Performance Management and Executive Agencies: Strategy and Outcomes in Jamaica

A Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of PhD
In the Faculty of Humanities

2014

Charmaine Isabelle Cummings

Manchester Business School
# Abridged Table of Contents

**List of Figures, Diagrams, etc.** ................................................................. 10  
**Abstract** ........................................................................................................... 13  
**Copyright Statement** ....................................................................................... 14  
**Declaration** ....................................................................................................... 15  
**Dedication** ....................................................................................................... 16  
**Acknowledgements** ......................................................................................... 17  

**CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: CONNECTING THE CHAPTERS** ......................... 18  
1.1 Outline of Introduction ............................................................................... 18  
1.2 Background .................................................................................................. 19  
1.3 The Research Narrative ............................................................................. 22  

**SECTION 1- THE LITERATURE REVIEW** ......................................................... 34  

**CHAPTER 2** .................................................................................................. 36  
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT THEORY: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN  
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES ....................................................................................... 36  
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 36  
2.2 Setting Forth the Grounding Theories for the Literature Review ............. 38  
2.3 Performance Management Systems (PMS) in Executive Agencies (EAS) .... 45  
2.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 60  

**CHAPTER 3** .................................................................................................. 64  
AN INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: DEVELOPMENT OF A PMS ...... 64  
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 64  
3.2 Definitions for Developing a PMS ................................................................. 67  
3.3 PMS Integrative Conceptual Framework .................................................... 71  
3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 92  

**CHAPTER 4** .................................................................................................. 94  
JAMAICA AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND THE  
CONTRIBUTION OF PMS ................................................................................... 94  
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 94  
4.2 History of Public Administrative Development in Jamaica ..................... 96  
4.3 Early Challenges and Contributions of PMS in JEAS ................................. 111  
4.4 PMS Development in JEAS and the Integrative Conceptual Framework  
............................................................................................................................. 115  
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 126  

**SECTION 2- THE METHODOLOGY & METHODS** .......................................... 128  

**CHAPTER 5** .................................................................................................. 130  
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY: STRATEGY AND DESIGN ......................................... 130  
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 130  
5.2 Research Strategy ......................................................................................... 134  
5.3 Research Design- Operationalization of the Research Strategy ............... 141
SECTION 3 - THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS .................................................................................. 154

CHAPTER 6 ........................................................................................................................................ 156

CASE AGENCIES: PRIMARY DATA ANALYSIS THROUGH THE INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................................. 156

6.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 156
6.2 DATA ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................................. 159
6.3 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 201

CHAPTER 7 ............................................................................................................................................ 204

CASE AGENCIES: DATA TRIANGULATION AND RESEARCH FINDINGS ......................................................... 204

7.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 204
7.2 DATA TRIANGULATION AND RESEARCH FINDINGS ............................................................................. 206
7.3 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 229

CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................... 237

8.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 237
8.2 CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................................................................................................. 238
8.3 LIMITATIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 240
8.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 242

REFERENCES: ......................................................................................................................................... 243

APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................................... 259

APPENDIX 5.1 - INITIAL QUESTION SET ................................................................................................. 259
APPENDIX 5.2 - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ..................................................................................................... 261
APPENDIX 5.3 - FINAL TEMPLATE ANALYSIS CODES ............................................................................... 266
APPENDIX 5.4 - STEPS IN CONDUCTING MATRIX ANALYSIS .................................................................... 268
APPENDIX 5.5 - PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES .......................................................................................... 269
### Detailed Table of Contents

- **LIST OF FIGURES, DIAGRAMS, ETC.** ................................................................. 10
- **ABSTRACT** ........................................................................................................... 13
- **COPYRIGHT STATEMENT** .................................................................................. 14
- **DECLARATION** ................................................................................................... 15
- **DEDICATION** ...................................................................................................... 16
- **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** ..................................................................................... 17

#### CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: CONNECTING THE CHAPTERS ....................... 18

1.1 OUTLINE OF INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 18
1.2 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 19
1.3 THE RESEARCH NARRATIVE .......................................................................... 22

**1.3.1 DECIDING TO REVIEW BRITISH NEXT STEPS LITERATURE** ................... 22
**1.3.2 CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OUTLINE OF THE THESIS** ................................. 23

- 1.3.2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 23
- 1.3.2.2 Section 1 – Literature Review Chapters ....................................................... 27
- 1.3.2.3 Section 2 – Methods and Methodology ....................................................... 30
- 1.3.2.4 Section 3 – Empirical Chapters .................................................................. 31
- 1.3.2.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 32

#### SECTION 1- THE LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................. 34

#### CHAPTER 2 ........................................................................................................... 36

**PUBLIC MANAGEMENT THEORY: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES** ................................................................................................................. 36

2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 36

**2.1.1 PURPOSE OF THE CHAPTER** .................................................................... 36
**2.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER** ...................................................................... 37

2.2 SETTING FORTH THE GROUNDING THEORIES FOR THE LITERATURE REVIEW .......... 38

**2.2.1 ISSUES IN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND PATH DEPENDENCY** ........ 39
**2.2.2 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND PATH DEPENDENCY PERSPECTIVES OF PMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR** ................................................................. 41
**2.2.3 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM, PATH DEPENDENCY AND SUCCESS IN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND POLICY TRANSFER** ......................................................... 43

2.3 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (PMS) IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES (EAS) .... 45

**2.3.1 CONTEXTUALISATION OF PMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR** ......................... 45

**2.3.1.1 Agencification** .......................................................................................... 47
**2.3.1.2 Agencification, Public Management and Earlier Reform Initiatives- Predating British Next Steps** ............................................................................................................ 48
**2.3.2.1.1 Defining an Executive Agency ................................................................. 49
**2.3.2.1.2 Next Steps and PMS .............................................................................. 50

**2.3.2 THEORETICAL ISSUES ABOUT PMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR** .......... 51

**2.3.2.1 PMS Roles in the public sector.** ................................................................. 51
**2.3.2.2 PMS Benefits to the public sector ............................................................. 53
**2.3.2.3 The Problem of PMS in the public sector .................................................. 53

**2.3.2.3.1 Publicness ............................................................................................. 54
**2.3.2.3.2 Operationalizing PMS in the public sector ............................................. 56
**2.3.2.3.3 The Political Imperative ....................................................................... 59

2.4 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 60

**2.4.1 THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE** ................................................................. 60
2.4.2 CONNECTING TO NEXT CHAPTER ................................................................. 62

CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................. 64

AN INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: DEVELOPMENT OF A PMS .......... 64

3.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 64

3.1.1 PURPOSE OF THE CHAPTER ..................................................................... 64

3.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER ..................................................................... 65

3.2 DEFINITIONS FOR DEVELOPING A PMS .................................................... 67

3.2.1 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (PMS) ..................................... 67

3.2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF PMS ......................................................................... 68

3.2.3 DIFFERENTIATING OTHER TERMS .......................................................... 70

3.3 PMS INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ....................................... 71

3.3.1 ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP .............................................................. 71

3.3.1.1 INVOLVE KEY STAKEHOLDERS .......................................................... 72

3.3.1.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, COMMITMENT AND CONTROL .............................. 76

3.3.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES ............................... 79

3.3.2.1 APPROPRIATENESS OF MEASURES .................................................... 80

3.3.2.1.1 Financial vs non-Financial ............................................................... 82

3.3.2.1.2 Global vs Local Measures ............................................................... 82

3.3.2.1.3 Internal vs External Measures ......................................................... 83

3.3.2.1.4 Hierarchical Measures vs Departmental Measures ......................... 83

3.3.2.2 FOCUS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES ............................................. 84

3.3.2.3 DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT ......................................... 84

3.3.3 MANAGEMENT PROCESSES FOR PMS .................................................. 85

3.3.3.1 ORGANISATIONAL MISSION, STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES ................. 86

3.3.3.1.1 Periodic Review and Feedback ......................................................... 87

3.3.3.1.2 Changing Measures ......................................................................... 87

3.3.3.1.3 Relevancy and Continuous Alignment ............................................ 88

3.3.3.2 A PROCESS APPROACH ................................................................... 89

3.3.4 INTEGRATE PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ...................... 90

3.4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 92

3.4.1 LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE .................................................................... 92

3.4.2 RELEVANCE OF THIS CHAPTER TO THE THESIS .................................. 93

CHAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................. 94

JAMAICA AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND THE

CONTRIBUTION OF PMS ....................................................................................... 94

4.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 94

4.1.1 PURPOSE OF THE CHAPTER .................................................................. 94

4.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER .................................................................. 95

4.2 HISTORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN JAMAICA ........... 96

4.2.1 EARLY YEARS ............................................................................................ 96

4.2.2 EVOLUTION OF JAMAICA’S MODERN PUBLIC SECTOR ......................... 98

4.2.3 EARLY REFORM INITIATIVES ................................................................... 99

4.2.3.1 Independence ...................................................................................... 99

4.2.3.2 Administrative Reform Programme (ARP) ......................................... 101

4.2.3.3 Public Sector Modernisation Programme (PSMP) and Its Main Features 102

4.2.3.3.1 Agency Development Programme (ADP) and EAs ......................... 103

4.2.3.3.2 Purpose and Features of Jamaican EAs ........................................... 106

4.2.4 WHY THE NEXT STEPS MODEL ............................................................ 107
4.3 EARLY CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF PMS IN JEAS ................................. 111
  4.3.1 ROLE OF PMS ........................................................................................................ 111
  4.3.2 EARLY CHALLENGES .............................................................................................. 112
  4.3.3 EARLY PMS CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................................................ 113
4.4 PMS DEVELOPMENT IN JEAS AND THE INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
  ........................................................................................................................................ 115
  4.4.1 CONSIDERATIONS FOR PMS FRAMEWORK .......................................................... 115
    ........................................................................................................................................ 115
    4.4.1.1 Organisational Ownership ................................................................................. 116
    4.4.1.1.1 Accountability and Control ............................................................................ 116
    4.4.1.2 Characteristics of Performance Measures and Performance System ................. 119
    4.4.1.3 Management Processes for PMS ......................................................................... 120
    4.4.1.4 Integrate PMS with Other Management Systems ............................................... 124
    4.4.1.5 PMS in JEAs- first three years .......................................................................... 125
4.5 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 126

SECTION 2- THE METHODOLOGY & METHODS ................................................................. 128

CHAPTER 5 ......................................................................................................................... 130

RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY: STRATEGY AND DESIGN ..................................................... 130
5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 130
  5.1.1 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CHOICES OF METHODOLOGY ............... 131
  5.1.2 METHODS AND OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER ...................................................... 134
5.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY ............................................................................................... 134
  5.2.1 CASE STUDIES ...................................................................................................... 135
    ........................................................................................................................................ 135
    5.2.1.1 Four Cases ......................................................................................................... 136
    5.2.2 DATA COLLECTION ............................................................................................. 137
      ........................................................................................................................................ 137
      5.2.2.1 Primary Data- Interviews ............................................................................... 137
        ...................................................................................................................................... 137
        5.2.2.1.1 Respondents .............................................................................................. 139
        ...................................................................................................................................... 139
        5.2.2.2 Secondary Data- Official Government Sources and Unofficial Sources ......... 139
    5.2.3 ETHICAL APPROACH .......................................................................................... 140
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN- OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH STRATEGY ....... 141
  5.3.1 INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (ICF) AND THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ... 141
  5.3.2 SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS .............................................................................. 144
  5.3.3 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS .................................................................................. 144
    ........................................................................................................................................ 144
    5.3.3.1 Template Analysis ............................................................................................. 146
    5.3.3.2 Matrix Analysis ................................................................................................. 148
    5.3.3.3 Cross-case Analysis ........................................................................................... 150
    5.3.3.4 Application of Analytical Methods ................................................................. 150
  5.3.4 LONGITUDINAL ASPECT TO STUDY ..................................................................... 151
5.4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 152
  5.4.1 RELEVANCE OF THIS CHAPTER TO THE THESIS ............................................ 152

SECTION 3- THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS ......................................................................... 154

CHAPTER 6 ......................................................................................................................... 156

CASE AGENCIES: PRIMARY DATA ANALYSIS THROUGH THE INTEGRATIVE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................... 156
  6.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 156
    ...................................................................................................................................... 156
    6.1.1 CONNECTING TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS ................................................... 156
7.2 DATA TRIANGULATION AND RESEARCH FINDINGS ................................................................. 206

7.2.1 ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP ......................................................................................... 206

7.2.1.1 Research Theme One: to determine the extent of Accountability and Control of the PMS .................................................................................................................. 206

7.2.1.1.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Accountability, Commitment and Control .................................................................................................................. 206

7.2.1.1.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Accountability, Commitment and Control .................................................................................................................. 208

7.2.1.1.3 Main Findings for Accountability, Commitment and Control .......................................................................................................................... 209

7.2.1.2 Research Theme Two: to determine the extent of Stakeholder Involvement ............................................................................................................. 210

7.2.1.2.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Stakeholder Involvement .................. 210

7.2.1.2.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Stakeholder Involvement .......................... 212

7.2.1.2.3 Main Findings for Stakeholder Involvement .................................................................. 212

7.2.1.3 Research Theme Three: to determine the extent of Performance Data Circulation among Stakeholders .............................................................................. 215

7.2.1.3.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Performance Data Circulation among Stakeholders .............................................................. 215

7.2.1.3.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Performance Data Circulation among Stakeholders ...................................................................................... 215

7.2.1.3.3 Main Findings for Performance Data Circulation among Stakeholders .................. 216

7.2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES ....................................................... 216

7.2.2.1 Research Theme Four: to determine the Spectrum of Performance Measures in use .......................................................... 216

7.2.2.1.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Spectrum of Performance Measures .................................................................................................................. 216

7.2.2.1.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Spectrum of Performance Measures .......................... 218

7.2.2.1.3 Main Findings for Spectrum of Performance Measures ....................................................................... 218

7.2.3 MANAGEMENT PROCESSES FOR PMS ........................................................................ 219

7.2.3.1 Research Theme Five: to determine the extent to which Performance Measures are Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives ........................................................................................................ 219

7.2.3.1.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for PMs Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives ............................................................................. 219

7.2.3.1.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for PMs Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives .................................................................................. 221

7.2.3.1.3 Main Findings for PMs Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives ........ 221

7.2.3.2 Research Theme Six: to determine the extent to which PMS is Managed and Drives Management Operations ........................................................................................................ 221

7.2.3.2.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Extent to which PMS Drives Operations .............................................................................................................................. 221

7.2.3.2.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Extent to which PMS Drives Operations .......................... 223

7.2.3.2.3 Main Findings for Extent to which PMS Drives Operations .............................................. 224

7.2.4 INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ..................................... 225

7.2.4.1 Research Theme Seven: to determine the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems ........................................................................................................ 225

7.2.4.1.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for if PMS is Integrated with All Management Systems ........................................................................................................ 225

7.2.4.1.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for if PMS is Integrated with All Management Systems ........................................................................................................ 226

7.2.4.1.3 Main Findings for if PMS is Integrated with All Management Systems ........................................................................................................ 226

7.2.4.2 Research Theme Eight: to determine how/if PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time ........................................................................................................................................ 227

7.2.4.2.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for how/if PMS reflects success/failure of EAs over time ........................................................................................................................................ 227

7.2.4.2.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for how/if PMS reflects success/failure of EAs over time ........................................................................................................................................ 228

7.2.4.2.3 Main Findings for how/if PMS reflects success/failure of EAs over time .......................... 228

7.3 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 229

7.3.1 RE-ARTICULATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AS PERTAINS TO RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................ 230

7.3.1.1 Is PMS development in JEAs viable for managing JEAs? .............................................. 232

7.3.1.2 Are PMS a Central part of the Strategic Management of JEAs? .................................. 234
7.3.1.3 Do performance data influence government decisions at ministerial level? .................. 234
7.3.1.4 Do performance data influence strategic decisions made by chief executives? ............. 235
7.3.1.5 Do performance data influence staff performance and remunerations? .................... 235
7.3.1.6 Integrative Statement on Research Findings as Pertains to Research Aim and Objectives 236

CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 237
8.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 237
  8.1.1 PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER ..................................................... 237
  8.1.2 SUMMARY OF THESIS ....................................................................................... 237
8.2 CONTRIBUTIONS ....................................................................................................... 238
8.3 LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................................ 240
8.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 242

REFERENCES: ................................................................................................................. 243

APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. 259
  APPENDIX 5.1 - INITIAL QUESTION SET ................................................................. 259
  APPENDIX 5.2 - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ................................................................. 261
  APPENDIX 5.3 - FINAL TEMPLATE ANALYSIS CODES ............................................ 266
  APPENDIX 5.4 - STEPS IN CONDUCTING MATRIX ANALYSIS ............................. 268
  APPENDIX 5.5 - PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES ....................................................... 269
List of Figures, Diagrams, etc.

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 – Andrew’s (2013) Iceberg Model .................................................. 43
Figure 3.1 – Integrative Conceptual Framework for PMS Development................... 65
Figure 3.2 – Kennerley and Neely’s (2002) Framework of factors affecting the evolution of performance measurement systems......................................................... 68
Figure 3.3a – Elements of PMS Development- Organisational Ownership.............. 71
Figure 3.3b – Element for PMS Development- Characteristics of Performance Measures
Figure 3.3c – Elements for PMS Development- Management Process..................... 85
Figure 3.3d – Elements for PMS Development- Integrate with Other Management Systems.............................................................................................................. 90

List of Diagrams

Diagram1.1 – Outline of Thesis................................................................................. 25

List of Boxes

Box 1.1 – Key to Diagram 1.1 explaining the logic of the links between chapters....... 26
Box 2.1 – Defining Executive Agencies................................................................. 49
Box 5.1 – Sample of Template Analysis Codes....................................................... 145

List of Tables

Table 2.1 – The likelihood of path dependency from structural and situational logics... 39
Table 3.1 – Adapted from Kloot and Martin (2000)................................................ 73
List of Tables cont’d

Table 3.2 – Talbot’s (2010) Performance Regime and Tools of Government.........74
Table 3.3 – Issues to consider when designing a performance management system (Neely, et al., 1996)........................................................................................................80
Table 4.1 – Comparing JEAs, Next Steps EAs and Crown Entities.......................103
Table 4.2a – Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002)..................................................................................................116
Table 4.2b – Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002).................................................................................................117
Table 4.2c – Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002).................................................................................................118
Table 4.2d – Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002).................................................................................................120
Table 4.2e – Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002).................................................................................................121
Table 4.2f – Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002).................................................................................................122
Table 4.2g – Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002).................................................................................................123
Table 4.2h – Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002).................................................................................................124
Table 5.1 – Generic Matrix Analysis Table.............................................................148
Table 6.2a – Cross-case Analysis Table.................................................................159
Table 6.2b – Cross-case Analysis Table.................................................................165
Table 6.2c – Cross-case Analysis Table.................................................................170
Table 6.2d – Cross-case Analysis Table.................................................................172
List of Tables cont’d

Table 6.2e – Cross-case Analysis Table…………………………………………………176
Table 6.2f – Cross-case Analysis Table…………………………………………………181
Table 6.2g – Cross-case Analysis Table…………………………………………………192
Table 6.2h – Cross-case Analysis Table…………………………………………………195
Table 7.2a – Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014……………206
Table 7.2b – Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014……………211
Table 7.2c – Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014……………214
Table 7.2d – Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014……………216
Table 7.2e – Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014……………218
Table 7.2f – Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014……………221
Table 7.2g – Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014……………225
Table 7.2h – Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014……………226
Table 7.3 Summary of Research Findings as Pertains to Research Aim and Objectives with a Summative (Integrative) Statement on Findings .................................232

List of Appendices

Appendix 5.1- Initial Question Set………………………………………………………260
Appendix 5.2- Interview Schedule………………………………………………………262
Appendix 5.3- Final Template Analysis Codes…………………………………………267
Appendix 5.4- Steps in Conducting Matrix Analysis…………………………………269
Appendix 5.5- Profile of Interviewees .................................................................270

TOTAL WORD COUNT 74, 548
Abstract

This thesis explores the question of whether Performance Management Systems (PMS) contribute to the managing of Executive Agencies (EAs). Exploring this question empirically in the context of the Jamaican public sector, it develops a realist methodology with methods, which are applied to the study of four Jamaican Executive Agencies (JEAs). Primary research conducted in 2011 through semi-structured interviews is combined with secondary research that considers both official government and unofficial resources such as reports (official) and newspapers (unofficial). The thesis is one of very few studies to focus on JEAs, one of only two studies to explore PMS in JEAs, and the first to make a focus on PMS in JEAs the primary object of study. It therefore contributes to a very limited literature, which is, therefore, both a strength of the thesis insofar as it breaks new ground, and also a challenge. It is a challenge because the lack of available literature on JEAs with which to relate. In order to address this lack, drawing on Historical Institutionalism (HI), Path Dependency (PD) and Policy Transfer theories, it argues that it is reasonable to draw on British literature owing to the historical influences of Britain on Jamaica, their institutional and constitutional contexts and, particularly, because the agencification of the Jamaican public sector has been based on the British Next Steps Model.

From reviewing the British literature an Integrative Conceptual Framework (ICF) is developed. This framework incorporates those factors deemed as critical to the development of PMS in the organisational performance management literature, (that is, both management and public management), in order to harness the structural, procedural, situational and behavioural aspects discussed in the existing literature into a single framework. The ICF is at the heart of the thesis because it influences the methods used in conducting the primary research, and the presentation of research findings. It is therefore a major contribution of the thesis, and it is recommended that this framework could be applied in other contexts (e.g. in the private sector) and locations (e.g. in countries other than Jamaica) to analyse the use of PMS for managing. By triangulating the primary research findings with secondary data, that is, existing literature on the four case studies, the ICF is applied to generate a longitudinal aspect to the study. It is also found that PMS do contribute to managing JEAs, and that the use of PMS in JEAs has evolved positively over time for managing JEAs. The research findings discuss how PMS contributes to managing the four JEAs in terms of the different components of the ICF. Based on this, the study is able to add to existing academic literature, and make recommendations to practitioners. The contribution of this thesis to literature therefore incorporates both a conceptual and theoretical aspect, and also has a practical element. Both of these, it claims, could form the basis for further research.

Keywords: Organisational Performance Management Systems, Executive Agencies, Managing in the Jamaican Public Sector, Performance Management, Performance Measurement.
Copyright Statement

i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made.

iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions.

iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://www.campus.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/policies/intellectual-property.pdf), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on presentation of Theses.
**Declaration**

I hereby swear that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.
Dedication

To Him who sits on the Throne and unto the Lamb
Acknowledgements

A heart felt thanks and appreciation to all those who have contributed to the completion of this thesis by way of support, prayer, encouragement and feedback. Thank you for being there.

Thank you, Richard, for your supervision and feedback on my thesis.

Thank you, Colin, for informing me about the work you did in Jamaica that was essential for my research.

Thank you, Helen and Claire, for your prayer, encouragement and feedback. Friends for all seasons!

Thank you Prof Leo McCann, Prof Stuart Hyde, Helen McManamon for your support and advise. A stitch in time!

My colleagues, you’ve made the journey worthwhile- Mansoor, Lina, Judy, Cuong, Sean, Michelle, Stuart, Rumana, Masairol, Richard, Patrick, Kim, …

The last is by no means the least. Rachel, your dedicated and administrative help has graced me to this finish.
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION: Connecting the Chapters

1.1 OUTLINE OF INTRODUCTION
This chapter serves to clarify the issues and theoretical concepts that inform the empirical work and analysis conducted in this research. It does so by first discussing, in Section 1.2, the original interest informing the study, which forms the background to the research. This background explains the motivation for the focus on Performance Management Systems (PMS) in this research, which can be traced back to a Master’s Degree in Information Technology, Electrical and Electronic Engineering and Management Science at the University of Strathclyde. Building on the Master’s, the background to the study describes the development of my interest in PMS, which indirectly led to my interest to explore the 2002 proposed public reform initiative of the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (GORTT). It was around this latter interest that my PhD proposal and initial research was orientated. Out of this context I explored why and how I have come to focus my work in Jamaica. It follows, therefore, that the background explains and justifies the reasons for a reorientation of the focus of the study, which occurred during the early stages of the research.

Following a discussion on the background, which culminates in the main aims and objectives of this thesis, the chapter then presents a narrative of the thesis (see section 1.3). The narrative serves to orientate the reader to the logic of the thesis and it is divided into two parts. Firstly, Section 1.3.1, introduces a problem, namely, that there is an extremely limited amount of literature focusing on EAs in Jamaica (JEAs). Worse so, there are fewer studies that incorporate PMS into the research of JEAs, and none that make PMS in JEAs the primary object of study. This study therefore contributes to existing literature by being the first to make the primary focus of study the use of PMS in JEAs (see Chapter 8). Evidently, the limited existing literature concerned with EAs and PMS is reviewed. It has been necessary, however, in order to address the extreme lack of existing literature, to review literature on PMS in EAs outside of Jamaica. Section 1.3.1 introduces the reasons why the British Next Step literature was decided as the most appropriate literature to review given the lack of available Jamaican literature. Secondly, in Section 1.3.2, the focus on the research narrative discusses the interconnectivity of
each chapter and the role each chapter plays in the overall development of the research. It also locates the origin of the research aim and objectives of the thesis as emerging out of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2.

1.2 BACKGROUND

As part of the fulfilment of a Master’s degree at the University of Strathclyde, I completed a dissertation project on Managing Uncertainty and the Strategy for an E-Business. The aim of the project was to evaluate a methodology for business risk assessment and management of a business that was transitioning to an e-Business and to demonstrate the process using lightweight tools such as the Balance Scorecard (BSC). The project looked into the theories of Corporate Strategy, Programme Management and Decision Risk Analysis. Drawing on these theories it identified a programme of projects within the business strategy with impact upon the business performance as the e-Business strategy was implemented. The project attempted to counter the risks arising in the programme of projects that could generate conflict and over commitment of the organisation. Toward this end a business model was designed, and the risks associated with these projects were identified and quantified, and new actions evaluated to manage the uncertainty and risks. The results of a sensitivity analysis then identified the high impact projects that had been selected for driving the performance improvement and delivering the e-Business strategy. The modelling approach used in the project ensured that for a range of business scenarios, the critical success factors with the greatest impact upon the business were identified and quantified objectively, with counter-measures introduced to minimise the uncertainty.

Several tools were employed in the formulation of the project, including the BSC, a PMS for translating the business strategy into a programme of projects; and iDecide2000, for calculating project risks. The BSC proved to be very useful for both performance measuring and performance managing. As a system, it was useful to organise and drive a business strategy while giving “top managers a … comprehensive view of the business” (Kaplan and Norton, 1998, p. 123). As a management tool, I thought it was very appropriate for managing private sector organisations and looked forward to investing time in researching its usefulness.
Sometime after completing my Master’s dissertation, I learnt of the vision of the newly incumbent GORTT of 2002. Several years before starting the PhD in 2008, I began background research on GORTT with a view to developing my interest in performance management- thinking that I could focus my interests influenced, by my Masters, through possible PhD research focussed on GORTT. Their vision and mandate was for Trinidad and Tobago to attain developed country status by the year 2020. Toward this vision, the GORTT and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) developed the Public Sector Reform Initiation Programme (PSRIP) 2003-2020 as a long-term strategy to reform the Public Sector. To attain this status, the government found it was necessary for the public service to achieve “superior organizational performance towards the enhancement and delivery of quality public services” as “the overall strategic objective of the reform effort” (Riley and Nunes, 2004, pp. 3, 6). They also found that the implementation of an integrated performance management system across the public service was critical to enabling this achievement. They recognized the mammoth-size task ahead would be to form a culture of performance measuring within the sector (Vision 2020 Multi-Sectoral Group, n.d.).

I, however, considered that it was not just creating a performance measuring culture that was mammoth sized. Rather, the sheer task of building a comprehensive performance management framework across the whole public sector (Vision 2020 Multi-Sectoral Group, n.d.) did not appear at all feasible, based on the following perspectives:

Firstly, my then understanding of the use of a performance management system, put in simplest terms, was that it works best in an organisation that was typically private and more homogenous in its structure than obtains across the public sector. In addition to its homogeneity, such an organisation would have a clearly expressed vision that could be communicated through strategic objectives, and accomplished through operational measures with clear targets, otherwise difficult to attain in the public sector (Boyne, 2002, p. 101).

Secondly, several governments, which implemented performance management frameworks, chose to do so, not across central government, but in individual public bodies specifically created to accommodate the use of performance measures and usually acting at arms-length from central government. In some important respects, then, these public bodies mirrored private sector organisations (Allison, 1983, p. 76). Some examples
are Executive Agencies in the UK, Federal Agencies and public law bodies in Germany, Special Operating Agencies (SOAs) in Canada, Agentschappen in the Netherlands and Crown Entities (CEs) in New Zealand. Such bodies generally possess that sense of homogeneity in their structure and functions, “a single focus or discrete service delivery area” (Manning and Shepherd, 2009, p. 1), which could not be claimed for the public sector as a whole nor any one given ministry in the central government of Trinidad and Tobago (TT).

Even so, performance measurement in government was not a proven success. Instead, there were many problems, unintended consequences and evidence to the contrary (Thomas, 2006; Martinez, et al., 2004; Greiling, 2006; Radnor, 2005).

The National Strategic Plan was completed circa 2004. The Vision 2020 Multi-Sectoral Group formed in 2002, which comprised representatives from the public and private sectors, labour, academia and civil society, as well as international development agencies, drew this plan. Citizens also participated in the process of consultation and dialogue through community meetings held in Community centres across the nation. I managed to make a few contacts with some committee members and tried to keep abreast with their development. In 2007, a year before the commencement of my PhD, the GORTT had published its Vision 2020 Operational Plan 2007-2020 established on five developmental pillars. Each pillar consisted of a set of goals, which were to be accomplished through a number of specific ministries. Attached to these goals were a set of strategic objectives and related projects to accomplish them and finally a set of targeted outcomes. However, two years on, several of my initial contacts were no longer accessible and new contacts were established through a performance unit that had by then been established. Through these new contacts I learnt that a new performance evaluation system for assessing employee performance annually was implemented but that the original organisational performance management framework never got off the ground and neither was it going to in the foreseeable future. Was the then performance management framework of the GORTT at any point possible? Was it too overly ambitious? This is yet to be known; as yet no such initiative has been implemented.

As disheartening as this was to find out, being the intended focus of my PhD study, in late 2009 I was heartened to learn from Prof. Colin Talbot that Jamaica had established a number of public bodies that were each using performance measurement for almost a
decade. The evidence seemed to suggest that four of the first such public bodies, called Executive Agencies (EAs), amidst questions, were already experiencing a number of favourable outcomes (Talbot et al., 2002, pp. 35-38). Moreover, in each of these bodies, there already were operable performance management frameworks that could become the empirical focus of my research. During the early stages of the PhD, I therefore set out to develop my research on PMS with the four Jamaican EAs becoming the empirical context of the study. A review of the literature in Chapter 2 revealed that there was insufficient research to support whether PMS were making any significant contribution toward the management of the public sector, and EAs in particular (See Section 2.4.1). Therefore, the main aim of the thesis is to examine whether PMS form the central premise of JEAs by assessing the contributions, which PMS makes toward the managing of these EAs. The main aim is accomplished through two main research objectives: to

1. assess whether performance management systems (PMS) are integrated into the strategic management of the Jamaican agencies and
2. assess the usefulness of PMS at ministerial, executive and staff levels by assessing whether performance data gathered from these management systems influence
   a. government decisions at ministerial level
   b. strategic decisions made by chief executives
   c. staff performance and remunerations

1.3 THE RESEARCH NARRATIVE

1.3.1 DECIDING TO REVIEW BRITISH NEXT STEPS LITERATURE

Having decided to focus on the performance management systems in the four JEAs, an early hurdle that I faced was the paucity, and almost total absence, of any literature on PMS in Jamaica’s public sector to inform my study. An extended period of time was spent searching for literature, this search turned up only one piece of empirical work that both focussed on EAs in Jamaica (Talbot et al., 2002), and also made significant reference to the use of PMS at these JEAs. Several other works, namely, Davis (2001), Armstrong (2001) and Tindigarukayo (2005) make reference to Jamaica’s Executive Agencies (JEAs). While these studies focussed on the wider context of Jamaican public sector reform (in terms of NPM and EA-related issues, and with regards to the gains EA status brought to the Jamaican public sector), none of these works made any reference to the
usefulness or impact of this instrument, PMS, to the performance of these public bodies. This led me to the conclusion that I needed to identify a body of literature on PMS in the public sector or, in the least, PMS in EAs that could best compliment or substitute for the lack of work existing on PMS in JEAs.

Jamaica’s EAs were mainly based on the UK Next Steps style of agency (Tindigarukayo, 2005, p. 6; Davis, 2001). Hence, with the dearth of literature on PMS in JEAs and the abundance of literature about PMS in UK Next Steps, the latter has been reviewed based on its relevance to the Jamaican context. Another consideration was to bear in mind that the focus of the research was the use of PMS in the public sector and not so much, though notwithstanding the difference in, country context. Therefore, PMS used in a public body with significant shared characteristics with JEAs seemed a fair choice. In considering the difference in country context, attention was paid to the 350-year relationship between both countries (Jamaica and the UK) that produced some similarities in both their constitutional and institutional context. Firstly, both countries shared the same head of state. Secondly, their relationship was based on Jamaica being a former colony of Britain and, like many of the other former British colonies, Jamaica’s laws, constitution, and government administration and structure, developed along the lines of Britain. Yet, the research does not assume that it is sufficient to state these considerations as valid to justify the use of Next Steps literature on PMS as a substitute for the lack of literature on PMS in JEAs. Rather, a theoretical ground is established to justify its use based on theories from Historical Institutionalism (HI), Path Dependency (PD) and Policy Transfer Theory (see chapters 2 & 4).

For specific focus on developing the PMS framework in Chapter 3, the study draws from the organisational performance management literature, that is, both management and public management, and not human resource management literature that focuses on individual performance management.

**1.3.2 CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OUTLINE OF THE THESIS**

**1.3.2.1 Introduction**

This thesis is composed of six chapters, which are divided into three main sections (Section 1, Section 2 and Section 3), with an introduction and conclusion at the beginning and end of the thesis. There are, therefore, eight chapters in total. This introductory
chapter serves to orientate the reader into the logic as it develops through the research. Given this it is important to consider how the three sections of the thesis underpin the study. Section 1 of the study focuses on three reviews of literature- a theoretical review (Chapter 2), a conceptual review (Chapter 3) and an empirical review (Chapter 4) of existing literature. Section 2 of the thesis considers the methodology and methods used for empirical analysis, that is, the research philosophy, strategy and design, which is discussed in Chapter 5. Section 3 considers the empirical research and comprises a first chapter focussed on primary data analysis (Chapters 6), and a second chapter that triangulates the primary data with secondary data, through which the research findings are presented (Chapter 7). Section 3 is followed by the conclusion (Chapter 8), which communicates the contributions of the research, and includes discussion on the recommendations and limitations of the research.

However, it is important to point out a couple of issues at this juncture. Firstly, the empirical research takes on a historical approach, for though it is mainly based on data gathered at the end of twelve years of JEAs, it also triangulates these recent data against data from the first three years of JEAs. Although the study does not gather longitudinal primary data, it still contains a longitudinal aspect without being a longitudinal study, based on its secondary data. Secondly, the chapters are not always interlinked in a purely sequential manner, so, the logic of the link between the chapters is explained in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.1 below.
Diagram 1.1 Outline of Thesis
(Box 1.1, below, explains the link nodes)
The letter A in Diagram 1.1 illustrates how the development of the research problem driving the study connects Chapters 2 and 3. Whereas the second half of Chapter 2 reviews literature concerned with public sector management theory from which gaps are identified to inform an articulation of the research problem in the conclusion to the chapter, Chapter 3 develops an Integrated Conceptual Framework to engage with and respond to the research problem expressed in Chapter 2. It is in this way then that, in terms of the logical development of the study, Chapters 2 and 3 are connected.

The letter B in Diagram 1.1 illustrates the relationship between Chapters 3 and 4, with a common focus on the Integrative Conceptual Framework. The Framework developed in Chapter 3 is applied to the second half of the literature reviewed in Chapter 4, which examines PMS contributions to managing in the early period of JEA establishment. Developing the Framework out of existing literature in Chapter 3, to applying the Framework to focus on a review of existing empirical literature in Chapter 4, forms the link between Chapters 3 and 4.

C illustrates the relationship between Chapters 2 and 4, which are linked by theories on HI, PD and Policy Transfer. To put this in context, Chapter 2 is a ‘theoretical’ review of literature, Chapter 3, a ‘conceptual’ development from the literature while Chapter 4 is a review of ‘empirical’ and historic literature. The theories reviewed in the first half of Chapter 2 (HI, PD and Policy Transfer) are applied to the empirically and historically informed literature in the first half of Chapter 4. Chapter 4, therefore, draws on the theoretical literature reviewed in Chapter 2 to justify the grounds for reviewing empirically informed British Next Steps literature in order to prepare for the primary research conducted in Jamaica.

D illustrates the relationship between Chapters 4 and 7. The connection between these chapters is the triangulation of primary data with secondary data. Specifically, the secondary data from the empirically informed research findings from an earlier study, Talbot et al. (2002), are reviewed in Chapter 4 because of its input to addressing questions concerned with the contribution of PMS to the management of JEAs in the early period of their establishment. Chapter 7 draws on this empirically informed literature reviewed in Chapter 4 in order to triangulate this secondary data, that is Talbot et al. (2002), and the more recent secondary data against the primary data collected in 2011.

E illustrates how Section 2 is a bridge between the literature review chapters in Section 1, that is Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and the empirical chapters in Section 2, that is, Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 5, in Section 2, therefore, serves to bridge the link between the theoretical, conceptual and empirical reviews of literature, and the empirical research conducted in this study that forms the basis of the research findings and realist claims to knowledge that this research makes.

F illustrates the relationship between the two empirical chapters (Chapters 6 and 7). The connection between these chapters is in the eight objectives themes that are derived during the initial analysis of primary data in Chapter 6. These eight themes are used to focus not only the triangulation of primary data in Chapter 6, but also the triangulation of primary data with secondary data in Chapter 7 (see Section 7.2). It follows then that these eight themes are the link for the analysis of primary data in both Chapters 6 and 7. However these separate themes are then pulled together or integrated into a more definitive statement on the research findings in Section 7.3.

G illustrates the link between the final chapter and the rest of the thesis, the three sections. It draws from the body of the thesis– the literature review, the methods and methodology, and the empirical- to bring to focus on the significance of the work conducted in this study to the relevant literature. In so doing, this chapter presents the contributions this thesis makes to the literature, the limitations to be noted in it and recommendations for further research based on the argument developed throughout the thesis.

Box 1.1- Key to Diagram 1.1 explaining the logic of the links between Chapters
For example, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 comprise the literature review chapters. Put differently, whereas Chapter 2 is a *theoretical* review of the literature, and Chapter 3 a *conceptual* development from the literature, Chapter 4 is a review of *empirically* informed literature that is analysed through the application of the theoretical and conceptual chapters that precede it. The *sequencing* of these chapters is therefore organised according to the type of literature reviewed – theoretical, conceptual and empirical – rather than in terms of the themes, which cut across these chapters and are therefore considered non-sequentially (see Diagram 1.1 and Box 1.1).

1.3.2.2 Section 1 – Literature Review Chapters

CHAPTER 2 – Public Management Theory: Performance Management Systems in Executive Agencies

The focus of this thesis is on the use of Performance Management Systems (PMS) in Executive Agencies (EAs) in the Jamaican Public Sector. This is the first of three literature review chapters, which make up Section 1 of the study, and is concerned with exploring the basis for empirical research into the use of PMS in JEAs. Chapter 2 reviews theoretically informed literature and is divided into two parts. The first part, Section 2.2, sets forth the *grounding theories* for the literature review. This is of particular relevance to the writing in Chapter 4 (see letter C in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.1), as it examines the grounds for studying British literature given that there is a lack of existing Jamaican literature available for the study of PMS in EAs (see Section 1.3.1). The theories that may justify a ground for such usage are Historical Institutionalism (HI), Path Dependency (PD) and Policy Transfer.

The second part of the chapter, Section 2.3, similarly reviews theories, but is directed towards theories about *PMS in EAs*. This second part to Chapter 2 is explored in two parts, Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Section 2.3.1 *contextualises* theories on PMS in the Public Sector literature. The section focuses broadly on discussions on Performance Management Theory, namely, New Public Management Theory (NPM), which emphasises ideas originating in the private or business sector such as efficiency, effectiveness and economy. This is relevant to the thesis because it gave rise to what is described as Agencification, which has lead to the development of EAs. EAs fit into the Agencification agenda as a response to providing greater efficiency, effectiveness and economy through a shift in
emphasis on public administration toward public management. As such PMS has become a tool implemented with the aim of increasing efficiency and effectiveness.

Exploring this context in terms of theoretical issues raised about PMS in EAs, the roles, benefits and problems of PMS in EAs are discussed in Section 2.3.2. This theoretical focus enables the identification of a gap in the existing public management literature in the conclusion of Chapter 2 (section 2.4.1). The gap is that the work and research done in examining the contribution of PMS for managing EAs is insufficient. Having identified this gap enables an articulation of the main research aim and objectives of this thesis (see end of Section 1.2 or 2.4.1) and on which this thesis focuses. This gap, which informs the research aim and objectives, therefore, informs the research questions of this study. Given this research aim, deduced from a theoretically informed review of literature, Section 2.4.2 prepares the reader toward a conceptually informed review of literature that results in the development of the Integrated Conceptual Framework (in Chapter 3) that is used to empirically research this problem.

CHAPTER 3 – An Integrated Conceptual Framework: Development of a PMS

Based on the discussion of the research aim in Chapter 2, which considers several theoretical issues pertaining to the roles, benefits and limitations of the use of PMS in the public sector, a number of fundamental factors have been identified with regards to the development of a PMS in the management of the public sector (and EAs). The existing theoretical literature can therefore be credited with having already ascertained fundamental issues with respect to the research aim. This chapter goes beyond reviewing the theoretical literature, and into literature more concerned with the conceptual development of PMS (see letter A in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.1). The review of such literature discusses the variety of issues that have determined as conceptually fundamental to the development of PMS, and leads to the development of the ICF for the purpose of assessing the contribution that PMS can make to the management of EAs and also for determining the viability of a PMS for managing.

Being an integrative framework, the work in the chapter incorporates those factors deemed as critical in other frameworks in order to harness the structural, procedural, situational and behavioural aspects into a single framework. It therefore distinguishes itself from the relatively partial frameworks reviewed during the chapter. This chapter is central to the development of the thesis because it not only develops a framework, which is applied to
the theoretical gap in the literature identified in Chapter 2, but it is also applied to the empirical work in this research. Therefore, the ICF developed in this chapter generates an analytical lens that is applied to the empirical research written up in Section 3 of the thesis (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). However, it may also be applied to analyse existing empirical research focussed on EAs but concerned with PMS development. It follows then that the ICF is also applied to the empirically informed literature on JEAs reviewed in Chapter 4 (see letter B in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.1) to further develop the literature discussed in that chapter and, in so doing, expands the literature.

CHAPTER 4 - Jamaica: Public Administration Development, JEAs and the Contribution of PMS

This is the third and final literature review chapter, and therefore concludes Section 1 of the thesis. It is located after the first two review chapters because it draws on these earlier chapters in order to apply theory and concepts to empirically informed literature, which is its focus. Whereas, Chapter 2 identifies the research aim and lays the theoretical ground work for justifying the use of British literature through discussion of three theories- HI, PD and Policy Transfer, Chapter 4, in Section 4.2, analyses and discusses the evolution and historic development of public administration, towards public management initiatives, through the lens of these three theories up until the establishment of JEAs in 1999.

It is demonstrated that the hand of Britain can be seen right from the beginning of Jamaica’s public administration system, and right through to the rise of public management initiatives which take us up to the present day. Based on this, it is argued that there is not only a strong case of PD and HI informing Jamaica’s establishment of EAs, but also of Policy Transfer because the EA model in Jamaica is shown to be adapted from the British Next Steps model. It follows that the empirical literature focusing on Jamaica, considered through these theoretical lenses, gives reason for the use of British literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, given the lack of literature focussed on JEAs, and PMS in JEAs, in particular.

Nevertheless, it is important to consider the little literature on JEAs as part of the research on PMS for managing JEAs. The only two empirical studies on JEAs¹ (Tindigarakayu, 2001 and Talbot, 2002) are reviewed in Section 4.2 but because only one of these texts

¹A few other papers make mention of JEAs: Davis (2001), a conference paper on EAs as an outcome of public sector reform; Armstrong (2002), which looks at EAs in four OECD nations and the implications they hold for JEAs: McKoy (2000) and McKoy (2001) which could not be accessed.
actually makes reference to PMS in JEAs, it should, therefore, be clear why it is necessary to focus on the British literature. The only one of these texts, Talbot et al. (2002), to make reference to PMS in JEAs does so as a secondary focus, with the study of the creation of agencies in Jamaica and their progress being its primary focus. Nevertheless, in Section 4.4, this existing research is considered by analysis through the application of the ICF, developed in Chapter 3, in order to assess what it contributes to the study of PMS for managing JEAs in their first three years of establishment and to determine the viability of the PMS in JEAs for managing. This then bears relevance to the empirical analysis advanced through this study because, in Chapter 7, this secondary data is triangulated against primary data collected during the fieldwork of this study (see letter D in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.1).

1.3.2.3 Section 2 – Methods and Methodology

CHAPTER 5 – Research Philosophy: Strategy and Design

The chapter begins with a discussion on the philosophical assumptions underpinning the empirical research. As such, the research strategy and design are orientated around the aim of producing realist claims to knowledge (see Section 5.1), firstly, with a clear link to Section 1, by drawing upon the ICF for examining the research aim and secondly, by applying a research strategy that operationalises the research design towards making such realist claims in Section 3 of the thesis (see letter E in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.1).

Following a discussion on the philosophical assumption, the chapter is divided into two main sections, Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Section 5.2 considers the research strategy, which has three components: i) the ethical responsibilities of the researcher to the people and organisations researched ii) the introduction of the four case studies for the empirical research, and iii) the methods of data collection from these four cases. Primary data is collected through semi-structured interviews while secondary data is collected mainly through official resources, such as reports, and, to a much lesser extent, through unofficial resources such as newspapers. The importance of this secondary data to the research is its role in validating the primary data collected through triangulation with it.

Section 5.3 focuses on the research design, which is largely concerned with developing an Interview Schedule for the collection and analysis of primary data- including its
triangulation with secondary data. While the triangulation of primary and secondary data is vital to the research design (see Chapter 7), the three main components of the research design are concerned with operationalising the research strategy with respect to the primary research. Firstly a framework (see Appendix 5.2), derived from the ICF, was developed as the basis for organising the semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals holding various, comparable positions of responsibility in the four cases. Secondly, supplementary questions also based on the ICF, but derived from Neely et al.’s (1995) construct (see Section 3.2.2) were also formed as part of the semi-structured interviews (see also Appendix 5.2). Thirdly, the research design considers the three data analysis methods employed in this study. These are Template, Matrix and Cross-case Analysis, all of which are discussed in relationship with the analytical lens developed through the ICF (see Section 5.3).

1.3.2.4 Section 3 – Empirical Chapters

CHAPTER 6 – Primary Data Analysis

The logic of the empirical chapters starts by analysing raw data before discussing the research findings. This chapter presents the initial analysis of primary data collected during the fieldwork. It transforms this data collected through semi-structured interviews into manageable information by applying the methods outlined in Chapter 5- Template, Matrix and Cross-Case Analysis. By applying the Interview Schedule also described in Chapter 5, the ICF informs eight research themes for assessing the development and use of PMS as a management tool in JEAs. These eight research themes are used to both arrange the discussion on the initial primary data analysis in Chapter 6, and then to organise the triangulation of the primary data presented with secondary data in Chapter 7 (see F in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.1). The arrangement of the primary data is, therefore, the first interrelated development in the empirical analysis, which starts with a more general presentation of the empirical material, in Chapter 6, and goes on to a focussed discussion of this material in terms of the research aim in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 7 – Data Triangulation and Research Findings
Drawing on the initial presentation of primary data in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 makes two further interrelated developments. As such, Chapter 7 is divided into two main parts, Section 7.2 and Section 7.3. Section 7.2 *triangulates* the primary data with secondary data (this triangulation is the second of the interrelated developments). There are three aspects to this process of triangulation. Firstly, through the presentation and triangulation of secondary data collected through both official government and unofficial resources such as reports (official) and newspapers (unofficial), the empirical analysis in this chapter either endorses or questions the primary data collected. Secondly, the primary data is triangulated against empirical research findings from 2002 discussed in Chapter 4 (see letter D in Box 1.1 and illustrated in Diagram 1.1). This triangulation enables an examination of the development of PMS for managing JEAs over a twelve-year period and, therefore, adds a longitudinal aspect to the study. Thirdly, these two processes of triangulation not only add a level of rigour to the empirical analysis by either questioning or validating the primary research, but in being organised around the eight research themes identified in Chapter 6, they also enable a more specific discussion of the research findings as a response to the research aims and objectives, with regards to the use of PMS for managing JEAs in Section 7.3.

Section 7.3 presents the research findings in terms of their response to the research aim and objectives. This presentation builds on the discussion around the eight research themes in Section 7.2 to present these findings through an integrative statement on PMS as a tool for managing JEAs. By doing so, the interrelated developments across Chapters 6 and 7 starts with a more general presentation of the empirical research to specifically addressing the research aim explicitly. By applying the realist methodology and the methods discussed in Chapter 5, it follows then that through the integrative statement it is possible to make realist claims to knowledge in articulating these research findings.

1.3.2.5 Conclusion

This final chapter is a culmination of the main three sections in this thesis - the literature review, the methods and methodology employed and the empirical work- to bring to focus the significance of the work conducted in this study. This chapter, therefore, moves from a presentation of the research findings and how these findings respond to the research aim, that is the motivation behind the research, to a presentation of contributions this research makes, some limitations encountered to limit the full potential of the
research and recommendations for further research, drawn from both the contributions and limitations of the research.
Section 1- THE LITERATURE REVIEW
This section consists of three chapters that inform the literature necessary for setting the basis of this study. Chapter 2, the first of these three chapters, is a theoretical review of the literature; Chapter 3 is the conceptual development of the ICF; and Chapter 4, a review of empirically informed literature that is analysed through the application of the theoretical and conceptual chapters that precede it.

In terms of the logical development of these chapters, we learnt in Section 1.3.2 that the themes that connect these chapters are not presented sequentially, nor can they be, if the logic of the chapters is to be maintained. The interlinking of how the different themes are dealt with and related across the review chapters in Section 1 are both explained in Section 1.3.2, and also in Box 1.1 and Diagram 1.1. To recap, Chapter 2 has two foci. Firstly, it develops the theoretical grounds (by reviewing literature on HI, PD and Policy Transfer) for focusing on British literature on PMS in EAs to analyse PMS in JEAs, where the reason for doing this is the focus of Chapter 4. Secondly, it draws on public management theory to identify a gap in the literature, namely, that there is insufficient literature focussed on the use of PMS for managing EAs.

Chapter 3 develops the ICF, which is very important to the methods and methodology developed in Section 2 of the thesis, and is, therefore, central to the whole thesis. Moreover, the ICF when applied to the very limited amount of existing empirical research on JEAs reviewed in Chapter 4, adds to this literature by, specifically, analysing it to determine the viability (see Footnote 2) of the PMS for managing JEAs in those early years.

Chapter 4, therefore, has two foci drawn from the tenor of the two chapters that precede it. Firstly, drawing on the grounding theories reviewed in Chapter 2 (HI, PD and Policy Transfer) it brings to focus a justification for focusing on British literature for this study of PMS in JEAs. Secondly, by applying the ICF to the empirically informed literature, it adds to this existing empirical literature on PMS and JEAs (see above). This added dimension to the literature is then vital for the triangulation with the primary data in Chapter 7, where it communicates the progression in the development of PMS in JEAs over the twelve-year period of JEA establishment.
Chapter 2
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT THEORY: Performance Management Systems in Executive Agencies

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2.1.1 PURPOSE OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter is the first of three chapters that review the literature and sets the premise for this thesis. This chapter explores the public management literature on the emergence of Performance Management Systems (PMS) in the public sector, and in Executive Agencies (EAs), in particular, keeping in mind that EAs are derived from and remain a part of the public sector. In doing so, this chapter looks at PMS in the historical development of EAs and, by examining the literature, locates a gap for research in the use of PMS in the public sector. This gap becomes the research focus of this thesis.

It is worth noting here that, though the empirical work for this study is conducted and focussed on Jamaica, the literature review for this chapter is based on the UK Next Steps model. This decision was based on the i) need to compensate for the dearth of literature on PMS in Jamaican EAs (JEAs) and in its wider public sector, ii) the fact that the JEA model and its main characteristics were derived from the UK Next Steps, and also iii) that in the wider context of PMS in EAs, there are constitutional and institutional administrative parallels in Jamaica that were derived from Britain. As such, the first discussion of this chapter is not focussed on exploring the PMS literature but instead, turns toward setting a theoretical ground for exploring British literature for the case where the empirical work is done in Jamaican EAs. This theoretical ground is further explored in the third of these three chapters, Chapter 4, which applies the theoretical ground to the emergence of JEAs and which examines the sparse Jamaican literature for PMS in JEAs.

Put differently, this chapter has two purposes. The lesser purpose, which is settled between two chapters, that is, this chapter and Chapter 4, is to justify the use of British
literature for an empirical study of Jamaican EAs. While the primary purpose, which extends and founds the thesis, is to locate a gap in the literature surrounding the study of the use of PMS in the public sector, and EAs, in particular. Having established this gap in the literature, the next chapter, Chapter 3, then develops a Conceptual Framework for examining this gap during the empirical research.

2.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER
This chapter comprises four main parts. The first part examines two theories that may justify the use of British literature for the study of PMS in JEAs; the second part looks at a third theory that focuses on the eventual emergence of PMS and Next Steps and; the third and fourth parts look at the roles, benefits and problems associated with the use of PMS in the public sector in general, and EAs, in particular.

In the first instance, the chapter introduces the basic tenets of the theories of historical institutionalism (HI) and path dependency (PD) that, together, emphasise the importance of history in institutional reform (see Section 2.2). Next it looks further at some of their formative elements and opposing views (see Section 2.2.1). Drawing from these two theories, the chapter then foreshadows their implications for the evolution of EAs in the UK and, by extension, PMS in EAs, and their subsequent adaptation by the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) (see Section 2.2.2). (A discussion of the prefiguring of EA characteristics in both contexts is explored later in Sections 2.3, for Next Steps, and 4.2.3, for JEAs. Doing so, in the first instance, allows us to grasp an understanding of the origination and forces guiding this model in its contextual habitat, by tracing its main drivers and shaping mechanisms from both the academic and practitioner’s perspectives before examining its transfer and adaptation in Jamaica in Chapter 4). The section then closes with an examination of different perspectives on institutional reform and the part that PD and other factors, such as policy transfer, play in its success or failure.

Having examined the theoretical perspectives of HI and PD, the second part of the chapter goes on to look at the popularisation of the theory of New Public Management (NPM) and the concomitance of Next Steps characteristics already foreshadowed in this propagation (see Section 2.3.1). Thus, the deterministic influence of PD is seen to be at work in earlier reform initiatives leading to the eventual emergence of Next Steps and the use of PMS (see Section 2.3.2). This focus on reform, NPM and EAs in this section also aids in the contextualisation for PMS use in the public sector. Also, a look at public
management theory helps us to understand the origination of EAs and the intended critical role that PMS should play in that context as discussed in Section 2.3.2.

Based on the public sector literature the chapter then discusses the main roles and the benefits of using PMS in the public sector, albeit a debatable one. Similarly, the beneficial role and use of PMS in EAs also seem to be a debatable one. The third part of this chapter examines this conundrum in Sections 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2. The fourth part then looks at the problems associated with the use of PMS in the public sector in general, and EAs, in particular. As espoused in the same literature, this part of the chapter examines the problems that unfold in an attempt to operationalise PMS in EAs and the public sector (see Section 2.3.2.3.2), noting those problems, which may arise from the public/private sector dichotomy of applying management methods that originated in the private sector to the public sector but also looking into the argument that such a dichotomy really follows along a continuum (see Section 2.3.2.3.1). The chapter then looks at the problem of the political imperative that may obstruct rather than aid the viable use of PMS in the public sector (see Section 2.3.2.3.3).

In the final section, Section 2.4, the chapter closes with a summary of the main points raised and an area for further research located from the literature reviewed. It then sets the stage for the succeeding chapter.

### 2.2 Setting Forth the Grounding Theories for the Literature Review

During the late 1970s to early 1980s the awakening of new ideas in the study of policy development centred on the theory of Historical Institutionalism (HI) (Pierson, 1993). HI forms one of the three analytical approaches under the New Institutionalism, along with sociological institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Though these are distinct in their postulating, they each examine the relationship ‘between institutions and behaviour and … explain the process whereby institutions originate or change’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 937). Institutions may be understood as formal or informal procedures, values, norms and conventions, and ‘patterns of communication and activity’ that form part of the polity (Skocpol, 1995, p. 105; Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938).

HI is applied to this research insofar as it is a historical approach to political studies where history matters (Greener, 2002 and 2005). In its earliest postulation, HI emphasises
that institutions shaped the goals and strategies of its actors and, as applied to political studies, not only does policies shape political processes but also are, in turn, shaped by them. By so doing HI emphasises the significance of contextualisation and the examining of transformations and processes in institutions over time (Skocpol and Pierson, 2002).

A later development of HI, focussed not just on the dynamism of the time element but also the idea of change through the notion of path dependence (Pierson, 2000; Farrell and Newman, 2010). In the HI literature, path dependence (PD) is treated as a vital arm of HI. It is seen as that particular feature of HI that describes the process of institutional stability and change. It infers that earlier decisions for policy-making or institutional development place constraints on any further development afterward, where policies determine the politics or, where under some circumstances, policies give way to new politics (Pierson, 2000). Both these theories (along with Public Management Theory) support and inform this research, with emphasis on PD as the dominant theory for the investigation of British literature where there is a dearth of Jamaican literature on the use of PMS in the public sector.

2.2.1 ISSUES IN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND PATH DEPENDENCY

Hall and Taylor (1996), two early proponents of HI, identify several concerns of HI. The first concern looks at the relationship between structure (or institutions) and individual human agency using two approaches, the ‘calculus approach’ and the ‘cultural approach’. The calculus approach defines human behaviour as strategic in an attempt to choose the best option that offers maximum benefit. The cultural approach defines human choices as not merely calculative but also constrained by the familiar or established patterns (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Critics of this feature have argued that this HI proposition is merely tangential and not a robust, but an inchoate theory (Kay, 2005; Hay and Wincott, 1998). The response of its proponents has been that this issue is intended to explain macro-level political outcomes not micro ones and that as HI develops it is yet to attain the level of precision as more suited to other study areas in institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1998). They also contend that their proposition considers the possibility of other factors in a causal chain with institutions toward the development of political outcomes. One such factor is the role of ideas and its relationship with existing institutions to either effect stability or produce change. However, those who oppose this view claim that HI has not fully treated with ideas as ‘objects of investigation in their own rights’ (Blyth, 1997, p.
and therefore it lacks the requisite coherence, as it is, thus, presented more as an outline than a well-developed theory (Hay and Wincott, 1998).

However, HI proponents see a vital contribution of their theory to the study of institutions and agency in the second concern of HI, which is that of power relations and the disparity with which one group has access to the decision-making process over another group. HI proponents, therefore, contend that their contribution to institutions and agency lies in their stance to consider this disproportionate distribution of power that results in some winning and others losing rather than assuming that all benefit (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

The third, and an important, emphasis of HI is that of path dependency, which is seen as the mechanism that puts the historic into historical institutionalism (Greener, 2005, p. 62), and the ‘critical junctures’ where it may lead to unintended consequences. This feature reflects the HI issue of continuity of old paths and the creation of new paths at the ‘critical junctures’ where institutional changes occur (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 942). Though path dependency is criticized for not providing as cogent explanations for change as for continuity and stability of existing political outcomes, it is still regarded as ‘a valid and useful concept in political studies’ (Kay, 2005, p. 553). For instance, Greener’s (2005) framework, based on Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic cycle analysis, (see Table 2.1) puts forward a case that can be drawn upon not just to explain stability but also change. Change is explained by the interactions of structure, human agency and culture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergent property (in phase two of morphogenetic cycle)</th>
<th>Structural situational logic</th>
<th>Cultural situational logic</th>
<th>Likelihood of path dependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Necessary complementarities</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary incompatibilities</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Correction leading to syncretism</td>
<td>High – medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent incompatibilities</td>
<td>Elimination</td>
<td>Choice (forcing of)</td>
<td>Lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent compatibilities</td>
<td>Opportunism</td>
<td>Cultural ‘free play’</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Archer (1995, p. 218)

Table 2.1: The likelihood of path dependence from structural and situational logics
Greener (2005) discusses path dependency in terms of these interactions as influential upon the political system. He argues that though these influences are interdependent they can be treated separately. He analyses them according to Archer's morphogenetic cycle, by a compatibility and necessity matrix. From this matrix he hypothesizes that where the dependent and compatible variables between these influences are high path dependence is also very likely and thus very high. However, he continues his argument that path dependency decreases with a reduction in these variables where the lowest possibility of path dependence, or change occurrence, may arise when the variables of incompatibility and contingency are high (see Table 2.1). This framework shows varying degrees of likelihood of path dependence, with less likelihood for continuity, and hence increased probability for change occurring, when the situational logics are incompatible and contingent.

Greener’s (2005, p. 68) designs a framework that postulates three conditions for testing for path dependence. These conditions are that one must i) show that there were other viable options to the political choice ii) demonstrate that contingent events were substantially instrumental in establishing the political outcome and iii) state the conditions in which path-dependent systems constrain choices to the political outcome. By application of this framework, it follows then that the inertial nature within the political process is maintained where path dependency is more likely to occur.

2.2.2 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND PATH DEPENDENCY PERSPECTIVES OF PMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Given this research examines PMS in JEAs but bases the literature of PMS in EAs on the British public sector literature, it seems imperative to also examine the circumstantial and institutional context around which the JEAs were established, and their relation to the UK EA model, Next Steps. This examination thus draws on the discussion of PD as a factor in the emergence of JEAs in its relationship with Next Steps and is discussed further in Section 4.2.4. Modell et al. (2007) provides insight on how path dependency may inform an institutional perspective on performance management in the public sector. Namely, they argue that it presents institutionalisation as a process comprising

“a series of interdependent choices exercised at specific, critical junctures”

with the premise
“that past choices have an enduring influence on and continue to shape emerging change initiatives by narrowing the range of viable alternatives. Hence, certain trajectories are precluded while others are reinforced” Modell et al. (2007, p. 456).

Such thinking evokes the idea of path dependency as a liable factor in the decision of the GoJ to adopt this particular model of agency and not another and, by extension, the implementation and developmental process of performance management. The unveiling of any influence of PD in the establishment of JEAs is, therefore, explored further in Chapter four, which looks at the evolution of JEAs (see Section 4.2.3). This is preceded by a similar examination on the evolution of Next Steps in Britain in a later section of this chapter (see Section 2.3.1.1).

This idea is further supported by Modell’s et al. (2007, p. 454) description of path dependency as “related to historical, political and institutional factors that constrain and mediate the choice and implementation of novel control practices and [as] increasingly used as an analytical lens in policy studies”. Greener (2005, p. 64) explains the constraining and mediating effects of path dependency seen in institutions by arguing that there is a tendency of institutions toward inertia, where change is the anti-norm occurring only at ‘critical junctures’. It is therefore relevant to assume that these ‘critical junctures’ are explained in the situational logic that may undermine the determinism suggested in path dependency and points towards the limits of path dependency as an analytical lens or toward a cessation of the continuity of stability that path dependence exposit to allow for change (see Table 2.1).

The idea thus provokes a further question about the extent to which change, in particular, the GOJ’s decision to implement EAs after Next Steps, may be evolutionary (and not, say, revolutionary), and thus dependent on existing institutional arrangements. Modell et al. (2007, p. 456) contends that such a determination would require “some recognition of what plausible alternatives were available to the ones that gradually come to exert a dominant influence”, which is consistent with Greener’s first condition for testing for path dependence (see Section 2.2.1). In continuation with “what competing alternatives to existing institutional arrangements were available” he questions why these arrangements were rejected at specific points in time. He, therefore, presents “‘institutionalisation as a ‘cumulative process’’” (Modell et al., 2007, p. 456). Greener (2005) echoes similar sentiments on the likelihood of path dependency occurrences being contingent to the compatibility between alternative trajectories and existing cultural norms and
institutionalized arrangements in a particular social setting. These different frameworks, therefore, bear some assertion for examining the emergence of Next Steps in the UK and JEAs in Jamaica.

2.2.3 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM, PATH DEPENDENCY AND SUCCESS IN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND POLICY TRANSFER

This section considers the likely causes of success and failure of institutional reform and possible means of reducing failure. Two very recent works that highlight this issue of probable causes for successful or failed implementation of institutional reform are Andrew (2013) and Common (2013).

Andrew’s (2013) discusses the main underlying causes for failure and proposes a new approach for successful reform. His general argument for failure is premised on three existing views. The first is that, the rules for institutional reforms are usually proposed by multilateral and bilateral international development organisations, and that these rules originate outside the country context of where they are enforced and randomly applied. Secondly, the countries where the rules are enforced usually vary widely in economies, “political and social structures, geography and history” (Andrew, 2013, p. 7). Therefore, the enforcement of these rules is on the premise that these reforms are universal. Thirdly, he asserts that in spite of these wide differences between countries, which one would expect would make for different reforms, the random enforcing of these rules continues. Institutional reforms proposed by these international bodies are “similar even in [varied and] different contexts”, purporting a view that public sector institutional reform “ideas, opportunities, demand and supply” are generic and thus can be applied to all countries.

Notwithstanding these conditions, the reforms are shaped by these foreign contexts rather than by the particular contextual needs of the affected countries, thus expressing a view that change is exogenously enforced. The consequence of the above conditions for institutional reform “produce[s] mixed, and often disappointing, results”, with high incompatibility between the actual needs of the country and the effectiveness of the reforms. As evidence of this incompatibility, Andrews draws our attention to conflicting results between countries that were on record as having ‘a strong compliance’ but scored low on the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score for progress in implementing World Bank public sector reform.
Andrews (2013, p. 17) thus recommends an approach to international reform that is crafted from “purposive muddling that includes active, ongoing, and experiential learning” that is more concerned with not just making governments appear better but also ensuring that “reforms are viable and relevant”. He terms this approach problem-solving iterative adaptation (PDIA).

Common (2013) takes a different stance to that purported by Andrews (2013). He asserts that it is the individual country’s context that impedes the transferability of policy or, in Andrews’ terms, the implementation of institutional reforms. Common (2013) asserts that more likely to happen is the adaptation rather than the adoption of policy to local contexts- political, economic and cultural. Put differently, Common argues that policy transfer, or the adoption of policy, is superseded by policy adaptation. According to Common (2013, p. 13), the evidence shows that there is little impetus to policy convergence such as obtains in the case of NPM, its concomitants and public governance “in many parts of the world”.

Common (2013, pp. 14-15), citing Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), acknowledges the influence of the state’s reform trajectory on policy transfer, namely that states are on “different reform trajectories” and that “policy learning is not a straightforward process”. He, therefore, evokes an assertion for the influence of path dependency and historical institutional arrangements on the outcome of policy and their successful or failed implementations. He also puts forward three reasons for the failure of institutional...
reform, namely i) the lack of political consensus ii) poor reform design (as was the case in his study of Georgia) and iii) culture and religion, (as was for his study of Saudi Arabia).

So in examining the case for failure or success of international reform or policy transfer both Common (2013) and Andrew (2013) argue from different sides of the fence. Common argues in favour of *policy transfer* that is exogenously applied, and therefore observed from the perspective of its origin. Andrews argues for the *adaptation of policy* or reform according to individual political, economic and social contexts of the affected country (see Figure 2.1). In spite of their overt differences, and bearing in mind that they speak from different perspectives, policy transfer and policy adaptation, some consensus can be forged from both arguments. Namely, the argument for the implementation or transfer of policy is predicated upon a number of endogenous factors and whether or not these factors form part of the policy shaping, as in the case of Andrew’s argument, or part of the implementation process, in the case of Common.

### 2.3 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (PMS) IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES (EAS)

#### 2.3.1 CONTEXTUALISATION OF PMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The period of the late 80s and 90s was known for widespread institutional reform. One such reform, which swept across the face of the British public sector, was the establishment of EAs under the Next Steps initiative of 1988. The emergence of these agencies was preceded by earlier ideas that drove reform. Public sector reform focussed on management and governance and was influenced by the ideas of public choice theory and the application of managerial principles to public organisations (Aucoin, 1990, p. 115). Together these ideas were paradoxical in their basic focus and tenet; whilst public choice theory focussed on re-establishing “the primacy of representative government over bureaucracy”, the latter sought to re-establish “the primacy of managerial principles over bureaucracy” (Aucoin, 1990, p. 115). They emerged as different paradigms and formed the bases from which several principles, which drove the efforts for widespread public sector reform in this period, were derived. The marriage of these new paradigms became known as the New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991, p. 5).
The main claims of the proponents of NPM were its universality to remedy the ills of government in varying contexts and its “political neutrality” to any “political party or programme” (Hood, 1991, p. 8). However, opposing views to NPM were that neither did it deliver on its claim to better efficiency in governance nor was it the panacea for public management. Doctrines such as disaggregation of public sector units, arms-length government and use of performance measurement, and managerial emphasis on output or outcomes rather than procedures and resource management (Hood, 1991, pp. 4-5) were rooted in either of the two paradigms and later formed the basis of EAs.

However, NPM was not unique to Britain (Hood, 1991, p. 3). The decades of the 80s and 90s are described as ‘pandemic of public management reform … across much of the OECD world’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, p. 1), but such reform changes bearing similarities to NPM doctrines and practice in the UK, could also be observed in countries such as New Zealand, Australia and others (Hood, 1991, p. 4; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000).

Common (1998, p. 440) discusses “five possible overlapping explanations” for this spread of NPM, where spread is conceived as the "universal application of public policy”. First, he ascribes the spread of NPM to possibly the zeal of “management gurus” with a vested interest in its spread. Secondly, he agrees with Hood (1991) that political neutrality had its part in NPM spread and shows that NPM was not unique to any political ideology but that there are instances where it has been supported by both left- and right-wing governments in several countries. Thirdly, he describes an apparent hand-clap relationship between the occurrence of privatization and NPM. Fourthly, he asserts that the imposition of policy by international organisations, such as the WB, IMF and OECD, creates an appearance of globalisation of NPM. Fifthly, he argues for a case of the spread of NPM as a result of voluntary or coerced policy transfer. Where transfer is voluntary, he ascribes it to policy learning by policy-makers who study the ‘foreign’ policy and find it able to be fed into their own ‘domestic policy-making process’ (Common, 1998, p. 447).

One aspect to the spread of NPM was an increase in the popularity of agencies found in many OECD countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 83; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004a) such as Sweden, where it already existed for two decades, the USA, UK, New Zealand and Australia, among others.
By the 90s, EAs after the British model were spreading to other non-OECD countries across the continents of Asia, Africa, North America, Eastern Europe and Jamaica in the Caribbean, where inherent in these new agencies was the prevalence of performance measurement for management and reporting (Talbot and Caulfield, 2002).

2.3.1.1 Agencification
Agencification, as the development of EAs came to be called, is thus a key component of many NPM-type reforms. The separation of policy from provision, or ‘the politico-administrative dichotomy’, often traced to the classic work of Woodrow Wilson and other American progressives, continues to drive much of the managerialist NPM theory that underscores public administration reform. The rise of EAs, though debated as revolutionary, is also seen as evolutionary insofar as the principles of earlier reform initiatives shaped the key characteristics of EAs. These characteristics are later defined (see Section 2.3.2.1.1).

The international trend towards agencification in other nations, such as Jamaica, was adapted after British Next Steps, although the concept was originally pioneered in New Zealand and Sweden (Boston, J., 1995). The popularisation of agencification in many nations in the late 80s and 90s was thus highly influenced by the Next Steps initiative of 1988 which strongly bore the characteristics of principles found in earlier reform initiatives. Some earlier reform principles were that of accountability and efficiency embedded in reforms prior to 1979 (Flynn, 2007). Performance measurement and management also existed since the Financial Management Initiative (FMI) of 1982, though in a more nominal capacity than enforced (Carter and Greer, 1993) but became an integral part in the structure of EAs.

Agencification, as a reform initiative, was, therefore, an old concept in countries such as the USA, Finland and Sweden (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). Interpreted according to the Next Steps model, it only occurred at the end of the 80s, and spun a chain of ‘agencifying’ after the British model cross-continentally, in developed and developing nations (North America- Canada, 1990s; the Caribbean- Jamaica, late 1990s; Africa- Tanzania, 1990s; Eastern Europe- Latvia, 1990s; and Asia- Japan, 2000) (Pollitt et al., 2001; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). As discussed below, it bore as its key elements some of the structural and operative changes that were already at work in other reform initiatives.
2.3.1.2 Agencification, Public Management and Earlier Reform Initiatives- Predating British Next Steps

Though there were earlier attempts at reform, the defining characteristic of public sector reforms of the 80s and 90s was the heavy emphasis placed on public management. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, p24) these reforms bore a more “international character and … political salience” than the earlier periods. They were also “more transformational in character compared to those in the 1960s and 1970s” (Isaac-Henry, 1997, p1). For many governments, and the UK in particular, the common levers of reform over these periods were primarily decentralisation of central ministries and departments; privatisation of a number of large state bodies; and modernization of the public sector by adoption of business-like methods (Common et al., 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004; Flynn, 2007).

These three reform initiatives- decentralization, privatization and application of business-like methods to the public sector- are noted in the literature as predating and having distinct influence on the shaping of Next Steps agencies.

Decentralisation as a reform initiative, which necessitated the reduction in size of large centralised bodies into more manageable units and removed superfluous layers of managers to reduce the distance of management, was mainly concerned with making the task of management local within the public sector (Common et al., 1992, p. 51). According to Common et al. (1992), for the British government decentralisation was motivated by the need to save money. Though downsizing remained a key element, characteristically, it also involved the devolution of responsibilities and hence involved less bureaucracy with the hope of increased efficiency (Common et al., 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, p. 88) differentiate between different types of strategic choices in decentralisation among governments in developed nations: political or administrative, competitive or non-competitive, and internal or external. They note that the UK has the least devolution of responsibilities to its local authorities.

Among the reasons cited for privatisation is the opportunity to optimise efficiency of former public sector units that had otherwise failed in their responsiveness owing to the security of having a monopolistic market (Taylor and Warrack, 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, p. 171). This motivation to privatize has also been lauded as an
important element of governments’ agencification drive, to increase efficiency in performance.

Other ideas concurrent with reform initiatives of the 80s and 90s were a move toward business-like methods such as the use of performance measurement and a focus on management rather than administration (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004)- the predominance of business-like methods in the running of EAs.

Talbot (2004a, p. 6), in his tripartition, argues that in addition to performance management, two other elements are identified as central to the agency idea and consistent with the concept of decentralisation. These ideas are structural disaggregation and reregulation.

With structural disaggregation units within a department or body may be formed into task-specific organisations or subordinate agencies that remain subject to the parent department or body. The precise form that structural disaggregation takes may be found to vary even in its key features from country to country: the number and type of functions the new agency performs, the type of legislation that forms it (formal or statutory), having its own managerial head or Chief Executive Officer, reclassification of its staff, having its own Accounting Officer and procedures for reporting and managing (Talbot, 2004a).

Talbot (2004a) discusses reregulation as a separate concept from disaggregation. Though both may occur in the decentralisation process, they are in fact distinct concepts. As with disaggregation, Talbot (2004a) reasons that the outworking of reregulation for these new organisations may vary from one government to another: the change in terms and conditions, and even reclassification, of staff; the extent of autonomy given to the agency; and the extent of self-regulation allowed, if any. These three reform characteristics are also central to the executive agency structure in Jamaica.

2.3.2.1.1 Defining an Executive Agency

Agencification in the general sense varied from country to country and even ‘within particular countries’ (Pollitt, 2002, p. 57). In some countries, such as Sweden, Netherlands, France and Finland, it may include state enterprises, public sector units now privatised or even voluntary organisations (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). One particular definition that clearly delineates a Next Steps agency from the host of other agencies is
outlined in Box 2.1 (Pollitt et al., 2001, pp. 274-5; Pollitt, 2002, pp. 57-8; Pollitt, 2004; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004a, p. 5).

Executive Agencies are those bodies that have all or most of the following characteristics:

- They are at arm’s length from the main hierarchical spines of ministries, i.e., there is a degree of structural disaggregation
- They carry out public tasks (service provision, regulation, adjudication, certification) at a national level
- Their core staff are public servants (not necessarily civil servants—definitions here again vary enormously between countries)
- They are financed, in principle at least, by the state budget. In practice, some agencies recover a good deal of their financial needs from charges (e.g., charging for a driving or television license). However, even in these cases, the state retains the residual financial liability
- They are subject to at least some administrative law procedures (i.e., they are not wholly or predominantly private law bodies)

**Box 2.1 Defining Executive Agencies**

(Pollitt et al., 2001, pp. 274-5)

In so doing, the above definition eliminates all of the aforementioned agencies from this definition of an EA to give way to a description after the Next Steps model. (See Box 2.1).

### 2.3.2.1.2 Next Steps and PMS

Having looked at a definition for Next Steps EAs (in Section 2.3.2.1.1), this section now looks at the emergence of PMS in the public sector as critical to Next Steps and as consistent with prior reform initiatives. The emergence of PMS in the public sector can be traced directly to the Thatcher era, which saw efficiency, effectiveness and economy (the three E’s) as the bedrock of good public management. Emerging from this era, ‘performance management has taken centre stage in managing change’ (Isaac-Henry, 1997, p.14) in the public sector. Its introduction is seen to embody the drive for accountability and the three E’s.
Several pruning actions were taken in a bid to overturn the old public sector practices that were deemed as inefficient and wasteful. In one decade from 1979, the Civil Service was reduced by almost 25 per cent (Johnson, 1997) through the privatisation of state-owned bodies. As a result, the commercialism of the public sector grew exponentially. As such, more commercially orientated bodies, namely EAs, began to function as arms-length from government focussing on service provision and replacing over 70 per cent of civil servants within a decade (Jenkins, 2008). Moreover, with the establishment of EAs there was greater emphasis on management and accountability in the public sector, similar to the aim of FMI, 1982, to better equip ministers and top civil servants to manage their departments. Performance measurement, based on the process of developing “effective targets and objectives with clear accountability” (Jenkins, 2008, p.122), was to be integral to the management of these agencies.

Agencification is, therefore, strongly linked to, and, at least within the UK, emerged from public management reforms aimed at improving the performance of government. A PMS was used as the skeletal frame for the management of an EA and was, according to Talbot (2004a, p.15), “crucial to the agency project”. Thus, given Talbot’s (2004a) tripartite structure of structural disaggregation, reregulation and performance management, this research focuses only on the third leg of that structure, which is performance management. Therefore, the remaining sections of this chapter review the existing literature in regard to the use of PMS in EAs and the public sector in general.

2.3.2 THEORETICAL ISSUES ABOUT PMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

2.3.2.1 PMS Roles in the public sector
A common problem facing governments of the 1970s and 80s was the management of big government. Britain was by no means an exception, numbering among those nations with the largest public sectors in the world. Her government was faced with the challenge of shaping government into one of efficiency and economy and of applying proven management principles that were at work in the private sector. Next Steps, as it came to be commonly called, was the result of such an attempt. It was crafted over two decades of attempted reform from the Fulton Report of 1968, the Rayner Scrutinies of 1980 and the FMI of 1982. Next Steps emphasised measurement of performance in the public sector as foundational for ‘proper’ management. EAs were formed with the implementation of PMS being central to their operations. The adage that ‘what got measured got done’ was
to drive the implementation of this strategy to pervade all of what happened in this sector. The feasibility of doing so has been and, to some extent, continues to be reviewed and re-engineered in search of the ‘golden thread’ that makes PMS use in the public sector as effective as reported in the private sector. Micheli and Neely (2010) identifies this golden thread in terms of the design and implementation of targets and indicators and how these are aligned from central government to local organisations for the measuring of performance. These dimensions of the golden thread, in a more focussed context of PMS discussion, leaves open the question of what other dimensions to the golden thread there may be.

The role of PMS in the public sector has been aligned closely to its roles in the private sector: to increase accountability and control over the decision-making process; to improve equity, economy and efficiency of the distribution and use of resources; and to develop public sector processes conducive to organisational learning (Jackson and Palmer, 1989; Brignall, 1993, p. 25; Common, 2004). Organisational learning may be single or double loop (Argyris and Schön, 1978). Single loop learning, according to Argyris and Schön (1978), is reflected in the actions that an organisation takes to correct errors that it detects in its operation without recourse to changing its policies. However, if actions taken to correct errors that are detected involve the modification of the basic policies and norms that govern the organisation then double loop learning has occurred. However, according to Common (2004, p. 38), “the public sector context is often considered to be resilient to the kind of ‘double-loop’ learning advocated by Argyris and Schon (1978)”

From the Next Steps report, the intended use of PMS was to facilitate opportunity for active management even among junior levels of management and to increase the sense of accountability and responsibility at different levels throughout central government (Jenkins et al., 1988; Jenkins, 2008).

EAs, under Next Steps, were not established by legislative action but were an administrative reform defined by a framework document. Unlike the rest of central government where PMS may have become an add-on to affect new management objectives, in EAs, the use of PMS was to be integral to their very management and operations. Therefore, PMS, with a focus on setting targets for management and improved performance, was to be the main spine of EAs and “part of the central premise
of Next Steps” (Jenkins, 2008, p.122). Several reports following Next Steps suggest that PMS for management has not been an easy task (Trosa, 1994; Masey, 1995; Jenkins 2008)

2.3.2.2 PMS Benefits to the public sector
Martinez, et al. (2004) reports that little research has been conducted on the impact of PMS in the public sector making it difficult to determine whether management systems in the public sector are delivering results and effective outcomes consistent with their multi-faceted aims. Boyne and Walker (2010, p. 190) recognise the exigency of measuring organisational performance. According to Thomas (2006), while organisations should invest in the use of PMS as a means of improving performance, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, he asserts that it is easier to find examples of PMS, which have been abandoned or drastically scaled back than systems that have become an influential feature of government decision-making or ones contributing demonstrably to performance improvement in public organisations. A host of other works, Smith (1995), Kravchuk and Schack (1996), Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) (2003), Greiling (2006), Radnor (2005) and Radnor (2008), to name a few, also identify a number of unintended consequences from use of performance measurement in the public sector that militate against positive outcomes in the respective public organisations. These works do not deny the potential for success or the successes met by use of PMS in government. They, however, highlight some common pitfalls and in the case of Radnor (2008, p. 326), urge that unless PMS is about “driving improvement and performance” it becomes more “about measurement and reporting for its own sake”. Put differently, if not put to the right use of managing the organisation, the PMS becomes more useful ‘for reporting out’ than ‘reporting in’. Kloot and Martin (2000), who surveyed a number of councils in the UK, found that financial issues were too dominant a driver behind performance measurement resulting in ineffective systems.

However, some research has shown that there are some positive effects from using PMS in the public sector. Walker et al (2010), looking at the mediating effect of performance management between management innovations and organisational performance, found that performance management had a positive impact on organisational performance. Downe et al. (2007, p. 7) examines three different British performance regimes and describes their varying impacts as either “encouraging improvement”, having “had positive impacts” or having “not so far delivered better performance or faster rates of
improvement” - with the most positive results pointing to the regime that bore incentives and punitive aspects and similar in type to the performance regime described in the Framework Documents for Jamaican EAs (Davis, 2001; Talbot et al., 2002, p.11; Talbot, 2004b; The Working Group on Public Sector Reform, 2003, p.8; Tindigarukayo, 2005, p.8). Tindigarukayo (2005, p.9) reports on a number of positive impacts from JEAs but does not reflect the contribution that PMS has towards these results. Talbot et al. (2002, pp. 35-55) reports extensively on the use of performance reporting in the Jamaican EAs, detailing the performance indicators developed by each agency, distinguishing whether it was favourable or unfavourable, and describing the strategies developed to meet these targets and the actual targets that were attained. (The latter two works are discussed in further detail in Section 4.3).

The benefits of PMS to EAs, on one side, have been debated over issues of gaming, unintended consequences and their impracticality and unsuitability as another failed private sector tool that influences a public sector initiative (Smith, 1995; Greiling, 2006; Radnor, 2008). On the other hand, many of the theoretical value propositions of PMS support the roles that they can play in EAs, namely that of accountability, monitoring, control and review, and managing and motivating staff (Jackson and Palmer, 1989). Relevant research would be to look at what the fundamental requirements for PMS would be for fulfilling these roles.

2.3.2.3 The Problem of PMS in the public sector

The literature identifies several problems with using PMS in EAs that suggest an indigeneity of PMS to the private sector that makes it problematic in the public sector. This Section discusses the fit of PMS in the public sector, and in EAs in particular, in light of these problems, namely the issue of publicness, operationalization and the political imperative.

2.3.2.3.1 Publicness

The use of private sector management tools in the public sector has aroused questions on the validity of applying such tools to the public sector (Alford, 2001; Boyne, 2002). The argument points to the differences between the two sectors and hence the disparity that can result from cross application of methods. This determination thus points to potential problems in using PMS, a private sector derived management tool, in the public sector.
In examining the public sector, Jackson (1995b, p. 20) describes it as far more complex than its private sector counterpart. He defines this complexity in terms of the range and diversity of its ‘clients’, the multiplicity of its goals, policies and services, and the complexities of its socio-political environments. He thus depicts the challenges faced by public sector managers as far more daunting and demanding in its skill requirement and range than for their private sector counterparts. Talbot (2010) also alludes to this complexity of the public sector in his performance regime. In particular, he considers the complex set of institutional actors who influence performance in service provision units in the public sector, for which EAs qualify. More specifically, Talbot (2010) considers that these actors have the power to exercise varying levers of power and influence over the direction of service units.

Alford (2001) purports that the two sectors are not distinctly homogenous. Rather each sector differs from the other by degrees of ‘publicness’. He therefore does not see their distinction as a dichotomy but as a continuum from ‘pure public’ to ‘pure private’. As was mentioned earlier, a number of the reform initiatives of the 1970s and 80s in governments worldwide surrounded the introduction of business-like strategic management methods. Alford (2001) suggests that these governments found these business-like management methods viable methods for use in the public. However, he contends that though managers in both sectors are similarly “engaged in a process of converting resources into tangible or intangible things of value”, each stage of the process for the public sector does embrace “a wider array of possible elements than in the private sector” (Alford, 2001, pp. 5-7). This array includes production of private and public values for a complex set of actors, productive capabilities that extend outside the public sector organisation and a diverse set of resources that vitally includes public power (Alford, 2001, pp. 5-7). Alford (2001) suggests that for the more public organisations there may be a greater need to modify than to abandon private sector methods.

Boyne (2002) finds three main distinctions between the private and public sectors. These distinctions are ownership, funding and control. He tested four hypotheses on the impact of ‘publicness’ as against ‘privateness’ on organisational environments, goals, structures and managerial values. Only three of the hypotheses were supported by the study, namely that i) public organisations are more bureaucratic ii) public managers are less materialistic and iii) public managers have weaker commitment than private sector counterparts. However, the available evidence from Boyne’s study does not provide
conclusive evidence ‘that public and private management are fundamentally dissimilar in all important respects’ (Boyne, 2002, p.118). Similarly, there is insufficient evidence in the literature to support whether the difference of publicness is sufficient to form a basis for rejecting the use of private sector management methods in the public sector.

Broad et al. (2007) suggests that an initial step in overcoming the hurdles that public organisations face in using PMS is to ensure that there exists a performance measuring culture. This culture, he argues, needs to emphasize an understanding of the importance of performance management permeated top-down from senior management, through the use of the various means of communication in the organisation. As a second means of developing such a culture, he suggests that there should be frequent reporting from staff on a reasonable number of measures, which would eventually result in the sustenance of a performance management culture. Initially it may be essential for central government to intensively impose measures on government bodies so as to kick-start the development of a performance culture. However, this should naturally lead to measures being locally determined which should prove more effective (Broad et al., 2007, p.125).

Bryson et al. (1987), looking at different private sector methods in strategic planning, advises that the usefulness of a method applied to the public sector would be contingent on a number of conditions. These conditions are i) managerial consensus on what ought to be done ii) the requisite managerial power to implement what should be done iii) whether the organisation has sufficient control over all or most of its operations, as well as iv) there being the requisite agreements made by key decision makers. He strongly recommends that any private sector method used in the public sector be modified or ‘tailor[ed] to fit’.

There is a general consensus from empirical research supporting the application of private sector management methods to the public sector. This support, however, recognises the need for tailor-fitting these private sector management methods when applied to the public sector.

2.3.2.3.2 Operationalizing PMS in the public sector

There is a wide range of problems cited in the literature that pertains to the use of PMS in the public sector. Implicit in these problems is the fact that such management methods have been devised for the private sector. However, this does not imply that the private
sector may not also suffer some of the same problems. Most notable among these
problems are i) the introduction and implementation of PMS ii) problems dealing with the
appropriate use and development of measures and measurement iii) the problem of
management using performance measures iv) problem of varying perspectives about the
use of PMS generally, and v) particularly with public organisations, the added complexity
of functions, control and diverse stakeholders in public organisations.

The introduction of PMS in the public sector has not always been well received as some
employees view this move as a means for central government to exercise more control
over them (Jackson, 1995b). Others, however, simply opposed such methods as
unsuitable for the public sector. Research has shown that implementation of some PMS
models such as the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) can be problematic (McAdam and Walker,
2003; Holmes, 2006) or, in the least, more used for communicating data rather than for
strategic planning (Aidemark, 2001), that is, ‘reporting out’ rather than ‘reporting in’.
Where the BSC has been applied in the public sector there have been problems with
operationalizing it, and it is often adapted to the context of the organisation (Moulin et
al., 2007) so that the resultant model is a modification of the BSC.

The use of performance measures and measurement carry with it a range of problems
within the public sector. From the cases they researched within the public sector, Broad et
al. (2007) reports a lack of outcome indicators and a heavy emphasis on operational
measures (75%). Their findings therefore show that 75% of the cases had a PMS that was
strongly internal-focussed. They also report a lack of clear guidelines as to how the
measures and measurement were developed.

Stewart and Walsh (1995) describe the measurement as elusive and attribute this lack of
clarity to a judicial approach to measurement in the public sector. They contrast this
negativity with rather what would be obtained in the natural sciences or engineering. The
view is that performance in the public sector does not easily lend itself to a clear
definition and hence its measurement cannot approach the precision that would be found,
say, in engineering. For example, the measurement of service output is more difficult to
measure than product outputs with the former being determined by the interaction of
different actors (Stewart and Walsh, 1995).

Jackson (1995b) reports on the inattention to detail and the misreporting of changes in
data that would adversely affect measures for efficiency and effectiveness. Added to this,
he notes the prevalence of outright failings to record the negative impacts of outputs on other services. The failure to make proper record can eventually lead to misrepresentation of the reported levels of efficiency and effectiveness. This may be further exaggerated by the tendency to directly manipulate performance data where there is insufficient security measures built into the PMS to prevent interference with the performance data. Jackson (1995c) also reports difficulties in measuring outputs and on preventing undesirable outcomes.

Writing over two decades ago, Pollitt (1989, p. 68) reports some of the same problems as Broad et al. (2007) and Aidemark (2001), which suggests that over time, there has been little progress in developing solutions to problems with PMS. His research shows that performance indicators and measures were unreliable and there was little confidence expressed in what they actually meant. Moreover, he shows that there was a lack of evidence that performance data were critical in actual managerial decision making but that such data were usually consulted after issues ‘emerged onto the managerial agenda’ and, as such, were not used for resource and strategy planning. Such information reflects that after two decades public organisations today are echoing the same problems as their predecessors. From this discussion two more questions arise: are PMS being used (or are they capable of being used) for driving management? If so, what are the requirements, the golden thread, to ensure that this is so?

A number of management issues relating to PMS and the use of performance measures is also found in the literature. Where Central Government has introduced PMS as an enforced action, local managers may be unwilling to make the necessary organisational changes to encourage a culture of performance. They may view such enforced action as an attempt by Central Government to increase control and often view the performance data and reporting as a ‘cost-cutting exercise’ (Jackson, 1995a, p10). Thus the general atmosphere that may prevail among such management is one of inertia toward the use of a PMS for driving performance improvement and the PMS itself, which further influences any motivational prospects from other staff. As reported by Jackson (1995b), there was the tendency of management to over-emphasize the short term in their designing of measures. Also, the literature would show that where a management team has not been involved in the development of the PMS they are less likely to have confidence in the performance data and, hence, less likely to put it to its full use. It is also reported in the literature that where they can, managers have gamed with performance
data to reflect what looked more favourable to their organisation (Radnor, 2005) (see Section 2.3.2.2).

Therefore, according to Jackson (1995b) it is essential that the design of measures be beyond manipulation by management, which would suggest that the design process be very transparent. As such he suggests that measures be designed within a comprehensive framework that can be strategically used for driving the organisation. This should also lessen the chances of them becoming ends in themselves or being narrowly used for purely operational purposes of economy and efficiency.

2.3.2.3 The Political Imperative

Another area that poses a problem for the successful use of PMS is the political imperative of the day. As governments change hand systems may not receive the same level of priority as before, or even within government the significance of any system may vacillate with the political tide of the day. Pollitt (1989, p. 52) describes this as “the fate of many of the indicators in the federal productivity measurement scheme”. Hence, the use of PMS is not immuned from the influence of this behaviour in government. It is not uncommon to find an emphasis on short-term priorities in government overlooking longer term ones, and as a result the priorities of the Civil Service being determined primarily by the short term political demands (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 76, 82). Of course, this behaviour may also stem from the need to otherwise protect or keep politically sensitive information away from public scrutiny (Jackson, 1995b, p. 22; Flynn et al., 1995).

Another common problem that may be influenced by the political imperative is the emphasis on ‘reporting out’ rather than ‘reporting in’. This occurs when the focus of performance data becomes the submission of periodic reports to Central Government or parent ministries rather than on improving performance within the given organisation. Broad et al. (2007, p. 122) commenting on findings in their study found that “there was a sense that PMs were largely concerned with managers talking to managers (departments/ division reporting to central managers, central managers reporting to external bodies) [but] … little evidence of PMs being used for reporting to other stakeholders in any meaningful way”. This behaviour may also lead to other unintended consequences such as the finding in Broad’s et al. (2007) study. They found that the focus of practitioners was i) “to achieve a better PM rather than [better] service outcomes”, or ii) to manipulate

59
performance measures in order to improve the scores or general appearance of organisational performance in periodic reports.

2.4 CONCLUSION

2.4.1 THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE

This chapter set out primarily to examine public management literature on the use of PMS in EAs and the public sector in order to establish a gap in the literature. In so doing, it looked at the emergence of PMS in the British public sector under Next Steps and defined the boundaries of an EA based on Pollitt et al.’s (2001) definition. However, it first established a theoretical ground for reviewing British literature on PMS in EAs and in the public sector for the case where the empirical study is based elsewhere, that is, in Jamaican EAs.

It also looked at the series of earlier reform initiatives that predisposed the shape and basis of EAs and determined the use of PMS in these agencies as the pivot around which they should function. These early reforms, as discussed, emphasised the three E’s of efficiency, effectiveness and economy. These were embodied mainly through government’s acts of decentralization, privatization and the application of business-like methods rooted in NPM doctrines such as disaggregation of public sector units, arms-length government, separation of policy from provision and the use of performance measurement and managerial emphasis on output or outcomes rather than procedures and resource management.

Foreshadowed in these earlier reform initiatives and coming out of an examination of the roles, benefits and challenges presented in using PMS in the public sector a number of questions were raised. Namely, i) are there other dimensions to the golden thread of using PMS ii) what is needed to make the task of managing by measures or PMS more feasible or what are the fundamental requirements for PMS to effectively be used for management iii) are PMS “part of the central premise [for driving management] of Next Steps” (Jenkins, 2008, p.122)? If so, what are the requirements, or the golden thread, to ensure that this is so?

These questions would suggest that
1 in spite of the plethora of research and writing on the use of PMS in the public sector there is insufficient empirical research to verify whether PMS forms part of the central premise of EAs as ought (Talbot, 2004a, p. 6; Jenkins, 2008, p.122) such that they are used for managing EAs and not merely for reporting purposes, that is, that they are used for ‘reporting in’ and not only for ‘reporting out’; and that, in response to this gap in the research, that

2 the idea of a golden thread for the use of PMS in management still begs for further research in order to determine what other aspects to the golden thread, that is, aspects in addition to Micheli and Neely’s (2010) aligning targets and indicators from central government to local organisation (see Section 2.3.2.1), are critical for assessing the use of PMS in the public sector and EAs.

In response to the first suggestion, (that is, the ‘reporting out’/‘reporting in’ dilemma) a research gap and, hence, a research aim, is located. This study proposes to examine whether PMS form the central premise of EAs by assessing the contributions, which PMS makes toward the managing of EAs. In response to the second suggestion from the literature and to undergird the first, the research would seek to further determine from the literature the fundamental aspects required in order for a PMS to be useful for managing EAs (see Section 2.4.2 and Chapter 3). The first part of the research aim would be studied according to the following research objectives:

1. to assess whether performance management systems (PMS) are a central part of the strategic management\(^1\) of the Jamaican agencies and
2. to assess the usefulness of PMS at ministerial, executive and staff levels by assessing whether performance data gathered from these management systems influence\(^1\)
   a. government decisions at ministerial level
   b. strategic decisions made by chief executives

---
\(^1\) According to the definition of strategic management, by Nag et al.’s (2007), based on the first aspect of their study drawn from a large panel of strategic management scholars,

’T he field of strategic management deals with (a) the major intended and emergent initiatives [operation or strategy] (b) taken by general managers [CEOs] on behalf of owners [stakeholders], (c) involving utilization of resources (d) to enhance the performance (e) of firms [organisations] (f) in their external environments [market].’

The definition also relates to the second aspect of Nag et al.’s (2007, p. 936) study that included respondents from ‘boundary-spanners’ or ‘scholars whose recent work is jointly in strategic management’ and adjacent fields such as mainstream management, economics, sociology and marketing. Hence, strategic management is recognised as eclectic in nature and intersects with a number of fields.
c. staff performance and remunerations

2.4.2 CONNECTING TO NEXT CHAPTER

This chapter has derived the research aim for this study. The following chapter examines the literature further to determine the fundamental factors that are required to undergird the main research aim, that is, that makes a PMS viable\(^2\), and develops from these factors an integrative conceptual framework. A number of issues that were raised in reviewing the literature for the roles, benefits and challenges in using PMS in EAs already point to some factors that are fundamental to this issue. Some of these factors are, that a PMS

- requires managerial consensus, managerial power and sufficient organisational control over, at least, most of its operations and should be locally determined
- empowers managers with more control over their departments and also acts as a basis for strategic planning, monitoring, controlling and reviewing, and for managing and motivating staff
- requires a performance measuring culture with frequent reporting
- concerns measurement and reporting for driving improvement and performance, not just for the sake of reporting
- requires agreements by key decision makers
- raises questions about the appropriate use and development of measures and measurement
- may present problems of operability in its introduction, implementation and use
- with insufficient security, measures may give way to undesirable behaviours and misrepresentation of the reported levels of efficiency and effectiveness
- managers may over-emphasize the short term in designing measures,
- may vacillate with the political tide of the day

\(^2\) This idea of viable or viability is understood in terms of critical factors that make PMS, in practice, capable of successfully delivering effective and efficient managing of EAs consistent with NPM ideas.
may not be critical in managerial decision making, nor used for resource and strategy planning.

Deriving these fundamental factors, therefore, is to be credited to the existing literature. However, building on these and other fundamental factors, yet to be discovered in the literature, to produce an Integrative Conceptual Framework must be credited to this study. This conceptual framework would incorporate those factors that recur both in the theoretical and empirical literature as fundamental, and also deemed as critical in other frameworks to the managing of public sector organisations. By integrative, this framework would seek to draw from the literature and other frameworks, and harness the structural and procedural, situational and behavioural aspects evident in these factors within this single framework. In addition to assessing the contributions that a PMS makes to manage an EA, the framework can also be used for assessing the viability or usefulness of any PMS for managing EAs.
Chapter 3

AN INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: Development of a PMS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.1.1 PURPOSE OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter continues to examine the public management literature on PMS in EAs in accordance with the research aim identified in the previous chapter for this study, namely to assess the contributions, which PMS makes to the managing of EAs, and to undergird this research aim by determining from the literature the fundamental aspects of a PMS necessary for such an assessment, thus the aspects of a PMS that make it viable (see Footnote 2) for managing an EA. Chapter 2 reviewed the public management literature to explore the emergence of EAs and the use of PMS and to establish a basis for the use of British literature to study PMS in JEAs. Based on the discussion on ‘publicness’ in that chapter (see Section 2.3.2.3.1) the review of the PMS literature from the private sector (or from management) also forms part of the review in this chapter, because of the more focussed discussion on PMS development in that literature with implications for public management. Therefore, based on the discussion from chapter 2, this chapter now draws from the organisational performance management literature, that is, both management and public management (and not human resource management literature that focuses on individual performance management), particularly from the UK public sector, to ascertain the fundamental and key factors or principles that recur in the literature for developing a PMS. This chapter then aims to develop an Integrative Conceptual Framework from the organisational performance management literature with these fundamental and key factors as its basis. The Integrative Conceptual Framework (ICF) is to be used in the empirical part of this research to examine the research aim stated above. In so doing, from the empirical research, the objective of the first part of the research aim will

i. assess whether performance management systems (PMS) are integrated into the strategic management of the Jamaican agencies and
ii. assess the usefulness of PMS at ministerial, executive and staff levels by assessing whether performance data gathered from these management systems influence
   a. government decisions at ministerial level
   b. strategic decisions made by chief executives
   c. staff performance and remunerations

This ICF may also be applied to the JEAs and other public organisations to determine the viability of their PMS.

Though the ICF is derived mainly from the British literature, the empirical context of the research focuses on Jamaica. Using the British literature allows us to develop a framework consistent with the British Next Steps model of Executive Agency (EA) established in Jamaica. This school of literature provides the advantage of drawing from a span of two and a half decades of proven EA operation and thus also enables us to examine the strengths and weaknesses of PMS in such operation (see Section 2.3.2). This thesis does not presuppose that there are not differences between Next Steps and JEAs (see Section 4.2.3.3.1 and Table 4.1), but rather focuses on their use of a common tool, PMS for managing. The UK literature on PMS also helps to fill the gap where there is an insufficiency of literature from the Jamaica aspect (see Section 2.1.1).

Therefore, in keeping with the purpose of this research, the ICF is later applied to the Jamaican context to assess the contributions of PMS to managing JEAs (see Sections 4.4 and 6.2).

3.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter comprises two main sections.

The first section, Section 3.2, looks at making clear the meaning and use of key terms used in this chapter that are relevant to the development of the Framework. It produces a definition for Performance Management Systems drawn from both the private and public sector literature. The intention is to posit a definition away from country context, which, based on the primacy of the research aim, focuses on the use of PMS. That is to say, the relevance of path dependence to the review of British literature for JEAs is a non-issue in the discussion and development of this framework insofar as a contextual discussion on PMS, if any, relates more to sector context (that is, private or public sector) than to country context. Section 3.2, therefore, takes into account that i) PMS originated as a
private sector tool (see Section 2.3.2.3.1) that has been popularised in the public sector over nearly the past three decades ii) PMS has served similar and same purposes in both sectors (see Section 2.3.2.1) and iii) the use of PMS in both sectors has grown to the extent that PMS and PMS software are either developed in-house, are off-the shelf or customised for use across sectors (Kaplan and Norton, 2001d; Moulin, 2007; Radnor and Barnes, 2007; Behn, 2009). Hence, any attempt at defining PMS in the public sector should give consideration to its private sector definition. Section 3.2 then looks at other terms relevant to the development of the Framework.

The second main section of this chapter, Section 3.3, builds on the factors elicited from the discussion on PMS in Chapter 2, and presented in Section 2.4.2 as fundamental factors to the development of a PMS. It explores the literature further to ascertain if there are other factors that are fundamental and/or critical to PMS development. It groups these factors together under four main elements, which form the bedrock of the ICF. These four elements are i) Organisational Ownership ii) Characteristics of Performance Measures iii) Management Processes for PMS, and iv) Integration of PMS with Other Management Systems (see Figure 3.1).

**Fig. 3.1 Integrative Conceptual Framework for PMS Development**

The ICF is later used to assess the contributions and viability of the PMS for managing JEAs (see Sections 4.4 and 6.2). These fundamental factors are also determined based on that which obtains as critical to the successful establishing of Next Steps EAs and the
changes that have, in fact, occurred in them over two decades of observations (Jenkins et al., 1988; Trosa, 1994; Jenkins, 2008).

The chapter then concludes with a discussion of the Framework and its limitations and scope (Section 3.4.1) and the relevance this chapter bears to the subsequent chapter and the overall thesis (Section 3.4.2).

3.2 DEFINITIONS FOR DEVELOPING A PMS

3.2.1 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (PMS)

The terms performance measurement and performance management have become commonplace in the twentieth and twenty-first century performance management literature- sometimes even being used interchangeably (Propper and Wilson, 2003). However, some of the foremost authors on performance in both the public (Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; Radnor, 2008; Broadbent, 2009; Moulin, 2007b; Brignall and Modell, 2000) and private sectors (Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Neely et al., 1995; Lebas, 1995) have taken to distinguishing between both terms. The consentient position on these terms is that performance measurement is most useful in an environment where there is performance management, and performance measurement is not, nor should be made to be, an end in itself as to do so is a recipe for disaster (Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; Radnor, 2008; Broadbent, 2009; Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Amaratunga & Baldry, 2002; Neely et al., 2005; Lebas, 1995). Succinctly put, performance management “creates the context for” and gives meaning to performance measurement (Lebas, 1995, p. 23); it should therefore, be conceived as the means to, and not the ends of, performance management (Heinrich and Marschke, 2010, p. 186).

Neely et al. (1995, p. 81) puts forward a definition for performance measurement systems that is often used in the literature. The definition is framed from a basic construct that examines the performance measurement system from three levels, “i) the individual performance measures ii) the set of performance measures; and iii) the performance measurement system and the environment within which it operates” (Neely et al., 1995, p. 81). They define a performance measurement system as “the set of metrics used to quantify both the efficiency and effectiveness of actions” and describe the application of such a system as involving a process of measuring (or performance measurement) where
the individual metrics or the performance measures are the means by which measurement is done.

Radnor and Barnes (2007, p. 393), taking a similar view of performance measurement, have put forward a definition for performance management. They define performance management as “action, based on performance measures and reporting, which results in improvements in behaviour, motivation and processes and promotes innovation”, and where such action is driven by a performance management system (Radnor and Barnes, 2007, p. 396). Radnor and Barnes’ (2007) performance management system, therefore, encompasses Neely et al.’s (1995) third level, which is, the performance measurement system and the environment within which it operates.

Though there is agreement that both terms are defined distinctly, the ‘hand to glove’ means by which they operate and are intertwined renders them inseparable in use (Lebas, 1995, p. 34; Radnor and Barnes, 2007). Therefore, drawing from Neely et al.’s (1995) and Radnor and Barnes’ (2007) definitions, this thesis refers to a Performance Management System (PMS) as

\[
\text{a system for managing performance of an organisation to improve behaviour, processes and outcomes, and to promote innovation through the use of performance measurement and reporting}
\]

### 3.2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF PMS

The understanding of the term development of a PMS is made clear in the reading of Kennerley and Neely (2002, 2003) and their recommendation that the PMS should not be static. They, therefore, allude to the idea that ‘development’ is necessarily a dynamic process in a continuously changing environment. Indeed, building on Neely et al.’s (1995) PMS definition and drawing from a number of authors on this subject, Kennerley and Neely (2002, 2003) have shown that the development of a PMS must be able to cope with a continuously changing environment. Some authors on this subject, such as Kaplan and Norton, call on organisations to modify their PMS to adapt to and to reflect changes in their competitive business environments and to keep performance measures consistently relevant to their business strategy and objectives (Bititci et al., 2000; Wisner and Fawcett, 1991; Neely et al., 2000). The call from the public sector is the same, with Moulin et al. (2007, p. 289) raising the issue of the need for the PMS to sustain relevance.
in the context of organisational change and Kravchuk (1993, p. 355) describing it necessary that PMS be kept flexible to adapt to the changing environment, and hence, change requirements of the organisation.

![Figure 3.2 Kennerley and Neely’s (2002) Framework of factors affecting the evolution of performance measurement systems](image)

**Fig. 3.2 Kennerley and Neely’s (2002) Framework of factors affecting the evolution of performance measurement systems**

The understanding gained is that the development of a PMS is not static but dynamic, and that it continues to evolve as it is used. The first two stages, design and implementation (Broadbent, 2009; Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; Bourne et al., 2000), set the PMS ready to be used. As it is used, aspects of the PMS may be called into question, which may result in modification and (re) deployment of the PMS. Kennerley and Neely (2002, 2003) identified these stages which follow the implementation stage of the PMS as the use, reflect, modify and deploy stages (see Figure 3.2), where the modification stage is a result of using and reflecting on the PMS before redeploying it.

These stages describe the actions taken for the development of a PMS but which are reliant on the presence of certain fundamental factors, identified within the four elements of the framework. These fundamental factors are explored in Section 3.3. Therefore, with this understanding of PMS and of PMS development the chapter would explore the literature to determine these fundamental factors that are required for the development of PMS in EAs, where these fundamental factors occur at all or any of the above named stages.
3.2.3 DIFFERENTIATING OTHER TERMS

In addition to the two terms defined above, several other sets of terms require mentioning here, not to define them but, in order to communicate that for each set the inclusive terms are used as supplements to or synonymous to each other. It is hoped that in so doing the use of these terms would be clarified and any confusion of terms would be avoided in the subsequent sections. These terms are identified below with their supplements or in singularity.

Firstly, the term fundamental, from its Oxford English Dictionary definition, refers to

A leading or primary principle, rule, law, or article, which serves as the groundwork of a system; an essential part.

For this thesis, this term is supplemented by two other terms critical and key, which are all adjectival to the factors that comprise the ICF. As supplements, neither term, fundamental, critical nor key, suggests any greater or lesser meaning than the other.

Next, the term factor is supplemented by the terms principle, aspect and element which each refers to those fundamental components of the ICF.

The terms targets, measures and indicators are often used interchangeably in the literature. However, from both the private and public sector literature, the general understanding is that indicators usually are used with the higher-level values that the organisation hopes to achieve toward meeting its strategic goals and objectives. These higher-level values are often called key performance indicators or KPIs and are directly linked to and derived from the organisational goals and objectives (Carter et al., 2002, p. 49). (However, as indicated, it is not uncommon for performance indicators to be used interchangeably with performance targets (Carter et al., 2002) or performance measures (Flapper et al., 1996). To attain these KPIs various aspects of performance are measured. Each aspect of the KPI and the means by which it is measured is called a measure (Neely et al., 1995; Folan and Browne, 2005; Radnor and Barnes, 2007) and the value allocated to each measure is called a target (Kaplan and Norton, 2001b; Flapper et al., 1996; Radnor and Barnes, 2007, p. 392).

In this thesis, the use of the term indicator is consistent with the general use, that is, the higher-level organisational values or KPIs, while the terms targets and measures are used interchangeably.
Finally, the term *performance* refers to those actions that contribute to improving the organisation and which the organisation may choose to measure (Lebas, 1995; Neely et al., 1995).

### 3.3 PMS INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This section examines the literature to determine factors that are deemed fundamental to the development of a PMS. The idea is to develop from the literature a working ICF that can be operationalized for examining PMS in the public sector and JEAs, in particular. To be clear, the aim is not to design another PMS Model, such as the Public Sector Scorecard or the Public Sector Value Model, nor to assume this framework is the panacea for solving every possible challenge governments that use PMS face. Neither is it to critique which model might be more successful over the others. Rather, the aim is to elicit from the literature on PMS in EAs and in general, those common factors found in the literature as critical to contributing to PMS functioning as an effective and successful management instrument. Thus these fundamental or critical factors would be applied as the basis of forming an ICF from which one may critically assess the use of PMS in the public sector and in EAs and JEAs in particular, and ascertain the contribution they make to these EAs. The ICF would be operationalised in subsequent chapters in this thesis as the means of examining the research aim raised.

To derive the elements of the framework a substantial number of authors’ work on this subject have been peer reviewed. Some works focus on performance management frameworks (Moulin et al., 2007; Broadbent, 2009; McAdam et al., 2005), others on guidelines for developing PMS or both (Neely et al., 1995), while others focus on more general issues on the implementation and use of PMS, where implementation sometimes refers to the whole development of the PMS, that is, to all of design, use, review and modification issues. (Bouckaert & Peters, 2002; de Waal and Counet, 2009; Bourne et al., 2000). These works are discussed within the body of this section (see Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.4) as they discuss what aspects of a PMS are required, and are critical, in order to manage an organisation. These aspects unfold the elements of the ICF.

#### 3.3.1 ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP

Practitioner and academic experts, surveyed in de Waal and Counet (2009), identified 31 problems associated with the implementation and use of PMS. Fifteen of these problems
relate to management behaviour that has to do with a lack of control and commitment to its PMS. In much of the literature, organisational ownership of a PMS is heralded as one of the key behavioural aspects required for the successful operation of a PMS in any organisation. However, in the public sector, its likelihood is often dependent on other situational aspects, determined by central government.

The literature reveals that an organisation must demonstrate ownership of its PMS in order for a PMS to function effectively. Ownership is demonstrated in terms of the measure of accountability, commitment and control, and the involvement of its key stakeholders (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2009; McAdam, 2005; Boland and Fowler, 2000; C. Lohman et al., 2004). Organisational ownership is therefore one of the first fundamental criteria for the development of a PMS and is, therefore, included as the first element of the ICF (see Figure 3.3a).

![Figure 3.3a Elements for PMS Development- Organisational Ownership](image)

### 3.3.1.1 INVOLVE KEY STAKEHOLDERS
A key aspect of organisational ownership cited in the literature is the involvement of stakeholders. Stakeholder involvement, however, demands requisite skills and knowledge, or where lacking, training on the part of such stakeholders. Jenkins et al. (1988) draw our attention to this when they describe the culture of central government at the dawn of Next Steps as one that did not foster delegation and involvement at all levels.
In fact, at “the first sign of trouble” central government, with a knee-jerk reaction, would withdraw responsibility from local units (Jenkins et al., 1988, p. 28). The Next Steps team viewed their intent to remedy this problem of central government absolving its managers from responsibility as the “substantial gain [they were] aiming for” in this initiative (Jenkins et al., 1988, p. 16). Six years after Next Steps, Trosa (1994) reports that the situation had not changed much. Twenty years on and Jenkins (2008) reports a cycle of system failure still evident among senior Civil Servants who, when required to resolve problems, chose to make suggestions over taking responsibility. Jenkins (2008), who also formed part of the Next Steps team of 1988 under the Thatcher government, attributed this result to the lack of emphasis on having management experience and training in the highest office of the public sector.

Kloot and Martin (2000, p. 248) rate the involvement of stakeholders as “an approach to performance management which provides for the long-term development” of the organisation (See Table 3.1). This approach places emphasis on the involvement of stakeholders from the stage of PMS design to managing outcomes.

Walker (2010, p. 372) highlights the need to involve stakeholders by devolving the process of decision making to as “close to the users and citizens as possible”. Flapper et al. (1996, p. 33) and Globerson (1995) points us to who stakeholders should be. They indicate that stakeholders should be persons involved in its use (customers, employees, managers, employers and suppliers). As such they also recommend that these persons also form the development group for selection of performance criteria, which like Jenkins (2008), demands that stakeholders involved should have the requisite skills, knowledge and training according to their involvement. Such involvement of stakeholders is inherent in the development of Kaplan & Norton’s BSC and other derivatives of that scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Moulin et al., 2007) used both in the private and public sector.

Beyond Flapper et al.’s (1996) stakeholder recommendation, Talbot (2010), in his performance regime, presents a detailed examination and analysis on who comprise stakeholders in the public sector. Talbot’s (2010) performance regime presents stakeholders as institutional actors with vested power to influence performance of service delivery units, such as Next Step EAs. The actors are not an undifferentiated, homogenous group, as is more commonly presented in the literature, but are distinct actors, with changing roles and priorities and over time effecting varied levers of power.
and influence over these service delivery units. Actors include Ministries, Ministers, Legislature, Judicial Bodies, Audit, Inspection and Regulatory Bodies, Partners, Users and Professional Institutions, each differentiated by the type of control it has over such units (see Table 3.2). It also only includes those with state delegated power to influence these units. He focuses on stakeholder influence on performance from those within government but acknowledges it may also come from outside.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Choice in Local Government Performance Management</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Approach</strong></td>
<td><strong>Performance-Oriented Approach</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down State Government and councillor-imposed, control-oriented performance measurement</td>
<td>Strategic, collaborative development of a performance management system involving all stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposition of universal, industry-wide measures with less validity for specific councils</td>
<td>In-house development of valid, council specific measures to be used for organisational improvement and benchmarking with like councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodic reporting for the purpose of meeting control requirements of senior management, councillors and State Government</td>
<td>Real-time, up-to-date performance information for all stakeholders to monitor progress, demonstrate accountability and manage outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piecemeal, myopic approach with a focus on the measurement process</td>
<td>Integrated performance management system across the organisation focussed on value-for-money service delivery and organisational improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on financial measures only</td>
<td>Focus on financial and non-financial measures: a results and determinants approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 Adapted from Kloot and Martin (2000)

The complexity of the contexts within which public sector performance is, therefore, measured speaks of a relationship of multi-principals to agent than what is sometimes typified of service agencies in the literature, that is a singular principal to agent relationship. It is therefore a complex web of accountabilities found in this sector; and thus raises some questions that are considered in the next section, (see Section 3.3.1.2). Table 3.2 shows the power relations of inter-organisational stakeholders and the probable
degree to which influences may vary from one organisation to another over the service delivery unit. Intra-organisational actors, however, such as CEOs, directors and executive management within service delivery, for example EAs, are not differentiated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nodality</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Treasure</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Executive</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line Ministries</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial and quasi-judicial bodies</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditors and Inspectors</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional bodies</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Organisations</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 Talbot’s (2010) Performance Regime and Tools of Government.

Jenkins et al. (1988) also made recommendations to the relationship network within government. Though not as extensive as Talbot’s (2010), Jenkins et al.’s differentiation pertains specifically to the setup and running of EAs. The main influencers within government were to come from the Minister and a Permanent Secretary (PS) to whom the CEO of the EA would be accountable. The critical relationships rest between Ministers, Central Civil Service and the Executive Agencies. Trosa (1994, p. 7), presents a closer look at this “growing gap between centres of Departments and Agencies” that exist in this network for UK EAs but also notes that this phenomenon is common worldwide wherever there is the attempt to increase autonomy to similar formed agencies. However, in the prevailing culture, central government, by practice, still exercises more autonomy over the EAs than is expected according to the Framework Document. Jenkins (2008) reports that after twenty years this phenomenon has not changed.

Kloot and Martin's (2000) suggest that where there is adequate stakeholder involvement, objectives and targets are more likely to be met. When at the design phase targets or measures that comprise the PMS are developed from strategy imposed from central government (PASC, 2003), at the service delivery level measures may still be misaligned with local organisational objectives. Collier et al. (2001, p.21) found that the use of
“enforced choice”, that is, strategy imposed by central government, is limiting to strategy development locally. Where there is enforced choice, local stakeholders may be exempted from critical stages in the development of the PMS, which become dominated by central government.

Similarly, Smith (1995), PASC (2003) and Radnor (2008), have shown that at the stages of PMS design and implementation there needs to be greater involvement of managers and employees who can construct more meaningful and relevant targets, as at this phase of PMS development in the public sector there is a lack of integration between performance culture and targets. Where this lack of integration occurs, “the PMS will not be used (enough) by organisational members for achieving better performance” (de Waal and Counet, 2009, p. 371).

3.3.1.2 ACCOUNTABILITY, COMMITMENT AND CONTROL
De Waal and Counet (2009) numbered the lack of commitment from management among the five top reasons for the unsuccessful implementation and use of PMS. The lack of commitment is also evident in a number of other highly, frequent problems that they noted, such as i) placing a low priority on PMS implementation and high priority on short term problems ii) abandoning the PMS when there is a change in management, and iii) underestimating the time, resources and organisational capacity required for full implementation of a PMS (de Waal and Counet, 2009). This lack of commitment may redound with other adverse effects on the commitment and attitude of other employees about the benefit of the PMS. De Waal and Counet (2009) also identified employee resistance toward the use of the PMS and the lack of a performance culture within the organisation as very problematic toward its sustainability. Therefore, for the successful development of a PMS, it is imperative that there is consensus from management about the need for it and a willingness to be fully engaged in its operation. This was also identified earlier by Bryson et al. (1987) and (Broad et al., 2007) (see Section 2.3.2.3.1).

Partial ownership may result from governments enforcing the implementation of PMS without sufficient consultation with the local unit or organisation. Though, not uncommon, it “has [no] meaning or validation” in successfully developing a PMS (Blenkinsop and Davis, 1991; Walker, 2010). Total commitment from all involved is therefore mandatory (Blenkinsop and Davis, 1991).
As part of the successful establishment of UK EAs, for which performance management was to be an integral part, Jenkins et al. (1988) also recommended to the government of the day, a strict reckoning to the idea of *accountability* by top management for the successful transitioning to EAs and for improved management. They suggested that where accountability was lacking, it was a hindrance to progress.

As regards *local control*, Jenkins’ team recommended that the localised management skills be progressively developed to enable “the agencies [to] take full management responsibility” (Jenkins et al., 1988, p. 16). This removal of central constraint was seen as necessary to maximise results and optimise performance. As changes were implemented, the team found that through the use of PMS local managers had a better handle on local management and of resources. However, Trosa (1994, p. 76) found that there was still a problem of delegating full management to Chief Executives according to the envisioning of Next Steps and even as was prescribed by the Framework Document and, thus, recommends that CEOs “should be overruled only on major issues”. Yet, Jenkins (2008, p.181) reports two decades later, that accountability at the top remained the most difficult task and civil servants remained unskilled as managers.

*Accountability*, like local autonomy, remained high on the agenda of setting up Next Steps. Writing on what obtained prior to British Next Steps, Jenkins et al. (1988) report that there was a serious lack of any genuine control or responsibility for middle management in government who experienced frustrating constraints from those higher up the echelon in politics and the civil service. This lack of opportunity for responsibility contributed to the attrition of some Civil Servants to private sector jobs as their frustration levels were heightened by the absence of any opportunity to really manage, and as the decision-making process over resources and organisational objectives did not involve them but were made from central government or ‘centre of the Civil Service’. These constraints, stemming from the prevailing culture and rules laid down by central government, did not reward nor encourage personal responsibility neither was there much room for change in the criteria for promotion, as seniority remained the strong determining factor and not performance. To counter the lack in management initiative in the civil service and the opposing culture, Jenkins et al. (1988) recommend that the government of the day along with its senior Civil Service be committed to the change that was exigent, notwithstanding the perceived difficulty any government Minister might endure to such a process. As noted earlier, Jenkins et al. (1988) recommended a strict
reckoning to the idea of accountability by top management for the successful transitioning to EAs and for improved management. They suggested that where accountability was lacking, it was a hindrance to progress. The suggestion for the latter therefore was to encourage this pattern of accountability between executive management of EAs and Parliament within some given legal framework but that “ultimate accountability … must also rest with Ministers” (Jenkins et al., 1988, p. 17). Executive Managers of EAs were therefore to be accountable to Ministers and to Parliament. The use of performance measurement and management was to facilitate this level of accountability.

The designation of control and accountability of the PMS should, therefore, be relegated to the local organisation unit and not left solely in the hands of central government (Globerson, 1995; Walker, 2010). Experts surveyed in de Waal and Counet (2009) identified a ‘lack of focus on control’ as a common problem. Local control should be present from the design and feasibility stage and throughout the other stages of the development of the PMS and should identify clear lines of responsibility for collecting and reporting performance data (Globerson, 1995; De Waal and Counet, 2009). According to the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) (2004), on average only 60% to 69% of line managers in the public service were accountable to the implementation of the PMS in their organisations. Thus, in the public sector the development and control of the PMS for local departments should involve employees of the local units. Blackman et al (2012), who like other authors showing a growing interest in high performance organisations, conceptualizes this involvement of employees and managers as mutual accountability and mutual obligation, which provides an enabling environment conducive to high performance.

However, one cannot ignore the complexity of the multi-centric accountabilities that Talbot’s regime describes and it’s implications for total commitment and control from the local unit. This, in turn, raises further question about the likelihood of consensus between and among each principal regarding how service delivery units are steered. How is consensus on the most critical measures and indicators for performance, setting of organisational objectives and strategy arrived at for the local unit with multi-principals, and different power relations?
Talbot’s (2010) discusses the methods of interventions that are sometimes used by institutional actors and shows that such actors exercise influence according to the levers of power available to the actor. Therefore, because the levers of power differ and vary in their accessibility, and may not in fact be used by those actors who have the right to them, congruence between actors and management consensus about them is not a remote possibility.

Thus the regime does not discount the potential for conflict co-existing with consensus from such a complex web of institutional actors. It makes no attempt at showing how conflict may be rectified although, by suggesting that actors may not always exercise their varying levers of power, it alludes to the probability of less conflict and of more congruence. Talbot’s (2010) leaves room to allow us to also consider the possibility of change that may come from this dynamic web of actors - change that may be in their institutional focus and to also consider the differing emphasis and focus each may place in their role to shape performance - a step that is outside the scope of this research.

### 3.3.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Having decided on a committed team to develop the PMS, the next step is to design the individual measures which, as a set, is the first stage prior to the implementation of the PMS. Performance measures are one of the most discussed and written about aspects of the development of a PMS. Performance measures are identified as foundational to the structure and development of a PMS. Hence, they form the second fundamental element of the ICF (see Fig 3.3b).

![Fig. 3.3b Elements for PMS Development- Characteristics of Performance Measures](image-url)
They comprise the first two of the three levels of Neely’s et al. (1995) PMS construct (see Section 3.2.1). Walker (2010, p. 374) defines measures as ensuring the organisational strategy within which the PMS operates. The idea of developing measures for EAs was that they would be translated all the way down to individuals as personal objectives having originated from the strategic objectives of the EA. Overall the reporting team found that measures were “effective in changing attitudes and practices” (Jenkins et al., 1988, p. 23). By 1988 much of what was being done in EAs was based or related to performance-appraisal systems, pay and new salary agreements. Broad et al. (2007) speak of the contribution of measures toward encouraging a performance culture (see Section 2.3.2.3.1). They also discuss other issues surrounding the use of measures, namely, their appropriate choice and use (see Section 2.3.2.3.2)- a discussion that is taken up by other voices in the measurement literature (namely Neely et al., 1996; Jackson, 1995b; Stewart and Walsh 1995; Pollitt, 1989).

### 3.3.2.1 Appropriateness of Measures

Within the PMS construct, Neely et al. (1996) defines critical elements that determine what characteristics should be present in choosing performance measures (see Table 3.3). In this tabulated construct, he presents a survey of the literature on performance measures and draws from a number of authors who have written guidelines for the development of a PMS. From these guidelines he identifies narrower and more specific criteria for defining how measures should be: clearly defined, purposeful, practical with appropriate scale, self-checking, cost effective, integrated both horizontally and vertically. In addition to these criteria, the literature alludes to several other characteristics that should form the basis for selecting the measures that comprise the PMS. As discussed in Section 2.3.2.3.2, the appropriateness of measures, the types of measures and the means of selecting measures are significant to the development and the proper functioning of a PMS.

Broad et al. (2007) reports the need for guidelines to develop measures. De Waal and Counet (2009), in the responses from 31 experts, identified difficulty in defining appropriate measures as a common problem that both practitioner and academic experts found to be frequent among organisations. By 1994, Trosa reports that any problems with targets did not so much concern targets being of an appropriate level but one of relevance and quality.
### Table 3.3 Issues to consider when designing a performance management system  
(Neely et al., 1996)

The findings showed that time was of essence to properly devise targets relevant to organisational objectives but that often targets were “set up very quickly”, Trosa (1994, p. 9). The enquiry also found that though there might have been diversity of measures, according to Flapper’s et al. (1996) types of measures discussed below, higher priority was given to financial targets. The literature identifies several key characteristics for defining measures. These characteristics range from simple, measurable and directly relevant to organisational goals and strategy, (Maskell, 1991; Neely et al., 1995; Waggoner et al., 1999; Neely et al., 2000; Bittici et al., 2000; Olsen, 2007) to reflecting the organisation’s “external competitive environment, customer requirements and internal objectives” (Kennerley and Neely, 2002, p. 1224). In regard to the latter, Flapper et al. (1996) has derived five categories or dimensions in which the measures that comprise a PMS should be classified i) financial vs non-financial ii) global vs local iii) internal vs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Measures</th>
<th>Measures should be clearly defined/easy to understand</th>
<th>Fortuin, 1988; Hronec, 1993).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance measures system</td>
<td>Measures should be purposeful</td>
<td>(Maskell, 1991).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system &amp; the environment</td>
<td>Measures should be practical. They should have the appropriate scale</td>
<td>(Crawford and Cox, 1990~.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measures system</td>
<td>Measures should form part of the control loop</td>
<td>(Bungay and Goold, 1991~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system</td>
<td>Measures should be failsafe/self checking</td>
<td>(Fortuin, 1988; Hayes et al., 1988).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measures system &amp; the environment</td>
<td>Measures should be practical. They should have the appropriate scale</td>
<td>(Fortuin, 1988; Hayes et al., 1988).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measures system</td>
<td>Performance measures should be integrated over both the functions and hierarchy</td>
<td>(ICAS, 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system</td>
<td>The system should provide data for monitoring past and planning future performance</td>
<td>(Kaplan and Norton, 1992).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system</td>
<td>The measurement system should provide a balanced picture of the business</td>
<td>(Fitzgerald et al., 1991).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system</td>
<td>The measurement system should show how results are a function of determinates</td>
<td>(Fry and Cox, 1989).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system</td>
<td>The measurement system should not contain any measures which conflict with one another</td>
<td>(ICAS, 19931.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system</td>
<td>The performance measurement system should reinforce the firm’s strategies</td>
<td>(Skinner, 1971~ Maskell, 1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system</td>
<td>The performance measurement system should match the firm’s culture</td>
<td>(IPM, 1992).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance measurement system</td>
<td>The performance measurement system should match the existing reward systems</td>
<td>(Hayes et al., 19881.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
external iv) hierarchical and v) departmental measures. These dimensions are well advocated across the literature and are discussed below.

3.3.2.1.1 Financial vs non-Financial

The first classification has become a common platform for discussing the shortcomings of more traditional type PMS fixated on an organisation’s return of investments (ROI) against what is advocated in systems today. It identifies that measures should be both financial and non-financial (Neely et al., 1995; Kloot and Martin’s, 2000; Kaplan and Norton, 2001). Blenkinsop and Davis (1991) also recommends that measures should not fixate on just ‘sales figures’ but should represent the various goals of the organisation at long, short and medium term. This aspect of setting measures ensures that every aspect of the organisation’s performance that contributes to attaining goals and objectives is measured. It is strongly advocated in several performance frameworks such as the BSC and the Performance Pyramid (Cross and Lynch, 1988).

3.3.2.1.2 Global vs Local Measures

Flapper et al. (1996, p. 28) then distinguish between measures that are global, which are more useful to top management, against local measures that serve lower level managers and staff. The first category allows executive management to focus on the key measures in the PMS while departmental managers focus on those measures that relate specifically to their department.

Wisner and Fawcett (1991) also make this distinction as necessary for defining the organisation’s competitive advantage. The idea is that the organisation’s goals and objectives should not just be the business of management but should be well communicated to the lower echelons of the organisation and that performance measures consistent with organisational goals should be designed specifically to suit those departments.

Maskell (1991) recognises that the organisation should not carbon-copy measures from one department to the next but that measures should be chosen based on their suitability to the department (Wisner and Fawcett, 1991).

To this end Wisner and Fawcett (1991) recommends that management should have a clear understanding of each departmental role in accomplishing “the various strategic objectives” of the organisation.
3.3.2.1.3 Internal vs External Measures

Thirdly, the measures should focus on both the internal and external positions of the organisation. Flapper et al. (1996), therefore, classify measures either according to their focus on the inward functioning of the organisation (internal) or based on the experience of customers or performance of suppliers (external). Kaplan and Norton (2001) also supports this view where internal measures relate to performance measurements of critical business processes, innovation and organisational learning and growth, and external measures relate to the organisation’s performance toward its customers, such as in satisfaction, loyalty, retention, and its shareholders (in terms of its ROI).

3.3.2.1.4 Hierarchical Measures vs Departmental Measures

Other authors usually contrast Flapper’s et al. (1996) fourth and fifth dimensions of measures as one combined aspect. These dimensions are the organisational hierarchy and the departmental measures. Similar to the dimension of global versus local measures, only that the latter focuses on who is best served by these measures while hierarchical versus departmental measures is concerned with the relation between the two directions of the measures. From a hierarchical perspective, the number of measures decreases as it vertically ascends the levels in the organisation. The sum of departmental measures far exceeds the number of top management measures. They also reflect the different, horizontal areas of the organisation revealing a variance of emphases on performance as per department.

A note of caution on this matter from Blenkinsop and Davis (1991) is that careful observation be taken to avoid inconsistencies in setting departmental goals and measures or of unwittingly creating interdepartmental conflict but that the local measures chosen should be “valid indicator[s] of the performance of the group”. Top management measures, therefore, are more directly related to organisational objectives and cover a greater scope and must, thus, be devolved into smaller, more measurable (departmental) measures that can be carried out by a particular department. Through the setting of measures from organisational goals, the PMS is, therefore, predicated upon linear causal relations between the two- the goals are the desired effect while the measures are the cause.

De Waal and Counet (2009) found that some PMS were irrelevant for managing their organisations because there were no links between their global measures or indicators and
departments. To this regard, Neely et al. (1995, p. 108) identifies the practicality of this sort of integration of measures, that is “both across an organisation’s functions and through its hierarchy”, as critical to the development of a PMS.

### 3.3.2.2 FOCUS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES

Another key aspect of performance measures is the focus they bring to bear on the strategic objectives. Put differently, the measures should reflect the intended results of the strategic objectives and not just reflect the activities done. In this regard, Heinrich (2002), in analysing the effectiveness of designing performance systems for managing program outcomes and impacts in the public sector, mentions five different foci of performance that may be measured. These are input, activity or process, output, outcome and impact measures. The foci of the first three are a central part of traditional performance measurement. Within the public sector, input measures measure routine tasks and are cost focus and thus important for budget allocation (Heinrich, 2002). Output measures are product or service focus. They may be used internally by management for effecting better internal operations and also, for measuring what the organisation produces or supplies. Process or activity measures are focussed on the day-to-day tasks that the organisation does to achieve output and other measures and objectives (Heinrich, 2002; Radin, 2000).

Unlike earlier, more traditional systems for measuring performance, modern performance management systems use outcome measures, which are result-focus and are based on what the organisation hopes to achieve. Heinrich (2002, p. 714) describes outcome measures as critical to achieving organisational objectives (derived from the organisational mission) and help to focus the organisation, its ‘management and staff[s]’ attention on those ends deemed most important’. Impact measures are also result-oriented but evaluate the net worth of program outcomes. They are, therefore, useful to improve outcome measures by showing the extent to which outcome measures contributed to the organisations achievements and organisational objectives and the difference they made or are yet to be made.

### 3.3.2.3 DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT

Describing their PMS frameworks or guidelines on the development of PMS, some authors stress the need for clearly defining the means of collecting data and of measuring each performance criterion within the PMS. De Waal and Counet (2009, p. 371) found that “getting the data to calculate the performance indicators” was a common problem.
The method for collection of performance data should be clearly defined by a set of procedures as should be the means and units for calculating and processing performance measures (Waggoner et al., 1999:55). Neely et al. (1995, p. 83) suggests that the preferred measures should be ratio-based and not absolute. Crawford and Cox (1990) suggests that data collected should primarily be reported graphically as this means is more easily comparable over time. He suggests, however, that there need not be specific numeric standards for doing so. He also suggests that the data collected should be done by those whose performance is being measured and “measured in ways that are easily understood by those whose performance is being evaluated”, (Crawford and Cox, 1990) thus, stressing the need for local control over measures. It is also important in choosing measures that a precise method is determined for their calculation, and the unit of measurement should be very clear (Neely et al., 1995).

3.3.3 MANAGEMENT PROCESSES FOR PMS

Having designed and implemented the set of measures there are a number of processes that are vital for the recurrent stages (see Section 3.2.2) to take effect, and thus, for the continued development and upkeep of the PMS. Their effect is not only procedural but to also sustain a PMS structure that is not static and that enables the PMS to be effectively used for managing the organisation. These processes, therefore, transition the PMS from the stage of design to that of Kennerley and Neely’s (2002) evolutionary stages of continuous use and improvement. Together these features are critical to “closing the management loop”, Neely et al. (2000: 1127), and ensuring the task of managing is accomplished.

Therefore, in addition to ensuring that measures have the right and diverse set of characteristics as discussed in Section 3.3.2, is the need to ensure the adaptability of those measures and of the PMS as a whole to the circumstances of the organisation for the purpose of managing. The literature would show repeatedly that to ensure this adaptability of the PMS certain processes must be an inherent part of the life cycle of the PMS. These processes include ensuring the measures continue to reflect the organisational strategy through i) periodic review of performance measures and of performance data to provide feedback ii) adjusting measures where and when required, and iii) keeping measures continually aligned and relevant. Also, from the literature we learn that applying a process approach allows for each of these processes to be on-going
and for continuous improvement of the overall system. Therefore, the third element of the ICF is a set of management processes for using the PMS (see Figure 3.3c)

![Fig. 3.3c Elements for PMS Development- Management Processes](image)

### 3.3.3.1 ORGANISATIONAL MISSION, STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

It is commonly and widely accepted in both the public and private sector literature that an organisation’s mission, strategy and objectives are the key referral in the development of its PMS (Maskell, 1991; Wisner and Fawcett, 1991; Blenkinsop and Davis, 1991; Kaplan and Norton, 1993; Globerson, 1995; Otley, 1999; Walker et al., 2010). Such authors recommend that these three—mission, strategy and objectives—should be clearly defined and used as the basis for informing the development of the PMS and choice of measures. Similarly, the use of performance measures in the EA idea was to have a framework that was defined by strategic objectives. These objectives were, however, to be set by those of the top echelon, that is ministers, permanent secretaries and Chief Executives, while the job of how they were actualised was to be the responsibility of the EA Managers who understood the job at hand within the set framework. By aligning the measures to strategic objectives, the purpose for choosing corresponding measures is made clear, by directly relating to and reflecting what is most important to the organisation, (Maskell, 1991; Globerson, 1995). Such alignment is presented in the literature as favourable for keeping individual performance in line with organisational strategy (Blackman et al., 2012; ANAO, 2004). Unfortunately, misalignment between performance measures and the requirements of agencies is not uncommon ANAO (2004). This position, however,
supposes that the organisation has a well-defined set of objectives, mission and strategy, which may not always be the case in public sector organisations. The following processes are to ensure that the PMS remains aligned to what is central to the organisation.

### 3.3.3.1.1 Periodic Review and Feedback

Crawford and Cox (1990) recommend that there should be an established periodic cycle for reviewing the PMS and that this review should include a process that involves review of all the measures in use (Bourne et al., 2000). The performance data produced should be reported on a frequent or periodic basis but checks should also be done on possible problematic areas of the PMS (Wisner and Fawcett, 1991). Blackman et al. (2012) found that there are many challenges to providing adequate feedback in public agencies. De Waal and Counet (2009, p. 371) found that a common PMS problem was that “the system lacks cause and effect relations or is over-complex due to too many causal relation”. The PMS, therefore, should be periodically reviewed to maintain the causal relations and currency of its measures to strategic objectives and to provide a steady flow of feedback (Wisner and Fawcett, 1991). “The measures should provide fast feedback” as this is essential for management to efficiently use the PMS to manage the organisation (Maskell, 1991).

### 3.3.3.1.2 Changing Measures

“The performance management system requires developing and reviewing at a number of different levels as the situation changes” (Bourne et al., 2000). The issue of change is an important phenomenon to be acknowledged in the development of a PMS (Maskell, 1991) but as suggested by Blackman et al. (2012, p. 17) the ability to adapt to change is a key characteristic of high performance organisations and the failure to develop this capability may be the reason why some PMS fail to meet “their espoused outcomes”. Through periodic review an organisation’s management should be able to determine from performance data or report generated whether there are internal or external factors that require a shift in organisational strategy and objectives, which should result in corresponding changes to performance measures. Changes to organisational strategy and objectives, therefore, should place a demand for the upkeep of the PMS (Waggoner et al., 1999; Bourne et al., 2000; Neely, 2000), for when such changes occur it is critical that the performance measures continue to be consistent with strategic objectives and that what is being measured is in fact what is important to the organisation (Flapper et al., 1996). To attain such a relevant and beneficial relationship may require making changes to the
PMS, that is, changes to individual performance measures or changes to the set of performance measures through additions or deletions of measures (Flapper et al., 1996, p.36), which may occur at any stage of the development of the PMS. Reviewing the PMS should therefore also “coincide with changes in either the competitive environment or strategic direction” and result in the development of new measures that correspond to these changes (Bourne et al., 2000, p. 758). The issue of change also relates to the ability of the PMS to sustain relevance to organisational goals and objectives throughout the life of its use, as the latter changes in the course of time.

However, the freedom to change measures at the local unit may be restricted by the control and influence of the institutional actors and the extent of leverage they exercise. The legal power of such documents as the Framework Document must be taken into consideration in this determination. The question bears on the extent of leverage of the EA’s CEO against the extent to which that power is only nominal.

### 3.3.3.1.3 Relevancy and Continuous Alignment

As discussed above, due to changes in the internal or external environment of the organisation some performance measures may become redundant losing validity and should therefore be removed and/or replaced (Flapper et al., 1996, p. 35). The use of relevant performance measures is non-negotiable for an organisation’s success (Neely et al., 2000). It is therefore not sufficient to just choose the right set of measures before implementation of the PMS but to ensure that after implementation the PMS remains relevant and that measures continue to “stimulate continuous improvement” in the PMS than simply provide data (Maskell, 1991). According to Waggoner et al., (1999, p. 58) “few organisations appear to systematically modify and manage their measurement systems over time”. Therefore what happens over time is the PMS becomes misaligned with the organisation’s objectives and strategy rendering it incapable of providing management with relevant data to manage the organisation.

Talbot’s Performance Regime brings to question the probability of attaining relevancy and continuous alignment in a PMS used in the public sector. It does not state clearly whether service delivery units are fed a consensual ensemble of organisational objectives and measures but leaves open a likelihood for ambiguity and even conflict of objectives coming from such a wide and disparate set of institutional actors. It is uncertain from the regime how or if this ambiguity may be resolved or, in the least, absolved. From the
analysis of Talbot’s regime there is, therefore, the likelihood of structural and institutional impediments to alignment.

According to Smith (1995), what often occurs in the public sector is though performance measures may have lost their relevance they continue to be part of the PMS, so that, in effect, the modification phase of PMS development is not executed. PMS therefore remain unrevised and irrelevant measures not removed. As regards to the use of measurement data collected, Radnor (2008) and Johnsen, (2005) have found that there is a lack of relevant data, with very low decision relevance to such data. This has been attributed to the time consuming nature of gathering such data so that no time is left for ensuring performance measures are even relevant and appropriate.

3.3.3.2 A PROCESS APPROACH
Together, these processes above equate to the steps taken in applying a Process Approach. A Process Approach, also called a Systems or Dynamic approach (Bittici et al, 2000; Bourne et al., 2000; Neely et al., 2000) from the field of Systems Analysis Theory, is an approach that contemplates the performance of the system even after implementation. It comprises different phases, which need to be continually revisited after execution to ensure successful continuity of the system (Flapper et al., 1996, p. 35-36; Bourne et al., 2000, p. 757). These phases are as described in Section 3.2.2 as use, reflect, modify and deploy stages (Kenerley and Neely, 2002; Neely et al., 1995, p. 755). Mwita (2000) recommends using the principles of Systems Analysis Theory for the development of a performance management model where Systems Analysis is defined as “the organised step-by-step study of detailed procedures for the collection, manipulation and evaluation of data about an organisation for the purpose not only of determining what must be done, but also of ascertaining the best way to improve the functioning of the system” (Mwati, 2000, p. 25).

Successful continuity being a key feature of a Process approach, we find Moulin et al. (2007), after successful design and implementation of the Public Sector Scorecard (PSS), questioning the ability of the Scorecard to sustain relevance in the context of organisational change. The clear suggestion is that with changing circumstances the performance management system could become irrelevant and cease to contribute successfully to the operations of the organisation. Many other authors have cited that maintaining performance measures that are relevant to the strategic goals of an
organisation is critical to the successful use of that PMS (Waggoner et al., 1999; Neely et al., 2000; Bourne et al., 2000; Kennerley and Neely, 2003; Olsen, 2007). To do otherwise, or to not do so, is to encourage a static PMS soon to grow laden with irrelevant measures.

It is important to recognize the dynamic nature that PMS must adopt to contradict any practice that encourages a static PMS (Bittici, et al., 2000; Kennerley and Neely, 2002, 2003; Paranjape, 2006). As discussed earlier, to maintain relevance PMS must evolve over time by being reviewed and updated as an ongoing process of its development (Waggoner et al., 1999; Neely et al., 2000; Olsen, et al., 2007). As cited by Waggoner et al. (1999, pp.55) “a performance measurement system is of no use if it is not able to adjust itself to changes in today's competitive environment”. Waggoner et al. (1999, p.58) cites organisational culture as a major barrier as “a culture which discourages risk taking and innovation can block action steps that are essential for bringing about successful change to the firm's performance measurement system”. “From an administrative point of view, a performance measurement system needs to be designed, managed, and evaluated periodically to ensure that it yields the desired [organisational] results”, Waggoner et al., (1999, p.55).

Adopting a Process Approach ensures that processes discussed before are enacted and that the PMS is kept relevant to organisational needs.

3.3.4 INTEGRATE PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

As the name suggests a Performance Management System is a tool that is used to manage the organisation. It is critical that “the measurement system actually drives day-to-day decisions and actions-thereby ensuring that the firm's strategy is implemented”, Neely et al. (2000, p. 1127). Wisner and Fawcett (1991) recommends that the performance measurement system be used for a number of management purposes, namely, “to identify competitive position, locate problem areas, assist the firm in updating strategic objectives and, making tactical decisions to achieve these objectives, and supply feedback after the decisions are implemented”. In order for this to be effected it is also necessary that the PMS be integrated with and conducts these functions in conjunction with other management systems.
Fig. 3.3d Elements for PMS Development- Integrate with Other Management Systems

However, according to de Waal and Counet (2009), one of the frequent problems identified by its 31 experts is that it is common to find in an organisation that the ICT system is not fully compatible with the PMS and that financial rewards are insufficiently linked to it. Blackman et al. (2012) describes the integration of management as one of the key characteristics of high performing organisations in both the public and private sectors. Talbot’s, (2010, p.107) recommendation has also been for producing a unified system for “allocating resources and performance targets and reporting and managing”. The integration of management systems with budgetary systems, by the inception of Next Steps, was, in fact, encouraged to foster improved management in government. There was a general awareness of progress and linking with different management systems in use relevant to executive functions.

Therefore, coming from the literature, the admonition is that a PMS should not be a standalone tool but one well integrated with and sensitive to changes in the internal and external environment (Bititci et al., 2000, p. 696). According to Bititci et al. (2000, p. 692) “current knowledge and techniques are sufficiently mature to create” such ‘dynamic systems’ using “IT based management tools” ensuring “that an organisation's performance measurement system remains integrated, efficient and effective at all times”. (See also point four of Table 3.1 Kloot and Martin’s, 2000). An integrated PMS can more likely maintain relevance between organisational goals and performance targets.
consistent with changes in the organisation (Bourne et al., 2000; Kennerley and Neely, 2002, 2003; Paranjape et al., 2006); while a standalone or non-integrated PMS is more likely to become static within the short-term and thus affect “the agility and responsiveness of the organisation” (Bititci et al., 2000, 694).

However, integration of management systems may not always be very plausible in public organisations. According to Pollitt (2005, p. 16) looking at the extent to which PMS were integrated with other management systems he found that as for the European experience, the “findings of the U.S. Government Performance Project” show that, “first, ‘integration is neither an obvious choice for governments nor an easy process’ and, secondly, ‘an integrated performance-based government is a progressive, building-block process’”.

3.4 CONCLUSION

3.4.1 LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE

The focus of the ICF is to determine whether a PMS is being used for managing an organisation. From the discussion in Section 3.3, the Framework raises questions and answers to several vital questions about the ability of a PMS to manage an organisation. One of those questions is ‘who determines what is to be measured’. Another question focuses on what it is measuring and whether what is measured is sufficient and appropriate. A third question asks 'Is it managing or just measuring'. And a fourth question looks into the suitability of the performance environment to adequately measure what is important to the organisation. Each question was examined in order within the first, second, third and fourth elements of the ICF.

However, some of these questions present other ideas that may be important for further research. The question of managing or ‘just measuring’ throws up another idea, that of management beyond measurement. That is, it questions the scope of the PMS to manage those tasks that are ‘unmeasurable’ or not easily measured. The linear, cause and effect model may present measuring as an abstraction of all that actually pertain to managing for performance improvement. Managing solely by measurement, therefore, does not fully explain the complexity that may otherwise be part of the managing process. This idea is also inherent in the second question, the ‘sufficiency of what is measured’. These are, therefore, limits to the ICF and cannot be addressed in the scope of this research,
which is to determine the contributions that PMS, with its *measured* performance, is making to managing EA organisations.

### 3.4.2 RELEVANCE OF THIS CHAPTER TO THE THESIS

Even as the field of modern performance management continues to evolve, the elements of the ICF continue to be an integral part of that evolution (Blackman et al., 2012).

However, this research, for the sake of assessing the contribution of PMS to managing EAs has focussed on the factors that are deemed the most critical and that occur more frequently throughout the literature. As you would recall, the Framework is not an attempt at another PMS Model but rather it is to be used to assess or evaluate i) the contributions a given PMS makes to managing an organisation, and ii) the viability of any PMS. In so doing, by using the Framework, one can assess how much and what specific contributions a PMS makes to manage an organisation.

For the purpose of this research it is useful to have a framework that can be immediately applied to assess the cases that would be examined during this thesis. As Talbot (2010) has shown for his performance regime, there is still much work to be done, so that at best the framework is a heuristic analysis of what might be and not a theory. Though heuristic, the individual parts of the framework have been used across the literature and appear, to different extents, in PMS frameworks and guidelines over decades as a means of assessing various aspects of measuring performance in both the private and public sector.

The Framework is first applied in Section 4.4 to examine the early contributions that PMS made toward managing JEAs. This examination is based on secondary data from Talbot and Caulfield (2002) taken from the first two years of Executive agencies in Jamaica. The Framework is again used to design the empirical fieldwork and Interview Schedule (see Section 5.3) and, hence, to examine the primary data collected. Thirdly, it is applied in the analysis of the primary data (see Section 6.2) and finally, in the triangulation of the primary data with the secondary data (see Section 7.2). In short, the ICF is central to the whole thesis.
Chapter 4

JAMAICA AND EXECUTIVE AGENCIES: Public Sector Reform and the Contribution of PMS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1.1 PURPOSE OF THE CHAPTER

This is the third of the three chapters that review the literature on PMS in public sector and set the premise for the research that was conducted for this thesis. The first of these chapters, Chapter 2, establishes a theoretical premise to justify the examination of mainly British literature for the study of PMS in Jamaican EAs (JEAs), given the paucity of Jamaican literature for the study. Chapter 2 also examines the organisational performance management literature and ascertains a gap in the literature, which founds this research. Chapter 3 follows with the conceptual development of the ICF for the study of the contribution of PMS to EAs to research the gap identified in Chapter 2, based mainly on the review of British literature from both the public and private sector.

Combining the tenor of the preceding two chapters, that is, the theme of path dependence as an historic determinant of future political outcomes and the presence of critical factors for PMS development, this chapter now applies these discussions to the empirically informed literature on JEAs. It traces the emergence of JEAs as a path dependent outcome, with policy transfer implications, to British influence on Jamaican public administration. This it does by drawing from the theoretical discussion on HI and PD in Chapter 2, applying Greener’s (2005) framework (see Section 2.2.1) and the arguments of Common (2013) and Andrews (2013) (see Section 2.2.3). It then reviews the available Jamaican empirical literature on EAs, first, to look at the role, challenges and the contributions of PMS to managing JEAs during their early years, setting up a comparative to the review of the theoretical literature in Chapter 2 (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.2.3). Based on this review, it then ascertains the extent to which the PMS used by the JEAs in their first three years were developed according to the principles outlined in the
ICF of Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3) and thus, the extent to which they were used for managing JEAs. Therefore, at this early stage of the study, this chapter begins to add to the sparse existing literature on PMS in JEAs by applying the ICF to analyse the sparse literature to determine the viability of the PMS for managing JEAs in the early years (see Section 4.3).

4.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter consists of three main sections. The first section, Section 4.2, takes a historical look at public administration in Jamaica over the past 350 years leading to the emergence of JEAs. It starts from the incipience of the colonial relationship between Jamaica and Britain (Section 4.2.1), tracing the evolution of Jamaica’s early administration to its modern public sector (Section 4.2.2) and its reform initiatives from the early to mid 20th century, up to present day (Section 4.2.3). The latter also involves looking at the attempts at reform leading to the establishment of JEAs (see Section 4.2.3.3). This first section reveals Britain’s historic role in Jamaica’s administrative development. It draws from Greener’s framework (see Section 2.2.1) and establishes that JEAs were largely a result of path dependence (Section 4.2.4), which in itself is an argument that contends against the backdrop theme of self-government that seems to dominate all of Jamaica’s history (Ayest, 1960). Again, examining the role of path dependence in the use of PMS in JEAs is predicated on the need to justify why the use of British literature for the study makes a suitable substitution where there is a drought of Jamaican literature to do the same. However, it does not draw this conclusion without examining the issue of policy transfer as a concomitant contributor to this outcome.

Bearing in mind that the main aim of the research is to examine the contributions that PMS make toward the management of EAs, the ensuing two main sections review the available literature on the development of PMS in JEAs during the first five years since its inception. The first of these two sections, Section 4.3, looks at the role, challenges and contributions of PMS to JEAs. Then, Section 4.4 takes a closer look at the early PMS used by the JEAs to determine the extent to which they incorporated the elements outlined in the Conceptual Framework developed in Chapter 3. Whereas Section 4.2 examines historical and other available literature on the development of Jamaica’s public administration and Section 4.3 draws from all the available literature on JEAs and PMS in JEAs, in particular, Section 4.4 is based on an examination and analysis of the findings
of Talbot et al. (2002), using the ICF. Talbot et al. (2002) makes significant reference to the use of PMS at JEAs. (Chapters 6 and 7 will then look at the use of PMS in JEAs with more recent data, based chiefly on the primary data collected during the empirical aspect of this study, in Chapter 6, and triangulated against the data provided in this chapter and more recent secondary data provided by each JEA, in Chapter 7).

Section 4.5 closes with summative remarks on the discussions that proceeded in this chapter, namely on the path dependent influence on the EA model, on the contributions of PMS to JEAs in its first five years and on early PMS development based on application of the ICF.

4.2 HISTORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN JAMAICA

4.2.1 EARLY YEARS

The birth of a Jamaican government was hewn out of British Imperialism after the mid seventeenth century. In 1655 under the British Commander, Oliver Cromwell, Jamaica was won from Spain. As a new British colony, Jamaica’s constitutional government was not as advanced as some of the older British colonies like Barbados and Nevis. As such, for the first seven years Jamaica was under the rule of a military government, which later gave place to a civil government under its first governor, Lord Windsor.

Within a year under his government, Lord Windsor fulfilled the promise of establishing an Assembly under the Old Representative System (ORS) of government, which was more in common with older West Indian colonies, and which allowed some degree of local power to Jamaica. At this early stage the Jamaican government and constitutional form bore a structural resemblance to that of the English government with the Governor’s function being representative of the Crown’s, the Council’s similar to that of the House of Lords and the Assembly’s to that of the House of Commons with judicial, executive and, legislative functions respectively (Ayearst, 1960; Spurdle, 1963). These functions, which were, often blurred in the early period, became more distinct during the eighteenth century. However, the colony was in no way equal to the Crown nor independent of it but was allowed some measurable degree of power of government, providing they did not contradict English Law by which they were governed.
Establishing an Assembly, comprising twenty members, was a first step in the new colony asserting some measure of pre-eminence in self-government. For the best part, as a colony, full power of government lay in the hands of the Crown. Then as a further step to curtailing arbitrary imperial intervention in their affairs, the Assembly took to further actions such as declaring it illegal for the imposition of any further taxes by the Crown on the colony without the consent of the Governor, Council or Assembly (Ayarst, 1960). Moreover, it also imposed a number of tax laws to buttress the colony’s economy. In these actions, they sought to enjoy the constitutional liberties of the more developed governments of the older colonies who saw “government [as] more a matter of local concern than of the King’s” (Spurdle, 1963, p. 26).

However, it was common practise that the patent office system allowed for the Crown to make appointments of persons. Local officials (Governor, Council and Assembly) saw this act “as an infringement of their rights and a diminution of their authority” (Spurdle, 1963, p. 201). Nevertheless, the power enjoyed by the Assembly under Lord Windsor was increasingly reduced under the second reign of Charles II as King, from 1660 to 1685. These victories were short-lived as Jamaica soon came under new governorship, Sir Thomas Modyford, who voided the former Acts, established a new Assembly with less power, and restored administration of revenue to the Governor and Council. Constitutional reform was generally very slow during the 17th century but it showed immense growth and development by the end of this period and beyond, placing Jamaica at the “front … of the West Indian colonies” (Spurdle, 1963, p. 112).

Over the century to come the Assembly’s power grew with Governors having reduced power over Assemblies but by 1865 Assembly power and size waned under the newly established Crown Colony Government.

Such interplay of the ebb and flow of local power represents i) the asymmetrical power relations between Crown and Colony and ii) the pattern that follows over the three centuries of the Jamaican government’s attempt at stemming the tide of imperial power. Imperial power retained the right to determine the form of government of all its West Indian colonies and the level of power delegated to them. The change of government in 1865 from the ORS to Crown Colony Government was evidence of the Crown re-asserting its power and restricting the liberties that the Assembly had formerly enjoyed.
4.2.2 EVOLUTION OF JAMAICA’S MODERN PUBLIC SECTOR

Crown Colony Government, which replaced the ORS, was a form of government with more direct control by the Crown. This system of government came three decades after the emancipation of slaves in 1834. Because the government was no longer controlled by the planocracy (that is, planter class which made up the Assembly), for the first time it allowed former slaves-turned-citizens access to some of the benefits of emancipation. In fact by the turn of the twentieth century, and moreso, after WWI, the colour of political leaders was slowly changing, making room for local-born politicians of slave ancestry who carried the interests of the local Jamaicans (Bell, 1964). Globally there were new thoughts on “civil, political, economic, and social equity spread” (Bell, 1964, p. 16) of which Jamaica was not left behind. Unfortunately, for Jamaica this precipitated in a failure by government and Crown to fulfil promises of reform. In fact, after its initial impetus for reform in the 1860s “crown colony government had become an obstacle to further progress” (Bell, W, 1964, p. 25). Instead, what followed it was an intensification of frustration and discontentment among the masses building up over the years.

By the late 1930s, such discontentment came to a head in the expression of work stoppages, strikes and riots that spread throughout the capital city of Kingston and eventually the rural areas. New leaders emerged, who were not legitimately part of the Legislative Council or government. Rather, they were freed men of the people who shared their common sentiments, and who, in some cases had received the best of education. They set about dealing head-on with the repression still experienced within the free society. These new leaders had the attention and confidence of the people and through this, and their own political rhetoric, were taking Jamaica to a new place in its politics. Sir Alexander Bustamante, a man of little formal education, and Norman Manley, a former Rhodes scholar and Oxford law graduate, were two of these renowned leaders. These men rose from the ashes of the 1930s unrest to reshape the political landscape of Jamaica, eventuating in their dominance in this sphere by the early 1940s. Each leader formed his own political party. Though differing in their politics- Manley founding the more left wing, People’s National Party (PNP), and Bustamante, the more right, Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), (Schipke, 2001)- they both emphasised self-government and political democracy with universal suffrage (Bell, 1964, p. 18).
4.2.3 EARLY REFORM INITIATIVES

4.2.3.1 Independence

The global recession of the 1930s spun a spate of unrest that could also be felt throughout the Caribbean region. In response, Britain commissioned an investigation into the social and economic conditions in her colonies in 1938 from which came the Moyne Report, which, though not advocating self-government, fuelled the drive for it. By late 1944, Jamaica had a new constitution that granted universal suffrage. This led to the first general election and limited self-government under British tutelage (Bell, 1964; Ayearst, 1960). Like her other West Indian counterparts, Jamaica’s leaders were relentless in their drive for full self-government. Through a number of “constitutional changes … in 1949, 1953, 1956, 1957 and 1959” (Bell, 1964, p. 19) they sort independence through a West Indian Federation which, though eventually failed when Jamaica withdrew, led to full independence from Britain in 1962.

Visibly, amidst the structural (economic, political and social) changes and challenges Jamaica experienced emerging from a slave to a free society, “the years of transition to self-government from 1944 to 1962 were relatively prosperous” (Bell, 1964, p. 29). Jamaica is cited as being ‘the best example of adequate preparation for independence among the former British colonies’ having sustained early “efforts to develop a governmental bureaucracy” (Bell, W, 1964, pp. 61-62). At this time, she also had far more experienced political leaders and, by 1954, a rising increase in those who attained tertiary education (political leaders 18%, Appointees 43%, Higher Civil Servants 39%), (Bell, 1964, p. 59). As Jamaica’s leaders relentlessly pursued their independence they did so with a sense of ‘coming into themselves’. Independence held for them many advantageous prospects, as they perceived it, among which were i) gaining self-respect and respect from other nations ii) accelerating the progress of Jamaica’s, politics, culture and economy; and iii) more efficaciously deciding their own affairs (Bell, 1964). Even among the minority anti-nationalists, who for economic reasons preferred colonial status, there was general consensus that independence would bring self-respect (Bell, 1964, p. 135).

As part of the decision for shaping the new politics of Jamaica was the decision for Jamaica to choose her global alignment. The world after World War II was a different place with two main ruling political ideologies- democracy and communism. To choose
the former was to be aligned with the USA, a superpower, or the latter, the USSR, another superpower. The decision to be made by Jamaica’s new leaders was strongly based on their perspective of these nations, their morality and dealings, nationally and globally (Ayearst, 1960; Bell, 1964; Schipke, 2001). Ultimately, the choice of government was the Westminster UK model, so that Jamaica’s alignment on the world stage was with democracy, and hence the US and not the then USSR.

In the period of independence, from 1962, and the decade that followed, there was considerable modernisation and growth in Jamaica’s public sector (Sutton, 2006, p. 38). The roles of the government expanded to i) production and tourism ii) establishing state-owned enterprises in the leading sectors of the economy iii) taking over failing businesses in order to save jobs iv) placing greater focus on social improvement to expand education and health and redistribute wealth v) adoption of ideologies championing socialism and challenging dependency [as was also found] in Guyana and Grenada (Sutton, 2006, p. xi). However, by the late 1970s the wind of change brought with it unfortunate circumstances for Jamaica that led her to enter into a Standby agreement with the IMF and which necessitated structural and other changes to her public sector.

The politico-administrative history of Jamaica reveals that the nation has, by its efforts and striving, the heartbeat and ambition for self-government and self-sufficiency. From her inception as a British colony, she has worked on developing this capacity. When catching up was necessary, she has drawn from the expertise of others and made adaptation suitable to her polity. Yet with this backdrop for self-governance and self-sufficiency one question looms large. Why has Jamaica not sought for full sovereignty from Britain? Why, unlike a number of her rival West Indian counterparts, has Jamaica retained the British Privy Council as the final appellate court and its Queen as her Head of State? Why have no definite steps been taken to become a Republic and to make the Caribbean Court of Justice, established for more than a decade, her final court of appeal? Might it be for the same reasons that many of her nationals denounced the hope for independence in the 1940s or membership to the West Indian Federation of the 1960s? Might it be that in spite of the strong show for self-governance Jamaica feels a dependency toward her former colonial power and a need to be aligned to her politically and as such to import her political and administrative systems?
4.2.3.2 Administrative Reform Programme (ARP)

The 1980s represented a period of economic difficulties that drove Jamaica’s government, as for many other Caribbean nations, to the IMF and the World Bank. The exacted price of which was structural adjustment to its economy and public sector, to some degree reversing the sense of pride and, “expectations and policies” of self-government that were built up since the early 1940s (Sutton, 2006, p. xii). This turn of events redounded in a drive for public sector reform in the 1980s in Jamaica and throughout the Caribbean nations. Comprehensive or piecemeal, but influenced by the NPM approach pioneered in Britain and other OECD nations, government was refocussed from its traditional administrative-centeredness toward being management-focussed- amongst other key changes. However, public sector reform had been a part of Jamaica’s history for decades. According to Priestley (1983) as cited by (Kitchen 1989), from 1942 Jamaica had at least 45 reports that focussed on public administrative change and review.

Following in this vein, one of the main government reform efforts of the 80s was the Administrative Reform Programme (ARP), 1984 to 1995. The main driver behind ARP reform was the need to create a more market-driven economy and thus the necessary environments to enable a more developed private sector, as was prescribed by the WB. It is credited as originating with the then Prime Minister, Edward Seaga, who fully supported the reform (Kitchen, 1989). However, Seaga supported the reform as the requisite to meet the needs of the public sector and the second Structural Adjustment Loan of the World Bank to Jamaica. Such loans did not come without suggestions for public administrative reform, especially when it was found that the purpose of earlier loans failed because of weaknesses in public administration (Kitchen, 1989). Inherent in the reform initiatives were some of the elements to be found in later reforms. For example, there was a strong focus on decentralisation and devolution of specific tasks to line agencies, as we would later find with EAs, and also a focus on assessing individual performance. Earlier agreements made with the WB and the IMF in the 1970s aimed at reducing the operational cost of the public sector whilst the ARP focussed on improving “efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness” of the public sector through restructuring both financial and human resource management policies and systems (Sutton, 2006 p. 59; Mills and Slyfield, 1987).
This reform initiative has, on one hand, been described as “a ‘quantum leap’ in the process of administrative improvement” that was to trail-blaze a path for other developing nations with a similar public sector institutional background (Kitchen, 1989, p. 351; Mills and Slyfield, 1987, p. 399). On the other hand, looking back at the ARP, Osei (2006) describes it as a failed effort. This failure came about for a number of reasons, including the exclusiveness practised by disparate project consultants, which led to a lack of cohesion, the poor involvement of in-government consultants that led to failure of continuity of reform efforts after foreign consultants left, and the lack of long-term commitment from the Government of Jamaica (Osei, 2006). These reasons are also suggestive of Andrew’s (2013, p. 17) argument that such policies originate outside the context of where they are enforced and that without “active, ongoing and experiential learning” from the recipient country, such policies fail.

4.2.3.3 Public Sector Modernisation Programme (PSMP) and Its Main Features

In 1996, the GoJ, after many early but failed attempts at reform to improve efficiency in governance as a whole, and the public sector in particular, introduced the Public Sector Modernisation Programme (PSMP), 1996 to 2002. This was assisted and/or partially funded by international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the UK Overseas Development Agency (ODA). Up to the mid-90s several problems existed within Jamaica’s public sector—“poor management, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, inadequately trained staff, lack of automation and computerisation, low levels of compensation and the centralisation of authority in personnel and financial management decisions” (BDDC, 1996, p. 11; Talbot, 2004)- that drove the need for further reform. Some of the conditions were similar to that which the British public sector faced prior to its Next Steps initiative, which had sought to bring more transparency and efficiency to British government (Common et al., 1992; Flynn, 2007).

Jamaica is heralded as having made the most ambitious attempts at reform in the Caribbean- reforms, which pervaded all of its public sector under its PSMP. The PSMP was built on the ARP and was later incorporated into the Public Sector Modernisation Vision and Strategy 2002-2012. The changes to follow included the establishment of EAs; improved customer service with the introduction of Citizens’ Charters; transparency in government in procurement and contracting; the implementation of a PMS for
Permanent Secretaries (PS); and human resource development programmes for the public service (Sutton, 2006, pp. xiii-xiv).

The hope for these changes was embedded in the main focus and objectives of this reform. Five of its main objectives were i) better efficiency in running the public sector with various reform initiatives such as an accountability framework for PS, tax and pension reforms, social policy and education reforms focussed on modernising the public sector ii) improving accountability through the use of performance management and various policy documents establishing the code of conduct for all public officers including Ministers and PS iii) improving financial management across government, especially through a comprehensive tax administrative reform initiative (TAXARP), to boost compliance and increase tax revenue and which, two years later, resulted in a 60% increase of registered taxpayers iv) and improving the human resource function and capacity “from one that was primarily record keeping to genuine human resource and knowledge management” through the installation of a Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS) (Sutton, 2006, pp. 61-66).

The initiatives introduced through this reform were similarly fashioned after those introduced in countries influenced by NPM doctrines (see Section 2.3). Jamaica’s administrative reform was not only partially funded by international organisations and government, namely Britain, but also relied on the expertise of foreign consultants, which came mainly from Britain. Changes included the introduction of EAs, an emphasis on measuring performance and use of organisational Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and generally modernising the public sector to place greater emphasis on a market-driven economy than mere administration.

4.2.3.3.1 Agency Development Programme (ADP) and EAs

Under the Agency Development Programme (ADP) of 1996, which formed part of the PSMP, the GoJ aimed “to create a smaller, efficient, effective and accountable public sector that delivers high quality service” (BDDC, 1996, p. 1). Drawing strongly from the British Next Steps model, Jamaica sought to bring more transparency and efficiency into its government by setting up small semi-autonomous bodies called Executive Agencies. JEAs conformed to most aspects of Next Steps EAs as defined by Pollitt et al. (2001) (see Box 2.1). The ADP remained the backbone for establishing these EAs and was deemed one of the most radical reform measures taken by the GoJ (Davis, 2001, p. 4). However,
some elements of JEAs are more comparable to New Zealand’s Crown Entities (CEs), where CEs are the New Zealand response to agencies working arms-length from central government (see Table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JEAs</th>
<th>NEXT STEPS EAs</th>
<th>CROWN ENTITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Classed according to 3 types based on financial dependence on government’s budget</td>
<td>No other classifications-just many different functions</td>
<td>Classified according to level of independence and autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>Framework Document that is reviewed annually, sets out the operations of the EA, its goals and objectives, services provided, financial objectives and accounting, and managerial arrangements</td>
<td>Framework Document that is reviewed annually, sets out the operations of the EA, its goals and objectives, services provided, financial objectives and accounting, and managerial arrangements</td>
<td>Statement of Intent that is reviewed annually, sets out the management strategy and key outcomes expected, including actions to be taken and resources to be used, goals and funding for the CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>Provides only service delivery</td>
<td>Provides services and regulatory functions</td>
<td>Provides services and regulatory functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>Managed by a CEO and Senior staff by fixed term contracts</td>
<td>Managed by a CEO and Senior staff by fixed term contracts</td>
<td>Governed by a Board or Council but in a few cases a single person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi</td>
<td>CEOs are appointed by Senior Executive Service rather than Service Commission- thus, kept depoliticised</td>
<td>CEOs posts are advertised openly but a majority are chosen from the Civil Service</td>
<td>Appointments are made by the government of the day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi</td>
<td>Staff is not appointed by Service Commission but selected by CEOs who are given delegated authority for personnel and pay matters. As such guidance to staff are prescribed in a Code of Conduct Manual formulated by each EA.</td>
<td>Staff comprises civil servants but EAs are given delegated authority for personnel and pay matters.</td>
<td>Staff is employed under private sector labour laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii</td>
<td>Accountable to Minister-submits Corporate and Strategic Plans and monthly report as set out in the Framework Document</td>
<td>Accountable to Minister- submits Corporate and Strategic Plans and monthly report as set out in the Framework Document</td>
<td>Accountable to Minister- submits Strategic Plans as set out in the Statement of Intent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Comparing JEAs, Next Steps EAs and Crown Entities
A similar set of conditions, as existed in the UK during the 1980s, was also concurrent with New Zealand’s public sector, namely, the need for greater accountability and efficiency. Public management reforms in New Zealand in the 1980s were also comparable to those in OECD countries and eventuated in the establishment of CEs in 1989, though the Crown Entities Act was of 2004 and only came into effect in 2005.

These bodies, like their counterparts in Britain, showed some measure of success. Hence, the GoJ gave considerations to both forms of agencification, political similarities and cultural and historical peculiarities but, as Jamaica’s Minister of Finance and Planning, Michael Peart, said in Parliament, Jamaica “follow[ed] the path set by the United Kingdom” (Jamaica Observer, 2002).

Accordingly, aspects of JEAs strongly bore the mark of Next Steps EAs yet carries similarities to CEs. For example, both JEAs and CEs were established as an Act of Parliament, whereas Next Steps EAs proceeded from administrative action rather than legislation. Also, staff in both JEAs and CEs is not graded as is done in the Civil Service but is guided by a different set of regulations, while Next Steps staff is classified as civil servants (see Table 4.1). However, by Pollitt et al’s (2001) definition for Executive Agencies (see Box 2.1), JEAs were patterned after Next Steps.

Of the projected 16 executive agencies to be established under the Public Sector Modernisation Programme (PSMP), the GoJ currently has 10 such agencies, (Briggs, 2009). Four of these agencies were created on April 1, 1999, (Davis, 2001; Talbot et al, 2002; Tindigarukayo, 2005; Briggs, 2009), four more by April 1, 2001, and two more thereafter (Tindigarukayo, 2005). The first four agencies comprise the sample for this research. These agencies, as described by Tindigarukayo (2005, p. 7), are

- Management Institute for National Development (MIND). This is the main public sector training institution in Jamaica. It also provides training and consultancy services to the private sector.
- Registrar General's Department (RGD). This is the only repository in Jamaica for birth, marriage and death records.
- The Company Office of Jamaica (COJ). Formerly the Office of the Registrar of Companies (ORC), this institution has the responsibility for the registration, monitoring and regulation of companies.
• The Administrator General’s Department (AGD). This institution is in charge of properties of persons who have died intestate, leaving minors as beneficiaries.

4.2.3.3 Purpose and Features of Jamaican EAs

EAs were therefore established with the view of meeting some of the inefficiencies in government aimed at under the PSMP. Some of the key objectives of implementing EAs were to:

• reduce control from central government
• improve management in government by delegating power to Chief Executive Officers to make their own decisions about their agencies
• improve quality of service delivery by government to citizens in a way that was efficient and cost-effective, and by having well trained staff (Talbot et al, 2002, p. 28; Tindigarukayo, 2005, p. 6)

The creation of EAs was governed under a Framework Document that delineated the legal framework within which the EA operated in relation to the responsibilities of i) the appointed Chief Executive Officer ii) the relevant minister and ministries and iii) its own rights and obligations, (Talbot et al., 2002). Some of their key features were

• establishing clear lines of accountability between government ministers and their departments through a contractual arrangement between the Minister and the CEO
• defining performance in an unambiguous and measurable way, for which targets are set out in the performance contract
• delegating authority to the chief executive officer
• establishing incentives that reward or punish results relative to the agreed outcome
• reporting and monitoring performance.

Unlike the Next Steps model, Jamaican EAs fall in either of three categories: Model A, Model B or Model C which, respectively, defines those wholly dependent on government funding, those partially dependent on state funding with substantial revenue from sales of goods or services, or those which are totally self-funded and raise significant revenue (Talbot et al, 2002, p. 31).
4.2.4 WHY THE NEXT STEPS MODEL

Greer (1994) argues that the introduction of EAs to British politics under Next Steps was both evolutionary and revolutionary. Many of the evolutionary and elemental characteristics of Next Steps stemmed from the failed attempts of earlier reform initiatives - managerial style of running government with emphasis on improved efficiency through a number of means such as increased autonomy, public accountability, performance measuring and contract management. However, in the way these earlier initiatives combinatorially shaped Next Steps, it was also revolutionary, and revolutionary insofar as it was very different from any other reform effort known to Britain. However, Common (1998, p. 440) argues that to apply the term ‘revolution’ to the public sector is to imply that there was “sudden change”, which he describes as a rare occurrence for the public sector.

It is with a somewhat similar yet different perspective that the development of JEAs may be viewed. Firstly, the introduction of JEAs, established in April 1999 after three years of planning, may be viewed as a sudden change brought upon the Jamaican public administration. Its revolutionary aspect could then be examined in terms of that suddenness or relatively radical departure from any earlier reform initiative and explained in terms of some considerations forwarded by Common (1998) (see Section 2.3.1). Secondly, its evolutionary emergence, however, could be examined through the lens of path dependency, as precipitated and constrained by earlier public administrative constructs that preceded it. These two perspectives are now examined below.

Common (1998) asserts that, in spite of five overlapping but different, possible explanations for the spread of NPM, the one with the weightier argument is policy transfer (see Section 2.3.1). It is possible that as Common (1998) purports, that these five explanations do have some concomitant ground in explaining the establishment, not just of NPM principles in Jamaica’s public sector, but namely, the establishing of JEAs, as a product of such principles. It follows below, that the emergence of JEAs is examined through these lenses.

Firstly, as seen in Section 4.2.3.3, foreign consultants (Common’s ‘management gurus’ - see 2.3.1) were, in fact, very instrumental, not just in the establishing but also, in the continuance of the reform programme that founded JEAs. Not only did international organisations such as the WB, IBRD and UK ODA provide financial assistance to the
GoJ to establish JEAs but they also provided foreign consultancy (BDDC, 1996). As a matter of fact, Talbot et al. (2002), which looked into the progress of JEAs three years on from their establishment, was funded by the DfID.

Secondly, if the idea of agency were argued toward a particular political ideology, Jamaica would be an exception. The passing of the Jamaica Executive Agencies Bill to becoming an Act in January of 2002 received the support of the Opposition, JLP, of which one member said, “he had no negative views on the executive agencies” (Jamaica Observer, 2002). Still, by the following month another of the JLP’s member raised questions about the likelihood of the JEAs becoming politicised, given that the CEOs reported directly to the Minister and not to the PS (Buckley, 2002). However, the following electoral term saw the JLP in office and, as government, it continued to give full support to the idea of EAs and the continuation of the Public Sector Modernisation Vision and Strategy, 2002-2012, overarching the agency programme. After twelve years, agencification in Jamaica continues to receive the support of both major political parties.

Thirdly, from the 1980s up to the period of the establishment of JEAs (the late 90s) and beyond, privatisation has remained a key element in Jamaica’s public sector reform initiatives. From hotels to its railway and its airport, and more recently, a hospital and industrial companies, have all been sold to private owners (Allen, 1991; Buckley, 2002b; Observer, 2002b; Gleaner, 2012). Privatisation, therefore, preceding and continuing beyond the introduction of EAs, cannot be argued as a necessary complement of JEAs. However, Sutton (2000, p. 8) notes that though privatization started in the early 1980s, it was toward the end of the 1990s, that is, when JEAs were being established, that it “gathered strength”. He, however, associates this increase in privatisation to the fiscal crisis of Jamaica, and not necessarily to the emergence of JEAs.

Fourthly, the involvement of international organisations in the design and implementation of the ADP cannot be underestimated. Reform initiatives of the 1980s called for stringent structural adjustments to Jamaica’s public sector and financial management by the organisations that funded them. Policies regarding these changes were mandatory for securing WB and IMF loans. The failure of earlier initiatives have been argued on the ground of failed implementation by the GoJ (Kitchen, 1989), which itself suggests lack of commitment and follow-through but also that the policies may have been more forced (directly or indirectly) than voluntary as Andrew (2013) describes to be often the case.
Fifthly, the prevalence and increase in the number of JEAs since 1999 suggests that, not only has there been clear implementation of the ADP but that there may be some measure of success. Such a measure is evidently sufficient to persuade the GoJ to increase the number of public sector bodies, which are given this level of autonomy and leverage. This increase in JEAs (see Section 4.2.3.3.1) also speaks of a level of government commitment to the long-term and suggests confidence garnered by the GoJ after over a decade of experience with working with them. Also, unlike earlier reform initiatives where there was poor cohesion between foreign and local consultants resulting in a breakdown when foreign consultants left (Osei, 2006), with the ADP, local consultants continued long after and were later further supported by foreign consultants. Also, conversations with the longstanding employees included in the empirical work of this study revealed that a number of them, especially three of the four the CEOs, were involved in the reform at least a year before it was implemented. Their involvement before the commencement as full-on EAs allowed them sufficient time to understand the requirements for their operation and the GoJ had invested time and effort in studying not only the British model of EA but also the New Zealand CEs. This would suggest some reasonable level of policy learning about Next Steps and, in the least, policy adaptation as an argument for the implementation of a reform that has been deemed different from any before it.

Having looked at these five possible explanations we see that the probable influence of each on the spread of JEAs varies from very unlikely, in the case of political-ideological motivation, to strongly so, in the case of international organisations and policy transfer influence. The involvement of international organisations in the establishment of JEAs can be largely credited, and, whether their reform policies were initially coerced or voluntary, the scale does indicate that the GoJ was and continued to be an active and learned participant of its reform.

Toward the evolutionary nature of JEAs, firstly, it can be related to the pattern of the politico-administrative development of Jamaica over its 350-year history with Britain. From the commencement of this relationship Jamaica’s government was shaped after that of Britain’s, at least in form, if not in substance. Even after gaining its independence from Britain, Jamaica elected to adopt a Westminster-Whitehall, and again British, style of government. Path dependency may be the determinant of Jamaica’s political behaviour
and form and hence the ultimate reason why she chose a style of EAs that was more influenced by that of Britain than New Zealand, or that of any other nation.

The evolutionary nature of JEAs can also be reasoned in terms of the reforms that shaped Jamaica since independence- first the attempt by the state to be the panacea for all the nation’s problems followed by the NPM infiltration through the ARP initiative and then further evidence of EA elements in the PSMP eventuating into the JEAs themselves. The steps that follow from one reform initiative to another are very clear but the reasons behind why the adaptation to Britain’s model and not, say New Zealand’s, may not be so easily evident without closer examination.

As discussed earlier in Section 2.2.1, Greener’s (2005) framework describes three conditions to be present for determining path dependence. The first condition is to show that there were other viable options to the political choice. The second is to demonstrate that contingent events were substantially instrumental in establishing the political outcome and the third is to state the conditions in which path-dependent systems constrain choices to the political outcome. It follows then that we can test for path dependence as a possible explanation for the evolutionary emergence of JEAs by applying Greener’s (2005).

Firstly, in the GoJ’s decision for a choice of EA, there were other viable options of arms-length agencies available to choose from. There were the Federal Institutions in Germany; Special Operating Agencies (SOAs) in Canada; Agentschappen in the Netherlands; CEs in New Zealand (Bach and Huber, 2012). To begin with, in spite of having some of the characteristics of the latter, JEAs can be defined by the delineation used by Pollitt et al. (2001, pp. 274-5) as shown in Box 2.1. Furthermore, GOJ chose to name their arms-length bodies after the name coined by the UK government, Executive Agencies, and, in fact, to admit that the UK ‘blazed the trial [sic] for us setting [JEAs] up here’ (Jamaica Observer, 2002). As indicated in the discussion for the case of a revolutionary explanation for JEA emergence, the GoJ’s choice was for a UK model, was taken after studying other models.

Secondly, contingent to the conditions that necessitated public sector reform in Jamaica were similar conditions faced by governments worldwide- the UK, New Zealand, Canada, Australia (see Section 2.3.1). As cited in Section 4.2.3.3, some of those conditions were “poor management, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, inadequately
trained staff, lack of automation and computerisation, low levels of compensation and the centralisation of authority in personnel and financial management decisions” (BDDC, 1996, p. 11; Talbot, 2004). The pandemic of NPM-type public management reform, as mentioned in Sections 2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2, that is, a focus on decentralisation and devolution of specific tasks to line agencies, on assessing performance and performance measurement- or put differently, Talbot’s (2004a) tripartite structure of structural disaggregation, reregulation and performance management (see Section 2.3.2.1.2)- was found worldwide and also contingent to Jamaican public management reforms. So this coming together of contingent events- the ideology of NPM being well populated worldwide, the willingness and commitment of the GoJ to the ADP reform, and the financial and expert support of international organisations, encouraging and promoting such reform- lent readily to the set up of EAs after the British Next Steps.

Thirdly, in the move toward reform, several arms of the British government and the WB largely supported the GoJ. The WB instrumentally assisted the GoJ In the development of the PSMP. Also, the GoJ, the IBRD, the DfID, the UK ODA and the EU jointly funded the PSMP (see Section 4.2.3.3) and, by extension, the ADP under which the JEAs were set up, while consultancy support came from the DfID (BDDC, 1996). It, therefore, stands to reason that had the GoJ sought support from one of the other OECD countries, NZ or Canada that she was more likely to shape her arms-length agency after their model. Given that both financial and consultancy support came largely from the UK “we would expect [UK] path-dependent systems to produce their [own] form and ‘lock-in’ to occur” (Greener (2005, p. 68). This is, in fact, what is evinced in the outcome of JEAs, and hence, establishes the argument of path dependency as a strong cause for JEAs. It does not negate the argument for policy transfer, and in particular policy learning, as a concomitant contributor but in fact establishes it, and agrees with Greer (1994) that the introduction of JEAs, like Next Steps, was both evolutionary and revolutionary.

4.3 EARLY CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF PMS IN JEAS

4.3.1 ROLE OF PMS

Talbot et al (2002, p. 34) lists five systems that should form part of the operative mechanism of JEAs:

1. the use of performance contracts
2. a Human Resource Development Unit to ensure adequate staff development’
3. Financial Management Systems
4. Human Resource Management Information Systems
5. Training of staff as a priority.

These systems together were to contribute to a new focus in the public sector on performance measurement and management (Briggs, 2009; Davis, 2001; Tindigarukayo, 2005), one of the basic elements of the Framework Document (Davis, 2001, p. 11). The use of PMS was to facilitate the NPM notion that governments should “steer more and row less” (Talbot et al, 2002, p. 27). The role of PMS, therefore, is to measure all the important aspects of performance of the Agency that enable management to accomplish its goals and objectives by steering. These goals and objectives may relate to internal operations and satisfying customer requirements but may also extend to higher-end ministerial related goals such as transforming the society.

4.3.2 EARLY CHALLENGES

Two key research studies- Talbot et al. (2002) and (Tindigarukayo, 2005)- were conducted to examine the progress made by the JEAs. From them we gain an understanding of some of the challenges that were faced in the use and implementation of PMS. Armstrong (2001) and (Tindigarukayo, 2005), however, provide very little on the use of PMS in the JEAs. They focus more on the benefits derived from establishing this new form of public organisation, while paying little or no attention to the contribution made by PMS to the JEAs. Some of the early challenges to executing performance management in JEAs are noted in Talbot et al. (2002). These challenges surround four main aspects, namely i) development of targets requires a more systematic approach ii) the responsibility of who sets the targets needs to be made clear iii) setting the right types of targets is required and iv) establishing a performance culture seemed to be a bit problematic.

The research reported in 2002 found that the reporting systems in JEAs were sometimes too extensive amassing far more performance measures than were practical. Some targets were “dubious and insufficiently robust … [there was] overkill in some of the reporting” due to too many KPIs and a tendency to emphasize process rather than output or outcome measures (Talbot et al, 2002, p. 7). It would seem that a systematic approach to the development of targets was lacking. Agencies seemed to have adopted an unsystematic
way of developing measures and were measuring any and every aspect of work in the agency. Instead, as Talbot et al. (2002, p. 37) suggested, Agencies needed to develop a few high level set of indicators linked to lower level ones. The impressive amount of targets may reflect a lot of thought in what might be important, but not sufficient discernment of what measures should hold more priority.

There also seemed to be unclear boundaries on where the responsibility rested for setting targets- the Parent Ministry, the Ministry of Finance or the Agency. The research team of 2002 reports that they were cited examples from all three having a strong input in this process. They also reported an allegation made by an Agency that seemed to raise issues of trust between Agency and external Audit, concerning whether the Audit team was using the prescribed ‘Financial Instructions to Executive Agencies’ to assess their KPIs, or using their own measures.

Another early problematic issue identified by Talbot et al. was the proliferation of process targets rather than output or outcome targets dominating the set of targets and measures to be used for reporting. Also, in the general scheme of managing the new Agencies by the process of measuring, the CEOs found the presence of a performance-orientated culture in their Agencies to be still furlong. Talbot et al. (2002) describes these phenomena as typical in the early stages of using a PMS.

4.3.3 EARLY PMS CONTRIBUTIONS

In spite of these drawbacks, the research of the 2002 team reported a number of observed strengths in the JEAs. These contributions would be examined here as part of the literature review and triangulated against more recent findings in chapter 7, which discusses the findings of the empirical data conducted during this research.

Firstly, they reported that the performance reporting systems created by the Agencies were very developed for external reporting and seemed quite robust and that there was a notable degree of transparency and debate publicly through publications such as the ‘Review of Executive Agencies 2000’ which give brief reviews with frank questions and answers on each agency. Within the two years of their existence the EAs had already made formal submissions to Parliament leading to “considerable press debate about Agencies” (Talbot et al 2002, p. 37-38).
By virtue of the volume of publications and hence attempts at stimulating internal communications the team reported a strong sense of commitment to JEAs by CEOs. They also found the level of cultural change achieved to be considerable. In comparing the development of performance reporting in Jamaica with Latvia and Tanzania, Jamaica’s is described as “best developed … with extensive reporting … within government and … [in] government wide reports” (Talbot et al, 2002, p. 7). As a result of the use of PMS and targets, some contributions were i) noticeable improvements while still at the early stage and ii) a steep learning curve in Agencies.

There are other benefits cited in the literature that focus more on the benefits of EAs but with no direct reference to the part played by the use of PMS. Given that PMS are supposed to form a critical part of EAs, the very backbone by which they operate, some deduction can therefore be made. Armstrong (2001, p. 1), for instance, reports that some of the benefits of JEAs are reflected in the recognition of staff performance, improved efficiency, responsiveness and courtesy in service to the public and an increase in productivity, transparency and direct accountability. One may deduce that the awareness that their performance is recognised and measured and the potential financial remuneration attached to such measurement may strongly influence the improvement in personnel performance in providing customer or public service. However, one cannot so easily deduce without further research whether other improvements as mentioned by Armstrong (2001) may stem from the use of PMS.

Tindigarukayo’s (2005) research focuses broadly on the level of change in the EAs, the direction or favourability of those changes and recommendations for the way forward. His research method is quantitative and reflects positively for the respondents’ opinions on the degree of significant changes and of favourableness to those changes. Similarly, in detailing the actual changes before and after EA status as pertains to several elements- organizational performance, treatment of staff, clients’ levels of satisfaction with performance of agencies and clients’ levels of satisfaction with service provision- the scale balances heavily toward satisfied and very satisfied as against dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. However, for the purposes of this research there is no reference to the role that the use of PMS plays towards these positive changes.
4.4 PMS DEVELOPMENT IN JEAS AND THE INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

4.4.1 CONSIDERATIONS FOR PMS FRAMEWORK

This section examines the extent to which the JEAs have practised the principles and considerations outlined in the ICF as necessary for PMS Development and managing of JEAs (see Section 3.2). Firstly, it is necessary to point out that in examining the literature for the PMS used in JEAs there is no clearly defined PMS framework. While the literature discusses in some detail the NPM and EA model adopted in Jamaica nothing is said about the PMS Framework used. As was mentioned earlier, though empirical works such as that of Tinidigarukayo (2005), set out to determine the benefits derived from the EA model as an approach to resolving inefficiency and other problems in the public sector, it makes no mention of the role PMS brings to these benefits nor of the PMS Framework used. As such, there is no stated definition of PMS for JEAs and so any emerging definition must be based on what is revealed about their performance reporting or performance reporting systems.

Similarly, because of the lack of any existing definition of PMS or clear PMS Framework for JEAs, examining the development of PMS in JEAs from these early research is itself a bit fragmentary at best. The idea, however, is to determine whether there may be any degree of systematic development for performance reporting in JEAs critical for the successful development of a PMS as discussed in the previous chapter (see Section 3.2). There, these critical factors are elicited from the literature as forming the basis from which one may assess the use of PMS in JEAs and the contribution they make to them. This step is therefore foundational. If it is that the set up of their PMS is essentially flawed then it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine what benefits derived from JEAs can be ascribed to the PMS.

At this point the research carried out by Talbot et al. (2002) is very useful for reviewing the early development of PMS in JEAs. This work would be examined in the next section through the perspective developed in the ICF of Chapter 3 (see Section 3.2). Chapter 7 will then discuss the findings of the empirical data analysed in Chapter 6 and triangulate it against the findings discussed in the section below. Chapter 7 of this research, which
seeks to produce the concluding findings, would look at this subject from more recent empirical findings triangulated against the earlier research.

The findings in Talbot et al. (2002) are, therefore, paramount to this examination. Though all three earlier empirical works on JEAs focus on the progress that JEAs have made since their inception, only Talbot et al.’s (2002) report makes some mention of performance measures, targets and performance management by measures to the progress of the JEAs. The findings provided by Talbot et al. (2002) are presented in two parts. The first part is a general discussion of the main findings found for all of the four EAs in terms of freedom, finance and performance. While the comments on performance give some insight into the use of performance measurement those made on freedom and finance give very little insight but do add invaluably to an understanding of the context within which performance measuring operated.

The second part details specific findings per case but is only revealed for three of these four cases- Cases A, B and C, where A, B, C and D are anonyms for the four JEAs examined in this research. The main and general findings are discussed below with all four cases in mind, while the specific findings, which are found in Tables 4.2a to 4.2g only refer to Cases A, B and C with some inclusions of the general marks added to all three. The tables used to organise these findings are those derived for the primary data (see Section 6.2). However, because both research were based on different research focus and design, these tables can only be partially filled and, therefore, do not produce the intended wealth of findings for triangulation with primary data findings (see Section 5.4.1). This earlier research still remains invaluable for this comparison.

4.4.1.1 Organisational Ownership

4.4.1.1.1 Accountability and Control

On the matter of accountability Talbot et al. (2002) reports that what JEAs had accomplished over the short period of their existence was remarkable in terms of the high level of communication and reporting of the JEAs measured performance. Clear lines of accountability are reported for some of the cases (see Table 4.2a). Reviews about all four EAs could also be found in the main newspapers, the Gleaner and the Observer, and by the PSMP (see Table 4.2a). This level of communication was evident between JEAs, with their parent ministries and Parliament, in their publications and even in the press, where they were frequently discussed. There was evidentially clear accountability through a
well-developed system of ‘reporting out’ and commitment from the higher ranks in government to the EA idea. However, there is no strong evidence that the systems are as developed and robust for ‘reporting in’ or steering the EAs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research Theme 1: To determine the extent of accountability and control of PMS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability</strong></td>
<td>CEO reports to Minister on performance of EA against Business Plan and targets. CEO is accountable to Minister and is assisted by a Board of Senior Managers</td>
<td>CEO reports to Minister on performance of EA against Business Plan and targets Chief Executive Board, of which CEO is the Chair, meets monthly to monitor B’s performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awareness of Effect of PMS</strong></td>
<td>CEO felt that there was a long way to go for a performance culture to be embedded in the EA. However, research found that the culture change achieved was already impressive showing a real commitment to change.</td>
<td>CEO felt that there was a long way to go for a performance culture to be embedded in the EA. However, research found that the culture change achieved was already impressive showing a real commitment to change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Usefulness of PMS to Managers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of awareness of PMS by the public</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attempts at making public aware of PMS</strong></td>
<td>Frequent articles in the newspapers, the Gleaner and the Observer, propagated reviews of each of the four agencies public awareness. The PSMP also a pamphlet which gave reviews on each EA</td>
<td>Frequent articles in the newspapers, the Gleaner and the Observer, propagated reviews of each of the four agencies public awareness. The PSMP also a pamphlet which gave reviews on each EA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2a Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002)**

Talbot et al. (2002) report an allegation made against an external auditing team that the team was not applying the guidelines established for assessing EA performance and were instead using their own targets by which the EA was assessed. The research team, however, did not have the opportunity to confirm the allegation, which if true, seemed to suggest that there were still some unclear boundaries on whose responsibility it was for devising the targets used for measuring EA performance. However, if true, the case was reported more as an aberration than the established practice. Another aberration was that
there seemed to be no clear line of responsibility for who should set targets as suggestions were they were set by the Agencies themselves, whilst others claimed that contributions came from parent Ministries, or yet, from the Ministry of Finance or, as stated above, from the external auditor. However, the reality of who set targets was outlined in the Framework Document and discussed further in the section that follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Theme 3: To the extent of performance data circulation among stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESTING:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examining data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMS Data-representation and importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO reports to Minister on performance of EA against Business Plan and targets. Frequency is not clear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive Board meets monthly to monitor B’s performance and acts in an advisory capacity to the CEO.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2b Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002)**

The level of autonomy found at the EAs was described as “real”, “working well”, and with regard to their human resources, “seriously implemented” (Talbot et al., 2002, p35). This also redounds to the level of control over their PMS. The 2002 research also found that all 4 EAs showed there was “successful delegated management in action” evinced by “well developed plans and performance targets”, which, however, did not leave them free of other problems (Talbot et al., 2002, p. 36). In spite of the new freedom EAs experienced with control over their finances, such as to ‘‘vire’’ funds within budgets; ability to put cash on deposits; greater retention of income [and] … retention of 50% retention of extra revenue generated’’ (Talbot et al., 2002, p. 36), CEOs levied several complaints against the Ministry of Finance. These complaints all reflected an infringement of their financial freedom and control, such as i) total income was equally divided between the EA and the consolidated fund ii) arbitrary decisions and budgetary cuts which suggested that their Corporate Plans were either not read or were disapproved
iii) informal regulations iv) promises not delivered v) one CEO found that where the Ministry of Finance criticised her plans with “peculiar, detailed, nit-picking comments” there were “no useful strategic advice and support” (Talbot et al., 2002, p36) vi) another CEO found her autonomy being eroded by increased bureaucracy from the Ministry and excessive monitoring. The research team was not able to verify these complaints, as their meeting with the Ministry did not take place. However, they found some of these problems to be just ‘teething’ problems, which were similar to complaints raised in the early period of UK Next Steps.

4.4.1.1.2 Involve Key Stakeholders

Executive Agency status in Jamaica was fully supported by the GoJ as part of the government’s PSMR reform initiative; in particular, there was strong political support from the Prime Minister (Talbot et al., 2002, p. 33).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research Theme 2: To determine the extent of stakeholder involvement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying Main EA Stakeholders</td>
<td>Foreign and local government consultants, existing employees, government officials in parent ministries, Ministry of Finance, CEOs, Chief Executive Board</td>
<td>Foreign and local government consultants, existing employees, government officials in parent ministries, Ministry of Finance, CEOs, Chief Executive Board</td>
<td>Foreign and local government consultants, existing employees, government officials in parent ministries, Ministry of Finance, CEOs, Chief Executive Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of Local control of PMS</td>
<td>Initial performance measures were agreed between CEO and PS, or also the External Auditor, or also the Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Initial performance measures were agreed between CEO and PS, or also the External Auditor, or also the Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Initial performance measures were agreed between CEO and PS, or also the External Auditor, or also the Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level and Extent of use of PMS data Internally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level and Extent of use of PMS data Externally</td>
<td>Also formal reporting to Parliament</td>
<td>Also formal reporting to Parliament</td>
<td>Also formal reporting to Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Staff Benefit</td>
<td>Improved training provision; Salary adjustment to suit performance and government wage guidelines; Increased employee satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2c Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002)

From the onset government’s willingness to designate local control to the CEO of each EA was evident in the Framework Document. This document was drawn as a legal basis
for establishing the EAs and how they were to be operated and the performance contracts that defined the terms and conditions of performance of key employees. EA status was granted to both existing public organisations providing service to the public and other service units in government that were converted to individual EA organisations. For those EAs that formerly existed as distinct government organisations, that is the RGD and the AGD, there was a period of transition of at least a year before becoming full-fledged EAs.

During this transitory period both foreign and local government consultants and existing employees were involved in the transition to EA status and as such, formed the primary stakeholders in this transition. However, government officials in parent ministries and Ministry of Finance were also part of this effort. A Chief Executive Board (CEB) was also part of each EA to act in an advisory capacity to the CEO and to monitor the performance of the EA. The CEB comprised the CEO as chair, and members she chose from executive managers of the EA and other government or non-government officials. CEOs were given delegated local authority and so exercised a certain degree of autonomy and accountability as is reflected in the discretion left to them to choose the KPIs for their organisation. However, in the first instance these were agreed between the CEO and the PS in the parent Ministry. The complexity of a PMS environment for service delivery or the intricacies that may govern the relationships of those who may be classified as stakeholders, as found in Talbot’s (2008) Performance Regime, is not, however, raised in this early research.

4.4.1.2 Characteristics of Performance Measures and Performance System

According to Talbot et al (2002, p. 33) “[p]erformance measurement and the setting of measurable targets, in consultation with the appropriate minister, were seen as the major means of standard operational practice”. The research team also described the performance reporting system developed for the EAs as extensive. One main concern they found with the approach to developing performance measures and targets was the high proliferation of them. About the approach, it seemed that they were not systematically derived starting first with few higher level ones and leading increasing lower ones. However, that “there were attempts to make them into ‘balanced scorecards’” (Talbot et al., 2002, p. 37) suggests that the idea of devolving from higher order to lower was followed but that with an excessive amount of higher order ones.
Table 4.2d Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002)

There was also the observation that mainly process measures were used and that little or no attention was given to output and outcome measures, and much learning was still needed in this area. However, Talbot et al. (2002) described this as common for the early stages of performance management systems so, hopefully, the later empirical data would reflect otherwise. Also, the literature does not proceed with a discussion of any further types of measure as, for example, in conformity with Flapper et al.’s (1996) or Neely et al.’s (1996) classification or on the appropriateness of measures or on the method of data collection and measurement (see Section 3.3.2).

4.4.1.3 Management Processes for PMS

Other vital aspects of PMS development in JEAs, such as periodic review and feedback, changing measures and relevancy and continuous improvement and a process approach, are not discussed in any detail. What we are told is that the choice of KPIs, which would
constitute the higher-level objectives of the organisation, were derived by the CEO and PS in the first instance. The extent to which the lower level objectives were derived from the KPIs is uncertain for this early period in JEAs’ history. We do learn specifically about case B from the 2002 research that each KPI was related to one of the strategic objectives (see Table 4.2e). The same is not stated in the specific findings for cases A and C. However, it may be reasonable to assume this is so, given that each EA was governed by a similar Framework Document which stated the key outputs, the key performance indicators attached to those outputs (this was left out in the only Framework Document received which was provided by A) and the main performance indicators.

| MANAGEMENT PROCESSES for PMS- managing the PMS data within an organisational context |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Research Theme 5: To determine the extent to which performance measures are kept continually aligned to main goals and objectives | CASE A | CASE B | CASE C |
| TESTING: | | | |
| Organizational Mission, Objectives and Targets | | Each of the 17 KPIs was related to one of the strategic objectives. | | |
| | | Additionally, 12 indicators related to time management strategies and 2 to financial strategies. | | |
| Relevancy and Continuous Alignment of Measures to mission and objectives | | KPIs were refined and expanded in the 2000/2001 to 2002/2003 Corporate Plan | | |
| Review, Feedback and Changing of Measures | | | |
| Reasonable Measures | 23 out of 32 KPIs were achieved, of which 20 were over-achieved | | Of the 37 KPIs, 17 were output, 9 Input and 11 Activity oriented There was an 83.6% success rate. |

Table 4.2e Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002)

However, from Talbot et al.’s (2002) account, it would appear that measures were not systematically arranged. We also learn that the EAs were well engaged in disseminating performance information to government and the public at large, through publications and the media, especially the Jamaica Gleaner and Jamaica Observer.
Therefore, there was significant reporting out but the extent of ‘reporting in’, that is using the PMS to manage and steer the EAs, remains unclear. However, it is yet to be determined whether the adaptability of measures to changing circumstances, or even changes in the organisational goals and objectives within the EA, is a key aspect of the PMS. So up to this stage in JEAs history it remains unclear whether any steps were taken to ensure that should performance measures lose their relevance that i) the relevant change would be reflected in the set of measures and targets and that ii) there would be an attempt to keep these measures continually aligned to organisational goals and objectives. It may also be that the period under examination was still too early to have the need to make such changes or to give a clear presentation on any developmental mechanism built in to perform these functions.

| MANAGEMENT PROCESSES for PMS- managing the PMS data within an organisational context |
|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| **Research Theme 6:** To determine the extent to which the PMS is managed and drives management operations | CASE A | CASE B | CASE C |
| **TESTING:** | | | |
| PMS- piecemeal or complete system | * Evidence suggest more piecemeal | Evidence suggest more piecemeal | Evidence suggest more piecemeal |
| Reviewing measures- periodic or ad hoc | * There is evidence of change of targets due to technical capacity limit within the EA. KPIs are re-assessed and targets were carded to be changed as A had no control over certain inputs relating to the targets | | |
| Management by Measures | | | |
| Monitoring accuracy of data from within | | | |
| Data synchronicity with real time performance | | | |
| Single looping | Nearly doubled its target i) Increased computerisation, which allow for reach of a wider clientele ii) Improved levels of communication between staff via system of internal meetings and use of email | With the amendment to the relevant Act, B was allowed to charge fees for special services and exceeded its revenue projections by 4% ii) In one case it exceeded its target by 52% iii) There was reduction in a turn around time for one measure whose target was exceeded | Introduced new services and consolidated others to improve its customer satisfaction: i) pay and leave applications and collect document within 10 days ii) Fast service iii) Extra fast wedding service iv) Genealogical research v) Mobile Customer Services vi) Special services Unit to handle queries of services not provided in guaranteed time |
| Double looping | | | |
Some measurable improvements at each EA have been noted in Table 4.2f. Improvements noted are i) gross revenues exceeding targets ii) staff training, communication and satisfaction iii) increased computerisation iv) ability to charge fees, thus boosting revenue v) reduction in turn around time for services, and vi) a series of new services provided by C to boost its customer satisfaction.

4.4.1.4 Integrate PMS with Other Management Systems

As stated earlier (see 4.3.1), Talbot et al (2002, p. 34) lists five systems that should form part of the operative mechanism of the JEAs

1. Use of performance contracts
2. A Human Resource Development Unit to ensure adequate staff development’
3. Financial Management Systems
4. Human Resource Management Information Systems
5. Training of staff as a priority

At the point of their research it would seem that these systems did not form an integrated whole as some were still in development and further computerisation was still a basic need or part of the new improvement. However, the Human Resource system is discussed as being “seriously implemented” (Talbot et al., 2002, p. 35) with strong support from the Public Service Commission, and the management of the EAs is described as successful with “well developed plans” (Talbot et al., 2002, p. 36).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Theme 7: To determine the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems? Where this integration is low, what are the reasons for that?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESTING:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of PMS and other Systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2g Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002)
The overall view of the financial freedom afforded to CEOs was welcomed but CEOs also found there was increasing intrusion from the Ministry of Finance that was contrary to the original stipulations for the operation of the agencies. These complaints surrounded issues such as i) an increase in bureaucracy and in demands for weekly financial reports ii) the 50/50 split of the revenue generated by the EAs with Ministry of Finance and iii) arbitrariness in regulations levied against the EAs by the Ministry. There was, however, a clear Financial system to be developed for each EA that included the installation of hard and soft systems. With exception of A, no other comment was made about the level of training received by staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research Theme 8: To determine how/if PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESTING:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can PMS reflect areas of improved performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can PMS reflect areas of declining performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2h Comparative Summary of Main Findings for JEAs, A, B AND C (taken from Talbot et al., 2002)

The main concern of this section was to determine the level of integration between each system and the PMS. This could not be done with the information provided. Also, the degree to which the PMS could indicate where the organisation was at any given time, that is, whether it was improving or declining in respect to its targets and objectives, could not be ascertained from the findings. However, it is reasonable to assume that given the early phase in their development and with other systems yet to be developed this could not be the case.

4.4.1.5 PMS in JEAs- first three years

In conclusion, there is meagre evidence that the embryonic years of JEAs were engaged in sufficient aspects of the ICF to render their PMS as robust or viable for managing their
organisations. Evidence for organisational ownership (accountability, control and stakeholder involvement) extends as far as an adequate level of accountability to external stakeholders but there is no evidence for a system of internal reporting that may substantiate that the PMS was used to keep managers abreast with internal goings-on. Stakeholder involvement surrounded CEOs, government ministries and local and foreign consultants and gives no detail of any further involvement in the development of the PMS. There is evidence of some level of local autonomy invested in CEOs over the JEAs but at this stage autonomy over the development of the PMS was largely influenced by government input, namely from the PS.

Similarly, several aspects for the design of performance measures (PMs) were lacking. The top-down design of performance measures from organisational objectives to KPIs and measures, though practised, was not a systematic procedure starting with a few KPIs and leading to more numerable measures. Instead, Talbot et al. (2002) found the number of KPIs, or higher order measures, were excessive. There was also no evidence of the dimensions and foci discussed in the ICF (see Section 3.3.2). Though these shortfalls are accepted as common in the early phases of PMS (Talbot et al., 2002), they weaken the ability of the PMS to be used for managing the organisations.

A similar argument follows for the management processes described in Section 4.4.1.3, as there is almost no evidence to support that the JEAs engaged in these practices. Also, the development of management systems was still on the agenda of these JEAs and so did not yet exist for integration with the PMS (Section 4.4.1.4).

It is therefore, evident that the PMS at this early stage was not sufficiently viable for managing the JEAs.

4.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented an historical account of the development of the politics of Jamaica in order to determine the influence of Britain on Jamaica’s politics and choice of agency model. In so doing, and by considering a case for policy transfer and by application of Greener’s (2005) framework for path dependency, it establishes that a number of contingent events pushed toward a JEA-outcome. Firstly, there was sufficient pattern of adoption of British politics over the 350 year relationship between both countries and
secondly, that direct influence and involvement of Britain determined that the model was fashioned largely after that of Next Steps and thirdly, that the conditions that necessitated public sector reform all led to the emergence of JEAs. However, the ultimate reason for this argument was to establish a justification for reviewing British literature on the use of PMS in EAs given the dearth of Jamaican literature on this subject.

The chapter also examined the first five years of the development of PMS in JEAs and noted a number of benefits. However, not all benefits were empirically attributed to the use of PMS to the management of these EAs but by deduction of performance measurement being pivotal to their operation, such that it was the very vein from which they operated, such attribution would not be far-fetched. However, some direct benefits have been that the reporting systems enabled better transparency in reporting the performance of EAs, that staff performances had improved in terms of their responsiveness and their courtesy to the public and that an increase in productivity, transparency and direct accountability had taken place.

Finally, this chapter examined the development of performance measurement and reporting system in her EAs against the ICF developed for this thesis. From this it appears that JEAs bear some aspects of the ICF but also that since most of the data available only reflect the development in the first three years of JEAs that a longer time span would be necessary to do a more telling evaluation of the success potential of the PMS. At this early stage, the PMS does not hold up as viable for managing their organisations. Thus the empirical work carried out for this thesis, as presented in Chapter 6 and discussed in Chapter 7, would aim to fill this time gap. Meanwhile, the following chapter would discuss the methods used for collecting and analysing the empirical work.
Section 2- The Methodology & Methods
This is the second section of the three main sections of this thesis and is only composed of Chapter 5. It draws upon the developments from Section 1, namely the research aim (the use of PMS in managing JEAs) identified in Chapter 2 and the ICF developed in Chapter 3 for examining the research aim, to communicate the realist methodological assumptions and perspectives of the research.

The purpose of this Section, and, therefore, of Chapter 5, is to explain and ground the research methods used in this thesis, and, in particular, how these methods- Template Analysis, Matrix-Analysis and Cross-case analysis of primary data, triangulated with secondary data- enable the realist knowledge claims that this study makes in Chapter 7. Therefore, the focus of this Section (and Chapter 5) is the development of methods for the empirical research that articulates the strategy and design of the empirical work in this study, presented in Section 3, that is, in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
Chapter 5
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY: Strategy and Design

5.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the main focus is the research methods used to gather and analyse the empirical data. The choice of these methods is derived from the underlying research methodology driving the thesis. The chosen methodology relates to the aims and objectives of the study and has been informed by philosophical reflections pertaining to the epistemological and ontological assumptions made in order to develop the focus of the study. In the context of the aim, which is, *to determine the contribution of PMS to the managing of EAs*, with particular reference to the Jamaican context, two objectives have been identified

i. to assess whether performance management systems (PMS) are a central part of the strategic management of EAs and

ii. to assess the usefulness of PMS at ministerial, executive and staff levels by assessing whether performance data gathered from these management systems influence
   a. government decisions at ministerial level
   b. strategic decisions made by chief executives
   c. staff performance and remunerations

Drawing on ideas introduced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), considering Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency, and in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1), considering Jamaica’s political historical context, the argument is made that there are reasons to believe that the application of British literature could prove relevant to the analysis of PMS in JEAs in terms of the above stated research objectives. This argument was focussed on the close historical relationship between Jamaica and Britain, namely in the area of their politics and public administration, and was necessary to justify the use of British literature for the study of JEAs since there is a dearth of literature focusing on PMS in JEAs, and the relative abundance of literature focusing on PMS in British EAs.
Drawing on the limited literature focusing on PMS in Jamaican government, and working with the relatively abundant literature considering Britain, an ICF was developed in Section 3.2.3 as the basis for analysing PMS in JEAs. It follows that the philosophical assumptions made in adopting a research perspective that is first framed by Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency and then driven by the use of an ICF need to be identified to develop a research methodology. This introduction to the chapter therefore proceeds by considering the philosophical assumptions in relation to the question of developing a research methodology (see Section 5.1.1). This focus on research methodology is then related to the choice of research methods and an outline of the chapter (see Section 5.1.2), given that the main focus of the chapter is on the research methods used to gather and analyse the empirical data.

5.1.1 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CHOICES OF METHODOLOGY

Burrell and Morgan (1979), who identify four paradigms of organisational analysis, argued that a researcher can ‘locate’ their research in relationship to other researchers by understanding in which paradigm one’s research and other researchers work is located. Della Porta and Keating (2008) similarly identify three dominant research paradigms, which they identify as positivism, realism and interpretivism. Della Porta and Keating (2008) argue that identification with a dominant methodological paradigm involves the adoption of distinct ontological and epistemological positions. Drawing on Della Porta and Keating’s (2008) description of these distinct positions, given the assumptions of determinism (see Sections 2.2.1, 4.2.1 and 3.2) behind working with Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency and an ICF to analyse PMS in JEAs, it is possible to identify, or locate, research methodologies by considering these assumptions.

For Della Porta and Keating (2008), a positivist’s position holds that social reality can be objectively known. They argue that for a positivist, the knowledge produced is always distinct both from the object of study and the researcher. As such positivist knowledge seeks to discover through inductive reasoning the causal relations that can be made to posit law-like generalisations.

The realist, for Della Porta and Keating, like the positivist, holds the assumption that an object of study can be objectively known. Unlike for the positivist, however, they argue that the researcher might influence understandings of social reality. It follows then that although the realist seeks for explanations about the governing behaviour of its object,
from which he may discover law-like knowledge, a realist methodology assumes a
greater degree of external influence about the knowledge produced due to the role of the
researcher and the nature of the object of study to effect change.

For the interpretivist, unlike the positivist and realist, there is no clear distinction between
the ontology of the object of study and the researcher’s discovering knowledge of the
object (the epistemological). Instead, the interpretivist researcher’s knowledge is
subjective and context bound. Della Porta and Keating’s (2008) point out that, rather than
producing law-like knowledge, interpretivist research considers the actors involved and
their motivation.

It is important to identify that though both positivism and realism may make
generalisations, the process for doing so is integrally different and predicated upon
different tenets. The positivist approach to generalizations about social phenomena is
deduced from regularities that are observed to occur by correlation of observable data
(Stockman, 1983; Sayer, 1992, Danermark, 2002, Caldwell, 1982). Whereas for the
realist, generalizations are not based on 'association of patterns of events [as for the
positivist], but the ascription of causal powers to objects' (Ackroyd et al., 2000, p. 29),
where causal powers are arrived at after study of the nature of the object of study. The
realist, therefore, first seeks for explanations on 'how' change comes about and the part
the object of study plays in producing that change, based on studying the nature of the
object (Van der Ven, 2007, Sayer, 1992) and only then may the realist determine if
generalizations are plausible. (The nature of the object may be defined as the internal
relations or elements or themes abstracted about the object and that are held invariant
within the context of the study, though the constitutive parts of those relations may
change (Sayer, 1992)).

Returning to the assertion in Sections 2.2 and 4.2.1, therefore, Historical Institutionalism
and Path Dependency point largely towards a determinist reality. In the case where this
research seeks to produce knowledge about PMS in JEAs, this reality may be objectively
known. Similarly, analysing PMS in JEAs, drawing on the ICF, assumes that it is
possible to identify conceptual components, or underlying mechanisms, to determine the
success of PMS in JEAs. Put differently, by working with an ICF, there is a basic
assumption that components or mechanisms that determine success are discoverable and
can be objectively known. Nevertheless, one must consider that the Framework may
involve a degree of uncertainty about the knowledge produced insofar as the nature of the object of study (that is the PMS) can influence the resultant knowledge, as is, the role of the researcher, for instance, in developing the framework (see Section 3.2). Therefore, although there would be an assumption from a positivist perspective that the ICF can be used to produce objective knowledge, from a realist perspective both the researcher and research objects may also influence understanding of social reality and, hence, influence the objective knowledge produced from use of the ICF. As such, this research assumes commitments closer to realist ontological and epistemological paradigms than it does positivist.

Willmott (1993) criticizes Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) focus on paradigms. Willmott suggests that a researcher might adapt a multi-paradigm perspective with several and contrasting epistemological and ontological assumptions complementing each other in a study. Although this thesis, with its focus on Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency and an ICF, holds realist assumptions, it does draw, to some extent, on the subjective knowledge of research subjects, namely interviewees, and the interpretive capacities of the researcher to both gather data and analyse it. To some extent, therefore, the actors involved and their subjective and context-bound knowledge undermines the realist assumption that research can produce objective and law-like knowledge, suggesting that the knowledge produced, therefore, is not independent of interpretivist methodological assumptions. However, since the questions are structured by the ICF and analysed in ways that structure analysis to the themes of the Framework, it follows then that the interpretivist assumptions are limited. The methods used are developed methodically by being derived from and related to the ICF, therefore focusing the research as far as possible on an adherence to realist assumptions. Through the means of objective analytic methods (see Section 5.3.3) for analysing the data, interpretations of the data are objectified and interpretivist assumptions are further reduced.

As such, interpretivism is used as a minor complement to the more dominant realist methodological assumptions underlining the thesis. This is therefore consistent with Della Porta and Keating’s (2008) argument that a realist methodology assumes a greater degree of uncertainty than a positivist methodology about the knowledge produced through research owing to the role of the researcher producing this knowledge.
5.1.2 METHODS AND OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

The methods used, therefore, are used to assess the success and, hence, contribution of PMS to managing JEAs. The chapter begins by justifying the focus on four case studies of EAs that use PMS in JEAs (see Section 5.2). The data collection techniques used to assess the success of PMS in the four EAs is semi-structured interviews (see Section 5.2.2.1) and official government sources and unofficial sources (see Section 5.2.2.2). Section 5.2.2.1 justifies the use of semi-structured interviews and Section 5.2.2.2, the official government sources and unofficial sources. This is followed by a discussion on the ethics employed in gathering the data, before turning to a discussion on Research Design (5.3). The focus on research design describes how the questions asked in interviews were derived from the ICF. Based on this framework, the main questions were articulated and posed to interviewees and these questions were complemented by supplementary questions, which were asked where appropriate in order to move beyond and reinforce the focus of the main questions.

In the next section of the chapter entitled Data Analysis (5.3.3), three modes of data analysis (Matrix Analysis, Template Analysis and Cross-case Analysis) are identified with justifications provided for choosing them. This leads into a description of the analytical processes (see Sections 5.3.3.1 to 5.3.3.3), which details how the data analysis methods were deployed.

Despite the careful way in which methods have been developed, given the realist methodological commitments, it is necessary to recognise certain limitations of my approach. The chapter, therefore, concludes with a discussion on the limitations and contributions (5.4.1) of the research methodology before linking the chapter (5.4.2) to what follows in chapter 6.

5.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY

In this section data collection methods are justified firstly by explaining the reasoning behind adopting case study analysis and secondly, the use of interviews and secondary data.
5.2.1 CASE STUDIES

The research strategy of enquiry is described as that which ‘connect[s] researchers to specific approaches and methods for collecting and analysing empirical materials’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2000, p 371). Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p 371) go on to identify the case study as one such strategy of enquiry that is reliant ‘on interviewing, observation and document analysis’. With regards to the data gathering methods this research draws on semi-structured interviews and documents produced by official government and unofficial sources. The choice of a case study method is well substantiated by theory for the study of organisations. Hartley (2004, p.323) recommends that 'case study is particularly suited to research questions which require detailed understanding of organisational processes' and an advantageous strategy for examining emergent themes in an organisation. As such, case studies are appropriate for analysing PMS in JEAs especially because the focus of the research is on developmental use of PMS in EAs and therefore emergent organisational processes that inform such developments. According to Myers (2009, p.80), case studies 'allows [the] researcher to explore or test theories within the context of messy real-life situations and to get 'close to the action'". With the focus on drawing on the ICF to analyse PMS in real-life situations, it follows then that case studies are appropriate for testing the relevance of the theories that made up components of the framework. Moreover, case studies are also well suited for research questions that seek to explain 'how' and 'why' (Yin, 2003). With the aim of applying the framework to test the success of PMS in JEAs, the case studies method would, from Yin’s perspective, appear relevant with regards to exploring and explaining ‘how’ and ‘why’ PMS are (or are not) successful in their contribution to managing EAs. Yin, (2003, p.7) strongly recommends it for examining contemporary events in which 'the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated'. Though the intention while conducting the practical aspect of this research was to get 'close to the action' (Myers, 2009, p.80) it was by no means to manipulate the process of the PMS as it exists within these organisations but to discover the extent of their application to effect organisational success.

Case Studies, therefore, are used as the method of studying PMS in EAs, with four cases in JEAs being the focus of the empirical research. The four EAs on which the thesis focuses were chosen owing to their relatively long use of PMS. In contrast to other EAs, which could have been included in the study, the relatively long use of PMS in each of the chosen cases made them more relevant to an analysis of the development of PMS
over time. As a result these EAs were deemed as relatively relevant to the research strategy.

Jamaica is a relatively small country and thus the potential range of cases for analysis is limited. Although examining four different cases may not be sufficient for generalisation in a positivist methodology, the research, bearing a more realist methodological focus, aims to develop objective knowledge, from these four cases, to explain, through in-depth empirical research, ‘how’ and ‘why’ PMS are successful, that is, in specific contexts in which emergent behaviours can be discovered in each case (see Myers, 2009) through interviews, documents and the relevant analyses (see Section 5.3.4). From the point of view of some researchers- Myers, (2009), Hartley (2004) and Yin, (2003)- a single case is sufficient for such explanations and even for some degree of generalization.

Given the view that just one case may have the potential to generate generalisations, it is that focusing on four cases may provide rich content that can be added to a limited but growing body of knowledge contributing to PMS analysis in Jamaican EAs. Moreover, it is also hoped that insights from this thesis may have contributions to make to research focusing on the wider Caribbean context, given contextual similarities, in culture, politics and history, and even beyond. From a Historical Institutionalism/Path Dependency perspective, there is indeed cause for optimism with regards to how similar cultures, politics and histories may contribute in determining the success of PMS in EAs.

5.2.1.1 Four Cases
The four JEAs under study for the empirical aspect of this research are the Registrar General's Department (RGD), the Administrator General’s Department (AGD), the Company Office of Jamaica (COJ) (formerly the Office of the Registrar of Companies (ORC)) and the Management Institute for National Development (MIND), and are referred anonymously in this research as Cases A, B, C and D. Each EA has been using PMS since their inception, though at different stages of their development, (Talbot, et al., 2002).

Originally, 16 EAs were to be established under the Jamaica Government’s Public Sector Modernisation Programme (PSMP). Of those 16, the government of Jamaica currently has 10 such agencies, (Briggs, 2009). The four agencies, selected for this study, were the first four JEAs, established on April 1, 1999, (Talbot et al, 2002; Tindigarukayo, 2005; Briggs, 2009). These agencies were selected on the basis of their longevity and
experience in using PMS. The other EAs were established thereafter. Early empirical work (Talbot et al., 2002; Tindigarukayo, 2005) conducted on JEAs was, in the case of Talbot et al. (2002), focussed on these four agencies while Tindigarukayo (2005) focussed on the first 8 JEAs. These early work with their ready historic data and findings provided an added impetus to select the first four JEAs for this study. These agencies, as described by Tindigarukayo (2005, p. 7) are

- **Management Institute for National Development (MIND):** the main public sector training institution in Jamaica. It also provides training and consultancy services to the private sector.
- **Registrar General's Department (RGD):** the only repository in Jamaica for birth, marriage and death records.
- **Office of the Registrar of Companies (ORC):** the only institution with responsibility for the registration, monitoring and regulation of companies.
- **The Administrator General’s Department (AGD):** the institution in charge of properties of persons who have died intestate, leaving minors as beneficiaries.

**5.2.2 DATA COLLECTION**

The research is developed through semi-structured interviews as the main data collection method. The interviews are supplemented by documents from official government and unofficial sources. We saw above that Denzin and Lincoln deemed these appropriate methods for data gathering in case study analysis (King 2004a) and in this section explanations of how these sources were used to gather data from the empirical field are discussed given the realist methodological commitment prevalent to the study (see Section 5.1.2).

**5.2.2.1 Primary Data- Interviews**

Myers (2009, p.80) identifies several problems associated with the use of interviews. These include difficulties in gaining access to relevant organisations and to key personnel in organisations to which access is gained; and, particularly for inexperienced researchers, the problem for a scholar to be able to discern relevant from irrelevant issues. Despite identifying these disadvantages, it is worth noting that access to relevant organisations for case study analysis has been gained for this research (namely, the four JEAs mentioned in Section 5.2.1.1). Moreover, following Chan’s (2004) advice that administrators with broad responsibilities can be identified as key personnel; such
targeted personnel were interviewed in each JEA. These administrators included mainly senior officials who played roles in design, implementation and/or monitoring of PMS in their organisation. In-depth interviews with these officials were held but were left open-ended in the style of a semi-structured interview to allow a detailed and nuanced understanding of decision-making involving the use of PMS (Marschan-Piekkari, 1998) to be articulated. As such, respondents were encouraged to develop and 'to clarify their thoughts' on the themes discussed (King, 2004a). Myers, (2009, p.80), also argues that an advantage of interviews is that they hold 'face validity' and, where respondents are available, may afford an hundred per cent respondent rate. 'Face validity' analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this research because such analysis introduces a largely subjective analysis that is inconsistent with the objective analytic methods applied in this research.

Interviews were kept semi-structured and opened-ended to elicit from interviewees as in-depth information as was needed on any relevant issue of interest that arose. In addition to the Interview Schedule (Appendix 5.2), questions likely to elicit dialogue during the interviews were based around issues like the type of PMS implemented, rationale behind choice, efficacy of PMS, structure of organisation, organisational experience of PMS, extent to which PMS meets the 'golden thread' (Micheli, et al., 2010), changes experienced by the organisation since implementation of the PMS in relation to change in electoral government, change in internal organisational structure that result in key staff being transferred, national threat or crisis or any other changes that may have arisen in discussions with the interviewee (see Section 5.3.1).

The interviews were recorded digitally, where permitted, along with note taking to form verbatim records (Yin, 2003). The preferred forum was face-to-face interviews, rather than by telephone or email, though the latter remained an option if it became necessary or as supplementary to following up or initiating interviews (Myers, 2009). Where the electronic media was necessary it was used as a substitute. The advantage of this latter form is it is time redeeming when not requiring transcription (Morgan and Symon, 2004).

The main thrust behind the interviews, however, was to evoke informed responses from respondents that could be fed into how their PMS was contributing strategically to attaining organisational goals in Jamaican EAs.
5.2.2.1.1 Respondents
On average there were 10 interviewees per case- altogether there were 39 interviewees from the four cases and 2 others indirectly affiliated with central government. Interviewees ranked from mainly executive management, then junior and senior managerial and supervisory positions, and lower ranked employees or officers. In few cases a number of long serving employees who were employed prior to executive agency status also formed part of this caucus. Notably, for each case the Chief Executive Officer made herself available for interviewing. Interviews were held for an average of one hour, with two exceeding 1.5 hours and one just over 2 hours. Ministerial officials from central government were neither accessible nor available for interviews (see Section 5.4.1 for the impact of this on the research objectives). In one case the ministerial officer postponed the time of the interview, then ultimately declined from being interviewed. In another case, the ministerial representative was a contractual employee from the Canadian government and a former Jamaican citizen. However, the interview with the latter was very brief. (See Appendix 5.5 for a profile of each interviewee. To maintain anonymity the age and length of service of each interviewee is kept within a range and job title is kept generic, as described above).

5.2.2.2 Secondary Data- Official Government Sources and Unofficial Sources
Two main sources of secondary data were official government data and a report from an earlier research that looked into the study of agency creation programmes. Articles from reputable media sources were also useful. The official government data were provided by the CEOs from each JEA and form the main source of data used for triangulation against the primary data in Chapter 7. This secondary data cover the period from 2005 to 2011. They include both reports and Strategic Plans sent by the JEAs to their parent ministries and other stakeholders. In most cases the reports are only dated up to 2007, with the exception of C who also provided 2010 reports. The annual reports that each case study provided are: A for the period 2005-6, B for 2004-5 and 2006-7, C for 1998-9 and 2005-6, and D for 2008-9 and 2009-10. C also provided quarterly reports for the first three quarters in 2010, a weekly and monthly Human Resource department reports to the CEO (for May and January 2011, respectively) and forms for performance appraisal and development, while A provided its Framework Document (with several key pages omitted). Case studies B, C and D each provided a Strategic Business Plan for the periods 2009-14 (for B) and 2011-2014 (for C and D). Attempts to get a strategic plan from A
proved unfruitful. Electronic data was also accessed from agency websites and other government websites such as the Jamaica Information Service (JIS).

The findings in the report by Talbot et al. (2002) were the other important source of secondary data covering the first three years of JEA status. Indeed, these historic data are useful to the live (primary) data collected from interviews as they allow for comparisons, possible explanations and even development of patterns over the years and for institutional behaviours encountered in the Jamaican EAs. Indeed, this data brings to the thesis a longitudinal perspective on the research question that allows for the examination of the development of PMS for managing JEAs over a twelve-year period, 1999 to 2011 (see Section 7.2).

Unofficial sources came from the Jamaican media such as the Jamaica Gleaner, Jamaica Observer and BBC News Jamaica, online news that report political affairs in Jamaica. These were especially useful for in examining the historical development of Jamaica’s public administration in Section 4.2. Other unofficial sources expected to be taken from publications from practitioner journals and Caribbean academic journals such as the Caribbean Journal of Public Sector Management were not available.

Secondary documents, in particular online sources, were used at the initial stage of data collection for surfacing 'salient concepts', (Yin, 2003). However, they were also used as supplementary to the final stage to give clarification to data collected from interviews. The point by Rowlinson, (2004, p.302) is well taken that this type of data is unlike data from interviews as it is “merely collected” and not “directly generated”. Media reports also proved a useful source of information in so far as it inform emergent understandings of the field of study.

5.2.3 ETHICAL APPROACH

This section describes the ethical approach to conducting interviews for this research. Well in advance of commencing the interviews all CEOs were invited by email to participate in the interview. Request was made to interview their managerial staff. They were provided with information about the research, the aims, outcomes, confidentiality and use of data collected, their purpose in the research, possible duration of interviews and other information according to the instructions provided by the University of Manchester. ‘Informed consent’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p33) was thus requested and
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN- OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE RESEARCH STRATEGY

This section discusses the Interview Schedule used during the fieldwork aspect of this research- the questions themselves, their sources and justification for use in this research. The Interview Schedule comprises a set of research themes with supporting questions built around the four key components of the ICF developed for analysing the success of PMS (see fig. 1). Initially there were five research themes (Appendix 5.1) broken into sub-questions but these sub-questions were further revised. The revised questions included four sets of research themes organised according to the ICF (see Section 5.3.1) and some supplementary questions (see Section 5.3.2) organised according to Neely’s et al. (1995) PMS construct to elicit more detailed information during interviews and to more thoroughly investigate the action of PMS in managing JEAs. A large number of these questions have proven validity by virtue that expert researchers in the field, namely, Talbot and Caulfield (2002, pp.136-137) and Pollitt (2005, pp 17-18) have used them. Talbot and Caulfield (2002) examine EAs in Jamaica and other developing countries while Pollitt (2005) compares performance management in EAs in four European countries. The questions with proven validity are written in italics (see Appendix 5.2) and are either quoted directly or adapted from these sources. The ICF further informs the other questions, which include the initial and revised questions developed by the researcher. For the actual interviews, questions were grouped according to their relevance to the position and experience of the interviewee.

5.3.1 INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (ICF) AND THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The Interview Schedule was fundamentally derived from the ICF developed in Chapter 3. It thus fulfils the aims and objectives of the research principles, which were defined through the development of the framework. This section, therefore, describes the
Interview Schedule in its relationship with the ICF and aims, objectives and principles of the study.

The Interview Schedule initially comprised four sets of research themes that each relate respectively to the four elements in the ICF (organisational ownership, characteristics of performance measures, management processes for PMS and the integration of PMS with other management systems). (The number of research themes was later broken down to eight as the data analysis methods were applied to the primary data- see Section 5.3.3 and Appendix 5.3). Each theme comprises a set of questions that were used to elicit information consistent with the themes from interviewees at the JEAs.

The first set of research themes in the Interview Schedule was broken in three parts each with its own set of questions. The research themes were to determine the importance of accountability and control of PMS; to determine the importance of stakeholder involvement at the given EA; and to determine the importance of performance data circulation among stakeholders. These research themes therefore examine organisational ownership, the first consideration in the ICF and one of the fundamental elements that enables us to determine the importance of a PMS to the operations within EAs. In fulfilling these objectives the questions sought to discover

i. the level of awareness of the use of PMS at the EA by employees and the public
ii. the attempts to enhance awareness
iii. whether the PMS is continually used and developed with local control
iv. and if the data derived from the PMS is disseminated and used by the local organisation and other government ministries.

The second research theme in the Interview Schedule was singular, that is, to determine the spectrum of performance measures in use at the EA. This research theme examines the second consideration of the ICF, characteristics of performance measures. In fulfilment of these research themes the questions that follow sought to discover

i. the spread of measures according to Kaplan and Norton’s (2001) and Flapper’s et al (1996), as discussed in the framework in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.3.2.2)
ii. the alignment of the departmental measures to the organisational Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
iii. and whether there were conflicting measures in the PMS.
The third set of research themes in the Interview Schedule was broken into two parts. The first part was designed to determine whether performance measures are kept continually aligned to the organisation’s strategy, main aims, goals and objectives. The second part was to determine how the PMS is managed and whether it drives management operations. These research themes, thus, examine the third consideration of the framework, management processes for PMS. In so doing, the questions that follow these research themes sought to discover

i. whether there is data synchronicity with real life performance and steps taken to ensure data accuracy
ii. whether there are steps within the EAs management operation to ensure that performance measures are kept relevant and continually aligned to the organisation’s strategy, main aims, goals and objectives through a deliberate process of reviewing and feedback, and the regularity of this process
iii. whether the data derived from the PMS is used to manage the EA
iv. and therefore, the extent and levels of organisational learning, that is, whether the event of single looping (the agency improving itself as a result of using the data) or double looping (the agency changing itself as a result of using the data) is occurring.

The fourth set of research themes in the Interview Schedule also comprised two parts. The first part was designed to determine whether the PMS was integrated with other management systems and where possible to determine the reasons why this integration may have been low. The second part was to determine how PMS may provide information on the success or failure of EAs over time. These research themes, thus, examined the fourth consideration of the framework, integration of PMS with other management systems. In so doing, the questions that follow these research themes sought to discover

i. what other management systems existed within the EA and whether they were integrated with the PMS
ii. and whether the PMS could provide and compare time (historic and current) information about the EA’s performance and thus tell the areas where the EA was improving or declining.
Overall, by examining each research theme a determination may be made for the overarching question that seeks to determine how far PMS contributed to operating and managing EAs. This determination would be made from the discussion that proceeds in chapter 7 on the analysis of the data and findings.

5.3.2 SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS

Further questions were added to the Interview Schedule to elicit more data from interviewees that are relevant to the ICF. These questions were based on the three levels of the Neely’s et al (1995) PMS Construct (see Section 3.2.2), that is, the individual measures, the PM system itself and its integration with other systems, and were added as supplementary questions to those discussed above, to strengthen them and, in some cases, to be further used in the analysis of the data collected. Questions at the measures level were used with questions that dealt with the spectrum of measures of research theme 2. Those at the systems level were incorporated with questions for research theme 3, focussed on systems alignment to organisational goals and systems coverage of departments, organisational aspects and systems improvement. Those at the systems integration level were incorporated with questions from research theme 4, dealing with systems integration, and research theme 2, looking at spectrum and coverage of measures. Where these added questions are used they contribute to the data presentation of chapter 6 and to the discussion on data analysis and findings in chapter 7.

5.3.3 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS

The approach to analysing the data for the four cases is based on realist methodological assumptions informing the study. Yin (2003, p.120) suggests that the most appropriate data analysis method for explanatory case studies is ‘a special type of pattern matching’. Three pattern-matching forms of data analysis methods are applied Matrix Analysis, Template Analysis and Cross-case Analysis.

Having first experimented with these data analysis methods to analyse sample data I found the dynamic and flexibility of the process of developing the templates and matrices to be consistent with the progression of conducting interviews by allowing for insertions, deletions, change of scope or changing the order of already classified codes (King, 2004b, pp. 261-263). An initial Template of basic codes is generated from a first analysis, which is then used to produce a matrix structure. The matrix structure is used to further
investigate the subsequent interviews, which, in turn, informs the Template. Both template and matrix analyses are very compatible analytic methods that enable the researcher to objectify the knowledge gathered in accordance with the components of the ICF in this thesis. This analytic process therefore makes it possible to claim objective knowledge about the level of the success of the development of PMS in JEAs using the ICF to describe the ‘real’ mechanisms, which determine success (according to the literature- see Chapter 3).

Examining the matrix structure gives further ideas for other gaps that could be further examined in a sort of reiterative and recursive way. As Miles et al. (1994) suggests, finding key themes in isolated cases may not be clear 'without cross-case analysis'. So where common themes or constructs can be found cross-case analysis was also used to analyse data to produce a general explanation. Data that was generated by interviews was triangulated with data collected from documents. Nadin and Cassell, (2004) suggests an iterative process for analysing case study data. This alludes to a recursion of data analysis from the start of data gathering until data satisfactorily fit into key themes and questions and patterns being discovered during the process. The full process is described in Sections 5.3.3.1 to 5.3.1.4.

Fitting the data to the key themes identified in the ICF is important to the logic of the study. As was suggested in Section 5.1.1, the use of semi-structured interviews may lead to context-bound subjective knowledge produced through the interactions of interviewee and interviewer. It follows that the knowledge produced may not be independent of the subjective understandings of the interviewer and it would, therefore, be necessary to acknowledge assumptions associated with an interpretivist research methodology (see Section 5.1.1). However, working with the responses from many interviewees over a similar question set and fitting the data into themes derived from the ICF and analysed through matrix, template and cross-case analysis, to some extent mitigates against this problem for a research committed to realist methodological assumptions. It does this by objectifying the knowledge in the process of analysing the data by cross analysing the varied responses to anyone question and doing so according to the components of the ICF. With this in mind, it is necessary to discuss these different analytic methods that enable the researcher to claim objective knowledge about the success of the development
of PMS in JEAs. The full process is discussed in the three analytical methods below (see Sections 5.3.3.1 to 5.3.1.4).

### 5.3.3.1 Template Analysis

King (2004, p. 256), writing about template analysis (TA), describes it as suitable for a “range of epistemological positions”. He highlights it as useful to the realist qualitative position, as adopted in this research, where attaining research objectivity is significant to the epistemological paradigm. He explains the usefulness of TA to allow for creation of structured codes, which helps in examining the interview in detail and through revisionary steps help in further analysis (King, 2004b). He further describes the process as neither hard and fast nor prescriptive but embodying a range of techniques where reliable coding is integral to the process. The flexible nature of TA (King, 2004b), and the unpredictability of doing open interviews make for compatibility between both these methods. The versatility of using TA therefore allows for openness with the data yet within a workable structure that can be defined by the researcher (King, 2004b) according to the themes of the research, which initially for this research are the components of the ICF. The process of defining codes is, in fact, the initial stage of analysis and usually entails several layers of coding. Template Analysis, as applied in this research includes up to five levels of coding- level-one codes, level-two codes, up to level-five codes. Each layer of coding further brings out the depth and power of the detail in the data (Nadin and Cassell, 2004, p. 281), as they form themes, from which the data may be explored. This process of coding can be redefined at any stage but, at first, is essential to create the basic template.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Management Processes for Management Processes for PMS- (Level-one Code)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Objective 6: determining the extent to which the PMS is managed and drives management operations- (Level-two Code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Is the PMS piecemeal or complete system- (Level-three Code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Reviewing Process– periodic or ad hoc - (Level-four Code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Monitoring accuracy of data - (Level-four Code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Internal- (Level-five Code)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Box. 5.1 Sample of Template Analysis Codes

As recommended by King, the first step in developing the Template was considering the aims and objectives (see Section 2.4.1) of the research. Since the ICF, from which the Interview Schedule was developed, embodied these aims and objectives, insofar as the Framework was designed to evaluate the aims and objectives, it was used as the first means of coding, thus the level-one code. Level-one codes thus comprised the four components of the ICF- Organisational Ownership, Characteristics of Performance Measures, Management Processes for PMS and Integration of PMS with other Management Systems (see Appendix 5.3). These four overarching themes were further categorised into more specific ones at increasing levels of coding up to five (see Box 5.1 and Appendix 5.3). Box 5.1 depicts a sample of the levels of coding by indentation and numbering, while Appendix 5.3 shows the full complement of codes used in the Template analysis).

Initially, there were two levels of coding after which the codes were used to inform the Matrix Analysis table (discussed below). However, in order to produce greater levels of specificity in the data, it was deemed necessary to revisit the Template Analysis for deeper levels of coding while using the data. This resulted in three more levels of coding in the Template analysis (see Box 5.1 and Appendix 5.3), which were then applied to the Matrix Analysis.

Organisational Ownership is the first level-one code and is one of the primary focuses of the ICF and was therefore minutely examined in the Interview Schedule. It, therefore, required a similar treatment in the analysis of the data and, hence, includes four levels of coding. It comprises three level-two codes: determining the extent of accountability and control of PMS, determining the extent of stakeholder involvement and determining the extent of performance data circulation among stakeholders. Each level-two code is further divided to give 11 level-three codes altogether, including ‘Level of awareness of PMS’, ‘PMS Benefits to Managing’ and ‘Extent of Local control of PMS’. Some level-three codes are then further subdivided to give 11 level-four codes (see Appendix 5.3).

The second level-one code is Characteristics of Performance Measures, which like the
levels before is vital to the study in this research. This code relates to appropriateness in choosing measures (see Sections 3.2.3.2.1 and 3.2.3.2.2) and comprised one level-two code, determining the spectrum of performance measures in use. The level-two code was divided into two level-three codes, which, in turn, was subdivided into eight level-four codes. Each level looked closer at the coverage of performance measures and their relationship with organisational KPIs.

The third level-one code is Management Processes for PMS, which, like the first one, was very important in informing the Interview Schedule. This code directly relates to the aim of determining whether PMS are used for managing EAs and, hence, involves five levels of coding. It includes two level-two codes, determining the extent to which performance measures are kept continually aligned to organisational strategy, main aims and objectives and determining the extent to which the PMS is managed and drives management operations, which are subdivided to give 6 level-three codes. The level-three codes were divided into eight level-four codes which give a further 2 level-five codes.

Finally, the fourth level-one code is Integration of PMS with other Management Systems, which, in keeping with the aim of the research, examined the integrality and reach of the PMS to the general management of the organisation. This code includes two level-two codes, determining the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems and determining how PMS reflect success or failure of EAs over time, which are subdivided to give 2 level-three codes. The level-three codes were divided into five level-four codes.

5.3.3.2 Matrix Analysis
According to Nadin and Cassell (2004, p. 271), writing about the process of matrix construction, “… matrix construction is itself the result of an in-depth analytical process from which further analysis and interpretations can be made”. As such, the actual Matrix construction process for this research was preceded by several stages of analysis, which were accomplished first through Template Analysis (see Box 5.1 and Appendix 5.3). The Template Analysis codes, which were first informed by the components of the ICF, were then applied to build the initial Matrix Analysis Table. Matrix Analysis, which gives a ‘useful overview of the main features’ (Dey, 1993, p.95) of the data, was useful for representing the data. Initially, Matrix Analysis comprised four tables, one for each of the four EAs, derived from the Template. Each Table comprised columns depicting the four
Framework components in the first column, the research themes of each component in the second column, the interview questions reorganised according to the relevant component in the third column and in the remaining columns, the names of interviewees with their main response to each interview question.

As the interview data was added to the Matrix Tables other themes were derived. This meant rethinking the Template, resulting in further levels of analysis and increased levels of coding in the Template, which were then applied to the analysis in the Matrix Table. (See Table. 6.1 for a generic example of the Matrix Tables). The columns in each table reflect these different levels of codes, up to the third level, and their relationship to the Interview Schedule (and interview questions), along with the interview responses. (Fourth and fifth level codes, derived from some of the third- and fewer of the fourth-level codes, respectively, though built into the analysis of the data were not highlighted in separate columns in the Matrix Table). Finally, the overall response from interviewees per question, depicting general consensus, opposing views or other differing responses was placed in a final summary column. This final table was the constructed matrix that was applied to each of the four case agencies (see Table. 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level-One Codes</th>
<th>Level-Two Codes</th>
<th>Level-Three Codes</th>
<th>Interview Schedule (Interview Questions)</th>
<th>Interviewee One Responses</th>
<th>Interviewee Two Responses</th>
<th>...</th>
<th>Summary of Responses per Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compo-nent 1</td>
<td>Research Theme 1</td>
<td>Testing for i</td>
<td>Qu. 1.1</td>
<td>Response to qu1.1</td>
<td>Response to qu1.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Summary to qu1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Testing for ii</td>
<td>Qu. 1.2</td>
<td>Response to qu1.2</td>
<td>Response to qu1.2</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Summary to qu1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compo-nent 2</td>
<td>Research Theme 4</td>
<td>Testing for v</td>
<td>Qu. 2.1</td>
<td>Response to qu2.1</td>
<td>Response to qu2.1</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Summary to qu2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table. 5.1 Generic Matrix Analysis Table

Thus the steps of refining the themes that could come out of the data were first ones of pre-analysing and then post-analysing the Interview Schedule. This was done in order to organise data that would, otherwise, have been too large and unmanageable for analysis. A description of each step taken to build the Matrix Tables is stated in Appendix 5.4. The Matrix construction is, therefore, a pre-analysed table, which is then further analysed.
when data is added. The data itself is analysed by the matrix and template, thus, resulting in an analytical process of iteration, re-iteration and recursion, as supported by Nadin and Cassell (2004, p271). The constructed matrix with its deconstructed themes is examined against each case agency and goes on to form the basis for Cross-Case Analysis.

5.3.3.3 Cross-case Analysis
Having been satisfied that all the relevant themes or codes were included to examine the data, and that the data was well analysed through the initial two methods, all the summary responses up from the level-one codes through to level five codes, for all four cases, were organised in one table for the purpose of Cross-case Analysis. Yin (2009) refers to this analytic method as Cross-case Synthesis. This title is appropriate insofar as the analysis of several cases is brought together according to common analytic parameters. He describes the steps in this method as first treating each case as a separate study (as was done in the process of Matrix Analysis for this research) before aggregating the findings of each individual case. However, by comparing and contrasting all four cases according to the themes derived, further analysis is still done at this stage. The Cross-case Analysis table is then subdivided into 8 tables according to the research themes of the four components (see Tables 6.2a-h).

Cross-Case Analysis provides the initial groundwork for further discussion and for the findings for this research in Chapter 7. These findings are then further cross-examined by triangulating them with findings from secondary data. The secondary data is first presented in Chapter 4 using data from the first five years of EA-status (see Section 4.3). Similarly, together with Chapter 4 findings, secondary data from the later period are triangulated with the live data from chapter 6.

5.3.3.4 Application of Analytical Methods
The application of each of these methods and the initial results are presented in Section 6.2. Further analysis with triangulation and discussion of all findings is done in Chapter 7. Since the intention behind the data analysis is also to triangulate the preliminary primary data (that is, the main set of data) findings with the secondary data findings from the two periods- that by Talbot et al. (2002) and that provided by JEAs during the fieldwork- the themes constructed in the analysis methods and applied to the primary data (see Section 6.2) are also applied to the secondary data (see Sections 4.4.1 and 7.2).
However, application of the methods for triangulation using these themes has to be adjusted according to the different data sets.

The adjustment to the methods for triangulation is necessary to accommodate the difference in the research design of Talbot et al. (2002), which focussed on reporting on the performance and progress of JEAs, and the research design for this research, which focussed on examining the contributions that PMS makes to manage the JEAs and, thus necessitated a PMS conceptual framework to examine this. Therefore, both research designs would have differed and consequently, the earlier research findings would not answer to many of the themes constructed from the analysis methods for the primary data, thus leaving some gaps in the triangulation between both data findings (see Tables 4.2a to h).

5.3.4 LONGITUDINAL ASPECT TO STUDY

This research is based primarily on data findings from the empirical work undertaken in this research but it also includes findings from earlier research, together spanning a 12-year period of PMS use in JEAs. As such, there is a longitudinal aspect to this research. However, this research makes no claims to being a longitudinal research. The current research and earlier research were not derived from a single research methodology and design (Ployhart and Vandenberg, 2010) and, therefore, do not conform to the general definition of a longitudinal research. For instance, according to Ployhart and Vandenberg’s (2010) definition, longitudinal research is a

\[
\text{research emphasizing the study of change and containing at minimum three repeated observations (although more than three is better) on at least one of the substantive constructs of interest.}
\]

Where this definition falls true for the current and earlier research, it is only coincidental and not by intent. The initial research was not designed with the current one in mind, neither was the reverse true. However, the earlier research was seen to serve two main purposes to the current research. Firstly, the earlier research provided an adequate source for the literature review on the use of PMS in JEAs, and is especially important where literature on this subject was otherwise abjectly lacking (see chapter 4). Secondly, the literature does not have any example of research in which EAs were revisited. This research is therefore a first example in this sense as it revisits the same JEAs that were under study in the earlier research. Furthermore, it incorporates the findings from that
research and makes it possible to develop a longitudinal perspective to the study of PMS in Executive Agencies. However, both researches cover sufficient common ground to allow an examination of the developmental use of PMS and the opportunity to make comparative assessment of its contribution to managing JEAs. While the primary focus of this research is the use of PMS, the earlier research primarily focussed on the development of JEAs, but reports on their development relative to their use of performance data and aspects of their performance reporting. Both researches also, do not only share the same four cases but also share some of the same contributors to their data. During the time of the current study three of the four Chief Executives present, were also part of the earlier research. Also, a number of employees interviewed in the present research were already employed during the earlier research, though it is not clear whether they made any contribution to the data in the earlier research.

The main data focus of this research, however, is the primary data collected during the fieldwork in 2011. The secondary data collected during this time, is important for triangulation with the primary data. The secondary data component included documents from the period 2005 to 2011. However, these documents varied from one agency to another in quantity, type and the time periods they covered. Therefore, the secondary data do not consistently nor adequately cover in breadth or depth all the areas of the research aim that the Interview Schedule aimed to cover, and through which the primary data was derived. Again, the earlier research also serves as part of the secondary data triangulation with the primary data but over two different periods, hence providing that longitudinal approach to the study.

5.4 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there have been both limitations to the research methodology and methods used in this study as well as contributions. These are discussed in Chapter 8 (see Sections 8.2 and 8.3). This chapter closes on a discussion of the relevance that this chapter bears to the whole thesis (see 5.4.1).

5.4.1 RELEVANCE OF THIS CHAPTER TO THE THESIS

The chapter begins by relating the research aims and objectives to the assumptions underpinned in adopting commitments to Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency to justify the development of a Conceptual Framework largely based on
literature derived mainly from the British context to analyse the success of PMS development in JEAs (see Sections 2.2 and 4.2.1). Based on a discussion on the three dominant methodologies for social science research (positivism, interpretivism and realism), it is shown why the underpinning assumptions driving the study are predominantly compatible with realist methodological commitments. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the use of a case study method with semi-structured interviews implies assumptions associated with interpretivist methodological commitments.

It follows having justified the use of case study and interviews, as well as documents for this research, that the research design and processes deployed objectify the subjective knowledge produced by adopting interviews. This is considered important given the realist methodological and philosophical assumptions behind the study, and it is argued that Matrix, Template and Cross-case Analysis are therefore appropriate methods for data analysis when objectified to fit to the components of the ICF. Moreover, they are objectified to fit the ICF based on semi-structured interviews which are structured by the components of the Framework which it is argued can be used to produce objective knowledge about the success of PMS development (see Chapter 3).

It follows then that the data provided in chapter 6 through the ICF, and in chapter 7, the research findings are considered to produce ‘real’ or ‘objective’ knowledge pertaining to the level of success of PMS development in JEAs.

Given the suggestion that case studies can be used to generate potentially generalizable knowledge, particularly given the effects of Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency, it is argued that this research may contribute to other studies in different locations. As such, the methods and realist methodology used justify the view that this research can have broad as well as specific Jamaican contributions and objective. This is an insight drawn upon in Chapter 8, the Conclusion to the thesis.
Section 3- The Empirical Chapters
This section consists of two empirical chapters in which three interrelated developments are made. Chapter 6, the first of these two chapters, is focussed on the analysis of the primary data collected during the fieldwork using the methods of analysis outlined in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3.3), namely Template, Matrix and Cross-case Analysis. Primary data, based on the Interview Schedule (see Appendix 5.2), is organised into manageable information by applying these analytical methods in Chapter 6. Ultimately, the idea is to generate realist claims to knowledge consistent with the methodological assumptions underpinning the research (see Section 5.1.1). As a result of initial Template Analysis, presented in this chapter, eight main research themes are derived. These eight themes inform the triangulation of primary data against secondary data, and, hence, the articulation of research findings, discussed in Chapters 7.

A direct link is, therefore, made between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 (again, see letter F in Box 1.1 and Diagram 1.1). Whilst the triangulation of data in Chapter 6 is exclusively concerned with ‘cross-casing’ the primary data of the four cases, after first applying Template and Matrix Analysis, the triangulation in Chapter 7 draws on cross-cased secondary data from Chapter 4, that is the earlier research of 2002, and from Chapter 7, that is secondary data from the period 2005-11, against the primary data of Chapter 6. This is to discuss how comparisons between data confirms and/or questions the initial primary data analysis presented in Chapter 6 and to later give a more direct response to the research aim in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7 therefore makes two further interrelated developments. Firstly, to validate or question the primary data, it triangulates it against secondary data from two periods-which enables an examination of the developments in the use of PMS for managing JEAs and adds a longitudinal perspective to the research. Secondly, it presents the research findings. In terms of the logic of these developments, it follows then that each development progresses by drawing from a more general organisation of data toward an increasingly robust and focussed articulation of the usefulness of PMS to the managing of JEAs.

Based on a clear statement of the usefulness of PMS to the management of JEAs accomplished in Section 7.3, the recommendations, contributions and limitations of the study are then communicated in Chapter 8, the conclusion.
Chapter 6

CASE AGENCIES: Primary Data Analysis Through The Integrative Conceptual Framework

6.1 INTRODUCTION

6.1.1 CONNECTING TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS

The preceding chapters have examined the philosophical underpinning of this research and have developed an ICF for examining the case of PMS as a viable contributor to managing JEAs.

First, we recall that Chapter 2 established a premise to justify the examination of mainly British literature for the study of PMS in JEAs based on HI and PD. The British literature, therefore, is used to study PMS in EAs after the Next Steps model. It follows then that the ICF developed in Chapter 3, is based mainly on the British literature given the absence or unavailability of Jamaican literature. With the aim of the study being to determine the contribution of PMS to the operation of JEAs, an ICF was developed to test this contribution. This aspect draws the focus of the literature not just to EAs but mainly to PMS and thus chapter 3 focussed more specifically on the organisational performance management literature from both management and public management.

The ICF is applied to the analysis of existing literature in Chapter 4, which focuses on the Jamaican context during the first five years of EA establishment. This analysis assesses the contribution that PMS makes to managing the EAs and the viability of PMS development in JEAs according to the ICF.

This examination is done in light of an earlier research, Talbot et al. (2002), that was conducted on JEAs (see Section 4.3) and which examined the first four EAs established in Jamaica. The existing research indicates that there was notable progress in each of the first four EAs but that their PMS was not sufficiently viable for managing the JEAs.
Chapter 4 thus provides an early bridge that can be connected to the empirical research presented in this chapter. However, this bridge, with the exception of the work done by Talbot et al. (2002), only focuses on the progress of JEAs without making any reference to the contribution of PMS to that progress. In the absence of any Jamaican literature that deals directly with the contribution that PMS makes to managing JEAs, such information remains vital to this study, and so it was added as part of the review of literature for PMS in JEAs.

In addition, Chapter 4 also looks at the development of Jamaica’s politico-administrative development. Chapter 4 therefore serves another purpose by bridging a gap that is created in the discussion in Chapter 2. Given the assumptions of HI and PD, it is argued that the application of British literature is relevant to the analysis of PMS in JEAs in terms of the research aim to determine the contribution of PMS to the operation of JEAs. Like Chapter 2, which explores the subject of NPM and its concomitant relevance to the emergence of Next Steps and the use of PMS in the public sector, Chapter 4 does a parallel examination in the Jamaican context. Chapter 4 traces the establishing of EAs after the Next Steps model as an option based on a high path dependence logic (see Section 2.2.1) given the other plausible alternatives of the New Zealand and Canadian models, and thus finds further justification for the assumptions of HI and PD discussed in Chapter 2.

Chapter 5 has articulated the research strategy through which the data is examined in this chapter. The strategy is informed by the philosophical assumptions behind HI and PD, and realism, and their fit with the ICF. The operationalising of the research strategy and the collection and analysis of data presented in this chapter is based on the Data Analysis Methods discussed in Section 5.3.3. These methods are applied below in Section 6.2 and further developed in the triangulation of the primary with secondary data in Chapter 7.

6.1.2 OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter begins with a recapitulation of the work that has been covered in the earlier chapters. The methodology described is consistent with the earlier philosophical assumptions of Chapter 2 and its connectedness to the ICF, and, hence, the Interview Schedule. It bears in mind that the ICF presents the fundamentals required for the successful development of any Performance Management System, where development is inclusive of the design, continued use and modification of the system (see Section 3.2.2). In the case of a dynamic system such as a PMS, the continued use of that system involves
making modifications to that system as and when required (Kennerley and Neely, 2002, 2003). This methodology is then applied in Section 6.2 where the analysis of the primary data is presented in both a summarised, tabular form and a detailed textual description.

In spite of the detailed process applied in developing a thorough Interview Schedule, certain gaps in the data were identified. Generally, this may be partly due to the flexibility allowed in executing the Interview Schedule and that conducting the interviews in a semi-structured manner allowed respondents to respond openly to questions posed yet with the liberty to withhold information where they deemed necessary to do so. The chapter, therefore, concludes with a discussion on the completeness of the data collected and analysed and its effect on the thesis (see Section 6.3.1) and the relevance of this chapter to the chapter that follows (see Section 6.3.2) and the overall thesis.

6.1.3 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse and present the primary data gathered (during the fieldwork conducted in Jamaica in 2011) in accordance with the Interview Schedule. The obvious enormity of the data gathered from around 40 interviews, which each averaged an hour (see 5.2.2.1.1), needs to be organised or arranged into manageable information that can be ultimately used in order to express the research findings (in Chapter 7) and research recommendations, contributions and limitations (in Chapter 8).

In order to organise the data into manageable information, the data was analysed by the methods discussed in Section 5.3.3.

From Section 5.3.3, it should be clear that the first stages of primary data analysis are presented through Template and Matrix analysis. While the main purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the analysis of the primary data, through Cross-case analysis a level of empirical rigour is further developed by the triangulation of information from each of the four cases. This chapter is therefore important to the main focus of Chapter 7, which adds further rigour to the empirical analysis through a process of data triangulation and discussion on the validity of the primary data triangulated against secondary data.
6.2 DATA ANALYSIS

6.2.1 ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP

According to the ICF discussed in Chapter three, one of the critical elements in the development of a PMS is organisational ownership. This section, therefore, examines three research themes that tests different aspects of organisational ownership to determine whether it is an integral part of the PMS at each agency.

6.2.1.1 Research Theme One: to determine the extent of Accountability and Control of the PMS

The first research theme of the Interview Schedule was to determine the extent of accountability and control of the PMS in each EA. This research theme was examined by testing for the awareness of the presence of PMS at the agency; the level of awareness of the effects and functions of the PMS at the individual, organisational and governmental level; the general regard for the use of PMS to managers; and the public’s level of awareness. The result of analysing their responses is discussed below (see Sections 6.2.1.1.1 to 6.2.1.1.5) and shown in Table 6.2a.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 1: To determine the extent of accountability and control of PMS</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of awareness of PMS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* 100% level of awareness at A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* All operational work is target driven.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Interviewees expressed strong appreciation for and confidence in the use of their PMS.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Central government is 'willy-nilly' in assessing performance compared to A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Greater accountability than in a traditional government setting.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Similar to working in the private sector.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Benefits of PMS: very effective, makes a worthwhile difference in their work output and forms 'part of the lifecycle of the organisation which we now depend on', motivated by the end of year bonus.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Output is far greater than under central government where without clear targets it is less focussed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Central Government employees are discontented they do not implement or benefit from training received</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Here, it is target driven so no time to waste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* It encourages organisational alignment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* It boosts personal management and responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Without financial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* C used as model EA by central government influencing the implementation of a PMS in all ministries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Pre-EA, CEO described C as 'worse government agency', with no technology, disgruntled employees, and irresponsibility in filing documents. EA status brought a complete turn-around to how things should be, greatly lifting staff's morale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* All improvements from pre-EA to EA status are attributed to C being performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* General awareness 100%; depth of understanding and familiarity with PMS it is 75%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Individual measures are more defined than in pre-EA status.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Increments now based on performance not on one’s position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* There is more accountability and efficiency because of the use of PMS.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* One’s job function is clearly aligned to the organisational goals and objectives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The evidence of measurement are more rigorous and equitable and hence no complaints from employees about verification of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.2a Cross-case Analysis Table

6.2.1.1 Level of Awareness of PMS

Interviewees were asked about their general opinion on the awareness of the use of PMs in their agency. Their responses revealed that there was a high level of awareness at each...
Based on interviewee responses, 100% of employees were aware of the use and function of the PMS enforced at their workplace as each person's work was directly 'tied' to it. However, employees are more familiar with the term Performance Evaluation System (a process everybody goes through) than they are with Performance Management System. They are first made aware at the commencement of their job, then through meeting with their managers and also, at staff meetings where the organizational KPIs are the focal point and where employees are made aware of the performance of other units. At D, the entire staff was involved in the process of developing the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), so everyone is aware of the use of a PMS. In terms of fully comprehending how the PMS works, this knowledge varies among staff in each EA. The use of employee rewards and recognition of teams, based on identification with corporate values, also strengthens this awareness and understanding. All employees can describe that a PMS is in effect at their organisation.

All operational tasks at the individual, departmental and organizational levels remain target-driven in each EA. Hence, the PMS is focussed on operational and key aspects that are measurable and not on every work activity carried out at the EAs.

6.2.1.1.2 Awareness of Effect of PMS

Questioned on the general opinion shared about the PMS experience at A, interviewees expressed very strong appreciation for and confidence in the use of their PMS. They described it as very effective, making a worthwhile difference in their work output and forming 'part of the lifecycle of the organisation by which they now operated, appreciated and depended on'. Interviewees expressed that the use of measures allowed them to measure their own performance against that of the whole organization at any particular time and enabled them to better manage their own resources, giving some measure of personal satisfaction. The CEO, however, described employees’ early sentiments as 'sometimes fearful or resentful ... say[ing] all management thinks about is targets'. However, she described that their attitudes change when 'they realize meeting their targets will mean that at the end of the year they get a bonus'. Others expressed that it helped staff to be better acquainted with the goals of the agency in a given year and encouraged and drove timeliness. Those working in operational units experienced a more direct impact from its use as their targets were more directly linked to the organization’s KPIs. At the organizational level, interviewees found that overall performance was better
with improvements in punctuality, deportment, attendance and work effort as the latter were either measured or observed with incentives (punishment or rewards) on end of year bonuses and salaries. However, one employee expressed that under tight deadlines, employees work under a ‘lot of pressure’ in an attempt to meet targets.

Interviewees at B also expressed a very positive outlook on the benefits derived and the functions of PMS at their workplace to drive performance and operations. The main benefits that were identified were: it drives and determines the direction of the EA and since ‘targets are linked to goals and objectives, it helps keep each person streamlined’; it is necessary for the proper functioning of the organization; it drives production; it gives clearer direction, it facilitates the work process of the EA itself; the use of targets now forms the new culture and a way of life at the EA and acts as incentives to staff resulting in more than 90% of targets being met; also it results in greater work output than under Central Government; the use of PMS helps to drive persons so a supervisor does not need to push them; it boosts personal management and responsibility; PMS gives one the clear idea of duties ahead of time allowing everything to come to together as long as the individual works toward his targets; it keeps employees focussed and puts the responsibility on the individual to get his work done; it has produced some culture change in punctuality and general conduct.

However, some drawbacks were also identified, namely, that without the financial gratuity persons are not as involved as they ought to be in achieving targets; and it is unclear on how to measure some work output.

The Internal Auditor at C, one of two employees (the other being the CEO), involved in the transition of C from central government to EA, attributed all of the improvements experienced at C to its use of performance measurement. Interviewees at C also claimed to be the main influence in the design and implementation of a PMS called PMAS (Performance Management Assessment System), across all government ministries. C was used at the model agency for this design. With the use of PMS C has taken the Next Steps Model to another level, designing systems for management that are sought out abroad. However, the view was also held that an off-the-shelf PMS was restrictive to C expressing itself fully.
Interviewees at D were equally positive in their outlook of their organization’s use of PMS. Some of their comments highlighted that with the use of PMS there was more accountability and efficiency, better work structure and alignment to the objectives and mandate of the organization, which is in contradiction to the structure of work prior to EA status, and the use of a PMS brings each person into the vision of the organization and shows how their performance can impact the organization.

Central government compared to A was described as having a 'willy-nilly' attitude in assessing performance. One employee, who formerly worked in the private sector, described his experience at A as being similar to working in the private sector, that there is greater accountability than obtains in a traditional government setting.

One interviewee described the use of PMS as always allowing for organisational improvement. If the system worked in a given year they looked for ways to make it better; if it did not work, they would look to see how to make it work; or if it worked well, they still looked for ways to improve it.

**6.2.1.3 Usefulness of PMS to Managers**

In terms of assessing impact on management, managers expressed similar opinions on their experience with managing by measures. Overall, they felt that it makes a positive difference to management. One operational manager said she was one 'hundred per cent sold on the concept'. Generally, they found that using a PMS made their job of managing easier because employees were more self-driven to meet their targets and to obtain end of year incentives. Also, managers expressed that they were more focussed and had a better sense on the performance of their unit through accessing performance data. Managers also expressed satisfaction with the improved quality of employees’ work-output which was attributed to the inherent quality checks that came with using a PMS.

At B, managers explained the current increase in work output, as compared to performance prior to EA status, as attributable to the use of a PMS and targets in particular. Employees were more driven as they worked towards set targets. The situation prior to EA status meant in central government employees did not work with any clear direction. Employees have greater appreciation and regard for their job because of their awareness of how their targets contribute to the organisational goals and objectives and because they can measure their performance at any stage.
C has attained international recognition since its transformation as an EA within the Caribbean and Latin American region. It has marketed its services to governments who have sought its expertise within the Caribbean. Included amongst these governments are Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Antigua and Canada. The conditions at C were deplorable before it became an EA: it was counted the worse agency in central government, using no technology, no computers, having files and documents just thrown on desks, rat-ridden, with poor sewage and employees who absented themselves from staff meetings. Since becoming an EA, C now earns the revenue needed to operate itself, to market its services beyond Jamaica; and most notably among the other EAs, is moving toward becoming outcome focussed. The CEO at C described that one of its KPIs now contributes to a particular outcome, though there is no actual measure of the outcome. It is now mandatory for new mothers to name the baby’s father at the bedside where she has given birth as an aim to reduce crime. This target is growing in popularity and has attracted the Canadian crime observatory to invite C to demonstrate to them how civil registration impacts identity and crime. Other clients such as Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Antigua have also expressed an interest.

At D, what remained a clear impact during the interviews was the clarity of how job function related to organizational objectives through the use of targets. An example was cited from conversations overheard between two janitors. The CEO at D related a conversation she overheard between two grounds men who now, as other employees, perceive themselves as strategists. They were discussing how collecting water from rain gutters and using to water the plants on the grounds would contribute to the attainment of the organisation’s goals of efficient use of energy and resources. At D, as at the other EAs, a PMS culture is firmly established. The period 2009-2014 is covered by the first strategic plan. Prior to this period there was just a corporate plan that determined how strategy and aims would be accomplished. Again, up until 2009 employees had individual targets devolved from organizational measures but since 2009 all individual targets were removed while D, with outsourced help, built a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) as part of its new drive to be more strategic and to improve its operations.

D is the first EA to use the BSC. All other EAs use a generic method for building their PMS based on a similar BSC approach of devolving measurable targets from the organization’s strategy, goals and objectives. It was hoped that the BSC would be fully
operational by April 2011, the start of the third year since its gradual introduction, and that targets at the individual level would be re-introduced but D has been experiencing some challenges with the operationalizing of the BSC, on a whole, and individual targets in particular. D was persuaded to move toward adopting a BSC based on the BSC being lauded as a PMS instrument that provided a comprehensive perspective of an organisation. However, since 2009 there have only been annual reports, all other periodic reporting has ceased.

6.2.1.4 Level of Awareness of PMS by the Public

When questioned about the public's level of awareness of the use of a PMS at the EAs, interviewees' responses ranged from "I'm not sure how much they know of the details" to "While they are appreciative of the fact that we are more accountable or more professional, I don’t think the public is aware that there is a PMS at work and that because it’s here, it’s impacting on what service they get". One interviewee described those who are aware as " [mainly the professionals], like charter secretaries, lawyers, and accountants who are more intimate with the knowledge and running of the agency because a lot of them have been around a very long time or are employees in the public sector or are those who stay au courant with the news".

More interviewees believed that the public was aware, with one interviewee commenting that customers confirm that they are aware when they remark, "you all are not meeting your time". Interviewee responses reflect that the public are more likely aware that the agency sets targets for providing services but may not be aware that the performance of individual employees is being measured. They are aware of the money-back guarantee provided on some services if not provided in a given time, but as one interviewee at A pointed out, this may be disputable based on the fact many do not make the money back claim.

6.2.1.5 Attempts at Making Public Aware of PMS

Customers are made and kept aware of EA's use of performance measures through yearly customer satisfaction surveys and other public education services, from which the public learn of the agency's use of time frames for which services are provided. At B the use of PMS is made public through several media forms such as community groups, churches, private companies, school, government offices, police, airwaves and customer surveys.
Government held courses on Performance Management Assessment/Appraisal System to managers and senior officers within the public sector also help to educate the public, namely public sector employees, about the use of PMS at the EAs.

6.2.1.2 Research Theme Two: to determine the extent of Stakeholder Involvement

The second research theme was to determine the extent of stakeholder involvement with the PMS. This research theme was examined by testing for the extent of agency and stakeholder influence over the on-going development of the PMS, the level and extent of use of PMS data by stakeholders and the level of staff benefit from use of PMS.

The main stakeholders as named by each EA are Parent Ministries, the Ministry of Finance, the Auditor General (AG), Cabinet, Parliament, the Chief Executive Board (CEB), the Advisory Board (AB), clients, the Office of the Services Commissions and Staff, with Banks and Insurance Companies being the exception named only by B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CASE A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TESTING:**

**Identifying Main EA Stakeholders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Parent Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Former Registrars from the parent Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Auditor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Chief Executive Board (CEB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Advisory Board (AB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Other EAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Parent Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Auditor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Chief Executive Board (CEB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Advisory Board (AB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Insurance Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Office of the Services Commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Parent Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Auditor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Chief Executive Board (CEB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Advisory Board (AB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Parent Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Auditor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Chief Executive Board (CEB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The Advisory Board (AB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Extent of Local control of PMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Combined management team determines KPIs yearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Others influence that decision: Board of Directors, the parent Ministry, the Permanent Secretary (P.S), Ministry of Finance, and, less directly, clients through demands they may make.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* From KPIs heads of departments devolve departmental targets from which they get individual targets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Combined management team determines KPIs yearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Others influence that decision: CEB, the parent Ministry, the Permanent Secretary (P.S), Ministry of Finance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* From KPIs heads of departments devolve departmental targets from which they get individual targets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Combined management team determines KPIs yearly during retreat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Others influence that decision: Board of Directors, the parent Ministry, the Permanent Secretary (P.S), Ministry of Finance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* From KPIs heads of departments devolve departmental targets from which they get individual targets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Combined management team determines KPIs yearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Others influence that decision: Board of Directors, the parent Ministry, the Permanent Secretary (P.S), Ministry of Finance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Clients, through demands they make.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* From KPIs heads of departments devolve individual targets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

166
**Research theme 2: To determine the extent of stakeholder involvement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>departments devolve departmental targets from which they get individual targets</td>
<td>* A healthy, on-going part of discussions and basis for meetings at A * Departmental managers meet weekly to discuss their set targets. * Managers then meet with supervisors or directly with departmental staff to discuss any issues that arose. * Management meets biannually to discuss performance data * The CEB meets quarterly to discuss targets and overall departmental performance * Data required from the system for generating reports</td>
<td>* Managers meet monthly to discuss their performance data * Managers and employees meet regularly or informally to discuss challenges or deterrence to meeting performance targets * Employees who met their targets before the deadline are eager to talk about them who met their targets before the deadline are eager to talk about their targets * Employees who believe that another department delays them from meeting their targets.</td>
<td>* Managers meet monthly to discuss their performance data * Managers then meet with supervisors or directly with departmental staff to discuss any issues that arose. * Management meets biannually to discuss performance * The CEB meets quarterly to discuss targets and overall departmental performance * Necessary for managers to frequently consult with data * All staff for monitoring their individual performance targets</td>
<td>Executive management meets weekly to discuss KPIs and other business initiatives and quarterly in preparation for reporting to government. * General Managers’ meetings now occur quarterly, to discuss their performance data. * Managers then meet with supervisors or directly with departmental staff to discuss any issues that arose.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level and Extent of use of PMS data Internally**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* The parent ministry receives a report on performance data monthly but only sends feedback where A has not met a KPI, where A has made a request for permission to adjust targets or where the CEO needed to increase her spending limit * As many as 10 different ministerial offices, including the Cabinet Office and other ministries, receive a quarterly report but no feedback is received from them</td>
<td>* The parent ministry receives a report on performance data monthly but only sends feedback where A has not met a KPI, where A has made a request for permission to adjust targets or where the CEO needed to increase her spending limit * There are quarterly reports to Minister of Finance * Ministry of Finance used performance data from first 4 EAs as models for newer EAs</td>
<td>* The parent ministry receives a report on performance data monthly but only sends feedback where A has not met a KPI, where A has made a request for permission to adjust targets or where the CEO needed to increase her spending limit * There are quarterly reports to Minister of Finance * The CEB meets biannually to discuss overall departmental performance</td>
<td>* The parent ministry receives a report on performance data monthly but only sends feedback where A has not met a KPI, where A has made a request for permission to adjust targets or where the CEO needed to increase her spending limit * There are quarterly reports to Minister of Finance * The CEB meets biannually to discuss overall departmental performance</td>
<td>* The parent ministry receives a report on performance data monthly but only sends feedback where A has not met a KPI, where A has made a request for permission to adjust targets or where the CEO needed to increase her spending limit * There are quarterly reports to Minister of Finance * The CEB meets biannually to discuss overall departmental performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level and Extent of use of PMS data Externally**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Employee receive bonuses based on three conditions: all of organisational, departmental and employee targets are met</td>
<td>* Employee receive bonuses based on three conditions: all of organisational, departmental and employee targets are met</td>
<td>* Employee receive bonuses based on three conditions: all of organisational, departmental and employee targets are met</td>
<td>* Employee receive bonuses based on three conditions: all of organisational, departmental and employee targets are met</td>
<td>* Employee receive bonuses based on three conditions: all of organisational, departmental and employee targets are met</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level of Staff Benefit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2b Cross-case Analysis Table
6.2.1.2.1 Extent of Local Control of PMS

The initial PMS at each EA (comprising the set of targets) was developed in-house but signed off by the Permanent Secretary (PS). Initially, there was consultant input (e.g. the DfID, the World Bank). Today, the executive management team at each EA determines the direction and objectives of the organisation, and the combined management team, comprising executive and other managers, determines the KPIs. This is done annually during their corporate planning exercise. From the agreed KPIs the departmental targets are devolved and then further distributed by heads of departments to individual employees within their department with varying degrees of consultation with employees among EAs. Further input for determining the KPIs comes from Board of Directors and externally from the parent Ministry, namely the Permanent Secretary (P.S), Ministry of Finance. Further discussions about targets take place at varying degrees at each EA. At A such discussions are on-going and form a strong part of staff engagement.

According to the CEO at A, her EA would try to meet suggested targets set by the parent Ministry but may not necessarily make these targets formal. Two examples of ministerial influence at A were reducing turnover times for completing applications from 5 to 3 days and increasing employee bonuses from 6.5% to 12.5% of their salary on condition that 80% or more of the targets were met. A positive influence from the parent Ministry beneficial to A was the reduction in their contribution to the Ministry from 50% of their total revenues to 50% of their surplus.

At C, the combined team go on a retreat for 3 to 5 days where managers must defend the plan they would have submitted months earlier. Directors would later review the KPIs but a lot of decisions would have been made during the retreat. At B, the executive determines the direction of the organisation with consultation from other managers, based on discussions with their individual departments. Since 2009, D has been involved in the development of a BSC model for their PMS, which has been a process that was fully participatory by all employees. In so doing, departmental targets have been used to steer departments without recourse to developing specific individual targets. The full scale BSC was expected to be operational by April 2011 but since then D has been faced with problems in interpretation and cascading of organisational objectives to individual targets. However, the level of involvement of its staff in the development of the BSC is noteworthy.
6.2.1.2.2 Level and Extent of use of PMS data Inside the EA

Performance measures and data remain a healthy and on-going part of discussions and basis for meetings at the EAs. At A, departmental managers meet weekly to discuss their set targets. Managers then meet with supervisors or directly with departmental staff to discuss any issues that arose. One employee commented that Managers’ discussion with staff about targets is more instructional than suggestive. Also, according to the Deputy CEO informal discussions of targets among employees is not typical which differs from what obtains at B where employees are known to discuss their achievement or failure to meet individual targets or where another department may be causing a delay in their meeting their targets. Combined management at each EA meets biannually to discuss performance. They require the approval of the Ministry for change in targets, which, is usually granted. With the exception of D, meeting of managers is conducted monthly, and usually follows further departmental meetings to discuss relevant issues around meeting targets with their subordinates. At D meetings are held quarterly as the BSC is being phased in. This, the CEO explained, is an attempt to move with the new ethos to encourage meaningful monitoring where managers develop an attitude of monitoring motivated by the need to improve performance and not for the sake of doing a monthly report.

Performance data at A is mainly accessed by Operation Managers, such as Customer Service, in order to drive employee performance. Generally managers access it where it is necessary to make adjustments during the year. Data required from the system can be generated as reports. Managers also produce monthly reports, which reflect on their departmental performance. Before these meetings, each manager submits information about the performance of his departments to all other managers. Also, unlike A, where there is easy accessibility to performance data from one’s desktop, as may be relevant to the individual employee, at B such data must be requested from HR. As such, consultation with the data at B seems much less frequent than at A. Managers at C access performance data at frequent and regular intervals. At D, the performance data serves useful to all at regular times. For the CEO office it is necessary to analyse performance of the organisation, for strategizing and for reporting to government. For managers it is necessary to manage their department and for HR to identify gaps in any department.
6.2.1.2.3 Level and Extent of use of PMS data Outside the EA

Based on performance data, a monthly report is submitted to each parent ministry by their respective EAs. D is again the exception here, since the commencement of its development of a BSC in 2009. A quarterly report goes to a wider number of recipients, including the parent Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, the Cabinet Office and other ministries. At A, the quarterly report goes to as many as 10 different ministerial offices but no feedback is received from them. Feedback from the parent ministry is usually only received where an EA has not met a KPI, where an EA has made a request for permission to adjust targets or where the CEO needed to increase her spending limit. However, the CEO at A opined that the ministry makes no further decisions for A from the report they received, and as such it appeared that data was only collected by government and not, in fact, used to influence the direction of the agency nor government. The CEO went on to express that it appears that the reports they send to their parent ministry may not at all be read but that she sends it to comply. Another of her officers also expressed that he believed these reports were just 'stacked up' at the parent ministry but served no other purpose there. Beside reports sent to government, most EAs receive no other requests for PMS data. At D, there have been growing yet relatively little interest in their PMS data from students, both Master’s and doctoral student. The public stays informed through the agencies’ newsletters, public programs and websites but express no direct request for performance data.

At each EA, there exist two boards, the Advisory Board (AB) comprising external and internal members as advisors to the CEO and the Chief Executive Board, (CEB), selected by the CEO. The CEB meets quarterly to discuss targets and overall departmental performance. The AB is also supposed to meet quarterly to discuss the performance but in most EAs this seldom occurs.

6.2.1.3 Research Theme Three: to determine the extent of Performance Data Circulation Among Stakeholders

The third research theme of the Interview Schedule was to determine the extent of performance data circulation among stakeholders. This research theme was examined by testing for how data was collected, the frequency and emphasis on delegated responsibility for this process; the most important data from the PMS and the person/s
with whom its significance lie, both internally and externally; and how data was usually represented.

### 6.2.1.3.1 Data Collection Process

The PMS at A is mainly computerized with about 10 to 15% of the performance data being manually collected. While data is generally collected daily, only some data is collected in real time. The computerized system, Document Processing Management Information System (DPMIS), was internally developed. The DPMIS allows for the generation of reports on any required data that has been collected. Operational departments, such as Customer Services, can use required data to produce end products such as certificates. However, data is focussed on operational performance and therefore departments, such as Finance, with little operational tasks, may not contribute any relevant data to this system.

---

**ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 3: To determine the extent of performance data circulation among stakeholders</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td>* Performance data is mainly computerised with about 10 to 15% of the performance data being manually collected * The computerised system was developed in-house * The PMS allows for the generation of any required data that has been collected. * Data is restricted to operational department performance * Operational departments, such as Customer Services, can use required data to produce end products such as certificates * Data is collected daily</td>
<td>* Work processes are mainly manual e.g. manual filing of client data, fieldwork verification, court applications, property evaluation, employee target sheets and work log. Customer satisfaction data varies from manual to online surveys * Each unit collects performance data through prescribed forms but later digitalises up to 90+% of the captured data * 20% of data is electronically captured * Data is collected daily</td>
<td>* Data capture is daily and largely electronic * Probably the EA with the most developed electronic systems for data capture and real-time synchronicity * There exists an electronic system that sits on all databases and provides real-time information on the performance of any courier or any particular CSR employee * Data is collected daily</td>
<td>* Using a BSC Model since 2009 but it is not fully implemented * Performance data are captured manually by record keeping by both manager and employee; * Most targets measured are captured manually * Data is collected according to frequency of measured activity * PMS data collection is the responsibility of each individual manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Examining data collection**

| * Monthly and quarterly reports are sent to the parent ministry reflecting data as requested by minister but mainly about the performance of operational units (customer wait times, registration, turnaround timelines) the performance of the company's website and * Monthly and quarterly reports are sent to the parent ministry reflecting data as requested by minister but mainly about the performance of operational units (customer wait times, registration, turnaround timelines) and their financial performance * Managers can generate | * At moment D reports according to their strategic objectives and associated performance targets and any other relevant information * Government met with D in 2010 indicating in a document what they | | |
ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 3: To determine the extent of performance data circulation among stakeholders</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>their financial performance.  * The Minister publicly announces improvements accomplished by A.  * The information is also relevant to the ministry who may be called to give account by other ministries or members of Parliament  * Non-governmental bodies, especially the media, which request data from A have not requested performance data beyond the number and type of its clients.</td>
<td>reports from the system about their own departmental performance.  * Employees have been trained in doing the reports, through use of statistical means such as calculating variances, etc. It is, however, based on simple statistical formula. It becomes automatic very early.</td>
<td>performance  * Performance data used in consultancy with country clients to demonstrate efficacy of their systems</td>
<td>want to be included in the report- with the Ministry of Finance yet to implement the standardisation of the reporting format</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2c Cross-case Analysis Table

At B, data collection varies from 100% digitally collected in one department to 100% manually collected in another. Generally, there was a much higher percentage of data being collected manually. Internal reporting to one’s manager is done daily, weekly and monthly, but mainly monthly. Managers then generate monthly reports for their departments. C was the most computerized of all the EAs. Data from Operation departments were 100% computerized and collected daily and in real time. D was in a state of flux as since 2009, it has been engaged in developing a BSC. 100% of its performance data is manually collected. Performance data is reviewed weekly when executives meet. Quarterly, managers review performance data to ascertain the position of their departments and the organization in relation to departmental targets and KPIs. Departmental meetings usually follow these meetings.

6.2.1.3.2 PMS Data- representation and importance

Monthly and quarterly reports are sent to the parent ministry reflecting data as requested by minister but mainly about the performance of operational units (customer wait times, registration, and turnaround timelines), the performance of the company's website and their financial performance. The Minister announces improvements accomplished by A publicly through the media. The information is also relevant to the ministry who may be called to give account by other ministries or members of Parliament. Other recipients of
the quarterly reports are stakeholders as mentioned in Section 6.2.1.2 and Table 6.2b. Non-governmental bodies, such as the media, that request data from A have not requested performance data but have been more interested in client-related data, such as the number and type of clients. D currently reports based on their strategic objectives and associated performance targets and any other relevant point. In 2010, the government met with D and indicated in a document what should be included in their report. The CEO interpreted this action as an increased effort from the Ministry of Finance toward standardising the reporting format for EAs.

6.2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES

6.2.2.1 Research Theme Four: to determine the Spectrum of Performance Measures in use

The fourth research theme of the Interview Schedule was to determine the spectrum of performance measures in use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment of departmental measures with KPIs</td>
<td>* Departmental and individual targets are all devolved from the organisational KPIs</td>
<td>* Targets are function based and derived from departmental and organisational KPIs</td>
<td>* Departmental and individual targets are all devolved from the organisational KPIs</td>
<td>* Departmental and individual targets are all devolved from the organisational KPIs based on the BSC model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spread of measures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Targets fit the following categories: global and departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal and external, financial and non-financial</td>
<td>* Targets fit the following categories: global and departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal and external, financial and non-financial</td>
<td>* Targets fit the following categories: global and departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal and external, financial and non-financial</td>
<td>* Targets fit the following categories: global and departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal and external, financial and non-financial</td>
<td>* Targets fit the following categories: global and departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal and external, financial and non-financial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Internal targets also focus on employees' committee involvement</td>
<td>* Performance appraisal looks at tasks and attitude toward work, reliability, punctuality, participation, comprehensive some of which are difficult to measure but is also based on observation of the employee through the year. * There is also a</td>
<td>* Internal targets also focus on employees' committee involvement</td>
<td>* To ensure a fit with employee, employee job description was used alongside departmental targets for developing employee targets * There is a strong focus on customer-orientated targets * Since 2005, all managers must submit at least one Innovation for Business Improvement performance target</td>
<td>* Organisational KPIs are categorised under the broad categories of stakeholder satisfaction &amp; appraisal; programme &amp; operations excellence; transformative learning &amp; professionalization; resource mobilization and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* There is some attention to employee development (e.g. funding for employee training, specialised training to ensure persons can properly interpret and analyse the legislation) but it is not measured</td>
<td>* There is some attention to employee development (e.g. funding for employee training, specialised training to ensure persons can properly interpret and analyse the legislation) but it is not measured</td>
<td>* There is a strong focus on customer-orientated targets</td>
<td>* D examines but does not measure its training-impact on public service. It looks at changes in performance improvement in individuals and its impact on their organisation using a survey focussed at 3 levels- the individual, his peers and team leader</td>
<td>* D measures the growth of the public sector's</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 4: To determine the spectrum of performance measures in use</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>awareness of their presence and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half-yearly review that gives staff member to improve in an area where he is weak.</td>
<td>per quarter. Item must be thought out for proposed implementation to improve operation of the EA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflicting Measures</strong></td>
<td>* There are occasional conflicts in meeting targets due to differences in target times between departments to complete tasks related to the same work case. * As a result of this sort of conflict departments strive to work in tandem. * Sometimes there are arguments in managerial meetings as one department's work negatively impacts another. There is no target to reinforce SLA.</td>
<td>* There have been conflicts in meeting targets due to time lag in releasing files in one departments impacting on ability to meet time target in another department * Where this has happened the target is now set for officers causing the delay to send files within a particular time.</td>
<td>* No known area of conflicting targets</td>
<td>* D is still dealing with operationalizing initiatives and training to properly allocate targets to individuals but experiencing some uncertainty in doing so</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 6.2d Cross-case Analysis Table

This research theme was examined by testing how measures were spread- whether there were sufficient non-financial as well as financial measures, their global and hierarchical distribution, and internal and external focus- and whether there were conflicting measures.

**6.2.2.1.1 Alignment of Departmental Measures with KPIs**

At all four EAs departmental and individual targets are all linked to the organisational KPIs. Therefore, targets vary from one department and from one employee to another according to the function of the department or role of the individual. The IT department
at A plays a pivotal role in testing new targets and determining their feasibility before they are actualised to the relevant departments. The audit department at C is also very instrumental in designing its own in-house systems and determining the feasibility of targets.

6.2.2.1.2 Spread of Measures

The method of devolving individual targets from departmental targets, which in turn were devolved from organisational KPIs, lend naturally to a hierarchical structure to targets. At each EA targets are more internal focussed than external and are strongly customer-orientated (e.g. customer satisfaction, waiting times) and revenue-focussed. Generally measures reflect the internal business processes (e.g. at A- turnaround times, data accuracy; at B- number of cases referred, received, closed). With the exception of B, employee development and involvement (such as funding for employee training at A, specialised training to ensure persons can properly interpret and analyse the legislation, and at D a strong focus on leadership development) are not measured. At B, employees’ involvement in Committees is measured. At A, employees may be the first to feel the negative impact of a reduced budget, as training may be one of the first cuts made. Overall, more emphasis is placed on customer and internal business processes which are linked to targets that can affect employee bonus payments.

6.2.2.1.3 External Measures

A conducts its own customer service surveys and triangulates their data against customer survey data done by an independent body. Customer feedback and performance feedback does influence customer targets. For instance having documents computerised arose first as a request from clients from surveys that A conducted. Also, wait time, which was formerly 15 minutes, was changed in 2008 to 30 minutes based on performance data collected.

There is an external focus in A’s business prospect about global and Caribbean positioning but there are no measures to drive this. Hence, A has its eyes on expanding its market to the Caribbean and Latin American region and overseas in order to remain relevant and ahead of the prospect of competitors. However, based on the World Bank rating for 'the ease of doing business' A has set a target to move higher up the rank. The
CEO explains that this target is indirectly linked to A's positioning itself for both its Caribbean & Latin American position and the world at large.

C is the only EA that claims to have a direct impact on a national outcome, namely the reduction of crime through the immediate registration for birth certification and paternity at the hospital. Unfortunately, C does not yet have a target for measuring its impact on crime.

D uses a survey to measure the impact it is having on its customers and their environment. The survey helps D to ascertain its training-impact on performance improvement in individuals and its impact on their organisation, the wider public sector community, based on the service it provides for its customers. This is still difficult to be made measurable but D measures the percentage of the public sector that is made aware of its services.

6.2.2.1.4 Conflicting Measures

At A there are occasional conflicts (which may occur roughly once per month) in meeting targets due to differences in target times between departments to complete tasks related to the same work case. For instance, where the time target of one department results in an overflow in the work process of another unit and puts a strain on the latter unit meeting their target (e.g. the IT department has a 1 hour target on processing each document, while another department has a 3 day target for completion of a document process. This sometimes results in an overflow from IT to the other department). As a result of this sort of conflict departments strive to work in tandem. One manager explains that this kind of conflict is more likely to occur where an employee holds an insular view on meeting their own target and that of the department and pays no heed to the organizational target being met. Frequent manager meetings at B are used to address any potential case for conflicting measures. B described that in most current cases, conflicts arise as a result of external delay on the part of the Courts than on an employee not meeting deadlines. In the past, however, there were cases where an employee would be careless in safeguarding a file for which another department was held responsible. There is now shared responsibility between departments for the safety of files. There has also been the resultant improvement in setting targets in consideration of others and the interrelated workflow. Also, where employees may have despatched files at their own leisure, the
target is now set for officers to do so within a given time. D is currently faced with the challenge of operationalising its KPIs and the need for more training to properly allocate targets to individuals but faces a lot of uncertainty in doing so. C, on the other hand, could not identify any conflicting targets.

6.2.3 MANAGEMENT PROCESSES FOR PMS

6.2.3.1 Research Theme Five: to determine the extent to which Performance Measures are Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives

The fifth research theme of the Interview Schedule was to determine the extent to which performance measures are kept continually aligned to main organisational goals and objectives. This objective was examined by finding out what were the organisational mission, strategy and objectives and whether the measures were aligned and kept relevant to the strategy and objectives through review, feedback and continual alignment.

6.2.3.1.1 Targets & Organisational Objectives

The general opinion expressed by managers and other employees about how targets are derived was similar. The targets and measures are derived from its KPIs, which in turn relate to its goals and mission. The organisational objectives are expressed in the form of the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and from these the departmental targets are devolved. As such, the general opinion at each EA was that departmental or individual targets could be clearly linked to organisational objectives.

| MANAGEMENT PROCESSES for PMS- managing the PMS data within an organisational context |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Research theme 5: To determine the extent to which performance measures are kept continually aligned to main organisational goals and objectives | CASE A | CASE B | CASE C | CASE D |
| TESTING: | | | | |
| Organizational Mission, Objectives and Targets | * CEO clearly outlined the main goals and objectives of A, the main goals being linked to that of their parent Ministry. Essentially the strategic objectives do not change though where necessary they may be slightly tweaked. | * The basic mission statement remains the same but with slight changes to the vision, agency goals and objectives reflect these changes which further redound to their yearly KPIs and departmental and employee targets | * The basic mission statement remains the same but the vision, agency goals and objectives change with their growth and development reflected in further changes to their yearly KPIs and departmental and employee targets | * There is a clear overhaul in strategic objectives prior to 2009 and since 2009. These are reflected in the agency’s KPIs and departmental and employee targets and relate to the use of the BSC and the D’s new ethos of “everyone a leader” |
| Relevancy and Continuous Alignment of Measures to mission | * KPIs are derived from goals and objectives that are in | * KPIs are derived from goals and objectives that are in | * KPIs are derived from goals and objectives that are in | * BSC model is applied to derive KPIs from goals and |
## MANAGEMENT PROCESSES for PMS- managing the PMS data within an organisational context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 5: To determine the extent to which performance measures are kept continually aligned to main organisational goals and objectives</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual targets</strong> are set from departmental targets derived from the organisational KPIs, for e.g. getting a number of annual returns done allows for meeting a KPI that deals with revenue; the KPI of guaranteed service is met through customer services completing an application process in 5 to 5 working days</td>
<td>turn related to the mission of parent ministry. Departmental targets are set from the KPI’s and devolved by heads of departments to individual employees within the department. * Supervisor can relate her targets to the organisational KPIs. Her staff can also relate to this link through engagement with managers, supervisors and discovering it as they engage in their work. * Workflow also relates to other departments so an employee understands how his/ her work affects other departments and what their targets are.</td>
<td>turn related to the mission of parent ministry. Departmental targets are set from the KPI’s and devolved by heads of departments to individual employees within the department.</td>
<td>turn related to the mission of parent ministry. Departmental targets are set from the KPI’s and devolved by heads of departments to individual employees within the department. * D ensures government’s high level statements are considered in their corporate plans., * With the introduction of the BSC in 2009, generally, the targets mentioned are stated like objectives showing that the operationalizing of the individual targets is yet to be done</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Some targets have been changed as they were no longer feasible or a new policy was put in place: * Formerly all staff must attend meetings but now the physical space is not prevents this so the target has changed to each staff must attend at least a certain number of meetings per year. * An Executive has a target to develop 4 new targets per year which after 6 years is no longer practical * A’s initiative for global positioning and to be assessed globally means their IT service must be able to do all their activities online. Customers could complete the registration process online without having to visit A’s office and would be reflected in a change in target.</td>
<td>* There may be revisions or adjustment but this is not the norm. However, targets are more likely to be added than deleted. * Targets are constantly reviewed, and so do not remain static. So targets are changed or revised- e.g. target for Grants of LA’s has decreased since it was strongly dependent on external factors (from the Court) * Overtime however, corporate KPIs generally remain the same</td>
<td>* Quarterly all managers must submit a new target for Innovations &amp;Business that is clearly linked to the Strategic objectives and that will improve operation of the EA * Targets are added or deleted according to changes in operations, technology, vision and new business initiatives * Over the past twelve years as an EA there have been significant changes in targets as the agency grows and develops.</td>
<td>* Actual targets needed changing in so far as they conflicted with methods of capturing data. D still has a lot to accomplish in this regard * Introduction of BSC has resulted in some changes to operations and new goals and objectives which have effected some change in departmental targets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Actual targets needed changing in so far as they conflicted with methods of capturing data. D still has a lot to accomplish in this regard * Introduction of BSC has resulted in some changes to operations and new goals and objectives which have effected some change in departmental targets.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

[178]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 5: To determine the extent to which performance measures are kept continually aligned to main organisational goals and objectives</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* For the most part, managers and employees alike felt that the number of targets they individually worked with was manageable. * An operational manager found that individuals were responsible for too many targets (between 6 to 7 each) which often resulted in them 'disconnecting themselves from' the link between the departmental targets and their own. * Some managers claimed that employees sometimes complain that their targets are too vague to be objectified, in which case the targets are re-examined. * One executive manager claimed that one of his departmental targets cannot be measured attaining it is outside the purview of his department and the organisation. * Though he deems the amount of targets generally devolved to an individual or present in a department as manageable, he claims that the numbers have increased with increased computerisation at A, as targets that 'were more eye-level are broken into more measurable targets'. * Operationalizing targets for the non-operational units (HR, finance and auditing) is deemed difficult. One such manager commented 'that our work is more outside of targets. A lot of what we do is hard to measure'.</td>
<td>* Unanimously, interviewees found their measures feasible and their number manageable.</td>
<td>* Managers are still to derive a new target quarterly even after 6 years. This has led to new innovations at C such as having its own Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System which has led to a reduction in the error registration target from 30% to 0.05% * Targets are feasible.</td>
<td>* D is yet to fully develop targets for individuals under its new BSC model. * Employees who facilitate for up to 30 hours per week believed the number of hours was unreasonable given other aspects of their jobs. * There are some 'work activity' that are still not measurable. * There are aspects in the job description which were formerly measured but currently are not because they do not engage in them because of cost.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2e Cross-case Analysis Table
Whereas most managers at A held the view that even individual employees could make this link with their individual targets, one manager did express that due to the absence of any visible plan that maps targets to organisational objectives and strategy, this was not a straightforward case with most employees and that many employees were, in fact, clueless about how their individual targets related to organizational goals or objectives. Some managers, however, seemed to be more proactive in ensuring that their employees were aware of how their targets were mapped to organizational KPIs.

At B all employees are made aware of this link through engagement with their managers and supervisors. Departmental KPIs are discussed at department meetings. Managers also claimed to keep their departments aware of the targets of other departments. This is encouraged as the workflow of one department connects to that of other departments so that one employee could understand how their work affects other sections and what their targets are. At D, the targets remain underdeveloped. Generally, the targets mentioned are more like organisational objectives showing that the operationalising of the objectives is yet to be done.

**6.2.3.1.2 Targets & Operations**

Interviewees at each EA were also able to describe how the operations at the EA were influenced by the use of targets. Each employee is motivated to meet his individual target in order that he may receive end of year bonuses. However, even if an individual were to meet their targets but the department did not, then no one in that department, including the individual who met the target would receive bonuses. Similarly, if the organisation failed to reach a certain percentage of its targets, no department would receive any bonus. This awareness and concern seemed strongest at D where the BSC is yet to be fully implemented. However, at D bonuses are paid based on organisational and departmental targets being met.

**6.2.3.1.3 Sufficiency**

The number of departmental targets at A ranged from 4 to 7, with individuals being responsible for up to seven targets. With the exceptions of the managers with four and seven departmental targets finding the amount too little and too many, respectively, all other managers believed that the number of departmental and individual targets were manageable but would not like to see an increase. At B the number of targets employees
were responsible for ranged from 13 to 49. Though targets were many in some cases, interviewees explained that the period of meeting targets varied from daily to annually, including weekly and monthly, and so the numbers were manageable. Also, a target may be tagged to a number of other targets so that attaining one suggests a number of other ones were also attained, and in other cases more than one target may be attained in carrying out a single task. At C, the number of targets per employee ranged from 5 to 10 targets. Departmental targets ranged from 2 to 25 with six departments having less than 12 targets and five departments having between 14 to 27 targets. For D, where employees worked toward departmental targets, meeting some targets was challenging but generally targets were met.

6.2.3.1.4 Feasibility

The general opinion held by all interviewees was that the number of targets were manageable and the targets themselves feasible. At A there was a clear emphasis that all targets meet the SMART criteria, that is, that all targets be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound. Targets that fail this test are sent back by the HR department to be reviewed by the specific manager in his department. The HR manager expressed that owing to the nature of the work done in HR and Finance a lot of what they do cannot be or is too difficult to measure. For B and C, the main objection was the lack of resources that sometimes delayed the ability to meet targets or to accomplish them altogether. For example, at B, there has been a shortage of cash in hand to pay for stamp duties that involved high value property.

However, at D many employees felt that targets that related to the number of hours required for facilitating clients (as much as 30 hours per week) were unreasonable. D also still faces many challenges in its attempt to roll out the new system modelled as a BSC. There are some 'work activity' that are still not measurable while there are aspects in some job descriptions that are not being measured, because employees concerned no longer engage in those aspects. One such aspect is academic research required on some job descriptions. Due to the lack of the full complement of personnel no time can be allotted for research. D cannot currently afford the extra cost to facilitate this activity. Other problems experienced in developing measurable targets are that some performance data was not captured in a manner to make it measurable or targets could not be established because key inputs to inform some targets were not received, such as how
government required some data to be reported. Overall, though D awaits the full implementation of the new PMS, it still functions under the old system.

6.2.3.1.5 Irrelevant Targets

Managers have indicated that as company objectives change some targets lose relevance. Changed KPIs usually happen annually than randomly. For example at A, in the quest for global positioning, it has become the responsibility of the IT department to fully function online. As a result of this customer registration is no longer done in part online. This redounds in a change in all formerly related targets. At B officers could barely recall any major changes to targets. The IT manager, however, said that generally, KPIs have remained the same over the years, but targets are reviewed at regular periods and some targets, such as those that were dependent on external factors, such as response from the Courts, have been decreased due to delayed response from same. Another example was the removal of targets that related to a software system that was no longer in use rendering such targets irrelevant to the new replacement software. Where such changes were required, permission would have been requested from the parent minister to have the changes made. D has experienced a number of targets being changed in its move toward a new PMS model- such as targets involving methods of capturing data. The new work process is supposed to reduce multi-tasking and be more streamlined toward a one-stop approach. It may be that the transformation to the new structure may have been too ambitious- with lack of resources and little hope for a seamless transition from the old to the new having not first corrected the glitches as existed in the old.

6.2.3.2 Research Theme Six: to determine the extent to which the PMS is Managed and Drives Management Operations

The sixth research theme of the Interview Schedule was to determine the extent to which the PMS is managed and the extent to which the PMS drives management operations. This research theme was examined by testing whether the PMS was a complete system or a piecemeal one, the regularity with which measures and targets were reviewed (periodically or ad hoc), what the review process entails and the vitality of the performance data for management. The research theme was also examined by testing for data synchronicity with real life performance and for single and double looping.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 6: To determine the extent to which the PMS is managed and drives management operations</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| PMS- piecemeal or complete system | * Systematic or piecemeal:  
* It is a detailed system capturing from organisational to individual targets and all processes  
* Enables us to project forward  
* Has enabled good camaraderie intra- and interdepartmentally especially for operational units  
* One manager described it as a bit ad hoc insofar as some units are not covered by it  
* Employees can identify the targets but not the actual system | * Systematic or piecemeal:  
* A system with connectivity at all levels, from goals down to departmental targets to employee targets  
* A system that focuses the organisation towards particular goals, allowing for greater efficiency | * Systematic or piecemeal:  
* It is a complete system derived from a procedure of deriving targets from organisational goals  
* A system that keeps you aware of the goal to be achieved  
* A system that enables employee through time-management and setting priorities to attain individual targets | * Systematic or piecemeal:  
* Engenders a culture of interconnectedness of all D aims to do, reflecting the systems within the systems at the EA  
* PMS shows where the emphasis lies and where one's focus should be because it is more specific and less vague |
| Reviewing measures-periodic or ad hoc | * Measures form a healthy, on-going part of discussions and basis for all meetings at A. Review of targets is always one aspect of these meetings:  
* Combined management biannual and monthly meetings  
* The CEB quarterly meetings  
* At operational level review of targets is done weekly  
* In departmental meetings managers discuss targets as regards performance and feasibility  
* HR assesses whether employee targets submitted by department are SMART and may sometimes request they be rewritten | * Targets are reviewed by management monthly, bi-annually and yearly  
* The CEB meets every quarter to discuss overall departmental performance and includes review of targets where necessary  
* Meeting agenda includes matters from managers and tasks to be done or matters concerning department  
* Meetings involve suggestions or input from employees  
* The result may be an adjustment in target for next quarter or year | * Combined management meet quarterly to review targets and discuss other business  
* Departmental managers meet monthly to review targets  
* Senior managers and supervisors now meet on an as-needs-basis or weekly  
* Complaints about targets may be daily-monitoring radio programmes where complaints may be lobbied in print media, online or television  
* Directors formerly met weekly, but from 2010 on an as-needs-basis, because it was very tasking  
* Review process includes inter or intradepartmental discussion between managers or between manager and employees about feasibility of targets | * Executive meets once per week-looking at certain business development initiatives, also reviewing measures and performance  
* Managers more responsible for meeting to discuss targets once per quarter-formerly monthly but became impractical  
* Staff meets once per quarter  
* All management meetings are often followed by a departmental meeting  
* Since introduction of BSC the focus has now been on organisational and departmental targets |
| Management by Measures | * For the IT Manager it is critical for day-to-day management of the department. However, performance data is treated seriously within EA as against the ministry  
* For the Customer | * It varies from one unit to the other, the need or particular case at hand. Data may be consulted daily or even quarterly, for eg properties that are rented must be verified for where person is in  
* Performance data helps to better communicate the strategic direction of the organisation to junior staff and to convert strategy into measurable targets to each member of team. | * Performance data helps to better communicate the strategic direction of the organisation to junior staff and to convert strategy into measurable targets to each member of team. | * Consulted in preparation for all managers meetings-monthly, etc.- and for submission of internal and external reports  
* Necessary for directing a team  
* It helps to keep |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monitoring accuracy of data from within</th>
<th>Single looping</th>
<th>Double looping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Services uses performance data daily throughout the year to drive how the unit goes forward and make adjustments accordingly.</td>
<td>* One manager said 'managers are constantly reviewing measures, minutely [by the minute]' * Managers said it helps them to manage their teams, because they are able to see how far they are from there goal</td>
<td>* E-commerce will reposition EA from a national organization to a global one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* No recognisable evidence of double loop learning</td>
<td>* E-commerce will reposition EA from a national organization to a global one.</td>
<td>* No recognisable evidence of double loop learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* More quality control on data since 2006 with the introduction of a computerised PMS.</td>
<td>* Internal Audit uses an electronic system to check data from all departments.</td>
<td>* Pioneered the idea of a marketing department at JEA's and a first in Jamaican government, also the idea of using tents to accommodate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Internal Audit unit, which checks data from all departments.</td>
<td>* Internal Audit controls files so they can verify that what is reported by individual officers against what is logged in the logg Book or in Registry unit</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Some managers say they also check that their officers have covered the work they claim to have done</td>
<td>* External Audit is done yearly by the Auditor General</td>
<td>* Rebranded with a more professional look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* A Quality Assurance unit which does daily random checks on data</td>
<td>* External Audit is done yearly by the Auditor General</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* External Audit is done yearly by the Auditor General</td>
<td>* The workflow through accountability</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The development of a service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* A significant amount of data capture is done in real-time with officers having off-site internet access and with the use of its Integrated Tracking system and Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Rebranded with a more professional look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Certain aspects of data capture are done in real-time by the PMS; e.g. what activity a CSR is engaged in, number of calls unanswered or answered. This should increase with the introduction of online registration</td>
<td>* Very little real-time capturing of data due to low integration of many systems with PMS.</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Areas of improvement include</td>
<td>* Increase in computerised data from 10% to 90% which has boosted operations * Use of electronic printed receipt * Increased internet access at desktops * Reduction in time targets due to computerisation; with shorter time for tracking a service from desktop rather than having to visit relevant unit.</td>
<td>* Pioneered the idea of a marketing department at JEA's and a first in Jamaican government, also the idea of using tents to accommodate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The development of a website to allow for e-commerce</td>
<td>* Performance data allows D to constantly assess the relevance of training programmes * A decline in schedule training programmes but an increase in customised programmes * Revenue generation is now more based on meeting customer needs than on schedule programs * Increased business from Caribbean governments</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced wait-time of 30 min</td>
<td>* Investing in a number of in-house and off-the-shelf systems for better performance measuring and managing</td>
<td>* Rebranded with a more professional look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced error to 5%</td>
<td>* Internal Audit regularly verifies accuracy of data * Managers verify the work done by their officers</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced number of missed calls with VOIP</td>
<td>* Managers controls files so they can verify that what is reported by individual officers against what is logged in the logg Book or in Registry unit</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The electronic PMS allows for tracking, making data more accurate, faster speed in the business process.</td>
<td>* External Audit is done yearly by the Auditor General</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data synchronicity with real time performance</td>
<td>* Increased internet access and managing data capture are done in</td>
<td>* A constant guide to where we are going</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The workflow through accountability</td>
<td>* The development of a service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Not possible to manage ones team without consulting the performance results and the set targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* A significant amount of data capture is done in real-time with officers having off-site internet access and with the use of its Integrated Tracking system and Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Very little real-time capturing of data</td>
<td>* Internal audit regularly verifies accuracy of data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Performance data allows D to constantly assess the relevance of training programmes</td>
<td>* A decline in schedule training programmes but an increase in customised programmes</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Revenue generation is now more based on meeting customer needs than on schedule programs</td>
<td>* Increased business from Caribbean governments</td>
<td>* Rebranded with a more professional look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Increased internet access and managing data capture are done in</td>
<td>* Performance data allows D to constantly assess the relevance of training programmes</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The development of a website to allow for e-commerce</td>
<td>* A significant amount of data capture is done in real-time with officers having off-site internet access and with the use of its Integrated Tracking system and Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced wait-time of 30 min</td>
<td>* Investing in a number of in-house and off-the-shelf systems for better performance measuring and managing</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced error to 5%</td>
<td>* Internal Audit regularly verifies accuracy of data</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced number of missed calls with VOIP</td>
<td>* Managers verify the work done by their officers</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The electronic PMS allows for tracking, making data more accurate, faster speed in the business process.</td>
<td>* External Audit is done yearly by the Auditor General</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Areas of improvement include</td>
<td>* The workflow through accountability</td>
<td>* Not possible to manage ones team without consulting the performance results and the set targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The development of a website to allow for e-commerce</td>
<td>* The development of a service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced wait-time of 30 min</td>
<td>* A significant amount of data capture is done in real-time with officers having off-site internet access and with the use of its Integrated Tracking system and Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Rebranded with a more professional look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced error to 5%</td>
<td>* Performance data allows D to constantly assess the relevance of training programmes</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced number of missed calls with VOIP</td>
<td>* Internal Audit regularly verifies accuracy of data</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The electronic PMS allows for tracking, making data more accurate, faster speed in the business process.</td>
<td>* Managers verify the work done by their officers</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Areas of improvement include</td>
<td>* The workflow through accountability</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The development of a website to allow for e-commerce</td>
<td>* The development of a service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Rebranded with a more professional look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced wait-time of 30 min</td>
<td>* A significant amount of data capture is done in real-time with officers having off-site internet access and with the use of its Integrated Tracking system and Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced error to 5%</td>
<td>* Performance data allows D to constantly assess the relevance of training programmes</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced number of missed calls with VOIP</td>
<td>* Internal Audit regularly verifies accuracy of data</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The electronic PMS allows for tracking, making data more accurate, faster speed in the business process.</td>
<td>* Managers verify the work done by their officers</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Areas of improvement include</td>
<td>* The workflow through accountability</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The development of a website to allow for e-commerce</td>
<td>* The development of a service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Rebranded with a more professional look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced wait-time of 30 min</td>
<td>* A significant amount of data capture is done in real-time with officers having off-site internet access and with the use of its Integrated Tracking system and Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced error to 5%</td>
<td>* Performance data allows D to constantly assess the relevance of training programmes</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced number of missed calls with VOIP</td>
<td>* Internal Audit regularly verifies accuracy of data</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The electronic PMS allows for tracking, making data more accurate, faster speed in the business process.</td>
<td>* Managers verify the work done by their officers</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Areas of improvement include</td>
<td>* The workflow through accountability</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The development of a website to allow for e-commerce</td>
<td>* The development of a service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Rebranded with a more professional look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced wait-time of 30 min</td>
<td>* A significant amount of data capture is done in real-time with officers having off-site internet access and with the use of its Integrated Tracking system and Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced error to 5%</td>
<td>* Performance data allows D to constantly assess the relevance of training programmes</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Reduced number of missed calls with VOIP</td>
<td>* Internal Audit regularly verifies accuracy of data</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The electronic PMS allows for tracking, making data more accurate, faster speed in the business process.</td>
<td>* Managers verify the work done by their officers</td>
<td>* Regional clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Areas of improvement include</td>
<td>* The workflow through accountability</td>
<td>* New ethos everybody can be a leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.2f Cross-case Analysis Table

#### 6.2.3.2.1 Piecemeal or complete PMS

The popular response from each EA was that their PMS was a complete system. The basis of this view was that it was well connected at ‘all levels of the system from goals down to departmental targets to employee targets’. Interviewees viewed the process of developing the PMS, which is, devolving individual targets from the organisation’s goals and objectives, as allowing for a system that was comprehensive and that governed operations throughout the EA.

The responses from A showed a somewhat varied perception of whether the PMS formed a complete system. Whereas more interviewees commented on its systemic power to enable managers to guide their units and, by extension, the organisation, there were opposing views. One manager described the system as not as visibly distinct a unit as is the set of targets or measures that form it. She explained that the main computerised management system does not capture every aspect of work that is done and measured and that many other aspects, especially in the non-operational units, are captured and measured manually. On the other hand, one manager described the system as detailed, but not necessarily comprehensive, in so far as, though it captures from organisational aims and objectives to departmental targets and Service Level Agreements (SLA), SLAs are not measured and therefore is not linked to the PMS by any target or measure. She thought there was more adhocracy at the EA, even with the use of the PMS, than the level of structure she was used to in her experience in the private sector.
6.2.3.2.2 Reviewing measures - periodically or ad hoc

The overall opinion on the periodicity of reviewing measures was that there were several periods for this process and that it was by no means ad hoc, and that the process of reviewing was done across departments during scheduled meetings. These periods were similar across all EAs. At A, weekly meetings take place between operational managers to review the performance of departmental targets. All managers meet monthly to further ascertain the progress and performance of targets. For monthly meetings, managers receive a priori reports from other managers concerning their departmental performance and together these are discussed during the meetings. These monthly meetings result in departmental meetings following soon after to discuss developments and findings by managers. Then the CEO reports monthly to the parent minister on the organisation’s performance. The Chief Executive Board (CEB), which mainly comprises managers, meets quarterly to discuss targets and overall and departmental performance. The CEO then reports quarterly to several government departments including the parent ministry, the Ministry of Finance, the Auditor General, the Cabinet Secretary. Combine management meets at half year for corporate planning and to determine goals, measures and tasks for the following year. From this meeting, an annual report, which has a further reach and is tabled in Parliament, is sent out by the CEO to all main stakeholders.

At B, the review process is similar as targets are reviewed monthly, quarterly and annually but on occasion may be reviewed weekly. Meetings are conducted similarly to those at A and may result in adjustment to targets. Also, at C, supervisors also play a role in reviewing targets and giving feedback to managers.

The executive management team at D meets once per week to consider certain business development initiatives including the discussion of targets. Monthly, there have been the general management team meeting where targets are reviewed. Sometimes at midyear there may be the need to change targets according to need. Sometimes there are changes to the Strategic Plan level, which is cascaded down, resulting in change in targets. For example a government policy may be changed and necessitate a change in D's targets. However, since the introduction of BSC the focus has been on organisational and departmental targets and not individual ones. After setting targets there is a 4 or 5-month period within which employees can report on or object to targets. However, some targets are non-negotiable.
6.2.3.2.3 Using PMS data to steer

The general opinion held by Managers in all EAs was that operational managers found the use of performance data critical to their day-to-day operations and management while other departmental managers, such as Finance, do not need to make frequent referrals to performance data. Managers also must consult with performance data in preparation to periodic meetings and, as with the CEO, in preparation of reports. It helps manages to monitor the overall performance of team members, by having a ready access to performance measuring data. At C, the CEO described the PMS as ‘helping to better communicate the strategic direction of the organisation to junior staff’. At D, the CEO also cited the need to refer to performance data when performance of the EA is called into question- for example, a client complained about the timeliness of proposals so the CEO requested to see records of how many proposals were being generated per period.

6.2.3.2.4 Monitoring accuracy of data

There are a number of checkpoints for the accuracy and internal checks on data at each EA. Since 2006, with the introduction of a computerised performance management system, most of the processes at A are automated. The computerised system also has its own inbuilt quality checks but this is subject to the accuracy of data inputted into the system. This system can determine where any error may lie and who may be responsible, as one task is linked to another with details on who worked on each tasks. At the end of any process the PMS performs checks. This has allowed for better quality control on the accuracy of data. The presence of a Quality Assurance unit and Examiner since about 2008 has also improved the quality of checks on data. This unit performs daily random checks on documents and accordingly emails the managers with whom these checks may pertain. Individual managers also claimed to do manual checks for verification of work done by their subordinates. The EA is also audited by its own internal auditors and from external government auditors.

B also has a number of checkpoints that mainly come through managers, the CEO, HR, internal auditors and external auditors. Managers provide one of the first checks and balances as individual employees submit work to their managers. Under the current legislation internal audit also plays such a role but is mainly focussed on financial aspects, comparing reports with data, even examining individual level targets per
employee. Accounts department also verifies some of the checks paid. Internal Audit also performs one or two audits yearly while external audit performs a yearly check.

Checkpoints at C are similar to B only, like A, their Internal Auditor audits daily using an electronic system that sits on all databases and then reports to the relevant manager. Some audits may be manual such as how many equipment to be repaired. Managers and Supervisors also monitor the validity of reports submitted by employees. The workflow or work process also acts as a check and balance for accountability. For e.g. the number of records retrieved from a vault, the total number of records keyed by different employees and the number of files printed should be the same.

There are some similar checkpoints for the accuracy of data at D as at the other EAs, namely managers, internal and external audit. Internal audit does so regularly throughout the year while external is done once yearly and managers verify the targets set for subordinates by comparing work done with data that is logged and recorded.

6.2.3.2.5 Data synchronicity with real time performance

There is very little real-time data capture at B and D. Though the level of computerization at B has significantly increased (from 10% to 90% since becoming an EA), there is still low integration of many systems where data is entered or captured, with the PMS. The nature of the work done at B may not lend as easily to real-time data capture as B does a lot of fieldwork that requires waiting on information from other organizations.

Interviewee responses at D suggested that data was inaccessible in real-time. Generally, data capture for performance data at D was manual, rendering it virtually impossible to have real-time access to performance data. The exception seemed to be one target-related performance data that could be captured by the system, a Facilitators time to respond to a client’s application to one of D’s program. However, according to the IT Manager, some systems were still at the testing phase, namely in Finance and HR. Others were yet to evolve, such as a move toward e-business.

Real-time data entry is more prevalent at A and at C. One departmental manager at A revealed that whereas for 2008-2010 their target error rate was 25%, this error rate has now been reduced to 5% and the department has been meeting it. This improvement in performance is largely attributed to A’s ability to perform real-time checks conducted by
the department on its performance. Also, computerized performance data is accessible by all employees at any point in time and therefore allows employees to be au courant with their own performance.

A significant amount of data capture is done in real-time at C. This can be attributed partly to the high level of computerization, the integration of all 9 offices through the use of servers at each regional office integrated with the server at head office and the high level of integration between the PMS and other systems. In addition, field officers have remote internet-access by which they may access required data and provide real-time data capture while on the field. Other systems, such as a Tracking system and a Customer Service Monitoring and Evaluation System, also make this possible.

6.2.3.2.6 Level of Organisational Learning from Performance Data

In examining whether the PMS drives operations at the EAs, one concern was to examine the degree of impact that performance data was having on each EA. The examination, therefore, checked for the level of organisational learning, to determine whether single or double loop (Argyris and Schön, 1978) was taking place.

According to the IT Manager at A, any new measure or target was first tested before implemented. If the target proved to not produce improvement at the EA it was not implemented. During corporate meetings, managers examined targets that were producing better performance against those that were not and, hence, which needed changing. Other managers gave examples of this such as the addition of a new error rate target in one department and the constant effort to reduce customer wait time. On one level, evidence of single loop improvement in achieving their goals were espoused to a number of changes made. Some such changes were the move from having direct calls to the EA to introducing VOIP (voice over internet protocol); establishing a call centre to satisfy the need of customers to successfully contact the EA and reducing the number of failed attempts to do so directly; the use of mobile internet access on the field; and the merging of two operational units to reduce rejection rate and performance time transferring from one unit to another. On another level, evidence of double looping was espoused as the current move toward e-business, which will change the current positioning of the EA from a national organization to a global one.
At B there has been a continued focus on surpassing its targets. Changes have been relegated more toward operations and not necessarily reflected in changes to its policies. Targets at B have changed because of an increase or decrease in performance. Where there has been a sustained decrease or improvement in performance regarding a particular KPI, B has sought to make changes to related targets. An increase in its computerization from 10% in its initial stage to 90% currently has greatly boosted its operations. The resultant effects are seen in customer satisfaction, reflected in more cordial and positive customers’ comments on wait time and processing time. Positive impacts of computerization also redound to B’s internal business performance. All employees now have internet-access at their desktops. Also, customers now receive electronic printed receipts instead of handwritten ones. Through public education B has improved its image and is held in much higher esteem and is better known throughout Jamaica. Also, its Backlog Project has resulted in clearing many backlogged files.

At C the improved staff morale, customer satisfaction and internal business performance is attributable to the use of PMS and increase in computerization. C has focussed on the development of a well built IT infrastructure behind all its operations, with its CEO herself holding former positions in IT systems development. To keep abreast with the demands of the market C continues to invest in both in-house and off-the-shelf software systems for better performance measuring and managing. From its very inception, C pioneered the idea of a marketing department at JEAs, which was the first marketing department in Jamaican government. In Jamaica, it also pioneered the idea of using tents to accommodate customers at very busy times and which has since been followed by other agencies. Its modus operandi, as explained by its internal Auditor is to live the idea of working from the vision and not from the budget. He describes this inner position backed by the challenge for each manager to quarterly produce a new target ready for implementation, as leading to a constant flow of innovations at the EA. In addition, C continues to venture into new areas of business operation such as providing immediate birth registrations at hospitals and selling its expertise to other governments in the Caribbean and Canada, and even the UK in one named instance.

At the single loop level, D identifies the use of performance data as giving them the ability to assess the relevance of the products they offer to clients and to help them ascertain the direction of the market. For example the data reflecting a decline in the
demand for one particular product and an increase in demand for another signalled to D the need to strengthen its capacity to respond more readily to client need and evaluate the relevancy of the product in less demand. One result has been an increase in training programs customized to its clients’ needs, which has led to an expansion of staff.

At the double loop level, D described a number of transformative changes it has undergone. Changes in strategic positioning in 2008 to use the BSC to better accomplish its aims. The new ethos was based on the philosophy that everybody can lead from where they are without the need of a title to lead. This new ethos is evident in staff morale and attitude and causes each person to be more strategic in their outlook. An office attendant now views himself or herself as a strategist. Where before an employee would pass blame, there is now a greater sense to take ownership. The CEO described a situation where two yard attendants were overheard describing a task of using recycled water for the plant watering as contributing toward the organizational objective of efficient use of energy and all utilities.

The new ethos has produced an improved image of the organization at different levels. The level of sophistication and professionalism seems to attend this image is seen in the manner its products are now packaged. For example where before clients received course document in a manila folder, now they receive a ring binder with a profile of D, of the CEO, of the Faculty and a training outline. These changes have resulted in the rebranding of D.

Governed by this new ethos D is now more proactive in meeting the needs of stakeholders, such as foreseeing the need to meet certain needs before government requests such needs to be met. The former departments of HR and Communications were more focussed on making D visible, and having attained that aim are now rebranded under a new department Finance Human Resource Institutional Strengthening (FHRIS) which is proactive and focussed on the capacity building aspect of D.

Where D’s core business used to be pre-determined courses, it now packages two sets of products run by two different departments, one for customized programs and the other for schedule programs. Revenue generation is now heavily based on meeting customer needs than on schedule programs. Changes have brought an increase in revenue with the same customers requiring larger number of their participants to be trained. There is also
increased business from Caribbean governments, especially from Trinidad and Tobago and Montserrat, and better partnerships with international organizations that attend delivery of their programs, such as the IDB.

Some other notable changes in its drive for leadership throughout has been an emphasis in efficiency and reduction on waste over tasks that are not measured. Signs have been put by light switches to remind employees to turn off lights not in use; in some cases motion sensors are in use; water saving taps have been installed in bathrooms; recycled water is used for watering plants and lawn; composting of organic material is used for plant manure; where the emphasis was placed on getting jobs done, it is now customer-focused with customer satisfaction surveys and client satisfaction surveys for the client organization.

The CEO expressed confidence that by year-end of the financial year a lot more of the projected change would be seen and D would be further along in fully implementing the strategic plan for the BSC.

6.2.4 INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

6.2.4.1 Research Theme Seven: to determine the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems

The seventh research theme of the Interview Schedule was to determine the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems. This research theme was examined by discovering what other management systems existed at the EA and the degree of integration (strong, weak) between the PMS and these other systems.

6.2.4.1.1 Integration of PMS & Other Management Systems

At A there were three other main management systems beside the PMS, a Financial Management system, a Logging system and a Human Resource Management system. For each of these systems there is only partial integration with the PMS with the degree of integration varying with each system and each department. Managers are kept abreast with all issues pertaining to each system during their meetings. The IT Manager described the integration between PMS and other systems to be partial but progressive and based on the needs of the department. Other managers, such as HR, described the
integration between the PMS and other systems to be strong. For example the HR Manager described the integration between HR, Finance and PMS to be high in so far as he could access all he requires from any of these systems via an interface on his desktop. However, some limitations exist because a large part of the performance data, as high as 50%, entered in his department is done so manually, a problem he deemed solvable by the EA giving more attention to administrative issues as is currently given to strategic issues. The IT Manager explained that incompatibility issues also exist between systems for whereas some systems are developed in-house others are third party. Other integration issues under consideration arose with their plans to introduce a ‘work from home’ arrangement and the current mobile fieldwork done in more remote areas. Also, increased integration with the HR system is required for validating and securing employees’ identity.

**INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 7: To determine the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems? Where this integration is low, what are the reasons for that?</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of PMS and other Systems</td>
<td>* Systems with varying levels of integration with the PMS: * The Lobby system is not integrated * The Financial System is partially integrated * Payroll and HRM System are strongly integrated but only partially integrated with the PMS * The PMS is in every department and accessible by all employees * Some managers can access the information they require from the PMS from an interface on their desktops</td>
<td>* No distinct performance data management system but an estate management system was used in each department for managing their performance data, and therefore, is treated here as B's PMS* * Varying degrees of integration with the PMS: * Backlog system is 100% integrated * Property management system is about 50% integrated * Estate management system is 100% integrated * File tracking system are standalone * Human Resource Management and two financial management systems are partially integrated with other systems but not with the PMS</td>
<td>Varying degrees of integration with the PMS: * PMS is used by all employees * Storage systems are fully integrated * A batching system that is 100% integrated * Online systems are 100% integrated and live 24hr * Tracking System is 100% integrated, from photocopying to producing electronic computerised birth certificates</td>
<td>* Systems integration with the PMS is low to nil: * Little data capture * Systems in use are a payroll and accounts system, a course management system, and MS Office * Client/student management systems to be integrated * Other systems to be introduced- a web-based system for measuring performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.2g Cross-case Analysis Table**

However, there have been improvements in integration between the PMS and communications or telephony system. Also, there were also plans to improve the
limitations in the Lobby Management system, which is currently standalone. The IT Manager explained that the benefit of linking this system to the PMS is clear as the Lobby system keeps a track of customer flow and so tracks customer performance variables such as wait time, which will allow to better measure that aspect with other operations if there were an interface. This improvement is planned through the introduction of a new system that is totally automated. Cost, however, remains an inhibitor to progress.

Responses from interviewees at B revealed that there was no one distinct performance data management system. However, one system, an estate management system, was the most popular and was used in every department for managing their performance data, and therefore, is treated here as B’s PMS. However, interviewees mentioned several other management systems, each related to the specific work done in a given department and each with varying degrees of integration with the PMS. There is a backlog system that captures and manages data of files that should be closed. This system is 100% integrated with the PMS. A property management system that captures property-related data is 50% integrated with the PMS. Another system that manages estate related funds and payments is 100% integrated with the PMS. There is a file tracking system for locating files but it is not physically integrated with the PMS. Other standalone systems such as a Human Resource Management system and two financial management systems are partially integrated with other systems but not with the PMS. However, each system facilitates staff in collecting performance data and/or client-related data, and generates its own report. Due to limited integration a user must individually log in to each system to retrieve any required information.

There are a number of data capturing systems at C with varying degrees of integration with the main system for capturing and managing their performance data. A number of their management systems were developed in-house involving the expertise of the CEO who has a strong background in information technology. The main system is used by all employees and for tracking other applications and is referred here as the PMS. This system can also tell which officer is using a given application. Two other systems are used for converting all documents to an electronic form and electronic documents to a hardcopy for storage respectively. These systems are fully integrated with the tracking system and allows the CEO to know all files that were viewed and printed and by whom.
Another system handles all retails noting the monies collected for all payments made. A batching system that is 100% integrated with the PMS or tracking system, an accounting system with limited integration and a VOIP system to be integrated later on and which monitors all calls going out, are a few other systems used at C.

There are two new in-house projects on the way, one that would give customers access to the PMS by way of their receipt number, so they may track the status of their application. The other system would allow for online registration and introduce tablet computers at hospitals to phase out the involvement of the data entry team who can then focus on backlog files.

There are several management and data-capturing systems used at D but the level of integration between systems is very low to nil. Even though D is awaiting the full implementation of its BSC, there is no indication that there is dedicated, computerized systems for data capture. In fact, the IT manager described such a dedicated system as a scarce resource. Some systems in use are a payroll and accounts system, a course management system, and MS Office for building varying templates. There are also two systems that D hopes to later integrate, one for managing client/students record and incoming applications and another for hosting online workspace for courses. These two systems also enable some degree of real-time data capturing including a facilitators response time to course-related queries. Still in their state of change, D is also looking at introducing additional systems. One such system would accommodate Finance and HR but is still at the testing phase. Another is a web-based system for measuring performance. This system is developed and used by one of the newer EAs and D is yet to examine its compatibility with its own framework.

6.2.4.2 Research Theme Eight: to determine how/if PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time

The eighth research theme of the Interview Schedule was to determine how PMS reflect success or failure of EAs over time. This research theme was examined by testing how well the PMS provides historic data that reflects different aspects of the EA’s performance and whether the PMS can detect areas where performance has improved or declined.
6.2.4.2.1 PMS & EA Improvement

The main area of improvement at most EAs was customer wait-time. At A this has improved through several means. Firstly, the introduction of a call centre has reduced customer complaints of not getting through to the EA and increased the number of customers who reach the EA. Improved customer wait-time at A is also traced from recorded wait-times via the Logging system, and the reduction in wait-time targets over the years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research theme 8: To determine how/if PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can PMS reflect areas of improved performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Use of computerised PMS has brought significant change: rate of work is now faster: system verifies work that employees do and immediately captures it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Improving employees tools of trade: internet access on the desktop and remote internet access for compliance staff allows for immediate data capture and access while out on the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Files are now computerised reducing the size of manual client files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Quality of data examinations has improved backed by increase in quality checks by QA unit since</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* New project to move toward e-business and allow for full registration online.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* More searches are done on the website by public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can PMS reflect areas of declining performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

196
Since about 2008, there has been a bigger shift from manual to computerized filing of documents resulting in quicker responsiveness to and satisfaction of customer demands. A more computerized PMS has resulted in customer and internal requests being facilitated much quicker. This improvement is reflected in the change (reduction) in targets from year to year. Greater improvement is expected in the anticipated move toward an e-business where customer requests can be fully met online.

The presence of a Quality Assurance examiner, who does daily random checks on documents, since around 2008, has resulted in more emphasis placed on quality standards and not just meeting quantitative targets. The increased use of technology (computerized PMS) with an increased ability to streamline operations now generates required data much faster. The impact is also felt nationally with an increase in compliance rate of customers across the nation. There has also been an increase in searches on A’s website by the public. Customer satisfaction was seen to fall from its initial height and is again rising to the point where A won the Secret Shopper Competition that was run across government by the government Monitoring unit. There has also been improved customer comfort in terms of seating and customer feedback, which indicates that A makes increased effort to meet customer needs.

Employees are more comfortable with tools they work with. However, job roles do not seem to hold the same level of change as some described their roles as very mundane or ‘rote’, with the IT department having the most scope for widening job roles and experience. However, a training budget is allocated for staff on a consistent yearly basis for staff development.

Interviewees at B described several areas where the agency has improved. With increased computerization customers wait time at B has been reduced. The EA has been modelled for Best Practice and has won awards to reflect the same. For two consecutive years, 2009 and 2010, B won awards for customer service. There is evidence of general care meted out to clients, which originates with Manager/staff relationship. Managers practice
an open door policy toward employees, promoted by the CEO, which redounds to the public. Clients usually comment on the courtesies they meet at the agency.

From its onset as an agency the more obvious improvements were in employee attendance, punctuality, personnel attire and general conduct. Most persons can be seen at their desk by 8:30 engaged in agency work and not other personal matters. Also, the staff is more qualified, all possessing degrees where before seniority was the basis for promotion. The use of a PMS allows for more accountability and an internal work restructure of departments, along with an increase in resources (ergonomic furniture for employees, and better work spaces in cubicles for officers or enclosed offices for managers, new and faster desktop computers and copiers, more branches of the EA and increased number of supervisorial positions) that positively affects performance. The EA has always met and surpass its target, which, though it may suggest that it would be more difficult to meet targets the following year, yet employees are motivated to keep meeting them. This motivation is attributed to the team spirit that is engendered by the use of PMS. There have also been improvements within team communication since about 2009 with the introduction of monthly meetings with departmental managers.

Some other improvements at B have been the backlog initiative introduced since 2007, which is bringing closure on a large number of undealt cases and which involves the use of a database that is integrated with the main PMS and that makes it easier to capture information; the one year old file tracking system, accessible to all employees; and internet access recently made available to all employees. There has also been recent improvement in setting more compatible, inter-departmental targets that reduce interdepartmental conflicts and better suits the interrelated workflow. Targets were once set without consultation with the individual but since 2008 consultation is done with the individual and departmental manager. Also, unlike what obtains in central government, when an employee returns from outside training, that employee may make suggestions to management to have changes implemented. Such suggestions are sometimes implemented.

Outside of measurement there are many committees at B: a Grief Counselling committee, Disaster Preparedness for natural disasters for getting them in readiness for people and records, a website committee, a staff relations committee, Procurement Committee attached to Ministry of Finance (to prevent nepotism), a cost saving committee that is
also attached to government and exists for both the public and employees. There are no measures attached to what the committees do, but there is the incentive attached to bonuses if an employee belongs to a committee that has a Terms of Reference.

Recently, C has had a number of new initiatives. It now has a fully running online application for services; offers the first free Birth Certificate and bed side registry; genealogical research which is growing in popularity with international clients; performs registry weddings; in February 2011 began using a VOIP and an Interactive Voice Recording Protocol which allows customers to track the status of their applications using any phone by inputting their application number; an increase in customer service offices, the use of a ticketing system for awaiting customers; a customer service training with the ethos that staff are also customers; more educated employees (from the inception the CEO brought in lecturers to prepare staff for ordinary level examinations and encouraged staff to pursue degrees).

Several improvements at D are attributed to the use of PMS. Greater understanding now exists about the use of PMS than before. Though measurement was done before, more critical things are now captured through constant review of former procedures and measurement gaps. There is a greater level of cohesiveness between departments and a deliberate attempt at interconnectivity and integration between units and systems, which did not exist before. Like at A, the recent presence of a Quality Assurance unit has brought about greater accuracy with the performance data. One manager spoke of her increased confidence in the accuracy of performance data due to the work of the Quality unit and improvement in training in the usage of some systems that before were only partially used. The Customer Service manager found there was marked improvement in data capturing in her department with increased use of the Participant Management System by clients and by employees, as data is more timely and accurate.

### 6.2.4.2.2 PMS & EA Decline

One of the current challenges to A’s growth was identified as its present inability to expand its employee base due to measures taken by government in its agreement with the IMF to cap the wage bills. Even where more employees are deemed necessary and where A can afford to pay the salaries, it is not permissible. A remains the only EA that is a Model B treated as a Model C, meaning it is completely self-sustained and financially
independent of the government. Also 50% of A’s surplus goes to the government. (The same applies to C, which is the first Model C JEA).

An area of decline identified in the staff review was the decline in staff-human relations attributed to employees being too target driven to focus on developing staff relations. The review also reflected that staff was no longer enjoying their jobs as they did before. Insularity in departments was suggested as another plausible reason for employees losing sight of the wider organizational goals. One manager cited decrease morale because of central government’s refusal to meet certain requests by A for greater monetary bonuses and increments to staff salary. The new government policies also included cut backs on spending on social events, such as Christmas parties and government’s failure to grant 7% increase due from 3 years back since the wage-freeze. As such staff shows less effort ‘to go the extra mile’. Staff attrition was low in the early years of A, but within about 3 years of A’s existence it spiked and over the last few years it has tapered off. The spike period was attributed to the wage freeze where persons turned to better-paying, private sector jobs but are now finding greater job security at the EA during the financial crisis. Present performance data reflects increased current employee satisfaction as employees conceive the EA as trying to meet their needs.

In spite of the government’s cap on the wage bill and the resultant halt on increasing staff at A, there is a pressing need for increase work space for employees and the need to relocate to a larger property.

Though A is treated as a level C EA, that is, completely, financially self-reliant, and submits 50% of its surplus revenue to the government, the Ministry of Finance was described as not sufficiently responsive to approve change needs and so acts as the main inhibitor to A’s progress. Unlike A’s parent ministry that has been described as very supportive, the finance Ministry is described as taking ‘extremely long’ to respond on any important matter.

Interviewees’ responses at B concerning any decline in performance at the agency ranged from ‘Over the 12 years [there has been no] decline whatsoever … only progress’ to there is some evidence of decline in some areas. One manager opined that there was a decline in attire, and deportment but mainly among new employees who may not yet be well acquainted with the accepted standard at B. Another said there might have been a decline
in the overall target but that B has still surpassed the required, corporate target of 85%. One officer expressed that there was a greater need for upward mobility as a lack of opportunity affects employees’ performance and morale.

Interviewees at C expressed three main areas of decline all linked to financial restraints brought on by the government’s budget restrictions: the need to upgrade computers and other equipment; due to financial restrictions a radio drama programme which used to be aired on 11 stations is now on only 2 stations; the inability to give promotional items to public due to financial restraint. C, therefore, experiences similar restrictions from the Ministry of Finance, as does A.

Though D envisages a lot of progress with their use of the BSC, the challenges it faces with operationalizing certain aspects of the BSC has caused some momentary setbacks in setting targets. Since 2009 D has not used targets set at an individual level and has, therefore, awarded individual bonuses based on performance of the given unit and organisational targets. There have also been problems in interpreting and cascading some organisational objectives to departmental targets.

6.3 CONCLUSION

This section focuses on the completeness of the data presented in Section 6.2 above and discusses the relevance of this chapter to the logic of the thesis and how it will be worked within the next chapter, Chapter 7.

6.3.1 DATA COMPLETENESS

The analysis of the primary data gathered for this research is pivotal to the logic of this thesis. The ICF exposes an aspect of this logic as the fundamentals of the successful development of any Performance Management System. It is essential that each area of the Framework be covered in the empirical work as gaps in the data may impede the full benefit that can be derived from applying it in the analysis, or may create loopholes to uncovering the full extent of the usefulness of PMS to managing EAs. Hence, below I examine some of the gaps encountered while analysing the data, the possible reasons for each gap and the disadvantage it may present to the aims of this research.
One of the research themes is to look at the usefulness of the PMS at ministerial levels. However, senior officers at the ministries concerned (parent ministries and the Ministry of Finance) were not available. Where appointments were made they were postponed for another day and cancelled by the next. Therefore questions to be raised at this level could not produce any data for the analysis. Hence, this aspect of the aim cannot be fulfilled. It was still hoped that in some cases the responses from interviewees might help to suggest what may obtain at the Ministerial levels.

However, one question posed to interviewees at the EAs was ‘what data from the PMS is most important to stakeholders’. None of the EAs were able to identify any specific examples of performance data requests that are made by external stakeholders. The generic response was that it focussed on finance and customer related information. This would have been vital information, especially, in the absence of any direct information from Central Government. It could have provided the research with some information about the value that certain aspects of PMS data hold to government or what data are more important to government and which may have held implications toward the research theme of determining the influence of PMS data on government decisions made at ministerial levels. Nevertheless, the secondary data collected from each EA should provide some of this information.

Again, when questioned about the organizational mission, strategy and objectives for each EA, CEOs unanimously referred to their Strategic and Business Plan manuals. However, upon request only three of the four EAs, that is, with the exception of Case A provided this plan which covered from 2009 to 2014, for D, and 2011 to 2014 for B and C. This information is vital for assessing key aspects of the ICF for determining the ability of a PMS to manage an organisation. Without the knowledge of the organisation’s Mission, Strategy and Objectives there is no sure-proof way of determining the relevance or alignment of the measures to them or of assessing the types and spread of targets. In this event, any consistency in the responses received from interviewees would be used to fill this gap.
6.3.2 RELEVANCE OF THIS CHAPTER TO THE THESIS AND CONNECTIVITY TO CHAPTER 7

This chapter aimed to present the analysis of the primary data collected for this research. The data presented is analysed according to the methods discussed in Section 5.3.3 and is presented in both a tabular and textual form. The analysed data of this chapter is pivotal to the development of the thesis, which questions the contributions PMS makes to managing EAs. Toward this aim, this chapter has sought to analyse the primary data through the three methods - Matrix, Template and Cross-case Analysis.

The analysed data presented in this chapter is triangulated against the secondary data presented in Chapter 7. By this process of triangulation, the primary data is either corroborated or called into question by the secondary data. The result of this triangulation is further compared and contrasted in Section 7.2 to the secondary data from the earlier period (see Section 4.3). Doing so serves the purpose to make good the aim that this research would develop a longitudinal aspect insofar as the data collected during this research is then analysed in relationship with an earlier research conducted at the same four JEAs (see Chapter 4). This aspect of the discussion and triangulation is useful to help trace any developments over the full twelve year period of how the EAs have progressed and the contributions that PMS would have made toward that progress.

The comparing and contrasting of all four cases over the different periods will be done according to the eight main themes informed by the Interview Schedule and derived in this chapter.
Chapter 7

CASE AGENCIES: Data Triangulation and Research Findings

7.1 INTRODUCTION

7.1.1 PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

From the introduction, we can recall that the aim of the thesis was to assess the contribution of PMS to managing of EAs. This chapter now seeks to discuss whether such contributions exists and, if so, what they may entail. A significant outcome of the previous chapter was the identification of eight research themes after applying three rigorous methods- Template, Matrix and Cross-case Analysis- for organising and presenting the large quantity of primary data gathered during the fieldwork. To incorporate the analysis accomplished in Chapter 6 into this chapter (see letter F in Box 1.1 and Diagram 1.1), secondary data is analysed in Section 7.2 in accordance with these eight themes (see Tables 7.2a to 7.2h). Ultimately, the thesis aims to generate realist claims consistent with the methodological assumptions discussed in Section 5.1.1 about the use of PMS for managing EAs (see Chapter 8). To do this, Section 7.2 builds on the primary data analysis in Chapter 6 to discuss the research findings. Section 7.3 then integrates the earlier presentation of findings in Section 7.2, organised around each of the eight research themes, to present a more focussed articulation of the usefulness of PMS to managing JEAs according to the research aims and objectives (expressed as 5 research sub-questions in Sections 7.3.1.1 to 7.3.1.5).

However, before doing so, this chapter first analyses further the initial presentation of primary data through a process of triangulation with secondary data. This is done in Section 7.2. There are two key aspects to this process. Firstly, through a presentation and triangulation of the secondary data (for the period 2005-2011) with the primary data, this chapter either endorses or questions the accuracy of the information presented from the primary data analysis, which is from a similar period, 2011. The secondary data used in developing this discussion include Strategic Plans and reports that have been analysed from each JEA (see tables in Section 7.2 and list of documents in Section 5.2.2.2).
Where there is no corresponding secondary data to triangulate with the primary data, the triangulation of the four cases through Cross-case Analysis is considered sufficient, being the result of a further analysis after the two other analysis methods.

Secondly, by then triangulating the primary data with the secondary data from the 2002 research, in accordance with the eight research themes, it enables a discussion on how the use of PMS for managing JEAs in this earlier period have since developed, and by so doing brings a longitudinal aspect to the research. The secondary data used in developing this discussion are the findings from Talbot et al. (2002) reviewed in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.4.1 and letter D in Box 1.1 and Diagram 1.1).

However, it is important to note that because most of the secondary data from 2005 to 2011 fall toward 2005-6, and not toward 2011, and at most only two of any given document-type was received (see Section 5.2.2.2), certain aspects of the eight research themes, do not produce substantial findings when examined by these documents. This shortcoming places a limit on the extent of the triangulation with the primary data, which are collected and based on 2011 data (see Section 8.3). These documents, however, lend themselves more toward verification of the second, third and fourth elements of the ICF, which are structural and procedural and can therefore be verified by the accounts for the procedural and structural aspects of the PMS detailed in the Strategic plans and reports. However, for the first element, organisational ownership, which is mainly behavioural, looking at the extent to which stakeholders are involved in and the level of local autonomy they exercise over the development of the PMS, the secondary documents bear a weaker verification. They do however, in a number of instances, have strong suggestions toward commitment and accountability.

In terms of the three interrelated developments of these two empirical chapters (see Section 3), it is important to note that Section 7.2 builds upon Chapter 6 and also links into the discussion on the research findings. Behind the logical development of each of these different analyses is the more general organisation of data, toward an increasingly robust and focussed articulation of the usefulness of PMS to the managing JEAs. It follows then that while Chapter 7 necessarily reiterates ideas developed in Chapter 6, that the idea is to go from the initial analysis of primary data toward the presentation of a more integrated statement on research findings (in Section 7.3). Section 7.3, therefore, considers the research aim and objectives discussed through the application of the
Framework in light of the empirical analysis of primary and secondary research presented and discussed in Sections 6.2 and 7.2, and integrates this analysis into a more clearly and integrated statement on findings.

7.2 DATA TRIANGULATION AND RESEARCH FINDINGS

This section triangulates the primary and secondary data and discusses the main findings from this triangulation. It discusses them according to the ICF and the eight research themes derived from the Interview Schedule in Section 6.2.

7.2.1 ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP

7.2.1.1 Research Theme One: to determine the extent of Accountability and Control of the PMS

7.2.1.1.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Accountability, Commitment and Control

The secondary data gathered from the latter period (see Section 7.2a) makes strong suggestions, consistent with the primary data, about the level of accountability, control and commitment at each JEA. From the documents provided by each JEA, it is evident that the development of their PMS, especially setting their strategic objectives and targets, was controlled by each JEA within the parameters allowed by their organisational mission, Framework documents and in keeping with the GoJ’s 2030 vision (see Table 2.a and 2.b). It is also evident that their CEOs felt a strong commitment about the usefulness of their PMS for managing their organisations. For instance, in their strategic plan for 2009 to 2014, the CEO of D describes their new PMS “as its principal management tool” (Strategic Plan, 2009-14, p. ix). The other JEAs make similar references to their PMS (see Table 7.2a). This point is strengthened by evidence of the two monthly reports provided by C as samples of what obtains across all departments. As samples of what obtains across the organisation, it would suggest that performance data at C is useful for keeping all managers abreast with performance across the organisation. That such reports were needful for their monthly management meetings also suggests that “reporting in” was an active part of using performance data.

The regularity of reporting to its stakeholders and the depth of detail in the reports suggest that C practices a high level of accountability and maintains a commitment to
being transparent. For instance, C’s Strategic Plan carefully details the strategy employed within each of its units and all the tasks required to effect each strategy. This level of detail suggests that it is less possible to ‘game’ the actual outcome of each measure to satisfy rigorous audit. D shows a similar level of commitment in its detailed description of its BSC, detailing from the strategic issues that it needs to address, its vision, mission and core values all the way to their strategic objectives and themes where the issues are addressed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 1: To determine the extent of accountability and control of PMS</th>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TESTING:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of awareness of PMS</td>
<td>* Reporting on KPIs and performance related targets is evidence of awareness among Executive level of Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* “[R]eporting to stakeholders, indicates an awareness of PMS at Agency executives involved in reporting (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 13).”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Reporting on KPIs and performance related targets in periodic reports and strategic Plan is evidence of awareness among Executive level of Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Strategic Plan indicates a ‘highly participative’ development of PMS from all staff levels (Strategic Plan, 2009-14, p. ix).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of Effect of PMS</td>
<td>* Reporting on KPIs and performance based on targets from PMS indicates awareness of its effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Reporting on KPIs and performance based on targets from PMS indicates awareness of its effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Reporting on KPIs and performance based on targets from PMS indicates awareness of its effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Reporting on KPIs and performance based on targets from PMS indicates awareness of its effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness of PMS to Managers</td>
<td>* Several references to the use of targets for measuring agency’s performance, changing projections, determining customer perspective and operational performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* As expressed in its Management and Accountancy Framework Plan. It serves to “enable CEO … to better manage the Agency” (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Performance data useful for strategic meetings (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* “[M]anagement initiated a new strategic planning process … to incorporate the Kaplan and Norton Balanced Scorecard Methodology as its principal management tool” (Strategic Plan, 2009-14, p. ix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of awareness of PMS by the public</td>
<td>* Members of the public who are Advisory Board and Chief Exec Board members professional clients and stakeholders would be aware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* See cell below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Cell below indicates a high awareness level in the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* High level of awareness among targets groups. See cell below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempts at making public aware of PMS</td>
<td>“Agency’s budget [2005-6] for public education was not as large as in the previous year” (Annual Report, 2005-6, p. 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Public education on its services via mobile visits, live presentations and brochures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Ensure[s] that relevant information is available to the public” but no indication in Plan on targets for or means of public education initiatives (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The implementation of a comprehensive public education programme” including electronic and print media, radio, focus group sessions, brochures and outreaches (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 14, 27-28).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* Public awareness initiatives is focussed on “strategic partnerships development” and “consultations held with key stakeholder groups” (Strategic Plan, 2009-14, p. 19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2a Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014
On the basis of such implication, one may determine that there is a high level of transparency from B, C and D. A’s 2005-6 report, though fairly detailed, does not show the relationship from its vision and mission to its measures, only from its 6 KPIs to its measures and it is, therefore, difficult to ascertain from this single document the level of accountability or commitment to the use of the PMS for managing its organisation. However, since the documents attest to each JEA being responsible for developing their PMS on a regular basis, the secondary data would also suggest that each JEA exercises local control of its PMS.

Accountability, however, is more evident from the primary data, which, show that each JEA submitted frequent and regular reports to stakeholders and kept the public aware in different forums. Since only a few of these reports were actually seen, a number of them being dated, and that there was no contact with central government or other stakeholders to confirm the regularity of reporting, there is no other way outside the primary data to confirm the level of accountability. A similar argument may follow for control, that is, that it was more evident from the primary data than the secondary data would suggest.

7.2.1.1.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Accountability, Commitment and Control

Based on the triangulation with secondary data from the earlier period, some improvements in accountability for each JEA are noted from the primary data. Firstly, whereas in the earlier period there was little evidence to suggest that performance data was significant beyond ‘reporting out’ to external stakeholders (see Table 4.2a), triangulation of the primary data with the secondary data of 2005-14 above suggests that accountability within is very alive at each JEA. It also suggests that performance data was vital among management for management purposes and that even employees found them necessary to their day-to-day functioning. Secondly, whereas in the earlier period one CEO expressed concern that her EA was yet to embrace a performance management culture, it was now evident that each JEA not only embraced such a culture but strongly felt it had become a necessary part of their existence. Thirdly, a further development noted in the use of PMS for managing the agencies was the line of responsibility for setting targets. Whereas, in the earlier stage this line seemed blurred, the primary data shows that this line of responsibility is now clearly a combined (that is, executive and general) management effort led by each CEO. Furthermore, there was no evidence of complaint that this line was in anyway usurped.
With regard to the general level of autonomy, the earlier complaints that were levied against the Ministry of Finance were far reduced as was predicted by Talbot et al. (2002). However, two CEOs did complain about the financial restrictions that were placed by the Ministry of Finance on their spending as a result of government agreement with the IMF to cap the wage bill. These CEOs complained that though their organisations, based on their revenues, could afford further spending, their progress was being hindered by these restrictions.

7.2.1.1.3 Main Findings for Accountability, Commitment and Control

On the question of accountability, commitment and control four tests were performed on the primary and secondary data (see Tables 4.2a, 6.2a or 7.2a). These tests focussed on staff (and in particular, managers) and the public awareness of the effect and usefulness of PMS. Based on the triangulation of secondary data from 2005-14 against the primary data, the findings from these tests show there is a high level of awareness of the use of performance measurement by all employees and much lesser so by the public. This high level of awareness by staff prefigures a parallel commitment by management to their PMS and to developing a performance management culture throughout their establishments.

However, with the exception of D, this awareness seemed a bit confused among some of the non-managerial employees whose responses suggested that the PMS was a human resource system for assessing employee performance. These employees referred to the PMS as a ‘performance evaluation system’, which enabled them to meet their targets, and which determined whether they would receive an annual bonus. This particular group of respondents did not convey the idea of the PMS as a tool for managing the organisation; neither did they have a clear grasp on the wider scope and application of the PMS as linking their targets to the overall organisational goals and KPIs. This may be because these employees were not engaged in any of the design or implementation stages of the PMS. This deduction is strengthened when contrasted with the behaviour at D. Employees at D have a clear understanding of the presence of a performance management system that governs all of the EA. They understand that their actions contribute to some given organisational goal (even in the absence of individual targets). This understanding can be attributed to the involvement of all employees at D in the development of the BSC from the design stage (see section 6.2.1.1.1 and Table 6.2a),
enabling them to grasp a fuller picture of the system as a governing whole with applications beyond mere personal/personnel assessment. The employees’ responses at D reflected that their focus was not just on meeting targets but about accomplishing the goals of the EA.

Respondents at all JEAs reflected a very positive sense that the use of targets and measures was the way forward. Respondents also possessed a strong sense of ownership about their use of measures and targets, with C exuding the highest level of confidence. These effects ranged from personal to organisational benefits for improved performance.

Generally, managers found that the PMS enabled them “to better manage” their organisations (see Table 7.2a) and were, thus, committed to the use of PMS for managing. Particularly, they found that employees were more self-driven toward their responsibilities and that managers were more focussed on organisational goals and objectives, because targets were directly aligned to them. The issue of ‘reporting in’ is evident in the frequent management meetings to discuss performance and performance data, and the clear effort to keep stakeholders and each manager abreast with the goings-on within the whole EA, therefore maintaining a high level of accountability both to stakeholders and to each other. Employees are also kept abreast with the role of their department following these management meetings.

On the other hand, the public's level of awareness is uncertain and veers more toward the services provided and services guaranteed by each JEA than to a system for managing the organisations.

7.2.1.2 Research Theme Two: to determine the extent of Stakeholder Involvement

7.2.1.2.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Stakeholder Involvement

With the exception of D, the secondary data only made indirect references to who the key stakeholders were. These mainly confirmed what was found in the primary data: namely, Parent Ministries, the Ministry of Finance, Cabinet, Parliament, the Chief Executive Board (CEB), the Advisory Board (AB). Of these stakeholders, the Ministry of Finance, the parent ministry and the AB were the most influential over the PMS. However, the CEO and her management team determine the strategic direction of each JEA but require the approval by the parent Ministry and Ministry of Finance.
### ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 2: To determine the extent of stakeholder involvement</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying Main EA Stakeholders</td>
<td>* Indirect references to Key stakeholders in Report are Parent Ministry, members of the Advisory and Chief Executive Boards who which include employees of A, clients and other members of the public; Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>* Indirect references to Key stakeholders in Reports and Plan are Parent Minister, Permanent Secretary, Cabinet, Director of PSMD, Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ),</td>
<td>* Indirect references to Key stakeholders Reports and Plan are Parent Minister, Planning Institute of Jamaica, Permanent Secretary, Auditor General and an extensive list of all customers and stakeholders is given in (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 8)</td>
<td>* Key stakeholders identified in Strategic Plan are Cabinet Secretary, Services Commissions, Ministry of Finance, Public Service, Jamaica Civil Service Association,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of Local control of PMS</td>
<td>* CEO and executive team * Others that influence the EA through review and audit are the Chief Executive Board, Audit Committee, Ministry of Finance and Planning.</td>
<td>* Cabinet approves recommendations for any changes * CEO and executive team determine EA’s strategic direction and new management framework is designed implemented and monitored by CEO (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 5, 10) and setting its KPIs</td>
<td>* Parent ministry must approve performance objectives and targets recommended by Agency (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 7) * CEO and executive team and Advisory Board meet quarterly to discuss “progress against targets” (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 13)</td>
<td>* CEO with senior management team determines strategic direction of Agency * Development of strategic Plan according to new Scorecard PMS model “was highly participative … with executive management, senior management and the strategic planning committee which is a cross cutting staff forum composed from all ranks” (Strategic Plan, 2009-14, p. ix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level and Extent of use of PMS data Internally</td>
<td>* “The CEO reviews … quarterly performance reports” for strategic positioning of EA (Annual Report, 2005-6, p. 2). * Data is used for generating reports and determining staff incentives</td>
<td>* There is “constant monitoring and analysis of … performance” to determine “areas that may require change” (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 13) * PMS is useful as a tool in the decision-making process at (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 13)</td>
<td>* Performance data outputs used provide accurate information for clients and “support national planning and management of citizen’s identity” (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 13)</td>
<td>* Experience with the BSC model useful to D as a forerunner to GoJ’s intentions to implement performance management across the public service (Strategic Plan, 2009-14, p. 2) * CEO with her executive and senior management determine strategic direction of organisation through use of performance data and government vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level and Extent of use of PMS data Externally</td>
<td>* “Audit Committee … considers Internal Audit Reporters as well as External Audit Reports” and “assesses the adequacy and scope” (Annual Report, 2005-6, p. 2).</td>
<td>* PMS is linked to government’s National Development Plan-Vision 2030 with corresponding KPIs and monitored by PIOJ through reports (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 14)</td>
<td>* PMS is linked to government’s National Development Plan-Vision 2030 with corresponding KPIs (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 4)</td>
<td>* New PMS direction incorporates expectations from Cabinet decisions, government’s 2030 Vision, party manifesto and Millennium Development Goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Staff Benefit</td>
<td>* Staff training in 2005-6 was less than last period because of a smaller budget but it exceeded its target by 9.32% (Annual Report, 2005-6, p. 4, 20). * No performance incentives paid to staff: A did not meet the KPI performance standard for the previous year. * There is a target of 1500 man-hours for employee</td>
<td>* Increased staff training in this period with 3 related KPIs but none specifically measuring staff training (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 15, 20)</td>
<td>* Emphasis on staff welfare (providing health services) and training with 2 and 8 targets respectively (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 1-17)</td>
<td>* 2 of the 14 KPIs are focussed on staff training and competencies (Annual Report, 2009-10, p. 29-31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 2: To determine the extent of stakeholder involvement</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>training and development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2b Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014

Pertaining to the use of performance data, the documents show that there is far more internal use than by external stakeholders. Internally, the PMS serves a number of purposes including determining strategic direction of the JEA, staff incentives, and generally useful for making decisions. Externally it is more useful for review by the Audit team.

7.2.1.2.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Stakeholder Involvement

With regard to stakeholder involvement a few developments have occurred with the use of PMS at JEAs since 2002: i) development of the PMS is largely in the hand of the CEO and her management team, rather than between the CEO and the PS ii) there is a wider cadre of stakeholders, which includes more actors from Talbot’s (2010) complex network and iii) there is a greater emphasis on staff training and development (see Table 4.2c) over this period. Since no mention was made of the level of accountability between managers in 2002, it would also suggest that the level of ‘reporting in’ has grown.

7.2.1.2.3 Main Findings for Stakeholder Involvement

On examining the extent of stakeholder involvement, the research findings were based on three tests performed on both the secondary and primary data triangulation (see section 6.2.1.2). These tests focussed on the extent of stakeholder influence and use of PMS, and the benefits of performance data to staff. The findings are that staff involvement in the development of the PMS is high but varied. The data shows that managerial staff actively contributes to all aspects of PMS development, while non-managerial staff contribute via feedback given to managers during departmental meetings. Stakeholder influence on the PMS directly comes from the CEOs and their management teams and, less directly, from non-staff members of their AB and CEB (see Tables 6.2b and 7.2b).
The scope of stakeholders at each JEA does approach the complex network described by Talbot (2010) in Section 3.3.1.1 and Table 3.2, and is inclusive of at least four sets of actors- Line Ministries, the Legislature, Auditors and Inspectors, Professional Bodies and Users. However diverse the levers of power, there is very little evidence of conflict between stakeholder involvement on one hand, and local control and decision-making on the other. Also, the diverse sets of actors are mainly part of the Chief Executive Board, CEB, which is supposed to meet quarterly, but in most cases seldom meets. Therefore, the main decision-making about the PMS is left to each CEO and her combined management staff. Parent ministries, however, must approve the strategic direction intended by each JEA and also any changes to KPIs or targets. However, such approvals are usually granted. No government official was available for interview and so the related findings could not be validated (see Section 8.3). However, based on the CEOs’ responses it was ascertained that the extent of government involvement is:

i) through a yearly audit that determined whether the EA was entitled to its bonus and that verified performance data for accountability purposes

ii) very hands-off and arms-length. “We are really an entity, we run our own shop”, commented the CEO at A

iii) to use reports submitted by EAs ‘for PR’ purposes and for advancing their political interest, without vacillation to the significance of the EA’s semi-autonomous operation and, on occasion, for answering to questions raised in the Legislature. One interviewee explained that contrary to the Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s attempt to implement a Performance Management Framework in the public sector, in Jamaica the setting up of EAs was not politicised and, from its inception, remained fully supported by the opposition.

iv) financial, insofar as an EA progresses, a) GoJ it may reclassify it. Reclassification as we see in Section 4.2.3.3.2 allows a JEA greater financial autonomy as it is only required to submit to the Ministry of Finance a percentage of its surplus rather than of its entire revenue and b) the government’s financial responsibility to the EA is reduced so that though legislatively the GoJ is still financially responsible to the EA, in practice, the EA does not benefit from the government’s budget. Such is the case for A, which is a Model B JEA functioning as a Model C (see Sections 4.2.3.3.2 and 6.2.4.2.2 and Table 4.1) and for C, which is the only Model C JEA.
The data also suggest that the use of information technology was also relevant to the development of each PMS. The JEAs with a strong ICT department, namely A and C, had far more developed PMS. Several interviewees at C, including its CEO, were IT experts experienced in developing software systems. They communicated a clear understanding in the use of technology to strengthen their PMS and to continually drive organisational performance. There is also a strong anticipation of ‘the next step’ there. This was also noted in the IT team at A whose leader bore a stronger concern about the vision (and expanding the vision) of the organisation, than was otherwise noticed. This leader also worked closely with the CEO to develop and test new targets before they were finally implemented. This particular aspect was notably absent at B, whose IT manager was absent for interviewing, and whose PMS, by comparison, seemed less evolved.

The introduction of the BSC at D has seemingly encouraged a mind-set among their staff that is very suitable for encouraging a performance management culture. Notably at D, from the lowest ranked employee embodied the vision of the organisation and its ethos of ‘everyone a leader’. This is attributed to the involvement of all employees in the development of the PMS from the stage of design, and the strong bearing that each employee clearly understands how his or her responsibilities directly contributes to attaining organisational aims. In this regard, and as indicated in Section 7.2.1.1.3, D differs from the other JEAs insofar as employees at D could more readily relate their tasks to the organisational KPIs. This particular finding then is consistent with the perspective discussed in Section 3.3.1.1, that stakeholder involvement is critical to the success of the PMS. To this we may also add that increased stakeholder involvement encourages a positive attitude toward a performance management culture.

Finally, in looking at staff benefit from the use of PMS the findings are that employees receive yearly bonuses based on organisational, departmental and employee targets being met. The implication is, therefore, that if the organisation did not meet its targets then no one would receive a bonus. Also, if an employee met his targets but the department fell short that employee would receive no bonus. This signals that employee remuneration is not so much a decision taken by the JEA to encourage good performance from their employees but by the parent ministry and the Ministry of Finance to encourage good performance from the JEAs.
It would be interesting to examine if there would be a distinct change in attitude and performance if there were no incentives attached to the PMS.

7.2.1.3 Research Theme Three: to determine the extent of Performance Data Circulation Among Stakeholders

7.2.1.3.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Performance Data Circulation among Stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATIONAL OWNERSHIP</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research theme 3:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine the extent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of performance data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circulation among</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESTING:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examining data collection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Launch of computerised PMS to take place within 2006-7 operation year, which will affect data collection processes.</td>
<td>* Replacing main Management Software with one more suited to “process all aspects” of core business and to enable “data management systems to facilitate better decision-making” Strategic Plan (2011-14, p. 6).</td>
<td>* Strong emphasis on “using technology” to improve services (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 12) with four different focuses under its ICT department, in addition to an E-Business unit.</td>
<td>* Implemented a new PMS after the BSC Model (Strategic Plan, 2009-14).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Increased computerisation of data (eg documents) in preparation for use of new PMS and “enhancement of the Agency’s website to facilitate electronic registration … and electronic commerce” (Annual Report, 2005-6, p. 4).</td>
<td>* Increased computerisation of data and “less reliant on manual records” (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 6)</td>
<td>* Very probably the EA with the most developed electronic systems for data capture and real-time synchronicity</td>
<td>* Very little reference to the use of information technology in its Strategy suggests that data capture may be largely manual.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMS Data-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representation and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>importance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Annual Report is</td>
<td>* Annual Reports and Strategic Plan are addressed to the parent Minister and sent to other unlisted stakeholders.</td>
<td>* Monthly, quarterly and Annual Reports and Strategic Plan are addressed to the parent Minister and sent to other unlisted stakeholders.</td>
<td>* Annual Reports and Strategic Plan are addressed to the parent Minister and sent to other unlisted stakeholders listed in Table 7.2c.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>addressed to the parent</td>
<td>* Performance data are reported in both tabular and prose form</td>
<td>* Performance data are reported in both tabular and prose form</td>
<td>* Performance data are reported in both tabular and prose form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister and sent to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other unlisted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stakeholders.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Performance data are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reported in both tabular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and prose form</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Table 7.2c Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014

The documents from B and C show an increased emphasis on the importance of information technology for improved performance (see Table 7.2c). However, the document from A and D indicate otherwise. D makes very little reference to the use of information technology while A’s PMS is yet to be computerised. However, the document provided by A covers 2005-6 period and does not corroborate the primary data which indicates that A’s PMS and ICT department is far more advanced. Though B
indicates steps to make it “less reliant on manual records” (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 6), its primary data indicates that most of its data capture up to 2011 was still manual.

As indicated in Section 7.2.1.2.1, the documents indicate that there is a lot of ‘reporting out’ but shows little evidence on the value of the performance data to external stakeholders.

7.2.1.3.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Performance Data Circulation among Stakeholders

Examination of the 2002 secondary data suggests that the frequency of ‘reporting out’ could have increased to later incorporate quarterly reports. The data also suggests marked improvement in the use of computerisation, generally, and of digital data in particular.

7.2.1.3.3 Main Findings for Performance Data Circulation among Stakeholders

Based on the primary and secondary data there are a few main findings about data circulation among stakeholders. The research finds that there are regular periods when each JEA reports to their key stakeholders. It also finds that regular reporting together with the presence of an internal auditor at each JEA and regular annual checks from an external auditor suggest that JEAs value transparency. Also, while A and C have made significant advance in capturing data digitally, B and D are still very manual. However, documents provided by C, which had the highest level of digitalisation and real-time collection of data, showed strongest evidence for commitment to disseminate performance data to stakeholders. C was the only JEA that readily provided samples of all the performance data documents that they provide to their stakeholders. However, A, which had the second highest level of digitalised real-time data, provided only a very dated Annual Report.

7.2.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES

7.2.2.1 Research Theme Four: to determine the Spectrum of Performance Measures in use

7.2.2.1.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Spectrum of Performance Measures

The secondary data for 2005 to 2014 corroborates the primary data in most areas investigated in regard to performance measures. The areas of strongest corroboration are the spread and focus of measures and the alignment of departmental measures to KPIs.
There was not any evidence that there were conflicting measures from the data or any evidence to negate or call into question the primary data, only that the secondary data indicated a greater emphasis on employee training and development than did the primary data, though. However, the emphasis on employee training and development still appears lacking: in the period 2005-6, one of the 48 KPIs at A measured staff training; none of the 21 KPIs at B in 2011-14 period measured staff training; ten of the 136 departmental targets at C measured employee training and welfare in 2011-14 period, and; one of the 24 KPIs at D measured employee training in 2009-14 period.

### CHARACTERISTICS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 4: To determine the spectrum of performance measures in use</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TESTING:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment of departmental measures with KPIs</td>
<td>* 2005/6 Annual Report shows KPIs devolved from a set of ‘performance objectives’ but does not show departmental link to targets, though in some cases this may be deduced</td>
<td>* Strategic Plan (2011-14) shows KPIs, devolved from strategic objectives, are linked to a particular department</td>
<td>* Strategic Plan (2011-14) shows KPIs, devolved from strategic objectives, are linked to a particular department</td>
<td>* Departmental targets are devolved from the organisational KPIs based on the BSC model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus of Measures</td>
<td>Of the 48 KPIs in the Annual Report (2005-6), 24 are input and 12 each are activity and output</td>
<td>Of the 21 KPIs shown in the Strategic Plan (2011-14), 2 are input, 4 activity and 15 output</td>
<td>Of the 136 KPIs shown in the Strategic Plan (2011-14), 15 are input, 28 activity and 93 output</td>
<td>Of the 24 KPIs shown in the Strategic Plan (2009-14), 2 are input, and 22 output of which 2 may be interpreted as outcome as they measure satisfaction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spread of measures</td>
<td>* Targets fit the following: financial and non-financial, global but not clearly departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal and external, * Targets are strongly customer-oriented and revenue-focussed. * There is also a target of 1500 man-hours for employee training and development in different categories</td>
<td>* Targets fit the following: global and departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal and external, financial and non-financial * There is no target for employee training and development, only one target for “percentage of staff who meet or exceed competency level” (p. 31). However, the Plan does mention a list of courses for staff training</td>
<td>Targets fit the following: global and departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal (over 50%) and external, financial and non-financial * Eight department targets are employee programme-focussed plus two for social intervention * There is a strong focus on business processes</td>
<td>* Targets fit the following: global and departmental, hierarchical and horizontal, internal (just over 33% of total targets) and external, financial and non-financial * There is one target for employee participation in training programmes and 3 focussed on employee competencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicting Measures</td>
<td>* No indication of conflicting measures in Report</td>
<td>* No indication of conflicting measures in Plan</td>
<td>* No indication of conflicting measures in Plan</td>
<td>* Very organised and discernible Plan with few KPIs and no apparent conflict of targets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2d Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014
7.2.2.1.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Spectrum of Performance Measures

A similar pattern in the focus of performance measures is observed from 2002 to that which currently obtains from the primary data. Namely, there are no outcome or impact measures. However, from the secondary data of 2005 to 2014, there are increasingly more output measures and a reduction in activity (or process) measures. This suggests that there is still room for growth in devising outcome and impact measures. Also, it indicates that JEAs need to give more thought to their missions and the desired impact they look to have on Jamaica and, thus, should consider how their mission may be more fully expressed and accomplished through outcome and impact measures.

7.2.2.1.3 Main Findings for Spectrum of Performance Measures

The main findings surrounding performance measures are that JEAs design measures that are inclusive of Flapper’s et al. (1996) measure dimensions (see Section 3.3.2.1) and as described in the primary data. However, JEAs are yet to include outcome and impact measures and, therefore, their PMS do not fully reflect their mission. Only C claims to have a direct impact on a national outcome, namely the reduction of crime through the immediate registration for birth certification and paternity at the hospital. Unfortunately, C does not have any measure to reflect this impact.

Measures, though varied, mainly emphasise customer satisfaction and internal business processes and few emphasise to employee development. In fact, with the exception of B, employee development and involvement (such as funding for employee training at A, specialised training to ensure persons can properly interpret and analyse the legislation, and at D a strong focus on leadership development) are not measured. However, as provided by C, performance appraisal and development forms, including self-appraisal forms, are used to assess employees’ annual development. These forms are not based on meeting performance targets but qualitative descriptions of an employee’s conduct throughout the year.

Additionally, individuals working in non-operational units expressed that owing to the nature of their work a lot of what they do cannot be or is too difficult to measure. The case with D also suggests that there are problems of operationalising the BSC as suggested in the literature (see Section 2.5.2). Though into their third year of developing the BSC, D was still unable to devolve individual targets from its departmental targets.
7.2.3 MANAGEMENT PROCESSES FOR PMS

7.2.3.1 Research Theme Five: to determine the extent to which Performance Measures are Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives

7.2.3.1.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for PMs Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives

The secondary data analysed in Table 7.2e for each of the four cases corroborate the primary data that KPIs are derived from the strategic objectives which are derived from the mission; that targets are reviewed over time and kept aligned with strategic objectives; that strategic objectives change with strategic repositioning of the organisation, thus maintaining relevant targets; that targets are reviewed, at least monthly; and that for most cases targets are manageable. Thus, an examination of the Business and Strategic Plans of B, C and D confirms that all organisational KPIs were directly derived from the strategic objectives. These Plans show clearly a hierarchical alignment from strategic objectives to KPI and, in some cases, namely B and C, their departmental spread. Secondary data from Case A, however, did not show any direct link between mission and organisational KPIs nor give any indication of how targets are devolved to departments (see Table 7.2f). However, the information provided was from the 2005-6 Annual Report and is, therefore, inconsistent with the primary data, which might suggest that by the time of the fieldwork in 2011, much else would have improved at A.

Also, comparing Annual Reports over different periods show that there have been changes in the set targets and strategic objectives. In 2005-6, B had 4 strategic objectives and 8 KPIs, with one objective having no clear KPI. In 2006-7, B had 6 strategic objectives and 23 KPIs with each objective having very clear KPIs and the additional objectives focusing on their human resource and information systems, which were ignored in the previous period. For D, in 2008-9 there were 10 strategic objectives and 32 related KPIs. In their 2009-10 Annual Report there were 14 strategic objectives each linked to a unique KPI. The change in structure was due to the introduction of the BSC, which was proposed in the previous report. C’s 1998-9 Annual Report contained 33 KPIs with related targets but no stated strategic objectives. Its 2005-6 report shows 3 strategic objectives and 16 KPIs with related targets focussed on service delivery, change management and financial management, while its 2010-11 Strategic Plan and monthly
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 5: To determine the extent to which performance measures are kept continually aligned to main organisational goals and objectives</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TESTING:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Mission, Objectives and Targets</td>
<td>* 2005/6 Annual Report indicates 48 KPIs with a devolved set of ‘performance objectives’ (sub-targets) with their targeted and actual value outcomes but shows no clear link between mission and organisational KPIs</td>
<td>* 2011-2014 Strategic Plan shows connectivity at all levels: from mission to strategic objectives to KPIs and related departments for each of the three years in this period</td>
<td>* 2011-2014 Strategic Plan is very detailed and shows connectivity at all levels. “The KPIs are related to the core functions of the Agency and are linked to its goals and objectives” (Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p.14).</td>
<td>* 2009-2014 Strategic Plan shows connectivity from mission to Strategic Objectives to departmental unit and related performance measures * Its strategic focus was to “align its strategic plan with government principles … and integrate these in department’s strategies” (Annual Report, 2009-10, p.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevancy and Continuous Alignment of Measures to mission and objectives</td>
<td>* 2005/6 Annual Report indicates that based on previous performance some targets were adjusted after being approved by the parent Ministry</td>
<td>* Annual Report (2004-5) records 4 Strategic objectives and 8 corresponding KPIs. Annual Report (2006-7) shows 2 new Strategic objectives and 23 corresponding KPIs. Strategic Plan (2011-14) shows same 6 Strategic objectives but 2 less KPIs than in 2006-7. * There is no explanation or reference to the specific changes</td>
<td>* Annual Report (1998-9) lists 28 targets linked to 8 sub-targets (or KPIs) and 3 target areas or strategic objectives; Annual Report (2005-6) lists 58 dept. targets linked to 16 sub-targets (or KPIs) and 3 target areas or strategic objectives; Quarterly reports (2010-11) lists 100 departmental targets linked to 18 sub-targets (KPIs) and 7 target areas or strategic objectives; Strategic Plan (2011-2014) lists 136 departmental targets linked to 24 sub-targets and 6 target areas or strategic objectives;</td>
<td>* Annual Report (2008-9) lists 10 strategic objectives derived from the mission and linked to 32 targets; For Strategic Plan (2009-2014) and Annual Report (2009-10) BSC model is applied and lists 24 KPIs derived from 14 strategic objectives that are in turn related to the mission of parent ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review, Feedback and Changing of Measures</td>
<td>* The above indicates some level of review, feedback and changing of measures takes place. For example it states that projected earnings were reduced “as a result of revised operational targets later in the year” Annual Report (2005-6, p.6)</td>
<td>* There are a few changes in strategic objectives and targets but targets continue to be aligned to objectives *and are monitored consistently … monthly” “Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p.13). For example one target from objective 2 in Annual Report (2006-7) is moved to objective 1 in Strategic Plan (2011-14)</td>
<td>* There are significant changes in strategic objectives and targets but targets continue to be aligned to objectives.</td>
<td>* There are significant changes in strategic objectives and targets with the introduction of the BSC but targets continue to be aligned to objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable Measures</td>
<td>* 2005/6 Annual Report shows a manageable number of KPIs</td>
<td>* Documents show a manageable number of both strategic objectives and KPIs</td>
<td>* Documents show a manageable number of both strategic objectives and sub-targets or KPIs but increasing over the years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2e Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014
reports of the same period show 6 strategic objectives with 24 KPIs and related targets. All in all, KPIs have been kept aligned with the strategic objectives.

**7.2.3.1.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for PMs Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives**

The aspects of developing a PMS as examined in Table 6.2e were, to some extent, already a part of PMS development since 2002 (see Section 4.4.1.3), namely that mission, objectives and KPIs were linked in that order, and hence targets were kept aligned to objectives. Secondary data for B, C and D show that over time the development of targets was more refined (the number of KPIs derived from strategic objectives grows proportionately less- see Table 7.2e). There is no evidence, however, to support that in the earlier period targets were reviewed and/or changed where or when required. Therefore, any such evidence supported by more recent data points to a further development in the use of PMS at JEAs.

**7.2.3.1.3 Main Findings for PMs Continually Aligned to Organisational Goals and Objectives**

Therefore, on examining whether PMS are kept continually aligned to organisational goals and objectives, the research main findings confirm that this is so. It shows that the processes deemed necessary for maintaining this practice, namely devolving targets (and measures) from KPIs and KPIs from strategic objectives; reviewing measures regularly; providing feedback and where necessary changing measures; and thus keeping measures relevant are part of the development of the PMS at each JEA.

**7.2.3.2 Research Theme Six: to determine the extent to which PMS is Managed and Drives Management Operations**

**7.2.3.2.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for Extent to which PMS Drives Operations**

The secondary data for 2005 to 2014 strongly agrees with the primary data that there are a number of processes (listed above in Section 7.2.3.1.3) employed at each JEA to enable the PMS to be used for managing these organisations and that each PMS significantly drives management operations. More important to managing the organisation is how the measures are used. The secondary data, and especially the reports provided, suggest that the JEAs are reliant on measures to communicate the strategy of their organisation and by frequently measuring their targets they can determine their strategic position. The data also shows a growing need to have access to more timely data through increased
computerisation to allow “easier access to information and [to] aid in Management’s ability to make informed decisions” (B’s Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANAGEMENT PROCESSES for PMS- managing the PMS data within an organisational context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research theme 6: To determine the extent to which the PMS is managed and drives management operations</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* The computerised PMS (DPMS) was yet to be launched by 2006</td>
<td>* 2011-2014 Strategic Plan shows connectivity at all levels: from mission to strategic objectives to KPIs and related departments for each of the three years in this period</td>
<td>* 2011-2014 Strategic Plan is very detailed and shows connectivity at all levels: from mission to Strategic goals and Objectives to departmental unit and related performance targets for each of the three years in this period</td>
<td>* 2009-2014 Strategic Plan shows connectivity at all levels: from mission to Strategic focus to Thematic Objectives to Strategic Objectives to departmental unit and related performance measures and targets for each of the four years in this period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Test: PMS- piecemeal or complete system** |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Annual Report (2005-6, p. 12) reflects that targets were revised where necessary to better meet customer demand, namely by reducing the target set for one service that exceeded customer demand, and increasing the target for another service that was in greater demand than estimated.</td>
<td>* Changes in strategic objectives and targets as reflected in Annual Report (2006-7) and Strategic Plan (2001-14) are minimal</td>
<td>* In 2009 PMS is replaced by BSC model. Change in strategic objectives and targets are reflected in Annual Reports (2008-9 and 2009-10) and Strategic Plan (2009-14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Reviewing measures: periodic or ad hoc** |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Annual Report reflects shows that targets are a critical part of communicating the strategy of the organisation</td>
<td>* Reports show that targets are a critical part of communicating the strategy of the organisation</td>
<td>* No indication of how/if targets are devolved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Management by Measures** |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Auditors report from Ministry of Finance should indicate level of data accuracy but was not made available</td>
<td>* Auditors report from Ministry of Finance should indicate level of data accuracy but was not made available</td>
<td>* Details in weekly and monthly reports for January and May 2011 minutely detail activities that make for easy verification of weekly against monthly report and also cross-departmentally or with Central department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Monitoring accuracy of data from within** |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Annual Report may be too dated to indicate if real-time data is an aspect of A’s ICT.</td>
<td>* Strategic Plan (2011-14, p. 28) indicates that “sections of the Agency targeted for automation had electronicized systems … implemented” but that Operations was the final area</td>
<td>* Strategic Plan (2011-14, pp. 17, 19, 22) indicates that there are a number of real-time data capturing systems: ATS, VOIP, E-business. In fact, C is “Closer to real-time assessment as deemed necessary, and speed of access allows” Strategic Plan (2011-14,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Data synchronicity with real time performance** |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* No indication that real-time data is an aspect of D’s ICT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MANAGEMENT PROCESSES for PMS- managing the PMS data within an organisational context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research theme 6: To determine the extent to which the PMS is managed and drives management operations</th>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>CASE B</th>
<th>CASE C</th>
<th>CASE D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yet to receive such upgrade</td>
<td>pp. 33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single looping</td>
<td>* 2005/6 Annual Report reflects adjusting targets to meet customer demands based on previous performance * Approval from Ministry to increase wait-time from 15 to 20 min to facilitate customer demands</td>
<td>* Strategic Plan (2011-14, p. 15) reveals increase in computerisation for “evaluating and monitoring … performance and improve [their] ability” to provide more timely data. * Planned reduction in time targets for next 3 years of strategic plan.</td>
<td>* Quarterly report (Apr-Jun 2010, pp. 9-13) shows investing in a number of in-house and off-the-shelf systems for better performance measuring and managing, namely ATS for tracking applications and updating databases, SEP for systems protection, VOIP to increase accessibility of customers to the agency.</td>
<td>* Annual Report (2009-10, p. 8, 15) indicates that D has received benchmark status in its core business provision; a decline in scheduled services but an increase in customised ones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double looping</td>
<td>* No indication of this level of change from Annual Report * No recognisable evidence of double loop learning</td>
<td>* No recognisable evidence of double loop learning</td>
<td>* Quarterly report (Apr-Jun 2010, pp. 1, 3, 7) indicates venturing into new areas of business operation: immediate birth registrations at hospitals since 2007 with 100% success, selling its expertise to other governments (received Best Practice from the OAS “in the area of Civil Registration to implement and modify the Civil Registry of Six Eastern Caribbean countries”</td>
<td>* Strategic Plan (2009-14, p. vi) indicates a “set of strategies that will make [their] organisation different”: a new focus on customised rather than scheduled services; expanding to regional clients and partnerships with international organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2f Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014

#### 7.2.3.2.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for Extent to which PMS Drives Operations

Comparing the more recent data with what obtained up to 2002, the JEAs have made significant progress in incorporating strategies that enable their PMS to be relevant for driving operations. Based on both the primary and secondary data there is greater evidence of real-time data capture, especially at A and C, and where this is not evident, there is an increase emphasis on storing data digitally (compare Table 4.2f with Tables 6.2f and 7.2f).

Though still some obvious difficulties, it appears that the JEAs are doing more than just rowing to the tune of Central government. There is consistent evidence across all agencies to suggest that decisions are made based on performance data, with approval sought from parent ministries when there is the need to change targets to effect better strategic positioning.
7.2.3.2.3 Main Findings for Extent to which PMS Drives Operations

Based on the primary and secondary data, there are a number of research findings about the extent to which PMS drives operations at the JEAs. Firstly, this research finds that each PMS was systematically built from the mission and strategic objectives of the EAs and are, therefore, comprehensive systems that connect all individual targets to organisational KPIs. However, missions were only translated into strategic objectives that could be measured by input, process or output measures (see Section 7.2.2.1.2) without inclusion of outcome and impact measures. The exclusion of outcome and impact measures suggests that JEAs may not be fully translating their missions into objectives and reachable targets and are thus limiting reaching the full potential of their missions. For instance, the mission statement for one of the agencies in the documents provided, but was:

*To provide public servants with quality leadership development options, management training, support and outreach services that sustain a culture of enterprise, efficiency and organisational responsiveness to the publics they serve.*

Yet its strategic objectives only partially translate the mission as they focussed on satisfying stakeholders, excelling in its operations, strengthening its human resource, products and services and programmes, and mobilising its resources. There is no strategic objective focusing on the impact of their mission, or outcome measure that would enable the organisation to measure whether their products effect and sustain ‘a culture of enterprise, efficiency and organisational responsiveness to the publics’ served by its clients. Therefore, this JEA cannot determine or measure if it is accomplishing its mission based only on output measures. The inclusion of outcome and impact measures would enable this.

Secondly, the research finds that review, feedback and, where necessary, changing measures, are regular parts of using the PMS at each JEA. The findings also show that the PMS was critical to managers in performing their jobs (see Section 7.2.3.2.3)-being a regular reference for management.
Thirdly, data accuracy was also treated very seriously, with each JEA having an internal and external checks and balances to ensure that the performance data was accurate (see Section 7.2.3.2.4).

Fourthly, real-time data capture was virtually non-existent at B and D while A and C had increasingly, higher levels of real-time data capture and, particularly C which has a higher level of computerization.

In concluding, each EA displays a significant degree of improvement, which they have attributed to the use of and feedback received from performance measures. Improvements include i) several improved systems for their internal operations ii) improved targets iii) increasing customer satisfaction iv) improved staff morale (see Section 6.2.3.2.6). There has been some slight evidence of double loop learning at both A and C (see Section 6.2.3.2.6). Though it is the view that double loop learning is not common in the public sector (Common, 2004), it may be fair to hypothesise that semi-autonomous bodies such as JEAs which i) provide only service delivery and so do not engage in policy development and ii) are established by legislation and hence are not as subjected to the whim of the politics of the day are likely to be more free of the bureaucracy that prevents or restricts double loop learning from occurring.

7.2.4 INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

7.2.4.1 Research Theme Seven: to determine the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems

7.2.4.1.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for if PMS is Integrated with All Management Systems

The secondary data show some evidence of integration between the PMS and other management systems, namely at C, and indicate that at other JEAs some systems were still being developed (see Tables 4.2h and 6.2h). In fact, B reports such integration as “one of the[ir] critical needs” (B’s Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 28) while one of D’s strategic objective is to strengthen its PMS “and ensure [it is] anchored in and across the Agency’s departments and linked to its Management Information System (MIS) and research databases” (D’s Strategic Plan, 2009-14, p. 21). However, up to 2006, the computerised PMS at A was not yet launched (see Table 7.2g) and so, there could be no integration between PMS and other management systems.
INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

| Research theme 7: To determine the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems? Where this integration is low, what are the reasons for that? |
| CASE A | CASE B | CASE C | CASE D |

TESTING:

Integration of PMS and other Systems

- By 2006 the computerised PMS was not yet launched

- Strategic Plan (2011-14, p. 28) indicates “Agency’s ability to link the data inputted with related work in other sections” as critical. As such a new software is to be implemented for “easier access to information and aid in Management’s ability to make informed decisions” (p. 6)

- Strategic Plan (2011-14, pp. 17, 19, 22) a number of real-time data capturing systems: ATS, VOIP, E-business. Though it does not indicate the level of integration it does indicate that the ATS operated in real-time over all the different locations of this JEA.

- Strategic Plan (2009-14, p. 21): One strategic objective is to strengthen its PMS “and ensure [it is] anchored in and across the Agency’s departments and linked to its Management Information System (MIS) and research databases”

Table 7.2g Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014

7.2.4.1.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for if PMS is Integrated with All Management Systems

The data from the 2002 research showed no evidence of any level of integration between the PMS and other management systems but did indicate that some systems were still being developed and that computerisation was increasing though still basic (see Section 4.4.1.4 and Table 4.2g). The decade between both researches shows that the level of integration, though still partial at each JEA, has significantly increased and would continue to increase (see Table 6.2g). This would indicate that management perceives integration of the PMS with other management systems as significant for enabling the managing of JEAs, and hence much effort has been made to improve this ability.

7.2.4.1.3 Main Findings for if PMS is Integrated with All Management Systems

The main findings concerning integration of PMS with other management systems is that this is increasing in the vision of each JEA. However, it is more pronounced at A, B and C. With the exception of D, each JEA had fully implemented Financial and Human Resource Management Systems. In each case, these systems were partially integrated with the PMS (see Table 6.2g).
There was no secondary data, however, to support this aspect of the PMS.

### 7.2.4.2 Research Theme Eight: to determine how/if PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time

#### 7.2.4.2.1 Secondary Data (2005-2014) Triangulation for how/if PMS reflects success/failure of EAs over time

The reports received from each JEA indicate whether performance in specific areas had met, in some cases exceeded, or failed to meet the set targets in a given year. In general, the reports mainly present a static view of the JEAs performance in a given year with comparison with the previous year (see Table 7.2h) while the Strategy Plans reflect some of the trend intended for the JEAs’ performance over time but within the period of the Plan and hence rarely exceeding hindsight of more than a year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTEGRATION OF PMS WITH OTHER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research theme 8: To determine how/if PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESTING:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can PMS reflect areas of improved performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can PMS reflect areas of declining performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7.2h Cross-case Analysis Table for Secondary Data, 2005-2014*
Also, the dates of the reports received from each JEA varied widely, namely from 1998-9 to 2013-14, with most reports falling between 2004-2006; and the number of Annual Reports received from each JEA was on average less than two (see full list in Section 5.2.2.2). The significance of the report dates and the number of reports made available reveals that the secondary data is often too sparse to consistently reflect the change expected to be observed for research theme 8, if such change is not reflected in a single report.

The primary data, on the other hand, presented a clearer articulation of the success or failure of EAs over time than can be retrieved from the secondary data (see Table 6.2h). This is discussed in the main findings below.

7.2.4.2.2 Secondary Data (2002) Triangulation for how/ if PMS reflects success/failure of EAs over time

The data from the 2002 research did not state whether the PMS had the ability to reflect success or failure over time. However, it stands to reason that it is doubtful that the PMS would have had the ability to reflect changes in organisational performance at this early stage. This is given that i) most management systems seemed to be still at the developing stage ii) integration of the PMS with other management systems was not in existence (see Table 4.2g) and iii) the increased use of computerisation was still at an early stage (see Table 4.2f).

That the PMS at most JEAs now present varying ability to show such changes (see Table 6.2h) shows that there is an increased ability in the use of PMS for this aspect of managing JEAs.

7.2.4.2.3 Main Findings for how/if PMS reflects success/failure of EAs over time

Customer wait-time has been the most noted and common area of improvement in each EA. At A it is easily reflected in its Logging System, and, as for each JEA, is generally attributable to the use of increased computerisation. The increased use of computerisation affects some other areas of progress reflected in the performance data, namely customer wait-time, customer satisfaction, faster provision of services, improved targets, more accurate data with increase in quality assurance checks, staff performance, increased accountability. Other areas of improvement reflected in the performance data are reduced
conflicts to interdepartmental targets, enhanced team spirit and communication and, generally, an improvement in timely data.

A common cause of decline was attributed to the financial restraints placed on the EAs by the Ministry of Finance. Both A and C felt stagnated by the government’s budget restrictions which prevented them from investing in a larger workforce or expanding areas of service necessary for their development, and hence reduced freedom to progress to the next level. This also affected staff morale. Some other areas of decline influenced by the use of PMS are, using targets have resulted in a breakdown in staff relations and decreased morale as employees are too target-driven to focus on building staff relations; in spite of the gains had from introducing the BSC, fully operationalizing the new PMS has been problematic; achieving one’s targets does not create room for upward mobility.

7.3 CONCLUSION

This research set out to examine the research aim of whether PMS form the main spine or central premise of JEAs (Jenkins, 2008, p.122) by assessing the contributions that PMS makes toward the managing of JEAs and the viability of PMS development in JEAs, according to the ICF. In response to the first part of the research aim (whether PMS form the main spine or central premise of JEAs) this thesis looked at the following two objectives:

1. to assess whether performance management systems (PMS) are a central part of the strategic management of the Jamaican agencies and
2. to assess the usefulness of PMS at ministerial, executive and staff levels by assessing whether performance data gathered from these management systems influence
   a. government decisions at ministerial level
   b. strategic decisions made by chief executives
   c. staff performance and remunerations

Because no information was available from central government, the first part of the second objective (usefulness of PMS to influence government decisions at ministerial level) could not be fully carried out but implications were made from the data that were otherwise obtained in the study. Section 7.2 has stated the main findings of the research. This section aims to clearly articulate how the research findings are a response to the
research aim (and objectives), and the extent to which the question is answered by the findings. It does so by first considering the second part of the research aim, which is to assess the viability (see footnote 2) of the PMS in JEAs (see Section 7.3.1.1) and then considering the two individual objectives of the first part of the research aim (whether PMS form the main spine or central premise of JEAs). These two objectives are expressed as sub-questions and discussed below in Sections 7.3.1.2 to 7.3.1.5. Finally, the chapter ends with an integrative statement on the findings of the research in Section 7.3.1.5.

7.3.1 RE-ARTICULATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AS PERTAINS TO RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES

This section re-articulates the research findings as pertains to the two parts of the research aim (and objectives), re-stated in Section 7.3 above, and thus shows the extent to which the research findings answer to the research aim (see Table 7.3). The research findings are first re-stated in terms of the second part of the research aim, which is, to assess the viability of the PMS in JEAs (see Section 7.3.1.1). This is then followed by addressing the first part of the research aim, which is to assess the contributions that PMS makes to managing JEAs (see Sections 7.3.1.2 to 7.3.1.5). As was re-stated in 7.3, the first part of the research aim is analysed in terms of two objectives. However, the second objective, which looks at usefulness of PMS, is expressed in its 3 parts (see Section 7.3 objective 2a, b and c and Sections 7.3.1.3 to 7.3.1.5) and it is in terms of these three parts (forming three sub-questions) that the restatement takes place. Therefore, there appears to be four different objectives, when in fact, three are the subparts of the second objective. Analysed by a division of the two objectives into four parts, this then enables a clearer articulation of the research findings, which are re-stated in terms of their response to each of the following objective and sub-questions:

1. Are PMS a central part of the strategic management of JEAs (see Sections 7.3 objective 1 and 7.3.1.2)
2. Do performance data, gathered from these management systems, influence government decisions at ministerial level (see Section 7.3 objective 2a and 7.3.1.3)
3. Do performance data, gathered from these management systems, influence strategic decisions made by chief executives - agency (see Section 7.3 objective 2b and 7.3.1.4)

4. Do performance data, gathered from these management systems, influence staff performance and remunerations (see Section 7.3 objective 2c and 7.3.1.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Aim</th>
<th>Research Objectives</th>
<th>5 Sub-questions</th>
<th>Research Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To assess the viability of the PMS in JEAs and</td>
<td>Is PMS development in JEAs viable for managing JEAs?</td>
<td>Application of the ICF shows that PMS development in JEAs are viable for managing JEAs insofar as since 2002: • JEAs show a strong sense of organisational ownership and control of the PMS, involving both reporting in and reporting out as means of managerial accountability. • With the exception of not including outcome and impact measures, the characteristics of performance measures at the JEAs are consistent with the recommendations from the literature (and the ICF) for managing an organisation. • JEAs apply a process approach comprising several processes that suggest that a PMS is significant for managing the JEAs • JEAs have a long way to go in ensuring that all management systems are fully integrated with their PMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to assess the contributions of PMS makes to managing JEAs</td>
<td>Are PMS a Central part of the Strategic Management of JEAs?</td>
<td>By way of the application of a process approach and its subprocesses to developing their PMS and that management describes their PMS as their “principal managing tool”, PMS are central to the strategic management of JEAs. However, organisational missions still need to be fully translated into strategic objectives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to assess the usefulness of PMS at ministerial, executive and staff levels by assessing whether performance data gathered from these management systems influence</td>
<td>Do performance data influence government decisions at ministerial level?</td>
<td>These findings were inconclusive at best but based on deductions from CEOs’ responses did not show that performance data influenced government decisions beyond making decisions about the JEAs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do performance data influence strategic decisions made by chief executives?</td>
<td>The evidence shows that the performance data is critical to decision-making at each JEA through frequent reporting in and “constant monitoring and analysis of … performance” for determining the strategic direction of their organisations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do performance data influence staff performance and remunerations?</td>
<td>Employees are motivated by performance data to work towards meeting their targets, which may adversely result in decreased staff relations and morale.</td>
<td>Staff remunerations are directly influenced by performance data when all of organisational, departmental and individual targets are met.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summative or Integrative Statement on Research Findings as Pertains to Research Aim and Objectives: PMS at JEAs are viable for managing the organisations and show a high level of organisational ownership, with well-rounded performance measures (with the exception of outcome and impact measures) and application of processes critical for management but bear a low level of systems integration with other management systems.

Table 7.3 Summary of Research Findings as Pertains to Research Aim and Objectives with a Summative (Integrative) Statement on Findings
Objectives one and three are closely related insofar as they both draw directly from the strategic management aspects of the findings. However, objective one focuses more on the processes and structure of the PMS and how it relates to managing the JEAs while objective two focuses on the behaviour of those in management and how they act upon the power of the PMS to influence their decision-making.

7.3.1.1 Is PMS development in JEAs viable for managing JEAs?

As discussed in the ICF (see Section 3.3), the findings for the eight research themes, derived from the Framework, show various aspects and extents to which the PMS at JEAs are viable for management. Firstly, as pertains to organisational ownership, JEAs have maintained a high level of accountability to government, and increasingly a high level of managerial accountability to management and to their subordinates (that is, a high level of ‘reporting in’), and a strong sense of ownership and control of the PMS since 2002. Stakeholder involvement has also been strengthened since 2002 with a higher level of internal-organisational involvement in the development of the PMS but much lesser so from other stakeholders. These high levels of accountability, control and stakeholder involvement, which together speak of organisational ownership, contribute to strengthening the viability of the PMS for managing at JEAs.

Secondly, as pertains to the characteristics of performance measures (PMs), PMs cover a wide range of dimensions and foci recommended in the literature (Maskell, 1991; Neely et al., 1995; Waggoner et al., 1999) but still do not include outcome or impact measures. As raised in Section 7.2.3.2.3, this exclusion places a question on their strategic focus and its relationship to their mission, that is, it suggests that they may not be fulfilling their mission or, as suggested by Heinrich (2002), they may not be achieving that which is most important, and therefore, not taking full advantage of the potential of their PMS. Missions, though translated into strategic objectives, need to be translated to reflect outcomes and impacts. There is also insufficient emphasis on measures for staff training and development and again, one case, using the BSC, was unable to fully operationalise its PMS to include individual targets. However, on a positive note, not only are there now clear lines of responsibility for who sets measures and targets, it is also clear that targets and measures are derived from the KPIs, which in turn are derived from the organisational objectives. It is also found that KPIs are kept aligned to organisational
objectives, insofar as they are added or deleted to the PMS relevant to changes in strategic objectives.

Thirdly, as pertains to application of management processes for the development of a PMS, JEAs apply a process approach (Bourne et al., 2000; Neely et al., 2000: and see Section 3.3.3.2), which comprises several processes that suggest that a PMS is significant to managing the JEAs. These processes include a comprehensive system connecting mission, strategic objectives and KPIs; regularly reviewing performance measures and providing feedback; making necessary changes to the PMS to ensure that measures are kept continually aligned to the organisational strategy, goals and mission. In addition to a process approach, JEAs maintain an internal audit to secure accuracy of data. As Neely et al. (2000: 1127) describes it (see Section 3.3.3), these aspects are critical to “closing the management loop” and enhancing the viability of the PMS.

Finally, as pertains the integration of PMS with other management systems, this varies widely. On average, few systems were fully integrated with the PMS, with the majority of fully integrated systems being at C, and lesser so at B while there were no fully integrated systems at D. By Bititci et al.’s (2000) argument (see Section 3.3.4) a non-integrated PMS “affects the agility and responsiveness of the organisation” and would have adverse implications for accessing required information in other systems for decision-making in real-time. Real-time data capture, which is significant to determining the position of the organisation at any given time, also still has a long way to go.

Though all JEAs attributed improvement in their performance to the use of PMS, the question of whether their PMS could substantiate this claim over time varied with the extent to which their PMS was integrated with other management systems and the level of computerisation at the JEA. Where operational areas were highly computerised this was likely. For instance, the logging system at A is in real-time and reflects the level of progress for some operational measures. At D, where computerisation was at its lowest and real-time data capture non-existent, this was less possible. However, success and failure of JEAs can be ascertained from the performance data over time by comparing performance data reported in periodic reports but may not necessarily be directly obtained from the computerised PMS due to lack of integration of systems.
7.3.1.2 Are PMS a Central part of the Strategic Management of JEAs?

That managers described their PMS as their “principal managing tool” (D’s Strategic Plan, 2009-14, p. ix) or that their PMS enabled them “to better manage the Agency” (B’s Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 12), speaks strongly about the centrality of a PMS to the strategic management of JEAs. Several other findings for aspects of the development processes of the PMS (such as reviewing and changing measures- see Sections 7.2.1.1 where these and other management processes are reiterated) also reveal that PMS are indeed critical to the strategic management of each JEA and that encouraging a performance management culture was intrinsic to their organisation (see Section 7.2.1.1).

However, two findings negate against this, namely that though missions are translated into strategic objectives, the strategic objectives do not fully translate organisational missions and that there is a lack of integration of management systems with the PMS (see Sections 7.3.1.1). Both these findings, as discussed earlier, could have adverse effects on strategic management within these organisations. Though there was no reason to believe that JEAs were aware of the first condition, there are clear attempts to improve the second (see Table 7.2g).

7.3.1.3 Do performance data influence government decisions at ministerial level?

Both secondary and primary data confirm that JEAs are committed to disseminating performance data to stakeholders, most notably their parent ministries. However, attempts to validate these data with parent ministries and the Ministry of Finance, more so to ascertain how performance data was useful to these central government ministries, was unfruitful, as government officials were not available for interviewing.

Nonetheless, based on the CEOs responses, I was able to ascertain to some degree how government used performance data (see Section 7.2.1.2.3). This information was drawn primarily from the interviews and cannot be taken as conclusive as they were not validated by government sources, though they were consistent across CEOs’ responses. Therefore, overall, the deduction did not show that performance data influenced government decisions beyond making decisions about the JEAs (see Section 7.2.1.2.3).
7.3.1.4 Do performance data influence strategic decisions made by chief executives?

A number of findings focus on the behaviour of those in management and show that they are reliant on their PMS to influence their decision-making. Firstly, in Section 7.2.1.1.3, we find a high level of managerial accountability to management and to their subordinates and, therefore, frequent 'reporting in' taking place. Secondly, there is “constant monitoring and analysis of … performance” to determine “areas that may require change” rendering the PMS useful as a tool in the decision-making process (B’s Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 13), for strategic meetings (C’s Strategic Plan, 2011-14, p. 13) and for determining the strategic direction of their organisations through use of performance data (see Tables 7.2a and 7.2b). B plainly spells out the usefulness of its PMS for influencing its strategic decisions by intending to replace mainly its management software with one more suited to “process all aspects” of core business and to enable “data management systems to facilitate better decision-making” Strategic Plan (2011-14, p. 6) (see Table 7.2a).

However, as noted in Section 7.3.1.2, the usefulness of performance data to guide or influence strategic decisions is limited by the extent to which the design of PMS fully translates the mission of the organisation (see Section 7.2.3.2.3).

7.3.1.5 Do performance data influence staff performance and remunerations?

Concerning staff remuneration, to the extent that employees meet the targets that have been allotted to them, and that both the departmental and organisational targets are met, employees are remunerated. However, if only the first condition is met, that is, employees alone meet their targets, employees are not remunerated (see Section 7.2.1.2.3). This is the extent to which staff remunerations are based on performance data.

Concerning staff performance, in Section 7.2.1.1.3, one finds that with the use of PMS employees are more self-driven toward their responsibilities. The indication is that employees are motivated to perform better or work harder towards meeting their targets, as in doing so they may receive their annual bonuses. However, the adverse effect is that as employees become more target driven staff relations and morale may decrease (see Section 7.2.4.2.3). (The converse was also vouched for- see Section 7.2.3.2.3). The findings also show that there are insufficient emphasis on targets for measuring staff
growth and development. The findings also show that employees’ involvement in the early stages of the development of the PMS encourages a positive attitude toward a performance management culture and suggests a stronger likelihood to them having a comprehensive understanding of the organisational goals and objectives (see Section 7.2.1.2.3).

7.3.1.6 Integrative Statement on Research Findings as Pertains to Research Aim and Objectives

In conclusion, the research has found that there is strong evidence to suggest that the PMS in JEAs is viable, given that there is a high level of organisational ownership at each JEA; that the characteristics of performance measures are largely what is recommended in the literature in terms of foci and dimensions, with the exception of outcome and impact measures for ensuring that organisational mission is attained; that the processes critical to “closing the management loop” (Neely et al. (2000, p. 1127) are embedded in the operation of PMS at each JEA; but that, overall, there is still a low level of systems integration with the PMS at JEAs.

In a similar token, the large number of findings discussed in Section 7.2 and re-articulated in Section 7.3.1, in terms of the research aim and objectives, to support that after a decade, the JEAs are showing significant improvement and constant engagement in these four areas, further proved that PMS are used and are seen by CEOs as critical for the managing of JEAs.
Chapter 8
CONCLUSION: Contributions, Limitations and Recommendations

8.1 INTRODUCTION

8.1.1 PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter brings to a conclusion the work carried out in this thesis. It looks beyond the research findings toward the limits and benefits of the research, as a whole, to practitioners and the research community. Firstly, it re-asserts the main focus of the thesis by summarising the study. It, then, articulates the contributions that this research makes and addresses the limitations encountered in conducting it. It also goes on to make recommendations that are drawn from the contributions and limitations, highlighting areas for further research to conclude the study.

8.1.2 SUMMARY OF THESIS

This thesis fills a gap in the literature (see Section 2.4.1) by examining both the contribution that PMS makes to managing JEAs and the viability of PMS development in JEAs according to the ICF that is developed in Chapter 3 of the thesis.

Firstly, in Chapter 2 the thesis establishes a premise to justify the examination of mainly British literature for the study of PMS in Jamaican EAs based on Historical Institutionalism, Path Dependency and Policy Transfer. This premise was deemed necessary for the development of the thesis (see Sections 2.2 and 4.2) because Jamaican literature for the study of PMS in JEAs is sparse, even after a thorough search for such literature from multiple university resources and from the Internet. The British literature, was, therefore, used to study PMS in the four JEAs informing the empirical research given the direct impact of the UK Next Steps on their development (see Section 4.2.4).

Secondly, in Chapter 3 the ICF is developed to examine the case for the use of PMS for managing EAs, and for determining the viability of a PMS for doing so. To extend the existing literature on PMS in JEAs, the ICF was applied to analyse the sparse existing Jamaican literature on this subject in Section 4.4, focusing on the Jamaican context on the
first three years of EA establishment. In applying the ICF to the literature, which essentially focused on the earliest years of JEA establishment, the research extended this literature with a contribution on the viability of the PMS in JEAs during these early years. As was discussed in Chapter 4, this examination indicated that their PMS were not yet viable for managing their JEAs. However, discussions in Chapter 7 indicated that there was notable progress in each of the first four JEAs, from this initial period to the time of the fieldwork, nine years later.

Thirdly, in Chapter 5, the thesis articulates the research strategy for examining the primary and secondary data gathered during the empirical research of this thesis. The analysis of this data is informed by realist philosophical assumptions consistent with the ICF (and also HI, PD and Policy Transfer), given that the ICF is both explicitly incorporated into the realist methodology used to develop the thesis, and also informs and is consistent with the development and use of methods discussed in Chapter 5. In applying the methods and methodologies developed in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 presents the analysis of primary data presented through three data analysis methods - Template, Matrix and Cross-case Analysis. This is followed by Chapter 7, which presents the triangulation of the primary with secondary data and the resultant research findings. The findings and triangulation are initially expressed according to the eight research themes derived from the ICF. These findings show that the PMS at JEAs are in the main part viable for managing and that CEOs significantly use PMS for managing JEAs. Chapter 7 concludes with an integrative articulation of how PMS is used in managing JEAs.

Finally, having presented the main thesis, this study now closes by addressing the main contributions that are made from the research conducted, considering the limitations that come with it, and presenting the recommendations for further research that the research claim to make on the basis of realist empirical findings. Section 8.2 articulates these findings, followed by Section 8.3 that considers the limitations of the study, and concludes with an offering of recommendations based on the contributions and limitations, in Section 8.4.

8.2 CONTRIBUTIONS

This thesis makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. One such contribution is the Integrative Conceptual Framework or ICF. As indicated in Section
2.4.2, the four components of the ICF are drawn from the literature to focus on organisational performance management from both the private sector and the public sector. In some cases it draws from performance management frameworks, such as the Public Sector Scorecard, that form part of the literature but also draws from more pragmatic guidelines for developing PMS, or from more general issues on the implementation and use of PMS. Altogether, the ICF integrates these different aspects of PMS development and harnesses the structural, procedural, situational and behavioural aspects that are relevant to the development of a PMS. In so doing and as was demonstrated in this thesis, particularly in Chapters 6 and 7, the ICF can be used to assess if a PMS is being used for managing an organisation but it may also assess the viability of a PMS for doing so.

Keeping in mind that the ICF also drew from performance management in the Next Steps literature, though insufficient for a full examination of PMS development, this was deliberate in an attempt to build a Framework that was relevant to examine PMS in EAs. That the Framework was not limited to that set of literature nor was it primarily based on it, suggests that it may also be applied in a broader scope. Also, because the ICF is not based on any country context but is focussed on both the private and public sector literature for PMS, it may also be applicable to contexts outside of the focus of this research. Notwithstanding, these claims may also be validated through, and could inspire, further research.

Another contribution of this thesis is in its methodology. Though essentially not a longitudinal study, but because a longitudinal aspect was grafted in as a feature of the study, two contributions are made in this regard. On one hand, adding a longitudinal aspect sets this study as the first study to revisit the four researched JEAs a decade after a former study was conducted. Doing so has allowed the study to look at any improvement made in the use of PMS for managing JEAs. On the other hand, the longitudinal aspect also offers the opportunity to look at related developments at these EAs over more than one time frame.

Enquiry into Internet and library resources resulted in only two studies on JEAs being found for analysis. Should there be other studies, while it would be helpful to engage with these in developing any future research, it is nevertheless clear that there is an extremely limited body of literature focusing on JEAs, and even less so, considering
PMS in JEAs. To this note, this study contributes most broadly to the academic literature on EAs of which there is substantial literature of different country context. More specifically but relatively broadly, it also contributes to the literature on JEAs of which there is a very limited literature and therefore, of which this thesis makes a very clear contribution. In particular, given the specific focus of this thesis is PMS in JEAs, it makes one of its main contributions because, not just is this only the second study to consider PMS in JEAs, it is the first to focus on it as the main focus of the research.

Finally, based on the research findings, this study makes several important contributions to both the empirical and more theoretical literature on organisational performance management. Though most of the findings confirm what is already known in the literature, most notably are those findings that go beyond what is known. One such finding is that employees’ involvement in the early stages of the development of the PMS suggests a stronger likelihood to employees having a comprehensive understanding of the organisational goals and objectives as indicated in Sections 7.2.1.2.3 and 7.3.1.5.

8.3 LIMITATIONS

There are several limitations to the research mainly pertaining to the research methodology and methods. Firstly, by drawing from the earlier work of Talbot et al. (2002), this thesis has added a longitudinal aspect to the study. However, the difference in research focus between this research and the earlier one is also problematic where the hope was to approach as close as possible to continuity in examining the contribution of PMS to managing JEAs. Since the first research did not focus on the contribution of PMS per se, to the managing of JEAs, there were expectedly some unfilled gaps when comparing both periods (note differences in gaps in Tables 4.2a to h and 6.2a to h). The idea of a longitudinal aspect to the research was therefore not fully attainable. Hence, some of the advantages inherent from longitudinal study- same or related research strategy, design and research participants- could not be had. As such, many interview respondents from the first research conducted in 2001-2 were no longer part of the agencies, and hence were not accessible to be part of the interview respondents for this research. However, three of the four CEOs were still present and so were a number of long-standing employees. Also, though individuals within these four agencies may no longer have been participants in this research, it is expected that secondary data collected,
though mainly covering from 2005 to 2011 (see Section 5.2.2.2), might have acted as a consistent measure of changes taken place over the research periods.

Secondly, an initial limitation was the lack of academic literature that could be reviewed about PMS in EAs in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean. Although this limitation was remedied by drawing on British literature, this research is intended to add to that limited body of literature, as indicated in the section above (see also Section in 4.4). Also, not all agencies were forthcoming with copies of the varied documents that they submit to central government. Therefore, a less than full-scale triangulation of the secondary data with primary data was conducted in Section 7.2.

Thirdly, because this is the first study of its kind, namely a study that focuses on PMS in JEAs, there is the added disadvantage of a lack of any international comparator studies conducted on other executive agencies, even for OECD countries, using a longitudinal study approach. Indeed, it was suggested that given the assumptions of Path Dependency and Historical Institutionalism that case studies might have the potential to generate generalisations where similarities in culture, politics and history exist between locations. As such, the lack of existing literature and studies that might be used to compare the research findings makes it impossible to test the findings of this study with other studies. Nevertheless, the possibility that case study analysis may lead to generalisations across location, points towards some of the potentially significant contributions of this study, as discussed in Section 8.2, in which realist methodologically informed findings are presented.

Finally, the accessibility of officials from central government was essential for fulfilling part of the second objective of the research:

> to assess the usefulness of PMS at ministerial, executive and staff levels by assessing whether performance data gathered from these management systems influence government decisions at ministerial level.

However, since such officials were not available for the empirical aspect of the research, assessing the above usefulness of the PMS was limited. The assessment of the above objective was based primarily on information elicited from CEOs and could only be
corroborated as far as the Cross-case responses for CEOs would allow, and in fact, not by central government officials.

8.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the work carried out and also on some of the contributions and limitations of the study, this thesis now concludes with several recommendations for further study. Firstly, the ICF is one of the key contributions of this research derived from both public and private sector literature on organisational performance management. Though it was applied specifically to examine PMS in JEAs, it may also be applied in other contexts. Firstly, it may be applied in the public sector of other countries that use the Next Steps or other agency model. Secondly, it is also intended for examination of PMS in the private sector.

A number of references to possible further study were made in the discussion of this thesis. Two of these are now reiterated here to add to other recommendations from this study. In Section 7.2.3.2.3, I hypothesised that semi-autonomous bodies such as JEAs, which provide only service delivery, are not as subjected to the whim of the politics of the day as those that do policy development. Moreover, I continued that the former are more likely to be free of the bureaucracy that prevents or restricts double loop learning from occurring, as asserted by Common (2004) (see Section 2.3.2.1). This hypothesis is recommended here as one that can make for interesting research. Another possible area for further research, coming out from Section 7.2.1.2.3, would be to examine employee performance in organisations that use organisational PMS that have no employee incentives.

Furthermore, based on the discussion on longitudinal approach above, it is hoped that this research would provoke other research looking at the use of PMS in EAs, or even looking only at the progress of EAs, toward that goal of using a longitudinal approach. In the least, it can be said that this research still bears the mark as the first to revisit former EAs and comparatively look at their performance, if only in a narrower sphere, that of PMS contribution to JEAs.

Finally, it is also hoped that this study would encourage more study on PMs in JEAs, as other governments move toward the implementation of PMS in the public sector or toward setting up EAs.
REFERENCES:

- BDDC, Jamaica Terms of Reference, Interim Support for Ministry of Finance and Planning (MoFP) to Develop Financing Regimes, Responsibilities, Delegations and Accounting & Reporting Requirements for Executive Agencies, 1996
• Bell, W., Jamaican Leaders- Political Attitudes in a new Nation, Univ of California Press, 1964

• British Development Division in the Caribbean (BDDC), Jamaica Agency Development Programme, 1996


• Burrell, G., Morgan, G., Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis-Elements of the Sociology of Corporate Life (Heineman 1979)


• Chan, Yee-ChingLilian, Performance measurement and adoption


- Common, R., Flynn, N., Mellon.E., Managing Public Services- Competition and Decentralisation, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1992


- Common, R., When Policy diffusion does Not Lead to Policy Transfer- Explaining resistance to international learning in public management reform in Carroll, P and Common, R. (Eds), Policy Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management: International Contexts, Content and Development (eBook), (Routledge Critical Studies in Public Management), (26 Jun 2013)


- Cross, K. F., Lynch, R. L., The SMART Way To Define And Sustain Success, National Productivity Review; Winter 1988; 8, 1

- Danermark, Berth, Exploring Society, (Routledge, 2002)

- Davis, C.E., Executive Agencies in Jamaica: The Story Thus Far and The Central Management Mechanism, UWI/MIND Conference on Executive Agencies in action) - MAY 19, 2001


Dey, I., Qualitative Data Analysis, Routledge, 1993


Greer, P., Transforming central government : the Next Steps initiative, OUP, 1994

Greiling, Dorothea, Performance Measurement: a Remedy for increasing the

- Hall, P., Taylor, R., Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies (1996), XLIV, 936-957


- Jackson, P., ‘Reflections on Performance Measurement in Public Service
Organisations’ in Jackson, P., Measures for Success in the Public Sector, Public Finance Foundation Reader 1995a, pp1-18


- Jenkins, K., Politicians and Public Services- Implementing Change in a Clash of Cultures, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008
• Kennerley, M., Bourne, M. Assessing and Maximising the Impact of Measuring Business Performance. POMS/EurOMA Conference, Lake Como, June 2003
• King, N., 'Using Interviews in Qualitative Research', in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research, SAGE, 2004a, pp.11-22
• King, N., 'Using Templates in the Thematic Analysis of Text', in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research, SAGE, 2004b, pp.256-270
• Kloot, L., Martin, J., Strategic performance management: A balanced approach to performance management issues in local government, Management Accounting Research, 2000, 11, pp. 231–251
• Kravchuk, R.S., Schack, R.W., Designing effective performance-measurement systems under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Public Administration Review; Jul/Aug 1996; 56, 4; p. 348
• Lodge, G., Rogers, B., Whitehall’s Black Box, London: Institute for Public Research, 2006
• Marschan-Piekkari, R., Welch, C., Handbook of qualitative research methods for international business, 1998
• Massey, A., After Next Steps, Office of Public Service and Science (OPSS), 1995
• Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., Qualitative Data Analysis, SAGE publication, 1994
- Myers, M., D., Qualitative Research in Business and Management, SAGE, 2009


• Osei, P. D., ‘Public Sector Reform in Jamaica’ in Sutton, P., Modernizing the State- Public Sector Reform in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Ian Randle Publishers, 2006


• Paranjape, B., Rossiter, M., Pantano, V., Performance measurement systems: Successes, failures and future- a review, Measuring Business Excellence, VOL. 10 NO. 3 2006, pp. 4-14


• Pollitt, C., Performance indicators in the longer term, Public Money & Management, Volume 9, Issue 3, 1989


Pollitt, C., Talbot, C.,eds., Unbundled Government- a critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and Contractualisations, Routledge, 2004


Public Services Productivity Panel, 2000, Public services productivity: meeting the challenge, London, HM Treasury
- Radnor, Z., Developing a Typology of Organisational Gaming, paper presented at the EGPA Conference, Berne 2005
- Rowlinson, M., 'Historical Analysis of Company Documents', in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research, SAGE, 2004b, pp.256-270
- Sanger, Mary Bryna, From measurement to Management: Breaking through the Barriers to State and Local Performance, Public Administration Review, 2008, pp.570-585
- Sayer, A., Method in Social Science: A realist approach, (Routledge, 1992)
- Schacter, M., Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries- Issues, Lessons and Future Directions, Prepared forPolicy Branch Canadian International Development Agency December, 2000;
- Skocpol, T., Why I Am an Historical Institutionalist, Polity, Vol 28, No 1, pp 103-106
- Spurdle, F. G., Early West Indian Government, Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd., 1963
- Sutton, P., Modernizing the State- Public Sector Reform in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Ian Randle Publishers, 2000
- Sutton, P., Modernizing the State- Public Sector Reform in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Ian Randle Publishers, 2006
• Talbot, C., Theories of Performance, Oxford, 2010
• The Working Group on Public Sector Reform, Steering Committee for CARIFORUM, The Executive Agency Model: Legal and Policy Management Issues in Jamaica, Prepared for Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARIFORUM/EDF Project No. RCA 008 ACP 005), 2003
• Thomas, G., Performance Measurement, Reporting, Obstacles and Accountability- Recent Trends and Future Directions, ANU E Press, 2006
• Tindigarukayo, J. K., Implementation of the Executive Agency Model in Jamaica, University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 2005.
• Trosa, S., Next Steps: Moving On, Office of Public Service and Science (OPSS), 1994
• Van der Ven, A., Engaged Scholarship, (Oxford University Press, 2007)
• Wisner, J.D. and Fawcett, S.E., “Link firm strategy to operating decisions through performance measurement”, Production and Inventory Management Journal, Third Quarter, 1991, pp. 5-11
• Yin, R. K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE publication, 2003
Appendix 5.1- Initial Question Set

1. To What Extent is Stakeholder Involvement?
   - Who determines what the current set of performance measures should be? (Where appropriate, pursue this with supplementary questions aimed at establishing how far the agency effectively sets its own indicators or, alternatively, how far indicators are imposed on it from outside? Were measures developed from objectives set for the agency or were they handed down by the relevant, i.e., Finance or other-Ministry?)
   - Are performance data much discussed within the agency?
   - Who makes the most use of them inside the agency?
   - Who (if anyone) makes the most use of them outside the agency? (Can you give an example of their use?)

2. How Relevant Are Performance Measures?
   - Are measures clearly linked to the operations of the agency?
   - Are they sufficient? (Or too much or too little?)
   - Are they feasible?
   - What are the most important measures or indicators (from the point of view of agency staff)?
   - Do measures ever become irrelevant? If so, are they changed or are they still used? (What are some particular measures that are no longer used?)

3. Is a Process Approach applied to the function of the PMS?
   - Are there internal checks on the accuracy of the data?
   - Are there external checks on the accuracy of the data?
   - How far do the performance data reflect the important aspects of the agency’s ‘real’ performance?
4. To What Extent Are Performance Measurement Systems Integrated with All Other Management Systems? Where This Integration Is Low, What Are the Reasons for That?

- How far do you think the performance data reflects the important aspects of the agency’s ‘real’ performance?
- In general, how closely is the performance measurement system linked in with the other main management systems in the agency?
- What kinds of links are there with financial systems? (If weak, then why?)
- What kinds of links are there with planning systems? (If weak, then why?)
- What kinds of links are there with human resource management systems? (If weak, then why?) Are employees’ salary affected by performance data?
- 5. How do PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time?
- Does the data allow you to trace aspects of the agency’s performance back over time? (If so, what aspects and for how long back?)
- What aspects of the agency’s performance are improving? (And what data confirms this improvement)
- What aspects of the agency’s performance are declining? (And what data confirms this decline)
Appendix 5.2 - Interview Schedule

(A large number of these questions have proven validity, either taken directly or adapted from Talbot and Caulfield (2002, pp.136-137), which examines EAs in Jamaica, Latvia and Tanzania or from Pollitt (2005, pp 17-18), which compares performance management in EAs in four European countries. These questions are written in italics)

Research Theme 1i: To determine the importance of accountability and ownership of PMS

- What is the general opinion on the use of performance measures in the agency?
- Do you agree to the use of performance measures for managing the agency?
- What percentage of all employees is familiar with the use and purpose of the PMS?
- Is the public aware of the use and purpose of the PMS at the agency?
- How are they made aware?
- How are they kept informed?

Research Theme 1ii: To determine the importance of stakeholder involvement

- Who are the main stakeholders to the Agency- Ministries, EA staff, public?
- *Who determines what the current set of performance measures should be? (Where appropriate, this would follow supplementary questions aimed at establishing how far the agency effectively sets its own indicators or, alternatively, how far indicators are imposed on it from outside. Were measures developed from objectives set for the agency or did the relevant Ministry, i.e., Finance or other, hand them down?)*
- Are performance data usually discussed within the agency?
- Who makes the most use of them inside the agency?
- Who (if anyone) makes the most use of them outside the agency? (Can you give an example of their use?)

Research Theme 1iii: To determine the importance of data circulation among stakeholders

- How is data collected?
- How often is it collected?
- Is there a particular person/s responsible for collecting data
In what particular form is data reported? (e.g. graphical

What data is circulated?

What data is provided to/requested by ministerial level?

Is there a differentiation between data provided to ministerial levels and other stakeholders, such as the public? What data is provided to/requested by ministerial level?

Is there a differentiation between data provided to ministerial levels and other stakeholders, such as the public?

Research Theme 2: To determine the spectrum of performance measures in use

Is there a differentiation between data provided to ministerial levels and other stakeholders, such as the public?

What are the main areas of performance that are measured?

Is there a distinction between what management measures and what other areas/units of the EA measure?

Are there measures that focus on the public’s (customers’, clients’) experience?

Are these measures determined from feedback from the public?

Are there measures that conflict with other measures?

Does the data allow the agency to improve itself (single loop)? Can you name specific occurrence/s of this?

Research Theme 3i: To determine whether performance measures are kept continually aligned to strategy and main aims/goals/objectives

What are the main aims/goals/objectives of the agency?

What strategies are used to accomplish aims?

How are measures clearly related to the main aims/goals/objectives of the agency

Are measures related to the strategy of the agency? What are some examples of this?

How are measures clearly linked to the operations of the agency?

Are they sufficient? (Or too much or too little?)

Are they feasible?

What are some of the most important measures or indicators (from the point of view of agency staff)?
• Do measures ever become irrelevant? If so, are they changed or are they still used? (What are some particular measures that are no longer used?)

Research Theme 3i: To determine how the PMS is managed and whether it drives management operations

• How does the PMS work? Is it recognised as a distinct system at work within the agency?
• How often are measures reviewed
• What does the review process entail?
• How frequently does management consult with data from the PMS?
• How vital is this data for driving daily (short-term, long-term) operations of the agency? (Can you give some examples of how performance data drive decisions taken in agency)?
• Are there internal checks on the accuracy of the data?
• Are there external checks on the accuracy of the data?
• How far do the performance data reflect the important aspects of the agency’s ‘real’ performance?
• Does the data allow the agency to improve itself (single loop)? Can you name specific occurrence/s of this?
• Does the data allow the agency to change itself (double loop)? Can you name specific occurrence/s of this?

Research Theme 4i: To determine whether the PMS was integrated with other management systems and where the integration is low, the reasons for it being low.

• How far do you think the performance data reflects the important aspects of the agency’s ‘real’ performance?
• In general, how closely is the performance measurement system linked in with the other main management systems in the agency?
• In general, how closely is the performance measurement system linked in with the other main management systems in the agency?
• What kinds of links are there with financial systems? (If weak, then why?)
• What kinds of links are there with planning systems? (If weak, then why?)
• What kinds of links are there with human resource management systems? (If weak, then why?) Are employees’ salary affected by performance data? Do employees receive promotions, bonuses etc. based on performance data reported from PMS?

Research Theme 4ii: To determine how PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time?

• Does the data allow you to trace aspects of the agency’s performance back over time? (If so, what aspects and for how long back?)
• What aspects of the agency’s performance are improving? (And what data confirms this improvement)
• What aspects of the agency’s performance are declining? (And what data confirms this decline)

Supplementary Questions

(These questions can be directed for more detailed information about performance measures using further questions from Neely et al, 1995, below):

Level i- Measure Questions

• What performance measures are used?
• What are they used for?
• How much do they cost?
• How much do they cost?
• What benefit do they provide?

Level ii- System Questions

• Have all the appropriate elements (internal, external, financial, non-financial) been covered?
• Have measures that relate to the rate of improvement been introduced?
• Have measures that relate to the both the long- and short-term objectives of the business been introduced?
• Have the measures been integrated both intradepartmental, vertically and horizontally?
• Do any of the measures conflict with one another?

Level iii- Integrated System Questions

• Analyse whether the measures reinforce the firm’s strategies
• Analyse whether the measures match the organisation’s culture
• Analyse whether the measures are consistent with existing recognition and reward structure
• Analyse whether some measures focus on customer
• Analyse whether measures focus on what the competition is doing
• Are there outcome related targets?
• What model is used for PMS?
• Are employee targets employee focussed (such as employee satisfaction) or are they organisational focussed (such as to draw from the employee benefit to the organisation)
• Is there/has there been a learning curve to measurability Influence of former experience
• To what extent does the EA still perform as a stereotypical public sector?
• What kind of feedback do you get from stakeholders?
• How accurate is manual method of data collection
• How can you describe the development of a performance and customer service culture here at the AGD over the past 15yrs and particularly over the past 12 yrs.?
Appendix 5.3- Final Template Analysis Codes

1. Organisational Ownership
   a. Objective 1: determining the extent of accountability and ownership of PMS
      i. Level of awareness of PMS
      ii. Awareness of Effect of PMS
         1. In government
         2. In management
         3. Employee benefits
         4. On public
      iii. PMS Benefits to Managing
      iv. Level of awareness of PMS by the public
      v. EA attempts at making public aware of PMS
   b. Objective 2: determining the extent of stakeholder involvement
      i. Identifying EA Stakeholders
      ii. Extent of Local control of PMS
      iii. Level and Extent of use of PMS data
         1. Internally
         2. Externally
      iv. Level of Staff Benefit
   c. Objective 3: determining the extent of performance data circulation among stakeholders
      i. Examining data collection process
         1. The manner
         2. The frequency
         3. Delegated responsibility
      ii. PMS data
         1. Data representation
         2. Most important or popular data and for whom

2. Characteristics of Performance Measures
   a. Objective 4: determining the spectrum of performance measures in use
      i. Spread of measures
         1. Horizontal alignment with KPIs (sum of unit measures=KPIs)
         2. Hierarchical alignment with KPIs (from employee to KPI)
         3. Customer measures
         4. Financial measures
         5. Internal Measures
         6. External Measures
         7. Operational Measures
         8. Output versus Outcome Measures
      ii. Conflicting Measures
Appendix 5.3 cont’d- Final Template Analysis Codes

3. Management Processes for PMS
   a. Objective 5: determining the extent to which performance measures are kept continually aligned to strategy and main aims/goals/objectives
      i. What are the Organizational Mission, Objectives and Measures
      ii. Relevancy and Continuous Alignment of Measures to mission, and objectives
      iii. Review, Feedback and Changing of Targets
      iv. Reasonable Measures
         1. Sufficiency
         2. Feasibility
   b. Objective 6: determining the extent to which the PMS is managed and drives management operations
      i. Is the PMS piecemeal or complete system
         1. Reviewing Process– periodic or ad hoc
         2. Does management use data to manage- frequency and instances
         3. Monitoring accuracy of data
            a. Internal
            b. External
         4. Data synchronicity with real life performance
      ii. Organisational Learning
         1. Single loop
         2. Double Loop

4. Integration of PMS with other Management Systems
   a. Objective 7: determining the extent to which Performance Management Systems are integrated with all other management systems
      i. Integration of PMS and other Systems
         1. Financial
         2. Human Resource
         3. Other
   b. Objective 8: determining how PMS reflect success/failure of EAs over time
      i. Measuring Organisational performance
         1. Areas of improved performance
         2. Areas of declining performance
Appendix 5.4- Steps in Conducting Matrix Analysis

1. Each important point made by interviewee in response to a question, whether consenting or opposing, is noted in Matrix Table.

2. A summarised version of what was said by interviewees in response to that question is noted in the final column of the Matrix Table. This summary entails the common responses and instances of contrasting responses and differing responses that bring out a new point.

3. In the summary to the question, the position of the interviewees, their access to more organisational information, their supposition about what might be the case for another unit or for a given situation for which they are not directly privy (as against what they know factually or experientially) is used to evaluate what actually obtains.

4. Initially, the Matrix Table was built in linear sequence to the Template Analysis Table. However, in the process of Matrix Analysis, each form of analysis-Matrix and Template- was informing and re-informing (restructuring) the other in a re-iterative and sometimes recursive way.

5. The end result is a Matrix Table where the first three columns depict i) the component of the ICF under which the questions that comprise the Interview Schedule falls and ii) other levels of coding. The remaining columns (or from the fourth column onwards) depict the interviewee and his/her responses. The final column depicts the summary of the interviewees’ responses for each question.

6. Steps 1 to 5 are followed for each of case A, B, C and D producing four separate Matrix Tables.

7. These four tables serve to provide an initial general but in-depth description of what obtains for each case.
## Appendix 5.5- Profile of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Case Agency</th>
<th>Job Title (Generic)</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age Range (in years)</th>
<th>Length of Service (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>8 - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>8 - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>0 - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>20+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>0 - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>8 - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>14 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>12 - 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>14 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>14 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>8 - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>60+</td>
<td>20+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>8 - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>8 - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>14 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>14 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>8 - 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>14 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>26 - 35</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Executive Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>12 - 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>12 - 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>14 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>12 - 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>14 - 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>0 - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>4 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 - 45</td>
<td>0 - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>Consultant from Canadian Government</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>46 - 60</td>
<td>0 - 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>46 - 60 (unverified-declined interview)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>