, 1988).

Gorin, Jean-Pierre, "The Way of the Termite: The Essay Film."
<http://www.cinemathequeontario.ca/programme.aspx?programeld=271&page=1>.

Grabowski, Waldemar, *Polish Human Losses, 1939-1945*, Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), <http://www.bibula.com/?p=13530>.

Graves, Robert, *New Larousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology*, (New York: Hamlyn, 1972).

Gumkowski, Janus & Leszcynski, Kazimierz *Poland Under Nazi Occupation*, (Indiana: Polonia, 1961).

Grobman, Alex & Shermer, Michael, *Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It?*, (California: University of California Press, 2009).

Haggith, Toby & Newman, Joanna, *Holocaust and the Moving Image: Representations in Film and Television Since 1933*, (London: Wallflower Press, 2005).

Halbwachs, Maurice, *On Collective Memory*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992).

Herberman, Nanda, *The Blessed Abyss*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000).

Hirsch, Marianne, *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

Hirsch, Marianne, "Family Pictures: Maus, Mourning and Post-Memory," *Discourse*, 15(2), pp.3-29.

Hirsch, Marianne, "The Generation of Postmemory," *Poetics Today*, 29(1), pp.103-28.

Hirsch, Marianne, *The Generation of Postmemory: Visual Culture After the Holocaust*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

Homze, Edward L., *Foreign Labour in Nazi Germany*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

The Huffington Post, "Antoni Dobrowolski Dead: Auschwitz Survivor Dies at 108,"
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/22/antoni-dobrowolski-auschwitz_n_2000718.html.

Huxley, Aldous, *Collected Essays*, (London: Harper and Brothers, 1960).

The Independent, "As Survivor's Dwindle, What Will This Mean for Memories of the Holocaust?", <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/as-survivors-dwindle-what-will-this-mean-for-memories-of-the-holocaust-9040133.html>.

Insdorf, Annette, *Indelible Shadows: Film and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

International Organisation for Migration, "Claim Form For Slave Labour, Forced Labour, Personal Injury or Death of a Child," January 2001.

Irving, Andrew, "Strange Distance: Towards an Anthropology of Interior Dialogue," *Medical Anthropology Quarterly*, 25:1, pp.22-44.

Irving, Andrew, "Ethnography, Art and Death," *Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute*, 13:1, pp.185-208.

Irwin-Zarecka, Iwona, *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994.

The Jerusalem Post, "Israel slams Iran Holocaust conference," <http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Israel-slams-Iran-Holocaust-conference>.

Jensen, Olaf, & Sharples, Caroline, *Britain and the Holocaust: Remembering and Representing War and Genocide*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

Jevtic, Iva, *Between Word and Image: Walter Benjamin's Images as a Species of Space*, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ci/v1/v12/Jevtic%20paper.pdf>,

Kaplan, Ann ed., *Psychoanalysis and Cinema*, (New York: Routledge, 1990).

Kansteiner, Wulf, *Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies*, *History and Theory*, 41:2, May, 2002., pp.179-197.

Kerner, Aaron, *Film and Holocaust: New Perspectives on Dramas, Documentaries, and Experimental Films*, (New York: Continuum, 2011).

Kochavi, Arieh J., *Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States & Jewish Refugees, 1945-48*, (New York: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

Konrath, Lisa, *Metafilm: Forms and Functions of Self-Reflexivity in Postmodern Film*, (Düsseldorf: VDM Verlag Dr Müller, 2010).

Kracauer, Siegfried, *From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of German Film*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.

Kulka, Otto Dov, *Landscapes of the Metropolis of Death: Reflections on Memory and Imagination*, Ralph Mandel trans., (London: Penguin, 2013).

Kulka, Otto Dov, "Otto Dov Kulka: Everyone one of us has his or her own story of survival. But we never talked about,"

<http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/07/otto-dov-kulka-interview>.

LaCapra, Dominick, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).

LaCapra, Dominick, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*, (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2001).

Langer, Lawrence, *The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination*, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1977).

Langer, Lawrence, *Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory*, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1991).

Lasson, Kenneth, "Defending Truth: Legal and Psychological Aspects of Holocaust Denial," *Current Psychology*, 26:3-4 (December 2007), pp.223-266.

Lebow, Alisa, *The Cinema of Me: Self and Subjectivity in First-Person Documentary Film*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

Levy, Daniel, Olick, Jeffrey K., Vinitzky-Seroussi, Vered, eds., *The Collective Memory Reader*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Leyda, Jay, *Films Beget Films: Compilation Films from Propaganda to Drama*, (New York: Hill & Wang, 1964).

Lipstadt, Deborah E., *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory*, (New York: Plume, 1994).

Lothe, Jakob et al eds., *After Testimony: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Holocaust Narrative for the Future*, (Columbus: Ohio State University, 2012).

Lowenthal, David ed., *The Past is a Foreign Country*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985.

Lukács, Georg, *Soul and Form*, Anna Bostock trans., (London: Merlin Press, 1974).

Maddin, Guy, "Obsessions into Light: An Interview with Guy Maddin," *Cineaste*, 33:4 (Fall 2008), pp.47-49.

Magilow, Daniel H. & Silverman, Lisa, *Holocaust Representations in History: An Introduction*, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015).

Mankowitz, Zeev W., *Life Between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied Germany*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Materski, Wojciech & Szarota, Tomasz, *Poland 1939-1945: Human Losses and Victims of Repressions under Two Occupations*, Institute of National Remembrance

- (IPN),
http://web.archive.org/web/20120323161233/http://niniwa2.cba.pl/polska_1939_1945.htm.
- Montaigne, Michel de, "Apology for Raymond Sebond," Donald Frame trans., *Essays: Volume II*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958).
- Montaigne, Michel de, *Essays*, J. M. Cohen trans., (London: Penguin, 1958).
- Nichols, Bill, *Introduction to Documentary*, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001).
- Nichols, Bill, *Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Gay Science*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Novick, Peter, *The Holocaust and Collective Memory*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2001).
- Nurowski, Roman, *War Losses in Poland: 1939-1945*, (Poznań: Wydawn, 1960).
- Pawelczyńska, Anna, *Values and Violence in Auschwitz: A Sociological Analysis*, Leach, Catherine S. trans., (California: University of California Press, 1971).
- Pearce, Andy, *Holocaust Consciousness in Contemporary Britain*, (New York: Routledge, 2014).
- Perks, Robert & Thomson, Alistair eds., *The Oral History Reader* (London: Routledge, 1998).
- Piotrowski, Tadeusz, *Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 1998).
- Plottel, Jeanne Parisier, ed., *Collage*, (New York Literary Forum: New York, 1983).
- Rascaroli, Laura, "The Essay Film: Problems, Definitions, Textual Commitments," *Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media*, 49:2 (Fall 2008), 24-47.
- Renov, Michael, *The Subject of Documentary*, (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
- Renov, Michael ed., *Theorizing Documentary*, (London: Routledge, 1993).
- Rentschler, Eric ed., *West German Filmmakers on Film: Visions and Voices*, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988).
- Rogers, Holly, *Music and Sound in Documentary Film*, (London: Routledge, 2014).

- Roters, Ulrich & Wossildo, Joachim eds., *Interview und Film*, (Munster: Waxmann Verlag, 2003).
- Rothberg, Michael, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonisation*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
- Rothberg, Michael, *Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
- Rothe, Anne, *Popular Trauma Culture: Selling the Pain of Others in the Mass Media*, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2011).
- Schubert, Rikke & Virchow, Fabian eds., *War Isn't Hell, It's Entertainment: Essays on Visual Media and Representation of Conflict*, (North Carolina: McFarland, 2009).
- Silverman, Kaja, "What is a Camera? or: History in the Field of Vision," *Discourse* 15 (Spring 1993), pp.3-56.
- Skoller, Jeffrey, *Shadows, Specters, Shards: Making History in Avant-Garde Film*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005).
- Sofsky, Wolfgang, *The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
- Sontag, Susan, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2003.
- Sobanet, Andrew, *Jail Sentences: Representing Prison in Twentieth-Century French Fiction*, (London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008).
- Spence, Lewis, *An Introduction to Mythology*, (New York: Cosimo, 1921).
- Stam, Robert, *Reflexivity in Film and Literature: From Don Quixote to Jean-Luc Godard*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).
- Stein, Arlene, *Reluctant Witnesses: Survivors, Their Children, and the Rise of Holocaust Consciousness*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- Steinbacher, Sybille, *Auschwitz: A History*, (London: Harper Collins, 2005).
- Steiner, George, *Language and Silence: Essays 1958-1966*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).
- Stone, Dan, *Histories of the Holocaust*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
- Stone, William F. & Yelland, Linda M. "Belief in the Holocaust: Effects of Personality and Propaganda," *Political Psychology*, 17:3 (September 1996), pp.551-562.
- Str ath, Bo ed., *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Society*, (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2000).

Summerfield, Penny, "Culture and Composure: Creating Narratives of the Gendered Self in Oral History Interviews," *Cultural and Social History*, 1:1 (2004), pp.63-93.

Summerfield, Penny, *Reconstructing Women's Wartime Lives*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

Tal, Kalí, *Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Thompson, Paul, *The Voice of the Past: Oral Past*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

Tobisch, Jürgen, *Film Within Film: Self-reflexivity in European Auteur Cinema*, (Norderstedt, Germany: GRIN Verlag GmbH, 2003).

Tournon, André, "Self Interpretation in Montaigne's *Essais*," *Yale French Studies*, 64 (1983), pp.51-72.

Jacobs, Lewis, *The Documentary Tradition*, (New York: Hillstone and Blake, 1971).

Trinh T. Minh-Ha, "Documentary Is/Not a Name," *The MIT Press*, 52:9 (Spring, 1990), pp.76-98.

Trinh T. Minh-Ha, *When the Moon Waxes Red: Representation, Gender and Cultural Politics*, (New York: Routledge, 1991).

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "How is a Holocaust Survivor Defined?" <http://www.ushmm.org/remember/the-holocaust-survivors-and-victims-resource-center/benjamin-and-vladka-meed-registry-of-holocaust-survivors/registry-faq#11>.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "Labour Allocation in the Greater German Reich, vol. 31.10.1944, no.10, *National Archives*, Washington, D.C.

Vansina, Jan, *Oral Tradition as History*, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

Warren, Charles, ed., *Beyond Document: Essay on Nonfiction Film*, (London: Wesleyan University Press, 1996).

Wees, William Charles, *Recycled Images: The Art and Politics of Found Footage Films*, (Anthology Film Archives: New York, 1993).

Weigel, Sigrid, *Body-and Image-Space*, (London: Routledge, 1996).

Wiesel, Elie, *A Jew Today*, Marion Wiesel trans., (New York: Random House, 1978).

White, Hayden, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

Winston, Brian, *Claiming the Real: The Griersonian Documentary and Its Legitimations*, (London: British Film Institute, 1995).

Yad Vashem: The Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance Authority, "Gathering the Fragments: A National Campaign to Rescue Personal Items from the Holocaust Period,"
http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/exhibitions/gathering_fragments/index.asp?WT.mc_id=wiki.

Yad Vashem, "The Righteous Among the Nations,"
<http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/statistics.asp>.

Young, James, *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

Zelizer, Barbie *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera's Eye*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998).

Zerubavel, Yael, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

Žižek, Slavoj, *Mapping Ideology*, (London: Verso, 1994).

Zryd, Michael, "Found Footage Film as Discursive Metahistory: Craig Baldwin's Tribulation 99," *The Moving Image*, 3:2 (Fall 2003), pp.40-61.

Filmography

- A Bridge Too Far*, Richard Attenborough dir., (United States: United Artists, 1977).
- A Movie*, Bruce Connor, (United States: N/A, 1958).
- Blair Witch Project*, Daniel Myrick, Eduardo Sánchez dirs., (United States: Haxan Films, 1999).
- Blood of the Beasts*, Georges Franju dir., (France: Janus Films, 1949).
- Chronicle of a Summer*, Edgar Morin, Jean Rouch dirs., (France: Argos Films, 1961).
- Cloverfield*, Matt Reeves dir., (United States: Paramount Pictures, 2008).
- Images of the World and the Inscription of War*, Harun Farocki dir., (Germany: N/A, 1988/89).
- F For Fake*, Orson Welles dir., (France/Iran/West Germany: Specialty Films, 1973).
- Frankenstein*, James Whale dir., (United States: Universal Pictures, 1931).
- Hôtel des Invalides*, Georges Franju dir., (France: Janus Films, 1952).
- Last Year in Marienbad*, Alain Resnais dir., (France: Cocinor, 1961).
- Letter from Siberia*, Chris Marker dir., (France: N/A, 1957).
- London*, Patrick Keiller dir., (United Kingdom: BFI, 1992).
- Metropolis*, Fritz Lang dir., (Germany: UFA, 1927).
- My Winnipeg*, Guy Maddin dir., (Canada: IFC Films, 2007).
- The Passion of Joan of Arc*, Carl Theodor Dreyer, (France: Société Générale de Films, 1928.)
- Patton*, Franklin J Schaffner, (United States: Twentieth Century Fox, 1969).
- Robinson in Space*, Patrick Keiller dir., (United Kingdom: BFI, 1997).
- Robinson in Ruins*, Patrick Keiller dir., (United Kingdom, BFI, 2010).
- Rose Hobart*, Joseph Cornell dir., (United States: N/A, 1936).
- Schindler's List*, Steven Spielberg dir., (United States: Universal Pictures, 1993).
- Spark of Being*, Bill Morrison dir., (United States: Hypnotic Pictures, 2010).

Tribulation 99: Alien Anomalies Under America, Craig Baldwin dir., (United States: Other Cinema, 1991).

Wanda, Anton Bielecki dir., (United Kingdom: bielecki&bielecka, 2014).