Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi
and the Appropriation of Huayan Thought

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Works by Thomé H. Fang

CMN Creativity in Man and Nature: A Collection of Philosophical Essays

CPSD Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development

CVL The Chinese View of Life

FDXY Fang Dongmei xiansheng yanjiangji 方東美先生演講集

HZ Huayanzong zhexue 華嚴宗哲學

KZR Kexue zhexue yu renshe 科學哲學與人生

SSD Sheng sheng zhi de 生生之德

XRZSJ Xin rujia zhexue shiba jiang 新儒家哲學十八講

YRDZ Yuanshi rujia daojia zhexue 原始儒家道家哲學

ZDF Zhongguo dasheng foxue 中國大乘佛學

ZRZ Zhongguo renshe zhexue 中國人生哲學

ZZJF Zhongguo zhexue jingshen ji qi fazhan 中國哲學精神及其發展

Works by Tang Junyi

DZZJ Daode zhi zhi jianli 道德自之建立

NZX Nianpu; Zhushu nianbiao; Xianren zhushu 年譜；著述年表；先人著述

RJZC Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian 人文精神之重建

RZT Rensheng zhi tiyan 人生之體驗
RZTX  Rensheng zhi tiyan xubian  人生之體驗續編

SCYXJ  Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie  生命存在與心靈境界

WYYDL  Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing  文化意識與道德理性

XWYR  Xin wu yu rensheng  心物與人生

ZG  Zhexue gailun  哲學概論

ZL  Zhexue lunji  哲學論集

ZRDS  Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie  中華人文與當今世界

ZRDSB  Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie lubian  中華人文與當今世界補編

ZTS  Zhi Tingguang shu  致廷光書

ZYDL  Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Daolun pian  中國哲學原論・導論篇

ZYYD  Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuandao pian  中國哲學原論・原道篇

ZYYX  Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuanxing pian  中國哲學原論・原性篇

Others

DZJ  Dazheng xinxiu dazangjing  大正新修大藏經
This thesis examines the rationale behind the work of Thomé H. Fang 方東美 (Fang Dongmei, 1899-1977) and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909-1978), two of the most important Confucian thinkers in twentieth-century China, who appropriated aspects of the medieval Chinese Buddhist school of Huayan to develop a response to the challenges of ‘scientism’, the belief, widespread in their times, that quantitative natural science is the only valuable part of human learning and the only source of truth.

As the status of Confucianism in China had declined from the mid-nineteenth century, non-Confucian ideas were appropriated by Chinese thinkers for developing responses to ‘scientism’, adopting the principle of *fanben kaixin* 返本開新 (going back to the origin and developing new elements). Buddhist ideas from a range of schools played an important role in this. Unlike other thinkers who turned to the schools of Consciousness-Only and Tiantai, Fang and Tang, for reasons of their own, saw the thought of the Huayan school as the apex of Buddhism and so drew on selected aspects to support and develop their own views.

Fang regarded Huayan thought as a fine example of the idea of ‘harmony’, since in its vision of the perfect state all phenomena co-exist without contradiction. Interpreting the explanation of this given by Dushun 杜順 (557-640) in his own way, Fang argued that human beings are able to integrate physical, biological and psychic elements of the ‘natural order’ with values such as truth, beauty and goodness which belong to the ‘transcendental order’. He thus proposed that scientism’s view of humanity as matter could be incorporated without contradiction but also without excluding ‘non-scientific’ aesthetic, moral and religious values.

By contrast, Tang stressed the characteristics of Huayan’s theory of ‘doctrinal classification’, as developed by Fazang 法藏 (643-712). Interpreting this to mean that different ideas could be applicable in different periods, Tang argued that the worldview of ‘scientism’ may indeed help solve problems in its own sphere, such as the desire for scientific development. Other paradigms, however, are preferable in discussing moral issues. In other words, this Buddhist theory allowed him to claim that both Confucianism and ‘scientism’ have their own value. Neither of them should be negated in principle.

I argue that Fang’s and Tang’s selective appropriations of Huayan thought not only paid heed to the hermeneutical importance of studying ancient texts in order to be more responsive to modern issues, a concern hotly debated in the field of Chinese philosophical studies, but also helped confirm the values of Confucianism under the challenge of ‘scientism’. In short, by absorbing ideas from Huayan thought, both Fang and Tang, to different extents and in different ways, provided responses to the challenge of ‘scientism’ which gave a place to science without rejecting the importance of human faculties such as aesthetic appreciation and moral judgment or asserting the dominance of perception and cognition over other human faculties, the ultimate cause, as they saw it, of ‘scientism’.

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**ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the rationale behind the work of Thomé H. Fang 方東美 (Fang Dongmei, 1899-1977) and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909-1978), two of the most important Confucian thinkers in twentieth-century China, who appropriated aspects of the medieval Chinese Buddhist school of Huayan to develop a response to the challenges of ‘scientism’, the belief, widespread in their times, that quantitative natural science is the only valuable part of human learning and the only source of truth.

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Fang regarded Huayan thought as a fine example of the idea of ‘harmony’, since in its vision of the perfect state all phenomena co-exist without contradiction. Interpreting the explanation of this given by Dushun 杜順 (557-640) in his own way, Fang argued that human beings are able to integrate physical, biological and psychic elements of the ‘natural order’ with values such as truth, beauty and goodness which belong to the ‘transcendental order’. He thus proposed that scientism’s view of humanity as matter could be incorporated without contradiction but also without excluding ‘non-scientific’ aesthetic, moral and religious values.

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DECLARATION

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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

1.) For authors with both Chinese and English works cited in the study, their names will be shown in the Wade-Giles transliteration but not in pinyin, though their names in pinyin will be in parentheses the first time their Chinese works appear. Charles Wei-hsun Fu 傅偉勳, for example, is used in the study. However, Charles Wei-hsun Fu (Fu Weixun) 傅偉勳 will be used the first time his Chinese work is cited.

2.) For authors with only Chinese works cited, their names will be in pinyin in the content of the study.

3.) To make the transliterations consistent, the title of works which are written in Chinese will be in pinyin, including Dazheng xinxiu dazang jing 大正新修大藏經, though its title is usually shown as Taishō Revised Tripitaka in other scholarship.
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The topic of this work was initially inspired by Prof. Lao Sze-kwang’s 劉思光 (1927–2012) comments on Tang Junyi. Although I do not know Prof. Lao in person, I appreciate his inspiration to me. Prof. Lee Yun-sang’s 李潤生 advices about studying Buddhist thought enhance my confidence in doing research on this topic, though I accept full responsibility for the mistakes that remain in this work.

Finally, I dedicate this work to my dearest parents and my wife for their selfless support and countless encouragement along the way. Words cannot express my gratefulness for everything they have done for me.
Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi and the Appropriation of Huayan Thought

Chapter 1 Research Questions, Methodology and Literature Review

Chapter 1.1 Research Questions

This study is about two modern Confucian thinkers, Thomé H. Fang 方東美 (Fang Dongmei, 1899-1977) and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909-1978), who sought to appropriate aspects of the medieval Chinese Buddhist school of Huayan 華嚴 to develop a response to the challenges posed by ‘scientism’ (Chi. kexue zhuyi 科學主義), a widespread issue discussed in twentieth-century China. Although Fang’s and Tang’s importance as modern thinkers has been widely recognised,¹ they are often simply categorised as the figures of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ (Chi. dangdai xin rujia 當代新儒家). While their Confucian ideas have been the focus of studies about them, the contribution made to their thought by Huayan Buddhist ideas and methods has rarely been studied. In fact, Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought help constitute a phenomenon found among many Chinese thinkers in their times, which is to ‘go back to the origin and develop new elements’ (Chi. fanben kaixin 返本開新).² To critically discuss this issue, I shall address three related research questions: first, why ‘scientism’ became an issue in twentieth-century China; second, why Chinese thinkers at that time tended to go back to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas; and third, why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought in particular to respond to ‘scientism’.

How modern Confucian thinkers appropriated Buddhist ideas to develop their thought has been well studied in recent years, especially in the cases of Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893-1988), Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968) and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995).³ In a talk in commemoration of the first anniversary of Tang’s passing, Lao Sze-kwang 勞思光 (Lao Siguang, 1927-2012) claimed that Tang’s philosophical method is actually Huayan’s idea of ‘All is One, One is All’,⁴ though Tang was commonly considered a Hegelian idealist⁵

³ For details, see chapter 2.
⁴ Lao Sze-kwang (Lao Siguang) 勞思光, Siguang renwu lunji 思光人物論集 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2001), pp.81-89.
and a loyal Confucian thinker. Since then, the view that Tang was influenced by Huayan thought appears to have been increasingly accepted by many scholars, although detailed studies on the topic are very rare. In a conference in 2009, Lao raised this issue again, recounting that once in a private conversation with Tang, he was asked by the latter whether it is possible to explain Confucianism using Huayan thought. Lao’s recollection reminds us that Huayan thought may potentially play an important role in Tang’s thought.

In fact, Tang’s probable appropriation of Huayan thought is not unique among thinkers in his times, as Thomé H. Fang also makes much of this Buddhist tradition. Regardless of the controversy over Fang’s identity as a ‘pure’ Confucian thinker, the huge effort he paid in interpreting Huayan thought is unusual among his contemporaries, even compared with Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (1883-1967), who is well-known for using Huayan ideas to explain Confucian canons. Together Fang and Tang and the other Confucian thinkers mentioned above helped create ‘one of the great moments in world intellectual history’, which was to use non-Confucian ideas to develop new theories to meet current needs in early twentieth-century China, a principal characteristic of the phenomenon of \textit{fanben kaixin}. To these Confucian thinkers, ‘origin’ is not necessarily restricted to Confucian ideas but other ancient Chinese thought. Buddhist ideas, among various ancient Chinese intellectual traditions, play a particularly important role in the issue.

Amongst the modern Chinese thinkers who employed ideas other than Confucianism to develop their theories, there are several reasons to study Fang and Tang in particular. First, despite the great reputation they enjoyed in the field of Chinese philosophical study, studies about them are few compared with their contemporaries. As a thinker consciously writing in

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6 Frederick J. Streng considers Tang the spokesman of Confucianism in twentieth century, like Paul Tillich and Keiji Nishitani the spokesmen of Christianity and Buddhism respectively. See his \textit{Understanding Religious Life} (California: Wadsworth, 1985), pp.257-263.


9 I will further discuss this point in chapter 3.


English, Fang enjoyed an international reputation as illustrated in the admiration of D. T. Suzuki (1870-1966), Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) and Charles Moore (1901-1967) and was regarded as one of the greatest Chinese philosophers in the last century.12 Tang is even considered the most remarkable Confucian thinker since Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) and Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529), while his Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie 生命存在與心靈境界 (The Existence of Life and Horizons of Mind) was viewed as on a level with Plato’s Republic, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger’s Being and Time and Whitehead’s Process and Reality.13 Due to his contribution to contemporary Chinese thought, Tang was described by Mou Zongsan as a ‘giant in the universe of cultural consciousness’ (Chi. wenhua yishi yuzhou de juren 文化意識宇宙的巨人), similar to Isaac Newton (1643-1727) and Albert Einstein (1879-1955) as giants in the field of science, and to Plato (424 BC-347 BC) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as giants in the field of philosophy.14 Astonishingly, not only are the appropriations of Buddhist ideas by such important thinkers rarely studied15 but even their own theories are seldom critically discussed.16

In fact, Thomé H. Fang was also a teacher of Tang Junyi when Tang did his undergraduate degree in 1920s. However, this teacher-student relationship is largely ignored. Instead, it is the so-called teacher-student relationship between Xiong Shili and Tang Junyi that academia tends to discuss. Although I agree that the relationship between Xiong and Tang cannot be neglected, I argue the relationship between Fang and Tang is also crucial for our understanding of the thought of the latter, a point I will discuss in chapter 4. This appears to be the first attempt in Western scholarship to put these two thinkers together, reviewing their appropriations of Huayan thought and the relationship between their own thought. In this regard, this study helps improve the research on Fang and Tang both quantitatively and

12 For details, see Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥 ed., Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing 方東美先生的哲學典型 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 台灣學生書局, 2007), pp. II-III.


15 As Cheng Hsueh-li mentions, both Fang and Tang considered Huayan ‘the highest and accurate thought of Buddhism’. However, he fails to explain why they considered so. See his ‘Phenomenology and T’ai-icai and Hua-yen Buddhism’, Analecta Husserliana vol.XVII (1984): 215-227.

16 There could be numerous reasons behind this phenomenon. That their writing styles are rather difficult to understand is one of them. For this view, see Liu Shu-hsien, Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp.73-88; Ng Yu-kwan (Wu Rujun) 吳汝鈞, Dangdai xin ruxue de shenceng fansi yu duihua quanshi 當代新儒學的深層反思與對話詮釋 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2009), pp.407-408. The huge influence of Mou Zongsan in the camp of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’, which is considered a situation like ‘a crane standing out among chickens’ (Chi. heli jiqu 鶴立雞群) by individual scholar, is perhaps another reason preventing academia from studying them as Fang is not considered a ‘mainstream’ Confucian thinker and Tang is a secondary figure behind Mou. For this comment on Mou, see Jason Clower, The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p.9. For more discussion of this point, see Li Du (Li Tu) 李杜, ‘Tang Junyi xiansheng yu Taiwan ruxue 唐君毅先生與台灣儒學’, Zhexue yu wenhua 哲學與文化 vol.24, no.8 (1997): 710-724.
Second, both Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought play an exceptional role in Huayan studies in twentieth-century China and are extremely valuable to modern Chinese Buddhist study. As a medieval Buddhist school which prevailed in the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Huayan School has been inconsistently regarded in Chinese history. Although there was a ‘Huayan University’ set up in Shanghai in the early 1910s by the monk Yuexia 月霞 (1858-1917), its method of study has been criticized as ‘old-fashioned’. In short, it has not ‘contributed much to the philosophical current in contemporary Buddhism’. As Deng Keming 鄧克銘 argues, philological study alone cannot make Huayan thought alive but modern interpretation of the thought is needed. In fact, in Haichaoyin 海潮音, a famous Buddhist journal primarily edited by the monk Taixu 太虛 (1890-1947), modern issues such as ‘scientism’ have been discussed amongst many Chinese Buddhists since the early twentieth century. In my view, Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought are not only a modern interpretation of the thought that makes this Buddhist tradition more responsive to the issues in their times, but also make Confucianism more responsive to the issue of ‘scientism’, similar to what their Buddhist counterparts as appeared in Haichaoyin did in the period.

Third, following the previous point, ‘scientism’ has long been and is still a problem facing China and therefore, Fang’s and Tang’s responses to it are worth further review. As I will argue in chapter 2, there was ‘the polemic on science and metaphysics’ (Chi. ke xuan dazhan 科玄大戰) about ‘scientism’ in early twentieth-century China. Instead of coming to an end, debate about ‘scientism’ is prevailing in present China as it is said by many scholars that the country is now governed by a Marxist government and ‘scientism’ is exactly a main characteristic of Marxism-Leninism. In this sense, I argue that Fang’s and Tang’s responses to ‘scientism’ are actually finding a Chinese way of dealing with the issue of modernity.

Fourth, Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought inevitably raise a live issue in current Chinese philosophical study, which is the development of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’. As the Huayan thought Fang and Tang discussed is restricted to that in the medieval period, there

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is a huge ‘historical gap’ facing their modern appropriations of its ideas. All the ultimate concerns, approaches and languages of Huayan’s patriarchs were so different from Fang’s and Tang’s that it is important to stress that Fang and Tang certainly interpreted Huayan thought from their own perspectives or horizons. Nevertheless, the way they read Huayan thought helped shape their own thought and was in accordance with the trend of fanben kaixin that I mentioned at the beginning of this study. In this sense, I argue that Fang and Tang are significant to the discussion of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’, though they are largely neglected in relevant studies.

To conclude, this study will contribute to the discussion of modern Chinese thought in general and to Fang’s and Tang’s thought in particular. All such issues as the historical context in which Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, the characteristics of ‘scientism’, and the current discussion of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ will be covered in chapter 2. Now, I turn to discuss the methodology I use as it helps shape the findings of this study.

Chapter 1.2 Methodology

In order to answer the research questions, I will mainly employ textual and conceptual analyses in this study, which help construct the historical context in which Fang and Tang wrote and indicate the characteristics of their appropriations of Huayan thought. In what follows, I argue that many misunderstandings of Fang and Tang are due to incomplete readings of their original works. On the one hand, some scholars only focus on Fang’s and Tang’s theories and pay little attention to their lives and the historical context in which they were writing. As a result, the discussion tends to become a kind of conceptual game, which is purely theoretical but not responsive to Fang’s and Tang’s real situation. As I discuss later, Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought relates to their understanding that this Buddhist tradition helps solve the intellectual challenges facing their times. To some extent, as I will discuss in chapter 5, their appropriations of Huayan thought have had impact on these issues. Since works in autobiographical style usually reveal the intention of the authors, while employing textual analysis, I focus not only on Fang’s and Tang’s philosophical works but also on their autobiographical writings. These kinds of writings indicate the socio-cultural situations Fang and Tang faced, the objects of their writing and

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their using Buddhist ideas to develop their theories. All of these, together with other studies about the intellectual environment in early twentieth-century China, constitute the historical context that I will discuss in detail in chapter 2. On the other hand, some scholars like to discuss Fang’s and Tang’s lives but ignore the relationships between their lives and theories. These kinds of study miss the point that both Fang’s and Tang’s roles as thinkers make them important in the field of Chinese philosophical study. The stories of their lives are only supplementary to our understanding of their thought. That means, the stories of their lives cannot be considered a replacement for their theories. In consideration of the limitations of the studies concerning Fang and Tang, all their published works will be reviewed thoroughly though some will be examined more critically in detail.

However, as this study is to examine the relationships of various forms of thought, conceptual analysis is important and it will therefore be employed throughout the study. In doing this, I shall be in a better position to assess the characteristics, strengths and limitations of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought. Furthermore, I shall show why it was that some aspects of Huayan thought were appropriated whilst other aspects of it were not used by them. To some extent this helps explain why other intellectual traditions were not favoured in constructing their own positions. In addition to employing conceptual analysis in reading Fang’s and Tang’s works, in chapter 2, I also use the concepts of ‘ti’ or substance and ‘yong’ or function, two traditional Chinese terms, to discuss the historical context facing Fang and Tang, and the characteristics of their appropriations of Huayan thought. As I argue in chapter 5, Fang’s and Tang’s tasks are to re-define the meaning of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of Chinese culture, including that of Confucianism. Since the concepts are closely related to the content of chapter 2, I will continue discussion of this aspect there.

In short, while textual analysis helps provide the necessary foundation for this study, conceptual analysis of both Fang’s and Tang’s major writings will be necessary to probe deeply and provide evidence for the comments I will make about their work. All texts will be reviewed critically, which is not the custom in much of the recent scholarly work about Fang and Tang written to date in Chinese. However, due to the large corpus of texts relating to Fang and Tang, it is necessary to define the scope of the study in order to be able to have a sustained discussion.

Fang’s and Tang’s ideas are so extensive that many intellectual traditions of both the West and

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China are covered in their works. In this study, I will mainly focus on their most important writings, though others will also be considered when necessary. For Fang, his last work *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development*\(^{25}\) is definitely important as it shows his general view on different Chinese intellectual traditions. Both *The Chinese View of Life*\(^{26}\) and *Shengsheng zhi de* 生生之德 (The Virtue of Creative Creativity)\(^{27}\) also reveal the characteristics of Fang’s philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’. Although Fang’s thought is evident in the above works, his ideas on Huayan are mainly found in the two volumes of *Zhongguo dasheng foxue* 中國大乘佛學 (*The Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism*)\(^{28}\) and the two volumes of *Huayanzong zhexue* 華嚴宗哲學 (*The Huayan Philosophy*).\(^{29}\) These works will be reviewed thoroughly while discussing his interpretation of Huayan thought, which I will principally cover in chapter 3.

For Tang, he mentioned explicitly that some of his works are representative of his thought, including his early writings like *Rensheng zhi tiyan* 人生之體驗 (*The Experience of Life*),\(^{30}\) *Daode ziwo zhi jianli* 道德自我之建立 (*The Formation of Moral Self*),\(^{31}\) *Xin wu yu rensheng* 心物與人生 (*Minds, Material and Life*),\(^{32}\) *Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian* 人文精神之重建 (*The Reconstruction of Humanistic Spirit*),\(^{33}\) and his final work *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* 生命存在與心靈境界.\(^{34}\) In his own words, Tang considered that the early works mentioned above cover such important subjects as the characteristics of Mind (Chi. *Xin*) and the value of human beings, some topics he thought about throughout his life. His final work, to a large extent, is a response to such concerns.\(^{35}\) It is also in this work that Tang suggested his well-known theory ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’ (Chi. *Xinling jiu jing* 心靈九境). Although *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* covers Tang’s interpretations of Buddhism, his comments on Huayan are mainly discussed in *Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuanxing pian* 中國哲學原論 - 原性篇 (*The Original Discourse on Chinese Philosophy - Original Nature*),\(^{36}\) and the third volume of

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\(^{27}\) Fang, *Shengsheng zhi de* (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 2005). For the term ‘Creative Creativity’, I will further explain in chapter 3.


\(^{32}\) Tang, *Xin wu yu rensheng* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2002).

\(^{33}\) Tang, *Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian* (Hong Kong: Xinya yanjusuo 新亞研究所, 1974).


Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuandao pian 中国哲学原论 · 原道篇 (The Original Discourse on Chinese Philosophy - Original Way), which I will focus on while discussing Tang’s interpretation of Huayan in chapter 4.

Since this study is about Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought but not a study of Huayan thought itself, the discussion of this Buddhist tradition will mainly rely on secondary sources, though first-hand Huayan materials will also be referred to if necessary. In other words, I am not aiming at correcting or compensating any discussion of Huayan thought. All of the discussion concerning Huayan thought in this study will be restricted to the scope of Fang’s and Tang’s interpretation of it. In consideration of this point, I will mainly discuss the Huayan thought in the Tang Dynasty, as Fang and Tang only paid attention to the Huayan thought in this period. Besides, except through Chinese and English translations, I also use the original Sanskrit word of the Buddhist terms throughout this study. This not only helps indicate the Indian origin of the terms but also the Huayan patriarchs’ transformation of the Indian meanings into their own to develop Huayan thought. As a result, the characteristics of Huayan thought are better seen.

All of the key terms relevant to the thought of Fang, Tang and their use of Huayan will be discussed in the respective chapters below. However, two terms need more clarification here. First is ‘philosophy’ or ‘zhexue 哲學’ and the second ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’. As I will discuss in the following chapters, both Fang and Tang considered their thought ‘philosophy’ and therefore, this word appears very often throughout this study. However, as Lao Sze-kwang reminds us, the characteristic of ‘philosophy’ in Chinese tradition is somewhat different from that in the West, as the former mainly aims at achieving ‘self-transformation’ and ‘transformation of the world’. In a sense, the meaning of ‘philosophy’ in China is probably closer to that of ‘religion’ in the West. Fang’s and Tang’s employments of the word certainly follow this suggestion of Lao, a point which needs to be remembered throughout the following discussions.

The term ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ is crucial in all modern Chinese philosophical studies. The term ‘xin rujia 新儒家 (Eng. Neo-Confucianism) was probably first suggested in Fung Yu-lan’s 馮友蘭 (Feng Youlan, 1895-1990) Zhongguo zhexue shi 中國哲學史 (A History of Chinese Philosophy) published in 1934, in which he specifically referred to the Confucianism of the Song 宋 (960-1279) and Ming 明 (1368-1644) dynasties. After the

39 Lao Sze-kwang, Xujing yu xiwang: lun dangdai zhexue yu wenhua 虛境與希望：論當代哲學與文化 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), pp.149-150.
book was translated from Chinese into English by Derk Bodde in 1937, the term ‘Neo-Confucianism’ became better known in academia. In order to distinguish the thought of modern thinkers from those in the dynasties, ‘Contemporary’ is often added to the former, signifying modern thought. Although the appearance of the thought of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ is usually traced back to Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili, its development is mainly the contribution of Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan (1903-1982).

In fact, although the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) ended the civil conflicts among warlords and established a central government in China in 1928, the political difficulties facing the country did not change. Domestically, there was a serious quarrel between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communist Party. Externally, there was a threat of Japanese invasion. After the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Nationalist-Communist Civil War (1945-1949), the Chinese Nationalist Party withdrew to Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (1949). The establishment of the new government was a turning point for the country, both politically and culturally. In order to escape the Communist rule, many scholars fled from mainland China to Hong Kong and Taiwan from the late 1940s. Facing a Communist China and its total denial of Chinese culture, many exiled scholars considered it a life-and-death moment for the Chinese tradition. As a result, they promoted Chinese culture in Hong Kong and Taiwan, thinking this the last chance to preserve the tradition. Based on this belief, institutes focusing on the teaching of Chinese culture were set up. In Hong Kong, Qian Mu (1895-1990), Tang Junyi and Zhang Pijie (1905-1970) established the New Asia College in 1949, arguing that it followed the private schooling tradition of the Song Dynasty. On the other hand, Xu Fuguan and Mou Zongsan taught Chinese thought in Tunghai University in Taiwan in the 1950s. Both New Asia College and Tunghai University are considered the centres of ‘Contemporary


43 As Tang Junyi argued, the Communist rule means the end of Chinese culture. See his Riji 日記 vol.1 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1988), p.39.

44 See Qian Mu, Xinya yiduo 新亚遺譜 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1989). Also see Grace Ai-ling Chou, Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War: Chinese Cultural Education at Hong Kong’s New Asia College (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
Two events helped establish the identity of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’. First, in 1958, ‘A Manifesto on [the] Reappraisal of Chinese Culture – Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to [the] World Cultural Outlook’ (Chi. Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie: women dui Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi 中國文化與世界：我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同認識), a declaration drafted by Tang and jointly signed by Carsun Chang 張君勵 (Zhang Junmai, 1887-1969), Mou and Xu, was published. In the Manifesto, the four thinkers suggested that ‘Heart-Mind and Nature’ (Chi. Xinxing 心性) was the core spirit of Chinese thought and that Confucian orthodoxy was also based on the study of it. These four thinkers, Tang, Mou and Xu in particular, are commonly considered the main figures within ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’. Second, after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Chinese Government began to think of the relationship between modernization and traditional Chinese culture, which were seen to co-exist in many Chinese societies like Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. A national project titled ‘The Investigation of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and the Trend of Thought’ (Chi. Xiandai xin rujia yu sichao yanjiu 現代新儒家與思潮研究) was therefore established in 1986, aiming at investigating the thought of ten twentieth-century pro-Confucianism thinkers: Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, Carsun Chang, Fung Yu-lan, He Lin, Qian Mu, Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan. Since then, the term ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ has prevailed in Chinese academia.

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45 Tu Wei-ming, Way, Learning and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual, note 11.
47 The term in the Manifesto is ‘Xinxing zhi xue’ 心性之學, which is translated as ‘studies of heart-mind and nature’ by most scholars. See Mou Bo, Chinese Philosophy A-Z (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p.38. In the English version of the Manifesto, however, it is translated as the ‘study of Moral Mind and Moral Reason’. Since the English Manifesto was published before the death of the four thinkers, this translation is believed to be endorsed by them. However, this translation is seldom used in other scholarship. For the process of translating the Manifesto, see Huang Zhaqiang 黃兆強, Xueshu yu jingshi: Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai 學術與經世：唐君毅的歷史哲學及其終極關懷 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2010), pp.490-495. To avoid disputation, I will follow the practice of most scholars, employing ‘studies of heart-mind and nature’ here temporarily.
Despite its prevalence, unlike most other scholars, I will not be using this term to describe the thought of Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi in this study. This is because the term causes fierce controversy. First, even some thinkers described as ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucian’ may not accept such identification. In fact, in the 1958 declaration, Qian Mu refused to sign since he considered that the declaration could only lead to different ‘factions’ or ‘sects’ (Chi. *menhu* 門戶) in academia, a phenomenon he deplored throughout his life.\(^{50}\) Even though Thomé H. Fang gave his opinion as the document was drafted,\(^{51}\) he did not sign it. As Yu Ying-shih argues in his famous article ‘Qian Mu yu xin rujia 錢穆與新儒家’ (Qian Mu and Neo-Confucianism), the meaning of the term ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’, on the one hand, is so broad that it tends to include all thinkers who study and show sympathy for Confucianism. In this sense, the term becomes meaningless. On the other hand, the meaning of it may be so narrow that it refers only to those who emphasize the study of ‘Heart-Mind and Nature’. The term, therefore, seems exclusively to refer to Xiong, Tang, Mou and Xu. Other thinkers outside this academic line, including Yu himself, cannot be included within it.\(^{52}\)

Second, in terms of the approaches to and conclusions about the study of Confucianism, there are actually huge differences among the figures as listed in the national project. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to classify them as part of the same group. Since there is little consensus about the definition of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’, the employment of the term is seen to be rather arbitrary.\(^{53}\) In a sense, the usage of the term becomes a political rather than an academic issue.\(^{54}\) Since the employment of the term is so controversial, I will not be using it to describe the thought of Fang and Tang.

In fact, there are two advantages in not using the term to describe Fang’s and Tang’s thought. The first is that their thought can be reviewed more objectively and comprehensively without any unnecessary preconceptions. Their interpretations and appropriations of other intellectual

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\(^{50}\) Qian Mu, *Zhongguo xueshu sixiangshi luncong* 中國學術思想史論叢 vol.9 (Taipei: Sushulou wenjiao jijinhui lantai chubanshe 素書樓文敎基金會蘭臺出版社, 2000), pp.251-252.


\(^{52}\) Yu Ying-shih, *You ji fengchui shuishang lin: Qian Mu yu xiandai Zhongguo xueshu 猶記風吹水上游：錢穆與現代中國學術* (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1991), pp.31-98. Li Zehou 李澤厚 also shares similar view, see his *Shuo ruxue si qi 說儒家四期* (Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe 上海譯文出版社, 2012), pp.111-112.

\(^{53}\) Yu Dan 于丹, a popular figure introducing Confucianism via a television show in mainland China, for instance, is considered a ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucian’ by some scholars. See Ronnie L. Littlejohn, *Confucianism: An Introduction* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), pp.177-186. However, at least up until now, Yu’s understanding of Confucianism is debatable.

\(^{54}\) It is said that the proprietary rights of mainland thinkers over the interpretation of Confucianism would be diminished if Fung Yu-lan and He Lin, who stayed in mainland China after 1949, were excluded from the list. See John Makeham, ‘The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism’, note 40.
traditions, Huayan thought for instance, therefore, will not be simply considered from a Confucian perspective.  

Second, because, for some scholars, the term ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ means the academic convention created by Xiong, it consolidates the image of the teacher-student relationship between Xiong and Tang but neglects the fact that Tang actually refused to be the private student of Xiong. As Tang himself argued, he had established his own thought before meeting Xiong. In this sense, Xiong’s influence on Tang may not be as great as many scholars think. By contrast, the relationship between Fang and Tang has drawn almost no attention in academia. In this study, however, I argue that there is close relationship between their thought. In consideration of this, not using the term ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ in relation to Fang and Tang is to be preferred.

In order to achieve the objectives of this study, I will work according to the following plan. In chapter 2, I will discuss all the necessary elements constituting the historical context in which Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, including i.) the ideas of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, ii.) the Western challenge, ‘scientism’ in particular, and Chinese response since the mid-nineteenth century, iii.) examples of Chinese thinkers’ appropriations of ideas alternative to Confucianism to develop their theories, and iv.) characteristics of Huayan thought. I will also briefly discuss the issue of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ so that Fang’s and Tang’s cases can join the discussion in current academia. In chapters 3 and 4, Fang’s and Tang’s own thought and their interpretations of Huayan thought will be addressed respectively. All these chapters together will thus help answer the three research questions I listed at the beginning of this study, which I will discuss in detail in chapter 5. In short, Fang appropriated Huayan’s idea of ‘harmony’ to support his own thought of ‘comprehensive harmony’ in responding to the challenge of ‘scientism’, while Tang used the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification to handle the issue. Before further discussion, however, it is necessary to see how other scholars have viewed the relevant issues in order to show both the sources on which this discussion

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55 Once in a private conversation with a former professor in the Philosophy Department, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, I was told that Fang and Tang simply viewed Huayan from a Confucian perspective. Therefore, their interpretations are not ‘objective’. For similar criticism, see Charles Wei-hsun Fu (Fu Weixun) 傅偉 勳, Cong chuangzao de quanshixue dao dasheng foxue 從創造的詮釋學到大乘佛學 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1990), p.346.
56 Tang, Nianpu; Zhushu nianbiao; Xianren zhushu 年譜; 著述年表; 先人著述 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), p.42.
will draw and to locate its own particular contribution more clearly.

Chapter 1.3 Literature Review

In general, the literature used in this study may be divided into three categories, each containing certain sub-classifications. The first category comprises materials about the historical context of Fang and Tang, and the second and third categories cover the discussion about their thought respectively. Below, I review relevant materials critically, discussing their pros and cons and explaining their roles in this study, as well as locating my own approach in relation to previous studies.

Chapter 1.3.1 Historical Context

Western Challenge and Chinese Response

In order to define the Western challenges facing Fang and Tang, an understanding of the historical events of China from the mid-nineteenth century is necessary. Of the plentiful scholarship about Chinese history of this period, I refer principally to those works closely related to the Western challenge and the Chinese response and the changes in these two elements. The two volumes of *The Cambridge History of China*59 and Spence’s *The Search for Modern China*60 provide sufficiently comprehensive information about individual events, their characteristics and significances for the present purpose. However, to understand the development of the Western challenge, which must be understood through the unfolding of such individual events, Teng’s and Fairbank’s *China’s Response to the West: a documentary survey 1839-1923*,61 Hsu’s *The Rise of Modern China*,62 Tang’s *Wanqing qishi nian* 晚清七十年 (*The Seventy Years of the Late Qing Dynasty*)63 and Luo’s *Minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo sixiang* 民族主義與近代中國思想 (*Nationalism and Recent Chinese Thought*)64 all provide discussion of these developmental changes. By observing the main characteristics of different Chinese reforms from the mid-nineteenth century, the evolution of the Western

challenge and the subsequent demands upon the Chinese are seen. All of them help explain how the understanding of the Chinese about the Western challenge shifted from one emphasising technology and institutions to one stressing culture.

However, none of the works above employs the concepts of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ as a theoretical framework. As Yang Rubin argues, almost all recent Chinese thought has employed the concepts of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’.65 As I will mention in chapter 2, the employment of these concepts also runs through the historical events from mid-nineteenth-century China. In this sense, therefore, I argue that the explanatory power of the above works is not enough for this study, which I will show in detail in chapter 2. Below I discuss the studies about ‘scientism’ and ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ in particular, since they are the exact Western challenge and Chinese response on which I focus in this study.

‘Scientism’ in China

Many studies such as those by Chang Hao,66 Thomas A. Metzger,67 Roger Ames68 and Huang Jinxing69 have mentioned that ‘scientism’ is the main challenge facing Chinese thinkers in the early twentieth century. However, few of them further explain what ‘scientism’ means. In fact, the works by Elman,70 Fan Fa-ti,71 Hu Danian,72 Lackner, Amelung, and Kurtz,73 Schneider,74 and Wright75 help support the point that ‘science’ plays an important role in Chinese intellectual history from the seventeenth century. In this sense, it is not reasonable to assume that Fang and Tang confused ‘scientism’ with ‘science’. In my view, Liu Shu-hsien’s following words explain the goal of Fang’s and Tang’s theories appropriately, that

69 Huang Jinxing 黃進興, Cong lixue dao lunlixue: Qingmo Minchu daode yishi de zhuancua 从理学到伦理学：清末民初道德意识的转化 (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua 允晨文化, 2013).
73 Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz, New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2001).
75 David Wright, Translating Science: The Transmission of Western Chemistry into Late Imperial China (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2000).
the contemporary Neo-Confucian philosophers are no longer hostile to scientific investigation. But they can see the limitations of science and firmly reject scientism as one-sided."76 In this study, as I will further explain in chapter 2, I argue that admitting the achievement of ‘science’ while at the same time preserving traditional Chinese values are the main tasks of Fang’s and Tang’s theories. The reason for their appropriating Huayan thought is also related to this.

Charlotte Furth’s *Ting Wen-chiang; Science and China’s New Culture*,77 Hua Shiping’s *Scientism and Humanism: Two Cultures in Post-Mao China, 1978-1989*,78 Ouyang Guangwei’s ‘Scientism, technocracy, and morality in China’ 79 and Wang Hui’s *Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi* 現代中國思想的興起 (*The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought*)80 provide comprehensive discussion about the ‘scientism’ facing China in the times of Fang and Tang. Although none of them mentions Fang’s and Tang’s response to the issue, which can be considered a shortcoming from the point of view of this study, I mainly refer to them while discussing ‘scientism’ in the following chapters.

**Appearance of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’**

Whilst ‘scientism’ is the main Western challenge I discuss in this study, the so-called ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’ is the Chinese response on which I focus. Both Chow Tse-tusng’s *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*81 and Edmund S. K. Fung’s *The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity: Cultural and Political Thought in the Republican Era*82 each provide a comprehensive picture of almost all kinds of pro-traditional Chinese thinkers from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. All Tu Wei-ming’s *Way, Learning and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual*,83 Liu Shu-hsien’s ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism: Its Background, Varieties, Emergence, and Significance’84 and John Makeham’s *New Confucianism: A Critical

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Examination, discuss the background of ‘Contemporary Neo Confucianism’ in detail in particular. However, all of them principally describe the general ideas of this philosophical camp at the expense of the characteristics of individual thinkers. As a result, the features of Fang’s and Tang’s theories cannot be known from these studies.

Although Xiandai xin ruxue yanjiu lunji (Collection of Essays about the Study of Contemporary Neo-Confucianism) and the first volume of Xiandai xin rujia xuean (Study of Contemporary Neo-Confucians) edited by Fang Keli, who was in charge of the 1986 national project about ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’, discuss Fang and Tang to some extent, they fail to mention their appropriations of Buddhist ideas, not to mention their relationship with Huayan. Therefore, in order to meet the objectives of this study, more specific discussion is certainly needed. Before that, however, studies about Huayan should be discussed as they help clarify what aspects of Huayan Fang and Tang appropriated and the reasons behind their appropriations. This therefore brings our discussion to studies concerning this Buddhist tradition.

Huayan Thought and its Modern Development

Huayan thought is a key element in this study. In the following, I will divide the discussion into two sections: the history of the Huayan School and its thought.

i.) History of the Huayan School

Historical study about the Huayan School is further divided into general history and specific history. There is much scholarship on the general development of Chinese Buddhism. Both Tang Yongtong’s Han Wei Liang Jin Nanbeichao fojiao shi (History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasties) and Sui Tang ji wu dai fo jiao shi (Buddhist History of the Sui, Tang and the Five Dynasties) are two of the most important of the works written in Chinese. Based on his vast knowledge in textual study, Tang tries to confirm the validity of much of the important information on this subject by comparing different original materials written in Chinese, Japanese, Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan. As well as Tang’s works, E. Zürcher’s The Buddhist

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86 Fang Keli and Li Jinquan ed., Xiandai xin ruxue yanjiu lunji, note 49.
87 Tang Yongtong, Xiandai xin ruxue yanjiu lunji, note 49.
88 Tang Yongtong, Han Wei Liang Jin Nanbeichao fojiao shi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983).
89 Tang Yongtong, Sui Tang ji wu dai fo jiao shi (Taipei: Huiju chubanshe, 1986).
conquest of China: the spread and adaptation of Buddhism in early medieval China,\textsuperscript{90} Kamata Shigeo’s 鎌田茂雄 Zhongguo fojiao shi 中國佛教史 (History of Chinese Buddhism)\textsuperscript{91} and Ui Hakuju’s 宇井伯壽 Zhongguo fojiao shi 中國佛教史 (History of Chinese Buddhism)\textsuperscript{92} also provide reliable information. All of these works help constitute the general history about Buddhist entry into China.

For the history of the Huayan School, on the one hand, Kimura Kiyotaka’s 木村清孝 Zhongguo Huayan sixiang shi 中國華嚴思想史 (The History of Chinese Huayan Thought)\textsuperscript{93} and Wei Daoru’s 魏道儒 Zhongguo Huayanzong tongshi 中國華嚴宗通史 (The General History of Chinese Huayan School)\textsuperscript{94} provide comprehensive information about the development of the School in the medieval China. The works by Robert M. Gimello,\textsuperscript{95} Liu Ming-wood,\textsuperscript{96} Chen Jinhua,\textsuperscript{97} Imre Hamar,\textsuperscript{98} and Peter N. Gregory\textsuperscript{99} also discuss individual Huayan patriarchs of the Tang Dynasty in detail. While referring to particular historical facts concerning the Huayan patriarchs of that time, therefore, I will rely on the above works. On the other hand, both Yu Lingbo’s 于凌波 Minguo gaosengzhuan chubian 民國高僧傳初編 (Eminent monks in Republic of China vol.1)\textsuperscript{100} and Shi Tianen’s 釋天恩 Huayanzong de liuchuan yu zai Taiwan de fazhan 華嚴宗的流傳與在台灣的發展 (The spread of Huayan School and its development in Taiwan)\textsuperscript{101} discuss the development of the Huayan School in twentieth-century China, which make the characteristics of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought clearer.

Since the study is to analyse how Fang and Tang view Huayan thought in the Tang Dynasty and the influence of Huayan on their own ideas, it is Huayan thought rather than the details of

\textsuperscript{90} E. Zürcher, The Buddhist conquest of China: the spread and adaptation of Buddhism in early medieval China (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
\textsuperscript{91} Kamata Shigeo, Guan Shiqian 關世謙 trans., Zhongguo fojiao shi (Taipei: Xinwenfeng 新文豐, 2010).
\textsuperscript{92} Ui Hakuju, Li Shijie 李世傑 trans., Zhongguo fojiao shi (Taipei: Xiezhi gongye congshu 協志工業叢書, 1970).
\textsuperscript{93} Kimura Kiyotaka, Li Huiying 李惠英 trans., Zhongguo Huayan sixiang shi (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1996).
\textsuperscript{94} Wei Daoru, Zhongguo Huayanzong tongshi (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe 鳳凰出版社, 2008).
\textsuperscript{98} Imre Hamar, A Religious Leader in the Tang: Chengguan’s Biography (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2002).
\textsuperscript{99} Peter N. Gregory, Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
\textsuperscript{100} Yu Lingbo, Minguo gaosengzhuan chubian (Taipei: Yuanming chubanshe 圓明出版社, 1998).
\textsuperscript{101} Shi Tianen, Huayanzong de liuchuan yu zai Taiwan de fazhan (unpublished masters dissertation, Institute of Hua-yen Buddhist Studies 華嚴專宗研究所, 2004).
the history of the School that is the focus of study. Therefore, in this study, very few criticisms
will be made about the historical studies mentioned, unless it is related to our understanding
of Huayan thought.

ii.) Discussion of Huayan Thought

Huayan thought has been criticized by some scholars on the grounds that the *tathāgatagarbha*
(Eng. Buddha nature or pure mind; Chi. *rulaizang* *zixing qingjingxin* 如來藏自性清浄心) it
suggests is not a Buddhist idea. Since I aim at discussing how Fang and Tang interpreted
and appropriated Huayan thought, I will not participate in this debate over Huayan thought
here. Instead, I will use the works enjoying good reputation in academia and having a close
relationship with Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of the thought. Liu Ming-wood’s *The
Teaching of Fa-tsang - An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*¹⁰³ is the work on which I
mainly rely in this study as it provides comprehensive discussion about the thought of Fazang
(643-712), who is commonly considered the founder of the School by almost all
scholars. As I will further discuss in chapter 2, many important concepts of the Huayan
School derive from Fazang. In this sense, a good understanding of Fazang is crucial to
comprehend the basis of Huayan thought. Liu’s work fulfils this need. In fact, as I will discuss
in chapter 4, Tang Junyi focused on Fazang while interpreting Huayan thought. Peter N.
Gregory’s *Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity*,¹⁰⁴ *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of
Buddhism*¹⁰⁵ and Ran Yunhua 冉雲華 *Zongmi*¹⁰⁶ discuss the ideas of Zongmi 宗密
(780-841) clearly, including his theory of doctrinal classification. As the last Huayan patriarch
in the Tang Dynasty, Zongmi’s theory represents a kind of maturity. These works by Liu and
Gregory provide comprehensive views of this Buddhist tradition. However, there is little
scholarship available about Dushun, who is a focus of study of Thomé H. Fang. In this sense,
Fang’s interpretation of Dushun seems to complement the discussion about Huayan thought.

Since Huayan thought was largely influenced by the concept of Consciousness-Only, an
understanding of Chinese appropriations of Consciousness-Only is necessary for discussing
Huayan thought. In this study, while discussing the concept of Consciousness-Only, I mainly
rely on the works by Lambert Schmithausen, including the two volumes of *Ālayavijñāna: On

102 For discussion, see Lin Chen-kuo, ‘Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate between
Two Buddhisms’, in Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson ed., *Pruning the bodhi tree: the storm over
103 Liu Ming-wood, *The Teaching of Fa-tsang - An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics*, note 96.
104 Peter N. Gregory, *Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity: An Annotated Translation of Tsung-mi's
Yuan jen lun with a Modern Commentary* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995).
The issue of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ has been of most interest to Chinese and Chinese-American scholars as most of the discussions about it are developed by them. Among the studies, Cheng Chung-yi’s ‘An Onto-Hermeneutic Interpretation of Twentieth-Century Chinese Philosophy: Identity and Vision’, Charles Wei-hsun Fu’s (Fu Weixun) 學問的生命與生命的學問 (The Life of Learning and the Learning of Life) and Liu Xiaogan’s 詮釋與定向 : 中國哲學研究方法之探究 (Hermeneutics and Orientation: Investigation of Method of Chinese Philosophical Study) are especially influential. Since I will discuss these works in depth in chapter 2, I will not be commenting on them here. Below I discuss the works concerning Fang and Tang in particular, including the relationship between their thought and that of Huayan.

Chapter 1.3.2 Thomé H. Fang and Huayan Thought

Most of the works about Fang are at an introductory rather than an explanatory level. For example, Vincent Shen’s ‘Fang Dongmei (Thome H. Fang)’, Li Chenyang’s ‘Fang

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112 Liu Xiaogan, Quanshi yu dingxiang: Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu fanlia zhi tanjiu (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2009).
Dongmei: Philosophy of Life, Creativity and Inclusiveness’, Liu Shu-hsien’s Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy115 and Jiang Guobao’s and Yu Bingyi’s all just provide introductions to Fang’s thought, discussing its characteristics and his general interpretation of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. However, none of them tries to evaluate Fang’s ideas critically. The shortcomings of Fang’s arguments are seldom discussed in this literature. Although Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue 方東美先生的哲學 (Philosophy of Thomé H. Fang),117 a collection of essays written in Chinese and English for a conference marking the tenth anniversary of Fang’s death, Hermann Marc’s ‘A Critical Evaluation of Fang Dongmei’s Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony’118 and Wan Xiaoping’s 宛小平 Fang Dongmei yu Zhongxi zhexue 方東美與中西哲學 (Thomé H. Fang and Chinese and Western Philosophies)119 discuss Fang’s ideas rather critically, they fail to mention Fang’s idea of Huayan.

In fact, up to now, there have been only two essays about Fang and Huayan, both of which discuss the issue in a descriptive way but explain nothing about why Fang viewed Huayan as he did.120 In consideration of the limitations of the above works, I argue that previous study of Fang is far from satisfactory for the purpose of this study. Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing 方東美先生的哲學典型 (Philosophical Model of Thomé H. Fang) edited by Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥121 is the most recent work about Fang’s life and ideas. Published in 2007, it reveals some little-known stories about Fang. More important, it contains a chronology of his life, recording dates and other details about his life, including his experience of learning Huayan. The editor, as one of Fang’s closest students, provides reliable information about him. To some extent, this work helps sharpen the discussion about the relationship between Fang and Huayan.

115 Liu Shu-hsien, Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy, note 16, pp.73-88.
116 Jiang Guobao and Yu Bingyi, Fang Dongmei sixiang yanjiu 方東美思想研究 (Study of Thomé H. Fang’s Thought), note 40.
121 Feng Huxiang ed., Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing, note 12.
Chapter 1.3.3 Tang Junyi and Huayan Thought

Although the scholarship concerning Tang appears greater than that about Fang, much of it is commemorative rather than explanatory too. Most of the works focus on Tang’s Confucian ideas but fail to notice that Buddhist thought, and Huayan thought in particular, played a role in his thought. Thomas A. Metzger’s *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political Culture*, note 122 Li Tu’s ‘Tang Junyi (T’ang Chun-i)’, note 123 and Anja Steinbauer’s ‘A Philosophical Symphony: Tang Junyi’s System’ note 124 are all such examples. As I will explain in chapter 4, Tang’s thought cannot be discussed separately from his own daily experience. Unfortunately, very little scholarship links his thought with his own experience. William Yau-nang Ng’s *T’ang Chun-i’s Idea of Transcendence: with special reference to his Life, Existence, and the Horizon of Mind-Heart* is one the few exceptions. In this study, I will link Tang’s own experience with his thought, providing a major difference in this study from most existing scholarship about him.

Although the idea that Tang’s thought is influenced by Huayan thought is prevalent in Chinese academia, little literature discusses this issue fully. While Jing Haifeng’s *Xin ruxue yu ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang* 新儒學與二十世紀中國思想 (*Neo-Confucianism and the Chinese Thought in Twenty Century*) note 126 and Zhang Yunjiang’s *Xin tong jiu jing: Tang Junyi yu Huayanzong* 心通九境：唐君毅與華嚴宗 (*Nine Horizons through the Mind: Tang Junyi and Huayan School*) note 127 try to discuss the relationship between Tang and Huayan, they mainly describe how Tang interpreted Huayan but fail to explain the influence of Huayan on Tang. Xu Jia’s *Xiandai xin rujia yu foxue* 現代新儒家與佛學 (*Contemporary Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism*) note 128 provides general discussion about the Buddhist influence on Tang. However, the particular role Huayan plays is overlooked. In fact, valuable study about Tang’s appropriations of Huayan is so rare that the role the Buddhist tradition actually plays in Tang is very unclear to scholars. As Lin Yu-sheng 林毓生 argues in a conference, Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought is a ‘confusion of ideas’. note 129 As I will

show in this study, Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought cannot be simply explained in one or two sentences. Thus, as in the case of Thomé H. Fang, Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought is a topic worth further study and this will form the core content of this study. First, then, we turn to a more detailed examination of the historical context facing their appropriations, which brings us to the discussion of chapter 2.
Chapter 2 The Historical Context of Modern Confucian Thinkers’ Appropriations of Buddhist Ideas

Chapter 2.1 ‘Ti’ and ‘Yong’ as a Theoretical Framework

As noted by Li Hongzhang 李鸿章 (1823-1901), an influential official of China’s late Qing 清 Dynasty (1644-1912), the challenges facing the country from the mid-nineteenth century on were so revolutionary that they amounted to ‘the greatest change in more than three thousand years’ (Chi. sanqian yu nian yi da bianju 三千餘年一大變局) of Chinese history.1 It is certainly impossible, in a single chapter, to discuss the entire historical context in which Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi appropriated Huayan thought, and, in fact, there are many excellent studies about the historical events of this period.2 In my view, however, it is not a lack of information but a lack of a theoretical framework that makes the characteristics and relationships of these events unclear to readers. In order better to analyse this complex historical context, therefore, I will be employing the concepts of ‘ti’ 體 and ‘yong’ 用, two terms that enjoy an important place within pre-modern Chinese intellectual history,3 as well as in modern times.4

In Chinese tradition, the concepts of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ have been employed, from the time of the early Six Dynasties (220-589) to the present day. Literally, the word ‘ti’ means ‘body’, which approximates to the English word ‘substance’, while ‘yong’ usually means the response of a thing when stimulated.5 Although Chan Wing-tsit’s ‘substance’ and ‘function’ are now widely adopted in English writings as the translations of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’,6 their employment has

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1 Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Li Hongzhang zhuàn 李鴻章傳 (Haikou: Hainan chubanshe 海南出版社, 1993), pp.42-43.
3 Qian Mu 錢穆, Xin ya yiduo 新亞遺鐸 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian 三聯書店, 2004), p.194; Walter Liebenthal, Chao lun: the treatises of Seng-chao (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1968), p.17.
4 Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, Jinxiaidai rujia sixiangshi shang de tiyonglun 近現代儒家思想史上的體用論”, in Chen Rongkai 陳榮開 ed., Tianrenzhi ji yu renqinzhibian: bijiao yu duoyuan de guandian 天人之際與人禽之辨: 比較與多元的觀點 (Hong Kong: New Asia College, 2001), pp.195-226. Li Zehou 李澤厚 argues that these concepts also help explain the characteristics of the economic reforms of China nowadays. See his Shuo xiti zhongyong 說體中用 (Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe 上海譯文出版社, 2012), pp.62-79.
varied widely in different periods. Amongst various explanations, that of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), the great Confucian thinker in the Song Dynasty, is the most influential:

Consider our body as *ti*, seeing and hearing, as well as the movements of our hands and legs, are its *yong* (functions/operations). But if we consider our hand as *ti*, then the movement of the fingers is its *yong*.

Zhu also cited the well-known motto of Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107), another Confucian thinker, to complement his idea:

*Ti* and *yong* come from the same source, and there is no gap between the manifest and the hidden.

The above reflection on ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’ contains two implications for this study. First, the usages of ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’ are context-dependent. Therefore, their exact meanings depend on individual situations. That means an understanding of them needs to include concrete events or texts, though ‘*ti*’ is generally regarded as body, substance or principle, while ‘*yong*’ is considered function, phenomenon or approach. Second, ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’ are not separate, but they are actually two sides of the same coin. I will use these two points to help sharpen our understanding of the historical context in which Fang and Tang developed their thought, the characteristics of their own theories, and, most importantly, the nature of their appropriations of Huayan thought.

However, before I analyse the features of the historical context by means of the concepts of ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’, it is essential to have a basic understanding of the historical events, which constitute the context. In the following, I firstly discuss the historical context facing modern Confucian thinkers’ appropriations of Buddhist ideas from a macro-perspective, including the declining status of Confucianism, the appearance of ‘scientism’ and the Chinese search for ideas other than Confucianism to develop their thought, which I summarize as ‘Western challenge’ and ‘Chinese response’. I then focus, first, on appropriations of Buddhist ideas by

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8 The original Chinese are ‘如這身是體，目視，耳聽，手足運動處，便是用；如這手是體，指之運動捉握處便是用。’ See Zhu Xi, *Zhuzi yulei* 朱子語類 vol.6. For this translation, see Antonio S. Cua, ‘Ti and Yong (T'i and Yung): Substance and Function’, note 6, p.721.

9 The original Chinese is ‘體用一源，顯微無間’ For the translation, see Antonio S. Cua, *ibid*.

10 *Ibid*.

individual Confucian thinkers and, second, undertake a discussion of Huayan thought as relevant to Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations.

Chapter 2.2 Western Challenge and Chinese Response - An Overview

Many scholars have noted that Chinese history from the mid-nineteenth century was largely a response to the Western challenge.\textsuperscript{12} Although this ‘challenge-and-response’ model is criticized because it oversimplifies the concept of the ‘West’ and neglects the autonomy of China,\textsuperscript{13} it remains useful for this study as Tang Junyi himself conceptualised Chinese thought in the past hundred years as mainly a response to the West.\textsuperscript{14} In short, modern Chinese thought, including the so-called ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’, was seen by its own advocates and many scholars as a kind of cultural response to the Western challenge.\textsuperscript{15} In this sense, what we should do is not deny the influence of the West on modern Chinese thought or its place in their problematic. Instead, the key task is to define ‘Western challenge’ and ‘Chinese response’ more carefully.

It is always difficult to define ‘Chinese’ as the concept entails many dimensions, including the historical, the ethnic, the linguistic and the geopolitical. Therefore, there is no common consensus on the content of ‘Chineseness’ in academia.\textsuperscript{16} Further, in saying that modern Chinese thought is a cultural response to the West, the word ‘culture’ also needs more consideration. Literally, the original Chinese term ‘wenhua’ 文化, which is translated as ‘culture’ in English, first appears in The Book of Changes or Yi Jing 易經, where it is said that ‘through contemplation of the forms existing in human society it becomes possible to shape the world’ (Chi. guan hu renwen, yi huacheng tianxia 觀乎人文，以化成天下).\textsuperscript{17} Qian Mu argues that ‘culture’ can be considered in two ways: the first, material (Chi. wuzhi de 物質的),

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Tang Junyi, \textit{Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie 中華人文與當今世界} vol.2 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1988), pp.373-377; Tang Junyi, \textit{Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian 人文精神之重建} (Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo 新亞硏究所, 1974), pp.122-126.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} For the translation, see Richard Wilhelm, Cary F. Baynes trans., \textit{The I Ching or Book of Changes} (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), p.91.
\end{itemize}
and the second, spiritual (Chi. jingshen de 精神的). While architecture is a good example for
the former, literature and philosophy are examples for the latter. For Qian, when using the
term ‘culture’, the Chinese people understand it in a spiritual context as referring to
intellectual rather than material pursuits. Here I am not going to evaluate Qian’s idea, but
argue that this is the interpretation that Fang and Tang would have made of the term. As I will
argue in the following chapters, Fang and Tang, in their understanding of ‘culture’, were
concerned with intellectual and religious traditions such as the thought of Confucianism and
Buddhism. Material culture was not their focus.

However, even though ‘culture’ mainly means intellectual or spiritual traditions in this study,
changes in intellectual traditions happen continuously throughout history. In short, ‘culture’ is
never a static but a dynamic concept. In consideration of the difficulties in defining
‘Chinese’ and ‘culture’, I use the term ‘Chinese culture’ in a very loose sense. This
clarification is necessary in two aspects. First, the employment of the terms is so arbitrary in
many studies that a particular form of ‘culture’ may be easily categorized as ‘Chinese’ but not
considered relevant to the West, and vice versa. As a result, the cultural gap between China
and the West tends to be unnecessarily enlarged. Second, and more important, this
ambiguity of the term provides room for Fang and Tang, who are widely regarded as
Confucian thinkers, to appropriate Huayan thought.

Traditionally, it is usually argued that specific religions and intellectual traditions prevailed in

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18 Qian Mu, Xinya yiduo, note 3, pp.560-574.
19 As Tang argued, while discussing ‘culture’, he focused on its spiritual dimension. See his Bingli qiankun 病裡乾坤 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2013), p.114;
22 Chou Grace Ai-ling (Zhou Ailing) 周愛靈 criticizes that the concept of ‘culture’ as suggested by the Contemporary Neo-Confucians is not clear. In my view, her criticism obviously overlooks the advantage brought by the ambiguity of the term. See her Huaguo piaoling : Lengzhan shiqi zhimindi de Xinya shuyuan 花果飄零：冷戰時期殖民地的新亞書院 (Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 2010), p.12.
different periods. For example, in the Jin 晋 Dynasty (265-420), Xuanxue 玄學, which developed from the ideas of Laozi 老子 (? - ?), appeared to play a main role among thinkers of that time. In the Tang 唐 Dynasty (618-907), it was Buddhism which played the key role. 24 From the time of the Song 宋 Dynasty (960-1279), Confucianism, which developed from the ideas of Confucius 孔子 (Kongzi, 551BC-479BC), seemed to predominate among leading thinkers. This change in intellectual trends is endorsed in many influential Chinese philosophical studies. 25 In a sense, the observation that particular intellectual traditions prevailed in certain periods is true. However, it may easily ignore the role of other traditions, not to mention the interaction among them. In fact, this kind of interaction, which I call the ‘tradition of dialogue’, takes place throughout Chinese intellectual history. 26 Ignoring this fact, therefore, makes the understanding of an intellectual tradition incomplete. For many Chinese thinkers, for example, Confucianism and Buddhism are not incompatible but interactive with each other. 27 This principle also applies to Fang and Tang. 28

Before further discussion, one more point needs clarification here. Although terms like ‘Confucianism’ and ‘Buddhism’ are often used in academia, they conceal many aspects of the different underlying Chinese characters. ‘Confucianism’, in particular, may refer to ‘ru jia’ 儒家, ‘ru jiao’ 儒教, ‘ru xue’ 儒學 and ‘ru’ 儒. These are difficult to summarize in a single word. 29 To avoid confusion, in this study, I employ ‘Confucian ideas’ and ‘Buddhist ideas’ while discussing specific philosophical ideas rather than simply classifying them as ideas belonged to ‘Confucianism’ or ‘Buddhism’, words which refer to two intellectual and religious traditions with concrete content and characteristics. All of the above provides us a preparation for the discussion of the historical context, in which Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought.

24 For the entry of Buddhism into China, I will further discuss in the following sections.
26 In Shiji 史記 (Records of the Grand Historian), for example, it is reported that Confucius asked Laozi about ‘li’ 礼 or ritual. Zhuangzi 莊子 (369BC-286BC), another representative Taoist, also exchanged his ideas with Hui Shi 惠施 (370BC-310BC), a key figure of the School of Names in his time. Leading Confucians in the Song and the Ming dynasties confessed their fellowship with contemporary Buddhist monks.
Chapter 2.2.1 Declining Status of Confucianism since the Mid-Nineteenth Century

The reasons for Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought are partly to do with the perceived failings in Confucianism from the mid-nineteenth century on, a key issue to which we now turn. Although there are a variety of intellectual traditions in Chinese history, Confucianism is widely considered to have been the most influential among the ruling élites, particularly in late imperial China.\(^{30}\) However, its status began to change after the defeat of the Qing Dynasty in the Opium War (the First Anglo-Chinese War, 1839-1842). At first, as many Chinese considered that the backwardness of Chinese technology and military equipment was the reason of the failure of the country in the War, the status of Confucianism among intellectuals was not yet critically challenged. In the Self-Strengthening Movement (1860-1894) of the Qing Government, it was mainly technology that was introduced from the West while the soft power such as philosophical and religious ideas, musical and aesthetic practices as well as political institutions remained largely untouched.\(^{31}\) The leading ideology of the Movement, in brief, was ‘Chinese learning for fundamental principles (ti), Western learning for practical applications (yong)’ (Chi. zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong 中學為體，西學為用), an idea probably first suggested by scholar Feng Guifen 馮桂芬 (1809-1874) and promoted by scholar Zheng Guanying 鄭觀應 (1842-1922) and official Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 (1837-1909).\(^{32}\) As Li Hongzhang noted, Chinese attitudes towards Western learning in the Self-Strengthening Movement were negative:

In peacetime we sneer at the effective weapons of the foreigners as things produced by strange techniques and tricky crafts, which we consider unnecessary to learn. In wartime we are alarmed by these weapons; we marvel at them but regard them as something which we cannot possibly learn.

We do not realize that for several centuries the foreigners have considered the study of firearms indeed as important as that of body and mind, human nature and destiny.\(^{33}\)

To many Chinese people at that time, Western learning was a kind of ‘strange techniques and tricky crafts’ (Chi. qiji yinqiao 奇技淫巧), which simply belonged to the category of ‘yong’.

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Here we see clearly the use of the key terms ‘\textit{ti}’ and ‘\textit{yong}’ which I shall employ throughout my analysis.

In the previous section, I mentioned that there is no strict usage of the terms of ‘\textit{ti}’ and ‘\textit{yong}’. The meanings of them depend on context. In the Self-Strengthening Movement, for instance, which attempted to make China as ‘modern’ as the West, the Qing Government tended to consider that the substance (\textit{ti}) should be ‘Chinese learning’, while ‘Western learning’ was envisaged only as a kind of function (\textit{yong}), or scientific facility. In the eyes of the Qing Government and many Chinese thinkers at that time, such facility would not change or endanger the substance or fundamentals of society, including the people’s confidence in their traditional value system.\textsuperscript{34} This idea of ‘Chinese learning for fundamental principles, Western learning for practical applications’, however, violates the second characteristic of the terms ‘\textit{ti}’ and ‘\textit{yong}’ I identified, namely, that they cannot be discussed separately. This violation became a big problem to Chinese thinkers after the defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895.

Japan, a country employing a ‘closed door’ policy from the seventeenth century, also faced a military threat from the West in the early nineteenth century. In order to defend the country, Japan began a series of reforms from the mid-nineteenth century, at almost the same time as China’s Self-Strengthening Movement.\textsuperscript{35} In a sense, therefore, the two countries were engaged in a kind of ‘competition’,\textsuperscript{36} helping to explain why Chinese people were shocked when the country was defeated by Japan. The result of this not only meant the failure of Chinese reforms but also raised a further wave of reflection. To some Chinese thinkers, the decay of the political system was considered the reason for the country’s defeat. Thus Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873-1929) suggested constitutional reform, while Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866-1925) promoted revolution. Although their suggestions were different, all demanded a change at the institutional level.\textsuperscript{37}

In light of the analyses of ‘\textit{ti}’ and ‘\textit{yong}’, I argue that the rationale behind the ideas of Kang, Liang and Sun is that they considered an institution ‘\textit{ti}’, and each kind of institution had its own ‘\textit{yong}’. It was through a change of the institution that China could get rid of its

\textsuperscript{34} For discussion, see Yu Ying-shih 余英時, \textit{Zhongguo sixiang chuantong de xiandai quanshi} 中國思想傳統的現代詮釋 (Taipei: Lianjing 聯經, 1987), p.522; Luo Zhitian, \textit{Minzuzhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo sixiang} 民主主義與近代中國思想, note 32.
difficulties. While institution can be regarded as ‘\(ti\)’, however, I argue that it can also be regarded as ‘\(yong\)’. In this case, what constitutes institution is considered ‘\(ti\)’. This is exactly the argument many Chinese thinkers held in the early twentieth century, as I shall now explain.\(^{38}\)

Historically, the ideas of Kang and Liang were accepted by the Qing Government in 1898. The subsequent reform, called the Hundred Days of Reform, lasted only for 103 days before it was suppressed by the conservatives, encouraging more Chinese people to support Sun and participate in revolutionary activities, thus helping accelerate the end of the Qing Dynasty. However, the fall of the Dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the Republic of China 中華民國, officially proclaimed the following year, did not change the difficulties facing China. As a republic, China was not the equal of Japan and many Western countries, especially as the latter continued to enjoy legal and economic privileges, which were protected by the treaties signed between the Qing Government and various countries.\(^{39}\) Furthermore, there were also numerous civil conflicts among warlords within China.\(^{40}\) Many thinkers eventually took the view that it was ‘Chinese culture’, Confucianism in particular, that was the ultimate reason behind the country’s backwardness. The idea of ‘Chinese learning for fundamental principles, Western learning for practical applications’ was therefore under serious challenge,\(^{41}\) as is seen in the statement of Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854-1921), the influential translator:

‘\(Ti\)’ and ‘\(yong\)’ are actually referring to the same thing. While there is ‘\(ti\)’ of a cow, its ‘\(yong\)’ is to bear a heavy burden. If there is ‘\(ti\)’ of a horse, then its ‘\(yong\)’ is to cover a long distance. I have never heard that a thing having the ‘\(ti\)’ of a cow will have the ‘\(yong\)’ of a horse. The differences between Chinese and Western learning, like the faces of their people, cannot, assertively, be claimed similar.\(^{42}\)

Yan’s position implies that if Western learning is to be endorsed, Chinese learning needs to be abandoned. Following this understanding of ‘\(ti\)’ and ‘\(yong\)’, a huge demand for a complete re-evaluation of ‘Chinese culture’ erupted, leading finally to the ‘New Cultural Movement’ 新

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\(^{42}\) The original Chinese is ‘體用者，即—物而言之也。有牛之體，則有負重之用；有馬之體，則有致遠之用。未聞以牛為體，以馬為用者也。中西學之為異也，如其種人之面目然，不可強闢似也。’ See Yan Fu, *Yan Jidao wenchao 嚴幾道文鈔* Book 4 (Shanghai: Zhongguo tushu 中國圖書, 1916), pp.18-19.
Yan Fu’s above idea implies that the ‘ti’ of a thing helps determine its ‘yong’. However, while discussing the relationship between ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, the following idea by Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692), a leading Confucian thinker in the late Ming Dynasty, should not be overlooked, which is to acknowledge the ‘ti’ of a thing through reviewing its ‘yong’. As he said:

I know there is such a ‘ti’ of a thing through its ‘yong’. Is it not certain?44

According to Wang, the content of ‘ti’ is actually defined by the ‘yong’. That is to say, it is not only the ‘ti’ determining the ‘yong’ as Yan Fu suggested, but the ‘yong’ helps defining the ‘ti’. As I will discuss in chapter 5, this idea of Wang is not only valued in current Chinese philosophical study45 but is also essential to our understanding of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought.

Let us return to the discussion of the ‘New Cultural Movement’. During this Movement, Confucianism was fiercely attacked by many influential thinkers like Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879-1942), Zhou Shuren 周樹人 (known as Lu Xun 魯迅, 1881-1936) and Hu Shi 胡適 (1891-1962). Instead of Confucianism, ‘Democracy’, ‘Science’ and ‘Westernization’ occupied the thought of many Chinese thinkers.46 The focus of demands for reform, therefore, shifted from institutions to the general culture.47 To these Chinese thinkers, the development of ‘Democracy’ and ‘Science’ was not a technical nor an institutional issue but a cultural one. Although this shift of focus was criticized by Lin Yu-sheng as ‘a fallacy of cultural...
reductionism’, I argue that the relationship between culture and institution is like that of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, a point I will discuss further in the following sections.

To a large extent, the denial of Confucianism implies a negation of the original ‘ti’ of ‘Chinese culture’, that its ‘yong’ was not able to respond to the current challenges facing China. Such negation not only meant a change of faith of individuals but also the entire moral system in the society. As Da Xue 大學 (The Highest Order of Cultivation), one of the Confucian classics, argues, the constitution of a society begins from the cultivation of each individual:

The ancients, in wishing to manifest luminous virtue in the world, first brought good order to their states. In wishing to bring good order to their states, they first regulated their households. In wishing to regulate their households, they first cultivated themselves.

In this sense, the failure of Confucianism means destruction of social order, which contains the five relationships as suggested by Mencius 孟子 (Mengzi, 372 BC-289 BC): love between father and son, duty between ruler and subject, distinction between husband and wife, precedence of the old over the young, and faith between friends, as was reflected by the widespread attacks against patriarchal family and arranged marriages, some traditions considered to be derived from Confucianism by many Chinese. Perhaps the famous distinction between ‘the fall of dynasty’ (Chi. wang guo 亡國) and ‘the loss of commonality’ (Chi. wang tianxia 亡天下), which means the loss of common values, by Gu Yanwu 顧炎武 (1613-1682), the leading Confucian thinker in the early Qing Dynasty, helps better explain the significance of the fall of Confucianism amongst Chinese people:

There is the fall of dynasty (guo) and there is the loss of the commonality (tianxia). How is the loss

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50 The original Chinese are ‘古之欲明明德於天下者，先治其國；欲治其國者，先齊其家；欲齊其家者，先修其身’; For the translation, see Ian Johnston and Wang Ping, Daxue and Zhongyong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2012), p.135.
of the polity to be distinguished from the loss of the commonality? I would say that a different surname and change in reign name is what is meant by the loss of the dynasty. But ‘when the path of morality is blocked, then we show animals the way to devour men, and sooner and later it will come to men devouring men’ – that is the loss of the commonality.52

I argue that ‘the loss of commonality’ was exactly the situation facing Chinese people in the early twentieth century,53 as mentioned in the monologue of a professor recorded in Tides from the West, the well-known autobiography written by the former chancellor of Peking University Chiang Monlin 蔣夢麟 (Jiang Menglin, 1886-1964):

Strikes here, there, and everywhere – strikes yesterday, today, tomorrow and every day. Mr. Chancellor, what are you going to do about them? When is the thing going to end? Someone has said that the new spirit is born, but I say the old tranquil spirit is dead!54

If Chiang’s record is rather general, the suicide of Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877-1927) shows the shock brought from the fall of Confucian values to the Chinese people in a concrete way. A leading scholar of his time in philology, Wang drowned himself in a lake in Beijing in 1927. Although the reason for his committing suicide is still controversial in academia,55 the reason given in the epitaph by Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 (1890-1969), an influential historian, is the one most generally accepted:

As a culture is declining, people growing up under this culture definitely feel suffering. The more one feels attached to the culture, the more one suffers. In the most serious situation, committing suicide is the only means by which one can enjoy peace of mind and show righteousness.56

The above citation of Chen shows the impact of the collapse of traditional values in society, and helps answer the first research question of this study, which is why ‘scientism’ became an

56 The original sentences are ‘凡一種文化之衰落之時，為此文化所化之人，必感苦痛，其表現此文化之程量愈宏，則其所受之苦痛亦愈甚；迨既達極深之度，殆非出於自殺無以求已之心安而義盡也。’ See Chen Yinke, Chen Yinke shiji: fu Tang Yun shi cun 陳寅恪詩集：附唐賢詩存 (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 1993), pp.10-16.
issue in twentieth-century China as I will discuss in detail in chapter 5. In fact, as Lao Sze-kwang argues, Chinese thought from the Self-Strengthening Movement on was full of the ‘consciousness of saving the nation from extinction’ (Chi. jiuwang yishi 救亡意識). Based on my understanding of the above citations, I argue that the crucial task of Chinese thinkers at that time was to establish a kind of new morality and new social ethics from new sources other than Confucian ideas so that a rejuvenated and unified China could be formed in order to deal with the problems facing the country, including warlordism, an exploitative landlord system and foreign imperialism. As I discuss below, both Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought are to help establish such a kind of morality and social order for China by means of re-defining the ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of ‘Chinese culture’, Confucianism in particular. Before further discussion, however, I will explain the characteristics of ‘scientism’ facing China in detail, as this is exactly the Western challenge I focus on in this study.

Chapter 2.2.2 ‘Scientism’ as a Western Challenge in Early Twentieth Century China

The history of scientific development in China can be traced back to as early as the fourth century B.C. Even China’s encounter with Western science happened as early as the seventeenth century A.D.. From that time, Western science began to affect Confucian studies in different ways. During the times of Fang and Tang, science had become much more popular amongst Chinese people, as reflected in the fact that Western and Japanese scientific texts were widely translated into Chinese, institutes specifically for scientific education were set up in the country, and modern science eventually replaced Confucian classics in official examinations in 1905. Because of this, we may not easily consider that Fang’s and Tang’s rejection of ‘scientism’ was due to their ignorance of science. As I will argue later, the aim of

57 Lao Sze-kwang, Zhongguo wenhua luxiang wenti de xin jiantao 中國文化路向問題的新檢討 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1993), p.89.
60 For details, see Yu Ying-shih, ‘Confucianism and China’s Encounter with the West in Historical Perspective’, in Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy vol. IV, no.2 (2005): 203-216.
Fang’s and Tang’s theories was not to reject scientific investigation, but to reject ‘scientism’.  
To be more specific, they were to confirm the values of both scientific investigation and ‘Chinese culture’, especially Confucianism. The key questions to consider now are what ‘scientism’ means and to what kinds of ‘scientism’ they were trying to respond. Only by understanding these can we answer the first research question of this study: why ‘scientism’ became an issue in twentieth-century China, even though science has existed in the country for centuries.

The definition of ‘scientism’ varies amongst scholars. In this study, I summarize their findings as below: ‘scientism’ is a belief that quantitative natural science is the only valuable part of human learning and the only source of truth. Following this notion, subjects that do not belong to science should imitate the method and language of science, or be seen from a scientific perspective, which leads to a view that only what is measurable in terms of science is considered knowledge.

The first appearance of the term *kexue zhuyi* 科學主義, which is commonly translated as ‘scientism’, is now unknown, though ‘the polemic on science and metaphysics’ (Chi. *ke xuan dazhan* 科玄大戰) is widely considered the main disagreement about the issue in early twentieth-century China. From the mid-nineteenth century, the West had gradually become a focus of admiration in the eyes of many Chinese. The outbreak of the First World War (1914-1918), however, challenged this admiration. In his *Ouyou xinying lu* 歐遊心影錄 (*Reflection of the Trip to Europe*) written in 1919, Liang Qichao criticized Western imperialism, arguing that Western culture was not as attractive as many Chinese people


67 Liang Qichao, *Ouyou xinying lu jielu* 歐遊心影錄節錄 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 中華書局, 1936).
Although the visit of John Dewey (1859-1952) to China from 1919 to 1921 impressed many Chinese teenagers, his promotion of pragmatism was also criticized by many Chinese thinkers. It showed that Western thinkers were no longer unchallengeable. Furthermore, Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) criticized Western imperialism and militarism during his stay in China in the early 1920s, arguing that the West should learn from China about the ‘large tolerance and contemplative peace of mind’. All this helped to suggest that Western culture was itself not perfect and could even be considered to be in decline.

Indeed, some thinkers began to regard ‘scientism’ as the main cause behind the apparent failure of Western culture. For instance, throughout his *Ouyou xinying lu*, Liang stressed that it was the idea of the ‘omnipotence of science’ (Chi. *kexue wanneng* 科學萬能) that was causing the West to become over-materialistic. As a result, a debate on ‘the polemic of science and metaphysics’ developed and, in 1923, Carsun Chang 張君勳 (Zhang Junmai, 1887-1969), a politician who studied in Germany and taught philosophy at Peking University, delivered a speech, opposing the idea that science could solve all problems, including those concerning life, death and the soul. Instead of science, Chang argued that Chinese people needed to establish a ‘view of life’. Only in this way could China successfully overcome the challenges that had faced the country since the mid-nineteenth century. Chang’s view was attacked by Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 (1887-1936), a geologist trained at the University of Glasgow who argued that ‘the omnipotence of science, and its comprehensiveness, lies not in its subject matter, but in its method’, meaning that the scientific approach was applicable to all issues. Although there were a lot of figures involved and articles published in the polemic, doubt remained about the applicability of science to the field of human values.

During the period of the ‘New Cultural Movement’, in fact, two types of ‘scientism’ could be

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71 Liang Qichao, *Ouyou xinying lu ji eju*, note 67.
74 Literature about the debates among Chang, Ding and other figures are recorded in *Kexue yu renshe ng guan* 科學與人生觀 (Taipei: Wenxue chubanshe 同學出版社, 1977).
further identified, which were ‘empirical scientism’ represented by Hu Shi and ‘materialistic scientism’ represented by Chen Duxiu. In general, ‘empirical scientism’ is based on the experimental tradition in Western physical science largely deriving from Francis Bacon (1561-1626). The core idea of this type of approach is that it is the concepts and methodology of physical sciences which are to be employed in the studies of ‘unscientific’ subjects such as ethics and history. In this sense, figures holding the idea of ‘empirical scientism’ are also positivists, who insist that data derived from perception and cognition as well as logical and mathematical treatments exclusively form the sources of all knowledge. Since value judgments are not cognitive, to those holding the idea of ‘empirical scientism’, they are neither true nor false but merely expressions of emotion. These ideas of ‘empirical scientism’ further threatened the status of Confucianism, as many moral values Confucianism suggests were not ‘scientific’ from the view of ‘empirical scientism’. ‘Materialistic scientism’, on the other hand, is the belief that matter forms the ultimate reality of the universe. Under this notion, ‘materialistic scientism’ assumes that all aspects of life belong to a natural order, following definite scientific laws. Therefore, they are knowable by methods of science. Since ‘materialistic scientism’ is axiomatic and monistic, Hua Shiping claims that it helps develop state socialism, in which only one source of power is permitted. In this sense, there became a close relationship between the idea of ‘materialistic scientism’ and the subsequent twentieth-century Chinese political environment.

As a representative of ‘scientism’ in early twentieth-century China, in fact, Hu Shi has long been the target of hatred and contempt among modern Confucian thinkers. Thomé H. Fang’s criticism that Hu’s discussion of Chinese culture is ‘nonsense’ (Chi. hushuo 胡說) is certainly very serious. Tang Junyi’s implying that Hu enjoyed great reputation in Chinese academia only because of the Chinese tradition of ‘respecting elders’ (Chi. jinglao 敬老) is also very unkind. During a public lecture in 1958 in Taiwan, Hu Shi, in the presence of Mou Zongsan, said openly that Mou was his student as he taught Mou philosophy in Peking University. Mou’s reply, ‘I was not your student’ made the atmosphere extremely embarrassing. In my view, the following idea of Xu Fuguan helps explain the attitude of these modern Confucian

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79 See Hua Shiping, ‘Science and Humanism’, note 75.
80 For Fang’s attitude towards Hu Shi, see Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥 ed., *Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing 方東美的哲學典型* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2007), pp.72-76.
thinkers towards Hu Sh: Hu’s ‘scientific method’ rejects the value of Chinese culture.\(^{81}\)

In fact, the impact of ‘scientism’ on Confucianism was seen as potentially fatal, which can be partly shown in the following story. As Mou Zongsan recollected, once Xiong Shili and Fung Yu-lan discussed the issue about the existence of the mind, which is widely regarded as the fundamental element of Confucianism.\(^{82}\) On this occasion, Fung challenged Xiong, saying that the existence of the mind and its function of moral consideration were just theoretical presumptions of Confucianism. Xiong then replied that they were not theoretical presumptions, but the real ‘manifestation’ (Chi. *chengxian* 呈現) of the life of humanity. Mou claimed, therefore, that Fung viewed the issue of the mind from a cognitive perspective and thus failed to comprehend the mind in the Confucian tradition.\(^{83}\)

Fung and Xiong represented two approaches to understanding Confucianism which, as Chan Wing-tsit argues, can be summarized as the ‘New Rationalistic Confucianism’ and the ‘New Idealistic Confucianism’ respectively.\(^{84}\) Here I am not aiming at discussing them in detail, but pointing out that the challenge brought by ‘scientism’ to Confucian thinkers was that many Confucian ideas are difficult to measure from a scientific perspective. This point helps shape the characteristics of Confucian thinkers’ appropriations of Buddhist ideas, including those of Fang and Tang which I discuss in chapters 3 and 4. As Tang argued, with the notion of the ‘omnipotence of science’, humanity will employ a scientific perspective to view the world. As a result, both humanity and the natural environment are just a type of material and even objects to be conquered. This materialism, according to Tang, was the ultimate cause of imperialism and Marxism, in which such values of humanity as morality, aesthetics and religion are simply denied.\(^{85}\) In this sense, ‘scientism’ tends to negate the value of many Chinese traditions like Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, which are considered kinds of humanism, discussing the issues of morality, aesthetics and religion.\(^{86}\) How Chinese thinkers responded to the challenge of ‘scientism’ theoretically was either to abandon traditional value systems or find solutions to defend them. These two approaches represent exactly two of the main foci of academia in the time of Fang and Tang.

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\(^{81}\) For the discussion about Tang, Mou and Xu in this paragraph, see Chak Chi-shing, ‘Wenhua jijin zhuyi VS. wenhua baoshou zhuyi: Hu Shi yu gangtai xin rujia’, note 53.

\(^{82}\) Roger T. Ames, ‘Confucianism: Confucius (Kongzi, K’ung Tzu)’, note 30.


Chapter 2.2.3 Searching New Sources for Cultural Transformation as Chinese Response

In early twentieth-century China, thinkers could be broadly divided into two groups, which, as Edmund S. K. Fung classifies, include those demanding a total ‘Westernization’ and those asking for a protection or re-construction of Chinese culture. Although the latter group is often considered conservative, almost all figures of the period sought change. The main difference was the degree of change. In this sense, considering the latter group conservative seems inappropriate. In this study, therefore, I describe them as ‘pro-traditional’ and it is to this group that Fang and Tang belonged. After this clarification, I identify the questions facing the ‘pro-traditional’ thinkers as follows: what should be changed in ‘Chinese culture’ in order to effectively respond to the challenge of ‘scientism’? How was this change to be achieved? Certainly, there were no simple answers to these questions, although absorbing new ideas from the West was obviously an option.

In fact, despite the prevalence of Western thought in early twentieth-century China, its influence on Chinese thinkers should not be overestimated, particularly for those classified as ‘pro-traditional’. There are two reasons. First and practically, Western thought was no longer unchallengeable in the eyes of many Chinese thinkers, as I have previously mentioned. Therefore, I argue that even though Western thought was absorbed by Chinese thinkers at that time, the adoption of it was selective. Overemphasizing the place of Western thought amongst Chinese thinkers may thus ignore the latter’s autonomy. Second and theoretically, if Western influence played the only essential role in the thought of the ‘pro-traditional’ thinkers, the distinction between them and those seeking total ‘Westernization’ would become vague, as both of them neglected the essential role of Chinese intellectual traditions in their theories. In this sense, it is hard to classify any thinkers as ‘pro-traditional’. Unfortunately, it is a point that many studies seem to overlook. As a result, for some time, Western influence rather than traditional Chinese thought has been the focus of studies concerning those I identify as the ‘pro-traditional’ thinkers. This creates a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the

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91 I will further mention this point while I discuss modern Confucian thinkers’ appropriation of Buddhist thought in the following sections.
so-called ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucians’ are usually considered conservative or, as I argue, ‘pro-traditional’. On the other hand, it is their appropriations of Western thought, which was certainly a new source of ideas for these thinkers, that is the focus of many studies. I argue that this focus is somewhat debatable.

For instance, Mou Zongsan’s appropriation of Western philosophical ideas is obvious. He argued that, in the Western tradition, only Kant successfully suggested a kind of metaphysics of morals, which he saw as based on the analysis of the mind-heart of human beings. Kant’s idea, according to Mou, was similar to Confucianism in this sense. To go a step further, Mou even considered that Kant’s philosophy could be a bridge between Western philosophy and Chinese thought. Since he employed Kant’s ideas on a large scale, Mou has been criticized for misinterpreting both the thought of Kant and Confucianism. His works have been described as like ‘German philosophy in Chinese’. All this makes clear the impact of Western philosophical ideas on the ‘pro-traditional’ thinkers.

Although Fang and Tang did not employ Western ideas as widely as Mou did, Western influence on their writings can still be clearly seen. In fact, both Fang and Tang were considered similar to certain European philosophers. In consideration of his emphasis on the primacy of spirit, for example, Tang Junyi was titled a ‘Hegelian’, a follower of the German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). The role Hegel’s dialectic played in Tang’s thought is not only comprehensively studied by some scholars, but the idea that Tang was hugely influenced by Hegel is also recognized as a consensus by many of Tang’s disciples. In my opinion, it partly explains why a serious study about Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought rather than his use of Hegel’s philosophy is so important, as

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94 See his *Yuan shan lun 圓善論* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1996).
95 For discussion, see Guo Qiyong, ‘Mou Zongsan’s view of interpreting Confucianism by “moral autonomy”’, *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* vol.2, no.3 (2007): 345-362.
it may challenge a key assumption in the field of Chinese philosophical study. Similarly, since Thomé H. Fang strongly favoured ‘comprehensiveness’, a point I will further discuss in the next chapter, his thought is widely considered to be a kind of organic philosophy, like that of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947).\textsuperscript{100} From these examples, all of which discussed Chinese thought using a comparative method,\textsuperscript{101} considering that Western ideas helped make the ‘creative transformation’ of Chinese thought seems perfectly reasonable.\textsuperscript{102} The question is, how important was the role Western philosophy played?

In fact, as I have already suggested, the influence of Western philosophy on the ‘pro-traditional’ thinkers should not be overestimated. For instance, Mou’s employing Kant’s philosophy not only constructs a bridge between Western philosophy and Chinese thought, but also places Confucianism in a superior position to Kant’s philosophy, as he considered that Confucianism was the only intellectual tradition which successfully constructed a metaphysics of morals and comprehended the state of ‘Noumena’ via intellectual intuition.\textsuperscript{103}

In this sense, it is Confucianism that is the essence of Mou’s thought. The case of Tang employing Hegel’s philosophy is similar. Although Tang admitted that he was influenced by Hegel,\textsuperscript{104} he affirmed his independence as follows:

I respect and love the spirit of Western philosophers. However, I cannot prostrate myself before it nor worship it. Even if there were a rebirth of Plato and Hegel, I could not admire them sincerely. I am not willing to follow them with my life and spirit. For Confucius, Buddha and some Chinese and Indian philosophers, however, I am willing to do that.\textsuperscript{105}

Tang’s own words here suggest that, at least for Tang himself, the role of Western philosophy in the development of his thought may not be as great as many scholars have argued.

In chapter 1, I mentioned that the objective of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought, together with other thinkers’ appropriations of various ancient Chinese thought, is to


\textsuperscript{104} Tang Junyi, Rensheng zhi ti yan 人生之體驗 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2000), p.18-19.

\textsuperscript{105} The original sentences are ‘我對西洋哲人的精神，景仰之，心愛之，而不能頂禮之，膜拜之。雖柏拉圖黑格耳復生，我亦不能心悅誠服之，不願傾吾之生命精神與之。然吾於孔子釋迦以及若干中、印哲人則然。’ See Tang, \textit{ibid.}, p.27.
‘go back to the origin and develop new elements’, that is *fanben kaixin* in Chinese. I also mentioned previously that the ideas of ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’ run through almost all of modern Chinese thought. As He Lin argues, Chinese thinkers’ appropriation of Western thought in their own theories is ‘to enrich “*ti*” with “*ti*” and to complement “*yong*” with “*yong*”’.\(^{106}\) Take Mou’s appropriation of Kant’s ideas as an example. Mou tried to combine Kant’s ideas with Confucianism, arguing that the moral values suggested by Confucianism were not assertion but had ‘metaphysical’ reasons, which he summarised as ‘moral metaphysics’. Therefore, to Mou, Confucianism was not outdated but could be responsive to modern subjects, like developing ‘science’ and ‘democracy’. In my view, Mou’s appropriation of Kant’s ideas is a good example of ‘enriching “*ti*” with “*ti*” and complementing “*yong*” with “*yong*”’. Here I argue that this enrichment of ‘*ti*’ and ‘*yong*’ can also be achieved by means of re-discovering ancient Chinese thought, which is exactly what many Chinese thinkers did in the early twentieth century.

As I mentioned earlier, there have been a great variety of intellectual traditions in Chinese history. Regardless of its huge influence, Confucianism was only one of them. As the West became seen as no longer the only target of modern Chinese learning, these ancient intellectual traditions naturally became seen as another source of ideas for cultural transformation. In the face of the trend to revolution in the early twentieth century, for instance, Liang Qichao employed the ideas of Mohism 墨家, an intellectual tradition flourishing along with Confucianism in the Spring and Autumn Period (771BC-403BC) and the Warring States Period (403BC-221BC), to support his anti-revolutionary ideas.\(^{107}\) As Li Yushu 李漁叔 (1905-1972) argues, a main reason for early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers to study Mohism was because they considered the thought ‘scientific’ and ‘logical’,\(^{108}\) the elements the Chinese people crucially needed at the time under the challenge of ‘scientism’. In consideration of the advantage of rule of law as observed in the West, Chen Lie 陳烈 (?-?), together with other famous thinkers like Xie Wuliang 謝無量 (1884-1964), stressed the function of Legalism 法家, another intellectual tradition prevailing in the late Warring States Period, considering its spirit equivalent to the idea of rule of law.\(^{109}\) Since there were a number of thinkers studying Legalism in the early twentieth century, a term ‘Neo-Legalism’ has even been suggested recently, implying there was a ‘school’ at that


\(^{109}\) Chen Lie, *Fujia zhengzi zhuxue* 法家政治哲學 (Shanghai: Huatong shuju 華通書局, 1929), author preface.
Li Zongwu 李宗吾 (1879-1943) also published his famous work *Hou hei xue* 厚黑學 (*Thick Black Theory*) in 1911, claiming that Chinese people should learn to have a thick hide and dark mind in order to be more cunning and more powerful.111 As Li admitted, followers of his idea should understand Legalism.112 I argue that his theory is also a combination of the idea of *Guiguzi* 鬼谷子, a classic of the School of Diplomacy 縱橫家, which is notorious for ignoring moral cultivation but focusing on persuading and pleasing the seniors. All of these ideas were responses to the situation facing China, as the country urgently needed to become more practical, scientific, wealthy and powerful.113 In short, the tasks of these thinkers can be summarized as remoulding the past to respond to current issues.114

Undeniably, the scope of appropriations of ancient Chinese thought identified here was somewhat limited. In terms of depth and breadth, Chinese thinkers’ appropriations of Buddhist ideas are much more significant. In my view, a key reason for this phenomenon is that the theories of Mohism and Legalism are, to differing extents, incompatible with Confucianism.115 To use the language of the concepts ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ highlights a contradiction between the ‘ti’ of Confucianism and that of Mohism or Legalism. In other words, I argue that thinkers suggesting the ‘ti’ of Confucianism should not employ the function or ‘yong’ of Mohism or Legalism. For Buddhism, however, Confucian thinkers seem to see the way to communicate the ‘ti’ of both. And it is in this historical context that Fang, Tang and other Confucian thinkers appropriated various Buddhist ideas to develop their thought.

Chapter 2.3 Confucian Thinkers’ Appropriations of Buddhist Thought – An Overview

Buddhist study and practice so flourished in the first part of twentieth-century China that it was, in Holmes Welch’s words, a ‘Buddhist revival’.116 In order to fully understand the

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111 Li Zongwu, *Hou hei xue* (Taipei: Chuanwen wenhua 傳文文化, 1994). Interestingly, the preface of the book was written by Tang Difeng 唐迪風, a Confucian scholar and father of Tang Junyi.
112 Ibid., p.37.
113 For more discussion, see Wang Ermin 王爾敏, *Zhongguo jindai sixiang shilun* 中國近代思想史論 (Taipei: Huashi chubanshe 華世出版社, 1978), pp.527-529.
position of Buddhism at this time, one should not focus solely on Buddhism’s own thinkers and organizations but also acknowledge the studies of contemporary Confucian thinkers. For, from one perspective, the ideas of Confucian thinkers helped transform the development of modern Buddhism. The appropriations of Buddhist thought by Confucian thinkers, discussed below, are clear illustrations of this trend.

As Zhang Mantao 張曼濤 (1933-1981) argues, Buddhist study in early twentieth-century China could be generally divided into two groups: study within Buddhism by Buddhist monks and scholars themselves, and studies by those outside the religion. For the former, three sub-groups could be further identified. First were those aiming at saving the religion and the country through various reforms of Buddhism. Second were those who tried to revive the religion by means of studying particular Buddhist ideas, especially the concepts of Consciousness-Only. Third were those who insisted on traditional Buddhist practice with no major amendments. Zhang lists Taixu, Ouyang Jian 歐陽漸 (1871-1943) and Yinguang 印光 (1862-1940) as representatives of these three sub-groups respectively. Certainly, the distinction between the three sub-groups is not especially rigid, as even Taixu stressed the study of Consciousness-Only, and there were also certain amendments of Buddhist practice in Yinguang. Thus, Zhang’s classification is based only on the main characteristics of the different Buddhist figures he identified but his classification is still useful. As I will discuss further below, the Huayan School in early twentieth-century China seems to follow traditional Huayan study and practice with very few amendments. In this sense, Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought are ‘revolutionary’ compared with their Huayan contemporaries.

In terms of studies by non-Buddhists, Zhang also divides these into several sub-groups, including those employing a historical approach to study Buddhism such as Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 (1893-1964), those integrating scientific knowledge with Buddhist ideas like Wang Xiaoxu 王小徐 (1875-1948), and those using Buddhist ideas to develop their own thought.

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117 For following discussion, see Zhang Mantao, ‘Dangdai zhongguo de fojiao sixiang 當代中國的佛教思想’, Zhexue yu wenhua 哲學與文化 vol.6, no.5 (1979): 25-29.
118 For the life and thought of Taixu, see Don. A. Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s Reforms (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001).
119 For reference, see Eyal Aviv, Differentiating the Pearl from the Fish Eye: Ouyang Jingwu (1871–1943) and the Revival of Scholastic Buddhism (unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University, 2008).

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For this final sub-group, Zhang also categorizes them as those without strong and fixed religious position, such as Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 (1865-1898), and those with clear Confucian standpoints like Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili. Before discussing modern Confucian thinkers’ appropriations of Buddhist ideas, I want to stress that some Buddhist studies of the time, like that about Mohism, emphasized the relationship between Buddhist thought and science, arguing that the thought was ‘scientific’ and responsive to the current needs of the country, a point I will return to later.

Zhang’s classification not only provides a general picture of Buddhism in twentieth-century China, but also helps locate the contribution of Fang and Tang more clearly amongst different kinds of Buddhist study. In fact, as I will show below, Confucian thinkers who appropriated Buddhist ideas at that time did not do this to save the religion, nor did they aim at reviving any particular Buddhist school at all. Apart from Liang Shuming, none of the Confucian thinkers I am going to discuss followed Buddhist practice. They did not study Buddhist ideas from a historical perspective and historical accuracy was not their concern. Most of them did not attempt to integrate scientific knowledge with Buddhist ideas in order to demonstrate that Buddhism does not contradict science. Rather, as I previously mentioned, the aim of their appropriations of Buddhist ideas was to enrich the ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of ‘Chinese culture’, Confucianism in particular, so that it could be more responsive to the challenge as posed by ‘scientism’.

Amongst those Confucian thinkers who appropriated Buddhist ideas, Liang Shuming was probably the most influential in his times. Having been famously regarded as a Confucian thinker for a long time, Liang confirmed in an interview in the late twentieth century that both Confucianism and Buddhism played an essential role in his thought. To better understand him, therefore, both intellectual traditions should be considered. In his well-known Dong xi wenhua ji qi zhexue 東西文化及其學 (Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies) published in 1922, Liang argued that Western culture was so aggressive that it led to a conquest of nature and even of other peoples. Indian culture, mainly Hinayana Buddhism, however, was seen as too regressive and as laying its focus on death rather than life. For Liang, ‘Chinese culture’, especially Confucianism, sat between Western and Indian cultures. In other words, all Western, Indian and Chinese cultures had their own strengths and weaknesses. Chinese people should not adopt Indian culture at a time when China was still suffering from both civil unrest and foreign challenge. On the other hand, the country should

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125 Wang Zongyu, ‘Confucianist or Buddhist? An Interview with Liang Shuming’, note 27.
126 Liang Shuming, Dong xi wenhua ji qi zhexue (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 上海書店, 1989).
also avoid blindly following the West, as the outbreak of the First World War showed its limitations. In brief, ‘Chinese culture’ was preferable at that time.127

While Liang’s attitude toward different cultures, noted above, seems to be the core of his thought, his attitude toward Buddhist ideas needs further consideration. As I argued previously, ‘scientism’ had been the main challenge facing Chinese thinkers since the early twentieth century. Some scholars have pointed out that Liang valued the concept of Consciousness-Only, considering its method rational and scientific, and capable of competing with Western philosophy.128 Linking Liang’s attitude toward Consciousness-Only and the challenge of ‘scientism’ in his time together, I argue that Liang’s adoption of Buddhist ideas was not simply restricted to the overall Buddhist analysis of life and death, but he also saw its potential to respond to ‘scientism’. In other words, in Liang’s view, ‘science’ and philosophy of life are not necessarily exclusive to each other. This point not only provides an alternative to the positions of Carsun Chang and Ding Wenjiang in ‘The polemic on science and metaphysics’, but also helps sharpen our understanding of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan, as they too tried to confirm both the value of science and traditional Chinese thought. In fact, I argue that Liang’s confirmation of the values of different cultures also employed the Buddhist idea of doctrinal classification (Chi. panjiao 判教) implicitly, as he considered that different ideas could be applicable in different periods, a point I will further discuss in section 2.4.3.

The significance of Liang’s ideas to this study will be more obvious if we relate them to the categories of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’. Although Liang himself did not use the terms, his ideas do actually touch on these concepts. As Liang argued, the characteristics of different cultures were decided by the spirit of their people.129 Following this idea, Yang Rubin points out that Liang regarded human spirit as ‘ti’ while culture is its ‘yong’.130 In this sense, for instance, people with Chinese spirit could not develop Western culture, and vice versa. Thus Chinese ‘ti’ could not sustain Western ‘yong’. Thus Liang rejects Zhang Zhidong’s idea of ‘Chinese learning for fundamental principles, Western learning for practical applications’, like the example of ‘cow and horse’ that I mentioned earlier. Although the concept of Consciousness-Only potentially helped Liang to respond to the challenge of ‘scientism’, it did not help him re-define the ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of ‘Chinese culture’ in general. In short, though ‘Chinese culture’ itself was considered preferable to Liang, it failed to respond to the

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129 Liang Shuming, Dong xi wenhua ji qi zhexue, note 126, pp.150-152.
challenge facing it. Therefore, paradoxically, the implication of his approach was that ‘Chinese culture’ might not survive even though it was considered preferable at this stage. I argue that this is exactly the question other Confucian thinkers in Liang’s times needed to consider.

Xiong Shili is another important Confucian thinker whose thought was influenced by Buddhist ideas. Having learned Consciousness-Only under the well-known Buddhist scholar Ouyang Jian, Xiong later changed his faith from Buddhism to Confucianism, arguing that only the ideas of Yi Jing or Book of Changes help develop a kind of ontology with ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, which could be responsive to the current challenge.

In his Xin weishi lun 新唯識論 (New Doctrine of Consciousness-Only) published in 1932,131 Xiong suggested that Buddhism denies the essence of the universe and Consciousness-Only also suggests ālayavijñāna as the ultimate self of the human being.132 In his understanding, the Buddhist idea of ‘emptiness’ only developed a kind of ‘dead’ body or ‘ti’, which fails to sustain any functions or ‘yong’. This idea of Xiong fits the second principle of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, that the two concepts are not separate from each other.133 For Xiong, in order to sustain various functions or ‘yong’, the ‘ti’ of human beings should not be limited but infinite. This infinite ‘ti’ is expressed in Yi Jing’s ideas of ‘xi’ 翕 and ‘pi’ 開, which imply ‘closing’ and ‘opening’ respectively. As Chan Wing-tsit argues, ‘closing’ means the ‘tendency to integrate’ and ‘opening’ suggests the ‘tendency to maintain’, which consists of ‘a process of unceasing production and reproduction’.134 Xiong insisted that the main characteristic of human minds is ‘changing’. Therefore, in the face of the various challenges facing China like the needs of developing modern science and establishing democracy, Chinese should go back to the mind, re-discovering its aspect of ‘openness’ and finding solutions to these problems.135 Although Xiong’s understanding of Consciousness-Only was criticized by many influential Buddhist scholars and monks,136 in this study, I argue that the main point is not the accuracy of his interpretation of Consciousness-Only, but his suggestion that Chinese people should ‘go back to the origin and develop new elements’ or fanben kaixin 返本開新, though the ‘origin’ here does not mean

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131 Xiong Shili, Xin weishi lun (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju 中華書局, 1985).
132 For the idea of ālayavijñāna, see below.
135 Guo Qiyong 郭齊勇, Xiong Shili yu Zhongguo chuantong wenhua 熊十力與中國傳統文化 (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu 天地圖書, 1988), pp.52-61.
136 The debate between Xiong and his opponents is now recorded in Lin Anwu 林安梧 ed., Xiandai ru fo zhi zheng 現代儒佛之爭 (Taipei: Mingwen shuju 明文書局, 1990).
‘Chinese culture’ but the human mind.\textsuperscript{137}

To Xiong, all the cultures and achievements of human beings are developed using their minds, science being no exception to this. However, scientific knowledge is only a kind of ‘worldly truth’ (Skt. samvrti-satyā; Chi. sudi 俗諦), its effectiveness is restricted to empirical and physical worlds. The knowledge of the mind, as discussed in Xiong’s versions of Buddhism and Confucianism as Xiong defined them, belongs to ‘supreme truth’ (Skt. paramārtha-satyā; Chi. zhendi 真諦). In this sense, there is no contradiction between scientific knowledge and the knowledge of the mind as they actually belong to various levels of truth. Together with the ideas of ‘closing’ and ‘opening’ mentioned above, Xiong’s main argument becomes more obvious, that the mind is always a process of development but never a fixed or unchanged concept. Since human culture stems from the mind, the former is also always dynamic. The challenge of the West is just a kind of stimulus to China, which urges China to improve its culture. In brief, learning from others is a normal and natural process. This idea of Xiong, on the one hand, answers those refusing to accept that China should learn from the West. On the other hand, however, it suggests that Confucianism should not be simply abandoned as it is valuable at the level of ‘supreme truth’.\textsuperscript{138} Although Xiong did not indicate what the Chinese should learn from the West and what of ‘Chinese culture’ should be maintained, he reminds us of the flexibility of the mind and its significance in responding to the Western challenge in principle,\textsuperscript{139} a point essential to understanding Tang’s thought, as I will discuss in chapter 4.

Following Xiong’s approach, Mou Zongsan also divided knowledge into two levels, which are those from ‘sensible intuition’ (Chi. ganxing de zhijue 感性的直覺) and those from ‘intellectual intuition’ (Chi. zhi de zhijue 智的直覺) respectively. To Mou, the knowledge stemming from the former is ‘phenomenal’ (Chi. xianxiang 現象), while the knowledge from the latter is called ‘of the thing itself’ (Chi. wuzishen 物自身). Obviously, this distinction of Mou’s is inspired by Kant’s philosophy, which is commonly regarded as the building block of Mou’s own thought.\textsuperscript{140} However, unlike Kant, who believed that ‘the thing itself’ could not be known by humans, Mou argued that it is knowable.\textsuperscript{141} And this brings us to Mou’s understanding of the nature of Chinese thought, including his interpretation of Tiantai 天台 thought.

\textsuperscript{137} Lin Chen-kuo 林鎮國, Kongxing yu xiandaixing 空性與現代性 (Taipei: Lixu wenhua 立續文化, 1999), pp.72-84.
\textsuperscript{139} For more discussion, see Chak Chi-shing, The contemporary Neo-Confucian rehabilitation: Xiong Shili and his moral metaphysics (unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1990), pp.323-366.
\textsuperscript{140} For Mou’s appropriations of Kant’s philosophy, see Serina N. Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan (Leiden: Brill, 2011), chapters 4 to 6.
In his autobiography *Wushi zishu* 五十自述 (*Self-introduction at Fifty*), Mou recalled that in the late 1920s, ‘idealism’ (Chi. *weixilun* 唯心論) was seriously attacked by young people at a time when the status of human beings was only determined by financial condition and social class. As Mou stressed, these ‘inhumane’ (Chi. *feiren* 非人) criteria made him uncomfortable, as they contradicted the traditional values of his youth. In this period, the arguments on the ‘polemic on science and metaphysics’ drew his attention.\(^{142}\) To Mou, scientific knowledge belonged to the area of ‘phenomena’, which only applies to the empirical and physical world. The obtaining of this kind of knowledge, however, cannot be separated from human beings. In this sense, the understanding of human beings is more fundamental. As Mou argued, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism all contribute to human understanding, which he called ‘intellectual intuition’. In order to develop scientific knowledge, Chinese people should temporarily stop focusing on such ‘intellectual intuition’ and concentrate on the world of ‘phenomena’. This comprises his controversial idea of ‘self-negation of innate moral consciousness’ (Chi. *liangzhi zhi kanxian* 良知之坎陷), an idea trying to explain the co-existence of scientific knowledge and traditional Chinese thought, as well as putting the latter in a superior position from an ontological and an axiological point of view.\(^{143}\)

Amongst those intellectual traditions which succeeded in building up ‘intellectual intuition’, Mou regarded Tiantai thought the most successful within the Buddhist tradition. According to Mou, as we saw earlier, the concept of *ālayavijñāna* as suggested by Consciousness-Only failed to construct a ‘*ti*’, not to mention ‘*yong*’. The pure mind of Huayan thought, an idea I will further discuss later, tends to consider the mind an entity, which seems contradictory to the Buddhist idea of ‘emptiness’. To Mou, the mind as suggested by Tiantai succeeds in weakening its concrete image and therefore raises little controversy.\(^{144}\) More important, Mou explicitly employed Tiantai’s theory of doctrinal classification to harmonize various seemingly controversial theories within Buddhism.\(^{145}\) As Lin Chen-kuo argues, Mou’s harmonization of different Buddhist theories is important, as it helps make ‘Buddhism’ a coherent unity so that he could compare it with ‘Confucianism’, leading to the conclusion that it is ‘Confucianism’ not ‘Buddhism’ which achieves the ‘*Summum Bonum*’ (Eng. the Highest Good; Chi. *yuan shan* 圓善).\(^{146}\) To some extent, therefore, arguing that Tiantai thought helps construct Mou’s ultimate theory of Confucianism is reasonable, as the former constructs a bridge for Mou to compare the two intellectual traditions, which shows ‘Confucianism’ more


\(^{143}\) For discussion about this concept, see Tao Guozhang 陶國璋, *Shengming kanxian yu xianxiang shijie* 生命坎陷與現象世界 (Hong Kong: Shulin chubanshe 書林出版社, 1995), pp.216-226. For the English translation of it, see Serina N. Chan, *The Thought of Mou Zongsan*, note 140, pp.115-116.

\(^{144}\) See Lin Chen-kuo, *Kongxing yu xiandaixing*, note 137, p.88-89.

\(^{145}\) For discussion, see Jason Clower, *The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism* (Leiden, 2010), pp.151-153.

\(^{146}\) Lin Chen-kuo, *Kongxing yu xiandaixing*, note 137, p.121. Also see Clower, *ibid.*, pp.191-197.
favourable eventually.

While Liang, Xiong and Mou are probably the most widely discussed modern Confucian thinkers, Ma Yifu has been neglected in the discussion concerning ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’. Regarded as one of the ‘three sages’ together with Liang and Xiong in modern Confucian history, Ma Yifu has been criticised by some scholars who say that his thought is actually very traditional, difficult to regard as ‘new’, and thus fails to respond to the challenge facing his times. This criticism is valid as he gave much of his attention to the ancient Confucian ‘six arts’ (Chi. liu yi 六藝) and the main Confucian canons like *Classic of Filial Piety* (Chi. Xiao Jing 孝經). However, for this study, Ma Yifu is as important as the other modern thinkers identified above as he was not only one of the many who employed Buddhist ideas to develop his thought, but also one of the very few to appropriate Huayan ideas to interpret Confucian canons.

As I mentioned in the last section, traditional Confucian values had been seriously attacked since the May Fourth Movement. The five relationships including filial piety between son and father, were considered obstacles to the modernization of China. In my view, Ma’s emphasis on the *Classic of Filial Piety* at that time is a response to this kind of criticism. Instead of simply affirming the values of filial piety, Ma used the terms of Huayan thought, trying to argue that there was a metaphysical foundation behind this Confucian value. In chapter 1, I briefly said that there was a Huayan School existing in twentieth-century China and the monk Yuexia was a key figure of the school. Yuexia was a close friend of Ma and Ma’s interest in Huayan was affected by the former, though the details of this friendship are now largely unknown. As Ma argued in his famous *Fuxing shuyuan jianglu* 復性書院講錄 (*Lecture Notes of Fuxing College*), filial piety is the truth of ‘Heaven’ (Chi. tian 天), ‘Earth’ (Chi. di 地) and ‘Humanity’ (Chi. ren 人). However, the filial piety in ‘Humanity’ is just a reflection of that of ‘Heaven’ and ‘Earth’. In other words, the truth of ‘Heaven’ and ‘Earth’ manifests through ‘Humanity’. To Ma, filial piety in ‘Humanity’ is like Huayan’s idea of ‘dharma dhātu of events’ (Chi. si fajie 事法界). Behind it there is the filial piety of ‘Heaven’,

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148 For example, see Liu Shu-hsien 劉述先, *Ruxue de fuxing* 儒學的復興 (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu 天地圖書, 2007), p.85.


150 See the discussion in note 51.

which he considered similar to Huayan’s idea of ‘dharmadhātu of principle’ (Chi. *li fajie* 理法界). The filial piety of ‘Earth’ links the filial pieties between ‘Humanity’ and ‘Heaven’, which he regarded as the ‘dharmadhātu of Non-Obstruction of Principle against Events’ (Chi. *li shi wuai fajie* 理事無礙法界). To discuss all these three aspects of filial piety is the ‘dharmadhātu of Non-Obstruction of Events against Events’ (Chi. *shi shi wuai fajie* 事事無礙法界).^152

Admittedly, Ma’s employment of Huayan ideas to explain Confucian canons is a kind of assertion. Without considering the difference between the two, Ma seems to stretch the Huayan ideas to suit his objective. Compared with Fang and Tang, the scope of Ma’s appropriation of Huayan thought is also limited. However, his case helps indicate that there is potential communication between Huayan and Confucian ideas, a point quite unusual amongst those Confucian thinkers who appropriated Buddhist ideas in their theories, as most of them did not aim at communicating the two intellectual traditions but at emphasizing the advantages of Confucianism over Buddhism. As I will discuss later, Fang and Tang also stressed the similarities between Confucian and Huayan ideas, though their conclusions are different.

Certainly, thinkers appropriating Buddhist ideas to develop their thought were not restricted to those listed above. In consideration of the subject matter of this study and Zhang Mantao’s classification which I discussed at the outset of this section, I argue that the above discussions are the most important and the most relevant to explain the general historical context facing Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought, which is why and how Chinese thinkers in the twentieth century sought ideas alternative to Confucianism to develop their theories. More specifically, I have shown why and how Confucian thinkers at that time appropriated Buddhist ideas in particular to develop their thought.

Since Fang and Tang employed Buddhist ideas on a large scale, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of this Buddhist tradition, in terms of both its main arguments and its modern development. Below, therefore, I will discuss these in more detail to ground the discussion of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations in the following chapters.

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^152 Ma Jingquan 馬鏡泉 ed., *Ma Yifu juan* 馬一浮卷 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe 河北教育出版社, 1996), pp.211-212. I will further these Huayan ideas in the next section.

^153 Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1868-1936), Yang Du 楊度 (1874-1932) and Chen Daqi 陳大齊 (1886-1983) are other famous examples who appropriated Buddhist ideas to develop or support their own thought.
Chapter 2.4 Classical Huayan Thought and its Modern Development

There have been many controversies over the interpretation of Huayan thought. The objective of this study is to examine why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought to develop their thought, but not to study Huayan thought itself. Hence, I shall restrict my outline of key concepts in Huayan thought here to those issues which are closely related to Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of this Buddhist tradition. That is to say, I am not aiming to discuss the entire Huayan tradition here, nor am I attempting to discuss in great depth the controversies within Huayan thought.

In consideration of the fact that Fang and Tang focused only on the Huayan thought of the Tang Dynasty (618-907), I will myself focus only on the thought of that period. The sole exception to this is that I will consider its modern development as this will help to introduce the nature of the thought at the time of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of it, thus making the characteristics of the appropriations clearer. Below, I outline the history of the Huayan School, which provides us with the background to the appearance of the thought.

Chapter 2.4.1 Brief History of the Huayan School in the Tang Dynasty

The exact date and route of the introduction of Buddhism into China are not exactly known, though it has traditionally been thought to have been around or just before A.D. 67 and via the land route from north-west India. Despite disputes about this, it is certain that the religion, characterized by substantial developments in religious thought in several Buddhist schools, bloomed during the Tang Dynasty, among them the Huayan School. The name of the School is derived from Huayanjing 華嚴經 (Skt. Avatamsaka Sūtra; Eng. Garland Sūtra) and its dominance mainly began in the time of Fazang 法藏 (643-712), between the periods of the dominance of, respectively, the Tiantai School and the Chan School, which arose around the time of Zhizhe 智者 (538-596) and Huineng 惠能 (638-713). Historically, there was

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competition and reciprocal absorption of the ideas amongst the schools. In fact, both Tiantai and Huayan considered their own philosophical systems ‘yuan’ 圓, a term, which, to some extent, implies finality and closure.\textsuperscript{157} From the perspectives of Tiantai and Huayan, therefore, further theoretical development in Buddhism was considered unnecessary, if not impossible. In this sense, Huayan thought, at least in the eyes of the Huayan patriarchs, was the intellectual apex of Buddhism.\textsuperscript{158}

The lineage of the Huayan patriarchs varies amongst scholars. However, most consider that Dushun 杜順 (557-640), Zhiyan 智嚴 (602-668), Fazang, Chengguan 澄觀 (738-839) and Zongmi 宗密 (780-841) were the main patriarchs of the School during the dynasty.\textsuperscript{159} According to Xu gaoseng zhuan 續高僧傳 (Continuation of Biographies of Eminent Monks), Dushun once learned meditation with Chan master Sengzhen 僧珍 (dates unknown). Apart from this, Dushun’s learning is something of a mystery.\textsuperscript{160} According to Zhiyan, his own interpretation of Huayanjing was learned from Dushun,\textsuperscript{161} which provides the only hint about the relationship between Dushun and Huayanjing.\textsuperscript{162} As I will discuss in chapter 3, unlike almost all interpreters of Huayan thought, Thomé H. Fang focused on Dushun in particular, claiming that it was Dushun who was the most important figure in the Huayan tradition.

Although Zhiyan was a disciple of Dushun, he also learned from the masters of the Nan Dilun 南地論宗 and Shelun Schools 擧論宗,\textsuperscript{163} which Paul Williams refers to as the early schools of Consciousness-Only (Skt. Yogācāra; Chi. Weishi 唯識) in China.\textsuperscript{164} Fazang argued that Zhiyan derived his profound understanding of Huayanjing from the masters of these Schools.\textsuperscript{165} This suggests a close relationship between Huayan thought and that of

\textsuperscript{157} I will further discuss this term later.
\textsuperscript{159} Lu Cheng 呂澂, Zhongguo fojiao shi 中國佛教史 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng 新文豐, 2010), pp.188-193.
\textsuperscript{160} Dazheng xinxiu dazangjing 大正新修大藏經, vol.50, no. 2060, pp.653b-654a. Dazheng xinxiu dazangjing is abbreviated as DZJ in this study.
\textsuperscript{161} DZJ, vol.45, no. 1868, p.514a.
\textsuperscript{163} DZJ, vol.51, no. 2073, p.163b23-163c18.
\textsuperscript{165} DZJ, vol.51, no. 2073, p.163c, 1-18.
Fazang was called the third patriarch of the Huayan School. However, he is widely regarded as the real founder of the School.\textsuperscript{166} In fact, Huayan gained its political and intellectual importance during the period of Fazang, as it is traditionally considered that Fazang explained his thought to Empress Wu 武后 (624-705) face-to-face around 700. The speech given by Fazang is claimed to be recorded in \textit{Jin shizi zhang 金師子章 (Treatise on the Golden Lion)},\textsuperscript{168} though its origin as a speech delivered by Fazang to Empress Wu is also largely apocryphal.\textsuperscript{169} Most of the important concepts of Huayan, such as doctrinal classification theory, were established by Fazang.\textsuperscript{170} Due to his importance in the School, the discussion of Huayan thought in this chapter will be mainly based on Fazang’s thought.

After the death of Fazang, his disciple Huiyuan 慧苑 (673-743) amended Fazang’s ideas of doctrinal classification, arguing that ‘sudden teaching’ should be removed from the doctrinal classification system. This idea of Huiyuan was criticized by Chengguan, later the fourth patriarch of the School.\textsuperscript{171} As I will argue in chapter 5, doctrinal classification is probably the most important Huayan element which Tang Junyi appropriated in his thought. Therefore, in this study, we cannot overlook the disputation between Huiyuan and Chengguan, though the former is never regarded as a Huayan patriarch. Zongmi, a disciple of Chengguan and also renowned as the ‘Chan master of Guifeng’ 圭峰禪師,\textsuperscript{172} was the fifth patriarch of the School in the period. His attitude towards the harmonization of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism also inspired Tang.

Apart from the monks listed above, Li Tongxuan 李通玄 (635-730), a layman and a member of the Li royal family of the Tang Dynasty, also contributed to the development of Huayan thought. Interpreting \textit{Huayanjing} from the perspective of the \textit{Yi Jing}, Li stressed the

\textsuperscript{166} For the early Huayan history, see Yang Weizhong 楊維中, ‘Huayanzong de yunyu xinkao 華嚴宗的孕育新考’, \textit{Zhexue men 哲學門} vol.10, no.2 (Feb 2010): 29-60.
\textsuperscript{167} Chan Wing-tsit, \textit{A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy}, note 25, pp.406-408.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{DZJ}, vol.45, no. 1880, pp. 663a-667a.
\textsuperscript{170} Although Huayan’s doctrinal classification theory was firstly suggested by Zhiyan, it is developed by Fazang. For discussion, see Kimura Kiyotaka 木村清孝, Li Huiying 李惠英 trans., \textit{Zhongguo Huayan sixiangshi 中國華嚴思想史} (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1996), pp.117-122. For Zhiyan’s role in the development of Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification, see Robert M. Gimello, \textit{Chih-yen (602-668) and the Foundations of Hua-yen Buddhism} (unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1976), chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{171} For the life of Chengguan, see Imre Hamar, \textit{A Religious Leader in the Tang: Chengguan’s Biography} (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2002).
importance of practice, a point important to our understanding of Thomé H. Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, which I will discuss in chapter 3.

Despite the importance of the School in the Dynasty, ‘Huichang Persecution’ (Chi. Huichang fanan 會昌法難), a political movement led by Emperor Wu of Tang 唐武宗 (814-846) in 845 which aimed at destroying Buddhism fundamentally, accelerated the decline of the School. Although the decline of the School is not my focus in this study, Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought provide us a good opportunity to discuss the creative interpretation of the thought in modern society, an issue I will discuss in detail after introducing Huayan’s key ideas.

Chapter 2.4.2 Foundation of Huayan Thought

As already mentioned, the name of the Huayan School indicates that its thought is based on the Huayanjing. It is not possible to explain the content of the whole text here. However, as Liu Ming-wood argues, its main theme is to relate the ‘numerous stages a bodhisattva has to pass through before he can achieve the supreme end of Buddhahood’. There are in all three translations of Huayanjing in Chinese, all translated from Sanskrit. The first was by Buddhhabhadra 佛陀跋陀羅 (359-429) completed around 420; the second was by Siksananda 實叉難陀 (652-710) around 699; and the third was by Prajna 般若 (734-810?) around 798, which is mainly a re-translation of ‘Entry into the Realm of Reality’ (Chi. ru fajie pin 入法界品), the thirty-ninth chapter of the second translation.

Although Huayan patriarchs claimed that they based their teachings on Huayanjing, some monk scholars argued that there was no relationship between the two as their ideas were actually inconsistent. In fact, Huayanjing is only one of the Buddhist texts the Huayan

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177 DZJ, vol. 9, no.278, 395a-788b.
178 Ibid., vol. 10, no.279, 1a-444c.
179 Ibid., vol. 10, no.293, 661a-851c.
patriarchs relied on. Apart from it, there are other sources of Buddhist ideas which have contributed to the formation of Huayan thought; Consciousness-Only is one of them.

In the previous section, I mentioned that Zhiyan once studied with the masters of the Nan Dilun and Shelun Schools, the representatives of the thought of early Consciousness-Only in China. There is a close relationship between the appearance of the Nan Dilun School and the translations of *Shidijing lun* 十地經論 (Skt. Daśabhūmikasūtra-sāstra),¹ an important work held to be written by Vasubandhu (around 420-500 A.D.) to interpret *Shidijing* 十地經 (Skt. Daśabhūmiśvara), and which now features as a chapter in the ‘shidi pin’ 十地品 in *Huayanjing*. The Sanskrit version of *Shidijing lun* first appeared in China in the days of Emperor Xuanwu 宣武帝 (483-515), when three Indian Buddhist monks, Bodhiruci 菩提流支 (?-527), Ratnamati 勒那摩提 (?-?) and Buddhasant佛陀扇多 (?-?), were visiting the country.¹² As requested by the Emperor, the three monks, working with several other monks, translated the text into Chinese, completing it around 511.¹³ However, there were disagreements among them about how to interpret the term ‘xin’ 心, usually translated as ‘mind’, literally ‘heart-and-mind’, and its functions, leading to the development of the Dilun School. In general, the disciples of Bodhiruci, who remained in the north of Luoyang 洛陽 and were therefore called Bei Dilun School 北地論宗, considered that the mind is defiled and as such is called ālayavijñāna 阿賴耶識, whereas the disciples of Ratnamati, who stayed in the south of Luoyang and were called Nan Dilun School 南地論宗, considered ālayavijñāna pure.¹⁴ This idea of the Nan Dilun School reminds us of the characteristics of the thought of the Shelun School.

Apart from the Nan Dilun School, Zhiyan also studied with the master of the Shelun School, Fachang 法常 (567-645). Based on its interpretation of Asanga’s (310-390) *She dasheng lun* 收大乘論 (Skt. Mahāyānasāṅgraha), this school argued the mind is pure. The main difference between the Shelun School and the Nan Dilun School is that the former considered the pure mind amala-vijñāna 阿摩羅識, which is the ninth consciousness after ālayavijñāna whereas the Nan Dilun School considered that there are only eight consciousnesses in Buddhism. The eighth consciousness is, as mentioned above, ālayavijñāna.¹⁵ Despite the difference between them, both suggest that the mind is pure. As mentioned previously, Zhiyan’s understanding of

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¹¹ DZJ, vol. 26, no.1522, pp.123a-204b.
¹² For the discussion in this paragraph, I mainly refer to Kamata Shigeo, Zhongguo fojiao shi, note 159, pp.92-96.
¹³ There are many versions about the process of the translation, see DZJ, vol.49, no.2034, p.86a, 13; vol.50, no. 2060, p.607b18-608b. In this study, I rely on the version of vol.25, no.1509, as it was from an official in the time the translation was conducted.
Huayanjing was inspired by the Nan Dilun School and Shelun School, which might imply the Huayan School also tended to consider the ‘mind’ to be pure (Chi. jing淨). However, as I will discuss in the following sections, this concept of the pure mind raises a theoretical difficulty.

But first it is necessary to introduce the key term dharma at this point. The meaning of dharma, which is commonly translated as ‘fa’法 in Chinese, varies dependent on context. In the Mahāyāna Buddhism, for example, dharma in the singular means ‘whatever leads to enlightenment’, extending to meanings such as ‘the patterns of reality and cosmic law-orderliness discovered by the Buddha(s), Buddhist teachings, the Buddhist path of practice, and the goal of Buddhism, the timeless Nirvāṇa’. In the Indian Abhidharma tradition, however, dharmas are the fundamental units which create our impression of a stable world and are held to be reals. The Indian Madhyamaka thinker, Nāgārjuna (150?-250?) argued, by contrast, that the nature of dharmas is neither absolute ‘non-existence’ (like that of a hare’s horn) nor substantial ‘existence’ (of an independent permanently existing real). Dharmas are, rather ‘empty’; they are not non-existent but they are not independent reals. In the Yogācāra school, the understanding of ‘emptiness’ was developed further in relation to the so-called Three Natures theory, as we shall see below. According to Dasheng baifa mingmen lun 大乘百法明門論 (Skt. Mahāyāna-śatadharmaprapākāsamanukha-śāstra; Eng. The Shastra of the Door to Understanding the Hundred Dharmas), there are in all hundreds of kinds of dharmas, and these can be grouped into five categories: ‘mind dharmas’, ‘mental dharmas’, ‘form dharmas’, ‘dharmas separate from the mind’ and ‘unconditioned dharmas’, the latter including tathatā, or suchness. Despite these categories, dharmas can also be simply classified into two groups: pure dharmas and defiled dharmas. To conclude, whilst on the whole when used in the plural, ‘dharma’ carries a more technical meaning, in the singular its meaning is more general. This breadth of meanings is retained in Huayan. Liu Ming-wood argues that the key Huayan thinker, Fazang, used the term ‘dharma’ in its widest sense to mean teachings, religious practices and methods of instruction. As I will discuss below, however, ‘dharma’ in the plural usually means ‘phenomena’ in the Huayan

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186 Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations, note 164, p.42
188 Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations, note 164, p.175.
189 Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, history and practices, note 187, pp.116-119.
192 For more discussion about the term ‘fa’, see Yinshun 印順, Yi fo fa yanjiu fo fa 以佛法研究佛法 (Taipei: Zhengwen chubanshe 正聞出版社, 1992), pp.103-130.
or what Liu Ming-wood refers to in Fazang’s thought as all things, both internal and external as objects of perception and discrimination. Therefore, I also regard dharmas as phenomena in the following discussion.

As I mentioned previously, the issue of pure mind raises a theoretical difficulty. Because if the mind is pure, as argued by the Nan Dilun School, this fails to explain why there were defiled dharmas in the world, whereas the Shelun School explained the origin of defiled dharmas through the concept of ālayavijñāna, arguing that it is the eighth consciousness that is responsible for the appearance of defiled dharmas. Despite there being defiled dharmas, the ultimate mind, which is the ninth consciousness in the Shelun School tradition, is still pure. This idea seems similar to that of Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論 (The Treatise on the Mahayana Awakening of Faith), another Buddhist text influencing the thought of Huayan.

Consciousness-Only also explains that the suffering and entanglement of humanity are due to attachment and misconception, reminding us that practice and transformation of the mind are the key for humanity to get rid of suffering and entanglement. I argue that this is important to our understanding of Huayan’s idea of ‘Dharma Realm’, which I will explain in the next section.

As I indicated earlier, Huayan also suggests that the mind is pure. In order to explain why there are defiled dharmas in the world, therefore, Huayan patriarchs employed the idea of Dasheng qixin lun, arguing that ālayavijñāna is responsible for such kinds of dharmas. There is much argument about the authorship and origin of Dasheng qixin lun. Although the authorship was traditionally attributed to Aśvaghoṣa 馬鳴 (80?–150?) and the text said to have been translated from Sanskrit into Chinese by Paramārtha 真諦 (500-569), it is now largely considered in academia that the work was originally written in Chinese. As the text argues, pure and defiled dharmas come from two different aspects of mind:

The revelation of the true meaning (of the principle of Mahayana can be achieved) by (unfolding the doctrine) that the principle of One Mind has two aspects. One is the aspect of Mind in terms of the Absolute (tathatā; suchness), and the other is the aspect of Mind in terms of phenomena (samsāra;
birth and death). Each of these two aspects embraces all states of existence. Why? Because these two aspects are mutually inclusive.\(^{199}\)

Since both the aspects of absolute and phenomena are from the mind, there is no fundamental difference between them and, as is further explained, the difference between dharmas is an illusion. Crucially, if the mind does not attach to such factors as verbalization, description and conceptualization, all dharmas are seen as equal in nature.\(^{200}\) Dasheng qixin lun further explains the aspect of the mind in terms of phenomena as follows:

The Mind as phenomena (\textit{samsāra}) is grounded on the \textit{Tathāgatagarbha}. What is called the Storehouse Consciousness is that in which ‘neither birth nor death (nirvāṇa)’ diffuses harmoniously with ‘birth and death (samsāra)’, and yet in which both are neither identical nor different. This Consciousness has two aspects which embrace all states of existence and create all states of existence. They are the aspect of enlightenment and the aspect of non-enlightenment.\(^{201}\)

According to the citation, the mind as phenomena is grounded on \textit{tathāgatagarbha} (Eng. Buddha nature or pure mind; Chi. rulaizang zixing qingjingxin 如來藏自性清淨心), which literally means ‘womb’ of the \textit{Tathāgata}, a doctrine expressing the potential of all sentient beings to become Buddha.\(^{202}\) As I will discuss below, Huayan thought argues that the mind as phenomena has facets of both eternality and impermanence. It is eternal because its origin is \textit{tathāgatagarbha}, which is assumed to be totally pure. On the other hand, however, the mind of phenomena can be non-awakened, and in this sense is impermanent. That is to say, Huayan thought considers \textit{ālayavijñāna} a transitional concept while \textit{tathāgatagarbha} is the ultimate mind of humanity.\(^{203}\)

Finally, as a system of thought which arose after Confucianism and Taoism, Huayan thought could not completely ignore these forms of Chinese traditions. For example, some specific terms like ‘The Ten Mysteries’ (Chi. \textit{shi xuan men} 十玄門) of Huayan draw on terms from


\(^{200}\) \textit{DZJ}, vol. 32, no.1666, p.576a, 8-13.

\(^{201}\) The original Chinese sentences are ‘心生滅者，依如來藏，故有生滅心，所謂不生滅與生滅和合，非一非異，名為阿梨耶識。此識有二種義，能攝一切法，生一切法．云何為二？一者覺義，二者不覺義。’ \textit{Ibid.}, pp.576b, 7-11. For the translation, see Yoshito S. Hakeda, \textit{The Awakening of Faith}, note 199, pp.36-37.


\(^{203}\) For more discussion, see Liu Ming-wood, ‘The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-yen Buddhism’, note 195.

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Taoism and the *Yi Jing*, here the notion of the ‘profound’ (Chi. *xuan* 玄). As traditional Chinese thought emphasizes the idea of the interconnectedness of all phenomena, Huayan thought also incorporates this idea. As I will discuss in chapters 3 and 4, the point that there is potential communication between Huayan and traditional Chinese thought helps explain why modern Confucian thinkers could appropriate this Buddhist tradition to develop their theories. Since the influence of ancient Chinese thought on Huayan is not the focus of this study, I will close my discussion of the intellectual background of Huayan thought here and move on to discuss the key concepts of Huayan thought.

2.4.3 Key Concepts of Huayan Thought

As I argued previously, Huayan thought is grounded on the ideas of the Nan Dilun School, the Shelun School and *Dasheng qixin lun*, all of which address the concept of the mind, which is therefore the first of the key concepts of Huayan thought that I consider.

Mind

In principle, Buddhist teaching argues that the existence of all *dharmas* is in terms of *nidāna*, which means ‘chain of causation’. This is the core idea of ‘Dependent Arising’ (Skt. *pratītyasamutpāda*; Chi. *yuánqi* 隱起), an explanation of human experience that all Buddhist schools follow. This means, in short, that no *dharma* has an independent nature, but arises on the basis of other *dharmas*. The early Mahāyāna described this by saying that *dharmas* are ‘empty’. In Buddhism, therefore, ‘emptiness’ does not mean ‘non-existence’, as the former means no independent essence while the latter implies nothingness. As I argued earlier, Huayan thought’s concept of the mind is similar to that of *Dasheng qixin lun*, as Fazang believed that pure and defiled *dharmas* come from two different aspects of mind, which is *tathāgatagarbha*. It is because of ‘ignorance’ (Skt. *avidyā*; Chi. *wuming* 無明) that there is the appearance of defiled *dharmas*. According to Fazang, if the mind does not function, all

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dharmas are empty.210 Huayan thought, as argued in Liu Ming-wood’s discussion of Fazang, aims to explain the ‘interpenetration’ of dharmas.211

In order to explain the ‘interpenetration’ among dharmas, Huayan thought firstly needs to argue that there is no real obstruction amongst dharmas. This brings our discussion to Huayan’s harmonization of the ‘Three Natures’ (Skt. trisvabhāva; Chi. san xing 三性), a doctrine mainly set out in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Chi. Jie shenmi jing 解深密經) which interprets ‘emptiness’.212 The first Nature is called the conceptualized nature (Skt. parikalpitasvabhāva), which the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra links with the falsifying activity of language. In the She dasheng lun, conceptualized nature is explained as the appearance of an object when, in reality, there are only perceptions. In other words, conceptualized nature is what is experienced by unenlightened persons, since things do not exist independently. The second kind of nature is dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva), referring to the dependent origination of dharmas. Although actually beyond language, we might say that dependent nature is the flow of experiences which is a really existing basis for the manifestation of conceptualized nature but is mistakenly divided. The final kind of nature is perfected nature (parinispannessvabhāva), which refers to the true nature of things that can only be revealed through meditation. It is only a single flow of perceptions and is empty of independent entities. The perfected nature, therefore, is the complete absence in the dependent nature of the conceptualized nature. Ontologically, the dependent nature is probably the most important among the Three Natures. This is because the dependent nature, as basic for the conceptualized nature, is the basis for sansāra. On the other hand, as the basis for discovering the true nature of things, the dependent nature is the basis for nirvāṇa.

Although there is no fundamental contradiction amongst the Three Natures in Consciousness-Only schools, Liu Ming-wood argues that Fazang’s presentation of Huayan thought revises the ‘Three Nature’ theory in stressing the basis of their unity. He does this both by equating the dual aspects of each of the three natures, and in redefining the three natures as tathāgatagarbha (perfected), phenomenal world (dependent) and ignorance (conceptualized).213 In Jin shizi zhang, in simplified form, Fazang explained the ‘Three Natures’ to the Empress Wu as below, drawing attention to a gold lion sculpture in her palace as an analogy:

The lion exists because of our feelings. This is called (the nature) arising from vast imagination……

211 Liu Ming-wood, The Teaching of Fa-tsang – An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics, note 193, pp.343-344.
212 For the discussion about ‘Three Natures’ in this paragraph, I mainly refer to Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations, note 164, pp.89-92.
213 Liu Ming-wood, ‘The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-yen Buddhism’, though in the end (pp.200-211) he queries the coherence of both these approaches. See note 195.
The lion seems to exist. This is called (the nature of) dependence on others (gold and craftsman) (for production)…. The nature of the gold does not change. This is therefore called (the nature of) Perfect Reality.214

To Fazang, the ‘Three Natures’ are actually one, from the perspective of the mind as absolute (Chi. zhenru xin 真如心), an idea explicitly from Dasheng qixin lun.215 As Liu Ming-wood argues, Fazang considered that the perspective of tathāgatagarbha is the culmination of the entire Consciousness-Only tradition. It is from the view of pure mind, but not that of differentiating consciousness, that there is no distinction between absolute and phenomenon, a point Huayan thought mostly concerns.216 This dissolution at the level of the mind is important as it is only from a pure mind that a harmonious world can be viewed,217 a point vital for understanding Tang Junyi’s interpretation and appropriation of Huayan thought, which I will discuss below in chapters 4 and 5 respectively.218

Dharma Realm

Dharma Realm (Skt. dharmadhātu; Chi. fajie 法界) is one of the concepts that hold different meanings in various Buddhist texts.219 In Huayanjing alone, for instance, at least three meanings can be found, including first, an infinite world; second, the notion that all dharmas are equal, and third, a kind of classification describing different groups of dharmas with various characteristics.220 There is a lot of discussion about the Dharma Realm by the Huayan patriarchs.221 However, the theory of ‘Four Dharma Realms’ is commonly considered the most representative.

Before further discussion, I mention Fazang’s ideas of dharma and ‘dhātu’ first as they help

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216 Liu Ming-wood, The Teaching of Fa-tsang – An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics, note 193 pp.338-339; Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations, note 164, pp.141-144.
218 For more discussion about Fazang’s idea of mind, see Liu Ming-wood (Liao Minghuo) 廖明活, Zhongguo foxing sixiang de xingcheng he kaizhan 中國佛性思想的形成和開展 (Taipei: Wenjin 文津, 2008), pp.305-333.
221 For full list, see Yang Zhenghe 楊政河, Huayan zhexue yanjiu 華嚴哲學研究 (Taipei: Huiju chubanshe 慧炬出版社, 2004), pp.323-456.
enhance our understanding of the concept of ‘Dharma Realm’. Fazang defined the meanings of ‘dharm’ as below:

‘Fa’ (dharm) has three meanings: 1.) ‘That which upholds’, for its self-nature does not change; 2.) ‘That which regulates’, for through its regulation, understanding arises; 3.) ‘That which is confronted’, for it is cognised by the mind-consciousness.\footnote{222}

As Liu Ming-wood explains, ‘that which upholds’ indicates that ‘all things [are] without self-nature except the Tathatā or the Tathagatagarbha’, while ‘that which regulates’ concerns ‘such things as truths, wisdom and teachings, through which right understanding can be achieved’. As for ‘that which is confronted’, this refers to the view that the “mind-consciousness” is considered in Buddhism as having all things both internal and external as its objects of perception and discrimination, [so] the phrase most probably refers to all modes and elements of existence.\footnote{223} In short, as we saw in 2.4.2, the meanings of the term dharma or ‘fa’ are broad and extensive. Its specific meaning needs to be considered together with other concepts, like ‘dhātu’.

As Fazang argued, the meanings of ‘dhātu’, which is translated as ‘jie’ 界 in Chinese, are as below:

As for ‘jie’ (dhātu), it also has three meanings: 1.) ‘Cause’, for the holy ways come into being based on it...; 2.) ‘Essence’, for it is the essence on which all ‘fa’ (dharmas) are dependent...; 3.) ‘Difference’, for phenomena [Chi. xiang 相] (in the realm of) dependent origination do not mix up with each other.\footnote{224}

Liu Ming-wood argues that if ‘dhātu’ is regarded as ‘cause’ or ‘essence’, dharmadhātu would mean ‘the cause or essence of the Tathata, truths, wisdom, all elements of existence, etc’.\footnote{225} On the other hand, if ‘dhātu’ is ‘understood as ‘difference’, dharmadhātu would mean ‘Tathata, truths, wisdom, all elements of existence...are different in that they exist together without being mixed up with each other’.\footnote{226} As Liu further suggests, the first meaning of dharmadhātu applies to the discussion of ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of Dharma Realm’ (Chi. fajie yuanqi 法界緣起), which I will further mention in the following sections,

\footnote{222} The original Chinese are ‘法有三義，一持義，謂自性不改故。二軌義，謂軌範生故。三對義，是意識所知故。’ DZJ. vol.44, no.1838, p.63b, 18-19. For the translation, see Liu Ming-wood, The Teaching of Fa-tsang – An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics, note 193, p.392.
\footnote{223} Liu Ming-wood, Ibid., p.393.
\footnote{224} The original Chinese are ‘界亦有三義，一是因義，依生聖道故。二是性義，謂諸法所依性故。三是分齊義，謂諸緣起相不雜故。’ DZJ. vol.35, no.1733, p.440b, 7-13. For the translation, see Liu Ming-wood, ibid., p.393.
\footnote{225} Liu Ming-wood, ibid., pp.393-394.
\footnote{226} Ibid., p.394.
while the second meaning of dharmadātu is preferable in the discussion of the theory of ‘Four Dharma Realms’, which I outline next.\(^{227}\)

In brief, the theory of ‘Four Dharma Realms’ tends to mean a kind of classification for distinguishing different kinds of dharmas with various characteristics.\(^{228}\) According to Fazang, the ‘Dharma Realm’ could generally be divided into two: the ‘dharma realm of events’ (Chi. shi 事) and the ‘dharma realm of principle’ (Chi. li 理).\(^{229}\) The former is the realm of phenomena, in which all dharmas are observed as different objects and events. The latter, on the other hand, is a realm of the principle of ‘emptiness’.\(^{230}\) To Fazang, these two realms are not contradictory to each other, but can be comprehended simultaneously.\(^{231}\) In Huayan, this status is called the ‘dharma realm of non-obstruction of principle and events’ (Chi. li shi wuai fajie 理事無礙法界). As Fazang further defined it, the relationship between principle and events is like that of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’,\(^{232}\) a pair of concepts I have referred to throughout this chapter. To Huayan patriarchs, since the nature of events is empty, there is no real contradiction amongst them. Therefore, it is not only principle and events which co-exist at the same time, but the relationship among events is also non-obstructive. This status, in Chengguan’s definition, is the ‘dharma realm of non-obstruction of events’ (Chi. shi shi wuai fajie 事事無礙法界).\(^{233}\) In this sense, Huayan’s employing ‘li’ or principle to describe the idea of ‘emptiness’ has a positive connotation.\(^{234}\) In Huayan thought, this dissolution of contradiction among events is considered the most important.\(^{235}\) As I will discuss in the next chapter, the ‘dharma realm of non-obstruction of events’ is one of the main ideas which attracted Thomé H. Fang to endorse Huayan thought.

Since there is no theoretical contradiction between events and principle, what is crucial is how

\(^{227}\) For more discussion, see Liu Ming-wood, ibid., pp.392-394.


\(^{229}\) DZJ, vol. 35, no.1733, p.145a, 7.


\(^{232}\) DZJ, vol.45, no.1875, p.635b, 6-8.


\(^{234}\) Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations, note 164, pp.142-143.

human beings understand this position. This brings us to a discussion about ‘Dependent Arising’ and ‘Nature Arising’.

Dependent Arising and Nature Arising

As we saw earlier, all Buddhist schools agree that the dharma exist interdependently in a ‘chain of causation’ (nīdāna), an idea at the heart of the notion of ‘Dependent Arising’. Mahāyāna schools tended, in elaborating on this, to consider the nature of all dharmas as empty, though they interpreted ‘emptiness’ in various ways. Before suggesting its own theory of ‘Dependent Arising’, Huayan outlines four theories of other Buddhist schools which hold relevant views.

First is the ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of karma results’ (Chi. yegan yuanqi 業感緣起) in pre-sectarian Buddhism before the rise of Mahāyāna, which considered that the appearance of a dharma is caused by karma. According to this view, all human suffering is caused by ignorance. It is due to ignorance that humans engage in bad karma which yields bad karmic results, which in turn create the conditions under which they will again engage in bad karma. In this sense, dharmas are also affected by karma.

Second is the ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of the Eight negations’ (Chi. babu yuanqi 八不緣起) in Mādhyamika. As Nāgārjuna argued, there are eight negations, which are ‘neither birth nor death; neither permanence nor end; neither identity nor difference; neither coming nor going’. Through these eight negations, concepts and language are shown to be irrelevant to reality as it is. Therefore, the nature of a dharma cannot be comprehended through language or concept but only by insight (prajñā) gained through meditation.

Third is the ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of ālayavijñāna’ (Chi. laiye yuanqi 賴耶緣起) in the thought of Consciousness-Only. Consciousness-Only includes the idea of

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236 Meng Peiyuan 蒙培元, Zhongguo xinxing lun 中國心性論 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp.251-266.
239 The Chinese sentences are ‘不生亦不滅，不常亦不斷，不一亦不異，不來亦不出。’ See DZJ, vol. 30, no.1564, p.1b.
ālayavijñāna as a store consciousness, in which good and bad seeds are stored. Therefore, all dharmas can be considered to arise from ālayavijñāna in this sense.\textsuperscript{241}

Fourth is the ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of tathāgatagarbha’ (Chi. rulai zang yuanqi 如來藏緣起) of Dasheng qixin lun, which suggests the mind is always pure. Although there are defiled dharmas in the world, these are only from ālayavijñāna. However, it is the pure mind, not ālayavijñāna, which represents the self of human beings. In this sense, pure mind is the origin of understanding of all dharmas.\textsuperscript{242}

In contrast with these ideas concerning ‘dependent arising’, Huayan begins the discussion of its own position directly from the perspective of the functioning of the pure mind.\textsuperscript{243} As previously mentioned, Fazang argued that the world as viewed from tathāgatagarbha is harmonious, with no contradiction amongst or obstructions between events seen. According to Fazang, this functioning of tathāgatagarbha is called ‘Nature Arising’ (Chi. xing qi 性起).\textsuperscript{244} The ‘dependent arising’ as viewed from this functioning of tathāgatagarbha is named the ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of the Dharma Realm’ (Chi. fajie yuanqi 法界緣起).\textsuperscript{245} Since the ‘Dharma Realm’ is based on tathāgatagarbha, all dharmas are experienced from this viewpoint as not defiled. Therefore, the ‘dharma realm’ is also called ‘the One True Dharma Realm’ (Chi. yizhen fajie 一真法界).\textsuperscript{246} After mentioning the achievement of this non-obstructive ‘Dharma Realm’, Huayan thought further explains the logic behind this achievement via the following concepts.

Interpenetration

In order to resolve an incompatibility among events not only at a theoretical but also at a practical level, Huayan suggests the idea of ‘interpenetration’ (Chi. xiangji xiangshe 相即相攝) in order to explain the relationship amongst various events.

As Fazang argued, there is always a side of ‘emptiness’ to a dharma or an event. On the one hand, there is its appearance, on the other its ‘emptiness’. So, on the one hand, if only the appearances of dharmas are taken into account, there seem to be contradictions or


\textsuperscript{243} Mou Zongsan 牟宗三, Foxing yu bore 佛性與般若 vol.1 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2004), pp.490-491.


\textsuperscript{245} DZJ., vol. 45, no.1866, p.503a, 16-21.

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., vol. 36, no.1736, p.2b29-3a6.
incompatibilities between them. In order that a dharma can embrace or contain other dharmas without exclusion, Fazang argued that, when considering the interaction between dharmas, one of them should be considered empty. The dharma which is empty is like a ‘force’ (Chi. *li* 力) pulling others to be embraced. In Huayan, this pulling activity is called ‘she’ 摄. By contrast, on the other hand, as the nature of all dharmas is actually empty, they can interpenetrate each other without real contradiction. In this sense, a dharma can penetrate another dharma though their appearance seems contradictory. In Huayan, this is like a ‘force’ allowing a dharma to go anywhere it wants. This pushing activity is called ‘ji’ 即.247 These ideas of ‘she’ and ‘ji’, which help explain the function of the causal chain or *nidāna* and ensure that dharmas interact with each other without obstruction in dependent arising, comprise the teaching of ‘interpenetration’ or xiangji xiangshe.248

The Ten Mysteries and The Harmony of Six Characters

Both ‘The Ten Mysteries’ (Chi. *shi xuan men* 十玄門) and ‘The Harmony of Six Characters’ (Chi. *liu xiang yuanrong* 六相圓融) describe the harmonious ‘dharma realm’ from different angles.249 Fazang listed the titles of the former as follows:

1. [The] gate of simultaneous completion and mutual correspondence
2. [The] gate of full possession of the attributes of purity and mixture by the various storehouses
3. [The] gate of the mutual compatibility and difference between the one and the many
4. [The] gate of mutual identification of all dharmas existing freely and easily
5. [The] gate of the completion of the secret, the hidden, and the manifest
6. [The] gate of the compatibility and peaceful existence of the subtle and the minute
7. [The] gate of the realm of Indra’s net
8. [The] gate of replying on facts in order to explain dharmas and create understanding
9. [The] gate of different formation of separate dharmas in ten ages

247 *DZJ*, vol. 45, no.1866, pp.503b7-504a1.
10. [The] gate of the excellent completion through the turning and transformation of the mind only

In general, each item helps suggest the idea that no matter where the discussion begins, the result is always harmonious from the angles of ‘Dependent arising as viewed in terms of the Dharma Realm’ or fajie yuanqi, an idea also applicable to the discussion of ‘The Harmony of Six Characters’. As Fazang explains this, in relation to his gold lion analogy:

The lion represents the character of universality. The five sense organs, being various and different, represent the character of specialty. The fact that they all arise from one single cause represents the character of similarity. The fact that its eyes, ears, and so forth do not exceed their bounds represents the character of difference. Since the combination of the various organs becomes the lion, this is the character of integration. And as each of the several organs remains in its own position, this is the character of disintegration.

In the citation, three pairs of seemingly contradictory concepts are presented: ‘the character of universality’ and ‘the character of specialty’, ‘the character of similarity’ and ‘the character of difference’, as well as ‘the character of integration’ and ‘the character of disintegration’ respectively. Since the nature of all dharmas is empty, such dualisms are only created by sentient beings. They represent seeing the lion from different limited perspectives. Being aware of this helps in the resolution of the apparent dualism. Although Fang and Tang did not use the concepts of ‘The Ten Mysteries’ and ‘The Harmony of Six Characters’ directly, these categories help sharpen our understanding of their appropriations of Huayan in responding to the challenge of ‘scientism’, which I will discuss in chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

Theory of Doctrinal Classification

Based on all the above concepts, Huayan comments on various Buddhist theories and classifies them into different categories to develop its own version of the theory of ‘doctrinal classification’ (Chi. panjiao 判教). A theory of ‘doctrinal classification’ has two aims. The


251 Liu Ming-wood, The Teaching of Fa-tsang – An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics, note 193, p.438. Historically, there were some differences between the names of ‘the ten mysteries’ between Zhiyan and Fazang. For discussion, see Liu, ibid., pp.438-442.

252 The original Chinese is ‘師子是總相，五根差別是別相；共從一緣起是同相，眼、耳等不相濁是異相；諸根合會成實相，諸根各住自位是等相。’ DZJ, vol. 45, No.1881, p.670b, 7-10. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, note 25, p.413.

253 For more discussion about these two concepts, see Charles Wei-hsun Fu, ‘Chinese Buddhism as an Existential Phenomenology’, note 249.
first is to rank the value of different Buddhist theories. The second is to dissolve the apparent contradictions and conflicts among different Buddhist theories by arguing that the theories are developed at various times and for different targets. In other words, Buddhist theories are classified as provisional and ultimate.\(^{254}\) In short, a theory of ‘doctrinal classification’ aims to harmonize various forms of thought within a system.\(^{255}\)

Although there are certain differences between the theories of ‘doctrinal classification’ of Huayan’s various patriarchs,\(^ {256}\) they are based on the model of Fazang, which he described as follows:

1. Although the lion is a dharma produced through causation, and comes into and goes out of existence every moment, there is really no character of the lion to be found. This is called the Small Vehicle Doctrine of Ordinary Disciples.
2. These dharmas produced through causation are each without self-nature. It is absolutely Emptiness. This is called the Initial Doctrine of the Great Vehicle.
3. Although there is absolutely only Emptiness, this does not prevent the illusory dharmas from being clearly what they are. The two characteristics of coming into existence through causation and dependent existence coexist. This is called the Final Doctrine of the Great Vehicle.
4. These two characteristics eliminate each other and both perish, and (consequently) neither (the products of) our feelings nor false existence remain. Neither of them has any more power, and both Emptiness and existence perish. Names and descriptions will be completely discarded and the mind will be at rest and have no more attachment. This is called the Great Vehicle’s Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment.
5. When the feelings have been eliminated and true substance revealed, all becomes an undifferentiated mass. Great Function then arises in abundance, and whenever it does, there is surely Perfect Reality. All phenomena are in great profusion, and are interfused but not mixed (losing their own identity). This all is the one, for both are similar in being nonexistent in nature. And the one is the all, for (the relationship between) cause and effect is perfectly clear. As the power (of the one) and the function (of the many) embraces each other, their expansion and contraction are free and at ease. This is called the Rounded (inclusive) Doctrine of the One


\(^{255}\) Huo Taohui 霍韜晦, Juedui yu yuanrong 絕對與圓融 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 2002), pp.340-422.

(all-inclusive) Vehicle.\textsuperscript{257}

It is argued that the ‘Small Vehicle Doctrine of Ordinary Disciples’ or ‘Small Teaching’ is \textit{Hinayāna}. The ‘Initial Doctrine of the Great Vehicle’ or ‘Initial Teaching’ is \textit{Mahāyāna}, including Mādhyamika and Consciousness-Only. The ‘Final Doctrinal of the Great Vehicle’ or ‘Final Teaching’ is the system of \textit{tathāgatagarbha}, including \textit{Dasheng qixin lun}. The ‘Great Vehicle’s Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment’ or ‘Sudden Teaching’ is Chan Buddhism.\textsuperscript{258} The category of ‘\textit{yuan jiao} 圓教’, which is described as ‘Great Function’ and ‘Rounded (inclusive) Doctrine of the One (all-inclusive) Vehicle’ in the citation and is usually translated as ‘Perfect Teaching’ in other studies,\textsuperscript{259} was, in fact, classified by Huayan into two further types. The first type is the thought of Tiantai, which is ‘The Common Teaching of the One Vehicle’ (Chi. \textit{tongjiao yicheng yuanjiao} 同教一乘圓教). The second type, which is Huayan thought, is called ‘The Distinct Teaching of the One Vehicle’ (Chi. \textit{biejiao yicheng yuanjiao} 別教一乘圓教).\textsuperscript{260} In order better to understand this classification, a brief introduction to Tiantai thought, and its theory of ‘doctrinal classification’ in particular, is necessary.

Similar to Huayan, Tiantai’s patriarchs also considered their thought ‘\textit{yuan}’, though what ‘\textit{yuan}’ designates in these two Buddhist traditions is not totally the same. In its ‘doctrinal classification’ system, Buddhist theories are classified into four according to the nature of the teaching. The first is primary teaching (Chi. \textit{zangjiao} 藏教), which means the basic teachings of Buddha such as the four noble truths as well as the noble eightfold path. The second is common teaching (Chi. \textit{tongjiao} 通教), which means the thought of \textit{Prajñā}, the core idea commonly accepted by all Buddhist schools. The third is distinct teaching (Chi. \textit{biejiao} 別教),

\textsuperscript{257} The original Chinese are ‘師子雖是緣生之法，念念生滅，實無師子相可得，名聲聞教。此師子緣生之法，各無自性，徹底唯空。名大乘始教。此師子雖然徹底，唯空不礙，幻法宛然，緣生假有，二相雙存。故名大乘終教。即此二相，互奪兩亡，惰疲不存，倉無有力，空有雙泯，名言路絕，柄心無寄，故名大乘頓教。即此師子悟盡體露之法，混成一塊，繁興大用，起必全真，萬象紛然，參而不雜，一切即一，皆同無性，一即一切，因果歷然，力用相收，卷舒自在，故名一乘圓教。’ See \textit{DZJ}, vol. 45, no.1881, pp.669a11-669b14. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, \textit{A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy}, note 25, pp.410-411. In points 3 and 4, however, I change the translation from Chan’s ‘characters’ to ‘characteristics’.


\textsuperscript{259} There are various translations of the term ‘\textit{yuan}’. Some studies translate it as ‘perfect’. For example, see Liu Jee-loo, \textit{An Introduction to Chinese System of the Hua-yen School in Chinese Buddhism} (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), p.409. Since the original word ‘\textit{yuan}’ in Chinese means ‘round’ or ‘circle’, it is also seen in some studies that ‘\textit{yuan}’ is translated into ‘round’. See Liu Ming-wood, \textit{The Teaching of Fa-tsang – An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics}, note 193. In fact, Huayan’s meaning of ‘\textit{yuan}’ is not totally equal to ‘perfect’. Its implication is also more than ‘round’ or ‘circle’. In many Chinese phrases like ‘\textit{yuanrong wui} 圓融無礙’, ‘\textit{yuan}’ also means harmony without obstruction. Therefore, ‘\textit{yuan}’ is translated as ‘inclusiveness’ in individual study. See Chan Wing-tsit, \textit{A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy}, note 25, p.410. Considering the complexity of the term, therefore, I follow Mou Zongsan’s idea of not translating it into any single word here. See his \textit{Zhongguo zhuxue shijiu jiang} 中國哲學十九講 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1999), pp.314-316.

\textsuperscript{260} \textit{DZJ}, vol.45, no.1866, pp. 477a-509a4. For the translations of the terms, see Liu Ming-wood, \textit{The Teaching of Fa-tsang – An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics}, note 193, p.159.
which refers to the thought of Consciousness-Only, *tathāgatagarbha* and the function in becoming Buddha. The fourth is ‘*yuanjiao*’, which emphasizes the emptiness of the mind. Since the mind is empty, it has no fixed characteristic. Therefore, the mind can communicate with others without any prejudiced views. This mind, which contains all thought in principle, includes evil and the possibility of multiple worlds being contained in a momentary thought. Ideas which were core to the Tiantai School’s teaching on ‘One Instant Thought contains the Three Thousand Worlds’ (Chi. *yinian sanqian* 一念三千) and ‘Evil in the Buddha Nature’ (Chi. *foju xinge* 佛具性惡). Since the mind is all-inclusive, no specific state should be attached to it. Therefore, as the empty characteristic of a *dharma* is noted, at the same time, its other characteristics such as appearance should also be noted. Without becoming attached to any one characteristic of a *dharma*, the middle way is achieved. However, even the middle way should not become a subject of attachment. In this sense, the emptiness, the appearance and the middle way of a *dharma* are all experienced in a single moment. At the same time, one should not be attached to any of them. This key idea of Tiantai is called ‘Harmony of Three Truths’ (Chi. *sandi yuanrong* 三諦圓融). Due to its inclusiveness, Tiantai thought claims its thought ‘*yuan*’, implying that all Buddhist theories are included in it.261

From Huayan’s point of view, however, Tiantai thought is a kind of relative truth since it is only comparatively better than other Buddhist theories. The thought of Huayan, on the other hand, is absolute truth since it is based on the ‘Dharma Realm’ stemming from the function of *tathāgatagarbha*, a state different from other sentient beings in principle.262 As is shown in the citation on Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification above, the *tathāgatagarbha* is the ground from which different dharmanas are seen to be interpenetrative with each other. All the above contribute to the basic ideas of Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification, which is essential to our understanding of Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought that I discuss in chapters 4 and 5.

The content of Huayan thought is much more complex than has been outlined above. My intention here has been simply to provide a preparatory background for the main study of Fang and Tang. The ideas outlined here are mainly those Huayan ideas which Fang and Tang reinterpreted, but, before we turn to their interpretations, I will first briefly introduce some of the other modern developments within the Huayan School to show the contrast with Fang’s and Tang’s approaches.


2.4.4 Modern Development of the Huayan School

Undeniably, compared with the Huayan School in the Tang Dynasty, the Huayan School in later periods has gained little attention in academia. For example, in *Buddhism in the Sung*, the work which famously argues that Buddhism was not in decline after the Tang Dynasty, no articles mention Huayan. Although there is some discussion in individual studies of the Huayan School and its thought in later periods, the discussion has been rather general. In this sense, any study about the development of Huayan after the Tang Dynasty would be valuable. However, in this study, I do not consider the thought of Huayan between the Tang Dynasty and the modern period, since this was not the concern of Fang and Tang. However, an introduction to the Huayan School in early twentieth-century China is necessary, as to some extent, it helps explain the situations in which Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought.

As I briefly mentioned in chapter 1, the monk Yuexia set up a ‘Huayan University’ in Shanghai in the early 1910s, where he attracted more than eighty young monks to study with him. It is clearly recorded in its school manifesto that the objective of the ‘University’ was to study Huayan teaching, with *Huayanjing* and Fazang’s *Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang* (Outline of Huayan’s Teaching of One Vehicle) as the core readings. However, the ‘University’ only lasted until 1916 due to financial difficulties. Although Yuexia is regarded a figure who revived the Huayan School in modern times, it is also said that the ‘University’ he set up was only a place specifically discussing Huayan thought, implying that the teachings in the ‘University’ were not responsive enough to the issues facing the outside world and the efforts of Yuexia cannot be considered a success.

Among those young monks studying with Yuexia, Chisong 持松 (1894-1972) is probably the most famous one. Most of the works written by Huayan monks in the early twentieth-century were lost. Chisong’s *Huayanzong jiaoyi shimoji* (Complete Teachings of Huayan School) is one of the rare works which is extant. In this work, Chisong focused on

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264 For example, see Wei Daoru 魏道儒, *Zhongguo Huayanzong tongshi* (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2008); The work by Wang Song 王頌 is an exception which clearly discusses Huayan in the Song Dynasty. See his *Songdai Huayan sixiang yanjiu* (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2008).
Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification, comparing every detail amongst various teachings through the eyes of Huayan thought. However, none of the other important concepts of Huayan thought such as the Dharma Realm, Dependent Arising, Nature Arising and the Ten Mysteries were discussed nor was Huayan thought employed to respond to the current challenge of ‘scientism’. As I mentioned in chapter 1.1, even Fafang (1904-1951), a monk in the time of Chisong, criticised the method of study at ‘Huayan University’ as ‘old-fashioned’. Chan Wing-tsit also argues that the Huayan School at that time has not ‘contributed much to the philosophical current in contemporary Buddhism’.

In my view, Chisong’s work helps support the idea that Huayan studies in early twentieth-century China were not sufficient to deal with the difficulties facing the country. In other words, while it is correct to say that Chisong did go back to the origin of Huayan thought, he obviously failed to develop new elements from this origin. From this point of view, Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan ideas to develop their theories were a way forward in making this Buddhist tradition more responsive to the current world. As I will discuss in the following chapters, in the eyes of Fang and Tang, Huayan thought is not an ‘old’ Buddhist tradition without vitality. Instead, it helps enrich the ‘ti’ and complement the ‘yong’ of Chinese culture, including Confucianism. This point not only shows the characteristics of Fang’s and Tang’s thought, but also explains their significance in modern Huayan studies, elements which have not been fully recognised in academia. It, therefore, brings our discussion from the historical context to the field of modern Chinese philosophical study.

Chapter 2.5 Fang and Tang as Models of ‘Chinese Hermeneutics’ – Preliminary Discussion

The above discussion has indicated the historical context in which Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, and has given an introduction to this Buddhist tradition. However, as I argued in chapter 1, Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought should also be considered in relation to ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ (Chi. Zhongguo quanshixue 中國詮釋學), an issue widely discussed in the field of current Chinese philosophical study. To complete this preparatory material, I outline the key issues here.

The use of the term ‘hermeneutics’ in the West derives from the thought of such influential philosophers as Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). Rather than studying the thought of these philosophers in Chinese, ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ discusses the hermeneutic tradition in terms of Chinese background, while stressing that it is not simply

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269 For discussion, see chapter 1, notes 17 and 18.
a kind of limited ‘hermeneutics in China’.⁷²⁰ Among those involved in the discussion, Cheng Chung-yiing 成中英 (1935 - ) is probably the first to employ the term ‘hermeneutics’ in his thought, which he calls ‘Ontological Hermeneutics’ (Chi. Benti quanshixue 本體詮釋學). According to Cheng, ‘Ontological Hermeneutics’ suggests that various parts of the world are inter-related.⁷²¹ Chinese thought should not be discussed from a single perspective, even that of ‘Heart-Mind and Nature’.⁷²² I argue that this suggestion of Cheng is implicitly a response to the academic convention created by Xiong Shili. As I will further discuss in chapters 3 and 4, Cheng’s idea of ‘Ontological Hermeneutics’ seems to be inspired by Thomé H. Fang, who was a teacher of the former. In my view, therefore, Cheng is thus not the first proposing a perspective other than Xiong’s in interpreting Chinese thought.⁷²³

Instead of focusing on the method of interpreting Chinese thought, Charles Wei-hsun Fu 傅偉勲 (Fu Weixun, 1933-1996) pays more attention to the function of Chinese thought in the contemporary world, putting forward the idea of ‘Creative Hermeneutics’ (Chi. chuangzao quanshixue 創造詮釋學).⁷²⁴ Fu argues that there are five levels of interpretation. The first is to study ‘What exactly did the original thinker or text say?’, which he considers a kind of philological study of the text. The second is to study ‘What did the original thinker intend or mean to say?’, which he considers a kind of linguistic study of the text. Both of them help discover the ‘original meaning’ of a text. The third is to study ‘What could the original thinker have said?’ or ‘What could the original thinker’s sayings have implied?’, which is to study the text from a historical perspective. The fourth is to study ‘What should the original thinker have said?’ or ‘What should the creative hermeneutician say on behalf of the original thinker?’, which is to study the various interpretations of the text critically, trying to discover the implications of the interpretations. The fifth is to study ‘What must the original thinker say now?’ or ‘What must the creative hermeneutician do now, in order to carry out the unfinished philosophical task of the original thinker?’, which is to elaborate the ideas of the

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²⁷⁰ Tang Yijie 湯一介, Wo de zhexue zhi lu 我的哲學之路 (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe 新華出版社, 2006), pp.280-310; also see the discussion among Yu Dunkang 余敦康, Huang Junjie 黃俊傑, Hong Handing 洪漢鼎 and Li Minghui 李明輝, see Hong Handing ed., Zhongguo quanshixue 中國詮釋學 vol.1 (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe 山東人民出版社, 2003), pp.247-254.
²⁷⁴ For the questions listed, I refer to Fu’s original writings. See his Cong chuangzao de quanshixue dao dasheng Foxue 從創造的詮釋學到大乘佛學 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1990), pp.9-12.
original thinker in order to respond to current needs.\(^{275}\) To Fu, the fifth level of hermeneutics is the most important, if Chinese thought is to play a role in the contemporary world. In short, transforming traditional Chinese thought becomes the focus of Fu’s idea,\(^ {276}\) which correlates with the subject matter of this study in that Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought are to ‘go back to the origin and develop new elements’. In fact, the idea that Chinese thought is not creative enough to respond to the current challenges is one of the main criticisms that many scholars make about Chinese philosophy.\(^ {277}\) However, as I will discuss in chapter 5, this criticism may not be correct.

Although Fu suggests that knowledge in philology, linguistics and history are all important in interpreting Chinese thought, to many scholars, there is a worry that Fu’s interpretation of the thought may be too ‘creative’, so that the ‘original meaning’ of the thought may be easily misinterpreted.\(^ {278}\) To respond to this issue, Liu Xiaogan 刘笑敢 (1947 - ) argues that ‘Chinese philosophy’ should be viewed as a discipline within the academy but not a recipe for ‘national identity’ or a kind of ‘Chicken Soup for the Soul’. Only in this way can philosophical construction avoid the problem of subjectivity and arbitrariness.\(^ {279}\) However, Lao Sze-kwang argues by contrast that ancient Chinese thinkers put forward their theories not only to develop a School but also to respond to specific issues in their lifetimes. Therefore, their thought cannot be comprehended separately from their lives, situations and feelings.\(^ {280}\) In fact, in this study, I argue that Fang’s and Tang’s thoughts are in line with Lao’s approach, as they seek to respond to the challenge of ‘scientism’. In this sense, there is a close relationship between the historical context in their lifetime and their theories. I therefore doubt whether Chinese thought can be properly understood if it is only investigated as an

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\(^{275}\) For details, see Fu, *ibid.*, pp.12-46; Charles Wei-hsun Fu, *Xuewen de shengming yu shengming de xuwen 學問的生命與生命的學問* (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju 正中書局, 1993), pp.220-258.


\(^ {277}\) As Neville argues, Chinese philosophy needs to be creative about the issues facing our time, implying that the past philosophical study is not able to meet the current needs. See Robert Cummings Neville, ‘New Projects in Chinese Philosophy’, *The Pluralist* vol.5, no.2 (2010): 45-56; also see Yin Lujun, ‘The Crisis of Hermeneutical Consciousness in Modern China’, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* vol.17, no.4 (1990): 401-425.


\(^ {280}\) Lao Sze-kwang, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi* vol. 1, note 25, pp.10-12.
To sum up, three points can be drawn from the above discussion. First, Chinese thought needs to be transformed in order to meet current needs. Second, such transformation needs to avoid arbitrariness. Third, even though the concept of ‘Heart-Mind and Nature’ (Chi. Xin-xing 心性) plays a central role in Chinese thought, and Confucianism in particular, one needs to avoid being attached to any one specific concept or position. Otherwise, other perspectives may be overlooked. All these points help sharpen our understanding of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought, which I go on to discuss in the following chapters.

281 For details, see chapter 1.2.
Chapter 3 Thomé H. Fang and Huayan Thought

In chapter 1, I noted that Thomé H. Fang is generally overlooked in studies about ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’, and this neglect relates both to his own thought and his interpretations of various intellectual traditions. For example, after Fang’s death, it was only Tang Junyi, observing that Fang’s *Kexue zhexue yu rensheng* 科學哲學與人生 (Science, Philosophy and Human Life), published in 1936, was a contribution to ‘the polemic on science and metaphysics’ or *ke xuan dazhan* in the 1920s, who reminded us that Fang’s thought did try to deal with the challenge of ‘scientism’. It is also only recently that Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought has been discussed critically by some scholars. In this chapter, I link these two elements together, discussing the relationship between his response to ‘scientism’ and his interpretation of Huayan thought.

Chapter 3.1 Thomé H. Fang’s General Philosophy

Chapter 3.1.1 The Life of Fang and Characteristics of his Works

Thomé H. Fang 方東美 (Fang Dongmei, 1899-1977) was born in Tongcheng, in the Chinese province of Anhui, to a family well-known for its contributions to Chinese scholarship. Due to the excellent private education provided by his family, Fang acquired an outstanding knowledge of literary Chinese. In 1918, he studied philosophy at the University of Jinling, a university with a Christian background established by an American missionary at that time. In 1921, Fang continued his graduate studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison in the United States where he was awarded a master’s degree by completing a thesis, ‘A Critical Exposition of the Bergsonian Philosophy of Life’ in 1922. Although it is widely considered that Fang also gained a doctorate degree from the same university in 1924, this has never been

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3 There were many influential scholars, such as Fang Yizhi 方以智 (1611-1671) and Fang Bao 方苞 (1668-1749), coming from the Fang’s family of Tongcheng in Chinese history. For the introduction of the family, see Wan Xiaoping 宛小平, *Fang Dongmei yu Zhong xi zhexue* 方東美與中西哲學 (Hefei: Anhui daxue chubanshe 安徽大學出版社, 2008), pp.17-19.
confirmed.\(^4\) After returning from the United States, he taught in several universities in mainland China, including the Central University (now University of Naijing) in 1929 where Tang Junyi was one of his students. In 1948, a year before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Fang fled to Taiwan and chaired the department of philosophy of the National Taiwan University. Fang never returned to mainland China but concentrated on his teaching in Taiwan and the United States. He died in 1977 from a combination of lung and liver cancer.

Since Fang was a somewhat reticent figure, some mysteries about his life still remain. Apart from being known as a PhD graduate, Fang is considered to have become a Buddhist layman in his last years.\(^5\) However, the accuracy of this is in some doubt as it is said he fainted during the relevant Buddhist ceremony.\(^6\) Together with his being labeled as a ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucian’,\(^7\) the core ideas of Fang seem to be far from well understood. The following self-portrait of Fang, which was made at the 1964 East-West Philosophers’ Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii, is generally cited as a summary of his academic life: ‘I am a Confucian by family tradition, a Taoist by temperament, a Buddhist by religious inspiration; moreover, I am a Westerner by training.’\(^8\)

Unlike the cases of Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili, Fang’s interest in Buddhism developed rather suddenly. According to Fang himself, it was under the hardship of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) that he studied Buddhism, of the Huayan School in particular. What he did at this time, as he jokingly described, was ‘study Huayan, [and] make poor poetry’.\(^9\) There is no record of his reading Buddhist journals or contacting Buddhist scholars

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\(^4\) Most studies concerning Fang consider that he held a PhD by finishing thesis ‘A Comparative Study of British and American Neo-Realism’. However, this thesis is not recorded in the University library. Although it is explained by some scholars that the thesis was not published due to ‘lack of funding’, an email I got from the Department of Philosophy of the University on 28 October 2010 shows that Fang’s record as a student there is only up to master level. In this sense, Fang may not be officially considered a PhD graduate. For the explanation of Fang’s doctorate status, see Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥 ed., Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing 方東美先生的哲學典型 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 2007), p.172. For the reply from the University, see Appendix 1. Coincidentally, just after the death of Fang, Tang Junyi mentioned that Fang only held a master’s degree. See Tang, ZRDSB vol.2, note 1. Tang’s query, however, did not raise much attention from the academia.


\(^7\) In many studies about Confucianism, Fang is easily classified as a Confucian thinker without thorough examination. For example, see Yao Xinzhong, An Introduction to Confucianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.255-260; Wen Haiming, Chinese Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.152.


\(^9\) Feng Huxiang, ibid., p.37.
and monks. His first writing about Buddhism was probably the letter in which he discussed Buddhist ideas with Xiong in 1938. Before that, his writings were mainly about Western philosophy, especially Positivism and the philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941). In fact, as Fang said, it was not until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War that he changed his focus from Western philosophy to Chinese thought. However, we may not simply consider Fang a nationalist as he never aimed at arguing that Chinese thought is ‘superior’ to its Western counterpart. In fact, as I will discuss in depth in chapter 5, arguing that Chinese thought is ‘superior’ to Western thought is obviously against the aim of Fang’s appropriating Huayan thought. Instead, his ultimate writing plan was to write a grand study on the comparative philosophy of life. Unfortunately, he was unable to finish this before he died and we are left with only the outline of the project.

In fact, in a dialogue with Indian philosopher Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975) in 1939, Fang showed his frustration with the works on Chinese philosophy produced by English academia and determined to write in English himself. As he said, ‘I am now appealing to the English-speaking world for a sympathetic understanding of the Chinese mentality.’ Introducing his ideas in English differentiates Fang from other modern Chinese thinkers, not only in his mode of expression but also in the perspective from which he viewed the subject. However, this makes conducting research about him more difficult in the Chinese academy. Fang’s English writings have now been translated into Chinese and, together with his Chinese works, are included in the series of complete works of Thomé H. Fang, which were published in Taiwan in 2004. This has made conducting research about him less difficult than it might otherwise have been.

However, I would argue that there remain several problems in studying Fang. First, eight out of his thirteen works are edited from lectures and public addresses, causing his ideas inevitably to appear somewhat unstructured. Although his most important work, Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development, is a well-structured study, some of the ideas in it are over-simplified. Understanding it, therefore, requires knowledge of his other works and

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10 The letter is now recorded in Thomé H. Fang, Zhongguo dasheng foxue 中國大乘佛學 vol.2 (Taipei: Liming wenhua 黎明文化, 2004), pp.382-404.
11 See catalogue of Fang’s writings, Fang Keli 方克立 and Li jinquan 李錦全 ed., Xiandai xin rujia 存代新儒家學案 vol.2 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1995), pp.1119-1128. As I will argue in the following sections, Fang’s idea of ‘creativity’ seem to be influenced by Yi Jing or The Book of Changes, rather than the philosophy of Bergson.
13 See Appendix 2. For its sources, see Fang, CPSD, note 8, pp.535-538.
the situation created by the poor structure of these requires some attention. In fact, together with his writing in English, the point that Fang’s works are mostly edited from his lectures and public addresses is important to our understanding of the aim of his thought, as it shows that his potential audiences or readers are mainly Westerners and Chinese teenagers. In other words, Fang did not aim at convincing his Chinese contemporaries. Although I am not sure of the exact reason, I surmise that it is because the ideas of ‘scientism’ had been prevailing in China in his times that he felt it would have been difficult to change the trend.

Second, again partly due to the poor structure of the work, Fang often confused his comments on various intellectual traditions. Unlike many thinkers who write commentaries on existing texts, a phenomenon rather usual in Chinese tradition, Fang never wrote any commentaries on existing texts but gave his general view of different intellectual traditions or philosophical systems. Though, strictly speaking, his comments on different and distinct traditions and schools cannot be equated with his own original thought, they are interrelated. The confusion of Fang’s own thought with his comments on other traditions certainly hinders the gaining of a clear understanding of his thought. As I will show below, Fang expressed his own ideas through his interpretation of different intellectual traditions and evaluated them based on his own perspective.

Moreover, in my view, Fang’s mode of expression should also be noted. It is generally observed that this is synthetic rather than analytic, and this is regarded by some scholars as an obstacle to understanding his thought. In fact, I agree that, as a pioneering thinker who tried to discuss both Chinese and Western thought in early twentieth-century China, Fang’s vocabulary is not precise compared with the thinkers of later times. In this sense, the above observation is correct. I argue, however, that if we read Fang’s works more carefully, he explicitly says that an analytic approach is only helpful in investigating a particular issue and does not help produce an adequate understanding of a whole philosophical system. Only by viewing a system within a larger perspective can we obtain a complete view of it and avoid bias. Therefore, it should be recognised that there is actually a rationale behind Fang’s

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16 For example, ‘ji’ 即 is a crucial word in Neo-Confucian thought. Fang suggested that there were six explanations of the word and each explanation made various conclusions to the thought. Unfortunately, further comments are not found due to the poor quality of the recording equipment when such lecture was given. See Thomé H. Fang, Xin rujia zhexue shiba jiang 新儒家哲學十八講 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 1993), pp.225-227.


19 Liu Shu-hsien argues that Fang’s ‘grand style may not suit the current taste’. See his Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy (Westport: Praeger, 2003), pp.73-88. Also see his Zhong xi zhexue lunwenji 中西哲學論文集 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1987), p.5.

20 Fang, YRDZ, note 12, pp.18-19.
synthetic writing style. His comments on individual intellectual traditions, on the one hand, help explain his general thought and, on the other hand, his general thought helps explain his comments on individual intellectual traditions. Fang’s thought, in this sense, cannot be treated as clichéd simply because of his apparent lack of analytic argument. On the contrary, I would say it is like Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833-1911) idea of the ‘hermeneutic circle’, which suggests that the whole obtains its definition from the parts and the parts can only be comprehended in the light of the whole. This aspect of Fang’s writing needs to be borne in mind throughout the following discussion.

In fact, in his famous article ‘The Alienation of Man in Religion, Philosophy and Philosophical Anthropology’, which was released at the 1969 East-West Philosophers’ Conference at Hawaii, Fang reminds the audiences of his characteristic usage of words:

As we shall come to see, every word in the title of this essay carries with it the character of indeterminacy. Modern logic has set its standard of accuracy in meaning for all words to comply with, in order that their users may not commit a semantic or syntactic crime. The concealed supposition is the naïve ‘picture-theory’ of language, committing itself to the factitious relation of one-to-one correspondence between sign and object. To me, in the realm of metaphysical inquiry as in the kingdom of poetry, words are roamers with wings, enjoying a vagrant life of their own until the disciplined users know how to usher them into the proper range of symbolic significance.

In my view, on the one hand, the ‘indeterminacy’ caused by Fang’s ‘poetry-like’ language is difficult to analyze, a problem I mentioned above. On the other hand, I argue this writing style of Fang is essential to our understanding of his own thought, his interpretation of Huayan thought, and his appropriation of this Buddhist tradition, which I will further discuss in the following sections and chapter 5. In what follows, I firstly explain his criticism of ‘scientism’, as Fang considered this to be the root of the failure of Western culture.

Chapter 3.1.2 Fang on ‘Scientism’ and the Failure of Western Culture

As I argued in chapter 2, some Chinese thinkers in the early twentieth century believed that Western culture was in crisis. Fang was certainly one of them. In a speech delivered during

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21 Perhaps Fang’s synthetic writing style brings an impression that his idea is rather like cliché, some scholars have carelessly judged Fang’s ideas ‘inferior’ to that of other modern Chinese thinkers without sufficient arguments. For this criticism of Fang, see Yan Binggang 颜炳罡, Dangdai xin ruxue yinlun 当代新儒学引论 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe 北京図書館出版社, 1998), pp.271-274.
24 Ibid., p.66.
the Second Sino-Japanese War, Fang summarized the problem of Western culture as follows:

After the establishment of a system of scientific thought, Westerners in recent times take advantage of it to develop technology and control natural resources for human use. The achievements of such technological civilization are therefore remarkable and we should fully recognize them. However, there are also some problems that we cannot ignore. Since science needs to follow the exactness of logic, pursue the flexibility of means and emphasize the truth of objectivity, it only admits the existence of time, space and material in exploiting the content of nature. It obliterates the importance of the mental attributes of human beings. Therefore, beauty as revealed in the arts, the good as shown by moral character, the truth as revealed by philosophy and religion and any other values are all undervalued and considered a sort of subjective fantasy. This represents a huge crisis in terms of cultural development.  

From this, it is clear that Fang acknowledged the contribution of science. However, he was concerned with the fact that the emphasis on science alone could lead to ‘scientism’, in which other values such as beauty and morality are denied. As I will argue in chapter 3.2, Fang criticized ‘scientism’ fiercely while discussing Huayan thought, a phenomenon seldom seen during his discussion of other intellectual traditions. In my view, this is because Fang considered that Huayan thought helps respond to the challenge of ‘scientism’, an issue I will discuss in detail in chapter 5.

Fang considered that the trend of the negation of beauty and good had been significant in China from the late eighteenth century. This trend, however, was even earlier and particularly obvious in the West from the sixteenth century, the time which Fang believed to be the beginning of the development of modern science. To him, human culture in general was in decline and Western culture was further along this path. To follow the West blindly
would only bring China misfortune. In this sense, Fang is generally considered a cultural pessimist. However, Fang did not simply point out this trend but urged a change in it by developing a new philosophy. In his *Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development*, Fang argued explicitly that his purpose was ‘to challenge the Western segregational mode of thought, beset with difficulties in antipathetic duality, by the Chinese wisdom of comprehensive harmony’. The so-called ‘Western segregational mode of thought’, as he argued, was to be healed by means of his suggestion of ‘the correlative structure of men and the world’ or ‘blueprint’, a formula I will explain in chapter 3.1.4. Before further discussion, however, it is necessary to introduce his idea of metaphysics, as this plays an essential role in Fang’s general philosophy.

**Chapter 3.1.3 Fang on the Purpose of Philosophy and the Characteristics of Metaphysics**

In a series of radio broadcasts released before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Fang suggested the purpose of philosophy was as follows:

Philosophy does not teach us how to live because living is our primary instinct and therefore it is not necessary for philosophy to teach it. It is how to live meaningfully and truthfully, that is philosophy’s key concern.

Throughout his writings, in fact, Fang emphasized that philosophy must be based on the real situations human beings face. One of these real situations, Fang argued, is that our life consists of both rational and emotional characteristics. If philosophy wants to explain or deal with the real world effectively, philosophical theory should be able to address both these characteristics. In fact, ‘emotion’ (Chi. *qing* 情) is an important issue in Chinese intellectual history, from the time of Confucius to the Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. Therefore, I argue that Fang’s emphasis on ‘emotion’ is not exceptional from the point of view of Chinese intellectual history, though it distinguishes him from many of his

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31 Fang, *CPSD*, note 8, p.i.
35 For discussion of ‘emotion’ in Chinese intellectual tradition, see Meng Peiyuan 蒙培元, *Qinggan yu lixing* 情感與理性 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2002).
philosopher contemporaries, who considered philosophy purely a product of human reason.\textsuperscript{36}

In order to deal with rational and emotional characteristics in one theory, Fang introduced his own classification of metaphysics. According to Fang, there are in general two kinds of metaphysics within intellectual history: ‘praeternatural metaphysics’ and ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’.\textsuperscript{37} The former he explained and critiqued as follows:

Judged in the light of their imagined visions, the world is shot through with two irreconcilables. The Absolute Being is set in sheer contrast with the Not-Being. Existence is sharply divided into the authentic and the illusory. Life is disjoined from its natural conditions in the world……Values in the eternal forms of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, and Justice are severed from all the defiled disvalues, namely, the False, the Evil, the Ugly, and the Unjust. ……The Chinese have taken this stand not so much for the reason that praeternatural metaphysics lays great stress upon the supreme ideals of value, which we do all the more, as for the reason that it has the tendency, explicitly, to impair the concordance and continuity of Nature with Supernature and, implicitly, to hurt the integrity of the human individual which is a healthy soul merged in a sound body so as to form a unified personality or wholesome character.\textsuperscript{38}

It can be seen that the reason for Fang’s dissatisfaction with ‘praeternatural metaphysics’ is that it always divides the world into separate fragments and fails to observe the wholeness of the ‘Absolute Being’.\textsuperscript{39} From a praeternatural metaphysical point of view, according to Fang, the world is divided into various kinds of dualism, with one side usually in a superior, and the other side an inferior, position. This type of dualism helps make different concepts contradictory to each other. The pairs of concepts like ‘man and nature’, ‘reason and emotion’, ‘ideal world and actual world’ as well as ‘soul and body’ are some examples of the product of ‘praeternatural metaphysics’. However, Fang argued that the world does not consist of fragments. Therefore, ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’, a kind of metaphysics emphasizing the wholeness of the world, is to be preferred.\textsuperscript{40} He explained the former as follows:

I shall entitle the transcendental metaphysics as a characteristic Chinese doctrine of reality, whatever it may be – a kind of being, a form of existence, a mode of life, or a genus of value – which, on the

\textsuperscript{36} When Fang studied in the University of Wisconsin at Madison, it is said that the learning atmosphere there was predominantly neo-realistic and anti-Hegelian. In order to know more about Hegel, Fang studied in Ohio State University for a year. See Fang, \textit{CPSD}, note 8, pp.526-527.  
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, p.1.  
\textsuperscript{38} Fang, \textit{CPSD}, note 8, pp.18-19.  
\textsuperscript{39} Fang never gave ‘Absolute Being’ a clear definition, which brings certain difficulties to his whole theory. I will further discuss this point later.  
\textsuperscript{40} Fang, \textit{CPSD}, note 8, p.23.
one hand, cannot be considered as a transcendent object, in abstraction from all other natural entities and processes so as to enjoy, in and by itself, the surreptitious prerogative of complete independence; and, on the other, must not be rigidly pinned down to the realm of mere actualities or matters of fact, denuded of the importance for energizing ideality. It rejects neat bifurcation as a method; it disowns hard dualism as a truth. From its viewpoint, both the world and the individual therein are alike considered to be a sort of architectonic unity in which all the relevant basic facts are taken for a solid foundation on which to build up different layers of superstructure, ascending from below till the coping stone is set over them all. Thus a system of transcendental metaphysics is a kind of ideal realism or, what amounts to the same thing, a kind of real idealism.\footnote{Ibid., p.19. The last sentence of the citation may look rather abstract at this stage. However, its meaning will be clearer after the discussion of the following sections.}

In brief, based on a transcendent-immanent metaphysical perspective, Fang argued that the world is a unity and not to be divided. Both humanity and nature are components of the world. Dualism, therefore, is not employable in the case of ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’. Concepts considered contradictory to each other in ‘praeternatural metaphysics’ are not in opposition in the case of ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’. According to Fang, ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’ is observed in such ancient Chinese traditions as Confucianism and Taoism.\footnote{Fang, CVL, note 15, pp. 76-82.} An ideal person in this kind of tradition is a combination of prophet, poet and sage, which implies that varieties of value should be found in human beings.\footnote{When mentioning the combination of prophet, poet and sage as the ideal personhood, Fang argued that he was inspired by F. M. Cornford’s \textit{Principium Sapientiae} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp.90-102. See Fang, \textit{CPSD}, note 8, p.29. For discussion about Fang’s idea, also see Thomas A. Brennen, ‘Congenial Congruence: Thomé Fang’s View of the Philosopher-Poet-Sage’, in Executive Committee of the International Symposium on Thomé H. Fang’s Philosophy ed., \textit{Philosophy of Thomé H. Fang} (Taipei: Youth Cultural, 1989), pp.103-117.} This point is important to our discussion of Fang’s response to ‘scientism’ in chapter 5 as it suggests, in Fang’s mind, that an ideal person should not have scientific knowledge alone, but needs to possess various values. This ideal personhood, which can be achieved through the following ‘correlative structure of men and the world’ or ‘blueprint’, further explains the shortcomings caused by ‘praeternatural metaphysics’.

\textbf{Chapter 3.1.4 Introduction to the ‘Correlative Structure of Men and the World’ or ‘Blueprint’}

As Fang rejected the idea that the world should be divided into fragments, he further argued that this does not mean that human beings can only focus on the actual world, no matter how many evils and miseries it contains, and avoid pursuing an ideal world. According to him, there are actual and ideal elements in our world. The actual world and the ideal world are,
Admittedly, Fang did not provide definitions of the actual world and the ideal world in his writings. However, based on the discussion in the following sections, I argue that his descriptions of the actual world and the ideal world mean the world of physical, biotic and psychic lives and that with ‘transcendental value’ respectively, which I will immediately discuss in this section. Saying that the two worlds are not separated but dependent on each other means, on the one hand, the achievement of the ideal world should be based on actual reality. On the other hand, however, the actual world should be filled with ideal values. As Fang argued:

Our aim of life consists in the realization of supreme Good which, however, is not to be attached merely to the other world……Our ideal world is just the actual world transmuted by the magic of spiritual exaltation. Our virtues are just the enthusiastic endeavours actually accomplished in this real but idealized world.  

To Fang, we human beings are the key for filling the world with ideal values:

All schools of Chinese philosophy accept the fact that human beings have different kinds of ability. However, these abilities are only the raw material of our life. It is the fact of humanity and we accept them. After that, we need not to denounce or appreciate such abilities. We should, based on the actual situation that human beings have certain kinds of ability, look into the essence of our life and pursue change and development. Through self-knowledge, we can achieve self-development; through self-development, we have self-discipline and self-culture. From the perspective of considering different human abilities as raw material, good can be developed by means of cultural ideal; both beauty and truth also lead to relevant accomplishments. We can then achieve a self-ideal.  

In fact, as many scholars have argued when discussing the idea of ‘self’, a number of elements were identified by ancient Chinese thinkers: a) a body which has biological desires like the appetites of hunger and sex; b) the capacities for perception and cognition; c) emotion;

Fang’s argument that there are different abilities of humanity obviously is in line with the ideas of ancient Chinese thinkers. According to Fang, there is no doubt that human beings have different kinds of ability, including the ability to move, to create and to think. Having such kinds of ability is the actual reality human beings inhabit. However, we should not be satisfied with this fact as we also need to develop the values hidden within these abilities. A simple example may help explain this idea of Fang. By employing the abilities to think and create, for instance, we can build an apartment. The building of an apartment can be considered an achievement of our intellect. This intellect, however, can do both good and harm to our society. We can employ our intellect to build an apartment but we can also employ it to make a weapon. If we only focus on the abilities to think and create, the ideal side of the world is not necessarily observed. Fang emphasized that the abilities always contain values and it is through developing good values that the actual world can become an ideal world. Let us go back to the example of building an apartment. Through the building process, we can show the values of beauty and morality by building an aesthetic and safe structure. In this sense, there are always values hidden in our abilities. By developing such values, human beings can improve themselves from a lower level, which consists of different kinds of ability with utilitarian values, to a higher level, as Fang explains:

We should develop our life by increasing the value level by level – from the material world to the sphere of original life, then the sphere of mind, the sphere of art, the sphere of morality and the sphere of religion.\footnote{The Chinese sentences are ‘我們要把人的生命領域，一層一層地向上提昇，由物質世界 — 生命境界 — 心靈境界 — 藝術境界 — 道德境界 — 宗教境界’. Fang, FDXY, note 25, p.276.}

This process of progression is further explained in the following ‘blueprint’, as Fang called it, that explains the ‘correlative structure of men and the world’:\footnote{For its source, see Fang, CMN, note 23, p.84.}
As can be seen, some terms in the figure are in Latin. In fact, in order better to explain his ideas to various audiences and readers, Fang not only employed different languages such as Chinese, English and even Latin intermittently in his works, but also cited the works of various Western scholars, including philosophers and literary authors, wherever he felt necessary. Perhaps because he employed diverse languages and materials, Fang is generally
considered a thinker who is adept at comparative philosophy.\textsuperscript{50} In my view, Fang tended to consider that the ideas as suggested in the ‘blueprint’ are universally shared by such ancient civilizations as China, India and Greece.\textsuperscript{51} Employing Latin, in a sense, helps support his implicit claim that ideas in the ‘blueprint’ did exist in the ancient civilizations, including those in the Latin tradition. This explains why Fang employed Latin in his ‘blueprint’ without providing a detailed explanation of individual terms. This principle also applies to his interpretation of Huayan thought, in which he employed Sanskrit, a point I will further discuss in chapter 3.2. In short, I think that Fang’s use of different languages in his works is to show the universality of his ideas, that is, to develop a ‘world philosophy’\textsuperscript{52}

As set out in his ‘blueprint’, Fang explained the different states or conditions that an individual human being can achieve. At the base is the ‘Natural Order’, which includes the spheres of physical life, biological life and psychic life. According to Fang, each sphere reflects a key ability that human beings possess. However, the abilities in the ‘Natural Order’ are considered utilitarian, which means they can cause both good and bad in our lives. The sphere of physical life, for instance, reflects the human ability to employ materials. In this sphere, a human being is only a kind of animal with an intellect, which is called ‘\textit{Homo faber}’\textsuperscript{53} or ‘\textit{xing neng de ren 行能的人}’\textsuperscript{54} Fang believed that ‘creativity’ is revealed in, for example, the processes of using material to make tools. This ‘creativity’ helps human beings to progress from the sphere of physical life to biological life, where the human beings are called ‘\textit{Homo dionysiacus}’\textsuperscript{55} or ‘\textit{chuangzao xing neng de ren 創造行能的人}’\textsuperscript{56} However, by only using tools human beings cannot achieve a high level of civilization. Therefore, ‘creativity’ must be guided by reason and not led by desire. Fang called human beings who can employ ‘creativity’ rationally ‘\textit{Homo sapiens}’ or ‘\textit{zhishi heli de ren 知識合理的人}’\textsuperscript{57} These three spheres help constitute the ‘Natural Order’, in which such values as beauty and morality are not yet involved.

Although values are not overtly involved in the state of ‘Natural Order’, according to the

\textsuperscript{51} As Fang argued, his ideas in the ‘blueprint’ are applicable to both the West and China. See Fang, \textit{FDXY}, note 25, p.48.
\textsuperscript{53} Fang, \textit{FDXY}, note 25, pp.52-53. As Fang admitted, the Latin terms he used were inspired by Ernst Cassirer’s \textit{An Essay on Man, An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture} (New Haven and London: Yale University Press and Oxford University Press, 1944).
\textsuperscript{54} Thomé H. Fang, \textit{Sheng sheng zhi de 生生之德} (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 2005), p.413. The Chinese translations of the terms are cited directly from Fang’s Chinese works.
\textsuperscript{55} Fang, \textit{FDXY}, note 25, p.53.
\textsuperscript{56} Fang, \textit{SSD}, see note 54.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ibid.}
example of building an apartment, values are actually hidden. Fang suggested that our awareness of the existence of values is the beginning of our ‘metaphysical’ life. The pursuit of such values as beauty, morality and religion contributes to the achievement of the ‘Transcendental Order’. For instance, if an architect shows passion in designing an aesthetic apartment, the value of beauty will then be demonstrated. Human beings who show the value of beauty are called ‘Homo symbolicus’ or ‘yishu de ren 藝術的人’. Similarly, the apartment designed should be solid enough, otherwise it will be a danger to the dwellers. In order to avoid accidents, therefore, the architect must not only design an aesthetically pleasing apartment, but also a safe structure. The intention of keeping the dwellers safe from any potential accidents is an expression of moral value. Human beings with this value are called ‘Homo honestatis’ or ‘daode de ren 道德的人’. Furthermore, Fang also argued that once the architect shows the values of beauty and morality, his or her horizon broadens and this horizon is no longer limited to a single individual’s benefit. Fang considered that any extension of our concerns to other values rather than our own interest is a demonstration of the spirit of religion. Human beings who are in this state are called ‘Homo religiosus’ or ‘zongjiao de ren 宗教的人’. In the ‘blueprint’, these values of beauty, morality and religion represent respectively three spheres, which are the ‘sphere of artistic life’, the ‘sphere of moral life’ and the ‘sphere of religious life’. Such spheres altogether constitute the ‘Transcendental Order’, a level superior to ‘Natural Order’ in terms of the values it holds.

Above the ‘Transcendental Order’ of the ‘blueprint’ are ‘Homo nobilis’ or ‘gaogui de ren 高貴的人’, ‘Divinity’ or ‘shenren 神人’ and ‘Deus absconditus’ or ‘shenwei aomiao 深微奧妙’ above the ‘Transcendental Order’. According to Fang, the main difference between ‘Homo nobilis’ and ‘Transcendental Order’ is the extent of the values human beings pursue. For human beings to be in the ‘Transcendental Order’, they should show a form of such ‘transcendental’ values as beauty, morality and religion. However, the extent and duration of the values shown are unclear. This implies human beings can only show a very limited degree of the values and may stop showing them at any time. ‘Homo nobilis’, on the other hand, indicates those human beings who can hold the values continuously. Up to this point, I would argue that the process of self-exaltation, a term I will expand on later, seems to be an achievement only possible for humans. However, if we consider that Fang argued that both humanity and nature are parts of the world, it is reasonable to assume that nature plays a role

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58 Fang, FDXY, note 25, p.57.
59 Fang, SSD, see note 54.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Fang, FDXY, note 25, pp.60-61.
in Fang’s ‘blueprint’. In fact, Fang did not explain the terms ‘Divinity’ and ‘Deus absconditus’. These two states cannot be fully understood unless elements beyond the sphere of human beings are involved. I will consider this below.67

In fact, many thinkers such as Samuel Alexander (1859-1938),68 Taixu69 and Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919-1969)70 also shared Fang’s idea of evolution from the physical to the spiritual spheres. I argue that it is perhaps the reason behind the evolution that Fang suggested which makes his idea distinguishable from those of his senior and contemporary thinkers, a point I will immediately discuss below.

Chapter 3.1.5 The Force behind Self-Exaltation - Creative Creativity

Although, as set out in the preceding discussion, humanity and nature are components of the world, the role of nature is not, in my view, clear. In Fang’s works, the words ‘nature’ and ‘universe’ are used alternately, and he defined the latter as follows:

The Universe, in our regard, is not merely a mechanical field of physical actions and reactions, but also a magnificent realm of the concrecence of Universal Life. Such a theory may be called Organicism as applied to the world at large.71

To Fang, the universe is not mechanical but organic, since ‘creativity’ is observed in it:

The Universe, as it is, represents an all-comprehensive Urge of Life, an all-pervading Vital Impetus, not for a single moment ceasing to create and procreate and not in a single place ceasing to overflow and interpenetrate.72

‘Creativity’ (Chi. chuangzao li 創造力 or chuangsheng 創生) is widely considered an idea of

68 Samuel Alexander, Beauty and Other Forms of Value (New York: Crowell, 1968).
70 Yin Haiguang, Xueshu yu sixiang 學術與思想 vol.3 (Taipei: Guiguan tushu 桂冠圖書, 1990), pp.1431-1438.
71 Fang, CVL, note 15, p.30.
72 Ibid, p.33.
**Yi Jing** (The Book of Changes). As its first hexagram ‘Qian’ 乾 means ‘to create’ and its last hexagram ‘Wei ji’ 未濟 means ‘not yet finished’, the implication is that the creative process is not yet complete. Therefore, as Fang explicitly stated, the main idea of **Yi Jing** is its thought of endless creativity, which he called ‘creative creativity’. In this sense, I argue that Fang’s idea of ‘creativity’ is probably based on his interpretation of **Yi Jing** rather than the philosophy of Henri Bergson, though ‘creativity’ is also stressed by the latter. As noted above, in discussing the ‘Natural Order’ of the ‘blueprint’, Fang considered that using materials and making tools are signs of the function of ‘creativity’. This ‘creativity’ also has a close relationship with ‘Divinity’ and ‘Deus absconditus’ as identified in the ‘blueprint’.

According to the ‘blueprint’, ‘Deus absconditus’ is described as ‘God-head’, ‘God the most High’ and ‘the Mysteriously Mysterious Mystery’, which Fang summarized as ‘xuanzhiyouxuan de “huang ye shangdi”’ 玄之又玄的「皇矣上帝」, a term generally meaning ‘such a mysterious Divinity’. In this context, I would argue that a certain kind of divinity seems to play a role in Fang’s thought. The question that remains now is what kind of divinity does Fang mean? The answer can be found elsewhere in Fang’s writing:

God is in no way a thing; He is a power, a creative force; He is a spirit, the very spirit of infinite love, merging all beings in a wave of love.

From this, it is clear that the divinity suggested by Fang is a force rather than a personal god. This force is creative and shared by all beings. Fang summed up this state as the ‘divine immanent in all things’, a kind of pantheism. Since there is divinity everywhere, human beings should treat all things reverentially. I consider that this idea of Fang follows the spirit of Confucianism, as in *The Analects* it is said that Confucius once remarked, ‘What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are the four seasons going round and there are the hundred things coming into being. What does Heaven ever say?’, a statement usually considered as

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Confucius’ admiration of the divinity of nature. All this helps explain the idea of such a ‘Divinity’, which Fang called ‘spirit of infinite love’, an example of Fang’s ‘poetry-like’ language to describe the positive effect of this impersonal divinity on humanity. Although Fang suggested that such a ‘Divinity’ pervades the world, he emphasized that human beings would not be able to obtain any knowledge of the ultimate origin of such divinity. As he also argued, what human beings could know at most is that the world keeps on changing without any sign of stopping. This ‘creativity’ is unlimited and therefore, it is also called ‘creative creativity’. In this sense, according to Fang, ‘Divine’ is equal to ‘creativity’ and there is no difference between the two:

Man takes his origin from the Divine which, as a primordial source of infinite power, embraces all heaven and earth as the interlacing hierarchy of orders wherein the ever-going and never-ceasing of creation solemnly exhibits itself.

Since the ultimate origin of such ‘Divinity’ is unknown to human beings, ‘Deus absconditus’, which is at the apex of Fang’s ‘blueprint’, also has the name of ‘Mysteriously Mysterious Mystery’. With this, the whole ‘blueprint’ appears complete.

As ‘creativity’ is in all beings, it is also in humanity. In fact, as the idea of ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’ suggests, both human beings and nature are components of the world. Therefore, the concepts of ‘Divinity’ and ‘Deus absconditus’ in the ‘blueprint’ not only explain nature but also humanity. As I mentioned earlier, human beings can progress to the state of ‘Homo nobilis’ without considering the role beyond the sphere of the human. However, Fang argued that human beings should always think of other spheres during the process of self-exaltation:

Our philosophers have told us to strive after our utmost to abide by the fundamental Root of Tao; to trace back to what has been conferred on us by Heaven; and to feel perfectly identified with the divine will to live, with a view to understanding thoroughly all that there is, and all that there can be, in the Universe in respect of the magnificent creative spirit of life; partaking fully what is great in the noble sentiments of compassion, benevolence, and love; and extirpating completely what is most perilous in the dark practice of selfishness, partiality, and prejudice before we can display in a grand manner the all-embracing vastness, the inexhaustible profundity, and the exalted illuminancy that pertain to the nature of our being. The great men and sages, so inspiring to the Chinese people,

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83 Fang, *KZR*, note 44, pp.35-36; also see *SSD*, note 54, pp.184-185.
84 Fang, *CVL*, note 15, p.45.
86 Fang, *CMN*, note 23, pp.16-17.
are the most ideal personalities, being identical in attributes with Heaven and Earth, coextensive with the wondrous infiltration of Tao, and conducive to the eminent deeds of universal love.\textsuperscript{87}

He even stated that:

The Universe represents for us the perpetual augmentation of value. The meaning of human life consists in the exaltation of value. The Universe and human life are the concurrent processes of creative values.\textsuperscript{88}

It should be noted that Fang used ‘exaltation’ in English here, which he translated in almost all his other works as ‘\textit{chaosheng}’ 超昇,\textsuperscript{89} a term rather unusual in Chinese philosophical study. In fact, as I will explain below, Fang’s use of the term ‘exaltation’ may be due to his emphasis on ‘creativity’ rather than ‘humanity’ in the process of progression. The above citations partly explain this point as they clearly show that exaltation is not only an issue concerning human beings but also all other beings, an idea which considers that creation is not related to a specific god, as in the Christian tradition, but is a natural phenomenon of the universe.\textsuperscript{90} Both humanity and nature, which are components of the world, influence each other but are not caused by each other. Through interaction between the two, the process of creation continues. This view of cosmology, therefore, is also described as ‘co-creation’ by some scholars.\textsuperscript{91} Only by considering the role of nature can humanity achieve full self-exaltation. In other words, nature provides the opportunity for self-exaltation through the striving of the individual, who in turn participates in the creativity of the nature.

In fact, in the ‘blueprint’ shown in figure 1, human beings who achieve the level of ‘\textit{Deus absconditus}’ need to return to the ‘inferior’ levels, as human are not separate from nature, even though they may be cultivated and divine, ‘Natural Order’ is not to be depreciated. Any self-exaltation is based on the ‘Natural Order’. Therefore, even human beings on the level of ‘\textit{Deus absconditus}’ are always engaged in but not aloof from worldly affairs.\textsuperscript{92} Only by first

\textsuperscript{87} Fang, CVL, note 15, p.92.  
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., p.96.  
\textsuperscript{89} As recorded in a speech in Chinese, Fang argues that ‘chaosheng’ is equal to ‘exaltation’. See Fang, \textit{FDXY}, note 25, p.106.  
\textsuperscript{92} Li Anze 李安澤 argues that Fang ignores the material world. This is obviously a misunderstanding of Fang. See his \textit{Shengming lijing yu xingershangxue: Fang Dongmei zhexu e de chanshi yu piping 生命理境與形而上學: 方東美哲學的闡釋與批評} (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 2007), p.126.
being exalted upwards and then going downwards is the whole process of self-exaltation completed. This notion of exaltation not only comprises the core idea of Fang’s thought but also plays an important role in his evaluation of various intellectual traditions in human history, including Huayan thought, as I will discuss below.

Chapter 3.1.6 ‘Comprehensive Harmony’ as a Criterion for Evaluation

According to Fang, the concept of ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’ allows dualism to be dissolved; by dissolving dualism, contradiction is to be avoided; by avoiding contradiction, a state of harmony is to be achieved. The ultimate goal of Fang’s theory is to achieve a state of ‘comprehensive harmony’, a term commonly translated as ‘guangda hexie’ by different scholars, which Fang explains as follows:

Chinese mentality is best characterized by what I call the cultivated sense of comprehensive harmony, in unison with which man and life in the world can enter into a fellowship in sympathetic unity so that a bliss of peace and well-being may be enjoyed by all. The only condition essential to its actual working is that we should conceive man in particular, and the universe at large, in terms of the principle of creative creativity.

The ‘blueprint’, in my view, is the route to achieve ‘comprehensive harmony’.

In fact, in Chinese, both the terms ‘he’ and ‘tong’ can be translated as ‘harmony’. Although the terms are interrelated, their meanings are also contrastive. In short, when different values are in balance, it is called ‘he’; where different values are unified, it is called ‘tong’. According to the previous discussion, I suggest that Fang’s idea of ‘comprehensive harmony’ is probably nearer to the meaning of ‘tong’, as all values are unified under Fang’s idea of ‘blueprint’. However, such unification is difficult to regard as ‘he’, as different values seem not to be in balance. This is because, in Fang’s ‘blueprint’, values in ‘Transcendental Order’ are obviously ‘superior’ to that in ‘Natural Order’. In fact, as I will discuss in chapter 5, this is one of the main differences between Fang’s and Tang’s responses to ‘scientism’. It is, in my view, even a potential difficulty in Fang’s response.

Although Fang discusses different intellectual traditions, his comments are always from the

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93 Vincent Shen, ‘Fang Dongmei (Thomé H. Fang)’, note 75.
94 Fang, CVL, note 15, pp. i-ii.
95 Ibid., p.12.
view of ‘comprehensive harmony’, an idea which initially stemmed from ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’. In this sense, I argue that ‘comprehensive harmony’ is actually a criterion which Fang uses to evaluate and interpret other intellectual traditions. Only by acknowledging this can we make sense of some of his controversial comments about different intellectual traditions. For instance, Fang considered that The Analects do not pay enough attention to ‘creativity’. As a result, The Analects is not, in his view, so important in Confucianism. He also had some harsh comments on Mencius and the Neo-Confucians of the Song and Ming Dynasties as he considered that they failed to see the unity and wholeness of the world. In fact, as it is well-known in Chinese academia, the relationship between Fang and Mou Zongsan was really bad. As Liu Shu-hsien recalls, once, when Fang and Mou welcomed Tang Junyi at the airport, they sat back-to-back, saying nothing to each other. I estimate that this was because of Fang’s discontent with Mou’s paying almost no attention to the idea of ‘creativity’, despite his over-emphasis on the idea of ‘Mind’. All the above comments and attitude seem unusual in the field of Chinese philosophy, especially in that of Confucian study. However, in considering his criterion for evaluating various intellectual traditions, these comments become clearer. This criterion, of course, also applies to his interpretation of Huayan thought. Before discussing his interpretation of Huayan, however, it is necessary to review Fang’s thought critically, as this directly relates to the effectiveness of his theory in responding to the Western challenge, which I will discuss in chapter 5.

Chapter 3.1.7 Discussion of Fang’s Thought

Most of the studies of Fang’s thought are descriptive rather than explicatory. Therefore, in my opinion, they are not thorough enough for fulfilling the objective of this study, which is to examine the relationship between Fang and Huayan thought, an issue for which a deep understanding of Fang’s thought is necessary. In fact, Fang’s thought deserves a more thorough critical review since this will help inform our understanding of its impact on other modern thinkers, as I will discuss in the following chapter.

There are both insights and limitations within Fang’s thought. His emphasis on openness in a

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98 As Fang argued, he employed a metaphysical approach while discussing Chinese philosophy. See Fang, CPSD, note 8, p.13.
system is probably his major insight. Fang was not interested in a closed system since this would be unfavourable to the functioning of ‘creativity’. In this sense, ‘creativity’ helps ensure a system working continuously. For Fang, the state of ‘comprehensive harmony’ is replete with different values, a point which is essential for our understanding of his appropriation of Huayan thought. As noted above, according to Fang, ideal personhood must be a combination of prophet, poet and sage. Consequently, there is no single rigid condition that humanity must achieve, or a single fixed form of personhood that humanity must seek, though, in practice, Fang considered that the ‘blueprint’ he put forward is a suitable model. The specific forms of the ideal world and ideal personhood depend on particular situations:

Although they are such in antiquity, they have, in moments, personal inclination towards one special character in the combination. Some are more of the prophet than the other two; some, more of the poet; and some, more of the sage.

In my view, such openness in Fang’s thought provides a kind of flexibility, which allows people to develop their own different characteristics. Thus, in different times there are different types of people. No unchanging standard should be assumed. Since there is no unchanging standard, varying values can be incorporated into the concept of ideal personhood whenever required. As different cultures may be better for particular values, in a sense, all cultures are more or less equal. This openness provides a possibility for different cultures to communicate. As I will discuss in chapter 5, this underlies Fang’s main argument in his response to ‘scientism’.

Although the relationship between the limitations of Fang’s theory and his appropriation of Huayan thought may not be that direct, in my view, it is better to point out the limitations in this study, as it helps evaluate the status Fang should enjoy in the field of Chinese philosophical study. I argue that the first challenge to Fang, at least according to his own analysis, is that human beings seem to be compelled to progress. Fang’s comments on the relationship between humanity and nature help explain this idea:

Hence we come to the consciousness that the universe cannot go on without the presence of my moral being. If I, as a creative personality, had not come into existence, that would indicate the defect of the universe, that would show that life is not comprehensive enough, and that would

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103 Fang, SSD, see note 54, p.349 and 396.
104 For details, see the discussion in note 43.
105 Fang, CPSD, note 8, p.31.
106 Vincent Shen, ‘Fang Dongmei (Thomé H. Fang)’, note 75.
betoken that the supreme moral values are grievously arrested in development. I, as an individual, cannot live for a single moment without the universe. If the cosmic order were not well established, I should have nothing to rely upon, my life would be an idle dream, and the idea of the good pertaining to human nature would be a floating idea no better than illusion.\footnote{Fang, CVL, note 15, p.107.}

As an organic unity, both human beings and nature are components of the world. Therefore, human beings and nature are always interactive. According to the citation, on the one hand, there would be a flaw in nature if human beings were absent as this would imply that nature was not comprehensive. On the other hand, human beings could not achieve self-exaltation if the role of nature was neglected. As discussed in chapter 3.1.5, Fang considered that ‘creativity’ is incorporated into the world, though the origin of it is a mystery to human beings. Fang assumes this predominant role for ‘creativity’ in the world, which assures the world is always changing. If either human beings or nature were not employing ‘creativity’, it would imply that ‘creativity’ would not be fully incorporated as predominant in the world. Taking human beings as the example, I summarize Fang’s argument thus:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [Premise 1:] Human beings not employing ‘creativity’ implies ‘creativity’ is not incorporated into the world;
  \item [Premise 2:] ‘Creativity’ is always incorporated into the world;
  \item [Conclusion:] Human beings not employing ‘creativity’ is not possible.
\end{itemize}

Based on this argument, human beings should always employ ‘creativity’. In this sense, the self-exaltation of human beings seems to be compulsory. In fact, even though it is true that the world is always changing, from the observation of daily experience, human beings can stop progressing but stay in a specific level.\footnote{Xu Fuguan 徐復觀, *Zhongguo renxing lun shi. XianQin pian* 中國人性論史·先秦篇 (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 臺灣商務印書館, 2003), pp.218-219.} Without providing further reasons for human beings to progress themselves, Fang’s suggestion that human beings should self-exalt because the world is always employing ‘creativity’ seems problematic, as it neglects the role of human responsibility. As I will further discuss in the following chapters, a main difference between Fang and Tang and their appropriations of Huayan thought is that Tang stressed the autonomy of each individual. To respond to the challenges of ‘scientism’, this autonomy of human beings is important.

There are other limitations within Fang’s theory, though most of them stem from the above theoretical difficulty. Fang argued that the world will change endlessly due to the existence of ‘creativity’. However, Fang considered the origin of such ‘creativity’ a mystery. Since the origin of ‘creativity’ is unknown, simply assuming that it will go on endlessly seems too
optimistic. There should, in fact, be a reason guaranteeing that ‘creativity’ will continue. Otherwise, there is the possibility that the world would one day cease to change. Fang’s refusing to discuss the origin of ‘creativity’ is because he thought that the infinite ‘creativity’ could not stem from a limited metaphysical origin. The issue is, therefore, beyond the knowledge of human beings. However, the result caused by his refusal to comment further on the origin is unsatisfactory. The reason guaranteeing that the world must keep on changing is a question Fang fails to consider.

Perhaps there is another reason to show that Fang should consider the origin of ‘creativity’ more thoroughly, which is the need for a clear definition of ‘creativity’. What does ‘creativity’ mean? In my view, the content of it seems rather vague. Can all creations be considered good and beautiful? Provided that there is ‘creativity’ incorporated into both human beings and nature, are the characteristics of the ‘creativity’ they hold the same? There are thus many questions remaining about the content of the concept of ‘creativity’. For instance, there are many creations in the natural world, mountains and oceans are some examples. To some extent, such creations are considered aesthetic and even morally good, because they help produce a variety of lives. However, there are also some natural creations which may not be considered aesthetic or good. The eruption of a volcano which kills many people is an example. In this case, ‘creativity’ is not necessarily appropriate for human beings to employ. Nature, which is also full of ‘creativity’, is not necessarily appropriate for human beings to follow either.

In fact, Fang’s argument about the employment of ‘creativity’ is like a case of circular reasoning. The following argument helps explain this:

[Premise 1:] Nature and human beings are not separate.
[Premise 2:] Since nature is always employing creativity, human beings are also employing creativity.
[Premise 3:] Human beings are employing creativity.
[Conclusion:] Nature is always employing creativity.

The above argument is not directly used in Fang’s work but if we read his work carefully, we find this form of argument. Since the premises and conclusion are the same, Fang’s argument about the ‘creativity’ in nature and human beings may not be convincing. This problem, like much of the preceding discussion, cannot be solved unless there is a better reason

110 Fang, CVL, note 15, pp.12-13; Fang, KZR, note 44, pp.35-36.
111 To my astonishment, no study about Fang mentions the problems of his arguments. However, a book on logic does state that Fang’s argument is considered a potential example of fallacy. See Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2002), p.173.
supporting the function of ‘creativity’, which is related to the characteristic of Fang’s appropriation of Huayan thought and even its effectiveness responding ‘scientism’.

In fact, in Fang’s ‘blueprint’, the process of exaltation develops in a positive way, which is from the ‘Natural Order’ to the ‘Transcendental Order’ and the states of ‘Homo nobilis’ etc. In many of his other remarks, Fang also mentioned that the behaviour of human beings should follow a moral principle and a moral direction. Therefore, some scholars argue that Fang actually holds a ‘good-nature’ theory. In the ‘blueprint’, Fang also suggested that human beings need to be down-to-earth. The suggestion of the ‘good-nature’ of human beings, perhaps, is a more reasonable notion than ‘creativity’ for explaining this phenomenon of regressing, since human beings are unwilling to abandon worldly affairs. This point, paradoxically, is what Fang emphasised in his interpretation of Huayan thought, which I will discuss in chapter 3.2. In fact, virtue (Chi. 德) plays a crucial role in almost all of the important Confucian theories of self-cultivation, which stem from self-consciousness and are different from the values observed from a changing nature. Although Fang’s identity as a Confucian is debatable, the role of virtue deriving from self-consciousness certainly needs considering. Fang’s potential ‘good-nature’ theory cannot override the fact that he paid little attention to the role of human nature, an idea closely related to the construction of ‘self’ in humanity. As I will discuss in chapter 5, this point is critical to the achievement of the world of ‘comprehensive harmony’ Fang suggested.

Perhaps it is hard to credit that Fang, one of the leading intellectuals of his time, ignored the importance of human nature but only focused on the various abilities of humanity. In fact, Fang seems purposely to weaken the role of human nature because he thought that focusing the discussion on it alone would overlook the wholeness of the world, an idea closely related to his ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’. More specifically, he denied the dominant role of the Confucian view of human nature in Chinese culture, considering that Taoism and Chinese Buddhism are as important as Confucianism. Therefore, he rejected the idea of the Confucian orthodox line of transmission (Chi. 道統), which is to stress the role of the Mind (Chi. 心) in Confucianism, as emphasized by certain modern Chinese intellectuals, like Xiong Shili, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. There is clearly a dilemma here. On the one hand, a theory of self-exaltation needs to avoid the over-dominance of human

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112 Fang, ZRZ, note 32, p.86 and 116.
115 Mou Zongsan, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang 中國哲學十九講 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1999), pp.69-85.
116 Fang, FDXY, note 25, p.172.
nature or the wholeness of the world is ignored. On the other hand, the function of ‘creativity’ needs a broader explanation, to allow human nature to play a role. As I mentioned in chapter 2, Fang tried to redefine the ‘ti’ of Chinese culture so that the ‘yong’ of it can be more responsive to the challenge of ‘scientism’. In my view, his lack of emphasis of the dominant role of human nature is crucial in this redefining process, which I will discuss in greater detail in chapter 5. First, I wish to turn to Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, as it helps explain why he appropriated that thought to develop his response to ‘scientism’.

Chapter 3.2  Thomé H. Fang’s Interpretation of Huayan Thought – A Critical Review

Chapter 3.2.1  Fang’s Overall Interpretation of Huayan Thought

Among Thomé H. Fang’s works involving Buddhism, his interpretation of Huayan thought, which he called the ‘culmination’ of Chinese Buddhism, definitely plays a central role. In fact, in Fang’s complete works, there are in total six works dealing with Buddhist thought, but the Huayan School is the only school Fang discusses in detail. In his interpretation of this body of thought, the first central point is his emphasis on the role of Huayanjing. As discussed in Chapter 2, Huayan patriarchs argued that Huayan thought was developed from Huayanjing, though in fact most of the important concepts of the thought are not found in this text. However, Fang explicitly confirms that Huayanjing plays a central role in Huayan thought.

Generally, while explaining the role of Huayanjing, Fang repeatedly emphasized the following scenarios in the text:

i.) There are countless lights released from Vairocana, a symbol of Buddha in Huayanjing, and these lights reach the other Buddhas and bodhisattvas without any obstruction.

ii.) After being reached by the lights, all Buddhas and bodhisattvas in different locations and different times go to meet Vairocana.

iii.) Sudhana, a clever boy, visited the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī, the symbol of wisdom. Mañjuśrī asks Sudhana to learn from the other forty-one bodhisattvas.

iv.) After experiencing various difficulties, Sudhana learns the ways of practice and the importance of being concerned with other sentient beings. Samantabhādra, the symbol of practice, accepts Sudhana’s effort and takes Sudhana to meet Maitreya, the next Buddha after Śākyamuni in

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117 Fang, HZ vol.1, note 78, p.181.
118 The six works are Huayanzong zhexue vol.1 and 2, Zhongguo dasheng foxue vol.1 and 2 and Zhongguo zhexue jingshen ji qi fazhan vol.1 and 2. The last work is a translation of Fang’s English work Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development.
120 For details, see chapter 2.4.2.
Buddhist tradition.

v.) Maitreya shows Sudhana numerous pearls and jewels. From the reflection of the lights of the pearls and jewels, the world seems infinite and all phenomena co-existent.\(^{121}\)

Summarizing the content of the above, I consider that three points can be discerned. First, *Huayanjing* describes a perfect and a harmonious state directly (i), without further explaining the cause of such state. There are no obstacles amongst Buddha and phenomena, regardless of different locations and times (ii); these are a part of the harmonious state and therefore, the scope of it is unlimited. Second, attaining this perfect state is not only about wisdom but also about practice (iii and iv). Therefore, a person with wisdom should also have personal experiences in real life, such as the experience of suffering. A wise person, in this sense, does not exclude him- or herself from others. Third, only with both wisdom and personal experience can one truly get the taste of the fruit of Buddha (v). This links back to the path for entering the perfect state introduced in (i). The content of *Huayanjing* is certainly greater than the above synopsis. Fang, however, focused mainly on these points. According to Fang, in fact, *Huayanjing* is even the best introduction to philosophy in the world since it explains how a person grows with consideration of his or her own experience.\(^{122}\) In this sense, we see how important is the above synopsis in Fang’s view.

As Fang argued, the style of *Huayanjing* is story-telling, and this understanding of the text is essential in order to understand Huayan thought, as it provides readers with a method for reading the text: \(^{123}\)

As with the content of the *Huayanjing*, we should not consider it a depictive language but a metaphorical language or a poetical language instead.\(^{124}\)

He further explained:

The language of *Huayanjing* is not that of common poetry since it is not depicting certain ‘phenomena’ but the ‘principle’ behind them. When the ‘principle’ attains the ultimate realm, which is holy and marvelous, it is beyond thought. Only artistic, musical and symbolic language can help

\(^{121}\) Fang’s mentioning of these points is recorded throughout his two volumes of *Huayanzong zhexue*.

\(^{122}\) Fang, HZ vol.1, note 78, p.130.


\(^{124}\) The original sentences are ‘就其所描寫的內容來說，應該先要把這種方塊字所使用的這一種depictive language（記述的語言）點化掉，成為 metaphorical language（隱喻的語言）、poetical language（詩的語言）’. Fang, HZ vol.1, note 78, p.227.
depict it.\textsuperscript{125}

The task of Huayan’s patriarchs, according to Fang, is to provide such symbolic language with a philosophical explanation:

If we do not comprehend the sentences [of \textit{Huayanjing}], we will not understand the patriarchs of the Huayan lineage, who rationalize the religion and make the religion into a kind of profound philosophy.\textsuperscript{126}

As I mentioned in chapter 1, Lao Sze-kwang reminds us that ‘philosophy’ in Chinese tradition aims at achieving ‘self-transformation’ and ‘transformation of the world’.\textsuperscript{127} Based on this understanding, Lao further suggests that there are two kinds of philosophy: ‘orientative philosophy’ and ‘cognitive philosophy’. While the aim of ‘cognitive philosophy’ is to establish objective and reliable knowledge, the aim of ‘orientative philosophy’ is to inspire others to transform themselves.\textsuperscript{128} In my view, Fang’s considering \textit{Huayanjing} a metaphorical language or a poetical language seems to argue that \textit{Huayanjing} is a kind of ‘orientative philosophy’, which is to inspire or encourage others to improve. In fact, as I mentioned previously in chapter 3.1, Fang considered his use of language is ‘poetry-like’. Together with his understanding that the style of \textit{Huayanjing} is also story-telling, I argue that his own answer to ‘scientism’ is also a kind of story-telling, a point I will further discuss in chapter 5.

As Fang argued, \textit{Huayanjing} is not a strict philosophical work written in logical sentences. What it provides is a vision of a perfect state, which helps inspire the confidence of human beings about self-cultivation. The task of the patriarchs of the Huayan is to explain the content of \textit{Huayanjing} so that the perfect and harmonious Buddha realm, as suggested in the text, can be achieved in principle.\textsuperscript{129} This exposition of \textit{Huayanjing} by Fang is the first thing to note in his interpretation of Huayan thought.

Given his view that the content of \textit{Huayanjing} is not merely a story but has philosophical implications, Fang then went to explain the content of Huayan thought philosophically. As I mentioned earlier, there are three points of \textit{Huayanjing} on which Fang particularly focused.

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{125}]The original sentences are ‘華嚴經所旁述的文字，並不是尋常散文的詩歌體材，因為它所記載的不僅僅是「事」，而是從「事」的領域中所烘托出來的一種極微妙的「理」，當這個「理」達到極神聖的微妙的境界時，它是不可思议的，它是不容以常理去理解的，於是以好筆好聲藝術上面的形容法，拿富於音樂性的文字或富於象徵性的文字來形容。’ \textit{Ibid.}, p.254.
\item[\textsuperscript{126}]The original sentences are ‘如果我們無法理解這一段文字的話，那麼就不能體會華嚴宗的那幾位祖師們，把這一套宗教的教義點化，而成為深含哲學理念的高深哲理。’ \textit{Ibid.}, p.237.
\item[\textsuperscript{127}]For details, see chapter 1.2.
\item[\textsuperscript{128}]Lao Sze-kwang, \textit{Xujing yu xiwang: lun dangdai zhexue yu wenhua} 虛境與希望：論當代哲學與文化 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), pp.149-150.
\item[\textsuperscript{129}]Fang, \textit{HZ} vol.1, note 78, pp.352-353.
\end{itemize}
First is the perfect state. Second is the importance of both theory and practice in the process of achieving such perfect state. Third is the concern for the world. Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, in fact, matches these three points.

In chapter 3.1, I argue that Fang suggested that the understanding of an intellectual tradition requires a macro-perspective. This principle also applies to his understanding of Huayan thought since he said that only by viewing the thought as a whole can it be comprehended. The whole, in my view, is the perfect state as suggested by Huayan’s patriarchs. In order to show the perfection of such a state, Fang emphasized the role of Dushun among Huayan’s patriarchs, a view rather uncommon in studies of Huayan thought. In fact, except Huayanjing, the works under Dushun’s name are what Fang discussed most in his interpretation of Huayan. Dushun, who is considered the first patriarch of the Huayan School by some scholars, is one of the mysteries of the history of Chinese Buddhism. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, the life of Dushun is largely unknown. His relationship with Huayanjing is also unclear. The works under his name are only mentioned in passing in the works of other Huayan patriarchs. Obviously, Fang did not worry about the historical accuracy of Dushun’s life, as he said:

Among the five great Buddhists of this school during the Tang dynasty I have great admiration for Tu-shun [Dushun] whose ingenious mind had brought to the light of day almost all elements of truth in the metaphysical philosophy of Huayan although Fa-tsang [Fazang] and Cheng-kuan [Chengguan] surpassed him in detailed erudition. What was fully elaborated and elucidated in later generations with reference to the Avataṃsaka Sūtra had been anticipated by him excepting, perhaps, the theory of dependent-causation upon the dharmadhātu as to details for which the credit should be given to Chih-yen [Zhiyan], Fa-tsang [Fazang] and Cheng-kuan [Chengguan], and especially the latter two.

According to Fang, the scope of Huayan thought was determined in the time of Dushun. He sees the works of the later patriarchs as just footnotes to Dushun’s thought, which help to make his thought more precise. As Fang argued, Huayan wujiao zhiguan (Huayan’s Contemplation of Five Teachings), the work claimed to be from Dushun, describes the perfect and harmonious state and explains the rationale making perfection possible, which Fang further explained as follows:

All Dharmas are interlaced like Indra’s network of pearls mutually radiating images of reflection unto one another dovetailed into a system of interpenetrative infinity. This, I think, is the first manifesto of the philosophy of Huayan to be further developed by Tu-shun [Dushun].
himself and by those who followed him for two hundred years in the Tang dynasty.\textsuperscript{133}

As Fang indicated, \textit{dharmas} here are phenomena.\textsuperscript{134} The Buddha realm as stated in \textit{Huayan wujiao zhiguan}, like the one in \textit{Huayanjing}, consists of all \textit{dharmas} co-existing with each other harmoniously. Dushun, in Fang’s view, also explains the rationale for the \textit{dharmas} co-existing, which is the principle of ‘interpenetration’, which I have briefly discussed in chapter 2.4.3. In fact, by ranking Dushun as the most important patriarch in the Huayan School, the logic behind Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought seems clear. As I argue throughout, the possibility of making the world a more harmonious place plays a significant role in Fang’s thought. Any concepts irrelevant to this, no matter how important other scholars considered them, play a less important role in Huayan thought for Fang. For instance, Huayan’s doctrinal classification theory, a theory considered important by almost all Buddhist scholars, does not play a main role in Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, as he gives it only a brief consideration in his works.\textsuperscript{135} This characteristic of Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought is important to our understanding of his appropriation of the thought to respond to the challenge of ‘scientism’, which I will discuss in depth in chapter 5.

Besides the emphasis on the harmonious state suggested by Dushun, Fang traced the origin of realizing such a state to the pure mind (Chi. \textit{Qingjingxin} 淨心) of the human being. In chapter 2, I briefly explained that Huayan’s suggestion of ‘dharma realm’ depends on the state of the mind. A perfect state is a manifestation of the pure mind, in which no conflicts among \textit{dharmas} are found, as all of them can co-exist without obstruction by means of the principle of ‘interpenetration’, in brief, when one \textit{dharma} manifests the emptiness of the whole world. In this sense, the mind is the cause while the realization or attainment of ‘dharma realm’ is the result of the process of achieving the harmonious state. Fang, after showing interest in the result suggested by Huayan, immediately concentrated on the cause. In fact, in a letter to Xiong Shili in 1938, the earliest extant source in which Fang discussed Buddhism, he commented on Xiong’s analysis arguing that not only the Buddha realm needs to be considered, but also the origin causing the realm. Otherwise, the claimed Buddha realm would be subjective.\textsuperscript{136} As I will shortly discuss below, Fang’s emphasis on the mind in the letter is a point inconsistent with his interpretation of Huayan in which discussion of

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.312-313.
\textsuperscript{134} Fang, \textit{CPSD}, note 8, p. 312.
\textsuperscript{135} Qu Dacheng argues that in Fang’s interpretation of Huayan, the theory of doctrinal classification plays a main role. See his article as stated in note 2. However, I argue that it is obviously incorrect. It is because in Fang’s \textit{Zhongguo dasheng foxue}, Huayan’s doctrinal classification theory is briefly mentioned. However, relevant theories of Tiantai and Consciousness-Only are also introduced in the work. In this sense, Huayan’s doctrinal classification theory seems not to play a special role in Fang’s interpretation of Chinese Buddhism. See Fang, \textit{ZDF} vol.1, note 10, pp.266-320.
\textsuperscript{136} For the letter, see Fang, \textit{ZDF} vol.2, ibid., pp.382-404. Interestingly, as far as I know, content in the letter is never discussed in academia, though there are many studies discussing Xiong’s idea of Buddhist thought.
\end{footnotes}
characteristics of the mind seems rather limited. It tends to make his response to ‘scientism’ somewhat assertive and unconvincing, as I will discuss later in chapter 5.

Admittedly, Fang did not provide the concept of ‘mind’ or ‘pure mind’ a clear definition. In considering the characteristics of the mind which assist the achievement of the harmonious state, Fang explained it thus:

This Buddha is not merely an external ideal but rather the internal reflection and experience of each person, [and allows one] to transform oneself [right] from the [very] centre of one’s life to the highest center of spiritual perception and wisdom. In this way, the existential subjectivity of each person can all be described as spiritual subjectivity, equal in importance to the spiritual subjectivity of the Buddha (法身). 137

As Fang further argued, this transformation moves from the material world to the sphere of the spirit. 138 Thus, when considering Fang’s ‘blueprint’ in figure 1, his idea of transformation matches his general idea of ‘self-exaltation’. In other words, I argue that Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought is from his own philosophical perspective. According to Fang, the real spirit of Buddhism should be developed in such a perfect and pure mind:

[I am] to reject the error of ‘arising from conceptualized nature’ as suggested in the thought of Consciousness-Only and to discuss the issue directly from the perspective of ‘dependence on others’. However, this ‘dependence’ should not be based on mistake (defilement) but on the spiritual subject of Buddha (pure mind). It changes ‘dependence on others’ to ‘perfect reality’. ‘Perfect reality’ is a spiritual subject with perfect values, which is also the ultimate cause. From this ultimate cause [human beings] can develop wisdom with reason, develop ideal with wisdom and develop value with ideal. Only by that can Mahāyāna be transformed into Buddha vehicle. In Buddhism, therefore, if human beings consider the world disappointing, negative, pessimistic, suffering and cursed, they are not real Buddhists, nor do they understand the real spirit of Buddhism. What they understand is the wrong spirit of Hinayāna. 139

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137 The original sentences are ‘這個佛，不僅僅是一個外在的理想，而是每一個人，都根據他內心的反省，體驗，把自己從生命的中心，變為最高的精神主體與智慧中心。在這種情況下，那麼個人的生命主體都可以說是精神主體，而這個精神主體，同佛的精神主體（法身）同樣重要。’ See Fang, HZ vol. 1, note 78, p.33.

138 Ibid.

139 The original sentences are ‘把佛學唯識中三性三無性說法裡面的「偏計所執性」的錯誤去掉，而從「依他起性」來說，但是這個「依他」，並不是依錯誤（染污），而是依佛的精神主體（清淨心）。於是把依他起性變成圓成實性。圓成實性是一個價值美滿的精神主體，是一個根本原因，由這個根本原因，才能從理性上產生意智，從智慧裡面生理想，從理想裡面把握價值，這樣才能點化為大乘，點化為佛乘，所以在佛學裡面，凡是對這個世界持有失望、消極、悲觀、痛苦、詛咒態度的人，都不能算是真正的佛教徒，或理解真正的佛教精神，而只是小乘佛教的錯誤精神。’ Ibid., p.38.
According to Fang, the achievement of a perfect state depends on a perfect mind, which is pure and non-obstructive. Only the *Mahāyāna* which develops based on this pure mind can be the culmination of Buddhist thought. Perhaps this is debatable but, if we remember that Fang had his own criteria for classifying various intellectual systems, there is a reason for his view. In fact, Fang showed his discontent with *Hīnayāna* throughout his works, saying that the worldview of *Hīnayāna* is negative.\(^{140}\) To him, Huayan thought is the best among *Mahāyāna*, since Huayan develops its thought based on the function of the pure mind. With the pure mind functioning, all *dharmas* are non-obstructive. As a result, the harmonious state is achieved. Other forms of thought like Tiantai and Consciousness-Only, Fang argued, do not totally comprehend the role of the pure mind so that a perfect state cannot be achieved through the thought of these schools.\(^{141}\)

As well as emphasizing the formation of the perfect state, Fang also stressed the importance of practice. As will be immediately apparent, Fang’s discussion of practice is rather simple, as he fails to provide any definition of it. His suggestion of the idea, in my view, is to remind us that Huayan thought is not only a philosophical theory or conceptual game but also a kind of religion which requires our participation. Therefore, in his works, he tended to classify philosophical theory and religious practice into two categories without further explanation. In a sense, Fang seems to simplify the issues of philosophy and religion. However, this simplification helps sharpen the characteristic of his interpretation of Huayan thought.

Based on the experience of Sudhana in *Huayanjing*, Fang argued that both rationality and practice are important for human beings in reaching the perfect state.\(^{142}\) Huayan thought, in Fang’s view, therefore, is not only a kind of philosophical thought. Fang’s emphasis on practice in Huayan thought makes his interpretation immediately different from those of other scholars who pay little or even no attention to this.\(^{143}\)

In considering the role practice plays in Huayan thought, Fang argued that the entire Huayan system should be comprehended via four steps. First is faith in Vairocana, a symbol of the perfect state.\(^{144}\) Without faith in the perfection of the world, any thought, no matter how logically valid, remains a mere theory.\(^{145}\) Second is the understanding of the logic behind Huayan thought and its various concepts. Third is the religious practice of the teaching of Huayan thought and fourth, only by following the previous steps can we obtain the fruit of

^{141}\) Fang, *HZ* vol.1, note 78, pp.380-381.  
^{142}\) Fang, *ibid.*, pp.127-129.  
^{144}\) Fang, *HZ* vol.1, note 78, pp.57-58.  
perfect state. Fang summarized the four steps in four words: faith (Chi. xin 信), understanding (Chi. jie 解), practice (Chi. xing 行) and enlightenment (Chi. zheng 證). Based on Fang’s suggestions, I argue that most of the studies about Huayan thought are mainly concerned with the categories of understanding and enlightenment. However, comprehension of the thought is incomplete if the roles of faith and practice are ignored. In fact, as I will suggest in the next chapter, Tang Junyi discussed the role of practice through his interpretation of Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification, a theory overlooked in Fang’s interpretation of Huayan. Ironically, in my view, though Fang claimed that both theory and practice are important for human beings in reaching the perfect state, in his interpretation of Huayan thought, it is only philosophical theory that is the main subject of discussion. This point is also essential to understanding his response to ‘scientism’, as I will explain in chapter 5. Regardless of this inconsistency in Fang’s interpretation, his suggestion about the roles of faith and practice are remarkable, compared with most of the studies about Huayan thought.

A further point also requires attention. In his own thought, Fang argued that an ideal person needs to be concerned with others. This principle also applies to his interpretation of Huayan thought. As well as emphasizing the perfect state and practice, Fang also stressed Huayan’s idea of the ‘dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena’ or shi shi wuai fajie, believing it to indicate that the ideal person should be down-to-earth and should not isolate him- or herself from the world. As I mentioned in chapter 2, Huayan’s idea of the ‘dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena’ suggests there are no real conflicts among dharmas. Therefore, various dharmas can co-exist without obstruction. Fang extended this idea, arguing that a similar principle should apply to humanity. It is similar to the situation of a person who is already enlightened needing to consider others. Perhaps Fang’s interpretation of ‘dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena’ is ‘creative’ in terms of Charles Wei-hsun Fu’s idea of ‘Creative Hermeneutics’, which I discussed in chapter 2.5. However, to a large extent, Fang’s ideas may be too far from the ‘original meaning’ of Huayan thought, a view I will consider again at the end of this chapter. Regardless of the possible disputation, Fang’s criterion in ranking various Buddhist theories, the extent to which they contribute to the achievement of harmony, is now clear.

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146 As Fazang described, the fruit of Buddha should be ‘perfect, clean and full of praise’. See Fazang, Huayan youxin fajie ji 華嚴遊心法界記, DZJ, vol.45, No. 1877, pp.646b, 8-12.
147 Fang, HZ vol.1, note 78, pp.53-84.
149 This idea of Fang is seen repeatedly throughout the two volumes of HZ, note 78.
150 For discussion, see HZ vol.1, note 78, pp.492-496; HZ vol.2, ibid., pp.352-360.
Chapter 3.2.2  Fang’s Criterion in ranking Buddhist Theories: Extent of Harmony

From the preceding discussion it is now clear that the focus of Fang’s thought is the perfect state which Huayan thought suggests. The perfection of such a state, in fact, is the criterion for Fang’s ranking of various Buddhist theories. Among the various potential characteristics of such a perfect state, ‘non-obstruction’ is stressed by Fang:

We can summarize the content [of Huayan’s thought] in a word, that is apratihata. What is apratihata? It is to see the diverse realms through an ultimate category so that an integral structure can be seen. Then the differences among diverse worlds can be transformed as an organic unity. In this organic unity, whole and part as well as part and part can be mutually absorbed.151

In chapter 3.1.4, I stressed Fang’s use of different languages to show that his ideas are actually shared by various ancient civilizations. His using apratihata here is a good example of it. According to the citation, Fang considered that apratihata helps make the diverse worlds into an organic unity. In Huayan thought, there is no real obstacle amongst dharmas. Fang argued that this ‘non-obstruction’ in Huayan thought is precisely its advantage, which he considered the dissolution of dualism. As I discussed in chapter 3.1, dualism is Fang’s main criticism of ‘praeternatural metaphysics’. The ‘interpenetration’ of Huayan thought, therefore, is a method to avoid the disadvantages caused by ‘praeternatural metaphysics’. Fang explained this idea clearly thus:

Under the thought of Huayan, the universe is totally an organic unity……this wisdom of all-inclusiveness, from my point of view, can help cure the schizophrenia of Greek thought, modern Western thought and even Indian Buddhism.152

As I will discuss in chapter 5, it is exactly this characteristic of Huayan thought that Fang considered as a response to the challenge of ‘scientism’. However, Fang’s view of Huayan’s perfect state as an organic unity does not mean that there is no classification in Huayan thought. To Fang, the advantage of Huayan thought is the interpenetration among various dharmas:

151 The original sentences are ‘我們可以把它們的含義歸結到一個字上來說明，這一個字就叫做apratiḥata (無礙)，就是所謂「無礙」，這個「無礙」是什麼呢? 就是拿一個根本範疇，把宇宙裡面千差萬別的差別境界，透過一個整體的概念，而彰顯出一個整體的結構，然後再把千差萬別的這個差別世界，一一化成一個整體的統一，並且在整體的統一裡面，對於整體與部分之間能夠互相貫注，部分與部分之間也能互相貫注。’ See Fang, HZ vol.2, ibid., p.3.

152 The original sentences are ‘在華嚴思想的笼罩下，宇宙它才徹底統一、徹頭徹尾是一個統一的整體，……這個具足整體的智慧，從我的觀點上看來，是可以醫治希臘人的心靈分裂症、也可以醫治近代理性主義的分裂症，甚至還可醫治佛學在印度方面所產生的心靈分裂症。’ Ibid., pp.30-31.
Huayan’s thought is not to deny the various levels caused by dualism, but to solve the separation among different levels……that is to say, for two levels, they are not separated but mutually penetrated.\footnote{The original sentences are ‘華嚴宗的哲學，並不是要否認這個二元論所存在的不同層次，而是要解決任何相對的層次的隔絕性……換句話說，在兩種相對的境界裡面，它並不是隔絕的關係，而是透的關係。’ \textit{Ibid.}, p.354.}

In short, it is this capacity of Huayan thought to help construct a harmonious world which makes Fang consider it the best theory within Buddhism.

While describing Huayan thought, in fact, Fang employed many terms specifically used in his own ‘blueprint’ of ‘the correlative structure of man and the world’. As Fang argued explicitly, Huayan’s Buddha realm is a good example of ‘comprehensive harmony’,\footnote{Fang, \textit{CMN}, note 23, pp.56-59.} a point uncommon in his interpretation of various intellectual traditions, including Confucianism and Taoism. The following table shows some of the similarities between the world of Huayan and Fang’s own ‘blueprint’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fang’s Blueprint</th>
<th>Huayan Thought</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biological sphere</td>
<td>World of sentient beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological sphere</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysteriously mysterious mystery</td>
<td>Vairocana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God the most high</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Comparison between Fang’s blueprint and Huayan thought\footnote{For Fang’s employment of specific terms to describe Huayan thought, see Fang, \textit{HZ} vol.1, note 78, pp.14-17, 292 and 319.}

Through practice, however, sentient beings can develop and the summit of the process of self-exaltation is ‘\textit{Deus absconditus}’, which Fang also called ‘Mysteriously mysterious mystery’ and ‘God the most high’. As observed, Fang considered that the terms also fit the state of Vairocana, a symbol of the perfect state in Huayan’s tradition. Therefore,\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp.13-17.}
from Fang’s perspective, Huayan thought is conceptually similar to his own ‘blueprint’. Although Fang did not explicitly say that Huayan thought is equivalent to his ‘blueprint’, in my view, his employing specific terms in his ‘blueprint’ to describe Huayan thought is not merely a coincidence. When he discusses other Buddhist schools, he does not make such comparisons. Therefore, though the comparison may be rough, Fang’s comparing Huayan to his own ‘blueprint’ seems intentional. To Fang, as I mentioned earlier, Huayan thought is a state which can be considered ‘comprehensive harmony’. Hence, while discussing Huayan thought, Fang was actually discussing his own thought. Therefore, to conclude, the degree of reaching ‘comprehensive harmony’ is the criterion employed by Fang for ranking different Buddhist theories. This criterion is worth remembering as it helps explain his response to ‘scientism’, which I will discuss further in chapter 5.

Chapter 3.2.3 Insights and Limitations of Fang’s Interpretation of Huayan Thought

Huayan thought is a complicated system. Therefore, having a comprehensive understanding of the thought is always difficult. From the discussion above, we have gained a basic idea about Fang’s interpretation of this thought. His interpretation has its own insights which may contribute to its study but it may also have limitations and raise other questions as well. In this section, I will discuss both aspects.

For the insights, first, Fang provides a new angle to interpret Huayan thought, which I argue particularly rare and commendable in Chinese academia. In Fang’s ‘blueprint’, the material, which consists of the actual world, is at the lowest level in his idea of ‘comprehensive harmony’. By comparing Huayan thought with his own ‘blueprint’, Fang helps suggest that the material also plays a role in Huayan thought. In fact, Huayan thought is largely regarded as a kind of idealism by many scholars, in which all dharmas are just a manifestation of the mind though not actually existing independently. In terms of Fang’s interpretation, however, Huayan thought does not deny the existence of the material. Instead, what humans should do is to develop from the purely material sphere to an ideal world, as he clearly argued:

It [Huayan thought] believes that the ‘One True Dharma Realm’ is an object full of existences of

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157 As I check Zhongguo dasheng foxue, Huayanzong zhexue and Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development, the works in which Fang interpreted Buddhist thought, such comparison is only observed in his discussion of Huayan thought.
material, forms of life, and states and destinations of spirit. It is not from an epistemological point of view, arguing that the world full of object is the transformation of the subjective mind. Although Huayanjing admits that there is an objective world, this world needs to develop itself from a material world to the worlds of life, spirit and holiness. Only in this way can it be claimed an ideal world. Since the objective world is full of life and holiness, and it will finally turn to spiritual glory, from this point of view, I call the Huayan philosophy the philosophy of ideal-realism.  

From the citation, it is obvious that Fang rejected the idea of ‘idealism’ as suggested by many scholars, which suggests that the existence of the material is ultimately dependent on the human mind. To Fang, the world is concrete or as what he called ‘objective’. The task of the mind is to transform the values of the material, making it full of ‘holiness’ and ‘glory’, as is suggested in his ‘blueprint’. Although this interpretation may not totally match Huayan thought as discussed in chapter 2, together with his emphasis on Dushun rather than other Huayan patriarchs, Fang certainly provides a new angle to discuss the thought.

Second, Fang’s suggestion of faith, understanding, practice and enlightenment as the steps for comprehending Huayan thought may be considered an alternative framework for the study of Huayan thought. According to Fang’s classification, most of the studies about Huayan only covered the categories of ‘understanding’ and ‘enlightenment’ with the categories of ‘faith’ and ‘practice’ being neglected. In fact, theoretical discussion and daily practice cannot be separated completely in a religious tradition. Taking his view into account, philosophical discussion alone cannot help human beings rise from the material world to the spiritual world. On the other hand, practice needs to embrace theoretical discussion. This suggestion of Fang helps make the discussion of a religious tradition more comprehensive.

Despite the insights of Fang’s interpretation, its limitations also require consideration. First, Fang’s comment on the role of the pure mind in the Buddhist tradition is debatable. In his own work, Fang doubted whether the subject, since it is not totally pure in nature, can really achieve an ideal and perfect world. As Fang argued:

If we look back to the original issue of human nature, [we find that] human nature extends from

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159 The original sentences are ‘它承認「一真法界」本身就是一種客體，而在這個客體的裡面，包含了一切物質的存在，一切生命的形式，一切精神狀態和一切精神的歸宿，而且它也不從知識論的立場去看，而把客體的世界領域化成主觀的心靈狀態。雖然華嚴經承認有一個客觀的世界，但是這個客觀的世界裡面是要從物質世界發展到生命世界，生命世界發展到精神世界，精神世界再發展到最高的神聖領域去，才可以說是一個 ideal world (理想的世界)。而客體的世界裡面，因為它含藏了生命，含藏了生命世界上面的一切莊嚴世界，同時在這個生命世界上面的一切莊嚴領域，最後又都變成了 spiritual glory，變成了精神上的莊嚴，所以從這麼一個觀點上看起來，華嚴宗的這一套哲學，我們可以叫它做 philosophy of ideal-realism (理想實在論的哲學 —— 倡即事即理)。’ See Fang, HZ vol.1, note 78, p.259.
Fang also suggested that the thought of Consciousness-Only should abandon the concept of ālayavijñāna, which Fang considered impure.¹⁶¹ Fang’s comments on Buddhism are entirely based on his own criterion, which is the actualization of a comprehensive harmonious world. This position of Fang, however, may be less convincing given that the pure mind is one of the concepts explaining the possibility of achieving the perfect state. Historically, the pure mind never gains a dominant role in Buddhism.¹⁶² Theoretically, on the other hand, the impure character, which in the citation Fang called bad character,¹⁶³ as appearing in ālayavijñāna is not the end of the thought of Consciousness-Only. The aim of the system is to change the impure character stored in ālayavijñāna into a pure character.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, Fang’s conclusion that only if it develops a philosophy based on the pure mind can Buddhism achieve a ‘comprehensive harmony’ may be premature. In my view, Fang’s discussion of Buddhism appears to be arbitrary, as the historical fact and theoretical argument of the religion seem to be deliberately misinterpreted.

Second, ironically, Fang’s interpretation also neglects the characteristics of the pure mind as suggested by Huayan’s patriarchs. In chapter 2, I briefly explained that there should be no contradiction among various concepts at the mind level. Only a mind without obstacles can develop to a harmonious world. The contribution of Fazang, Huayan’s third patriarch, is to revise the content of the pure mind and make such harmony possible at the mind level by

¹⁶⁰ The original sentences are ‘如果我們回顧人性的根本問題時，那麼人性是從感性的知識活動所延伸，由前五識，第六意識，再講到第七識 (自我為意根)，第八識 (阿賴耶識) 而來，在第八識裡面是善惡糾纏在一起的，為染淨同住的。假使人性是如此，而應該地要受到善惡糾纏不清的話，那麼人類是否有可能昇到大般涅槃經所說的那一種永恆的精神世界的上去呢？這當然是一個大問題。’ Fang, HZ vol.1, note 78, p.380. Please note that the translation is only a summary of Fang’s sentences.
¹⁶² For a good discussion about the appearance and prevalence of different concepts in Buddhism, see Akira Hirakawa, Paul Groner trans., A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990); Liu Ming-wood, Madhyamaka Thought in China (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1994); Lu Cheng 呂澂, Yindu foxue yuanliu lüejiang 印度佛學源流略講 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 2005).
¹⁶³ Literally Fang seemed to assume that impure character is morally bad, a point not particularly discussed in Huayan thought. Since Fang did not further explain his choice of word in his works, I guess he may want to stress that impure character is not good for achieving ‘comprehensive harmony’. However, this guess is rather difficult to prove given the limited discussion by him.
revising the three natures’ theory suggested by the thought of Consciousness-Only. Although Fang admitted the role of the pure mind, he failed to realize the importance of the work of Fazang but discusses only the contribution of Dushun directly. As a result, Fang admitted the role of ‘perfect reality’ only. In this sense, Fang appears to ignore Fazang’s idea that the three natures are actually penetrating each other, as I mentioned in chapter 2.4.3. To Fazang, ‘perfect reality’ is also ‘arising from conceptualized nature’ and has ‘dependence on others’ by nature. There is no real difference among these three. Unlike ālayavijñāna, which is a concept responsible for explaining the appearance of phenomena, the pure mind is rather like an assumption explaining the possibility of attaining the perfect state. The functions of ālayavijñāna and the pure mind, are in essence, different. However, Fazang tended to combine the two in one concept, arguing that the pure mind is not only the origin making the perfect state possible but also the explanation of the appearance of all phenomena. In this sense, Fazang made his own contribution to Huayan and even Chinese Buddhism. Without his dissolution of the potential contradiction among various dharmas at the mind level, the achievement of ‘comprehensive harmony’ as suggested by Dushun would have been theoretically impossible. Therefore, Fang’s emphasis on the role of Dushun rather than that of Fazang may not be convincing. The impression that Huayan thought is subjective can also not be improved using Fang’s interpretation on its own. As I mentioned earlier, though Fang considered that the way Xiong discussed Buddhism from the point of view of the perfect state directly was problematic, in my view, Fang seems to make the same mistake and fails to compensate for Xiong’s shortcomings.

In fact, as I discussed in chapter 2, Fazang’s suggestion that the pure mind is both the origin of the perfect state and phenomena stems from the Dasheng qixin lun. Unfortunately, due to unknown reasons, Fang neglected the role of Dasheng qixin lun in Huayan thought totally, not to mention Nan Dilun School and Shelun School, and this makes his interpretation of the thought incomplete. First, as I have said, Fang failed to explain why the pure mind can achieve ‘comprehensive harmony’. Second, he also failed to account for the appearance of impure or defiled dharmas if the mind is pure. In short, by contemporary standards, his works may not be regarded as sufficiently scholarly, and this factor helps explain why his interpretation of Huayan thought has gained little attention within academic circles.

Certainly, in terms of the main theme of this study – the consideration of both Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought to meet the challenge of ‘scientism’ – it is not essential that Fang’s interpretation addresses all the issues about Huayan. This section points out only the potential insights and limitations of Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought so

that the characteristics of his appropriation of this Buddhist tradition can be better understood.

Chapter 3.3 Conclusion

At first sight, the discussions in this chapter appear to be about Fang’s own philosophical thought and his interpretation of Huayan thought. However, I would argue that they are actually about Fang’s redefining the ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of Chinese culture and that of Huayan thought. In fact, Fang considered aspects of Huayan thought to represent exactly the characteristics of ‘Chinese philosophy’,¹⁶⁶ in which, using the terms of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, ‘comprehensive harmony’ is its ‘ti’ while harmonization of different values is its ‘yong’. According to Fang, Confucianism and Taoism are representations of the kind of ‘Chinese philosophy’ that offer ‘comprehensive harmony’.¹⁶⁷ Amongst the schools in Buddhism, Huayan also shares this characteristic.¹⁶⁸ In chapter 3.2, I discussed why Fang considered that Huayan belongs to a philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’ and how the thought helps harmonize different values. In other words, Fang defined the ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of Huayan thought, arguing that the thought shares the concepts of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ with Confucianism and Taoism. In chapter 2, I suggested that modern Confucian thinkers’ appropriations of Buddhist ideas are to ‘enrich the Confucian ‘ti’ with the Buddhist ‘ti’ and to complement the Confucian ‘yong’ with the Buddhist ‘yong’. While in this chapter I have raised Fang’s idea of Chinese philosophy’s ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ in relation to Huayan thought, I will in chapter 5 discuss how the ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of the latter subsequently helped enrich and complement the ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of the former, so that Chinese thought could become capable of responding to the challenge of ‘scientism’.

¹⁶⁶ For discussion, see CVL, note 15, pp.1-26.
¹⁶⁷ Ibid.
¹⁶⁸ Fang, CMN, note 23, pp.56-59.
Chapter 4 Tang Junyi and Huayan Thought

Unlike Thomé H. Fang’s appropriation of Huayan thought, which is largely overlooked in academia, Tang Junyi’s relationship with Huayan thought seems widely recognized, especially among Chinese academics. Astonishingly, however, there is a lack of serious study about this issue.¹ Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought was even criticized by Lin Yu-sheng 林毓生 (1934 - ), a famous historian, as being a ‘confusion of ideas’,² implying that his appropriation of the thought is a failure. To a large extent, I argue that Tang’s relationship with Huayan thought has not been properly understood. Like the discussion about Fang and Huayan in chapter 3, discussion about Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought also needs, in my view, to consider his own general thought, as it is from his own perspective that Tang interpreted this Buddhist tradition and appropriated it. Therefore, in this chapter, I will first critically assess Tang’s own thought and its characteristics, and will then discuss his interpretation of Huayan.

Chapter 4.1 Tang Junyi’s General Philosophy

Chapter 4.1.1 The Life and Works of Tang Junyi

Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909-1978) was born in Yibin, in the Chinese province of Sichuan. His father, Tang Difeng 唐廬風 (1886-1931), was a scholar in the late Qing Dynasty and a student of the then well-known Buddhist scholar, Ouyang Jian. His mother, Chen Zhuoxian 陳卓僊 (1887-1964), was a teacher in primary and secondary schools.³ With this family background, Tang Junyi was introduced to cultural issues from an early age. During his teenage years, he became interested in Western philosophy and considered traditional Chinese

¹ Most studies about this issue are at an introductory level, which tend to repeat what Tang said about Huayan thought. For example, see Zhang Yunjiang 張雲江, Xin tong jiu jing: Tang Junyi yu Huayanzong 心通九境: 唐君毅與華嚴宗 (unpublished MA dissertation, Sichuan: Sichuan University 四川大學, 2005); Jing Haifeng 景海峰, Xin ruxue yi ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang 新儒學與二十世紀中國思想 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe 中州古籍出版社, 2005), pp. 243-252; Xu Jia 徐嘉, Xianrui xin rujia yu foxue 現代新儒家與佛學 (Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe 宗教文化出版社, 2007), pp.162-171.


³ For introduction to Tang’s parents and their works, see Tang Junyi, Nianpu; Zhushu nianbiao; Xianren zhushu 年譜；著述年表；先人著述 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju 臺灣學生書局, 1990).
thought hackneyed. However, his initial view of Chinese thought changed gradually with age and experience. In 1925, Tang studied philosophy at Peking University. Becoming tired of the difficult atmosphere of rivalry amongst the scholars there, he moved in 1927 to the Central University, where he met Thomé H. Fang and Tang Yongtong. After graduation in 1932, Tang taught in several universities and secondary schools in mainland China and rapidly developed a strong reputation in academia. In 1940, he met Mou Zongsan and the two became lifetime friends.

When the Chinese Communist Party gained control over the country in 1949, Tang Junyi, Qian Mu and Zhang Pijie moved to Hong Kong, where they established New Asia College 新亚書院. In 1958, Tang Junyi, together with Carsun Chang, Xu Fuguan and Mou Zongsan, published the declaration ‘A Manifesto on [the] Reappraisal of Chinese Culture – Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to [the] World Cultural Outlook’, arguing that ‘Heart-Mind and Nature’ (Ch. Xinxing 心性) represented the core values of Chinese culture, and Confucianism in particular. Although this declaration is jointly signed by several thinkers, it was drafted by Tang Junyi and therefore, the declaration is largely considered to comprise the ideas of Tang.

In 1963, New Asia College, together with Chung Chi College 崇基學院 and United College 聯合書院, became the founding colleges of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Tang became the first professor in the Philosophy Department and the Dean of the Faculty of Arts of the University in the same year. The three colleges were at first granted autonomous powers but in the 1970s, the Hong Kong Government decided to assert administrative authority over the colleges. Worried that the ideal of New Asia College would not survive, Tang Junyi, Qian Mu and the other seven college governors resigned in protest at the Government’s decision in 1977. However, Tang died of lung cancer in Hong Kong the following year. In fact, as Tang spent his whole life within education, his potential audiences

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4 See Tang, ibid., p.21.
5 It is said that Daode ziw o zhi jianli 道德自我之建立, a work of Tang written at his thirties, was selected for the top academic prize by the Government at that time. Han Wei Liang Jin Nanbeichao fo jiao shi 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史, the influential work about Buddhist history written by Tang Yongtong, came second place. Since Tang Yongtong was once a teacher of Tang Junyi, it is said that Tang Junyi declined the prize modestly. This story helps mention that Tang Junyi, as a young scholar, enjoyed good reputation. See Tang Junyi, Tang Junyi quanji 唐君毅全集 vol. 30 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp.86-87.
6 For details, see chapter 1.2.
7 Huang Zhaoqiang 黃兆強, Xueshu yu jingshi: Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai 學術與經世：唐君毅的歷史哲學及其終極關懷 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2010), pp.479-505.
and readers were mainly adolescents, a point helpful in our understanding of a key characteristic of his thought, which is the emphasis on ‘practice’, as I will discuss below.

Shortly after his death, a series of comments were made by some of Tang’s former colleagues. Once acknowledging his friend as a ‘giant in the universe of cultural consciousness’, Mou Zongsan later suggested that Tang’s scholarship did not develop greatly after his thirties. This raised questions and even doubts, especially among younger scholars, about the status of Tang in modern Chinese thought. Although this dispute has diminished in recent years, comprehensive study of Tang remains comparatively rare. Some aspects of his thought have not been fully explored and the general understanding of his significance in academia is far from satisfactory. This study therefore seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of Tang’s role in modern Chinese intellectual history.

If Thomé H. Fang’s interest in Buddhism, and Huayan thought in particular, during the Second Sino-Japanese War was rather sudden, Tang Junyi’s interest in Buddhism could be characterized as a mystery. Although it is recorded that Tang Junyi studied with Tang Yongtong, a famous scholar of Buddhist history, during his undergraduate years, no further mention of this teacher-student relationship can be found. The only record indicating Tang Junyi’s relationship with influential Buddhist figures was his visit to Ouyang Jian in 1940, when he refused to be a private student of the latter and said he would like to learn more than Buddhism. In fact, as shown in his early writings, Tang expressed his discontent with the Buddhist idea of impermanence (Skt. anitya; Chi. wuchang 無常), insisting that his desire of pursuing a perfect world was ‘real’. As Tang indicated, it was such a desire rather than the impermanence of the world that he valued. In this sense, Tang’s use of Huayan in his thought would seem rather unlikely and something which can only be fully understood after considering his views on the purpose of philosophy.

Chapter 4.1.2 Tang on the Purpose of Philosophy

For Tang, the purpose of philosophy cannot be separated from his understanding of the ultimate goal of humanity, which is to achieve an ‘infinite life’ (Chi. wuxian zhi xingming 無限之生命). He explained this idea as follows:

9 See chapter 1.1.
11 Li Zehou 李澤厚, for example, ignores Tang while mentioning modern Chinese thought. See his Zhongguo xianshui siyuan shilun 中國現代思想史論 (Taipei: Sanmin shuju 三民書局, 1996).
12 Tang Junyi, NZX, note 3, pp.41-42.
13 This point will be clearer after the discussion of section 4.1.2.
14 Tang Junyi, Daode ziwo zhi jianli (Hong Kong: Rensheng chubanshe 人生出版社, 1963), pp.74-81.
What is the real existence (Chi. zhenshi cun zai 真實存在) of our life? It is the impossibility of a being not to exist. This is the real existence. This life of its being impossible not to exist means an infinite life, which is forever lasting and universal. For the world of common mortals, this life is normally considered the life of heaven or god. Ordinary men may consider it impossible for them to obtain. However, I will argue that it is obtainable for all human beings. A life truly penetrating innumerable lives means this infinite life.\(^\text{15}\)

According to Tang, the purpose of philosophy is to help a human being achieve an ‘infinite life’ through penetrating the lives of others, so that the life of a human being can be ‘forever lasting and universal’. This point is important to our understanding of Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought, as this Buddhist tradition stresses the interpenetration amongst different phenomena, a view I have discussed in chapters 2 and 3. As Tang admitted, any knowledge or theory irrelevant to this ultimate purpose, the penetration of the lives of others, can only be a conceptual game.\(^\text{16}\) In this sense, philosophy covers not only certain kinds of thought but certain kinds of teaching, which help human beings expand their mind and reach other beings in practice. As Tang said:

\[\text{The purpose of philosophy is to become a teaching.}\]

As I have noted throughout this study, ‘philosophy’ in the Chinese tradition tends to achieve ‘self-transformation’ and ‘transformation of the world’\(^\text{17}\). In my view, the word ‘teaching’ (Chi. jiao 教) Tang used here is not restricted to religion, but any thought which helps achieve the above transformations. Therefore, it is important to remember that practice plays an essential role in Tang’s thought. This emphasis on practice probably stemmed from his personal experience, as he explicitly indicated:

\[\text{As I generally say, some ideas derive from your character from youth onwards. There are many genuine experiences, which provide the background for thinking about an issue. Sometimes, your thought and knowledge may not match your genuine experiences. But no matter how circuitously they develop, they eventually match genuine experiences……the most important part of my thought}\]


\(^{16}\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp.24-36.

\(^{17}\) The original sentence is ‘哲學之目標在成教’ \textit{Ibid.}, p.33.

\(^{18}\) For discussion, see chapter 1.2.
develops from genuine experience.  

To a large extent, Tang’s pursuit of philosophy can be viewed as a response to his own experience (Chi. *jingyan* 經驗), and this is why I argue that Tang’s thought cannot be discussed separately from his own experience. In fact, Tang’s experience is stressed throughout his writings, so for example:

1.) While seeing the land split due to drought during his childhood, Tang worried that the earth would soon end.

2.) During his teenage years, while watching a movie about Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the founder of the Republic of China, Tang wondered how little a human being was, compared with the whole universe. At the same time, he appreciated how much a human being could achieve.

3.) When separating from his parents, Tang genuinely felt sadness.

From these experiences, Tang eventually concluded:

I hence realize that there is a sincere and compassionate benevolence (Chi. *ren* 仁) in my life. The heart of compassion as suggested by Buddhism is also inherent in me. Although this Humanity has manifested itself only occasionally since my teenage years, no matter how circuitously, my philosophical thought has developed along with the direction of explaining the existence of such Humanity. This is not for mere intellectual interest but for helping myself and others better to manifest Humanity in order to save the world.

To Tang, manifestation of this benevolence is not mysterious but a real personal experience, an idea similar to that of Xiong Shili in his famous dialogue with Fung Yu-lan, to which I referred in chapter 2.2.2. Perhaps it is this similarity between Xiong and Tang that has caused the so-called teacher-student relationship between them to be stressed in academia, a point I

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23 The original sentences are ‘吾即以此而知吾之生命中，實原有一真誠惻怛之仁體之在，而佛家之同體大悲之心，亦吾所固有。吾之此仁體，雖只偶然昭露，然吾之為哲學思辨，則自十餘歲以來，即歷盡種種曲折，以向此一物事之說明而趨，而亦非只滿足個人之理智興趣，而在自助、亦助人之共昭露此仁體以救世。’ *Ibid.*, p.467.

will further discuss in chapter 4.2. According to Tang, philosophy is not only a theoretical but also a practical issue, in which how to be a moral being is the core concern. In terms of ancient Chinese thought, this is called the ‘scholarship of becoming moral’ (Chi. chengde zhi xue 成德之學). In short, I argue that it is the achievement of an ‘infinite life’ through becoming moral which is the purpose of Tang’s philosophy. And it is by means of this kind of philosophy that Tang responded to the challenges of ‘scientism’. Any topics unrelated to this are, therefore, secondary in his thought.\(^{25}\)

Chapter 4.1.3 The Existence of Mind as a Theoretical Prerequisite

Since Tang’s task is to explain the existence of benevolence in human beings, he stressed the concept of mind (Chi. Xin 心) throughout his writings, as is shown below:

The aim [of the work] is to indicate a direction of philosophical thought that raises the place of the human mind in the universe.\(^{26}\)

It should be noted that most of Tang’s early works were written in the 1940s, the period when Communism prevailed in China and the Chinese Communist Party began to take control of the country. It is under this atmosphere that Tang tried to confirm that the mind, not material considerations, plays the most fundamental part in human activity. As he said:

We do not deny the existence and reality of the matter (Chi. wuzhi 物質). Like all materialists, we are also convinced. What we want to argue is that the existence of matter is only a kind of existence and existence is not completely matter.\(^{27}\)

In fact, Tang provides many arguments to illustrate the existence of the mind.\(^{28}\) In my opinion, the simplest but also the most convincing one is that, when one denies the existence of the mind, it is the mind reflecting on the issue and drawing this conclusion. Therefore, saying that the mind does not exist is paradoxically a proof of its existence.\(^{29}\) Based on this understanding, Tang developed many arguments supporting the view that the mind is more fundamental than the material in human life, though he did not reject the idea that we human

\(^{25}\) For reference, see Lao Sze-kwang, ‘Yi Tang Junyi xiansheng ji qi chengde zhi xue 憶唐君毅先生及其成德之學’, Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua no.8 Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu 中國哲學與文化 no. 8 唐君毅與中國哲學研究 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2010), pp.1-2.

\(^{26}\) The original sentences are ‘其用意則在指示一「提高人心在宇宙中之地位」之哲學思想方向。’ See Tang Junyi, Xin wu yu rensheng 心物與人生 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2002), p.4.

\(^{27}\) The original sentences are ‘物質的存在與實在，我們一點亦不否認，我們同一切唯物論者，一樣的堅信，我們只是要說明，物質的存在只是一種存在，而存在者不全然是物質。’ Ibid., p.165.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., pp.7-163.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., p.90.
beings can regard our minds as a kind of ‘object’.\textsuperscript{30} Among numerous arguments, I consider that his theory of death helps explain the issue in a rather lively way. He argued that human beings not only live to fulfil their bodily needs but that there are always other goals for them to achieve. For instance, since human beings need to fulfil their bodily needs by eating or drinking, having food or water is simply a means whereby human beings sustain themselves. After supporting their lives, human beings can then pursue other goals, like improving the lives of their families and contributing to society. Therefore, in Tang’s own terms, there are always spiritual (Chi. \textit{jingshen de 精 神 的}) needs beyond human beings’ pursuit of the material. According to Tang, the mind is the origin of all spiritual activities.\textsuperscript{31} Therefore, the mind is more fundamental than the material in human life. For Tang, the material will eventually be destroyed but the spirit can remain alive. The achievement of ‘infinite life’ is, in fact, through our continuously enhancing the spirit.\textsuperscript{32} The more human beings develop concern, the broader the spirit will be.\textsuperscript{33} Tang’s definition of life, in short, is spiritual rather than physical.\textsuperscript{34}

In my view, this relationship between an ‘infinite life’ and the mind touches the central theme of Tang’s thought. As previously mentioned, Tang’s understanding of the ultimate goal of human beings is the achievement of an ‘infinite life’. The purpose of philosophy is to help human beings achieve this ultimate goal through penetrating the lives of other beings, meaning as we have seen, enhancing the concern for others. The mind, which is the origin of all spiritual activities, is, therefore, a theoretical prerequisite of Tang’s entire thought. It immediately brings the discussion to a crucial stage: the introduction of the content and characteristics of the mind, as well as its relationship with other beings.

\textbf{Chapter 4.1.4 The Characteristics of Mind}

In Chinese intellectual traditions, Confucianism for instance, there are many terms which help describe various characteristics of the human self. While ‘mind’ usually refers to the capacity
for moral reflection, ‘sentiment’ (Chi. 情 qíng) and ‘desire’ (Chi. 欲 yù) are other examples, which respectively describe feelings such as emotion towards others and the sexual impulse. In short, ‘mind’ means the mental activity of humanity. Interestingly, however, Tang seems to express all these meanings with one word ‘xin’, a characteristic which makes his thought sometimes difficult to discuss. While ‘xin’ is usually translated as ‘mind’, it is also translated as ‘Heart-mind’ in some literature. This is because the term Tang used is closely related to his thought in most of his writings, including his last work 生命存在与心灵境界 (The Existence of Life and Horizons of Mind), that Tang employed ‘xinling’ 心靈, a term becoming popular in China from the early twentieth-century onwards and with almost the same meaning as ‘xin’ in daily Chinese, rather than ‘xin’ to express his ideas, a phenomenon rather unusual amongst his contemporaries. Tang explained his rationale as follow:

The ‘xin’ in the term ‘xinling’ is mainly used inwardly while ‘ling’ refers to vacuity and the ability to reach outward. The nimbleness and the ability for reaching outward imply the meaning of ‘empathic penetration’.

While ‘xin’ normally refers to a mind with tangible characteristics and functions, such as capacities for moral reflection and thinking, which I call the ‘concrete’ side of the mind, Tang argued that ‘ling’ 靈 describes the ‘vacuous’ (Chi. 虛 xū) side of the mind. In fact, in Taoism, emphasizing ‘vacuity’ is common as in the Laozi 老子, it is remarked that ‘While vacuous, it is never exhausted. When active, it produces even more.’ The concept of ‘vacuity’, in short, means something not substantial or immaterial. Although the face of ‘vacuity’ is particularly emphasized in Taoism, it is also discussed in Confucianism. Xunzi 荀子 (340BC – 245BC.), for instance, emphasized this aspect of the mind when he discussed the way of learning. As he said, ‘How does a man understand the way? Through the mind. And how can the mind understand it? Because it is empty [vacuous], unified, and still. The mind is

36 In fact, Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139-1193), an influential Confucian thinker in the Song Dynasty, also shared this characteristic of Tang. In this sense, Tang is not the only Confucian thinker who expresses various meanings related to subjectivity with one word ‘xin’.
38 The original sentences are ‘心靈之「心」偏自主于內說，「靈」則言其虛靈而能通外，靈活而善感外，即涵感通義。’ See Tang, SCYXJ vol. 1, note 15, p.10.
constantly storing up things, and yet it is said to be empty [vacuous]. The mind is constantly marked by diversity, and yet it is said to be unified. The mind is constantly moving, and yet it is said to be still.\(^{41}\) I argue that this idea of Xunzi helps explain Tang’s understanding of the mind.

According to Tang, the mind is never rigid. On the contrary, there is always room in it to absorb new ideas and reach a new phase. While the concrete side of the mind helps explain different human abilities, such as the abilities to feel and to think,\(^ {42}\) the vacuous side of the mind explains the possibility of interacting with others without any obstacle. Both sides of the mind help constitute the idea of ‘empathic penetration’ (Chi. gantong 感通).\(^ {43}\) an idea originally drawn from the famous statement of Yi Jing: ‘Change has neither thought nor action, because it is in the state of absolute quiet and inactivity, and when acted on, it immediately penetrates all things’.\(^ {44}\) Literally, ‘gantong’ means feeling and penetrating, which, I argue, are derived respectively from the concrete and vacuous sides of the mind. In short, the term means ‘one’s ability to feel and know an object or a situation and to penetrate it with one’s empathetic response’.\(^ {45}\) However, the absence of either side of the mind makes the constitution of the idea of ‘empathic penetration’ impossible.\(^ {46}\) As I argue below, the odds of achieving ‘empathic penetration’ is one of Tang’s criteria for judging various intellectual traditions, and needs to be considered together with his theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’ (Chi. xinling jiu jing 心靈九境).

Tang’s discussion of the mind, however, does more than just emphasize its two sides. In fact, Tang further classified the characteristics of the mind as substance or ‘ti’, appearance or...

\(^{41}\) The original Chinese sentences are ‘人何以知道? 曰：心，心何以知? 曰：虛壹而靜。心未嘗不臧也，然而有所謂虚；心未嘗不兩也，然而有所謂壹；心未嘗不動也，然而有所謂靜。’ See Xunzi, chapter 21. For the English translation, see Burton Watson, Basic writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.127. It is noted that Watson uses emptiness but not vacuity to translate ‘xu’.


\(^{43}\) There are many translations of the term. In this study, I follow the translation of Donald J. Munro, as he exactly discusses Tang’s idea of ‘gantong’, but not the ‘gantong’ of other Chinese thinkers. See his ‘Empathy – Comments at the Unveiling of the Statue of Tang Junyi on 20 May 2009’, in Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua no.8 Tang Junyi yu zhongguo zhexue yanjiu, note 25, pp.3-5.

\(^{44}\) The original sentences are ‘易無思也，無為也，寂然不動，感而遂通天下之故。’ See Appended Remarks of Yi Jing 周易繫辭 part 1, chapter 10. For the translation, see Chan Wing-tsit, note 39, p.267.


‘xiang’ 相 and function or ‘yong’, two of which I have partly discussed in chapter 2. In general, the word ‘xiang’ is used as the Chinese translation of the Buddhist term ‘laksana’, which primarily means the appearance or attributes of things.\(^{47}\) In China, the employment of ‘xiang’ is in most cases also discussed together with ‘ti’ and ‘yong’. A stone, for instance, is grey and hard. The colour and quality are the appearances, attributes or ‘xiang’ of the stone. A stone can also be used for building a house, which can be considered its ‘yong’. Since there are ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’ of the stone, in terms of the analysis of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, which I discussed in chapter 2, there should be a ‘ti’ of the stone. In short, all beings, no matter whether sentient beings or not, have their own ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’. To Tang, the mind is not an exception to this, as it can also be analyzed as ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’. This idea helps constitute his well-known theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’, an original theory developed by Tang, which I will now discuss.

Chapter 4.1.5 Introduction to the Theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’

Among Tang’s more wide-ranging ideas, the theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’, which is set out in his final work, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, is critical. As indicated in the name, two components play a central role in the theory, ‘mind’ (Chi. xinling 心靈) and ‘horizon’ (Chi. jingjie 境界).

Although the word ‘jing’ 境 is seen in some Taoist texts in the period of Wei, Jin, and the Southern and Northern Dynasties (220-589),\(^{48}\) it was after the prevalence of Consciousness-Only in China, during the Tang Dynasty, that the philosophical meaning of the word became more common. ‘Jing’ is primarily employed to translate the word ‘viśaya’ from Consciousness-Only, meaning ‘sphere’ or ‘field’. Different from its employment in Consciousness-Only, however, in the Chinese tradition, ‘jing’ is commonly linked with the word ‘jie’ 界, which helps constitute the term ‘jingjie’ 境界, a term similar to the meaning of ‘mental status’ or ‘horizon’. In this sense, therefore, it can be considered that there is a close relationship between ‘jingjie’ and the mind. In fact, ‘jing’ is usually used together with ‘xin’ or the mind and it helps constitute another term ‘xinjing’ 心境, commonly used in daily Chinese to mean ‘state of mind’.

For Tang, however, the meaning of ‘xinjing’ is more than just a state of mind. As I mentioned earlier, Tang argued that there are both concrete and vacuous sides to the mind. In fact, he also


\(^{48}\) For example, see Guo Xiang’s Commentary on the Zhuangzi 郭象莊子注.
considered that all things in the world, including the mind of humanity, contain these two faces. While the word ‘object’ tends to indicate the concrete side of a thing, including the human mind, it fails to denote its vacuous side. In this sense, the mind is not only an object but more than that, an idea that will be clearer after the discussion in section 4.1.7. Therefore, as Tang himself stated, ‘jing’ is better translated as ‘horizon’ or ‘world’ in his thought, as the word helps contain the core meaning of object, while at the same time, lessening the meaning of the concrete side which the word ‘object’ implies.\(^{49}\) According to Tang’s own definition, the term ‘xinjing’ suggests a relationship between the mind and horizons. Since ‘jing’ or ‘horizon’ is not an object, Tang considered that it is not opposite to the subject. Mind and horizon, therefore, are not obstructive but interactive. The mind perceiving horizon indicates that the latter is to be perceived by the former. In this case, the horizon exists in the mind. On the other hand, the way the mind perceives is altered by different horizons.\(^{50}\) The theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’ indentifies nine relationships between the mind and horizons, in which the interaction between the two is emphasized. This interaction, in Tang’s own words, is called ‘empathic penetration’ or gantong, a term I explained briefly above.\(^{51}\)

The question now remaining is how ‘empathic penetration’ functions. As noted, Tang argued that there are three characteristics of all things, ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’. According to Tang, the interaction with horizons is, for instance, only a ‘yong’ of the mind. To fully comprehend a thing, however, Tang suggested different horizons were necessary. He considered that our understanding of a thing always follows a particular order, which is perception first, like the reception of sense data, followed by cognition, such as the categorization of that data. This way of comprehension via a specific order is called ‘sequential observation’ (Chi. shun guan 順觀), by which the ‘yong’ or function of a thing is understood. Besides, ‘xiang’ or appearances of different things are all the same from an axiological perspective, since they are the reflection of the ‘ti’ or substance of the things. Observing the identity of ‘xiang’ is called ‘horizontal observation’ (Chi. heng guan 橫觀). Although ‘xiang’ are all the same from an axiological point of view, the ‘ti’ of the thing can be different. Comprehending a thing via its ‘ti’ is called ‘vertical observation’ (Chi. zong guan 縱觀).\(^{52}\) These three ways of comprehending the world comprise the entire activities of the mind. Admittedly, the relationships between and among ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’ as Tang argued are so far not clear. However, I argue that the key point of Tang’s argument is not to explain these relationships, but to suggest that all things, including the human mind, can be comprehended via the dimensions of ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’. In other words, the absence of any dimension makes

\(^{49}\) Tang Junyi, SCYXJ vol. 1, note 15, pp.11-12.  
\(^{50}\) Ibid., pp.12-14.  
\(^{52}\) For details of the three different ways of comprehending a thing, see Tang Junyi, SCYXJ vol. 1, note 15, pp.12-17.
our comprehension of a thing incomplete. I argue that this point is essential to our understanding of Tang’s response to ‘scientism’, as I will discuss further below.

For Tang, a comprehensive understanding of a thing involves observing its ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’ through the three ways of comprehension. These ways of comprehension correlate to the understanding of object, subject and the relationship between the two. According to Tang, human understanding of the world is at first outwardly directed, since it starts from the observation of the object. However, the direction then turns inwards, from the observation of object to the subject, which is responsible for comprehending the object. Along with the enhancement of the extent of self-cultivation, eventually, the distinction between object and subject is dissolved. In short, the ‘nine horizons’ of Tang discuss the spheres of object, subject and the state without distinction between the two.\(^{53}\) In general, the construction of Tang’s theory of the ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’ can be summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substantive Horizon</th>
<th>Appearance Horizon</th>
<th>Function Horizon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective Horizon</td>
<td>Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things</td>
<td>Horizon of the Transforms as related to Species and Genus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(萬物散殊境)</td>
<td>(依類成化境)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Horizon</td>
<td>Horizon of Interpenetration of Perceptions</td>
<td>Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(感覺互攝境)</td>
<td>(觀照凌虛境)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendence of</td>
<td>Horizon of Conversion to the one God</td>
<td>Horizon of the Void of Self and that of Existent Things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective and</td>
<td>(歸向一神境)</td>
<td>(我法二空境)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective Horizon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Summary of Tang Junyi’s Theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’\(^{54}\)

In short, the first three horizons help describe, respectively, the ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’ of objects, which Tang summarized as the ‘Objective Horizon’ (Chi. *keguan jingjie* 客觀境界).\(^{55}\) The first horizon is the ‘Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things’ (Chi. *wanwu sanshu jing* 萬物散殊境), which consists of numerous unconnected and individual units. In this horizon, each unit, including human beings, does not recognize the existence of other beings. Therefore, each unit exists independently and no connection can be drawn between them. For Tang, what concerns human beings in this horizon is only the individual unit. The

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\(^{54}\) Table 1 is revised from Tan’s ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy’, ibid., p.552.

existence of the individual unit is considered objective. Tang considered that all worldviews concerning the individual, like individualism and even knowledge of individual objects, should be categorized under this horizon.56

The second horizon is the ‘Horizon of the Transformations as related to Species and Genus’ (Chi. yilei chenghua jing 依類成化境), which consists of the classification of different individuals in terms of their common characteristics. In the ‘Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things’, there is no relationship between individuals. However, there are actually different and common characteristics among them. By sorting the differences and commonalities among individuals, they can be categorized into different groups. For example, by knowing the common characteristics of a dog and a cat, both can be categorized into the group of animals. By knowing the differences between them, however, they can be seen as different kinds of animal. In short, in this horizon, the ‘xiang’ of the objects is observed.57

The third horizon is the ‘Horizon of Functional and Orderly Operations’ (Chi. gongneng xuyun jing 功能序運境), which consists of causal connections between individuals. In this horizon, the functions of individuals and groups are focused on. Among various functions, Tang emphasized the relationship of cause and effect. For Tang, after considering the existence and appearances of individuals, the causal correlation between them should be considered. Any knowledge concerning the investigation of correlations among individuals and groups is classified in this horizon.58

As the ‘Horizon of the Discrete Existence of the Myriad Things’ describes the existence of an individual thing but not its ‘xiang’ or ‘yong’, Tang considered it a horizon for describing the ‘ti’ or substance of a thing. Besides, the ‘Horizon of the Transformations as related to Species and Genus’ describes the common characteristics of different things. These common characteristics, to Tang, are the ‘xiang’ of the things. Therefore, it is a horizon for describing the appearance of a thing. Likewise, the ‘Horizon of Functional and Orderly Operations’ describes the ‘yong’ of various kinds of thing. As I mentioned earlier, Tang considered that these three horizons help describe the ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’ of objects respectively, which he summarized as ‘Objective Horizon’. In the sphere of ‘Objective Horizon’, human beings pay attention to the object only and neglect the existence of the subject. However, along with the increase of daily experience, human beings should realize that there must be the existence of a perceiving and cognitive subject, otherwise comprehension of the object would not be possible. Therefore, after discussing the ‘Objective Horizon’, Tang immediately introduced the horizons related to subject, which he summarized as ‘Subjective Horizon’ (Chi. zhuguan

56 Ibid., pp.57-152.
58 Ibid., pp.231-344.
The first of these horizons is the ‘Horizon of Interpenetration of Perceptions’ (Chi. ganjue hushe jing 感覺互攝境). In this horizon, Tang argued that the relationship between subject and object begins from the perception of human beings. For example, the fact that an object can be observed by me is because I have the ability to see. If I did not have such ability, the relationship between me and the object might alter. To Tang, perception is the first step for human beings to link themselves with others. By reflecting on the ability of perception, a human being begins to realize the existence of self. Such existence of self, according to Tang, is the substance of subject.  

The horizon which follows is the ‘Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void’ (Chi. guanzhao lingxu jing 觀照凌虛境). In the previous horizon, the ability of perception is stressed. In addition to this ability, however, the subject of human beings can also act like a mirror and let the objects and even subjects manifest themselves as they actually are. In short, it is the ability of doing abstract contemplation. By achieving this, the universal characteristics among various kinds of thing are to be reflected. Such universal characteristics, according to Tang, are the ‘xiang’ or appearance of the things.  

The next horizon is the ‘Horizon of Moral Practice’ (Chi. daode shijian jing 道德實踐境). There are obviously various abilities in humans, including the abilities to perceive and to conceive abstract ideas, as expressed in the previous two horizons. Among these different abilities, however, Tang stressed the ability for moral practice, considering it the most important function of human beings. Without acknowledging this function, the understanding of the subject is not comprehensive. All moral philosophy stems from the moral reflection of the subject.  

The above horizons are related to the ‘ti’, ‘xiang’ and ‘yong’ of the subject respectively and all of them are summarized as ‘Subjective Horizon’. However, Tang’s ultimate goal of the ‘Theory of Nine Horizons’ is not simply to introduce the characteristics of object and subject but to dissolve the distinction between the two, the ideal explained in the three horizons which Tang categorized as ‘Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon’ (Chi. chao zhuguan keguan jing 超主觀客觀境).  

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59 Ibid., p.49-51.  
60 Ibid., pp.345-439.  
61 Ibid., pp.441-604.  
62 Ibid., pp.605-688.  
63 Tang Junyi, SCYXJ vol. 2, note 20, p.3.
The first of these horizons is the ‘Horizon of Conversion to the one God’ (Chi. guixiang yishen jing 归向一神境). In this horizon, Tang suggested that only a transcendent god is the ultimate ‘ti’ or substance of the universe. Subject and object are not the concern of human beings, as the faith of human beings should be put in God but not in anything else. Christianity, to Tang, is an example of this horizon.64

The next horizon is the ‘Horizon of the Void of Self and that of Existent Things’ (Chi. wo fa er kong jing 我法二空境). In this horizon, Tang discussed the idea of emptiness in Buddhism, considering that there is a state in which all beings, including self and any other phenomena which he called ‘fa’ 法 or dharmas, are empty in nature. That the self is empty means there is no unchanged nature in subject. Similarly, that all existent things are empty implies there is no independent nature of object. In this sense, the distinction between subject and object is only a ‘xiang’ or appearance. There is no real contradiction or conflict among them. In short, the apparent contradiction between subject and object can in principle be dissolved.65

The last horizon is the ‘Horizon of Embodiment of Heavenly Virtues’ (Chi. tiande liuxing jing 天德流行境), a state, according to Tang, belonging to Confucianism. In this horizon, human beings will extend their moral consideration to others consciously, helping transform the world with virtues. In this horizon, there is no difference between subject and object from an axiological point of view. This idea, Tang considered, is the ‘Unity of Heaven and the Human’ (Chi. tian ren heyi 天人合一), a key notion of Confucianism.66

As Tang explicitly argued, the main characteristic of the horizons belonging to the ‘Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon’ is their emphasis on practice and experience.67 These horizons are actually certain kinds of teaching rather than purely theoretical thought. As I will further discuss in chapter 5, I believe that this enhances Tang’s interest in Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification. Tang explained his idea as follows:

In these three horizons, knowledge needs to be transformed into wisdom, or attributed to wisdom, in order to function in life and help human beings achieve the real existence of life with value. It is different from other learning in the world, which distinguishes knowing from doing as well as existence from value. The philosophy of it [Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizons] is not only knowing but the teaching in our living and life.68

64 Ibid., p.3-73.
65 Ibid., pp.75-154.
66 Ibid., pp.155-252.
67 Ibid., pp.3-12.
68 The original sentences are ‘在此三境中, 知識皆須化為智慧，或屬于智慧，以運于人之生活，而成就人之有真實價值之生命存在；不同于世間之學之分別知與行，存在與價值者，其中之哲學，亦皆不只是學，而是生活生命之教’; see Tang Junyi, SCYXJ vol. 1, note 15, p.51.
As I will discuss in section 4.1.7, the dimension of practice is always stressed in Tang’s thought, and is even regarded as being one of his most important contributions to the thought of ‘Contemporary Neo-Confucianism’. Before discussing this, however, I wish to stress that Tang considered that observing a thing from different angles involves various horizons. The choice of observation is, however, dependent on the individual. There is no universal principle requiring all human beings to reach certain horizons. Observing vertically, horizontally and sequentially are three ways humans have of viewing the world. Since each observation has its own perspectives on discussing subject, object and the dissolution between the two, each constructs its own worldview in a relatively comprehensive way. Therefore, Tang summarized them as ‘universal observation’ (Chi. pian guan 遍觀), which is different from those perspectives taken only from certain particular perspectives like individual disciplines, such as economics and physics. This point is important to our understanding of Tang’s response to ‘scientism’, as science, according to the above analysis, is only regarded as a particular angle and not as a ‘universal observation’. Although the nine horizons have been briefly mentioned above, they are not the whole of Tang’s theory and, in fact, the most important aspect of his theory is an understanding of how the horizons function together. It is this that I now wish to consider.

Chapter 4.1.6 ‘Universal Observation’ on universal observations

Although Tang presents the horizons deriving from sequential, horizontal and vertical observation as comprehensive, he argued that humans should not stick solely to one of them:

No matter how good a horizon of mind is, if we consider it complete and feel content with it, it becomes the fetter of the mind.  

For Tang, each observation uses only a part of the entire function of the human mind. None of the observations permanently applies to all situations, which means their application depends on particular individuals in particular circumstances. The most important point to recognise is that every kind of observation is from the human mind. Therefore, as Tang argued, the spirit of human beings towards God, the pure mind of Buddhism and the moral consideration of others as suggested by Confucianism are actually all from the same origin but with different

70 Tang Junyi, SCYXJ vol. 1, note 15, p.17.  
71 The original sentences are ‘無論什麼好的心靈境界，當我們視之為完成而自足於其中時，他便成為我心靈本身之桎梏’ See Tang Junyi, Rensheng zhi tiyan 人生之體驗 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2000), p.58.  
72 I will give examples for this point in chapter 5 as it is closely related to Tang’s response to ‘scientism’.
names. It is in this sense that Tang confirmed the value of all important intellectual traditions, as he explained:

All words with meaning are reasonable from a certain perspective. If classifying them in terms of types and levels, making clear which orders we refer to and saying them in a right time, all words can be of benefit to the audience and can be considered ultimate truth from certain perspectives. 

Although the term ‘order’ (Chi. cixu 次序), which means sequence in the context of the above citation, is very common in daily Chinese, it plays an important role in Tang’s thought. It is because it states that the interaction among different horizons and observations needs to follow a particular sequence. In fact, as noted previously, Tang considered that human beings firstly comprehend the object and then turn the attention to the subject. In my view, this already shows an ‘order’ of comprehending the world. At the very beginning of this study, I mentioned Lao Sze-kwang, who argued that Tang Junyi’s philosophical method is Huayan’s ‘All is One, One is All’. As I will discuss further at the end of this chapter, Tang’s emphasis on ‘order’ proves Lao’s idea wrong. In my view, Huayan’s influence on Tang is not its logic of ‘All is One, One is All’, but its theory of doctrinal classification, a point I will discuss in detail in chapter 5.

But, to return to the discussion of ‘universal observation’, although one intellectual tradition may be better than another in the light of certain criteria, no single intellectual tradition can be supposed to be entirely superior to others. Therefore, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism and any other kind of intellectual tradition and thought are actually forms of ‘relative truth’. The ‘absolute truth’, according to Tang, is harmonization among various ‘relative truths’, as he explains:

That we feel dissatisfied with relative truths is only because there are usually contradictions and conflicts among them. The ways of interdependence, inter-justification and harmony are always neglected. The pursuit of absolute truth simply means the dissolution of the contradictions among relative truths so that a harmony can be achieved.

Considering the fact that there are numerous ‘relative truths’ in the world, practically harmonizing all of them and reaching ‘absolute truth’ is impossible. Tang explicitly stated that

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74 The original sentences are ‘一切說不同義理之語，無不可在一觀點之下成立，若分其言之種類層位，而次序對學者之問題，而當機說之，無不可使人得益，而亦皆無不可說為最勝’ Ibid., p.481.
75 See chapter 1.1.
76 The original sentences are ‘我們所以不安於相對真理，唯由於相對真理之有矛盾衝突互相對待，而不見其互為根據互相證明而相貫通和諧，求絕對真理之心所求者，只此矛盾衝突對待之銷除融化以得一貫通和諧’ See Tang Junyi, XWYR, note 26, p.154.
he realized the complexity of this task. However, as ‘absolute truth’ can never be obtained, this implies the mind will not stop at any particular stage but will continue to pursue ‘absolute truth’. Otherwise, the ‘absolute truth’ would be a fetter of the mind, preventing it from further improvement. Therefore, for Tang, the human mind is always dynamic.

Applying this idea to the three ways of observation, Tang concluded that human beings should always reflect on their insights and limitations, and not adhere to any of them permanently. Even though one particular viewpoint may be employed, human beings need to reflect on the value of it from time to time, and not ignore the value of the other types of observation. In this sense, in my view, employing sequential, horizontal and vertical observation to construct a worldview is not the ultimate end of Tang’s thought but only a process which a person, ceaselessly pursuing philosophical questions, needs to experience. To view different observations critically, according to Tang, is called ‘Universal Observation on universal observations’. Without such ‘Universal Observation on universal observations’, the mind will become rigid and, as a result, the achievement of an ‘infinite life’ will become impossible. As he said:

If [viewing an issue from certain kinds of universal observation] is inevitable in principle, the oneness of the world of philosophical truth will be split. Each philosophy can only achieve a certain kind of universal observation. None can achieve a universal observation on the universal observations. The human activity of mind also fails to achieve a universal observation on the universal observations via philosophy……the life of existence on which the activity of mind relies, as a result, fails to reach or achieve an infinite life of existence either.

Tang’s thought is thus a never-ending process, in which all the ‘relative truths’ are to be harmonized. In fact, as I will discuss in chapter 4.2, Tang harmonized Fang’s thought based on this idea. The key to achieve this ideal is the human mind, since different forms of observation actually stem from it. Whilst this discussion may have helped reveal Tang’s complete thought, a crucial issue remains, namely how to make the thought practicable. It is therefore necessary to consider the practice of the mind, otherwise the theory will be a kind of empty talk. In fact, Tang discussed the practice of the mind throughout his writings, and I consider this in the next section.

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77 Tang Junyi, SCYXJ vol. 1, note 15, p.17.
78 Tang Junyi, XWYR, note 26, pp.148-149.
79 The original sentences are ‘若正為義理上之必然，則哲學義理之世界之全，即為一破裂之世界，而一切哲學將只能各成就一遍觀，而無一能成就對遍觀之遍觀，而人之心靈活動，亦終不能憑哲學以成此高層次之遍觀之遍觀……而其心靈活動所依之生命存在，亦不能真通于或成為一無限之生命存在矣，‘ Tang Junyi, SCYXJ vol. 1, note 15, p.31.
Chapter 4.1.7 Theory of Practice: A Preliminary Discussion

Many scholars correctly state that the main theme of Confucianism is moral self-cultivation, in which how to become good is stressed.\(^{81}\) While some scholars like Julia Ching emphasize the external rituals of Confucianism which Confucian scholars practice in order to achieve self-cultivation,\(^{82}\) others pay more attention to the internal practice of the mind.\(^{83}\) However, as Confucius said, ‘What can a man do with the rites who is not benevolent? What can a man do with music who is not benevolent?’\(^{84}\) In this sense, in my view, external rituals seem to play a secondary role, as the most important element is the quality of the mind.

In fact, some scholars argue that because of social and economic changes, many Confucian rituals are no longer relevant in contemporary society.\(^{85}\) Taking this a step further, the characteristics of a Confucian in modern times are inevitably different from those of the past.\(^{86}\) If we consider the words of Confucius, however, there is no necessary relationship between Confucian rituals and being a good person. Even if there was no ritual at all, a person could still achieve self-cultivation. On the other hand, if a person does not achieve self-cultivation, the existence of the rituals alone is meaningless.

While discussing the practice of the mind, Tang Junyi also suggested a theory, known as ‘gongfu’ 功夫, a word which has no exact equivalent in English but approximately means ‘the effort spent on something’.\(^{87}\) In discussing self-cultivation, therefore, this can be expressed as the ‘gongfu of self-cultivation’. Many Confucians, especially those in the Song and the Ming dynasties, suggested their own ‘gongfu of self-cultivation’. Tang, however, is probably the only contemporary Confucian thinker who tried to suggest such a theory. As Lao Sze-kwang says, with the death of Tang, the tradition of discussing the ‘gongfu of becoming moral’ ends.\(^{88}\) In his Zhxue gailun 哲學概論 (Introduction to Philosophy), Tang emphasized the role of practice after his discussion of various philosophical theories, arguing that their real

\(^{88}\) Lao Sze-kwang, ‘Cong Tang Junyi zhongguo zhexue de quxiang kan zhongguo zhexue de weilai’, note 69.
value was in practice rather than in discussion. The theory of ‘gongfu’, therefore, is essential.⁸⁹ He defined this theory as follows:

The simplest definition of the learning of moral achievement of human beings is the conscious alteration of the behaviour of their bodies. Its most profound ‘gongfu’, however, is cultivation of mind.⁹⁰

To understand this mental practice, I will highlight four points in Tang’s thought. First, he considered that all evil ideas preventing human beings from improving themselves stem from the desire for the material. Second, he argued that human beings should recognize the ability and the possibility of overcoming this desire. Third, if, despite their ability, and the possibility of overcoming this desire, human beings still fall into it, Tang considered that there would be a sense of humiliation in humans, and this would motivate them to improve again. In this sense, it is anticipated that the stronger the sense of humiliation humans feel, the greater their determination for self-cultivation. Fourth, Tang considered that there is no universal principle of practice for all human beings, implying that the suggestion of a theory of practice depends on individuals.⁹¹

Admittedly, Tang’s discussion of practice is rather simple. However, its characteristics easily make him distinguishable from his fellows since he was not only trying to develop a theory concerning self-cultivation, but also to practise what he suggested. In other words, Tang not only discusses what is good, but also how to be good. Therefore, his thought is also described as the ‘scholarship of becoming moral’ (Chi. chengde zhi xue 成德之學).⁹² In fact, as I will discuss in chapter 4.3 and chapter 5 respectively, Tang’s emphasis on practice not only influences his interpretation of Huayan thought, but also his response to ‘scientism’. This general introduction to Tang’s thought leads us to his consideration of the failure of Western culture.

Chapter 4.1.8 Tang on the Failure of Western Culture

Like Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi also considered that Western culture was failing. In general, he concluded that Western culture developed downwards and outwards, from, in his

⁹⁰ The original sentences are ‘人之從事道德的實踐之學，其最淺之義，雖即在人之任何對自己身體之行為，自覺的加以改變處，即可表現；然其最深義之工夫之所在，卻只在人之內心之修養，’ See Tang, ZG vol.1, ibid., p.23.
⁹¹ For Tang’s theory of practice, see Tang, DZZJ, note 14, pp.48-147. For supplementary discussion, see Thomas A. Metzger, note 45.
⁹² Lao Sze-kwang, ‘Cong Tang Junyi zhongguo zhhexue de quxiang kan zhongguo zhhexue de weilai’, note 69.
To explain this, Tang first suggested that the development of modern science stemmed from the ‘Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void’, the fifth horizon in his theory of nine horizons, in which humans thought about the universal characteristics of phenomena. From this, the development of studying abstract concepts including mathematics became possible. On the one hand, Tang admired the great achievement of Western culture in developing modern science; on the other hand, he criticized Western culture for failing to develop it upwards, from the ‘Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void’ to the ‘Horizon of Conversion to the one God’ or to any of the other horizons in the ‘Transcendence of Subjective and Objective Horizon’. Tang believed that Western culture developed in an opposite direction:

This turning downwards and outwards from the ‘Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void’ causes problems in the contemporary world that human beings face. The culture of this so-called modern world differs from that of the classical world, which develops upwards and inwards from the ‘Horizon of Abstract Contemplation in the Void’ and creates a moral-and-religion based social culture. This is a difference of direction and this difference is led by changes in Western culture.93

To Tang, the downward and outward development of culture not only caused ‘scientism’, which denies the value of religion, but also individualism, which recognises human beings as merely different individuals, and even Marxism-Leninism, which classifies them in various socio-economic groups. As a result, he held that humanism was destroyed and the future of humanity put in crisis.94 In order to complement the shortcomings caused by this cultural change, Tang suggested that the development of science needed eventually to be subordinated to a kind of moral philosophy or religion, as he argued below:

In previous times, morality which belonged to an individual nation, an individual class and an individual occupation or profession is certainly [a kind of] closed [system]. Only emphasizing certain particular moral norms or a morality in particular behaviours is, however, also closed. [Instead.] the morality of truly admiring different kinds of personality and the virtue of penetrating all morals empathically through an open mind are respectable. In terms of philosophical wisdom, a philosophical theory, which illustrates the common nature of all religions, illustrates how a philosophy empathically penetrates all kinds of morals, and illustrates that these kinds of religious

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93 The original sentences are ‘此一由觀照凌虛境而外轉下轉，以形成人類當前時代之世界，亦即所謂現代社會文化之世界，乃與人類之古典的社會文化，重在由觀照凌虛境而內轉上轉，以形成一以道德宗教為本之社會文化，其根本方向不同者，此根本方向之轉變，則以西方文化之轉變為主導。’ See Tang, SCYXJ, note 20, pp.456-457.
94 Tang, ibid., pp.457-462; also see Tang Junyi, Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian 人文精神之重建 (Hong Kong: Xinya yanjiusuo 新亞硏究所, 1974), pp.153-164.
morality and philosophical wisdom should predominate over all knowledge and technology, is going
to occur. It is not my personal view but the call of our time, or the direction which follows the trend
of current religious morality and philosophy.  

In my view, this represents the central element of Tang’s thought. At least, it is the goal for
which Tang developed his thought. In his theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’,
different scales of values are put into various horizons. Horizons particularly contribute to the
development of the study of material and abstract ideas. The ‘Horizon of the Discrete
Existence of the Myriad Things’, the ‘Horizon of the Transformations as related to Species
and Genus’, the ‘Horizon of Functional and Orderly Operations’ and the ‘Horizon of Abstract
Contemplation in the Void’ are in the lower ranking, while ‘Transcendence of Subjective and
Objective Horizon’ occupies a higher position. In this sense, like the ‘blueprint’ suggested by
Fang that I discussed in chapter 3, Tang’s theory seems to handle the challenge of science.
However, before I discuss how effective their responses to ‘scientism’ are, a more critical
review of Tang’s thought is necessary as it relates to our discussion in chapter 5.

Chapter 4.1.9 Conclusion: A Critical Review of Tang’s Thought

Although Tang is considered one of the most important figures in Chinese intellectual history,
his thought has been much criticized in academia. First, it is argued that he tended to privilege
Confucianism and to integrate various intellectual traditions into Confucianism. At first
sight, this criticism seems reasonable, as Confucianism is considered the final horizon in
Tang’s theory of the ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’, implying that Confucianism is the
most important intellectual tradition. However, if we consider Tang’s own philosophical
position, saying that Confucianism is the most important among various intellectual traditions
seems only applicable to Tang’s own situation. Not everyone regards, nor needs to regard,
Confucianism as the most important intellectual tradition. As Tang argued, his main concern
is to explain the existence of the mind, especially its ability to employ moral consideration.
For Tang himself, Confucianism provides the most convincing explanation of this.

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95 The original sentences are ‘昔日之道德之限於一民族、一階級、一職業、一行業中之道德，固
為封閉的道德，而只重若干特殊德目，或特殊行為規律之道德，亦為一封閉的道德，真能體驗欣
賞不同之形態之人格之道德，而以一開放的心靈，以與一切道德相感通，所成之仁德，必當被重
視。以哲學智慧言之，則一能說明上述之一切宗教之共同之心本質，說明如何有此與一切道德
相感通之仁德之哲學，並說明此宗教道德與哲學智慧，當為一切思想技術之主宰之哲學理論，必
當出現，此皆順時代之呼召，或應世而生之宗教道德與哲學之方向所在，而非吾一人之私見所
存者也。’ See Tang, SCYXJ, note 20, pp.465-466.

96 Du Baorui 杜保瑞, ‘Dui Tang Junyi gaoju ruxue de fangfalun fanxing 對唐君毅高舉儒學的方法
論反省’ in Zheng Zongyi 鄭宗義 ed., Xianggang Zhongwen daxue de dangdai ruzhe 香港中文大學
lun “geti de ziwo” 唐君毅論「個體的自我」’, Zhexue yu wenhua 哲學與文化 vol.36, no.8 (2009):
77-100.
Since the ultimate goal may be different for different people, considering Confucianism the best philosophy in all situations is not essential. For Tang, Confucianism is the best explanation of moral issues among other intellectual traditions, as, for him, Christianity, Buddhism and other intellectual traditions are not the final answer. However, they may be the answer for other people. In this sense, Tang considering Confucianism the last horizon does not mean that Confucianism plays a superior role to other intellectual traditions. Judging different intellectual traditions ‘objectively’ or in a scholarly way is not his main concern. Instead, what he tries to achieve is the absorption of different intellectual traditions into his own system, so that each intellectual tradition has its own place. As Tang argued, the ideal world he wanted is a world of harmony (Chi. *he* 和), in which different views and values can co-exist without conflicts and obstacles. A world with identical value (Chi. *tong* 同), which is also sometimes translated as ‘harmony’, was not what he pursued. Confucianism, for Tang, is the best intellectual tradition for achieving this world of ‘he’. In fact, as I mentioned in chapter 3.1.6, this is one of the main differences between Fang and Tang, as the former seems to pursue a value which is shared by various cultures, while the latter aims at preserving different values. As I will discuss in chapter 5, both Fang and Tang appropriated aspects of Huayan thought to achieve their goals. In short, in my view, criticizing Tang for ranking Confucianism as superior and other traditions as inferior may, in the final analysis, not be fair to Tang.

In fact, I would argue that Tang did not put Confucianism above other intellectual traditions. On the contrary, his thought helps define the effectiveness of Confucianism. According to Tang, Confucianism belongs to ‘sequential observation’. It is only one of the three observations which make up the function of the mind. In this sense, there is no absolute superiority of Confucianism over other intellectual traditions. This point is very important because it helps us understand Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, which I will discuss in chapter 4.3. Just as Kant’s discussions of the subject actually help limit the power of the subject, Tang’s discussions of Confucianism also help limit its power. This point, unfortunately, is ignored in almost all scholarship about Tang.

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97 Tang, SCYXJ, note 20, pp.556-589.
100 Tang, XWYR, note 26, p.265.
Second, Tang’s thought is largely considered ‘pan-moralism’, in which all phenomena in the world are summarized as moral activities of the mind.\textsuperscript{102} Similar criticism, in fact, appears in many discussions of Confucianism, where the issue of morality seems to play a dominant role.\textsuperscript{103} Although the term ‘pan-moralism’ is a kind of criticism that some scholars such as Chen Te 陳特 are eager to make about Tang,\textsuperscript{104} I consider that such a description can, in fact, be considered a kind of appreciation of Tang’s own definition of moral activity. While discussing the nature of moral activity, Tang said:

I think the nature of moral life is to overrule one’s own living consciously. Since I believe that, fundamentally, human beings can reflect consciously, we can view ourselves or the world consciously in a different manner……moral value is shown at the moment that the limit of our actual self is transcended……the actual self means the self trapped in an object in a particular time and space……the common nature of moral mentality and moral activities is to help the self get rid of the trap, helping the self not to get trapped again. Moral value is shown at this moment of liberation.\textsuperscript{105}

According to Tang, moral value is shown whenever actual life is consciously transcended. Whether a life is moral or not depends on the extent of the transcendence. The more the actual life is transcended, the more moral the life is.\textsuperscript{106} Therefore, Tang concluded that:

All of your life can be moralized, as long as you consider that the life is supposed to be.\textsuperscript{107}

‘Pan-moralism’, in this sense, is not a criticism at all. On the contrary, it reflects the fact that Tang tried to show moral value in different situations, an attitude suggested in Confucius’ saying, ‘The gentleman never deserts benevolence, not even for as long as it takes to eat a

\textsuperscript{103} For discussion about the issue, see Li Minghui 李明輝, ‘Lun suowei rujia de fan diode zhuyi 論所謂「儒家的泛道德主義」’, in \textit{Dangdai xin ruxue lunwenji – zonglun pian} 當代新儒學論文集—總論篇 (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe 文津出版社, 1996), pp.179-245.
\textsuperscript{105} The original sentences are ‘我認道德生活的本質，即自覺的自己支配自己之生活。因我相信，人根本上是能自覺的，所以我們對我們自己、或世界、本來可以有不同之自覺的態度……道德價值表現於「現實自我限制之超越之際」的意思……現實自我即指陷溺於現實時空中之現實對象之自我……而道德心理、道德行為之共性，即使自我自此限制範圍中解放，不復有所陷溺，而道德價值即表現於此解放之際，’ See Tang, \textit{DZZJ}, note 14, pp.4-7.
\textsuperscript{107} The original sentence is ‘你一切生活可以道德化，只要你之生活都是經你認為應該的就是了，’ \textit{Ibid.}, p.65.
meal. If he hurries and stumbles one may be sure that it is in benevolence that he does so. The emphasis on moral value in all situations and phenomena is undoubtedly a characteristic of Tang’s thought and is similar to Huayan thought, which considers the fruit of Buddha to be always harmonious, a point I will return to in chapter 5. In my view, considering this characteristic a shortcoming may not be appropriate, as, according to Tang, viewing the world in a contrary way may also reflect that a person is not moral enough. A short story helps explain this idea. In the myth about Emperor Yao and Emperor Shun in ancient China around the twenty-third century B.C., it is said that Emperor Yao transferred the ownership of the country to Shun, as the latter was a moral person. This myth is always considered the political ideal of Confucianism. Once asked by a student if Emperor Yao was forced to give way to Shun when the latter held the military power, Tang responded agitatedly, arguing that we should not doubt others’ good intentions simply because we do not share them. In this sense, according to Tang, it is the person who cannot act well who needs to reflect, not the person who can act well who deserves the challenge. Therefore, after defining the meaning of moral activity as suggested by Tang, I argue that it is not necessary to defend the view that Tang’s thought is not ‘pan-moralism’. On the contrary, this description helps confirm the characteristic of his thought, which is to consider the world full of moral value.

Third, Tang is largely considered an ‘idealist’ by many scholars, which suggests that only the mind is true or real. This description, in my view, clearly simplifies Tang’s thought. As discussed above, Tang explicitly said that he admitted the existence of the matter. In his theory of ‘Nine Horizons’, there are three horizons explaining the substance, appearance and function of objects. He also argued that there are many reasons which constitute a phenomenon, although moral reason is the one he considered most determinative. Therefore, I argue that considering Tang an ‘idealist’ is contrary to his own idea. This illusion concerning Tang is probably caused by his emphasis on the role of the mind. Based on the fact that matter and objects also play a role in his thought, it may be said that what Tang is concerned with is the relationship between subject and object, or mind and material. The term ‘idealist’, therefore, is so misleading that it only makes Tang’s thought confusing.

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110 For the story, see Chen Yongming 陳永明, Zhexue ziwuxian 哲學子午線 (Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館, 1993), pp.234-242.
Although the criticism of Tang may not be as serious as many scholars believe, I consider that there are potential difficulties with his theory. The most important of these is the issue of the existence of the mind, and especially its function of moral consideration. Tang tended to consider that the existence of the mind is a practical rather than a theoretical issue. In other words, human beings can experience but not think of the existence of the mind. Tang obviously agreed with Xiong Shili’s idea that the experience of the mind is a ‘manifestation’ in our daily life.\footnote{Tang, \textit{SCYXJ}, note 20, p.359.} Intuition, as he admitted, became more important in his later life.\footnote{Tang Junyi, \textit{Zhonghua renwen yu dangjin shijie bubian} 中華人文與當今世界補編 vol. 1 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2005), pp.344-361. For discussion, see Frederick J. Streng, \textit{Understanding Religious Life} (California: Wadsworth, 1985), pp.259-261.}

However, in my view, if such experience is denied by an individual, or their experience is not as strong as Tang’s, his theory becomes less persuasive.\footnote{As Mark R. Wynn argues, some persons are ‘more sensitive than others to the needs of their fellows.’ In other words, the ‘moral experience’ is not necessarily the same amongst people. See his \textit{Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding: Integrating Perception, Conception and Feeling} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.1-3.} In fact, while discussing Tang’s thought, some scholars may consider that the existence of the mind and its characteristic of being morally good is just an ‘assumption’ made by Tang.\footnote{Kevin Shun Kai Cheng, \textit{Karl Barth and Tang Junyi on the Nature of Ethics and the Realization of Moral Life: A Comparative Study} (unpublished Th.D thesis, Graduate Theological Union, 1995).} Although when we consider the existence of the mind and its characteristic of moral consideration an assumption seems necessary theoretically, this may not touch the core of Tang’s thought. As he admitted, his argument concerning the existence of the mind is like that of Descartes’ ‘I think, therefore, I am.’ Only when a human being uses the mind can its existence and characteristics be acknowledged. As long as there is a feeling of sympathy in the daily life of human beings, the capacity for moral consideration is proved.\footnote{Tang, \textit{SCYXJ}, note 15, p.9.} In this sense, I argue that Tang’s argument for the existence of his own mind and its function is mainly empirical, based on his own inner experience of moral reflection. Therefore, I call him a ‘moral empiricist’. Tang’s argument for the existence of the mind of other human beings is similar. As Tang considered that his own mind was moral, therefore, it would therefore be immoral to assume that only he had a mind.

He also argued that he felt the existence of the minds of other people in his daily experience.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp.87-88.} This experience Tang called ‘empathizing with the same feeling’ (Chi. \textit{Tongqing gonggan 同情共感}).\footnote{Tang, \textit{SCYXJ}, note 20, pp.631-647.} Therefore, admitting that minds exist in all human beings is not a theoretical but a practical point, experienced in our daily life but not in our thought.\footnote{Huang Huiying 黃慧英, ‘Tang Mou er xiansheng dui taren xinling yu xingshan de pupianxin de lunsu 唐牟二先生對他人心靈與性善的普遍性的論述’, \textit{Ehu xuezhi 鵝湖學誌} vol.43 (2009): 96-119.}
In fact, since Tang’s argument is mainly based on his experience and the existence of the mind is never proved theoretically,\(^{122}\) the feasibility of ‘The Nine Horizons’ may also be doubted.\(^{123}\) Perhaps it is only Tang who can say if the interpenetration among ‘The Nine Horizons’ may be achieved or not, since other people cannot share his experience. Alternatively, people who follow Tang’s theory of practice may also experience the horizons as Tang suggested. In this sense, I think that Tang’s thought seems doomed to be criticized as subjective and idealistic, though in fact he introduced routes for his readers to follow. Tang stressed that his thought is only an answer for him. I also suspect that his theory is only valid for his own experience since it is, to a large extent, very particular. However, Tang’s theory may be considered universal insofar as it is based on an experience that all human beings are believed to have. This is the experience of moral consideration. Various disciplines may have their own explanations of this experience. For Tang, however, it derives from the human mind. Undoubtedly, Tang emphasized the function of moral consideration of the mind. For those holding a similar position, therefore, his theory may be more convincing. In short, in my view, the effectiveness of Tang’s thought seems to depend on the individual. The more attention a person pays to Tang’s notion of moral consideration, the more effective Tang’s thought will be, and vice versa. This point is like Huayan thought, in which the achievement of a harmonious world depends on the quality of the practitioner.

Second, the meaning of the mind Tang suggested is so broad that it is difficult to obtain any specific meaning for it. As I have said previously, in the Confucian tradition, there are numerous words relating to subjectivity, each of them referring to a specific meaning or function. Mind (Chi. xin 心), sentiment (Chi. qing 情) and desire (Chi. yu 欲) are some examples. Although the application of them may vary among different thinkers,\(^{124}\) containing all their meanings within a single term is not popular. For Tang, however, all the functions and characteristics of the subject seem to be attributed to the concept of mind or ‘xinling’\(^{125}\). This is, on one hand, an innovation by Tang, especially in the context of modern Chinese philosophical study. On the other hand, however, the extensiveness of the meaning of the concept may also make its content too broad and its characteristics too vague. Perhaps it is this innovation which creates the difficulty of understanding Tang’s thought and experience.

The subjective nature of Tang’s theory has led to much commentary upon it, but whether

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\(^{123}\) Fung Yiu-ming (Feng Yaoming)馮耀明, *Chaoyue neizai* de misi: cong fenxi zhexue guandian kan dangdai xinruxue 「超越內在」的迷思：從分析哲學觀點看當代新儒學 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), pp.58-73.

\(^{124}\) For a full discussion about their meanings throughout intellectual history, see Lao Sze-kwang, *Xinbian Zhongguo zhexueshi* 新編中國哲學史 (3 vols., Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe 廣西師範大學出版社, 2005).
criticisms or defences, all may be valid from certain perspectives. Tang’s thought is inevitably enhanced by its complexity, but this complexity also makes his thought less rigid than the thought of many of his fellow academics. As Tang said:

I don’t want my philosophy to be a castle but a bridge. I don’t want my philosophy to be a mountain but a road and river.

Using the bridge, road and river metaphors, Tang suggested that everyone can find their own destination. He recommends no fixed philosophical model and this is probably the main feature of his thought. It is also the source of his strengths and his weaknesses. Tang’s work was extensive and discussed many topics, including education and politics, which cannot be covered in a single chapter. However, I believe that the introduction above covers the most important elements in his thought for understanding his appropriation of Huayan thought, which I discuss in chapter 4.3. First though I wish to show how Tang harmonizes Fang’s thought, an issue almost totally ignored in academia but important to our understanding of their appropriations of Huayan thought.

Chapter 4.2 Tang Junyi’s Harmonization of Thomé H. Fang’s Thought

There are two reasons for discussing Tang’s harmonization of Fang’s thought here. First, as I briefly mentioned in chapter 1, Tang was a student of Fang. However, this teacher-student relationship is always neglected in academia. In fact, as I will show below, Fang’s thought seems to have inspired Tang. Only by considering this point can Tang’s thought be comprehended thoroughly. Second and more important for this study, Tang’s harmonization of Fang’s thought is a good example of his idea of ‘Universal Observation on universal observations’. As I will discuss in chapter 5, Tang tried to harmonize various intellectual traditions in order to avoid causing ‘scientism’. His harmonization of Fang’s thought, therefore, provides a preparatory discussion for chapter 5.

Although Tang refused to be a private student of Xiong Shili and considered he had established his own thought prior to meeting the latter, his role as Xiong’s follower is

\[\text{125 The original sentences are ‘吾不欲吾之哲學成壁壘之建築，而唯願其為一橋樑；吾復不欲吾之哲學如山嶽，而唯願其為一道路、為河流。’ Tang, SCYXJ, note 15, pp.34-35.}\]

\[\text{126 Tang, RJJC, note 94, pp.566.}\]

\[\text{127 Although the theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’ is a model, Tang considered that it is a model of his own but not a model universally applicable to all people. As he argued in the preface of Shengming caozai yu xinling jingjie vol.1, where the theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’ is suggested, it is not a must for a person to read the book. Whether reading it or not depends on that if a person feels a question. See note 15, p.7. Instead of an expression of his humble character, I think it is a sound comment on his thought.}\]

\[\text{128 Tang, NZX, note 3, p.42; Tang, SCYXJ vol. 2, note 20, p.480.}\]
always stressed, a phenomenon I do not find a satisfactory explanation. Interestingly, chatting once with a Western scholar, Tang said, in English, ‘Fang is my teacher’. The scholar wondered if Tang had said, ‘Fang was my teacher’ but Tang emphasized that even though a long time may have passed, in Chinese tradition, the relationship between a teacher and a student continues. A letter from Tang to Fang in 1962 suggests the close relationship between them:

My own immature works are not worth mentioning. But I do still remember my teacher saying more than thirty years ago that philosophy should contain both emotion and reason as well as involving an analysis of literature and science. I did not understand then what this meant but I have subsequently realized this task is not easy. Contemporary philosophers separate emotion and reason, taking a particular theme and arbitrarily applying it to everything. The harm this can do is serious and eventually affects everyone. Therefore, I always want to set beginners on the right path, insisting that emphasizing one particular reason is to be avoided and that they should pursue the whole character and wisdom of life. My works are so crude that they fail to achieve this and my intellect is also rather limited so that I am unable to comprehend literature. Fortunately I have not completely abandoned my teacher’s words of long ago and I am willing to teach young people in this spirit so that they should not be hidden from a single perspective.

Tang’s letter explicitly shows both his own sense of humility and his respect for Fang. Perhaps the letter may be considered a polite form of address as Tang was observed as always being kind to others. However, I argue that the interpretation of the letter may be different if the characteristics of Fang’s thought are taken into account. As I discussed in chapter 3, Fang distinguished ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’, based on the wholeness of the world, from what he saw as dualistic ‘praeternatural metaphysics’, based on a single perspective. In my view, Fang’s ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’ is probably what Tang described he was trying to achieve in the letter.

However, based on his own thought, which tries to confirm all valuable intellectual traditions

131 The original sentences are '拙著無足稱，唯尚憶三十餘年前聞吾師之教，謂哲學當兼綜情與理，並通於文學與科學。當時雖不解其義，後乃知其不可易。而當世之為哲學者，蓋皆不免裂情理為二，而執一曲之理以武斷人生之全者，其弊尤甚，而禍亦將及於生民。因常念端正初學之方向，當先祛一曲之理之執，以嚮往於人生之性命與智慧之道之全。拙著粗陋，固不足以語此，而才力短淺，更不能上契於文學，唯亦幸未大違吾師昔年之教，願以此精神導來學，咸勿以一曲之理自蔽耳。’  See Tang Junyi, Shujian 書簡 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp.30-31.
132 For the image of Tang among his friends, colleagues and disciples, see Tang Junyi quanji vol. 30, note 130; Donald J. Munro, Ethics in Action: Workable Guidelines for Public and Private Choices (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008), pp.121-128.
and harmonize various ‘relative truths’, it may not be Tang’s intention to negate the value of ‘praeternatural metaphysics’ but, instead, to acknowledge the values of both ‘praeternatural metaphysics’ and ‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’. As Tang stated:

In human metaphysical thought, there are naturally two types of approach: the absolutism that covers the practical world with a metaphysical reality, and the relativism that divides the metaphysical reality and practical world in two. I cannot stop the successive occurrence of these two types of metaphysics. I also think that this division never ends. The people who recognize the profound meaning of harmonization I describe will also know that the successive occurrence of the two types of metaphysics helps develop a teaching. Since there is successive appearance, there is no contradiction if this happens in the thought of a person or in the intellectual history of humanity; these two types of metaphysics help different individuals who are in different phases of development. It helps individuals not to become stuck in the current phase.¹³³

Although Tang never quoted Fang’s works, I argue that his view on the two types of metaphysics is largely identical to Fang’s, a point no scholarship has previously mentioned. Therefore, Tang’s harmonization of the two types of metaphysics is a complement to Fang’s idea of distinguishing these two metaphysics. In order to harmonize the two types, Tang firstly suggested the idea of doctrinal classification, where I argue that in his view various apparently contradictory ideas actually derive from different periods, so that there is no real contradiction between them. I will discuss this in detail in chapter 5. Secondly, Tang further argued that individual metaphysics fitted the needs of individual people. Therefore, no metaphysics should be negated in principle. Thirdly, based on his idea of ‘empathic penetration’, different intellectual traditions occur successively without an end. In my view, all these ideas of Tang are substantially better understood if the linkage between Fang and Tang is acknowledged. That is to say, if only the relationship between Xiong and Tang is stressed, such issues in Tang’s thought as to why and how to harmonize different subjects and values in the world may not be easily understood. Ironically, it is exactly this idea that Tang suggested in the epilogue of his last work, Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie, an idea believed to be his final position.¹³⁴

As I argued above, following Fang, ‘scientism’ should be seen as a kind of ‘praeternatural metaphysics’. Tang’s harmonization of ‘praeternatural metaphysics’ and

¹³³ The original sentences are ‘在人之形上學之思想，又有本質上之二型之分，即以形上真實包涵現實世界之絕對論，與以形上真實與現實世界相對之相對論之分。……吾亦不能絕此二型之形上學之永將更迭出現，吾且將謂其永當更迭出現，而使真知此吾之貫通之論之密意者，即以此二型之形上學更迭為用，以興教。……然其更迭出現，則在一人之思想與人類思想史中，皆不相矛盾。……則此二型之思想，對在不同階段之人，即各有當機之用，以使人不致停滯於其所屬之階段。’ See Tang, SCYXJ, note 20, pp.510-517.

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp.453-524.
‘transcendent-immanent metaphysics’, in this sense, may be seen as an example of responding to ‘scientism’. Therefore, investigating the relationship between Fang and Tang not only helps discuss their thought from a different angle, from that focusing only on the relationship between Xiong and Tang, but also helps better explain Tang’s response to ‘scientism’. Before assessing this thoroughly in chapter 5, we must first return to Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, as it is his appropriation of this Buddhist tradition in order to respond to the challenge of ‘scientism’ that is this study’s focus.

Chapter 4.3  Tang Junyi’s Interpretation of Huayan Thought – A Critical Review

At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned several studies which discuss the relationship between the thoughts of Tang and Huayan. In fact, all of them consider whether Huayan thought fits Tang’s thought leading to the conclusion that Tang’s appropriation of Huayan is or is not a ‘confusion of ideas’. However, I argue all of the studies employ a wrong approach to discuss the issue. This is because, in my view, the key is not whether Huayan thought fits the thought of Tang or not, but whether the Huayan thought perceived or understood by Tang fits his thought. In this sense, it is first necessary to comprehend how Tang interpreted Huayan thought, and I will discuss this in the following section.

Chapter 4.3.1  Tang’s Overall Interpretation of Huayan Thought

Compared with Fang, the relationship between Tang and Huayan has attracted much more attention within the academy. In general, Tang relied on the writings of Fazang and his interpretation can be divided into two parts. First is his clarification of the ideas of Huayan, particularly its idea of the content of the mind. Second is his explanation about the doctrinal classification theory of the thought.

For the clarification of the ideas of Huayan, the first step Tang took was to redefine the content of the mind (Chi. xin 心) by emphasizing the relationship between Huayan and Consciousness-Only. This point is very important, since Huayan thought, both historically and theoretically, develops based on the thought of Consciousness-Only. In fact, the characteristics of the thought of Consciousness-Only help guide the direction of Huayan thought. A good example is the relationship between consciousnesses and different phenomena as suggested by Consciousness-Only that all phenomena should be comprehended via consciousnesses. Without consciousnesses, phenomena cannot be understood, a key theme of ‘no realm but consciousness’ (Chi. weishi wujing 唯識無境) of the thought of Consciousness-Only. Although Fazang revised some ideas of Consciousness-Only, considering ālayavijñāna subordinate to the pure mind, an idea of Dasheng qixin lun, this
relationship between subject and phenomena does not change. In this sense, it is impossible to say that Huayan considered the pure mind the origin of phenomena. Tang’s task, first of all, is to explain clearly the relationship between these two systems. For this, Tang emphasized Fazang in his interpretation, considering him a key figure connecting these two schools. In his Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuanxing pian (The Original Discourse on Chinese Philosophy – Original Nature), Tang argued as follows:

The Huayan School emphasizes the penetration of the three natures. Based on this penetration, the suchness [of mind] consists of both the characteristics of unchanged and changed……that is to say, the suchness [of mind] is an absolute which is beyond any comparative concepts like ‘defiled’ and ‘pure’, but not only say that the suchness [of mind] is the ‘not destroyed’ among ‘birth’ and ‘death’, or the ‘unchanged’ among ‘changed’. This idea is not accepted in the thought of Consciousness-Only since it considers defiled and pure [dharmas] are contradictory to each other……but Fazang mentions the characteristics of being unchanged and pureness of the mind of suchness and how they work with both defiled and impure [dharmas]. This does not only mean that the mind consists of both characteristics of being defiled and being pure. It also means that the appearance and the constitution of both defiled and pure [dharmas] are from the pure mind. Both defiled and pure [dharmas] are from the pure mind of suchness.135

As Tang defined it, the term dharma or ‘fa’ 法 has various meanings, including the way to Nirvāṇa, Buddhist teaching, Buddha nature and, in its most technical sense, all the things which arise dependently. When speaking of the last, instead of discussing each kind of dharma, he usually used ‘all dharmas’ (Chi. yiie zhufa 一切諸法) in his works.136 Unlike Fang, who appeared to consider impure or defiled dharmas, which he defined as phenomena, morally bad and pure dharmas morally good, Tang did not confuse the quality of a dharma with its moral value. In fact, Tang’s explanation is probably closer to the meaning of Huayan thought, as the ultimate concern of Huayan seems to dissolve the apparent distinction and conflict amongst all phenomena. For Tang, the dissolving of the apparent distinction and conflict among phenomena is possible in Huayan thought because of Fazang’s revision of the ‘three natures’ theory of Consciousness-Only. Without Fazang’s revision, which is to harmonise various concepts at the level of the mind, a harmonious world such as Huayan suggests would not be theoretically possible. All concepts related to the description of such a

135 The original sentences are ‘華嚴宗特重三性相即之義，依此三性相即之義，而有真如之隨緣不變之義……此乃重在言真如之為運於一切價值上為相對之染淨中之絕對者；而非重在言真如之為在生滅中之不生滅者，或變中之不變者。按此義，亦非唯識論之所許。因依唯識義，染淨乃相違法故……法藻則兼論真如心之不動性淨，以成於染淨，此即不只言性具染淨，且言由淨性以起染起淨，成染成淨，染淨乃皆直接為一性淨之真如心之所起所成矣。’ See Tang Junyi, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuanxing pian (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.273-274.
136 Ibid., pp.178-184.
harmonious world, therefore, would also be meaningless.\textsuperscript{137} The key to the penetration of the three natures, furthermore, is the emptiness of the mind:

Although [Huayan] replaces the passionless seeds with the pure mind or the suchness of mind, human beings should not consider this pure mind or suchness of mind a general reality only but know that it has an empty nature.\textsuperscript{138}

Here, Tang explicitly states that the pure mind is not a reality which has an independent nature, a point easily misunderstood in much scholarship about Huayan. For Tang, the mind consists not only of types of consciousness but also of the nature of emptiness. Due to the nature of emptiness, what human beings perceive as reality or as the unchanged character of the mind is actually only its appearance. Also because of the emptiness of the mind, human beings can perceive different kinds of phenomena while, at the same time, not be attached to any of them. This non-attachment of the mind helps dissolve the contradictions among the three natures. This means that interpenetration among phenomena is already possible at the mind level, which is the initial stage of the entire process of achieving enlightenment. Tang argued that Fazang’s emphasis on both the emptiness and appearance of the mind is a combination of the thought of Madhyamaka and Consciousness-Only.\textsuperscript{139} This point becomes a main characteristic of Tang’s interpretation of Huayan.

After clarifying such an important characteristic of the mind, Tang also helped explain the epistemological relationship between the mind and phenomena by better defining the word ‘\textit{sheng}’ 生, a step rare in the scholarship on Huayan thought. In the Chinese language, when employed as a verb, ‘\textit{sheng}’ usually means ‘to create’ or ‘to grow’. One of the best-known sentences about ‘\textit{sheng}’ in the Chinese intellectual tradition is probably, ‘The way begets one; one begets two; two begets three; three begets the myriad creatures,’ in \textit{Laozi}.\textsuperscript{140} In Chinese Buddhist texts, ‘\textit{sheng}’ is also employed to discuss the relationship between the mind of suchness and differentiated experience. It is probably the usual meaning of ‘\textit{sheng}’ which makes the relationship between the mind and \textit{dharmas} controversial in Chinese Buddhism.

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\textsuperscript{137} Tang Junyi, \textit{Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun. Yuandao pian} \textsuperscript{vol.3} (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.280.  
\textsuperscript{138} The original sentences are ‘今以如來藏，心真如，代此無漏種，人亦不可執此如來藏，心真如，只是一般之實有，而當說其亦具真空義’,. \textit{Ibid.}, p.312.  
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}, p.304.  
\textsuperscript{140} The original sentences are ‘道生一，一生二，二生三，三生萬物’. For the translation, see D.C. Lau, \textit{Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching} (London: Penguin, 1963), p.63. 
\end{flushright}

Tang, however, explained clearly that ‘\textit{sheng}’ does not mean ‘to create’ in the \textit{tathāgatagarbha} tradition, of which Huayan is a part. In his interpretation of \textit{Dasheng qixin lün}, Tang explained this idea as follows:

All theories about the mind of suchness ‘creating’ various \textit{dharmas} are different from the situations where a conclusion comes from a premise, or a baby from its mother……if we do not discuss this issue from a cosmological or logical perspective, but from this angle that ‘throughout the process of practice, how does the mind respond to the situations we face’, then we can understand what “the mind of suchness ‘creating’ \textit{dharmas}” means……the meaning of ‘to create’ is that we respond to the situations we face by means of our mind of practice, so that the situations can be in the same path [of practice] with such a mind, that can change the defiled into the pure, to give up the defiled but choose the pure.\footnote{The original sentences are ‘凡此所謂心真如生萬法一類之論，此所謂生，皆非邏輯上前提生結論之生，亦非如母之生子，其腹中原有子，子由之生出之生……吾人於此若根本不自此一宇宙論之態度出發，並本邏輯律令以為推論；而自另一「向內反省吾人在修道歷程中，此心之如何對所遭遇者」之態度出發；則謂一切染法萬種塵勞，以及整個之天地萬物，皆由一心真如或清淨如來藏以生，亦可有說……此所謂生之另一義，吾人可說即：「吾人之修道心之貫徹於其所遭遇之一切之中，以使之呈現於此心之前，而又與此心求轉染而依淨，捨染而取淨，相依而轉」之生。’ See Tang, \textit{ZYYX}, note 135, pp.259-260.}

Different from Fang’s idea of ‘creativity’, which is a mysterious force pushing the world and human beings to self-exalt, Tang suggested that ‘\textit{sheng}’ is rather like the meaning of ‘to renew’ or ‘to transform’. It means the value of a phenomenon can be renovated through the functioning of the human mind. The phenomenon, in short, is not created by the mind.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} In my view, Tang’s interpretation of ‘\textit{sheng}’ here seems rather similar to the characteristic of his own thought, as his thought is usually considered a kind of idealism, which suggests that only the mind is true or real, an idea I previously indicated as mistaken. In this sense, it is not reasonable to argue that only the mind is real in the \textit{tathāgatagarbha} tradition. In short, Tang seemed to consider that phenomena have existence independent of the mind and are thus real. However, this position of Tang may not necessarily contradict the position of Huayan thought, which considers that phenomena are experiences of the mind. As Tang further argued:

According to the view of Huayan’s ‘\textit{dharma} realm’, all \textit{dharmas} are interpenetrated. All \textit{dharmas} are actually mind. Such a realm itself is \textit{dharmas} and also the mind. The penetration of various realms is equal to the penetration of various minds. My view on various \textit{dharmas} is equal to my view on the
penetration of various minds. The universe is, therefore, filled with transparent lights of mind, without any attachment to external horizons and there is no attachment to be defeated……the universe and all dharmas are actually mutually transparent, an infinite unity. It is the world view that when the pure mind functions, all dharmas are the manifestation of the mind.\footnote{The original sentences are ‘依華嚴法界觀以觀法界中之一切法，皆能相攝，即皆是心。如境是法，亦即是心，萬界相攝如眾心相攝，我心觀萬界，即我心觀萬心之互攝，於是充塞宇宙皆成一透明之心光所照耀，更無外境可執，無執可破……宇宙萬法實在一互相透明，往復交映，重重無盡之全體中，而此即一「真心顯現萬法皆心」之宇宙觀，’ See Tang Junyi, 
Zhexue lunji \(\text{哲學論集}\) (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp.328-330.}

Based on the above citations, I argue that Tang, on the one hand, considered that phenomena are not merely manifestations of the human mind. Phenomena, in this sense, have existence independent of the mind. On the other hand, phenomena are perceptions of the mind. This ambiguity of Tang, in my view, needs to be considered alongside his own philosophy as I suggested in chapter 4.1. As mentioned there, Tang showed his discontent with the Buddhist idea of impermanence from his earlier days. In this sense, I argue that Tang could not hold the view that phenomena are just manifestations of human mind. Instead, there is independence of phenomena. However, in his interpretation of Huayan thought, the independent character of phenomena needs to weaken. Otherwise, it is difficult to discuss the possibility of interpenetration between various phenomena. In fact, the latter is exactly what Tang meant in his interpretation of Huayan’s theory of ‘dharma realm’, which he defined as ‘the wholeness of all dharmas’.\footnote{The original Chinese is ‘此一切諸法之全體，合名法界’, see Tang, ZYYX, note 135, p.179.}

According to the citation, from a metaphysical point of view, both the pure mind and phenomena are empty. Therefore, any obstruction between them is not real. Employing this principle in the world of phenomena leads to the conclusion of the ‘dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena’ (Chi. \textit{Shi shi wuai fajie} 事事無礙法界) of Huayan thought. In fact, Tang argued that because there is no obstruction between phenomena, interpenetration between them becomes possible. As noted in chapter 4.1.2, Tang aims at achieving an ‘infinite life’, in which human beings can penetrate the lives of other beings. To connect these two factors, I argue that Huayan’s idea of the ‘dharma realm of non-obstruction of phenomena’ helps explain the possibility of Tang’s idea of the achievement of an ‘infinite life’, a point Tang also admitted implicitly in his work.\footnote{Tang, \textit{SCYXJ} vol.2, note 20, p.386.}

In fact, as ‘interpenetration’ among phenomena becomes possible only when the pure mind functions, Tang’s interpretation of Huayan naturally turns to the idea of ‘Nature arising’ (Chi. \textit{Xing qi} 性起), an idea closely related to Tang’s interpretation of the doctrinal classification theory of Huayan thought. As Tang reminded us, the ultimate aim of Buddhism is to help
living beings become detached from vexation and cease suffering. Therefore, the most important step is to practise Buddhist theories, as he explained below:

According to Buddhism, the human intellect is capable of thinking of the ultimate truth of the universe and our life. However, if we cannot change our attention from intellectual thinking to the pure mind and work hard in practice, we cannot obtain the true wisdom and employ the wisdom to defeat the attachment. Therefore, the true wisdom is the fruit of practice [but not the intellectual understanding of the principle].

Tang’s emphasis on the role of practice in Buddhism is crucial to his interpretation of Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification. During an interview, Li Runsheng 李潤生 (1936-), a student of Tang and a leading Buddhist scholar in Hong Kong, briefly mentioned that Tang’s thought might have been influenced by the Buddhist theory of doctrinal classification. Although Li did not explain this idea further, I would argue that Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification plays a crucial role in Tang’s thought. Before we discuss this idea, however, we must consider Tang’s understanding of doctrinal classification. In general, Tang identified the aim and characteristics of doctrinal classification as follows:

i.) doctrinal classification is the main characteristic of Chinese Buddhism;

ii.) the aim of it is to harmonize various Buddhist theories, stressing that the theories are addressed by the historical Buddha at different times, to different audiences;

iii.) since the theories are not articulated in the same period, to the same person, there is no contradiction between them;

iv.) different Buddhist theories play various roles in Buddhism;

v.) different Buddhist schools suggest their own theories to achieve the aim of ii.).

Tang’s considering that doctrinal classification is a characteristic of Chinese Buddhism is perhaps debatable as even Tiantai’s Zhiyi 智顗 (538-597) and Fazang himself considered that it is also a characteristic of Indian Buddhism. However, this is not the main issue regarding Tang’s suggestions, as it is observed that doctrinal classification really plays a key role in

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147 The original sentences are ‘依佛家義，人之理知或知解縱能思及宇宙人生最高之真理，然若未能引此知解，以反諸心，在修持上用工夫，以破除此深心之執，皆不得為真正之智慧，故真正之智慧實為修行之果。’ See Tang, ZL, note 144, p.311.


Chinese Buddhism, particularly Tiantai and Huayan.\textsuperscript{151} Instead, the main point of these classifications was to stipulate what the ultimate truth is that is suggested by the Buddha. According to Tang’s suggestion above, the Buddha taught different theories at different times to different audiences. In this sense, what the Buddha said at a certain time may be a temporary expedient as only the theory based on ultimate truth can be called ‘\textit{yuan}’圆. In order better to explain this idea, Tang compared the thought of Huayan and Tiantai, as the schools both claimed their thought to be ‘\textit{yuan}’圆.

In chapter 2, I explained that the meaning of ‘\textit{yuan}’圆 is so broad that it cannot be translated by a single word. Tang also argued that its meanings as suggested by Tiantai and Huayan are different.\textsuperscript{152} Therefore, before discussing which school is ‘\textit{yuan}’, the definition of ‘\textit{yuan}’圆 employed by each school needs to be clarified. Tang explained the definition of ‘\textit{yuan}’圆 in Tiantai and Huayan as follows:

Tiantai considers the teaching of \textit{Lotus Sūtra} ‘\textit{yuan}’, because it suggests the way of reaching the ultimate reality through different expedient means, as well as the way of surrendering the expedient means but confirming the ultimate reality. It implies that there is an expedient means to surrender in order to reach the ultimate reality. Huayan, on the other hand, asserts the reality of the single Buddha-realm. There is no expedient means to surrender but only ultimate reality to confirm.\textsuperscript{153}

Although the idea of ‘expedient means’ seems to derive from the Sanskrit ‘\textit{upāya}’, a similar idea, ‘\textit{quan}’權 is also seen in \textit{Mencius}. Here ‘\textit{quan}’权力 means discretion by an individual scholar.\textsuperscript{154} In fact, ‘\textit{quan}’, the word Tang employed in his discussion of ‘expedient means’, is exactly the word used in \textit{Mencius}. In this sense, Tang may not consider ‘expedient means’ exclusively an idea of Buddhism but also an idea of the Chinese tradition. In the above citation, in short, Tiantai confirms the value of both expedient means and ultimate reality, considering the former a means to reach the latter. It helps explain the idea of ‘evil in Buddha nature’ (Chi. \textit{fo ju xinge}佛具性惡), a controversial concept of Tiantai which suggests that Buddha may also employ evil means to help sentient beings wherever necessary. Since the means Tiantai uses is flexible, in principle, no sentient beings are excluded. As a result, no sentient beings are excluded from Tiantai teaching and therefore, Tiantai’s patriarchs considered their thought ‘\textit{yuan}’. Huayan, on the other hand, develops its theory based on the functioning of the pure mind, through which all the distinctions and conflicts among various


\textsuperscript{152} See Tang, \textit{ZYYD} VOL.3, note 137, p.324.

\textsuperscript{153} The original sentences are ‘天台之以法華為圓教，乃自其開權顯實，廢權立實說。此自是有權可廢，意在開顯。而華嚴則只說一佛境界之實，而無權可廢，意在直顯。’ \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{154} See \textit{Mencius}, chapter 7.17. For the translation of the term as discretion, see D. C. Lau, \textit{Mencius} (London: Penguin, 2004), p.84.
dharmas are dissolved. The world in this state, therefore, is non-obstructive and harmonious. This realm is considered ultimate by Huayan thought, since no other realms are regarded as superior.

The definitions of ‘yuan’ by Tiantai and Huayan in the above discussion are actually different. To Tiantai, though the Tiantai’s patriarchs did not state this explicitly, it is actually the practicability of means which makes its thought ‘yuan’ compared with other Buddhist theories. To Huayan, on the other hand, it is the perfection of the harmonious world that indicates its thought is ‘yuan’. Therefore, contrary to Tiantai, it is in the end but not the means that Huayan considered its thought ‘yuan’. In other words, both Tiantai and Huayan considered their thought ‘yuan’ in terms of their own definitions. Argument about which school is ‘yuan’, therefore, is not meaningful when the criteria used are not the same. By clarifying the definition of ‘yuan’ between the two schools, Tang tends to dissolve the dispute which had affected the two schools since the Tang Dynasty.

However, as I mentioned previously, the ‘yong’ or function of the mind is definitely important in Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought. The positions of the Tiantai and the Huayan patriarchs, as Tang described them, help support this view:

Tiantai’s Zhili suggested Buddha nature contains all characteristics, criticizing that Huayan’s idea of nature arising depends on external conditions. Therefore, it is not as certain as saying that Buddha nature contains all characteristics. Huayan, however, argued that ‘if Buddha nature functions completely, is there any reason to say that Buddha nature does not contain all characteristics?’ ‘The idea that Buddha nature functions with certain characteristics [performing good acts for instance] necessarily includes the idea that Buddha nature contains such characteristics [good].’ However, the idea that ‘Buddha nature contains certain characteristics [good] does not mean such characteristics [performing good acts] will necessarily function’. Therefore, arguing Buddha nature contains certain characteristics is less comprehensive than saying that the Buddha nature functions with these characteristics.

As Tang argued, the idea that Buddha nature has certain characteristics, such as the ability to behave well, for instance, implies there are characteristics of goodness in Buddha nature; otherwise, the ability to demonstrate good behaviour could not exist. Arguing that Buddha nature contains certain characteristics, to some extent, means nothing if such characteristics

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156 The original sentence are ‘天臺知禮言性具，而以華嚴之言性起，乃隨外緣方起，故不如言性具之必具，然後華嚴宗之續法，則以「外全起，內豈不具?」「起必含具」，而「具不必起」，乃以言性具者，不如言性起之全備。’ See Tang, *ZYYD* vol.3, note 137, p.326.
are not functional. For example, a person with good character should perform certain acts in accordance with that good character, like helping others who are in need. If the person is observed not to help when so required, arguing the person has good character seems nonsensical. In this sense, discussing the functioning of the mind is more sensible than discussing its nature.

A point of clarification is perhaps needed here. We may say that a person performing good acts does not necessarily prove the person has a good character because the person can perform good acts for a bad purpose. To please others by helping them so that a long-term benefit can be gained is an example. This argument, to me, however, does not apply to Huayan thought since Huayan develops its thought based on the idea of the pure mind. The pure mind is by definition good and therefore, its intent cannot be bad. This is a presupposition of Huayan thought and is reflected in the fact that Huayan does not agree with Tiantai’s idea of ‘evil in Buddha nature’, an idea tending to suggest that even Buddha could act badly. In this sense, at least in the case of Huayan thought, Tang’s arguing that the mind functioning with certain characteristics always implies there are such characteristics in nature is logically valid.

In the same way, however, Huayan’s arguing that a pure mind will always do good is criticized by Mou Zongsan, who considered the argument a tautology. Regardless of the controversy over the form of the argument, as we have seen, the functioning of the mind is always important in Tang’s interpretation of Huayan, like the situation in his own thought discussed in previous sections. The emphasis on the functioning of the mind helps determine the practical character of Tang’s thought, a point to be borne in mind whenever discussing him. This point also explains Tang’s interpretation of ‘sudden teaching’ (Chi. dun jiao 割教), the teaching just before ‘yuan jiao’ in Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification.

As introduced in chapter 2, there are five teachings in Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification, which are ‘Small Vehicle Doctrine of Ordinary Disciples’ or ‘Small Teaching’, ‘Initial Doctrine of the Great Vehicle’ or ‘Initial Teaching’, ‘Final Doctrine of the Great Vehicle’ or ‘Final Teaching’, ‘Great Vehicle’s Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment’ or ‘Sudden Teaching’ and ‘yuan jiao’. ‘Great Vehicle’s Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment’ or ‘Sudden Teaching’ is placed between the tradition of tathāgatagarbha, which is expressed as ‘Final Doctrinal of the Great Vehicle’, and ‘yuan jiao’. Therefore, it would be expected that the role of ‘sudden teaching’ would be highly ranked in the Huayan system. However, in fact, its place was once controversial in the Huayan School. Huiyuan 慧苑 (673-743), a student of Fazang,
suggested removing ‘sudden teaching’ from Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification, considering the nature of ‘sudden teaching’ different from other teachings. Tang, however, argued that ‘sudden teaching’ is the key for Huayan thought to change its focus from philosophical theory to religious practice, through which it is possible eventually to recognise the harmonious world. Traditionally, ‘sudden teaching’ is a major element in Chan Buddhism and so it is generally thought that Huayan ranks Chan Buddhism as inferior to its own thought. For Tang, however, ranking Chan Buddhism as inferior to Huayan thought is not the aim of the inclusion of ‘sudden teaching’ in the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, for as he argued:

To agree with the perfect realm is profound. It is not an issue about extensive thinking. In fact, human beings need to stop practising extensive thinking, for only by doing that can they have a profound agreement with the perfect realm. Therefore, sudden teaching is different from the previous teachings suggested by Buddhism.

According to Tang, Chan Buddhism is one of the Buddhist traditions trying to alter the focus from philosophical theory to religious practice. ‘Sudden teaching’, however, is more than Chan Buddhism. To Tang, any theories sharing the same function can be classified as ‘sudden teaching’. In this sense, Chan Buddhism is only one kind of ‘sudden teaching’. Huayan’s emphasis on ‘sudden teaching’ is to explain the change of focus, not a basis for discriminating between Chan Buddhism and Huayan thought. In fact, as noted in chapter 2, Huayan thought has been widely criticized as subjective and a main reason for this criticism is the lack of a clear theory of religious practice in the Huayan patriarchs’ teaching. According to Tang, ‘sudden teaching’ is a kind of religious practice: only from it the realisation of harmony is possible. Like his own theory of practice, which, as I discussed in chapter 4.1.7, is rather general and open, Tang did not elaborate further on what Huayan’s religious practice means. However, it is clear that he considered ‘sudden teaching’ Huayan’s theory of practice.

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160 For example, see Chan Wing-tsht, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, note 39, p.413.
161 The original sentences are ‘此入乃深度的契入之事，固非廣度的思議之事，人亦正須絕此廣度之思議，乃能有此深度的契入也，故此頓教法門，决不异于以前之諸門’ See Tang, ZYYD vol.3, note 137, p.321.
164 Ibid., p.298.
Tang argued, Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification is not only a theory for harmonizing various Buddhist beliefs at a theoretical level, but also a path or process of self-cultivation through which the harmonious world can eventually be achieved at a practical level.\footnote{165 Tang, ZYYD vol.3, note 137, p.280.}

In fact, compared with Fang’s interpretation of Huayan, Tang wisely considered the issue of religious practice in his interpretation of Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification, even though he did not discuss Li Tongxuan. In this sense, religious practice need not be found outside the teaching of Huayan’s patriarchs. Therefore, it is a characteristic of Tang’s interpretation to consider the issue of Huayan’s religious practice, while at the same time, leaving the pedigree of the Huayan School unchanged.

When understanding the above ideas concerning the theory of doctrinal classification, we can see that, for Tang, different Buddhist theories are mutually complementary. Huayan thought is undoubtedly ‘yuan’ since it is directly developed from a Buddhist perspective, and no other theories are considered superior within the tradition of Buddhism. However, without other Buddhist theories, the possibility of reaching the harmonious world is doubtful. Therefore, Tang concluded that there are certain advantages in all Buddhist theories. Whether a theory is superior to others depends on the angle from which one approaches the issue. Tang explained this idea as follows:

To me, when viewing an issue from a philosophical and aesthetic point of view, Tiantai is not competitive with the thoroughness of Huayan. In terms of the variety of methods for achieving Buddha state, Huayan’s teaching is less sincere and less careful than Tiantai. However, when considering the aim of reaching Buddha state, comprehending the principle of mutual penetration is less straightforward than directly confirming our mind is equal to the Buddha mind. For the latter is the advantage of Chan Buddhism.\footnote{166 The original sentences are ‘吾意如依哲學與審美之觀點看，則華嚴之通透而上達，蓋非天台所及；若自學聖成佛之工夫看，則華嚴之教，又似不如天台之切懇而警策，然自人之求直契佛所自證境之目標看，則徒觀佛所證之境界之相攝相入，又不如直由一念靈知，以頓悟己心即佛心，更不重教理之詮説者之直截，然此後者則尤為禪宗所擅長。’ See Tang, ZYYX, note 135, p.298.}

The above statement shows that, though considering Huayan ‘yuan’, Tang also admitted the value of other Buddhist theories. In fact, this point is very important to our understanding of Tang’s response to ‘scientism’. It is because he confirmed that various intellectual traditions have their own strengths and weaknesses, that each of them could play particular roles in different time periods. This point, together with the other characteristics of Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, will be discussed in depth in chapter 5.
From the above citation, one can see the flexibility of Tang’s interpretation. This creates a certain degree of openness but this openness may make his position on different Buddhist schools and even on various other intellectual traditions unclear. Discussion about his interpretation, therefore, may be rather difficult. However, based on the above analysis, certain clues to the rationale behind his interpretation can be observed. In the following sections, the criteria used by Tang in ranking Buddhist theories will be discussed, and his overall interpretation evaluated.

Chapter 4.3.2  Tang’s Criterion in ranking Buddhist Theories: Harmonization of Values

As in the case of Thomé H. Fang, Tang’s interpretation of Huayan cannot be discussed separately from his own thought and considering his thought definitely helps explain the rationale behind his interpretation. In the previous sections, I mentioned that Tang suggested absolute truth to be the harmonization of various relative truths. This point, to a large extent, can be considered a criterion for Tang’s ranking of different intellectual traditions, including Huayan.

Perhaps influenced by Tang’s image as a Confucian, scholars discussing his interpretation of different intellectual traditions tend to assume that his perspective is a Confucian one. Confucian ideas thus seem to be the criterion for Tang’s interpretation. For example, as he considered the idea of ‘Heart-Mind and Nature’ to be the core concept of Confucianism, we may think that the more a concept is like the Confucian mind, the more Tang approves it.\(^{167}\) If this claim was valid, however, it would probably have been Chan Buddhism rather than Huayan thought which would have attracted Tang since there are several similarities between the function of the mind in Confucianism and in Chan Buddhism.\(^{168}\) But, given that Tang did not set particular store by Chan Buddhism, I argue that there must be other reasons for his emphasis on Huayan. In fact, as I explained previously, the constitution of mind put forward by Tang includes substance, appearance and function. But Chan Buddhism emphasizes the function rather than the substance and appearance of the mind in comparison to Huayan. In terms of the analysis of the constitution of the mind, Huayan thought is definitely more comprehensive. Therefore, the pure mind is not the only criterion Tang used in ranking various Buddhist theories. How the pure mind is constructed is also crucial.

For Tang, however, the most important factor is not how the mind is constructed, but the

\(^{167}\) For scholarship sharing such idea, see Zhang Yunjiang, Xin tong jiu jing: Tang Junyi ya Huayanzong, note 1.

effect this has. As previously mentioned, Tang considered the absolute truth to be the harmonization of various relative truths. Thus all values should in principle be included within a system. The more a system achieves this, the better it is. A theory’s ability to harmonize various values, therefore, is Tang’s main criterion in ranking different Buddhist theories. To Tang, Huayan thought is the best theory, among various Buddhist theories, for achieving this goal. Therefore, it can be said that it is the comprehensiveness of Huayan thought which attracts Tang, since comprehensiveness also implies an inclusiveness in which all values co-exist. In fact, this criterion is not only used for ranking Buddhist theories but also in Tang’s discussion of many other issues. In his opinion on humanism, for instance, he argued that the best theory of humanism needs to provide humanistic explanations for the appearance of the thought of non-humanism, but not simply to negate the value of the latter. His opinion on the conflict of religions, similarly, suggests that all religions should first put aside their disagreement over the nature of God and admit the value of human beings. In this sense, no specific religion is to be negated. Tang’s thought, if viewed closely, is based on this ideal. His interpretations of Huayan thought, as well as his ranking of various Buddhist theories, are not exceptions in his thought. In order better to discuss Tang’s interpretation of the former, a wider understanding is first required.

Chapter 4.3.3 Insights and Limitations of Tang’s Interpretation of Huayan Thought

As shown above, Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought has its own characteristics, which contain strengths and weaknesses. Regarding strengths, first, Tang helped reconstruct the notion of a harmonious mind, which helps develop a harmonious world and this is usually the focus of scholarship on Huayan. However, the logic behind the construction of such a harmonious world is neglected. In fact, I argue that the result is determined by the cause. The achievement of a harmonious world, in this sense, is caused by a harmonious mind; hence a harmonious mind is always necessary. Tang’s emphasis on the construction of such a mind helps supplement Fang’s argument.

Second, Tang is one of the few contemporary Chinese scholars trying to discuss Huayan’s idea of the relationship between the mind and phenomena. As noted in chapter 2, Huayan thought is usually considered a kind of idealism, in which phenomena are just a creation of the mind. One of the main contributions of Tang is to redefine the meaning of the word ‘sheng’ and, as a result, the ideas of Huayan thought can be seen as more consistent and less controversial.

169 Jing Haifeng, Xin ruxue yu ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang, note 1, pp.251-252.
170 Tang Junyi, RJZC, note 94, pp.596-599.
Third, Tang tried to introduce a theory of practice for Huayan thought through reinterpreting Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification. As Huayan is widely criticized as a beautiful theory lacking feasibility, a theory of practice is definitely required. Among the various teachings in the doctrinal classification theory of Huayan, Tang stressed the role of ‘sudden teaching’, considering it a key for turning the focus of human beings from philosophical theory to religious practice. According to Tang, Huayan never lacks a theory of practice, since the entire body of Huayan thought is itself a theory of practice. In this sense, Huayan thought should be reviewed as a whole and not discussed piecemeal.

However, strictly speaking, the discussion of ‘sudden teaching’ in Tang’s interpretation may not be sufficient to answer the doubts about Huayan articulated by other scholars. According to Tang, the suggestion of ‘sudden teaching’ aims to turn the focus of human beings from philosophical theory to religious practice. But how they are to change the focus is not discussed. Perhaps a problem facing both Huayan thought and the scholarship about it is that human beings may not find it easy to change their focus. Therefore, if Tang’s interpretation is to be criticised, his failure to indicate how human beings can change their focus must be acknowledged. In fact, perhaps influenced by the common view that Huayan thought is mainly developed by the five patriarchs including Dushun, Zhiyan, Fazang, Chengguan and Zongmi, Tang seems to ignore the role of Li Tongxuan, a scholar also contributing to Huayan study during the time of Fazang. As Li appeared to focus on religious practice, we might have expected Tang to use him to supplement the discussion of ‘sudden teaching’. There would then be some specific content about ‘sudden teaching’ so that it is not just a suggestion about a change of focus. By considering the role of Li, Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought could have been more comprehensive. In fact, thinking ‘out of the box’ sometimes helps improve the quality of a theory of hermeneutics. In his interpretation of Huayan, unfortunately, Tang tended to follow the old tradition as many other scholars do. In general, however, his interpretation of Huayan thought is still one of the most comprehensive studies in academia and we should not neglect it.

Before commencing chapter 5, I would like to make the following point. At the very beginning of this study, I cited an idea of Lao Sze-kwang, which is that Tang’s philosophical method is actually Huayan’s ‘All is One, One is All’. Since Lao did not explain further, it is difficult to respond to it. Here I would just say that, according to Tang’s theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’, Buddhism, Huayan thought included, belongs to a kind of ‘Horizontal Observation’. This classification implies that, at least in Tang’s view, Buddhism in general observes the ‘xiang’ or appearance of phenomena in an instant but does not follow any kind of

172 Lu Cheng, Zhongguo foxue yuanliu lüejiang, 中國佛學源流略講 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), p.199
‘order’. Confucianism, which Tang considered the ultimate answer to his own concerns, however, follows a kind of ‘order’. In fact, it is clear that ‘empathic penetration’, an idea of Confucianism as Tang argued, needs to follow an order, from penetrating the horizons belonging to objects to that belonging to subjects. With this fundamental difference, I argue that Tang’s method is not Huayan’s idea of ‘All is One, One is All’. Instead, it is the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification that plays a main role in Tang’s appropriation of this Buddhist tradition.\(^{173}\)

In chapter 5, based on the findings of the previous chapters, I discuss the three research questions I set out at the beginning of this study, as well as suggesting how Fang’s and Tang’s interpretations of Huayan thought help improve the current debate concerning the development of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’.

\(^{173}\) Both Zhang Yunjiang and Jing Haifeng argue that Tang favoured Huayan thought because the mind as suggested by Huayan is similar to that of Confucianism. See Zhang Yunjiang, *Xin tong jiu jing: Tang Junyi yu Huayanzong*, note 1, pp.34-37; Jing Haifeng, *Xin ruxue yu ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang*, note 1, p.252. I argue that this view, like the view of Lao Sze-kwang I mention here, misunderstands Tang’s interpretations of Buddhism and Confucianism. It is because, according to Tang’s theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’, Buddhism belongs to a kind of ‘Horizontal Observation’. The characteristics between Buddhism and Confucianism are so huge that it is difficult to consider them similar.
Chapter 5 Fang’s and Tang’s Appropriations of Huayan Thought and ‘Scientism’

Thus far, this study has discussed the historical context in which Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi appropriated elements of Huayan thought to develop their own ideas, as well as the characteristics of contemporary ‘scientism’ and those scholars’ interpretations of Huayan thought. All this helps answer the research questions I set at the beginning of this study, which are: first, why ‘scientism’ became an issue in twentieth-century China; second, why Chinese thinkers at that time tended to go back to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas; and third, why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, in particular, to respond to ‘scientism’. In what follows, based on the findings of the previous chapters, I will discuss these questions section by section, aiming at evaluating the role of Huayan thought played in Fang’s and Tang’s response to ‘scientism’.

Chapter 5.1 ‘Scientism’ as an Issue: From the point of View of ‘Ti’ and ‘Yong’

The background to the development of ‘scientism’ in early twentieth-century China becomes clearer if we consider the historical problems facing China from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. As I noted at the beginning of chapter 2.2, there have been numerous excellent studies on the historical events of that period. However, what is needed most for the purposes of this study is a theoretical framework to help provide a clearer explanation of these events. In short, by using the concepts of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, which I believe provide an appropriate theoretical framework, I aim at considering why rather than how ‘scientism’ became a focal issue at that time.

In chapter 2, I stressed that the history of science in China can be traced back to as early as the fourth century B.C., while China’s encounter with Western science can be traced back to the seventeenth century. I therefore argued that science was not a new issue for Chinese people in the early twentieth century. The aims of both Fang’s and Tang’s theories were thus not to reject scientific investigation as such but to reject ‘scientism’. In fact, we can think about the question of why ‘scientism’ became an issue in twentieth-century China from a different perspective, namely, by asking why ‘scientism’ was not an issue in China before the twentieth century. I would argue that this reorientation is necessary because it not only retains the original meaning of the research question but also helps to answer it more accurately.

When discussing the Chinese attitude towards Western learning during the time of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1860-1894), I cited Li Hongzhang’s well-known criticism, arguing that to many Chinese people at that time, Western learning was a mixture of ‘strange

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1 For details, see chapter 2.2.2.
techniques and tricky crafts’ (Chi. qiji yinqiao 奇技淫巧). This demeaning phrase shows, on the one hand, how negative the Chinese attitude was towards Western learning but, on the other hand, it indicates the perceived role of Western learning in China immediately prior to the twentieth century. As noted in chapter 2.1, while ‘ti’ is generally regarded as body, substance or principle, ‘yong’ is seen as function, phenomenon or approach. I would therefore argue that, by using the words ‘technique’ and ‘craft’, Chinese people, during the time of the Self-Strengthening Movement, saw Western learning as a kind of function or approach. That is, Western learning was considered as ‘yong’, a point supported by the leading ideology of the Movement, that of ‘Chinese learning for fundamental principles (ti), Western learning for practical applications (yong)’, as I discussed in chapter 2.2.1. However, considering Western learning as ‘yong’ only may contradict the crucial characteristic of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ that I have emphasised throughout this study: that they are inseparable.

In fact, in chapter 2, I referred to the ideas of Yan Fu and Wang Fuzhi, which help sharpen our understanding of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’. As Yan argued, an animal with a cow’s ‘ti’ should not have the ‘yong’ of a horse, implying that ‘ti’ determines ‘yong’.

According to Wang, however, the content of ‘ti’ is also defined by the ‘yong’. Thus, not only does ‘ti’ determine ‘yong’ but ‘yong’ helps to define ‘ti’. As I will discuss below, this understanding of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ helps explain why twentieth-century Chinese thinkers tended to return to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas, and why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, in particular, to respond to ‘scientism’.

Returning to the discussion of why ‘scientism’ became an issue in twentieth-century China: Chinese thinkers, acknowledging that ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ are not separate, gradually took the view that it was the backwardness of Chinese institutions rather than Chinese technology which rendered the country inferior to its Western counterparts. That is to say that, while Chinese institutions are regarded as ‘ti’, the development of Chinese technology comprises the ‘yong’. In other words, it is institutional arrangements that influence the level of scientific development within a country. I argue that it was exactly this fundamental assumption that lay behind the Hundred Days of Reform of 1898. However, as noted in chapter 2.1, the usages of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ are context-dependent. Institution, on the one hand, can be ‘ti’, influencing national scientific development, but, on the other hand, can be ‘yong’. To many Chinese thinkers of the May Fourth Movement of early twentieth-century China it was Chinese culture, and Confucianism in particular, that was the ultimate reason for the backwardness of the country. In this sense, Chinese culture is ‘ti’, while institution is ‘yong’. To go a step further, if Chinese culture is ‘ti’, scientific development is its ‘yong’. If the history of China from the

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2 See chapter 2.2.1.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
middle of the nineteenth century supports Yan Fu’s notion of ‘ti’ influencing ‘yong’, I would argue that the appropriations of Huayan thought by Fang and Tang support Wang Fuzhi’s idea. This is because, as I will show in the following sections, Fang and Tang first confirmed the ‘yong’ of both scientific development and Confucianism, before reconstructing the ‘ti’ of Chinese culture. In other words, they believed it necessary to attempt to redefine ‘ti’ through first reviewing the ‘yong’.

The discussion so far may seem irrelevant to the first research question, though in fact it already touches upon the subject matter of the answer to that question. In chapter 2.2.2 I explored the ideas of ‘empirical scientism’ and ‘materialistic scientism’, in which science is no longer regarded as a ‘technique’ or ‘craft’ but as a kind of ideology. If ideology is ‘ti’, it needs to be related to its ‘yong’. Thus, ‘materialistic scientism’ regards all beings as fundamentally material. Human beings are therefore deemed to follow natural laws and no spiritual activities are recognised. So, if ‘materialistic scientism’ is ‘ti’, the denial of spiritual activities is the ‘yong’. This helps provide the answer to the research question.

Historically, as noted in chapter 2.2.2, the exact date of the first appearance of ‘scientism’ in China is largely unknown, though it is widely recognised that ‘scientism’ became an issue in the early twentieth century, the time of ‘the polemic on science and metaphysics’. Historical events indicate when ‘scientism’ became an issue but they cannot on their own explain why it became an issue precisely then, particularly if we consider the fact that scientific invention had existed in China for thousands of years. In fact, as just noted, the role of science changed during the discussion about ‘scientism’, from one associated with ‘technique’ or ‘craft’ to one connected to ideology. In other words, the perceived role of science changed, in the eyes of many early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers, from ‘yong’ to ‘ti’, and this precisely helps to provide the answer to the first research question.

In chapter 2, I referred to two developments experienced by China in the early twentieth century. The first was the collapse of the traditional value system, as reflected in their different ways by the writings of Chiang Monlin and the suicide of Wang Guowei. Following the above analyses of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, I would argue that this collapse actually meant that the old ‘ti’ of Chinese society was perceived to have disappeared. The second development was the appearance of the ideas of ‘scientism’, as represented in the writings of Ding Wenjiang, Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu. For these thinkers science was no longer a technique but a worldview. In this context, and as identified earlier, science changed its role from ‘yong’ to ‘ti’ and, in my view, the two developments did not co-exist by chance but were closely related. As noted in chapter 2, both occurred in the early twentieth century, so that once the new ‘ti’, represented by ‘scientism’ threatened the old ‘ti’, based on the dominant intellectual traditions
of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, ‘scientism’ became an issue. This explains why ‘scientism’ occurred in twentieth-century China and not earlier, as science was still regarded as ‘yong’ before that time.

In short, to answer the first research question, I would argue that it is from the time that science began to be regarded as ‘ti’ rather than ‘yong’, and was even considered a replacement of the older ‘ti’ of Chinese culture that ‘scientism’ became an issue. As I will discuss below, it was this threat to the old Chinese ‘ti’ that required early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers to return to ancient Chinese thought to try and rediscover the former ‘ti’ of Chinese culture, in order that the old value system could be maintained in the face of the challenge of ‘scientism’. This requires a discussion of the second research question, which is why these Chinese thinkers tended to go back to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas.

Chapter 5.2 Ancient Chinese Thought as a Means for Enhancing ‘Ti’

In chapter 2.2.3 I suggested that early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers could be divided broadly into two groups: those demanding a total ‘Westernization’ and those seeking a protection - or re-construction - of traditional Chinese culture. In fact, in terms of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, I have argued that the position of the former group was to replace Chinese ‘ti’ with Western ‘ti’, so as to acquire Western ‘yong’. However, I have also stressed that the rapid change of ‘ti’ may cause problems, for example, that the old value system may be destroyed before the new value system is fully established. Unfortunately, as illustrated in the writings of Chiang Monlin and the suicide of Wang Guowei, this was exactly the situation facing China in the early twentieth century. Unlike the thinkers who demanded a change of ‘ti’ through total ‘Westernization’, the second group of thinkers sought to enhance the traditional ‘ti’ of Chinese culture, so that the latter could respond to the Western challenge. I argue that, in order to do this, these thinkers tended to redefine the ‘ti’ of Chinese culture by reconsidering the ‘yong’ that the country most needed, an idea similar to that of Wang Fuzhi.

In chapter 2.2.3 I argued that there were, in fact, several ancient Chinese ideas that were favoured by the early twentieth-century pro-traditional thinkers. Among these ideas were those of Mohism, Legalism and even the School of Diplomacy. There were various reasons for these ideas regaining popularity at the time. For example, Mohism was widely regarded as scientific and logical and promoted the idea that scientific thought had existed in China’s past and that the development of science was not a contradiction of the Chinese tradition. In addition, the ideas of Legalism were considered equivalent to the Western idea of the rule of

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5 Lao Sze-kwang also suggests similar idea. See his Zhongguo wenhua luxiang wenti de xin jiantao 中國文化路向問題的新檢討 (Taipei: Dongda tushu 東大圖書, 1993), p.124.
law, so that the rule of law was not a Western monopoly but a value shared by China. In my view, it is because these traditions of scientific development and the rule of law were urgently needed by China at that time that Mohism and Legalism were adopted by the pro-traditional thinkers. For them, responding to the challenge of the West did not need to mean abandoning Chinese culture or replacing its ‘ti’ with the Western one, but rather encouraged them to return to its origin to enhance the traditional ‘ti’. This is exactly the idea of ‘going back to the origin and developing new elements’ or fanben kaixin, the notion that I mentioned at the very beginning of this study. In my view, this idea of enhancing the Chinese ‘ti’ by going back to ancient Chinese thought provides the answer to the second research question: why early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers tended to return to ancient Chinese thought to develop their own ideas.

Before proceeding further, however, one point requires greater consideration. Earlier in this section I stated that the old Chinese value system was destroyed in early twentieth-century China. However, in chapter 2.1.1, I cited the ideas of Da Xue, which maintained that Confucianism is not just a personal belief, but is applicable to society as a whole. In fact, although there was a tradition of appropriating ancient Chinese thought, such as Mohism and Legalism, to develop contemporary theories, I would argue that these appropriations could not help preserve the old value system, which was built largely on Confucian ideas. Because the old value system was destroyed before the new value system was established, the pro-traditional thinkers faced a dilemma. Their most urgent task was to reconfirm the values of Confucianism in order to preserve the old value system but they needed to admit the value of science, whilst at the same time avoiding ‘scientism’. In other words, while responding to ‘scientism’, they should not abandon Confucianism, and it is this that is the prerequisite of the theories of both Fang and Tang. Thus, the appropriations of Huayan thought by Fang and Tang are both attempts to achieve this difficult task. Below I go on to consider this question, which forms the central subject matter of this study.

**Chapter 5.3 Revisiting the Role of Huayan in Fang’s and Tang’s Response to ‘Scientism’**

In chapter 2.2.2, I defined ‘scientism’ as a belief that quantitative natural science is the only valuable element in human learning and the only source of truth. In chapters 3 and 4, where I discussed Fang’s and Tang’s criticism of ‘scientism’ and their views of the failure of Western culture, I also argued that emphasis on perception and cognition as the dominant human faculties could be seen as a main cause of ‘scientism’. In order to connect both Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought with ‘scientism’, two points need emphasizing. In both of their appropriations, Huayan thought needed to argue, first, that there are other human

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6 For Fang’s and Tang’s ideas, see chapter 3.1.2 and 4.1.8 respectively.
faculties besides perception and cognition, and, second, that perception and cognition should not be dominant over the other human faculties. Only by acknowledging these factors could their appropriations of Huayan thought be really responsive to the issue of ‘scientism’. Thus, in what follows, I will address the third research question, which is why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought in particular to respond to ‘scientism’, based on these two prerequisite factors.

Chapter 5.3.1 Fang, His Appropriation of Huayan Thought, and ‘Scientism’

As I mentioned in chapter 3.2, Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought can be summarized in a sentence: Huayan thought is a representation of the philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’. In fact, according to his chronicle, Fang’s discussion of Huayan thought began very late in his life, from 1973 onwards, just four years before his death, though his ‘Correlative Structure of Men and the World’ or ‘Blueprint’ first appeared in 1969. As I stated in chapter 3.2, Fang explained Huayan ideas in the light of his own philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’. I suggest, therefore, that Fang developed his own philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’, as discussed in chapter 3.1, before he considered Huayan thought. In other words, he appropriated Huayan thought to support, rather than to develop, his philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’.

In fact, although Fang emphasized that Confucianism, Taoism and Chinese Buddhism all share the characteristics of ‘comprehensive harmony’, I argue that it is not until his discovery of Huayan thought that his philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’ finds the support that is crucial in his redefining the ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ of Chinese culture. Since Fang considered Huayan thought a fine example of ‘comprehensive harmony’ and that the characteristics of this ‘comprehensive harmony’ were shared by the major Chinese traditions, I argue that Huayan thought is representative, for Fang, of Chinese culture as a whole. As I noted in chapter 3.1, Fang argued that the main function or ‘yong’ of the philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’ is to dissolve dualism, which he considered the main product of ‘praeternatural metaphysics’. In terms of the analysis of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, I argue that the philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’ is ‘ti’, its ‘yong’ being the dissolution of dualism. In fact, Fang explicitly stated that the value of Huayan thought is to help dissolve dualism, which is an essential requirement in responding to the challenge of ‘scientism’. As with his explanation of Huayan in terms of his own philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’, Fang’s

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7 See the discussion of chapter 3.2.2 and chapter 3.3.
8 Feng Huxiang 馮滬祥 ed., Fang Dongmei xiansheng de zhexue dianxing 方東美先生的哲學典型 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2007), pp.165-264.
9 Fang, CMN, pp.65-102.
10 Fang, CPSD, pp.17-35.
11 Fang, HZ vol.2, p.223.
linking of Huayan thought with ‘scientism’ is also unique amongst his interpretations of
different intellectual traditions. That is to say, he did not link ‘scientism’ with any other
intellectual traditions, apart from Huayan.

At the start of this section, I indicated the two factors that Huayan thought must include in
order to be useful to Fang and Tang in responding to ‘scientism’, namely that it should stress,
first, that there are other human faculties apart from perception and cognition, and, second,
that perception and cognition should not be the dominant human faculties. Fang’s
appropriation of Huayan thought, based on his philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’,
achieved this. As a fine example of ‘comprehensive harmony’, Fang argued that Huayan
thought does not exclude any particular values, nor allow any one of them to be dominant. As
a result, ‘scientism’ could be avoided. If this analysis is correct, I argue that Fang’s view that
Huayan thought could provide an ideal response to ‘scientism’ is reasonable.

In fact, as discussed in chapter 2, for many Chinese people in the early twentieth century,
Confucianism meant social order. The most urgent task for pro-traditional thinkers was thus to
reconfirm the values of Confucianism so that the old value system could be preserved, whilst
at the same time the value of science could be acknowledged, thus avoiding ‘scientism’. In
terms of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, Fang’s claim that Huayan thought is representative of Chinese culture
actually enhances the ‘ti’ of Chinese culture. As a result, the ‘yong’ of Chinese culture can
also be enlarged. Fang’s enhancing of the ‘ti’ helped preserve Confucianism, as no values,
including those of Confucianism, are excluded in his philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’,
thus allowing for the development of science without accepting ‘scientism’. I conclude that
this is the core of Fang’s appropriation of Huayan thought.

Based on the above, Fang never claimed that Chinese culture is ‘superior’ to its Western
counterparts. Instead, Fang suggested that different cultures need to learn from each other in
order to achieve the ideal of ‘comprehensive harmony’. As he said:

The ancient Greeks, - I mean, their souls – should come down to the workaday world to save its
appearances. The Chinese should descend from the metaphysical-moral order to the order of
physical nature to learn to appreciate the achievement of modern science. The Indians should break
through the maya of hierarchical castes to see into the real importance of equality of men and of all
creatures, as was once vehemently advocated by the Mahāyānic Buddhists. Modern western men
should lead people to a little higher level in the endeavour of life to apprehend and comprehend
spiritual values, as has been achieved in the classical age of all peoples throughout the world.
East-West philosophers should form a united front in advocating authentic spiritual democracy in its
largest scope and in its highest quality.\textsuperscript{12}

Since exclusion of values obviously contradicts Fang’s philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’, which is embodied in Huayan thought, as I argued in chapter 3.1, classifying Fang as a nationalist is not suitable as it contradicts his appropriation of Huayan thought.

However, a story about Fang may also suggest the potential difficulties facing his theory:

Fang presented a paper entitled ‘The World and the Individual in Chinese Metaphysics’ at the 1964 East-West Philosophers’ Conference [at Hawaii]. Professor Findlay, the British philosopher, remarked that Fang’s view sounded like a beautiful dream; how could Fang convince him of the truth of this beautiful dream? After commending Findlay for his seeing the beauty of the dream, Fang told Findlay a story he had heard from Professor Dodds of Oxford, the author of \textit{The Greeks and the Irrational}, while in the war-time capital of Chungknig. Dodds was visiting the British Museum admiring the Parthenon sculptures when he was approached by a youth who said that, although it was an awful thing to confess, he found himself unmoved by the display of Greek art. Fang thereupon asked Findlay, ‘Suppose that you were in the position of your esteemed colleague, Professor Dodds; tell me please, Professor Findlay, how can you convince the young man of your beautiful dream?’\textsuperscript{13}

Although Fang’s reply was admired by some Chinese scholars,\textsuperscript{14} I would argue that Professor Findlay’s reply, where he described Fang as ‘absolutely assertive’,\textsuperscript{15} is more relevant to this study. In fact, in my view, there are three implications of the story. First, how can Fang convince others to believe in his notion of ‘comprehensive harmony’, in which various values co-exist? Second, how can he prove that the faculties of perception and cognition, which are largely represented by Professor Findlay’s question, are necessarily inferior in his ‘comprehensive harmony’? Third, given that Fang’s philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’ \textit{did} exist, why should some faculties be dominated by perception and cognition? If these questions cannot be fully answered, I would argue that the satisfactoriness of Fang’s solution to the ‘scientism’ problem might be in doubt.

Although evaluating the satisfactoriness of Fang’s response is not my main concern, I would like to raise one issue, namely Fang’s method in solving the above practical difficulties. In chapter 1, I noted that there are few academic studies of Fang in comparison with his

\textsuperscript{12} Fang, \textit{CMN}, p.83.
\textsuperscript{14} Fang, \textit{ZZJF} vol.2, pp.245-246.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}
contemporaries. In chapter 3.1, I also noted that some scholars see Fang’s mode of expression as an obstacle to understanding his thought. In fact, I argue that Fang’s way of writing is the key to understanding how he deals with the practical difficulties noted above. In chapter 3.2, I observed that Fang regarded the language of *Huayanjing* to be metaphorical or poetic. Indeed, Mou Zongsan also argued that Fang’s own style is poetic or literary, while Fang tended to express his ideas through poetries and stories. In chapter 4.2, during my discussion of Tang Junyi’s harmonization of Fang’s thought, I quoted a letter from Tang to Fang, in which the former stressed Fang’s emphasis on literature. All these examples highlight the fact that Fang used literature or a literary style to attract his readers, encouraging them to see that there are values other than those of science. In short, in my view, in judging the effectiveness of Fang’s response to ‘scientism’, we need first to assess the impact of his literary style on his readers, although this question is beyond the main focus of this study. However, if my analysis is correct, this helps to explain why Fang’s style is so different from his contemporaries, most of whom tried to explain their ideas as clearly as possible. In this context, I would argue that criticising Fang’s style as literary reveals a misunderstanding or even ignorance of his method.

My discussion of Fang’s appropriation of Huayan thought to develop his response to ‘scientism’ concludes here and I now go on to consider Tang Junyi’s appropriation of this Buddhist tradition, a topic which has had far more attention within the Chinese academy.

**Chapter 5.3.2 Tang, His Appropriation of Huayan Thought, and ‘Scientism’**

In chapter 4.2, I mentioned that Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought focuses mainly on two points. First, there is his emphasis on the harmonization of various concepts within the mind, as Fazang had suggested, and second is the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification. In fact, as I noted in chapter 4.1, Tang’s idea of ‘xinling’ was rather imprecise in his earlier writings, in which there was little discussion about what it denotes. It is only in his last work, *Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie* (*The Existence of Life and Horizons of Mind*), finished in 1977, that the character of ‘xinling’ is fully explored. Tang’s earliest consideration of Huayan thought was in the late 1960s, when he discussed Fazang’s harmonization of the ‘Three Natures’. Indeed, it was as late as the early 1970s before he discussed Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification. I therefore argue that Tang’s consideration of Huayan thought developed late in his life. It is therefore possible that Tang’s general ideas, including his theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’, were inspired by Huayan thought.

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18 Tang, *NZX*, p.64.
Before examining the concept of the mind, however, I wish to discuss the relationship between Tang’s thought and his interpretation of the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, as this is closely related to his response to ‘scientism’. In chapter 2.4.3, where I discussed Huayan’s key concepts, I argued that from the perspective of Huayan’s ‘yuan jiao’, all values are equal in that each has its place in the relevant context. In my view, this idea is endorsed by Tang and probably represents the most important element in his response to ‘scientism’. As noted in chapter 4.2, Tang considered Huayan’s doctrinal classification theory as a process of enlightenment, in which all ‘Small Vehicle Doctrine of Ordinary Disciples’, ‘Initial Doctrinal of the Great Vehicle’ and ‘Final Doctrinal of the Great Vehicle’ belong to certain kinds of verbal directions, while the ‘Great Vehicle’s Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment’ is designed to turn people away from philosophical theories towards personal practice. Only by practising virtuous theories can someone achieve the state of ideal personhood and, from the perspective of ideal personhood, all previous theories are worthwhile and necessary, as they all contribute to the process of enlightenment. Thus, no theories should be regarded as worthless.

There are three implications of this for Tang’s response to ‘scientism’. First, he suggests that all theories, from the point of view of ideal personhood, have equal importance. Thus, again from the perspective of ideal personhood, the values of both Confucianism and scientific development should be acknowledged. Second, all earlier theories - and even experiences - can be seen as lessons or steps towards achieving the state of ideal personhood. None of them should therefore be casually dismissed and, again, the values of Confucianism and scientific development must be recognised. Third, practice is necessary to achieve the state of ideal personhood. In other words, responding to ‘scientism’ is more than a purely theoretical issue. I would argue that this is the central difference between the respective responses to ‘scientism’ of Fang and Tang. In fact, as observed in chapter 4.1.7, Lao Sze-kwang also stressed that Tang’s thought is a form of the ‘scholarship of becoming moral’ (Chi. chengde zhi xue 成徳之學), in which practice is essential. This is why, in my view, Tang put Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity together as the final three horizons in his theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’, as he explicitly stated that these intellectual traditions emphasize practice and experience. In short, they all embody forms of teaching rather than being merely theoretical.¹⁹

Following his interpretation of the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, Tang did not believe that any one value is necessarily inferior to another, as Fang had suggested. According to Tang, whether a value is superior depends on the circumstances. In ‘A Manifesto on [the] Reappraisal of Chinese culture - Our Joint Understanding of the Sinological Study Relating to [the] World Cultural Outlook’, a declaration published in 1958 and widely held to be a

¹⁹ For details, see chapter 4.1.5.
reflection of Tang’s thought, although signed jointly by Carsun Chang, Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan, as well as Tang,\(^{20}\) this was further clarified:

If the Chinese really want to set themselves up as a moral subject they must try also to set themselves up as an epistemological subject [because scientific development can also help improve the lives of human beings]. In that subtle process, the former should temporarily suspend its role or at least temporarily retreat behind the latter as its supporting character. That must be done till the latter has accomplished its mission and resolved knotty problems. Till then, the moral subject might step forward, evaluating, guiding and promoting its pragmatic activities.\(^{21}\)

The position that no values should always be seen as superior to others is clear. The declaration continued:

We thus advocate that in accordance with its own demand for development, Chinese culture must develop a full-fledged ideal of culture in a way that the Chinese people not only realize themselves to be a moral subject (moral being) through their Rationalism but also a political subject (political being) with regard to politic matters, and an epistemological self (epistemological being) in dealing with the world of knowledge, and a technological, practical subject (technological, practical being) in controlling their social and natural environment.\(^{22}\)

At the beginning of this section, I observed that in order to develop science, whilst at the same time avoiding ‘scientism’, humankind needs to acknowledge the faculties of perception and cognition, but insist that they should not dominate the other human faculties. Tang’s thought explicitly observes these two requirements.

In chapter 2, I mentioned that Huayan thought considers the idea of ‘emptiness’ provisional and only that of the ‘pure mind’ as final. Using this classification, Buddhist teachings can be explained within a hierarchical framework, from the most elementary to the most profound.\(^{23}\) Furthermore, I argued that doctrinal classification theory helps unify various Buddhist teachings, allowing Buddhism to be regarded as a whole. As a result, modern Confucian thinkers, Mou Zongsan in particular, could compare Confucianism and Buddhism more fully.\(^{24}\) In chapter 4, I suggested that some scholars have noted that Tang’s thought is probably inspired by the Buddhist theory of doctrinal classification. However, they fail to

\(^{20}\) Huang Zhaoqiang 黃兆強, Xueshu yu jingshi: Tang Junyi de lishi zhexue ji qi zhongji guanhuai 學術與經世：唐君毅的歷史哲學及其終極關懷 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2010), pp.479-505.

\(^{21}\) This citation is from the English version of the declaration. See Tang Junyi, Completed works of Tang Junyi 唐君毅全集 vol. 19 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p. 529.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 526.

\(^{23}\) For details, see chapter 2.4.3.

\(^{24}\) See chapter 2.3.
indicate which Buddhist theory of doctrinal classification Tang employed, nor do they say in what particular aspects Tang was influenced by Huayan theory. Combining these various perspectives, I would argue that the influence of Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification on Tang enabled him to see Buddhism as a whole and thus compare Confucianism and Buddhism more effectively. Unlike Mou Zongsan, who argued that Confucianism was ‘superior’ to Buddhism, Tang emphasized that the conclusion of Huayan thought was that, from the perspective of ideal personhood, different values have equal status.

As I noted in chapter 4, Tang’s recognition of different values appears to be derived from the idea of ‘empathic penetration’ (Chi. gantong 感通), through which all values and phenomena should be seen as interpenetrative without obstruction. However, I would argue that ‘empathic penetration’ only leads to an acknowledgement of the existence of different values, rather than suggesting that, from the perspective of ideal personhood, all values have equal status. In other words, although ‘empathic penetration’ admits various values, there could, in principle, be some discrimination between them. Thus, I would argue that Tang’s view that all values are equal from ideal personhood’s point of view derives from his appropriation of Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification.

In fact, in interpreting the theory, Tang stressed the role of the ‘Great Vehicle’s Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment’, considering it a key step on the path to enlightenment, because the process of enlightenment is not a conceptual game but something requiring serious practice. In chapter 3.2, I mentioned that in his interpretation of Huayanjing, Fang had emphasized the role of practice in reaching Huayan’s concept of the harmonious world. However, ironically, Fang did not include it while developing his own philosophy of ‘comprehensive harmony’. This neglect of practice means his thought is more of an assertion, as reflected in the story of Fang and Professor Findlay. I would argue that this ambiguity in Fang’s thought is due either to his overlooking Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification or his very different interpretation of doctrinal classification theory from that of Tang.

By contrast, Tang’s view of the ‘Great Vehicle’s Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment’ as a turning point in changing our attitudes from philosophical theory to practice matches his own theory about the final three horizons belonging to the category of practice, a point I highlighted in chapter 4.1. In fact, after the death of Tang, there was a great number of essays in memory of him. However, I argue that the nature of the essays was mainly to discuss Tang’s personality rather his philosophical thought, a phenomenon uncommon amongst Tang’s contemporary fellows. This is, perhaps, not an aberration. As I mentioned earlier, Fang’s method of inspiring others was his writing style. Here I argue that Tang’s method of

25 See chapter 4.3.1.
influencing others was to set himself as a personal example, teaching the teenagers by his own deeds, which is called ‘shenjiao’ 身教 in Chinese. Only by understanding this characteristic of Tang can we better comprehend the following issues: why New Asia College, which was co-founded by Tang and Qian Mu, emphasized students’ conduct so much; why Lao Sze-kwang argues that the death of Tang means the end of ‘scholarship of becoming moral’ or chengde zhi xue; why many studies about Tang as seen so far, focus on his personality and why doing research about Tang is so difficult. I argue that all of the above relate to the fact that Tang’s ultimate method of transforming others was not verbal or written. It was through his personality and deeds that Tang showed his readers, mainly students as I mentioned in chapter 4, that there are other values in addition to those of perception and cognition. Unlike Fang’s method, which largely shows the value of beauty, I argue that Tang’s method mainly shows the value of morality.

In short, I would argue that, in Tang’s view, there are other human faculties besides those of perception and cognition but the value of these faculties depends upon the attendant circumstances. Thus, developing scientific knowledge may be preferable in some circumstances, whilst moral development is more important in other circumstances. Similarly, whether someone avoids the problem of ‘scientism’ or not will depend on his or her own circumstances and no universal model will be applicable in all cases.

In my view, the above idea of Tang’s is very similar to the argument of Liang Shuming, which I discussed in chapter 2.3, as Liang also suggested that Confucianism should be preferred as long as China was suffering from civil unrest and foreign challenge. For Liang the values of Western and Indian cultures should only be rejected because they did not seem relevant at that time. This position is similar to Tang’s affirmation of different values and, taking into account Tang’s harmonization of the ideas of Thomé H. Fang, as discussed in chapter 4.2, I would argue that Tang’s thought is actually a response to - or synthesis of - the thought of Fang, Xiong and Liang.

We now encounter a theoretical difficulty. In chapter 4.1, I argued that Tang considered Confucianism the answer to his own central concern, which was to explain the existence of the moral self. In this context, Confucianism is the ‘ti’ of Tang’s thought. At the same time, I have suggested that the ‘yong’ of Tang’s theory is actually Huayan. Thus, Tang’s theory of having both the Confucian ‘ti’ and Huayan’s ‘yong’, seems to contradict the principle of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ that I have assumed throughout this study, the two being inseparable. Lin Yu-sheng’s harsh criticism of Tang, as noted in chapter 4, that Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought represents a ‘confusion of ideas’ seems accurate.26 However, because Wang

26 For details, see beginning of chapter 4.
Fuzhi suggests that the content of ‘ti’ is also defined by ‘yong’, I would argue that Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought is not as problematic as suggested by Lin Yu-sheng.

In chapter 1.1, I mentioned that, in a private conversation between Lao Sze-kwang and Tang Junyi, it is reported that Tang said he intended to explain Confucianism through Huayan thought. While appropriating Huayan’s ‘yong’ of considering all values of equal status, from an ideal personhood’s perspective, I would argue that Tang needed to re-define and enlarge the ‘ti’ of Confucianism, so that it could carry the ‘yong’ of Huayan. Such a view derives from the first characteristics of Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, which stress the harmonization of all concepts at the level of the mind. In chapter 4.1, I discussed Tang’s idea of ‘xinling’心靈, in which both concrete and vacuous sides are regarded as equally important. In fact, in his earlier work, Xinwu yu rensheng心物與人生 (Minds, Material and Life), completed before the early 1950s, Tang had already put forward the idea of ‘xinling’. Following his focussing on Huayan thought from the late 1960s, however, the term ‘xinling’ became a philosophical term and, as such, became a key concept in his last work Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie. This change may seem trivial but I think Tang’s emphasis on the vacuous aspect of the mind was affected by Huayan thought. In Tang’s view, since Confucianism and Huayan share a similar ‘ti’, which relates to the vacuous aspect of the mind, both enjoy a similar ‘yong’, which comprises the harmonization of different values at the mind level. In short, both intellectual traditions admit different values, including those of scientific development and moral cultivation. In this context, Lao’s suggesting that Tang intended to explain Confucianism through Huayan is possible, as Tang appears to enrich the ‘ti’ of Confucianism by reviewing the ‘ti’ of Huayan.

However, as I noted earlier, from an ideal personhood’s perspective, Huayan thought considered all values to be of equal status, a point markedly different from the Confucian idea of ‘empathic penetration’. In this sense, although Tang redefined the ‘ti’ of Confucianism, it did not contain the ‘yong’ of Huayan. However, as I argued in chapter 2.1, the contents of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ are context-dependent. Thus, although the ‘yong’ of Confucianism and of Huayan thought are finally different, Tang believed that the ultimate ‘ti’ is the mind. All intellectual traditions develop in the mind, as I discussed in chapter 4.1, when considering Tang’s theory of ‘The Nine Horizons of the Mind’. Thus, while the mind is ‘ti’, all intellectual traditions, such as Confucianism and Huayan thought, are its ‘yong’. Therefore, although Confucianism does not have the ‘yong’ of Huayan, the mind has the ‘yong’ of the Buddhist tradition. This is why Tang stressed that ‘xinling’ can move from one horizon to other horizons without any attachment, based simply on the change of environment. In this context, I would argue that Tang’s appropriation of Huayan thought, in order to respond to ‘scientism’, does not

27 For details, see chronicle of Tang in NZX.
contradict the principle of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, since Tang considered that the most effective way to respond to ‘scientism’ in his time was to confirm the values of both scientific development and Chinese culture, and not to argue that one is superior to other. This concludes my examination of the role Huayan thought plays in the thought of Tang Junyi. In what follows, I discuss the significance of Fang’s and Tang’s appropriations of Huayan thought to the development of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’, an issue hotly debated in current Chinese philosophical studies.

Chapter 5.4 The Writings of Fang and Tang in terms of ‘Chinese Hermeneutics’

As noted in chapter 2, there are three points that need to be considered when discussing ‘Chinese hermeneutics’. First, such hermeneutics must avoid analyzing the characteristics of Chinese thought from a single perspective. This is, to a large extent, a response to the tradition emphasizing ‘Heart-Mind and Nature’, as suggested by Xiong Shili and his followers. Second, traditional Chinese thought must answer current needs and therefore a transformation of the thought is necessary. Third, the ‘original meaning’ of traditional Chinese thought also needs to be explored, but not in an arbitrary way. Together, these three elements provide excellent criteria for evaluating the significance of the interpretations by Fang and Tang of Huayan thought.

First, so as to avoid discussing things from a particular narrow perspective, both Fang and Tang offered their own answers. As Fang argued in his own thought and in his interpretation of Huayan thought, considering an issue from a macro-perspective is preferable. For Fang, ‘comprehensive harmony’ is just such a macro-perspective, in which there is no dualism and where the wholeness of the world cannot be divided into separate parts. This avoids approaching the subject from a single perspective. However, Fang appears to overlook the fact that viewing an issue from a single perspective can sometimes have its advantages. Taking his interpretation of Huayan thought as an example, Fang discussed the thought from the perspective of a perfect world, believing that in such a world, all values are included. However, as I discussed in chapter 3.2, Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought cannot affect its image as the subjective fantasy of a group of patriarchs. A route for achieving a harmonious world is required. Thus, in this case, discussing the issue from a single perspective appears necessary. The key concerns here for any thinker are how to avoid being constrained by a single perspective but how also to advance from it. Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought seems more successful in this context.

For, as Tang argued in his interpretation of the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, different Buddhist theories have had different positions at different times. Thus, no theory can
be dominant; that is, whether one theory is superior to others depends on the context. So viewing an issue from a single perspective is not always wrong, assuming the single perspective is necessary at the time. In Tang’s interpretation of the Huayan theory of doctrinal classification, for example, ‘yuan jiao’ is certainly important, as it represents the perfect world that Huayan thought pursues. However, for a sentient being which cannot use its pure mind, ‘yuan jiao’ is simply a fantasy. For such sentient beings, other Buddhist teachings, as identified in Huayan’s theory of doctrinal classification, are probably preferable. Thus, in this example, Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought appears to meet the requirement of avoiding seeing an issue from a single perspective - unlike Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought - while at the same time avoiding the shortcomings of Fang’s theory.

Second, the need to respond to current issues is perhaps one of the things which current studies misunderstand most about the thinkers in the times of Fang and Tang. As noted in chapter 2.5, some scholars complain that contemporary Chinese thought fails to respond to the needs of our time. According to these thinkers, in the time of Fang and Tang the goal of thinkers seems to have been finding the ‘original meaning’ of Chinese thought and the criteria for assessing the value of an interpretation largely depended on how much it conformed to the original texts. The aim of transforming traditional Chinese thought to meet current issues was simply overlooked. As I mentioned in chapter 2, there is a historical background to the development of the thought of the pro-traditional thinkers, including Fang and Tang. This background helps define the thinkers’ area of concern, namely the challenge of ‘scientism’, based on the assumptions that Western culture had been ‘failing’ and that Chinese culture was worth retaining. Because of particular historical factors, the response of the pro-traditional thinkers at the time was not arbitrary. Although it is true that pro-traditional thinkers in the early twentieth century did not consider issues like human rights, environmentalism and feminism, such issues at the time, if they existed, were not as vital as meeting the challenge of ‘scientism’. In this sense, many pro-traditional thinkers tried to respond to the needs of their time. From the findings of this study, it is obvious that Fang and Tang responded to this challenge rather than seeking the ‘original meaning’ of traditional Chinese thought, though the results of their responses varied considerably.

Third, the ‘objectivity’ of the interpretations of Huayan thought by Fang and Tang also needs to be considered. Although I argue that both Fang and Tang tried to transform traditional Chinese thought in order to meet the needs of their time, their approaches to the ‘original meaning’ of the traditional thought also needs to be examined. Otherwise, the product of their work would be a totally new theory, rather than a transformation of traditional thought. In Fang’s case, his absorption of Huayan thought may be rather controversial as the Huayan patriarch on whom he focused was Dushun, about whose life little is known. In addition, Fang
ignored the relationship between Huayan thought and other Buddhist theories, such as the concept of Consciousness-Only and *Dasheng qixin lun*. Theoretically, Fang’s interpretation is also debatable because he neglected the thought of other Huayan patriarchs, considering their thought a footnote to Dushun’s idea of the perfect world. As a consequence, many important concepts from Huayan thought - ‘Dharma Realm’, ‘Dependent Arising’ and ‘Nature Arising’ are mentioned only briefly and not explored in any depth by Fang, nor related to Dushun’s idea of the harmonious world. Consequently, Fang’s interpretation of Huayan thought may easily be criticized as selective since many of the important texts and concepts were not considered.

Tang’s interpretation, by contrast, is, in my view, less controversial. Unlike Fang, Tang discussed Huayan thought based on its relationship to the concepts of Consciousness-Only and *Dasheng qixin lun*. Therefore, the relationship between the mind and the concept of ‘dharma realm’, as well as the word ‘sheng’, are more fully considered. In addition, Tang focused on the thought of Fazang, who is widely recognised within the academy as the real founder of the Huayan School. Fazang’s thought is more comprehensive than Dushun’s, so Tang’s use of Fazang to develop his interpretation provides for a more complete interpretation. In fact, many important concepts of Huayan thought are included in Tang’s interpretation and their meanings are, as a result, better explained, thus helping avoid the difficulty of Fang’s interpretation, which discusses the harmonious world *in vacuo*. Certainly, whilst the ‘original meaning’ of Huayan thought may not be gleaned from Tang’s interpretation, his theory probably avoids the criticism that his interpretation is selective. As a result of his interpretations of other intellectual traditions, in my view, Tang’s theory is considered one of the best among his contemporaries, as it goes some way to meeting the three requirements of developing ‘Chinese hermeneutics’ in today’s Chinese academy.

Although Tang’s interpretation of Huayan thought, in terms of the discussion about ‘Chinese hermeneutics’, seems more comprehensive than that of Fang, the discussion about the relationship between Huayan thought and these two thinkers does not end here, because the question of absorbing Huayan thought also needs consideration. Their interpretations of Huayan thought are closely related to the effectiveness of their own theories in responding to the challenge of ‘scientism’. In this sense, following the discussion in chapters 2 and 3, I suggest the idea of ‘theoretical power’ as a fourth requirement of developing ‘Chinese hermeneutics’, which is to evaluate the effectiveness of a hermeneutic theory in terms of its ‘explanatory power’ of the issues to which it is responding.²⁸

²⁸ For this idea, I am inspired by Lao Sze-kwang. See his *Xujing yu xiwang: lun dangdai zhexue yu wen hua* 虛境與希望：論當代哲學與文化 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003), pp.19-24.
In other words, I argue that the effectiveness of Fang’s and Tang’s theories needs to be considered while discussing their roles in the development of ‘Chinese hermeneutics’. In my view, as noted in chapter 5.3, their methods are rather personal and it is difficult to judge if their methods are influential on others. As I discussed in chapter 4.2, even Tang Junyi admitted that Fang’s writing style is difficult to learn. There is also a rumour in Chinese academia that Fang was once very disappointed as his writing style was criticised by other scholars as ‘a heavenly steed soaring across the skies’ or 天馬行空 in Chinese. I argue that perhaps Fang himself may have experienced a world of harmony in which ‘scientism’ was avoided, as is suggested in his own theory of ‘comprehensive harmony’. However, others may not feel the same. The exchange between him and Professor Findlay supports this point. That is to say, Fang’s story-telling style may not inspire others very successfully. It certainly weakens the effectiveness of his theory. Similarly, Lao Sze-kwong’s view that the death of Tang means the end of the tradition of the ‘scholarship of becoming moral’ also implies that, at least in Lao’s eyes, very few people, if there any, can or do follow Tang’s path. Although I believe that Tang himself practised his theory, appreciating different values and avoiding ‘scientism’, I argue that a more comprehensive theory of practice is certainly needed. Otherwise, it is difficult for others to follow his path. Therefore, in order to enhance the effectiveness of Tang’s theory, a theory of practice is a topic we need pursue in future study.

The appropriations of Huayan thought by Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi in order to respond to the challenge of ‘scientism’ provide a notable example of Chinese thinkers looking to the past for inspiration about the present and future. However, in consideration of the continuing need for Chinese thinkers to argue for a viable approach to progress in the twenty-first century, I am sure that discussions about appropriating the past to meet current needs will not end here. Tang’s words in The Experience of Life 人生之體驗 are therefore, perhaps, an appropriate way to conclude this study:

在真理世界本身，一切真理是互相融攝，
而有一絕對的真理為中心。
這絕對的真理中心，即在你愛真理的態度本身。

In the World of Truth, all truths are mutually penetrative,
with an absolute Truth as its centre.
This absolute Truth is your passion for truths itself.  

29 Tang, Rensheng zhi tiyan (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 2000), p.47.
Appendix 1:
Reply from the University of Wisconsin-Madison about Fang’s Status

From: "Patty Winspur" <pwinspur@wisc.edu>
To: "King Pong Chiu" <Kingpong.chiu@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk>
Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2010 5:16 AM
Subject: records on degrees for Thome Fang

Dear King Pong,
I heard back from the Registrar's office today. Their records confirm that Thome Fang received a M.A. (master's) degree from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1922. They do not show any subsequent Ph.D. degree at our university.

Patty

--
Patty Winspur
Grad Coordinator
Philosophy
U.W.-Madison
(608) 263-5278
Appendix 2: Prolegomena to A Comparative Philosophy of Life: An Outline

Ideals of Life and Patterns of Culture

I. The Philosophical Assemblage
1. Wisdom lost and wisdom regained in potency
2. Philosophical anthropology
3. Types of man
4. Intuition, explication, and the unity of knowledge
5. Integral universe and differentiating worlds
6. The choice ingression into the differentiating worlds
7. Characteristics of the differentiating worlds
8. Orientation, transport, and co-ordination of the differentiating worlds
9. The interfusion of things and the confluence of life
10. Extensive connection and the principle of comprehensive harmony

II. The Discernment of Worlds and the Appropriation of Languages
1. The intelligible worlds and the eloquent languages
2. Causes of misunderstandings and ill-usage
3. Nine kinds of language pertaining respectively to the following world-orders:
   a.) the upper world,
   b.) the lower world,
   c.) the outer world,
   d.) the inner world,
   e.) the common world,
   f.) the world of labour and technical manipulation,
   g.) the moral world,
   h.) the historical world,
   i.) the ‘hinter-Welt’, behind world
4. Languages re-classified
5. Semiotics, semantics & syntax
6. Science, art & religion
7. Philosophy versus ‘meta-philosophy’

III. Existence and Value
1. The meaning of existence
2. Three theories of existence
3. The meaning of value
4. Psycho-biological theories of value
5. Logical consideration of value
6. Idealistic and realistic conceptions of value
7. The relation between existence and value considered in the light of the major traditions of philosophy
   a.) Greek thought
   b.) European science and philosophy
   c.) Hindu speculation
   d.) Chinese philosophy
IV. Types of Wisdom and the Spirit of Culture
1. Nature of wisdom
2. The roots of wisdom
3. Wisdom manifested in the articulate forms of Spirit: A fourfold tripartite division-
   a.) The Greek:  i.) the Apollonian  ii.) the Dionysian  iii.) the Olympian
   b.) Modern Europe: i.) the Renaissance  ii.) the Baroque  iii.) the Rococo
   c.) The Indian: i.) the Upanishadic  ii.) the Buddhistic  iii.) the Bhagavadgitaic
   d.) The Chinese: i.) the Taoist  ii.) the Confucian  iii.) the Mohist
4. The varieties of wisdom: A quarternary division re-considered
   a.) the Greek
   b.) the European
   c.) the Indian
   d.) the Chinese
5. The essences of wisdom as elucidated in section (4)
6. The modes of wisdom
   a.) the Greek pattern of culture
   b.) the European pattern of culture
   c.) the Indian pattern of culture
   d.) the Chinese pattern of culture

V. The Varieties of Cosmology
1. The sentiment of life and the conception of the universe
2. Characteristics of Greek cosmology
3. Characteristics of modern European cosmology
4. Characteristics of Indian cosmology
5. Characteristics of Chinese cosmology
6. The open world versus the closed universe
7. Life creative and Life petrified

VI. Inquiries into the Constitution of Human Nature
1. Religion and religiosity
2. Integration vs. Bifurcation of human nature
3. Unity of personality vs. ‘the schism of the soul’
4. Contrast, contradiction and harmony
5. The principle of three-fold unities and the noetic order….. (the Greek concept of mind)
6. The scientific claim of neutrality and the empiricist-rationalist controversy concerning the human
   mind…..(Modern European turns of thought)
7. Brahma-Ātman Aikya vs. the diversified Ālaya…..(the Indian outlook)
8. The thorough goodness of all the endowments of human mind…..(the full-fledged Chinese
   conception)
9. Metamorphosis of the human spirit
10. The divergence of East and West and a possible way of mutual adaptation
11. Trends of life and human destiny
12. ‘Guilt-culture’, innocence-culture and glory-culture

VII. Glimpses of the Variegated Spirit of Life
1. Exemplifications of the cosmic principles in life
2. The ultimate consequences of different estimates of human nature
3. Leveling-up, leveling-down and the ways of democracy
4. Self-diversification and self-perfection
5. Brahma- Ātman Aikya, the perennial flux of the Ālaya-vijñāna and the ways of Yoga
6. The Confucian ways of living characterized
7. The Taoist ways of living characterized
8. The Mohist ways of living characterized
9. The dimensions of life: shrinking and expansion
VIII. Moral Endeavour and Ethical Culture
1. Metaphysical foundations of moral life
2. Causal monism vs. causal pluralism
3. Power and the highest reach of life
4. Moral plane and moral hierarchy
5. Moral restraints and moral choice
6. Moral determination and moral freedom
7. Moral values
8. Ideal personality and the measure of moral value
9. Items of virtue
10. The ethical reverence for life

IX. The Sentiment of Art
1. Actuality, ideality and the magic touch of beauty
2. Imitative art vs. creative art
3. Essences of beauty
4. Forms of beauty
5. Tasks of art
6. The transformed world or art
7. The conquest of space and its wondrous transmutation
8. The rhythm of life
9. Style and the divine fervour
10. Aesthetic education, morality and religion

X. The Organized Life of the State
1. Reasons of existence for the State as an organized power
2. Greek Political ideals: their virtues & limitations
3. Theoretic foundations of Western democracy
4. Laws of nature and human rights
5. Freedom and equality: a philosophical critique
6. Two misfortunes in History: lessons from Israel and India
7. Chinese political ideals and their ways of realization
8. The present crises and the prospects of world-order in the future

XI. A Critique of Culture
1. The Meaning of Culture
2. Spirit and form of culture
3. Value-directions in the realms of life
4. Transcendence and immanence of the spirit
5. The historical vista of humanity
6. History at its cross-ways; the tragedy of life
7. Historical wisdom and historical folly
8. The procreation of culture
9. The rhythmic development of culture
10. The achievements of culture
11. The advancement of spirit
12. Social enjoyment of culture
13. Assimilation of culture
14. Transformation of culture
15. Interfusion of culture
16. Vitality of culture
17. Human immortality
18. Spiritual exaltation and spiritual freedom
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