An Analysis of Organisational Culture of 
Integrated Public Organisations: 
The case of Thailand

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Abstract

The theme of the re-aggregation of public organisations has been embraced in the recent public sector reforms of some developed countries such as the UK. The re-aggregation of public organisations may benefit the government in terms of focusing its interests on policy coordination. This is an alternative way of reforming the public sector in order to increase greater outcomes and the performance of public organisations with regard to the achievement of particular policy goals. The reform inevitably affects the targeted public organisations in both tangible and intangible ways. Since organisational culture is an important issue that can affect organisational outcomes and performance, including the achievement of policy goals, the research aims to analyse how organisational cultures have been changed following the integration of Thai public organisations. In this respect, the researchers used an integrated model of Competing Values Framework and human paradox theory to assess cultural changes of integrated public organisations.

The research was based on quantitative and qualitative data gathered in field research conducted in Thailand’s four integrated public organisations. It was found that, overall, organisational cultures were altered following the organisational integration. Public employees perceived that the hierarchy culture hardly changed following a reform. However, the clan value has largely reduced, while market and adhocracy values have increased rather significantly within the new organisations. In terms of clan value, the research found that the reduction was a result of power struggles between groups of people who came from different organisational backgrounds. Power-struggling between clans could lead to lower team cooperation, a lack of trust and diminished loyalty to organisations. Public officials also perceived that a significant development of market and adhocracy cultures in organisations could be a result of external forces, as well as the integration reform. With regard to these changes, the development of market values was inimical to human relations within integrated organisations. Together with the existence of a patronage system in the Thai public organisations, leadership also contributed to a paradox of competition and cooperation where members of a dominant clan could be favoured over the others. People who came from minor cultures might feel a disadvantage from being part of the minority and then give minimal cooperation to the integrated organisation. In this respect, teamwork and organisational cohesion could be difficult to build if the tension is unbalanced.

It can be concluded that the cultural model of the organisations studied changed and seemed to be more balanced than was previously found. The integration of organisations also has a great influence on cultures and paradoxes in organisations. The dissertation hopes to contribute to the existing literature, with regard to the application of a Competing Values Framework and human paradox theory to the underexplored context of integration reform in the public sector. Findings from the use of this instrument can offer a fresh point of view towards the reality of organisational integration reforms, especially for academics, Thai reformers and public employees themselves.
Declaration

I, Pantharak Phookpan, hereby declare that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

Pantharak Phookpan
Date: 4 January 2013
Degree: PhD, the Faculty of Humanities, the University of Manchester
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Dedication

To

My grandparents

Ajarn Tho Kaewkamsaen
Kammoon Kaewkamsaen
Krue-narong Phookpan
Sriwan Phookpan

and

All the teachers
Acknowledgements

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I finally offer genuine gratitude to my beloved parents: Ajarn Phansak and Ajarn Atcharapor Phookpan, and family. They truly are my inspiration.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.E.</td>
<td>Buddhist Era Calendar</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEC</td>
<td>Basic Education Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>The Constitutional Drafting Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Civil Service Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVF</td>
<td>Competing Values Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDPM</td>
<td>Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPEC</td>
<td>District Primary Education Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEC</td>
<td>Higher Education Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPMC</td>
<td>National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPEC</td>
<td>National Primary Education Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBEC</td>
<td>Office of the Basic Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSC</td>
<td>Office of the Civil Service Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODPEC</td>
<td>Office of the District Primary Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPDC</td>
<td>Office of the Public Sector Development Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPEC</td>
<td>Provincial Primary Education Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TQF</td>
<td>Thailand Qualification Framework for Higher Education</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocate</td>
<td>Office of Women’s Affairs and Family Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aide A</td>
<td>Disaster Victims Relief Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aide B</td>
<td>Department of Public Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst A</td>
<td>The National Safety Council of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyst B</td>
<td>Office of the National Commission on Women’s Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao-nai</td>
<td>Bosses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission A</td>
<td>Office of the Basic Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission B</td>
<td>Office of the Higher Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>Office of the Educational Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>Department of Accelerated Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guru A</td>
<td>Office of the National Primary Education Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guru B</td>
<td>Department of General Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor</td>
<td>Department of Curriculum and Instruction Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanomchan</td>
<td>A name of a Thai dessert that is cooked with many layers contained in a single structure. It may be translated as a layered sticky rice cake. In this thesis, it implies that layers of organisations existed after different types of higher education institutions were integrated into a single organisation (see chapter six).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kreng-chai</td>
<td>Inner feeling of being very courteous or being too considerate to someone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattayomsuksa</td>
<td>The secondary education qualification, ranging from levels 1 to 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Ministry of University Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prathomomsuksa</td>
<td>The primary education qualification, ranging from levels 1 to 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajabhat</td>
<td>Office of the Rajabhat Institute Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajamangala</td>
<td>Rajamangala Institute of Technology</td>
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</table>
Rescue  Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
Supporter  Division of Women, Child and Youth Development
Volunteer  Civil Disaster Prevention Division
Chapter One:

Introduction

1.1 Background

Public sector reform has always been an issue for governments attempting to improve the efficiency of public organisations in providing public services. A government may reform the public sector for various reasons, influenced by both domestic and international factors. Dating back to the late 1970s, governments of many developed countries such as New Zealand, UK, Australia and USA have reformed their public sectors using the so-called New Public Management approach, hereafter referred to as NPM. NPM offers several concepts to increase the economy, efficiency and the effectiveness of public service delivery (Hood, 1990; Pollitt, 2004). Not only has NPM been adopted by western countries, but it has also been transferred across the world (Samaratunge et al, 2008; Yamamoto, 2003; James & Manning, 1996; Manning, 2001).

More specifically, Thailand adopted NPM as a condition of loans from international organisations such as the IMF and the Asian Development Bank during its economic crisis in 1997. However, the country also implemented a major public sector reform in 2002 during the Thaksin Government. Thailand’s reform has not only adopted elements of NPM, but it has also combined other aspects derived from the good governance concept of the late 1990s. One of NPM elements that was implemented in many countries was the disaggregation of large public organisations into smaller sized organisations as, for instance, with the UK’s executive agencies. In Thailand, the government also followed the idea of the disaggregation of public organisations but slightly differently from its original form. The government has created nine autonomous organisations that operate in a similar way to the executive agencies in the UK (Bowornwathana, 2004b). At the same time, it disaggregated public
organisations, bureaux and institutions into smaller entities and then re-aggregated similar functions together to become new departments and ministries. This twofold reform may have produced unintended consequences, such as frustration, organisational incoherence, inefficiency or ineffectiveness of public service delivery. Inevitably, any public sector reforms cause changes in the public sector in both tangible and intangible ways to a certain degree. Therefore, this dissertation is interested in studying the relationship between public sector reform and cultural changes within integrated public organisations.

Previous research relating to organisational culture change following reform in Thailand was found in Jingjit’s Ph.D. thesis (2008). Her study focused on a comparison of the organisations’ cultural existence in the pre and post-reform periods. She studied cultural change in seven public organisations, none of which were affected by disaggregation or re-aggregation reform. Generally, she found that prior to the reform Thai public organisations were dominated by a clan culture. This referred to a period when human relationships were emphasised above any other values. After the reform had been implemented for four years, her research found that the cultural orientation of the public organisations studied had changed to a co-domination of clan and hierarchy cultures.

These findings have inspired me to further explore whether ‘the hybrid bureaucracy model’, as it was called by Jingjit, prevails in another type of reform, namely the integration of public organisations. Integration reform was a challenging issue for Thai public sector management since the country has never implemented cross-organisational integration. In this respect, structural integration has come with high expectations with regard to the effective coordination of particular policies, cost reductions of running the public services and the increase in efficiency of public organisations. The integration of organisations in the education policy domain is another very interesting and challenging issue for the country. This is because the government wished to eradicate policy fragmentation among related organisations that operated at the same level within education, such as foundation and higher education. Also, the integration of educational organisations may be the most
complex case since it integrated relatively big departments that had specific organisational characteristics. All in all, the study of the relationship between integration reform and organisational culture change would be useful for academic society, reformers, public employees themselves and the country, to discover whether integration reform would yield better policy coordination than was previously found.

1.2 Aims and objectives of the study

Many studies put their efforts into investigating organisational culture; however, the assessment or observation of culture is most likely carried out either in private companies or within a single-dimension of cultural existence (Jittaruttha, 2010; Rashid & Rahman, 2003). This research aims to emphasise the organisational culture of public organisations with regard to the integration of organisations.

To investigate this issue, the major theoretical argument within this research is whether or not integration reform could facilitate effective coordination among related public organisations. Additionally, would there be any linkages which could reinforce or support organisational cohesion following the integration of organisations? Empirically, the understanding of the current challenges in Thailand will be investigated and discussed as the case study of the research. Consequently, according to the theoretical and empirical background, the aims of this research are:

1. To have a better understanding of the organisational culture of Thai integrated public organisations;
2. To study the pattern of cultural change subsequent to the integration reform of public organisations and
3. To examine the critical factors that may facilitate or impede the culture of newly integrated organisations following integration reform.
1.3 Research questions

To achieve the aims and objectives as presented, the following research questions must be addressed:

1. To what extent has the organisational culture of Thai integrated public organisations changed following integration reform?
2. To what extent have cultural changes contributed to managerial paradoxes?
3. How do public employees working in different professional organisations perceive organisational culture changes?
4. How do public employees working in different types of organisations perceive organisational culture changes?

1.4 Significance of the study: Why Thailand?

This thesis attempts to look at the relationship between integration reform and its consequences in terms of organisational culture change in a developing context, such as that of Thailand. The case of Thailand may be interesting because, first, the country was obliged to reform its public sector as one condition of its lenders. Secondly, the public sector reform in 2002 was the largest reform in the modern history of Thailand, when the absolute monarchy style of public administration was abolished in 1932. Thirdly, Thailand also wished to increase the ability of the public sector to facilitate economic growth and competition at both a regional level, such as in the ASEAN community, and at an international level.

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1 Professional organisations refer to (a) teachers, (b) civil servants, and (c) higher education academics.
2 Types of organisations refer to different organisational types (the traditional and committee-based departments). The organisations can have different professional groups working together such as Commission A and Commission B.
3 ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It is a geo-political and economic organisation that is composed of ten countries in Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 2009).
Since administrative reform can be transferred and learned from other countries, the Thai government has adopted various international and domestic concepts to reform its public sector (Bowornwathana, 2006; Painter, 2006; Sirisamphan, 2006). Accordingly, the government promulgated two crucial acts in 2002 to engender the major public sector reform in the country. The State Administration Act (Vol. 5) B.E.2545 was promulgated in 2002 to develop a generally more systematic and efficient public administration whereby the improvement of citizen-based public service delivery was also encouraged. Public organisations needed to set clear policy goals and evaluate them periodically. The creation of new ministerial, objective-based agencies was possible if their creation would facilitate the achievement of policy goals. Elimination of public organisations that had provided redundant public services was implemented if such elimination could improve efficiency in public spending and service delivery.

The Reorganisation of Ministries, Sub-ministries and Departments Act B.E.2545 was also promulgated in 2002 to expound the State Administration Act (Vol. 5) B.E.2545, in response to Thailand’s changing economic, political and social environment. The thinking behind the law was that previous public sector reforms had not been sufficiently effective to provide efficient public services to citizens. Many public organisations that had similar policy goals were unable to coordinate their work with regard to delivering efficient public services. Thus, reorganisation of public organisations by integration had to be implemented. Integration of public organisations was intended to enhance policy coordination and the achievement of goals, whilst resources were pooled. In this respect, public organisations would have clearer missions, responsibilities and policy goals by which efficient public service delivery could be achieved at lower cost. Practically, when the structural reorganisation in Thailand was implemented, various sizes of new integrated public organisations, ranging from supersized to relatively small, were established. The size of organisations was categorised in accordance with the numbers of employees: less than 500 is very small; 501-3,000 is small; 3,001-10,000 is medium; 10,001-50,000

4 B.E. stands for Buddhist Era Calendar. It is the official calendar of Thailand, and equates to Christian Era plus 543 years (see Glossary).
is large; and more than 50,000 is supersized. This was the first time the country had experienced the integration reform, whereby target organisations were first disaggregated and then re-aggregated across departmental or ministerial boundaries. Inevitably, this integration reform has directly affected targeted organisations and officials in both tangible and intangible ways.

As far as the intangible effect is concerned, the change of organisational culture is a significant issue that could accelerate or decelerate the performance of newly-integrated organisations. The study of organisational culture would also illustrate what cultural values have been embraced and whether organisational members would prefer to change these. The change of cultures of public organisations is also an interesting issue since the performance of public organisations could affect, more or less, all parts of society. Since the Thai government has invested a large amount of time and money in the reform for nearly a decade now, it may be an appropriate time to assess the consequences of this reform.

Although the previous research study by Jingjit (2008) is of the same nature and offered fresh perspectives on the cultural orientation of general public organisations that my thesis will partly benefit from, a study of cultural changes with regard to Thai integrated organisations has never been done before and cultural issues could be more complex when compared with those of typical, civil departments. This is because the newly integrated organisations aggregated at least two different organisational cultures and new identities had to be built while the structure was being realigned. In this respect, I would argue that the findings of my research differ from what was previously found by Jingjit with regard to the volume and content of cultural change. Therefore, I hope that such findings may not only offer a fresh viewpoint from which to observe organisational culture change in an under-explored area, but that they also contribute to a more extensive application of analytical tools within integration reform than has previously been offered.
1.5 Concise theoretical underpinnings

This dissertation is based on three branches of a theoretical framework. The combination of public sector reform, organisational culture and human paradoxes theory will be used to understand the cultural changes and paradoxes of integrated public organisations.

During the past three decades, NPM has been the best-known concept of public sector management. This is a western concept but was later transferred and implemented in both developed and developing countries around the world. Although it lacks a universal meaning, NPM has offered a basket of reform ideas from which governments may pick and mix (Pollitt, 1995; see also Hood, 1995b). One NPM idea that has been implemented by many governments is the disaggregation of public organisations into smaller-sized authorities in order to increase the efficiency of public services to citizens (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004). Nonetheless, this reform idea might be partially responsible for creating an unintended problem of policy fragmentation, due to the independence of each responsible organisation. This problem might also then lead to the failure of some policies, such as social policies, as a result of a contradiction in goals, redundancies or incompatibility among the responsible authorities.

With regard to the problem of uncoordinated policy goals, a new reform concept emerged during the late 1990s, namely so-called joined-up government (Perri 6, 2004; Catney, 2009). This offers an idea for tackling the problem of policy fragmentation within social policies in particular. This is because social issues are cross-cutting and need salient policy coordination to tackle the problems effectively. In order to strengthen policy coordination, the government may choose various reform concepts ranging from joint-work to the integration or merger of organisations. For example, the UK’s New Labour government (1997-2010) implemented the re-aggregation of some public organisations or agencies such as HM Revenue and Customs and the Department for Work and Pensions (Talbot & Johnson, 2007). In Australia, the government has created Centrelink in order to
provide integrated service delivery to its citizens (Kernaghan, 2009). In the USA, the federal government has integrated the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with the Department of Homeland Security to strengthen policy coordination among national security organisations (Kettl, 2003).

Subsequent to any reforms, changes to public organisations are unavoidable (Talbot, 2006: 337). One aspect that may be as important as structural change is organisational culture. This is because the right cultural orientation would contribute to higher organisational performance. In this respect, organisational culture has been increasingly studied since the 1980s, in the private sector in particular (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983; Pascale & Athos, 1982; Peters & Waterman, 2004; Deal & Kennedy, 2000; Schein, 1985; Handy, 1993). Accordingly, different scholars have proposed different models to observe or assess what cultures are best for organisations. Each model has different strengths and weaknesses. However, this dissertation has employed a cultural model that was developed in the private sector to assess the organisational culture of public organisations, called the Competing Values Framework, hereafter referred to as CVF (Cameron & Quinn, 2006).

This model has been chosen because, first, the framework offers a balanced model to assess the organisational culture of an organisation. This means that the model acknowledges the presence of four cultures in an organisation at the same time, which can also compete with each other. Those four cultures are: clan, adhocracy, market and hierarchy. This implies that no values “…can be ignored and all of which have to be satisfied to some extent to achieve excellence in public service” (Talbot, 2008: 13). In addition, each cultural type needs different leading roles and uses different strategies to attain organisational goals. Organisations may employ a particular culture at a particular time and later change to embrace another cultural aspect that is more appropriate in a different environment. Secondly, the CVF was used to assess the organisational culture of Thailand’s public sector. Since the consistency of the assessment tool is kept, it will be possible to enhance my understanding of the reality of Thailand’s public sector reform with regard to the
similarities or differences of cultural existence between general and integrated public organisations.

In addition to public sector management and organisational culture literature, this dissertation has also used the human paradox theory developed by Talbot (2005) to further explain the reality of organisational management. This is because the CVF cannot sufficiently accommodate this aspect of the matter. Fundamentally, Talbot argues that “…contradictions can remain permanently unresolved” (2005: 7). Human beings are paradoxical by nature. They are either one thing or another, such as aggressive or peaceful, competitive or cooperative and so on, endlessly. Then, “…[these] paradoxical traits or instincts in turn generate paradoxical human systems, especially human organisations” (Talbot, 2005: 6). They are real attributes of real organisations (Talbot, 2005: 21). In this respect, the theory has been built in the same way as the CVF. Consequently, the model is composed of four pairs of paradoxes that exist at the same time in an organisation, namely cooperation and competition, aggression and peace-making, altruism and selfishness and autonomy and conformity. These also need to be balanced in order to best maintain the organisations’ performance.

Acknowledging the existence of paradoxes in human organisations, this dissertation uses the CVF to measure the cultural changes of integrated public organisations. Then, the human paradox theory is used to explain the real paradoxes in organisations. Although the CVF was employed to measure the organisational culture of Thailand’s public sector (Jingjit, 2008), the application of it in conjunction with the ‘human paradox theory’ has never been employed in the study of organisational culture change in the public sector, especially in a developing context such as that of Thailand’s integrated public organisations. The findings that will be derived from the data analysis may not only offer a fresh perspective for exploring organisational culture change in an under-explored area, but also contribute to a more extensive application of the CVF and human paradox theory than have previously been tested.
1.6 Methodology

This research employs a variety of methods in the research methodology. A quantitative method of inquiry will be used to investigate the degree of cultural existence and change. Then, a qualitative method of inquiry is used to extract in-depth information about cultural changes, organisational paradoxes and the reality of the integration reform. Mixed methods are also used in a triangulation method, which helps to overcome the inadequacy of a single method in studying organisational culture, and to avoid any misinterpretation of the data due to a reliance on a single technique. The following paragraphs present the research design and data collection and analysis methods.

1.6.1 Case studies

The research has been conducted in four integrated public organisations in Thailand. The first organisation is the Office of the Basic Education Commission, which deals with educational services at a foundation level (pre-school to Grade 12). The second organisation is the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, which deals with risk and disaster management. This department was created as a policy unit but later its responsibility was expanded to provide operational services. These two cases will be explored in detail in Chapter Five. The third organisation is the Office of the Higher Education Commission, which supervises higher education institutions. The fourth organisation is the Office of Women’s Affairs and Family Development, which deals with issues relating to women and family affairs. This fourth organisation is a policy unit but it provides some operational activities too. The third and fourth cases will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Although all the cases studied are an integration of relevant organisations in terms of structure and management systems, the Office of the Basic Education Commission and the Office of the Higher Education Commission retain separated personnel administration systems within their organisations. A minority of civil servants working in both organisations is managed by the Office of Civil Servants Commission. In contrast,
the teaching majority is managed by its teacher professional regulations, in the case of the Office of the Basic Education Commission, while people who work in higher education institutions are managed differently by university professional regulations. All the cases differ in the size and complexity of their administrative structures.

1.6.2 Data collection and analysis methods

Quantitative samples of this research project were determined by Yamane’s formula (1973), where the confidence level is 95% with ± 10% precision. 1,055 questionnaires, structured using the CVF, were issued amongst the population associated with each case study, of which 570, 180, 250 and 55 questionnaires were distributed in four cases, respectively. A total of 974 questionnaires were returned, of which 553, 167, 209 and 45 questionnaires were responded by people who worked in each of the four organisations, respectively. The overall response rate was 92.32% while the response rate of individual cases were 97.02%, 88.89%, 87.60% and 81.82%, respectively (see also section 4.3.1 and Table 7). Once the questionnaires had been collected, quantitative data was initially entered, managed and analysed through an Excel spreadsheet, following a calculation method suggested by the CVF. Data was subsequently imported to an SPSS program for more advanced analyses and tests of statistical significance.

Qualitative data was collected from semi-structured interviews conducted with 32 public officials and the questionnaire’s open-ended questions. Questions were also structured according to the CVF. Interviewees were chosen for their roles and status within the organisations. This information was retrieved from an organisational chart. A total of 27 interviewees were selected to be interviewed based on their hierarchical positions in the organisations, of which seven, five, nine and six people from the four cases were interviewed, respectively. Other five people were interviewed based on a snowball technique, of which two, one, and two persons from the second, third, and fourth cases were interviewed, respectively (see also Table 7). A snowballing technique provided an alternative method for locating additional
interviewees since some potential interviewees were not able to participate in the research. Once data had been collected, qualitative data was transcribed verbatim and analysed by a template analysis method. This is a particular way of thematically analysing qualitative data that involves the development of a coding ‘template’ which organises the data in a meaningful manner (King, 1998: 118).

1.7 Structure of the dissertation

The thesis is structured as follows:

Chapter One provides an overview of the thesis. It comprises the background, aims and objectives of the study; the research questions; the significance of the study; a brief literature review; the methodology and the thesis structure.

Chapter Two demonstrates the theoretical framework applied through the research. It concentrates on the concepts of the main theories of the research and offers a systematic framework for subsequent data analysis. This chapter presents the situation and the conceptual justification for the main concepts that will form the substantive discussion. A discussion regarding the theories as a framework will be presented in order to outline the scope of the thesis. In this respect, a conceptual justification of the chosen analytical instrument, the “Competing Values Framework”, and of “human paradox theory”, will be offered.

Chapter Three examines contextual issues relating to public sector reform in Thailand. It argues that, although the Thai government has attempted to reform the public sector following the experiences of developed countries, the reform consequences may differ in a developing context, such as that of Thailand. This chapter will provide the political and administrative contexts, and the cultural attributes of Thai society, with reflections from a theoretical viewpoint.
Chapter Four explores the research methodology and design. It explains the rationale of how the research was conducted based on reliability and validity. This chapter will contain information about the research method, cases, data collection methods and data analysis methods.

Chapter Five presents the findings and a discussion of the organisational culture found from the horizontally integrated cases of the Office of the Basic Education Committee and Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. Both quantitative and qualitative data will be analysed, illustrated and discussed in order to assess and compare organisational cultures between the pre and post-reform periods.

Chapter Six employs the same structure as the previous one, but differs in terms of how the organisations are integrated. As the structural configuration of the Office of the Higher Education Commission and the Office of Women’s Affairs and Family Development is vertically integrated, the direction and magnitude of change may be different from that of the horizontal integration.

Chapter Seven presents a cross-case analysis. A discussion and comparison of the organisational culture regarding the types of organisation and profession will be provided. The organisational paradoxes will also be explored.

Chapter Eight sets out the conclusions and challenging issues drawn from the empirical results relating to integration reform. The limitations of the research and recommendations for future research will also be outlined.
1.8 Concluding remarks

This dissertation aims to investigate how organisational cultures have been altered after the integration of public organisations in Thailand had been implemented since 2002. This is because the transfer of an administrative reform that has been invented in a western context may yield different outcomes when being implemented in an eastern context. It is hoped that the findings and lessons that derive from this study will be useful to both academic and practical communities. The dissertation also wishes to contribute to the extensive application of the CVF and human paradox theory in the field of public sector management. The next chapter is the theoretical framework chapter.
Chapter Two:

Public Sector Management and Organisational Culture

This chapter embarks on the theoretical perspectives and academic arguments of the research area. The initiative of New Public Management (NPM) will be reviewed, due to the fact that it has been adopted in and transferred to countries across the world. The NPM reform has had a great effect on the operation of government organisations. The chapter then explores the origins and concepts of the new era of public sector management that arose during the late 1990s. Many scholars refer to this as a post-NPM era, where holistic public service and governance were a central focus. The next section investigates another theoretical framework with regard to organisational culture. The chapter argues that public-sector reform and the culture of public organisations are intertwined and mutually influential on one another. Crucially, these issues are the theoretical underpinning of the research. The chapter allows the researcher to explain, rationalise and justify the conceptual framework with regard to the theories employed. It also draws on the theoretical gap and analytical framework which will be subsequently employed in the discussion and analysis.

2.1 Public sector management

With regard to changes in social, economic, and political issues over time, public-sector management has not always guaranteed the efficiency, quality, or effectiveness of public services (Flynn, 2009). In this respect, it is normal for the government of any country to carry out administrative reform with motivation to, for example, save the costs of running public services (see, e.g., Hood, 1991), improve the quality of public service, make the operation of government more efficient, increase the opportunities for the selected policies to be implemented effectively
Accordingly, administrative reform is a continuous process that can also be learned, or shared, by other countries (see, e.g., Pollitt, 2004; Peters, 1997). This section begins with a reform concept called NPM, which has prevailed in the public management literature since the 1980s. Its definitions and critiques will be discussed. Then a discussion of the post-NPM reform will be given, especially with regard to the concept of joined-up or re-integrated public organisations. The main ideas and critiques of this concept will also be discussed.

## 2.1.1 New Public Management: The evolution

### 2.1.1.1 History and definitions

During 1945-1975, welfare-driven public management emerged in most developed countries. This involved increased public spending and the emergence of new public service bureaucracies, which provided education, health services, and welfare for those receiving unemployment, disability and pensions benefits (Talbot, 2009a). The public sector management during the pre-NPM era embraced ideas of bureaucracy. Talbot argued that,

“...it was the heyday of the classic public administration which organized more resources and people than ever before in human history (during peace time). It ended, or at least started to end, with the oil-triggered economic crisis of 1975. The decisive shift away from collectivist towards individualist solutions to social problems is usually seen to have been signalled by the elections of Margaret Thatcher (1979) in the UK and Ronald Reagan (1980) in the USA.”

(Talbot, 2009a)

Since the 1980s, a new theme with regards to improving efficiency and effectiveness within government organisations has emerged, this is known as ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). NPM appealed to many countries, such as the UK, USA, Australia and New Zealand, as a new method of modernising the public sector and making it more economic, efficient and effective. Talbot contended that:
“The period of market-oriented reforms and the supposed ‘rolling back of the frontiers of the state’ coincided with a very different approach to public administration – the rise of the so-called ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). NPM placed great emphasis on – as the name suggests – active management, rather than (supposedly) passive administration. Managing by budget and rules was to be replaced by management by initiative, responsibility and performance.” (Talbot, 2009a)

However, NPM definitions have yet to be mutually agreed among scholars. NPM is generally based on two themes – ‘public choice theory and managerialism’ (Aucoin, 1990). These two concepts focus on removing the differences between the public and private sectors and applying private-sector strategies within the public sector, the aim being to replace large, inflexible and inefficient governments (Horton & Farnham, 1999: 55).

On the one hand, public choice theorists believe that public organisations can be understood in the same way as corporations. In this regard, NPM offers a set of administrative reforms that imbue contestability, user/consumer choice, transparency, and a greater concentration on incentive structures, with regards to public service provision (Horton & Farnham, 1999: 5). These reforms also include the breaking down of public bureaucracies into smaller units, contracting-out, quasi-market mechanisms, and performance-related pay for bureaucrats (Hood, 1991: 5; Rhodes, 1997: 48). On the other hand, managerialism refers to the implementation of private-sector management methods within the public sector and is often referred to as the ‘3Es’: economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Hood, 1991: 5-6; Rhodes, 1997: 55-56). In this respect, managerialism proponents propose the concepts of, for example, professional management, greater discretion for managers in managing public services to achieve results, better organisational performance through the development of appropriate cultures, the active measurement and adjustment of organisational output, greater value for money, and increased closeness to the customer. From these two intellectual roots, NPM offers various components depending on different scholars.
For example, Hood (1991) claimed that NPM comprises seven key aspects. These are:

1. Professional management within the public sector;
2. Disaggregation of units within the public sector;
3. Greater competition within the public sector;
4. Explicit standards and measures of performance;
5. Greater emphasis on output controls;
6. Greater discipline and parsimony, in terms of resource use, and
7. Emphasis on private-sector styles of management practice.

However, Pollitt (1995) argued that NPM consists of eight elements. These elements are:

1. Disaggregation of traditional bureaucratic organisations into separate agencies;
2. Decentralisation of management authority within public agencies;
3. Separation between the providers and purchasers of public services;
4. Introduction of market and quasi-market mechanisms;
5. Cutting administrative costs, capping budgets, and seeking greater transparency in resource allocation;
6. Requiring staff to work to performance targets, indicators, and output objectives;
7. Focusing on contract employment and performance-related pay;
8. Emphasis on service quality, standard setting and customer responsiveness.

Ferlie et al. (1996) contended that NPM is a reform related to four issues of efficiency improvement: downsizing and decentralisation; in search of excellence; and public service orientation. Common (2001) proposed that NPM is comprised of structural and procedural reforms. The main structural changes focus on organisational decentralisation strategies concerned with: the creation of single-purpose agencies; new forms of organisation; territorial/geographical decentralisation; a reduction in the number of departments and agencies; quasi-
privatisation and contracting out. A further set of changes is concerned with managerial processes that involve the importation of private-sector management techniques, in which the reform process is grouped into three major changes: in the budgetary process, in human resource management, and in the introduction of quality-management initiatives. Table 1 summarises the similarities and differences between NPM components. Two ideas of hierarchical bureaucracy reduction and service quality may be mostly agreed upon but the rest are different. Therefore, NPM does not seem to have a universal definition.

Since it is difficult to find an exact meaning for NPM, due to a diversity of interpretations by academics which sometimes overlap or are sometimes parallel, this dissertation intends to refer to NPM as a concept that influences organisational restructuring and managerial improvement. The restructuring of organisations stands for the idea of the disaggregation of existing public organisations into smaller units. One example of this is the establishment of Executive Agencies in the UK (see, e.g., Unbundled Government, Pollitt & Talbot, 2004). Managerial improvement stands for the use of performance standards and the evaluation and quality of public service. These issues are important characteristics that are being transferred to many countries (see, e.g., Common, 1998; Berman, 2011), especially in a developing context, such as Thailand, which will be the case study in this thesis. Practically, the influence of NPM to Thailand’s public sector reform can be seen through the promulgation of three organic laws that have incorporated concepts of organisational restructure and performance-based management. In terms of organisational restructure, the government has established nine autonomous organisations (Quangos\(^5\)) and six new ministries from the re-aggregation of existing departments (see, e.g., Bowornwathana, 2004b, Siriprakob, 2012). In terms of performance-based management, the government has established the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission to set performance criteria and evaluate the performance of public organisations (see, e.g., Sirisamphan, 2006; Lorsuwannarat & Buracom, 2011). More discussion will be further presented in chapter three.

\(^5\) Quasi non-government organisations
Table 1: Similarities and differences of NPM by different authors

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<tr>
<td>Organisation restructuring</td>
<td>Shift to disaggregation of units into quasi-contractual or quasi-market forms</td>
<td>Breaking up traditional monolithic bureaucracies into separate agencies</td>
<td>Creation of single-purpose agencies, new forms of organisations, reduction of number of ministries or agencies</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Introducing market and quasi-market type mechanisms to foster competition</td>
<td>Quasi-privatisation, contracting out</td>
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<td>Decentralising management authority within public services</td>
<td>Decisions made close to/at point of service delivery</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Clearer separation between functions of purchaser and provider</td>
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<td>Managerial improvement</td>
<td>Stress on private sector styles of management practice</td>
<td>Performance targets for managers</td>
<td>Corporatisation/strong organisational leadership</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Greater emphasis on output controls</td>
<td>Quality management initiatives</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Explicit standards and measures of performance</td>
<td>Capping/fixed budget</td>
<td>Budgetary process changes</td>
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<td>Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use, reworking budgets to be transparent in accounting terms</td>
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<td>Hands-on professional management</td>
<td>Changing employment relations</td>
<td>Human resource management changes</td>
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6 Source: Author’s construct
2.1.1.2 Critiques of NPM

First of all, the definition of NPM has been contradictory, with the lack of an internal consistent definition. On the one hand, NPM is arguably a reform that relates to structural reforms, such as the reorganisation or disaggregation of public organisations into separate, smaller agencies. On the other hand, it is seen as something concerning managerial improvement, such as performance and budget management. Many scholars contend that NPM is a slippery term that offers various perspectives, with regards to the improvement of public sector management (see e.g., Talbot, 2009a; Hood, 1995a; Common, 1998; Pollitt, 1995; Turner, 2002). For example, Dunleavy et al. pointed out that

“…different conceptualizations of NPM all stress different things” (2005: 469).

Hood (1990: 8) commented that NPM is a convenient, if somewhat loose, shorthand used to denote the set of similar administrative doctrines which came into the ascendancy in the late 1970s and 80s. He also pointed out that

“…not all of the NPM precepts were equally present in all cases because they do not have a single intellectual source” (Hood, 1991: 3-4).

Pollitt argued that NPM involves logical contradiction and conceptual vagueness. He gives an example: that the motivational model of the public servant is crude and elusive. In particular, the individual’s commitment to work, moral and social inequalities and the model’s position on decentralisation is discordant. NPM may not be adjustable for the many situations that it is applied to. It could be internally consistent as a logical outline, but it is still an incomplete model for application to many public services (Pollitt, 1993: 118).
Closely linked to the ambiguity of the NPM concept is a second problem: the diversity of contexts may cause problems in applying NPM. This means that NPM can be adopted or applied in different ways. Pollitt & Bouckaert contended that “the successful application of a single template for reform right across the globe ... is inherently improbable” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004: 17). Administrative reform can have different meanings for different societies at different times (see e.g., Bowornwathana, 1996a). This is because public administration in each country is developed in different social, political, economic, geographical and cultural contexts (Common, 2001: 54). With regard to these differences, the application of NPM has potentially been chosen on the grounds of appropriateness to the country, as individual systems of public administration are embedded within particular national and administrative cultures, political-socioeconomic backgrounds and social values. Countries implementing NPM appear to be picking and mixing components from a given menu of techniques, a menu that appears to be changing.

For example, Scandinavian countries place more emphasis on performance management (Green-Pedersen, 2002), whilst New Zealand, the UK and the USA place a strong emphasis on market-type mechanisms, the contractualization of the public service and systematic approaches to improving service quality (Pollitt, 1995; Common, 2001). The adoption of NPM, regardless of such differences, may create superficial or ineffective reforms or fail to produce the desired aim: it may even generate perverse effects that render the relevant administrative processes worse than they were previously (see e.g., Flynn, 2009: 33; Common, 2001: 54; Haque, 1996: 316). In this respect, it is most important that scholars and practitioners be aware of the “different experiences and historical backgrounds” of countries (Pollitt, 1993: 133). Thus, pressures of reform may be uneven and different in terms of intensity, as are the consequences and effects of reform. The application and consequences of Western-based administrative reforms, such as NPM, that were transferred to and implemented in a developing context, such as that of Thailand, will be further discussed in the next chapter.
In addition, the problem of uncoordinated public policies is an on-going issue that has been aggravated by NPM’s disaggregation reform, especially in dealing with social problems recently (see, e.g., Bogdanor, 2005; Foster, 2005). Perri 6 et al. (2002: 37) claimed that the problem of coordination can be seen in the form of, for example:

- Dumping of problems and costs on one agency by another;
- Conflicting programmes: where two or more agencies have conflicting policy goals, or where, despite serving the same or consistent policy goals, their interventions can undermine each other;
- Duplication;
- Narrow exclusivity in responding to need: where individual services assume they can provide a complete solution, without reference to other agencies and they end up failing to meet real needs;
- Inaccessibility of services, confusion about their availability; people often do not know where to find the most appropriate services.
- Lacunae or gaps in service provision, or interventions that arise from a failure to think about the causes of major problems in the process.

More specifically in the case of the UK, the “Next Steps” reform during the NPM era made “…major changes to the structure of the British civil service by introducing a new organizational form to be called ‘agencies’” (Talbot, 2004: 104; see also Pollitt et al., 2001: 272). Existing ministerial structures were disaggregated into many smaller organisations and they were “expected to act more or less autonomously” (Peters, 1998: 296). Following this reform, ‘agencies’ became specialised in particular areas. However, the government faced the fragmentation problem of ‘agencies’ in dealing with social problems, also known as “wicked issues”, such as poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and crime (Clark, 2002; Bogdanor, 2005). This is because social problems are cross-boundary and it is difficult to find the real causes and they need effective coordination if the government wishes to tackle such problems effectively (Russel & Jordan, 2007: 1). In this regard, an individual, specialised agency, emerging from the NPM reform may not be effective enough to tame complex, cross-boundary social problems alone (Bogason & Toonen, 1998:...
In this aspect, it is very likely that government policy goals may not be attained. Dunleavy et al. (2005: 468) contended that the NPM reform was ‘rolled back’ following the new dawn of coordinative and integrative solutions to social solutions; this was called the “post-NPM wave of management change”. The following paragraphs discuss this reform in detail.

### 2.1.2 Post-NPM: The era of holistic governance

The NPM reform may partially lead to poor policy coordination across organisational boundaries. However, during the late 1990s, the governments of many developed countries, especially among the Anglophone countries, shifted their emphasis to more integrated public-service delivery (Perri 6, 2004; Mulgan 2002; Needham, 2006). In other words, a greater emphasis on service outcomes is being focused on. The re-aggregation of public organisations to tackle social problems became widely prominent and is highlighted in recent public management literature (Bogdanor, 2005; Talbot & Johnson 2007; Ling 2002). For example, Newman (2001) argued in *Modernising Governance* that NPM was replaced by a new paradigm of holistic, or outcome-focused, government. She further claimed that, in the UK, “…the modernisation agenda emphasises inter-organisational collaboration and policy coordination, both encompassed by the phrase ‘joined-up government’” (Newman, 2001: 106). However, the post-NPM era has not completely replaced the NPM reform. The emphasis on coordination can be seen as overlaying the more market-driven NPM. The issues of collaboration, coordination and integration were depicted as follows.
2.1.2.1 Comparative perspectives on collaboration, coordination, cooperation and integration

Although collaboration, coordination and integration represent the ideas of working together, they are distinct from each other in details. The definition of each concept will be illustrated and a discussion will then follow. First of all, collaboration is important as it is a key policy objective of the government. However, the definition of collaboration is defined variously according to different scholars. O’Leary and Vij (2012: 508) argue that the term “lacks a common lens or definition; there are seemingly “101 definitions of collaboration”. For example, Gray (1985: 912) contends that collaboration means:

“(1) the pooling of appreciations and/ or tangible resources, e.g., information, money, labor, etc., (2) by two or more stakeholders, (3) to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually.”

In addition to Gray’s definition, Agranoff and McGuire (2003: 4) further claim that:

“Collaboration is a purposive relationship designed to solve a problem by creating or discovering a solution within a given set of constraints.”

Wood and Gray (1991: 146) claim that

“Collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to act or decide on issues related to that domain.”

Roberts and Bradley (1991: 212) argue that

“Collaboration is a temporary social engagement in which two or more social actors work together toward a singular common end requiring the transmutation of materials, ideas, and/or social relations to achieve that end.”
Bardach (1998: 8) perceives collaboration as

“…any joint activity by two or more agencies working together that is intended to increase public value by their working together rather than separately”.

With regard to these definitions, the thesis intends to conceptualise collaboration as a process where two or more organisations collaborate with each other to tackle some problems more effectively beyond the boundaries of individual organisations. Collaboration implies resource sharing to tackle problems (both financial and non-financial resources), which contributes to lower costs. Collaboration can be made at various degrees ranging from a merely interactive contact to creation of a collective structure as Mandell (1999) contends. She identifies a continuum of collaborative efforts as follows:

- linkages or interactive contacts between two or more actors;
- intermittent coordination or mutual adjustment of the policies and procedures of two or more actors to accomplish some objective;
- *ad hoc* or temporary task force activity among actors to accomplish a purpose or purposes;
- permanent and/or regular coordination between two or more actors through a formal arrangement (e.g. council or partnership) to engage in limited activity to achieve a purpose or purposes;
- a coalition where interdependent and strategic actions are taken, but where purposes are narrow in scope and all actions occur within the participant actors themselves or involve the mutual sequential or simultaneous activity of the participant actors; and
- a collective or network structure where there is a broad mission and joint and strategically interdependent action. Such structural arrangements take on broad tasks that reach beyond the simultaneous actions of independently operating actors. (Mandell, 1999: 6)
In addition, Thomson et al (2007) argue that collaboration may involve five key dimensions: governance, administration, organisational autonomy, mutuality and norms. Therefore, organisations may “enhance their collective problem-solving skills, increase the scope and extent of their responsibilities, and gain greater support from stakeholders for organizational decisions” (Sharma & Kearins, 2011: 172). In reality, this thesis has found that the Thai government has committed to enhance collaboration among relevant public organisations in a form of merger. Structural rearrangements have been implemented in order to create a new structure where it can enhance greater depth of working. The government hopes that collaboration without the boundaries of organisational autonomy will increase efficiency, effectiveness and lower costs of operation. Collaboration in this form has caused changes in organisational cultures and norms. Further discussions are presented in chapter seven.

Nevertheless, collaboration may face problematic experiences with regard to organisational dependencies. Sharma and Kearins argue that

“Members representing different organizations may want to maintain their organizational identities and interests distinct from those of the collaboration. As a result, they may struggle to find a compromise between their “organizational self-interest” and the “collective interest”. Conflict may arise if the collaboration proposes or adopts changes that go against individuals’ self-interests.” (Sharma & Kearins, 2011: 172)

Next, coordination has been variously defined as similar to collaboration. For example, Alexander, who has reviewed the issue of coordination extensively, points out that coordination is defined as:

“…a deliberate activity undertaken by an organization or an inter-organizational system to concert the decisions and actions of their subunits or constituent organizations. Such coordination is manifested in both process and structure. This definition includes coordination at any level of the organization or inter-organizational system, from interactions between individuals to the structure of inter-organizational networks.” (Alexander, 1993: 331)
Peters (1998: 296) also claims that coordination may be referred to as

“an end-state in which the policies and programmes of government are characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and lacunae.”

In addition, Mulford and Rogers (cited in Alexander, 1993: 330) define coordination as

“…a process whereby two or more organisations create and/or use existing decision rules that have been established to deal collectively with their task environment.”

Coordination may also be defined as

“a structure or process of concerted decision-making or action, wherein the decisions or actions of two or more organisations are made simultaneously, in part or in whole, with some deliberate degree of adjustment to each other” (Warren et al., cited in Johnson, 2004: 98).

Schlossberg (2004: 133) contends that coordination may be defined as

“an active, mutually beneficial relationship among organizations that potentially includes sharing organizational resources (financial, personnel, and capital).”

According to Perri 6 et al coordination should be laid down at all key levels of activity, namely:

- **Policy**: the process of making and formulating the content of policy, then exercising oversight, or scrutiny, over its implementation;
- **Regulation**: the organisation, content and impact of regulation of individual, private organisations, and within government;
- **Service provision**: the organisation, content and impact of service provision;
- **Scrutiny**: the evaluation, auditing, interpretation and appraisal of performance in policy, regulation or service provision. (Perri 6 et al., 2002: 28)
In this respect, they argue that coordination refers to

“...the development of ideas about joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of planning, and making decisions” (Perri 6 et al, 2002: 33).

Hall (1999) contends that there are two different types of coordination: administrative coordination and policy coordination. He further explains that

“The need for administrative coordination can be said to occur when there has been agreement on aims, objectives and policies between the parties that have to be coordinated but the mechanism for coordination is undecided or there are inconsistencies in implementation. The necessity of policy coordination arises when there is conflict over the objectives of the policy that has to be coordinated and implemented. The two types of coordination may sometimes be hard to distinguish as coordination will nearly always mean that one policy or decision will be dominant over others. Furthermore, the need for coordination only becomes paramount when it is not occurring. Most coordination occurs in a very loose fashion that does not require formal arrangement. In addition, some conflict can also be productive in the formulation of new ideas or strategies for dealing with problems.” (Hall, 1999: 278)

Although definitions of coordination are varied, this thesis intends to conceptualise coordination as a process whereby joint decision or planning among two or more organisations is made with individual organisations’ autonomy still intact (Perri 6 et al, 2002; Schlossberg, 2004; Hall, 1999). Nonetheless, the problems of coordination within the public sector are unlikely to go away (Peters, 1998: 308). For example, traditional public administration that followed the departmentalism approach may contribute to coordination problems in terms of departments not knowing that another organisation is doing the same thing (Kavanagh & Richards, 2001). Similarly, the reform that followed the concept of NPM also contributes to the problem of coordination although the issue of coordination was set aside by the introduction of the managerialist approach at the beginning. The disaggregation of public organisations into smaller agencies may contribute to a problem of policy fragmentation (see, e.g., Sopchockchai, n.d.; Pollitt et al, 2001; Bach et al, 2012;
Kohler, 2011). This implies that policy goals that have been set by the government of the day are unlikely to be attained because of programme contradiction, redundancy, or both (Peters, 1998: 295). Catney (2009: 49) has recently argued that,

“the concern with policy coordination that had been so prominent during the 1970s was revived under the label of ‘holistic governance’, or ‘joined-up government.’”

With regard to the difference of cooperation and coordination, Johnson (2004: 99) argues that the former differs from the latter in terms of

“decision rules; the degree of formalisation; the goals and activities emphasised; the extent of personal resources involved; the threat to autonomy and implications for vertical and horizontal control.”

Payan (2007: 227) argues that

“Cooperation refers to an orientation that reflects a spirit of willingness of one organization to work with another organization [whereas] Coordination refers to general joint activities that take place between organizations.”

Hall (1999: 278) contends that

“Coordination tends to refer to formal institutionalised relationships among existing networks of organisations, interests and/or individuals, while cooperation is ‘characterized by informal trade-offs and by attempts to establish reciprocity in the absence of rules’.”

Coordination and integration also differ from each other. Perri 6 et al. (2002: 33), who offered a new set of definitions and concepts of coordination and integration, argue that coordination differs from integration in that the former refers to
“the development of ideas about joint and holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of planning, and making decisions, while integration is concerned with their actual execution or implementation, through the development of common structures and merged professional practices and interventions.”

Consequently, coordination can be strengthened through “‘mergers and gigantism’ approaches of the government of the day to pursue policy consistency” (Perri 6, 2004: 104). On the other hand, Johnson (2004: 100) claims that integration is a process whereby the principles of coordination are executed. With regard to this dissertation, the author tends to refer to integration as the re-aggregation of hard and soft elements of related units, such as, organisational structures, resources, cultures, values, staff and skills between two, or more, government units to become a single organisation. Accordingly, an integrated organisation is expected to operate with a seamless management system and policy redundancy or contradiction should be eliminated.

Finally, Selden et al (2006) offer a comprehensive comparison of cooperation, coordination, collaboration and service integration as follows.

“On the one end is interorganizational cooperation supported by informal and personal relationships between management and staff of different organizations. On the other end is formalized service integration, in which two organizations work together to provide a new package of services to their mutual clients. Between these two extremes are coordination, in which both organizations make an effort to calibrate their actions (although the organizations themselves remain independent), and collaboration, in which organizations share existing resources, authority, and rewards.” (Selden et al, 2006: 414)

They then put each term onto a continuum in order to depict different positions where organisations may choose to work together (see below).
However, the reality can be different especially in the case study of this thesis. The Thai government has reformed its public sector combining three concepts of integration, collaboration and coordination together. The integration of public organisations is an attempt to move toward greater collaboration and coordination among relevant organisations under a new, single roof. Therefore, the uncoordinated administration and services have become integrated. Accordingly, the government can save costs of administration through the elimination of redundant tasks, while the public can benefit from more efficient and effective services provided by these integrated public organisations. Also, the reform has inevitably shifted organisational cultures of relevant organisations. Chapter five, six and seven will further present the extent and content of these cultural shifts. The differences of cooperation, coordination, collaboration and integration has been summarised and presented in Table 2. The next section presents a discussion of joined-up government, which executes an idea of policy coordination of related government units.

2.1.2.2 An example of holistic governance in practice: Joined-up government

Joined-up government is a concept that revitalises the coordination issue during the post-NPM era. Initially, this term was used in the United Kingdom when New Labour came to power in 1997 (see, e.g., Flynn, 2007; Davies, 2009; Bellamy, 1999). However, joined-up government can also be found in other countries too such as Canada’s Service Canada (Kernaghan, 2009); Australia’s Centrelink (Victoria State Government, 2007), the Netherlands (Klievink & Janssen, 2009), New Zealand and Norway (Wilkins, 2002; Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Perri 6, 2005). Thailand also embraces this concept in its reforms (see Chapter Three).
Table 2: A summary of cooperation, coordination, collaboration and integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule system</td>
<td>No formal rules</td>
<td>Formal rules</td>
<td>Formal rules</td>
<td>Formal rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational structures</td>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>Separated or new structures</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational autonomy</td>
<td>Authority separated</td>
<td>Authority rested with individual organisation</td>
<td>Official partnership or contractual management</td>
<td>Single authority within common structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Resources kept separated</td>
<td>Resources made available for specific projects</td>
<td>Resources shared and secured among partners</td>
<td>Integrated resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and decision-making implication</td>
<td>No joint planning</td>
<td>Joint planning or joint decisions</td>
<td>Joint planning for long-term projects</td>
<td>Integrated planning and seamless decision-making process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals emphasised</td>
<td>Organisations’ own goals</td>
<td>Joint goals emphasised</td>
<td>Common goals</td>
<td>Organisational goal – long-term and short-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Conveyed when needed</td>
<td>Information shared</td>
<td>Multi-levelled communication</td>
<td>Information system integrated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s construct
Joined-up government can be defined in various ways. On the one hand, it can refer to an action of working together for a specific purpose but maintaining separated organisational boundaries. For example, Pollitt defined joined-up government as an attempt to eliminate the contradictions and tensions between different policies to make better use of resources, through the elimination of duplication and/or contradiction between different programmes; to improve the flow of good ideas and cooperation between different stakeholders in a particular policy sector, in order to produce synergy or smarter ways of working; and, to produce a more integrated, or ‘seamless’, set of services from the point of view of the citizens who use them (Pollitt, 2003: 35). Joined-up government can be defined as an approach that brings organisations together to work across organisational boundaries towards a common goal (NAO, 2001). Ling (2002: 616) claimed that joined-up government is the joined-up working that aims at coordination of programmes, or activities, among organisations without removing their organisational boundaries. Mulgan (2005: 175) argued that joined-up government can be concerned about “...how structures are organised, how budgets are allocated, how targets are set.”

On the other hand, joined-up government can be seen as the re-aggregation of public organisations (Flynn, 2007; HC, 2000). However, “Organisations have been restructured in different ways” (Talbot & Johnson, 2007: 58), and this is not necessarily about the creation of a new super agency (Ling, 2002: 617). More specifically in relation to the UK, the re-aggregation of organisations implies “mergers, re-assimilations of agencies into cohesive departmental groups” (Dunleavy et al., 2005: 481). Examples of such are the Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue and Customs, Prison and Probation Services, and the National Health Service (Talbot & Johnson, 2007). Table 3 below provides an example of joined-up government from Richards’ typology, in which four different strategies towards creating joined-up government are presented (cited in Johnson 2004: 104).
Table 3: A typology of joined-up government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of joined-up government</th>
<th>Degree of centralisation in governance</th>
<th>Key performance indicators</th>
<th>Key element of knowledge base</th>
<th>Key structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional professional services</td>
<td>Decentralised</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Community of professional practice</td>
<td>Specified service unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with intractable problems</td>
<td>Decentralised</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Situational</td>
<td>Community partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-boundary solutions to tame problems</td>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Evaluation and research based</td>
<td>Service provider partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamless service</td>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Expert systems based on explicit knowledge</td>
<td>Call-centre/internet service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although joined-up government can be perceived differently, one crucial aim is an attempt to strengthen policy coordination in order to achieve policy outcomes, especially in those related to cross-cutting problems (Ling, 2002; Flynn, 2009). In so doing, it places coordination as a central theme of the reform programme, with a wish to solve the policy fragmentation problem (Perri 6, 2004: 121). Organisations may be integrated, or re-aggregated with each other, if such integration can increase the possibility of government attaining its policy goals. If this happens, integration is a stage where coordination principles are executed under the creation of a new, single structure (Perri 6 et al., 2002: 53), where different cultures, shared values, skills, managerial styles, structures, people, and other resources are integrated (Page, 2005; HC, 2000). For the purpose of this dissertation, the author intends to refer to joined-up government as the integration of public organisations.

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8 Source: Johnson (2004: 102)
Nevertheless, joined-up government can go wrong as is true of other concepts even though it offers an alternative way to tackle the problem of policy fragmentation. Theoretically, joined-up government faces the problem of the lack of definition consistency (see, e.g., Hyde, 2008: 1). In this regard, Pollitt (2003: 34) argued that the concept

“…has emerged as a fashionable term of art, rather than a precise scientific or technical concept.”

Similarly, Ling (2002: 616) contended that joined-up government

“…is an umbrella term describing the various ways of aligning formally distinct organisations in pursuit of the objectives of the government of the day.”

In this respect, the implementation of joined-up government can vary from country to country. Also, any reform that attempts to improve performance of the public sector “…on one dimension or against one objective may lead (intentionally or unintentionally) to a lower performance in other dimensions” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004: 16).

Practically, the implementation of joined-up government may also “...lead to institutional conservatism, nimbyism and organisational fragmentation” (Ling, 2002: 631). In the UK, earlier failures to co-ordinate well among child protection authorities has led to the tragic death of Victoria Climbie in 2000 (see, e.g., Climbie report urges childcare reform, 2003; Littlemore, 2003). This situation has partially driven the integration of children’s services between local education departments and children’s social services (see, e.g., Thordardottir, 2009; School ‘losing out’ in shake up, 2009). However, the integration of these authorities has caused errors. In a much publicised case, the death of a child in the care of social services known as ‘Baby Peter’ led to severe public criticism. The former agency was much larger than the latter and the then-head of the new organisation came from the education agency and, thus, had limited expertise within social services (Talbot, 2009b). Although
there was a panel for the Baby Peter meeting, the panel preserved a consensus while it ignored the strong reservations given by the police about the course of action taken (see, e.g., Lightfoot, 2009; Brindle & Carvel, 2008). Sadly, they failed to protect the child who later died from his injuries, sustained at home.

Another example came from the USA, where a problem following departmental amalgamation was also found. The US government created the Department of Homeland Security and integrated the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) into it. Previously, FEMA was a small organisation which specialised in disaster management, but when integrated, it had to follow the new organisation’s priorities, which were “...planning for terrorist incidents” (Talbot, 2009b). When Hurricane Katrina hit the country in 2005, FEMA was unable to deal with the situation (Kettl, 2006: 13). These two examples provide the lesson to government that “…what tends to happen when two or more organisations, with very different tasks and functions, merge, is that the dominant organisation sets the agenda, gets most of the top jobs, allocates resources, and sets policies favouring its preoccupations … the other function, unless huge efforts are made, tends to be neglected” (Talbot, 2009b).

When the government implements any reform initiatives, the cultures of public administration and organisations are inevitably affected (Dwivedi, 2005). For example, the implementation of NPM has caused changes to the governmental culture, such as changing Britain’s administrative culture of “administrative centralism” (HC, 2001) to decentralisation, agencies, and performance-based management, with the aim of improving the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of government (Pollitt, 2005; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). Similarly, the implementation of organisational integration reform has altered the existing administrative culture of many countries with regard to holistic public service delivery (Perri 6, 2004; Pollitt, 2003; Catney, 2009; Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). Since two or more organisations are integrated together, one thing that will change following the integration is the organisational culture. The next section explores this issue.
2.2 Organisational culture

This section discusses the organisational culture literature. As public organisations are the subject of government reform, a change following any reforms affects the organisational culture to some degree. The section begins with an outline of definitions of organisational culture. The comparative perspectives with regard to an assessment of organisational cultures will then be illustrated.

2.2.1 Comparative concepts of organisational culture

According to scholars, the term organisational culture may be varyingly defined. Generally, a much quoted definition of culture has come from Hofstede’s *Cultural Consequences*. He argued that:

“Culture is the collective programming of the human mind that distinguishes the members of one human group from those of another. Culture in this sense is a system of collectively held values.”

(Hofstede, 2001: 24)

With regard to the study of organisational culture, there have been some prominent studies related to this topic. For example, Deal and Kennedy’s *Corporate Culture* (2000) explains organisational culture on the basis of an American corporate culture:

“Every business – in fact, every organization – has a culture. Sometimes it is fragmented and difficult to read from the outside – some people are loyal to their bosses, others are loyal to the union, still others care only about their colleagues … On the other hand, sometimes the culture of an organization is very strong and cohesive; everyone knows the goals of the corporation, and they are working for them. Whether weak or strong, culture has a powerful influence throughout an organization; it affects practically everything – from who gets promoted and what decisions are made, to how employees dress and what sports they play.” (Deal & Kennedy, 2000: 4)
Schein (1985: 6) referred to organisational culture as:

“...the deeper level of *basic assumptions* and *beliefs* that are shared by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously and define in a basic “taken-for-granted” fashion an organization’s view of itself and its environment.”

For Schein, an organisational culture is a composition of underlying assumptions, values and artefacts. In this respect, he believed that “Culture is manifested at different levels and can, therefore, be studied at different levels provided one has understood the deeper levels” (Schein, 1991: 252).

Cameron and Quinn (2006: 17) contended that organisational culture is:

“...reflected by what is valued, the dominant leadership styles, the language and symbols, the procedures and routines, and the definitions of success that make an organisation unique.”

Brown (1998: 9) defined organisational culture as:

“...the pattern of beliefs, values and learned ways of coping with experience that have developed during the course of an organisation’s history, and which tend to be manifested in its material arrangements and in the behaviours of its members.”

Christensen et al (2007: 1061) claimed that:

“Organisational culture has to do with the *informal norms* and *values* that evolve and become important for the activities of formal organisations.”

Dwivedi (2005: 23), who studied administrative culture, proposed that:

“Obviously, culture deals with collective values, but an important source of conflict may come when individual members’ personal values are at variance with the collective values of an organization.”
With regard to the perception of organisational culture, Wilson, based on the organisational culture of private companies, also suggested that:

“Organizational cultures are not mirror images of the cultures of the wider society. There are other factors that shape the cultures of organizations … One way of examining the culture of an organization is to look at its corporate image to see what and who is valued in the organization. A ‘corporate image’ is the mental picture that the clients, customers, employees, and others have of an organization. This impression is the combination of unconscious, unintended, conscious, and intended factors, found among annual reports, advertisements, or in-house magazines. Clues to the culture of an organization can be found in its norms, its values, and its rituals; the language of an organization, the metaphors, myths, and stories that are in common use, and the ceremonies, symbols, physical artefacts, taboos, and rites are also indicators.” (Wilson, 2010: 224-5)

Although various definitions have been provided through the organisational culture literature, the author of this thesis intends to refer to organisational culture as a set of norms and values, informally and formally, that hold the organisation together. The next section explores various perceptions in relation to cultural elements in an organisation.

**2.2.2 Empirical studies on organisational culture**

As far as the study of organisational culture and performance is concerned, one of the well-known studies in the 1980s was the 7S framework from a book entitled *In Search of Excellence* by Peters and Waterman (2004), who worked as consultants at the consulting firm McKinsey and Company. They proposed a model consisting of seven elements. They argued that, if an organisation wishes to perform well or to achieve its intended objectives, it is important that all seven elements are well-aligned and mutually reinforcing. The elements were: structure, strategy, systems, skills, style, staff and shared values, also known as ‘7S’. These seven aspects were categorised into two groups of hard and soft elements. The hard elements were the structure, strategy and systems, whereas skills, style, staff and shared values
comprised the soft elements. Peter and Waterman contended that the hard elements were easier to identify and the management could influence them explicitly, such as through strategy statements, organisational charts, formal processes and IT systems. In contrast, the soft elements were more difficult to identify, less tangible and were influenced by organisational culture. With regard to the division of hard and soft elements, Talbot (2010: 153) commented that:

“The conclusion reached by the McKinsey consultants was that, in organizational terms, this was about concentrating on what they regarded as the neglected “softer” aspects of organizational life – the so-called soft-square of staff, skills, style, and, above all, shared value.”

Arguably, the advantage of the 7S model was that it helped to identify what element needed to be aligned to improve organisational performance or to maintain alignment during organisational changes, such as reorganisation, structural merger or integration, new processes or change of leadership. It also helped to envisage how elements are interrelated, so that a change in one element may have a wider impact on other elements or the whole organisation.

Another study that applied the 7S framework can be found in Pascale and Athos’s *The Art of Japanese Management* (1982). They contended that Japanese firms were more successful in their approach, with an emphasis on soft S-elements in contrast to American firms. For example, Near comments:

“The authors contend that the Japanese are more successful with the soft S’s. The Japanese are better able to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty than American managers and are less willing to make premature decisions; they are more patient in letting the decision be discovered over time. The Japanese avoid formal communication and announcement (such as a formally declared reorganization); instead change is allowed to move gradually. In interpersonal relations Japanese managers avoid direct criticism, seeking by diplomatically indirect statements to both make their point and “save face” for the other party. American managers, who pride themselves on directness, confrontation, and decisiveness, would do well to emulate these management skills, contend Pascale and Athos. In matters of staffing,
the authors focus on the interdependence of boss and subordinate and describe the two cultures’ reactions to this relationship. The Japanese are apparently much more comfortable with this interdependence; they view themselves as members of larger groups, from which they draw their identity. Americans pride themselves on their rugged individualism and independence. They are less willing to acknowledge interdependence, and are particularly unwilling to recognize their dependence on these subordinates.” (Near, 1981: 84)

Some Japanese cultural characteristics (as identified in this study) are similar to the Thai management style. Pascale and Athos’s perspective is useful to provide an overview of Eastern-style management, which the Thai organisations share, in part. In addition to these two studies, there are other cultural models that offer an instrument to perceive organisational cultures. This section explores four models that look at organisational culture from different dimensions. Each model has different advantages and disadvantages. In short, organisations may operate through specific sets of values or elements. However, one cultural orientation may be appropriate for an organisation at one specific time, but inappropriate at a different period.

2.2.2.1 Deal and Kennedy's Typology

Deal and Kennedy (2000) proposed a cultural typology of corporate organisations that distinguished the cultures into four different groups, namely: the ‘tough-guy, macho’; ‘work hard/play hard’; ‘bet-your-company’; and ‘process’ cultures. This typology was derived from an examination of hundreds of corporations and their business environments. The typology is, therefore, largely based on corporate culture. The authors also claimed that a division of cultures into four categories is simplistic. Briefly, the ‘tough-guy, macho’ culture is regarded as “…a world of individualists who regularly take high risks and get quick feedback on whether their actions were right or wrong” (Deal & Kennedy, 2000: 107). Examples of tough-guy, macho organisations are police departments, construction, and the entire entertainment industry. However, since these organisations are made up of individuals who do not benefit from cooperative activity, “organizations tend to have
a high turnover of staff and thus often fail to develop a strong and cohesive culture” (Senior & Swailes, 2010: 144).

The next cultural type is the ‘work hard/play hard’ culture that exists in organisations that have small risks but quick feedback, such as sales organisations (Deal & Kennedy, 2000: 113). Employees take few risks, as the achievement of single individuals has little impact. Rather, “the culture emphasizes the team because it is the team that makes the difference” (Senior & Swailes, 2010: 145).

The ‘bet-your-company’ culture embraces high risks but involves slow feedback on actions and decisions. It may take years before the employees know whether their decisions have paid off. Examples can be found in the cultures of oil companies, aircraft manufacturers, investment banks and computer-design companies. Since the stakes are high, “Decision making comes from the top down—once all the inputs are in” (Deal & Kennedy, 2000: 117). They will act cooperatively because they are betting on the company rather than themselves. Hierarchy is likely to be in the nature of the organisation.

Lastly, ‘process’ culture is regarded as a culture of organisations that entails low risks and slow feedback on decisions, such as public and government organisations, and heavily regulated industries like pharmaceutical companies. Since employees are working in a world of little or no feedback, “they have no idea how effective they are until someone blames them for something” (Deal & Kennedy, 2000: 119). Therefore, they tend to concentrate on the means rather than the end and focus on technical perfection by getting the process right. Senior and Swailes (2010: 145) contended that “Process cultures are effective when dealing with a stable and predictable environment, but find it difficult to react quickly to changing circumstances.”
Handy’s theory was based on Harrison’s work, which offers four types of organisational culture. However, the theory of cultural propriety has used four gods to symbolise the different ways to perceive organisational cultures. The model was constructed on an assumption that:

“the cultures of organisations rightly differ, that cultures are affected by a variety of factors, that these diverse cultures are reflected in diverse structures and systems … it will be argued that many of the ills of organisations stem from imposing an inappropriate structure on a particular culture, or from expecting a particular culture to thrive in an inappropriate climate” (Handy, 1993: 180).

Four Greek gods (Zeus, Apollo, Athena, and Dionysus) were used to describe different types of organisational culture. The first culture was called the ‘power’ culture, where the patron god was Zeus. An organisation that operates under this culture depends on a central power source from a single person or group. Decision-making is centralised in the same way as a spider’s web, where a spider stays at the middle and senses all movements on its web. However, these organisations adhere to few rules and procedures, and involve little bureaucracy. Organisational effectiveness depends instead on trust and empathy.

Secondly, it is the ‘role’ culture, which, Handy (1993: 185) argued, was often stereotyped as bureaucracy. Apollo is its patron god, the god of reason. In this culture, an organisation operates on the basis of logic and rationality. Organisational effectiveness relies on procedures and rules rather than on the individual who fulfils them.

The third type is the ‘task’ culture, which is represented by Athena, the warrior goddess. It is a job- or project-oriented culture that “… seeks to bring together the appropriate resources, the right people at the right level of the organization, and to let them get on with it” (Handy, 1993: 188). An organisation can be perceived as a ‘matrix organization’ where people are connected via networks. It also embraces
such values as expertise, skill, creativity, and rewards results and group objectives more than position or personal power.

Finally, the ‘person’ culture is a culture that puts individuals at its centre. Handy contends that this culture “… would exist only for the people in it without any superordinate objective” and “If there is a structure or an organization it exists only to serve and assist the individuals within it” (Handy, 1993: 189-90). This is why Dionysus, the god of the self-oriented individual, is used to represent this culture. Examples of this culture are barristers’ chambers, architects’ partnerships, hippy communes or social groups. Individuals are bound by a psychological contract in which “[t]he individual can leave the organization but the organization seldom has the power to evict the individual” (Handy, 1993: 190).

With regard to this model, it will be of great advantage to an organisation if it operates in the right choice of culture, since the achievement of organisational effectiveness is highly likely. Practically, this model was used to explore cultural aspects of the Royal Thai Army by Jittaruttha (2010). The research found that the culture of the Royal Thai Army has the attributes of the ‘role’ culture, where authority, security of work, status and power of positions prevail. However, such findings may be an exception since the Army has specific characteristics and it operated in a unique environment when compared to civil public organisations. Figure 1 summarises Handy’s four cultures.
2.2.2.3 The Competing Values Framework (CVF)

This model was developed by Cameron and Quinn (2006) to assess cultures of organisations in the private sector. Basically, the model asserts that human organisations are shaped by two fundamental contradictions: flexibility versus control, and internal focus versus external focus. These two dimensions form four quadrants, “…each representing a distinct set of organizational effectiveness indicators … These indicators of effectiveness represent what people value about an organization’s performance. They define what is seen as good and right and appropriate.” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006: 35). These four cultures are clan, adhocracy,
market and hierarchy. The clan and market cultures represent competing assumptions as do the hierarchy and adhocracy cultures. Figure 2 illustrates the CVF model.

**Figure 2: The Competing Values Framework**

![The Competing Values Framework](image)

The first type of culture is called a ‘clan’ culture. Basically, a clan-oriented organisation is typified by it being a friendly place to work, more like an extended family. Typical characteristics of clan-type organisations are teamwork, employee involvement programmes, and corporate commitment to employees (Cameron & Quinn, 2006: 41). This implies that such an organisation is culturally homogeneous where:

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10 Source: Cameron and Quinn (2006)
“...most members share a common set of values or objectives plus beliefs about how to coordinate effort in order to reach common objectives. The clan functions by socializing each member completely so that each merges individual goals with the organizational ones, thus providing them with the motivation to serve the organization.” (Ouchi & Price, 1978: 65)

Since a clan-based organisation is typified by being a friendly place to work, organisational members are held together by tradition, trust and loyalty to the organisation and cultural homogeneity is relatively high. Leaders are perceived as mentors or facilitators who build up trust and maintain loyalty among team workers to ensure that the organisation can achieve its goals. In contrast to a clan-based organisation, the ‘market’ culture is characterised as a combination of control and external focus. It values competitiveness and productivity as core elements. Cameron and Quinn contended that:

“The basic assumptions in a market culture are that the external environment is not benign but hostile … the organization is in the business of increasing its competitive position, and the major task of management is to drive the organization toward productivity, results, and profits. It is assumed that a clear purpose and an aggressive strategy lead to productivity and profitability.” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006: 40)

In this respect, a market organisation is a result-oriented workplace, where leaders are perceived as producers or directors who have to drive an organisation to accomplish goals or targets. Employees are held together by an emphasis on winning and are rewarded on a performance basis.

The third culture is a ‘hierarchy’ culture that values clear lines of decision-making authority, standardised rules and procedures, and control and accountability mechanisms. These values are the key to success. The basic assumption is that an organisation operated effectively “…when the environment was relatively stable, tasks and functions could be integrated and coordinated, uniformity in products and services was maintained, and workers and jobs were under control” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006: 37). So, an organisation is a formalised and structured workplace where
employees are governed by procedures. Employees are willingly giving superiors “...the right to tell them (within some zone of indifference) what to do. The employees must also willingly allow their superiors to closely monitor their activities and outputs.” (Ouchi & Price, 1978: 65). Tasks are also regulated through the organization’s structure (Wilson, 2010: 260). An organisation operates through the hierarchical mechanism, where job specialisation is highly important. Public organisations are the best example of organisations that incorporate the hierarchy culture. In a hierarchy-oriented workplace, members are held together by formal rules and policies, while the organisation is concerned with stability, predictability, and efficiency as its long-term effectiveness, whereas effective leaders are good coordinators and organisers who have to maintain a smooth-functioning organisation (see, e.g., Osborne, 1997).

The fourth type is an ‘adhocracy’ culture, which is a combination of external focus and flexibility. This culture is characterised by a dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative workplace that can quickly respond to the external environment. Cameron and Quinn (2006: 43) contended that “A major goal of an adhocracy is to foster adaptability, flexibility, and creativity where uncertainty, ambiguity, and information overload are typical”. This means that the organisation has to be ready for change. In this culture, organisational members are glued together by a commitment to experimentation and innovation, whereas effective leadership must be “visionary, innovative and risk-oriented” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006: 45). The ability to produce unique and original products and services means success and rewards will be given on this basis. Figure 3 summarises the cultural attributes of each culture.
The advantage of a CVF is that it acknowledges the existence of four cultures in an organisation at one time. They exist alongside each other and the organisational culture can be different from time to time. However, the most effective operation is a balanced model of all four values. The CVF model is very interesting in terms of comparing the cultures of the organisation at two different times, such as current and preferred cultures or pre- and post-reform cultural existence. Although a CVF originated from the private sector, it was later applied in the public sector (see e.g. Marshall et al, 2003; Smart & St. John, 1996). In addition, it was used to assess organisational cultures of public organisations in the developing context.

11 Source: Author’s construct based on Cameron and Quinn (2006)
Recently, a CVF was used to observe the organisational culture of public organisations in Thailand. Jingjit (2008) found that after the public sector reform had been implemented, a co-dominance of hierarchy and clan cultures existed in public organisations, although a reduction in both values was found. This implies that Thai public organisations’ cultural attributes are “…concurrently oriented towards clan and bureaucratic values” (Jingjit, 2008: 269). She further claimed that her findings “…could be considered as providing a significant fresh point of reference regarding the organisational cultures of public-sector organisations in the Far Eastern context, which until now has been largely under-explored” (Jingjit, 2008: 269). Since culture will vary even from one organisation to another, as claimed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 41), her findings have inspired me to further investigate whether a hybrid of clan and hierarchy values existed in another unexplored area, in the form of integrated public organisations in a developing context, such as that of Thailand. This is because a transfer of administrative reform from the Western hemisphere and holistic governance in particular, may yield different outcomes when implemented on Thai administrative soil. Section 2.3 will further discuss the justification for the CVF model.

2.2.2.4 Talbot’s Human Paradox Theory

Using a CVF approach that offers a perception of paradoxical or competing values in organisations, Talbot has further developed a realist model called “human paradox theory” by using the same approach as Quinn and colleagues to map managerial paradoxes in organisations. Initially, Talbot argued that human beings are paradoxical by nature, in which they have either one trait or another, such as aggressive or peaceful, competitive or cooperative, and so on. Accordingly, “…paradoxical traits or instincts in turn generate paradoxical human systems, especially human organisations” (Talbot, 2005: 6). Subsequently, Talbot built a framework with a combination of two fundamental ideas; the idea of Darwinian evolution of human beings and the idea of paradox as a real phenomenon in human behaviour and institutions (Talbot, 2005: 9). The combination results in four pairs of
paradoxes: aggression and peace-making, conformity and autonomy, altruism and selfishness, and cooperation and competition. This implies that human beings are innately aggressive or peaceful, conformist or individualistic, selfish or altruistic, or focused on competition or cooperation. Figure 4 is an illustration of the model. This model is very interesting with regard to public sector management because, contended Talbot (2005: 27):

“Public institutions reflect the paradoxes of human nature at several levels: in their overall structuring, in their management and above all in their successes and failures.”

Hewett (2005) also commented that:

“…he [Talbot] makes the case for all of these tendencies to be part of our evolved nature, drawing on evidence from the behaviour of primates. He counter-poses the notion that we have innate tendencies in a particular direction (for example towards aggression) with a simple map of apparently contradictory tendencies as shown above and suggests that they actually represent paradoxical human instincts (that is tendencies that co-exist).”

Talbot himself also claims that:

“This model has the advantage of simplicity but it is a theoretical construct rather than derived from empirical analysis. It may well be too rigid, or simple, in its current form but it does highlight the genuinely contradictory and paradoxical nature of these evolved instincts.” (Talbot, 2005: 83)
Figure 4: The Human Paradox Theory

Particularly in regard to this dissertation, this model looks very promising for the study of organisational culture and management, where conflicts, maybe paradoxes, in new integrated organisations can be perceived. In sum, with regard to administrative paradox, Hood and Peters argue that

“Some element of paradox, in the sense of unanticipated side effects, is no doubt unavoidable in any administrative reform program. After all, the limits of human knowledge, coupled with the high dynamic complexity of human organizations and the inherent difficulties of experimentation for some kinds of social engineering, would limit the capacity of reformers to avoid surprise even (or perhaps especially) if administrative science had the same kind of funding and research capacity as medical science.” (Hood & Peters, 2004: 277)

12 Source: Talbot (2005)
2.3 Analytical framework of the study

The previous sections have outlined two theoretical frameworks of public-sector management and organisational culture. The relationship between public-sector management and the culture of public organisations is intertwined. The cultural change of integrated organisations has been chosen for exploration since there has been a shortage of studies in this area, especially in a developing country context, such as that of Thailand. The integration of reform has subsequently caused changes in both physical and non-physical issues. As a result, the change in one aspect has inevitably affected another. Moreover, a change in organisational culture may result in organisational paradoxes as well. With regard to the aims and objectives of the research, related theories have previously been reviewed. Figure 5 illustrates where this research fits into the three areas of the study.

Figure 5: The analytical framework of the study

13 Source: Author’s construct
Figure 6 illustrates how theories related to public-sector reform, organisational culture and managerial paradoxes have played an important role and how they are related. The public-sector reform (NPM or joined-up government) has been implemented in many countries. However, organisational culture and paradox issues have been studied to a lesser extent. Therefore, these two neglected issues are an interesting area to be explored with regard to an attempt to understand the whole context following integration reform.

**Figure 6: The scope of the study**¹⁴

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¹⁴ Source: Author’s construct
2.3.1 Identified gap in the literature

As previously illustrated, the CVF offers a balanced and complex model that acknowledges the existence of multiple cultures and values in an organisation (Talbot, 2010: 126). This implies that no values “can be ignored and all of which have to be satisfied to some extent to achieve excellence in public service” (Talbot, 2008: 13). As suggested by its name, all values are competing with one another. However, the CVF does not sufficiently accommodate the aspect of managerial paradoxes, although they are real attributes of real organisations (Talbot, 2005: 21). Consequently, regarding the existence of paradoxes in human organisations, this dissertation uses an integrated model of CVF and Talbot’s paradox theory to assess the cultural changes of integrated public organisations. Figure 7 depicts a conceptual framework that combines a CVF (Cameron & Quinn, 2006) and human paradox theory (Talbot, 2010).

Figure 7: The conceptual framework for organisational culture assessment

![Figure 7: The conceptual framework for organisational culture assessment](source: Author’s construct)
The model has been built with the assumption that a cultural orientation assessed by a CVF will have an effect on paradoxes in organisations. Paradoxes will explain the real situation of organisations after being integrated with each other. Presumably, a change in cultures will only give an overall picture of how organisations have been changed following integration reform. With regard to human paradox theory, it will further explain how real cultural change is. These paradoxes represent how an organisation deals with cultural changes by trying to hold members from different backgrounds during the process of building a new, single organisational identity. However, only two pairs of paradoxes have been specially focused on, which are, cooperation versus competition, and peace-making versus aggression. This is because these paradoxes are more likely to be perceived by organisational members. The paradoxes of conformity and autonomy, and altruism and selfishness are less well perceived in an organisation. Usually, public officials view conformity as part of the job because the nature of Thai public organisations is rule compliance. In this respect, individuals rarely have autonomy while working in an organisation. The altruism and selfishness paradoxes are more likely to be perceived as part of teamwork cooperation or competition for performance.

Although a CVF approach has been employed to assess the organisational culture of Thailand’s public sector (e.g., Jingjit, 2008), its application with Talbot’s paradox theory has never been employed to the study of the organisational culture of integrated public organisations, especially in a developing context, such as that of Thailand. The findings that will be derived from the data analysis may not only offer a fresh viewpoint to observe how organisational culture has changed in an under-explored area, but also contribute to a more extensive application of the CVF and human paradox theory than have previously been tested.

The application of this integrated model to observe the cultural change of integrated Thai public organisations may be interesting in the sense that Thailand and the UK (as a pioneer of joined-up government implementation), obviously, have different national and administrative cultures and contexts. In this respect, Dwivedi (2005: 22) argued:
“…when it comes to the transmission of culture from one place to another, several actors participate (both consciously and unconsciously) in the process, such as the state apparatus, socioeconomic and political factors as well as religious institutions.”

In addition, he contended that:

“As culture and style of governance are the keys to understanding what makes a country function, it is imperative that any public sector reform imposed on developing nations draws from the local customs, culture, and traditions.” (Dwivedi, 2005: 34)

Thailand has long experienced a strong centralised bureaucratic administration that rules and controls the country’s public administration (see more in Chapter Three). The philosophy of administrative reform in Thailand follows the principles of the democratic governance paradigm, partially influenced from Western-style management practices, which advocates a government that is smaller and does less, with a global vision and flexible organisations, that is highly accountable to its citizens and elected politicians, and that is fair (Bowornwathana, 1999: 72). In this regard, the major public-sector reform that was implemented in 2002 may have changed the administrative cultures of public organisations to some degree. The findings may also differ from what was previously found by Jingjit (2008).

2.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework underpinning the research. It began with a review of the literature related to public sector management that provides different perspectives. One of the most widely adopted during the past three decades is NPM, which has been implemented in many countries – from the West to East and in the developed and developing countries. The concept originated in the late 1970s but still persists today. Nonetheless, a new wave of reform came into existence during the late 1990s, when the NPM-based reform shifted to governance reform in many Western countries. While the former embraces market-led
orientation, the latter focuses more on need-based or holistic public services. The post-NPM reforms have also been transferred to many countries, especially in the Anglophone regions. With regard to any public-sector reform, public organisations are usually a prime target for implementation. Not only does structural change need to be rearranged, but non-physical aspects also need to be adjusted, especially organisational cultures. The chapter has also investigated the definitions of organisational culture and explored models that have been developed to assess organisational cultures.

This chapter provided an analytical framework to be used to assess the organisational culture of integrated public organisations. A model has been built from a combination of CVF and human paradox theory. These issues are intertwined with one another so a change in one aspect can contribute to changes in another. The integration reform that has been implemented in government organisations has caused cultural changes of targeted organisations to some degree. Also, the changes in organisational culture from one aspect to another can produce paradoxes in a newly integrated organisation. Such paradoxes can either accelerate or decelerate the performance and cohesion of a new organisation. The chapter aimed to contribute to the existing literature with regard to the application of CVF and human paradox theory to the underexplored context of integration reform. Findings from the use of this instrument will offer a fresh point of view towards the reality of reforms, especially for academics, Thai reformers and public employees themselves.
Chapter Three:

The Context of Administrative Reform in Thailand

This chapter explores public administration and administrative reform in Thailand. It begins with a background section that provides general information about the country and its socio-political contexts. Thailand is a country located in the Southeast Asian sub-continent. Administratively, it is a unitary state and the power of administration is highly centralised in the hands of a national government. The government policies can be highly influential for all parts of the country, including local government. This leads to the second section, which presents the administrative characteristics and reform history of Thailand in detail. National politics has been quite unstable in regard to the breakdown of coalition government or military coups. However, the Thaksin government was an exception, as his government was the first government to stay in office full-term. Accordingly, the public sector reform in Thailand during his premiership was the only major reform the country has recently witnessed. The third section explores the administrative reform with regard to Thailand’s adoption of the NPM concept. The Thaksin government chose some NPM elements to be implemented in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, such as disaggregation and performance-based management. The government also adopted the holistic governance concept through the re-aggregation or integration of public organisations. The final section of the chapter is the conclusion.
3.1 Background

Geographically, Thailand is located at the heart of the Indochina peninsula and has a total area of 513,115 square kilometres. Thailand had a population of 67,312,000 as of 2011: the fourth largest in ASEAN\(^{16}\) (ASEAN, 2011). Thailand is the second largest economy in ASEAN (Hill & Menon, 2010: 9). Thailand is a unitary, developing state in Southeast Asia and has different socio-political contexts from Western countries.

Socially, the value system of Thai society and culture plays an important part in moulding Thai political attitudes. Gohlert (1994: 147) claimed that the Thai value system is informed by the Theravada sect of Buddhism (approximately 93.6 % of the population are Buddhists), with mixed elements of Brahmanism, belief in Phi (supernatural power) and other elements. Buddhism is rooted in Thai society and has played a major role in shaping and influencing the attitudes and social values of Thai people. The social structure also reflects many of the religious teachings, for example, the relationship between young and old (see e.g. Mulder, 2001). Vichit-Vadakan noted that

“The traditional Thai social structure, values and beliefs evolve \([sic]\) around personal criteria, rather than universalistic principles. A person’s primary duty and allegiance were \([sic]\) to his family and then to his kinship network, then to his village or community. Mutual assistance, trust, reciprocity, and social cohesion operated \([sic]\) well within the realm of one’s personal affiliation. Traditional Thai society was also hierarchical and highly stratified, and such status differences gave rise to an elaborate and intricate system of patron-client relationship where status unequals entered into a mutually beneficial relationship. … Key values espoused by the patronage system were loyalty, obedience, and gratitude from the standpoint of a client to his patron. Kindness, compassion, and generosity were required of a patron toward his client.” (Vichit-Vadakan, 2011: 85)

\(^{16}\) See Glossary
This tradition was a result of ingrained feudalism, so that people attach importance to a great personality, power, fortune, and wealth (Nakata, 1981; PRD, 2000: 119). The patron-client relationship was also perceived in the public sector in regard to the relationship between leader(s) and subordinates (see chapters five and six). As far as the patronage system is concerned, Vichit-Vadakan further pointed out that

“Client-patron relations also explain the poor development of the public interest … Loyalty is pledged and served to person/s and never to a “public” that one did [sic] not personally know or interact with. The notion of public interest as an ultimate goal in public ethics and public administration is somewhat foreign to the traditional Thai way of perceiving the ethical/moral obligations of leadership that would lead to good governance.” (Vichit-Vadakan, 2011: 85)

Politically, Thai politics in the modern era started from 1932, when the absolute monarchy was replaced by the constitutional monarchy system. The new governing system that installed a Western democratic blueprint with a parliament and representatives was, however, introduced by the new elites rather than by public’s demand. Therefore, the majority of society was under-prepared to become part of a new democratic system. During that time, most of people did not understand the true meaning of democratic governance beyond going to vote for representatives and had little opportunity to participate in the political process after that. They also witnessed political disruptions either by parliamentary dissolutions or military coups. In the decades that followed, Thai politics was still unstable and yet has presented a revival of elitist politics, in which power is assembled in the hands of small groups of the elite (the military, elected politicians and bureaucracy) rather than the mass (Wakefield, 2002). Many Thais probably still feel more comfortable listening to or complying with laws and orders planned from the top. Therefore, people are likely to think that government is the responsibility of the powerful or the elite (Sivaraksa, 2005: 17). They should listen to them in the same way as giving respect to their seniors. This attitude could have contributed to a deeper patron-client relationship and it pervades the public sector. This relationship has made it difficult to develop public sector management effectively in Thailand.
Political instability in the modern Thai era\textsuperscript{17} has also contributed to the marginal public sector reform. Although coalition governments aimed to stay in power full-term, fragile coalition breakdowns and military coups could happen at any time (see further details in section 3.2). Nevertheless, this was not the case with the Thaksin government, which administered the country from February 2001 to September 2006 and implemented a major public sector reform (see section 3.3 and 3.4). Since politics and public administration are intertwined with one another, political instability inevitably affects the performance of the public sector regarding the issues of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness. This is because the government was unable to finish the reform projects. Also, new governments might initiate new reforms, schemes and initiatives that might be in conflict, make redundant or undermine the effectiveness of the former government’s policies (Bowornwathana, 2000: 398). As far as the unstable politics and strong persistence of the patronage system in Thailand are concerned, they contributed to unintended consequences, in that the bureaucracy retained the power of public administration, resisted change and embraced the patron-client relationship at any levels of the administration.

3.2 Thai public administration: History and contexts

The political and administrative characteristics of Thailand are highly centralised. The history of public administration in Thailand is therefore worth exploring. During the reign of King Rama V (1869-1910), the king introduced the ministerial administration after paying visits to many European countries during his reign. Bowornwathana (2011) noted that twelve ministries were established: interior, defense, foreign affairs, royal household, metropolitan, agriculture, finance, justice, war, public works, public construction, and privy seal.

\textsuperscript{17} Since the establishment of constitutional monarchy in 1932, there have been 12 coups d’état and 13 rebellions (Bowornwathana, 2011: 37). There were 17 constitutions in the 75-year period following the revolution (PMO, 2011). The last coup was staged in September 2006 to remove the Thaksin government.
“The first cabinet in 1892 consisted of nine of the king’s sons and three court nobles. During the time of absolute monarchy, the king would appoint his brothers, cousins, and relatives to high positions in these ministries.” (Bowornwathana, 2011: 32)

Bowornwathana pointed out that the public administration during this time was highly centralised. For example,

“First, the enormous power of court nobles such as the Bunnag family at the beginning of the Bangkok era was gradually curtailed. Second, western-style ministries were introduced. King Rama V appointed his sons and cousins to run these ministries. Third, King Rama V consolidated this power in the capital and provinces by setting up a modern civil service system with remuneration. He abolished the practice of assigning bureaucrats to oversee the provinces without remuneration and gave them the right to extract taxes from the people as much as they wanted as long as their tax collection met the minimum requirement set forth by the king. Fourth, he replaced provincial rulers with salaried bureaucrats answerable to the Ministry of Interior in Bangkok [the capital city]. Fifth, a modern army under his command was established to maintain national security and suppress unrest in the provinces.” (Bowornwathana, 2011: 33)

In an effort to centralise government power, King Rama V organised the provincial administration across the country. Bowornwathana noted that

“King Rama V introduced the regional system (*monthon tesabhiban*) by dividing provinces into 18 regions. Below the regions were cities (*muang*), districts (*amphoe*), sub-districts (*tambon*), and villages (*muban*). At the *tambon* and village levels, elections of sub-district and village headmen were held on a trial basis. Provincial governors were under the close supervision of the regional officials … Limited local government was experimented with by introducing sanitation administration.” (Bowornwathana, 2011: 33)

The bureaucratic system began to take root in the public sector, focused on serving the King to run the country. Na Nakorn noted that human resource management in the Thai civil service before 1982.
“…was based on the patronage system where such functions as selection, recruitment, and promotion were not well regulated, leaving decisions on HR [human resources] at the disposal of supervisors.”  
(Na Nakorn cited in Sivaraks, 2011: 114)

In 1928, during the reign of King Rama VII, the first Civil Service Act B.E. 2471 was promulgated. Sivaraks (2011: 114) argued that this law

“…transformed the Thai civil service into a merit system that relies on rules of law as well as the principles of competence, merit, and fairness.”

This meant that standardised administrative procedures and practices in the public sector, the personnel administration system, formal roles and rights of civil servants and fair career promotion and recruitment were clarified. This act also categorised civil service officials into three types:

(1) ordinary civil service, which is the career service recruited through an examination process and entitles personnel to a pension on retirement; (2) special service, which are those who possess special skills that the government hire on a non-fulltime basis; and (3) government clerk. (Sivaraks, 2011: 114)

In 1932, Thailand witnessed a revolution, in which

“A group of western-educated military and civilian bureaucrats overthrew the absolute monarchy and replaced it with a constitutional monarchy. Political power changed hands from the king to the bureaucratic elites. The political arena shifted from the king’s court to the military bureaucracy.” (Bowornwathana, 2011: 35)

The first elected government reinstated the civil service as a mechanism of public administration. However, the administration was made stronger through centralisation. Civil servants were given higher status and authority over day-to-day administration. In particular, senior civil servants were allowed:
“…to exercise considerable patronage power. In relation to this, it has been argued that since bureaucrats often belonged to different cliques and factions during this period, the possibility of climbing up a career ladder depended, significantly, on how influential their particular groups were in comparison to others.” (Jingjit, 2008: 71)

Public sector reforms after the 1932 revolution caused minor changes to the public sector until 1973. Bowornwathana (2011: 36) pointed out that, during this period,

“…military leaders took turns to assume political power, and administrative reform was undertaken to centralize power in the hands of military dictators. In other words, the tradition of authoritarian rule, centralization, and big government set forth by the early era of kings as master was followed.”

In 1975, the Civil Service Act B.E. 2518 was promulgated and changed the classification system from rank to position-based classification. The law, in turn,

“…created a job series and 11 grade levels and was supported by such related mechanisms as job description and step-wise salary structure. Other major changes under this act include: (1) the exclusion of “politician” from the Civil Service Act, defined under another specific law; (2) the adoption of a “positive discipline” approach requiring managers to encourage their subordinates to follow discipline; and (3) a more strategic and expanded role of the CSC to perform an advisory role for the cabinet on both HR policy and on the civil service’s O&M [organisation and management] policy.” (Sivaraks, 2011: 114-115)

During the General Prem government (1980–1988), which was branded the semi-democracy era, the government attempted to reform the public sector by limiting the size of the civil service. The government limited the recruitment of new civil servants to two percent per year of the existing bureaucrat population. The next Chatichai government (1988–1991) had a role to play in enhancing political development by transferring the conventional, bureaucratic decision-making process of the Thai state to the hands of the elected politicians (McCargo, 2002: 1). This

18 This exclusion was to create a neutral civil service by prohibiting civil service officials from taking any political position at the same time. (Sivaraks, 2011: 115)
radical change signified the future for the development of public administration in Thailand (Hirsch, 1997: 179). The hope of modernising the country’s public administration was removed by the military coup over the claim of corruption, fuelled by the country’s remarkable economic growth (see e.g. Hongladarom, 1995). Nevertheless, the Chatichai government implemented a performance reform of the public sector in terms of decreasing service time to citizens. Public organisations were required to clarify the length of service time citizens would wait to get a response after putting in a request. This reform was an attempt at an administrative procedure.

Then, the Anand government (1991-1992) aimed to alter civil servants’ roles and attitudes to correspond to the needs of citizens. The government assigned the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and Office of Civil Service Commission (OCSC) to prepare recommendations for this reform, which contained measures to: (1) modernise the system and enhance the efficiency of the public sector, and (2) increase the quality and ethics of civil servants through the modification of recruitment processes, in order to attract highly capable candidates to the public sector. The Civil Service Act B.E. 2535 was promulgated in 1992 to alter the traditional role of the civil service from control and implementation to facilitating and monitoring roles. The CSC had four major roles: human resource advisor to the government, organisation and management; manager for the civil service; civil service’s merit caretaker; and watchdog for the civil service officials. Sivaraks pointed out that

“The role of the CSC also became more strategic as the act made the commission the advisor to the cabinet on the management aspect of the overall civil service. The position classification was also adjusted for the benefit of career advancement and the improvement of a compensation mechanism (through position allowance).” (Sivaraks, 2011: 116)
Then, the parliament was dissolved and a general election was held for the first time after the military coup in 1991. People hoped that the coming election would bring a new beginning for political development that could further engender good governance reform. Although a general election was held, the military was not about to give up its control. The then-elected government appointed General Suchinda Kraprayoon as the Prime Minister (7 April–10 June 1992) and the parliament was about to revise the then constitution in order to give the military and bureaucracy extensive power (McCargo, 2002: 3). Consequently, hundreds of thousands of citizens gathered on the main streets of Bangkok, the capital city, and protested against the military-led government. During 17-20 May 1992, the protest turned into the most extreme political violence in the country since 1976. The violence ceased when General Kraprayoon resigned from his premiership on 24 May 1992. The interim government led by former Prime Minister Anand (June to September 2012) staged a new general election and it was the Democrat Party, led by Chuan Leekpai, that won the majority vote to become the newly-elected government during 1992-1995.

In 1993, the Chuan government aimed to reform the public sector by emphasising organisational restructuring, clarifying responsibilities, and restricting the size of the public sector. During 1994–1995, the government focused particularly on public spending control. Performance control was introduced in order to increase the effectiveness of the public sector. A customer-oriented ethos was also emphasised in service delivery. At the same time, the Thai public demanded a large-scale political reform led by democracy-oriented groups (Thabchumpon, 2002: 196). Therefore, the government established the Committee on Developing Democracy to host the political reform in 1994.

The Barnharn government administered the country from July 1995 to November 1996. During his premiership, the government promulgated the Administrative Procedures Act (1996) and the Official Liabilities Tort Act (1996) in order to make the public administration more transparent and accountable to citizens. The former strengthened the efficiency and fairness of administrative procedures to benefit the
public’s interests. The latter provided for how citizens might get compensated in cases of being abused by government officials. The Banharn government also promoted transparency, effectiveness, fairness, and public satisfaction within the public sector.

Also in 1996 the demand for political reform became stronger and attracted a broader range of support from business groups, technocrats, NGOs and the press (Connors, 2002; Thabchumpon, 2002). In accordance with the Constitution Amendment Bill of May 1996, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) was established with the purpose of drafting a new constitution that would initiate political reform in Thailand. In order to encourage the involvement of Thai people as far as possible, the CDA organised public hearings throughout Thailand to enable concerned citizens and groups to voice their opinions on a variety of topics and subjects crucial to the working and effectiveness of the Constitution (Connors, 2002: 42; Aphornsuvan, 2001). In August 1997, the CDA presented the draft Constitution to the parliament. Although the majority of Thais supported the draft, it had to contend with significant opposition from a number of senators, bureaucrats and politicians (see, e.g., Connors, 2002; McCargo, 2002).

Coincidently, the Chavalit government (November 1996 to November 1997) was alleged to have caused the country’s economic crisis in July 1997 and a potential political crisis could have arisen if it had opposed the political reform project. The government faced pressures from all sides, for instance, the military, business, reformist politicians, the media, and the people (McCargo, 2002; Thabchumpon, 1997). The new constitution was finally promulgated in 1997. Unlike most of the previous constitutions, which came into being because those in power (e.g., the military, bureaucracy) needed legitimacy, the Constitution of 1997 was initiated and supported by citizens, who wanted a genuine democratic governance regime (Nelson, 2004). After the promulgation of the Constitution of 1997, General Chavalit resigned from his premiership.
As far as the Constitution of 1997 was concerned, the political structure of the country marked a significant change from elite-led politics to a system that encompassed good governance and democratic elements more than previously. It also attempted to alter the bureaucratic culture of public service delivery to a citizen-oriented one. The Constitution also engendered new hopes for Thailand to develop its politics and public administration. New checks-and-balance mechanisms were established, such as an Administrative Court to oversee all administrative disputes, the Office of the Auditor General of Thailand, and the Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission. However, the ingrained hierarchical and patron-client culture within the bureaucracy seemed to be very difficult to dilute. These cultural values still exist elsewhere and they have taken deep root in Thai society. Therefore, relationships between people in human organisations in Thailand are likely to be based upon vertical relations.

In 1999, the Chuan government (second term) promulgated a Public Sector Management Reform Plan that emphasised the issues of: (a) roles, functions and management practices within the public sector, (b) the budgetary system, (c) personnel management, (d) legal frameworks, and (e) cultures and values within the public sector (OCSC, 2002). In addition, the public sector was restricted in increasing its workforce. The Early Retirement Scheme was initiated to persuade older public officials, with attractive remuneration packages, to take early retirement, whilst 80% of civil servant retirees would not be replaced. Also, the Public Organisation Act (1999) was promulgated to grant autonomy to financially capable public organisations, such as hospitals, universities and other social service organisations in order to cut public spending. Performance-based budgetary indicators were introduced as a monitoring tool to control public spending.

In 2002, the Thaksin government (2001–2006) undertook a major public sector reform. The State Administration Act (Vol. 5) B.E.2545 (2002) and the Reorganisation of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments Act B.E.2545 (2002) were promulgated to execute the reform policy. The former engendered a more systematic and efficient public administration in terms of the country’s development.
and citizen-based public service, whilst the latter was a response to Thailand’s changing economic, political and social environment. Therefore, public organisations were restructured, whilst performance management was strengthened. This reform was crucial in terms of changing the culture of the public organisations immersed in traditional, bureaucratic administration to more modern and effective government. Previously, the administrative culture, in general, was characterised as a strong centralised system and it was normal for civil servants to work with the aim of satisfying their superiors, in order to acquire promotion, rather than focusing upon the collective interests of the public. This most recent reform may have caused changes in the culture of work for public employees.

In 2008, the current Civil Service Act B.E. 2551 was promulgated and caused changes in regard to human resource management of the Thai civil service. The four roles of the CSC that were specified in the previous version were reduced to only the human resource manager and advisor of the government, leaving the other roles to be covered by other organisations. Sivaraks pointed out that

“There are three major functional areas under such a role: (1) providing proposals and advising the cabinet on public HR management policies and strategies; (2) supervising and monitoring HR management of ministries and departments as well as issuing rules and regulations in pursuance of the Civil Service Act; and (3) formulating and managing government scholarships.”

“The OCSC serves as the secretariat to the CSC and is the operational unit assigned to undertake the CSC functions mentioned above. The OCSC is headed by a secretary-general who is in charge of its civil servants and administration, and is directly accountable to the prime minister.” (Sivaraks, 2011: 117)

The Civil Service Act of 2008 also underlined five other principles of the civil service: managing work, managing self, managing people, jurisdiction, and coverage. Details of these principles are presented in Table 4.
### Table 4: Principles of Thai civil service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Managing work</td>
<td>The organisations of civil officials shall be undertaken with a view to the result-based outcome, efficiency and good value in the discharge of state functions, and to make officials perform their duties with quality and virtuously and have a good quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Managing self</td>
<td>Officials should exhibit honour and dignity, relentlessly insist on taking the correct action, act with honesty and responsibility, be transparent and accountable in performance of duties without any unfair discrimination, and use result-based determination when making decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Managing people</td>
<td>The government organisations have to take into account that: (1) entry is based on the knowledge, competency, equality, fairness and interests of the government service; (2) management is directed toward the end-result and efficiency of the organization, while avoiding unfair discrimination; (3) promotion and conferment of other benefits should be done fairly, based on work products, capacities, and behaviours, without regard for political views or party affiliation; (4) disciplinary proceedings should be impartial and without prejudice; and (5) human resource management should be politically neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Jurisdiction</td>
<td>The Civil Service Act covers the roles and responsibility of all key stakeholders in the realm of the civil service’s human resource management system, including the cabinet, the prime minister, ministers, the CSC and its sub-commission, government agencies’ executives, and civil service officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Coverage</td>
<td>The Civil Service Act covers the management of all key human resource areas, such as recruitment and selection, position classification, compensation, appointment and promotion, ethics, and discipline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 Author’s construct based on Sivaraks (2011)
Currently, public administration in Thailand is divided into three: national, regional and local. The national administration is controlled by the central government through ministerial administration. The Prime Minister is the leader of the executive authority, whilst ministers are in charge of the ministerial administration. The chief of the civil servants in each ministry is the Permanent Secretary, while the Director-General is the head of department within a ministry. Some departments of ministries may have provincial and district offices located in the provinces and/or districts. The second type of administration is called regional public administration and comprises provincial and district administration. The public services at this level are provided by many national departments that have established offices at a provincial and district level. The Provincial Governor is head of regional public administration by law and he or she hierarchically controls the district governors within a provincial boundary. Public employees, who work at a provincial or district level, have to report to the Director-General of their host departments as part of organisational hierarchy. They also have to report to the Provincial Governor, if requested.

The third type of Thai public administration is local government. Thailand has five different types of local government: municipality, the Provincial Administrative Organisation, the Sub-District Administrative Organisation, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and Pattaya City. Although local governments maintain some authority to manage their local affairs, they are loosely controlled by the central government through the Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior, or by the Prime Minister in the case of the BMA. This is an overall picture of public administration in Thailand, but only the public administration at a national level is the focus of this thesis.

As of 2007, the Thai civilian workforce consists of approximately 2 million personnel, approximately 3% of the country’s population, working in 19 ministries (excluding the Ministry of Defence) and 147 departments (Sivaraks, 2011: 114). More specifically for this dissertation, the study involved three types of civilian workforce: ordinary civil servants, teachers, and university lecturers and officials. Table 5 presents the number of officials in regard to these types.
Table 5: Types of civilian workforce

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officials in central and provincial administration</th>
<th>Number of officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ordinary civil servants</td>
<td>346,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Teachers</td>
<td>463,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. University lecturers and officials</td>
<td>53,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other types of officials</td>
<td>232,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,113,325</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, Bowornwathana claimed that public administration in Thailand has exhibited unique traits of governmental culture. For example,

“...the tradition of authoritarian rule, centralization, and big government acquired from the past has been with us to the present. This tradition of a centralized big government with a single authoritative figure has been a strong trait of Thai traditional governmental culture. The underlying assumption is that the entire government bureaucracy, central and local governments, should be under a single person such as the prime minister. [In addition,] the traditions of the hierarchy and clientelism have been core features of the Thai bureaucracy and society from the past to the present. [Also,] the reconciliation tradition has been much alive throughout modern Thai political history (1932 to present).” (Bowornwathana, 2011: 44)

Bowornwathana’s conclusion is not too different from what Hofstede (2012) has found from his study of the Thai national culture. He studies Thai culture through the lens of the 5-D Model, which is also used to study the culture of an additional 92 nations. The five dimensions are power distance, individualism, masculinity/femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. He claims that Thai society is characterised as:

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20 Author’s construct based on OCSC (2007)
“… a society in which inequalities are accepted; a strict chain of command and protocol are observed. Each rank has its privileges and employees show loyalty, respect and deference for their superiors in return for protection and guidance. This may lead to paternalistic management. Thus, the attitudes towards managers are more formal, the information flow is hierarchical and controlled.” (Hofstede, 2012)

Moreover,

“Thailand is a highly collectivist country. This is manifest in a close long-term commitment to the member ‘group’ (a family, extended family, or extended relationships). Loyalty to the in-group in a collectivist culture is paramount, and over-rides most other societal rules and regulations. The society fosters strong relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their group. In order to preserve the in-group, Thais are not confrontational and in their communication a “Yes” may not mean an acceptance or agreement. An offence leads to loss of face and Thais are very sensitive not to feel shamed in front of their group. Personal relationship is key to conducting business and it takes time to build such relations thus patience is necessary as well as not openly discuss business on first occasions.” (Hofstede, 2012)

Also, Thailand is

“…considered a feminine society … [it is] a society with less assertiveness and competitiveness … This situation also reinforces more traditional male and female roles within the population.” (Hofstede, 2012)

In addition, Thailand has a strong preference for avoiding uncertainty.

“In order to minimize or reduce this level of uncertainty, strict rules, laws, policies, and regulations are adopted and implemented. The ultimate goal of this population is to control everything in order to eliminate or avoid the unexpected. As a result of this high Uncertainty Avoidance characteristic, the society does not readily accept change and is very risk adverse. Change has to be seen for the greater good of the in-group.” (Hofstede, 2012)
Lastly,

“Thailand is a long-term oriented culture … Long-term oriented culture is manifest on their respect for tradition and inequality between people. Amongst the values that are praised, working hard and having a sense of moderation are dominant. The investment in personal relationships and network is paramount. Protecting one’s face is key and a protocol in their non confrontational behavior. Their concern is not to look for one truth which helps them be flexible and pragmatic in negotiations.” (Hofstede, 2012)

3.3 Administrative reform in Thailand: Contexts and arguments

3.3.1 The recent reform: NPM and holistic governance

As Thailand is a member of many international organisations, the country has been partially influenced by the global reform trends in one way or another. During the Thaksin administration, the government underwent a major public sector reform in 2002, following NPM, and holistic governance themes prevailed in the public administration literature (Sirisamphan, 2006). The reform objectives aimed at making a smaller government that does less, and is flexible and highly accountable to citizens and elected politicians (Bowornwathana, 1999, 2005). These objectives were stated in the 1997 Constitution, which laid down the foundation for democratic governance, the 8th (1997-2001) and 9th (2002-2007) National Social and Economic Development Plans, a Master Plan of Government Administrative Reform (1997-2001), and a Cabinet decision on a plan for public sector reform (2002). Coincidentally, Thailand faced an economic crisis in 1997, and the government had to take a loan from international organisations such as the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. As a result, these monetary aid lenders imposed a condition that Thailand had to reform the public sector and good governance mechanisms had to be established, to prevent maladministration in the future (Rajataramya, 2008: 3; Kulshreshtha, 2008: 560; World Bank, 2006: 6). Following these domestic and
international pressures, the Thai government adopted NPM and the governance reform package transferred from Western countries, to reform its public sector. The administrative reform attempted to tackle problems of incoherence and inefficiency in the public sector.

As far as the policy fragmentation problem is concerned, the integration or re-aggregation of some public organisations was implemented subsequent to the promulgation of two important public administration laws in 2002, namely, the State Administration Act (Vol. 5) B.E. 2545, and the Reorganisation of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments Act B.E. 2545. The former was promulgated with the important purpose of engendering systematic and efficient public administration in order to respond to the country’s development and meet citizens’ expectations of better public service delivery. Unlike other versions, this version embedded a concept of governance by encouraging all public organisations to set clear organisational, divisional, or group objectives and achieve them. The law also allows for the establishment of a new ministerial or objective-based unit, which may be possible, if such a creation can contribute to the achievement of policy objectives. The dissolution or integration of public organisations that provided redundant tasks can be put forward, if such an action can facilitate the improvement of policy coordination and goal achievement and public service delivery.

In order to implement the State Administration Act in detail, the Reorganization of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments Act, B.E. 2545 (2002), was then promulgated with the rationale to respond to the changing social, political and economic environments of Thailand. Previous public sector reforms, which largely focused on administrative restructuring, with regard to disaggregation, were less effective in providing coherent public service delivery. Different public organisations that provided similar public services have been unable to coordinate their work, due to the complication of organisational hierarchy and boundaries. Therefore, the dissolution and integration of similar public organisations had to be done to tackle both organisational and policy fragmentation. With regard to organisational integration, newly integrated organisations are expected to provide effective
coordination, due to having clearer missions, eradicating duplicated tasks and being able to utilise resources efficiently. In this respect, attaining coordinated public service delivery and policy goal achievement would be less difficult.

As a consequence of these laws, the integration of similar public organisations to become either new ministries or departments was executed. At a ministerial level, six out of twenty ministries were newly created through the integration of similar departments, namely: Ministry of Tourism and Sports; Ministry of Social Development and Human Security; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; Ministry of Information Technology and Communication; Ministry of Energy, and Ministry of Culture. On the other hand, at a departmental level, some offices, bureaux, and departments were integrated. For instance, the two departments of Public Works and Town and Country Planning were integrated into the Department of Public Works and Planning. The integration of the Office of National Youth Promotion and Coordination Commission, with three small divisions from the departments of Community Development, Rural Acceleration Development, and Public Welfare, became the Office of Welfare Promotion, Protection and Empowerment of Vulnerable Groups.

More specific to this dissertation, four integrated organisations, namely, the Office of the Basic Education Commission, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, the Office of the Higher Education Commission and the Office of Women’s Affairs and Family Development will be further explored in chapters five and six, with the purpose of observing the relationship of the organisational integration reform, cultural changes and paradoxes in the Thai context. The government hoped that the structural integration reform would benefit Thai society with more coordinated public services for particular issues. Although Jingjit’s earlier work (2008) studied the cultures and values of Thai public organisations, there has been no study on the specific cultures of each case study such as those in the domains of construction and policy. However, cultural characteristics of these organisations might be characterised from interviewees’ perceptions of the values of
their former workplaces. These cultural characteristics will be presented in chapters five and six.

In 2003, the government also promulgated The Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance B.E. 2546, setting good governance targets for public administration. These targets are about making public organisations more responsive, result-based, effective, efficient, coherent, coordinated, and user-friendly. This law indicates that

“…the government should announce the Government Administration Plan, which relies on a national policy and government agenda. All government agencies have to translate the Government Plan into their own 4-year Performance Plan and annual plan to request an annual budget.” (Lorsuwannarat & Buracom, 2011: 103)

Consequently, the government established the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) to deal with administrative reform and performance-related management. This organisation is responsible for monitoring, evaluating and suggesting performance improvement for all public organisations, with regards to efficiency (see, e.g., Siriprakob, 2010: 4-5). Theoretically,

“The OPDC has initiated the Performance Agreement as a tool for monitoring and evaluating the performance of government agencies. The concept of the Balanced Scorecard has been applied as a framework of performance evaluation. Then, the OPDC will monitor and evaluate the performance of the agencies based on what was stated in their Agreement. The [sic] incentive scheme will be provided in accordance with performance.” (Lorsuwannarat & Buracom, 2011: 103)
Practically,

“The government agencies have to develop their performance agreement, consisting of four perspectives and negotiate with the OPDC to determine the performance indicators and targets to be achieved and the scoring criteria. The agencies have to report their implementation progress in the form of a Self-Assessment Report Card (SAR) at the end of six, nine, and twelve months.” (Lorsuwannarat & Buracom, 2011: 103)

This was the case where many participants of this research had pointed out that they had to prepare for both individual and organisational reports to be evaluated. The former will be evaluated by managers or executives while the latter will be evaluated by a committee selected from the OPDC, Budget Bureau and OCSC. Although the performance-based management looked promising in terms of value for taxpayers’ money, some participants claimed that the preparation of such reports was a waste of time since the actual result could be different from what is stated in the report. There were other factors that could affect performance evaluation such as patron-client relationship, spending cut or negotiation. The evidence is presented throughout chapters five, six and seven. In addition, the high frequency of reports submissions has increased the burden on the government organisations. For example, Lorsuwannarat and Buracom use the case of universities to argue that

“[they] are evaluated by the Commission of Higher Education and the Office for Standards in Education concerning their education quality. The universities still need to prepare performance agreements for the OPDC, instead of simply using the reports submitted to the two central education agencies. This limitation highlights the duplication of the structures and functions of the central evaluation agencies. As a result, the reporting agencies have to spend more time and effort in preparing the data and reports.” (Lorsuwannarat & Buracom, 2011: 105)
Moreover, Lorsuwannarat and Buracom (2011: 105) claim that the Performance Agreement scheme entails other difficulties too, for instance, “…choosing the appropriate measurement to evaluate the performance of every agency, creating the culture supporting performance evaluation, and building the systems as well as the mechanisms for performance evaluation.”

In summary, as far as the issue of uncoordinated policies within the Thai public sector is concerned, the administrative reform followed the concept of the ‘organisational re-aggregation’, whereby organisational structures were integrated to reduce incoherence in policy and implementation (Talbot & Johnson, 2007). The integration process in Thailand went well because it was supported by the stable Thaksin government through the promulgation of the three organic laws previously noted. Although organisational structures were integrated, the improvement of internal cohesion and policy coordination might still have to be affirmed. Some factors, such as ‘value conflicts’ or organisational culture, are very important to either accelerate or decelerate cooperation and cohesion of the organisations (Berman, 2011; Davies, 2009; Riad, 2005). Also, an important factor that has an effect on cooperation one way or another is the intense evaluation of individual performance. The following section explores the problems and limitations of the administrative reforms.

### 3.3.2 Administrative reform: Problems and limitations

As far as the literature related to public administration in Thailand is concerned, this dissertation is based largely upon Bowornwathana’s writings. This is because this author is a well-known scholar in the field of public administration in Thailand. He has also produced extensive work that have been published in recognised domestic and international journals. In this respect, information related to public administration issues in Thailand written by him is widely accessible in terms of English-language orientation. Therefore, readers of this thesis will find that information related to public sector reform in Thailand is likely to be quoted from
Bowornwathana’s writings. Nevertheless, other scholars’ work, both in English and Thai, will be used occasionally in this thesis to prevent research bias.

Under domestic and international pressures prior to the implementation of administrative reform, Bowornwathana argued that the adoption of the NPM package transferred from the western hemisphere was a good choice because:

“...it silences domestic differences, pleases funding agencies, and presents convenient packages of ready-made reform programs. It is also easier to convince the public about the benefits of a reform proposal that has already worked well in a developed country than to build public support for a completely new indigenous reform programme’ (Bowornwathana, 2000: 398).”

However, the decision to adopt reform projects without thoroughly understanding the socio-political contexts of the adopting country could produce unintended consequences. Administrative reform in Thailand, following the adoption of NPM and holistic governance concepts, has been a rather pick-and-mix strategy. This meant that the government chose to pursue both disaggregation and integration of public organisations. For example, the disaggregation reform created new agency-type organisations called “Autonomous Public Organisations” (see, Bowornwathana, 2004b), while on the other hand the holistic governance reform integrated government departments, offices, and units responsible for similar issues to become the new, single departments or ministries for the purpose of tackling policy fragmentation problems. As far as this issue is concerned, Bowornwathana contended that

“When governance reform policies are implemented, they are likely to deviate from their original forms and goals to serve the special historical contexts of the Thai public administration. The results are reform hybrids that are unable to serve the goals of governance, and in turn, produce unintended consequences. … In Thailand, governance reform ideas are adapted to fit the needs and interests of traditional powerful actors in the bureaucracy.” (Bowornwathana, 2011: 48)
Bowornwathana (1994) argued that administrative reform in Thailand sought to reduce the excessive power of the bureaucracy. This meant that elites - politicians and bureaucrats - were competing with each other to hold power in the country’s administration. Politicians wanted to reassert their control over the bureaucracy as representatives of the general public. Therefore, the administrative reform in Thailand tended to involve the assertion of control mechanisms such as centralisation, coordination and control, by politicians to tame bureaucrats by concentrating power in the hands of an elected executive (Bowornwathana, 1994: 153). He further commented that

“Increasingly, bureaucrats see the importance of politicians as the new “patrons” who can support their career advancement and provide them with protection from enemies in the bureaucracy.” (Bowornwathana, 2011: 38)

Also, the nature of the Thai coalition government was unstable, in that it, usually, collapsed after less than two years in office. The administrative reform was therefore further complicated and confused by the governments (see, e.g. Sopchokchai, n.d.). For instance, several master plans for administrative reform were floating around, some belonging to previous governments, whereas, others may have originated from past Cabinet decisions (Bowornwathana, 2000: 398). The proposal to establish a Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Sports during the Banharn Government (1996) was a good example of this situation. Politicians and bureaucrats could not agree with each other in terms of quantity and types of organisations that would be integrated into the new ministry. The bureaucrats from the Civil Service Commission and the Office of Civil Service Commission strongly opposed the proposal, claiming that

“…the Cabinet did not follow the Office of the Prime Minister’s Regulation of 1988 regarding procedures for submitting proposals to the Cabinet, which required that related agencies be given the chance to forward their opinions before the Cabinet makes decisions that may affect them.” (Bowornwathana, 1996b: 28)
Although the proposal gained Cabinet approval, the Thai parliament was dissolved soon afterwards. So, the new government would have to start again if it wished to propose the creation of a Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Sports. Therefore, no major effective administrative reform can be expected from short-lived government, which is so characteristic of Thailand.

Administrative reform in Thailand has also not presented the character of a democratic governance regime. Bowornwathana (1994: 152) contended that the administrative reforms usually presented a unique Thai character called the “regime-survival paradigm”. This regime concerned the survival of politicians in office, more than a concern for greater control over bureaucrats and more effective management. Politicians in unstable regimes, such as Thailand, usually bear in mind that they may be overthrown by coups, or by the breakdown of their fragile coalitions, at any time. So, they will have to introduce measures that can tame the bureaucracy and devise feasible structural changes, rather than implement any radical plans. At the same time, politicians have to make sure that such reform measures do not trigger the downfall of their regime. The government is likely to pursue a strong line of management, as well as the centralisation of hierarchical power, to retain their control over the bureaucracy. Bowornwathana (1994: 156) argued that coordinating mechanisms were usually “…set up to assist politicians in issuing directives and monitoring the work of ministries and departments” more than creating effective, citizen-oriented service delivery. No matter how promisingly reform blueprints were presented, Thai coalition governments usually sought a balanced strategy to combine the pressures and interests of all sides and ‘regime-survival’ is still the major guiding philosophy (Bowornwathana, 1994). Therefore, when any administrative reform plans seemed to be a threat to government power, such reform plans tended to be delayed or, eventually, aborted.

Although the stable Thaksin Government successfully undertook a major public reform following NPM and democratic governance concepts, Bowornwathana (2005) contended that the consequence of the reform was reversed by the consolidation of government power in the hands of Prime Minister Thaksin. He later called this
situation “prime ministerialisation” (Bowornwathana, 2004a), indicating the absolute power of Prime Minister Thaksin. In this regard, the process of democratic governance reform that was followed by previous governments had shifted to a regime called “democratic authoritarianism” (Bowornwathana, 2005: 43). Under this regime, the administrative reform turned into the centralisation of power in Thaksin’s hands. The power of ministers, politicians, and bureaucrats were minimised with the return of the single-hierarchy model of government, which has a single leader, or CEO, at the top. The unintended consequence of administrative reform was that Thailand had a bigger government. During the Thaksin government, Bowornwathana (2005) contended that the integration of some public organisations to create new ministries was created for a specific purpose - to facilitate the business of capitalist politicians (Thaksin and his cronies), rather than for the public interest. He firmly claimed that:

“The Thai state has not been hollowed out. On the contrary, it has been thickened. Contrary to the idea of self-organising network, Thaksin is centralising all government work.” (Bowornwathana, 2005: 47)

In addition, he contended that

“Considering that Thailand has had a long and strong tradition of authoritative [authoritarian] rule, centralization, and big government, it is not surprising to find how difficult it is to introduce western-style governance reform into the present Thai public sector. Efforts to disperse political and administrative power, to introduce decentralization and foster strong civil society, and to downsize central government, are policies that run counter to Thai government traditions and culture.” (Bowornwathana, 2011: 33-34)

In terms of human resource management, an overemphasis on performance has produced an unintended consequence in regard to the issue of demoralisation. According to information gleaned from fieldwork, some public officials admitted that they were demoralised by the pressure to increase personal performance following the introduction of intensive efficiency evaluation criteria. Some older
officials also admitted that they had considered the early retirement option, due to a sudden and intense evaluation that left them with little time to learn about, and adapt to, the new performance evaluation system. In addition, some employees were likely to produce a glowing personal performance report, rather than focus on overall policy outcomes, since performance has been evaluated on a paper or report basis. As evaluation is important to their future career, employees are loath to allow colleagues to take advantage of them or receive better praise. Employees may, therefore, limit the amount of co-operation with colleagues, unless specifically asked to do so. Relationships and trust among employees from different backgrounds are slow to develop. In this respect, efficiency reform has caused a paradoxical consequence in organisational coordination (see, e.g. Christensen & Laegreid, 2007; Comtois et al., 2004). The paradox between cooperation and competition in an organisation will be further discussed in chapters seven and eight.

3.4 Concluding remarks

The public sector reform of any countries was rather selective as the governments did not adopt all the components to be implemented. Thailand also reformed its public sector by following foreign reform blueprints, such as NPM and governance concepts. However, a few NPM elements were chosen, such as, disaggregation of organisation and performance-based management, whereas integration of organisations was chosen from the holistic governance theme. Since the major public sector reform in Thailand came quite late in 2002, when the NPM concept in many developed countries had withered away, and holistic governance had taken its place, the government mixed elements of both concepts to be used in the reform project. In this respect, some public organisations were disaggregated to create agency-like organisations, whilst some other organisations were integrated to become new organisations, with the purpose of enhancing policy coordination among these integrated organisations. At the same time, the government also pushed for intensive performance-based management.
Although the public sector reform looked very promising, the reality could be another story. Obviously, the administrative reform was more complex than expected. Because of the pick-and-mix strategy pursued by the government reform elements ran counter to one another. For example, the emphasis on personal performance could undermine cooperation and policy effectiveness. Sometimes, public employees were likely to focus more on their own tasks than those of the organisations, since they did not want to be disciplined for failing the criteria for individual performance. The integration of organisations could also undermine organisational cohesion when at least two organisations compete with each other to dominate the new organisation. In addition, the persistence of patron-client relationships in the public sector could worsen cooperation among new colleagues who came from different backgrounds and were attached to different patrons. Overall, coordination at the policy level may be better than previously, but organisational cohesion might not always have been guaranteed. Therefore, the intended reform outcomes might need more time to surface.
Chapter Four:

Research Methodology

This chapter explores the research methodology. It begins with a methodological discussion about conducting research in the social sciences. Traditionally, both quantitative and qualitative research offer different methods to justify social knowledge. Alternatively, mixed methods have been increasingly used in social research by combining quantitative and qualitative methods of knowledge inquiry. This approach claims to offer a more substantial understanding of the study compared to choosing only one method. This thesis has consequently chosen mixed methods as the main methodology. The next section presents the research design, in which a case study of organisations has been chosen as the most appropriate method for data gathering and analysis. The strength of this method is the ability to generate holistic understanding of organisational life. In addition, it fits with mixed methods research as both quantitative and qualitative methods can be used together to gather and analyse data. The third section explains how data was gathered. Quantitative data was collected by a questionnaire survey distributed among the population of each organisation, whereas qualitative data was gathered from a semi-structured interview with public officials working in the organisations studied. The fourth section presents how the data was analysed. Quantitative data was analysed statistically with a computer-based programme and results are presented in tables and diagrams. Qualitative data was analysed through a technique called template analysis and findings are presented by themes. The final section is the chapter’s conclusion.
4.1 Methodological discussion

As far as the theoretical framework, research questions and context are concerned, the thesis employs mixed methods as the prime research methodology. One initial reason why I have chosen this research method is that I wish thoroughly to understand how organisational cultures have changed following the integration reform in terms of volume and psychological effects. Conducting research based solely on either quantitative or qualitative methods alone might be insufficient to discover the true meanings of cultural changes and paradoxes in integrated organisations. The following paragraphs explain the rationale behind why mixed methods research has been chosen.

The underpinning pragmatist epistemology of mixed methods “…rejects the either/or choices associated with the paradigm wars, advocates for [sic] the use of mixed methods in research, and acknowledges that the values of the researcher play a large role in interpretation of results” (Teddle & Tashakkori, 2009: 8). Creswell and Plana Clark (2007) define mixed method research as:

“…a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies.” (Creswell & Plana Clark, 2007: 5)

In addition, mixed methods can be perceived as

“…a type of research design in which QUAL [qualitative] and QUAN [quantitative] approaches are used in types of questions, research methods, data collection and analysis procedures, and/or inferences” (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003: 711).
In this respect, social research that employs the mixed methods approach is likely to involve an appropriate combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in many phases of the research process.

Since mixed methods combine quantitative and qualitative methods together, both methods are worth discussing. On the one hand, the quantitative method provides a strong claim of validity and generalisation due to the use of scientific methods to acquire knowledge. Accordingly, data will be able to make comparisons, to describe and to understand through scientific and systematic explanation. The scientific method of knowledge justification is not limited to natural, objective science, but is also applied to social sciences. For example, Benton and Craib (2001) claim that:

“Social problems and conflicts can be identified and resolved one by one on the basis of expert knowledge offered by social scientists, in much the same way as natural scientific expertise is involved in solving practical problems in engineering and technology.” (Benton & Craib, 2001: 23)

Travers (2001: 10) contends that knowledge is independent of the real world, so it is observable and describable through systematic and scientific explanation. Denzin and Lincoln (2005: 10) also argue that the social scientific analysis can be done within a value-free framework. Researchers are able to justify knowledge systematically and scientifically. However, a quantitative approach is maybe insufficient to understand social knowledge meaningfully. This is because the social world is complex and knowledge is socially constructed and value-laden. With regards to this perspective on knowledge, Devine (2002: 201) argues that:

“...no objective science can establish universal truths or can exist independently of the beliefs, values and concepts created to understand the world.”
Thomas (1979: 74) claims that,

“...there are senses in which social science must note meanings that natural science can ignore.”

Fay (1996: 76) also contends that pursuing a scientific method to understand social phenomena is in error and contributes nothing. Hollis (1994: 142) therefore asserts that:

“The social world can only be tackled from within by methods different from those suited to the natural sciences.”

Since social phenomena are unique and the interaction of social factors in each setting is different, the quantitative approach may not be appropriate for validating social knowledge. This is because the regularities of social actions are hardly likely to be the same across time and space (Sayer, 1992: 1). More specifically to research in the management field, Whitley (1984: 370) argues that it is impossible to acquire knowledge of the human world which is similar to that obtained of the natural world because of the inherent meaningfulness of human action and its highly contextual nature. In this respect, the inductive process of knowledge justification may be more appropriate when it comes to understanding social phenomena.

In contrast to the quantitative approach, qualitative research offers a different way of thinking about and of viewing the world (Strauss & Corbin, 1994: 4). It studies things in their natural settings in order to “...make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 3). This is because people are active contributors to social knowledge (Fay, 1996: 76). Accordingly, qualitative research looks at data through a wider lens in order to understand patterns of relationship between sets of concepts (Brannen, 1992: 4). In other words, qualitative analysis is designed to “…capture meaning, thinking processes and contexts” (Bryman, 1988: 62). In qualitative research there are various methods for gathering and analysing data to be chosen by researchers. Examples are case studies, ethnography, unobtrusive methods, discourse analysis, historiography,
and action research or participant observation. Each method has different advantages and disadvantages, but Denzin and Lincoln (2005: 5) argue that the use of multiple methods helps to “…secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question.”

Although it is claimed that qualitative research more appropriate to understand social knowledge meaningfully, it has encountered the problems of validity and generalisation. In terms of validity, qualitative findings are derived from a non-scientific method. In contrast, qualitative research “…tends to assess the quality of things using words, images, and descriptions, whereas most of quantitative research relies chiefly on numbers” (Berg, 2007: 4). Moreover, since the social phenomenon is unique, qualitative findings of some specific cases may be suitable for generalisation when compared with quantitative findings. Divine (2002: 204) raises an additional problem and argues that:

“Field relations raise problems about bias while the interpretation of the material can be highly subjective and not open to external validation.”

Although they have different strengths and weaknesses, Read and Marsh (2002: 231) claim that

“…both qualitative and quantitative methods have a role to play in social science research.”

A clear-cut division of qualitative and quantitative methods is not always necessary. Rather, “…both quantitative and qualitative methods may be used appropriately with any research paradigm” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 15).

Since this thesis aims to develop a strong understanding of organisational culture and paradoxes, it employs mixed methods as the research methodology. This choice has been chosen because it is an appropriate way of answering research questions. First of all, the CVF model is used as the main instrument to assess organisational culture
in this thesis. It has been developed in the form of a questionnaire that requires individuals to respond to issues. The “Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument” developed by Cameron and Quinn (2006) consists of six items, namely, dominant characteristics, organisational leadership, management of employees, organisational glue, strategic emphases, and criteria of success. They claim that the six items:

“… have been found to be equally predictive of an organization’s culture … [In addition,] this instrument has been found to be both useful and accurate in diagnosing important aspects of an organization’s underlying culture.” (Cameron & Quinn, 2006: 23)

The questionnaire respondents have to weigh scores between four cultural values in two different periods including between current and preferred or pre- and post-reform. Scores are calculated and signify the presence of cultures in the organisation. Importantly, the overall organisational culture represents the existence of all four values, which can be either balanced or unbalanced. For instance, the organisation might find that, at one time, one particular culture was dominant, but it might no longer dominate the organisation at another time.

Previously, Jingjit applied these six items to assess the organisational culture of public organisations in Thailand in her unpublished thesis. She argued that all six aspects form a major depiction of the organisational culture in Thai public organisations (Jingjit, 2008: 93). However, my thesis focused on a different aspect of the public sector reform in terms of the integration of public organisations. With regard to the literature review, one crucial objective of the integration reform of organisations was the achievement of policy goals. In this respect, I added the seventh aspect of mission accomplishment to be included with the original six issues because it signified whether the integration reform had achieved the reform objective. In the process of diagnosing organisational cultures of Thai integrated public organisations, the decision was made to focus on seven key elements as follows:
Secondly, with a belief that culture is value-laden, the pursuit of CVF alone with regard to its scientific method of assessing change may not be sufficient to profoundly understand the meaning of changes in Thai integrated public organisations. This is because the integration reform has caused a great effect in the targeted organisations in both physical and psychological ways. It was also found from a pilot survey that a pure questionnaire survey might not be enough to thoroughly understand the reality of cultural change in the Thai context. This is because particular issues such as the patron-client relationship, non-confrontational behaviours and Hofstede’s five cultural characteristics (previously presented in chapter three) persisted in Thai society and have pervaded public organisations. They have also played an important role in the perceptions of organisational culture. Acknowledging these characteristics of Thai society, the author conducted qualitative interviews in order to gain a more comprehensive view of how individuals felt about the integration and to complement the quantitative work. The qualitative research will also contribute to a thorough understanding of the case studies since the meaning of actions or behaviours of people has been studied through their eyes. The seven key aspects used in the questionnaire are also guided by the interview questions.

The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods helps to overcome the inadequacy of studying organisational culture change by one method alone, and to avoid any misinterpretation of the data due to a reliance on a single technique (see e.g., Putnam, 1983; Rose, 1982). Teddlie and Tashakkori use the term ‘parallel
mixed design’ which applies both quantitative and qualitative methods to collect and analyse data. They note that:

“Parallel mixed designs are designs with at least two parallel and relatively independent strands: one with QUAL [qualitative] questions, data collection, and analysis techniques and the other with QUAN [quantitative] questions, data collection, and analysis techniques. The QUAL and QUAN strands are planned and implemented to answer related aspects of the same overarching MM [mixed methods] research question. Inferences based on the results from each strand are integrated to form meta-inferences at the end of the study. A meta-inference is a conclusion generated through an integration of the inferences that have been obtained from the results of the QUAL and QUAN strands of an MM study.” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 12)

With regards to triangulation designs, Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) claim that:

“The triangulation design is a one-phase design in which researchers implement the quantitative and qualitative methods during the same timeframe and with equal weight. The single-phase timing of this design is the reason it has also been referred to as the “concurrent triangulation design”. It generally involves the concurrent, but separate, collection and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data so that the researcher may best understand the research problem. The researcher attempts to merge the two data sets, typically by bringing the separate results together in the interpretation or by transforming data to facilitate integrating the two data types during the analysis.” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007: 64)

As far as mixed methods were concerned, this research concurrently collected quantitative data from a questionnaire survey and qualitative data from open-ended questions. The semi-structured interviews were conducted separately but within the same data collection timeframe. In this respect, not only can mixed methods research provide a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone, it also contributes to valid and well-substantiated conclusions about a single phenomenon (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007: 65). All these reasons have attempted to justify why the mixed methods research was chosen. The next section presents a research design that has been shaped by a mixed methods research methodology.
4.2 Research design

The thesis has employed a case study as a method for data collection and analysis. The prime reason is because the case study method is

“… a method involving systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions” (Berg, 2007: 283).

Yin (2009: 4) contends that:

“…the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events—such as individual life cycles, small group behaviour, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, social performance, international relations and the maturation of industries.”

In addition, the case study method is commonly used as a research method in social science disciplines such as public administration, political science, education, and business and marketing (Yin, 2009: 5). Since this research is also in the research field of public management and wishes to understand the organisational culture of integrated public organisations, the case study method is appropriate. Nonetheless, case study research can be conducted either as a single case or multiple-case studies. Yin points out that:

“Single cases are a common design for doing case studies, and two variants have been described: those using holistic designs and those using embedded units of analysis … the single-case design is eminently justifiable under certain conditions—where the case represents (a) a critical test of existing theory, (b) a rare or unique circumstance, or (c) a representative or typical case, or where the case serves a (d) revelatory or (e) longitudinal purpose … Within the single case may still be incorporated subunits of analyses, so that a more complex—or embedded—design is developed. The subunits can often add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case.” (Yin, 2009: 52)
On the other hand, multiple-case studies claim to offer more compelling evidence because “…the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Yin, 2009: 53). Each organisation in a multiple case design is the subject of an individual case study, but the study as a whole covers several organisations. This thesis is a study of organisational culture and paradoxes in which individual integrated organisations are subjected to the implementation of integration reform. In this respect, the case study of multiple organisations is most appropriate to answer research questions with regard to:

“…the systematic gathering of enough information about a particular organization to allow the investigator insight into the life of that organization … the case method is an extremely useful technique for researching relationships, behaviours, attitudes, motivations, and stressors in organizational settings.” (Berg, 2007: 296)

Each organisation is a collective unit that can “…permit considerable cultural (or subcultural) homogeneity, diffuse interactions and relationships between members, and to produce a social identification by its members” (Berg, 2007: 297). Therefore, each considered organisation is counted as being a different community that differentiates members’ behaviours and patterns of communication and relationships from one another. Since the understanding of organisational culture and paradoxes involves the perceptions of organisational members, the case study is believed to be the most appropriate research design that can contribute to a robust understanding of issue studies. The analytical benefits from having more than one case will be substantial since the single-case study is vulnerable with regard to having put “all your eggs in one basket” (Yin, 2009: 61). This is because “…a case may later turn out not to be the case it was thought to be at the outset” (Yin, 2009: 49-50).

More importantly, the reason why the case study research was chosen is because the research can include both qualitative and quantitative methods in the analysis. This is what Yin has argued:
“...case studies can include, and even be limited to, quantitative evidence ... the case study method is not just a form of “qualitative research,” even though it may be recognized among the array of qualitative research choices. Some case study research goes beyond being a type of qualitative research, by using a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence. In addition, case studies need not always include the direct and detailed observational evidence marked by other forms of ‘qualitative research.”’ (Yin, 2009: 19)

Based on the literature review and research questions previously presented, the unit of analysis of the thesis is the cultural change. Four types of organisational cultures (clan, adhocracy, market and hierarchy) were analysed to explore how each culture had either developed or decreased followed the integration reform, and how cultural changes had led to further consequences of the reform. Four organisations were chosen as cases, and were examined to investigate how contextual factors exert influence upon the cultural changes. Criteria for case selection were selected on the basis of how organisations were integrated (horizontally and vertically), size (large, medium and small), policy area (education and social services) and administrative styles (committee-based and traditional departments). These organisations were Commission A, The Rescue, Commission B and The Advocate. These shorthand names were used throughout the dissertation to represent major characteristics of each organisation, namely, the Office of the Basic Education Commission, the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, the Office of the Higher Education Commission, and the Office of Women’s Affairs and Family Development, respectively. Commission A and Commission B have similar functions with regard to educational services, but are different in the levels of educational provision, professional and academic independence. The Rescue and The Advocate are civil organisations that have been designed to deal with particular social issues and services. The following subsection presents details of the case studies that were derived from documentary research and semi-structured interviews with public employees working in these organisations.
4.2.1 Case I: Commission A

Commission A was established by the Administration of Ministry of Education Act (2003) in an attempt to reduce policy fragmentation and redundancy in a fundamental education service. Commission A was a secretariat office of the Basic Education Committee, which was a single, supreme body to formulate policies, educational standards and national core curricula that corresponded to the National Economic and Social Development Plan and National Education Plan. In this respect, Commission A was not a typical department that was governed by a director-general but rather a committee-based organisation. With regard to size, Commission A became the largest department of Thai public sector controlling more than 30,000 schools, 411,631 teachers and 1,057 civil servants (OBEC, 2009).

Purposefully, three departments of the Ministry of Education (MOE) were horizontally integrated together, namely, Guru A, Guru B and The Instructor. Similarly to the organisation shorthand names, these three names were also used throughout the dissertation as a shorthand to represent organisational characteristics of each department, namely, the Office of the National Primary Education Commission, the Department of General Education and the Department of Curriculum and Instruction Development, respectively. Guru A and Guru B were responsible for teaching but differed in the levels of education. The former was responsible for primary education whilst the latter dealt with secondary education. In this respect, teachers in both departments were regulated with the same professional regulation and committee, called the Teacher Commission. On the other hand, The Instructor was responsible for curriculum and instruction development, as the name suggested. Its personnel were regulated by the CSC.\footnote{See Glossary}
Previously, *Guru A* was the largest department of the MOE, so it had the largest workforce of the MOE and of all departments across the Thai public sector (OCSC, 2007). *Guru A* was responsible for providing primary education from pre-school to Prathomsuksa 6 (Grade 6) education. Some schools might further provide secondary education from grade 7-9. In total, *Guru A* took care of 29,362 schools across the country. Administratively, *Guru A* had two tiers of management: central and local. The local level was composed of another three sub-levels: provincial, district and school. Although it was a committee-based department, the general administration was tightly controlled with a top-down approach. Policies, orders or practices were delivered from the central to provincial levels. Then, the provincial office forwarded issues to its districts offices. The district office would pass such issues to the local schools it was responsible for. A district office was also responsible for internal coordination between primary schools in one district whereas a provincial office was responsible for internal coordination within one province. This was the character of coordination of this department.

*Guru B* was the second largest department of the MOE and responsible for providing secondary education from Mattayomsuksa 1-6 (Grade 7-12) through 2,366 secondary schools across the country. *Guru B* also had two tiers of administration between central and local levels. The local level was composed of two levels: provincial and school. Unlike *Guru A*, the provincial office did not control local schools in a hierarchical way. It rather had to provide help and support among schools in that province. Internal coordination between central offices and local schools was directed. In comparison, the hierarchical line of control at *Guru B* was shorter than that of *Guru A*. Unlike the previous two departments, *The Instructor* was the smallest department among the trio and was only composed of central offices. The main responsibility of this department was to develop the curricula and instruction of both primary and secondary education. New curricula and teaching instructions were researched and developed here before being implemented at the school level in both primary and secondary schools.
Practically, the work of these three departments is closely interrelated. Since elementary education in Thailand is compulsory from Grade 1-9, students who finished Grade 6 from the management of *Guru A* had to continue their secondary education under the management of *Guru B*. Curricula and teaching instructions at both levels of education were developed by *The Instructor*. Although these organisations worked co-ordinately on particular issues, coordination among them was not always smooth. With regard to the independence of departments, there was no need for them to comply with other departments’ requests unless they had been commanded to do so by their leaders. Therefore, coordination among departments meant that it took a long time to reach final decisions due to the communication and documentation process. For example, the documentation process started at the bottom level of one organisation with regard to composing an official document. The document would be forwarded to higher levels until it was signed off by the director-general. If the document needed correction, it would be returned to the relevant persons for correction before being forwarded upward again. The signed document would then be sent to another department, and it would fall into the documentation process of that department before being signed off by the top executive. If lucky, the request, or co-ordination, might be granted at the first attempt. However, if negotiation was needed, the implementation had to wait because the communication among related departments had to restart from the beginning.

The cultures of work of the trio were also different. For example, theoretically, *Guru A* was a committee-based department that was administered by the National Primary Education Committee, hereafter referred to as NPEC. This committee-based format was further implemented at *Guru A*’s provincial and district offices. Local schools were the smallest operational unit and controlled by the district office upward to the national level. The internal coordination between administrative levels was made through a hierarchical structure. Therefore, *Guru A*’s organisational culture was likely to be a combination of participation and control. In contrast, *Guru B* was a typical bureaucratic department that was controlled by a director-general as the top executive. This was the same for *The Instructor*. Although *Guru B* had provincial offices, the office only acted as a coordinator of secondary schools in the same
provincial network whereas each school might follow the director-general’s orders directly. Theoretically, Guru B was more hierarchical than Guru A, but had shorter lines of command. Although administrated by a typical bureaucracy, The Instructor was a specific department that dealt particularly with academic-related issues. In view of these characteristics, The Instructor’s organisational culture was likely to be a combination of specialisation and control.

Since the trio had different internal administrative structures and organisational cultures, the government policies with regard to basic education tended to encounter with incoherent policy implementation. Accordingly, the integration of Guru A, Guru B and The Instructor was seen as an alternative by minimising policy fragmentation with regard to foundation education, including the wish to accelerate the greater educational achievement of the nation. Commission A originally had 10 central bureaux and 185 educational areas. At a central level, functions that similarly existed in each department were integrated into one single bureau such as the Bureau of General Administration, Bureau of Policy and Planning, Bureau of Personnel Administration, Development and Legal Affairs, and Bureau of Finance. Thus, civil servants working in these bureaux probably had to work with new colleagues, whereas those who worked in specialised functions that particularly belonged to The Instructor largely remained with old colleagues, but with new names such as the Bureau of Academic Affairs and Educational Standards and Bureau of Technology for Teaching and Learning.

On the other hand, the integration of former Guru A’s and Guru B’s provincial and district offices constituted a local-level administration called the Educational Area. Each educational area had another educational committee that supervised, monitored, and supported all education-related issues, including the encouragement of coordination and collaboration between local schools and amongst public and non-public sectors in local areas. The Office of Educational Areas, hereafter referred to as The Dealer, was a secretariat office of the local educational committee that worked co-ordinately with local schools. With regard to the integration at a local level,

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people from different local offices were placed together in a larger-than-district administrative structure. Administratively, although The Dealer was devolved with more power to administer educational affairs at a local level, it complied with regulations and orders issued by Commission A. The administrative structure of Commission A (as of 2010) can be illustrated by Figure 8.

Figure 8: Administrative structure of the Office of the Basic Education Commission (Commission A)

In terms of workforce, different dealers had different numbers of workforce and it was more likely that The Dealer located in provincial centres had larger workforces than those in rural locations. Jacob, who was a senior advisor of Commission A, explained that:

“…for example, Nakorn Ratchasima province [in the Northeast region] had seven Dealers, but the one located at a provincial centre had nearly 200 people working in it despite the maximum workforce number being limited to 100. Some Dealers had only 20-30 people working. This also happened in provinces that had more than two Dealers in its provincial boundary such as in the southern region …. The further distance away The Dealer was the smaller the workforce it had”.
A total of 570 questionnaires were distributed at Commission A, of which 553 (97.32%) were returned. Of this, 100 and 470 questionnaires were distributed at the central and local levels, respectively. The response rates of central and local levels were 84 (84%) and 469 (99.79%), respectively. A questionnaire distribution at the central level was made through internal communication channels in which 38, 33 and 13 questionnaires were returned from people who had formerly worked at Guru A, Guru B and The Instructor, respectively. At the local level, 349 and 120 questionnaires were returned from those who had previously worked at Guru A and Guru B, respectively. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with four and three people who had worked at central and local levels, respectively. Interviewees who had worked at the central level were all managers, of which two, one, and one person(s) had worked at Guru A, Guru B and The Instructor, respectively. At a local level, all three interviewees had worked at Guru A. One interviewee was a school head-teacher, another a teacher and the last one working as an educational adviser at The Dealer.

**4.2.2 Case II: The Rescue**

*The Rescue*, Ministry of the Interior, was born out of the Reorganisation of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments Act (2002). Originally, *The Rescue* was established as a policy think-tank of the government on disaster-related issues. Prior to the integration of organisations, risk and disaster management was dealt with by many small governmental divisions located in different departments or ministries. The institutional division inevitably caused fragmentation and redundancy of policy formulation and implementation. Therefore, the establishment of a single organisation for the management of risks and disasters was agreed by the government through the horizontal integration of five governmental units. However, only one partner was the policy think-tank while others were operational units.
The largest partner came from general functions of the Department of Accelerated Rural Development, hereafter referred to as The Developer. The Developer itself was dissolved completely so that internal divisions were disaggregated into small groups and were subsequently established as new departments or integrated with other organisations such as that of The Rescue. Previously, The Developer was an expert in infrastructure construction and wellbeing development for people in rural areas. The second partner was the National Safety Council of Thailand of the Prime Minister’s Office, hereafter referred to as Analyst A. This was originally a policy think-thank giving policy advice or consultation with regard to disaster management to the Prime Minister.

The third partner was the Civil Disaster Prevention Division of the Department of Provincial Administration, hereafter referred to as The Volunteer. Prior to the integration reform, The Volunteer dealt with risk and disaster management at a local level and in cooperation with local communities. The strength of the organisation was local volunteers, who could access the disaster-affected areas swiftly before official support later arrived. The fourth partner was Aide A, a shorthand name for the Disaster Victims Relief Division of the Department of Public Welfare. As the name suggested, Aide A was previously responsible for welfare mitigation with regard to disaster-related issues. The last and smallest partner was a very small group from the Community Development Department, which provided basic engineering services. Its core function was similar to that of The Developer.

Since The Rescue was designed as a policy think-tank, Analyst A should have taken a leading role in The Rescue as it was already a policy unit while the rest were more operation-oriented units. Practically, The Developer took control of the organisation as it had the largest workforce and owned the buildings. Moreover, The Volunteer, who shared a similar ministerial culture to The Developer, knew how to “play the game” at the ministerial and departmental levels. Therefore, they were able to share some managerial positions with The Developer. Analyst A, which had a smaller workforce and came from a different ministerial culture, thus had little opportunity to
lead *The Rescue*. Their experience and specialisation did not help, which was also the case for *Aide A*.

Although *The Rescue* was established as a policy think-tank, this role was practically insufficient to encourage the coordination of policy implementation since it had no hierarchical authority over other organisations and no operational unit. In addition, two acts related to disaster management were then enforced and redundant, namely, the Civil Disaster Prevention Act (1979) and the Fire Prevention and Control Act (1999). To eradicate redundancy and implementation fragmentation, the government cancelled those two acts and promulgated the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act (2007) to be enforced solely. Accordingly, the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee, hereafter referred to as NDPMC, became the supreme body to formulate and endorse disaster policies and plans, integrate the disaster prevention and mitigation system between national and local governments and private organisations, give consultation and advice to related organisations, and so on. Therefore, *The Rescue* was a secretariat of the NDPMC and a national organisation for disaster management. Its responsibilities were, for example, preparing a national disaster prevention and mitigation plan, implementing, coordinating, facilitating and supporting public organisations, local governments and non-public organisations in disaster prevention and mitigation, including providing initial alleviation to victims, and so on.

In addition, disaster prevention and mitigation centres and provincial offices were established as an operational unit responsible for supervision and to support the policy implementation in particular areas. This was because the alleviation process needed an intermediary to effectively accommodate the needs and cooperation among various organisations. Therefore, the organisational characteristic of *The Rescue* has shifted from simply a policy think-tank to a typical, general department that has both policy and operational functions. The operational unit was an important step to strengthen operational coordination. For example, if a disaster hit some areas, the management in coordination with related organisations would become more salient and effective in responding to the situation. This was the case during the
Asian Tsunami that hit some parts of Thailand in 2004\textsuperscript{23}. With regard to this law, the disaster management became more coordinated than had previously been the case. Administratively, The Rescue had 1,591 civil servants and hundreds of employees and volunteers, 17 centres and 75 provincial offices, as of 2010 (DDPM, 2010). The administrative structure of The Rescue can be illustrated in Figure 9.

**Figure 9: Administrative structure of the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (The Rescue)**

A total of 180 questionnaires were distributed at The Rescue, of which 167 (92.78\%) were returned. Questionnaires were distributed at both central and local levels. At the central level, a total number of 160 questionnaires were issued, of which 148 (92.50\%) were returned. At a local level, 20 questionnaires were issued, of which 19 (95\%) were responded to. A questionnaire distribution at the central level was made through internal communication channels, through which 135, 9, 10, 13 and 2 questionnaires were returned from people who had formerly worked at The Developer, Analyst A, The Volunteer, Aide A and Community Development.

\textsuperscript{23} Interview extracts from Ashton, who was a bureau head.
Department, respectively. At the local level, questionnaires were posted to individuals and the response counts were 17, one, and one from people who had previously worked at The Developer, Analyst A and Community Development Department, respectively. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven people who had all worked in managerial positions at the central level. However, five of them were chosen from organisational charts while the other two were chosen from a snowball technique.

4.2.3 Case III: Commission B

Commission B was established by the Administration of the Ministry of Education Act (2003) in an attempt to reduce policy fragmentation and redundancy in higher education. As the name suggests, Commission B follows a committee-based style of management in which the Higher Education Committee, hereafter referred to as HEC, is a single, supreme body to formulate the policies, guidance and educational standards of higher education, which corresponds to the National Economic and Social Development Plan and National Education Plan. In other words, Commission B was a secretariat office of the HEC. Its responsibility also includes resource provision, and the monitoring, inspection and evaluation of higher education provision, in which academic excellence and the independence of higher education institutions must be preserved.

Unlike the two previous organisations, Commission B was vertically integrated: a ministry, two departments and another higher education institution were grouped together. All partners dealt with higher education provision but were previously managed by different authorities. With regard to organisational boundaries and separated management systems, the higher education policy in Thailand was the least coordinated the least across organisational boundaries. This included academic-related cooperation among higher education institutions of different hosts. In this respect, the integration of organisations was favoured by government reformers in order to strengthen policy coordination with regard to higher education.
The first partner was a whole Ministry of University Affairs, hereafter referred to as *The Ministry*. *The Ministry* was composed of two administrative tracks, the first of which was a ministerial, central office that dealt with general administration issues to support 25 public universities in its network (as of 2003). Accordingly, *The Ministry* gave minimal advice to public universities and acted as an intermediary to support cooperation across the university network. Staff working at this level were categorised as civil servants. On the other hand, each public university had its own administrative system with regard to individual establishment laws. Therefore, universities had full control over their internal affairs. Members of university staff were also administrated by a different personnel law from that of civil servants. University staff were further divided into two categories of academics and general administration staff. Each university operated independently but sometimes cooperated with other network members on certain issues such as academic cooperation.

The second partner was the Office of the Rajabhat Institute Council, Ministry of Education, hereafter referred to as *The Rajabhat*. *The Rajabhat* implemented a departmental administrative structure whereby the secretary was an organisational head. *The Rajabhat* was composed of two administrative levels, the central and institutional levels. A central office dealt with all issues related to the whole department such as policy, planning, personnel and more importantly the budget of the department. At an institutional level, *The Rajabhat* had 41 institutes as its operational units across the country. Unlike the 25 public universities of *The Ministry*, no Rajabhat institute ever had full authority to manage institutional affairs. Everything was controlled and planned by *The Rajabhat* including budget allocation. In other words, all Rajabhat institutes would have everything in common such as internal administrative structures, types of academic schools and curricula and a fair share of the institutional budget. Personnel was also centrally planned and managed although they worked at institutions. The institution president was appointed by and accounted to *The Rajabhat* secretary as the latter was his or her head. In this respect, the administration of *The Rajabhat* was more hierarchical than that of *The Ministry*. 

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The third partner was the Rajamangala Institute of Technology, Ministry of Education, hereafter referred to as *The Rajamangala*, which also implemented a departmental style of administration. Although *The Rajamangala* had the mandate to manage its 35 campuses across the country, the organisational management was similar to that of *The Rajabhat*, where everything was planned and controlled by a central, single authority. Therefore, coordination within *The Rajamangala* was made through lines of command. The last partner was Pathumwan Technical College, which was part of the Department of Vocational Education, Ministry of Education. Administratively, it was hierarchically controlled by the director-general, who laid down policy directions for the college and appointed the president to run the college. These shorthand names: *The Ministry*, *Rajabhat* and *Rajamangala* are used consistently throughout the dissertation to represent organisational characteristics.

Since these four partners operated under different authorities, they had no need to cooperate with each other across organisational boundaries. The higher education policies initiated by these four organisations were therefore incoherent and sometimes redundant with regard to the nation’s workforce plan. There was a need for a single policy authority for all was required to align the direction of higher education and strengthen coordination among operational units. Accordingly, *The Ministry* and *The Rajabhat* were dissolved and their central offices were integrated together. The authority of the former 25 public universities remained untouched but all Rajabhat institutes became independent from the control of the central office and were given university status. Nevertheless, no Rajabhat institutes have had an individual establishment law in the same way as the other 25 public universities have had. *The Rajamangala* was also restructured; whereby 35 campuses were grouped to become nine Rajamangala universities of technology. Similar to *The Rajabhat*, no independent Rajamangala universities have their own establishment law. Also, the Pathumwan Technical College was disaggregated from its former host department and became independent and was supervised in the same way as other higher education institutions. In this respect, it is hoped that higher education policy planning and implementation will become effectively coordinated while the problem of organisational boundaries is eradicated.
Subsequently, *Commission B* was established and composed of one central office and 166 higher education institutions<sup>24</sup>, of which 78 were categorised as public universities. Administratively, the central office was composed of nine bureaux (as of 2003) and was responsible for issues such as providing policy suggestions and standards of higher education, initiating cooperation between domestic and international universities, suggestions for the establishment, dissolution or integration of higher education institutions, monitoring, examining and evaluating the quality of higher education provision on behalf of the HEC and so on (Administration of Ministry of Education Act, 2003: 79-80). In this respect, *The Ministry* has taken the leading role as it has more expertise in working to support, not control, academic strengths and the independence of higher education institutions. As far as its workforce is concerned, *Commission B* is the second largest department (after *Commission A*) of the Ministry of Education, with 53,560 staff. However, only 476 civil servants work at the central office and they are hierarchically controlled by the secretary of *Commission B*, the remaining 53,084 members of staff are managed by their host universities (OCSC, 2007). The administrative structure of *Commission B* (as of 2010) can be illustrated by Figure 10.

A total of 250 questionnaires were distributed at *Commission B*, of which 209 questionnaires were responded to. At the central level, 70 questionnaires were distributed through internal communication channels, through which 34 and 19 questionnaires were returned from *The Ministry* and *The Rajabhat*, respectively. At the institutional level, 180 questionnaires were distributed to higher education institutions across the country, of which the response counts were 107 and 49 from *The Ministry’s* universities and *Rajabhat Institutes*, respectively. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 people, of which six and four people had worked at the central and institutional levels, respectively. Nine interviewees were chosen by their role and status in the organisations while another interviewee was chosen by a snowball technique.

<sup>24</sup> As of 2008, there were 78 public universities, 69 private universities and 19 community colleges acting as current higher education institutions in Thailand (OHEC, 2008). 

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Figure 10: Administrative structure of the Office of the Higher Education Commission (Commission B)

4.2.4 Case IV: The Advocate

*The Advocate* is the small department under the administration of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security and both the department and ministry were established in accordance with the Reorganisation of Ministries, Sub-Ministries and Departments Act (2002). Prior to the organisational integration, women and family issues were dealt with by many government units located in different departments. The institutional division caused inevitable fragmentation and redundancy of policy formulation and implementation. Therefore, the Government hoped to establish a single authority to be responsible for women- and family-related issues. In doing so, seven government units, from three different hosts, were vertically integrated together and named the Office of Women’s Affairs and Family Development. Initially, *The Advocate* was designed as a policy think-tank of the Government in
women- and family-related issues. Similarly to other cases, these shorthand names: Advocate, Analyst B, Supporter and Aide B are used throughout the dissertation to represent organisational characteristics.

The first partner was the Office of the National Commission on Women’s Affairs, hereafter referred to as Analyst B. This was a small bureau of the Prime Minister’s Office and had 43 staff working within it. Analyst B was originally established as a government policy think-tank with regard to all women-related issues. The director was the head of the bureau and accounted to the permanent secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office. Theoretically, Analyst B was administrated by hierarchical bureaucracy but, in reality, it was rather flexible with regard to expertise and its small size entailed a very short line of command. Analyst B did not have an operational unit since women-related issues were already implemented by many government units. Nonetheless, as a government policy think-tank, Analyst B worked across organisational boundaries through policy suggestions on behalf of the Prime Minister. Therefore, Analyst B had expertise in policy formulation and initiatives. Natasha, who has worked at Analyst B for more than 20 years, explained that:

“The organisation that had dealt with women’s affairs in Thailand was officially established in 1979. In the past, most of government missions were located at the Prime Minister’s Office. So was the issue of women’s affairs, which involved coordination with many government units. Therefore, the original responsibility of the unit [women’s affairs] was policy coordination. We had only four people working together originally and they were hierarchically controlled by the secretary of the Prime Minister’s Office. The unit was later integrated with other government units and transferred to the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security in 2002.”

The second partner was a unit that was responsible for women’s development, located in the Division of Women, Child and Youth Development of the Community Development Department, Ministry of the Interior, hereafter referred to as The Supporter. The Supporter was a relatively small unit composed of only 18 staff. As the name suggests, The Supporter was responsible for women-related development in
terms of practical activities provided by the unit. Nathan, who has worked at *The Supporter* for more than 20 years, noted that:

“The Supporter was an operational unit that adopted government policies through the Ministry of Interior to be implemented in local communities. As the implementation unit, it focused on regulations, measurements and operational systems in order to increase knowledge and expertise. … Since the implementation of policies or programmes was completed by the Community Development Department itself, coordination emphasised internal and comprehensive communication, which contributed to policy efficiency and effectiveness.”

The remaining five partners were the largest group and all came from the same organisation, which was the Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. The work of these five units related to women and family welfare but was located in different divisions. As the department could imply particular characteristics, the term *Aide B* will be used to refer to these five units, who shared a similar culture to the Department of Public Welfare. 164 public officials of *Aide B* were later transferred to *The Advocate*. Nicole, who has worked at *Aide B* for more than 20 years, pointed out that:

“The characteristics of *Aide B* were a general, operational unit of the government. We focused on social welfare and virtue. Knowledge was accumulated and we had expertise in operations in regard to these particular issues. For example, we differentiated the urban and rural communities in order to deal with specific needs effectively since both types of community faced different problems. We well understood what the problems were. Therefore, we were able to deal with social services effectively.”

Since the women- and family-related issues were managed by three different hosts, the policy implementation these units were responsible for was uncoordinated due to different organisational goals and boundaries. Similar to other case studies, the integration reform attempted to establish a single authority responsible for coordinated policy and implementation related to women and family issues. Initially, *The Advocate* was designed as a policy think-tank with no operational unit. The
organisation was responsible for three main issues: the development of women’s capacity, the promotion of gender equality and the promotion of building a strong family institution. With regard to initial organisational design, Analyst B was most qualified for the job and took the majority of bureau head positions. Those who came from The Supporter also shared a few positions due to a transfer of existing managers to the new integrated organisation. This was because the transfer of any positions in the Thai public sector cannot relegate the occupiers to lower positions. In this respect, those managers who had already occupied the managerial positions at their former workplaces were appointed to available positions at The Advocate. However, the research remained unknown whether the new allocation of positions for these individuals actually granted them the same amount of power (different positions of the same official level will occupy different role) or how many of the former key personnel of each organisation took the new lead roles. The integration of organisations therefore instigated conflicts among partners with regard to an unfair share of managerial positions (see Chapter 6). This partially caused a high turnover rate of workers during the early years.

As of 2007, The Advocate had only 188 civil servants (OCSC, 2007) and was composed of four bureaux and two special units (see Figure 11 for the administrative structure of The Advocate). A total of 55 questionnaires were distributed at The Advocate, of which 45 (81.82%) were responded to. Each questionnaire was posted to the individuals and returned to the researcher’s postal address. Of these, 10, nine, and 26 questionnaires were returned from civil servants who had once worked at Analyst B, The Supporter and Aide B, respectively. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with eight people, of which six and two people were chosen from an organisational chart and a snowball technique, respectively. Table 6 summarises the information on all the cases under consideration.
Figure 11: Administrative structure of the Office of Women’s Affairs and Family Development (The Advocate)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Type of integration</th>
<th>Type of organisation</th>
<th>Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission A</td>
<td>Foundation education</td>
<td>Horizontal integration</td>
<td>Committee-based department</td>
<td>(1) Office of the National Primary Education Commission, (2) Department of General Education, (3) Department of Curriculum and Instruction Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rescue</td>
<td>Disaster-related policies</td>
<td>Horizontal integration</td>
<td>Traditional department</td>
<td>(1) Divisions of Department of Rural Acceleration Development, (2) National Safety Council of Thailand, (3) Division of Civil Disaster Prevention, (4) Division of Disaster Victims Relief, (5) A group of basic engineering of the Community Development Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Advocate</td>
<td>Women and family affairs</td>
<td>Vertical integration</td>
<td>Traditional department</td>
<td>(1) Office of the National Commission on Women’s Affairs, (2) The women’s development task group of the Women, Child and Youth Development Division, (3) A task group of Social Security Division, (4) A task group of Community Service Division, (5) A task group of Welfare for Hill-tribes Division, (6) A task group of Occupational Welfare Division, (7) A task group of Self-assisted Community Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Data collection methods

Since mixed methods research involves both quantitative and qualitative methods in the research process, this section is divided into the two sub-sections of qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection.

4.3.1 Quantitative method

Quantitative data was collected using a survey method. A questionnaire was structured by the use of the CVF, which consisted of seven key issues as previously presented in Section 4.1 (see Appendix 1). The number of questionnaire respondents was statistically determined by Yamane’s formula (1973), where confidence level is 95%. In this respect, samples of each organisation resulted in 100, 94, 100 and 40 for cases I to IV, respectively (see also the third column of Table 7). The questionnaire was randomly distributed amongst the population associated with each case, but not limited to sampling numbers derived from the statistical calculation. A total of 1,055 questionnaires were distributed, of which 570, 180, 250, and 55 questionnaires were distributed at Commission A, The Rescue, Commission B and The Advocate, respectively. At the end of the survey, a total of 974 questionnaires were collected (see also the fifth column of Table 7). The proportionate responses from Commission A, The Rescue, Commission B, and The Advocate were previously presented in each associated case (section 4.2.1 - 4.2.4). However, the distribution and return rates at Commission A were the highest among all the case studies. This was because many people voluntarily made a request to participate in the survey. Overall, there were 323 male and 651 female respondents to the survey. The numbers of respondents aged 21-30, 31-40, 40-50, and more than 50 years were 15, 209, 361, and 389 people, respectively. Also, the numbers of participants who had worked in organisations for 8-14, 15-21 and more than 21 years were 209, 241, and 524, respectively.
Table 7: Sample sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Size of population</th>
<th>Statistical number of samples</th>
<th>Number of questionnaires issued</th>
<th>Actual questionnaires returned</th>
<th>Questionnaire response rates</th>
<th>Number of interviewees by organisational charts</th>
<th>Number of interviewees by snowballing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission A</td>
<td>435,767</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>97.02%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rescue</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>92.78%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission B</td>
<td>53,560</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>83.60%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Advocate</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81.82%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>498,044</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>92.32%</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.2 Qualitative method

Qualitative data were collected by semi-structured interview. Interviewees were located by a combination of organisational charts and a snowballing technique. This was because a snowballing technique helped to identify some subjects who had certain attributes or characteristics that were necessary for the study (Berg, 2007: 44). A total number of 32 individuals were interviewed, of which 27 people were chosen from organisational charts and five people were chosen by a snowball technique. Half of the interviewees (16) were female and the other half male. The number of interviewees from each organisation is presented in the seventh and eighth columns of Table 7. Seven key issues guided the interview questions, similar to the questionnaire survey (see Appendix 2). Interviewees were required to have been working prior to the integration reform of public organisations – more than eight years. This was because they would be able to compare the organisational culture between the pre- and post-integration periods. In this respect, interviews were conducted with 12 and 20 interviewees who had worked in the organisations for 15-21 and more than 21 years, respectively. In addition, interviews were carried out with public officials occupying different hierarchical levels, ranging from executive to operational staff. The aim was to ascertain their perceptions with regard to the reform and the organisational culture changes. In so doing, 19 managers, four advisers and nine operational staff were interviewed.

In addition, each interview lasted at least 45 minutes and was conducted at the workplaces of the interviewees. Only one interview was conducted by telephone at the request of the interviewee, to be anonymous. At the time of the interview, the conversation was handwritten and recorded with a digital device. However, some interviewees requested that a digital device not be used to record the conversation. In these instances only notes were taken. Qualitative data was also collected from open-ended questions embedded with the questionnaire survey. Laws, organisational annual reports and other published documents were also researched in order to arrive at a profound understanding of the case studies.
4.4 Data analysis methods

Once data was collected, it was analysed using mixed methods according to the types of data. Quantitatively, cultural scores derived from the questionnaire survey were initially entered and calculated to find mean scores for each cultural type by an Excel spreadsheet computerised programme. Scores were subsequently imported to an SPSS programme for more advanced analyses and tests of statistical significance such as standard deviation and correlation analysis. With regard to correlation analysis, Foster explained that

“A correlation expresses the extent to which two variables vary together. A positive correlation means that as one variable increases so does the other … A negative correlation is when one variable increases as the other decreases … Correlations vary between -1.00 and +1.00; a correlation of 0.00 means there is no relationship between the two variables.” (Foster, 2002: 204)

In other words, correlation analysis indicated the strength of the relations between two variables. There are two types of correlation: bivariate and partial. Field described that

“A bivariate correlation is a correlation between two variables whereas a partial correlation looks at the relationship between two variables while ‘controlling’ the effect of one or more additional variable. Perason’s product-moment correlation coefficient and Spearman’s rho are examples of bivariate correlation coefficients.” (Field, 2009: 175)

Since the quantitative data gathered from field research was ordinal, Spearman’s correlation coefficient was used to indicate the relations between: the perceptions of cultures and age groups; education levels; groups of work experience (in years); and job ranks. The results of correlation analysis are reported in chapters five, six and seven. A comparison of cultural scores between pre- and post-reform periods is offered in order to indicate whether organisational cultures have developed or decreased as a result of the integration reform. Results are presented in the form of tables and diagrams to ensure clarity.
Interview data were analysed using “template analysis”. Template analysis was useful in terms of helping me to understand organisational culture change more profoundly, in addition to quantitative results. King, who is a proponent of this technique, contends that:

“The greatest advantages of template analysis reside in the fact that it is a highly flexible approach that can be modified for the needs of any study in a particular area. It does not come with a heavy baggage of prescriptions and procedures, and as such is especially welcome to those who want to take a phenomenological and experiential approach to organizational research. At the same time, the principles behind the technique are easily grasped by those relatively unfamiliar with qualitative methods – in part because of the similarities to content analysis – and as such it can be a valuable introduction to the whole field. … Finally, the discipline of producing the template forces the researcher to take a well-structured approach to handling the data, which can be a great help in producing a clear, organized, final account of a study.” (King, 1998:132)

Using this technique, each interview was transcribed and read through to identify a list of codes that were later developed to become themes. To define the codes, an open coding technique was used since it “… aims at expressing data and phenomenon in the form of concepts” (Flick, 2006: 296). In this respect, the analysis would then generate categories and themes of data. Berg (2007: 319) contends that

“… the more organized and systematic the coding schemes, the easier it is for all the data to talk to you and inform you about various research-related questions you might have.”

Therefore, a coding technique would help to find patterns or themes of organisational culture through interview texts. The template would then be developed, revised and used for analysis. The thesis’ final template consisted of three themes: organisational characteristics, culture and change, and it consisted of four sub-themes (clan, hierarchy, market, and adhocracy cultures), and organisational paradoxes, which are composed of two sub-themes (cooperation-competition paradox and leadership styles). Finally, both quantitative and qualitative results were compared and combined to produce rigorous discussions throughout this thesis. Interview excerpts
were presented to give clarification of the arguments. All findings link to the answers to the research questions.

4.5 Concluding remarks

The chapter has clarified the research methodology and design of the thesis. A mixed methods approach is employed, as the pursuit of both quantitative and qualitative methods will contribute to a robust understanding of the research rather than choosing either approach on its own. With regard to the research design, a case study is employed and further guided by the scope of the research and how data would be gathered and analysed. Accordingly, four integrated organisations were chosen as units of analysis. Two organisations were a result of horizontal integration whereas the other two were vertically integrated. Also, two of them were categorised by law as committee-based departments while the other two were administered with a typical, departmental style. Two cases dealt with educational policies whilst the other two were responsible for social policies.

Samples for the questionnaire survey were determined statistically by Yamane’s formula and a total of 977 questionnaires were returned from all the organisations studied. A semi-structured interview was conducted with a number of public employees working in each organisation. The interviews lasted until all the necessary information was obtained. With regard to data analysis, quantitative data was analysed statistically with an SPSS computerised programme whereas interview data was analysed with a template analysis technique to find themes in the data. Results from both types of data will be presented separately and later combined at the interpretation stage to arrive at a substantive discussion. The next chapter presents the findings from the horizontally integrated organisations.
Chapter Five:

Changes in Organisational Culture and Horizontal Integration

This chapter presents findings and discussions about cultural change in two horizontally integrated public organisations, namely Commission A and The Rescue\textsuperscript{25}. Briefly, Commission A was established to deal with integrated fundamental education policies, whereas The Rescue was created to be responsible for coordinated risk and disaster management. The former was the integration of three departments of the Ministry of Education while the latter was the integration of five government units from three ministries. Commission A was a committee-based organisation whereas The Rescue was administered by a typical bureaucratic department in which a director-general was the head of the organisation.

This chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which examines the cultural profiles of the organisations derived from qualitative data. The next section presents the findings from quantitative data. The third section is a discussion of cultural change and the crucial factors in the cultural changes. The final section is the chapter’s conclusion. A comparison between the two organisations is made throughout the whole chapter. This chapter argues that the horizontal integration reform altered the cultural orientations of related public organisations. Generally, the cultural orientation shifted from a clan-dominated to a performance-based workplace following the reform. However, when the details were investigated more closely, public employees from different workplaces perceived such changes differently.

\textsuperscript{25} See Glossary for full names of the organisations.
5.1 The cultural profiles of organisations: Qualitative findings

This section presents the qualitative findings from semi-structured interviews conducted with seven people from Commission A and another seven people from The Rescue. Data also includes answers derived from open-ended questions from the questionnaire. The section is divided into four topics with regard to cultural values: clan, hierarchy, market and adhocracy. Each topic presents the pre-reform situation first and is followed by the post-integration period.

Generally, the cultural profiles of public organisations during the pre-reform period inclined toward a clan culture though hierarchy values were also found, but to a lesser extent. Market and adhocracy elements were rarely noticed by public employees. However, organisational characteristics might facilitate the perceptions of these two cultures in organisations such as The Instructor and The Developer. The fact that the perception of a clan culture was most frequently noted implies that public organisations embraced flexibility and discretion, and internal focus and integration. In this respect, public organisations appeared to value tradition, trust, loyalty, teamwork and consensus more than any other values. Public employees believed that their workplaces were a friendly place to work in. Subsequently, when the integration reform was implemented, public employees felt that the clan culture had decreased whilst market values had increased. The hierarchy culture was quite static since public organisations must always comply with laws or administrative procedures. The adhocracy culture had decreased with regard to the perceptions of people who used to work at The Instructor and The Developer. More details are presented in the following paragraphs.

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26 See Glossary for full names of the organisations.
5.1.1 The clan culture

In Commission A, the research has found that public officials working at different organisations identified their organisations as clan-oriented workplaces, during the pre-integration reform. The clan values were found highly. Teamwork, tradition, trust or loyalty to organisations prevailed overwhelmingly. However, this cultural aspect declined after organisations were integrated together. For example, Jasmine, who is a primary school teacher and has taught for more than 30 years, said that:

“During Guru A time, a relationship in an organisation was very close and went on as if it was a family. Internal coordination was closer and easier than currently as it has become more distant. To sum up, the old atmosphere was close and warm … In the past, teamwork was dominant. We worked, won or lost together … In terms of relationships, Guru A was full of closeness as if we were an extended family. In this respect, coordination within an organisation was easy. However, when it became Commission A the relationship between local schools and the higher levels of administration became distant. In my opinion, I feel that working with Guru A was warmer as if working and communicating with family members. People were less competitive. Teamwork and generosity were overwhelming. After the integration, Commission A has focused on performance and this leads to fiercer competition among colleagues. Everyone [teachers] has to be energetic and ready for self-development. Otherwise, they would be left behind and this affects their career prospects”.

Feeling the same, Paula, who has taught for more than 20 years at another of Guru A’s schools in another province, noticed that:

“Previously, we worked as if we were siblings. The administration was flexible and helpful. So, this facilitated the happiness in the workplace. Everyone wanted to work, so the task achievement was quite good”.
Although working at a different level and school, Jeremy, who is a head teacher and has worked for more than 30 years, had a similar perception to Jasmine and Paula that Guru A was once dominated by clan values. He said that:

“[Previously,] I had no power to discipline a teacher even if firm evidence of wrong doing was clear. The only thing I could do was report the issue to the ODPEC\textsuperscript{27}, I should expect nothing as Guru A’s administrative culture embedded attentiveness and generosity highly. When any conflicts occurred, the committee set up by the ODPEC would probably ease the situation by calming both sides down with a reason such as forgivingness. “\textit{Chao-nai}” [the boss] preferred to resolve conflicts at the district or, at most, the provincial level. In this respect, the resolution was kind of soft and compromising, such as warning or transferring that person to another school. Hardly ever was anyone sacked”.

The word “\textit{Chao-nai}” implies a stereotype of the patronage system in Thai society. It signifies an imbalanced relationship between patrons and clients, and implicitly a notion of clans or networks (as previously explained in Chapter Three). So, Jeremy’s quotation suggests how a clan culture was embedded in Guru A. Furthermore, working as an educational advisor at the ODPEC, Jared, who has worked for more than 30 years, similarly recognised that:

“Previously, teamwork was important in pushing Guru A forward. Helpfulness and understanding of each other were found overwhelmingly. We worked as if we were kin … The organisational size was also appropriate to facilitate teamwork, understanding and caring among colleagues. This was a characteristic of Guru A”.

Not only was a clan culture found in Guru A, it was also found in Guru B. For instance, Jonathan, who is a senior supervisor and has worked at a central level for more than 30 years, explained by using the example of a head-teacher transfer that:

\textsuperscript{27} ODPEC stands for the Office of District Primary Education Commission.
“…whenever it was head-teacher transfer time, we usually made a
decision on the basis of seniority, *Kreng-chai*
and the size of school budget … In addition, a larger school usually took care of and gave
support to smaller schools in the same area. This was our culture; a
culture of attentiveness and generosity. Doing it this way did not
mean that we ignored formal rules but rather complied with them
with regard to our styles of management. I believe that organisational
culture is more persistent than rules and regulations”.

Working at the same workplace as Jonathan, Rose, who has worked as a
knowledgeable staff member for more than 20 years, also felt that:

“The previous organisational culture was dominated by teamwork
and harmony”.

After the integration reform was implemented, the perceptions of clan values
changed. In fact they have declined to some extent. Some examples were previously
illustrated by Jasmine’s interview extract. In addition, Pamela, who was a bureau
head and had worked at *The Instructor* for more than 20 years, noticed that the
perception that ‘clan’ had declined might also be a result of the characteristics of new
tasks. She said that:

“Some people might feel that they were not accustomed to some
tasks because they still lingered with old tasks. So, they might feel
less comfortable when compared to those who quickly adapt to new
tasks … we had to build mutual understanding and change the old
vision to fit with objectives. This might help them and the team to
move forward”.

Her opinion indicates that a clan-based relationship was altered to a result-oriented
one in the case of *Commission A*. Furthermore, at a local level, Jared perceived that
the reduction in a clan culture was replaced by a fiercer competition among
colleagues. He said that:

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*Kreng-chai* may be translated as a state of feeling too considerate to other people.
“The competition during the Commission A era was higher than that of Guru A. Everyone focused on competition more than in the past and an emphasis on outputs was highlighted. So, empathy among colleagues decreased as an unintended consequence … The output-focused strategy got in the way of happiness and attentiveness in the workplace, inevitably. The organisation might have better outputs but teamwork might be questioned. Sometimes, it seemed that we worked as a team but at another time, it rather seemed that we were competing with each other. Everyone wanted to produce gleaming individual outputs but they were sometimes repetitive and they weakened helpfulness”.

In the case of The Rescue, civil servants working at The Developer also noticed the clan culture in their workplace during the pre-integration reform. For example, Ashton, who is a bureau head and has worked at The Developer for more than 20 years, said that:

“The working culture of The Developer focused on teamwork. This meant that we knew each other, trusted in each other and then worked together … The patronage system was perceivable”.

It is clear that a patron-client relationship was dominant at his workplace. Moreover, a clan-based relationship was also noticed by Sahara, who has worked at the same organisation but at the general level for more than 14 years. She perceived that:

“Previously, the working atmosphere was helpful, supportive and attentive as if we were siblings”.

Similarly, Samara, who has worked at the academic level of The Developer for the same period, felt that colleagues:

“…used to work as a team and fully supported each other”.

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Although working at *The Volunteer* for more than 20 years, Steve, who is a front-line staff member, also noted that:

“Previously, people respected seniority, maturity and qualifications. Colleagues were generous and helpful. However, at present, the workplace is full of the patronage system and nepotism. People are interested in their groups’ benefits more than anything else”.

In the post-reform period, people’s perceptions of a clan culture at *The Rescue* were diverse. Some people noticed the development of clan-based relationships. For example, Serena, who came from *Aide A* and has worked for more than 20 years, commented that:

“Currently, *The Rescue*’s culture of work is full of patronage, nepotism and clan-divided interests more than organisational outcomes. There is no harmony in the organisation. People are selfish and self-interested. The integration has not brought any harmony at all; only your clan, my clan or their clans are found out there. The powerful dominate the organisation whilst the powerless have to bear with this situation. This is completely different from my previous workplace, which usually embraced a sibling-like culture. Everyone clearly knew their career paths while promotion was considered with regard to seniority and experience”.

Although working at *The Developer*, Shane, who has worked for more than 20 years, noticed an increase in clan values in the organisation by mentioning that:

“Recently, the patronage system has flourished more than was previously found. People once had fair career promotion on the basis of seniority and competency, but all that is gone now”.

Simon, who has worked for more than 20 years and currently works at one provincial office of *The Developer*, also perceived the stronger clan-based relationship in *The Rescuer*. He stated that:
“At present, performance is not an indicator of career promotion but nepotism and the patronage system are. Although this kind of relationship was stronger in the past, promotion still depended on leaders’ decisions and patron-client relationships, despite the best and most unbiased evaluation indicators being created”.

In summary, these interview extracts suggest that clan values in both organisations have altered to some extent. People from Commission A’s partners perceived that the reduction of clan values was a consequence of an emphasis on result-oriented culture. On the other hand, civil servants at The Rescue noticed a stronger patron-client relationship of powerful individuals when compared with the pre-integration period.

5.1.2 The hierarchy culture

The research has found that, prior to the integration reform, a hierarchy culture was found to a moderate extent in public organisations. Mostly, people perceived it through the administrative structure of organisations. For example, in Commission A, Jared noticed that:

“…Guru A’s administration was hierarchical and tightly controlled from the national to district levels. Everything was patterned and flowed under this hierarchical style of management … Orders, commands or regulations were passed from the top down to Guru A’s provincial and district offices and schools … I think that a major factor that helped Guru A to accomplish its missions was the systematic and flexible management … orders were passed systematically to lower administrative levels”.

This was similar to Jeremy’s view; he noticed the hierarchy element through his experience in school management. He compared the situation between the pre- and post-reform and noted that:
“During the Guru A time, school management was hierarchically controlled from top to bottom … when Commission A was established, each school was devolved with more decision-making power than was previously found. For example, if I considered that someone abused the job and had firm evidence, I could discipline that person with power stated in the education law. If he or she believed that the punishment was overstated, that person could appeal to The Dealer … Nonetheless, the school administration always has to comply with government laws and regulations”.

A hierarchy aspect was also discreetly found through the relationship between the school and Guru A’s district office too. Jeremy explained that:

“Previously, dealing with school documentation tasks was not as complicated as currently because ODPEC29 did everything for us. We also had a close relationship with each other and any communication between us was also easier and more supportive. Moreover, the school could trust their suggestions without reservation”.

In addition, Julie, who is a bureau head and has worked at The Instructor for more than 20 years, perceived that:

“…the structure of Guru A embraced the participatory administration by the committee. The administration was supervised by the NPEC30 at the national level, PPEC31 at the provincial level (where a provincial governor acted as the president) and DPEC32 at the district level, where the district governor acted as president. The secretary of Guru A was not the head of the organisation but rather an office manager. In contrast, Guru B and The Instructor were governed by a director-general, the same as other typical, bureaucratic organisations. These two departments were more highly conservative than Guru A”.

29 ODPEC stands for the Office of the District Primary Education Commission
30 NPEC stands for National Primary Education Committee
31 PPEC stands for Provincial Primary Education Committee
32 DPEC stands for District Primary Education Committee
In the post-integration reform, the change in a hierarchy culture in organisations was perceived differently among people. As previously illustrated, Jeremy found that Commission A became less hierarchical with regard to power devolution to schools. In contrast, Jonathan felt differently. He commented, by making a comparison of his workplace, Guru B, with Guru A, that:

“I felt that the integration was very limited where the devolution of power was designed regardless of three different cultures. For those who used to work at Guru A, which was highly hierarchical, the organisational integration was really good for them. They were empowered with more independence over school administration. So, they were put at an advantage by the reform and had more opportunities than previously. For us, who used to have a higher power of school management, the design of Commission A was limited and it limited our ability to effectively provide secondary education with regard to academic, school and budget management issues … The integration dragged us backward. It was wrong to design a single administrative track without acknowledging cultural differences … All public employees of The Instructor were transferred into related bureaux of Commission A due to a lack of front-line unit. I thought that they were least affected by the power devolution because they still work under a central, hierarchical administration … Commission A has become a rule-oriented organisation. Regulations were mentioned in every meeting despite the fact that Guru B previously operated this way. Commission A should look at its goal in providing the quality of fundamental education instead of emphasising formal rules”.

In The Rescue, the hierarchy values were found in both the pre- and post-reform periods. Before the organisations were integrated, Ashton noticed the administrative culture of The Developer as follows:

“The department always focused on top-down policies and orders. Whenever the boss ordered something, everyone had to follow. This was because we had to work corresponding to the ministry policies, politicians or the public”.

Sarah, who has worked at *The Developer* for more than 20 years as a senior professional worker, felt similarly that:

“The administration in the past always focused on rule and regulation compliance. Currently, the emphasis has been altered to outcome achievement under the supervision of OPDC33”.

Although having less working experience than Ashton and Sarah, Sophia, who has worked at *The Developer* for 7-14 years, also noticed that

“The hierarchical line of command during the constructor era was much tighter than currently”.

Then, after *The Rescue* was established, employees’ perceptions of a hierarchy culture were different to some extent. Some people did not see the difference between the pre- and post-reform. For example, Andrea, who has worked at *The Developer* for more than 20 years and is a head of unit, commented that:

“Rule compliance remained the same. We always complied with laws and regulations as our best guardian against wrongdoing. We had to make sure that any outputs we delivered were transparent and accountable. We attempted to eradicate any risks. We relied on regulations as a self-protector. This culture of work happened over time”.

Similarly, Anya, who has worked at *The Developer* for more than 30 years and is an advisor of *The Rescue*, stated clearly that:

“Both *The Rescue* and *The Developer* had to comply with laws and regulations as public organisations must do. However, *The Rescue* had more flexibility than *The Developer* as it had to work co-ordinately with other partners within the scope of the law34”.

33 OPDC stands for Office of the Public Sector Development Commission
34 The Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act (2007)
This characteristic was also perceived by Sunny, who has worked at *The Developer* for more than 20 years but had a different opinion. He felt that:

“*The Rescue* focused on top-down orders more than *The Developer*. I sometimes felt that some orders were irrational”.

Some people noticed that a hierarchical administration had changed into a more coordinated administration. For example, Smith, who has worked at *The Developer*’s provincial office for more than 20 years, perceived that:

“The previous administrative culture depended on orders from top executives. However, leaders of the current organisation had to work co-ordinately with relevant organisations and local governments to implement such plans and policies that related to disaster prevention and alleviation”.

These interview extracts illustrate one fact, namely that public organisations always have to comply with state laws. In this respect, the hierarchy culture was unlikely to change with regard to the nature of Thai public organisations. Public officials were accustomed to compliance with laws and orders. Although some people felt that some decision-making power had been devolved to lower levels of administration, the decision-makers still had to comply with administrative procedures and laws.

### 5.1.3 The market culture

During the pre-integration reform, the research has found that the market culture in organisations was found to a lesser extent when compared with clan and hierarchy values. As far as the performance issue was concerned, Jasmine, for example, perceived that it was not the main focus of *Guru A*, but it was increasingly focused on during the post-reform period. Her perception was similar to that of Jared. He said that:
“…Guru A mentioned teaching development and learning achievements, but these issues were not implemented continuously. After the reform, Commission A emphasised other aspects e.g. managerial procedures, goal setting, performance indicators and reports on top of Guru A’s previous issues. What is more, performance evaluation was made regularly. I thought that these were the new characteristics of Commission A”.

Many people noticed the development of market values in Commission A during the post-integration reform. For example, Penny, who has taught at one primary school for more than 20 years, mentioned that Commission A focused on performance issues and job achievement, so the competition among colleagues had increased. With regard to performance-based management, Ray, who has also taught for more than 20 years, noticed that:

“People competed with each other in every aspect such as learning achievement and performance reports in order to have a better performance and to be rewarded with special remuneration or career promotion … I thought that success criteria were more commercial-centric with uses such as investment and profit-loss calculations. I did not think that these criteria were applicable to an education context”.

Nevertheless, outcomes might be something different. For instance, Jacob felt that:

“Six years after the organisational integration, it was found that the quality of education had not improved. The overall educational achievement score between the pre- and post-reform periods had not had a significant improvement. The trend rather declined a little. So, we had to find other solutions for this issue”.

Having a similar perception, Jonathan commented that:

“Actually, the quality of education had decreased despite organisations being integrated, the budget being increased and instructions and curricula being developed. I had no idea why the learning outcome turned in the opposite direction to the reform objective … If asked whether organisational integration failed, I was not sure, but the quality of education was lower than previously”.
This outcome problem was of concern to Julie. She mentioned that:

“Actually, measuring organisational achievement in terms of quantities was not difficult because we were able to deliver products as planned such as learning media, instructions and so on. However, achievement in terms of outcomes was different. Outcomes were not something about matching criteria, set by the OPDC. I personally thought that those criteria were rather lacking in cultural awareness of our nation as some of them were crudely imitated from foreign nations. So, I was not sure that we could attain policy outcomes by only matching the criteria”.

Regarding the issue of policy transfer, Julie felt that it could affect organisational cultures and educational outcome. However, she was the only respondent mentioned the issue of policy transfer. In the case of The Rescue, civil servants from The Developer might notice the market values more than other partners due to its organisational characteristics. For example, in the pre-reform period, Anya said that:

“The Developer built many things in rural areas such as roads, water source development and water supply, occupation and business training and so on. Whenever the infrastructure was constructed in any remote areas, we delivered to people a whole package of these things. This was our dominant characteristic that we counted as our goal achievement. Although outsiders might notice these outcomes least, local people knew wholeheartedly”.

Having a similar perception, Andre, who is an engineer and has worked at The Developer for more than 20 years, said that:

“The Developer attained its goals on the basis of achieving construction and development targets such as the development of roads, bridges, reservoirs or weirs in rural areas. These physical things could be counted as achievements since rural people began to gain benefit from them”.
Ashton also explained:

“The Developer’s missions were typically providing an absolute package to targeted areas … The culture of work usually focused on how to develop the wellbeing of rural people. So, we accessed remote areas and provided people with essential things such as roads, water supply, a communication network, development projects for women and the young, occupation training and so on to fulfil the government objective”.

These interview extracts demonstrate that people from The Developer perceived completed projects as an organisational achievement. However, after the organisational integration, the market values became more ambiguous as perceived by former employees of The Developer. For example, Anya commented that:

“The reform committee said that there was no need for us to develop rural areas anymore. They believed that rural communities were already strong as a result of our jobs and it was about time we were dissolved. This implied that The Developer had fully achieved government goals. Then, The Rescue was established with new functions such as an R&D department, which became more academic-centric. Theoretically, it should formulate policies and give advice related to risk management but it was ineffectual with regard to policy implementation. We were designated to deal with implementation functions later on. However, we had to work co-ordinately with other partners. So, it was difficult to measure outcomes as (1) goal achievement depended on other stakeholders too and (2) it was difficult to signify goal achievement when it came to disaster prevention and alleviation processes”.

Having a similar perception, Andre also thought that:

“According to the act\(^\text{35}\), The Rescue had the two main functions of disaster prevention and alleviation, and building public awareness of disaster management. Since natural disasters were unpredictable, how could we prevent them? I thought we would never attain this goal. Then, we might build public awareness by investing in staff training and implementing public awareness campaigns with related

\(^{35}\) The Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act (2007)
organisations but would this action really imply goal achievement? I doubted it”.

However, considering the narrower scope of routine jobs, the market culture was noticed through performance reports. This is because public employees have to have a shining performance as one condition to be rewarded with the following year’s pay rise. Accordingly, some people noticed a development of market values. For instance, Sandra, who has worked at The Developer for more than 20 years, felt that the culture of The Rescue focused on outputs and outcomes that were measured by KPIs more than was previously found. Similarly, Stella, who came from Analyst A and has worked at the academic level, perceived that:

“Recently, there had been no trust between each other as The Rescue increasingly focused on outcome-based management. However, I doubted whether outcomes were really achieved or only just a presentation”.

With similar feelings to Stella towards the development of performance issues and the reduction of teamwork, Sharon, who has worked at the academic level for 7-14 years at The Developer, perceived that:

“The Rescue emphasised achieving performance indicators by forgetting the teamwork philosophy. Generosity among colleagues withered away while performance achievement was overemphasised. Colleagues were forced to compete with each other for better personal performance”.

In addition, Aiden, who is a head of division and came from The Developer, saw that the development of market values was part of hierarchical command. He reported that:

“Soon after the integration, the first director-general attempted to increase organisational performance in order to gain trust from the public … Subordinates were controlled through orders for self-development and had to adapt to a new scope of work and increase their performance as much as possible. He insisted that the culture of
work had to change to a performance-oriented one if the department wished to avoid future dissolution”.

These interview extracts demonstrate how the market culture was found in organisations. In summary, it had increased after the integration reform since public organisations were controlled through performance indicators. Although public organisations and employees could match all the indicators, genuine outcomes might be different things. In addition, the increase in market values might lower other values (such as clan values) at the same time.

5.1.4 The adhocracy culture

The research has found that an adhocracy element was rarely noticed by public officials during the pre-reform period. The adhocracy values were found according to organisational characteristics. In the case of Commission A, whose partner, The Instructor, was formerly responsible for researching and developing academic initiatives that related to basic education, those initiatives developed by them could illustrate adhocracy values in the organisation. For example, Pamela, who is a bureau head and has worked at The Instructor for more than 20 years, said that:

“The Instructor usually focused on developing quality and the standardisation of educational products. Our main responsibilities were about the development of academic curricula, teaching and learning instructions, educational measurements and evaluation, and learning media. This also included other academic-related issues that had to have a national standard … Recently, we have had one more function of implementation. This has meant that we have to follow up product implementation at the school level. This is more than just producing documents, papers or other products that we once used to do. Recently, we have had to do all things from the beginning to the end like a one-stop service organisation”.

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This was similar to what Aiden, who has worked for more than 20 years at *The Developer*, remembered. He stated that:

“The missions of *The Developer* and *The Rescue* were different. Previously, we completed our tasks independently as *The Developer* was established to deal particularly with infrastructure construction and development in remote areas. Whenever we were ordered [by the government] to develop rural areas, we managed to deliver to people a full package of roads, water supply development, occupational training, youth development and so on”.

Andrea also pointed out that her former workplace delivered many things to the rural areas. She stated that:

*The Developer* dealt with infrastructure construction such as roads, bridges, reservoirs, artesian wells and so on to rural areas. We also offered a wellbeing development package for rural people such as occupational training and distributing the concept of *Rai-na-suan-pasom*.

Aaron, who is a bureau head and who has worked at *The Developer* for more than 20 years, explained that:

“At that time, *The Developer* was a big department with more than 20,000 kilometres of roads, many bridges and water supply sources. The project management was easy because when the construction was completed, we put up a sign at every property to signify our ownership … I thought that *The Developer* was very good at providing integrated development of the country with regard to the integrated social and economic infrastructure and wellbeing development to rural people”.

These interview extracts suggest that some organisations, such as *The Instructor* and *The Developer*, had embraced an adhocracy element through their core functions. More specifically, *The Developer* was originally established as an ad hoc unit to help

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36 This was a concept about mixed farming whereby landowners should divide their land proportionally into farming, water supplying, livestock and living zones. This would help people to live self-sufficiently even with less cash in hand.
the government to combat the communist ideology that had come into Thailand during the cold war era. For example, Anya explained that:

“The Developer was established as an ad hoc organisation. It was the only public organisation to work in the once ‘red zones’ of the country. Those areas were at risk of adopting communist ideology but gained trust from local people. We did nothing related to political ideological conflicts but we used infrastructure construction to develop the wellbeing of rural people”.

After the integration reform, the perceptions of adhocracy values had changed to deliver more intangible projects to the society. For example, Andrea commented that:

“Unlike The Developer, outputs of The Rescue were quite normative. I was not sure whether I am right in saying this but outputs were difficult to be seen. Although we knew that The Rescue had to provide help and support, we did not deliver this service by ourselves. We rather needed cooperation from partners and networks to implement training or rescue plans. So, I was not sure how we could count these actions as organisational products”.

Having a similar perception, Amy, who has worked at The Developer for more than 20 years and is a deputy-head of one bureau, perceived that:

“Both The Developer and The Rescue delivered integrated public services to the society but in different ways. The former provided integrated development packages to rural people while the latter provided integrated risk management to the whole nation. The Rescue had to work co-ordinately with stakeholders. So, integration was a core action of The Rescue”.

These examples illustrate how adhocracy values have changed following the integration reform. For people who worked at The Developer, the change was quite obvious when compared with other organisations. This might be a consequence of changing the nature of the work from a tangible delivery service to an intangible one.
5.2 Changes in organisational culture: Quantitative findings

This section presents quantitative findings derived from a questionnaire survey at Commission A and The Rescue. The data were analysed using SPSS and Excel spreadsheet analysis. The section is divided into two topics with regard to the pre- and post-reform periods. A comparison between the two cases is also made.

5.2.1 The pre-integration period: Cultural profiles of organisations

Prior to the horizontal integration reform, the overall cultural profiles of Commission A and The Rescue were similar, as they inclined toward clan culture (see Figure 12). The average scores were 32 and 31.5, respectively (see Table 8). However, the hierarchy and market values were slightly differently perceived according to public employees who worked at Commission A and The Rescue. In Commission A, the hierarchy and market values were found with scores of 24 and 23, respectively. In contrast, civil servants from The Rescue noticed that the market element was slightly higher than hierarchy values, scoring 24.5 and 24, respectively. The adhocracy element was found least in both cases, scoring 21 and 20 for Commission A and The Rescue, respectively. The following paragraphs present the research findings from each case.

Table 8: Pre-reform cultural scores of horizontally integrated organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission A</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rescue</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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At Commission A, the research has found that, during the pre-reform period, public employees who worked for different organisations had different perceptions as to how their organisations operated. Firstly, the clan values were found to be the highest of all values in all partners of Commission A. The scores were 32, 30 and 35 from Guru A, Guru B and The Instructor respectively (see Table 9). Civil servants from The Instructor noticed the market culture with a score of 23 whereas hierarchy and adhocracy elements were equally found, scoring 21. In Guru B, the market and hierarchy values were equally found, with a score of 24. This left the adhocracy element as the least in Guru B, scoring only 22. Having similar perceptions, people from Guru A found the market and hierarchy elements with an equal score of 23.25. The adhocracy value was least found, scoring 21.5. Although the trio were administered under the same ministerial administration, the data revealed that none of them had exact cultural perceptions. Nonetheless, the fact that the highest scores were pulled toward clan values implies that the trio were friendly places to work in.
The level of teamwork, consensus, trust and loyalty to the organisation rather than other values were overwhelmingly important (see Figure 13).

Table 9: Pre-reform cultural scores of Commission A’s partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guru A</th>
<th>Guru B</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>23.25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>23.25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
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</table>

Figure 13: Pre-reform cultural models of Commission A’s partners
Examining the data further, according to the levels of administration, the research has found that the cultural models between people working at the central and local levels were slightly different (see Table 10). People from both groups similarly perceived that organisations were clan-dominated workplaces with scores of 30.5 and 32 from the central and local levels, respectively. At the central level, the market, hierarchy and adhocracy elements were found with scores of 25, 22.5 and 22, respectively. At the local level, the hierarchy element was found second whereas market and adhocracy values were third and least, scoring 23.5, 23 and 21.5 respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of professional differences between teachers and civil servants, the research has found that both groups had slightly different perspectives. They did have similar perceptions that the clan element was overwhelmingly found in organisations, scored 32 by teachers and 31 by civil servants (see Table 11). However, teachers found the hierarchy aspect second, with a score of 23.5. The market culture was found third but marginally less than that of hierarchy, scoring 23. The adhocracy element was least found, scoring only 21.5. On the other hand, civil servants noticed the market and hierarchy elements second and third, with scores of 24.5 and 22.5 respectively. The adhocracy culture was lowest, scoring only 22, which was slightly higher than the teachers’ perception.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Civil servants</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>Adhocracy</td>
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<td>Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>23.5</td>
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On the other hand, at The Rescue, the research has found that overall cultural profiles of partners during the pre-reform period inclined towards a clan culture. The clan element was found to a great extent in The Developer, The Volunteer and Aide A with scores of 31, 33 and 35, respectively (see Table 12). With regard to Aide A, the clan score was more than one-third of the total score whereas it was just under one-third for The Volunteer. People from Analyst A also perceived that their organisation operated toward a clan-based workplace with a score of 27. In terms of a market culture, it was found second and slightly higher than the hierarchy one at The Developer and Aide A. In The Volunteer, the score of hierarchy values was slightly higher than that of the market, scoring 24 and 22 respectively. However, the market and hierarchy values were equally found at Analyst A, with a score of 25. The adhocracy culture was found lowest of all values in all organisations. Although the cultural orientation of all organisations operated as a clan culture, the research has found that the cultural model of Analyst A was the most balanced in comparison with the other three organisations (see Figure 14).

Table 12: Pre-reform cultural scores of The Rescue’s partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Developer</th>
<th>The Volunteer</th>
<th>Analyst A</th>
<th>Aide A</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
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<td>Market</td>
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<td>Hierarchy</td>
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In summary, the research has found that the organisational culture of Thai public organisations during the pre-reform period was a clan-oriented culture, regardless of administrative types, sizes, hosts or professions. The next section presents research findings about the post-reform period.
5.2.2 The post-integration period: Cultural changes

In the post-integration period, the research has found that people who worked at Commission A and The Rescue have similar perceptions toward the cultures in organisations. The market value was found highest in both workplaces, with an equal score of 27 (see Table 13). However, the perceptions toward the other three values were slightly different. On the one hand, the adhocracy and clan values were equally found in Commission A, with a score of 25. This left the hierarchy element as the least one to be found, scoring only 23. On the other hand, the hierarchy and adhocracy values were equally found in The Rescue, with a score of 25. Thus, the clan culture was least found with a score of only 23 (see Figure 15). More importantly, it was found that the cultural profiles of both organisations became more balanced, when compared with the pre-reform period.
Table 13: Post-reform cultural scores of horizontally integrated organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
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<td><strong>Commission A</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The Rescue</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
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</table>

Figure 15: Post-reform cultural models of horizontally integrated organisations

In the case of *Commission A*, when looking at the data with regard to its partners, the research has found the following. At *Guru A*, public employees perceived that the market element developed to become the dominant culture, with a score of 27 whereas the clan value decreased significantly, from 32 to 25. These two scores were similar to the overall score of *Commission A* (see Table 14). Moreover, they perceived that the adhocracy element had increased from 21.5 to 26. This score was higher than the average score of *Commission A*. Furthermore, people noticed that the hierarchy culture had declined from 23.25 to 22 and it was found to be lower than the average score. At *Guru B*, public employees also felt that the market culture
developed significantly from a score of 24 to 27. It became the dominant culture of Commission A in their eyes. The clan element dropped substantially from a score of 30 to 24.5. However, adhocracy values developed moderately, from a score of 22 to 24.5. The perception of both values was lower than the average score. Furthermore, people believed that the hierarchy aspect was not changed by the reform at all, with a score of 24. Nevertheless, the perception of it was above the average organisational score.

Table 14: Post-reform cultural scores of Commission A’s partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Guru A</th>
<th>Guru B</th>
<th>The Instructor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At The Instructor, civil servants had different perceptions from the other two groups with regard to the cultural orientations of Commission A. They observed that the clan culture was still dominant, although it dropped from a score of 35 to 27. This score was moderately above the average score. Having opposite perceptions, they considered that the hierarchy element had developed moderately, from a score of 21 to 23, despite being equivalent to the average score. In addition, they saw that market and adhocracy values moderately developed following the integration reform. The former increased from a score of 23 to 26 while the latter going from 21 to 23. Both of them were found to be below the average organisational score. Figure 16 illustrates the cultural perceptions of Commission A with regard to people’s different organisational backgrounds.
Figure 16: Post-reform cultural perceptions of Commission A’s partners

When looking at the data with regard to the levels of administration, public employees who worked at the central and local levels perceived the organisational cultures slightly differently. At the central level, the market score was found highest of all. It increased from a score of 25 to 28. This score was higher than the average score (see Table 15). Next, clan and adhocracy values were equally found, scoring 25. However, the clan culture dropped significantly from a score of 30.5 to 25 while the adhocracy one increased moderately, from a score of 22 to 25. The hierarchy score was least found and it decreased marginally, from 22.5 to 22. This score was below the average score.

Table 15: Post-reform cultural scores of Commission A’s levels of administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
At a local level, the market and adhocracy cultures were found mostly and equally, scoring 26. Although the market culture increased moderately, from 23, the score was lower than the average score. The adhocracy element developed substantially, from 21.5 and the total score was higher than the average organisational score. The clan element dropped sharply, from a score of 32 to 25. The hierarchy culture was least found and decreased marginally, from a score of 23.5 to 23. Figure 17 illustrates different cultural perceptions with regard to the levels of administration.

Figure 17: Post-reform cultural profiles of Commission A’s levels of administration
Teachers and civil servants perceived the organisational cultures slightly differently. On the one hand, teachers noticed that market and adhocracy values co-dominated *Commission A*, with a score of 26 (see Table 16). The market element developed moderately, from 23, and it was found to be lower than the average score. In contrast, the adhocracy aspect was found to be higher than the organisational score and it increased from 24.5. The clan culture was found third and it dropped substantially, from 32 to 25. The hierarchy element was least found, with a marginal reduction, from 23.5 to 23.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 16: Post-reform cultural scores of different professions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, civil servants perceived that *Commission A* was a performance-based workplace as the market culture dominated the organisation, with a score of 28. The score was also higher than the overall score. The adhocracy element was next found and it developed moderately, from a score of 22 to 25. The clan culture was found third. It dropped significantly, from a score of 31 to 24. This score was also lower than the organisational score. Unlike teachers, civil servants perceived that the hierarchy culture developed marginally during the post-reform period, with a score from 22.5 to 23.

Turning now to correlation analysis, the research has found that education levels were found to be positively correlated with the hierarchy culture in *Commission A* (see Table 17). This means that the more highly people were educated, the more likely they were to notice the hierarchy values. However, the other three values, which were clan, adhocracy and market, had no relationship with demographic factors.
Table 17: Correlation analysis of Commission A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.669</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.462</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.689</td>
<td>.739</td>
<td>.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>-.045</td>
<td>.108*</td>
<td>-.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.286</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

In the case of *The Rescue*, the research has found that each partner perceived the organisational cultures slightly differently. In regard to *The Developer*, the market score was found highest of all values (see Table 18). It developed moderately from a score of 25 to 27. Next, adhocracy and hierarchy cultures were found equally with a score of 25. The former increased substantially, from 20, whilst the latter developed slightly, from 24. The clan culture was least found and it dropped a great deal, from a score of 31 to 23. At *The Volunteer*, the market culture was reported mostly and developed significantly from a score of 22 to 26.5. This score was slightly lower than the overall score. The hierarchy element was found second and developed slightly from a score of 24 to 25. The clan culture was then found and it was the only culture that dropped substantially, from a score of 33 to 24.5. Although reported least amongst all, the adhocracy element developed moderately, from 21 to 24.

Table 18: Post-reform cultural scores of The Rescue’s partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>The Developer</th>
<th>The Volunteer</th>
<th>Analyst A</th>
<th>Aide A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Public officials who came from *Aide A* also considered market values as the dominant culture. It developed significantly, from a score of 23 to 28. This score was higher than the overall score and was the highest amongst all partners. The adhocracy aspect was next found with a substantial development from a score of 20 to 24.5. The clan culture was then reported, and although it did decrease a great deal, from a score of 35 to 24, the score was higher than the organisational score. The hierarchy aspect was least found but it developed slightly, from 22 to 23.5. When compared across all partners, the hierarchy culture was also least found according to people from *Aide A*.

Having a slightly different perception to the rest, civil servants from *Analyst A* perceived that the clan culture still dominated *Commission A*. Although it dropped slightly, from a score of 27 to 26, the clan values were substantially found higher than the organisational score. Market and adhocracy values were equally found, with a score of 25. The market score had not changed and was lower than the overall score while the adhocracy score increased moderately, from 23 to 25. The hierarchy element was least found of all values. It dropped slightly, from a score of 25 to 24. Figure 18 illustrates the cultural profiles of *The Rescue* with regard to different backgrounds.
Using correlation analysis of *The Rescue*, the research has found that only age groups were negatively correlated with the market culture (see Table 19). This means that the older the people were, the less likely they were to notice the market culture in the organisation. For the other three cultural values: clan, adhocracy and hierarchy, there was no relationship with demographic factors.

### Table 19: Correlation analysis of *The Rescue*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
<th>Job rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>-.119</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>-.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adhocracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>-.126</td>
<td>-.041</td>
<td>.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.942</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.602</td>
<td>.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>-.184*</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>-.095</td>
<td>-.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>.222</td>
<td>.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hierarchy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>.536</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>.974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)*
5.3 Discussion

This section discusses the qualitative and quantitative results that have been presented in sections 5.1 and 5.2. The discussion has been formulated according to cultural types, beginning with clan, hierarchy, market, and concluding with adhocracy.

Public employees perceived that a clan element was found highest of all values in the pre-reform period. Quantitatively, the findings presented in section 5.2.1 have demonstrated that a clan-based relationship dominated organisations regardless of organisational types, professions and levels of administration. For qualitative data, the template analysis was used to build themes of cultural characteristics. A theme of clan-based relationship was aggregated from words and phrase such as attentiveness, generosity, warmth, siblings, kinship, brothers and sisters, family and teamwork that were frequently mentioned by participants. Interviewees reported through their recollection that the clan-based relationship at their former workplaces was high (see also section 5.1.1). Given that the perception of the clan culture inclined toward flexibility and discretion and internal focus, this implied that the organisations valued human relationships more than any other values. Organisations operated on the basis of tradition, commitment to teamwork, mutual understanding, trust in each other, and loyalty to the workplace more than any other values. Furthermore, it also implied that organisational types (commission-like and traditional departments) had no relationship with the clan domination of organisations.

When the integration reform was implemented, a reduction of clan values was found by both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data has clearly demonstrated substantive differences in clan scores. For example, when comparing the cultural scores from Table 13 with those of 8, a significant reduction of the clan aspect was found. It decreased from a score of 32 to 25 at Commission A and from 31.5 to 23 at

37 Throughout this thesis, a significant reduction means a decrease in scores of more than five scales. A moderate reduction refers to a decrease in scores of 2.1 to 5. A slight reduction means a decrease in scores of 0.1 to 2.
The Rescue. More specifically in the case of Commission A, although the clan element dropped a great deal, people from The Instructor still felt its domination in the organisation (see Table 14). In the case of The Rescue, people who came from Analyst A similarly perceived the domination of the clan culture in the organisation, but a slight reduction was found (see Table 18). While the majority of public employees perceived that a clan-based relationship was no longer dominant in their workplace, people from Analyst A and The Instructor felt that their new workplace was still a friendly place to work at; although the intensity of clan values was less than the pre-reform era. Qualitative data also revealed the reduction in clan values. Public employees perceived that their new integrated organisations valued clan-based relationships to a lesser extent than previously. The perception of clan values was based on recollections or on a comparison of current situation to and pre-reform one. The theme of clan-based relationship in the post-reform period was represented in negative-meaning words or phrases such as nepotism, patronage system, group-based interests and competition for outputs and performance. Participants frequently mentioned these words to explain how clan values had decreased, in especially those who worked at The Rescue. This could imply, in this situation, that new team-building, trust in each other and loyalty to new workplaces, were superseded by a patron-client relationship.

As far as the hierarchy culture was concerned, its presence was found to a moderate level\(^38\) in organisations. In the pre-reform period, quantitative data in Table 8 has demonstrated that the hierarchy element was found in second and third place in Commission A and The Rescue, respectively. When looking more closely at the data, hierarchy values were found in public organisations to varying degrees. For example, the hierarchy culture was found second, third or equal to either market or adhocracy values according to data presented in Tables 9 and 12. People’s perceptions of hierarchy values at the central and local levels were slightly different. The data in Table 10 has disclosed that the hierarchy culture was found second and third at the

\(^38\) Throughout this thesis, the presence of cultural values is categorised into three levels. A slight level refers to a cultural score of less than 22. A moderate level means a cultural score of 22.1 to 28. A high level means a cultural score of more than 28.
local and central levels, respectively. The data in Table 11 has revealed that teachers reported the hierarchy values second to clan while civil servants considered it in third place. The theme of hierarchy-based relationship emerges in how the public employees frequently mentioned formality and lines of command in the workplaces. They believed that law and order compliance was a must-do thing for all public employees. Thus, they referred to words such as orders, regulations, commands, systems or procedures to explain how hierarchy values were perceived.

In the post-reform period, the perception of the hierarchy culture had changed slightly. It dropped slightly and became the least found at Commission A. On the other hand, it developed slightly and was equally found in second place with the adhocracy culture at The Rescue. Regardless of background, profession and level of administration, the data presented in Tables 14-16 has revealed that public employees who worked at Commission A perceived similarly that the hierarchy culture was found lowest of all values following the integration reform. At The Rescue, civil servants from The Developer and The Volunteer noticed that the hierarchy culture was found second. However, it was least found among all values according to the people from Analyst A and Aide A. The qualitative data from both case studies revealed how public employees had to follow formal regulations. Although they could have some decision-making power, they had to use it within the law. Most of the respondents did not notice a change in hierarchy values between the pre- and post-reform periods. They believed that the hierarchy culture was quite static, especially in The Rescue, where the departmental administration followed a typical, bureaucratic style.

Prior to the integration reform, the level of the market culture was moderate. It was reported next to the hierarchy culture in most organisations studied, but never close to the clan culture. For example, Tables 9 and 12 suggested that, in general, a market culture was found second in most workplaces, except in the case of The Volunteer. More specifically to the case of Commission A, the perception of the market culture was different with regard to levels of administration. Table 10 has revealed that people who worked at a central level considered the market culture as second, next to
the clan one, whereas those who worked at a local level noticed it less than clan and hierarchy values. Scores from Table 11 have revealed that different professions also perceived the market values differently. In regard to civil servants, the market culture was found second but it was found in third place according to teachers. The fact that the score of the market culture perceived by civil servants was higher than that of teachers and the level of market values at a central level was higher than that of the local one implies that different professions and levels of administration could affect how people perceive market values in their workplace. Qualitative data has revealed that the market-based culture was perceived through reports of achievement and performance. However, participants mentioned that these issues were not formally emphasised during this period.

After the integration reform was implemented, the market culture became the dominant culture of Commission A and The Rescue. According to quantitative data presented in Table 13, the market scores developed moderately but were the highest amongst all the values. Therefore, it could be concluded that both organisations recently operated toward stability, control, external focus and differentiation. They became result-oriented workplaces in which winning and goal achievement were emphasised. Public employees were motivated by rewards which would be given on a performance basis.

With regard to levels of administration in Commission A, Table 15 has revealed different perceptions between central and local levels. The score of the market culture at the central level was slightly higher than the organisational score. However, people who worked at a local level thought that the market culture co-dominated the organisation with that of the adhocracy one. Moreover, looking at data with regard to professional differences between teachers and civil servants revealed that both groups perceived the cultural orientations of Commission A differently (see Table 16). While civil servants believed that market values dominated Commission A, teachers observed that it co-dominated the workplace with that of the adhocracy one. The observation was made here that the perceptions of market values of teachers and people who worked at a local level were similar. This was highly likely to be a
result of the fact that the majority of people working at the local level were teachers. In this respect, teachers and people who worked at the local level perceived that Commission A was a workplace that embraced values such as competitiveness, productivity, innovation and creativity more than other values. Accordingly, public employees were rewarded on the basis of performance, initiatives, products and services. On the other hand, civil servants and people who worked at the central level considered Commission A as a performance-oriented workplace.

As far as the issues of performance and outcome are concerned, qualitative data has revealed that the emphasis of a market-based culture might have produced unintended consequences. On the one hand, most respondents acknowledged that a performance-based evaluation had increasingly developed in their workplaces. It had changed the human relationship from a team-oriented one to a more competitive one. A theme of market-based relationship was built with an aggregation of words frequently mentioned by participants such as performance reports, KPIs, special remuneration and career promotion. Participants felt that the emphasis on these issues were formalised compared with the pre-reform period. However, many respondents also wondered whether matching performance indicators really signified outcome achievement of the organisations. For example, in the case of Commission A, if these two issues were the same, why did learning outcome go against performance achievement reports? The outcome issue was more complicated at The Rescue as new organisational characteristics made it more difficult for the department to measure outcomes. This was because it needed cooperation from stakeholders to achieve organisational outcomes. In addition, the increase in performance-based evaluation tied in closely with the reduction in clan values in organisations as people were forced to compete with each other for personal rewards. In this respect, the increase in performance-based management had not always signified outcome achievement of the organisations.
As far as the adhocracy culture was concerned, its scores were least found amongst all values regardless of organisational type, professions and levels of administration in the pre-reform period (see Tables 9-12). The presence of adhocracy values were rarely mentioned by the participants, with the exception of The Developer and The Instructor. This was because The Developer was originally established as an ad hoc organisation whereas The Instructor was a specialised department to research and develop curricula and instructions. In this respect, people from both workplaces identified adhocracy values through products and services more clearly than other organisations. In the post-reform period, the quantitative data has shown that adhocracy values developed in all organisations. It became the second element to be reported in Commission A and The Rescue. It was equally found with a clan culture in Commission A while it was also equally found with a hierarchy culture in The Rescue.

As far as the different professions and levels of administration of Commission A are concerned, Tables 15 and 16 have revealed that teachers and public employees who worked at the local level believed that the adhocracy culture co-dominated their workplace with the market culture in the post-integration reform period. According to this data, they perceived that their organisational culture had changed from a clad-dominated to a combination of result-based and innovation-oriented culture. According to the qualitative data, the perception of the adhocracy culture was different from the quantitative results. In the case of The Rescue, the perception of adhocracy values in the post-reform period was lower than the pre-reform one. This might be because of the changing nature of The Rescue, where the culture of work changed from construction to cooperation with outsiders. Thus, it was more difficult for The Rescue’s employees to identify public services as part of organisational success. However, for people who had a background with The Instructor, the perception of adhocracy values changed peripherally due to the unchanging core functions of work.
Finally, with regard to the civil service profession, a comparison of cultural perceptions between *Commission A* and *The Rescue* was made. This is because both included the civil service profession within their organisations. In addition, all civil servants are regulated and evaluated under appropriate laws and criteria, regardless of the workplace. The research has found that they perceived the organisational cultures slightly differently (see Table 20). Although civil servants from both organisations similarly reported that a market culture dominated their workplaces, the levels of other cultural values were found to be different. In *Commission A*, the adhocracy, clan and hierarchy values were second, third and least found, respectively. In *The Rescue*, the adhocracy and hierarchy values were found equally whereas the clan element was found lowest of all values. In this respect, it could be concluded that organisational characteristics had a relationship with the cultural perceptions of members. Figure 19 illustrates how cultures were perceived.

**Table 20: A comparison of post-reform cultural scores of civil servants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commission A</th>
<th>The Rescue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The research has also found that leadership was one important factor with regard to the perceptions of organisational cultures in the post-reform period. It could either minimise or deepen the cultural differences of partners. In addition, the organisational characteristics might influence how leaders pursue tools and methods in order to administer the integrated organisations. At *Commission A*, which was a committee-based and huge organisation, leadership at different administrative tiers was exhibited slightly differently. At the national level, leadership was important in the transitional period as people from three different cultures had to work in the same team. Leaders probably sought the most appropriate administration to balance cultural differences. For example, Jacob, who was a bureau head, explained that:
“Suddenly after the integration, I was the head of the General Administration Bureau that integrated the general administration functions of Guru A, Guru B and The Instructor. I knew that people from each organisation came with their cultures, teams or clans. So, I regard human resources as more important than anything else. I believed that the prolonged misunderstanding among partners led to separation or castes. I minimised differences through negotiation, bargaining and seminar strategies. It took some years to build mutual understanding but a few people were still heartbroken from the integration”.

In terms of leadership at the executive level affecting a whole organisation, a clear vision and emphasis of strategies and goals was important to glue the organisation together. Jacob further noted that:

“Commission A was lucky once it had a leader who used to be the director-general of all three departments, so she understood the cultures of all of them. She probably compromised the needs of all sides since it was more important to build a single team to operate effectively. She usually focused on organisational goals and coordination, including respect for different opinions. She emphasised that people could have different attitudes but we must not be divided. Thus, we had to work together with the most appropriate solution”.

However, apart from organisational visions, goals and strategies, leadership at the local level might have had different influences on the cultural perceptions of people at the local level. It is likely that leadership at this level involved a relationship between The Dealer and schools. For example, Jeremy did not notice any change in the leadership of executives through the integration reform. In contrast, he felt that the relationship between local actors had changed from a clan-based to a hierarchy-oriented one. He explained that:

“The relationship between top executives and people working at a local level was not different between the pre- and post-integration. It was always distant since the organisation was always too big to retain closeness between each other. The communication was always formal and hierarchical. However, the relationship between local actors was different. Prior to the reform, ODPEC was a family-like workplace where closeness between the office and schools was
overwhelmingly found. We treated each other as if we were brothers and sisters. The atmosphere was friendly and full of generosity and attentiveness. In contrast, Commission A was more hierarchical and rule-oriented. Administration and communication were based on regulations or orders so the relationship between schools and The Dealer was more formal and distant. Perhaps it was difficult to know everyone on a much larger organisational scale. Generosity and the attentiveness culture nearly dried up”.

Having a similar perception, Jasmine felt that leadership influenced how she perceived organisational cultures. She described how:

“When I worked at Guru A, the Secretary and provincial and district heads were close to subordinates. The atmosphere was full of understanding, compromise and warmth. Human relationship was one of the organisational focuses. In contrast, human relationship within Commission A was more distant. The boss was the boss, regardless of the levels of administration they occupied. Internal coordination was made through orders and hierarchical control was more evident than previously”.

In addition, a relationship between local leadership and cultural perceptions could be found through the scale of administration. For example, Jared, who once worked at ODPEC and then The Dealer, commented that:

“Leadership and size at a local level interrelated with each other, with regard to managerial complication. Previously, ODPEC was smaller and less complicated to manage than The Dealer. As it was small, teamwork was formed more easily; helpfulness, warmth and understanding of each other were found easily. We used to work as if we were kin. This culture was one important force that pushed our organisation forward. After the integration reform, The Dealer was larger than ODPEC as it was the aggregation of many local educational offices. It became more complex to manage and the relationship between The Dealer and schools became distant as a result of an overload of work at The Dealer level. It became used as one of the main communication methods and schools had to help themselves for general administration. In addition, local leaders were interested in reading performance data or output reports at the office rather than paying a visit to schools as they did previously. This widened the gap of distant relationships while teamwork, helpfulness and generosity at the local level gradually withered away”.

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At *The Rescue*, which was smaller than *Commission A* and was administered with a typical, bureaucratic style, leadership at the executive level went down through the frontline staff. The relationship between leaders and subordinates was likely to be top-down, single, steady and hierarchical. For example, during an early stage of integration, leaders pursued regulations and orders to align both tangible and intangible values. For example, Ashton mentioned that:

> “During the period of one director, he set up a team to deal specifically with team building. A new departmental symbol was repeatedly used to emphasise teamwork … Coincidently, when the tsunami hit Thailand’s southern coast, we had to work hard to help victims, regardless of different backgrounds. The tsunami unexpectedly narrowed background differences as people understood each other more than previously. I now think that everyone was happy and overlooked background differences”.

This demonstrates how an attempt to create teamwork was originated by a top-down order. Nevertheless, some people might feel that leadership discreetly embraced a patronage-based system. For example, although coming from the majority side, *The Developer*, Sahara viewed the organisational leadership as follows:

> “Previously, leaders usually supported and took care of subordinates. At present they are pretty ignorant, authoritarian, merciless and nepotistic”.

A relationship between leadership and the alteration of culture such as the reduction in clan values and the development of a patronage-based relationship was also witnessed by Serena, who has worked at *Aide A* for more than 20 years. She described how:

> “Currently, leaders pay less attention to, give less advice and support to, subordinates than was previously found. This action has lowered subordinates’ morale as leaders are self-interested in being promoted to higher positions and ignore front-line staff … Recently, some leaders have not been promoted from within or based on actual performance but instead because they are close to top executives. I was speechless. Some of them were authoritarian, rude, foolish,”
disrespectful, self-interested, selfish and would look down on people”.

With regard to the performance issue, leadership could affect the perception of a patron-client relationship that existed discreetly. For example, Stephanie, who has worked on the support staff at The Developer for more than 14 years, commented that:

“Although indicators about performance evaluation and salary and career promotion were set, they were only documents. In reality, such decisions still depended on a patronage system, as was previously found. The value of human resource rather depended on who your patrons were”.

Feeling the same, Sahara perceived that:

“The current culture of work focuses on individual performance. This results in a lack of support among colleagues. In contrast, subordinates have to endure nepotism, caste and heartlessness from leaders”.

These interview extracts illustrate how leadership can influence the cultural changes in public organisations. This is because the exhibition of leadership has led to the perceptions of cultural elements in organisations such as the development of or reduction in cultural values in the post-reform period, as has already been illustrated in previous paragraphs.
5.4 Concluding remarks

The horizontal integration of public organisations has altered the cultural orientation of related organisations. The current research has found that prior to the integration reform, public organisations operated toward flexibility, discretion, internal focus and integration. This meant that traditions, trust, loyalty, teamwork and consensus were valued more than any other values. These values glued people together in each of the studied organisations. However, when horizontal integration was implemented, the reform had a great effect on target organisations. Accordingly, the clan culture decreased significantly in both the committee-based and traditional organisations until it no longer dominated either workplace. In contrast, the market culture was developed to become the dominant culture of Commission A and The Rescue. This meant that organisations operated toward external focus, differentiation, stability and control. Performance-based or result-oriented management became a focus during the post-reform era, so public employees were rewarded on a performance based scheme. The development of market values countered the reduction in the clan culture to a certain extent. The once friendly workplace turned into a battleground amongst colleagues, who competed for better performance. In this respect, teamwork, generosity and attentiveness decreased. With regard to adhocracy and hierarchy values, the former had increased in most organisations while the latter was perceived as the nature of Thai public organisations. However, the hierarchy culture slightly developed at The Rescue while it slightly decreased at Commission A following the reform.

Leadership was an important factor that influenced the cultural perceptions of organisational members. This was because leaders were always the ones who guided organisational directions, visions or strategies. Therefore, the development of or reduction in any cultural values depended on the emphasis of the leaders. Nevertheless, although the general cultural orientation of Commission A and The Rescue during the post-reform embraced a result-based culture, the clan aspect, with regard to the patronage system, was still found in public organisations, especially at The Rescue. It was disguised under the performance issue and decisions were
sometimes made on a patron-client basis. One reason that could explain why a patronage system at The Rescue was more obvious than Commission A was the holding of managerial positions by powerful individuals. The powerless were then likely to be left out. In contrast, partners of Commission A maintained their negotiating power where power sharing was equal. In this respect, conflicts among people from different backgrounds at The Rescue were more likely than at Commission A. Moreover, when comparing happiness in the organisation between Commission A and The Rescue, both quantitative and qualitative data have revealed that people who worked at Commission A were happier with their lives than those at The Rescue.

In summary, the integration reform, theoretically, might have achieved its goal with regard to eliminating policy fragmentation. This is because both Commission A and The Rescue currently have a single committee to formulate policies and other related plans. Practically, only The Rescue became a wholly integrated department whereas Commission A still has two separate personnel systems with regard to teachers and civil servants. Although this difference might affect policy coordination of the organisation the least, it has a psychological effect in terms of different evaluation criteria and career advancement. In addition, the difference might affect how people from both groups perceive the organisational cultures.
Chapter Six:

Changes in Organisational Culture and Vertical Integration

This chapter presents findings and discussions about cultural changes from two vertically integrated public organisations, namely, Commission B and The Advocate\textsuperscript{39}. Briefly, Commission B was created to deal with higher education policies whereas The Advocate was responsible for coordinated policies related to women and family institutions. The former was the integration of four organisations while the latter was the re-aggregation of seven units from three different organisations. Commission B was a committee-based organisation whereas The Advocate followed a traditional, departmental administration in which a director-general was the head of the organisation.

Similar to chapter five, this chapter is divided into four sections, of which the first presents the cultural profiles of the organisations derived from qualitative data. The next section presents the findings from quantitative data. The third section is a discussion of organisational cultures and the crucial factors in cultural changes. The final section is the chapter’s conclusion. A comparison between the two organisations is made throughout the whole chapter. This chapter argues that the vertical integration reform has changed the cultural profiles of the relevant public organisations. The organisational culture changed from a clan-dominated to a performance-based workplace following the reform. However, when the details are investigated more closely, public employees from some workplaces perceived the cultural changes differently.

\footnote{39 See Glossary for full names of organisations.}
6.1 The cultural profiles of organisations: Qualitative findings

This section explores qualitative data derived from semi-structured interviews conducted with ten people from Commission B and another eight people from The Advocate. The findings also include answers derived from open-ended questions from the questionnaire. With regard to cultural values, the section is divided into the four topics of clan, hierarchy, market and adhocracy cultures. Each topic discusses the culture in the pre-reform period first and is followed by the post-integration situation.

6.1.1 The clan culture

At Commission B, the research has found that public officials working at different places identified their organisations as being clan-based workplaces in the pre-integration reform. The presence of clan values was widely perceived. However, the clan aspect declined following the integration reform. At the central level, Andrew, who had worked at The Rajabhat and at the time of the research was a bureau head, noticed that his former workplace was really clan-oriented because the organisation usually focused on people. He said:

“In terms of social relationships, you have to understand that The Rajabhat dealt mainly with education affairs. This meant that the director-general of The Rajabhat was not only your boss but also probably your previous lecturer. This implied a really strong seniority in the organisation. You might call this a semi-patronage culture. Everything went well under this system. It was not strange as this kind of relationship was relatively common in Thai society anyway. The relationship [among colleagues at The Rajabhat] was really warm, for example, executives always took good care of subordinates in almost everything from routine jobs or personal issues … The atmosphere was really warm as if we were kin.”
Although from a different organisational background, Kara, who had worked at The Ministry and was now a senior civil servant, considered that

“…the working culture of my previous organisation was a family-like institution. We worked as though we were brothers and sisters and got full support from each other”.

Similarly, Hazel, who had worked at The Ministry for 8-15 years, said that

“…previously people were full of attentiveness. Currently, after the new evaluation criteria were implemented to reward people who have outstanding performance, people have started competing with each other for better personal performance more and more.”

The presence of clan values was also found from higher education institutions in the pre-integration reform. For example, Henry, who had worked for the support staff at a former Rajabhat institute, noticed that:

“The organisation once had a close relationship. People were helpful and supportive due to the small size of the organisation. However, the organisation has become larger and a restructuring of the organisation was implemented to facilitate more flexible management. This has resulted in more distant relationships between people.”

Bella, who was an assistant professor and had worked at another university of The Ministry for 15-21 years, commented on the presence of clan values through a comparison that:

“…previously, the organisation focused on teamwork and rule compliance. Recently, competition has increased and management became more flexible.”
Similarly, Billy, who was the department head with more than 21 years’ work experience at another university of The Ministry, perceived that,

“Previously, we used to work together, have fun, have happy moments and support each other at work and away from work. Secondly, we were accredited and trusted by local communities that believed in the neutrality and fairness of the university. Thirdly, academics used to work as a team, helping and supporting each other in teaching, research, academic services and so on with no jealousy or discouragement.”

After organisations were integrated with each other, many public employees perceived that the clan culture had declined substantially. Again, Andrew, who came from a minority group, felt that fault perception or an underestimation of other people’s capabilities might widen the gap between clans. He said:

“At the time of integration, the functions of both organisations were certainly different. The previous functions of The Ministry, approximately 90 per cent, have been passed onto Commission B. So, we had very little idea what things we should do and how … Initially, I was not interested in working here at a central level, but decided to transfer to work at one university. However, I changed my mind when I heard from some colleagues who had already relocated to Commission B that they were loathed by people from The Ministry for their ineffectiveness. People from The Rajabhat did the same thing. Both sides despised each other. I decided to come here to experience it for myself and prove them wrong … People from The Ministry were afraid that people from The Rajabhat would take most of the managerial positions as the latter group had occupied a higher rank than them … I was lucky that one of my subordinates who came from The Ministry taught me a lot about the administrative styles [of The Ministry]. However, some heads were humiliated by subordinates because of their ineffectual administration … Familiarity needs some time and all of us have to adjust ourselves and learn from each other … It has been five years now. I think that we have already blended as we have come to understand the styles of work and strengths and weaknesses of each other. Time helped”.

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Kara, who was a civil servant with more than 21 years’ work experience at *The Ministry*, also believed that:

> “Trust in each other led to generosity and determination to work for the organisation. However, it needed some time to build up especially for people who had different working cultures. I thought that colleagues who used to work together at *The Ministry* would trust in each other more than trust in those who came from *The Rajabhat*.”

Also, Samantha, who had a background at *The Ministry* and was also a bureau head, explained that:

> “At the beginning, there was a separation between us and people from *The Rajabhat* as they were still located at their old workplace. It was a bit difficult to coordinate with one another. However, when they relocated here, they were mixed with us and appointed to various bureaux according to their skills. It was no problem as they were in a minority, in that our system was less centralised than theirs. As we had more autonomy, it was easy for them to adjust to this system. There might still be a small problem due to the strangeness of new colleagues. We were not used to working with them to begin with. However, as time passed, we sat next to each other, worked together until we barely recognised people’s backgrounds.”

In *The Advocate*, the presence of and change in clan values between the pre- and post-integration periods were also perceptible. For example, Norah, who came from Analyst B with 15-21 years’ work experience, said that:

> “The organisational culture at my previous workplace imitated a relationship in a family. We were brothers and sisters. Subordinates used to call their managers at all levels with the word “*Pii*”,40 so that the atmosphere really reflected what our organisational culture was like.

40 *Pii* means older brothers or sisters.
The “Pii-Nhong”\textsuperscript{41} culture that we were accustomed to changed. Subordinates who worked here began to call their managers a “leader”. I wondered why they would not call managers “Pii” as we did once and found that the human relationship at Analyst B was closer than here … The Advocate had a very low degree of generosity, attentiveness or helpfulness among colleagues who came from different backgrounds. The organisation had not yet built mutual understanding between each other … I thought that everyone wished to go back to where they were, as I did. However, I thought that The Advocate also had good points and its core policy issues would motivate people to stay.”

Nick, who came from Aide B, also admitted that an integrated organisation had widened a clan-divided atmosphere especially during the beginning of the integration reform. He reported that:

“In an early period of integration, people from different organisations stayed around with their own groups so that the organisation looked like a layer of oil and water. Those who came from Analyst B were highly academic and expert while those who came from The Supporter were trained in specific issues of community development. Both came with strong personalities. In contrast, Aide B was composed of people who had diverse backgrounds such as doctors or general administrators. We [Aide B] might be less specialised than the other two groups, but we used to work in an extremely friendly workplace where respect was given to each other. When cultural backgrounds were totally different, conflicts were sure to arise, following the integration reform. People from Analyst B did not respect those who came from Aide B as they thought that people from the latter were not sufficiently capable of working with them. Later, the situation was better after some ice-breaking activities were used to ease the tension and build mutual understanding among colleagues.”

These perspectives reflected the fact that the level of clan values had declined sharply in these two integrated organisations. Although a clan element was still found, it was not yet similar to what had been embedded in former workplaces. Indeed, human relationships in the new integrated organisations still needed some time to crystallise amidst different organisational characteristics or ways of thinking.

\textsuperscript{41}“Nhong” means younger brothers or sisters. Therefore, the “Pii-Nhong” culture means the brother-and-sister culture
6.1.2 The hierarchy culture

In Commission B, the hierarchy values were perceived through organisational characteristics. For example, Thomas, who was a bureau head with 15-21 years’ work experience at a central, civil office of The Ministry, perceived that, prior to the integration reform,

“The organisational structure of the Secretariat Office of The Ministry was directly controlled by a minister [of the Ministry of University Affairs]. However, the organisation dealt only with general administration and regulations. We were working as a support unit to facilitate [25] public universities in terms of coordinating them to set strategies corresponding to the government’s higher education policies. Since The Ministry was a small entity, the hierarchical line of command was short and less complex.”

On the other hand, with regard to The Rajabhat's organisational characteristics, the presence of a hierarchy culture was widely perceptible. For example, Ricky, who had worked at one Rajabhat institute for more than 21 years and was at the time of the interview a chancellor, similarly perceived that:

“Although all Rajabhat Institutes had their individual, institutional councils, these councils were not independent but rather controlled by The Rajabhat, which was the central council for all institutes. The administrative mechanisms or institutes’ supervision were controlled by The Rajabhat anyway. This culture had been derived from the previous administration, which was known as the Teacher College era.”

After organisations were integrated with each other, a hierarchy culture was variously perceived by public employees. At an institutional level, Karina, who had worked for 8-14 years at one university of The Ministry, noticed that
“Commission B has imposed some regulations and guidance such as the TQF\textsuperscript{42} or other educational standard criteria upon academics. This enforcement is burdensome and we have to comply with it. The compliance inevitably impacts on academic freedom.”

Similarly, Brian, who was an associate professor with more than 21 years’ work experience, became very frustrated with the excessive power of Commission B over his academic profession. He said that

“…strategic issues such as Blueprint for Change have been decided by imprudent people who did not understand the nature of higher education. Also, academics have been ordered to comply with a silly PMQA [Public Sector Management Quality Award]. This was totally rubbish, wasteful and untrue”.

Karen noticed that the organisation had now been overwhelmed with hierarchical elements. She said that:

“Recently, academics have been assigned many tasks and have to execute them all. Mostly, it was about filing and preparing too many documents designed by Commission B. It consumed most of our time and had to be done only for the purpose of ticking boxes. So, time for academic development such as doing new research or other expertise development has been traded-in for these burdens”.

Also, Mark, who was an assistant professor and had worked at one university of The Ministry between 8-14 years, commented that:

“Previously, academic freedom was really high. The Ministry gave minimal supervision to universities. However, when The Ministry was integrated to become Commission B, universities were controlled through lots of regulations, guidance and standardised criteria in many ways more than previously.”

\textsuperscript{42} TQF stands for Thailand Qualification Framework for Higher Education
However, Katie, who was an assistant professor and had worked at one former Rajabhat institute between 8-14 years, had a slightly different perception of the presence of hierarchy values in the organisation. She said that

“…new administrative regulations were more flexible than the old ones, especially for budgetary management”.

Her opinion suggests that the previous organisational management was more controlled by regulations than the present one. At the central level of Commission B, civil servants felt that the hierarchy culture had declined. For example, Andrew, who came from a more centralised atmosphere, contended that:

“The Rajabhat was operated under a bureaucratic system in that the director or secretary of The Rajabhat was the top executive. Management was done through hierarchical lines of command that placed all 41 Rajabhat institutes as equivalent to internal bureaux. So, those institutes were under the control of a director through the appointment of institute chancellors … The Rajabhat was a centralised organisation but when it was integrated into Commission B, the old working styles changed nearly completely. Commission B was a more decentralised workplace as the central office had no power to control universities like The Rajabhat once had. This was because the budgets of Commission B and the universities were allocated separately … Commission B might set curriculum standard criteria and could only ask universities to cooperate by implementing such criteria. Having no powers of enforcement over universities, Commission B only accredited curricula that matched all the criteria”.

Furthermore, Peter, who was a senior consultant of Commission B with more than 21 years’ work experience at The Ministry, explained that:

“The Ministry was controlled by the Administrative Regulations of the Ministry of University Affairs Act, which indicated its roles and responsibilities. Actually, this act gave us no power to intervene in university administration, but identified roles to support universities in how they followed government policies or national plans to meet the need of graduates … Although we worked at a policy level, we never had any power to allocate resources to universities. They could deal directly with the Budget Bureau for their annual budget. This was a crucial problem as we might not have well-coordinated policy
directions. Although Commission B had policy guidance, universities might decide not to follow it and we could do nothing. It might look like Commission B had enforcement powers, but actually not at all … Therefore, if we did not have power over resource allocation, how could we reward universities’ good practices or discipline the failing ones? We might only use social sanctions to discipline those below the standard institutions. We would tell society about the standardised universities. We thought that education standards were crucial and we had been blamed for doing this quite a lot … The relationship between the then Ministry or recently Commission B and universities, was not a hierarchy, but rather a process of supervising them to follow our standard criteria. Universities had their own administrative authority. We always embedded aspects of participation on the part of universities as our way of work. We invited university scholars to give advice and comments before arriving at mutual agreement. Therefore, any guidance that was issued by Commission B did not mean that they were discreetly made or top-down formulated. Even the TQF guidance was designed, commented on and criticised by academic guests, well before being put forward to be implemented by the universities.”

In short, the development or reduction in the hierarchy values in Commission B probably depended on organisational backgrounds. The perceptions of people who worked at The Ministry’s universities with regard to the development of hierarchy values were similar. This was because some university academics linked a hierarchical culture to the implementation of standard criteria such as TQF. On the other hand, those who came from The Rajabhat were likely to perceive the decline of a hierarchical culture following the integration reform.

In the case of The Advocate, the presence of a hierarchy culture was perceived through the enforcement of administrative procedures and rule compliance. For instance, Nick, who came from Aide B and at the time of the interview occupied one of the administrative positions, noticed hierarchy elements in his former workplace as follows:

“Aide B usually worked within the scope of law. In the division where I worked there was dealing with low-income welfare so implementation always had to comply with the law.
“Following the establishment of The Advocate, which aggregated relevant organisations into a single department, we worked in accordance with treaties, regulations or procedures. I thought that this was a very challenging task with regard to the change in perspectives of target groups. Having clear directions benefited the organisation with higher budget allocation from the Government.”

Although his answer was not directly pointed at the hierarchical administration, the way The Advocate worked was still committed to official procedures. In contrast, Norah felt that, after the integration of organisations, the hierarchy culture had increased. She said that:

“The organisation really bound itself too much with rules and procedures, by which it delayed the process. Although my previous workplace complied with rules and procedures, we used them to make our understanding clear and to prevent corruption.”

All in all, the presence of hierarchical values in Thai public organisations was easily perceived through rule and order compliance. In every step of the implementation, public employees usually followed formal procedures to prevent themselves from being disciplined due to wrongdoing. In addition, a subordinate did not want to challenge authority or decisions made by a leader since his or her career could be in danger if it was proved that the allegation was untrue. Most subordinates thought that it was better form to follow decisions from the higher lines of command. In this respect, the level of hierarchy values in public organisations, regardless of types and sizes, was rarely changed but could be possibly disguised by a clear line of command or a true understanding of administrative procedures. Public employees would not feel strange as they would be accustomed to this style of work as it was the nature of Thai public organisations.
6.1.3 The market culture

Public employees who worked at Commission B perceived the presence of and change in the market culture by comparing the situation between pre- and post-reform periods. People noticed an increase in market values after the integration reform. This might have subsequently resulted in a reduction in clan values. For example, Kylie, who had worked between 15-21 years as a non-academic of staff at a former university of The Ministry, noticed that

“Recently, the organisation has emphasised task achievement. Performance has been used for motivation while shorter implementation procedures have also been pursued. So, customers are more satisfied with the services than previously … At the same time, coordination between internal units has been better as they had similar organisational goals. Also, the family-like style of organisational management has declined. This was because performance had been used for evaluation. Pass or fail, the indicators would have some implications for the achievement of a person, unit and organisation in one way or another. So, generosity and attentiveness between colleagues have declined.”

Having a similar perception, Kara, who worked at a central office of The Ministry, noted that

“Recently, the evaluation criteria that were monitored by two organisations – the OPDC and the Budget Bureau have reduced the generosity between colleagues. Everyone is focused on producing performance in order to pass the indicators for career promotion. Also, since the integration aggregated people from different working cultures, this has widened the gap between clans or colleagues.”

Martin, who was an assistant professor from a former Rajabhat institute, reported that:

“I thought that the introduction of performance evaluation had recently replaced a patronage system in the organisation.”
These perspectives indicated how the development of market values could have brought about a reduction in the clan element. The development of a market culture might be due to other factors such as the introduction of an evaluation system. For example, Katrina, who was a deputy head of a Faculty and had more than 21 years of work experience at one university of The Ministry, commented that

“Recently, Key Performance Indicators have been clearly designed although the Faculty of Humanities has usually focused on organisational management, teaching, research, academic services and arts and culture preservation issues since its establishment. However, the evaluation following the KPIs did not guarantee that outcomes would signify any success on the part of the organisation.”

Maxwell, who was a non-academic member of staff who worked at a former Rajabhat institute between 8-14 years, perceived that

“There were so many performance indicators which helped increased work efficiency. This was different from the past where efficiency was not emphasised.”

Hilda, who was a head of department with more than 21 years’ work experience, also noted that

“Recently, clear performance indicators have been introduced as a result of the Educational Quality Assurance policy. Accordingly, everyone has had to report their progress or success.”

Mike, who was a head of department at one university, had a similar view that:

“The Education Quality Assurance system has been introduced with various criteria to measure the success of organisations.”
At *The Advocate*, the presence of and change in the market culture was noticed through organisational characteristics. For instance, Norah, who came from *Analyst B*, commented that:

“Previously, *Analyst B*’s performance was not difficult to perceive since it was specialised and clear in its function in giving women-related policy suggestions to the Government. In addition, there was a national mechanism called “The National Committee for Women’s Support and Coordination”, which was chaired by the Prime Minister. As the PM was the head of the Government, his or her decisions would be effective and implemented by related organisations.

Recently, because they came from diverse backgrounds, people did not trust each other. Although the organisational management was quite clear, the focus had shifted to operation and implementation more than policy suggestion due to the policy of the permanent secretary of the ministry. I looked back and questioned why the reality was something different from the reform objective. I did not know how to explain my feelings. It was something that my ex-colleagues were capable of achieving their jobs with regard to policy suggestions. However, when I was relocated here, some people felt it was really difficult for them to do so. Instead, they were very capable of implementation with regard to preparing for activities, projects or something like that, but did those activities correspond to the establishment objective? I wondered.”

Her opinion implied that integration reform had weakened organisational performance and the capacity to produce planned outcomes. The re-aggregation of different organisational competences between policy and implementation units might have produced unintended consequences like this. However, Nick, who came from an implementation unit, perceived that the integration could enhance organisational performance. He contended that:

“After *The Advocate* was established as a policy unit, the integration accelerated the achievement of targets. Public employees were more comfortable implementing their jobs because the relevant laws endorsed the power of implementation. We could now work in cooperation with other partners from the public, private and non-government sectors. However, other factors that could facilitate target achievement had to be considered too, such as the follow-up
process and the delegation of projects to responsible organisations i.e. local governments. It still needed cooperation and collaboration from stakeholders to drive the project and to result in policy achievement.”

Nathan, who had a background with The Supporter, perceived the market values in the following way:

“The Advocate was a policy unit that had to produce relevant policies to be implemented by other government organisations. For example, a policy about family issues that involved many implementation phases would be implemented by responsible organisations such as the Department of Social Development and Welfare, the ministry of Education or the ministry of Public Health.”

Having another perspective, Nicole, who had more than 21 years of work experience at Aide B, seemed to be aware of the nature of social issues that might affect the achievement of targets. She considered that:

“Although we could set clear strategic and implementation plans, social issues were always dynamic. We would never catch them because they could have changed all the time. The dynamic nature of social problems could also affect how the organisation had to deal with particular problems such as the re-allocation of budget or the unintended impact on other issues.”

Nathan, who came from The Supporter, perceived the performance issue of The Advocate similarly to Nicole. He said that:

“Performance of The Supporter was measured from annual projects that were implemented systematically. For The Advocate, although it had an annual plan, this was only one part of the success. Whenever we needed other stakeholders to implement our policy initiatives, we could not always guarantee the achievement of a policy. It also depended on external factors and effective coordination among everyone.”
All these interview extracts illustrated the fact that the market culture had developed in organisations after the integration reform was implemented. Although some people noticed that their organisations previously had an evaluation system, the performance criteria were clearer and more consistent at the present time. This suggested that organisations operated in terms of result-based management. This meant that there was more emphasis on success or achievement than had previously been found, in that employees were rewarded on a performance basis.

6.1.4 The adhocracy culture

The presence of and change in the adhocracy culture was reported the least by public employees when compared to the other three cultures. At Commission B, adhocracy values might be found more easily in universities since they could be categorised as an ad hoc organisation with regard to individual internal management. For example, Miles, who was a lecturer at one of the former Rajabhat institutes with 8-14 years’ work experience, perceived that:

“Previously, the university focused on every aspect but it currently focuses on the development of university uniqueness (identity).”

Miguel, who was an assistant professor at one university of The Ministry and had worked between 8-14 years, also explained that

“Currently, the organisation has focused on issues such as patents, copyrights and innovation more than previously and I felt that it was too much for me”.

The ability to define itself and set university direction signified how an organisation embraced some autonomy to do so. With regard to IT and innovation elements, Milo, who had worked between 15-21 years and was at the time of the research an assistant professor at a former Rajabhat institute, considered that his workplace benefited from the use of IT in the administrative process. He said that:
“Recently, the process of documentation has been faster than previously due to the use of IT. Administrative power has been decentralised to faculties more than previously, such as human resource management, finances, and so on.”

Similarly, Kylie, who had worked at a different university, acknowledged the increase of IT being used as a part of job implementation. She said that:

“Recently, leaders have employed new technology and innovation with the purpose of facilitating the operation of the organisation.”

Seeing the relationship between IT and goal achievement, Bella also commented that:

“IT is currently being used in administration and implementation processes. I thought that this would be a push factor for organisational achievement.”

These perspectives reflected how particular organisational characteristics of higher education institutions contributed to the presence of adhocracy values. On the other hand, although being administered with a typical government department where the organisational environment could be more predictable than universities, civil servants who worked at The Advocate noticed the adhocracy culture too. People probably perceived ‘adhocracy’ as existing and changing through the implementation of some ad hoc projects. For example, Nicole, who came from Aide B, said that:

“With regard to family issues, if problems arose, such as domestic violence, we would quickly respond to the issue by initiating a campaign. We would use the media to campaign for the understanding and respect of the family. Also, it was used to raise public awareness of domestic violence including providing information related to protection and support. In addition, we would provide advice and help in cooperation with partners. I thought that tackling the problem needed effective coordination in both policy and implementation units. The policy alone was insufficient because everything was connected.
Nathan, of The Supporter, also inferred the presence of adhocracy elements through the characteristics of his organisation. He reported that:

“I thought that working at The Advocate was more flexible since it was small-sized. It was easier and faster to communicate with organisational members. It also had the ability to change and adapt when needed. In addition, the organisation was composed of various age groups in which members would benefit from adaptation and would learn to respect other people.”

Nikki, who came from Analyst B and was the head of one bureau, perceived the adhocracy culture:

“When Analyst B was part of the Prime Minister’s Office, we were more flexible and productive in that we had outputs with regard to women-related policies to be implemented by related organisations. Sometimes we might start implementing things by ourselves, such as a pilot campaign to raise public awareness toward the importance of women. We adopted many strategies that would enhance the success of policies through effective implementation.”

The adhocracy culture might be the one that public organisations embraced the least. This was because in their nature they did not have much autonomy to do things beyond the scope of the law. This had excluded some organisations that were given specific responsibilities, such as higher education institutions, or Analyst B, which was originally established as an innovative policy unit for the Government. In this respect, adhocracy values could be perceived.

In summary, the cultural profiles of public organisations in the pre-integration period inclined toward a clan culture; hierarchy values also appeared, but to a lesser extent. Market and adhocracy elements were rarely noticed by public employees. The fact that the perception of a clan culture was most frequently reported suggests that public organisations operated with flexibility and with discretion, and internal focus and integration. In this respect, public organisations preferably valued tradition, trust, loyalty and teamwork more than any other values. Public employees believed that their workplaces were a friendly place to work in. Subsequently, when the
integration reform was implemented, public employees felt that the clan culture had declined whilst market and adhocracy values had increased. Nonetheless, the hierarchy culture rarely changed.

6.2 Changes in organisational culture: Quantitative findings

This section presents findings derived from quantitative data analysis. The section is divided into two sections: the pre- and post-integration eras. A comparison between the two organisations is also made.

6.2.1 The pre-integration period: Cultural profiles of organisations

Prior to the vertical integration reform, the overall cultural model of Commission B and The Advocate was inclined toward the clan culture. The average scores of both organisations were 30 (see Table 21). Public employees who worked at both organisations also similarly perceived the presence of the hierarchy culture with a score of 25. However, the hierarchy culture in The Advocate was equal to the score of the market. People from Commission B considered the presence of a market cultural aspect third with a score of 24. With regard to the adhocracy culture, it was least found in both organisations; scoring 21 and 20 for Commission B and The Advocate, respectively (see Figure 20). The fact that the highest scoring culture is the clan culture means that the observation can be made that the cultural model of the organisations in the pre-reform period was oriented towards internal affairs. The following paragraphs examine the research findings from both cases. It starts with Commission B and finishes with The Advocate.
Table 21: Pre-reform cultural scores of vertically integrated organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission B</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Advocate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: Pre-reform cultural profiles of vertically integrated organisations

With regard to **Commission B**, the research has found that public employees who worked at different partners had different perceptions as to the presence of cultural values in their organisations. Firstly, people from all partners similarly perceived that their organisations largely embraced the clan culture in the pre-reform period, with scores of 30 and 32 from *The Ministry* and *The Rajabhat* respectively (see Table 22). Next, people from *The Ministry* noticed that the hierarchy culture was found second, with a score of 26 whereas the market values were found slightly lower than the former one, scoring 24. However, people who worked at *The Rajabhat* considered that the hierarchy and market cultures were close in their workplace, with scores of 25.
24 and 23 respectively. Further, the adhocracy culture was found the least in both organisations, scoring 20 and 21 from *The Ministry* and *The Rajabhat* respectively.

In this respect, the cultural model of organisations before they were integrated was imbalanced as it was significantly pulled toward the clan culture. The high clan score implied that both workplaces were friendly places to work and teamwork, trust in each other and loyalty to the organisation bound the people together (see Figure 21).

**Table 22: Pre-reform cultural scores of Commission B’s partners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Ministry</th>
<th>The Rajabhat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 21: Pre-reform cultural models of Commission B’s partners**
With regard to the organisational characteristics, higher education organisations were generally divided into two separate bodies of management, namely central and institutional levels. When examining the data according to levels of administration, the research has found that the cultural models between people working at central and institutional levels were slightly different (Table 23). Nonetheless, public employees of both groups still perceived that the organisations were clan-dominated workplaces with scores of 29.5 and 30.5 from the central and institutional levels, respectively. At a central level, the market, hierarchy and adhocracy elements were second, third and least reported, with scores of 25.5, 24 and 21 respectively. At an institutional level, university lecturers and officials considered the levels of the hierarchy, market and adhocracy values with scores of 25, 23.5 and 21 respectively.

| Table 23: Pre-reform cultural scores of Commission B’s levels of administration |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Clan                                 | Central          | Institutional    |
| Adhocracy                            | 29.5             | 30.5             |
| Market                               | 21               | 21               |
| Hierarchy                            | 25.5             | 25               |

At a central level, where Commission B was the result of the vertical integration of the central offices of The Ministry and The Rajabhat, the research found that civil servants from both organisations had similar perceptions of organisational culture but differed slightly in the degree of cultural presence. For example, people from both organisations noticed that their workplace was a clan-based organisation with average scores of 29.5 and 29 for those who came from The Ministry and The Rajabhat respectively (see Table 24). Also, the hierarchy element was reported second in the organisations with average scores of 25.5 and 26 from people who had backgrounds with The Ministry and The Rajabhat respectively. Thirdly, they noticed the level of a market culture with a similar average score of 24 from both groups. The adhocracy element was the least found in both organisations, with a similar average score of 21 out of 100. Accordingly, this suggests that, in the pre-reform period, both The Ministry and The Rajabhat were oriented toward flexibility and
internal focus. In this respect, team commitment, loyalty to the organisation and trust in each other were high.

Table 24: Pre-reform cultural scores of Commission B’s central offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>The Ministry</th>
<th>The Rajabhat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At an institutional level, people working in different types of university had more distinct perceptions toward organisational cultures. University workers from both The Ministry and The Rajabhat perceived that their organisations were clan-based organisations, with average scores of 30 and 33 respectively (see Table 25). Noticeably, the score for the Rajabhat institutes was higher than the overall, institutional score for clan culture, whereas the score for The Ministry’s universities was slightly lower than the overall score. Secondly, employees from the Rajabhat institutes noticed that hierarchy and market elements were equally reported in their workplace. Moreover, the average score for the hierarchy culture was lower than the overall score, i.e. 23 compared to 25. In contrast, lecturers and officials from The Ministry’s universities produced a higher average score for the hierarchy culture than the overall score. Lastly, the adhocracy culture was least reported by people from both institutional backgrounds. In this respect, it can be inferred that the cultural model of both institutions similarly valued tradition, teamwork, mutual agreement and trust in each other in the pre-integration period (see Figure 22).

Table 25: Pre-reform cultural scores of different types of institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Rajabhat Institute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In sum, quantitative analysis has found that, overall, the cultural profiles of Commission B’s partners in the pre-reform period inclined toward a clan culture. The only difference was the perceptions of organisational culture between the two groups of people, The Ministry and The Rajabhat. In this respect, it can be inferred that, in the pre-reform period, organisations operated with flexibility and internal focus. They embraced values such as tradition, teamwork, loyalty, trust in each other and mutual agreement as the fundamental ethos of the organisations. The organisational atmosphere was likely to have been full of attentiveness as though everyone was a family member.
At *The Advocate*, the research has found that all partners embraced a clan-based atmosphere. However, civil servants working at different partners had different perspectives toward the presence of cultural values in their workplaces. Firstly, at *Analyst B*, civil servants noticed that the clan culture was relatively high before the integration reform, scoring 35 out of 100 (see Table 26). The hierarchy culture, which was found second, scored only 23 and was close to the market and adhocracy values, which equally scored 21. This implied that *Analyst B* was a highly clan-embedded organisation in which teamwork and trust in each other was relatively high.

**Table 26: Pre-reform cultural scores of *The Advocate*’s partners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Analyst B</th>
<th>The Supporter</th>
<th>Aide B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next cultural model of *The Supporter* illustrated another different perception. Civil servants noticed the highest level of the clan culture there, scoring 31, and the market element was reported second with a score of 28. The adhocracy culture was found third, with a score of 22. This left the hierarchy culture as the least value to be found among all, scoring only 19. Accordingly, the cultural model of *The Supporter* suggested that the organisation might have been pulled between clan- and market-based orientations in the pre-integration reform. The third cultural model of *Aide B* was the most balanced when compared with the other two organisations (see Figure 23). Although the clan culture was found highest, with a score of 28, the hierarchy aspect was found slightly less than clan values, scoring 27. The market culture was found third and close to the presence of the hierarchy aspect, scoring 25. This left the adhocracy value as the culture that was least considered in the organisation, scoring only 20.
6.2.2 The post-integration period: Cultural changes

The research has found that public employees who worked at Commission B and The Advocate generally had similar perceptions toward the presence of cultural values in the organisations. Firstly, they considered that the market culture was found highest in both organisations, with scores of 28 and 30 for Commission B and The Advocate respectively (see Table 27). However, people who came from Commission B perceived that the clan, adhocracy and hierarchy cultures were at similar levels after organisations were integrated, scoring 24. On the other hand, civil servants who worked at The Advocate noticed the greatest reduction of the clan culture, scoring only 21.5 out of 100. This became the lowest cultural value to be reported in the organisation. The hierarchy culture was not changed when compared to the pre-reform period. The adhocracy value increased moderately and was found third in The
Advocate. However, the presence of all values in Commission B and The Advocate became more balanced when compared with the pre-reform period (see Figure 24).

Table 27: Post-reform cultural scores of vertically integrated organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission B</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Advocate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 24: Post-reform cultural models of vertically integrated organisations
In the case of Commission B, public employees who worked at both The Ministry and The Rajabhat felt that the market culture developed significantly and became the dominant culture of Commission B (see Table 28). Nonetheless, the former perceived that the level of market values was slightly higher than the average score whereas the latter noticed it slightly less than the mean score. Secondly, the level of the hierarchy culture in the workplace was lower than in the pre-reform period. However, people who came from The Rajabhat considered that the hierarchy values were lower than the average score and became least found among all values. Thirdly, a significant reduction in the clan culture was witnessed by people from both backgrounds. People from The Ministry felt that the clan values were least noticeable following the integration reform, with a score of 23.5, whereas those who came from The Rajabhat considered that it was equal to the adhocracy culture, with a score of 25. Lastly, public employees from The Ministry noticed that the adhocracy culture was found equally to the hierarchy element, with a score of 24.

Table 28: Post-reform cultural scores of Commission B’s partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>The Ministry</th>
<th>The Rajabhat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 25 illustrates the cultural perceptions of Commission B with regard to people’s different backgrounds. As the highest score is the market culture, Commission B is oriented toward stability and external focus. This means that the organisation has become a result-oriented workplace, where an emphasis on winning is the glue that holds people together (Cameron & Quinn, 2006: 40). In addition, the cultural model of Commission B has been found to be more balanced than in the previous era.
When the data was analysed according to the levels of management, the research showed that some results are slightly different from the overall result. At a central level, civil servants noticed adhocracy culture the least in Commission B, scoring only 23, although it has increased in the post-reform period (see Table 29). In contrast, university lecturers and officials placed the adhocracy element second, after the market culture. With regard to the clan culture, both groups of people have a similar perception that it has decreased significantly. However, civil servants working at a central level reported the clan culture in second place after the dominant market culture, scoring 25, whereas those working at the institutional level noticed it the least in their workplace. It changed the most, from 30.5 to 23.5, according to the latter’s view. The hierarchy culture has slightly decreased according to people working at both levels of management. This implies that the organisation now focuses less on the hierarchical mechanism than previously. On the other hand, the higher education institutions have become a result-oriented workplace since the market values have significantly increased and are now the most found, after the
integration reform. Figure 26 illustrates different cultural perceptions with regard to the levels of administration.

Table 29: Post-reform cultural scores of Commission B’s levels of administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 26: Post-reform cultural profiles of Commission B’s levels of administration
With regard to the cultural perceptions of people who worked at the central office of Commission B, which was an integration of two central offices of The Ministry and The Rajabhat, the findings were slightly different. Firstly, civil servants who came from The Rajabhat had noticed a higher development of the market culture than those of The Ministry (see Table 30). The former scored 29 for the market culture in their organisation, while the score was only 27 from the latter. Although the perceptions were slightly different, the development of market culture had signified to them that Commission B had become a performance-based workplace more than previous organisations. Former employees of The Rajabhat perceived a greater reduction in hierarchy culture than their colleagues who came from The Ministry. This implied that The Rajabhat was a more hierarchical workplace than The Ministry.

#### Table 30: Post-reform cultural scores of Commission B’s central offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>The Ministry</th>
<th>The Rajabhat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When making a comparison with regard to types of higher education institutions between The Ministry and The Rajabhat, the research has found some interesting results. First, the employees in Rajabhat institutes have perceived that the hierarchy element has slightly increased following the integration of organisations (see Table 31). This finding is contrary to all the other results derived from this case. It is an interesting finding since The Rajabhat was highly hierarchical in terms of having tight control over its institutes in the pre-integration period. Ideally, the dissolution of The Rajabhat should have enabled its institutions to have more autonomy in order to administer their own internal affairs. However, although the hierarchy element has increased, it is still least when compared with other elements. Secondly, lecturers and officials in The Ministry’s universities have perceived that the clan element has declined the most, in that it has become least found in the post-integration era. Whilst
they have noticed that the three elements are closely reported, the market element now stands out from these three. Therefore, the cultural model of their universities has inclined toward the market culture. On the other hand, people working at the Rajabhat institutes have noticed a more balanced model of organisational culture, where all elements are found closer to each other (see Figure 27). However, it can be concluded that all university employees have noticed that their institutions changed from a clan-based to a result-oriented workplace after the integration reform was implemented.

Table 31: Post-reform cultural scores of different types of institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Rajabhat Institute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Changes</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>23 -7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>24 +4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>29 +5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>24 -2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 27: Post-reform cultural profiles of different types of institution
Turning now to correlation analysis, it was found that, in the post-integration period, only educational levels were found to be significantly correlated with cultural changes. Education was positively correlated to the market and adhocracy values (see Table 32). Statistically, this suggests that the more highly educated people were, the more likely they were to notice the presence of market and adhocracy cultures. On the other hand, educational level was negatively correlated with the clan culture. This implies that the more highly educated people were, the less they perceived the incidence of clan elements in organisations. This was because the majority of respondents (156 out of 209 people, 74.64%) had worked in higher education institutions where evaluation criteria were based upon individual academic performance more than depending on managers’ decisions as appeared in other civil departments. In addition, 117 university employees (75%) were educated with a master’s degree and higher⁴³. In this respect, university employees might think that the effect of a clan-based relationship to performance evaluation was less important in organisations than other values. However, it was found that the hierarchy culture has no relationship with demographic factors.

Table 32: Correlation analysis of Commission B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>-.174*</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.146*</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.369</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.165*</td>
<td>-.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>-.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>.943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

⁴³ By qualification levels, 44 respondents had a doctoral degree; 73 respondents had a master’s degree; 36 respondents had a bachelor’s degree, and three respondents had lower than bachelor’s degree qualification.
In the case of *The Advocate*, the research has found that people perceived organisational culture slightly differently with regard to their previous organisational background. Unlike any other cases, civil servants who came from *Analyst B* and *The Supporter* perceived that *The Advocate* has become a hierarchy-oriented organisation, with the highest score of 30 and 28.5 for the former and the latter respectively (see Table 33). Both groups also considered that the market culture was found second, with scores of 29 and 27.5 for *Analyst B* and *The Supporter* respectively. The third cultural aspect found was adhocracy, which scored 21 for both *Analyst B* and *The Supporter*. Moreover, the clan values were least reported in both organisations, scoring only 20. In this respect, both groups of people believed that *The Advocate* has operated on the basis of clear lines of decision-making authority, standardised rules and procedures and control and accountability mechanisms.

### Table 33: Post-reform cultural scores of *The Advocate*’s partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Analyst B</th>
<th>The Supporter</th>
<th>Aide B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having a different perception to the rest, civil servants from *Aide B* noticed that *The Advocate* embedded the market culture as the dominant culture in the post-integration era. The second element was the adhocracy culture, scoring 24. The gap between the first and second values was highest when compared to the rest, with +7 degrees between them. In contrast to the other two partners, the hierarchy culture was least reported in the organisation, scoring only 22. The level of the clan culture was slightly higher than the hierarchy one, scoring 23. Similar to other people, they noticed a significant reduction in clan values since the organisations were integrated with each other. As far as the perception of people from *Aide B* is concerned, *The Advocate* has become a performance-based workplace where goal achievement is embraced the highest among other values. Figure 28 illustrates the cultural perceptions of *The Advocate* with regard to people’s different backgrounds.
Turning now to correlation analysis of The Advocate, the research has found that age groups were positively correlated with the adhocracy culture (see Table 34). This suggests that the older the people were, the more likely they were to notice an adhocracy culture in the organisation. Job ranks were also positively correlated to the market culture. This implies that the higher the ranks people occupied, the more likely they were to perceive a market culture in the organisation. For the clan and hierarchy values, no relationship with demographic factors was found.
Table 34: Correlation analysis of The Advocate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
<th>Job rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>-.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.869</td>
<td>.764</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.348*</td>
<td>-.112</td>
<td>.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.463</td>
<td>.402</td>
<td>.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>-.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.791</td>
<td>.638</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>-.224</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>-.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.485</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.813</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

6.3 Discussion

This section discusses the qualitative and quantitative results that have been presented in sections 6.1 and 6.2. The discussion has been formulated according to cultural types, beginning with the clan, hierarchy and market cultures, and concluding with adhocracy.

The presence of the clan culture was reported in the same way by both quantitative and qualitative results. Quantitatively, the findings presented in Tables 21-26 showed that organisations highly embedded a clan culture regardless of organisational and professional types in the pre-reform period. As far as qualitative data was concerned, the template analysis was employed to analyse the data in the same way as in chapter five. The template of a clan-based relationship was built based on clan-related characteristics. Similar to the cases in the previous chapter, public employees mentioned particular words to illustrate how clan values were found, such as attentiveness, generosity and teamwork. Interviewees noticed that their previous workplaces were full of a clan-based relationship through their recollection (see also section 6.1.1). The fact that the clan culture was found highest suggests that the human relationships were most important to hold an organisation together. In this respect, organisations valued trust, tradition, mutual understanding and loyalty more than any other values. Moreover, organisational types (the committee-based and
traditional departmentalism) had no relationship with the cultural profiles of organisations. Nonetheless, it was only in the case of Aide B that the clan culture was found close to the hierarchy one.

After organisations were integrated, public employees in both cases witnessed a sharp reduction in clan values in the new organisations. This was supported by both the quantitative and qualitative findings. With regard to quantitative data, a comparison of clan scores between pre- and post-reform periods in Tables 21 and 27 revealed that the clan score of The Advocate decreased substantially from 30 to 21.5 and from 30 to 24 for Commission B. Accordingly, it was found the least in The Advocate while it was reported at the same levels with adhocracy and hierarchy in Commission B. Nonetheless, people who came from The Rajabhat of Commission B and Aide B of The Advocate did not think that the level of clan values was the least in the integrated organisations. Rather, the former perceived that it was equally reported in the organisation with adhocracy whereas the latter noticed its presence as the third element. The qualitative findings also revealed that some public employees still had fond memories of the once overwhelming clan-based atmosphere, which they could not feel in the same way in the integrated organisations. In addition, they mentioned that the emphasis on performance or results had changed the human relationship in the organisation from attentiveness and generosity to competitiveness and aggression.

The presence of the hierarchy culture was probably the most static one when comparing its change between the pre- and post-integration periods. Prior to the integration reform, the quantitative results presented in 6.2.1 revealed that the hierarchy values were reported second in most case studies. However, it was equally found with the market culture in the case of the Rajabhat institutes while it was found least with regard to people from The Supporter (see Table 26). When the integration of organisations was implemented, the perception toward hierarchy values with regard to the whole organisation was not changed with regard to The Advocate, while it slightly decreased in the case of Commission B. Nevertheless, when looking more closely at the data, the research found that the presence of a
hierarchy culture was variously perceived. The most interesting point was found within The Advocate, where the development of hierarchy values increased highly with regard to the perception of people who came from Analyst B and The Supporter. In contrast to the overall score and to Aide B, they perceived that The Advocate had become a rule-oriented workplace when compared with the situations at their previous organisations. In terms of qualitative results, the template of a hierarchy-based relationship revealed that public employees mentioned how they suffered from the rule-based organisational administration, especially those who came from Analyst B of The Advocate. Similarly, university lecturers were also frustrated by the increased indirect control of Commission B over academic standardisation and quality assurance programmes. Noticeably, with regard to the development of hierarchy values, the finding was also in contrast with all the results from other case studies of this dissertation.

The level of the market culture prior to the integration of organisations was moderate. It was found third in Commission B but second in The Advocate. Generally, public employees in most organisations noticed its presence next to the hierarchy one, only slightly lower. Nonetheless, civil servants from The Supporter noticed the highest score of the market values when compared with people from other backgrounds. This implied that the organisational characteristics of The Supporter could affect how people perceived market elements in the workplace. Moreover, people from Analyst B considered that the market and adhocracy values were found the least in their workplace. In terms of qualitative results, the template of a market-based relationship revealed that public employees mentioned performance evaluation. However, the process was irregular and not compulsory. When organisations were integrated together, the market culture became the most dominant value to be perceived in both Commission B and The Advocate. The fact that the highest quantitative score was for the market culture suggests that the achievement of organisational goals became most important among any other values in both organisations. Public employees have been motivated to achieve goals by rewards, such as special remuneration.
However, when looking closer at the data related to cultural perceptions with regard to different organisational backgrounds, people had diverse perspectives. Firstly, although the overall score of *The Advocate* revealed that it embraced market values mostly in the post-reform period, civil servants from *Analyst B* and *The Supporter* had different perceptions. The market values were reported second from *Analyst B*, although they sharply increased following the integration reform, from a score of 21 to 29. Civil servants from *The Supporter* rather witnessed a slight reduction in market values, with a score of 28 to 27.5, but still noticed it as the second element similar to the pre-reform period. When compared across backgrounds, public employees from *The Supporter* noticed the least degree of a market culture in the organisation.

People who worked at the central office in the case of *Commission B* also had different perceptions of the level of a market culture. For those who came from *The Ministry*, a moderate development of market values was noticed, from a score of 24 to 27. On the other hand, civil servants who came from *The Rajabhat* rather felt a significant development in a market element, from a score of 24 to 29. At an institutional level, university lecturers and officials who had different backgrounds with regard to university types also had different perspectives toward the development of market values in the post-integration reform. Those who came from *The Ministry*’s universities noticed a development of market values from a score of 24 to 29 whereas people from Rajabhat institutes felt a development of the market culture with a score of 23 to 26. Also, the latter group considered that its presence was close to that of an adhocracy element, with a difference of only 0.5.

The development of market values was also underpinned in the qualitative findings. Most interviewees perceived its presence in contrast to a reduction in clan values following the integration reform. The template analysis revealed that public employees mentioned market values in terms of competition and performance management that had been constantly emphasised after the reform. The research found that civil servants who worked at *The Advocate* had a stronger feeling toward the increase of performance-based management since a regular evaluation process
had just been introduced in civil departments and they had to compete within a smaller group of colleagues. This situation might have caused an uncomfortable feeling, leading to difficult conditions in which to build teamwork in the organisation. Similarly, as in the two previous cases, some public employees were unsure whether performance reports really signified policy achievement. All in all, it may be an inconvenient truth for public employees to accept that the domination of market values in organisations has recently changed the human relationship from a clan- to a performance-based one.

The research has discovered that the level of the adhocracy culture prior to the integration reform was the least among all values. In terms of quantitative results, several interesting points emerged. First of all, university lecturers and officials at the Rajabhat institutes reported that the level of the adhocracy values was higher in their workplaces than those of The Ministry’s universities (see Table 25). The next observation came from people who worked at Analyst B, who reported that the adhocracy culture was found least, similar to that of the market one. When compared across partners of The Advocate, this perception was rather higher than the perception of Aide B. The third and most interesting observation came from the case of The Supporter, where the presence of the adhocracy element was not the lowest, as in other organisations. It was found as the highest in the organisation when compared with the other two partners prior to the integration reform.

When organisations were integrated with each other, most cases witnessed the development of adhocracy values in the new organisations, excluding people who came from Analyst B. According to them, it remained unchanged and became noticed the least when compared with people from the other two partners. Amongst civil servants who worked at the central office of Commission B the adhocracy culture was equally found with a hierarchy one, and it was found the least following the integration reform (see Table 30). However, people from The Ministry witnessed a stronger change than those of The Rajabhat. In terms of different institutional backgrounds, university lecturers and officials from the Rajabhat institutes felt a stronger presence of adhocracy values in organisations than those who worked in The
Ministry’s universities (see Table 31). The fact that the adhocracy score was never found to be the highest in these two cases implies that public organisations had never operated with an innovative-based orientation. Although adhocracy values in regard to IT have been embraced more than previously, public organisations are still not ready to quickly respond to the external environment and changes.

Finally, with regard to the civil service profession, the cultural perceptions of civil servants who worked at Commission B and The Advocate can be compared. As explained in a previous chapter, all civil servants were regulated under the same laws and performance was evaluated under the same criteria, regardless of the workplace. In this respect, this research has found that civil servants who worked at Commission B and The Advocate noticed organisational cultures differently (see Table 35). Prior to the integration reform, both groups similarly perceived that their workplaces were dominated by a market culture as this achieved the highest score. However, the rest was different. First of all, civil servants of Commission B considered that a clan culture was found second but it was found the least in The Advocate. Further, they considered the level of the hierarchy culture in the third place but it was found second according to those who worked at The Advocate. Although the adhocracy culture was found the least at Commission B, it was reported third in The Advocate. Therefore, it could be concluded that, in accordance with the influence of the integration reform, organisational characteristics had a relationship with the cultural perceptions of its members. Figure 29 shows how cultures were perceived.

**Table 35: A comparison of post-reform cultural scores of civil servants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commission B</th>
<th>The Advocate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Leadership was another crucial issue that could either accelerate or decelerate the speed of cultural change in an organisation, similar to the two other cases in the previous chapter. For example, Nathan of *The Advocate*, contended that:

“With regard to the integration of three different departments, each one certainly had particular ways of thinking or administrative styles. Some aspects might have been similar while some others were different. In terms of differences, it was one important mission for a leader to minimise them as much as possible. With regard to organisational development, a leader also attempted to build a new organisational culture of *The Advocate* that would supersede the former cultures and be accepted by all.

A leader attempted to build trust in each other and loyalty to the organisation through various projects such as training, seminars and sporting events. We called these activities ice-breaking, a development phase when we shared opinions among colleagues.”
At Commission B, where the organisational characteristics had two separate administrative systems between general office administration and individual universities, leadership at the central level had affected university employees the least unless there were some specific issues. Generally, middle managers at the central office were important as the intermediate actors who implemented HEC’s policies and guidance that was to be implemented at both central units and all higher education institutions. At a central level, leaders were also important during the early period of organisational integration. This was because they had to balance different cultural aspects and build a new organisational identity at the same time. In this respect, appropriate strategies and skills were used to run the organisation, such as negotiation and bargaining.

With regard to the patronage system, it is difficult to deny its existence in Thai bureaucracy (see, e.g., Bowornwathana, 2000 and Jingjit, 2008). Leadership and the clan culture might also have a close link with each other. For example, Mark, who had worked at one university for more than 21 years, witnessed this relationship at his workplace. He explained that

“...leaders at that time were interested in personal interests and benefits more that morale and ethics. Some leaders hired friends from their clan to work in the organisation despite them having no relevant knowledge or experience”.

Similarly, Henry, who had worked as a support member of staff at another Rajabhat institute, pointed out that:

“Leadership was crucial and essential to practitioners’ morale. However, when personal interests got involved, some people offered themselves to be appointed as leaders. The most important thing was that these leaders implemented a patronage system within organisational management. This affected the morale of the personnel and led to insecurity, since promotion and rewards were more likely to be offered to clan members than to outsiders.”
Moreover, Macy, who was a lecturer at one former Rajabhat institute, reported that

“...the executive team listened to university staff less than they were listening to the opinions of team members”.

These perceptions have given a picture that the level of a clan culture within higher education institutions might be more intense than that at the central level. The quantitative results presented in Section 6.2.2 appear to show a significant reduction in clan values, but in reality it was rather discreetly disguised by various issues such as recruitment, career advancement and performance evaluation issues. In addition, leadership also influenced the change in the market culture at higher education institutions. For instance, Brian considered that

“...goal achievement, performance indicators and money-oriented management were strongly emphasised at my workplace. The academics had been demoralised by this action of the executives”.

Karen also commented that

“The recent atmosphere was quite stressful. Every employee has been forced to produce higher performance in order to match organisational indicators”.

In addition, the implementation of some policies that Commission B was responsible for also affected the cultural perceptions of universities, such as the introduction of the Thailand Qualification Framework for Higher Education (TQF) by the HEC. This framework had the purpose of standardising the quality of academic provision and developing the academic excellence of higher education institutions (MUA, 2006). In this respect, all universities had to follow the TQF implementation. Otherwise, their degrees would not be accredited by Commission B and they would then not be recognised by the OCSC, which was the main body that regulated the public sector workforce. This meant that graduates would be unable to use their degree qualification to apply for jobs in the public sector. Therefore, the introduction of
TQF to universities subsequently caused some changes to universities. For example, Karina noted that

“…the HEC’s policies such as the enforcement of TQF or other academic standard criteria had a direct affect on changes in the working culture of academics”.

On the one hand, it might have increased the hierarchy culture in higher education institutions. For instance, the introduction of TQF might implicitly underpin the control power of Commission B over academic freedom, as Brian commented that

“Commission B misunderstood its role by self-proclaiming itself as a “director” or being “authoritarian”, set up to command universities rather than being a policy unit to support and facilitate higher education institutions”.

On the other hand, TQF was perceived as a catalyst for the development of market values in higher education institutions. For example, Copper, who worked at one former Rajabhat institute for 15-21 years, explained that

“Recently, Commission B enforced regulations such as TQF on us [higher education institutions]. It had many indicators that practitioners like us had to comply with. Furthermore, we had to prepare [performance] report after report, but sometimes they did not reflect quality, efficiency and reality.”

With regard to cooperation across different types of university, the integration reform had the least effect on this issue. This was because three separate networks of universities still existed, namely The Ministry, The Rajabhat and The Rajamangala universities. This meant that the same types of university were likely to maintain cooperation within their network. For example, there were two separate bodies of University Chancellor Meetings between the former universities of The Ministry and The Rajabhat. Each group might make different decisions with regard to educational strategies and development. For instance, Ricky said that:
“In the early stage of integration, there were some difficulties associated with cultural blending between different university networks due to different cultures. Their development [The Ministry’s universities] was different from ours at some levels [The Rajabhat universities]. When the organisations were integrated, the structure looked like a Khanomchan more than a harmonious one. All universities were not integrated into one single group. Rajabhat and Rajamangala universities were perceived as newborn universities whose fundamental administrative structures and budgets were unable to match the old ones [The Ministry’s universities]. Therefore, some special forms of cooperation between different university networks took place, to offer advice to newborn universities. In addition, it was difficult for all universities to have similar developments at the same time, since there were so many universities in recent years. Therefore, the organisation was still perceived as a Khanomchan.”

Nonetheless, the integration reform was able to achieve its purpose with regard to the single administration that was found at the central level. Old structures were reorganised and colleagues were subsequently relocated to new structures. In this respect, the administrative systems and internal coordination were integrated into one. Although different cultures were found between groups in the early stages of integration, colleagues began to identify themselves as the team of Commission B as time passed. For example, Thomas noted that:

“At the time of integration, when people from different backgrounds had to work together, their individual perception of work was different. People from The Rajabhat were accustomed to a top-down management approach, whilst we [The Ministry] were rather accustomed to the coordination and decentralisation of power. So, they did not know that we never controlled universities. It was some time until they understood how Commission B should operate. They had to adapt themselves as we had, since all of us had to cope with the new tasks and the responsibilities of Commission B.”

Khanomchan is a name of a Thai dessert that is cooked with many layers contained in a single structure. It may be translated as a layered sticky rice cake. In this interview, it implies that layers of organisations existed after universities were integrated into a single organisation.
This was also the case at *The Advocate*, where Nick perceived that:

“The integration of organisations to become *The Advocate* could benefit the public better than the fragmentation of organisations located in different departments as was previously found. The positive side was that the women issue was dealt with effectively and powerful mechanisms were derived from a departmental status. In addition, it eradicated redundancy of policy implementation since a systematic, coordinated implementation was initiated. Therefore, the policy direction related to women and family issues was clearer and became important to all. On the negative side, *The Advocate* needed time to build up specialisation and people should have been allowed sufficient time to accumulate expertise. This was the integration reform and was not about crude re-aggregation of organisations without changing any responsibilities. *The Advocate* had more functions to do than previously.”

In summary, leadership was one of the most important factors that could either accelerate or decelerate the speed of cultural change. If leaders set clear goals and indicators, including having strong determination, organisational cultures were likely to change faster. The change also involved the issue of organisational cohesion, especially in the integrated organisation. Leadership might have a close link to the clan and market cultures in both good and bad ways. During the beginning stage, people were likely to stay with those who came from a similar background rather than move around. Since Thai bureaucracy disguisedly embraced a patronage-based relationship, staying with old clans and leaders might be safer and more advantageous than changing to a new group. At the very least, this action suggested that the person gave loyalty to a clan and leaders so that he or she would be protected by their patrons in return. In regard to the performance issue, if leaders’ clan members were favoured over non-members in terms of the personal performance assessment, their leadership might be at risk if another clan could win more power in the organisation.
Therefore, if leaders were visionary, adaptive, understanding and generous, the cultural change of an organisation would alter more quickly. This was because they had to balance the interests of all in order to hold the organisation together. In contrast, if a leader could not balance the interests of groups, a battle with each other for organisational domination could delay the integration and cultural change processes. One observation was that if ‘soft’ methods such as explanation, negotiation or bargaining were insufficient to solve conflicts, leaders were likely to rely on formal regulations to align things and get them to operate functionally and effectively. This method was so powerful in that the objection was subjected to career disciplinary proceedings, so it would never be good for anyone.

6.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter has explored how the vertical integration reform changed the cultures of relevant organisations from a clan- to a result-based workplace. Prior to the integration reform, organisational cultures were oriented toward the clan culture. The cultural model of organisations during this period was imbalanced as it sharply inclined toward clan values. This meant that those organisations emphasised tradition, teamwork, trust in each other and loyalty to organisations similar to those of horizontally integrated ones. Organisations were a friendly place in which to work. This claim can be found from both the qualitative and quantitative results presented in sections 6.1 and 6.2.1.

However, after organisations were integrated with each other, clan-dominated organisations changed to performance-based workplaces due to the significant development of a market culture and a sharp reduction in clan culture. This implied that both Commission B and The Advocate had recently placed more emphasis on productivity, performance and goal achievement. Public employees were rewarded on a performance basis, where leaders should act as a director to drive an organisation towards target achievements. This claim was evident in section 6.1.3, where the issue of performance criteria was obviously perceived by respondents. The
development of the market culture might have a close link to the development of or decline in clan and hierarchy values. On the one hand, an emphasis on performance might reflect the development of hierarchy values through compliance and enforcement on the part of organisations. On the other hand, the same situation might widen the gap between people, as everyone was forced to compete with one another to get the best evaluation marks. So, the workplace became a less friendly place to work in.

Leadership is another factor that could either accelerate or decelerate the process of cultural change through their authority and patron-client relationships. Although the quantitative results indicated that the clan-based orientation had significantly decreased, it had rather been disguised by other issues such as leadership and performance evaluation, according to the qualitative results previously presented in section 6.3. The integration reform might rather sharpen the patronage-based picture between different organisational backgrounds such as the competition to retain a majority of managerial positions in order to protect group interests, the separation of university networks to protect their network interests or unethical management within some universities, which has led to the appointment of clan members to administrative positions. All of these would indicate strong clan values in organisations but they might have been masked by several other issues.

Since the objective of organisational integration was to make policies more coordinated, the integration reform gradually yielded a better prospective future for the organisations involved. Policies had been formulated and were supervised by a single authority such as HEC. This meant that the Government plans with regard to national human resource development or social issues were implemented in a coordinated manner. In addition, nepotistic evaluation had been superseded by standard performance criteria, although it had not been completely eradicated from the public sector. All in all, it can be concluded that the cultural model of Commission B and The Advocate in the post-reform period became more balanced than was previously the case (see Figure 24). The organisations became oriented towards a performance-based style. More specially in relation to Commission B,
although the vertical integration reform had been implemented for seven years (as of 2010), higher education administration may still need some time to achieve better coordination, especially between different types of university (The Ministry, The Rajabhat or The Rajamangala).
Chapter Seven:

Cultural changes and paradoxes

This chapter explores and compares the levels of intensity of organisational cultures, changes, and paradoxes with regard to the integration reform. Both quantitative and qualitative data are used to build a constructive discussion of the three issues. The chapter uses a cross-case analysis to present a cultural model of Thailand’s integrated public organisations. The analysis is also looked at through demographic data. In addition, all research questions are answered in this chapter, following the use of quantitative and qualitative evidence. The chapter has been divided into four sections, the first of which examines the relationship between integration reform and organisational cultures by using quantitative data. The next section explores the culture of and changes in integrated organisations derived from qualitative data. The discussion also attempts to triangulate findings derived from quantitative analysis. The third section demonstrates the relationship between cultural changes and organisational paradoxes. The final section is the chapter’s conclusion. The chapter argues that the structural integration reform has created cultural changes and unintended consequences (paradoxes) in relevant public organisations. Generally, the organisational culture has changed from a clan-dominated to a result-based culture following the reform. However, when the details are explored closely, the cultural change has also contributed to paradoxes in organisational management.
7.1 Organisational culture and the integration reform

This section explores the relationship between the integration reform and organisational change. It attempts to answer the first research question: To what extent has the organisational culture of Thai integrated public organisations changed following the integration reform? In so doing, quantitative findings are presented with regard to the overall cultural models of relevant organisations.

7.1.1 The presence of organisational culture

Prior to the integration reform, the research has found that public officials perceived their organisational culture to be highly clan-oriented, with a score of 31 (see Table 36). Scores were obtained by aggregating the individual data of all respondents. The scores for market and hierarchy cultures were similar, with 24 points, whereas the adhocracy value was the lowest of all. Since the highest scoring culture was clan, the observation was made that the cultural model of public organisations was largely oriented towards internal affairs and discretion (see Figure 30). To a lesser extent, the equal score with regards to hierarchy and market revealed that the administrative culture was also inclined towards control. These findings were different from previous research by Jingjit (2008) in the sense that the cultural model of public organisations was more balanced rather than “…largely inclined towards hierarchy and clan models” (2008: 127).

Table 36: Cultural scores of organisations in the pre-reform era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviations</td>
<td>13.05</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>9.49</td>
<td>11.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results of demographic data analysis had indicated that the public officials across demographic groups appeared to share a common view that there was a greater element of the clan culture in their organisations than hierarchy, market and adhocracy elements in the pre-reform period (see Table 37). The research discovered that female respondents noticed a stronger presence of a clan culture than male employees, whereas the latter perceived more market values than the former. In terms of hierarchy and adhocracy cultures, both genders had a similar view about their presence in organisations.
Table 37: Cultural scores of demographic data in the pre-reform era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than Bachelor degree</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate degree</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years of work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the data was analysed according to the respondents’ age, it was found that the youngest respondents (21-30 years)\(^{45}\) perceived the strongest presence of clan and adhocracy values and the lowest level of a hierarchy culture (see Table 37). All age groups had a similar perception of the presence of a market culture, with a score of 24. With regard to the respondents’ educational background, the research found that people who had a doctorate degree were less likely to notice the presence of a clan culture, whereas a hierarchy culture was found second in most organisations when scores were compared across educational backgrounds. This finding revealed that the more people were educated, the greater a hierarchy culture was noticed. In addition, those who had a bachelor degree noticed that a clan culture was most dominant while a market element was found the least in organisations when it was compared across all backgrounds. Those who had the least education qualifications reported that the level of adhocracy culture was found slightly more than people from other educational backgrounds. Lastly, when the data was analysed according to the respondents’ work experience in terms of years, the research discovered that the

\(^{45}\) The numbers of respondents aged 21-30, 31-40, 40-50, and more than 50 years were 15 (1.54%), 209 (21.46%), 361 (37.06%) and 389 people (39.94%), respectively. (See also 4.3.1)
longer people had worked in an organisation, the more a clan culture was perceived (see Table 37). When data was compared across work experience groups, it was found that people who had worked between 15-21 years noticed that a hierarchy culture was most dominant while a market element was found the least in their organisations. They all also had a similar perception in terms of the presence of an adhocracy culture, with a score of 21.

### 7.1.2 Overall changes in organisational culture

After the integration reform was implemented, government employees appear to have perceived a significant cultural change in their organisations. It has been found that market and adhocracy cultures are significantly developed, whilst the hierarchy culture has slightly decreased. However, the prominent clan culture has noticeably decreased. Its average score has dropped from 31 to 25 (see Table 38). Since adhocracy and market cultural types are externally oriented, while the other two are internally focused, this change implies that the overall culture of the organisations studied has shifted significantly towards an external orientation (see Figure 31). More importantly, the range of average scores has become considerably narrower. The highest mean in terms of market culture (27) is close to the lowest mean value in terms of hierarchy (23). This suggests that the gap between the levels of the four cultural types has become smaller than it was during the pre-reform period, and the cultural model seems to be more balanced than previously. These findings are interesting when compared with the previous research adopting the same model to observe cultural changes of general public organisations. Previously, Jingjit claimed that

“…the overall cultural profile of the civil service … remained effectively identical to the situation prior to the launch of the reform in 2002 in that group-based and bureaucratic values continued to be more prevalent than market and adhocracy cultural types.” (Jingjit, 2008: 148)
In contrast, the market value has become most prominent, whereas the hierarchy culture has changed the least, compared with the post-reform period. Noticeably, the clan value mostly fell after the organisations were integrated.

Table 38: Cultural scores of organisations in the pre- and post-reform periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-reform</strong></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviations</td>
<td>13.05</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>9.49</td>
<td>11.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-reform</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Deviations</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>11.19</td>
<td>11.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 31: Overall cultural profiles
In the post-reform era, there are also several interesting results from the analysis of the demographic characteristics. First of all, disparities can be observed between the average scores of male and female respondents for both hierarchy and clan cultural models. The data appears to suggest that female respondents perceived a stronger presence of a clan culture than male participants, whereas the latter observed more of a hierarchy cultural model than the former (see Table 39). Male respondents perceive no change with regard to a hierarchy culture while female employees notice a slight reduction, with a score of 24 down to 23 (see Tables 37 and 39). In addition, males consider that a market culture has developed slightly but females see that it has increased significantly, from a score of 23 to 27. As for the adhocracy culture, both genders have a similar perception that it has developed significantly, from a score of 21 to 25.

**Table 39: Post-reform average cultural scores of demographic data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than Bachelor degree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate degree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years of work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although both genders felt that organisations have become market-oriented workplaces, male employees consider that the adhocracy culture is found second while the clan and hierarchy values are equally reported at a lower level. On the other hand, female officials feel that clan and adhocracy co-exist second after the market value. This has left the hierarchy culture as the lowest scoring culture. Overall, both genders think that the cultural model of public organisations in the post-integration reform has become more balanced than was previously the case (see Figure 32).

**Figure 32: Cultural perceptions of genders in the post-reform period**
Secondly, when the data is analysed according to the respondents’ age, it is found that the youngest respondents (21-30 years) clearly perceive that a clan culture is still particularly prominent in their organisations (see Table 39). In contrast, they perceive that the average score in terms of a market culture has not changed between the pre- and post-reform periods. Next, respondents aged between 31-40 years perceive that a hierarchy culture is highest in their organisation when compared with other age groups. In contrast, people aged between 41-50 years particularly notice that a market culture is the highest in their organisation with an average score of 28. For those over 50 years of age, the hierarchy culture is deemed to be the least presented in their organisations, with an average score of only 23.

Thirdly, when the data is analysed according to the respondents’ educational background, it is found that people who have a doctorate degree perceive that a market culture is most highly developed in their organisations (see Table 39). Those that have a bachelor degree also noticed that a market culture is most dominant in organisations whereas clan values are no longer prominent, but share an average score with the adhocracy element. Those who have the lowest education qualifications perceive that a clan culture is still most prominent in their organisations, although market values have been developed and share a similar average score. When making a comparison across levels of education, it is found that people who hold a master’s degree perceive that hierarchy is the most prominent in their organisations. On the one hand, the finding reveals that the more people are educated, the less a clan culture is noticed. On the other hand, the more highly people are educated, the greater a market culture is perceived in their organisation.

Finally, when the data is analysed according to the respondents’ work experience in terms of years, it is found that the longer people work in an organisation, the greater a clan culture is perceived (see Table 39). In contrast, the fewer years people work, the greater the extent to which a hierarchy culture is noticed. Additionally, when data is compared across work experience groups, it is found that people who have worked between 15-21 years notice that a market culture is most dominant in their organisations.
Overall cultural changes with regard to demographic data are presented in Table 40. The analysis has found that male officials perceive a lower overall change than female colleagues. Also, it is discovered that people aged between 41-50 years see the greatest cultural shift, whereas those of 21-30 years of age notice the least transformation. With regard to education levels, the analysis has found that people in the lowest qualification group see the lowest amount of cultural change. These findings are similar to what Jingjit found in her research (2008: 142), although some differences are found. Whilst Jingjit found that people who had a master’s degree perceived the highest degree of cultural change, the current thesis discovered that people with a doctorate qualification noticed the highest degree of change. Also, with regard to market culture, employees aged between 41 and 50 years perceive the greatest degree of development, whilst the 21-30 year age group do not detect a change. With regard to work experience, respondents with 15-21 years’ work experience perceive the greatest cultural shift. No change in the hierarchy culture is found according to some categories of demographic data.

Table 40: Cultural changes of demographic data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 50</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower than bachelor degree</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral degree</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years of work</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-14</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-21</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 21</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The correlation analysis has discovered that only the education factor has both positive and negative relationships with the perception of organisational cultures in the post-reform period. Positively, the education level correlates with market- and hierarchy-based values (see Table 41). This means that the more respondents are educated, the greater they perceive that market and hierarchy values are prominent in their organisations. In contrast, a negative correlation between education level and clan- and adhocracy-based values is also identified. This suggests that the more people are educated, the less they tend to perceive the presence of clan and adhocracy cultures in their organisations. These findings are different from those of Jingjit, who found that the education, gender and age factors were statistically correlated to changes in organisational culture (2008: 153).

Table 41: Overall correlation analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correlation coefficient</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>-.138*</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>-.065*</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>.081*</td>
<td>-.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>.082*</td>
<td>-.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

In summary, results derived from quantitative data suggested that, initially, the culture of Thai public organisations prior to the reform was typified by high clan-based values. However, when the integration of organisations reform was implemented, the cultural prominence in organisations changed. The research found that there was a significant development of market and adhocracy values, accompanied by a slight reduction in the hierarchy element. The clan culture had significantly declined, so that it no longer dominated organisations. Since the dominant culture was the market culture, the findings reflected the fact that the orientation of integrated organisations had shifted from a group-based towards a result-based workplace. Statistically, this suggests that organisational performance
and goal achievement were emphasised more than previously. In addition, it was interesting to see that the reform had changed the overall cultural profile of the integrated organisations studied, to become more balanced than previously.

7.1.3 Professions and the perspective on organisational culture

This section attempts to answer the research question: To what extent do public employees working in different professional organisations perceive organisational culture changes? Professions are important in terms of human resource management. An organisation may have more than one type of profession but each profession will have specific personnel laws and they are separately managed. In this respect, public employees are subjected to evaluation and are considered for pay rises or promotion according to the criteria of their professions. In this thesis, there are three types of professions, namely, civil service, teachers, and higher education academics (hereafter academics).

Prior to the integration reform, people from all types of profession had a similar perception that a clan culture highly dominated their organisations whereas an adhocracy element was found the least (see Table 42). A hierarchy culture was the second element to be found while a market culture was reported slightly less than the hierarchy values. In this respect, the cultural models with regard to professions were not balanced but rather had inclined toward a clan-oriented culture. After the integration reform was implemented, people from all professions perceive that a market culture has developed significantly and has become the dominant culture of organisations. In contrast, the clan culture has decreased substantially and is found the least. With regard to the hierarchy culture, civil servants perceive no change whereas teachers and academics notice a slight reduction in hierarchy values. The adhocracy culture has also increased greatly, especially in the teachers’ perceptions. Teachers also consider that adhocracy and market cultures co-dominate their organisation in the post-reform period. When compared with the other two professions, teachers consider that the presence of hierarchy values is least found,
whereas the clan culture is reported the most. Academics notice that market values are most developed, whereas a clan culture is least apparent in the organisation. Overall, the cultural model for each profession has become more balanced than was previously the case (see Figure 33).

Table 42: Cultural change scores of professions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-reform</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-reform</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teachers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-reform</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-reform</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-reform</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-reform</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 33: Post-reform cultural profiles of professions
The results of the correlation analysis of the civil service profession display different findings from the overall analysis previously presented in Table 41. Firstly, only the adhocracy culture has a negative correlation with the education levels (see Table 43). Age groups are positively correlated to the adhocracy value, whereas they are negatively correlated to the market model. In a positive sense, this implies that the older civil servants are, the greater they perceive adhocracy values in an organisation. In contrast, the younger people are, the greater they notice a market culture in organisations. Next, job rank has a positive correlation with clan culture, but a negative correlation with the hierarchy culture. Positively, this implies that the higher the position that employees occupy, the greater clan values are perceived. Negatively, it suggests that the lower the ranks people occupy, the greater a hierarchy culture is noticed in their organisations.

Table 43: Correlation analysis of the civil service profession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
<th>Job ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>-.094</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.103*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.888</td>
<td>.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adhocracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.104*</td>
<td>-.151**</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>-.149**</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>-.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.233</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hierarchy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>-.123*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance level</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>.297</td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:*  
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)*

For the teaching profession, education levels are correlated to changes in clan and hierarchy values. Education is positively correlated to a hierarchy culture while negatively correlated to a clan element. This suggests that, on the one hand, the more highly people are educated, the greater they notice hierarchy values in organisations (see Table 44). In contrast, the younger people are, the greater they perceive a clan culture in organisations. Moreover, years of work also have a negative correlation to the hierarchy aspect. This means that the longer people have worked, the less they notice a hierarchy culture. However, adhocracy and market values have no relationship with demographic factors.
Table 44: Correlation analysis of the teaching profession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.098*</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.928</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.693</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td>.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.531</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.149*</td>
<td>-.098*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)*

With regard to the academic profession, only education levels are found to be significantly correlated with cultural changes (see Table 45). Education is positively correlated to a market culture. This means that the more highly people are educated, the more likely they are to notice the presence of market values. On the other hand, education level is negatively correlated with clan culture. This suggests that the less people are educated, the greater they perceive the incidence of clan culture in organisations. However, the research discovers that adhocracy and hierarchy cultures have no relationship with demographic factors.

Table 45: Correlation analysis of the academic profession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td>-.214*</td>
<td>-.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.318</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhocracy</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>-.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.861</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.175*</td>
<td>.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>-.064</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.550</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)*
In summary, when making a comparison of cultural scores, civil servants perceive no change at all in the hierarchy culture. However, the correlation analysis reveals that job ranks are negatively correlated with the perception of hierarchy values in organisations. This is likely to be because most of the respondents work as subordinates who have to comply with rules and procedures. Moreover, they notice that hierarchy, clan and adhocracy values are closely emphasised in organisations. Only the market culture has developed to any great extent in workplaces. Teachers report the least hierarchical values but the most clan values in the workplace when compared across types of professions. They also perceive that the cultural model has become more balanced than was previously found. When compared across all professions, the teachers’ cultural model is the most balanced. Academics notice the greatest development of market values and the least presence of a clan culture amongst the cases considered. They notice that the organisation has become a result-oriented workplace, whereas clan, adhocracy and hierarchy values are emphasised to a lesser extent. Education levels are the only factor that has a relationship to all four cultures in terms of people’s perceptions toward cultural change. All in all, this may imply that goal achievement of public organisations may be attained more than previously because of the high market score derived from all professions.

7.1.4 Organisational administration and culture

This section summarises the cultural changes of individual organisations, derived from chapter five and chapter six, and answers the second research question: To what extent do public officials working in different types of organisation perceive organisational culture changes? In the pre-reform period, a clan culture was found to be the highest across the different types of organisations studied. This implies that organisational types (the traditional and committee-based departments) might not have an impact on the human-based culture in the workplace.
The cultural profile of individual organisations after the integration reform was implemented is summarised and compared in Table 46. The data reveals that public officials working in Commission A are least conscious of the presence of hierarchy culture, both in their organisations and when compared with all cases. However, the integration reform causes no change to hierarchy culture in Commission A, The Rescuer and The Advocate whereas a slight reduction is found in Commission B. Civil servants from The Advocate perceive the highest domination of market values in both the pre- and post-reform periods. The adhocracy element is closely developed among the cases. Similarly, the clan culture has decreased substantially across the cases. However, clan and adhocracy values are still found to be the highest in Commission A in both the pre- and post-reform eras when compared across cases.

Table 46: Cultural scores and changes of organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clan</th>
<th>Adhocracy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission A</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-reform</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-reform</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+3.5</td>
<td>+3.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission B</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-reform</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-reform</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Rescue</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-reform</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-reform</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alteration</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Advocate</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-reform</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-reform</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>+3.5</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Glossary for full names of the organisations.
In summary, it is evident that all organisations have experienced a similar picture of cultural changes. The development of market and adhocracy values, and a reduction in the importance of clan culture are considered to be significant. Interestingly, only people from *Commission B* report a slight change in the hierarchy culture in their organisation. Moreover, public employees at *The Advocate* perceive that a market culture really stands out in their workplace whereas the presence of a clan culture is least found when compared among the cases considered. Comparatively, it also appears that in terms of cultural change, the largest organisation (*Commission A*) appears to be the most balanced, whereas the smallest case (*The Advocate*) appears to be the most varied (see Figure 34).

**Figure 34: Cultural profiles of organisations in the post-reform period**
7.2 Perspectives on the organisational culture and changes

This section discusses findings from qualitative data in order to examine the presence of cultural values in organisations in the pre- and post-reform periods. It also attempts to triangulate qualitative findings with those derived from the quantitative method. The section is divided into four subsections, corresponding to each type of culture.

7.2.1 The clan culture

Public employees in all cases generally considered that clan values were mostly found in the pre-integration period. This research has found that a clan-based relationship dominated organisations regardless of organisational types, professions and levels of administration. Quantitative findings have shown how people from all ages, genders, educational backgrounds and experiences perceived the domination of clan-based relationships in workplaces. Qualitative data also revealed this. People used several words to represent a clan culture and often repeated them during the interviews to signify a highly clan-based relationship at their former workplaces. Such words included attentiveness, generosity, warmth, siblings, kinship, brothers and sisters, family, and teamwork. For example, Ronny, who was aged between 50-60, held a master’s degree and had worked for more than 21 years, perceived that:

“Previously, the workplace was full of generosity and attentiveness. This atmosphere enhanced the flexibility of work and goal achievement.”

Similarly, Nadia, who was aged between 41-50 years, held a master’s degree and had worked between 14-21 years at one civil department, believed that:

“My former workplace was very helpful, supportive and attentive. Also, colleagues were very sincere to each other.”
Sean, who was aged between 41-50 years, held a bachelor degree and had worked between 14-21 years at another civil department, noticed that:

“\textbf{In the past, teamwork was the main factor that led to the success of my organisation.}”

However, when the integration reform was implemented, a reduction in clan values was significantly noticed. Public employees across all cases perceived that their new integrated organisations valued a clan-based relationship less than previously. The reduction in clan values was not difficult to perceive through qualitative data. Similar words and phrases were used to voice their concerns about the reduction in clan values. For example, Nancy, who was aged between 31-40 years, held a master’s degree and had 14-21 years’ work experience at The Advocate, had witnessed how:

“\textbf{Previously, teamwork was a crucial factor that led to organisational success. Colleagues devoted their personal resource and supported each other for the achievement of objectives. The team was more flexible as people had different capacities. We understood this nature, so the relationship in the organisation was really close as if we were siblings. Recently, there has been no attentiveness and generosity as people have been forced to work for the achievement of objectives. When someone was unable to achieve objectives, happiness in the career was shaken and replaced by stress.”}

Working at The Rescue, Samantha, who was aged between 41-50 years, held a bachelor degree and had more than 21 years’ work experience, stated that:

“\textbf{In the past, colleagues used to work as a team. The relationship was close as if we were brothers and sisters. However, everything changed when the organisations were integrated. The old, warm atmosphere has been replaced by competition among colleagues for better individual performance.”}
Not only had the integration reform changed clan values, it had also created a clan-divided atmosphere in the new organisations. Some people noticed that unmerited values such as nepotism, a patronage system and group-based interests had increased. For example, Paula, who had worked at Commission A for more than 21 years, noticed that:

“Previously, the organisation embraced teamwork, flexibility, helpfulness and happiness. This kind of atmosphere encouraged people to work for goal achievement. Recently, everything has been done for the benefit of cronies.”

Similarly, Nadia commented that:

“The current organisation integrated three different organisations together. The coordination within the new organisation has not yet become a single team. The separation among cronies still exists whereas trust in teamwork and sincerity among colleagues are very low.”

Sahara, who had worked at another department, also perceived that:

“In the past, colleagues were helpful, supportive, generous and attentive. We lived as if we were siblings. Recently, the organisation has focused on individual performance. No more support is found between colleagues. Generosity is drying up while the battle for group-based interests is becoming tense.”

All these qualitative findings reveal how public employees view the presence of a clan culture in their workplace. Their perceptions of clan culture are not too different from those derived from the quantitative method. Moreover, the qualitative data has identified a clan-divided relationship, which may accelerate the team building in a new organisation. This issue will be further discussed in section 7.3.
7.2.2 The hierarchy culture

As far as the hierarchy culture is concerned, the research has found that its presence was slightly less prominent than that of the clan aspects in the pre-reform period. Public employees in all cases perceived hierarchy values through administrative procedures and lines of command. The nature of the Thai public sector, where compliance with law and order was a must for all public employees, also helped maintain the existence of hierarchy values. This reflected the bureaucratic style of management that pervaded throughout the Thai public sector at that time. Public employees often used words such as orders, regulations, commands, systems or procedures to describe how they perceived hierarchy values in organisations. For example, Stella, who had worked between 8-14 years at a traditional department, believed that:

“Previously, we had to comply with the administrative procedures of the Prime Minister’s Office. The organisational administration focused on discipline, achievement and as much flexibility as was available to us.”

Similarly, Natalie, who had 8-14 years’ work experience but at a different department, perceived that:

“In the past, the organisation strictly complied with all administrative regulations. This compliance helped to clarify job responsibilities and cooperation in the organisation.”

Thomas, who had worked at Commission B, noted that:

“…although my former workplace was a small unit, it was directly and tightly controlled by a minister … It was always important that all organisational management had to comply with laws and procedures.”
In the post-reform period, the perception of hierarchy culture has changed slightly. Public employees in all cases still commented on how they had to follow formal procedures and regulations. Generally, public employees did not see a substantial change in hierarchy values between the pre- and post-reform periods. They viewed its presence as rather static. However, some people perceived that the hierarchy culture had increased after the reform. At Commission A, the integration of departments had created more tiers of management. In this respect, the management of local schools had encountered many more procedures than in the previous era. For example, Parker, who was a school head-teacher, had seen that:

“The line of command between The Dealer and local schools is more distant than in the past. The integration of several local support units that had different organisational cultures has resulted in a lack of cooperation and managerial separation at the current time.”

At another traditional department, Naomi, who had more than 21 years’ work experience, had also noticed an increase in hierarchy values at her new workplace:

“The current organisation pursues regulation-based management more than my previous workplace. Regulations are strictly emphasised in the organisation. This has limited the flexibility of doing the job. Accordingly, the inflexibility sometimes impedes goal achievement.”

Sonia, who had worked between 8-14 years, believed that:

“My former workplace had fewer and uncomplicated lines of command while the new organisation rather has a more complex one. Together with the culture of the Interior ministry, the management is so complicated and has affected subordinates’ evaluation and morale.”

In general, the presence of a hierarchy culture is not too different from the quantitative findings. The hierarchy values have changed the least in the post-integration period. In other words, the reform has impacted less on the intensity of hierarchy values, in so far as integrated organisations have still been perceived as
part of government administration. In this respect, all organisation studies are still categorised as a “machine bureaucracy” (Mintzberg, 1980) since “Hierarchy entails superior and subordinate positions and various vertical levels in an organization.” (Christensen et al, 2007: 24).

7.2.3 The market culture

The data has revealed that the level of market culture prior to the integration reform was moderate in public organisations. Some values that signified a market-oriented culture were mentioned such as achievement and performance, but they were not compulsory. However, after the integration reform was implemented, the level of market values has increased substantially. Most public employees acknowledge that a performance-based evaluation is being increasingly employed in their workplaces. Some words such as performance reports, KPIs, special remuneration and career advancement are used to describe how the performance issue has been emphasised in organisations.

For example, Sonia, who used to work at The Developer, had noticed the presence of a market culture:

“Previously, there was no OPDC to be established. So, performance evaluation was less intense than in the current period.”

Natalie commented that:

“Recently, the organisation has emphasised achievement and competition. People have to be ready for changes in order to have better performance.”
Rachel, who was educated with a master’s degree and had more than 21 years’ work experience at one traditional department before her workplace was integrated and later managed with a commission-like organisation, had noticed that:

“Previously, there was less competition among colleagues than in recent times. People were clearly assigned to do specific tasks in which performance could be used for promotion evaluation. Recently, the job responsibility with regard to individual responsibility has decreased but people have to work as a team. So, team success cannot be claimed as individual performance because no specific task has been assigned under a specific name. In this respect, selfishness has inevitably increased.”

Sean, who had a background with The Developer, perceived a market culture in terms of products. He claims that:

“The Developer used to have the main responsibility for constructing basic infrastructure, water sources (ground and underground) and local economy-related programmes in rural areas across the country. After the integration reform, The Rescue has a completely different responsibility. Performance has become blurred as tasks in disaster prevention and mitigation are highly normative so that they can be precisely measured.”

Nelly, who had more than 21 years’ work experience at one traditional department, believed that:

“In the past, my former department had clear objectives and target groups. Therefore, objective achievement was highly fulfilled. However, the current organisation has different tasks in which objectives and target groups are unclear. So, the implementation is less likely to achieve goals.”
More specifically to the post-reform period, Ray, who was a teacher and had more than 21 years’ teaching experience, perceived a market culture through the performance issue. He said that:

“Recently, people have been competing with each other in every aspect such as learning achievement and performance reports in order to have a better performance. The better performance can lead to rewards such as special remuneration and career promotion.”

Hazel, who was a lecturer at one university with more than 21 years’ work experience, had also noticed a development of market values at her workplace. She noted that:

“Currently, after the new evaluation criteria were implemented to reward outstanding performance, people have started competing with one another for better personal performance, more and more.”

Stella, who came from a minor partner of one traditional department, has a curious perception toward the performance-centric management. She observed that:

“Recently, trust in each other has been really difficult to find. The management strongly emphasises result-based achievement. However, I wonder whether the claimed achievement is real. It could only be numerical statistics that are irrelevant to real quality.”

In summary, it is obvious that a market culture has increased across all the cases considered. The majority of public employees report how market values have been increasingly emphasised recently. The qualitative findings corresponded closely to what quantitative data has found. Moreover, the relationship between market and clan cultures may closely intertwine with each other. The development of a market culture may partially cause a reduction in clan values since a result-based management is tied in closely with competition for performance and rewards. This issue will be further discussed in section 7.3.
7.2.4 The adhocracy culture

The research has found that an adhocracy element was rarely noticed by public officials in the pre-reform period. Usually, the presence of adhocracy values was found according to organisational characteristics. However, people from The Developer perceived higher adhocracy values than those from other organisations. This was because the department was originally established as an ad hoc organisation that constructed basic infrastructure in rural areas. After the integration reform was implemented, the perception of adhocracy values varied. For people who came from The Developer, the perception of adhocracy values is lower than in the pre-reform period. One reason may come from the changing nature of the department, where the culture of work has changed from infrastructure construction to cooperation with stakeholders. Consequently, it has become more difficult for employees to identify new products and services as part of organisational success as in the previous era. For instance, Sebastian, who had more than 21 years’ work experience at The Developer, described how:

“Previously, The Developer was responsible for initiating many projects to which the government allocated a large amount of money for the specific purposes of the department. Recently, though, The Rescue has had a very specific task in relation to disaster issues. The changing scope of work has resulted in a lower amount of money being allocated to the department. The organisational success is more difficult to measure when compared with the pre-reform period.”

Sabina, who had worked at The Developer between 8-14 years, noted that:

“Previously, the department was an implementation unit that had clear objectives in delivering development-related programmes. However, the current organisation completely has a different role as it is a policy unit.”
Rita, who had 15-21 years’ work experience as a general staff member at Commission A, also perceived that:

“The current organisation has become a more assertive workplace as a result of increased effective coordination. Information is becoming more up-to-date than in the previous era. It has constituted a more detailed operation because precise information is crucial to decision making. Every piece of information has to be up-to-date for an effective operation. Accordingly, the operation can be changed when appropriate.”

The adhocracy culture may be the most difficult one to be perceived by public employees. This is because of the nature of Thai public organisations, which rarely have flexibility to act quickly in response to a changing environment. Since public organisations always have to comply with administrative procedures, public employees have hardly any authority to act spontaneously. New initiatives or innovative products are rarely found in general public organisations unless they are designated. Therefore, respondents rarely report this culture. Although the quantitative score of the adhocracy culture has increasingly developed after the reform, qualitative data reveals an insignificant change in it. The increase in market culture strongly attracts people’s attention toward cultural changes since the performance-oriented management is more concrete and has a greater effect on career prospects. In addition, people usually count new products derived from doing the jobs or implementing the programmes as performance. Therefore, the adhocracy culture is highly likely to be understood as a subset of performance, which will be used for evaluation in the end.

In summary, the perception of flexibility and discretion and internal focus was relatively high in the pre-reform period could lead us to conclude that the organisations valued human relations more than any other values. This implies that public organisations once operated on the basis of tradition, commitment to teamwork, mutual understanding, trust in one another, and loyalty to workplaces more than other values. However, after the organisational integration reform was implemented, the cultural model of integrated organisations has changed.
Organisations have become oriented toward results, performance and goal achievement as they embrace values such as competitiveness and productivity more than other aspects. This suggests that integrated organisations have moved toward stability, control and external focus. Public employees are rewarded on a performance basis while their leaders have to act as the directors who drive an organisation to accomplish goals or targets. More importantly, the research found that the types of integration (horizontal and vertical integration) have no relation to the cultural profiles of organisations. Public officials working in different organisations have perceived the same direction of change in cultural values.

7.3 Cultural changes and paradoxes

Since the integration reform, the culture of relevant public organisations has changed from clan-based to result-oriented domination, as demonstrated in previous sections. The cultural shift has also contributed to paradoxes in the organisations. In other words, the integration of organisations has produced unintended consequences. Therefore, this section attempts to answer the research question: To what extent have cultural changes contributed to managerial paradoxes? The section starts with the paradox of competition and cohesion. It then moves onto the importance of leaders in organisational management.

7.3.1 Changes in culture and the cooperation-competition paradox

Theoretically, the integration of organisations strengthens the policy coordination of relevant organisations. The reform has engendered a single supreme body to formulate policies and plans and to supervise policy implementation, such as that of the BEC of Commission A, the HEC of Commission B and the NDPMC of The
Rescue. These responsibilities are stated in related law.\footnote{The Reorganization of Ministries, Sub-ministries and Departments Act (2002); The Administration of the Ministry of Education Act (2003); The Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance (2003).} However, the practicality seems different. The reform has unintentionally created a paradox of cooperation and competition. With regard to cooperation, Talbot claims that,

“Cooperation implies an active and willing exchange of resources in some mutually beneficial way.” (2005: 64).

At the same time,

“we also compete – between individuals, family groups, groups, teams, clans, nations, societies” (Talbot, 2005: 67).

Both of these are natural to human organisations. Since cooperation and competition are paradoxical to each other (see Figure 4 in chapter two), the development of one thing inevitably entails a reduction in the other. This is evident in all the organisations considered, where public employees have perceived that cooperation in organisations has decreased substantially whereas competition among colleagues has rather intensified in the post-reform period.

A prime external player, the OPDC,\footnote{Office of the Public Sector Development Commission} has also become an assertive factor in terms of the competition-cooperation paradox and the development of a market culture in organisations. At the time the government implemented the integration reform, it also established the OPDC to monitor and evaluate the performance of public organisations. This organisation sets evaluation criteria and works closely with the Budget Bureau by asserting its views about how efficiently public organisations have spent their budget during the previous year. This means that all public organisations have to submit reports indicating their performance as a whole. This also implies that an organisational performance is the aggregation of individuals’ performance. Public employees are subjected to personal performance evaluation in terms of their career
prospects, pay rises and special remuneration. Accordingly, each person has to submit reports that demonstrate what indicators he or she has matched and failed to match. The performance evaluation is divided into two levels. At a personal level, leaders are the ones who assess personal performance, whereas the OPDC takes responsibility for evaluating performance at an organisational level. Both assessments are made on a documentation basis. Personally, no one wishes to fail the assessment because the result could affect his or her career prospects in both financial and non-financial terms. This also applies to organisations, as a poor performance may lower next year’s budget allocation.

 Practically, after organisations were integrated, each partner seeks to dominate and maintain their power and characteristics in the new organisations. The battle to hold managerial power is not difficult to see regardless of type of integration – horizontal or vertical. The powerful are more likely to occupy managerial positions than the powerless. This situation has jeopardized cooperation in new organisations. For example, Jeremy, who had worked at a local school, pointed out that:

“I think that having a single organisation responsible for fundamental education is very good. Policies are better coordinated and are being implemented in the same direction between primary and secondary education. This also increases cooperation among local schools. For example, former Guru A’s schools that provide extended education can seek help, support or consultation from Guru B’s secondary schools in the same Dealer that are more specialised in this issue. The integration means that departmental boundaries are lifted while cooperation between each other has become easier than was previously found. Effective cooperation is likely to enhance teaching quality as some problems can be resolved faster.

...However, the integration has not yet changed people’s attitudes. Those who came from Guru B still thought that they were better than Guru A’s teachers in everything. They were trying to re-establish an organisation to deal exclusively with secondary education while blaming the integration for making their administration more cumbersome, hierarchical and for them being allocated a smaller

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49 Extended education is secondary education (Grade 7-9) but has been provided by primary schools (rather than normal secondary schools) in remote areas to enhance students’ opportunities to acquire higher levels of education.
budget. Their proposal was already submitted to the government. If they won, *The Dealer* would deal with primary and extended education as *Guru A* previously did. Nevertheless, I could not see the point of disaggregation as students would be the ones who were disadvantaged from uncoordinated educational policies.”

Jeremy was not the only person to notice the rough relationship between two organisational backgrounds; Jonathan also felt the same. He said that:

“I agree with the integration idea because fundamental education must be managed under a single authority. Everything had to be passed onto the next levels systematically and continuously such as students and coordinated curriculums. However, the organisation has to find another way to mutually align different cultures if it wishes to increase cooperation among people who came from different backgrounds. The current one has not worked. I thought that if the reformers had designed two administrative tracks to allow sufficient time for everyone to adapt to a new single culture, the integration would have yielded better results than now. Since the change was sudden, the integrated management has not been effective enough to resolve cultural differences and conflicts.”

These interview extracts implicitly point to the fact that competition among former organisations to take the lead in the new integrated organisation can be perceived. Organisational integration may help increased policy coordination but people still feel that the integrated organisation has not fostered a friendly atmosphere to work in. In this respect, public employees who come from different backgrounds do not feel that they are working in the same, new team. Moreover, with regard to performance evaluation enforced by the OPDC, colleagues have to compete with each other to show better performance and be rewarded with special remuneration or pay rises. For example, Ben, who had more than 21 years’ work experience at *Commission B*, noted that:

“Recently, organisational or personal achievement has been measured by key indicators whereas monetary bonuses are used to motivate people or organisations to increase performance by matching indicators. This evaluation system has somehow created competition among colleagues.”
An emphasis on the performance issue has created an unintended problem of demoralisation. Many public officials feel that the introduction of performance-based measurement has been overemphasised and imbalanced so that they feel demoralised by the pressure to increase personal performance. Some older officials argue that the new system has not allowed sufficient time for them to adjust to the evaluation system and the criteria fail to consider other aspects of human beings. For instance, Brian, who had more than 21 years’ work experience at one higher education institution, commented that:

“The attempt to measure performance is a phenomenon that reflects the craziness (madness) of the quantitative approach. This is because such criteria always ask about quantitative, numeric measures, whereas non-numeric issues have never been mentioned e.g. ethics, morale, quality [of education] and happiness. The results are worth very little with regard to human values in the organisation.”

Additionally, since the evaluation of personal performance is done on paper, some people consider that it has created another unintended consequence, where the aim of focusing on customer-based services has been shifted to producing a glowing personal performance report. Some people and organisations are likely to produce gleaming reports rather than state the facts. In this regard, some documents are worth very little, while the situation does not help to minimise the cooperation-competition paradox. For example, Stella, who came from Analyst A, perceived that:

“Recently, there has been no trust between one another as The Rescue increasingly focuses on outcome-based management. However, I doubt whether outcomes were really achieved or was it just a presentation?”

Sharon, who had worked at The Developer, also reported the paradox of cooperation and competition and stated that:

“The Rescue strongly emphasises result-based management. People have to work assertively in order to match the evaluation criteria. This atmosphere has weakened teamwork since colleagues are forced to compete with each other whereas generosity has withered away.”
At the same time, a patronage system is still inherent in the Thai public sector and has manifested itself where members of the powerful clans are favoured over those of the powerless (Vichit-Vadakan, 2011: 85). It is less likely that the powerless will continue to challenge decisions since they might never win, although they are loath to allow colleagues to take advantage of them or receive better praise. This is evident in some organisations, where some partners never get an opportunity to share managerial power. Consequently, employees may limit the amount of cooperation with fellow workers unless specifically asked. For example, Nadine, who had worked at The Advocate, perceived that the organisation could never become integrated since patrons have always favoured their own clients and would try anything to prevent members of other clans from gaining power. Similarly, Shane, who had worked at The Developer, noticed that:

“Currently, teamwork at my organisation is just a failure. People are divided into several clans and always fight for group interests. The fight is merciless and winning is the main thing.”

As previously demonstrated, the integrated organisations present strong evidence of the cooperation and competition paradox. Again, this paradox corresponds to a change in organisational culture, where a reduction in clan and a development of market values in the post-reform period have been noticed. Prior to the reform, public employees knew the way their organisations operated, cooperated and competed through shared values or practices. In this respect, competition between individuals was moderate as competition for career advancement or special pay rises was viewed as natural in the workplace. However, after the integration reform, the cooperation and competition paradox is more apparent as already presented. In this respect, it can be concluded that structural integration does not always imply effective cooperation with regard to human relations.
7.3.2 Leadership and the aggression-peace making paradox

Another important factor that helps balance paradoxes and manages organisations is the leader. Leadership is a challenging task since a leader has to combine different organisational cultures into one and balance group interests. Human nature being what it is, individuals can vacillate between aggression and peace making, and so does a leader. By aggression, it is not meant that members do not cooperate and are never helpful, but there might be a constructive motive, a positive force that is acting for the benefit of the group (Tiger & Fox cited in Talbot, 2005: 52). Some leaders are more likely to act as peacemakers.

In the post-integration reform, leadership was very important to lead the organisations with regard to minimising cultural differences and building trust in a new team. So, leadership could facilitate or worsen both cultural change and paradoxes. The research found that organisational characteristics might influence how leaders used tools and methods in order to administer the integrated organisations. For instance, in the cases of Commission A and Commission B, a committee-based and huge organisation, leadership is spread through tiers of administration. The former has three tiers of management (central, zone and school), whereas the latter is composed of two tiers of administration – central and institutional. In terms of the whole organisation, it is crucial that leadership be exhibited properly in order to hold a new, single team together. Leaders may choose appropriate strategies to balance cultural differences among people who come from different organisations. The action can be clearly seen at the central level of both organisations in an attempt to build an integrated administrative system. On the one hand, leaders pursue a peace making strategy, such as initiating ice-breaking programmes, seminars or training for colleagues who come from different organisational backgrounds. The research has found that the peace-making strategy was helpful at the head office of Commission B and The Advocate, which have smaller numbers of staff. For example, Thomas noted that:
“It was lucky that the then-secretary of Commission B arranged many activities such as training, seminars and field trips to dilute cultural differences. In addition, some candidates from The Rajabhat were promoted as heads of bureaux. These attempts helped minimise conflicts between groups, more or less.”

Many staff thought that such ice-breaking activities gave the chance for colleagues to start building good relationships between themselves without the boundaries of different organisational cultures. In this respect, leaders are perceived as a facilitator. On the other hand, leaders sometimes pursue a more aggressive method to align fragmented units to cooperate more effectively. The most likely tools are administrative laws and orders. Decisions made on this basis are the final decisions with which everyone must comply. This is clearly evident in the case of Commission B, whose then-leader ordered staff of The Rajabhat to relocate from the former location to its head office in order to strengthen internal coordination. For instance, Andrew stated that:

“After organisations were integrated, there was a conflict between the then-secretaries of The Rajabhat and The Ministry. The former had to be under the latter’s authority by law. However, the boss [The Rajabhat secretary] refused to let us relocate to the Commission B head office. He said “do not go, let them sort it out”. This status quo remained for nearly a year until the then-secretary of Commission B visited The Rajabhat head office to build a mutual understanding between each other. However, this did not yield a fruitful solution as our boss still persuaded us not to move there. Finally, the secretary of Commission B used a formal regulation to command us to relocate to its head office within 30 days of the announcement … I just offered you a clearer picture of the situation that there was a conflict from the beginning, including the contention and jealousy of each other between top leaders of two organisations … It is already five years since that time and I think that we are now integrated.”

This example reveals another different role of leaders in terms of an aggressive move. Leaders are perceived as coordinators who have to maintain a smooth-functioning organisation. Since they have to act differently, their leading roles can be exhibited paradoxically between aggression and peace-making, depending on particular times.
Crucially, the research has found that leadership is at the heart of an organisation since it contributes to either peace or conflicts in new integrated organisations. An aggressive or peaceful strategy may not help if leaders have not acted neutrally. If this is the case, a clan-divided organisation is easily discovered. For instance, at *The Rescuer*, leadership strongly contributed to organisational discord. Although the department focuses more on results, the performance evaluation ties in rather closely with patron-client relationships. Stephanie, who came from the majority, perceived that:

“Although guidance or evaluation criteria have been officially written, they are only documentation. In reality, performance evaluation, pay rises, career advancement or anything is highly tied in with the same, old patronage system. Your value depends on who your patrons are.”

Samara also had a similar perception towards this issue. She explained that:

“Previously, the development of human resources was fair for everyone. Currently, such personal development depends on who your patrons are. The patron’s clients thus have greater opportunities to be trained more than others who have no patron.”

Being a member of one clan may have side effects if another clan can win more power in the organisation. This refers to a situation where members of a dominant clan may be favoured over non-members in terms of the personal performance assessment. For example, Billy, who had worked at one university and who was a head of department, stated that:

“The role of leaders is really important to organisational management. If leaders or managers are dictatorial, narrow-minded and misuse administrative power for their own self-interest and that of the clan, the whole organisation will be hugely impacted in many ways by this wrongdoing and unethical management.”
Not only has this kind of atmosphere helped in creating a neo-clan environment in new organisations, it also leads to the tense paradox of cooperation and competition. The vicious circle of internal fragmentation will then move on again. This situation reflects the fact that leadership is really crucial to building trust among people from different backgrounds and to becoming a single team. The pursuit of laws may not be enough to create organisational harmony if people still perceive that nepotism has been maintained by leaders.

Furthermore, leadership and the size of organisation tie in closely with each other. When the organisation is large and is composed of many tiers of administration, leadership at a central level hardly reaches those who work at a local level. With regard to internal coordination between central and local units, leadership is perceived only through general practices and policy directions given to staff at the organisation. In addition, the integration of local structures of Commission A has worsened coordination between The Dealer and schools due to the large size of The Dealer. The Dealer is unable to respond to the high volume of needs from local schools under its responsibility since the zone is too big to be efficient and effective. This also includes a lack of expertise in managing different levels of education (primary and secondary education). The decline in coordination at a local level has been witnessed by Jared, who commented:

“Previously, Guru A was dominant in internal organisational coordination, although it had three tiers of management. Its internal coordination was easy and the structure efficiently supported spontaneous coordination and communication. On the other hand, people who worked at Guru B were accustomed to flexible school management. They had some decision-making power at the school level …When the organisational integration was implemented, Commission A was huge. Similarly The Dealer … Cooperation within the organisation became less efficient … Since the area itself was vast and variable in terms of school sizes and levels of education, The Dealer became helpless to provide help and support and cope with the high volume of different demands requested by local schools. The lack of district office as a mediate actor has worsened coordination processes as all requests were sent directly to The Dealer, where the staff shortage and specialisation problems
Feeling similarly, Parker, who was a head teacher that had more than 21 years’ work experience at Guru A, considered that coordination between The Dealer and schools had become distant. The integration of local units of Guru A and Guru B from many districts had not yet built a single style of administration. He commented that:

“Probably, the culture of work now can be described as no coordination between the two former systems.”

Although Commission A has been designed as a committee-based organisation, its management really imitates a bureaucratic style in terms of hierarchical administration. Therefore, leadership at any level is crucial to producing effective coordination. In contrast, while Commission B is also a committee-based and big organisation, the organisational administration is quite different from Commission A. Commission B has separate administrative systems between central and institutional levels. In this respect, leadership at a central level only has a great effect on public employees who are working at this level. For university lecturers and officials who are working at higher education institutions, institutional leadership has a far greater effect on them.

On the other hand, coordination is slightly different in the case of The Rescue, which is smaller and has different characteristics of organisational management. It appears that the integration reform has facilitated internal coordination through a hierarchical line of command. Having a rigid line of command has increased the organisational coordination of The Rescue since top executives tightly control policies and practices. Furthermore, since most managerial positions are taken by people from The Developer, which is the most powerful partner, The Rescue strongly embeds most of The Developer’s cultures. In addition, managers who come from the same background implicitly help in setting clear directions for a new organisation with regard to familiarity and teamwork. However, people who come from other organisations may feel uncomfortable with the way The Rescue operates. For
example, Sonia, who came from Analyst A and had 8-14 years’ work experience, felt that:

“My previous host had uncomplicated lines of command whereas The Rescue had very complex ones. It also embraced cultures of the Ministry of Interior [an alleged highly patron-client relationship], which directly affected how the organisation commanded, gave rewards or disciplined subordinates. It really affected the staff morale.”

All this is how the reality of the integration reform has turned out. Since the reform has integrated different sizes of organisation while ignoring the specialisation of different cultures, it may not fully yield the expected consequences with regard to policy achievement and a completely integrated system. The two examples of Commission A and The Rescue are helpful to illustrate how organisational cultures play their roles in organisational discord. It can be concluded that not only is the integration unable to accelerate internal coordination, it is not yet effective in terms of minimising the division of clans in organisations.

### 7.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter has used quantitative and qualitative findings to answer the research questions. The research has found that the cultural orientation of integrated organisations has changed from clan-based to market-oriented culture. The change is quite strong in volume as it has shifted from one aspect to the opposite culture. The reduction in clan culture is highly significant since both quantitative and qualitative data from the organisations considered present a similar picture of change. On the other hand, the development of the market culture has also increased. The performance evaluation has also been implemented substantially regardless of organisational types and professions. The adhocracy has developed too. With regard to this cultural aspect, the quantitative data presents a clearer picture of its development than the qualitative results. Some respondents include the presence of an adhocracy culture with the market culture since the end products of the adhocracy
culture will be finally used for performance evaluation. The hierarchy culture is least changed from the integration reform. This is because public organisations have to comply with laws, administrative procedures and government orders. In this respect, public officials feel more secure if they follow formal procedures. Overall, the perception of cultural change of people working in different types of organisation (traditional and committee-based) and professions (academics, teachers and civil servants) is not particularly different.

Although the integration reform has partially contributed to more effective policy coordination of relevant organisations, it has also created unintended consequences. Firstly, the shift of organisational culture to a market culture has triggered a paradox of cooperation and competition among colleagues. The integration reform aims to create a single, effective team but also forces people to compete with each other for performance evaluation. In reality, cooperation is very difficult as colleagues come from different backgrounds and yet are entering into performance competition at the same time. With regard to the cooperation-competition paradox, it is difficult for organisations to build trust among people who come from different backgrounds. This situation may implicitly lead to a clan-divided workplace, where clans battle for managerial power and favour members more than outsiders.

This leads to the second crucial factor, called leadership, which can either minimise or worsen organisational paradoxes. This is because leaders can lead an organisation anywhere they wish as long as it is within the scope of the law. They can also contribute to a paradox of aggression and peace-making in terms of organisational management. Since the integration of organisations aggregates different organisational cultures and practices together, the management of a new organisation needs both aggressive and peaceful moves. With regard to aggression, leaders are likely to pursue a typical, hierarchical command when they wish to effectively align things in a newly integrated organisation. Their decisions are absolute and subordinates must comply with them. This is evident in all the cases considered although two organisations are designed with a committee-based administration. The secretariat office of the duo still embraces a hierarchical management to some
degree. Moreover, leadership can also nurture a cooperation-competition paradox. For example, if leaders nurture a patron-client relationship, the organisation is likely to be divided into several clans – at least the clans that originated from different partners. Since leaders are the head figure of human organisations, their decisions are always crucial to every aspect of organisational management, especially in terms of organisational culture, cohesion and paradoxes.
Chapter Eight:
Conclusion

This chapter summarises the reflections on changes in organisational culture that have been presented in this dissertation. It argues that the culture of integrated public organisations has changed from clan-dominated to market-oriented administration. In addition, a cultural model that was previously inclined toward a clan culture has become more balanced in the post-integration reform. However, this shift of organisational culture has also led to the question of whether the goal of integration reform has been attained. This chapter has been divided into six sections covering: cultural changes and administrative paradoxes, the relationship of leadership and organisational cohesion, the persistence of hierarchy culture, limitations of the research, recommendations for future research, and concluding remarks. All in all, the main contribution of the dissertation has been the utility of CVF and human paradox models in explaining and understanding the reality of integration reform of public organisations in a developing context such as that of Thailand.

8.1 Unintended consequence of changes: Cohesion or division?

Prior to the implementation of structural integration, public employees perceived that the clan culture was the most predominant. Their perception was confirmed through both qualitative and quantitative data. Given that the perception was inclined towards flexibility and discretion and internal focus, it could be concluded that the organisations valued human relationships more than any other values. This implied that organisations operated on the basis of tradition, commitment to teamwork, mutual understanding, trust in each other, and loyalty to workplaces more than any other values. Furthermore, it revealed that organisational types (commission-like and traditional departments) did not have a relationship with the cultural orientations of
organisations. After organisations were integrated together, the clan culture decreased significantly whereas a market culture also developed and has come to dominate organisations. Words such as competition, outputs and performance are used more often to explain how these issues have replaced clan values in this period.

Although qualitative and quantitative findings present a cultural change in relevant organisations, the market-oriented administration is being questioned as to whether it can facilitate organisational cohesion. Not only have organisations been integrated, but existing organisational values, cultures or identities also need to be neatly realigned. The emphasis of performance and goal achievement may have come prematurely in cases where the integration of soft elements from different organisations has not been neatly done yet. In this respect, cohesion is unlikely where colleagues who have come from different backgrounds are forced to compete with each other.

The paradox of cooperation and competition is not difficult to perceive. Public officials usually compare the pre- and post-reform atmosphere and are likely to favour their old workplaces, where they usually felt that human relationships were warmer and closer than in the integrated organisation. People for whom their former workplace was partially disaggregated from the main organisation, such as partners of The Rescue and The Advocate, are likely to have stronger perceptions toward the paradox. Noticeably, both organisations are administered as a typical department where organisational structures are not complex when compared with Commission A and Commission B. In this regard, the integration of organisations may have brought to the surface a patron-client relationship in the new integrated organisation through a struggle for power and performance evaluation. People who worked at The Rescue generally used words with a negative meaning, such as nepotism, patronage system or group-based interests. This can imply, in this situation, that new team-building, trust in each other and loyalty to new workplaces may be superseded by a meritless human relationship. In this respect, public officials who have worked at integrated organisations wonder whether the integration reform really contributes to organisational cohesion.
The patron-client relationship is another real, challenging issue for the integrated organisations. It can worsen human relationships and organisational effectiveness in a new integrated organisation. On the one hand, people who compete with each other do not only compete with colleagues but also other clans. On the other hand, performance evaluation, which has been conducted under the patron-client relationship, may not contribute to organisation effectiveness and achievement. This is because the members of a dominant clan may be favoured despite having similar performance when compared with non-clan members. Although a patron-client relationship was also found prior to the integration reform, its presence seemed more discreet than in the current period, where clan-favouritism is not difficult to perceive. In this respect, it is difficult to be convinced by public officials that the structural integration really builds genuine teamwork. Some partners may have wished to be disaggregated again to become independent from the current form of organisational management. For example, in the case of Commission A, a new bureau has recently been established to exclusively supervise secondary education. Its responsibilities and internal units are mostly comprised of the previous functions of the Department of General Education. This move reflects the fact that the structural integration cannot enhance teamwork under a single roof called Commission A.

Although the division of university groups at Commission B with regard to their former types of administration still exists, partners generally prefer to stay as a single organisation for the benefit of policy coordination, budget allocation and independent administration at an institutional level. The patron-client relationship in this case may be least perceived when compared to other cases. This is because, firstly, each higher education institution is independent of each other and no one can influence the management of the other. Secondly, former central offices of each partner tended to be small and their functions were almost the same. So, the structural integration at a central level meant the alignment of similar functions. Since the functions of Commission B are nearly the same as the previous partner – The Ministry – people from other cultures are highly likely to adapt themselves to fit in with the established culture. In addition, Commission B is vertically integrated so that the majority of people come from The Ministry. With a combination of functions and the workforce
proportion, people from other cultures are likely to adapt themselves to the new organisation more than those who come from *The Ministry*. When compared with other cases, *Commission B* may best demonstrate how structural integration can gradually yield expected consequences regarding a single identity and organisational cohesion (at a central level).

In summary, the achievement of integration reform may involve many issues in addition to structural re-aggregation, and cultural aspects also need to be carefully aligned. In addition, the ingrained patron-client relationship that exists across time and space is one of the challenging issues that needs to be minimised if not eradicated. This is because it can have a great effect on public employees’ morale with regards to bias performance evaluation. If these aspects are effectively managed, a single team or organisational cohesion may be achieved quickly.

### 8.2 The culture of Thai public administration: The hierarchical management

The integration of Thai public organisations may have changed organisational cultures in varying degrees. However, the hierarchy culture remains almost unchanged. Public officials perceive that the integration reform has not changed the way public organisations have always operated: rule and procedural compliance. The administration of public organisations still follows top-down management across different types of organisation. In a typical departmental style of administration such as *The Rescue* and *The Advocate*, a hierarchy culture is not difficult to perceive at all. The department has been managed with a top-down approach under the control of a director-general, similar to other civil departments. Therefore, the administration is still rigid and tightly controlled by administrative procedures.
Although *Commission A* and *Commission B* are administered by a commission-like style of management, the presence of a hierarchy culture in both organisations is not too different from the other two cases. Following the integration, some decision-making power has been devolved to local units of *Commission A*. Nonetheless management at this level still represents a hierarchy culture in which *The Dealer* controls local schools. Moreover, all local units have to comply with orders and decisions made by the top executive of an organisation, as was the case at former workplaces. This situation is the same for *Commission B*, especially at a central level. At an institutional level, higher education institutions may have autonomy to manage individual affairs but the organisational structure and administration always has to comply with the law. In addition, a hierarchy culture is found in the management process, where top-down decisions and documentation are usually made.

The static hierarchy culture is also an advantage to organisational management with regard to coordination. Leaders of integrated organisations can rely on rules and procedures to increase internal coordination in new integrated organisations. This is because the source of the decision-making power is reliable and a top manager has the supreme power of management. It is necessary that subordinates follow decisions, policies or orders. In this respect, coordination can be partially facilitated by top-down administration as witnessed by public employees in all the cases considered. All in all, the integration reform rarely changes the perception of public employees towards a hierarchy culture. They still perceive that rule compliance is crucial for the management of public services. In so doing, it can guard them from wrongdoing while the public can rely on the standardisation of public services at the same time. Therefore, the integration of organisations has a very minimal effect on the persistence of hierarchy values. This research has confirmed through the findings and discussions in the previous chapters that public employees perceive hierarchy values as the nature of public organisations regardless of administrative types.
8.3 The contribution of leadership to organisational cohesion

With regards to the management of integrated organisations, leadership is a very challenging issue in relation to minimising conflicts whilst also enhancing organisational cohesion (see e.g. Martin et al, 2009: 772). The most likely role of leaders in an integrated organisation is balancing the paradoxes of competition and cooperation. However, leadership can be exhibited differently. In the case of horizontally integrated organisations where each partner has equivalent power such as Commission A, leadership has been exhibited in terms of negotiation and coordinating through organisational management. Moreover, the design of central units by sharing equal administrative power among partners helps balance different interests.

However, the horizontal integration may witness another form of leadership. In the case of The Rescue, leadership is more challenging. This is because one partner dominates the new organisation and they have taken almost all the managerial positions, with no positions being left for minority partners. Also, the development of a market culture has partially caused a rough relationship between colleagues who come from different backgrounds. Unlike Commission A, power sharing is unequal and the patron-client relationship in The Rescue is more clearly perceptible. In this respect, leadership is quite challenging in terms of minimising conflicts among different partners while at the same time also maintaining a leading status and preserving the interests of the clan.

In vertically integrated organisations, the role of leaders is also crucial and challenging. In order to hold an organisation together, leaders may act in the same way when compared with horizontally integrated organisations. After an organisation is vertically integrated, power sharing has been allocated with regards to previous functions and positions occupied. It is likely that the bigger in size the partner was the more managerial positions were assigned to them. When comparing Commission B and The Advocate, leadership at the former workplace is less complex than the latter due to clearer responsibilities of the integrated organisation. Also, most
responsibilities previously belonged to *The Ministry*, who became the leading function of *Commission B* in the post-integration reform.

On the other hand, leaders at *The Advocate* may exhibit their role slightly differently amidst conflicts of interests from different partners. Since the responsibilities of a new integrated organisation largely belong to *Analyst B*, many of them hold the middle managerial positions while leaving few positions for the rest. Accordingly, the struggle for power is not difficult to find. However, the director-general is not promoted from within. So, the top leader does not need to worry too much about maintaining the interest of his or her clan. A head usually exhibits his or her leadership by balancing the needs of partners to perform well while enhancing organisational cohesion through ice-breaking activities. The ice-breaking initiatives are important since they may help to minimise differences between colleagues while forming a new team. However, some people still believe that such activities are useless if nepotism can still be found in an organisation. The problem of favouritism may swing back to bias performance evaluation and organisational fragmentation, as discussed in a previous section. In this respect, leadership is a very challenging role because it can have a great effect on the whole organisation regarding policy achievement.

In summary, leadership is a prime factor that can influence organisational culture and cohesion. In an attempt to enable organisational cohesion in regard to the western context, Vallance comments that “Smooth interpersonal relationships in many non-Western countries are founded upon values such as respect for an individual’s feelings and avoiding situations likely to give rise to conflict” (1999: 81). However, with regard to the existence of patronage systems in Thai public organisations, leadership is really crucial to build organisational cohesion while the competition for performance is an unavoidable situation. This is a difficult task in a clan-divided environment since some clans may be so influential and take advantage of others.
8.4 Limitations of the research

There was extensive literature available in the fields of public sector management and organisational culture. This research was a piece of work that adopts some of the theoretical approaches and issues from academic pieces of writing. Therefore, the most relevant literature on the topic was considered.

Practically, Thailand is a unitary state, where the centralised administration has been extended across the country. In this respect, there have been diverse policies which may form specific organisational characteristics of the organisations considered. Four different organisations is an appropriate number of samples within which to conduct the research. However, findings from this research might not offer a comprehensive conclusion of the cultural model of other integrated organisations. This was because each integrated organisation embraced different organisational specialisations and characteristics. Therefore, some other integrated organisations might offer good practice of organisational integration, while others might have faced more problems of integration than the cases studied.

In addition, since the research involves human beings, ethical issues must be considered. Participants must give informed consent and their compliance could differ from the expected plan. Some participants were willing to give information anonymously since they were concerned about their career if information revealed who they were.

The questionnaire is about weighing marks among four different types of organisational culture and then comparing past and present situations with regard to the integration of the organisations. Most of older respondents complained that the current situation at the integrated organisations is worse than the pre-integration period in every respect. On the one hand, some respondents decided not to fill in the questionnaire because they did not want to provide faulty information to a researcher. When this situation appeared, the researcher attempted to conduct an interview instead of collecting information from the questionnaires. On the other hand, some
respondents put a note at the end of the questionnaire, saying that they had tried their best to weigh the marks in order to make statistical analysis possible, but these marks may not reflect the reality of cultural attributes. However, their answers of the open-ended questions were very useful to explain the situation of changes in organisational culture.

8.5 Recommendations for future research

This dissertation wishes to pass on some points to other researchers who might wish to conduct research in the field of public management. The application of models such as CVF and human paradox theory in a developing context may involve considering carefully how societal contexts could affect the cultures of public organisations. For example, the clan culture found in Thai public organisations has not referred only to a formal relationship among colleagues who acted as a group. It also implies a relationship beyond the workplace regarding courtesy, generosity and attentiveness from managers to subordinates. It imitates the relationship between seniors and juniors in Thai society, where the former usually takes care of the latter (see section 3.1). When there is a perspective related to clan values, this also comes with the implication of unequal relationships between leaders and followers. The influence of a patronage system upon the cultural orientations of Thai public organisations should always be observed closely. This is because the perceptions of a patron-client relationship are crucial as they can shape people’s attitudes towards organisational cohesion, effectiveness and paradoxes. Public employees who may either benefit or be disadvantaged by this system can have different perspectives with regards to cultures and the performance of the organisation. In addition, public employees are likely to refer to the element of clan values through the relationship between themselves and middle level leaders more than top executive ones, especially in large-sized organisations.
With regard to ‘adhocracy’ culture, its persistence can be least perceived or it overlapped with market values in Thai public organisations. This is because traditional government organisations are not allowed to restructure the organisations as they wish. Nonetheless, public universities that have a different structure can amend internal structures through the approval of the university council and within the scope of establishment law. In this respect, adhocracy values in typical government organisations are seemingly perceived as the new way of working, such as the introduction of IT as an innovative-led culture that could affect their routine jobs. Although new products or initiatives are created, they are usually counted as individual or team performance more than organisational outputs. Therefore, future research may be interested in whether a comparison between typical and innovative-led organisations can be made. Doing this may enhance understanding of how adhocracy values are perceived by public employees who work in these specific types of organisations.

With regard to human paradox theory, the combination of it with a CVF is very useful to understand cultural changes in organisations. From this dissertation, the human paradox theory has led to a more profound understanding of how competition and cooperation, and aggression and peace-making are paradoxical with one another whilst also shaping people’s perception of organisational cultures. Future research that applies both theories together may contribute to a more profound understanding of cultural changes, organisational behaviour and management with regard to different types of human organisations or administrative contexts.

In addition, research that focuses on the relationship between organisational leadership and cultural or paradoxes management in integrated public organisations may be useful. This dissertation has already shown that leaders play an important role with regard to cultural and paradoxes management. Since the integration of organisations aggregates different cultural values and identities together, leadership is important in holding an organisation together. Also, leadership, organisational performance and paradoxes are intertwined with each other in that any actions from leaders can either minimise or increase organisational paradoxes and performance.
Research about the cultural orientations of integrated higher education institutions is another interesting issue that may be explored. This is because recently, the Thai government has established some universities from the integration of different types of higher education institutions. Moreover, some other higher education institutions have been planned for future integration by the government too. With regard to the different characteristics and cultural attributes of individual institutions, the integration of those higher education institutions may yield worthwhile lessons for the better quality of higher education.

8.6 Concluding remarks

The dissertation is based on quantitative and qualitative data gathered via field research conducted on four of Thailand’s integrated public organisations. The Thai government underwent a major public sector reform in 2002, which included the integration of some public organisations. The research has found that overall, organisational culture has changed from a clan-based to a performance-based orientation following the organisational integration. With regard to clan culture, its level has decreased in the post-reform period. In contrast to the reduction in clan values, a significant development in market values in organisations has been found. The development might relate to the influence of external forces since the Thai government has introduced performance criteria to evaluate the performance of individuals and public organisations. In this respect, market and adhocracy values have been increasingly emphasised throughout organisations. All personnel have to be evaluated to earn special remuneration, promotion or other benefits. Hierarchy values have changed the least following the reform since public employees felt that it has always been necessary for them to comply with administrative procedures and regulations.
In addition, the research has found that the domination of market values has produced paradoxes between cooperation and competition. The battle for power in new integrated organisations among partners has resulted in greater competition and less cooperation in organisations. This situation is exacerbated when a dominant partner has higher opportunities to take managerial positions in new organisations. The winners gain control of the whole organisation and leaders are crucial players who can influence all issues in an organisation, such as culture, practices or identities. In addition, a patron-client relationship cuts a deep division between clans, as members of a powerful group are favoured over others. So, people from minor cultures might give minimal cooperation to the organisation as a result of feeling disadvantaged from being part of the minority. In this situation, competition among partners has resulted in lower team cooperation and a lack of trust and loyalty to organisations. The change in organisational culture also produces aggression and peace-making paradoxes with regard to leadership. The research has found that leaders need different degrees of action to manage new integrated organisations. They are likely to act as a peacemaker or negotiator since the integration of soft values such as cultures might need some time to be completely integrated. However, they sometimes pursue a more aggressive method if necessary, especially when effective internal cooperation is needed. The pursuit of aggression is inevitably paradoxical to peace in organisations. All in all, it can be concluded that the integration of organisations can have a great influence on cultural attributes and paradoxes in relevant public organisations.
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire

The Survey of Organisational Cultures of Integrated Public Organisations

Dear Colleague

❖ The aim of this survey is to discover the impact of merging public organisations implementation on organisational culture.
❖ Your answers to this questionnaire will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. No individuals will be identified as having participated in the study and the information you provide will remain solely in the possession of Manchester Business School, and used only for statistical purposes. Data on individuals will not be divulged to any other individuals or organisations and will be held securely for the requisite period and then destroyed.
❖ If you have any queries, please contact Mr Pantharak Phookpan on 08x 632 05xx, or Pantharak.Phookpan@postgrad.mbs.ac.uk

Notes on completion

This questionnaire has six pages and is divided into two sections:

Section 1: Background information which has seven questions

Section 2: Your views about the organisation which has six questions. Each question has four alternatives. Divide 100 points among these four alternatives depending on the extent to which each alternative is similar to your own organisation. Give a higher number of points to the alternative that is most similar to your organisation. For example, in question 1, if you think alternative A is very similar to your organisation, alternatives B and C are somewhat similar, and alternative D is hardly similar at all, you might give 55 points to A, 20 points to B and C, and 5 points to D. Just be sure that your total equals 100 for each question.

The “Previous” column means that you are rating your own feeling about your former organisation as it was before the merger of your organisation (before 3rd October 2002) whilst the “Now” column means that you are rating your own feeling about your current organisation. Please also feel free to provide additional information that you think that it will be useful for this study. The space is provided at the bottom of each page.
Section 1: Background Information (Please tick appropriate box)

(1) Gender: [ ] Male [ ] Female

(2) Your current age in years:
   [ ] 20-30 years [ ] 31-40 years
   [ ] 41-50 years [ ] 51 years and older

(3) What is your education qualification?
   [ ] Lower than Bachelor’s degree
   [ ] Bachelor’s degree or equivalent
   [ ] Master’s degree
   [ ] Doctoral degree

(4) How long have you worked in the public sector?
   [ ] 0-7 years [ ] 8-14 years
   [ ] 15-21 years [ ] 22 years and longer

(5) What is your current job title/grade? (Please also tick appropriate grade box)
   [ ] Executive □ Lower □ Chief
   [ ] Administrative □ Lower □ Top
   [ ] Academic □ Operational □ Specialised
     □ Highly Specialised □ Expertise
     □ Highly Expertise
   [ ] General □ Operational □ Skilled
     □ Senior □ Specialised
   [ ] Other (Please indicate)................................................................................................................

(6) What was your former organisation before the merger (3rd October 2002)?
   (Please indicate).................................................................................................................................

(7) In which Office/Department/Institute/Division/Plan do you currently work?
   (Please indicate).................................................................................................................................
**Section 2: Your views about the organisation**

### 1. Dominant Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>The organisation is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People seem to share a lot of themselves.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>The organisation is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>The organisation is very result-oriented. A major concern is with getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement-oriented.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>The organisation is a very controlled and structured place. Formal procedures generally govern what people do.</td>
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Total: 100 100

Please use this space to provide additional information about your organisation’s dominant characteristics

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### 2. Organisational Leadership

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<th>Before</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify monitoring, facilitating, or nurturing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify entrepreneurship, innovation, or risk taking.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive, result-oriented focus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>The leadership in the organisation is generally considered to exemplify coordinating, organising, or smooth-running efficiency.</td>
<td></td>
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Total: 100 100

Please use this space to provide additional information about your organisation’s dominant characteristics

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304
3. **Strategic emphases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The organisation emphasises human development. High trust, openness, and participation persist.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B. The organisation emphasises acquiring new resources and creating new challenges. Trying new things and prospecting for opportunities are valued.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C. The organisation emphasises competitive actions and achievement. Hitting targets and being the best are dominant.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The organisation emphasises performance and stability. Efficiency, control, and smooth operations are important.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Total  | 100 | 100 |

Please use this space to provide additional information about your organisation’s dominant characteristics

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4. **Criteria of Success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. The organisation defines success on the basis of the development of human resources, teamwork, employee commitment, and concern for people.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B. The organisation defines success on the basis of having the newest products. It is a leader and innovator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. The organisation defines success on the basis of winning and outpacing the competition. Competitive leadership is key.</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. The organisation defines success on the basis of efficiency. Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low-cost production are critical.</td>
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| Total  | 100 | 100 |

Please use this space to provide additional information about your organisation’s dominant characteristics

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305
5. Management of Employees

| A. The management style in the organisation is characterised by teamwork, consensus, and participation. | Before | After |
| B. The management style in the organisation is characterised by individual risk taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness. | | |
| C. The management style in the organisation is characterised by hard-driving competitiveness, high demands, and achievement. | | |
| D. The management style in the organisation is characterised by security of employment, conformity, predictability, and stability in relationships. | | |
| **Total** | 100 | 100 |

Please use this space to provide additional information about your organisation’s dominant characteristics

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6. Organisation Coordination

| A. The organisation that you work with is coordinated by loyalty and mutual trust. Commitment to this organisation runs high. | Before | After |
| B. The organisation that you work with is coordinated by commitment to innovation and development. There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge. | | |
| C. The organisation that you work with is coordinated by putting an emphasis on achievement and goal accomplishment. | | |
| D. The organisation that you work with is coordinated by formal rules and policies. Maintaining a smooth-running organisation is important. | | |
| **Total** | 100 | 100 |

Please use this space to provide additional information about your organisation’s dominant characteristics

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7. Mission Accomplishment

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<tr>
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<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Organisational mission accomplishment is a result of team-working.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Organisational mission accomplishment is a result of being able to deliver new challenging or innovative services.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Organisational mission accomplishment is a result of getting the job done or achieving goals.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Organisational mission accomplishment is a result of following formal rules, regulations or guidelines.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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Please use this space to provide additional information about your organisation’s dominant characteristics:

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Thank you for your kind cooperation in taking the time to complete this questionnaire.
Appendix 2: Questions for the semi-structured interview

1. How would you have described the dominant characteristics of your organisation during the pre- and post-reform?

2. How was the leadership style of your organisation exhibited during the pre- and post-reform period?

3. How was your organisation’s strategies emphasised during the pre- and post-reform period?

4. How would you have described the success criteria of your organisation during the pre- and post-reform period?

5. How was your organisation’s human resources managed during the pre- and post-reform period?

6. How was your organisation’s coordination perceived during the pre- and post-reform period?

7. How were your organisation’s goals accomplished during the pre- and post-reform period?