What are the institutional implications of co-production as a strategy for development?

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Manchester for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2014

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SCHOOL OF ENVIRONMENT, EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
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<td>AU</td>
<td>Africa Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>B&amp;MGF</td>
<td>Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation</td>
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<td>CABS</td>
<td>Central Africa Building Society</td>
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<td>Dialogue</td>
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<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement</td>
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<td>HSUFF</td>
<td>Harare Slum Upgrading Finance Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSUP</td>
<td>Harare Slum Upgrading Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIED</td>
<td>International Institute for Environment and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NSDF</td>
<td>National Slum Dwellers Federation (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGHK</td>
<td>Operation Garikai / Hlalani Kuhle</td>
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<td>OPP</td>
<td>Orangi Pilot Project</td>
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<td>PB</td>
<td>Participatory Budgeting</td>
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<td>PMC</td>
<td>Project Management Committee</td>
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<td>RSDF</td>
<td>Railway Slum Dwellers Federation (India)</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Slum / Shack Dwellers International</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPARC</td>
<td>Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (India)</td>
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<td>UCAZ</td>
<td>Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WOZA</td>
<td>Women of Zimbabwe Arise</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZBS</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Building Society</td>
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<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>ZHPF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation</td>
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<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
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**SHONA TERMS**

*Chimurenga*  
Liberation war – first being 1896-87; second refers to the 1970s war of liberation; it’s was also used as a political rallying call - the third *Chimurenga* to describe the land invasions.

*Dombo*  
Stone. Refers to the practice used during hyperinflation of repaying loans in-kind: ‘dombo for dombo’.

*Dzivarasekwa*  
Residential area 20km east of Harare City Centre. The word is Shona for ‘duck pond’.

*Garikai / Hlalani Kuhle*  
Operation ‘Live Well’ the proposed housing and infrastructure construction programme to follow *Murambatsvina*.

*Gukurahundi*  
Literally means the whirlwind / rains that cleanse the crop by blowing away the chaff. Refers to the Fifth Brigade massacres of Ndebele peoples in Matebeleland between 1983 and 1986.

*Gungano*  
Name of the urban poor fund. The meaning in Shona is a ‘coming together of many people’.

*Jambanja*  
Refers to land invasions also more literally means chaos or mayhem.

*Kukiya-kiya*  
Refers to the growing informal economy and ‘making-do’ to meet basic needs.

*Kutamura*  
Defined as ‘striving, a ZHPF savings group in Harare.

*Murambatsvina*  
Refers to operation ‘restore order’ / ‘clean away the trash’.

*Musika*  
Market area – used to refer to Mbare in Harare.

*Nhamoya Pera*  
Defined as ‘poverty being alleviated / overcome, a ZHPF savings group in Harare.

*Pungwe*  
Political gathering or celebration where nationalistic songs are sung and stories told.

*Shangi Rirai*  
Defined as ‘perceiver’, a ZHPF savings group in Harare.

*Ta Fara*  
Defined as ‘we are happy’, the name of a ZHPF savings group in Harare.
ABSTRACT

The University of Manchester
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PhD: Development Policy and Management
September 2014

What are the institutional implications of co-production as a strategy for development?

This research investigates the institutional implications of co-production as a strategy for development. The study is located within international debates on global development targets beyond 2015 and how cities of the Global South meet the challenges of urbanisation and informality. With forecasts indicating the continuing growth of urban populations, there is an urgent need to consider how governments, working collaboratively with communities, meet the burgeoning demand for housing and basic services and create the institutions necessary for sustainable urban development.

Co-production is examined empirically through an embedded case study with the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation, its partner NGO Dialogue on Shelter Trust and the City of Harare Council. The research traces how co-productive relations have evolved between these stakeholders over the period 1997 to 2013. Co-production is considered as a mediating function that supports the creation of spaces for dialogue and problem-solving in complex urban environments. Drawing on sociological institutional theory, the thesis examines the implications of co-productive working on the discursive representation of people in poverty and the institutionalised practices of the state toward low income communities.

The research finds that the organisational and deliberative processes associated with co-production are formative: contributing to the efficacy of low income communities and the state to address housing and basic service needs. The thesis reports firstly that community mobilisation has a significant role in bringing together the financial and human resources needed to contribute to co-production. More importantly mobilisation provides the social infrastructure needed to create agential communities. Secondly, where organised communities are involved in the governance of development projects, there is an enhanced capacity to problem solve, which galvanises state support for progressive policies. Thirdly, the research in Harare identified that processes and practices of co-production stimulate adaptation of institutional arrangements. These gain significance over time as they accumulate to affect discourse, epistemic practice and lead to small scale institutional change.

The research confirms the potential significance of co-production for sustainable urban development. For communities, co-production serves to shift their subjectivity within existing institutional configurations; creating the potential to act outside of normatively defined roles. For the state, co-production creates an opportunity to establish spaces of deliberation that provide an infusion of resources and can bolster failing legitimacy. However, evidence from Harare also underlines that co-production is contextually defined and adaptive change is fragile in the face of stronger forces of politics and elite interests.
DECLARATION

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This research would not have been possible without the support and forbearance of the leadership and staff of Dialogue on Shelter, the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation and the City of Harare Council. While unable to name individuals, in order to maintain anonymity, I deeply thank all those that generously gave their time and shared their stories for this research. In particular the community members of ZHPF, who participated in interviews and focus groups and whose continuing struggle is an inspiration and example to governments and low income communities.

Finally, and most of all, I would like to thank Christine and my sons Michael, Thomas and Liam. They gave unfailing support and encouragement and put up with the time away for fieldwork, broken Skype conversations and distractions created by this research. I am so grateful for all the support you have given me that this acknowledgement can be just a small token of the thanks that I owe you.
THE AUTHOR

I completed my first degree at the University of Reading in 1990 in Combined Studies. After university I worked at the House of Commons as a Parliamentary Researcher for a Labour Shadow Minister for Employment. Following the 1992 General Election I then worked for the West London Training and Enterprise Council as a labour market analyst. Whilst working at the TEC I studied part time at Thames Valley University for a Post Graduate Diploma in Applied Research Methods, which I obtained in 1994.

From 1996 to 2003 I worked for the London Borough of Lewisham as Head of Economic Development, with responsibility managing the delivery of business, investment, employment services and economic development policy. In 2003, I moved, with my family, to Manchester and I worked at the Northwest Regional Development Agency as Head of Economic Regeneration before moving to Manchester City Council in 2004. I was employed by the City Council as Head of Economic and Urban Policy with responsibility for employment, adult skills and economic development policy.

I left the City Council in 2009 to start an economic development consultancy (EDP Associates) working for national and local government on policy development. I also returned to formal learning and started a part time MSc in Poverty and Development at the University of Manchester. I graduated the MSc with Distinction in 2011 and was accepted to undertake this PhD. I was successful in winning an ESRC CASE studentship in 2012 for my research.

During the PhD I have also been involved in setting up and running a research project called Growing up on the Streets. This is a qualitative study with street connected young people (aged 14 – 20) living in three African cities (Accra, Harare and Bukavu). The aim of the research is challenge how street children are conceptualised in policy and to inform national and international service design. While this research has run in parallel to the PhD, the process of conducting research with young people has given me a new perspective on urban life for people in poverty.
1.1 Introduction

There is an active and ongoing international debate on the design of the post-2015 development agenda and the transformation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), to reflect changing politics and environmental conditions of the Global South. While much of the debate appears consistent with the hegemonic neoliberal ideology that influenced the setting of the original MDGs, there are calls for a greater focus on social justice (Fukuda-Parr et al, 2014) and the multidimensional causes of poverty, linked to a comprehensive global development programme (Hulme and Wilkinson, 2012). Across a wide ranging literature, which includes scholarship, policy documents and interest group lobbying, emphasis is placed on mechanisms to reduce social inequality (UN System Task Team, 2012); actions that are environmentally and socially sustainable; policies that capture local capability and respond to the complexity of development challenges on the ground (Satterthwaite et al, 2013); and mechanisms to raise the aspiration of national government to deliver long-term improvement in the wellbeing of citizens (Pritchett and Kenny, 2012).

The opportunity presented by the post-2015 development agenda is more than a recasting of targets, but the chance to design a framework of policy and action which ‘leaves no one behind’ (UN, 2013). While the United Nations report significant progress in delivery of the MDG (UN, 2012), much of the statistical improvement has, according to Satterthwaite et al (2013), been regionally located in China and has taken place during a period, estimates suggest, of rising inequality in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2013). Within this debate there are calls for the development of specific policies to support urban areas in addressing the challenges created by fast growing populations (UN-Habitat, 2013). The United Nations forecast that urban populations will increase by some 2.4 billion people by 2050, with the majority of this growth taking place in the urban centres of the

1 See for example the civil society campaigning network Beyond 2015 – www.beyond2015.org
Global South (UN DESA, 2012). The scale and complexity of this challenge will require a transformation in local governance arrangements, a significant increase in the total value of resources available to localities and new tools to deliver development within dynamic urban environments. This suggests, for the global development agenda, the need to move beyond the veneer of policies that promote participation and accountability to consider more a fundamental re-engineering of institutionalised relationships able to realise the full capacity of communities working in partnership with the state (Green, 2012; Pieterse, 2014).

Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014: 239) propose that in most urban contexts it is only through collaboration, where people can influence the actions of the state and where they have the space to scale up tailored solutions with the support of government, that poverty can be significantly reduced. Khan (2012) identifies the importance of creating institutional conditions that enable experimentation and contextualised problem solving to long-standing development issues. This will also require the generation of local revenues and the reconfiguration of resources to support development. This objective is expected to become more important, as Green et al (2012) indicate, given the decrease in donor budgets and, following the experience of the global financial crisis, requirements for development investment to be matched by increased share in ‘domestic resource mobilisation’ (World Bank, 2013). How international development policy, post-2015, is framed will influence the range of possible responses. This, as Booth and Cammack (2013) suggest, must avoid the negative incentive effects of aid programming, to promote ‘development governance’ that encourages institutional adaptation.

Hickey (2012: 688), quoting Fukuyama (2011), states “the most effective institutions are often ones that have been modified to fit the particular social characteristics of the country in which they are being applied.” This echoes Evans’ (2004) caution against ‘institutional mono-cropping’ in development policy and the need for, as Khan (2012: 672) indicates, “policy-makers, political leaderships and broader social constituencies to be aware of and engage with their own experiences and those of other countries.” While the ‘best fit’ approach to
development policy has been adopted by major institutions, including the World Bank, in programme design over the last decade according to Booth and Cammack (2013), this does not fully address the need for active, competent and willing collaborators at a local level able to adapt and implement programmes within dysfunctional institutional conditions. While the challenges of development delivery will continue to be significant in the Global South, the outcome is not predetermined, with more positive views of agential communities available. Manuel Castells (2006: 219) for example, suggests that “social action is shaped by the context, but does not reflect or reproduce the context.” It is in this environment where partnership can be most effective; joint projects of development utilising the collective efforts, resources and organisational inputs of communities and the state.

This research explores the formative impact of co-production on institutions and the application of rules that govern access to land and basic service infrastructure. Co-production is examined both as a means of filling gaps in the resources and capacity needed to deliver development and, through collaboration and joint problem solving, its impact on institutional adaptation and change. This is explored empirically through a case study of the Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation (ZHPF), their NGO partner Dialogue on Shelter Trust (Dialogue) and their work to build a collaborative relationship with the City of Harare Council and Zimbabwean Government over the period 1997 to 2013. In the context of combative politics and economic failure, ZHPF and Dialogue have sought to construct a discursive frame that represents urban low income communities as agents of development. This approach is closely examined to consider its contextual effectiveness (considering Khan, 2012 and Hickey, 2012) as a method of bridging resource and institutional gaps that restrict access to provision, but also enable low income communities to engage with the structures of urban governance.

Using a process tracing research method, the activity and impact of ZHPF and Dialogue’s relationship with organisations of the state in Zimbabwe is explored to examine how co-production operates as a mediating function to alter discourse and institutionalised patterns of behaviour. In order to locate and understand the
significance of co-production, analysis of empirical case study data is undertaken through the lens of institutional theory and specifically the idea that institutions, as socially embedded systems of rules, evolve through iterative processes of adaptation (Cleaver, 2002; Healey, 2006; Brousseau and Raynaud, 2011; Andrews, 2013). Co-production is framed as a strategic tool for low income communities to engage the state and obtain improved access to land and basic services (Mitlin, 2008). The empirical focus provides the basis to consider the wider applicability of co-production to development policy and practice.

From this perspective not only do institutions matter in international development, as Leftwich and Sen (2010) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) have argued, but institutions and society are mutually constitutive. This connects with the current debates on post-2015 development policy concerned with the governance of urban centres that face the prospect of an ongoing demographic challenge. This research avoids conceptualising urban populations and urban managers as binary opposites but rather, as Pieterse (2014) suggests, as co-constructors of systems of urban authority and key contributors to the production of development. The research aims to provide an empirical examination of the potential of co-production to build, as Houtzager (2005: 22) suggests “a polity in which societal actors and state agents compete and cooperate to produce purposeful change through a combination of representative and deliberative institutions.” This Chapter continues with an outline of the conceptual framework adopted for this research, followed by a discussion of key concepts and definitions of co-production and institutions used in this thesis.

1.2 Conceptual Framework

To consider co-production through institutional theory requires a conceptual frame that moves beyond the limited scope of local government managerialism which, as Mitlin (2008) and Watson (2014) have found, dominates the literature discussing co-production. This requires positioning co-production as more than an alternative version of the functional and administrative relationships between service providers and consumers, to consider it as a mechanism that influences the shape of relationships between communities and the state. In order to explore this
perspective, co-production has been located within theories of institutional change on the basis that, as Manuel Castells (1983: 190) says, “the relationship between the state and the people is organised around the institutional distribution of urban services, coupled with the institutional mechanisms of political control.” Also recognising, as Elinor Ostrom (2005: 138) suggests, that changes in “rules may be easier [to achieve] or more stable than attempts to change the situation through changes in the biophysical world or attributes of the community.”

The focus on institutions builds upon Mitlin (2008: 41), who argues that it is “impossible for the urban poor to secure improved development opportunities simply through improved incomes; more comprehensive change is required to [...] produce adequate supplies of land and the infrastructure required for the delivery of basic services.” Co-production is considered as a vehicle for low income communities to re-engineer relations with the state, in contexts where they have limited economic power or political traction (as examined in Chapter Four). This research positions co-production within a social context to investigate the impact of action on both ‘informal’ institutions of embedded cultures and norms and ‘formal’ manifestation of institutions as written rules and laws. As Mitlin (2008) suggests, meaningful improvements for low income communities rely on penetrative change in the systems of urban governance, which can only be achieved through institutional adaptation.

Co-production here is not suggested as a singular force able to change institutions, but as a mediating function deeply situated within institutionalised conditions and embedded cultures. Co-production is examined as a constitutive practice, which by bringing together social actors, creates new opportunities for collaboration, problem solving and actions that catalyse institutional change. Similar to the approach taken by Baiocchi et al (2011), in their study of Participatory Budgeting (PB) in Brazil, mediation enables the translation of claims and demands of actors that occupy differing social fields and have differing levels of power. Co-productive relations are positioned as a transmission mechanism, where the variant objectives and capacities of communities and the state are converted into coherent
programmes of action. Co-production, within a given institutional context, can be described as a “causal transaction” (Schatzki, 1988), which sets in motion a chain of actions and responses that ultimately can become formalised as new practices and institutions. By introducing co-production into situations activated by institutions and norms, actors are inviting change to existing patterns of governance.

The conceptual framework shown in figure 1.1 is used to connect the two distinct literatures on institutional theory and co-production. The conceptual framework is intended to clarify the terms of investigation (Leshem and Trafford, 2007); to position the research within an existing terrain of knowledge (Miles and Huberman, 1994); and, in practical terms, to inform the research process and the design of research tools (Berman and Smyth, 2013). Figure 1.1 illustrates how co-production has been located as a mediating function, which is both influenced by broader institutional conditions but also, when introduced, shapes the adaptation of existing rules and managerial practices. The principal theoretical basis for this research is found in sociological institutionalism, which provides a theory of change grounded in social interaction that takes place through iterative and adaptive processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Hodgson, 2006; Caballero, 2013). However, through the research, contextual conditions are also considered to assess the implications and the operation of co-production to embed new practices.

For this conceptual model, a sociological institutionalist approach has been adopted in order to observe the micro-dynamics of social relations in shaping and sustaining institutions. This contrasts with historical and rational choice theories of institutions that emphasise path-dependency and argue that institutions persist until a shock, or an over-riding incentive, intervenes to change an establish pattern of behaviour (Peters, 2005). As discussed below, conceptually a sociological perspective allows observations of small-scale practices to be incorporated into a model of change that gives preference to the agency of actors and the mutability of systems of governance. Gonzales and Healey (2005: 2057) citing Gualini (2001), identify a sociological institutionalist approach as one where “[c]ontext and activity, structure and action are treated as co-constitutive and co-generative” in relation to a wide
set of socially based forces and interventions. Co-production is defined socially as a mechanism for communities and the state to interact and to negotiate the terms of collaboration, which may lead to more substantive adaptations in organisational behaviour and institutions. This includes managerial adaptations in the practices of public agencies, such as exceptions to rules, amendments to existing administrative procedures and the involvement of communities in decision making. These are examined empirically, in the context of Harare (see Chapters Five to Eight), to identify the extent to which adaptations become embedded and coalesce into new institutions.

*Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework*

From a sociological perspective, it is suggested that co-production not only affects the institutions that govern the behaviour of public agencies, but the internal political efficacy and sense of empowerment of community members. Pollock (1983: 403) defines internal political efficacy as an “individual’s perception of his or her own competence as political actor, quite apart from his / her evaluations of the political system.” This is explored, in Chapter Six, by examining whether co-production, through processes of community mobilisation, builds efficacy to create the resources and motivation for collaboration with the state. This connects with Fung and Wright’s (2003) ideas of the empowering potential of deliberative democracy and also Fung’s (2004) study of the impact of citizen participation on the
‘reinvention’ of institutions, through community collaboration with the state in Chicago.

As illustrated in the conceptual framework, co-production is subject to a range of contextual conditions and factors that directly affect both its possibility, given the particular economic, political and social environment, and the form it may take. Using the conceptual framework, empirical research has been designed to examine the particular contextual conditions as they affect co-production through a case study of community-state relationships in Harare, Zimbabwe. As indicated in figure 1.1, the analysis of co-production has been located within a temporal field that reflects the historical development of social relations and prevailing cultural norms. This positions social actors, as well as the range of actions available to them, in an historical context and within a subtext of beliefs and expectations. Hall (2010) underlines the importance of temporality, noting new institutional change is affected by previous episodes of institutional change. While the sociological approach taken here has been adopted to avoid a deterministic analysis, the historical context remains important, as discussed in Chapter Four, in both in understanding the motivations of actors and also the value of particular incentives towards new collaborative initiatives. It also, following Hickey and Mohan (2004), reflects the cumulative impact of ‘participative’ engagement over time, and how political processes may unfold in response to new relations between communities and the state.

The possibility of co-production is also conditioned by changes in external political and economic environment. The impact, for example, of changes in international development policy or shifts in the performance of global markets can affect the opportunity for, and appropriateness of, co-productive collaboration. Within the conceptual framework of this research, exogenous shocks are treated as contextual stimuli that can have an important impact on behaviours by limiting or creating the opportunities for collaboration. Through empirical examination, the research highlights the responses and evolving tactics of key stakeholders in managing multiple influences on co-productive activity. Based on previous studies, and as
discussed in Chapter Two, co-production can take a number of forms that reflect contextual conditions and how rules are ‘played-out’ in different situations.

1.3 Research Approach

Building from the conceptual framework, this research uses an embedded case study of community-state relations in Zimbabwe to explore the institutional implications of co-production. The empirical research method described in Chapter Three has focused on the evolving relationship between ZHPF and their NGO partner Dialogue with the City of Harare Council over the period 1997 to 2013. Since formation 1997, ZHPF has developed into a national movement of the urban poor with some 54,000 members (Chitekwe-Iti, 2014). With the support of Dialogue, it has cultivated a significant relationship with local and national government in Zimbabwe and an international profile through the global network, Slum / Shack Dwellers International (SDI). Using a process tracing method, this research tracks the developing relationship between communities and the state, looking specifically at the production of housing and basic services in two settlements in Harare.

The research approach and methodology for this thesis, as detailed in Chapter Three, has been constructed around the participation of those community members and key stakeholders who have shaped co-production in Harare. This takes up the challenge, as posed by Garth Myers (2011: 115), to move away from the inevitable trajectories of a neoliberal good governance agenda to find “more tangible ways to see and analyse with fresh eyes the complexities of what is actually going on, on the ground, in African cities.” The approach taken in this research is geared to understanding the conditional institutional factors that enable and constrain daily life. The research design has been constructed to begin to conceptualise a form of urban governance permeable to the collective input of people in poverty. The research practice adopted here is qualitative, relying on the triangulated histories, opinions and experiences of those people that form part of the complex society of the case study areas. While this approach is not without limitations, as discussed in Chapter Three, it has been designed to maximise an
opportunity to probe, and examine empirically, the micro-forms of interaction and adaptation of behaviour suggested by sociological institutional theory.

The methodology operationalises the conceptual framework detailed above (figure 1.1) to generate evidence and enable a discussion on the institutional implications of co-production as a strategy for development. The focus is urban and, as explained in Chapter Three, grounded in the particular challenges created by urbanisation in the Global South. The research approach has been developed to address the complexity of dynamic conditions found in urban centres to identify and illuminate the transformative aspects of the relationships between communities and the state. In applying institutional theory, as part of an investigation of the practices of co-production, an opportunity is created to ask how, and under what conditions, co-production can contribute to changes in the rules and the behaviours that govern urban life? Linked to this, the research considers the contribution of collective action to the wellbeing of populations living in poverty. Aside from the instrumental benefit of organised activity by the poor towards improved relations with the state, is the creation of horizontal structures of support that help to reduce the social isolation experienced by residents of low income communities. This is considered as a direct benefit of co-production for individuals and households and as a material contribution to the development of a political voice and agenda.

1.4 Key Concepts

Before proceeding to a critical examination of the relevant literature, the following section provides an outline of the key concepts of co-production and institutional change used in this thesis. The purpose of this is to provide definitional clarity in support of the discussion that will follow in Chapter Two and in the later empirical Chapters. This is important because, in addition to the challenges of bringing two distinct areas of study together within a single conceptual frame, neither co-production nor institutional change have fixed and agreed definitions or a consistent application in theory. The following section therefore provides, for this
research, a foundational description of the meaning and the intended use of both of these fields of scholarship.

1.4.1 Defining Co-Production

Co-production was first discussed in the USA during the late 1970s, as part of an exploration of urban service governance (Brudney and England, 1983; Ostrom, 1996). Empirical analysis of public service delivery, undertaken by the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, challenged the Weberian idea that public services were delivered from a unitary source of public authority and capacity. They argued that services were produced with input from a range of actors, which for social services in particular, were dependent on the contribution of service consumers. Scholars defined a synergistic relationship where ‘regular producers’ (those organisations who produce services and goods for money) and ‘consumer producers’ (who contribute to producing goods or services that they will in part consume) combine productive efforts to create a service output (Sharp, 1980; Whitaker, 1980; Parks et al, 1981). This model of co-producing services articulated practices that were significant different from a Weberian theory of public sector organisation.

These initial discussions of co-production largely focused on issues of public sector service management, in a context of tightening budget conditions in US cities. It was not until the mid-1990s that discussions on co-production were applied to development issues in the Global South. In 1996, a seminal edition of World Development was published featuring articles by Evans (1996), Lam (1996) and Ostrom (1996) and others that reignited an interest in co-production. Applied to development in the Global South, co-production was positioned as a practical framework for the engagement of low income communities in service delivery and governance in circumstances where weak economic conditions and politics fractured the delivery of public services. This discussion took place alongside a challenge to the macroeconomic policies of liberalisation (Sahn et al, 1997), which highlighted social capital and ‘grassroot’ human and financial resources as essential contributions to development (Putnam, 1993; Moser, 1997).
From the mid-2000’s co-production literature broadened beyond discussions of public sector management to investigate its economic and political implications. A number of scholars propose a wider utilisation of co-production: as adaptive institutional behaviour (Joshi and Moore, 2004); as a vehicle to establish dialogue and negotiate with the state (Mitlin, 2008); as a means for communities to build trust and social capital with government (Tsai, 2011); as modes of local governance of public services (Olivier de Sardan, 2011); and as contributing to new planning practice in the Global South (Watson, 2014). While diverse, these scholars have helped to expand the discursive boundaries of co-production and demonstrate its potential applicability to a wider understanding of community-state interactions, developed contextually, to secure basic service provision. As reflected in the questions for this research (set out in Chapter Three) there are a number of common lines of inquiry including how, within adverse circumstances, communities work together to resolve the under-provision of basic services and through this create the space to challenge the institutionalised practices of the state? Further to this, once spaces of negotiation have been established, how these contribute to more substantive institutional change?

These questions connect with wider discussion within international development literature on the utility and effectiveness of governance-led approaches to public service reform (see for example Ringold et al, 2012; Bukenya and Yanguas, 2013). It is well established that in developing nations, access to basic services is obtained through a patchwork of inputs from state agencies, NGOs, commercial providers and through the efforts of service consumers (Blundo and Le Meur, 2009; Booth, 2011; Cammett and MacLean, 2011; Batley et al, 2012). Booth (2012: 35) goes further to state that “[u]nder today’s conditions of economic and political liberalisation, almost all public goods’ provision in Africa takes the form of co-production by several actors, including both formal organisations and informal collaborations between individuals or groups.” However, the potential for co-productive approaches to change the institutional conditions, which determine access to basic services, has received less attention.
Focusing on co-production provides an opportunity to examine the actions of organised low income communities to improve access to land and basic service infrastructure and efforts to engage with the political and institutional arrangements that govern access. Moreover, repositioning low income communities as legitimate partners in poverty reduction, within co-productive arrangements, accords with a core conclusion of the Africa Power and Politics Programme that “governance challenges in Africa are not fundamentally about one set of people getting another set of people to behave better. They are fundamentally about both sets of people finding ways to act collectively in their own best interests” (Booth, 2012: viii). This highlights the potential of co-production, through active participation, to be constitutive both on the behaviours of actors and the institutional mechanisms that determine the distribution of basic service provision.

Co-production is seen here as an embedded and, following Evans (1995; 1996), synergistic activity that improves the availability of land and basic services for poor communities. As such, and connecting with the conceptual framework for this research, it is a practice that operates as a mediating function, creating a space for collaboration between citizens and the state. This view differs from other scholars such as Rhodes (1996) and Gualini (2002: 32 - 33) who view co-production as marking a “dissolution of the distinctions between state and civil society” towards a “governance without government in specific spheres of activity.” While this research is examining co-production as a mechanism to remedy some of the more negative aspects of the dualism of community and state within the particular context of Zimbabwe, the state remains a necessary participant (according to Mitlin, 2014) in the provision of services at a scale needed to meet demand. Co-production here is a means of substantiating the role of the state; recreating the functional efficacy of institutions through the contribution of human and financial resources by organised low income communities. The impact of this collaborative activity is experienced by individuals in a material way because of increased access to goods and services; socially in their improved relationships within structures of
power; and instrumentally in the influence over the institutional practices through participation in the bureaucratic systems of the state.

1.4.2 Defining Institutions

The creation of ‘effective’ institutions is widely recognised as being central to the achievement of economic growth and development, and is well established as a primary focal point for international policy and action (Jutting, 2003; Leftwich and Sen, 2010). While the importance of institutions is accepted, defining what is ‘effective’ and building a clear understanding of how institutions operate within particular contexts, provides a greater challenge. Kingston and Caballero (2009) underline the lack of a standardised definition of institutions as a difficulty for constructing empirical studies of institutional performance and change. Recent analysis of institutions has been set within what has been termed ‘new institutionalism’ which, according to Peters (2005), offers a theory rich analysis, from a number of disciplinary perspectives, of institutions. These institutional theories, as outlined in table 1.1, offer a range of explanations that locate institutions as a product of society, where individuals are involved in a range of patterned interactions.

While there are distinct characteristics for each of the strands of institutional theory identified by Peters (2005) and Schmidt (2008; 2010), there are also clear areas of overlap in definitions of how institutions function and their respective conditions for change. In this thesis, and as identified in section 1.2, a sociological approach is taken, with institutions understood, following Hodgson (2006: 2), as “systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions.” Institutions can therefore be seen as mechanisms that define and control behaviour within society, recognising that these mechanisms are socially grounded and “evolve through complex, long-term interaction between state and society” (IDS, 2010: 12). As the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990) “[i]nstitutions are systematic patterns of shared expectation, taken-for-granted assumptions, accepted norms of routines of interactions that have robust effects on shaping the
motivations and behaviour of sets of interconnected social actors” (Chang and Evans, 2005: 99).

**Table 1.1**

**Institutional Theories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Theory</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative Institutionalism</td>
<td>The function of institutions is governed by interpretation of social norms and conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational choice Institutionalism</td>
<td>Emphasises the function of institutions through systems of rules and incentives as individuals maximise self-interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Institutionalism</td>
<td>Institutional function is governed by precedent and the persistence of rules along a ‘path’ until affected by exogenous shocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Institutionalism</td>
<td>Eschews structure to suggest that institutions are important to establish a framework of action, but other variables such as political interests are more important for policy choices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Institutionalism</td>
<td>Connects with international regime theory and the structures of interaction between state-level institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociological Institutionalism</td>
<td>Institutional function is determined by the relationship between society and the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discursive Institutionalism</td>
<td>Institutions are the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Information drawn from Peters (2005) and Schmidt (2008; 2010)*

Institutions provide a framework for social interaction, which as Chang and Evans (2005: 102) point out, creates both the constraints to action and the enabling mechanisms for social and economic activity, which are inherently “constitutive of the preferences and world views of their constituents.” This highlights that institutions are not separate to the social existence of individuals, but embedded in cultures and normative values that are internalised and affect both self-identity and more widely, social and organisational behaviours (Tilly, 1984). Leftwich (2010) underlines that the creation of institutions rest on the interaction between social structure and the operation of individual agency to adopt and accept norms that maintain stable social conditions. North (1990) describes the operation of institutions as a matrix, where formal rules found in laws, regulations and policies are embedded in and overlap with deep seated social attitudes and values. This is
echoed by Barley and Tolbert (1997: 93) who see institutions as a “web of values, norms, rules, beliefs and taken for granted assumptions.” Institutions then are understood here as constraining and enabling, but moreover define the prevailing boundaries of social action.

A key aspect of sociological institutional theory is discourse, which Schmidt (2008: 305) defines as both the “substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed” and applied in practice. While Schmidt (2008; 2010) suggests discourse as a separate ‘institutionalism’, it is considered here, following Peters (2005), as a means through which institutions are articulated, challenged and changed. Thus empirically, the observation of how discourse is used as a tactic to define and create spaces in the negotiation between communities and the state, as well as how changes in discourse signal shifts in institutionalised practices, provide a key tool for this research. Millstein et al (2003) for example, examines how, in the context of South Africa, community organisations used discursive approaches to define political spaces to challenge for housing. Discourse, as Fischer (2006: 25) notes, “make some things important and other things insignificant”. Discourse is represented as a technology of urban management in the Global South, as discussed by Nyamu-Musembi (2006) in the context of Mombasa; Kamete (2002) in Harare; and Myers (2003; 2011) in Zanzibar.

Williamson (2000), in figure 1.2, offers a simplified differentiation of institutions, to describe an interlocking hierarchy of rules that change over differing periods of time. The first level of institution being embedded norms, customs and traditions, which form the foundations of social behaviour and change slowly over centuries. Level two, as the institutional environment, is where formal rules such as constitutions, laws and property rights and associated legislative, judicial and bureaucratic functions of government are defined. Level two institutions determine the distribution of power and are constrained by the embedded norms at level one. Level three are the institutions of governance that define the operation of the primary institutional structures of government found at level two. This includes the incentive structures to secure the functioning of the market, through courts and contract arrangements that change infrequently over a period of years. The final
level four institutions determine resource allocation and employment. This according to Williamson (2000) is the level at which neoclassical economic operates, where there is constant adjustment to prices and output and institutions change to optimise conditions driven by interaction in the market.

**Figure 1.2**

**Williamson’s Institutional Hierarchy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Frequency (years)</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1: Embeddedness: informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, religion</td>
<td>$10^3$ to $10^6$</td>
<td>Often noncalculative; spontaneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2: Institutional Environment: formal rules of the game – esp. property (polity, judiciary, bureaucracy)</td>
<td>$10$ to $10^2$</td>
<td>Get the institutional environment right. 1st order economizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3: Governance: play of the game – esp. contract (aligning governance structures with transactions)</td>
<td>1 to 10</td>
<td>Get the governance structures right. 2nd order economizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L4: Resource allocation and employment (prices and quantities: incentive alignment)</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Get the marginal conditions right. 3rd order economizing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Reproduced from Williamson (2000: 597)*

While Williamson’s analysis is primarily focused on economic conditions, and the specifics can be challenged when applied empirically to contexts in the Global South, it offers a schema to identify the relational character and the relative mutability of institutions. This is useful in underlining the systemic connection between institutional categories, as suggested by Williamson, to explain the role of co-production as a ‘change function’ as discussed in Chapter Two (section 2.3.2). Of particular interest is Williamson’s suggestion that supporting more dynamic institutions, at levels three and four, are socially embedded beliefs, practices and
rules that provide a ‘super-structure’ to define the possible extent of institutional change.

1.4.3 Locating Institutional Change

While institutions provide the structures for social interaction this does not mean that institutionalised rule systems are either consistently functional or inherently equitable. Being socially grounded, institutions are conditioned by, and reflect the patterns of, power within society and are open to challenge by various actors (Kingston and Cabellero, 2009; Frodin, 2012). Pressure for change can originate from a number of places as actors vie to alter institutions to protect their interests. This includes heterogeneous elite interests. Leftwich (2010: 104) states that power and its uses are contextual and elites will seek to shape “the formal and informal institutional rules of the game in which they operate and which they deploy to achieve their ends.” Also institutions are, according to Thelen (2004), “the objects of on-going political contestation” (quoted in Leftwich and Sen, 2010: 39), where changes that benefit one section of society may disadvantage another. Additionally, institutions are, as Leftwich and Sen (2010: 44) quoting Margaret Levi (2006) point out, “empty boxes” without the organised human agency that makes them work. A lack of financial, human or organisational capacity to enforce rules affects both the efficacy of the institution and the legitimacy of agents with responsibility for their implementation.

Variation in opinions of how institutions change provides, for Peters (2005), a marker of the difference between approaches to institutional theory. It is accepted that from an historical perspective institutions change, as North (1990: 118) states “[t]hey connect the past with the present and the future so that history is a largely incremental story of institutional evolution”. However, there is a lack of consensus among scholars on the precise conditions that trigger change (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). Peters (2005: 161) identifies two broad schools of thought that see institutional change as either “an ordinary part of institutional life or as the exception to a rule of stability.” The former reflects a perspective where the social construction of institutions includes an inherent dynamism and capacity to reflect
the interests of influential social actors. Whereas, the latter presents institutions as stable social structures that, outside of mutable market conditions, are resistant to change except in the face of powerful exogenous forces. This divergence, beyond the ontological implications, is significant for policy design and the formation of expectations on how development outcomes can be achieved.

Searle (2005), suggests that institutional change occurs when practices become regularised as rules in formal procedures, policy, regulations and laws which in-turn are constitutive of societal structures. This is a two way effect, with social actors both being a cause of institutional change and also, individually and collectively responding, through changes in their own behaviour, to institutional conditions. Hodgson (2007: 331), for example, states that “the framing, shifting and constraining capacities of social institutions give rise to new perceptions and dispositions within individuals.” The creation and adaptation of institutions is undertaken by social actors who according to Cleaver (2002: 14), citing Elinor Ostrom (1992), can transform weak institutions through continuous and evolutionary processes to “reduce the ‘social overhead costs’ of co-operation.” Institutional change is regarded by Cleaver (2002), as a relational process embedded in social life. Cleaver proposes a central role for social relations in institutional development with adaptation taking place through “a process of bricolage – gathering and applying analogies and styles of thought already part of existing institutions” (Cleaver, 2002: 15). Here structures do not overwhelm individual and collective agency; people are able to affect institutions through daily interaction and improvisation.

This contrasts with a more structural analysis of institutional change developed from, in particular, a rational choice perspective, see table 1.1 above. It suggests, as Leftwich and Sen (2010: 39) propose, the “persistence of institutions [as] the norm in most societies.” They explain an inherent resistance to change of economic institutions where there is a strong connection to underlying cultural norms and where there is a lack of interest from the elite in supporting changes that may not benefit them. These factors limit the occurrence of institutional change to moments
of exogenous shocks or the outcome of power struggles between elites. From this view institutions are largely fixed social structures, grounded in normative values and maintained through regulation. Evans (2005: 101) citing Greif (1994) observes that “once institutions take hold, they are likely to endure even if they have a long-run negative effect on development, crowding out the possibility for the emergence of more efficacious institutions”. Hall (2010) however, points out while rational choice theory has a strong explanatory power regarding the operation of institutions, it is limited in explaining of how institutions emerge from the ‘critical junctures’ between periods of stability. From an historical and sociological institutionalist perspective, change is not just a process of readjustment in response to exogenous shocks, but takes place on a continuous basis as the product of incremental adjustment within social settings (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The micro-dynamics of institutional change are discussed further in Chapter Two (section 2.3.3).

The inherent ‘stickiness’ suggested by rational choice institutionalism holds, particularly when we consider the significance of embedded institutions suggested by Williamson (levels one and two as shown in figure 1.2) in shaping social behaviour and expectations. These embedded beliefs and practices are sustained and reproduced because they have a depth of social investment that contribute to individual and collective identity formation and protect vested interest. However, it is perhaps helpful here to distinguish between what Brousseau and Raynaud (2011: 66) term “institutional environments”, which are the macro-terms of social interaction and “institutional arrangements” which govern the micro-dynamics of bilateral relationships. The former provides a stable and generic infrastructure, while the latter more malleable rules of engagement. These two institutional ‘arenas’ are overlapping and necessarily connected and can be understood, with regard to the processes of change, as consistent with sociological theory on the evolution of institutions. Brousseau and Raynaud (2011) suggest that institutional change is initiated at a micro-level and, as new rules become more widely accepted, they affect, more broadly, social behaviours. In highlighting the inherent connection between institutional environments and arrangements, Brousseau and Raynaud
focus on adaptive and iterative processes as a primary means by which institutions change.

For Brousseau and Raynaud (2011), the interests of social agents and micro-level institutional arrangements are heterogeneous and require activation to affect change, in keeping with the conditions for co-production to be discussed in Chapter Two. On issues of access to land and basic services, individual households may have differing requirements and distinct experiences of the operation of formal institutions. Even where, broadly, households exhibit similar socio-economic characteristics and are collectively categorised as, for example, ‘illegal settlers’, differences of expectation, ethnic identification or social connectivity may, as discussed empirically in Chapter Six, inhibit collective action geared to challenging institutions. Additionally, Barley and Tolbert (1997: 96) referring to Tolbert and Zucker (1996), highlight that institutions should not be treated as homogenous because “practices and behavioural patterns are not equally institutionalized. This variation depends, in part, on how long an institution has been in place and on how widely and deeply it is accepted” in society. This underlines that institutional change may rely on contextualised actions that generate tailored mechanisms of change (Kingston and Callabero, 2009) but can be seen as a process of sedimentation where adaptations are layered upon previous institutional practice.

A further issue for institutional change is the role of the state as a source of elite interests and a Weberian ‘custodian’ of institutions. The state, according to Migdal (1994: 12) “is not a fixed ideological entity. Rather, it embodies an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of goals, as it engages other social groups.” He says that the state cultivates an “aura of invincibility” (ibid: 14) in order to impose institutions as rules of social behaviour. Frodin (2012: 273) reflects that far from being a source of unitary authority the state represents “an aggregate effect of a myriad of institutionalised practices.” The state in undertaking its role to apply rules, creates path-dependency that Leftwich and Sen (2010) consider can stand in the way of institutional change: diluting the possibility of innovation and reform.
This serves elite interest by protecting against radical change that may reduce their power or status.

While the role of the state is problematic, it is also a necessary participant in institutional change, as emphasised by Mitlin (2014). It has a key role in orchestrating the operational application of institutions and arrangements to ensure that there is enforcement and consistent application of rules. Ostrom (2005: 131) points out that weak monitoring and sanctioning of rules, particularly where these rules are externally imposed, can discourage the formation of social norms that are important to promote compliance and a wider acceptance of institutions. The state has both an instrumental role in the application and administration of institutions and a symbolic role, as a source of legitimisation, where social actors seek the endorsement and support of the state and the embedding of change in state organisational practices. The importance for communities of engaging the state as partner and collaborator, following Mitlin (2008), highlights the potential significance of co-production as a strategy for low income urban communities to create dialogue and to promote institutional change. Here the development of projects of co-production, between organised groups of the urban poor and agencies of the state, aim to remedy the material lack of services but moreover, to redefine relationships in order to generate the ‘political capabilities’ necessary to have influence within a wider field of governance and power relations (Whitehead and Gray-Molina, 2005; Hickey, 2009).

1.4.4 Terminology Used

It is important to define and justify the terminology used in this thesis, given that discursive representations of power, communities and institutions are central to the analytical approach adopted in this research. Language that categorises people and legitimises action has significant power to define and delimit participation within a ‘development discourse’ (Green and Hulme, 2005), as has been evident in the course of this research. Firstly, the term ‘Global South’ has been used in this thesis to include “nations classified by the World Bank as low and middle income that are in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean” (Mitlin and
Satterthwaite, 2013: 13). While this term has limitations, most notably that much of the Global South is north of the equator, it avoids the use of labels that apply subjective and comparative reference to levels of development.

Secondly, use of the term ‘slum’ has been avoided where possible and replaced with an alternative descriptive such as low income communities and informal settlement. This is intended, as discussed by Gilbert (2007), to avoid conflating poor quality environments with the people that live in these conditions. As explored in this research (see Chapter Four), these labels have been used in Zimbabwe to justify extreme and violent action by the state against people in poverty. It is not possible to avoid ‘slum’ entirely, given it is used extensively both by the major development organisations, as an MDG target, and also because it has been appropriated by organised groups of people in poverty (most significantly Slum / Shack Dwellers International) as a justification for action and negotiation with state organisations.

Thirdly, the term ‘poor’ remains problematic in its ubiquity across development literature and policy. While relating to relative measures of income, ‘the poor’ is used inappropriately as a social category. This is despite, as Krishna (2009) explains, the heterogeneity of income levels and financial capability of people categorised in this way. But more importantly, as Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2013) point out echoing Sen (1999), it fails to reflect the competence, resilience and innovation needed to survive on very low and unstable incomes. Where possible ‘poor’ and ‘urban poor’ have been replaced with more accurate statements including ‘people with low incomes’ or ‘people in poverty’ to separate the economic circumstances from the person.

Finally, ‘the state’ is used to describe the primary agent of public authority, namely national and local government and its agents. It takes account of the view that the traditional Weberian boundaries between state and society are often opaque in nations of the Global South (IDS, 2010). Following Migdal (1994), the state is seen as part of society and a centre for authority, but not as homogeneous in its

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2 See for example UN-Habitat (2003; 2006) and UN (2013) reporting on MDG target 7.D – by 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.
relations with citizens, nor as coherent in its organisational approaches. Citizenship is also referred to recognising that definitions of citizenship are complex and contested (see Kabeer, 2002) and imply a range of rights, memberships, identities, belongings and reciprocal responsibilities within a state and among communities. The term here is used its broadest sense to represent individuals who are part of the social fabric, but who may face exclusion and disenfranchisement. In the context of urban poverty, citizenship is problematic due to circumstances, as found in Zimbabwe and other places, where the poor are unable to secure official identity documents because of a lack of money, or a recognised residential address, or where they are able to claim rights are prevented from enforcing them by the high costs of litigation.

### 1.5 Thesis Structure

The thesis continues in Chapter Two with a discussion and critical assessment of the literature on co-production and institutional theory. Having provided an introduction and definitions above, the next Chapter offers a deeper analysis of the application of co-production in a development context, drawing from a cross-section of literature and case study material to provide a foundation for later empirical Chapters. This as Robert Yin (2003: 9) suggests, is provided not as a summary of relevant scholarship, but to contribute to “sharper and more insightful questions about the topic.”

Chapter Three introduces the research case study and explains the methodological choices and approach taken. Chapter Three describes the research tools and process and offers some reflections on the challenges and limitations of the research approach. This is followed by a contextual analysis in Chapter Four, which provides background on Zimbabwe, Harare and international policy on development of informal settlements. This outlines the historical context for the work of community partners and the City of Harare with the aim of providing explanatory depth to the analysis of institutions to follow. Chapter Four also includes an introduction to the work and importance of SDI in supporting mobilised activity of the urban poor.
Chapter Five begins the reporting and analysis of the empirical data by drawing out the key information gathered during the fieldwork. This Chapter offers detailed information on the demographics and the environment of the case study areas. Additionally, drawing from the research data, it highlights the operation of ZHPF, describing its structure and membership. The Chapter is organised around the timeline of 1997 to 2013, identifying the key moments and developments that helped to progress co-productive relationships in Harare.

Chapters Six to Eight contain the empirical analysis of the research data. Chapter Six is focused on the issues of collective action to examine the importance of mobilisation in creating the conditions and opportunity for co-production. Drawing on interviews with community members and stakeholders, this Chapter identifies how the processes of mobilisation, alongside the social support structures established in low income communities, help to corral the human and financial resources needed for co-production. The Chapter also explores how the systems of mutual support and micro-level objective setting build the confidence and capacity for poor communities to become agents of development. Chapter Seven extends this analysis to consider governance and governmentality. This examines whether co-production should be viewed as co-opting the radicalism of organised groups of people in poverty or whether empirically, co-production is governance defined in pragmatic terms. Chapter Eight focuses on the institutional implications of co-production in Harare, using a range of empirical examples of discursive, practical and policy changes. Drawing together the evidence from the fieldwork, the significance and the sustainability of co-productive activity is considered.

Chapter Nine provides conclusions and draws out the policy implications from this research study. The Chapter returns to the research questions outlined in Chapter Three to draw out key conclusions and policy recommendations. The Chapter offers an overview of the findings and suggestions for areas of further research. The thesis concludes with references and appendices.
2.1 Introduction

The trajectory of scholarship on co-production has drawn the discussion away from managerialist approaches to local service delivery, to locate the debate in a wider scene of urban poverty reduction. Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014: 239) make a bold statement that identifies co-production as an essential ingredient in reducing urban poverty.

“[I]n most urban contexts in the Global South, poverty can only be reduced significantly when urban poor groups and their organisations can influence what is done by the local and national government agencies that are tasked to support them, and when they have the space to design and implement their own initiatives and then scale up with government support” (emphasis in original).

Satterthwaite and Mitlin’s contribution moves the debate on co-production beyond administrative changes to local authority service delivery to a field of participatory and deliberative governance. This shift raises a number of important questions on how co-production is defined and positioned, within the current rubric of development policy. As identified in Chapter One, there is a significant push to locate the challenges created by urbanisation more centrally within the post-2015 global development agenda. Addressing the consequences of population growth requires more than targets appropriate to managing urbanisation, although as Hulme et al (2014) indicate this is a significant task in itself. It requires a re-engineering of the tools available to international agencies, governments and communities to actualise equitable urban development.

A significant challenge in considering the instrumental value of co-production for urban development is distilling its core characteristics. Building on Chapter One, context appears to be highly important in shaping both the possibility of co-productive relations between community groups and the state and in determining the form of inputs available. Equally, the capacity of communities to organise and articulate their needs, drawing on community self-help, by establishing a dialogue
with the state would seem essential (Mitlin, 2014). Co-production when used strategically to tackle issues of urban poverty provides a means to challenge the institutionally defined distribution of resources. Moreover, co-production can be initiated by organised communities, providing a positive means to demonstrate capability to partner with the state in delivering urban development (Appadurai, 2004). This highlights the participative value of co-production to enable low income communities to engage with more powerful agencies of the state, and with NGOs and international development organisations.

For co-production to have a lasting impact it needs to, as Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) suggest, move beyond immediate project based outcomes. Co-production should influence governance processes as well as secure improved access to services for low income communities. This is not to suggest that co-production is a transformative activity per se, but as a visible form of collective action it provides a means to mediate and modify institutions and institutionalised behaviour. Discussing co-production, through the lens of institutional theory, raises a number of questions about the mechanics of institutional change and adaptation that are discussed in this Chapter. This, as discussed below, draws on sociological theories of institutional change, which through cumulative micro-level interactions creates pressure, as well as the justification, for substantive shifts in informal and formal institutions.

This Chapter critically explores how literature has reflected on the potential contribution of co-production to development. This focuses particularly on the application of co-production within an urban context and examines its use by organised communities as a strategy to engage the state. Drawing from a range of case study material, a structured comparison is used to draw out the core characteristics and the conditional requirements for co-production. This is then linked to a critical analysis of institutional theory literature to discuss co-production as a mechanism to stimulate adaptation of institutionalised behaviours and practices. The objective for this Chapter is to probe and develop a foundation for the application of these ideas in the analysis contained within the empirical Chapters Six to Eight.
2.2 Conceptualising Co-production

The origin of co-production was introduced, in Chapter One, as an evolving area of scholarship that has a strong practical focus in public service management. From the mid-2000s, the discussions of co-production have broadened to consider its formative contribution to community-state relationships in the Global South and, in particular, as a strategy for low income communities to collectively utilise their limited resources to engage national and local government in dialogue on development issues (Mitlin, 2008; Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014). Co-production can take various forms and is shaped by the political context and the capacities and objectives of the actors involved. Booth (2012) suggests that in the context of fragmented public services in the Global South, the co-production of public goods has become a ubiquitous response by people in poverty to the lack of adequate provision by the state. Due to the diversity of case studies describing co-production found in development and public administration literature, it is useful to look critically across examples of co-production to assess whether necessary conditions for co-production emerge that help to define co-production.

The evolving ideas and the diverse application of co-production within the literature make establishing a hard definition problematic. Since the initial descriptions of co-production by, for example, Kiser and Percy (1980); Whitaker (1980); and Brudney and England (1983), which focused specifically on local service delivery in the United States, more recent discussion has been set in the context of the Global South. This has ranged from Lam’s (1996) study of irrigation governance in Taiwan to the collection of taxation in Ghana (Joshi and Moore, 2004) and discussions of community based adaptation as a response to climate change (Pelling, 2010; Dodman and Mitlin, 2013). These describe contextualised forms of collaboration between citizen groups and state organisations in delivering a defined output. While this is broadly consistent with original definitions, which focused on the production of a specific service or public good (see for example Parks et al, 1981), closer examination of the necessary and sufficient conditions for co-production provides a more differentiated perspective.
Despite the many studies citing co-production in the development and public administration literature, there is little structured comparison drawing out the core characteristics or conditions required for co-production to occur. This may be a feature of the very different contexts in which collaborative activity is being examined, but also reflects a gap in how co-production has been conceptualised. The existing literature lacks clear analysis of the conditional factors necessary for co-production to take place or an indication of sufficiency to generate benefits for citizen groups or the state as partners in co-production. Drawing from a cross-section of eleven studies,\(^3\) shown in table 2.1, each of which considers co-productive community-state relationships in different contexts, necessary and sufficient conditions for co-production are examined.

**Table 2.1**

*Co-production Articles Analysed*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Citations*</th>
<th>Case Study Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks et al (1981)</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lam (1996)</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostrom (1996)</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abers (1998)</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appadurai (2001)</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patel et al (2002)</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshi and Moore (2004)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bovaird (2007)</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitlin (2008)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsai (2011)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workman (2011)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source – Number of times articles cited in other work. As listed in Google Scholar. Data collected 25 May, 2014.

The selection of studies was made using three broad criteria. These were firstly, temporal coverage, by including papers from the 1980s to more current publications to capture evolving ideas of co-production. Secondly, case studies from

\(^3\) A single page summary of each of the eleven case studies is shown in appendix 1.
Africa, Asia, Latin America and USA / Europe to reflect regional differences in how co-production operates. Thirdly, that the articles were influential among scholars, as measured by the number of times articles were cited. A summary of the selection criteria results is shown in table 2.1. While this selection does not provide a comprehensive representation of scholarship on co-production, it offers a cross section of important works for analysis.

Analysis of the selected papers revealed a set of conditions that appear necessary for co-production, as set out in table 2.2. While the context, and the localised processes for establishing co-production, varied considerably for each of the studies analysed, a set of common conditional factors are identifiable. These conditions are discussed below and are explored as being both singularly necessary and jointly sufficient for co-production. A significant feature of this analysis is, as illustrated in table 2.2, that conditions are initially separately constituted in community groups and in state organisations, but through collaborative relationships, become animated and available as collective inputs to co-production. For example, communities may have a strong sense of common identity that generates social benefit, but it is through working towards co-production that the benefits of a strong community can be realised as a collective resource, for example to organise labour inputs into housing construction with the state. Similarly, the state may have policies that address urban development, but lack the operational capacity to deliver these without inputs from communities. These conditions exist as latent capacities that are triggered into use by a combination of contextual institutional factors which, as suggested in the conceptual model in Chapter One (figure 1.1), make co-production both possible and influential.

In identifying necessary conditions for co-production, it is important to caveat the significant difficulties of making co-production work. This difficulty is reflected in communities, with de Wit and Berner (2009: 928) offering a stark view that “the urban poor are not ‘naturally’ inclined to engage in horizontal organisations or get involved in collective actions” preferring to rely on vertical patronage. A more nuanced finding is provided by Robins (2008: 98), who concludes in his study of the
South African Homeless Peoples Federation, that experiments in ‘deep democracy’ are highly situated “within specific localities, historical moments and political trajectories.” Thus, even where there is the potential for co-productive activity within communities, these need to be activated within a framework of collective action. Similarly challenges exist within state organisations where conflict between elite groups and the protection of political interest may provide a barrier to new forms of collaborative relations being developed with communities. The necessary conditions suggested in table 2.2 are examined in the following paragraphs.

Table 2.2
Necessary Conditions for Co-production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary Condition</th>
<th>Organised Communities</th>
<th>State Organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creating Objects</td>
<td>Clear objectives established.</td>
<td>Bounded project activity set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generating Benefits</td>
<td>Co-production meets individual need.</td>
<td>Co-production meets political / organisational need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchestration</td>
<td>Mobilisation of community inputs.</td>
<td>Political will / bureaucratic capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Capital, labour and skills.</td>
<td>Capital, skills and permission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.1 Creating Objects of Development

The examples of co-production represented in the sample studies are typically articulated as discrete projects, even where they form part of a longer strategy of engagement by organised low income communities. This may be a feature of the way in which the case studies are presented in scholarly articles, where structured examples of co-production are used to emphasise and observe the differential inputs into service delivery. It also reflects on the normative bureaucratic form of development interventions. Critically, Ferguson (1994), Crush (1995), Kothari and Minogue (2001), Dar and Cooke (2008) among others have detailed the hegemony of managerialist approaches to development as an exercise of neoliberal authority.
Analysis of the sample studies suggests that the form of co-productive projects appear instrumentally important in defining activity within prevailing discourses of public management, in order to engage state organisations in building collaborative activity. The co-productive project in this sense becomes a created object that can be distinguished from the wider politics of urban government and thereby justified initially as an exception to, rather than a formal change in, policy.

This echoes the work of Swyngedouw et al (2002: 543) on the management of neoliberal cities and the use of “exceptionality measures” to secure investment and protect the interests of elite groups in urbanisation processes. It also reflects Baptista’s (2012) analysis of the use of exceptions within government, used as a tactic of political and bureaucratic actors to secure advantage by enabling permission to be granted for development schemes, which would otherwise be refused under planning regulations. This has been presented by Marxist scholars (such as Swyngedouw, 1996; Smith, 2002; and Harvey, 2008) as a diminution of the democratic practices of the state through the selective application of institutions. Based on the sample studies, the creation of projects as discrete objects can perhaps also be explained as a transitional device (see also section 2.3.3) that enables the adoption of new approaches that may contradict existing epistemic practices or regulations. From this perspective, projects create the space for organisations of the state to trial new managerial approaches and involve community actors in a way that limits the impact, and therefore the risk to individual officers and politicians adopting new approaches to urban management.

Two examples can be taken from the sample studies to explore this feature of co-production. Firstly, the development of water and sanitation infrastructure in Recife, Brazil as discussed by Ostrom (1996). In this study, the state recognised a problem of funding and delivering affordable infrastructure to low income communities. Ostrom identifies innovative practice by the city government who arranged for the design and construction of sanitation infrastructure to be undertaken jointly by professional engineers and community members. This was supported by a technical approach that emphasised reduced cost in the choices of
materials and in the use of ‘condominial systems’ design that maximised the input of residents’ labour and skills in the construction process. According to Watson (1995), the author of the source report for Ostrom’s case study, the Recife initiative formed one of a number of demonstration projects in Brazil that tested the model of co-productive condominial systems in low income urban areas. While the outcome was considered to be successful, the project as object, provided evidence to counter the scepticism of government and utility companies who favoured scalable approaches of centralised infrastructure development, over co-productive arrangements with community members.

The second example is taken from Patel et al (2002) who describe the resettlement of some 60,000 low income people residing beside the railway tracks in Mumbai. Patel et al outline the response of poor residents to the plans of the Government of Maharashtra and Indian Railways to upgrade the rail infrastructure and, in the process, displace around 20,000 households. Initially, informal dwellings were to be demolished as part of the infrastructure upgrading project however, following protests to the Indian High Court, and support from the World Bank, which had made a substantial loan of capital towards the scheme, a resettlement and rehabilitation policy was established and included in the development scheme. The alliance of the NGOs SPARC (Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres), Mahila Milan with the community based organisations National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF) and the Railway Slum Dwellers Federation (RSDF) were delegated responsibility within the rail upgrading programme for the enumeration of households and the allocation of alternative housing and compensation. While according to Patel et al, this project marked an important change in the attitude of the Indian Railway agency, who previously saw rail side shack dwellers as ‘encroachers’ without rights, it was incorporated and funded by the state as project strand within a large-scale urban development programme.

For low income communities, co-production is significantly different to more abstract rights-based protests or standardised forms of user participation in development projects. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) suggest that community support
during episodes of contention, when focused on specific issues of concern, may ‘tail-off’ after a period of initial protest unless it ‘shifts’ in scale and gains traction in a political arena. The studies of co-production, including Lam (1996), Patel et al (2002), Joshi and Moore (2004) and Miltin (2008) highlight how co-production is focused on the achievement of concrete objectives, but that these activities are framed within a long-term effort to engage the state on issues important to communities. This also distinguishes co-production from Cornwall’s (2004: 2) negative description of ‘invited’ spaces of participation, which are “transplanted into institutional landscapes in which entrenched relations of dependency, fear and disprivilege undermine the possibility for the kind of deliberative decision making they are to foster.” In the example of Patel et al, new spaces were created, through difficult negotiation with the state, within an overall development programme. While an ‘invited’ space was created, to address the relocation of rail-side dwellers, this engagement generated outcomes that produced a wider set of benefits for low income communities and state agencies.

The example of Mumbai (Patel et al, 2002) highlights how organised groups of low income communities seek to create opportunities for engagement, in this case with a reluctant state, in order to address specific issues or objectives. In engaging the state, communities demonstrate their capabilities in ways that change how urban low income communities are perceived. While the actions of community partners in Mumbai is considered by Roy (2011) as an act of complicity with the neoliberal state, it serves to highlight how communities develop strategies to gain access to the hierarchies of power, which are more readily available to middle and higher income urban residents (de Wit and Berner, 2009). It also demonstrates, given these divergent perspectives, the difficulty of identifying true intent and unambiguous outcomes within complex social and political contexts. Co-production, as an object of collaboration is a coordinative mechanism where, as Bovaird (2007: 857) observes, “multiple stakeholders agree to commit resources in exchange for commitments from others within (at least partially) self-organised systems for negotiating appropriate rules and norms.”
2.2.2 Generating Benefits for Citizens and the State

Analysis of the selected case studies suggests that co-production conditionally requires the generation of specific outcomes for constituent actors. These studies all indicate the importance of co-production addressing individual need, as well as generating collective benefits, to demonstrate the value of co-production. For individuals and communities benefits include improved access to sanitation, as in the example of the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia (Mitlin, 2008) and lower incidents of crime within in a neighbourhood, following the establishment of community patrols (Parks et al, 1981). For the state, benefits may include raising their ability to deliver against statutory responsibilities, such as making the delivery of water infrastructure affordable within existing budgets (Ostrom, 1996); delivery of core policy goals, such as participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre (Abers, 1998); or improved outcomes for children in deprived areas, as in the Sure Start project (Bovaird, 2007).

Mitlin (2008) discusses the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), which was initiated in the informal settlements of Karachi in 1982 as a community-led initiative to install a gravity driven sewer system (see also Hasan, 2001 and Zaidi, 2001). In its early stages OPP could not be described as a co-production project as the state refused to support connection of locally funded waste conduits into the main city sewer network. Also, community leaders rejected public match funding in order to retain local control of activity. However, with the success of the community-led project, Karachi City Council agreed to link the system to the main network because they came to see this as an affordable way to extend public infrastructure and address very poor levels of public health in the Orangi community. For both sets of actors, there is a positive outcome through improvements to public health, but the justifications for initial involvement, and the targets for specific outputs from co-productive activity, were different. This is significant because, as for OPP, with state refusing to initially support the construction of sewers, it was vital for the community to identify and mobilise around specific and achievable benefits.
Within projects of co-production the benefits are divisible, related to the specific concerns of citizen participants and state organisation, while also being synergistic generating outcomes that would have otherwise been unavailable outside of co-production. This is reflected by Marschall (2004: 233) who says that “co-production depends upon the existence of meaningful opportunities for citizen participation, as well as structures and procedures that facilitate the flow of information between citizens and government” (emphasis added). Meaningfulness is created by communities and the state when they take a risk in supporting a new relationship that carries with it some cost. Bovaird (2007: 856) identifies:

“[c]o-production means that service users and professionals must develop mutual relationships in which both parties take risks – the service user has to trust professional advice and support, but the professional has to be prepared to trust the decisions and behaviours of service users and the communities in which they live rather than dictate them.”

The creation of mutual benefits and responsibilities is central to the success of co-production. Lam (1996: 17) in his study, points out that for “a co-production process to succeed, incentives must be in place so that regular producers (the irrigation officials) are motivated to serve the interest of consumer producers (the farmers). If the payoffs to irrigation officials are somewhat dependent on how well they serve the farmers, the officials are more likely to take the interests of the farmers into consideration.” Where these incentives are not present, the stability of co-production relies on pre-existing relationships between the community and state actors. The study by Workman (2011) emphasises the importance of reciprocity as a key factor in the development and the maintenance of co-production. Based on contrasting case studies, Workman shows how the creation of bonds of mutual responsibility and censure between the community associations and Makeni City Council, in Sierra Leone, can have an important impact on the success of co-production. This is important both in building social and political capital between co-productive actors, but also as a motivator for effective collective action. Workman (2011: 60) states, “when local public goods are provided through co-production by local councils and interest-based associations, the dynamics of the
co-productive relationship are a critical determinant of the quality of the public goods provision.”

2.2.3 Mobilising Co-productive Inputs

A further necessary condition for co-production appears to be associated with the organisational capacity of actors. Based on the analysis of the sample studies, while modality of participation in co-production differs between communities and the state, they are equally necessary as participants. For citizen groups, co-production can occur where individuals (and their interests) are mobilised as collective agents and are able to represent their interests to the state. In all examined cases the creation of federated groups of low income community residents (Appadurai, 2001; Patel, 2002; Mitlin, 2008); the formation of village committees (Tsai, 2011); or trades union interest groups (Joshi and Moore, 2004; Workman, 2011) enables the alignment of interests, which can be subsequently introduced into discussions with the state. According to Patel and Bartlett (2009), it would have been impossible for railway shack dwellers (in Patel et al, 2002) to initially challenge and then engage the state without having first organised and collected data on the demographics of the population affected infrastructure improvements. The mobilisation of poor communities both creates a scale of interests that becomes visible to the state and establishes collective efficacy.

While mobilisation of communities can build individual and collective agency (Howes, 1997; Bebbington and Carroll, 2002; Appadurai, 2004; Mitlin, 2004), it is not without problems. The term agency is used here, reflecting Amartya Sen, as an individual’s “ability to act on behalf of what he or she values or has reason to value” (Alkire, 2008: 2), while also cognisant of Giddens (1984) structuration theory of human agency being composed as a continuous form of social conduct. For urban residents living in poverty, working collectively to overcome institutionalised barriers, establish savings schemes (d’Cruz and Mudimu, 2013) or otherwise exercise agency, carries risks of creating new forms of exploitation (Coelho et al, 2010). Robins (2010) for example highlights how social movements can be
‘hijacked’ by local or national actors that see groups as resources to be exploited. Similarly, Robins identifies the risk of leaders using group activity to further individual or sectional interests.

For the state, co-production can offer an additional source of financial input (Mitlin and Muller, 2004); knowledge (McFarlane, 2004); and capacity (Patel et al, 2002) to enable the delivery of statutory responsibilities or policy goals. The form of organisational capacity of the state is necessarily different to communities because the state is corporate and has a defined legitimacy to act on issues of services, public goods and development. The state, in various forms, may lack the capacity to act, or face internal conflicts that limit its coherence as a public authority, but it is established both in law and as a key social entity. A necessary condition for state involvement in co-production is securing political support and, through this, directing bureaucratic systems towards co-production. In Abers (1998) and Workman (2011) political priority was given to co-productive activity to ensure both the support of officials and also appropriate allocation of resources. Here political coverage is a necessary condition for the involvement of city authorities in collaborative activity with community based organisations. A further example of state initiative towards co-production is seen in Joshi and Moore (2004), where the state permits the Ghana Road Transport Union to collect taxes to obtain revenue, but more significantly, to secure a political ally. This reflects a political decision to devolve responsibility for governance of road transport operators, where the state identified an opportunity for financial and political gain.

A counter example is found in Ostrom’s (1996) Nigerian case study, where the state does not support co-productive inputs into rural education delivery. Ostrom underlines how a rejection of community input into the delivery of primary education removes the opportunity for co-production. While this has a negative impact on the effective delivery of education, it reflects a policy position by the state to preserve control, within existing administrative structures. In this context the communities are required either to withdraw from spaces occupied by the state or develop parallel systems of delivery using their own resources. This is also
evident in Uganda with the introduction of donor funded Universal Primary Education. The implementation of this programme has included the dismantling of parent – teacher associations that previously supported and monitored schools, in favour of empowered head teachers who report directly to government. Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2013: 26), citing Dauda (2004), report that this has led “to a significant reduction of local accountability and ownership” that has included “less-poor families” withdrawing their children and support, which in turn has undermined the resource base available to schools.

The formation of organised groups creates the capacity to address gaps in existing delivery arrangements. Thus for Patel et al (2002), the community organisations were able to utilise the human capacity and local knowledge of rail side communities to deliver a resettlement programme in a way that the state could not. Organised community capacity has a flexibility to be shaped to address dysfunctional delivery infrastructure or to complement state funded services in ways that are unavailable to statutorily defined public agencies. To realise this degree of co-ordination requires willingness and significant management input from both community organisations and state agencies to establish the structures of joint working.

2.2.4 Releasing Resources for Co-production

A final necessary condition is suggested as the availability of resources, in various forms, to contribute to co-production. This can be funding that is generated through community savings schemes (Mitlin, 2008); organised inputs of labour (Parks et al, 1981; Tsai, 2011); knowledge (Patel et al, 2002; Joshi and Moore, 2004) or public funding allocated by the state as a contribution to a co-productive project (Abers, 1998). The form and processes through which resources are mobilised differs between citizens and state actors, but remains a necessary condition for co-production. For Joshi and Moore (2004), funding and organisational capacity is contributed by businesses to the intelligence function of the Karachi police, with small amounts of match funding being offered by the state. A key feature of this
example is the permission granted by the state for businesses to be involved in and
directly resource a sensitive public function. Labour and materials are offered by
residents of Recife towards the construction of condominial water and sewage
infrastructure (Ostrom 1996); Tsai (2011) identifies financial contributions and
labour inputs as key for the delivery of village public infrastructure in China; and
Mitlin (2008) the use of community based savings schemes to meet the cost of
incremental housing construction and service infrastructure.

For the state, the form of resource contribution towards co-production can be
direct funding the delivery of an agreed outcome, for example the resettlement of
railway shack dwellers (Patel et al, 2002); an in-kind contribution of land (Mitlin,
2008); the use of equipment (Workman, 2011); or the permission to act (Lam, 1996;
Bovaird, 2007). While superficially the state may lack both human and financial
capacity to contribute towards the provision of services, they have (given the
political will) the ability to identify and allocate resources. Where a co-productive
relationship has been established, along with the reciprocity and trust described
above, the state can provide a resource to make co-production viable. Workman
(2011) provides a useful counterpoint to this with the example of the Makeni
abattoir where capital was provided by the state towards the construction of a
slaughterhouse, but poor budgeting and a lack of revenue funding for maintenance
made the facility unusable within a short period of time. This highlights that the
availability of resources must to be consistent with the form of agreement, as a
single investment or ongoing revenue commitment. Where the state, or indeed the
community, is unable to maintain reciprocal agreements, following Workman’s
example, co-production is unlikely to be sustained.

The state can, as in the case of participatory budgeting (PB) (Abers, 1998; Souza,
2001; Baiocchi et al, 2011), have a positive role in extending the boundary of
decision making to formally include low income communities. Devas (2004: 117)
describes the stated purpose of PB to “widen participation in budgetary decisions
to include the poor majority who have hitherto been excluded or kept in a state of
clientelistic dependence by the political system”. The participation of local residents
in budgeting processes relied, according to Abers (1998) in Porto Alegre, on the mobilisation of communities to argue for investment in local service infrastructure and social provision through PB processes. She states that the demonstration effect of seeing investments taking place in neighbouring areas became a strong incentive for communities to become involved. While PB has been critiqued for its lack of challenge to the politics and institutions of decision making and the relatively limited proportion of city budgets made available to community influence (Devas, 2004), the process is thought to have defined spaces of negotiation that have enabled the poor to interact with state authorities in ways that can reinforce their agency and position them as active partners in development (Avritzer, 2006; Mitlin, 2008; Baiocchi et al, 2011).

2.2.5 Sufficiency

Institutional context is important because it determines whether the necessary conditions for co-production can be sufficiently met. As identified above, even where the necessary conditions are (separately) present, they need to be activated towards a particular goal. Based on the selected studies, this requires leadership, vision, persistence and the structures to support the delivery of co-production, both within the community and within the organisations of the state. It also requires that the institutional environment does not obstruct either mobilisation of communities nor adaptive practices within the state. Following Brousseau and Raynaud (2011), adaptations visible in local arrangements signal the presence of institutional environments that may be receptive to change. While it has not been possible to incorporate a comparative element to this research, there are a number of indications from the sampled studies that could be investigated in further research (see Chapter Nine, section 9.5.1).

Where necessary conditions are present and they have been activated to create, at least for discrete projects, sufficient capacity and interdependency between organised community groups and the state then, as based on the selected studies,

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4 The comparative methodology designed by Baiocchi et al (2011) to study the impact of PB in Brazil, offers a potential model to investigate variation in contextual conditions for co-production.
co-production can occur. A further characteristic of sufficiency found in the case studies, is the establishment of a long-term dialogue that helps communities and state organisations understand each other better. Workman (2011) describes the instrumental function of reciprocity to overcome inherent caution by both state and communities in stepping out their normal roles. This is achieved iteratively and experientially over a long period and through the creation of spaces of collaboration. Lam (1996) points to sustained periods of collaboration contributing to the development of partnership between communities and the state that achieves, within the limits of the co-productive project, a relatively symmetric relationship. Appadurai (2001: 33) highlights the importance of “precedent-setting” as an overt strategy of NGOs and community leaders in India. This establishes the cumulative impact of small adaptations, new practices and growing relationships that demonstrate the capacity of organised low income communities and provide an evidential base to encourage the state to extend the involvement of communities in development activity.

Critics of co-productive approaches, including de Wit and Berner (2009), emphasise the limitations and fragile nature of collaboration between community groups and the state in delivering sustainable development outcomes. This appears to be in part correct, for example where there is diminishing commitment on the part of either the state or community groups (as in Workman, 2011), which leads to co-productive initiatives failing. However, the experience of community organisations delivering co-production is one that, as Satterthwaite et al (2011) indicate, is fraught with difficulty requiring patience and flexibility to establish meaningful relationships with local government. Where clear objectives are established and support is mobilised, co-production can be used to release latent community resources. Within this, according to Satterthwaite et al (2011), it is vital that low income community organisations also develop their own agenda and support networks in order to smooth what may be erratic relations with the state.

As with the case studies of co-production discussed above, low income communities adopt pragmatic approaches to creating spaces of dialogue with the
Alongside strategies for everyday coping, there are also ‘invented’ spaces (Miraftab, 2009: 39) created through the “collective actions of the poor that directly confront authorities and challenge the status quo.” While the form of confrontation will be contextually specific, in relation to the risks of violence and retribution by the state, it can include progressive interventions targeting the operation of systems of urban governance. Gaventa (2004: 27) argues for the transformative possibilities of citizen engagement in local governance, under certain conditions, recognising that “participation can become effective only as it engages with issues of institutional change.” Decisions on the form of participation and creation of ‘invented’ spaces are conditioned contextually and made in light of community experience of the state.

Building the collective capacity of community based organisations enables grassroots organisations to be resilient in establishing relations with the state, but it is also necessary to move towards a synergy between public and private realms, as proposed by Peter Evans (1996). Evans defines synergy as “mutually reinforcing relations between governments and groups of engaged citizens” (ibid: 1119). This suggests that sufficiency, beyond short term material gains, includes a deepening of capacity and influence on institutional structures and behaviours. Achieving small scale and incremental improvements in livelihoods and environmental conditions contributes to the efficacy of community based organisations to both cope with the exigencies of relations with public agencies and move towards engagement that are pro-active rather than defensive, as suggested by Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014). The following section reflects on this issue looking specifically at co-production through theories of institutional change. Building on the definitions outlined in Chapter One, the following provides a critical examination of co-production as a change function.

2.3 Co-production and Institutional Change

For co-production to make a meaningful contribution to the challenges of urban development, as envisioned by Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) at the beginning of this Chapter, it needs to connect with and affect institutions. As defined in Chapter
One, institutions include informal cultures, practices and socially informed behaviour and formal institutions as written rules, regulations and laws that govern the actions of people (North, 1990; Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Ostrom, 2005; Leftwich and Sen, 2010). Following Gore (1993), Cousins (1997) and Bratton (2007) formal and informal are not separate realms, but coexist and are mutually constitutive; operating at multiple levels to shape the beliefs and behaviour of individuals and organisations. This implies that where co-production occurs it will take place contextually within institutional systems to connect community interests with those of state actors. The modality of co-productive practice can take a variety of forms to reflect the prevailing institutional environment. To impact on the distribution of services and the exercise of power in urban governance, practices developed through co-production must become institutionalised to operate beyond a project basis.

Douglass North (1990) points to the pervasive importance of cultural values, which underpin the design and application of formal institutions. He states that the “subjective perceptions of [social] actors are not just culturally derived but are continually being modified by experience that is filtered through existing (culturally determined) mental constructs” (North, 1990: 138). While North applies this statement to changing transactional costs in the market, it also indicates firstly, an important iterative process where the operation of institutions change in real time and secondly, a gradual adjustment of the institutions themselves, that includes revisions to rules articulated through institutionally defined arrangements and organisational behaviours. North indicates the importance of adaptive capacity within institutional systems as a central feature of successful economic development. The following section will explore the issue of adaptive institutional change by critically considering how co-production affects the organisational behaviour and formal systems of rules governing the allocation of services, land and housing.
2.3.1  Adaptive Institutional Change

Co-productive approaches are adopted by organised low income communities where institutions severely disadvantage their interests (Mitlin, 2008) or where the state is unable to meet its responsibilities by providing services or preventing exclusions (Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014). Self-interest is a strong incentive to mobilise at a community level and to develop self-directed actions that compensate for the lack of state provision of basic services. The co-productive form of these actions is contextually responsive, but typically geared toward solutions that reinforce the functionality of institutionalised provision. This reflects an understanding that the systems of authority and decision making that govern the distribution of basic services are partial and politicised (see Swyngedouw, 2004; 2009) and may function for wealthy urban residents, while at the same time exclude people in poverty. The key concern for low income communities is therefore to reverse the discursive, material or political factors that reproduce exclusions in ways that make institutions functional ‘for them’.

Ostrom and Ahn (2000: 18, quoting Ostrom, 1992) identify that when institutions are dysfunctional “individuals may devise their own working rules that ‘assign de facto rights and duties that are contrary to de jure rights and duties’” (emphasis in original). From the perspective of communities, conciliatory approaches are logical because their weak economic and social position provides them with a limited range of alternative options (Sugden, 1989). Bebbington et al (2010: 1319) identify that where there are asymmetric power relations, social movements are “more concerned to gain concessions from, rather than transformations of, the state”. Co-production therefore, provides a vehicle for engagement of state organisations in a way that creates spaces to pursue institutional adaptation, outside of direct confrontation.

Community based organisations seeking concessions to the practices of the state, are criticised for their inherent conservatism in failing to challenge inequitable policies (Roy, 2011) or for allowing their interests to be co-opted (Cooke, 2004a). However, it can be argued that taking a position within existing institutional
frameworks, where this appears to offer the best possible return, is not necessarily negative or passive, but reflects a tendency of people to “adopt rules [and positions] which are analogous to rules with which they are already familiar” (Kingston and Caballero, 2009: 164). By focusing on the adaptation of existing rules, low income communities are able to manage risk, using their experience to predict the likely response of the state to various strategies. For people in poverty acting in ways that reduce potential for violent retribution is a key survival strategy. Examples of co-production suggest that a typical response of community based groups is to engage in ways that are consistent with, rather than in opposition to, prevailing institutions. This is illustrated below in statement from the Indian community based organisation SPARC, one of the founders of SDI, on collaborative and iterative approaches to securing rights and benefits for the low income communities.

“Then, as now, we were faced with alternative courses of action. We could have stormed the barricades and joined protest movements, but we chose otherwise. Instead, SPARC undertook a census of the pavement dwellers and organised them. The mobilisation of the community, and patient advocacy on their behalf, led to a change in policy a decade later. A change that recognised pavement dwellers as legitimate citizens and placed them on par with slum dwellers in terms of their right to be resettled. That policy is now being implemented and, for the last decade, pavement dwellers who have fulfilled certain conditions have enjoyed protection from demolitions.” (Mitlin and Patel 2005: 3)

Also, from the perspective of the state, co-productive approaches that build the capacity for the delivery of services and enhance their legitimacy without challenging their authority or status is attractive. Houtzager (2005: 16) referring to Skocpol (1992) suggests that state actors are more likely to adopt policies that are low cost or have limited requirements for institutional adaptation. A lack of functionality in prevailing institutions both weakens the institution itself as well as the organisational entity that has responsibility for implementing it. Adrian Leftwich 2010: 97) points out that “institutions will only work effectively where they are perceived to be both procedurally and substantively legitimate. If not, there will be avoidance, evasion and deviation wherever possible, or they will simply fall into
abeyance or be corrupted.” Allowing that some institutions may only serve the interests of elite actors, co-production provides a way to re-orient institutionalised practice. This, for low income communities, can address weaknesses in functionality and, where the state collaborates, contribute to re-building legitimacy. Thus, adaptations and small scale innovations can be seen as significant both for communities and for the state in creating functional arrangements in circumstances where institutions are not ‘fit for purpose’ or where there is a lack of capacity to ensure effective operation of rules.

As described in Chapter One, the state is not conceived here as a unified source of authority, but following Migdal (1994), has a dynamic presence within society. This is matched, as Evans (1995) shows, by significant variation in the internal functioning of state organisations, which determines the capacity to engage in collaborative action. For organisations of the state, just as de Wit and Berner (2009) critically comment for communities, the motivation to engage in co-productive activity may well be short-term and focused obtaining political or financial gain. If, as suggested in section 2.2 above, different motivations provide a conditional characteristic for co-production, then what becomes important is the impact of collaborative behaviour on institutions. Houtzager (2005: 15) suggests that the fact of interaction has an important “institutional effect” on the way in which state organisation engage in social relationships. This suggests that co-productive relationships may affect the form of social participation, particularly with low income communities, where relations are governed formally, and at arm’s length, through institutions.

Mitlin (2008) and Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) highlight the significance of co-production as a strategy to address the exclusion of low income populations who may be considered to be ‘out of place’ when seen through, for example, formal planning policy. In urban contexts where ‘illegal settlers’, ‘squatters’ and ‘informal communities’ are effectively outside of the social contract with the state (and are more broadly considered to be illegitimate), they can be subject to state action that increases their vulnerability (McFarlane, 2012). Through constructing co-productive relationships with the state, communities are able to create what Searle (2005)
describes as deontic relationships – mutual obligations, responsibilities and authority to act. Searle (2005: 10) states “just about all institutional structures are matters of deontic power” and further that the formation of obligation affects the behaviours of people who share bonds of mutual responsibility. As a form of ‘empowered participatory governance’ (Fung and Wright, 2003), co-production offers the opportunity for actors, and their actions, to become legitimised: recognised and documented in ways that can lead to institutional adaptation. Through collaborative and co-productive relationships both state and community actors have the opportunity to construct an alternative perspective on institutions and to build bonds of trust that are important for adaptive change as demonstrated by Ostrom and Ahn (2007) and Workman (2011).

2.3.2 Creating New Spaces for Dialogue

To create the forms of deontic relations suggested by Searle (2005) requires overcoming inherent institutionalised resistance of political and bureaucratic systems and the negative representations of people in poverty. Establishing new relationships, through co-production, is made difficult where state actors perceive a challenge to elite interest (IDS, 2010). States may see active civil society as a threat to the authority national government, as in Zimbabwe, and seek to control challenge through violence and intimidation (Moyo et al, 2000; Sachikonye, 2011).

Within communities too, there are significant difficulties in mobilising residents of low income settlements towards projects of collective interest. De Wit and Berner (2009: 928) take a view that building collective action on the “basis of horizontal ties and common interests does not appear to work well in most places” and is least effective in poorer communities. Thompson and Tapscott (2010: 6) highlight, that even where there is a common experience of systematic discrimination, low income communities may not “coalesce into clear patterns of mobilization and resistance of either the organised or unorganised variety.”

Despite these challenges, a number of studies have indicated that creating spaces for dialogue and engagement is vital to changing state perceptions of the people in poverty and ultimately affecting institutions. Houtzager et al (2007: 9) find, in their
study of Mexico City and Sao Paulo that the quality of citizen relationship with government is shaped, over the long-term, through involvement in processes involving political actors. Similarly, Mcloughlin and Batley (2012: 14) referring to Batley (2011) and Rose (2011), found for the production of public goods and services that “effective and enduring – less brittle – forms of collaboration between government and non-government service providers seem to arise where the relationship has evolved rather than been created.”

Establishing spaces for discussion and negotiation between community groups and state organisations is therefore vital to both building co-productive relationships and achieving institutional change. Discourse, according to Schmidt (2008: 310), performs a range of roles in maintaining and operating institutions, including a coordinative function to elaborate and justify policy and programmatic ideas. As defined in Chapter One, discursive institutionalism (as championed by Schmidt 2008; 2010) is positioned here as part of a wider sociological understanding of institutions. This recognises the constitutive importance of ideas and language in shaping social action and influencing institutional change. Discourse provides the framework to locate people and action within systems of power and social relations and is an ideational driver to affect the reproduction and adaptation of rules. Agency, legitimacy and authority is produced through the communication of ideas and represented in speech, text and the interaction between people.

In order to involve the state in dialogue on co-production, community groups need to understand the epistemological position they are entering and “fashion meaningful accounts of themselves and the issues at hand in order to motivate and legitimate their efforts” (McAdam, 1996: 339). For individuals and low income groups engaging in development, overcoming institutionalised barriers in the form of administrative systems that delimit “who can speak, from what point of view, with what authority, and according to what criteria of expertise” (Escobar, 1997, quoted in Kothari, 2005: 427) provides a major challenge. Before institutions can be affected and before voices will be heard, people in poverty need to be accepted discursively as capable agents in order to position themselves and their interests (Appadurai, 2004; Bebbington et al, 2010).
The struggle to become partners in development is illustrated in the study by Patel et al (2002), discussed in section 2.2. This exemplifies the efforts of low income communities to minimise the negative impact of a major urban development project. The alliance of NGOs and community organisations used their unique knowledge of the demographic and social structure of railway community populations and trusted relationships within low income groups to negotiate on behalf of households living alongside the railways. The formation of urban poor Federations provided visibility to the shack dwellers and, through the NSDF, demonstrable experience and capacity for the delivery of local development activity. While the process of negotiation was often fraught with setbacks, which required community organisations to lobby and formally challenge decisions of the state organisations through courts and international donors, Patel et al (2002: 171) present this case study as a positive example of “grassroots democracy in action.” They were able to build on the collective structures established within the community, along with tactical use of national laws and pressure through the World Bank’s contractual requirements on the resettlement of populations, to negotiate a unique role and partnership with the state on this project.

Coaffee and Healey (2003) and Healey (2006) examine, in the context of UK urban regeneration policy, how community based innovations in local governance arrangements can change the institutionalised practices of local government in service delivery and economic development. They are interested in how innovation can “transform the mainstream rather than just incorporate new ideas and practices in ways which neutralise threats to established practices and the various power relations embedded in them” (Coaffee and Healey, 2003: 1983). Healey (2006: 303) draws from Anthony Giddens (1984) analysis of the relationship between structure and agency (structuration) to identify the flows of interaction that “shape the materialities and identities of actors and create the structural forces which they experience.” This is represented through the cumulative impact of engagement in institutionalised practices from an initial discursive form to affect the routines of governance. This, when connected to sociological theories of institutional change, suggests a causal relationship between discourse and the
adaptation of formal systems of routinized governance, through the adoption of new managerial vocabularies and practices.

Figure 2.1, illustrates an idealised process of engagement leading to institutional change, based on Coaffee and Healey (2003). This highlights how organised groups initiate discursive engagement with the state in order to begin a dialogue and overcome bureaucratic obstacles to change. This is formalised through the development of projects, or ‘specific episodes’ of engagement, to demonstrate the capacity and efficacy of community-based action that in turn impact on the behaviours and institutional practices of the state. This formal engagement can lead to co-production, where there are structure inputs into localised delivery affecting decision making and allocation policy. This impacts on governance cultures and ultimately contributes to the adaptive development of new policies and formal regulation.

**Figure 2.1**
**Idealised Process of Engagement Leading to Institutional Change**

Source: Figure based on Coaffee and Healey (2003)

While figure 2.1 is presented as linear process, to emphasise the steady creation of relationships and capacity as suggested by Houtzager et al (2007) and McLoughlin and Batley (2012), institutional change, reflecting the conceptual framework shown
in Chapter One (figure 1.1), is conditioned by a complex web of interdependent factors. Bebbington (2013: 6), in the context of his analysis of natural resource extraction, suggests that “the reproduction of institutions takes a great deal of work” and that in this effort a route may be found to catalyse institutional change. On the same theme, Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 4) argue that “institutional change often occurs precisely when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways.” Returning to the example of Patel et al (2002), by providing a co-ordination and leadership capacity for resettlement of rail side shack dwellers, organised communities created a space for action within a state-led development scheme. This was achieved in part by adopting repertoires of project delivery familiar to state organisations, but also by providing a source of capacity and expertise that was unavailable within state agencies.

Opportunity can also be created when the state invites community based organisations to participate in development projects. Mitlin and Muller (2004) highlight a co-productive housing programme in Windhoek, Namibia where the state, recognising its lack of capacity to meet the demand for housing, sought a partnership with the community to provide affordable housing. Mitlin and Muller (2004) identify that this reflected both a strong political commitment, grounded in the principles of the national liberation movement (as a shared cultural identity), and also as a pragmatic strategy to manage the cost of urbanisation. This is an example of where co-production, as Mitlin (2008: 349) points out, creates “openings for citizen involvement in areas that have been reserved for the state.” While the approach could be challenged by critics such as Cooke (2004a) as a form of co-optation, it has provided an avenue for low income communities to establish an active engagement in the day-to-day practicalities of service provision (Mitlin, 2008). This illustrates the potential role of co-production as a means of engagement with the state, but moreover repositioning communities to use co-production to demonstrate their capacity to contribute to development.
2.3.3 Co-production as Change Function

Drawing on Williamson’s (2000) institutional hierarchy, as presented in Chapter One, the practices of co-production can be linked to each institutional level, as illustrated in figure 2.2. Co-production can be framed to resonate with established societal values, giving legitimacy to demands and proposed actions. This is significant because as Kingston and Caballero (2009) citing Libecap (1989) note, the strength of connection to embedded institutions affects how potential rule changes are perceived by decision makers and therefore their likely acceptance. For co-production to overcome the embedded resistance inherent in institutional structures, as highlighted in section 2.3.2, new approaches and demands need to appear to be legitimate. The practices of co-production can be tailored, and borrow legitimacy from, normative values such as the basic human need for shelter, or aspects of national identity, which may be particularly powerful in recently independent countries where narratives of struggle frame political discourse.

Figure 2.2
Co-Production and Williamson’s Institutional Hierarchy

Source: Figure based on Williamson (2000)
Co-production can also be located to address specific organisational deficiencies found in discrete services areas or in market determined processes represented in level four of Williamson’s hierarchy. The tactical application of co-production enables specific issues to be addressed that add value to the operation of public services. When presented as problem solving or, as Fung and Wright (2003: 17) suggest as a form of “deliberative solution generation”, co-production provides a framework for negotiation. Co-production when considered within this framework provides a participative and discursive arena for social actors to engage with each other in ways that may fall outside of normal organisational practice.

When the institutional implications of co-production are considered, and following Mahoney and Thelen (2010), the processes of discussion and interaction can lead to new forms of operation and establish patterns of managerial behaviour that become standardised, replacing or adapting previous practices. Adaptation is aided where new arrangements are consistent with embedded institutions; being more easily absorbed into the ‘organisational routines’ of operational staff (Knudsen, 2008). This creates, over time, the space for new institutionalised behaviours to be normalised and adopted as responses to frequently occurring problems and delivery requirements. This reflects the conclusions of Kingston and Caballero (2009: 156) who state “institutional change is usually incremental since it is often easier to achieve consensus on small adjustments than to affect major changes to existing rules.” This is reinforced by Knudsen (2008: 126) who notes “when an individual finds a satisfactory answer to a problem that frequently arises, there is a tendency to repeat the behaviour or thought.”

At an organisational level, stability of operation and the availability of problem solving techniques have an important impact on the expectations of actors and their regularised behaviours (Knudsen, 2008). When grounded in, and authorised through, the managerial structures of an organisation, adaptive practices may be replicated beyond the specific area where the innovation has first taken place, with routines providing the “containers of information that can be transferred in selection processes” (Knudsen, 2008: 147). For example, within a local government setting, if a non-standard practice is adopted to achieve a specified goal and if this
exception has been authorised through political and managerial structures, the practice may spread within the organisation, if an operational benefit is evident from its adoption. This process is confirmed by Hall (2010), who observes that once actors have adjusted their institutionalised ‘habits’ (practices) they become more interested in further reforms that enhance the new position and become reluctant to revert to former arrangements.

This suggests that an iterative approach to institutional change can be effective when small changes take place within a wider set of ‘rules’, without destabilising the institution per se. This is possible theoretically where, as Kingston and Caballero (2009) point out, there are multiple points of equilibria within a process of ‘evolutionary’ institutional change. This could also be theorised as a ‘transition phase’ where both ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutions operate simultaneously, while ‘new’ rules become embedded and reproduced through application, as illustrated in figure 2.3. The idea of a transitional phase is consistent with a sociological model of institutions embedded in social environments, where change occurs in response to cognitive shifts in how actors perceive institutionalised situations (Peters, 2005 citing Berger and Luckman, 1967). This contrasts with historical and rational choice versions of institutional theory, which emphasis path dependency and jarring transitions generated by shocks or direct competition between elite groups (Peters, 2005).

**Figure 2.3**

**Institutional Transition**
Conceptualising a transition phase allows for the identification of spaces geared to resolving dysfunction in institutional systems. This, as suggested above, could operate through the development of co-productive projects and creation of exceptions that do not overtly conflict with existing rules. This is important because as Barley and Tolbert (1997) point out “enacting scripts that encode institutional principles ... [allows] actors [to] simply behave according to their perception of the way things are.” This suggests that organised low-income communities are more likely to realise the cumulative benefits of small changes to institutional practices over a long period of time than be successful in a single challenge to prevailing practices.

Brousseau and Raynaud (2011: 65) theorise a process whereby locally devised and voluntary “institutions endogenously turn into more generic and mandatory ones”. While not all local agreements become formalised or ‘solidified’, co-productive practices that become established have the potential to become more generally adopted and applied. Emerging institutional forms ‘compete’ with existing practices and where new arrangements are considered to be more effective, across a number of fields, they replace existing institutions. The transition from one institutional condition to another can take various forms. Bowles and Naidu (2006: 3) state:

“[w]hile many institutional transitions are implemented as the deliberate outcome of bargaining among a small number of elite groups, some are more decentralised, with changes in practices occurring informally among a large number of private actors that are later confirmed by changes in formal governance structures.”

The implication of this approach is that outside of elite bargaining, growing weight of support for a particular institutional change stimulates a transition where the new institution will come to the fore to replace the old rules. While this is consistent with sociological ideas of the evolution of institutions, it perhaps underestimates the difficulty of overcoming the embedded authority of elite groups to oppose change. Even where there is a significantly large popular support for rule changes, adaptation can be resisted by relatively small but powerful elite. Robinson (1998) suggests that the difficulty of initiating institutional change is multiplied by
the complexity of motivations of key actors. Even where there is economic opportunity, change may be rejected by politically dominant elites “if such changes imply diminished relative political power” (Evans, 2005: 101).

For community based organisations the ability to strategically target areas where there is scope and the prospect of support for institutional change is vital. This is an issue explored empirically through the case study of Harare to examine how community based groups build traction with more powerful and institutionally supported organisations of the state. An example of the strategy involved can be seen in Cress and Snow’s (1996; 2000) analysis of NGOs in the USA. Here groups are focused on gaining increased financial and policy support for homeless populations. While set within a wider set of housing rights issues, the strategy used by successful NGOs, according to Cress and Snow, includes producing a diagnosis of problems narratively coherent to the policies of the state, which is used to negotiate a forward action plan that includes NGOs as delivery agents. This resonates with Kingston and Caballero (2009), who suggest that in situations where there is an asymmetry of power, agents will chose to take an adaptive approach and devise new rules that are analogous to rules with which they are already familiar. The frame, as well as new rules, is crafted utilising signals from the state on the limits of acceptable adaptation that will be accommodated within the scope of managerial practice. This, while not necessarily isomorphic, is grounded in a tactical analysis of the limits of action by non-state actors.

In many contexts globally, informal settlements have been established in response to the lack of affordable housing options (Gilbert, 2007) to become ubiquitous in cities of the Global South (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2013). While residents of low income communities may have an appreciation of the importance of planning and building regulations for the creation of safe and sustainable settlements, the shortage of affordable land and high cost of building materials result in illegal settlement and the construction of unsafe dwellings. There are many examples of
state initiated demolition of illegal settlements,\(^5\) including the notorious *Operation Murambatsvina* in Zimbabwe,\(^6\) but more typically settlements slowly become formalised as householders incrementally improve their dwellings and environments, as in Moser’s (2009) account of Guayaquil.\(^7\) Incremental and co-productive approaches to settlement upgrading are promoted at an international policy level (Cities Alliance, 2012; UN-Habitat, 2013) and through networks of community based organisations (SDI, 2013). This is intended to generate new co-productive approaches to development, whereby existing rules are adapted and enabled to provide functional responses to the pressures of urbanisation.

A key feature of this approach, and one that fits with institutional theory, is the processes of negotiation inherent to co-production. Deliberative approaches to problem solving create space to bring community and state organisations together to jointly deliver a series of commonly defined outputs and, in the process, address dysfunctional rule systems and practices. Through a critical engagement with existing rules, as a central part of establishing co-production, weaknesses and potential improvements to institutions become evident. This corresponds with Hall (2010), who considers institutions to be the “instruments [...] actors use to negotiate the complexity of the world.” Beyond the specific achievement of project based activity, the relationship and experience of working collaboratively is formative; opening up a range of alternative approaches to development delivery. Institutional change in these contexts is not spontaneous but, as suggested by Ostrom and Ahn (2007), occurs cumulatively as practices ‘that work’ become obvious. Examples of this steady adaptation can be found in economic literature describing how the trading of company shares has evolved over time (Hadfield, 2004; Kingston, 2007). These illustrate the normalisation of practices as informal behaviours become institutionalised in formal rules.

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\(^6\) See Chapter Five for a discussion on *Operation Murambatsvina*.

\(^7\) Alternatively Gulyani and Talukar (2008) argue that particular combinations of high demand and low incentives for investment by landlords can inhibit long term upgrading.
Where institutions adapt it is not just the state and regulatory frameworks that change, but also the behaviours and expectations of people. Within a complex and interdependent institutional system, as described above, change is mutually constitutive and is reflected across community-state relationships. This can be seen in the case studies highlighted in this Chapter, whereby opportunities to take responsibility for the delivery of resettlement programmes (Patel et al 2002) reinforced the efficacy of ‘slum dwellers’ to act in spaces previously reserved for the state. Also the implications of growing relations with city authorities in Karachi (as described by Mitlin, 2008) enabled Orangi community members to become involved in city-wide discussions on the planning of sanitation services. Adaptive change, and the creation of new and normalised behaviours, as Fischer (2006) suggests, shifts the subjective position of actors in social relationships, creating new platforms for further adaptation of institutions. This is echoed by Kirdina (2013: 1) in her study of evolving rule systems in Russia who suggests institutional change as analogous to “how new branches contribute toward the continued evolution of a tree, new institutions inherit and also move forward, evolving into foundational institutional structures.”

2.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, co-production can be an important tool for both state organisations and low income communities to engage in, and address, challenges of urban development (Mitlin, 2008; Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014). Co-production provides a means to reorder and release the resources and capabilities needed to improve the availability of urban shelter and basic services (Patel 2002; Patel and Bartlett, 2009). It provides a platform for negotiation between communities and the state and creates the possibility, beyond immediate material benefit, of stimulating institutional adaptation and change (Appadurai, 2001). Despite criticisms that co-production is inherently conservative (Cooke, 2004a), a form of co-optation (Roy, 2011) and relies on the effective organisation of communities that de Wit and Berner (2009) consider to have limited scope in the Global South, where it has been effective it appears to have made a significant difference to the lives of people living in poverty.
This Chapter has sought to identify the necessary conditions for co-production, drawing from eleven important studies, and considering these against sociological institutional theory, as outlined in Chapter One. The analysis has highlighted that while the latent capacity for co-production may be present within communities and within the state, this potential must be activated and orchestrated within defined projects of co-production. This interpretation differs from Booth (2012) and Olivier de Sarden (2011) who suggest a ubiquity of co-production in the Global South as a response to the unavailability and high cost of public and commercial provision of basic services. Focusing on the necessary conditions identified from analysis of the selected studies on co-production, underlines that co-production must be defined as a purposive activity, which is more than the manifestation of coping strategies in the absence of service provision. This conclusion is significant if co-production is to be considered as a strategy able to contribute to the post-2015 challenges of urban development.

When understood as a structured action that requires direct input of resources and the active organisation of participants, co-production becomes a form of deliberative governance, as suggested by Fung and Wright (2003). This connects with the second area of examination presented in this Chapter which focused on co-production and institutional change. While co-production is not a driver of change per se, it can have instrumental importance in shaping the development of institutions and institutionalised practices. Adopting sociological theories of institutional change, co-production as a form of structured engagement, stimulates the adaptation of rules. Institutional change, as suggested by Knudsen (2008); Kingston and Caballero (2009); Mahoney and Thelen (2010); Hall (2010); and Brousseau and Raynaud (2011) occurs through the accumulation of micro-changes in relationships, attitudes and behaviours. This, given the challenge posed by Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014), creates an incentive to build grounded capacity for co-production as a formative part of urban development policy.

In keeping with Yin’s (2003) advice quoted in Chapter One, this Chapter has attempted to use existing literature to sharpen the focus of this research by exploring the meaning and potential application of co-production within a
framework of sociological institutional theory. While this may have some limitations in not fully contextualising the development of co-production scholarship, it is intended to support the design of a framework for empirical analysis later in this thesis. In focusing on the necessary and sufficient conditions for co-production and by locating co-production as a change function within institutional theory, this Chapter has created a basis to investigate the use of co-productive approaches in Harare. Prior to setting the scene for the fieldwork in Chapter Four, the following Chapter discusses the methodology adopted within this research to explore the institutional implications of co-production.
3.1 Introduction

This Chapter presents the research methods employed in this study. Building from the conceptual model and definitions outlined in Chapter One and the discussion of co-production and institutional change in Chapter Two, this Chapter focuses on how the research question has been operationalised to gather useful data. The research has sought to observe, what Pieterse (2008: 6) suggests as, “surreptitious, sometimes overt and multiple small revolutions” in institutions and behaviours of the state and low income communities. The methodology used has aimed to investigate co-production as a ‘small revolution’ in its effect on institutions and the attitudes of state actors towards urban poor communities and on the expectations and actions of communities in their efforts to secure access to housing and basic services.

As detailed below, this has entailed constructing a research frame and tools to be consistent with the conceptualisation of institutional change used in this study and also sensitive to the particular circumstances of undertaking community based research in Zimbabwe. This Chapter is structured to describe the philosophical underpinnings of the research methodology and the conceptual challenges this produces. This is followed substantively by a discussion of the study area and a critical reflection on the process of conducting this research. The description in this Chapter provides an introduction to the empirical data presented in Chapters Five to Eight. The Chapter concludes with a report on the methods of data analysis and research ethics.

3.2 Methodological Approach

The research is conducted from a critical realist ontological perspective to reflect the author’s world view and because it provides the most appropriate frame to examine the dynamics of social relations central to the research question. Citing
Bhaskar (1989), Patomaki and Wright (2000: 223) state that critical realism presents the world as “composed not only of events, states of affairs, experiences, impressions and discourses, but also of underlying structures, powers and tendencies that exist, whether or not detected or known through experience and/or discourse.” The critical realist approaches used here provides a frame to examine complex and dynamic causal interaction which are defined by social, and therefore institutional, contexts (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). From this ontological perspective, and consistent with the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter One, this research locates co-production within an institutional system that enables and constrains social action. Institutions are, following Sayer (2000), both observable and unobservable, but contribute to the generation of outcomes.

The methodological approach has been designed to explore the pre-existing and created regularities and functioning of institutions, as they operate in Harare, on issues of land and housing. These manifest in how power is exercised through attitudes, responses and behaviours of individuals and the organisations of the state in the distribution of services and assets. Critical realism is used to define context and the mechanisms employed to generate co-production, alongside the identification of processes that underpin the social reproduction of rules and behaviours. This was expected to assist, for this research, in the exploration of particular outcomes in Harare and also provide the basis for middle-range theory development from empirical evidence. Linking to a retroductive approach, the research focuses on the cognitive mechanism and processes of social construction that shape rules of behaviour (Blaikie, 2007). It also creates space to recognise that institutional change occurs over protracted periods of time (Pierson 2004) and the mobilisation of communities lead cumulatively to the creation of material and political resources (Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Whitehead and Gray-Molina, 2005).

Abstract ideas of rules and beliefs are treated, following John Searle (1995), as ‘institutional facts’, which are socially real and manifest as barriers or enablers to individual action. Institutions have relative functions and are maintained and reproduced through social action. When institutions and institutional change is
considered from this philosophical perspective, the mechanisms of change become ‘researchable’. This informs the design of the research method and the tools (interviews and documentary analysis) used to gather evidence of how collaboration affects the social and organisational perspectives of key actors. Central to this approach is the understanding that individuals are social agents. While, in abstract, the lack of resource, power and status available to low income communities appear incommensurate with the challenge of changing the beliefs and behaviours of the state, people affect the world around them. The methodology applied in this research, creates a framework to examine whether institutions change in response the efforts of people in poverty, while also exploring whether the observable processes that lead to change have wider application to urban theory and development policy.

A case study approach has been selected to investigate co-production and institutional change. Case study research is defined by George and Bennett (2005: 5) as “the detailed examination of an aspect of an historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.” For this research, and following the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter One, institutions have multiple origins and support a range of social functions (Greif, 2006). This is consistent with an understanding of the deeply contextualised nature of institutions, which “do not stand alone but are embedded in a local setting influenced by historical trajectories and cultures” (Jutting, 2003: 32) and are reproduced through social relationships. An in-depth case study approach has been adopted as the most appropriate research method. Yin (1981: 59; 2003) highlights the distinctive contribution of case study research in “a real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Woolcock (2013) similarly points out the more complex the research task the more useful analytical case studies become.

As identified in Chapter Two, case studies have been used extensively across the literature on co-production to describe and examine episodes of collaboration between communities and the state (see for example Ostrom, 1996; Joshi and
Moore, 2004; and Mitlin, 2008). Case studies can also be found illustratively in discussions of institutional change (see Coaffee and Healey, 2003; and Sheingate, 2010). Elinor Ostrom (2005) highlights how single case studies can be effective in analysing complex institutional situations. A case study approach provides a method to interrogate social situations in depth (Bennett and Elman, 2006) and provide a flexible method to identify and follow through particular episodes or events to assess their causal significance, in what Woolcock (2013) describes as an ‘internal dialogue’. The approach adopted here is an embedded case study design, as defined by Yin (2003), focusing on the relationship between Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZHPF), Dialogue on Shelter Trust (Dialogue) and the City of Harare Council over the period 1997 to 2013. This provides the primary focus of analysis drawing on two case studies of settlement development projects during this period. This approach has been adopted to allow for an exploration of the operational detail of co-production, while also looking at two initiatives that took place at different times and at different points in the trajectory of the relationship between community and state actors. The investigation has been organised using a process tracing method, which according to George and Bennett (2005), can be used to define causal mechanisms and processes to explain a particular outcome.

In establishing the methodological basis for this research, it is important to recall that the central objective is to identify and document a process of engagement between people: residents of urban low income communities and the officials and politicians of state organisations. Applying a case study approach increases the significance of careful research design; respecting that the subject of investigation is not an abstract policy or social model, but people that struggle to create lives that, in Amartya Sen’s (1990) terms, they have reason to value. In compiling evidence for a case study, the researcher is temporarily entering an established set of relationships and an unfamiliar cultural environment for the purpose of observation and data gathering. This demands a reflexive approach that carefully navigates the differing perspectives and experiences of participants, while sensitively designing research tools to minimise risk to all participants; ensuring the collection of useful data through ‘respectful inquiry’ (Byrne–Armstrong et al, 2001).
3.3 Research Questions

The questions set for this research reflect the multi-dimensionality of power and institutional relationships (Hickey and Mohan, 2004), where authority is constituted and reproduced through various social routes and arena. Given the distinct but overlapping constituencies of citizen and the state, as defined in Chapter One, the research questions have been framed to guide the process of investigation towards a deep understanding of outcomes associated with the design and operation of co-production. Within the overall objective of identifying the institutional implications of co-production as a strategy for development, three research questions were posed.

- What role does mobilisation of communities play in meeting the conditions for co-production?
- Does co-production contribute to the creation of alternative forms of urban governance?
- Does involvement in the co-production of low-cost housing and services affect institutions and the organisational behaviours of the state?

These questions were used to shape an inquiry into the significance of co-production focusing firstly, on how collective action is motivated and sustained. The aim was to examine the importance of co-production as a co-ordinating function for communities and to understand how this contributes to the mobilisation of human and financial resources towards collaborative projects of development. Secondly, to understand the contribution of co-production to urban governance, studied empirically in the economic and political context of Zimbabwe. Thirdly, questions were geared to exploring the institutional impact of co-productive activity. This investigates the implications of co-production for formal rules and for state attitudes and behaviours towards low income communities. In conducting the research, participants were offered the opportunity to reflect upon the significance of co-production for their own constituencies and organisational activity; to
consider what impact it had on their partnerships; and more widely on the achievement of development outcomes.

3.4 Conceptual Challenges

Developing the methodology for this research entailed addressing a range of conceptual and practical challenges. Most significant of these was navigating the complexity of overlapping political, social and environmental conditions present in Zimbabwe, in order to identify whether co-production affected institutions and the behaviours of state organisations towards low income communities. Woolcock (2013: 235) refers to complex contexts, such as Zimbabwe, as having “high causal density”. These are characterised by uncertainty, numerous pathways and feedback loops where people exercise discretion to act in accordance with expectations, precedent, professional norms and self-interest. The approach taken in this research, as described in Chapter One, is considering institutions as a “web of values, norms, rules, beliefs and taken for granted assumptions” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 93), recognising that change in one part of an interconnected system will dynamically impact on other rules and behaviours, as suggested by Healey et al (2002).

This inherent complexity makes identifying linear causality difficult and creates a reliance on inference, based on the operation of institutions and observable changes in relationships and behaviours (Baubock, 2008). The research explores the various levels of connection between community groups and the City of Harare on contentious issues of housing and basic services. This exploration takes account of complex contextual factors that affect decision making and the operation of institutions, by employing a sociological model of institutional change, driven by small-scale and cumulative adaptation of institutionalised activity. It also recognises that responses to different situations are determined by internalised cultures and embedded norms, which shape how people perceive their social situation and the actions open to them. Additionally, and as highlighted in the conceptual framework in Chapter One, the impact of exogenous factors such as
economic conditions and international policy, on issues as in-situ upgrading of poor communities, are taken into account. These affect how the state in Zimbabwe frames its understanding of local challenges and how receptive it is to the mobilised interests of poor community members.

George and Bennett (2005) are helpful in identifying the limitations of a reliance on the observation of linear causal mechanisms to explain socially based behaviour. They reference Sayer (1992) on the problems of identifying linear causality, stating “the operation of the same mechanism can produce quite different results and, alternatively, different mechanisms may produce the same empirical results” (George and Bennett, 2005: 145). Within a framework of overlapping formal rules and deep set normative institutions, there exists as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) identify, spaces for the adaptation and application of institutions to ‘fit’ with changing conditions and localised demands. Thus, the reinterpretation of rules over time provides a mechanism for the adaptation of existing practices. Following this idea, this research has sought to identify and trace shifts in discourse and the actions and interventions developed by community based actors, over a sixteen year period. This identifies both how low income communities have responded to a lack of housing and basic services and how these responses have impacted on the behaviours of the state towards low income settlements and settlers. This assumes an inherent complexity in the actions of social agents who, seeking to influence institutions, may be necessarily circuitous to achieve their objectives. This approach is temporal, contextual and recognises the cumulative impact of actions and interventions that may become a catalyst for institutional change.

In observing and investigating the conditions for institutional change, adopting a research approach that is sensitive to patterns of change over time becomes vitally important. Pierson (2004: 2) states that “[a]ttentiveness to issues of temporality highlights aspects of social life that are essentially invisible from an ahistorical vantage point.” This reflects the literature on sociological institutional theory, which applies an evolutionary character to change (Kingston and Caballero, 2009; Brousseau and Raynaud, 2011). This research sought to evidence the institutional
impact of co-production, through the detailed processes, and the compounding, of small changes that derive from the development of purposive relationships between urban low income communities and the state.

The research approach sought to identify transition in the relationship and forms of engagement between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare between 1997 and 2013 (as discussed in Chapter Two, section 2.3.3). These, as discussed in Chapter Five (section 5.4), suggest ‘key moments’ of adaptation in institutionalised processes governing housing and basic services. As described below, the research has been designed to identify institutional change over time. This has been achieved by using research techniques geared to: capturing and triangulating the recollections of the same events by different actors, to compare perceived significance and impact; recognising progressive change to examine the potential for cumulative causality; using specific questions to draw out changes in the character and function of community-state relations; and highlighting changing patterns of engagement and participation in developmental projects. Additionally, the research has aimed to distinguish between impacts that affect just ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare and wider impacts that shape, for example, national policy or the embedded practices of City of Harare on housing and basic services.

The research approach most suited to the specific conditions and objectives of this research task is process tracing, which Collier (2011: 823) defines as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.” Process tracing is used to undertake within-case analysis, “drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or phenomena” (ibid: 824). Analysis is based on “relevant, verifiable causal stories resting in differing chains of cause-effect relations whose efficacy can be demonstrated independently of those stories” (Tilly, 1997 quoted in George and Bennett, 2005: 205). This approach emphasises the temporal by identifying causal chains that link dependent and independent variables (Vennesson, 2008: 231), which operate as key transformative moments to explain observable outcomes. The
collection of documentary and testimonial evidence from a number of perspectives helps to construct a narrative and to inform analysis of the causal and constitutive implications arising from the interaction of variables within a given context. This approach provides the basis for the design of a research frame and the development of specific methods and tools.

3.5 Research Frame

To investigate the institutional implications of co-production a number of preconditions were identified, at the planning stage of the research, for a case study approach. Firstly, the selection of a research site required that co-production had taken place and that collaboration had generated a ‘product’, in the form of low-cost shelter and basic services. Secondly, the organisations and individuals involved in co-production needed to be available and willing to take part in the PhD research. Thirdly, that the environment was conducive to research and met the terms of the University of Manchester’s ethical research guidelines and requirements. Based on these criteria, and in discussion with the research supervisors, Zimbabwe was identified as the preferred location. Zimbabwe provided some challenges for a UK based researcher given the underlying political conditions and the position and treatment of low income communities as described in Chapter Four. Further to this, national elections were due during the fieldwork period, which based on the previous elections in 2008, had the possibility of becoming violent. However, there was a strong community based organisation in ZHPF and an established NGO (Dialogue) that were willing to facilitate the research. Additionally, the lead supervisor Professor Diana Mitlin had strong connections with prospective participants and the student also had some previous experience of undertaking urban research in Zimbabwe.

Additionally, Zimbabwe was selected for this research because of its institutional environment. Zimbabwe, in common with many post-colonial African states, has an institutional architecture and legal frameworks governing land use and basic service provision, which are based on British technical and normative values (Berrisford,
Post-independence, these values remain largely intact and inform the institutionalised practices of local and national government, despite the vast changes in conditions in Zimbabwe since 1980. The particular conditions created by a series of economic and political crises that have dogged Zimbabwe since independence⁸ are also significant. The dynamic political and economic environment of Zimbabwe provided an opportunity to observe how people in poverty respond to adverse conditions to build structures for collective action. In particular to study the activity of ZHPF and Dialogue, in the context of endemic political violence and economic collapse, to promote collaboration, across institutional spheres, that compensate for dysfunctional rules and procedures.

Initial background research on the work of ZHPF and Dialogue showed that the groups formed in 1997 with the intention of mobilising communities to address housing and basic service need. The activity in Zimbabwe was inspired by similar community based initiatives in South Africa, Namibia and India, where mobilised groups of the urban poor built relationships with the state to improve their material and environmental conditions, that repositioned them within local politics (Patel et al, 2002; Muller and Mitlin, 2007). ZHPF has grown to have some 54,000 members nationally by 2013 (Chitekwe-Biti, 2014) and engaged in a number of developmental projects with the City of Harare, focused on in-situ upgrading of poor settlements (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; d’Cruz and Mudimu 2013). The initial assessment, prior to fieldwork and ethical approval, confirmed the suitability of Zimbabwe as a site for the research and ZHPF with Dialogue as a case study, using a process tracing approach, to examine the institutional implications of co-production. An additional benefit of Zimbabwe as the location of the case study was that ZHPF is an affiliate member of the network organisation Shack / Slum Dwellers International (SDI). SDI promotes the formation of spaces of engagement with local government (McFarlane, 2004) by seeking partnerships with the state to challenge for the interests of the poor (Appadurai, 2001). The connection between

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⁸ See Chapter Four for a full discussion of the political and economic context.
ZHPF and SDI enabled the Zimbabwean case study to be located in the context of a wider movement of the ‘urban poor’.  

The research is also framed within an urban context both pragmatically, because many of the available case studies and examinations of co-production are located in urban and peri-urban settlements, and following Manuel Castells (1983: xv), because “urban issues are at the forefront of contemporary political conflicts, and politics have become the core of the urban process.” The importance of urban as a focus for development continues to be prominent within international policy, as outlined in Chapter One, and provides as Harvey (2012: xvi) identifies “an incubator of revolutionary ideas, ideals and movements.” Moreover, the density and dynamism of the urban environment accentuates the function and the visibility of institutions within a pattern that is sociologically distinctive (Wirth, 1964 cited in Robinson, 2006). Castells (1978: 63) highlights this when discussing the social function of urban planning: “[t]he increasing complexity of the urban phenomenon and the acuteness of the problems involved have led to a necessary recourse to institutional mechanisms for the regulation of urban contradictions.”

Alongside the political and structural characteristics that distinguish the urban from rural, and justify the research focus, is the position of low income communities in relation to the resources nested in urban economies. Simone (2010: 5) discusses, with reference to African cities, the particularity of urban as producing “specific actors with specific capabilities” within an environment that is essentially ‘makeable’. “Cities are spaces of exchange, sometime regulated by the price mechanism of formal markets, but more often through the orchestrating of interactions among discrepant materials, experiences and positions, whose relationships are not easily translatable into stable forms of comparison and value” (Simone 2010: 6). Releasing human and financial potential, through collective action, can make an important contribution to the ‘massive deficiencies’ in urban infrastructure and management capacity, as identified by Satterthwaite and Mitlin

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9 See Chapter Four for a discussion of SDI.
(2014) in much of the Global South. The focus on urban brings the full potential of collaborative activity into scope and, considering co-production, provides a partial response to Garth Myers’ (2011: 194) challenge of rethinking how informality and formality can work together as a hybrid of urban governance constructed upon a renegotiation of state-social relationships. Within this research urban has been selected because there is a clear conceptual significance of the “urban laboratory” (Karvonen and van Heur, 2014) as a site of knowledge production, to interrogate complex social relations and also, as Robinson (2006) proposes in the context of global urbanisation, these issues become ‘ordinary’ rather than ‘exceptional’ challenges for development.

3.6 Study Area and Approach

Within Zimbabwe, the capital city Harare was identified as the primary spatial focus for the research, with the local authority of area being the geographical unit of analysis. Harare was chosen because ZHPF originated in the holding camps and informal settlements of the City and there has been continuity of activity since its formation in 1997. There are established relationships between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council providing routes to participant interviews and a track record of project activity that had been partially documented and could be examined. It was recognised that in selecting Harare there may be ‘capital city issues’ as not only the largest urban area in Zimbabwe, but also the seat of national government. It was anticipated that this may accentuate political contestation beyond what may have been found in provincial centres, but it was also possible there could be an inherent motivation towards development that accelerated the creation of opportunity spaces for innovative practice. While it was not possible within the limits of this research to undertake a structured comparison of the relationship between ZHPF and local authorities in other contexts, questions of difference in approach and response to co-production were included within interview schedules with research participants.10

10 Further comparative research is recommended in Chapter Nine, section 9.5.1.
Within Harare two case study sites were identified in discussion with Dialogue and ZHPF as appropriate foci for the research. These were Crowborough North and Dzivarasekwa Extension both, located in the west of Harare city centre (see map in figure 3.1). Crowborough North is a formal residential area where ZHPF members have developed housing units. Dzivarasekwa Extension is former holding camp where ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare are co-productively delivering in-situ housing improvements. Further detail on the history and social composition of these sites can be found in Chapter Five. These areas were selected because they are important in the development of co-productive relationships with the City Council and both had a strong ZHPF membership able to contribute to the research.

An early activity, consistent with a process tracing method, was the production of a temporal frame for the research that identified the major events in Zimbabwe affecting ZHPF and the development of a co-productive relationship with the City of Harare (see figure 5.4 in Chapter Five). The development of housing units at Crowborough North and in-situ upgrading at Dzivarasekwa Extension were ‘key moments’ for ZHPF and Dialogue in building their credibility with the state as a development partner and in advancing a model of co-production through the delivery of site specific projects.

Locating these initiatives within a temporal frame was significant, as established in the conceptual model in Chapter One, for examining the contribution to processes of adaptive institutional change. As Mahoney and Thelen (2010) identify, institutional change when it is occurring slowly and on an incremental basis, can be difficult to identify unless seen over a longer timeframe. Pierson (2004) points out that identifying the actions that contribute to institutional change within a temporal context, allows an observation of social process that may not be evident in an analysis of single moments. While the trajectory for institutional change may not follow a linear path, the processes (building blocks) for change are expected to be cumulative (Woolcock et al, 2011). This is significant to establish the degree of causality between action and outcome and to identify how contextual conditions either enable or prevent iterative shifts in institutional behaviours. Central to the process tracing approach applied in this research, was using interviews to

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encourage participants to ‘step back’ and examine the path they had taken, to identify progress, barriers and achievements. This reflected Pierson’s view that “[s]ome causal processes and outcomes occur slowly because they are incremental – it simply takes a long-time for them to add up to anything. In others, the critical factor is the presence of threshold effects. Some social processes may have little significance until they attain a critical mass, which may then trigger major change” (Pierson 2004: 13).

Figure 3.1
Location Map of Crowborough North and Dzivarasekwa Extension in Harare

Source: Map produced by Dialogue on Shelter Trust (2013)

3.6.1 Primary Data Collection

The primary data collection for this research was undertaken during 2013 and early 2014 in five field visits to Harare. While structuring data collection in this way carried the risk of the researcher not being fully immersed in the politics and culture of Zimbabwe, it had the benefit of providing the opportunity to reflect on the data collected between field visits. Research data collection was focused in two
areas, firstly interviews with key stakeholders (as detailed in table 3.1) and secondly, the collection of documentary information in the form of reports, minutes of meetings, management information and financial accounts from both Dialogue and from the City of Harare Council. Data collection was structured with the aim of using interviews and documentation to maximise the opportunity for triangulation, in accordance with the process tracing method. With the support of Dialogue staff, appointments were made with key participants to conduct interviews. As set out in the University of Manchester ethical approval for this project, prospective interviewees were provided with an information sheet describing the research (versions in English and Shona) and asked for an interview lasting around one hour.

In total 48 people participated in interviews and focus groups during the fieldwork sessions, with a number of these, particularly Dialogue and City of Harare personnel engaged up to three times. As identified in Chapter One, the distribution of participants reflects an objective to understand the differential impact and experience of co-production across social domains occupied by communities and the state. While community members of ZHPF and officers of the City of Harare Council are part of the same institutional paradigm, they perceive and relate to the operation of institutional power very differently. This has a practical implication for the methodology, in structuring research participation and data analysis, to enable contrasting and comparison of experience and meaning of the ‘same’ set of events. The question frame for interviews emphasised issues of change, reflecting the research focus on institutional adaption, and the implications of shifting discourse, behaviour and levels of efficacy among community and state participants.

Interviewees were chosen with consideration of their perspective, experience and ability to contribute to the research. In particular this concerned the knowledge of participants about the changing relationships and institutions since formation of ZHPF in 1997. The selection of participants reflected the importance of triangulation of data, with interviews distributed across the three main stakeholder groups. Emphasis was given to ZHPF members in Crowborough North and
Dzivarasekwa Extension in order to incorporate the voices low income residents as the ‘beneficiaries’ of collaborative development projects. There were 18 interviews conducted with community members, which allowed for ‘saturation’ on key aspects of the research. The point of saturation occurred when the addition of new participants did not lead to different responses from the data already gathered (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Saturation was managed initially by the allocation of time for community interviews when the fieldwork was being planned. This was supplemented during fieldwork by listening to the responses to the interview questions.

The choice of participants favoured female interviewees, as women play a prominent role in ZHPF and in practical terms they were most likely to be at home during the day when interviews were conducted. Interviews with ZHPF and Dialogue staff focused on the most experienced personnel who were best able to discuss the evolution and the impact of collaborative projects. A spectrum of interviews was carried out within the City Council across departments to obtain a spread of perspectives on the role and the effectiveness of ZHPF and Dialogue as partners in development. A common structure of questions was used with participant groups that focused on the changing patterns of interaction between communities and the City of Harare Council over the study period of 1997 – 2013. This reflected the process tracing method, in building an explanatory narrative of the ‘facts’ of interaction (from different perspectives) as well as drawing out implications both for personal efficacy and for institutional conditions.

Contact with participants was made through Dialogue and ZHPF to maximise access and, given strong pre-existing relationships, used to route information to ensure that prospective participants were fully informed about the research and the intentions of the researcher. As this indicates, the researcher’s relationship with both ZHPF and Dialogue was vitally important to the viability of the research project. Contact was made with Dialogue and ZHPF in November 2012, before fieldwork commenced, to meet with key staff members and to explain the background and objectives of the research. This process of engagement and
familiarisation helped to ensure that ZHPF and Dialogue were comfortable and knowledgeable about the research and it was used to build a bond of trust with the researcher that would be important to accessing community and stakeholders in the interviews. It was also important for the researcher to understand the culture of ZHPF and Dialogue and the nature of their relationships with the state. The staff and members of ZHPF and Dialogue ensured access to key informants and provided logistical support and advice throughout the fieldwork.

While introductions by ZHPF to prospective community participants and to the City of Harare via Dialogue presented the researcher as a ‘friend’, the depth of experience of collaborative working and interest in ‘documenting’ their experience appeared to offset any bias. Participants appeared to be willing to reflect critically upon their experiences and identify the limitations of collaborative activity. The support of ZHPF and Dialogue was vital not only on a practical level to undertake the research, in contexts where there is suspicion of outsiders, but also because the intervening periods between research exercises made spaces for casual conversations that were invaluable to understand the context and how Zimbabweans feel about their country and the work they are doing to improve the conditions in low income communities. These spaces were used to explore the meaning and implications of events in Zimbabwe, and to hear informally from community members their views on the significance of their work, when judged against their own experiences and those of their peers. This data was collected in note form and recorded in a fieldwork log that has been drawn upon for the empirical Chapters of this thesis.

The relationship with ZHPF and Dialogue and with the City of Harare was central to accessing the supporting and documentary evidence necessary for the process tracing. This included informal conversations, site visits and observation at meetings alongside, where available, paper based records in the form of minutes, reports and policy documents. This latter information was found to be highly fragmented, with a lack of systematic record keeping and documentation of processes, activities and decisions outside of projects, such as Dzivarasekwa
Extension, where there were requirements for project monitoring and reporting by an external funding agent. The lack of formal documentation should perhaps be expected where the platform for co-productive activity is based on developing interpersonal networks and relationships of trust, as a precursor to more structured tangible activity. It also perhaps reflects the lack of capacity of community based organisations who may not have the time to document and reflect upon an ongoing process, which they experience as part of the pattern of daily life, rather than abstractly as a delimited programme of activities viewed by the researcher.

Table 3.1
Interview Participant Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Group</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Interviews Undertaken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Dialogue on Shelter Trust</td>
<td>3 senior staff provided multiple interviews over the fieldwork period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>ZHPF – Leadership</td>
<td>Interviews were undertaken with 4 national leaders 3 of whom were involved in the establishment of ZHPF in 1997 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZHPF – Members</td>
<td>Individual interviews were undertaken with community members – 7 in Crowborough and 11 in Dzivarasekwa Extension. Additionally, a focus group was completed in each settlement with those interviewed to discuss changing relations with institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>City of Harare Council</td>
<td>11 interviews were completed with middle level and senior officers of the council across 4 departments. A former senior politician was interviewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Stakeholders</td>
<td>University of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>A focus group was conducted with a group of 8 final year planning students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Cooperatives</td>
<td>A senior officer was interviewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DFID Zimbabwe</td>
<td>A sector manager was interviewed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>A senior officer was interviewed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.6.2 Stakeholder Interviews

Stakeholder interviews were undertaken with the staff of Dialogue and the leadership of ZHPF, with officers and a former senior politician at the City of Harare and with key organisations (as shown in table 3.1). These were selected on the basis of their experience of collaborative working and because they held informed views about the practice and the context for co-production in Zimbabwe. These were conducted as semi-structured interviews, taking place in the offices of Dialogue or on the premises of the stakeholder organisation in Harare. All stakeholder interviews were undertaken in English and were transcribed for analysis. As the fieldwork was structured over five visits, multiple contacts were made with some officers of City of Harare Council and with Dialogue staff. This proved useful mechanism to interrogate and follow up on issues and review and test evidence emerging from the ongoing research and initial analysis.

The objectives of the stakeholder interviews, as part of a process tracing method, were firstly to understand and gain subjective testimony on processes of collaboration leading to co-production in Harare. Given the paucity of documentary evidence, this proved to be the principal source of information on the patterns of engagement and changing discourse of poverty and informality in Harare. The second objective was to explore the implications of community - state engagement, both on state behaviour towards people in poverty and the expectations of low income communities of the state. Specifically, the interviews provided an opportunity to examine change over time and to identify adaptations in the practices and policies of authority towards urban poor communities. This approach, as Richards (1996) suggests, uses elite interviewing to examine both the perceived ‘facts’ of a given situation, but moreover the “mind-set” of actors who shape societal power relations. The interviews were used to illuminate motivations, process and the influential factors leading to decision making but that remain hidden ‘behind closed doors’ (Lilleker, 2003).
An important issue in using interviews as a key method of data collection is addressing the subjective nature of the personal narrative (Richards, 1996). This is overcome partly through triangulation and identification of supporting or contradicting evidence, as part of the analytical processes of the research. However, considering the specificities of iterative institutional adaptation, the effects of subjectivity is an integral element of what is being observed. An actor’s perception of a particular situation is formative and according to George et al (2006: 347) can translate into organisational actions leading to institutional change. This view reflects an analysis of institutional change, whereby human cognition shapes the institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In the context of interviews, participants may order information, and provide recollections of their actions and decision making process in ways that resolve dissonance between for example, the public service commitment of officials to the provision of public housing and actions to demolish informal settlements. However, the construction of responses to the interview may also reflect their efforts to justify and assimilate adaptive actions. “As organizations depart from established ways of doing things, they set up the ground for challenging the legitimacy of those established ways, and they create the framework for new legitimate forms” (George et al, 2006: 353).

Reflecting on the process and outcome of interviews with stakeholders the impression gained from ZHPF, Dialogue and key officers of the City Council, is a sense of achievement in very difficult conditions. There is a shared sense of purpose that appears, at least for the particular projects under discussion, to have been transformative and liberating. The progress made in Harare has been achieved despite the prevailing systems of governance and the limited resource base available. Participants were keen to demonstrate their innovation during interviews and reflect on their experiences and working in partnership. However, it was also evident that the research was taking place at a relatively stable time in the turbulent history of Zimbabwe. The results of the research may have been different if gathered at a different time.
3.6.3 Community Interviews

Interviews with members of the Federation took place in the case study communities of Crowborough North and Dzivarasekwa Extension and typically in or outside the homes of the interviewee. The process of conducting the interviews was structured to comply with the ethical approval granted for the research by the University of Manchester, but also cognisant of the context of researching in low income communities to reduce risk for both the participant and the researcher. In total 18 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with residents: 11 in Dzivarasekwa Extension and seven in Crowborough North. The interviews were arranged through ZHPF leadership who, based on discussions with the researcher, identified prospective participants available for interview. In discussion with ZHPF, a selection of participants were identified who had been members of the Federation for a number of years and therefore able to comment on the changing discourse of poverty and relationships with the City of Harare Council and to form a judgement on the impact of the Federation on their lives and well-being. An anonymised profile of research participants is shown in appendix two.

The interviews were supported by a local ZHPF co-ordinator and a translator. On arrival at the settlement, a meeting was held with the ZHPF co-ordinator to finalise the arrangements for the interviews and to obtain background on the settlement. This was followed by a transect walk through the settlement. The transect walk provided an opportunity to become familiar with the geography of the settlement and to be introduced to the individuals that would be interviewed. Following Moser (2012), the transect walk was more significant than merely gathering ‘soft’ information about the location; it was an opportunity to be seen. It was clearly important for ZHPF to ‘announce’ that a stranger was on the settlement and to justify the presence of the visitor. An extract from the research field notes illustrates this.
“Walking through Crowborough North we were greeted by many people who were curious about my presence. [ZHPF co-ordinator] introduced me and said that I was a friend of the Federation doing research on their community. This seemed to explain why I was there and the responses were all friendly. But it seemed for [ZHPF co-ordinator] that this was about obtaining permission as well as asserting his authority and status in the community.”

Interviews were conducted with participants using a prepared question frame with interviews lasting between 25 – 35 minutes. The interviews were conducted in English where possible, but a majority were a mix of Shona and English depending on the language skills and the confidence of the ZHPF member being interviewed. The interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed for coding and analysis. Each participant signed a consent form giving permission for the interview and future use of the data. In addition to the semi-structured interviews, two focus groups were held with ZHPF members, one in each of the key sites, to undertake an institutional mapping exercise. This provided an opportunity to discuss relationships with key organisations and service providers in Harare; the importance of these organisations to community members; and changes in the practical and discursive terms of their engagement with service providers. This was used to inform a discussion with interviewees on how relations with the state had changed and the meaning of this for them.

In reflecting on the interviews, there was an inherent trade-off in relying on the ZHPF leadership to identify research participants and to support the interview process. Based on guidance from the researcher, ZHPF identified participants that had knowledge of the activity of ZHPF and Dialogue, but also had a mix of positive and negative experiences of the changing relationships with the City of Harare Council. While relying on ZHPF potentially introduced a bias into the selection of participants, it also ensured access and a route into the community that would have been unavailable if individual residents of the case study areas had been directly approached to participate in the research. There is an understandable suspicion of

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11 Field note, 2 July 2013.
12 Where Shona was used it was translated by the ZHPF co-ordinator.
outsiders in Harare that would have provided a significant barrier to the research without the assistance of the ZHPF leadership. A direct approach would have heightened the risks both for the researcher and also for any individuals agreeing to participate in the research.

While responses to the interview questions were consistent in the regard to the development, objectives and operation of ZHPF, this consistency can be assigned to the processes and rituals of mobilisation used by ZHPF (as discussed in Chapter Six), individual stories were also evident. The nuances of experience and expectations of ZHPF members were important in triangulating data, but more importantly in providing texture and depth to the qualitative information. The variations in individual experiences and perspectives, and how these were conveyed during the interviews, helped to validate the selection process. Despite participants being members of ZHPF, their personal routes to Crowborough North or Dzivarasekwa Extension were subtly different. This was reassuring that participants had not been coached or that there was a significant bias in who was selected to participate in the interviews.

3.7 Data Analysis

The fieldwork and data gathering process generated some 43 hours of interviews, written observation notes and a significant body of primary documentary data in the form of reports, monitoring and evaluation information, newspaper cuttings, meeting minutes and council committee reports. These were analysed firstly, using descriptive coding that enabled sorting of data around key themes associated with the research questions. A system of colour coding was used to help categorise the data and to support the organisation of information and identification of analytical themes for exploration in the research. As the data collection process was undertaken over five fieldwork visits this allowed time to undertake a first level descriptive analysis, which was used to focus subsequent visits. Coding enabled triangulation between items of evidence and the contrasting of views collected from research participants. The descriptive coding also informed the analytic
process and the identification of specific statements and items of evidence. This was used to examine the data in depth, through the conceptual frame, supported by analysis gleaned from the literature review. Following the approach recommended by Yin (2003), analysis was conducted with reference to theory to determine the extent to which the form and the sequencing of activity identified in Harare was consistent with expected outcomes.

The analysis was informed by the process tracing method, which not only provided a framework for the design of fieldwork and data collection, but also informed the structure for the analytic stage of the research. In the context of complex social relations, process tracing has been used to establish connections between the actions of ZHPF members, the institutionalised behaviours of the state and the changing expectations and expressed agency of low income community members. The process is exploratory, to identify and examine prospective causalities, in order to assess the developmental impact of co-production. This is necessarily inferential and requires a critical assessment and alternative explanations of the data (George and Bennett, 2005). Locating the research within institutional theory creates a challenge of determining the weight that should be given to various actions and conditional factors that are included as variables in the research. While as Vennesson (2008) points out this, at a basic level, can only be done as a ‘judgement call’ based on plausibility, it also underlines the importance of the process tracing method of constructing a narrative, based on the available evidence, of the relationships between actions of participants and the specific outcomes observed.

3.8 Research Ethics

The research was approved by the University of Manchester ethics committee on 27 February 2013. Approval was granted following a long period of discussion, which included a presentation to the committee and revisions to interview guides. A key aspect of the ethics submission was the management of risk both to the researcher and also potentially to residents of low income communities, in the potentially violent political context of Zimbabwe. This underscores the importance
of the engagement of support of ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare in the research to preserve the safety of all involved in the research, as discussed above.

The research was undertaken as an ESRC CASE studentship with the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). The association with IIED\textsuperscript{13} underlined the importance of sharing the findings of the research and contributing to the efficacy of ZHPF and Dialogue as organisations operating at the ‘grassroots’. Included as a key aspect of the research was a feedback session to research participants (held in April 2014) to report the interim findings of the research and to create a space for challenge and discussion. This provided an opportunity, within this research, for ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare to come together and debate the issues raised in the research. Data from the consultation workshop provided an additional empirical input into the research and also provided a number of clarifications to data.

3.9 Conclusion

This Chapter has provided a commentary on the development and the application of the research methodology for this thesis. This has highlighted the conceptual challenges of designing an approach able to identify micro-level changes to, and adaptations in, the relationships between low income communities and the state. It has also explained the rationale for a case study approach focusing on Zimbabwe and the work of ZHPF and Dialogue with the City of Harare Council. Central to the construction of the research method has been an ontological perspective that people, and for this research members of urban low income communities specifically, have agency within complex institutional systems. Following from the conceptual framework in Chapter One, the method has aimed towards the application of qualitative tools that are sensitive to the overlapping causality of social, political and environment conditions, while also providing a means to isolate the actions and interventions that may affect institutionalised behaviours. The

\textsuperscript{13} Involvement was through Professor Diana Mitlin who in addition to her role at the University of Manchester is a Principal Researcher in the Human Settlements Group of IIED.
research has adopted a process tracing approach to support an emphasis on the temporal aspects of change. This adopts Pierson’s (2004: 88) view that:

“many of the most important effects of institutional fragmentation work themselves out only indirectly and over extended periods of time. Seeking to analyse the effects of institutions while holding other variables constant, many analysts failed to see that the values of these other variables were themselves in part the long-term consequences of institutional structures.”

A key strategy to help resolve the challenge of complexity is the relationship with local actors and the participation of ZHPF and Dialogue in the research. While there are some risks of bias associated with a close involvement of individuals and organisations that are also the subject of the research, the support of ZHPF and Dialogue was essential to understanding the small-scale conditions, norms and actions that may accumulate to contribute to wider institutional change. Certainly, the political context of Zimbabwe is one where community focused qualitative research can only realistically be undertaken with and through trusted local partners. The following Chapter explores the historical and political context of Zimbabwe to locate, and begin to define, how and why co-productive approaches were developed by ZHPF and Dialogue in Harare.
Chapter 4  
Zimbabwe - Historical and Political Context

4.1 Introduction

This Chapter provides an overview of the historical and political context of Zimbabwe, to inform the empirical analysis of co-production presented in Chapters Five to Eight. As set out in Chapter One, institutional change is informed by social experience and embedded cultural and normative values. While this Chapter does not offer a comprehensive history of Zimbabwe from independence, it aims to identify the conditions and events which have a direct relevance to the reproduction and adaption of institutions affecting land and urban housing. Understanding the shared historical and cultural experiences of Zimbabweans is vital to the analysis of institutional conditions, the creation of agential communities and the possibility of co-production. This follows Joshi and Houtzager’s (2012) suggestion of examining the impact of community engagement with the state through an examination of context. In keeping with sociological explanations of institutional change, political and economic context is more than the backcloth to events in society, it is instrumental in shaping the limits of action.

The historical context of Zimbabwe is particularly important to understanding community-society relations because the narrative of independence continues to have a prominent and influential role in national politics and in the construction of individual identity. The idea of Zimbabwe shapes the ways in which ‘challenge’ to state authority is presented and it also has deep resonance with the communality that underpins efforts to mobilise low income communities. The discursive representations of poverty, used to justify national policies to control who can reside in cities, reflect a complex and sometimes contradictory relationship between Zimbabwean citizens and the state. This manifests in a tension between an idea of an independent Zimbabwe, free of the constraints of colonial rule, and the necessities of institutionalised controls, that enable the management of complex urban environments. These tensions, common to many post-colonial
African nations (See Myers, 2011; Berrisford, 2011), are played out in Zimbabwe in a context of political violence, economic collapse and efforts to re-engineer national institutions.

The Chapter is structured first with a discussion of national politics since independence. This focuses on the emergence of a combative political environment, economic decline and land as a totem of national politics. This is followed by an outline of the consequences of *Operation Murambatsvina*, economic collapse and the formation of a Global Political Agreement, leading to national elections in 2013. The contextual discussion moves to Harare, considering the impact of urbanisation and how institutional frameworks have structured the relationships between the City of Harare Council and low income communities. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the changing approaches to informal settlements promoted by Shack / Slum Dwellers International (SDI) and the evolving priorities reflected in international policy. The aim of this Chapter is to contextualise the actions of ZHPF and Dialogue and the responses of the City of Harare to the demand for land and basic service provision.

4.2 Independent Nation

Zimbabwe became an independent country on the 18 April 1980, marked by *pungwes* (political celebrations) across the country (Bourne, 2011). For the Zimbabwean people it was a moment to recreate national identity after years of protest, brutal conflict and oppression by colonial and then White minority governments. Established on socialist principles, the first post-colonial government sought to dismantle the racist policies of previous governments to build public provision and ‘Africanise’ the organisations of the state (Chimhowu, 2009). The developmentalist ethic (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011) included a large scale increase in public sector employment and plans for major investment in education, housing and social services to address embedded patterns of inequality (Manjengwa, 2012). The terms of the Lancaster House agreement in 1979, which set out the basis for independence, according to Mamdani (2008), left many questions unanswered, but ensured that the issue of land would remain central to
national politics and was, at least for the first decade of independence, beyond the resolve of the new governments of Zimbabwe.

The final stages of constitutional transition, was characterised by fraught negotiations at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Lancaster House in London. The Lancaster House agreement, signed on 21 December 1979, established the scope of the constitution for Zimbabwe, set the terms for a ceasefire in the civil war and a timetable for the first national elections. Central to the agreement, were controls on land reform that restricted redistribution to a ‘willing-buyer willing-seller’ basis for a decade; thereby securing the rights of some 6,000 White landowners to retain control of 39 per cent of land in the country (Mamdani, 2008). While the agreement secured political leadership for Black Zimbabweans, the Lancaster House agreement preserved a key aspect of economic production for a minority of White Zimbabweans. This, according to Bratton and Masunungure (2011), ignored the aspirations of Black Zimbabweans to address stark economic inequalities and ensured that issues of land remained a principle source of popular discontent.

While the progressive intentions of the newly formed Zimbabwean Government were clear, the early years of independence were shaped by the Lancaster House agreement (Bourne, 2011); drought (Chimhowu, 2009); military attacks by apartheid South Africa aimed at destabilising the new Zimbabwe Government (Hanlon, 1986); and failure by international donors to deliver promised aid (Hanlon et al, 2012). These conditions contributed to falling GDP, rising public sector debt and the take up of conditional loans from the World Bank (Potts, 2010). Under pressure in 1991, Zimbabwe adopted a World Bank Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which included requirements for large scale cuts in public spending, the opening up of agricultural and industrial markets and the privatisation of state-led services and assets (Dashwood, 2003). Zimbabwe faced significant pressure to accept the neoliberal conditions included in ESAP. Potts (2010) states that the adoption of ESAP was unnecessary: dramatically increasing the vulnerability of a fledgling economy, by removing protections from
manufacturing and agricultural industries. ESAP, as suggested by Brown (2001: 324), for the Zimbabwean Government “signalled an end to its 12-year socialist economic policies.” Manjengwa (2012) citing Mlambo (1997) comments that the overall result of ESAP was a decline in the standards of living for most Zimbabweans; causing lower household earnings and rising unemployment.

This also marked the beginning of, what Hammar et al (2010) calls, the ‘informalisation of everything’; the loss of structural integrity in the formal economy to a point where informal became the norm. For the population at large and, to an extent, the political and administrative systems of the state, rent seeking and ‘making-do’ (Jones, 2010) provided the way to ‘get along’. This had significant political and economic impact as informal economic activity, with for example, the operation of markets and street vending in cities (including Harare), becoming highly politicised and governed through party allegiance, more than state licencing.

This created an undertone of insecurity, affecting both economic activity and tenure, where livelihoods are subject to internecine conflict. The importance of this is also felt in the lack of procedural coherence in gaining ‘permission’ for housing and economic activity for those outside of the elite; emphasising the importance of relationships and discourse over systems of formal challenge and negotiation.

4.2.1 Combative Politics

Party politics in newly independent Zimbabwe was deeply divided across ethnic lines with ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, associated with the Shona people and ZAPU, led by Joshua Nkomo, with Ndebele people. Alexander (1998) suggests that the ethnic and geographical identity of the two parties was a product of the recruitment patterns of guerrilla armies over the course of the 1970s. The first national elections held in February 1980, during the transition period when the British Government reassumed Governorship of the last days of Southern Rhodesia, reflected the inherent tensions of political groups formed in the context civil war. According to Bourne (2011), while ZANU and ZAPU agreed a pact to jointly enter the elections, the day before parties were required to register ZANU decided to run alone, ending the agreement with ZAPU.
While this proved tactically astute for ZANU and Robert Mugabe, who won 71 per cent of the votes and 57 of the 80 common roll parliamentary seats (Bourne, 2011: 95), it marked out a territory of ongoing division and conflict. The scale of victory by ZANU was achieved, according to Bourne (2011), through the effective use of propaganda and coercion. It also reflected the effectiveness of civil war practices of ZANU guerrillas who were engaged in educating and mobilising Black populations, while also fighting Rhodesian forces. Dzingai Mutumbuka, youngest member of the ZANU delegation at the Lancaster House conference, commented that “the style of fighting that ZANU was employing was to use those guerrillas as fighters / politicians ... they also went to explain what the fight was about.”\(^{14}\) The outcome of the election established ZANU as the dominant national party.

Bratton and Masunungure (2011) highlight how from the first government, President Mugabe located trusted political allies, former guerrilla commanders and professionals returning from exile, into key ministerial and security agency posts to reinforce his direct authority. Ministerial appointments were given to ZAPU members, including Joshua Nkomo, as Minister without Portfolio, but these were tokenistic with little authority over strategic areas of government. Justification for the consolidation of power around President Mugabe, and his close allies, was aided by sporadic insurgent activity by former ZAPU military (ZIPRA – Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) in western Zimbabwe, which according to Bratton and Masunungure (2011) gave President Mugabe the excuse he needed to dismiss ZAPU members of the government for their tacit support of anti-nationalist activity.

Inter-party tensions were exploited by the South African apartheid government who sought to undermine the Zimbabwean state\(^{15}\) by promoting conflict between Mugabe and Nkomo supporters (Chan, 2011). This came to a tragic conclusion with the torture and suppression of the Ndebele population and the massacre of some 20,000 Ndebele people in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces (Alexander, 1998; [\[\text{Source: BBC Radio 4 programme “The Reunion” broadcast on 31 August, 2014.}\]

\[^{14}\text{Source: BBC Radio 4 programme “The Reunion” broadcast on 31 August, 2014.}\]

\[^{15}\text{The South Africa government waged a covert campaign against Zimbabwe that involved promoting inter-ethnic tensions, destroying military establishments and arming criminal groups, see Hanlon (1986).}\]
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2007; Phimster, 2008; Chavunduka and Bromley, 2011). In February 1982, the discovery of a cache of arms was used as evidence of a planned insurrection by Nkomo supporters (Alexander, 1998). The government sent the brutal Fifth Brigade of the national Army, known as Gukurahundi – “the whirlwind that cleanses the crop by blowing away the chaff” (Chan 2011: 32) to supress potential revolt. The Gukurahundi were fiercely loyal and reported directly to the office of the President (Alexander, 1998). What occurred between January 1983 and the end of 1986 was a criminal massacre of Ndebele civilians, which secured the dominance of ZANU and the Shona people in national politics (Phimster, 2008). The acquiescence of ZAPU was finalised in a unity accord between ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 (Raftopoulos, 2013) leading to the creation, or at least a re-labelling, of ZANU-PF\textsuperscript{16} as the primary political party in Zimbabwe (Alexander and McGregor, 2003).

Sachikonye (2006) highlights how ZANU-PF, through the offices of state, became progressively authoritarian and violent, relying heavily on security agencies to control political opposition and protest. The politicisation of all aspects of state bureaucracy (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011) was supported by legislation that reinforced the authority of the state to deal with ‘dissidence’ (Alexander, 1998) and political opposition framed as counter-nationalism. Statutes including the \textit{Public Order and Security Act} and \textit{Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act} gave the state considerable power to suppress political opposition and civil society organisations and to limit public gatherings. Raftopoulos (2000) describes how, throughout the 1990s, growing tensions generated by weakening economic conditions and neoliberal ESAP policy, contributed to increased friction between government and civil society organisations. Women’s groups, church organisations and social welfare NGOs that aimed to fill gaps in the shrinking coverage of public services were, for the Zimbabwean government, a source of expressed criticism and a challenge to their legitimacy. The state was to paint NGOs as counter-

\textsuperscript{16} The Patriotic Front was the collective name used to describe the coalition of ZANU and ZAPU in the war against the Rhodesian Government of Ian Smith.
revolutionary and in the service of western powers, to justify the implementation of a series of statutory and security measures used to subordinate civil society.

The threat of serious violence helps to explain why Zimbabwean NGOs have a tendency, as suggested by McFadden (1999, cited by Raftopoulos, 2000: 45), to “work with and in the state” rather than offer a direct challenge to policy or engage in politics. Raftopoulos however, cautions against simplifying this as weak radicalism, pointing to complex relations where NGO activists shared common roots with the first generation of political leaders. This suggests more nuanced forms of political positioning, within a shared cultural experience of post-colonialism, while also highlighting the practices of the state to suppress perceived threats to its authority.

Direct challenge to the position of ZANU-PF began at the end of the 1990s, from a diverse alliance of actors opposing government policy, in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The core membership and leader were provided by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), an organisation paradoxically, at its formation on 28 February 1981, aligned to ZANU-PF and established to unify six existing trade union bodies. ZCTU gradually moved away from its paternalistic relationship with ZANU-PF from the mid-1980s, to become an important source of protest and political opposition to ESAP and the autocratic policies of the ZANU-PF government. The MDC was formed in 1999 under the banner of “a struggle for jobs, decency and democracy” (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011: 22) electing Morgan Tsvangirai as its leader at its inaugural party congress in January 2000.

The millennium year saw increasing use of violence by the ruling ZANU-PF party, as the untested MDC began campaigning for parliamentary elections in June 2000. In February a national referendum on a new constitution was rejected, albeit on a very small turnout of 20 per cent (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011), but this

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17 Details from ZCTU website: [www.zctu.co.zw](http://www.zctu.co.zw)
marked the first time that ZANU-PF had faced popular defeat. The response was an intensification of propaganda from ZANU-PF on the ‘unpatriotic’ and western aligned MDC, supported by a programme of violence and intimidation against political opposition that included invasion of White owned commercial farms. This had its origins in unresolved issues of access to land with resulting in attacks on White farmers who were portrayed as a primary source of support for MDC. Despite the violence, as Bourne (2011: 170) reports, the MDC won 57 seats with 47 per cent of the vote at the 2000 elections, compared to ZANU-PF who had 62 seats with a voting share of 48 per cent. This result, despite the many voting irregularities reported during the election, established the MDC as a credible opposition to the ruling party.

Violent confrontation between ZANU-PF and MDC continued during the decade, as MDC increased its political control over urban local government. This generated an increasing anti-urban stance by the ruling ZANU-PF, who promoted a narrative that associated urban support for MDC with counter-revolutionary activity. The Parliamentary elections in March 2005, which were characterised by political violence (Bourne, 2011), resulted in victory for ZANU-PF who secured 59.6 percent of the contested seats (Andrews and Morgan, 2005). Despite MDC maintaining strong support in urban areas, the loss of the elections caused a conflict among MDC leaders over party strategy. In October, 2005 a faction led by Arthur Mutambara split to form MDC-M. This according to Bourne (2011) this was in part a response to the corrosive impact of sustained violence and intimidation by ZANU-PF, but also reflected other underlying tensions. These included an inevitable fracture in the original broad-based coalition that formed MDC in 2000 and discontent in the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai following successive election ‘failures’.

4.2.2 Land Reform

As suggested above, access to and distribution of land is central to the post-colonial political narrative of Zimbabwe; forming “the centrepiece of the ruling party’s construction of belonging, exclusion and history” (Raftopoulos, 2004 quoted in
Alexander 2007: 183). ZANU-PF used the slogan “land is the economy and the economy is the land” (Bourne, 2011: 172) in their June 2000 parliamentary election campaign. The importance of land is illustrated by Barclay (2011: 153) who quotes President Mugabe from a speech made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002:

“[l]and comes first before all else [...] This is the one asset that not only defines the Zimbabwean personality and demarcates sovereignty, but also an asset that has a direct bearing on the fortunes of the poor and prospects for their immediate empowerment and sustainable development.”

Manjengwa (2012) highlights the frustrations created by the slow pace of land redistribution by the late 1990s, despite the terms of the Lancaster House agreement ending in 1990, as a cause of jambanja (land invasions) by peasant farmers, war veterans and politicised youth groups. While the land invasions may have begun spontaneously, although this is a contested point (Hammar, 2008), Moyo and Yeros (2007: 106) note that the “occupation movement was both adopted and co-opted by the ruling party”. Following the unexpected success of MDC in the parliamentary elections in 2000, Chan (2011) suggests that the international furore created by the farm invasions provided cover for the ruling party to align themselves with the land invaders and step up their intimidation of opposition party supporters. Chan (ibid: 134) states that by the first week of June 2000, 1,400 farms had been occupied and 29 MDC campaigners had been murdered.

Central to the ‘adopt and co-opt’ response suggested by Moyo and Yeros (2007), was the formalisation of land seizures through the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in July 2000 and later by the 17th Amendment to the Constitution in August 2005, which nationalised all commercial farming land in Zimbabwe. There are contrasting, and according to Rutherford (2012), shifting views on the ultimate effectiveness of the land reform programme. Scholars such as Moyo (2001); Scoones et al (2010); and Hanlon et al (2013) argue that, while fraught with

18 Full text of the speech can be found at: www.un.org/events/wssd/statements/zimbabweE.htm
difficulties, the transfer of land has served to redistribute ownership and provide a basis for enterprise and innovation that has benefitted populations in rural and peri-urban areas. This contrasts with view by scholars such as Hammar et al (2010) and McGregor (2013) who have concentrated on the violence and perceived corruption that has undermined a previously productive agricultural sector. Hammar et al (2010: 273) for example question whether land reform “can or should be assessed independently of ZANU-PF’s broader and violent hegemonic project.”

While there is insufficient space here to explore the specifics of these arguments further, the overall impact has been a significant restructuring of land ownership and use, with smallholding replacing the previously dominant model of large-scale commercial farming (Mamdani, 2008; Chimhowu, 2009). But moreover, as Matondi (2012) suggests, invasions, and the reform programmes constructed in response to them, have had a deep effect on how Zimbabweans locate themselves in relation to questions of land. While the vast majority of allocations incorporated into the reform programmes were in rural areas, peri-urban farmland was also affected. This included, according to Matondi (2012), land on the outskirts of Harare which, given its location, was particularly sought after. But state collusion in land invasions (Chavunduka and Bromley, 2011), and subsequent division of former commercial enterprises into small and medium sized farms, also had ramifications for perceptions of who could legitimately occupy land and the expectations of people in poverty in both rural and urban areas.

The issue has deep resonance for urban poor populations in relation to the growing need for land and housing in cities. Under colonial systems, and similar to the conditions for allocation of land in rural areas, spatial control was exercised to distinguish land for ‘native’ populations and ‘European’ settlers (Ranger, 2007). This included powers for municipal authorities, under the terms of the Land Apportionment Act 1930, to set aside Native Urban Areas which de facto segregated the remainder of the city (ibid: 168). The impact of this was both the creation of ‘high-density areas’ for Black workers, and the establishment of differential approach to public investment service infrastructure, political
representation, land use, housing design standards and the level of attention given by authorities to the wellbeing of residents. Both legalistic and discursive, Hanlon et al (2013) emphasise the cultural weight assigned to the word ‘squatter’ as a person ‘out of place’ who could be forcibly removed and prevented from occupying urban spaces without permission. This tension of place, space and people was played out in the most dramatic way in 2005 across the urban centres of Zimbabwe in the militaristic Operation Murambatsvina.

4.2.3 Operation Murambatsvina

The demands created by urbanisation across Zimbabwe have resulted in large scale under-provision of housing, with government estimating a national cumulative backlog in construction of over one million housing units in 2000 (UN-Habitat, 2009). For urban areas alone, government estimate a backlog of some 542,530 housing units; an unmet housing demand affecting 46.2% of urban populations in 2009 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2009). For Zimbabwe, in common with other African nations, increases in urban populations in the first decade after independence were, according to Myers (2011), as much to do with the perception of opportunity offered by cities as landlessness in rural areas. They also reflected a sense of entitlement that, after the spatial segregation created by colonial rule opportunities could and should be sought in cities by Black majority populations.

In addition to the quantum of unmet housing demand in cities, there were also serious qualitative problems, as Kamete (2006) and Chatiza and Mlalazi (2009) note, with overcrowding and large numbers of households living in unsafe and unsanitary conditions. This is particularly notable in Harare where state control of illegal settlement has concentrated low income families into low quality formal housing. There has been a systemic failure of state and market provision of housing, which has contributed to growth of unapproved development on marginal land (ibid). These typically consist of shacks, poor quality housing extensions and ‘back-yard’ developments in residential areas (Chitekwe-Biti 2009; Grey, 2012). Growing urban populations have also created a strain on infrastructure services (water, waste, sanitation and roads) and social service provision, that was already weak and
suffering from severe under-investment due to the national economic collapse and the combative politics of national and local government relations (Kamete, 2009). The scale of this challenge was recognised prior to economic crisis, by national and local government, as illustrated by the extract from Zimbabwe Parliamentary debate on housing.

“Housing the urban population is one of the biggest challenges that faces Zimbabwe today. The demand for housing increasingly continues to lag behind the provision of housing and the extent of overcrowding continues to increase. The majority of the urban population has responded to their immediate housing requirement by squatting in shacks or putting up shacks on perceived ‘available urban open land’. This has over the years forced urban local authorities to carry out forced evictions in a bid to clean up the urban areas. This has however not solved the problem of homelessness.”

May 2005 is a key moment for Zimbabwe when Operation Murambatsvina (or operation ‘restore order’) was initiated, with large scale ‘clearance’ of illegal and informal settlements. The chair of the Harare Commission, Sekesai Makwavarara, appointed by the Minister of Local Government following the suspension of democratic government in Harare (see section 4.3.4 below), announced that City of Harare intended to enforce by-laws and tackle all forms of illegal activity. She stated:

“[t]hese violations of the by-laws in areas of vending, traffic control, illegal structures, touting / abuse of commuters by rank marshals, streetlife / prostitution, vandalism of property infrastructure, stock theft, illegal cultivation among others have led to the deterioration of standards thus negatively affecting the image of the City” (quoted in Potts 2010: 214).

The scale and estimated impact of the operation, which was completed over a three month period, has been the subject of intensive study (for example Action Aid International, 2005; Tibaijuka 2005; Sachikonye, 2006; Potts 2010) and is thought to have directly affected over 700,000 people and indirectly up to 2.5 million people across Zimbabwe; destroying homes, livelihoods and communities. Potts (2011a)

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suggests that one in seven urban residents was made homeless by the ‘tsunami’ of demolitions, targeted at any structure or activity that was considered to breach planning by-laws or was otherwise unauthorised. The underlying motivations for Murambatsvina are frequently suggested as a political response by ZANU-PF to the growing popularity of MDC in urban areas (Action Aid International, 2005; Hammar, 2008), although the official justification used was the enforcement of planning and public health regulations. The politics cannot be ignored however, as Operation Murambatsvina took place just six weeks after national elections and was targeted primarily at urban areas, which were perceived as lost from the control of ZANU-PF (Hammar, 2008).

The government presented the action within a narrative of urban upgrading and public welfare: removing illegal, unsanitary and unsafe structures that were becoming increasingly visible in urban areas. The Government newspaper, The Chronicle, stated that Operation Murambatsvina was intended to “reverse the long-established culture in cities whereby municipal authorities’ by-laws were ‘flouted with reckless abandon to a point where some people now feel it is within their right to disregard local government regulations” (quoted in Mpofu, 2011: 178). While this, as Potts (2011b) discusses, had some resonance with western approaches to development control, it was used as a shock tactic to demonstrate state authority and deter rural to urban migration. It was also, according to Sachikonye (2006), a response to paranoia of civil unrest in the context of growing discontent in cities that were experiencing worsening economic conditions, deteriorating service provision including water shortages, disruptions in waste collection rising unemployment.

The Zimbabwean Government provided a post-hoc justification for the demolition of informal settlements by announcing a rebuilding programme called Operation Garikai / Hlalani Kuhle (OGHK) or ‘Operation Live Well’. This was presented as a formal response to the ‘clean-up’ campaign and intended as a large-scale programme to deliver low cost housing for the thousands affected by Murambatsvina. The “overall stated aim was to restore the dignity of victims and
meet their hopes for a better future by building homes for them and bays where they could earn their livelihood” (Mpofu, 2011: 183). While OGHK is regarded as little more than a public relations exercise to address the international criticism levelled at Zimbabwe following Murambatsvina, it did mark a reassertion by the state on issues of land use and the construction of housing.

The OGHK commitment, given the economic conditions in Zimbabwe from 2006, with weak planning, unachievable timescales and lack of local resource to provide serviced stands, was impossible to deliver (Sachikonye, 2006; Dzimiri and Runhare, 2012). Some investment in housing was made through this programme, with around 3,500 units completed (UN-Habitat, 2009) although many remained without connection to basic infrastructure. The units were typically made available to government officials and to ZANU-PF members selected from housing waiting lists, rather than those that had been violently displaced by Murambatsvina (Mpofu, 2011). Directed by national government, OGHK by-passed local council structures and made no impact in realising its aim of addressing the severe shortage of low cost housing. The overall consequence of Murambatsvina was to worsen living conditions in Zimbabwe, creating a dramatic rise in slum conditions and overcrowding after 2005 (UN-Habitat, 2012).

4.2.4 Economic Collapse

The economy of Zimbabwe had been weakening since the end of the 1990s with steady declines in both total economic output (as measured by national GDP) and worker productivity (GDP per capita). As shown in figure 4.1, GDP fell by some US$2.4 billion between 1999 and the height of the economic crisis in 2008. Formal employment all but disappeared with unemployment thought to be at 80 per cent in 2008 (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011). To illustrate, Chimhouwu (2009) estimates that employment in agriculture and manufacturing sectors (combined these represent nearly one-third of the Zimbabwean economy) fell from around 3.6 million in 2003 to just 480,000 by 2008. Across the country there was severe hardship and poverty as livelihoods collapsed, food was in short supply and public services failed. Potts (2010: 75) summarises the crisis in stating that “[n]early all the
people of Zimbabwe, who had possibly been the best educated, healthiest and longest-lived in sub-Saharan Africa at the end of the 1980s, by 2008 were living desperate lives in both urban and rural areas.”

**Figure 4.1**
**GDP and GDP per Capita, Zimbabwe 1980 – 2012**

Failure to deliver expected economic growth in the early part of the 1990s combined with the negative effects on industrial output and reductions in public sector employment, undermined the Zimbabwean economy by the end of the 1990s (Chimhowu, 2009). Government responded through crisis management (Potts, 2010) that included, according to Bratton and Masunungure (2011: 27), “an alphabet soup of emergency recovery programmes ... [that were] introduced and abandoned in quick succession.” This was accompanied by tightening security control, with the violent disruption of protests by ZCTU and community organisations, including the notorious beating and arrest of members of WOZA (Women of Zimbabwe Arise). The formal structures of the economy were failing and being replaced by informal activity and what Jones (2010) describes as “*kukiya-*

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20 GDP calculated at current US$ using official current conversion rates.
21 See Bourne (2011).
“kiya” (making-do to meet basic needs) of petty trading and insecure work on a subsistence basis. Chimhowu (2009: 19) cites US Aid estimates that by the end of 2008 “up to 80 per cent of the population survived on less than US$2 a day.”

The nadir of the economic crisis occurred in October 2008, when hyperinflation is estimated to have reached 3.8 trillion per cent per annum (Hanke and Kwok, 2009). Areasson (2010: 145) highlights the difficulty of defining the precise cause of the economic crisis, noting a number of contributing factors including ‘Black Friday’ in 1997 when the Zimbabwean Dollar depreciated by 74 per cent in just a few hours; the land invasions in 2000; payment of unaffordable pensions to war veterans; and military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo. To this can be added the policies that caused mass migration of skilled professionals resulting in an extraordinary displacement of populations outside of Zimbabwe (Hammar et al., 2010); and also Operation Murambatsvina that undermined the functional, if informal, parts of the economy. Sachikonye, (2006) cites the Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum (2005) who estimated that following Murambatsvina that one million people lost livelihoods across Zimbabwean cities because of the destruction of key points of supply and employment in the informal sector.

The economic crisis perhaps should be seen, as Bond (2007) suggests, as symptomatic of a longer pattern of acquisitive practices of the political elite and a steady loss of value in economic activity. This connects the social and economic consequences of government focused on retaining power through what Sarah Bracking (2005: 343) describes as Zimbabwe’s “exclusionary mode of political rule”. This suggests a mutual causality between failure to maintain economic stability and increasing autocratic policies of the state. The inherent dysfunction amplifies a desire to rule through domination, when few other institutional options appear available able to maintain the security of the political elite.

This was most evident in the 2008 elections, where MDC-T appeared to win a marginal victory in the parliamentary vote, securing 99 seats compared to ZANU-

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22 Trillion is used in the long scale meaning million billions (10^{18}).
PF’s 97 seats, with the splinter MDC–M winning 10 seats (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011: 30). Morgan Tsvangirai had also secured a small but insufficient majority over Robert Mugabe in the Presidential elections. The Zimbabwe Election Commission ordered, in line with constitutional requirements, a second round in the Presidential elections. What ensued was a period of political violence where 100 MDC officials and supporters were killed and beatings and intimidation were targeted at supporters of the opposition parties. In response to the violence, Tsvangirai withdrew from the second round elections giving ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe victory. While the elections and the violence were condemned internationally, it became the first time that other African leaders openly criticised the Zimbabwean regime, calling for a mediated response and the establishment of a government of national unity.

4.2.5 Global Political Agreement

The fall of Zimbabwe’s economy and the political violence surrounding the 2008 elections, provided a catalyst for action by African leaders to mediate a stabilisation pact between the main Zimbabwean political parties. The African Union (AU), led by the South African President Mbeki, “facilitated negotiations towards a power sharing agreement in an effort to end the […] impasse” that followed the 2008 elections (Government of Zimbabwe and UN Country Team, 2010: 3). This resulted in a Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of an ‘inclusive’ government on 13 February, 2009. The GPA secured the Presidency for Robert Mugabe and created a new post of Prime Minister for Morgan Tsvangirai, with key cabinet positions negotiated by MDC-T and MDC-M. Chan (2011) notes how both Mugabe and Tsvangirai vied for control of military and security services and the economic portfolio at the same time as trying to restrict the scope of operation of the other party in government.

From the outset the Government of National Unity (GNU) would be an uneasily coalition, where the protagonists jostled for strategic advantage. Chan (2011: 241) suggests that the key architects of ZANU-PF power saw the presence of MDC in government as a “temporary impediment” to their long period of control.
Muzondidya (2013: 49) goes further in suggesting that the GPA was “lopsided”, as it left “President Mugabe with undiluted executive powers, so allowing him the space to act unilaterally on issues of interest to himself and his party.” However, the politics of undermining and confrontation used by the ZANU-PF establishment was tempered with realism; it was only the MDC that could rebuild a dialogue with international financial institutions to address a nation with failing public infrastructure, demoralised people and major outbreaks of cholera in the cities. The process of stabilising Zimbabwe began in February 2009 with a national budget, produced by MDC-T Finance Minister Tendai Biti, which replaced the failed Zimbabwean Dollar with a multicurrency system, based on the US Dollar (Government of Zimbabwe and UN Country Team, 2010).

Raftopoulos (2010) provides a critical insight into the coalition, drawing on Gramscian theory, that characterises the GNU as a ‘passive revolution’, which changed, if temporarily, the configuration of party actors in government. He sees the GPA as an opportunity taken by ZANU-PF to regroup its position in national politics at a time when its existence was being challenged by economic and political crisis. The formation of an inclusive government provided a shield to external criticism from the west, as the Zimbabwean government stabilised the economy and social relations and presented the prospect of a transformation of national polity. Through the GNU, ZANU-PF maintained control of the Presidency and key ministries including as Raftopoulos (2010: 713) comments, “the state’s coercive forces to limit the implementation of those aspects of the GPA that could potentially open up democratic spaces in the Zimbabwean polity.” This included notably, ensuring the content and timing of a new constitution, did not reduce the power base or financial interests of ZANU-PF.

The GPA was designed to stabilise political relations following the violence of 2008 and prepare a process leading to general elections in 2012/13. However, as Muzondidya (2013) suggests, it was limited in not facilitating inter-party cooperation in government, once the GPA had been signed. Across the 25 articles
included in the GPA agreement, the key measures focus on joint responsibility of political parties to re-establish economic stability; to draft a new constitution; to respect the principles of free speech and assembly; and define the governmental structures for the GNU. The GPA also attempted to move beyond the trauma of the previous two decades, for example on the issue of land, where the agreement explicitly states that signatories accept the irreversibility of land acquisition and redistribution that had occurred since 2000. While a degree of stability, both economic and political, was achieved under the GNU, scholars such as Raftopoulos (2010; 2013), Hammar et al (2010), Sachikonye (2011) and McGregor (2013) underline how ZANU-PF was able to maintain and extend its politics of patronage and continue to use violence and coercion to preserve its key centres of power.

The GNU and GPA came to an end in July 2013, with unified national elections for Parliamentary seats and the Presidency. The widely held expectation, prior to the vote, was the elections were a formality and MDC-T would repeat its record of success in 2008 and remove ZANU-PF from office (Booysen, 2014). The result however, was quite different. In a largely peaceful election process, which was marked more by arguments on the accuracy of electoral roles than scenes of violence, ZANU-PF won majorities in both Parliamentary and Presidential elections. Despite charges of vote rigging and appeals by MDC-T to Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Court, the election results stood and were endorsed by SADC and AU election observers.

Recent analysis such as Raftopoulos (2013) and Muzondidya (2013) suggest that while the GNU provided an important period of ceasefire and stabilisation, it did little to affect the underlying politics of Zimbabwe. ZANU-PF regained ground, taking the time to regroup its political machinery and MDC-T had experience of government and the exercise of ‘state-craft’. Overall, there was little change in the

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efficacy of the state to build public services or ultimately a break away from the paradigm of violence and control that had characterised the period from 1990. Post-election, the state has reverted to the fixed range of public policy responses that preserve the interests of the ruling party, providing limited space for new responses to long standing issues of underinvestment and economic stagnation.

4.3 Harare

Harare is the capital city of Zimbabwe and the seat of national government. Harare, formerly known as Salisbury prior to independence, was established in 1890 as a colonial fort and incorporated as a city in 1935. The metropolitan area of Harare covers some 890Km², including the dormitory towns of Epworth and Chitungwiza²⁵ and has a recorded population of 2.1 million across 531,967 households.²⁶ Harare is the most populace province in Zimbabwe, with 16.2 per cent of the national population. The population of Harare is reported to have grown by 1.0 per cent since the national Census of 2002; this is consistent with national population growth over the same period of 1.1 per cent.²⁷ Chatiza and Malazi (2009) highlight the likely inaccuracy of national statistics in registering population numbers because in high density settlements, such as Epworth, large numbers of the population are ‘informally settled’ and may be uncounted in official data.

4.3.1 Urbanisation

According to United Nations data, as shown in figure 4.2, there has been steady growth in urban populations in Zimbabwe since independence, with an increase of 3.6 per cent per year between 1980 and 2010. This data suggests that in 2010, 38.1 per cent of the Zimbabwean population was urban, with continuing urbanisation this is forecast, over the next decade, to reach 46 per cent in 2025. While the graph indicates a linear rise, there was a significantly slowing of urban population growth between 1995 and 2010 which corresponds with state action to deter rural – urban migration through demolitions of informal settlements. The general trend is

²⁵ City of Harare Department of Urban Planning Services – Annual Report 2011.
²⁷ Ibid.
consistent with Potts’ (2013) findings that rural-urban migration typically slowed in African nations following a peak period immediately after independence. This also reflects Satterthwaite’s (n.d) cautions to ensure a clear understanding of the difference between urban population growth and urbanisation – the latter being a shift of populations from rural to urban rather than just increases in the number of urban residents.

Figure 4.2
Percentage Urban Population, Zimbabwe 1980 - 2025

![Graph showing percentage urban population in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2025 with a forecast]


Urban population growth in Zimbabwe has, according to Sachikonye (2006: 11) “far outstripped the capacity of the authorities to provide decent and adequate shelter, hence the recourse to self-provisioning of housing by part of the population.” The patterns of settlement established during the colonial era categorised Black workers as temporary migrants who were spatially segregated into ‘black spaces’ of the city (Potts 2010; 2011). Chatiza and Malazi (2009: 17) point out that it was not until the 1970s that city administrators “grudgingly recognized the permanency of married black families as urban residents.” The racist practices and legislative frameworks “governing urban development placed the burden of housing provision
squarely on local authorities [who] were ill-prepared to cater for rapid urbanization and the growing population” Chitekwe-Biti (2009: 348).

As described above, urbanisation manifests in Zimbabwe as growing high density settlements and the proliferation of backyard shacks which offer basic, if expensive, accommodation for migrants and low income earners. The character of this growth in Harare differs from the expansive urban ‘slum’ areas found in other African cities, with populations in Harare concentrated in holding camps and formal low income areas. According to Rakodi (1995) City Council action to demolish squatter camps during the 1980s and 1990s forced urban poor to spaces that kept them out of public sight. Spatial growth in Harare between 1984 and 2013 is characterised by infill, unapproved extensions of formal housing and leapfrog developments, which are attributed to rapid population growth and government housing policy among other factors (Kamusoko et al, 2013). The development of informal housing was part of complex relationships between settlers and local and national government, with inaction by the state providing tacit approval for the construction of housing. Sithole and Goredema (2013) discuss the significant volume of housing development that has taken place on wetlands and arable lands on the periphery of Harare. This reflects both a lack of available land for affordable development and the opportunistic (and illegal) approvals granted by local and national government officials and politicians.28

A key mechanism used by the state to manage unwanted urban populations is the creation of ‘holding camps’. These are settlements established by government located on the outskirts of cities as ‘temporary’29 locations for people displaced by large scale demolitions of illegal dwellings. These according to Kamete (2007) and Potts (2010) were used to assess and process people; those without resource or employment in the city were told to return, often forcibly, to rural areas. These camps had infamous reputations, such as Caledonia Farm, of being “places of extreme deprivation and terrible environmental conditions” (Potts, 2010: 228). The

28 This issue is discussed empirically in Chapter Eight.
29 Tibaijuka (2005) notes the camps are described as temporary, many people have been resident for a number of years.
peripheral location of camps such as Porta Farm, which is 40km west of the city centre, made obtaining work in the informal sector difficult. Rakodi (1995: 74) reports in the early 1990s how residents “depended on food handouts from the Salvation Army and World Vision ... [and] resorted to doing odd jobs on nearby farms, scavenging, producing illegal alcohol or prostitution”. Potts (2008) describes how post-Operation Murambatsvina people in holding camps were ‘stuck’; having neither the resource to find formal accommodation in the city nor the ability to return to their rural ‘home’.

4.3.2 Relationship with Communities – Institutional Frameworks

Despite the removal of movement controls following independence (Potts 2011b), low income families and economic migrants to the cities in Zimbabwe had few opportunities to secure land for housing. While the formal segregation of cities was removed from statute books, Mitlin (2004: 175) notes that in Zimbabwe, spatial exclusivity was maintained through land pricing and the implementation of unaffordable building standards and regulations. Brown (2001: 321) also highlights how “housing policies have reinforced segregation and created new low-income communities which are isolated in the outskirts of the city.” The relationship between communities and the City of Harare Council on the issues of land and housing is managed through the application of regulations and processes of enforcement (Kamete, 2002). The formal institutional framework, on issues of land and housing for local authorities, are contained in three Acts of Parliament: the Regional Town and Country Planning Act; Urban Councils Act; and the Public Health Act, which together provide the legal basis and powers for the City Council’s actions.

While legal definitions of land use and the responsibilities of local authorities to deliver needed infrastructure are clear in statute, there is a severe lack of capacity to implement existing regulations (Chatiza, 2010). This reflects an institutional disjunction between the intent of the regulations and the ‘reality’ of the conditions that the regulations are designed to manage. This is manifest in Harare in the

30 The spatiality of informal settlements is discussed further in Chapter Five.
under-provision of serviced land, poorly maintained and overwhelmed public infrastructure and, according to Chitekwe-Biti (2014), the use of regulation to criminalise of survival strategies of the urban poor. This institutional disjuncture most significantly affects low income communities, who are subject to regulations that, as Berrisford (2014: 167) suggests for planning law, lack any “significant societal benefits”, but it also creates a constraint to the operation of local government. The lack of resource and growing demand for services entrench behaviours and undermine the ability and the confidence of local authorities to develop solutions to long term urban development issues. This creates negative patterns of organisational behaviour, where local authorities focus on the functions they are able to deliver, rather than engineering the services they should be delivering, in order to continue to maintain organisational coherence.

Even where NGOs come forward with potential solutions to long standing problems, historically this has been treated as a challenge to the established culture and operational practices of the state (Chiroro, 2013). In Zimbabwe, local government lacks the institutional autonomy to act outside of statutorily prescribed roles and has weak participative traditions to engage effectively with the community in the delivery of services. This tension has been exacerbated, in the case of NGO relationships, by national policies that have sought to define NGO activity and organised communities in opposition to the national leadership of government. Chatiza (2010: 21) notes “local government has, in the majority of instances, lacked capacity to nurture civil society, let alone define and protect citizen spaces from closure by central government.” Paradoxically, in Harare, it is the NGO and cooperative housing sectors that have been instrumental in bolstering the legitimacy of local government by providing capacity and new ideas, as explored empirically in Chapters Seven and Eight.
4.3.3 Discursive Representations of Poverty

Despite the socialist intentions\(^{31}\) of the first Zimbabwean governments in the decade after independence, the state promoted contradictory representations of people in poverty in support of its political objectives and efforts to control urban population growth. Teeden and Drakakis-Smith (1986: 314) note that following independence rising rural poverty and dismantling of movement controls resulted in increased migration to cities. The expanding migrant populations created a tension for the state, and its policies to build an urban middle class (Rakodi, 1995), that disrupted its vision of modernisation. While government considered a range of policies to address growing pressure for housing, including the establishment of urban ‘building brigades’, (construction workers mobilised from within urban communities to provide the labour for housing and public works), the state ultimately went ‘back’ to the enforcement of existing planning policies to control squatting and illegal settlement (Teeden and Drakakis-Smith, 1986). Enforcement was supported by a discourse that limited entitlement to reside in the city; associating people in poverty with crime, ill-health and counter-nationalist behaviours.

These policies have continued, largely unabated, and are reflected in the spatiality of low income communities (see figure 5.2 for an illustration of spatial distribution of low income communities in Harare) and reinforced through cultural representations of poverty and informality. Squatters and illegal settlements are presented as threats to civic order and a source of criminal behaviour. This is illustrated by press reports in Harare during 2011 and 2012 which refer to illegal settlements that ‘mushroom’ in Harare that provide a “platform for the outbreak of diseases such as cholera and dysentery.”\(^{32}\) Similarly, the ZANU-PF supporting Sunday Mail highlights the “curse of illegal settlements” as sources of “prostitution and thuggery” citing that the City of Harare Council plan to “clamp down on illegal

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\(^{31}\) The first Zimbabwean government from 1980 adopted a policy rhetoric of ‘one family, one home’ (Teeden and Drakakis-Smith, 1986).

structures and restore sanity in and around the capital”. The use of language to elicit Malthusian fears of rapid and overwhelming population growth and consequent risks to public welfare are typical of press reports on informality in Zimbabwe. This discourse is used to both justify draconian acts by the state (as with Operation Murambatsvina) but also to deny the agency and legitimacy of people in poverty (Benford and Snow, 2000; Kamete, 2002; Fischer, 2006).

As discussed in Chapter Eight, affecting the patterns of discourse and challenging the representation of low communities is central to changing institutions and institutional behaviour. In the context of Harare, limitations placed on the citizenship of people in poverty is a major obstacle to low income communities engaging and then interacting with the state in meaningful ways. Discourse has been used in Harare to maintain binary positions that isolate low income communities both spatially, justifying the use of holding camps, and in respect to ‘rights to the city’. This is overlaid by party politics, where acts of loyalty to ZANU-PF provide one of the few available routes for people in poverty to access housing and basic services.

4.3.4 Political Relations – City and National Government

The City of Harare Council has experienced a declining ability to deliver urban services as the economic and political conditions have worsened. This is despite continuing to bear formal responsibility for the management of the urban realm. The fraught political relations after 2000, caused by the success of MDC-T in local government elections, ensured that relations were conducted through the medium of party politics. This included both a loss of revenue to deliver services and also frequent interventions by the Minister for Local Government in local decisions. These Sachikonye (2006) suggests were intended to frustrate and undermine MDC-T control of urban councils. This included for Harare, the dismissal of the elected Mayor Elias Mudzuri in December 2004 replaced, under the authority of the

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33 Sunday Mail (1 September 2012) ‘Shanty Town Menace Haunts Harare’.
34 The financial situation was exacerbated in August 2013 when central government ordered local authorities to cancel the debts of residents for services owed since February 2009. See http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/councils-plunge-into-crisis/
Minister of Local Government, by a commission led by a ZANU-PF appointed chair (Kamete, 2009). This, as discussed above in the context of Operation Murambatsvina, marked a hiatus in local democracy and an assertion of the authority of central government over the political control of local government. The Harare Commission, which under the terms of the Urban Councils Act should have been implemented as an emergency measure for a period not exceeding six months, ended in March 2007, after two years, following challenge in the high court (Potts, 2010).

Under the Harare Commission there was an ongoing battle between the Minister for Local Government (Ignatius Chombo) and City Councillors. MDC-T Councillors refused to support many of the edicts issued by the Minister which led to the dismissal of six Councillors and the suspension of 13 others (Kamete, 2006). These tensions continued after the restoration of democratic control of Harare creating a fraught relationship between the City and central Government. In addition to the bureaucratic roadblocks, which frustrated the effective administration and development of Harare, were serious acts of violence and intimidation against MDC-T Councillors. This included an attack against Emmanuel Chiroto, the MDC-T Mayor of Harare, on 16 June 2008, allegedly by ZANU-PF supporters. Chiroto’s home was fire-bombed and his wife and four year old son were kidnapped. Chiroto’s wife Abigail was found two days later, murdered, on a farm in Borrowdale. 35 Emmanuel Chiroto went into hiding with his son. This incident illustrates a pattern of violence and intimidation by the Government against opposition party Councillors and MPs to undermine the functioning of urban government. 36

In this context Harare attempted to manage the relationship with Government and with Minister Chombo at a technical level, outside of overt party politics. This

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included the appointment\(^{37}\) of Muchadeyi Masunda as Mayor of Harare in July, 2008. Masunda is a prominent lawyer and businessman in Zimbabwe who is not a member of a political party; a factor that he used\(^ {38}\) to negotiate support and a working relationship with Minister Chombo. The relationship between city and national government during the period of the GNU followed an existing pattern where local government was starved of funding and had limited support in the development of new approaches to urban management. As discussed in Chapter Eight however, ZHPF and Dialogue did manage to build a relationship with national politicians and ministerial officials with responsibility for land and housing issues. This created a seam of credibility that is likely to have reinforced the ability of the City of Harare to avoid censure from Minister Chombo in developing an external profile and direct relations with donors.\(^ {39}\)

### 4.4 Changing Approaches to Informal Settlements

Since the formation of ZHPF in 1997, international discussion of urban development and governance has been buoyed by the creation of global networks of the urban poor. This is contextually significant in contributing the effectiveness and the authority of community based organisations in Zimbabwe and in establishing a normative base for the participative engagement of the state. As discussed below, the development of Shack / Slum Dwellers International (SDI) created a formal structure for country focused collective groups of the urban poor to connect globally, to exchange learning and to raise their profile on the world stage. This was instrumentally important for Zimbabwean groups as it provided a source of support and a validation of their actions to mobilise communities and engage local and national government in dialogue on upgrading of informal settlements. The actions by organised low income communities were accompanied by, and connected to,

\(^{37}\) An amendment to the Local Government Laws Amendment Act, December 2007 saw the abolition of executive mayors in favour of a more ceremonial role. Mayors were appointed by a majority vote of the governing party. This amendment was supported by MDC-T, according to McGregor (2013), as the directly elected mayors risked creating power bases that were outside of party control.

\(^{38}\) Interview with former City of Harare politician, 12 November 2013.

\(^{39}\) Mayor Masunda was appointed to the UN Advisory Council on Local Authorities (UNACLA) in January 2010, becoming Vice President for the Southern Africa region of the United Cities and Local Government Africa (UNLGA) in March 2010.
changes in the discourse of international policy on housing and urban governance. This is also contextually significant for the work of ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare as it provided a supportive background and a frame for public policy discussions, which smoothed a path for the challenges of changing institutions at a city and national level.

4.4.1 Shack / Slum Dwellers International ⁴⁰

SDI formed in 1996 as a network of community based organisations of the urban poor in the Global South. ⁴¹ It built upon the federated groups of six countries: India, South Africa, Namibia, Cambodia, Nepal and Thailand who had mobilised low income communities to challenge the state for improvements in housing and access to basic services. SDI created a global platform to engage with governments and international organisations and to participate in discussions on urban development; to share the experiences and knowledge of low income communities across different contexts; and innovate new solutions long-standing problems of urban poverty. The formation of SDI, and the national federations it supports, arises from discontent with the effectiveness of state action and the uninformed nature of generic anti-poverty strategies (Bolnick, 2008; Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014).

Central to the philosophy of SDI is that poor people and communities are essential participants to addressing urban poverty and, as suggested by Appadurai (2004), are necessary partners, with organisations of the state, in development. Seventeen years after its formation, SDI connects with over one million active saving members, across 34 countries and over 300 cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America (SDI, 2013).

SDI affiliate members operate a particular model and approach: seeking partnerships with the state as a primary method to challenge for the interests of low income communities (Appadurai, 2001; Mitlin and Patel, 2014). SDI has adopted non-party alignment, which McFarlane (2004: 907) says “facilitates the formation of particular spaces of political engagement while excluding other

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⁴⁰ The term ‘slum’ is commonly used in Asia while ‘shack’ is typically used in Africa – the use of the organisations name therefore depends on who is using it. See Patel et al (2001).
⁴¹ See www.sdinet.org for details of SDI global activity.
possibilities.” The national shack/slum dweller federations typically form around women organised savings schemes geared towards meeting daily needs and contributing to upgrading squatter settlements, securing land tenure or the development of low-cost housing (Mitlin, 2003; Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2007). Scale and legitimacy is achieved through active and member led ‘mobilisation’ of urban poor residents and this generates social capital in the form of finance, knowledge and mutual support. As McFarlane (2004) suggests, this highlights a choice by urban residents to pursue collaborative and co-productive approaches as the best route to meeting the needs of low income communities.

SDI federations42 operate, as Pieterse (2008: 115) states, through “unambiguously people-led, people-centred and people-controlled” structures. Involvement of low income communities is organised through ‘rituals’ (established practices) that include “enumeration and mapping, surveying, house modelling and savings schemes establishment, exchange visits between settlements and internationally, precedent setting and claim-making.” These form the basis of a refined set of activities that maintain the engagement of members as well as officials and politicians of local and national government. The programme of visits and exchanges is particularly important as a way to share knowledge across networks, build solidarity and to establish relationships with politicians and officials (SDI, 2013). Investment in learning for members is essential to “ensure that ideas come from the urban poor and are not imposed on them by well-meaning professionals” (Mitlin and Patel, 2014: 301). Through removing local and national government partners from their familiar context, SDI affiliates are able to discuss key issues in an abstracted way that sits outside of the epistemic and political constraints of specific city based problems. “[E]xchanges provided an opportunity for Council to see how collaborating with low income communities could help them to address some of the issues that they were failing to address on their own.”43

42 Local groups of the urban poor are neighbourhood based and come together at city and national levels to create country based federations.

43 Interview with Dialogue manager, 10 May 2013.
The scalar characteristic of SDI affiliates working at neighbourhood, city, national and international levels enables organisational activity to remain grounded in the everyday experiences of urban poverty, but also protect the coherence of the organisation from co-optation. A key danger, as examined in Chapter Seven, is that the transformative objectives of SDI are undermined by accommodating the interests of the state. This is addressed to a large extent by the systems of mutual accountability and subsidiarity which exists within SDI affiliates; as primary authority is located at the community level. However, this is not always effective, as Steven Robins (2008: 94) discusses in the context of South Africa, where one Federation group in Cape Town, assumed authority over smaller groups and became “hierarchical, centralised, violent and intolerant of competition”. Where systems of mutual accountability and decision making work, they can offer an important bulwark for community members to preserve identity and independence from state and from the influence of NGO partners.

The approach and methods developed by SDI and its affiliate members has resonance with neoliberal development policy and in particular the role of ‘citizen’ groups challenging, and seeking to hold accountable, public funded service providers. McFarlane (2012: 2808 citing Pierce, 2007) reports comments by a B&MGF programme officer that SDI was a good ‘bet’ as they expected that the entrepreneurialism shown by SDI would help generate match funding and overcome the typically unhelpful attitudes of municipal authorities. While superficially in keeping with hegemonic ideas of development, the creation of collective and communal action through savings schemes, enumerations and networks of mutual support reflect how communities combat their exclusion from institutionalised routes of redress (as Castells, 1983). SDI has packaged their approach in a way that enables them to connect with dominant policy actors, in order to build a voice and construct collaborative and co-productive initiatives. This creates more than a veneer of ‘neo-liberal populism’ as suggested by Roy (2010), but rather provides a point of connection with, and influence on, the epistemology of urban development.
4.4.2 International Policy Priorities

Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) highlight how, historically, there has been a limited urban focus in the design and the delivery of official development assistance beyond the support provided incidentally through sector targeted programming. Monitoring of donor funding undertaken by IIED (International Institute of Environment and Development) from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s shows the relatively low priority given to urban poverty issues directly, and within this almost no support for improvements to informal housing settlements (Satterthwaite, 1997; 2001). They suggest that the World Bank is exceptional in its support for providing funds to support ‘sites and services’ programmes as part of a wider objective to create the conditions for economic growth (World Bank, 2008). While the MDGs from 2000 provide a sub-target to improve the lives of slum dwellers, scholars such as Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) suggest that the MDGs served to shift donor assistance to issues with a ‘higher moral imperative’ away from the addressing structural causes of urban poverty.

Pieterse and Parnell (2014) highlight the recent and rapid growth of urban populations in Africa and the implications of this for national and international development policy. Pieterse (2008) highlights the contributions of organisations, including UN-Habitat and the Cities Alliance, in building a debate on issues of housing and urban governance in the Global South. Initiatives such as City Development Strategies (Cities Alliance, 2006) create a framework for the development of ‘inclusive cities’ that address objectives to promote economic growth, while also building the capacity of urban government and governance to address poverty and inequality. Central to the delivery of inclusive cities is the agency and participation of low income communities to contribute to sustainable development. Stren (2012) points to a wide range of experiments, linked to inclusive cities, on the delivery of urban services in water, sanitation, health and

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44 MDG 7d: Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.
public transport that have involved communities and NGOs working in partnership with local government.

The potential contribution of community based organisations to urban development is through improving the economic efficiency and the ‘scaleability’ of public investment in housing and basic services. Pieterse (2008: 117 - 118) highlights the formation of the South African People’s Housing Partnership Trust, as promoted by SDI at the Habitat II Conference in 1996, as a means of co-producing the construction of low cost housing.\(^\text{45}\) He outlines how this entails combining state resources, in the allocation of land and funding for infrastructure, with the “sweat equity” of communities who contribute the labour for collective self-help housing construction. The effect of this has been to reduce the direct costs of development to the state, while increasing the speed of delivery by ensuring that local communities had a major stake in the successful development of the housing scheme.

As described in Chapter One, the launch of a new set of development targets from 2015 provides an opportunity to build both dialogue and targeted action on housing and urban poverty. This will require not just a set of targets for urban development, but measures to locate co-productive approaches at the centre of delivery arrangements. As Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) suggest, even with sympathetic policies for urban development, operational capacity is required at all levels to achieve sustainable improvements to cities. This creates an opportunity, and an additional contextual incentive, for urban partnerships to showcase their activity through initiatives such as the World Urban Forum meetings.\(^\text{46}\) These events not only raise the profile of urban development issues and create opportunities for cross-contextual learning but, moreover help to embed the importance of participative urban development with stakeholders in governments and international agencies. This motivates ongoing discussion at a policy level and, through reference to international discourse, makes local negotiations more likely.

\(^{45}\) See also Huchzermeyer (2004).

\(^{46}\) See for example the World Urban Forum 7 programme and report: [http://wuf7.unhabitat.org](http://wuf7.unhabitat.org)
4.5 Conclusion

This Chapter has aimed to provide a brief historical and political context for the empirical Chapters that follow, focusing on the development of Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 to the national elections in July 2013. While the intention is not to provide a summary of Zimbabwe’s turbulent history, as there are many excellent studies that cover this ground, it is important to locate the behaviour and the thinking of state and community actors within a cultural and historical frame.

For a majority of Zimbabweans, the struggle for independence and majority rule is a recent, and manifestly important, factor in the construction of identity and the expectations that they hold about their government and the conduct of society. According to important scholars of Zimbabwe such as, Raftopoulos, Sachikonye, McGregor and Hammar as referenced above, much of the inheritance of independence has been stolen or otherwise squandered away from the majority of Zimbabwean people, through acts of state initiated violence. Episodes of violence and endemic rent seeking set the contextual tone for low income communities who occupy a tenuous position, being both formally illegal in their occupation of land and disenfranchised through their poverty.

The issue of land remains a central and contentious issue in the politics of Zimbabwe, which has affected both rural and urban areas. In the cities, including Harare, economic and political conditions have exacerbated the difficulty of providing sufficient land and infrastructure to meet the demand for housing. While this has often caused institutional retrenchment, such as the reliance on the violent enforcement of planning policies, the inadequacy of the state to meet its statutory responsibilities has also created spaces for collaboration as explored in Chapters Six to Eight. The generation of new ideas and approaches to managing relations with the state have been out of necessity; arising from a resolute disappointment with the ability of the state to deliver development to low income communities.

The period since 2008, with the formation of the GNU and the appointment of a non-partisan Mayor in Harare, has produced a degree of stability for low income
communities, even if this has not been accompanied by significantly improved economic conditions. It has, however, provided an opportunity for ZHPF and Dialogue to be established as a partner to the City of Harare and to build a relationship with government on issues of land and housing. The following Chapter provides a deeper insight into the development of ZHPF and Dialogue through an empirical examination of collaborative and co-productive projects in Harare. This examines how ZHPF and Dialogue have used the delivery of incremental housing development to build their legitimacy and a track record of delivery, which has affected both the discursive position of low income communities and enabled the development of co-productive relationships.
Chapter 5
Research Background to the Case Study Areas and Communities

5.1 Introduction

As reported in Chapter Three, the fieldwork for this research was undertaken in Zimbabwe during 2013 and early 2014 with stakeholders from the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZHPF), Dialogue on Shelter Trust (Dialogue) and the City of Harare Council. Using a process tracing method, the research sought to identify and triangulate evidence on the institutional impact of co-production over the period 1997 to 2013. This first empirical Chapter reports the results of the fieldwork, to add depth to the contextual descriptions provided in Chapter Four and specific detail of activity in preparation for the empirical analysis presented in Chapters Six to Eight. This Chapter begins the examination of data collected during the fieldwork, to build a picture of the places and the people who participated in, and were the principal focus for, this research.

To examine the institutional impact of co-production requires a study of the personal, political and power relationships of actors operating in the context of Zimbabwe. Within this research, these relationships are explored in two ways. Firstly, by considering the evolution of relationships, reflected in the discourses and behaviours of stakeholders towards each other, around issues of housing and service development in low income communities. Secondly, through the examination of two case study areas: Crowborough North and Dzivarasekwa Extension. The development of these settlements marks the evolving relationship between the community and the City of Harare Council. These case studies do not represent the totality of engagement between low income communities and the state, but are presented here as moments of transition to illustrate the deepening bonds of trust between stakeholders and the creation of platforms that enabled relationship, and institutions to adapt.
The Chapter continues by introducing ZHPF and the savings schemes that form the core of its mobilisation activity. This is followed by a report on how Dialogue and ZHPF have helped to articulate the character of informality and unmet housing need in the City. Dialogue and ZHPF have used mapping, enumerations and surveys to builds evidence that positions the experience of urban poverty in a way is ‘visible’ to the state. The Chapter then examines the evolving relationship between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare over the period 1997 to 2013, through specific projects of collaboration. The aim is to highlight how relations change in order to assess the significance of strengthening ties against the contextual conditions identified in Chapter Two. The Chapter concludes by considering the scope and scale of activity shown in the data prior to the detailed analysis that follow.

5.2 Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation

ZHPF began in 1997 with four residents living in holding camps in Harare. It has grown to have a membership of some 54,000 across 658 savings schemes in 74 local authority areas in Zimbabwe, as illustrated in figure 5.1 (Chitekwe-Biti, 2014). ZHPF was established to overcome the isolation experienced by residents of holding camps, urban ‘squatter settlements’ and overcrowded formal housing. To facilitate conversation and to mobilise participation, ZHPF was constructed around community savings schemes, which as D’Cruz and Mudimu (2013) identify, were intended to contribute to build a collective financial asset and provide a source of small crisis loans. The essential character of ZHPF was defined through the social relationships between people (and typically women) in poverty. Despite differences of ethnicity, culture and politics among members, ZHPF aimed to create networks for dialogue and mutual support that helped to address the daily challenges of urban poverty.47

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47 Interview with ZHPF leaders 5 November 2013.
5.2.1 Structure and Membership

ZHPF, in keeping with the structures and practices developed by SDI, is built from small community based savings groups. These “form the basis of collective action in urban poor communities” and the foundation architecture for national federations “that provide their savers with more influence and scope for action” (SDI, 2013: 34). The savings groups have a majority of women members, with for example 65 per cent female membership across the 184 groups in Harare.\textsuperscript{48} Small savings groups, each with a membership of between 30 and 50 people, provide the core and the organisational coherence of ZHPF as a movement of people in poverty. While membership is open to all residents of low income communities, members are required to commit to savings and communal activity, this requirement can be seen

\textsuperscript{48} ZHPF – National Membership Information (September, 2012)
as a potential barrier to participation. The ZHPF model is predicated on the potential for material benefit over the long term, rather than any immediate gain. This for some people, including current members who had previously left and then returned to ZHPF, provides insufficient incentive to commit to membership.\textsuperscript{49}

The practice of daily saving is a key ‘ritual’ of ZHPF membership, that “strengthens social organisation” (Mitlin, 2003: 184) and provides the resources for “asset based community development” (Pieterse, 2008: 115). D’Cruz and Mudimu (2013) highlight that while daily savings creates a discipline of saving small amounts of money from irregular earnings, toward a reserve fund for households emergency or capital purchases, as described below, it is also a key organisational technique of maintaining engagement and promoting bonds of mutual support among members. They quote from a South African Federation member who says: “it is easier to save one or two Rand each day than try to put by 30 Rand every month. I am embarrassed to go to the savings meeting if I do not have that 30 Rand to spare” (ibid: 39).

Savings groups provide the foundational structure to co-ordinate individual members and households and provide an important forum for forward planning of group activity. The groups offer, as a Crowborough North resident suggested, places for the “everyday talkings of poverty”\textsuperscript{50} and an opportunity for members to work through problems, issues and tactics. Simone (2010: 8) suggests that such forms of collective action are “opportunities for participants to rehearse various practices of negotiation, collaboration, exchange and strategic planning.” For ZHPF, savings groups enable individual households to build reciprocal relationships with neighbours that embed practices of democratic decision making and systems of accountability. Creating and supporting leadership at a grassroots level contributes to ongoing mobilisation, builds confidence and the efficacy essential to co-production, as described in Chapter Two.

\textsuperscript{49}Two female interviewees in Dzivarasekwa Extension had previously left ZHPF because they had found other ways to meet their housing and health needs.

\textsuperscript{50}Male interviewee, aged 39, Crowborough North, 2 July 2013.
The development and delivery of projects, in the form of collaborative activities identified by savings groups, is a mechanism for maintaining and renewing organisational structures. These can include income generating initiatives such as running a market stall;\textsuperscript{51} skills sharing by members in for example, sewing, building or soap making, which assist individuals to secure income or employment;\textsuperscript{52} through to larger scale construction projects that contribute to the upgrading of the local environment or improve access to facilities such as toilet blocks (D’Cruz and Mudimu, 2013). Projects are agreed by members and contribute to “maintain[ing] functional relationships with neighbours, co-workers, and extended family members” Simone (2010: 10). The group structure, with the social and organisational bonds that sustain it, provide the means through which the collective resources of the poor can be orchestrated. This secures benefit both for individual members that are able to draw support, in various forms, and for the collective interests of the group who, through ZHPF, are able to operationalise aggregate resources toward communal projects.

The organisational structure for ZHPF and Dialogue is set out in figure 5.2. The key feature is the hierarchical relationship between the grassroots savings groups, which ZHPF and Dialogue see as the primary source of authority and resource for ZHPF, sub-regional networks and the regional and national leadership. Dialogue is shown as providing administrative support, technical advice, fund raising and management and policy support to the national activity of ZHPF. In practice Dialogue provides greater input at a national and policy level, with management of grassroots arrangements being undertaken by networked groups of members. While issues of conflict over power between Dialogue as an NGO and ZHPF as a community organisation is ever-present\textsuperscript{53} there is a clear view from Dialogue

\textsuperscript{51} Interview with ZHPF leaders, 5 November 2013.

\textsuperscript{52} Female interviewee, aged 50, Dzivarasekwa Extension, 3 July 2013.

\textsuperscript{53} See Bolnick (2008) for a discussion of this tension and an example in the South African Homeless People’s Federation in Robins (2008).
managers that they play a supporting role to the collective voices of ZHPF members.⁵⁴

Figure 5.2
Organisational Structure of ZHPF with Dialogue on Shelter Trust⁵⁵

The development of an alliance between Dialogue and ZHPF supports the functionality of both organisations, but is structured to enable community members to take a leading role in relations with local and national government. A Dialogue manager commented that they try to leave as little a “footprint” as possible because “we are very conscious about wanting to change the dynamics of power and who is visible.”⁵⁶ While disagreements are aired in private, in public Dialogue supports the decisions of ZHPF, even where they consider them incorrect. For Dialogue “the capacity to listen to the community has to start with us – listening to the community and understanding the community voice.”⁵⁷ This is also important in supporting the strategic coherence of ZHPF as a popular movement. Through engaging the state the aim is to create spaces where ZHPF is able to

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⁵⁴ Informal discussion with Dialogue Managers, 8 February 2013.
⁵⁵ Data from ZHPF National Membership Information, September 2012.
⁵⁶ Informal discussion with Dialogue Managers, 8 February 2013.
⁵⁷ Ibid.
influence decision making in ways that reflect the experiences of poverty and the needs of people living in low income communities. This is activated in negotiations with state organisations, where ZHPF leaders are given the space to “compromise where they need to compromise” in order to achieve community objectives.\textsuperscript{58}

5.2.2 Savings Schemes

The establishment of ZHPF provided a means to address a fundamental issue of chronic poverty.\textsuperscript{59} ZHPF provides access to a basic financial service in the form of savings and loans, which are otherwise unavailable to the poor, and locates this provision socially, within structures of mutual support and collective action. As identified above, for the ‘ritual’ of daily savings members contribute whatever small amounts they had from their earnings, after meeting their basic needs. Robins (2008: 90) discussing the South African Homeless People’s Federation, states that “daily savings as a ritual produces high levels of participation and mutual interaction between federation members – these daily encounters are perceived to be the social glue that binds communities.” The principle of regular savings, as an “an ethic of collective commitment to social development” (McFarlane 2012: 2810), extends to other saving schemes available to ZHPF members.

The largest funds operated by ZHPF are the daily savings scheme and \textit{Gungano}\textsuperscript{60} urban poor fund, which together constitute 64.9 per cent of the national savings for ZHPF. These are complemented by smaller saving schemes for health, land and burial costs, plus savings for stationary costs of administering the funds and, in some regions, other specific locational savings. While the value of individual savings is relatively low, with an average total savings of US$97\textsuperscript{61}, as can be seen in table 5.1, the aggregate value of savings available to the ZHPF becomes significant. ZHPF management data shows national savings valued at US$1.1 million and a total for the Harare federations of around US$574,000.

\textsuperscript{58} Informal discussion with Dialogue Managers, 8 February 2013.
\textsuperscript{59} See Green and Hulme (2005) for a discussion of chronic poverty.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Gungano} translates from Shona as the coming together of many people. As discussed in Chapter Six savings scheme are given names by their members to reflect the personal ambitions they share.
\textsuperscript{61} ZHPF National Membership Information, September 2012.
ZHPF, with the support of Dialogue, established the *Gungano* Urban Poor Fund in 1999 as a revolving financing scheme providing loans to communities (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). *Gungano* was conceived as a means to maximise the limited resources of members to match fund specific projects with international donors and leverage savings co-productively, through joint investment with local and national government. The fund is geared specifically towards the construction of housing, basic services and public realm investment to improve the lives and environment of low income communities. Members contribute US$1 per month to the fund, with loans made to savings groups (see Mitlin, 2008; D’Cruz and Mudimu, 2013) rather than individuals, to reinforce the importance of collective working. Chitekwe-Biti (2009: 360) highlights that lending to groups, and relying on peer management and accountability, is an effective substitute for a lack of collateral for loans.

*Table 5.1*

**ZHPF National Savings Data by Region, 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Savings Groups</th>
<th>Daily Savings (US$)</th>
<th><em>Gungano</em> (US$)</th>
<th>Total Savings (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>245,146</td>
<td>94,213</td>
<td>573,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18,769</td>
<td>5,566</td>
<td>27,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>21,592</td>
<td>30,469</td>
<td>85,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5,298</td>
<td>6,952</td>
<td>15,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>22,630</td>
<td>12,309</td>
<td>43,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44,994</td>
<td>9,559</td>
<td>88,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35,565</td>
<td>9,003</td>
<td>61,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>42,443</td>
<td>20,941</td>
<td>94,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6,102</td>
<td>8,187</td>
<td>19,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutare</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40,229</td>
<td>21,739</td>
<td>69,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watershed</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11,999</td>
<td>13,081</td>
<td>39,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>494,768</td>
<td>232,019</td>
<td>1,119,359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ZHPF Management Data – September 2012*

Access to the *Gungano* Fund for housing construction is structured to ensure that ZHPF members develop a discipline of saving and avoid a situation where they become overwhelmed by debt. Loans are made over three phases of construction: setting the foundations; building of the superstructure; and for completion of roof and finishing. Those members seeking loans are given an inventory of materials ⁶²

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⁶² See appendix 3 for a breakdown of the materials required to construct a two roomed house.
needed for construction and are encouraged to purchase building materials as part of their savings strategy as the Gungano loan will only pay for bricks; hard-core; pit sand; roofing materials; and timber. All other building materials must be paid for by the householder, from earnings and savings. The loans require that the applicant group provides 10 per cent of the value of the loan requested, to demonstrate commitment. Repayment term is flexible and can be up to three years, however further Gungano loans are not available until existing loans are repaid. Loans reflect the iterative character of construction and assume that householders will live ‘on-site’ and can occupy the partially completed parts of homes while they are being built.63

5.3 City of Harare – Mapping Informal Settlements

Alongside core activity of supporting the construction of housing through savings schemes, ZHPF and Dialogue build local knowledge on the location and the structure of low income communities across Harare. This activity is central to building legitimacy and spaces of dialogue with state organisations. Local knowledge includes undertaking community enumerations, surveys and targeted research to define the scale and demographic character of informal and ‘squatter’ settlements and overcrowded formal housing in Harare. The research techniques used, for example in settlement surveys, are highly participative with ZHPF members being trained as enumerators.64 This utilises local knowledge of communities, and helps to improve the responsiveness of residents to surveys. It also meets the strategic objective of evidencing homelessness and poverty in a form that is accepted by the state. The participative methods used contribute to the processes of community mobilisation.

5.3.1 Informal Settlements in Harare

The impact of Operation Murambatsvina continues to reverberate within low income communities in Harare. As found in surveys undertaken by ZHPF and

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63 Fieldnotes on discussion with Dialogue Programme Manager, 14 November 2013.
64 For example 21 community enumerators are identified in the Dzivarasekwa Extension enumeration report of June 2012.
Dialogue and also during interviews conducted as part of this research, a large number of ZHPF members have direct experience of evictions and of Murambatsvina. As highlighted by Mitlin (2004) and Potts (2010), despite the removal of laws governing the spatial segregation of Black and White populations in Zimbabwe, in practice market prices, land use policy and the limited availability of sites for development continue to segment Harare that are in ways indistinct from colonial policies. Chitekwe-Biti (2009: 356) points out the vast inequality of access, such that “poor families, which constitute more than 60 per cent of the population of Harare, only had access to 2 per cent of Harare’s land.”

Dialogue and ZHPF, in association with the City of Harare, carried out mapping of Harare ‘slum’ settlements in 2012. This study identifies 37 sites in Harare, as shown in figure 5.3, of varying sizes that constitute ‘slum’ developments. These include a range of locations from the dense Mbare flats where there is severe overcrowding and lack of sanitation, to small and hidden settlements constituted of shacks. The enumeration documented previously ‘invisible’ sites of occupation within the City; creating unique knowledge and supporting the initial stages of mobilisation. The data presented in figure 5.3 identifies the location of ‘slum’ settlements in Harare, superimposed on a map showing land-use classification. This shows the spatial concentration of slum settlements to the peripheral west and north-west of the city on land designated as high density or for agricultural use. The few settlements identified in the north and north-east are small and are located in areas with high land values. These low density residential areas were previously reserved for White occupation during colonial administrations.

The profile data provides unique information on the residents and the form of development on each site. Gunhill, for example, which is described in the Slum Profile Report as a “prestigious” residential suburb of Harare, is recorded as having 52 households located on wetland, in houses constructed from waste materials including plastics, scrap metal, plywood and cardboard. The settlement is thought

65 For example a Dialogue / ZHPF survey in Crowborough North show that 24 per cent of respondents have previous experience of evictions.
originally to have been developed by families of horse grooms, employed at the nearby Borrowdale Race Ground. Residents engage in urban agriculture, as a form of income generation, along with brewing of illicit beer and engaging in street trading. They are noted to have had “running battles” with police and the City Council, with the settlement having been “razed down” on a number of occasions.\(^{67}\)

**Figure 5.3**
Location Map of ‘Slum’ Settlements in Harare, 2013

![Location Map of ‘Slum’ Settlements in Harare, 2013](image)

*Source: Dialogue on Shelter Trust, 2013*

The significance is that for the first time the City of Harare Council formally recognises the existence of ‘slum’ communities as a feature of the urban environment. This marks both a discursive shift and a reorientation of informal developments in respect to the responsibilities of the City Council. Expanding on the example of Gunhill, this is a settlement located on private land that previously, according to a senior planning officer of the Council, been ‘bulldozed’ with

\(^{67}\) Harare Slum Profiles Report, March 2012.
residents dispersed or sent back to rural areas, because the land is valuable and the owners are influential. However, the City with the support of ZHPF and Dialogue, has been in negotiation with the land owners about potential investment that would see the community relocated to a permanent site, offering the potential for development of formal housing and access to services. While disruptive in the short-term for the residents of Gunhill, relocation offers an opportunity to avoid future confrontation with land owners and a chance to benefit from the changing attitudes of the City Council, which is beginning to recognise a “responsibility to take care of the poor within our community”.

5.4 Moments of Change

This section provides an overview of the changing relationship and the key activities of ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council between 1997 and 2013. Pierson’s (2004) approach of identifying moments of significance within a temporal frame has been adopted, to examine the points of collaboration between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare. A temporal perspective is consistent with the process tracing method, as it establishes a descriptive structure which, as Collier (2011: 824) states, begins with “good snapshots at a series of specific moments. To characterize a process, we must be able to characterize key steps in the process, which in turn permits good analysis of change and sequence.” While simplified as a linear process in figure 5.4, the contextual conditions in Zimbabwe, (as described in Chapter Four) created many barriers and setbacks to establishing co-productive relationship with organisations of the state. While figure 5.4 offers a descriptive summary of formative activity, it is also presented to emphasise the cumulative process of relationship building central to sociological theory of institutional change as described in Chapter Two. This reflects the development of deontic relationships (see Searle, 2005) of mutual responsibility and obligation around the delivery of housing and services in low income communities.

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68 Informal discussion with City of Harare officials, 1 February 2013.
69 Ibid.
A significant finding from the fieldwork is how participants consistently refer to a small number of key events that are seen to have shaped, and progressed, the relationships between the community and City Council. These, as highlighted in figure 5.4, and discussed more fully in Chapters Six to Eight, contributed to establishing new discursive representations of the poor and, through collaborative activity, the basis for closer working on the delivery of development projects. These ‘transitional stages’ appear to consolidate formative experiences of engagement, creating the conditions for increasingly deeper forms of collaboration leading to co-production. This corresponds to the discussion of institutional transition illustrated in figure 2.3. Following the construction of the toilets in Mbare, the City Council recalibrated their perception of the capacities of ZHPF and Dialogue, to engage in more substantive development activity with ZHPF and Dialogue. 

Informal discussion with City of Harare officials, 1 February 2013.
approaches and expectations. These experiences altered the limits of normative conceptions of the respective organisations.

Figure 5.4 highlights the progressive pattern of engagement and change over a period of time. In 1997, it would seem inconceivable that ‘illegal’ low income communities would be working in partnership with the City of Harare to jointly finance and manage the construction of housing and infrastructure. The institutional conditions were such that the presence of ‘squatter’ settlements would have been responded to by planning enforcement action, in contexts where interaction between citizens were managed through public service delivery. As explored in Chapters Six to Eight, the interaction between organised communities and the state appear to have affected both the discursive representation of low income communities and expanded the range of possible options for action. In considering the changing relationships and activity, from a temporal perspective, there seems to be a shift over the 1997 – 2013 period in the ‘way of doing things.’ While this is more visible in the actions of the City of Harare than in national government policy, the changing behaviour is indicative of the adaptation of institutions.

Additionally, figure 5.4 highlights the changing character and significance of collaborative activity over the period. When considered against the discussion in Chapter Two, it is evident that co-production occurred in Harare first with the construction of the Mbare toilets and then more substantially in the joint development of Dzivarasekwa Extension. As a demonstration activity, the Mbare pay toilets met the conditions for co-production identified in Chapter Two (table 2.2) and was significant in defining a space for collaboration where the objectives of both organised communities and the City of Harare could be met. While small scale, this makes possible activity leading to an alignment of objectives and joint management of inputs. The remainder of this Chapter considers each of the ‘moments’ identified in figure 5.4, to explore the nature of engagement, with

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71 Interview with Dialogue Manager 27 November 2013,
reference to the conditional and definitional terms for co-production suggested in Chapter Two.

5.5 Formation of ZHPF and Dialogue

The inspiration for ZHPF is credited to Beth Chitekwe-Biti who, with the encouragement of SDI, and drawing on her experiences in Namibia and South Africa of nascent homeless people’s federations, brought the idea of mobilising the urban poor to Zimbabwe. The idea of a Zimbabwean federation, connected to other groups of urban poor people in Africa and Asia, was used to initiate a series of discussions in low income communities about housing issues. In parallel, Dialogue was being formed as a registered NGO, to provide a formal vehicle to bid for development funding and establish the organisational capacity to support the conversations within low income communities.

The initial contact, made by Beth, was with community leaders in two Harare holding camps at Hatcliffe Extension and Dzivarasekwa Extension. These, as explained in Chapter Four, were established by government at the margins of existing high density areas (hence ‘extensions’) as temporary sites for ‘homeless’ people evicted from informal settlements. With the assistance of SDI, Beth arranged for the four community leaders to visit South Africa to learn about the federation model and techniques of community mobilisation. The experience of travelling to another country and hearing the experiences of people, who were also living in poverty, shaped the early activity of ZHPF. A member of this original group, who remains a national leader of ZHPF, explained that bringing back knowledge to Zimbabwe they were highly motivated to go and talk to residents of holding camps.

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72 Beth is the founder and now Executive Director of Dialogue on Shelter Trust.
73 Based on interviews with Dialogue staff and ZHPF leaders.
74 Dialogue was formally registered as an NGO in Zimbabwe in 2003. This was due to the lengthy registration process, but they were operational from 1998.
75 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
Savings schemes provided the core of the message about the value of mobilisation and also established the principle, which has remained important for ZHPF that the solutions for everyday problems of poverty need to come first from within the community. Using the administrative materials borrowed from the South African Federation, savings schemes were promoted by word of mouth through women because “when you empower women you empower the community”. 76 The first savings scheme was called Kutamura, which in Shona means ‘striving’; named to reflect the ambitions and intentions of the first ZHPF group. As more people in holding camps became interested, so the number of savings groups increased with new groups formed and existing groups sub-divided to make them more manageable. People were attracted by the potential offered by the aggregate value of collective savings to address housing needs, but also the opportunity to “prove to government that we are the people that are not homeless and hopeless but homeless and hopeful.” 77

As the number of savings schemes increased, and discussions were held in holding camps and low income communities across Harare, ZHPF faced challenges from ZANU-PF militia who threatened them and accused them of making undeliverable promises and stealing the savings of the poor. ZHPF leaders have examples of threats, being detained and followed by members of the state security services for their activities when mobilising communities. 78 A central aim of ZHPF was to support mobilised communities to engage the state on issues of land and housing. This is based in SDI practice and a contextual understanding of the importance of being able to connect to the City Council systems. 79

Engaging the Council provided a key challenge, as direct discussions between residents of low income communities conflicted with the epistemic practices of local government officials. It was also difficult because it was at a time when opposition political parties were coming to the fore and by 2000 many community

76 Ibid.
77 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
78 Workshop with research participants, 24 April 2014.
79 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
groups and NGOs were labelled by the state as being ‘insurgent’. The view of the City of Harare Council is reflected in the comment that at “first we were not even prepared to discuss with them [ZHPF and Dialogue]. But when they kept pestering us we began opening up.” Despite the dangers, ZHPF and Dialogue continued to press for meetings with city and national government, achieving a breakthrough in 1999 when ZHPF were invited to attend the National Housing Conference. The visibility of being a delegate helped to reposition ZHPF and Dialogue as legitimate contributors to national debates on housing and urban poverty. It also assisting in building networks with both the City of Harare and other municipalities. As a result of efforts to engage officials and politicians, ZHPF and Dialogue were able to secure their first demonstration project in Harare, which was the construction of pay toilets in Mbare.

The creation of ZHPF and Dialogue addresses a necessary condition, as identified in Chapter Two, of ‘orchestration’ in mobilising people and the inputs required for co-production. In common with the studies reviewed in Chapter Two, ZHPF and Dialogue developed the organising structures to build collective agency to connect with political processes and engage state agencies in Zimbabwe. While this faced challenge from aggressive state security services, it served to create a voice for low income urban communities, initially at a small scale, to feed into national discussions on land and housing management. ZHPF was also significant in beginning to create the resource base, through savings schemes and the collective organisation of labour, to contribute to collaborative development projects with the state. While at this stage insufficient necessary conditions are met to create co-production, the orchestration of people and resources led to state support for the demonstration project in Mbare.

5.6 Mbare Toilets

Mbare is a major market area to the immediate south of Harare City Centre. It is a bustling location for informal trading and was a principal area of residence in the

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80 Interview with a City of Harare official, 7 May 2013.
City for male migrant workers during the colonial administration (Rakodi, 1995). Mbare continues to be the primary market (*musika*) serving Harare’s high density areas and a section of the city that is highly politicised, due to the opportunities for rent seeking from traders. It also has large and overcrowded apartment blocks with ‘slum’ conditions. Mbare is a key location for ZHPF and Dialogue has been a focus of discussions with the City of Harare Council to improve housing conditions.

The proposal to construct a communal toilet block in Mbare arose from an impasse in discussions between Dialogue, ZHPF and the City of Harare Council on upgrading of informal housing in 2002. In line with regulatory requirements, and due to a lack of capacity to expand sanitation infrastructure, the City Council had refused residential development without services being in place first (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). Applying knowledge gained on the construction and operation of communal toilet blocks during an exchange visit to Mumbai, which involved the City politicians and Council engineering officials, a pilot project was developed that involved Dialogue, ZHPF and the City of Harare in constructing a communal toilet. Chitekwe-Biti (2009: 358) states “[t]he city officials wanted to see if the communal facilities could work and whether it would be feasible to allow families to move onto their land with basic, but adequate sewerage reticulation and then at a later stage begin to develop individualized facilities.”

The activity in Mbare was informed by research undertaken by ZHPF and Dialogue in June 1999 that highlighted the overcrowding and poor environmental conditions present in the suburb. This formative enumeration was focused on the residents of Mbare’s notorious hostels, where 40,000 people live in squalid conditions, with six people to a room and 40 people to a toilet. The report aimed to dispel myths about criminality in the community and identified that 93 per cent of people were working; half were on the Council’s waiting list for homes and had been for an average of nine years; and there was a noted willingness of residents to work with city and national governments to improve the housing and

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81 Harare Slum Profiles Report, March 2012
environmental conditions. The scale of need provided an overwhelming challenge to the City Council, which was unable to meet the demand for housing and basic services from within existing budgets.

Construction of the toilet block (as illustrated in figure 5.5) was undertaken by community members and was developed in partnership with the City of Harare who provided the land. Adopting a model used by SDI affiliate organisations in Mumbai, the toilets are operated by ZHPF members who charge a small fee for use. This generates sufficient income to meet the running costs of the facility and offers the potential for a small profit for ZHPF to use for other development activity. The commercial model for the toilet has been successful and subsequently been adopted by the City of Harare Council in the construction of additional toilets nearby.

Figure 5.5
Mbare Pay Toilet Block

The significance of the construction of the toilet block, beyond the benefits for low income residents of Mbare, was to further build the relationships between community members and the City of Harare Council through practical problem solving. The SDI sponsored exchange visit to Mumbai demonstrated to the City Council that communal toilet facilities could be clean and provided on a self-
sustaining cost model. Moreover, it provided an opportunity for the City Council to
test the capabilities of ZHPF as a prospective partner. A Council official stated³³
“[w]e were monitoring them continuously until they finished building it and they
started operating. Up to now it’s one of the cleanest toilets in the City”. It was also
important for the development of ZHPF and Dialogue in allowing them to build their
knowledge of service delivery.

The construction of the Mbare toilets meets the necessary conditions suggested in
Chapter Two and can be considered sufficient for co-production. As a bounded
‘object’ of development, the toilets provided a defined project that addressed a
shared problem, caused by unmet demand and overcrowding of residential units in
Mbare. Addressing the problem through construction of the pay toilet provided a
benefit for both community and the City Council. A majority of the labour and
financial input for construction was provided by ZHPF and Dialogue, with the City
providing land and the permission to construct. While small scale, this project set a
precedent for community-led construction, in partnership with the state, which was
significant for later developments.

5.7 Crowborough North

Crowborough North is a settlement established in 2002 located 16km west of
Harare city centre, its location within Harare is shown in figure 3.1. Based on
surveys⁴⁴ undertaken by ZHPF and Dialogue, there are 4,179 people resident in
Crowborough North across 889 households. Ownership includes ZHPF members,
housing co-operatives and individuals, with dwellings being a mix of completed and
partially completed brick houses and temporary wooden cabins. The majority of
households are composed of families, with 44 per cent of residents under the age
of 18 years. Nearly all residents (90 per cent) have some form of employment, with
49 per cent recorded as being formally employed and 51 per cent with employment

³³ Interview with City of Harare Council Architects Department officer, 7 May 2013.
⁴⁴ Information used is from an unpublished Dialogue / ZHPF survey report into patterns of property
ownership and inheritance and also from data collected for an externally funded project into HIV
and health.
in informal activity. Average earnings for residents of Crowborough North are reported as US$217 per month against average household expenditure of US$216.

Crowborough North is a formal settlement, with reticulated water and sewage systems and roads. While service infrastructure is present, it is unreliable with frequent cuts in services and breaks in water and sewer lines, which pose a risk to health. During loss of water supply 79 per cent of residents use wells that they have constructed on their property; a majority (55 per cent) do not treat the water they use. Despite the large population of children there is no school on the settlement, with the nearest being in neighbouring Mufakose and Kuwadzana which are around three kilometres away. Despite the distance, survey respondents report that 62 per cent of children are attending school. Fees are reported to be US$107 per term, per child.

Figure 5.6
Selected Images of Crowborough North*

* From top left – a Commuter Omnibus or ‘Combi’; informal market at the entrance to the settlement; a wooden cabin; a partially completed house.
There are no recreational facilities on site and public transport is provided by ‘Combi’ vehicles (as illustrated in figure 5.6), which cost approximately US$1.50 for a single journey to the city centre at peak times and 5 Rand (equivalent to 50 US cents) at other times.\textsuperscript{85} Health services are organised by ZHPF, with a weekly clinic provided from the community centre on site. Retail facilities are provided from a market, selling a range of food and household goods and offering repair and personal services such as hairdressing. Market stalls are operated by residents of the Crowborough North community and provide an important source of income as well as services. Stall holders source their goods from Mbare Musika, transporting them to Crowborough North for sale. This raises the prices of goods for those that are unable to travel to the wholesale market.

5.7.1 Development of Crowborough North

Crowborough North housing development scheme was initiated by the City of Harare Council in 2002. The City Council appointed the Zimbabwe Building Society (ZBS) as its agent to organise the allocation of stands to co-operatives and housing developers. ZBS also has responsibility for preparing the site and commissioning the installation of service infrastructure, which it did through a private contractor. To be offered an allocation of stands by ZBS, organisations first had to be approved by the City Council as a bone-fide developer. Dialogue and ZHPF had been lobbying the City of Harare Council from 1998 to be included in land allocation processes, thus to be invited to develop housing was seen as a major breakthrough.\textsuperscript{86} Their inclusion not only provided the first formal recognition by the City Council of their role as a prospective housing development partner, but also for ZHPF, provided a real opportunity to demonstrate their capacity to deliver low cost housing units.

While the allocation of land was a milestone, it also provided a number of significant challenges for Dialogue and ZHPF. Firstly, ZHPF and Dialogue would have preferred unserviced stands in order to reduce the cost of purchase. Secondly, ZBS

\textsuperscript{85} Fieldnote, 2 July, 2013.
\textsuperscript{86} Background information from Dialogue and interviews with ZHPF leaders on 8 May, 2013.
had made the offer of stands very late on the process. This meant that while 150 stands were made available, these were not in the best locations on the site in respect to position and the soil conditions. The stands were therefore less attractive and potentially more expensive for ZHPF members to develop. Thirdly, Dialogue and ZHPF wanted stands of 150m$^2$, however the majority of the stands were 300m$^2$ in size, making the development of the stands unaffordable for ZHPF members (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; 2014). Dialogue and ZHPF had to enter into negotiations with the City of Harare to obtain permission to divide the stands into two semi-detached units. Lastly, the time allocated by the City of Harare and ZBS for Dialogue and ZHPF to accept the allocation was short, which created a problem for a grassroots organisation to effective consult with and involve members in decision making.

Despite these issues Dialogue, as the registered NGO, accepted the offer on behalf of ZHPF and paid Z$58 million in February 2003 for the land and services. From the perspective of Dialogue and ZHPF it was important to accept the offer of land even though the allocation came with a number of problems, as indicated above. A Dialogue manager commented:

we were “[m]ore than glad. That’s why we accepted it after such a long time of asking. We decided to accept and see what we could do with the allocation. It would also have meant a lot if we had turned it down in us losing our credibility. On one hand we had pestered for it for years and then you turn it down and backtrack it would have been very damaging.”

Interviews with City of Harare officials also highlight the significance of the decision to allocate land at Crowborough North to Dialogue and ZHPF. From the City Council’s perspective, the allocation of land was used to test the capabilities of ZHPF and Dialogue to deliver low cost housing and also to gauge whether “people [politicians at city and national level] would accept the idea” of community based organisations funding and developing housing, using saving scheme resources.

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87 Also confirmed by a ZHPF leader on 8 May 2013.
88 This is discussed further in Chapter Eight.
89 Interview with a Dialogue manager, 8 May 2013.
90 Informal discussion with City of Harare officials, 1 February 2013.
Dialogue and ZHPF successfully negotiated with the City Council to sub-divide stands, with the condition that statutory requirements for housing construction were met and appropriate permissions from the City Council planning department were obtained.\(^{91}\) This secured benefit for 233 families from land allocated for 150 families (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009) and established an important precedent for future activity.

The housing development on Crowborough North has been undertaken on an incremental basis, using savings resources through the *Gungano* fund and communal labour inputs into the construction of housing. While the City Council is not involved in the development, ZHPF members are working collaboratively to construct houses. This models the communal organisational functions required for co-production, used in Dzivarasekwa Extension. Working through ZHPF and community savings networks, inputs of labour and craft skills (such as bricklaying, carpentry, plumbing and electrical installation) are sourced through the community. As illustrated in figure 5.6, house construction is at various stages, which ranges from fully completed properties through to occupied superstructures and wooden cabins.

It should be underlined that the terms and processes for allocation of land at Crowborough North do not meet the conditions for co-production discussed in Chapter Two. The release of land, the costs per stand and the processes associated with being invited to take up development sites, followed standard commercial practice. The significance for ZHPF and Dialogue in this development were firstly, validation in being included in the process of land allocation; secondly, the opportunity to demonstrate their capacity to deliver incrementally constructed housing; and thirdly, as reflected in the correspondence with the City Council, to raise the profile of homeless communities in Harare.\(^{92}\) These are in addition to the

\(^{91}\) Letter from City of Harare Acting Director of Works, 21 July 2003.
\(^{92}\) For example in a letter to Dialogue from the Director of Housing and Community Services, 28 February 2003, Dialogue is congratulated for securing the stands as these “will go a long way towards fulfilling the wishes of the homeless society in Harare.”
procedural and administrative adaptations that were secured from negotiations on the development of the stands, which are discussed in Chapter Eight.

For Dialogue and ZHPF, Crowborough North was an important learning opportunity on the tactics of “what we should be asking for and demanding from the municipality”\(^\text{93}\) and also the challenges of affecting institutionalised practices: “it is a very difficult process of trying to get them to change what they know to be the only solution to problems of urban development”.\(^\text{94}\) It is also characterised by another Dialogue manager as improving understanding of how the City Council works and for the City Council the benefits of working with ZHPF and Dialogue.

“Because as we interacted more the element of suspicion that normally typifies relations with Council was beginning to fade away – people could now relate, you could now, without going through that laborious process of having appointments, you could just knock at someone’s door for instance within the housing department and they would entertain you. So the allocation in itself transformed the relationship between ourselves as an alliance with the City and it also enabled the Federation to demonstrate its capacity as was exemplified by the houses that the communities started building in Crowborough.”\(^\text{95}\)

Crowborough North also, for ZHPF leaders and Dialogue, highlighted an early naivety in its relations between members. As indicated above, the initial allocation of 150 stands were approximately 300m\(^2\) in size. Once the acquisition from ZBS was complete, ZHPF began the process of allocating stands to members in 2003. This was before they had received confirmation from the City of Harare that the stands could be sub-divided.\(^\text{96}\) ZHPF members knew that the initial allocation to Dialogue had been for 300m\(^2\) stands but this has been revised to provide for sectional titles to be used. Some members initiated a legal challenge against Dialogue and ZHPF to recover the ‘full’ stands. This challenge was a shock to Dialogue and ZHPF leaders\(^\text{97}\) who relied

\(^{93}\) Interview with a Dialogue manager, 8 May 2013.
\(^{94}\) Ibid.
\(^{95}\) Interview with a Dialogue manager, 10 May 2013.
\(^{96}\) Approval to sub-divide the stands received 21 July 2003 – letter from City of Harare Director of Works to Dialogue.
\(^{97}\) Informal discussion with Dialogue Manager, 4 February 2013.
on a sense of collective purpose among members. Ultimately, the legal challenge was rejected with, significantly, the support of the City of Harare. A Dialogue manager commented: “fortunately, for the Federation, mistakes are part of the learning.”

5.8 Dzivarasekwa Extension

Dzivarasekwa Extension is a former holding camp approximately 20km to the west of Harare city centre – as shown in figure 3.1. The settlement was established in 1991 by the Zimbabwean Government as a temporary site for people evicted from Mbare and Epworth. These evictions had been justified as efforts to clean up overcrowded settlements in preparation for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, held in Harare in October 1991. The settlement is adjacent to Dzivarasekwa suburb which was established in the late 1950s as a residential area for domestic workers in neighbouring, and formerly White only, areas of Marlborough and Mabelreign. Dzivarasekwa Extension does not have basic service infrastructure and is on marginal wetland vulnerable to flooding in the rainy season. Under a government programme some families were relocated from Dzivarasekwa Extension to Hatcliffe Extension in 2004, others remained if they had insufficient documentation to justify their relocation or they were children of the original settlers. Following Operation Murambatsvina an influx of new families came to Dzivarasekwa Extension to settle informally. In 2006 the land was allocated to ZHPF by central government for housing development.

Dzivarasekwa Extension has an enumerated population of 2,120 and 501 households. The settlement has a mixture of temporary wooden cabins and brick homes, which are at various stages of completion. Approximately 49 per cent of the population are aged 18 or younger, with 81 per cent of households

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98 Interview with a Dialogue Manager 10 May, 2013.
102 Data from Dialogue enumeration fact sheet, July 2013.
including children. Some 72 per cent of children attend the Yemurai Primary School, adjacent to Dzivarasekwa Extension, or other schools in surrounding areas. The predominant reason for children not attending school is the cost of fees. Analysis of the enumeration data indicates that average monthly expenditure on school fees is US$61 or around one quarter of household income. Approximately two thirds (65 per cent) of residents reported that they are employed, with a majority (79 per cent) in informal employment. The dominant form of work is vending, with other occupations including farm labouring and brick making identified. The average respondent income is recorded as US$145 per month (US$221 per month for households) with monthly expenditure to meet household costs indicated to be US$320.

Figure 5.7
Selected Images of Dzivarasekwa Extension*

* From top left – borehole in use; community construction – digging of trench for sanitation infrastructure; children reading outside wooden cabins; market stall.

103 Data analysis using enumeration dataset, collected June 2012.
5.8.1 *In-situ Housing Development*

Dzivarasekwa Extension was selected\(^{104}\) as the site for a five year slum upgrading project, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (B&MGF), supporting the co-production of 480 homes. The initiative is part of the Global Project on Inclusive Municipal Governance operating across five cities in Africa\(^{105}\) focused on “building partnerships between city governments and the urban poor.”\(^{106}\) The project is jointly managed and delivered by ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council and governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed by the project participants in March 2010. The MOU sets out the respective contributions of project partners to a number of urban development activities, centrally the construction of housing in Dzivarasekwa Extension, and also provides a framework for collaboration and the management of the co-production project. The significance of the MOU is discussed further in Chapter Eight (section 8.3.3).

In contrast to the development of Crowborough North, the land at Dzivarasekwa Extension has no basic services, with residents initially using shallow wells for water and pit latrines and bush areas for human excreta. As such, developing housing on this site would formally be considered illegal as contrary to the *Region, Town and Country Planning Act* as well as local by-laws. However, because of the foregoing relationship between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council, a programme of in-situ upgrading was jointly developed under the umbrella of the B&MGF project. This provides a solution the financial constraints of the City Council that would otherwise prevent them extending costly infrastructure to a peripheral area of the City. It also creates a permissive framework for residents to develop housing incrementally, in keeping with their low and unstable incomes. Dialogue with the support of SDI and advice from the City of Harare Architects Department,

\(^{104}\) Dzivarasekwa Extension was selected to replace the original project site of Mbare for the construction of houses as Mbare was too politicised to effectively manage the delivery of a collaborative initiative with the City Council.

\(^{105}\) These are Harare, Lilongwe, Luanda, Monrovia and Cairo.

\(^{106}\) Source: Press release issued by Dialogue, no date.
initiated the development of site plans with local residents for housing. This process iteratively produced a master plan for site that was acceptable to community members, while also minimising cost and maximising the use of the land available (figure 5.8).

Figure 5.8
Map of Dzivarasekwa Extension Development Site

To enable the incremental development of housing for Dzivarasekwa Extension, arrangements were made to construct three capped boreholes to supply water on site (illustrated in figure 5.7). The absence of reticulated sewage infrastructure was addressed through the erection of Eco-san ‘skyloo’ toilets. These are ecological toilet units that separate faecal matter and urine to reduce the possibility of polluting ground water. The liquid matter travels through a soak away into the ground whereas solid matter is dried to be used as fertiliser. In July 2013, 131 individual Eco-san units and 11 communal toilets
had been constructed in Dzivarasekwa Extension settlement.\textsuperscript{107} The Eco-san toilets are relatively quick and cost efficient to construct, taking approximately five days to build and costing (including labour) around US$455.\textsuperscript{108} Significantly, the City of Harare Council has accepted the use of the Eco-san toilets as temporary installations, pending the completion of reticulated systems. However, they also recognise, given the parlous state of existing infrastructure, that the Eco-san toilets provide an important alternative in cases where mains systems are unavailable.\textsuperscript{109}

\textit{Figure 5.9}  
\textbf{Image of Dzivarasekwa Extension, Showing Development of Stands}

In addition to resolving problems of access to basic services, an incremental approach to house construction is adopted by residents of Dzivarasekwa Extension. This process allows for costs to be spread over a period of time, as determined by the income levels of the stand owner, and for communal inputs of labour and shared cost of building materials. The current costs for commercial construction projects in high density areas per square meter is approximately three times that of comparable housing development costs.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{107} Data from Dialogue enumeration fact sheet, July 2013.  
\textsuperscript{109} Informal discussion with Harare Council officials 1 February 2013.
\end{flushright}
(US$446/M² comparing to US$146/M²) in Dzivarasekwa Extension. This helps to overcome the central challenge of affordability experienced by people with low incomes in Harare.

**Figure 5.10**

**Incremental Housing Construction Process**

- Allocation of stand through ZHPF.
- Funding for temporary cabin through ZHPF Gungano fund.
- Occupation of stand reduces expenditure on rent.
- Increase in savings and accumulate necessary building materials.
- Construct Eco-san toilets.
- Build and occupy 2 roomed house as temporary structure.
- Extend to 5 roomed family home.
- Use home to generate income – e.g. lodgers, business operation.

The housing development model used in Dzivarasekwa Extension allows families to move on-site and into wooden cabins from the point they are allocated a stand (figure 5.9). This has important implications for the viability of incremental development as it releases money, within household budgets, that would otherwise pay for the room rental. It also provides an opportunity rent out space in order to generate an income. In Harare, rental of a single room in a high density area of the city can cost US$50 – 60 per month, which represents around a quarter of average household income for low income communities. Savings on rent and additional income from renting space can be put towards the accumulation of building materials. A simplified model is shown in figure 5.10 illustrating the cumulative process of savings, procuring materials and steady construction of dwellings. The timescale for

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110 Based on analysis undertaken by Dialogue staff – comparison is the suburb of Budiriro which is a joint housing project between the City of Harare and the Central African Building Society (CABS). See press reports e.g. [http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/12/13/us62-million-om-housing-scheme-nears-completion/](http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/12/13/us62-million-om-housing-scheme-nears-completion/) on the project. See also Chapter 7 (section 7.3).

111 Male interviewee aged 58, Crowborough North, 2 July 2013.
the construction varies considerably between households, with research participants, during interviews, finding it difficult to articulate a timetable for the completion of their homes.\textsuperscript{112}

5.8.2 Co-productive Approaches

In considering the conditions suggested in Chapter Two, the development of Dzivarasekwa Extension can be seen as fully co-productive, as described in table 5.2. The in-situ upgrading is being undertaken collaboratively by the residents of Dzivarasekwa Extension and departments of the City Council, governed through a Memorandum of Understanding. This provides a framework agreement on the delivery of the project and a vehicle to secure inputs into the construction of basic service infrastructure and housing units. The operational management of the project is overseen by a Project Management Committee (PMC) with membership from the City of Harare, ZHPF and Dialogue. This meets regularly and provides a forum for reporting on progress, delegating tasks and identifying and resolving problems. The significance of the MOU and the role of the PMC are discussed further in Chapter Eight (sections 8.3.3 and 8.2.2 respectively).

The inputs allocated to Dzivarasekwa Extension can be categorised as three types, as illustrated in figure 5.11 below, which while overlapping to a degree, reflect the forms of input into the delivery of the co-productive project. These are firstly resources, which includes monetary inputs from ZHPF Gungano fund, member savings, City of Harare budgets and B&MGF grant resources as allocated to the project. Resources also, importantly, include the use of the land as a material asset, which for Dzivarasekwa Extension was allocated by the Zimbabwean Government to ZHPF in 2006. Additionally, the permission to develop land is included as a notional resource. This includes exemptions and adaptations to planning and building control regulations through the City Council. This is a particularly significant as illegality, lack of tenure and associated risks of violent eviction are impediments

\textsuperscript{112} During interviews in Dzivarasekwa Extension, the responses to this question ranged between those with firm timetables for construction, through to comments that suggested completion of construction was a distance dream.
to the confident release of public and private capital to invest in housing (UN-Habitat, 2011).

Table 5.2
Dzivarasekwa Extension – Meeting Necessary Conditions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary Conditions</th>
<th>ZHPF / Dialogue</th>
<th>City of Harare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creating Objects</td>
<td>• Scope of the project defined through B&amp;MGF contract and agreed by ZHPF leadership.</td>
<td>• Scope of the project defined through B&amp;MGF contract and agreed by Council Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Site planning initiated by Dialogue with technical support from SDI.</td>
<td>• City of Harare agrees the masterplan and City Surveyor marks out plots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Application of knowledge on low-cost building techniques through community participation.</td>
<td>• Supervision and quality control overseen by City Council engineers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generating Benefits</td>
<td>• Stands allocated to homeless members of ZHPF.</td>
<td>• Co-productive project provides resources to fund housing and infrastructure construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchestration</td>
<td>• Strategic management of the project undertaken jointly with the City of Harare.</td>
<td>• City of Harare support provided by Mayor and senior officer team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Organisation of community inputs by ZHPF.</td>
<td>• Strategic management of the project undertaken jointly with community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Additional technical support (i.e. architecture of low cost housing) from within SDI network.</td>
<td>• Additional technical support (i.e. engineering) obtained for the project from within City of Harare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>• Use of the ZHPF savings schemes for purchase of building materials.</td>
<td>• Construction of roads and trunks to sewage and water using B&amp;MGF grant and City of Harare human resources and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Funds and constructs temporary sanitation facilities and boreholes.</td>
<td>• Additional funding provided for abnormal costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Construction of housing undertaken incrementally by householder using labour from within the community</td>
<td>• Provides permission for development – removing risk of eviction for community.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secondly, the input of knowledge reflecting the deficit of information held by the state and a lack of understanding of the populations and structures of low income communities (McFarlane, 2004). This is an essential tool for communities to “mobilize knowledge about themselves in a manner that can resist eviction, exploitation and surveillance in favour of advancing their own rights, resources and claims” (Appadurai 2012: 639). Within this type of input, knowledge in the delivery context of Dzivarasekwa Extension, includes spatial and socio-economic data gathered through mapping and enumerations; survey and master planning used in site design; and construction and architectural knowledge used in building of low cost housing. For ZHPF the co-productive project has also helped them to understand the functional operation of the City Council and identify the people that occupy spaces of authority within local government.

The third type of input into co-production is capacity, which includes, for Dzivarasekwa Extension, the mobilisation of labour within the community to contribute to the construction of infrastructure and housing. Labour is included as capacity, rather than a ‘human resource’, to emphasise how, through organisation, the potential for action is released. ZHPF members provide the manual labour for construction of trenches and bedding for pipes into the community. The City of Harare deploys its personnel and equipment in support of this work through use of trucks and plant in addition to its technical oversight on the work of local residents. For Dzivarasekwa Extension, capacity is drawn from the project partners and orchestrated to deliver in-situ development. The PMC provides a co-ordinating function which includes a route to identify additional resources necessary for project delivery from the City of Harare. This is illustrated by a Committee report to the Council on 7 June 2012\(^\text{113}\) seeking approval for the Council to donate gravel needed for road construction. The report identifies that additional resources amounting to US$27,000 are required to complete road construction.

\(^{113}\) City of Harare Town - Clerks Report to the Education, Health, Housing and Community Services and Licencing Committee. 7 June 2012.
Within the frame of the project, there is active negotiation over the use of resources and joint decision making on the operational delivery of the in-situ upgrading of Dzivarasekwa Extension, as discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight. It is apparent that the commitment of the City of Harare is possible because of the additional resources provided through the B&MGF funding. A senior Dialogue manager suggested that the project at Dzivarasekwa Extension occurred because of B&MGF resources.\textsuperscript{114} The pressure of delivering a high profile external funding project forced the pace of activity and solidified the relationship to ensure there was high level commitment by all parties to meetings, communication and the resolution of problems. The reliance on B&MGF resources also prompted a recognition that additional resources for ‘slum upgrading’ needed to be found for after the donor funds ended. This prompted a further development of the relationship between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare in the creation of joint finance facility for improvements to low income settlements.

\textsuperscript{114} Interview with Dialogue Manager, 10 May 2013.
5.9 **Harare Slum Upgrading Finance Facility**

People with low and unstable incomes typically have no access to traditional financial services, such as mortgage loans (Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014). With little in the way of material assets or collateral to offer as security, and no evidence of formal employment, established banks and building societies will not risk loans for housing development. This was confirmed in Zimbabwe by preparatory research undertaken under the auspices of the B&MGF Harare Slum Upgrading programme which concluded that “the urban poor in Zimbabwe were excluded from the formal financial sector”. The consequence is a reliance on informal systems of loans that may carry high interest rates and be enforced through violence or use familial and social networks that may act to shift the burden of debt within low income communities.

The principal objective of the Harare Slum Upgrading Finance Facility (HSUFF) “is to provide micro affordable loans and technical support services to slum dwellers in and around Harare”. HSUFF provides financial services in the form of loans to groups resident in low income communities, but is also concerned with infrastructure investment and ‘technical assistance’ in the form of “community mobilisation and organisation, project design and construction related support”. The design of HSUFF builds upon the experience of the *Gungano* fund recognising the complexities associated with in-situ upgrading in low income settlements. The fund has capital inputs from the City of Harare of US$120,000, ZHPF of US$50,000 and Dialogue US$50,000 and governed through a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the City of Harare, ZHPF and Dialogue on the 2 May, 2014, shown below.

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116 Draft HSUFF business plan, June 2014.
117 Ibid.
118 Dialogue on Shelter Press Release, 2 May 2014.
The MOA\textsuperscript{119} forms the basis for a trust, independent of local authority control and established as a legal entity, to govern the management and allocation of resources. A board of trustees, drawn in equal numbers from ZHPF, the City of Harare and Dialogue, will oversee the strategic operation of HSUFF, with ZHPF and Dialogue ensuring that there is a majority voice from low income settlement dwellers. The preparatory reports indicate the lengthy discussions between partners on the most appropriate form of governance for the finance facility, with the PMC structure employed for the Dzivarasekwa Extension project considered ‘insufficiently legal’ to either allow the City Council to fully participate or to demonstrate, external to the partners, probity of decision making processes.\textsuperscript{120}

A central feature of HSUFF, in keeping with the social basis of ZHPF savings schemes, loans will be made to groups of people with low income who are unable to access finance through established service providers. These groups “should be self-created partnership[s] rooted in genuine trust, rather than a collection of

\textsuperscript{119} This is discussed further in Chapter Eight (section 8.3.4).
\textsuperscript{120} Internal Report – Bryan Winston – Design and Implementation of a slum upgrading finance facility.
individuals forged together by their lending institutions.\textsuperscript{121} This reflects the ‘solidarity commitment’ constructed for ZHPF loans whereby if “one member cannot pay [their regular loan repayment] other group members come together to make up the difference.” \textsuperscript{122} This contributes to the low default rates registered in ZHPF loans, because members of the groups have intimate knowledge of the circumstances of each other and are collectively responsible for the repayment of the loan. They are able therefore to respond quickly, where a member of their group has a crisis and also to anticipate future problems that may affect the repayment of the loan.

The governance and operation of the finance facility has been the subject of significant discussion, in particular how the new arrangements dovetail with the Gungano fund. There is an inherent risk associated with introducing a new ‘product’, targeted at residents of low income communities, of undermining existing savings schemes. But also, and more importantly, negatively affecting the social basis of existing savings groups, particularly as these provide the social ‘glue’ that binds the ZHPF membership. Linked to this are the conditions for accessing the finance facility and ensuring that people who are unable to access existing financial services are not crowded out by the overwhelming demand for housing that exists more widely among low and middle income groups in Harare.

Following the model adopted by the Gungano fund, loans through HSUFF the intention is to disburse loans of up to US$2,000 though groups over at least three stages (as shown in section 5.2.2) that correspond with incremental stages of construction identified above. This has the benefits of avoiding large lump sum payments that are hard to manage and supporting the role of the savings group to re-evaluate the progress and the capacity of members of the group to repay loans and progress construction.\textsuperscript{123} Further to this, and drawing from international examples of successful microfinance, initial reports indicated that housing loans

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Draft HSUFF business plan, June 2014.
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Draft HSUFF business plan, June 2014.
\end{itemize}
should be within a range of 25 to 33 per cent of borrowers monthly income.\textsuperscript{124} While this calculation becomes problematic in the context of low and erratic income levels, this ratio is significant at the group level to ensure there is sufficient capacity to manage risk of non-payment due to crisis.

While the initial capital input into HSUFF is from stakeholders, the intention is the formation of a trust will allow additional contributions to be sought from national organisations in public and private spheres and by international aid agencies to raise the scale of upgrading activity in Zimbabwe. This is anticipated to partially compensate for the lack of capital for housing development available through the public sector and also create greater leverage for ZHPF savings. However, an explicit objective appears to be to create a structure that development organisations external to Zimbabwe could invest in. This reflects both the normative conditions of international development funding but also a route to avoid the specific barriers created by, and the responses of western governments to, political conditions in Zimbabwe.

The fund is intended to become self-sustaining, with the project partners planning to charge interest on the balance of loans.\textsuperscript{125} The HSUFF will be used first in Dzivarasekwa Extension, prior to an expansion into other areas. Increasing the scale of the facility will depend on the ability to attract further capital investment, the circulation of loans within the fund and also the forms of contribution by city and national partners to the fund assets of the finance facility. Initial reports \textsuperscript{126} suggested that where cash is unavailable, land assets could be contributed by city councils and government to the finance facility. This extends the model used for Dzivarasekwa Extension and also has the benefit of linking investments to land use permissions.

\textsuperscript{125} This issue is yet to be finalised as of July 2014.
\textsuperscript{126} Internal Report – Bryan Winston – Design and Implementation of a slum upgrading finance facility
The establishment of HSUFF marks a further evolution of the co-productive relationship between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare in the creation of partnership vehicles for the delivery of incremental housing development. When considered against the necessary and sufficient conditions identified in Chapter Two, HSUFF demonstrates both pooling of resources and integration of decision making processes. This builds both on the capacity available within mobilised communities and also on the track record of collaborative and co-productive working established between the partners. While the HSUFF is at an early stage of implementation,\(^{127}\) it offers the potential for a scalable model of co-production. This initiative is examined further in Chapter Eight as an example of innovation arising through joint working towards a common set of objectives to reduce urban poverty.

5.10 Conclusion

This Chapter has aimed to provide some empirical depth to the theoretical and contextual Chapters set out earlier in this thesis. The evidence has been structured to emphasise the temporal development of relationships in Harare and to indicate a steady transformation of knowledge and behaviours on the part of both organised low income communities and the City of Harare Council. What appears to be evident from the data presented in this Chapter is a layering of experience, within a dynamic context, that makes adaptation possible. This moreover takes place because the actions come to appear sensible responses to the constraints and the lack of resources available to address long term issues. This, as will be examined in Chapters Six to Eight, is at the heart of a sociological explanation of institutional change.

The Chapter has also aimed to apply the conceptual discussion of necessary and sufficiency conditions for co-production, as set out in Chapter Two. When considered alongside a temporal analysis of the ‘key moments’ of collaboration, the empirical evidence highlights the changing forms of engagement. The deepening of

\(^{127}\) As suggested in Chapter Nine (section 9.5.1) further research that tracked the impact of HSUFF would be of great interest to scholars and practitioners.
involvement in the governance of development projects appears to have affected both the discursive representation of low income communities in Harare and the behaviours of the City Council.

The growing relationships have not been without setbacks, as ZHPF and Dialogue have faced sometimes violent and oppressive responses from the state. The City of Harare officials have also experienced challenge both from within the organisation by senior officers and politicians that continue to consider that policies of ‘slum clearance’ to be the most appropriate response to informal settlements. Additionally, more recent work with low income communities has also been a point of contest with government officials, who use the City Council’s commitment to work with communities as a criticism that they are wasting time and resources. Also, and what is not explored here due to limited space, is the subtle and low level forms of engagement that occurred between the ‘key moments’. These in some respects are equally important as the more prominent projects in embedding knowledge and trust between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City Council. Through regular conversations, attendance at meetings, seeking advice and by participating in exchanges and receiving delegations the deontic relationship (as described by Searle, 2005) are established.

By gradually building relationships between community and state dysfunctional institutionalised practices are identified and new approaches are developed. The following Chapters investigate this further, focusing firstly on the processes and the significance of mobilisation of communities. The discussion draws further from the theoretical analysis contained in Chapter Two to examine mobilisation of communities as a necessary condition for co-production. Connecting with social movement literature on collective action the Chapter explores empirically how mobilisation both creates human and financial resources while also embedding the social infrastructure to overcome barriers to participation in co-production. The Chapter is followed by an empirical discussion of urban governance to examine the impact of co-production on management practices in Harare. This is contextualised by Zimbabwe’s weak economic base and adverse political conditions, to consider
the options available to low income communities to engage the state. The final empirical Chapter provides a detailed examination of the processes of institutional change drawing together examples from the case study.
6.1 Introduction

The organisation of community based inputs into the local delivery of basic services is a definitive requirement of co-production, as suggested in Chapter Two. In order for organised communities to contribute to co-production, there is a need first to engage heterogeneous individuals and households in common objectives through an organisational structure (Gamson, ([1975] 1990). The difficulty of establishing a unifying framework for action and motivating sustained contribution to collective activity should not be underestimated. Differences of ethnicity, caste, gender or experience amongst ‘the poor’ can be a significant barrier to generating collective action (Woolcock and Narayan, 2006) and to realising the social capital needed to co-ordinate inputs and resources required for co-production.

Indeed, while people with very low incomes may share common economic characteristics, Krishna (2009: 960) in his deconstruction of ‘poor’ as category, emphasises heterogeneity. He suggests that ‘the poor’ are “an inconstant, internally differentiated and fluid collection of individuals, who are moving in different directions at the same point of time.” Even where there are clear commonalities, which could be considered a positive incentive for collective action, differences of culture, history or the personal objectives of those involved, can limit mobilisation, as illustrated by Mahmud’s (2010) case study of low paid garment workers in Bangladesh. Mahmud points out that while there was a common need for workplace rights, workers failed to mobilise due to their narrowly defined perceptions of community, which limited the “horizontal solidarities” required to coordinate their social resources.

Despite the challenges of developing a common framework and set of outcomes that resonate with disparate populations, working with and through organised groups of individuals offers an important means for low income communities to break patterns of exclusion (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004) and to ‘deepen
democracy’ (Appadurai, 2001). Robins (2008: 6) writing in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, states that while an appeal to “rights may be significant and efficacious in settings where there is a relatively well resources and responsive state, it may make more sense to invest in social networks, clientelistic relations and common forms of belonging in places where the state is extremely thin on the ground.” Moore (2005: 273), underlines the importance of communities working together when he states “poor people in poor countries have few political resources and become politically effective only through collective action.” Communities working together enable concerted voices to challenge the causes of poverty and, more radically, affect institutions and institutionalised behaviours.

Beneath the aggregate view of community collective action, are the interpersonal relationships that form the building blocks of social capital (Moser, 1997). It is the connections between people and households that create the transformative potential of communities working together. For individuals, the bonds of trust, reciprocity and practical support available through federations of people in poverty, provide the motivation to join and to contribute to projects of collective action. While ZHPF has had to overcome inherent ethnic and cultural differences among members of low income communities, mobilisation has focused on tangible benefits of membership. This includes efforts to improve access to land and, as shown in the quotations below, the role of the group to address “the isolation and disempowerment produced by conditions of poverty” (Robins 2008: 78). The framework for collective action, and the processes of mobilisation instigated by ZHPF and Dialogue, provides a vehicle for low income communities to redefine themselves as agents of change, able to transform the conditions that perpetuate their deprivation. This process, in line with Hall’s (2010) analysis of institutional change, starts with building a coalition of people in poverty around a specific and problematized set of issues.

“As a member of my [savings] group I know that I will be helped whenever there is a problem and the whole group will come together.

128 Evident from interviews with ZHPF leaders and their descriptions of the challenges of forming ZHPF.
The group gives me more confidence and power to move on and tackle the challenges in my life.”

“Being a member of the Federation has been fantastic! I have achieved something that I was not going to achieve when I was alone. But when I joined the Federation I achieved a stand – land in the Capital City.”

Alongside the ‘internal’ perspective on collective action, which reflects the behaviours and the characteristics of people living in poverty, are the ‘external’ conditions that create the need for mobilisation. In Zimbabwe, the organisation of communities has been developed in response to the lack of housing and services and in the absence of recourse through institutionalised political and organisational routes. The political environment, as discussed in Chapter Four, creates adverse conditions for organisations (NGOs and community based groups), which are represented as a threat to the authority of the governing party and state. The contextual conditions affect the spaces open to communities and the forms of response that are available. As discussed in Chapter Two, co-production requires an alignment of interests and activities: where both citizen groups and state organisations commit to the delivery of a common outcome.

This Chapter examines the processes and significance of mobilisation through the experiences of ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council, to address the first research question posed in Chapter Three. Data is drawn from the interviews with research participants and from analysis of documentary resources obtained from Dialogue and from the City of Harare Council. This evidence is critically analysed to explore the function of mobilisation to create social infrastructure and the collective resources needed to engage the state in co-production. Grounded in the analysis of empirical data, this Chapter firstly considers the benefits of communal working to tackle social isolation and release the agency of the poor to create alternative and makeable futures. Secondly, the Chapter considers collective action and the mobilisation of human and financial resources towards co-production. The Chapter concludes in looking at how ‘collection action problems’ are addressed by

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129 Female resident of Crowborough North, aged 44, 2 July 2013.
130 Female resident of Dzivarasekwa Extension, aged 50, 3 July 2013.
ZHPF in the context of Harare. Before moving to this analysis, the following section defines and discusses mobilisation, drawing from empirical data and social movement literature.

6.2 Defining Mobilisation

The term ‘mobilisation’ has been used extensively throughout social movement literature since the 1970s to describe an instrumental process of bringing together people and resources around common objectives or contentious issues. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 35) for example, define mobilisation as “how people who at a given point in time are not making contentious claims start to do so.” Resources can also be mobilised according to Cress and Snow (1996; 2000), with resources including money and supplies; information including technical knowledge; human inputs of time and labour; as well as moral support offered to peers within social networks. Mobilisation activates resources, which may be in a latent form within low income communities, to enable them to be applied through collective action. The drawing together and organisation of people and resources are, as Cress and Snow (1996: 1090) identify, the “principal antecedent task to collective action” and a key determinant in the activity levels of social movement organisations.

Within the social movement literature, mobilisation describes the “channelling of discontent into organisational forms” (Edelman, 2001: 289), which are political, class based or focused on specific issues of importance to members of collective groups. There are two aspects, which are significant for this research. Firstly, the production of collective action frames that have an “interpretive function, which simplify and condense aspects of the ‘world out there’” to mobilise potential supporters (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614). This is particularly significant in order to make claims, and the people that are making them, visible to the state. The framing of discourse and activity is action-oriented and legitimises social movement organisations (ibid). Actions may be directed to issues where sections of society are purposely excluded from services or opportunities available within a public arena or to exclusions, as Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) suggest, that are due to the dysfunction or lack of capacity of state-led institutions. The second aspect is the
social function of mobilisation as a way to create an infrastructure of mutual support and reciprocity among culturally heterogeneous populations. These are considered below, drawing from empirical data.

6.2.1 Collective Action Frames

Adopting the analysis presented by Tilly and Tarrow (2007), mobilisation provides a means to make the aggregated interests (contestations) of individuals visible to the state. While complaints and challenges can be made by individuals to state organisations, as a strategy, mobilisation can make contestation, in different forms, more visible when articulated through collective activity. This may be subject to collection action problems (as discussed below), but may offer a means to challenge social inequity in a way that is more effective than individual protest. Interviews with the leadership of ZHPF and with Dialogue senior managers indicated a key objective of ZHPF is to raise the profile of urban poverty, and the need for land for housing, in national debate with government. Land issues, while central to the politics of independent Zimbabwe, focused on the redistribution of farming land, with little consideration of how private ownership and the impact of regulation affected supply of land in urban areas. A Dialogue interviewee commented:

“until the urban poor started to organise, no one had ever brought that way of thinking [about rights to land] into an urban realm. So it was okay to distribute land for commercial farming purposes, but no one ever saw the same level of deprivation in the context of an urban setting.”

The frame adopted by ZHPF and Dialogue located claims within modes of non-partisan political engagement with the state; voicing issues of urban poverty through the membership-based organisation.

The narrative frame deployed by ZHPF and Dialogue presents low income communities as capable agents of change, following the SDI model (Appadurai, 2001; McFarlane, 2004). A Dialogue interviewee commented “what is critical is that our strategy is based around demonstrating what is possible. So rather than just

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131 Interview with Dialogue manager, 5 July 2013.
saying that this doesn’t work, actually presenting what works.”132 This strategy is intended to reduce the scope for the state to reject overtures from ZHPF on the basis that it represents unwarranted challenge to the legitimacy or authority of the state. Joel Bolnick, Director of SDI, outlined the approach: “[d]on’t confront authority head-on. Instead of storming the citadel, infiltrate it. [...] Play Judo with the state – use its own weight to roll it over” (quoted in Pieterse, 2008: 116). This approach adopts the repertoires of partnership in order to pursue particular policy goals, while highlighting the capability of low income communities to deliver development that resonates with the policy objectives of the state.

This frame is intended to create meaning and discursive coherence (Benford and Snow, 2000) to the actions and claims of ZHPF and Dialogue, both for the external state actors that ZHPF is seeking to influence and also for the membership itself. This latter function emphasises a longer-term iterative strategy of building capacity and efficacy to act within the community through mobilisation. ZHPF leaders recognised from the outset that, as a fledgling community based organisation, they did not expect state officials to listen to their claims, as they needed to establish their legitimacy through localised action. A ZHPF leader described their approach in saying “we said let’s start by making sure that we are strong enough in ourselves, then if you are strong we know that our women have the voice and you can put them in front and then we can support them.”133 In developing this capacity to act, ZHPF built the foundations for collective action as well as communicating their capability to targeted organisations of the state.

Overcoming the institutionalised practices and cultures that restrict access to decision makers provided a major challenge for ZHPF. As a strategy of engagement, ZHPF with the support of Dialogue, framed their approaches to the City of Harare Council in ways that accentuated their formality in order to counter exclusionary behaviour. This included Dialogue registering as an NGO in order to legitimately engage in discussions on issues of community interest. Obtaining a formal status

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132 Informal discussion with Dialogue managers, 8 February 2013.
133 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
overcomes a boundary to engagement of the state. The importance of this is illustrated by the comment that if a community member had requested a meeting directly with a Harare City Council official “no one would have given them the time of day.” As found by Millstein et al (2003) in the context of South Africa, epistemic boundaries and power relationships are such that the formal barriers to engagement need to be removed in order to initiate a conversation. The strategy of ZHPF and Dialogue has been to accept underlying, and unequal, power relationships to concentrate on framing collective action as a resource for problem solving. This contributes to the ideational power of discourse to strengthen the agency of urban poor communities, while also representing the approaches of collective actors as an opportunity rather than a threat to state authority.

6.2.2  Mobilisation Creating Social Infrastructure

Alongside the framing of collective action to establish meaning, legitimacy and to position ZHPF to engage the state, mobilisation is centrally about the (re)creation of a social infrastructure missing from the lives of the urban poor. Essentially, community mobilisation addresses the isolation created by poverty (Patel and Mitlin, 2004). It provides a means to counterbalance what Simone (2010: 19) describes as the reality of urban life for the poor who “spend their time compensating for insecure, provisional livelihoods and social conditions rather than building new possibilities for [...] the future.” For low income communities in Zimbabwe, the combined effect of a time consuming struggle for income; a lack of stability; few social and financial assets; and a lack of political traction, trap them in a cycle of material and psychological deprivation that is difficult to escape (Potts, 2011a; Manjengwa, 2012). Mobilisation describes a process of people coming together around their collective interests to challenge for improved rights or access to goods and services (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007), but moreover is about creating an opportunity to break patterns of exclusion drawing on the potential resources latent in the community (Baumann et al, 2004).

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134 Ibid.
Mobilising to create social infrastructure offers a positive incentive for poor communities to overcome cultural differences in order to create sources of ‘familial’ support. Observing this form of communality among the urban poor in Africa has a strong tradition in anthropology, as Jennifer Robinson (2006) points out. She refers to studies undertaken by the Manchester School on the Copperbelt in Zambia where “urbanites have generated fictive kin, eagerly sought to make connections where none really existed, carefully nurtured neighbours and family, built communities and defended difference” (ibid: 9). The need for protective and supportive social relations is echoed in Robins’ (2008: 84) study of the South African Homeless Peoples Federation. He cites Werbner (2002) and Nyamnjoh (2002) in challenging the idea of the lone citizen fighting for rights as a liberal individualist construct at odds with African realities. He states “conviviality, intersubjectivity and interconnectedness are especially highly valued in the contexts of vulnerability and uncertainty that characterise everyday life in many parts of Africa.”

As described in Chapter Five, ZHPF and the social relationships of its members, is structured around local savings groups that provide the architecture for practical and moral support and offer the point of co-ordination for inputs into wider projects of collective action. D’Cruz and Mudimu (2013: 33) highlight how savings schemes help address individual needs but also, for the women that form the majority of the membership of SDI affiliated urban saving schemes, provide a forum to “identify their collective issues and seek collective solutions to the more difficult issues of their existence in the city.” The group provides the supportive infrastructure that is otherwise unavailable to poor residents of the city. The experiences of social poverty in holding camps, unstable economic positions and mythologised memory of rural communality culminate in a deep felt loss of mundane forms of reciprocity and concern.

“Before I joined the Federation you know you are in a situation. During that period you could not see how tough it is to be in that situation, but as soon as someone lifts you off that situation and puts you into a new situation and you look back that’s when you see that situation was very tough. It was very tough doing our things and lonely. If you get a problem like your wife is not feeling well I just phone an ambulance and
my neighbours are ashamed – ‘what’s going on, an ambulance is there?’ But now with the Federation you start by just telling your neighbour. If I just tell my neighbour that I am not feeling well, she will go around telling others that something is happening there. So that’s good about Federation.”

A female ZHPF member highlighted the importance of the ZHPF group meetings as a way to gain perspective on her life, by listening to other network members. The meetings provide an opportunity to share and compare experiences and to see “how people are living in and developing their areas. We come together and they can learn from us and we will also learn from them.” Sharing knowledge and experience helps individuals to think through their own situations and address the practical problems of poverty, which can appear to be insuperable. The processes of mobilisation emphasise sharing and joint problem solving to build internal efficacy. The same female ZHPF member continued by underlining a key benefit of the group for her was the realisation that “even with as little money as we have you can survive, you can start a business, and you can generate something from the little that you have and you can feed your family.”

When considered through empirical data mobilisation, for the members of ZHPF, resonates with Freireian ‘conscientization’, to reflect the instrumental mechanics of the poor coming together to act, but moreover is “the process by which human beings participate critically in a transforming act” (Freire, 1985: 106). This transformation is internalised in building individual efficacy and raising expectations of life and social relations. It also provides a frame for activities directed towards institutions that impact negatively on the lives of the urban poor. Building collective identity in the community reflects Cleaver’s (2002) view, that the coalescence of interests in a social settling provides the foundation for action to affect institutionalised behaviours. A leader of ZHPF commented that mobilisation:

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135 Male interviewee aged 40, Dzivarasekwa Extension. 3 July 2013.
136 Female interviewee aged 29, Dzivarasekwa Extension. 3 July 2013.
137 Ibid.
“can be anything what you want to be or what you want not to be or what you want to happen in the future. For example we can mobilise our city fathers so that they can change the policies that we don’t want.”

Being mobilised, as a member of ZHPF, means understanding and making a commitment to the central objectives and the communal practices; it provides a process for building a framework of social support and action; and for members, it helps to boost self-esteem. This quotation above can also be analysed by drawing on William Gamson’s ([1975] 1990) seminal book *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Gamson defined mobilisation as embracing two closely related ideas of the *activation* of commitment and the *creation* of commitment. Activation, when applied to ZHPF, is the recruitment of low income community members who share a need for land and improved access to services, to “move those who already possess some degree of commitment to take a specific action” (ibid: 15). However, mobilisation is also deployed to increase the commitment and support of external actors to the collective interests of communities. As described above, this can be seen to include the efforts of ZHPF to ‘mobilise’ support and action by state authorities. This latter activity becomes significant, as addressed in Chapter Eight, where there the state has weak functional capacity to meet its statutory responsibilities.

6.3 Mobilising for Co-Production

Mobilisation, as suggested in Chapter Two, is a necessary condition for low income communities to engage the state in co-production. Patel and Baptist (2012) note that individuals, who are outside of collective structures, lack the visibility and scale to interest and engage public authorities, beyond representing the atomised concerns of service consumers or constituents. Individuals do not have the resources or stability to significantly improve their position within urban economies (Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014). As individuals, residents of low income communities may be physically present in urban areas but, due to a lack of formal status or identity, may be ‘invisible’ to the state. This according to Kabeer (2002:

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138 Interview with ZHPF leaders, 5 November 2013.
24) reveals the architecture of inequality, as manifest through the “routine devaluation, subordination and invisibilisation of certain groups within society.” However, as Simone (2010: 5) suggests, the urban is a particular environment as “a locus for the composition of social processes” and makeable through coordinative mechanisms able to shape human effort. Castells (1983: 263) highlights, in his analysis of social movement organisations in Madrid, how the organised actions of communities were transformative of space, culture and politics but moreover changed “the social perception of what the city was and should be.”

Mobilisation is considered here an inherently creative exercise, in the spirit of Paulo Freire who stated “[i]n order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform” (Freire [1970] 1993: 31). It is also a practical and pragmatic response to standing conditions of poverty and exclusion. The following section explores the practical aspects of mobilisation through the experiences of ZHPF members in Harare. This analysis is structured to highlight how the processes and the organisational practices of ZHPF create and orchestrate human and financial resources suitable for co-production. This aims to move beyond the generic consideration of the benefits of mobilisation for poor communities, to begin to identify the specific resources and capacities made available for co-productive projects of development in partnership with the state.

6.3.1 Building Scale

For co-production to take place, as suggested in Chapter Two, people and resources must to be orchestrated in a form that make them manageable. Inputs including allocation of time, labour and money need to be controlled and deployed in order to be introduced into co-productive activity. Examples of co-production provided by Ostrom (1996), Lam (1996), Patel et al (2002) and Workman (2011) highlight the importance of organisational structures of collective action as vital to enable the state to work with citizens outside of individualised relationships mediated through the administration of public services. Organising structures raise
the visibility of citizen interests and also enable the functional realisation of potential resources, knowledge and capacity into co-production. From the perspective of the state, a ‘legitimate’ organisation, in the form of a registered community association or legal entity, has the potential to be considered as a partner.

As described in Chapter Five, ZHPF is structured to enable grassroots members to be the primary source of authority. However, the federated structure also provides the flexibility to operate at varying scales to achieve its objectives. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 94) describe this as ‘scale shift’; a “process that not only diffuses contention across space or social sectors, but creates instances for new coordination at a higher or lower level than its initiation.” When applied to ZHPF and Dialogue, this reflects the significant organisational capacity available through savings groups and social networks to co-ordinate inputs, at a localised level, towards specific projects both within the community, or co-productively with state agents. It also is evident in the potential to corral support through the national federated structure to engage government on strategic issues of policy and beyond this to mobilise international partners, through SDI, to engage in discussion and lobbying for urban development with multilateral organisations such as UN-Habitat.139

The application of ‘scale shift’ in Zimbabwe is evident from the initial formation of ZHPF (described in Chapter Five), with mobilisation taking place through diffusion of ideas, as poor communities in holding camps in Harare and latterly outside of the Capital, saw the potential benefits of saving and organising. This was driven in part by active communication by the founding members of ZHPF, but also as a leader pointed out, when they arrived at holding camps to talk about saving schemes they often found people waiting to sign up, as information had spread through word of mouth.140 Building a constituency of interest provided ZHPF and Dialogue with the legitimacy to begin to contact the local government and participate in national

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139 ZHPF and Dialogue have been active participants with SDI in a number of World Urban Forum events.
140 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
consultation events such as the National Housing Convention 1999 (as discussed in Chapter Five, section 5.5), this according to a ZHPF leader, provided the first opportunity to present the approach to a wider audience of politicians, journalists and national and international NGOs. More recently ZHPF and Dialogue have been involved in the development of the National Housing Policy, 2012.

This is significant for the operation of co-production, whereby collective groups working at different scales are able to obtain support and to mitigate risks and avoid becoming the subject of power struggles between national and local political actors. The federated structure also has some weaknesses in respect of the accountability of national leaders. While there undoubted benefit for strong grassroots organisation, particularly for individual members, the structure of ZHPF (as shown in figure 5.2) risks the formation of an elite, disconnected from the isolated spheres of individual savings groups. This appears to be avoided by ZHPF as leaders maintain membership of the savings groups where they live and remain part of the social fabric of ZHPF. Through daily contact, leaders are available to communicate with the broader membership within their community and to be held to account (horizontally) for their activity.

6.3.2 Reciprocity – Releasing Human Capacity

Central to the process of mobilisation is the creation of bonds of trust and reciprocity. Trust, as highlighted both in empirical studies (for example Workman, 2011) and in theoretical analysis (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007), is key in creating social capital and co-production. For ZHPF and Dialogue, collective action at a community level is constructed through reciprocity, which extends from the mutual support provided to individuals through social networks, to the pooling of labour for house building and environmental improvements. Members of ZHPF accumulate “sweat equity”, which is called upon when needed from other members of the community. This is illustrated by a ZHPF member in Crowborough North who said that when he first joined ZHPF that he was attracted by the idea that members

141 Ibid.
142 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
143 Interview with Male aged 58, Crowborough North, 2 July 2013.
would “come together, save together and work together”. When he was building his house, other members of his group would come and help. “All the members of your group would come and dig the trench, shovel out the sand, foot the trench and the builder comes” to construct the foundation. When the work is complete, he noted, you “rotate yourself” to other projects being undertaken by the group members.

In addition to physical labour, a reciprocal approach is taken to the sharing of skills and life experiences through savings groups and networks. This includes sharing knowledge on coping with the practical and emotional difficulties created by poverty and also sharing of skills, including training that can expand earning opportunities for individuals in the formal and informal economy. Members of ZHPF report that it is these structures of support that provide central benefit and incentive for membership. A female resident of Dzivarasekwa Extension commented that she felt happy if she could help another member of the group or they could learn from her. This day to day reciprocity alongside the networks of support are important for communities, as there can be a long period of waiting (suggested by Simone, 2008 as characteristic of the experience of urban poverty) before land may become available. Interview participants from Dzivarasekwa Extension were members for an average of 9 years before being allocated land.

The ability of ZHPF and Dialogue to ‘deliver’ land through its relationships with city and national government is an important measure of its effectiveness. A key ‘selling point’ of membership, used when mobilising communities, is the translation of individual small scale savings into a significant loan fund (Gungano) to support individuals to obtain housing. In Harare, while there are some 18,500 members, ZHPF and Dialogue have ‘delivered’ less than 1,000 stands since inception.

144 Male interviewee aged 40, Dzivarasekwa Extension, 3 July 2013.
145 Female interviewee aged 50, Dzivarasekwa Extension, 3 July 2013.
146 Data from interviews with ZHPF members. Average membership for the nine Dzivarasekwa Extension interviewees who had not previously lived in the Dzivarasekwa Extension holding camp.
147 Data from ZHPF National Membership Information, September 2012.
148 This takes account of development in Dzivarasekwa Extension, Crowborough North, Hatcliffe and Epworth.
highlighting a ‘gap’ between the messages promoted during mobilisation and actual provision of land. While membership creates a number of additional benefits, both through acts of reciprocity and in affecting the institutionalised behaviours of the state toward low income communities (see Chapter Eight), the level of demand suggests that a majority of ZHPF members may never get land directly through ZHPF processes. This increases the importance of ZHPF and Dialogue as an influencer and participant in the systems of urban governance (as discussed in Chapter Seven).

Returning to the necessary conditions for co-production discussed in Chapter Two, reciprocity is significant within communities in providing the social infrastructure for the mobilisation of individuals and also the release of resources. Reciprocity is also important in building relationships with the state. As Searle (2005) and Ostrom and Ahn (2007) have suggested, forming deontic bonds of trust supports the creation of mutual obligation vital both for co-production and creating the potential for institutional change. Empirically, deepening forms of engagement, at a personal and an administrative level, is evident in Harare as ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare engage in both collaborative projects and more broadly in the development of urban housing policy. Reciprocity, for the state, enables new relationships to be ‘shaped’ in ways that demonstrate how they contribute to organisational objectives to garner political and bureaucratic support.

6.3.3 Creating Financial Resources

Urban poor communities typically lack a sufficient level of income to meet their basic requirements for food, shelter and health services or the financial stability to accumulate financial assets or savings to meet exigent needs (Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2013; Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2014). Living on a subsistence basis makes building assets difficult (Moser, 1997) and contributes to reproduction of chronic poverty (Hulme et al, 2001), with negative consequences for social relations and physical and psychological wellbeing. Major longitudinal studies such as Moser (2009) and Perlman (2010) indicate the potential for poor households to move out of poverty over generations. However, this is dependent on regular earnings and
the availability of support structures that enable individuals to accumulate assets, such as housing or businesses that contribute to income generation and help to smooth variations in employment.

As detailed in Chapter Five, the development of the savings schemes, and in particular the *Gungano* fund, is used extensively to promote ZHPF and to attract new members. While interviews indicate that people are at first incredulous that just US$1 can lead to obtaining a house, when they understand the operation of the saving scheme, it makes an important contribution to changing members’ views about their role as economic actors. This mobilises and motivates in a way that is at odds with the daily experiences of isolation and subsistence living. The importance of the local savings schemes in the lives of individual members is underlined by the practice of giving the groups names that represent the member’s aspirations. These include *Ta Fara* (we are happy); *Kutamura* (striving); *Shingi Rirai* (perceiver); and *Nhamoya Pera* (poverty being alleviated / overcome). A ZHPF leader talking about the formation of a savings group in Kwadzana in 1998 says:

“the day we named our group, it was on the 20 September 1998, it was called ‘Nhamoya Pera’ housing savings scheme it means ‘poverty being alleviated’. We thought that it was going to be the end of our poverty because what we heard from those guys, the way that they were mobilising us, telling us that the little we save we can loan each other a little […] and it can improve our lives and we can also manage to pay our school fees for our children.”

While the construction of savings schemes model was not specifically intended to support co-production, the approach is particularly suited to the mobilisation of resources towards co-production, identified as a necessary condition in Chapter Two. The daily savings ritual both generates a significant fund, in aggregate, that can be used to contribute to housing development and service delivery, and provides a means to create a stable resource base for collective action. The stability of the savings scheme was severely tested in 2009, with hyperinflation and the

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149 This comment was made in a number of interviews in both Crowborough North and Dzivarasekwa Extension.

150 Interview with ZHPF leaders, 5 November 2013.
subsequent collapse of the Zimbabwean Dollar (as discussed in Chapter Four, section 4.2.4). To preserve the assets of ZHPF, cash and loans were converted into building materials, with members making repayments in-kind. This is explained by a female Crowborough North resident who described a process of “dombo for dombo” or ‘stone for stone’. If “you are given river sand to construct your house, maybe five cubic metres of sand, you have to find a way to get or buy five cubic to another member for their construction.” This maintained the value and the operation of the savings scheme and protected the assets of members during a period of economic collapse in Zimbabwe.

The creation of a significant financial resource is vital to persuading the state of the serious potential of organised community action to contribute to the delivery of housing and local development. A senior City of Harare official identified the willingness of low income communities to contribute to infrastructure and incremental housing development as an important condition of working collaboratively with organised groups of ‘the poor’. Demonstrating financial “commitment” to the delivery of slum upgrading, by residents, was also identified as a key outcome from a partnership workshop involving ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare in December 2010. As described in Chapter Five, using ZHPF savings enabled the purchase of land for the Crowborough North housing scheme which in turn helped to reposition ZHPF and Dialogue as credible development partners. Interviews with City Council officials affirmed that a lack of resource within the city authority was an overriding impediment to the delivery of housing development. Co-production when seen from this perspective becomes possible, and attractive to the state, because mobilised resources bring additional capacity to joint working.

151 Female ZHPF member aged 49, Crowborough North, 2 July 2013.
152 Interview with senior Council Planning officer, 7 May 2013.
153 Harare Slum Upgrading - consensus building workshop, 23 November 2010.
154 Interview with City of Harare Engineering Officer, 6 November 2013.
6.3.4 Mobilising for Delivery

As detailed in Chapter Five, the development of housing units on the former holding camp of Dzivarasekwa Extension was made possible by a US$5 million grant from the B&MGF. The terms of the funding required that ZHPF, Dialogue and City of Harare form a co-productive partnership,\textsuperscript{155} governed by a MOU, which identified their separate contributions towards the construction of housing and basic services. It is considered unlikely by both ZHPF and the City of Harare\textsuperscript{156} that the Dzivarasekwa Extension project would have taken place without the external funding and local labour, given the parlous condition of the City of Harare finances. But the partnership has demonstrated the effectiveness of co-productive working and has provided an opportunity to build new forms of collaborative governance of urban development.

As discussed in Chapter Two, it is important to recognise that even where the capacity for co-production is present, resources need to be activated. Management takes place at a number of levels to ensure the timely availability of inputs to co-production. Joint decision making also occurs in the processes of negotiation necessary for co-ordinated action between community and state partners. This is, as discussed further in the context of governance (Chapter Seven) and institutional change (Chapter Eight), requires participants to develop a range of skills and knowledge on the effective operation of partner organisations. Active management of mobilised resources is formative, with the experience of joint decision making affecting both the discursive representation of low income communities and underlying institutions and institutionalised behaviours.

6.4 Dealing with Collective Action Problems

A challenge to the potential benefits of mobilisation for co-production can be found in the literature on collective action problems. Conceptualised in the mid-1960s by Mancur Olsen, the collective action problem states “no self-interested person

\textsuperscript{155} Funding contract correspondence from B&MGF project team to Dialogue 9 March, 2010.
\textsuperscript{156} Interview with ZHPF leader 8 May 2012 and City of Harare engineering manager 6 November 2013.
would contribute to the production of a public good ‘[u]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest’” (Ostrom 2000: 137 quoting Olsen 1965). This suggests that individuals will lack the motivation to work towards a collective objective when an immediate payoff is unavailable, even where it may be in their long-term interests. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 90) suggest that “most people with claims prefer to leave it to those with a larger stake in those claims to represent them. This phenomenon produces the paradox that many claims, with genuinely strong support, will remain unrealized because the mobilization needed to gain satisfaction for them is missing.”

Ostrom and Ahn (2007) discuss second generation collection action theories that move away from the limitations of the self-interested individual, reflected in Olsen’s analysis of collective action problems, to consider more complex motivations and social relations. This takes account of behavioural preferences and the “historical interaction between institutional structures and the quality of citizenship” (ibid: 7). Second generation collection action theory emphasises bonds of trust and mutual reliance within social groups as a foundation for mobilisation and the management of collective action problems. This perspective resonates with the experiences and the organisational values of ZHPF in creating ‘family’ relationships at a local level through savings groups. Unity of purpose and action becomes important for realising the resources for co-production and also in creating a momentum for institutional change. The sociological perspective on adaptive change, used in this thesis, relies on the adoption of new practices to demonstrate precedent that may become more widely supported within institutional environments. The management of collective action problems is discussed empirically in the following sections, drawing from the experiences of ZHPF and Dialogue to establish and maintain the coherence of collective action in low income communities. This considers two key problems for collective action: firstly, mobilisation and maintaining engagement of communities and secondly, free rider issues.
6.4.1 Mobilisation and Maintaining Engagement of Communities

Managing potential collective action problems is central to the successful mobilisation of communities (Hall 2010) toward co-production. As described above, establishing the organisational basis for collective action requires members of low income communities to be persuaded to join saving schemes as a route to housing. Membership of ZHPF is conditional on a set of practices and social behaviours geared towards establishing a collective voice; conditions that become harder to enforce as membership expands. Collective action problems are managed as part of the ethical and the practical organisation of ZHPF in the construction of social bonds and also through the rituals of participation.

A ZHPF leader indicated\(^ {157} \) the importance of groups to the stability of the overall structure and the management of collective action problems. He pointed out that the process of mobilisation is essentially about supporting the formation of new savings groups. Rather than accepting individual members into existing structures, ZHPF operates by converting existing social networks into a savings groups. This has important implications for managing collective action problems as there will be existing shared knowledge, experience and social bonds. The unity of purpose is inherent from the outset because people have chosen to be ‘mobilised’ into the savings group. This reflects Chappell’s (2012: 130) criticism of the rationalist basis of the collective action problem analysis. She underlines that there are a number of other factors that need to be included as motivations for collective action such as “habit, a sense of duty or the sense of enjoyment that participation provides, despite the fact that these are difficult to quantify.” The role of ZHPF to facilitate the organisation of social networks into groups is illustrated in the following comment from a ZHPF leader.

“When you come in from outside, you come in to advise not to tell them what to do because I know my problems better than anyone else and they know their problems better than anyone else. So it is better that they organise themselves - we ask people to organise themselves

\(^{157}\) Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
around savings. If they are able to help each other then it’s easy to work with groups that are organised.”

Ostrom and Ahn (2007) identify that creating trust is the key determinant in generating social capital for collective action. In order to build the social bonds to reduce collective action problems “[t]rust is enhanced when individuals are trustworthy, are networked with one another, and are within institutions that reward honest behaviour” (ibid: 8). Evans (1996: 196) also states that “[s]hared norms of trust and cooperation are a means of overcoming collective action problems. If a community is riven by conflicting interests, the nature and meaning of social capital becomes more complicated.” This is most evident in the structures and the mode of operation of ZHPF where there are strong horizontal ties that maintain bonds of reciprocity. Savings groups for example monitor the repayments of loans and contributions to practical forms of mutual support that underpin the groups. McFarlane (2012: 2811 quoting Appadurai 2001) points to the ritual of saving as developed by SDI affiliate organisations where “saving [...] operates not just as a financial discipline but as a ‘moral discipline’ that ‘builds a certain kind of political fortitude and commitment to the collective good.’”

As suggested above, a risk arising from the group approach, adopted by ZHPF, is maintaining the long-term involvement of members where land is not forthcoming from the state or conversely where housing has been obtained, thereby reducing the justification for maintaining membership in savings groups. In these situations the theory of collective action problem would suggest that membership should reduce and thereby undermine the viability of ZHPF. Membership numbers are maintained by the organisational structures of ZHPF, which rely on regular contact and participation in group activity. As previously highlighted, projects help to cement social relationships, as well as generate useful outcomes for members. Organisational structures for collective action, as suggested by Hall (2010), in his discussion of historical institutionalism, condition the manifestation and opportunities for collective action problems to arise.

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158 Ibid.
Membership of ZHPF is transformative for many individuals, providing the social connection and support structures that are otherwise unavailable to them. While the savings scheme is highly important to members, the wider perspective of community interviewees is that the “Federation is for life”; meaning both a long-term relationship and also the help they need to live. The Gungano as a revolving fund requires a US$1 per month contribution regardless of whether the member has obtained a stand. The principle of this, as a collective resource, is vitally important for many members, with one member who had partially constructed a house in Crowborough North commenting “if you don’t contribute [to the Gungano fund] then you are giving a problem to others who do not yet have their stands.”

While strongly felt, this degree of commitment to collective savings and action is not a unanimous perspective, with ‘individualisation’ being identified by Robins (2008) in the South African Federation. Similarly, in Harare two interviewees in Dzivarasekwa Extension highlighted how they had previously dropped out of ZHPF after joining in 2000. The reason for one member was that she had been married and her housing position had stabilised. The second member decided that the ZHPF was unimportant to her at that time. Both were “remobilised” (as they termed it) in 2010 after their housing positions changed and they needed to access health support available through the ZHPF.

Extending Ostrom and Ahn’s (2007) analysis beyond social relations, the importance of building trust as a basis for collective action can also be used to understand relationships with the state. While the institutional implications of this are discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight, the evolving relationship between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council demonstrates the importance of trust and familiarity to the development of co-production. Through close working, ZHPF and Dialogue have constructed a set of relationships that have enabled co-production.

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159 Female ZHPF member aged 51, Crowborough North, 2 July 2013.
160 Male ZHPF member aged 58, Crowborough North, 2 July 2013.
161 Two female ZHPF members both aged 35, Dzivarasekwa Extension. 3 July 2013.
to take place and created the spaces for more fundamental changes in organisational behaviour and institutions. Dialogue suggests that their model of collective action has developed beyond the pooling of resources of individual members to incorporate the City Council.

“I think increasingly [...] it now also refers to working collectively with the City as well. So rather than the community saying that this is our approach or this is our solution, saying this is a collective solution. So that the City sees a material stake in working with the community as well [as] any benefits or mistakes.”\textsuperscript{162}

For ZHPF and Dialogue the process of building strong relationships with the City of Harare has been difficult, and entailed hard choices and compromises. In 2005, \textit{Operation Murambatsvina} placed ZHPF and Dialogue in a difficult position when many of their members were violently displaced:\textsuperscript{163} losing homes and possessions and the social networks that, as described above, are so important for coping with poverty. Despite \textit{Murambatsvina}, ZHPF leadership worked to maintain a dialogue with the state at a point where they would have been justified in cutting links and seeing the demolitions as a terminal breach of trust. ZHPF justified this approach to its membership as a ‘reality check’ of working in changeable political environments. A ZHPF leader made the following comment about the implications of \textit{Murambatsvina}.

“So that was quite a huge dent but to an extent it also helped to strengthen the movement because we became away that the environment can change any time any minute we should not just sit and relax we should anticipate some changes made by government or whoever. So we have to be very strong so sometimes we plan for evictions that are not coming because we never know whether it is going to come or it may not come. So it kind of strengthened.”\textsuperscript{164}

The comment highlights an important strategy, used by ZHPF and Dialogue, to build internal capacity and activity among members to limit the reliance on partner organisations. This is a response to \textit{Murambatsvina}, but is also more generally

\textsuperscript{162} Informal discussion with a Dialogue manager 8 February, 2013.
\textsuperscript{163} Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
aimed at managing the risk that the City Council can reject initiatives out of hand due to non-compliance with regulations. While this in effect limits the range of co-productive engagements to development ‘objects’, as described in Chapter Two, it also emphasises interaction among members and their involvement in collective projects. This strengthens bonds of trust among members, increases the generation of assets and underpins efforts to reduce ‘free riding’.

6.4.2 Free Riding

The direct benefits of ZHPF and its activity are exclusively available to members through the social networks, organisational arrangements and in the housing developments secured through collective action. However, there a number of areas that are not excludable and create the opportunity for free-riding both by members and non-members of ZHPF. Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 17) define free riders as “people who use more than their fair share of a resource and/or who cover less than their fair share of costs of its production.” Free riding is a problem where it undermines the coherence of group based activity and generates collective action problems or where it contributes to the under production or the overuse of a public good.

The tight social structures of ZHPF that create a discipline of participation among members to limit free riding also create barriers to ‘outsiders’. The level of engagement and input into saving schemes is monitored by the group who will challenge members that are seen to contribute less than their ‘fair share’, given their resource base. A greater risk for ZHPF and Dialogue is that people outside of the communities will come to use resources that have been secured by or funded through ZHPF member activity. This occurs, for example in Dzivarasekwa Extension, where populations in neighbouring co-operative housing units use boreholes established for ZHPF members. This additional usage is thought to have contributed to the failure of pumps, making one of the boreholes on the site inoperable.

More broadly the work of Dialogue and ZHPF to change the discourse and the behaviours of the City Council towards poor communities becomes a public good. As an example, a senior City of Harare official commented the experiences of
working with ZHPF in Dzivarasekwa Extension has affected her perception of the urban poor stating “…this project in Dzivarasekwa Extension it has made us wear the shoes of the people that are in informal settlements if I may put it that way.”\textsuperscript{165} The improved understanding of the conditions of the urban poor has had a significant impact on discursive representation and treatment of ZHPF members and positively on informal communities more generally in Harare. This suggests a wider impact on institutions and governance arrangements.

A key issue for the ZHPF and Dialogue has been managing the transition from championing the interests of a relatively small set of mobilised members to becoming a movement concerned with the wider issues of urban poverty. This in part has been an inevitable consequence of their growth in membership and international activity, but is also due to the increasing number of localised projects. A contentious issue was highlighted by Dialogue in describing the take up of land for the upgrading project at Dzivarasekwa Extension. As a legacy of the former holding camp, there were some 150 families located on the site that were not ZHPF members and could have been evicted to make way for the Dzivarasekwa Extension upgrading initiative. This provided a contradiction for ZHPF who had fought against evictions, but now faced a decision to evict the existing residents on the site. This generated a significant discussion within ZHPF who decided that they could not be part of a process that evicted 150 families and needed to find a way to incorporate existing occupants into the upgrading scheme. While there are ongoing appeals to Government to extending the land available to accommodate additional families, for ZHPF the issue highlighted the implications of becoming a wider movement of the ‘urban poor’.

6.5 Conclusion

This Chapter has focused on the mobilisation of communities as a conditional requirement for co-production, as suggested in Chapter Two of this thesis. Drawing from social movement literature and empirical evidence gathered in Harare, the Chapter has explored how ZHPF and Dialogue have developed structures that

\textsuperscript{165} Interview with City of Harare Planning Officer, 7 May 2013.
enable collective action by heterogeneous communities. Further to this, how action is framed to construct spaces of negotiation and collaboration with the state. Building on the analysis of the conditions for co-production in Chapter Two, the empirical data indicates that mobilisation has two primary functions in Harare. Firstly, and in keeping with the existing literature, mobilisation enables the orchestration of people and resources. Collective action raises the profile of claims and the potential value of inputs to service delivery. Secondly, mobilisation is deployed to create the social infrastructure of mutual reliance and reciprocity missing from the isolated lives (Patel and Mitlin, 2004) and “provisional livelihoods” (Simone 2010: 19) of urban residents living in poverty. As described in this Chapter, social infrastructure is significant both in addressing the social and economic exclusion of urban life, but also providing the ‘glue’ to sustain mobilised community input into co-production.

Mobilisation provides a means to develop organisational coherence and activate the latent human, financial and material resources of low income communities. This, drawing on the evidence of Harare, appears to be essential in constructing co-production. However, data from Harare also shows the inherent difficulties in maintaining the involvement of individuals in collective action over an extended period. Central to the experience of ZHPF and Dialogue has been creating the organisational resilience to cope with slow progress achieving objectives or significant negative shifts in state policy towards low income communities. The capacity to sustain engagement of individuals and the state in slow processes of iterative change provides a key connection with sociological theories of institutional change.

The gradual embedding of new practices and behaviours is explored further in the following Chapter on urban governance. Chapter Seven builds on the analysis of community mobilisation to consider how organised communities affect the decision making of state actors. In addition to becoming more visible to the state, mobilised communities must also be seen as legitimate agents of change; shifting their position within existing structures of power. In extending the analysis beyond
communities, Chapter Seven explores the spaces of interaction between communities and the state to understand the choices and compromises made by ZHPF and Dialogue to influence urban governance. Considering empirically the motivations and tactics of stakeholders in Harare provides an insight into the potential implications of co-production for the institutions of urban governance.
Chapter 7
Governance and Governmentality – Building Legitimacy

7.1 Introduction

The relationship between the City of Harare Council and the community is framed institutionally to determine the distribution of services and the forms of interaction. While, as Migdal (1994) identifies, the state in practice is not a unitary actor, and is constituted as an organisation of organisations, how it governs is prescribed formally through statute and informally by a shared epistemology of practice. To engage the state, communities must come to understand the complexities of public management in order to build strategies that support the formation of relationships that further their interests. This provides a number of challenges for community based groups, who may need to adopt tactics, or make compromises, that allow them to build a dialogue with state actors. In situations where low income communities are unable to hold state service providers to account, have little traction with formal politics or are locked into clientelist relationships, difficult choices are made to legitimise a voice with the state, while also maintaining self-determinacy and core objectives of collective action.

Where community based organisations and NGOs engage in co-productive relationships they are open to criticism of being ‘co-opted’ within systems of Foucaultian governmentality (see Rose 1999; Corbridge et al, 2005; Dean, 2010). This negatively refers to the appropriation of resources by the state in situations where, for example, service users are carrying out tasks that are understood to fall within the responsibility of public service providers. It also makes reference to the inherent politics of service delivery which, when viewed from a binary perspective of state verses citizens, can amount to the de-radicalising of public claims that should be played out in a political arena. The implication of this criticism is, when considering co-production, the autonomy of community organisations is diminished as they become agents of state operations and exercise discipline over communities on behalf of the state.
Cooke (2004a) suggests that the risk of co-optation is inherent to participation, citing Selznick’s 1953 account of Roosevelt’s New Deal Tennessee Valley Authority project in 1933 to create hydroelectric infrastructure. Cooke (ibid: 45) highlights “how ostensibly autonomous grassroots groups were co-opted formally and informally into supporting the programme and goals of the project, and in particular of the project director, and became instruments in policy battles.” This example is used to illustrate how states persuade communities to support actions that appear contrary to their interests. Moreover, the compliance of grassroots organisations reinforces the disciplinary authority of the state for future action that may be contrary to the interests of communities. In a different context Ananya Roy (2011) offers a critical analysis of how neoliberal approaches to urban management in India criminalise urban poverty through policies to eradicate low income settlements (see also Bhan, 2009). Roy comments that the co-optation of SPARC, a founding SDI member in Mumbai, was significant to realising the national project of upgrading the Mumbai railway networks, which included the managed relocation of some 60,000 trackside shack dwellers (see Patel et al, 2002; Patel and Bartlett, 2009). Roy (2011: 267) identifies SPARC as complicit in maintaining “the dominant narrative of the poor as encroachers” in pursuit of the state’s teleological vision of world class city status.

There is an inherent contradiction for low income communities who, wishing to change institutions and institutionalised practices, may see, as Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) suggest, direct involvement in delivery of urban development as a means to limit the negative impact of the state on communities. The challenge, for organised groups, is to balance the consequences of involvement in governance processes while avoiding co-optation. In contexts of complex urban environments and asymmetric power relations, this is not the clear choice suggested by Cooke (2004a), as low income communities may have few options as to how they engage the state.
This tension is evident from the example of SPARC (see Patel et al, 2002) who consider that engaging the state and facilitating the relocation of track-side shack dwellers gave them some control over a process that could have been disastrous for low income communities. Indeed the process of engaging the state provided a considerable challenge for SPARC and the Indian National Slum Dweller Federation who mobilised pressure from international agencies and the Indian judicial system to get the Railway Authorities to accept their responsibility for rehousing residents displaced by railway upgrading. This example raises a number of questions, to be explored empirically in this Chapter, about how mobilised communities adopt positions, relative to state-led programmes of urban development, in order to further their interests. As in the example of Mumbai railway dwellers, the response of ZHPF and Dialogue in Harare is more complex than a simple acceptance of state authority; forming part of a process to define spaces of legitimacy and rights in order to influence the impact of state-led action. Building spaces for negotiation, as found by Lavalle et al (2005) in their study of Sao Paulo, increases the ability of community organisations to improve their tactical knowledge of the operation of the state and secure a route for future access to decision makers.

This perspective responds to calls by Robinson (2006), McFarlane (2011) and Myers (2011) to consider empirically how new urban compacts and models of governance are developed that address the challenges faced by cities of the Global South. This rejects a simple dichotomy of community versus state to recognise how mobilised residents meaningfully participate in programmes of city-making. Co-production when seen through a lens of urban governance in the Global South, improves efficacy and increases the resource base available to communities and the state for development. Working collaboratively across the public – private divide can generate the momentum to resolve institutional dysfunction. However, it also enables state organisations to re-establish a legitimate public service role where a lack of resource and reductive practices of rent seeking may have undermined its position of authority.
For state actors, developing new forms of operational governance may create tensions within governmental organisations due to disturbance of existing hierarchies of authority and procedures. Conflict arises from competition for power or resources and also in regard to how new collaborations ‘fit’ with organisational and political objectives. Using the example of land and housing, an urban council may lack the capacity to meet demand, but at the same time be institutionally reluctant to support alternative forms of delivery through organised communities in fear of being *ultra vires* (acting beyond its statutory powers) and encouraging ‘illegal’ settlement. This creates an unproductive, and potentially intractable, set of issues that impact on the efficacy of systems of urban governance. New partnerships offer the potential of breaking negative cycles of behaviour to create polycentric forms of governance (Ostrom, 2005) that maximise the benefits of mobilised communities and entrepreneurial public agents in urban management.

A means of introducing new, and potentially contentious, approaches to governance is through the adoption of discourse that challenges the limits of action (Abrahamsen, 2000). As introduced in Chapter One, the construction and operation of discourse in the “substantive content of ideas and in the interactive processes” (Schmidt 2010: 1) that govern social relationships, is central to the sociological theories of institutional change. The forms and use of language, ideas and argument, within institutional frameworks, reveal the ontological perspectives of actors, while also providing tools to affect behaviours. As discussed below, both communities and the state employ discursive strategies to build spaces that maintain or extend their boundary of influence. Through discursive structures, such as meetings and the joint production of policy documents and ideational processes associated with problem solving, the challenges of urban management are understood in ways that become resolvable and affect the practices of governance.

This Chapter addresses the second research question in Chapter Three by considering the implications of co-production for urban governance and how, within a context of contested politics and weak economic conditions, co-productive relations are used to build legitimacy. Extending the discussion in Chapter Six, the
following explores how the ‘urban poor’, through ZHPF, move beyond the isolation of day-to-day coping (as discussed by Simone, 2010; Myers, 2011) to engage in the systems of governance that reproduce poverty. This is examined empirically by first exploring whether ZHPF can be seen to have curtailed its claims for land and basic service provision in order to engage in collaborative activity with the state. Secondly, from the perspective of the City of Harare Council, how relations with ZHPF are structured to support the delivery of basic services. Before discussing issues of governance and governmentality, the Chapter continues with a brief discussion of the challenges of urban governance in order to clarify terms and to establish a foundation for the analysis of empirical data.

7.2 Challenges of Urban Governance

The term governance is a relatively recent, and contested, contribution to the lexicon of urban development. The World Bank (2014) defines governance as the way in which “power is exercised through a country’s economic, political and social institutions.” Myers (2011) points out that applied definitions of ‘governance’ go beyond descriptions of the ‘manner of governing’ and include decision making processes that are not restricted to the state. These are “measures that involve the setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules” (ibid: 104). Hulme et al (2014) underline that ‘governance’ is used widely and often inconsistently in development literature and is frequently prefixed as ‘good’ governance, to emphasise the significance of political democratic structures and the architecture of public and accountable bureaucracy to neoliberal forms of development.

The use of governance is not restricted to macro-scale institutional organisations and is applied to service delivery. Ringold et al (2012: 4) define governance of service delivery as a “set of incentives, accountability arrangements and rules that affect the way key actors [...] are held accountable for their behaviours and ability to deliver high-quality services.” This asserts a dominant perspective in development policy, as argued by Booth and Cammack (2013), of the principal-agent model of service reform based on stimulating demand and holding service
providers to account through the monitoring of delivery. This model relies on the responsiveness of state and contracted public service providers to the demands of users, as well as the ability of users to collect information, understand how services are managed and effectively lobby for improvements to provision. As such the accountability approach to service governance has a high entry cost and requires a diversification of functions within and outside of state organisations.

There is also a distinctive use of the term governance in the context of complex urban environments. Urban governance is visible spatially in the allocation of land, in the management and distribution of basic services and also in the relationship communities have to the urban economy and structures of decision making. Myers (2003), drawing on Mitchell (1988), refers to the configuration and management of cities as a process of “containerization”, where low income communities are directed to marginal and undesirable locations. This affects both quality of life for residents in badly serviced locations and also their ability to connect to the economic, social and service infrastructure of the city. Devas (2004) highlights how the interaction between government, private sector and civil society is the critical factor shaping the ability of urban poor communities to address conditions of poverty.

While notions of ‘good governance’ have been critiqued as an artifice of neoliberal international development discourse (Grindle, 2004; Khan, 2012), the underlying principle of decision making, with and beyond the state, continues to have value. Sundaram and Chowdhury (2012) highlight an emerging ‘realist’ view of good governance that is sensitive to politics, power and social relations, but is focused on embedding practices that generate more substantive and sustainable institutional changes. This theme is developed by Andrews (2013) in his detailed study of World Bank programmes. He concludes that despite major investment, government and the processes of governance rarely become more effective after receiving funding and policy support. Efforts to facilitate national development fail where there is a lack of connection between policies and embedded institutional values. Hickey (2012) reflecting on a political economy perspective, notes that more grounded
approaches to institutional reform offer the potential of progressive forms of
governance and politics to emerge.

To develop the discussion of governance, and identify its substantive implications
for management of interactions within complex urban environments, it is helpful to
follow Blundo and Le Meur’s (2009: 4) suggestion to disconnect governance from its
“normative straightjacket” of ‘good’. This creates the space to observe and
problematic the lack of capacity within governmental organisations, weak
economic conditions and conflictual politics that typify many cities of the Global
South. It also creates an opportunity to consider forms of participatory governance,
addressing the delivery of shelter and basic services, that may be more functional
and contextually relevant than established models of ‘good governance’ derived
from the experiences of the Global North. This echoes Khan (2012: 672), who
cautions developing nations against implementing a “blueprint for any particular
type of governance, but instead identify areas of governance that are most likely to
make a difference given the growth challenges that they face”. This challenge can
be explored empirically by considering the contextual conditions present in Harare,
as a framework to understand the development and operation of co-productive
relationships.

7.2.1 Urban Governance in Context - Harare

As described in Chapter Four, the City of Harare over the period 1997 to 2013 has
been seriously challenged by overlapping problems of a failed national economy
and political conflict between city and national government. These problems have
manifest in disruptions to the supply of water, sewerage and electricity (Potts,
2010), a lack of income to meet the cost of public administration,\(^\text{166}\) and politically
motivated interference from national government in the operation of the City
Council (Kamete, 2009). This is combined with state initiated violence that ranges
from intrusive surveillance by agents of security services (McGregor, 2013) through
to the large scale and orchestrated demolition of informal housing initiated by the
state as \textit{Operation Murambatsvina} (Tibajjuka, 2005; Sachikonye, 2006; Potts, 2010).

\(^{166}\) Interview with UCAZ, 6 November 2013.
It is within this dysfunctional context that ZHPF and Dialogue have sought to engage the City of Harare and navigate a route through the machinations of politics and a weak resource base to address the shelter and basic services needs of low income communities.

While the City of Harare maintains many of the administrative systems inherited from the colonial organisation of local government in Zimbabwe, much of the institutional architecture and associated processes have become dysfunctional in the context of economic failure and combative party politics. The impoverishment of Harare residents (see Potts, 2010), lack of effective administrative systems for revenue collection and the withdrawal of grants from central government\textsuperscript{167} alongside widespread corruption\textsuperscript{168} have reduced the total resource available to City Council for infrastructure investment and delivery of core services. This affects everyday service delivery and the forward planning of service provision. Reports of discussions involving City Council officials, ZHPF and Dialogue underline the inability of government to meet the demand for low cost housing and basic service provision without additional input from donors and communities.\textsuperscript{169} In these circumstances the established forms of urban government are subject to adaptation to reflect the realities of fractured economic conditions and weak organisational capacity.

During interviews, City of Harare managers comment how the delivery ‘slum upgrading’ at Dzivarasekwa Extension would not have been possible, in the context of financial pressures on the City Council, without B&MGF funding and direct input from the \textit{Gungano}.\textsuperscript{170} The Council prioritises its expenditure on maintenance of the service infrastructure and meeting the costs of essential services, rather than direct investment in housing development, in the absence of external funding. Their inability to manage the burgeoning demand has, however, encouraged the City Council to look to other approaches and partnerships with community and business

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} See for example press reports – Newsday 10 March, 2014 reporting on a Harare City Council budget discussion on increasing revenue income from markets and housing. www.newsdays.co.zw/2014/03/10/newsday-editorial-lawlessness-cripples-harare-city-council/
\textsuperscript{170} Interview with Engineering Department official, City of Harare. 6 November, 2013.
sectors to address the gap.\textsuperscript{171} This was illustrated by a former senior politician who highlighted historical practice in Zimbabwe of partnerships between employers, workers, building societies and local authorities collaborating to provide low cost housing.\textsuperscript{172} The idea of shared and co-ordinated input into housing development was presented as a practical approach that allowed for the formation of new delivery arrangements. Co-production addressed the limited liquidity of local government by drawing in savings schemes, such as the ZHPF Gungano Fund, while also providing a framework for the public sector to utilise its assets of land, technical support and access to service infrastructure.\textsuperscript{173} This focuses partnership activity on contextualised problem solving, recognising the limited capacity of partners to deliver development in isolation.

A further contextual issue that shapes the forms of participation and urban governance in Harare is the threat of state initiated violence. Kamete (2009) details how police and security services in Harare have a track record of brutally enforcing Zimbabwe’s Public Order and Security Act by breaking up any public gathering that could be construed as political protest. This has particular impact on the operation of community based organisations and their activities; providing an incentive to adopt co-productive approaches rather than more challenging forms of engagement of the state. McGregor (2013: 783) argues that the loss of political control of urban centres by ZANU-PF from elections in 2000 “turned urban governance into the object of intense political struggle and drastically undermined the capacity of councils to deliver services.” These issues are magnified in Harare, as the Capital City and seat of national government, with implications for how communities mobilise and how they represent their concerns to the state.

ZHPF and Dialogue manage the complex politics of Harare by adopting an overtly non-partisan approach, as promoted by SDI, both in dealings with the state and among members. This tactic enables ZHPF to navigate the potential risks

\textsuperscript{171} Fieldwork note – Housing Finance Seminar, Harare. 3 May, 2013.
\textsuperscript{172} Interview with former senior City of Harare politician, 12 November 2013.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
associated with ‘party militia in the markets and streets’ (as described by McGregor, 2013) by pragmatically dealing with whomever is in power. This echoes the work of the Indian Alliance (see Appadurai, 2001) to build an identity separate from political parties, which is used to defend against being drawn in to clientelist relations. At a practical level, ZHPF take great care to prevent political displays, speeches and campaigns in group activity. This is managed through the membership, who exert peer pressure to, for example, get people to remove political party t-shirts at group meetings and where politicians are invited to events, to make it clear that campaigning speeches are unacceptable.

While these efforts appear to be effective in preventing ZHPF activity from becoming performances of party-based argument, individuals and ZHPF remain affected by the wider politics of Zimbabwe. From the elections in 2000, when MDC came to prominence and, in particular, following the violence surrounding the 2008 elections, political contestation in Zimbabwe shaped public-facing activity of ZHPF. A ZHPF leader provided an example of a community meeting in Mbare, an area of Harare that is politically volatile, where they were confronted by local ZANU-PF militia and accused of trying to steal the money of local people. Threatened with a beating, the ZHPF leaders had to call in a local councillor to vouch for them before they were released. Similarly, members of ZHPF and Dialogue have been arrested and threatened with prison, when meeting with communities outside of Harare, for inciting civil disobedience.

This highlights a managed tension within ZHPF between the freedom of individual members and leaders to maintain party allegiance and the ‘apolitical’ stance of the collective group that is vital to their leverage on issues of housing and basic services with the state. ZHPF and Dialogue have adopted a position of minimising individual political commitments, due to the affect that arrests and violence from state authorities would have on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the collective. The importance of working to build relationships through administrative processes and

174 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
175 Fieldwork note – informal discussion with Dialogue Manager.
galvanising support among local politicians and officers appears to offer the best method to negotiate and collaborate with the state. A Dialogue manager commented:

“[t]here is absolutely no other option at the moment [...] this whole process of co-production in some ways allows them [the community] the space to develop the sophistication to demand more which they would not have otherwise. This strategy is founded in the experience of Federation members who have tried various approaches in the past to become heard and to improve their access to services – these have failed.”

Within the options available to collective groups of the urban poor, finding ways to become involved in systems of urban governance, even where this externally may be viewed as co-optation, provides a means to build agency and legitimacy and affect the factors that shape the reproduction of poverty. The following sections develop this issue looking firstly from the perspective of ZHPF and Dialogue at their strategies of engagement of the state and secondly, from the perspective of the state the benefits of cultivating new relationships with the urban poor as partners in development.

7.3 ZHPF and Dialogue – Strategy of Engagement

From the initial formation of ZHPF and Dialogue in Zimbabwe, there was an intention to address issues of urban poverty by working with central and city government. While the initial focus for ZHPF was on mobilising the capacity of low income communities to address poverty, there was a recognition by ZHPF and Dialogue that, as Williams (2004: 96 citing Moore and Putzel, 1999) identifies, engagement of the state is central to a struggle for rights and resources. A strategy of engagement was driven by the experience of institutionalised violence in response to direct challenge to state authority (see for example Sachikonye, 2011). However, it also reflected a deep commitment, among ZHPF members, to the idea and narrative of Zimbabwe as a successful and independent country with strong social values. While scholars, such as Phimister (2012), have critiqued the

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176 Interview with Dialogue Manager, 10 May 2013.
177 Interview with Dialogue Manager, 5 July 2013.
political applications of ‘patriotic history’ as a ready tool of oppression by the ruling party in Zimbabwe, cultures of self-help provide a powerful driver of communal action.\textsuperscript{178}

ZHPF has developed a strong group discourse on the agential possibilities of collective action, which is reproduced through the rituals and processes of mobilisation. Centrally, this refers to ideas of communal self-help, but also connects with, and in some senses appropriates, the national political narrative of empowerment used extensively by ZANU-PF.\textsuperscript{179} For ZHPF, this discourse helps to build internal efficacy, underpin the entitlement of members to live in the city and to be part of the civic life of Harare, while also reinforcing the importance of group solidarity. This is expressed in practical terms through a philosophy of “if we want change we have to demonstrate what can change first,”\textsuperscript{180} used to motivate individual contributions to group projects. It is also reflected in ZHPF and Dialogue’s ambitions to occupy spaces (developing policy and delivering services) that would normatively be the preserve of the state. In engaging in co-productive activity ZHPF and Dialogue are affecting governance arrangements by influencing the delivery decisions of the City of Harare Council.

A formative moment for ZHPF and Dialogue, in developing their strategic approach to addressing issues of homelessness and urban poverty came with the state supported land invasions, which took place from March 2000 (Hanlon et al, 2013).\textsuperscript{181} The land invasions (or \textit{jambanja}), which occurred just three years after the formation of ZHPF, generated arguments among the leadership on whether ZHPF should ‘seize the moment’ and join farm invaders as a way to secure access to land. It was significant because it clarified how ZHPF was positioned relative to national politics and it also tested their core strategy of seeking partnership and negotiation with the state. The land invasions were politically oriented, through ZANU-PF’s grassroots organisation, and participation by ZHPF would have tacitly aligned them

\textsuperscript{178} Interview with Dialogue Manager, 5 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{179} See for example ZANU-PF 2013 Election Manifesto that uses the slogan “Indigenise, empower, develop and create employment.”
\textsuperscript{180} Interview with Dialogue Manager, 5 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{181} See Chapter Five for further background on the land invasions.
with ZANU-PF national politics. As described in Chapter Five, the timing of the land invasions was highly significant in relation to national politics. The invasions followed ZANU-PF’s first electoral defeat, on a proposed new constitution, in February 2000. This period corresponded with the growing significance of MDC, who were to take control of a majority of urban councils in Zimbabwe and become a substantial presence in Zimbabwean politics from the elections in June 2000.

ZHPF leadership decided that as a movement they would not participate in land invasions as they considered it would discredit them, in the long-term, as a legitimate development partner to central and local government and would undermine their credibility with international donor organisations.\textsuperscript{182} A number of ZHPF members did occupy farms or participate in the organisation of invasion gangs and while some faced censure, they were allowed to continue as members of ZHPF. A key point of discussion for ZHPF and Dialogue, at this time, is reported to be about how they effectively represent their objectives as a movement\textsuperscript{183} and their legitimacy with members and with the state. While the decisions made by ZHPF and Dialogue convey a commitment to engaging fully in the formal arena of urban governance, they recognised, given their relatively weak negotiating position, the need to secure substantive change in the policies and practices of the state on issues of urban poverty. The land invasions, while populist, did not address the underlying exclusion and poverty experienced by low income community members or affect the governance practices of the state in meeting need for low cost housing and basic services.

The approach developed by ZHPF and Dialogue echoes Appadurai’s (2001) analysis of the Indian slum dwellers Alliance, which he describes as a form of radicalism that rests on the poor claiming spaces and undertaking actions more typically considered as the responsibility of the state. Through building precedents of successful partnership working, the Indian Alliance becomes legitimised as a partner to the state, increases its knowledge of how to ‘manage’ and influence

\textsuperscript{182} Interview with Dialogue Manager 5 July, 2013.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
urban governance processes, while also increasing the visibility of the needs of low income communities. Their approach to precedent setting connects with the sociological theories of institutional change, discussed in Chapter Two, by initiating small changes in attitudes and behaviours. While these changes are not exempt from reversals, as discussed by Bhan (2009) who highlights the anti-poor narrative led by the Indian court system, it serves to demonstrate the potential efficacy of collaborative solutions to urban development.

The experience of ZHPF and Dialogue, and their response to the ‘opportunity’ of land invasions, illustrates how community based organisations navigate real politics. It marks an approach distinct from romantic views of collective action towards a realist understanding of politics and the limits of protest. This perspective was underlined by a Dialogue manager who stated “I think for a lot of poor people who are resource marginalised, who are in the margins of society, to be radical it’s just another way to be marginalised.” This highlights how strategic choices in Zimbabwe are grounded in a critical analysis of the political context and the available routes for action by the urban poor. But moreover, as Williams (2004: 102) suggests, even where engagement is successful the expectation is that the effects of these are “routinizing rather than revolutionary.”

This perspective is shared by community members of ZHPF who see the engagement of the City of Harare Council as a way to be recognised as residents of Harare. As described in Chapter Four (section 4.3.2) a central practice of the state has historically been to delegitimise urban residency by forcing people in poverty to occupy holding camps or return to rural areas. Therefore, to be involved in collaborative activity, even where this comes with additional responsibilities and costs, is empowering and justified as a short term practical response to the resource constraints evident in Harare. A community member said that the City Council is “happy because they know if they give us a piece of land it will be serviced and it’s okay for them. In a very short time they will be collecting rates and

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184 Interview with Dialogue Manager, 5 July 2013.
keeping the ground clean.” Even when the same community members is challenged that ZHPF members are doing the job of the Council for them, he replied that “we are doing for them but it is for my benefit as well.”

The experience of community members, as described in Chapter Six, is one of isolation and disconnection from the state in its Weberian public service role. In Zimbabwe, historically the state has been a source of threat rather than support (Kamete, 2002). While mobilisation compensates for this in many respects, there remains a normative motivation to engage with and be legitimised through a relationship with the state. A general perspective from across the interviews with community members is that they value the City Council’s engagement with ZHPF and see their new status as service consumers as important. This extends to a paradoxical position where residents of Crowborough North, for example, place value on being registered to pay water and sanitation rates. This additional financial burden is viewed as recognition of their legitimacy. This is despite people being unable to meet the relatively high costs and easily getting into arrears. While the status of consumer may be considered as a severely limited as a form of citizenship, this in addition to the visits by politicians to Crowborough North and Dzivarasekwa Extension is perceived by ZHPF members as evidence of a changed relationship with the City of Harare Council.

The implications of this changed relationship between urban poor communities and the City of Harare, as examined in Chapter Eight, has reduced the perceived risk of violent mass demolitions, but can be viewed as having limited scale of impact in the provision of additional low-cost housing. The City of Harare Director of Housing estimates, considering demand, there is a housing construction gap of some 500,000 units in Harare. ZHPF and Dialogue activity in Harare has had limited impact against this gap with 480 stands planned for Dzivarasekwa Extension; 150

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185 Interview with male ZHPF member aged 39, Crowborough North, 2 July 2013.
186 Average monthly charge of US$27 – 30 plus interest on arrears reported in Crowborough North. Data collected during community interviews 2 July 2013.
187 See for example Dagnino’s (2005) discussion of neoliberal conceptions of citizenship.
188 Reported at a housing finance workshop in Harare 3 May 2013.
stands in Crowborough North; and various small initiatives that have included developments at Hatcliffe (55 stands) and Epworth (20 stands). While at an individual level these developments have been highly significant, they have had little impact on the shortage of low cost housing in Harare.

The limitations of ZHPF and Dialogue’s influence over issues of city management can also be illustrated by on-going discussions on the provision of low income housing as part of a development in the Harare district of Budiriro\(^\text{189}\) (see also reference in Chapter Five, section 5.8.1). This is a joint housing construction project involving the City of Harare and Central African Building Society (CABS) to build 3,000 completed new homes for freehold purchase, targeted at low earners. ZHPF and Dialogue have been in discussion with the City of Harare for some time to obtain an allocation of units to be issued to ZHPF members. While the City Council is supportive, CABS have indicated that ZHPF members would be unlikely to meet mortgage qualifications.\(^\text{190}\) Discussions continue, with ZHPF and Dialogue proposing to guarantee member mortgages, however this illustrates limited community traction on major development projects.

Returning to the question of whether ZHPF ambitions and impact have been constrained because they have sought to engage rather than challenge government, there is a consistent view from ZHPF, Dialogue and from the City of Harare Council.\(^\text{191}\) This is put succinctly by a ZHPF leader who said “it is common knowledge in Zimbabwe that if you try to use muscles, the people in Zimbabwe are good at using muscles, especially the state […] so if we had taken the approach of using muscles we would have been on the losing side […] some of our members are going to die, and that has happened before.”\(^\text{192}\) As an organised group ZHPF, with the support of Dialogue, aim to present themselves as a credible partner and see their approach as cumulative: changing the patterns of state behaviour over time in

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\(^{189}\) See [http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2013/12/12/old-mutual-to-build-15-000-houses](http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2013/12/12/old-mutual-to-build-15-000-houses) and [http://www.herald.co.zw/city-rolls-out-15m-housing-project/](http://www.herald.co.zw/city-rolls-out-15m-housing-project/).

\(^{190}\) Fieldnotes, 24 April 2014.

\(^{191}\) This issue was discussed at the consultation workshop with participants in Harare 23 April 2014.

\(^{192}\) ZHPF leader at consultation workshop Harare 23 April, 2014.
the context of a charged political environment. They describe their engagement of the state as “leniently demanding their rights”\textsuperscript{193} at a time when other groups were protesting against the government at international meetings. The philosophy of ZHPF and Dialogue, in keeping with the SDI model, is that at some point there will need to be a discussion and a negotiation on issues of housing and land and this should not be undermined by taking oppositional positions that are difficult to reverse.

The expectation of ZHPF and Dialogue is that their approach will achieve scale over time, as new practices of collaboration become embedded. The SDI methodology, used in Zimbabwe, relies on participation by government and organised low income communities in negotiation of contentious issues. A national leader of ZHPF commented that the “SDI method cannot be seen to have yielded results today, but in the long-run we are expecting that all governments will see that this is the only way to go to engage the urban poor.”\textsuperscript{194} ZHPF and Dialogue measure their impact by qualitatively by assessing influence on state decision making, joint working and reduced risks for the urban poor, in addition to the scale of outcome from development schemes. An institutional effect is anticipated to arise as the state adopts new ideas and approaches that inform the allocation of land and the commissioning of low cost housing through co-operatives. The aim being to embed new organisational behaviours through planning and regulation, as discussed in Chapter Eight, where it can benefit all low income communities.

For ZHPF and Dialogue, the strategy of engagement has developed through experience and a critical assessment of contextual conditions. While this approach has limitations and can be critiqued as a form of co-optation, it provides for ZHPF and Dialogue a pragmatic means of advancing the interests of low income residents of the City. It entails a number of trade-offs which include building a ‘long-route’ to partnership with the state and, for ZHPF members, legitimacy and internal efficacy in relation to state organisations. ZHPF and Dialogue have worked to establish a co-

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} ZHPF leader at consultation workshop Harare 23 April, 2014.
operative approach with government rather than be co-opted. They maintain their independence through the mobilisation of communities, but consider that for sustainable change the state needs to be an active partner in discussions. This may entail compromises for communities, for example the slow pace of housing development, but this for the ZHPF and Dialogue is grounded in a strategy that focused on long term institutional change.

“The greatest criticism that I often get from other organisations is that the SDI methodology just allows local authorities to, kind of, just get away with not delivering. But it’s very pragmatic. The reality is that even if you were to demand you are not going to get it. So the way to get something out is to make it look like this is the most logical thing for the local authority to do. [...] I don’t think that the Federation would have got anywhere if they had not used that strategy.”

7.4 City of Harare – Identifying Partners in Urban Development

The City of Harare recognises that it lacks the resource and capacity to meet the demands for land and basic service provision created by urban population growth. Moreover, there has been a realisation within the City Council that policies to eradicate informal settlements have been ineffective. The former Mayor stated that *Operational Murambatsvina* was a “very sad period in this country’s history”. This view is generally shared those officers of the City Council participating in interviews. They indicated the need to change approach to urban management from forced evictions to creating negotiated solutions to ‘illegal’ settlements. “The solution is not really moving people. The solution lies with the people themselves – engaging with them.”

The weak resource base, political conflict with central government and a lack of capacity to act, have become strong incentives for local government in Zimbabwe to innovate in order to remain organisationally viable. UCAZ, the Urban Council’s Association of Zimbabwe,

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195 Interview with a Dialogue manager, 5 July 2013.
197 Interview with senior City Council Planning officer, 7 May, 2013.
198 Quoted from a speech to the housing finance workshop in Harare 3 May, 2013.
199 Interview with a City Council Planning Officer, 7 May 2013.
commented that the “situation is such that you now have to survive more efficiently rather than in the orthodox way of doing things.”

While necessity has created an incentive for the City of Harare to consider new approaches urban management, the Council is reliant on organisations in the community willing and able to engage in partnership activity. Prospective partner organisations are considered where they bring capacity otherwise unavailable with the City Council. Analysis of Council documents suggests that partnership is typically defined as commercial or contracting relationship with a third party such as a housing developer, but also includes inputs from community based organisations substituting for public investment. For example, the donation of chemicals for the maintenance of swimming pools by community clubs; provision of health and welfare support for HIV / AIDS, child protection and soup kitchens; and refurbishment of community halls by churches. These illustrate how the City of Harare is attracting resources from wealthier sections of the community to support the delivery of services, in the absence of core funding.

Drawing on the discussion of co-production in Chapter Two, this substitutive approach supports the functionality of public services but lacks structured engagement in the governance of services. While this does however, have practical significance for the City of Harare in how it utilises its limited resources, it does create the risk that the City Council will seek to abjure its responsibilities in areas where it is expensive or difficult to deliver. This is highlighted in the following quote from a City of Harare Planning Officer on policing river pollution.

“The City is far removed from those places where the action is happening. In that scenario Dzivarasekwa Extension, because they [ZHPF] are an organised group, they are able to look at those issues and discuss them at their committee meetings. [...] These are community based organisations [and] because they are organised they can take

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200 Interview with UCAZ, 6 November 2013.
201 For example Department of Housing and Community Services Annual Report, 2011; Department of Planning Services Annual Report, 2011; and City of Harare Strategic Plan, 2012 – 2025.
202 Department of Housing and Community Services Annual Report, 2011.
those responsibilities. For example sometimes you don’t even need the City to organise you, they police themselves.”

This suggests that the City of Harare is expecting to use the structures and organisational capacity created by ZHPF and Dialogue to enforce disciplinary policies of the City Council. However, as a practice of governance, the devolution of responsibilities for communities to self-manage state responsibilities within a defined framework of Council policy can be seen as a form of Foucaultian governmentality. This is possible both because of the relative spatial isolation of the community in Dzivarasekwa Extension and due to the willingness of communities to be accept responsibility, which as described above is viewed as a symbolic gesture towards the legitimacy of organised local communities.

The most recent City of Harare budget statement prioritises broadening the Council’s resource base to secure new revenue streams for the delivery of services. The budget implies that the operational viability of the City Council is inherently linked to its perceived legitimacy and authority as a public agency. Thus, maintaining the ability to deliver services is a strong incentive to engaging in collaborative and co-productive activity, even where new arrangements fall outside of ‘normal’ operating procedures. This can be illustrated by the work of UCAZ, which is supporting urban councils to bring partners into the service delivery chain as a way to augment or fill gaps in available budgets. The approach is described by UCAZ as follows.

“We don’t want this old view that participation only means coming to meetings and so forth. We are seeing civic participation from a different perspective [...] civil society to come in and do some physical things like the refuse collection, like if they are engineers they can assist in repairing broken water pumps.”

This approach represents the delivery of basic services as a necessarily participative exercise, with managed inputs required from a number of sources. In addition to working with organised community groups, this model looks to businesses and

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203 Interview with a City Council Planning officer, 7 May 2013.
204 City of Harare 2014 Budget Speech and Proposals, 8 November 2013.
205 Interview with UCAZ, 6 November 2013.
other state organisations, such as the Army, to provide technical input into the
delivery of local government services, such as road maintenance, or the loan or
repair of vehicles and equipment. According to UCAZ this provides an important
means to ensure the viability of local government provision. But importantly, these
forms of collaboration, operated as technical exercises, carry reduced risk of being
criticised by national government, as they can be justified as entirely separate from
a party political realm.

By finding co-productive ways to deliver statutory responsibilities, in the context of
limited resources, the legitimacy of local authorities is buoyed as a deliverer of
services. Failure to provide land, basic services or maintain roads and infrastructure
undermines the credibility of public authorities, which in turn makes collection of
revenue more difficult. Press reports in April 2014 highlight how residents groups
in Harare are threatening to boycott payment of rates in protest to erratic water
supplies. The Harare Residents’ Trust is quoted as saying that residents are “losing
confidence in their [City of Harare Council’s] capacity and efficiency”. 206 Providing
alternative capacity to deliver services and meet public commitments for basic
service delivery reinforces the efficacy of government and contributes to
maintaining organisation viability.

An example of a pragmatic approach taken in Harare, as described in Chapter Five,
is the construction of boreholes as a primary source of water supply for residents of
Dzivarasekwa Extension. While contrary to planning policy, 207 the settlement has
been established without reticulated water supply. The construction of boreholes is
represented as a temporary measure to facilitate incremental development of the
site, but may remain as a permanent feature given the inconsistent nature of mains
water supply in Harare. 208 This illustrates how the City Council agreed to an
exception to the regulations as a ‘temporary’ measure allows for the Dzivarasekwa
Extension project to proceed. Local arrangements, negotiated with ZHPF and

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207 Rules for development contained in Regional, Town and Country Planning Act.
208 Informal discussion with City of Harare Public Health Official, 1 February 2013.
Dialogue, have ensured public health standards for maintenance of boreholes have been met. These arrangements notably have resulted lower incidences of cholera during recent outbreaks among residents of Dzivarasekwa Extension than seen by the City Council in more formalised areas of Harare. This exception, achieved because of the relationship between the City Council, ZHPF and Dialogue has met the needs of local residents for water while creating an acceptable level of compliance with public health regulations.

The context of weak economic conditions and contested politics has undermined the ability of the City of Harare to meet many of its obligations as a public authority. These difficult circumstances have provided an incentive for Harare, in common with other local authorities in Zimbabwe, to consider alternative approaches to both resourcing existing services and to developing new partnership arrangements that affect the governance of public provision. Having outlined the motivations and methods of co-productive engagement by both ZHPF and Dialogue and also the City of Harare, the following section of this Chapter brings together the evidence to consider the implications for urban governance.

7.5 Urban Governance

The definitions of governance, as discussed at the start of this Chapter, and whether used with a prefix of ‘good’ or not, can have a variety of meaning and application within development policy and literature. However, empirically in the specific context of Harare, governance is about the functionality of institutions and organisations to deliver urban services and development. When government lacks the capacity, reach, resources or legitimacy to meet the demand of growing, and increasingly economically polarised, urban populations, productive interaction between social actors becomes more significant (Devas, 2004; Bayat and Biekart, 2009). The preceding sections of this Chapter have demonstrated that, despite different constraints and motivations, both the community sector (ZHPF with the support of Dialogue) and the state (City of Harare) have a mutual interest in

209 Ibid.
influencing how and where urban services are delivered. The ‘gap’ between what they want and what they are able to obtain, through existing systems, is manifest in “shadow boxing” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 21) between communities and the state. They are actors in motion, aiming to reinforce their legitimacy and substantiate their influence over the mechanisms of urban governance.

This engagement, when considered through a lens of sociological institutionalism, creates the micro-changes and adaptations to discourse and behaviour that contribute to iterative reformation of rules (Coaffee and Healey, 2003; Knudsen, 2008; Kingston and Caballero, 2009; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; and Brousseau and Reynaud, 2011). It is through engagement and ‘lenient demand for rights’ that social agents adapt the tools and technologies of governmentality in order to shape new sets of rules. In discussing why the Indian Alliance adopted the repertoires of the state, Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014: 228) suggest this is in order “to strengthen members’ capabilities and specifically their knowledge base and relational capital.” This is consistent with Arjun Appadurai’s (2001) ideas of ‘governmentality from below’, where low income communities occupy and annex the practices of public management and re-animate these within a framework of co-production. Familiar rules and processes are adapted to include spaces for participation, negotiation and joint decision-making that reinforce the legitimacy of low income communities and the state working together within urban governance frameworks. The remainder of this Chapter examines co-production firstly, as a form of hybrid governance and secondly, as a means to fund urban infrastructure to consider the practical utility of co-production for urban development.

7.5.1 Hybrid Governance

Co-production can be viewed as contributing to the development of ‘practical hybrid’ systems of urban governance. This, as a pragmatic response to dysfunctional systems of delivery, focuses on utilising available resources and capacity towards urban development (Wild and Foresti, 2013). Booth and Cammack

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210 ZHPF leader at the consultation workshop, 23 April 2014.
(2013: 129) define practical hybridity as “the willingness to construct institutions using the best available materials, marrying modern, professional knowledge and skills with ways of doing things successfully to which people are accustomed and which they understand.” While this has historical precedent in the “intense two-way interactions between colonies and rulers (and others), that coalesce to inform the distinctive content of institutions” as described by Woolcock et al (2011: 82) citing Bayly (2008), it continues to have resonance for urban policy. Simone (2014: 227) describes governance in contexts were there are complex patterns of relations and expectations as “‘joining the dots’, extending the ways in which different actors, their interests and ways of doing things become implicated with each other in expanding circles of relationships.”

This can be illustrated in the establishment of a Programme Management Committee (PMC) to govern the delivery of the Dzivarasekwa Extension project in Harare, discussed in Chapter Five.211 The PMC was established as part of management arrangements for the B&MGF programme to direct the operation and the delivery of the enumeration and upgrading schemes. Core membership of the PMC is drawn from the senior officers of the City of Harare, Dialogue and ZHPF who meet every two weeks to monitor progress and resolve problems in delivery. This has provided an important forum to address operational issues and for partners to gain the experience of working collaboratively on projects where they both have a stake in successful delivery. The meeting minutes indicate that the PMC is used to share information on urban development issues outside of the operations of the B&MGF programme. The meetings, supported by the strong personal relationships that emerge from joint working, enable the City Council, Dialogue and ZHPF to ‘join the dots’ (as Simone, 2014 suggests) to extend the boundaries of communication and decision making.

While this relates to a specific project, it is located within a wider ‘web’ (Barley and Tolbert, 1997) of institutional norms and organisational practices. These

211 This is discussed further in Chapter Eight (section 8.2.2) to illustrate changing discourse.
institutional connections enable the reproduction and transmission of new patterns of behaviour into different contexts, thereby creating the potential for wider institutional change. The benefits of co-productive working are championed by PMC members within the City Council, to national local authority networks and through contact with central government. This has both a discursive impact on the language and the representation of ‘problems’ of low income communities and also on the operation of governance structures.

This is illustrated by the Zimbabwe National Housing Policy 2012, which articulates the importance of participative approaches that maximise the “mobilisation of [housing] beneficiaries own resources” (Government of Zimbabwe, 2012: iv). It also promotes a changed role for local housing authorities to exercise a facilitative role that enables the adoption of new sources of investment and use of technology. Hybrid approaches are also recognised as having practical application in the context of Harare. This was discussed with a senior officer of City of Harare Council who saw the example of community based management in Dzivarasekwa Extension as a model that could be transferred.

“The people are able to look after the environment better are those already in those areas you just have to empower them. So this is a lesson we are learning from them [ZHPF members] and that lesson can be transported to low density areas, medium density areas and other income groups”.  

In considering co-production as hybrid governance it is important to highlight that adaptation is nested in existing institutional structures and practices. In common with sociological institutional theory, changed behaviours occur and become accepted because they are recognised as meeting a need. Change to institutionalised behaviour toward low income communities is likely to take place slowly (Satterthwaite et al, 2011) with expectations tempered by a realistic analysis of how power structures impact on communities. In this context co-production underpins an alternative form of governance able to formalise and direct

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212 As evident from the National Housing Policy, 2012.
213 Interview with City of Harare Planner, 7 May 2013.
contextually available resources, which can be deployed to raise the functionality and output of public service delivery.

7.5.2 Funding Urban Infrastructure

A further implication for urban governance, arising from co-production, is in how service infrastructure is commissioned and financed. Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) note that while policy enthusiasm for privatisation of services have waned, given the limited profit-making opportunities in cities of the Global South, an alternative and affordable model of infrastructure investment has yet to be identified. Co-production as a framework of shared investment, albeit localised and small scale, has the potential to contribute to addressing the needs of low income communities in the absence of sustainable commercial models.214 A co-productive approach, as developed in Dzivarasekwa Extension and offered at a larger scale through the HSUFF, provides social alternative to existing public-private model of infrastructure investment. This becomes significant as a means of incremental investment, but also because the form of infrastructure funding directly affect the structures of governance.

As shown in Ostrom’s (1996) study of condominial water and sewerage connections in Recife, discussed in Chapter Two, co-production makes both a material and governance input to public infrastructure projects. While Ostrom’s paper concentrates on the process of negotiating contributions to the construction of the system, Watson (1995), who provided the case study data for Ostrom, highlights the importance of an ongoing commitment by residents to holding water providers to account. Households connected to the condominial system assume a governance role, using their technical knowledge of the system and ensuring that appropriate investments are made to maintain the quality of operation. This is important both to maintain the functionality of the system but moreover, to building long term ownership and the efficacy of residents that they can and should be part of decision

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making processes associated within a network system that they have contributed to creating.

This model is perhaps particularly relevant in the context of Harare where contested and uncertain national politics, alongside specific policies such as indigenisation of foreign assets, have deterred foreign and commercial investment (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011; Hujo and Braumann, 2013). Added to this, large scale economic informality (Jones, 2010) and limited opportunity for formal taxation, means that more innovative models of shared cost is one of a few options available to support the construction of low income housing and the extension of service infrastructure to poor and marginal areas of Harare. Co-production may also be attractive to city councils as an opportunity to reassert the authority of local government over land development. McGregor (2013: 793) highlights how the unofficial transfer of land to private developers has created significant public health problems in Harare and satellite settlements because of the substandard construction of sewerage and other services. Both corrupt practices by public officials and a lack of capacity to enforce existing regulations on services and environmental standards, has weakened the authoritative position of city authorities. Co-production offers a means to address this problem, as local residents have an interest to maintain standards in order to cement relationships with city authorities.

7.6 Conclusion

This Chapter has examined how the co-productive relationship between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare has contributed to the development of new urban governance arrangements. While these have been project based, the experience has been formative in building models of interaction to deliver and manage urban development. The evidence from Harare underlines that communities and the state are both motivated, despite their different starting points, to redefine the terms of civic relationships. This is in order to increase the functionality of institutionalised systems of urban governance and to build legitimate authority within decision making processes. This model follows the call by Robinson (2006), Myers (2011),
McGregor (2013) and Simone (2014) to recognise the real dynamics of urban governance in practice. As highlighted in Chapter Five, adaptive change occurs over a long period as experience, knowledge and trust is layered and frames governance arrangements.

Ideas of mutual dependency offer a nuanced view of community – state relationships that differ from dichotomous notions of co-optation. While for communities working with the state compromise may be necessary, the evidence from Harare suggests that more is gained by communities and the state working together than is lost. For ZHPF and Dialogue building a role as a partner to the state relates directly to their goals of raising wellbeing of urban poor populations. Building spaces of collaboration provides a means to manage the risks associated with engaging the state in Zimbabwe, but also to use the experiences of participation and collaboration to expand capacity at a grassroots level to initiate co-production of housing and basic services. This reflects Pieterse (2008: 116) observation of the SDI approach which does not pit “the solution proposed by the poor against the state programme, or lobbying for policy change, but rather the seeking of ‘shifts’ in the institutional arrangements which determine the way policy translates into action” (italics in original).

The broader impact of co-production on urban governance in Harare will need to be considered in the long term to understand how change transitions from micro-arrangements to the wider institutional environment (Brousseau and Raynaud, 2011). However, what is evident from this case study is the progressive development of embedded relationships that have contributed to the formation of hybrid governance of urban development projects. These have clearly been influential on the approaches of the City of Harare to managing ‘illegal’ settlement and have led to the formation of new spaces of dialogue and decision making, which are being captured in national policy. These reflect both specific incidences of participative forms of governance as well as impact on the processes that represent the articulation of authority. This, echoing Pieterse (2014), demonstrates the scalar potential of interaction where localised behaviours are reproduced at a
national level. The long term potential for urban governance is in creating self-
perpetuating change that becomes institutionally embedded in day-to-day practice. Achieving iterative and cumulative change in institutionalised behaviours provides a focus for the following Chapter. This builds on the idea of participative forms of urban governance to explore empirically the extent to which ZHPF and Dialogue in Harare have affected institutions, considering practices and policies on shelter and basic services.
8.1. Introduction

The final empirical Chapter focuses on the research question of whether the co-production of low cost housing and basic services affects institutional change, in the context of Harare. The terms and conduct of relationships between ZHPF and Dialogue with the City of Harare Council, as manifest in the discursive representation of urban poverty and the spaces of collaboration in Harare, is considered alongside the adaptation and formation of new rules of governance. The analysis of data is located within sociological theories of institutional change as described in Chapter Two. This, as proposed by Coaffee and Healey (2003); Knudsen (2008); Kingston and Caballero (2009); Mahoney and Thelen (2010); and Brousseau and Raynaud (2011), gives preference to small and iterative changes in relationships, behaviours and practice that cumulatively contribute to substantive institutional change over time. It does not exclude the impact of exogenous factors as catalysts for change, but suggests that the friction of social relationships creates micro-adjustments and adaptations, which contribute to gradual shifts in institutionalised behaviours and systems of rules.

Sociological theory is applied to the experiences of ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council over the period 1997 to 2013 and their relationship on issues of land for housing and the provision of basic services. As shown in Chapter Five (figure 5.4), there has been a deepening pattern of engagement since the formation of ZHPF in 1997, which has included the delivery of joint projects. These, it is suggested here, provide the markers of change in the character of engagement between organised community groups and the state and more fundamentally, ‘stage-posts’ in an adaptive process of institutional change. Situated contextually, these adaptations reflect the growing efficacy of organised communities to leverage the capacity and support created within neighbourhood savings groups to corral financial and human resources and use these to engage in problem solving.
and claim making with the state, as discussed in Chapter Six. Also, in the context of reduced ability of the state to effectively address rising demand for land and services (Chitekwe-Biti, 2014), the adoption of new approaches to resourcing and governing urban services (as discussed in Chapter Seven) that would normatively been seen as the responsibility of the City of Harare Council.

Drawing on Leftwich (2008), apparent in Harare is the operation of two distinct but related forms political contestation: change within the rules of the game (institutions); and change to the rules. Change within rules, as Mitlin (2014) suggests in her discussion of clientelism and pro-poor urban politics, reflects the powerlessness of low income communities to confront the state. Communities are forced accept prevailing rules and try to adapt them. In this context the strategy, as promoted by SDI, is engagement of the state through a variety of actions that seek to moderate those institutionalised behaviours that negatively affect poor communities, while at the same time legitimising the involvement of organised groups in the operation of state led activity (see also Appadurai, 2001).

The latter form, changes to the rules, can be examined empirically using the sociological theories of institutional change. Reconnecting with the discussion of Brousseau and Raynaud (2011), a causal relationship can be established between small scale changes contained within rules that gain scale and traction to be accepted as changes to rules. This occurs, according to Leftwich (2008: 9), in situations where “failed or failing institutions, which do not achieve their objectives, are replaced or supplemented by informal and even ad-hoc arrangements”. Leftwich cites co-production as a pragmatic response to dysfunctional institutions, referring to Joshi and Moore’s (2004) examination of state – citizen action to ‘get things done’ in Karachi and in Ghana. This model of dynamic interaction, between agential communities and state actors, is considered empirically using data from Harare to examine the extent to which change, both within and to institutions, can be observed.

215 See comment from ZHPF member in Chapter Seven (section 7.3) on the use of “muscles”.
216 See also discussion in Chapter Two and summary of case study in Appendix 1 of this study.
This discussion is structured firstly, to consider the discursive representation of low income communities in Harare, identifying whether interaction has led to changed ‘subject positions’ (as discussed by Fischer, 2006) because of collective engagement of communities and the state in development activity. Secondly, this Chapter will focus on examining formal institutions, as reflected in national and City of Harare policy and procedure, delivering housing and basic services. The Chapter will conclude by considering identified evidence of institutional change in the context of urban governance.

8.2 Discursive Representation of Low Income Communities

Fischer (2006) highlights how the discursive position of social actors establishes boundaries for action and agency. In an urban development context, Pieterse (2008: 12) notes that the way “issues are framed, talked about and relayed – discursive formations – is critical to understand what is being included / excluded from debates and decision making.” In focusing on the discursive position and representations of low income communities in Harare, ‘discourse’, as defined in Chapter One, “encompasses not only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed” (Schmidt, 2008: 305). Allen (1999: 75) quoting Foucault (1986), underlines the importance of discourse on social conduct and relations stating “[w]e live in a world completely marked by, all laced with, discourse.” Discourse and discursive exchange condition knowledge and the terms in which power is exercised, by framing how people understand the world and act.

Language, meaning and whose voices are heard, have a profound effect both action and the agency of individuals and collective groups. McAdam (1996: 339) referring to the work of Snow and Benford (1992), highlights the instrumental use of discourse for social actors “to fashion meaningful accounts of themselves and the issues at hand in order to motivate and legitimate their efforts.” As suggested in Chapter Two, creating ‘specific episodes’ (Coaffee and Healey, 2003) of dialogue between low income communities and the state, may help to establish a basis for
co-productive activity, leading to institutional change. Overcoming epistemic barriers to meaningful participation is, for community actors, a primary challenge and one that relies on, according to Benford and Snow (2000: 627), reshaping discourses to “legitimate and make possible some forms of action”. Central to this task is the prevailing, and typically negative, discourses of poverty and of the poor that emphasise encroachment and a lack of capacity, agency and action (Ghertner, 2008; Bebbington et al, 2010). Du Toit (2004) underlines the power of this discourse in development policy to create poverty as pathology.

While there is an alternative narrative of urban poverty that highlights the ordinariness of everyday strategies of coping (Pieterse, 2008; Robinson, 2006; Myers, 2011) and the capability of organised communities to contribute to development (Appadurai, 2001; Mitlin, 2008), there is a tendency in development policy to homogenise ‘the poor’ as a category (discussed by Green and Hulme, 2005; Krishna, 2009). The discursive representation of people in poverty as ‘incapable’ is found in Zimbabwe where, according to Kamete (2002), people in poverty are viewed as helpless and inadequately equipped, due to a lack of education, assets and experience, to survive in urban environments. Kamete suggests that these attributes reinforce both a social and psychological powerlessness. In common with Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989), poverty and informality is synonymous with nuisance and criminality. Illegal settlements are perceived as a challenge to local planning authority and an ‘encroachment’ on public spaces (Bayat, 2004).

8.2.1 Representations of Poverty in Zimbabwe

As detailed in Chapter Four, Zimbabwe has experienced a migration of populations from rural to urban areas, beginning during the civil war and continued post-independence, in response to the dismantling of racist segregation and occupancy laws enacted by colonial and White minority governments. Zimbabwe’s Government removed the restrictions intended to limit and control the Black urban workforce to major cities, including Harare, (Kamete, 2002; Potts, 2010) and colonial practices of spatial enforcement. According to Potts (2010) single male
workers were restricted to certain areas of Harare such as Mbare and the dormitory townships of Chitungwiza and Epworth to the south of city of Harare, which were outside of areas reserved for White residents. Despite the abolition of restrictive laws, the practices of spatial ordering, in common with other post-colonial cities in Africa, continued (see Myers, 2003 and Berrisford, 2011).

As discussed in Chapter Four, this historical context is important in shaping how low income communities are characterised by the state and, as a consequence, how the rights of individuals to reside in urban centres are applied. Post-independence, government faced contradictory challenges of removing racial movement controls while managing urban growth. Brown (2001), Kamete (2002) and Potts (2010) discuss how enforcement action was used as a primary response by city authorities to illegal settlements during the 1990s. In major towns and cities, including Harare, local authorities demolished illegal ‘squatter’ settlements; directing those without formal employment to return to their rural areas. This is characterised by a Dialogue interviewee as a process of ‘vetting’ to assess whether people were fit to live in the city “there was a very strong sense that the city was for people who could prove that they could make a living out of the city. By squatting you are giving evidence that you can’t.”

The categorisation of urban settlers as being ‘suitable’ or ‘unsuitable’ to live in the city provided the basis of the response by national and city government to control migration into urban areas. This practice speaks to a teleological view of cities, as economic centres, that should be available to those that contribute and can benefit from economic activity (similar to Ferguson, 1999). This not only contradicted nationalist ideas of free movement and settlement, but was at odds with the economic reality of Zimbabwe from the mid-1990s. As the economy declined there were increasing numbers of people unable to afford ‘formal’ housing who constructed low quality dwellings on the peripheries of cities or as ‘backyard’ developments. According to Chitekwe-Biti (2009) up until 2005 and Operation

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217 Discussed in Chapter Four (section 4.3.3).
218 Interview with a Dialogue manager, 5 July 2013.
government coped with growing informality through: demolitions; building holding camps on the edge of cities; ‘semi-legalising’ some informal housing by issuing ‘lodgers cards’ to register dwellers of backyard shacks; or otherwise ignoring the problem.

A strong discursive association was established that connected poverty and squatter settlements with indigence and a lack of agency. This narrative followed through into the practices and justifications used by of local government to discount the views and the engagement of poor communities. As explained by a Council officer, authorities adopted a direct approach to illegal settlements.

“We would, with our trucks, remove the people and take their IDs so we know which village they are coming from, we send them back to the their village and reintegrate them and we clean up the land.”

ZHPF and Dialogue had to overcome the institutionalised perceptions of poor communities which shaped the range of responses available to local government. As discussed in Chapter Six, ZHPF and Dialogue faced significant challenges in engaging the City of Harare, the early relations characterised as oppositional by the City Council who commented that it was typical for squatter residents to run away at the sight of officials in their areas.

8.2.2 Changing Discourse?

The process of building relationships, knowledge and trust between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare is a long-term exercise that has rested, to a large extent, on regular contact, discussion and joint work. From the perspective of the City Council, an interviewee pointed out that her understanding and opinions of poor communities had changed because of the experience of working with ZHPF members and with Dialogue on the Dzivarasekwa Extension project. This is

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219 See Chapter Four for background and a discussion of the impact of Murambatsvina.
220 Interview with City of Harare Planning Officer, 7 May 2013.
221 See Chapter Six, section 6.2.1.
222 Informal discussion with Council officials, 1 February 2013.
223 Interview with City of Harare Planning Officer, 7 May 2013. As quoted in Chapter Six she commented that working with ZHPF had allowed her to “wear the shoes of the people that are in informal settlements”.

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supported by another Council officer, closely involved with ZHPF, who commented “[s]o the law has not changed, but the way that we have been viewing our people and the way that they have been viewing us that’s where we have bridged the gaps” (emphasis added). This suggests that spaces of deliberative participation have been created (as Fung and Wright, 2003) and also, as Fischer (2006) suggests, there have been changes in sociocultural practices: expectations and social processes that govern interaction.

Establishing frameworks for collaborative action, through discrete projects, as shown by Nyamweru and Dobson (2014) in Jinja Uganda, can create spaces for discussion and galvanise relations between communities and local government. This is consistent with the idea of creating development objects, suggested as a condition for co-production in Chapter Two, to focus and contain arrangements that fall outside of normative practice. This can be examined empirically by considering the regular project management meetings held, every two weeks, for Dzivarasekwa Extension. These meetings can be seen as a ‘created space’ to allow communities and the City Council to share decision making in a way that is atypical of standard bureaucratic practice. While these meetings can be seen as part of the architecture of governance, they also illustrate adaptations of institutionalised practices of participation.

Regular project management meetings are used for reporting progress on housing and infrastructure construction, highlighting key issues from the community and setting tasks for project participants. They involve representatives from the City of Harare, ZHPF, Dialogue and other invited organisations, such as project consultants. A sample of minutes was taken from ten meetings held between February and November 2012 for analysis, the range of attendees is described in table 8.1. A key feature of the meetings is the fully participative character of the discussions.

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224 Informal discussion with Council officials, 1 February 2013.

225 A summary note of the meeting was produced by Dialogue and circulated to project participants. This provides a formal record of the meeting and actions arising from the discussions.
with both community representative and City of Harare representatives taking responsibility for actions and identifying tasks for other partners in the project.

Table 8.1
Dzivarasekwa Extension Site Project Meetings, Attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attendee Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City of Harare</td>
<td>On average there were 3 officers in attendance across the sampled meetings. These represented Architects, Housing, Engineering, Planning and Community Services divisions of the Council, depending on the issues discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZHPF</td>
<td>Formed the largest groups of attendees with an average of 31 ZHPF members attending meetings. The majority of participants were ordinary members with stands, living in Dzivarasekwa Extension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue</td>
<td>On average 2 members of Dialogue staff attended the meetings, taking a key role in facilitating and recording actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Across the ten meetings, two had other organisations attending on specific issues under discussion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meetings were typically held in Dzivarasekwa Extension in the open or a partially completed dwelling. This had a practical benefit of allowing progress of the construction to be inspected but, moreover, it was symbolically important for the community to have City Council officials come to their settlement. The minutes record the mechanics of the co-productive delivery of in-situ upgrading. This included providing information on progress of specific aspects of the scheme and the setting of tasks. ZHPF members attending the meetings represented the interests and concerns of local residents and conveyed actions back to the community. Examples of this included a request for Dzivarasekwa Extension residents to discuss and suggest the preferred location of model houses to be constructed on site; complaints from community members on various issues,

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226 This was raised by a number of interviewees who cited officials coming to Dzivarasekwa Extension to talk to community members as evidence of how they had become legitimate residents of the City.
227 Meeting minute from 8 March 2012.
including the slow speed of Council administrative processes that was impeding the progress on housing construction, and the unacceptable standards of work in constructing a temporary road. Where complaints and concerns were raised by ZHPF members, the minutes record actions for the City of Harare attendee to investigate, resolve issues and report back to a future meeting.

These meetings appear to offer a model of deliberative problem solving, as suggested by Fung and Wright (2003), whereby the operation of the upgrading project becomes the responsibility of the group. For strategic decisions, a Project Management Committee (PMC) has been established, with senior membership from the City of Harare, ZHPF and Dialogue to address contractual matters and provide overall budget control. The PMC also provides a route to negotiate and lever additional resources from the City Council. An example of this is a report to the City Council that requested the donation of materials and budget to support development of housing in Dzivarasekwa Extension. The City Council agreed to provide an additional US$27,000 to pay for gravel, plant hire and the costs of security to complete road construction. This demonstrates significant influence by the PMC to obtain additional resources to support the delivery the Dzivarasekwa Extension project.

While the minutes of the site project meetings make reference to decisions ‘pushed-up’ to the PMC, operational control rests at the community level, with responsibility for delivery devolved to partners. Beyond the practical significance of making co-production work, the site project meeting are constituted as a particular discursive space of collaboration, which appears contrary to the more generic view of poor and informal settlement dwellers employed by the City of Harare. This connects with Fischer’s (2006) Foucaultian analysis of how power and institutions define meanings and the ‘subject positions’ of those engaged in participative activity. While the meetings exist, to some extent within a project ‘bubble’, the

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228 Meeting minute 29 March 2012.
229 Meeting minute 21 September 2012.
230 City of Harare Education, Health, Housing and Community Services and Licencing Committee, 7 June 2012.
experience of both community and City Council members working co-productively, has informed their underlying attitudes towards each other that has wider implications for institutionalised behaviours.

A City Council officer underlines his change of opinion having worked with ZHPF and attended site meetings.

“To tell you the truth now I don’t look down on them at all. We are equals. They say we should do this and I say yes. To me the element of participation is essential whereas previously I would have thought that I would have to think for them because this is a deprived group”. 231

The shift in attitudes and behaviours of the City of Harare is confirmed by a ZHPF resident of Dzivarasekwa Extension who claims that since working with the City Council, there have been no major evictions. She states: “[t]hey have not done another Murambatsvina [...] they can develop the area where those people are staying so that they can’t just throw them away”. 232

This is supported by other comments by ZHPF members who consider that since having meetings with the City Council, community members are able to raise problems with Council departments and be listened to; 233 the City Council is perceived as willing to work in partnership; 234 and there is a more flexible application of rules that take regard of the low income of residents. 235 Overall, ZHPF members have observed a change in the attitudes and the behaviour of the City of Harare Council towards poor communities, because, they believe, ZHPF has exposed officials and politicians to the realities and the capabilities of low income communities. This view is summarised in the following quote.

“At first I think that the Council didn’t really expect that poor men and poor women could come together and start building [...] the City Council and local government expected houses to be built by only rich men and

231 Interview with planning officer, 7 May 2013.
232 Female interviewee aged 38, Dzivarasekwa Extension. 3 July 2013.
233 Male interviewee aged 40, Dzivarasekwa Extension. 3 July 2013.
234 Male interviewee, aged 39, Crowborough. 2 July 2013
235 Male interviewee aged 41, Dzivarasekwa Extension. 3 July 2013.
not poor men. But through seeing what we were doing on the ground when they gave us this land, they now realised that when people come together and have the same desire, given the resources they can do greater works. That is why they have changed the attitude of the Council.”

8.2.3 Wider Implications

To be considered as evidence of institutional change, shifting discourse needs to be visible beyond the finite relations of ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare to relate to how all low income and informal communities are treated in Harare. Partially, this can be observed in the halting of demolitions of informal communities but, more substantially, is evidence by the production of the City of Harare Slum Upgrading Strategy, in June 2012. The Slum Upgrading Strategy was produced jointly by the City of Harare Council, Dialogue and ZHPF with funding support from the B&MGF to offer an “alternative to evictions by providing a framework within which the city and different stakeholders can support improvements in these [slum] areas.”

The strategy is notable because it is the first formal recognition, by the City of Harare, of informal settlements. Previously, according to Chitekwe-Beiti (2014), these communities remained invisible on City maps and while recognised as a challenge, were treated as temporary, aberrant and as separate from the urban fabric of the City.

The Upgrading Strategy forms one of a suite of actions funded through the B&MGF Harare Slum Upgrading Programme (HSUP), which also included the Slum Profile Report referred to in Chapter Five (section 5.3.1). The report identifies 37 ‘slum’ communities, of various sizes, located across Harare as part of a process of documenting informality, which as, Appadurai (2012: 639) states, provides the “tools that enable poor urban communities to mobilize knowledge about themselves in a manner that can resist eviction, exploitation and surveillance in

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236 Male interviewee, aged 46, Crowborough. 2 July 2013.
237 Draft copy obtained in 2013.
240 See map in figure 5.2.
favour of advancing their own rights, resources and claims.” The Upgrading Strategy in its first paragraph makes a clear statement towards co-production by setting out the following.

“Due to city level and external factors the City lacks adequate technical and political capacity to fully mobilize their ['slum’ dwellers] participation let alone provide the necessary services required in slum areas.”

The Upgrading Strategy asserts that ‘slums’ are a consequence of the failure of municipal governance systems. The resolution of this failure is through adaptation of institutionalised processes governing the management of land, distribution of services and investment in service infrastructure. The discourse used in the Upgrading Strategy moves away from narratives of ‘blaming’ the poor and removing settlements as urban blight, to promoting participative approaches to in-situ and incremental upgrading. The Strategy does not distinguish between ZHPF and non-ZHPF settlements, but applies to informal communities across the City. A key statement in the Strategy marks a shift in approach by the City of Harare from policy of demolition, to one of improvement of rights and environmental conditions.

“Council’s general perspective regarding slums has traditionally been of removing them. However, the housing and community services sector now accepts the existence of slums and will make efforts to structure responses to situations of inhumane conditions, tenure insecurity and inadequate infrastructure.”

While the Strategy strongly reflects the interests of low income community members, as evident in the content and the language used, the objectives of the City of Harare are also made clear. These reflect a desire to formalise low income settlements, bringing housing construction up to standards defined in legislation; reinforcing the role of the City Council as the statutory planning authority; increasing revenue income to fund new infrastructure investment and maintain service delivery; and to extend territorial control, through community based

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242 City of Harare Slum Upgrading Strategy, p.15
organisations, to informal settlements in order to, for example, prevent slum development on wetlands. The Strategy articulates a very different discourse of low income communities from that more typically used in Harare. It reflects an acceptance of informality, but one where responsibilities for improvement of low income settlements are shared by communities and the state.

Despite the shifting discourse reflected in the Upgrading Strategy, ‘illegal’ settlement remains a contentious and politicised issue in Zimbabwe and one where ‘new’ ideas of shared responsibility and action have yet to be institutionally embedded. In November 2013, following national elections in July where ZANU-PF was re-established as ruling political party, the Minister of Local Government Ignatius Chombo is attributed as ordering the demolition of illegal developments in the Harare high density areas of Budiriro, and Glen View and in dormitory towns of Ruwa and Chitungwiza. The announcement quickly created a furore in the media (see figure 8.1) and caused public demonstrations that criticised the planned demolitions as a second Operation Murambatsvina. While legally the Minister is able to order demolitions under the Regional Town and Country Planning Act, the ferocity of responses to the planned demolitions showed the Minister to be out of step with both popular and political discourse on issues of housing and the responsibilities of government to provide land. A key feature of press reporting on this issue was the consistent response across Zimbabwe’s bifurcated press. Both government supporting newspapers, most notably The Herald, as well as opposition (Newsday and The Zimbabwean) and non-aligned (Zimbabwean Independent) newspapers ran front page articles that denounced the decision to demolish illegally erected residential and business units.

The Herald in a front page report urged the Zimbabwean Government to think twice, citing the ZANU-PF election manifesto commitment to address the national housing backlog and quoting an unnamed ZANU-PF official as saying “no house or

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243 The Herald, 12 November 2013.
244 Team ZANU-PF 2013 Election Manifesto (p.28) makes the following commitment. “ZANU-PF Government will embark on a vigorous housing programme to address the housing backlog of 1.25
shack should be demolished without a court order.” Further, the article reports that it was “important that responsible authorities be sensitive to the people’s needs in the changing socio-economic environment.” Press reports echoed a view that demolitions can only be justified where alternative accommodation is being provided245 and the importance of engagement of poor communities in discussions about removal of illegal development. Press reports were highly critical of local and national government’s inability to address the scale of need for land and housing and pointed to corruption as a cause of illegal settlement. This included allegations that residential stands were illegally sold by Government and City Council officials, and these stands had subsequently been developed and were threatened with demolition.246

Figure 8.1
Press Reports on Planned Demolition of Illegal Settlements247

Residents of Chitungwiza (through their residents trust) filed a court order to halt demolitions, this as reported in The Herald on 25 April 2013, was upheld by the court who ruled that “the respondent [Chitungwiza Municipality] has no power to

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demolish homes as stipulated in Section 74 of the Constitution which states that “[n]o person may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances.” While it is important to be cautious, as ZANU-PF have ignored court orders and criticisms previously, it can perhaps be seen as indicative of how a changing discourse is being reflected in institutionalised behaviours. The halting of Government action suggests a transformative effect of discourse on action; shaping how the planned demolitions played out in Zimbabwe. The language used in the press reports indicate that viewpoints have been informed by the history of *Operation Murambatsvina*, national and international discussions of the causes of urban informality and changing perspectives on the responsibilities of the state as a partner in urban development. It also suggests a cumulative causality of small incremental changes in how low income settlements are positioned. This illustration suggests a greater sensitivity to the needs of the urban poor and the form of acceptable (institutionalised) responses of the state.

### 8.3 Adapting Bureaucratic Processes

In addition to changing discourses of poverty, ZHPF and Dialogue have focused on the adaptation of City Council administrative practices that limit the ability of low income residents to access housing and service provision. As Batley et al (2012) suggest it is through the bureaucratic processes that govern service delivery that people experience the state as a tangible manifestation of formal and informal institutions. Processes associated with documenting identity, evidence of need, standards of construction and the occupation of space are defined and maintained through bureaucratic procedure. Compliance with rules, which may entail time, knowledge and money unavailable to people in poverty, creates an inherent disadvantage for poor communities in accessing services or citizen rights (Kabeer, 2002; Fung and Wright, 2003; Benequista, 2011). Approaches to adapting bureaucratic processes in Harare, to affect institutional change, are examined below using four examples: changes to the City of Harare housing waiting list; adaptations to City of Harare building regulations; the governance of co-production
through a Memorandum of Understanding; and formalising the establishing of a joint finance initiative for low income community members.

8.3.1 Housing Waiting Lists – Documenting Identity

The City of Harare Council maintains a housing waiting list for the allocation of homes and residential stands in the City. In May 2012 there were some 41,461 people on the waiting list.248 There is little movement in this list with the Council reporting in 2011 just 16 stands were allocated to individuals and a further 2,954 stands were allocated to housing co-operatives operating in Harare.249 Chitekwe-Biti (2014) points out that the City Council last allocated completed homes in 1996. The City of Harare Director of Housing accepts that the waiting list, as a device to register and respond to housing demand, is dysfunctional and has lost the confidence of homeless residents of the City250 and, according to Chatiza and Mlalazi (2009), is frequently ignored when allocations are being made. Chitekwe-Biti (2014) notes, from surveys undertaken by ZHPF and Dialogue, some ZHPF members have been on the waiting list for two decades without being invited to an allocation interview. While the ineffectiveness of the housing list process is widely known, it remains a key bureaucratic tool for the City Council to define identity and, in the context of co-productive relationships with ZHPF and Dialogue, to establish a process of authority and decision making in determining the allocation of land for housing.

The use of the housing waiting list to validate individual need and determine the allocation of stands was tested by ZHPF and Dialogue in Crowborough North in 2002.251 To join the waiting list individuals have to present identity documents including birth certificates, marriage certificates and payslips as proof of income. This was highly problematic as few of these forms of documentation are typically available to poor people (Mitlin, 2004). A Dialogue manager commented “[i]t’s ok...
for the middle class who have papers but for the poor it’s not so straight forward getting an ID.\textsuperscript{252} Through negotiation with the City of Harare Council, a concession was agreed in 2002, whereby ZHPF members could use their savings books as proof of identity, removing a barrier to the allocation of stands. An adaptation to the Council housing allocation process was agreed whereby applicants were ‘pre-checked’ by ZHPF using the savings record, prior to attending an interview with the City Council Housing Department. To join the waiting list the City Council used ZHPF savings books to confirm the identity of the applicant and checked, from their own records, that individuals had not previously been allocated a stand.

While this appears to be a minor amendment to a bureaucratic process, it provided a major breakthrough for ZHPF and Dialogue to overcome embedded bureaucratic practices. D’Cruz and Mudimu (2013: 32) quoting Sheila Magare, a ZHPF community leader, note after accepting savings books as proof of identity individuals applying to join the waiting list without payslips were directed back to ZHPF to join a savings scheme. While this practice could be critiqued as a form of governmentality, the change in this institutionalised process helped to resolve a key exclusion affecting people in poverty. It also, following Andrews et al (2012), created an adaptation that contributed to embedding more formative change in organisational behaviour.

8.3.2 Planning and Upgrading Settlements

A further adaptive change can be seen in how building regulations and land use policy has been applied. In common with many African cities, colonial (European) legislation continues to provide the basis for building and land use regulations (Watson, 2011). According to Berrisford (2011), while reform is widely recognised as a prerequisite for urban development, it has been difficult to achieve. In practice, there is a disjunction between the formal systems of rules and administrative processes and the daily practices and experiences of urban life, which is shaped by a lack of state capacity and unmet demand for land and housing. The use of land provides a literal terrain where institutions are played out in contexts of “ongoing competition over resources, authority, delimiting jurisdictions and property

\textsuperscript{252} Informal discussion with Dialogue manager, 4 February, 2013.
distinctions, and the categorization of persons” (Lund and Boone, 2013: 10). As described in Chapter Four, dispute over land use, building standards and the exercise of territorial authority is a primary arena for conflict between urban government and low income communities in Zimbabwe.

Chitekwe-Biti (2014: 17) states for Zimbabwe that land use legislation, alongside building by-laws, “are responsible for the criminalisation of survival strategies of the urban poor such as trading in undesignated areas of settling on land that is not serviced.” While this suggests that wholesale change is needed to update planning law, and to create a regulatory system more sensitive to the socio-economic realities of Zimbabwe, it would be difficult to achieve as a structural reform. This is due to the lack of technical capacity available to achieve the task (in keeping with Berrisford’s, 2011 wider analysis of planning capacity in southern Africa) and the risks of isomorphism identified by Andrews (2013) exacerbated by the institutional complexity of regulating land use. Based on interviews in Harare, there is also an apparent ambiguity, among both ZHPF members and professionals operating in housing and planning services, that the challenge of improving the institutional environment is less to do with the existing regulations per se than the organisational machinery that activates them.

Perhaps surprisingly, interviewees in both Crowborough North and in Dzivarasekwa Extension expressed support for the principles of land management and high building standards, despite having personal experience of state initiated demolitions justified as enforcing these regulations. An insight into this is provided by a ZHPF member in Crowborough North who recalls that when he lived in a wooden shack in Mbare he always wanted a house that was “well-built – one that is on the plan.” This reflects both a desire to occupy a high quality property, typically described as brick built, but also to be considered a legitimate resident of the city: living in a formalised area that is ‘on the plan’. Rather than a rejection of planning and building regulations, the central issue is that the application of rules

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253 Male ZHPF interviewee aged 58, Crowborough, 2 July 2013.
took no account of the economic circumstances of low income communities and the need for development to take place in a way that was affordable and sustainable. Recognising this, the approach of ZHPF and Dialogue focused on specific issues of adaptation of land use and building regulations that improved tenure security and enabled the incremental development of shelter. This can be illustrated through two significant adaptations to planning policy and process.

Firstly, increasing the density of residential development. As described in Chapter Five (section 5.7), when ZHPF and Dialogue obtained an allocation of land in Crowborough North in 2002 the majority of plots were 300m$^2$ in size – a standard for lower income residential development. Plot sizes and housing design in are prescribed in statute and according to Brown (2001) follow colonial models of urban development. The cost for the stand was high at Z$1,310 per square metre, which ZHPF and Dialogue considered to be unaffordable for ZHPF members (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). Through negotiation with City of Harare Council permission was granted to sub-divide the stands, which substantially increasing the number of families that could be accommodated on the development and reduced the construction cost to ZHPF members. Dialogue and ZHPF led the production of architectural designs, which were approved by the City Council for semi-detached housing units, and drew up sectional title agreements.

Obtaining an allocation of stands was significant for ZHPF and Dialogue to demonstrate their capability to undertake housing development and it also provided an opportunity to negotiate for concessions to regulations. For the City of Harare, the process also illuminated the economic constraints acting on low income residents; clarifying the need for greater flexibility in the application of planning

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254 According to City of Harare – Interview with Planning Officer, 7 May 2013.
255 Current standards are based on designs for low income settlements produced following independence in the early 1980s (Brown 2001 cites Musekiwa, 1993 and Musandu-Nyamayaro, 1993) which fixed plot sizes and regulated the materials and construction processes used for house building. These standards are reflected in the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act and Model Building By-Laws which provide the legal framework for Harare City Council.
regulations to enable the construction of ‘social housing’. The experience of Crowborough North, and later co-production of Dzivarasekwa Extension, has encouraged City Council officers to reconsider the functionality of existing regulations.

Secondly, incremental construction is an approach to low cost housing development that has been actively promoted internationally and has latterly been identified by the Zimbabwean Government as an appropriate response to addressing unmet need for housing. Incremental approaches allow people with low and unstable incomes to construct houses over a period of time as their finances allow (UN-Habitat, 2011). While, as Cities Alliance (2006) suggest incremental approaches have been criticised for producing low quality housing, through co-production and the involvement of local authorities, construction standards can be adapted to address cost issues, while maintaining building safety. As illustrated in figure 8.2, incremental housing development reflects the stylised processes of informal housing procurement, which as Wakely and Riley (2011) suggest, may begin with illegal squatting on land and be followed by the steady accumulation of assets to consolidate and improve a dwelling. In these circumstances, while households are likely initially to be without service provision, they avoid the trauma of displacement and are able to remain connected to economic centres and the social networks they have developed.

The approach to incremental housing development in Zimbabwe extends the ‘sites and services’ approach, promoted by the World Bank (see World Bank, 1974), to support the iterative construction of infrastructure for water, sewerage and roads. This has been particularly important for Dzivarasekwa Extension, as described in Chapter Five (section 5.8), because without the provision of boreholes and Eco-san toilets the development could not have taken place. Despite the occupation of a housing development site prior to the installation of services being strictly contrary

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256 This phrase was used by a Planning Officer (7 May, 2013) to describe the need for low cost housing construction rather than the provision of publically provided housing.
257 Interview with City of Harare Planner, 7 May, 2013.
258 Zimbabwe National Housing Policy, 2012.
to planning rules (*Regional, Town and Country Planning Act* and *Urban Councils Act*), the City of Harare granted an exception for Dzivarasekwa Extension on the basis that adequate temporary facilities were made available to residents. While the precise meaning of ‘temporary’ varied among Council personnel interviewed, the interim use of boreholes and sanitation units provided sufficient justification for the City Council to agree an exception to the regulations.

*Figure 8.2*

**Procurement Processes for Formal and Informal Housing**

![Diagram of procurement processes]

*Source: McLeod and Mullard (2006)*

Enabling people to move onto stands using temporary shelter is key to making incremental development affordable (Chitekwe-Biti, 2014). Typically in Harare, rent for a single room in a high density area costs approximately US$60 per month, which is around one third of total monthly earnings. Rental savings are used to fund the gradual purchase of building materials and to repay loans through ZHPF savings schemes. For ZHPF and Dialogue, it was essential therefore that a local adaptation to planning regulations was agreed to ensure the viability of the incremental development model. It also enables the co-productive model of aligning inputs of labour and funding into an agreed development project to work. The framework used to determine and structure inputs into Dzivarasekwa Extension are described in the following sub section.

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259 Confirmed by City of Harare Architect, 7 May 2013.

260 Male ZHPF interviewee aged 58, Crowborough, 2 July 2013.

261 Based on average household income of US$174 per month as identified in the Dzivarasekwa Extension enumeration report, June 2012.
8.3.3 MOU – Articulating Co-production

A contractual requirement of the B&MGF funding was the production of a partnership agreement to govern the relationship between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council for the HSUP. The agreement took the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which was signed by representatives of the three organisations on 19 March 2010. While MOUs can be viewed as superficial and bureaucratic, given their lack of contractual authority, in the context of evolving relationship between community groups and the state, they can also carry symbolic and instrumental importance. Based on discussions in Harare, the production of an MOU was a tangible commitment to co-productive working and created a space to define a discourse of collaboration that would underpin the formation of a new partnership. In formal terms, the MOU defines a project arena for co-production between the City Council and urban poor in a way that is different to extant relationships conducted at a distance or through the mechanisms of service delivery, but as a ‘project’ it does not fundamentally alter institutionally based power relationships.

The MOU is grounded in, and makes reference to, formal institutions in Zimbabwe. The first sections of the document establish the legitimacy of the parties to the MOU with reference to powers granted, through statute, to the City Council in the Urban Council’s Act; to the status of Dialogue as a formally constituted Trust; and ZHPF as “an organisation established in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe.” In establishing legal and corporal identity, and therefore the legitimacy of signatories to the MOU, it creates the authority to act by reference to, and by locating the MOU within, existing institutional frameworks. The implication being that, as definable actions within the terms of existing institutions, the partnership does not pose a risk to state authority. This provides an important conditional factor to justify the creation of a space for partnership and negotiation on a set of issues where the urban poor would more typically have very limited authority and voice.

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262 B&MGF project correspondence, 9 March 2010.
263 Memorandum of Understanding, 19 March 2010.
When considered as a framing document for an emerging partnership between the City Council and low income communities, the MOU occupies a narrow space, which restates the legal authority of the City Council, while creating the possibility of reformed power relationships. As an exercise in strategic positioning, it reflects Tarrow’s (1992: 190) analysis that “a movement is far more likely to bridge, extend, or amplify existing frames in the political culture than to create a wholly new one that may have no resonance in the existing culture”. The language used in the MOU stakes a claim for low income communities: underlining their entitlement to fair treatment and ‘right to the city’. In this sense the MOU presents a challenge to spatial ordering of people and space, reflecting, as Lund (2013: 16) suggests, the key issue is not just about who occupies space, but the organisation of the social and political perception of it. There is strong support for a discursive repositioning of low income communities, with the MOU stating that the parties to the agreement recognise “the importance of adequate and secure housing in the improvement of the lives of the urban poor” and makes formal recognition that there are people that “struggle with issues of poverty, homelessness, inadequate shelter, lack of safe water and sanitation, ill-health and overcrowding” in Harare.

The MOU, which was jointly drafted by Dialogue and officers of the City of Harare Council, provides the basis for co-production by committing partners to work together “to plan and develop settlements which will provide secure tenure and improved access to adequate shelter and basic services”. The basis of this relationship is defined in a section of the MOU entitled “shared principles” (see figure 8.3). Seven principles aim to define behaviour within asymmetrical power relationships; establishing a formal basis for collaboration. These address abstract ideas of equal treatment, while also dealing with daily practices; how the parties are represented to communities outside of the agreement; as well as controlling for future risks to the urban poor.

The drafting of the MOU reflects a context where people in Zimbabwe, as Rakodi (1993) and Bracking (2005) point out, have few rights and little traction within the
formalised mechanisms for urban management and politics. In Harare, the typical governance relationships are described by Kamete (2002: 60) as one where “the only detectable flow between public authorities and the poor comes in the form of a unidirectional movement of instructions, laws and regulations, as well as the imposition of decisions.” This is confirmed by a City Council official who stated “[t]he agreement recognises both parties as authorities and the need to work together. Previously the City would not have recognised them as an authority because whatever they have been doing would have been considered illegal.”

*Figure 8.3*

**Shared Principles Identified in the MOU**

- To establish a positive and transparent relationship between City of Harare and community-based organisation that represents the interests of the poor.
- To be equal partners to the projects and observing mutual respect.
- To ensure the projects will be apolitical.
- To implement projects in an inclusive way with no exclusion based on factors like political affiliation, poverty level or gender.
- To ensure the projects will encourage Harare residents to confirm with the City’s master plan and also promote new innovations around housing and infrastructure development that are relevant, appropriate and affordable.
- To ensure the projects will not lead to evictions or other victimisation of the urban poor.
- The projects will profile the urban poor in a positive manner.

As illustrated in figure 8.4 below, following the typology described in figure 5.11, the scope of the MOU can be categorised into three overlapping aspects to capture co-productive inputs into the delivery of housing improvement. These are firstly, the combination of resources – both cash and human labour towards the delivery of low cost housing and improvements. Secondly, the creation of knowledge drawing from both the formal land use and building regulations of the state and using poor communities as a source of innovation in building methods. Thirdly, capacity through the application of community skills and use of state owned materials and equipment in construction of housing and service infrastructure. It is

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*264* Informal discussion with City of Harare Housing Official, 1 February 2013.

*265* Memorandum of Understanding, 19 March 2010.
important to note that while these capacities exist in a latent sense, both within the City Council and within the community, it is through the MOU that they are activated when unified within a common process and framework.

The alignment of resources from low-income communities with those of the state, address the barriers created by low and unstable incomes of the poor that make participation in the formal housing market difficult. Mitlin (2003) identifies financial exclusion as a central cause of the growth of informal and illegal settlements. Also, in Zimbabwe, the parlous state of the national economy severely limits the resource capacity of central and local government to meet commitments on housing construction (Government of Zimbabwe, 2009) or to design financial mechanisms to support the development of low-cost housing.

Figure 8.4
Spaces of Action: Contributions to Co-production

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266 As discussed in Chapter Two (section 2.2.5).
The form of resources identified in the MOU reflects the specific capacity available to partners, including the City of Harare existing statutory responsibilities. The MOU identifies that the City of Harare is required to provide land for housing of the poor and, in accordance with statute, fund the delivery basic water, sanitation and road infrastructure to enable housing development. The MOU also specifies that Dialogue and ZHPF are required to “mobilize” financial resources from within the community, to fund the construction of housing units. The shared cost of housing construction recognises, and reinforces, the formal role of the City Council under the terms of the Urban Council’s Act to provide infrastructure to facilitate housing construction. It also recognises the latent financial capability of poor communities, through saving schemes, to incrementally fund the construction of housing units. Moreover, the framing of the agreement locates the contributions of both the state and the community in a common ‘project’ to construct low cost housing for the urban poor.

The orchestration of inputs from the City Council and the community provide an obvious material benefit to all parties, in a context of low levels of resource availability, however it is also a test of commitment to partnership working. Chitekwe-Biti (2009) notes that sustaining positive relationships between local authorities in Zimbabwe and Dialogue and ZHPF depended on being able to ensure the delivery of agreed objectives. This highlights that beyond the immediate impact of ‘more hands working’, that what is being created through partnerships, such as that documented in the MOU, is the creation of mutual obligations (as Searle, 2005). The fact of local authorities and collective groups of the urban poor working together creates new learned behaviours that impact both on the boundaries of power and decision making and on the willingness of institutionally governed organisations to experiment with new approaches and collaborations. As found in other case studies such as the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi (Hasan 2001; Zaidi 2001; Mitlin 2008), Windhoek (Mitlin and Muller, 2004) and Mumbai (Appadurai, 2001; Patel et al, 2002), creating new spaces for collaboration not only releases latent potential, much needed by public bodies to deliver urban development, but becomes a catalyst for more fundamental change in relationships.
Knowledge as an input into co-production is highlighted in the MOU as a principle to “promote new innovations around housing and infrastructure developments that are relevant, appropriate and affordable” and also as a responsibility for all parties to stimulate and contribute new knowledge. While this provides a recognition of the inadequacy of existing regulation led practices, it does not dismiss the primacy of statute to govern the form of development; but rather opens up avenues to identify new techniques that are sensitive to economic and environmental conditions. This is underlined in the MOU in two ways. Firstly, in planning additional housing construction “Harare residents [are to be encouraged] to conform to the city’s master plan” reinforcing a co-ordinated vision of the City. Secondly, that both the City Council and community partners have responsibility to contribute “technical expertise”.

As co-producers of housing, space is created to develop approaches, such as incremental construction, able to address the constraints of low income communities while also providing a formal process that can be adopted by the City Council. Co-production in Harare begins to address Roy’s (2005) concern that marginal spaces are typically considered as ‘unplannable’ by local government. The view being that the location, configuration or soil condition makes these spaces unsuitable for the application of standard building practices. Given the pressures on urban land for low cost development in Harare, practices that cultivate innovative building techniques and otherwise resolve problems of access, drainage and sewage become a valuable knowledge resource for urban management.

8.3.4 MOA – Financing Incremental Development

As described in Chapter Five (section 5.9), under the auspices of HSUP, Dialogue, ZHPF and the City of Harare are establishing a finance facility to support upgrading of informal settlements. The Harare Slum Upgrading Finance Facility (HSUFF) will fund housing and infrastructure improvements, initially in Dzivarasekwa Extension, prior to being replicated in other informal settlements. HSUFF is established as an independent trust which is jointly managed through a board with two
representatives from each of the core partners (Dialogue, ZHPF and City of Harare). Loans will be made towards improvements to basic water and sanitation infrastructure, land acquisition, incremental housing construction and livelihood activity. Building on the successful ZHPF *Gungano* model, loans will be made to organised groups with an established savings record and, depending on the type of loan, repayable over a period of six months to two years.\textsuperscript{267} The intention is to seek further financial inputs into the fund from the Zimbabwean Government and from international donor organisations,\textsuperscript{268} with the aim of maintaining investment in upgrading beyond the term of the B&amp;MGF contract.

The creation of HSUFF is set within the context of a lack of public funding for infrastructure and housing development, adverse economic conditions and a weak financial services sector where loan products for upgrading of low income settlements are unavailable.\textsuperscript{269} The partnership approach taken provides an opportunity to both leverage community generated financial and human resources for housing development projects and create a means to focus investment in low income communities. The partnership, in the form of a trust, creates a new institutional vehicle that redefines the space of collaboration that had previously been articulated in the MOU. Building on the experiences of joint working between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed on the 2 May 2014.

While the production of an MOA provides a practical framework for the development and management of the finance facility, it also reveals a process of progressive institutional adaptation. A comparison of the language and the terms set out in the MOU and MOA (as summarised in table 8.2) suggests a shift from loose partnership activity to formal and more specific terms of collaboration. This is

\textsuperscript{267} Information from Upgrading News (March 2014) – joint newsletter by Dialogue, ZHPF and the City of Harare.

\textsuperscript{268} City of Harare – Town Clerk’s report to the Education, Health, Housing and Community Services and Licensing Committee, 9 October 2012.

\textsuperscript{269} A number of internal background reports have been produced by B&amp;MGF consultants to establish the lack of financial services for people on very low and unstable incomes and the disinclination of building societies to provide loans for informal settlement upgrading.
accompanied, in the specific responsibilities allocated to partners, by what can be
described as a ‘triangulation of obligations’: each partner shares core tasks such as
raising budgets, the selection of beneficiaries and identification of development
projects for the trust. This can be seen as a mechanism to build mutual
accountability and reliance and establish patterns of joint activity that have the
potential to be ‘normalised’ in institutionalised behaviours.

Table 8.2
Comparing the MOU and MOA – Institutionalising Partnership Working

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOU</th>
<th>MOA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Character</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Informal agreement operated through partnership group (PMC).</td>
<td>• Formal agreement operating as a trust – special purpose vehicle for finance project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Explicitly states that commitments are not legally binding.</td>
<td>• As a trust activity is legally accountable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MOU “regulates” the relationship between parties.</td>
<td>• MOA “dictates and manages the relationship between parties”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sets general objectives towards housing improvement in low income communities.</td>
<td>• Specific task of establishing a trust to mobilise funding and administer finance facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emphasis on setting principals for partnership working.</td>
<td>• Emphasis on the operation of the trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commits generalised financial and organisational resources.</td>
<td>• Specifies detailed financial and organisational inputs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sets the foundation for longer term relationship.</td>
<td>• Creates capacity to extend partnership projects through the special purpose vehicle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The production of the MOA has been a fully collaborative process that has
addressed a range of fundamental issues about the nature of power relations and
the balance of authority. The development of HSUFF marks a transition in the form
of co-production from one where inputs are aligned, but decision making processes

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largely remain separate, to one where inputs are pooled, through structures of joint decision making. This marks a significant development of the relationship and a deepening of collaboration. The MOA creates a more functional participatory space able to translate mutually defined commitments into tangible outputs for low income communities.

The operation of HSUFF secures equal representation from the City of Harare, ZHPF and Dialogue in the management of the trust. This ensures a balance of authority for decisions on the allocation of loans for ‘slum’ upgrading and infrastructure investment. At this stage HSUFF is newly instituted and the structures are yet to be tested to assess the operational viability of this fully collaborative co-productive model. Despite the embryonic stage, it perhaps provides an example of Baiocchi et al (2011: 81) describe as “institutional bootstrapping” where “improved institutional designs emerge from pragmatic experimentation by those in charge of the institution.” As such, the agreement of the MOA and the establishment of the trust, provides evidence of adapted institutionalised practice in the development and upgrading of low income urban communities.

8.4 Conclusion

This Chapter has sought to examine whether the deepening relationships between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council over the period 1997 to 2013 has contributed to the adaptation of institutions and institutional conditions in Harare. Adopting sociological theory that institutions evolve through small scale and incremental changes, evidence has been assembled to highlight and discuss adaption of both process and activity associated with the provision of housing and basic services. Two areas of interest have been considered, firstly change to the discursive representation of the ‘urban poor’, from being collectively perceived as a risk to civic life to having agential qualities assigned to organised resident groups of low income communities. This addresses normative views and embedded institutionalised perceptions of poor communities. Secondly, how collaborative and

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270 This is an issue that could be picked up in further research, as recommended in Chapter Nine (section 9.5.1).
co-productive activity, through delivery of the ‘slum’ upgrading projects, based in Dzivarasekwa Extension Harare, have affected the adaptation of existing regulatory and bureaucratic institutions. The adaptation of administrative processes being presented as indicative of change to underlying institutions and systems of urban governance.

In Harare, the establishment of ZHPF and Dialogue and the relationships they have developed with the City of Harare since 1997, have according to interviewees, had a formative impact on how poor communities are understood. As a consequence, changed discourses of poverty and informality have affected the institutionalised behaviours of the state. While this has not been a smooth process, the changing relationships, shared experiences and active problem solving appear to have stimulated new ideas and approaches to urban management. Moreover, this has affected who can be involved in urban governance, the roles they can play and how systems of rules adapt to legitimise spaces of deliberation and decision making.

What is evident, in considering the changing patterns in relationships over a 16 year period, is the complexity of constitutive factors that influence the efficacy of particular ideas and approaches. For example, the scale of revolt against plans to demolish illegal settlements located in Harare dormitory towns would be unlikely without the historical experience, cultural resonance and political implications of Operation Murambatsvina. As described in section 8.2.3, the adoption of common discourses on informal settlements across the political spectrum both gave weight to the demand for a reversal of policy of demolitions and substance to the right to due process articulated in the new Constitution. This creates a ‘discursive terrain’ (Ghertner, 2008) able to connect issues of settlement and the responsibilities of the state to embedded institutions making other actions possible.

Further to this, the experience of collaboration has also created the opportunity to adapt the formal and bureaucratic institutions that govern land use and the provision of basic services. From minor changes in the evidentiary requirements for individuals to register for the housing waiting list, to the creation of a special purpose vehicle to jointly manage the delivery of finance for upgrading of low
income settlements. These, when considering Fung and Wright (2003), suggest in Harare the creation of specific episodes of deliberative governance that may (drawing on Andrews, 2013) have deeper resonance with the institutional realities, culture and politics of Zimbabwe.

While from a temporal perspective there is a cumulative logic to the development of new institutional arrangements, the experience of ZHPF and Dialogue is one of fragmented processes of gains and retreats. The approach taken in Zimbabwe reflects Pieterse (2008: 116) of “not pitting the solution proposed by the poor against the state programme, or lobbying directly for policy change, but rather seeking ‘shifts’ in the institutional arrangements which determine the way policy translates into action” (emphasis in original). Locally nuanced and intelligent approaches are tactically deployed that contribute to the evolution of relationships and the deepening on deontic responsibilities. The examples used in this Chapter indicate that adaptation is narrowly focused on specific practices that have been identified as being impediments to improving access to housing and basic services.

Institutional change has a particular and situated meaning in Harare and for ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare as participants in co-productive projects. This reflects not a wholesale change in the social parameters that govern urban life, but adaptations of those rules that create unnecessary barriers to individual and collective action to realise improvements to low income settlements. In accepting a view that institutions exist only so far as they enable societies to function (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Leftwich, 2010) co-production provides a framework for the resolution of problems and the development of new rules that have implications for urban governance. Thus opportunities to release latent human and financial resources, contribute to the legitimacy of institutions and the organisation of the state, creating systems of collaborative urban management that are essential for development in the Global South.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Policy Implications

9.1 Overview

This research has investigated the institutional implications of co-production as a strategy for development, using Harare and the relations between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City Council as an embedded case study. The research sought to draw together the distinct literatures on co-production and institutional theory to explore whether collaborative projects, addressing housing and basic service need, contribute to institutional change. This built on a conception of social interaction that recognised the agency of people, acting both independently and collectively, to meet their needs, even in repressive contexts such as that found in Zimbabwe. Underpinning this is an examination of the potential use of co-production as a strategy for people in poverty to engage and shift their relationships with the state to change the institutional rules and practices that contribute to their poverty.

As set out conceptually in Chapter One (see figure 1.1), co-production has been examined as a mediating function grounded in, and subject to, prevailing institutional conditions. Conceptually, co-production is positioned as a mechanism that creates spaces of dialogue and negotiation on contested issues of housing and the distribution of basic services. The research examined empirically the significance of collaborative working on how actors understand and respond to the challenges of urban development and the meaning of this for informal (cultural) and formal (regulatory) institutions that govern social relationships. The research has employed a qualitative process-tracing approach (as described by George and Bennett, 2005; and Collier, 2011), by collecting and triangulating interview and documentary data from the primary participants ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council. In keeping with the process-tracing method, the research has emphasised a temporal analysis, to identify a cumulative causality of ‘transformative moments’ (as suggested by Pierson, 2004; and Vennesson, 2008) that help to explain observed adaptations in institutionalised behaviours.
This concluding Chapter attempts to draw together the evidence gathered during the research to directly address the questions set out in Chapter Three. This is intended to provide a synthesis of key findings, while also contributing to the ongoing international policy discussions on urban development, as identified in Chapter One. The remainder of this Chapter is structured to reflect the research questions by firstly, considering the role of mobilisation in creating the conditions for co-production. This highlights the significance of building the material and organisational capacity for co-production and also reconsiders, in light of empirical data, the necessary factors for co-production discussed in Chapter Two. Secondly, this Chapter turns to the implications of co-production for issues of urban governance. Drawing from the case study data, the aim is to respond to the conclusions of Hickey (2012), Khan (2012) and Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) who emphasise the importance of contextualised responses to challenges of governance. Thirdly, the Chapter considers whether co-production in Harare has affected institutions and institutionalised behaviour. This will focus on the outcome of collaboration for low income communities. The Chapter concludes by highlighting the key implications of co-production within a changing international policy environment and with suggestions of further empirical investigation of co-production in relation to institutional change in urban contexts.

9.2 Mobilisation – Creating the Conditions for Co-production

As presented in Chapters Two and Six, there is an extensive discussion across the social movement and development literature on the significance and benefits of community mobilisation. These include mobilisation as a means of claim-making (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007); creating resources to resist economic exclusion (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004); building social capital and networks (Moser, 1997; Robins, 2008); and creating political traction (Appadurai, 2001; Moore, 2005). While the difficulty of overcoming differences of caste, ethnicity and experience can be considerable (Woolcock and Narayan, 2006; Krishna, 2009; Mahmud, 2010), collective action for low income communities can bring important benefits that would be otherwise unavailable to individuals.
As discussed in Chapter Two, it appears necessary for communities to organise in order to create the material and the agential capacity to engage with organisations of the state. Moreover, mobilisation is essential, as a foundational condition, to building the bonds of trust and reciprocity needed to undertake substantive collaborative activity involving community and state actors (Ostrom and Ahn, 2007; Workman, 2011). Through organised groups engaging in co-production, communities can better understand the operation of governmental apparatus and overcome what Blundo and Le Meur (2009: 20) describe as “the monopoly of technical-bureaucratic knowledge combined with a low degree of accountability”, which they consider typifies citizen relations with state organisations. This is illustrated by ZHPF and Dialogue’s engagement with the City Council in Harare over a 16 year period, where they were able to develop the “performative competence” (Gupta, 1995: 381) to navigate administrative systems and understand organisational power relationships within the City of Harare Council.

Evidence from Harare shows the creation of financial and human inputs into both communal self-help initiatives (Mbare toilets and Crowborough North) and as organised inputs into projects of co-production (Dzivarasekwa Extension and HSUFF). Mobilised capacity creates material input into collaborative projects and also augments the legitimacy of mobilised groups as development partners to the state, along the lines suggested by Appadurai (2004). Based on this case study, mobilisation is an activating function that creates the social infrastructure to bring communities together around common goals, and build a collective resource base to address the need for housing and basic services. It also serves to shift the subjectivity of low income communities within established institutional configurations; creating the potential for ‘poor communities’ to act outside of their normatively defined roles.
9.2.1 Limits to Mobilisation?

The evidence collected through this research supports the idea that mobilisation generates significant benefits per se for low income communities, such as those in Harare. However, there remain a number of questions on the effectiveness of a grassroots movement, with some 658 neighbourhood savings schemes (federated sub-regionally to a national structure), as a catalyst for institutional change. As described in this thesis, the form of engagement with the state, used by ZHPF and Dialogue, is based on relationship building rather than confrontation on specific issues or rights. This approach relies on overcoming inherent epistemic and bureaucratic resistance, within public agencies, to negotiations with communities outside of bureaucratic decision making processes. As described in Chapter Two, the “transmission belt” (Mohan 2002: 127) for establishing relationships has been the development of projects, and more specifically, projects that address long-standing urban management issues, affecting both specific locales and metropolitan areas.

The reliance on defined projects, as entry points into discussions with the state, raises a number of issues for the ability of mobilised grassroots communities to sustain the interest of state organisations, as suggested by de Wit and Berner (2009). The finite nature of projects require, for relationships to survive and develop, new projects to be put into place in order to maintain dialogue. In Harare, as set out in Chapter Five, ZHPF and Dialogue have maintained a continuity of engagement through successive projects, which have contributing to deepening relationships and led to the adoption of new institutional practices, despite asymmetries of power. This however, has had limitations as discussed in Chapter Seven (section 7.3) in the allocation of housing units in Budiriro. There are other examples of co-production in Zimbabwe, such as described by Mitlin (2004) in Victoria Falls, where after an initial successful collaboration, relationships stalled when local authority objectives had been met. Similarly, in Namibia (Mitlin and Muller, 2004) and in India (Patel and Bartlett, 2009) despite initial gains, mobilised
communities have had difficulty in influencing more substantive change in institutionalised behaviours.

Recognising this as a risk, and rather than dismissing these examples as failures, they can perhaps be understood, following Coelho et al (2010: 196), as “non-linearity of gains from participatory processes”. This suggests that within complex social and institutional relations that outcomes from mobilisation are not evenly distributed among actors and are revealed over a period of time. Thus for Patel and Bartlett (2009), the benefit of successful negotiation with railway authorities in Mumbai was not institutional change, but increased confidence and capacity, within mobilised communities, to deal with future challenges arising from relations with state authorities. Similarly, in Harare ZHPF and Dialogue have taken a long term perspective in their efforts to “mobilise our city fathers”, by extending the learning and bonds of mutual responsibility outside of communities to include the City Council. This appears to have broadened the basis of discussion beyond specific episodes of co-production; contributing to City Council officials adopting an institutionally significant approach to ‘slum’ upgrading over the displacement of informal settlements. While solidity of this change is difficult to determine in the scope of this research, these new practices of urban management can form the subject of further research.

As found by Baiocchi et al (2011) in their study of PB in Brazil, defining the impact of participation is less about identifying particular forms of engagement and more about how interaction changes the application of institutions in practice. Thus in Harare, the combined benefits of the social infrastructure created through ZHPF mobilisation (see Chapter Six) and the reduced risk of violent eviction through participative forms of project governance (Chapters Seven and Eight) are meaningful changes. However, realising these benefits is conditional on engaging with prevailing institutional arrangements and the capacity of organised groups to maintain stability and continuity of activity. There are a number of policy

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271 Interview with ZHPF leaders, 5 November 2013. Quoted in Chapter Six.
272 This is evidenced by the City of Harare Slum Upgrading Strategy.
implications from this research that connect to the wider debate on future designs of urban development policy.

9.2.2 Mobilisation - Policy Implications

The mobilisation of people, resources and organisational capacity to deliver developmental outcomes are positioned as a key component in the design of the post-2015 development agenda. The United Nations (2013) High Level Panel emphasise new approaches that assume a greater share of the cost of development is found through national sources such as taxation and the creative used of other (co-productive) resources. To capitalise on co-productive approaches national and local government will require more effective instruments to enable productive collaboration with civil society. Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) emphasis the need for community mobilisation and leadership in contexts where low income communities get little support, or are obstructed by city and national governments, in poverty reducing activity. This highlights the importance of policy support to address the institutional constraints that limit community contributions to development.

The evidence from Harare highlights a number of implications for international policy. First, the importance of strong social foundations to building collective voice and action. While collective action is grounded in low income communities working together, positive signals of support can be provided by governments and international agencies to encourage the formation of grassroots organisations for urban development policy. Secondly, this research underlines the importance of incremental institutional change within state organisations. As also highlighted by Blundo and Le Meur (2009), transformative change occurs as actors come to understand issues of poverty differently, through the experience of collaborative problem solving. In keeping with the findings of North et al (2009) and Andrews (2013), this research suggests that new models of behaviour cannot be imposed but have to develop organically; connect with deeply institutionalised cultures and behaviours (as discussed in Chapter Two). Thirdly, for the necessary conditions of co-production to be met, commitment from both state organisations and collective
citizen groups is needed. For development policy this means promoting joint planning, delivery and management of urban development schemes.

9.3 Urban Governance

The second research question, as set in Chapter Three, concerns the impact of co-production on urban governance: specifically investigating whether new forms of governance arrangements emerge as a consequence of collaborative activity. This is a key research question that has wider relevance to the international development literature and current policy debate on post-2015 goals. Chapter Seven provides a detailed analysis of the data gathered through this study on governance and responds to the call by Robinson (2006), McFarlane (2011) and Myers (2011) to develop empirical research that recognises the urban compacts and strategies emerging from cities of the Global South. The approach of these scholars has been followed to avoid the dichotomous position, as suggested in the work of Cooke (2004a) and Roy (2011), of judging the merits of participative engagement in governance as a form of co-optation. The analysis here aims to recognise the complexity of context, and implications of constrained agency, that shape the strategies of mobilised low income communities.

The context of Harare, as set out in Chapter Four, is one of fractured and often dysfunctional forms of government, where a lack of resource and capacity combines with difficult relations with national government to undermine the ability of the City Council to meet statutory obligations. In the area of housing and basic service provision, the existing legislative framework provides limited scope for a creative engagement in problem solving. The evidence gathered through this research suggests that from Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 that combative politics and failing economic conditions contributed to a period of inertia in addressing urban management issues. While negative, this context created an environment which, paradoxically, has stimulates spaces of adaptation in governance arrangements.
For ZHPF and Dialogue the availability of funding from B&MGF provided an opportunity to reinvigorate their relationship with the City of Harare Council and extend their involvement in urban governance through co-production. This appears to have consolidated the position of ZHPF and Dialogue as partners to the City of Harare and provided a platform for wider influence on the conduct and policy of national government, as reflected in the National Housing Policy 2012.\(^{273}\) Engagement in management of co-production, while project based, can be seen to ‘model’ hybrid governance (as defined by Booth and Cammack, 2013 and Wild and Foresti, 2013); creating the experiential basis to broaden into city management, as suggested by the Harare Slum Upgrading Strategy. Centrally, by influencing micro-level arrangements, as suggested by Broussard and Raynaud (2011), stakeholders in Harare created the potential to influence institutional environments.

9.3.1 Substantive Change?

While the development of new practices of participative governance are evident, both at a project level (Dzivarasekwa Extension) and in city-wide administration (Harare Slum Upgrading Strategy and HSUFF) a key measure of significance, as suggested by Biaocchi et al (2011), is the degree to which decisions are binding on the actions of the state. To be considered as institutionally significant, the influence of communities should be expected to extend beyond deliberation, to connect more fundamentally with the processes and the institutions that govern state activity. This, in the context of Zimbabwe where character of the state is highly politicised, is difficult to establish. However, recent examples such as the proposed demolitions of illegal settlements in Chitungwiza (see section 8.2.3), the production of the National Housing Policy (Government of Zimbabwe, 2012) and the formation of HSUFF (see section 8.3.4), provide indications of changes in discourses of poverty and practices addressing ‘slum’ settlements are suggestive of changes in the institutionalised patterns of governance.

\(^{273}\) Dialogue and ZHPF are both identified as key “non-state actors” involved in the Government of Zimbabwe National Housing Policy (2012: para. 43).
Following sociological theories of institutional change, as described in Chapter Two, adaptations need not be permanent to be considered substantial, but are evidenced by the degree to which they become embedded in normative practice. Following this logic, while the progress made by ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare may become subject to more powerful national politics, they have created a body of experience that is likely to continue to influence the operation of urban governance in Harare. This conclusion is in keeping with studies such as Baiocchi et al (2011) that indicate that even where there is a lack of overt change, due to the strength of elite power, that engagement of communities in participative processes can have a positive effect on institutionalised practices of the state over the long term.

9.3.2 Governance - Policy Implications

A key challenge in positioning mobilised communities as actors in urban governance post-2015, is defining legitimacy. Reflecting on the application of normative ideas of democratic participation and accountability that dominate development rhetoric (Gaventa, 2006), this research suggests that a response already exists in urban environments. This can be described quoting Blundo and Le Meur (2009: 16), as “governance defined in pragmatic terms.” Pragmatism avoids ‘institutional monocropping’, as critiqued by Evans (2004), and the imposition, through policy, of ineffective governance models as challenged by North et al (2009) and Andrews (2013). Pragmatic governance reflects a day-to-day engagement in contexts, as described by Booth (2011); Cammett and MacLean (2011); Batley et al (2012), where partial and fractured service infrastructure combined with institutionalised exclusion to germinate individual and collective innovation. This is referred to as “bootstrapping” by Baiocchi et al (2011: 161) where governance is “developed and elaborated through a continuous process of learning by doing."

The efforts of ZHPF and Dialogue to build co-production in Harare can be seen as consistent with Appadurai’s (2001: 34) consideration of Foucaultian “governmentality from below”. The function of governmentality being, as Rose (1999: 36) suggests, to “render visible the space over which government is to be
exercised”. Murray Li (2007) notes the process of rendering includes establishing boundaries and fields of action, assembling information and mobilising resources. In keeping with the idea of ‘deep democracy’, the ‘rendering’ in Harare is being undertaken by organised communities. In Zimbabwe, national government is preoccupied with resisting political challenge. At a city level, the lack of resource and capacity prevents the ready diversion of service activity from establish institutionalised practice. In this space communities can exercise, pragmatic engagement in urban governance.

It is in this context that the model of co-production shown in Harare appears to reduce the contradiction between idealised forms of governance and the realities of urban politics. This addresses both Myers’ (2011) call to find more credible responses to the complex political and social environments of the Global South, while also building institutional adaptation, as Khan (2012) suggests, in areas that are likely to galvanise state support towards more progressive policy. The implications for development, as others including Green (2012), Hickey (2012) and Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2014) have suggested, is to realise the transformative capacity of community and state actors working collaboratively towards delivering sustainable urban development. This research suggests that support for new configurations of urban and service governance that do not diminish the role of the state but encourage a re-engineering of roles towards the delivery of common urban objectives, offers significant possibility to address both democratic and resource deficits that increasingly affect cities of the Global South. A key implication, building on the findings of this research, is the need to establish policy frameworks able to utilise the strong roots that connect urban development with underlying institutional values.

9.4 Institutional Change

In considering the evolving relationship between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare from a temporal perspective, the research indicates that the opportunity for co-production emerged through a process of deepening bonds of engagement between partners. This reflects models of institutional change, as proposed by
Bowles and Naidu (2006) and Brousseau and Raynaud (2011), that emphasise institutional transitions as iterative adaptations that become embedded as practice and formalised as new rules. The cumulative characteristic appears particularly significant in the experience of ZHPF and Dialogue, as their initial intention was to create spaces of engagement and negotiation with the local and national government to address exclusion from existing systems of service distribution and accountability. While from the perspective of the City of Harare this was achieved through repeated “pestering” by ZHPF and Dialogue to become involved in delivering improvements in local housing and sanitation provision, it was undertaken in a particular way to connect with the repertoires and normative organisational expectations of the Council.

A key conclusion from this research is the importance of establishing spaces of dialogue as a foundational requirement to develop more progressive and structured community – state relations, such as co-production. Centrally, the approach of ZHPF and Dialogue has been to promote solutions to extant issues, in a way that do not overtly threaten the legitimacy of state authority. Thus the examples provided in Chapter Five of Mbare toilets and Crowborough North demonstrated how, through organising the collective capacity of low income communities, ZHPF and Dialogue engaged in development activity that leveraged their growing relations with the City Council to negotiate concessionary adaptions to prevailing practices in the use of Eco-san toilets and the subdivision of land for housing. The data suggests that engagement in exercises of joint problem solving create incentives for micro-adaptation of practices. These accumulate to shift expectations and affect the terms of relationships within established and structured power relationships. In this case study, productive ‘friction’ between the City of Harare and low income communities in the delivery of specific housing and basic service projects has contributed to new operational terms of engagement.

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274 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
275 As quoted from an interview with a senior City Council official, 7 May 2013.
It is suggested, through this research, that this ‘frictional’ aspect of engagement, which can be both positive and negative, contributes to institutional change. This is consistent with social theory, which highlights how “[s]ocial systems are organised hierarchically and laterally within societal totalities, the institutions of which form ‘articulated ensembles’” (Giddens, 1984: 170). The processes of social interaction reinforce institutions as “each time rules and resources are actualised they are reproduced” (Mouzelis, 2008: 197), with the corollary being that change, when accepted through practice, become embedded and reproduced with use. The strategy adopted by ZHPF and Dialogue, in keeping with the SDI model (as described in Chapter Four), is purposive engagement of the state in order to overcome bureaucratic structures that may inherently disadvantage low income communities. The aim is to affect the normative ‘taken for granted’ aspects of organisational behaviours, which shape behaviour in respect of the application of institutionalised practice and rules.

9.4.1 Institutional Transition

In adopting a sociological evolutionary understanding of institutions and institutional change, as discussed in Chapters One and Two, the transition from one institutional form to another is expected to take place as an incremental process. As such the micro-changes in attitudes and behaviours, which provide the first indicators of change, may only be evident subjectively, through the experiences of the actors involved. But these build to become more tangible, and thereby more visible, in the discourses used and practices of actors in applying rules. As discussed in Chapter Eight, evidence from this research in Harare appears to support this theoretical model, with the degree of traction on institutions and institutionalised practice increasing in line with the depth of engagement between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare. However, there also appears to be a long period of establishing relationships and trust before more structured co-production takes place as in the Dzivarasekwa Extension project.

As proposed in Chapter Two (see figure 2.3) iterative change can be seen to take place as a transitional process, whereby old institutions co-exist with nascent
institutions, as new arrangements become embedded. Brousseau and Raynaud (2011) indicate new arrangements come to the fore in some cases where they replace existing rule based practice. This implies that other ‘adaptations’ that fail to transform practice do not result in institutional change. Drawing on the Harare case study, the functionality of co-productive activity becomes embedded through regular formal and informal meetings, joint participation in SDI organised events and exchanges, discussions on housing policy issues and problem solving. The result being that interaction between ZHPF, Dialogue and City of Harare officials became ‘normal’; contrasting with the difficult meetings that characterised engagement at the beginning of the relationship in 1997. This highlights a key question, for further research, to investigate the conditions when small scale, incremental changes do not translate into more substantive institutional transformations.

The period of transition can also be considered as formative and subject to difficulties and reversals; taking place over variable periods of time. This is evident for Zimbabwe in Operation Murambatsvina, which in 2005 took place eight years after ZHPF formed and following the completion of the Mbare toilets and Crowborough North projects. This as discussed in Chapter Five, was a decisive moment in the relations between the state and low income communities in Zimbabwe. Moreover, it provided a dramatic ‘reality check’ for ZHPF and Dialogue in their expectations of the relationship developed with both national and city government in Zimbabwe. Despite establishing a track record of working with the state, progress in building new behaviours towards low income communities was overrun by much stronger political incentives. While ZHPF consider, in hindsight, that Murambatsvina made them stronger as an organisation,276 it also demonstrated how fragile their progress was in changing the institutionalised practices of the state. It is also indicative of the underlying processes of institutional change and the ‘frictional’ dynamic described above.

276 Interview with ZHPF leader, 8 May 2013.
Dzivarasekwa Extension and the development of the joint finance facility provide a means to further embed co-productive activity within a pragmatic form of urban governance. This appears to offer the real possibility institutionalising new practices in ways that positively affect the operation of state organisations towards urban low income communities. The adoption of new institutional arrangements would seem to be possible because, echoing Greif (2006), they are consistent with larger structures of social organisation and culture. But moreover, following the conclusions of North et al (2009), they are grounded in, and operate through, the political and economic realities of Zimbabwe. The approach developed by ZHPF and Dialogue has not sought to graft existing models of institutional participation but developed, iteratively, a form of practical engagement through co-production that enables the state to deliver against institutional obligations, while transforming the treatment of low income communities.

9.4.2 Institutions – Policy Implications

As set out in this thesis, this research reinforces recent scholarship that emphasises the importance of locally developed and embedded actions to achieve institutional reform (North et al, 2009; Hickey, 2012; Khan, 2012; Andrews, 2013). The examination of co-production in this research demonstrates how changes in institutionalised practices are achieved iteratively to improve the functionality of institutional arrangements in the medium term. The gradual development of new ideas and practices avoids a mimetic response, as cautioned against by Evans (2004) and Andrews (2013), which is likely to have a shallow impact on the ‘real’ underlying practices of governance. For international policy, this suggests a need to shift incentives away from macro ‘solutions’ to institutional reform, towards making space for local problem solving.

The case study of ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare demonstrates the potential significance of adaptation geared towards improving the functionality of institutionalised systems of governance. Partners in Harare have drawn ideas and support from the SDI network and development agencies but significantly, tailored these ideas to the specific context of Zimbabwe. This underlines the importance of
making space for local translation of policy goals and also developing nuanced ideas of success and failure. It is important also to reinforce the necessary involvement of state organisations as active partners and as enablers of co-production. This research supports a conclusion of Baiocchi et al (2011: 13), “that an affirmative state can compensate for the higher transaction costs of participation faced by subordinate groups and can in fact transform the social composition of participation.” Local government operating in an enabling role both creates a positive environment for community involvement in co-production, while also benefiting from creating an organisational culture of innovation, which in turn can catalyse institutional change.

9.5 Conclusions and Further Research

In conclusion, tracing the changing pattern of relationships between ZHPF, Dialogue and the City of Harare Council has provided an opportunity to explore the institutional implications of co-production. As set out in this thesis, the political and economic context alongside the discursive representations of poverty in Zimbabwe, have been instrumental in shaping community-state relations and framing the potential for co-production. Despite the huge difficulties of living and working in Zimbabwe, it is evident that ZHPF and Dialogue, through the mobilisation of members, have galvanised the agency and efficacy of people in poverty. This has generated positive effects for individuals who feel more secure and able to act to create lives they have reason to value; communities who collectively have a financial and human resource to resist social and economic exclusion; and for the state, which is animated by the demands and innovation arising from low income communities. From a sociological perspective this highlights firstly, how pressure for change in one part of society’s ‘institutional web’ (following Barley and Tolbert, 1997) affect other parts. Secondly, it suggests the potential for social transformation that is hidden and unutilised in low income communities.

When considered from a temporal perspective, as suggested by Pierson (2004), a pattern of change and adaptation in institutionalised relations is visible. The evidence from Harare highlights the long term effort of ZHPF and Dialogue to
improve the functionality of urban governance for low income communities. While questions about the sustainability institutional change remain, research participants recognise that there has been a fundamental shift in the operation of the state towards low income communities. While this does not exclude the possibility of reversals in the attitudes of the state (as illustrated by Bhan, 2009 in the context of India), the build up to and experience of co-production has provided a means to reconsider and reshape how communities and the state work together to address the significant task of urban development in Harare.

Returning to the challenge of positioning ‘urban’ in post-2015 development goals, this research provides some empirical evidence of the potential contribution of organised communities, working co-productively with the state, to reduce ‘slum’ conditions in the Global South. While there is some distance between the high level targets included in Sustainable Development Goals and localised co-productive activity, the work of ZHPF and Dialogue, drawing on the global network of SDI affiliate organisations, demonstrates a significant role for communities to contribute to urban development. The context of a shifting policy environment, the growing importance of localised resourcing of development and burgeoning demand on state organisations, suggests that a growing role for organised communities is both opportune and essential.

Co-production rather than being a prescription for community-state relations, is a cipher for a range of contextualised practices of urban governance. As seen in Harare the processes associated with community mobilisation and building relations with the state have made a range of collaborative and co-productive options both visible and possible. This moves beyond formulaic approaches to participation, toward a shared responsibility for decision making and delivery that fully utilises the potential of urban communities to contribute to urban development.
9.5.1 Further Research

This research has highlighted the potential significance of mobilised communities working with the state on co-productive development projects. In overcoming the separation of service production and service use, inherent to the Weberian model of public service organisation, the partners in Harare have created a combined capacity to begin to address long-standing issues of homelessness. While small scale, this offers a model of joint working that could be extended and tailored to the specific contexts of other urban centres in the Global South. A key benefit of a co-productive approach, and particularly in a context of large scale informality where there is limited formal taxation, is the creation of mechanisms to share the cost of infrastructure development and maintenance.

Building on the work of Joshi and Moore (2004), Mitlin (2008), Tsai (2011) and Watson (2014), along with the small contribution made by this research, further empirical study is suggested to develop the conceptualisation of co-production as a mediating factor in institutional change. Given the vast range of economic, political and social contexts found in the Global South, the potential usefulness of co-production should be examined further to assess its applicability and long term benefits. This should evidence the impact on communities and state organisations, the implications for the design of delivery mechanism for programmes of development and the significance for systems of urban governance for the changing, but substantive, role of local government organisations. There are a number of suggested additional research tasks that could arise from this research, both within Zimbabwe and within global networks.

Firstly, within Zimbabwe there was insufficient time and resource within this PhD research to develop a comparative analysis of the operation of co-production in different towns and cities. As described in Chapter Five, ZHPF now has an extensive network of members and has established relationships with some 74 local authority areas across Zimbabwe on issues of land and housing. Feedback during the research from ZHPF and Dialogue indicated that the experience of negotiation differs
between local authority areas, making direct comparison a useful task in further analysing and understanding co-productive models (as suggested in Chapter Two, section 2.2.5). This could also be extended to observation of how far different negotiation strategies and processes have affected localised institutional change. Additionally, this PhD research is being completed before the end of the B&MGF funded project in Dzivarasekwa Extension, and also before the new Finance Facility (HSUFF) is fully operational (as highlighted in Chapter Five, section 5.9). It would be of great interest to review the findings of this research following the completion of the projects currently underway, both to assess the final outcome but also to consider how far institutional adaptations have been embedded in city and national policy.

Within the dynamic politics of Zimbabwe, further research would also be useful to consider the impact of the new ZANU-PF government on co-production. This is in light of the National Housing Policy produced in 2012, which commits Government to partnership for housing development; a commitment also reflected in the ZANU-PF election Manifesto 2013. At a national level there is an apparent intent to extend modes of governance on housing beyond the formal structures of government. This is worth further investigation as the history of ZANU-PF in power suggests that any new approaches that diminish the power basis of the Party, and affect the architecture of centralised decision making, are likely to be rejected.

On a wider scale, many of the issues considered in this research will continue to feature in the development of post-2015 development policy and targets. With a greater focus on urban issues, as discussed in Chapter One, the ‘SDI model’ may become more prominent in the delivery of development outcomes and targets. In this context, further comparative research that extends the examination of co-production across cities of the Global South may be of interest to scholars and policy makers. Focused research testing the contextual conditions for co-production comparatively could contribute to delivering housing and basic service infrastructure to low income communities in different contexts. This would need to consider both effectiveness of co-production in generating housing and service
outputs and also understanding ethnographically, how institutionalised organisations of the state change.

Finally, further research is recommended looking at the specific and micro-processes associated with institutional change in urban contexts of the Global South. While there is a growing and significant body of theoretical research into institutional change from a sociological perspective, there is limited empirical evidence that either tests theory or elucidates what methods are most useful in identifying why some institutions change and others do not. Given international interest in urban governance and the challenges of urbanisation, this would appear to be a fruitful arena to locate evidence-based analysis to contribute to debates on the form and operation of local decision making.


Bhan, G. (2009) “‘This is no Longer the City I Once Knew’. Evictions, the Urban Poor and the Right to the City in Millennial Delhi’. *Environment and Urbanization* 21(1): 127 – 142.


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Summary Co-production Case Studies Analysed

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<th>Study</th>
<th>Definition of Co-production</th>
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| Parks et al (1981) | Co-production is defined in economic terms as a mixing of the productive efforts of regular and consumer producers. Co-produce occurs where it is technically feasible; is conditioned by prevailing institutions; and where marginal additional value is created through the combined inputs of producers. Co-production for Parks et al takes two forms:  
  - Substitutive – where the inputs of regular producers can be replaced by those of consumer producers without affecting the level of output.  
  - Interdependent – where not output can be obtained within the inputs of both regular and consumer producers. The definition of co-production reflects a North American model of competent and capacitated state infrastructure – at a local and national level. | • Communities (consumer producers) are incentivised to become involved in co-production where there are financial or efficiency benefits / gains to be made.  
  • Within a market framework consumer producers will chose the combination of price and service mix they prefer. This includes substituting their labour (i.e. curb side waste collection) for a reduced price.  
  • Where citizens consider their interests are best served through collective action they will develop the structures within the community to capture the necessary human and financial resources. | • The state’s role in co-production is as a regular producer of services – within a Weberian model of public service delivery.  
  • The state is also a generator of, as well as being subject to, rules (institutions) governing the management of service delivery.  
  • Local politics may override the market logic by either expanding the scope for co-production or limiting its action even where it is technically feasible and / or economically desirable.  
  • The state retains a responsibility to oversee the regulation of service provision and the execution of contracts for services. |
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| Lam (1996) | Lam defines co-production as a form of team production whereby individual efforts and resources are structured in complementary ways that yield a higher level of joint productivity.  
In his case study of irrigation systems in Taiwan, he illustrates this through the combined efforts of irrigation officials (regular producers) and farmers (consumer producers) who are interdependent where neither can totally substitute for the other. They combine their discrete skills in the scientific knowledge of irrigation systems with the localised time and space specific local knowledge of farmers. | • Farmers and the Association staff work together to produce an annual water plan that takes account of both the physical characteristics of the environment and anticipated water demand.  
• Implementation of the plan is managed by farmers who hold to account the Association who have responsibility to ensure the timely delivery of water.  
• Within the plan farmers exercise a degree of flexibility to meet local needs but this is conditioned by scrutiny of their peers to prevent free-riding or exploitation of the resource.  
• The farmers contribute voluntarily time and labour into the maintenance of irrigation systems in addition to the fees that they pay to the Associations. | • National government gives a high status to community led irrigation management which is an important motivator of local action.  
• Taiwan has established Irrigation Associations as parastatals that are legally owned and formed by farmers and supervised by government officials.  
• The Associations have a high degree of de jure autonomy and authority to levy fees.  
• Operational responsibility is devolved to localised irrigation teams of farmers.  
• The state relies on compliance with rules and the practical inputs of farmers to maintain irrigation systems. Without this co-operative behaviour irrigation management cannot be ‘produced’ by state officials.  
• This relies on rules being structured in a way that enables farmers to establish productive relationships with each other.  
• The Associations carefully measure their level of input in order not to encroach on the sense of ‘ownership’ of the farmers which may reduce their willingness to make voluntary inputs into the management of the irrigation system. |
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| Ostrom (1996)| Co-production is defined as “the process through which inputs used to produce a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization.” Further:  
  - the ‘regular’ producer is most frequently the state;  
  - the term ‘client’ is to be avoided in order to emphasise the agency of ‘citizens’. Ostrom highlights the contextuality of co-production by using contrasting case studies of an effective collaboration between citizens and the state in the construction of condominial water infrastructure in Brazil and; an ineffective form of relationship where the state is unresponsive to the collective approaches of the community to support the delivery of primary education in Nigeria. | Case study 1 – Water Infrastructure Recife Brazil  
Citizens are required to be active participants in all phases from the outset stages of the project.  
- They make decisions through negotiation with neighbours and the state on design, costs and future maintenance delivery.  
- Citizens meet the costs of constructing feeder lines – provide labour and materials.  
Case study 2 – Primary education Nigeria  
- In villages studied there were active associations of residents contributing to community and construction activity. This provided the capacity and structure for co-production.  
- Where parents were supportive of teachers and schools but their involvement in contributing to improving facilities were thwarted by state authorities who refused permission for parent led activity.  
- Ostrom shows that where parents are actively involved teachers and more motivated and pupils achieve to a higher level. | Case study 1 – Recife Brazil  
- State engineers invited citizen involvement as a means to reduce costs and extend access to potable water.  
- Project design and delivery is structured to enable citizen participation and moreover citizen ownership of the project.  
- State pays for the construction of main trunk lines that feed condominial units.  
- State provides technical engineering oversight to the construction.  
Case study 2 – Primary education Nigeria  
- Over a number of years the state had frequently changing policy positions culminating in a decentralisation of responsibility for primary education to local government.  
- Policy and operational incoherence was matched by a lack of resources to deliver national policy.  
- State authorities prevented alternative and local approaches despite their inability to ensure effective delivery of education. |
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| Abers (1998)| This paper does not talk directly about co-production but provides an important analysis of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil. This centres on the engagement of communities in decision-making processes for the allocation of public budgets on social programming and urban infrastructure. This model extends the idea of co-production beyond the limits of service delivery to consider a more strategic role for communities in determining how public resources are utilised in urban neighbourhoods. | - Citizen participation was central to the policies developed in Porto Alegre. In response, communities formed neighbourhood associations in order to maximise their impact on decision-making processes.  
- The prospect of real influence was a key catalyst for large-scale mobilisation and the involvement of residents – particularly among people that had not previously been political activists.  
- The opportunity also created space for new community leaders to come forward who challenged previous corrupt arrangements.  
- Through the participatory processes, citizens were involved in both decision-making and in scrutinising budget provision and delivery.  
- This gave exposure to budgeting, democratic formats, and programme management and build the capacity of community members to be more effective partners to the city. | - Participatory budgeting was launched as a political commitment by the democratic-socialist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) on winning office in Porto Alegre.  
- This commitment was founded in an ideological commitment to ‘pyramidal’ decision-making and the tradition of the party rooted in grassroots radicalism.  
- Government officials present general information on the budget to the public and ask residents to draw up priorities for investment.  
- The priority issues are then included in the city budget programme for the coming year. It was important that the investments were visible to the residents that had voted for them.  
- The approach challenged established practices of clientelism by institutionally encouraging support for politicians that had behaved in a transparent way.  
- It also affected the role of politicians and officials in their roles – being more open and responsive to the needs of residents. |
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<td>Appadurai</td>
<td>Appadurai does not use the term co-production per se in this paper but instead describes the form of partnership between community based organisations and the state in Mumbai, India. He describes “deep democracy” as:</td>
<td>• Horizontal mobilisation of urban poor populations to develop an agenda for action that reflects both their needs and their capacity to act.</td>
<td>• Organised groups of the poor approach the state and provide opportunities for new partnerships. But relationships are individualised, issue based and maybe outside of formal political decision making processes.</td>
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<td>(2001)</td>
<td>• centring the knowledge and capacity of the poor in the work of community based organisations and NGOs;</td>
<td>• Cultivate partnership relationships with the state and with political parties that avoids political party alignment and clientelism.</td>
<td>• State bureaucrats take risks on new practices and procedures that are presented as ‘precedents’ – new applications to existing rules and institutions.</td>
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<td>• keeping politically neutral and negotiating with whomever is in power;</td>
<td>• Focus on realising the knowledge of poor communities to formalise and solidify the effective practices contextually developed in slum communities.</td>
<td>• State involvement in Alliance activity both legitimises the actions of poor communities and also brings political benefits to the state in associating themselves with ‘grassroots’ exercises.</td>
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<td>• driving change through setting precedents and using these to negotiate support for changed policies; and</td>
<td>• Make claim to, refine and define spaces and practices and use these ‘precedents’ to argue for more substantive (institutional) change.</td>
<td>• Relationships with organised groups of the poor stimulate new forms of governance that enables the state to exercise control through partnership.</td>
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<td>• building partnerships with official agencies in ways that further the interests of the poor.</td>
<td>• Preserve and protect community grounded activity – to capacity build rather than chase a succession of projects and funding opportunities.</td>
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<td>Appadurai highlights the work of 3 civic organisations in Mumbai – SPARC, National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan (the Alliance) – to gain secure tenure of land, housing and access to services and urban infrastructure.</td>
<td>• Capitalise on the desire of local, national and international agencies that have the organisational objectives of reducing poverty.</td>
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<td>• Utilise international connections through global networks of the poor to raise the profile (through exposure visits and media) to local issues.</td>
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| Patel et al (2002) | The term co-production is not used directly, however this case study describes an engagement between organised slum dwellers and the state around a specific challenge of relocating some 20,000 households to make way for railway upgrading in Mumbai. The characteristics of this are: | • Communities organised as members of the Railway Slum Dwellers Federation as part of a national movement of the poor.  
• As a group they collected data on slum communities; lobbied the state for investment; set up savings groups; and supported the formation of housing co-ops.  
• The Federation challenged the Indian State in the courts supported by the World Bank on evictions and demolitions. They had to fight to make a space of negotiation to create a resettlement programme.  
• They led on a series of activities that enabled the effective resettlement of some 60,000 individuals. This included mapping of existing informal communities; enumeration of populations; formation of member groups of households to facilitate data gathering and provide mutual support; and assistance in the practical process of relocation.  
• While the initiative reduced many of the worst aspects of violent displacement, moving to a new area had negative consequences. This included (i) loss of trade; (ii) under provision of services such as school places; and (iii) additional costs of travelling back to their former residential areas. | • The state obtained World Bank funding to upgrade the railway infrastructure as a key part of their economic development strategy. Initially no provision was made for relocating the shack residents that lived alongside the rail lines.  
• The City of Mumbai and Indian Railways ultimately worked with the slum community groups because of (i) consistent pressure by slum dwellers to recognise the rights of the poor; (ii) the opportunity to overcome problems that prevented full implementation of the railway upgrading scheme; and (iii) a need to comply with World Bank funding conditions to assist displaced populations.  
• The state made land and 2000 apartments available to relocate railway line slum communities.  
• The state adapted its procedures for major capital schemes by delegating to the Alliance a contract to undertake socioeconomic surveys among the poor community and to design and implement resettlement action plans.  
• In utilising local knowledge the state also delegated responsibility to the community groups authority to determine eligibility to benefit from the relocation scheme and responsibility to allocate housing units. |

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<td>Joshi and Moore (2004)</td>
<td><em>Institutionalised</em> co-production defined as:</td>
<td><em>Case study 1 – Karachi Citizen Police Liaison Ctee</em></td>
<td><em>Case study 1 – Karachi Citizen Police Liaison Ctee</em></td>
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<td>- provision of public services including regulation;</td>
<td>- CPLC emerged from efforts by businesses to challenge civil disorder.</td>
<td>- State ‘persuaded’ to become involved under threat of a tax strike by business.</td>
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<td>- a regular and long-term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens;</td>
<td>- The CPLC was run by established elite / wealthy businessmen.</td>
<td>- CPLC formally recognised and given autonomy to define own agenda.</td>
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<td>- both parties making substantial resource contributions; and</td>
<td>- It undertook an intelligence and analysis role informally directing / influencing the activity of the police.</td>
<td>- Majority of funding provided by business with small grant by state.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>- being found where “state authority is weak”.</td>
<td>- This power not exploited because of (i) ties of mutual obligation; (ii) they restrict membership in order to maximise the external scrutiny of CPLC; (iii) strict code of behaviour; and (iv) carefully manage relationship with police to keep on good terms.</td>
<td>- Police use intelligence produced by CPLC to direct police activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Co-production is between elite state group providing a public interest service and the police public service.</td>
<td>- Co-production is between elite state group providing a public interest service and the police public service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Case study 2 – Ghana Road Transport Union</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- State delegated tax collection because (i) sector was fragmented and difficult to engage; and (ii) it created a political ally in the GPRTU with resource and power to control movement by road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Essentially this is a political arrangement to buy the support of a strategically important trade union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Definition of Co-production</td>
<td>Citizen Role</td>
<td>State Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Bovaird (2007) | Bovaird defines “user and community co-production as the provision of services through regular long-term relationships between professionalised service providers (in any sector) and service users or other members of the community, where all parties make substantial resource contributions.” | **Case study 1 – Sure Start**  
- Parents are considered as partners and are actively encouraged to co-deliver services designed by service professionals.  
- Parents (generally women) are offered training offer counselling (i.e. on breastfeeding) and encouraged to be advocates in their local community.  
- The Sure Start service provides can provide a catalyst for isolated community members to come together and to provide mutual support and advice.  

**Case study 2 – Caterham Barracks Development**  
- A community led trust was formed to oversee the development of a former Army base.  
- The trust promoted the development of housing and community facilities to reflect the needs of the existing community.  
- This achieved a higher quality of affordable housing and public service provision than would have been available, without their involvement, through commercial development.  
- The project also demonstrates the motivational effect of co-production to mobilise the resources from within the community. | **Case study 1 – Sure Start**  
- Services are designed around enabling frameworks. The intention is by working alongside professional staff parents will develop knowledge, skills and behaviours to improve the wellbeing of their children.  
- Sure Start providers (local and national government) encourage local people to supplement health / social worker provision and ‘model’ positive behaviours.  
- The state funds the construction of Sure Start Centres, locating them in deprived areas and providing revenue funding for professional staff and local engagement and training activity.  

**Case study 2 – Caterham Barracks Development**  
- Following from the establishment of the trust the community provided a key input into the design of housing development using local knowledge.  
- The facilities funded through the trust are managed by local community groups thereby extending the partnership with the local authority.  
- Bovaird reports that the council and the developer were satisfied with the outcome of the project although it was very different from the initial intended outcome. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Definition of Co-production</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>State Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mitlin (2008) | Co-production here is defined as the joint production of public services between citizens and the state, with one or more elements of the production process being shared. Mitlin extends the application of co-production beyond service delivery to position it as a route for the urban poor to consolidate their local organisational base and build their capacity to negotiate successfully with the state. Case studies of grassroots organisations that have used co-production to improve their access to goods and service and change their relationship with state programmes are used in this paper. Two cases – the Orangi Pilot Project in Pakistan and the Namibian Shack Dwellers Federation are highlighted here. | Case study 1 – Orangi Pilot Project
    - Following unsuccessful attempts to make clientelist strategies work with the city authorities in Karachi, the community organised to self-fund the construction of lane sanitation infrastructure.
    - To avoid endemic corruption in government and business the community were involved in the preparation, installation and management of sewer infrastructure.

Case study 2 – Namibian Shack Dwellers Fed
    - The Federation is made up of women led savings schemes in very low income settlements. The women lack tenure and wanted to purchase affordable plots of land.
    - They negotiated with the city of Windhoek to occupy land with access only to basic service infrastructure with plans to make incremental improvements to plot provision as they saved the funds.
    - Working with the city council provided a model of engagement in decision making through participation in the day-to-day practicalities of service provision – moving the boundary conventional service delivery by the state.

Case study 1 – Orangi Pilot Project
    - Initially the city council was not interested in collaborating with community groups but changed their view when they saw that community finance model worked.
    - Following the success of the Orangi Pilot Project the delivery model has been extended to other urban centres in Pakistan.
    - The state maintains a role of providing main sewer lines with local infrastructure funded and maintained by the community.

Case study 2 – Namibian Shack Dwellers Fed
    - The city council approved the occupation of land even though individual plots were unserviced.
    - City council provided some technical assistance on the construction of service infrastructure.
    - The state has recognised the significance of the grassroots project by contributing finance to a community loan fund. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Definition of Co-production</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>State Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsai (2011)</td>
<td>Co-production is defined as the contribution by state and non-state actors towards the production of public goods and infrastructure. Tsai argues that co-production increases the interaction between state and non-state actors contributing to improved relationships between state and citizens. Tsai uses four case studies of village based co-production in rural China to examine the implications of non-state participation in public goods provision on the disposition of officials towards non-state actors.</td>
<td>• The experience of citizens is that the Chinese state has not tolerated non-state provision – seeing this as a threat to national authority. • Mobilisation at a local level – generating both human (labour and skills) and financial contributions towards public works. • Through local committees or social groupings (such as temple associations) project-based decision-making is taken by local communities with officials playing a supportive role. • Freedom to work with the state promotes a positive view of the state and increases the willingness of citizens to accept state authority. Tsai finds that the contrary is also true in the case study villages.</td>
<td>• In the context of reduced central authority and resources for public goods investment the state – local officials – welcomed the increased input of non-state actors in public goods provision. • State provides permission for groups of citizens to collect funds from village residents towards the costs of infrastructure projects (i.e. school). • Once established local committees are semi-autonomous with supporting / technical assistance from the state. • Village government provide materials towards community led construction of public projects. • Alternatively the state uses co-productive approaches to develop partnerships with businesses to fund the delivery of public infrastructure works. This however, does not increase public confidence in the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Definition of Co-production</td>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>State Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workman (2011)</td>
<td>Co-production here follows the definition offered by Joshi and Moore (2004). Workman emphasises that relationships between local authorities and associations are:</td>
<td><strong>Case study 1 – Central Market Area</strong> Market traders are organised through the Makeni branch of the national traders union.</td>
<td><strong>Case study 1 – Central Market Area</strong> The city council relies on local effort to keep the market area clean and maintains funding to ensure that the refuse truck is available for pick-up of waste.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- often fluid in nature and rely on continuous negotiation rather than contract and can be intensely political; and</td>
<td>- Traders sweep and clear the market area of rubbish which the city council collects using its refuse truck.</td>
<td>- Waste management has been identified by the city council as a political priority. Its also seen as a way to build political capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- co-production is established and is sustained by patterns of reciprocal exchange.</td>
<td>- Traders clear drains and participate in city wide clean up days.</td>
<td>- City council uses the income from traders to supplement central government budgets to maintain the market area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The paper focuses on two case studies of co-production in the city of Makeni in Sierra Leone.</td>
<td>- They pay a fee to the council for use of market tables.</td>
<td>- The city is open to negotiation with the traders union on the level of fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Case study 2 – City Meat Slaughterhouse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Case study 2 – City Meat Slaughterhouse</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Butchers are organised in the Makeni Butchers Association to carry out supervised slaughtering of cattle at the slaughterhouse.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- The city council funded the construction of a city slaughterhouse with facilities suitable to maintain food hygiene standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- While a majority continued to use the facility, and pay the fees, the butchers considered that the city council had failed in providing electricity and water to the facility.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Through the Butchers Association a use fee was negotiated with the butchers for use of the facility. But this insufficient to met operating costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- This has weakened the commitment of butchers to the food standards negotiated with the city council and encouraged free riding.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- But within 4 years of opening the facility had fallen into disrepair due to lack of maintenance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Relationships between the city and the association failed because of a perceived lack of good faith in maintaining the slaughterhouse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Community Interview Schedule – Crowborough North

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Arrived Harare</th>
<th>Arrived Crowborough North</th>
<th>Household Size</th>
<th>Main Occupation / Source of Income</th>
<th>Income/ Month ($)</th>
<th>Total Savings / Month ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Market selling – vendor of groceries</td>
<td>n/k</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Husband a messenger at government surveyor general office</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>c. 3 - 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Carpenter / joiner</td>
<td>300 - 600</td>
<td>c.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Self-employed electrician</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Not employed – subsistence farming on site</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Part time domestic worker</td>
<td>20 - 30</td>
<td>5 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Husband a self-employed tailor in Harare</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Community Interview Schedule – Dzivarasekwa Extension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Arrived Harare</th>
<th>Arrived Dz</th>
<th>Household Size</th>
<th>Main Occupation / Source of Income</th>
<th>Estimated Income/ Month ($)</th>
<th>Estimated Savings / Month ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dz1</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Buy and sell on Dz – clothes and general goods</td>
<td>0 - 50</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vendor – tomatoes and vegetables</td>
<td>Circa 80</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz3</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Vendor – vegetables and fruit</td>
<td>120 - 160</td>
<td>7 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz4</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vendor - fruit, vegetables and sandwiches</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz5</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Security guard in Harare</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz6</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tailoring and carpet making</td>
<td>27 – 30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz7</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Husband a carpenter</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz8</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Vendor – vegetables and fruit</td>
<td>25 - 50</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz9</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Born in Epworth</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Husband a bricklayer</td>
<td>40 -50</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz10</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Born in Epworth</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Company Foreman</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dz11</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1998*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vendor – grocery and tuck shop</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Resident of Dzivarasekwa Extension holding camp.
### Construction Costs for 2 Room House – Harare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total Cost (US$)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Land survey</td>
<td>82.00</td>
<td>Paid to City of Harare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning approval</td>
<td>69.00</td>
<td>Formal submission paid to City of Harare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Setting out</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Marking and ready the ground for construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Foundations</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Excavation undertaken by stand holder with support from community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>1.1 cubic metre hard core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>216.00</td>
<td>16 bags cement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>1 cubic metre river sand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Damp course</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>1 x 20m roll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superstructure</td>
<td>360.00</td>
<td>3,000 bricks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>20 bags of cement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>2 x door frames</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150.00</td>
<td>2 x window frames</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5kg of putty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>24 panes of glass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>2 x 6m beams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>4 wall plates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>276.00</td>
<td>12 sheets of roofing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58.00</td>
<td>2 doors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>Door locks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81.00</td>
<td>Rendering - 6 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional costs</td>
<td>Transport costs</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>Cost for flatbed delivery - this shared to ensure full load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialist labour</td>
<td>110.00</td>
<td>Bricklaying cost - labouring provided by community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water Meter</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>Deposit paid to City of Harare for meter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,936.05</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author Fieldwork with members of ZHPF*