Oriental Studies and Foreign Policy:
Russian/Soviet ‘Iranology’ and Russo-Iranian relations
in late Imperial Russia and the early USSR

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Alphabetical List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AVPRF (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii) –
The Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation;

ARAN (Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk) –
The Archive of Russia’s Academy of Sciences;

AV (Arkhiv Vostokovedov) –
The Archive of Orientologists (St.Petersburg);

AVPRI (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii) –
The Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire;

Cheka (Chrezvychainaia Kommissiia po Bor’be s Kontrrevoliutsiei i Sabotazhem) –
The Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage;

DST (La Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire) –
The French Counterespionage Service;

FSB (Federal’naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) –
The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation;

GARF (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii) –
The State Archive of the Russian Federation;

GNCM –
The Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts;

GPU (Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie) –
The State Political Directorate;

GRU (Glavnoe Razvedovatel’noe Upravlenie) –
The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Army;
GULAG (Glavnoe Upravlenie Ispravitel’no-Trudovykh Lagerei) – The Chief-Directorate of Corrective Labour Camps and Labour Settlements of the OGPU/NKVD;

INO OGPU (Inostrannyi Otdel Gosudarstvennogo Politicheskogo Upravleniia) – The Foreign Department of the United State Political Directorate;

IRGO (Imperatorskoe Russkoe Geograficheskoe Obshestvo) – The Imperial Russian Geographical Society;

IVRAN (Institut Vostokovedeniia Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk) – The Institute of Oriental Studies of Russia’s Academy of Sciences;

KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) – The State Security Commmitee;

KUTV (Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudiashikhsia Vostoka) – The Communist University of the Toilers of the Orient;

MID (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del) – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

MIV (Moskovskii Institut Vostokovedeniia) – The Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies;

Narkommnats (Narodnyi Kommissariat Natsional’nostei) – The People’s Commissariat of Nationalities;

Narkomvneshtorg (Narodnyi Kommissariat Vneshei Torgovli) – The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade;

Narkomvoendel (Narodnyi Commissariat Voennykh Del) – The People’s Commissariat of Military Affairs;
NEP (Novaia Ekonomicheskaia Politika) –
The New Economic Policy;

NKID (Narodnyi Komissariat Inostrannykh Del) –
The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs;

NKVD (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del) –
The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs;

NKVT (Narkomvneshtorg, i.e. Narodnyi Komissariat Vneshei Torgovli) –
The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade;

OGPU (Ob’edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie) –
The United State Political Directorate;

PGU KGB (Pervoe Glavnoe Upravlenie Komiteta Gosudarstvenoi Bezopasnosti) –
The First Chief-Directorate of KGB (external intelligence);

Politbiuro (Politicheskoe Biuro) –
The Political Bureau of the Communist Party;

Polpred (Polnomochnyi predstavitel’) – Plenipotentiary;

Razvedupr (Razvedovatel’noe Upravlenie) –
The Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army;

Revvoensovet (Revolutsionnyi Voennyi Soviet) –
The Revolutionary Military Council;

RGALI (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literatury i Iskusstva) –
Russia’s State Archive of Literature and Arts;
RGASPI (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii) – Russia’s State Archive of Socio-Political History;

RGVA (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenny Arkhiv) – Russia’s State Military Archive;

RGVIA (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voенно-Istoricheskii Arkhiv) – Russia’s State Military Historical Archive;

RKISVA (Russkii Kommitet dlia Izucheniiia Srednei i Vostochnoi Azii) – The Russian Committee for the Study of Central and Eastern Asia;

RKKA (Raboche-Krestianskaia Krasnaia Armiiia) – The Red Army of Workers and Peasants;

Sovnarkom (Sovet Narodnykh Kommissarov) – The Council of the People’s Commissars;

SVR (Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki) – The External Intelligence of the Russian Federation;

VeCheka (Vserossiiskaia Chrezvychainaia Kommissiia po Bor’be s Kontrrevoliutsiei i Sabotazhem) – The All-Russia Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage;

VNAV (Vsesoiuznaia Nauchnaia Assotsiatsiia Vostokovedov) – The All-Union Scientific Association of Orientologists;

VTsIK (Vserossiiskii Tsentral’nyi Ispolnitel’nyi Commitete) – The All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party;

ZVORAO (Zapiski Vostochno Otdeleniia Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshestva) – The Notes of the Oriental Section of the Russian Archaeological Society.
List of Archives used for research (Russia and Georgia)

Russia (Moscow)
1 - ARAN (Arkhiiv Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk) –
  The Archive of Russia’s Academy of Sciences (Moscow’s Branch);
2 - AVPRF MID RF (Arkhiiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii) –
  The Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation;
3 - AVPRI MID RF (Arkhiiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii) –
  The Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire;
4 - GARF (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii) –
  The State Archive of the Russian Federation;
5 - RGALI (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiiv Literatury i Iskusstva) –
  Russia’s State Archive of Literature and Art;
6 - RGASPI (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii) –
  Russia’s State Archive of Socio-Political History;
7 - RGVA (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiiv) –
  Russia’s State Military Archive;
8 - RGVIA (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiiv) –
  Russia’s State Military Historical Archive;

Russia (St. Petersburg)
9 - ARAN (Arkhiiv Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk) –
  The Archive of Russia’s Academy of Sciences (St. Petersburg Branch);
10 - AV (Arkhiiv Vostokovedov) –
  The Archive of Orientologists of the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts;

Georgia (Tbilisi)
11 - GNCM – The Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts.
Abstract

Russia and Iran have been subject to mutual influence since the reign of Shah Abbas I (1588-1629). For most of the time this relationship was not one of equals: since the early nineteenth century and lasting at least until 1946, Russia and then the USSR, in strong competition with Britain, had been gradually, and for the most part steadily, increasing its political, cultural and economic influence within Iran up to very high levels. Nevertheless, the history of Russian/Soviet-Iranian relations still remains understudied, particularly in English-language scholarship. One of the main reasons for this gap must be sought in the hampered access of Western researchers to Russian archives during the Soviet time, which made them draw on Russian-language literature, traditionally pre-occupied with the history of social movements, and with the mechanical retelling of political and economic processes. Thus the cultural and political ties of the two countries on institutional and individual levels (especially during the period surrounding 1917), the influence of Russia, and then of the USSR, on Iran and vice versa, in political, economic and cultural spheres through the activities of individuals, as well as the methods and tools used by the “Big Northern neighbour” during the execution of its foreign policy towards Iran did not receive proper attention, and thus lack detailed analysis.

This research addresses the lack of detailed analysis of the power/knowledge nexus in relation to Russia’s Persian/Iranian Studies – the largest and most influential sub-domain within Russia’s Oriental Studies during the late Imperial and the early Soviet periods. The specific focus of this study is the involvement of Russian ‘civilian’ (academic) and ‘practical’ (military officers, diplomats, and missionaries) Persian Studies scholarship in Russian foreign policy towards Persia/Iran from the end of the nineteenth century up to 1941 – a period witnessing some of the most crucial events in the history of both countries. It is during this period that Persia/Iran was the pivot of Russia’s Eastern foreign policy but at the same time almost every significant development inside Russia as well as in her Western policies also had an immediate impact on this country – the state of affairs that ultimately culminated in the second Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941.

My thesis is based on extensive research in eleven important political, military and academic archives of Russia and Georgia, which allowed me to consult a significant amount of hitherto unpublished, often still unprocessed and only recently declassified, primary sources. While engaging with notions such as Orientalism, my analysis aims at transcending Edward Said’s concept of a mere complicity of knowledge with imperial power. My theoretical approach builds on Michel Foucault’s conceptualisation of the interplay of power/knowledge relations, his notion of discourse, and his writings on the role of the intellectual. While demonstrating the full applicability of the Foucauldian model to the Russian case through the study of the power/knowledge nexus in late Imperial and early Soviet Russia’s Persian Studies, or Iranology, I focus on the activities of scholars and experts within their own professional domains and analyse what motivated them and how their own views, beliefs and intentions correlated with their work, how their activities were influenced by the hegemonic discourses within Russian society. I analyse the interaction of these intellectuals with state structures and their participation in the process of shaping and conducting foreign policy towards Iran, both as part of the Russian scholarly community as a whole and as individuals on the personal level. For the first time my work explores at such level of detail the specific institutional practices of Russia’s Oriental Studies, including the organisation of scholarly intelligence networks, the taking advantage of state power for the promotion of institutional interests, the profound engagement with Russia’s domestic and foreign policy discourses of the time, etc.

In addition, the thesis presents a detailed assessment of the organisation of Iranology as a leading sub-domain within the broader scholarly field of Oriental Studies in the period from the end of the nineteenth century to 1941 and analyses the principles and mechanisms of its involvement in Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia/Iran.
Declaration

I declare that no portion of this work has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or another university or other institute of learning.

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A Note on Transliteration

The language of the major part of primary source material used in the thesis is Russian. The transliteration of Russian names (personal names, book titles, journals, newspapers and organisations) is provided in accordance with the Sixteenth Edition of the Chicago Manual of Style. Bibliographical references also comply with the same style.
Acknowledgements

This thesis is based on extensive research conducted in the archives of Russia (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and Georgia (Tbilisi) which would have been almost impossible had I not received the tangible support of the BRISMES, BIPS and BASEES. I am also grateful to the employees of the Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts for their warm hospitality and expert cooperation. I very much appreciate the sincere and efficient help of the staff of the ten Russian archives in which I was lucky to work. My special thanks go to the Head of AVPRI affiliated with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Dr Irina Popova, who kindly agreed to render me assistance on an exclusive basis for the sake of the development of scholarly knowledge, back in 2012.

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About the Author

Having been trained in Oriental Studies at Moscow State University (MGU ISAA) to Master’s level in the 1990s, Denis V. Volkov spent almost fifteen years in Iran working in the area of Russian-Iranian trade and economic co-operation. He returned to academia in 2010 to study for a PhD at the University of Manchester. During his four-year PhD period, he conducted extensive research in Russian and Georgian archives which enabled him to use some of the retrieved primary sources for a number of publications and conference papers. In April 2013, his paper about late Imperial Russia’s military Persian studies won the ‘I.B. Tauris Prize for Best Paper’ at Symposia Iranica – 2013. A year after, he was also awarded the ‘President’s University of Manchester Distinguished Achievements Award – PhD Student of the Year – 2014’.

He has also been a frequent expert guest at the BBC Persian TV (including programmes such as Pargar and Shast Daghigheh), regarding the history of Russo-Iranian relations and the contemporary topics related to Iran, Russia and Ukraine.
Introduction

Research context and rationale

In today’s Social Sciences and Humanities few, if any, scholars would deny that there is a strong correlation between scientific and scholarly knowledge and the social context within which this knowledge is produced. However, in Europe, the scholarly contemplation of this topic dates back to the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century – the period of the genesis of various social theories and the beginning of scholarly attempts at conceptualising the nation-state. Naturally, while these developments shared a number of common features that were the same across all the Western states in which they occurred, there were also marked differences and characteristics that were specific in each individual country. In this regard, Russia, which had always been distinct from both Europe and Asia, is a case in point. Thus, emphasising the importance of these distinctions in his substantial work on Science in Russia and the Soviet Union, Loren Graham wrote in 1993: ‘No one will deny that Russian society and culture have in the thousand years of Russian history differed from society and culture in Western Europe, where modern science was born. Russia has followed a different economic path from that of Western Europe, and it has religious political and cultural traditions quite unlike those of its Western neighbors.’

However, the issue of distinctions in possible modes of social development directly influencing all other spheres within different nation states had already been considered by intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. A good illustration of this can be found in the words of Bogdan Kistiakovskii, a renowned social philosopher and legal scholar in late Imperial Russia of Ukrainian origin, who had stated as early as 1909: ‘No one, single idea of individual freedom, of the rule of law, of the constitutional state, is the same for all nations and all times, just as no social and

economic organisation, capitalist or otherwise, is identical in all countries. All legal ideas acquire their own peculiar coloration and inflection in the consciousness of each separate people.\(^3\) However, against the backdrop of various kinds of national specificities, there were common general tendencies and factors, namely at the social, economic and political levels, in all Western societies which were considered by many historians to be major influences on science and scholarly knowledge and their development, and they were clearly apparent in Russia throughout the pre- and post-1917 periods.\(^4\)

Twentieth-century European thought witnessed major international debates on the philosophy and social history of scientific and scholarly knowledge. Since the beginning of the century, humanities scholars studying the history and present of science, and scientists themselves, particularly in those countries which were in the vanguard of the rapid development of science, had been paying further attention to questions such as the social effects of this process on societies, the role that science and scholarly knowledge play for a particular country or a society and for mankind, in general. In the second half of the twentieth century, the issue of the relationship between scientific and scholarly inquiry and their social context and, especially, the role of state power in this relationship became a subject of the scrutiny of social philosophers and historians. They also pondered the question of the place of scientists and scholars in the complex and entangled grid of multi-branch reciprocal influence between individuals and various forms of knowledge, social institutions and state power.\(^5\)

Among them, Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) work is of particular interest. His ideas on power relations within the power/knowledge nexus, the notion of discourse deeply influencing the process of scientific/scholarly knowledge production and perception of various truths by society, the role of intellectuals and the phenomenon of resistance are the

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\(^3\) See appendix one (Kistiakovskii).


\(^5\) In this context, the names of such prominent scholars (who this or that way touched upon these issues) as Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), Jacque Lacan (1901-1981), Louis Althusser (1918-1990), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) are worth mentioning.
most pertinent to the subject of this study.\textsuperscript{6} Foucault’s work is characterised by a high level of inherent inconsistency and the lack of theoretical totality and cohesion, but especially by its iconoclastic and challenging nature. However, what goes without saying is that ‘his influence is clear in a great deal of post-structuralist, post-modernist, feminist, post-Marxist and post-colonial theorizing. The impact of his work has also been felt across a wide range of disciplinary fields, from sociology and anthropology to English studies and history.’\textsuperscript{7}

Indeed, the Foucauldian theoretical legacy contains a much vaster spectrum of historically and philosophically important ideas; however, many of them, including also those concerning the history of sexuality and Western societies’ perception of madness, etc., are irrelevant to my topic and will not be touched upon here. However, those of Foucault’s ideas on which I am going to rely, can be used separately as basic theoretical tools for studying such societies as late Imperial and early Soviet Russia – societies which, at first glance, may not fully correspond to Foucault’s focus on late European juridical monarchies and liberal states but which, on the contrary, being different, prove the wider international universality of the Foucauldian ideas on power relations.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the applicability of these theoretical notions to the analysis of late Imperial and early Soviet Russia has been questioned since Foucault arrived at his conclusions through the study of the late European juridical monarchies and liberal states, a grouping to which Russia arguably did not belong.\textsuperscript{8} However, more recently, scholars have argued convincingly in favour of the Foucauldian approach to the study of Russian history, emphasising the universality of Foucault’s thoughts on power relations.\textsuperscript{9} Drawing on the insights provided by these scholars, the theoretical framework of my research will be informed by the above-mentioned Foucauldian notions.


\textsuperscript{7} Sara Mills, \textit{Michel Foucault} (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 1.

\textsuperscript{8} For the debates on the feasibility of application of Foucaudian ideas and notions to the Russian case see Engelstein, “Combined Underdevelopment,” 220-236. See also Beer, \textit{Renovating Russia}, 3-8, 16-26, 202-208. Kotkin, \textit{Magnetic Mountain}, 21-23. Also, it will be touched upon further in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{9} In the first instance, such scholars can be named among them as Nikolai Krementsov, Loren Graham, Alexander Vucinich, Vera Tolz, Michael Kemper, Daniel Beer, Peter Kneen, Nathaniel Knight, Stephen Kotkin, Jeffrey Roberg, Stephen Fortescue, Francine Hirsch, Ilya Gerasimov, Vadim Birstein, Yuri Slezkine and others.
The research presented by this thesis is situated within the above-mentioned two periods as the most crucial periods of the modern history of both Russia and Iran. In addition to their above-mentioned historiographical importance, explained by the character of large-scale developments in both countries and Russia’s intense activities in Persia/Iran, it is exactly during these periods that Russia’s Persian policy was seriously affected by the perceptions which circulated within the prevailing field of Russia’s Orientological knowledge of the time, namely Persianate studies. The scholars and experts engaged in this field constituted the core of late Imperial and early Soviet Russia’s Oriental studies – the field that exerted its intellectual influence far beyond its professional precincts in Russia. This, of course, is also explained by the protracted crucial importance of the multifaceted perceptions of the East and the West and their correlation within the context of various interpretations of Russia’s national identity during the two periods in question.

Though the extent of the depth of academic and practical training varied in different domains, late Imperial Russia’s Orientologists, in addition to Persian studies in its narrow meaning, were expected to study the history, culture and languages of a broader region embracing the territories of modern Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Central Asian states and further to the borders of China – the region which is now subsumed under the classification of the Persianate world. The scholarly interests of late Imperial Russia’s mature academics, and the practical assignments received by the military officers, diplomats and missionary clergymen lay within the same broad geography. For example, Vasilii Bartol’d can equally be regarded as an Iranist, a Turcologist or an expert on the interaction of Central Asia with Chinese culture. The future last Head of the Russian Legation in Persia and later Professor of Persian studies in SOAS, Vladimir Minorsky, served and gathered scholarly material in Turkey and Central Asia, in addition to his

11 In order to avoid the unnecessary Saidian connotation and to preserve the neutral epistemological denotation of the term, I henceforth am using the noun Orientologist and the adjective Orientological throughout the thesis, thus imitating Tolz and Schimmelpenninck. Whenever the term is used with the Saidian relevant connotation or in the context of the debates related to Said’s concept, the words Orientalism and Orientalist are used, except for direct quotations.
12 See RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1 ‘The Asiatic Section of the General Staff’, d. 3522 (1907), l. 38–41 (Colonel Iagello’s report on teaching Oriental languages); l. 50-52 (The Head of the General Staff instructions on Orientological training).
13 See appendix one (Bartol’d).
14 See appendix one (Minorsky).
substantial Persian record of service and scholarly activities. The future Lieutenant-General of the Russian Imperial Army and later founder of the Military Academy of the RKKA, Andrei Snesarev,\textsuperscript{15} also spoke Hindi and Chinese and studied these regions, in addition to Iran and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{16} Such an approach was underpinned by the Russian scholars’ thesis regarding the role of Iranian culture as a binding agent for a region spreading ‘far beyond the linguistic Iran – from Constantinople to Calcutta and the towns of Chinese Turkestan.’\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, this approach was also demanded by the political situation in the region, which was profoundly influenced by the underlying unity of historical and cultural commonalities of the peoples inhabiting those areas. Therefore, all the individuals studied in this research can also be subsumed under a broader definition of Persianate studies.

The given study also proves that Russia’s Persianate studies, as well as Persian studies therein – a field that became more narrowly defined by the study of Iran and Afghanistan along with the further development and specialisation of Oriental studies in Russia – consisted of four main domains of the production of scholarly knowledge during the late Imperial period, namely academic scholarship, the military, diplomatic service and Russian Orthodox Church’s missionary institutions, whereas the early Soviet period can be characterised by the presence of three main domains capable of contributing to Orientological knowledge, namely academic scholarship, military and diplomatic domains. The analysis of the activities undertaken within the above-mentioned Orientological domains during the two periods which is carried out in this research at institutional and individual levels clearly reveals the interplay of diverse multi-vector power/knowledge relations between its equipotent players, namely institutions, individuals, state, discourses and knowledge. The thesis, hence, also questions the Saidian orientalist concept of two-vector relations between state power and scholarly knowledge, as well as any kind of argument on the inapplicability of the Foucauldian concept to the Russian case.

In addition, regarding the example of the activities of the institutions and individuals involved in Persian studies during the two periods, the thesis presents ample historiographical information on the technicality of Russia’s dealing with Persia/Iran and illuminates some developments of the modern history of Russo-Iranian interaction from an

\textsuperscript{15} See appendix one (Snesarev).
\textsuperscript{16} RGVIA, f. 409, op. 2, p/s 338-604 (Snesarev’s Record of Service), l. 3 (02/06/1899).
\textsuperscript{17} Vasilii Bartol’d, “Iran. Istoricheskii obzor,” Sobranie sochinenii, vol.7 (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 232. On the place and the influence of the Iranian culture on neighbouring regions see also ibid, 237.
entirely new angle. In so doing, and given the Russo-Iranian manifold interaction during the two periods in question, the undertaken research necessitated applying to a range of archives and, as a result, draws on the documents from the eleven main political, socio-historical, academic and military archives of Russia and Georgia,\(^{18}\) hence putting into scholarly circulation recently declassified and unpublished documents on Russo-Iranian relations. It also engages with the most recent and relevant Russian-language literature, still unused in English-language scholarship. In Western scholarship, there are few works on the Russo-Iranian nexus\(^{19}\) and no works whatsoever with specific focus on Russia’s Persian studies, or Iranology, and its involvement in Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia/Iran. Therefore, the study also aims at filling this lacuna, by means of shedding new light on Russian Orientology through the prism of the Foucauldian power/knowledge relations.

**Statement of method**

By means of the analysis of institutional and individual activities within the domains in question, the research aims to trace the manifestations of the mutual influences of the main above-mentioned components of power/knowledge relations. This is done by drawing on Foucault’s theoretical postulations regarding notions such as society, truth, knowledge, the intellectual, discourse and others which are rather general in their essence. In order to receive more detailed answers on the technicalities of the interactions of the Foucauldian agents of power and among them, particularly, of intellectuals with state power, it is necessary to additionally employ the following more specific approach.

It is difficult to evaluate, let alone measure, the influence of intellectuals on actions of state power, in general, and on foreign policy, in particular. There is an abundance of works concerned with state control over scholarship and, especially, with the influence of

\(^{18}\) During the two periods Tiflis played a strategic role both in political and military terms in the context of Russia’s Persian policy. Georgian archives contain a lot of valuable documents on the issue, including GNCM safekeeping Konstantin Smirnov’s collection.

\(^{19}\) In this respect, the only most recent significant work can be named and this is *Iranian-Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions since 1800*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge, 2013), which contains insightful articles on the study of the history of Russo-Iranian relations in multiple dimensions, namely from political, military and economic to the two countries’ mutual cultural perceptions of each other. Another one is Elena Andreeva, *Russia and Iran in the Great Game. Travelogues and Orientalism* (New York: Routledge, 2007), which presents the analysis of the travelogues, authored by all sorts of Russians who travelled to Persia during the nineteenth century, from the angle of Said’s Orientalism.
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on scholarly knowledge and intellectuals.\(^{20}\) Though it is hardly possible to overestimate this influence, more recently some researchers, such as Robert Dahl, Dean Schooler, William Gamson and Jeffrey Roberg, have argued that most of the older scholarship tended to view this influence as being uni-directional, whereas according to them it should be viewed as, at least, bi-directional or indeed multi-directional, involving not only the relationship between scientific/scholarly knowledge and state power but also between intellectuals themselves, knowledge, social institutions and the society in which all of them operate.\(^{21}\) Examining and questioning two earlier attempts that had been made at identifying and measuring this influence,\(^{22}\) Jeffrey Roberg proposed his own approach.\(^{23}\) He advocates a synthesis of these earlier approaches, concluding: ‘...influence can be gauged by distinguishing among presence, attempt, and outcome. By dividing influence in this manner, we must seek to answer three questions: First, does the potential influencer have access to the decision-making arena, that is, can he/she be present to put forward policy options? Second, if the influencer gained access, what did he/she do while in the decision-making arena? And third, what was the actual outcome, that is, did the actor achieve the outcome that he/she wanted, or at least modify the outcome?’\(^{24}\) Thus, according to Roberg, the response to all these questions will give a complex vision of how this influence has emerged. At this stage, the analysis should be completed by exploring the personal characteristics required by an actor in acquiring this influence.\(^{25}\)

While I intend to partly draw on this approach too, it must be pointed out that it pays attention mainly to the practical or even physical access of the actors to the decision-making arena. It underestimates the intentional and unintentional indirect influence of intellectuals and their communities whose scholarly and professional activities influenced decision-makers and those very actors, through both generating the relative discourses (in the case of academic scholars) and through operating at an executing level, affecting the very execution of policies (in the case of experts). Therefore, in order to make up for that,

\(^{20}\) In this sense, for instance, the following work could be pointed out as the most representative among others: Stephen F. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).


\(^{22}\) As Roberg classifies them, the first one is outcome-dependent and is associated with Robert Dahl’s work, while the second one is process-oriented and was initially offered by Dean Schooler.


\(^{24}\) Ibid, 6-7.

\(^{25}\) Ibid, 7.
the above-mentioned approach will be enriched by studying various manifestations of the influence being exerted by scholars and state experts in the field of the foreign policy of late Imperial and early Soviet Russia towards Iran. This, of course, should be done cautiously since it is important to recognise that these kinds of influence have often tended to be exaggerated by other intellectuals.

In so doing, the research will draw on the personal archival files of scholars and experts, as well as on their public (published) or official written record, i.e. books, articles, reports, memos, notes et al. It will be supplemented by the analysis of the institutional activities of the Orientological structures in which they were involved. The necessary data will be obtained from the relevant Russian- and English-language literature but mostly from archival documents and the writings authored by the individuals in question. The study of the inner Russian discourses which existed at the time and influenced the current activities within Persian studies also will help identify whether this or that action was undertaken by an individual because of his susceptibility to a particular discourse or whether he was mainly motivated by personal/institutional interests, or by the compound of these influences. The analysis of the archival sources containing their private diaries and correspondence, combined with the available scholarship on the issue, will secure the retrieval of the necessary answers.

Simultaneously, in order to provide an answer to my over-arching research question, namely to gauge the influence of academic Orientologists, as well as of scholarly-trained experts, being practitioners working for political or military organs of the state, in the field of the foreign policy of the Russian state towards Iran, my research will address the following eight sub-questions.

1. What were the institutional structures for the involvement (to differing degrees) of academically trained and scholarly active Iran experts, both (‘pure’) academics and experts directly employed by state organs (ministries, military, party apparatus, commercial entities), in the process of policy formulation, decision-making and conducting Russia’s/the USSR’s policy towards Iran? The answer to the above-mentioned question will mainly be given in chapters two and three of the thesis, which will deal with the history of the institutional organisation of Russian/Soviet Oriental studies, in particular Persian studies, or, as it was later called, Iranology. Besides an examination of the scholarly activities in this field, there will be a brief analysis of the historical context of Russo/Soviet-Iranian relations. The answer to the first research question will also be
supplemented by the information retrieved from the biographies of the scholars and experts under study.

2. What was the nature of this involvement, e.g. written and/or verbal advice and consultancy (scholarly publications, memoranda, membership in committees, hearings, formal consultations, informal involvement through personal acquaintance with decision-makers, etc.), teaching/training/instructing of personnel, (secret) missions and expeditions, official postings as working on Iran for various state entities inside/outside Russia? According to Roberg, asking these questions provides valuable data for defining the influence of scholars and experts on state policy and is very important for identifying the internal mechanisms of their interaction during both general periods under study. The archival record will enable me to analyse the technicalities of the cooperation imposed by the state on the scholars and experts under study or chosen by them consciously or unwittingly. From there I will be able to deduce the patterns that were characteristic of each particular state power of the time (late Imperial Russia, the early Soviet state). This question will be dealt with mainly in chapters four and five.

3. In the case of policy advice on specific issues in Russo/Soviet-Iranian relations, what exactly was suggested by the experts arguing on which grounds? What kind of personal impact being expressed in what forms (endorsement or criticism of past/current government policies, other forms) was there? The personal archival files and the written works by the scholars and experts under study will be examined in order to find the answer to this question. It is in this context that I will explore their participation in creating and developing professional discourses, as well as their personal views and the correspondence of these views with the actual actions.

4. Is there congruence between the expert advice provided and the policies that were actually pursued in the end?

5. Is it possible to trace instances of direct impact of individual scholars and experts on the course of shaping and/or execution of policies? If so, how significant was it? For its part, the received answer will logically lead us to the following question, namely:

6. How effectively did the state bring into play the scholarly and expert knowledge, as a whole, and the expertise of individuals, in particular?

7. What motivated scholars and experts in their cooperation with the state? What was the character of their relationship with the state (smooth or conflict-ridden, etc.)? The last five questions will be tackled throughout the whole thesis.

8. In relation to the above seven questions, what are the common features and specific differences of the three periods under consideration? The answer to this question will contain both the statement of the distinctions and common features of the two general periods under study – late Imperial and early Soviet Russia – and, in other words, from the end of the nineteenth century to 1941. This will be given in Conclusions.

The above-mentioned time frame is mainly based upon the events of the two countries’ political history and Russia’s activity in Iran. The first period comprises the peak events of the Great Game and the Convention between Great Britain and Russia of 1907, Russia’s participation in cracking down on the Persian Constitutional movement, and Russia’s assistance to the Persian central government to quell tribal separatist activities, fighting the German and Turkish influence and securing the Persian front during WWI. Then, after the 1917 developments, comes a period of considerable unilateral changes in Russia’s policy towards Persia and activities aiming at “exporting revolution” and urging Persia to fully recognise the new Soviet state. The years after concluding the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty can be characterised as a time of relatively mutually beneficial cooperation of the two states when Soviet Russia was trying to conduct its interests on the basis of the outward respect of Iran’s territorial integrity and using mainly conventional diplomatic methods – a period that lasted well until 1941, the year of the second Soviet military invasion of Iran. In further substantiation of the time frame it should be noted that, by the late 1930s, all the individuals who were main representatives of Persian studies within their domains, and are thus studied in this research, had died or, rather, predominantly had been executed by the state.

The thesis studies the involvement of scholars mostly engaged in professional academic activities on the one hand (including such prominent figures as Vasilii Bartol’d, Valentin Zhukovskii, Vladimir Gurko-Kriazhin), as well as of experts who had received the relevant Orientological training but pursued careers in the state (or party) bureaucracy or the military/intelligence on the other hand (including such individuals as Vladimir Kosagovskii, Konstantin Smirnov, Vladimir Minorsky, Andrei Snesarev, Nikolai Bravin, Pavel Vvedenskii, Vladimir Osetrov (pseudonym - Irandust), Sergei Pastukhov (pseudonym – S. Iranskii), Konstantin Chaikin). The documents on the activities of the above-mentioned individuals and of the institutions with which they had been involved were retrieved from the eleven main Russian and Georgian archives.

The thesis consists of seven main parts, namely the Introduction, five chapters and Conclusions. The Introduction highlights the context in which the subject of the research is
problematised, and the research rationale. It also presents the outline of the thesis and its research methodology. The Introduction does not include a conventional literature review since the literature relevant to a particular chapter is analysed in the same chapter. Chapter One of the thesis contains its theoretical framework and substantiates the employment of this framework for the study of the power/knowledge nexus in the Russian case and for Oriental studies therein. It draws on English-, Russian- and French-language scholarship on the issue. Chapter two explains why the thesis mainly deals with Persian studies, or Iranology, and contains the analysis of its organisational set-up during the late Imperial period in the context of the current discourses. It also touches upon the activities of a broader number of the representatives of late Imperial Russia’s Oriental studies than those earmarked for detailed case study in chapters four and five. Work similar to chapter two is conducted in chapter three, however for the early Soviet period. It also analyses the continuities and shifts which took place over the 1917 watershed. Chapters four and five contain case studies of the individuals most representative for their Orientological domains during the late Imperial and early Soviet periods, respectively. Chapters two, three, and, particularly, four and five, predominantly draw on archival sources, in addition to the relevant literature.
Chapter One

Theoretical framework: Foucauldian notions and their applicability to the Russian case

Introduction

As was mentioned before, the theoretical framework of the thesis draws on Michel Foucault’s conceptualisation of the interplay of power relations, where individuals (in this case – the intellectual), institutions and discourses situated within power/knowledge nexus are the main players. Therefore, from the outset, it is necessary to define which notions are expected to be implemented as theoretical tools for this study and how they can be situated in application to the Russian context, which is performed in this chapter. So the first part of the chapter will be dedicated to the introduction of the Foucauldian conception of scholarly knowledge and its correlation with society. Then, I will briefly introduce the debate on the applicability of Foucault’s ideas and notions to the case of late Imperial and early Soviet Russia. Further on, while surveying the development of scientific and scholarly knowledge during the two above-mentioned historical periods, in general, and in Russia’s Oriental studies, in particular, I will trace the presence of Foucauldian power relations in the context of Russian society of the time. Thus, I will demonstrate the validity of Foucault’s relevant concepts for the student of Russian history. After that, I will explore the following notions in application to my research in more detail: power/knowledge nexus, discourse, resistance and the role of the intellectual. At the beginning of each section there will be a brief general introduction of the particular Foucauldian notion, which will then be linked to the Russian historical reality.

Foucauldian concepts and Russia

Foucault’s concepts of power, knowledge and discourse caused heated debates in the 1960s and 1970s and had a considerable impact on the further development of critical thinking at the end of the twentieth and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Among Foucault’s main concepts, his insistence on the absence of an absolute and pure truth is most noteworthy. Taking an approach to the study of the production of knowledge that he conceives of as archaeology, he argued that the process of striving for ultimate truths

27 In brief, it can be defined as analysing scientific and scholarly notions and the process of their production in the social context of a particular historical period within a certain society.
through conventional scholarly activities throughout the course of human history had always been subject to the influence of a vast range of factors, which led him to conclude that all truths are conceived or, to be more precise, constructed rather than being absolute and ultimate. Therefore, according to Foucault, there are no objective, constant and independent truths within the system of human knowledge, especially in the human and social sciences.

But, what is Foucault’s notion of truth? One answer to this question can be found in an interview that Foucault gave in 1976 and which was later labelled “Truth and Power”: ‘Truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements.’ 28 Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it – a “regime” of truth. This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. And it’s this same regime which, subject to certain modifications, operates in the socialist countries...’ 29 (italics supplied).

However, some researchers working on Foucault, such as Laura Engelstein, adhere to the opinion that, when Imperial Russia reached the epoch in which some of the Foucauldian modern mechanisms of social control and social self-discipline that had originated from Western practices had begun to develop in Russia, the old regime and Russian society still remained largely unchanged. She contrasts the Russian situation with that of other European countries which, she maintains, had already passed the two formations of the juridical monarchy and the Polizeistaat, having reached the status of the modern Foucauldian disciplinary regime. 30 Developing this idea, Engelstein argues in her article “Combined underdevelopment: Discipline and the Law in Imperial and Soviet Russia”: ‘Where monarchies once imposed order by brute force, through the coercive instruments of the state, Foucault observed, liberal capitalist societies exercise control through the gathering and production of information, the surveillance associated with these scientific projects, the imposition of categories derived from such investigation, and by inculcating mechanisms of self-censorship and self-restraint that compel people to police

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themselves.\textsuperscript{31}

Moreover, somewhat overstating the Russian case’s “otherness”, Engelstein comes to conclusions which might also partially reflect a residual Cold War mentality. She emphasises that Foucault stresses the underlying difference between the so-called Old Regimes where the state is the sole source of power, and liberal societies in which power regulates activities, based on scientific/scholarly knowledge, and is realised by means of disciplinary practices permeating society.\textsuperscript{32} She, therefore, concludes on the Russian case that ‘… although Western culture penetrated the empire’s official and civic elites, and the model of Western institutions to a large extent shaped the contours of state and social organization, the regime of “power/knowledge” never came into its own in the Russian context.’\textsuperscript{33}

Engelstein’s reasoning takes into consideration only the general organisational modes of modern Western society, as discussed by Foucault, and operates with very narrow definitions of structures when exploring the applicability of the power/knowledge nexus to late Imperial and early Soviet societies. Her focus is on the outward appearance and the concrete shape of structures. However, I would argue that what are really at stake here are not structures but principles. Indeed, although Russia had considerable distinctions from its Western contemporaries in terms of social organisation, the principles according to which power relations operated and permeated the whole society were quite similar.\textsuperscript{34}

In principle, of course, it is rather difficult to deny the specificity of these relations in Russian society and, consequentially, in Russian science and scholarship, in comparison with Western societies. Thus Graham states: ‘Imported initially from Western Europe, it [science] took root and developed in distinct ways. …The variations that arose were not only organizational and economic, but cognitive. The intellectual pathways of many areas of Russian and Soviet science are dissimilar from those in Western Europe and America.’\textsuperscript{35} However, taking into consideration the place of modern Russian culture as part of a pan-European endeavour, the basic principles are common. Thus, no scientist or scholar of nowadays would argue with the fact that utilitarian quality has become inherent to modern knowledge. Simultaneously, it would be absolutely wrong to expect scientific/scholarly

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{31} Engelstein, “Combined Underdevelopment,” 221.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 224.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 225.
\textsuperscript{34} See Beer, \textit{Renovating Russia}, 205-209. See also Kotkin, \textit{Magnetic Mountain}, 21-23.
\textsuperscript{35} Graham, \textit{Science in Russia}, 1.
\end{flushleft}
knowledge to only deal with the problems of the day.\textsuperscript{36} Although, in addition to this, a historian of Russian science, Alexander Vucinich, asserts that ‘The inner logic of social development and the inner logic of scientific development are different’\textsuperscript{37}, he immediately gives a quotation from a world-famous scientist: ‘Science is more than a unique mode of inquiry. It is also, to use an expression of Niels Bohr, an endeavor to reduce knowledge to order – to subsume an increasing flow of knowledge under a decreasing number of general laws.’\textsuperscript{38}

However, it goes without saying that “reducing” or “ordering” are the same as “editing”, which implies a certain regulating origin which tends to be personified by individuals, various institutions, or, finally, by society itself, and all of them are guided by certain combinations of specific rules and regulations. In this sense, Foucault aptly shows us that the whole system of human thought and the totality of its achievements are ‘knowledge invested in the complex system of institutions’\textsuperscript{39}. Thus, knowledge is embodied not only in theories or experiments, which are also subject to influence, but in a whole body of practices and institutions\textsuperscript{40}.

Indeed, the various factors comprising this influence may consist of both those on the highest level of structures organising human societies (for instance, state power, social and cultural structures, academic and other communities) and those of less complexity (relations between individuals, their personal viewpoints, endeavours, passions). All these shaped or indeed constructed knowledge, which therefore cannot be considered truly impartial, constant and objective.

**Imperial Russia**

Dwelling on this topic, Vucinich finally accepts the validity of the above-mentioned ideas: ‘Yet a given society can influence the development of science in many ways. A society’s needs may emphasize some sciences at the expense of others,\textsuperscript{41} or stimulate the rise of new sciences. A society’s dominant philosophic traditions may interact with scientific theory in different ways, and different kinds of relations may be worked out between science and various nonscientific modes of inquiry. The society of Imperial

\textsuperscript{36} See Vucinich, *Russian Culture*, xii.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 85.
\textsuperscript{41} See appendix one (Beneshevich).
Russia influenced Russian scientists in these ways and many more.\textsuperscript{42} Thus Vucinich cannot but explain the early success of Russian scientific and scholarly knowledge at the end of the nineteenth century by historical, geographical, economical features. He stresses, for instance, that Russia’s place in the vanguard of the world’s soil sciences relates to the vital importance of the issue to Russians, while the early blooming of Russian geography, ethnography, and comparative linguistics are explained by Russia’s vast areas and profuse ethnic variety, etc.\textsuperscript{43}

It is clear that the scientific activities in these fields would have been impossible without “state order”, another component of Foucault’s power grid. The above-mentioned breakthroughs took place precisely in those areas that were crucial for state viability and development of the then Russian Empire. For instance, the activities concerning geographic, ethnographic and linguistic research date back to the beginning of the eighteenth century, the time of Peter the Great, when Russia had to compete with other countries for the last lands remaining yet unclaimed and non-appropriated, especially the vast areas lying to the East and South of the Imperial centre. Of course, initially such activities had been dictated not by “pure” scientific necessity but by strategic, military, political and economic (trade expansion) purposes,\textsuperscript{44} though attained with the help of particular scientific individuals and institutions.

Indeed, for this period of Russian history, the interplay between power and knowledge in a Foucauldian sense with its entanglement of social, state and individual factors\textsuperscript{45} is clearly discernible. In this same vein, Graham concludes that ‘the fact that Russia’s early brilliant achievements in scientific explorations were prompted by a mixture of political and scientific motivations simply illustrates what already should be clear, that science never proceeds in a political and economic vacuum. The introduction of science to Russia in the early eighteenth century was a part of Westernization, and Russia adopted the motives as well as the science of its powerful neighbours.’\textsuperscript{46} However, in this context it is important to bear in mind Vucinich’s qualifier that ‘the Russian government – and the guardians of the official ideology – accepted science as a part of Russian civilization but

\textsuperscript{42} Vucinich, \textit{Russian Culture}, xiii-xiv.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, xiv.
\textsuperscript{44} See Graham, \textit{Science in Russia}, 26.
\textsuperscript{46} Graham, \textit{Science in Russia}, 27.
had grave doubts about its worth as a part of Russian culture.\textsuperscript{47} By the 1880s, the challenging spirit of science, implying unconstrained inquiry and critical attitude towards literally everything, including even the most cherished values of the Russian society – traditional orthodox consciousness, justifying the institutions of autocracy – brought the so-called “freethinking” (\textit{vol’nodumstvo}) and, ultimately, political revolt to Russian universities. Naturally, the regime reckoned them first to be centres of proliferation of political unreliability.\textsuperscript{48}

In the Imperial Russia of the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the overwhelming majority of intellectuals would consider science as a natural ally in securing political changes and, in the struggle against Russia’s authoritarian regime and the backward religious orthodoxy, hampering progress.\textsuperscript{49} Thus it was quite natural that many would immediately find themselves in trouble with the state. Therefore, in comparison to the West, the interaction between science and the state in Russia has been, on the whole, to the same extent conflict-ridden throughout its whole history and even dramatic during certain periods (such as the Soviet one).

As follows from the above, ‘the troubled relationship between knowledge and power did not begin in the Soviet period, but can easily be found in tsarist history. The root of the problem was the inherent contradiction that arises when a state tries both to modernize and to remain authoritarian.\textsuperscript{50} Among the most representative examples of that kind are the cases of Lobachevskii and Mendeleev\textsuperscript{51} - the first protested against promoting religious orthodoxy by the administration of the university and the latter was opposed to absolutist monarchy and, finally, was fired from the university and banned from teaching for supporting students’ protests. However, later each of them was endowed with a much higher position and more serious responsibilities within the government structures.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{Soviet Russia}

It is, however, also true, as Graham states, that ‘[d]espite the fact that the tsarist regime was oppressive, it still allowed considerable working room for independent-minded people. There is no known case under tsarist rule of the execution of a scientist or engineer

\textsuperscript{47} Vucinich, \textit{Russian Culture}, 184.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, 184.
\textsuperscript{49} See Graham, \textit{Science in Russia}, 58.
\textsuperscript{50} Graham, \textit{Science in Russia}, 157.
\textsuperscript{51} See appendix one.
\textsuperscript{52} See Graham, \textit{Science in Russia}, 157.
merely because of his or her political views…53 Indeed, this changing pattern of the Russian state’s attitude towards its scientists and scholars has been a continuous feature of the history of Russian science. The ambiguity of encouragement and acknowledgement to be followed by rejection and persecution and then again encouragement and acknowledgement has haunted not only scientists but also various kinds of intellectuals and experts in tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union and even present-day Russia.54 What varied over time was the intensity of the persecution. Here it is necessary to mention one of those historical moments, when Foucault’s discontinuity took place, that is the years after 1917, when the state policy towards science and its representatives considerably changed not only in terms of Foucault’s epistème and discourse but transformed ultimately into the problematic, and even the tragic.55

In other societies, the relationship between support for scientific activities and the scientific position of intellectuals was, for most of the time, relatively balanced even in times of economic and political crisis, whereas, in late Imperial Russia, individuals engaged in scientific activities would experience dismissal from their positions, being subject to social and political ostracism, and, in early Soviet Russia, in addition to all that, they would be imprisoned, exiled, executed.56 Even their next of kin could, with a great extent of probability, be deprived of basic social and political rights. In Soviet Russia ‘a scientist could be an adviser to the highest state bodies one day and an “enemy of the people” the next, and vice versa. Scientists conducted research in the well-equipped institutes of “Science Cities” and in sharashki57 prison camps.58

Simultaneously, with the 1917 Bolshevik coup d’état and the events of the Civil War, there took place a shift, changing perceptions of not only the role of science in society but that of the role of a human being himself and the value of his life. Naturally, all that had an enormous impact on scientific and scholarly knowledge in “new” Russia, which is pointed out by Engelstein in her article “Combined Underdevelopment”: ‘In contrast to the imperfect world of capitalist liberalism, which both extends and violates the promise of rights, the Soviet regime long offered discipline without rights. This was not

53 Graham, Science in Russia, 158.
54 See Kremenstov, Stalinist Science, 3-9. See also Graham, Science in Russia, 158.
55 See further in the chapter (on epistemic changes and discourses).
57 See appendix one.
58 Kremenstov, Stalinist Science, 3.
merely the old Polizeistaat under new ideological auspices... but its refurbishment with new tactics, by which society was enlisted to do its own policing but in which the discursive authority of the professional disciplines, speaking in the name of “science”, functioned only as a dependency of the state."\textsuperscript{59}

What sort of a “dependence” that was, what content and characteristics it had, and whether there was a reciprocal dependence and of what kind – all these issues compose a part of the questions this research aims to answer. For, ‘exploring the social context of scientific activity, a historian is able to identify the peculiar combinations of social factors which effect it and it is the extent and nature of these effects that the specific characteristics of science of the given period depend on.’\textsuperscript{60} Hence, it is important to study the dynamics of science development not only in terms of its continuity and inner logic of scientific/scholarly disciplines but in terms of the place they occupy in a particular society in a particular period of history. And the relationships between science and state, science and scientists as a part of power are among the main components of these combinations, according to Foucault.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{The Foucauldian power/knowledge}

In order to better analyse these relationships, the relevant Foucauldian conceptual notions will be used in this research. In his work \textit{Power/Knowledge}, Foucault describes knowledge as being a conjunction of power relations and information-seeking, which he terms ‘power/knowledge’. He states, in an essay entitled ‘Prison talk’, that ‘it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power.’\textsuperscript{62} Foucault emphasises that knowledge is not neutral but rather an integral part of struggles over power. According to him, in producing knowledge, one is always making a claim for power. Therefore Foucault coins the compound ‘power/knowledge’, allowing him to emphasise the way that these two elements are intertwined with one another.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{59} Engelstein, “Combined Underdevelopment,” 236.
\textsuperscript{61} See Foucault, \textit{Power}, 130-140.
\textsuperscript{63} Mills, \textit{Michel Foucault}, 69.
Furthermore, for Foucault, power as such is also an entanglement of relations and interconnections, something much more abstract than a certain specifically defined tool, which ‘[…] is not conceived of as something to be possessed, the attribute of a subject, but as a relation, the site of a constant tension which sometimes assumes the form of a collision.’

Foucault’s main concepts are mostly related to the interplay between social structures, various social and political institutions and individuals. ‘It is in the relationship between the individual and the institution that we find power operating most clearly.’

Thus, Foucault emphasises the analysis of the effects of various institutions on separate individuals or groups of people. However, this influence is not unidirectional. In the process of a complex entangled interaction, people play their own role in accepting and developing or transforming and rejecting those effects. And that also generates new processes, leading to changes and transformations in cognitive domains.

However, nowhere in Foucault’s writings is there a clear and straightforward definition of his notion of power. Four years after his death one of his contemporaries, Gilles Deleuze, tried to sum up Foucault’s main ideas and presented the following succinct definition of power in his book *Foucault*: ‘Power has no essence; it is simply operational. It is not an attribute but a relation: the power-relation is a set of possible relations between forces, which passes through the dominated forces no less than through dominating, as both these forces constitute unique elements.’

This can be developed by Foucault’s own words from his interview “Truth and Power”: ‘What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.’

At this point it becomes necessary to consider Foucault’s view of power as being productive. Foucault moves away from simplistic perceptions of power in which power is conceived of in only two dimensions: people and state institutions, the oppressed and the dominating, the constrained and the constrainers. Thus, in contrast, according to his notion, power is a substance which permeates all social environments with its multi-branched and multi-directional interconnections and creates new forms of behaviour, relationships and,

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64 Pasquino, *Michel Foucault*, 42.
67 Foucault, *Power*, 120.
finally, new forms of itself, which is equally well seen not only in Western societies but in the Soviet case, too.\textsuperscript{68}

Foucault is strongly opposed to the opinion that conceptualises power as the ability of certain powerful agents to impose their will on individuals or groups of people in terms of obeying what they do not want to. He challenges the perception of power as something which is exercised by those in power towards those who are weaker and who try to avoid it. According to him, power is something that cannot be possessed. It is more like a process and a system of relations spread throughout the society, rather than simply the application of a power vector towards the oppressed on behalf of the oppressors. Another important point is the role of individuals, which is conceived of as active and creative, not as passive and oppressed. Individuals are not only the places of power application but the sources of resistance; they are not only, and even not so much, the recipients of power, but rather its conductors and transformers within the system of their relations with others and with institutions. Power needs to be seen as something that is constantly performed, rather than achieved.\textsuperscript{69}

In addition to that, Foucault’s perception of the relation between power and the state is much wider than commonly adopted notions of that relationship and even lies in another coordinate system. He argues: ‘I don’t want to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of state… because the state, for all its omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations. The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth.’\textsuperscript{70} Thus, truth or knowledge, being a part of power, is being influenced and is exerting influence; hence the importance and regulating character of power relationships in every social environment. In this respect, Foucault explains: ‘Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth – that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.’\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{68} See Kotkin, \textit{Magnetic Mountain}, 22.
\textsuperscript{69} See Mills, \textit{Michel Foucault}, 34-39.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, 122-123.
\textsuperscript{71} Foucault, \textit{Power}, 131.
Indeed, in the interview “Truth and Power”, Foucault outlines the following five traits, characterising Western, or democratic, societies: ‘Truth is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, notwithstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); finally, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (“ideological” struggles).’

I would argue that these five features also apply to the cases of Imperial and Soviet Russia. In order to demonstrate this it is necessary to analyse the institutional organisation of the power/knowledge nexus and its inner power relations within the late imperial Russian and early Soviet context.

Organisational arrangement of science and scholarly knowledge in late Imperial Russia

By the middle of the 1910s there were ten universities in Russia, including the oldest of them, Moscow University, which was established in 1755 by a Russian scientist, Mikhail Lomonosov – the architect of Russian science, whom Russian society would later assign an important discursive role and who, in fact, as Bartol’d put it as early as 1915, ‘was the first among scholars to point out the necessity of the organisational establishment of Oriental studies in Russia’. In addition to Moscow University, Russia had the Imperial Academy of Sciences, founded in 1725, which ‘continued to sponsor valuable research throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. If nineteenth-century Russia was often thought of in the West as a country outside of the scientific tradition, a nation where forms of Slavic mysticism and Orthodox Christianity not conducive to science were the principal intellectual trends, it is quite clear, to the contrary,

72 Ibid, 131.
73 See Graham, Science in Russia, 80.
74 See appendix one (Lomonosov).
that by the end of that century Russia possessed a developing and capable scientific community already rooted in an institutional base."\(^{76}\)

Simultaneously, by the turn of the twentieth century it had become obvious that Russia was well behind the leading countries of the West and that this could not be tolerated in the context of upholding international prestige and proving sustainability of the Russian absolutist polity against the backdrop of increasing domestic unauthorised “freethinking attitudes”. The country badly needed modernisation and the ruling establishment finally realised that, in the process of economic and military development, it could not do without the promotion of science. Gradually, science became one of the main components of Russian society and its culture, to an extent resulting in Russia occupying leading positions in some scientific and scholarly areas by the first decade of the twentieth century.\(^{77}\)

However, as already mentioned, the regime increasingly perceived intellectuals as a threat and therefore became highly suspicious of university communities and other centres of scientific and scholarly activities.\(^{78}\) For this reason, the government’s policy towards intellectuals and the scientific institutions to which they were affiliated contained a great amount of political connotations. The tsarist authorities had to combine punitive measures with actions aimed at the encouragement of scientific and scholarly knowledge – wishing those to develop but to develop in the direction that the authorities believed to be in their interest. ‘Their confidence in performing this difficult balancing act varied greatly with the political times, resulting in contradictory policies. Russia’s greatest scientists […] were affected both by periods of reform and periods of reaction. Their educations and even their research were intimately tied to the political, economic, and intellectual milieux of their times.’\(^{79}\) For instance, it would be pertinent to refer to the example of Mendeleev, who was oppressed because of his political views and support of students’ protests and, shortly later, within the context of the 1860s-1870s’ political changes, was appointed an advisor to the reformist minister of the tsarist government and was in charge of supervising many state scientific programmes.\(^{80}\)

Another distinctive example that lies in the field of the interaction of state power and scientific institutions is the relationships between the Russian Imperial Academy of

\(^{76}\) Graham, *Science in Russia*, 80.
\(^{77}\) Ibid, 3.
\(^{78}\) See Vucinich, *Russian Culture*, 63.
\(^{79}\) Graham, *Science in Russia*, 32.
\(^{80}\) Ibid, 157.
Sciences and the tsarist regime. The content of these relationships considerably distinguished the situation in Russian science from that in the West. Contrary to Lomonosov’s perception of national roles of the Academy and the universities that defined the task of the Academy as an institution, bringing science into Russia from the West with its simultaneous institutional rooting in Russian culture, and the task of universities as the cultivation of national scientists and the further development of national scientific and scholarly knowledge, the Academy still strove to preserve leading administrative and scientific roles in the development of national science. On the other hand, in the circumstances of political unrest of the time, ‘the tsarist government distrusted the politicised university professors more than it did the members of the Academy, and the latter institution benefited from this distrust.’

Naturally, being organisationally an organic part of state power and financially totally dependent on it, the Academy kept retaining much more conservative positions in comparison with the universities, which were more subject to the direct influence of a traditionally defiant young generation. In response, it would receive more state support and capacities, including financial ones. This status quo was also maintained by the underdeveloped character of Russian capitalism, which could not provide sufficient funding for independent scientific activities. This factor enhanced the dependence of science on the state, which itself could hardly afford to fund scientific research after the war with Japan and during WWI. All those factors influenced the relations between scientific institutions and gravely affected the development of Russian science itself.

As far as Russian Oriental studies are concerned, it was institutionally much younger than other Russian academic disciplines but by the turn of the century it had gained a considerable part within the national scientific and scholarly community, particularly in such an important Russian institution as the Imperial Academy of Sciences. In comparison with Oriental studies, only Slavonic studies were represented by a greater number of scholars who were full members of the Academy. Another remarkable feature that distinguished this discipline from its Western counterpart was that all its scholars were partly or entirely engaged in studying Russia’s so-called ‘own’ Orient – the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East, - the regions which were within the borders of the Russian

81 See Vucinich, Russian Culture, 196-197.
82 Graham, Science in Russia, 81.
83 Ibid, 81.
Empire itself. This situation also reflects the strong interdependency between scholarly knowledge and state priorities that existed at that time in the context of imperial national state building.

In addition to that, the history of the inception of Oriental studies in Russia itself illustrates the close relation that the development of this discipline had with its utilisation for the purposes of the state. The organisation of teaching Oriental languages at the beginning of the nineteenth century coincided with the increasing activity of Russian foreign policy in the Orient. In 1804, the chairs of Arabic and Persian were established at Moscow University and two others – in Kazan’ and in Kharkov. The choice of languages is also characteristic. From the outset, the teaching of Oriental languages and cultures at Russian universities was aimed at preparing necessary expert cadres for ministries of foreign affairs and military entities. Sometimes even the curriculum would become a tool in diplomatic rivalry between Russia and other countries. For instance, the teaching of Dari started in Russian universities during the Crimean War in order to send a diplomatic massage to Britain regarding Russia’s possible increase of interest towards the area, which was the last frontier between Russia and the British valued colonial possessions.

In this respect, in his work “The Imperial Roots of Soviet Orientology”, Schimmelpenninck provides a very telling testimonial quoting the rector of St. Petersburg University, who wrote to the Russian Minister of Education in 1888: ‘Our civilizing mission in the East and the political confirmation of our power and influence in all corners of Asia will not succeed unless we carefully prepare for it, unless along with military measures we train men who know these regions, their way of life, beliefs and languages.’

On the other hand, the reciprocal influence exercised by scholars by creating certain “discursive priorities” was also at play. In this regard it is worth mentioning Aleksandr II’s order to especially keep the Oriental Languages Faculty open when, during the students’

85 The most important events of this period are the 1804-1813 Russo-Persian War and the 1806-1812 War of Russia with Ottoman Empire, which included vast Arabic-speaking areas.
87 Ibid, 37.
88 Ibid.
unrest of 1861, he enjoined to shut down the rest of St. Petersburg University. All the above-mentioned concrete examples illustrate both the state’s aspirations in the field of science and its attitude towards scholarly knowledge, and the interplay of relations between scholars and academic institutions amongst themselves and in their relations with the state.

A very pertinent characterisation of the ambiguous nature of this web of interdependent relations can be found in Vucinich’s work *Science in Russian Culture 1861-1917*: ‘On the one hand, the government saw science as indispensable to the modernization of Russia’s economy, armed forces, and public services; on the other, it distrusted the scientific spirit, with its critical attitude towards authority, its relativistic interpretation of nature and social institutions, its individualistic approach to problems, and its belief in the supreme wisdom of man’s rational capacities.’ This ambiguity, which was so characteristic of the late imperial Russian society, remained until the very year of 1917, when the new polity brought a type of relations, which were considerably different in their content but which saw similar inner mechanisms at work.

**Organisational arrangement of science and scholarly knowledge in early Soviet Russia**

Having seized state power as a result of the October 1917 coup, the Bolsheviks encountered strong opposition from many, including the overwhelming majority of intellectuals. Russian intellectual society was deeply ideologically divided. Naturally, under these circumstances of the struggle to retain power against the backdrop of internal resistance and external threats, the Bolsheviks elevated utility and usability of scientific and scholarly knowledge to the highest rank among the state scientific priorities. ‘Immediately following the October Revolution, the new authorities began to distinguish between fields of research regarded as important for socialist construction and others deemed of lesser or no importance. This division determined not only the distribution of funding but also whether certain academic posts and disciplines would exist at all.’ Here, a case in point is the fate of Vladimir Beneshevich, a corresponding member of the

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89 Ibid.
90 Vucinich, *Russian Culture*, xi.
Academy, whose scholarly discipline – Byzantine Church Law – was abolished like many others that were classified as “reactionary sciences”.93

Thus, the Russian scientific community found itself facing the question of survival, but survival not only of disciplines and scientific activities but also the physical survival of scientists and scholars themselves. In addition to the difficulties of the Civil War, such as famine and anarchy, the Russian scientific community, being an organic part of the Russian society of the time, encountered the mass terror of the Bolsheviks. Scientists and scholars would be exiled abroad, imprisoned and executed without any investigation, and subjected to legal proceedings, particularly during the War Communism of 1918-1921.94 In his substantial work about the post-revolution persecution implemented by the Bolsheviks towards scientists and scholars, Birstein quotes a letter sent by the Permanent Secretary of the Academy, Prince Ol’denburg, to Lenin on November 21, 1921, where he appealed to the Head of Sovnarkom to intervene against ‘uncontrolled mass execution’ of scientists who had not been involved in any political activity. Apparently, no due measures were undertaken and the only resolution regarding the letter was to put “this” into the archive, so executions continued.95 During this period the state’s attitude towards intellectuals could often be characterised by Lenin’s eloquent quotation: ‘The intellectual forces of the workers and peasants are growing and gaining strength in the struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and its henchmen, the intellectual lackeys of capital, who imagine they are the brains of the nation. Actually, they are not brains, but shit’.96

Thus, the regime of fear, uncertainty and snitching was being inculcated in the whole society and, respectively, in the Russian scientific community. The process of demolition of main moral standards was being encouraged. In these circumstances, for those who were, for some reasons, not capable of active armed resistance or leaving the country, the only way out was to compromise through conformism and demonstration of outward loyalty towards the new polity. Moreover, taking into consideration the Bolsheviks’ interest in maximal usability of science and achieving immediate results, in order to save and develop the remains of scientific and scholarly knowledge it was necessary to initiate research and programmes which were vitally important, first of all, for the state itself and which promised quick practical implementation of scientific outcomes.

93 See Footnote 41. Also see in Tolz, Russian Academicians, 183-184. Iurii Krivonosov, “Partiia i nauka,” 13, 16.
94 See Birstein, The Perversion of Knowledge, 28-33.
95 Ibid, 32.
This interplay of scientific and state interests and their institutional relations was most representative in the case of the Academy of Sciences.97

While depicting the early post-revolution history of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Graham writes: ‘It is one of the paradoxes of the history of science in early Soviet Russia that the scientific institution that was generally acknowledged as being the most conservative, the Academy of Sciences, met the Bolshevik revolution with less overt resistance than did the universities and other scientific institutions. Indeed, the Academy not only refrained from the hostile declarations and acts that were characteristic of many learned organizations and professional societies immediately after the October Revolution, but cooperated with the Soviet government from a fairly early date.’98 However, it is hardly possible to find something surprising or inexplicable about it – not only because of the arduous conditions, which have just been mentioned above, and the prevailing instinct of self-preservation – but also the fact that during the final years of Imperial Russia, the Academy disapproved of the conservative policy of the tsarist government. It reckoned it to be incompetent in almost all fields of activities, particularly in the field of scientific and scholarly knowledge.99

Besides that, judging by the almost two hundred-year history of the Russian Academy of Science, it had always been totally dependent on the state (except for a very short period between two revolutions in 1917 when, after the February revolution, the Academy was legislatively granted organisational autonomy)100. In fact, it had institutionally been part of the state power and exercised power itself. ‘The Academy was from the very beginning treated as a branch of the government and subject to imperial command.’101 So, it had already been part of the institutional practices of the Academy to find ways of getting on with central governing institutions, which supports Foucault’s conception of the active interaction between all components of his power/knowledge compound.

Almost all academicians took the Bolsheviks’ coming to power as a catastrophe on a national scale and, in December 1917, after two emergency meetings, adopted a strong anti-Bolshevik resolution. However, on the day after, they were informed that, if they refused to acknowledge the authority of Sovnarkom, the Academy would not be subsidised.

97 See Krivonosov, “Partiia i nauka,” 13-14.
98 Graham, Science in Russia, 82.
100 See Graham, Science in Russia, 18-20.
101 Ibid, 19.
Thus, in January 1918, the President of the Academy, Karpinskii, and the Permanent Secretary, Ol’denburg, entered the first round of negotiations with the Commissar of Education, Lunacharskii, about the future of relationships with the new authorities.\footnote{See Birstein, \textit{The Perversion of Knowledge}, 22.}

Naturally, the Bolsheviks were also interested in the full cooperation of scientists and scholars for the purpose of solving further issues of national state building. ‘They worked on three fronts: adapting the traditional scientific institutions to modern conditions, creating new institutions to respond to previously unattended needs, and building a bridge between science and ideology.’\footnote{Vucinich, \textit{Empire of Knowledge}, 72.} Therefore, in this context, scientists gained a remarkable opportunity to defend their own personal and professional interests. While describing the situation of the time, Graham points out: ‘The permanent secretary of the Academy in the years after 1904, Prince S. F. Ol’denburg, dreamed of a renaissance of Russia, a blooming of its scientific and cultural potential, with the Academy of Sciences playing the leading role. When the Communist leaders inherited this extraordinary institution they faced a decision – abolish it… or build a structure of scientific research in which it would be the central and critical element. They decided to adopt the last choice.’\footnote{Graham, \textit{Science in Russia}, 81.} Already at the beginning of 1918 Karpinskii promised that ‘the Academy, in keeping with its tradition of service to the state, would help develop the productive forces for national needs. In response the government began to release funds for the Academy’s operations.’\footnote{Ibid, 84.}

Here, it is worth referring to the Foucauldian notion of productivity of power and to the creative role of power relations. Whereas new forms of power are exerted, new forms of resistance and power relations emerge. The components of the Foucauldian power grid never tend to be self-destructing; they produce new relations, often directly resulting in increasing national economic and cultural product.\footnote{See Jon Simons, \textit{Foucault and the Political} (London, New York: Routledge, 1995), 82.} The Bolsheviks’ government ‘was the first in the world to recognize the now common notion of science as a powerful instrument in national development.’\footnote{Krementsov, \textit{Stalinist Science}, 11.} It put utilitarian usage of scientific and scholarly knowledge on a wide scale, pursuing its immediate goals in securing power and constructing a new state. And the Russian scientific community, namely the Academy, having overcome, at least outwardly, its initial hostility towards the new polity, began constructing new structures of relations which led to its benefiting from state active science policy. Partly in spite of, but, perhaps, more due to new circumstances, Russian scientists
and scholars managed to recover and considerably develop their institutions and activities. The situation that emerged in the early 1920s, in the relatively liberal context of the NEP, provided them with a previously unknown level of autonomy in their internal affairs and created real opportunities for exerting influence on state scientific policymaking.\textsuperscript{108} Having carefully analysed the 1920s-1930s’ history of Russian science in terms of its power/knowledge relations, Krementsov distinguishes a phenomenon that was characteristic only of the Soviet science, namely the emergence of the so-called ‘spokesmen’ and ‘patrons’. He asserts that the scientific and scholarly communities gradually ‘produced spokesmen able and willing to undertake the “dirty” job of representing their disciplinary and institutional interests to the control apparatus and trying to persuade the decision makers to serve their particular agendas and the development of various Soviet scientific disciplines was greatly influenced by the personal relations between particular disciplinary spokesmen and their powerful party patrons.’\textsuperscript{109} At the beginning, the ‘spokesmen’ belonged to the same scientific circles (such as Ol’denburg), and the ‘patrons’ were reputable influential individuals, for example, among writers (such as Gor’kii who played the role of one of the most influential ‘patrons’ for Oriental studies, biology and medicine),\textsuperscript{110} or politicians (such as Lunacharskii (1875-1933) – linguistics, Bukharin (1888-1938) – history, philosophy, Krzhizhanovskii (1872-1959) – economics, mathematics),\textsuperscript{111} but later, as the intergrowth of state political structures and scientific institutions gradually advanced, these two groups mixed, simultaneously occupying posts both in scientific institutions and party/government/security services structures.\textsuperscript{112}

Therefore, ‘[a]s official policies became gradually more assertive, academicians were left with less and less room to maneuver.’\textsuperscript{113} ‘In the early days of the New Economic Policy, the weight of scientific opinion, heir to the disciplinary authority of the bourgeois professions, reinforced the official project of social control and social engineering. Later, as Stalin consolidated his hold on power, science itself fell under the domination of political orthodoxy.’\textsuperscript{114} New forms of the regulation of scientific and scholarly activities kept emerging. The control over scientists and scholars tightened. All that created new

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{108} Ibid, 29.
\footnote{109} Krementsov, \textit{Stalinist Science}, 5.
\footnote{110} Ibid, 35.
\footnote{111} Ibid, 31-39.
\footnote{113} Tolz, \textit{Russian Academicians}, 183.
\footnote{114} Engelstein, “Combined Underdevelopment,” 233.
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forms of interaction between the components of the extended power grid – the interplay of ‘spokesmen’, ‘patrons’, scientists and scholars and the state bureaucracy.

It was natural that Soviet Oriental studies shared the destiny of the Soviet scientific community, being equally subject to the entangled interplay of institutional and individual relationships. Oriental studies were of particular interest to the new government, especially in the early post-revolution years.\textsuperscript{115} In the heat of revolutionary and war victories inside Russia, the Bolsheviks saw great revolution potential in the Orient and were firmly resolved to export revolution to the countries of the “oppressed Orient”. Oriental studies were the very scholarly discipline that could provide immediate practical results. Orientalists were expected to concentrate on political and socio-economic aspects, to “find” uncompromising class struggles and irreconcilable contradictions which would substantiate further Soviet military and, later, ideological expansion to the Orient.\textsuperscript{116}

**The Foucauldian épistème**

However, the above-mentioned features do not constitute the full content of power/knowledge relations. There are also other very important components pointed out by Foucault. *Épistème* and discourse are among them. In fact, they are from the most essential Foucauldian notions because of their capability to vector and to shape the process of knowledge development. Having studied three main historical periods that shaped the system of cultural values of contemporary western civilisation (the European Renaissance of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century, the ‘classical era’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the ‘modern era’ of the nineteenth and twentieth century) he reached the conclusion that what took place was not actually the creation of objective knowledge but the emergence of regulatory practices; that the very beginning of the process of scientific research was initiated by certain circumstances or social and political institutions and relationships which subsequently would strongly influence or even fully determine its general trends, methods, technicalities, ultimate results and their interpretation.


This process can be characterised as discontinuous “community” activities aimed at constructing truth. So, according to Foucault, his study demonstrates that during certain periods of human history there was something which would allow thought to form and organise itself. This something, being a sort of invisible grid or network, would limit and determine experience, knowledge and the very activity aiming at achieving truth; it would govern the sciences or other areas of human knowledge and activities this way or another in each period. Initially, Foucault called it épistème.

**Épistème in Russia**

From the very outset, in the Russian case, it is justified to point out the épistème that, throughout the whole three hundred years’ period, since the times of Peter the Great to nowadays, has remained steady and without any considerable changes or “shifts”, namely the idea of catching up with the West by means of scientific and scholarly development of the Russian society. The initiating and regulating role of state supreme authority (with the top-down vector) has never been contravened in this process, though the methods of science promotion were authoritarian. Another discursive component of this épistème was the pronounced national trend and preserving of its own cultural and political identity. At first, the task consisted of domesticating science and scholarly knowledge and cultivating Russia’s own Platos and Newtons.

As has already been mentioned, Lomonosov saw the role of the Academy of Sciences as an institution that would import Western science to Russia, and universities would proliferate it and produce a native scientific and scholarly community. As time passed, the task became more complex. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, the initial notion of the nationalisation of science as ‘the emergence of the nation as the structuring unit and the principal arena of scientific activity’ was supplemented by national state building. ‘Nationalization, above all, was reflected in the emergence of the (nation-) state as a structuring unit and a funding agent of scholarship and science. It was also manifested in the belief that scholarship should contribute to nation-building (through offering scientific definitions of a nation and a justification of the historical presence of a nation on a particular territory, thereby helping to forge close links among members of the

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national communities and individuals’ loyalty to these communities). A similar situation could also be found during the post-1917 decades. Therefore, the épistème of “catching up with the West” has remained essentially unchanged since Peter the Great until today.

The Foucauldian approach does not imply that these constructed or modified “truths” are necessarily lies. Rather, it demonstrates that there is simply no truth or knowledge which would not depend on the society or state where it is generated. The difference is only in extent of being subject to this influence and its intensity. Thus, the idea of discourse comes into being. The épistème gradually generates Foucault’s discourse, which comes to the fore as the omnipresent and determinative component of human knowledge; however as something less overwhelming in terms of time and space but more specific in terms of social and professional groups within which it is spread.

The Foucauldian discourse

In his Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault himself defines this term as ‘the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.’ Sara Mills, in her book Michel Foucault, presents the following definition of the Foucauldian notion of discourse, based upon Foucault’s influential lecture “The Order of Discourse” (1981) and his other main works: ‘A discourse is a regulated set of statements which combine with others in predictable ways. Discourse is regulated by a set of rules which lead to the distribution and circulation of certain utterances and statements. Some statements are circulated widely and others have restricted circulation.’

Indeed, by discourse Foucault means groups of statements which deal with the same topic or issues and which seem to produce a similar effect. They may be grouped together under some institutional pressure, or on the basis of origin or usage, or in view of their operational similarity. However, other Foucault scholars go beyond the two components of utterances and statements in their understanding of discourse. They point to conventional prevailing practices as a third constituent of discourse, which sometimes even

121 Ibid, 62.
123 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1972), 80.
124 Mills, Michel Foucault, 54.
plays a more determining role in the process of forming a discourse than semantic structures. In their opinion, it often happens that these practices generate the character of statements and even statements themselves. Accentuating this in their book *Introducing Foucault*, Chris Horrocks and Zoran Jevtich characterise Foucauldian discourse in this way: ‘Discourses are not linguistics systems or just texts – they are practices, like the scientific discourse of psychoanalysis and its institutional, philosophical and scientific levels.’

Following on from this premise, discourse is understood to be governed by the three interlinked structures:

‘Surfaces of emergence: social and cultural areas through which discourse appears, e.g. the family, work group or religious community.

Authorities of delimitation: institutions with knowledge and authority, like the law or the medical profession.

Grids of specification: a system by which different kinds of madness, say, can be related to each other in psychiatric discourse.’

It is obvious that the emergence of certain structural systems which deal with activities of human thought is possible only within social environments, involving people and forms of interaction between them. As a result of the process of human activities taking place in such environments, various forms of institutions tend to emerge. They regulate relations in such vital domains as knowledge and authority, thereby constituting the above-mentioned second main determinative of discourse. The process of interaction between individuals, various groups and communities, social and political institutions results in the generation and development of specification grids, which arrange the components of discourse.

Scrutinising the nature of Foucauldian discourse and its correlation with conventional notions of the ‘world thought order’, Mills presents the following comments: ‘So Foucault is not denying that there are physical objects in the world and he is not suggesting that there is nothing but discourse, but what he is stating is that we can only think about and experience material objects and the world as a whole through discourse and the structures it imposes on our thinking. In the process of thinking about the world, we categorise and interpret experience and events according to the structures available to

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126 Horrocks et al., *Introducing Foucault*, 86.
127 Ibid, 87.
us and in the process of interpreting, we lend these structures a solidity and a normality which it is often difficult to question.¹²⁸

Indeed, functioning in that way, discourse tends to create its object and develop it, generating new discourses. These processes are caused by a set of rules and conditions, established between various social, cultural and political institutions, adopted practices and widely spread patterns of behaviour. Foucault writes on this: ‘…[t]here is in all societies, with great consistency, a kind of gradation among discourses: those which are said in the ordinary course of days and exchanges, and which vanish as soon as they have been pronounced; and those which give rise to a certain number of new speech acts which take them up, transform them or speak of them, in short, those discourses which, over and above their formulation, are said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again.’¹²⁹

Therefore, it is to be expected that there would be mechanisms for the regulation and control of these processes. And it is in these mechanisms that Foucault is particularly interested. He writes: ‘In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised, and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.’¹³⁰ So, Foucault ascertained that there were procedures which would constrain discourse, regulating its development and reproduction or ensuring its transformation or complete demise.

Among those procedures was the commonly acknowledged ability to distinguish the true from the false – the practice that determines the shaping of discourse and its place in the power/knowledge system proposed by Foucault. Analysing this constraining practice of Foucauldian discourse, Mills comments: ‘…those in positions of authority who are seen to be “experts” are those who can speak the truth. Those who make statements who are not in positions of power will be considered not to be speaking the truth. The notion of the truth must not be taken as self-evident; he shows in his work how truth is something which is supported materially by a whole range of practices and institutions: universities, government departments, publishing houses, scientific bodies and so on. All of these institutions work to exclude statements which they characterise as false and they keep in

¹²⁸ Mills, Michel Foucault, 56.
¹³⁰ Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 52.
circulation those statements which they characterise as true. For Foucault, only those statements which are ‘in the true’ will be circulated…’

Thus, Foucault demonstrated how and under what conditions certain statements or practices can survive and develop but others not. They will be viable only if considered to be true according to the currently prevailing notions, and for that they should be in conformity with other statements and practices that have been authorised and adopted by a society. Simultaneously, the process of exclusion takes place. Thereby, this mechanism described by Foucault makes societies or certain environments reject and filter the statements and practices which are not in full conformity with the discourse. Hence, discourse occurs in an extremely complex and entangled system of interconnection, presented by Foucault as power/knowledge.

**Discourse in Imperial Russia**

Coming back to the Russian societies of late Imperial and early Soviet periods, initially, it is necessary to refer to social and political discourses that existed in the nineteenth and early twentieth century regarding different modes of modernising Russia which should ultimately have led to achieving the Western model of society, however, whilst retaining essentially Russian features. So, each discourse of this kind would emerge mainly based on the views of a particular monarch of the time and his advisors. It would be shaped and imposed on the Russian society according to the top-down vector and, at the same time, it would be subject to the influence and even modifications on behalf of its executors – individuals and institutions. For their part, all these relations greatly influenced Russian scholarship.

This can be illustrated by national discourses that appeared in the times of Alexander I (1801-1825) and activities of the so-called Private Committee, Nicholas I (1825-1855) and the chief educational administrator, count Sergey Uvarov, Alexander II (1855-1881) and Dmitri Miliutin’s slogans of *glasnost’* (openness), *zakonnost’* (legality) and *nauchnost’* (scientificity), Nicholas II (1896-1917) and Count Witte. For example, ‘Uvarov promoted a renaissance of the Academy of Sciences and a new blossoming of scholarship in the universities. He created in Russia a tradition of excellence in Oriental studies and he strongly supported the existing one in mathematics.’ The reforms inspired

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131 Mills, *Michel Foucault*, 58.
133 Graham, *Science in Russia*, 35.
by Miliutin had an enormous impact on scientific and scholarly knowledge, particularly on military Oriental studies – which will separately be studied in chapter two. Many restrictions including those concerning caps for admission to universities, class privileges, and bans on travel abroad for studying were abolished. The appropriations for research activities including the Academy of Sciences were considerably increased, and the freedom of forming scientific and scholarly communities and holding conferences was extended.\textsuperscript{134}

On the level of the scientific and scholarly community, the above-mentioned discursive tendencies were being refracted and transformed. Thus, other discourses were produced. For example, it is necessary to mention the tightly entangled discourses of nationalisation and internationalisation of Russian science and scholarship.\textsuperscript{135} The issue of language – so important in this context – would also often come to the fore. The debate was explicitly linked to the issue of nation-building and was influenced by the conflicting trends of nationalization and internationalization in science and scholarship. The advocates of using Russian argued that it would create a “national community of academics” that would advance Russian science and scholarship internationally. Others, however, continued to argue that, because foreign scholars often knew little Russian, its use by academics served little purpose. Thus many academic works continued to be published in Russia in foreign languages until 1917,\textsuperscript{136} when discontinuity led to the formation of a new discourse. It implied the constant endeavour for demonstrating and proving the authenticity and independence of the new Soviet scholarship. Shortly after, during the following years, it also led to not only the virtual ban of using other languages than Russian, but to the emergence of a special ‘Newspeak’\textsuperscript{137} in the humanities scholarship and even in the sciences, which gravely affected internationalisation of Russian scientific and scholarly knowledge.

There were other discourses in Russian society before and after 1917 that had strong distinctions. It is noteworthy that Russian Oriental studies, which initially originated as a tool of practical application of scholarship in the fields of foreign and military affairs, later generated a discourse on pure scholarship within their own context. Since the late 1850s there had been strong opposition at the Faculty of Oriental Languages of St.


\textsuperscript{136} See Tolz, “European,” 63.

\textsuperscript{137} See Krementsov, \textit{Stalinist Science}, 8.
Petersburg University towards the promotion of practical applicability.138 Similar views were also propagated by the patriarchs of Russian Oriental studies, namely Viktor Rozen (1849-1908),139 Vasilii Bartol’d, Sergei Ol’denburg (1864-1934), Nikolai Marr (1864-1934) and others. As far as it was possible in tsarist Russia they tried to stay away from the utilitarian side.

However, they were deeply worried about the moral aspects of their scholarship. Paying much attention to the ‘moral assessment of the connection between power and knowledge,’140 Russian imperial Orientologists often criticised Western Oriental studies for its political and colonial over-engagement, and anticipated the post-colonial debates long before Edward Said’s work.141 ‘Inspired by Rozen’s belief in the need to question the prejudices of European scholars studying the “Orient,” in 1905 Bartol’d began reading a university course on the historiography of Oriental Studies in Europe and Russia. First published as a book in 1911, the course aimed “among other things, at dispelling various myths about the East in Russia and Europe.” In Bartol’d’s writings, many European scholars were criticized for their “biased views and prejudices” in a manner not entirely dissimilar to Said’s critique of European Orientalism.’142

Naturally, the general critical attitude of Russian scholarship towards the West was also enhanced by the events of World War I.143 ‘Thus the post-1917 attacks by Marr and Ol’denburg on “bourgeois scholarship” and its juxtaposition to Soviet scholarship about the “East” with its own distinct profile were not simply a manifestation of political opportunism. To some extent they represented a further development of the views that had been forming among scholars both in Russia and elsewhere in Europe since the early 20th century and became radicalized in the course of World War I as a result of wounded national pride and doubts about the moral values of “European civilization.”144

Discourse in Soviet Russia

All this became the prologue to both future radical changes in discourses under the mostly coercive ideological pressure of the Soviet epoch and, simultaneously, the preservation of some discursive manifestations; in other words, to continuities. ‘Some

138 See Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient, 69-84.
139 See appendix one.
140 Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient, 83.
142 Tolz, “European,” 73.
143 Ibid, 76.
144 Ibid, 76-77.
Orientalists perished, while others left the country as refugees. Those who survived and remained in the country could hardly express and follow their personal and professional views if they were not in conformity with the new ideological postulates. After 1917 and the hardships of the Civil War, even during the still relatively diverse variety of opinions of the 1920s NEP, Russian “old” scholarship had to compromise with the new regime, adopting, although often only outwardly, the appropriate ideological structures along with the new rules of the game, and gradually giving way to new Soviet Orientology. Simultaneously, a new generation of Russian Orientologists was being trained based on works by Marx and Engels, implementing a new methodology for the study of the Orient. As Kemper concisely points out: ‘Marxist Oriental studies in early Soviet Russia emerged in opposition to the ‘bourgeois’ Russian tradition of classical Oriental scholarship; rather than studying texts and history, Bolshevik Orientalists saw their task in providing the Soviet government with the necessary political and socio-economic knowledge to support the liberation of the contemporary East from colonialism and imperialism.’

This approach generated a new discourse on Islam among the early Soviet Orientological scholarship. The Bolshevik state’s attitude towards Islam, as well as that of the early Soviet scholarly knowledge, was ambivalent. In the 1920s, there were plenty of often contradicting perceptions of Islam and its role in world history. Naturally, most of them were based on Marxist interpretations and were after identifying the “class character” of Islam, locating it within Marx’s notion of socio-economic formations, finding feudal and capitalist features in it. One of the revolutionaries wrote in his memoirs that, at the Fifth Congress of Soviets in 1918, there was even a decision taken on bringing Muslims into state power since experts argued that it would be possible to make all Muslims communists with the help of the Quran.

Michael Kemper in his article “The Soviet Discourse on the Origin and Class Character of Islam, 1923-1933” writes on this issue: ‘After the October Revolution of 1917

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149 RGASPI, f. 133, op. 1, d. 26(Kobozev’s memoirs; Not available for reading hall), 1. 7-8.
the Bolsheviks did not yet have a clear strategy on how to deal with Islam. There was also a persistent uncertainty among the Bolsheviks how to understand Islam on a theoretical level. Marx, Engels and Lenin did not provide a clear theoretical framework for a historical evaluation of Islam, and it took the Soviets more than a decade to explore the “class character” of that religion. The central question of this discourse was how Muslim society would fit into the general development of human history – a process which Marx imagined as a sequence of specific socio-economic formations. All this was to answer the main question: how to treat Muslims living in the Soviet state.

It is necessary to point out that it was not the “old” scholars and professional specialists on Islam who mainly regulated and defined the content and the character of this dispute. New individuals, professing significantly different views not only in terms of politics but also on scholarly methodology and activities, came to the fore. Among them there were Mikhail Vel’tman-Pavlovich (1871-1927), Sergei Pastukhov-Iranski (1887-1938), Vladimir Osetrov-Irandust (1898-1944), Vladimir Gurko-Kriazhin (1887-1931). So, it was not long before, in the early 1930s, the Soviet discourse on Islam was finally shaped. Islam was recognised as a feudal religion and solidly occupied its place in the row of other religions which were used by exploiters and counter-revolutionary elements. Thus, it became essentially anti-Soviet and deserved to be fought at all levels of society. Hence, based on the utilitarian priorities of the Soviet state’s science policy, many Soviet Orientologists were assigned the role of antireligious propagandists. They would be sent to various remote regions of the Soviet Union to carry out atheist activities. Such an attitude was also evident from the state persecution of the protagonists of Islam, including experts on Islam, historians, ethnographers, and interpreters who were pulled to OGPU-NKVD organs.

So, the general emphasis of the Bolshevik science policy on the practicality of knowledge led to a shift of the gist of scholarly activities in Oriental studies from studying and identifying relevant patterns to finding better ways of transforming the object of study itself. This resulted in drastically enhancing the individual impact of scholars and experts upon scholarly, political and social activities which were taking place in the Soviet society. Simultaneously, individuals, for their part, would form influential groups which started

153 See appendix one.
playing their own roles in this new complex of relations. Providing a general characterisation of these relations and supporting thereby the Foucauldian notions of shaping discourse within scientific knowledge and the role of scientists and scholars in exerting influence, Peter Kneen classifies scientists within such relations as ‘the members of real groups which form around the research problems on which they are engaged. It is in this kind of group that problems are defined, results evaluated and professional recognition distributed. The direction and significance of scientific work, as well as the professional standing of scientists, are influenced by such groups, networks, or scientific communities, as they are sometimes called. The cognitive and social aspects of science can thus be seen to be intimately linked.’ As the character of these relations shows, the possibility of the existence of ‘pure’ scientists and scholars is rightly questioned.\footnote{Peter Kneen, \textit{Soviet Scientists and the State} (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), 1.}

\section*{The Foucauldian Intellectual}

On the role of intellectuals, Foucault writes in his \textit{Power/Knowledge}: ‘Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or as something which only functions in the form of a chain […] Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation […] Individuals are vehicles of power, not its points of application.’\footnote{See Foucault, \textit{Power}, 130-131.} Emphasising the importance of the role of individuals in the context of power/knowledge, Foucault states: ‘It seems to me that we are now at the point where the function of the specific intellectual need to be reconsidered.’\footnote{Michel Foucault, \textit{Two lectures}, ed. C. Gordon, \textit{Power/Knowledge} (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), 98.} Simultaneously, he argues against idealised and simplistic perceptions of independent “pure” scholars: ‘Reconsidered but not abandoned, despite the nostalgia of some for the great “universal” intellectuals and the desire for a new philosophy, a new world-view… One may even say that that the role of the specific intellectual must become more and more important in proportion to the political responsibilities which he is obliged willy-nilly to accept, as a nuclear scientist, computer expert, pharmacologist, and so on. It would be a dangerous error to discount him politically in his specific relation to a local form of power, either on the grounds that this is a specialist matter that doesn’t concern the masses (which is doubly wrong: they are already aware of it, and in any case implicated in it), or that the specific intellectual serves the interests of state or capital (which is true, but at the same time shows the strategic position of)}
he occupies); or, again, on the grounds that he propagates a scientific ideology (which isn’t always true, and is anyway certainly a secondary matter compared with the fundamental point: the effects proper to true discourses).  

Commenting on Foucault’s attitude towards the role of individuals in the context of the power/knowledge nexus, Herman Nilson writes in his book *Michel Foucault and the Games of Truth*: ‘Yet it is precisely to Foucault’s credit that he showed through his work that knowledge alone does not suffice to change the world or one’s own life; that what is important is to develop an attitude, a philosophical ethos. For Foucault, scientific work was not limited to an explanation of our development, but was based on the conviction that we should take an active and transforming role in fashioning the process of development through the example of our own existence.’ Given that ‘power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither […] a certain strength we are endowed with; […] [but rather] the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society’, the importance of how individuals conceive of their own place in this “situation”, and of their intellectual and physical capabilities and to what extent they are concerned with that, drastically increases.

Thus, taking into consideration this complex entangled system of interconnections, Foucault puts forward new requirements towards intellectuals operating in these conditions. He is strongly opposed to vesting contemporary intellectuals with obligations to adhere to “universal values”. He considers it useless, as he believes in “specificity” of intellectuals according to the place they occupy. Referring to the historical realities of his time, Foucault states ironically: ‘…the intellectual has a threefold specificity: that of his class position (whether as petty-bourgeois in the service of capitalism or “organic” intellectual of the proletariat); that of his conditions of life and work, linked to his condition as an intellectual (his field of research, his place in a laboratory, the political and economic demands to which he submits or against which he rebels, in the university, the hospital, and so on); finally, the specificity of the politics of truth in our societies. And it’s with this last factor that his position can take on a general significance, and that his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications that are not simply professional or

159 Ibid, 130-131.
sectoral. The intellectual can operate and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth so essential to the structure and functioning of our society.\textsuperscript{162}

Based on Foucault’s above-mentioned dictum, it becomes evident that over the last few centuries intellectuals have played an increasing role in the context of that model of the world that mankind constructed and adopted for themselves; since, in society, where there is no objective and dispassionate knowledge and truths are available only in certain acceptable (for such a society) forms and always work in the interests of particular groups,\textsuperscript{163} a formidable role accrues to intellectuals who are participating in the “battles” for or around constructing those truths. Thus, Foucault appeals to a radical re-assessment of the impact of intellectuals: ‘…it’s not a matter of a battle on behalf of the truth but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays. It is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of “science” and “ideology” but in terms of “truth” and “power”.’\textsuperscript{164}

So, according to Foucault, intellectuals are supposed to take an active stand, personifying that very resistance\textsuperscript{165} in the nexus of power/knowledge. Considering resistance as an imminent part of power, Foucault asserts that there are no power relations without resistance. It emerges precisely when and where power is exercised. Applying this to the question of what constitutes appropriate conscientious social behaviour for the intellectual, Foucault argues that ‘the essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticize the ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure that his own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not changing people’s consciousnesses – or what’s in their heads – but the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth.’\textsuperscript{166}

Thus, Foucault sees the underlying task for intellectuals operating within the context of these “material processes” as follows: ‘It’s not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time. The political question, to sum up, is not error,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{foucault-power-132} Foucault, \textit{Power}, 132.
\bibitem{foucault-power-79} See Mills, \textit{Foucault}, 79.
\bibitem{foucault-power-132} Foucault, \textit{Power}, 132.
\bibitem{foucault-history-of-sexuality-12} See Foucault, \textit{The History of Sexuality}, 12. See also Mills, \textit{Foucault}, 40-42.
\bibitem{foucault-power-133} Foucault, \textit{Power}, 133.
\end{thebibliography}
alienated consciousness, or ideology; it is truth itself.' Based on Foucault’s analysis of relations between individuals and a society, which affects them through various institutions and state structures, subjectifying them and turning them into active agents operating within this vast net-like field of power relations, it can be concluded that, instead of being strongly limited to a high extent by multiple norms and regulations which are created by institutions and governments, in actual fact, individuals, especially intellectuals, have more opportunities, and even technical facilities, for exerting Foucauldian resistance, because they are an inherent part of these power relations and are endowed with additional opportunities by those very institutions. Jon Simons writes that according to Foucault ‘[…] all subjectifying power endows subjects with some capacities required to be agents, even when it is oppressive. As power in a positive sense enables subjects, one could not and would not wish to exist outside its limits.’

This leads to the Foucauldian notion of Governmentality, which deals with technologies of domination of others and those of the self. It demonstrates the tight interconnections and relationships between power exercised towards individuals by institutions or a state and that which is exercised by individuals towards themselves. These processes imply interaction between aspects of politics and human ethics. There are conduct regulation rules and techniques in our society which are designed and applied from the top, but, simultaneously, there are also rules and techniques exercised by individuals in order to control and arrange their own conduct, and they are tightly entangled with each other.

The Intellectual and Resistance in Imperial Russia

Naturally, the features of the Foucauldian Governmentality were significantly more characteristic of the Soviet society than of the late tsarist Russia. The evidence of relevant discourses – both imposed from the top and multiplied and developed by the appropriate self-control and adjustment of the conduct and scientific activities on behalf of Soviet intellectuals themselves – is much more clearly marked in the Soviet period. The imperial pre-revolution scientists and scholars were subject to influence of a different kind. Though there were intellectuals who were still trying to comply with the idea of supremacy of the Orthodox Christianity and the essential role of absolutist monarchy in Russia, the

\[\text{167} \quad \text{Ibid, 133.} \]
\[\text{168} \quad \text{Simons, Foucault, 82.} \]
\[\text{169} \quad \text{See Simons, Foucault, 36-41; see also Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 21-23.} \]
\[\text{170} \quad \text{See Krementsov, Stalinist Science, 3-9; see also Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, 21-23.} \]
overwhelming majority of Russian intellectuals would see their ultimate goal as being useful to the modernisation and renovation of Russia through their activities. They were united in acknowledging the necessity of transforming the polity of the time. In this respect they would reckon scientific and scholarly knowledge to have the appropriate qualities and the potential to help them realise their views.171 ‘By the end of the eighteenth century, the Russian intelligentsia has made the connection between scientific inquiry and political modernization, with the predictable response from the tsarist government and the Orthodox church.’172

This can be illustrated by mentioning the destinies of Lobachevskii and Mendeleev, who greatly contributed to the nationalisation discourse and, while retaining their civil stands against the state power, managed to influence not only scientific outcome but also social and political ones.173 ‘The lives of Lobachevskii and Mendeleev are revealing illustrations of the influence of social and political circumstances on scientific creativity.’174 Besides, it is appropriate to mention the case of the Academy of Sciences as the most representative part of the Russian scientific and scholarly community. Analysing the personal biographies and activities of its members, Tolz points out that ‘the academicians’ characters and views had been formed under the influence of the great reforms of the 1860s. In the course of these reforms, a new ‘man of action’ emerged, who thought independently and strove to apply his talents for the good of society.’175 Thus, the attitude of mind among the intellectuals affiliated to the late tsarist Russia’s science and scholarship can be characterised by the principle stressed by Vucinich in Science in Russian Culture 1861-1917: ‘A scientist has obligations not only to his discipline as such and to the scientific community, but to society at large. He is not only a scientist but an American or German or Russian scientist.’176 It is also quite natural that, for their part, the views of intellectuals, in particular academicians, were influenced by other factors, including, first of all, international. There had always been a tendency to look at the West and to compare processes in Russia with those which were happening or had happened in Western countries. It also influenced their behaviour. ‘The uniqueness of the academicians’ position is to be explained by the fact that they felt belonging to the international scientific community. Their international status gave the academicians a

171 See Graham, Science in Russia, 57-58.
172 Vucinich, Russian Culture, xv.
173 See Graham, Science in Russia, 54.
174 Ibid.
175 Tolz, Russian Academicians, xi.
176 Vucinich, Russian Culture, xiii.
broader vision of their professional goals as well as sense of greater political and social responsibility.\textsuperscript{177}

However, while striving to play a more socially and politically active role, the late imperial intellectuals could not avoid some false perceptions and interpretations of processes in Western societies. For example, they wrongly appraised the relationships between scholars and state in the field of Oriental studies and ethnography. They overestimated the extent of scholars’ involvement in state colonial projects in the West and the social and political influence of Western scholars and, hence, Russian scholars expected to be more involved in the relevant programmes and projects of the tsarist government, regarding both Oriental countries and Russia’s ‘own’ Orient.\textsuperscript{178}

**The Intellectual and Resistance in Soviet Russia**

As Hirsch argues, surprisingly, after 1917, in terms of attitude towards knowledge, Russian academicians found more in common with the Bolsheviks, professing the principle \textit{znanie-sila} (knowledge is power)\textsuperscript{179}. They were the first to identify knowledge as one of the mightiest tools for national development. Despite all the initial oppressiveness of the new polity during the first post-1917 years, later, during the \textit{NEP}, Russian science and scholarship received much more professional autonomy and involvement in state programmes, though for only a short period of time. The ideas about modernisation of Russia, which had been professed by imperial intellectuals, formed the basis of the new science policy, but its realisation was designed according to the rigid system of ‘usability’ priorities by the Bolsheviks.\textsuperscript{180} ‘From the start, they found themselves relying on former imperial experts …who themselves looked to Europe for approaches to solving Russia’s economic and social problems. Many of these experts had lived and studied in Europe. All were well versed in the politics of nationalism and the practices of empire. Like the Bolsheviks, these experts saw Russia’s problems and potential through the prism of Europe’s experiences, and like the Bolsheviks they had enormous faith in the transformative power of scientific government and in the idea of progress.’\textsuperscript{181}

Indeed, as far as Oriental studies is concerned, it is necessary to mention that, in the late imperial scholarly community and that of the 1920s, in each period with its own

\textsuperscript{177} Tolz, \textit{Russian Academicians}, ix-x. See also Beer, \textit{Renovating Russia}, 18-19.
\textsuperscript{178} See Hirsch, \textit{Empire of Nations}, 34.
\textsuperscript{179} See Tolz, “European,” 71.
\textsuperscript{180} See Krementsov, \textit{Stalinist Science}, 11. See also Beer, \textit{Renovating Russia}, 3.
\textsuperscript{181} Hirsch, \textit{Empire of Nations}, p. 7.
peculiarities, there was a strong belief that Oriental studies was one of the key scholarly disciplines that dealt with the vitally important questions which Russia was facing at that time. In 1925, one of the main Orientologists of both periods, the late Imperial and the early Soviet, Bartol’d, said the following words, precisely characterising the views of the scholars of that time: ‘The fulfilment by Russian people of their historic missions in the West and in the East is in close dependence on the condition of Russian scholarship.’ According to the opinion of these scholars, the nationalities question was central for the Russia of both periods. Tackling this question would allow Russia to achieve cultural unification and solve many internal problems, as well as demonstrate its power and success in dealing with the West.

**Conclusion**

Thus, analysing pre- and post-revolutionary Russia, we come to the conclusion that “operational autonomy” in its Western form was not that developed and sophisticated in Russia, especially in the Soviet Union since the end of the 1920s, but as such it existed nonetheless with the disciplinary mechanisms of self-control and self-regulation being of a different kind. Soviet scientists and scholars would act not only under the pressure of various discursive and ideological stipulations, imposed by the party and creatively developed by some of their ideologically driven colleagues, but also under the vigilant control of special institutional structures (from the party committees – partkomy – at workplaces to the monitoring by political security entities). However, in spite of all that, scientists and scholars also managed to play their own game. ‘While it was considered important to protect oneself as much as possible against ideological attack from philosophers or professional competitors, it was also recognized that party approval did not in fact depend ultimately on ideological factors, but rather on the ability of scientists to play politics…’

Irrespective of the issue of the level of “individual operational autonomy”, Foucault is particularly interested in power relations and how they influence the development of knowledge. These power relations can be equally found at work in late Imperial and Soviet

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182 Tolz, “European,” 54.
183 Bartol’d, “Vostok,” 534.
societies. The technicalities of power/knowledge operation, discourse, the relationships between the intellectual and state power, resistance – all these elements, in other words, the components of the Foucauldian power relations grid, can be seen easily in the Russian case. It might be argued that, in terms of the initial state power vector towards society in general (top-down), relations were brutal in comparison with Western cases, but in the field of the multi-branch relations between intellectuals and state power (down-top), the situation was much more entangled and complex. Thus Russian/Soviet scientists pursued their own personal and professional goals albeit being placed under rigorous constraints, imposed initially mainly by force.

Therefore, in the Russian case also, the issue of intellectuals and resistance makes integral and complete the Foucauldian interplay of power relations, consisting of such main components as individuals, institutions, discourses, knowledge and power. Pascuino writes in his overview of Foucault’s ideas: ‘It is on the basis of his analysis of these pivotal points of our culture, and of the concrete historical forms which the relations between them have assumed – exercises of government which accompany the production of discourses of truth and are founded on forms of conduct of life – that Foucault’s work must be assessed,’ and is useful for this research since in late Imperial and early Soviet Russia ‘...no less than in modern France, the state understood that its power rested on the characteristics and behaviour of the people.’ Hence, following a thesis that intellectuals, especially scientists and scholars, are the most influential and relatively integral part of a nation, it becomes clear what a great role the politics of their everyday life play in this sense.

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188 The relevant material on interplay between Russian/Soviet scientists and state power can be found in such works as Krementsov, *Stalinist Science*; Tolz, *Russian Academicians*; Tolz, *Russia’s Own Orient*; Kemper, “Red Orientalism”; Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain*, 21-23.
189 Pasquino, “Michel Foucault,” 46-47.
191 Ibid, 6-14, 21-23.
Chapter Two
Organisational set-up of the late Imperial Russian Oriental studies

Introduction
By the late nineteenth/early twentieth century Russian Oriental studies had evolved into a rather developed multi-branched system for the production of scholarly knowledge on the Orient. It comprised manifold Orientological scholarly and academic institutions as well as relevant structures in the Russian military and diplomatic services, and even within the Russian Orthodox Church. All of them were deeply intertwined in terms of both administrative organisation and the content and forms of the activities they would carry out.192 The critical analysis of their organisational set-up and of the modality of their functioning during the period of late Imperial Russia offered in this chapter is based on recent English- and Russian-language literature, as well as upon the relevant primary sources – the works of the individuals in question and archival documents. It also engages with the continuing debate about ‘Orientalism and Russia’ which began in the 1990s, and of which the articles by Nathaniel Knight, Adeeb Khalid and Maria Todorova in the journals Slavic Review and Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History are among the most representative examples.193 In addition to the in-depth study of the institutional set-up, emphasis will be placed upon the modality of the involvement of Russian Oriental studies in state politics and upon the main concomitant discursive manifestations, mostly drawing on the example of Persian studies in late Imperial Russia. The critical analysis which is going to be performed in this chapter in the light of Foucault’s previously analysed postulates will contribute to answering my research questions by clarifying the following issues:

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First, what were the institutional structures for the involvement of different kinds of Orientologists working on Persia and being engaged in the four main domains of Russian Orientological knowledge production, namely academic scholarship, the military, diplomatic service and the Orthodox missionary activities? Second, what was the nature of the connection between the historical political context of the time and the emergence and development of this set-up in Russia, and how was it influenced by political and economic factors of Russo-Persian relations? The study of this second issue will lead to one of the key findings of the thesis, namely the pivotal role of Persian studies in late Imperial Russian Orientology. Third, what was the modality and the extent of the involvement of various entities and their personnel in the production of knowledge and in the process of political decision-making, and how effectively did the state use the results of their activities? Fourth, what main discourses existed within each of the above-mentioned domains and how did they influence the activities and outputs of the entities in question? And, finally, what were the similarities and differences between these four domains of the Russian late Imperial Iranology of the period?

The chapter begins with a discussion of essential political and economic background of the period in question – the late nineteenth century till 1917 – which includes the developments of the Great Game and the subsequent events concerning the stepping-up and the retention of Russian influence in Persia during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 and WWI. Thereupon, the late Imperial Russian Oriental studies, in particular Persian studies, will be studied in terms of their organisational set-up and the modality of functioning within four domains: academic scholarship, the military, diplomatic service and the Church. The chapter will finish with a comprehensive conclusion, summarising the key findings with references to the scholarly debate about ‘Orientalism and Russia’.

**Political context of the Russian-Persian relationship at the turn of the twentieth century**

In the second half of the nineteenth century the struggle for influence in the Near and Middle East between the European powers intensified dramatically. Having been defeated by Russia in the wars of 1804-1813 and 1826-1828, and due to further developments in her domestic political and economic life, by the end of the century Persia had ceased to be any military threat whatsoever to its “big northern neighbour” and had turned to the arena of diplomatic rivalry, mainly between Russia and Great Britain. This
very rivalry, solidly based on the sense of superiority towards the object of contest, shaped
the nature of Russian-Persian relations during the latter part of the nineteenth and the
beginning of the twentieth century.194

A mission of reconnaissance carried out by staff officers of the Caucasus military
district in 1889 reported extremely low combat readiness of the Persian troops and
suggested that any military confrontation with Persia would only occur if the country was
to be pulled into the war by other states. Further intelligence, collected ten years later and
transferred to the Russian General Staff, confirmed the previous conclusions and noted a
further weakened capacity of the Persian military. The only forecasted threats were a risk
of insurgence and the danger of Persia changing its political course under foreign
influence, as well as the possibility that foreign states, especially Great Britain and Turkey,
could launch hostile operations from Persian territory.195 Thus, the best mode to counteract
any such threats was deemed to be expansion and a strengthening of the Russian presence
in the country. Thereupon, given its geographical location, the immediate proximity to
neighbouring British India and the Ottoman Empire, the potential as a new trade area as
well as its military weakness, Persia became the ‘centre of constant fierce economic and
political contest between Russia and Great Britain.’196

In 1897, the Russian War Minister Kuropatkin197 submitted to Nicolas II a secret
note entitled ‘About our tasks in Persia’ where he pointed out that, strategically, Russia had
no need to annex new territories in Persia and, consequently, was in a favourable position
to use this as a bargaining chip in its Western diplomacy, namely demanding that other
states also keep their hands off Persia.198 The then architects of Russia’s foreign policy in
Iran – Finance Minister Witte and Kuropatkin – considered Persia to be of vital importance
as a place where Russian political and economic influence would be exercised for the
pursuit of Russian national interests and in order to prevent the use of her territory for

194 See Andreeva, Russia and Iran, 1-2, 5-6, 59. See also Khalid, “Russian History,” 691-
699. See also Liudmila Kulagina, Rossiia i Iran (XIX – nachalo XX veka) (Moscow:
Izdatel’skii Dom ‘Kliuch-S’, 2010), 128.
195 See Marshall, General Staff, 108-109. See also Nugas Ter-Oganov, “Persidskaia
dzach’ia brigada: period transformatii (1894-1903 gg.),” Vostok. Afro-aziatskie
196 See Ter-Oganov, “Brigada,” 69-70. See also Kulagina, Rossiia i Iran, 128.
197 See appendix one.
198 AVPRI, f. ‘Persian Desk’, d. 2308, l. 115ob.
possible hostile operations against Russia by other states.\textsuperscript{199} Simultaneously, having to put up with the fact that the country became a playground for foreign states, the Persian ruling establishment resorted to playing their own game, sometimes very successfully playing the rival powers off against each other.\textsuperscript{200}

Though during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century Great Britain had initially been considerably ahead of the Russian Empire in the field of economic influence\textsuperscript{201}, this lag began to rapidly contract in the 1870s. In 1873, following a personal invitation from the Russian Tsar Alexander II, Naser al-Din Shah Qajar visited Russia. The trip deeply impressed the Shah and laid the ground for the consequent political and economic rapprochement of the two countries.\textsuperscript{202} However, the main fruit of the Shah’s trips to Russia (a second one took place in 1878) became the establishment of a Cossack Brigade in Tehran in 1879 upon his request.\textsuperscript{203}

It goes without saying that while establishing the Cossack Brigade in Persia, Russia was after enhancing its own influence over the Shah, the court and the country, in general.\textsuperscript{204} In 1900, the War Minister separately mentioned the Cossack Brigade as a factor allowing Russia, to a great extent, to govern the developments in Tehran.\textsuperscript{205} Kuropatkin’s words explicitly indicate the impact of the Cossack Brigade and of Colonel Kosagovskii’s\textsuperscript{206} activities on Imperial Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia. Kosagovskii, guided by personal Orientological expertise and his perception of the promotion of Russian national interests, succeeded in occupying an influential place in the Persian political establishment and, in fact, turned the Cossack Brigade into a powerful tool of Russian political influence in Persia as well as an abundant source of Orientological first-hand information.

\textsuperscript{199} AV, f.155, op. 1, d. 152, \textit{The Humble Report of Lieutenant-General Kuropatkin on his trip to Persia in 1895}. See also Andreeva, \textit{Russia and Iran}, 5-6. Kulagina, \textit{Rossiia i Iran}, 129.


\textsuperscript{202} See Aleksandr Shirokorad, \textit{Persiia – Iran. Imperiiia na Vostoke} (Moscow: Veche, 2010), 98.

\textsuperscript{203} The Shah was deeply impressed by the combat skills and the discipline of the Cossack guard of honour that convoyed him during his stay in St. Petersburg and in the Transcaspian Region (See Kulagina, \textit{Rossiia i Iran}, 136.)

\textsuperscript{204} RGVIA, f. 446, op. 1, d. 47, l. 27-30 (The War Ministry correspondence with the \textit{MID}).

\textsuperscript{205} AVPRI, f. 144 ‘Persian Desk’, d. 2308, l. 117.

\textsuperscript{206} See appendix one.
Furthermore, along with its practical and potential influence on the ruling establishment and the local political events, the presence and activities of such a unit in Persia created remarkable opportunities for the gathering of all kinds of information about the country, namely military, political, economic, social, geographic, ethnographic, historic, cultural, etc.; in other words, assisting the production of scholarly knowledge. When recruiting officers to serve in the Brigade, the Russian General Staff, besides the experience of serving in the Caucasus or Central Asia, expected knowledge of Persian, French and another European language. The Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade became a powerful source of the country-study information, especially after Colonel Kosagovskii had become Chief-Commander in 1894, since he unprecedentedly put on a grand scale the activities related to the gathering of such information.

The above-mentioned activities owed their success to the 1860s-1870s – the crucial period when underlying liberal reforms took place in practically all spheres of Russian society. The social, political and economic setup of the whole Empire underwent serious modifications: the abolition of serfdom, the establishment of local self-government, liberalisation of laws, courts reform, the considerable easing of political censorship, education reforms. This turning point also embraced critical changes in the perception of the role of the military, the necessity of which had been also stipulated by the bitter defeat of the Empire in the Crimean War of 1853-1856. The new approach propagated by Dmitry Miliutin, who was in charge of the War Ministry in the period of 1861-1881, changed the views on the place of scholarly and scientific knowledge within the army, in general, and became the rich soil which provided the future rapid development of Russian military Oriental studies, in particular.

The progress in the turf war with Britain was also achieved through the year-on-year increasing of military presence underpinned by growing economic and financial influence at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Russian economic penetration gained particular significance in the framework of Kuropatkin’s policy, proclaimed by him after his trip to Tehran in 1895 and aimed at ‘inconspicuous eliminating of the British influence in Persia’. During the period between 1895 and 1910

207 RGVIA, f.400 (Asian Section of the General Staff), op. 1, d. 3522 (Correspondence of the Head of the General Staff, 1907), l. 50-52.
208 See Baskhanov, Russkie, 126-127. See also Ter-Oganov, “Brigada,” 69-79.
210 See appendix one (Miliutin).
211 AVPRI, f. 144, d. 2308, l. 116.
Russia invested almost 21 million roubles in the construction of roads in Persia, and this while there was a lack of funding in this field in Russia itself.\textsuperscript{212} By 1907, Russian companies were also implementing various projects in the south of Persia, the traditional zone of the British influence. Such a massive political and economic penetration would demand the relative quantity of specially trained experts and the accelerated development of pertinent knowledge, which led to a considerable spree in Russian Imperial Iranology, of all domains.

The Russian political influence in Persia, provided by various means including military presence in the country and close ties with the Persian court, was increasing year on year. Trying to use this influence against Western powers, Russia would take steps which adversely impacted the very development of Persia. Fearing the much more economically and industrially developed Britain and Germany – they could have much faster built railways that would have facilitated their take-over of the Persian market and created the risk of the potentially quick redeployment of their troops in the proximity of Russian borders – since 1873 Russia had been hampering the construction of railways in Persia by every means available. In 1887, under Russian diplomatic pressure, the Persian government juridically committed to refrain from constructing railways and granting relevant concessions. In 1890, Russia and Britain officially signed an agreement regarding the non-construction of railways in Persia, renewed in 1900 for other 10 years.\textsuperscript{213}

The Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 put an end to “free trade competition” between the two powers and divided Persia into three zones of influence (British, neutral, Russian). It can be argued that the agreement benefited both sides. Nevertheless, in the short-term, Russia benefited more than Britain, given her close geographical proximity. ‘The treaty of partition […] had turned the northern provinces of Persia over to Russian rule, and during the pre-war years they were not far removed from the status of an internal colony of the Russian Empire.’\textsuperscript{214} Thus, the previous more aggressive policies gave way to a peaceful but powerful and relentless penetration orchestrated by Witte, then a member of the State Council, who had previously occupied the posts of Minister of Finance and Prime Minister. Having become economically stronger and, which was more important, having gained much more favourable military position in the country, in 1913 Russia decided to

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid, d. 4021, l. 230-235.
\textsuperscript{214} Geyer, \textit{Russian Imperialism}, 333.
obtain the concession for the construction of railways, by that very act opening a similar opportunity to Britain.\textsuperscript{215} In addition to the fact that the Russian zone of influence – especially after enhancing the military, political and administrative institutions following the revolutionary unrest of the years 1905-1911 – had become a virtual Russian colony, Russia was both Persia’s most important creditor and its largest trade partner. The Russian Loan and Discount Bank would finance not only large-scale local projects but would also allocate funds to the Shah’s court without any specific assignment.\textsuperscript{216}

From the above description of Russia’s policy towards Persia at the turn of the century, it becomes clear that the main feature of Russo-Persian relations in this period was massive Russian penetration into Persia carried out by versatile means: economic, political and military, where the Russian economic weakness and non-competitiveness was supposed to be compensated by political influence and military presence.\textsuperscript{217} This in turn meant that there was a great need for well-trained experts in order to staff the manifold entities representing the Russian state in Persia. It was, however, only belatedly that the Russian Imperial establishment would start paying significant attention to the vital importance of this factor.

Intensive debate on the issue happened in the aftermath of Russia’s defeat in the war with Japan in 1904-1905. A prominent role in this debate was played by Russian scholars such as academician Bartol’d, who sharply criticised the state’s inadequate attention to Oriental studies and its attitude to “the Orient”, in principle.\textsuperscript{218} The general character of Russian activities in Asia and the condition of Oriental studies at the turn of the century could be illustrated, in particular, by the ideological underpinnings, based on moral claims of the Imperial Russian “civilising policy” towards Persia, which implied a strong feeling of superiority, emanating from the sense of belonging to European civilisation which was inherent to the Russian elite.\textsuperscript{219}

This sense of civilising mission quite corresponds to one of the main features of that very Western Orientalism, described in Edward Said’s celebrated book.\textsuperscript{220} Although in

\textsuperscript{215} See ibid, 333-335.
\textsuperscript{216} See ibid, 336.
\textsuperscript{217} Nugzar Ter-Oganov, “Zhizn’ i deiatel’nost’ Konstantina Nikolaevicha Smirnova,” in K. N. Smirnov, Zapiski vospitatelia persidskogo shaha (Tel-Aviv: Irus, 2002), 6. See also Kulagina, Rossiia i Iran, 157. A. A. Vigasin and A. N. Khokhlov, eds., Istoriia otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia s serediny XIX veka do 1917 goda (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniia RAN, 1997), 142.
\textsuperscript{218} See Bartol’d, Russkaia nauka, 541-545. See also Marshall, General Staff, 167-170.
\textsuperscript{219} See Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient, 29.
\textsuperscript{220} See Khalid, “Russian History,” 691-699.
his eponymous work Said did not engage with Russian Orientalism, contenting himself with the study of mainly the British and French cases, and his whole theoretical premise implied a certain unified hostility of the West towards the Orient, his arguments are not irrelevant to the study of Russian colonial policies, especially when it comes to the arrogant and even contemptuous attitude of the majority of Russian Imperial military officers and diplomats towards Persia.\(^{221}\) It is well documented by Elena Andreeva in her work *Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism* where she analyses more than two hundred travelogues and reports by Russian military officers, diplomats and scholars, who had dealings with Persia during the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century.\(^{222}\) It could also be illustrated by Russia’s 40-year inhibition of the construction of railways in Persia, which has already been mentioned.

However, in the Russian case the sense of superiority towards the Orient seems to have been also aggravated by the sense of inferiority towards Europe – to which Russians had compared themselves since the eighteenth century. This general feature of Russian popular perception became apparent in their relationship with the East where and only where Russians could feel fully-fledged Europeans, as if supporting Dostoevskii’s thesis that Russians were Europeans in Asia and Tatars in Europe.\(^{223}\) The same thesis is supported by Andreeva’s book, giving it the name of ‘the East-West syndrome’.\(^{224}\) It was also reflected in “Russian Foreign Policy and Orientalism” by James Brown, who made a succinct attempt to trace ‘the troubled relations’ in this triangle – “the West-Russia-the East” – until nowadays.\(^{225}\) However, the study of the Russian juxtaposition of the Self with the Occident and the Orient most distinctively appeared in the articles of the main participants of the debate on Russian Orientalism: Knight and Todorova.

Knight argues that Said’s civilisational dichotomy can scarcely be applicable to Russia’s interaction with the Orient since there is ‘the awkward triptych in the Russian

\[^{221}\text{See Evgenii Belozerskii, “Pis’ma iz Persii ot Baku do Ispagani, 1885-1886,” Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii 25 (1887): 1-108.}\]

\[^{222}\text{See Andreeva, *Russia and Iran*, 78, 86, 92, 104, 109.}\]

\[^{223}\text{See Andreeva, *Russia and Iran*, xii, 3.}\]

\[^{224}\text{See James Brown, “Russian Foreign Policy and Orientalism,” *Politics* 30/3 (2010): 155-156.}\]

\[^{225}\text{See James Brown, “Russian Foreign Policy and Orientalism,” *Politics* 30/3 (2010): 155-156. The tendency to this kind of juxtaposing by the scholars and practitioners of Russian Oriental studies is also mentioned in Tolz’s work *Russia’s Own Orient* (for example, p. 30).}\]
case: the west, Russia, the east’. He puts forward a thesis about the simultaneous existence of ‘Occidentalist and Orientalist tropes’ that makes Russia stand out of the row of Western Imperialist powers. Drawing on Grigor’ev’s example, Knight contrasts his acceptance of the Orientals’ ability to develop and progress against Said’s Orientalism, which reckons them ‘utterly incapable of positive change either as individual or as part of a nation’. This belief in the historical opportunity to transform Orientals and to integrate them into Russian civilisation, ipso facto enhancing it and making up for the sense of inferiority and backwardness towards the West, shaped a significant part of internal Russian nationalist discourses of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century.

Thus, contrary to Said’s dichotomy, Knight assumes a much more entangled set of power relations in the Russian case, which is supported by Todorova, emphasising the determinative role of cultural context in the debate on Orientalism. However, Khalid, strongly warning against creating too much sophistication about Russian Orientalism, champions a thesis that such an approach can result in the development of a new variety of Orientalism, aiming at alienating Russia and emphasising its Otherness, like the West alienates the Orient, according to Said. Khalid argues that in Imperialist Russia the state of affairs in dealing with the Orient was quite similar to that presented in main European powers of the time. Undoubtedly, there are more underlying similarities in Russian Orientalism than differences in comparison with those in France and Britain. By and large, the main task of the Orientological apparatus in Russia was to technically facilitate the dealing of its Imperialist government with the Orient through their knowledge of languages and local attitude of mind; however, on an individual level many of them would envisage different and more far-reaching aims and would try to find more space for their operational autonomy, and this will be dealt with further in the following chapters on individuals. Therefore, Khalid’s simplification seems unjustified in overlooking the influence of various internal Russian discourses on the Russian local Orientalist content.

The format of journal articles might have not allowed Knight and Todorova to go into much detail in identifying and studying these discourses; however, the influence of various internal Russian discourses has been studied by another researcher in the format of a book. Vera Tolz’s Russia’s Own Orient tackled their impact on one particular group of

226 See appendix one (Grigor’ev).
228 See Knight, “Grigor’ev,” 81.
229 See also Todorova, “Russian Soul,” 724.
230 See also Khalid, “Russian History,” 691-699, 696.
Russian Orientologists: members of the Academy of Sciences from St. Petersburg. One of Tolz’s main arguments is the great nationalist impact of the scholars of Baron Rozen’s school on late Imperial and early Soviet Orientology, who propagated Russia’s better understanding of the East and, hence, a better capability of civilising mission in comparison with West-European countries and Russia’s favourable position for the Orient’s ultimate integration into Russian culture.\textsuperscript{231} The notion of the same fact allowed Knight to conclude about the existence of a discourse of the time defining Russia as a ‘bearer of enlightenment’. He wrote in his response to Adeeb Khalid: ‘Not only would Russia bring order and civilisation to the peoples of the East, nationalists argued, it would do a better job of this than England, France and the other colonial powers.’\textsuperscript{232}

The same is evident in the words that belong to the rector of St. Petersburg University, who wrote to the Russian Minister of Education on 19 April 1888: ‘Our enlightenment mission in the Orient, political consolidation of Russian might and influence in all parts of Asia cannot be put into effect unless we actively prepare for it, unless along with military measures we train people, possessing both the knowledge of regions, of the way of life and spirituality of their inhabitants as well as of the language of the latter. Only by means of possessing the cohort of experts in Asian languages, we will be in position to study and assess Asian affairs with our own eyes, not with those of others, and we will have our own pioneers of the Russian influence in the Orient who, collecting various first-hand intelligence, will provide solid base for state considerations on where and how to act in future.’\textsuperscript{233} Besides a belief in Russia’s superior right to civilise non-European people and the statement of its on-going competition with European powers in this process, the above-mentioned letter, requiring state tangible support in this respect, also well illustrates the attempts of scholars aimed at the promotion of their own scholarly institutions while using current discursive developments within the context of the interaction with state power that could be found in Foucault’s works.\textsuperscript{234}

In the Russian Imperialist context, Said’s Orientalism applies more straightforwardly to those domains which were directly linked to state power, namely the military, diplomacy and the Orthodox church. Whereas, when it comes to Russian scholars, the question becomes much more entangled and multifaceted because of their greater

\textsuperscript{231} See Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient, 3-5.
\textsuperscript{232} Knight, “Response to Khalid,” 706.
\textsuperscript{233} The Letter of the Rector of the St.Petersburg University M. Vladislavlev to the Minister of Education in Materialy dlia istorii Facul’teta Vostochnykh Iazykov, Vol. 2 (S.-Peterburg: Tipografiia A.A. Stasilevicha, 1905), 185.
\textsuperscript{234} See appendix one (Pursuing own interest).
susceptibility to domestic intellectual discourses on Eurasianism and Slavophilism, as well as the fact that Russian Oriental studies was subject to the profound influence of German Orientology, the country which only belatedly engaged in colonial adventures overseas.\textsuperscript{235} As Tolz fairly mentions, Russian Orientologists even argued that ‘the German Orientological scholarship model could serve Russia better’ than the British model of practice-led Orientology.\textsuperscript{236} Thus, Said’s Orientalism seems to be merely a particular, rather limited, case of something much vaster which did not necessarily imply the dichotomy of subjugation and submission but rather could be defined as something where the interplay of power relations, knowledge and discourses are the main inherent components. In this respect, Knight’s opinion seems quite justified when he argues: ‘One must be careful to distinguish Said’s model of Orientalism as discourse from the views of Michel Foucault that Said drew upon.’\textsuperscript{237}

**Russian Oriental studies academic scholarship in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century**

During the whole nineteenth century Russian Oriental studies scholarship was greatly influenced by foreign policies of the Russian Empire, which resulted in gradually developing self-reliant utilitarian military and diplomatic domains. However, academic Oriental studies kept constituting its basis and simultaneously living on their account\textsuperscript{238} to a great extent. Organised teaching of Oriental languages at the higher educational level began in Russia in 1804 when the first Joint Charter of Russian universities was adopted. The Chairs of Oriental languages (mainly Persian, Arabic and Tatar) were established in the universities of Moscow, Kazan’ and Kharkov.\textsuperscript{239} At the time, the term Tatar designated

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\textsuperscript{235} See Schimmelpenninck, *Orientalism*, 8. During the second half of the nineteenth century, most of Russia’s scholars of the field were of German origin and extensively drew on German-language works. Even the first textbook of Persian grammar *Persische Grammatik mit Literatur, Chrestomathie und Glossar* was written in German by Karl Zaleman and Valentin Zhukovskii in 1889.

\textsuperscript{236} Tolz, *Orient*, 84.

\textsuperscript{237} Knight, “Grigor’ev,” 99.

\textsuperscript{238} Russian Oriental studies scholars and scholarly institutions would greatly benefit from the primary area-study information and manuscripts Russian military officers and diplomats (voluntarily and/or to order) regularly brought from their mission-trips to the Orient. See Schimmelpenninck, *Soviet Orientology*, 37. Denis V. Volkov, “Persian Studies and the Military in Late Imperial Russia: State Power in the Service of Knowledge?” *Iranian Studies* (October, 2013): 1-18. See also chapter four on Zhukovskii’s scholarly intelligence networks.

various Turkish dialects, mainly Azeri as spoken throughout Northern Persia. In 1816, due to the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Sergei Uvarov’s, efforts, the teaching of Persian and Arabic was established in St. Petersburg. His words could illustrate the attitude of the then enlightened circles towards Persian culture, comparing Persian poetry and people to ‘the French of Asia’, which seems to be also a sign of that very romanticised perception of the Orient inherent to European Orientalism but with a Russian tinge of the then elite’s sympathy towards all things French. It also well supports Knight’s above-mentioned thesis on the existence of the ‘Russian triptych’. Needless to say, the first university teachers of Oriental languages in Russia were from France, two disciples of Sylvestre de Sacy, ‘the father of all Orientologists’, the most famous scholar of Persian studies of the time.

In general, the process of shaping Russian Oriental studies was taking place under a significant influence of European Oriental studies (the French and German schools) that had already been rather developed by that time. Moreover, as the existing literature on the issue and the historical context demonstrate, it was initiated and carried out by state power, pursuing its own agenda in the practical field of foreign policy and discursive manifestations concerning the catching up with the West. Right in the first half of the nineteenth century Russia witnessed the exhilaration of its foreign policy in the East, especially in the Muslim East. It also had to compete with European powers not only in terms of the organisation of scientific and scholarly knowledge but also in the field of measuring the strength of influence in the East.

This situation brought Russia’s state closer to further understanding of the practical applicability of Oriental studies for state benefit, which resulted in the full-scale organisational reform of Russian Oriental studies in 1854 that saw the issuance of the


240 See Vigasin and al., eds., _Istoriia_, 126.

241 See Bartol’d, _Obzor_, 54. See also Schimmelpenninck, _Orientalism_, 168. See also _Iranistika_, ed. Kulagina, 23.


243 Schimmelpenninck, _Orientalism_, 164. Later Demange and Charmoi were employed by the Russian _MID_ to kick off the Persian courses in the Educational Section just established in 1823 (See Vasilii V. Bartol’d, “Proekt spetsial’nykh shkol. Vostokovedenie v S.-Peterburge,” _Sobranie sochinenii_, vol. 9 (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 57).

244 See Tolz, _Orient_, 83, 84. See also Bartol’d, “Russkaia nauka,” 537-540. See also Vigasin and al., eds., _Istoriia_, 4.

245 See Bartol’d, “Russkaia nauka,” 535-540.
Decree on the establishment of the Faculty of Oriental Languages at St. Petersburg University.\textsuperscript{246} The motion also stipulated the closure of Oriental studies chairs in Kazan’, Odessa and Kharkov,\textsuperscript{247} reportedly because of the poor quality of training they had been offering. Indeed, the development of the Russian Oriental studies in the first half of the nineteenth century could be characterised by an extensive or quantitative mode of development. Notwithstanding the considerable number of Oriental studies chairs in various cities, there was no unified curriculum that would be accepted by all interested state institutions and the crisis in Russian Oriental studies of the second quarter of the nineteenth century was explained, first of all, by the “implicitness of goals and the trends of the further development of universities’ Orientology”.\textsuperscript{248}

Within the period of 1845-1850 this state of affairs was frequently pointed out in his reports to Russia’s Minister of Education by the privy councillor Count Mikhail Musin-Pushkin, who was appointed the warden of St.Petersburg and Kazan’ educational districts in 1845. He criticised the then organisation of Oriental studies training in Russian universities and persistently proposed reforms to its organisational set-up, which were to add up mainly to the concentration of the all-Russia higher educational Orientology within only one university, however at a separate faculty with a curriculum to conform to the needs of state entities engaged in dealing with the Orient.\textsuperscript{249}

The above-mentioned goals and the awareness of the factors which had caused the crisis in Russian Oriental studies training helped to make crucial emphases while implementing the new project.\textsuperscript{250} All financial, administrative and tangible facilities from other cities were handed over to the new faculty. As a result, the best of the Russian Oriental studies community were concentrated in St. Petersburg and most of them, in one way or another, dealt with Persian studies which, in turn, occupied if not the main, then at least a very significant space in the curriculum.\textsuperscript{251} The first Dean of the newly established Faculty of Oriental Languages of St.Petersburg University was Aleksandr Kasimovich

\textsuperscript{246} AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 183, l. 110b.
\textsuperscript{247} See Bartol’d, \textit{Obzor}, 103.
\textsuperscript{248} Andrei Kononov, \textit{Vostokovedenie v Leningradskom Universitete} (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1960), 9, 11.
\textsuperscript{249} See the reports of Musin-Pushkin to the Minister of Education in \textit{Materiały dlja istorii Facul’teta Vostochnych iazykov}, Vol. 1 (S.-Peterburg: Tipografiia A.A. Stasiulevicha, 1905), 5-7. See also Bartol’d, “Obzor,” 86. Vigasin and al., eds., \textit{Istoriiia}, 5.
\textsuperscript{250} See Bartol’d, \textit{Obzor}, 109-111.
Kazem-Bek (1802-1870), professor of Persian, who would be at its head during two periods: 1855-1858 and 1866-1870.

Kazem-Bek was born in the Persian Azerbaijan to the family of a Muslim cleric who later moved to Astrakhan’ (Southern Russia) to run a mosque. In adolescence, under the influence of Irish missionaries, Aleksandr converted to Christianity and became interested in philosophy and history. In addition to his native Persian and Azeri, he mastered Russian, Arabic and the main European languages. He authored works on the Persian, Arabic and Turkish languages, the history of Persia, Islam, and Babism, and was an associated-member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and a member of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain. Being an active advocate of the centralisation of Russian Oriental studies and of the practical emphasis in training, from the very establishment of the Faculty he announced the strong orientation at practical training of specialists for state entities.252 In his letter to the Rector of the University he wrote: ‘[…] the purpose of our Faculty is purely practical, directly applicable to use, namely – the preparation of young people for the service in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the military and others […] Scholarly purpose should interest our Faculty to the extent it is necessary for the preparation of Asian languages teachers.’253 However, Kazem-Bek’s perception of what should be taught and how encountered strong opposition among the Faculty scholarly community, which led to his replacement three years later by an individual orientated towards the enhancement of scholarly components in teaching.254

If we compare the curricula of 1854, 1863, 1884 and 1913255 it will be clear that an academic trend steadily increased throughout the period and, by the early twentieth century, the Faculty had become a full-scale academic division with the emphasis on ancient and medieval Oriental studies, lacking attention to the present, which in effect corresponded to the perceptions of the main scholars of Oriental studies about the Faculty activities (Rozen, Zhukovskii,256 Bartol’d, Zaleman and others).257 However, contrary to Khalid’s and in support of Knight’s and Tolz’s argument on the existence of greater sophistication and diversity in opinions among Russian academic Orientologists, it is

252 See Bartol’d, Istoriiia izucheniiia Vostoka, 467.
253 The letter of the Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Languages in Materialy dlia istorii Facul’teta Vostochnykh Iazykov, Vol. 1 (S.-Peterburg: Tipografiia A.A. Stasiulevicha, 1905), 392.
254 See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriiia, 9-10.
255 See appendix one (Curricula).
256 See appendix one.
pertinent to mention that it was happening during the period when the Educational Section of Oriental Languages and the Officers’ Courses of Oriental Languages under the MID had gained enough productive strength and training quality mainly on account of the active efforts of the above-mentioned scholars.\textsuperscript{258}

One of the important features of scholarly orientation of the Faculty was its immensely close cooperation with the Asiatic Museum, another crucial scholarly institution of the Russian Oriental studies organisational set-up. Organised on the basis of Peter the Great’s Kunstkamera, since the early nineteenth century this institution had been playing the role of the main place for storing, processing, codifying and studying manuscripts, books and other materials written in Oriental languages.\textsuperscript{259} Taking into consideration that at its early stages Russian Oriental studies paid its main attention to studying written primary sources,\textsuperscript{260} it is possible to envisage what enormous importance this institution had for Orientology in the country.

In support of the thesis on the role of Persian studies in the whole Russian Orientology of the time, it is also very noteworthy that the Asiatic Museum during the major part of its history was headed by eminent scholars of Persian studies: academicians Boris Dorn (1842-1881)\textsuperscript{261} and Karl Zaleman (1890-1916),\textsuperscript{262} who also taught at the Faculty of Oriental Languages. In general, it was typical of the Russian Oriental studies community that the same scholars acted and even headed chairs in various Oriental studies institutions at the same time. The convergence of the Faculty and the Asian Museum under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences was so organic and productive that it formed an integral centre of Oriental studies, appraised by the Permanent Secretary of the Academy Sergei Ol’denburg’s as: ‘[…] the first place in the history of Russian Oriental studies, beyond debate, belongs to the Faculty along with the Academy of Sciences.’\textsuperscript{263}

In addition to that and, presumably, less important in scholarly terms, Moscow Oriental studies school was presented by Moscow State University and the Lazarev

\textsuperscript{258} AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 184, l. 76-77ob.
\textsuperscript{259} See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 19.
\textsuperscript{261} Boris Anreевич (Iogann Albrekt Berngard) Dorn (1805-1881), the Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Orientologist. The pioneer of the teaching of Dari in Russia.
\textsuperscript{262} Karl Germanovich Zaleman (1850-1916), the Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, philologist-Iranist.
\textsuperscript{263} See Sergei Ol’denburg, “Pamiati V. P. Vasil’eva i o ego trudakh po buddizmu,” Izvestiia Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk (1918), 535.
Institute of Oriental Languages, funded by a wealthy Armenian family of Persian origin and preparing practitioners, mainly, for Russian private business in Trans-Caucasia and the Middle East. The activities of these institutions also intensified in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, even resulting in preparing such scholars of Persian studies as Korsh (1843-1915), Miller (1848-1913), Krymskii (1871-1942), Minorsky and others. Thereby, the main Moscow centre of Oriental, in particular, Persian studies was the Lazarev Institute.\textsuperscript{264} It gradually gained a tinge of a contrast to St. Petersburg Faculty - the training emphasis in the Institute was on utilitarian aspects in view of the fact that the graduates could be used by private entities or by the organisations of state power such as the MID or others.\textsuperscript{265}

Another means of scholarly contribution to Russian Oriental studies was also made by various scholarly public societies. The underlying feature of these scholarly societies consisted in the consolidation of interests, efforts and potentials of people, representing completely different professional domains, in the course of the attainment and development of knowledge, albeit with final outcomes applicable to their own professional needs. All representatives used their membership of these societies for championing and promoting their own professional interests, which would result, mainly, in the production and development of scholarly knowledge. However, in the field of foreign policy these groups and their activities were rather homogeneous in the context of being an integral part of discursive manifestations existing at that time in Russia. Their efforts were focused on the promotion of \textit{Russkoe delo} (the Russian Cause) which, in fact, contained two main discursive components: the “civilising influence” exerted on Orientals by Russia as part of European culture, and the protection of all modes of Russian presence in the Orient in the context of Russian competition with the main European powers. This statement of purpose is discernible in almost all programmes of Oriental studies at scholarly institutions and societies, views of diplomats, military officers and other Orientologists-practitioners, and was mentioned in the books and correspondence of the time as well as in the contemporary literature on the issue.\textsuperscript{266}

\textsuperscript{264} See appendix one (Lazarev Institute).
\textsuperscript{265} See \textit{Iranistika}, ed. Kulagina, 104.
\textsuperscript{266} See the correspondence between the Head of the Asian Department of the MID and subsequently the Russian Minister to Persia Gartvig and the Staff-Captain Smirnov, the tutor of the Persian Crown Prince Ahmad-Mirza (GNCM, f. 39, d. 78, 1-4ob). See also Nugzar Ter-Oganov, “Pis’mo N.G. Gartviga K.N. Smirnovu kak tsennyi istochnik dlia kharakterisiki anglo-russkikh otnoshenii v Irane v nachale XX veka,” in \textit{Iran. Istoriia}, 78.
For instance, the *IRGO*, established in 1845, set ‘the study of Russia and neighbouring countries for pursuing the interests of Russia’ as its main goal and since the middle of the nineteenth century it had concentrated its main attention on Central Asia. The same factor helped its founders to obtain His Majesty’s permission for their activities (expeditions, missions, trips etc.) within the shortest time.267 Being heavily dependent on the current political agenda, the Society used to organise or to participate in the organisation of multiple expeditions to Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan with the aim of gathering geographic, ethnographic and other country-study material. For example, the Society took an active part in organising the expedition of Khanykov, who was an employee of the Persian Desk of the Russian *MID*, to Persia.268 The Society was funded from private sources, as well as through special financial grants from the Asian Department of the *MID* and the Asian Department of the War Ministry and, partly, directly from the Imperial Court. From the outset, Russian senior military officers and diplomats were among its founding members. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars of Oriental studies took an active part in its activities. Every expedition used to bring back materials valuable for each interested part of the Society.269

However, along with Russian scholars’ zeal for being useful to their state, which remained mainly unrequested on behalf of the late Imperial government,270 there also was debate on the dissociation of scholarly knowledge from the politics within Russian Orientological scholarship.271 In 1887, the Oriental Commission of Moscow’s Archaeological Society was established ‘for the purpose of the cultural and historical study of the ancient and modern Orient’. It was headed by Iranists Korsh, Miller and Trutovskii (1862-1932)272 until 1917. According to their initial idea, this society was supposed to host “pure scholars” and to pursue pure scholarly goals alone.273 Academician Bartol’d’s statements and activities on advocating the prevalence of the pure scholarship were also illustrative, which resulted in the establishment of the journal *Mir Islama* (World of Islam)

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269 See Vigasin and al., eds., *Istoriiia*, 85-90, 117.
270 See Bartol’d, “Russkaia nauka,” 534, 543-545. See also Tolz, *Orient*, 73. See also Vigasin and al., eds., *Istoriiia*, 261.
272 See appendix one (Trutovskii).
with pure scholarly orientation in 1912. However, these discursive developments at the institutional level had the least impact on the whole involvement of Oriental studies in state power activities.

For instance, shortly after its establishment, the Commission developed strong ties with state entities in Central Asia, one of the forefronts of Russian Imperial policy of the time. The employees of state institutions engaged in foreign policy, such as Minorsky (when in Bukhara and after), would take an active part in its activities. Bartol’d also widely participated in Russia’s activities in the Orient through his membership of manifold inter-institutional societies with close links to state power, and contributed to the institutional development of Oriental studies in all domains. On top of that, his pure scholarly journal *Mir Islama* did not last even a year because of its closure by its funder - the Interior Ministry - for being useless for promoting Russia’s presence in her own Orient.  

Drawing on the role of the scholarly societies which, in fact, were the driving forces of practical Orientology, it is worth mentioning the *RKISVA*, whose activities were particularly significant in this context. Its institutional status also indicates the similarity of goals and practices with West-European Orientalist institutions. Established in 1902 at the Thirteenth International Congress of Orientologists in Hamburg as the central organ of the International Association for the Study of Central and Eastern Asia, it unified almost all Russian state and sheer scholarly entities and coordinated their work on Asia till 1918. This was a completely new type of institution for Russia in terms of its organisation, scale and the character of goals, which clearly speaks for the presence of the institutional forms of Western Orientalism depicted by Said on the example of such learned societies as the Royal Asiatic Society, the American Oriental Society and, particularly, la Société Asiatique with its ‘embeddedness in the government’.  

The importance of this institution for the Russian government can be illustrated by the fact that it was under the direct patronage of Nicolas II himself and was affiliated with the *MID*. All interested state entities - the *MID*, the Interior Ministry, the War Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of People’s Enlightenment, the Imperial Court – and scholarly institutions – the Academy of Sciences, the St. Petersburg University’s Faculty of Oriental Languages, the Oriental Commission, the Russian Geographical Society, the

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274 See Tolz, *Orient*, 74. See also Vigasin and al., eds., *Istoriiia*, 261-262.
Russian Archaeological Society – delegated their representatives to become members of the Committee. Among the governing board of the Committee were the leading scholars of Persian studies such as Zhukovskii, Bartol’d, Zaleman, Zarubin and high-ranking military experts on Persia such as General-Major Vasil’ev, Head of the Asian Department of the General Staff.\textsuperscript{277} The Charter of the Committee set up the strategic goals of spotting – through establishing necessary contacts and interacting with local institutions and individuals – what cultural heritage, what peoples, what areas were subject to studying first hand ‘and, thereby, to be saved for scholarly study’.\textsuperscript{278} This wording also speaks for the partial support of Khalid’s argument on the existence of underlying commonalities between the European and Russian cases of Orientalism, which could be referred to as Said’s depiction of the indisputable sense of superiority and belief in the right of the European Orientalist scholarship to decide what was worth being saved, studied, developed, etc.\textsuperscript{279}

Another striking example of the political, as well as discursive, involvement in the promotion of \textit{Russkoe delo} was \textit{Obshchestvo Vostokovedeniia} (the Society of Oriental Studies), established due to a private initiative in 1900. However, the new entity benefited from support by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of War.\textsuperscript{280} The society pursued the goal of providing the needs of Russian political, trade and cultural expansion in Oriental countries. It was the only entity dealing with preparing specialists on the economy of Oriental countries (courses on Oriental languages were also organised by the Society).\textsuperscript{281} The fact of the presence of another discursive component regarding the catching up with the West, which is to be outlined among other features of the Society, is supported by its strong feminist emancipation trends, actively advocated by the first Russian female Orientologist of the time, Ol’ga Lebedeva.\textsuperscript{282} A considerable number of women were among students of the Society’s courses – a phenomenon which has remained uncommon after 1917 throughout the whole history of the Soviet Union and modern Russia.

In 1907, the Society was transferred under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and partly transformed into the Academy of Practical Orientology. Pursuing

\begin{footnotesize}
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    \item[277] See Vigasin and al., eds., \textit{Istoriia}, 104.
    \item[278] Izvestiia RKISVA, 1903, No. 1 in Vigasin and al., eds., \textit{Istoriia}, 104.
    \item[280] AV, op. 2, d. 50, l. 1(Shvedov’s letter to Snesarev).
    \item[281] AV, op. 2, d. 27, l. 1-2; d. 50, l-7(Snesarev correspondence with Shvedov); op. 1, d. 288(Photo of the Board of Directors of the Society with Snesarev).
    \item[282] See appendix one.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the goal of training specialists for its own bureaucratic entities among the Muslim population of Russia’s own Orient, in 1911 the Interior Ministry organised special courses within the Academy. However, the efforts aiming at creating a full-scale Oriental studies centre for training specialists for state organisations and private companies within this institution did not prove successful, and the training quality was very low. This is also supported by the fact that in 1916 the Academy’s activities were intensively criticised by such leading Orientologists of that time as Bartol’d, Zhukovskii, Marr, Ol’denburg, Sherbatskoi and others. The fact that the further existence of this Academy was selfishly lobbied for by a group of individuals in the Interior Ministry who had close relations with the Royal Court also played a crucially negative role in advancing Zhukovskii’s projects on reforming the practical Oriental studies training, supported by MID and the War Ministry.

The training quality in the Academy reportedly remained poor until its closure in 1918. The reforms in Russian Oriental studies, initiated by scholars in alliance with the main state entities, engaged in foreign policy, and stipulated in “Zapiska gruppy russkikh vostokovedov” (a Report authored by leading Orientologists and presented in 1916 to the Government and the Russian Parliament - the Duma) were never realised. The case of the Academy of Practical Orientology and the closely intertwined inter-institutional struggle between state power entities, scholarly institutions and individual interests, which are touched upon in more detail in the section “The Russian diplomatic service and Oriental studies before 1917” later in the chapter, became another striking example of power relations interplay in Russia during the second decade of the twentieth century.

In view of the above it is possible to draw intermediate conclusions on the questions stipulated at the beginning of the chapter regarding the scholarly domain of late Imperial Russian Oriental studies. By 1917, academic Oriental studies had succeeded in developing a relatively comprehensive organisational establishment on the initial basis of the European (mainly, French and German) Orientological knowledge. Having emerged as part of scholarly knowledge with mostly utilitarian application, in the second half of the nineteenth century Russian scholarly Oriental studies evolved into a classic multi-branch organisational set-up, comprising relevant scholarly and academic entities, societies and institutionalised practices.

283 See Marshall, General Staff, 165.
284 See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriiia, 114.
285 See the section The Russian diplomatic service and Oriental Studies before 1917 of the chapter.
The emergence and development of this set-up were heavily dependent on the Russian state power institutions, which, in their turn, acted according to the imperatives of Russia’s Eastern policy context. The thesis of the strong correlation with foreign policy is also supported by the revealed correspondence of the importance of the Persianate world (particularly, Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia) for late Imperial Russia to the influential place which the relevant scholars and scholarly practices occupied within Russian Oriental studies. In addition to that, the above analysis of the organisational set-up leads us to conclude that there was a deep interconnectedness of the Russian Oriental studies scholarly community with state power institutions of late Imperial Russia through various joint institutions and the scholars engaged by the state entities of foreign affairs, albeit at this stage of research it is too early to make conclusions about the influence of these scholars on late Imperial Russia’s foreign policy.

It is also evident that there were certain discursive practices at institutional levels which deeply influenced not just practical, but also academic Oriental studies. The following two discursive practices, which also seem to have informed Russia’s Eastern foreign policy, were particularly prominent: the sense of civilising mission, which for the scholars of Oriental studies consisted in the confidence of their better capability of studying and preserving Oriental artefacts and, the second, the promotion of Russkoe delo – in other words, the Russian interests, which also included the overcoming of Russian general backwardness vis-à-vis the West (in Oriental studies, in particular) and the spreading of Russian influence in alliance with other Imperial forces which, in this case, were represented by the entities of state power.\textsuperscript{286} It is also supported by the constant comparing of Russian Oriental studies with those in Europe in the scholarly literature of the early twentieth century (Bartol’d, Zhukovskii) and later on (Miller, Kononov, Kuznetsova, Kulagina).\textsuperscript{287}

This stage of research, as was mentioned earlier, does not allow the drawing of conclusions on the individual impact of Russian Oriental studies scholars; however, regarding the issue of how efficiently the late Imperial Russian state used scholarly Oriental studies at an institutional level, it is possible to conclude that, in spite of the deep interconnectedness of scholarly institutions with those of state power, the scope of this

\textsuperscript{286} See Bartol’d, “Russkaia nauka,” 534, 543-545. See also Tolz, Orient, 73.
utilisation was largely in the training of specialists who would directly work for state entities and in the field of the pertinent institutional construction and development. Naturally, influenced by the discourses spread among them, Russian scholars of Oriental studies, on their behalf, were not content with the status which the state would ascribe to them, and longed for a more active and broader involvement, bringing forward the European example.\(^{288}\) This will be examined in further chapters covering the study of individual cases.

**Russian military Oriental studies before 1917**

The Nepliuevskii military college, founded in 1825 in Orenburg, was the first step undertaken by the Russian military in the direction of establishing training in Oriental languages for officers. The languages taught at the College were Tatar, Persian and Arabic. However, the number of graduates was small and the quality of training was reportedly poor. In the middle of the nineteenth century some eminent scholars, such as Professor Kazem-Bek, prepared a series of specified lectures to be read at the Academy. However, this did not improve the whole situation, which was characterised by the later reformist War Minister Dmitry Miliutin in his memoirs as amateurish, as he recalled that his peer officer-students had been able to dedicate only their spare time to learning Oriental languages.\(^{289}\)

The Russian General Staff Academy itself was founded only in 1832 and it took a very long time to establish Oriental studies there that would be tailored to military needs. The professionalisation of the army in general started only in the middle of the nineteenth century, and it was the changes in the General Staff services that had an enormous impact on Russian policy and practical activities in Asia in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century.\(^{290}\) The General Staff officers working in the Asian Department were part of Russian society and thus they, of course, were inevitably influenced by relevant discourses which were widespread in educated Russian circles, in general, and Russia’s Oriental studies community, in particular.\(^{291}\)

However, the character of Russian involvement in Asia in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century predetermined the substantial role which the Russian military

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played in the accumulation and development of Oriental studies. At the early stages of its
development, Russian Oriental studies particularly needed primary material and in this
sense the contribution of the military could scarcely be overestimated. Indeed, many
primary source materials such as manuscripts and artefacts were gathered during
expeditions, in military terms reconnaissance operations, which became routine work in
the military domain from the 1860s. The tasks of Imperialistic expansion of the time
dictated the necessity of intensive activities in this field, and Oriental studies as a
discipline, dealing with any information on the region of study, greatly benefited from the
mode of these activities (collecting all available information), which had been stated as
Russian military intelligence doctrine since the 1860s. Thus, we witness another
component of power/knowledge relations – the reciprocal productive interaction between a
state, chasing new sources of power and endowing its agents with capabilities, and
knowledge itself, represented by its own practices and institutions, using these capabilities
for its own benefit.

The multiple expeditions organised by the Asian Department of the General Staff
and by the Turkestan Military Region, particularly to Persia and Afghanistan, made an
enormous contribution to Oriental studies in addition to other considerable activities
carried out by Russian military officers. In 1901, a Russian officer, Tageev, with an
excellent command of Persian, undertook a covert expedition to Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif
under the cover of a Tajik pilgrim. The expedition was sponsored by the Russian Imperial
Geographical Society and Turkestan Military Region’s Intelligence bureau due to his
previous close ties with both, which were developed during his service in Central Asia in
the 1890s. Three years later a book summarising the substantial scholarly outcome of the
expedition was published.

It should be mentioned that it was the 1860s-1870s when, along with the
considerable changes in the public life of Russia, the approach towards the scholarly
knowledge within the military began to change. The new approach propagated by Dmitry
Miliutin stipulated the future rapid development of the Russian military Oriental studies.
Miliutin argued that the study of Russia’s Asian neighbours should be comprehensive (not

292 See David van der Oye Schimmelpenninck, “Reforming Military Intelligence,” in
Reforming the Tsar’s Army: military innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to
the Revolution, ed. David van der Oye Schimmelpenninck and Bruce W. Menning
293 See Andreeva, Russia and Iran, 64-67. See also Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriiia, 116, 134.
See Marshall, General Staff, 9, 144-146.
294 See appendix one (Tageev).
limited to mere technical reconnaissance) with the descriptive component being complemented by analysis.295 It was in Miliutin’s time when a system of writing graduation papers similar to preparing a thesis and passing a viva was introduced for the officers of the Russian General Staff Academy, which later evolved also into the preparation of special reports as a result of the officers’ one- to two-year fieldwork carried out in the country of study after graduation from the Academy.296

Furthermore, the development of Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East and the resulting sharp political confrontation with Great Britain dictated that serious efforts in this direction were made, given the increased need for well-trained officers with comprehensive knowledge of the region. In 1863, after the merging of the Department of the General Staff and the Depot of Military Topography into the Headquarters of the General Staff, the status of the Asian Section within the new structure became permanent.297 However, the state bureaucratic mechanism of the Russian Empire slowly realised the vital importance of urgently gaining further expertise on the Orient. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century war operations and military reconnaissance expeditions remained the main if not almost only sources for obtaining information on Oriental countries. Analysing the Oriental studies of that time and acknowledging the direct beneficial correlation of activities, pursuing state interests, and institutionalised Oriental studies, Bartol’d wrote that the study of the Middle East had been possible very often only due to colonial wars.298

At the same time, these power relations could also be characterised by inter-institutional competition and even strife. The Imperial MID still kept the monopoly on dealing with the Orient on behalf of the state and resisted any suggestions for reform that would involve its own structures or would delegate activities to other state entities.299 Several projects for the reorganisation of Oriental studies in Russia failed because they included proposals to change the status of the Educational Section within the MID. The War Ministry’s suggestions for using diplomatic missions and consulates in Asian countries for enhancing military intelligence work suffered the same fate. Military officers

296 See Baskhanov, Russkie, 5-7. See also Marshall, General Staff, 48.
297 See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 139-141.
298 See ibid, 152. See also Bartol’d, “Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka,” 467. See also Marshall, General Staff, 26.
299 See Marshall, General Staff, 16. See also Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 146. See also Bartol’d, “Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka,” 470-480.
working in Persia and Turkey needed cover and the most ingenuous form of cover was diplomatic status; however, the MID was extremely reluctant to provide posts in its missions and consulates to the military.300

However, officers working in Persia were among the first to conclude that for an efficient military intelligence and for later tactical work it was necessary to deploy military agents to the Russian consulates in border and coastal regions of Persia. Colonel Kosagovskii, during his tenure in Persia, repeatedly applied to his top brass in St. Petersburg to obtain the replacement of at least one purely diplomatic employee per consulate with a dedicated military agent on the payroll of the War Ministry, a quest in which he was later also supported by some of his colleagues working on Mesopotamia and Turkey, but which evoked an abrupt and negative response from the MID and resulted in a bitter exchange between the two ministries.301

Throughout the nineteenth century the War Ministry was also completely dependent on the MID in the field of the Oriental studies training of its officers. It was only in 1883 when the War Ministry succeeded in accomplishing what had been demanded by Miliutin: a dedicated course in Oriental languages aimed at officers only was inaugurated under the auspices of the Educational Section at the MID. The curriculum comprised the three main Oriental languages of the time: Persian, Turkish and Arabic. That was also characteristic for the Section itself and the priorities that were being pursued by the Faculty of Oriental Languages of the University of St. Petersburg and Lazarev’s Institute of Oriental Languages in Moscow. It reflected the main trends within Russia’s foreign policy of the second half of the nineteenth century: military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire and competition with Britain in Asia.302

Besides Oriental languages, students were taught Muslim and International Law, French and, after 1907, also English. In general, there was little difference in terms of the academic content of the dedicated officers’ course in comparison with the curriculum of the civilian students because the officers’ course had been designed by the same academics who taught Oriental studies at universities and academic institutes – which speaks much for the influence of scholarly institutions and practices, if not of scholars themselves, yet, on state power. In fact, the courses were even run by them. For instance, Zhukovskii, one

301 RGVIA, f. 446, d. 45(Regarding the appointment of military agents). See Baskhanov, Russkie, 126-127. See also Marshall, General Staff, 124.
of the main scholars in the field of Persian studies of the time, who was the Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Languages in St. Petersburg, was also the director and lecturer of these courses.\textsuperscript{303}

An illustrative example of the contribution of Russian military Oriental studies could be also found in the activities of another military scholar who was among the first graduates of the courses - Aleksandr Tumanskii (1861-1920), Rozen’s disciple, a later General-Major and a prominent scholar in Persian, Turkish, Arabic studies and the main expert of his time on Babism. The would-be coryphaeus of the Soviet Orientology Krachkovskii\textsuperscript{304} mentioned him as ‘an Orientologist by vocation, not by profession’. In 1894 Tumanskii was sent on a reconnaissance mission from the southern Caspian coast through the entire Persian territory right up to the Persian Gulf. Besides the accomplishment of his main professional duties and gathering the necessary material, he obtained a number of precious documents and manuscripts on the Babi sect, copies of which he made available to his teachers – a contribution that was separately pointed out by Rozen.\textsuperscript{305}

In 1908 and 1909 Tumanskii kept visiting Persia on missions, also using them for his scholarly activities. The fact that he also actively participated in activities of the Eastern section of the Russian Imperial Archaeological Society supports the thesis about deep interconnectedness of all Russian Oriental studies institutions. Significantly contributing to the relevant knowledge production, he left multiple works on the history and economy of Persia and a series of works on Babism and translations of key Babi texts, including ‘Ketab-e Aghdas’. He also discovered and translated a tenth-century manuscript of the ‘Hodud-ol’-Alam’, which, however, was published due to Bartol’d’s efforts only in 1930 and in 1937 translated into English by Minorsky, then Professor of Persian studies at the University of London, and Tumanskii’s former colleague in the Russian diplomatic service (at one point Tumanskii served under diplomatic cover in Persia).\textsuperscript{306} In 1911 Tumanskii was appointed head of the Tiflis Regional Training School of Oriental Languages.\textsuperscript{307}

The Tiflis Regional Training School of Oriental Languages, in fact, personified the crucial changes in the system of military officers’ Oriental studies training that took place

\textsuperscript{303} AV, op. 2, d. 22, l. 34-35(Zhukovskii’s correspondence with von-Klemm on curriculum). See Bartol’d, \textit{Istoriiia izucheniiia Vostoka}, 472.

\textsuperscript{304} See appendix one.

\textsuperscript{305} ARAN(St.P.), f. 208, op. 3, d. 496, l. 62ob(Rozen’s letter to Ol’denburg, 07/10/1893).

\textsuperscript{306} RGVIA, f. 409, op. 1, d. 172812, Service Record 148-610, l. 1-23.

\textsuperscript{307} Ibid, l. 20ob.
in 1910-1911 because of a last-minute rush for training military interpreters at a time of serious financial constraints. The debate on the preference of an academic or sheer utilitarian emphasis in Oriental studies within the War Ministry ended up in favour of the latter and resulted in the dismantling of the dedicated officers’ course at the Educational Section of the MID in 1910.\(^{308}\) The War Ministry established its own regional training schools affiliated with the Headquarters Staff of the Turkestan and Caucasus Military Regions with the centres of deployment in Tashkent and Tiflis. The training was changed to eight months of language training to be followed by two years’ of fieldwork.\(^{309}\)

The Turkestan Military Region School, based in Tashkent, was much better prepared to cope with the new situation because its Oriental studies was established on the basis of Urdu courses in 1897, owing its existence to the personal efforts of Staff-Captain Ivan Iagello (1865-1942), who had graduated from the above-mentioned MID dedicated officers’ courses three years after Aleksandr Tumanskii, in 1895. Having learned Persian and Arabic, Iagello was assigned to the Staff of the Turkestan Military Region, which sent him to France where he studied at Paris’ renowned School of Living Oriental Languages, the famous Langues O’, learning Urdu. On his return to Turkestan, Iagello initiated the establishment of Urdu courses, which was followed by starting teaching Persian and Arabic, thus laying the ground for the setting up, in 1908, of a full-scale Officers’ School of Oriental Languages in Tashkent where history, geography and Islamic law were also taught.\(^{310}\)

It is worth mentioning that the nascent Oriental studies activities in Tashkent – and Iagello’s scholarly work in particular\(^{311}\) – were widely criticised by the St. Petersburg scholarly community (of Persian studies) at the turn of the century. The scholars in the capital questioned the idea of establishing a military Oriental studies institution of higher education as propagated in 1902 by the member of Russian Academy of Sciences, Ol’denburg.\(^{312}\) In contrast to him, some representatives of Persian and Central Asia studies, such as Bartol’d, were convinced that the establishment of an institution such as this, far

\(^{308}\) AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 168, l. 1-3ob.(War Ministry correspondence with Zhukovskii).


\(^{310}\) RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1(Asian Section), d. 3522, l. 38-52(Iagello’s activities); op. 2, d. 23872, Service Record 313-964a, l. 3ob.-6.

\(^{311}\) See Marshall, General Staff, 169.

\(^{312}\) See Baskhanov, Russkie, 278. See also Marshall, General Staff, 169-170.
from Russia’s main academic centres and libraries, would not be efficient and could even harm Russian Oriental studies, wasting efforts and funds which could have been used more efficiently elsewhere. Speaking strongly for the thesis on the institutional interplay, it also indicates another support for direct and strong dependency of all Russian Oriental studies on state power. The leading scholars’ opinions and activities played their significant, albeit not decisive, role and deferred the implementation of the project. Finally, the issue was given up because of the lack of state funds – until the state bureaucrats learnt a lesson from the Russian-Japanese War and began gradually comprehending the harm of the dearth of Orientologists to *Russkoe delo*.  

After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 Military Oriental studies became part of the debate within the scholarly community and Russian society on the further development of Oriental studies, which took place on the pages of various periodicals affiliated with ministries, military regions, institutes and societies. So, the enhancement of the role of military Oriental studies in the discourse of *Russkoe delo* resulted in the desperate attempt to re-examine and re-structure its institutional set-up after the war of 1905-1906.  

Under the conditions of financial constraints and lack of time the choice was made in favour of the waiver of a rather wide and strong theoretical education for the sake of practical efficiency and the increase in quantity of graduates. However, as the history showed, this motion had advantages, as well. It laid the foundations of a new institutional form of Russian Oriental studies that was taken up and successfully developed later by the Bolsheviks, namely regional, or peripheral Orientology with specialised scholarly centres in the main cities of the Soviet republics.

As mentioned above, having emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century as a narrowly profiled domain of utilitarian knowledge, by WWI Russian Military Oriental studies had evolved into an organisationally structured self-contained branch of scholarly and practical knowledge, making contributions to the development of adjacent fields of general scholarly knowledge. One of its underlying features was that Military Oriental studies, being an intrinsic part of Russia’s general Orientological knowledge, was developing hand in hand with the Asian policies of the Russian Empire. This immense interconnection with the state’s foreign policy preconditioned the fact that Persian studies

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314 See Bartol’d, “Russkaia nauka,” 543. See also Vigasin and al., eds., *Istoriia*, 73-74.
315 See chapter three.
occupied a prevailing position within Russian Military Oriental studies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

It is also clear that close institutional interconnectedness between the military, diplomatic and scholarly domains resulted in a very dynamic, interrelated development of both the utilitarian and the scholarly knowledge. As is clear from the above, senior military officers were members of various Orientological societies, using their activities and effecting scholarly outcomes, as well as prominent Russian scholars of Persian studies; for instance, Kazem-Bek, Rozen, Bartol’d, Zhukovskii and others had strong ties with the military and played main roles in the Oriental training of officers.317 However, this close organisational interconnectedness also had its disadvantages because if there were disagreements in one area, they would then immediately affect others. The Cause would also considerably suffer from inter-organisational feuding and factions, as was shown above.318

Simultaneously, there were obvious strong discursive components in the activities of institutions and individuals, which consisted of the dichotomy of the promotion of Russkoe delo, implying the protection of the expansionist goals of the Imperial state in the Orient against Western powers, as well as in the civilising role of Russia in the Orient which was stipulated by the affiliation of Russia with the European civilisation.319 However, when it comes to the entities of state power, particularly to the Russian military domain, whose vocation was to protect and promote Russia’s state interests, manifestations of this kind should be regarded as naturally inherent and were much more pronounced than, for example, in the civil scholarly domain.

Thereupon, a lot of supporting evidence could be found in Kosagovskii’s Persian diaries where he presented as his task the need to make the indigenous ‘semi-wild population’ familiar with the Russian way of life or upon the withholding of Russian officers and their units from taking part in punitive actions of the “Asiatic” Persian government towards its people during bread riots, ipso facto stressing the “humane” and “truly civilised” character of the Russian mission.320 Something similar could be also found in Staff-Captain Smirnov’s reports on his activities in the Shah’s Court and in his

317 See Bartol’d, “Istoriia izucheniiia Vostoka,” 446. See also Marshall, General Staff, 24, 164-165, 168. Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 128-129.
318 See Marshall, General Staff, 166.
319 See Khalid, “Russian History,” 691-699. See also Knight, “Response to Khalid,” 701-715.
320 RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 9-10.
correspondence with the Russian Minister to Persia Gartvig.\textsuperscript{321} The above-mentioned two discursive components also distinctly appear in the reports and travelogues of other Russian military officers which were given a scrupulous study in \textit{Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism} by Elena Andreeva. Given the above in application particularly to the military domain, Khalid’s argument on the universality of Said’s model seems to be quite fair in the Russian case; however, Knight’s warning against simplifications and his assumption on the existence of more sophistication turns out to be also justified since the Russian picture, in addition to the traits of Said’s Orientalism, was diversified by Russia’s own discourses on its place between the West and the Orient.

Considering the efficiency of using military Oriental studies by the state it is obvious from the above that, in general, at the turn of the century, lack of funding was one of the main constraints. Even the already mentioned officers’ courses under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry’s Educational Section would not have been established if Russian academics had not proposed to teach for free.\textsuperscript{322} In spite of the understanding which took place in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese war and which can be formulated in the words of Count Vladimir Kokovtsov, the Russian Finance Minister of the time (1904-1914), regarding the imbalance between the foreign policy far-reaching aims and the scant assets in hand, no efficient measures were taken.\textsuperscript{323}

Thus, as Alex Marshall notices in his work \textit{The Russian General Staff}: ‘It was this sense of drift and Imperial overstretch which was to become the dominant concern during the final period of Tsarist military involvement in Asia between 1895 and 1917, and which was to be the predominant theme and topic of criticism for […] military orientalists’.\textsuperscript{324} The Russian Empire simply set up goals in its foreign policies that greatly exceeded its abilities and, in spite of all enormous efforts undertaken by some bright minds, they were doomed to failure – mainly due to Russia’s own economic backwardness. The same is also supported by this notion that, in spite of the fact that by the start of WWI Persia had already become one of the most heated areas of Russian confrontation with the would-be war enemies, Russia did not succeed in properly arranging and using military Oriental studies in that period, and the institutional activities of this domain were significantly disorganised and had almost run dry by 1917.

\textsuperscript{321} See appendix one (Smirnov).
\textsuperscript{322} See Marshall, \textit{General Staff}, 29.
\textsuperscript{323} AVPRI, f. 144‘Persidskii stol’, f. 4028, l. 42. See also Aleksandr Popov, “Stranitsa iz istorii Russkoi politiki v Persii,” \textit{Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’}, no.4-5 (1924): 154 as quoted in N. K. Ter-Oganov, \textit{Zhizn’}, 7.
\textsuperscript{324} Marshall, \textit{General Staff}, 167.
Russian diplomatic service and Oriental studies before 1917

The second half of the nineteenth century is the period of the building-up activity of Russian foreign policy in Asia. After Gorchakov’s appointment to the post of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry, like the whole Russian society in the 1860s and 1870s, underwent a series of reforms. While Gorchakov was totally concentrated on Western affairs, Russian foreign policy in Asia was mainly determined by Egor Kovalevskii, Head of the Asian Department of the Ministry, and a famous expert on the Orient. The diplomatic rivalry with Great Britain became one of the central issues of Russian foreign policy. Due to its strategic location Persia played a key role in this rivalry. From the Russian perspective there was a risk of Britain being able to gain a dominant position in Persia and use this as a staging post for securing an exclusive position of power in Central Asia and in the Persian Gulf region. For this very reason Russia could not allow Britain to bring Persia under her full control. In addition, Persia was also vulnerable to potential political and military penetration on the part of the Ottomans, while Russian commercial interests were also on the rise in Persia.

Given this, and having comprehended the importance of the power/knowledge liaison, the MID took active measures aimed at gaining comprehensive knowledge about the region. The employed practices were similar to those used in two other domains – scholarly and military – enhanced by the strong interconnectedness at institutional and individual levels. So, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed multiple expeditions to Persia, which were organised by the Ministry in alliance with scholarly and military entities. Here, Khanykov’s expedition undertaken in 1857-1859 is a particularly illustrative case in point. Between 1854 and 1857, Nikolai Khanykov served as Consul General in Tabriz before, in 1857, the Ministry charged him with heading an expedition that included several scholars and scientists. Having arrived at Mazandaran Province via the Caspian Sea, the party made its way to Tehran before heading eastward again to explore Khorasan, as well as Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan, and then Tabas, Yazd, Kerman, Esfahan and finally returning home via Tehran. Besides achieving remarkable results in terms of military reconnaissance and the establishment of politically crucial contacts, Khanykov, who was simultaneously a full member of the Russian Imperial Geographical Society, with the help of the other scholars, brought home unprecedentedly

325 See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 116, 136, 140. See also Kulagina, Rossiia i Iran, 128.
326 See Kulagina, Rossiia i Iran, 129. See also Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 140.
327 See Kulagina, Rossiia i Iran, 130.
328 See Kulagina, Iz istorii, 31. See also Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 117.
rich materials on geography, ethnography, economy, history and culture of the visited regions.  

The Ministry succeeded in the considerable increase of Russian influence through the extension of its institutional presence in Persia through opening new consulates. This went hand in hand with the rapidly increasing trade and, as an effect of the latter, a significant growth of the Russian community in Persia. In addition to the Russian Legation in Tehran and the Consulate-General in Tabriz, in the 1880s and 1890s consulates were established in Esfahan, Mashhad, Ahvaz, Anzali and many other Persian cities and towns.

This intensified policy towards Persia implied the availability of sufficient well-trained staff within the Ministry. In the period between 1883 and 1891, Head of the Asian Department of the Ministry was Ivan Zinov’ev (1835-1917), who had for many years worked in Russia’s Legation in Tehran, the Russian Consulate in Rasht, before becoming Consul General in Tabriz and, finally, Russian Envoy Extraordinary to Persia. It is fair to assume that Zinov’ev’s long-term experience in Persia contributed to the considerable intensification of the activities of the Educational Section of Oriental Languages of the Ministry, particularly in the field of Persian studies that occurred in the 1880s.

According to the charter of the Educational Section, initially the emphasis was on training in Persian, Arabic and Turkish. In 1888, the Tatar language was added to the curriculum. As was mentioned earlier, at the time Turkish dialects, mainly Azeri as spoken throughout Northern Persia, were subsumed under the category of Tatar languages. The students were supposed to learn three languages in addition to Muslim and International Law. The training quality of the Section was high even in comparison with academic training, not least since the teaching was carried out by academics from the St. Petersburg Faculty of Oriental Languages. Moreover, the activities of the academic staff were complemented by teaching provided by experienced diplomats and native speakers. The quality of the training in the Section is also witnessed by the fact that, during the

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330 See Father Superior Aleksandr Zarkeshev, *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v Persii-Irane (1597-2001)* [The Russian Orthodox Church in Persia-Iran (1597-2001)] (St.Petersburg: Satis, 2002), 76. See also Vigasin and al., eds., *Istoriia*, 120.

331 See Vigasin and al., eds., *Istoriia*, 123.

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establishment of London’s SOAS, the British Foreign Office asked its Russian counterpart to kindly share its experience and the details of its curriculum.\textsuperscript{332}

It is also notable that during two prolonged periods the Section was headed by scholars of Persian studies, namely Gamazov (1872-1893)\textsuperscript{333} and Zhukovskii. The latter played a particularly important role in the history of the Educational Section. Despite the formidable role which the Section played in the training of Russian diplomats (by 1914 in Persia all diplomatic posts were occupied by graduates of the Section (31 out of 31), in Turkey the proportion was 38 to 31, in Bukhara, 5 to 4),\textsuperscript{334} financial constraints caused by the increasing distance between far-reaching Imperial ambitions and the economic development of Russia would tell upon the Section. At various moments in the early twentieth century, for instance, in 1907 and again in 1912, some high-ranking bureaucrats in the Ministry called for the Section to be closed down because of a shortage of funds.\textsuperscript{335} Again, the inter-play of power relations, expressed herein in institutional interconnectedness and discursive manifestations in the context of \textit{Rosskoe delo}, played their productive role. In many respects, the Section survived due to Zhukovskii’s vigorous efforts. It was he who, appealing to the historical significance of the period for Russian national interests and the crucial necessity of the diversified development of Russian Oriental studies, permanently tried to prove the vital importance of the Section to the public and the people of the Duma, and put forward various projects for its improvement. In 1907 he wrote that universities were not able and must not replace the Section because of the difference in goals and, given the tasks assigned to the Russia of that time, there was no other alternative.\textsuperscript{336}

Mainly due to Zhukovskii’s efforts channelled through the \textit{MID} and the War Ministry, in 1912 the Duma was approached with a project prepared by him and the Asian Department that implied a considerable multi-branch enhancement of the Section: increase in the quantity of students, intensification of training, annual fieldwork missions, adding civil and criminal law of relevant countries to the curriculum, etc. If the Duma had adopted the project, the Section would have been transformed into a powerful centre of Oriental studies for diplomatic and military services.\textsuperscript{337} However, this time the inter-institutional

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{332} AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 183, l. 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{333} See appendix one.
\item \textsuperscript{334} See Vigasin and al., eds., \textit{Istoriia}, 131.
\item \textsuperscript{335} \textit{Rossiia} (Protokoly zasedanii Dumy), April 15, 1912, no. 1969, 3450-3453 in Vigasin and al., eds., \textit{Istoriia}, 129.
\item \textsuperscript{336} AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 183, l. 5-23ob.
\item \textsuperscript{337} AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 185, l. 1-6ob.
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feud represented by the lobbying on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior and, particularly, Lieutenant-General Shvedov, hampered the project. Shvedov was Head of the Imperial Society of Oriental Studies and the President of the Practical Oriental Academy. Moreover, he was close to the court through his devotion to Rasputin and, therefore, much appreciated by Nicolas II’s wife. So, it did not take him much to impede the adoption of the project – it did not even pass through the relevant committee in the Duma. That speaks for the fact of the absence of any well-structured consistent state policy towards Oriental studies in Russia.

Studying the impact of this domain, it is worth mentioning that Russian diplomats themselves made a significant contribution to the production of Orientological knowledge. Along with carrying out their official duties, they would spend their spare time conducting scholarly research or would even spend their own money on artefacts and ancient manuscripts in order to later donate them to Russian museums and universities. Among them the works by the following authors were most notable in terms of their scholarly value: the travel notes by the First Secretary to the Russian Diplomatic Mission in Tehran, Baron K. Bode, *Ot Bosfora do Persidskogo zaliva* by Gamazov, who later became Head of the Educational Section (1873-1892), the book *Rossiia, Angliia i Persiia* (1912) by the earlier-mentioned Zinoviev, Head of the Asian Department. The works of Minorsky – who from the very outset of his diplomatic career was interested in Persian history, ethnography and literature and who ended up as a Corresponding Member of the British Academy of Sciences and Professor of Persian studies in Cambridge – are worth separately mentioning. His works written before 1917 on Babism, on Sufism, and on the Kurds greatly contributed to late Imperial Russian Orientology.

It is also noteworthy that the practice of providing their scholarly teachers with primary sources was rather common and widespread among Russian diplomats. In this respect, the reciprocal institutional interconnectedness was fruitful. Kazem-Bek, Rozen, Zhukovskii and other Persian studies scholars would often receive primary materials from their former students who worked in consulates in Tehran, Tabriz, Rasht and other Persian cities on demand or on a quite voluntary basis.

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339 See Vigasin and al., eds., *Istoriia*, 123.
340 See Bartol’d, “Iran,” 326.
341 See Vigasin and al., eds., *Istoriia*, 133.
In sum, there was a significant departmental contribution of the Russian diplomatic service to Oriental studies. Problems caused by a lack of funding and by inter-agency feuding should not be underestimated and affected Oriental studies activities to a certain extent; however, taking into account the prevailing role of the MID and its monopoly on dealing with foreign countries, it is possible to state that, in terms of organising Oriental studies training, its outcomes and the overall contribution to Russian scholarly knowledge, the Russian diplomatic service was much more successful than the War Ministry. The considerable volume of works on Persia and the scholarly effectiveness of the Ministry’s activities in this field are explained by its important place in the Russian foreign policies of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{342}

In addition to that, from reading the memoirs of Kalmykov, who had been taught by Rozen, Zaleman and young Zhukovskii,\textsuperscript{343} and later became a prominent Russian diplomat, it becomes clear that the Ministry’s strength in this sphere can also be accounted for by a focus on the individuals involved: Persia was considered a difficult posting and serving there did not particularly help with rapid career progression within the diplomatic service. Thus most people who would take up Persian studies within this domain were the individuals who tended to regard this subject as a veritable vocation or indeed as their life cause, which implied the strong presence of romantic perceptions, inherent to Said’s Orientalism,\textsuperscript{344} or, in broader Foucauldian terms, of discursive components, manifested in the sense of a personal mission for “civilising the Orient” and promoting Russian national interests, as well as expressed in simply personal drive for the study of the Orient, which had been significantly stimulated by their teachers.\textsuperscript{345}

Missionary activities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century

The activities undertaken within this domain seem to be of particular interest since, despite its stated peaceful mission, it was, in alliance with all above-mentioned domains, at the front line of the Imperial turf war between Russia and European powers. The Russian Empire would broadly employ clerical scholarly institutions for the purpose of gaining influence among the peoples of other beliefs, particularly among the Muslims in the inner and neighbouring areas. The Russian missionary Oriental studies in both fields, scholarly

\textsuperscript{342}See Iranistika, ed. Kulagina, 31-33. See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriiia, 124.
\textsuperscript{343}ARAN(St.P.), f. 208, op. 3, d. 496, l. 30(Rozen’s letter to Ol’denburg).
\textsuperscript{344}See Said, Orientalism, 224.
\textsuperscript{345}See Andrew D. Kalmykow, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat. Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917 (London: Yale University Press, 1971), 13-17. See also AV, f. 17, op. 2, d. 9(Zhukovskii’s correspondence with Bravin, 23 letters).
and practical, could be a perfect illustration of the thesis on the interconnectedness of state power and knowledge, inter-institutional mutual penetration and the role of discourse.

In spite of the closure of the Faculty of Oriental Languages at Kazan University in 1854, the Russian Imperial state kept the local Oriental studies within the walls of the Kazan Ecclesiastical Academy in the form of teaching Persian, Arabic and the Tatar languages as well as Muslim Law and anti-Islamic polemics. The direct engagement of this institution with state policies and the relevant discourse on the superiority of Russian culture, in particular the superiority of the Orthodox Christianity, is bluntly supported by a speaking for itself organisational feature of this Academy, namely the establishment and functioning of the Chair of Anti-Islamic Subjects. It implied research and training activities aiming at countering Islam from the standpoint of the Russian Orthodoxy. 346

Kazem-Bek’s disciple - professor of Islamic studies Il’minsky - initiated the establishment of this Chair and was the first to head it, as well as being the person who significantly accelerated and promoted the establishing of relevant institutional structures on behalf of the Russian state and the Orthodox clergy for the training of ministers in Oriental studies for missionary activities among Muslims. 347 Special courses on the anti-Islamic polemics were developed and taught by Il’minsky, Malov, Mashanov, Ostroumov – all these scholars of Kazan’s Islamic studies literally fought Islam, heavily relying on their personal beliefs in the superiority of the Orthodox Christianity and sincerely trusting in their beneficial scholarly impact on the state policies towards Muslim peoples. Their scholarly and practical activities were conscientiously adjusted to the Russian state interests which, for them, were inseparable from the Orthodox Christianity.

In this sense, the examples of Mashanov and Ostroumov – who, being committed Orthodox believers and closely engaged in scholarly activities, worked in various state power capacities and actively consulted Russian high-ranking military and diplomatic functionaries – were very indicative within the discourse of promoting Russian interests abroad. 348 These activities also included conventional practices, adopted in three other domains of Russian Oriental studies, namely multi-task mission trips. The instructions

composed by Malov by order of the Kazan Ecclesiastical Academy Council for Mashanov’s two-year mission trip to the Middle Eastern countries, besides the scholarly component, contained substantial missionary tasks. The above-mentioned scholars used to train would-be Orientologists not only for missionary purposes, but also for state power entities. For example, the Interior Ministry was invariably interested in the graduates of the Academy. This Academy also produced some ministers for the Orthodox missionary cause in Persia.

In 1998-2001, noteworthy research was conducted by the Father Superior of St. Nicolas Church in Tehran Aleksandr (Zarkeshev) which resulted in the publication of a book Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v Persii-Irane (1597-2001) (the Russian Orthodox Church in Persia-Iran (1597-2001)). The author made significant efforts in order to reconstruct the history of Russian religious missions to Persia from the reign of Shah Abbas I (1587-1599) to 2001 with the help of the archives of AVPRI, fragments of documents related to missionary activities and the reminiscences of elderly Russian residents in Iran. Though the work does not lack in self-serving discursive connotation concerning the superiority of Orthodox Christianity towards Islam and of all things Russian towards all things Persian and, in this sense, could be well placed in one row with the works of the above-mentioned clerical scholars, it still remains the only relatively comprehensive, albeit rather brief, research on the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in Persia/Iran.

In support of the similarity of the institutional practices of various domains of Russian Oriental studies, the above-mentioned research includes the study of multiple expeditions and mission trips undertaken by Russian clergymen to Persia which resulted in gathering valuable ethnographic and historical material, in particular on the history, traditions, modes of life and cult of the Nestorians in Persia. Based on this information and in line with the foreign policy tasks of Imperial Russia in terms of the peaceful comprehensive penetration into Persia proclaimed by Witte and Kuropatkin, the St. Petersburg Sacred Governing Synod took the decision on the reunification of the Assyrian population of Persia with the Russian Orthodox Church and on the establishment of the Orumiye Russian Orthodox Permanent Mission.

349 See Geraci, Window, 91-92. See also Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 41-42.
350 See Schimmelpenninck, Orientalism, 93-121. See also Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 35-43, 210.
351 See Zarkeshev, Tserkov’, 85. See also Schimmelpenninck, Orientalism, 122.
352 See Zarkeshev, Tserkov’, 68-69, 82, 91.
By the beginning of WWI there were ten Russian Orthodox parishes mainly under Russian diplomatic missions and consulates, and almost forty Orthodox churches under the jurisdiction of the Orumiye Mission. In view of such a broad presence in Persia, on one hand, and given the inertness and even backwardness of the Russian Orthodox Church of that time – which was slightly touched upon by Schimmelpenninck in his book *Russian Orientalism*, on the other hand – Russian clerical institutions in Persia, generally, lacked their own experts on Persian studies, which itself does not speak much for the efficiency of the organisational activities of this domain and of the relevant state participation. However, taking into consideration the underlying factual proximity to and the dependence of the Russian Orthodox Church institutions on Russian state entities in Persia – diplomatic and military – the necessary linguistic and expert assistance was usually provided by them.

Being part of the foreign expansion of late Imperial Russia, the Orthodox missionary activities also implied intensive translation work into Persian and Assyrian, aimed at disseminating religious literature and converting new followers to the Orthodox doctrine, and, in this context, were assisted by Russian-speaking Persian Assyrians. That constituted another feature of this domain that was common to the rest: the accumulating and processing of Orientological knowledge and the sequential exerting of influence, which ultimately results in the production of more power. The activities undertaken by the Russian Orthodox Church in alliance with other Russian Orientological domains on the gathering and studying of local historical, ethnographic and religious data secured its subsequent actions on the precise application of institutional influence to certain areas and peoples of Persia which were the most susceptible to it, and on the production of power in the context of the conjoint national discourse on the promotion of *Russkoe delo*.

**Conclusion**

The above analysis, made partly on the basis of the existing literature and of the relevant primary sources, allows us to ascertain the presence of four main domains in late Imperial Russia’s Oriental studies, namely academic scholarship, the military, diplomatic service and the missionary. This set-up becomes particularly clear when drawing on the example of Persian studies. The trade domain could not play any considerable role in Oriental knowledge production in the context of Russia’s activities in the East because of

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the nascent condition of capitalism inside Russia itself. The above-mentioned four domains were strongly represented within late Imperial Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia. As it appears from the above study, all four domains had been quite well institutionalised by the turn of the twentieth century. However, along with their professional self-consistency, they were closely intertwined. In addition to the close connections between academic training institutions and the entities of the practical application of Orientological knowledge within each professionally defined domain, all these four domains were deeply interconnected at both institutional and individual levels – a fact which has been left in the cold by the above-mentioned participants of the debate on Russian Orientalism but which has crucial importance for the study of power/knowledge relations.

Indeed, the emergence of the academic scholarship of Oriental studies was initially instigated by the demands of Russia’s Eastern policy as well as the fact that the sequential development of Oriental studies, in general, went hand in hand with these demands. Russia’s foreign policy emphasis on the East and, within that, on the neighbouring Persianate world predetermined the role occupied by Persianate studies within Russia’s Orientology. As Tolz points out: ‘[...] Oriental studies was one of the strongest areas of the [Russian] academy’s research. In the period between 1846 and 1924, there were fifteen full members of the academy who were specialists in Oriental studies. The only other field to which more academicians belonged in the same period, was Russian language and literature...’ 357 The research shows that all key members of main scholarly, training and practical institutions within the four domains were individuals who had majored mainly or partly in Persian studies. Persian, Arabic and the Tatar languages (later Turkic languages), which mainly included those spoken in the northern areas of Persia under the classification of the time, invariably were the initial curriculum nucleus of almost all training institutions set up throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. The character of the Russian massive presence in Persia and the development of its modality were reflected at an institutional level in all domains.

The study also demonstrates a significant contribution to Orientological knowledge made by all four domains in Persian studies, particularly by the military, which used the practices of mission trips (reconnaissance) more intensively, considerably contributing to general area-study knowledge at the stage of its primary accumulation. Given the initial connection of military and diplomatic domains to the state power decision-making area, the impact of Oriental studies within these domains on state policies was more palpable. In

357 Tolz, Russian Academicians, 7,192.
the field of solving state power tasks, their significant role could be identified more straightforwardly in comparison with the activities of those individuals who were, first of all, scholars and – only in addition to their “genuine status” – were, one way or another, engaged in state politics. Overlooking this nuance in scholar Grigor’ev’s activities, Knight tries to identify this unequivocal and straightforward impact on state power and, certainly, does not find it. Khalid critically points it out, saying that ‘Knight demands proof of the connection between knowledge and power at such a crudely instrumental level that nothing short of Orientalists issuing marching orders to troops conquering regions of their expertise would satisfy him’; whereas I would argue that in the Russian case the impact of “pure” scholarly institutions and relevant scholars should be mainly sought in their indirect influence on state power.

Although Rozen’s disciples tried to position themselves as impartial and independent from politics (the most sound example was Bartol’d, who tended to call himself and his colleagues ‘closet scholars’), as well as to distance themselves from the Imperial and colonial context of the time, nonetheless they were keen on preserving and expanding the nexus between scholarship and state power, in order to be able to hand down their “correct” beliefs and perceptions of the East to that very state power and, what was more important for them, underscore the discursive importance of Oriental studies for the state, to be able to better promote their scholarly institutions. Therefore, the undertaken study demonstrates that they were much more successful in their latter enterprise. With the exception of inter-domain scholarly societies, which connected the activities of the representatives of all domains, the research did not reveal any direct scholarly Oriental studies effective involvement at an institutional level in late Imperial Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia. However, at an individual level the impact of scholars on the emergence and development of institutions for training practical experts in the three other domains was enormous.

In spite of the vaster diversity of discourses among Russian scholars which was noticed by Knight and scrupulously studied by Tolz, all four domains were relatively coherent in the advancement of Russkoe delo and the comprehension of “civilising mission” when it came to foreign policy activities in the East. The spirit of patriotism – boiled down to the promotion of Imperial Russia’s state interests and Russian culture in Persia, which was mixed with the sense of “civilising mission” and took place against the

358 See Khalid, “Russian History,” 696.
359 Bartol’d, “Russkaia nauka,” 534.
360 See Knight, “Grigor’ev,” 81. See also Tolz, Orient.
backdrop of concomitant turf war with European powers – was generally inherent to the activities of all domains. Simultaneously, in the development of Knight’s argument and contrary to Khalid’s belief in the universality of Said’s model, it is possible to separately mention Russian Oriental studies scholars who were less united on the comprehension of the Russian mission in the Orient. For instance, within the discourse of separating scholarly knowledge from the politics there were also various efforts to dissociate Oriental studies from state power at the institutional level. But these efforts could not change the pattern of the deep involvement of scholarly institutions into training practical specialists and their intense production of country-study knowledge at least potentially for the sequential state utilisation – the thesis that was, actually, glossed over by Knight in his *Grigor’ev in Orenburg*.

Simultaneously, the study could not retrieve any evidence that in late Imperial Russia the state had fully apprehended the direct link between power and knowledge (knowledge is power), which, on the other hand, was ‘the main slogan of scholarship in the nineteenth century’, as Tolz and Knight argue, referring to Grigor’ev’s words.\(^{361}\) There was no well-thought-out and structured politics towards Oriental studies on behalf of the state. It would happen that their very existence in some domains was in question, let alone the lack of its proper funding throughout all domains. The state kept using scholars as a source of primary country-study knowledge and constrained their role mainly within the area of training experts necessary for the state. Using this state interest in them, some scholars played on it to attain the goals of promoting their scholarly institutions under the conditions of lack of funds and of the ensuing choice of priorities by the state.

It consequently appears that the state would generally prefer to foster Oriental studies experts within each domain, directly engaged in state power activities, including the Church, and to resort to their competence rather than to grant access to the political decision-making arena for academic scholars. Contrary to the scholarly domain, Orientological institutions, and even individuals of the three other domains to a significantly greater extent, were capable of directly influencing Imperial Russia’s foreign policy activities towards Persia – a fact which was ignored by the participants of the debate on Russian Orientalism. Neither Knight, referring to Grigor’ev’s tenure with the Ministry of Interior, nor Khalid, contrasting the example of Ostroumov’s service with the War Ministry, paid attention to the fact that their characters could no longer be scrutinised as

\(^{361}\) Tolz, *Orient*, 70. See also Knight, “Grigor’ev,” 74-100. Knight, “Response to Khalid,” 701-715.
academics during their tenures but only as the employees of state power institutions, with all-ensuing consequences which implied much less intellectual autonomy of their activities but far more endowed them with the capabilities of influence on state power.

In general, all participants of the above-mentioned debate agree that Said’s concept of ‘Orientalism is definitely relevant for Russia insofar as it describes the power relations in a concrete Imperial/colonial context’ 362 However, it is clear that the whole debate whirls mainly around Said’s eponymous model and the two-vector relations between knowledge and state power, whereas the gist, I would argue, is in the manifold multi-vector relations of the power/knowledge nexus where power is exerted by all agents of this interplay towards each other: scholars, experts, institutions, discourses, state, etc. Unfortunately, Knight’s attempt to break away from this narrow circle of Said’s model and to return to the origins of the Foucauldian remained mostly unnoticed by the others.363

In addition to the distinctions between the domains it is also possible to point out that since the outset the Russian MID had played the prevailing role in foreign policy activities in terms of the subordination of other state entities, in particular the military. A similar situation was found in terms of the institutional organisation of military Oriental studies, which, in fact, was hosted by the MID. However, throughout the period, especially since the turn of the century, military Oriental studies had begun to gain more self-consistency, exactly as was the case of the relationship between the MID and the War Ministry in Russia’s foreign policy activities, in particular in Persia. It resulted in the establishment of specialised military Orientological institutions in Tashkent, Ashkhabad and Tiflis, in the dismantling of the officers’ courses under the Educational Section in 1910 and in the establishment of Courses in Oriental languages under the staffs of Central Asian military districts by WWI. After 1917 this motion was developed by the Bolsheviks and spread onto all Soviet Oriental studies, which led to the creation of a vast and rather efficient institutional set-up of Oriental studies with centres of specialisation in all Eastern republics of the Soviet Union, which will be studied in the following chapter.

Similarities between the domains were presented by their scholarly and practical Oriental studies’ deep institutional interconnectedness both within each domain and between them, as well as by similar practices in Orientological knowledge production and by significant contribution to general scholarly knowledge. This modality was intrinsic to all three “practical” domains. Their entities would turn into powerful Oriental studies

362 Todorova, “Russian Soul,” 720.
363 See Knight, “Grigor’ev,” 100.
institutions, partly due to the new approaches adopted by the government, partly due to the efforts of separate individuals personally interested in Oriental (Persian) studies.

This phenomenon can be particularly well illustrated by the example of the military domain. Suffice it to remember the Persian Cossack brigade which, in addition to its important political and military role, had become a seminal source of country-study information since Kosagovskii’s tenure. Staff Captain Smirnov’s posting with the Shah’s court (1907-1914), which was to become, first of all, the conductor of Russian cultural influence in Persia and the source of valuable first-hand intelligence on the country, additionally resulted in the production of a series of unique scholarly works in various fields of Persian studies. So the development of Russian Oriental studies went hand in hand with foreign policy and, within the context of late Imperial Russia’s foreign policy in the East, the Oriental studies of all domains was subject to the main discourses of “civilising mission” and promoting Russkoe delo, which, by and large, were directly associated with the core of the foreign activities of the Russian Empire by the representatives of all domains.
Chapter Three
Organisational set-up of early Soviet Oriental studies
(1917-1941)

Introduction
The chapter draws on Soviet and post-Soviet literature on Iran, as well as on the recent Western scholarship studying the developments of Soviet foreign policy towards Persia during the period from 1917 to 1941. The analysis presented in the chapter also includes the data retrieved from archival documents, which helps fill in the gaps existing in the above-mentioned literature and allows researchers to look at the relevant historical events from a different perspective. The underlying aim of the chapter is to present a comprehensive analysis, at the institutional level, of the emergence and activities of the scholarly, military and diplomatic structures which dealt with Persia during more than two decades after the collapse of the Tsarist power. Naturally, this comprises the study of institutional practices within three early Soviet Orientological domains. I also touch upon the relevant discourses which influenced the establishment and development of these institutions and secured their tight nexus with the Soviet state policy towards Persia. Therefore, the chapter mainly answers the research questions on the organisation of early Soviet institutions for the study of Persia/Iran and on the technicality of the involvement of academic scholars and practical experts in Soviet Persian foreign policy, as well as gives a partial answer to the question on the efficiency of the bringing into play of Orientological scholarship by the early Soviet state which, later, will be supplemented by the case studies of chapter five.

In order to better situate the organisational activities in question within the field of foreign policy the chapter is divided into two chronological periods, embracing two different courses of early Soviet policy towards Persia, namely 1917-1921 and 1921-1941. The former is the period of the attempted forced sovietisation of Persia, whereas the latter is the period of the gradual cultivation of Persian society for social conversion via the support of the national bourgeois government. For both periods, the academic domain is studied after the other two (military and diplomatic) because of its total marginalisation from the decision-making and operational fields of Soviet Persian policy that happened after 1917. For the second period, the study of the military and diplomatic domains is merged into one section because of the absence of Oriental studies training institutions
within the latter until the early 1930s and the immense overlapping, at the institutional and individual levels, of both in the operational field.

**Political context of Russian-Persian relationships in 1917-1921**

As in the previous period, the Russian-Persian relationships after 1917 remained deeply affected by the factors of international politics. Persia, as before, was the arena of the close fight between the main European powers. This time, the political games were complicated by military operations which had been held on Persian territory. With the outbreak of WWI, considerable changes took place in the British policy towards Persia in terms of strategic goals. Great Britain no longer intended to keep Persia as a buffer zone between Russia and the colonial possessions in India and embarked upon the road of separating the southern part of Persia to secure its access to the Persian Gulf oil. In 1914-1915, the British policy aimed at decentralisation of Persia was repeatedly reported to St. Petersburg by the Russian minister in Persia, Korostovets. In 1915, the British Foreign Office officially proposed to revise the Convention of 1907 in part to assign the neutral stripe to the British zone. It should be mentioned that similar ideas were wandering in the Russian MID regarding the northern parts of Persia. They were even aired by Minorsky and Smirnov as early as 1909.

The Soviet and post-Soviet scholarship on Iran is unanimous in that such political rapprochement between Russia and Britain on the eve of WWI caused the relevant counteraction on behalf of Germany and Turkey which skilfully took advantage of the increased inner dissatisfaction of all strata of the Persian society with these Anglo-Russian intensified policies. The increased national-patriotic spirit of Iranians was also encouraged by German-Turkish pan-Islamism and anti British-Russian propaganda. All these factors led to the weakening of Russian political influence and to the growth of antipathy towards Russians. They also created the fertile soil for the German-Turkish politico-economic

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365 See Captain Noel’s letter to Sir Percy Sykes which was intercepted by Germans, later handed over to Russians, and is still kept in AVPRF(f. 028, op. 10, d. 11, papka 31, l. 8-9). See also AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 502, l. 1(Minorsky on Captain Noel’s report, 1918).


367 GNCM, f. 39, d. 12, 73ob-75; d. 11, l. 3, 16ob. On Minorsky’s *Azerbaijan Project of 1909* and his efforts to revive it in 1917 see also Aliev, *Istoriia Iran*, 90-91.

penetration on the eve of the war and for the successfully rapid military occupation of the western and southern parts of Persia by 1915.\textsuperscript{369}

Therefore, the forecast held in the military intelligence reports of 1889 and 1899 on the peril of ‘drawing Persia into war by other hostile states’ came true.\textsuperscript{370} Though Russian troops prevented the coup prepared by Germans and Turks and, by early 1916, Russian troops recaptured Qom, Karaj, Hamadan, Kermanshah, it took considerable military efforts and the bringing of new troops into Persia. It also left Russian troops in solitude in the hostile environment of the Kurds and other nomadic tribes. The following events of 1917 in Russia resulted, generally, in the massive desertion of Russian troops in Persia and, by the summer of 1917, in the collapse of the Persian front.\textsuperscript{371}

After the February Revolution, the previous Imperial foreign policy towards Persia was reconsidered from a new angle. Though in her book, \textit{Russia and Iran (19\textsuperscript{th} - the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century)}, Kulagina argues that ‘[...] the Provisional Government made no changes in Russian-Iranian relationships\textsuperscript{372} and it corresponds to Lenin’s characterisation of the Provisional Government policies towards Persia,\textsuperscript{373} the works by other scholars such as Aliev and Genis present the evidence of intensive exchange of correspondence on the issue between Minorsky, the acting Head of the Russian diplomatic mission in Persia, and two Ministers for foreign affairs of the Provisional Government, Miliukov and Tereshenko. Indeed, judging by the documents of Minorsky’s private collection,\textsuperscript{374} all participants confirmed Russia’s adherence to all previous agreements with Britain; however, they acknowledged the underlying need to conduct Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia based on new democratic principles, corresponding to the new republican status of Russia. Finally, Minorsky received direct instructions on non-counteracting to any democratic manifestations, on supporting liberal nationalistic movements and on severing all kinds of overt support for reactionary elements. Minorsky also tried to return to his project of creating the Persian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan autonomous democratic republics and

\textsuperscript{369} See Zarkeshev, \textit{Tserkov’}, 110-111.
\textsuperscript{370} See Marshall, \textit{General Staff}, 108.
\textsuperscript{372} See Kulagina, \textit{Rossiia i Iran}, 194.
\textsuperscript{373} See V. I. Lenin, “Rech ob otnoshenii k Vremennomu pravitel’stvu na Pervom Vserossiiskii s’ezde Sovetov rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov, 3-24 iiunia 1917 g.,” in \textit{Sobranie sochinenii}, vol. 32 (Moscow: Progress, 1970), 268.
\textsuperscript{374} AV, f. 134, op. 2, d. 197(Minorsky’s correspondence with the Ministry, 1916-1917), l. 1-50; d. 211(Apr.1917-June.1917), l. 1-14.
transforming the Persian negative perception of Russia. However, the Bolshevik coup brought a halt to all the plans.

On the third of December, 1917, the Bolshevik government published an appeal “To all labouring Muslims of Russia and the Orient” – a crucial document that laid official principles of the new foreign policy towards Persia. The Soviet government announced the abolition of all agreements and conventions infringing on the rights and interests of Persia as well as the repudiation of all Imperial Russian property and financial assets in Persia. However, this motion resulted in gaining the sympathy of nationalist and liberal groups of the Persian society and did not secure the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations between Persia and the Bolshevik government. Using that as a pretext, and following their own political expediency, since 1918, the Soviet government had launched a rapidly intensifying campaign supporting the armed nationalist movements in Persia, aiming to stir up the socialist revolution.

In this sense, a noteworthy piece of research by Oliver Bast was published in 2006. The author scrupulously traced the twists and turns of the organisation of the abortive Persian Socialist Revolution during 1919-1920 and the significant contribution made to this process by local Bolsheviks from Turkestan, Azerbaijan and Persia itself. The relevant inspiration for such activities was overtly derived from Stalin’s inaugural speech at the First Congress of the Communists-Muslims in November 1918 and from Lenin’s inaugural speech at the Second All-Russia Congress of the Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the Orient. Although nothing was said about military intervention, the debate on this issue and, finally, the working design was circulated in secret between

375 Ibid, d. 197(Minorsky’s correspondence with Miliukov), l. 1-3, 6, 23, 24ob, 43-44.
377 See also Kulagina, Rossiiia i Iran, 195, 200.
378 The Bolshevik leaders reckoned that their young socialist state could not survive in the hostile environment of capitalist countries. On the other hand, in 1918-1919 it became clear that so much anticipated socialist revolutions in main European states were delayed. Having realised it, they had to seek an alternative in the Orient (see Moisei Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia. O sovetskom vtorzhenii v Iran i Bukharu v 1920-1921) (Moscow: Izdatel’skii Dom ‘Muravei-Gaid’, 1999), 11-15).
379 AVPRF, f. 04, op. 18, d. 50638, papka 109, l. 1ob.
381 See Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia, 12, 17, 18.
Trotsky, Lenin, Zinoviev and other leaders, in their relevant correspondence, reports and the protocols of special sessions.\(^{382}\)

By the early 1920s, the main ‘strike directions’ about which Trotsky had been speaking\(^ {383}\) were chosen, namely India and Persia.\(^ {384}\) Shortly before, in August 1919, the Soviet government issued an appeal “To the workers and peasants of Persia”, which debunked the just-signed British-Persian Agreement and announced its refutation of it.\(^ {385}\) Under these circumstances, following Lenin’s and Trotsky’s orders, in late 1919-early 1920 the Soviet government organised a special centre in Turkestan which was supposed to become the military, industrial, financial and scholarly base for the forthcoming socialist revolution in Persia. Lenin particularly emphasised the necessity to organise a centre for propaganda in Tashkent among the neighbouring countries’ Muslims.\(^ {386}\)

However, in their studies both Bast and Persits overlooked the crucial roles played in the above-mentioned activities by former Tsarist Orientologists Nikolai Bravin and Ivan Iagello, discussed in chapters two, four and five of the thesis. Without them, the Bolsheviks would have been unable to so rapidly and qualitatively unfold Oriental studies training of their agents on such a scale. In this sense, the current commander of the Persian Cossacks in Khorasan, Colonel Starosel’skii’s, report to the Russian Minister in Persia, von-Etter, about Bolshevik activities in the region is noteworthy. In the end, he emphasises: ‘The Persian Iomuds have totally been converted by Bolsheviks [...] The Bolsheviks’ propaganda is carried out by them on a grand scale for which they spend huge resources. In Tashkent, there was established a special school for propaganda in all local dialects. The Propaganda Section is headed by Bravin, famous in Persia’.\(^ {387}\) The example of Bravin and Iagello’s activities and of their results clearly supports postulations on the productivity of power relations intensified by the interplay of expert knowledge and the enhanced capabilities vested in these individuals.

Unfortunately, the role of the former Tsarist experts is not even touched upon in another fundamental work, either, namely Red Persia by Vladimir Genis; however, the work presents a valuable, detailed account of the attempted military sovietisation of Persia.

\(^{382}\) Ibid, 19-20, 23, 33.
\(^{383}\) Ibid, 22.
\(^{384}\) Ibid, 27.
\(^{385}\) See Mamedova, “Istoriia Sovetskogo-Iranskih otnoshenii,” 158-159. See also Aliev, Istoriia Irana, 98.
\(^{387}\) AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 212(Starosel’skii’s report to von-Etter), l. 13-19ob.
Genis’ emphasis is on Bolshevik military activities in Persia that followed the intensified combat actions undertaken in Gilan by the armed insurgents with Mirza Kuchek-Khan as Head of the nationalist movement. They were holding active combat operations against the corps of General Dunsterville, who were on their way to Baku. The British troops supported by the Shah’s forces – consisting, in fact, of the Russian Cossacks, headed by Colonel Staroselskii – succeeded in cracking down on the jangalis who, in January 1920, had to sign a peaceful agreement.\textsuperscript{388} However, during the next months the representatives of Persian insurgents took part in meetings among the Bolshevik leaders regarding the military sovietisation of Persia.\textsuperscript{389}

On 18th May 1920, the Soviet troops, headed by Fedor Raskolnikov\textsuperscript{390}, with the help of the Volga-Caspian fleet ships captured Anzali and the neighbouring areas. Shortly after, on capturing Rasht on 4th June, the establishment of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Persia was declared. The Vice People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Karakhan, following Trotsky’s orders, gave the instructions to organise state administrative and military apparatus consisting of undercover Soviet citizens but financed from local funds. Traces of the official Soviet presence were not supposed to be seen and even the troops who had come from Russia were instructed to act under the colours of the local communist party – at worse, of the Azerbaijan Autonomous Republic.

In this respect, Trotsky’s wording, which was in full conformity with the current discourse on the forced sovietisation of the Orient, is rather illustrative: ‘[...] Fourth – to secretly create and to leave a vast Soviet organisation in Persia. To force them to understand that we have nothing against the people of Persia and we are not going to seize anything in the Orient.’\textsuperscript{391} (italics supplied) Raskol’nikov was also ordered to organise a powerful propaganda establishment in Persia.\textsuperscript{392} All this demanded a significant quantity of Persian studies specialists.

\textsuperscript{390} See appendix one.  
\textsuperscript{391} RGVA, f. 157(The Revolutionary Military Council of the First Army), op. 8, d. 7, l. 11(Trotsky’s cable).  
\textsuperscript{392} Ibid, 3, 3ob, 11.
Soviet military Oriental studies, 1917-1921

Taking into consideration the great extent of Russia’s involvement in WWI and the concentration of its military activities in the western direction, Russia was able to pay much less attention to its activities in the Orient. Troops even for the Persian Front, which was, in fact, the south-eastern flank of the War theatre, would be allocated with significant difficulties. In support of this, Marshall writes: ‘Over the course of the subsequent World War the establishment of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff itself withered on the vine as a natural consequence of the concentration of all material and human resources upon the western frontier.’ After 1915, there were only two officers left in the Asian Department, processing both routine work and country-study material.

In 1917, a certain Colonel Smirnov was offered to the Department as a desk-head by the Headquarters of the Caucasus Military region. It was that very Konstantin Nikolaevich Smirnov who had served at the Qajar Court as a tutor of Heir to the Throne Ahmad-Mirza (1907-1914), and then served in the Headquarters of the Caucasus army in intelligence and counter-intelligence sections. Ter-Oganov separately points out that, having written a considerable number of works on Persian history, ethnography and economy, Smirnov – a high-ranking military officer - had also been known as a scholar of Persian studies by that time. However, Ter-Oganov does not go further than enumerating Smirnov’s merits and does not study their implications, whereas I would argue that, according to conventional institutional practices of the time, Smirnov’s scholarly record was supposed to become a decisive factor in his nomination for the post, significantly contributing to the production of Orientological knowledge within the domain.

Marshall also notices the potential operational significance of this nomination, writing that Smirnov’s forthcoming appointment was meant to rescue the Department from reassignment to the Ministry of Interior and, thus, its virtual dismantling; however, the October coup complemented the demise of the Department, bringing a palpable rupture. As we can see, similarly to Minorsky’s case in the diplomatic domain, scholarly expertise really was an added value not only for personal interests of individuals but also for the

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393 See Aleksandr Shishov, Persidskii front (1909-1918) (Moscow: Izdatel’skii dom Veche, 2010), 175.
394 Marshall, General Staff, 174.
395 GNCM, f. 39, d. 3-3ob.
397 See Marshall, General Staff, 174.
production of knowledge itself, and the state had learnt to value its ad hoc scholars within each practical domain by the end of the late Imperial period.\textsuperscript{398}

Having in mind the forthcoming military activities on the southern direction, in particular in Persia, the Bolshevik government realised that the designed sovietisation of Persia would be impossible without relevant experts or, at least, people speaking Persian. Following Lenin’s and Trotsky’s orders regarding the organisation of a ‘military-industrial base in Turkestan’,\textsuperscript{399} the Chief Commander of the \textit{Turkfront}, M. V. Frunze,\textsuperscript{400} invited the former Head of the Tashkent Officers’ School, Colonel Iagello, to organise and to head the training in Oriental Languages in Tashkent.\textsuperscript{401} Thus, in 1919, the Turkestan Oriental Institute began its work.\textsuperscript{402}

Furthermore, three months before Raskol’nikov’s landing in Anzali, on 16 February 1920, the \textit{Revvoensoviet} of the RSFSR ordered the \textit{Razvedupr} ‘to organise agent reconnaissance on large scales’ in, first of all, those countries with which the possibility of a military clash was most likely. Among those countries were Persia, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{403} Based on the experience of Soviet activities in the north of Persia during spring-summer 1920, which even more revealed the extreme dearth of specialists on Persia, in October the \textit{Revvoensoviet} of the Turkestan Front introduced a separate military curriculum within the institute which in 1922 resulted in the establishment of the Tashkent Higher Military School of Oriental studies.\textsuperscript{404}

In the same year, a successor to the former Asian Department – the Oriental Section of the General Staff of the Red Army – was established. According to Order 137, signed on 20 January 1920 by Head of \textit{Revvoensoviet} Trotsky, its educational part, called the Oriental Section, was organised and subordinated to the Academy of the General Staff. In addition to Persian, Arabic, Turkish and other Oriental languages, the curriculum consisted of such subjects as Muslim Law, country-study, military geography, history and practice of diplomacy, trade law and others.\textsuperscript{405} The section trained specialists in Oriental studies for

\textsuperscript{398} See Minorsky’s case in chapter four of the thesis.
\textsuperscript{399} Persits, \textit{Zastenchivaia interventsiia}, 26.
\textsuperscript{400} See appendix one.
\textsuperscript{401} RGVA, f. 400, op. 1(Asian section), d. 3522, l. 38-52. See Marshall, \textit{General Staff}, 189-190.
\textsuperscript{403} See A. I. Kolpakidi and D. P. Prokhorov, \textit{Imperiia GRU. Ocherki istorii Rossiskoi voennoi razvedki} (Moscow: OLMA_PRESS, 1999), 47.
\textsuperscript{404} See S. Vucinich, “The Structure,” 56-57.
\textsuperscript{405} RGVA, f. 11, op. 1, d. 186, l. 15-20ob.(Vostochnoe otdelenie).
both the military and Soviet diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{406} In the period of 1919-1921, the Academy was headed by the former Tsarist General, Andrey Snesarev.\textsuperscript{407} As is clear from the above, and supported by Stephan Conermann,\textsuperscript{408} Said’s orientalist nexus is most evident in early Soviet Oriental studies, where the Soviet military domain, I would argue, became its supreme manifestation during the period 1917-1921.

‘In the immediate course and aftermath of the Civil War, Russia’s new rulers found themselves in a terrifying state of strategic and scientific ignorance.’\textsuperscript{409} The Bolshevik government realised that it simply could not do without former Imperial military and scholarly experts. Having forgotten its distrust towards them, the government decided to use them for solving current practical tasks and bringing up a new generation of Soviet scholars and experts. Following this principle, it employed such experienced military experts and simultaneously eminent scholars of Persian studies as General Snesarev, Colonel Iagello, Colonel Smirnov and others.

General Snesarev\textsuperscript{410} was an expert on a broad spectrum of studies, including Persia and Afghanistan, and by right received the fame as the founder of the Soviet Military Oriental studies.\textsuperscript{411} Due to the administrative efforts and scholarly contribution of Snesarev, the Oriental Faculty of the Military Academy, in addition to military and diplomatic Orientologists, was also extremely efficient in training scholars of Oriental studies in various fields: linguistics, history, economics and others.\textsuperscript{412} Throughout a period of five years this military scholarly institution provided three-quarters of the whole Soviet diplomatic and military staff in the Near and Middle East,\textsuperscript{413} among whom were a future Ambassador to Persia and a Soviet scholar on Persia, Sergei Pastukhov (1933-1935), as well as a legendary notorious revolutionary-terrorist, Head of Trotsky’s personal security guard, one of the founders of the Communist Party of Persia, a member of its Central

\textsuperscript{406} See S. Vucinich, “The Structure,” 56. See also Kuznetsova, Iz istorii, 12.
\textsuperscript{407} AV, op. 1, d. 202 and d. 204.
\textsuperscript{409} Marshall, General Staff, 189.
\textsuperscript{410} See Baskhanov, Russkie, 217-220.
\textsuperscript{411} See Baziiants, “Iz istorii,” 56. See also Marshall, General Staff, 190-191.
\textsuperscript{412} RGVA, f. 11, op. 1, d. 186, l. 18. See also Kuznetsova, Iz istorii, 12.
\textsuperscript{413} See Marshall, General Staff, 191.
Committee, a military Commissar of the Red Army of Persia, unaccomplished Head of Cheka of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Persia – Iakov Bliumkin (1900-1929).^414

Taking the above into consideration, it is possible to conclude that, although WWI and the following events of the first post-1917 years had an enormous adverse impact on the organisational structure of the military domain and its ability to contribute to scholarly knowledge, the Bolsheviks’ readiness to incorporate the inherited expertise into the process of exerting new foreign policy and to overwhelmingly invest in the direct “state power/knowledge nexus” resulted in a quick overcoming of ruptures and in reviving continuities from imperial institutional practices, albeit with considerable qualitative transformations. In other words, one of the main features of the above-studied period was that the new government had to employ the Imperial experts and scholars in order to reach out with its current political agenda and these people tried to extract lessons from their past experience and to reform Military Oriental studies the way they had reckoned it expedient before 1917, when lacked state support. They also secured the transfer of imperial institutional practices on bringing in scholarly active officers-vostochniki for training new specialists which would be implemented later in the 1930s, as new Soviet Iranists with practical knowledge returned from abroad.^415

Another underlying feature was the scale of activities undertaken by the state in this field. Following its ambitious and sometimes hectic political agenda, the Bolshevik government spared no moral and tangible efforts to, in the shortest possible period, cover its needs in Oriental studies knowledge and, more importantly, in trained military Orientologists. It would adversely tell upon the quality of training but had positive organisational outcomes in terms of the institutional extension of Oriental studies from a long-term perspective.

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^415 See Vashurina, “Rodoslovnaia voennykh perevodchikov”. The term vostochniki derives from Vostok (‘the East’ or ‘the Orient’ in Russian) and officially was used in late Imperial Russia for differentiating the military officers and the employees of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs from their colleagues who had not received the appropriate Oriental studies’ training. It can be translated as ‘orientalist’. Since the early 1920s a term vostokoved (‘orientologist’) has officially been used for everyone professionally trained in Oriental studies. The latter sounds more scholarly in Russian.
Soviet diplomatic service and Oriental studies, 1917-1921

There is neither English- nor Russian-language scholarship specifically dedicated to the institutional activities of the Oriental Section of the Bolshevik successor to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, there is little profound ad hoc literature studying its institutional activities in general because of the regime of secrecy and the hampered access to its post-1917 archive – the old-fashioned Soviet practices which are still unjustifiably maintained by Russia’s current political establishment. However, there are noteworthy recent works such as, for example, *Russian and Soviet Diplomacy, 1900-1939* by Alastair Kocho-Williams, who tried to emphasise continuities rather than stunning differences in the activities of the new institution, whereas I would argue that its nature was based much more on a rupture than continuities – at least, for its Oriental Section.416

In view of the fact that after the October coup the staff of the MID refused to fulfil the orders of the Bolsheviks, on 13 November 1917 all operating employees of the Ministry were fired. The day after, the process of the creation of its successor – the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs – began from scratch. By the end of November, the new structure had a modest but quite workable organisational set-up: the Commissar for Foreign Affairs had two assistants, supervising two main sections – Western and Oriental. The operating personnel counted less than 20 people.417 So it is not surprising that, during the first years after the Revolution, the organisation of any training in Oriental studies within the diplomatic domain was out of the question.

Similarly to the military domain, as a start, the Bolshevik government decided to draw to its side the former Imperial experts. In November 1917, the then Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky, sent a cable to all Russian consulates in Persia, containing the demand to accept new Soviet power. Nikolai Bravin, Head of Vice-Consulate in Khoi, was the only one who took up the call of the new power – the only one out of several dozen

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staff of Russian diplomatic entities working in Persia at that moment. Under Trotsky’s order he was immediately appointed the Soviet diplomatic representative in Persia.

However, Bravin’s credentials were not accepted by the Persian Court. As Minorsky pointed out later, this failure and the fact that Bravin had to experience public loathing on behalf of the Russian colony, in general, and from all his former colleagues, in particular, during several consecutive months, eventually made him give up his mission and return to Russia in summer 1918, without Moscow authorisation. The above-mentioned situation testifies to significant ruptures at the institutional and individual levels within the diplomatic domain over the 1917 watershed, whose former staff were reluctant to associate themselves with the new power, arguably because of a huge difference in social status between them and the image of the new polity.

The following developments prove the fact that nobody in Petrograd and in Moscow was ready to cooperate, either. In the summer of 1918, Vice-Commissar Karakhan, supervising Oriental countries, entrusted Head of the People’s Commissars Council in Baku Shaumian with choosing another candidature. Thus Ivan Kolomiitsev, aged twenty-six, became a new Soviet diplomatic representative in Persia. Shaumian chose him because of his alleged knowledge of Persia and that he was known among the Azeri Bolsheviks by his revolutionary activities while he served with Russian troops in the north of Persia. As Kolomiitsev wrote himself, he spoke fluent Persian and French and had worked for more than a year in Persia. In the current situation, that was more than enough for the new state.

It is worth mentioning that, based on biographical information found in a few works on the issue, including the work Tak nachinalsia Narkomindel, before the war Kolomiitsev studied at certain commercial courses and in 1916 was sent, at the rank of warrant officer, to Russian troops in Persia with the assignment of identification of the Bolshevik agents in the army, albeit, ultimately, he joined them himself, having become a member of the Party in 1917. This information leads to the assumption that he was one of the graduates of those courses under the Practical Oriental Academy that had been

419 AVPRF, f. 94, op. 2, d. 1, papka 1, l. 4 (Chicherin’s diplomatic notes to the Persian Government).
420 AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 224, l. 1-3ob.
421 AVPRF, f. 04, op. 18, d. 50638, papka 109, l. 5.
422 See Zarnitsky, Tak nachinalsia Narkomindel, 225-226.
organised by the Interior Minister Shvedov and Colonel Snesarev in 1911 and went to Persia as the agent of Okhranka. The long and the short of it is that Kolomiitsev’s first mission in Tehran was smashed by the Cossacks and the British, and when in 1919 he was again sent to Tehran with a special appeal from the Soviet government he was intercepted by the Cossacks and arbitrarily executed.

Given the importance which the Bolsheviks assigned to their revolutionary activities in the Persianate world, by late 1920 – the time when the Persian policy started to switch from aiming at the organisation of an immediate revolution to cultivating national bourgeoisie – in addition to the Oriental Faculty of the Military Academy, which was the main scholarly training institution covering the needs of NKID, a number of others had already been established. In 1918, the Institute of Oriental Languages was established in Kiev and shortly after transformed to the Institute of Foreign Relations. Under the decree of the People’s Commissars Council, on 7 September 1920, the Central Institute of Living Oriental Languages was set up. It was immediately assigned the status of a military entity and the graduates were supposed to work either for the military or the Soviet diplomatic service. This is another testimony to the fact that, in contrast with the preceding period, after 1917 the military domain prevailed upon the diplomatic one both at organisational level and in Orientological training.

In general, the above-studied period brought to diplomatic Oriental studies much more disruption than to the other two domains, namely military and academic. Old, experienced specialists were discursively excluded from the field but new ones had not been nurtured, yet. During the period in question, the Bolsheviks realised their inability to successfully tackle such a subtle issue as diplomacy in the Orient and took up the policy of accelerated training of new experts on the basis of the two other domains, mainly the military one. Simultaneously, significant efforts were undertaken for creating a new preliminary organisational basis for the would-be Marxist diplomatic Oriental studies

423 AV, f. 115, op. 2, d. 50(Snesarev’s correspondence with Shvedov), l. 1, 3 and 6. See also chapter two.
424 AVPRF, f. 94, op. 4, d. 4, papka 2, l. 5-5ob.(Chicherin to Raskol’nikov, 20.05.1920).
425 See appendix one (Kolomiitsev).
426 See Kononov, Vostokovedenie, 24-25.
428 See Kuznetsova, Iz istorii sovetskogo vostokovedeniia, 12-13.
429 Ibid, 11.
which later transformed into a substantial contribution to the new Marxist Orientological knowledge.\footnote{See Michael Kemper, “The Soviet Discourse on the Origin and Class Character of Islam, 1923-1933,” Die Welt des Islams 49 (2009), 2. See also Kemper, “Red Orientalism,” 452-458.}

\textbf{Soviet Oriental studies scholarship set-up in 1917-1921}

The disruption caused by the events of the revolutions also told upon the Oriental studies scholarly community which, instead of carrying out its scholarly activities, had to get down to arranging its relationships with the new state power. After long and multiple discussions within the walls of the Academy of Sciences, academicians embarked upon the road of cautious cooperation with the Bolshevik state.\footnote{See Baziiants, “Iz istorii,” 18-19.} However, in addition to political contradictions of a new everyday social life, the main difficulty which Russian academic Oriental studies encountered after the Bolshevik coup was the advised necessity of changing methodology. ‘It was the so called new Soviet Orientology the major task of which was defined as the study of national-liberation movements and the problems of socio-political and economic life of the countries and peoples of the Orient mainly during the modern history and based on the Marxist methodology.’\footnote{Aleksandr Tamazishvili, “Vladimir Aleksandrovich Gurko-Kriazhin: sud’ba boitsa “vostokovednogo fronta”,” in Neizvestnye stranitsy otechestvennogo vostokovedenia, ed. Vladimir Naumkin (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2008), 44.} Such an attitude posed the question regarding the usability of Orientological knowledge and became the foundation for the emergence and rapid development of the discourse on the expedient utilitarianism of Oriental studies for state interests.

The new polity needed Orientological knowledge, first of all, for assisting in the organisation of revolution in the oppressed Orient.\footnote{GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 5(constitutive documents of Oriental studies institutes), l. 41-49, 52-54ob.} Consequentially, the former Imperial Oriental studies which had paid allegedly too much attention to ancient and medieval history and “abstract” linguistics needed to be changed from within and organisationally restructured in order to serve the goals of the world revolution. Simultaneously, in view of the politically vital importance of the issue, the new state urgently needed the expansion of this scholarly field both in terms of increased output and the adaptation of the new
methodology, the combination of which was to result in producing a great number of specialists, trained in full conformity with this new methodology.\(^{434}\)

The organisational changes in Soviet academic Oriental studies started from the unsuccessful attempt to reorganise and then to close down the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in Moscow.\(^{435}\) The problem was that the elaboration of the project of reorganisation was entrusted to Academician Nikolay Marr\(^{436}\) who, realising the uniqueness of such a scholarly educational institution (secondary and higher schools together), engaged other academicians (Bartold, Ol’denburg, Orbelli) in the work, trying to enhance its positive unique features for the sake of a better scholarly outcome.\(^{437}\) However, his final project drastically diverged with the demands of the Bolsheviks. He did not succeed in, as Pavlovich put it, ‘bringing scholarly knowledge closer to the political struggle of the Soviet country and of the peoples of the Orient’.\(^{438}\)

Therefore, the Institute was doomed to closure. Only Maksim Gorkii could save the Institute by writing a letter to Lenin and proposing the establishment of the Institute of Oriental Studies. Lenin supported the idea and authorised the *Narkomnats* to organise the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow and the Petrograd Institute of Living Oriental Languages. Mikhail Pavlovich, who at that time lived in Moscow, was appointed the first director of the Institute.\(^{439}\) So the precious staff of Persian, Arabic and Turkish studies (in the Lazarev Institute only these three fields had been left by 1917) were transferred to the Institute of Oriental Studies and, on 4 March 1919, a new Armenian Institute was created on the basis of the Lazarev Institute which dealt only with Armenian studies.\(^{440}\) However, the demand for new Marxist scholars and experts of Oriental studies was far from being met and, on 7 September 1920, Lenin signed the decree on the establishment of the Central Institute of Living Oriental Languages in Moscow, too.\(^{441}\)


\(^{435}\) See also Baziiants, “Iz istorii,” 50.

\(^{436}\) See appendix one.

\(^{437}\) See also Baziiants, “Iz istorii,” 51.

\(^{438}\) Ibid, 52.

\(^{439}\) Georgii Ezhov, “Polveka tomu nazad v Tegerane (Otryvki iz vospominani sovremennnika),” in *Iran. Istoriiia, ekonomika, kulturа (Pamiati Salekha Mamedovichа Alieva)* (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniia RAN, 2009), 79.


\(^{441}\) See Baziiants, “Iz istorii,” 54.
In general, Gorkii played a very important role in securing institutional interests of Soviet Oriental studies.\textsuperscript{442} The above-mentioned developments clearly show that, in contrast with the late Imperial period, after 1917 academic scholars began to lose their relative institutional autonomy in solving organisational affairs within their domain. The state interference with the pure scholarly domain produced indirect counter-action within the Foucauldian grid of power relations, which resulted in the emergence of the phenomenon, pointed out by Krementsov, namely ‘spokesmen’ and ‘patrons’.\textsuperscript{443} Given his acquaintance with Lenin and the ability to play politics, Ol’denburg became the ‘spokesman’, first of all, for his own institution. He negotiated deals with the state, trying to secure and promote the interests of the scholarly community of the Academy of Sciences, whereas Gorkii was the ‘patron’ of scientific and scholarly activities – a person outside scholarly community but at the level of a statesman who, being close to the highest government circles, was able to lobby for the interests of various groups of scientists and scholars. In the context of the new polity one of these groups became Orientologists.

The last “old regime” bastion – the St. Petersburg Faculty of Oriental Languages – did not lack the Bolsheviks’ attention either and in September 1919 was merged with the Historico-Philological and Judicial Faculties into the Faculty of Social Sciences. This motion also resulted in the manifestation of the resistance on behalf of the intellectual: in 1920, Bartol’d established Kollegiia Vostokovedov (the Collegium of Orientologists), which united the “old regime” scholars of the former Faculty. They adhered to their traditional methodology in teaching and scholarly work on the premises of the newly established Faculty of Social Sciences, although the curriculum was enriched by politico-economic subjects. However, the Persian studies were taught by former Imperial professors (Bartol’d, Freiman, Inostrantsev, Romaskevich).\textsuperscript{444}

One of the main features of the studied period is that, in the context of the overwhelming discourse on the proliferation of revolution in the Orient, there were laid the foundations for another discourse which would determine the development of Soviet Oriental studies throughout the 1920s and until the late 1930s, namely the necessity of practical applicability of Orientalogical knowledge solely for state interests. This discursive utilitarianism resulted in the palpable marginalisation of the classical Iranists, who were reluctant to meet the demands of the new state in application to the Persianate world, which was situated at the spearhead of the Eastern foreign policy of the early Soviet

\textsuperscript{442} See chapter one. See also Baziiants, “Iz istorii,” 48.

\textsuperscript{443} See chapter one.

state. The same utilitarianism explains the fact that the Bolsheviks were eager to so urgently establish that significant number of training institutions in Oriental studies – another distinctive feature of that period.\textsuperscript{445} Under the rigorous conditions of the Civil War and the lack of resources, the Bolshevik government succeeded in launching the reorganisation and enormous expansion of the inherited scholarly institutions of Oriental studies and, more importantly, laid the solid foundation for the creation of similar institutions in remote regions of Russia – the vital need of Russian pre-Revolution Oriental studies scholarship which Grigor’ev and Rozen had often pointed at.

Political context of the Russian-Iranian relationships in 1921-1941

During the second half of 1920, along with the gradual realisation of the fact that the sovietisation of Persia had proved a failure\textsuperscript{446} and the simultaneous change of political priorities, deeply influenced by the developments on the Western direction, the trend within the Bolshevik government towards the normalisation of relationships with Persia as an independent state significantly intensified.\textsuperscript{447} In 1920, Rotshtein, an experienced Bolshevik, who had an excellent knowledge of British politics but had had very little to do with Persia, was appointed the Soviet diplomatic representative to Persia.\textsuperscript{448} It is unlikely that Lenin and the members of the Politbiuro were familiar with the institutional practices of the military and diplomatic domains of Imperial Russia which embraced the successful employment of specialists on Persia also in the British affairs;\textsuperscript{449} in any case, this, almost similar, choice seems to have been dictated by the expedient necessity determined by the preserved continuities within the triangle-shaped Russo-Britto-Persian complex relations of both the pre-1917 and post-1917 periods.

\textsuperscript{445} Another remarkable organisational feature of the new Soviet Oriental Studies scholarship was the development of periphery centres. Besides Tashkent, in 1918 Oriental Studies educational and scholarly institutions were opened in Rostov-on-Don, in 1919 – in Kazan and Baku.

\textsuperscript{446} As early as 10/11/1920 the Commander-in-Chief of the [Soviet] Persian Army Gikalo, newly appointed by Ordjonikidze, wanted from him a warrant for the liquidation of Kuchek-Khan, referring to him as conducting negotiations with the Shah government and the British, and, in general, pointed out that the revolutionary movement in Persia collapsed. Not having authorised the liquidation, Ordjonikidze later instructed on the necessity of striking a peace with the Shah government (RGASPI, f. 85‘Secret Persia’, d. 27, l. 5, 12; d. 47, l. 2).

\textsuperscript{447} RGASPI, f. 85, d. 47, l. 2(Chicherin to Ordjonikidze); d. 38, l. 1.

\textsuperscript{448} See appendix one (Rotshtein).

Rotshtein became the conductor of Moscow’s strengthening guideline of curtailing the Soviet armed interference and championed the urgent establishment of conventional diplomatic and trade ties with Persia. He had to act against the backdrop of the local authorities’ opposition in Baku and Tashkent; they were vigorously inclined to build up the armed help to the Persian revolutionaries, ultimately aiming at the forceful ousting of the British from Persia and the toppling of the Persian government. The counter stance even led to Stalin’s coming to Baku, Tashkent and Poltoratsk (Eshgabad) with Lenin’s assignment to ‘adjust our Oriental policy.’ Sultanzadeh, Head of the Persian Communist party at that time and a future scholar of Persian studies, was dismissed and the policy of peaceful assistance to the Persian bourgeois revolution was confirmed. The same Chicherin, who a year before had sent a letter to Lenin with congratulations on the forthcoming Bolshevik military sovietisation of Persia, cabled to Rotshtein in early summer 1920: ‘Our activities in Persia aim at […] the opening way for the Persian bourgeoisie to consolidate its dominancy.’

In February 1921, the Bolshevik government signed the Treaty of Friendship between Soviet Russia and Persia, officially confirming the abrogation of all Imperial Russia’s agreements and handing over all Russian tangible and financial possessions to Persia, provided they were not subject to be used by third countries. After the multiple political debacles in Europe the Orient was regarded by the Bolsheviks as the area with great revolutionary potential. Due to its strategic position and profound cultural, economic and political ties with neighbouring regions, the Persianate world was to become the springboard for cultivating the necessary social conversion in the whole East, where Persia was to become the main point of the application of efforts. On 5 October 1920, Chicherin wrote to Rotshtein: ‘[…] the road to the liberation of the whole East, most likely, runs through Persia […] our policy in Persia is an initial-experimental part of the general,

450 AVPRF, f. 028, op. 10, d. 11, papka 31, l. 6,7, 39, 63 (Chicherin to Rotshtein).
451 RGASPI, f. 85, d. 14, l. 3 (Rotshtein to Chicherin, 26/12/1921); d. 38, l. 1 (Chicherin to Ordjonikidze, 13/03/1921).
452 See Aliev, Istoriia Iran, 125.
453 AVPRF, f. 028, op. 10, d. 11, papka 31, l. 65 (Protocol of Politbiuro). See also Persits, Zastenchivaia interventsiia, 150-151.
454 RGASPI, f. 159, op. 2, d. 49, l. 122 (Chicherin to Lenin, 07/06/1920).
455 AVPRF, f. 028, op. 10, d. 11, papka 31, l. 7.
immensely complex, liberating policy in the whole East.” As General Edmund Ironside wrote about that time in his diaries, later published under the name *High Road to Command*: “[…] Soviet Russia had plenty of trouble on her hands in Europe. The Russians might confine their efforts to peaceful infiltration of their ideas amongst the Persian politicians […]” This confirms the previously mentioned changes in the Soviet foreign policy towards Persia.

Having come to power, Reza-Khan became that political figure who succeeded in preventing the disintegration of the country through using force and also took advantage of the nationalist slogans so topical for the then Persia. Both countries, Persia and Soviet Russia, during the period of 1923-1925 almost solved the problems in the field of state construction, put an end to various counter-regime and separatist manifestations and centralised the state power by using mainly military force. The trends of economic policies of both countries corresponded to each other: the Bolshevik government declared the *NEP* and the Persian government undertook efforts aimed at the encouragement of civilised private business in the form of *sherkat* (company). This backdrop positively influenced the Soviet-Persian relations. The two countries established official trade representations not only in the capitals but also in other important cities. A considerable number of joint Soviet-Persian export-import companies were established during the 1920s. For instance, in 1923 two joint companies, *Perskhlopok* and *Persshelk*, were set up which, in fact, revived the Persian cotton and silk industries. A joint Soviet-Persian bank, *Ruspersbank*, was also established for servicing entities engaged in the bilateral trade.

In the first half of the 1930s, the USSR was the main trade market for Iran in the field of export-import activities. In the field of Iran’s export, the Soviet Union was a consumer of one hundred per cent fish production, almost one hundred per cent of rice and cattle, ninety per cent of cotton, more than eighty per cent of wool, almost seventy per cent of silk and a half of the whole export of Iranian leather. However, with the changes in the countries’ domestic policies (the enhancement of dictatorship trends, the dismantling of

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457 AVPRF, f. 028, op. 10, d. 11, papka 31, l. 63.
458 William Edmund Ironside (1880-1959) was a Chief-Commander of the British forces in Persia in 1921. According to his memoirs, it was him who initiated using Reza Pahlavi by the British as a promising political figure in Persia.
460 Ibid, 177.
461 See appendix one.
463 See Mamedova, “Istoria,” 163.
the NEP in the USSR) since the early 1930s, the character of the Soviet-Iranian\(^{464}\) trade relations had started to change, too. Trade operations between the countries were later carried out only by official state organisations. Cultural ties became restricted.

Simultaneously, along with the changes in the geopolitics of the 1930s and the rise of Nazi Germany, Reza Shah gradually embarked on the road of making use of a third political power. Reza Shah had always tried to draw on nationalism-tinged motions in his policies and a third force had been always considered as a promising factor in political games with Great Britain and Soviet Russia. In the 1930s, the German political and trade stands in Iran would enhance year by year. In the second half of the 1930s, the share of the Soviet Union in Iranian trade drastically diminished, so that in 1939 it constituted only a half per cent of the whole trade turnover of Iran.\(^{465}\) The increase of the German political and trade influence was widely pointed out in the Western and Soviet post-war historiography. However, such allegedly common knowledge was questioned by some post-Soviet researchers, in particular by Aliev, who in 2004 argued that the extent of this influence had been exaggerated and that there was no evidence behind the multiple references to the massive presence of the fascist intelligence in Iran and its plans to organise a pro-fascist coup in Tehran, and that the figures of Germans residing in Iran were also significantly exaggerated.\(^{466}\) One can only assume that this exaggeration was for the sake of more solid substantiation of the Allies’ occupation of Iran.

On the other hand, another researcher, who succeeded in gaining access to the archives of SVR\(^{467}\) and the restricted files of AVPRF,\(^{468}\) Aleksandr Orishev, has recently offered evidence (the deficiency of which was pointed out by Aliev) in defence of the Western and Soviet post-war opinions and tried to prove not only the crucial rapprochement of Iran and Nazi Germany on the eve of WWII but also the existence of the Nazis’ coup plot in Iran and the plans to turn the country into the springboard for attacking British India and Soviet Asia.\(^{469}\) In any case, by the late 1930s the volume of Soviet-Iranian relations had reached its historical minimum at all levels. According to the Iranian

\(^{464}\) See appendix one (Persia).
\(^{466}\) See Aliev, *Istoriia Irana*, 195-201.
\(^{467}\) Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki, since 1991 the post-Perestroika successor to PGU (Pervoe Glavnoe Upravlenie KGB) – the Directorate within the former KGB responsible for intelligence activities abroad; now independently subordinated to the President of the Russian Federation.
\(^{468}\) See Orishev, *Iranskii uzel*, 4-6.
\(^{469}\) Ibid, 16-28, 53-57, 77-85.
customs registration, in 1937 the German share in Iranian imports was fifty per cent more than that of the Soviet Union and in export – twice as much.\textsuperscript{470} Instead of dimmed trade ties, Soviet political and intelligence activities highly intensified, which entailed the further impetuous development of Soviet Iranology.\textsuperscript{471}

**Soviet diplomatic and military Oriental studies, 1921-1941**

In January 1919, one of the founders of the Soviet Oriental studies, Gurko-Kriazhin, wrote that the course of events clearly proved ‘the truth of comrade Lenin’s assertions that the world war could not finish without the world revolution [which in its turn] could not be over barely within Europe. Beyond doubts, the mortal strike to Imperialism will be inflicted only after the flames of the revolution also envelope the Orient which is the main source of strength and wealth for Imperialism.’\textsuperscript{472} So, the first years after the establishment of the Oriental Section in the Military Academy and of the Special Courses in Tashkent passed under the aegis of the training of specialists for future revolutionary battles in the Oriental countries.

However, the early 1920s made their amendments in the Soviet foreign policy towards the Orient and in the modality of Military Oriental studies training. In the 1920s, the heroes of the unsuccessful sovietisation of Persia (such as Sultanzadeh (Mikaelian),\textsuperscript{473} Abikh,\textsuperscript{474} Ehsanullal\textsuperscript{475}) were back in Soviet Russia and started working both in Soviet state bureaucracy and scholarly institutions, making a feasible contribution to new Soviet Oriental studies, particularly Persian studies.\textsuperscript{476} Others, such as Osetrov (Irandust),\textsuperscript{477} Pastukhov (Iranskii),\textsuperscript{478} Il’in (Raskol’nikov) and Tardov\textsuperscript{479}, continued to work in

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{470} Ibid, 29.
\footnote{471} See appendix one (Teimurtash).
\footnote{472} Vladimir Kriazhin, “Retsenziia na Troianovskii K. Vostok pri svete revolutsii,” \textit{Sovetskaia strana} 1, 27/01/1919.
\footnote{473} See appendix one (Mikaelian).
\footnote{474} See appendix one (Abikh).
\footnote{475} See appendix one (Ehsanullal).
\footnote{476} See also Liudmila Kulagina, “Moskovskaia shkola iranistiki: izuchenie istoricheskikh problem,” in \textit{Iranistika v Rossiii i iranisty}, ed. Liudmila Kulagina (Moskva: Institut vostokovedeniia RAN, 2001), 47. See also Genis, “Rudol’f Abikh,” 151.
\footnote{477} See appendix one (Osetrov).
\footnote{478} See appendix one (Pastukhov).
\footnote{479} See appendix one (Tardov).
\end{footnotes}
Afghanistan and Persia, contributing by writing articles and supplying valuable country-study first-hand materials.\textsuperscript{480}

In view of the organisational volatility of the first post-Revolution decades and the dearth of Oriental studies specialists, the links between the Soviet military and diplomatic services were to a significantly greater extent intertwined in comparison with the late Imperial period. For instance, Raskol’nikov, after he commanded the Bolsheviks’ expedition corps in Persia and then the Soviet fleet on the Baltic Sea, was appointed the Soviet diplomatic representative to Afghanistan (July 1921 – December 1923).\textsuperscript{481} Rudol’f Abikh was the Secretary of the Political Section of the Persian Red Army and a member of the Military Committee of the Liberation of Persia. On returning to Moscow, he entered the Oriental Section of the Military Academy and simultaneously was a research officer of the All-Russia Scholarly Association of Oriental studies (VNAV).\textsuperscript{482} After his graduation from the Military Academy he became Head of the information subsection of the Press Department of Narkomindel and after that, in 1926, he was appointed the TASS (the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) representative under the Soviet diplomatic Mission in Tehran.\textsuperscript{483} In 1918-1919, Tardov worked in the Supreme Military Inspection and the Narkomvoendel of the USSR (Ukraine). After graduation from the Persian courses of the Military Academy, he was appointed the NKID representative to the short-lived Soviet Socialist Republic of Persia and then Head of the Soviet General Consulate in Esfahan (1921-1928).\textsuperscript{484} As demonstrated in chapter two, such a situation would have been impossible during the late Imperial period.

Naturally, in view of the extraordinary conditions of the new polity and the dearth of qualified staff, the Soviet entities dealing with Oriental countries would also accept employees with any kind of training or simply people who spoke the necessary languages, having been born and lived in the relevant regions. The most important criterion was

\textsuperscript{481} RGASPI, f. 159, op. 2, d. 49, l. 51-63(Raskol’nikov’s correspondence with Chicherin). See also Liudi i sud’by, eds. Vasil’kov et al.
\textsuperscript{482} GARF, f. P-1335, op. 1, d. 6, l. 55.
\textsuperscript{483} See Genis, “Rudol’f Abikh,” 146-147, 151-152.
\textsuperscript{484} GARF, f. 7668, op. 1, d. 2883(Tardov’s personal file), l. 1-3ob. RGASPI, f. 85, d. 96, l. 1-4(Tardov’s cooperation with Rotshtein). RGALI, f. 626, op. 1, d. 2, l. 344.
ideological fidelity to the polity but not professionalism. This quite often led to productive manifestations. An interesting example was Khaji-Murat Muguev (1893-1968), whose Oriental background and experience of serving at the Persian front in 1914-1917 were used by the Bolsheviks, who appointed him Head of the Intelligence of the Persian Red Army. After leaving Persia in 1920, he went on working in the military intelligence structures of the Soviet Army on Iran in the 1920s-1930s. His contribution to Oriental studies was realised through literature, as he became a famous Soviet writer. His novels, shedding light on the nineteenth-twentieth centuries’ historical events in Persia, and his poems about Persia, were among his multiple literary works.

However, Orientologists-practitioners, in particular Iranists, were trained mainly at the Oriental Faculty of the Military Academy. It should not be omitted that Persian courses were established in the NKID on 15 November 1919; however, they ceased to function shortly after, with Chaikin’s departure for his posting as an interpreter of the Soviet Plenipotentiary Mission in Turkey and Persia (based in Baku in 1920). The training in Oriental languages was finally launched on the premises of NKID in the early 1930s. The learning of Oriental languages for the NKID’s staff dealing with Oriental countries became obligatory and study hours were considered as working hours which, in actual fact, revived the traditions of the Educational Section of the late Imperial period.

In 1924, the Oriental Section of the Military Academy was transformed into the Oriental Faculty of the Military Academy. In view of its purposes and its academic composition (the organisational and scholarly set-up was drawn up by Snesarev, which beneficially influenced the teaching process and the quality of training), the Faculty succeeded in developing the scholarly training of the “old” scholarship against the backdrop of its practical orientation. It hence occupied, in this sense, the place between

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487 GARF, f. 7668, op. 1, d. 2889 (Chaikin’s personal file), l. 1-5ob.
488 See Volkov, “Persian Studies,” 1-18. See also the site of the Russian MID of the Russian Federartion (http://www.mid.ru/nsite-sv.nsf/mnsdoc/03.15.03.01).
489 AV, f. 115, op. 2, d. 63(Snesarev’s correspondence with the Oriental Section of the General Staff about the curriculum of the Academy), l. 1.
the “old regime” academic Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages and the MIV, which was organised to meet the state organs’ demands for Orientologists.490

In the 1920s-1930s, the Persian studies of the Military Academy were also taught by Konstantin Chaikin, a talented young scholar of the pre-Revolution Persian philology. He also worked as an interpreter in the Soviet Embassy in Tehran in 1921-1926. Having returned to the Soviet Union, Chaikin occupied himself mainly with scholarly activities: he went on teaching in the Military Academy, became an associate professor in the MIV and prepared a number of works on Persian literature and language,491 including linguistic works in co-authorship with the Academician Marr. By the late 1920s, the NKID employed a sufficient number of Persian language specialists and throughout the 1930s Chaikin was engaged by the NKID for interpreting and translating only from time to time, on very important occasions, such as interpreting for Iranian high-ranking delegations or double-checking the translation of Soviet-Iranian Trade Treaties.492

In the late 1920s, Chaikin also taught at the KUTV, another scholarly and educational institution of Oriental studies, founded in 1921 and responsible for training political activists in Soviet and foreign Asia. Being affiliated with the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party, in application to the foreign Orient this institution played the role of a certain Party school which would train its activists for the organisation of communist parties in neighbouring Oriental countries. The main feature of this University was that its students mainly originated from the places at which they were later expected to work.493 The first Persian group, consisting of twenty-four students, was formed on 2 August 1921. Judging by their curriculum, comprising the study of Turkestan, Bukhara, Khiva, Persia and Afghanistan, they would later be assigned to become operative in the whole Persianate world.494 The potential of periphery, earlier never used in Imperial Russia, became immensely useful under the conditions of the dearth of practical Orientologists, including the fact that it eliminated the necessity for cultural and ethnographic induction of students. One of the noteworthy organisational features of this institution was that it almost did not accept students who spoke Russian, believing that they either had been connected to the “old regime” state organs (the Imperial Ministry of

491 See appendix one (Chaikin).
492 AVPRF, f. 08, op. 10, d. 190, papka 33, l. 22.
493 GARF, f. p-1335, op. 1, d. 5, l. 55.
494 Ibid, l. 61, 80-1.
Interior) or originated from wealthy families – in both cases they were ‘class-alienated elements’.495

The earlier-mentioned trend of the Soviet Oriental studies regarding the establishment and rapid development of new institutions on the periphery continued in the 1920s-1930s. In 1922, in Tashkent, the Military Courses of Oriental Studies were transformed into the Higher Military School of Oriental Studies with the Iranist Ivan Yagello at the head of it. The main goal of the School was stipulated as the preparation of ‘military and political-military specialists with special Orientological training sufficient for the independent scholarly activities, connected with the knowledge of Oriental languages.’496 The period of training was three years, during which students would study at least two Oriental languages from Persian, Urdu, Uzbek and Kazakh.

Following the call of the times, as early as the late 1920s such subjects as Muslim Law and History of the Muslim Orient were removed from the curriculum and replaced by Leninism, Modern History, Soviet Development, Economy and mode of life of the Muslim countries, Historical Materialism and other signs of the new humanities. In the field of Persian studies, during the 1920s-1930s Iagello went on with his own unique pre-1917 system of teaching Persian and Arabic through pictures. He also authored a number of works on Persian linguistics. In 1928, due to his contribution to Soviet Orientological knowledge, Ivan Iagello was awarded the Honourable Letter of Commendation of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. In 1930-1932, he also taught at the Oriental Faculty of the Military Academy in Moscow.497

The susceptibility of Iagello, Snesarev and Chaikin to the pre-1917 discourse of Russkoe delo,498 which metamorphosed after 1917 into the discourse of “the service to their nation who had chosen the Bolsheviks”, prevented them from withdrawing from scholarly and administrative activities, which, in actual fact, resulted in them becoming Foucauldian vehicles of power, manifested in the preservation of Imperial institutional practices in Oriental studies within, mainly, the military domain. In contrast with the military domain, which in this sense, as Hirsch maintains, turns out quite similar to the academic domain,499 this phenomenon is not seen in the diplomatic domain, whose

495 Ibid, l. 52ob.
498 See chapter two. See also Volkov, “Persian Studies,” 3, 13-14, 16-17.
scholarly active vostochniki all preferred the preservation of, mostly, personal interests in this interplay of power/knowledge relations, hence opting for emigration. This leads us to an assumption that the susceptibility to the discourse of Russkoe delo which had been identifiable in the activities of Russian diplomats-vostochniki and, particularly, in their glaring utterances (for example, the correspondence between Minorsky and Vvedenskii, Minorsky’s private diaries, Bravin’s letters to Zhukovskii and to the Imperial MID) were of a more outward nature and were perceived by them, consciously or unwittingly, as the intrinsic part of their beliefs simply because those practices and utterances, arguably, coincided with their personal interests, such as tangible remuneration, career promotion and prestige. This, of course, will be dealt with in more detail in chapters four and five.

Notwithstanding the dominancy of military structures in Persian studies until the late 1930s, there was one institution that, at least, nominally can be subsumed under the jurisdiction of the diplomatic domain. Based on the initiative of the Soviet diplomat Iakov Surits (1882-1952) in 1922, the Tashkent Special Scholarly Oriental Commission was established under the representative offices of the NKID and Narkomvneshtorg. The main goal of the Commission was the comprehensive study of the countries ‘adjacent to Turkestan, namely Khiva, Bukhara, Persia, Afghanistan, West-China and India’ with the emphasis on the study of contemporary issues. The Commission also assisted in establishing the Newsletter of the Central Asia Media, publishing materials from foreign newspapers of the region.

Thus, the study of the military and diplomatic domains of Soviet Oriental studies during the 1920s-1930s makes it possible to state a deep, even hectic interconnectedness, also engulfing civil scholarly institutions, which was rather explicable for the post-1917 times. During the 1930s, the situation, to an extent, improved and the organisational overlapping of the domains significantly diminished; however, the military component continued to dominate. Even Soviet ambassadors were ultimately subordinated to GRU and INO OGPU station-chiefs, in full contrast to the Imperial period when the diplomatic domain totally dominated the operational field abroad.

500 AV, f. 134, op. 2, d. 525, l. 1-4; op. 1, d. 803, Two notebooks. AV, f. 17, op. 2, d. 9. AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489, d. 1022b, l. 106.
501 See appendix one (Surits).
502 The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade; also NKVT.
503 GARF, f. P-1335, op. 1, d. 5, l. 1, 5.
504 Ibid, l. 1-7.
505 See chapter two.
The change in scholarly methodology and the trend for immediate practical application of Oriental studies knowledge predetermined the relevant organisational structures and the modality of the participation of individuals within them during the period, as long as almost all activities were subjugated to the interests of state power and its political agenda. Due to the change in the character and the goals of Oriental studies scholarly activities, the individuals engaged in Soviet military and diplomatic services perceived themselves at the forefront of producing and developing new scholarly knowledge, laying the foundation for the rest of the age of Soviet Oriental studies. It is the discursive endeavour of those experts, who had worked in the Soviet military and diplomacy and then went on in academia, that constituted the background of Soviet Iranian contemporary studies during the 1920s-1950s, even if most were to perish in the purges of the late 1930s. It is also notable that during the 1920s-1930s in this context Iranology occupied the central place within these two domains in question, being immensely important both in political and military fields.

**The organisational set-up of academic Oriental studies, 1921-1941**

Early Soviet Oriental studies was insufficiently studied in Western scholarship in the twentieth century. Those few works by Richard Frye, Wayne S. Vucinich and Muriel Atkin substantially drew on the works of the Soviet scholars of the mature and late periods of the USSR, who themselves had been subject to various kinds of discourses, inculcated by the Soviet state, and whose research had been restricted by the straightforward ideological censorship of the time. Notwithstanding the profound changes in the political and public life of Russia of the 1980s-1990s which led to significant epistemological shifts in the activities of the Russian scholarly community, the post-Soviet mainstream Iranology, in general, and the researchers engaged in the study of Soviet Iranology, in

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particular, have surprisingly preserved many of the scholarly approaches of the Soviet period.\textsuperscript{509}

On the other hand, the scarce Western scholarship of the recent period, albeit implementing new historiographic and theoretical approaches, continues to heavily draw on the Soviet and post-Soviet works on the organisational set-up of Soviet Oriental studies.\textsuperscript{510} While actively engaging with the Soviet and recent Russian scholarship, as well as with the available English-language literature on the issue, the chapter still tries to employ as much archival material as necessary for constructing a separate historical narrative on the organisational set-up of early Soviet Iranology. In so doing, it will become a prologue for a more detailed study of the field in the following chapters.

The \textit{NEP} – the period between the War Communism (1918-1921) and the Great Break (1928-1941) – still remained a period of relatively free scholarly activities. Along with the “old” Oriental studies scholarly community, now there was another community consisting of people, standing on strictly ideological positions and conducting research mainly on the current aspects of the Orient. Their scholarly activities mostly included writing articles for newspapers and journals on the issues related to the study of economic, political, cultural and ideological developments in Oriental countries. Persian studies were no exception to that. The aggressive Soviet foreign policy of 1919-1921 towards Persia generated such new Soviet scholars as Pastukhov (Iranskii), Sultanzadeh, Rotshtein, Osetrov, Pavlovich and others who combined work in new Soviet ministries (\textit{NKID} and \textit{NKVT}), other state and scholarly institutions, public organisations, newspapers and journals. They were real experts on the very recent and current life of Persia and would subjugate the analysis of their subject of study to their personal political and ideological agenda.\textsuperscript{511}

The new Soviet Oriental studies were criticised by the “old” school because of the mainly superficial character of their works and the narrow orientation to the present and the utilitarian application.\textsuperscript{512} Their scholarly training and quality of professional knowledge


\textsuperscript{512} See Vasilii Bartol’d, “Iran,” 333-334. See also Kulagina, “Moskovskaia shkola iranistikii,” 47.
were also questioned by classic scholars. For instance, Pavlovich was reprimanded for not speaking any Oriental language and for the absence of Oriental studies education while he considered himself entitled to express his opinion on all issues of Orientology, particularly on Persia. There also was a sort of confrontation between the Petrograd (former St. Petersburg) and Moscow academic Oriental studies’ communities in view of the fact that Moscow became the capital of Soviet Russia and the majority of new scholars would concentrate around the main state organisations, situated in Moscow, while Petrograd stayed the main centre of “old” scholarship. This situation was also pointed out by Ol’denburg, who said in 1927 that for a long period there had been no good relationships between “old” and “new” scholarly communities.

On the other hand, there was even more sharp criticism on behalf of Marxist scholars which targeted the “old” school. In 1921, in his note to Stalin, Pavlovich wrote that “old” Orientologists were incapable of creating necessary works on revealing the true essence of Imperialism and on studying national liberating movements in the Oriental countries. He stressed that these kinds of activities should have been entrusted ‘not to our Orientologists but rather to our comrades-communists, familiar with the Oriental issue’. As we see, Pavlovich accentuated ideological fidelity rather than scholarly quality of the individuals in question. Thus these people ‘familiar with the Oriental issue’ were the former head of the Persian Communist Party Central Committee, Sultanzadeh, and Tardov who, in 1909-1911, had worked in Persia as a journalist and overtly criticised Imperial Russia’s policy in Persia and then that of the Provisional Government, and who had actively cooperated with the Bolsheviks since 1918.

Pavlovich also used Bartol’d’s criticism of the pre-1917 Oriental studies and the state approach towards it, but transformed it in a way that imperial Oriental studies were criticised for the lack of attention to social-economic aspects. He stated that Russia previously had ‘no literature about the Orient’ and ‘there was no correct study of the Orient before 1917.’ The scholars of the “old” school were criticised for their sheer theoretical

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515 GARF, f. 5402, op. 1, d. 57, l. 1-2 (Pavlovich to Stalin).
516 GARF, f. 7668, op. 1, d. 2883, l. 3ob.
approach, for paying too much attention to philological issues and for underestimating of the study of modernity.\textsuperscript{518}

In order to improve this situation and ‘to disseminate correct information about the Orient among the masses’,\textsuperscript{519} and hence to surmount the difficulty of that antagonism between the “old regime” Oriental studies and the new Soviet Orientology, the VNAV was designed by Mikhail Pavlovich. In so doing, he was actively assisted by Snesarev, who became a member of the ‘organisational fiver’.\textsuperscript{520} In general, the Association, established at the very end of 1921, was to draw the “old” scholars over to the new Soviet Orientological scholarship and to become an organisational and governing Centre of the country in the field of Oriental studies.

The VNAV was set up under the decree issued on 13 December 1921 by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of Narkomnats. In its charter it was mentioned that the main aim of the VNAV activities was the comprehensive study of both the foreign and the Soviet Orient as well as the dissemination of Orientological knowledge. The Association consolidated all Oriental studies societies and organisations on the territory of Russia (the Soviet Union – since the beginning of 1922). It was authorised to use all available relevant forces and materials and had the right to contact foreign entities and organise international events and activities. It was also expected to render consultations to state entities and to be the source of necessary information and manpower for them.\textsuperscript{521}

Mikhail Pavlovich was appointed Head of the Association. However, he had posts in many other state and public organisations such as Narkomnats, the Military Academy, the Oriental Trade Chamber, the Union for Actions and Propaganda of the Peoples of the Orient and other organisations.\textsuperscript{522} In spite of his great deal of energy and revolutionary passion, in fact, overloaded with his duties he was unable to lead administrative-organisational work with the same success, and the Association began properly functioning only after the appointment of Gurko-Kriazhin as a scholarly secretary in February 1922.\textsuperscript{523} By the end of 1922, the first edition of \textit{Novyi Vostok} (The New Orient) journal, the main print media organ of the Association, was published. It contained the programme article by Pavlovich which in addition to scholarly activities proclaimed ‘the economic and spiritual liberation of the Orient’ among its main tasks. It also mentioned that the Association was

\textsuperscript{518} GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 23, l. 1-6.
\textsuperscript{519} GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 17 (The Charter of VNAV, Pavlovich’s manuscript), l. 18.
\textsuperscript{520} AV, f. 115, op. 1, d. 222, l. 2-5. GARF, f. P-1335, op. 1, d. 5, l. 10; d. 17, 24.
\textsuperscript{521} GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 17, l. 2-24.
\textsuperscript{522} See M. V. Ivanova, \textit{Vvedenie v regionovedenie}, 14.
\textsuperscript{523} See Tamazishvili, “Gurko-Kriazhin,” 58.
going to closely cooperate with the KUTV, MIV and other educational and scholarly institutions in the field of Oriental studies.\textsuperscript{524} Throughout the following years, the journal printed articles mainly written by such scholars of new Soviet Oriental studies as Pavlovich, Gurko-Kriazhin, Osetrov, Pastukhov, Shitov and those “old” academics who had either accepted the new polity, such as Marr, or decided to at least officially cooperate with it for the sake of knowledge itself, such as Krymsky, Romaskevich and Ol’denburg.\textsuperscript{525}

The leading centre of the Association was the Political-Economic Section, headed in 1923 by Gurko-Kriazhin. The period between 1923 and 1927 was considered to be most successful in the history of the Association activities. Gurko-Kriazhin designed a special programme which, in view of the lack of data on Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan, initially stipulated the development of theoretical studies and the application of Marxist methodology.\textsuperscript{526} As the influence of the Association grew the quantity of its members also increased among people who were mainly engaged in practical work and who ultimately helped to gain the access to the most actual information on the Oriental countries. Rotshtein, Osetrov, Pastukhov, Tardov and Raskolnikov were among the most active members of the Association. Tardov even organised a branch of the Association in Tehran. Other branches of VNAV were also established in other republics of the USSR. The VNAV branches mainly dealing with the study of Persia operated in Tashkent, Baku and Tiflis.\textsuperscript{527} The Tashkent Society for the study of Tajikestan and Iranian nationalities established in 1925 was particularly active in this field.\textsuperscript{528}

Kemper and Tamazishvili sum up that by the time VNAV was dismissed in 1930 it had failed to reach the goals stipulated in its Charter.\textsuperscript{529} This is only partly fair. Indeed, the Association did not succeed in becoming a really all-Union and central organ, uniting and managing all the Orientological activities in the USSR. However, it did succeed in achieving its other priority, namely the construction of a direct reciprocal solid nexus between state power and scholarly knowledge, particularly in the field of Persianate studies. Its activities involved the active cooperation of those people who literally determined early Soviet foreign policy in this region, for example, Pastukhov and Osetrov

(their impact will be studied in chapter five of the thesis). Their scholarship, accumulated and processed at VNAV, would directly reach the highest government structures and Orientological training centres. It is noteworthy that the same practical Orientologists designed and took their actions in the field of foreign policy, based on their own scholarship reflected through the VNAV, namely its publishing organ Novyi Vostok, organised scholarly debates and other institutional activities.

Simultaneously, the “old” academic scholarship who, after a series of reorganisations of Oriental studies, mainly concentrated in the Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages, were almost totally marginalised from exerting any influence on early Soviet foreign policy, but were still actively being engaged in the state-run nationalities domestic project throughout the 1920s, as Hirsch argues in her profound Empire of Nations. The Kollegiia Vostokovedov, established in 1921 on Bartol’d’s initiative, regularly printed its Zapiski Kollegii Vostokovedov, reflecting its academic continuities even in the title, which was a direct reminder of Imperial ZVORAO. The above-mentioned journal and the journal Vostok (The Orient), affiliated with the Asiatic Museum, published scholarly articles on the ancient and medieval history, literature, arts and general spiritual heritage of the Orient, hence explicitly stipulating their contributors’ reluctance to engage with politicised Orientology. During the NEP’s relative pluralism within academic activities, Bartol’d, Freiman, Krachkovskii, Ol’denburg and others mostly pursued the pre-1917 mode of research and teaching traditions, with the emphasis on ancient and medieval Oriental history and literature.

The Moscow Oriental studies scholarly community was represented mainly by the MIV which appeared from the merging of the Central Institute of Living Oriental Languages and the Oriental Faculty of the Moscow University. The curriculum of the Institute was approximately the same as the one at the Petrograd Institute of Living Oriental Languages, but with a lesser quality in philological training, especially in Persian studies. Kuznetsova and Kulagina in their work Iz istorii sovetskogo vostokovedeniia, 1917-1967 characterised the MIV as being much weaker in scholarly terms than that in Petrograd, while other researchers, such as Kemper and Baziiants, wrote that it had been

530 See Hirsch, Empire of Nations.
532 See Kuznetsova, Iz istorii, 14-15.
533 GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 5, l. 41.
534 See Kuznetsova, Iz istorii, 15.
the Soviet leading centre for training specialists on the Orient throughout the 1920s.\textsuperscript{535} There was no contradiction. The point is that the teaching staff of the Moscow Institute mainly consisted either of the scholars who had accepted the new ideology or of young tutors, as well as later it was managed by Pavlovich. So, one of the main requirements of that time was the replacement of a part of theoretical studies by practical and ideological training. Besides that, the Institute was situated in the capital and was orientated, first of all, at the training of specialists for state power entities. The main “consumers” were \textit{Narkomindel, Narkomvneshtorg, Narkomvoendel} and \textit{NKVD}.\textsuperscript{536} This trend was preserved until 1938 when the Leningrad Oriental Institute (the former Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages since 1928) was merged with the \textit{MIV}. Thus, by the late 1930s, Oriental studies in Leningrad had remained only in the walls of the Leningrad University and by that time had suffered multiple reorganisations into various faculties and institutes and, finally, had been returned under the University auspices.\textsuperscript{537}

In 1930, the Asiatic Museum and \textit{Kollegiia Vostokovodov} ceased to exist as independent organisational structures and were transformed into the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In general, the years between 1927 and 1934 were the period of crucial restructuring of the Soviet Academia, which began from the adoption of a new Charter of the Academy of Sciences in 1927 and the gradual taking over of the Academy by the Bolsheviks. The quality criterion gave its place to quantity. Also, the Oriental studies education of the 1930s could be characterised by the narrow specialisation trend and the insufficient linguistic training. The educational institutions would confine it to learning contemporary newspaper language, which decreased the training level of Soviet Orientologists.\textsuperscript{538}

It should be also noted that during the 1920s-1930s the scholarly and educational Oriental studies institutions kept rapidly developing in other cities of the USSR, especially in Asian republics. Among them Tashkent, Baku, Tiflis (Tbilisi from 1936) and Yerevan should be mentioned separately. The Turkestan Oriental Institute and the Philological Faculty of the Turkestan People’s University were also established in Tashkent. Bartol’d cooperated with both institutions and took part in the activities of a special commission on

\textsuperscript{535} See Kemper, “Integrating,” 3.
\textsuperscript{536} GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 5, l. 41-49ob.
\textsuperscript{537} See Kononov, \textit{Vostokovodenie}, 25.
\textsuperscript{538} See Kuznetsova, \textit{Iz istorii}, 70-72, 77.
the selection of teachers for the Philological Faculty. In 1922 and 1923, the classes were launched at the Oriental Faculties of the Baku and Yerevan universities.  

**Conclusion**  

It is possible to conclude that the trend aiming at the complete change of methodology in Oriental studies research that started in the first post-1917 years kept ramping up throughout the 1920s against the backdrop of the fading influence of the “old” scholarship and became totally consolidated in the 1930s. The current issues of the Orient, reviewed from the angle of the Marxist ideology, occupied the central place in Soviet Orientological research and training. The demands of the state power organisations dealing with the Orient totally defined the organisational and training policy in the field of Oriental studies.  

By the mid-1930s, the academic Orientological training became much more narrowly specialised, which speaks in favour of its rigorous orientation to state power needs. In 1939, the Chair of Iranian philology of the Oriental Faculty of the Leningrad University comprised the Persian, Tajik, Ancient Iranian, Kurdish, Osetian and Dari languages sections – a number of Iranian languages that had never been taught before in Russia. Therefore, the emphasis on Iranian studies, which had been characteristic of the late Imperial period due to its scholarly and political importance, continued with further drastic increase during the two decades post-1917 and can be explained mainly by foreign policy institutions’ demands. The additional importance gained by Iranian studies in the post-1917 time was also pointed out by Bartol’d, who in 1926 even proposed the establishment of a special publishing organ on Iranian studies – which did not exist for any other field of Oriental studies.

The instrumental and ideologically driven approach of the new Soviet state towards Oriental studies, in general, resulted in the graduate demise of the classical school of Persian studies by the early 1930s, as also supported by Rodionov. The involvement of “old” Orientologists, including Iranists, with the state-run inner nationalities project, which, according to Hirsch, brought about the new significant capabilities and operational autonomy which those scholars had not had during the Imperial period, did not have a palpable positive impact on Persian studies, except for the facilitating of the

540 See Kemper, “Integrating,” 2-3.  
541 See Kononov, *Vostokovedenie*, 116-117.  
542 See Bartol’d, “Iran,” 334.  
physical survival of those scholars through the 1920s. In the 1930s, their place was occupied by a new academic generation of ideologically driven Iranists carrying out research of rather low quality and restricted by the postulations of the Marxist methodology. However, in quantitative evaluation, throughout the whole early Soviet period, academic Oriental studies, and Iranology therein experienced enormous institutional expansion in training and later in research fields, due to the state-heightened attention of which late Imperial Oriental studies could have only dreamt.

The same factor resulted in the impetuous quantitative development of Oriental studies within practical domains, particularly of Iranology, due to the fact that the Persianate world occupied an even more important and discursive position in the early Soviet policy than Persian studies had had during the late Imperial period. The continuities which had been present during the Imperial period and were preserved in both the military and diplomatic domains during the early Soviet period, namely the employment of professional postings for gathering multifaceted primary material for sequential scholarly processing, secured the enhanced productivity of power/knowledge relations during the period in question. The lacuna which indeed had existed in the study of the contemporary Orient had become almost replenished by the late 1930s, albeit with knowledge of arguably rather questionable or biased character.

The impetuous expansion of institutional structures within each domain has confirmed the proposed overall threefold organisational set-up of early Soviet Oriental studies. Simultaneously, based on the analysis of the Soviet-Persian relationships of the 1920s and, particularly, of the 1930s, and given the presence of multiple Soviet trade and economic representations in Persia, which gathered and produced lots of area-study information on the relevant issues, a presumption of the emergence of a new – trade – domain in early Soviet Iranology would inevitably come to mind. However, taking into account that these activities were carried out under the aegis of NKID and the entities involved were staffed mainly with experts – Iranists from NKID, the military and INO OGPU – the trade activities cannot organisationally be defined as a self-contained domain of Orientological knowledge production. Thus, early Soviet Iranology possessed only a threefold structure: academic scholarship, diplomatic service and the military, whose activities were significantly more intertwined at the institutional and individual levels than of those during the late Imperial period.

545 AVPRF, f. 08 ‘Karakhan’s office’, op. 10, papka 33, d. 190, l. 5-6 (Karakhan’s correspondence with Davtian).
Chapter Four

Between Cultures and States:

Russian Orientologists and Russia’s Eastern policy

Introduction

The involvement of Russia’s Orientologists in the intense manifold interaction between the Russian Empire and Persia during the period from the late nineteenth century to 1917 predominantly took place within the main four professional domains which have been studied in chapter two of the thesis, namely academic scholarship, the military, diplomatic service and the Orthodox Church missionary activities. Given the nature and the historical developments of this interaction, the extent of the involvement of each domain in question was different, as was their impact on Russo-Persian relations of the period. However, as the undertaken research has already shown, there were well-discernible continuities and commonalities in the organisational set-up and practices of these domains as well as in the roles of individuals – namely academic scholars and practical experts of Persian studies – involved in the activities of these domains.

This chapter is dedicated to the study of the above-mentioned individuals and their impact within the operational field of Russia’s Eastern policy from the late nineteenth century to 1917. The tackling of narrowly framed research questions (specified in chapter one), concerning their lives, activities and written works, will enable us to ascertain and analyse the presence and the interplay of power/knowledge relations at an individual level as was done in the previous chapters two and three for the institutional level. In order to identify the ‘physical’ proximity of these individuals to state power, first, it is necessary to examine the modality of their involvement in state activities: their posts, institutional subordination, reports and other writings they produced. This will help identify their basic or “nominal” capacity of influence on events and, eventually, on state policy.

After that, it is possible to switch to the study of their personal contribution to the interaction between Russia and Persia, which will include their personal reasons for being involved in the operational field of a particular domain, the personal factors (for example, susceptibility to discourses) that influenced the (non-)execution of their duties, their personal stance and the eventual impact on concrete historical events. The research question on the efficiency of the employment of their expertise by the state will be tackled in the conclusion to the chapter. The initial data for the above analysis has been retrieved from archival materials, which documented the activities of the individuals in question, and
from their published and unpublished private and scholarly writings as well as from the writings of their contemporaries and the existing literature about them.

The analysis of the political background of the Russo-Persian relations given in the previous two chapters shows that the diplomatic and military domains were the main spheres of the countries’ interaction and, consequently, the individuals involved in the activities of these domains were doomed to play if not main then underlying roles in the designing and the realisation of late Imperial Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia. However, in addition to the deep interconnectedness of all domains that was studied in chapter two, the analysis of the organisational set-up of the Russian Oriental studies of the time showed the primary influence of academic scholars on their disciples from both “civilian” and “practical” institutions. The scholars ‘exercised intellectual and political influence beyond their scholarly fields’ and transferred to their disciples ‘a number of common perceptions... about how to understand the peoples and societies that they studied’. With this in mind, the chapter starts with the study of the key “civilian” academics of Russia’s Persian studies of the period and continues with the consecutive studies of the experts involved in the other three “practical” domains of Persian studies who, along with their outstanding practical record, made a significant contribution to Orientological knowledge.

“Civilian” academic scholars

Valentin Alekseevich Zhukovskii – who can rightfully be regarded as the token figure of the nexus of state power and scholarly knowledge in late Imperial Russia – has surprisingly little been studied even in Russia itself. For the last more than fifty years

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547 See appendix one (Civilian scholar).
548 In order to secure the epistemological congruency of my research methodology, the criterion of “being scholarly active” was applied at the stage of selecting individuals subject to research within the “practical” domains. Taking into account that the notion of “scholarly active” implies a rather broad set of activities: looking for artefacts when in Persia, collecting scholarly observations, their procession and sending to “civilian” academic scholars and scholarly societies as well as composing and publishing scholarly writings, and a great number of “practical” experts, in one way or another, were engaged in this kind of activities in Russia (see chapters two and three), another criterion was chosen in order to narrow down the focus, namely of “being prominent enough” within their own professional domain.
549 There are 3 brief works on Zhukovskii that were authored by his colleagues Bartol’d and Ol’denburg and his disciple Romaskevich shortly after his death in 1918, namely Bartol’d, *Pamiati Zhukovskogo*; Sergei Ol’denburg, “Valentin Alekseevich Zhukovskii, 1858-1918”, *Izvestiia Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk* 2 (1919), 2039-68; Aleksandr
there has been no comprehensive research into the scholarly and administrative activities of this individual whatsoever. Whereas, in addition to his scholarly contribution, which laid the foundations of Russia’s Persian studies of the twentieth century, he played the key role in the development of Russia’s practical Oriental studies. Being the main connecting link between “civilian” scholarship and the state in the Russian Empire of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, he became the most perfect illustration of the scholars taking advantage of state in their own interests, most of all for the benefit of scholarship itself.  

Zhukovskii graduated from the St.Petersburg Faculty of Oriental Languages in 1880 and in 1883, for the excellence of his Master of Arts’ thesis, he was left at the University in preparation for professorship at the Chair of Persian philology. According to the institutional practice inherent in all domains of Russia’s Oriental studies (which owed it to the activities of Professor Aleksandr Kazem-Bek, the first dean of the St.Petersburg Faculty of Oriental languages (1855-1858, 1866-1870), and Professor Dmitrii Miliutin, the Russian War Minister (1861-1881)), Zhukovskii was immediately sent for his fieldwork to Persia where he spent three years. Living together with Persians and extensively travelling around the country, Zhukovskii realised how deeply Persian culture and Persians themselves were dependent on religion and this personal finding formed the main field of his future scholarly interests.

His close relative (his sister’s husband) and colleague, Vasilii Bartol’d, wrote: ‘Russia’s leading expert on the study of Islamic Persia, Zhukovskii was not so much a historian in this field but rather a researcher of the language and literature. Among the spheres of people’s life he was particularly interested in religious beliefs.’

His first trip to Persia resulted in gathering a great amount of scholarly material, mainly on Persian dialects, folkloric literature and beliefs. On his return, he authored a number of groundbreaking works, including the first textbook in Russia on the grammar of Persian. The materials gathered by Zhukovskii were supposed to be published in five volumes, the


See appendix one (Scholarly intelligence network).


Vasilii Bartol’d, “Iran,” 332.
first of which provided him with the professorship in Persian studies in 1889. Having institutionalised Persian literature as one of the main fields of Russia’s Persian studies, he taught Persian language and literature at the St.Petersburg Faculty of Oriental studies throughout the 1890s-1900s and remained Russia’s main scholarly reference on them till his very death.553

However, besides the abundant scholarly harvest of that fieldwork, there was another component of no lesser importance. During his stay in Persia, Zhukovskii developed relations with high-ranked state functionaries in the main cities of Persia, such as Tehran, Esfahan and Shiraz,554 and actively cooperated with Russian diplomats, which, most likely, had already been included in his assignment when he was sent to Persia.555 It, though, fully complied with the conventional institutional practices of Russian Orientology of the time that are also touched upon in Russia’s Own Orient by Tolz.556 In fact, this three-year trip laid the foundations for Zhukovskii’s close and intensive cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the War Ministry of Russia until November 1917 – the year when he along with all other Imperial Foreign Affairs employees simply did not turn up at the Ministry on the day after Leo Trotsky took it over.557 During the 1890s, Zhukovskii, simultaneously with his academic activities at the Faculty and in the Educational Section of the MID, undertook other scholarly expeditions to Persia and the Trans-Caspian region that were organised with the assistance of the two above-mentioned ministries.558 Having become in 1899 an associate fellow at the St.Petersburg Academy of Sciences, three years later he was appointed the Dean of the Faculty (1902-1911) and in 1905 Head of the Educational Section of the MID.559

553 See Bartol’d, “Pamiati Zhukovskogo,” 694, 700-702. See also Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriiia, 197-198.
554 Zhukovskii so much valued his connections within the Persian highest state establishment that many scholarly materials, received from Persia, and works on the issues of contemporary life in Persia remained unpublished (see Bartol’d, “Pamiati Zhukovskogo,” 699; see also Iurii Borshevskii, “K kharakteristike rukopisnogo naslediia V.A. Zhukovskogo,” in Ocherki po istorii russkogo vostokovedeniia, ed. Iosif Orbeli (Moscow: Nauka, 1960), 8).
555 See appendix one (Belozerskii).
556 Tolz, Orient, 73.
557 See Zarnitsky et al., Tak nachinalsia Narkomindel, 7-9.
558 See Valentin Zhukovskii, Drevnosti zakaspiiskogo kraia. Razvaliny Starogo Merva (St.Petersburg: Ministry of the Imperial Court, 1894), 1.
559 See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriiia, 128. In 1915 he was also appointed the Head of Translation Section of Political Departments of MID. See also Bartol’d, “Pamiati Zhukovskogo,” 696-695.
A ‘closet scholar’, as Bartol’d used to call himself, and a staunch propagator of the dissociation of scholarship from state, could not help implicitly disapproving of Zhukovskii’s preoccupation with state activities which eventually, indeed, turned out to the detriment of Zhukovskii’s scholarly output. The rest of the five volumes remained unpublished until after Zhukovskii’s death since he had not had enough time to finalise the materials. His contemporaries usually saw piles of manuscripts in his office that were half-ready for publication but never published. Instead, albeit at the expense of his own scholarly output, Zhukovskii created a whole system of relations which resulted, in particular, in the promotion of the scholarly institutions in which he was engaged and the advancement of all Oriental studies of late Imperial Russia, in general. This crucial component of Zhukovskii’s activities has not properly been studied, yet.

Having begun with his own scholarly field, he developed and industrialised what had been initiated by Baron Rozen, namely the making use of his former students as a source of raw materials on the country. Almost all former students of Zhukovskii who worked in Persia would provide him with artefacts, manuscripts and scholarly reports on various aspects of Persian history and culture on a grand scale. He would openly state it as the direct duty of those Russians with Orientological training who were serving in Persia. This intrinsic feature of the scholar’s activities was also separately pointed out by Bartol’d. Thus Zhukovskii used to receive materials from Bravin, Minorsky, Nikitin, Shapshal, Baranovskii, Girs and many other employees of the Russian Legation and multiple Russian consulates in Persia as well as from military officers-vostochniki. In 1906, Zhukovskii’s former student and Head of the Russian Loan and Discount Bank in Tehran, Leonid Bogdanov, succeeded in obtaining Omar Khaiam’s manuscripts, which became part of those 246 Persian manuscripts collected and sent by him to St.Petersburg during his tenure from 1904 to 1914.
Simultaneously, using his good relations with the representatives of practical Oriental studies, Zhukovskii would conduct joint scholarly efforts with them (based on the materials they provided) in studying the issues of his own interest, namely the aspects of religious life in Persia. As Cambridge researcher Firuza Abdullaeva, albeit just in passing, mentions, many of the valuable reports presented by him to various scholarly societies were based on materials received from his former students serving in Persia. Based on materials received from Girs, Consul in Mashad, and Baranovskii, Consul in Esfahan, Zhukovskii presented his famous scholarly report “The features of the current condition of Persia in her literary works” at the session of the Oriental Section of the Russian Archaeological Society on 20 November 1903; however, he left it unpublished due to his political reservations. According to Bartol’d, Zhukovskii’s joint works with Colonel Tumanskii on Babism as well as his cooperation with Minorsky on Sufism and the sect Ahl-e hagh became sound illustrations of his significant combined contribution to Persian studies.

In terms of his administrative activities, using his scholarly prestige and his connections with former students who had already become influential employees of the MID and the War Ministry, he would push forward the realisation of his ideas on the further development of Russia’s Oriental studies and its funding. For instance, from Zhukovskii’s correspondence with Vladimir Minorsky in 1911, it becomes clear how Minorsky routinely assisted him to liaise with ministerial high-ranked officials and the representatives of Russia’s State Duma. This was during a crucial period for the Educational Section, when its very destiny was at stake. Due to Zhukovskii’s efforts and his resulting multi-vector influence, directed through his former students and his other influential connections in the key ministries of the Russian Empire, as well as through his scholarly colleagues, not only did he twice succeed in preventing the dismantling of the Educational Section (in 1907 and 1912), but he also elaborated on and successfully introduced the project concerning its extension and long-term development, from which not only Persian, but other areas of Russian Oriental studies benefited, too.

570 AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 23.
571 AV, f. 17, op. 2, d. 37 (Correspondence with Vladimir Minorsky, 1902-1904), l. 1, 2, 2ob., 6-8. See also Bartol’d, “Russkie issledovaniia,” 332.
572 AV, f. 17, op. 2, d. 37 (Correspondence with Vladimir Minorsky, 1911), l. 10.
573 The number of academics and students was increased. In addition to Persian, Arabic and Turkic, traditionally taught in the Section, the Far-East languages were added. The
In 1909, Vasilii von-Klemm, an official for special missions of the Russian MID, wrote in a brief letter to Zhukovskii: ‘Your requests regarding the teaching of Persian – received and executed. I also managed to have a talk with the Minister with regard to the [Educational] Section.’ From the next page, we see that Klemm confirmed that he would receive ‘those two young men’ Zhukovskii had told him about. In another letter, we see that, finally, on 5 August 1911, when the victory (albeit short-lived, as turned out later) had already become clear and Zhukovskii had been given la carte blanche with regard to the Section, von-Klemm returned to St.Petersburg from the party at Zhukovskii’s dacha and, while thanking him and his wife for their wonted hospitality, asked Zhukovskii to design and submit a new curriculum for, this time, a new expanded Educational Section of the Ministry.

Of course, all this was done by Zhukovskii not merely for the benefit of scholarship but rather within the patriotic endeavour to be useful for his Motherland – the discourse which was intrinsic to the disciples of Rozen who himself had derived these ideas from the legacy of his teacher Vasilii Grigor’ev (1816-1881) – the emblematic figure of Russia’s troubled relations between scholarship and state – whose life and activities became such a fertile ground for the genesis and flourishing of the debate on Russian Orientalism throughout the last decade. Rozen ‘accepted Grigor’ev’s view that scholarship should serve the interests of a nation to which a particular scholar belonged and successfully transferred this postulation to his disciples, the favourite of whom was Zhukovskii.

Apprehending the crucial importance of the Eastern question for Russian domestic and international affairs, Zhukovskii was even more active and successful in his endeavour to use his scholarly and administrative influence for strengthening his country. Similar to his colleague Bartol’d, he often stressed ‘the greatness of the historical tasks of Russia in one-to-two years fieldwork also appeared on the offer of the Section curriculum. See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 128-131.

574 AV, f. 17, op. 2, d. 22 (Correspondence with Klemm), l. 34-34ob.
575 ‘Those two men’ were Zhukovskii’s former students for whom he was trying to secure jobs in the Ministry (AV, f. 17, op. 2, d. 22 (Correspondence with Klemm), l. 35).
577 See Tolz, Orient, 8-9.
578 See chapter two for the debate between Knight, Khalid and Todorova which took place on the pages of Slavic Review and Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. The debate was then developed by the works published in the late 2000s. See Kemper, “Integrating”; Schimmelpenninck, “The imperial roots”; Tolz, Orient.
579 Tolz, Orient, 9.
580 See Abdullaeva, “Zhukovskii”.
581 See Bartol’d, “Russkaia nauka,” 534.
application to the Orient\textsuperscript{582} in his scholarly writings and administrative reports. In addition to the apprehension of such a vital question for the Russian Empire as the incorporation of Eastern peoples and their cultures from the peripheries of the Empire, he shared views on the Eastern foreign policy which were rather common for the Russian state establishment of the time and were succinctly stated by General Shvedov, the Minister of Interior, during the debate over Oriental studies in Russia: ‘Now, not only our tasks in the East are equal to those in the West but far outweigh them’.\textsuperscript{583}

Therefore, Zhukovskii, indeed, was part of the Russian civilising mission discourse, which inspired Russia’s foreign policy, for instance, towards Persia at that time. However, for him this was only in terms of the promotion of Russkoe delo, namely the spreading of Russian prestige and influence outside Russia. When it came to the cultural perceptions of the Orient, he, like his many other academic colleagues, would disagree with those politicians and military men who believed in the superiority of Russian culture and in the fact ensuing from this regarding the superior rights which the Russian Empire allegedly had over Oriental peoples.\textsuperscript{584}

In general, sympathy towards the peoples and cultures of their study was not rare among Russian Orientologists of the fin de siècle, as is also pointed out by Knight and Schimmelpenninck.\textsuperscript{585} Such an approach developed from the belief in the underlying difference of Russian culture and hence Russian scholarship from the West in terms of Russia’s cultural affinity to the Orient which was frequently stressed not only by “civilian” scholars but also by Russian military Orientologists.\textsuperscript{586} The same approach was inherent to Zhukovskii, as one of his contemporaries, Ol’denburg, confirms in his obituary for Zhukovskii.\textsuperscript{587} This was, of course, added to its ideological armoury by Soviet historiography; however, in an adequately distorted form. Soviet researchers of Zhukovskii hastened to oppose him versus Western scholars in terms of their support of the colonial arrogant attitude of their governments towards the East and hence of the exploitation of

\textsuperscript{582} AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 183 (the manuscript of Ocherk istorii Vostochnogo Otdelenia, 1907), l. 17.

\textsuperscript{583} Ibid, d. 192 (General Shvedov’s Report), l. 34.

\textsuperscript{584} Ibid, d. 24 (Review of Belozerskii’s Report), l. 4, 11, 14.

\textsuperscript{585} See Knight, “Grigor’ev,” 97. See also Schimmelpenninck, Orientalism, 9, 194-195.

\textsuperscript{586} AV, f. 115 (A.E. Snesarev), op. 1, d. 70 (The manuscript of “Otnosheniiia k aziatskomu miru”), l. 2, 5-7.

\textsuperscript{587} See Ol’denburg, “Zhukovskii”.

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Eastern peoples, as if not noticing Zhukovskii’s albeit indirect but conspicuous participation in Russia’s overall colonial presence in Persia.\footnote{See Bushev, “Zhizn’,” 118.}

Indeed, in the correspondence with one of his most favoured disciples, Nikolai Bravin, Zhukovskii reproached him a few times because of the arrogance and the lack of respect towards Persians and their culture that ‘suddenly’ appeared in Bravin’s letters to his former teacher after he went to serve in Persia as a Russian imperial diplomat. Reminding Bravin that it was not what he had taught to him, Zhukovskii calls on him ‘to love Iran’, in response to which Bravin, like a tricked school pupil, complains that ‘in books and your [Zhukovskii’s] explanations it [Iran] is one but in reality - another’.\footnote{AV, f.17, op. 2, d. 9 (Correspondence with Nikolai Bravin), l. 11-11ob.}

This, of course, raises another phenomenon which was more intrinsic to “practical” Orientologists than, for example, their “civilian” academic counterparts, namely the very romantic fascination with the Orient that was transferred to Russians from the Western Orientalism, depicted by Said in his eponymous book.\footnote{See Bartol’d, “Russkaia nauka,” 541. See also Said, Orientalism, 1-9, 14-123, 222-223.} According to Bravin’s letters and Minorsky’s private diaries,\footnote{AV, f. 134, op. 2, d. 39 (The First Trip of the Lazarev Institute Student from Moscow to Persia, 1902).} these romantic perceptions would often be followed by disappointment as soon as the yesterday’s students found themselves “in the field”. This will be examined in more depth later in this chapter.

In general, the whole spirit of rather frequent correspondence between Zhukovskii and Bravin, which lasted about seven years, demonstrates that, due to the guidance of his teacher, Bravin looks at Persians not as the object of semi-colonial administration, whose representative he was, but as the equal to Russians, albeit very different from them; people whose culture represents immensely valuable material not only for Orientological scholarship but also in terms of enriching his own culture.\footnote{Ibid, l. 24-27, 53-55. In his criticism of Belozerskii’s writings on Persia Zhukovskii extensively touches upon the spiritual wealth of Persian culture and the virtues of the Persian character (AV, f. 17, op. 1, d. 24).} These ideas, rooted in Grigor’ev’s perception of the East-West nexus within Russia’s nature, later, via his disciple Rozen, became part of the discourse of a historical fusion of Western and Eastern civilisations within Russia that prevailed among “civilian” scholars of Russia’s Oriental
studies of the turn of the twentieth century and that was passed over from them to the experts and scholars of the diplomatic and military domains, albeit with lesser intensity.\textsuperscript{593}

In this respect, Andrew Wachtel points out: ‘As opposed to the elites of other imperializing nations, whose explicit or implicit assumption of cultural superiority caused them to view their own values as universal and as something to be imposed on others, members of the Russian cultural elite proposed a model that emphasized their nation’s peculiar spongelike ability to absorb the best that other peoples had to offer as the basis for a universal, inclusive national culture’.\textsuperscript{594} However, at first hand, such a discourse was intended to serve domestic needs as ‘a novel interpretation of the imperial project as a project of translation of world culture into and through Russia’\textsuperscript{595} but immediately spread over to further areas since: first, given the broad specialisation profile of Russian Orientologists, the same scholars were engaged in dealing with the whole Persianate world, which comprised both Russia’s inner and outer Orient; second, given the then imperialistic expansion, in the perception of the time, “today’s inner Orient” was “yesterday’s outer” – as much as “today’s outer Orient” could potentially become “Russia’s inner Orient of tomorrow”.

The same approach was characteristic of Bartol’d’s views and activities since he also belonged to Rozen’s ‘entirely new school of Orientology’, as Ignatii Krachkovskii classified it.\textsuperscript{596} As early as the 1890s, Bartol’d started by declaring the principle which was laid into the foundation of his methodological approach for the rest of his life: ‘It is the same laws of historical evolution that operate in Asia and Europe’\textsuperscript{597} – the principle which was still far from being taken for granted at that time. In his work “Istoriia izucheniiia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii” (The History of the Study of the Orient in Europe and Russia) he questioned the approach widespread in European scholarship of the time of investigating the difference between the historical laws of the development of European and Oriental societies.\textsuperscript{598} Bartol’d argued: ‘For long, the apprehension of the history of the Orient ... has been hampered by the biased attitude of European scholars towards the object

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{593}{See Andrei Snesarev, “Sostoianie Persii”, \textit{Golos Pravdy}, no. 1316 (15/01/1910). See also Andrei Snesarev, “Skromnoe, no ochen’ vazhnnoe delo”, \textit{Golos Pravdy}, no. 1242 (13/10/1909). See also AV, f. 115 (A.E. Snesarev), op. 1, d. 70, l. 2-7.}
\footnotetext{594}{Andrew Wachtel, “Translation, Imperialism, and National Self-Definition in Russia”, in \textit{Public Culture} 11, no. 1 (1999), 52.}
\footnotetext{595}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext{596}{Ignatii Krachkovskii, \textit{Ocherki po istorii russkoi arabisitiki} (Moscow: Nauka, 1950), 139.}
\footnotetext{597}{Vasilii Bartol’d, “Doklad V.V. Bartol’da”, in \textit{ZVORAO} 11 (1898), 355.}
\footnotetext{598}{It was Bartol’d’s criticism of Friedrich Christoph Schlosser’s work \textit{The History of the Eighteenth Century} (See Bartol’d, “Istoriia izucheniiia Vostoka,” 226).}
\end{footnotes}
of study. Under the influence of the superiority of European culture that had been defined by that time, since the seventeenth century there has been a neglectful attitude of Europeans towards the peoples of the Orient. 599

However, as Schimmelpenninck and Tolz point out, the criticism of their European colleagues did not prevent Russian scholars from conscious and active involvement in the colonial policy of their own state in the East. 600 Driven by patriotic motives, they strove to exert their, as they perceived it, scholarly informed influence on Russia’s policy in the East for the benefit of their native land, but the final outcome was not as successful as they had been expecting. In this respect, Tolz emphasises: ‘When the scholars noticed that their work was disregarded by the government, they were dismayed.’ 601

Indeed, Zhukovskii and Bartol’d often expressed their dissatisfaction with the inefficiency of the Russian Eastern policy and with the attitude of the state towards Russian Orientalist scholarship. This was particularly clearly articulated in Bartol’d’s “Istoriia kul’turnoi zhiz’ni Turkestana”, where he expressed his blunt criticism of Russia’s military and administrative activities in Central Asia which, according to him, had been perpetrated without any scholarly approach mostly by people who did not have the necessary knowledge of the region. 602 In his “Pamiati V.A. Zhukovskogo”, Bartol’d also expresses the disappointment, expressed by Zhukovskii, regarding the fact that the Russian state finally failed to comprehend the right place of Orientalist scholarship within itself. 603 As if drawing a summarising line of hopelessness, just two years before the October coup, Bartol’d wrote that ‘... Russian Orientalism, eager to work for the benefit of the native land, would meet either repulse or such sympathy that even more used to lose its heart.’ 604

In general, contrary to Zhukovskii, Bartol’d often tried, at least in outward appearance, to keep his distance from the institutions of state politics. However, to the same extent, it was related to scholarly fieldwork, too. As he acknowledged himself in his

601 Tolz, *Russia’s Own Orient*, 73.
603 See Bartol’d, “Pamiati Zhukovskogo,” 700-701. See also Sergei Zhukovskii’s brief article-memoirs “Moi otets” (My Father), where he depicted his father’s sincere frustration, caused by the complete indifference and incomprehension, he had experienced on behalf of the Russian government and the Duma’s representatives towards Oriental studies in Russia (see Sergei Zhukovskii, “Moi otets,” in *Ocherki po istorii Russkogo vostokovedeniia*, ed. Iosif Orbeli (Moscow: Nauka, 1960), 128).
604 Bartol’d, “Vostok i russkaiia nauka,” 542.
autobiography, after his unsuccessful expeditions of 1903-1904 to Central Asia he realised that he had been ‘deprived of necessary qualities for the, so to speak, fieldworks on tangible artefacts. I feel comfortable enough only during the work on written sources in a closet.’

According to the then standard and only possible for that time Orientological specialisation, Bartol’d was trained in the history of the Orient and the Persian, Arabic and Turkish languages under the supervision of such professors as Aleksei Veselovskii (1843-1918), Vasilii (Wilhelm Friedrich) Radlov (1837-1918) and, mainly, Viktor Rozen at the Faculty of Oriental Languages. Having spent a year (1891-1892) in European universities at the lectures of August Muller (1848-1892) and Theodor Noldeke (1836-1930), according to Rozen’s recommendation and on his own account, Bartol’d realised that at that, rather young, stage of world Orientology, when scholarship so much needed primary written sources on the history of the Orient, Russia was in a much more favourable position since she was in immediate geographical and, more importantly, cultural proximity to the Orient.

While making an emphasis on the importance of written sources for the study of the Orient, Bartol’d propagated the deep academic character of Orientological training and was opposed to introducing the components of practical Orientology at universities. Albeit caring about the good of his native land to the same extent as his colleagues Zhukovskii and Ol’denburg, he had a different view from them on the further development of Russia’s Oriental studies. Preoccupied with the belief in the supremacy of “pure” scholarship, Bartol’d was strongly convinced that, in the then conditions of Russia, when there was a dearth of necessary specialists and the state was unable to properly fund academic Orientology, it was unjustified to divert energy and funds for any kind of institutions of practical Oriental studies. His impedance in this regard resulted, for example, in the

605 See appendix one (Closet scholar).
607 See appendix one (Bartol’d’s productivity).
609 See Vasilii Bartol’d, “K proektu vostochnogo instituta,” v. 9 (Moscow, 1977), 499-502. See also Bartol’d, “Po povodu proekta S.F. Ol’denburga”. Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriiia, 73-74, 252
protracted delay of the establishment of the Oriental Institute in Tashkent that had been initiated by military Orientologist Ivan Iagello at the turn of the century. 610

Indeed, notwithstanding Bartol’d’s endeavour to stay away from any physical involvement in the political activities of state, he could not help using his scholarly prestige for the promotion of “pure” Orientological scholarship in the way he perceived it right. Having become a professor in 1901, he occupied the post of secretary of the Faculty from 1906 to 1910 and as early as 1913 was elected an associated member of the Academy of Sciences. He was a member of almost all main scholarly societies, in one way or another, dealing with the Orient, namely the Oriental Section of the Russian Imperial Archaeological Society, the Russian Imperial Geographical Society and others. However, the RKISVA (1903-1918) became the main place of the application of his efforts for the advancement of his scholarly interests.

Given the significant authorities of the Committee and the fact that it consisted of the representatives of five main scholarly entities of Russia’s Oriental studies, of the Orthodox Church and of the main ministries – namely Foreign Affairs, Interior, Education, the Imperial Court and the War Ministry – the Committee was virtually the culmination of the interconnectedness of all four domains of Oriental studies in late Imperial Russia. Occupying the post of Committee secretary and, in actual fact, being its leading executive, 611 Bartol’d successfully used the interaction with the other members for organising and funding expeditions, receiving assistance on behalf of Russian legations and consulates at sites, coordinating international activities of Russian scholars with those from other countries, and using reports of the military for scholarly needs.

The Committee activities’ area covered the whole Persianate world and the majority of scholarly expeditions and works, which, of course, included not only scholarly purposes, 612 were mainly organised by this Committee (for example, the expeditions of Zaleman, Zarudnyi, etc.). 613 It should also be noted that the original idea of the establishment of such a compound body was born at the XII International Congress of Orientologists (1899) in Rome with the eventual purpose of facilitating the study of Central and Eastern Asia for European scholars. Thus Bartol’d’s initial idea on the taking advantage of Russia’s beneficial position in the study of the Orient was realised as well as

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610 RGVIA, f. 409, op. 2, d. 23872, p/s 313-964a, l. 6. See also Bartol’d, “K proektu,” 499.
611 Head of the Committee was Bartol’d’s former teacher, Vasilii Radlov, who was already 66 at the moment of its establishment.
612 All ministries, represented on the Committee, in all kinds of activities pursued their own narrowly defined corporate goals (see Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 104).
613 See Vasilii Bartol’d, “Russkii komitet”.

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his ideas, inherited from Rozen, on the promotion of the Russian Orientological school within the world of Oriental studies.

The same idea of the popularisation of Russian scholarship on Islam roused Bartol’d to undertake the responsibilities of the chief-editor of the Mir Islama scholarly journal in 1912. Notwithstanding the fact that the establishment of the journal was initially (1907) conceived as a propagandist and missionary anti-Islamic tool by the Sacred Sinod, the highest managing organ of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Department of Clerical Affairs of Foreign Confessions at the Ministry of Interior in association with a missionary Orientologist, Professor Mikhail Mashanov (1852-1924),\(^\text{614}\) Bartol’d turned it into a fully-fledged “dry” scholarly journal, dealing with various aspects of the life of Muslim countries.\(^\text{615}\)

A noteworthy detailed research on the history of the foundation of this journal was published in its present-day eponymous successor, printed by the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences.\(^\text{616}\) According to the author, Mashanov offered the concept of the journal that suggested ‘on one hand, to shaken Islam and, on the other, to make Muslims closer to the Russian Christian culture and, hence, to prepare the ground for the amalgamation of Tatars with Russians’.\(^\text{617}\) As it appears from Mashanov’s words, the scholars of the missionary domain shared the views of Rozen’s school, however with their own approach, inherent to the Orthodox Church – they intended to supersede Muslim culture with the Russian Orthodox one rather than to organically incorporate it into multi-religion Russia along with simultaneous mutual enrichment. Bartol’d was apt to accept neither this militant approach nor the possibility of becoming physically or morally employed by the Ministry of Interior, which resulted in a rather blunt conversation with the Minister about the role of Russian Orientological scholarship in Russia. No Russian scholar was ready to replace Bartol’d and the journal was eventually closed down.\(^\text{618}\)

The above-mentioned situation highlights another manifestation of Foucauldian power/knowledge relations, namely the resistance of the intellectual and their capability to

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\(^\text{614}\) The project was not realised due to financial and bureaucratic encumbrances. The first issue of the journal saw the light only in 1912 and that under Bartol’d’s editorship.

\(^\text{615}\) See Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 261.


\(^\text{617}\) Ibid, 5.

\(^\text{618}\) See appendix one (Makarov).
breakthrough from Governmentality, which is so well analysed in works of Herman Nilson, Sara Mills and Jon Simons. Further to their interpretation of Foucault, regarding the specific place of the intellectual and the natural desire of individuals to stay within the limits of power which endowed them with capacities, hence, creating their own Governmentality, Bartol’d’s example appears to be an illustration in question – a sample of one of those intellectuals who exert resistance within their own lot of (scholarly) truth and overcomes their own Governmentality. Therefore, the life and activities of Zhukovskii and Bartol’d once again demonstrate how one-sided and simplified Said’s model of ‘unanimity of scholarship and politics’ is and how cautiously it should be applied, at least to the Russian case.

**Officers-vostochniki**

Among the whole available scholarship on Russian Orientalism the issue of the impact of the Russian military on Oriental studies in late Imperial Russia was particularly highlighted only in Marshall’s substantial study of the development of Russia’s army in application to its activities in Asia during the period from the beginning of the eighteenth century to 1917. The study also makes clear the underlying role of Dmitrii Miliutin’s reforms for the subsequent development of the military intelligence in the Asian theatre of activities that, in fact, constituted the core of Russia’s military Oriental studies.

The same phenomenon is pointed out in Schimmelpenninck’s “Reforming Military Intelligence”.

However, the above-mentioned works examine the interaction between the military and Orientological knowledge in Imperial Russia as a subaltern object of their studies, focusing mainly on the aspects of pure military nature whereas it is such works as “Applied Orientalism’ in British India and Tsarist Turkestan” by Alexander Morrison and Istoriia otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia s serediny XIX veka do 1917 edited by Aleksei Vigasin which separately, to a significant extent, focus on the contribution of the military to Russia’s Oriental studies, particularly during the crucial period of late Imperial Russia’s

619 See Foucault, *Power*. See also Foucault, “Two lectures”. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*.
620 See Nilson, *Michel Foucault*. See also Mills, *Michel Foucault*. Simons, *Foucault and the Political*.
624 See Schimmelpeninck, “Reforming Military Intelligence,” 141-143.
military activities in Central Asia and the Middle East. Leaving aside the Russian scholar Vigasin’s work – composed with a great deal of the laudation of native achievements still so inherent in Russia’s conventional historiography, nevertheless, Morrison’s observation of the Russian greater specificity is, instead, worth mentioning since he analysed the impact of late Imperial Russia’s Orientologists of different affiliation in the similar context of Western Oriental studies, particularly that of Britain.

This great contribution to Orientological scholarship was mainly provided by individuals who, along with their genuinely military status and subsequently acquired Orientological training, were personally interested in carrying out scholarly activities. The secret of their significant impact on scholarship and, arguably, on state policies was hidden in the fact that they succeeded in combining their military and administrative duties with the scholarly quest, very often based on their personal endeavour and interest. In this sense, one of the main illustrative examples is Konstantin Nikolaevich Smirnov (1877-1938) who, according to his Service Record, was trained by the Oriental Languages Officers’ Courses (1900-1903) and assigned to the Headquarters of the Caucasian Military District as an officer-vostochnik of the Russian General Staff.

In 1904, Staff-Captain Smirnov, as an interpreter, accompanied Colonel Vladimir Liakhov (1869-1920) during his successful reconnaissance trip to northern Kurdistan, which might have been an essential condition for the later crucial change in Smirnov’s professional career. In the wake of this trip, Smirnov receives his first combat bravery awards and in 1906 becomes the aide to the Head of Intelligence of the Caucasian Headquarters. There is no direct evidence as to whether Liakhov played an important role in Smirnov’s appointment as a private tutor of the Heir to the Persian Throne, Ahmad-Mirza (the later Shah of Persia); however, it is certain that without his approval the appointment would not have taken place since in 1907 Liakhov already was the

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625 See Alexander Morrison, “‘Applied Orientalism’ in British India and Tsarist Turkestan,” in Comparative Studies in Society and History 51/3 (2009), 619-647. See also Vigasin and al., eds., Istoriia, 134-156.
627 GNCM, f. 39 (K.N. Smirnov’s Private Collection), d. 3 (Smirnov’s Service Record), l. 1ob.-2ob.
628 See Nugzar Ter-Oganov, “Rapport du Capitaine en Second Constantin Smirnov sur son Voyage en Turquie en 1904,” in Iran and the Caucasus 10/2 (2006): 209-229. In addition to the important information on the then relations of Kurds with the Ottoman state, the report contains Liakhov’s detailed characteristic, so valuable for the historiography of the Russia-Iran nexus.
629 GNCM, f. 39 (K.N. Smirnov’s Private Collection), d. 3 (Smirnov’s Service Record), l. 1ob.-2ob.
Commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade. So, as appears from the above, Smirnov’s Orientological training was appreciated from the outset even by Liakhov, experienced enough in Oriental affairs by that time.

Smirnov’s seven-year tenure at the Persian Shah’s Court resulted in the creation of multiple significant scholarly works on the ethnology and culture, religions and education, and history and economy of Persia.630 Among them, there are Smirnov’s diaries or notes, comprising some parts of his reports to the Russian Minister in Persia and to the Headquarters of the Caucasian Military District as well as other data on his interaction with Persians which were not included into his official reports.631 As the main Israeli researcher of late Imperial Russia’s military and political presence in Persia, Nugzar Ter-Oganov, points out, the notes ‘are a serious document which allows for a deeper and more accurate understanding of the tendencies of the socio-political history of Iran, as well as for the understanding of the Iranian-Russian and of the British-Russian relationships in the epoch of the Constitutional Movement until the very beginning of WWI ... [The notes] contain lots of the most interesting information about the British, German and Turkish policies in Iran, about dozens, if not hundreds of political activists, and, undoubtedly, are the most valuable and rather objective eyewitness accounts...’632

Another researcher of the period, Moritz Deutschmann, rightfully notices other dimensions of the work which Smirnov himself called Zapiski vospitatelia persidskogo shaha (The Notes of the Tutor of the Persian Shah). The Notes demonstrate how Smirnov’s position at the Qajars’ Court considerably assists the better interpenetration of two different cultures and symbolises a rather characteristic for that time tendency in Russo-Iranian relations, namely the increasing, albeit unequal, but mutual influence which was exerted in cultural and political fields between the two countries. ‘By giving a detailed insight into Ahmad Mirza’s education, Smirnov’s text documents important

630 Smirnov’s articles were extensively published in military journals and the journal of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society (see, for example, Konstantin Smirnov, “Poezdka v Severnyi Kurdistan v 1904 godu,” IRGO 17 (1904): 282-326; “Naselenie Persii s voennoi tochki zrenia,” Izvestiia Shtaba Kavkazskogo Voennogo Okruga, no. 27 (1910): 20-64; no. 28 (1910): 1-62; “Messionery v Persii,” no. 23 (1909); “Dervishy i ikh politicheskoe znachenie,” no. 31-32 (1911). Books - Persy: Ocherk religii Persii (Tiflis, 1916); Persy: Etnograficheskii ocherk Persii (Tiflis, 1917).
631 GNCM, f. 39, d. 11, l. 3.
632 Ter-Oganov, “Zhizn’,” 26. Unfortunately, Smirnov did not publish Zapiski vospitatelia persidskogo shaha, 1907-1914 because of the information, given in the manuscript, that could be potentially harmful and unpleasant to the characters of the Notes. Zapiski... were published only in 2002 in Tel-Aviv due to the profound efforts of Nugzar Ter-Oganov who had prepared the manuscript for publication.
transformations in the way the Qajars looked at themselves. He also shows how these transformations were linked to Russian attempts to monopolize their influence on the dynasty at the cost of other groups at the court. Furthermore, Smirnov’s role was not an exception, but was part of a broader trend: in fact, many members of the Iranian elites at the time even sent their sons to Russia for education, most importantly to military schools. This role of military education in the Russian empire had a long tradition; it had, for example, played a central role in integrating Muslim elites from the Caucasus into the empire.  

It goes without saying that Smirnov’s posting at the Persian Court, in addition to gathering relevant political intelligence, was, first of all, meant to exert cultural influence on the would-be Shah and his close environment by means of “civilising” them, which implicated inculcating the European “civilised” mentality however with a simultaneous strong emphasis on the Russian cultural and political component. In his Notes Smirnov writes of how he adjusted the curriculum of his teaching in order to give ‘a proper European education’ to the Heir and to instil good manners in his charge; however, at the same time, throughout his whole communication with Ahmad-Mirza and his surrounding, Smirnov always tried to behave and to speak in an implicit way that would be for the good of Russian state and culture and for the bad of other countries – Turkey, Britain and France. He also quite often points out the witnessed positive outcome of his influences.

His diaries for 1909 also contain a noteworthy depiction of a successful intelligence micro-operation, aiming at ‘civilising andarun in the interests of Russia’, which he solely designed and perpetrated. It resulted in “planting” a Russian Muslim governess into the andarun of the Shah’s Court who was supposed to cultivate European customs among women of the Court and, simultaneously, to promote all things Russian. Given the important role the women of the Qajar Court played in the political life of Persia, which

634 GNCM, f. 39, d. 19, l. 51-53 (The Annual Report on teaching Soltan Ahmad-Mirza). See also d. 11, l. 21, 22; d. 12, l. 2ob.-7, 25-26, 65-66, 70-70ob., 75-77, 83ob.-84ob.; d. 13, l. 98-99, 114-114ob.; d. 14, l. 27-32, 50-58ob; d. 15, l. 6-11ob.; d. 17, l. 35ob.-39; d. 19, l. 3ob.-4ob.
635 Ibid, d. 12 (Diaries, 1908), l. 53-53ob., 66ob.-69ob., d. 13 (Diaries, 1909), l. 4ob; d. 19, l. 1-2ob.
was also pointed out by Abbas Amanat, one can judge the scale of the impact of Smirnov’s operation.\textsuperscript{636}

In his valuable study of the relationships and even of the underlying cultural nexus between the Russian and Iranian monarchies, as the article claims, Deutschmann characterises Captain Smirnov in this way: ‘Konstantin Smirnov was a typical example of a Russian “military Orientalist,” who combined a career in the military with a passion for Orientalist scholarship’.\textsuperscript{637} Although Deutschmann, referring to their significant scholarly impact, implicitly denotes a certain extent of the specificity of Russian officers-\textit{vostochniki}, however he immediately stresses their Saidian Orientalist inward nature, pointing out Smirnov’s feeling of an accentuated cultural ‘otherness’ from Persians.\textsuperscript{638} In this context, Smirnov’s ‘typical Orientalist’ status seems debatable since, throughout the whole period from his reconnaissance trip with Liakhov to northern Kurdistan in 1904 until his departure from Persia in 1914, Smirnov’s perception of Persians gradually metamorphosed as he witnessed events in Persia and his own country. Therefore, Ter-Oganov’s characteristic seems more correct: ‘K.N. Smirnov [was] a typical representative of the Russian military intelligentsia, a staunch patriot-monarchist, believing in the paramount predestination of Russia...’.\textsuperscript{639}

The point is that the officers of the General Staff belonged to the highly educated part of Russian society and, given the interpenetration of all Oriental studies’ domains in Russia, they, more or less in the same way, inherited discourses widespread within the “civilian” scholarly domain. Smirnov sincerely believed in both the beneficial role of Russia for Persia and the possibility of the organic incorporation of Eastern cultures into Russian culture. Smirnov’s concern about the promotion of the Russian Cause in Persia, including the protection of Russian interests versus the main European powers – Britain, Germany and France – is, of course, the red thread passing through all his works;\textsuperscript{640} however, comparing the Russian revolution of 1905-1907 and the Persian of 1905-1911, Smirnov draws conclusions not in favour of Russians. He finally points out that Iranians,


\textsuperscript{637} Deutschmann, “All Rulers,” 403.

\textsuperscript{638} Ibid, 403-404.

\textsuperscript{639} Ter-Oganov, “Zhizn’ i deiatel’nost,,” 7.

\textsuperscript{640} GNCM, f. 39, d. 12 (Diaries 1908), l. 47ob.-48, 83ob.-84; d. 13 (1910), l. 103-103ob., d. 24, l. 8ob.
due to their ancient culture and moral traits, turn out to be much more “civilised” in the circumstances of the absence of central power that happens during insurgencies.641

As far as Smirnov’s influence on Russia’s policy towards Persia is concerned, the available documents do not provide an unequivocal answer. On the one hand, Smirnov’s position at the Court, his relations with the Russian Mission and his Orientological expertise would allow him to stay in the thick of things during the whole period of his posting in Persia. Being an insider at the Court, even in the andarun itself, he had an undoubtedly significant impact on the shaping of the Persian perception of Russia and, simultaneously, he was, arguably, the only source of first-hand objective intelligence on the Qajar Court.642 On the other hand, being a military man and rather modest by nature, Smirnov had no intention to go out of the framework of his above-mentioned nominal role. He neither had nor tried to have (as, for example, Domantovich and Kosagovskii did) access to the strategic decision-making level in Russia’s policy towards Persia.643 In addition to that, the then political situation in Persia deprived the Qajars of the necessary grip on power in the country whereas Russia continued, through inertia, to bet on their preservation and the strategic interaction with this kindred monarchy.644

Serving in Tiflis, in the Headquarters of the Caucasian Military District, before coming to Persia, Smirnov had multiple talks with the then commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade, Fedor Chernozubov (1863-1919),645 who once told him: ‘You think that Persians need a tutor for the Heir? No way! It is just people in St. Petersburg who measure the extent of our influence by facts such as the presence of Russian instructors, of a Russian doctor, etc. Now the Minister thought up a Russian tutor to the Heir and those in

641 GNCM, f. 39, d. 11, l. 1ob.-2ob; d. 20, l. 39ob..
642 A character that can be compared to Smirnov in terms of his awareness of the Court affairs was Seraia Shapshal (1873-1961), one of Zhukovskii’s disciples, who had been working with Mohammad-Ali since 1901 and had occupied an influential position at the Court. However, not being officially subordinated to the Russian Mission, he always prioritised his own personal interest among all others and left Persia in 1908, after the quarrel with the Shah and the Court and also fearing an attempt on behalf of constitutionalists (see f. 39, d. 11, l. 17; d. 12, l. 46-46ob., d. 13, 15ob. (Shapshal’s corruption)).
643 GNCM, f. 39, d. 12, l. 52ob., 53ob. On active political games for influence, led by Domantovich, the first Commander of the Brigade, and Charkovskii, his successor, both at the Persian Court and within the Russian Mission, see, for example, Nugzar Ter-Oganov, “The Russian Military Mission and the Birth of the Persian Cossack Brigade: 1879-1894,” Iranian Studies 42/3 (2009): 457, 460; whereas on Kosagovskii’s activities in this sense see Ter-Oganov, “Brigada”.
644 On the kinship feelings of the Russian and Persian monarchies see Deutschmann, “All Rulers”.
645 See appendix one.
St. Petersburg will be very happy with him for that.\(^{646}\) When in Persia, Smirnov repeatedly remembered Chernozubov’s words and came to the conclusion that Russia’s “à la Hartwig” support of the Persian Court was a mistake since it did not respond to the condition of the Persian society at the time and, in its eventual political outcome, was easily overweighed by the British support of the Constitutionalists.\(^{647}\) However, Smirnov’s activities and works show that, being a staunch monarchist, he himself could offer nothing but the preservation of the Persian monarchy and the criticism of Izvol’skii’s\(^{648}\) policy of losing Russian interests in Persia to the British.\(^{649}\)

Smirnov’s posting in Persia can rightfully be compared to the activities of the fifth commander of His Majesty the Shah of Persia’s Cossack Brigade, Major-General Vladimir Kosagovskii, in terms of both his influence in the context of the Russian-Persian relations and his impact on Russia’s Persian studies.\(^{650}\) However, given the timing of his posting in Persia and, certainly, his post itself, Kosagovskii’s personal activities turned out to be much more conspicuous in the field of Russia’s policy towards Persia.\(^{651}\) During his tenure, he became one of the most influential politicians inside Persia, as well as gaining direct access to the War Minister and the Emperor of Russia. In 1906, during the execution of Kosagovskii’s retirement, Nicolas II, who had known Kosagovskii personally because of his Persian activities, consented to grant him the out-of-turn rank of Lieutenant-General for his services in Persia.\(^{652}\)

According to Kosagovskii, when in 1894 he took over the Brigade it was on the edge of being dismantled.\(^{653}\) The underlying mistake of the Russian government was that, by establishing the Cossack Brigade (at first, it was only a regiment) in Persia in 1879, Russia aimed exclusively at enhancing its own influence over the Shah’s court, as well as

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\(^{646}\) GNCM, f. 39, d. 11, l. 5ob.-6.
\(^{647}\) Ibid, l. 6-8ob.
\(^{648}\) Aleksandr Petrovich Izvol’skii (1856-1919) was the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (1906-1910). In Russia of the time his activities were notorious by their excessive Orientation at France and Great Britain.
\(^{649}\) GNCM, f. 39, d. 11, l. 9, 10ob., 12-15. See also ibid, d. 12, l. 83ob.-84
\(^{650}\) Though the Soviet and present-day historiographies, for unknown reasons, prefer to spell Kosagovskii with ‘o’ in the middle and the main Israeli expert on the Persian Cossack Brigade - Nugzar Ter-Oganov does the same, I adhere to the way Kosagovskii himself would write his name and so did his direct commander, Head of the Caucasian Military District, General Sergei Sheremetev (for example, RGVIA, f. 446, op. 1, d. 47, l. 6-8, 44). The same spelling with ‘a’ is also adopted in Baskhanov, Russkie, 126-127.
\(^{651}\) On Kosagovskii’s mission in Persia see Nugzar Ter-Oganov, Persidskaia kazach’ia brigada, 1879-1921 (Moscow, 2012).
\(^{652}\) RGVIA, f. 409, op. 2, d. 25711, p/s 317686, l. 21 (Nicolas II’s personal instruction).
\(^{653}\) See Ter-Oganov, Brigada, 77-79.
preventing other European powers such as Great Britain from taking a similar step.\textsuperscript{654} Its first commander, Aleksei Domantovich, was even instructed by the War Ministry to try to become one of the Shah’s ministers.\textsuperscript{655} So the real combat training and the creation of a militarily efficient and strong unit in a neighbouring country by no means was part of Russia’s plans. At the same time, as a conventional colonial imperialist power, Russia put the whole financial burden of relevant expenses on the Persian government.\textsuperscript{656} Naturally, seeing the deplorable condition to which the Brigade had come by the mid 1890s, the Persian War Minister, Naib al-Soltaneh, tried to convince the Shah to replace it with a special personal guard which would, possibly, be trained by German instructors.\textsuperscript{657}

Having visited Persia before and being familiar with her culture and people’s character, Colonel Kosagovskii realised what a model military unit should look like in Persia. Already by 1897, the Brigade’s new Chief-Instructor had succeeded in making the unit visibly strong and trained: the personnel increased thrice and the Brigade demonstrated properly at parades and at show manoeuvres. Against the backdrop of the general decay of the Persian military, the Brigade looked the strongest national military unit. This helped resolve the lack of funds for the maintenance of the Brigade and allowed Kosagovskii to occupy an influential place at the Court, which enabled him to play his own card in the political game with multiple components: the Shah, the Persian Ministers, the Russian and the British Missions, and the representatives of other countries.

All these efforts aimed at a better promotion of \textit{Russkoe delo} in Persia, which was perceived by Kosagovskii as the main task of his posting. Throughout all his diaries and other writings he emphasises that his activities were dedicated to the increase of Russian influence in Persia and counteraction to the influence of other powers.\textsuperscript{658} However, in his apprehension, this was not confined to exerting merely political influence, but rather it comprised the component of civilising mission with a strong emphasis on Russian culture. By the virtues which could be seen in the example of the Cossack Brigade and the behaviour of Russian officers, he wanted to make ‘the indigenous semi-wild population’

\textsuperscript{654} RGVIA, f. 446, op. 1, d. 47, l. 27-30 (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Head of the General Staff, 11/03/1894).
\textsuperscript{655} See Ter-Oganov, “Military Mission,” 452-453.
\textsuperscript{656} RGVIA, f. 446, op. 1, d. 43, l. 28-35 (The Contract between Domantovoch and the Persian Government).
\textsuperscript{657} See Ter-Oganov, \textit{Brigada}, 77-78.
familiar with ‘the Russian way of life’.\(^{659}\) He also always forbade, contrary to the insistence of the Persian government, the participation of the Cossack Brigade in the crackdown on bread revolts in Persia and in other punitive actions of the Persian government against peaceful population, ipso facto stressing the allegedly genuine humane purpose of Russians in Persia.\(^{660}\)

From the correspondence of the Head of the Caucasian Military District with the War Ministry, it is obvious that Colonel Kosagovskii’s Orientological expertise was almost the main decisive factor which led to his final approval as the Cossack Brigade Chief-Instructor among many other candidacies.\(^{661}\) Such a thoughtful approach on behalf of the state was well paid off. Following the main guideline of Miliutin’s views on military intelligence activities and perceiving it as an intrinsic part of his service to the native country, Kosagovskii paid particular attention to gathering all sorts of information about Persia. Being guided by his personal interest in the study of Persia and his perception of promoting Russian interests, Kosagovskii took advantage of his authority as Chief-Instructor and of the influential place he had occupied within the Persian ruling establishment and turned the Cossack Brigade into an exuberant source of Orientological information for Russia: the officers were constantly on missions in various places in Persia, gathering intelligence which, according to Miliutin, was to comprise information of any kind. So, the officers’ reports would include the descriptions of towns, villages, routes, local communities, linguistic specificities, customs and traditions, everyday life, etc.\(^{662}\) Kosagovskii would also send his own detailed reports on geography, ethnography and linguistics of Persia to the Military Learned Committee and was in constant correspondence with the library of the War Ministry.\(^{663}\)

The amount of area-study materials was so significant that, in 1898, Kosagovskii applied for transfer to the General Staff in order to help process the materials he had sent. Notwithstanding the fact that the then War Minister Kuropatkin, being an active

\(^{659}\) RGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 279, l. 9.
\(^{661}\) RGVIA, f. 446, op. 1, d. 47, l. 4, 6-8 (General Sheremetev to the War Minister Obruchev, 1894).
\(^{662}\) RGVIA, f. 76 (Kosagovskii’s Reports to the Military Learned Committee), op. 1, d. 48 (General Report on Trips around Persia and Kurdistan); d. 255 and 256 (Officers’ Reports). Delo 254 (1901) demonstrates that Kosagovskii used to entrust even native agents with composing reports on the local life in their towns and villages.
\(^{663}\) RGVIA, f. 76, op. 1, d. 340. See also ibid, d. 374 (Scholarly Report on the Khanate of Maku).
Orientologist himself, realised the high value of Kosagovskii’s scholarly reports and the necessity of their urgent procession, he preferred to leave Kosagovskii in Tehran since his importance as a successfully operating agent of Russian political influence in Persia by far outweighed the potential scholarly impact of his materials, even in the eyes of such a scholarship-orientated individual as Kuropatkin.664

However, along with the fact that Kosagovskii’s contribution to the study of Persia was separately acknowledged by the following generation of Persians, later on Kosagovskii’s writings were also criticised by his younger colleagues such as Smirnov for the lack of objectivity and the sense of superiority of all things Russian towards the Persian.665 This, of course, also demonstrates Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge at play since officers-vostochniki were part of Russian society, therefore their views and, consequently, approaches to scholarship, changed in conformity with the main intellectual trends of the time. Kosagovskii intellectually belonged to the 1870s-1880s, the generation of conquerors, whereas Smirnov received Orientological training almost twenty years later and was situated in one row with Minorsky and Snesarev, who were, to a significant degree, influenced by their teachers such as Rozen, Zhukovskii, Bartol’d and others.666 This is also to support the thesis about the enhanced impact of “civilian” scholarship of fin-de-siècle on the other adjacent domains of Russia’s Orientological knowledge.

Late Imperial Russian Colonels Smirnov and Iagello, and General Snesarev as well as diplomats Minorsky, Bravin and Vvedenskii constituted a generation of “practical” vostochniki that can be called transitional. In fact, the changes which took place in their perception of the Orient and its scholarship during the last decade of Tsarist Russia personified that historical intellectual bridge which concatenated Imperial Russia’s sheer colonial mentality of the state experts of the 1860s-1890s to the omnipresent critique of imperialism of the first 10-15 years of the Bolshevik rule. All the above-mentioned experts made it to the new Soviet era and continued their expert and scholarly activities, having considerably been influenced by the events of 1917 and the following years. In this context, the activities of Andrei Snesarev can be regarded as the most indicative within the military domain.

Andrei Snesarev entered the Academy of the General Staff in 1896 when he had already served in the Russian Army for several years, having the doctorate of abstract

664 See Ter-Oganov, Brigada, 93-95. On the scholarly activities of Kuropatkin, as an Orientologist, see Baskhanov, Russkie, 135-136.
665 GNCM, f. 39, d. 27, l. 75ob. in Ter-Oganov, Brigada, 93.
666 RGVIA, f. 409, op. 2, d. 25711, p/s 317686, l. 70.
mathematics from Moscow State University and pursuing, at the same time, a professional career as an opera singer at the Bolshoi Theatre. On his graduation from the Academy in 1899, he received the out-of-turn promotion for his excellence in mastering Oriental languages.667 Having been assigned to the Headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, Snesarev did not have protracted postings to Persia and his main activities were concentrated on Afghanistan and India; however, due to the character of his intelligence service, he carried out several missions in Persia and in 1905 was even bestowed with the Order of Lion and Sun – the highest Persian decoration – on behalf of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah.668 He authored several works on the Babists, the Persian Constitutional Movement and the Russian-British interaction in Persia.669

However, his main contribution to scholarship was in his active participation in the activities of various Orientological scholarly societies and in the coordination of state entities’ activities (the Ministry of Interior, the War Ministry, the MID, etc.) in the field of Oriental studies. His role can rightfully be compared with the one of Zhukovskii, with the difference that Snesarev secured the backward linkage of the practical domains with the academic one. For example, in the period from 1905 to 1914 he played the leading role in Obshestvo Vostokovedeniia and, in close cooperation with the Minister of Interior, Shvedov, established the Academy of Oriental Studies, where he later taught. Based on Miliutin’s Military Statistics, Snesarev elaborated and introduced his own system of “practical” Orientological training with the core subject of Military Geography.670

Given Snesarev’s multifaceted intellectual training and active interaction with the representatives of other intellectual domains of Russian society, including “civilian” Orientological scholarship, among other officers-vostochniki he was particularly subject to the influence of various discourses widely spread in the educated circles. In his writings belonging to the period 1900-1917, he paid significant attention to the study of the “tryprich” of the West - Russia - the Orient and the place of Russian Orientological

667 RGVIA, f. 409, op. 2, p/s 338–604 (Snesarev’s Service Record), l. 3. In total, in addition to English, French, German and Latin, Snesarev mastered fourteen Oriental languages, including Persian, Arabic, Urdu, Hindu, Turkish, etc.
668 Ibid, l. 4.
669 See Andrei Snesarev, Anglo-Russkoe soglashenie 1907 goda (St.Petersburg, 1908); “Poslednee politicheskoе dvizhenie v Persii,” Golos Pravy, no. 546 (15 June 1907); “Ot konokrada do Kromvelia,” Golos Pravy, no. 1067 (4 April 1909); “Nizverzhennyi vladyka,” Golos Pravy, no. 1260 (1 November 1909); “Sostoianie Persii”.
670 AV, f. 115, op. 2, d. 27, 1-2; d. 50, l. 1, 3-7. See also Andrei Snesarev, “K novomu polozheniu o vostochnykh iazykakh,” Russkii invalid, no. 235 (2 December 1911).
scholarship therein.\footnote{See Andrei Snesarev, \textit{Indiia kak glavnyi factor v sredneaziatskom voprose: Vzgliad tuzemtsev na anglichan i ikh upravlenie} (St.Petersburg, 1906); \textit{Vostochnaia Bukhara: voenno-geograficheskii ocherk} (St.Petersbug, 1906); \textit{Probuzhdenie Afghanistana,} \textit{Tashkentskie Vesti} (31 January 1905); \textit{V obshestve vostokovedeniia,} \textit{Golos Pravdy} (27 October 1909); \textit{25-letie ofitserskih kursov vostochnyh iazykov,} \textit{Golos Pravdy}, no. 950 (20 November 1908); and many others.} The most illustrative, in this sense, work by him is the article “Otnosheniia k aziatskomu miru” (Attitudes towards the Asiatic world) where he, similar to Rozen, Bartol’d and Zhukovskii, elaborates on the indebtedness of European civilisation towards the East and on Russia’s inherently better (than Western cultures) capability to absorb all the best features during the interaction with the Orientals.\footnote{AV, f. 115, op. 1, d. 70 (Manuscript), l. 1-14.} 

The following citation can serve as the best illustration that embraces the manifestations of all main discourses, spread among scholars of all Orientological domains of late Imperial Russia. In 1906, Snesarev wrote: ‘The conquest of Asia was cruel and uncivilised in form, particularly in those areas where natives interacted with purer representatives of Europe. Our Russian conquest system progressed in a soft and smooth manner. Having been neighbours to Turko-Mongol-Finnish tribes and having had many of them on our land since long ago, while conquering them we were neither arrogant nor haughty; in addition we differed little from the nations defeated by us. Along with this knowledge, during our interaction with Asians we gained an awareness of some advantages or, at least, virtues of our Asian neighbours. However, whenever the pure Europeans, particularly, for example, the English, stepped on the Asian continent, their victorious marching signified vicious cruelty, mass robbery and undisguised contempt for all Asians.’ \footnote{Ibid, l. 5-6.} 

The point here is not that the Russians were more merciful and noble than the British, but rather that, similar to their teachers, Snesarev, Tumanski, Smirnov, Iagello and the early twentieth century’s other military Orientologists, trained and subsequently influenced by Rozen and his “civilian” disciples, perceived of Russia ‘as a particular kind of political and cultural space where there was no boundary between the “East” and the “West”.’ \footnote{Tolz, \textit{Russia’s Own Orient}, 5.} Accordingly, taking into consideration the political situation in Persia and around her, in the early twentieth century Persia was seen as a potential part of Russia.\footnote{See Lamzdorf’s letter to Nicolas II in Ter-Oganov, \textit{Zapiski}, 6.} At least, the northern part of Persia, being under factual Russian occupation with all conventional colonial institutions from 1909 to 1917 (the public order and security were
provided by Russian troops, executive and judicial powers were carried out by multiple Russian consuls, stationed in all significant population aggregates, etc.), had already become a virtual Russian territory by the 1910s.\textsuperscript{676}

\textbf{Diplomats-vostochniki}

Russia’s military presence in Persia in the early twentieth century went hand in hand with the activities of the Russian late Imperial diplomatic corps. In fact, the activities of the Russian military in the field (except for those aiming at gathering strictly military data) were, first of all, subordinated to the Head of Russia’s Legation in Tehran and to consuls stationed in other cities and towns of Persia. Marshall fairly argues that, due to this status quo, the diplomats were doomed to play the role of the main bearers of Russian influence in Persia.\textsuperscript{677} Given this fact, I would continue that they possessed much more operative autonomy and capabilities, in comparison with the military, to influence the events and the outcome of Russia’s policy towards Persia. In this sense, one of the most representative examples of such diplomats was Vladimir Fedorovich Minorsky (1877-1966).

Having been trained in Law at the Moscow University, Minorsky converted in 1900 to the course of Oriental studies at the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages with the aim of embarking on a career of a diplomat-vostochnik. As a senior colleague of his, Andrei Kalmykov, put it in his memoirs, learning Oriental languages could somehow guarantee employability in the most privileged workplace in the Russian Empire - the Ministry for Foreign Affairs - as its European sections were impregnable for students from relatively modest families. This was also indicative of the discursive manifestations of higher Russian society – the opportunity to be permanently engaged in interaction with the Western culture was the most desired option for educated Russians.\textsuperscript{678}

Given the fact that Minorsky was descended from a very modest family who lived in the small town of Korcheva on the Upper Volga and moreover that his father was a Jew, any kind of prospect of securing a good placement was ruled out, due to the conditions of

\textsuperscript{676} In his \textit{Notes}, dated by 1908, Smirnov mentioned a certain ‘top-secret message’, sent through him from Mohammad-Ali Shah to Nicolas II and the latter’s response, however, because of the secrecy of the matter he did not reveal the content. Only in 1933, Smirnov added a comment on his manuscript that it had been a request to accept Persia as Russia’s protectorate, similar to Bukhara Khanate, and Nicolas II’s polite refusal (see GNCM, f. 39, d. 13, l. 39-39ob; d. 19, l. 13-17).

\textsuperscript{677} See Marshall, \textit{General Staff}, 16, 26-27.

\textsuperscript{678} See Kalmykow, \textit{Memoirs}, 12-18.
pronounced anti-Semitism within Russia’s state structures of the time. That is why, having succeeded in entering Moscow University merely due to the Gold Medal he had received at secondary school, four years later he decided to convert his Law Course to Persian studies, which was a rather unprestigious area within the Russian Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It should be noted that this unpretentious choice not only allowed Minorsky to penetrate Russia’s most hard-to-get-into entity but eventually turned out for the better for his future professional and scholarly career.

Having been employed by the MID in 1903, Minorsky spent four years – 1904-1908 – in Russia’s General Consulate in Tabriz and the Russian Legation in Tehran. As early as 1966, well before the debates on power/knowledge relations, Lang separately pointed out that, along with his professional duties, Minorsky dedicated this time to the study of the Western and north-western parts of Persia. Precisely during this period he became profoundly interested in the history and culture of the Kurds as part of Iranian culture. Being inspired by the writings of Edward Browne and the Russian scholars Rozen and Colonel Tumanskii, he also used his secondment in Persia for gathering a lot of first-hand material on the Iranian Baha’is and the Ahl-e hagh sect. It is worth noting that Minorsky’s scholarly writings and the reports presented to the Russian Imperial Geographical, Archaeological and other scholarly societies resulted in him being perceived by the MID as someone more than a conventional diplomat and in late 1911 he was assigned to supervise the topographical surveillance of areas in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, the precise areas of his scholarly interest.

As early as 1902, when still a student of the Moscow Lazarev Institute, he began to correspond with Zhukovskii, who had by that time authored a number of publications in this field. It was then that they established the close Teacher-Disciple relationship which lasted until Zhukovskii’s death in 1918. Zhukovskii provided his new disciple with his ad hoc guidance and later supervised his work on The people of Truth and gathering relevant manuscripts, after Minorsky had embarked on the career of an Imperial diplomat at the

Persian Desk on 3 September 1903. This consequently enabled Minorsky to present successful reports in Russia’s Orientological societies and to publish his first monograph on the sect in 1911. The work received the Gold Medal of the Ethnography Section of the Moscow Imperial Society of Natural Sciences and some very positive feedback from the demanding and uncompromising scholar of the time, Bartol’d, which secured the beginning of their close and protracted scholarly cooperation that continued even during the early Soviet period, until Bartold’s death in 1930.

Minorsky’s above-mentioned scholarly activities highlight the feature common for most of its representatives, namely the endeavour to employ their Orientological training and professional postings for the production of scholarly knowledge – a discursive practice propagated by their academic teachers, mentioned earlier in this chapter. Minorsky’s activities also demonstrate the immense interconnectedness of the domains in question. On top of that, Minorsky’s and suchlike scholars’ professional careers show that the state would put additional value to such representatives of practical domains and used to give them more operational autonomy, hence opening more opportunities for them to significantly influence the eventual outcomes of its foreign policy.

Minorsky’s participation in the activities of the Quadripartite Boundary Commission, established according to the Constantinople Protocol of 1913, can rightly be regarded as the quintessential manifestation of the interplay of power/knowledge relations. The detailed narrative of the Commission spadework and the demarcation of the border itself – both of which, on the whole, took almost four years – are easily reconstructed with the help of Minorsky’s unpublished private diaries, kept in the Archive of Orientologists of the St. Petersburg Institute of Ancient Manuscripts affiliated with the Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation, and the accounts of the British officers-members of the Commission which were published in the 1920s.

Due to his scholarly prestige and expertise in the region, Minorsky gained confidence on behalf of not only his superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also
the British Foreign Office, which instructed the British officers that Minorsky was the only man competent in the question.  

This enabled him to uphold a lot of areas within the Persian territory, which was in Russian interests in the context of the discourse of Russkoe delo.  

At the same time, he made use of his strategic position for reaching his personal career goals, deriving tangible benefits for himself.  

In addition, Minorsky’s obsession with collecting area-study data during the spadework of the Commission in 1911-1913 and its fieldwork in 1914 resulted in an eventual significant contribution to Russia’s Persian studies.

It is worth noting that, in so doing, Minorsky also productively followed the unique institutional practices of Russia’s Oriental studies of the time. It was precisely during his several months’ absence from Istanbul in 1913 that he met his future wife and scholarly assistant for the rest of his life – Tat’iana Shchebunina. Within the period Minorsky was staying in St. Petersburg, he succeeded in arranging his marriage and coordinating with the Ministry the possibility of his wife accompanying him during the Commission’s field activities.  

This fact is also indicative of his privileged position within the highly bureaucratised diplomatic apparatus of late Imperial Russia. Minorsky did not miscalculate on this account either. Instead of a potential burden, being the only woman among the almost 200-man party, Tat’iana turned out to be a great scholarly gain. Continuing to master Persian, she was able to establish contacts in those places that were traditionally inaccessible in Muslim societies for male foreigners – almost every time the party made a stop in a village or a nomad winter settlement Tat’iana, properly instructed by Minorsky, would go to anderuns, communicating with local women and jotting down necessary ethnographic or linguistic data. Her husband so much appreciated her scholarly contribution that he dedicated his main work, resulting from this protracted trip, to her, and separately mentioned her productive role in his notes and published writings.

Therefore, in fact, Minorsky became a successor to the Russian Orientological tradition, initially introduced by one of his teachers, namely Zhukovskii in the 1880s. Later, this phenomenon became so widespread among Russian Orientologists that it can be

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686 AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 803 (Notebook no. 2), l. 7. On the role of Minorsky in the activities of the Commission see also Sir Arnold Wilson’s words in “The Demarcation of the Turco-Persian Boundary in 1913-1914: Discussion,” 238. See also Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes’ words in the same document on page 241.
688 See AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 803 (Travel letters; Notebook no. 1), 5-50b.
690 See Kocho-Williams, Russian and Soviet Diplomacy, 16-18.
691 See Vladimir Minorsky, Kurdy (Petrograd: Tipografiia Kirshbauma, 1915).
subsumed under the category of an institutional practice adopted by late Imperial Russia’s Oriental studies. Against the backdrop of a dearth of primary sources and in the context of the discourse of obtaining all the available information about Russia’s Asian neighbours (which was propagated within military Oriental studies by the current War Minister in the 1860s-1870s and then passed over to Oriental studies of the other domains – academic, diplomatic and missionary⁶⁹²), such information was supposed to be collected by all means available – military, political and academic. This also included Orientologists’ wives who, due to their conventional high educational background, would be of great scholarly assistance to their husbands, particularly in those areas which were impregnable to them because of strong gender taboos in Muslim societies. In 1883-1886, during Zhukovskii’s academic fieldwork in Persia, his wife, Varvara Karlosheva, mastered Persian to the extent that she was able to collect and process linguistic data on Persian folklore that she would receive during her communication with local women. In the letters to his teacher Viktor Rozen, Zhukovskii particularly acknowledged her help in his ethnographic studies, including family relationships and women’s everyday life in Persia⁶⁹³ Varvara made friends in the Shah’s andarun in Tehran and then in the andaruns of the governors of Isfahan and Shiraz – the three cities where her husband did his fieldwork – and became a valuable source of ethnographical and political information for Zhukovskii. She even later published an independent scholarly work, Persidskii enderun.⁶⁹⁴ When in Persia, Captain Smirnov also entrusted his wife, Kseniia, with a similar assignment. In addition to nuanced political intelligence, Smirnov’s wife provided him with extensive information on customs and everyday life in the Shah’s andarun which was used by Smirnov in his scholarly writings. This phenomenon of the wives’ scholarly participation is not observed in the case of European countries’ Oriental studies.⁶⁹⁵

In general, it should also be noted that, though Minorsky’s impact on the activities of the commission was enormous, it stayed within the general guidelines of late Imperial Russia’s Persian policy, which was determined in St. Petersburg. His influence rather had a local influence within the limited scales of being able to bargain away from the British this

⁶⁹² See Volkov, “Persian Studies,” 7-10, 16.
⁶⁹⁴ See Varvara Zhukovskaia, “Persidsky enderun,” Vestnik Evropy (October, 1886), 501-549.
⁶⁹⁵ GNCM, f. 39, d. 12, l. 50ob.-51ob; d. 13, l. 75-75ob, 77. See also Ter-Oganov, “Zhizn’,” 17.
or that small territory for its factual inclusion to the zone under Russian control. His suggestions on wresting concessions in the South of Persia from the British or on the severing of Azerbaijan from Persia – which he scholarly substantiated by citing considerable cultural differences between Azeris and Persians – remained unnoticed by the Russian foreign policy establishment that would give priorities to reaching agreements in its Western foreign policy.  

**Conclusion**

Notwithstanding the fact that late Imperial Russia’s “civilian” Orientologists perceived the necessity of their influential involvement in the interaction with the state in different ways, in the 1910s they came to a deplorable conclusion that their protracted efforts to make the state establishment apprehend the importance of Orientalist scholarship and to secure the beneficial impact of their knowledge on Russia’s present and future had eventually suffered a bitter defeat. However, their influence made successful headway in another sphere, namely the formation of their students’ perception of the Orient. One of the main features of this perception was that the Orient was not perceived as the Other but rather as something that could successfully interact with the Russian culture and even organically supplement it.

It was now them, the former students – the current agents of state power – who were supposed to exert their own influence on the process of policymaking. The late Imperial Russian state valued its diplomats and military officers with special Orientalist training, particularly those among them who would productively combine their professional duties with intensive scholarly activities. Such practical Orientologists, as a rule, gained more operational autonomy, which enhanced both their professional efficiency and scholarly productivity. However, albeit their impact on the realisation of Russian foreign policy towards Persia was enormous at a local scale and their reports did have a share in the shaping of Russia’s policy towards Persia, the role of practical Orientologists on the relevant strategic level was neither decisive nor significant. The general guidelines of the Persian policy were drawn in St. Petersburg in the context of the current expediency of Russia’s relationships with West-European powers by experts in European affairs and, quite often, contrary to the suggestions of experts on Persia.

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696 AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 803 (Notebook no. 2), 8-9ob. See also GNCM, f. 39, d. 12, 73ob-75; d. 11, l. 3, 16ob. On Minorsky’s *Azerbaijan Project of 1909* and his efforts to revive it in 1917 see also Aliev, *Istoriia Irana*, 90-91.
Simultaneously, the main impact of the scholars of all four domains turned out to be mostly in making use of the capacities, with which they were endowed by the Russian state, for the promotion of the scholarly institutions in which they were engaged, and for the production of the scholarly knowledge in which they were interested. The interplay of power relations between scholarly and state institutions, discourses and various interests of the intellectual eventually resulted in productivity, leading to the accelerated development of Oriental studies.
Chapter Five
The Birth and Death of Red Orientalism (1917-1941)

Introduction

This chapter presents a study of the activities of the most significant figures of early Soviet Iranology which, as shown in chapter three, consisted of three domains: scholarly, diplomatic and military. All three domains included both groups of scholars and experts on Iran: those who were trained and acted before 1917 – the so-called “representatives of the old regime” – and those individuals who were completely new to the field and started working on Iran after 1917. So the chapter follows the same criteria as the previous one for choosing the individual subjects to study. It continues to trace the activities of the already familiar characters as well as those newcomers to the field who became prominent within their domains and remained scholarly active throughout the period. Along with a new ideology, the latter brought new discourses and institutional practices to the field. This chapter studies the involvement of both groups in the process of shaping foreign policy towards Persia and the production of scholarly knowledge about her. On the examples of the activities of the individuals in question, it also seeks to answer what qualitative and quantitative transformations took place in discourses and practices within the above-mentioned three domains and what continuities can be traced.

The chapter also aims to find out whether there was direct or indirect influence of the scholars and experts in question on the early Soviet foreign policy towards Persia and what was the degree of this influence. In so doing, we determine the approach of the early Soviet state power towards Orientological knowledge and how effectively the state used this knowledge. The analysis presented in this chapter will demonstrate on what grounds those scholars and experts cooperated with the state and what character their relationships with the state had. In order to answer the above-mentioned questions, the chapter draws on the recent English- and Russian-language scholarship on early Soviet Oriental studies, but mostly on the unpublished documents retrieved from Russian and Georgian academic, political and military archives, shedding light on the activities of the individuals in question.

The issue of significant changes that took place in the activities of the individuals engaged in Russian Oriental studies over the boundary of 1917 was particularly dealt with in the Soviet literature of the second half of the twentieth century. In this sense, the importance of the 1960s-1980s’ works on the history of Soviet Oriental studies can hardly
be overestimated. For instance, _Vostokovedenie v Leningradskom Universitete_ (Orientology in the Leningrad University) by Andrei Kononov is a case in point that represents a supremely efficient guide to the entanglements of the organisational perturbations of the 1920s and 1930s and traces the institutional development of Soviet Oriental studies, particularly of Iranology, up to the late 1950s, though mainly with a rather narrow focus on the Leningrad Orientological school. In addition, it contains a valuable succinct excursus on the history of the St. Petersbog Oriental studies in late Imperial Russia. Kononov’s endeavour was taken up and developed by such Soviet Iranists as Nina Kuznetsova, Liudmila Kulagina and, shortly after, by Ashot Baziants with their _Iz istorii sovetskogo vostokovedeniia, 1917-1967_ (Of the History of Soviet Orientology) and _Stanovlenie sovetskogo vostokovedeniia_ (The Formation of Soviet Orientology) respectively. These scrupulous research studies have remained the main comprehensive chronicles of the formation and development of Soviet Orientology, in particular of Iranian studies, including the shaping of multiple national centres of Iranology in various Soviet republics, until the present.

It is also worth mentioning another influential work whose value is enhanced by its narrow focus on the initial period of the emergence of a new Soviet Iranology formed mainly by the experts of the so-called practical area-study knowledge newly adopted by the Bolshevik state. The book, _Sovetskoe iranovedenie 20-kh godov_ (Soviet Iranian studies of the 1920s), by Semen Agaev, deals with activities and views propagated by the founders of the new Iranology, who all in some way participated in the abortive attempt to organise the Persian Socialist Revolution and in the activities of Iran’s Communist party, namely Iranskii, Irandust, Soltanzadeh, Rotshtein, Pavlovich, Gurko-Kriazhin, Tardov and others. The work focuses on the new approaches offered by the above-mentioned individuals for Soviet Iranology, which propagated the underlying principle of practical usage of Orientological knowledge as a powerful tool in the cause of social revolution proliferation. Given the historical period in which all the above works were written, and the discourses and self-censorship of that time, inculcated from the top, they are overwhelmed with relevant ideological underpinnings and lacking in analysis. If, however, making use of the Foucauldian tools of archaeology of knowledge, one disregards or discards the disadvantages determined by the time the works were created, they can be

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697 See Kononov, _Vostokovedenie_.
698 See Kuznetsova et al., _Iz istorii_. Baziants, _Stanovlenie_.
699 See Agaev, _Sovetskoe iranovedenie 20-kh godov_.

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used as valuable sources of factual historical narrative on the content and forms of the new Soviet Iranology.

The works by Western researchers of the same period, such as Wayne S. Vucinich, Richard Frye and Muriel Atkin, echoed the above-mentioned Soviet scholarship in excessively emphasising the post-1917 shifts. Recently, however, West-European scholarship has begun contemplating the issue of the existence of strong continuities inherited from the late Imperial period by the early Soviet Oriental studies. Although Stephan Conerman epitomises Said’s concept of Orientalism as ‘a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imaginary, doctrines [...] for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ and argues that ‘Soviet studies on the Orient fit very well into this overall definition’, the articles collected in the volume he edited with Michael Kemper mainly highlight other crucial specificities of Soviet Orientology. They mostly draw on the interplay of power/knowledge relations that unfolded within the grid of personal, institutional, and state interests and discourses of the Soviet period, which is significantly broader than merely two-vector relations between a particular scholarly domain and state power. They demonstrate that this interplay was inherited from the late Imperial period by Soviet Oriental studies.

Already in the introduction to the volume Kemper points out the ambiguity of the relationships of Soviet scholars with their state, which was also intrinsic to the pre-1917 status quo, as well as the employment of late Imperial Russia’s discursive practices for fighting Islam by the Bolshevik atheist propaganda. In addition, Soviet Orientology ‘maintained, from the outset, an agenda on liberating the East’, embracing it into its own cultural and political entity on equal terms, hence leaving no place for differentiating the Self from the Other – the mind-set rooted in activities of Kazem-Bek and Grigori’ev. Touched upon in Schimmelpenninck’s “The Imperial Roots of Soviet Orientology”, their views on the organic integration of Russia’s Western and Eastern origins were later developed by Rozen and his disciples and constituted the core discourse which existed among the Orientologists of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The troubled relations of late Imperial Russia’s Orientological scholarship with state power spanned the 1917 watershed and into the early Soviet period. In this sense, it is

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703 Ibid, 21.
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pertinent to separately mention the article “Profiles under pressure: Orientalists in Petrograd/Leningrad, 1918-1956” by Russia-based researcher Mikhail Rodionov, which was published in Kemper’s above-mentioned edited volume.\textsuperscript{705} This focuses on the activities and the Foucauldian resistance of the two classical Orientologists of both periods – the specialist in Central Asian studies and *Iranist*, Vasilii Bartol’d, and the expert in Arabic studies, Ignatii Krachkovskii, - in the rigorous conditions of the Bolsheviks’ rule. A notable merit of this work is a detailed periodisation of the gradual destruction of the classical Russian Orientological scholarship by the Bolshevik regime. The author also stresses the high importance of the above-mentioned work carried out since the 1990s by Marina Sorokina’s group of scholars, and touches upon the increasing difficulties which researchers nowadays come across in Russian archives regarding restricted access.\textsuperscript{706}

The impact of Bartol’d and Rozen’s other disciples such as Zhukovskii, Marr, and Ol’denburg has been scrupulously studied in the seminal work *Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods* by Vera Tolz, which dwells upon Russian/Soviet Orientology within the Academy of Sciences and its perceptions of the Orient in the context of Russia’s own national discourses existing in the period of study.\textsuperscript{707} The author strongly supports the idea of the great impact of Rozen’s disciples, among whom Bartol’d was one of the main representatives, on the Bolshevik elite’s perception of ‘various ethnic groups in the Eastern and Southern periphery of the Soviet state in the 1920s.’\textsuperscript{708} Tolz engages with the debate on the applicability of Said’s model to Russia and argues that his notion of ‘Orientalism’ is the echo of a larger spectrum of ideas expressed by the above-mentioned *fin de siècle* Russian Orientologists. The advantage of this book is that the author goes beyond the Saidian approach and actively engages with a broader concept of power/knowledge relations which manifested themselves in the interaction of these scholars with state power.\textsuperscript{709}

The protagonists of Tolz’s book were the members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which mostly succeeded in preserving the ‘pure scholarly’ spirit of its activities, as they themselves would perceive it, till the very end of the 1920s. Not sharing Bolshevik ideology, they quite successfully prevented the Academy from being politicised and ideologised for longer than a decade after 1917. However, in spite of their often outward

\textsuperscript{705} Rodionov, “Profiles under pressure.”
\textsuperscript{706} Ibid, 55-56.
\textsuperscript{707} Tolz, *Russia's Own Orient*.
\textsuperscript{708} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{709} Ibid, 69-84.
but mostly covert opposition to the Bolsheviks,\textsuperscript{710} the old academicians of Russian Oriental studies became consciously and actively involved in the early Bolshevik nationalities policy and turned out in the complete service of the practical needs of the new government.\textsuperscript{711} This is also explained by the fact that one of the main reasons for scholars’ dissatisfaction with the late Imperial government was that it did not duly rely upon their scholarship in policymaking towards Russia’s own Orient, as Tolz argues,\textsuperscript{712} whereas from the early 1920s they were delighted to discover the affinity of their views on the issue with the Bolshevik government. As Hirsch convincingly maintains, they were allured by discovering that the Bolsheviks also ‘had enormous faith in the transformative power of scientific government and in the idea of progress.’\textsuperscript{713}

**Academic Iranology: New vs. Old**

A prominent figure of this scholarly community who had become the leading scholar on the whole Persianate world was academician Vasilii Bartol’d, whose pre-1917 activities have been studied in the previous chapter.\textsuperscript{714} Based in Petrograd (Leningrad from 1924), Bartol’d continued teaching at the Faculty of Oriental Languages, which along with the historic-philological and law faculties, was integrated into the unified Faculty of Social Sciences in 1919.\textsuperscript{715} It was based on the academic staff of this faculty that Bartol’d established *Kollegiia Vostokovedov*, which gathered the so-called “old regime” academics who still adhered to the pre-1917 school of Oriental studies, and became the virtual scholarly opposition to the “new Soviet school of Orientology” manifested in Pavlovich’s politically influential Moscow-based VNAV.\textsuperscript{716}

Throughout the 1920s, VNAV made multiple efforts to subordinate *Kollegiia* to itself or at least to establish close interaction – efforts which remained mainly ignored by *Kollegiia*. Bartol’d even refused to write scholarly articles for *Novyi Vostok*, the publishing organ of VNAV.\textsuperscript{717} He considered it impossible to cooperate with new, ideologically driven, illiterate, as he perceived, experts on the Orient, who rejected the scholarly

\textsuperscript{710} See Rodionov, “Profiles,” 47.
\textsuperscript{712} Ibid, 73-79.
\textsuperscript{713} Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*, 7.
\textsuperscript{714} It should be reminded that Valentin Zhukovskii died in 1918.
\textsuperscript{715} See Kuznetsova and al., *Iz istorii*, 13.
\textsuperscript{716} See chapter three.
\textsuperscript{717} GARF, f. P-1335, op. 1, d. 5 (Pavlovich’s correspondence), l. 20.
practices and methods of the pre-1917 Russian Orientology.\textsuperscript{718} This outward stance and reluctance to comply with the new rules of scholarship in the Bolshevik state resulted in the gradual suppression of all activities of Kollegiia by the end of the 1920s, a fact which was pointed out by Bartol’d himself in his letters to Minorsky shortly before his death.\textsuperscript{719} This, of course, was not a random coincidence with the purges in the Academy which started in 1929.

Hirsch argues that ‘[i]n 1917 Ol’denburg and Vladimir Il’ich Lenin had formed an alliance, bringing together scholars and Bolsheviks; the Academy had provided the regime with expert knowledge and had been granted in exchange funding, protection, and a considerable degree of scientific freedom’\textsuperscript{720}, which manifested itself in the establishment of KIPS composed of the “old regime” academics with Ol’denburg himself as its head. This unwritten alliance, achieved mainly after Ol’denburg’s famous conversation with Lenin,\textsuperscript{721} resulted also in Sovnarkom’s Decree of 1918 regarding ‘The Improvement of Scholar’s Wellbeing’\textsuperscript{722}, also lobbied by Maxim Gorkii, qualified in Krementsov’s work as ‘one of the most influential patrons of science’.\textsuperscript{723} The Decree granted the old scholars cooperating with the state exceptionally favourable tangible conditions of life in a Russia torn by the Civil War. As Rodionov points out, for almost all scholars of the time it was a matter of surviving.\textsuperscript{724} However, this alliance was not destined to last for long. In the context of the new discourses which were created by the new polity and which questioned the very right of physical existence of any scholarship unable to yield immediate practical returns, the old expert knowledge lost its vital importance. As soon as the main tasks of the Bolshevik nationalities policy were largely solved in the 1920s, the old academics ceased to be, in new terms, productive for the state. This process became aggravated by the change of the paradigm of political loyalty, which demanded a transition from not

\textsuperscript{718} It should be noted that Pavlovich would pay to Bartol’d with the same coin. For example, in his “Zadachi VNAV” he wrote that there had been no valid study of the Orient in Russia (GARF, f. P-1335, op. 1, d. 23, l. 6).

\textsuperscript{719} AV, f. 134, op. 3, d. 479, l. 17ob., 25.

\textsuperscript{720} Hirsch, 140.


\textsuperscript{722} Newspaper Izvestiia, 14/12/1921. See also Kuznetsova et al., Iz istorii, 42-43. The materials on the activities of the Central Commission of VTsIK (1921-1931) can be found in GARF, f. P-4737.

\textsuperscript{723} Krementsov, Stalinist Science, 35.

\textsuperscript{724} See Rodionov, “Profiles,” 48.
committing active resistance and being relatively apolitical to wholehearted, at least outwardly, devotion to the regime and its ideology.

Notwithstanding the fact that after the October coup Bartol’d continued his endeavours to preserve his work from becoming part of any political ideology or stream, regardless of its affiliation with Bolsheviks or Russian émigrés, there was no longer any place in the new polity for apolitical scholarship. In this sense, his correspondence with the representatives of the Eurasianism movement is worth mentioning. In response to Savitskii’s efforts to draw on Bartol’d’s ideas for the promotion of Eurasianist postulations on Russia’s predestination to unite Europe and Asia – a theory predominantly spread among people of letters of the Russian Emigration community of the time – Bartol’d wrote: ‘[...] I am not the follower of “eurasianist theories” and would prefer to use the word “Eurasia” with the former meaning: Europe and Asia. It is absolutely clear that geographical divisions should not be put into dependence on the volatile destinies of political life. In that sense, Asia is not a homogeneous whole, and the Muslim world mainly stands closer to Western Europe than to China.’725

In addition to Bartol’d’s refutation of what later would be defined as “Orientalist contraposition of the West to the Orient”, which was studied in chapters two and four of the thesis, this citation confirms his strong belief in the necessity of keeping scholarship beyond politics. The new straightforward discourse on making scholarship useful to state practical interests secured the exclusion of Bartol’d and suchlike scholars of Rozen’s group not only from the operational grid of interaction with state power but also from national scholarship. Bartol’d was banned from teaching and would have been arrested, like many others among his “old regime” colleagues, had he not died in 1930. Subsequently, his scholarship was denounced as class-alienated and his works became unavailable in libraries.

Bartol’d’s authorised oblivion, as Rodionov argues, continued well into the 1950s.726 However, in one of Krymskii’s letters to Krachkovskii, dated 20 May 1935, we find the first signs of the slowly changing behaviour of the state towards Bartol’d’s legacy. According to Krymskii, while in other cities of the USSR the attitude remained the same, those signs were noticed in St. Petersburg.727 Obviously, the process had started by that

725 GARF, f. P-5783, op. 1, d. 418 (Correspondence with Savitskii), l. 37.  
726 See Rodionov, “Profiles,” 51.  
time and we can witness radical changes as early as a couple of years later. One of Bartol’d’s few disciples, Ivan Umniakov (1890-1976), testifies that the Institute of Orientology of the Soviet Academy of Sciences entrusted him with the codification of Bartol’d’s works and the publication of its complete annotation as early as the late 1930s. This, of course, could not have been done without full state authorisation, which can be regarded as the end of the obstruction of Bartol’d’s scholarly legacy. This was done precisely when the state secured its omnipotent ideological grip on domestic scholarship and felt safe inwardly and, on the other hand, as Hirsch argues, at the time when it felt unsafe outwardly because of the re-evaluation of the nations issue in Western Europe against the backdrop of the Nazi threat. The Soviet state took into consideration that, as the representatives of Rozen’s school believed, WWI had mainly been related to the nationality question, and the Russian Empire had not been prepared for that in terms of scholarly background. Therefore, having learnt from the experience of its Imperial predecessor, on the eve of a new large-scale conflict of a similar character the current state felt the necessity to consolidate whatever was available in the scholarly domain for these needs.

Curiously enough, as early as 1960 mature Soviet Orientology regarded Bartol’d as one of the founders of the study of the socio-economic history of Oriental countries in its Marxist terms, whereas he had never used Marxist methodology in his studies nor supported such an approach in general. For example, the first and the only time when Bartol’d used the term ‘feudalism’ was his scholarly paper “To the Question of Feudalism in Iran”, presented by him at a session of VNAV in 1929, just several months before his death, and published in its organ Novyi Vostok in 1930. It should be noted that, in actual fact, the paper had nothing to do with the study of Marxist postulations in application to ancient Iran. However, it was already the time when scholars were learning to play their own politics with the state – a phenomenon that became widespread in the 1930s and existed in Soviet scholarship until the late 1980s, as Krementsov and Fortescue maintain. By including Marxist terminology, quite often far-fetched references to the

728 See Ivan Umniakov, Annotirovannaia bibliografiia nrudov V.V.Bartol’da (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 11.
729 See Hirsch, Empire, 15-16.
730 Ibid, 45-49.
731 See Kononov, Vostokovedenie, 23.
732 See Vasilii Bartol’d, “K voprosu o feodalizme v Irane,” Novyi Vostok 28 (1930): 108-116. It was the only case when Bartol’d participated in the VNAV’s activities.
founders of the ruling ideology, and engaging with novoyaz in general, Soviet scholars would simply make possible the physical continuation of their scholarly work in the context of an ideologically driven society.\textsuperscript{734}

This, of course, did not rescue the old school of Russian Orientology from destruction, which had been accomplished by the early 1930s, according to Rodionov.\textsuperscript{735} Notwithstanding the active engagement in the state-run project of drawing up the USSR’s nationalities map, Bartol’d and his colleagues merely succeeded in gaining a temporary physical immunity and relevant operational autonomy in their own scholarly domain. The state instrumentally used them as the source of expert knowledge without granting them the slightest opportunity of access to the decision-making area of domestic policy, let alone foreign policy. From the very first days of the new polity, on the scale increasing from year to year, the so-called pure academic Oriental studies were gradually substituted with the new “scholarship” of individuals representing a certain symbiosis of practical knowledge and scarce theoretical pieces of Orientological knowledge, both of which were being obtained on the move - as they were carrying out their professional duties in the field of Bolshevik policy towards the East simultaneously with writing their “scholarly” works on the East, based on the Marxist ideology.

In the case of early Soviet Iranian studies, this group was represented by individuals such as Vladimir Gurko-Kriazhin (1887-1931), Sergei Pastukhov (1887-1940), Vladimir Osetrov (1893-1938), Mikhail Vel’tman-Pavlovich (1871-1927), and Vladimir Tardov (1879-1938). Being staunch apologists for Bolshevism, all of them founded their attitude towards the Orient and their methodology for its study on the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin.\textsuperscript{736} Moreover, acting as the employees of the state entities directly involved in perpetrating Soviet foreign policy towards Eastern countries, they combined their organisational activities with the on-going study of the East based on new methodology, and, vice-versa, they would immediately integrate their elaborated scholarly approaches and achieved conclusions into their organisational activities, hence securing the conformity of suchlike activities to their scholarly guidelines in practice.

Almost all of them did not have even initial academic Oriental training. The closest any of them came to conventional notions of academic training and scholarly activities was Gurko-Kriazhin, who graduated from the Historico-Philological Faculty of the Moscow State University in 1912 and had majored in the ethnography and archaeology of the

\textsuperscript{734} See Krementsov, \textit{Stalinist Science}, 27, 49-53.
\textsuperscript{735} See Rodionov, “Profiles,” 47, 55-56.
\textsuperscript{736} See Vucinich, “The Structure,” 52.
Caucasus, without mastering a single Oriental language but with a great interest in the history and culture of the Orient. Later, he happened to work in the Lazarev Institute under the supervision of an acknowledged expert on the Persianate world, Aleksandr Freiman (1879-1968). This also influenced Gurko’s overall engagement with Persia.\footnote{GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 6, l. 69.}

As Tamazishvili points out, Gurko-Kriazhin’s Orientological career began with his public lecture “The White Peril: The West and the East”,\footnote{See Vladimir Gurko-Kriazhin, “Belaia opasnost’. Vostok i Zapad” [The White Peril. The West and the East], in Russkoe Slovo 01/02/1914.} held in Moscow in 1914.\footnote{Tamazishvili, “Gurko-Kriazhin,” 34.} In the lecture, he analysed the colonial expansion of Western powers of the time to the East and emphasised an underlying racist component present in the on-going submission of the Orient – a thesis that became very popular in Western critique of Orientalism during the second half of the twentieth century. It is worth mentioning that before 1917 Gurko did not adhere to any socio-democratic political movement and was, as he later characterised himself, an ‘idealist Orientophile in Tolstoy’s style’.\footnote{Vladimir Gurko-Kriazhin, “V sektiiu Zarubezhnogo Vostoka Obshestva istorikov-marksistov. Zaiavlenie,” in Istorik-marksist 17 (1930), 89. See also Tamazishvili, 34.} Strong sympathy towards Oriental peoples remained eminent in Gurko’s activities and scholarly writings throughout his whole life - a rather common feature for all the early Soviet Orientologists, who looked at the “oppressed” Orientals as actual or potential allies in the worldwide struggle of classes.

Given the hectic Civil War times and the constantly varying character of the state activities in which they were involved, it is a rather challenging undertaking to assign the above-mentioned Orientologists to a particular domain of the Oriental studies of early Soviet Russia, namely academic scholarship, diplomatic service or the military. Even Gurko-Kriazhin, who was engaged most consistently and straightforwardly in scholarly academic activities, had time to serve in both the Bolshevik diplomacy and the RKKA as an expert on the Orient.\footnote{GARF, f. P-1335, op. 1, d. 6, l. 69-70.} Of course, one can reason that, beyond the academic sphere, he had neither diplomatic nor military training. However, the others did not, either - this was one of the most unique features of the post-1917 state of affairs: the state would mostly entrust individuals with professional assignments according to their revolutionary zeal and their readiness to undertake new challenges, not by their professional background, hence
granting them many more operational capabilities than in Imperial Russia. Yet Gurko-Kriazhin is perceived to belong to the academic domain of early Soviet Oriental studies.

Having wholeheartedly accepted the October coup, and perceiving it as a fully-fledged people’s revolution with only truthful ideology, he believed in the necessity of establishing a new Orientology that “would be bearing the burden of the emerging new social psychology.” In his particular case it was an Orientology based on Marxist methodology and aiming at the study of socio-political and economic issues of the modern and contemporary history of the Orient. The study of the national liberation movements was supposed to occupy the central place in this quest for new knowledge. Obviously, this approach has much in common with the Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge, unearthing the past and comprehending our knowledge about it according to the social context of its time. The difference is that Foucault used this postulation to better understand the knowledge of the past and the practices of its production, whereas Gurko suggested the transformation of the perception of existing knowledge and of the available ways of its production.

The second tantamount part of the new Orientology was perceived as the immediate link to the state activities in the East. The ‘social psychology’ of the time also implied the promotion of the worldwide revolution, the future of which mainly lay in the East, according to him. In 1919, Gurko-Kriazhin embarked on service in the General Staff of the Red Army until in June 1920 he was assigned to the Bolshevik joint diplomatic mission in Persia and Turkey, which was based in Baku. This happened in the full swing of the abortive Persian Socialist Revolution instigated by the landing of Raskolnikov’s forces in Anzali shortly before. Heading the Information Section of the Bolshevik Plenipotentiary Mission and the Representation of ROSTA (Russia’s Telegraph Agency) in the whole Middle East, Gurko-Kriazhin was subordinated to Rotshtein and fitted well into the team of Pastukhov and Osetrov, forming together the core fabric of the production of the Bolshevik Persian policy for more than a decade.

742 See appendix one (Pavlovich).
743 Tamazishvili, “Gurko-Kriazhin,” 44.
744 GARF, P-1335, op.1, d. 23, l. 1-10.
747 See the analysis and criticism of their roles in the process of the Persian policymaking in RGASPI, f. 85, op. Secret Persia, d. 106 (10 persidskikh pisem Vardina).
Similarly to his above-mentioned colleagues, who used their posts in the new Bolshevik foreign policy structures for integration of their scholarship into their state activities, Gurko-Kriazhin was opposed to the cause aiming at the organisation of immediate socialist revolution in Persia, which was furiously advocated by actual participants in revolutionary activities in Persia, namely by Ordzhonikidze, Sultanzadeh, Vardin and many other experienced militant Bolsheviks, who, however, had nothing to do with scholarly activities of the time.\footnote{GARF, f. P-5402, op. 1, d. 417, l. 1. RGASPI, f. 85, op. Secret Persia, d. 11, l. 1-2 (Ordzhonikidze’s complaint to Politbiuro on the activities of the Soviet Mission in Persia), l. 7; d. 106 (Vardin’s criticism), l. 8-8ob., 160b.} Following the Marxist methodology, Gurko-Kriazhin considered Persia unprepared for immediate social conversion and believed that Soviet Russia needed to assist Persia in creating and enhancing its nationalist bourgeoisie. The support of the Persian inner communist elements and the instigation of the inevitable socialist revolution should take central place in Soviet Persian policy only after the coming to power of the national bourgeoisie. For the time being, Soviet Russia had to cooperate with the nationalist forces, later clearly represented by Reza-Khan, and to unfold the full-scale efficient study of Persia based on new approaches.\footnote{AVPRF, f. 028, op. 10, d. 11, papka 31, l. 7, 41; RGASPI, f. 532 (KUTV), op. 2, d. 153, l. 17; f. 159, op. 2, d. 51, l. 127(NKID to Politbiuro); f. 85, d. 50, l. 1-2.}

In this respect, the article “Red Orientalism” by Kemper, focusing on the activities of Stalin’s deputy in Narkomnats and the founder of VNAV, Pavlovich, also sheds some light on Gurko-Kriazhin’s contribution to the work of VNAV, playing the first role after Pavlovich in terms of its scholarly organisation. Kemper rightly cites Gurko-Kriazhin’s words about VNAV which explicitly testify to the crucial role he ascribed to VNAV, and his work in it since, according to Gurko, ‘it was meant to be a laboratory of the new revolutionary Orientology.’\footnote{Kemper, “Red Orientalism,” 456.} Indeed, having taken one of the decisive roles in the establishment of VNAV and having become head of its leading politico-economic department after his return from Persia, Gurko-Kriazhin instructed the Soviet missions in the Middle East to submit to him regular analytical reports on the politico-economic situation of the relevant countries.\footnote{GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 6, l. 5, 18, 46, 82.} In this field, his cooperation with the Soviet Mission in Persia (Osetrov, Pastukhov, Tardov) and the Soviet Plenipotentiary in Afghanistan (Raskol’nikov) was particularly fruitful, given their personal drive for scholarly research –
a phenomenon totally overlooked in Kemper’s works on early Soviet Orientologists, in which he is preoccupied with their straightforward Orientalist link to state power.⁷⁵²

Gurko-Kriazhin codified and rigorously processed the received area-study information for its subsequent usage in composing consolidated reports and in the Orientological training of the students of the Military Academy, KUTV, MIV and Leningrad Institute of Living Oriental Languages. The Military Academy and MIV would apply to Gurko-Kriazhin to obtain his services as a lecturer and as their students’ scholarly supervisor.⁷⁵³ However, Gurko-Kriazhin was almost the only individual based in VNAV of so much scholarly significance - the rest, albeit fully-fledged members of VNAV, mostly worked in other organisations. So it was not as much VNAV as an institution that granted to Gurko-Kriazhin the opportunity to exert his direct influence on early Soviet Persian policy, as it was mainly his own scholarship and the attitude of the early Bolshevik state towards it.

Separately stressing VNAV’s direct affiliation with Narkomnats and its founder’s status as Stalin’s first deputy, Soviet scholarship of the second half of the twentieth century emphasised the great contribution of VNAV as an institution to all Orientological domains of the early USSR,⁷⁵⁴ while Western researchers such as Vucinich and Atkin, pointing to certain failures in organisational and scholarly activities, were more reserved.⁷⁵⁵ Later, in the development of the debate on the applicability of Said’s Orientalism mould to Russia, Kemper also emphasised the origins and significant role of VNAV as an Orientalist institution in Saidian terms; however, I would argue that, in this case, it was not the organisation which exerted influence or by means of its structure and activities enabled individuals to exert influence on state power, as it was in the case of IRGO, and particularly RKISVA, during the late Imperial period.⁷⁵⁶

It is true that all the politically influential Orientologists were members of VNAV, but it was they who would give more weight to VNAV by their individual activities, which were perpetrated not through VNAV but through their own political organisations of which they were employees. VNAV mostly failed to consolidate the efforts of the representatives of all three Orientological domains within the joint projects from which they all could have benefited. Moreover, during the first years after the establishment of VNAV many of its

⁷⁵² AV, f. 115, op. 2, d. 29, l. 1; op. 1, d. 156, l. 1.
⁷⁵³ GARF, P.-1335, op. 1, d.5, l. 88, 90, 101.
⁷⁵⁴ See, for example, Kuznetsova and Kulagina, “Vsesoiuznaia”.
⁷⁵⁶ See chapter two.
main members affiliated with the Red Army and intelligence services, such as Abikh, Pastukhov, Osetrov, Snerev, Raskol’nikov and others, had to outwardly withdraw their membership because of the limitations imposed by their main employers on cooperation with civilian entities.\textsuperscript{757} These were the individuals who literally shaped the early Soviet Persian policy.

**Red Orientalism: NKID as a mill of scholarly knowledge**

Sergei Konstantinovich Pastukhov (1887-1940) and Vladimir Petrovich Osetrov (1893-1938), who had both graduated from the Faculty of Law at Moscow University, went to NKID in 1918 and occupied key positions in the decision-making structures of early Soviet policy towards Persia. As mentioned above, in the context of the looming worldwide socialist revolution Oriental peoples were perceived by Russian revolutionaries as the nations oppressed by world reaction, and hence potential brothers-in-arms in the class struggle.\textsuperscript{758} The affinity of class character, which the new Orientologists felt towards the oppressed Orient, naturally transformed into a plain sympathy – a feeling which had quite often been inherent to late Imperial Russia’s Orientologists because of their Orientalist romanticised perceptions and the positivist attitudes inculcated in them by their teachers – the academics of Rozen’s family.\textsuperscript{759} This even manifested itself in the pseudonyms they took: Pastukhov became Iranskii which can be roughly translated from Russian as ‘belonging to Iran’, and Osetrov would sign documents as Irandust – ‘loving Iran’ or ‘Iran’s friend.’

In his *Russian and Soviet Diplomacy, 1900-1939*, Kocho-Williams maintains a thesis on the multiple continuities inherited from the late Imperial period by the Bolshevik foreign affairs apparatus,\textsuperscript{760} whereas I would argue that those continuities could mostly be found only in the apprehended necessity to follow conventional rules of diplomatic protocol and to secure routine diplomatic interaction for Bolshevik Russia. This was simply dictated by the existing realities, since otherwise the Bolsheviks would have been excluded from the international field of communication, which the nascent state was undoubtedly unable to afford. Simultaneously, the work *Tak nachinalsia Narkomindel*, notwithstanding all its ideological bias, gives valuable first-hand information on the

\textsuperscript{757} GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 6, l. 119, 130, 142.

\textsuperscript{758} See V.I. Lenin’s letter to Ammanallah-Khan dated 27/05/1919 in Izvestiia TsIK Turkestanskoi Respubliki 121, 14/06/1919.

\textsuperscript{759} AV, f. 17, op. 2, d. 9, l. 3, 5-7ob., 10-11ob.

\textsuperscript{760} See Kocho-Williams, *Russian and Soviet*. 

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technicalities of NKID functioning during the first post-1917 years, when it started its activities with a totally new operative personnel of fourteen on 18 November 1917, including Commissar Trotsky and his two deputies. This book demonstrates a different picture to the one depicted by Kocho-Williams.

Indeed, in contrast to academic and military domains (almost all leading scholars remained in their institutions and many Imperial senior officers joined the Red Army), NKID became a totally new institution based on deep ruptures in its personnel and professional approaches in comparison to its Imperial predecessor. These ruptures were particularly painful in the field of NKID’s Persian activities. In addition to crucial changes in the general political cause and the loss of the relevant experienced, ad hoc trained personnel in St. Petersburg, nobody among hundreds of Russian officials in Persia accepted the new power in Russia, except for one diplomat, who will be touched upon later in the chapter.

Given the emerging dearth of experts, it is not surprising that the new individuals, who were not even properly trained, succeeded in occupying strategic positions within their professional domain. However, I would argue that they would not have been able to retain and to significantly strengthen these positions in the context of new discourses and the attitudes of the new state towards scholarly knowledge, had they not quickly gained the necessary scholarly expertise through their own personal drive and the operational capabilities received from state power. For example, Iranskii headed the First Oriental Section of NKID from 1921 to 1933, the year when he embarked on the post of Soviet Ambassador to Iran. Since the first year of his diplomatic service (1918), he had been actively engaged in work on and the study of Iran, arguably combining them with his activities first in (Ve)Cheka and, later on, in INO (O)GPU and NKVD. Before being appointed as Ambassador, he often visited Persia but with short-term assignments, whereas Irandust spent much longer in Persia: 1920-1925 and 1928-1929 while he was permanently assigned to the same section of NKID.

Agaev points out: ‘The majority of the first Soviet Iranists had not been involved in history studies, in general, nor in Iranian studies, in particular, and came to Orientology from practical activities.’ This is fair; however, they embarked on gaining theoretical

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761 See Zarnitskii et al., Tak nachinalsia, 13-15.
763 RGASPI, f. 85, op. Secret Persia, d. 106, l. 173.
765 Agaev, Sovetskoe iranovedenie, 7.
expertise from the outset: when in NKID, Iranskii undertook Orientological training in the
Oriental Section of the Academy of the RKKA, established and turned by Snesarev into the
main source of Orientological cadres for NKID, political and military intelligence
services.\footnote{GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 6, l. 130.} Irandust took language and area-studies lessons from Krymskii’s best disciple
and expert on Persian literature, Konstantin Chaikin,\footnote{See appendix one.} who worked as an interpreter in the
Soviet Mission in Tehran from 1920 to 1926. In 1919-1920, before being posted to Persia,
the same Chaikin along with Snesarev taught Persian and area-studies to Iranskii in the
Military Academy.\footnote{GARF, f. 7668, op. 1, d. 2889, l. 5-5ob. See also A. Krymskii’s letter to I.
Krachkovskii, 03/01/1935, in Naumkin, Neizvestnye(1997), 216.}

Given the rupture in applied methodology and the above-mentioned lack of basic
Orientological training of new experts on Iran, their first works were, in actual fact, more
descriptive essays and superfluous articles, mostly aimed at posing new research questions
about contemporary Iran.\footnote{Agaev, Sovetskoe iranovedenie, 8-9.} In addition, what was a great gain for late Imperial
Orientologists such as Minorsky, Tumanskii, Smirnov and other properly trained
practitioners, namely direct access to primary sources at site, – in the case of the early
Soviet Iranists this advantageous strategic position quite often turned out worse for the
scholarly quality of their works because of their low ability to rigorously process the
abundantly collected contemporary materials, containing local bias. At the same time, it
should be noted that these flaws of the nascent Soviet Iranology would later be
acknowledged by Gurko-Kriazhin, S. Iranskii and Pavlovich as their expertise went on
XXXV, XLIII, XLIV-XLV; Mikhail Pavlovich, “Zadachi i dostizheniia sovetskogo
vostokovedeniia,” Novyi Vostok 16-17 (1926): IV.} However, the quantity had finally turned into quality by the end of the 1920s,
and the scholarly field activities, heavily mixed up with practical political activities, made
their significant contribution to Russia’s scholarship on contemporary Iran – the area
which had, indeed, received considerably less attention from late Imperial Russia’s Persian
studies.

Therefore, the symbiosis of revolutionary zeal, of Marxist ideology and of
growing Orientological expertise resulted in individuals such as Iranskii and Irandust
occupying strategically crucial positions within the grid of power/knowledge relations.
Drawing on their own scholarship, they would carry out the analysis of the situation in
Persia and come to certain conclusions which they implemented in their own practical foreign policy activities and in their analytical reports determining the decisions of their superiors – Chicherin and Karakhan.\textsuperscript{771} Irandust’s profound work, “Essays on the economic polity of Persia”,\textsuperscript{772} efficiently drawing on the abundant accumulated primary material on socio-economic issues by that time, became the most remarkable - both in terms of length and content – testament of the new Soviet Iranology, regarding its standpoint towards the object of study and the current and subsequent Soviet foreign policy towards Persia. It contained the perception of Persia as a society unripe for a social conversion similar to the one that had happened in Russia.

The work also expressed a belief in the necessity of supporting the national bourgeoisie and developing all kinds of relationships, particularly economic and political, with ‘Reza-Khan’s government of national dictatorship’, as well as to withdraw the Soviet military and political support for various kinds of nationalist armed movements similar to those of Kuchek-Khan, Ehsanollah and Gheidar-Khan.\textsuperscript{773} As the correspondence of the Soviet Mission in Tehran with NKID testifies, these were the main pillars of the Soviet policy towards Persia in the period from 1921 to the mid 1930s which, however, was frequently challenged by the other radical Bolsheviks pursuing the cause of the organisation of immediate revolution in Persia.\textsuperscript{774} During the 1920s and the early 1930s, Chicherin and his successors were frequently accused of allowing the group of Pastukhov, Osetrov, Tardov and Gurko-Kriazhin to literally shape the USSR’s foreign policy towards Persia\textsuperscript{775} – a protracted episode in the history of Soviet Oriental studies which can be regarded as the most unequivocal manifestation of Said’s Orientalism in terms of its straightforward nexus between knowledge and state power.

\textsuperscript{771} AVPRF, f. 04, op. 18, d. 50691, papka 112, l. 1-3, 38; d. 50749, papka 115, l. 3.
\textsuperscript{773} AVPRF, f. 04, op. 18, d. 50750, papka 115, l. 1-71; f. 028, op. 10, d. 11, papka 31, l. 2, 3, 6, 7, 39; The positivist term ‘Reza-khan’s government of national dictatorship’ was first coined by Iranskii (f. 94, op. 5a, d. 1, papka 105, l. 269). RGASPI, f. 159, op. 2, d. 51(Osetrov on Persia), l. 60-68, 111-113.
\textsuperscript{774} RGASPI, f. 85, d. 14, l. 1-3(Rotshtein’s correspondence with Chicherin). AVPRF, f. Krestinsky, op. 10, d. 81, papka 54, l. 12, 30-36, 44-67,96.
\textsuperscript{775} RGASPI, f. 85, d. 106, l. 170-171, 260, 267; f. 532, op. 2, d. 153, l. 17. On Chicherin seeking Pastukhov’s advice see also f. 159, op. 2, d. 51, l. 177. See also Chicherin’s response to the accusations in l. 180, 182.
Discontinuities and the inception of institutional practices

Against the backdrop of all the above-mentioned institutional ruptures and shifts within Russia’s new foreign policy structures, the example of tsarist diplomats Nikolai Zakharovich Bravin (1881-1921) and Pavel Petrovich Vvedenskii (1880-1938), used by the Bolshevik foreign policy state entities, can seem more an exception, where this is one of those exceptions that prove the rule. The former was the most controversial figure among the Russian late Imperial diplomatic corps, and he turned out to be the same among the first generation of Soviet diplomats. A gifted diplomat-vostochnik of late Imperial Russia and one of the most favoured disciples of Zhukovskii on the one hand, and, on the other, the only diplomat among his peers in Persia to recognise the Bolsheviks’ power and, subsequently, during the first years after 1917, the first Soviet polpred to Persia, Turkestan and Afghanistan, in January 1921 he was assassinated on Moscow’s orders following his refusal to return to Russia.

Both Russian and Western historiography have little on Bravin, mainly because of the restricted access to the relevant documents in Russian archives, a situation which is still maintained by Russian authorities. Drawing on the British and Iranian archival sources, the scarce Western scholarship on Bravin focuses on his failed efforts to take over the representation of Russia’s interests in Persia from the acting diplomatic mission in the period from November 1917 to June 1918, namely from the moment he positively responded from Khoi to Trotsky’s cable containing the appeal to all Russian diplomats and went over to Tehran, to the time he left Persia for Moscow. Being preoccupied with the general cause of the Bolshevik foreign policy towards Persia and Bravin’s mechanical role therein, France-based researcher, Pezhammer Dailami, left Bravin’s pre-1917 professional and Orientological past beyond the scope of his works, whereas a Russia-based scholar, Vladimir Genis, mainly due to his direct access to Russian archives, carried out more detailed studies of Bravin’s activities during the late Imperial and early Soviet periods,

776 AVPRI, f. 159, op. 749/2, d. 1 (Bravin’s personal file).
777 AV contains Bravin’s 23 letters to Zhukovskii testifying about their close teacher-disciple relations (AV, f. 17, op. 2, d. 9).
778 AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 224, l. 1-3 (Minorsky’s testimonial of Bravin). GARF, P-5802, op. 1, d. 617, l. 12.
779 RGASPI, f. 133, op. 1 (Not for Reading Hall), d. 26 (Kobozev’s notes), l. 30.
781 See Volkov, “Fearing the Ghosts of State Officialdom Past?”
predominantly focusing on his biography and emphasising Bravin’s excessive career ambitions. Drawing on the valuable recently declassified collections in Russian archives, Genis’s works have challenged the policing practices conventionally adopted in Soviet and still widely maintained in post-Soviet historiography. In Foucauldian terms, his research on Bravin has become a historiographical breakthrough from the patriotic discourse, widespread in Russia’s Iranology, on the necessity to keep expedient silence on the destiny of the first Soviet plenipotentiary to Persia and Afghanistan, who eventually became the first Soviet high-ranked diplomat-defector.

Nevertheless, the above-mentioned scholarship on Bravin does not aim in any way at engaging with the interaction of power/knowledge relations in his case. It totally overlooks his contribution to the accumulation of primary material on Persia during the late Imperial period and the role which he had played within Zhukovskii’s scholarly intelligence network, which was studied in chapter four of the thesis. Neither does it engage with the relevant study of Bravin’s activities during more than three years after the Bolshevik coup; whereas, I would argue, Bravin’s case personifies another indicative example of the interplay of personal and institutional interests within the grid of power/knowledge relations. His profound Orientological expertise and his almost 13-year professional experience as a diplomat secured him an influential strategic position with considerable operational autonomy within foreign policy activities of the new state.

After he abandoned his post in Persia he was appointed NKID’s plenipotentiary at the Turkestan Revolutionary Government in Tashkent, where he tried to implement his Orientological expertise in order to improve the new regime’s relationships with the local population and to attract the Bukharians’ sympathy towards the Bolsheviks. However, he was the only “old regime” expert in the government of Turkestan and, under the circumstances of military hostilities, the new power preferred more straightforward methods of coercion and did not take his expertise on board. In addition, not being captivated with the Marxist ideology, by the time he was posted to Afghanistan as Head of

783 See, for example, Genis, Neveryne, 12, 19.
784 Some of the archival collections, used by Genis, have been either reclassified or relocated to certain distant depositories, which made the retrieval of documents practically impossible. For example, such a destiny has befallen RGASPI’s Fond 17, containing documents on the Party’s counter-measures against defectors and the Central Committee’s orders for OGPU to elaborate preventive and punitive actions on the issue, which later led to the juridical legalisation of the practices, aimed at the physical liquidation of Soviet defectors on the territory of other countries.
785 RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 41, l. 3.
the First Soviet plenipotentiary mission he had become rather disappointed with his interaction with the Bolsheviks, which eventually resulted in mutual distrust. When already at the court of the Afghan ruler, Bravin even refused to explain the Bolshevik credenda to Ammanollah-Khan and his entourage, leaving this task to his ideologically driven companions, who could hardly speak Dari. All this was reported to Tashkent and Moscow shortly afterwards, with relevant consequences.

In the early stages of Bravin’s rather short-lived Soviet career, he played an underlying role in successful introduction of the principles of the new Russian state to Iranians, conquering their hearts by delivering flaming public speeches in the streets of Tehran and by publishing eloquent articles in Iranian newspapers in praise of new Russia; however, during its late stages, Bravin’s foreign policy output was quantité négligeable. His only tangible impact became his promises to Ammanollah-Khan on behalf of Soviet Russia to start the deliveries of arms for the Afghan army and, more importantly, to give away Kushka to Afghanistan, – the would-be most southern point of the USSR – the two issues which would remain a real headache for Bravin’s successors, Soviet plenipotentiaries in Afganistan, Surits and Raskol’nikov, for years.

This diminution can be explained by the fact that, due to the features of his character, Bravin utilised the potential and available capabilities of his strategic position for pursuing his personal interests alone, hence breaking the balance of the equipotent components of the Foucauldian interplay of power relations. In actual fact, Bravin

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787 The military representative and the commissar of the Mission, B.N.Ivanov, wrote in his report that Ammanollah-Khan and his government had taken Bravin’s Mission as the envoys of a certain Prophet Lenin who had proclaimed a new faith. Ivanov also added: ‘Finally, he said that liked our faith since it very much looked like the pure Islam, however the Afghan people were not able to understand it yet.’ (AV, f. 115, op. 1, d. 154, l. 3-4)

788 AV, f. 115, op. 1, d. 154(The Member of Revolutionary Military Council B.N.Ivanov’s Report on his mission in Afghanistan), l. 3.

789 AV, f. 134, op. 2, d. 304(Bravin’s actions). According to the Iranian historian and diplomat N.S.Fatemi, Lenin’s letter and the Soviet policy towards Persia, successfully introduced to Iranians by Bravin, ‘meant more to them than armies and trains with ammunition.’ (Zarnitskii, *Tak nachinalsia*, 221)

790 RGASPI, f. 5, op. 1, d. 2179(Cables of the RSFSR plenipotentiaries in Afghanistan to Lenin), for example, l. 1, 59. These issues were many times put forward by the Afghan authorities throughout the 1920s during negotiations with NKID’s representatives with a reference to Bravin’s promises, whereas Moscow was reluctant to suffer territorial losses and to sell weapons to Afghans because it feared that weapons would finally be shared with the Central Asian Basmatches.

791 He would say: ‘My choice was mercantilistic. Wishing to work, in general, and having spent a part of my life for special education and service, as well as not joining any party, I recognised the Soviet power. I simply do not want to discontinue my service and work, regardless of any changes of Russian politics.’(Genis, *Nevernye*, 19)
concentrated on solving the issues of his personal wellbeing and squaring his personal accounts with his old enemies, one of whom had been Vvedenskii since the spring of 1917, when Bravin started a whole campaign to discredit him, including sending reports to the official for special missions of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, von-Klemm, which accused Vvedenskii of financial wrongdoing and not observing Russian interests in Persia. 792

Indeed, only Minorsky, the acting Russian Minister in Tehran, who directly rebuked Bravin in summer 1917 for his libellous behaviour and tried to limit his complaints,793 as well as the subsequent events of late 1917, prevented Bravin from continuing to ruin his colleagues’ reputations, but not for long. When already in Tashkent as NKID’s representative at the Autonomous Government of Turkestan, Bravin resumed his attack on Vvedenskii, who had become an advisor to the Amir of Bukhara by that time. By 1919, due to his Orientological expertise and economic enterprise, already successfully demonstrated in Tabriz during the revolutionary unrest of 1905-1911,794 Vvedenskii had succeeded in preventing famine in Bukhara and ‘in stopping military hostilities and a bloody massacre [of the Russian population of Bukhara] which had been provoked by an attempt to forcefully sovieticise Bukhara in spring 1918.’ 795 As a result, Vvedenskii became the Amir’s right-hand man and the factual head of the heavily populated Russian colony in Bukhara. Naturally, the Turkestan revolutionary authorities saw him as a dangerous rival to Pechatnikov, the official Bolshevik plenipotentiary in Bukhara.

The subsequent sharp developments were triggered by Bravin alone, who had written a report on Vvedenskii to the government of the Turkestan Republic.796 He described Vvedenskii’s counter-revolutionary activities in Persia during the Constitutional Movement and accused him of current ties with the British and von-Etter (from whom Bravin had failed to take over the Mission in Tehran), as well as of receiving financial support from them. In the end, he proposed no less than the physical liquidation of Vvedenskii. ‘There should not be hesitations now. Vvedenskii must be liquidated this way or another. Otherwise, in Bukhara there will be constant British clandestine activities and an unequal struggle between Vvedenskii, having the powerful support of the British, and

792 AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489, d. 1022b, l. 106.
793 Ibid, d. 1023b, l. 33-34.
794 AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489b, d. 1022, l. 29-31.
795 Genis, Neverye, 21.
796 RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 41, l. 3-4(Bravin’s report).
Comrade Pechatnikov, who is far from being versed in the cobwebs of politics in the Orient.\textsuperscript{797}

It should be noted that Bravin’s above-mentioned actions, arguably dictated by his implicit, perhaps even unconscious, endeavour to eliminate the competing sources of expertise in his pursuit of state attention,\textsuperscript{798} determined his mechanical role as a Foucauldian vehicle of power.\textsuperscript{799} Eventually, he assisted the inception of a new institutional practice in the context of power/knowledge relations that would remain widespread in different forms, more intense and milder, in the USSR until the virtual collapse of Soviet power in the late 1980s, namely the use of scholars’ and scientists’ labour in prisons, concentration camps, and other forms of physical freedom restriction. Shortly after, in April 1919, Vvedenskii was kidnapped from Bukhara and imprisoned in Tashkent.

Although the Turkestan Cheka could find nothing incriminating about him, except his cooperation with the Amir of Bukhara\textsuperscript{800} and Bravin’s reports, he was kept in the central prison of Tashkent under a suspicion of counter-revolutionary activities. The Supreme Commission of the VTsIK for Turkestan Affairs entrusted him with the supervision and actual execution of the project on the demarcation of the borders of Turkestan with Persia and Afghanistan. The Commission also allocated a team of topographers who would come to Vvedenskii’s prison cell to carry out work under his supervision.\textsuperscript{801} This allows us to conclude that the phenomenon of the sharashki of the 1930s-1940s, studied by Krementsov in his insightful work \textit{Stalinist Science},\textsuperscript{802} and which later, in the 1960s-1970s, developed into classified scientific towns and institutes with incarcerated and exiled scientists, in actual fact had its roots in 1919, the very dawn of the Bolshevik state.

The unprecedented during the imperial period episode of Vvedenskii’s imprisoned scholarship, which unfolded during almost a year, reminds us of a story that would be entertaining were it not about real human lives. However, this time Vvedenskii would have his narrow escape, and it was not until 1938 that he was executed by firing squad – like all

\textsuperscript{797} Ibid, l. 4.
\textsuperscript{798} AVPRI, f. 144, op. 489, d. 1010b, l. 2(Report to Klemm).
\textsuperscript{799} See chapter one, Section \textit{The Intellectual}.
\textsuperscript{800} RGASPI, op. 2, d. 40, l. 815.
\textsuperscript{801} Ibid, l. 775-777.
\textsuperscript{802} On the phenomenon of Soviet \textit{sharashki} that was widely spread in the 1930s and 1940s see Krementsov, \textit{Stalinist Science}, 3. The word was an informal name for the secret research laboratories which were organised for imprisoned scientists and scholars within the Soviet GULAG concentration camps system.
his colleagues in Orientology who one way or another participated in foreign policy activities.\textsuperscript{803} After the Supreme Commission instructed the authorities of the prison to create all necessary conditions for Vvedenskii’s work,\textsuperscript{804} he started to play his own game. With each passing week, he produced new demands, which were all satisfied: transfer to a less crowded cell, better nutrition and lighting, ordering scholarly literature, medical services for his wife, etc.\textsuperscript{805} He was also allowed to attend the Turkestan central library under the escort of two armed soldiers.\textsuperscript{806} An archive in Moscow keeps complaints of the Head of the prison, written with numerous spelling and grammar mistakes, addressed to the Supreme Commission, regarding the fact that Vvedenskii took his typewriter and ‘ne otdaet’ [is not giving back].\textsuperscript{807} It should be remembered that all this was being conducted simultaneously with Cheka’s interrogations and the course of the investigation against Vvedenskii. However, the Government of the Republic of Turkestan finally opted for efficiency and succeeded in forcing Cheka to set Vvedenskii free ‘since the Section for Foreign Affairs needed his services as an Orientologist.’\textsuperscript{808}

The eventual inability of “old regime” experts like Bravin and Vvedenskii to integrate into NKID supports the thesis on the predominant presence of significant ruptures in institutional practices and discourses in the diplomatic domain over the watershed of 1917, which seriously undermines Kocho-Williams’ above-mentioned argument on continuities. This is also supported by the example of such a crucial figure as Minorsky, who remained in Persia until mid-1919 and became involved in the activities of the White Movement governments, fighting the Bolsheviks.\textsuperscript{809} However, Minorsky’s subsequent activities during his stay in France and Britain in the 1920s-1930s raise certain questions which still remain to be answered and require additional substantial research in the special archives of France, Britain and Russia. After his move to France, he cooperated with the Soviet diplomatic mission in Paris.\textsuperscript{810} Without any doubts, Minorsky was not a conformist,

\textsuperscript{803} See articles about Chaikin, Pastukhov, Osetrov, Smirnov, Snesarev in Vasil’kov, \textit{Liudi i sud’by}.
\textsuperscript{804} RGASPI, f. 122, op. 2, d. 40, l. 775.
\textsuperscript{805} Ibid, l. 767, 769, 787, 793, 796, 800.
\textsuperscript{806} Ibid, l. 790
\textsuperscript{807} Ibid, l. 791, 805.
\textsuperscript{808} Ibid, l. 764(Cable N1765 to Head of Cheka).
\textsuperscript{809} AV, f. 134, op. 1, l. 1; d. 4900; d. 4905. See also Aleksei Bezugol’nyi, \textit{General Bicherakhov i ego kavkazskaia armiia} (Tver: Tsentrpoligraf, 2011), 145-6.
\textsuperscript{810} See Mavi Boncuk, “Minorsky and Nikitin,” in \textit{Cornucopia of Ottomania and Turcomania}, 22/03/2013, \url{http://maviboncuk.blogspot.ru/2013/03/Minorsky-and-nikitin.html}.
but rather one of the most remarkable examples of an intellectual who skilfully and productively used the capacities with which he was vested by power/knowledge relations.

His private collection in the Archive of Orientologists contains documents indicating that during the 1920s he was one of the most valuable and reliable sources of political intelligence for NKID.\footnote{AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 396(Chicherin’s assignment), l. 1-3. It is worth noting that the archive authorities at their own discretion banned the photocopying of the materials of this and other files (delo) related to Minorsky cooperation with NKID.} Being handled personally by Chicherin, he would send reports on European domestic and foreign policies, particularly about France, where he lived and worked during this period. According to Chicherin’s instructions, Minorsky, using his personal contacts in the upper spheres of the French and British political establishments and, based on his own systematic analysis of events and relevant materials, would cover, ‘from the USSR’s standpoint’, a variety of issues, including France and Britain’s policies in the Middle East, Persia and Afghanistan, policies towards the USSR, domestic politics and the issues related to the situation of the Russian immigrant colony.\footnote{AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 396, l. 8. See also d. 433 (Reports on the situation in the Russian Embassy in London).} Minorsky’s teacher, Bartol’d, was aware of his ‘special position’ and was going to use it for the publication of Minorsky’s new scholarly works in 1930, which would have been impossible in the USSR for the scholarly works of ordinary Russian emigrants.\footnote{Ibid, op. 3, d. 479(Correspondence with Bartol’d), l. 25.}

This topic, of course, needs additional research to be carried out in other security services’ archives of Russia, France and Great Britain, since the documents available in Minorsky’s private collection do not clarify whether this cooperation was voluntary or forced, or whether Minorsky played a double game on behalf of the Russian Government in Emigration, the French DST or British MI-5. Minorsky’s notes only mention that NKID severed this relationship on its own initiative in late 1927, which can lead to an assumption that the Bolsheviks suspected him of supplying disinformation.\footnote{AV, f. 134, op. 1, d. 396, l. 1.} All the above-mentioned episodes of Minorsky’s interaction with the state demonstrate the justification of the historically and socially contextualised approach informed by the Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge and the interplay of power/knowledge relations, where individual and institutional interests and public discourses play equipotent productive roles along with the Saidian simplified two-vector nexus of state power and knowledge.
‘A nation does not make mistakes, does she?’

If in Minorsky’s case it is only possible to make assumptions on his sincere cooperation with the Soviet state, which might have been grounded in his strong susceptibility to the discourse of Russkoe delo studied in chapters two and four of the thesis, the cases of Smirnov and Snesarev are more straightforward in this sense, as was the power/knowledge nexus in the military domain of both periods.\footnote{See Volkov, “Persian Studies,” 3, 14.} Like many other Russian military officers in 1917, they both came to the conclusion that they needed to follow the choice of their people, which they perceived had been made in favour of the Bolsheviks: ‘It is difficult to immediately understand everything what has happened but if the Russian nation has followed the Bolsheviks I am with her. A nation does not make mistakes, does she?’\footnote{Snesarev’s letter cited in Mikhail Zakharchuk, “Lichnoe delo generala Snesareva,” Voennoe Obozrenie, 12 December 2012, http://topwar.ru/21778-lichnoe-delo-generala-snesareva.html.}

In 1918, Snesarev also wrote in his diary: ‘...[W]hat is experienced now by Russia is a great, may be, nationwide cause, and we must not evade participation as experts [...].’\footnote{Snesarev’s Smolenskii dnevnik, 13 November 1918 (http://www.a-e-snesarev.ru/smolenskii_dnevnik.pdf).} They both participated in the hostilities of the Civil War at the Caucasian front on the side of the Red Army and then switched to academic activities. Smirnov, who lived in Tiflis, was employed by the Georgian Academy of Sciences as a researcher on ancient Persian manuscripts. He also continued to conduct mostly scholarly correspondence with his old friend Minorsky and continued working on the contemporary issues of Persia, albeit without engaging with the Marxist methodology,\footnote{GNCM, d. 80(Minorsky’s letters). See also Smirnov’s Iran: ekonomicheskii spravochnik (Tiflis: AN GSSR, 1934).} which altogether was enough to finally determine his fate in 1938.\footnote{On 13 January 1938 Smirnov was taken away from his home by people from NKVD and disappeared. Only more than 21 years after it became clear that Smirnov was executed on 5 May 1938. During four years after his arrest, until her very death, his wife Kseniia pressed the authorities for her husband release or, at least, any information on him. Only in May 1939, through her distant relative, Kseniia got to know that Smirnov had been sentenced to ‘10 years without the right of correspondence’ – a formula that became apprehensible to Russians only in the late 1980s, after the uncovering of materials on repressions during Stalin’s period(GNCM, f. 39, d. 8, l. 1; d. 143 Notebook 2, l. 8ob.).}

Snesarev took a more active approach. In 1919, he played a crucial role in the establishment of the Military Academy of the RKKA and the promotion of the activities of its Oriental section, which provided the necessary area-studies training to Pastukhov,
Osetrov, Tardov and the notorious Iakov Bliumkin, who all would play significant roles in Soviet foreign policy towards Persia and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{820} Although Snesarev was not allowed to enter the field of foreign policy practical activities, he was extensively used for the organisation and conduct of Orientological training. As early as the 1900s, Snesarev put forward a thesis of the necessity of developing the so-called practical Orientology.\textsuperscript{821} He closely cooperated with Shvedov, the Minister of Interior of the time, in the establishment of the Academy of Practical Orientology.\textsuperscript{822} However, because of the active counter-action on behalf of academic Oriental studies, namely by Zhukovskii and Bartol’d, and the lack of funding, the enterprise did not receive due development. It was only in 1919 that he succeeded in unleashing fully-fledged organisational activities, totally on account of the heightened interest of the new state in the essentially practical component of Oriental studies.

In addition to his posts in the Military Academy, Snesarev became the director of the Moscow Institute of Orientology – the former Lazarev Institute – and the Petrograd Institute of Living Oriental Languages – a structure bolshevised from the outset and aimed at counterbalancing the pure academic bastion still kept by Bartol’d and his colleagues at Petrograd University.\textsuperscript{823} He also actively participated in the establishment of VNAV and became a member of its Governing Board.\textsuperscript{824} It was Snesarev who designed the Oriental studies curriculum for all these institutions, which mainly covered such regions as Central Asia, Persia and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{825} Snesarev’s activities in this field continued until 1931, when he was arrested and sentenced to death.

However, here again, his past as a scholar and an expert came in handy. Stalin had known Snesarev personally through their joint participation in the Civil War, but mostly through Snesarev’s Orientologic activities, which were quite often supervised by Narkomnats, which Stalin headed in the 1920s. On a scrap of paper, recently sold at a

\textsuperscript{820} RGVA, f. 11, op. 1, d. 186, l. 2-30ob. AV, f. 115, op. 2, d. 34, l. 1. On the activities of the individual who would nowadays be characterised as a fully-fledged professional terrorist – Iakov Bliumkin – see Iurii Sushko, Deviat’ zhiznei Iakova Bliumkina (Moscow: Tsentropoligraf, 2012).

\textsuperscript{821} See chapter two and four. See also Snesarev’s speech at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Orientologists, 2 May 1910, http://www.a-e-snesarev.ru/trudi/programma.html. See also Evgenii Snesarev, “Prakticheskoe izuchenie Vostoka,” Zhizn’ natsional’nosti (December 1921).

\textsuperscript{822} AV, f. 115, op. 2, d. 50, l. 1-3 (Shvedov’s letter, 1905).

\textsuperscript{823} Ibid, d. 29, l. 1; op. 1, d. 226; d. 231.

\textsuperscript{824} Ibid, op. 1, d. 222, l. 2-5.

\textsuperscript{825} Ibid, op. 2, d. 63; op. 1, d. 223, l. 1a; d. 202; d. 204; d. 209; d. 220.
Sotheby’s auction, Stalin asked Voroshilov to ‘replace capital punishment for 10 years’.\textsuperscript{826} This, of course, helped – but for only six years. Given the age of Snesarev, the GULAG conditions undermined his health to the extent that he was freed three years later and died in 1937.\textsuperscript{827}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The material presented in this chapter allows us to partly confirm the conclusions made in chapter three, and, based on the analysis of institutional activities during the period in question, in addition to draw new conclusions which have become feasible only after the study of the particular activities of the above-mentioned key individuals. Similarly to the late Imperial period, early Soviet Oriental studies witnessed the same interplay of power/knowledge relations, comprising the interaction of discourses and personal, institutional and state interests, this time in a more acute form. Furthermore, the presence of the threefold structure of early Soviet Oriental studies and, in particular, of Iranology has generally been confirmed. However, as it turns out in the case of individuals, the borders between the domains are rather fuzzy, with significant overlaps – the majority of individuals acted in all three domains at different times or simultaneously. This, of course, is explained, first by rather hectic transformation and inception processes which were taking place in general in the new polity after its establishment, and, second, by the discourse on the utilitarianism of Oriental studies. The latter was elevated to an extent that scholarly knowledge lost its primacy over practical knowledge and was replaced by a “scholarship of practice”. Therefore, every piece of knowledge in Iranology was expected to be practically useful for the state and the process of Orientological knowledge production had to be directly dependent on various foreign policy activities.

During the 1920s, the “old regime” academic scholarship lost even the indirect influence on state foreign policy which academic scholars used to have before 1917.\textsuperscript{828} Because of the lack of engagement with the Marxist methodology, their works later in the 1930s were not recognised as trustworthy in the Soviet academic domain either. The most palpable discontinuity, in terms of personnel and hence institutional practices, took place in the diplomatic domain, which, due to new individuals, discourses and the state attitude towards Orientological knowledge, was able to play the leading role in the Soviet

\textsuperscript{826} A photo of Stalin’s note addressed to Voroshilov, \url{http://www.a-e-snesarev.ru/foto/photo19.html}.

\textsuperscript{827} See Vasil’kov, \textit{Liudi i sud’by}, \url{http://memory.pvost.org/pages/snesarev.html}.

\textsuperscript{828} See chapters two and four.
Iranology of the 1920s-1930s. The military domain witnessed more continuities in terms of its scholarly active experts; however all of them - Snasarev, Smirnov, Iagello, etc. - were pushed into the back-office, namely to the training area.

Nevertheless, the utilitarianism discourse secured the state’s heightened attention to Oriental studies, hence enormously enhancing funding and other operational capabilities for all three domains. Being rightly combined with a personal drive for research and susceptibility to new discourses, it resulted in the enhanced productivity of power/knowledge relations, as the case studies of Iranskii, Irandust, Snasarev and others demonstrate. In addition to this, the examples of Gurko-Kriazhin, Iranskii and Irandust also virtually personify Said’s Orientalism; however, only in terms of its most straightforward and strong nexus between state power and scholarly knowledge. These individuals did not only influence and perpetrate the Soviet Persian policy during the 1920s-1930s, but even designed it.

In this respect, Kemper’s thesis – that ‘Red Orientalism’ lost its struggle with classical Oriental studies in Leningrad in the early 1930s after the dismantling of VNAV and the beginning of the severe criticism of Gurko-Kriazhin’s scholarship829 – seems rather questionable. First, classical Persian studies had died by that time, as was pointed out by its representatives themselves in 1935.830 Second, the discourse on the gradual grooming of Eastern societies in general, and the Persians in particular, for social conversion, which replaced the late Imperial discourse on the Russian civilising mission and existed as early as 1920, survived well into the 1930s – when its bearers still taught in various Orientological institutions and remained at key posts in the Soviet foreign policy towards Iran. In actual fact, ‘Red Orientalism’ died in the late 1930s, with the demise of all its representatives behind the walls of NKVD torture-chambers and after the organisational changes which mostly excluded the opportunity of such an extensive overlapping of the domains.

829 See Kemper, “Red Orientalism,” 475.
830 Krymskii to Krackovskii, 3 January 1935, in Naumkin, Neizvestnye(1997), 212-213.
General Conclusion

The involvement of Russia’s Orientologists in the intense manifold interactions between the Russian Empire and Persia during the period from the late nineteenth century to 1917 predominantly took place within the main four professional domains, namely academic scholarship, the military, diplomatic service and the Orthodox Church’s missionary activities. Given the nature and the historical developments of this interaction, the extent of the involvement of each domain in question was different, as was their impact on Russo-Persian relations of the period. However, there were also well-discernible commonalities in the organisational set-up and practices of these domains, as well as in the roles of individuals involved in the activities of these domains, namely academic scholars and practical experts of Persian studies. In addition, despite the great systemic shift which took place in 1917 and led to sequential significant changes in all spheres of the life of Russian society, there were strong continuities on the structural level of early Soviet Oriental studies and also in the discourses which were widespread among the Orientologists of a new generation.

The four domains of late Imperial Russia’s Oriental studies were well institutionalised and professionally self-consistent. Simultaneously, their organisational structures and institutional activities were closely interconnected, which resulted in the immense productivity of power/knowledge relations due to this deep interconnection at both institutional and individual levels. Based on the character of Russia’s presence in the Persianate world, in general, and in Persia, in particular, during the late Imperial period, the four-domain structure is evident in the case of Persianate studies and, especially, of Persian studies therein. The studied scholarly activities of Russian diplomats and of Russian military officers - as well as the missionary activities in addition to those of the academic domain – all support the fourfold organisation of late Imperial Persian studies.

Soviet Iranology of the 1920s-1930s kept the overall pre-revolution organisational structure, with the understandable exception of the missionary domain. The immensely active and overwhelming presence of Soviet trade institutions in Persia/Iran which also productively contributed to Orientological knowledge cannot be singled out into a separate self-consistent domain since there was no relevant Orientological training therein and these institutions were mainly staffed by experts with Orientological expertise, seconded from Narkomindel, Razvedupr and INO OGPU. Thus early Soviet Oriental studies comprised three domains, namely academic scholarship, the military and diplomatic service, where
the first domain consisted of the “old” and “new” schools, and other two were profoundly intertwined at both institutional and individual levels, particularly throughout the 1920s.

During the early Soviet period, the emphasis of Orientological training radically changed. Stressing the crucial importance of the practical usefulness of Oriental studies to state needs, the Bolsheviks replaced the former emphasis on gathering linguistic, ethnographic and cultural information for the study of Persia with enhanced political and, particularly, economic components. Though, similarly to the late Imperial period, academic Oriental training was shared by all domains, this time, it was the Military Academy of the RKKA that played the leading role in the Oriental training of practical experts on Persia during the 1920s, contrary to the former leading role of Russia’s Imperial MID in this field.

With the stipulated goals and the nature of the new regime in mind, the efficiency of Orientological training and of the bringing of scholars and experts into play by the state was much higher in the early Soviet period than in the case of late Imperial Russia where, in practical domains, vice versa, an excessive emphasis was made on the study of irrelevant Classics and the ancient history and texts of the Persianate world. The excessive academicism eventually led to the War Ministry withdrawing its students from the Officers’ Courses at the Foreign Ministry and to the establishment of Courses in Oriental languages affiliated with local military headquarters on the periphery of the Russian Empire in 1911.

This institutional practice of the late Imperial military domain became a continuity, taken up and extrapolated onto all the Orientological domains by the Bolsheviks, who later set up various kinds of Orientological institutions in the republics of (Trans)Caucasus and Central Asia which led to the unseen institutional expansion of Persianate studies and eventually to the significantly increased production of Orientological knowledge. However, in general, the research demonstrates that the contribution of the practical domains to Russia’s Orientology of both periods was enormous due to their physical proximity to first-hand materials, artefacts and being inside the culture – the strategic position which was particularly beneficial at the incipient stages of both Iranologies, pre-1917 and post-1917, and which was successfully exploited by practical and, indirectly, by academic Orientologists, for contributing to Oriental studies due to the relevant discursive manifestations of the time.

The late Imperial academic scholars of Persian studies exerted indirect influence on Russia’s Persian policy through their significant impact on the shaping of the attitude of
mind towards Persia of their current students – the would-be executors of this policy. It was precisely those scholars who passed over their professional discourses to their disciples, who embraced the interested attitude towards the Orient and the encouragement to continue to carry out scholarly research along with the duties of professional postings. It was underpinned by broader inner Russian discourses on *Russkoe delo* and on building a multi-national state with the Russian culture at its head but enriched and strengthened by Oriental cultures which, of course, also served the colonial expansion of the Russian Empire. In actual fact, late Imperial Orientologists, in the context of the importance which the East had for the state interests of the Russian Empire, promoted contributions to Orientological – in this particular case, Persian studies – knowledge to the rank of forwarding Russian national interests, equally with the straightforward professional activities of diplomats and the military in the Persianate world.

This later became conventional institutional practices within practical domains and went over to the early Soviet period, albeit in a transformed way. The continuity of teacher-disciple friendly relations through regular corresponding on mainly scholarly issues and staying in personal contact gave way to orders, instructions and political expediency. In addition to their professional duties, new practical Orientologists were expected to contribute to the class struggle in the East through the gathering and scholarly systematising of the area-study data of contemporary character for bringing them into academic circulation.

As the research maintains, almost immediately after 1917, the “old regime” Persian studies not only became deprived of even its indirect influence, which it had had through academic training and the influential activities in various joint multi-organisational Orientological societies, but was also gradually marginalised by the scholarship of new Soviet Iranology. As it sounds no less aphoristic, early Soviet Iranists literally created their scholarship on site, while designing and conducting foreign policy towards Persia/Iran, and, vice versa, they designed and conducted this policy based on their scholarship on Persia/Iran.

This, of course, was not a case in point for the late Imperial period. Although experts were able to crucially influence events on site and quite often they were granted great operational autonomy on site by their ministries, this impact can be regarded as of tactical character. Despite rare exceptions (Zinov’ev and von-Klemm), Persian studies experts could not receive direct access to strategic decision-making levels. More importantly, late Imperial Russia’s Persian foreign policy was defined by designers and
perpetrators of Russia’s Western foreign policy and mainly sacrificed to that, regardless of what was expertly advised or suggested in Minorsky, Smirnov, Kosagovskii and others’ official reports and notes. Their suggestions on rendering a tough stance towards Britain and on a gradual taking over of Persia, or, at least, severing Persian Azerbaijan, did not have any effect whatsoever, whereas their impact on the technicality of on-site execution of the general guidelines of Russia’s Persian policy and the upholding of Russian interests in the context of the discourse of Russkoe delo was enormous.

The high degree of Kosagovskii’s political influence on the Shah’s court and the government’s affairs, and that of Smirnov on the shaping of the Qajar family’s expedient attitude of mind towards the Russian Empire, in particular, and all things Russian, in general, as well as that of Minorsky on counteracting the British and preserving more territory for Persia as Russia’s current ally and her potential integral part, is evident. This was achieved through the interplay of power/knowledge relations in which Orientological expertise played an underlying role. Therefore, as the research shows, the late Imperial Russian state valued this expertise in practical domains, granting more tangible and moral capacities, hence power, to those experts. The same was inherent to the state’s interaction with the academic domain. Although academic scholars were denied direct access to decision-making space and their official advice was seldom heard, the state completely relied on their expertise in terms of the organisation of Orientological training throughout all four domains. In this field, scholars were autonomous enough and exerted direct impact on the relevant activities with the only constraints being of a purely financial character.

Drawing on the Foucauldian concept of power/knowledge relations has enabled the thesis to ascertain a reciprocal productive multi-vector interaction between the knowledge, chasing new resources for self-reproduction and endowing its agents with new capacities, and the state, represented by its own practices, institutions and individuals, all these being Foucault’s very equipotent vehicles of power. This interaction was productive during both periods in question. Late Imperial and early Soviet academic scholars acted in an identical way, as did scholars from other domains. Regardless of whether their influence on state policies was successful or unsuccessful, they all, consciously or unwittingly, carried out the following enthusiastically and productively. They exploited those capacities with which they were endowed within the grid of power relations for the eventual advancement of knowledge itself, in the given case - Persian studies.

This process was productively influenced by two main factors. The first one is the overwhelming political, military, economic and cultural importance of the Persianate world
for Russia of both periods. The second is the compound of multiple sophisticated discursive components, widespread in the field in question, the main of which, during the late Imperial period, ‘were a) the trivial European orientalist civilising mission, passed through the sieve of Russia’s alleged much more receptive interaction with the Orient; b) the protection of Russian interests versus Western powers; c) the promotion of all things Russian, including its own scholarship. The latter was patriotically seen as being “for the benefit of the native land” in its rivalry with the West’. It is these very three components that constituted the discourse of *Russkoe delo*.

During the early Soviet period, the first two of them transformed into the proliferation of revolution in Persia and then into the grooming of Persians for social conversion, with the same condescending approach as before 1917; however, this time not as a country, representing “the civilised world”, but rather as the first in the world polity of victorious socialist revolution. The third component, with the interchangeable words ‘Russian’ and ‘Soviet’, has made it through the whole Soviet to the post-Soviet period. Regardless of whether it was consciously or unwittingly, throughout all the three periods Russian Iranists have been seeing their scholarship in expedient compliance with their country’s so-called national interests. In practice, the representation of such interests is conventionally usurped by the political institutions of the ruling power. Therefore, it may seem that this status quo eventually resulted in the instrumental use of knowledge in the interests of current political regimes in Russia, whereas it was all the participants of this interplay of power/knowledge relations that played on this state of affairs for their own interests, namely individuals, various institutions, and the state itself. Due to the Foucauldian eventual productivity of power relations, it was knowledge that, possessing the nature of self-agency, reproduced and extended itself, ultimately overcoming the constraints of the Governmentality inevitably created by such continuous patriotic discourses.

A major finding of the analysis of the organisational set-up of Russian Oriental studies is that Persianate studies and Persian studies therein had occupied the leading positions in Imperial Russia’s Orientology since its institutional inception in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. This continuity made its way to the early Soviet period. A second, rather astonishing finding is that the discursive institutional practices of using the imprisoned science and scholarship by the Soviet state which are depicted by Krementsov as established in the 1930s, in actual fact, emerged in 1919. Thirdly, the

831 Volkov, “Persian Studies,” 17.
evidence also compelled me to conclude that in the case of early Soviet Iranology there was an utterly straightforward two-vector reciprocal link between Orientological knowledge and foreign policy, very much in the sense of what one might term ‘vulgar’ Saidism. We must further note the great individual impact of late Imperial military Orientologists on the process of establishment of early Soviet military Oriental studies, in contrast to the remaining two domains which, in this sense, demonstrate discontinuity. A fifth finding is the discursive institutional practice invented by Rozen and fully developed by Zhukovskii of handling a scholarly intelligence network, consisting of their agents-disciples who supplied academic Oriental studies with scholarly processed first-hand materials. In so doing, the former students, who were diplomats and military officers now, were encouraged by the discourse of promoting national scholarship, hence eventually contributing to Russkoe delo – the discourse inculcated in them by their former teachers.

The sixth is the Orientologists’ practice of employing their own wives to obtain additional area-study information; these women eagerly engaged with such tasks and were able to penetrate the areas traditionally inaccessible for male foreigners in the Muslim East, such as anderoons, etc. The seventh is that the studied individuals, as the diaries, private notes and memoirs of Kosagovskyi, Smirnov, Minorsky and others maintain, quite often were guided not so much by the imperatives of the relevant discourses but rather by their personal – sometimes very tangible – interests, such as career, better living conditions, state rewards, scholarly fame, etc.

My work in the archives has also unearthed a number of hitherto completely unknown documents, some of which directly challenge well established views within the scholarship or shed a totally new and rather unexpected light on the biographies of some of the individuals I have studied in the course of this thesis.

Among the main archival findings here is Minorsky’s secret cooperation with NKID during the 1920s, never mentioned before in relevant works and which requires further separate thorough research in Russian, British and French archives, potentially including those of SVR-FSB, MI-5 and DST. A second one is the discovery of Bravin’s correspondence with Zhukovskii during 1905-1911 (23 letters from Bravin), which revealed that Bravin was Zhukovskii’s most favoured disciple. Given Bravin’s pre-1917 and mostly crucial post-1917 activities and his notorious status in the context of the Soviet and post-Soviet politics of history, still maintained by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, this archival finding, never mentioned in the relevant works either, is of great importance in terms of shedding more light on Bravin’s fate and the
apprehension of present Russia’s regime of truth. The third one is that there is evidence in correspondence between Chicherin and Lenin that suggests that of those who orchestrated the Soviet invasion of Persia of May 1920, namely Chicherin and Trotsky, the former entertained rather more serious hopes as to the actual feasibility of a forced sovietisation of Persia than was allowed for by Genis who argued that Chicherin just as Trotsky had never seriously contemplated trying to turn Iran into a Soviet Republic but had solely been after scaring the British. A fourth discovery are archival documents that show that there was Soviet military assistance in cracking down on Kuchek-Khan’s forces in 1920-1921, authorised by Rotshtein, and the consideration by the Bolsheviks of Kuchek-Khan’s liquidation in October 1920. A fifth and final one concerns a hitherto completely unknown recently declassified archival file, containing the so-called “Ten Persian letters of Vardin”, shedding light on the process of shaping early Soviet foreign policy towards Persia and the activities of its main designers and perpetrators.

Another curious finding which seems worth stating in finally concluding my thesis is that two high-ranking Russian intelligence officers-vostochniki of two very different epochs, namely Konstantin Smirnov, whose activities in the early twentieth century have been discussed above, and Leonid Shebarshin (1935-2012), who was the PGU KGB Station-Chief in Iran between 1979 and 1982, with a gap of almost one hundred years between them, did not differ one iota in their respective judgments of the moral qualities of their own people in comparison to those of the people about whom they had become experts. Indeed, they both stated that, during the years of revolutionary unrest caused by the Constitutional Movement and the Islamic Revolution, which saw the greatest failure of central state power in the modern history of Iran, criminal manifestations remained at low levels and Iranians hardly revealed a tendency to violent robbery or homicide for personal gain, contrary to Russians during their own periods of unrest. Hence, according to these officers-vostochniki, Iranians turned out to be much more civilised than the people of the country that was trying to carry out a civilising mission for them, believing to thus incorporate them into its own ‘greater culture’.  

832 See Leonid Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy: Razvedka ot rastsveta do razvala (Moscow: Algoritm, 2012), 121-123. GNCM, f. 39, d. 22. l. 1-10b.
Appendix One
Biographical notes and other additional and more detailed data

Abikh, Rudol’f Petrovich (1901-1940), (footnote 474). He worked in the Soviet military in Persia in 1920-1921. In 1924 he graduated from the Oriental Faculty of the Military Academy. Majored in Iran, he worked in NKID and the Intelligence of the Red Army. In 1926 he was appointed the head of the Oriental Section of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army Headquarters. In 1927 he was recalled from Tehran because of the quarrel with the Ambassador Iurenev. He was a member of VNAV and taught in MIV. During the 1930s he was arrested a few times and then executed in 1940 (GARF, P-1335, op. 1, d. 6, l. 55).

Bartol’d, Vasilii Vladimirovich (1860-1930), (footnote 13). Baron Rozen’s disciple, Professor of St. Petersburg University (1901), Member of Russia’s Academy of Sciences, Secretary of the Russian Committee for the Study of Central and Eastern Asia (1903-1918). He authored more than 650 scholarly works on Central Asian, Persian and Islamic studies.

Bartol’d’s productivity (footnote 607). Bartol’d originated from a well-off bourgeois family and was able to afford trips with scholarly purposes to Europe, as well as to often buy manuscripts at his own expense which can also be added to the compound of factors which enabled such an enormous scholarly output – more than 650 scholarly pieces (see Bartol’d, “Autobiography,” 789-790).

Belozerskii, Evgenii Mikhailovich (1853-1897), (footnote 555). AV, f. 17 (Zhukovskii), op. 1, d. 24; see also Zhukovskii’s correspondence with Bravin (f. 17, op. 2, d. 9). From the materials, kept in the above mentioned archive, it is also clear that on his returning to Russia Zhukovskii had an access to the secret documents of the War Ministry. In 1887 Zhulovskii heavily criticised both the report of Staff-Captain Evgenii Belozerskii, who had been sent to Persia on a reconnaissance mission under the cover of a journalist, and the mode of his activities, practised by this officer in Persia in 1885. See also on Zhukovskii’s letter to Baron Rozen about his acquaintance with Naser al-Din Shah, in Firuza Abdullaeva, “Zhukovskii Valentin Alekseevich”, Encyclopaedia Iranica (15 August 2009).
Beneshevich, Vladimir Nikolaevich (1874-1938), (footnote 41). The most eloquent case in this context is the attitude of the early Soviet state power to science. For example, see in Vera Tolz, Russian Academicians and the Revolution: Combining Professionalism and Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 183-184. Also, see the case of a leading Russian specialist on Byzantine Church Law, Vladimir Beneshevich (a corresponding member of the academy until his scholarly field was abolished by the Bolsheviks) who faced constant harassment from the authorities, was arrested three times, de-facto deprived of employment and was, finally, executed in 1938 as a Polish spy (see further in the chapter).

Chaikin, Konstantin Ivanovich (1889-1938), (footnote 767). Zhukovskii’s disciple, graduated from the St.Petersburg Faculty of Oriental studies in 1916. Based on his graduation paper which was the translation of Jami’s Selaman and Ebsal in verses he was left at the University for preparing to the professorship of Persian literature. In 1920-1926 he worked in the Soviet diplomatic representation in Persia as an interpreter. After returning to the USSR he worked in various Oriental studies institutions authoring a number of influential scholarly works on Persian poetry. Throughout the 1920s - 1930s from time to time he was used by NKID as a linguist on the highest level until he was executed in 1938 under the accusation of espionage (AVPRF, f. 08 ‘The Secret Archive of NKID. Karakhan’, op. 10, papka 33, d. 190, l. 22). Besides a considerable number of works on Persian literature and language, in the mid of the 1930s, he authored a book on Persian literature and a number of translations of the Persian classic poetry, which were the only works of this kind during decades. He was executed in 1938 on the accusation of espionage. See Vasil’kov, Liudi i sud’by.

Chernozubov, Fedor Grigor’evich (1863-1919), (footnote 645). The General Staff Lieutenant-General. An officer-vostochnik, he graduated from the Academy of the General Staff where, at the Officers’ Courses of Oriental Languages, he mastered Persian, Turkish and Arabic. From 1902 to 1907 he was Chief-Instructor (Commander) of His Majesty the Shah of Persia’s Cossack Brigade, coordinating intelligence activities in Persia. He authored a number of scholarly works, including those on ethnography of Persian Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenians (see Baskhanov, Russkie, 260-261).

Civilian scholar (footnote 547). The term “civilian” scholars is used throughout the dissertation in order to differentiate the scholars, mostly engaged in teaching to conventional students and who had no diplomatic or military rank, such as Rozen,
Bartol’d, Zhukovskii, Zaleman and others, from those who genuinely were in diplomatic or military services and then became scholars, teaching mostly in diplomatic or military institutions, such as Miluitin, Kuropatkin, Tumanskii, Iagello, Zinov’ev, Minorsky, Smirnov.

**Closet scholar** (footnote 605). Vasilii Bartol’d, “Autobiography,” v.9 (Moscow, 1977), 791. In the 1903’ expedition Bartol’d broke his leg while getting off a horse and since then had been unable to use a horse which prevented him from properly carrying out his research in 1904, too. He also could hardly stand the field hardships of travelling in Central Asia (see also Vasilii Bartol’d, “Otchet o poezdke v Sredniuiu Aziiu,” in Zapisiki Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk (St.Petersburg, 1897), 1-2).

**Curricula** (footnote 255). In 1863 and 1884 there were adopted new University Charters which introduced changes into the Faculty curriculum. In 1913 new ‘Rules, programs and examination requirements of the testing commission’ were elaborated by the Faculty itself.

**Ehsanulla** (transliteration from Russian), or **Ehsanollah-Khan, Dustdar** (1884-1939), (footnote 475). A member of the Revolutionary Committee, one of Kuchek-Khan’s fellow-fighters. In July 1920, according to the plan designed by Bliumkin, he took over the command of troops and the leadership from austed Kuchek-Khan. After the defeat of the Persian Socialist Revolution, he spent the rest of his life in the USSR (executed in 1939). In 1933, he took up Abikh’s case to defend him against repressions, having written a letter to Ordzhonikidze (See Vladimir Genis, “Rudol’f Abikh – istorik Gilianskoi revoliutsii,” in Iranistika v Rossii i iranisty, ed. Liudmila Kulagina (Moskva: Institut vostokovedeniia RAN, 2001), 153).

**Frunze, Mikhail Vasil’evich** (1885-1925), (footnote 400). At the point of the October coup, he had already been an active Bolshevik with the experience of combat activities. During the Civil War he occupied various commanding posts in the Red Army, including the Chief Commander of the Turkestan Army and the Chief Commander of the Southern Front. The Red troops under his command defeated Kolchak’s and Vrangel’s troops of the Whites as well as captured Khiva and Bukhara emirates. He was enormously popular in the Red Army. In 1925 during a rather routine medical surgery he died - was allegedly murdered under Stalin’s plot. This version is supported by some historians and contemporaries, including Boris Bazhanov, a Stalin’s personal assistant, who in 1928
defected to the West, escaping via Iran (Boris Bajanov, *Avec Staline dans le Kremlin* (Paris: Editions de France, 1930)). See also Persits, *Zastenchivaia interventsiia*, 27.

**Gamazov, Matvei Avelevich** (1812-1893), (footnote 333). He dealt with translations from Persian and Turkish languages, including scholarly materials and manuscripts. He was in charge of publishing historical, literary texts and diplomatic documents. Gamazov also authored the military-technical Russian-French-Turkish-Persian dictionary, published in 1887 on account of the War Ministry (See Bartol’d, “Iran,” 327. See also ARAN, Fond 68).

**Grigor’ev, Vasilii Vasil’evich** (1816-1881), (footnote 226). A historian-Orientologist, an associated member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, active member of the Russian Geographical Society, a specialist on Central Asia. He spoke Arabic, Persian, Kazakh, Kirghiz and Mongolian. In Western scholarship Grigor’ev has become famous because of his idealistic ‘walkings into state power’ for exerting enlightened scholarly influence on it. Between teaching at universities, he was Head of the Orenburg Border Commission (1854-1859), Head of the Department of Kirghiz Affairs (1859-1862), Head of the Chief-Directorate of Press Affairs of the Russian Empire (1874-1880). He was a staunch apologist of embracing the cultures of the peoples on the periphery of the Russian Empire into the Russian culture, including the use of local scholars in Russian scholarship.


**Kolomiitsev, Ivan Osipovich** (1896-1919), (footnote 425). Soviet historiographers argued that on 21 August 1919 Colonel Staroselskii sent a telegramme to the then Prime-Minister of Persia Vosugh-od-Douleh, informing about the arrest of Kolomiitsev and the Persian
Prime-Minister ordered to bring the arrested to Tehran. So, the execution of Kolomiitsev was not authorised. However, it was never said about possible reasons of the Cossacks’ behaviour who were enough disciplined not to commit such a serious crime without solid grounds. An interesting explanation was offered by Father Superior Aleksandr (Zarkeshev), based on his research in AVPRF in the late 1990s. Kolomiitsev was carrying the so-called Bolsheviks’ hard currency – the Orthodox Church golden sacred articles and vessels – expropriated by the Bolsheviks and officially allocated to him by NKID to cover the mission expenses. During the first post-Revolution years the Bolsheviks officially regularly confiscated the gold from Churches and used it in export-import trade operations. The Cossacks were traditionally very religious, especially those who served under General Baratov – an ardent Orthodox believer. Having been shocked by such sacrilege, they decided to try and execute the Bolsheviks’ representative themselves (See Zarkeshev, Tserkov’, 111-114, 120-121). This is also supported by the documents, kept in RGASPI: new Soviet money was not accepted abroad and the state did not have the sufficient amount of foreign currency, so the conventional practice was to provide the agents being sent abroad, in this case to Persia, with the so-called Bolshevik hard currency, namely golden ritual articles, expropriated from Russian Orthodox churches (RGASPI, f. 454, op. 1, d. 8, l. 28, 29, 30, 243, 290, 292).

**Kosagovskii, Vladimir Andreevich** (1857-1918), (footnote 206). Between 1894 and 1902, Colonel Kosagovskii was Chief-Commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade and 1905-1908 he served as Head of the Transcaspian region. He is the author of multiple works on economy, finance, governmental set-up, history, geography, military forces of Persia. He retired in 1909 as Lieutenant-General and lived on his private country estate. After 1917 he had to resort to farming and after the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks burdened him, a ‘class-alienated landowner’, with extremely high taxes, which would have bankrupted him had they not been voluntarily paid by the peasant population of five neighbouring villages as a mark of respect towards their former landlord. They also several times saved him from being arrested by the Bolsheviks but he finally allegedly had to commit suicide in 1918 (His diaries are kept in RGVIA, f. 76; see also Baskhanov, Russkie, 126-127. Ter-Oganov, “Brigada,” 69-79.)

**Krachkovskii, Ignatii Iulianovich** (1883-1951), (footnote 304). Professor of Arabic studies (1918). He was a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1921) and knew
Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. In the 1920s he produced a translation of the Qur’an that remained the only reputable throughout the whole Soviet period.

Kuropatkin, Aleksei Nikolaevich (1848-1925), (footnote 197). The War Minister (1898-1904) of the Russian Empire, Lieutenant-General, an eminent Russian Orientologist (including works on Persia), full member of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society, in different periods served in Turkestan, was Head of the Asian Department of the General Staff, Head of the Transcaspian Region, War Minister, Governor-General of Turkestan. In 1895 Kuropatkin was sent to Tehran as a special envoy of the Tsar at the Persian court. As War Minister he took an active part in establishing Tashkent Officers’ School of Oriental Languages and the Officers’ Faculty at the Oriental Institute (See Mikhail Baskhanov, Russkie voennye vostokovedy (Moscow: Vostochnaia literature RAN, 2005), 135-136).

Lazarev Institute (footnote 264). See Iranistika, ed. Kulagina, 28, 29, 45. It was established in 1815 on the private financial means of the Armenian family Lazarev (Lazarian), originated from the area Julfa, the Armenian settlement in Esfahan. Being, at first, an ordinary secondary school for Armenian poor children and having the training in Persian and Arabic as its minor activities, by the middle of the nineteenth century this institution turned into a full-scale educational institute and one of the main centres of Russian Oriental studies. In 1892 Moscow University Professor Korsh was appointed Head of Persian Linguistics Chair and in 1897 another Moscow University Professor-Iranist Miller was appointed Director of Lazarev Institute (See Istoriia, ed. Vigasin and al., 27-35).

Lebedeva, Ol’ga Sergeevna (1854-1909), (footnote 282). Literary translator, Orientologist. She authored the first Russian translation of ‘Kabus-nameh’ from Persian. While she lived for several years in Turkey, she translated works by Pushkin, Lermontov, Tolstoy into Turkish. She was a famous public figure and one of the founders of the Society of Oriental Studies in 1900. She also was an active propagator of the Muslim women’s emancipation in Russia.

Lobachevskii, Nikolai Ivanovich (1792-1856), (footnote 51). A prominent Russian mathematician and geometer, the founder of non-Euclidean (Lobachevskian) geometry.

Lomonosov, Mikhail Vasil’evich (1711-1765), (footnote 74). In the pre-revolution Russian intellectual circles Lomonosov was considered as a symbol of emerging Russian scholarship and an active propagator of the so-called “nationalisation” trend in Russian
science. Whereas, having made of him the “founder” of this and that field of scientific knowledge and the “refuter” of some others, “the first scientist to study..., to describe..., to discover...”, and even the fighter with the injustices of Imperial Russia, the Soviet regime took full advantage of his personality for ideological purposes (see Graham, *Science in Russia*, 20-24; Alexander Vucinich, *Empire of Knowledge: The Academy of Science of the USSR (1917-1970)* (London: University of California Press, 1984), 16-18.

**Makarov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich** (1857-1919), (footnote 618). The whole editing board of the journal rejected the offered to them “honorary” duty to also work as the Ministry of Interior informants. During a period of several months after the first issue came out, the Russian officialdom became more and more disappointed with Bartol’d’s endeavours to keep the journal content at a highly scholarly and objective level. At the end of 1912 the Minister of Interior Aleksandr Makarov (1857-1919) summoned Bartol’d for a conversation, during which, in response to Bartol’d’s argument regarding the importance of the Russian Orientological scholarship for Russia itself, said that it was Western specialists whom he preferred to consult on scholarly issues (ibid, 12-16).

**Marr, Nikolay Yakovlevich** (1865-1934), (footnote 436). Russian and Soviet Academician, Orientologist, linguist, historian. Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He spoke Persian and many other Oriental languages. The founder of the New Doctrine about the inception of languages. He also had works on Iranian languages.

**Mendelev, Dmitry Ivanovich** (1834-1907), (footnote 51). A prominent Russian chemist and inventor, the creator of the first version of the periodic table of elements.

**Mikaelian, Avetis Sultanovich** (1888-1938), (footnote 473). Pseudonym Sultanzadeh. He had been Bolshevik since 1912. In 1919 he was sent to Tashkent to work in the Council for International Propaganda. He became one of the founders of the Persian Communist Party. In 1920-1921 he was the head of its left (extremist) wing. In 1920-1923 he was the Persian representative in the Executive Committee of Komintern. In 1925 he became the Chief-Editor of the journal ‘Economic Development’. He authored a number of research works on Iran. In 1938, on the accusation of espionage, he was executed (GARF, f. 7668, op. 1, d. 2449 (MIV, 1935), l. 4, 11).

**Miliutin, Dmitry Alekseevich** (1816-1912), (footnote 210). Professor of the General Staff Academy, Minister of War (1861-1881). RGVIA, f. 224(1860-1883), d. 1-6. On Miliutin’s activities see also his memoirs: *D.A. Miliutin. Dnevnik. 1876-1878, 1879-1881* (Moscow: 215

Minorsky, Vladimir Fedorovich (1877-1966), (footnote 14). A diplomat-vostochnik – he graduated from the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages. Since 1902 he had been visiting Persia with various secondments on behalf of the Russian MID and in 1915-1919 worked as Russia’s Chargé d’Affaires and acting Head of the Russian Mission after 1917. Having refused to subordinate the Mission to the Bolsheviks, he left for France in 1919. In the period of 1932-1966 he worked as Professor of Persian studies in SOAS, London.

NEP (footnote 461). The New Economic Policy (NEP) was proposed by Lenin and started being implemented in 1921 and lasted until 1928, replaced by Stalin’s industrialisation and collectivisation. The NEP implied a kind of mixed economy with state sector in main fields and private sector in minor less important fields with legislative liberalisations in the approach to private owners. The NEP was aimed at the exhilaration of economy after the Civil War and the policy of the War Communism.

OGPU (United State Political Directorate), (footnote 153). It existed in 1922-1934 as a successor to GPU, before that – Cheka-VeCheka(The [All-Russia] Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage); NKVD (The Peoples Commissariat of the Interior Affairs) was formed in 1934 and existed until 1943, finally evolving into widely known KGB (Committee of State Security) in 1954, after some reorganisations, merges and transformations.

Osetrov, Vladimir Petrovich (1893-1938), (footnote 477). Pseudonym Irandust. A historian of Iran. In 1918-1938 he worked for NKID. In 1920-1925 and 1928-1929 he worked in the Soviet diplomatic mission in Iran. Throughout the 1920s-1930s, he was a member of VNAV and MKV. He taught in the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies (MIV). In 1938, when deputy head of the second section of the Oriental Department of NKID, on a very common for that time accusation of being a spy, he was arrested and executed.

Pastukhov, Sergei Konstantinovich (1887-1940), (footnote 478). Pseudonym Iranskii. A historian of Iran. In 1918-1939, he worked in NKID. The head of the Middle Eastern Department, the head of the first Oriental Section, the Soviet Ambassador to Iran (1933-
1935). He also taught in MIV and was a member of VNAV. In 1939 on a common for that time accusation of being a spy, he was arrested and in 1940 executed.

Pavlovich (real surname Vel’tman), Mikhail Pavlovich (1871-1927), (footnote 742). In this sense, he is the most remarkable example. A journalist by practice, with an incomplete higher education in Law and without any kind of Orientological training nor speaking a single Oriental language, he became the most influential figure on the nationalities issue after Stalin and “the main Orientologist” of the early USSR (see Kemper, “Red Orientalism”).

Persia (footnote 464). The term Persia/Persian (distorted Pars) came to European languages through Hellenistic historians and initially implied subjugating motives on behalf the European civilisation. Iran is the only word available in Farsi for referring to the country. Following the undertaken nationalist trend in his policies, in 1927 Reza Shah ordered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to announce to all countries that the only word the country could be referred to in diplomatic correspondence was Iran.

Pursuing own interest (footnote 234). The Foucauldian capability of ‘civilian’ scholars, using the capacities, emanated from state, to benefit from state interests by means of creating discourses, necessary for pursuing their own interests often aimed at the institutional advancement of their scholarly field, was also studied in Krementsov’s work, though mostly for the early Soviet period (See Mills, Michel Foucault, 33, 58. See also Krementsov, Stalinist Science, 4-5, 29-30. See also chapter one, The Foucauldian Discourse and The Foucauldian power/knowledge regarding the fact that individuals tend to use the capabilities they are endowed by power for pursuing their own interests).

Raskol’nikov (real surname Il’in), Fedor Fiodorovich (1892-1939), (footnote 390). By the October coup, he had already been an experienced Bolshevik. He actively participated in the organisation and realisation of the October coup. Since January 1918, he had been the Vice People’s Commissar for Maritime Affairs. In the period of December 1918 – May 1919 he was in the British captivity. Since June 1919 until June 1920, he was the Chief Commander of the Red fleet on the river Volga and the Caspian Sea. After the successful Anzali operation, he was appointed the Chief Commander of the Baltic Sea fleet. In 1921 he retired from the Military and became the Soviet diplomatic representative to Afghanistan. Between 1924 and 1928 he was the Head of the Oriental Section of the Communist International Executive Committee. The member of the All-Union Scholarly
Association of Orientologists (VNAV). He taught Middle Eastern studies at Moscow State University. 1930-1938 – the Soviet representative to a number of European countries. In 1938, under the threat of arrest defected to the West and wrote an open letter to Stalin, protesting against the purges. One year after, he was murdered by NKVD in France (Liudi i sud’by, http://memory.pvost.org/pages/index2.html). See also Genis, Krasnaia Persiia, 65-66.

Rotshtein, Fiodor Aronovich (1871-1953), (footnote 448). Pseudonym Mirza, he had been a member of the Bolsheviks’ Party since 1901. During WWI he worked in the British Foreign Office and the British Ministry of Defence. He was one of the founders of the British Communist Party. In 1920-1921 he was the Soviet representative to Persia and Turkey, one of those who prepared and signed the 1921 Soviet-Persian Treaty. In 1924 he was appointed a Director of the Institute of World Economy and Politics. In 1939 he became a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Rozen, Viktor Romanovich (1849-1908), (footnote 139). Professor of Arabic and Persian studies. He was a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1890), Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Languages of St. Petersburg University (1893) and Head of the Oriental Section of the Russian Archaeological Society (1885). Bartol’d, Zhukovskii, Marr, Ol’denburg were among his disciples. See also Vasilii Bartol’d, “Baron Rozen i russkii provintsial’nyi orientalism,” Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 9 (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 589.

Scholarly intelligence network (footnote 550). In this respect, many noteworthy documents are kept in AV (Fond 17 ‘V.A. Zhukovskii’, dela 4, 22, 37, 184, 188, 193, 195) that demonstrate how Valentin Zhukovskii would actively use his connections in the MID and the War Ministry of Russia for the development of Orientological academic knowledge and for the institutional promotion of Oriental studies, first of all, Persian studies.

Shapshal, Seraia Markovich (1873-1961), (footnote 566). After graduating from the St.Petersburg Faculty of Oriental languages, Shapshal, due to Zhukovskii’s connections with the Qajar Court, was hired as a tutor of the Persian Crown Prince Mohammad-Ali and in 1907 became a Minister of the Persian government. Edward Browne in his The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 refers to him as a ‘Russian spy’, whereas Konstantin Smirnov’s
notes, saying in several places that Shapshal worked in Persia exclusively in his own interests that even very often contradicted Russian interests, refute this assumption.

*Sharashka* (footnote 57) was an informal name for secret research and development laboratories in the Soviet Gulag labour camp system. Etymologically, the word *sharashka* is derived from a Russian slang expression *sharashkina kontora* ("Sharashka's office", possibly from the radical meaning "to beat about"), an ironic, derogatory term to denote a poorly organised, impromptu, or bluffing organisation. The scientists and engineers at a *sharashka* were prisoners picked from various camps and prisons and assigned to work on scientific and technological problems for the state. Living conditions were usually much better than in an average taiga camp, especially bearing in mind the absence of hard labour. The results of the research in *sharashkas* were usually published under the names of prominent Soviet scientists without credit given to the real authors, whose names frequently have been forgotten (see Krementsov, *Stalinist Science*).

**Smirnov, Konstantin Nikolaeovich** (1877-1938), (footnote 321). GNCM, f. 39 (Smirnov’s Private Collection), d. 11 (Diaries, 1907), l. 18, 21; d. 12 (Diaries, 1909), l. 43ob.-46; d. 13 (Diaries, 1910), l. 26ob.-27, 95-96, 142. GNMC, f. 39 ‘Smirnov’, d. 78 *(Gartvig’s letter to Smirnov,’ dated 02/08/1909, with Smirnov’s later remarks, dated 1933). Military Orientologist, Colonel Smirnov authored a considerable number of works on Persian history, ethnography, geography and economy. Having graduated from the Officers’ Courses of Oriental Languages he served in the Intelligence Unit of the Caucasian Military District Staff and was appointed as Soltan Ahmad Mirza’s, the later Ahmad Shah Qajar’s personal tutor (1907-1914). He participated in WWI and after the Russian Civil War he worked as an interpreter in the Red Army in the Caucasus. In the 1920-1930s he worked as a research associate in the Academy of Sciences of Georgia before he was executed in 1938 *(Liudi i sud’by: Bibliograficheskii slovar’ vostokovedov-zhertv politicheskogo terror v sovetskii period, 1917-1991*, eds. Iaroslav Vasil’kov and Marina Sorokina (St.Petersburg, 2003)).

**Snesarev, Andrei Evgen’evich** (1865-1937), (footnote 15). Pseudonym Mosafer, Lieutenant-General of the Imperial Army. By 1917 he had been an acknowledged Orientologist and had works on Persia, Afghanistan, India, China. He spoke Persian, Dari, Uzbaki, Hindi, etc. After 1917 he joined the Red Army and participated in the Civil War. In 1919, he was appointed the Head of the Soviet Military Academy and its Oriental
Section. He made an underlying contribution to the organisation of the Soviet Military Oriental Studies.

**Surits, Iakov Zakharovich** (1882-1952), (footnote 501). In their work *Iz istorii sovetskogo vostokovedeniia* Kuznetsova and Kulagina mentioned that in 1922 Surits was the Soviet Diplomatic representative to Afghanistan while it was Fiodor Raskolnikov who was the Soviet representative to Afghanistan in the period of 1921-1923. The mistake must have been caused by the Soviet censorship (1970), trying to hush up Raskolnikov’s name who defected to the West in 1939. Surits had been an experienced Bolshevik by 1917. In 1919-1921 he was the Soviet Diplomatic representative to Afghanistan. In the period of 1921-1922 he was the Soviet plenipotentiary in Turkestan and Central Asia.

**Tageev, Boris Leonidovich** (1871-1938), (footnote 294). Pseudonym Rostam-Bek, an officer-*vostochnik*, a scholar and a writer, - he had a remarkable destiny, worthy of his epoch: after his military service in Turkestan and Afghanistan and his alleged severance from the Russian army he took part in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and was taken prisoner by the Japanese in 1904. Having been set free, he did not come back to Russia and had time to serve in the British Army and to work as a Daily Express front-line correspondent during WWI. After the war he struck up a close acquaintance with Henry Ford and worked for his newspaper syndicate, simultaneously cooperating with the weekly Soviet Russia published in the USA. In 1920 he returned to Russia and worked in structures affiliated with the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Revvoensovet) and other state entities, before he was executed in 1938 on the charge, common for that time, of working for foreign intelligence services (See V. Abramov and V. Frolov, “Voennyi uchenyi-vostokoved Tageev. Ob’ezdil polmira, a rasstrelian v Moskve”, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 4 (2002), 77-80. See also Baskhanov, Russkie, 231-232. See also Marshall, General Staff, 145-146, 227; for more details see Volkov, “Persian Studies,” 8-9).

**Tardov, Vladimir Gennadievich** (1879-1938), (footnote 479). A journalist, poet, historian, iranist. In 1909-1911, worked in Persia as a correspondent of the newspaper Russkoe slovo. In his reports he would criticise the activities of Russian troops in Persia. Some reports used to be sent by him to Manchester Guardian because of the Imperial Russia’s censorship. He initially learnt Persian through taking private lessons from Persian students in St. Petersburg. In 1917 he joined the Bolsheviks. He worked in the Soviet Military, NKID, was a member of VNAV. In 1928 gifted a large collection of Persian
artefacts to the Soviet state. After 1928 he taught Persian history and economy in MIV and the Military Academy. On a common for that time accusation of being a spy, in 1938 he was arrested and executed.

**Teimurtash, Abdolhosein** (1883-1933), (footnote 471). There was also a great deal of distrust and fear towards the USSR that continued to exist because of Article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 allowing military invasion of Iran on behalf of the USSR if the Iranian territory was this way or another used against the USSR. In 1935 after joining the League of Nations by the Soviet Union, Iran tried to take considerable but unsuccessful measures on abolition of this article through the League. Another aspect was Reza Shah’s personal distrust to the Bolsheviks and fear of their secret services. It was particularly aggravated after the revealing of Teimurtash’s (Reza Shah’s Court Minister and the effective leader of Persian foreign policy of the late 1920s-the early 1930s) cooperation with the USSR by Stalin’s secretary Bazhanov who defected to the West via Persia in 1928 (Boris Bazhanov, *Vospominaniiia byvshego secretaria Stalina* (Moscow: SP Sofinta, 1990)). Afterwards, this and other factors finally led to Reza Shah arresting and ordering to secretly murder Teimurtash in the prison (See Aliev, *Istoriia Irania*, 171-173. See also Mamedova, “Istoriia,” 161). The SVR archives naturally keep silence on the issue. Indirect evidence of Teimurtash’s close relations with the Soviet Ambassador and the *INO OGPU* Station-Chief Davtian can be found in the recently declassified collections of RGASPI – copies of *NKID’s* correspondence which is still classified in AVPRF. For example, RGASPI, f. 159, op. 2, d. 51, l. 178 (Chicherin to Kamenev), 190 (Chicherin to Karakhan)).

**Trutovskii, Vladimir Konstantinovich** (1862-1932), (footnote 272). He graduated from the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages and the Educational Section of Oriental Languages of MID. The title of his thesis was ‘Mazdak and his doctrine’. In 1898 he was appointed Head of the Kremlin Armoury. Actively participated and supervised the study of the Museum artefacts. He also was Head of Moscow Numismatic Society. One of the founders of the Oriental Commission.

**Zhukovskii, Valentin Alekseevich** (1858-1918), (footnote 256). Professor of Persian language and literature at the Faculty of Oriental Languages of St. Petersburg University. He was an associated member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Section of Oriental Languages at the Foreign Ministry(1905-1918) and also Head of the Translation Section at the Foreign Ministry (1915-1917). During the 1880s, 1890s, 1900s he undertook
scholarly missions to Persia. He was an active promoter of Oriental studies within scholarly and state power institutions. See Vasilii Bartol’d, “Pamiati V. A. Zhukovskogo,” in Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 9 (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 689.
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